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The Fight in the Haze

Critical discourse analysis of Indonesian prime-time television talk shows addressing the 2015 Indonesian Haze

A thesis
submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree
of
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ABSTRACT

On March to October 2015, fires raged in six Indonesian provinces in Sumatera and Kalimantan. Massive deforestation ensued, as well as a thick blanket of haze which extended to neighbouring countries. This study attempts to recognize the discursive processes that contribute to the status quo of the annual forest fires in Indonesia and suggests possible interventions instrumental to creating a counter knowledge and praxis. It uses critical discourse analysis to explore the processes of victimhood, blame, and justification in two prime-time talk shows hosted by two influential television channels. Those processes have created a status quo, which results in little to no action beyond reactive firefighting and law suits. The study ends with a commentary on the forest fires of Merauke, West Papua, which was step-sided throughout the talk shows studied. The case of West Papua is used as a mean to communicate the urgency and continuity of the research for the development of possible multi-level intervention strategy, which is based on critical consciousness and partnership.
“Ia mendapat kasih karunia di padang gurun.”

Yeremia 31:2
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CHAPTER 1: PREFACE

On 4 September 2015, six Indonesian provinces in Sumatera and Kalimantan proclaimed a state of emergency due to an air pollution crisis resulting from forest fires. Until the end of October 2015, approximately four months after the first fires were observed, 2.6 million hectares of land (more than the size of Waikato region in New Zealand and roughly the size of Massachusetts, USA) had been burnt (Liljas, 2016; The World Bank, 2015). Massive deforestation occurred, including loss of habitat for various endangered species including the last remaining orangutan. Seventy-five million people have been exposed to the toxic haze, resulting in 556,945 cases of respiratory tract infections and 24 official count of deaths including two children in 2015 (Balch, 2015; Chisholm, Wijedasa, & Swinfield, 2016; Jatmiko & Karmini, 2015; Kompas Team, 2015; Liljas, 2016). The toxic smog extended to neighbouring South-east Asian countries, notably Singapore and Malaysia (see Figure 1), and estimated to cause the early deaths of approximately 100,000 people in the areas closest to the fires (Associated Press, 2016; France-Presse, 2016; Liljas, 2016). The fires cost the Indonesian people approximately USD 16.1 billion dollars, roughly twice the reconstruction cost of the post-Aceh tsunami in 2004 (The World Bank, 2015). The level of carbon emissions that resulted has been estimated as equal to 18 months’ worth of New Zealand’s total emissions (Osborn, Torpey, Franklin, & Howard, 2015).

Many Indonesians organised street protests and utilised social media platforms to demand the government’s attention during September-October 2015. Street protests led by students and environmental campaigners were observed in the areas visibly affected by the haze, especially in Riau and the rest of Sumatera. In addition, Indonesian cartoonists took their critiques to social media platform Twitter (BBC Indonesia, 2015a). They used the hashtag #MasihMelawanAsap (translation: Still fighting against the haze) in conjunction with other tags such as #SaveRiau, #PrayForRiau, and #MelawanAsap (translation: Fight against the haze). One week later, the #MelawanAsap became the most popular topic on Twitter, having been used 52,000 times (BBC Indonesia, 2015b). Social media application Instagram hosted 78,205 images with the hashtag #melawanasap. Furthermore, numerous new dedicated Facebook pages and groups were launched in September 2015, incorporating “melawan asap” into their names. Each was used by administrators
and members to share information surrounding the forest fires, even though most of the pages had very little traffic by the time the wet season came in November 2015.

**Figure 1. NASA AIRS carbon monoxide in the mid-troposphere (500 hPa), October 13–26, 2015**

In response to the catastrophe, the State launched tremendous efforts. Indonesia sent everything from helicopters to elephants, deployed 30,000 soldiers and firefighters, and devoted USD 6.5 million to engage the fires. Countries like Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and Japan also sent aircraft, firefighters, chemicals and experts to aid. Several actions against the corporations deemed responsible for the fires have resulted in a dozen companies and numerous suspects taken to court (Liljas, 2016). However, only one company was found guilty. Environmental campaigners reported an unwillingness by the police to advance cases as evidence collection was difficult (Liljas, 2016), and in some instances corrupt (Indonesia Lawyers Club, 2015). The flames could only be extinguished when the monsoon rains came at the end of October 2015 (Chisholm et al., 2016; Jatmiko & Karmini, 2015). Even so, as this thesis was written in 2016, fires have raged again in Sumatera, Kalimantan, and Papua, even though they were suppressed by the wetter weather throughout the year (Liljas, 2016).
The complex and controversial nature of the Indonesian haze in 2015 became a hot topic for the media during the peak emergency state in September-October 2015. It resulted in many news reports and interviews on the national and local television channels. Two high-rating prime-time talk shows are the focus of analysis in this thesis.

This thesis is structured into five chapters. The first chapter above gave a short context overview toward the topic studied. The following Chapter 2: Literature Review (p. 4) acts as an introductory review which outlines the socio-psychological dimensions of disaster, media discourse of disasters, similar case of human-caused disaster found in the past in Indonesia, and a theoretical review of television talk shows as the representation of broader national discourse. Chapter 3: Method (p. 15) outlines how the study was done and structured, as well as provides contexts into the two talk shows studied. Chapter 4: Results and Discussion (p. 27) is structured into four parts, each addresses the discourse analysis of the three main groups of the talk show participants: The perceived victims and perpetrators, and the State. Finally, in Chapter 5: Conclusions and future directions (p. 85), key findings are summarised and illustrated, and possible solutions outlined. In Chapter 5, I also reviewed the case of West Papuan forest fires as a mean to introduce a broader understanding about the urgency and the continuity of the results of this study in other regions of Indonesia.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Forest and land fires have a longstanding history in the landscapes of Southeast Asia. Researchers have traced records of both natural and human-caused wildfires in carbon-dated charcoal fragments in forest soil (Murdiyarso & Lebel, 2006). As Figure 2 shows below, Indonesian wildfires mainly occur in Sumatera and Kalimantan (Indonesian region of Borneo Island) and reach their peaks during the dry seasons in September-October each year. The 2015 fires were the worst since 1997-1998 due to a strong El Niño condition. Peatland drainage by industrial canalisations, massive deforestation, and recurrent fires have made the land increasingly vulnerable to future fires (Center for International Forestry Research, 2015; Chisholm et al., 2016). Human efforts to fight the fires have been ineffective as the fires can only be tamed by a wetter season (Associated Press, 2016) with no assurance of total fire eradication.

![Indonesia smoke blankets, NASA Earth Observatory (Voiland & Schmaltz, 2015)](image)

In the last two decades, fires have become increasingly human-caused and interact with the climate and ecosystem situations. Politicians, scientists, and environmentalists agree that most of the agricultural slash-and-burn practices are the immediate cause of the fires and the resulting haze (Guciano, 2015; Nairn, 2015). They critique business expansions which value economic advances at the costs of
rainforests, biodiversity, and people. While most blame the big palm oil, timber, and pulp companies as the culprits, the Center for International Forestry Research (2015) argues that conventional farmers who live inside and around the companies’ concession areas could also be the fire-starters. Nevertheless, Nairn (2015) from the Global Institute for Tomorrow argues that blaming slash-and-burn practices has not touched the root causes and hence does not develop any solution beyond generating heated rhetoric and non-enforceable pledges. In addition, there is a relative silence on the multi-national involvement and corruption of the Indonesian and ASEAN governments.

WALHI environmental campaigners found that many companies exploited a loophole in the legislation that allows native forests areas to be declared as ‘lahan kritis’ (critical, unusable land) if they were burnt (Adam of WALHI Pontianak, West Kalimantan, personal communication, April 11, 2016; Suhadi of WALHI in ILC, 2015). The State is supposed to restore the rainforest devastated by fire to its former condition. However, the opposite happens: The companies proposed lahan kritis to be licensed to businesses and forced into production. The Ministry of Forestry and Environment, treating the forest as State-owned, would then release the land to the corporations. The raging fires, plus the exclusion of native communities in the licensing process, further push locals off their land, who in turn engage in their own slash-and-burn clearing as they try to settle somewhere else (Liljas, 2016; Nairn, 2015). Deforestation and fires continue as a result.

TIME magazine’s Liljas (2016) contends that it is not only the companies who displaced the people surrounding the burnt forest area but also the migrants. The government-sponsored transmigration program, which peaked in the 1980s, has sent millions of people from the overpopulated regions of the State, mostly from the island of Java, to scantily populated regions such as Kalimantan, Sumatera, and Papua. There, they gained government support and protection to start commercial plantations and other agricultural activities. However, the State often reduced the customary land rights of the indigenous communities in providing the land for the transmigrants, a practice that still survives until today. As a result, indigenous groups were often displaced and forced to live in poverty.
Social and psychological dimension of disaster

There is a range of discipline-based definitions of disaster, but according to Vacano and Zaumseil (2014, p. 5), such definitions agree in at least four aspects:

1. The destructive character of an occurrence serves as a constitutive element,
2. the occurrence is categorized as a disruption to normality,
3. the disaster is defined in relation to time, commonly as an event but sometimes as a process, and
4. the destructive and disruptive character of the occurrence is often linked causally to an element of dysfunction or overstrain, necessitating external assistance.

Following worldwide trends of increasingly recurring, severe and unpredictable disasters, studies about disasters have exploded although they are still mainly focused on events in USA and Australia (Pfefferbaum et al., 2014). The interconnectedness of global society has increased the regional, national and global consequences and impacts of disasters. With respect to psychological implications, these can range from common stress reactions to severe problematic stress reactions and psychological disorders (Narayana & Selvaraj, 2011).

While technocratic views and explanations have been dominating discourses of disaster (Drake, 2013), more recent works have shown growing interest in the social and cultural aspects of disasters in Indonesia. Concerning the Javanese people affected by the 2004 tsunami in Yogyakarta, Indrajaja and Zaumseil (2014) studied the people’s discourses of ‘trauma’, while Schwarz (2014) focused on gender mainstreaming in the same context. Zaumseil, Vacano, Schwarz, Sullivan, and Prawitasari-Hadiyono (2014) argue that disasters and the external responses to the disasters have significant power to change social structures and power relations in the communities affected.

Three dynamics are usually found after a community experiences an ‘extreme’ experience such as a one-off natural disaster. First, the community may undergo a process of “resistance”, a social conservation or a “post-event functioning, tailored to the pre-event environment.” Alternatively, they may go the path of “resilience” directing the community towards social change, to “post-event functioning, adapted to the altered environment” (Norris et al., 2008, p. 130 in Schwarz, 2014). The third possibility is that the community may continue its state of dysfunction even long after the disaster has passed. This condition is typically found when the affected communities are poor and marginalised. Not only they are the most harmed by the
disaster, they also may find it harder to recover compared to better-resourced classes and groups (Elliott & Pais, 2006; Ferris, 2013).

Nevertheless, not all disasters are one-off experiences. A human-made disaster such as war, most cases of flood, or human-started forest fires often go on long-term, and frequently, to the extent that it becomes normalised, especially when they happen in so-called ‘third-world countries’ (Harding, 2007). The pre-disaster state of vulnerability of such nations thus gets desensitised and perpetuated. Psychology often views that the paths to disaster recovery have to lead to a matter of individual well-being and functioning, often failing to consider the collective or community (Schwarz, 2014). Indonesian mainstream psycho-religious ideas and orientations, such as surrender, acceptance, and gratitude are commonly viewed as “effective, indirect ways of healing distress of the heart” when an Indonesian community faces natural disasters (Indrajaja & Zaumseil, 2014). However, Indonesian communities, especially in Java, often generalise the psycho-religious values as equally applicable to human-made disasters (Ahmady & Wahana Lingkungan Hidup, 2010).

The psychology of human-made disaster

The works mentioned above mostly address one-off natural disasters where communities affected are given a significant amount of time to recover. The case of the Indonesia forest fires is distinctive in that they are human-made and have struck the same groups of people and communities in the same regions for decades. The result is much more insidious, devastating and political. Local communities might not fully recover, and so their resilience is severely undermined in the face of new and ongoing disasters. Distrust, anger and blame of untrustworthy government and corrupt stakeholders along with the anxiety and fear of remaining vulnerable to future disasters can further emasculate the ability of a community to recover. The impact is even starker when the affected communities are poor and marginalised, as they are socially and economically vulnerable before the disaster and even more in the aftermath. Thus, disasters and unequal responses to disasters often aggravate existing racial, gender, and class inequalities (Elliott & Pais, 2006; Ferris, 2013).

There has been remarkably little attention to human-caused disasters in both research and relief efforts. Harding (2007) suggests that a sense of urgency
associated with natural disasters mobilises public attention and action, while long-term, human-caused disasters often do not elicit the same responses. A study about donations to disaster victims by Zagefka, Noor, Brown, de Moura, and Hopthrow (2011) found that victims of natural disasters were perceived to be innocent in their suffering and that they made more effort to help themselves. However, when it comes to the victims of human-made disasters, they tend to be prejudiced as lethargic and passive. As a result, more donations and interventions were made toward the victims of the natural disasters compared to the human-caused ones.

The conclusions of Zagefka et al. (2011) are further supported by Cox, Long, Jones, and Handler (2008). Cox et al. (2008) highlight the significance of how the media influences public opinion and the meaning of a disaster and societal evaluations toward the official responses to the catastrophe and the preferred responses of those, directly and indirectly, affected. For example, in colonial societies such as New Zealand, the dominant group’s cultural assumptions in the media have influenced collective attitudes toward the health-related behaviours and concerns regarding the health of indigenous Maori communities (Hodgetts, Masters, & Robertson, 2004). In Canada, neoliberal discursive framing and male and authoritative voices have been found to define post-disaster recovery processes, with specific emphasis on the return to ‘normal’ economic functioning and dependence on ‘experts’. Consequently, the ‘experts’ dominated the society’s constructions of disasters, while local voices were marginalised and authentic emotions associated with suffering were discouraged and often silenced (Cox et al., 2008). In the cases when a human-caused disaster happens in developing countries, Harding (2007) sees a normalisation of sufferings, that the developed world expects developing countries to experience human-made disasters regularly. Similarly, the effect can happen between the more developed regions and the less developed within a country.

Media discourse of disasters
Television has a very significant role in educating the Indonesian public and capturing their attention. In times of crisis and disasters, the saturated coverage mainly by the news channel of MetroTV and TVOne prominently influence the public’s political awareness and responses (Bintang, 2015). This is strengthened by the Indonesian oral tradition and the availability of television broadcasts throughout
the archipelagos. Even more in rural Indonesia where political education is a luxury, television programs, especially prime-time talk shows, have become the people’s chief source of political knowledge (Wibowo, 2015). As shown in Table 1 below, the exposure of both urban and rural Indonesian people to television broadcasts is far greater than that of the internet, newspaper or radio.

*Table 1. Proportion of residents above ten-year-old who are exposed to forms of mass media in Indonesia according to Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia (2012)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% of urban population</th>
<th>% of rural population</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia, 2012a)</td>
<td>23.56</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>15.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper/magazine readership (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia, 2012b)</td>
<td>26.11</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia, 2012c)</td>
<td>21.48</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>18.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia, 2012d)</td>
<td>95.83</td>
<td>87.26</td>
<td>91.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When a disaster takes place, weeks or even months of spectacular news attention on Indonesian television ensue, regardless of whether it is human caused or natural (Bintang, 2015). The actuality, depth and emotional content of disaster reporting encourage attention and responses from both national and international communities. Television stations themselves often use the weeks of saturated day and night disaster reporting to muster donations and thus increase the channels’ popularity. Such was the case during the forest fire events. Indonesian television networks were saturated with news reports and talk shows about the thick haze that resulted. Across October 2015, the living rooms of Indonesian were bombarded by the images of roads enclosed by white smoke, people wearing masks, the fires, and firefighting in Sumatera and Kalimantan. During prime-time in the evenings, NGO activists and politicians appeared on TV talk shows and interviews. Such media coverage tended to focus on times of immediate risk rather than on the systematic causes or the longer aftermath of the event. Most media focused on firefighting reports rather than preventive measures that educate the public as to how to respond and act to reduce possible future fires (Paveglio, Norton, & Carroll, 2011). At these
times, residents are often portrayed as victims of a normal process that is inherent to their place of living.

When the disaster is publicly viewed as human-caused, Indonesian television coverage becomes divided, often conflicting in their reports. The multitudes of private television networks which were established after the resignation of former President Soeharto (1966-1998) are controlled only by a dozen elites, most of whom are linked to various businesses outside the media including natural resources management. An example of how the people close to political power influence the images of human-caused disasters is that of the Lapindo (or Sidoarjo) mudflow eruption in 2006.

The case of Lapindo Mudflow

On 29 May 2006, residents of the district of Sidoarjo, East Java, Indonesia stared at a boiling mudflow which erupted in the proximity of the Lapindo Brantas, Ltd.¹, a gas exploration company. To everyone’s amazement, the mudflow spread rapidly, covering 350 hectares of land at the end of 2006 and 800 hectares by 2014 with a 20-meter-deep giant pool of mud. Eventually, twelve entire villages were drowned in toxic mud, while nine others were declared prone to danger. Paddy fields and farmlands, as well as parts of the main provincial highway, were consumed by mud and caused a downturn in the local livelihoods and the national economy (Bosnak, 2015). Ten years from the mud flow’s first occurrence, and despite soil embankments built by the government to contain the mud, mud continues to spring as do associated diseases and environmental damage. In the wake of the mud flow, 40,000-50,000 residents have been displaced and dozens of residents and response workers have since died (Drake, 2013). The Sidoarjo Mudflow has become one of the world’s largest mud volcanoes and the most expensive and controversial environmental disaster in Indonesian history (Drake, 2016).

The event incited heated debates from both national and international media and researchers alike. Like the Indonesian forest fire and haze, the Sidoarjo Mudflow

¹ At the time the company was a joint venture between Energi Mega Persada (50%), Santos Australia (18%), and Medco Energi (32%). The last is also suspected to be involved in the land conflicts between Merauke indigenous people of West Papua, Indonesia regarding the destruction of customary forests.
has become a sustained source of news on Indonesian television, internet and radio which frame it in a primarily negative perspective. Bosnak (2015) offers an overview of the heated debates and proposes that all can be associated with one question: Is the mudflow natural or is it human-made? As of the second half of 2006 onwards, the public naming of the mudflow has evolved from ‘Lumpur Sidoarjo’ (the Mud of Sidoarjo) which emphasizes the geographical location of the disaster, to ‘Lumpur Lapindo’ (The Mud of Lapindo), which links the mudflow to the associated company, Lapindo Brantas, Ltd.

The mud becomes an arena for the struggle of power. The owner of Lapindo Brantas, Ltd., Bakrie & Brothers conglomerate, is involved in a broad range of industries, news, and entertainment, in which it is one of the twelve conglomerates in control of Indonesian private TV stations (Bosnak, 2015). Its chairman Aburizal Bakrie was a coordinating minister for people's welfare during the governance of Yudhoyono (2005-2009) and remains a powerful politician under the current government. Moreover, the conglomerates tried to steer mass media and academic discourses to influence the outcome of investigations surrounding the Lapindo case to mediate damages to its image. For example, a Javanese language soap opera portrayed the disaster as natural, an act of the divine, and thus ‘acceptance’ is championed as a morally proper response (Bosnak, 2015). On the other side, victims of the disaster have been staging various mass demonstrations, road blocks, and strikes in both the site of the mudflow and the capital Jakarta, demanding attention from both Lapindo and the government (Bosnak, 2015). The people and children also wrote short stories and books containing testimonies of their lives impacted by the catastrophe, while various artists staged art installations in May each year during the commemorations of the disaster (Batubara, 2013; Drake, 2013).

Meyer and Hinchman (2002) postulate that much of the problem of inequalities can be related to colonisation by a media discourse, or “mediocracy” or “media democracy”. With limited time and resources, the media must decide, select and present a newsworthy narrative leaving aside other perspectives and details. A consequence of this pragmatic circumstance is that disaster and human sufferings may become distorted and simplified by how the media chooses to represent the disaster in its discourse. Wibowo (2015, p. 106), citing the Indonesian media context, argues that hard news thus is “coded” to be pleasant to the viewers, in
which important issues are re-packaged to be as “dramatic” as reality shows or soap operas. Broadcasted dialogues in Indonesian media, as Wibowo (2015) critiques, do not seek rational deliberation, but theatrical drama inciting emotional affections. This ‘drama’ is most prominently blatant in the prime-time political talk shows than anywhere else.

Talk show
Television talk shows have recently gained research attention as a social and political practice co-constructed between the media, the host, and the participant (Ilie, 2001; McKenzie, 2000). Often talk shows represent the discussions of the lay public reflecting a range of issues by involving lay participants, whose roles are to present their narratives on a topic to elicit the production of opposing opinions and stances in the dialogues (Thornborrow, 2007). Talk shows “fill a timeless need for human beings to feel involved in civic discourse” (McKenzie, 2000, p. 190).

Talk shows are where some semi-institutional discourses happen. It is a host-controlled, participant-shaped and audience-evaluated speech event, which has both the characteristics of casual conversations and institutional discourse regarding discursive configuration and goal, unequal status, speaking rights, and asymmetrical role distributions of participants (Ilie, 2001). In the talk show, the host facilitates arguments to make the show entertaining by “performing the argument”, while participants use arguments to detract from their opponent’s image and to enhance their own (van Rees, 2007, pp. 1456-1457). Lauerbach, Aijmer, and Lauerbach (2007, p. 1389) see talk show interviews as a “more relaxed and ‘feel good’ alternative to the traditional ‘heavyweight’ adversarial news or current affairs interview”.

There are three reasons why television talk shows are so common on television nowadays, as argued by van Rees (2007). Firstly, the production of a talk show is not as resource demanding as purchasing a pre-produced program or scripted local program. Secondly, the talk show genre incorporates interactive discussions, which give the audiences a sense of participation. Thirdly, talk shows formats, compared to other plot-driven programs, allow the viewers to browse a show while it is already underway and still make sense of the show.
The talk show is also seen as a form of epideictic, ceremonial discourse, which has three theoretical principles as introduced by Aristotle (McKenzie, 2000). First is the overarching presence of praising or blaming a person. Regardless of the topic, talk shows would predictably turn into blaming or praising someone. Wibowo (2015) suggests that talk shows, the political ones, in particular, do not seek rational deliberation, but theatrical drama and inciting emotional affections. The second is the principle of display, in which intellectuality of truth and falsehood is not the main aim of participants in a talk show, but the affectivity of good and evil. This is manifested in the exchange of praise and blame during the show and the way the hosts conclude the talk show with a statement of what is right and wrong. Therefore, a speaker’s “performative display”, as McKenzie (2000) calls it, is more important than the substance of the speaker’s argument. As for the audience, while they are predisposed principally to the general nature of praise or blame, the speaker’s performance will influence their conviction about their judgment.

The third principle is the talk show’s focus on morality by amplifying the good and bad features of a person’s action. The last principle is that the audience is treated as a spectator observing and judging the speaker’s performance. Also, because talk shows are typically scheduled regularly with the same host and format, the viewing experience becomes ritualistic, in which the audience expects the participants to behave in a standard way. Finally, the anticipation, reflection and reaction of the viewing audience of talk shows in the era of technological and social media interactivity transcend the spectators of the discourse into the potential participants in the discourse. This is where viewers listen, consider and react to the statements in the talk shows, which creates the sense of involvement in the civic affairs of the people. However, as McKenzie (2000) warns, this pseudo-feeling may threaten the real participation in civic discourse, such as attending village council meetings, contacting or protesting officials, or discussing issues with a neighbour.

I portray talk shows as an arena where different layers of community understanding of issues are represented by various participants who ‘perform’ their personae in their interactions with one another. Talk shows provide an opportunity to examine how different layers of communities carry out their arguments to commend or denounce one another, while simultaneously defending and bolstering their identities in attempts to be the ‘good guys’. The tension and conflict in talk shows
provide the opportunity to deconstruct and reconstitute the representations of injustice and thus disrupt the dominant relationship to power. In such understanding, a critical investigation into the discourse of Indonesian talk shows surrounding the annual forest fires and Indonesian smoke haze is expected to address the power relationships that make the fires seemingly inexorable and hopefully helps to develop possible strategies to transform this reality (Marková, 2003).
CHAPTER 3: METHOD

This chapter discusses the methods and steps taken to guide this study and critically outlines my experiences when utilising the methods. My aim is to recognize the discursive processes that contribute to the status quo of the annual forest fires in Indonesia and suggests possible interventions instrumental to creating a counter knowledge and praxis. It uses critical discourse analysis to explore the processes of victimhood, blame, and justification in two prime-time talk shows hosted by two national, private television broadcasters. The recordings analysed in this research are available in Indonesian for public online access through the YouTube platform. Indonesian and English transcripts of the recordings are included in the Appendices. Additionally, I included my commentaries toward the data set in Appendix 1C & 2C. Some of the commentaries are translated into the body of work of this thesis, while some may point to possible research in the future.

In addition to the analysis into the primary dataset outlined above, I include a short field reflection into a summary and postscript section (p. 82) in Chapter 4. The section outlines my field experience to Pontianak city, Kalimantan Barat, my direct observation into the livelihood in the region prone to forest fires and haze, and how the visit supported my study conclusions.

Data resource and collection method
I chose two prime-time talk shows to reflect national discourses in Indonesian society. They were hosted by two of the largest and most influential media networks in Indonesia. The networks are controlled by leading politicians and multi-millionaire business tycoons (CDAC Network, 2012). Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia (Indonesia Commission of Broadcasting) ranked both talk shows as the second and third highest quality TV shows in 2015.

2 Initial research proposal included an additional prime-time talk show recording held in 2014, the “I am Angry” video message published on YouTube by French-born environment campaigner Chanee Kalaweit, and three televised personal interviews with Kalaweit, as well as the online viewer commentaries. The recordings had been transcribed and translated into English, and prepared for analysis. However, after a more thorough examination into the key themes and in consideration of the time constraint, I decided to limit the current research into only two most recent prime-time television talk shows held in 2015.
All the data was drawn from the YouTube video hosting platform. Indonesian users have a habit of recording and uploading television talk shows and news reports that are interesting to them, and so the data set is readily available on the internet. However, to make a clearer reading, the authors of the YouTube videos would not be used as citations in Chapter 4: Results and Discussion but changed instead into the name of the talk shows. Table 2 lists the original sources of the dataset and how they will be referred to in Chapter 4.

Table 2. Research dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Video length</th>
<th>Cited as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Indonesia Lawyers Club 22 September 2015: Siapa Pembakar Hutan Kita? (Who is/are the Arsonist/s of Our Forest?)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=obCk2cGkEKA">www.youtube.com/watch?v=obCk2cGkEKA</a></td>
<td>3 hours</td>
<td>(ILC, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mata Najwa (The Eye of Najwa) 14 October 2015: Melawan Asap (Fighting the Smoke)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOEv8oDMK4">www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOEv8oDMK4</a></td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>(Mata Najwa, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have taken a bilingual approach in the data production, transcription, and analysis. The videos were fully transcribed in their original Indonesian (see Appendix 1A and 2A) and then translated into English (Appendix 1B and 2B). To avoid some meanings and contexts being lost in the translation, some original Indonesian terms and interpretations of the sentences addressed are added in the form of brackets and footnotes accompanying the quote. Explored below are the backgrounds of the two talk shows analysed.

Indonesia Lawyers Club’s “Who is to Blame”

*Ladies and gentlemen, who burn (the forests)? Last year a debate arose. Said the palm corporations, it was the farmers who were the arsonists. The traditional farmers. Meaning the commoners who dwell near the plantation areas. Said the commoners, the big companies. However, who really did it? This was not exposed last year. (I) hope in today’s discussion we can expose (them) (Karni Ilyas, ILC September 22, 2015, 00:16:35, English translation with my additions).*
Indonesia Lawyers Club (acronym ILC) is a three-hour prime time Indonesian talk show broadcasted by TVOne. The channel is owned by Aburizal Bakrie, a conglomerate and Chief Director of Golongan Karya (Golkar) Party. The party is a member of the current majority in the Congress and was a member of Merah-Putih coalition which fought against the winning coalition of the 2014 presidential election. The status of its owner as a member of the opposition to the current president is apparent in the TVOne’s critical attitude toward the current government.

Initially debuted as Jakarta Lawyers Club, ILC presents dialogues and debates about various trending hot topics in Indonesia. It is hosted by Karni Ilyas (63, male), a senior journalist with specialisation in law and political issues. In its introductions and mid-show breaks, relevant news editorials are presented.

ILC is attended by approximately 30 people who sit on round tables arranged in a studio hall. Despite the name, the Lawyers Club’s attendees come from various backgrounds, including community representatives or victims of the case being addressed, community leaders, non-government campaigners, members of Congress, law enforcement representatives, ministry staff, mayors, and governors. The controversial nature of ILC’s chosen topics and the round table setting of the show expose different discourses among the attendees, who are often observed competing with the others for the domination of the hall.

ILC broadcasts weekly on Tuesdays and is re-broadcasted on the following Sundays. Because of internet/YouTube uploads by viewers, the show has further influence in social media, albeit sometimes in an altered form. Some Indonesian YouTube users have recorded and uploaded the television’s shows, some in its totality, but most trimmed, sometimes with altered titles by their interests and meanings.
My study focuses on an ILC talk show originally titled “Siapa Pembakar Hutan Kita?” (“Who is/are the Arsonist/s of Our Forest?”). It was hosted in September 2015 at the peak of the Southeast Asian Haze and just three months before the nationwide district head elections. The talk show can be considered as a would-be annual series that ILC has produced in the recent two years. The earlier 2014 discussion was titled “Malapetaka Asap Riau Salah Siapa?” (“The Riau’s Smoke Disaster: Who is to Blame?”), hosted in March 2014, just weeks before the national parliamentary election and five months before the Indonesian presidential election.

Provided below is the list of the speaking participants presented on Indonesia Lawyers Club, September 22, 2015, by order of appearance.

*Table 3. List of speaking participants presented on ILC September 22, 2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Karni Ilyas</td>
<td>Host, senior journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Melayu performers</td>
<td>Performers in the intro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mukhlis</td>
<td>Resident of Tenayan Raya, Riau, Sumatera; father of the claimed child victim of the Haze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Azlaini Agus</td>
<td>Riau community figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Al-Azhar</td>
<td>Head of the Customary Institute of Melayu, Riau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Basrizal Koto</td>
<td>Riau community figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Dharmawi Aris</td>
<td>Representative of the Agency of Melayu Riau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Sutopo Purwonugroho</td>
<td>Representative of BNPB (The National Agency for Disaster Response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Doni Aprialdi</td>
<td>Head of Riau Government’s Liaison Agency in Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Made Ali</td>
<td>Forest Rescue Network (JIKALAHARI) campaigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Munhur Satyahaprabu</td>
<td>Law &amp; Policy Manager, WALHI – Forum for Environment Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Susanto</td>
<td>Secretary General of the Association of Physicians Pulmonary Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Anton Charliyan</td>
<td>Police Engineer General, Head of Public Relations of the Police Headquarters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mata Najwa’s “Fighting the Haze”

“Swallowing the pride the government finally gave up. What can we do, dear brothers? For two months (we) have been living besieged by the thick smoke strangling lungs. (...) (in the past) the fire was for agriculture; now it is widespread in the industrial concession areas. The thick darkness soars from the thousands of hotspots; the smoke is almost uncontainable. Sluggish intervention makes the condition worse; the disaster recurs just like a tradition” (Najwa Shihab, Mata Najwa October 14, 2015, 00:01:19, English translation with my additions).

Mata Najwa (Translation: The Eye of Najwa) is a one-hour prime time Indonesian talk show hosted by MetroTV since 2009. It is from this show that my second data set is selected. The television channel is led by Surya Dharma Paloh, a former member of the Golkar Party and the current Chief Director of the Nasional-Demokrat (Nasdem) Party. Nasdem is a member of the winning coalition in the 2014 presidential election, as such, it can be suggested that MetroTV emphasizes the successes of the current governance of President Joko Widodo. Mata Najwa is hosted by a senior journalist, Najwa Shihab (38, female) who is a various awards winner, including the Young Global Leader (YGL) 2011 sponsored by the World Economic Forum (WEF). In its introductions and middle breaks, relevant news reports are shown for subsequent discussion. Mata Najwa then invites up to 6 speakers from various backgrounds who sit on a stage with the host. Sometimes the appearance of speakers occurs in turns, sometimes one by one, other times two by
two. Mata Najwa’s guests include high ranking government officials as well as common citizens. In the epilogues of the show, Najwa Shihab sometimes invites one or some of the well-known audience members to express their views on the topic, including singers, poets, or NGO campaigners. This show reveals various discourses coming from the different backgrounds of its speakers.

Mata Najwa is broadcasted weekly on Wednesdays. In YouTube, the official account of Metro TV has created a Mata Najwa channel and uploaded the videos of the show weekly. Other Indonesian YouTube users accounts had either recorded the show from their television set or re-uploaded Mata Najwa shows, altered the titles and trimmed the videos accordingly to convey their own messages.

On 14 October 2015, Najwa Shihab hosted a talk show entitled “Melawan Asap” (“Fighting the Smoke”). Listed below is the speaking participants presented on the talk show.

Table 4. List of speaking participants in Mata Najwa October 14, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Najwa Shihab</td>
<td>Host, senior journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mukhlis</td>
<td>Resident of Tenayan Raya, Riau, Sumatera; father of the claimed child victim of the Haze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Nurhadi</td>
<td>Resident of Mantangai Hulu, District Mantangai, Central Kalimantan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Official Twitter post of Mata Najwa, showing Mukhlis, whose daughter has passed away, allegedly due to the Haze. A user is seen commenting, "No parent wants that, especially him. Such is the mystery of God. Just take the lesson” (Mata Najwa, 2015).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Muhammad</td>
<td>Former arsonist, now farmer in Ogan Komering Ilir, South Sumatera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Zenzi Suhadi</td>
<td>WALHI campaigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Siti Nurbaya Bakar</td>
<td>The Minister of Forestry and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Pasludin</td>
<td>Member of the Standing Committee for the Haze, the House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Agustinus Gusti “Nugie” Nugroho</td>
<td>WWF-WALHI ambassador, singer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis and the development of Discussion

I used several theoretical and content-based approaches to aid framing and organising my analysis, that is, my analytical framework, interrogative questions and critical discourse analysis and content-based sequencing of the discussion. These are described below.

Positioning the data set within the analytical framework

There are four key considerations in the analytical approach toward the data. This study positions the media, particularly talk shows and YouTube videos, firstly, as *a platform, a context* in which various political, economic and cultural forces interact with each other. Here the social actors represent (or try to represent) different communities in their audio-visual performance when interacting with other actors. I am also aware that the media as a platform is itself *a product, contextualised* by the world (Silverstone, 2007). This recognition is even more needed when looking at how the Indonesian television channels are led by only twelve powerful politicians and multi-millionaire business tycoons (CDAC Network, 2012). Thirdly, this research also takes into consideration that the participants presented by the media are a ‘double’ (Silverstone, 2007) or ‘triple’, that is, participants act for themselves, while at the same time represent and speak on behalf of others, despite also being represented on the media themselves. Lastly, the research also positions the *truth* as the translated, cultured truth, the truth meaningful to the speakers (Silverstone, 2007).

Content and critical discourse analysis

After repeated viewings of the talk shows, their transcription and translation to English, I developed five interrogative questions (see Table 5), the intention being...
that the questions would guide my analysis and identification of arising themes. Attribution theory was helpful in this regard. Attribution theory is concerned about the ways people make causal explanations of social actions or events. The focus is on the cognitive and perceptual, in which the attributions represent how people perceive and interpret their social world (Wooffitt, 2005). In this research, the 2015 Haze functions as a vignette: A narrative in which a set of events and relationships are being discussed. The speakers’ responses in the vignette reveal how they understand, make meaning of and relate to the wider web of events and social actors in the disaster, in which the discursive activities such as blaming, accusations and rebuttals are presented.

*Table 5. Interrogative questions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Who is being blamed?</td>
<td>Almost every answer to the questions asked by the hosts of the talk show implies blaming somebody for the Haze or the sufferings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Who suffers according to the subject?</td>
<td>The representations of victimhood implied by the participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>How the subject reacts to the Haze?</td>
<td>The emotional or rational contents of their statements when prompted to talk about what the subjects have done in response to the Haze or illness ensued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>How does the speaker make sense of the Haze?</td>
<td>The attribution can be seen through keywords and the moral content of the subject’s narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>How does the speaker describe how others react or make sense of the Haze?</td>
<td>There are times when the subject states their understanding about what the Haze or sufferings mean for the other people/communities/ institutions, e.g. the benefit gained, disadvantages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The five questions became a guide to breaking the data set into five workable themes. This study then attempts to critically analyse the discourses in the Indonesian talk shows surrounding the annual forest fires and South East Asian Haze. The purpose is to address the power relationships that make the fires seemingly inexorable, while the study attempts to invite practical public engagement and intervention to transform the reality. To achieve these objectives, I employed critical discourse analysis (CDA) as an analytic paradigm. CDA is
concerned with the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are presented, reproduced, and challenged by text and talk in the social and political context. It addresses discourses as a form of social action, in which social problems and power relationships are represented. It rejects the possibility of a value-free science and pays attention to how ideologies are always embedded in discourses. Thus, discourse analysts take an explicit socio-political standpoint in their efforts to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality (van Dijk, 2008). In doing so, I also acknowledge what Huckin (2002, p. 356) referred to as ‘textual silences,’ the themes that could have been mentioned in the discussions, but were not mentioned due to an underlying ideological leanings governed by the interests.

The organisation of Chapter 4 and 5
I used content-based sequencing found in the talk shows to organise Chapter 4. An initial read of the talk shows finds that different actors are presented in a sequence that resembles their degree of innocence, power, and responsibilities. Both ILC and Mata Najwa began their shows with a short editorial video made from a montage of videos. It functions to provide direction to the talk in the show and to frame the issue according to the media’s expectations. Chapter 4 in this thesis is constructed per the sequence and themes extracted from both the ILC and Mata Najwa editorials.

ILC’s sequence is as follows:

1. The introduction of the problem: The Haze and its victims
2. The introduction of those who were allegedly at the centre of the responsibility
3. The introduction of the people who have the power to solve the problem
4. The conclusion

Firstly, ILC introduces the Haze as an “annual routine that has never been broken,” and which has grown worse in 2015. The impact is firstly on education — “schools were forced to dismiss teaching and learning activities” indefinitely. The second is the “disruption” to the economy. As an example, ILC showed that some flights had been cancelled because of the poor visibility. “Health problems experienced by many citizens” came last.

After outlining the harms that the Haze has done to people, ILC proceeds to introduce the perpetrators in the issue. It shows a clip of an interview with Roichatul
Aswidah, the Commissioner of the National Commission of Human Rights Indonesia, which put the State as the “fundamental” offender. However, it is not only the State who is held responsible but also the corporations. They are narrated as the “major contributor to the environmental destruction,” but some of them “deny it and blame the peasants.”

ILC proceeded to introduce the people who have the power to solve the problem. It started with an interview with the President Joko Widodo, who was seen ordering the Chief of the Police “to take the firmest, most ruthless action” towards the “irresponsible companies.” Then the scene changed to the press conference held on behalf of Police Chief Baharudin Haiti, where he announced seven corporations and persons responsible for forest burning only by initials. In addition, the Minister of Environment and Forestry Siti Nurbaya Bakar was shown on the screen, explaining the planned punishment toward the companies responsible. As a closing remark, the editorial states that the “urge to immediately solve the problem” comes from the neighbouring citizens of Singapore and Malaysia through “sarcastic commentaries and images,” before ending it with a recent news item:

\begin{quote}
A 7.9 trillion rupiah civil claims against the companies found guilty may have been a shock therapy for this moment. However, if supervision is not enforced consistently, the government will be the most likely to return to its role as a firefighter in the future.
\end{quote}

Mata Najwa’s sequence is similar, but focusing on the victims instead of the people responsible or in power. The host Najwa Shihab narrates the editorial herself. While ILC has “Who burns our forest” as the title of the show, Mata Najwa chooses “Against the smoke” as its title. Firstly, like the ILC editorial, Shihab also puts the responsibility on the “concession industry” and that the government has “succumbed” to the situation. A video montage of Riau, a province in Sumatera, covered in fire and smoke, street protests, sickness and death, children with vaporisers, as well as photos of the youths and children expressing their demise through a sheet of paper. The rest of the prologue is filled by a video montage of sick children with child-voiced narration. The Haze is described as “robbing our health” and “claiming our precious time.” The child’s narration becomes a proper clue for Shihab’s introduction of the first speakers of the Haze: The victims.
The sequence and themes on ILC and Mata Najwa’s editorial prologue set a foundation for the presentation of my analysis in Chapter 4. Part 1 of Chapter 4 introduces my four classifications of participants in the talk shows. Part 2 introduces the Victims designated by the media and how they and the media co-constructed the victimhood discourse. Part 3 discusses the perceived perpetrators and how they were identified, defended, and challenged. Part 4 of Chapter 4 specifically addresses the government and its discourse of heroism, as they were the ones perceived as having the power to solve the problem. Chapter 4 ends with a short postscript derived from my experience in West Kalimantan during the initial stage of this thesis.

The findings described in Chapter 4 are brought further in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5 Part 1, I describe the main findings of Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 Part 2, I turn my attention to potential intervention strategies based on the values of liberation psychologies. In the next part, I describe the challenges faced in Merauke, a West Papuan district in the Eastern Indonesia to communicate the urgency for the development of intervention strategies. Limitations and future research directions close Chapter 5 and this study.

**Note on writing style**

I used a set of identifiers in forms of specific terms and writing style to better articulate the contexts and meanings of my ideas and data. Firstly, a glossary of terms is used to set apart specific referrals to the context of 2015 Indonesian Forest Fires or 2015 South-east Asian Haze. “The Haze” (with capitalised “H”) refers specifically to the Indonesian smoke blanket resulting from the forest fires in Sumatera and Kalimantan during the year 2015, or particularly during June-November 2015. “The Haze” is chosen as a simplified translation to many Indonesian terms used by the speakers to describe the event, including “asap” (smoke), “kabut asap” (smoke haze, or smoke blanket). The term “haze” (without capital “H”) will be used to refer to a general sense of the event.

Moreover, the word “Victim(s)” (with capitalised “V”) relates to the specific speaker(s) who attend the talk shows as “korban,” the victim(s) of the Haze. They were introduced as members of the public who live in the areas directly affected by the Haze. They were implied by the hosts as innocent because they did not take part
in the forest-burning and were deemed to have little or no social or political power to change their realities. The Victims are always the first participants to be introduced and to speak during the talk shows analysed. The term “victim(s)” (without capital “V”) will be used to refer to a general sense of a victimised individual or group of people.

I also used certain font styles in my direct quotes of the participants’ accounts. Capitalization on phrases or sentences represent the significant rise in volume, tone, and emphasis as the participant spoke. Furthermore, bold font-styling on direct quotes is used to highlight key phrases or sentences that are referred to in the analysis.
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

I have divided this chapter into four parts. Part 1 introduces the different groups of people presented in the talk shows. The rest of the discussion is dedicated to addressing the discourse of victimhood, blame, and the State’s response.

Part 1: The classifications of participants

I identify four main classifications of participants based on keywords used to refer to specific roles attributed to the talk show participants. They were “masyarakat” (the people), the advocates who include “tokoh masyarakat” (community leaders or figures) and “aktivis” (the activist), “perusahaan” (the corporates), and “pemerintah” (the government). The key arguments of each group of participants are listed in Table 6 (p. 30), 7 (p. 31), 8 (p. 61), and 9 (p. 79).

The people

The word “masyarakat” (translated in this thesis as “the people”) was used liberally and has multiple meanings. The word “masyarakat” in bahasa Indonesia commonly refers to society, community, or just a collective of people. However, on the talk shows and the context of forest fires, it could have a very wide range of definitions, from the local indigenous communities, a collective of local indigenous people plus local non-indigenous people, local farmers or smallholders, or all the people of Indonesia. The three Victims of the Haze, who were all male, are cast as representing the public. One participant, Mukhlis, was presented in both the ILC and Mata Najwa shows. I list the key arguments presented by the members of the people in both ILC and Mata Najwa in Table 6 (p. 30), including the arguments submitted by the Melayu vocal groups who featured in the ILC opening.

The advocates

The advocates are used in this thesis to classify “tokoh masyarakat” (community leaders, figures), “aktivis” (activist), and academics. In the talk show, the roles of community leaders were exclusive to ones of Riau, Melayu communities, as they were the only four representatives of local communities presented in ILC. TVOne and MetroTV used the term “activist” to represent the attending members of environmental non-government organisations, whose organisations were named.
ILC presented two of them, while Mata Najwa presented one. Additionally, ILC also identifies Ratna Sarumpaet as a “social media activist,” a title that was seemingly given based on her role in the discussion and not on the organisation she was representing. Finally, two academics were invited to comment and conclude the talk. Their universities or faculties of origin were not identified. It is worth noticing that among the 11 members of the advocate group, only Azlaini Agus and Ratna Sarumpaet are females. The key arguments of the advocates in both ILC and Mata Najwa are presented in Table 7.

The corporations
In the talk shows, the word “perusahaan,” when unaccompanied by a name, was used presumptively to represent the company(ies) or its (their) staff who were involved in the forest fires. It was commonly used in a general sense. For example, the phrase “the companies were arrested” should be interpreted as “the staff of the companies were arrested.” Furthermore, while the businesses that were involved in forest fires could have been working on all kinds of land resource production, the talk shows were almost exclusively focused on the palm oil corporations. For instance, ILC invited a chairman from the association of palm oil companies, but there was no representation for say, the logging or pulp concessionaires. It should also be noted that the local small business owners, even though they could be concessionaires who were involved in forest fires, were not classified as the “companies,” but “masyarakat” instead. Finally, “perusahaan” was often pitted against “masyarakat lokal” (the locals), even though the companies being referred to could be founded and managed by the locals. The key arguments presented by the corporate representatives are presented below in Part 3.1, Table 8 (p. 61).

The government
The word “pemerintah” (the government) was used liberally in the talk shows studied and often has ambiguous meaning. “Pemerintah” could refer to the individual or collective of the president, minister(s), ministry(ies), governor(s), mayor(s), and/or regent(s). The first three were often further grouped into the “central government” or just the “Central,” while the latter three grouped as the “local government” or the “Local.” Transcripts of the talks show that no specific
keyword differentiates whether the “government” mentioned was an individual or an institution except when the agents were clearly named. This means that the “government” could refer to any scope or level of the governing collective of institutions or people in Indonesia. For instance, in Mata Najwa, congressman Pasludin “hoped” that the “government” enforce the law, despite his obvious role in the government legislative wing. Another example is when the “government” was alleged to conspire with the corporations. There was no clear definition whether the “government” refers to the “central government,” the “local government,” the Police, the Army, or all of them. Furthermore, sometimes the participants would categorise the Police and the Army separately from the government, and thus in this thesis, they were grouped as the “aparat pemerintah” (government or State apparatus).

There were also some unique examples where a hierarchical title was used to refer to a specific individual instead of the numerous persons who hold the same title. For instance, “Ibu Menteri” (Madam Minister) was used to refer to Siti Nurbaya, the Madam Minister of Forestry and Environment because there was no other female member of the cabinet who was associated with the handling of forest fires. “Gubernur” (governor) or “Bapak Gubernur” (Mr Governor) commonly referred to Arsyadjuliandi Rachman, the acting governor (Pelaksana Tugas Gubernur) of Riau. This is because ILC only presented government officials and community leaders from Riau, who only talked within their context. Key arguments presented by the government officials in both ILC and Mata Najwa can be found in Part 4.2, Table 9.
Table 6. Key points of testimonies of the Victims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name, residential area; introduced as</th>
<th>Key points of testimony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mukhlis, Tenayan Raya, Pekanbaru, Riau; the father of a daughter who passed away due to the Haze (ILC, 2105)</td>
<td>When being introduced: Chronology leading to the death of Anggriawati, Mukhlis’ late daughter: Concerned with the daughter’s condition after a week, daughter’s breathing difficulty in the hospital, loss of consciousness, and death due to mucus in the lungs; “breathing failure” as the cause of death. When confronting a government official’s interpretation about his daughter’s death: “I am the parent of the victim;” “try to open the hearts (…) to bear with me who has lost a child,” “I have forgiven, but (…) has been opened again;” “by the name of Allah and Rasul, I am a religious person and have been religiously educated;” “My late daughter in the grave, why had you talk like that?;” “I have forgiven in the newspaper;” “thank the government (…) Health Insurance;” “I pray that it won’t touch your families.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mukhlis, Tenayan Raya, Pekanbaru, Riau; the father of a daughter who passed away due to the Haze (Mata Najwa, 2105)</td>
<td>“The trigger was the smoke, but (…) it is a destiny that I have to accept”; chronology of the sickness leading to the death of Anggriawati; “finally Allah called her”; “Her full name is Muhanum Anggriawati (…) 12 years old;” showing Anggriawati’s 5 years old photograph; telling good memories of his daughter, ; “all is respective to the will of Allah, and we can only pasrah (submit);” “we do not need to grieve deeper, but (…) support the government, the volunteers);” “if we always blame, the problem will never end. But let them work (…) Insha Allah (If Allah is willing);” children still go to school; the smoke still goes inside the house; “kindly give us your attention, (…) support, voice for our concerns who are exposed to the haze.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Nurhadi, Mantangai Hulu, District Mantangai, Central Kalimantan; a victim who rode for hours to attend Mata Najwa</td>
<td>The story of a seven hours motorcycle ride from Mantangai Hulu to Palangkaraya and the flight to Jakarta; “never wore a mask” in the Haze; “the mask has never been aided, (…) so people are just pasrah (submit);” “just enjoy (the heavy smoke);” “we do not have oxygen tanks like the people in urban areas;” showing his Facebook video clips reporting his situation in the Haze; family is sick; “sincerely hope with the government (…) to attend to the condition of the people (…), health centres (…) with no cost;” “high expenses to cure the family, (…) life in the village is tough nowadays”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Muhammad, Ogan Komering Ilir, South Sumatera; former arsonist turned farmer

The *modus operandi* of the land-clearing by fire; “if we are farmers, do not dare to burn;” following the order of the supervisor at the plantation; law enforcement and the army only “inspecting-ish” at the proximity of the fires; the cases are quick to be dismissed even though there were arrests; “no response (to reports), maybe because we are just farmers (...), only the officials get addressed;” “we also burn, but not as large as the company;” the current difficult livelihood as a conventional farmer and rubber-tapper

5. Melayu performers, Riau; vocal group

“We have failed to keep them (the children) safe”; the blood of generations contaminated; “do not point the fingers” because “we” all the adults are responsible, “Disaster is not a discourse!”

### Table 7. Key arguments of the advocates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name, agency/ office represented</th>
<th>Key arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.  | Azlaini Agus, Riau community figure | **Introduction:** The timeline of the Haze appearance and the air index measurement; “I evacuated my two grandchildren with their mother to Jakarta, (…) but how many people of Riau have the ability to flee to Jakarta;?” “millions of us are exposed to the Haze day and night; public figures met with the governor and had dialogues; the Minister of Health stated that “the evacuation should be carefully considered as they would cost a lot;” “as if we were not a part of NKRI;” the Haze has been disrupting since 1997; “there has never been a systematic effort to eradicate the fires;” “we are extinguishing the fruit of the labour of the businessmen (…) and the government cash out the people’s money to extinguish it;” “Regents and mayors were too busy (…) with the elections, so they forgot about the smoke;” the criteria for the local government to declare the state of emergency included total paralysis of flights, where in fact the flights never ceased even in the thick haze.  
**Challenging Charliyan from the Police:** “Riau in 2007-2008 had zero (hotspot)” because of the “assertiveness” of the then Riau Chief of Police; “regional police chief should not be sitting close to the
businessmen (…) treating them as golden children;” “the people know it is the companies who burn the land and loot the timber;” “there are police oknum (individuals) who are convicted (…) no need for Bapak to get offended, it is a fact.”

2. Al-Azhar, the Chief of the Customary Association for Melayu

**Introduction:** The fire has been predicted since 70s, when the government defined Riau as an area of natural resource exploitation; from 8 million ha of Riau land, 5 million ha is owned by 200-300 individuals while the rest is for 6 million of Riau residents; “Riau is no land for the people, (…) (but) only as a natural resource supplier;” “try to imagine” the customary land of Melayu getting claimed by communities without consent; there is the issue of land conflict between the indigenous communities and corporations; mismanagement of peatland causes the disaster; what happens in Riau is now spreading to neighbouring provinces;” discussion about plasma farming program which exchanges money for land instead of land ownership sharing; “we don’t do nothing, we complaint;” “our customary land in all history has never been acknowledged by the Indonesian government”.

**After two hours into the show:** Previous speakers spoke as if the smoke will be no more; “are we thinking solely for the economy or also about the humanitarian issues?;” “where is the State’s responsibility for the civilization?”

3. Basrizal Koto, Riau public figure

Introduced Al-Azhar as “the president of the Free Riau;” “we do not want to separate from the NKRI, but over the despair of the way the central government treats Riau, which is very unacceptable;” 2.7 million ha of Riau is covered by palm oil, while the smoke “reaps a soul of a child, one person, and 43,000 others got respiratory disease;” “the corporate owners have never cared about them;” there has been little change from the government; “alhamdullilah (…) our president went to Riau only briefly, never been staying overnight;” “we wish the central government to feel what we feel in Riau”.

4. Dharmawi Aris, the Chief of the Institute for Melayu Riau

**Introduction:** “I base my speech on the true facts;” “the governor has got no brain, (…) so is Madam Minister;” in the election, the governor did not think about the “future,” and so did the congressmen who travelled overseas; “there are many sons and daughters of Riau who can lead Riau,” but the bureaucracies deny them because they do not have any money; “80% of plantations in Riau do not have permit (…), tax is not paid;” all regents in Riau are corrupt; “Ade Plantation” has not been arrested; “I sent away 7 grandchildren (…), how much did it cost?;” the Minister of Health forbade people to go to work, but
| 5. | Made Ali, Forest Rescue Network (JIKALAHARI) (ILC 2015) | **Introduction:** BNPB and the local government “have forgotten the people, too busy putting the fire out;” “the ultimate arsonists of the land is cukong (financiers, often associated with Chinese-descent financiers) (...) who may be the police, the Army, or councilors;” the companies said that they lost their land, but a report from Serapu village shows that the burnt land has already been planted; “Ade Plantation” ordered its employees to burn; “the government allows the smoke to keep on recurring (...), after the rain came, they forgot and keep on silent;” 17 companies repeatedly offend the law by burning, but the government was silent.

**Responding to the defense of the corporate association:** The companies do not need to obtain a permit to burn from the government officials because they can certify it themselves; “we found a fact that in 2014” that a concession was on fire. The same concession was found to be readied for planting in 2015. |
---|---|---|
| 6. | Munhur Satyahaprabu, Forum for Environment Indonesia (WALHI) (ILC, 2015) | **Introduction:** At the peak fire in 1997-1998, WALHI and fellows mobilized all abilities to put out fires; realization that firefighting does not address the structural problems, which are the policy and law enforcement; of almost 9 million ha of Riau, 6.8 million is owned by corporations, 1 million is national park, and only 1 million left for the people; there is no single aid from the central government in Central Kalimantan; no audit to industrial permit; the ones responsible are the owners of concessions; the government are too busy creating the discourse of looking for perpetrators and redirect the blame to the...
farmers and communities; 117 corporations involved in 2013 including “Ade Plantation;” WALHI demands permit revocation, and the land returned to the State for recovery.

**Responding to the defense of the corporate associations:** Open access area is the responsibility of the permit holder, thus the misuse of it “should not create a stigma that the people are the ones burning the open access lands;” “the denial that no company burns” should be countered by cases of court verdicts, i.e. Kalwista Nature company; the cost to clear the land depends on the type (peatland or mineral) and is not as cheap as the corporate association said; “80%” of hotspots happen in peatland.

| 7. | Zenzi Suhadi, WALHI campaigner (Mata Najwa, 2015) | The burning is a collaborative effort of damaging the forest or peat; the people are only operators following the order of companies; a huge percentage of burnt concessions are owned by individuals, but they have never been arrested; two scenarios of burning: Getting permit then burn the forest, or burn so it’s declared critical and legal to be owned; by burning, companies force local communities to exodus; critical land should be restored; the government legitimizes and protects the crime; the government’s neglect to citizen reports has been found in 28 provinces that are covered by WALHI; “the police and soldiers become the vanguard to beat up the people who oppose the companies”; the Haze is secondary, the real issue is the struggle for space; the voice of the people must be considered in the implementation of Act 32 about concession permit; the permit issuance is usually booming close to elections; WALHI is setting lawsuit and hoping to win “if the judge is objective”.

| 8. | Agustinus Gusti “Nugie” Nugroho, WWF-WALHI ambassador, singer (Mata Najwa, 2015) | The smoke disaster has emerged in 1999 and still has been a problem until now; “there are the politics, businesses, interest;” “all nature exploitations are done for the fulfilment of the consumers;” “we don’t need to blame someone, it’s tiring, but do it from yourself (…) (by using) hashtags fight against the smoke, (…) buy what is fair;” “if the consumers are against buying (the unfair products), the companies would be closed”.

| 9. | Ratna Sarumpaet, ‘social media activist.’ | Inviting “all the people of Indonesia to see this smoke problem (…) with humility, sympathy, willingness to introspect;” the government officials are complaining, and proud of the firefighting program, but no result; the State is the one burning the forest because it has no action and not present; “the duty of the State is to protect the entire nation;” spreading the investment opportunities to the private (corporations), especially foreigners, should give a blessing to the people;” question about where the tax has gone; people as victims; “what are the congressmen doing;” “do not talk about headache because (you) cannot (sleep);” |
the development of the Constitution is wrong, it should have favored the people by Pancasila, but was politicized by the parliament

| 10. | Widjojo, a professor | “The arsonists are humans;” definition of lawful state; the State has failed to provide a good and healthy environment to the people in accordance with the constitution; “(Indonesia as) a lawful state has been transforming into a grocery market state, (…) like no man's land;” the haze is a state-sponsored crime of terrorism due to its characteristics, but in fact never been seen as so; “26 million people become victims” of the haze; we have not seen the heads of regions or offices that reflect poor environmental performance to be fired even when it's legal; inviting customary leaders to file a lawsuit representing the victims, and request help from other NGOs; the disaster has been felt by neighboring countries but has not been declared as national disaster; the disaster “is actually the State’s thanksgiving (syukuran);” the State has all means to eradicate the fire, but it just chooses not to do that; “this is the international conspiracy;” challenging Singapore and Malaysia to file a lawsuit against Indonesia at the international court, but believing that they would not dare due to their own involvements; challenging the ministries to announce the names of the companies and the products, so that the people can boycott them |

| 11. | Gabriel, a professor | The smoke problem in Riau is more serious than the smoke from cigarettes; it needs more attention from the government; the public has rights to the forests and rivers and giving the power to the State to manage them for their welfare – therefore “the repeated incidents of forest fires (…) show the State’s failure to be faithful;” the government must do license audit, spatial planning, and land use reviews; the government needs to pay “real attention to the rights of the indigenous peoples in every place” |
The attributions

Initial analysis of the key statements throughout the dataset reveals that there were two types of attributions of roles commonly found throughout the two talk shows. One is the assigning of roles based on a binary, that is, the moral terms of victim and perpetrator. The other is the attribution of perceived hierarchical credibility that can be seen by how the participants’ opportunities to talk were ordered, that is, from the representatives of the ‘common people’ to the government and academics.

The binary nature of how groups in conflict frame their own and others were also evident throughout the talk shows studied. Noor et al. (2009) argues, 

*Members of the groups involved in a conflict are likely to perceive the victim identity as dichotomous and nondivisible. Only one group—either the in-group or the out-group—can be the “real” victim of the conflict (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008a, 2008b). Furthermore, given their general motivation to maintain a positive in-group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), group members are likely to cast their in-group in the role of the victim and their out-group in the role of the perpetrator (p. 354).*

Likewise, the media and most of the participants defined a collective of people or people groups as the “real” victims and the other collective as the perpetrators. In the case of the 2015 Indonesian Haze, the first group included a Victim from Riau, a Victim from Pekanbaru, and an ex-arsonist from Sumatera. The second group to whom the participants attributed the role of perpetrators included the corporations, the government, and its apparatus. Furthermore, the community leaders and activists of non-government environmental organisations took the role as the advocates for the victims and the challenger for the perpetrators.

In Part 1, I have outlined the classification of participants found on the initial analysis, as well as the attributions the media and participants gave to their in-group and out-group. The following three parts present how victimhood, blame, and defence is discussed throughout the talk shows.
Part 2: The discourse of victimhood

Consistent throughout the talk shows is the view that humans are the victims of the Haze, as well its perpetrators and heroes. This first section is dedicated to exploring the co-constructed Victims, the victimhood of non-Victims, and how they were claimed, disputed, and defended. Also, this section explores how diverse groups of participants portray their sufferings as directly or indirectly present within the Haze.

In identifying the victims, Zur (2008, p. 6) explains that people who designate themselves as victims have some common psychological characteristics:

Victims are likely to attribute the outcome of their behaviour to situational or external forces rather than to dispositional forces within themselves. Low self-esteem, a sense of shame, guilt, helplessness, hopelessness, and an internal sense of badness are integral elements in the psychology of those who perceive themselves as victims.

Zur (2008) continues to argue that the behaviour of victims is enacted, consciously or unconsciously, to get the benefits that come with the status of being the victims. While the sufferings of the victims are apparent, the benefits are often subtle and implicit, including the right to empathy and pity, lack of responsibility and accountability, and moral righteousness. Lindorfer (2009) echoes that the aid industry works based on this logic, giving priorities of help to the representations of innocence, generally women, children, and the elderly.

In Part 2.1 below, I discuss how the media allows victimhood to be co-constructed as a social and political practice by the media, the host, and the participants. It is organised in three sub-sections according to how the media, through the hosts, structured, albeit implicitly, the participants based on the degree of moral innocence and the level of social hierarchy:

1. The ‘Victims’ who were seen as the innocent and had no control over their suffering;
2. the ex-perpetrator turned ‘Victim,' who was once an active participant who caused the fires; and
3. the ‘non-Victims,' who were seen as having some degree of control toward the structural pre-conditions that allow the fires to happen at the first place, including the community leaders, representatives of environmental non-government organisations, and the government officials and apparatus.
Part 2.1: The Victims
The ‘Victim(s)’ (with capital ‘V’) refers to the specific speaker(s) who attend the talk shows as the victims of the Haze. They were introduced as members of the public who live in the areas directly affected by the Haze. Their identities were co-constructed by the media, themselves, and the other participants as the people who attribute their sufferings and behaviours to the external forces and those who narrate their experiences with a sense of helplessness, hopelessness, and dependency on others, especially the State agencies. They were implied by the hosts as the innocent because they did not take part in the forest-burning and were deemed to have little or no social or political power to change their realities. The Victims were always the first participants to be introduced and to speak at the beginning of the talk shows analysed. Based on the order of introduction, the Victims of the Haze were the children, the local men, and the ex-arsonist.

The children
The first Victims who were introduced in both ILC and Mata Najwa were the children. They were expectedly seen as the idealised victims and thus set a proper stage for the proceeding discourse of victimhood. A group of Melayu poets and singers showed a photo of a toddler in a hospital bed as “one of the thousands of children who are on the verge of death” (ILC, 2015, 00:07:30) then proceeded to emphasise the victimhood of the children as they sang. Mata Najwa chose to present a video montage of sick children at the beginning of the show (Mata Najwa, 2015, 00:02:07). Mukhlis, one of the ‘victims’ spoke in Mata Najwa, showed the audience his five years old daughter’s photograph, even though the late daughter passed away at the age of 12 (Mata Najwa, 2015, 00:05:31).

The men
Despite the glorification of their victimhood, however, the children were never present in the talk shows. Instead, they were discussed and represented by the adults who spoke on their behalf. Specifically, the media summoned males with families, aged 30s-40s to represent the Victims of the Haze, and thus positioned them as the main co-creators of the discourse of victimhood.

Both shows presented Mukhlis, a local journalist from the urban Tenayan Raya, Pekanbaru, Riau as the first participant to speak. While ILC only introduced the
Riau resident Mukhlis as the sole representation of the Victims, Mata Najwa introduces the second Victim from Kalimantan: Nurhadi, a rural Palangkarayan resident. Mata Najwa also invited Muhammad (nickname “Mat”) to share his experience as a then-arsonist and now a farmer and a Victim of the Haze.

**Mukhlis**

Mukhlis (presented only by his first name) is introduced in ILC and Mata Najwa firstly as the father of a daughter who died, and secondly as a resident of Riau. The girl’s name is Muhanum Anggriawati, a 12-year-old “Elementary student” who passed away in Arifin Ahmad Hospital, Pekanbaru, on 10 September 2015 due to “breathing failure” (Mukhlis in ILC, 2015). Mukhlis was only ever given an oral explanation of his daughter’s symptoms which led to her death. He has never received any formal medical record from the hospital (Syukur, 2016). Despite the lack of medical explanation, Mukhlis firmly believed that the Haze was the single trigger leading to Anggriawati’s death. This belief is shared by the mainstream media, which introduced Mukhlis as the father of a child victim of the Haze.

In 2015, Indonesian Lawyers Club and Mata Najwa invited Mukhlis to the show as the first speaker on September 22 and October 14 respectively. Both Ilyas’ and Shihab’s first invitation as the host was to ask Mukhlis to tell a chronological story of his daughter’s death.

**Shihab:** I want ... I want to go to Pak Mukhlis first. Pak Mukhlis, err / your first daughter ... died?

**Mukhlis:** Right.

**Shihab:** Um / can we know the chronology and whether they are related to this dense smoke, Pak? (Mata Najwa, 2015)

Now I am addressing you Mukhlis. Mukhlis, who’s being said that his daughter died due to the smoke in Riau. When did it happen? (ILC, 2015)

Mukhlis proceeds to tell the story in chronological order, starting with the showing of symptoms which included breathing difficulties, the seven days of hospitalisation, to the death of Anggriawati. To end his story, Mukhlis had different conclusion remarks in ILC compared to Mata Najwa. In ILC, Mukhlis ended his story with a medical diagnosis given by the doctor in the hospital, which was “breathing failure” and “lungs covered by mucus”. In Mata Najwa, which was
hosted three weeks later, Mukhlis stated “breathing difficulties” as the cause of
death, then proceeded to conclude that the daughter was “called by Allah” and that
the death was “the will of Allah”. In responding to Mukhlis’ different conclusive
remarks, Ilyas and Shihab took a different route to explore Mukhlis’ story further.

In ILC, the host Karni Ilyas tried to keep the following conversation focused on the
medical explanation of Mukhlis’ daughter’s death and how Mukhlis could be
certain that the Haze really caused the death. Ilyas did not ask the name of the
daughter and referred to her as only “anaknya” (his child). Consequently, when
Mukhlis was inquired about the girl’s age, he felt the need to introduce Muhanum
Anggriawati as a “6th-grade elementary student at 171 Primary School, the City of
Pekanbaru, Tenayan Raya.” Mukhlis then once again re-told the chronological story
of his daughter’s sickness and death, before Ilyas asked him to confirm his belief:

_Ilyas: How do you give assurance that/ or doctor give certainty that the
cause of her cough was the smoke blanket and not the others/ for example,
it might be the lungs ... (she) contracted a lung disease. How can it be
assured by the doctor that it was (caused) by the smoke blanket?

Mukhlis: Err ... In principle, it was not ... It was not [inaudible], but
regardless, the situation at that time when my daughter was coughing was
certainly (because of) the smoke blanket Pak. I noticed it. Moreover, on the
normal days when there was no/ alhamdulillah, she was very healthy.
Almarhumah (the late daughter) was very healthy.

Ilyas: No, the doctor, what did the doctor say?/

Mukhlis: The doctor's explanation at that time was indeed he said breathing
failure.

Ilyas: Breathing failure, just that.

Mukhlis: Yes. Medical [inaudible]

Ilyas: And caused by the smoke blanket? Or is it you who conclude that the
smoke caused it?

Mukhlis: Probably (it was) the trigger, Pak. (...)_

As evident in the quoted transcript above, Ilyas thrice pressed Mukhlis to give a
scientific and expert-based confirmation to the direct cause of death. Mukhlis gave
his understanding based on the doctor’s vague statement about the symptoms and
not the cause, in addition to his observation of the environment at the time of his
daughter’s showing of symptoms. Ilyas failed to find the expert opinion that he was
seeking and did not ask further questions but immediately moved away to Azlaini Agus, a Riau female community figure to give further context to the Riau’s Haze.

Three weeks after his presence in ILC, Mukhlis attended the Mata Najwa talk show. This time, Mukhlis brought with him a childhood photograph of his late daughter and introduced her as “pretty smart”, “an inspiration to do better and better”, and an anti-smoking advocate since young. Interestingly, while Anggriawati was a 12-years-old teenager when she passed away, the photo shown by Mukhlis was of her at the very early age of 5. The father could have brought the most recent passport photograph of Muhanum, from her recent academic report sheet if he had wanted to.

In contrast to the ILC’s focus on hard facts, Mata Najwa host Najwa Shihab enquired of Mukhlis about how he gave meaning to the Haze. Mukhlis sees the death as the inevitable “will of Allah”, which he can only “pasrah” to and “ikhlas” with (submit oneself and give it up). He sees grief and blaming as inappropriate, and that the proper response to his loss is to “support the government and volunteers” and to “let them work”.

Mukhlis: If you want to make sense of it, all is respective to the will of Allah ... and we can only pasrah. But if the trigger is smoke, I invite ... representing all, parents ... who dwell in this Indonesia ... Especially the ones affected by the smog ... If there happens .., we do not need to gri... er ... grieve deeper. However, let us support the government, the ... volunteers /

Shihab: You are not blaming .., not blaming others, not blaming the local government, not blaming the ones / the ones... er / the ones causing this haze?

Mukhlis: If we always blame, Mbak, the problem will never end. But let them work ... and Insha Allah if Allah is ridho (if Allah’s willing and let it happen)

Shihab: You surrender it up (ikhlas)?

Mukhlis: Insha Allah, remain surrendering it up (ikhlas). Anything. Because we are only waiting as well when we are going to [inaudible].

This section about Mukhlis observes a contrast between the co-construction of the victimhood of Mukhlis in ILC and Mata Najwa. In ILC, the dialogue between Ilyas and Mukhlis was focused on the hard, expert-based facts surrounding the daughter’s cause of death. The theme was intended to prompt the responses of other high-profile participants sharing the table, which included community figures, NGO representatives, government officials, medical officers, and academics.
Consequently, Ilyas framed Mukhlas’ grief and suffering to fit the expectations of the experts present. This prompted Mukhlas to try to reclaim the humanity of his late daughter by stating her name and who she is. However, after his first speaking opportunity, the host Karni Ilyas did not give Mukhlas any further opportunity to comment or respond to the other speakers’ comments. However, the repression of Mukhlas’ personal narrative was observed to take a toll when a chief medical officer of Riau tried to give another interpretation to Anggriawati’s cause of death. This will be the focus of the next section.

In Mata Najwa, the conversation explores more of Mukhlas’ personal perceptions as a victim and how he copes with the death of his daughter. Mukhlas shared the table only with other Victims from Kalimantan besides the host herself, creating a more secure space for him to explore his perspective as a grieving father. By framing his experience religiously, showing his support instead of blame, introducing his happier memories of his daughter, and showing the daughter’s photograph at a very young age, Mukhlas co-constructed a memory in accordance with how he wants him and his daughter to be seen and remembered by the media and society, that is, as a morally good and innocent Victim of the Haze.

During the time discussed above, Mukhlas enjoyed a space as the first speaker on both ILC and Mata Najwa, and as the presumably innocent Victim, he enjoyed the relative convenience of not having to answer, clarify or challenge the statements of other guests of the shows. It is the other participants who were obliged to give answers to his victimisation. In ILC, a community representative and some government officials acknowledged Mukhlas’ victimhood by offering Mukhlas their condolences.

However, both ILC and Mata Najwa limited Mukhlas’ participation as a victim to his initial appearance only. The next hours were given to high-profile guests who would exchange expertise-based facts and interpretations with each other in an increasingly heated discourse. In ILC, as other experts and government officials started to cut across each other and speak without being invited, Mukhlas the Victim sat silently as a recipient and listener.

Two hours into the show, Riau’s Chief Medical Officer Andra Sjafril told the show about his interpretation of Anggriawati’s cause of death:
I immediately contacted the president director of Arifin Ahmad Public Hospital (...). The information was found that this beloved daughter was indeed suffered from respiratory failure due to comorbidity, which is TB meningitis. TB meningitis with body weight, so there was malnutrition as well.

In a similar manner, as he did to Mukhlis, Ilyas asked Sjafril if the trigger of the symptom “may be” the smoke, of which Sjafril twice confirmed. Here Sjafril did not deny the possibility that Anggriawati’s death was caused by a respiratory failure led by the smoke, but did give another interpretation he claimed to be officially sourced: A comorbidity of Tuberculosis Meningitis and malnutrition. The diagnosis is important because it disputed Mukhlis’ claim and the media’s belief about the cause of Anggriawati’s death.

Tuberculosis Meningitis is not a disease of the respiratory system and thus cannot be due to the breathing of toxic air. It is caused by a bacterial infection in the central nervous system. Ramachandran (2014) argues that the disease is common amid poverty, lack of public health infrastructure, lack of medical research to prevent and cure, and the co-epidemic of HIV. The indication of malnutrition could have prompted further critical questions about the contribution of the poor socio-economic environment to the death of Anggriawati. However, the talk show quickly dismissed this issue, never to be mentioned anymore.

Sjafril’s second confirmation satisfied Ilyas, who then moved on to other participants. However, Ilyas’ decision was found to be highly partial. While Ilyas normally gave opportunities to the other high-profile speakers to reply to each other, he gave no chance to Mukhlis, the Victim, to respond in the light of Sjafril’s new interpretation. Mukhlis sat silent for 20 minutes and two speakers after Sjafril’s remarks.

However, thirty minutes before the closing of the show, Mukhlis cut into Ilyas’ schedule. After apologising for the interruption, Mukhlis spoke:

I am the parent of the victim ... to Mr Andra yeah ... Try to open the hearts ... of us all ... If it was [vibrating voice] my daughter that was convicted as TBCmitis, try to feel / feel me who has lost a child, please. And this has also spread in the media the statements of doctor Zeli (?) and Mr. Andra, as the Chief Medical Officer of Riau Province ... I have forgiven, but tonight it (the matter forgiven) has been opened once again. The SOCIAL IMPACT to my life in Riau. Please help me Pak. I beg you, I be/ ... This is the voice of my heart/ BY THE NAME OF ALLAH AND RASUL! I am a religious person and ...
Two questions arise from this statement. Firstly, why was Mukhlis offended that Sjafril “talked like that,” which required him to “forgive” Sjafril and urge (the audience) to “open their hearts”? Secondly, what was the significance of Mukhlis’ religious declaration in his response to Sjafril? My answer to the first question is that Sjafril has unwittingly given Mukhlis’ daughter’s death a new name and meaning implying that her parents were irresponsible in the face of an understandable and preventable death. This in turn created a disequilibrium in Mukhlis’ worldview of his daughter’s death as caused by an unknown power, which was the “breathing problems.” Mukhlis interpreted Sjafril’s diagnosis as a challenge toward his accountability as a parent.

The second question can be addressed as to how Mukhlis chose to represent himself as a counter to the media’s representation. Interestingly, Mukhlis’ response was not constructed to justify the legitimacy to his claim about the cause of his daughter’s death. Instead, Mukhlis tried to legitimate his identity as a victim and defend his interpretation toward his daughter’s death. First, he called to the “hearts of us all” as the one “who has lost a child”. Mukhlis used the social resources available to him, which was the moral reasoning. Secondly, Mukhlis used the metaphor of a grave. Mukhlis has “buried” his late daughter, both literally and psychologically. A grave is a sacred place in Indonesian and Islamic traditions. The grave “has been opened once again” because of Sjafril’s interpretation. Mukhlis was offended by what he believed to be the desecration of his daughter’s grave, urging Sjafril, “Do not say it.” Thirdly, he announced himself as “a religious person” who “have been religiously educated.” Mukhlis named “Allah and Rasul” as his witnesses to further justify his position religiously. In addition to “Allah and Rasul”, the media itself also becomes his defence. A quick electronic search on Google search engine with keywords Mukhlis OR asap (smoke) OR Riau shows that mainstream media maintain legitimation to Mukhlis’ belief of his daughter’s innocent death due to the Haze.

Through this second series of the statement, Mukhlis claimed his rights to be perceived as morally right. He interpreted Sjafril’s diagnosis of his daughter’s death
as a threat to his moral image and accountability. In response, he defended it religiously and sent a veiled curse before closing his remarks:

*Do not be pleased with, with what you have said. Do not. Dear Allah, I pray that it will not touch your families. I cannot even imagine, please.*

Apparently, Mukhlis’ defence and his prayer were deemed uninvited by the other participants in the forum. Ilyas gave no response to Mukhlis defence and provided no time for Andra to respond to it. Ilyas saw Mukhlis’ response as unnecessary, saying. “I think you can understand,” and immediately moved to another speaker without another word. Furthermore, Mukhlis’ decision to speak for himself seems to have changed how the other participants viewed him. Before he spoke up, he received condolences and expressions of sympathy from the other speakers. However, after the incident, they were no more.

*Nurhadi*

In addition to Mukhlis, Mata Najwa invited a second Victim, Nurhadi, a resident of Mantangai Hulu, Kapuas, Central Kalimantan to speak as a representation of the Haze Victims in Kalimantan. His presence and Mukhlis completed the portrayal of Sumatera and Kalimantan as the most affected areas by the Haze. Nurhadi was introduced as a member of the public who had undergone arduous travel from his village in Kalimantan to be able to speak on the Mata Najwa show in Jakarta. He rode for 7 hours in the middle of thick haze before boarding a flight to Jakarta. Nurhadi had seemingly attracted the attention of Mata Najwa through his participation in citizen journalism. Mata Najwa showed Nurhadi’s Facebook videos of the everyday situation in his village in the rural Palangkaraya during the Haze. Nurhadi’s voice narrated them, reporting on the atmospheric conditions and showing images of the people affected by sickness.

When Shihab asked if Nurhadi and his community wear masks in their daily life during the Haze, Nurhadi answered that they “never wear a mask, because the mask has never been aided.” He proceeded:

“So, the people are just pasrah (resigned to the higher power), yeah. Every year there would be fire, which makes the heavy smoke like this. Just enjoy it.

Nurhadi’s statement was unexpected by Shihab, prompting her to probe into it. Nurhadi answered:
Well... what else can we do, isn't that so? Because the people do not have (...) masks, and do not have oxygen (tanks), like what people have in the urban areas, right? Still, good for them if they could buy. (...) However, when it comes to us in the village ... say we imagine ... want to buy, buy where? Don't even talk about oxygen, yeah? Even the masks we want to buy, buy where? So yeah, pray it's like, a habit (normalcy) all right, for the people to breathe the air of a smoke haze like that.

What does this statement imply about how Nurhadi sees suffering? Firstly, Nurhadi “enjoys” the Haze because it is something that is inevitable and cannot be changed, something that has been normalised by the people because of its recurrence. Shihab understood this answer. The host had no further question about what Nurhadi as the Victim does about the unavailability of masks in the village, or why he felt that he should wait for them to be helped. By her silence, she has agreed to the claim of innocence and the non-responsibility of the Victim.

Secondly, Nurhadi also interpreted the suffering as a sign of social and economic inequality. The community is forced to breathe toxic air without defence because they live in rural areas with limited access to breathing aids such as masks and oxygen tanks. Beyond what is said, Nurhadi expressed a sense of alienation he felt when the poorer and more remote villagers did not get the same attention and protection as the people who live in richer urban areas.

The references to social and economic inequality were unfortunately left unexplored. In Nurhadi’s next comments, he expected practical, remedial economic solutions towards the health problems he sees. Nurhadi’s five family members had been sick because of the smoke. Instead of something preventive, he felt an urgency for both the local and central government to alleviate the immediate burden of health cost and attend to his loss of livelihood:

(...) at least can attend to the condition of the people ... so (they) can build health centres, that can serve (the people) at no cost. (...) honestly, I feel that burden. (...) I feel the weight of the cost, because (I) have to spend high expenses, to be able to heal the family. Meanwhile, the life in the village is tough nowadays. Because there are many plantations of rubber, then the rattan plantation, which is now on fire.

Nurhadi has used his social media account and his exposure on Mata Najwa to show the reality of his suffering. However, as a representative of the communities in rural Kalimantan, he perceived the Haze as something unalterable. This belief disempowers him and, according to his testimony, his community, to provide self-
help as simple as providing masks in the village. In addition, Nurhadi raised the issue of alienation and social inequality between the urban and rural citizens, which contributes to the poorer health of the rural communities. Nonetheless, the resignation to his unchangeable condition makes him no longer hope for any fire prevention measures, but instead for the government to give immediate remedial assistances in forms of free health care and economic aid.

Part 2.2: Muhammad, the former perpetrator turned Victim

The third participant to speak at Mata Najwa was Muhammad (only stated by his first name). Muhammad was introduced as a “former land arsonist” who resides in Ogan Komering Ilir, South Sumatera, a district which had contributed the highest number of fire alerts in 2015 (Global Forest Watch, 2015). He was a farmer at the time of the show but worked for a company in 2007. Shihab was interested in learning from Muhammad how the burning was done.

Shihab: Okay. What’s the story? How is the burning done?

Muhammad: (...) the burning was at noon. Ah, at noon (we were), escorted by... a kind of firefighters... So that it did not spread to another place, is not it? [Shihab: mm-hmm.] So it could be bitten by bit. However, now not anymore. Since there... there is... regulation... err... Who burns ... is fined five million to 15 million, yeah? Well if we are farmers ... do not dare, Mbak, to burn that...

Shihab probed further and asked about “the order”:

Shihab: Pak Mat at that time / m / the ... who ordered to burn?

Mohammed: Well it was our boss, Sindar...

Shihab: The Supervisor at the plantation?

Muhammad: Yes.

Shihab: How large was the burnt area, Pak?

Two points can be observed from this short passage. First, both Shihab and Muhammad describe the burning as something being “done” and “ordered.” Both used passive verbs to detach Muhammad, as the then-arsonist, from his responsibility and active participation in the event. The activity of setting the fires was merely following the order of the “management of the plantation.” Secondly, Shihab could have asked further questions about Muhammad’s motive at the time.
It could have shed some insights into the social and psychological circumstances that allowed the active participation of local farmers in the company’s burning activities. Instead, the conversation quickly moved on to the statistics of the burnt area and how the soldiers and the police protected the activities. These two insights aim to attribute the responsibility and blame for Muhammad’s past activity as solely the responsibility of the company and the protective State apparatus.

Consistent with the analysis of Zur (2008) toward the psychology of the victims, Muhammad also believed that he was voiceless, unheard, and thus, helpless. This was shown when Shihab interviewed him about the Police’s treatment towards “Sindar” (Muhammad’s boss) and the management of his former workplace:

Mohammed: Yes both of them were taken to the local police ... but not/

Shihab: However only a few days there?

Mohammed: Just a few days.

Shihab: The case then has no follow-up?

Mohammed: No follow-up.

Shihab: The people ever / ever reported, Pak Mat and the other farmers ever / ever reported officially, never complained, this burning ... is blatantly done under the daylight?

Mohammed: There had also been a report, Mbak. Just ... there was also no response ... Maybe we ... because we are just farmers, perhaps? Would it ever be addressed when (we are) just farmers? Only the officials get addressed, Mbak... When it comes to us, we would not.

Shihab: So never been responded?

Mohammed: Never been responded.

After a period of dialoguing with Suhadi of WALHI, Shihab returned to Muhammad to ask about his current livelihood. Muhammad is now working on his land, tapping rubber and planting potatoes. Shihab asked Muhammad, “Now (are you) still able to work the field even in a situation like this, or is it already hard again?” Muhammad told Shihab that the work was somewhat “stagnant” and while the farming activity was still being done, there was no production from the land except rubber tapping. Muhammad’s gross income in such a situation was Rp 200,000 (NZD 21.5) weekly. On hearing that, Shihab responded:

Shihab: To live like that yeah, 200,000 per week. So indeed, this smoke makes Pak Mat difficult to... to earn isn't it Pak?
Muhammad: Yes.

Shihab: The impact has been so great. Are there any of your plantation which is affected by the fire Pak?

Mohammed: For now there is not...

Then after a brief exchange about how Muhammad had to watch over his land to prevent wildfires, the conversation was ended.

In this second section of the Shihab-Muhammad conversation, Shihab tried to establish the victimhood identity of Muhammad and empathised with Muhammad’s current situation. She described Muhammad’s life as a small farmer as “hard” (susah), and that the Haze made it “difficult to earn.” “The impact” of the fire “has been so great,” however for Muhammad, the former arsonist; the impact was not so much on his health or families as it was for Mukhlis and Nurhadi, but upon his source of income.

Muhammad was firstly introduced as a former perpetrator who took part in a company’s slash-and-burn practices in 2007. He was expected to testify about how the burning was done and protected. However, throughout the conversation, Muhammad maintained his innocence by underplaying his role as merely following the order of the company. His motive of obedience, unfortunately, remained unaddressed. In the later part of the conversation, Muhammad’s took the role as one of the Victims. Muhammad believed that he was powerless to change his circumstances. He and Shihab then tell his story as a traditional farmer who suffered due to the Haze. However, unlike the other Victims, Shihab focused on the former arsonist’s current financial situation rather than his health and family.

Part 2.3: The victimhood of the community leaders

Victimhood gives the claimant entitlements to empathy, pity, non-responsibility and moral innocence. The talk shows had defined and introduced the Victims of the Haze, giving them the first opportunities to speak about their victimhood and for all other participants to respond. However, in the case of the Haze, victimhood was claimed by almost all participants.

This section discusses the discourse of victimhood framed by the community leaders. The representatives of the corporate associations and State agencies claimed victimhood too, but because of the defensive nature of the claim, it will be
addressed in *Part 3: The discourse of blame* and *Part 4: The State’s answer*. Also, dealt with in *Part 3* is how the representatives of non-government organisations defended the victim status of “masyarakat” (the people) and put the responsibility solely on the corporations and the State.

ILC invited four community leaders to speak on behalf of the indigenous communities, all of them representing Riau’s Melayu communities. There was no community leader from Kalimantan invited to be on ILC or Mata Najwa. The first three speakers expressed the sense of alienation felt by the people regarding the Haze. The key arguments of the Riau community figures presented in ILC are included in Chapter 4, Part 1, Table 7.

The first speaker after Mukhlis’ interview as Victim was Azlaini Agus, a female community leader. Agus questioned the government’s response to the haze when it was asked to evacuate the vulnerable communities. She quoted the statement of the Minister of Health: “The evacuation has to be thought carefully because it takes a price.” Agus expressed her “deep grief” after the Minister of Health comment:

As if we (the people of Riau) who are exposed to the hazardous smoke for weeks were not a part of this nation. As if we were not a part of the One Republic of Indonesia. (…), we feel like we are no one. What I meant is that if the government cannot help us, at least please empathise with our fate. If we are really a part of this nation.

At the end of her statement, the audience applauded her.

Agus’ nationhood rhetoric signifies the sense of alienation and exploitation she felt toward the government’s perceived neglect of the welfare of the people of Riau. Ilyas further strengthened this relationship:

*Ilyas: “Madam, are you native to Riau or a descendant?***

*Agus: “Native, Sir.”*

*Ilyas: “What are you getting from the palm oil?”*

*Agus: “Nothing, Sir.”*

*Ilyas: “Nothing? [audience laughing] No, I asked this because Riau is pitiful. The funding for Five Repelita (Five Years National Plan of Development) (…) comes from Riau’s oil. Riau got nothing.”*

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3 Indonesian: “Keturunan”. In the context of this conversation, it refers to the descendant of migrants.
Agus: “Got the smoke.”

Similarly, Al-Azhar, the Chief of the Customary Association for Melayu, and Dharmawi Aris, the Chief of the Institute for Melayu Riau also discussed the alienation theme:

*Our land, the customary land, in all history has never been acknowledged, the customary land in Riau, by the Indonesian government to this day, Bang Karni (Al-Azhar in ILC 2015).*

*So Riau is somber looking. Indeed, from the beginning, until now, truly being dianaktirikan (treated as if it is a step-child) by the Central (Aris in ILC 2015).*

Al-Azhar saw that ultimately the fires were rooted in the advent of corporations and concessions to land and resources, and the influx of migrant workers that they attract to Riau. The ‘outsiders’ were deemed incapable of stewarding the peatland and combined with careless licensing; they were the ones to blame for the fires.

*Try to imagine the adat community, by the next week there would be signposts on their house yard, that the A Corporation owned this now, the B Corporation owned that, and they have never been asked to discuss their own adat forest and land. (...) tenurial imbalance (...) causes what is called as the conflicts of trimatra (the Indonesian term for the three spheres of earth, sky, and water) (...) especially in the surrounding areas of corporation activities (...). The conflicts of trimatra between (...) the adat people who feel that it is their traditional rights (...). Now the second, the migrants, the migration, the people who came from outside Riau coming there and see the opportunities given by the forest and land (...) Well, the peatland in Riau is vast, and she needs special handling, but in the permits, she was seen as the same with mineral land ... For the adat communities, the peatland is not a choice to be worked on.*

In response to Al-Azhar’s statement, Basrizal Koto, a Riau public figure jokingly named Al-Azhar the “President of Free Riau” (President Riau Merdeka). Ilyas responded, “Free how? Want to rebel?” Koto then gave his clarification after a laugh with the audience:

*So merdeka (freedom) means this Bang Karni: We do not want to separate from the Republic and NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), but over the despair, the despair (because of) the way the central government treats Riau, which for us is very unacceptable to the communities in Riau.*

Koto’s statement was very short, but there are some keywords worth exploring. “Merdeka” roughly means “free.” It is a slogan used in Indonesia’s fight for
independence against colonial powers in the 1940s. On the other hand, “NKRI” (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) is a popular nationalist slogan commonly used in conjunction with “harga mati.” The whole slogan translates as “the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is the price of death,” or “at any cost.” Historically, the cost is usually violence, as seen in Aceh, East Timor, South Maluku and Papua (Hobson, Bacon, & Cameron, 2014). It is commonly used by the military to signify territorial commands and nationhood identity and to fight the acts of territorial division and separation (“memecah belah”) (Bunte & Ufen, 2008). Furthermore, Koto also discussed the dyadic relationship between the “central government” and Riau, with the “central government” portrayed as “treating” Riau in a “very unacceptable” way.

Ilyas treated Koto’s statement as a very delicate matter, although, Ilyas, half-jokingly, interpreted Koto’s discourse as separatism, a “rebellion.” He tabooed merdeka, not because of its irrelevance in the issue, but because it is impossible to overcome the power of the State. As argued by Hobson et al. (2014), Ilyas implied that any threat to the territorial integrity of NKRI would be answered by violence:

*The KPRI Riau also involved [Koto laughs]. Ismail Lengah was the name of the commander at the time. (...) (He) was only bombed once then lost. So never rebel.*

Dharmawi Aris, on the other hand, views the smoke as economically costly. He asked the audience to “imagine” how much the cost was to send away “seven grandchildren” from Riau during the Haze. He criticised the Ministry of Health’s advice to not do “outdoor activities” as nonsense, because:

*If the people cannot do activities, (they) cannot eat. Where can they get money from?*

Aris closed his remarks by telling the audience the story of Suryanto Bakrie, a Malaysian “investor” who went back home by pompong (a small passenger wooden boat carrying around 20 people on board). Twice he emphasized the “going home by pompong” to signify the humiliation this foreign “investor” had to bear in the smoke. His ultimate concerns are indeed the foreign “investor” and the “local economy of the people of Riau.”
Aris, like the three other community figures, put the blame on the government and companies but distance the responsibility of change from both themselves and the communities they represent.

Aris: Yes/At that time (the smoke) had started (to spread) at the time he was elected, with Andreas Makmur/in the smoke blanket (...). He should have thought about the future. How the smoke in Riau could have been prevented.....(...) The members of the legislative did the same. At the time of the smoke blanket like this, they go abroad. Also idiots (brainless).

[audience clapping hands]

Ilyas: How could the people of Riau vote for the idiots, then? [audience laughing hard]

Aris: There are still many sons and daughters of Riau who can lead Riau, Pak. However, the bureaucracies in the leadership itself make those who are still good get denied as leaders. Perhaps they have better track records, but they do not have money, they cannot be leaders... This, what you (Mr Ilyas) should highlight.

Ilyas: Well, then... err your people prefer to vote for the rich, is that what you said?

Aris, or other community leaders, might have taken up Ilyas’ challenge to the people’s participation in the government and policies. However, until the end of the talk show, the question was left unaddressed as the talk becomes more and more constitution and expert-based.

Throughout the statements of the community leaders of Riau, the fatalistic and non-responsible victimhood discourse was maintained. The community leaders offered no guidance for the locals nor the broader national audience to navigate the disaster other than claiming victimhood. The “good” people of Riau whom the speakers were representing were described as innocent, passive objects, unjustly neglected, alienated, even denied by the government and the rest of the nation. All the responsibilities then were attributed to the government and the corporations.

Part 2.4. Discussing the victimhood discourse of the Haze

The introduction of the Victims as the first speakers in talk shows is purposefully structured to provide a connection with the audience at home. The media portrayed them as ordinary people, fathers in their middle adulthood who were concerned with their families’ health and cost of living. They took the role of what Silverstone (2007) called ‘a doubling;’ they spoke for and represented themselves, but also on
behalf of the others. Through them, the media gave the Victims a space to speak, to connect or to be denied by the targeted audience who sat in front of their television screen.

Throughout both talk shows, the Victims self-portrayed themselves and were represented as passive, accepting, dependent, and cannot be held responsible for predicting, preventing, and liberating themselves from their sufferings. The Haze was represented as something beyond human control and as divinely-ordained. Consequently, menerima (accepting) and pasrah (submitting oneself) were promoted as a proper response to the suffering. Moreover, even when one of them was responsible for the fires, the activity was seen as merely following orders. Similar to the findings of Milgram (2004) about the agentic state, the participant and the media shifted responsibility for Muhammad’s actions onto an entity of authority, placing the burden entirely on the company. None of the victims tried to prevent the fires in their communities, and neither did they report or organise a community defence. The media also participated in the discourse, asking none of the Victims about their response toward the comments of other expert participants, or how they would proceed to act on their suffering post-talk. Separating the victims from the historical, socio-economic, and structural context of their anguish, the media fixate the victims into the past and strip them of the agency, eventually turning them into therapeutic patients (Weinstein, 2014). This has become apparent when the Victims were given a chance to influence the response of broader public and policy makers. They chose to give “support” to the other experts and expected economic relief from the government.

Departing from the discussion about the Victims, I moved to focus on the community leaders as representations of affected communities. Interestingly, while fires were raging in Sumatera and Kalimantan, only community leaders of Riau were presented. Themes of nationhood, alienation, and marginalisation of indigenous communities were prominent in the discourse, as well as the economic impact on local livelihood. These themes could have demanded a closer

\footnote{Forest fires also raged in Merauke, West Papua at the time the talk shows were broadcasted, but were not mentioned at all throughout the talk shows. The issue is addressed on Chapter 5 Part 3.}
examination of the broader contexts that allow the fires to keep propagating, and how the indigenous communities make sense of the fires. Unfortunately, they were quick to be dismissed as ILC host Karni Ilyas directed the show toward the discourse of blame.

The only interventions mentioned by the community leaders were “menuntut” (demanding) and bringing the issue to the government, as was told by Azhar and Agus in ILC. They were postulated simply as the experts who vouched for the communities. There was no mention of any of them organising the local communities to voice themselves or to protect themselves from the disaster, nor any effort to empower or educate the communities they claimed to represent. There was no evaluation of the factors that would motivate some members of the communities to be involved as the arsonists. All in all, while sitting as the experts and representations of Riau communities, the community leaders portrayed themselves and were perceived as the blameless representatives of the innocent victims of the Haze, while the responsibility of change rested fully on the State and the corporations.
Part 3: The discourse of blame

The discourse of victimhood and harm set the introductory phase of the talk shows. This provides a series of expositions build toward a point of the greatest interest defined by the talk shows’ main questions. For Indonesian Lawyer’s Club, the interest was evident in the title: “Who burns our forest?” For Mata Najwa, the main topic was subtle, as the issue was framed as a “Fight,” even though it was not against someone, but against the “Haze.” Either way, the initial discourse of the ‘good’ victims demanded a discourse of evil and blame. The following sub-sections discuss the discourse of blame and perpetratorhood and how the perpetrators were identified, challenged, and defended.

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Part 3.1. The companies

Most participants agreed that “corporations” are the main culprit behind the Haze occurrence. The word “perusahaan” combined with "korporasi" (both roughly translates to corporation or company) are mentioned 44 times in Mata Najwa and 109 times in ILC, most in the context of corporations being the perceived perpetrator. In fact, both TVOne’s and MetroTV’s editorials framed the Haze as being motivated by “corporate greed.” This theme of corporate evil has become the primary frame of the talk shows, an arena in which the values of “humanity” are pitched against the “financiers,” as expressed many times by the hosts and participants.

Addressed in the literature review were a handful of studies that pointed out that the forest burning activities were done by a collective of corporations and the “ordinary people” (Center for International Forestry Research, 2015; Guciano,
However, talk show participants were found to be focused solely on the first, while dismissing the possibility of the involvement of the latter. In fact, the ILC framed the corporations in this way in their introductory editorial, in which President Joko Widodo spoke:

*I have sent for and bestowed to the Chief of Police to take the firmest, the most ruthless action against the companies that fail to comply ... Once or twice we have sent the message. // Because in fact they must also be responsible for their right and left, honouring the rights that we have given to them.*

The partial blame was found throughout most of the statements where the “companies” were mentioned, except when the corporate associations were talking. Perhaps it was the most evident in Mata Najwa, when the host Shihab interviewed the former arsonist Muhammad, then turned to WALHI representative Suhadi for confirmation. Here Muhammad had named “Sindar,” his former supervisor, as the one who “ordered” him to burn. However, when Shihab asked whether the farmers themselves burned the land, he countered by saying “there is, of course, the burning (activities) but not as large as the company’s.” He continued to explain:

*Muhammad: When it comes to the fellow farmers the largest they would burn would only be two hectares. However, since there is this new rule earlier ... until now many fellow farmers have not burned any, Mbak ... Do not dare to.*

*Shihab: Do not dare to.*

*Muhammad: Do not dare to. Who is willing to shell out five million to fifteen million, Mbak?*

*Shihab: The company, they still dare to?*

*Muhammad: They do ... when it comes to that, nothing’s changed... With ... the rule. Hence they burn at night...*

To this answer, Shihab asked Suhadi from WALHI to confirm if “most of the arsonists” were farmers or the companies.

*Suhadi: If we look at the process of burning that was one part of the collaborative effort (...) even when the people do the burning, these people are only the operators.*

*Shihab: Operators? Like Pak Mat and friends back then, operators?*

*Suhadi: Operators. Acting operators.*

*Shihab: The ones following the order of the company?*

*Suhadi: Yeah, the ones following the order. (...)*

2015; Liljas, 2016; Nairn, 2015).
Indeed, both Muhammad and Suhadi did not deny the fact that local farmers were involved in the burning activities. However, they described the farmers as “do not dare” and merely “following the order,” thus presumed as innocent. Consequently, the potential discourse of the farmers as the active participants in the burning was suppressed, leaving the discourse of perpetratorhood exclusively focused on the companies (and the State). In fact, Riau community figure Agus thought it was a “public knowledge” that “it is the companies that burn the land and looting timber.” This pattern would be repeated throughout the discussion in both Mata Najwa and ILC.

The identification
Besides the pattern of selective perpetratorhood above, there were further interesting patterns found from how the corporations were identified as perpetrators. The first was discovered among the community leaders and NGO representatives. In ILC, when asked to give an example of the names of the companies allegedly responsible, a community leader and two environment campaigners were quick to identify, first of all, a foreign corporation rather than the national ones, in particular, the Malaysia’s Ade Plantation, Ltd. This company was not amongst the highest contributors to the fire alerts in the year (Global Forest Watch, 2015). In fact, the calling for “Ade Plantation” was always followed by the phrase “a Malaysian company,” signifying the foreign origin and thus adding the rhetoric of “international conspiracy” to the discourse. As Widjojo, a professor and participant of ILC conclusively remarked:

This (the Haze) is an international conspiracy that I’ve observed. Therefore I challenge the fellows in Singapore that Pak Karni had just me (...) You don’t need to complain about Indonesia, about the smoke. But DO FILE AN INTERNATIONAL LAWSUIT against Indonesia. At the international COURT. I am sure Singapore and Malaysia do not want that. Why? If they want it, EVERYTHING WOULD BE REVEALED. I’ve studied since 2003 that ALL CORPORATIONS involve those countries. Hence the ones arrested, punished, in the history THERE HAVE NEVER BEEN their major shareholders and the major directors who LIVE in the countries that love to complain.

The second pattern in the identification of the companies allegedly responsible was found among the representatives of the Indonesian Police. They constantly follow what they call “public disclosure regulations.” The regulations allow the Police to
state the companies responsible only by their initials. For example, in a press conference, the Indonesian Police Chief Baharudin Haiti stated:

Seven of them include PT (Ltd.) BMH in Kabutan ... South Sumatera and the suspect is named JLE. And the second is PT Roselin/ ... PT RPP in South Sumatera, with suspect P. And PT RPS in South Sumatera, the suspect is S. And PT LIH in Riau, the suspect is FK. And the fifth PT GAP in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, the suspect is S. And the sixth is PT MBA in Kapuas, the suspect is GRN. And the seventh is PT ASP in Central Kalimantan, the suspect is WD (ILC 2015).

The principle of non-disclosure was critiqued as a form of the Police’s protection toward the companies. The Police defended it as they were “only the implementers of the legislation.”

Ilyas: If I may know, who are the companies alleged?
Charliyan: 0, lots bang Karni, the companies / like what was delivered by Pak Chief of Kapolri, have been announced /
Ilyas: Yes but (...) that was only the initials
Charliyan: Excuse me Bang Karni, because we have regulations about the public disclosure, where there are things that need to be kept confidential, including about the suspects so that POLRI should use initials. (...) Ilyas: I think of the whole world no suspect is described only by initials.
Charliyan: There is Pak, in the public disclosure regulations.
Ilyas: No, in all / in the world / in any country in the world the suspects / Charliyan: But in / in Indonesia that is so, the legislations.
Ilyas: Yes it makes (you) being picky Pak [audience laughing hard in the background]
Charliyan: We’re (only) the implementers of the legislation so / [while laughing]
Ilyas: There are some who are named, there are some who are only in initials.

The identification by initials, interestingly, is unique to the Police institution. Other government representatives, such as Kemal Anas, a representative of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, were open to disclosing the full names of the companies whose permits had been revoked, including Hutani Sola Lestari, Langgam Inti Hibrida, Waringin Agro Jaya, and Tempirai Palm Resources. Consequently, Ilyas’ response to Charliyan’s non-disclosure was not unexpected.
Still, the quotations included above were the only times the “corporations” were identified as individuals. Ultimately, the corporations were named only in a general sense, a collective “perusahaan” (corporation, company). There was also almost non-existent discussion about what kind of “companies” did the burning, but there was seemingly a general understanding that they were palm oil companies.

The companies’ defence
To give an answer to the attributions of blame to the corporations, ILC invited two representatives from the association of corporations: Purwadi Supriyanto, the Executive Director of the Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires, and Eddy Martono, the Chairman of the Agricultural Sector and Spatial Planning of the Indonesian Palm Oil Association (GAPKI). Their comments were almost immediately moderated by the comments by NGO representatives Made Ali of JIKALAHARI and Munhur Satyahaprabu from WALHI, respectively (see Table 7). Unfortunately, there was no parallel data from Mata Najwa, which did not present any representative from the corporations on stage.
Table 8. Key arguments of the representatives of the corporate associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, corporate association represented</th>
<th>Points of arguments</th>
<th>So, who’s fault is this?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purwadi Supriyanto, the Executive Director of the Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires (ILC 2015)</td>
<td>“Hope you still remember (about our similar discussion last year);” open access area, not the tenurial imbalance, is the problem because it has no designation of use and thus is used for “illegal activities;” the spatial planning in Riau “is still messy;” “we should sit down together (…) we are equally responsible;” “this issue of fire cannot be fully burdened to the corporations;” challenging Ali of JIKALAHARI to check the annual work plan of the company to prove that the burning done by companies is according to the permit given by the government officials.</td>
<td>The illegal activities (allegedly done by non-corporations), the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddy Martono, the Chairman of the Agricultural Sector and Spatial Planning of the Indonesian Palm Oil Association (GAPKI) (ILC 2015)</td>
<td>Expressing sympathy and condolences to Mukhlis; “We have branches in 12 provinces with total acreage of 3.9 million ha, and 663 corporate members (…) so GAPKI members have 35% of total area of palm oil plantations in Indonesia;” “the palm oil industry in Indonesia annually contributes 20 billion USD;” only 14 areas of GAPKI members were on fire; “is it true that the palm oil companies burn their own assets (…) because obviously that is a production machine;” only IDR 6 million is needed to mechanically clear the land; corporate burning would not be done without permit and is impossible because the risk is too high; Global Forest Watch shows that “67%” of fires happen outside concessions; “it is unlikely that the farmers or the public flock to plant palm oil if it is not profitable.</td>
<td>(Allegedly) the farmers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Supriyanto and Ali

Supriyanto’s response could be summarised in one sentence: The issue of fire “cannot be fully burdened to the corporations” because “we are equally responsible in there.” Supriyanto pointed at the “open access area” as the “source of the problem” and “illegal activities.” He blamed the “messy” and “unresolved” “spatial plan in Riau.” He also challenged the “friends from JIKALAHARI” to proof allegations of burning activities based on the alleged companies’ Annual Work Plan (AWP).

The proceeding debate was as quoted:

Ali: There is what is called a self-profile in the annual work plan, it was certified by besides/ if the office chief would not certify, the company can certify the AWP themselves. We found a fact that in 2013 the company /2014 was on fire. It is sizeable / within the concession. Well, it is sure to be in the concession. In the AWP. Because the company is responsible for the concession.

Supri: Hold on, hold on a minute, Pak. In the concession or in the AWP.

Ali: In the concession and the AWP.

Supri: Well, HOLD ON

Ali: Yes I have not finished, I have not done, you asked me for clarification before. Yes, you / listen first. Well on the year 2014 it was burnt immensely. On 2015 August we went there, it was already covered / covered yeah / by plants / we have the drone Pak Karni / if (you) want to see it now I will show you. If we want to display it on / on / on the television, yeah, well, the / land burnt was already grown. There were shrubs; there were trees. It was cleared, land-cleared. It was about to be planted by the Industrial Plantation Forest (company). Of course, it was in the AWP. The end.

Martono and Satyahaprabu

Martono, the Chairman of the Agricultural Sector and Spatial Planning of the Indonesian Palm Oil Association (GAPKI), offered his condolences and proceeded to defend the companies. He firstly expressed his “sympathy and condolences to the daughter of Bapak Mukhlis upon her passing,” but abruptly moved on to an “explanation” to respond to the “noise” about “the palm oil plantation companies” who had become “the accused.” Martono then presented his arguments. Firstly, he clarified that GAPKI represented only 35% of the concessionaires.

We need to say first that we have branches in 12 provinces, Pak, with a total acreage of our branches of 3.9 million hectares, with the members numbering to 663 companies. All palm oil plantations in Indonesia cover
10.9 million hectares. Err so the members GAPKI has about 35% of the total area of palm oil plantations in Indonesia.

Secondly, he emphasised, “We also need to know, that until now, the palm oil industry in Indonesia, it annually contributes, 20 billion US Dollar.” In response, Ilyas retorted that “it is not our focus” and that the focus was on “who burns our forests”.

Martono further defended his and the associations’ position with two arguments that saw the company-sponsored burning activities as “ridiculous.” First, he questioned whether it was “true” that “the palm oil companies burn their own assets.” The plantations were seen as the companies’ “machines of production” and therefore were irrational to be self-burnt. Secondly, he argued that the cost of the mechanical land clearing was cheap, “6 million per hectare”, which was only “10% of the total cost from the start of planting until the harvest.” Therefore, he concluded that it was unlikely that the companies would burn their assets to save cost at the risk of termination and “tens to hundreds of billions” in fines.

Furthermore, Martono also claimed that the palm oil companies were “unlikely to be operational” if there was no permit to operate. He believed that the Chief of the Forest Service would agree to the reasoning. He furthered his defence by referring to data from the Global Forest Watch, that 67% of the fires were outside the concessions, and that only 8% happened inside the palm oil concessions (compare with the more recent statistic on Figure 5).

Martono then proceeded to talk about “the problem of plasma farmers”.

So, err... I am sure that the plasma farmers are not / meaning this Pak / it is unlikely that the farmers or the public flock to plant palm oil if it is not profitable. So, what happens now, the current situation, the price is dropping Pak. However, if it is normal, it can be up to 2 to 3 million or 4 million per month. For 2 hectares, especially if the price, conditions are right.
Martono’s statement was interesting as there was no apparent reason behind the unprompted comment about the economic profit of plasma farmers. Why did Martono need to point out that the “public flock to plant palm oil if it is not profitable?” One possible explanation is that Martono tried to subtly deflect the “accusations” from the palm oil companies toward the farmers and the public because the business is “profitable”. This explanation is supported when Ilyas rephrased Martono’s (and Supriyanto’s) statement in a response to another participant, that according to Martono, it is “not the companies who burn, which means, the people (masyarakat) outside the corporations.”

Satyahaprabu from WALHI made three arguments in response to Martono’s comments. First, he asked the audience to not be “distorted” by what was called “open access”. He pointed out the open access areas could be within or outside the licensed areas, and that the open access area inside the concessions was the responsibility of the permit holders. He called the “open access” status as the “creation” of the permit holders, and that it “should not create a stigma that the people are the ones burning on the open access lands”. Secondly, Satyahaprabu challenged “the denial of GAPKI” that “no company burns” by pointing out the Rp 300 billion verdicts toward PT Kalwista Nature in Aceh as proof that the companies were involved in burning activities. Finally, he disputed the 6-million price that was quoted by Martono as the price of mechanic-based land-clearing. He called for clarification over the type of land and said that the price to ready the peatlands for plantations should have been much higher. In fact, Satyahaprabu argued, “80%” of the fires and hotspots were found in the peatlands.

The exchanges quoted within this sub-section were only a glimpse of the debates between the ‘defenders’ of the victims and the representatives of the companies as the perceived ‘perpetrators’ in the discussion. For example, between these exchanges, there was Aris, a Melayu community figure who tried to show evidence of the involvement of corporations in the forest fires, and Al-Azhar, also a Melayu community figure who critiqued Martono’s focus on material gains instead of the human cost.

Nevertheless, there were critical insights gained from the exchanges. The representatives of the associations defended the corporations by using three rhetorical strategies: 1) Pointing out the financial benefit that the companies have
given; (2) being silent toward the corporate involvement in the forest fires; and 3) deflecting the blame toward the government’s poor “spatial planning” and the “farmers or public's” pursuit of profit. Indeed, Martono quoted that “8%” of fire alerts were inside the palm oil concessions. However, it was only half of the facts: The same report from Global Forest Watch (2015) reveals that the palm oil, pulpwood, and logging concessionaires as a collective have contributed 37% of the fire alerts during 2015. That fact should not have been dismissed as insignificant and instead was used to redirect the blame toward the non-corporations.

In contrast, NGO representatives objected against the associations’ defence by referring to legal principles and two proofs of corporate burning activities. Nonetheless, the NGO representatives were silent toward the possibility that the public could be involved in the burning activities and were quick to dispute the “stigma”. Despite their efforts to prove the “evil” of the companies, we should critically ask the NGOs: Why avoid discussing the involvement of the smallholders and farmers in the forest fires? An exploration of Martono’s referral to the (Global Forest Watch, 2016) data could have revealed the facts that smallholders were also involved in the forest fires. In addition, reports by the government officials in the talk shows showed that the number of arson suspects from non-corporations was towering. In ILC 2015, Charliyan from the Police indicated that from 78 suspects detained; there were only nine suspects who were members of corporations. Likewise, Labay from the Riau Provincial Forestry Office reported only one corporation among 48 suspects identified by the local police. These reports could have been used as a base to address broader structural and social issues. They could also have prompted an evaluation of the factors that motivate members of the public outside the companies, like Muhammad, to participate in burning activities. Instead, the campaigners quickly dismissed these possibilities as an effort to “stigmatise” the “people” (masyarakat).

The selective attention practised by the campaigners in the talk shows often happens when there is conflict. Lindorfer (2009) argues that non-government interventions are often driven by ideologies, which define the Victims and their priorities, that is, children, women, and indigenous communities. Similarly, I agree that the same set of ideologies might define certain kinds of groups as perpetrators, for example, multinational corporations, or the government of developing countries. According
to Lindorfer (2009), these ideologies are highly influenced by the Western aid industry which provides significant donations to champion causes of interest. Therefore, he calls for “a constant re-viewing of ourselves, our tools and methods, our implicit ideologies and our legitimising role of international power structures” (p. 365).

Part 3.2. The government and its apparatus
The second collective that was perceived as the perpetrator in the discourse is the State and its apparatus. While the corporations were viewed as the one’s directly causing the fires, the government was identified as letting the perpetration happened at the first place and then protecting it.

The government was accused of many things. Local government officials were seen as “amnesiac,” as they were too focused on the elections and firefighting instead of taking care of the people’s welfare:

“In Riau, the governor and the mayor are too occupied with their preparations for the regional elections in the coming December. So pretty amnesiac they are with the smoke, Sir, even in amidst the haze they are campaigning. That is one of the terrible things with us” (Azlaini Agus, Riau community leader, ILC 2015).

The Local Government has forgotten the people Mr Karni. The governors, regents, including BNPB, they have forgotten the people. They are too busy putting out the fire (Made Ali, Forest Rescue Network, ILC 2015).

The State was also seen as failing the trust of the people:

(...) A trust from the public, which gives power to the state, to manage all the land and water including the forests in Riau's for its people’s welfare. The repeated incidents of forest fires in Riau, or anywhere else, show the State's failure to be faithful to the trust given by the people of Indonesia (Gabriel, academician, ILC 2015)

The government was also seen as “forgetful” about their tasks and principles:

(...) The government allows the smoke to keep recurring. All right / allow the smoke to keep recurring. After a season of smoke had passed, the rain came, forgot, the government forgot, keep on silent. As if there was no incident. Though the PRIMARY task of the local and national governments is to fix the forestry management and repair the damaged peatlands. It’s their job / but it has never been worked on (...) (pay attention) to the context of burning. That in the ACT 32 refers / whether it is deliberate or negligence, it is obvious that the land may not be on fire / and the
government ... neglects it. (...) This 17 companies, in the 2014-2015 they burned again Mr Karni. The Government was again silent. 

(...) we have to remind the PEOPLE in the House of Representatives what are you doing after all this time, that is what we have to remind Jokowi, and all his cabinet (...) look behind, what is actually wrong? The development is in our Constitution, isn’t it? It should be favouring the people. The original Constitution FAVOURS the people because there is Pancasila there. / But it has already LOST because of the amendment, and to this day all of you brothers and the brothers in the House, brothers who ARE SAYING that they are leading the pol/ what / politics in this Republic they are pretending to be idiots. Pretending to be idiots, that our Constitution doesn’t favour the people. Doesn’t favour (Ratna Sarumpaet, social media activist, ILC 2015).

The central government officials were seen as not being empathetic toward the people due to their perceived distance and their neglect toward the spreading health problems:

(...) even the Minister of Health stated that “the evacuations should be carefully considered as they will cost a lot.” Well, we Riau people, Pak, were very upset with that statement” (Agus, Riau community figure, ILC 2015)

(...) The central government does not think, especially Ibu Siti Nurbaya, how many times I have expressed to Siti / Mrs. / Nurbaya. By email, by phone. She still rambles. WHAT KIND OF Minister is she, rambling around [audience laughing] ... That is not what’s expected, she should have seen, when the smoke was coming, she stood in the middle of the smoke. Pak Jokowi did the same thing. Should not have just rambled around on the television. (...) (he) came Pak only to the airstrip did not do anything / better don’t. (...) Go into the forests, only then he would know, how hard it is for the people, who can, even to breathe in is difficult (Aris, Melayu community leader, ILC 2015).

The respiratory tract infection has been... already more than 1,000. It is about 1,500. Moreover, now it’s been announced as a respiratory tract infection emergency but has received no aid. (...) in Central Kalimantan / Palangkaraya / there is no single aid from the central government (...) (Satyahaprabu, WALHI, ILC 2015).

In addition, the government is also seen as a “land-grabber”:

(...) the customary land is counted as the customary (communities’) investment to the companies/ but this is surely not in the viewpoint, in the point of view of the land clearing in, err, in this/ because the land is shared on the tables of the mayor, the governor, and the table of the central government, that’s it. Our land, the customary land, in all history has never been acknowledged, the customary land in Riau/ by the Indonesian government to this day, Bang Karni (Azhar, ILC 2015).
Supriyanto from the Association of Forest Concessionaires, while he did not explicitly name the government in his defense, stated the government’s planning as the root of “illegal activities”:

(...) the area of open access is the source of the problem. Because of what, in the zone of open access there arise illegal activities there. Illegal encroachment, illegal logging, fires etc. Because what / the motivation is very clear. (...) last year I had reminded (you) about the spatial planning. The area of open access, problem, yeah/ plus the spatial plan in Riau, which is still messy / unresolved.

In Mata Najwa, Muhammad observed that despite the presence and knowledge of the Police and the Army in the area of burning activities, they were “just inspecting-ish”. Muhammad believed that they were being paid, as did Aris of ILC believe about the regents of Riau:

There are many in Riau, Pak, 80% / 80% of the plantations in Riau do not have IUP (Plantation Permit) [waving a piece of paper to the camera and the audience]. Here, the authentic data. Inside, there is everything. TAX is not paid … It’s obvious, Pak. The ATM (automatic teller machine) of all regents in Riau (...).

In ILC, Agus of Riau expressed a similar critique toward Charliyan from the Police, calling for the “assertiveness” of the Police:

Riau in 2007-2008 had zero (fire), Pak Karni, [inaudible]. Because at that time the police chief of Riau … Sutjiptadi, he firmly told all corporations in Riau, that if there is fire, he will not crack down the arsonists, but asked for the responsibility of the corporations. It was calm, at that time. What does it mean, the assertiveness of the regional police chief (...).

State officials were seen as working with the companies involved in burning, even ordering the burning itself, as Ali of JIKALAHARI argued in ILC:

The ultimate arsonists of the land are the cukong5 (...) the financiers, people who have a lot of money, the ones behind the screen (...) may take

5 “Cukong” according to The Great Dictionary of Indonesian (KBBI) translates to “a capital owner”. However, the history of the term is lost in the official definition. “Cukong” is derived from the Chinese Hokkian word “主公” which originally means a leader, chief, owner, or a boss of a company. However, since the former President Soeharto rose to power in 1960s, the word becomes loaded with derogatory meaning. The Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 98) defines “Cukong” as “a Chinese businessman who receives protection and privilege from a powerful, often military, patron in exchange for business assistance and/or share of the profits.” Cukong’s successes are associated with the State’s patronage and it is said that “all or most successful Chinese businessmen were cukong for some degree”. Historically, Cukong were a major target of racial-
forms as ... the police. (...) The Army (...) the councillors, Pak Karni, these cukong, then they pay the poor (...). There is one decision of the District Court of Siak, that one of the perpetrators is the police / has been convicted, yeah, well he started with the encroachment.

Ultimately, the ‘invisible’ and failed State was declared as the main perpetrator and the most responsible, both by participants and the media.

The central government, provincial government and district governments, they have the authority, and by their authority, they must take action. However, this obligation has never been carried out. So the government has done a very fundamental offense, which is not performing its obligation to act. In human rights, this is called the obligation of conduct (Roichatul Aswidah, Commissioner of Komnas HAM, ILC 2015)

Although technically it was carried out either the people, either by err what / corporations, either by cukong, by whoever it is, but it remains that the one who has NO action, who makes the fire happens, it is because the State is not present. The state is not present (Ratna Sarumpaet, social media activist, ILC 2015)

If now we are asking the responsibility of WHOM primarily fails to provide a GOOD and healthy environment, that is the STATE institution. Because now the CONSTITUTION is not running, it means the government is unconstitutional. (...) The environmental and humanitarian CRIME in this smoke issue is A C-RIME of terrorism. This is an ecological TERROR allowed by the STATE. Moreover, when THE INSTITUTION does not do that, then our suffering is COMPLETE. (Widjojo, professor, ILC 2015)

The attributions of fault against the government were launched by not only the participants from the non-government origin but also some of the government officials themselves. For instance, Minister of Forestry and Environment Siti Nurbaya recalled a story about her “encouragement” toward the governor of Jambi:

When I called the governor, I even got an answer that... this / do/ Bu, according to / err .... staff, according to the offices, according to to... our bureaucracy ..., This has not been in the emergency situation yet.. Then I say, oy, Pak... Governor, you should know that this condition has already been precarious, you do ... ess ... finish it, discuss it, and make a decision about this emergency preparedness, OR I WILL DECLARE AN OBJECTION with your performance as the governor, and I will convey it to Bapak President.

Based resentment and hostility in various riots in Indonesia both during and in post-Soeharto regime (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 98). For further reading on Cukong, see Choy (1993) p. 286-318.

Seeing that Ali had specifically used the term “cukong” instead of simply “pemilik modal” (financier, capital owner) or other more neutral terms, one may ask: Why did he do it? Was Ali’s statement racially prejudiced, albeit unconsciously so? If so, what would be the impact to the broader television audience adopting the discourse?
Toward the end of the session, Nurbaya compared the president and the governor and regents and found the latter two disappointing.

(Bapak President) does impromptu visit (blusukan) and meets the people, I had been thinking and dreaming that THEY WERE DONE BY THE GOVERNOR AND the regents ...

There was also a tendency of several government officials to state problems or weaknesses that they themselves are responsible for solving, in a way that shifts the responsibility to the other government agencies. This is done by using sentences without subjects as if the situation was seen through the third person point of view.

We found three examples to explain the case. Firstly, Charliyan from the Police saw that the “sanction” and “regulations were not strict enough,” despite his responsibility as a law enforcer. The uttered sentence had no subject, thus creating an ambiguous referral to non-Police government agencies. The second example is when Fadrizal Labay, Head of the Riau Provincial Forestry Office, said:

So we hope, the smoke that had been disruptive, which has / caused a casualty for my good friend, Pak Mukhlis, it is an issue that must be immediately resolved by the local government. And of course with the support of the central government Bang.

At the time, Labay attended ILC to represent the governor of Riau. However, Labay was found urging “local government” to solve the “disruption” despite his position as a part of Riau’s local government.

The third example came from Pasludin, a parliamentary member the Standing Committee for the Haze. He stated:

These fires ea / is .. a shared responsibility. Yeah? The joint responsibility of all, so… the House of Representatives encourages … so that in the upstream we create a change revision of … our legislations like that. We see that in the environmental legislation … 32, 2009, there is an article saying that people are allowed to burn two hectares of forest.

Consistent with the pattern from the other two examples above, Pasludin is a member of the State’s legislative body, whose task is to amend legislations. However, his only respond was to “encourage (...) the upstream.”

The participants on the talk shows, including some of the government officials, perceive the government and its apparatus as the main perpetrator of the Haze. The State was deemed as ‘amnesiac’, unfaithful of the people’s trust, distant, and even
invisible. In addition, the government was seen as land-grabber, as well as neglectful and protective of illegal activities.

Part 3.3. Discussing the discourse of blame
This chapter has discussed how the companies and the State were identified as the ‘perpetrators’ of the Haze, and how the companies defended themselves. While the two were discussed as two separate entities, the wrongdoing of one always co-existed with the others. In that light, the government is accused of acting as the protector of the crime and the corporations as the criminals themselves. For example, Azlaini Agus, a community figure of Riau accused the regional police chief to be “sitting too close to the businessmen who burn the land” and “treating the businessmen as golden children”.

Suhadi of WALHI named it as an “organised crime” by “a collaboration between the government and the businessmen”. He explained the “scenario” of how the companies and the “mainstream government” worked together to “get a concession”. First, the corporations and the businessmen force a community to move out from its living area by burning the area. The regulations of the Ministry of Forestry would then designate the burnt forest area as a “critical land,” and thus it would be allowed to be “forced into production’. The corporations proposed the release of the burnt forest for its critical status and made the burnt area a concession. This “crime,” told Suhadi, was not without opposition from the communities, but the State helped to silence the efforts systematically. When “from 2005 to 2015, 734 people who want to save the forest … fought against the companies,” they were persecuted up to a rate of “20 people per day.” Suhadi summed:

(...) The government is the one legitimising the crime to be done, and there is no law enforcement process against that offence. (...) When there is a company who commit a crime, the police, the soldiers become the vanguard ... to beat up the people who are against the company. (...) The discourse of blame extends to include the neighbouring countries, as Widjojo said in ILC

I’ve studied since 2003 that ALL CORPORATIONS involve those countries (Singapore and Malaysia). Hence the ones arrested, punished, in the history THERE HAVE NEVER BEEN their major shareholders and the major directors who LIVE in the countries that love to complain ... then processed by the law. Except for the staff and employees (...).
My own field experience supports this conclusion. On March 2016, I travelled to two cities in West Kalimantan to meet a group of academics and visit a WALHI office. At the time, Police signposts were set around the cities to warn “masyarakat” (the people) of the fines for land-burning. Adam, a WALHI campaigner, accused the signposts as misleading and as an effort to “erase” the agricultural tradition of the indigenous Dayakese communities. They argued that indigenous farmers if they were burning, would only “do a measured burning” up to 2 ha in a “mineral land,” a practice which has been done for “hundreds of years”. It is seen as environmentally safe and does not involve peatland burning. Thus, Adam, a WALHI activist argued that it was “impossible” that the “ritualised” agricultural tradition caused the Haze, and that only the big corporations could create such massive damage.

The blame toward the companies, however, was too limited in a presumption that someone must have directly started the fire. This makes the case against the companies too weak and easily countered by satellite surveillance data showing that the majority of hotspots appeared outside the concessions. In fact, a short documentary by Greenpeace indicates that peatland fires can be caused indirectly by corporate activities (GreenpeaceVideo, 2014). Large enterprises have been notorious for canal digging to drain water from peatlands and make it easier to be planted on. However, the method has no way of containing the drained area only to the companies’ concessions, and thus it can extend beyond the concessions and to the land of the communities. Once dried, the peatland becomes very vulnerable to the heat of dry seasons, making spontaneous ignition that much more possible. When the land gets burnt, it also becomes more prone to recurrent fires in the future and tough to extinguish. Without the protection of water, the flame could still be alive undetected a few meters below the ground. Ironically, the State adopted the same canalization method to limit the fire spread, which was criticised by environmental conservationist Kalaweit (2015) as making the problem worse due to water draining.

The allegations that the Haze is the fruit of the crime of the State and the corporations were indeed supported by numerous researchers and press, as well as the consensus of participants in both talk shows. It is curious that the victims and advocates were quick to make “impossible” another potential contribution to the
problem, the slash-and-burn practices by the farmers and smallholders. As revealed in the findings, only 34% of fire alerts happened in the area of known corporations (Global Forest Watch, 2015). While Suhadi from WALHI could have argued that the fires outside concessionaires were started by the corporations to begin the process of changing its status to critical, the possibility remains that the fires could have been initiated by the traditional slash-and-burn practices by local communities. Given these possibilities, discourses of blame and victimhood require interruption and redirection toward introspection and responsibility-taking, and analysis of broader structural and socio-economic interpretations.
Part 4: The State’s answer

While participants of the talk shows concluded that the government is the primary one to blame for the Haze, it is also trusted as the only one able to solve the problem. This is evident through the last messages of Mukhlis and Nurhadi in Mata Najwa and ILC. Mukhlis was thankful for the government’s “support” and encouraged the audience to support the government (ILC, 2015). Nurhadi also hoped that the government lowered the health cost for the areas affected by the Haze.

We also sincerely hope, yeah, with the government. Be it the regional government or the central government... in this case, of... err/ this smoke blanket, err/ at least can attend to... err... the condition of the people... so (they) can build health centres, that can serve (the people) with no cost. Because it does, honestly, I feel that weight. Five people have been... what/ err... sick because of... this smoke (Mata Najwa, 2015).

NGO representatives and community representatives, on the other hand, put high trust in State systems. They made lawsuits their first strategies, even when they were not so trusting in the fairness of the process. It is from these groups that the State received the most critiques as well as advice. The media followed and gave government officials more screen time to give answers than that afforded the other participants and the public.

How did the government representatives respond to the other participants’ expectations and critiques? In the next section, I explore how the State was portrayed as both victim and problem solver.

Part 4.1 The government as the victim

As previously addressed in Part 1 of the Discussion, the claim of victimhood garners responses of empathy and pity, freedom from responsibility and accountability, and ultimately, a degree of moral righteousness. Consequently, the rhetoric of victimhood is often used to justify and defend a moral position in the discourse, even by people of power such as government officials.

The head of Riau Government’s Liaison Agency of Jakarta, whose name was not shown on the screen, raised his voice to answer Aris’ statements. Aris had previously stated that several government officials “have no brain”. It later became known that the official's name was Doni Aprialdi. He countered Aris:
Actually, at this event, we're looking for solutions are we not, Mr. Karni. It is not for listening to useless rant. Telling people having no brain and so on is not right Brother Karni. We know Mr Governor, Mr Danrem, Mr Police Chief Mr Karni do not sleep, we know that. Likewise, the allegations that had been accused by this brother of ours, that BNPB deceived the public, it's incredible – the salt, the helicopter flew Bang Karni. So we wonder, in fact, who is the one brainless Bang Karni. [audience laughing in the background] Did he ever go to Riau during this haze. To my knowledge, he resides in Jakarta. The same as me. I am the Head of Riau Government's Liaison Agency in Jakarta. Anytime Mr Governor went to Jakarta, I must have certainly accompanied (him) for meetings anywhere. It includes the last meeting led by the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security in the Ministry of Madam Siti Nurbaya. So it's not true, Madam Minister was awesomely not sleeping Pak Karni we know it. Every second, every moment she was called by the President. The President is also concerned about the Riau smoke.

Three points of interest can be observed in Aprialdi’s defence: First, he framed the discussion as an effort to look for “solutions” and not for “listening to useless rant”. This response is similar to that of Charliyan of the Police, who saw the critiques toward the government officials as “provocation” and “searching for a scapegoat”. Like Aprialdi, Charliyan presented his argument by describing the “POLRI’s effort” to fight the fires: “70 special investigators”, 700 mobile brigades, 4,512 “troops”, and one 90-person unit. This description was also aimed to counter the opinions that asserted that the President and the Chief of Police “do not care”. He then proceeded to convey his defence:

There is a loss already, a loss, then fire, then err what else / there is (someone) who burns the situation (make provocation, getting the situation heated), then there is another, who burns hearts, what else, opinions are burnt, eventually it would be inflamed right, so here eventually pointing at each other, searching for a black goat (kambing hitam, scapegoat in Indonesian). (...) Probably we should not look for a scapegoat, let alone this smoke is so hard (making it all hard) (...)

Both Aprialdi and Charliyan saw that “searching for scapegoat” does not help to find the “solutions”. They argued that the government officials have done all they could to alleviate the problems. In addition, Charliyan also saw that both the government and the people had become victims to the Haze. Aprialdi went further to argue that the said government officials lacked sleep due to the hard work. The Minister of Forestry and Environment Siti Nurbaya was described hyperbolically as “awesomely not sleeping” because “every second, every moment she was called
by the President”. Anas from the Ministry of Forestry and Environment later echoed Aprialdi’s statement, explaining that the Minister has done a “marathon job”, even having “discussions with the experts and so on” up to “half to three in the morning”. Thus, they concluded that the government was “concerned” about the Riau smoke despite the allegations otherwise.

The theme of sacrificial “sleeping” was also used by Fadrizal Labay, Head of Riau Provincial Forestry Office, who was seen as representing the Riau governor who could not be present in ILC. Labay praised the Riau Forestry Office task force who held briefings “every day”, which were reported by the press, and

(...) have been working to the maximum, (...), day and night they have been working, our officers in the field have also been sleeping in the meadow, in plantations, on the soil, to improve the current situation.

Throughout his session, Labay praised the governor, the president, and the works done by the Central government and Riau’s. Labay apologised for the absence of the Riau governor, because “he still collaborates with the task force there in the province of Riau, with Pak Danrem and fellows from BPPD of Riau province”. Labay also explained the President’s actions in Riau during the forest fires, which included daily travels and “giving birth” to canal blocking solutions. Furthermore, Labay also described the hard work done by the government, including “water bombing aircraft”, “weather modification technology”, and a “16-plan of actions” implemented by Riau’s governor and the “48 suspects” who were identified.

Nevertheless, critiques can be made against the cases mounted by the three government officials above. Firstly, the three only mentioned what the government did to fight after the announcement of emergency status. They did not mention any effort made by the government or its apparatus to prevent the emergency happening in the first place. Secondly, their responses, despite the seeking-for-solutions rhetoric, did not offer any solutions but instead centred on counter-accusing the critics. Aprialdi questioned if Aris did “ever go to Riau” during the Haze, and in response did exactly what Aris did: accused Aris of “brainless”. Likewise, in Charliyan’s defence for the President and the Chief of POLRI, he alleged that the critics were “someone who burns the situation (...)”, who burns hearts”, a provocateur in short. Thirdly, by interpreting the ILC discussion as an arena to “look for solutions” and prohibit pointing fingers at the government
officials who had worked so hard, they misinterpreted the overarching question of the ILC show itself. It was clear that the ILC was titled, provocatively, to find “who” to blame. Lastly, the “looking for solutions” and anti-scapegoating rhetoric were also only used as a means to defend themselves, but not to offer any real solution. For example, they offered nothing to address the accusations that the government has protected unethical corporations and detained activists who opposed them.

Part 4.2 The government as the expert and problem-solver
As the discourse of the Haze found itself relying heavily on the government to provide answers, government officials were found throughout to assume the role of problem-solver. Several examples have been discussed in Part 4.1, which show how three government officials praised their superiors and institutions’ firefighting efforts as a defensive response toward various allegations expressed by other participants of ILC. In fact, the listing of firefighting and court processes was almost a default answer chosen by government officials in the shows (see Table 9 below).

However, three critical observations can be made from these statements of government officials. First, all participating agents of the state were focused on remedial, curative interventions, which can be further classified into two: a) firefighting and b) coercive, retributive law-based processes. These interventions were chosen as a reactive response to the perceived immediate and directly visible issue at hand, the fires, and the resulting Haze. The absence of fires and Haze were seen as the only measure of success. Thus, the government used big figures and stories of heroism to signify the scope of the government’s interventions. Also in focus is administrative sanctions and lawsuits against the perceived perpetrators, the “big companies”.

Nevertheless, many key concerns of the other participants were left unaddressed. There was nothing said about the broader, structural issues raised by the community leaders and NGO representatives, including systematic marginalisation of indigenous communities and the covert corruption of government officials. There was also no focus on the Victims’ concerns of the inflating health cost and loss of livelihood. Government officials also failed to respond to the corporations’ critiques, including the “messy” spatial plan. Prevention of future fires was
discussed only as ideas of legislative amendments, which were being “encouraged” at the time.

Secondly, none of the government officials admitted any responsibility or possibility of the Government contribution to perpetuating the fires and Haze. As shown in Table 9, many central government officials preferred to redirect the blame to the local government in addition to the companies. On the other hand, the local government officials tended to be silent or, as Labay did comment on the case from the third-person point of view. They were not adverse though to boasting about big numbers and “first-time” achievements as a valid response to critiques.
Table 9. Key points of the response of government officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, agency/ office represented</th>
<th>Responding to the critique about:</th>
<th>Points of defence</th>
<th>So, who’s fault is this?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purwonugroho, National Agency for Disaster Response (ILC)</td>
<td>Slow response from the government</td>
<td>“Assisting local governments” in 6 provinces; water bombing and weather modification, “17 helicopters, 6 aircraft”; hotspots had been decreasing in 2013-2014; working together with “BPPD Scientific Biz” and NASA; “we can be evaluated” by joining us in the weather modification flights and GPS tracking; “2,909 military personnel have been sent, also thousands of local army and police”</td>
<td>BNPB was always ready to respond to an emergency. The local governments were the ones late to establish an emergency alert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charliyan, the Police (ILC)</td>
<td>“POLRI does not care” about the fires</td>
<td>Big figures of burnt area, hotspots, cases handled by the Police in 2015, significant fines and penalties; “70 special investigators”, “700 mobile brigades”, “4,512 other troops” by the command of the President and Chief of POLRI</td>
<td>The companies neglected regulations; “non-availability of omissions” from the companies, communities, and government; excessive drought; “cultural problems”; sanctions “not strict enough”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labay, Riau Provincial Forestry Office (ILC)</td>
<td>Complaint of Aris that the President never stayed in Pekanbaru and that the government had “no brain”</td>
<td>The President went to 3 different places and stayed overnight; task forces held briefings “every day” and worked “to the maximum” and slept on the field, led by a military commander and “my good friend Edward Sanger”, Chief of BPPD; “information is available to the public”; “every day” there are press reportage; members of parliament had joined weather modification flights; some numbers of hotspots update; “16 action plan” of the governor and “governor act no. 15”; “48 suspects” identified by law enforcement</td>
<td>“It is an issue that must be immediately resolved by the local government.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anas, Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Administrative Sanction</td>
<td>Absence of the Minister of Forestry and Environment</td>
<td>The Minister was currently on a trip to Kalimantan and Riau; “task force”; figures of hotspots, which shows that 2015 hotspots were fewer than 2014’s; law enforcement, implementing Act 32; “the first time” termination of three companies and their names; “marathon job” of the Minister, discussions with the expert until 2.30 in the morning; gathering data through “clarification, verification, ground checking”; “190,000 ha” covered by the Ministry’s intervention; some regulations about canals</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utomo, Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Dispute Resolution</td>
<td>The Minister of Forestry and Environment “does not care”</td>
<td>Three law enforcements applied: Administrative sanctions, criminal and civil lawsuits; “even on Sunday we are checking in”; “this is the very first time” that the Minister suspended companies and terminated their permits</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry (Mata Najwa)</td>
<td>“The government is too late.”</td>
<td>“Canal barriers”; “encouraging and reminding the local government (…) and businesses”; story of a call of “encouragement” with the governor of Jambi, Sumatera; “I normally react immediately” to the critical air quality; requested “a reformation of bureaucracy” to the “friends in bureaucracy” to make regulations more “responsive”; “second line enforcement” which gives the Minister the right to intervene on the absence of the local government’s response; “400-ish” companies investigated, with three companies had been terminated and 23 others processed; the administrative sanctions were the “FIRST TIME” done; Rp 7 trillion lawsuit</td>
<td>Local government, including regents, mayors, and agencies; legal process or legal documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasludin, the House of Representative, standing committee for the haze</td>
<td>The recurrence of the Haze</td>
<td>“Encouraging” a revision of legislations “in the upstream”</td>
<td>The big companies, the board of directors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perhaps the culmination of the government’s denial and silence toward corruption took the stage when Agus of the Riau community confronted Charliyan of the Police. Agus compared the current corrupt Police performance with an “assertive” Riau Chief of Police who achieved “zero” forest fires during a short term of 2007-2008. Charliyan then reacted to “defend” his institution “everywhere”. He disagreed with the use of the term “the police” used by Agus, and emphasised multiple times that the corrupt ones were “oknum“ whom they “will surely fire”. Charliyan quickly argued that the Police as an institution could not be “accused” as they “also fought for our freedom”. That being said, he failed to mention any data about any of the Police member(s)’ involvement, did not admit the fact that members of the institution were involved in the corruption until confronted, and insisted on blaming the “oknum” instead of naming the perpetrator as within the institution of the police.

Lastly, due to the very narrow and focused nature of hierarchic interventions, the government officials failed to see local and national communities as partners. “Masyarakat” (the people) were portrayed as the victims and occasional perpetrators, and community leaders and NGO activists were marginalised, in favour of State-employed meteorological experts and foreign agencies such as NASA. Thus, the whole discourse of the State could be summed up as a heroic narrative, where they are cast as heroic and superhuman in their efforts.

Part 4.3. Discussion of the State's discourse of the Haze

The State was seen as the ultimate perpetrator and resolver for most participants in both talk shows. It is the most criticised, but also the only institution seen as capable of striking a new direction beyond the Haze and into healthier environments and lives. In their answers toward various accusations and challenges, government officials have defended their moral innocence through enumerating the enormity of their response, narratives of hard work and verbal refusal to lay blame other than that mentioned above, of the “oknum.” Their discourse emphasised curative, post-

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6 “Oknum” translates as an individual member of a collective or institution who is seen as an outlier to the collective or institution. The term is commonly used by modern Indonesian to distance the rest of the group from the rogue or shady person (Arnez & Sarnowsky, 2016), and in doing so, maintain the good image of the collective.
disaster firefighting and retributive justice narratives of “catching the bad guys”. However, in doing so, they have been silent on deeper structural and societal issues that concern the people the most, including corruption, the people’s welfare, the marginalisation of indigenous communities, and mismanagement of forest areas. These unaddressed concerns were in fact seen by other participants as the embers which allow the fires to recur from time to time. Finally, the discourse was focused solely on the official narrative of what the State has done, while effectively excluding the people and their advocates from active multilevel partnerships.

Ironically, the problem of burning and the Haze and all that is implied therein continues to remain. The embers are still alive.

A summary and postscript
On March 2016, in the early months of my thesis study, I returned from New Zealand to Indonesia. I took a trip to Pontianak, Kalimantan Barat, to get a better picture of the forest fires and the perspective of Dayakese communities in the city. Although it was not a formal aspect of my study, it was informative to my thinking about and analysis of the data collected.

It was my first time to Kalimantan. All my life I had imagined Kalimantan to be lush and green, the last remaining native rainforest in the world, a picture formed by encyclopaedias, documentaries, and my years of local education in Java. However, as my plane touched down, I could see that the land had been covered by palm trees.

It was clear that the fast-developing city of Pontianak had been built for the economy, not for the environment or its 573,751 residents. Much of the city’s original ground is peatland, which had been drained and burnt for residences and infrastructure. The city is designed for vehicles, most of them are motorcycles, with very few pedestrians and even less public parks. Except for the main streets where government buildings and malls are located, smaller streets are broken and full of holes with standing water. Every year the local government has a street repair project, only to have the same problem the next year. Construction projects are ever-present in the city. Every several kilometres, the government has installed banners and signage telling the people to not set the land on fire, threatening offenders with
jail time and fines. Even in the rainy month of March, tap water is scarce, brown and has a distinct smell of iron. Rain is, therefore, a welcome relief which allows families to reserve rainwater in tanks and cemented ponds built in their house yards. Still, come the dry season, households must buy water in containers from the water trader carts.

My visit to the Pontianak library in search of local material about the Haze was unfruitful. Pontianak City Library, though crowded with students on laptops, did not hold, in my view, adequate information to provide the public with the knowledge they needed to know about their own location and environment. Ageing local newspapers were piled tall in corners, still tied in plastic ropes. Librarians ate snacks on working hours while chatting with friends. When I asked about materials for the thesis, they just pointed me to a cabinet of random political magazines. Alas, local reading material, albeit also ageing, could only be found in private home libraries, such as that held by one of my hosts Albert, a Dayakese academic and campaigner.

On March 13, 2016, I joined a small Dayakese intellectual community in a discussion trip. They tried to help me make sense of the forest fires and how they keep on repeating. Along with a WALHI campaigner whom I had met a few days earlier, they defended the innocence of Dayakese communities, by stating that Dayak customs for slash-and-burn practice is wildfire-proof due to its highly-ritualised, controlled, and small-scale nature. While they argued that their customary agricultural life was threatened due to the State’s sanctioned ban on burning, they reached the conclusion that the forest fires were not the struggle of indigenous communities per se, but a struggle of the classes, in this instance benefiting the upper classes significantly more than the lower classes and those in poverty. In the end, we suggested that the fires and haze would be an eternal problem because they benefit many: The government would preserve their disaster project and funds, local workers would get hired to firefight, companies would continue in their profiting, and NGOs would keep the international aid industry going.

On March 23, 2016, I joined along with Donatius Praptantya, a sociologist at the University of Tanjungpura, Pontianak, in a two-hour focused group discussion hosted by an NGO which advocates for good governance. The meeting aimed to
help in producing a set of recommendations for the amendment of provincial regulations regarding land and forest management. Ten academicians and campaigners from diverse backgrounds were invited to speak, including law, economics, socio-politics, and agriculture. However, the meeting gave the priority and the largest portion of time to the participants with law backgrounds. Praptantya suggested the forum to address the broader contexts such as the inclusion and protection of local knowledge and communities in the land management. However, similar to what happened in the talk shows, his ideas were thrown under the rug as the forum preferred a top-down, State-managed, and regulatory approach, in which the group would act as a critique and advisor. Finally, at the end of the discussion, the host tried to give me an envelope containing a relatively large amount of money as a token for my participation. When I refused and reasoned that I was a mere observer in the meeting, they insisted, saying, “It is budgeted.” I only gave up when a fellow participant persuaded me to receive the money so that the host could report an efficiency in their financial report to their donor. He told me, “It is our custom here.”

My trip was insightful, but a disconcerting one. It did not turn up what I would identify as any optimistic progress for the better. I returned to New Zealand overwhelmed and sceptical but recommitted to doing significant and meaningful research in hope for change.

Kalimantan Barat was not the province with the highest number of hotspots in the 2015 Indonesian Haze. However, the city is a representation of the broader regional and national discourse. This is a discourse where “development” means constructions and ‘facelift.’ It is where the people were let to go on with their lives deprived of their basic needs such as clean water and air. It is where the mainstream and only solution was limited to the definitions of the State’s systems of law. It is where the public’s access to local knowledge relevant to them could only be met underground in private libraries and closed forums. Finally, it is where each group of people fend for themselves: The people with their survival; the advocates with their donors and critiques of the government and corporations; the corporations with their businesses; and the government with their construction and firefighting projects.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

There are several ways to analyse the discourse of the Haze critically; one is through the lens of blame and justification, an approach to the analysis I used in this research. In this respect, I identified in the two prime-time television talk shows the themes of victimhood and moral innocence with a focus on perpetrators and blame. I identified and discussed how these discourses became apparent, were challenged and defended. In Part One below, I present the major findings of my study. In Part Two, I turn my attention to possible intervention strategies that might disrupt the cycle of fires and move beyond the identified discourses of the blame. In Part Three, I describe the challenges faced in Merauke, a West Papuan district in the Eastern Indonesia that was ignored throughout the talk shows studied, but in fact, has the second highest hotspots reporting after South Sumatera. I use the case as a mean to emphasis the fact that the problem of forest fires is still ongoing and serious, and to communicate the urgency for the development of sophisticated intervention strategies. In the final part of this section, I conclude by suggesting areas for future research.

Part 1: Key findings

It was the dry season again in Indonesia in 2015. Residents of Sumatera, Kalimantan, and Indonesia’s international neighbours such as Singapore and Malaysia would expect their skies to be covered by a thick haze of pollution originating from the forest fires in Indonesia, a repeat of years before. During the Haze, two television channels decided to host one-off discussions about the Haze in a talk show format. In the comfort of air-conditioned halls in Jakarta, far from the polluted skies of Sumatera and Kalimantan, they talked for 90 to 180 minutes. ILC on TVOne sought to identify “Who Burns Our Forest,” while Mata Najwa on MetroTV wanted to tell stories about the “Fight against the Haze.” The findings of my analysis of these two talk shows are visually depicted in Figure 6 below. At the first glance, the drawing looks messy and complicated. That is because the situation is exactly that, messy and complex. On the face of it, participants in the talk shows all wanted to appear as if they had a desire to change the situation but their motives and capacity for doing so varied.
Figure 6. My illustration describing the main conclusions of the thesis
The Victims of the haze were situated as poor, innocent family men, who had lost much and felt no power to overcome their suffering. Even when one had some degree of responsibility in setting fires he portrayed himself as merely following the orders of a corporation. Seeing no future without forest fires, the Victims entrusted their fate to the government and experts, and at the same time, sought financial aid and cheap or free health facilities to ease their sufferings. While largely seeing themselves as powerless to do anything they were still able to situate their needs in the discussion.

In the two talk shows, community leaders and environmental campaigners came to the defence of the Victims. They held themselves and the people they claimed to represent as having zero part in the recurrence of forest fires. Instead, they laid blame on conspiracies between politicians and corporations, as well as the ignorance of trans-migrants toward their land. They saw the government as being too absorbed in maintaining their power rather than listening to and serving the people. One by one the advocates identified a range of problems that extended beyond the symptomatic reality of haze and fires, including the State’s protection of corporate crimes, corruption, environmental destruction, and the ongoing displacement of indigenous communities due to corporate activities. The advocates believed that their role in the discourse was to point out problems and to build cases for lawsuits.

Once a discourse of the poor, virtuous and victimised (“us”) was laid, a discourse of blame against the malevolent, conspiratorial, and implacable (“them”) could arise, in this case, against the big and often multi-national corporations and the State. Community leaders and NGOs saw that a pursuit for retribution through State-controlled court processes and lawsuits were the only options available to them. The position was maintained even when they realised that the constitutions and the justice system themselves might be corrupt.

Antagonised by the earlier participants in the talk show, representatives of corporate associations prioritised their need to maintain innocence. Ironically, mimicking what the advocates did, they admitted no participation in causing the forest fires. One boasted the economic benefit that the palm oil industry brings to the country, and the other tried to convince the audience that corporations were also the victims
in the picture. They challenged the environmental campaigners to set their facts straight by quoting the small percentage of hotspots located in corporate concessions compared to those outside. Furthermore, they blamed the government for permitting “illegal activities” by persons unknown. They saw the State as culpable for mismanaging the situation.

Government officials in the discussions answered allegations by focusing on their achievements. An extensive list of statistical figures, arrests, task forces, and firefighting activities were described and included heroic sacrifices by government officials who were portrayed as hard-working and went beyond the call of duty. A claim of innocence, however, ensued within the institution itself. The central government blamed local government officials. Local government officials refused to acknowledge any responsibility and used ‘third-person’ speech to create and maintain distance from the accusations. The main concerns of local people and communities, such as corruption, loss of livelihood, the drive to conform to corporate orders, and the marginalisation of indigenous communities were dismissed as irrelevant and not worth talking about.

The common goal of the two talk shows was to identify “who burns the forest” in an effort to “fight against the haze.” Much of the screen time was spent on the competition for moral innocence and the laying of blame. This blame-and-claim discourse did not present an optimistic resolution to the challenge of the Haze. In the end, the talk shows neglected critical and life threatening issues and offered little guidance on how to navigate the issue of human-made disasters other than finger-pointing and glorifying experts and political elites.
Part 2: Paths forward

I have attempted to examine the discursive processes that contribute to maintaining the status quo with respect to the continuing annual Indonesian forest fires. I have attended to the knowledge co-constructed by the participants in the talk shows, as individuals, as members of collectives, and as represented by the media. This knowledge is not explicit or formalised, but inherent in everyday praxis, much of the talk show participants unconscious of the discourses they are perpetuating (Martín-Baró, 1994). The discourses I identified in the findings section above have structured and limited the way people, advocates, corporates, and government officials relate to each other and their environments and presents a platform upon from which arises non-accountability, fatalism, blame, and silence. By making the discursive processes apparent, I aimed to achieve a critical understanding of the reality of interactions between stakeholders in the forest fires and how they position themselves. While this has been a useful learning experience for me as a student researcher, the question that arises is, how is the emergent knowledge from this thesis useful to the project of extinguishing fires, improving air quality, restoring damaged ecologies and community, and improving people’s life chances and livelihoods? How does it change the futures of indigenous peoples whose lands and lives are significantly impacted? How does it call to account those who have been complicit? To conclude this study on the point of just identifying patterns in discourses is not enough and in my view irresponsible, particularly as to do so would fail to recognize the power that I do have as an academic and researcher. In this respect, below I turn my attention to considering how my work might shape a meaningful contribution to future interventions that addresses fundamental challenges to positive and enduring change.

Understanding the big picture

Mistry, Berardi, and McGregor (2009) suggest that historically, two opposing discourses usually present when the environmental issues are a concern. The first is a dominant global, or in regards to this study, a national one, characterised by technical, 'scientific' expertise and hierarchical governance. Similar to the findings of this thesis, the global environmental discourses often define poor and innocent victims as evil or self-destructive villains, and the policy-making, scientific and
institutional stakeholders as heroes. Consequently, experts assert their authority to design interventions which are implemented through global and national conventions and institutions. The problem with this approach, Mistry et al. (2009) and Dryzek (2013) argue, is that the policies and interventions resulting often do not incorporate local understanding and the context of the problem, and thus, are prone to conflicts and to being short-lived.

The counter-discourse to the dominant global or national discourse is the ‘populist’ or ‘grassroots’ one (Mistry et al., 2009). The populist discourse reverses the narrative of the dominant discourse. It portrays the heroes on the national discourse as the villains who channel resources to the powerful groups. It then positions the marginalised communities as the heroes. As a result, the solutions are bottom-up and participatory engagements, including civil disobedience, boycott movements, and direct actions such as class action lawsuits and street protests. It replaces the reliance on experts with the lived daily experience of the local communities.

Within the talk shows, the WWF-WALHI ambassador Agustinus G. Nugroho and academic Widjojo both advocated grassroots national resistance. They recommended the publication of the names of the alleged palm oil companies, a strategy of public shaming and boycott. They believed the strategy would return some degree of coercive economic power to the people as consumers. While an admirable objective, it is unlikely to work for a variety of reasons elaborated below.

Firstly, boycott and public shaming strategies underestimate the identification process of the companies of origin. As palm oil goes through a long process of production and to the hands of consumers, the source concessionaires are often impossible to name and track. In fact, Al-Jazeera English (2011) documentary channel recognized one method for the corporations to avoid identification, that is by using front companies. Front companies are companies with clean track records that act as the product-launderers for unethical products from other businesses. Moreover, focussing on boycott strategies to companies does not address other complicit entities like small landholders and farmers, the government, and law enforcement agencies.

Secondly, it still does not address the structural and societal issues of corruption, marginalization and loss, issues that are closer to the everyday lives of local
communities. Strategies of public shaming and boycotting focus on interrupting consumption with the intention of punishing retailers and producers. The success of the intervention relies on the altruistic consciousness of individual consumers, both local and international, to buy fair trade products. However, most consumers live far away from the direct impact of the Haze and would require significant resource to educate and mobilise.

Finally, while public shaming and boycotting strategies are often seen as ways to ‘give power to the people’, its success is primarily dependent on a higher social hierarchy rather than a lower one. Considering the hesitancy of the Police and their apparent “principle of non-disclosure”, the identification of perpetrators falls to other entities like the media, experts, and some government officials to investigate and release the information to the public.

What the above discussion highlights is the need to be conscious of fundamental drivers within the context of the Haze. It begs an analysis of ‘what perpetuates the problem’ and looks for deeper and structural points for intervention.

**Liberation psychologies and strategies for change**

To break away from the current reality, change must involve “breaking the chains of personal oppression as much as the chains of social oppression” (Martín-Baró, 1994, p. 27). Euro-American psychology has always been clear about the needs of individuals to gain control over their own existence; and using Martín-Baró’s words, to liberate themselves from the unconscious and conscious mechanisms that hinder them in the pursuit of a healthy and meaningful life. Martín-Baró (1994) believes that a new reality of justice, participation and humanity can be achieved through three processes: a) the recovery of historical memory, b) de-ideologization of everyday experience and c) the utilization of the virtues of the people in popular organisations and class practice. These processes are contextualised and illustrated in Figure 7 below.
Figure 7. The three processes of change to address the Indonesian Haze
The recovery of historical memory

The hard struggle of those affected by forest fires to meet their basic needs, to build cases in court, or to firefight, forces them to stay in the here and now reality without a before or after. They become stuck in a “permanent psychological present” (Martín-Baró, 1994, p. 30), unable to imagine a future or remember a better past. The effect of this, for example, on victims, is a feeling of helplessness, of not being able to do anything to change their situation. Fatalism sets in and oppression becomes internalized. People ‘forget’ their roots and the potentials for what they could become as they continue in the struggle of everyday life.

A counter to ‘forgetting’ is through processes of collective remembering. Collective remembering involves reclaiming into present memory “those elements of the past which have proved useful in the defence of the interests of exploited classes and which may be applied to the present struggles to increase conscientization” (Borda in Martín-Baró, 1994, p. 30). By tracing the workings of Indonesian history and community context the causes of longstanding injustice that perpetuate the forest fires might then be identified, returning a sense of one’s identity, pride of belonging to a collective, and an admiration of tradition and culture. This process of recovery needs to occur not in the distance from the people who suffer, but among others who suffer similarly (Watkins & Shulman, 2008). Such processes of remembering typically occur in contexts where people feel safe to talk and recount. This might involve community meetings, quiet conversations, or active education programmes. In Figure 7 I represent the process of collective remembering through the activity of tree planting. I elaborate the rationale behind tree planting as an intervention in a section below.

De-ideologizing the common sense

The dominant discourse about the forest fires acts to deny and disguise certain aspects of reality. Martín-Baró (1994, p. 31) defines de-ideologizing the common sense as a “means to retrieve the original experience of groups and persons and return it to them as objective data”. This means that the public can utilize the data to formally articulate a consciousness of their own lived experience, and by doing so, verify the validity of ‘common sense’ knowledge.
There are several ways to de-ideologize the common sense. Martín-Baró (1994) suggests public opinion polls as a simple technique. Public opinion polls can help to reduce the feeling of alienation within a community “by forging a connection between what is lived and what is seen, what is felt as personal experience and what is received as collective experience” (p. 196). It challenges the official presumptions of reality propagated in the media and often in government statements. Additionally, Watkins and Shulman (2008, pp. 266-298) dedicates a chapter outlining critical participatory action research as a restorative act. Through dialogue, empathic listening, and compassionate analysis and action, communities can begin to reframe their experiences.

Public opinion polls and critical participatory action research together give voice to an alternative historical reality that has been marginalized and silenced by the dominant discourse. Martín-Baró (1994) told a story of Romero, the murdered Archbishop of San Salvador, as a religious leader who reflected back the plain truth about the daily experiences of the people in his weekly homilies. Through him, Salvadorean heard a formal account of their own experiences and an objectification of their consciousness, which then allowed them to muster strength to change their reality. In Indonesia, religious leaders hold similar power waiting to be harnessed, but so do psychologists, students, researchers, movie and art makers and as evident in this study, television talk shows. Moreover, social media and video sharing platforms such as YouTube may also be a viable platform to allow participatory interaction for a broader audience.

Utilization of the virtues of the people in popular organizations and class practice

The work of transformation is not completed without trusting that people will want to be virtuous and willing to participate in the change. In popular organisations, such as customary associations and resistance communities, people and environmental groups, even business entities and government officials may confront their situation in the strength of partnership rather than alone. In partnership approaches, people and groups who desire change can emerge from being side-lined in the history and represent their own interest simultaneously with other groups in the broader society. To be successful, social movements have to be embodied in class practices, that is, activities to benefit the poor and to break the
cycle that keeps the poor marginalized and fatalistic. Ultimately, it requires political and economic change to address the power inequities that persist in repressive initiatives and maintaining the status quo.

Asosiasi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN; Indonesian Association for Customary Communities) is an example of a community of different marginalized indigenous communities in Indonesia. It has grown into an independent non-government organization with a specific mission to represent and advocate the concerns of currently 2,304 customary communities throughout Indonesia. These communities include 17 million people. Working with both national and international communities, they regularly host congresses and meetings and share experiences through websites, social media, printed media, and radio. Their website features a list of customary leaders who are actively involved in indigenous community resistances throughout Indonesia and their efforts to protect their human and customary legacies, and to preserve their environment (AMAN, 2017a).

Indonesian communities are not adverse to protesting despite the talk shows showing a docile image of them. One most recent example is the Meratus Dayakese community in South Kalimantan, who organise street protests against the license given by the government to Kodeco Timber Ltd. to operate within their customary forest. Meratus Dayakese community leaders and members have long suffered criminalization and intimidation from local police for their objections. However, working in partnership with local NGOs, they have shown no sign of resignation (AMAN, 2017b). Another example are the nine women of Rembang, Pati, and Grobogan, Central Java, who staged a theatrical street protest in front of the National Palace in Jakarta against the operation of cement companies in the Kendeng Mountain area (Wulansari & Sigit, 2017). In April 2016, the nine women cemented their feet in wooden blocks for two days as a critique against the government-issued permit given to the cement companies. Defiant against intimidations and counter lawsuits lodged by the local government, the resistance efforts of the women of Kendeng gained media and the president’s attention, which led to the revocation of the company’s permit by the High Court in October 2016. Despite the decision, the government of Central Java re-issued the permit in February 2017 which prompted the Kendeng community to stage another protest in Jakarta on March 2017. This time, 50 male and female farmers were involved,
supported by the presence of 20 members of FBPI, a Jakarta-based Association for Port Labourers (Koranperdjoengan.com, 2017).

The support shown by the Jakarta-based Association for Port Labourers to the indigenous Kendeng communities suggests that local community movements can involve and embrace many potential allies including those that are not indigenous or customary. Importantly, participation by people and organisations that are migratory (eg, migrant workforce and trans-migrant organisations) is a vital step in the process of moving them from the position of passive bystanders into the more active role of critical witnessing. Here, transmigrants might engage in the recovery of their own historical memory, to know their place in the environmental destruction and the socio-economic injustice contributing to and arising from the forest fires. As a part of national and international communities, they bring a form of social capital that extends the reach of local communities and expands to a global audience side-stepping the politics of mainstream television stations and media outlets. With their inclusion in discussions about local community welfare and partnering for change, transmigrants and international organisations can leverage national and government change towards more transparent, sustainable and mutually beneficial economic strategies and ventures. While these are some activities that transmigrants and international organisations might engage in, the critical key to such a strategy is that of performing partnerships for change.

Above I have reviewed Martín-Baró (1994) three processes towards emerging a new reality of justice, participation and humanity. I have attempted to situate these strategies to find an enduring solution to the Haze in Indonesia. Below, I present the powerful example of the Green Belt movement that brings Martín-Baró's strategies to life in a very real way, one that I believe might bring about hope if applied in the Indonesian context.

**The Green Belt Movement**

The current endeavours of groups to put out fires and holding the government and corporations accountable need to be complemented by local initiatives on restoring and nurturing the environment. Currently, locals, such as Muhammad of South Sumatera in Mata Najwa, have reported efforts to protect their private agricultural land from the spreading fires, but their initiative in actively restoring the destroyed
ecology remains to be seen. One potential example of such a restorative initiative is the Green Belt Movement of Kenya, led by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Wanjira Maathai (The Green Belt Movement, 2017). Maathai encouraged women to respond to their drying streams, insecure food supply, and struggle to find firewood by working together to grow seedlings and plant trees. The effect of this was that the trees helped to bind the soil, to store and retain rainwater, nurture other plant growth, and provide food and wood. In engaging in tree planting activities, the women received a small monetary token for their work. The initiative is simple yet effective grassroots movement that has gradually grown into a non-government organisation that in turn attracts partnerships and gains access to public institutions like faith-based groups, schools, the Kenyan Army, and private land owners. Since its inception, the initial work has snowballed into community, civic and environmental education about exploitation and injustice behind environmental degradation. The Green Belt Movement has partnered with other national and international communities to advocate against land grabbing, the destruction of forest for agricultural development, and the release of political prisoners.

The widespread impact of the Green Belt Movement of Kenya could be attributed to the inclusivity of the movement and partnership building with other institutions and communities. Currently, the attitude of NGOs and community leaders on both ILC and Mata Najwa talk shows demonstrates an oppositional attitude that perpetuates a defensive attitude on the part of government officials and corporate representatives. The development of potential partnerships, therefore, becomes complicated. The only way to rewind from oppositional positions is to transition the dominant discourse to one of mutuality, shared lives and collective responsibility. However, for it to be achieved, it requires that interested stakeholders and potential partners dialogue with, rather than talk at each other, to find a synergistic way of moving forward.

**Hope strategies**

In the sections above I have reviewed strategies that might interrupt the longstanding status quo and continuing forest fires in Indonesia. Whatever the strategy, all must nurture a sense of hope and belief that change can happen, that engaging in action is a worthwhile activity. Simply banning the lighting of fires to burn land, intentionally or unintentionally, and criminalizing those who do, ignores
the everyday life reality of abject poverty that many Indonesians live in. Fire is used for warmth, cooking, purifying water and the like. These are fundamentally basic human needs and the targeting thereof minimizes the value of lives in poverty. They are not hopeful strategies. They do not speak to an optimistic future. These approaches need to change.

In arriving at the final sections of this thesis I am challenged by the question: Does my work still have relevance and use in the present period? If it does, then can my findings and suggestions be applied to other similar human-caused disasters in Indonesia? In this section, I review the incidence of forest fires in Indonesia to see if anything has really changed.

Compared with the dry season of 2015, 2016 saw a significant decrease in hotspots and haze. Both ILC and Mata Najwa did not host any follow-up talk show discussions. Perhaps the issue was not ‘hot’ enough. What did attract media attention were stories of Indonesian authorities stepping up firefighting efforts through banning the granting of new land and establishing agencies to restore the destroyed peatlands (France-Press, 2016). More recently in January 2017, President Joko Widodo boasted an 83.2% reduction in forest fires (see Figure 8), prompting more than 35,000 responses from Facebook users who thanked and congratulated him. The public perceived a victory against the haze. Perhaps the unseasonal rain in 2016, rather than State interventions, played a greater role (Associated Press, 2016).
Part 3: West Papua

Figure 8. Infographic from the official Facebook page of Joko Widodo, President of Indonesia, foregrounding an image of him and several high-ranking government officials walking in a forest area. On 23 January 2017, Widodo boasted an 83.2% reduction of forest fires in 2016 thanks to a joint effort of various government institutions and officials "who want to work together to prevent forest fires" (Widodo, 2016).

Far from the flames in Sumatera and Kalimantan, there is a never-seen-before increase of forest fire incidents related to government projects and corporate activities in the most eastern region of Indonesia, West Papua (see Figure 9). Distant from the centre of Indonesian population and too politically sensitive for the eyes of the international community, the fires of Papua are not only underreported but absent in media reporting. The West Papua fires and haze were overshadowed by the media noise in the western regions, especially Riau. Compared to the 11,590 hotspots found in Papua during August-October 2015, Riau only had 2,423 hotspots in the same period. The island of Papua was the site of 10% of all hotspots in Indonesia, with South Sumatera and Central Kalimantan having 22% and 25% respectively. In West Papua, 92% of the fires were concentrated in an area designated as the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE), the latest State-sponsored agricultural mega-project covering millions of hectares of land and virgin forest (Jong, 2015).
Haryadi (2017) argues that the government has forced the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate upon the local communities for the sake of national and international food and energy needs. The State is developing 1.2 million hectares or a quarter of the Merauke district as a state-of-the-art rice estate by 2018, with more areas planned to be sugar plantations and factories (500,000 ha) and again, palm oil estates (200,000 ha). President Joko Widodo has projected that it is only the first stage of a total 4.6 million ha development that would incorporate an area larger than Switzerland, Denmark, or the Netherlands (AwasMIFEE, 2015). Ironically, the Dutch colonials, whom Indonesians fought to gain freedom from, adopted a similar approach to development work forcing Java and Sumatera to be cleared and planted with export commodities such as sugarcane, coffee, and rubber in 1840-1870 (Haryadi, 2017).

MIFEE is not only associated with massive deforestation, but also with the marginalisation of West Papuan indigenous communities. The companies involved in the project actively destroy sacred forests and food sources for communities.
They block access to clean water, poison land and rivers, separate local communities from each other, and facilitate the relocation of transmigrant workers from overpopulated regions in Indonesia. MIFEE allows up to 49% foreign investment in local plantations but has no measure to protect local livelihoods (Jong, 2015). Various English-narrated documentaries have focused on the dislocation experienced by the hunter-gatherer Malind Anim tribe of Zanegi, Merauke (Sujana, 2012), and the Mahuze clan of Merauke (Haryadi, 2017; Watchdoc Image, 2015). Despite that, we see no sign of the project slowing down. Ironically, while the Minister of Forestry and Environment Siti Nurbaya Bakar boasted her crackdowns in Riau and Kalimantan, she denied being associated with any destruction activities in Papua. Instead, the minister blamed the hunting and foraging activities of the indigenous Papuan “nomadic groups” for the fires (Jong, 2015).

The political context of West Papua
The rise of forest fires in West Papua is rooted in the State-sponsored structural violence and division among West Papuans as a collective. In 1969, after a referendum mediated by the UN and as an “Act of Free Choice”, Indonesia forcibly annexed West Papua (Kirksey, 2012). Since then, there has been continued bloodshed between the people and the State military. Political unity amongst the West Papuan people themselves is a challenge as it comprises a complex people group, divided by approximately 300 tribal identities each with their own sub-tribes, clans and sub-clans (Sebastian & Syailendra, 2015). They live in remote areas that often take days to reach, making inter-regional travel arduous and costly. The isolation makes them easy to be divided in the contestations of land and resources. Moreover, Astraatmadja (2015) allegedly claims that corruption among locals has compromised the government fund allocated to help develop the region, in turn, heightening distrust toward some indigenous leaders.

Transmigration policies cause further social troubles. Elmslie (2010) described the demographic condition of the West Papuan peoples as “catastrophic”. Indonesian state-sponsored transmigration policies will be responsible for the settlement of 5 million non-Papuan by 2020, comprised mostly of people from Java and Sulawesi. West Papuan people were a 96.09% majority in 1971 but will only make up 28.99% of the region’s target population in 2020 (Elmslie, 2010; see Figure 10). It is a
A policy of minoritisation similar to strategies employed in New Zealand by British settlers, and in Tibet by China. As the government focuses development on urban areas dominated by new migrants, little benefit is felt by indigenous communities who inhabit inland areas. In addition, multinational companies prefer to employ non-indigenous workers because of their perceived better educational backgrounds.

Figure 10. The map of West Papua region, showing the demographic minoritisation (Stott, 2010)

Many West Papuan aboriginal leaders cry that they suffer from genocide under Indonesian rule. Violence and death have been occurring daily, with 500,000 deaths estimated since 1969. The presence of security forces can be found everywhere in the region, often hired by multinational companies to protect their interests. The troops are associated with “military business rackets, illegal logging, and human rights violations, including violence against women and girls… extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture and arbitrary detentions… with almost complete impunity” (Harvey, 2014; see, for example, Figure 11). Peaceful demonstrators, tribal leaders, and political activists are subjects of arrests, tortures, killings and assassinations (Harvey, 2014). Communities who refuse to sign away their land, and protest land confiscation, or who resist state-sponsored settlement policies are often labelled as separatists and threatened with guns (Awas MIFEE, 2013).
In Zanegi village in Merauke, the Medco forestry plantation tricked the Zanegi people to sell their land, with the promise to leave their sacred forest and sago groves intact. Subsequent to the sale; they were destroyed (Awas MIFEE, 2013). Zanegi villagers now have no access to food and clean water. It results in further displacement when men have to leave their village for days and live in temporary hunting camps, and women have to walk for kilometres just to get water. As a result, five children died from malnutrition and pollution-related diseases in the first half of 2013. An irony, because Medco came to the region under the MIFEE program (Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate), which has a motto, “Feed Indonesia, feed the world”. However, when confronted with the condition of malnutrition in the region, the Head of Health Department Setafanus Ozok commented that it would have been a result of poverty and diet patterns (Omona, 2015). Death from malnutrition and famine happened not only in Merauke. In Yahukimo, there were 220 deaths in 2005 and 2009, while in Paniai, there were 21 in 2007 (Omona, 2015).
The above review is simple but adequate to demonstrate that circumstances in Merauke and West Papua are dire yet familiar. The discourse of victimhood and blame is present and so too are the forest fires, and more disturbingly, the very real and tangible imposition of power through military might and control over the press. Where able, there is also community resistance. The reality of forest fires and life in West Papua is clearly rooted in deeper issues and discourses of annexation, minoritisation, marginalisation, economic development and silencing. Talk shows and research like this study are helpful, but multi-level change and intervention are what are required, and urgently so.

Part 4. Final remarks
This study attempts to recognise the discursive processes that contribute to the status quo of the annual forest fires in Indonesia and suggests possible interventions instrumental to creating a counter knowledge and praxis. In the first chapters, I have explored the contexts of Sumatera and Kalimantan forest fires and the media coverage in Indonesia. By using critical discourse analysis, I have described the processes of victimhood, blame, and justification in two prime-time talk shows hosted by two influential television channels. Moreover, I have outlined a possible multi-level intervention strategy based on critical consciousness and partnership. Finally, I have described the current challenges faced in Merauke, West Papua to show the relevance and continuity of my analysis in a present and broader national context.

Limitations
I identify at least three limitations of my study. First, although I endeavoured to comprehend the contexts in Sumatera, Kalimantan, and Papua, much of my understanding is grounded on theories and limited by my physical, cultural, and psychological distance to the areas affected by the forest fires. I was born and raised in Java, in a middle-class family, and thus, a member of the culturally predominant class in Indonesia. Due to time and travel constraints, my physical participation among the communities most affected by the Haze was limited to a two week visit in 2016 to West Kalimantan in the early stages of this research; a two week visit in 2012 to Sumatera, and my friendship with a West Papuan student during my time
in New Zealand. I make my subjectivities explicit in this instance to give the reader an insight into my own places and practices of privilege. Readers and researchers who live in the contexts I have reviewed in this study may suggest a better understanding of the political, cultural, and class processes at work that I might have overlooked.

Secondly, some bias is expected due to my decision to use the talk shows as the primary data. As postulated in p. 21, this work acknowledges that the participants, while acting and representing several Indonesian communities, are all selected and presented by the talk show producers. Consequently, this study should be considered as a limited analysis into the representation of media discourse, which is presumed to manifest itself into the political and ecological realities surrounding the status quo of Indonesian forest fires. This assumption is supported by the review into the relation between the discourse and the status quo of Lapindo Mudflow in Chapter 2 (see p. 10) and the arguments woven into Chapter 4. To minimize this bias, the study incorporates reviews into the historical and political context of the forest fires in Indonesia, a short field reflection, and associates the conclusions made with the past and ongoing situations in other regions such as East Java (in The Case of Lapindo Mudflow, p. 10), and West Papua (Chapter 5 Part 3, p. 98).

Finally, my work emphasises understanding discursive processes from which can be made suggestions for possible interventions, with the help of previous research and theory. Given the urgency for change in Sumatera, Kalimantan, and West Papua I realise that knowledge does not necessarily translate into praxis. Praxis and social change require action and reflection in engaged partnerships with individuals and groups, along with a necessary emergent critical consciousness. I presented my work as a small contribution to growing that consciousness with the hope for a healthier and just Indonesia.

Future research direction

With these limitations in mind, future research should focus on building a momentum for change and on the implementation of well thought out change strategies such as those suggested in Chapter 5 Part 2. Research into local opinions, as suggested by Martín-Baró (1994), can help in bridging personal and collective realities and can contribute to the knowledge of aid agencies, the media, the
government, and majority groups. When people begin to understand their reality, and reconnect to their history, momentum for change can be built, based on their virtues as individuals and collectives. This also informs those with access to power and presents a way to listen to the lived truths of those who might otherwise be ignored.

I cannot emphasise enough the urgency of the situations in Sumatera, Kalimantan, and West Papua. Researchers can play a part and have many research techniques available; critical participatory action (CPAR) research being a particularly useful one in implementing change and identifying the best practices. Researchers should not underestimate their capacity as experts to influence dominant and oppressive discourses. While hard science can make a very real contribution, social science knowledge and research can provide contexts into the issue and inform a more holistic intervention strategies.

Lastly, to make a healthy and just future possible, future research might examine partnership arrangements and explore creative approaches to the persistent challenges facing Indonesia. A system or ecological approach is important to considering the broader context of activities and actors in local communities. The divisive trap of ‘us’-‘them’ categorisations needs to be avoided. Instead, what is required is a more sophisticated understanding of interactions, motivations, roles and strengths that can be contributed to a synergistic shared social and ecological system. In that way, scholars can help to connecting and building strategic alliances between a diverse range of individuals and groups to practice change. Moreover, change strategies need not be confined to conventional practices. Creative and regenerative approaches to change should also be investigated. For example, health practitioner is an occupation who enjoy a relative freedom from government scrutiny otherwise experienced by many journalists, researchers and community practitioners. Given this, they are well positioned as both research and intervention partners as they go about their professional practice. Their viewpoints, i.e. from their day to day care of the communities most vulnerable to the respiratory health problems caused by toxic haze, could provide different input toward empiric-based strategies.
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APPENDIX 1: ILC 2015 DATASET

Appendix 1A: Indonesian Transcript of ILC 2015

Title : Indonesia Lawyers Club 22 September 2015: Siapa Pembakar Hutan Kita (Who burns our forest?)

URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=obCk2cGkEKA

Duration : 3 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Font style</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Normal</td>
<td>Baseline intonation and volume of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Italic</em></td>
<td>Medium intonation and volume of speech, emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CAPITALISED</em></td>
<td>Highest intonation and volume of speech compared to the baseline. High emphasis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Begin transcript]


[00:00:41] Aktivitas ekonomi pun terganggu. Sebut saja layanan penerbangan yang harus mengurangi slot terbangnya akibat jarak pandang yang terbatas. Belum lagi gangguan kesehatan yang harus dialami banyak warga akibat menghirup udara yang berkualitas buruk. Tak pelak kondisi ini membuat sejumlah orang menggugat tanggung jawab pemerintah melalui komnas HAM.


Keserakahan korporasi mencari keuntungan dalam membuka lahan disinyalir sebagai penyumbang terbesar rusaknya lingkungan. Meski tak sedikit dari mereka yang membantah dan kemudian menyalahkan para petani perambah lahan. Meski disebut sejumlah pihak terlambat, namun presiden Joko Widodo akhirnya memutuskan memimpin langsung penanganan peristiwa yang seharusnya ditetapkan sebagai bencana nasional ini.

[00:02:00] Mr. Joko Widodo (the President of the Republic of Indonesia): "Saya udah sampaikan juga, melimpahkan ke Kapolri untuk ditindak setegas-tesgasnya, sekeras-

[00:02:33] Jenderal Polisi Baharudin Haiti: "Tujuh di antaranya yaitu PT BMH di Kabutan... Sumsel, kemudian tersangkanya yang sudah ditetapkan itu atas nama JLE. Kemudian yang kedua PT Roselin... PT RPP di Sumsel, tersangkanya P. Kemudian PT RPS di Sumsel, tersangkanya S. Kemudian PT LIH di Riau, tersangkanya FK. Kemudian yang kelima, PT GAP di Sampit, Kalteng, tersangkanya S. Kemudian yang keenam PT MBA di Kapuas, tersangkanya GRN. Kemudian yang ketujuh PT ASP di Kalteng, tersangkanya WD."

[00:03:50] Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan RI Siti Nurbaya Bakar: "Yang diproses hukum pidana Polri, kita pasti proses administratifnya."

[00:03:54] Reporter: "Ada rencana, Bu, dibekukan mungkin?"

[00:03:56] Mrs. Bakar: Ee, tergantung mungkin kalau pidana bisa diberi... di... apa namanya, bisa langsung dicabut. Dan tentunya pidana itu kan yang paling berat ya, kalau di kita kalau sudah siap masuk ranah pidana, itu udah harus dicabut."

[00:04:12] Desakan untuk segera menyelesaikan masalah polusi asap juga datang dari warga Singapura dan Malaysia. Melalui media sosial mereka menggugat kalimat maupun gambar yang menyindir kondisi polusi asap. Tuntutan perdata sebesar 7,9 triliun rupiah kepada perusahaan yang terbukti bersalah bisa jadi merupakan syok terapi untuk saat ini. Namun jika ke depannya pengawasan tidak konsisten ditegakkan, bukan tergantung mungkin pemerintah hanya akan kembali berperan sebagai pemadam kebakaran.

[00:04:52] Introductory music

[00:04:56] Narrator: Indonesia Lawyers Club edisi malam ini hadir kembali dengan tema "Siapa Pembakar Hutan Kita." Hadirin dan pemirsa, kita sambut presiden Indonesia Lawyers Club, Karni Ilyas!


Jangan arahkan telunjuk ke sana kemari. Tidak perlu. Tidak perlu juga menyebut "kalian". "Kita semua". Kita semua adalah orang-orang dewasa yang seharusnya bertanggung jawab atas mereka.

Singer:

Dengan apakah kami bernafas...
Bila oksigen telah dirampas
Harum cendana tinggal cerita
Hilang wanginya ditelan bara
   Asap kelabu menyambut pagi
   Keserakahan... membumbung tinggi
   Mengepung kami kanan dan kiri
   Hingga tak ada tempat kembali
Hoo hoo hoo hoo hoo

Bencana bukan wacana!
Hoo oo ho o hooo
Bencana di depan mata!
Hoo oo ho o hooo
Bencana bukan wacana!
Hoo oo ho o hooo
Bencana di depan mata!
Ho hoo ho o hoo oh
Bencana di depan mata

[hands clapping]


[00:17:11] Sekarang saya ke Saudara Muchlis. Muchlis, yang katanya anaknya meninggal akibat asap tersebut di Riau. Kapan itu terjadi?

[00:17:26] Mr. Muchlis (the name only stated by the first, titled “Masyarakat korban asap Riau”): Meninggalnya anak saya itu baru tanggal 10 September 2015 yang lalu/

[00:17:34] Mr. Ilyas [cutting]: Yang lalu?

[00:17:34] Mr. Muchlis: Penyebab pertamanya, dia hanya batuk.

[00:17:43] Mr. Ilyas: Sejak kapan dia batuk?

[00:17:43] Mr. Muchlis: Hampir satu minggu dia batuk.

[00:17:47] Mr. Ilyas: Sebelum meninggal?

[00:17:50] Mr. Muchlis: Sebelum meninggal.

[00:17:50] Apakah sebelum-sebelumnya dia juga batuk?

[00:17:56] Pernah pada tahun yang lalu kabut asap juga dia batuk/

[00:17:59] Jadi karena kabut asap juga?

[00:17:59] Pada waktu itu dia diobat dengan dokter, alhamdullillah sembuh.

[00:18:05] Sejak kapan kabut kemarin dia.. di mana, di Pekanbaru?/

[00:18:08] Di Pekanbaru.

[00:18:09] Pekanbaru. Sejak kapan mulainya ada kabut asap?
Ya setelah... mungkin pada awal September itu mungkin udah nampak kabut asapnya, Pak.

Udah nampak.

Bisa Anda ceriterakan apa yang terjadi di rumah Anda dan seperti apa kira-kira di rumah tersebut sampai anaknya terkena kabut asap dan meninggal.

Ee... Anak saya itu / [inaudible]

Usia berapa?

Usia dua belas tahun.

Dua belas tahun, yak

perhatikan tu. Dan hari-hari biasa kalau misalnya tidak/ Alhamdulillah beliau sehat-sehat sekali. Almarhumah itu sehat sekali.

[00:21:20] Bukan, dokter apa kata dokter [non-verbal tangan menekankan, lalu melipat tangan]

[00:21:24] Penjelasan dokter pada saat itu memang dia mengatakan gagal napas.


[00:21:30] Iya. [inaudible] medis/

[00:21:33] Dan disebabkan oleh asap tadi. Atau Anda yang menyimpulkan bahwa itu gara-gara asap?


[00:21:55] Jadi walaupun pintu udah ditutup [Muchlis: masih], jendela udah ditutup, itu asap masih masuk?/

[00:22:00] Masih masuk.

[00:22:01] La Anda semua nggak/ nggak ikut sesak napas atau batuk-batuk?

[00:22:09] Saya kadang kala di lingkungan kita juga sesa/ ada yang sesak, ada yang batuk, ada yang pilek, macem Pak. Cuman kebetulan anak saya aja yang lebih parah.. pada saat itu.

[00:22:19] Mr. Ilyas: Mungkin Ibu Azlaini Agus bisa menceritakan apa yang dialamin di Riau/ di Pekanbaru sebagai tokoh masyarakat?


tanggal 14 September, ketika kami tokoh-tokoh masyarakat, adinda Al, saudara Made dan banyak lagi bertemu gubernur dan berdialog, kami mencium bau asap di ruang rapat Pak Gubernur yang ber-AC. Jadi asap pada tahun ini sudah sangat parah.


[00:27:43] Tapi kenapa dulu Gubernur Riau lama banget untuk menetapkan bahwa itu darurat?

[00:27:48] Di dalam undang-undang, Pak, untuk menetapkan status darurat tu ada kriteria, Pak.

[00:27:55] Di atas 300?

[00:27:57] Di atas 300 tapi/

[00:27:57] Ibu kan bilang udah sampai seribu/


[00:28:18] Mr. Ilyas [cutting]: Jadi kalau begitu bukan salah pemerintah pusat tok dong!/

[00:28:21] Nah, tetapi Pak/

[00:28:23] bupati dan walikota/

Commercial break
[00:31:23] Mr. Ilyas: Pemirsa, kita lanjutkan diskusi kita. Sekarang saya ke Pak Al Azhar, ketua lembaga ada Melayu.. Riau.... Apa tanggapan Bapak terhadap pembakar hutan?


[00:35:03] Kemudian yang kedua migran, migrasi, yang datang dari luar Riau itu ke sana, melihat peluang-peluang yang ada yang diberikan juga oleh hutan tanah, kemudian yang ketiga, korporat. Ini, korporasi yang ada di sana, itu sebab/ tambahan pula lagi, sejak pertengahan tahun 80-an itu, sebuah perkembangan dalam putusan pemerintah, yaitu menyerahkan atau tidak membedakan antara lahan mineral dengan lahan gambut. Nah, gambut di Riau itu las, dan dia memerlukan penanganan-penangan yang khusus, tetapi dalam izin itu disamarasamara/samaratakan saja/ mineral dan gambut... Bagi masyarakat adat, lahan gambut itu bukanlah pilihan untuk digarap. Jadi dia semacam cadangan. Sebab apabila dia sudah terbuka sedikit saja, dia mengerling, maka dia menjadi/ dia sewaktu- waktu bisa menjadi sumber petaka, sebagaimana yang sekarang terjadi. Nah penanganan atas kawasan gambut/ atas lahan gambut yang luas di sana sama saja, dan caranya yang terbaik, yang termurah bagi korporasi ialah dengan membuat kanal-kanal/ mengerikingkan itu/ di atas lahan-lahan yang kering itu ditanam komoditas mereka. Tetapi itu kan semacam membuka kotak Pandora, bagi bahaya yang tersimpan pada gambut yang mengerling itu/ dan itulah yang sesungguhnya terjadi sekarang...

[00:37:37] Mr. Ilyas: Makanya asap lebih banyak dari situ sekarang/

[00:37:40] Mr. Azhar: Makanya asap lebih banyak dari situ sekarang, ya, itu. Ee/ kalau kita bisa/

[00:37:46] Mr. Ilyas: Nggak, apa yang didapat oleh petani-petani di Riau dengan lahan-lahan sawit itu/ kan seharusnya ada yang disisakan untuk petani.

[00:37:58] Mr. Azhar: Tidak ada aturan yang harus menyisakan untuk petani/ ada yang disebut dengan pola KKPA/ tetapi tidak ada satu pun dalam pengalaman Riau, pola KKPA itu yang mensejahterakan petani. Sampai ke hari ini Bang Karni. Tidakk ada/ Bagaimana mungkin dalam sebuah pola KKPA misalnya, dalam/

[00:38:17] Mr. Ilyas: Apa itu KKPA?

[00:38:17] Mr. Azhar: K/ KKPA itu.. ee.. kemitraan antara korporasi dengan/ dengan dengan masyarakat sekitar. Nah, dua hektar kebun sawit yang dijanjikan/ yang dijanjikan oleh korporasi, pada harga sawit normal/ jangan lihat sekarang, karena sawit sekarang sedang anjlok betul, nah, itu.. kalau petani biasa mereka mendapat sekitar dua juta [Mr. Ilyas cutting] hektar/

[00:38:44] Mr. Ilyas: Yang saya maksud itu nggak ada program plasma [Mr. Azhar: Iya, iya] untuk petani/

[00:38:49] Mr. Azhar: Plasma untuk petani. Tidak ada satu pun yang sukses/ program/ e/ program plasma itu/

[00:38:53] Mr. Ilyas: Tapi ada? Program itu/


[00:39:14] Mr. Ilyas: Jadi plasma itu, plasma untuk petani itu yang dikasihin berupa uang kepada petani [Mr. Azhar: Berupa uang], bukan ee [Mr. Azhar: Bukan berupa lahan] panennya? Bukan/ [Mr Azhar: Bukan, bukan, iya]...

[00:39:31] Mr. Azhar: Karena perusahaan/


[00:39:40] Mr. Azhar: Tenti tidak, ya/ tentu kita tidak diam saja, kita/ kita mis/ kita misalnya ber/ be/ menuntut ya/ kita misalnya menuntut, pertama, agar tanah-tanah yang di/ menjadi tanah adat itu diperhitungkan sebagai investasi adat terhadap perusahaan itu/ tapi ini kan tidak ada di dalam frame, di dalam kerangka pembukaan lahan pada ee pada ini/
sebab lahan itu kan dibagi-bagi di atas meja dari bupatinya, gubernurnya, dan meja pemerintah pusat juga, begitu saja. Tanah-tanah kita, tanah-tanah adat itu, dalam sejarahnya tidak pernah diakui tanah-tanah adat di Riau itu/ oleh pemerintah Indonesia sampai ke hari ini, Bang Karni.

[00:40:35] Mr. Ilyas: Baik, sekarang Basrizal Koto, tokoh masyarakat Riau.


[00:40:50] Mr. Ilyas: Merdeka gimana maksudnya/ mau berontak?

[00:40:54] Mr. Koto: [laughing with the audience] Jadi merdeka itu maksudnya begini Bang Karni/ kita tidak ingin berpisah dari Republik dan NKRI, tapi atas kegudahan, kegudahan perlakuan pemerintah pusat terhadap Riau, yang menurut kami ee sangat.. tidak bisa diterima oleh masyarakat Riau. Coba, sekarang itu 2,7 juta hektar sawit ada di Riau. Ketika asap begitu dan menelan jiwa.. anak, satu orang, dan 43.000 dapat penyakit ISMA../

[Mr. Ilyas: ISPA] ya/ ISPA... ya, jadi.. perusahaan-perusahaan pemilik sawit itu tidak pernah peduli.. terhadap mereka... Itu ya/ tedinya kita juga berpikir, dengan pemerintahan baru ada sedikit perobahan. Janji-janji untuk pemerintah.. ee propinsi Riau. Tapi apa yang terjadi.. apa yang disampaikan oleh kakak saya Azlaini Agus tadi, alhamdullillah keadaan yang begitu parahnya ee presiden kita pun ke Riau.. hanya sebentar saja Pak Karni. Tidak pernah bermalam, dan kita pingin juga, pemerintah pusat ingin merasakan apa yang kita rasakan di Riau. Bagaimana rasanya asap itu, Pak Karni..... Itu aja yang dapat [lower voice] saya sampaikan.


[00:42:44] Mr. Ilyas: KPRI itu Riau juga terlibat [Mr. Koto laughing]. Nama komandannya Ismail Lengah ketika itu.

[00:42:50] Mr. Koto: Ini, ini presiden Riau/

[00:42:52] Mr. Ilyas: Baru dibom udah kalah [Mr. Koto laughing]. Jadi jangan pernah berontak. Eeh, sekarang ke.. Pak Dharmawi Aris... Juga tokoh adat katanya.

[00:43:08] Mr. Aris: Saya dari lembaga.. Melayu Riau, Pak.

[00:43:12] Mr. Ilyas: Lembaga Melayu Riau.


[00:44:02] Mr. Ilyas: Ini KPLT Gubernur sekarang?

[00:44:03] Mr. Aris: Iya/
Mr. Ilyas: Yang Bapak bilang nggak punya otak ini siapa?

Mr. Aris: Iya/ pelaksana gubernurnya juga nggak punya otak juga kalau dipikirkan. [audience clapping hands]... Sebab ketika itu/

Mr. Ilyas: Apa alasan Bapak mengatakan tidak punya otak/


Mr. Ilyas: Bagaimana rakyat Riau memilih orang-orang tak punya otak kalau gitu? [audience laughing hard]

Mr. Ilyas: Jadi kalau begitu.. ee masyarakat Bapak lebih pilih orang yang punya uang dong?

Mr. Aris: Jelas. [audience laughing hard, then clapping hands shortly]... Di Riau banyak Pak, mulai ini 80%/ 80% kebun Riau tidak punya IUP [waving a piece of paper to the camera and audience]. Ini, data otentik. Di dalam ini ada semuanya. PAJAK tidak dibayar.. Jelas Pak. ATM dari semua bupati yang ada di Riau. [audience clapping hands] Perusahaan-perusahaannya ini, Pak, 80%/ Silahkan nanti KPK ataupun apa, polisi, silahkan, saya tahu semuanya perusahaannya. Ini, bukti.. Satu pun tidak punya IUP/ hanya 20% yang punya IUP/ izin perusahaannya/ apa, perkebunannya. Yang bertanggung jawab di dalam hal ini, masalah asap, adalah perusahaan. Bukti/ waktu itu PT.. Ade Plantation.

Mr. Ilyas: Ade?


Mr. Ilyas: Apa itu nokoh-nokohi?

Mr. Ilyas: Jadi menurut Bapak, ini yang bapak bawa ini [pointing to the paper] perusahaan-perusahaan yang di/

Mr. Aris: Perusahaan-perusahaan yang di sawit. Yang memberi ijin itu kan pemerintah ni Pak/ tapi IUPnya tidak ada.

Mr. Ilyas: Jadi seperti apa sekarang hutan di Riau itu setelah jadi kelapa sawit?

Mr. Aris: Hutan ini Pak, sebenarnya/ hutan gambut itu tidak boleh dibikin kanal Pak. Hutan gambut itu tidak boleh dibuat kanal/ tapi YANG MEMBERI IZINNYA PEMERINTAH! Baik pemerintah pusat maupun pemerintah daerah! Akhirnya terjadi pengeringan. Kalau gambut itu Pak, kalau tidak dibikin kanal/ dia tidak kering/ dibakar, satu ton pun minyak situ tak akan terbakar.

Mr. Ilyas: Karena basah di dalam/

Mr. Aris: Untuk apa dibikin kanal, Pak/

Mr. Ilyas: Baik, ngambil duit kamu lah deh. [audience laughing]

Mr. Ilyas: Pak Jokowi kan datang.


Commercial break


Mr. Ilyas: Jadi nggak benar BNPB itu bodoh-bodohin masyarakat Riau aja, [Mr. Purwonugroho: Tidak betul.] Pura-pura ada garam di [inaudible]/


Mr. Ilyas: Apakah kemarin itu ada eee.. apa nggak/ ada kelihatan nggak itu ada Pemdanya yang terlambat menetapkan bencana.


Mr. Ilyas: Apa benar gara-gara birokrasi yang begitu bertele-tele harus ada dulu permintaan bupati, walikota, makanya terlambat pernyataan darurat.

Mr. Ilyas: Nggak, soalnya ada yang ngomong begini Pak, apa sih ruginya Pemda menyatakan darurat lebih cepat, kenapa harus lambat/ harus terlalu lama, kira-kira begitu proses masyarakat.

Mr. Purwonugroho: Ya sebenarnya bisa dilakukan cepat, asal semuanya berdasarkan prediksi dari kementerian lembaga yang kompeten/ kalau kita bicara masalah kekeringan, banjir, ya udah kompeten BMKG kan selalu menyampaikan, dari dasar BMKG tadi kita bisa menetapkan masalah darurat. Begitu terjadi bencana, maka darurat di situ. Jadi ada banyak hal yang bisa dilakukan selama darurat/ artinya ada kemudahan akses Pak.


Mr. Ilyas: Baik Pak. Tadi Pak Dharmawi Aris itu mau dijawab oleh.. Tunggu Pak, tunggu Bu, ada yang mau menyanggah Pak Dharmawi.


Mr. Ilyas: Baik.. Pak Made Ali, Jaringan Kerja Penyelamat Hutan.


[01:05:00] Mr. Ilyas: Polisi.


[01:06:34] Mr. Ilyas: Perkebunan sawit apa.


[01:06:40] Mr. Ilyas: Iya, tadi Anda mau nyebut nama perusahaannya kok nama/


[01:06:47] Mr. Ilyas: OK/


Mr. Ilyas: Gimana bisa terbakar lagi ya/ kan itu dibakar, supaya dia bisa bertanam sawit, kira-kira itu. Kalau sawitnya udah tumbuh ngapain terbakar lagi?

Mr. Ali: Luas/ misal Pak Karni/ ada satu perusahaan yang luas sawitnya itu 25.000 hektar.

Mr. Ilyas: Oo jadi dicicil

Mr. Ali: Iya Pak Karni/ jadi bukan sehektar dua hektar Pak Karni/ nah saya mau juga menjelaskan bahwa.. yang terbakar itu di/ di Riau adalah kawasan hutan. Ada satu, yang saya sebutkan tadi kawasan hutan produksi.. e HTI dan sawit/ untuk izin industri itu. Yang kedua adalah kawasan konservasi/ nah inilah yang saya bilang ada cukong-cukong itu Pak Karni/ kawasan hutan lindung, kawasan konse/ apa/ kawasan diam sejak kecil, ya, taman nasional, ada beberapa, ada satu putusan Pengadilan Negeri Siak, itu salah satu pelakunya adalah polisi/ sudah divonis, gitu ya, ya dia memulai dengan perambahan. Lalu lama kelamaan, ya itu kan kalau untuk itu kan murah Pak Karni/

Mr. Ilyas: Menurut catatan Anda, ada nggak korporasi yang udah dihukum.

Mr. Ali: Sudah 4.

Mr. Ilyas: Korporasinya/ Mr. Ali: Korporasi. Tiga sawit, satu sagu.

Mr. Ilyas: Apa hukumannya

Mr. Ali: Hukumannya kalau yang sagu, itu korporasinya denda. Satu milyar kalau nggak salah/ tapi kan sekarang sedang INKRA semua/ ada yang banding ada yang INKRA. Kalau yang satu tadi yang Malaysia/ Ade itu divonis kalau ndak salah 5 tahun penjara, denda 5M/

Mr. Ilyas: Yang divonis ini apanya, direkturnya, atau apanya

Mr. Ali: Ada yang, ada yang direktur/ di/ kalau yang PT Ade direktur dan korporasi, yang dipanggil direktur/ ada yang general manajernya... Itu, Pak Karni/

Mr. Ilyas: Itu udah iNKRA, yang lima tahun.

Mr. Ali: ... Dipending/ ee sekarang mereka ada yang banding ada yang kasasi.

Mr. Ilyas: Oo belum INKRA

Mr. Ali: Belum INKRA/ tapi faktanya yang kami pantau adalah/ kami memantau dari sidang pertama sampai, sampai putusan ya itu.. Bahwa ada.. sengaja melalaikan ketika lahannya terbakar hari itu, dibiarkan seminggu dua minggu, lima hari, padahal kami pernah jumpa dengan salah satu pemadam kebakar/ pemadam dari apa/ pemadam dari perusahaan, dia bilang, untuk memadamkan api dalam satu hektar, itu cuma
butuh setengah jam dengan sepuluh orang. Setengah jam. Satu hektar. Tapi kenapa ketika lahan 40 hektar, itu memadamkannya sampai berminggu-minggu.

[01:11:00] Mr. Ilyas: Apa benar kalau lahan itu kita tebang ya, untuk menanam sawit, atau apa tadi, akasia segala macam, itu biayanya 50 juta per hektar. Tapi kalau kita sewa orang membakar cuma 5 juta. Begitu kira-kira.


[01:11:30] Mr. Ilyas: Sekarang Pak Munhur Satyahaprabu (Manager Hukum & Kebijakan Walhi Nasional) Mr. Satya: Terima kasih Bang Karni.... Yak, mm, sebetulnya kami ingin menyampaikan begini/ bahwa kebakaran hutan ini besar pada tahun 97-98 ya, ketika itu WALHI berserta dengan teman-teman yang lain dan masyarakat sipil yang lain mengerahkan semua kemampuannya untuk memadamkan/

[01:11:54] Mr. Ilyas: Ya perlu diperkenalkan beliau ini dari WALHI.


[01:14:56] Mr. Ilyas: Ee kita cari siapa.. pelakunya tu bukan yang disuruh tok. Pelaku tu berkomentasi siapa yang [inaudible], siapa aktor intelektualnya, ya dalam hal perusahaan ya.. pasti larinya ke.. yang punya konsesi. Kalo penegakan hukumnya berjalan bener.


[01:16:13] Mr. Ilyas: Kalau izin dicabut, terus tanahnya dikasih ke siapa berarti?

[01:16:18] Mr. Satya: Tanahnya kan/

[01:16:19] Mr. Ilyas: Apa ini nggak jadi proyek baru lagi?


[01:16:34] Mr. Satya: Nah, kalau pertanyaannya begitu maka dijawab dengan Undang-undang 32 sebetulnya, bahwa pemberian sanksi itu bukan hanya pencabutan izin, tapi pemulihan, fungsi lingkungan, tapi juga, [Mr. Ilyas: Itu] apa namanya [Mr. Ilyas, sebetulnya ada dendanya sebetulnya] Iya, ada dendanya, ada tanggung jawab perusahaan di situ. Bukan hanya sanksi berjalan, sanksi yang lain tidak berjalan. Sebetulnya itu diakomodar dalam/ [inaudible]


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[01:23:16] Mr. Ilyas: Apa itu yang dialamin oleh anak Pak Muchlis tadi/
Dr. Susanto: Saya tidak bisa katakan apakah itu yang terjadi, karena memang harus dilakukan pemeriksaan secara langsung, ya kan, tetapi patofisiologi perjalanan aribat asap itu akan seperti itu/ Nah, itu kalau pada orang-orang yang normal/ memang beberapa orang punya resiko tinggi, seperti anak-anak ya, di bawah 12 tahun atau usia lanjut di atas 60 tahun/ karena mekanisme sistem/

Mr. Ilyas: Apa akibatnya untuk bayi-bayi.

Dr. Susanto: Secara umum hampir sama, hanya mereka punya potensi resiko lebih tinggi karena saluran nafasnya lebih pendek, kemudian mekanisme sistem kekebalan tubuh saluran nafas terhadap partikel yang masuk dari luar itu masih dalam proses pertumbuhan.

Mr. Ilyas: Apa seperti yang ibu tadi bilang bahwa mereka takutkan juga cancer paru-paru karena itu.


Mr. Ilyas: Baik Pak, sekarang ke Pak Anton Charliyan. Irjenpol, Kadiv Humas. Eeh, kami juga mengundang direktur.. grimsusnya/ kok nggak datang Pak.

Mr. Charliyan: Selamat malam Bang Karni, wassalammualaikum warahmatullohi wabarakatu [Mr. Ilyas: Walaikumsalam]. Salam tribratha. Jadi mohon maaf, ee para direktur tidak bisa hadir karena ya dengan situasi asap ini tidak bisa datang ke sini/ 

Mr. Ilyas: Dari daerah masing-masing

Mr. Charliyan: Dari daerah masing-masing, baik dari Kalteng, maupun dari Riau, yang kebetulan sedang siaga satu juga.

Mr. Ilyas: Tapi ada laporannya ke Pak anu/ 

Mr. Charliyan: Ada, ada

Mr. Ilyas: Pak Anton?

Mr. Charliyan: Iya, jadi pertama-tama saya mungkin dari kepolisian negara republik Indonesia turut prihatin kepada/ dengan masyarakat Sumatera, khususnya Riau dan ee Kalimantan, dan juga turut berduka cita, Pak Muchlis, atas meninggalnya e Putri Bapak.. Kemudian yaah, berbicara masalah kebakaran, ya mungkin kalau kita bakar ikan, bakar singkong enak, tapi kalau bakar lahan, bikin kita rugi semua bahkan menjadi masalah kita hari ini. Ee dan ini betul, dari data kami, merupakan kejadian berulang/ bahkan dari data kami itu kebakaran ini sudah dari tahun 1960. Jadi ada tiga dekade per 20 tahun. Adapun dari para penyidik di lapangan, luas yang terbakar ini se-Indonesia ini ada 7 propinsi, yaitu
37,309 ha. Jadi kalau diibaratkan ini hampir setengah daripada kota Jakarta. Ini data kami bisa dikonpirmasi, ada pun titik api di seluruh Indonesia itu ada ee 1.144. Ini yang terdata di kami. Ada pun ee.. yang ditangani untuk tahun ini adalah ada 184 kasus.. Bang Karni, kemudian ee.. yang sudah di.. sidik 127, kemudian yang sudah ditahan juga, ini sudah ada 78 orang. Jadi dalam hal ini Polri sangat serius sekali menangani masalah ini/


[01:29:22] Mr. Ilyas: Lebih murah kalau dibakar, dibanding ditebang


[01:31:27] Mr. Ilyas: Ya, saya minggu lalu makan siang sama Dubes Singapur.. yang pertama dia komplek, ekspor asap kita ke dia/ karena mereka mau F1 pekan ini. [Mr.


[01:32:34] Mr. Ilyas: Kalau boleh tahu, perusahaan jadi tersangka tadi perusahaan apa saja?

[01:32:37] Mr. Charliyan: O, banyak bang Karni, perusahaan itu ada/ seperti tadi disampaikan Bapak Kapolri, sudah diumumkan/

[01:32:44] Mr. Ilyas: Ya tapi kan perusahaan/ tadi itu kan inisial-inisial

[01:32:47] Mr. Charliyan: Mohon izin Bang Karni, karena kita ini ada undang-undang keterbukaan publik, di mana ada hal-hal yang perlu dirahasiakan, termasuk tersangka itu kita Polri ini harus menggunakan inisial. Jadi nanti kalau kita minta kita langsung/

[01:33:04] Mr. Ilyas: Saya kira di seluruh dunia nggak ada tersangka inisial.


[01:33:17] Mr. Charliyan: Kita kan pelaksana undang-undang begitu/ [while laughing]


[01:33:25] Mrs. Agus [speaking from the background before gaining attention]: Saya sedikit menyambut pembicaraan [inaudible]


Mr. Charliyan: Bukan maksudnya pembakar itu cukong, itu kan, maksudnya itu.

Mr. Ilyas: Nggak, yang menyuruhnya.

Mr. Charliyan: Maap kalau/ kalaus saya salah tanggap, itu kan/ karena tadi ada polisi, kalau polisi ya karena saya polisi juga [audience laughing in the background] harus saya bela institusi saya sampai di manapun juga, begitu kan.

Mrs. Agus: Karena ada oknum polisi yang diputus Pak. Sudah diputus INKRA.

Mr. Charliyan: Kalau itu oknum. Saya setuju dengan perkataan Ibu. Dan pasti akan kita pecat dia/

Mrs. Agus: Ya itulah oknum polisi inilah Pak. Ndak usah Bapak tersinggung, memang itu nyatanya.

Mr. Ilyas: Baik/

Mr. Charliyan: Bukan/ [audience clapping hands while laughing] Tapi jangan dibilang polisi, Bu. Kalau polisi ini adalah Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia. Lain Bu, yang juga berjuang untuk kemerdekaan kita [Mr. Ilyas: Baik], itu Bu, jadi/

Mr. Ilyas: Baik, saya kira nggak usah dilanjutin Bu/ [Mr. Charliyan still speaking: Ini tolong ditegaskan]


Mr. Supri: Ya, saya di sini mewakili Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia, ada HTI ada HPH menjadi anggota kami. Saya ingat satu tahun yang lalu saya duduk di meja sini, Bang Karni/ kita diskusi hal yang sama, itu ya/

Mr. Ilyas: Tahun lalu

Mr. Supri: Ya, moga-moga masih ingat. Nah, saya ingin sedikit menggarisbawahi apa yang disampaikan oleh Pak Al-Azhari tadi tentang.. ee.. ketidakseimbangan tenurial, ya, yang tadi diidentifikasi sebagai sumber dari persoalan kebakaran dan lain-lain. Saya ingin mengawali ee pembahasan saya atau diskusi ini dengan ee status areal open access, Bang Karni/ Areal open access adalah areal-areal yang hingga

[01:40:41] Mr. Ilyas: Maksudnya tidak melakukan di areal itu maksudnya apa/ di luar areal? Kebakarannya di luar areal?


[01:41:28] Mr. Ilyas: RKT itu apa?


[01:42:02] Mr. Supri: Tunggu tunggu, tunggu dulu sebentar Pak. Di dalam konsesi atau dalam RKT.

[01:42:05] Mr. Ali: Di dalam konsesi dan di dalam RKT.

[01:42:04] Mr. Supri: Na, TUNGGU DULU


[01:43:23] Mr. Ilyas: Loh, makanya, kan seharusnya itu kan ilegal namanya [Mr. Aris: Iya, yang ngomong legal siapa], artinya baik bupati, baik bupati maupun aparat adalah boleh bertindak


[01:44:07] Mr. Ilyas: Maksud Bapak di-backing ini dia melanggar, nanti diusut polisi, backingnya datang, selesai. [audience laughter in the background]


[01:44:57] Mr. Ilyas: Kita rehat dulu pemirs.

Commercial break


[01:45:30] Mr. Martono (Kabid Agraria dan Tata Ruang GAPKI): Ee, saya ralat, Pak.. Karni, saya adalah Ketua Bidang Agraria dan Tata Ruang Gabungan Pengusaha Kelapa

[01:47:06] Mr. Ilyas: Untuk apa


[01:47:33] Mr. Ilyas: Saya kira kita bukan ke situ fokusnya Pak. [Mr. Martono: Iya, kita lihat dulu/] Tapi siapa yang bakar hutan kita. [Mr. Martono; Baik, Pak Karni] Kalau pun ada devisa tapi harus membakar hutan, rakyat juga nggak terima/


[01:49:31] Mr. Ilyas: Kalau itu kan dari pihak yang menggugat.. pengusaha, kalau itu dibakar, itu cuma 5 juta. Tapi kalau itu dilakukan secara ee apa/ mekanis tadi, itu bisa 50-60 juta.


[01:50:05] Mr. Ilyas: Itu udah pave mekanisasi?

[01:50:06] Mr. Martono: Sudah pave ekskavator, pave buldoser, itu 6 juta. Jadi rasanya agak aneh itu ya kalau perusahaan berani membakar, dengan sengaja, untuk menghemat 6 juta per hektar/ Nah, ini saya berikan contoh ya Pak Karni, bahwa di/ di/ ie/ anggota GAPKI yang terbakar ini, maksimum, yang saya/ dari data laporan yang masuk, 400 hektar
terbakar. Tarohlah itu tidak ada tanamannya Pak, memang dibakar. 6 juta kali 400 hanya 2,4 milyar. Sedangkan.. akibatnya Pak, itu dicabut izinnya/

[01:50:49] Mr. Ilyas: Belum ada yang dicabut kan

[01:50:50] Mr. Martono: Sudah Pak/ kan si di/ ada yang kemaren di/ di/ dide/ didenda kan sudah ada sampai/ [inaudible]

[01:50:55] Mr. Ilyas: Didenda iya, tapi yang dicabut belum ada Pak.

[01:50:58] Mr. Martono: Dan itu dibekukan, Pak.

[01:51:00] Mr. Ilyas: Baru digertak-gertak, mau dicabut [Mr. Martono in the background: Iya, gitu.] [Audience laughing]


[01:51:54] Mr. Ilyas: Jadi secara persentase kecil sekali yang.. pe/ yang pengusaha punya, tapi di luar perusahaan punya/

[01:52:04] Mr. Martono: Betul, yang be/ ini dari Global Forest Watch. Jadi seperti itu data yang ada Pak/ Nah kemudian yang/

[01:52:10] Mr. Ilyas: Global Forest itu.. lembaga ataukah media ataukah online atau apa itu?


[01:52:59] Mr. Ilyas: Kenapa nggak mereka aja yang jual petaninya

[01:53:02] Mr. Martono: Maksudnya jual bagaimana Pak?

[01:53:03] Mr. Ilyas: Ya dia dapat 2 hektar, dia boleh panen sendiri, dia boleh jual sendiri/

[01:53:08] Mr. Martono: Memang jual sendiri Pak, mereka panen sendiri/

[01:53:10] Mr. Ilyas: Ya katanya tadi lewat perusahaan-perusahaan kasih uang tok. [An audience heard laughing in the background]

perusahaan, itu mereka na itu mereka panen sendiri dan mereka _kirim_/ koperasi yang _kirim_ Pak/ mereka tergabung dalam bentuk koperasi.

[01:53:46] Mr. Ilyas: Baik Pak. Tadi WALHI mau ngomong apa?

[01:53:49] Mr. Aris [from the background]: Saya mau klarifikasi sedikit Pak. Apa yang disampaikan oleh Bapak dari, dari Agraria Pak/ Ini surat agraria Pak. Data otentik agraria. Mr. Ilyas: Bahwa?


[01:54:29] Mr. Ilyas: Yang Bapak bantah dari bapak ini apa

[01:54:31] Mr. Aris: Iya, yang saya bantahkan itu _apa_ yang disampaikan oleh masalah kawasan hutan dan agraria itu tidak seimbang Pak. Ini _bukti_.

[01:54:41] Mr. Ilyas: Tidak sinkron, maksudnya


[01:54:46] Mr. Satya: Terima kasih Bang. Saya akan klarifikasi soal open access ya, ini jangan sampe ee, kita, menjadi _terdistorsi_/ _apa_ yang disebut dengan open access. Makanya dalam satu statement saya di awal, bahwa, open access itu, apakah di luar izin. Saya/ data kami menyatakan bahwa open access juga terjadi di wilayah-wilayah yang berizin. Makanya pentingnya audit perizinan, ya, open access bisa bersifat/ _begini_ Bang, bahwa satu perusahaan memiliki ratusan ribu, konsesi. Tapi dia hanya mampu mengelola 50.000. Artinya ada 70% ya 60% itu dia tidak kelola dengan baik. Itu bersifat open access. _Itu sebetulnya tanggung jawab siapa_/ ya pemilik konsesi. _Postur dari PP45_, kalau saya nggak salah ya/ tahun 2004 mengatakan bahwa pemilik izin itu bertanggung jawab. _Open access itu ditimbulkan oleh siapa_? Ya _oleh pemilik izin_. Makanya pentingnya bahwa open access yang di _apa_ disampaikan itu jangan sampai menimbulkan satu _stigma_ bahwa memang masyarakat melakukan pembakaran di lahan-lahan yang open access. Tapi sebetulnya itu ada di kawasan-kawasan yang berizin./ Pertama, konfirmasi itu/ Kedua, soal bantahan bahwa GAPKI, ee tidak ada perusahaan sawit yang membakar. _Ada satu contoh yang SANGAT gamblang dan INKRA._ Di Aceh. PT Kalwista Alam. _Terbukti_. Dan 300 _milyar_ didenda. INKRA. Lebih ya Pak ya? Ya, ini 300 lebih milyar itu, ya didenda. Artinya itu _terbukti_ ada perusahaan. Dan _gamblang itu_. Faktanya jelas/ dan di Riau juga/ walaupun belum INKRA/ juga _terbukti_. Begitu. Satu catatan kami, bahwa lahan-lahan terbakar itu, yang banyak sekali _apa_/ asapnya, itu ada di lahan _apa_/ lahan gambut! begitu. Riau, 6 juta per hektar ini diklarifikasi, itu di lahan apa. Apakah di lahan gambut? Atau di lahan biasa?


Selamat malam, Bang Karni.

Mungkin pertama kami sampaikan salam Pak Gubernur, seyogyanya beliau mau hadir di sini Bang, tapi karena situasi di Propinsi Riau berada dalam siaga darurat, ya/ siaga pencemaran udara akibat asap, jadi beliau tidak bisa meninggalkan tempat, dan beliau tetap bekerja bersama satgas yang ada di propinsi Riau, bersama Pak Danrem dan bersama kawan-kawan dari BPPD Propinsi Riau.

Saya kira tadi Bapak di/ biar saya yang pesan paha dadanya Pak, nggak begitu ya. [Audience laughing]

Jadi mungkin itu, Bang Karni, jadi yang kedua, saya ingin klarifikasi apa yang disampaikan dari Abang Da/ tadi Dharmawi, bahwa presiden Republik Indonesia Bapak Jokowi pernah bermalam di Pekanbaru, pada tanggal 26 November tahun 2014 lalu. Ini sewaktu beli/

Ini maksudnya yang sekarang Pak.

Jadi mungkin tadi apa yang disampaikan bahwa saat ini yang terjadi di Riau itu asap yang tadi sangat pekat, atau bahkan berada pada tingkat berbahaya itu memang rata-rata itu bisa kita duga, itu berasal dari daerah-daerah yang banyak hotspot tadi Bang. Sehingga ya situasi di Riau, dengan kabut asapnya itu, bahkan sampai memakan korban mungkin dugaannya begitu, ini adalah persoalan yang penting bagi kita semua. Berarti Riau tidak harus sendiri, tidak perlu sendiri, tetapi harus dengan dukungan/mungkin paling tidak regional Sumatera dan Jawa, dan Pusat, itu bersama-sama. Tapi Alhamdullah setelah ditetapkan kemarin siaga/apa, darurat pencemaran udara akibat/

[02:02:55] Mr. Ilyas: Pak, ini kan baru/ anu, apa yang terjadi. Yang saya ingin tahu itu apa yang akan dilakukan agar tahun depan itu nggak ada lagi kejadian kayak gini

[02:03:05] Mr. Labay: [cutting, seems defensive] Iya iya, saya belum/ belum sampai ke situ Bang. Ini kita/

[02:03:08] Mr. Ilyas: Ya waktunya sudah hampir habis Bapak belum sampai juga. [Audience laughing hard]


[02:04:23] Mr. Ilyas: Jadi bisa kita yakini ini bahwa tahun depan nggak ada lagi ini, asap.


[02:05:10] Mr. Ilyas: Ya, tapi kan kemaren-kemaren ada di Riau/

[02:05:11] Mr. Labay: Iya, kemaren-kemaren ya kita akui, ada/


[02:05:25] Mr. Ilyas: Ya baik, Pak itu mau nambahin, Pak Andra Sjafril?

[02:05:29] Mr. Sjafril (Kepala Dinas Kesehatan Pemda Riau): Ya, terima kasih Bang Karni, ee.. pertama, untuk diketahui bahwa, Plt Gubernur Riau, itu sangat .. sangat .. ee intens ya, sangat peduli, terkait dengan terjadinya pencemaran udara akibat ee asap ya,
sehingga muncullah ee status yang kita ketahui sekitar seminggu yang lalu. Ini bisa dibuktikan, hampir tiap hari kami, semua SKPD, khususnya yang masuk dalam satgas, itu kalender itu sudah tidak ada lagi warna merah. Jadi kalender itu sudah hitam semua. Jadi hampir tiap hari ada aja, ya/ beliau menanyakan bagaimana kondisi/ pagi pun jam setengah tujuh kalau beliau perlu, beliau telepon saya. Beliau telepon saya untuk menanyakan gimana keadaan yang ada. Itu yang pertama. Yang kedua, ee memang benar, dengan akibat terjadinya kondisi yang saat ini di Riau, terjadi peningkatan kasus terkait dengan 5 penyakit akibat asap, ya, jadi sesuai dengan Kepmenkes 289/III tahun 2003, kita tetapkan ada 5 penyakit, yaitu ISPA, pnemoni, asma, iritasi kulit, dan iritasi mata. Lalu, untuk diketahui, bahwa apakah masker yang sudah dilaksanakan, yang sudah dibagi-bagikan itu, ee tidak efektif? Untuk kami sampaikan, masker yang dibagikan, cost effective. Ya, cost effective, ya, itu dibagikan, kalau memakai yang lain/ kami tidak sebut/ ada satu jenis masker yang selalu dibicarakan, ya, yang menjadi tren saat ini, itu ee di kesehatan lebih diutamakan adalah untuk penyakit menular. Ya, untuk salah sa/ beberapa jenis penyakit menular, seperti H5N1, H1N1, kemudian MDRTB, ya, MDRTB. Maskernya itu ee men/ me/ apa namanya/ unuk menyaring di bawah 5 mikron. 5 mikron. Jadi kalau kita pakai terus menerus, kita sesak napas dibuatnya. Lalu terkait dengan ee ... saudara saya, saya sudah ini yang kedua kali mungkin ini saya sampaikan, ee saya turut berduka cita, ya, ee beliau sering berdiskusi dengan saya. Jadi karena pedulinya Bapak Plt Gubernur, beliau pun ya Pak, datang di hari Jumat, saya ingat sekali, datang ke rumah beliau, dan meminta saya untuk mencari jalan keluar. Untuk diketahui, bahwa informasi yang saya terima dari direktur utama/ jadi malam saya dapat informasi bahwa ee ananda meninggal, ee saya langsung kontak direktur utama RSUD Arifin Ahmad, dapat informasi/ dicari informasi bahwa ee ananda ini adalah terkena memang betul gagal nafas akibat penyakit penyerta yaitu meningitis TB. Meningitis TB dengan berat badan/ jadi ada kurang gizi juga/

[02:08:48] Mr. Ilyas: Jadi maksud Bapak tidak semata-mata gara-gara asap/
[02:08:50] Mr. Sjafril: Iya, tidak semata-mata karena itu/
[02:08:52] Mr. Ilyas: Walaupun pemicunya mungkin asap.
[02:08:53] Mr. Sjafril: Iya/
[02:08:53] Mr. Ilyas: Walaupun pemicunya mungkin asap./
[02:08:55] Mr. Sjafril: Iya, iya.
[02:08:57] Mr. Ilyas: Baik Pak. ... Apa?
[02:09:02] Mr. Azhar: Iya, saya mau katakan .. situasi di Riau, ya, banyak kita berbicara soal di Pekanbaru/
[02:09:10] Mr. Ilyas: Nggak, Bapak menanggapin aja sekarang, bukan menjelaskan lagi.
[02:09:13] Mr. Azhar: Iya/
[02:09:14] Mr. Ilyas: Ada yang Bapak mau nanggapin?
[02:09:15] Mr. Azhar: Iya/
[02:09:21] Mr. Azhar: Saya/ saya mau/ mau katakan bahwa, apa yang berlaku di Riau, khususnya, selama beberapa minggu, itu berkonsentrasi kepada kebakaran lahan/ meskipun kebakaran lahan, jumlah angkanya sebenarnya sedikit.

[02:09:35] Mr. Ilyas: Di Riaunya


[02:10:34] Mr. Ilyas: Nggak ada lah yang mengatakan itu, dia mengatakan bahwa perusahaan korporasi. [Mr. Azhar: Ya/ artinya/] [inaudible] membakar.

[02:10:41] Mr. Azhar: Iya, kalau begitu/

[02:10:42] Mr. Ilyas: Kalau/

[02:10:43] Mr. Azhar: siapa yang membakar?

[02:10:45] Mr. Ilyas: Ya berarti .. masyarakat di luar korporasi. Kalau korporasi nggak bakar/


[02:11:32] Mr. Ilyas: Kita rehat dulu sejenak pemirsa.

Commercial Break


[02:12:09] Mr. Anas: Baik, ee selamat malam Bang Karni. Ee ehm hari ini Bu Menteri, sedang ke .. Kalsel, kemudian hari Sabtu kemarin juga, ee ke Riau, artinya bahwa betapa perhatian ee pimpinan Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup terhadap ee penanggulangan atau .. pencegahan asap di wilayah Indonesia ini. .. Ee .. pada level nasional, bahwa ehm sudah ada satgas pengendalian operasi pengamanan kebakaran hutan dan lahan. Yang diketuai sendiri oleh Ibnu Menteri ee LHK. Kemudian .. bersamaan dengan BNBP, yah, mulai dari ... penguatan, ya, memastikan bahwa setiap posko di tiap-tiap propinsi khususnya yang ee terjadi kebakaran yang luar biasa seperti di Jambi, di Sumatera Selatan, kemudian Riau, tu wilayah Sumatera, kemudian juga di Kalimatan Selatan, Kalimantan Tengah, dan juga Kalimantan Barat. Ini enam propinsi yang saat ini ee luar biasa. Ee monitoring hotspot

[02:14:26] Mr. Ilyas: Maksudnya distribusi daerah yang kena asap itu


[02:14:41] Mr. Ilyas: Tapi titik apinya juga semakin banyak kan tahun ini

[02:14:44] Mr. Anas: Ya, tentu/ tentu itu jadi apabila dengan asap ini memang satu kesatuan yang ketika api membara, ya, itu asapnya berkurang tetapi/ itu sifat dari gambut. Kemudian apinya agak berkurang, atau katakan padam, tetapi karena ground fire, itu terjadi asap yang luar biasa. Itu yang saya/

[02:15:09] Mr. Ilyas: Itu yang ingin saya tanyakan juga ke Kehutanan Pak/ Tiap tahun kita mengalami ini/ dan tahun ini bukan semakin kecil, apalagi kalau kita berharap nggak ada, malah semakin besar. Ini .. apa yang dilakukan Kehutanan.


[02:16:45] Mr. Ilyas: Tadi sudah dicabut.

[02:16:47] Mr. Anas: Sudah dicabut. Yaitu .. kalau saya perlu sebutkan, yaitu PT .. Hutani Sola Lestari di Riau, kemudian kalau perkebunan, ya, itu ee Langgam Inti Hibrido, itu dibekukan izinnya, dan lahan-lahan yang terbakar, itu dikembalikan atau disita ke negara untuk proses lebih lanjut. Untuk di Sulawesi Selatan, yaitu, ehm Waringin Agro Jaya, dan juga Tempirai Palm Resources. Itu yang/ jadi kalau .. begini begini terus, pimpanin di Sumsel yang tadi dua, ya, dan kita ke depan, ya, seperti disampaikan Pak Karni/ apa yang akan dilakukan/ ini akan terus. Berdasarkan laporan, ya, hanya .. sekitar 7 sampai 9000 lahan terbakar, tetapi berdasarkan analisa ee LANDSAT, ya, citra satelit, itu tidak kurang dari 190.000 terjadi kebakaran pada tahun ini. Dan itu ada datanya di kami, ya, sudah dianalisa tinggal pengecekan, klarifikasi, verifikasi, ground check ke lapangan.


[02:18:19] Mr. Anas: Jadi itu dalam rangka apa nam/ [inaudible] juga sekaligus ee landscape management, tadi disampaikan ada audit perizinan dan sebagainya/ ini ke depan masih banyak/ tadi saya sebutkan 190.000 ha itu tersebar di tadi/ di 6 propinsi, bahkan lebih, dan ini akan diturunkan PPLH pejabat pengawas lingkungan hidup, untuk
kelapangan, apa yang disebut dengan Bu Menteri menyebutnya Satgasus Pengawasan. Nah ini semua kita ke depan, kita baru empat/ dan itu akan terus, ya, untuk memastikan bahwa apa yang disampaikan oleh sebelah kanan saya ini, apakah ada izinnya, atau tidak, kemudian tidak bisa mengelak lagi, bahwa di kawasan atau di lokasi, ya konsesi atau areal kerjanya itu terjadi kebakaran, karena kita akan melakukan ground check, oleh para petugas di lapangan/

[02:19:23] Mr. Ilyas: Itu bagaimana bisa ada yang tidak ada IUPnya katanya


[02:22:46] Mr. Anas: Ya dengan sendirinya kalau digenangi itu akan terjadi apa/ mati, ya/ saya punya pengalaman di daerah Bukit Kerikil Gemsia (?) kecil itu, ya/

[02:22:56] Mr. Ilyas: Sawitnya mati, gitu


[02:24:39] Mr. Ilyas: Saya kira Bapak bisa ngerti/


[02:25:00] Mr. Ilyas: Baik, terus Pak.

ini kita dengan Bu Menteri, itu sampai hari minggu pun kita masuk Pak, jadi masuk terus itu. Jadi e boleh dikatakan e Bu Menteri mungkin tidak ee tidak concern atau bagaimana, atau ngomong-ngomong saja, tapi adalah jelas, ee seri Bu Menteri [inaudible]. Ini dibuktikan adalah kaitannya dengan masalah ee pembekuan dan pencabutan izin. Dan ini adalah baru pertama kali terkait dengan itu.


Commercial break

[02:29:09] Mr. Ilyas: Pemirsaka kita sampai di ujung acara. Sekarang giliran Bu Ratna Sarumpaet ...


[02:36:12] Mr. Ilyas: Semua yang diomongin oleh .. Ibu Ratna Sarumpaet, dalam satu kalimat .. Cicero, filisuf Romawi, hukum tertinggi sebuah negara, adalah keselamatan rakyatnya. Dan itu dijabarkan di preambule Undang-undang Dasar 45. [some audience clapping hands] Sekarang dari Propesor Suparto Widjojo.


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Bahwa kematian hutan, adalah akhir dari kehidupan kita. Kita ketemu ILC yang akan datang.

[End of transcript]
Appendix 1B: Colour-coded English translation of ILC 2015 transcript

Title: Indonesia Lawyers Club 22 September 2015: Siapa Pembakar Hutan Kita (Who burns our forest?)

URL: https://youtu.be/obCk2cGkEKA

Duration: 3 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Font style</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Baseline intonation and volume of speech</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Italic</em></td>
<td>Medium intonation and volume of speech, emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAPITALISED</strong></td>
<td>Highest intonation and volume of speech compared to the baseline. High emphasis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Interrogative questions and color coding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Who is being blamed?</td>
<td>Almost every answer to the questions asked by the hosts of the talk show implies blaming somebody for the Haze or the sufferings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Who suffers according to the subject?</td>
<td>The representations of victimhood implied by the subject as they portray their narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>How the subject reacts to the Haze?</td>
<td>The emotional or rational contents of their statements when prompted to talk about what the subjects have done in response to the Haze or illness ensued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>How does the speaker make sense of the Haze?</td>
<td>The attribution can be seen through keywords and the moral content of the subject’s narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>How does the speaker describe how others react or make sense of the Haze?</td>
<td>There are times when the subject states their understanding about what the Haze or sufferings mean for the other people/communities/institutions, e.g. the benefit gained, disadvantages.</td>
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[Begin transcript]
[00:00:15] Editorial: Land and forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan seem to be an annual routine that has never been broken. If in 2014 people in Sumatra experienced the effects of the smoke only for approximately a week, now the people must experience it for nearly three weeks.

[00:00:41] Schools are forced to abandon teaching and learning activities for an indefinite period. Economic activities were disrupted. For example, the airports must cancel some flights due to the limited visual. Not to mention the health problems experienced by many citizens as a result of breathing poor quality air. Inevitably, these conditions prompt some people to demand the government’s responsibility through the National Commissioner for Human Rights.

[00:01:04] Roichatul Aswidah (Commissioner of the National Commission for Human Rights): The central government, provincial government and district governments, they have the authority, and by their authority, they must act. But this obligation has never been carried out. So, the government has done a very fundamental offense, which is not performing its duty to act. In human rights, this is called the obligation of conduct. Corporates’ greed and search for profit in their land clearing are speculated to be a major contributor to the environmental destruction. Even so, several of them deny it and blame the peasants. Although some say that it’s too late, President Joko Widodo finally decided to personally lead the intervention of this incident which should have been declared as a national disaster.

[00:02:00] Joko Widodo (The president of the Republic of Indonesia): “I have sent for, and bestowed to the Chief of Police to take the firmest, the most ruthless action against the companies that fail to comply .. Once or twice we have sent the message. // Because in fact they must also be responsible for their right and left, honoring the rights that we have given to them. Yes, that’s all.”

[00:02:33] Police General Baharudin Haiti: “Seven of them include PT (Ltd.) BMH in Kabutan … South Sumatera, and the suspect is named JLE. And the second is PT Roselin/ … PT RPP in South Sumatera, with suspect P. And PT RPS in South Sumatera, the suspect is S. And PT LIH in Riau, the suspect is FK. And the fifth PT GAP in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, the suspect is S. And the sixth is PT MBA in Kapuas, the suspect is GRN. And the seventh is PT ASP in Central Kalimantan, the suspect is WD.”

[00:03:50] The Indonesian Minister of Environment and Forestry Siti Nurbaya Bakar: “The ones who are processed by the criminal law of the police, we would definitely handle the administrative (sanction).”

[00:03:54] Reporter: “Is there a plan, Ma’am, to freeze (them), perhaps?

[00:03:56] Bakar: “Err, it depends, maybe if it’s criminal they could be sto/ ..be/ .. what is it, (their permit) could be taken away. And surely the criminal (punishment) is indeed the heaviest, and when it comes to us, if they (the companies) are ready to be deducted as offenders, it (the permit) has to be taken away.”

[00:04:12] Editorial: The urge to immediately solve the problem of smoke pollution also comes from the citizens of Singapore and Malaysia. Through social media, they object the haze (through) sarcastic commentaries and images. A 7.9 trillion rupiah civil claims against the companies found guilty may have been a shock therapy for this moment. But if
supervision is not enforced consistently, the government will be the most likely to return its role as a firefighter in the future.

[00:04:52] *Introductory music*

[00:04:56] Narrator: Indonesia Lawyers Club tonight's edition returns to the theme of "who cause the forest fires." Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome the president of Indonesia Lawyers Club, Karni Ilyas!

[00:05:19] Mr. Ilyas (ILC host): Ladies and Gentlemen, we meet again in Indonesia Lawyers Club. It’s weeks already... the land of Sumatra and Kalimantan is blanketed in smoke. Thus, the people there have been screaming for long that they cannot breathe and the businessmen close shops due to the haze. Because of that, tonight we were forced to broadcast this topic with the title "Who burn our forests." Because since last year we’ve been raising this issue. But we ... seem stupider than a donkey. Each year (we) would fall in the same pit. And in the last three years the same hole has grown bigger than in years before. Because of that, this evening we invited many stakeholders, representing the government, society, and even businessmen. Although there may be some here, who are not whom we invited, but are here as prisoners of their own employers or bosses. And before we begin let us first watch the Melayu-Riau artists in action .. with the song [clapping hands] "Disaster is not a Discourse". Please.

[00:07:30] Vocal leads: We have failed to keep them safe. [song] Shortness of breath, vomiting, and indicated bronchitis, and who knows what other diseases which will eventually weaken them all. [song] Our younger sister/brother is [showing a tablet with a photo of a toddler in a hospital bed] one of the thousands of children who are in the verge of death. They are us. Our younger siblings. Your children. Indonesian children living in Riau.

[00:08:34] A dozen years of generation after generation who have grown up in our land have their blood contaminated. Toxic dust that is carried by the smoke of the burning land, we must continually breathe. Even with the decrease of oxygen in the air. Each season the leaders design developmental strategies, promising benefits that purportedly for their (the children’s) future. Ironically, at the same time the disaster is allowed to continue .. the same disaster continues to occur, repeated, performed by the same person, for the same destruction, for .. they’re (the children) the victims. Ladies and Gentlemen, is it not that the ignorance is the same as allowing the loss of a generation of Indonesia. The omission of the death of their future .. and for whom? For whom really, the development was initiated, while today we realise that this beneficiary generation will not be able to present in the future to take it up.

[00:09:57] Do not point the finger to and fro. There’s no need. Also there’s no need to say "you". "We all". We are all the adults who should have been responsible for them.

[00:10:14] Singer:

*With what* [clapping hands] *we breathe*

*When oxygen has been robbed*

*The fragrance of sandalwood is just a story*

*Disappeared amidst the embers*
Gray haze greets the morning  
Greed ... soars high  
Surrounding us right and left  
Until there is no place to return

Hoo hoo hoo hoo hoo

[00:13:00] Lead [while music playing]: Mr. President, Mr. President Joko Widodo. The former president, governors, regents, former regents, I, all of us. We have failed to keep their future safe.

[00:13:23] Singer:

With what [clapping hands] we breathe  
When oxygen has been robbed  
The fragrance of sandalwood is just a story  
Disappeared amidst the embers  
Grey smoke greet the morning  

Grey haze greets the morning  
Greed ... soars high  
Surrounding us right and left  
Until there is no place to return

O oo ho hooo hoo  
Disasters are not a discourse!  
O oo ho hooo hoo  
Disaster in sight!  
O oo ho hooo hoo  
Disasters are not a discourse!  
O oo ho hooo hoo  
Disaster in sight!  
O ho ho hoo hoo oh  
Disaster in sight  
[hands clapping]

[00:15:41] Mr. Ilyas: Orangutans, chimpanzees, gorillas, thousands of years they live in the forest. And they are fantastic. Never their population exceeds the ability of the forest to provide. And never the forests are damaged by them. It seems they are more worthy than us humans. Said Gene Gudoll, anthropologist from England who became UN Ambassador of Friendship.
[00:16:35] Ladies and gentlemen, who is burning (the forests)? Last year there was a dispute happening. Said the palm corporations, it was the farmers who were the arsons. The traditional farmers. Meaning the common folk (rakyat kecil, “lowly folk” or literal translation: “the small people”) who dwell near the plantation areas. Said the common folk, the big companies. But who really did it? This (the who) was not revealed last year. (I) hope in today’s discussion we can reveal (them).

[00:17:11] Now I am addressing you Muchlis. Muchlis, whose being said that his daughter died due to the smoke in Riau. When did it happen?

[00:17:26] Mr. Muchlis (the name only stated by the first, titled "People victim of Riau’s smoke"): The death daughter was just on the last 10 September 2015/

[00:17:34] Mr. Ilyas [cutting]: Last 10 September?

[00:17:34] Mr. Muchlis: The first cause, she just coughed.

[00:17:43] Mr. Ilyas: Since when had she been coughing?

[00:17:43] Mr. Muchlis: Almost a week she coughed.

[00:17:47] Mr. Ilyas: Before she died?

[00:17:47] Mr. Muchlis: Before she died.

[00:17:50] Did she ever coughed before?

[00:17:56] In the last year’s haze she also coughed /

[00:17:59] So because of smog as well?

[00:17:59] At that time she was treated by the doctor, alhamdullillah cured.

[00:18:05] Since when the haze .. where, in Pekanbaru? /

[00:18:08] In Pekanbaru.

[00:18:09] Pekanbaru. When did the haze start?

[00:18:14] Yes after, ... probably in early September the haze was already seen, Pak.

[00:18:22] Already seen.

[00:18:22] Already seen.

[00:18:23] Can you tell what is happening at your home and how was it like in the house so that the daughter exposed to the haze and died.

[00:18:36] Er .. My daughter was / [inaudible]

[00:18:41] What age?

[00:18:41] The age of twelve.

[00:18:44] Twelve years, yeah

[00:18:44]

Her name is Muhana Anggriawati, a 6th grade elementary student at 171 Primary School, the City of Pekanbaru, Tenayan Raya. So the cause of my daughter’s (illness) was indeed the cough, Pak, at the initial stage, a week of cough at home. Err ... It was the most severe on the seventh day, and (on that day) the fog was the most terrible. Err… Because of our
sympathy as parents, to the daughter’s condition that did not allow her to sleep, breathing difficulty... her breath was difficult. So we took initiative to carry (her) to the hospital. But on the way to the hospital she was fine (happy) Pak, meaning nothing was (felt) abnormal. So when (we) arrived at the hospital, (she) was treated at the Emergency Installation, on that medical treatment she began to collapse (her condition was “dropped”) ... Began to collapse until she lost (her) consciousness. And (she was) declared (sentenced) as (experiencing) breathing failure, Pak. It was because her lungs were covered by mucus. That is what we know Pak.

Ilyas: How long she was at the hospital?
Mukhlis: (She was) At the hospital for a week Pak.
Ilyas: A week?
Mukhlis: A week.
Ilyas: So a week after the smoke blanket she had breathing difficulty/
Mukhlis: Not after the smoke blanket, but during the smoke blanket she also (treated) at the eecu (ICU), and (she) was unconscious
Ilyas: What was her position in the family?
Mukhlis: The first child, Pak.
Ilyas: How many children do Muchlis have?
Mukhlis: Of the three siblings.
Ilyas: How do you give assurance that/ or doctor give certainty that the cause of her cough was the smoke blanket and not the others/ for example, it might be the lungs ... (she) contracted a lung disease. How can it be assured by the doctor that it was (caused) by the smoke blanket?
Mukhlis: Err … In principle it was not … It was not [inaudible], but regardless, the situation at that time when my daughter was coughing was certainly (because of) the smoke blanket Pak. I took it noticed. And on the normal days when there was no/alhamdullillah she was very healthy. Almarhumah (the late daughter) was very healthy.
Ilyas: No, the doctor, what did the doctor say/
Mukhlis: The doctor’s explanation at that time was indeed he said breathing failure.
Ilyas: Breathing failure, just that.
Mukhlis: Yes. Medical [inaudible]
Ilyas: And caused by the smoke blanket? Or is it you who conclude that it was caused by the smoke?
Mukhlis: Probably (it was) the trigger, Pak. Because the situation in our region is extraordinary when the smoke goes inside the house. It goes inside the house, the trigger was.
Ilyas: So even though the door has been closed, the window closed, the smoke can still enter?/
Mukhlis: It can still.
Ilyas: Lha you all did not/ did not experience breathing difficulty or cough?

Mukhlis: I sometimes in our environment we also have (breathing) difficul/ there are some
(who experience) (breathing) difficulty, there are some who cough, and there are some who
contracted flu, that various (reaction), Pak. It was only coincidence that my daughter was
worse .. at that time.

[00:22:19] Mr. Ilyas: Perhaps Mrs Azlaini Agus can tell me what is experienced in Riau /
Pekanbaru as a public figure?

[00:22:31] Riau Community Leaders Mrs. Azlaini Agus: Thank you Mr. Karni. The
smoke / the haze in Riau this year has actually started since the second week of August. So
until the third week of September, it was six weeks already. In the first and second week
of the haze that we were merely at the dangerous state if we use the Air Pollution Standard
Index. But on the third week of the fourth and the fifth and sixth, the range shown on the
APSI information board were "Very Unhealthy" and "Hazardous". In the last two weeks it
has never been moved from the "Hazardous," "Hazardous", if we look at the air pollution
standard index, it is above 300. Even in the last two weeks in Riau, it shows the figure 800
to 900, even on September 17, in eer Siak, Siak region, the oil mining region in the coast,
the outdoors reached more than 1000. At 300, in / in the hazardous stage, Mr. Karni, it was
defined as "causing serious damage to human health". It was on the 300.

[00: 23:59] Now we
are weeks in that condition. So if then err the sweetheart err the
deceased daughter of this son Muchlis died of respiratory failure, I strongly agree because
on September 3, I evacuated my two grandchildren with his mother to Jakarta, because my
grandson also suffers from asthma and I also saw him to start having difficulty
breathing. Therefore, I evacuate them off, never to think of school, but about safety first.
But how many people of Riau have the ability to flee to Jakarta, Mr. Karni? Millions of us
are exposed to the haze day and night. The smoke even entered the governor's office that
is air-conditioned!

[00:25:10] Well, back then we in fact questioned, in such conditions err ... there was a
statement from the Minister of Health which stated that the situation in Riau was still not
dangerous, when we demanded the evacuation of citizens who are exposed, particularly err
the ones vulnerable to the negative effects of smoke ... even the Minister of Health stated
that "the evacuation should be carefully considered as they will cost a lot". Well, we Riau
people, Pak, were very upset with that statement. As if we who are exposed to smo / the
very dangerous smoke for weeks were not a part of this nation. As we were not a part of
the Unitary State of the Indonesian Republic. Hence the people see the fumes we are
inhaling and then it was said that it's not dangerous by the Minister of Health, we then feel
"who are we actually" that is. Meaning that if the government is not able to help us, at least
just empathise with our fate. If [hands clapping] we are really a part of this nation.

[00:26:27] Mr. Karni ... the haze in Riau was started in 1997. I remember it well, because
that time was my first son's graduation in Bandung, and we couldn't fly. We took the road
to Bandung. Since that time (1997) the smoke have always come to us. And there has never
been a systematic effort to make it disappear. People keep burning and the government
keeps extinguishing. So we are extinguishing the fruit of the labour of the businessmen, big investors who burn their land and plant (there) and the government cash out the people’s money to extinguish; What’s left is the people who are attacked by breathing difficulties, and we don’t know our children’s future anymore! Based on IDI’s (Indonesia Medical Doctor Association) statement, the smoke being breathed for a long time will contribute to lung cancer. Wallahu’ alam (Allah knows better). We are uncertain of our children’s future, and are our children not among the children of Indonesia? That’s what we/ we/ we feel.

[00:27:43] But why the former Riau Governor badly delayed the establishment of the emergency state?

[00:27:48] In the constitutions, Pak, there is a criteria needed to establish an emergency status, Pak.

[00:27:55] Above 300?

[00:27:57] Above 300 but /

[00:27:57] Bu, you've said it reached a thousand /

[00:27:59] Eight / yes. Then there are other criteria, that it must also be submitted by the regent and mayor. In Riau by coincidence these regents and mayors were too busy dealing with the simultaneous election in December to come. So he rather forgot about the smoke, Pak [audience clapping], even in the midst of the smoke they were campaigning / that was the terrible condition of ours /

[00:28:18] Mr. Ilyas [cutting]: So then it is the fault of the central government isn’t it! /

[00:28:21] Well, but Pak /

[00:28:23] regents and mayors /

[00:28:25] in the legislation it was mentioned, other criteria such as the total paralysis of flights, on at least three days. By coincidence the flight in Riau has never been totally paralyzed for any day. Many aircraft could not fly but Garuda could / well, it also cannot be used as a criteria /

Well, since the 14th, with a strong push from the public, the governor declared an emergency state of haze disaster. Now with status / with the emergency state we expected, certainly the central government would immediately intervene. But we want to convey, if the 14th was defined as the state of emergency, by coincidence on the 19th when the Madam Minister came on 19th was indeed (somewhat brighter yes, Son? – talking to Muchlis) the atmosphere was a bit brighter so their aircraft could land that afternoon, and indeed we delivered all our concerns to the central government. Pak err if we see, why then the Governor did not declare a state of emergency? Smoke in Riau comes from the other regions, isn’t it, Mr. Karni. For this year, yes. If /

[00:29:34] But still there are hotspots /

[00:29:35] There are hotspots but not /

[00:29:35] 16 spots in Riau /

[00:29:38] Yes, but not too many /

[00:29:39] Yes not /

[00:29:40] But if we see, indeed this year why even when the fires were extinguished, the smoke keeps on coming, it is because I think the Agency for Regional Disaster Response
was working. Disaster Management Task Force also was working to put out the fire, but the smoke does not diminish because the source was not in Riau region. Well, if it is already inter-provinces, it is indeed impossible for only the Riau Governor to take the initiative. It should become the responsibility of the central government. I think on the 15th (they) already had a meeting in Jakarta, and only from the days on I’ve seen an army of Kostrad being sent to the city [inaudible], wasn’t it, Son [talking to Muchlis] /

[00:30:25] Mr. Ilyas: Yes, only after the emergency state was announced [Mrs. Agus: Yes] they were sent. It was their duty [Mrs. Agus: Yes]. So why on earth was the governor so slow to [Mrs. Agus: Yes. I guess /] the mayor was busy [Mrs. Agus: Yes], the governor was slow /

[00:30:38] Mrs. Agus: That's right, Pak /

[00:30:39] Mr. Ilyas: Bu, are you native to Riau or [Mrs. Agus: Native, Pak /] a descent? What do you get from of the palm oil?

[00:30:45] Mrs. Agus: Nothing, Pak /

[00:30:45] Mr. Ilyas: Nothing? [audience laughing] No, I asked this because Riau is pitiful. The funding for Five Repelita (Five Years National Plan of Development) (...) comes from Riau’s oil. Riau got nothing " [Mrs. Agus: [inaudible] got smoke] There was no smoke [audience laughters]. Then the forest was cleared, transformed into palm oil, so I asked: What does the people of Riau get? [Mrs. Agus: Got smoke] We break for a moment [Mrs. Agus: Thank you; audience: hands clapping].

Commercial break

[00:31:23] Mr. Ilyas: Viewers, we will continue our discussion. Now I am addressing Mr. Al Azhar, head of the customary institute of Melayu... Riau ... What is your response to the forest burners?

[00:31:47] For the people who think ... people in Riau who think, what is happening now was in fact predicted in the final years of the 70s and 80s when the central government defined the Riau region as an area for natural resource exploitation based on forests and land after the exploitation of petroleum. It could actually be predicted that there would be something that we can now refer to as ecocide. Err ... ecocide, which takes place today. Mr. Karni, try to imagine, from the 8 million (hectares) of Riau’s land, in just a few years, 5 million (hectares) have become the private territory of only 200-300 people. And the rest is for 6 million people of Riau today. What happens, for instance when the logs are fallen, the rivers turn acidic because someone turn over the logs into it, what, what happens? So the ecocide is happening like a tidal wave in/ in/ in Riau. Because once again, as if Riau is no land for the people. Deemed as the land of no one and only as a natural resource supplier. Before there were mineral resource, natural oil, and now the eyes are into the resources from the forest and land.

[00:33:34] From the perspective of adat (customary, indigenous) Melayu, the old adat wisdom, that was there before, now is gone. Try to imagine the adat community, by the next week there would be signposts on their house yard, that the A Corporation owned this now, the B corporation owned that, and they have never been asked to discuss about their own adat forest and land. Now what happens there, now, today, is tenurial imbalances, the imbalance of the tenurial ownership. That’s one thing. And this causes what is called as the conflicts of trimatra (the Indonesian term for the three spheres of earth, sky, and water),
the conflicts that are connected with the forest and land in Riau, which in our notes, there are at least 240 spots scattered in all areas especially in the surrounding areas of corporation activities, the corporations there/ both logging and palm oil. The conflicts of trimatra between whom/ it’s between the adat people who feel that it is their traditional rights, and they know that their traditional rights are protected by the constitution, even more by the declaration of the UN. That’s one thing.

[00:35:03] Now the second, the migrants, the migration, the people who came from outside Riau coming there and see the opportunities given by the forest and land, and then the third, corporations. These, corporations which are there, that was the cause/ in addition, since mid-80s, a development on the government’s policy, that is giving up or in other terms not differ the mineral land with the peatland. Well, the peatland in Riau is vast, and she needs special handling, but in the permits she was seen as the same with mineral land … For the adat communities, the peatland is not a choice to be worked on. It is (worked) only as a backup. Because when it is cleared a little, it dries, then it becomes/ it can be a source of disaster at any time, as it is the case now. Well, the handling of the large area of the peat/ peatland there is just the same, and the best way, which has the lowest price for the corporation is to make canals/ dry the land up/ then on top of the dry land they planted their commodities. But that was like opening the Pandora's box, the danger stored in the dry peat/ and that is exactly what is happening now ...

[00:36:52] Well ... What do you do? (...) Already, years ago, in 2014 we thought that it was going to be the end. That this is the last year. Not because / not because there is a significant handling of the seeds of the disaster, but because we feel that there would be no land in Riau, wouldn’t it. But apparently what happened in Riau was transferred to our neighbouring provinces such as Jambi and South Sumatra. What took place in the 90s in Riau, now begins in our neighbouring regions, namely in Jambi and Sumatera Selatan.

[00:37:37] Mr. Ilyas: Hence more smoke comes from there nowadays /
[00:37:40] Mr. Azhar: So more smoke more comes from there nowadays, yes, indeed. Err/ if we can /
[00:37:46] Mr. Ilyas: No, what is gained by the farmers in Riau with the palm oil plantations being there/ they should have something left for the farmers.
[00:37:58] Mr. Azhar: There are no rules that something must be left to the farmers/ There is something called KKPA framework (Kredit Kepada Koperasi Primer untuk Anggotanya; rough translation: Credit to the Primary Cooperation for its Members) / but none in Riau’s experience proofs that KKPA framework is for the welfare of the farmers. Up to this day, Brother Karni. None /How is it possible that in the KKPA framework for example, in /

[00:38:17] Mr. Ilyas: What is KKPA?
[00:38:17] Mr. Azhar: K / KKPA is .. er .. partnerships between the corporate with/ with/ with the neighbouring communities. Well, the two hectares of palm oil plantation promised/ that is promised by the corporation, at the normal price of palm oil / Do not see it now, because the palm oil is really down right now, well, that is ../ The ordinary farmers they get about two million [Mr. Ilyas cutting] hectares /
[00:38:44] Mr. Ilyas: What I meant is it not a plasma programme [Mr. Azhar: Yes, yes] for the farmer /
[00:38:49] Mr. Azhar: Plasma for farmers. None were successful / programme / er / pasma programme is/

[00:38:53] Mr. Ilyas: But is there? The programme /

[00:38:54] Mr. Azhar: Yes, there is / why it is said to be unsuccessful? With the two hectares, people can actually relieve themselves from the poverty or less prosperous [Mr. Ilyas: Yeah] / But how could the two hectares only produce 250,000, 300,000 rupiah (26-31 NZD)? Which was distributed to the farmers? That is, the core of [Mr. Ilyas cutting below] the plasma.

[00:39:14] Mr. Ilyas: So the plasma, the plasma for the farmers were given in the form of cash to the farmers [Mr. Azhar: In the form of cash] and not err [Mr. Azhar: Not in the form of land] harvest? Not / [Mr Azhar: No, no, yes] ...

[00:39:31] Mr. Azhar: Because the companies /

[00:39:31] Mr. Ilyas: So what have you done as the Head of what [looking at the papers] Chief of the Customary Association for Melayu(?)? Nothing?

[00:39:40] Mr. Azhar: Of course not, well/ of course we don’t do nothing, we/ we for ex/ we for example we/ we/ object (sue, complaint?) yeah/ for example we object, firstly, so that the land/ being the customary land is counted as the customary (communities’) investment to the companies/ but this is surely not in the viewpoint, in the viewpoint of the land clearing in err in this/ because the land is shared on the tables of the mayor, the governor, and the table of the central government, that’s it. Our land, the customary land, in all history has never been acknowledged, the customary land in Riau, by the Indonesian government to this day, Bang Karni.

[00:40:35] Mr. Ilyas: Right, now Basrizal Koto, Riau public figure.

[00:40:40] Mr. Koto: Right / yes. Brother Karni, I introduce that Mr. Al-Azhar is the president of the Free Riau Pak .. [audience clapping hands] for the year 2000, 2005. So the meaning of Riau /

[00:40:50] Mr. Ilyas: Free how / want to rebel?

[00:40:54] Mr. Koto: [laughing with the audience] So freedom (merdeka) means this Bang Karni/ we do not want to separate from the Republic and NKRI (United State of the Republic of Indonesia), but over the despair, the despair (because of) the way the central government treats Riau, which for us is err.. very unacceptable to the communities in Riau. Look, now 2.7 million hectares of palm oil is in Riau. When the smoke is like that and reap a soul .. a child, one person, and 43,000 got ISMA disease ../ [Mr. Ilyas: ISPA (acute infection of the respiratory tract) yes / ISPA ... yes, so .. the corporate owners of the palm oil have never cared about them ... That is yes / once we ever thought, only with the new government there is a little change. The promises to the government .. err Riau province. But what happens .. what was expressed by my sister Azlaini Agus before, alhamdullilah in the bad circumstances err our president, went to Riau .. only briefly Mr. Karni. Never been staying overnight, and we also wish, the central government to feel what we feel in Riau. What the smoke is like, Mr. Karni ..... That was all [lower voice] I want to say.

[00:42:29] Mr. Ilyas: That was all, Bung Basril? [Mr. Koto: Yes] What you want to say? [Mr. Koto: Yes]. Yes, but do not ... rebel, I mean.
[00:42:39] Mr. Koto: We ain’t no [inaudible] rebel / [Mr. Ilyas: No ..] So the restlessness so that the central government understands /

[00:42:44] Mr. Ilyas: The KPRI Riau also involved [Mr. Koto laughing]. Ismail Lengah was the name of the commander at the time.

[00:42:50] Mr. Koto: This, the president of Riau /

[00:42:52] Mr. Ilyas: (He) was only bombed once then lost [Mr. Koto laughing]. So never rebel. Eer, now .. to Mr. Dharmawi Aris ... Also is said a customary leader.

[00:43:08] Mr. Aris: I'm from the agency of .. Melayu Riau, Pak.


[00:43:12] Mr. Aris: Thanks to Mr. Karni tonight. I base my speech on the true facts, which is what happened in the province of Riau. Starting from 20..13, the haze has already been very-very / at the time of the inauguration of the governor, at that time .. Pak / what now / Mr. Nirhaman was in the haze. The aircraft could not even land, Pak. In fact, the governor has got no brain, no brain. Wish he understood the situation before the time and nowadays. This is what is needed by the current governor. So is Ibu Minister.

[00:44:02] Mr. Ilyas: This is the current KPLT (the acting) governor?

[00:44:03] Mr. Aris: Yes /

[00:44:03] Mr. Ilyas: What is the reason to you Pak to say (he’s) got no brain?

[00:44:06] Mr. Aris: Yes / At that time (the smoke) had started (to spread) at the time he was elected, with Andreas Makmun in the smoke blanket. At the beginning of his period. He should have thought about the future. How the smoke in Riau could have been prevented …. This should be highlighted/ The members of the legislative did the same. At the time of the smoke blanket like this, they go abroad. Also idiots (brainless). [audience clapping hands]

Mr. Ilyas: How could the people of Riau vote for the idiots, then? [audience laughing hard]

Mr. Aris: There are still many sons and daughters of Riau who can lead Riau, Pak. But the bureaucracies in the leadership itself makes those who are still good get denied as leaders. Perhaps they have better track records, but they do not have money, they cannot be leaders. This, what should you (Mr. Ilyas) highlight.

Mr. Ilyas: Well, then.. err your people prefer to vote for the rich, is that what you said?

Mr. Aris: Indeed. [audience laughing hard, then clapping hands shortly] ... There are many in Riau, Pak, 80% / 80% of the plantations in Riau do not have IUP (Plantation Permit) [waving a piece of paper to the camera and the audience]. Here, the authentic data. Inside, there is everything. TAX is not paid .. It’s obvious, Pak. The ATM of all regents in Riau! [Audience clapping hands] These are the companies. Pak, 80% / Please later the Commission for the Eradication of Corruption or what, the Police, please, I know all these companies. This, the proof .. Not a single one has IUP / only 20% who had IUP / the

7 I am sure that Ilyas meant PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia – The Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) instead of KPRI.
Mr. Ilyas: Ade?

Mr. Aris: Ade Plantation, Malaysia. Why was not arrested? PLEASE ARREST. I dare, Pak, all fingers pointing to his chest, to show, Have pity, Pak, to my grandchildren. I sent away 7 grandchildren, Pak, from Pekanbaru (capital of Riau). On the 31st August. How much did it cost? Try to imagine. Again, to imagine. There is no minister who takes responsibilities today? Just rants and blabberies, the Minister of Health did: “The people should not work outside because of the smoke.” What should people eat? I am not what interrupted by audience laughing. .. there is nothing done by the minister, she just talked, forbids people not to wander outside, do outdoor activities. If the people cannot do activities, (they) cannot eat, Pak. Where can they get money from? This is what the central government also this BNPB (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana – The National Agency for Disaster Response), yes Pak, this is also the work of BNPB Pak, I know Pak. Where is he putting, show the what / make the, what / salt in the sea / up there. Who would check? Above the sky who would want to check? He says it's an artificial rain / it's nokoh-nokoh the society. [audience laughing in the background]

Mr. Ilyas: What is nokoh-nokohi?

Mr. Aris: Fooling Pak. [audience laughing hard] … Saying here is the way we would scatter / what the salt. The place of the salt itself we do not now. [audience laughing hard] Where does he want to lift / lift the salt to the sky / do not fool the people of Riau, I don’t like it [audience clapping hands] The Melayu Pak, has the resam custom. Yes, Pak, this Melayu has resam custom. We were respectful, Pak. But if we are trampled on, we will no longer be respectful with Central … Indeed, I am being frank.

Mr. Ilyas: So according to you, what you bring is the companies which are/ The companies in the palm oil. The one who gives permits is the government, isn’t it Pak? but there is no IUP

Mr. Aris: [NIKDA] [Mr. Ilyas: Huh], THE PROTECTED FOREST WAS ALL GONE swept by him. Yesterday, Ade Plantation Ltd. [pointing finger to the air], how many burning he was, brought, to what / what / Supreme Court. He won, because he has a lot of money, the community, becomes the victim [while pointing to Muchlis] [some of the audience clapping hands] … Well this our governor is still many Pak, if he’s not able to be a governor, replace with the kids who are, good, [audience clapping hands] I was fed up with Riau Pak / honestly Pak, [audience laughing] Although I am a native of Riau / but I am FED UP with Riau … Well that's it Mr. Karni that I honour /

Mr. Ilyas: So what has become of the forest in Riau after being transformed to palm oil?
but THE PERMIT WAS GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT! Both the central government and local government. Finally the drain happens. The peat Pak, if it’s not being surrounded by channels / she does not dry / even when she’s burnt, even with a ton of oils, it will not be lit.

[00:50:15] Mr. Ilyas: Because it’s wet inside /
[00:50:17] Mr. Aris: Yes, because it’s wet.
[00:50:18] Mr. Ilyas: But because it’s surrounded by channels [Mr. Aris: Surrounded by channels /] it dries out /
[00:50:21] Mr. Aris: Dries out.

[00:50:23] Mr. Ilyas: What is the use of the canals, Pak /
[00:50:25] Mr. Aris: Because this palm oil needs to d/ d/ do what, to get in there that the seeds must use a canal ... So the fault is in the government's itself Pak. That was because the ATM. Companies provide the ATM Pak ...
[00:50:46] Mr. Ilyas: ATM is indeed ATM , (they) are taking your money. [audience laughing]

[00:50:50] Mr. Aris: That’s how it goes, Mr. Karni [Mr. Ilyas: Right/] what I what / what I know. So we, were very-very / I as the chairman of the customary agency of Riau’s Melayu, if necessary the central government does not think, especially Ibu Siti Nurbaya, how many times I have conveyed to Siti / Mrs. / Nurbaya. By email, by phone. She still rambles. WHAT KIND OF Minister is she, rambling around [audience laughing] ... That’s not what’s expected, she should have seen, when the smoke was coming, she stood in the middle of the smoke. Pak Jokowi did the same thing. Should not have just rambled around on the television.

[00:51:27] Mr. Ilyas: Did not Mr. Jokowi come.
[00:51:29] Mr. Aris: Yes (he) came Pak only to the airstrip did not do anything / better don’t. [audience laughing in the background] ... Better don’t / only on the airstrip Pak. Go into the forests, only then he would know, how hard it is for the people, who can, even to breathe in is difficult. How much/ the people err of Malaysia yesterday, they went back Pak, to their hometowns, because of the smoke. The saddest thing is, there is an investor who came bringing, called Suryanto Bakrie, because of the smoke he could not, land on, in what, in / in Riau. Finally that investor went back home Pak, by pompong (a small passenger wooden boat carrying around 20 people on board) [audience laughing in the background], Pak, to Malaysia. By pompong / imagine it yourself, aboard on a pompong. Because it was no longer possible to land in Pekanbaru. So the eco-, the local economy of the people of Riau was indeed fooled around by the central government.

[00:52:40] Mr. Ilyas: Well Pak .. It's sad indeed. Not only in Riau. In Jambi, South Sumatra, especially Kalimantan, formerly a thousands of years old forests, now has become barren. The trouble is , sadly, it is easier for us to create a desert, rather than to create a forest. Said James Lothlock, a British environmental expert. We take a break.

Commercial break

[00:53:24] Mr. Ilyas: Viewers, we continue our discussion, now .. I want to drop-in first to Pak Sutopo Purwonegro / nugroho. From BNPB (The National Agency for Disaster
Response). Before the others, Pak, why it is perceived that the handling of the haze is slow. Meaning the smoke has already there for long before there was a response, both from the central and from the local (government).

[00:54:02] Mr. Purwonugroho: Yes, in fact / good evening Mr. Karni, in fact until now we’ve already done meaning that the central government provides assistance to the local governments. It has been conducted since February. The six provinces on fire, Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan and South Kalimantan, have different hotspot type / pattern, Riau, has two peaks. First (takes place) about February to March, its hotspots raise, then a lot of the rainy season comes, it raises again around June until the end of October. And in this case, according to the emergency statement of the respective heads of the regions, hence the central government / in this case BNPB / provides assistance to the local governments, of Riau, it has been assisted by using / doing water bombing and weather modification, since February, to March, we did the discussion so (it) wouldn’t burn. And .. Alhamdullilah the hotspots were down Pak. Do (you) know, 2013, 2014, the months of January, February the hotspots happened a lot there, and the smoke emerged. Well, this is what we did in accordance to the existing needs. And .. I tell (you), until now BNPB has done the assistance to 6 provinces, deploying 17 helicopters, which we spread out to six provinces / then also 6 artificial rainfall aircrafts, one in Riau, one in South Sumatra, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. We did the artificial rain not with carelessness Pak. Everything is done in conjunction with BPPT’s Scientific Biz. If there is no cloud, (we) do not do the sowing of salt. Even when there is cloud, should be the cloud which fulfils the special requirements. Those are the clouds from the cumulus class, which have the capability to be sowed. So, we did there, so if you Gentlemen /

[00:56:08] Mr. Ilyas: So it's not true that the BNPB is fooling the people of Riau, [Mr. Purwonugroho: Not true.] Pretending that there is salt in the [inaudible] /

[00:56:15] Mr. Purwonugroho: Not true. And we can be evaluated. Even, (we are) pleased if you want to fly. Join us, whether it is to do the water bombing by helicopters or artificial rain. We will explain exactly how is the mechanism, how is the evaluation, even the tracking was done with GPS. Where it would fall. Would it rain or not can be evaluated. And that we did. In the mechanism of disaster management, there are rules. One. The regent-mayor holds the primary responsibility of the disaster management in the region. Two, the governor with all the capability that exists on the region, meets or provide assistance to the affected district-city. Third, the central government provides assistance in extreme cases. What the local does not own, such as artificial rain, water bombing, even operational funds, the local is very limited. This we give aid for. Fourth, always involve the military-police. Until now there are 2,909 military-police personnel in Jakarta whom we have sent for Riau, Jambi and South Sumatra. In addition, also thousands of military and police in the regional units who are currently working. Everyone is working Pak. The air teams, land teams, the land teams include BPPD, the military, the police, Manggal Atni, the society concerned with the fire, volunteers, the communities work together to put out the fires. There is also the law enforcement task force that is carried out by the police and PPNS from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry-Ministry of the Interior. In addition also the socialization and health care. That we did. Whether it is quickly (done) or not, it’s relative.

[00:58:07] Mr. Ilyas: Did you see err the last time it .. did you / did you see that the Regional Government was late in announcing the disaster (status).
Mr. Purwonugroho: The way we see it, Riau has been announced for emergency, alert, since February. So there are phases through the emergency. There is a thing called emergency alert. BMKG (Agency for Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysics) has stated, the dry season of 2015, especially when it is affected by the El-Nino, will occur during, say, from March to November. We already know where (are the areas) that is subscribed to forest fires. When it would happen. So the governor declared an emergency alert. Riau has been set from the beginning, Sumatra also has been from the beginning, then South Kalimantan also from the beginning, the one that is rather late is Kalimantan / beg your pardon, South Kalimantan / Central Kalimantan since the beginning. So they did / there is also regent-mayor who were late to establish the emergency alert. Thus, the central government could not provide assistance. Well this / these need to be understood together. Not necessarily escalate directly to the emergency response [inaudible].

Mr. Ilyas: Is it true that because of the terribly complex bureaucracy that there must first be the request from the regents, mayors, that makes the declarations of emergency late.

Mr. Purwonugroho: Actually no. Actually, that's not it, Pak / so they already know what was happening in the field. And whether they declared an emergency or not, there are indeed weaknesses associated with the understanding of disaster management. Disaster emergency is different from martial law. Well, this often causes the regional heads, being hesitant to declare the emergency. Though the one called emergency alert, emergency response, it was in order to provide an ease of access for (the central government) to give emergency responses.

Mr. Ilyas: No, because someone said this Pak, what is the harm of the local government to be quicker to declare an emergency, why should be sluggish / to be so extensive, so to speak of how the people think.

Mr. Purwonugroho: Well it can actually be done quickly, as long as everything is based on the predictions of the competent ministries / if we talk about drought, flood, already competent BMKG always conveyed, from the basic of BMKG earlier we can issue an emergency problem. Once a disaster occurs, the emergency is there. There will be many things that can be done during an emergency / meaning there will be easy access Pak. So when the logistic, say the master and so on/ if (they) do not have the central will definitely provide assistance. Because, well, the fund available in the local is limited. Well this is what we do, and we always evaluate every day Pak. The satellite data we are all connected directly with NASA. We can find out how is the number of hotspots. It is indeed fluctuative, but if we compare from September 1 until now, everything is going towards the better. From the number of hotspots, better visibility, air quality that was once in the beginning always dangerous, now there are some which are already good, (even though) there are some that are not healthy. Then the other indicators, we still working (on them). And we need to appreciate Pak. So this has our common concern. So actually for the purposes of management, it has been given out. The ones called the 13 line of ministries-agencies, then the governors, regents-mayors, already given out in the Presidential Instruction no. 16, 2011. Regarding the Enhancement of Land and Forest Fire Control.

Mr. Ilyas: Well, Pak. Earlier Mr. Dharmawi Aris that would be answered by.. Wait Pak, wait Madam, anyone wants to res.. ponds to Mr. Dharmawi.
[01:02:10] Unknown: Thank you, Bang Karni, whom we respect. Actually at this event we’re looking for solutions are we not, Mr. Karni. It is not for listening to useless rant. Telling people having no brain and so on is not right Brother Karni. We know Mr. Governor, Mr. Danrim, Mr. Police Chief Mr. Karni do not sleep, we know that. Likewise, the allegations that had been accused by this brother of ours, that BNPB deceived the public, it’s incredible – the salt, the helicopter flew Bang Karni. So we are suspicious, in fact who are the brainless Bang Karni. [audience laughing in the background] Did he ever go to Riau during this haze. To my knowledge, he resides in Jakarta. The same as me / I am the Head of Riau Government’s Liaison Agency in Jakarta / Anytime Mr. Governor went to Jakarta, I must have certainly accompanied (him) for meetings anywhere. It includes the last meeting led by the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security in the Ministry of Madam Siti Nurbaya. So it’s not true, Madam Minister was awesomely not sleeping Mr. Karni we know it / Every second, every moment she was called by the President. The President is also concerned about the Riau smoke [Mr. Ilyas: Right]. Thank you Bang Karni.


[01:03:38] Mr. Ali: Err thanks Mr. Karni. I want to say this, actually the context told by Pak Dharmawi is like this, if Pak Sutopo the BNPB, he focuses on extinguishing the fire, from the emergency preparedness to the emergency response. Pak Liaison says so. The Local Government has forgotten the people Mr. Karni. The governors, regents, including BNPB, they have forgotten the people. They are too busy putting out the fire. Is that wrong / certainly not / but the people is forgotten / For example .. err the masks that were distributed to the people / the least decent masks. Surgical mask. So yes / surgical mask, Mr. Karni. The posts, the posts of the seven spots which we monitored for the four days, they were also not capable. Some have oxygen, some have none. I want to say, the government has forgotten the people. Busy extinguishing the fire / I don’t know, why just busy putting out the fire / though if it was really an emergency response, the people must also be concerned. That is the first / Well I want to answer like this, who are the arsonists of the forests and peatlands in Riau. Our study results, from 2002 to now, we have found, JIKALAHARI along with other NGO comrades, Eyes in the Forest, my other friends, the ultimate arsonists of the land is the barons (cukong). Barons [Mr. Ilyas: What]. [Mr. Ilyas: Barons] Ha / By the barons we meant the financiers, people who have a lot of money, the ones behind the screen, whom we found in the field Mr. Karni, the barons may take forms as.. the police

[01:05:00] Mr. Ilyas: The police.

[01:05:01] Mr. Ali: Yes. The Army, that is .. yes .. the councillors. Mr. Karni, these barons, then they pay pay the poor people .. whom with five million dollars cash would be happy to burn. That we found, that is what (I) meant by barons. And the second is the corporation. HTI (Industrial, Plantation Forest) and palm oil corporations. That is / the corporations and the oil palm plantations, so, last August, we went to the field. Checking out one corporation, in the [incomprehensible] area. In Desa Serapu. We found, in 2013, the HTI companies were severely on fire 5,000 to 6,000 (ha) of their land is on fire. Including the land of the communities. But in 2014/2015 these areas are not burnt / why, there we found, the once burnt land was indeed cultivated with trees. It is fertile, Mr. Karni, that (land) they cleared out, they planted acacia .. They always say that they lost. The fact they are not, are they. The burnt land they are using to plant acacia. That is what the
corporations mean. Then the four cases of the corporations who have been convicted in the state court, how many are there which have decided as final in the Supreme Court, the facts show that their land was on fire, there is one company, I'll just say an oil palm plantation for example. The arsons were its employees.


[01:06:37] Mr. Ali: Oil palm plantation. The name oil palm plantations.

[01:06:40] Mr. Ilyas: Yes, earlier you wanted to mention the name of the company name why /


[01:06:47] Mr. Ilyas: OK /

[01:06:47] Mr. Ali: The ones burning the land are we were watching the trial until the decision / the employees. So the employees pretended to buy the land there, then there it was burnt. Although finally he had been fired during the trial yeah / there is that fact that we found / that is the decision of the judge / the fact seemed right. There are 4 already of which we can see the facts / or Mr. Karni. Then in addition to the barons-corporations, the ones who also joins to burn the land is the government. Why, Mr. Karni, that the government allows the smoke to keep recurring. Alright / allow the smoke to keep recurring. After a season of smoke passed, the rain came, forgot, the government forgot, keep on silent. As if there was no incident. Though the PRIMARY task of the local and national governments is to fix the forestry management and repair the damaged peatlands. It's their job / but it has never been worked on.

[01:07:50] Mr. Ilyas: Yes but does not mean that they are burning, [Mr. Ali: Yes /] they are negligent alright.

[01:07:54] Mr. Ali: Yes (pay attention) to the context of burning. That in the ACT 32 refers / whether it is deliberate or negligence, it is obvious that the land may not be on fire / and the government .. neglects it / Well for example, there are at that time a finding on the audit on UKP4 licensing and the government .. government what / the Ministry of Forestry / the Cross-Sectoral Ministry of Environment / it found that there were 17 HTI and palm oil companies, who were not acting in accordance to the Indonesian laws. Well, this 17 companies, in the 2014-2015 they burned again Mr. Karni, the Government was again silent.

[01:08:28] Mr. Ilyas: How can it be on fire anymore/ it was burned alright, so that they could plant palm oil, yeah. If you've grown the palm, why is it burnt again?

[01:08:39] Mr. Ali: It was / for example Mr. Karni / there is one company whose palm oil was 25,000 hectares.

[01:08:45] Mr. Ilyas: Oo so it is paid by instalment (dicicil)

[01:08:47] Mr. Ali: Yes Mr. Karni / so it was not one or two hectares Mr. Karni / Well I would also like to explain that .. the ones burning in / in Riau was forest areas. There is one, that I mentioned earlier the production forest area .. er industrial, plantation forests and palm oil / for the industrial permit. The second is a conservation area / well here is what I say that there are barons Mr. Karni / area of protected forests, the area of conserve what / the area that is silent since the beginning, yes, national parks, there are some, there is one decision of the District Court of Siak, that one of the perpetrators is the police / has
been convicted, yeah, well he started with the encroachment. Later over time, that's/ that would be cheap Mr. Karni /

[01:09:32] Mr. Ilyas: According to your record, is there or isn’t there a corporation has already been punished.


[01:09:38] Mr. Ilyas: The corporations /


[01:09:42] Mr. Ilyas: What were the penalties

[01:09:43] Mr. Ali: The penalty for the sago, fines to the company. One billion (rupiah) if I am not wrong / but right now they are all in the final decision process / there are some who are on appeal, there are some who have the final decision. The one (sago) before is Malaysian / Ade if I am not wrong was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, a fine of 5 billion (rupiah) /

[01:09:58] Mr. Ilyas: The ones sentenced are what, the directors, or what

[01:10:00] Mr. Ali: There is, there is the director / at / in the case of Ade it was the directors and the company, it was the director who was called / general manager on others... That is, Mr. Karni /

[01:10:11] Mr. Ilyas: It has already on final sentence, the one with five years.

[01:10:14] Mr. Ali: ... it was postponed / er now some of them are on appeal or cassation appeal.

[01:10:17] Mr. Ilyas: Oo has not been on final sentence

[01:10:18] Mr. Ali: Not on final sentence / but the fact that we monitor is / we were watching from the first trial to, to the verdict that is. There was a deliberate neglect when the land was on fire that day, it was left for a week or two, five days, though we also ever met with one of the firefighters / the firefighters from what / the firefighters from the company, he told us, to extinguish the fire in one hectare, it would only take half an hour with ten men. Half an hour. One hectare. But why when the land is 40 hectares, the extinguishing took weeks.

[01:11:00] Mr. Ilyas: Is it true that if the land was cut ya, to plant palm oil, or what was it, acacia and all that, it would cost 50 million (rupiah) per hectare. But if we hire people to burn (it only takes) only 5 million. Roughly.


[01:11:30] Mr. Ilyas: Now Mr.

[01:11:35] Munhur Satyahaprabu (Law & Policy Manager of National WALHI – The Indonesian Forum for Environment) Mr. Satya: Thank you Brother Karni .... Right, um, actually, we want to say this / that this forest fire was big in the year 97-98 yeah, at that time WALHI along with other friends and other civil societies mobilized all abilities to put out /
Mr. Ilyas: Yes, he needs to be introduced that he is from WALHI.

Mr. Satya: Yeah, we mobilized all abilities to put out the fire alright. But in 2000-2001 it grew again, the existing forest fires. We saw that the emergency response that we had done in 97-98 that is currently undertaken by the national BNPB, yeah, that we did in 97, it did not address the existing problems. There are structural problems which in fact have been unanswered by the government. First what is the structural problem? First is the policy and law enforcement, yeah. See for example in Riau yes, 9 / 8.9 million of Riau area, 6.8 million already owns by concessions. Owned by people, by companies. Mining permits, industrial, plantation licenses. One million hectares owned by what, a national park and just the other one million hectares for the people of Riau. Not to mention that it includes what / the big rivers, including the public and other facilities. So to say in what / any other province. Today WALHI open posts in 5 provinces, Brother. In Riau, in Jambi, in South Sumatra, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. Yes, the fact remains that at this time in Central Kalimantan.. the respiratory tract infection has been already more than 1,000. It is about 1,500. And now it's been announced as a respiratory tract infection emergency but has received no aid. This report came from the post in Central Kalimantan / Palangkaraya / there is no single aid from the central government / this clarifies it. Now, moving on from the structural conflicts, the weak law enforcement, the permit review that was never done, what is the importance of permit review? Well, if (we) see the data from KP4 mentioned earlier (it) says that there are 17 companies that what / problematic, in fact the permit review could also be used to see whether the company is compatible or not with the current permits. One company reigns over one million hectares, another holds 2,000, 3,000, 300,000. Do they hold the land lawfully or not? The next question is not only about the ones who burn, but who is liable. It is ruled by / obviously / by the Act 32 of 2009, the Government Regulation also what PB45 also regulates it. Who is responsible? The owner of the concessions. That is, It is clearly stated. And we are busy looking for the perpetrators. And it was done by the government / who are the perpetrators, be the farmers / it definitely goes to the farmers and the communities. Currently, the record of the friends in Riau, corporations are also involved. In 2013 we reported 117 corporations who are involved in fires, yeah. 117, we submit the names to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. But how many were processed. In Riau, there were only two if I am not mistaken, PT Adi Plantation and NSP, alright. There is also .. The 117 were only in two provinces, Brother. In Jambi and Riau.

Mr. Ilyas: Err we find the one.. not only the underling, The culprit should be meant as the one who [inaudible], the intellectual actor, so if it comes to the companies.. surely .. ultimately it is toward .. to owners of the concessions. If the law enforcement is done right.

Mr. Satya: Yes, permit revocation should also have been applied. Corporate crime. Because we are into corporate crime these days. In fact the permit revocation has become one of the solutions that we offer / Since the years before the ILC exists, we have offered permit review. The company controls how many percent, what, the govern / what, the provincial government should have been reviewed. Until now, this has never happened. What's happening are just firefighting, emergency response / I feared it would become an annual project, alright. Well, the root of the structural conflict has never been deconstructed. We want that the weak law enforcement, yeah, the permit review that has never been done.
Mr. Ilyas: If the permit is revoked, then the land is given to whom?

Mr. Satya: The land is...

Mr. Ilyas: Would it not become another new project?

Mr. Satya: The land is the State’s, Bang. [Mr. Ilyas: Yes] The permits are of the land/

Mr. Ilyas: But it can be a palm oil plantation can’t it. Once it is .. it is.. the permit is revoked, probably it would be given out to [inaudible] another.

Mr. Satya: Well, if the question is like so then actually it would be answered by the Act 32, that the sanctions were not only revocation, but (also) recovery. the functional (recovery) of the environment, but also, [Mr. Ilyas: That] what it's called [Mr. Ilyas: There are actually the fines actually] Yeah, there are fines, there is the corporate responsibility there. Not only some sanctions are given, but the other sanctions are not. In fact it was accommodated in/ [inaudible]

Mr. Ilyas: Actually all that is performed by our employees in the civil law, it is the responsibility of the ones who give the order. So if our driver collided with a person, it is our responsibility to take care of the person who got hit earlier. And I think this also applies to the case of forest fires. The people are harmed in the forms of ARI illness earlier, the livelihood gone, maybe he cannot do business / it is in fact the civil liability of the companies involved in the forest fires/ we break for a moment.

Commercial break

Mr. Ilyas: Audience, we have heard the voices of the people of Riau. Now I want to ask the doctor. Pak doctor Agus Dwi Susanto .... According to Bapak, how is Bapak’s prediction on the health of people in.. Riau nowadays.

Dr. Susanto (Secretary General of the Association of Physicians Pulmonary Indonesia): Thank you Pak Karni. Err .. if we see it from 1997, it was said that these fires occur almost every year, repeatedly. Yes, if we're talking about the impacts to health, err they must be there in the population or the people living in the area yeah. We can see that there are two aspects that must be considered. One is related to the concentration of oxygen, yeah. So when we talk about air quality that was said to be poor, with an air pollution index of over 1,300 that is dangerous, er, ideally, we breathe normally with the air condition like this / oxygen concentration is about 20.9% / in the normal air. Well, in a large concentration of pollutants as a result of the forest fire, the oxygen concentration will decrease. The more pollutants dissolved in the air, the amount of oxygen is also reduced. Well, indirectly, even when the population is healthy they would breathe the air with low oxygen level. Shortness of breath would likely to arise as a result of this concentration / this is just one aspect of the reduced concentration of oxygen due to er er ... what / the increasing concentration of the pollutant,

The second is the danger arising from the pollutant materials caused by this fire, yeah / It is divided into two, namely the gas components and particle components, yeah. The gas itself has various kinds yeah, one of the most frequently mentioned being carbon monoxide, CO, this CO’s danger is it functions as asphyxiate, yeah, so if it is inhaled into the body, into the blood, it binds to the haemoglobin at 300 times greater (strength) than how the blood binds oxygen. We can imagine with the oxygen concentration reduced, plus there is the CO gas, so the ability of the blood to bind oxygen would be lower, so the
potential onset of shortness of breath is definitely high. Now we are talking about its potential that would inevitably arise. Well the other is a gas that is irritant in nature. This has almost the same impact as of particles, usually called in air pollution index as PM10, yeah, the particulate meter 10 / Besides PM10 there are PM5, PM2.5, it only shows the diameter of the particle itself yeah, the diameter of PM10 is approximately 10 microns. The 5, 5 microns, PM2.5 is 2.5 microns/ Well what is the relevance with the PM10/ Well most of the particles can get into the respiratory tract. From my throat down to the lungs, the particles are below 10 microns. Even if the PM is below 5 microns, it can get into the lungs, to the alveoli, and then cause an inflammation in the lungs / Well, most of these particles and gases other than the CO, they are irritant. Well, what is the effect of the irritant? The effect is when it is inhaled it will cause a mucosa, it irritates / Because it is called irritant, it causes irritation. From the mucosa of the eyes, yeah, at the least it would cause watery eyes. Nasal mucosa, sneezing. Now, then the breathing difficulty mucosa yeah, the middle throat will be swollen, cough, producing phlegm, then the lower tract will also be like that/ it will proceed to the next, there will also the narrowing. This happens in the terms of physiology. Even on the people who have no previous illness. The process will occur as such if the polluted materials are inhaled. Well, the consequences when the inflammation, swelling, the excess phlegm occurs like that/ then the complaints earlier will arise, alright, coughing, shortness of breath. The risk of infection will increase. The excessive phlegm will become a media for the onset of germs. Then the ARI happens, acute respiratory infections. The process would be like that. So then it was said that the complaints were coughing, excess phlegm, then the ARI cases that is reported is increasing/ almost every year if we look at the data from the health department’s reports that surely these cases would arise. Well, the next level after it (the ARI) happens is that the infection can go down to the lungs. Then there is lung inflammation, or pneumonia. If that happens, then there is a risk of respiratory failure if not addressed immediately.

[01:23:16] Mr. Ilyas: Is that what was experienced by Pak Muchlis’s child earlier/

[1:23:21] Dr. Susan: I cannot say if that's the case, because the examination should be done in person, shouldn’t it, but the pathophysiology of the process due to smoke would be like so/ Well, it would be the case for the normal people / there are indeed some people who have a high risk, like the children yeah, who rare under 12 years of age or elderly above 60 years / because the mechanism of the system /

[01:23:40] Mr. Ilyas: What are the consequences for babies.

[1:23:43] Dr. Susanto: In general, almost the same, only they have a higher risk because the breathing tract is shorter, then the respiratory immune system mechanism against the incoming particles from the outside is still on development.

[01:23:59] Mr. Ilyas: Is it like what Ibu said earlier that they also fear the lung cancer because of it.

[1:24:07] Dr. Susanto: Ah, there was the gas particle, there is [inaudible] gas, there is [inaudible] particle. Well [inaudible] particles are mostly the particulate meter. Well one of the components produced by the fire in various the literatures are said that there are polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, it is a carcinogen. Yeah, that means in theory, if it is inhaled or breathed in it has the potency to cause cancer. But normally the cancer occurs in the case of continuous exposure or [inaudible] for several years. Now the problem is that there is no research data in the world that states that if (people) get expo/ exposed for say, three weeks or a month and then stop then again on the next year one week or two then
stop, whether it can cause cancer, so far there has been no research data about it / but risk of the carcinogenic material is there, in the smoke of the forest fire.

[01:25:05] Mr. Ilyas: Right Pak. Now to Pak Anton Charliyan. The Engineer General of the Police, Head of Public Relations. Errr, we also invited the directors .. of [incomprehensible; special task force?] / why aren’t they present Pak.

[01:25:20] Mr. Charliyan (Irjenpol, Head, Public Relations of the Police Headquarters): Good evening Bang Karni, wassalamualaikum warahmatullohi wabarakatu [Mr. Ilyas: Walaikumsalam]. Salam tribrata (the vow of Indonesian police to serve the country, the humanity, and the people). So sorry, err the directors cannot be present because well the smoke situation does not allow them to come here /

[01:25:42] Mr. Ilyas: From their respective regions

[01:25:44] Mr. Charliyan: From their respective regions, from Central Kalimantan, and from Riau, which happens to be on the highest alert.

[01:25:52] Mr. Ilyas: But there are their reports to Pak who/

[01:25:53] Mr. Charliyan: Yes, there are

[01:25:53] Mr. Ilyas: Pak Anton?

[01:25:55] Mr. Charliyan: Yes, so first of all maybe I from the police of the state of the republic of Indonesia is sorry about / with the people of Sumatra, especially Riau and Kalimantan err, and also join in condolences, Pak Muchlis, on the death of er Bapak’s daughter .. Then yeah, talking about fire, so maybe if we burn a fish, burn a cassava it would be tasty, but if (we) burn the land, it makes all of us harmed even that becomes our problem today. Err and this is true, from our data, (this) is recurrent / even from our data the fire has already happened since 1960. So there are three decades (does he mean period?) every 20 years. From our investigators in the field, the burnt area in Indonesia are the 7 provinces, amounts to 37,309 ha. So as if it is almost half of Jakarta city. This data of ours can be confirmed, the hotspots all over Indonesia is at 1,144. This is recorded by us. There is also err handled for this year there are 184 cases .. Bang Karni, then err the ones taken for fingerprints are already at 127, then the ones who have been detained, there have been 78 people. So in this case the POLRI is very serious in dealing with this problem /

[01:27:48] Mr. Ilyas: These 78 errr are traditional farmers or of the corporations, or employees.

[01:27:55] Mr. Charliyan: Err from corporations there are 9, 9 suspects, and 9 corporations. The other 73 people are from the ordinary people. So err from the corporations only 9 that we have got the evidence.

[01:28:14] Mr. Ilyas: Err the evidence meaning that they burned the land.

[01:28:19] Mr. Charliyan: Err right, burned the land / and what is imposed is the Environmental Act section 99 and the Plantation Act / where here err indeed whoever err a company that neglects so er happens the damage to the health and other things, there will be penalties ranging from two years to six years and fines of up to 5 billion err, right / This is from the threat of penalties, so err this is what we impose. Compared with last year, this year’s is almost half of it/ last year’s was 350 / but the land that is burnt this year increases nearly six-fold, from a year ago / last year was only 6,031. Then about the cause, from the
reports in the field, the economic problems. Because like was said earlier, it is cheaper. So this is very efficient with burn/ [01:29:22] Mr. Ilyas: Cheaper with burning, rather than cutting it down [01:29:25] Mr. Chaliyan: Yes exactly, rather than cutting down. Then there is also the problem of cultural problems. These people believe that if it is burnt so many times the land will be fertile. The third non-availability or omission, from the companies, the communities, and government, and say the experts there is excessive draught. Because there is the canals, which causes the fire. That is also true, then the lack of socialisation. Because this is continuously repeated, but why it happens continuously, and the sanction regulations are not strict enough. Because beg your pardon, in Malaysia there are also peat companies which are not burning, only in Indonesia well maybe this needs the socialisation of strict regulations, both criminal-wise and administrative. Then about the efforts done by the POLRI, POLRI has made efforts. We've sent 70 special investigators from the POLRI Headquarter. They are qualified on Tipiter (The Police’s Response Unit for Specific Crime) [Audience clapping hands] and of Brimob has been deployed 700, then other troops 4,512, and in each province close to the fire zone, it is obliged, ordered by the Chief of Police, by the President, to send one SSK force (company unit consisting 90 people). So when in this case beg your pardon, Bapak President does not care, Pak Chief of POLRI does not care, perhaps we need to inform that these are the POLRI’s effort, alright? the POLRI’s effort and I think the efforts of us all. And then err about the loss perhaps we know ourselves, that loss yesterday we got a report that for Riau alone it is said to be nearly 20 trillion. 22 trillion. For Jambi 2.5 trillion / so it is immense that may be counted for later. That is just the material loss / not included of the immaterial loss, such as the health and other things. And then the other loss is our image. Because we know we are also one of the exporters of smoke / [01:31:27] Mr. Ilyas: Yes, I had lunch last week with the Ambassador of Singapore .. the first thing he complained, the export of our smoke to his / because they want to (host) F1 this week. [Mr. Chaliyan: Absolutely] Yes according to him well I said it will be extinguished in the rainy season. Well, but it will come again the next year, he said. [Mr. Chaliyan: Yes, that's right] Is our government capable to stop it he said. That is the question. [01:31:55] Mr. Chaliyan: This is what is needed to be anticipated. There is a loss already, a loss, then fire, then err what else / there is (someone) who burns the situation (make provoke the situation, getting the situation heated), then there is another, who burns hearts, what else, opinions are burnt, eventually it would be inflamed right, so here eventually pointing each other, searching for a black goat (kambing hitam, scapegoat in Indonesian). Nowadays a black goat is rather expensive, because tomorrow is Eid Hajj, is not it [audience laughing in the background] Well / so here (it) needs to be anticipated. Probably we should not search for a scapegoat, let alone this smoke is so hard (making it all hard), perhaps we all / [01:32:34] Mr. Ilyas: If I may know, who are the companies alleged? [01:32:37] Mr. Chaliyan: O, lots bang Karni, the companies / like what was delivered by Pak Chief of Kapolri, have been announced / [01:32:44] Mr. Ilyas: Yes but the compan / that was only the initials [01:32:47] Mr. Chaliyan: Excuse me Bang Karni, because we have regulations about the public disclosure, where there are things that need to be kept confidential, including about
the suspects so that POLRI should use initials. So then if we do it we would immediately get.

[01:33:04] Mr. Ilyas: I think of the whole world there’s no suspect that is described only by initials.

[01:33:07] Mr. Charliyan: There is Pak, in the public disclosure regulations.

[01:33:09] Mr. Ilyas: No, in al / in the world / in any country in the world the suspects /

[01:33:14] Mr. Charliyan: But in / in Indonesia that is so, the legislations.

[01:33:15] Mr. Ilyas: Yes it makes (you) being picky Pak [audience laughing hard in the background]

[01:33:17] Mr. Charliyan: We're (only) the implementers of the legislation so / [while laughing]

[01:33:19] Mr. Ilyas: There are some who are named, there are some who are only in initials.

[01:33:25] Mrs. Agus [speaking from the background before gaining attention]: I’d like to respond a little [inaudible]

[01:33:30] Mrs. Agus: err Riau in 2007-2008 had zero, Pak Karni, [inaudible]. Because at that time the police chief of Riau ... Sutjiptadi, he firmly told all corporations in Riau, that if there is fire, he will not crack down the arsonists, but asked for the responsibility of the corporations. It was calm, at that time. What does it mean, the assertiveness of the regional police chief / Pak regional police chief should not be sitting close to the businessmen who burn the land. Our hearts are hurt, the people’s [audience clapping hands] Pak. Our hearts are hurt. So do not be too friendly, treating the businessmen as golden children / who / the people know that it is the companies who burn the land, looting timber, alright / So have some manner. I / I / I guess Sutjiptadi’s duty was not long in Riau / because people who enforce the law such as him would not be popular in the police, Pak. He also did not get good promotion, but the people of Riau remember him eternally, eternally that during 2007-2008 there was NULL forest fire, why, because there was the decisive attitude of the police chief;

[01:34:43] Mr. Ilyas: Right, thank you.

[01:34:43] Mr. Charliyan: Right, thank you. He was / was probably one of the best sons of ours / so I am also here to rectify. One of the classification of barons were the police. The police is an institution. TNI (the Army), the Army and the others / so please this is also rectified / because that is an institution. If (you are stating) the police it means accusing the police as a whole. It was proven by Ibu, that one of our best sons, Brigadier General Sutjiptadi / was able to act decisively like so. But I hope, this decisive action is also done by all. Just like in Malaysia. So / like that, both from the legal sanctions or administrative sanctions;

[01:35:24] Mr. Ilyas: No, the meaning of barons Pak, was not corporations, but the people who give 5 million cash to the people earlier, they are called barons by the people of Riau. So even if it is the ordinary people, they would also be called barons Pak. [Mr. Charliyan: Oo] So not the businessman, I mean.

[01:35:42] Mr. Charliyan: No meaning the arsonists are (called) barons, aren’t it, what that means.
Mr. Ilyas: No, the one giving orders.

Mr. Charliyan: Pardon if I gave a wrong response, alright because there was the police, because the police I am also the police myself [audience laughing in the background] I have to defend my institution everywhere, don’t I.

Mrs. Agus: Because there are police individuals (oknum) who are verdicted Pak. Verdicted with final decision (of the court).

Mr. Charliyan: Those are individuals, I agree with Ibu’s words. And we will surely fire him /

Mrs. Agus: Yes those are police individuals here. Pak. No need for Bapak to get offended, it is a fact.

Mr. Ilyas: Right /

Mr. Charliyan: Not / [audience clapping hands while laughing] But do not say it is the police, Bu. Because this police is the Police of the State of the Republic of Indonesia. It’s different Bu, who also fought for our freedom (merdeka) [Mr.Ilyas: Good], alright Bu, so /

Mr. Ilyas: Right Pak. Now to Pak Purwadi Supriyanto, of the Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires. The Executive Director yeah? Please Pak. What is your response towards ... Both of them tend to (go to) the businessmen it seems Pak.

Mr. Supri: Yes, I am here to represent the Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires, there are Industrial Plantation Forest (companies) there are (the holders of the) Permits for Forest Management become our members. I remember a year ago I sat at the table here, Bang Karni / we discussed the same thing, yeah/

Mr. Ilyas: Last year

Mr. Supri: Yes, hope (you) still remember. Well, I want to underline a bit what was expressed by Pak Al-Azhar earlier about .. err .. the tenurial imbalance, yeah, that was identified as the source of the fire problems etc. I want to begin my err argument or discussion with err the status of the open access area, Bang Karni / the open access area is the areas that have no designation until now, there is no licensing. If we see Riau, we have / that was already very well conveyed by the friend in WALHI / there is 9 million of land in Riau which is divided from / the 5.5 million is the forest area, then 3.5 million is for other uses. I do not know exactly how much is it for the other uses, Pak Karni, that has no designated permit, or permits that granted to the corporations. But of the 5.5 million ha, yeah, that is now the forest area, that 1 point / almost 1.7 that has no owner, Pak Karni, no owner. Now what we see today, alright / Last year I have said that the area of open access is the source of the problem. Because of what, in the area of open access there arise illegal activities there. Illegal encroachment, illegal logging, fires etc. Because what / the motivation is very clear. When we speak / when we do things that are illegal, there are no moral obligations for ourselves, yeah, to be responsible to the activities outlined by the government / the rules of the game, yeah / no burning policy, not burning etc. / none. Well I want to start this discussion from this point, yeah / because secondly, the problem last year
I had reminded (you) about the spatial planning. The area of open access, problem, yeah/ plus the spatial plan in Riau, which is still messy / unresolved. Well I think this is why we should sit down together Bang Karni / why do I say this, yeah, if we look at the distribution of the current hotspots yeah Pak Karni, it spreads evenly on the total of 9 million ha. Within the protected forest, in in conservation forest, in production forests, and in the areas for other use, including the open access. Meaning this issue of fire, with all due respect, cannot FULLY be burdened to the corporations. Because of what, we are equally responsible in there, Bang Karni, right/ we are equally responsible in there/ Err from the friends in Jikaluhari , yeah / earlier (you) said that there is Industrial Plantation Forest (company) in where / Serapung yeah, Serapung they are burning there. Have you checked the Annual Work Plan (AWP) map there? There is a procedure, which is gone through by the officers from the company to conduct (their) annual activities. There is the permission from the the office of provincial forestry, yeah. I will challenge / if Bapak could prove that the burning is conducted in the Annual Work Plan (AWP) area, then I agree, that the company is guilty. But if the company, was not doing that activity, yeah, in its area of AWP, yeah, then you have to clarify that statement earlier. That is all Bang Karni.

[01:40:41] Mr. Ilyas: What does it mean by not doing that in the area what does it mean/ in the outside? The burning happens outside the area?

[01:40:51] Mr. Supri: There is an annual AWP permit, granted by the provincial forestry office, yeah. He'll certainly plant there, yeah. If the fires occur in the area of the AWP, yeah/ please report to the police, yeah. But if the fire happens outside his AWP / in regards of the planting (activity) / earlier it was like this Pak, the AWP is given annually, yeah, the assumption is that it is burnt this year then only by the next year (the company) plants, yeah. Please check the AWP map Pak, yeah, so that my argument can be clarified.

[01:41:28] Mr. Ilyas: What is AWP?


[01:41:35] Mr. Ali: There is what is called a self-profile in the annual work plan, it was certified by besides/ if the office chief would not certify, the company can certify the AWP themselves. We found a fact that in 2013 the company / 2014 was on fire. It is sizeable / within the concession. Well it is sure to be in the concession. In the AWP. Because the company is responsible for the concession.

[01:42:02] Mr. Supri: Wait wait, wait a minute, Pak. In the concession or in the AWP.

[01:42:05] Mr. Ali: In the concession and in the AWP.

[01:42:04] Mr. Supri: Well, HOLD ON

[01:42:06] Mr. Ali: Yes I have not finished, I have not finished, you asked me for clarification before. Yes, you / listen first. Well on the year 2014 it was burnt immensely. On 2015 August we went there, it was already covered / covered yeah / by plants / we have the drone Pak Karni / if (you) want to see it now I will show you. If we want to display it on / on / on the television, yeah, well, the / land burnt was already grown. There were shrubs, there were trees. It was cleared, land-cleared. It was about to be planted by the Industrial Plantation Forest (company). Of course it was in the AWP, the end.

[01:42:45] Mr. Ilyas: Right, enough.
Mr. Aris: What happened in Riau, the forest release for plantation is not clear Pak. It is not clear at all. The forest release. Beg your pardon, this is the report of the (Ministry of) Forestry. 80% has no release at all. Never been taken care of / even more the IUP, Plantation Permit for Businesses. So, it's like it’s free for all. What have our country become to?

Mr. Ilyas: Hey, because of that, it should be illegal shouldn’t it [Mr. Aris: Yes, who says it was legal], meaning that both the regents, both the regents and the authorities are allowed to act

Mr. Aris: Because of this Pak, the ATM / the ATM for the regents, the former regents Pak, this is the ATM. All the regents in Riau. Palm oil plantation. Including the officials and the STARS (military officials) IN JAKARTA. I SHOW (YOU) LATER PAK. [audible audience chatting in the background] There are cooperatives which / which are backed by the stars in the central Pak. I know it Pak, I have been travelling to the regions.

Mr. Ilyas: By backed you mean he violated, later when it is investigated by the police, the backer comes, then it’s finished. [Audience laughter in the background]

Mr. Aris: Yes, right. It is finished Pak. It is like that in Riau Pak. Riau is like that Pak. So Riau is very sad looking. Indeed from the beginning, until now, truly being discriminated (dianaktirikan - treated as if it is a step-child) by the central. The Minister of Forestry, at that time it was Zulkifli Hasan, he did the same / peatland was not allowed (to be given to any). But in reality it was given. That was Zulkifli Hasan. What the hell is that? He himself was / at the time of stitching Pak, the incidents of stitching, people stitched their lips in / in [inaudible] there. Were there any members of Parliament who saw it? Not even a single one (seekor – a single animal)!

Mr. Ilyas: Viewers, let’s break.

Commercial break

Mr. Ilyas: Viewers, we are still with Indonesia Lawyers Club. Who burns our forests. Now (I) want to (go to) Pak Eddy Martono first. As the Chairman of the Palm Oil Association.

Mr. Martono (Head of Agricultural and Spatial GAPKI): Err, I'd like to correct, Pak .. Karni, I am the Chairman of the Agricultural Sector and Spatial Planning of the Indonesian Palm Oil Association. Right thank you Pak Karni, first of all I also would like to express my sympathy and condolences to the daughter of Bapak Muchlis, upon her passing, and err, as well as .. perhaps I need to explain Pak Karni, with the noise that the err palm oil plantation companies err here become the / accused who burn lands for oil palm plantations. We need to say first that we have branches in 12 provinces, Pak, with a total acreage of our branches of 3.9 million hectares, with the members numbering to 663 companies. All palm oil plantations in Indonesia cover 10.9 million hectares. Err so the members GAPKI have about 35% of the total area of palm oil plantations in Indonesia. Well, secondly, Pak, we also need to know, that until now, the palm oil industry in Indonesia, it annually contributes, 20 billion US Dollar.

Mr. Ilyas: For what

Mr. Martono: The Foreign Exchange Pak. Generating foreign exchange, 20 billion US Dollar. Even Pak, for the first half, yeah, the first half of 2015, the contribution
of the palm oil industry in Indonesia amounted to 9.75 billion US dollars. It was the first half of 2015. Yeah. Then put it this way, Pak Karni.

[01:47:33] Mr. Ilyas: I think that is not our focus Pak. [Mr. Martono: Yeah, look /] But who burns our forests. [Mr. Martono: Right, Pak Karni] Even though there is the foreign exchange but at the cost of burning the forest, the people would not accept.

[01:47:43] Mr. Martono: Therefore we (need to) look here, Pak Karni. Of the fires in oil palm plantations, from GAPKI members, there are 14 companies. With a total area of 2,900 ha, in which the plasma which is burning is 1,000 ha, and the main which is burning is 1,900 ha. And this is all, for only 100 ha is not planted, all the total before are planted, Pak Karni. Well this is why I had to say, is it true that the palm oil companies burn their own assets. What is there, obviously that is a production machine, (how come) he burns it. Then earlier it was associated to the problem of economy. You see, Pak. To clear a palm oil land mechanically, the per hectare cost is 6 million. By mechanical, the mechanization. From the total cost from the start of planting, until the harvest, it's 60 to 70 million per hectare. So it is only about 10%. Then if we save 6 million per hectare, with the risks so great, meaning that once found out that they are burning, it was incredible, Pak / the permit (could be) revoked. Then the penalties would not be um tens to hundreds of billions even. Is it true that the palm oil companies would be that ridiculous? Because with burning it needs only 6 million per hectare for land clearing Pak.

[01:49:31] Mr. Ilyas: That is from the parties who sue .. the businessmen, if it is burned, it is only 5 million. But if it's done by err what / mechanical earlier, it could be 50-60 million.

[01:49:53] Mr. Martono: Oo it is not Pak Karni, so look, so for mechanization, it is only the clearing, Pak / I speak about land clearing. Only land-clearing alright Pak, the land-clearing here costs 6 million per hectare.

[01:50:05] Mr. Ilyas: It already uses mechanization?

[01:50:06] Mr. Martono: Already use excavators, bulldozers, it is 6 million. So it feels a bit strange yeah if the companies dare to burn, on purpose, in order to save 6 million per hectare / Well, I give an example yeah Pak Karni, that in / in / ie / these GAPKI members who are burnt, the maximum, which 1 / from the report data coming through, the 400 hectares is burned. Say it has no plants Pak, it burned on purpose. 6 million multiplied by 400 is only 2.4 billion. Meanwhile, the consequence Pak .. the permit would be revoked.

[01:50:49] Mr. Ilyas: No one has been revoked hasn’t it

[01:50:50] Mr. Martono: There is Pak / the in / there is one yesterday who is / is / is fined there is one who has gone / [inaudible]

[01:50:55] Mr. Ilyas: Fined yes, but no one’s revoked Pak.

[01:50:58] Mr. Martono: And it was frozen, Pak.

[01:51:00] Mr. Ilyas: Only being snapped at, hasn’t been revoked [Mr. Martono in the background: Yeah, like that.] [Audience laughing]

[01:51:03] Mr. Martono: Well, then, Pak Karni, I tell (you) again that the palm oil company is unlikely to be operational .. no IUP. Then there is no / for example it is a forest area / no area release, I think it can later be explained by the Chief of the Forest Service, it is not / it is impossible to dare Pak, certainly would be punished since the beginning. Well then then fire data which I / based on the Global Forest Watch, yeah, per / 21 September 2015, these
fires that are beyond the concession are 67%. While the fires that are in the oil palm concession are 8% Pak. This is the data from the Global Forest Watch. That is Pak.

[01:51:54] Mr. Ilyas: So it is a very small percentage that .. is owned by the / the businessmen, but outside the ownership of the companies/

[01:52:04] Mr. Martono: Right, that is / this is from the Global Forest Watch. So existing data is like that Pak / well then the one

[01:52:10] Mr. Ilyas: That Global Forest.. is it an institution or the media or online, or what is it?

[01:52:16] Mr. Martono: The same Pak err, NGO as well. [Mr. Ilyas: Oh NGO] Like so Pak. [Mr. Ilyas: No, (I’m) afraid] Well, then I also want to say Pak err, err about the problem of plasma farmers. So, err... I am sure that the plasma farmers are not / meaning this Pak / it is unlikely that the farmers or the public flock to plant palm oil if it is not profitable. So what happens now, the current situation, the price is dropping Pak. But if it is normal, it can be up to 2 to 3 million or 4 million per month. For 2 hectares, especially if the price conditions are good.

[01:52:59] Mr. Ilyas: Why don’t the farmers sell it themselves

[01:53:02] Mr. Martono: What do you mean Pak?

[01:53:03] Mr. Ilyas: Well he’s got 2 hectares, he could harvest it himself, he could sell it himself /

[01:53:08] Mr. Martono: Indeed (he) is selling (himself) Pak, they harvest their own/

[01:53:10] Mr. Ilyas: Well it is said earlier that companies only give cash. [An audience heard laughing in the background]

[01:53:13] Mr. Martono: Oh not / Look Pak / so it means that, er / in the case of plasma farmers, I am talking about plasma farmers, Pak. They harvest themselves, then they send err the TBS to the factory. They are paid afterwards Pak. Well perhaps what happen is / the self-supporting farmers, they sell to middlemen, perhaps like that. But when it comes to the plasma farmers, who are attached to the companies, they harvest themselves and they send / the cooperatives send Pak / they are incorporated in the form of cooperatives.

[01:53:46] Mr. Ilyas: Right Pak. WALHI wanted to say anything?

[01:53:49] Mr. Aris [from the background]: I would like a little clarification Pak. What was told by Bapak from, from the Agricultural Pak / This is the letter from the Agricultural Pak. An authentic data from the Agricultural. [Mr. Ilyas: Yeah?] On the problems described by Bapak, on the subject of PT Tunggal Prakasa Plantation. Here happens [knocking the table] a harassment, altogether. Actually the Agricultural department is also not right Pak. This is the evidence. The evidence, Pak. This, whose name is Suwandi, the Acting Deputy of Payroll and Countermeasures. This Pak, what I say to PRI at that time/

[01:54:29] Mr. Ilyas: Which Bapak’s statement are you arguing at

[01:54:31] Mr. Aris: Well, what is argued is that what was spoken about forest and agricultural problem are unbalanced Pak. This is the evidence.

[01:54:41] Mr. Ilyas: Not synchronous, you mean

[01:54:44] Mr. Aris: Not synchronous, right. That is all, thank you.
Mr. Ilyas: Right, you.

Mr. Satya: Thank you Bang. I'll clarify about the problem of open access. Yeah, let's not err, we are distorted / about what is called as open access. So in one of my statement at the beginning, the open access, whether it is outside the permit. My / our data states that the open access also occurs in the licensed territories. Hence the importance of permit audit, yeah, the open access can be / look Bang, a company has hundreds of thousands, concessions. But he is only able to manage 50,000. This means that there is 70% yeah 60% that he doesn’t manage properly. This is open access in nature. It is actually the responsibility of whom / of course it is the concessionaires. The standpoint of PP45, if I'm not wrong yeah / 2004 says that the permit holder is responsible. Open access was whose creation? Of course the permit holder. Hence the importance of the open access that is / what / said should not create a stigma that the people is the one burning on the open access lands. It is actually in the permitted regions. First, confirm that. Second, about the denial that GAPKI, err no company burns. There is one instance that is VERY plain and has been verdicted. In Aceh. PT Kalwista Nature. Proven. And fined 300 billion. Verdicted. Even more is it Pak? Yeah, this over than 300 billion, yeah fined. This means that it is proved to be a company. And plainly. The fact is clear / and in Riau also / although not been verdicted / it is also proven. Like so. One on our record, that the land which is burning, that have a lot of what / smoke, where is it happening/ peatlands! Like so. Riau, the 6 million per hectare should be clarified, what type of land is it. Is it in peatlands? Or in regular land? Here there won’t ever be. what was it call/ an interpretation that this is very cheap / It is not. Those / canals made to dry the peat are also expensive. Yes, that’s the fact. Until now 80% happen in peatland / So average the hotspots in Indonesia, mostly in Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, in Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, because they are peatlands. Alright / that has to be said.

Mr. Ilyas: Right, now the Deputy of Regional Government, the representative of the governor, the head of the forestry department and the head of the health department. ... Please. ... Many accusation earlier were directed to the governor, to .. the mayor, Bapak today represents the governor.

[Unnamed]: Good evening, Bang Karni.

Mr. Ilyas: You are the head of the Office?

Fadrizal Labay [Unnamed]: I am the Head of the Riau Provincial Forestry Office, Pak. Maybe first we pass Pak Governor’s regards, should he want to be present here Bang, but because of the situation in the province of Riau is in emergency alert, yeah/ alert for the air pollution due to smoke, thus he cannot leave, and he still works with the task force there in the province of Riau, with Pak Danrem and fellows from BPPD of Riau province.

Mr. Ilyas: (He) meant now Pak.
Mr. Labay: No/ meaning this Pak / earlier there was the workd never yeah/ so we want to say, (he) ever stayed overnight in Pekanbaru and the next day on 27th he went to the Meranti Islands, to the River Tohor. In where he.. gave birth to the canal blocking idea, to be developed in order to prevent the occurrence of forest fires in peatlands Bang. Then, err our fellows, the task force team that was in the main post at Roesmin Nurjdin Airfield in Pekanbaru, every day they always held briefings / meetings which were hold by the Commander of Korem 031 Wirabima, or by his deputy, the Chief of BPPD Riau, is my good friend Edward Sanger, Bang Karni, so the information there is open to the public. Every day there are fellows from the press and so on. So what was presented earlier by err .. Bang Dharmawi / if you want see there, if you want to fly, this is welcome. If you want to join a helicopter or wish e / the aircraft, for TMC, it is welcomed. Because also some time ago, e the fellows, Bapak-bapak from legislative also joined the flight to see from above what it was like the situation of the forest and land fires in Pekanbaru and its surroundings. ... Perhaps well we want to say that the Task Force in Riau as well as in the provinces and regencies have been working to the maximum, as being said by kakanda (older sister) Azlaini Agus, day and night they have been working, our officers in the field have also been sleeping in the meadow, in plantations, on the soil, in order to improve the current situation.

So we hope, the smoke that had been disruptive, which has caused a casualty for my good friend, Pak Muchlis, it is an issue that must be immediately resolved by the local government. And of course with the support of the central government Bang. So by the support of the water bombing aircrafts, then the aircraft er / for / the creator of the weather modification technology, they are very helpful. Because at the beginning of last September, for 3-4 days the permission to fly planes in Pekanbaru was not there, so the aircraft did not operate, (causing) the hotspots in Riau province rose sharply on that day. So perhaps as an information for us all, Bapak-bapak who are present here, that the latest hotspot condition on this day, September 22, 2015 recorded 16 hours earlier in the afternoon, Sumatra has 591 hotspots. And in our neighbouring province of South Sumatra it is approximated as 414. In Bangka Belitung is also 119. And in Riau there are 3 Bang. So maybe what was presented that today in Riau the smoke is very thick, or even be at a dangerous level indeed we can assume, that it comes from the areas of many hotspots earlier Bang. So well the situation in Riau, with the smoke haze, which has taken casualties perhaps the condition is like that, this is a critical issue for us all. Meaning Riau doesn’t have to be alone, doesn’t need to be alone, but must be supported / perhaps at least the regions of Sumatra and Java, and the Central, together. But alhamdullilah after being declared yesterday as alert/ what, air pollution emergency due to...
listed in the action plan / and have been partly implemented Bang. Such as making a structural plan, through the canal blocking, with et/ etc / and also non-structurally, with community empowerment, socialization, and so forth. Then also in other places / other sections are also the law enforcement. Maybe if it is in Riau can be said yeah.. what is done by our judicial team, the police and the prosecutor's office yeah, there have been a lot of suspects set. Earlier if not mistaken there are 48 people, individually. The results of our meeting this morning at the post, and there is one corporation. That is Bang. So what is don.

[02:04:23] Mr. Ilyas: So we can be sure that next year there won’t be this, smoke no more.

[02:04:28] Mr. Labay: Well probably it can be believed that there won’t be smoke/ There was an information from my fellows Bang, if it is in Riau maybe we can minimize it. No smoke can be / but up to the dangerous levels we may be fifty-fifty. (We) cannot guarantee that tomorrow there won’t be air pollution, resulting in the non-dangerous air quality. It’s also relative isn’t it. Because there had been a shift to the southern part of the island of Sumatra, the emergence of many hotspots. [Inaudible] / In the latest conditions today, we say ... the hotspots are not in Riau but the smoke /

[02:05:10] Mr. Ilyas: Right, but in the earlier days in Riau /

[02:05:11] Mr. Labay: Yeah, in the earlier days well we admit, there was/

[02:05:14] Mr. Ilyas: 16, well now it has already extinguished to 3. [Mr. Labay: Alright alright that is it/] We do not know whether it will increase again tomorrow, do we.

[02:05:20] Mr. Labay: Well we do not know the future Bang.

[02:05:25] Mr. Ilyas: Yes right, you would like to add, Pak Andra Sjafril?

[02:05:29] Mr. Sjafril (Chief Medical Officer of Riau Government): Yes, thank you Bang Karni, err .. first, it is to be known that, the Acting Governor of Riau, he’s very ... very .. err intense yeah, very concerned, regarding the the occurrence of air pollution due to err smoke yeah, so comes err the status that we know a week ago. This can be proven, almost every day we, all SKPD, especially those included in the task forces, there is no red on the calendar. So all has been black on the calendar. So almost every day there is always something, yeah / he asked about the conditions / even in the morning if he needs to, he calls me. He calls me to ask how are the existing circumstances. That is the first. Secondly, err it is true indeed, as the result of the current conditions in Riau, there are a rise in cases related to the five diseases caused by smoke, yeah, so in accordance with the Ministry of Health Policy 289 / III in 2003, we declare that there are five diseases, namely upper respiratory tract infection, pneumonia, asthma, skin irritation and eye irritation. Then, to be known, that are the masks that have been implemented, which have been distributed, err ineffective? We state, the masks distributed, it is cost-effective. Yeah, cost effective, yeah, they are distributed, if using the other / we do not state / there is type of mask that is always talked about, yeah, which has been trending currently, that err in the Health is preferred to be used for infectious diseases. Yeah, for one of the / some kinds of of infectious diseases, such as H5N1, H1N1, then MDRTB, yeah, MDRTB. The mask err / what was the name / filters below 5 microns. 5 microns. So if we use it constantly, we would experience difficulty breathing. Then regarding the err... my brother, I've said this for second time perhaps, err I'm very sorry, yeah, er he often has discussions with me. So because Bapak Acting Governor is very concerned, he even yeah Pak, came on Friday, I remember very much, came to his house, and asked me to find a way out. To be known, that the information
I received from the Managing Director / so the night I got an information that the beloved daughter died, I immediately contacted the president director of Arifin Ahmad Public Hospital, got an information / the information was found that the beloved daughter was indeed suffered from respiratory failure due to comorbidities which is TB meningitis. TB meningitis with body weight / so there was malnutrition as well.

[02:08:48] Mr. Ilyas: So Bapak mean it is not solely because of the smoke /
[02:08:50] Mr. Sjafril: Yes, not merely because it /
[02:08:52] Mr. Ilyas: Although the trigger may be smoke,
[02:08:53] Mr. Sjafril: Yes /
[02:08:53] Mr. Ilyas: Although the trigger may be smoke /
[02:08:55] Mr. Sjafril: Yes, yes.
[02:08:57] Mr. Ilyas: Right Pak. ... What?
[02:09:02] Mr. Azhar: Yes, I want to say .. the situation in Riau, yeah, many of us talking in Pekanbaru /
[02:09:10] Mr. Ilyas: No, Bapak can only respond now, not to explain things all over again.
[02:09:13] Mr. Azhar: Yes /
[02:09:14] Mr. Ilyas: There is something Bapak want to respond to?
[02:09:15] Mr. Azhar: Yes /
[02:09:15] Mr. Ilyas: Because Bapak have your chance earlier. So it was not to be repeated again what /
[02:09:21] Mr. Azhar: I / I want / want to say that what applies in Riau, in particular, for several weeks, it concentrates to the land fire / although, the number of land fires are actually not much.
[02:09:35] Mr. Ilyas: In Riau particularly
[02:09:36] Mr. Azhar: In Riau particularly. Well, what becomes a big problem for the people is the impact of the smoke. In the context of addressing the impact of smoke we're late. I do not know what happens in Riau today, as a whole. But if there are problems in Pekanbaru, then it happens in other districts, alright. Other districts / secondly, Bang Karni / I want to say that this issue .. err .. we talk a lot about / we talk a lot about the issue of/ err economic / about this / if Bapak-bapak’s statements earlier are heard, from / from / from the associations, then also from / that is .. it sounds like.. the smoke will be no more. And the smoke will never exist after several years / and the smoke will no longer exist.
[02:10:34] Mr. Ilyas: Well nobody says it, he said that it is not the corporations. [Mr. Azhar: Yes / meaning/] [inaudible] who burn.
[02:10:41] Mr. Azhar: Yes, if so /
[02:10:42] Mr. Ilyas: If /
[02:10:43] Mr. Azhar: who burn?
[02:10:45] Mr. Ilyas: Yes it means .. the people outside the corporations. If the corporations do not burn.
[02:10:51] Mr. Azhar: Yes that is. Well, I want to say / we .. we ... how is our way of thinking now / thinking solely for the economy or also thinking about the humanitarian issues / the people who inhale the smoke. If you look at the situation in Riau, South Sumatra, Jambi and Kalimantan now, this is not the year of 2015 Pak Karni, but year zero of civilization. Year zero of the civilization. Where, is the just and civilized humanity of the Second Principle. Where is the state's responsibility for the civilization [Mr. Ilyas: Right], I want to say that.

[02:11:32] Mr. Ilyas: We break for a moment.

Commercial Break

[02:11:39] Mr. Ilyas: Viewers we are still in discussion of who burns our forests. Already present with us the Complaints and Oversight Director of Administrative Sanctions of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Pak Kemal Anas. ... Please Pak. In response to what happens as / the representation of the Minister of Forestry.

[02:12:09] Mr. Anas: Right, err good evening Bang Karni. Err uhmm today, Bu Minister, is on a trip to.. South Kalimantan, then on Saturday also, err to Riau, it means that how concerned is err the leader of the Ministry of Environment toward err the countermeasures or .. the prevention of smoke in the territory of Indonesia. .. Err .. at the national level, that ehmm there is already a task force for the land and forest fires control and security. Chaired by my Ibu Minister err LHK. Then .. along with BNPB, well, ranging from the ... strengthening, yeah, to make sure that every post in every province particularly the ones err which are terribly on fire as in Jambi, in South Sumatra, and Riau, those are Sumatra, then also in South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan and West Kalimantan. These six provinces are currently exceptional. Err hotspot monitoring actual show a figure that this year, yeah, is far than the previous year as a whole, it is 14,915, in the period from 1 January to 21 September 2015 / and the previous year in the same period in 2014, from 1 January to 21 September it was 21,380. The difference is the distribution that is now exceptional. More so in Central Kalimantan, yeah, South Sumat.

[02:14:26] Mr. Ilyas: It means the distribution of the areas hit by the smoke

[02:14:27] Mr. Anas: Yes, last year it was more concentrated in Riau. Then now it's in Jambi, in South Sumatra that from the numbers it has increased from 2014.

[02:14:41] Mr. Ilyas: But the hotspot is also growing this year isn’t it

[02:14:44] Mr. Anas: Yes, of course / of course so the fire with the smoke is indeed a unity that when the fire is burning, yeah, the smoke is reduced but / that is the nature of the peat. Then the fire is somewhat reduced, or say extinguished, but because of ground fire, there is a remarkable smoke. That's what I /

[02:15:09] Mr. Ilyas: That's what I want to ask to Forestry Pak. Each year we experience this / and this year it is not getting smaller, especially if we wish it did not exist, even greater it will become. This .. what has the Forestry done

[02:15:24] Mr. Anas: Right, so err the first is ensuring that the task force by land, air task force, yeah togeth/ they are running in each province and even district and rural levels, yeah. Then we also do the law enforcement. Not only instrumenting criminal charges, yeah, civil / but also we are now err implementing the Act 32 that is the administrative sanction, yeah or administrative law, which is for the first time for the Forestry and err what was the name / the Plantation. Yesterday we/ on 11 earlier, yeah, have already
announced that there are three plantation companies whose permits are suspended. Then one IUPH, UH, yeah, or concessions, yeah, its permit has been revoked. So if it was mentioned earlier that there has been no, it was on 11, Pak Secretary General, yeah, and err this one what/ the marathon job, until.. late in the evening, Bu Minister on half to three, had discussions with the experts and so on, this/

[02:16:45] Mr. Ilyas: That was already revoked.

[02:16:47] Mr. Anas: Already revoked. That is.. If I need to mention, namely PT. . Hutani Sola Lestari in Riau, then for the plantation, yeah, it is err Langgam Inti Hibrido, its permit is suspended, and the lands burnt, they is returned or confiscated by the state to be further processed. In South Sulawesi, namely, uh Waringin Agro Jay, and also Tempirai Palm Resources. That was / So if . if this continues, the leaders in South Sumatra that had two, yeah, and we move forward, yeah, as stated by Mr. Karni / what to do / this will be continued. According to the report, yeah, only .. about 7 to 9,000 .. land are burned, but based on the analysis of err LANDSAT, yeah, the satellite images, it is not less than 190,000 are burnt this year. And the data is with us, yeah, has already analyzed but checking, clarification, verification, ground checking to the field.

[02:18:12] Mr. Ilyas: This is the very first time [Mr. Anas: Yes] that somebody is revoked. [Mr. Anas: Yes] This year is the very first isn’t it [Mr. Anas: Yes, yes]

[02:18:19] Mr. Anas: So it was in order to what was / [inaudible] also simultaneously err landscape management, earlier it was said that there is permit audit and so forth / In the future there is still a lot / Earlier I mentioned that the 190,000 ha are scattered in / in 6 provinces, more even, and the PPLH the environmental supervision officer is going to be deployed, to the field, what is called by Bu Minister who calls it the Special Task Force for Supervision. Well this is all in the future, we just have four / and that will continue, yeah, to ensure that what is expressed by my right hand side here, whether there is the permission, or not, then cannot evade it anymore, that in the area or on the location, yeah the concession or work areas that there are fires, because we will do the ground check, through the officers on the field /

[02:19:23] Mr. Ilyas: How come there is someone who has no Plantation Permit he said

[02:19:29] Mr. Anas: That's, uhm err the permits of some / what / plantations or other businesses are on the finance of the regional. / So we make sure of it with a second line enforcement, yeah, the Minister of Environment and Forestry takes over, because there is a clause in the tw/ sevent/ article 76 of Act 32 of 2009, that the minister can take over when the licensor does not do err anything, although the condition has already been very, very serious. Yeah, this is it/ Then the next one, that .. Ministry of Environment and Forestry also uhm err well along with the idea of Pak Jokowi, in the Peranti last year, yeah, happened an outstanding fires. Then there is the canal blocking, alhamdullillah in 2015 there is not many incidences / even though there are spots but they are not like last year. In some conservation areas that are part or managed by the Central, Pak, national parks, wildlife reserves, what / nature reserves, then hunting parks, we also do canal blocking. In early 2014, yeah earlier had been mentioned because in Riau there are two peaks of err dry season, in uhm February and also in err August, so January-March are called as dry season in / in / called as a wet draught season / then June to September is dry draught season. This is the most dangerous. Before it was mentioned that the canalisation has been outstanding. Whether it's business for err plantations or err forestry, as indeed it is a management instrument for inspection, in and out and also in order to err what was the
transforming the land into aerobic / it means the roots can breathe / But if it is anaerobic in the flooded conditions, only some plants can grow. Therefore our policy is to close the canals. PP71 which what / which mandates that water level should be 40 inches, many are resistant (about it). This is / so there will be a lot of crops that obviously the palm oil businessmen or what it was called err / forestry will be disrupted if it is 40 inches / because wetter / peat, yeah, Riau has 8.7 million hectares / 5.5 million hectares are forests, and 3.5 million hectares are peatlands. Well therefore when the peat is moistened peat, surely the fire probability is very small.

[02:22:43] Mr. Ilyas: But what is the loss for the businessmen. The production/

[02:22:46] Mr. Anas: Yes surely if it is flooded it will be what/ dead, yeah/ I have an experience in the area of Gravel Hill Gemsia (?) it was small, yeah

[02:22:56] Mr. Ilyas: The palm oil plants die, like so

[02:23:02] Mr. Ilyas: Right, Mr. Ragin now. Mr. Ragin Utomo the Director of Settlement.

[02:23:08] Mr. Muchlis: Sorry I want to clarify. I am the parent of the victim .. to Mr. Andra yeah .. Try to open the hearts.. of us all.. If it was [vibrating voice] my daughter that was convicted as TBCmitis, try to feel / feel me who has lost a child, please. And from where / even to her parents the doctors just did not dare to say it / and (only had) courage to say that it was respiratory failure. .. And this has also spread in the media the statements of doctor Zeli (?) and Mr. Andra, as the Chief Medical Officer of Riau Province... I have forgiven, but tonight it (the matter forgiven) has been opened once again. The SOCIAL IMPACT to my life in Riau. Please help me Pak. I beg you. I be/... This is the voice of my heart/ BY THE NAME OF ALLAH AND RASUL! I am a religious person and ... have been religiously educated. I beg you. DO NOT say it. Time and time again .. My late daughter in the grave, why had you talk like that? I have forgiven it in the newspaper/ I have ...And I thank the government. With the Regional Health Insurance, they gave me a relief on the cost (of the daughter’s hospitalisation). Please, Please Pak Andra.

[02:24:39] Mr. Ilyas: I think you can understand /

[02:24:40] Mr. Muchlis: Do not be pleased with/ with what you have said/ do not,... Dear Allah, I pray that it won't touch your families. I CANNOT EVEN IMAGINE, please.. Thank you. Wassalamualaikum warrahmatullohi wabarakatuh. [Audience: Wallaikumsalam]

[02:25:00] Mr. Ilyas: Right, continue Pak.

[02:25:03] Mr. Utomo (Director of Dispute Resolution of the Ministry of Forestry and Environment): Err thank you Bang Karni, so err about the law enforcement, it is we now apply three. First the administration, it had been presented by Pak Kemal, and it is we implement environmental permit Pak. So we err / every business activity / that requires EIA or KPA (?) / they are obligatory for (the issuance of) environmental permit. It is we are looking through the err environment perspective, then there it is we apply sanctions. So since this is a permission given by the local, hence we use what is called as second-line enforcement. So err because we are / we should have our own permit. A, because this is the local’s permit/ and there was a serious violation. So we call it serious violation / because the serious offense has a broad impact. There are the people who have, been hit by Upper Respiratory Tract Infection and so forth. So there / we have serious violation / then it is can be given a considerable sanction. Well, so it is we categorize that before is regarding with
the err suspension. Then the other one, the err what / forest that is associated with its operation permit. So it is different. So there are the three before that are more about the environmental permit, then one is about the business permit.

And then, in the terms of, err, Ibu Minister, stated that the err land, that later is burned, it is taken by the government. In a sense that it will be restored. So that what / so that to ensure that the land is not on fire anymore. So later err the legal process continues, so the administration continues / then the criminal charges continue, then when it is on final verdict, yeah / the decision, then later comes the turn of the decision before. If the verdict is for example err the party who err say there is the party err convicted, er pardon the defendant or the suspect wins, yeah, then it is possible to be returned again. So actually our direction, we also direct to the corporations. So the actual combination, we want the combination of administrative, then criminal and civil. But the administrative will/ will later be applied to all arsonists. But that is what is associated with the issue err criminal, if it has been criminal/ the civil will follow. So we bundle (them) Pak. So this is in order to what, in order to apply a deterrent effect. What is the point? / Because if our law enforcement is inconsistent/ then we use all three of our instruments we we apply well, it is later won’t affect err / for the better future. That's what we do, and err this is indeed necessary, indeed err the extraordinary resource.

So we may say to that this is us with Bu Minister, even Sunday we are checking in Pak, so keep on checking in. So er might be said er Bu Menteri probably is not err concerned or else, or only talk around, but it is clear, err Bu Minister is serious [inaudible] / This is proven is in relation to the issue of err suspension and permit revocation. And this is the very first time about it.

[02:28:34] Mr. Ilyas: Yes, if only it was from the beginning, maybe we have no fire anymore now. This means this is just .. Right, err .. if humans do not learn .. to respect the forest and the ocean, then life will be extinct. Said Peter Bensley, an American writer. We take a break.

Commercial break

[02:29:09] Mr. Ilyas: Viewers we have reached the end. Now it’s Bu Ratna Sarumpaet’s turn. ...

[02:29:21] Mrs. Sarumpaet (Titled: social media activist): Good .. good evening Pak Karni; good evening everyone. Um .. uluh .. I would like to invite .. all the people of Indonesia .. to see this smoke problem yeah, which occurs in Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, with humility .. with sympathy .. with the willingness to introspect .. the willingness, perhaps there is something wrong in my actions .. there is a fatality. We will not wait for more fatalities, will we? .. I witnessed before how the party here complained about this thing, then from the State party, or associated with the State, eloquently said ooh (we’re) not even sleeping, even this, even that, even that, even that/ … As if all have been done. Then the important question is HOW COME THE SMOKE IS STILL THERE THEN? [Audience clapping hands] .. Lest you haven’t done it as it should have been. Do not be proud of our notes records, the law enforcement have been this .. there will be task force and so on and so on. But the smoke is crazy. And there are victims. Let us just show our sympathy with a willingness to do humble dialogue. Let’s talk about this by / by heart. I want to start answering the question from the title of this show .. who burns our forests. And I’m not going to run from a single answer, the State. Although technically it was carried out either the people, either by err
what / corporations, either by barons, by whoever it is, but it remains that the one who has NO action, who makes the fire happens, it is because the State is not present. The state is not present. Just start from the preamble. The duty of the state is to protect, to protect the entire nation, ENTIRELY. So there is no exceptions / and including the culture, the civilization, preserved. When we invest / our country / we do not refuse investment. Of course we do not refuse, because logically it would not be possible / all is done by the people of Indonesia / But sowing, spreading the investment opportunities to the private (corporations), especially the foreign private or foreigners, foreign businessmen, should give a blessing for the people of Indonesia. [Audience clapping hands] Why should we invest then our investors have fun, and maybe corrupt / the corruptors get a little bit alright, then how much our tax is, then the tax is taken where, and what is left for Riau, What is left for Jambi. That is / if there is an investment at least the tax will be given to the State / it is the taxation that we want to see where is it going, isn’t it? It should be an assurance that say after last year alright say it happened, this year after the fires occur there should have been teams who have departed, right / There is the tax money, right? Where does the tax go? From the palm oil businesses that have been said have given so many / contribution to this nation, right Mas? Then where does the tax go? What is gained by the people when the investments, in which er what / the natural resources are exploited for profit. What has the people got. But becoming victims. Becoming victims [Audience clapping hands]. For me they are the victims. Let the people of Indonesia see this with the hum/ humility. Supposedly actually at the moment it is difficult for us to talk about this, which is more severe than which. The US dollar is till 14,600 US alright. Even when we are in a collapsed state like this (we are) still arrogant to say / ooh he has come alright, sleep-in yeah. [Exhaling, cynically laughed] I don’t know where we are going. Building a nation is to build a human life in its ful-fill-ness. The culture is there, the civilization there, all the wealth of humanity, that is what our country should have built. That is mandated by the preamble [emphasis] on us. That’s what we have to remind the PEOPLE in the House of Representatives [emphasis] what are you doing after all this time, that is what we have to remind Jokowi and all his cabinet. Do not talk about headache because (you) cannot sleep, (you) indeed should NOT SLEEP RIGHT? NO, SO WHY BECOME A MINISTER IF that makes you complain? [An audience shouting: "That’s right Bu!" While the others clapping hands] I... really wish, actually I would like to also invite all of us to look behind, what is actually wrong? The development is on our Constitution isn’t it. It should be favouring the people. The original Constitution FAVOURS the people, because there is Pancasila there. / But it has already LOST because of the amendment, and to this day all of you brothers and the brothers in the House brothers who ARE SAYING that they are leading the poli / what / politics in this Republic they are pretending to be idiots. Pretending to be idiots, that our Constitution doesn’t favour the people. Doesn’t favour. This is not to be discussed now / but this is my statement / So if WE do not want to be AWARE, that there is something that should be fixed in our national SYSTEM, we will be destroyed. Don’t talk about the four areas that are now on fire / er smoky , Lest the entire republic will be covered by smoke, and we are done. [Audience clapping hands]... Thank you Pak.

[02:36:12] Mr. Ilyas: All that has been said by Ibu Ratna Sarumpaet, in one sentence... Cicero, the Roman philosopher, the supreme law of a country, is the safety of its people. And it is described in the preamble of the Constitution 45 [some audience clapping hands] Now from Professor Soeparto Widjojo.
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[02:36:42] Prof. Widjojo (unnamed): Bang Karni, seems like I am not a professor, but a compressor, like that... We witnessed and I also want to answer who is actually the arsonists of our forests. Legally it is very simple the arsonists are surely humans. And individual humans or groups of humans who were clearly not the orangutan. Who is not called and saddened to see the point when a tragedy becomes a tradition in this country. Where azab (punishment from Allah) becomes sustained / in a country that is supposedly lawful. So this conversation actually discusses WHAT a lawful state means. Therefore in this note I would like to briefly reflect in the terms of why this incident happens, because there happens hasta karma of environmental law enforcement. Not hasta Karni, Bang Karni. It is hasta karma. We have done a legal karma. First of all, the LAW in the state administration, we failed to present a meaningful constitution for the people. That in the CONSTITUTION it is stated, the right of a GOOD and healthy environment, must be provided by the state, with the government doing it. Therefore if now we are asking the responsibility of WHOM primarily fails to provide a GOOD and healthy environment, that is the STATE institution. Because now the CONSTITUTION is not running. It means the government is unconstitutional. And IF this is followed-up constitutionally / there would be impeachment. The MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) can impeach because in the current position, the president can terminate the minister, the minister can sanction the governor, the governor can do so to the regent-mayor, and it IS THERE IN THE CONSTITUTION AND IN THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT’S ACT., Pak. Karni. And it has a long description and IT IS THERE in the environmental acts, but FOR THESE THREE DECADES we have been witnessing that a lawful state has been transforming into a grocery market state. This country seems like NO-MAN’s land. That is the first perspective of hasta karma. The second in the perspective of criminal law, why are people ignorant of the terrorism act. So the environmental and humanitarian CRIME in this smoke issue is A CRIME of terrorism. This is an ecological TERROR allowed by the STATE. And when the INSTITUTION does not do that, then our suffering is COMPLETE. I want to tell you a little of WHY the term environment is included in the terrorism act. It was in 2002, the discussion, we have Minister Pak Nabil Makarim, BKPSL throughout Indonesia / the agencies for cooperation, environmental study centers all over Indonesia gathered in Minangkabau, and at that time (they) asked to the forum TO BE INCLUDED that/ one of the MAJOR crimes that should be anticipated is the environmental (crime). So an environmental (crime) is a CRIME of terrorism. So I ask the Chief of Police to implement the terrorism act. It’s simple really. The mass casualties, meditated, disruptions to vital objects, there are human casualties / I want to ask, is it NOT MASSIVE ENOUGH, the victims of this smoke. TWENTY-SIX MILLION PEOPLE become victims. But I've never witnessed... since 2002, this smoke crime as a crime of terrorism / Probably this country hasn’t suffered enough [whisper: right, yeah]. [Audience clapping hands] The third is the administrative aspect as stated by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. This administrative (aspect) is a nice structure actually. Of the supervisor, who HANDLE this, we ask my friends who hold my number / my friends at the PLANTATIONS. Have you been observed, taught, educated by our bureaucratic institutions, so you would not destroy, would not pollute, would not burn. If this has never been done ACCORDING the environmental act, we as the founding fathers know EXACTLY, what it is... So the regents, mayors, heads of services, who DO NOT reflect an environmental PERFORMANCE, they can be FIRED. But until today we have not seen it. Against such a great incident, this environmental act, is still considered to be a toothless tiger that has no meaning. The fourth is a matter of...
compensation. Compensation / I hope the customary leaders voice it out loud, you have the legal opportunity to file a lawsuit. So it public action is not enough / what we need is legal action. Thus the customary communities based on law, based on the decision of the Constitutional Court, in such environmental issue may file a lawsuit. Calculate now, request help from WALHI, request help from that team, moreover this loud (guy). SHOW that you do have proof, then do the legal process. And you have the right to file a lawsuit representing the victims / how heroic it is if you do so, Pak, yeah. [Audience clapping hands]

[02:43:18] Then there is the environmental disaster act / I want to ask, you know the disaster status has been felt by Malaysia, felt by Singapore, but to this day it has never been declared as a national disaster. This is a national disaster. The standards according to our disaster act, there are mass casualties, there is a wide impact, there are victims, even in such condition we are ignorant toward the act. Then if we are now at this disaster act/ This is actually the State's thanksgiving (syukuran), I used to REJECT the presence of disaster management act. Why resist? By the disaster management act, the State, invites hey disaster, come to this country. If there is no fire, no smoke, BURN them all. Why because then the acts could apply. If there is no disaster it could not be applied in this country. And what / the government does have a budget, has staff, has vehicles, has all the instruments / so the disaster management act is structured CRIME LEGITIMATION of the State. [Audience clapping hands, an audience cheering] But / it is all there. Perhaps this situation should be shaded a little.

Then there are the forestry and plantations. So there are all the crimes of forestry, of plantations gentlemen, and all of those I'm sure we've understood. Next is the international aspect. This is an international conspiracy that I've observed. Therefore I challenge the fellows in Singapore that Pak Karni had just met, for instance. Try, you don't need to complain about Indonesia, about the smoke. But DO FILE AN INTERNATIONAL LAWSUIT against Indonesia. At the international COURT. I am sure Singapore and Malaysia do not want that. Why? If they want it, EVERYTHING WOULD BE REVEALED. I've studied since 2003 that ALL CORPORATIONS involve those countries. Hence the ones arrested, punished, in the history THERE HAVE NEVER BEEN their major shareholders and the major directors who LIVE in the countries that love to complain / then processed by the law. Except the staff and employees / Yet according to the business act in this country, they are supposed to be processed by the law. But unfortunately it was never done. The last is... the environmental act on consumer protection and production / This involves the economy / of the country, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, do read the regulations from the Forestry Act to the Consumer Protection Act, you can ANNOUNCE IT there, can’t you. When these plantations are involved in the process, then just announce ALL processes of production and the products. This is the factory, this is the product. It is involved in burning, let Pak Police process it, Pak Prosecutor Pak Judge, but what will the GOVERNMENT announce / this is the product, and we urge the people of Indonesia, boycott their products as a form of consumer protection / [ audience clapping hands] I believe the industry would think twice, ... because the industry thinks PROFIT, while they would lose. [here Mr. Widjojo says a poem] We gather here with Pak Karni, because of the love to the Unitary Nation of the Republic of Indonesia. [Audience clapping hands, some cheering]

[02:47:31] Prof. Gabriel (no title): Look / after listening earlier I guess the smoke problem in Riau, or anywhere else, in Sumatra, er is a serious problem / actually it is far more serious than the smoke from cigarettes. Therefore I think .. err it needs to get more attention / err very seriously of us all. Especially from, like Bu Ratna said earlier, and the professor said earlier, from the government. Because look, in article 33, paragraph 3. Err what it's called .. The land and water and the natural resources contained therein .. are managed by / with a clause for the highest welfare of the people. For the highest welfare of the people, it is the ratiolegy, animalegy, the antecedent SOUL / and the SOUL of the chapter, which gives the RIGHT of mastery to the State. You gentlemen can imagine, when, let alone for the welfare of the people, but instead to be a disaster for the people. How we have betrayed the article 33 paragraph 3. In the chapter, actually is already contained two important doctrines, which .. could also be the basis of a lawsuit, for instance, there is one doctrine of rex communes. It is the public's right to the forest and so on and so forth, clean water / the river, then due to the arsonist the river might be dead over there, there is also a trust from the public, which gives power to the state, to manage all the land and water including the forests in Riau's for its people's welfare. The repeated incidents of forest fires in Riau, or anywhere else, show the State's failure be faithful to the trust given by the people of Indonesia. Because it seems to me, it is important for the current government to do err what / say a RESTORATION politics for the ecosystems of tropical forests. This includes auditing the corporations that have licenses there. Then also to review, if any, the spatial planning, what spatial planning / the regional, and also the land use there. If this is all done, then what happens / we keep repeating / continue like this / in next year as well, perhaps there will be a discussion like this and like that. I think it is important to be done comprehensively, so then this smoke problem, and the things associated with it do not happen again. Please also pay real attention, to the rights of the indigenous peoples in every place. It's very important.

[02:50:37] Mr. Ilyas: I think it is enough. [Audience clapping hands] Viewers .... If anyone asks what is the solution, I think what is being done now is a part of the solution. That there has been the law enforcement. Against the permit administration and all sorts. There were someone who were revoked earlier, and of course I also see that the Police Headquarters are more active. Investigating this case not only from the actors in the field. But also on the intellectual factors. There are legal areas still untouched. And hopefully thanks to the advice .. of the professor earlier, namely the civil lawsuit, as a result of the smoke, both the one harming the company, harming the breathing, causing deaths, it is a joint responsibility of all the companies causing the smoke. Whether it is intentional, or unintentional. Finally viewers, I want to .. end this discussion with the story of Dorothy Stank, a nun in the America, which is also an environmental activist. She always voiced, that there are many ways to take the forest products without you destroying it. And she was very vocal, especially in Brazil. She opposed the forest burning there. And accused a group of people, who eventually sent the mafia to pursue her. When she was about to see the farmers in a village, on the banks of river Amazon .. the mafia got Dorothy. Are you armed, asked the mafia led by Maoro if I’m not wrong / Maora .. She said my weapon is just a sacred book. I bring the gospel she said. And she was killed, her body covered in a magazine .. er bullets, and four bullets in her head. One thing that she left. Her shi/ her clothing that was always
That the death of the forest, is the end of our life. / We’ll meet at the forthcoming ILC.

[End of transcript]
### Appendix 1C: Data reading table using investigative questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Who says</th>
<th>Timestamp</th>
<th>What is being said</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>ILC 2015</td>
<td>Who is to blame</td>
<td>Human Rights Commissioner</td>
<td>00:01:04</td>
<td>The government is responsible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>ILC 2015</td>
<td>Who is to blame</td>
<td>Intro</td>
<td>00:01:04</td>
<td>Greed of corporations, blaming the smallholders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>ILC 2015</td>
<td>Who is to blame</td>
<td>Joko Widodo</td>
<td>00:02:00</td>
<td>The police have to take harsh action toward the corporations, and the corporations have to be respectful to their “right and left”.</td>
<td>Joko Widodo said this in one of the forest areas which is still burning, with a mask on his neck. He told the reporter that he has sent (what) for “once or twice” (to whom). The corporations are to be blamed, and the police are the one who have to take actions. The latter implies that the “harsh actions” are judicial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>ILC 2015</td>
<td>Who is to blame</td>
<td>The Police General Baharudin Haiti</td>
<td>00:02:33</td>
<td>7 corporations which are processed currently, mentioned only by initials</td>
<td>Why initials? Also asked by Karni Ilyas on the talk show.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>ILC 2015</td>
<td>How I react</td>
<td>Ministry of Forestry and Environment Siti Nurbaya Bakar</td>
<td>00:03:50</td>
<td>The police have to take action, only then the ministry can do their administrative part.</td>
<td>Siti Nurbaya used all passive verbs with no subject when describing the sanctions that would be taken against the corporations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>ILC 2015</td>
<td>Who is to blame</td>
<td>Intro: The impact</td>
<td>00:04:12</td>
<td>Singaporean and Malaysian are demanding proper treatment; sarcasm arise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>ILC 2015</td>
<td>Who suffers</td>
<td>Host introduction</td>
<td>00:05:19</td>
<td>“The people over there” (orang sana) in Sumatera and Kalimantan are screaming …</td>
<td>“The people over there” is interesting. The corporations have bankrupted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   | ILC 2015 | Who is to blame | Melayu artists | 00:07:30-00:13:00 | “We” are the ones who are responsible and failed to protect the children. Yet later it is described that “we” have failed to “protect the children” from the “destruction” is done by those “same individuals”.

“We” the **adults** neglect “their dying future” (the children’s); but then in the song the “we” who failed are clarified as “Mr. President, former presidents, governors, former governors, I, all of us” with only “Mr. President” is named as “Mr. President Joko Widodo”. Using imaginaries of children in the hospital, parenthood, protection, the artists portray “we”, especially the government, as parents, whose sin is ignorance. Ignorance of the destruction that is brought repetitively by outsiders. However, the companies or businessmen are not included in the definition of the “we” who failed. |

|   | ILC 2015 | Who suffers | Melayu artists | The children are the ones who suffer the most through this **repetitive destruction** done by the same individuals |

|   | ILC 2015 | The meaning of the haze | Melayu artists | The songs have a chorus that cries that the “disaster is not something just to be talked about”, but it was “in front of your face”. The chorus was sung three times. The title of the song was “Bencana bukan Wacana”, which roughly translates as “Disaster is not a Discourse”. |

|   | ILC 2015 | The meaning of the haze (for the people) | Muchlis (“The people victim of Riau haze”) | 00:17:34-00:21:39 | The death of his twelve-year-old daughter because of “a cough”. Muchlis did not relate the “a cough” with the haze, but did mention clearly that a cough always took place at the same time as the haze. In describing what he experienced, Muchlis followed Ilyas’ guided interview which prompted him to only talk about the death and illness of his daughter. Muchlis’ commentaries which tell the audience about the “healthy
When Karni Ilyas confronted him about his “conclusion” that a cough was caused by the haze, he told Karni that the smoke “might be” the trigger.

### 12. ILC 2015
**The meaning of the haze (for a community leader), who suffers**

**Azlaini Agus** (Community Leader in Riau)

| Time | The haze was described as had happened for a long time, “dangerous”, unhealthy, and harmful to the human being, quoting **hard meteorological data**. After presenting the data, Agus told her **personal** experience of having to send her daughter-in-law and granddaughters to the capital Jakarta.

Agus reflected, **“How many people of Riau can take refuge in Jakarta?”** The rest had to be exposed to the smoke “day and night”. Agus then proceeded to describe how the haze also crept to the governor’s office.

While Agus implied that while the haze impacts the powerful and the poor alike, the poor suffers the most because of their immobility.

When she described the suffering as happened for a long time for “day and night”, seems that she’s requesting more attention.

### 13. ILC 2015
**The meaning of the haze for the government**

**Azlaini Agus** (Community Leader in Riau)

| Time | Agus questions the government’s response to the haze when it is asked to evacuate the vulnerable communities. The Minister of Health says, quoted: “The evacuation has to be thought thoroughly because it takes a price.”

At the end of her statement, the audience clapped hands for her.

The rhetoric of the “Unitary State of the Indonesian Republic” (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia) is a military jargon normally used in the discourses of foreign or separatist threats that can also be found on the discourse of West Papua, for example. Agus uses this rhetoric then proceeds about the issue of “not being a part of” Indonesia, about being neglected. At this point, the government clapped hands. The feeling of being treated as “no
one” underlines her expectation that the government should be com-passionate and in solidarity with the sufferers.

15. ILC 2015 Who is to blame Azlaini Agus (Community Leader in Riau) 00:26:27 “(...) there has never been a systematic effort to make it disappear. People keep burning and the government keeps extinguishing. So we are extinguishing the fruit of the labour of the businessmen, big investors who burn their land and plant (there) and the government cash out the people’s money to extinguish.”

The trinity of forest burning appears here. The “people” (orang-orang) is stated first, but this is interesting because when the other speakers try to clearly identify the people who burn forest as the outsiders, Agus does not state any specific identifier. Both the insider and outsider can burn the forest.

Here the government is portrayed as “the extinguisher” who use the people’s money, while the companies “the cultivators”.

16. ILC 2015 Who suffers Azlaini Agus (Community Leader in Riau) 00:26:27 “What’s left is the people who are attacked by breathing difficulties, and we don’t know our children’s future anymore. Based on IDI’s (Indonesia Medical Doctor Association) statement, the smoke being breathed for a long time will contribute to lung cancer. Wallahu’alam (Allah knows better). We are uncertain of our children’s future, and are our children not among the children of Indonesia? That’s what we/ we/ we feel.”

Agus expressed the feeling of uncertainty and threat to the children’s future, but also the feeling of helplessness expressed by the Arabic prayer wallahu-alam (Allah knows better).

17. ILC 2015 The meaning of the haze for the government Azlaini Agus (Community Leader in Riau) 00:27:59 “In Riau the governor and the mayor are too occupied with their preparations for the regional elections in the coming December. So pretty amnesiac they are with the smoke, Sir, even in amidst the haze they are campaigning. That is one of the terrible things with us.”

The regional government is not portrayed as doing anything as they are busy with the elections. But the main disappointment comes from the campaigns that
At the end of this sentence, the audience clapped hands.

| 18. | ILC 2015 | Who suffers Who is to blame | Karni Ilyas & Azalini Agus | 00:30:39-45 | Ilyas: “Madam, are you native to Riau or descendants?”
Agus: “Native, Sir.”
Ilyas: “What are you getting from the palm oil?”
Agus: “Nothing, Sir.”
Ilyas: “Nothing? [audience laughing] No, I asked this because Riau is pitiful. The funding for *Five Repelita* (Five Years National Plan of Development) (...) comes from Riau’s oil. Riau got nothing.”
Agus: “Got the smoke.”

In the economic sense, Ilyas and Agus conversed about the internal colonialism Riau is experiencing, when the State develop itself at the cost of the welfare of the indigenous people.

| 19. | ILC 2015 | How the speaker makes sense of the Haze | Al Azhar | 00:31:47-00:36:52 | [00:31:47] For the people who think .. people in Riau who think, what is happening now was in fact predicted in the final years of the 70s and 80s when the central government defined the Riau region as an area for natural resource exploitation based on forests and land after the exploitation of petroleum. It could actually be predicted that there would be something that we can now refer to as ecocide. Err ... ecocide, which takes place today. Mr. Karni, try to imagine, from the 8 million (hectares) of Riau’s land, in just a few years, 5 million (hectares) have become the private territory of only 200-300 people. And the rest is for 6 million people of Riau today. What happens, for instance when the logs are fallen, the rivers turn acidic because someone turn over the logs into it, what, what happens? So the ecocide is happening like a tidal wave in/ in/ in Riau. Because once again, as if Riau is no land for the people. Deemed as the land of no one and only as a natural resource supplier. Before there were mineral resource, natural oil, and now the eyes are into the resources from the forest and land.
[00:33:34] From the perspective of *adat* (customary, indigenous) Melayu, the old *adat* wisdom that was there before, now is gone. Try to imagine the *adat*
community, by the next week there would be signposts on their house yard that the A Corporation owned this now, the B corporation owned that, and they have never been asked to discuss about their own adat forest and land. Now what happens there, now, today, is tenurial imbalances, the imbalance of the tenurial ownership. That’s one thing. And this causes what is called as the conflicts of trimatra (the Indonesian term for the three spheres of earth, sky, and water), the conflicts that are connected with the forest and land in Riau, which in our notes, there are at least 240 spots scattered in all areas especially in the surrounding areas of corporation activities, the corporations there/ both logging and palm oil. The conflicts of trimatra between whom/ it’s between the adat people who feel that it is their traditional rights, and they know that their traditional rights are protected by the constitution, even more by the declaration of the UN. That’s one thing.

[00:35:03] Now the second, the migrants, the migration, the people who came from outside Riau coming there and see the opportunities given by the forest and land, and then the third, corporations. These, corporations which are there, that was the cause/ in addition, since mid-80s, a development on the government’s policy, that is giving up or in other terms not differ the mineral land with the peatland. Well, the peatland in Riau is vast, and she needs special handling, but in the permits she was seen as the same with mineral land … For the adat communities, the peatland is not a choice to be worked on. It is (worked) only as a backup. Because when it is cleared a little, it dries, then it becomes / it can be a source of disaster at any time, as it is the case now. Well, the handling of the large area of the peat / peatland there is just the same, and the best way, which has the lowest price for the corporation is to make canals / dry the land up / then on top of the dry land they planted their commodities. But that was like
opening the Pandora’s box, the danger stored in the dry peat / and that is exactly what is happening now ...

[00:36:52] Well ... What do you do? (...) Already, years ago, in 2014 we thought that it was going to be the end. That this is the last year. Not because / not because there is a significant handling of the seeds of the disaster, but because we feel that there would be no land in Riau, wouldn’t it. But apparently what happened in Riau was transferred to our neighbouring provinces such as Jambi and South Sumatra. What took place in the 90s in Riau, now begins in our neighbouring regions, namely in Jambi and Sumatera Selatan. /

| 20. | How the speaker makes sense of the haze | Mr. Ilyas | 00:37:46 | After Azhar’s explanation about what he thinks is happening in Riau and now spreading to the neighbouring regions, Ilyas responds with another question: “No, what is gained by the farmers in Riau with the palm oil plantations being there/ they should have something left for the farmers.” Ilyas guides Azhar to move on from the issue of land conflict and ecocide toward the economic issue. |
| 21. | How the speaker makes sense of the haze | Azhar | 00:37:58 | There are no rules that something must be left to the farmers / There is something called KKPA framework (Kredit Kepada Koperasi Primer untuk Anggotanya; rough translation: Credit to the Primary Cooperation for its Members) / but none in Riau’s experience proofs that KKPA framework is for the welfare of the farmers. Up to this day, Brother Karni. None /How is it possible that in the KKPA framework for example, in / |
| 22. | How the speaker respond; How the speaker makes sense; who the | Azhar | 00:39:40 | Challenged by Ilyas: “So what have you done as the Head of what [looking at the papers] Chief of the Customary Association for Melayu(?)? Nothing?” Azhar answers, sounding difficult in the process: “Of course not, well/ of course we don’t do nothing, we/ we for ex/ we for example we/ we/ object (sue, complaint?) yeah/ for example we object, firstly, so that Al-Azhar is not a stranger in the news. His name is associated with Riau’s Melayu people’s struggle to get land justice. In that regard, this particular answer is not related directly to the smoke nor the farmer’s share from palm oil plantation. Azhar sees that the root of it all |
| Perceived victim is | the land/ being the customary land is counted as the customary (communities’) investment to the companies/ but this is surely not in the viewpoint, in the viewpoint of the land clearing in err in this/ because the land is shared on the tables of the mayor, the governor, and the table of the central government, that’s it. Our land, the customary land, in all history has never been acknowledged, the customary land in Riau/ by the Indonesian government to this day, Bang Karni.” | is the unjust and corrupt customary land-grabbing by the Indonesian government. |

| 23. | How the speaker reacts; How the speaker makes sense; who is to blame; who the perceived victim is; what’s the perceived reaction of others | Basrizal Koto (Riau’s public figure) | Mr. Koto: Right / yes, Brother Karni. I introduce that Mr. Al-Azhar is the president of the Free Riau Pak . [audience clapping hands] for the year 2000, 2005. So the meaning of Riau / |

00:40:40 | Mr. Koto: Right / yes, Brother Karni. I introduce that Mr. Al-Azhar is the president of the Free Riau Pak . [audience clapping hands] for the year 2000, 2005. So the meaning of Riau / |

00:40:50 | Mr. Ilyas: Free how / want to rebel? |

00:40:54 | Mr. Koto: [laughing with the audience] So freedom (merdeka) means this Bang Karni/ we do not want to separate from the Republic and NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), but over the despair, the despair (because of) the way the central government treats Riau, which for us is err.. very unacceptable to the communities in Riau (…) |

00:42:29 | Mr. Ilyas: That was all, Bung Basril? [Mr. Koto: Yes] What you want to say? [Mr. Koto: Yes]. Yes, but do not … rebel, I mean. |

00:42:39 | Mr. Koto: We ain’t no [inaudible] rebel / [Mr. Ilyas: No .] So the restlessness so that the central government understands / |

| 208 | The discourse of “Free Riau” and the “Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia” (NKRI) brings close resemblance to the “Free Papua” and the majority’s response to it. The “NKRI” jargon is usually followed by the slogan “harga mati” (English: non-negotiable). The slogan is used militarily and usually functions as an answer to the separatist movement. |

Koto may jokingly bring separatism to the issue of smoke, but his next statement about “the way the central government treats Riau” only highlights the discourse of mistreatment, the desire for freedom, and separatism here. Ilyas takes it seriously and brings up the “rebel” issue and Riau’s related history to end his conversation with Koto. |
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>00:42:44 Mr. Ilyas:</th>
<th>00:42:50 Mr. Koto:</th>
<th>00:42:52 Mr. Ilyas:</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr. Ilyas: The KPRI Riau also involved [Mr. Koto laughing]. Ismail Lengah was the name of the commander at the time.</td>
<td>Mr. Koto: This, the president of Riau /</td>
<td>Mr. Ilyas: (He) was only bombed once then lost [Mr. Koto laughing]. So never rebel.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Dharmawi Aris</th>
<th>00:43:12-00:44:06</th>
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<td>I base my speech on the true facts, which is what happened in the province of Riau. Starting from 2013, the haze has already been very very… at the time of the inauguration of the governor, at that time… Pak / what now / Mr. Nirhaman was in the haze. The aircraft could not even land, Pak. In fact the governor has got no brains, no brain. Wish he understood the situation before the time and nowadays. This is what is needed by the current governor. So is the Ibu Minister.</td>
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Dharmawi Aris</th>
<th>00:44:02 Mr. Ilyas:</th>
<th>00:44:03 Mr. Aris:</th>
<th>00:44:03 Mr. Ilyas:</th>
<th>00:44:06 Mr. Aris:</th>
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<td>This is the current KPLT (the acting) governor?</td>
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<td>Mr. Aris: Yes /</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr. Ilyas: What is the reason to you Pak to say (he’s) got no brain?</td>
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<td>Mr. Aris: Yes / At that time (the smoke) had started (to spread) at the time he was elected, with Andreas Makmur / in the smoke blanket. At the beginning of his period. He should have thought about the future. How the smoke in Riau could have been prevented … This should be highlighted / The members of the legislative did the same. At the time of the smoke blanket like this, they go abroad. Also idiots (brainless). [audience clapping hands]</td>
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The rhetoric of "true facts" and "authentic data" will be repeated throughout Aris' speech.

Here Aris perceives the smoke problem as a personal one. The phrase "no brain" or "brainless" will be repeated with passion, first regarding the governor and Madam Minister of Forestry and Environment, then the members of the legislative. The audience seems to like the term, with them clapping hands. Aris blame the three for not doing pre-emptive treatments necessary to avoid the smoke at the first place.

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8 I am sure that Ilyas meant PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia – The Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) instead of KPRI.
Mr. Ilyas: How could the people of Riau vote for the idiots, then? [audience laughing hard]

Mr. Aris: There are still many sons and daughters of Riau who can lead Riau, Pak. But the bureaucracies in the leadership itself makes those who are still good get denied as leaders. Perhaps they have better track records, but they do not have money, they cannot be leaders. This, what should you (Mr. Ilyas) highlight.

Mr. Ilyas: Well, then, err your people prefer to vote for the rich, is that what you said?

Mr. Aris: Indeed. [audience laughing hard, then clapping hands shortly]...

Ilyas confronts Aris and place the burden of consequence to the voters in Riau. Then Aris provides a common answer to such problem of "good people cannot be leaders": They are good but they have no money. Hence Aris displace the responsibility to the corrupt bureaucracies. Ilyas only finds another reason to crack Aris' answer, that the people of Riau seems to prefer voting for the rich. Here Aris avoid the lengthy conversation and jumps into his "true fact" he has prepared.

Aris and Ilyas' dialogue provide a good example of the common discourse of responsibility in Indonesia post-1998 (post-authoritarian government, post-Soeharto, premature democracy).

After blaming the government, Aris proceeds to point his finger to the companies. However, he only samples a single company, and a Malaysian one at that. His answer would be echoed by other activists later on, probably because the case of Ade Plantation, Ltd. is exposed widely on the media. But why singles out the Malaysian?
plantation. The ones responsible for this matter, the problem of smoke, are the companies. The proof at the time... Ade Plantation, Ltd.

[00:46:30] Mr. Ilyas: Ade?

[00:46:31] Mr. Aris: Ade Plantation, Malaysia’s. Why was not arrested? PLEASE ARREST [angry face]. I dare, Pak [all fingers pointing to his chest] to show ...

By blatantly name the company responsible by its full name, Aris also represent the activists’ attitude toward the alleged arsons. It is a counter to the Police’s behaviour that often states the people responsible only by the initials.

The police and the Commission for the Eradication of Corruption are seen as the smoke problem solvers. This once again represent that while the people in the governments are perceived as the ones responsible, they are also the saviours.

Who is the perceived victim

00:46:31 Aris

Have pity, Pak, to my grandchildren. I sent away 7 grandchildren, Pak, from Pekanbaru (capital of Riau). On the 31st, August. How much did it cost? Try to imagine. [audience laughing].

After pouring his frustration, Aris seems to beg on behalf of his grandchildren. However, to whom he begs? To Ilyas? To no one? He also states the "cost" as the primary reason of his begging. The audience laughs when he asks them to imagine it. Why?

How the speaker react; who is the perceived victim, who is to blame; what’s the

00:46:31 Aris

What should people eat (using indigenous word of Riau for “getting food”)? [audience laughing hard at the use of the word, then clapping hands] … I am not what [interrupted by audience laughing] .. there is nothing done by the minister, she just talked, forbids people not to wander outside, do outdoor activities. If the people cannot do activities, (they) cannot eat. Pak. Where can they get money from?

While Aris is very passionate and serious in his utterance, the audience does not seem to treat him seriously and emphatically. They laugh at him. Maybe because of his communication style? (An old man ranting)
Here after complaining about the cost of sending his grandchildren away, he also question about the livelihood of the people, which is also described in an economic sense (getting food, work, money). He then retreats to point his finger to the Minister again, who he sees as insensitive to the reality in the communities.

Aris questions the National Agency for Disaster Response. His question seems to be uninformed. He probably does not bother to find the "true facts" about how the weather modification is done. However, I think his question represents the common people's silent question as well.

Aris blames the National Agency as fooling the people of Riau. He then explains the customary principle of Melayu people, resam. It's more or less the principle of reciprocal respect. Here the opponent of the "Melayu" is the "Central". Again, this represents how the indigenous people of Riau perceives its relationship and identity in regards of the State of Indonesia.
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<th>Text</th>
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| 00:48:44-00:48:55 | Aris    | [00:48:44] Mr. Ilyas: So according to you, what you bring is [pointing to the paper] the companies which are/  
[00:48:44] Mr. Aris: The companies in the palm oil. The one who gives permits is the government, isn’t it Pak, but there is no IUP.  
[00:48:53] Mr. Ilyas: Who is the biggest group?  
[00:48:55] Mr. Aris: ENIKDA [Mr. Ilyas: Huh], THE PROTECTED FOREST WAS ALL GONE swept by him. Yesterday, Ade Plantation Ltd [pointing finger to the air], how many burning he was, brought, to what / what / Supreme Court. He won, because he has a lot of money, the community, becomes the victim while pointing to Muchlis [some of the audience clapping hands] ... |
| 00:48:55 | Aris    | Well this our governor is still many Pak / if he’s not able to be a governor, replace with the kids who are.. good. [audience clapping hands] I was fed up with Riau Pak / honestly Pak. [audience laughing] Although I am a native of Riau / but I am FED UP with Riau ... |
| 00:49:45-00:50:46 | Aris    | [00:49:45] Mr. Ilyas: So what has become of the forest in Riau after being transformed to palm oil?  
[00:49:50] Mr. Aris: The forest Pak, in fact/ what forest/ peat forests should not be surrounded by channels Pak. Peatland forests should not be surrounded by channels / but THE PERMIT WAS GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT! Both the central government and local government! Finally the drain happens. The peat Pak, if it’s not being surrounded by channels / she does not dry / even when she’s burnt, even with a ton of oils, it will not be lit.  
[00:50:15] Mr. Ilyas: Because it’s wet inside / [00:50:17] Mr. Aris: Yes, because it’s wet. |

Aris’ opposition to the channels is similar to Chanee Kalaweit’s. Both argue that the governments’ intervention will only make the forest more vulnerable to future fire. Aris’ viewpoint, however, is unique because he also sees that while the channels are seemingly built to help eradicate the fires, the companies are the ones who benefit from this treatment. Aris’ sceptic sensitivity seems to be rooted on his firm belief in the government’s corruption.
[00:50:18] Mr. Ilyas: But because it’s surrounded by channels [Mr. Aris: Surrounded by channels/] it dries out /
[00:50:21] Mr. Aris: Dries out.
[00:50:23] Mr. Ilyas: What is the use of the canals, Pak /
[00:50:25] Mr. Aris: Because this palm oil needs , to d/ do what, to get in there that the seeds must use a canal ... So the fault is on the government’s itself Pak. That was because the ATM, companies provide the ATM Pak ...
[00:50:46] Mr. Ilyas: ATM is indeed ATM , (they) are taking your money. [audience laughing]

00:50:50-00:51:29 Aris

[00:50:50] Mr. Aris: That’s how it goes, Mr. Karni [Mr. Ilyas: Right/] what I what / what I know. So we, were very-very/ I as the chairman of the customary agency of Riau’s Melayu, if necessary the central government does not think, especially Ibu Siti Nurbaya, how many times I have conveyed to Siti / Mrs. / Nurbaya. By email, by phone. She still rambles. WHAT KIND OF Minister is she, rambling around [audience laughing] ... That’s not what’s expected, she should have seen, when the smoke was coming, she stood in the middle of the smoke. Pak Jokowi did the same thing. Should not have just rambled around on the television.

[00:51:27] Mr. Ilyas: Did not Mr. Jokowi come.

Once again Aris points to the central government and the Minister’s neglect and her “rambling”. And once again the audience laughs. When Aris points out that the president also “rambles around on the television”, Ilyas confronts his statement.

Aris’ wish is that Jokowi goes to the forest, which the president did in fact. Aris hope that the President empathize with the people’s suffering and shame how he represents the of messianic hope and victimhood. However, once again it appears that the ultimate concern to Aris is the
[00:51:29] Mr. Aris: Yes (he) came Pak only to the airstrip did not do anything / better don’t [audience laughing in the background] ... Better don’t / only on the airstrip Pak. Go into the forests, only then he would know, how hard it is for the people, who can, even to breathe in is difficult. How much/ the people err of Malaysia yesterday, they went back Pak, to their hometowns, because of the smoke. The saddest thing is, there is an investor who came bringing, called Suryanto Bakrie, because of the smoke he could not, land on, in what, in / in Riau. Finally that investor went back home Pak, by pompong (a small passenger wooden boat carrying around 20 people on board) [audience laughing in the background], Pak, to Malaysia. By pompong / imagine it yourself, aboard on a pompong. Because it was no longer possible to land in Pekanbaru. So the eco- the local economy of the people of Riau was indeed fooled around by the central government.

00:53:24 Ilyas

Before the others. Pak, why it is perceived that the handling of the haze is slow. Meaning the smoke has already there for long before .. there was a response, both from the central and from the local (government).

00:54:02- 01:00:17 Purwonugroho (National Agency for Disaster)

Purwonugroho spends a good 8 minutes to defend himself and his department (BNPB) against Ilyas’ questions. The first question is: “Why is it perceived the “investor” and the “economy of the people of Riau.”
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<td>01:02:10</td>
<td>Unidentified person</td>
<td>[01:02:10] Unknown: Thank you, Bang Karni, whom we respect. Actually at this event we're looking for solutions are we not, Mr. Karni. It is not for listening to useless rant. Telling people having no brain and so on is not right Brother Karni. We know Mr. Governor, Mr. Danrim, Mr. Police Chief Mr. Karni do not sleep, we are necessary to respond to Aris’ allegations. He doesn’t blame anyone, he doesn’t state any victim, but he sounds as if he is defending himself and the central government and deflect all the attacks toward the local government instead. He challenges anyone (Aris in particular) who doubts the Central’s efforts and invite them to “join the helicopter”, which is in fact impossible for the people with no political position. His narrative is filled with technical terms with the emphasis on the amount of work the central government’s agency has done. His statements also have a hierarchism tone in it, which can be summarised as: The central government has done everything it can as a higher level of the hierarchy, so the sluggishness lies on the local government. The unidentified person is allowed by Ilyas to spontaneously speak in response to Aris’ allegations. By his statement, he seems to represent a department in Riau’s government. He perceives “this event”’s aim to find solutions and Aris’</td>
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<td>Response representative</td>
<td>handling of the haze is slow, that the smoke has already there for long before there was any response?” The second question is about whether there is a complex bureaucracy or not. On the third question, Ilyas gives up to chase the central government ‘s weakness on the response and blame the local government: “No, because someone said this Pak, what is the harm of the local government to be quicker to declare an emergency, why should be sluggish / to be so extensive, so to speak of how the people think;”</td>
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know that. Likewise, the allegations that had been accused by this brother of ours, that BNPB deceived the public, it’s incredible – the salt, the helicopter flew Bang Karni. So we are suspicious, in fact who are the brainless Bang Karni. [audience laughing in the background] Did he ever go to Riau during this haze. To my knowledge, he resides in Jakarta. The same as me / I am the Head of Riau Government’s Liaison Agency in Jakarta / Anytime Mr. Governor went to Jakarta, I must have certainly accompanied (him) for meetings anywhere. It includes the last meeting led by the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security in the Ministry of Madam Siti Nurbaya. So it’s not true. Madam Minister was awesomely not sleeping Mr. Karni we know it / Every second, every moment she was called by the President. The President is also concerned about the Riau smoke [Mr. Ilyas: Right]. Thank you Bang Karni.

critiques as “useless rant”. However, the title of ILC’s session clearly isn’t aimed to find a solution, but who to blame.

He bases his argument on how the “governor, Danrim, Police Chief” and later “Ibu Minister” do not sleep and that the BNPB “flew the helicopter”. The words “incredible” and “awesomely” in describing the government’s response colour his statements. He points out that Aris is the one who has no brain instead, without stating Aris’ name. Then he tells how he “must have certainly” accompanied Riau’s governor.

The person’s rebuttal is fulfilled by names of the highest level government officials to whom he feels he relates to.

I want to say this, actually the context told by Pak Dharmawi is like this, if Pak Sutopo the BNPB, he focuses on extinguishing the fire, from the emergency preparedness to the emergency response. Pak Liaison says so. The Local Government has forgotten the people Mr. Karni. The governors, regents, including BNPB, they have forgotten the people. They are too
busy putting out the fire. Is that wrong / certainly not / but the people is forgotten / For example, err the masks that were distributed to the people / the least decent masks. Surgical mask. So yes / surgical mask, Mr. Karni. The posts, the posts of the seven spots which we monitored for the four days, they were also not capable. Some have oxygen, some have none. I want to say, the government has forgotten the people. Busy extinguishing the fire / I don’t know, why just busy putting out the fire / though if it was really an emergency response, the people must also be concerned. That is the first /

| 01:03:38-01:11:28 | Ali  |

Ali introduces a terminology to identify a collective of people to blame: “Cukong”. Cukong is defined by the “financiers, people who have a lot of money, the ones behind the screen, whom we found in the field Mr. Karni, the cukongs may take forms as the police, and the “Army” and “the councillors” who pay the poor to burn. Cukong is defined as different with “the corporation, Industrial Plantation Forest and the palm oil corporations.

Ali also names the palm oil plantation, which is once again the Malaysian company Ade Plantation Ltd. “Cukong” according to The Great Dictionary of Indonesian (KBBI) translates to “the capital owner”. However, the history of the term is neglected in the State-defined definition. Cukong is derived from the Chinese Hokkian word “主公” which originally means a leader, chief, owner, or a boss of a company. However, since the former President Soeharto rose to power in 1960s, the word becomes loaded with derogatory meaning. The Historical Dictionary of Indonesia defines “Cukong” as “A Chinese businessman who receives protection and privilege from a powerful, often
Then Ali once again points out that the government is to be blamed because of its “neglect” and “silence” in the justice process.

Cukong’s successes are associated with the State’s patronage and it is said that “all or most successful Chinese businessmen were cukong for some degree”. Cukong were a major target of racial-based resentment and hostility in various riots in Indonesia both during and in post-Soeharto regime (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 98). For further reading on Cukong, see Choy (1993) p. 286-318.

Even though Ali redefines cukong by his own definition, Ali has resurrected the racial and class-loaded term that has deep root in the Indonesian’s memory.

Munhur Satyahaprabu (Law & Policy Manager of National WALHI) 01:11:35-01:15:25 WALHI and “other friends and other civil societies” mobilised “all abilities to put out the fires” since 1997-1998. BNPB’s efforts do not address the underlying “structural problem”, which consists the policy and law enforcement and the inexistent permit review. Satyahaprabu sees that the business of “looking for the perpetrators” is deliberately created to point the blame to “the farmers and the communities”. He critiques that military, patron in exchange for business assistance and/or share of the profits.” Cukong’s successes are associated with the State’s patronage and it is said that “all or most successful Chinese businessmen were cukong for some degree”. Cukong were a major target of racial-based resentment and hostility in various riots in Indonesia both during and in post-Soeharto regime (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 98). For further reading on Cukong, see Choy (1993) p. 286-318.

In this section, Satyahaprabu addresses the “structural problem” mainly by the perspective of law. He emphasis the huge figures (of the respiratory tract victims, the land owned by the concessions, the amount of alleged corporations who are submitted to the the Ministry, etc.).
instead of solving the “structural problem”, the government limits itself to only firefighting efforts.

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Speaker &amp; Actor</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
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| 01:16:13-01:16:34 | Ilyas & Satyahaprabu | [01:16:13] Mr. Ilyas: If the permit is revoked, then the land is given to whom?  
[01:16:18] Mr. Satya: The land is/  
[01:16:19] Mr. Ilyas: Would it not become another new project?  
[01:16:21] Mr. Satya: The land is the State’s, Bang. [Mr. Ilyas: Yes] The permits are of the land/  
[01:16:24] Mr. Ilyas: But it can be a palm oil plantation can’t it. Once it is .. it is.. the permit is revoked, probably it would be given out to [inaudible] another.  
[01:16:34] Mr. Satya: Well, if the question is like so then actually it would be answered by the Act 32, that the sanctions were not only revocation, but (also) recovery, *the functional (recovery) of the environment*, but also, [Mr. Ilyas: That] what it's called [Mr. Ilyas: There are actually the fines actually] Yeah, there are fines, there is the corporate responsibility there. Not only some sanctions are given, but the other sanctions are not. In fact it was accommodated in/ [inaudible]  |
| 01:16:34 | Ilyas | [01:17:04] Mr. Ilyas: Actually all that is performed by our employees in the civil law, it is the responsibility of  |

Once again the speaker represents the ambivalent view toward the State. The “functional recovery” of the environment requires the government’s accountability, of which Satya distrusts on the earlier statements.

Ilyas eliminates the ones following “the order” from the perpetrator-victim relationship.
the ones who give the order. So if our driver collided with a person, it is our responsibility to take care of the person who got hit earlier. And I think this also applies to the case of forest fires. The people are harmed in the forms of ART illness earlier, the livelihood gone, maybe he cannot do business / it is in fact the civil liability of the companies involved in the forest fires / we break for a moment.

The illustration of the owner of the car who pays for the driver’s fault eliminates the responsibility of the driver. In other word, Ilyas shields the perceived victims (the commoners) and see them as undisputedly, morally right.

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<tr>
<td>01:18-19:48</td>
<td>Dr. Susanto (Secretary General of the Association of Physicians Pulmonary Indonesia)</td>
<td>Susanto is asked to “predict” the health of Riau people nowadays, of which he doesn’t clearly answer. Instead, Susanto explains in length the definition of poor air quality and its impact to the respiratory health. The lengthy speech is filled with medical terms. Susanto doesn’t answer Ilyas question, signifying his detachment from the health and social condition of the population. Instead, he only explains the theory of respiratory problem like a lecturer. This is probably an unconscious process, that Dr. Susanto presumed that the audience expects him to be an objective and scientific expert regarding position as a high-level medical official.</td>
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| 01:23-21 | Ilyas, Dr. Susanto                                                         | [01:23:16] Mr. Ilyas: Is that what was experienced by Pak Muchlis’s child earlier?  
[01:23:21] Dr. Susan: I cannot say if that’s the case, because the examination should be done in person, shouldn’t it, but the pathophysiology of the process due to smoke would be like so? Well, it would be the case  
Ilyas redirects his question to the concrete example that stands in front of him. |
for the normal people / there are indeed some people who have a high risk, like the children yeah, who rare under 12 years of age or elderly above 60 years / because the mechanism of the system /

Ilyas asks two questions about the consequences of poor air quality for babies and the probability of cancer, to which Dr. Susanto answers.

Ilyas’ posits the doctor as the medical knowledge expert, who the people can trust without question. He represents the earlier speakers’ questions and challenges about health issues.

Charliyan opens his session with the Islamic greetings “Assamualaikum Wr. Wb.”. He then apologises on behalf of the regional directors and states his sympathy to the local people affected and his condolences to Muchlis. Then he jokes: “Then yeah, talking about fire, so maybe if we burn a fish, burn a cassava it would be tasty, but if (we) burn the land, it makes all of us harmed even that becomes our problem today.” Then he explains in length the statistics of burning and how the POLRI is “very serious in dealing with this problem” by handling 184 cases and arresting 78 people, 73 of which are the members of the public and 9 from the companies.

Charliyan explains in length about the acts and penalties being used against the companies who burn. However,
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<td>01:28:19</td>
<td>There are three “causes from the report in the field”. First is the economic problems. There is no clear meaning of “these people”. However, the rationale implies that they are traditional farmers who do slash-and-burn in agriculture. The “cultural problems” are actually a customary, indigenous one. Many NGO activists defend the customary slash-and-burn method of the indigenous communities, saying that the fires are usually controlled and only done in small scale. The customary slash-and-burn, however, might have become uncontrollable because of the ban from the government. The indigenous communities, fear...</td>
<td>01:28:19</td>
<td>Then about the cause, from the reports in the field, the economic problems. Because like was said earlier, it is cheaper. So this is very efficient with burni...</td>
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| 01:28:19 | "Thi/ third non-availability or omission, from the companies, the communities, and government, and say the experts there is excessive draught. Because there are the canals, which causes the fire. That is also true, then the lack of socialisation. Because this is continuously repeated, but why it happens continuously, and the sanction regulations are not strict enough. Because / beg your pardon, in Malaysia there are also peat companies which are not burning, only in Indonesia / well maybe this needs the socialisation of strict regulations, both criminal-wise and administrative."

Charliyan’s sentence here is grammatically ambiguous. What is he trying to tell us here? First, “non-availability” of the companies, communities, and the government. Second, “there is excessive draught because there are canals”. Third, “the lack of socialisation”. Fourth, “the sanction” and “regulations are not strict enough” because “in Malaysia” there are no such thing as forest burning. Then his solution is “socialisation of strict regulations”.

| 01:28:19 | "Then about the efforts done by the POLRI, POLRI has made efforts /’ve sent 70 special investigators from the POLRI Headquarter. They are qualified on Tipiter (The Police’s Response Unit for Specific Crime) [Audience clapping hands] and of Brimob has been deployed 700, then other troops 4,512, and in each province close to the fire zone, it is obliged, ordered by the Chief of Police, by the President, to send one SSK force (company unit consisting 90 people). So when in this case beg your pardon, Bapak President does not care, Pak Chief of POLRI does not care, perhaps we need to"

Here Charliyan lists the big figures involved from his view, which invite the audience's applause.
inform that these are the POLRI’s effort, alright/ the POLRI’s effort and I think the efforts of us all. And then err about the loss perhaps we know ourselves, that loss / yesterday we got a report that for Riau alone it is said to be nearly 20 trillion. 22 trillion. For Jambi 2.5 trillion / so it is immense that may be counted for later. That is just the material loss / not included of the immaterial loss, such as the health and other things. And then the other loss is our image. Because we know we are also one of the exporters of smoke/

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<th>After Ilyas tells his meeting with the Ambassador of Singapore, who complaint about the annual smoke:</th>
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<td>[01:31:55] Mr. Charliyan: This is what is needed to be anticipated. There is a loss already, a loss, then fire, then err what else / there is (someone) who burns the situation (make provocation, getting the situation heated), then there is another, who burns hearts, what else, opinions are burnt, eventually it would be inflamed right, so here eventually pointing each other, searching for a black goat (kambing hitam, scapegoat in Indonesian). Nowadays a black goat is rather expensive, because tomorrow is Eid Hajj, is not it [audience laughing in the background] Well / so here (it) needs to be anticipated. Probably we should not</td>
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search for a scapegoat, let alone this smoke is so hard (making it all hard), perhaps we all /

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<td>01:32:34-01:33:19</td>
<td>[01:32:34] Mr. Ilyas: If I may know, who are the companies alleged?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[01:32:37] Mr. Charliyan: O, lots bang Karni, the companies like what was delivered by Pak Chief of Kapolri, have been announced /</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[01:32:44] Mr. Ilyas: Yes but the compan / that was only the initials</td>
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<td>[01:32:47] Mr. Charliyan: Excuse me Bang Karni, because we have regulations about the public disclosure, where there are things that need to be kept confidential, including about the suspects so that POLRI should use initials. So then if we do it we would immediately get</td>
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<td>[01:33:04] Mr. Ilyas: I think of the whole world there’s no suspect that is described only by initials.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[01:33:07] Mr. Charliyan: There is Pak, in the public disclosure regulations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[01:33:09] Mr. Ilyas: No, in al / in the world / in any country in the world the suspects.</td>
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Here lies the stark contrast between the treatment given to the alleged perpetrators done by the government apparatus and by the NGOs and community representatives. The Indonesian Police only states its suspects and proven offender by initials, hiding their faces from the public on the basis of the “legislation” of “confidentiality”. Ilyas challenges this tradition, pointing out that in such a way, the Police might become “picky”. Ilyas’ challenge hold some merit. Without publication, the public cannot act as a collective to, for instance, boycott or lodging complaint, or participate as witnesses against the companies or smallholders involved. Adding to Charliyan’s earlier statement of “no pointing fingers”, he implies that the power of justice should be held absolutely by the government, while the public and victims are supposed to be bystanders.
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<tr>
<td>01:33:14</td>
<td>Mr. Charliyan</td>
<td>But in Indonesia that is so, the legislations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>01:33:15</td>
<td>Mr. Ilyas</td>
<td>Yes it makes (you) being picky Pak [audience laughing hard in the background]</td>
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<tr>
<td>01:33:17</td>
<td>Mr. Charliyan</td>
<td>We're (only) the implementers of the legislation so / [while laughing]</td>
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<tr>
<td>01:33:19</td>
<td>Mr. Ilyas</td>
<td>There are some who are named, there are some who are only in initials.</td>
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Azlaini Agus 01:33:30

er Riau in 2007-2008 had zero, Pak Karni, [inaudible]. Because at that time the police chief of Riau, Sutjiptadi, he firmly told all corporations in Riau, that if there is fire, he will not crack down the arsonists, but asked for the responsibility of the corporations. It was calm, at that time. What does it mean, the assertiveness of the regional police chief / Pak regional police chief should not be sitting close to the businessmen who burn the land. Our hearts are hurt, the people’s. Our hearts are hurt because the people know it is the companies. So do not be too friendly, treating the businessmen as golden children / who / the people know that it is the companies who burn the land, looting timber, alright / So have some manner. / / I guess Sutjiptadi’s duty was not long in Riau / because people who enforce the law such as him would not be popular in the police, Pak. He also

Agus’ speech here is wealthy of social representations.

1. The 2007-2008 former police chief targeted the corporations, not the arsonists. In that way, the fires are totally quelled. According to Agus, the Police Chief holds the greatest influence in the recurrence of fire. The “assertiveness” is the opposite of “sitting close to the businessmen” and treating the businessmen as “golden children”.

2. Agus’ rhetoric is constructed as a broken-hearted member of the public. “Our hearts are hurt, the people’s. Our hearts are hurt” because “the people know it is the companies”. She also
did not get good promotion, but the people of Riau remember him eternally. Eternally that during 2007-2008 there was NULL forest fire, why, because there was the decisive attitude of the police chief.

rebuked Charliyan: “Have some manner”.

3. Agus’ speech ends with a common Indonesian tragic narrative for any honest and brave government official.

01:34:43 Charliyan
[01:34:43] Mr. Charliyan: Right, thank you. He was / was probably one of the best sons of ours / so I am also here to rectify. One of the classification of cukongs were the police. The police is an institution. TNI (the Army), the Army and the others / so please this is also rectified / because that is an institution. If (you are stating) the police it means accusing the police as a whole. It was proven by Ibu, that one of our best sons, Brigadier General Sutjiptadi / was able to act decisively like so. But I hope, this decisive action is also done by all. Just like in Malaysia. So / like that, both from the legal sanctions or administrative sanctions /

Charliyan tries to defend the Police by practicing a classic mechanism that avoids collective/ institutional responsibility by attributing the fault to individuals (Indonesian: “oknum”). But he also attributes the praise to the police as a collective to an individual. And he “hopes” that the “decisive action” is “done by all” just like in Malaysia. However, his next solution is “legal sanctions or administrative sanctions” and not the character of the Police as an institution itself as asserted by Agus, which is the non-compromising, impartial attitude and the assertiveness.

01:35:58 Mrs. Agus: Because there are police individual (oknum) who are verdicted Pak. Verdicted with final decision (of the court).

[01:36:04] Mr. Charliyan: Those are individuals. I agree with Ibu’s words. And we will surely fire him /

Here the debate gets heated. In the end Charliyan uses the “freedom” and military rhetoric again which is illogical and has far relation with the issue being talked about. He basically says, “We cannot blame the Police as an institution because this Police fought for our freedom.”
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<tr>
<td>01:36:06</td>
<td>Mrs. Agus</td>
<td>Yes those are police individuals here, Pak. No need for Bapak to get offended, it is a fact.</td>
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<td>01:36:10</td>
<td>Mr. Ilyas</td>
<td>Right /</td>
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<td>01:36:11</td>
<td>Mr. Charliyan</td>
<td>Not / [audience clapping hands while laughing] But do not say it is the police, Bu. Because this police is the Police of the State of the Republic of Indonesia. It's different Bu, who also fought for our freedom (merdeka) [Mr. Ilyas: Good], alright Bu, so /</td>
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<tr>
<td>01:37:04</td>
<td>Supri (representative of the Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires)</td>
<td>&quot;Well, I want to underline a bit what was expressed by Pak Al-Azhar earlier about ... err ... the tenurial imbalance, yeah, that was identified as the source of the fire problems etc. (...) in the area of open access there arise illegal activities there. Illegal encroachment, illegal logging, fires etc. Because what / the motivation is very clear. When we speak / when we do things that are illegal, there are no moral obligations for ourselves, yeah, to be responsible to the activities outlined by the government / the rules of the game, yeah / no burning policy, not burning etc. / none. Well I want to start this discussion from this point, yeah / because secondly, the problem last year I had reminded (you) about the spatial planning. (...) Meaning this issue of fire, with all due respect cannot FULLY be burdened to the corporations. Because of what, we are equally responsible.</td>
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responsible in there, Bang Karni, right/ we are equally responsible in there." “

Then Supri goes on to challenge Ali’s allegations that the fires happen in the concession areas.

| [01:40:51] Mr. Supri: | There is an annual AWP permit, granted by the provincial forestry office, yeah, he’ll certainly plant there, yeah. If the fires occur in the area of the AWP, yeah/ please report to the police, yeah. But if the fire happens outside his AWP / in regards of the planting (activity) / earlier it was like this Pak, the AWP is given annually, yeah, the assumption is that it is burnt this year then only by the next year (the company) plants, yeah. Please check the AWP map Pak, yeah, so that my argument can be clarified. |
| [01:41:28] Mr. Ilyas: | What is AWP? |
| [01:41:35] Mr. Ali: | There is what is called a self-profile in the annual work plan, it was certified by besides/ if the office chief would not certify, the company can certify the AWP themselves. We found a fact that in 2013 the company / 2014 was on fire. It is sizeable / within the concession. Well it is sure to be in the |

This dialogue represents the logic of the companies’ defence against allegations, by stating their backing (the government), and how the NGO would counter it by stating the field evidence.

Supri tries to defend the corporations by using the administrative reasons. His logic says, “If the fires did not happen inside the companies’ annual planned areas, the companies cannot be blamed”. Ali challenges back that the annual plan is a formality, which does not necessarily need a government official’s approval. Then he proceeds to challenge Supri, stating that he has the aerial photographs as the proof.

Supri cannot reply Ali’s challenge.
concession. In the AWP. Because the company is responsible for the concession.

[01:42:02] Mr. Supri: Wait wait, wait a minute, Pak. In the concession or in the AWP.

[01:42:05] Mr. Ali: In the concession and in the AWP.

[01:42:04] Mr. Supri: Well, HOLD ON

[01:42:06] Mr. Ali: Yes I have not finished. I have not finished, you asked me for clarification before. Yes, you / listen first. Well on the year 2014 it was burnt immensely. On 2015 August we went there. it was already covered / covered yeah / by plants / we have the drone Pak Karni / if (you) want to see it now I will show you. If we want to display it on / on / on the television, yeah, well, the / land burnt was already grown. There were shrubs, there were trees. It was cleared, land-cleared. It was about to be planted by the Industrial Plantation Forest (company). Of course it was in the AWP. The end.

[01:42:50] Mr. Aris: What happened in Riau, the forest release for plantation is not clear Pak. It is not clear at all. The forest release. Beg your pardon, this is the report of the (Ministry of) Forestry. 80% has no release at all. Never been taken care of / even more the IUP, while the corporations use their government-issued permits as their first line of defence, Aris critiques that the permit release itself is corrupt. The corporations and the government officials are seen as one corrupt co-existence, while the legislations
Plantation Permit for Businesses. So, it’s like it’s free for all. What have our country become to?

[01:43:23] Mr. Ilyas: Hey, because of that, it should be illegal shouldn’t it [Mr. Aris: Yes, who says it was legal], meaning that both the regents, both the regents and the authorities are allowed to act.

[01:43:37] Mr. Aris: Because of this Pak, the ATM / the ATM for the regents, the former regents Pak, this is the ATM. All the regents in Riau Palm oil plantation, including the officials and the STARS (military officials) IN JAKARTA, I SHOW (YOU) LATER PAK. [audible audience chatting in the background] There are cooperatives which / which are backed by the stars in the central Pak. I know it Pak, I have been travelling to the regions.

[01:44:07] Mr. Ilyas: By backed you mean he violated, later when it is investigated by the police, the backer comes, then it’s finished. [Audience laughter in the background]

[01:44:14] Mr. Aris: Yes, right. It is finished Pak. It is like that in Riau Pak. Riau is like that Pak. So Riau is very sad looking. Indeed from the beginning, until now, truly being discriminated (dianaktirikan - treated as if it is a step-child) by the central. The Minister of Forestry, (represented by the Parliaments) are seen as neglectful. Here the discourse of central vs. Riau is also enacted, with the keyword “step-child” and “discriminated”.
At that time it was Zulkifli Hasan, he did the same. Peatland was not allowed (to be given to any). But in reality it was given. That was Zulkifli Hasan. What the hell is that? He himself was at the time of stitching Pak, the incidents of stitching. People stitched their lips in [inaudible] there. Were there any members of Parliament who saw it? Not even a single one (seekor – a single animal)!

01:45:30 Mr. Martono: (...) Right thank you Pak Karni, first of all I also would like to express my sympathy and condolences to the daughter of Bapak Muchlis, upon her passing, and err, as well as...

perhaps I need to explain Pak Karni with the noise that the err palm oil plantation companies err here become the / accused who burn lands for oil palm plantations. We need to say first that we have branches in 12 provinces, Pak, with a total acreage of our branches of 3.9 million hectares, with the members numbering to 663 companies. All palm oil plantations in Indonesia cover 10.9 million hectares. Err so the members GAPKI have about 35% of the total area of palm oil plantations in Indonesia. Well, secondly, Pak, we also need to know, that until now, the palm oil

Martono’s speech is initiated by stating his condolences to the consensual victim presents, Muchlis. However, the fact that he rushes to his next point and leaves the condolences unfinished implies that this is only a lip-service.

The main victim in the discourse, introduced by Martono, is the palm oil plantations. He defends his association GAPKI by stating that they only hold 35% of the total area of the plantations and thus implies that the rest 65% are the ones mainly responsible. He also defends the palm oil industry by trying to impress the audience with the amount of foreign exchange produces by the industry.
industry in Indonesia, it annually contributes, 20 billion US Dollar.

[01:47:06] Mr. Ilyas: For what

[01:47:06] Mr. Martono: The Foreign Exchange Pak, generating foreign exchange. 20 billion US Dollar. Even, Pak, for the first half, yeah, the first half of 2015, the contribution of the palm oil industry in Indonesia amounted to 9.75 billion US dollars. It was the first half of 2015. Yeah. Then put it this way, Pak Karni.

[01:47:33] Mr. Ilyas: I think that is not our focus Pak. [Mr. Martono: Yeah, look?] But who burns our forests. [Mr. Martono: Right, Pak Karni] Even though there is the foreign exchange but at the cost of burning the forest, the people would not accept?

Ilyas stops Martono and reminds him that the forest is the cost being paid here and that “the people would not accept”.

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<td>01:47:43-01:50:06</td>
<td>Martono</td>
<td>Therefore we (need to) look here, Pak Karni. Of the fires in oil palm plantations, from GAPKI members, there are 14 companies. With a total area of 2,900 ha, in which the plasma which is burning is 1,000 ha, and the main which is burning is 1,900 ha. And this is all, for only 100 ha is not planted, all the total before are planted, Pak Karni. Well this is why I had to say, is it true that the palm oil companies burn their own assets. What is there, obviously that is a production machine, (how come) he burns it. Then earlier it was Martono explains the “economic logic” of why the GAPKI members would never burn their concessions. First, he explains that one ha of land-clearing only needs Rp 6 million (420 USD, 640 NZD) and thus its illogical that the corporations would take the risk of permit revocation just to save money.</td>
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associated to the problem of economy. You see, Pak. To clear a palm oil land mechanically, the per hectare cost is 6 million. By mechanical, the mechanization. From the total cost from the start of planting, until the harvest, it's 60 to 70 million per hectare. So it is only about 10%. Then if we save 6 million per hectare, with the risks so great, meaning that once found out that they are burning, it was incredible, Pak / the permit (could be) revoked. Then the penalties would not be um tens to hundreds of billions even. Is it true that the palm oil companies would be that ridiculous? Because with burning it needs only 6 million per hectare for land clearing Pak.

[01:49:31] Mr. Ilyas: That is from the parties who sue ... the businessmen, if it is burned, it is only 5 million. But if it's done by err what / mechanical earlier, it could be 50-60 million.

[01:49:53] Mr. Martono: Oo it is not Pak Karni, so look, so for mechanization, it is only the clearing. Pak / I speak about land clearing. Only land-clearing alright Pak, the land-clearing here costs 6 million per hectare.

[01:50:05] Mr. Ilyas: It already uses mechanization?

[01:50:06] Mr. Martono: Already use excavators, bulldozers, it is 6 million. So it feels a bit strange yeah if the companies dare to burn, on purpose, in order to
save 6 million per hectare. Well, I give an example.

Yeah Pak Karni, that in, in, ie, these GAPKI members who are burnt, the maximum, which I, from the report data coming through, the 400 hectares is burned. Say it has no plants Pak, it burned on purpose. 6 million multiplied by 400 is only 2.4 billion. Meanwhile, the consequence Pak, the permit would be revoked.

While Martono states that the companies are prevented to burn because of the fear of the permit revocation, there is only a single company who has received an administrative sanction at the time. In reality, the permit revocation is only discoursed as a potential punishment but has not been implemented at the moment. Hence Martono tries to conjure a false image of the companies’ responsibility to the public.

Martono perceives that because the threat of punishment is severe, it’s impossible that the companies “dare” to burn.

He also cites the data from the Global Forest Watch, a non-governmental organisation who...
since the beginning. Well then then fire data which I based on the Global Forest Watch, yeah, per 21 September 2015, these fires that are beyond the concession are 67%. While the fires that are in the oil palm concession are 8% Pak. This is the data from the Global Forest Watch. That is Pak. 

[01:51:54] Mr. Ilyas: So it is a very small percentage that is owned by the businessmen, but outside the ownership of the companies/

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<td>01:53:49-01:54:45</td>
<td>Aris</td>
<td>I would like a little clarification Pak. What was told by Bapak from, from the Agricultural Pak / This is the letter from the Agricultural Pak. An authentic data from the Agricultural. [Mr. Ilyas: Yeah?] On the problems described by Bapak, on the subject of PT Tunggal Prakasa Plantation. Here happens [knocking the table] a harassment, altogether. Actually the Agricultural department is also not right Pak. This is the evidence. The evidence Pak. This, whose name is Suwandi, the Acting Deputy of Payroll and Countermeasures. This Pak, what I say to PRI at that time.</td>
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[01:54:29] Mr. Ilyas: Which Bapak’s statement are you arguing at

gather and visualise NASA’s data of fire spots globally. This data exists.

Aris cuts Ilyas who wants WALHI representative Satyaphrabu to answer Martono. Here Aris takes one example of “harassment” and states the name of the company. However, it’s not clear what’s he arguing against. Aris is just saying names and state that their data is not synchronous.
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<tr>
<td>01:54:31</td>
<td>Mr. Aris:</td>
<td>Well, what is argued is that what was spoken about forest and agricultural problem are unbalanced Pak. This is the evidence.</td>
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<td>01:54:41</td>
<td>Mr. Ilyas:</td>
<td>Not synchronous, you mean</td>
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<tr>
<td>01:54:44</td>
<td>Mr. Aris:</td>
<td>Not synchronous, right. That is all, thank you.</td>
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<td>01:54:46</td>
<td>Satya</td>
<td>Thank you Bang. I'll clarify about the problem of open access yeah, let’s not err, we, are distorted/what/about what is called as open access. So in one of my statement at the beginning, that, the open access, whether it is outside the permit. My / our data states that the open access also occurs in the licensed territories. Hence the importance of permit audit, yeah, the open access can be / look Bang, a company has hundreds of thousands, concessions. But he is only able to manage 50,000. This means that there is 70% yeah 60% that he doesn’t manage properly. This is open access in nature. It is actually the responsibility of whom / of course it is the concessionaires. The standpoint of PP45, if I’m not wrong yeah / 2004 says that the permit holder is responsible. Open access was whose creation? Of course the permit holder. Hence the importance of the open access that is / what / said should not create a stigma that the people is the one burning on the open access.</td>
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</table>
access lands. It is actually in the permitted regions.

First, confirm that. Second, about the denial that GAPKI, err no company burns. There is one instance that is VERY plain and has been verificd. In Aceh. PT Kalwista Nature. Proven. And fined 300 billion. Verdicted. Even more is it Pak? Yeah, this over than 300 billion, yeah fined. This means that it is proved to be a company. And plainly. The fact is clear/ and in Riau also / although not been verificd / it is also proven. Like so. One on our record, that the land which is burning, that have a lot of what / smoke, where is it happening/ peatlands! Like so. Riau, the 6 million per hectare should be clarified, what type of land is it. Is it in peatlands? Or in regular land? Here there won’t ever be.. what was it call/ an interpretation that this is very cheap / It is not. Those / canals made to dry the peat are also expensive. Yes, that’s the fact. Until now 80% happen in peatland / So average the hotspots in Indonesia, mostly in Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, in Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, because they are peatlands. Alright / that has to be said.

01:57:41-01:58:46 Fadrizal Labay (Head of the Riau Provincial Forestry Office, representing the “Passing Pak Governor’s regards” who cannot be present because “he still works with the task force” etc. Then Labay defends the President by telling the story of him spending the night in Riau and gave birth to the

In this section, Labay functions as a defender for the government and its apparatus. He tells the story of what others have done to try returning the trust of the audience to the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>01:58:46</td>
<td>Labay</td>
<td>Labay “hope” that the smoke which has “caused a casualty for my good friend, Pak Muchlis” “must be immediately resolved by the local government” “with the support of the central government”.</td>
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<tr>
<td>02:02:55-02:03:12</td>
<td>Ilyas &amp; Labay</td>
<td>Ilyas points out that Labay has run out his time explaining about what happens and not what is being done by the Riau government as a measure of future prevention. Labay answers that he is “not there yet”. Only then Labay proceeds to explain the governor’s “plan of action” which includes “canal blocking, community empowerment, socialisation and so on and so forth (...) and law enforcement”. He states that “48 people” have been suspected plus “one corporation”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 02:04:23-02:05:20 | Ilyas & Labay | [02:04:23] Mr. Ilyas: So we can be sure that next year there won’t be this, smoke no more.  
[02:04:28] Mr. Labay: Well probably it can be believed that there won’t be smoke/ There was an information from my fellows Bang, if it is in Riau maybe we can |
minimize it. No smoke can be / but up to the dangerous levels we may be fifty-fifty. (We) cannot guarantee that tomorrow there won’t be air pollution, resulting in the non-dangerous air quality. It’s also relative isn’t it. Because there had been a shift to the southern part of the island of Sumatra, the emergence of many hotspots. [Inaudible] / In the latest conditions today, we say ... the hotspots are not in Riau but the smoke /

[02:05:10] Mr. Ilyas: Right, but in the earlier days in Riau /

[02:05:11] Mr. Labay: Yeah, in the earlier days well we admit, there was/

[02:05:14] Mr. Ilyas: 16, well now it has already extinguished to 3. [Mr. Labay: Alright alright that is it/] We do not know whether it will increase again tomorrow, do we.

[02:05:20] Mr. Labay: Well we do not know the future Bang.

<p>| 02::05:29 | Andra Sjafril (Chief Medical Officer of Riau Government) | “The Acting Governor of Riau” is “very intense” and “very concerned” to the air pollution due to the smoke. “There is no red on the calendar”. “Almost every day there is always something”. “even in the morning (...) he calls me.” | Like Labay, Sjafril acts as a defender of the governor and Riau’s task force. |</p>
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<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02:05:29</td>
<td>Sjafril</td>
<td>In the next part of his speech, Sjafril explains with broken grammar that “there are a rise in cases related to the five diseases caused by smoke in accordance with the Ministry of Health Policy” (...) and that “the masks distributed are cost-effective”. His further explanation does not seem to be logically comprehended. The discussion about the disease ends with: “Then regarding the err... my brother, I’ve said this for second time perhaps, err I’m very sorry, yeah, er he often has discussions with me. So because Bapak Acting Governor is very concerned, he even yeah Pak, came on Friday. I remember very much, came to his house, and asked me to find a way out.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:08:48</td>
<td>Sjafril</td>
<td>The information I received from the Managing Director / so the night I got an information that err the beloved daughter died, err I immediately contacted the president director of Arifin Ahmad Public Hospital, got an information / the information was found that err this beloved daughter was indeed suffered from respiratory failure due to comorbidities which is TB meningitis. TB</td>
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</table>

Sjafril explains what his department has done, which is “announcing” the five diseases caused by the smoke. He explains the distributed masks as “cost-effective”, which again use an economic term. However, the further talk about the masks does not seem to be logical. The grammar is so broken that it’s almost incomprehensible. I suppose the incomprehensible part is due to Sjafril’s attempt to correct his slip of tongue when he says that the masks were “cost effective”.

Sjafril, as the defender of the governor, emphasis his importance for the governor with “he often has discussions with me” and “he even came on Friday (to me) (...) to ask to find a way out”.

Sjafril prods the sensitive part of the discussion today by denying Muchlis’ victimhood discourse and putting the responsibility on Muchlis’ lack of care to his daughter. Muchlis would later confront Sjafril of his opinion.
meningitis with body weight/ so there was malnutrition as well.

[02:08:48] Mr. Ilyas: So Bapak mean it is not solely because of the smoke/

[02:08:50] Mr. Sjafril: Yes, not merely because it /

[02:08:52] Mr. Ilyas: Although the trigger may be smoke.

[02:08:53] Mr. Sjafril: Yes /

[02:08:53] Mr. Ilyas: Although the trigger may be smoke.

[02:08:55] Mr. Sjafril: Yes, yes.

02:08:57-02:10:51 Azhar

Azhar expresses his concern that the smoke problem is not the problem of Riau, but also the other districts. He tries to point out that the issue has been talked in mainly “economic” terms. He also expresses his doubt of the government’s promises “as if the smoke will be no more”.

Ilyas gives a seemingly unrelated comment:

[02:10:34] Mr. Ilyas: Well nobody says it, he said that it is not the corporations. [Mr. Azhar: Yes / meaning/]

[inaudible] who burn.

[02:10:41] Mr. Azhar: Yes, if so/

In this dialogue between Azhar and Ilyas, they seem to be pressed with time and their own agendas that each of them take different meaning from each other. Ilyas wants Azhar to “respond to” the earlier speakers representing the government (02:09:14). Azhar jumps out from Ilyas’ direction and talks about the “economic” way of thinking and his doubt of the government promises. Ilyas proceeds to speak about another thing, which is the blame that “the people outside the corporations” are the one to be blamed if the corporations do not assume the
[02:10:42] Mr. Ilyas: If /
[02:10:43] Mr. Azhar: who burn?
[02:10:45] Mr. Ilyas: Yes it means the people outside the corporations.
Azhar continues to question “our way of thinking” for “the economy or (…) the humanitarian issues, the people who inhale the smoke”. He ends the speech with, “Where is the State’s responsibility for the civilization?”

02:12:09-02:14:27 Kemal Anas (Complaints and Oversight Director of Administrative Sanctions of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry)
“Bu Minister, is on a trip to… South Kalimantan, then on Saturday also, err to Riau, it means that how concerned is err the leader of the Ministry of Environment toward err the countermeasures or .. the prevention of smoke in the territory of Indonesia… Err .. at the national level, that ehm there is already a task force for the land and forest fires control and security. Chaired by my Ibu Minister err LHK. Then .. along with BNPB, well, ranging from the … strengthening (…)”

Anas proceeds to talk about the amount of hotspots in the year compared to the last year’s and how the fire concentration has moved from Riau to the southern parts of Sumatera.

responsibility. Azhar again doesn’t proceed to reply to Ilyas’ comment, but points out the dichotomy between “the economy” and “the humanitarian issues”. He ends his speech with the question that puts the blame to the State instead.

Similar to the other government officials, Anas also begins his speech by praising his superior, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
Ilyas asks Anas: “Each year we experience this, and this year it is not getting smaller (…) what has the Forestry done?” Anas lists that “the first is ensuring that task force (…) are running (…) We also do the law enforcement”. He tells the audience that just on the day they have announced “three plantation companies whose permits are suspended” and “one IUPH (…) has been revoked”. He proceeds to tell the audience “the marathon job” done by the elite officials”, “until late in the evening”, “on half to three (Bu Minister) had discussions with the experts”.

Anas mentions the four companies by name. Ilyas confirms that this is the “very first time that somebody is revoked”.

Unlike the Police, Anas announced the alleged companies by their names. Answering Ilyas’ challenge about what has been done by the Ministry, Anas only responds normatively before he mentions the permit revocations.
statements of doctor Zeli (?) and Mr. Andra, as the Chief Medical Officer of Riau Province... I have forgiven, but tonight it (the matter forgiven) has been opened once again. The SOCIAL IMPACT to my life in Riau. Please help me Pak, I beg you, I beg... This is the voice of my heart! BY THE NAME OF ALLAH AND RASUL! I am a religious person and... have been religiously educated. I beg you, DO NOT say it. Time and time again... My late daughter in the grave, why had you talk like that? I have forgiven it in the newspaper I have... And I thank the government. With the Regional Health Insurance, they gave me a relief on the cost (of the daughter’s hospitalisation). Please Pak Andra.

[02:24:39] Mr. Ilyas: I think you can understand /

[02:24:40] Mr. Muchlis: Do not be pleased with/ with what you have said/ do not... Dear Allah, I pray that it won’t touch your families. I CANNOT EVEN IMAGINE, please... Thank you. Wassalamualaikum warrahmatullohi wabarakatuh.

[Audience: Wallaikumsalam]

[02:25:00] Mr. Ilyas: Right, continue Pak.

The ‘unblemished victim’ rhetoric is further amplified when Muchlis then exclaims that he is “a religious person and have been religiously educated”. This statement has no direct connection to what’s being talked about, but functions as a support for his credibility as the victim.

Muchlis then “thank the government” regarding the financial aid given to him. He only says so before rebounding again to his anger. He “prays”, but in his prayer lies a veiled curse that “it won’t touch your families.” He closes his statement with “I cannot even
imagine” which signifies his confusion that he, as a victim, still has to be held responsible to his daughter’s death, before eventually he says the Islamic closing remarks.

Throughout Muchlis’ second session, it is clear that his attitude is drastically different. He followed Ilyas’ prompts earlier, but now he interrupts Ilyas and does not allow Ilyas to guide the talk. He wasn’t given a chance to express his true feeling about his daughter’s death, and now he musters enough courage to cut the discourse dominated by high-level characters and speak his heart up to the public and the ruling officials.

Ilyas doesn’t seem pleased with it.

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<td>02:25:03</td>
<td>Ragin Utomo (Environment Ministry Director of Dispute Resolution)</td>
<td>“I witnessed before how the party here Sarumpaet invites all the people of Indonesia to see this smoke problem (…) with humility, with sympathy, with the willingness to introspect” because “there is a fatality”.</td>
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<td>02:29:21</td>
<td>Ratna Sarumpaet (“Social Media Activist”)</td>
<td>Sarumpaet is titled “social media activist”. The internet glorifies her as the “human rights activist” who has fallen and become more and more politically partial. Jurriens</td>
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complained about this thing, then from the State party, or associated with the State, eloquently said ooh (we’re) not even sleeping, even this, even that, even that, even that, even that, even that, even that/ … As if all have been done. Then the important question is HOW COME THE SMOKE IS STILL THERE THEN? [Audience clapping hands] .. Lest you haven’t done it as it should have been. Do not be proud of our notes records, the law enforcement have been this … there will be task force and so on and so on. But the smoke is crazy. And there are victims. Let us just show our sympathy with a willingness to do humble dialogue. Let's talk about this by / by heart. I want to start answering the question from the title of this show … who burns our forests. And I’m not going to run from a single answer, the State”

Although technically it was carried out either the people, either err what / corporations, either by barons, by whoever it is, but it remains that the one who has NO action, who makes the fire happens it is because the State is not present. The state is not present. Just start from the preamble. The duty of the state is to protect, to protect the entire nation ENTIRELY. So there is no exceptions / and including the culture, the civilization, preserved. When we invest / our country / we do not refuse investment. Of

(2009) calls her “the star-hero” (p. 85) based on her fondness of monologue and self-confirmation on her political radio show in 2001-2002.

Here Sarumpaet emphasis “humility, sympathy, and the willingness of introspect” because of “fatality”. She focuses her attention to the victims and critique the previous speakers’ focus on the self-praising stories. In the end, she puts the blame on the State.

Sarumpaet’s point is the absence and inaction of the state as he protector. She also implies the “investors” as “corrupt”. Then she talks about tax. In this passage, Sarumpaet mainly talks in the language of investment and profit before going back to the humanism on the next.
course we do not refuse, because logically it would not be possible / all is done by the people of Indonesia / But sowing, spreading the investment opportunities to the private (corporations), especially the foreign private or foreigners, foreign businessmen, should give a blessing for the people of Indonesia. [Audience clapping hands] Why should we invest then our investors have fun, and maybe corrupt / the corruptors get a little bit slighit, then how much our tax is, then the tax is taken where, and what is left for Riau. What is left for Jambi. (...) What is gained by the people when the investments, in which er what / the natural resources are exploited for profit. What has the people got. But becoming victims. Becoming victims [Audience clapping hands]. For me they are the victims.

I don’t know where we are going. Building a nation is to build a human life in its ful-fill-ness. The culture is there, the civilization there, all the wealth of humanity, that is what our country should have built. That is mandated by the preamble [emphasis] on us. That’s what we have to remind the PEOPLE in the House of Representatives [emphasis] what are you doing after all this time, that is what we have to remind Jokowi and all his cabinet. Do not talk about headache because (you) cannot sleep, (you) indeed should NOT SLEEP

Sarumpaet rebukes the speakers who boasts about the lack of sleep. She romanticises the past constitutions and antagonise the legislatives as well as other government officials.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02:36:12</td>
<td>Ilyas</td>
<td>All that has been said by Ibu Ratna Sarumpaet, in one sentence, Cicero, the Roman philosopher, the supreme law of a country, is the safety of its people. And it is “The safety of the people” as a priority of constitutions.</td>
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Widjojo’s introduction is an intelligent joke. He introduces himself as a “compressor” instead of professor. His session echoes his introduction as he provides a logically-structured explanation about the issue.

Firstly, he argues, “If now we are asking the responsibility of WHOM primarily fails to provide a GOOD and healthy environment, that is the STATE institution. Because now the CONSTITUTION is not running, it means the government is unconstitutional.”

Secondly, “in the perspective of criminal law”, Widjojo argues that the “environmental and humanitarian crime in this smoke issue is a crime of terrorism.” He proceeds to tell the history of the ecological terrorism act. He also explains why: “The mass casualties, meditated disruptions to vital objects, there are human casualties.” However, “since 2002” the smoke has not been perceived as a crime of terrorism.

Thirdly, Widjojo argues that the “administrative aspect” which has been the pride of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry has only been done half-heartedly and thus is a “toothless tiger that has no
meaning.” The plantations haven’t been “observed, taught, educated by our bureaucratic institutions”. That means that the “regents, mayors, heads of services” can be fired based on their “environmental performance”.

Widjojo further critiques the environmental disaster management act which focus on the post-event actions instead of prevention.

| 02:43:18 | Widjojo |

Widjojo critiques the complaints discoursed by the neighbouring countries and challenge those countries to “file an international lawsuit against Indonesia at the international court”. He argues that Malaysia and Singapore would not dare, because they are involved in the burning itself.

He ends his speech with a solution that environmental act involves consumer. He suggests that the ministries announce the plantations who are involved in the burning, the name of the factories, and the product, so that the law apparatus can process them. The people can also boycott the product as a form of consumer protection. In such a way, the industry would have control, because “the industry thinks profit”.

Widjojo interprets the inaction of the international communities against Indonesia as fear.

Widjojo’s solution is simple, which involves all levels of the Indonesian society in one intervention: Announcing the names of the plantations, companies, and the products. He indirectly confronts the Police’s commitment to keep the names secret.
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<tr>
<td>02:47:31</td>
<td>Gabriel</td>
<td>Gabriel begins his speech by a sarcastic remark about how the smoke from cigarettes is considered bigger in Indonesia than the smoke problem in Riau and Sumatera. He echoes Sarumpaet’s comments that the government needs to pay more attention and quote the article 33 paragraph 3 of the Supreme Constitution. He states that “the highest welfare of the people is the ratiolegy, animology, the antecedent soul of the chapter which gives the right of mastery to the State”. He emphasis that the land, water, and natural resources management is a “trust” and “power” given by the public to the State and thus the forest fires show the “State’s failure.” He then proceeds to suggest “a restoration politics for the ecosystems of tropical forests” to prevent the repetition of forest fires, which includes corporate audits, spatial planning review, and land use audit. He ends his speech with a plea to “pay real attention to the rights of the indigenous peoples in every place.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>02:50:37</td>
<td>Ilyas</td>
<td>Ilyas conclude the ILC that day by stating that “what is being done now is a part of the solution”, which includes “law enforcement, (…) permit administration and all sorts”. But “there are legal areas still remain</td>
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Cigarettes smoke has been a pretty big issue in Javanese cities, especially in the capital Jakarta. Gabriel points out the lack of attention when the bigger problem happens in Riau and Sumatera.

He then proceeds to academically outline the humanistic principle of the Supreme Constitution to point out the State’s responsibility and failure in the forest fires. His solution is government-based.

His conclusive remark is interesting. No other speakers but the indigenous communities’ representative and him pay attention to the “rights of the indigenous peoples”. If not because of the time constraint, Gabriel might have further explored the relationship between the indigenous people’s rights and the forest fires.
untouched”. He emphasizes that the result of the smoke is “harmful” and that it is “a joint responsibility of all the companies causing the smoke, whether it is intentional or unintentional.”

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<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>02:50:37</td>
<td>Ilyas</td>
<td>Ilyas ends the ILC by telling a story about Dorothy Stank, “A nun in the America, which is also an environmental activist.” She was shot dead by a group of mafia with a bible on her hands. Ilyas gives attention to her shirt, which has a writing “the death of the forest is the end of our life.”</td>
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Ilyas story tells about the death of a person fighting for the environment. The perpetrator is the “mafia”, which represents the companies. The “weapon” is the holy bible, signifying the sacred principle or even spiritualties. There is no government in this state. Also no ordinary people. Only the relationship between an activist, her principles, and her killers.
APPENDIX 2: MATA NAJWA 2015 DATASET

Appendix 2A: Indonesian transcript of Mata Najwa 2015

Title : Mata Najwa (The Eye of Najwa) 14 October 2015: Melawan Asap (Fighting the Smoke)

URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5BMN6RIdJg

Duration : 1 hour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Font style</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Baseline intonation and volume of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italic</td>
<td>Medium intonation and volume of speech, emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPITALISED</td>
<td>Highest intonation and volume of speech compared to the baseline. High emphasis.</td>
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[Begin transcript]

[00:00:00] Intro bumper.

[00:00:08] Luwak White Koffie Sponsor Bumper.

[00:00:12] Mr. Mukhlis: Akibat kabut asap inilah.. membuat anak saya itu… mengalami radang pernapasan. Selama tujuh harilah.. almarhumah.. melawan daripada.. gangguan pernapasan.

[00:00:28] Transition.

[00:00:29] Batik red-ivory: Memang… Tidak.. tidak pernah memakai masker karena memang masker itu.. ya tidak pernah dibantu.

[00:00:36] Ms. Shihab: Karena tidak punya? Tidak ada?

[00:00:37] Batik red-ivory: Tidak punya, dan juga dibantu oleh pemerintah.

[00:00:40] Transition.

[00:00:41] Ms. Shihab: Pak Mat waktu itu.. m/ yang/ yang memerintahkan untuk membakar siapa?

[00:00:46] Batik chocolate: Ya atasan kita, Sindar.

[00:00:48] Ms. Shihab: Pengawas perkebunan?
Batik chocolate: Iya.

Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Beliau blusukan dan bertemu masyarakat, saya tadinya berfikir dan bermimpi bahwa itu pun dilakukan oleh gubernur dan bupati.


Singer: Apa yang telah kulakukan... nahh... Hingga kau tak lagi berserii...

[00:02:54] Transition.

[00:02:55] Video montage of forest fire and environment covered in smoke.


[00:03:20] Child Narrator 2: Kabut asap… Telah merenggut waktu berharga kami [video montage of hospitalized children and their deaths].

[00:03:37] Transition.


[00:03:48] Ms. Shihab: Saya ingin.. Saya ingin ke Pak Mukhlis dulu. Pak Mukhlis, ee/ putri Anda yang pertama.. meninggal dunia?

[00:03:56] Mr. Mukhlis: Benar.

[00:03:57] Ms. Shihab: Em/ bisa kami tahu kronologisnya dan apakah memang berhubungan dengan asap pekat ini, pak?


[00:05:23] Mr. Mukhlis: Iyak…

[00:05:24] Ms. Shihab: Siapa nama putri bapak?
Mr. Mukhlis: Nama lengkapnya Muhanum Anggriawati.

Ms. Shihab: Usia berapa, pak?

Mr. Mukhlis: Usia 12 tahun.

Ms. Shihab: Itu bapak membawa fotonya?

Mr. Mukhlis: Iya. [Ms. Shihab smiling bitterly] Ini poto.. poto beliau saat… [showing a photo of his child] dia.. masih berusia lima tahun, ya… [Ms. Shihab: hm-m] Cukup agresip dia cukup pintar.. dan dia merupakan.. anak pertama saya yang menjadi suatu inspirasi saya.. untuk saya berbuat lebih baik lagi, gitu. Artinya, dalam arti kata.. salah satu contoh saja, dia selalu memotipasi.. bahaya rokok… [smiling]

Ms. Shihab: Hm-m.. Bahkan di usia dua belas tahun itu, ya? [smiling]

Mr. Mukhlis: Iya. [Ms. Shihab: hm-m] Di usia 10 tahun dia sudah mengatakan, bahaya rokok itu luar biasa, katanya.

Ms. Shihab: Melarang bapak merokok?

Mr. Mukhlis: Iya. Sampe alhamdulilah.. Sampai sekarang rokok itu adalah musuh saya.


Mr. Mukhlis: Ee… Dia tiga bersaudara. E-yang nomer dua, laki-laki bernama Adrian Abdulmanap…

Ms. Shihab: Usia berapa, pak?

Mr. Mukhlis: Usia.. sss.. sebelas tahun…

Ms. Shihab: hm.. hm-m.

Mr. Mukhlis: Ee… Dibawahnya.. usia tiga tahun setengah.. [Ms. Shihab: mm] bernama… Afikah Wijat.


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Ms. Shihab: Mm… Jadi, sama sekali tidak ada… Hal-hal yang waktu itu memuatan khawatir sampai sebelum akhirnya kabut asap menjadi sedemikian pekat ini?

Mr. Mukhlis: Benar. Tidak ada membuat saya khawatir, dan biasa.. seperti biasanya saja, kemudian.. setelah kabut asap itu udah mulai dia, me/mulai/ mulai.. batuk ringan, kemudian ya, biasalah kita obati di.. dokter terdekat, ya. Tapi, lama-kelamaan semakin.. menjadi, akhirnya dia dirujuk ke rumah sakit. [Ms. Shihab: mm] Sebenarnya dia waktu dirujuk ke rumah sakit tu.. tidak pernah ada ini.. tidak pernah ada komplain.. kan dia pun nggak mau juga, gitu.

Ms. Shihab: Tidak mengeluh? Tidak pernah mengeluh?

Mr. Mukhlis: Nggak pernah mengeluh dia.. Cuman, dia menunjukkan.. ee.. menunjukkan.. bahwa dirinya tu udah nggak bisa bernapas itu.. maap.. ee.. mulutnya tergangg aja gitu dia.. [gesturing with hand] bernapas dengan mulut dia… [reposition his glasses] Dia sempat berkata… [reposition his glasses] ee… kepada mamanya, ya. Saya lagi ngurus administrasi untuk.. penanganan medis.. Mah… Apakah saya ada di dunia ini lagi, gitu… [reposition his glasses] Masih, nak… Tapi ndak ada liat orang, gitu… Akhirnya… lama kelamaan dia.. langsung tak bernapas gitu, jatuh.. Dan dia minta tolong, dia tu. Lepaskan semua alat-alat itu… Tapi karena.. ingin.. ingin… sembuh kita, kan. Saya biarkan lah. Tapi, pesan terakhirnya dia bilang, mah, apakah.. anum tak.. tak/ tak didunia ini lagi, gitu.. Tu, mbak. [reposition his glasses]

Ms. Shihab: Itu/ itu kenangan/

Mr. Mukhlis: Itu kenangan yang/

Ms. Shihab: Kenangan terakhir apa yang dikatakannya/

Mr. Mukhlis: Yang apa dikatakana/ tapi kalau kenangan dia sangat luar biasa [inhaling]. Dia anaknya… pada mama sayang sekali, ya. Dia hobinya masak.. ee.. paporit dia tu e/ siapa.. Frequin siapa? Sapa? Yang.. tukang masak itu? Yang na/ yang terkenal?

Ms. Shihab: E-he.

Mr. Mukhlis: Aa.. dia.. itu/

Ms. Shihab: O suka mengikuti itu/


Ms. Shihab: 12 tahun [Mr. Mukhlis nod] kemudian diambil oleh Allah. Jadi Anda memaknainya itu sebagai apa, memaknai meninggalnya putri Anda sebagai apa, pak?
Mr. Mukhlis: Ya kalau mau maknai itu.. mungkin.. semua terlepas dari kehendak Allah.. dan kita hanya bisa berserah diri, pasrah. Namun kalau memang pemicunya adalah sebuah asap, saya mengajak.. mewakili seluruh.. orang tua.. yang ada di Indonesia ini… Terutama yang kena kabut asap… Apabila ada terjadi.. tak perlu kita ber.. ee.. berduka lebih dalam. Tapi, mari kita dukung pemerintahan, para.. relawan/

Ms. Shihab: Anda tidak menyalahkan.. tidak menyalahkan orang, tidak menyalahkan pemda, tidak menyalahkan yang/ yang.. e/ yang menyebabkan kabut asap ini?

Mr. Mukhlis: Kalau kita selalu menyalahkan, mbak, ndak akan putus dalam persoalan. Tapi biarkan mereka bekerja.. dan insya Allah kalau Allah ridho.

Ms. Shihab: Anda mengikhlaskan?

Mr. Mukhlis: Insya Allah, tetap mengikhlaskan. Apapun. Karena, kita hanya menunggu juga, kapan kita akan [inaudible]

Mr. Nurhadi (Up Next): Jadi, masyarakat hanya.. ya pasrah lah. Setiap tahun terjadi kebakaran, yang membuat asap tebal seperti ini.. ee… dinikmati saja.

Ms. Shihab: Saya ingin ke.. ke Pak Nurhadi [reading her notes]. E/ Anda persisnya.. tinggalnya di mana, Pak Nurhadi? Saya ingin tahu, bagaimana proses Anda dari lokasi tempat tinggal, sampai bisa ada di studio Metro TV saat ini. Berapa jauh?


Ms. Shihab: Anda persisnya di mana ini tinggalnya, pak?

Mr. Nurhadi: Di Desa Mantangai Hulu, Kecamatan Mantangai.

Ms. Shihab: Oke.

Mr. Nurhadi: Nah, jadi kalau dari.. kampung saya itu.. saya harus m/ apa, mengendarai motor..
Ms. Shihab: Naik motor?

Mr. Nurhadi: Iya.. berangkat kemaren itu.. sekitar jam 4 subuh.. [Ms. Shihab: m-hm] Jadi naik motor, kemudian.. juga, harus menyebrangi.. Das Kapuas.. Kemudian dari situ lagi.. ee/ kita melanjutkan perjalanan menyelusuri.. apa/ e/ perkebunan sawit. Jadi, untuk/ apa, untuk alternatif jalan pintasnya. Kalau kita melewati jalan.. negara.. itu bisa membutuhkan waktu.. sampai.. sembilan jam biasanya.

Ms. Shihab: Jadi Anda memotong lewat kebun-kebun sawit? [Mr. Nurhadi: Iya.. Betul.] Berapa jam itu motong jalan?

Mr. Nurhadi: Tujuh jam.

Ms. Shihab: Tujuh jam? [Mr. Nurhadi: Iya.] Naik sepeda motor?

Mr. Nurhadi: Iya. Baru sekit/ ee.. apa, ee/ be/ baru bisa sampai ke Kota Palangkarayanya.

Ms. Shihab: Baru naik Palangkaraya, kemudian dari situ naik pesawat ke Jakarta?

Mr. Nurhadi: Iya, betul.

Ms. Shihab: Jadi perjalanan.. perjalanan naik motor di tengah kebun yang penuh pekat asap seperti apa itu?

Mr. Nurhadi: Ya.. kalau untuk perjalanan itu.. ya sangat sulit, ya. Karena pertama, selain kabut asap yang tebal begitu.. juga kita berhadapan dengan debu.. karena ee.. yang namanya jalan perusahaan kan.. pastilah lalu lalang [Ms. Shihab: mm]. Apa/ e/ truk mengeyang mengangkut buah.. buah sawit dari perusahaan itu.

Ms. Shihab: Eyak… Jadi penuh debu?

Mr. Nurhadi: Iya, betul [Ms. Shihab: mm]. Jadi kalau.. dari perjalanan dari kampung sampai ke Kota Palangkaraya itu.. jadi seluruh badan ini.. tidak nampak lagi warna bajunya… Yang ada hanya warna kuning, debu…

Ms. Shihab: Menempel di seluruh badan [Mr. Nurhadi: Iya]

Mr. Nurhadi: Menempel di seluruh.. apa/ pakaian… [inaudible] [Ms. Shihab: Anda..]

Ms. Shihab: Anda sanggup tujuh jam dengan perjalanan dan.. menggunakan masker? [gesturing a mask on the face]
Mr. Nurhadi: Secara kebetulan… untuk perjalanan saya kali ini menggunakan masker. Karena memang ada dari… e/ sebuah lembaga yang ada di Palangkaraya, yang menyebut namanya.. Gerakan Anti Asap.

Ms. Shihab: Sebelumnya, dalam peramah-ramah kehidupan Anda sehari-hari sebetulnya jarang?

Mr. Nurhadi: Tidak pernah memakai masker/

Ms. Shihab: Tidak pernah? [Mr. Nurhadi: Iya..] Walaupun kabut sudah sedemikian/ e/ asap sudah sedemikian pekat, tidak pernah?

Mr. Nurhadi: Iya, betul.

Ms. Shihab: Itu Anda sendiri atau rata-rata warga juga tidak memakai masker?

Mr. Nurhadi: Kalau di masyarakat itu.. memang.. tidak.. tidak pernah memakai masker, karena memang masker itu.. ya tidak pernah dibantu.

Ms. Shihab: Karena tidak punya? Tidak ada?

Mr. Nurhadi: Tidak punya dan juga tidak dibantu oleh pemerintah… [Ms. Shihab: mm..] Jadi, masyarakat hanya.. ya pasrah lah. Setiap tahun terjadi kebakaran, yang membuat asap tebal seperti ini.. ee… dinikmati saja.

Ms. Shihab: Bagaimana caranya [Mr. Nurhadi: Secara inaudible] menikmati asap?


[00:14:00] Mr. Nurhadi: Secara kebetulan… untuk perjalanan saya kali ini menggunakan masker. Karena memang ada dari… e/ sebuah lembaga yang ada di Palangkaraya, yang menyebut namanya.. Gerakan Anti Asap.

[00:14:14] Ms. Shihab: Sebelumnya, dalam peramah-ramah kehidupan Anda sehari-hari sebetulnya jarang?

[00:14:18] Mr. Nurhadi: Tidak pernah memakai masker/


[00:14:23] Mr. Nurhadi: Iya, betul.


[00:14:28] Mr. Nurhadi: Kalau di masyarakat itu.. memang.. tidak.. tidak pernah memakai masker, karena memang masker itu.. ya tidak pernah dibantu.

[00:14:37] Ms. Shihab: Karena tidak punya? Tidak ada?

[00:14:38] Mr. Nurhadi: Tidak punya dan juga tidak dibantu oleh pemerintah… [Ms. Shihab: mm..] Jadi, masyarakat hanya.. ya pasrah lah. Setiap tahun terjadi kebakaran, yang membuat asap tebal seperti ini.. ee… dinikmati saja.


[00:15:57] Transition.

[00:15:58] Video about current condition in Kapuas, West Kalimantan.
[00:16:05] Mr. Nurhadi (as narrator): Kondisi asap saat ini… Kamis, tanggal delapan.. Oktober.. 2015. Sedikit berkurang… [photos of sick child and everyday life under the effect of smoke]

[00:16:36] Transition.

[00:16:37] Ms. Shihab: Itu sebagian situasi yang/ yang Anda.. e/ upload di Facebook, Pak Nurhadi. Terima kasih sudah memberikan kepada kami… E… Sampai sekarang kondisinya masih separah itu, atau sudah lebih e/ membaik?

[00:16:49] Mr. Nurhadi: Masih… ee/ waktu saya berangkat itu, ya jarak pandang normalnya hanya sekitar 20 mätër/

[00:16:57] Ms. Shihab: 20 meter?

[00:16:58] Mr. Nurhadi: Iya… Jadi hampir/ hampir sama lah seperti yang.. saya upload di.. Pesbuk itu…

[00:17:05] Ms. Shihab: Sepanjang ingatan Anda, tahun-tahun sebelumnya apakah pernah situasi sampai seekstrim ini?

[00:17:12] Mr. Nurhadi: Tahun 1997 yang memang.. terjadi k/ ee.. apa, kabut asap pekat seperti ini… Kalau tahun.. selain itu.. memang pernah ada terjadi, tapi tidak pernah setebal.. et/

[00:17:27] Ms. Shihab: Jadi sepanjang ingatan Anda ini memang yang terparah sejak tahun 97?


[00:17:37] Mr. Mukhlis: Parah.. Di Riau juga parah… Bahkan, ee.. asap di.. Riau ini sudah 18 tahun, ya…

[00:17:46] Ms. Shihab: I/ tahun ini, tahun yang paling parah? [Mr. Mukhlis: Tahun ini..]


[00:17:56] Mr. Mukhlis: Masih. Masih sekolah/

[00:17:57] Ms. Shihab: Masih sekolah?

Ms. Shihab: Rumah masuk asap?

Mr. Mukhlis: He-em. Maka kami gunakan, karena tidak tidak ada AC, kami gunakan kipas dua.. kipas angin/

Ms. Shihab: Untuk mengusir asap [Mr. Mukhlis: untuk mengusir asap] keluar dari rumah?

Mr. Mukhlis: Satu untuk di luar, satu untuk ee/ apa, e/ ya.. ke arah pintu, satu ke di dalam, untuk menetralkan. [Ms. Shihab: m-hm.]

Ms. Shihab: Pak Nurhadi juga seperti itu, bahkan di dalam rumah pun sudah lagi.. pembatas dalam rumah pun menghirup asap?

Mr. Nurhadi: Iya, betul. Sampai.. apa e/ malam.. itu.. e/ kita selalu.. menghirup udara, kabut asap itu. Nah, justru itu, yang kemudian.. la/ apa, keluarga saya juga.. mengalami gangguan kesehatan juga.. en/ apa/ ee/

Ms. Shihab: Pak Nurhadi juga seperti itu, bahkan di dalam rumah pun sudah lagi.. pembatas dalam rumah pun menghirup asap?

Ms. Shihab: Siapa saja yang sakit, Pak Nurhadi?

Mr. Nurhadi: Awalnya yang terjadi itu.. istri saya.. Eee.. sempet juga dirawat oleh bidan yang ada di desa. Tu selama.. satu minggu.. kemudian juga.. anak saya, putri saya.. yang baru bu/ berusia tujuh tahun, juga mengalami hal yang sama.

Ms. Shihab: Mas/ dirawat di rumah sakit?

Mr. Nurhadi: Untuk sekarang tidak.. Tapi masih rawat jalan.. Jadi.. ee.. ada lima.. orang.. dari anggota keluarga saya yang mengalami gangguan kesehatan itu.

Ms. Shihab: M/ apa yang ingin Anda sampaikan sehingga seluruh warga, yang tidak bisa merasakan langsung penderitaan, hanya bisa menyaksikan lewat televisi, hanya bisa mendengar, membaca di Facebook, apa yang Anda ingin.. sampaikan ke mereka? Bagaimana rasa hati.. warga yang terpapar asap?

Mr. Mukhlis: Ya... Mohon perhatiannya lah. Mohon dukungannya.. Mohon suaranya.. untuk.. keprihatinan kami.. yang mengalami kabut asap itu.

Ms. Shihab: Terima kasih, kita kasi tepuk tangan, Pak Mukhlis. Terima kasih, Pak Mukhlis. [Audience clapping]. Pak Nurhadi, adakah yang spesifik yang ingin Anda katakan?

Mr. Nurhadi: Kami juga sangat berharap, ya, dengan pemerintah. Baik itu pemerintah daerah maupun pemerintah pusat.. dalam hal.. ee/ kabut asap ini, e/ setidaknya bisa memperhatikan.. eee.. kondisi masyarakat.. [Ms. Shihab: Baik.] untuk bisa
membangun posko kesehatan, yang sifatnya bisa melayani secara gratis.. [Ms. Shihab: mm.] karena itu memang, terus terang, saya merasa beban itu.. Ada lima orang yang sudah mengalami.. apa/ ee.. sakit gara-gara.. asap ini, saya merasa terbebani biaya.. karena harus mengeluarkan.. apa/ ee/ banyak biaya, untuk bisa/ apa/ memulihkan.. keluarga. Sementara kehidupan di.. di desa itu.. ee.. sangat sulit sekarang.. [Ms. Shihab: mm.] karena banyak kebun-kebun.. karet, kemudian kebun rotan, yang saat ini terbakar.. e/ kemudian/ [Ms. Shihab: Jadi penghasilan sudah tidak ada..] Iya betul/ [Ms. Shihab: Masih lagi ditambah pengeluaran ekstra..] Iya/ [Ms. Shihab: ..untuk biaya kesehatan.] Iya.. Betul.

[00:21:01] Ms. Shihab: Jadi Anda mengharapkan bisa ada minimal masker dan minimal ada posko kesehatan gratis, yang bisa mengobati warga yang terpapar asap [Mr. Nurhadi: Betul.]

[00:21:08] Transition

[00:21:08] Mr. Muhamad (Up Next): Kalau.. dia mbakar, sebab/ kin yang mbakarnya tu malam hari, setelah mbakar itu kan ditinggal. Jadi, ke mana api merambat?

[00:21:18] Ms. Shihab: Bisa sampai berapa banyak itu?

[00:21:19] Commercial break

[00:21:24] Audience clapping


[00:22:12] Ms. Shihab: Pak Mat ini petani di sana?


Mr. Muhamad: Ya sekarang tidak lagi, kan/

Ms. Shihab: Sudah tidak lagi? [Mr. Muhamad: Iya.] Kapan terakhir Pak Mat bekerja di perusahaan ini?

Mr. Muhamad: Pokoknya kita kerja lapan tahun yang lalu/

Ms. Shihab: Lapan tahun yang lalu/

Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Tapi yang Pak Mat akan ceritakan di Mata Najwa sesuatu yang masih terjadi sampai sekarang, Pak Mat?

Mr. Muhamad: Sampai sekarang masih sama.

Ms. Shihab: Oke. Bagaimana ceritanya? Bagaimana pembakaran itu dilakukan?

Mr. Muhamad: Pembakaran itu kalau yang dulu, dulu.. itu mbakar itu siang hari. Aa, siang hari itu ada dikawal oleh.. sejenis pemadam kebakaran… Supaya nggak ada merambah ke tempat-tempat yang lain begitu, kan? [Ms. Shihab: m-hm.] Jadi bisa sedikit-sedikit.. Tapi kalau sekarang nggak. Semenjak di.. adakan ada.. peraturan.. eee.. Siapa yang mbakar.. didenda.. lima juta sampai 15 juta, kan? Ya kalau kita petani.. nggak berani, mbak, mbakar itu…

Ms. Shihab: Pak Mat waktu itu/ m/ yang.. yang memerintahkan untuk membakar siapa?

Mr. Muhamad: Ya atasan kita, Sindar…

Ms. Shihab: Pengawas perkebunan?

Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Yang dibakar berapa banyak itu, pak?

Mr. Muhamad: Kalau yang dulu, terbatas. Dulu terbatas.. batas.. paling ada satu.. satu petak. Satu petak itu paling 20 hektar, atau 25 hektar.

Ms. Shihab: Dua p/ em-hm…

Mr. Muhamad: *Tapi kalau kini nggak*…

Ms. Shihab: Sekarang berapa banyak itu?

Mr. Muhamad: Kalau.. dia mbakar, sebab/ kin yang mbakarnya tu malam hari, setelah mbakar itu kan ditinggal. Jadi, ke mana api merambah?
[00:23:41] Ms. Shihab: Bisa sampai berapa banyak itu?

[00:23:44] Mr. Muhamad: Bisa sampai 80-an hektar…


[00:24:08] Ms. Shihab: Mm. Tidak pernah ada selama bertahun-tahun pembakaran itu tidak pernah ada.. ee/ aparat di sana yang memeriksa, yang menegur? Warga di sana pasti melihat, dong, kalau pembakaran, apalagi kalau siang, siang hari?

[00:24:19] Mr. Muhamad: Sebenarnya aparat yang magang juga kan ada.. Saya lihat di situ polisi ada yang magang. Sudah itu armit juga yang magang di situ ada.

[00:24:31] Ms. Shihab: Ada tentara juga?


[00:24:33] Ms. Shihab: Dan mereka melakukan apa?

[00:24:35] Mr. Muhamad: Ya sekedar ngawas-ngawasi gitu, mbak..

[00:24:38] Ms. Shihab: Mengawasi pembakaran?


[00:24:39] Ms. Shihab: Jadi ada di sana pada saat dibakar?

[00:24:41] Mr. Muhamad: Ada… Tapi mereka kan diam saja, karena mereka dibayar, gitu kan…

[00:24:46] Ms. Shihab: Mm…… Dan ini perintahnya spesifik dari manajemen perusahaan menyuruh?

[00:24:51] Mr. Muhamad: Iya… Menyuruh membakar.. Ya jadi mereka tu cuman.. ee/ ngeliat dari jauh…

[00:24:59] Ms. Shihab: Mm…… Sudah berapa tahun ini jadi praktek ini yang/ sepengetahuan Pak Mat?

[00:25:03] Mr. Muhamad: Dari tahun 80.

[00:25:05] Ms. Shihab: Dari tahun 80?
Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Dan Pak Mat tahu sampai sekarang pun itu masih dilakukan? [Mr. Muhamad: Masih sama…] Masih sama?

Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Walaupun orang sudah gembor/

Mr. Muhamad: Bahkan yang kini, modelnya kan sudah ada undang-undang itu tadi, mbak. Maka yang mbakar, itu tadi, malam hari.. supaya.. jangan kena.. undang-undang itu…

Ms. Shihab: Mm…… Menghindar dari aturan?

Mr. Muhamad: Iya/ Ms. Shihab: Jadi sepanjang Pak Mat tahu, belum ada satu pun yang/ yang terkena proses hukum?

Mr. Muhamad: Belum ada, mbak……

Ms. Shihab: Dari petaninya, dari mandornya, dari Sindarnya belum ada satupun yang pernah kena?

Mr. Muhamad: Ini tadi ada yang.. ee.. pernah kedapatan mbakar itu oleh.. ee.. polda. Polda Sumsel.. itu nggak lama juga, mbak.

Ms. Shihab: Nggak lama maksudnya?

Mr. Muhamad: Cuman berapa hari ada di.. di polda itu…

Ms. Shihab: Kemudian kasusnya hilang?

Mr. Muhamad: Hilang.

Ms. Shihab: Mm-m…… [holding lower jaw] Itu siapa waktu itu, level apa/ level pelaku atau level manajemen?

Mr. Muhamad: Nah itu yang.. manajemen. Yang.. merintah. Yang merintah kan Sindar… Nah, s/ yang.. yang diperintah itu mandor besarnya…

Ms. Shihab: Mm.

Mr. Muhamad: Ya dua-duanya itu dibawa ke polda… tapi nggak/

Ms. Shihab: Tapi cuma beberapa hari di sana?
Mr. Muhamad: *Cuma beberapa hari doang.*

Ms. Shihab: Kasusnya kemudian tidak ada kelanjutannya?

Mr. Muhamad: Nggak ada kelanjutannya.

Ms. Shihab: Masyarakat pernah/ pernah lapor, Pak Mat dan petani-petani yang lain pernah/ pernah lapor resmi, pernah komplain, ini kebakaran.. terang-terangkan dilakukan?


Ms. Shihab: Jadi tidak pernah ditanggapi?

Mr. Muhamad: Nggak pernah ditanggapi.

Ms. Shihab: Itu tadi kan Pak Mat cerita, waktu Pak Mat bekerja di sana, kemudian disuruh melakukan. Nah, petani-petani sendiri juga kan terkadang membakar lahan kan, Pak Mat?


Ms. Shihab: Tidak berani.

Mr. Muhamad: Tidak berani. Siapa yang [Ms. Shihab: Kalau..] mau keluar uang lima juta sampai lima belas juta, mbak?

Ms. Shihab: Kalau perusahaan, mereka tetap berani?

Mr. Muhamad: Masih.. kalau yang itu, nggak ada pengaruh… Dengan.. aturan itu. Makanya mereka mbakar malam hari…

Ms. Shihab: Membakar malam hari.

Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Baik. Mas Zenzi, ini m/ sebagian besar kalau kita petakan, sebagian besar pelaku pembakaran itu apakah petani seperti tadi cerita model Pak Mat, atau.. perusahaan-perusahaan yang memang membayar.. untuk melakukan pembakaran [Mr. Suhadi nodded], pembukaan lahan atog/ atau untuk panen misalnya?
Mr. Suhadi: Kalau kita melihat proses pembakaran itu salah satu bagian.. dari upaya kolaboratif, merusak ee/ satu bentang alam, dalam hal ini hutan ataupun gambut. Nah, masyarakat/ kalau pun makai masyarakat melakukan pembakaran, itu.. masyarakat ini hanya operator…

Ms. Shihab: Operator? [Mr. Suhadi: he-e] Seperti Pak Mat dan kawan-kawan ketika itu dulu, operator?

Mr. Suhadi: Operator. Operator pelaku/

Ms. Shihab: Yang melakukan.. e/ perintah perusahaan?

Mr. Suhadi: Iya, yang melakukan perintah. Nah, selama ini kan, siapa yang merencanakan, terus satu tingkat di atasnya, siapa yang menikmati keuntungan.. dari proses pembakaran itu belum tersentuh. [Ms. Shihab: mm..] Kayak di.. Riau, Jambi, sama.. ee/ Sumatra Selatan, itu ada satu orang menguasai.. hampir 1,9 juta hektar hutan. Yang kita catat dari tahun 2010 hingga tahun 2015, itu dalam konsesinya ini terus mengalami kebakaran. Malah di tahun 2015, 52% titik api.. di Sumatra Selatan itu berasal dari.. e/ konsesi milik e. orang ini.


Mr. Suhadi: Tetapi, simbol dari grup ini ada satu orang.. ee/ pemiliknya. Kayak begitu/

Ms. Shihab: Dan Walhi punya data, siapa-siapa saja pelaku pembakaran ini?

Mr. Suhadi: Grup yang terlibat kita punya… [Ms. Shihab: Punya?] Grup yang kita punya dan kita sudah mengidentifikasi, kita mengelompokkan dua modus dalam proses pembakaran ini, yang dilakukan dalam bentuk skenario. Skenario pertama, legal dulu baru dibakar.. Atau, skenario kedua, bakar dulu supaya legal. Dan ini berjalan serentak dan masip.. di seluruh.. propinsi yang mengalami kebakaran. Termasuk propinsi-propinsi sekarang yang.. terancam. Kita prediksi, bisa kita buktikan nanti, di tiga-empat tahun ke depan, asap akan banyak, titik api akan banyak, itu di Papua…

Ms. Shihab: Di Papua?

Mr. Suhadi: Di Papua.

Ms. Shihab: A/ dari mana.. prediksi itu? [holding her jaw]

Mr. Suhadi: Karena sekenario.. ini tadi sudah mulai dijalankan di sana.

Ms. Shihab: Legal dulu baru dibakar?

Mr. Suhadi: Legal dulu baru dibakar atau bakar dulu/
Ms. Shihab: Bakar dulu baru dijadikan legal. [Mr. Suhadi: Iya.] Apa itu maksudnya; legal dulu baru dibakar, jadi?

Mr. Suhadi: Jadi di Kementerian Kehutanan, dulu ya, sekarang Kementerian Kehutanan dan Lingkungan Hidup, ada dua skema.. untuk.. reak/ untuk pelepasan kawasan hutan. Skema pertama, pelepasan kawasan hutan secara langsung, atas usulan perusahaan. Skema kedua, pelepasan kawasan hutan, atas usulan kepala daerah. Nah yang kita temukan, perusahaan atau pengusaha, ini mendorong masyarakat eksodus ke suatu tempat, bakar dulu kawasannya, baru diuji/ di.. ajukan pelepasan kawasan hutan. [Ms. Shihab: Oke.] Nah, kecenderungan tim terpadu.. yang merekomendasikan ke.. Kementerian Kehutanan dulu, kalau dalam kawasan itu sudah dinyatakan kritis atau terbakar, maka.. Kementerian akan melepaskan kawasan itu.. pun menjadi area peruntukkan lain ataupun jadi [Ms. Shihab: Jadi ini cuma cara..] area perkebunan.

Ms. Shihab: Skenario untuk mendapatkan konsesi [holding her jaw], dengan cara seperti itu..

Mr. Suhadi: Itu juga buah dari kesalahan mainstream pemerintah. Memperlakukan alam di.. Indonesia kalau kita lihat.. Karena, dalam kebijakan kita, kalau hutan.. itu kritis, maka dia dipaksa untuk produksi. Padahal seharusnya hutan kritis, itu dia dipulihkan... Karena kecenderungan memaksa hutan kritis ini produksi, maka para pelaku usaha ini dibikin kritis dulu.. hutannya. Baru di.. didapatkan izinnya. Begitu.

Ms. Shihab: Bencana asap akibat kebakaran hutan adalah kejahatan terencana [read her notes]. [Mr. Suhadi: Iya.] Ini kejahatan terencana? [Mr. Suhadi: Kejahatan terencana.] Yang dilakukan oleh?

Mr. Suhadi: Kolaboratif, antara pemerintah sebenarnya, dan para pelaku usaha.

Ms. Shihab: Pemerintah menurut Anda melakukan kejahatan?
Ms. Shihab: Dan yang tadi disampaikan Pak Mat, bahwa karena petani tidak akan didengar, kalau pejabat mungkin didengar.. Itu hanya Pak Mat saja, atau Anda juga melihat seringkali aduan-aduan rakyat itu tidak begitu ditanggapi kalau bicara proses penegakan hukum lingkungan?

Mr. Suhadi: Walhi ada di 28 propinsi, di semua propinsi kita menemukan hal yang serupa dengan Pak Mat tadi. Apa yang disampaikan Pak Mat. Bahwasannya, ketika ada perusahaan melakukan kejahatan, polisi itu, tentara itu menjadi bagian terdepan.. menghajar rakyat yang melawan perusahaan. Itu pakta yang terjadi. Justru di tahun 2012, proses penangkapan terhadap aktipis.. yang melawan proses penghancuran hutan itu.. lebih cepat dari bumi berputar... Bumi berputar satu kali satu hari. Ini penangkapan satu hari nyampe 20 orang. Artinya, bet/

Ms. Shihab: Aktifis-aktivis yang menentang.. perusakan lingkungan?

Mr. Suhadi: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Yang seringkali kan terlibat konflik.. tanah di sana? Jadi kan persoalannya tidak sesederhana itu kadang-kadang kan, Mas Zenzi?


Ms. Shihab: Oke.

Mr. Suhadi: Sesungguhnya, kejadian kebakaran, kejadian asap, itu kejadian alternatif. Bisa tidak terjadi apabila pemerintah mengambil keputusan yang tepat. Sebelum kejadian itu.. di depan mata.

Ms. Shihab: Dan seringkali, menurut Anda, itu tidak tepat? Atau terlambat diambil?

Mr. Suhadi: Memang salah memposisikan diri…

Ms. Shihab: Salah memposisikan diri?

Mr. Suhadi: Salah memposisikan diri.

Ms. Shihab: Selama ini bagaimana memposisikan diri?

Mr. Suhadi: Seharusnya kalau sesuai dengan mandat undang-undang, ya, undang-undang 32… Proses penerbitan izin, itu harus memprioritaskan keselamatan lingkungan, berlanjut apa tidak lingkungannya. Terus, suara rakyat itu harus diperhatikan. Rakyat menolak atau menerima? Nah.. Dari.. seluruh kasus yang kita tangani.. suara rakyat,
Ms. Shihab: Yang menjadi pertinda/ pertimbangan utama adalah?

Mr. Suhadi: Justru kita melihat.. penerbitan izin, itu diterbitkan marak itu ketika.. prosesi pilkada. Dalam artian.. pertimbangan utama pejabat yang berwenang ketika itu, apa kepentingan dia di saat itu. Itulah yang menjadi pertimbangan/

Ms. Shihab: Jadi proses politik seringkali itu yang menjadi faktor utama untuk menentukan.. izin itu keluar atau tidak?

Mr. Suhadi: Yang kita temukan demikian.


Ms. Shihab: Jadi ilustrasinya itu seperti apa? Ilustrasinya karena mau pemilu, pejabat butuh.. butuh uang, dipinjami uang, begitu selesai.. terpilih, membayar utang itu [gesturing quote marks] dengan memberikan konsesi? Seperti itu ilustrasinya?

Mr. Suhadi: Sepertinya sepertinya.

Ms. Shihab: Dan ini banyak dilakukan oleh.. pemda?

Mr. Suhadi: Kepala daerah yang.. incumbent.

Ms. Shihab: Kepala daerah yang incumbent. Di tahap yang apa ini? Level daerah? Jadi bupati-bupati, walikota?

Mr. Suhadi: Bupati, gubernur.. masing-masing me/ mem/ mempunyai kepentingan di dalam.. apa, di dalam.. e/ pilkada, itu.. dimana w/ mereka punya wewenang, disanalah mereka.. ee/ terlibat dalam.. proses kejahatan terhadap sumber daya alam... [Ms. Shihab: Oke.] Kita m/ melakukan analisa, ada 12 pintu gratipikasi. Dan delapas/ delapan belas bentuk... gratipikasi. Itu diberikan para pelaku usaha, kepada.. pemerintah, pejabat pemerintah.. [Ms. Shihab: Oke.] Dari pemerintah daerah sampai ke pusat.
Ms. Shihab: Jadi, jadi itu yang kemudian Anda dan teman-teman Walhi temukan?

Mr. Suhadi: Iya/

Ms. Shihab: Baik. Kita kasih tepuk tangan, dong untuk Walhi [audience clapping]. Eee.. datanya… Pak Mat, Pak Mat ini sekarang bertani? Bertani apa, pak?

Mr. Muhamad: Kita kebun karet, ya… sudah itu kalau dulu ya kebun nanas, ya nanas kini udah nggak ada, jadi kini tanam ubi/

Ms. Shihab: Itu lahan punya bapak sendiri?

Mr. Muhamad: Iya, punya sendiri.

Ms. Shihab: Masi sekarang masih bisa bertani walaupun situasi seperti ini, atau sudah susah lagi?

Mr. Muhamad: Kalau kini agak mandek dulu, mbak.

Ms. Shihab: Mandek?

Mr. Muhamad: Mandek dulu [Ms. Shihab: Sudah/]

Ms. Shihab: Sudah berapa lama jadi berhenti bertani?

Mr. Muhamad: Ya kalau bertani masih terus, mbak. Cuman.. maksud aku, ngerjakannya itu di.. diberhentikan dulu karena/

Ms. Shihab: Iya, sudah berapa lama itu berhenti? Aktifitas itu?

Mr. Muhamad: Kini.. sudah berapa bulan kini, kan.. kering, kan di tempat kita itu.

Ms. Shihab: Jadi sudah bet/ ber/ bulan-bulan ini tidak ada hasil.. dari tanah?

Mr. Muhamad: Nggak ada yang hasilnya dari situ.

Ms. Shihab: Jadi Pak Mat hidup dari mana, Pak Mat?

Mr. Muhamad: Ya masih juga m/ e-anu.. nyadap karet, mbak.

Ms. Shihab: Nyadap karet.

Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Mm. Tapi tidak lagi mengandalkan dari hasil.. ee.. e/ lahan Pak Mat, begitu ya?
Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Dari nyadap. Dapet berapa itu, pak, sehari-hari dapetnya?

Mr. Muhamad: Sedikit, mbak... Paling ada kita cuman dapat.. 40 kilo itu p/ baru.. per minggu.

Ms. Shihab: M-hm. Itu kalau dijual berapa pak?

Mr. Muhamad: Kalau dijual kini harga kan 7000…

Ms. Shihab: Oke.. Jadi bowo/ bawa pulang uang untuk anak istri berapa banyak, Pak Mat?

Mr. Muhamad: Cuma 200 lebih, sih.

Ms. Shihab: 200.000?

Mr. Muhamad: Hi-hi-ya [laughing].

Ms. Shihab: Per/ per apa tuh?

Mr. Muhamad: Per minggu.

Ms. Shihab: Per minggu..

Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Untuk hidup seperti itu ya, 200.000 per minggu. Jadi memang asap ini juga membuat Pak Mat sulit untuk.. untuk berpenghasilan ya pak ya?

Mr. Muhamad: Iya.

Ms. Shihab: Dampaknya sudah sedemikian besar. Kebun bapak ada yang terkena dampak kebakaran tidak pak?

Mr. Muhamad: Untuk sementara kalau kini nggak.


Mr. Muhamad: Ya dijaga terus mbak.

Ms. Shihab: O Pak Mat yang jaga langsung?

Mr. Muhamad: Iya. Jadi jaga terus.

Ms. Shihab: Kalau nggak dijaga, seperti apa tu pak?
[00:38:47] Mr. Muhamad: Takutnya kalau.. kebakaran mbak.

[00:38:49] Ms. Shihab: Bisa merembes sampai ke sana?


[00:39:35] Ms. Shihab: Jadi Anda bahkan sudah menyiapkan langkah hukum?

[00:39:36] Mr. Suhadi: Iya. Pem/ huku/

[00:39:38] Ms. Shihab: Bukan hanya sekedar menuding?


[00:39:44] Mr. Suhadi: Sudah kita siapkan/


[00:39:47] Mr. Suhadi: Kalau hakim/

[00:39:47] Ms. Shihab: Cukup kuat?


[00:39:50] Transition.


begini beg/]

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[00:40:02] Commercial Break.

[00:40:06] Montage showing President Jokowi walks among smokes and scorched trees.

[00:40:21] Joko Widodo, President of Indonesia: Ya kita kemaren.. sudah.. minta bantuan, dari Singapur, masih dalam proses.. eeee… Rusia, dan Malaysia, kemudian Jepang… Menangani gambut.. berbeda.. dengan.. menangani kebakaran hutan biasa. Sangat berbeda sekali.


[00:42:04] Ms. Shihab: Desember tahun 2014?

[00:41:05] Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Yap, [inaudible]/

[00:42:06] Ms. Shihab: Saya mendapat info, Anda bahkan sempat menelpon salah satu kepala daerah, dan/ dan mengancam, dalam tanda kutip, kalau tidak mengambil langkah, Anda akan laporkan ke presiden?


[00:42:40] Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: E-heh.. [laughing] Saya.. waktu itu, jam setengah 12 malam, karena saya sudah kontrol [gesturing “making barriers” with both hands] ini sudah menyatakan siaga darurat, karena sebelum darurat, kita harusnya siaga darurat dulu. Saya sempat.. kontrol semua/ saya selalu kontrol [spinning
hands on one another, setiap waktu, terutama dengan indikator hotspot itu [gesturing “indicators” with both hands]. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] Jadi kalau antara hotspot dan indikator pencemaran udara, itu ada korelasinya, maka ket/ setiap kondisinya kritis, angkanya di atas 50-60-70, trus saya biasanya sudah langsung bereaksi... Ketika saya menelefon gubernur itu, saya bahkan mendapat jawaban bahwa.. ini/ me/ Bu, menurut hh/ ee.. staff; menurut dinas-dinas, menurut.. birokrasi kami, ini belum masuk ke.. posisi darurat.. Terus saya bilang, eh, Pak.. Gubernur, Anda harus tahu bahwa ini kondisinya sudah sangat rawan, Anda kerjakan.. ess.. selesaikan, diskusikan, dan tentukan kesiagaan darurat ini, ATAU SAYA AKAN MENYATAKAN KEBERATAN akan kinerja anda sebagai gubernur, dan saya akan sampaikan pada bapak presiden. Itu persisnya kalimat itu seperti itu.. oleh karena itu/


[00:43:48] Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Nggak, sebetulnya sih bukan ancaman. Itu hanya sebagai dorongan saja/

[00:43:51] Ms. Shihab: Tapi setelah ibu bilang seperti itu, baru bergerak?


[00:44:08] Ms. Shihab: Boleh saya tahu gubernur daerah mana, Ibu?


Mr. Pasludin: Kita mendorong bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan yang besar, perusahaan-perusahaan lakukan pembakaran/ me..e/ sengaja membakar.. ini harus dicabut.. ijinnya oleh Kementrian.. Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutana/


Ms. Shihab: Mm. Jadi bahkan ada undang-undang yang mempobo/ memperbolehkan masyarakat membakar sampai dua hektar?


Ms. Shihab: Baik. Kit/
[00:47:47] Mr. Pasludin: Dan untuk.. pidananya ini saya kira jangan hanya.. terhenti kepada pembakar langsungnya, tapi.. kalau perlu, direksi dan komisarisnya ini. pemiliknya ini harus dikenai.. e-apa namanya, pidana. Supaya ada efek jera untuk tidak melakukan kebakaran di tahun yang akan datang gitu.

[00:47:59] Ms. Shihab: Baik… [audience clapping] Bu.. Siti tadi, tadi di awal kita dengar ada t/ ee.. cerita korban asap, kemudian tadi ada teman dari Walhi, dan ada.. Pak Mat ee.. petani yang juga waktu itu sempat melakukan pembakaran lahan, ee/ apakah memang… proses.. izin.. yang diobral.. oleh e/ kepala daerah.. ini juga menjadi salah satu penyebab.. yang kita saksikan sekarang? Kebakaran tak/ tak/ tak terkira?


[00:48:48] Ms. Shihab: Tapi kan seringkali kemudian itu ada di tingkat daerah kan ibu?


[00:48:55] Ms. Shihab: Kalau ibu katakan, ibu akan lebih.. kuat akan/ akan lebih prudent dalam melakukan, tapi kan kalau daerah tidak melakukan itu, percuma saja/


[00:49:30] Ms. Shihab: Diambil alih oleh kementrian?


[00:49:40] Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Sudah. [Ms. Shihab: Sudah?] Sudah.. adaa… [Ms. Shihab: Ada berapa banyak bu?] Kita mengidentifikasi sekarang ada ha/ sekitar 400-an, yang.. harus kita.. investigasi… dan sudah.. diselesaikan kemaren 34, tetapi kembali dari lapangan itu.. e/ 27, ternyata di lapangan juga medannya berat, ee.. apa namanya/ pete/ petugas-petugas pengawas saya banyak juga yang putri-putri dan dilapangannya cukup berat, medannya berat, jauh, dan sebagainya.. sehingga kemaren masuk 27.. perusahaan, dan kita sudah.. e/ cabut satu ijin di.. Riau, dan.. kita bekukan tiga
ijin, satu di Riau, dan dua di Sumatra Selatan, sekarang sedang dipersiapkan lagi 23.. ee/ entitas dunia usaha, yang sedang dipersiapkan untuk diberikan sanksi.

[00:50:35] Ms. Shihab: Mm.. [audience clapping] Sanksinya itu berupa pencabutan izin?


[00:50:54] Ms. Shihab: Selama ini belum pernah ada sanksi/


[00:51:00] Ms. Shihab: Selama ini belum pernah karena apa, ibu? [audience clapping]

[00:51:05] Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Saya kira itu ee/ political will pemerintah.. ee.. kemudian juga, at/ tidak gampang memang melakukan preparasi kebijakan. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] Jadi e/ kami terus terang.. pertama ee.. bapak presiden meminta untuk dilakukan penegakan hukum… Ee/ dengan.. saya melihat, mengapa sanksi administratif ini menjadi penting, karena disinilah rasa keadilan masyarakat itu muncul… Mengapa? Karena walau pun dipidanakan jalan terus, tetapi ternyata bebas, atau hukumannya kecil, yang di/ yang kena pidananya juga.. level yang kecil.. e/ sehingga.. ee.. perusahaan tetep jalan terus, tetep be.. berproduksi terus, masyarakat merasa itu tidak adil. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] Nah, akhirnya yang paling adil adalah lakukan tiga sanksi sekaligus. Pidana, perdata, dan administratif. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] [audience clapping]

[00:51:57] Ms. Shihab: Mm. Tiga-tiganya?


[00:52:00] Ms. Shihab: I/ Bu Siti, ee/ e/ perusahaan-perusahaan atau grup/ pru/ grup yang.. yang disinyalir di.. ee/ terlibat, adakah kesulitan atau keengganan pemerintah menindak mereka?

[00:52:10] Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Nggak ya, saya.. saya yang sekarang sedang berproses perdata itu.. eeee.. sedang berlangsung di Pengadilan Negri.. Palembang, itu.. biasa-biasa saja. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] Memang di.. daalaa.. d-wi.. di proses hukum kan saya sudah mengikuti selama saya di.. kementrian, sudah ada enam atau tujuh, memang ada yang diputuskan bebas. Memang ada yang tidak kena pidana, tetapi hanya cukup membayar dua milyar. Ma/

[00:52:37] Ms. Shihab: Ada kecurigaan tertentu atas hasilnya itu ibu? [Ms. Nurbaya: Nggga, ee-wee.. ya.. ha [laughing]] Memang proses pembuktiannya saja yang tidak berhasil atau ada upaya-upaya lain?
Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Kalau saya sih mau... lebih baik koreksi ke dalam saja, mungkin proses hukum atau dokumentasi hukum acaranya yang kurang baik dan sebagainya, saya ambil, juga kami terus berkonsultasi kepada Mahkamah Agung dan Komisi Yudisial. Tetapi ada yang membanggakan... ketika hakim agung memutuskan denda yang sampai 300... ee.. [Ms. Shihab: Milyar?] Milyar, dan itu merupakan... titik cerah kita bisa lakukan ini dengan baik. Proses ye/ perdata yang kita sedang lakukan di Pengadilan Negri Palembang, itu kita.. am/ menggugat perdata sebanyak tujuh triliun, dengan pertimbangan dua triliun untuk kerusakan lingkungan, dan 5 triliun adalah kerusakan ekonomi masyarakat, seperti yang tadi disampaikan oleh pak.. mat/ ee/ pak... [Ms. Shihab: Pak Nurhadi, Pak Mat, Pak Mukhlis.] Nurhadi dan Pak Mukhlis. Jadi ada problem-problem atau biaya sosial yang terjadi akibat persoalan ini/

Ms. Shihab: Pemerintah menggugat tujuh triliun?

Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Tujuh triliun.

Ms. Shihab: Mm... Tujuh triliun? [audience clapping]

Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Hm-... [Ms. Shihab: Oke.]


Siti Nurbaya, Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan: Sekarang ini kalau kita lihat cara.. bapak presiden kita.. terpilih, itu betul-betul karena masyarakat... [Ms. Shihab: Oke.] Oleh karena itu, ketika beliau blusukan dan bertemu masyarakat, saya tadi juga berfikir dan bermimpi bahwa ITUPUN DILAKUKAN OLEH GUBERNUR DAN bupati...

Ms. Shihab: Tapi ternyata tidak?


Transition.

Montage of people extinguishing fire using woodsticks:

Singer: di mana.. gerangan jiwamu.. Apa yang telah kulakukanaaan... Hingga kau tak lagi berseriiii...

Commercial break.

Audience clapping.


[00:56:48] Transition.

[00:56:51] Nugie performs, accompanied by another guitarist:

_Dan melayang_

_Daun-daun yang mengering_

_Di negeri ini_

_Tampak hitam_

_Mata air yang mengeruh_

_Di negeri ini_
Ke mana suara gaibmu, bumi?
Di mana gerangan jiwamu?
Apa yang telah kulakukan
Hingga kau tak lagi berseri?
Iii hi. Iii hii..
Apa yang telah kulakukan
Tak cukup tuliskah cintaku kepadamu?
Oo hoo...
Bumi...

[00:58:17] Catatan Najwa bumper


[00:59:19] Outro and credits.

[End of transcript]
Appendix 2B: Colour-coded English translation of Mata Najwa 2015

Title: Mata Najwa (The Eye of Najwa) 14 October 2015: Melawan Asap (Fighting the Smoke)

URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsBMN6RIdJg

Duration: 1 hour

Interrogative questions and color coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Who is being blamed?</td>
<td>Almost every answer to the questions asked by the hosts of the talk show implies blaming somebody for the Haze or the sufferings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Who suffers according to the subject?</td>
<td>The representations of victimhood implied by the subject as they portray their narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>How the subject reacts to the Haze?</td>
<td>The emotional or rational contents of their statements when prompted to talk about what the subjects have done in response to the Haze or illness ensued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>How does the speaker make sense of the Haze?</td>
<td>The attribution can be seen through keywords and the moral content of the subject’s narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>How does the speaker describe how others react or make sense of the Haze?</td>
<td>There are times when the subject states their understanding about what the Haze or sufferings mean for the other people/communities/institutions, e.g. the benefit gained, disadvantages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Begin transcript]

[00:00:00] Intro bumper.

[00:00:08] Luwak White Koffie Sponsor Bumper.

[00:00:12] Mr. Mukhlis: Due to the smog here .. made my daughter ... having respiratory inflammation. During the seven days.. almarhuma .. fought the .. respiratory problems.

[00:00:28] Transition.
Red-ivory batik: Indeed ... Never .. never wore a mask because the masks were ..
well never been given as aid.

Ms. Shihab: Because (you) do not have (them)? None?

Red-ivory batik: Do not have, and also assisted by the government.

Ms. Shihab: Mr. Mat at that time .. um / who / who ordered (you) to burn?

Batik chocolate: Well it’s our boss, Sindar.

Ms. Shihab: The supervisor of the plantation?

Batik chocolate: Yes.

Siti Nurbaya, the Minister of Environment and Forestry: He (the president) did
blusukan (impromptu visits) and met the people, I had been thinking and dreaming that it
was done by the governor and regent.

Ms. Shihab: Must the benchmark have been easy, Ma'am? [Ms. Nurbaya: ...
there must be .. the courage [laughing]] People cannot breathe anymore [gesturing view
distance with hand] [Ms. Nurbaya: Right, that's what I ..] the visibility has not been visible,
the people have [Ms. Nurbaya: So listen ..] been screaming and the local government did
not want to do anything until it is threatened[Ms. Nurbaya: Miss .. Najwa]

Singer: What have I doooonnne... nahh ... so that you no longer bloom...

Ms. Shihab: Good evening, welcome to Mata Najwa. I Najwa Shihab, host Mata
Najwa ... The forest fire and smoke is getting worse, despite the pride of the government
finally subdued ... What can we do, my friend? Two months of living under siege thick
smoke suffocating lung ... Since the first burn of forest has been incredible ... The last ten
years of smoke is getting worse ... Formerly burning for farming, is rampant in the
concession industry ... Concentrated black soared from thousands of hotspots smoke barely
The delay handling control ... aggravate the condition, often recurrent disasters like
tradition ... This is the Mata Najwa.

On-set LCD displaying text: Against the Smoke

Ms. Shihab: Against the smoke.

Video montage of Riau covered in fire and smoke, people's efforts to fight
against them, sickness and death, children covered with breathers, youngsters and children
campaigning with text on paper.
Title: AGAINST THE SMOKE.

Transition.

Audience clapping.

Ms. Shihab: The smoke, the regular guest has come again to make .. Sumatra and Kalimantan dark. Casualties fall as a result of inhaling the smoke that has enveloped the island for nearly two months.

Transition.

Video montage of forest fire and environment covered in smoke.

Child Narrator: The haze ... has robbed our health by force [video montage of sick children].

Child Narrator 2: The haze ... has claimed our precious time [video montage of hospitalized children and their deaths].

Transition.

Ms. Shihab: We present in Mata Najwa, Nurhadi, residents Kapuas, Central Kalimantan, and Mukhlis, a resident of Riau. Both were victims of smoke. Good evening, thank you already present in Mata Najwa [Mr. Mukhlis: Tonight ... Tonight] [audience clapping]

Ms. Shihab: I want .. I want to go to Pak Mukhlis first. Pak Mukhlis, err / your first daughter .. died?

Mr. Mukhlis: Right.

Ms. Shihab: Um / can we know the chronology and whether they are related to this dense smoke, Pak?

Mr. Mukhlis [reposition his glasses]: Right, thank you .. to .. Mbak Najwa. The chronology of the death of my daughter .. indeed the trigger was the smoke ... But if you talk (about it), it is a destiny (takdir). [reposition his glasses] that I have to accept (terima)... [reposition his glasses] because of this haze... it makes my child had breathing inflammation ... For seven days she .. coughed. First it was a mild cough, seco / up to seven days (she was) at home ... and on the seventh day .. almarhumah .. was referred to the hospital. Arifin Achmad Hospital, Riau province ... For those seven days ... almarhumah .. was fighting against ... her breathing problem ... And finally Allah called her ... [Ms. Shihab: So s /] And I have never / ever [inaudible] but it was the will of Allah.

Ms. Shihab: So, she / in fact only ill for two weeks? Seven days sick at home, then [Mr. Mukhlis: Yup] after that .. Bapak brought (her) to the hospital [Mr. Mukhlis: Yup] for seven days and eventually died?

Mr. Mukhlis: Yup...

Ms. Shihab: Who is Bapak’s daughter’s name?

Mr. Mukhlis: The full name is Muhanum Anggriawati.

Ms. Shihab: What age, Pak?

Mr. Mukhlis: 12 years old.

Ms. Shihab: You brought her picture?
[00:05:31] Mr. Mukhlis: Yes. [Ms. Shihab smiling bitterly] This photograph .. the photograph of her when ... [showing a photo of his child] she was five years old, yes ...
[Ms. Shihab: hm-m] Quite aggressive she was pretty smart .. and she was .. my firstborn who has become such an inspiration to me .. for me to do better and better, that is. Meaning, in the sense of the word .. one example, she always motivated .. the dangers of smoking ... [smiling]

[00:06:00] Ms. Shihab: Hm .. Even at the age of twelve years, huh? [Smiling]

[00:06:02] Mr. Mukhlis: Yes. [Ms. Shihab: hm-m] At the age of 10 years she had said, the dangers of smoking is incredible, she said.

[00:06:06] Ms. Shihab: Prohibit you from smoking?

[00:06:07] Mr. Mukhlis: Yes. Until alhamdulilah.. Until now the cigarette has become my enemy.

[00:06:11] Ms. Shihab: My enemy? [Mr. Mukhlis: laughing slightly.] Because (you) always remember the message of (your) daughter? [Mr. Mukhlis: Remember her message.] Hm-m. [Audience clapping ...] (your) son or daughter how many are there, Mr. Mukhlis? Sir (your) sons and daughters, in addition to the el / eldest?

[00:06:22] Mr. Mukhlis: Err ... She's (one of) three. Er-the number two, a son named Adrian Abdulmanap ...

[00:06:30] Ms. Shihab: What age, Sir?

[00:06:31] Mr. Mukhlis: Age .. sss .. eleven ...

[00:06:33] Ms. Shihab: hm .. hm-m.

[00:06:34] Mr. Mukhlis: Err ... .. After him.. at the age of three and a half .. [Ms. Shihab: mm] named ... Afikah Wijat.


[00:06:47] Mr. Mukhlis: ... from the first we have been healthy. There has been no .. problem. No problem from any disease. Insha Allah until now there is no problem [inaudible]. And almarhumah did not have history .. of any disease. She is very strong .... to .. [inaudible] normal illness she / she has never t.. told. I am sick, that has never been (said).

[00:07:05] Ms. Shihab: Um ... So, there was absolutely no ... The things that at that time worries (you) until the smog becomes this heavy?

[00:07:13] Mr. Mukhlis: Right. Nothing worried me, and usual .. just as usual, then .. after the haze had started she, st / start / started .. mild cough, then yeah, you know we treated her at .. at the nearest doctor, yeah. However, over time became .. that way, finally she was referred to the hospital. [Ms. Shihab: Um] In fact at the time she was referred to the hospital.. there's never this .. never there a complain .. she also did not want (to go?) too, alright.

[00:07:43] Ms. Shihab: Did not complain? Never complaint?

[00:07:44] Mr. Mukhlis: Not once did she complained .. However, she showed .. ee .. tu showed.. that she could not breathe anymore .. pardon .. er .. her mouth was opened just like that she was .. [gesturing with hand] breathe through mouth she did... [reposition his
glasses] she once said ... [reposition his glasses] er ...... to her mother, yeah. I was working on the admittance for.. the medical treatment .. Mum ... Am I still in this world, like so... [reposition his glasses] You are still, Sweetheart ... But (she) could not see people, alright ... Finally ... over time .. she suddenly stop breathing, falling .. And she cried for help, she did. Remove all of those instruments ... But because .. (she) want .. want ... to be cured, alright. I let (her) be. But her final message she said, Mum, Is .. Anum no / no longer in this world, like that.. That is, Mbak. [Reposition his glasses]

[00:08:49] Ms. Shihab: That / that memory /

[00:08:50] Ms. Shihab: The last memory what was she said /

[00:08:51] Mr. Mukhlis: Was what said / however her memory is very remarkable [inhaling]. She was a child who ... to her Mom was very loving, yeah. She had a cooking hobby .. er .. her paporite was er / who .. Frequin who? Who? That .. chef? The one na / the famous one?


[00:09:10] Mr. Mukhlis: Aa .. she .. /

[00:09:12] Ms. Shihab: Oh likes to watch it /

[00:09:12] Mr. Mukhlis: Yes, yes. Yes / er .. making food for grandma. In fact .. even the rest of her spending she (used to) buy different kinds of meatballs for instance [Ms. Shihab: m-hm]. Miso, that is what her grandma likes. Is not it? That every time she came home from school she .. gave it hanging, thiss, the meatballs. Like so... [Ms. Shihab: m-hm]. Anyway .. how (can I say). If I remember... almahrhumah was incredible. Extraordinary. But, unexpectedly Allah just gave me a mandate to me until that age of 12.

[00:09:41] Ms. Shihab: 12 years [Mr. Mukhlis nod] and then taken away by Allah. So you make sense of it as what, make sense of the death of your daughter as what, Pak?

[00:09:49] Mr. Mukhlis: Yes if you want to make sense of it .. maybe .. all is respective to the will of Allah .. and we can only surrender, pasrah. However if you the trigger is a smoke, I invite .. representing all .. parents .. who dwell in this Indonesia ... Especially the ones affected by the smog ... If there happens .. we do not need to gri.. er .. grieve deeper. But, let us support the government, the .. volunteers /

[00:10:26] Ms. Shihab: You are not blaming .. not blaming others, not blaming the local government, not blaming the ones / the ones.. er / the ones causing this haze?

[00:10:36] Mr. Mukhlis: If we always blame, Mbak, the problem will never end. But let them work , and Insha Allah if Allah is ridho (if Allah‘s willing and let it happen)

[00:10:44] Ms. Shihab: You surrender it up (ikhlas)?

[00:10:46] Mr. Mukhlis: Insha Allah, remain surrendering it up (ikhlas). Anything. Because, we are only waiting as well, when we are going to [inaudible]

[00:10:51] Transition

[00:10:51] Mr. Nurhadi (Up Next): So, the people just .. resign (pasrah) yeah. Every year there are fires, which makes the smoke this heavy like this .. err ... just enjoy it.

[00:11:02] Commercial break
Motion graphics: The number of casualties caused by the smoke: 45,668 people in Riau, Jambi 69,734 people, 83,276 people in South Sumatra, 43,477 people in West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan 29,104 people, 36,101 people in South Kalimantan.

[00:11:32] Transition

[00:11:32] Audience clapping

[00:11:34] Ms. Shihab: I want to .. to Pak Nurhadi [reading her notes]. Er / you exactly .. where (do you) live, Pak Nurhadi? I want to know, how was your process from the location of residence, to be in here in the Metro TV studio this moment. How far?

[00:11:47] Mr. Nurhadi: Yes. If count.. counted... during the trip ... about 7 hours. So there are.. two regencies that I should have passed.

[00:12:00] Ms. Shihab: You exactly where (do you) live, Pak?

[00:12:01] Mr. Nurhadi: In the village of Mantangai Hulu, District Mantangai.

[00:12:04] Ms. Shihab: Okay.

[00:12:05] Mr. Nurhadi: Well, so from.. my village .. I have to r/ what, ride a motorcycle ..

[00:12:12] Ms. Shihab: Ride a motorcycle?

[00:12:12] Mr. Nurhadi: Yeah .. So .. departed yesterday .. at around 4 in the early morning .. [Ms. Shihab: m-hm] So riding a motorcycle, then .. also, had to cross .. Das Kapuas .. Then from there again .. er / we continue the journey alongside .. what / er / palm plantations. So, for / what, for a shortcut alternative. If we pass through the road .. the public (State) road.. .. it could take.. up to.. nine hours normally.

[00:12:45] Ms. Shihab: So you (took a ) shortcut through the palm plantations? [Mr. Nurhadi: Yeah .. That's right.] How many hours you were shorcutting?

[00:12:49] Mr. Nurhadi: Seven hours.

[00:12:49] Ms. Shihab: Seven hours? [Mr. Nurhadi: Yes.] Riding a motorcycle?

[00:12:51] Mr. Nurhadi: Yes. That is only to reach / er .. what, er / only / only to reach Palangkaraya City.

[00:12:55] Ms. Shihab: Only to reach Palangkaraya, then from there (you) boarded a plane to Jakarta?

[00:12:58] Mr. Nurhadi: Yes, yes.

[00:12:59] Ms. Shihab: So the travel .. [Mr. Nurhadi: e-hm] was very long, thank you for taking your time .. to come to Mata Najwa and tell (us your) story [audience clapping].

[00:13:07] Ms. Shihab: The travel .. the travel on a motorcycle in the middle of the plantation full of the heavy smoke how was it like?

[00:13:12] Mr. Nurhadi: Yes .. for the ride.. well very difficult, yes. Because first, other than the thick smog like that.. we are also facing the dust.. because er .. the one called the companies’ road is indeed .. surely has a traffic [Ms. Shihab: mm]. What / e / the trucks hauling fruit .. palm fruits of the company.

[00:13:34] Ms. Shihab: Yeah... so full of dust?
Mr. Nurhadi: Yes, yes [Ms. Shihab: mm]. So if .. on the trip from the village to the city of Palangkaraya it .. so this whole body .. the color of the shirt disappears ... There was only yellow, the (color of the) dust ...

Ms. Shihab: Sticking onto the whole body [Mr. Nurhadi: Yes]

Mr. Nurhadi: Sticking onto .. what / clothing ... [inaudible] [Ms. Shihab: You ..]

Ms. Shihab: You were able to seven hours of travel and .. wore a mask? [Gesturing a mask on the face]

Mr. Nurhadi: By chance ... for my trip this time I was wearing a mask. Because there was indeed from.. e / an institution in Palangkaraya, which called itself .. The Anti-Smoke Movement.

Ms. Shihab: Earlier, in [incomprehensible] / your normal life is in fact really rarely?

Mr. Nurhadi: Never wore a mask /

Ms. Shihab: Never? [Mr. Nurhadi: Yeah ..] Although the haze has been like so / e / the smoke has been so heavy, never?

Ms. Shihab: Is it only you yourself or do the average people also wear no mask?

Mr. Nurhadi: If it is in the community.. indeed.. never .. never wear a mask, because the mask has been .. well never been (given as) aided.

Ms. Shihab: Do not have? None?

Mr. Nurhadi: Do not have and also is not aided by the government ... [Ms. Shihab: mm ..] So, the people are just.. resigned (pasrah) yeah. Every year there is fire, which makes the heavy smoke like this .. er ... just enjoy it.

Ms. Shihab: How [Mr. Nurhadi: As in [inaudible]] to enjoy the smoke?

Mr. Nurhadi: Well... what else can we do, isn’t that so? Because the people.. er / do not have.. what, do not have masks, and do not have.. err...oxygen (tanks), like what people have at the urban areas, right? Still.. good for them if they could buy. Like that. But when it comes to us in the village.. say we imagine.. want to buy, buy where? Don’t even talk about oxygen, yeah? Even the masks we want to buy.. buy where... So yeah.. pray it’s like.. a habit (normalcy) alright.. for the people... to breathe the air of a smoke haze like that.

Ms. Shihab: Mr. Nurhadi, we have / er / You are diligent in uploading .. er / photos and also videos. [Mr. Nurhadi: Yes ..] What the situation is like in your village. [Mr. Nurhadi: Yes ..] In .. er / social media sites. I want us to look together at how the conditions in the hometown of Mr. Nurhadi is through .. [pointing big projector screen] the videos he uploaded on Facebook as follows.

Transition.

Video about the current condition in Kapuas, West Kalimantan.
Mr. Nurhadi (as narrator): The condition of the smoke today ... Thursday, the eighth of October ... 2015 ... Slightly decreased... [photos of a sick child and everyday life under the effect of smoke]

Transition.

Ms. Shihab: That's a glimpse of the situation that / that you .. er / uploaded on Facebook, Mr. Nurhadi. Thank you for giving it to us ... Er ... Until now is the condition still severe as it was, or has it been more er / improved?

Mr. Nurhadi: Still ... er / by the time I departed, well the normal visibility was only about 20 meters /

Ms. Shihab: 20 meters?

Mr. Nurhadi: Yes ... So nearly / nearly the same as .. the one I have uploaded .. that Pesbuk...

Ms. Shihab: Throughout your memory, in the previous years has there ever be a situation this extreme?

Mr. Nurhadi: 1997 which is ... happened s / er .. what, a heavy smoke haze like this ... The year .. other than that .. there ever happened, but never as thick .. er /

Ms. Shihab: So throughout your memory this is indeed the worst since year 97?

Mr. Nurhadi: Yes. Twice, yes [Ms. Shihab: In Central Kalimantan?] 

Ms. Shihab: Is that also what you have experienced, Mr. Mukhlis? That you and the friends in Riau feel? [Mr. Mukhlis: Right. Er /] It's never been as bad as this?

Mr. Mukhlis: It is severe ... In Riau also is severe ... Even, er ... the smoke in Riau has already been 18 years old, yes ...

Ms. Shihab: Thi / this year, the most severe year? [Mr. Mukhlis: This year ..]

Mr. Mukhlis: The most severe year. The smoke .. [Ms. Shihab: Te / tell me ..] [inaudible]

Ms. Shihab: What is it like on daily basis? Mr. Mukhlis and the children. The children still go to school?

Mr. Mukhlis: Still. Still go to school/

Ms. Shihab: Still go the school?

Mr. Mukhlis: However, yesterday was called off, was not it. By the Department of Education ... Our lives is indeed still have to wear a mask when going out. Mask. [Ms. Shihab: m-hm.] And the house the smoke also comes into.

Ms. Shihab: The house the smoke also comes into?

Mr. Mukhlis: He-em. So we use, because there is no air conditioning, we use two fans .. fans /

Ms. Shihab: To expel the smoke [Mr. Mukhlis: to expel the smoke] out of the house?

Mr. Mukhlis: One for the outside, one for er / what, er / well .. toward the door, one toward to inside, to neutralize. [Ms. Shihab: m-hm.]
Ms. Shihab: Mr. Nurhadi is also like that, even in the house there is no barrier even inside the house (you) inhale the smoke?

Mr. Nurhadi: Yes, yes. To the level .. what er / that .. night .. er / we always breathe the air, of the haze. Well, actually that is, then .. / what, my family also experiences health problems as well .. en / what / er /

Ms. Shihab: Who are the ones sick, Mr. Nurhadi?

Mr. Nurhadi: It originally happens to.. my wife... Err .. also ever treated by a midwife in the village. That was for one week .. then also.. my child, my daughter .. who is just / a seven-year-old, also experienced the same thing.

Ms. Shihab: Ref / treated in the hospital?

Mr. Nurhadi: For now they aren’t.. but still on the ongoing treatment .. So .. er ... there are five.. of my family members who experience those health problems.

Ms. Shihab: M / what do you want to say so that all citizens, who cannot directly feel the suffering, can only watch on television, only to hear, read on Facebook, what do you want to tell them ..? How is the feeling on (your) heart .. the people who are exposed to the smoke?

Mr. Mukhlis: Well ... Kindly give us your attention alright. Beg your support.. Beg your voice for.. our concerns .. who are exposed to that haze.

Ms. Shihab: Thank you, we give applause, Mr. Mukhlis. Thank you, Mr. Mukhlis. [Audience clapping]. Mr. Nurhadi, is there anything specific you want to say?

Mr. Nurhadi: We also sincerely hope, yeah, with the government. Be it the regional government or the central government.. in this case of.. err/ this smoke blanket, err/ at least can attend to.. err.. the condition of the people.. so (they) can build health centres, that can serve (the people) with no cost. Because it does, honestly, I feel that burden.. There are five people who have been.. what/ err.. sick because of.. this smoke. I feel the burden of the cost.. because (I) have to spend.. what/ err/ high expenses, to be able to/ what/ heal.. the family. Meanwhile the life in the.. the village.. err.. is very difficult nowadays.. because there are a lot of plantations.. of rubber, then the rattan plantation, which is now on fire.. err/ then/ [Ms. Shihab: So the income is no more..] Yes right/ [Ms. Shihab: Still on top of that the additional expenses..] Yes/ [Ms. Shihab: ... for the health cost] Yes.. Right.

Ms. Shihab: So you wish there will be masks at least, and free health centres at least, that can heal the people who are exposed to the smoke. [Mr. Nurhadi: Right.]

Mr. Muhammad (Up Next): If .. he burns, because / the burning was done at night, after burning that is left alright. So where would the fire spread?

Ms. Shihab: Could be up to how big is that?

Commercial break

Audience clapping

Ms. Shihab: Audience, the smog disaster has disrupted the order in the society. Adverse effects that occur are not only on the health, but also on the economy and to the
social and cultural frictions. Even, the US space agency calls that this is the worst smoke disaster throughout the history of Indonesia. Already present at the table of Mata Najwa, a former land arsonist, Muhammad, and the Forests and Plantations Campaign Manager for the Forum for Environment, Zenzi Suhadi. Good evening, Mas Zenzi [Mr. Suhadi: Good evening.] [Audience clapping], good evening, Mr. Mohammed [Mr. Mohammed: Night, night.] Thank you for coming to Mata Najwa, I want to go to Pak Mat first. You were .. formerly a land arsonist. Exactly whe / where, and how did Pak Mat and friends back then burning the land?

[00:22:07] Mr. Mohammed: About that, to be exact the area is in Ogadilir [Ms. Shihab: Ogadilir in South Sumatra?] Yes. In South Sumatra /

[00:22:12] Ms. Shihab: Pak Mat is a farmer there?
[00:22:13] Mr. Mohammed: Yes, a farmer /
[00:22:14] Ms. Shihab: Working at this company?
[00:22:18] Mr. Mohammed: Well not anymore, alright/

[00:22:19] Ms. Shihab: No more? [Mr. Mohammed: Yes.] When was the last time Pak Mat worked for this company?

[00:22:22] Mr. Mohammed: I say we work eight years ago /

[00:22:24] Ms. Shihab: But Pak Mat will tell in Mata Najwa something that still happens to this day, Pak Mat?

[00:22:29] Mr. Mohammed: It is still the same.

[00:22:31] Ms. Shihab: Okay. What's the story? How the burning is done?

[00:22:35] Mr. Mohammed: The burning at the past, the past.. the burning was at noon. Aa, at noon (we were) escorted by.. a kind of firefighters.. So that it did not spread to other place, is not it? [Ms. Shihab: m-hm.] So it could be bit by bit. But now not anymore. Since there .. there is .. regulation .. err .. Who burns.. is fined five million to 15 million, yeah? Well if we are farmers .. do not dare, Mbak, to burn that..

[00:22:08] Ms. Shihab: Pak Mat at that time / m / the.. the one ordered to burn is who?

[00:23:12] Mr. Mohammed: Well it was our boss, Sindar ..

[00:23:14] Ms. Shihab: The Supervisor at the plantation?


[00:23:16] Ms. Shihab: How large was the burnt area, Pak?

[00:23:18] Mr. Mohammed: Back then, it was limited. It used to be the limited .. limited .. probably one .. one plot. One plot was 20 hectares at most, or 25 hectares.

[00:23:29] Ms. Shihab: Two p / em-hm ...
Mr. Mohammed: But not nowadays ...

Ms. Shihab: Now how much is it?

Mr. Mohammed: If .. he burns, because / the one who burns does it at night, after burning that is left alright. So where would the fire spread?

Ms. Shihab: Could be up to how big is it?

Mr. Mohammed: Can be up to 80 hectares-ish...

Ms. Shihab: So how (do you) get paid? D / let it be just like that?

Mr. Mohammed: Let it be.. immediately left ... So / So he .. did the burning then probably what, be looked at from a distance maybe. [Ms. Shihab: mm.] So, suppose there were his friends or reporters wanting to take photographs well because it is in the night (they) would not be able to, Mbak.

Ms. Shihab: Mm. There has never been any burning in the past years there has never been.. err / the enforcement there who checked, who rebuked? The residents there have certainly seen, obviously, when the burning happened, especially when it’s at noon, daytime?

Mr. Mohammed: In fact the enforcement interns were also there alright .. I see there was also police interns. In addition there was also the army in intern.

Ms. Shihab: There were soldiers too?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes.

Ms. Shihab: And they do what?

Mr. Mohammed: Well just inspecting-ish, Mbak..

Ms. Shihab: Inspecting the burning?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes.

Ms. Shihab: So they were there at the time of burning?

Mr. Mohammed: They were... But they were just silent alright, because they were being paid, weren’t they ...

Ms. Shihab: Mm ...... And this order was from the company's management who told?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes ... Ordering to burn .. Yeah so they were just .. eer / watching from afar ...

Ms. Shihab: Mm ...... So how many years this practice has been / according to your knowledge Pak Mat?

Mr. Mohammed: From the year of 80.

Ms. Shihab: From the 80s?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes.

Ms. Shihab: And Pak Mat knows even now it is still being done? [Mr. Muhammad: Still the same ...] Still the same?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes.
Ms. Shihab: Although people are already on hype /

Mr. Mohammed: Even the one happens today, the form there is that legislation earlier alright, Mbak. So the one burning, that was, in the night .. so .. could not be hit.. that law ...

Ms. Shihab: Mm ...... Evading the rules?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes /

Ms. Shihab: So according to what Pak Mat knows, not a single one is / is hit by the legal process?

Mr. Mohammed: None, Mbak.....

Ms. Shihab: Of the farmers, of their foremen, of the Sindar no one has ever been hit?

Mr. Mohammed: Just a moment earlier there was someone .. er .. ever been caught bruning by .. er .. local police. The regional Police of Sumsel .. it was not long, Mbak.

Ms. Shihab: Not long means?

Mr. Mohammed: Just for several days (he) was in.. in the local police ...

Ms. Shihab: Then the case disappeared?

Mr. Mohammed: Disappeared.

Ms. Shihab: Mm-m ..... [holding the lower jaw] That was who at that time, what level / perpetrator level or management level?

Mr. Mohammed: Well that is the.. management. The one.. who gave orders. The one giving orders was Sindar alright... Well, s / the one .. the one being ordered was the high-level foreman....

Ms. Shihab: Mm.

Mr. Mohammed: Yes both of them were taken to the local police ... but not/

Ms. Shihab: However only a few days there?

Mr. Mohammed: Just a few days.

Ms. Shihab: The case then has no follow-up?

Mr. Mohammed: No follow-up.

Ms. Shihab: The people ever / ever reported, Pak Mat and the other farmers ever / ever reported officially, never complained, this burning .. is blatantly done under the daylight?

Mr. Mohammed: There had also been a report, Mbak. Just .. there was also no response ... Maybe we .. because we are just farmers, perhaps? Would it ever be addressed when (we are) just farmers? Only the officials get addressed, Mbak.. When it comes to us we would not.

Ms. Shihab: So never been responded to?

Mr. Mohammed: Never been responded to.
Ms. Shihab: That was your story Pak Mat alright, at the time Pak Mat was working there, then got ordered to do as such. Now, the farmers themselves don’t they sometimes burn the land right, Pak Mat?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes. Also burn, ka / however, when it comes to farmers, we burn .. that .. that .. is not as large as the company's land isn’t it .. There is obviously the burning .. but not as large an area as of the company. The company's land is very vast. When it comes to the fellow farmers the largest they would burn would only be two hectares, But since there is this new rule earlier... until now many fellow farmers have not burned any, Mbak ... Do not dare to.

Ms. Shihab: Do not dare to.

Mr. Mohammed: Do not dare to. Who would [Ms. Shihab: If ..] be willing to shell out five million to fifteen million, Mbak?

Ms. Shihab: The company, they still dare to?

Mr. Muhammad: They do .. when it comes to that, nothing’s changed... With .. the rule. Hence they burns at night ...

Ms. Shihab: Burns at night.

Mr. Mohammed: Yes.

Ms. Shihab: Right. Mas Zenzi, this m / most of them if we see the bigger picture, most of the arsonists are they farmers like the typical story of Pak Mat, or .. the companies who are paying .. to do the burning [Mr. Suhadi nodded]. for land clearing or / or for harvesting, for instance?

Mr. Suhadi: If we look at the process of burning that was one part... of the collaboratip effort, damaging ee / one landscape, in this case the forest or peat. Well, the peop / even when the people do the burning.. these people are only the operators ...

Ms. Shihab: Operators? [Mr. Suhadi: he-e] Like Pak Mat and friends back then, operators?

Mr. Suhadi: Operators. Acting operators.

Ms. Shihab: The one following .. e / the order of the company?

Mr. Suhadi: Yeah, the one following the order. Well, to this time yeah, who plan, then to the next level up, who enjoy the benefits.. from that burning process have not been touched. [Ms. Shihab: mm ..] As in... Riau, Jambi, and .. ee / South Sumatra, there was one person controlling .. almost 1.9 million hectares of forest. The one we recorded from 2010 to 2015, it was in his concession that continuously on fire. In fact, in 2015, the 52% of hotspots in South Sumatra .. they came from .. er / the concessions of er .. this individual.

Ms. Shihab: So that is individual? Individuals who ow / who.. a company, individuals? 52%? [Mr. Suhadi: One / one group.] One group? Okay. [Mr. Suhadi: One big group.]

Mr. Suhadi: But, the flagship of this group there is one person .. ee / the owner. Like so/

Ms. Shihab: And WALHI has the data, of who would be these arsonists?
Mr. Suhadi: The groups involved we have ... [Ms. Shihab: (You) have?] The groups that we have and have already identified, we categorise two modes in the burning process, which is done in forms of scenarios. The first scenario, get a legal permit first and then burn. Alternatively, the second scenario, burn first so it is legal. And they run simultaneously and massively. Throughout the provinces experiencing the fire. Including the provinces which nowadays are threatened. We predict, we can prove later, in three-four years into the future, there will be a lot of smoke, a lot of hotspots, in Papua.

Ms. Shihab: In Papua?

Mr. Suhadi: In Papua.

Ms. Shihab: A / where did this .. prediction come from? [Holding her jaw]

Mr. Suhadi: Because this scenario .. has already been started to run there.

Ms. Shihab: Legal first and then burn?

Mr. Suhadi: Legal first and then burn or burn first /

Ms. Shihab: Burn first then make it legal. [Mr. Suhadi: Yes.] What does it mean; legal first and then burn, so?

Mr. Suhadi: So in the Ministry of Forestry, back then yeah, now the Ministry of Forestry and Environment, there are two schemes .. for.. / for the release of the forest areas. The first scheme, a direct release of a forest area, by a company’s proposal. The second scheme, the release of a forest area, by a suggestion of the head of the region. Well in our findings, the companies or businessmen, they encourage a community to do exodus to a place, burn the area first, then proposal it was proposed for forest area to be released. [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] Well, the tendency of the joint team .. who recommended to the Ministry of Forestry back then, if in the area it has been declared as critical or on fire, then .. the Ministry will release the area .. to become a designated area for other purpose or [Ms. Shihab: So this is just a way to..] plantation area.

Ms. Shihab: Scenarios to get a concession [holding her jaw], using this trick.

Mr. Suhadi: That is also the fruit of the fault of the mainstream government. Treating the nature in.. Indonesia if we look at it. .. Because, in our policy, when it comes to the forest.. if it is critical, then she would be forced to production. It should have been healed (restored) if it is a critical forest. Because of this tendency to force this critical forest to produce, so these businessmen make it critical first.. the forest. Then the permit would be obtained. Like so.

Ms. Shihab: The smoke disaster caused by the forest fires is an organized crime [read her notes]. [Mr. Suhadi: Yes.] This is an organized crime? [Mr. Suhadi: An organised crime.] Done by?

Commercial break.

Ms. Shihab: There has been a loud statement by WALHI; the smoke disaster caused by the forest fires is an organized crime [read her notes]. [Mr. Suhadi: Yes.] This is an organized crime? [Mr. Suhadi: An organised crime.] Done by?

Mr. Suhadi: Collaboratively, in fact by the government, and businessmen.
Ms. Shihab: According to you the government commits the crime?
Mr. Suhadi: We say the government is a part of this because the government is the one legitimizing the crime to be done. And there is no law enforcement process against that crime. Ms. Shihab: mm. Why do we also say that the government is a part? Because in our records, from 2005 to 2015, there are 734 people who want to save the forest, who want to save the environment, they are imprisoned. Because they fought against the companies who this permit earlier. It is because of this the State has become a part that is protecting that crime. Ms. Shihab: mm. When one becomes a part that protects the crime process, then for us it has become a part of the crime itself.

Ms. Shihab: And the thing that was said by Pak Mat, that because the farmers would not be heard, and not the case with the officials. It was only Pak Mat, or do you also see that the people’s complaints are not taken seriously in the cases of the environmental law enforcement?
Mr. Suhadi: WALHI exists in 28 provinces, in all provinces we have found similar cases with Pak Mat earlier. What was expressed by Pak Mat. That is, when there is a company who commit a crime, the police, the soldiers become the vanguard to beat up the people who are against the company. That pact is real. Instead, in 2012, the arrest against the aktipists who are against the destruction of the forest were faster than the rotation of the Earth. The Earth rotates for once a day. This arrests were up to 20 people a day. Meaning?

Ms. Shihab: The activists who oppose the environmental destruction?
Mr. Suhadi: Yes.
Ms. Shihab: Often they are involved in the land conflicts there? So the problem is not as simple as it seems sometimes right, Mas Zenzi?
Mr. Suhadi: Well... I do not agree we cluster the conflict between the communities and the companies. It is a struggle for space. Prior to the conflicts for space, first there was the removal processes of the evidence containing the people’s rights. Before the companies getting the concessions. Hence, this is also a part of what we call the organised crime.

Ms. Shihab: Okay.
Mr. Suhadi: In fact, the inc/ the fire incidents, the smoke incidents, those are secondary. Might not have happened if the government took the right decision before the incident in front of their eyes.
Ms. Shihab: And often, in your opinion, it is not appropriate? Or late?
Mr. Suhadi: They are indeed wrong in their position...
Ms. Shihab: Wrong in their position?
Mr. Suhadi: Wrong in their position.
Ms. Shihab: So far, how (they) position themselves?
Mr. Suhadi: If it is in accordance to the constitutions, yeah, the law (no.) 32... The process of issuance of permits, it should have prioritized the safety of the environment, whether the environment would be sustained or not. Then, the voice of the people must be considered. Do the people reject or accept it? Well... Of... all the cases we have been
handling .. the voice of the people, the safety of the environment, have never become a primary consideration, whether a permit is worth it or not worth it.

[00:34:48] Ms. Shihab: The one becomes the primary consideration is?

[00:34:50] Mr. Suhadi: Instead we see .. the permit issuance, it is booming when .. it is toward the elections process. Meaning .. the primary consideration of the authority at the time, is what interests him at the moment. That becomes the consideration?

[00:35:04] Ms. Shihab: So often the political process becomes the primary factor to determine.. the permissions to be issued or not?

[00:35:09] Mr. Suhadi: That's what we find.

[00:35:12] Ms. Shihab: There is / what you find, then perhaps you and friends have done a series of [Mr. Suhadi: Yes,] data analysis, is that so? Can be accounted for? [Mr. Suhadi: Yes. We did verify, we can be responsible (of it).] So dur/ aft/ whenever there is a regional or national election / perhaps it happens on the national election? The 2014 election has just happened, has not it?

[00:35:24] Mr. Suhadi: In the 2009 election we found a figure for the issuance of permits, 14.7 million hectares, which is associated to that election. Why do we say that it is associated? .. In 2006, 2007, the permits issuance was normal. Ordinary. But in 2008, 2009, 2010, it soared over 300% .. How can we say that this has no correlation? Only in 2012, in 2013, it declined, in 2014, that .. was increasing, the permits issuance. Like in Riau.. There is [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] a release of a forest area, the proposal from the region was 3.2 million hectares.

[00:36:02] Ms. Shihab: So the picture is like what? The picture that because (they) approach the elections, the officials need .. need money, be lended money, once it is completed .. (and they get) elected, in order to pay the debt [gesturing quote marks] with concessions? The picture is like that?

[00:36:12] Mr. Suhadi: It seems so.

[00:36:13] Ms. Shihab: And this is mostly done by.. local government?

[00:36:16] Mr. Suhadi: The local heads who are.. incumbent.

[00:36:18] Ms. Shihab: Incumbent local head. At what stage is this? Regional level? So the regents, mayors?

[00:36:23] Mr. Suhadi: Regents, governors, each ha / ha / have an interest in .. what, in .. the e / election, that is .. where w / they have the authority, that's where they .. er / are involved in .. the crime against the natural resources .. [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] We d / do the analysis, there are 12 doors of gratification. And eight / eighteen forms of .. gratification. It was given by the businessmen, for .. the government, government officials .. [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] from the local government to the central.

[00:36:55] Ms. Shihab: So, so that is what you and the friends in WALHI found?

[00:36:59] Mr. Suhadi: Yes /

[00:36:59] Ms. Shihab: Right. Let’s give the applause for WALHI [audience clapping]. Err .. the data ... Pak Mat, Pak Mat is now a farmer? Farming what, Pak?
Mr. Mohammed: We do rubber plantation, yes ... in addition back then it was also pineapple, well the pineapple is no longer, so now we are planting potatoes.

Ms. Shihab: That is the land you own?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes, it’s my own.

Ms. Shihab: Still now still able to work the field even in a situation like this, or is it already hard again?

Mr. Mohammed: Nowadays is somewhat stagnant, Mbak.

Ms. Shihab: Stagnant?

Mr. Mohammed: Stagnant at the moment [Ms. Shihab: Already /]

Ms. Shihab: How long have you stopped farming?

Mr. Mohammed: Well the farming still continues, Mbak. Just ... I meant, the work is... dismissed at the moment because .. /

Ms. Shihab: Yeah, how long has it been stopped? The activities?

Mr. Mohammed: Now... have been months now, haven’t it.. dry, the place we are living at.

Ms. Shihab: So it has been months with no product .. from the land?

Mr. Mohammed: None from it.

Ms. Shihab: So what do you live by, Pak Mat?

Mr. Mohammed: Well still we / e-the thing.. rubber tapping, Mbak.

Ms. Shihab: Rubber tapping.

Mr. Mohammed: Yes.

Ms. Shihab: Mm. But no longer relying on the production.. err .. er / of the land Pak Mat, like that?

Mr. Mohammed: Yes.

Ms. Shihab: From tapping. Getting how much is it, Pak, normally?

Mr. Mohammed: A little, Mbak ... The most we got .. 40 kilo that is only.. per week.

Ms. Shihab: M-hm. If that is sold how much, Pak?

Mr. Mohammed: If it is sold the price now is 7,000 alright...

Ms. Shihab: Okay .. So brong / bring the money home for the family how much, Pak Mat?

Mr. Mohammed: Only more than 200.

Ms. Shihab: 200,000?

Mr. Mohammed: Hi-hi-ya [laughing].

Ms. Shihab: Per / per what was it?

Mr. Mohammed: Per week.
Ms. Shihab: Per week..
Mr. Mohammed: Yes.

Ms. Shihab: To live like that yeah, 200,000 per week. So indeed this smoke makes Pak Mat difficult to .. to earn isn't it Pak?
Mr. Mohammed: Yes.

Ms. Shihab: The impact has been so great. Are there any of your plantation which is affected by the fire Pak?
Mr. Mohammed: For now there is not..
Ms. Shihab: No? [Mr. Mohammed: Yes.] So, so the plantation is safe? [Mr. Mohammed: Yes indeed] Not affected by the fire?
Mr. Mohammed: Yes.
Ms. Shihab: O Pak Mat watch it personally?
Mr. Mohammed: Yes. So continuously watch.
Ms. Shihab: If not watched, what would that be?
Mr. Mohammed: We were afraid .. that it would be on fire, Mbak.
Ms. Shihab: Can it spread to the area?
Mr. Mohammed: Yes. We will see in court later.
Ms. Shihab: Will see in court? [Mr. Suhadi: Yes.] Are there lot of evidences you have gathered?
Mr. Suhadi: We have prepared already.
Ms. Shihab: Will win or not, the evidence? [Smiling]
Mr. Suhadi: If the judge.
Ms. Shihab: Strong enough?
Mr. Suhadi: If the judge is objectip, hopefully win.
Ms. Shihab: Must the benchmark have been easy, Ma'am? [Ms. Nurbaya: ... there must be .. the courage [laughing]] People cannot breathe anymore [gesturing view distance with hand] [Ms. Nurbaya: Right, that's what I ..] the visibility has not been visible, the people have [Ms. Nurbaya: So listen ...] been screaming and the local government did not want to do anything until it is threatened[Ms. Nurbaya: Miss .. Najwa]

Montage showing President Jokowi walks among smoke and scorched trees.

Joko Widodo, President of Indonesia: Well yesterday we.. have… asked for help, from Singapore, it is still in the process .. errrr .. Russia, and Malaysia, then Japan .. to handle peat... it's differer ... with ... handling regular forest fires. Very very different.

Ms. Shihab: And already present in the table of Mata Najwa, Minister of Environment and Forestry, Siti Nurbaya, also a member of the Committee of Smoke DPR (Indonesian Parliament), Andi Akmal Pasludin. Good evening, Bu Siti. [Ms. Nurbaya: Good evening.] [Audience clapping] Good evening, Pak Andi [Mr. Pasludin: Good evening.] Thank you for coming in Mata Najwa. [Mr. Pasludin: Yes.] I want to go to .. Ibu Siti Nurbaya first .. the government is accused of coming so late, Ibu.. in handling the smoke. Er / [reading her notes] It is stated that if only the response hadn’t been as it is now, it will not be this bad ... the smoke hit our brothers in Sumatra and Kalimantan. The government is too late?

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: The president and us have begun in Riau, er / and .. we have are already seen some of the causes and we have tried to anticipate (the fires) with the canal barriers ... [Ms. , Shihab: Mm.] Me in… December has also / err the month .. b / a lot of interaction with the.. governors in the areas of smoke concentration, ie .. Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan and South Kalimantan. So actually, err / the measures from the central government in encouraging and reminding the local government together, as well as the the businesses have actually been from December, we've done them.

Ms. Shihab: December 2014?

Nurbaya Siti, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Yep, [inaudible] /

Ms. Shihab: I got an information, you even phoned one the heads of the region, and / and threatened, in quotation marks, if (he) does not take a step, you will report (him) to the president?

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Yes, that's right. Yes-a that occurred in the evening of August 27, err / because indeed I saw that the condition had already been [spinning index fingers of both hands] er / pretty .. hard. Which in Riau that as we see, the hotspots were only 42% ... of the hotspots on 2014. So in fact if it was managed, then in fact it i/ er / e / could.. [Ms. Shihab: It would not be this bad?] could be kept on position. Yes.

Ms. Shihab: So (are) you angry [Ms. Nurbaya: Ma ..] at that time, Bu?

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: E-heh .. [laughing] ... at the time, half to 12 in the evening, because I had checked [gesturing "making barriers" with both hands] that this had already been declared as an emergency alert, because before the
emergency, we should have first been standby for emergency. I had always checked them all / I checked them all [spinning hands on one another], every time, especially with the hotspot indicator [gesturing "indicators" with both hands]. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] So if between the hotspot and the indicators of air pollution, there is a correlation, then / each time the condition becomes critical, the numbers are above 50-60-70, then I normally react immediately ... When I called the governor, I even got an answer that... this / do/ Bu, according to / err .. staff, according to the offices, according to .. our bureaucracy ... This has not been in the emergency situation yet.. Then I say, oy, Pak.. Governor, you should know that this condition has already been very risky, you do .. ess .. finish it, discuss it, and make a decision about this emergency preparedness, OR I WILL DECLARE AN OBJECTION with your performance as the governor, and I will convey it to Bapak President. That was the exact sentence.. therefore /

[00:43:45] Ms. Shihab: So you had to threaten first [Ms. Nurbaya: e-heh [laughing]] to report to the President?

[00:43:48] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: No, it is not an actual threat anyway. It was just an encouragement /

[00:43:51] Ms. Shihab: But only after Ibu said so, (the governor) made a move?

[00:43:53] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Err .. [Ms. Shihab: What was the sanction delivered (by or to?) the governor?] Later that evening g / err .. he gathered the o/ offices, at half to 12 at night, then the next day I then got.. er / document le / the governor's decision that it should be emergency alert.

[00:44:08] Ms. Shihab: May I know in what region is this governor, Bu?

[00:44:10] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Pe / the acting governor of .. Jambi.

[00:44:11] Ms. Shihab: The acting governor of Jambi?

[00:44:12] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Yup. Well, er .. after that communication indeed getting better [spinning right hand, gesturing "communication"]. Why? Because after he set .. ee / a standby for emergency, then it means that the central's resources could be deployed to the region. There are / there are the principles here. [Making circle using both hands] Me .. menazuaya ... eeee ... the fund .. that the central owns, for the disaster that is called on-call budget. Ready-to-use-fund. The ready-to-use-fund can only be worked on by a request from a region. Now, the request from the region can be worked on following certain criteria. For example first from the (requests of) this amount of regents, then it is reported to the governor, and so forth.. Well, in the field it is not easy. [Ms. Shihab: But what I.. Hm.] It eventually seems to be not easy, unless /

[00:45:02] Ms. Shihab: Should the benchmark easy at all, Bu? [Ms. Nurbaya: ... it must have the courage .. [laughing]] People could not breathe [gesturing view distance with hand] [Ms. Nurbaya: Yak, that's what I ..] visibility is terrible, people have [Ms. Nurbaya: So you see ...] been screaming and the regional government do not want to work before being threatened [Ms. Nurbaya: Ma'am .. Najwa]

[00:45:12] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Well, you see .. It/ is now been requested actually the reformation of the bureaucracy. So the regulation must also be
responsive to the situation in society. That's actually what I've always been pushing as well. [Ms. Shihab: mm.] To the friends in the bureaucracy.

[00:45:29] Transition.

[00:45:29] Mr. Pasludin: We encourage that big companies, the companies who burn / do / deliberately burn .. their permits should be revoked .. by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.

[00:45:38] Commercial break.

[00:45:43] Motion graphic titled "Law Enforcement to Combat Forest and Land", displaying police reports and information on the suspects.


[00:46:22] Ms. Shihab: I want to go to the House of Representatives. The member of you are the member of the standing committee for the haze. Exactly what would the standing committee for the haze want to see? Is one of the concerns we (just) regretting things? Not to find out who is wrong, Bu Baya, [Mrs. Nurbaya: Yes.] But this disaster is continuously recurred every year alright. How come we cannot learn from a disaster?

[00:46:38] Mr. Pasludin: Yup, we want to see that what was that / these fires etc / is a shared responsibility. [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] Yeah? The joint responsibility of all, so.. the House of Representatives encourage .. so that in the upstream we create a change revision of our legislations like that. We see that in the environmental legislation .. 32, 2009, there is an article saying that people are allowed to burn two hectares of forest. This might indeed be .. err .. what, the legalization of this regulation to do forest burning. If there is any/

[00:46:05] Ms. Shihab: Mm. So there are even laws that allow / allow people to burn up to two hectares?

[00:46:09] Mr. Pasludin: Yes that is, the legislation on / er / the environment. [Mrs. Nurbaya: Iya [nodded]]. So I guess [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] we need to revise Act 32, in the House we will revise it, and .. in the House of Representatives now, in Commission 4, err .. we will propose to Prolegnas (National Legislation Programme), that there is a regulation for the prevention of forest fires. [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] And we hope that after this there is, then.. the government implemented.. err / or a strong law enforcement [move his palm outward]. In the.. Ministry of Environment and Forestry there is an.. administrative enforcement, yeah, there are civil penalties, and in the police there are criminal sanctions. We encourage that the big companies, the companies doing the burning / do / deliberately burning .. Their permits should be revoked.. by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.

[00:47:46] Ms. Shihab: Right. we /

[00:47:47] Mr. Pasludin: And for these.. criminal sanctions I guess it should not be only.. stopped at the immediate arsons, but .. if necessary, the board of directors or the trustees. The owners should be charged .. er-what's it called, by criminal sanctions. So there is a deterrent effect not to burn in the coming years like that.

[00:47:59] Ms. Shihab: Right... [audience clapping] earlier Bu .. Siti, since the beginning we've heard that there were / eer .. stories from the smoke victims, then there had been a
friend from WALHI, and there .. Pak Mat eer .. a farmer who once did land burning, eer / Is ... the permit .. process .. that is sold .. by er / the heads of the regions.. is this also one of the causes of .. what we are witnessing now? The fire that cannot/ cannot/ cannot be measured?

[S0:48:23] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Now I ask the director generals and the directors, should be done .. the substantial consi..deration. So what is the situation in the field, the social.. indications, so that the allocation policy politics that is indeed in.. our regime is very important. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] Because selling permits is .. eer / really should no longer occur.

[S0:48:48] Ms. Shihab: But often then it occurs in the local level, doesn’t it Ibu?

[S0:48:51] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Yup, yes. Yes. Yes. [Ms. Shihab: In the provinces, or in the districts, so not in the hands of Ibu as the Minister.] Righ/

[S0:48:55] Ms. Shihab: You are saying, Ibu will be .. stronger will / would be more prudent in doing, but if the locals do not do it, it's useless.

[S0:49:02] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Earlier, earlier WALHI... said that in the permit process, there is something related to the land planning expert and so on. [Ms. Shihab: Yes.] That was the first. Second, Act 32 of 2009 also paves way to what is called a second / second line enforcement. So if the head of the region does not .. correct, or .. say suspending or revoking permits, then the Minister can do it... [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] And now we are doing it.

[S0:49:30] Ms. Shihab: Taken over by the ministry?

[S0:49:31] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Yak.

[S0:49:32] Ms. Shihab: Right ... [audience clapping] Who are those Ibu? Is there.. there.. there err / any company or permit that are difficult to be suspended by the Ministry?

[S0:49:40] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: There is already. [Ms. Shihab: Already?] There is .. alreadyy.. [Ms. Shihab: How many Bu?] We identify now there are alm / 400-ish, which .. that we should .. investigate... and 34 have been resolved already, but from the field .. er/ 27, turns on the field the terrain was too harsh, er .. what was the name / the offit / many of my supervising officers are girls and the field was quite hard (on them), strenuous terrain, far away, and so forth .. so yesterday 27 companies have been included, and we have already .. e / revoked one permit in Riau .. and .. we froze three permits, one in Riau, and two in South Sumatra, now 23 more are being prepared.. err / business entities, being prepared to be sanctioned.

[S0:50:35] Ms. Shihab: Mm .. [audience clapping] Is the sanction in the form of permit revocation?

[S0:50:37] Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Could be revocation, could be freezing, could be coercive administrative sanctions. Mbak.. Najwa, for the fils/ first time the government did the process of administrative sanctions which had not been done UNTIL now.

[S0:50:54] Ms. Shihab: So far, there had never been a sanction /
There had never been done and this is the only first time we perform administrative SANCTIONS.

Ms. Shihab: Because of what it had never been before, Ibu? [Audience clapping]

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: I guess the err / er political will of the government .. Then also, ther/ it is indeed not easy to prepare a policy. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] So er / frankly we... first Bapak President requested (us) to enforce the law ... Er / with .. I see, why the administrative sanction is important because this is where the people’s sense of justice arises... Why? Because even if the crime punishment continues, but then (they are) free, or sanctioned lightly, the one / the one who is sanctioned is of the lower levels .. er / so .. err .. The companies keeps on doing what it does, continue to .. produce, the people feel that it is not fair. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] Well, the fairest of all is do three penalties simultaneously. Criminal, civil, and administrative. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] 

Ms. Shihab: Mm. All three?

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: All three.

Ms. Shihab: Bu Siti, ee / e / the companies or groups / pru / groups .. who are allegedly in .. ee / involved, is there any difficulty or reluctance of the government to crack them down?

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: None yeah, I .. the one that I am proceeding now .. errr .. that is underway at the State Court of .. Palembang that is .. as usual [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] Indeed, in .. in .. in .. in the legal process I've been following since I have been in .. the ministry, there have already been six or seven, there are some who were freed indeed. Indeed there are some who are not criminally punished, but just asked to pay two billion. Therefo

Ms. Shihab: There is a certain suspicion on the results Ibu? [Ms. Nurbaya: No, err-werr .. yeah .. ha [laughing]] Indeed, was the evidence gathering was not successful or are there were other efforts?

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: If it comes to me I want to re / want .. better correct the internal, perhaps the legal process or legal documentation are less decent and so on, I take, we also continuously consult with the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission. But there are some who boasted .. when the Supreme Judge vindicated the fines of up to 300 .. err .. [Ms. Shihab: Billion?] Billion, and it is .. a bright point that we could do this well. The civil / process we are working on at the State Court of Palembang, that is we.. um/ civil suing seven trillion, with the consideration that the two trillion is for the environmental damage, and the 5 trillion economy is for the destruction of the economy on the society, as it was presented by Pak .. Mat / err / Pak... [Ms. Shihab: Pak Nurhadi, Pak Mat, Pak Mukhlis.] Nurhadi and Mr. Mukhlis. So there are problems or social costs that result from this problem /

Ms. Shihab: The government is suing seven trillion?

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Seven trillion.

Ms. Shihab: Mm ... Seven trillion? [Audience clapping]

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: Hm-m.
Ms. Shihab: *Ibu, the things that we are facing now are the stories in the beginning of Mata Najwa earlier, the story of Pak Mukhlis, [Ms. Nurbaya: Yup] the story of Pak Nurhadi, [Ms. Nurbaya: Yup.] who .. cannot work anymore, [Ms. Nurbaya: Yup.] So/ no earning, [Ms. Nurbaya: Yu.] but still have to pay extra for health, [Ms. Nurbaya: Right] What / What can be done .. to ease their burden, Ibu? What can be done by the government?*

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: *Now if we look at the way .. our Bapak President.. was elected, it was really because of the society ... [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] Therefore, when he does impromptu visit (blusukan) and meets the people, I had been thinking and dreaming that THEY WERE DONE BY THE GOVERNOR AND the regents ...*

Ms. Shihab: *But they are not?*

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry: *[Laughing] Maybe not yet. Transition.*

Montage of people using fire extinguishing fire using woodsticks:

Singer: Where is your soul .. .. What have I done ...To make you no longer shine...

Commercial break.

Audience clapping.

Ms. Shihab: *Err.. I want to conclude with.. eer .. an artist whose … commitment towards .. er / the environment is no longer in doubt. There is Mas Nugie. Good evening, Mas Nugie. [Mr. Nugie: Evening, Mbak Najwa [inaudible]] Thank you for coming to Mata Najwa. Err / You and the fellows environmental activists [audience clapping]. have never/ never ceased to voice concerns over the haze. What is in .. mind and in your heart when looking at the suffering of our brothers there?*

Mr. Nugie: *What I / I am still confused, because.. I had been witnessed myself... m / the first time.. er .. the smoke disaster emerged [gesturing quote with both hands] approximately on 99 ... Until now .. it continues to become a remarkable problem .. complicated [quote gesturing with both hands] and entangled: Even more when just now I was told.. there is the politics, the businesses, the interest. [Ms. Shihab: Yup.] Finally I took one conclusion that... All these nature exploitations are done for the fulfilment of the consumers... Well, I as a consumer, as a commoner, would like to invite people to c’mon, we don’t need to .. ee / blame.. someone. It’s tiring. Do it from yourself, and there are hashtags besides [pointing outward] fight against the smoke .. the hashtag fight against the smoke, there is the hashtag buy what is fair... that is buying.. the products all products, derivative products .. from .. perhaps the palm oil plantations have become the most problematic here yeah.. The derivatives of palm oil are many, but it turns out the products are not all necessarily fair. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] All we have to find out is, perhaps the analogy is if we are going to buy / go to / err .. the urban area in Jakarta, chicken noodles are being sold along one street... But finally we would select the most delicious and the others would be closed. Perhaps it is like so. Because these products are sponsored by the big companies which might not be able to be fought by ordinary people. [Ms. Shihab: Mm..] But if the consumers are against buying, I am sure the the company would be closed and will .. will not do / anymore expansion.*
[Ms. Nurbaya writes on a paper] Anyway I think, from now, this opportunity is the people’s chance to just do it [raises his fist].

[00:56:36] Ms. Shihab: Let’s give an applause to Mas Nugie. [Audience clapping] May I have one song? There is Mas Nugie’s song .. the Earth? What is the title? May I ask [Mr. Nugie: Ah-yes.] To close Mata Najwa tonight? Let’s give an applause [audience clapping].

[00:56:48] Transition.

[00:56:51] Nugie performs, accompanied by another guitarist:

And fly away
The drying leaves
In this land
It is black
The springs were clouded
In this land
Where is your magical voice, dear Earth?
Where is your soul?
What have I done
So that you no longer shine?
Hi hi! Hi hi ..
What have I done
Is my love not sincere enough for you?
Oo hoo ...

Dear Earth…

[00:58:17] Najwa’s Note bumper

[00:58:28] Ms. Shihab: The image of Indonesia as the lung of the world is dead, the forest now turned into disaster. The land-clearing permits have gone crazy, the ecological disaster has grown widespread, accumulated. Indonesia so diligently sweeps her forest. Bored with saws, she is now pouring the fire. Instead of absorbing the emission, Indonesia finishes off her forest while spreading smoke pollution. What could be more ungodly than our own behaviour, the forest owners who routinely corrupt the earth. The rate of the Indonesian forest destruction is the highest in the world. Who cares if money has become idols? Too busy chasing investments, at the expense of the people and the high environmental costs. The smoke that regularly carries an insight, that we are no longer the guardian, but a greedy predator.

[00:59:19] Outro and credits.
Appendix 2C: Data reading table using colour coding

Table 1. Who is Being Blamed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Who says</th>
<th>Timestamp</th>
<th>What is being said</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muhammad</td>
<td>00:23:12</td>
<td>“Well it was our boss, Sindar…” (The supervisor of the plantation)</td>
<td>Shihab asks Muhammad who ordered him to do land burning, to which Muhammad answered by stating the title and the name “our boss, Sindar”. For Muhammad, the one to blame is personal as well as authoritative. His blatant way of stating the one in charge is contrast with how the Police officers hid the names of individuals and state the names of the companies only by initials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(former arsonist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Suhadi (WALHI rep)</td>
<td>00:30:01; 00:30:55; 00:38:52</td>
<td>The companies or businessmen do the burning to encourage local communities to move from a future plantation area. By burning the land, the forest would be declared “critical” and thus can be released by the Ministry of Forestry to become plantation area. While Shihab probes into WALHI’s argument, she stated that WALHI “already mapped (…) the groups (of companies) (…) who were suspected, allegedly involved as arsonists” (00:38:52).</td>
<td>This understanding is shared by Adam, my WALHI correspondence in Pontianak, West Kalimantan.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Suhadi (WALHI rep)</td>
<td>00:30:55; 00:31:48; 00:32:43; 00:33:51</td>
<td>The mainstream government and its faulty policy about the forest. Critical forest should not be forced to produce, but restored (00:30:55). The government is deemed as a part of the crime because of its legitimizing power, its protection, and its negligence toward the crime. In addition, the government also imprisons 734 people who wanted to save the forests because they “fought” (melawan) against the companies (00:31:48). The police and the</td>
<td>Here the government and its apparatus’ crimes are described with active verbs: “legitimizing” (melegitimasi), “protecting” (melindungi), “beat up” (menghajar), and “arresting” (melakukan penangkapan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The army become the “vanguard” (bagian terdepan) to “beat up” (menghajar) the people who oppose the companies (00:32:43).

Furthermore, the government did not “take the right decision” to prevent the fires before they happen (00:33:51).

4. 00:31:42 The government and the businessmen as a collaborative.

5. 00:36:16; 00:36:23 The (corrupt) incumbent local heads at the governor/regent level, up to the central government all give permits to be bartered with campaign funding for elections.

6. Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry 00:42:40; 00:44:10; 00:45:02; 00:54:05 After telling Shihab about what she had done to lead the local government to announce the emergency status, she proceeds to tell how she “threaten” the acting governor of Jambi.

Throughout her comments, even though implicit, the central government here is mostly portrayed as the authoritative figure who has done very well, while the regional governments become the ones to blame of their slow response to the emergency state. This is strengthened later in the discussion, when Siti Nurbaya compares what is done by President Joko Widodo and what is done by the “governors and regents” (00:54:05).

7. Pasludin (Member of the Standing Committee for the Haze) 00:46:38 The fires are said as “a shared responsibility”, “the joint responsibility of all”. But there is no further explanation of what “all” means. Pasludin only proceeds to tell that the legislations need to be revised.

8. 00:47:09 Here Pasludin encourage the permit revocation of “the big companies, the companies doing the burning”.
9. Nugie (singer and environmental activist) 00:56:51 In the song, Nugie looks into himself, “What have I done”.

10. Shihab 00:58:28 The forest owners who corrupt the earth, money, the pursuit for investments.

Table 2. Who suffers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Who says</th>
<th>Timestamp</th>
<th>What is being said</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>MetroTV</td>
<td>00:02:07</td>
<td>The media itself posits the sick, the death, the children, youngsters as victims. But they are not only inactive victims, but the ones who protests in signs and texts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td>00:03:15-20</td>
<td>The portrayal of children as victims seems to be important to the media, which would be the base for the decision to employ children narrators. Here the children narrators say that the haze “has robbed our health by force” and “claimed our precious time”, while the images of sick and hospitalised children are shown on the screen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00:03:15</td>
<td>The choosing of the child victims is also implied by the decision to choose Muchlis to become the speaker.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mukhlis</td>
<td>00:05:31</td>
<td>Muchlis shows his 5 years old daughter’s photograph, who was “pretty smart”, “an inspiration to do better and better”, etc.</td>
<td>Muchlis’ daughter was 12 years old when she died. Muchlis could have brought the most recent passport photograph of his daughter, maybe taken from her academic report sheet. However, he chooses to bring her childhood photograph. What does he mean by this? Does he want to incite compassion by showing a little girl’s photo instead of a teenager?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>MetroTV</td>
<td>00:11:07</td>
<td>Victims are also represented by figures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nurhadi</td>
<td>00:14:58</td>
<td>The people who “do not have masks, (...) oxygen tanks” the people in the villages who don’t live in “urban areas” and thus do not have access to buy masks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>00:16:05</td>
<td>In his documentation, Nurhadi shows photos of a sick child (his daughter) and everyday life under the smoke.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>00:18:50</td>
<td>Wife, who was treated by a midwife of the village, his seven year old daughter. Both experience difficulty breathing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>00:19:59</td>
<td>Here Nurhadi portrays himself as a breadwinner of his family. He feels the “burden” of health cost” of five members of the family who are sick because of the smoke.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shihab</td>
<td>00:21:29</td>
<td>The order of the society is disrupted. “Adverse effects (...) on the economy and to the social and cultural frictions”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Suhadi (WALHI representative)</td>
<td>00:30:01</td>
<td>The people living in the surrounding area of the burnt forests. They are forced to exodus by the fires started by the “companies or businessmen”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>00:31:48;</td>
<td>The “734 people .. who want to save the forest, who want to save the environment,” who are imprisoned by the State because of their fight against the companies responsible for the burning.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00:32:43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shihab</td>
<td>00:45:02</td>
<td>In the context of the slowness of the supposedly regional governments to do benchmarking, the victims are “the people” who “could not breathe”, the visibility, the people “screaming”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Siti Nurbaya</td>
<td>00:52:44</td>
<td>“Social costs” that was defined by the figure of “5 trillion (...) economy of the society”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Shihab</td>
<td>00:53:46</td>
<td>Here Shihab is listing the stories of the supposed victims of the smoke, which are Muchlis and Nurhadi “who cannot work anymore” and have “no earning but still have to pay extra for health (service)”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here Shihab only explains Nurhadi’s problem while Muchlis’ problem is not stated explicitly. Is it because that death is taboo to be talked about, or that death is
Table 3. How does the subject reacts to the Haze?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Commentaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muchlis</td>
<td>00:09:49; 00:10:26; 00:10:36; 00:10:44</td>
<td>“We can only surrender (pasrah)”. “We do not need to (…) grieve deeper” but to “support the government, the volunteers”. When Najwa asks that he does not blame others, not the local government, not the ones responsible, Nurhadi states that “the problem will never end” if “we always blame” (00:10:36). But “let them work”. Najwa clarifies once again if Muchlis surrenders it up (ikhlas) (00:10:44), and once again Muchlis confirms, “Insha Allah, remain surrendering it up (ikhlas)” (00:10:46).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Nurhadi</td>
<td>00:14:00</td>
<td>Nurhadi only wears a mask when given by “an institution in Palangkaraya” (00:14:00) but “never wore a mask” before (00:14:19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td>00:14:38</td>
<td>Every year there is fire and heavy smoke, he says he “enjoys it”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Muchlis</td>
<td>00:17:56</td>
<td>Amidst the smoke, Muchlis’ family still take their children to school.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td>00:17:58</td>
<td>Muchlis and his family always “wear a mask when going out”, while at home he uses “two fans (…) one toward the door, one toward the inside, to neutralise”</td>
<td>Here Muchlis states that they only wear masks only when “going out”; but at least in Riau it seems that they have better access to masks compared to the people in Kalimantan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...so obvious that it is not necessary to be mentioned again and again?
Muchlis’ solution to the smoke problem inside the house is placing two fans which are oppositely directed. While this shows effort, what is done is ineffective, because they are virtually surrounded by smoke.

6. Mohammed (former land arsonist) 00:37:48; 00:37:53 “Rubber tapping” is how Mohammed cope with his live demands. He can “no longer rely on the land”.

7. Mohammed 00:38:39-44 Mohammed keep his plantation safe by watching it continuously, personally

8. Suhadi 00:39:21-44 WALHI “set up legal move” and “gather evidences”. In 2015 (the year of interview), “we opened posts for complains (…) for communities in 15 provinces.” The complaints are used for the base of “compensation by the companies” when WALHI “sue these companies in 2015”.

9. President Jokowi 00:40:21 “We have asked for help from Singapore (…), Russia, and Malaysia, then Japan” to handle the peat fire.

10. Siti Nurbaya 00:41:24 “The president and us” have “seen some of the causes”, “tried to anticipate with the canal barriers”, “has a lot of interaction with the governors”, “encourage and remind the local government as well as the businesses from December”

Here Siti Nurbaya Bakar shows the unique bureaucratic responses that also can be found at other speeches of government officials. The central government, in this case the Ministry of Forestry and Environment portray itself as a coordinator of the local governments and an enforcer of businesses.

11. 00:42:06; 42:13-48 Shihab asks for confirmation that Siti Nurbaya has called one of the heads of the region and “threatened, in quotation marks (that) if (he) does not take any step, (Nurbaya) will report (him) to the president”.

To this question, Nurbaya sums her response: “No, it is not an actual threat anyway. It was just an encouragement”. The story told by Nurbaya about the incident states the date, the exact time of the call, and what is spoken on the phone.

Nurbaya’s “encouragement” story portrays herself as the commanding figure in the State hierarchy who is morally and factually right, while the governor is portrayed as ignorant and bureaucratic. However, Nurbaya’s explicit drive to act is seemingly the procedures, figures, and performance assessment (“I WILL DECLARE AN OBJECTION with your performance”) rather than the risks faced by the people and the environment. The “encouragement” statement as told by Nurbaya involves hierarchyism, which uses a higher person in the hierarchy, in this case the
The story ends with Nurbaya says the “exact sentence” of the “encouragement”, which is “you should know that this condition has already been very risky, you do .. ess .. finish it, discuss it, and make a decision about this emergency preparedness, OR I WILL DECLARE AN OBJECTION with your performance as the governor, and I will convey it to Bapak President.”

President, to force the lower person in the hierarchy into action.

Nurbaya (and Shihab) proceeds to confirm that the hierarchism “encouragement” works effectively (00:43:51-53).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12.</th>
<th>Nurbaya “pushes” the “reformation of the bureaucracy”, which is more related to the “regulations” rather than the bureaucrats themselves. This is the responsibility of “the friends in the bureaucracy”.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00:45:12</td>
<td>Even though she was seemingly blaming the local governments as the ones too slow to act and then tell a story about how hierarchism seems to work, Nurbaya singles the revision of legislations as the drive to the local governments to work faster. Consequently, “the friends in the bureaucracy” or the House of Representatives become the one responsible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13.</th>
<th>Representing the House of Representatives, Pasludin says that because the fire is “the joint responsibility of all”, “the House of Representatives encourage” a “revision of our legislations” in the “upstream”. He then explains the “need to revise Act 32, in the House (of Representatives)” and that “we will propose to National Legislation Programme” that “there is a regulation for the prevention of forest fires”. Then Pasludin “hopes that (…) the government implemented (…) or a strong law enforcement (…). In the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (…) administrative enforcement, (…) civil penalties) and in the police there are criminal sanctions.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pasludin (Member of the Standing Committee for the Haze in the House of Representatives)</td>
<td>Pasludin follows hierarchism patterns as shown by other government officials. Even though the House of Representatives is the legislative body of the State that has access to legal change, his statements are “to encourage” and to “propose”. The change is supposed to happen “in the upstream”. These promises have no applicable timeline, which show that they might be empty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00:46:38; 00:47:09</td>
<td>The next statement is the “hopes” of Pasludin that something would be done by the “government”. His definition of “government” does not seemingly include himself as the legislative member and the Representation of the People.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14.</th>
<th>“So if the head of the region does not .. correct, or .. say suspending or revoking permits, then the Minister can do it... [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] And now we are doing it.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Siti Nurbaya</td>
<td>00:49:02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 15. | 00:49:40; 00:52:10 | In response to Shihab’s question, Nurbaya explains the numbers of the companies to be investigated, whose cases have been resolved, and are being investigated. She then proceeds to tell that the “harsh”, “strenuous” and “far away” terrain is “hard” on the supervising officers, especially the “girls”. She tells the audience that “27 companies have been included in (administrative) sanction list” while they “have already revoked one permit in Riau (...) and two in South Sumatera”.

It’s interesting how the investigations done by the Ministry of Forestry and Environment are seemingly heavy on Sumatera, while there is no statement about Kalimantan.

Siti Nurbaya also implies that the “girls” are victimised by the hard work. Is she inciting compassion in the audience? | 00:49:40; 00:52:10 | In response to Shihab’s question, Nurbaya explains the numbers of the companies to be investigated, whose cases have been resolved, and are being investigated. She then proceeds to tell that the “harsh”, “strenuous” and “far away” terrain is “hard” on the supervising officers, especially the “girls”. She tells the audience that “27 companies have been included in (administrative) sanction list” while they “have already revoked one permit in Riau (...) and two in South Sumatera”.

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Siti Nurbaya also implies that the “girls” are victimised by the hard work. Is she inciting compassion in the audience? |
| 16. | 00:50:37; 00:50:55 | Three sanctions by the Ministry: Revocation, freezing, coercive administrative sanctions. Nurbaya then proceeds to argue that “for the first time the government did the process of administrative sanctions which had not been done UNTIL now.” She repeats this statement again when Shihab confirms it (00:50:55) which prompts the audience appreciation (hands clapping).

Nurbaya states her personal hope to “correct the internal, perhaps the legal process or legal documentation” while also “continuously consult with the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission”.

The figures are amazing, almost impossible. However, it is later understood that the 7 trillion sanction would never be done. The legal process against the company was dropped by Judge Parlas Nababan at an absurd reason that “the forest can always grow again”. The failure prompts public outrage in social media. | 00:50:37; 00:50:55 | Three sanctions by the Ministry: Revocation, freezing, coercive administrative sanctions. Nurbaya then proceeds to argue that “for the first time the government did the process of administrative sanctions which had not been done UNTIL now.” She repeats this statement again when Shihab confirms it (00:50:55) which prompts the audience appreciation (hands clapping).

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| 17. | 00:52:44 | Nurbaya states her personal hope to “correct the internal, perhaps the legal process or legal documentation” while also “continuously consult with the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission”.

Nurbaya proceeds to state the figures involved in the legal processes being processed by the government against the companies, first 300 billion rupiah (23 million USD), then 7 trillion rupiah (560 million USD). When Shihab tries to confirm it and Nurbaya reconfirm it, the audience clap hands. |
| 18. | 00:52:44 | Nurbaya states her personal hope to “correct the internal, perhaps the legal process or legal documentation” while also “continuously consult with the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission”.

Nurbaya proceeds to state the figures involved in the legal processes being processed by the government against the companies, first 300 billion rupiah (23 million USD), then 7 trillion rupiah (560 million USD). When Shihab tries to confirm it and Nurbaya reconfirm it, the audience clap hands. |
| 19. | 00:53:46; 00:54:05 | When asked by Shihab about “what can be done by the government” to “ease the people’s burden” of death and loss of livinghood, Nurbaya answers with: “Now if we look at the way .. our Bapak President.. was elected, it was really because of the society ... [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] Therefore, when he does impromptu visit (blusukan) and meets the people, I had been |

Here Nurbaya perceives that the solution to the “burden” of the people is impromptu visits done by the President. She then emphasise that the governors and regents should also do that. However, does this solve the real problems? She seems to see the people’s grief as only emotional, which then be solved again by hierarchism, when the elites show their sympathy by doing “blusukan” and meet with the commoners. | 00:53:46; 00:54:05 | When asked by Shihab about “what can be done by the government” to “ease the people’s burden” of death and loss of livinghood, Nurbaya answers with: “Now if we look at the way .. our Bapak President.. was elected, it was really because of the society ... [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] Therefore, when he does impromptu visit (blusukan) and meets the people, I had been |

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thinking and dreaming that THEY WERE DONE BY THE GOVERNOR AND the regents ...”

20. Nugie (musician, environmental activist) 00:55:09 Nugie, “as a consumer, as a commoner” invites people not to blame someone because “it’s tiring”, to solve the problem “from yourself” by “buying what is fair”. He advises the audience to choose the derivative products of palm oil gained by fair trading.

Nugie’s argument seems to be smart and realistic to the “consumer” and “commoner”. His overall tone is also empowering, which puts the success of the “fight against the smoke” at the hands of the consumers. However, he does not explain how his idea can be achieved in practice. There is currently no way to know whether a derivative palm oil product is fairly gained or not. Consequently, Nugie’s idea is only a wishful thinking.

Table 4. How does the speaker make sense of the Haze?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Who says</th>
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<th>What is being said</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Shihab</td>
<td>00:01:19</td>
<td>As an opening, Shihab says: “The forest fire and smoke is getting worse, despite the pride of the government finally gave up (takluk)... What can we do, my friend? Two months of living under siege thick smoke suffocating lung ... Since the first burn of forest has been incredible ... The last ten years of smoke is getting worse ... Formerly burning for farming, is rampant in the concession industry ... Concentrated black soared from thousands of hotspots smoke barely The delay handling control ... aggravate the condition, often recurrent disasters like tradition ...”</td>
<td>Here Shihab portrays the “proud” government who “subdues” to the forest burning and the smoke. But what does she mean by this statement? Is the statement associated with the regional government who finally announced the emergency status? Or that the central and regional governments eventually take actions? Shihab then proceeds to frame the smoke as happening in the industrial concessions. The fires are also described as uncontrollable; worsen by the slow treatment, until the disaster becomes a “tradition”. On 00:02:04, however, Najwa entitles her session “Against the Smoke”. The smoke seemingly become the main enemy targeted, probably regarding to the human casualties caused by it. This explanation can be confirmed by the proceeding video montage and narrations that shows children casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Muchlis</td>
<td>00:04:02; 00:09:49;</td>
<td>Muchlis sees that the death of his daughter is triggered by the smoke. However, when “you talk (about it), it is Muchlis’ frame of meaning is an example of a theodicy in viewing human-caused disaster. The death (and</td>
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Muchlis then proceeds to tell the chronology of his daughter’s sickness and death, which he ends with “finally Allah called her”. However, before he sums it with “it was the will of Allah”, he sounds to want to say something which is left unfinished: “I have never/ever [inaudible]” (00:04:02).

At 00:09:49 again emphasise how the haze means for him when Shihab asked him about how he makes sense of his daughter’s death. He says, “All is respective to the will of Allah .. and we can only surrender, pasrah. However if you the trigger is a smoke, I invite .. representing all.. parents .. who dwell in this Indonesia ... Especially the ones affected by the smog ... If there happens .. we do not need to grieve deeper. But, let us support the government, the .. volunteers /”

At 00:10:36 Muchlis advises to “let them work and isha allah if allah is ridho (Allah is willing and let it happen).

At 00:10:46 Muchlis ends his first session with “Insha Allah, remain surrendering it up (ikhlas). Anything. Because, we are only waiting as well, when we are going to [inaudible]” suffering) is viewed as beyond human, as a “destiny” and “the will of Allah”, and thus the logical response is to surrender (pasrah) and to accept (terima).

At the end of the interview, Muchlis once again frames his daughter’s death as the “will of Allah” and that “surrender” (“pasrah” or “ikhlas”) is the “only” viable response to it. He even argues that grieving is not an option, and then proceeds to encourage the audience to support the government and volunteers and “let them work”. However, even the success of the government is framed as Allah’s will.

Muchlis ends his first part with a statement which sums up his worldview about the Haze and suffering, that death is inevitable and that “we are only waiting”. To this time, the word “surrender” (“ikhlas” or “pasrah”) has been repeated thrice.

Muchlis first session exposes his fatalistic view regarding the human-caused disaster, while at the same time implies Muchlis unconditional trust to the "government and volunteers" to solve the problem.

3. Nurhadi 00:14:58

After Najwa asks him how he “enjoy the smoke”, Nurhadi explains that he has nothing else that can be done. Then he proceeds to compare the access to the masks experienced by the villagers and urban dwellers. He closes his statement with: “Don’t even talk about oxygen, yeah? Even the masks we want to buy... buy where... So yeah.. pray it’s like.. a habit (normalcy)
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Muchlis</td>
<td>00:19:39</td>
<td>Najwa asked Muchlis if he wants to say something to the audience who can only watch his experience through the television. He answers, “Kindly give us your attention alright. Beg your support.. Beg your voice for.. our concerns .. who are exposed to that haze.”</td>
<td>Attention, support, and voice are the three things Muchlis asked from his audience.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Nurhadi</td>
<td>00:19:59</td>
<td>“We also sincerely hope, yeah, with the government. Be it the regional government or the central government.. in this case of.. err/ this smoke blanket, err/ at least can attend to.. err.. the condition of the people.. so (they) can build health centres, that can serve (the people) with no cost.. Because it does, honestly, I feel that burden.. There are five people who have been.. what/ err.. sick because of.. this smoke, I feel the burden of the cost.. because (I) have to spend.. what/ err/ high expenses, to be able to/ what/ heal.. the family. Meanwhile the life in the.. the village.. err.. is very difficult nowadays.. because there are a lot of plantations.. of rubber, then the rattan plantation, which is now on fire.. err/ then/ [Ms. Shihab: So the income is no more..] Yes right/ [Ms. Shihab: Still on top of that the additional expenses..] Yes/ [Ms. Shihab: .. for the health cost] Yes.. Right.”</td>
<td>“Attend to the condition of the people” which Nurhadi sees as mainly the health cost and loss of income. Here Nurhadi frames the smoke blanket problem as an economic one.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
<td>00:22:35</td>
<td>“The burning at the past, the past.. the burning was at noon. Aa, at noon (we were) escorted by.. a kind of firefighters... So that it did not spread to other place, is not it? [Ms. Shihab: m-hmn.] So it could be bit by bit.. But not now anymore. Since there .. there is .. regulation .. err .. Who burns... .. is fined five million to 15 million, yeah! Well if we are farmers .. do not dare, Mbak, to burn that...”</td>
<td>Mohammed compares the past burning and current burning modus. “We”, the farmers do not dare to burn because of fear of money-based sanction.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
<td>00:23:50-25:59</td>
<td>Mohammed and Najwa chat about how the company avoid getting hit by the law. Including in this section is</td>
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how the alleged supervisor was not held for long in the local police office.

| 8. | Mohammed | 00:26:12-00:26:43 | Mohammed was asked whether the case had follow-up or not, to which Mohammed answers: there was also no response ... Maybe we .. because we are just farmers, perhaps? Would it ever be addressed when (we are) just farmers? Only the officials get addressed, Mbak.. When it comes to us we would not.” Here the problem becomes a class-problem. The response to farmers is different compared to the “officials” (Pejabat). |
| 9. | Suhadi | 00:27:50-00:28:15 | If we look at the process of burning that was one part… of the collaboratif effort, damaging ee / one landscape, in this case the forest or peat. Well, the peop / even when the people do the burning.. these people are only the operators … Suhadi singles out companies as the arsons while the “people” are only operators who follow orders (00:28:15) |
| 10. | Suhadi | 00:30:55 | Suhadi frames the problem as the “fruit of the fault of the mainstream government”. He proceeds to explain the permit policies in regards to the critical forest. |
| 11. | Suhadi | 00:33:23-51 | Suhadi: Often they are involved in the land.. conflicts there? So the problem is not as simple as it seems sometimes right, Mas Zenzi? Suhadi: Well .. I do not agree we cluster .. the conflict between the communities and the companies. It is a struggle for a space... Prior to the conflicts for space, first there were the removal processes of the evidence containing the people’s rights. Before [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] the companies getting the concessions. Hence, this is also a part of what we call the organised crime. (…) In fact, the inci/ the fire incidents, the smoke incidents, those are secondary. Suhadi connects the land conflicts with the smoke and frame it as “The struggle for space” and “organised crime” conducted by a collaboration between the government and the businessmen (00:31:42). The fire incidents are “secondary” to what Suhadi perceives as the root. |
| 12. | Suhadi | 00:34:18 | “If it is in accordance to the constitutions, yeah, the law (no.) 32 ... The process of issuance of permits, it should have prioritized the safety of the environment, whether the environment would be sustained or not. Then, the |
voice of the people must be considered. Do the people reject or accept it? Well.. Of.. all the cases we have been handling .. the voice of the people, the safety of the environment, have never become a primary consideration, whether a permit is worth it or not worth it.”

13. Suhadi 00:34:48-00:36:23
[00:34:48] Ms. Shihab: The one becomes the primary consideration is?
[00:34:50] Mr. Suhadi: Instead we see .. the permit issuance, it is booming when .. it is toward the elections process. Meaning.. the primary consideration of the authority at the time, is what interests him at the moment. That becomes the consideration /
[00:35:04] Ms. Shihab: So often the political process becomes the primary factor to determine.. the permissions to be issued or not?
[00:35:09] Mr. Suhadi: That’s what we find.
[00:35:12] Ms. Shihab: There is / what you find, then perhaps you and friends have done a series of [Mr. Suhadi: Yes.] data analysis, is that so? Can be accounted for? [Mr. Suhadi: Yes. We did verify, we can be responsible (of it).] So dur/ aft/ whenever there is a regional or national election / perhaps it happens on the national election? The 2014 election has just happened, has not it?
[00:35:24] Mr. Suhadi: In the 2009 election we found a figure for the issuance of permits, 14.7 million hectares, which is associated to that election. Why do we say that it is associated? .. In 2006, 2007, the permits issuance was normal. Ordinary. But in 2008, 2009, 2010, it soared over 300% ... How can we say that this has no correlation? Only in 2012, in 2013, it declined, in 2014, that .. was increasing, the permits issuance. Like in Riau.. There is [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] a

“The primary consideration” of the people in the government according to Suhadi is not the “voice of the people” or “the safety of the environment”, but the election process. Suhadi bases his data on “what we find”, which can be verified.
release of a forest area, the proposal from the region was 3.2 million hectares

[00:36:02] Ms. Shihab: So the picture is like what? The picture that because (they) approach the elections, the officials need .. need money, be lended money, once it is completed .. (and they get) elected, in order to pay the debt [gesturing quote marks] with concessions? The picture is like that?

[00:36:12] Mr. Suhadi: It seems so.

[00:36:13] Ms. Shihab: And this is mostly done by.. local government?

[00:36:16] Mr. Suhadi: The local heads who are.. incumbent.

[00:36:18] Ms. Shihab: Incumbent local head. At what stage is this? Regional level? So the regents, mayors?

[00:36:23] Mr. Suhadi: Regents, governors.. each ha / ha / have an interest in .. what, in .. the e / election, that is .. where w / they have the authority, that's where they .. er / are involved in .. the crime against the natural resources .. [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] We d / do the analysis, there are 12 doors of gratipication. And eight / eighteen forms of... gratipication. It was given by the businessmen, for .. the government, government officials .. [Ms. Shihab: Okay.] From the local government to the central.

[00:36:55] Ms. Shihab: So, so that is what you and the friends in WALHI found?

[00:36:59] Mr. Suhadi: Yes /

14. Shihab and Mohammed 00:37:18- 00:38:51 Here Shihab and Mohammed discuss the loss of income that Mohammed experiences due to the fire and smoke. Muhammed explains that he does rubber tapping to cope. Here the problem for “Mohammad the ex-arson” is an economic one. The smoke makes Mohammed “difficult to earn”. Shihab does not ask about the health or home like she does toward Muchlis and Nurhadi earlier.
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| **15.** | Suhadi | 00:38:52-00:39:48 | When challenged by Shihab that WALHI is said to only be able to point their fingers, Suhadi answers that they have opened posts in 15 provinces and that they have set up a legal move.  
However, the win or lose of the “evidence” will depend on the “judge” who is “objective”. | Suhadi understands that the success of his “evidence” depends on the subjective individual who says the last word, not the procedural law itself. |
| **16.** | Siti Nurbaya | 00:44:12 | Informative information about emergency ready to use funding and how it can be utilised |   |
| **17.** | Nugie | 00:55:09 | Nugie singles consumerism as the root of “all these nature exploitations”.  
“These products are sponsored by the big companies which might not be able to be fought by ordinary people. [Ms. Shihab: Mm.] But if the consumers are against buying, I am sure the the company would be closed and will.. will not do / anymore expansion. [Ms. Shihab: So it is a very powerful coercive force?] [Ms. Nurbaya writes on a paper] Anyway I think... from now, this opportunity is the people’s chance to just do it [raises his fist].” | For Nugie, the problem of smoke is the problem of the consumers’ consumption. So the solution for him is to use the coercive power of consumption. Here the fight is between “the big companies” and “the ordinary people”. |
| **18.** | Shihab | 00:58:28 | Shihab ends the show with a prosaic closing statement.  
“The image of Indonesia as the lung of the world is dead, the forest now turned into disaster. The land-clearing permits have gone crazy, the ecological disaster has grown widespread, accumulated. Indonesia so diligently sweeps her forest. Bored with saws, she is now pouring the fire. Instead of absorbing the emission, Indonesia finishes off her forest while spreading smoke pollution. What could be more ungodly than our own behaviour, the forest owners who routinely corrupt the earth. The rate of the Indonesian forest destruction is the highest in the world. Who cares if money has become idols? Too busy chasing investments, at the expense of the people | Mata Najwa has a ritual of prosaic opening and closing which is done in every show.  
The closing statement of Najwa is morally constructed, using the words “ungodly”, “corrupt”, “idols” and “greedy predator”. The actors here are firstly “Indonesia and secondly “us, the forest owners”. Najwa frames the problem of the smoke as the problem of greed and consumption. |
and the high environmental costs. The smoke that regularly carries an insight; that we are no longer the guardian, but a greedy predator.”

Table 5. How does the speaker describe how others react or make sense of the Haze?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Who says</th>
<th>Timestamp</th>
<th>What is being said</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Nurhadi</td>
<td>00:14:28-38</td>
<td>If it is in the community.. indeed.. never .. never wear a mask, because the mask has been .. well never been (given as) aided. [00:14:37] Ms. Shihab: Because do not have? None? [00:14:38] Mr. Nurhadi: Do not have and also is not aided by the government ... [Ms. Shihab: mm ..] So, the people are just.. resigned (pasrah) yeah</td>
<td>Either Nurhadi is talking about himself or the actual “community” (masyarakat, society), he says the people are just “resigned” (pasrah) because the masks are not given by the authority figure, which is the government.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Shihab</td>
<td>00:19:24</td>
<td>What do you want to say so that all citizens, who cannot directly feel the suffering, can only watch on television, only to hear, read on Facebook, what do you want to tell them ..? How is the feeling on (your) heart .. the people who are exposed to the smoke?</td>
<td>For Najwa, the “citizens” mean the people who are not directly exposed to the experience of the victims, which are “the people who are exposed to the smoke”. Najwa wants Muchlis to speak as if he is speaking heart to heart.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
<td>00:24:19-41</td>
<td>[00:24:08] Ms. Shihab: Mm. There has never been any burning in the past years there has never been.. err / the enforcement there who checked, who rebuked? The residents there have certainly seen, obviously, when the burning happened, especially when it’s at noon, daytime? [00:24:19] Mr. Mohammed: In fact the enforcement interns were also there alright .. I see there were also police interns. In addition there was also the army in intern. [00:24:31] Ms. Shihab: There were soldiers too? [00:24:32] Mr. Mohammed: Yes. [00:24:33] Ms. Shihab: And they do what?</td>
<td>Najwa asks about the responses of two sides: The enforcement (state apparatus) and the residents surrounding the area. However, Mohammed only speaks about the response of the enforcement, which includes the police and the army interns.</td>
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[00:24:39] Ms. Shihab: So they were there at the time of burning?<br>[00:24:41] Mr. Mohammed: They were... But they were just silent alright, because they were being paid, weren’t they ...

| 4. | Suhadi | 00:34:18<br>
“… the voice of the people, the safety of the environment, have never become a primary consideration, whether a permit is worth it or not worth it.”<br>

| 5. | Shihab | 00:38:52<br>
WALHI is accused, fellows NGO, those guys can only point their fingers. This association of the companies, or later the companies who / who are alleged state; there has never been any evidence. Only able to.. um / accuse randomly these WALHI and friends. They do not feel involved.

| 6. | Metro TV | 00:40:06<br>
Montage showing President Jokowi walks among smoke and scorched trees.<br>

| 7. | Siti Nurbaya | 00:42:40-00:43:11<br>
Siti Nurbaya retells the “encouragement” incident with the governor of Jambi<br>

|   |   | “The voice of the people” and “the safety of the environment” is what Suhadi thinks are not prioritised by the government. Later Suhadi argues that local government election is the primary drive of the permit issuance.

|   |   | Shihab does not state who says that, utilising passive sentence.

|   |   | The montage of the president walking among the burnt land is portrayed often in the media. It portrays the president as “willing to get his hands dirty” (berani kotor)

|   |   | After listing the things that the she and the central government have done, she proceeds as if to compare her performance with the governor. At first, Nurbaya doesn’t state which governor she’s talking about, creating speculations and singles out any “governor”. She only specifies the person when she was asked by Najwa. Even so, turns out the one talked about is not even the elected governor, but the acting governor.
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<th>Siti Nurbaya</th>
<th>00:45:12</th>
<th>So the regulation must also be responsive to the situation in society.</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Pasludin</td>
<td>00:47:09-00:47:47</td>
<td>After telling about the proposal for legislation change, Pasludin lists “our hopes” which are “the government implemented… err / or a strong law enforcement [move his palm outward]. In the.. Ministry of Environment and Forestry there is an.. administrative enforcement, yeah, there are civil penalties, and in the police there are criminal sanctions. We encourage that the big companies, the companies doing the burning / do..er / deliberately burning .. Their permits should be revoked.. by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. [00:47:47] Mr. Pasludin: And for these… criminal sanctions I guess it should not be only.. stopped at the immediate arsons, but .. if necessary, the board of directors or the trustees. The owners should be charged .. er-what's it called, by criminal sanctions. So there is a deterrent effect not to burn in the coming years like that.”</td>
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