

MANAGERIALISM AND THE NEOLIBERAL UNIVERSITY: PROSPECTS FOR NEW FORMS OF “OPEN MANAGEMENT” IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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The learning of one man does not subtract from the learning of another, as if there were to be a limited quantity to be divided into exclusive holdings. . . . That which one man gains by discovery is a gain to other men. And these multiple gains become invested capital. . . .

John Wesley Powell, 1886

ABSTRACT. The restructuring of state education systems in many OECD countries during the last two decades has involved a significant shift away from an emphasis on *administration* and *policy* to an emphasis on *management*. The “new managerialism” has drawn theoretically, on the one hand, on the model of corporate managerialism and private sector management styles, and, on public choice theory and new institutional economics (NIE), most notably, agency theory and transaction cost analysis, on the other. A specific constellation of these theories is sometimes called “New Public Management,” which has been very influential in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These theories and models have been used both as the legitimation for policies that redesigning state educational bureaucracies, educational institutions and even the public policy process. Most importantly, there has been a decentralization of management control away from the center to the individual institution through a “new contractualism” – often referred to as the “doctrine of self-management” – coupled with new accountability and competitive funding regimes. This shift has often been accompanied by a disaggregation of large state bureaucracies into autonomous agencies, a clarification of organizational objectives, and a separation between policy advice and policy implementation functions, together with a privatization of service and support functions through “contracting out”. The “new managerialism” has also involved a shift from input controls to quantifiable output measures and performance targets, along with an emphasis on short-term performance contracts, especially for CEOs and senior managers. In the interests of so-called “productive efficiency,” the provision of educational services

has been made contestable; and, in the interests of so-called allocative efficiency state education has been progressively marketized and privatized. In this paper I analyze the main underlying elements of this theoretical development that led to the establishment of the neoliberal university in the 1980s and 1990s before entertaining and reviewing claims that new public management is dead. At the end of the paper I focus on proposals for new forms of “the public” in higher education as a means of promoting “radical openness” consonant with the development of Web 2.0 technologies and new research infrastructures in the global knowledge economy.

Keywords: New Managerialism, New Public Management (NPM), performance culture, contractualism, self-management, decentralization, contracting-out

1. Introduction

After Nietzsche, the philosophical critique of the Western university has developed along two interrelated lines: the first, pursued by Weber and continued by Heidegger, Jaspers, Lyotard and Bourdieu emphasized the dangers of economic interest vested in the university through the dominance of *technical reason*; the second, initiated by members of the Frankfurt School and developed differently by Foucault, traces the imprint and controlling influence of the state in the academy through the apparatus of *administrative reason*. With the rise of the “neoliberal university” these two forms of reason have come together in a new constellation. First, through a capitulation of the norms of liberal humanism and the Kantian ethical subject the university has embraced the main articles of faith underlying the revitalization of economic rationalism and introduced the principle of *homo economicus* into university governance. Second, through the imposition of structural adjustments policies of the IMF based on the “Washington consensus” universities in the developing world during the 1980s were forced to privatize universities with devastating impacts.

Neoliberal universities, with little philosophical self-reflection, have been put in the service of the “new global economy” under conditions of *knowledge capitalism* that has had several effects.¹ First, it has diminished the public status of the university. In the era of sovereign debt crisis the search for alternative funding patterns have led to national strategies for encouraging fee-paying students on the basis of human capital theory, leading to excessive student debt and a consequent privatization of higher education. Second, it has buttressed domestic fee-paying students with an internationalization of higher education and the global competition for international students with the growth of multiple campuses and off-shore profit centers. Both these features led directly to the encouragement of all forms of capitalization of the self and a kind of new educational prudentialism (Peters,

2005). Third, it has focused on issues of intellectual capital and the ownership of the means of knowledge production with the development and expansion of research parks, private-public partnerships in science production, and an emphasis on the commercialization of research and online teaching initiatives. Fourth, it has led to the huge growth of administration *vis-à-vis* the teaching and research faculty, to an increasing bureaucratization of the university and to the emergence of a new class of “knowledge managers,” – an administrative cadre – whose job is monitor and measure academic performance and to maximize returns from research.

Most of these developments leading to the neoliberal university and its recent variants – the “entrepreneurial university,” the “enterprise university,” the “innovation university” – spring from the application of neoliberal economics to higher education based on a series of reforms carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, the reforms often collectively referred to as “new managerialism” or “new public management,” often applied to the reform of the public sector as a whole, have sprung from public choice theory and new institutional economics leading to a fundamental reframing of the university what Bill Readings has called “the university of excellence.” The vice-chancellor, deans and heads of department have increasingly become “knowledge managers” in a knowledge corporation charged with running the university through a strategic planning process in accordance with targets, new incentive structures, and policy directives at the expense of traditional collegial and democratic governance. Governing councils have become corporate boards further sidelining academic forums. There is a new emphasis on executive-directed systems for internal university consultation and communication, from internal market research to vice-chancellors’ advisory groups with the consequent decline of collegiality forums and faculty input into key governance decisions. The rise of new property structures concerning international education, intellectual property, relations with industry, and work-based training have thickened the relationship to industry without any compensating collegial structures. Research management is increasingly subject to the new discipline of performance system assessment as institutions gear up to deliver research outputs and competing for funding within increasingly sophisticated national funding output-driven performance systems. This has led to a diminishment of the role of peer input into decisions about research and the prioritization of research in terms of quantity of research income rather than in terms of numbers of publications produced or in terms of quality of scholarship (Marginson, 1999).

2. Theoretical Elements of the “New Managerialism”

1. *Public Choice Theory*

Public choice theory applies the methods of economics to the study of political and administrative behavior. It originated with Gordon Tullock (editor of *Public Choice*) and James Buchanan, formerly of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and now located at George Mason University at Virginia. The essence of public choice theory has been summed up by Buchanan (1980: 19–27) who identifies its two elements as the “catallactics” approach to economics (or “catallaxy” as Hayek terms it) and the classical *homo economicus* postulate concerning individual behavior normally interpreted in terms of three attributes: rationality, individuality and self-interest. Individuals are conceived as “rational utility-maximizers.” “Catallactics” is the study of institutions of exchange which Buchanan deems the proper object of research and inquiry in economics. It allegedly rests on the principle of “spontaneous order” most thoroughly developed in the work of Hayek who argues that unhampered markets, without government control or intervention, demonstrate a tendency to equilibrium. In Hayek’s thought the spontaneous order conception applies to physical systems (for example, crystals and galaxies) as much as to social and cultural life (for example, the growth of language; the development of law and the emergence of social norms). We can distinguish three elements of the idea of spontaneous social order in Hayek’s work:

- The invisible hand thesis that social institutions arise as a result of human action but not from human design;
- The thesis of the primacy of tacit or practical knowledge – a thesis which maintains that knowledge of the social world is embodied in practices and skills and only secondarily in theories;
- The thesis of the natural selection of competitive traditions in which “traditions” are “understood to refer to complexes of practices and rules of action and perception and the claim is that there is a continuous evolutionary filtering of these traditions” (Gray, 1984: 33-34).

It is ultimately on the basis of this argument, originating in a critique of Cartesian rationalism that Hayek (distinct from Buchanan) claims that we must give up the modern ideal of an interventionist public policy and replace it with an ideal of cultivating general conditions within which benefits might be expected to emerge.

The main innovation of Buchanan and the public choice school is to apply this notion of spontaneous order conception beyond simple exchange (two commodities/two persons) to complex exchange and finally to *all processes of voluntary agreement* among persons. Buchanan (1986: 20) writes:

“By a more or less natural extension of the catallactic approach, economists can look on politics and on political action in terms of the exchange paradigm.” It is important to realize that this is the case so long as collective action is modeled with individual decision-makers as the basic units. The result of this conception is to confine politics to the realm of non-voluntary relationships among persons – that is, those relationships involving power or coercion. Normative implications are derived from public choice theory and carry with them an approach to institutional reform. To the extent that voluntary exchange is valued positively while coercion is valued negatively, public choice theorists favor market-like arrangements and/or the decentralization of political authority. The constitutional perspective is said to emerge naturally from the politics-as-exchange paradigm: “To improve politics it is necessary to improve or reform the rules, the framework within which the game is played ... A game is described by its rules, and a better game is produced only by changing the rules” (Buchanan, 1986: 22).

Buchanan (1986), following Wicksell (the Swedish economist and claimed precursor of public choice theory), states that if reform in economic policy is desired then we should look to the rules through which economic policy decisions get made, that is, look to the constitution itself. This conception has revolutionized “public choice” and provided a strong rationale and approach to the reform of the public sector. The second element of public choice theory is the behavioral postulate known as *homo economicus*, that is the modern “rediscovery” of the main tenet of classical liberal economics, that people should be treated as “rational utility-maximizers” in all of their behavior. In other words, individuals are modeled as seeking to further their own interests (defined in terms of measured net wealth positions) in politics as in other aspects of their behavior.

2. *New Institutional Economics*

Managerialism is a new form of governance based on constitutional or rule-making activity. As Davis (1997: 228) suggests the “new institutional economics encouraged policy-makers to see public services not as production functions or firms, but as governance structures.” Institutional economics abandons the traditional notion of a firm as being a production function to see it as a governance structure that reduces transaction costs and market competition favors the governance structure with the most efficient solutions of the problems of transaction costs. The notion of economic efficiency in institutional economics has successfully shifted ethos and practice of *management* to a question of the culture and structure of *governance* based on the value of customizing the service or product.

Neoliberalism is the substantive discourse of governance that is potent precisely because of its capacity to combine economics, the social, and

politics on behalf of rational choice as a principle of legitimacy. Governance arrangements have been classified into simple purchase and sale arrangements, bilateral arrangements for more complex relationships as for example, with joint ventures, trilateral arrangements where third parties are involved in processes such as arbitration and vertically integration where the transaction costs are reduced by forming a firm. While the institutional analysis of the public sector (for example, selecting governance structures which minimize transaction costs) is fundamentally concerned with the same issues as in the private sector, the actual issues and concepts of the public sector are different from the private sector for whereas in the private sector firms may fail, the same cannot be allowed for government structures even under marketized conditions.

The new institutional economics embraces at least two different strands of thought: agency theory and transaction cost analysis. Agency theory focuses on the problem of how to get agents to do what their principals want through contracts. While managerialism did not necessarily imply a move to contracting in the public sector, but it laid all the necessary foundations. Transaction cost analysis is concerned with concepts and principles for analyzing and controlling transactions though, for example, transparency, goals specification, clear allocation of decision rights, incentives, contracts and the credibility of commitments. Transaction costs are seen as the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems and transaction cost analysis is concerned with an examination of the comparative costs of planning, adapting and monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures. As the context for business changed difficulties in transacting business ensued whereupon attempts were made at designing new governance systems that would minimize the costs of such transactions.

We can also distinguish the old collectivist notion of the social contract from a “new contractualism” that represents a neoliberal politicization of public management. No longer are citizens presumed to be members of a political community that it is the business of a particular form of governance to express. The old presumed shared political process of the social contract disappears in favor of a disaggregated and individualized relationship to governance. Although contract can be regarded as a source of legitimacy – on the basis of the social contract – the idea of contract as an instrument of government can also be invoked. While contract theory is commonly regarded as addressing questions of the *legitimacy* of government, it can be seen as the core of an autonomous *rationality* of government on three counts: first, it specifies the population to be governed as “autonomous” citizens; second, it identifies a rationality of government that depends on no external principles; third, it tells us that individuals are to be governed on the basis of the presumed social contract.

3. *New Public Management*

During the 1980s and '90s a particular form of managerialism referred as New Public Management (NPM) (Boston, 1996; Boston, et al., 1996; Hood, 1990, 1991, 1992; Aucoin, 1988, 1990a, 1990b; Peters, 1990) or simply as public management (Pollitt, 1990: 156) came to dominate policy agendas. Pollitt (1992: 11) notes that the managerial literature contains little reference to the welfare state or the characteristic modes of thought of its policy-makers, administrators and service providers. He notes that social needs, professional standards, deprivation, community and equity have historically played little or no part in the development of managerialism and writes: "the transfer, during the last decade or two, of managerialism from private sector corporations to welfare-state services represents the injection of an ideological 'foreign body' into a sector previously characterized by quite different traditions of thought" (Pollitt, 1992: 11).

Private sector management theory – notably the work of Drucker – had an influence on new public management outside economic theory. There is an extensive literature on strategic management and management by objectives which predate the new institutional economics but which arrive at similar conclusions about clear goals and reporting relationships. The emphasis, for example, on contracting could emerge from business management theory or public administration theory as no more than a useful technique to introduce clarity, transparency and competition into organization. Some scholars argue that the notion of public management does not differ substantially from private management (e.g., Martin, 1994).

The key features of new public management as developed in New Zealand as perhaps the most comprehensive model have been identified by Boston and his colleagues (1996: 4–5) as comprising three separate aspects: the broad objectives; the administrative principles; and the specific policies. In specific policy terms, the model developed in the mid 1990s exhibited the following features:

1. A preference for retaining key governmental powers and responsibilities at the central government level with only limited devolution to sub-national government despite considerable rhetoric about devolution in the 1980s.
2. A strong emphasis on the use of incentives to enhance performance, at both the institutional and the individual level (e.g., short term employment contracts, performance-based remuneration systems, promotion systems, etc.).
3. An extensive use of explicit, generally written "contracts" of various kinds, which specify the nature of performance required and the respective obligations of agents and principals (e.g., performance agreements between ministers and department CEs, purchase agreements between ministers and

departments, and contracts between funders and purchasers and between purchasers and providers). In addition to the emphasis on *ex ante* performance specification, more exacting monitoring and reporting systems have been introduced.

4. The development of an integrated and relatively sophisticated strategic planning and performance management system throughout the public sector. Key elements include the specification by ministers of strategic result areas and key result areas and the integration of these into CEs' performance agreements and departmental purchase agreements.

5. The removal, wherever possible, of dual or multiple accountability relationships within the public sector, and the avoidance of joint central and local democratic control of public services

6. The institutional separation of commercial and non-commercial functions; the separation of advisory, delivery, and regulatory functions; and the related separation of the roles of funder, purchaser, and provider

7. The maximum decentralisation of production and management decision-making, especially with respect to the selection and purchase of inputs and the management of human resources

8. The implementation of a financial management system based on accrual accounting and including capital charging, a distinction between the Crown's ownership and purchaser interests, a distinction between outcomes and outputs, an accrual-based appropriations system, and legislation requiring economic policies that are deemed to be "fiscally responsible."

9. Strong encouragement for, and extensive use of, competitive tendering and contracting out, but few mandatory requirements for market testing or competitive tendering (Boston et al., 1996: 4–5).

NPM has gained political acceptance in at least three different countries: Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. He says all of these three variants of NPM share some general features. They include the switch in emphasis from policy formulation to management and institutional design; a shift from process controls to output controls; a move from integration to differentiation and from statism to subsidiarity. Hood (1990) then gives five possible explanations for the rise of NPM in the late 1980s: First, NPM could be simply interpreted as a "mood swing" or passing fad. Second, NPM could be interpreted as a "new-look form of Treasury control with a set of doctrines fastened upon the financial by central controlling agencies to destroy the administrative bases of the public welfare lobby and to increase their own power *vis-à-vis* the professionalized line departments" (Hood, 1990: 206). Third, "parts of NPM could be seen as reflecting a new political campaign technology – the shift to public policy based on intensive opinion polling which is part of the new machine politics style" (Hood, 1990: 206).

Fourth, NPM could reflect a “new client politics,” the advent of a new easily mobilizable coalition whose collective self-interest drives a policy boom. This is sometimes referred to as the development of the new elite aiming at increasing their own powers of patronage and consisting of management consultants, financial intermediaries, insurance companies, and other groups that have a clear interest in privatization and contracting out. It is these people who give policy advice to government on what the rationality of government should be. Fifth, NPM could be interpreted as an administrative reflection of that broader set of social changes triggered by “post industrialism” or “post Fordism.” Of the five possible explanations of the rise of NPM, the fifth is, according to Hood (1990: 207), this is the most complete.

Hood (1990: 214) considered that the NPM is not sufficiently theorized and concludes with a discussion about four possible areas of concern. The first concerns the change in public service ethics, loyalty to the service as a whole and resilience to political crisis: political accountability involves much more than achieving “one line” results. The second concerns the problem of how to reconcile the Taylorist and “new institutional economics” wings of NPM. Public choice has an inherently decentralist, consumer oriented bias, whereas the new Taylorism is about manipulation from above or from a controlling authority. The third concern is about the limits of the NPM revolution. There seems to be no end to the individualizing and atomization process. Hood refers to the possibility of selling government administrative positions so that the purchaser could then invest in the successful discharge of their duties. The fourth concern is the problem of exactly what kind of public service the NPM revolution is aiming to produce. Should the really high salaries go to the public sector or to the so-called private “wealth producing” sector? In the latter case, how then could the public sector attract the necessary talent? – or would it be then structured to produce the very mediocre performance that it was so criticized for in the past?

Pollitt (1990: 25) draws attention to a recently emerging analysis that sets limits on the practical usefulness that managers can derive from any general theory of management. This failure is attributed to the idea that managerial skills differ considerably from other sorts of expertise in their limited standardization across industries, their susceptibility to change, their specificity to situations rather than problems and their diffuse, varied knowledge base. Effective management will require more than mere knowledge of management theory. This suggests that to the extent that we see the same model of management spread across all situations in the public sector, it will be appropriate to ask how realistic this is in terms of the very different requirements between the various public areas.

3. “New Public Management Is Dead”

New public management is a management philosophy used by governments to modernize and restructure the public sector based on the hypothesis that a more market orientation in the public sector will lead to greater cost-efficiency for governments, without negative side effects. Often the neo-liberal restructuring reforms across the public sector with an emphasis on public health and the universities as two of the largest government portfolios focused on introducing competition in to the public sector through consumer-driven systems (citizens as shareholders), with strong attention to better management of the public budgetary process and a new accent on leadership.

By the end of 1990s commentators were heralding the end of public choice and new public management with a resurgence of institutional theories based on March and Olsen’s (1984) famous paper. B. Guy Peters (2000) writes:

The past decade and a half have seen a major reassertion of institutional theories in the social sciences, and especially in political science. The March and Olsen (1984) article in the APSR was the beginning of the revolution against the methodological individualism of both behavioralism and rational choice approaches. Following from that and their subsequent publications (1989; 1994; Brunsson and Olsen, 1993; Olsen and Peters, 1996) there has been a proliferation of institutional theories and applications of those theories. Similarly, in economics (North, 1990; Alston, Eggerston and North, 1996; Khalil, 1995) and in sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995; Zucker, 1987) there has been a birth (or more appropriately a resurrection) of institutional approaches to the basic questions in these disciplines.

A number of critics proclaim that NPM is “dead” and argue that the cutting edge of change has moved on to digital era governance (DEG) focusing on reintegrating concerns into government control, holistic (or joined-up) government and digitalization. DEG draws on principles of open government and utilizes the Web and digital storage to focus on transparency and better communication within government. For instance, Dunleavy and Margetts (2006) argue that NPM has stalled or been reversed because its complexity has reduced the capacity of citizens and public stakeholders to participate in the solution of social problems. They claim that next wave of technology-centered change is shifting toward “digital-era governance” (DEG), which involves reintegrating functions into the governmental sphere, adopting holistic and needs-oriented structures, and progressing digitalization of administrative processes.

Others associated with Public Value theory have re-asserted a focus on citizenship, networked governance and the role of public agencies in working with citizens to *co-create public value*, generate democratic authorization, and foster legitimacy and trust. They stress that the domains within which public managers are working as complex adaptive systems with characteristics that are qualitatively different from simple market forms, or private sector business principles (Moore, 1995; Cole & Parston, 2006; Cresswell et al., 2006).

In 2001 the European Commission wrote a white paper on governance entitled *European Governance* which begins with the following statement:²

Democratic institutions and the representatives of the people, at both national and European levels, can and must try to connect Europe with its citizens. This is the starting condition for more effective and relevant policies.

And continues

The White Paper proposes opening up the policy-making process to get more people and organizations involved in shaping and delivering EU policy. It promotes greater openness, accountability and responsibility for all those involved.

The white paper proposes a change to “better involvement and openness” based on online information in the preparation of policy, more systematic dialogue with all constituencies, greater flexibility to accommodate local diversity, and the encouragement of partnership arrangements. The white paper also promotes “better policies, regulation and delivery,” “global governance” and “refocused institutions.”

4. Radical Openness and the Idea of the University

Ron Barnett (2011: 3) is one author who has recognized the evolution of new institutional forms in higher education under conditions of neoliberal knowledge capitalism that tend toward the “hyper-modernisation” of the university. He writes:

New institutional forms involving cross-institutional collaboration, a blurring of the public and the private, new learning modes (especially favouring e-learning and practice-based learning), forms of knowledge pursued for their ‘impact’ on the knowledge economy, the rise of the ‘global’ in higher education and the emergence of ‘nomadic’ identities among academics: all these and more contribute to the ‘hyper-modernisation’ of the university (cf. Lipovetsky, 2005).

He comments on the shift towards “performativity”, the accent on so-called “useful knowledge” with direct applicability in society and “a slide away from “liberal education” towards vocationalisation and the increasing influence of governments and inter-governmental agencies in encouraging these shifts” (pp. 4–5).

The 2008 global financial crisis was the consequence of the processes of both “financialization” and the hegemonic neoliberal ideology based on self-regulated and efficient markets. Neoclassical economics has played the role of a meta-ideology as it legitimized, mathematically and “scientifically,” neoliberal ideology and deregulation (Bresser-Pereira, 2010). There is hope that from this crisis a new democratic capitalist system will emerge with tendencies toward a global and knowledge-economy based on an improved democracy that is more open, social and genuinely participative.

New forms of technological-enabled openness, especially emergent social media that utilizes social networking, blogs, wikis and user-created content and media, provide *new models of openness* for a conception of the intellectual commons based on peer production which is a radically decentralized, genuinely interactive, and collaborative form of knowledge sharing that can usefully serve as the basis of “knowledge cultures” (Peters & Besley, 2006; Peters & Roberts, 2011). The modern university was based on the principles of industrial broadcast mass media that was designed to reach large audience on a one-to-many logic. The open university is based on the new P2P architectures and technologies that are part of the ideology of Web 2.0 and given expression in ways that emphasize the ethic of participation (“participatory media”), collaboration and file-sharing characterizing the rise of social media (see Peters et al, 2011).

The modern university was an institution built on the principles of industrial media; the open university is an institution built upon the principles of social media providing the basis for a new social media model of the university that embraces the social democratic vision of the university and that it provides, first, the means to recover and enhance the historical mission of the university (Peters, 2007) and, second, a useful discourse to re-theorize the university in the twenty-first century, jettisoning its neoliberal managerialist ideology and returning to a fully socialized view of knowledge and knowledge-sharing that has its roots in Enlightenment thinking about science and its new practices in commons-based peer-production.

The *university model of open management* builds on both digital-era governance and the notion of public value and links effectively with moves to rebuild new forms of the public through principles of open governance. It is linked to the rejuvenation of open-source governance as a political theory that harnesses open source and open-content movements to democratic principles to promote collaborative and deliberative forms of open

management characterized by the centrality of historic structures of peer review and peer governance. If the capacity to create knowledge – or what Italian autonomists call the “general intellect” – is becoming the key productive force, arguably there is a need for a full-blown social form of knowledge management (Peters & Bulut, 2011; Peters & Reveley, 2012).

In the age of knowledge capitalism, we can expect governments in the West to further ease themselves out of the public provision of education as they begin in earnest to privatize the means of knowledge production and experiment with new ways of designing and promoting a permeable interface between knowledge businesses and public education at all levels. In the last two decades we have witnessed the effects of the Hayekian revolution in the economics of knowledge and information, we have experienced the attack on “big government” and reductions of state provision, funding and regulation. In the age of knowledge capitalism the next great struggle after the “culture wars” and the “science wars” of the 1990s will be the “education wars,” a struggle not only over the *meaning* and *value* of knowledge both internationally and locally, but also over the public means of knowledge production.

The problem of the accumulation of knowledge – a new accumulation regime at the very heart of knowledge capitalism – is a complex layered system comprised on at least three components: the content layer; the code layer; and the infrastructure layer. Where content can be open and free, code and infrastructure is generally owned. This is the essence of “algorithmic knowledge capitalism” (Peters, 2011) and clearly evident in the development of a cybernetic informational capitalism and the recent emergence of the giant info-utilities like Google, Amazon.com and Microsoft.

The learned society provides a model that is neither state nor market that has a long history of a commitment to public knowledge and science based on peer review and governance as an essential characteristic of science and scholarship, along with replicability, testability and the cultivation of a critical attitude that is the essence of peer review. Learned societies also provide a useful set of norms upon which to generalize and establish the learning society as a generalized science model committed to the public good. In the digital age new Web 2.0 technologies and forms of social media provide new ways of enhancing and building upon the peer production of knowledge. The Internet has become the foundational cyberinfrastructure that facilitates scholarly communication and deep data-sharing, archiving and publishing affecting every stage of the scholarly production, transforming the historical concepts that historically comprised the legal and economic architecture that grew up around intellectual property rights and the emergence of the concept of the public in its modern sense. Mass digitization of books, electronic books and new forms of open journals systems have greatly

expanded the availability of scholarly publication and scientific data changing both the logics of production and consumption (reception) of academic texts. New models of open science and open knowledge production based on principles of global public goods and an ethos of sharing and collaboration create new transnational academic communities in global knowledge ecologies that intersect in novel ways. Now is the time to experiment with and institute new university models of open management that recognize the vital role of the *public* university and its role in the production of knowledge and citizens for knowledge democracies.

NOTES

1. On higher education and the forms of the knowledge economy, see Peters & Besley (2006), Peters (2007), Murphy, Peters & Marginson (2010), Marginson, Murphy & Peters (2010), Araya & Peters (2010), Peters (2010), Peters & Bulut (2011), Peters & Reveley (2012).

2. See the governance website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/index_en.htm.

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