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**The Collectors:
Naval, Army and Air Intelligence
in the New Zealand Armed Forces
During the Second World War.**

John Tonkin-Covell

**A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
Requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
At the University of Waikato**

2000



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Abstract

This thesis examines the performance of the intelligence collection organisations of the armed services of New Zealand during the Second World War. It considers the intelligence bodies of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force and looks at their growth, development and demise, and assesses their effectiveness as intelligence organisations. The question of how much New Zealand could be expected to achieve in the field of intelligence arises, not least because New Zealand was demographically small, had a long coastline and was geographically relatively remote. How much could New Zealand contribute to the Allied cause in intelligence terms is another issue, and what forms did any participation take? Were there lessons to be learned from the wartime experience (there were, but they went for the most part largely unheeded)?

New Zealand, like other countries, had a fragmented approach to intelligence collection, making for a degree of complexity over a range of activity, despite the intelligence organisations being of modest size. The examination of the organisations in this thesis includes multi-service and multi-departmental dimensions along with the production of useful intelligence. Whether good use was made of intelligence collected is another matter. There was a substantial amount of liaison, contact and practice

between departments of state as to various aspects of intelligence, the Organization for National Security and coastwatching being two notable areas. The overarching role and limitations of the Organization for National Security with regard to intelligence is explored, and the development of a combined intelligence centre examined. The participation of New Zealand signals intelligence organisations in the great Allied interception offensive is detailed, along with the mundane but fundamental task of coastal surveillance. The establishment and spectacular decline of the first local independent security service is traced. Both the intelligence and security aspects of the Army's operationally deployed units are covered, along with the growth of RNZAF air intelligence.

The effectiveness of all of these organisations could hardly be expected to be uniform, and indeed it was not. Some bodies succeeded in their collection roles beyond expectations, others were reasonably effective, and two organisations failed dismally in different ways, for a number of reasons. If a pattern emerges at all, it is that small single service component-type intelligence sections collecting operational intelligence were the most effective New Zealand intelligence organisations. Operational focus and operational requirements underlay the drive for successful collection. Most significant within the Allied context were the signals intelligence bodies. At

the other end of the scale, larger co-operative interdepartmental New Zealand intelligence ventures failed to deliver projected results.

New Zealand's armed forces had an interesting variety of intelligence contributions during the Second World War. Of these, the most effective organisations collected intelligence to meet directed operational requirements.

Contents

Introduction

Part I The Centre

Chapter 1 The Secretary and the ONS

Chapter 2 Prewar Preparations

Chapter 3 The Outbreak of War and the Combined Intelligence Bureau

Chapter 4 The Combined Operational Intelligence Centre

Part II The War in the Ether

Chapter 5 The Heart of the Matter: Naval 'Y' and H/F D/F

Chapter 6 Radio Fingerprinting

Chapter 7 Army 'Y'

Part III The Watch on the Coast

Chapter 8 Coastwatching – New Zealand's Shores

Chapter 9 Coastwatching – The Islands

Part IV The Struggle Over Internal Security

Chapter 10 A New Security Service

Chapter 11 Fiasco – The Ross Affair

Chapter 12 Aftermath

Part V Other Service Intelligence

Chapter 13 Army Intelligence and Security

Chapter 14 Air Force Intelligence

Conclusion

Notes

Glossary

Appendices

Bibliography

Introduction

During the Second World War, New Zealand had a surprising amount of involvement in the intelligence field, despite its small size of population and remote location. Yet neither demography nor geography prevented the development of strong links with intelligence organisations of larger powers. The roots of certain of these linkages were quite deep, partly an imperial legacy and partly the product of changing times. The increasing independence of the Dominions, the prospect of war with Germany for the second time in the century, and above all the expected conflict with imperial Japan had considerable influence on the range of intelligence collection activity engaged in by New Zealand's armed services. This thesis concerns those service intelligence collection organisations during the war, and assesses the degree of success of their operation.

Intelligence in general during the Second World War was even more important than it had ever been, not least because of the communications revolution that had taken place with short wave radio and established cable links. The ability to get inside the enemy's deliberations, orders, instructions and routines, to read his intentions, follow his movements, assess his capabilities and materially assist in causing him great operational discomfort were all components of the proffered prize in the interception and evaluation of his communications. Yet the possibilities connected with the interception of enemy signals traffic at the outset of hostilities were rendered that much more difficult with the introduction of machine codes which in manual mathematical terms might take years to break. These difficulties were overcome sufficiently to make interception operationally useful, and the Allied signals intelligence offensive was arguably the most important

dimension of the intelligence war. Two small New Zealand intelligence organisations, the Navy's 'Y' Room and the Army's Special Section, played a minor and largely unsung part in that offensive.¹

The New Zealand intelligence scene was fragmented, but this was the case for all the major powers. Most countries' intelligence services were divided a number of ways. For larger powers, there was a civil/military split and an intelligence collection/security intelligence separation. The classic espionage activity is intelligence gathering, and the activities associated with preventing espionage by other powers is security intelligence or counterintelligence. If we look at a number of countries, this fragmentation of effort becomes clear. The Russians, for example, were divided in their intelligence collection between the military intelligence arm, the GRU, and part of the civilian overarching agency, the NKVD.² Germany had the Abwehr for military intelligence and the Sicherheitsdienst or SD, the Nazi Party intelligence organisation.³ The NKVD in Russia also looked after border security and internal security, while the SD in Germany was part of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt – the Reich Security Main Office or RHSA – an SS organisation. The RHSA also contained the Gestapo, the Nazi security service which had criminal apprehension as another of its tasks.⁴ The intelligence collection agencies of the United States were divided between the Army and the Navy in the military, the Army having the Signal Intelligence Service and the Navy OP-20-G or naval intelligence.⁵ Security in the United States was the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or FBI.⁶ In Britain, the divisions were even more complex.

Espionage in Britain was conducted by a shadowy organisation, the Secret Intelligence Service or MI6. MI6 worked off-shore for the most part.⁷ Security

intelligence or counterintelligence was carried out by MI5.⁸ A branch of MI6 with the innocuous sounding covername of the Government Code and Cypher School or GC&CS was engaged in codebreaking (and changed its name during the war to Government Code Headquarters or GCHQ). Before the outbreak of war MI6, MI5 and GC&CS were grossly understaffed.⁹ All of these bodies nominally came under the War Office, although they were not Army organisations at all. The Royal Navy had the Naval Intelligence Division, the Army had Military Intelligence.¹⁰ Security in the Army was carried out by Field Security units.¹¹ The Royal Air Force had its own intelligence organisation. A sabotage body was created early in the war for operations on the Continent and elsewhere: this was the Special Operations Executive or SOE.¹² There were a variety of offshoots from a number of these organisations.¹³

In Australia, the intelligence scene was similarly fragmented. Naval intelligence was operationally focussed and covered a wide range of intelligence, including signals intelligence and the setting up of a coastwatching system. Military Intelligence was small, and the expansion of the intelligence staff made difficult with the raising of 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2 AIF) for overseas service. The Army was also involved in signals intelligence. RAAF intelligence had a security rather than an operational focus at the outset of the war. This changed, and later on Australian cryptanalytic capability involved AIF, RAN and RAAF personnel. Internal security was looked after by the Commonwealth Investigation Bureau (CIB), a body succeeded by the Commonwealth Security Service in early 1941.¹⁴ Intelligence in Australia was to be much more complicated by the expansion of the war with Japan and the arrival of United States forces. The setting up of the American-Australian Central Bureau, the Australian-British

Allied Intelligence Bureau and US Navy's FRUMEL (itself a branch of OP-20-G) added to a complex intelligence picture.

Between intelligence and security organisations there existed natural friction, for those collecting intelligence (like MI6) were engaged in a different kind of activity than organisations set up to catch spies and close off leaks (like MI5). There was also inter-service rivalry, and the conflict between the US Army Signals Intelligence Service and the US Navy's OP-20-G ran very deep indeed.¹⁵ As well as the plethora of intelligence agencies, there were also police forces. Some of these had branches of their own engaged in security work, like the British Special Branch.¹⁶ The FBI's main work was catching criminals, although it had national counterintelligence responsibilities.¹⁷ Friction, division and fragmentation were normal, if potentially deleterious, constituents of a state's intelligence arrangements. It is unsurprising then that a number of different intelligence organisations developed in New Zealand having different, and on occasion, overlapping functions.

* * * *

The literature on intelligence in during the Second World War and the Cold War has expanded enormously since the 1960s, the largest increase occurring in the last two decades. The increasing distance from the 1939-1945 war and the technological revolution of the last thirty years has meant that much of the secret technology used for the gathering of signals intelligence during the war has long been overtaken by later developments. This is not to say that all can be revealed, by any means.¹⁸ The literature explosion is also in part simply the routine historical process, where at least some matters previously concealed impact upon interpretations of campaigns, operations, commanders,

political leaderships and intelligence bodies. More releases of documentary intelligence material to archival collections in the United Kingdom, the United States and Commonwealth countries have greatly widened the scope for research. With regard to signals intelligence, for instance, more recent releases at the Public Record Office have provided fertile ground for researchers.¹⁹ The same goes for the amount of signals intelligence material released by the National Security Agency to the United States National Archives, but on a larger scale.²⁰ The end of the Cold War has not only assisted this process, but has brought about some access to small selections of certain Soviet intelligence files. The writing of intelligence histories and memoirs by former intelligence personnel has supplemented the efforts of intelligence historians.²¹ This process has greatly altered interpretations of intelligence history over the last four decades.

With regard to the Second World War, the greatest focus of interest has been without doubt in the earlier well-concealed role of signals intelligence in general, particularly what has commonly become known as Ultra, that is, intelligence derived from certain enemy signals traffic. The interception of enemy radio and cable traffic had long been important,²² and this more common form of signals intelligence known as 'Y' intelligence underpinned, supplemented and at times substituted for Ultra in most important ways.²³ Ultra was the term used first to refer to intelligence obtained from German Enigma traffic,²⁴ which was then extended by both the British and the Americans to refer to selected Japanese signal traffic.²⁵ Signals intelligence in general terms was the most important intelligence enterprise successfully engaged in over the course of the war. Its value lay in that it revealed a huge range of information about the Axis enemies, based

on German and Japanese internal communications, including intentions, operations, strengths, support available, identity, and copious background information.²⁶

The signals intelligence offensive made further intelligence exploitation possible. ISOS and ISK,²⁷ the reading of the Abwehr's hand and machine cipher traffic, for instance, permitted the pulling inside out of the German agent offensive against Britain through the capture and turning (or execution) of most Abwehr agents landed in Britain.²⁸ Enough agents turned and played back against the enemy were regarded as reliable enough by the Germans to enable, for example, certain crucial deception operations to be successfully mounted in support of the D-Day landings.²⁹ Signals intelligence was vital in the outcome of the U-Boat *guerre de course*, the Battle of the Atlantic, the desert campaign in North Africa, and at Normandy.³⁰ While the German intelligence effort was largely although not entirely negated,³¹ the Japanese in the Pacific were to suffer equally serious reverses as a result of the Allied intelligence offensive.³² Indeed, it might be argued that part of the Japanese failure to obtain sufficient success to break the Allied resistance in 1942 lay in an unmatched intelligence advantage, although the Allies were very much on the defensive. While the Japanese were successful in their offensive operations this was not critical, but from the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway onwards the Allied intelligence offensive spear-headed by signals intelligence materially assisted the wearing down of the Japanese war machine.

At the same time, it needs to be recognised that undetected problems posed by Russian intelligence organisations against their Anglo-American allies had an unnoticed but alarming potential. For the first period of the war, the Russians were, if not allies of the Germans, at least rendered neutral by way of the Non-Aggression Pact and the carve-

up of Poland. Agents of the NKVD, and probably the GRU, were successful in penetrating useful positions of the wartime British government bureaucracy from the mid-1930s onwards.³³ During the war these included the Foreign Office, the Treasury, Lord Hankey's office, the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, MI6, MI5, SOE and other departments.³⁴ There were enough of these agents in useful positions to cumulatively reveal almost all of the intelligence advantage possessed by the Allies. Whether the intelligence obtained was well used is another question.³⁵ These were long-term agent penetrations and a fair number of these sources remained in place for more than a decade, that is far beyond the end of the war.³⁶ Whereas the GRU's famous Rote Kapelle (the Red Orchestra) was largely destroyed by the Germans on the Continent, the British sources were to be of considerable utility for Moscow Centre. There was similar, though it appears not as extensive, penetration of the United States government machinery.³⁷ Just how successful the Soviet intelligence organisations were in the long run is a question still very much up in the air for intelligence historians, for it is possible (indeed, most likely) there are still quite well concealed aspects of this wartime and postwar struggle.³⁸ What is undeniable is that just as the Allies were enjoying a great intelligence advantage over the Axis enemy, so the Russians had managed at least to obtain perspectives on the extent of that advantage. Clearly some benefits were reaped from it (timely signals intelligence courtesy of Cairncross before the Battle of Kursk being an outstanding example).³⁹ If the British intelligence organisations were well penetrated, then it was entirely logical that the administrative bureaucracies of the British Commonwealth Dominions should be seen as useful for the Russians. This might be only to get hold of British and American material circulated to the Australian, Canadian and

New Zealand governments, simply as a litmus test of Allied material already supplied. As Australian, New Zealand and Canadian security was quite lax, this was an attractive proposition.⁴⁰

Against this on the other side of the ledger was the Allied resumption of intelligence interest in the Soviet Union. Although the prewar intelligence interest in the Russians by the British had extended through to June 1941, this seems to have been put in abeyance for a period.⁴¹ Towards the end of the war, the British intelligence organisations resumed their interest (the Russians, be it noted, had never suspended their efforts in this area) in the interception of Russian communications.⁴² This interception naturally continued in peacetime, when renewed attempts were made to decipher accumulated intercepts of encoded Soviet signal traffic. This was the so-called Venona traffic, or Operation Bride, and inroads were made: some traffic was broken into retrospectively, and some other cables seem to have been read with little delay.⁴³ Venona dealt with only a fraction of Soviet traffic, yet was sufficient to assist in exposing a number of the Soviet agent-based penetrations in Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States. The release of a large amount of decrypted Venona traffic by the US National Security Agency to the US National Archives from 1996 onwards has proved most fruitful as Desmond Ball and David Horner have demonstrated by careful analysis of Canberra-Moscow intercepts, and Nigel West on Venona overall.⁴⁴ Recent light thrown on Soviet intelligence by the collaborative efforts of Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, Genrikh Borovik and Phillip Knightley and the unique perspectives from Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin have enriched this picture. The Mitrokhin Archive (1999) which refers to one

New Zealand spy was merely a first volume, and at least a further volume dealing in part with Soviet espionage in both Australia and New Zealand is promised. My personal enquiries on the New Zealand material have elicited nothing as yet. Reliability questions on Soviet-sourced material are being raised and assessed by reviewers as diverse as the late Robert Cecil, Frank Cain and Sheila Kerr.⁴⁵

The history of intelligence during the Second World War has been dramatically altered, particularly by documentary material that might have never been expected never to see the light of day. Intelligence memoirs have also become more useful, if treated with some caution, as former personnel have been more forthcoming with the passage of time.⁴⁶ If we consider just how these developments have been treated in intelligence literature, the pace of changing perspectives can be discerned.

The 1960s and 1970s signalled the beginning of the flood. David Kahn's seminal work on communications interception,⁴⁷ came out around the same time as Kim Philby's Russian-sponsored memoir of his penetration of MI6,⁴⁸ and the first of a long series of Philby biographies and works on the Cambridge spies.⁴⁹ The official history on SOE in France⁵⁰ had been published, signalling a partial beginning to the British official histories on intelligence. In 1972, the former chairman of the celebrated Twenty Committee published his previously classified report on the Double-Cross system, lifting the veil on the turning of German agents in Britain.⁵¹ A lengthy account of the Abwehr came out the same year,⁵² and one of the double agents published his memoirs in 1974.⁵³ But the greatest stir was caused with the publication of F.W. Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret⁵⁴ in 1974, an account riddled with inaccuracies, although not immediately apparent. Until this point, Ultra had remained a closed book to the outside world, in spite

of the fact that several thousand intelligence personnel had worked in this area during the war. Three years later the first Ultra material was released to the Public Record Office.⁵⁵ This was immediately mined for works on intelligence, from Patrick Beesly's authoritative account of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre to Ronald Lewin's appreciation of Ultra on the battlefield.⁵⁶

The first volume of the comprehensive British official history on intelligence during the Second World War⁵⁷ by a team of ex-intelligence officers led by F.H. Hinsley, followed in 1979, the last two volumes being published in 1990.⁵⁸ These were written with access to extensive collections of secret files. Quite a proportion of those files still remain classified, although more have emerged recently. The official histories threw new light on the overall intelligence picture, the main deficiency being the deliberate omission of substantial material relating to war in the Far East and the Pacific.⁵⁹ A continuing stream of books and articles on the intelligence war followed throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Nigel West has produced a large number of books on the British intelligence organisations, one of the last being a semi-official release of the file history of British Security Co-ordination in the United States.⁶⁰ Former intelligence officers like Ralph Bennett, Peter Calvocoressi, Gordon Welchman, Alan Stripp and F.H. Hinsley produced accounts centring on their wartime experiences at Bletchley Park and elsewhere.⁶¹ Further accounts of Ultra in the Far East came from Ronald Lewin and John Winton, with Arthur Marder's Old Friends, New Enemies breaking new ground on the Far East Combined Bureau, while Bradley F. Smith explored Ultra in the context of the Anglo-American relationship in greater depth.⁶² More recently, John Prados, Peter Elphick and

Alan H. Bath have provided more detailed studies of the intelligence war in the Pacific in the light of the 1990s document declassifications, Prados and Bath being most valuable.⁶³

The Australian intelligence literature has followed the growth pattern over the last twenty five years, since David Horner's article on 'Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific in World War II' in 1978⁶⁴ and Richard Hall's book on Australia's secret state.⁶⁵ Horner's High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy, 1939-1945⁶⁶ revealed more on the complex Australian-American-British intelligence picture in wartime Australia. Frank Cain's work on pre-ASIO political surveillance⁶⁷ followed, and a number of other publications on the Anglo-Australian connection, like articles by John Chapman⁶⁸ and Christopher Andrew,⁶⁹ and James Rusbridger and Eric Nave's flawed book on the background to Pearl Harbor.⁷⁰ Geoffrey Ballard's On ULTRA Active Service⁷¹ and Jack Bleakley's The Eavesdroppers⁷² shed further light on Australian signals intelligence. Barbara Winter's The Intrigue Master: Commander Long and Naval Intelligence in Australia 1913-1945⁷³ covered a great deal more ground than simply naval intelligence. Books by Manne and Bialoguski⁷⁴ on the Petrov affair, Hall's biography of Milner,⁷⁵ McKnight on Australia's spies,⁷⁶ and Ball and Horner's⁷⁷ work on Venona had wartime implications for security. Desmond Ball's prolific output on intelligence has touched on the war period quite usefully, as for example, his article on signals intelligence in Hong Kong.⁷⁸

New Zealand literature on intelligence is quite limited. While a number of the official historians of New Zealand's role in the Second World War were ex-intelligence personnel of one sort or another, like W.D.Stevens, O.S.Gillespie, D.M.Davin and S.D.Waters, no official history on intelligence was produced and this remains a gap.

Gillespie's The Pacific,⁷⁹ Davin's Crete⁸⁰ touch on intelligence a little more than other campaign histories, and Waters covers aspects of naval intelligence in Royal New Zealand Navy.⁸¹ Waters wrote an unpublished 'History of Naval Intelligence Organisation in New Zealand', which was used as a basis for the New Zealand section of ADM 223/494, the history of the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division, now held at the Public Record Office.⁸² Michael Parker's book on the postwar security service,⁸³ the NZSIS, refers anecdotally to the wartime security service and its demise. More recently, Nicky Hager's monograph on signals intelligence and Appendix D of Secret Power have sketched outlines of New Zealand's wartime signals intelligence operations.⁸⁴ Malcolm Templeton's book on the Moscow Legation refers quite extensively to the mainstay of that post, the New Zealand intelligence officer Paddy Costello,⁸⁵ while Ian McGibbon's Undiplomatic Dialogue contains very interesting correspondence between Berendsen and McIntosh.⁸⁶ Laurie Barber and Cliff Lord's Swift and Sure contains material on the army's 'Y' section in wartime.

The sources used for this thesis are documentary for the most part, supplemented by correspondence, interviews, privately held papers and secondary sources. For the most part the documentary sources come from the New Zealand National Archives along with very useful Canadian, Australian, British and American material. National Archives in Wellington contain intelligence documents in a range of government file collections. These include the Army Department(AD), the Air Force (AIR), the Navy (N), World War I and II (WA), External Affairs (EA), Customs Department(C), Marine Department (M) and the Governors' (G) files. Material most difficult to locate were on certain aspects of the war in the ether, like the 'Y' organisation, its Special Intelligence Section and

involvement in minor cryptographic work and diplomatic interception, evidence of the army's Special Section interceptions, and matters to do with radio fingerprinting. Some documentary material relating to the security service was held elsewhere, but has been made available. Waters' draft naval intelligence history referred to above, was a fuller account than the PRO adaption. The Hanson Papers consist of privately held material collected by the first head of the Government Communications Security Bureau, Group Captain Colin Hanson OBE. It included collections of papers like the de la Perelle collection not located in archives. His perspectives on intelligence were extremely useful in filling in gaps, and the Hanson MSS referred to was a helpful but incomplete draft. Interviews and correspondence with a range of ex-intelligence personnel were conducted or obtained, including the 'Y' Room, the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, the H/F D/F stations, the radio fingerprinting station, coastwatchers and the security service.

The intelligence collection organisations of New Zealand's armed forces developed and operated according to requirements for intelligence from within the government structure, or from those states with which there were shared strategic interests, based on historical experience and constitutional ties. There was no grand design about New Zealand intelligence collection, and the attempt to co-ordinate intelligence collection between the services was to remain a pallid shadow. Where the intelligence requirements were clear-cut, straightforwardly functional at the tactical level, success was achieved by small-sized, single-service component-type intelligence sections. The larger the New Zealand intelligence organisation and the greater reliance on multi-departmental and multi-service co-operation in intelligence collection, the greater the prospects for weakness, lack of cohesion and failure.

This thesis is an examination of that experience and the conclusions that can be drawn. These will go some way towards answering four questions. Could a small country like New Zealand be expected to achieve more in the intelligence field? How important was New Zealand in the Allied intelligence efforts against the Axis powers? Were there any lessons to be learned about the difficulties of operating an intelligence organisation in a small country? Can a small country like New Zealand compensate for its limited military strength with a focussed intelligence effort?

There was a certain amount of friction between the New Zealand intelligence bodies, although this varied. The intelligence and security intelligence organisations were small, and a number did not exist on the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Intelligence activities inevitably crossed over into civilian departments of state. An umbrella body, the Organization for National Security, had pretensions towards co-ordinating intelligence like other government activities. This was inevitable as the Chiefs of Staff Committee was one of its most important bodies, and all service intelligence developments came from them in one form or another. Alongside this were departments of state with long and varied associations to do with intelligence and security, like the Marine Department, the Customs Department, the Post & Telegraph (P&T) Department and the Police Department.

The purpose here is to consider the New Zealand armed services intelligence organisations from the point of view of the effectiveness of their collection activities, whether they were single or multi-service or multi-department, and who controlled their activities. The most important structures are dealt with first, moving onto to the more self-contained bodies. The Organization for National Security, combined intelligence,

naval intelligence and 'Y', coastwatching, the security service, army intelligence and air force intelligence are considered in turn. The effectiveness of the intelligence organisations was uneven, so the order of importance does not mean those treated last were less effective as intelligence organisations. The intelligence organisations of New Zealand's armed services were not subject to central control for operational reasons, served either single service interests or clusters of interests, some of which by their very nature lay within an Allied rather than merely New Zealand context. It is argued that the Navy dominated the New Zealand intelligence scene in general terms over the course of the war, but that there were significant limitations placed on this prevailing position by the other services and other departments. The Army and the Air Force separated off their respective main intelligence activities. In the first case this was facilitated by the nature of the Army's main contribution to the war, the raising of expeditionary forces for service overseas. Those formations by their absence far away developed self-contained intelligence sections for operational purposes. The Air Force by contrast dragged its feet on intelligence up until the end of 1942, and then deliberately moved away from linkage with the Navy in the second combined intelligence organisation. This had to do with the nature of the RNZAF's most important focus: the provision of operational intelligence for the squadrons committed to the Pacific islands. The Naval ascendancy on the local intelligence scene occurred by default on the part of the other two services.

The Navy's venture into the technological cutting edge of intelligence collection, assisted by a tiny separate yet symbiotic Army initiative, made the difference with regard to New Zealand being perceived as a useful ally in the intelligence field. In the provision of technical equipment, services and personnel, this effort was underwritten by the Post

& Telegraph Department. The P&T Department along with the Customs Department, were of considerable assistance to the service intelligence organisations overall. By contrast, the Police Department had an adverse effect, perhaps strategically deleterious, on the development of security intelligence within New Zealand.

This thesis on New Zealand's service intelligence organisations is divided into five parts, a total of fourteen chapters in all. Part I, 'The Centre', deals with the moves towards the co-ordination of intelligence during the war and assesses the extent to which this was successful. Chapter One attends to the centralising tendencies of the Organization for National Security, which had a contingent rather than a necessary influence in the area of intelligence. It provided a framework within which committees oversaw a variety of intelligence activities, including the co-ordination of intelligence, among other things. The members of the ONS's most powerful committee, the Chiefs of Staff, had central roles in policy decisions on intelligence. Chapter Two considers prewar preparations, such as they were, while the third chapter attends to the outbreak of hostilities and the setting up of the first combined intelligence organisation, the Combined Intelligence Bureau. The fourth chapter deals with the establishment and running of the more useful successor organisation, the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre. It also scrutinizes the run down of the COIC and examines the nature of the achievements of New Zealand combined intelligence during the war. This assessment deals with the lack of effectiveness of the COIC in co-ordinating the intelligence interests of the three services.

Part II, 'The War in the Ether', surveys the most significant New Zealand intelligence collection activity both before and during the war. It traces the history of

both the naval and army interception organisations (there was no air force signals intelligence capability), and measures their effectiveness. Chapter Five covers the main preoccupations of the naval 'Y' organisation, its Special Intelligence sub-section and the shore-based high-frequency direction-finding stations. The increasing operational effectiveness of 'Y' intelligence and the changing nature of the business is outlined. Chapter Six sets out the establishment and operation of the radio-fingerprinting station near Blenheim, a tiny organisation at the cutting edge of contemporary technical intelligence. Chapter Seven concerns the small Army 'Y' unit at Nairnville Park, its links with the Navy's 'Y' section, and its particular contribution to the Allied 'Y' offensive. Part II argues that New Zealand signals intelligence had a much more solid foundation than New Zealand's foray into combined intelligence, and that signals intelligence beyond New Zealand within a British and later Anglo-American intelligence context brought new and significant capabilities.

Coastwatching is the focus of attention for Part III, consisting of two chapters, one on the coastal surveillance from New Zealand's shores; the other to do with the watch maintained by New Zealand coastwatchers on a great variety of offshore islands, comprising either New Zealand or British possessions. Coastwatching being a basic intelligence activity, Chapters Eight and Nine assess how well or how poorly the watch on the various coasts was kept. This entailed more co-operation between the services and other government departments than any other New Zealand intelligence activity. The poor performance of the watch on the New Zealand coast turned out to be the greatest New Zealand intelligence failure of the war and contrasts with the surveillance carried out elsewhere, in the Gilbert & Ellice Islands, for instance.

Internal security was a basic security intelligence task. Part IV deals in effect with a power struggle between the advocates and opponents within the government of an independent security service. The Police Department, the armed services and the Prime Minister were all caught up in an unseemly wrangle in the middle of the war. The body at the heart of the furore was the first separate New Zealand security service, the Security Intelligence Bureau (the SIB), established under the auspices of the Army. It was fated to slide under the control of a civilian department of state, although remaining nominally an army intelligence organisation until the end of the war. The three chapters respectively examine the development of the SIB through to 1942 (Chapter Ten), the sea-change signalled by the Ross affair (Chapter Eleven), and finally the consequences and implications for internal security for the rest of the war (Chapter Twelve). The role of the Police Department throughout was highly significant, while questions remain as to whether New Zealand was blind to the prospect of the penetration of parts of the New Zealand government machinery by the intelligence services of at least one foreign power. Had the police been less hostile to the new security service, there might have been an opportunity for some really useful work. If the Police Department had adequately carried out the internal security role that it so jealously guarded in the first place, a competing security body may not have got off the ground.

Part V deals with army and air force operational intelligence. The commitment of the Army's field formations to service overseas produced a requirement for an operational intelligence collection capability and operational field security. Chapter Thirteen investigates the intelligence collection and field security organisations of the army both in New Zealand and deployed overseas. Chapter Fourteen examines the

RNZAF air intelligence organisation, from the extremely slow start in the opening years of the war through to the highly operationally-focussed body by the end of hostilities. It underlines the independent direction eventually taken by the Air Force's air intelligence organisation and the move away from tri-service co-operation in this field.

The first four Parts of this thesis have to do with functions that overrode single service interests: the co-ordination of intelligence and the matter of combined intelligence, the signals intelligence offensive, coastal surveillance, and internal security. Naval intelligence prevailed in combined intelligence, signals intelligence and coastal surveillance, all areas intimately connected with the Navy's intelligence interests. Internal security was of significance for the civilian departments of state and the armed services, posing the question as to whether a separate security service was necessary, and if so, should it be a military or civilian organisation. Part V, by contrast, is single service focussed, because of the particular and very different requirements dictated by operational imperatives of army and air force units deployed.

Part I
The Centre

Chapter One

The Secretary and the ONS

The moves in the direction of centralising defence matters in New Zealand in the 1930s were to result in the establishment of an umbrella organisation inside the government bureaucracy. This body was in turn to have some influence in certain respects on the subsequent setting up of a combined services intelligence centre. It is necessary to outline the workings of the umbrella construction because, for a period at least, it was to serve as a conduit between a number of intelligence bodies and the War Cabinet. The evolving role of two significant and increasingly powerful officials in this process was to be of some moment, namely the provision of intelligence to the higher levels of government.

While the Organization for National Security (or ONS) may appear to have been in a pivotal position under the Cabinet with regard to intelligence, it is important not to exaggerate its significance. Although standing apparently at the top of the intelligence tree the Organization for National Security had wider responsibilities. Intelligence should not be seen out of focus inside what seems to have been essentially an umbrella organisation, concerned with defence in the widest sense, a veritable collection of committees on national security matters. It is germane here to consider the development and functions of the ONS, and to set in context the important role which its most significant official, the Secretary of the ONS, would play in intelligence matters on the New Zealand scene. It needs to be noted that part way through the war the ONS was succeeded by a body called the War Cabinet Secretariat (or WCS), although the Secretary

ONS simply was translated into the WCS as the Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet (see below). If the ONS and the WCS were to appear to have some oversight role in intelligence matters, this was more image than substance. Both the ONS and the later WCS were at something of a remove from intelligence matters in the day-to-day operational sense, in spite of the pervasive role of the Secretary. What does need to be constantly remembered is that the Secretary ONS/Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet was an official in the Prime Minister's Department. As the war went on, the significance of the ONS as an umbrella organisation declined somewhat. However, the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet in his role as Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee had an enduring influence as a conduit between the War Cabinet and the service chiefs. The connection between the Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet and the Cabinet Secretary from 1943 onwards was the continuing development of a strong working relationship. These two individuals became even more influential in important positions at the heart of the government bureaucracy in the postwar period. This included matters connected with intelligence.

In 1920 an Advisory Committee on Defence was formed to look at defence policy questions, consisting of the two heads of the armed services (ie the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief Naval Adviser, there being no air force at this time), and other experts. This Committee met only once, in July 1920, and in fact there was no single body responsible for the co-ordination of defence activities until the 1930s.¹

From 1930 to 1933 there was discussion about forming a New Zealand branch of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and on 15 November 1933 a meeting held at General Headquarters in Wellington gave approval for such a body to be formed. This meeting,

chaired by the Prime Minister, was attended by the service chiefs and interested parties from other government departments.²

The New Zealand Committee of Imperial Defence (or NZCID) had nine standing committees: the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Overseas and Home Defence, Imperial Communications and Censorship, Manpower, Principal Supply Officers, Shipping, War Emergency Legislation, Control of Civilian Population, and the Co-ordination and War Book Committee. In spite of this impressive list, the work of the NZCID, while said to be efficient, remained rather rudimentary.³ In November 1936, the name was altered from the New Zealand Committee of Imperial Defence to the more neutral 'Organization for National Security', in part to mollify concerns with the term 'Imperial' by the new Labour administration.⁴

Since the opening discussions in 1930, the secretarial work of first the NZCID and then the ONS had been carried out by Major W.G. Stevens and Captain G.H. Clifton from Army GHQ. Cabinet approved Stevens' appointment as fulltime Secretary of the ONS from 23 March 1937. Stevens also became Secretary of the new Defence Council. The Secretary of the ONS was based in the Prime Minister's Department, so direction and control of the ONS was located there.⁵ The post of the Secretary of the ONS was destined to become the most senior intelligence position in the Government (albeit de facto). The first incumbent perceived his duties thus.

As it is an essential pre-requisite for the discharge of the duties of Secretary...that the individual chosen should have an intimate knowledge of all secret matters which may be proceeding, and of political intelligence which would indicate that a particular class of activity requires priority in treatment above others, the Secretary was located...in the Prime Minister's Office. It was also desirable that the Secretary should be located in the Prime Minister's Department in order that he would be readily accessible to the Prime Minister.⁶

This access to the Prime Minister was fundamental. The position of the Secretary was to turn out to be a linchpin between the Prime Minister and other senior officials on intelligence and other matters. How the Secretary carried out his role can be seen through a substantial portion of this thesis. In another context later on in wartime, the Secretary's access to the Prime Minister did not go unchallenged, although the significance of this should not be overstated (see Part IV). The official concerned was the director of the new security service.

Within a year the increasing workload of the ONS required the appointment of an Assistant Secretary to the Secretary ONS, and Mr. Foss Shanahan LL.M (late of the Customs Department) took up this position on 1 March 1938. He would succeed Stevens as Secretary ONS on 10 January 1940, when the latter left for the Middle East with the First Echelon of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force.

The co-ordination of defence by the ONS was effected by means of interdepartmental committees. In these, officials representing different departments met to consider particular problems, and including the implementation of plans to do with the possible outbreak of hostilities.⁷ The committees of the ONS reported upwards to the Council of Defence, which was formed in 1937. The Council comprised the Prime Minister, the Head of the Prime Minister's Department, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chief of Naval Staff (or CNS), the Chief of the General Staff (or CGS), the new Chief of Air Staff (or CAS), the Minister of Defence and other ministers appointed by the Prime Minister, plus the Secretary ONS.⁸

All reports of the various ONS committees, including the powerful Chiefs of Staff Committee, were referred to the Council of Defence. Some 153 papers were produced by

the ONS committees between 1937 and June 1940, of which 39 had come from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Reports and recommendations were then considered by Cabinet for approval, and the formation of a Cabinet Defence Committee sharpened this focus. Reports were compiled by the ONS committees, despatched to the Council of Defence, and on to the Cabinet Defence Committee. Finally, they might be referred to the full Cabinet. Between 1937 and mid-1940 the Council of Defence had twenty-seven meetings, while the Cabinet Defence Committee met on nine occasions.⁹

Such a cumbersome process did not make for quick progress on matters raised in ONS papers. Regardless of this, the Secretary ONS himself was in a central position, for he was also Secretary to the Council of Defence, the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the other ONS committees. As Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee

the knowledge which he gains as a result of his association with other ONS committees is of considerable assistance to this committee. Instances occur, not infrequently, where particular aspects of a problem have already been or are considered by some ONS committee, and it is valuable to the Chiefs of Staff to know the conclusions already arrived at or proposed.¹⁰

Along with access to the Prime Minister and the Head of the Prime Minister's Department, this put Stevens, and subsequently Shanahan, in a very useful position, literally a junction node for defence information and intelligence. The Secretary's position provided a clear and direct conduit for intelligence into the Prime Minister's Department and therefore to the top level of the government.

The handiness of the position held by the Secretary ONS notwithstanding, it is worth noting that representation by the armed services on the various committees of the ONS was high. In June 1938 there were already over twenty committees. These were: the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Combined Intelligence, Action in Emergency, Aliens,

Censorship and Publicity, Combined Communications and Meteorological, Emergency Precautions, Joint Planning, Manpower, Mapping, Medical, National Supply, Official Correspondence, Oil Board, Service Supply Board, Supply Advisory, Shipping, War Book, War Emergency Legislation, Wireless Telegraphy, and War Watching.¹¹ Of those, sixteen had Army and Air Force members, one had an Army member (Aliens), and the sole committee without any armed services representation was the War Legislation Committee. The armed services had more representation on the ONS than any other department apart from the Prime Minister's Department (with the Secretary ONS).

With the outbreak of war, the primacy of the Prime Minister's Department in co-ordinating action was underlined in a memorandum on 18 September 1939. From Peter Fraser to 'All Ministers', it asserted that the Prime Minister's Department:

1. ...must have early advice of all measures prepared in connection with the war.
2. When a concrete problem arises as a course of action is proposed departments must inform the Prime Minister's Department, in order to ensure that co-ordination is observed from the outset, and that all interested parties are kept informed and have the opportunities of stating their views ...¹²

The memo noted use should still be made of the ONS with the existing committees being used for advisory purposes. Thus:

6. In general the Prime Minister's Department must be looked on as the central co-ordinating department for all war activities.
7. The initial approach to the Prime Minister's Department should in general be through the Secretary, Organization for National Security.¹³

By December 1940 there had been a sizeable increase in the number of interdepartmental standing committees. Along with twenty-six ONS committees, there were at least another ten 'Ad Hoc' committees to co-ordinate the war effort.

There were thirteen ONS committees that had a direct or partial connection with intelligence matters. These were: the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Intelligence, Coastwatching, Guards Vital Points, Control of Navigational Aids, Meteorology, Aliens, Treatment of Consuls, Overseas Passenger Traffic, Enemy Property and Trading with the Enemy, Censorship and Publicity, Mapping, and Communication in Emergency.¹⁴ The work of these committees varied. Clearly, the deliberations of the service chiefs incorporated intelligence and security matters, and reference will be made to those aspects later.

Physical security of what were regarded as installations critical to New Zealand, such as oil storage tanks and so forth, came under the Guards Vital Points Committee. This comprised representatives of the armed services and the Police Department. The GVP detachments provided by the Army took on their role with the outbreak of hostilities on a twenty-four hour basis. This was a matter of simple physical security. The GVP Committee met four times before the war – by December 1940, this figure had increased to nineteen occasions.¹⁵ The Committee made recommendations ‘regarding the increase or diminution of guards on certain establishments as well as commenting upon the necessity for guarding other points of importance.’¹⁶ Some sixteen papers had been produced by 1940. One GVP detachment would guard New Zealand’s most secret intelligence establishment later in the war, the REB station at Blenheim (see Chapter Seven).

The Coastwatching Committee of the ONS consisted of members drawn from the armed services, the Post and Telegraph Department, and the Marine Department. A coastwatching scheme was prepared and the committee recommended ‘for the

establishment of coastwatching stations on certain strategic parts of the coast.’ Ironically, Shanahan noted in his account of the ONS on 7 June 1940 that not only had the coastwatching scheme been approved by the Government, but also that the ‘strategic situation’ now permitted a reduction in coastwatching posts and the substitution of air reconnaissance. The Coastwatching Committee had only needed to meet once since the outbreak of hostilities.¹⁷

Six days later an undetected enemy raider laid mines across the approaches to Auckland’s Waitemata Harbour, one of which accounted for the outward bound SS. *Niagara* on 19 June. By 20 August there had been three further meetings of the Coastwatching Committee, with more advice with regard to the extent of precautions needed to stop coastal waters being used by enemy vessels.¹⁸

The security of trade, the movements of enemy vessels and timely intelligence concerning the menace posed by raiders lay at the heart of local coastwatching. This aspect of security was a theme that was to run through much of the intelligence effort in New Zealand in wartime. Coastwatching was an important intelligence task and is considered more closely later, and its effectiveness assessed (see Part III).

Whatever the shortcomings of particular committees, the structure of the ONS was considered favourably by the service chiefs. On 23 January 1940, a Chiefs of Staff Committee minute revealed that

The Chiefs of Staff considered whether or not the Organization for National Security should continue as a separate organization under the control of the Prime Minister’s Department. They considered that in view of the role which the Organization for National Security had been performing and its co-ordination of war activities, and in view also of its function of keeping the Chiefs of Staff informed on matters on which they should receive information, that it was evidently desirable that it should continue. It was emphasised also that the

Organization for National Security was a well recognized co-ordinating body and that it would be unfortunate if it were to disappear.¹⁹

The Secretary ONS continued to have an oversight of intelligence developments within New Zealand, perhaps the most important of which was the establishment of a combined intelligence organisation. There was to be a long lead time to get this body set up, complicated by a number of factors. The Secretary ONS was nonetheless one of the central figures in the push for this initiative.

In 1943, changes within the Prime Minister's Department saw the demise of the ONS. Jeffery replaced C.Berendsen as Head of the Prime Minister's Department. The latter became the New Zealand High Commissioner in Canberra. As part of the reorganisation at this time, a War Cabinet decision noted the appointment on 19 March of A.D.McIntosh as Secretary of the War Cabinet, with Foss Shanahan becoming Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet. Shanahan remained as Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and it was decided that in line with the reorganisation of the Prime Minister's Department, the War Cabinet Secretariat should take over the functions of the ONS and the latter be disbanded.²⁰ Shanahan was pleased with this outcome, welcoming the end of what he termed 'a rather anomalous position.'²¹

A memorandum from the Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs to Permanent Heads outlined the situation early in April. The duties on the business of the War Cabinet and the communications of the Government by cablegrams and telegrams were being carried out by the War Cabinet Secretariat. All communications should be addressed to the Secretary of the War Cabinet, and all questions formerly directed to the ONS would be dealt with by the WCS.²² The memorandum noted that Shanahan as Secretary ONS was

now Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet and that communications for former ONS matters should go to him.²³

McIntosh had been in the Prime Minister's Department since 1935. On 11 June 1943 the Department of External Affairs was formally established,²⁴ with McIntosh becoming the Permanent Head, while remaining Secretary to the War Cabinet. Jeffery, the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department had suffered head injuries from a car accident, leaving him partially incapacitated. McIntosh undertook all the substantive work of the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department.²⁵ McIntosh subsequently became Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department in 1945, as well as retaining his position as Permanent Head of External Affairs. He occupied both posts until 1966, making him one of the most powerful and enduring civil servants.²⁶ Shanahan became Deputy Head of External Affairs in 1949 (and Cabinet Secretary from 1948 to 1955).²⁷

The linkage between McIntosh and Shanahan was most significant in terms of the evolution of top level policy, and indeed of the oversight of intelligence matters in general terms. When Frank Corner first worked for McIntosh in 1943, his first daily task was to prepare material based on the latest incoming intelligence signals, to be used by McIntosh to brief the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet on the war situation.²⁸ As Permanent Head of External Affairs, McIntosh also had oversight of diplomatic mail coming through.

At the time the correspondence contained in each "diplomatic bag" would be sent first to Mr McIntosh who would read or skim it as necessary and inscribe on each item the name of the person who would be responsible for taking action upon it. The folders would then go through the Registry, where file numbers would be assigned, to Miss Hussey who would note on the schedule of the contents of the diplomatic bag precisely where each paper was being sent.²⁹

Collectively, the responsibilities to the War Cabinet, the Prime Minister's Department, External Affairs and defence (via the COS Committee) put both McIntosh and Shanahan coincidentally in very convenient positions with regard to all sorts of matters relating to Government policy, including intelligence.

George Laking (also from the Customs Department) who came to succeed Shanahan as Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, described the intersection of interests between McIntosh and Shanahan in this way:

An organisational chart which I drew up in a moment of exasperation showed two intersecting circles, one centred on McIntosh, the other on Shanahan. Round the circumference of each were three or four acolytes chasing their tails. Most appeared on both. The lines of accountability were in the form of a triangle – the base line connecting McIntosh and Shanahan while the diagonals connected each with the Prime Minister... Within the composite structure were two separate streams of activity. One, in which Shanahan was the dominant figure, was the War Cabinet Secretariat and the network of activities which flowed from that. Under his influence and guidance it led eventually to the kind of Cabinet Secretariat which exists today. The other was the newly born External Affairs Department and the creation of a different network of external relationships. Here McIntosh had the primary responsibility and interest. Moreover, as Secretary of the War Cabinet and also External Affairs his position and authority were central to the whole enterprise. They were reinforced by his relationship with the Prime Minister. He and Shanahan were not necessarily compatible personalities to be placed in such a close and to some extent competitive situation.³⁰

The post of Secretary ONS, and later that of Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, was important with regard to intelligence in New Zealand insofar as it was a conduit between the military and the top level of government. The Secretary ONS had a hand in the pulling together of various intelligence strings in concert with the three Chiefs of Staff of the armed services. The combined intelligence organisation, coastwatching, the establishment of a security service (and the subsequent complications that arose) and the dissemination of some of the products of those intelligence bodies were areas in

which the Secretary was involved, to a greater or lesser extent. If the ONS itself provided an umbrella for the co-ordination of defence matters, the contribution of the Secretary ONS to do with intelligence was wide-ranging, in terms of being part of, or facilitating decision making. This was a sometimes delicate job, and on at least one occasion had the Secretary party to deliberations that were contrary to the Prime Minister's wishes – a conflict over certain intelligence summaries. Many years later, it is said that the one piece of advice given by Prime Minister Fraser to the incoming Holland was to 'watch Shanahan!'³¹ The very close working relationship with the three Chiefs of Staff of the armed services was fundamental. The first incumbent as Secretary was an army officer, so it was probably natural that this closeness should evolve. His civilian assistant who succeeded him followed the established practice, with arguably more talent and over a longer period. Nowhere, in terms of intelligence, was this more obviously displayed than with the development of a combined intelligence organisation.

Chapter Two

Prewar Preparations

The development of a tri-service intelligence organisation during the Second World War was the most significant New Zealand intelligence initiative for the period. Whether it was well utilised once established, to what extent it became truly tri-service, or if its significance was less appreciated than might have been expected are matters for later consideration. Such an organisation could only come about if there was a perceived requirement for it. Indeed, the question of its continued existence and the limits placed upon its functioning was predicated upon perceptions connected with assumed intelligence requirements. The 'Centre' that was eventually established did not come about as the result of haste, even though the rate of progress to that end fluctuated considerably. This chapter considers the prewar preparations for intelligence co-ordination. Chapter Three looks at the outbreak of war and the establishment of the first combined intelligence centre, the Combined Intelligence Bureau (the CIB). The Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (COIC), the successor to the CIB, is the subject of Chapter Four, and an assessment is made of the effectiveness of New Zealand combined intelligence during the war.

The prewar preparations in the direction of the co-ordination of intelligence can be described as rudimentary. Not much was done prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Two strands provide the substance to the prewar preparations. The two successive combined intelligence organisations that evolved in wartime were largely outgrowths of naval intelligence, owing much to the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy which in

October 1941 formally became the Royal New Zealand Navy. It is worth tracing the development of New Zealand naval intelligence from 1914 through to 1939. The second strand was the moves in the late 1930s groping towards intelligence co-ordination under the aegis of the ONS. From these strands some conclusions may be drawn about the effectiveness of intelligence collection in the prewar period.

It is clear that without the Navy, no combined intelligence organisation would have eventuated. The Army's involvement in combined intelligence initially had to do with the post occupied by Major Stevens as Secretary of the ONS – a strategic post passed on to his civilian Assistant Secretary, Foss Shanahan of the Prime Minister's Department. Apart from deliberations at the Chiefs of Staff level, the Army's contribution can only be described as meagre. As the Air Force did not come into existence as a separate service until 1936, air intelligence was quite literally a one-man band, there being one intelligence officer extant.

Naval intelligence in New Zealand between the 1920s and the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 centred on the person of the naval intelligence officer in Wellington. He presided over an agent-reporting network, although developments in radio location technology were a concurrent dimension of increasing importance. The naval intelligence effort eventually led to an expansion of intelligence activities with a maritime focus. These included further extension of already established technical methods of signals interception (for example, in direction-finding), increasing numbers of coastwatching posts and close co-operation with Allied intelligence organisations. Co-operation pointed up the need for the centralised analysis and dissemination of collected intelligence (from

both allied and local sources). This lay at the heart of the requirements of combined intelligence.

The taking up of naval intelligence duties on the New Zealand Station was inaugurated on 4 August 1914 with the appointment of Commander R.A. Newton RN as Naval Intelligence Officer. Two days later, Newton reporting on the interception of German and Dutch wireless telegrams, noted the Naval Intelligence Officer, Sydney, had sent surmised position reports for two warships of the German armoured cruiser squadron in the Far East. Assistant-Paymaster W.J.A. Brown succeeded Newton as Naval Intelligence Officer in September 1914. There was a good deal of monitoring by New Zealand stations aimed at the interception of enemy signals, and a proper reporting system set up. An 'Admiralty Intelligence Centre' was established in Wellington in September 1914 and the 'six New Zealand Reporting Officers' reported to the Centre. The Naval Adviser, Captain P.H. Hall-Thompson RN, had jurisdiction over the Naval Intelligence Officer (Brown) and the 'Admiralty Intelligence Centre'. Hall-Thompson in 1917 circulated 'intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, China, Commander-in-Chief, Cape of Good Hope, Navy Office, Melbourne, Esquimalt, Panama and Callao', and he proposed an extension of this exchange to the naval staff officer in Suva.¹ The pattern of exchange of intelligence between the Admiralty authorities in the Far East and the Pacific, and Australia and Canada laid the foundations of co-operation on a grander scale in the Second World War.

After the First World War, Captain M.R. Yeo was appointed District Intelligence Officer, Wellington on 5 September 1921.² The District Intelligence Officer, Wellington, was the only Royal Navy officer employed ashore in New Zealand not lent for duty to the

New Zealand Government. Yeo was succeeded on 18 September 1922 by Paymaster Lieutenant Commander J.T.V.Webster, and he in turn, was followed by Lieutenant Commander F.Lumb on 1 February 1926.³

In June 1925 the Admiralty enquired whether the New Zealand Government would be prepared to assume responsibility for a Naval Intelligence Centre in Wellington, noting that this was being done in Australia and Canada, with close liaison between those centres and the Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty.⁴ In August the Commodore Commanding the New Zealand Station (CCNZS) put before the New Zealand Naval Board a proposal to take responsibility for a naval intelligence officer, on the grounds that although a Staff Officer (Intelligence) might not be so useful in peacetime, his role in the event of an outbreak of hostilities would be of real value to New Zealand.⁵ Commodore Beal noted the Staff Officer (I) worked directly for the Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty, and although the SO(I)'s reports went through Beal to London, the SO(I) was not on Beal's staff and was not responsible to the Commodore or to the Navy Office in Wellington. It was suggested if New Zealand took financial responsibility for the SO(I), then he would be able to be used in wartime by New Zealand. A Cabinet decision was deferred until after the general election.⁶

The subject was revisited in early 1927 by the next CCNZS, Commodore G.T.C.P.Swabey. He suggested that the post of SO(I) could be amalgamated with that of Staff Officer (Operations),⁷ the arguments being put to the Minister of Defence on 8 April 1927.⁸ The 15 March memorandum, from the 'Chief Staff Officer', noted that thus far the Government had not assumed fiscal responsibility for either the 'Naval Intelligence Centre' or the 'Staff Officer (Intelligence)'. Observing that the Admiralty had

previously asked the Navy Board if a Staff Officer (Operations) should be allocated to the New Zealand Station in June 1926,⁹ the Chief Staff Officer commented that an appropriate time had arrived to link the two posts in one appointment, that of a Staff Officer (Operations and Intelligence). It was noted on the intelligence side that New Zealand was so remote from important trade routes and 'Foreign Territory' that it was unlikely that there was scope for the employment of a fulltime intelligence officer in peacetime. In wartime, on the other hand, a Staff Officer (Intelligence) would be very busy with a variety of duties, including liaison with merchant shipping, the routing of individual ships, the organisation of convoys, censorship, contraband measures, involvement with the Royal Naval Reserve and the Military, and local defence questions. Similarly, the Staff Officer (Operations) would not have much to do on the flagship in peacetime, but in wartime would come ashore when the Commodore moved into the Navy Office. It was suggested that a new SO(O&I) be appointed at the rank of lieutenant commander to work either aboard the flagship or in the Navy Office. It was envisaged that the SO(O&I) would not only work on matters affecting the New Zealand Squadron, but also assist the Chief Staff Officer with running the Royal Naval Reserve, base development and port defence, combined exercises with the Army, the revising of Station Orders and a number matters to do with war orders. It was argued that the intelligence gathered by the Staff Officer (Intelligence) was only used 'in England' and that the intelligence centre was thus of little local value in peacetime, whereas in time of war the intelligence centre was important to New Zealand.¹⁰ This was making a case to use the SO(O&I) for the Chief Staff Officer's purposes in peacetime, yet implied the Intelligence

Centre could immediately become operationally useful on the outbreak of war, despite his assertion that information useful to London was of little local application.

In late April 1927, the Government accepted responsibility for the 'Naval Intelligence Centre' in Wellington from 1 April 1928, on the proviso that the Admiralty could loan an officer to undertake the combined duties of Staff Officer (Operations & Intelligence) for a period of three years.¹¹ The Admiralty through the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs acknowledged its appreciation of the New Zealand Government's decision. The Admiralty was prepared to 'lend' Lieutenant Commander C.J.M.Lang for three years as SO(I), and there was no objection to using him for operations tasks in peacetime, provided this was not to the detriment of his role as intelligence officer.¹² The revised Naval Intelligence Manual was quoted to underline the point. Each naval station had an intelligence centre responsible to the Commander in Chief, and the Staff Officer (Intelligence) could be employed on other work by the local Senior Naval Officer while still carrying out his intelligence tasks. The visits of the Staff Officer (Intelligence) to Reporting Officers in his area was emphasized, and local commanders were to facilitate this in co-ordination with routine warship cruises.¹³

The Admiralty qualified the use of the SO(I) as an operations officer. At times of increased international tension the SO(I) should be ashore to carry out the duties associated with his post, and it was essential to avoid a situation where the SO(I) was required as an operations officer afloat, thus leaving his intelligence duties in the hands of an officer 'not equally well versed in the duties of the post.'¹⁴ The dangers in compromising the wartime intelligence role were to be in New Zealand's case, somewhat prophetic. The New Zealand Government accepted of the loan of a Staff Officer

(Operations & Intelligence), and accordingly, Lieutenant Commander Lang took up his post under the new arrangement on 3 April 1928.¹⁵ He was followed by Lieutenant Commanders W.H.Bremner (on 15 August 1930), G.St.A.Alcock (on 10 February 1933), J.S.Head (on 8 August 1935), T.Ellis (on 4 February 1938) and E.K.H.St.Aubyn (in August 1939).¹⁶ The last mentioned was not a regular rotation.

The SO(O&I) ran an intelligence organisation during the thirties consisting for the most part of a variety of what were really part-time official agents scattered around the Pacific. These Reporting Officers held normal official posts which put them in useful positions for obtaining intelligence. The Collectors of Customs at the ports of Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton, Dunedin, Bluff and Napier along with the Postmaster on the Chatham Islands were Reporting Officers in New Zealand.¹⁷ There were Reporting Officers scattered through a number of island territories in the Pacific, viz. Rarotonga, Ocean Island, Fanning Island, Apia, Suva, Nukualofa, Papeete and Honolulu. The SO(O&I) travelled from time to time to these more remote locations on warship cruises in the South Pacific¹⁸ and communication took place using post and cable links where these existed. This was working quite well by April 1938, for example, when it was noted that valuable monthly reports were being received from the Reporting Officers at Suva, Ocean Island, Nukualofa and other places.¹⁹

In late 1934 the Admiralty had taken steps to strengthen the naval intelligence capability in the Far East. Since the 1920s there had been signals intelligence work done on Japanese naval and military ciphers by collaboration between the Admiralty and the Government Code and Cypher School (at this time GC&CS came under the Secret Intelligence Service or MI6). In 1934 Paymaster Captain Arthur Shaw was sent out to

Hong Kong to establish the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB). Shaw was appointed to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief China Station with the title of Chief of the Intelligence Staff (COIS) The COIS would also be known as the 'Captain on the Intelligence Staff' or simply as the 'Captain on the Staff'. Under the Captain on the Staff, the Far East Combined Bureau was formed to co-ordinate, collate and evaluate all intelligence in the Far East as a whole, with particular regard to Japan. Based initially in Hong Kong, it oversaw intelligence collection and developed operational co-ordination of signals interception and code-breaking in the Far East. Captain Shaw was succeeded as Captain on the Staff by Captain F.J.Wylie in 1938, who was in turn replaced by Captain K.L.Harkness in 1940. Wylie and Harkness had close liaison with the SO(O&I) in Wellington. Indeed, the New Zealand high frequency direction-finding station in Fiji in 1941 was under the direct operational control of FECB, and the other three New Zealand H/F D/F stations were to be part of a wider Pacific network. In 1939 the Far East Combined Bureau relocated to Singapore, with a small support staff left on Stonecutters Island in Hong Kong.²⁰

For the co-ordination of naval intelligence to work, the Admiralty took the view that it was essential that the various naval intelligence officers on the East Indies Station, the South American Division, the North American and West Indies Station, and those in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, should have a very close liaison with the Captain on the Intelligence Staff. It was intended that the whole organisation should be known as the Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation (PNIO). This came under the direction of Far East Combined Bureau until the end of 1941. The New Zealand Naval Board agreed to co-operate with regard to the collection of intelligence on Japan.²¹ There was an

established pattern of practical co-operation between the naval intelligence officers in Canada, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand in the circulation of operational intelligence during the First World War.²²

In March 1939, the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Naval Intelligence Division in London intimated that it was intended to introduce measures for co-operation between Staff Officers (Intelligence) abroad and French intelligence in their overseas territories. The exchange of intelligence was to be limited to emergency operational information and naval movements affecting British and French warships.²³ The SO(O&I) in Wellington was asked to meet French officials in Papeete, and in May the SO(O&I) was instructed that measures for the protection of trade and naval dispositions could be fully discussed. On 3 July, Lieutenant Commander Ellis attended a meeting in Papeete aboard the French sloop *Dumont D'Urville*. The SO(O&I) was accompanied by his Reporting Officer in Tahiti, Ernest Edmonds (the British consul), while the French were represented by Captain Azur of the *Dumont D'Urville* and the Marine Commandant, Oceania, Lieutenant Commander Brachet. The SO(O&I) in his report of this meeting came to the conclusion that the potential for useful co-operation in the event of the outbreak of hostilities was virtually nil, because of deficiencies on the French side. The *Dumont D'Urville* was the only French warship in the South Pacific. There was only one French Reporting Officer in the French possessions, Brachet at Papeete, with no-one at Noumea or in the New Hebrides. Furthermore, Brachet could only contact the sloop at certain times, and then not in cipher. Brachet's only means of obtaining information locally was via the masters of native trading schooners who reported to the harbourmaster at Makatea Island, who passed on material to Brachet.²⁴

The arrival of Lieutenant Commander E.K.H.St.Aubyn in July 1939 to take up the post of Staff Officer (Operations) potentially allowed Ellis to function as SO(I) and concentrate on intelligence duties. This was short-lived as Ellis was recalled to London in August owing to a shortage of intelligence officers in the Naval Intelligence Division. The problems envisaged earlier by the Admiralty in a 'time of strained relations' were now compounded, as the newly arrived St.Aubyn had to pick up the intelligence role. Once more the post was operations and intelligence. With hostilities only a few short weeks away, the new SO(O&I) was to have his hands full. His staff at this time consisted of two Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve officers for operations and intelligence, the Merchant Shipping Officer, plus clerical staff. As might be expected in deteriorating circumstances, the SO(O&I) quite rapidly attracted a number of other functions on top of operations and intelligence, leaving him in the words of the Official Historian, as 'Staff Officer (Everything)'.²⁵

With the commencement of hostilities there was some reorganisation of the Reporting Officers in New Zealand. The Naval staffs at Auckland, Lyttelton and Dunedin took over the roles of Reporting Officers from the Collectors of Customs. The Collectors of Customs at Napier and Bluff were retained. At other New Zealand ports the Collectors of Customs worked to the Comptroller of Customs in Wellington for both shipping control and intelligence duties.²⁶

The Reporting Officers in the various island groups in the South Pacific continued their work, although with varying degrees of success. Only two of the eight Reporting Officers in the Pacific Islands had cable communication with New Zealand, namely Suva and Fanning Island. When codes were considered to be compromised it became hard to

send secret messages to other posts using commercial W/T. The lack of adequate postal links and long distances often precluded the use of postal services for communication. Communication with Ocean Island usually took several weeks and the only regular calls at Fanning Island were made by the *Dickenson*, a US cable vessel. The United States was not in the war at this time, and it was considered that unless there was 'a reliable British subject' on passage on the *Dickenson*, the Reporting Officer (the British consul) at Honolulu could not forward confidential documents.²⁷

The Consul in Honolulu was experiencing difficulty in tracking the locations of US warships following the US Navy Department's imposition of secrecy on naval movements. The Consul in Papeete had difficulty trying to report on the intentions of the Governor of Tahiti and the movements of the *Dumont D'Urville*. The Consul and Agent at Nukualofa, Armstrong, was assiduous in his Reporting Officer role and 'prompt' in his investigations. The able Comptroller of Customs in Suva, Martin, was extremely useful, not merely because of his previous experience at Freetown, but also because his was a busier port.²⁸

The naval intelligence organisation in New Zealand up to the outbreak of war was a very slender body. Some work had been done in further developing signals interception capability through the use of high-frequency direction-finding stations and the collation of that and other operational wireless intelligence. This was a natural extension of the First World War interception experience which had not completely died away during the 'twenties and 'thirties. This can be described as 'Y' intelligence and lay at the heart of New Zealand's technical intelligence capability. The 'Y' organisation's contribution

crops up repeatedly in the operation of the two successive combined intelligence organisations.

If the dimensions of the naval intelligence effort up to the outbreak of war seem rather slight, the moves taken in the direction of co-ordinating intelligence in New Zealand were even less substantial in the prewar period. Slow and unrealistic, they consisted initially of little more than the establishment of a document-shelving service of slender means. It was the Organization for National Security that provided the umbrella for any developments in this area. The commentary of the first Secretary of the ONS, Lieutenant-Colonel W.G.Stevens, is apposite.

During the lean years Operations and Intelligence for all its high sounding name, was a phantom branch as far as the constructive work was concerned. There were no operations of any conceivable kind in which New Zealand troops were likely to play a part – that is, if there were any troops. If I had suggested preparing plans for the formation of an expeditionary force, I would have been stopped dead because of the political implications; and in any case one officer and his one clerk could not do much. ‘Intelligence’ was entirely dependent on material sent to us from the United Kingdom – even intelligence about the Pacific at our very doors. Papers came not only from the War Office but also from the Committee of Imperial Defence including reports on many countries which might be – and were – our enemies in a future war, but all we could do was file them, for there was no staff available to analyse them or think about how we might be affected.²⁹

The first effective move towards some form of combined intelligence organisation originated in the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the ONS. On 17 March 1938, it proposed that the Secretary ONS should contact the three service intelligence officers to prepare a plan for combined peacetime and wartime intelligence activities, including the production of ‘a combined intelligence summary.’³⁰

The Combined Intelligence Committee of the ONS duly convened under its Secretary, W.G.Stevens, for the first meeting on 29 March 1938. It consisted of five

members from the defence establishment: two from the Army (both long associated with the ONS); two from the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy (the departing and incoming naval intelligence officers); and an Army officer seconded to the Air Department. At this initial meeting³¹ there was general agreement that compiling a combined intelligence summary presented no difficulties. Air and naval intelligence material should go to the 'Naval Intelligence Officer' around the twenty-fifth of each month. He would then put the summary together in 'some coherent order.' If the typing and duplication of the summary was beyond the capabilities of the Navy Office, the office of the Secretary ONS would do it. The prospects for war were discussed. As an aside on the matter of censorship, it was decided to co-opt Detective A.M.Harding of the Police Department onto the Committee. The arrival of a police representative was something of a portent of things to come pertaining to that Department's attitude towards intelligence and security.

The next meeting of the Combined Intelligence Committee took place on 28 April 1938, attended by Stevens and Clifton (Army), Ellis (Navy), Free (Air Department) and Harding. Typing and duplication of the proposed combined intelligence summary would be done by the ONS. After discussion on the scope of the intelligence material for the combined summary, it there agreed it would consist of internal intelligence only, and not substitute any summary of external intelligence put out by any of the services.³² To what extent this limitation of the scope of the combined summary to internal intelligence matters was attributable to the police representative remains unclear, although the rest of the minuted discussion implies the expression of strongly held police views. Detective Harding noted, on internal security that 'At present the Police were carrying on with

certain work, but never had any instructions regarding it.' It was agreed the police had two security responsibilities: first to keep a record of arrivals and departures of 'aliens', particularly certain nationalities; second, to keep a watch on bodies or individuals who might be likely to engage in sabotage or antiwar agitation. On surveillance, it was noted that there was no system of hotel registration reporting to the police in place. Harding also raised the question of the distribution of intelligence information between the armed services and the Police Department. However, no decisions were taken on this matter.³³ The question of access to service intelligence by a civilian department was to become a minor but recurrent feature of the Police Department's attitude towards armed forces' intelligence.

The third meeting of the committee was only a few days later. Harding asserted³⁴ that the police had arrangements in hand for a register of arrivals and departures of 'aliens' to be drawn up with the assistance of the Customs Department and the Census and Statistics Department. The police admitted they had experienced difficulties in keeping track of Japanese nationals in New Zealand, but were aware of the desirability of collecting all possible information on them. The meeting also resolved that the distribution of intelligence should be a matter for each originating department. This meant no general routine circulation of intelligence. It seems likely that this reflected the influence of the Navy. Although independent in many respects, the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy was closely tied operationally to the Admiralty in London. There would have been a considerable reluctance to consider, even in principle, the notion of circulating sensitive operational intelligence to a civilian department of another government. On the other hand, the Committee was 'happy' with the 'now satisfactory'

situation on internal security intelligence.³⁵ The subject of wartime intelligence was held over for further discussion.

An ONS minute of 5 May on the combined intelligence summaries outlined what was thought to be useful for inclusion and the extent of the circulation envisaged:

1. Information to be provided by each branch of the service about its own activities. Much information of this type which is useful and interesting to other branches is not passed on under present arrangements.
2. Intelligence of local interest should be included by the branch which collects it, if it is likely to be of interest to other branches. Intelligence of general interest received from foreign sources peculiar to one service only, should be included.
3. Intelligence Reports or Summaries received by any branch should be recorded as 'Received' in the Combined Summary, in order that all branches may refer to them for special information if such should be required.
4. Reporting to external authorities and circulation of reports will still be done by branches as before.
5. Question – Should the combined summary be issued to Government Departments?³⁶

The idea of giving wide circulation to 'Government Departments' was naïve in the extreme from a security angle, and was not what had been agreed to the day before. The issue of the extent of the distribution of intelligence was to become another irritant.

The rather credulous approach to security was further demonstrated in the Combined Intelligence Committee's deliberations between June and August 1938. The meeting on 16 June concerned the security of prohibited areas. Noting that it was difficult to police the air, the Committee observed that no cameras could be taken up in aircraft in wartime without a permit from the Air Department. Prohibited sea areas could be promulgated from time to time, and there were sufficient powers at present to prevent people from entering those areas. Essentially, security was to be a collaborative effort between departments.³⁷ On Vital Points, Detective Harding noted that the Police Commissioner was in agreement with the present principles, although some changes in

detail might be required. The Secretary ONS was to elicit the views of the Public Works and the Railways Departments.³⁸ The Committee met in mid-July with representatives from those Departments along with the National Broadcasting Service and the P & T Department to discuss Vital Points.³⁹ Shortly after this the Committee reflected on the security of Army, Air Force and Naval establishments.⁴⁰

Another aspect of combined intelligence was the possibility of a regional focus. Stevens noted the intelligence committee thought a lot of information would come into Auckland from aerial reconnaissance, coastwatching and public spirited citizens. This should be sifted in Auckland by service personnel and not just passed to Wellington. The committee considered a combined intelligence office was required in Auckland and Lyttelton (or Christchurch).⁴¹ Stevens observed that the organisation of the proposed operations room in Wellington remained unclear.⁴² The regional focus was returned to in another memorandum from the Secretary ONS on 14 September. He asserted the armed forces had arranged that all incoming coastwatching reports were to go to the District Naval Intelligence Officer, and he would pass the reports to the services' local intelligence officers as well as to Navy Office. Again, the suggestion was made that local information reported to local intelligence officers be locally exchanged by telephone, and be sifted and tested before being passed to Wellington. It was agreed that the three intelligence officers in Wellington assisted by a police officer should form an intelligence centre. Similar intelligence centres should be set up in fortress areas.⁴³ Regionalism was returned to by the Chiefs of Staff. A combined intelligence centre was to be located at the headquarters of each military district, and local information sorted before forwarding to Wellington.⁴⁴

While sounding nicely co-operative in principle, establishing a plethora of intelligence centres might be less easy to implement in practice. There was an attendant risk that important intelligence which might fill the gaps in a larger picture might not be passed to Wellington, simply because the significance might not be appreciated at the local level.

The larger question was to make a start on a combined intelligence organisation. In January 1939 the Chiefs of Staff decided to set up a committee to look at the concept of a Combined Headquarters Operations Room.⁴⁵ Lieutenant Commander Ellis was to convene a meeting with Major Clifton and Squadron Leader Grundy to sketch the layout and communications requirement for an operations room. The outline that emerged from this sub-committee was comprehensive in its scope. The operations room was to have situation map displays with the latest plotted operational information to enable the three Chiefs of Staff to make appreciations and take appropriate action. All other relevant intelligence was to be available in some convenient manner.⁴⁶

The sub-committee considered there were five sources of intelligence: the three services, the Meteorological Office, and the public. Certain information would need 'sifting', but some intelligence of an imperative nature and from an 'unimpeachable source' should be made available as quickly as possible. Naval intelligence sources were the Admiralty, warships at sea, merchant shipping, the coastwatching organization, the District Naval Intelligence Officers, and the Post and Telegraph Department W/T Stations. The intelligence picture would be built up from the positions of friendly warships and merchantmen, enemy warships and merchantmen and neutral shipping.

The information should be delivered by the 'Naval Intelligence Officer' by the 'quickest possible channel'.⁴⁷

The sub-committee considered that most Army intelligence would be of no practical use, coming from each Military District's forces. The most useful would be reports of landings and locations of enemy forces in particular places. Army intelligence would need to be sorted by the Combined Intelligence Staff (composed of service and police personnel), and the small useful portion passed to the operations room. The police and the public would provide large amounts of information which would require lots of sifting. Air intelligence was thought likely to be useful, and consist of reports from RNZAF stations and aircraft on patrol. These could be sent directly by wireless to the operations room. Meteorological Office information should go direct. Secure communications were to be by W/T landline and direct phone links between intelligence sections and the operations room.⁴⁸

The main requirement was for timely and accurate intelligence for the service chiefs to assist operational decision-making. This was more easily said than done, for it could be assumed that the service chiefs were likely to be remote from any scene of action unless it was local. The amount of information needing to be 'sifted' implied a looming bottleneck unless handled very carefully. Even more fundamentally, the time, distance and resource problems might prove insurmountable, given the country was slightly larger than the United Kingdom, yet possessed a small population and very flimsy maritime defence forces.

There was, however, a lack of urgency about actually establishing a combined intelligence organisation, for in June the Police Commissioner requested clarification

from Stevens on possible wartime intelligence arrangements. He wished to know if a police officer was required for fulltime duty at the 'Combined Intelligence Office' on receipt of the Precautionary Message.⁴⁹ Stevens replied on 5 July that while the services were agreed on forming a combined intelligence organisation, and while close police liaison was essential, a fulltime police officer was not necessary.⁵⁰ The situation was more prosaic. Nothing effective had been done, and no moves made to set up a combined intelligence organisation. The recommendations of Ellis, Clifton and Grundy went no further, and more than a year would pass before any further steps were taken. Combined intelligence was accorded a low priority and threats from outside New Zealand were not regarded as sufficiently dangerous to require action. In terms of the provision of useful operational intelligence, the slender intelligence resources of the Navy were left to fill the gap. The war had arrived, but the establishment of a combined intelligence centre remained as distant as ever.

Chapter Three

The Outbreak of War and the Combined Intelligence Bureau

The outbreak of war did not result in any priority being given to establishing a combined intelligence centre. Further moves were made very slowly, prompted only by a sudden shock administered by the enemy in June 1940. The Navy provided operational intelligence to fill the gap, and continued to do so. Steps eventually followed leading to the establishment of the first combined intelligence body, the Combined Intelligence Bureau (CIB). The CIB was hampered by a lack of resources and had hesitant, inauspicious beginnings. These shortcomings led to the re-engineering of the combined intelligence organisation in late 1941, when it was translated into the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (COIC). It had taken from September 1939 to December 1941 to develop anything resembling a useful combined intelligence centre.

When hostilities opened, naval intelligence was the principal source of operational intelligence for the Chiefs of Staff. New Zealand naval intelligence was, however, disrupted by the departure of the SO(I), Lieutenant Commander Ellis, in July 1939. The recently arrived Lieutenant Commander St.Aubyn took over operations and intelligence, but was saddled with additional duties.¹ He had just three officers plus clerical staff to cover operations, intelligence and merchant shipping control, so the production of intelligence was meagre.² Naval personnel had taken over the Reporting Officer roles at the larger New Zealand ports from customs officials (who nevertheless retained their intelligence function at minor ports). Communications delays materialised between some Pacific Islands Reporting Officers and the Navy Office.³ Signals

intelligence was a little brighter. Although it was early days for the naval 'Y' organisation, taking up the wartime interception role was a matter of working up from past practice. The exploitation of the potential of the high-frequency direction-finding stations from as early as 1938, was central to this effort. Indications that commerce raiding would commence on distant trade routes were noted by the Chiefs of Staff at this time.⁴ It was to pay off immediately with the *Graf Spee* search (see Chapter Five).

The Navy took the initiative in the production of an intelligence summary, the first of which was issued in October 1939. As the format and content provided the pattern for intelligence summaries issued later by the combined organisations, it is worth considering a couple of examples. The main focus of interest for the naval intelligence summaries was the location and movements of enemy naval units. Issued by the SO(O&I), the weekly naval intelligence summaries had limited distribution within New Zealand.⁵ They went to six recipients within New Zealand and two outside destinations, Australia and Fiji.⁶

The reports were divided into two sections, one on Allied shipping and one headed Intelligence Summary. The 'Report of Progress in Naval Defence' for 8 October 1939⁷ discussed under Part I the movements of HMS *Leander*, the mobilisation of further naval reservists, the arming of merchantmen, the commissioning of the first of three minesweepers, and the on-going conversion of the *Monowai* as an armed merchant cruiser. Part II was sub-divided into four sections. Under the heading Allied Warships a number of observations were made. These included the retention of a small force in Hong Kong, the redeployment of some Yangtse gunboats, and the presence of British and French warships in the Singapore area. Patrol and search duties were being carried out in

the Indian Ocean; HMS *Achilles* was on the west coast of South America en route to the South Atlantic; the appearance of an enemy surface raider near Pernambuco had led to a strengthening of British forces; and the RAAF now had a reconnaissance squadron located at Port Moresby. The German Warships section noted the sinking of the steamer *Clement* on 30 September had been carried out by the pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer* (later this turned out to be the *Admiral Graf Spee*). A South American report indicated that German submarines were operating off Peru and Chile and British merchantmen heading for Panama should give the Galapagos Islands a wide berth. The section German Merchant Vessels noted reports indicated that several German disguised merchant raiders or supply ships were about to sail, and noted the arrival of the *Erlangen* at Punta Arenas in Chile (the only German vessel in New Zealand waters on the outbreak of war).⁸ Other German merchantmen were in the Dutch East Indies. The section United States Warships noted the strengthening of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The weekly summary for 17 December noted the *Graf Spee* engagement already 'fully reported' in the press,⁹ the crippling of the *Leipzig* in the North Sea and the suspected presence of another raider in the South Atlantic. An intercept of a Japanese message was mentioned,¹⁰ and it was noted that wireless searches for signals traffic from commerce raiders, submarines and merchant ships were being conducted.¹¹ This referred to the signals intelligence work of the 'Y' organisation. Naval intelligence continued to issue its intelligence summaries, the only routine useful supply of operational intelligence for the service chiefs. Matters to do with combined intelligence had slid into abeyance.

The German commerce raider *Orion* laid 228 mines in the approaches to Waitemata Harbour during the night of 13/14 June 1940. This operation began at 7.26

pm, took seven hours to complete, and was punctuated by pauses as inbound vessels passed by. Two of these were the armed merchant cruiser, HMS *Hector* and the cruiser HMS *Achilles*. The mines were only revealed six days later when an outward bound Canadian-Australian mail steamer, the *Niagara*, struck one of them and sank in the early hours of 19 June. The Government and the new Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, had received a sizeable shock, and recriminations followed. This was not merely because the unknown raider had been able to go about its business undetected, but because the Prime Minister now learned there were no really useful anti-submarine defences in New Zealand ports,¹² the product of a lack of foresight and defence spending. A contingent result was some renewal of interest in the matter of combined intelligence.

Circumstances compounded the problems for naval intelligence at this point. The Admiralty's shortage of naval intelligence officers led to the SO(O&I), St.Aubyn, being posted to Singapore. He departed on 19 July, and operations and intelligence duties devolved upon the Squadron Signals Officer from *Achilles*, Lieutenant Commander E.A.Nicholson, pending the arrival of a replacement, Commander G.F.Hannay, from Britain.¹³ The Chief of Naval Staff, Captain W.E.Parry, was concerned about the overloading of the SO(O&I) and the need to separate operations and intelligence.¹⁴ Technical and material duties were eliminated from the SO(O&I)'s burden, reducing it slightly. Commander Hannay assumed his post in September,¹⁵ but still faced the continuing difficulties of combining operations and intelligence. These remained problematical until the second half of 1941.

In the *Orion's* wake, yet another Intelligence Committee was convened on 16 August 1940 to consider a combined intelligence centre.¹⁶ It comprised the Secretary

ONS, Foss Shanahan, Lieutenant-Commander G.E.L.Alderton, Lieutenant-Colonel D.G.S. Urmson and Wing Commander E.M.F.Grundy. Grundy was the only survivor from the previous committee nearly eighteen months earlier, as Ellis, Clifton and Stevens had departed overseas. The August committee assessed the usefulness of the available sources of intelligence.¹⁷ These were grouped under Naval Intelligence, Local Intelligence, Air Intelligence, Army Intelligence and Combined Intelligence. There were seven external sources of naval intelligence consisting of the Admiralty's Weekly Intelligence Report, NATELS, the Far East Combined Bureau, Shanghai Intelligence, Hong Kong, the Australian Naval Intelligence Summary and Pacific Islands Intelligence.¹⁸

The Weekly Intelligence Report took six weeks to arrive. The NATELS or Naval Telegrams were current operational intelligence. Far East Combined Bureau reports received from Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai (not to be confused with operational signals from FECB) were two months old. The Australian Naval Intelligence Summary was more current.¹⁹ Intelligence from the Reporting Officers in the Pacific Islands was 'unsatisfactory and erratic', although efforts were being made to improve regularity and frequency.²⁰ The NATELS, the Weekly Intelligence Report and the Australian Naval Intelligence Summary were the most useful as a combination of depth and timing. The delayed WIR and FECB material provided interesting background reading. NATELS (and other signals) gave a stream of operational intelligence.

Local sources for naval intelligence were poor. Little was obtained from the police, and small amounts came from the Customs Department, the Censorship

organisation and the Air Department.²¹ The naval 'Y' organisation, a concealed local source with outside connections, was not listed.

The Air Force's sources of intelligence consisted of a daily signal from the Air Ministry in London, plus a delayed weekly summary. The Air Department had some information from the police, and anything else came from the Navy.²²

The Army's external intelligence sources were the War Office weekly intelligence summary, plus summaries from army headquarters in South Africa, Australia, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Malaya, all delayed. The Army's local intelligence sources were meagre, with little from Censorship, the Navy, the Air Force or the police.²³

Remote geographical location, mail delays and lack of local resources drew a bleak picture for the committee. Only the daily signals from the Admiralty and the Air Ministry and the RAN summary could be described as timely. A system of local reporting officers was suggested.²⁴ The Navy, of course, already had one. The Customs Department was part of this network, and any reduction was because of the Navy's reorganisation of the system. The P&T Department's listeners' surveillance was in its early stages. The Police Commissioner provided intelligence summaries on internal security to the Secretary ONS.²⁵

Obstacles to obtaining more timely operational intelligence needed to be overcome. The committee insisted an intelligence centre should have all available intelligence. It commented on the withholding of intelligence by senior officers and department heads. Recognising the need for distribution restrictions for certain intelligence, the committee accepted that it was impossible to run an intelligence centre if

it was denied sources. Collection, collation and rapid distribution of intelligence was the centre's role.²⁶

Recommendations followed. A combined intelligence centre needed to be set up speedily to process and distribute intelligence received.²⁷ The plans for a Combined Operations Room and a Combined Intelligence Centre should be put into effect. The Centre would be small, with one fulltime officer to run it, administer its records and distribute intelligence. Accumulated information on aliens, the disaffected, subversive and suspicious activities plus information from the services and the censorship authorities would provide internal intelligence. External intelligence would come from the armed services, Singapore, Australia, the Pacific islands and other places, and from the Prime Minister's Department. A weekly intelligence bulletin was to be produced from all this by the intelligence centre.²⁸ This was a tall order for one fulltime officer, even with other assistance. Such a centre could not be run around the clock, yet to be 'fully efficient' it would need to do just that.

The Committee deliberated on the role of the police. They were crucial for internal security information but reservations were raised about the effectiveness of local police reporting.²⁹ Small fragments of larger pictures might be missed. A police liaison officer should be appointed for each Military District to remedy this concern, plus a further office for the Combined Intelligence Centre.³⁰ The Navy was not happy with the laid back attitude of the police, who wanted 'gingering up.'³¹ Three additional suggestions were added. The three service intelligence officers appointed to the centre should be co-located. The Army needed a reporting system. A fulltime senior officer was

required to command the centre and be able to make immediate decisions on the receipt and distribution of intelligence.³²

The Intelligence Committee's report of 6 September 1940 set out succinctly the main requirements for the Combined Intelligence Centre. The Centre should be speedily established, and the three service intelligence officers accommodated therein, ensuring the expeditious handling of incoming intelligence, and thorough inter-service intelligence liaison. Clerical staff were needed for record keeping. Internal intelligence was expected from Customs, Marine, Publicity and Prime Minister's Departments, plus close liaison with the police. A police liaison officer was to be appointed to each Military District. If the police proved unwilling to go along with the proposals, it was considered that a system of reporting officers under military control should be set up. There was a hint here of a proposal for a separate security service. Within two months the concept of a separate security service under Army auspices, was being actively considered, in the face of police opposition. The report underlined the fact that delays in sending intelligence from government departments needed to be avoided.³³ The Centre's initial product was to be a weekly intelligence summary.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the report's recommendations on 12 September and agreed to meet the Police Commissioner the next day. The Secretary ONS was to consult the Police Commissioner on the police role.³⁴ Having carefully delineated the police role on internal security, but omitted reference to the measures contemplated if the police demurred, Shanahan's memorandum to the Commissioner concluded by saying a quick decision was necessary.³⁵ A meeting between the Chiefs of Staff and the Commissioner was brought forward to the following day. It was however cancelled

abruptly 'by order of the P.M.'³⁶ The Police Commissioner was unwilling to accommodate the proposals,³⁷ and had the ear of the Prime Minister.

Commander Hannay's takeover as SO(O&I) in early September had permitted a small reorganisation of naval intelligence. He presided over two sections - the Merchant Shipping Office with Lieutenant Commander Cornelius and Lieutenant Brackenridge; and an Intelligence Section with Lieutenant Commander Alderton and a clerical assistant.³⁸

On the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff a Central War Room and a Combined Intelligence Bureau were set up in the Navy Office in September.³⁹ The Central War Room was for the Chiefs of Staff for operational purposes, and run by the Combined Intelligence Bureau. The Bureau was under Hannay's command. By the end of September, draft operating orders for the Central War Room were in place, and the main focus was on enemy commerce raiders.⁴⁰

The draft orders of the Central War Room were set out in three sections: General Policy, Procedures for Operations in the Tasman Sea and Internal Procedure.⁴¹ The Central War Room was to be a central directing room for the Chiefs of Staff and (possibly) the War Cabinet for conducting operations around New Zealand. It envisaged operational co-operation with the RAN Central War Room in Melbourne and the C.-in-C. Far East. The operations room was to be supplied with intelligence by the Combined Intelligence Bureau.⁴² The intelligence centre was to receive and analyse intelligence, generating useable operational information. Tactical co-operation across the Tasman was sketched out. Operations in the Tasman Sea beyond the range of shore-based aircraft, would come under the direction of the Central War Room in Melbourne. The Wellington

CWR would have the right to modify or disregard Melbourne's instructions, but would inform Melbourne immediately. Both CWRs were to exchange intelligence. The Internal Procedure section outlined how an alert situation was to be handled and intelligence channelled. Once there was a requirement to deploy New Zealand warships and aircraft, the Navy Duty Officer (or the SO(O&I) if present) was to notify the relevant personnel in the naval and air staffs and the army if considered necessary.⁴³

The SO(O&I) was to file all naval and aircraft signals during the operation. All signals were to be seen by the service chief conducting the operation. The Duty Signals Officer was to sort messages. The Navy's 'Y' organisation would accumulate and distribute intelligence obtained by signals interception, and report any signals intelligence relevant to the operation.⁴⁴ Positions of shipping would be displayed on the CWR's main Shipping Plot, along with plots on other charts. The Naval Duty Officers were to be responsible for current intelligence on the location and strength of enemy units, available friendly forces, merchant shipping positions and the plot displays. The Procedure for Operations outlined operational co-ordination of ships, aircraft and listening watches mounted once a raider was detected.⁴⁵ The Naval Secretary forwarded to the Secretary ONS the Draft Orders for the CWR to issue as a Chiefs of Staff paper, but the Chiefs of Staff considered that a paper could be better issued later after operational experience.⁴⁶

The Prime Minister's comments to his Australian counterpart on 4 October 1940 acknowledged a larger Australian role and the potential of using Suva and Port Moresby for exchanges of operational intelligence. Further consultations between respective service chiefs were expected to cover contingency arrangements if Japan entered the war.⁴⁷ The New Zealand CNS received a response from the RAN CNS on 12 October

which threw cold water on the trans-Tasman proposals. The CWR and Combined Operational Intelligence Centre in Melbourne were not complete. He indicated the RAN's co-ordination measures on operational intelligence but implied some interservice friction on the CWR/COIC concept.⁴⁸

Within a month of setting up, problems arose for the Combined Intelligence Bureau from an unexpected quarter. It had to do with the CIB's weekly intelligence summary. Summary No.2 was suppressed on direction of the Prime Minister.⁴⁹ On Monday 21 October, the Prime Minister held a meeting with the Minister of Defence, three naval officers (Captain Fanshawe, Lieutenant-Commander Alderton and Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson), two army officers (Colonel Goss and Captain Williams), two air force officers (Flight Lieutenant Canning and Group Captain Neville), a police officer (Madden) and the Secretary ONS. Opening the meeting, the Prime Minister stated that publication of CIB reports was suspended by the Ministry of Defence until members of the Government had discussed their contents with the service chiefs and the intelligence officers.⁵⁰ Noting that the intelligence summaries were to be distributed overseas, Fraser

...stated that he was unhappy over the reporting, in the two reports published to date, of internal security topics, and particularly stated that it was undesirable to quote opinions, even when they came from the most eminent quarters, and that the reporting of labour disputes and stop-work meetings should be in such a way as not to convey a misleading impression, i.e. they must be related to the whole general situation.⁵¹

Calling into question the accuracy of sections of the reports, the Prime Minister emphasised the importance of the Bureau obtaining internal security information from the police, and he directed the police should provide this information.⁵² There was some discussion on this point, for he 'further agreed' the police should co-operate with the

CIB.⁵³ However, Colonel Goss pointed out that the service chiefs had written to the police with proposals for 'co-ordination between the Services and the Police Department in this connection', with those to be discussed at a proposed meeting.⁵⁴ This was a most pointed reminder of the 13 September meeting which the Prime Minister had cancelled. In the face of Goss's objections the Prime Minister agreed to discussions on co-operation between the Chiefs of Staff and the Police Commissioner.⁵⁵

Whatever the Prime Minister's objections about the intelligence summary, this scarcely justified stopping production of a long overdue document distributed to a relatively limited audience. Problems persisted, and further delays in production and circulation ensued because of hold-ups at the Prime Minister's office. Delays in circulating even weekly intelligence summaries diminished their usefulness. The Chiefs of Staff returned to these difficulties on 15 November.

The Chiefs of Staff took note of a direction given by the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister that before any further reports were published by the Bureau they should be submitted to him for approval. It was further noted that the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister had indicated at a conference, held on the 21st October to discuss the issue of reports by the Bureau, that a section of the report on internal security should be compiled by the Police Department. It was decided, therefore, that the Chiefs of Staff should approach the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister reminding him of his previous direction, and enquire whether, if this course were followed for the future, he would be prepared to allow of the reports being issued without prior reference to him. If he was unwilling to accept this arrangement, the Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the report should in future be published with no reference to internal security, so avoiding the necessity for reference to the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister for prior approval.⁵⁶

This underlined the lack of value the Chiefs of Staff attached to any contributions by the police on internal security. The Chiefs of Staff were carefully circumventing the need to comply with the Prime Ministerial direction, with the collaboration of the Secretary ONS.

This issue arose once more on 23 November in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Mawhood from the War Office, who was in Wellington to advise the Government on establishing a security service. Following Mawhood's address on security measures in Britain,

The position in New Zealand was outlined to Lt.Col. Mawhood, particular reference being made to the fact that reports of the Bureau could not be published until such time as they had been approved by the Prime Minister. In view of the discussions [sic] it was decided to rescind the previous agreement...and to defer further consideration of the matter until after Lt.Col. Mawhood had finished his discussions with War Cabinet and officers of the Combined Intelligence Bureau.⁵⁷

It would have been clear to Mawhood that the stumbling block was the internal security section of the intelligence summaries. At the same meeting the Secretary ONS was directed to contact the Commissioner of Police to inform him of CIB-police liaison arrangements and of the service chiefs' intention to meet with him.⁵⁸

This was an interesting ploy in the light of moves to set up a separate security service. Internal security was about to be reorganised without police co-operation. Despite the Police Commissioner submitting a regular intelligence summary on internal security to the Secretary ONS,⁵⁹ the service chiefs' dissatisfaction with the police was sufficient to continue them moving in the direction of an independent security service. This was not an auspicious climate for police liaison with either the CIB or a proposed security service.

On 5 January 1941, the departing head of the Far Eastern Combined Bureau arrived in Wellington on a liaison tour to Australia and New Zealand, visiting the CIB the next day. Captain F.J.Wylie RN had been the 'Captain on the Staff' of the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, since 1938. He briefed the Chiefs of Staff on the FECB on 7 January, then spent time with Lieutenant Commander Nicholson discussing W/T and D/F

intelligence. The following day he addressed four members of the War Cabinet on the FECB, namely the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defence and Finance, and J.G. Coates of the Opposition.⁶⁰

Wylie outlined his views on a combined intelligence organisation. Intelligent and broadminded officers were required in sufficient numbers to prevent overloading, along with clerical staff. Service officers should not be employed on clerical duties, and an official was needed to keep an efficient registry. All intelligence, except for that of technical interest to one service only, had to be pooled. There should be direct contact between the combined intelligence officer and his own service, but the combined view should always be put on matters affecting more than one service. Interservice jealousies should be recognised and circumvented. Each officer should be able professionally to evaluate his own service's intelligence. Wylie observed that the Naval directing officers in Australia and New Zealand were overloaded. He noted that a start had been made on combined intelligence and that a constant watch was maintained on the shipping plots.⁶¹

Matters to do with overloading the CIB were coming to a head. The SO(O&I) was so fully occupied with convoy organisation, the routeing of merchant shipping and other matters that intelligence was pushed aside. The Merchant Shipping Section of the CIB had become increasingly focussed on the commerce raider threat. Shipping intelligence was passed on to other naval authorities and the FECB in Singapore (which was the controlling authority for shipping intelligence in the Pacific and East Asia) as a matter of course. Before November 1940 the average number of merchantmen plotted by the Merchant Shipping Section averaged 107 per day, including 35 coastal vessels. After November this rose to an average of 136 per day, with 36 coasters. Additionally, an

average of 40 ships per day, mostly foreign vessels, passed through the area to the north of New Zealand, but were not plotted because of a lack of personnel and time. Beyond this, the dispositions of enemy and Allied warships needed to be plotted on the main wall chart in the CWR. Intelligence and Merchant Shipping staff amounted to four officers plus typists, and the intelligence personnel were absorbed in the safe passage of merchant shipping. In Melbourne, with three times the merchant traffic, there were four times the number of staff in the merchant shipping section alone.⁶²

In March 1941 the CNS raised the issue of his overloaded SO(O&I) with the Admiralty. A full-time Staff Officer (Intelligence) in Wellington was required. If an SO(I) was appointed, Hannay could concentrate on the operations role.⁶³ On 4 April the Admiralty replied that Lieutenant Commander F.M.Beasley had been appointed as SO(I). The CNS suggested Beasley visit the FECB at Singapore en route, and the Admiralty concurred.⁶⁴

Hannay outlined the shortcomings of the CIB. Although reports could be sent quickly from any part of New Zealand to Wellington (an advantage over Australia) the problem was a lack of resources and staff to handle them. Port security, including the Naval Base, would be better left to the new security service (set up in February). The 'Staff Officer (Intelligence)'[sic] had no time to sight suspiciously worded mail or cables drawn to his attention by the P.&T. Department's censorship staff, and thus only sporadic attention was paid to such traffic.⁶⁵ No use had been made for propaganda purposes of liaison with the Publicity Department. Contact with customs officers was limited through lack of staff. Little background information was coming in from District Naval Intelligence Officers or Intelligence Officers in warships because of lack of knowledge or

other duties. Intelligence from the Pacific Islands was poor, although important events were reported by signal and other information came by mail. Coastwatching reports were frequently of little value with vague descriptions of shipping. Lieutenant Brackenridge was fully occupied on collecting and distributing raider intelligence, editing the Admiralty's Weekly Intelligence Reports, and sorting intelligence from the Pacific islands. The War Diary required writing up, but there was no-one spare for it. Even the weekly intelligence summaries could not be sustained, with only about eight in all being issued by mid-1941. Although this was a bleak catalogue of deficiencies, Hannay preferred reorganisation of the CIB to wait until Beasley arrived.⁶⁶

On 22 July the CNS outlined preliminary measures for the CIB's reorganisation which were approved by the Chiefs of Staff. Beasley had arrived and a start could be made. The CNS suggested the CIB prepare a periodical summary of 'hot' intelligence to be distributed only to the services, the DNI in Melbourne and FECB in Singapore. The three service intelligence officers should pool their latest information. Intelligence relating to the enemy and the Japanese should be confined to the immediate situation in the New Zealand area as far as possible. Although the first summary might be difficult to produce, further production could be supplements to the first.⁶⁷

In the meantime a comprehensive overhaul of the CIB was contemplated. On 26 July, Beasley wrote to the DNI in Melbourne requesting the loan of his Civil Assistant, W.H. Brooksbank, to critically assess the state of the CIB. Brooksbank had been Civil Assistant to the DNI since 1922 and helped lay the foundation of the Australian Naval Intelligence Division. He had a comprehensive knowledge of the combined intelligence set-up in Australia. The DNI assented to Beasley's request.⁶⁸

The CNS and the new SO(I) clearly intended that sweeping changes should be made. Between 8 and 16 August two meetings and three memoranda fundamentally altered the shape and scope of the combined intelligence organisation. On 8 August yet another committee met to look at the CIB, consisting of Beasley, Lieutenant-Colonel Donaldson, Major Stevenson, Squadron Leader Hunter and Flight Lieutenant Canning. They set out a number of proposals for change.⁶⁹ There would be a name change from the CIB to the 'Combined Operational Intelligence Centre' (COIC) to reflect the organisation's function.⁷⁰ The main task was to provide operational intelligence for the Chiefs of Staff for the conduct of operations within the New Zealand area. Operational intelligence on enemy and friendly forces, with an emphasis on Japan and the Pacific, was to be collected, collated and analysed. A central record system was to be maintained. Current intelligence summaries with restricted distribution were to be issued, plus a general summary once a fortnight. Specific intelligence recommendations could be made by the COIC to the service chiefs. The COIC should have no responsibility for security, instead receiving regular reports from the new security service. The COIC would be commanded by a Director appointed and responsible to the Chiefs of Staff. The COIC must be split into three sections, one for each service. However, service personnel had to appreciate they were in a combined organisation responsible to all three services. This still permitted retention of their own service expertise on operations and intelligence. The COIC required copies of all operational orders, instructions, memoranda, location and intelligence reports from each service. Reference publications urgently needed should be purchased. The Director was to assess office accommodation requirements. The COIC was to be staffed by one officer from each service, but increased to four naval officers,

two army officers and two air force officers for 'active operations' in the New Zealand area. COIC intelligence staff would have no outside responsibilities, and the same went for clerical staff. Clerical staff amounted to a typist, a clerk and a messenger, although two more typists and a clerk could be added when operations were imminent. These staffing levels were extremely flimsy and short-sighted for a combined intelligence centre. Raider activity was a continuing problem, and a developing operational situation was hardly conducive for introducing new clerical staff to the typing and filing procedures for an intelligence centre. However, staff numbers were to be left to the Director's discretion.⁷¹

The next day, 9 August, the CNS set forth comprehensive 'notes' as a basis for discussion of the CIB and CWR reorganisation by the Chiefs of Staff. These were drafted by Beasley and subsequently appeared as an enclosure, 'New Zealand Naval Intelligence Organisation', in a letter from the Naval Secretary to the Minister of Defence on 16 August.⁷² The CNS argued that substantial alteration to the CIB and the CWR were necessary. The CWR worked as a naval operational intelligence room, keeping track of merchant shipping and warship movements and there was nothing combined about it. He noted that use of the adjoining air operations room by the combined staff was not the best arrangement. The CIB itself appeared to be mainly an appendage to Major Folkes' (Director, Security Intelligence Bureau) new security service and a naval and air intelligence repository.⁷³ It failed to supply rapid intelligence appreciations for the Chiefs of Staff. It was adequate for immediate naval operational requirements, but an increased tempo of operations around New Zealand would reveal the serious deficiencies. Too much attention centred on the merchant shipping section. The CWR and a Combined

Operational Intelligence Centre needed operational intelligence from the three services and should be distanced from the Merchant Shipping Section. Operational intelligence required a stream of signals, operations orders and messages for up to date information at all times. Operational intelligence was best displayed on maps, with files in a central filing system or single service files in adjoining rooms. A Convoy Room could be set up comprising the Merchant Shipping Section, with the Staff Officer (Operations) in close proximity. The SO(I) was to be located next to the CWR, with the 'Y' organisation by the COIC. The name change to COIC signalled the change in function to other departments, and time taken up with peripheral matters like censorship, publicity and security were to be eliminated. The CNS recommended four junior naval officers be trained as watchkeepers for the COIC and air plotters be made available.⁷⁴

On 11 August the Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the intelligence committee report and the CNS's 'notes'. The recommendations were to be implemented. The CIB was to be renamed the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre. The COIC was to provide the Chiefs of Staff with intelligence for New Zealand area operations. The COIC's Director would be appointed by, and be responsible to, the service chiefs. His role was to control, organise and direct the centre. Beasley was made Director. The COIC was to be split into three sections, one for each service, but personnel were collectively responsible to all three services. At least one officer from each service was to be appointed to the COIC, and personnel numbers could be increased if operations around New Zealand were imminent.⁷⁵

Following the deliberations of the Chiefs of Staff, the Naval Secretary sent a memorandum to the Minister of Defence on 16 August⁷⁶ putting the proposals into a

strong maritime context. An extensive enclosure prepared by Beasley gave much more detail on the naval intelligence organisation, and its reorganisation.

According to the Naval Secretary, the CNS considered naval intelligence should be overhauled, and this was underlined by his visits to Melbourne and Singapore and had led to the appointment of the new SO(I). The officer appointed had experience in naval intelligence and so alterations to the local organisation had been deferred until his arrival.⁷⁷ The Naval Secretary noted that the changes for the 'Combined War Room' [sic] and the 'Combined Operational Intelligence Centre' approved by the service chiefs followed the United Kingdom model and were similar to those being adopted in Singapore and Melbourne.⁷⁸ The Naval Secretary outlined a list of recommendations for the Minister to approve. These were that the CIB be abolished and a COIC be formed with the SO(I) as the Director; and that the COIC should be completely separate from security matters. A general intelligence section was to be formed to look after 'all non-operational intelligence'. Ten additional personnel were required: two Lieutenants (RNVR) as Intelligence Officers for the 'Combined Intelligence Section', one Civil Assistant to the SO(I) and one typist, one clerk and one messenger, plus four junior officers as watchkeepers.

Beasley's enclosure outlined his solutions, for an organisation deemed '..to be seriously inadequate in many respects...'⁷⁹ The SO(I) should be in charge of naval intelligence and be 'directly responsible' for liaising with overseas intelligence organisations, for the 'reporting officers and reporting organisation', and for the coastwatching organisation. He was also to be Director of the COIC. The intelligence organisation should comprise three components: Section 1, the Combined Operational

Intelligence Centre; Section 2 the General Intelligence Centre; and Section 3 the 'Y' organisation.⁸⁰

Section 1, the COIC, was to be staffed with three officers under the Director for the initial establishment, with numbers being increased when necessary, along with three clerical staff. In addition, if operations were under way, there would need to be a 'constant watch in the C.O.I.C.', and for this four junior naval officers should train as COIC watchkeepers 'now'. The three officers for the COIC would be one from each Service, with Lieutenant W.W.Brackenridge as the naval member. Collecting intelligence, preparing appreciations and intelligence summaries, and having operational intelligence ready at all times for the Chiefs of Staff was the role of the COIC.⁸¹ Operational intelligence was to be displayed on maps, with other material in the central filing system. It was necessary that Section 3, the 'Y' section, be located close at hand.

The second arm of the restructured intelligence organisation, Section 2 – General Intelligence, was headed by Lieutenant-Commander Barker, who was to be responsible for naval security matters.⁸² 'General Intelligence' was interpreted as security intelligence. It was proposed that two other officers would be needed to look after a wide variety of tasks 'which are seriously neglected at present.' While in broad terms these two officers' purview included naval censorship and naval publicity, close collaboration between them and Barker was expected, for they must also cope with 'numerous other duties.'⁸³

The three General Intelligence officers were to liaise with 'Major Folkes' Security service' [sic], the Police Department, Army and Air Force security organisations, and with the District Naval Intelligence Officers on security matters. To do this, the officers

would need to have knowledge of regulations pertaining to security (including the powers of arrest and detention by the Police). They would need to be involved in the vetting of naval recruits and personnel rejoining the Navy (this meant the checking of names against Police records, Security Intelligence Bureau records and 'records of subversive activities'). A card index of suspicious persons, both civilian and military service personnel was to be maintained. The security of vital points was of interest, and in particular the security of naval establishments like the Navy Office in Wellington, HM Dockyard in Auckland, and HM Ships of the New Zealand Station. The security of the waterfront in harbours and wharves and shipping would be 'in collaboration with Harbour Board and [the] Waterfront Control Commission.' Permits for photographs and visits to ships, and the issuing of all passes including entry to Defence Headquarters came under the orbit of the General Intelligence Section. A watch was to be kept on suspicious activities including yacht movements, trouble on board warships and merchantmen, strikes, the sabotage of work, delays affecting shipping in ports, the activities of foreign seamen and deserters from HM Ships.⁸⁴

In the area of censorship, all questions to do with the leakage of information required attention. The censorship of private W/T messages would include delays imposed on certain information, along with the censorship of broadcasts and a watch for word codes in public debates. There needed to be close collaboration with the Controller of Censorship on the censoring of letter mail, parcels and cables leaving New Zealand, and on statements to the press.⁸⁵ Decisions might be made on whether news published in Australia could be published in New Zealand. The press should also be scanned for breaches of censorship regulations, and for the coverage of strikes. 'Word Codes and

Security generally' needed attention, with 'Items of interest' being brought to notice. The finding of 'dangerous material' could be taken up with the Censorship Department. There should also be a close working relationship with the Controller of Customs and customs officials which would include the inspection of baggage. These would need to work closely with the head of the General Intelligence Section on the requirement 'for secrecy for [the] departure of convoys and movements of merchant shipping generally.'⁸⁶

The two officers would have a number of other tasks. They would compile statistics on 'services', 'supply', on steaming, distances and days at sea. There would be preparation of statements for the Minister of Defence. They would write up the Periodical Intelligence Summaries and also the War Diary. Liaison would be carried out not only with Censorship, Publicity and Customs, but also with the masters of merchantmen, with the District Naval Intelligence Officers and with the Intelligence Officers of HM Ships.⁸⁷

Section 3 of the new organisation had signals intelligence as its focus. This was the 'Y' organisation. Its list of tasks prescribed supplying intelligence to the Captain on the Staff, Singapore, liaison with the Australian 'Y' organisation, supplying intelligence to the COIC, and liaison with the communications authorities.⁸⁸

Beasley suggested that it would be useful to appoint a Civil Assistant to the SO(I), following the RAN's example. The Civil Assistant would be 'a suitable Public Servant' who was to 'ensure continuity of policy for the Intelligence Organisation of New Zealand which has been sadly lacking in the past.' When the SO(I) was absent, the Intelligence Organisation would continue to function, and it would also prevent the SO(I) from being bogged down with routine work at the Navy Office.⁸⁹

It was noted that the RAN's Director of Naval Intelligence in Melbourne had a Civil Assistant, a Deputy DNI, a Naval Secretary, a Naval Assistant to the Civil Assistant, three Intelligence clerks and a stenographer. The staff of the Australian combined intelligence organisation was approximately five times the size of that envisaged for New Zealand.⁹⁰ There were six officers in the RAN's COIC, the DNI's office had three staff, the DNI's Civil Assistant had three, while Security, Censorship and Publicity Sections had nine personnel (three each). There was one Commander (the DNI), five Lieutenant-Commanders, nine Lieutenants and nine civilians (including seven stenographers), making a total of twenty-four staff in all.⁹¹

The RAN's Civil Assistant, Mr.W.H.Brooksbank arrived and rapidly compiled a report which he delivered on 13 September.⁹² Brooksbank's report took into account Beasley's proposals. He considered the proposals for increasing the numbers of intelligence personnel 'are not sufficiently far-reaching.' He observed that the RAN's Naval Intelligence Division consisted of some sixty-one officers. Sixteen were in the Central Organisation at Navy Office in Melbourne, another six in the COIC at the Navy Office under the DNI, thirty-five more were stationed at sub-centres around Australia, while four officers were on the COIC staffs at Area Combined Headquarters at Freemantle, Darwin and Townsville. He reflected that as New Zealand had more sea around it than Australia did, New Zealand's naval intelligence commitment should be around the same as Australia's.⁹³

The deteriorating political situation in the Pacific with the apparent decision of Japan to pursue a southwestern expansionist policy was the central element here. There was closer liaison between the RAN and the Netherlands Navy, with to a lesser extent,

the United States Navy. There was the Australian decision to establish forward Combined Operational Headquarters at Fremantle, Darwin and Townsville. Brooksbank assessed that in the event of hostilities with Japan, units of the Royal Navy, the US Navy and the Netherlands Navy might have to operate in local Australasian waters, and thereby impose strains on the local intelligence organisations.⁹⁴

Brooksbank questioned the need for a messenger, having regard to the highly secret work of the COIC. He suggested useful recruits for intelligence work would be officers with a public school background, as they would have a strong imperial outlook, 'possess the necessary mental equipment', and have a corresponding understanding of discipline.⁹⁵

He considered the 'Combined War Room' [sic] should normally function only when major operational problems arose. Simplification should be the policy with regard to the room, which should contain a big map of the Pacific. The COIC itself should be readily accessible for the Chiefs of Staff for the supply of sectional maps and more detailed information. As to the COIC, the notion that it was there to simply provide intelligence was technically a misinterpretation. It was more correct for the COIC to be seen as a pool for the collation and assessment of operational intelligence received from the three Services and to furnish the CWR the result of its combined appreciations.⁹⁶ The COIC was regarded by Brooksbank essentially as an analytical organisation. He had reservations about not manning the COIC continuously.

Security was said to be a 'difficult' subject that required a careful exercise of judgement. The processes of security were very slow by their very nature, as reference to other government departments and security organisations was necessary. Time needed to

be allocated for the consideration of a problem, and for re-assessment of it as well. It was too much to expect an officer engaged in security duties to undertake general intelligence work as well.⁹⁷ Here Brooksbank was drawing a sharp distinction between 'general intelligence' and 'security', whereas we have already seen that under Beasley's scheme, the proposed Section 2 was to be the General Intelligence Section, which was a security section in terms of its scope. Brooksbank noted that in Melbourne, security was the task of the Assistant DNI: it was his sole role, and he was assisted in it by a barrister. Brooksbank noted that any idea of a Combined Security Bureau held particular hazards, for

...it is not quite clear to me where Major Folkes' [the head of the new Security Intelligence Bureau] responsibilities begin and where they end. If a Combined Security Bureau were to be established it seems to me that Major Folkes might advance claims to assume charge of it. This, from the Naval point of view, might not be altogether desirable.⁹⁸

It might give, Brooksbank noted, Army officers a say in internal security matters like the internal political welfare of the Royal New Zealand Navy, because the Security Intelligence Bureau was an Army organisation. Brooksbank's caution and implicit ambivalence regarding the Director of the SIB is intriguing.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee noted on 22 October War Cabinet approval for additional staff for the combined intelligence organisation, and that the CGS would urgently consider the addition of 'a suitable Army officer'.⁹⁹ The Chiefs of Staff declared that the CIB was abolished and the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre was established with Beasley as Director.¹⁰⁰ There was also a feeling of urgency for the provision of useful and timely intelligence. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that a summary of up-to-date operational intelligence on the Pacific was essential, and

- (a) That a telegram should be sent to the Intelligence Authorities, Singapore, requesting that information be supplied by telegraph as soon as possible showing the strengths and distribution of Japanese forces and that details of any change in these particulars should be indicated by telegraph at intervals of not less than one week.
- (b) That the Director of the Intelligence Bureau should arrange for a summary of this information to be furnished at weekly intervals to each Chief of Staff.- For action by the Director of the Intelligence Bureau. [sic]¹⁰¹

Beasley observed that the 'present Weekly [Naval] Intelligence Summaries' were being too widely distributed. Instead, he suggested that there should be two summaries. One concerned future operational intelligence to be sent to about twelve addressees. The other general intelligence summary with 'interesting stories' could go to around fifty recipients. He suggested that the Army content of the summary could be reduced, and drew attention to the interest of the Police Commissioner wanting to get onto the distribution list for the present summary.¹⁰²

The outbreak of war in 1939 had overtaken the tentative deliberations on the subject of a combined intelligence centre. Naval intelligence was the only useful provider of operational intelligence as the army had no significant means of collection, while air intelligence was almost non-existent. The Navy's provision of operational intelligence summaries went a little way towards filling the gap, but not enough to give the Chiefs of Staff comprehensive intelligence of the situation in New Zealand waters or elsewhere. The first raider foray right into Auckland's approaches rekindled interest in the combined intelligence concept, and the immunity of the commerce raiders' further operations suggested effective intelligence measures should be put in place. The CIB was the first move in this direction, but got de-railed almost immediately because it was too small an organisation to be effective. There were not enough intelligence staff. Bickering over intelligence summaries and internal security between the Chiefs of Staff, the Prime

Minister and the Police Commissioner were beside the point and assisted in prolonging the intelligence hiatus. It was not until nearly mid-1941 that moves began to be made to rectify the position, driven by the CNS in the face of the threat of war with Japan. Even then, the new SO(I) did not arrive until July, and it was August before action was taken. The decisions for transforming the CIB, the Brooksbank report, and the setting up of the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre ran everything too close to the widening of the war. The new combined intelligence organisation was still in transition by early December. The DNI was about to travel to Pearl Harbor on 8 December, but was unavoidably delayed. It was not until late December that the COIC began to produce useful summaries of intelligence as required by the Chiefs of Staff. The COIC tumbled into war, understaffed and ill-prepared. Once again, time had run out for New Zealand combined intelligence.

Chapter Four

The Combined Operational Intelligence Centre

December 1941 and January 1942 was chaotic for the new Combined Operational Intelligence Centre. The abrupt deterioration of the situation in the Pacific, and a concurrent increase in demand for operational intelligence precipitated by the Japanese landings in Malaya and the attack on Pearl Harbor, coincided with the translation of the CIB into the COIC. The move to a new building and the acquisition of extra staff made a measured transition impossible. After long delays and procrastination in addressing the shortcomings in combined intelligence, much needed to be done in a hurry. It was not until late December that the COIC began to produce useful summaries of intelligence as required by the Chiefs of Staff.

Three days after Pearl Harbor, the Police Commissioner was on to the Secretary ONS about getting access to 'summaries of Operational Intelligence', on the basis that the police circulated their internal security intelligence summaries to the PM, the Secretary ONS, the COIC and the SIB.¹ The Chiefs of Staff decided not to pass intelligence summaries to the Commissioner and Shanahan diplomatically informed him that suitable relevant extracts would be sent to him by the DNI.²

The DNI sent the first COIC Daily Summary dated 19 December 1941³ to the service chiefs, the Secretary ONS and the US Naval Observer the following day. It consisted of a chronology of events in the New Zealand area between 7 and 17 December, made up of coastwatching reports from the Pacific Island territories, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands particularly, relating Japanese air and naval movements.

Among these, the report of a landing on Tarawa at 1645Z 9 December (or 0445 10 December local time) noted that one radio set had been destroyed and the other hidden; on 10 December further landings on Tarawa, Makin and Butaritari were reported from Ocean Island. Tarawa was still reporting on 16 December. The Gilbert stations were significant because New Zealand coastwatching teams had only been there four months at most.

The COIC Daily Summary consisted of a one (or occasionally two) page compilation of operational intelligence. The 19 December Summary contained three coastwatching station reports - from Abaiang in the Gilberts, Neiafu in Tonga and the Kermadecs. The RNZN cruiser *Leander* was escorting a ship to Suva and *Achilles* was with an RAN squadron in the north Tasman. Two RNZAF flying-boats were en route to Suva from Singapore. 'Dusk perimeter patrols' by aircraft were conducted for North Cape, the Hauraki Gulf, both approaches to Cook Strait and to Lyttelton, all proving 'negative.'⁴

The summaries for December 1941 were short, with distribution restricted to seven or eight customers. They reflected the serious situation facing the Allies even in the South Pacific. In the Daily Summary on 22 December, apart from noting the movements of the two New Zealand cruisers and local dusk patrols off ports, the focus was on information from the coastwatching stations in the islands. The garrison at Fanning Island was standing to with the approach of a tug and barge. Five reports of enemy aircraft over different islands in the Gilberts were noted, as was the chilling news that the 'Japanese have detected presence of radio sets at Abemama, Maiana and Abaiang [sic].' A naval message from Suva indicated 'that since Japanese landing at Makin it is probable

that 4 soldiers of the N.Z.E.F. are prisoners-of-war.’⁵ By the end of December a weekly COIC Intelligence Summary was also being produced, along with a fortnightly General Intelligence Summary.

The COIC was to be located in the new building in Stout Street in the new year. Although not quite finished, the building had enough room to accommodate the COIC on the second floor. The set-up consisted of two rooms for the COIC itself, the Central War Room, a Cypher Room, a Teleprinter Room, two Coding Rooms, a small Merchant Shipping Office, plus a lobby and a ‘Control Room’.⁶ The COIC was not large and occupied a corner of the second floor. On 10 December the strength of the COIC and related fields at the Navy Office was listed as the DNI, six COIC officers, two COIC typists, four Merchant Shipping officers, two Intelligence Officers, eight Wireless Intelligence Officers, five Cypher Branch personnel, eleven Coding staff, three RDF officers, plus five operations staff under the SO(O).⁷ Beasley’s intelligence organisation had been caught short-handed, and there was an urgent request on 16 December for three more junior naval officers for watchkeeping and other duties in the COIC. These included keeping track of enemy surface units and submarines in the South Pacific and New Zealand areas, bombing and mining activities, friendly warship and merchant vessel movements, compilation of operational intelligence summaries and preparation of war communiques.⁸ One of the new watchkeepers of the COIC, (the then) Temporary Sub-Lieutenant (Special Branch) V.E. Jaynes, described his entry.

I think at the very beginning when I joined we were still in the old army buildings in Featherston Street opposite the Railway Station (the old brick building) and these were temporary quarters. We were rapidly expanding at that time because of the entry of Japan into the war and we were shortly to move into the departmental building in Stout Street. The building hadn’t been finished then, but enough of it was available for us. ...on the second floor where we set up the

Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, also...the Central War Room, right alongside the Merchant Shipping Office which controlled the movements of merchant ships through our particular area. But when I joined in '42 we were still in the old building...Wally Brackenridge was the man I was immediately responsible to...his boss was the Director of Naval Intelligence, Lieutenant Commander Beasley...At that time there were several Air Force officers in the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, and we had one Army officer who maintained liaison, a chap called Dawson... We manned this Centre on a 24-hour basis, seven days a week, receiving reports from stations throughout the Pacific and through a variety of watching stations in New Zealand – coastal batteries, coaswatchers. And a lot of reports came through – nervous people who had seen something like an aircraft carrier off New Plymouth, that sort of thing. These reports were funnelled through to us.⁹

He noted that along with reports from 'Y' intelligence, including the direction-finding stations in New Zealand and Australia, a stream of information came to the COIC watchkeepers throughout the day and night.

On 26 January 1942 it was proposed that a daily meeting in the COIC would be introduced for the Chiefs of Staff and others approved by them, the first meeting to be on Wednesday 28 January 1942. It would consist of a verbal appreciation of the current situation.¹⁰ The intelligence obtained and updated in the last 24-hours was outlined, and dispositions of Allied and enemy forces were given 'as far as known.' General enemy intelligence and allied operations (except for the Australian and New Zealand Stations) would be dealt with by the DNI. W/T and Special Intelligence would be covered by the SO(Y) (Tel.Lieutenant H.Philpott), while intelligence on British and Allied operations on the Australian and New Zealand Stations and merchant shipping and convoys came from the SO(O) (Hannay). It was recommended that the Air Force and the Army should provide their own briefing officers.¹¹ The daily meeting took place at 1000 hours in the Central War Room, except for Sundays.¹² As time went on, daily briefing presentations fell to the junior officers of the COIC as Narrative Officers.¹³

Following the morning meeting the Daily Intelligence Summary was compiled and despatched around noon. A precis was sent by signal – a ‘GENSIT’ (General Situation) – to United States, Australian and British intelligence authorities in the Far East and the Pacific.¹⁴

The DNI accompanied the CNS to Hawaii, meeting Admiral Nimitz on 22 January. Beasley observed Nimitz ‘struck me as being an old man, slow and perhaps slightly deaf.’ More importantly, from a professional viewpoint, Beasley met Commander Rochefort and Lieutenant Commander Layton, and W/T, ‘Y’ and direction-finding intelligence were discussed.¹⁵

The assumption of command of the ANZAC AREA by Vice-Admiral H.F. Leary, USN, in Melbourne in February further disrupted the New Zealand combined intelligence reorganisation. Beasley went to Melbourne to join the staff of COMANZAC as New Zealand liaison officer.¹⁶ He did not return to his post as DNI until ANZAC AREA ceased to exist two months later when the SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA and the SOUTH PACIFIC AREA were formed.

Perhaps an air of desperation can be perceived in mid-February in the Chiefs of Staff comments regarding intelligence inadequacies that began to take on potential operational significance. Noting that the possibility of invasion was the primary focus, the Chiefs of Staff lamented that the COIC was clearly insufficient for the purpose of effective operational co-ordination. No linkages existed at the tactical level, even though air and sea action had been activated from the centre on previous occasions.¹⁷ It was not practicable to put forces of the three services in any one region under one commander. Co-ordination of operations did not depend on a single commander but more on common

objectives and rapid communications.¹⁸ The services chiefs suggested instead that three combined operational headquarters be established for the Northern, Central and Southern Military Districts, and that each district should include no less than four intelligence centres.

A Naval Information Centre displaying disposition and movements of our own and enemy warships and shipping.

A Military Information Centre showing the disposition and movements of our own and enemy land forces.

An Air Information Centre in which the following information is visually displayed:

- (i) Location of our own air forces on the ground and in the air;
- (ii) Location of enemy air units and enemy air movements in progress, the latter being deduced from the following:
H.M.ships, our own aircraft, coastwatching stations, observer posts and other sources.

A Civil Information Centre for liaison with civil authorities.

17.- These Information Centres must be in the one building and, if not in one room, they must be in adjoining rooms...¹⁹

Just how all this was to be put into action when the COIC in Wellington was still struggling with its restructuring, with the DNI absent in Melbourne and the relative lack of resources and staff is a good question. There would be no less than twelve intelligence centres plus the COIC/CWR set up in Wellington. There was the foolish assumption that operations could be neatly separated into sea, air and land, which implied little had been learned from the conduct of the war thus far. The proposals had a whiff of panic.

The reality was a little more modest. By 17 May 1942, the DNI had thirteen intelligence personnel working in the COIC. There were four Air Force officers, one Army officer, and six naval officers and one civilian.²⁰ There were minor teething problems. The DNI noted in May that persons in the opposite building could see through the Central War Room curtains and distinguish maps, and he asked that the windows be frosted.²¹

Another issue was access to the CWR, and the need to cut down on outsiders.²² A quite large number of persons had 'the right of entry at any time' to the CWR. They included seven Army personnel, fourteen Air Force (plus two civilian clerical staff), and nineteen Navy personnel (plus three civilian clerical staff), a total of forty-four. Added to this were the UK High Commissioner, Sir Harry Batterbee; Lieutenant Commander Haitsma of the Netherlands Navy; Captain Olding, the US Naval Attache, and his assistant, Lieutenant-Commander Stephenson; and Colonel Nankivell, the US Military Attache. A temporary liaison officer of the US Marine Corps was approved later.²³

In early June, access to the daily briefings in the Central War Room was raised by the Naval Secretary, for 'At present certain people who have no connection with service operations' were allowed to attend, in his opinion, 'a most undesirable practice.'²⁴ He suggested that only the Chiefs of Staff, staff officers connected with operations and intelligence, and the equivalent officers of the United States forces be permitted to attend, and that all liaison officers or civilians should have to apply to one of the services. The CAS noted his impression that the Dutch Consul General would be asking the Prime Minister's Department to allow the Netherlands naval attache to attend, and thought that it would be best to consult with the Head of the Prime Minister's Department before coming to a decision.²⁵

The Chiefs of Staff asserted that a 'vast amount of most secret material' was examined at the daily briefings, much of it from the Admiralty and 'other authorities', given on condition that circulation was restricted. The services chiefs decided that attendance should be limited to themselves and their deputies, officers concerned with operations and intelligence, Vice-Admiral Ghormley (Commander South

Pacific Area) and/or his representative, and members of the War Cabinet.²⁶ It was an exaggeration that ‘vast amounts of most secret material’ was examined; nevertheless, an amount of extremely sensitive intelligence was considered. The War Cabinet on 30 June decided the matter was to be ‘left entirely to the Chiefs of Staff, with security as the prime consideration.’²⁷ The position was ‘explained’ to the UK High Commissioner and the DCNS would be discussing it with the Netherlands Naval Liaison Officer.²⁸ What had brought it all to a head was that the access ‘question had been raised unofficially by Vice-Admiral Ghormley’.²⁹

The Standing Orders for the Central War Room of 23 June 1942 set out in detail the refined duties and functions of the personnel involved in the operation of the COIC and CWR. The CWR and COIC were set up as a central directing room and an operational intelligence room.³⁰ The central directing room was to be used by the Chiefs of Staff for the conduct of operations in and around New Zealand. The operational intelligence room (the COIC) displayed a plot of the disposition of Allied forces locally, and was used as a place where the operational and intelligence staffs could ‘present to the Chiefs of Staff a daily summary of events.’³¹

The Duty Officers were to be familiar with the roles of the main sources of information like the coastwatching stations, the direction-finding stations and so on. A complete set of War Routine Orders was held and maintained in the CWR and staff were made aware of the relevant portions that applied to them. They would also have to be acquainted with information concerning ports’ fixed defences and the positions of all coastwatching and direction-finding stations. Detailed information was located in a Videx binder maintained by Sub-Lieutenant Studholme.³² A roster of naval watchkeepers

at the time lists Whitmore, Williams and Reddell with back-up substitutes available, namely Studholme, Jaynes and Cheyne.³³

Watches were kept on a twenty-four hour basis, a shifting cycle being employed to allow for breaks and cover. In this, the first Naval Intelligence watchkeeper was on duty from 0800 hours until 1300 hours. The second watchkeeper came on at 1245 and went through to 1900. The first officer then returned at 1845 hours and stayed through the night until 0900 the following morning. He was relieved at 0830 by the second watchkeeper who worked through to 1300. The third watchkeeper came on at 1245 hours and went through to 1900 hours, and so on. The first watchkeeper having gone off at 0900 was free until 1245 the next day. This system meant one duty officer on duty around the clock. Extra staff could be called in, although during the day these would be the normal CWR duty officers. The watchkeeping duty roster was under the direct control of the DNI and NI(1) (Whitmore).³⁴

Inward signals and messages would be dealt with by the Duty Officer, who would read the signal and initial it plus the time of receipt. Signals containing operational intelligence and the movements of Allied forces were received from: the Naval Senior Duty Officer, the Air SDO via Air Intelligence, the Army SDO via Military Intelligence, by telephone or secraphone from Groups, etc, and from the D/F plotting room. Of the signals coming in, the naval ones fell into a large number of categories, much larger than those for the Air Force or the Army.³⁵ Given the numbers of stations and the naval dominance of special equipment, this might not be unexpected.

Incoming signals were to be logged.³⁶

<u>TOO</u>	<u>From whom</u>	<u>Short text</u>	<u>Clip No.</u>
310126	ACNB	Warship dispositions	3

They were then classified under one of thirty-four headings, the clip number being written on the bottom right hand corner of the signal. These headings with their clip numbers were listed as follows: 1 - New Zealand Warships; 2 - South West Pacific Warships; 3 - Other Allied Warships; 6 - CMSOPAC Bulletins; 7 - Digests; 8 - Washops; 9 - Maoris; 10 - Arctics; 11 - Kiwis; 12 - Gensits; 13 - RNZAF Suva; 16 to 22 were Japanese and Allied Operations (16: New Zealand Area; 17: Solomons; 18: Remainder South Pacific Area; 19: South West Pacific; 20: Central Pacific; 21 North West Pacific; 22: East Indies Station, Burma, China); 24 - Unidentified Aircraft; 25 - Unidentified Ships; 26 - Mines, Minefields, Sanctuaries, etc; 27 - Coastwatching Pacific Islands; 28 - Miscellaneous Signals; 31 - Enemy Weapons; 32 - Submarine Sightings, Attacks, etc; 33 - Raiders, Blockade Runners; 34 - D/F Fixes Submarine and Surface Units. Each category had separate wall clips.³⁷

After receipt, initialling and annotations, naval signals were placed on the Current Day Signal Pad which lay on the CWR Duty Desk, and was not to be removed. Only authorised personnel could examine the signals. At 0830 each day, the Duty Officer placed a card on top of the signals included in the Daily Summary, and subsequent signals were put on top.³⁸ At 1700 hours, signals under the card were taken to the appropriate wall clip. Signals received by the Navy for the other services were passed immediately to the Air Operations Officer or an Air Force Intelligence Officer, or to the G Duty Officer at Army Headquarters.³⁹

Some incoming naval signals received very careful treatment, as they were of operational importance, or from very sensitive sources. 'Natels' (Naval Telegrams) and Optels (Operational Telegrams) were listed along with Most Secret Sources as being

‘Special Signals’. These were given by the Senior Duty Officer to the DNI and were to be filed by Whitmore.⁴⁰ Most Secret Sources usually denoted signals intelligence obtained by codebreaking from Bletchley Park, the FECB, or the RAN. A whole section of the Standing Orders was devoted to the handling of this type of material. Codenamed ULTRA (which applied to both British and American intercept summaries) and ZYMOTIC (though not all ZYMOTIC signals were from codebreaking), these required great care as these were most significant sources in the Allied intelligence arsenal, the summaries of enemy signals traffic. The summaries paraphrased the content of the intercepted traffic. This was a basic security countermeasure in the event of enemy interception to prevent giving direct textual clues to the Germans or Japanese that their communications were being read. The precautions for Special Intelligence material are worth quoting in full.

18. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

- (a) Special intelligence is contained in signals commencing with the letters ZYMOTIC (ZYM) and ULTRA. These are normally only made out in the original and are given to S.O.(Y) who is responsible for showing them to officers concerned. During silent hours (1830-0900) when S.O.(Y) is not in the office, messages which bear an indication of priority and appear to require immediate action are to be taken to the C.W.R. Naval Intelligence Duty Officer. If they require such action, he is to ring S.O.(Y) or, in his absence, the Duty Senior Officer who is to be informed that “a special intelligence message has been received and requires immediate action.”
- (b) On no account are any of the contents of these messages to be passed over the ordinary telephone or secraphone.
- (c) The message is to be handed to S.O.(Y) on his return to the building with the information as to who has seen it.
- (d) The contents of these messages are never to be included in any summaries or mentioned at daily meetings without the direct permission of D.N.I.⁴¹

A very limited circle existed for the actual receipt of Special Intelligence – the DNI (Beasley), the SO(Y) (Philpott), plus the naval intelligence watchkeepers on duty at the time. Handling instructions for Ultra had come from the Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet,

and are set out in Appendix 1. The content of such messages could be (although not always) incorporated into the COIC's main operational intelligence products, if the DNI assented (that is, in the Daily Summaries, the GENSITS and the Weekly Intelligence Summary – all with relatively restricted distribution).

Signals were not to be destroyed by watchkeepers: old or unwanted signals were to go first to Whitmore.⁴² Categories other than naval signals were to be handled differently. Most Air Force signals 'of general interest' were to be placed on the Current Day's Signal Pad and later destroyed, unless they had 'useful or interesting information.' Air Force intelligence signals from Suva, on the other hand, were to be filed and retained. Army signals were of less interest, as most dealt with operational exercises. They were destroyed once the exercise was over.⁴³ Telephone or secraphone messages went into the Operations Book, with time of receipt and who sent the message. Action taken on any message or signal received was noted in the Operations Book.⁴⁴

Office space for the COIC posed obstacles that one might have assumed were eliminated in wartime. The COIC Air Force intelligence officers were short of office space, and it was suggested the Deputy Chiefs of Staff might move, or even the CGS be shifted. Similarly, the CGS became annoyed because the DNI had put 'a girl' into Room 228 which belonged to Army.⁴⁵ The Navy held their ground.

The production of a weekly intelligence summary derived from the weekly summaries produced by naval intelligence in 1940. The CIB's summaries, however, had a stuttering beginning, being disrupted by the intervention of the Prime Minister with just twenty-eight CIB intelligence summaries produced between 23 September 1940 and 19 October 1941.⁴⁶ The next two weekly summaries followed on the CIB series numbers,

being 29 and 30, but entitled 'Combined Operational Intelligence Centre Intelligence Summary'. A new series of weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries began with no.1 on 31 December 1941. This series went through until no.102 on 15 September 1944, although by then it had become a fortnightly bulletin.

The COIC Daily Summaries from 28 January 1942 went out after the daily briefing. The shortened version was the 'GENSIT' signal. A further abbreviated version known as a 'KIWI' signal, came into use during 1943. The weekly COIC Intelligence Summary was largely a weekly cumulation of operational intelligence, although it sometimes contained background information on non-operational issues; and there was a general fortnightly summary of non-operational intelligence. The weekly summary of operational intelligence, the daily summaries and the short signals went to a relatively restricted circle. All the operational intelligence summaries could contain intelligence from Most Secret Sources, which is not to say all did. The general fortnightly summary was on much wider distribution, and did not disclose operational information or highly sensitive intelligence. Apart from this, intelligence in the form of operational signal traffic was coming and going quite separately in many ways through the wireless intelligence or 'Y' organisation within the COIC. Although integral to the COIC and directly under the DNI, the operational role of the 'Y' Room added another dimension. Strict limitations were placed on 'Y' intelligence and Special Intelligence.

The Daily Summaries were short, composed of intelligence notes on a variety of operational information received in the last twenty-four hours. The early summaries were divided into 'NAVAL' and 'AIR' intelligence with sub-headings, which lasted only

into the first two months of 1942; after this a variety of headings were used and this remained the pattern through to Daily Summary no.1007 on 28 September 1944.⁴⁷

One section of the Summary in the first two and a half months was headed 'W/T and 'Y' Intelligence' or 'W/T and D/F Intelligence'. This dealt with both high-frequency direction-finding and the analysis of signals traffic, trying to estimate strengths, movements of enemy units, and identify callsigns. This revealed matters that the 'Y' Room was interested in at this time, but having it labelled so explicitly in an intelligence summary was highly insecure. If the summary fell into enemy hands, what then? As will presently be seen with a related type of summary, this could inadvertently occur. The practice of drawing attention to 'Y' or 'W/T and D/F' intelligence ceased by March, probably as a precautionary measure. From then on, direction-finding fixes were referred to in the summaries, but without emphasis, and no particular attention was drawn to callsign analysis.⁴⁸

In 1942 there was, as might be expected, a considerable amount of space in the Daily Summaries devoted to the local New Zealand area as the war came closer. Locating enemy warships or submarines assumed great importance, and the summaries are full of sighting reports from aircraft, ships and coastwatchers, direction-finding bearings on submarines and accounts of operations in progress.⁴⁹

Distribution of the Daily Summaries remained narrow. In 1942 it went to nine recipients: the Governor-General, the Prime Minister's Department, the three Chiefs of Staff, the Naval Secretary, the US Naval Attache, the GSO1 (Operations and Intelligence) and the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Auckland (who was to pass it to COMSOPAC). Yet there could also be a widening of distribution when a copy went to a

department rather than a person. The Prime Minister's Department copy was seen by the Prime Minister, the Head of the Prime Minister's Department, McIntosh, Shanahan, and members of the War Cabinet.⁵⁰

By early 1943, the Daily Summaries were more measured, dealing with local matters first, then describing events further away to the north. Thus, Daily Summary no.431 of 22/23 February 1943 for instance deals with local New Zealand warship and aircraft movements, and a strong D/F contact by 'four stations' of a submarine in Cook Strait, before turning to events elsewhere. This moved on to air activity around Fiji, coastwatcher reports from Penrhyn in the Line Islands, air strikes by Allied aircraft over New Georgia, coastwatcher reports from the New Hebrides and further air operations in the Solomons.⁵¹

By August 1944 with the operational activity waged far away from New Zealand shores, apart from the occasional concerns about enemy submarines, the Daily Summaries were largely accounts of air and sea operations in the Solomons, the Bismarcks, the Carolines, New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies.⁵² In late 1944 the requirement for Daily Summaries was perceived to have passed. The COIC Daily Summaries were the staple intelligence product of the COIC, the end point for each 24-hour period and the focus of all collection, collation and analysis undertaken by the COIC. They provided a useful operational focus, and their demise derived from a lessening of urgency in obtaining up-to-date intelligence.

The GENSIT reported on the 'general situation' in the South Pacific over the last 24 hours to 0830 hours on the day it was dispatched. An example of this process in action is as follows. The main points of COIC Daily Summary no.758 of 0830 15th to

0830 16 January 1943 were abbreviated in GENSIT no.696 16 January 1944, transmitted at 1250 hours that day.⁵³ It went to the New Zealand Liaison Officer in Suva, the Tonga Defence Force, the Southern Military District, and the US Naval Attache. The few lines of each section of the Daily Summary were boiled down to one or two lines in the signal. The first entry on Daily Summary no.758 reads:

NEW HEBRIDES

1. SUBMARINE REPORTED

An enemy submarine was reported in position 15 degrees 55'S 168 degrees 57'E at 1910M 15th.

At 2143M 15th a D/F fix placed a submarine within 100 miles of position 15 degrees 15'S 171 degrees 30'E.

The former position is approximately 100 miles East of ESPIRITU SANTO, while the D/F places the submarine in approximately the same position as the attack on the "GULF STAR" (refer Summary No.757, Para.2).

In the GENSIT this became:

SS reported 15 degrees 55'S 168 degrees 57'E at 1910M/15. D/F at 2143M/15 Places SS within 100' of 15 degrees 15'S 171 degrees 30'E.

A section on light air activity over Torokina is omitted from the GENSIT. In the Daily Summary a Fijian reconnaissance patrol report is detailed:

EAST BOUGAINVILLE

2.The Fiji reconnaissance patrol has reported that the beach from TENEKAU north to INUS POINT, including the NUMA NUMA area, is only lightly held by the Japanese who are not patrolling inland. The only natives appear to favour the Allies and are being contacted daily.

In the GENSIT, this was:

FIJIAN recce patrol report E BOUGAINVILLE INUS POINT to TENEKAU only lightly held by Japs and natives friendly.

The state of the aerodromes on New Britain as reported in the Daily Summary:

NEW BRITAIN

2. AIRFIELD STATE

Photographs taken on 14/1 show: -

LAKUNAI: 94 fighters, 6 light and 3 medium bombers.

TOBERA: 54 fighters, 1 medium bomber.
 VUNAKANAU: 1 fighter, 9 light and 21 medium bombers.
 RAPOPO: 2 fighters, 3 light and 8 medium bombers.
 All the above runways serviceable.
 KERAVAT and DUKE OF YORK IS: Nil aircraft.
 Both runways unserviceable, with the latter runway being surfaced.

The GENSIT noted:

Photos 14/1 show LAKUNI, TOBERA, VANAKANAU [sic], ROPOPO runways serviceable KERAVAT unserviceable. DUKE OF YORK Is. being surfaced.

And so on. The GENSIT was an abstract of the COIC's daily intelligence output. On 5 April 1943 another short summary was inaugurated. These were KIWIS.⁵⁴ KIWI signals were to provide a brief operational intelligence summary on the South Pacific to British intelligence authorities. KIWI no.1 went to the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet and to the ACNB, and in April the Admiralty and GHQ, New Delhi were added.⁵⁵ An interesting KIWI was no.16 of 20 April 1943, reporting Allied air activity over Bougainville in the past four days. One observation was that 'Lightnings morning 18/4 shot down 3 B[ombers], 3 F[ighters] for one.' This referred to the shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto.⁵⁶

An example of a KIWI generated from a Daily Summary was KIWI no.37, sent at 1425 hours on 17 May 1943. The Daily Summary in question was no.514 of 0830M 16th to 0830M 17th May with over ten sections.⁵⁷ These were reduced from several lines or a paragraph in the Daily Summary to a couple of lines in the KIWI signal, in the same way as the GENSIT. Items 2,3, and 4 in the Daily Summary were set out thus:

2. MINE ON BEACH.

A mine was found on 16/5 north of AUCKLAND on the west coast adjacent to HELENSVILLE. The matter has been referred to the Bomb Disposal Group for necessary action.

3. FIJI AREA.

A Japanese submarine has been reported by D/F in position 20 degrees S 174 degrees E at 1907M/16. This is approximately 200 miles S. W. of FIJI ISLANDS.

At 0233M 17th a distress signal was received from the Liberty Ship "WILLIAM K. VANDERBILT" which reported having been torpedoed in position 18 degrees 41'S 175 degrees 07'E. This is approximately 120 miles W.S.W. from FIJI ISLANDS.

3. TONGA AREA.

A Japanese submarine has been reported by D/F in position 21 degrees 30'S 178 degrees W at 2007M 16th. This is approximately 160 miles east of TONGATABU.

In KIWI no.37 this reduced to:

Mine stranded west coast near AUCKLAND N.Z. 16/5.

SSSS from Liberty ship "WILLIAM K. VANDERBILT" 18 degrees 41'S. 175 degrees 07'E. 17/5 D/F Japanese SS 21 degrees 30'S. 178 degrees W. 16/5.

SS sighted 10 degrees 50'S. 163 degrees 05'E. 16/5.

The KIWI was simply another form of exchange of intelligence between the New Zealand intelligence authorities and those of their allies.

From time to time bizarre occurrences crop up in war, and the loss of certain New Zealand intelligence material to the enemy falls into that category. The material concerned might appear to have had the potential for disastrous consequences, and indeed arguments have been advanced to suggest just that. The intention here is to briefly examine those arguments, which still leave open a couple of interesting questions, and to look closely at the material involved. As it concerns a selection of weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries from the early part of 1942, this also serves as a useful place to consider these as yet another of the intelligence outputs.

The weekly COIC Intelligence Summary began to be published to a limited audience at the end of 1941. Near the middle of 1942 a month's worth of these summaries fell into enemy hands. James Rusbridger, in an article in Encounter in May 1985 entitled 'The Sinking of the "Automedon", the Capture of the "Nankin" – New

Light on Two Intelligence Disaster in World War II',⁵⁸ outlined the circumstances surrounding the loss of these summaries. His claims seem to be a little astray in parts, and as they have been repeated subsequently, most recently in Peter Elphick's Far Eastern File, and Richard Aldrich's Intelligence and the War Against Japan⁵⁹ they require examination.

The loss of the intelligence material occurred with the interception of the Australian steamer, the *Nankin*, by the German disguised merchant raider *Thor* on 10 May 1942. Secret papers and codes were disposed of in the hour long engagement that preceded capture by the raider. There were quite a large number of mail sacks taken by the Germans, and in these were four weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries: no.12 (21 March 1942), no.13 (30 March 1942), no.14 (6 April 1942) and no.15 (13 April 1942). These were addressed to FECB in Colombo. Just how the COIC summaries got into the general mail is an interesting puzzle in itself, for this was an appalling breach of security. Somewhere along the line, perhaps at the start in Wellington, the secret material had got into the ordinary mail bags. One of the problems with port security in New Zealand was the handling of overseas mail, so it might not be so surprising that a blunder of this magnitude could occur. The captain of the *Nankin* was unaware that such sensitive material was aboard.

The intelligence summaries were, according to Rusbridger, transferred to the German blockade runner, the *Regensberg*, although, as Elphick notes, he provides no authority for this statement. The *Nankin* was taken as a prize, and both she and the *Regensberg* made their way independently to Yokohama, with the latter docking on 18 July.⁶⁰ The COIC Intelligence Summaries were passed to Admiral Paul Wenneker, the

German Naval Attache in Tokyo. According to Rusbridger, Wenneker began to relay by signal to OKM in Berlin summaries of what had been found in the mail, and on 25 and 28 July sent details of some of the COIC material.⁶¹ It took a month for Wenneker to be given authority to show the COIC summaries to the Japanese, which he obtained on 29 August 1942.⁶² Elphick takes the view that the Japanese were probably told about the material before this date.⁶³ Rusbridger notes that the Seekriegsleitung (SKL) War Diary at German Naval Headquarters in Berlin referred to a meeting on 3 September 1942,

and records that the Allied knowledge of the Japanese fleet dispositions showed that their communications were insecure, and that the Japanese requested the assistance of the German Navy in improving their cipher security.⁶⁴

Rusbridger observes that a communications agreement between the two countries was prepared and signed on 11 September 1942, and in 1943 some 500 German Enigma machines were delivered to Japan, it not occurring to the Germans that their own signals might be compromised.⁶⁵

Up until August the US Navy had been reading what Rusbridger describes as the Japanese 'JN25 fleet-cipher'.⁶⁶ New codebooks were distributed and the new version, JN25c, was supposed to come into effect on 1 April; however, because of logistical problems getting the new cipher to widely scattered naval units, this did not occur until 29 May. Elphick asserts that the 'naval code' changed to a new version JN25d on 14 August 'and was followed shortly afterwards by a total change of ship callsigns', and there were indications that the Japanese were using radio deception techniques.⁶⁷

Elphick notes that the abrupt change may have come about because the Japanese possibly became aware of an article in the Washington Times-Herald on 7 June 1942.⁶⁸ In fact a series of remarkably indiscreet articles had emerged that day on the Battle of

Midway. The Chicago Tribune published a front page story under the headline 'Navy had Word of Jap Plan to Strike at Sea', saying,

The strength of the Japanese forces with which the American Navy is battling somewhere west of Midway Island... was well known in American naval circles, several days before the battle began, reliable sources in naval intelligence disclosed here tonight.⁶⁹

The Washington Times-Herald that day headlined 'US Navy Knew in Advance All About Jap Fleet', also quoting 'reliable sources in naval intelligence'.

The information in the hands of the Navy Department was so definite that a feint at some American base, to be accompanied by a serious effort to invade another base, was predicted. Guesses were even made that Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians and Midway... might be targets... by last Tuesday [2nd June] the Americans were able to conclude that a feint was to be made at Dutch Harbor.⁷⁰

The story was also carried in the New York Daily News on 7 June.⁷¹ This, of course was a security lapse of monumental proportions.

There is no doubt the Americans and other Allies were no longer able to read the main Japanese naval cipher, JN25, for a period of some months, during which a number of bitter engagements were waged around the Solomons. This meant Allied intelligence organisations (and operational commanders) had to rely on traffic analysis for this period, that is, direction-finding, 'Y' inference and identification techniques like radio fingerprinting, being shut out of the content of the signals. We will return to those aspects in the next chapter, but it is worth observing in passing that this loss of reading JN25 traffic did not leave the Allies quite as blind as might be implied.

Rusbridger and Elphick note that the British never informed the Americans of the *Nankin* business and the loss of the New Zealand COIC Intelligence Summaries.⁷² They also note indications of a cover-up since the war, instancing the later retyping of the log of the raider *Thor*, and the fact that the incoming signal log at Naval headquarters in

Berlin for the relevant period is missing. Certainly, the parts of the diary of Admiral Wenneker, the German Naval Attache, for the period May to November 1942 are missing, although as Elphick reflects this may be coincidence (the diaries have been translated, edited and published by John Chapman as *The Price of Admiralty*).⁷³

What, then of the COIC Intelligence Summaries themselves. Rusbridger alleges that each of the summaries, distributed to 22 named recipients including Nimitz, 'stated that the contents came from Most Secret Sources', and that this meant cryptanalysis. Each summary was divided into four parts, and he notes that 'Part Four gave a detailed list of the estimated disposition of Japanese naval vessels in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and their likely future movements.'⁷⁴ Noting that some of the information would have come from normal sources like air reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, coastwatchers, and analysis of radio traffic, he asserts,

But it was equally obvious that much of the very detailed knowledge of the whereabouts of enemy ships and their intended movements could only have come from code-breaking; and it seems, therefore, that the COIC was receiving a great deal of information from the US Navy's cryptanalysis organisation in Hawaii.⁷⁵

Rusbridger contends that the intelligence contained in COIC Intelligence Summaries nos 12, 13, 14 and 15

clearly showed the increasing extent of the US Navy's knowledge of the Japanese battle fleet's movements in the weeks leading up to the Battle of Midway (3-5 June), and this could only have come from reading the JN25 fleet-cipher.⁷⁶

A closer perusal of the offending summaries, and the ones preceding the critical period, reveal the holes in some of the foregoing arguments. There was however, a further undisclosed potential danger with regard to the security of the intelligence summaries.

There was a good deal of intelligence in each of the summaries. COIC Intelligence Summary no.13 'for the week ending 30th March 1942' is typical of the four.⁷⁷ It was distributed to 22 customers. These included the three New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, the commanding officers of three RNZN warships, the OC's of three RNZAF squadrons, the OC's of the three military districts, the Naval Officer-in-Charge Auckland, the Naval Officer-in Charge Suva, the three New Zealand Liaison Officers in Honolulu, Melbourne, and at COMANZAC, and the Army's GSO 1 (Operations & Intelligence). There were four other recipients: the Captain on the Staff, Colombo (to whom the offending summaries had been addressed), the DNI Melbourne 'for Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, Melbourne', the Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Fleet, and the United States Naval Observer in Wellington.

At the start of the Summary itself, there was a stricture.

PARAGRAPHS MARKED WITH A MARGINAL LINE ARE FROM MOST SECRET SOURCES AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN A WIDER DISTRIBUTION THAN THAT SHOWN IN THE DISTRIBUTION LIST.⁷⁸

This definitely was a convention for referring to the product of Special Intelligence like Ultra. However, the marginal lines were clearly only put physically on copies: they were not printed on them. Moreover, they were most probably applied to only certain copies, as the file archival copies⁷⁹ of these summaries do not contain marginal lines on material that comes from such sources. It is not possible to know if the captured summaries were marked with marginal lines.

Part I was headed 'INTERNAL' and took up just over two pages, and this dealt with local matters in the South Pacific. Movements of New Zealand and Australian warships in the ANZAC area of operations were detailed. A probable mine explosion off

Great Barrier, the identification of a suspicious vessel was made, observations concerning the Japanese looting Tarawa and bombing the Gilberts noted. Submarine sightings were reported, plus a report from CINCPAC giving a submarine's position around 40 miles south of Savaii, Samoa. Various aircraft sightings were recorded, and a list of US aircraft in an out of Nandi compiled.⁸⁰

Part II headed 'EXTERNAL' covered a wide variety of topics over seven pages. These included notes on movements and appointments of four naval officers, one of which was Admiral Somerville's assumption of command of the Eastern Fleet on 28 March. Heavy naval casualties in recent times, the movement of US troops to Australia, matters to do with enemy raiders, depth charges, merchant ship recognition signals, the recent success of convoy protection, military and political administration in Japan, shipbuilding in Singapore and methods of delivering low level bomb and torpedo attacks were set out. A cruiser action in the Mediterranean on 22 March and Japanese radio broadcasts were reported. Under ARMY, operations in Burma, the Andaman Islands, and the Philippines were discussed, while enemy and Australian air operations over northern Australia and New Guinea and the position in New Caledonia were described.⁸¹

Part III was headed 'INFORMATION RE JAPANESE FORCES'. This section of three pages considered Japanese mines, Japan and the Solomon Islands, rice supplies for Japan, and Japan's trade and maritime warfare. It concluded with a break down of the Japanese Army's order of battle on 22 March, as estimated by the Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon.⁸²

Part IV was most interesting as it set out 'ESTIMATED DISPOSITIONS OF JAPANESE NAVAL UNITS IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS', over four

pages. These were listed in particular localities, and names of units were given where possible. Units, part units or individual vessels were set out under the following sub-headings: North Tasman (2), Samoa (1), North Pacific (4), Empire Waters (7), Marshall's Area (8), Truk Area (3), Rabaul Area(10-13), Netherlands East Indies (11 + groups of vessels off Timor), and Malaya (10). These were set out like the following example in the Netherlands East Indies.

- 1.- Unit of 1st Carrier Division –
“AKAGI” (72 planes).
- 2.- 2nd Carrier Division –
“SORYU”)
“HIRYU”) 53 Planes each.
- 3.- 5th Carrier Division –
“SHOKAKU”)
“ZUIKAKU”) 60 planes each
- 4.- 5th Destroyer Squadron –
“NATORI” (7 – 5.5”) Flagship.
12 Destroyers.
- 5.- 4th Submarine Squadron. Composition unknown.
- 6.- 6th Submarine Squadron –
“KINU” (7 – 5.5”) Flagship.
Four Minelaying submarines.
- 7.- 23rd Air Squadron, operating over North Australia from Koepang.
- 8.- “TAKAO” Air Squadron.
- 9.- 22nd Air Squadron.
- 10.- 31st Air Squadron.
- 11.- 32nd Air Squadron. ⁸³

This was a fair amount of detail in the positions and strengths, all of which was far beyond the capabilities of the Royal New Zealand Navy to collect for a weekly report. The inference was that the information for such estimates was coming from a variety of sources. We will return to the implications of this in a moment.

Completing COIC Intelligence Summary no.13 was an appendix setting out the positions and states of all Allied warships in the ANZAC area, and the remainder

scattered about various localities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The name, type of vessel and a small comment about each accompanied each entry on the list.

This outline of the content of COIC Intelligence Summary no.13 for 30 March gives some idea of the kind of product being produced by the COIC, as well as the extent of the intelligence windfall for the enemy. This was quite a comprehensive intelligence survey, and while it contained much of what can simply be described as background interest, there was enough operational intelligence to provoke reflection. The listed deployment of Japan's naval forces, if accurate, implied that the RNZN (and thus the Allies) had a pretty good idea of the whereabouts of most Japanese units, if in fact the ships were where they were stated to be. The obvious question for the Japanese was how did they know? Over four COIC Intelligence Summaries there were clear implications.

An interesting aspect of the issue of the four captured summaries is that they were not so indiscreet as the summaries produced weeks earlier. COIC Intelligence Summary no.3 of 14 January 1942⁸⁴ had a whole section on 'W/T and D/F Intelligence' to do with assessing Japanese strength in the Marshalls, at Truk and Palau. Intelligence Summary no.4 of 21 January⁸⁵ went even further and specifically mentioned intelligence from the US Navy's intelligence unit in the 14th Naval District in Hawaii. Worse than this was the practice of listing the Japanese deployments. COIC Intelligence Summary no.5 for 29 January⁸⁶ was headed 'ESTIMATION OF THE DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC FROM THE LATEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION.' Not only did it set out the units or vessels, but also it gave the source of the intelligence as well. For example, most units of the 4th Fleet, including two Japanese carriers, were said to be in the Mandated Islands on 21 January. The sources were C.I.B.6 at 0740Z/21

and C.O.S. Singapore 1146/0161. These were not spelled out but left an interesting puzzle. In fact they stood for Combat Intelligence Bulletin from the interception and codebreaking centre in Hawaii, and the Captain on the Staff of FECB in Singapore. Others were listed as C.O.I.C. D/F and W/T, as F.E.C.B.820, as A.C.N.B., etc. There were some 74 such attributions as sources, which suggested an extensive supply of information originating from different organisations, even if the new reader might be puzzled as to what these stood for. Fortunately, by COIC Intelligence Summary no.8 of 20 February, these sources were deleted from the deployment list in the Summary, although there were still one or two comments about D/F and W/T. By COIC Intelligence Summary no.11 of 14 March, all the sources of intelligence in the Japanese naval dispositions were omitted.⁸⁷ The main point of this is that had the captured summaries contained the source annotations, it is possible much worse consequences might have ensued.

So what can be said about the debacle and the nature of this intelligence product? It seems unlikely that the Japanese realised the full implications of what they were reading when they saw the four summaries, although clearly allowing them to fall into enemy hands had been a considerable breach of New Zealand security. Rusbridger takes his case too far and ignores the press reports on Midway that for timing fit better with changes to JN25, than does the New Zealand intelligence. There were, of course, some logical problems for the prescient enemy reader with the New Zealand material. New Zealand was well known to have only small maritime forces of her own. The material collected was way beyond any conceivable New Zealand intelligence capability. Yet here was the New Zealand COIC producing prolific intelligence reports. How was the

COIC getting its material? Did it show that the New Zealand intelligence effort was on the face of it quite prodigious? If it did, and New Zealand was one of the smaller Dominions, was it not logical to assume that Australia, Canada, Britain and the United States would be going to far greater lengths in securing up-to-date operational intelligence? What were the implications of that? These are all merely hypothetical questions, but they might suggest the lines along which the captured COIC Intelligence Summaries could be approached. It seems, in view of the success of the Allied signals intelligence effort, that those questions may not have been asked.

As to the weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries as a product of a combined intelligence organisation, it may be confidently said that they comprised a useful cumulation of recent and current background and operational intelligence. Regarded within an intelligence package that contained Daily Summaries and GENSIT for a variety of customers here and abroad, the weekly summaries occupied a very useful place. Their extensiveness is all the more remarkable, given the adverse and rapidly deteriorating operational and strategic circumstances in which they were conceived. The Admiralty on 6 October 1942 noted it had just received the War Office copy of the COIC Intelligence Summary No.24, observing that the reports were of great interest to the Naval Intelligence Division, and asking for previous reports to be sent.⁸⁸

There were changes afoot in the COIC. Brackenridge was sent to COMSOPAC's in Noumea to be the New Zealand Liaison Officer with the rank of Acting Lieutenant Commander. Beasley noted drily to Commander Long, the DNI in Melbourne,⁸⁹ that as COMSOPAC disliked liaison officers, Brackenridge was actually on the staff as a working member. He later observed⁹⁰ that although Brackenridge had settled in well at

COMSOPAC'S headquarters, he was 'not allowed to send us any operational information.' Brackenridge returned later on to be DNI for a short period, before returning to a further liaison officer role till the end of the war.

In his letter to Long on 12 February 1943, Beasley spoke of having reorganised the COIC and the CWR to give the latter more operational significance, and to divide the COIC into separate service components. 'We have, however, retained a combined nucleus of one officer from each service.' This was said to be an improvement as '...we were too much in each other's pockets and the new arrangement should give the respective service more chance to get down to their proper intelligence work.'⁹¹

This was the exit point for combined intelligence. As the air force increased its intelligence commitment, single service direction kicked in. This was because of the new focus for air intelligence. The Centre was to revert to the role of a naval operational intelligence centre, despite the space given to air intelligence in the Daily Summaries. The reorganisation involved rearranging the intelligence and operations rooms vis-à-vis the CWR. The need to do this had arisen from the growth of the Air Intelligence side, the development of an Air Operations Room, and the fact that

the present functions of the Central War Room are felt to have deteriorated into those of an intelligence display room and conference room. The operational and planning significance of the Central War Room has been largely lost.⁹²

There was to be no alteration to the layout of the CWR itself. From an operational perspective the Air Operations Room was too far away from the CWR to be useful. On the other hand, the intelligence officers located next door to the CWR were distracted by noise, when the nature of their work required peace and quiet. Part of the Air Intelligence

component was accommodated on the floor above through lack of space. Piecemeal growth had resulted in 'much unnecessary running about.'

The changes, according to the Air Force, demonstrated a more workable set-up. The Air Operations Room was to be next to the CWR, with the Air Intelligence and Naval Intelligence moved to separate rooms but quite close to a COIC Room containing one intelligence officer from each service. The DNI was located by the COIC, while the Naval and Army watchkeepers were next to the Air Operations Room.⁹³ What had occurred was a marked increase by the RNZAF in the number of air intelligence personnel compared with the previous year. There was a quiet revolution under way in air intelligence, with a focus on providing operational intelligence for squadrons deployed in the forward area.

The personnel of the COIC/Naval Intelligence/Air Intelligence at this time reflected a balance between the Navy and the Air Force, with the Army in its minor role. There were approximately 28 personnel involved, without counting the staff of the 'Y' Room and the Merchant Shipping Office. The DNI's office contained the DNI and one civilian assistant. Lieutenants Williams, Newcombe and Sub-Lieutenant Reddell, an Army officer and Miss Brookman were in a 'Naval Intelligence and Operations' room. The COIC Room was occupied by three service intelligence officers, Lieutenant Whitmore, Lieutenant Dawson (Army) and Flying Officer Amodeo. A Naval Intelligence and 'Y' Room was to be occupied by Sub-Lieutenants Jaynes and Cheyne, Lydia Warnock and two 'Y' staff. Across the corridor were Squadron Leader Wright, Flying Officer Tyrer, Flying Officer Muir, Flying Officer Wells and Miss Wakefield of Air Intelligence. Next door to them were six COIC typists and two orderlies.⁹⁴

At this time in change of direction, as air intelligence headed off with its northern focus, progress in naval technical intelligence collection gave more precision in the identification and location of enemy naval units at sea. The perceived increasing effectiveness of the direction-finding stations and the REB station in traffic analysis is reflected in an exchange of a series of minutes between senior naval staff officers in mid-1943. On the subject of the PROTECTION OF TRADE FROM ENEMY SUBMARINES AND RAIDERS, the Staff Officer (Operations) recommended that certain changes be made to improve the security of shipping at sea. The SO(O) noted that as the CNS was to be Commander New Zealand Sea Frontier, responsible for the protection of trade in the southern half of the South Pacific Area, it was necessary to have a daily assessment of enemy submarine positions and their anticipated movements, if possible. The object of this was to re-route merchant shipping away from submarines. Forecasting enemy movements as against direction-finding, sightings or sinkings had proved invaluable in preventing sinkings. He proposed that the daily assessment be in the form of a chart produced by midday. Co-ordination of intelligence by the submarine expert on the DNI's staff, and those from the SS(O) and SO(Y) was necessary.⁹⁵ The DNI commented:

I suggest that one officer only should be made responsible for the production of the chart to be given to S.O.O. by noon daily. Propose that this should be Lieutenant Cheyne who is already on the job of studying submarines.

2.- Most Japanese submarine transmissions take place at night and if we can arrange rapid D/F and R.E.B. information together with all sightings, attacks, etc. to be supplied from Central War Room, I see no reason why we should not be able to produce an 0600 submarine situation chart by 1200 daily.

3.- The above will require the collaboration of S.S.O., S.O.Y. and C.W.R. officers in order that full and rapid information from all the available sources can be supplied to Lieutenant Cheyne. Propose that he should work in the Naval Intelligence Room (236) where there is space available.⁹⁶

REB was radio fingerprinting which was a form of interception and analysis of certain aspects of enemy wireless transmissions, and was done in conjunction with high frequency direction-finding. Beasley noted that to get the chart completed, all relevant information needed to be ready by 0830 hours. The SS(O) agreed that Lieutenant Cheyne should be responsible for producing the chart by midday. He went on:

2.- I think details of the presentation of data should be arranged between D.N.I. and S.O.O. so that the responsibilities of Lts.Cheyne and Minshall may be defined exactly. Also that S.S.O. should arrange with S.O.O. that when signals are promulgated to N.[aval] O.[fficers] I.[n] C.[harge] and N.[aval] C.[ontrol] S.[ervice] O.[fficers] on certain aspects of the Submarine situation, there is no possibility of the secret source of the information (e.g. REB, cryptography) being disclosed.⁹⁷

A different hand noted the information should be given on the lines of 'an area to be avoided. NO information giving the means of obtaining such information will be given.'

Beasley set out arrangements for the submarine intelligence on 26 May.

2.- The following information to be supplied to Lt.Cheyne, Room 236, by 0830 daily:-

- (a) By C.W.R. Duty Officer.
 - (i) summarised list of [submarine sightings/attacks etc. in the last 24 hours]...
 - (ii) subsequent information on the above to be supplied by C.W.R. [immediately on receiving it up to chart production time]...
- (b) By D/F Plotting Room.
 - (i) Complete summary of information received during the night from D/F and R.E.B. etc.
 - (ii) Continue as in (a) (ii) above.
- (c) By S.O.(Y)
All information received from special intelligence concerning submarines immediately on receipt.
- (d) By Signal Department.
Copies of all signals referring to submarine attacks, sightings, etc [given promptly to CWR and Room 236]...during working hours. After working hours to C.W.R. only. These for Room 236 to be retained till 0830.

3.- Permission to be obtained for ZYM messages which may have any connection with submarine activities to be shown promptly to Lt.Cheyne.

4.- In order to provide a relief for Lt.Cheyne, N.I.(1), Lt.Whitmore and N.I.(20), Lt.Jaynes, will understudy him sufficiently to be continuously in the picture and produce the chart on Sundays etc.

5.- Agree with S.O.O. [that information to Naval Control Service Officers should be on the lines of an area to be avoided, without specific details – this responsibility to be SOO's].

6.- Lt.Cheyne to take the chart to S.O.O. daily at noon where it will be retained until 0830 of the following day [when it would be given to Room 236 to assist with compiling the new chart. Note that the old chart was then to go to the D/F plotting room for retention for record purposes about noon].⁹⁸

An annotation by the SO(Y) (Lieutenant H.Philpott) suggested that the third paragraph be deleted as it was already covered by 2(c) 'and is undesirable for other reasons'.

On 1 June, the CNS, Commodore Atwell Lake, sent out a memorandum⁹⁹ with minor but significant alterations to the DNI's missive. The timing for information to get to Lt.Cheyne was put back an hour to 0930. All references to REB and ZYM had disappeared. The task of SO(Y) was to pass 'All information of a secret or special nature concerning submarines.' The SO(O) was cautioned that 'The information passed [for the routing of merchant shipping] to be of a general nature, no mention being made of the means by which it was received.'

A memorandum from the SO(O) to the Merchant Shipping Officers (cc.DNI, SSO, SO(Y), Cypher Room) on 4 June on the promulgation of submarine intelligence asserted that 'With reference to N.A.08/1/18 of 1st June, 1943 (Daily Summary of Submarine Intelligence) the Merchant Shipping Department is responsible for promulgating to New Zealand routing authorities and Naval Operating Base, Auckland information received regarding enemy submarines and raiders [affecting the direction of ships' course from New Zealand]', and it noted that this was in addition to the Admiralty Messages to Ships at Sea. It listed as sources D/F (in New Zealand, Australia and the United States), Admiralty AF messages from Australia, War Warning messages from US

sources, sighting reports and attack reports, and finally '(e) Special intelligence from S.O.(Y)'s department, which is generally of forecasted movements.'¹⁰⁰

The DNI instructed the CWR watchkeepers on 5 June that the CWR Duty Officer was to supply Lt.Cheyne of Room 236 at 0900 of all submarine reports since 1200 the previous day, plus any further information received between 0900 and 1200 this day. This included reports of attacks, Asdic contacts, airborne ASV contacts, sightings from ships or shore, or aircraft photo reconnaissance.¹⁰¹ These reports were to be set out as follows:

Time of sighting	Position		Nature of Report	Signal References
1140M/3	<u>Latitude</u> 6 30 S	<u>Longitude</u> 174 20 E	Torpedo Attack on "WILLIAM JAMES"	A.C.N.B. 031158

The officers running the daily intelligence briefings and compiling the chart were under some pressure from all this. Lieutenant Whitmore on 24 June questioned the desirability of continuing with the morning briefing, when a more comprehensive brief could be given on Tuesdays and Fridays. Attendance at the daily meetings had dropped off, as there was often little or nothing to report. Less frequent meetings meant it was possible to summarise operations and movements over a number of days for an improved perspective.¹⁰² Latest intelligence received was compounding matters, as a lot of the briefing intelligence was received about two hours prior to meetings. This did not allow time for analysis, to connect it with earlier events or appreciate the consequences with regard to future operations. Narrative Officers did not get an opportunity to get together and discuss the significance of the incoming intelligence. It was suggested that furthermore, the Daily Summary adequately covered the day-to-day events. The morning

meeting wasted time better spent on analysis, while daily submarine intelligence was covered with the chart.

The DNI noted the issue as worthy of consideration, although 'hot' intelligence might be missed, and there would be no opportunity for the Chiefs of Staff to ask questions. If offensive operations developed in the New Zealand vicinity the daily meeting would have to be held.¹⁰³ The CNS commented in forthright terms in ink on 26 June, firmly putting his foot down.

These meetings are to continue. They are not convened solely to listen to narratives; they constitute a reliable opportunity for the Chiefs of Staff, senior officers and Attaches to meet daily, maintain personal contact, and discuss matters great or small amongst principals.¹⁰⁴

And that was that. There were signs that things were beginning to wind down, however. KIWI No.102 of 26 July 1943 noted that the KIWI signals series sent to the RAN and British addressees would no longer be daily signals, but would be sent 'as warranted by the situation.'¹⁰⁵ By September, there was a perception of the lessening risks of the war to New Zealand. As the Deputy CAS noted on 23 September, the service chiefs took the view that six months warning of an impending attack could be anticipated, although a raider or a submarine must always be expected.¹⁰⁶ This was a considerable shift from the near panic of early 1942. The Naval Secretary the same day suggested that,

2.- In view of the present strategical situation and the general trend of the war in the South Pacific area it is considered that there is no longer any necessity to keep a permanent watch in the Central War Room.¹⁰⁷

He went on to say he was not proposing to do away with the Central War Room, as the morning meeting would go on and the daily summaries continued to be produced and signals sent. The Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1943 addressed the Naval Secretary's memorandum, confirming the proposal to wind down the permanent watch

except during working hours. It is added that after working hours the Merchant Shipping Officer will be responsible for dealing with all matters affecting the Central War Room.¹⁰⁸

They decided to approve the reduction in watchkeeping, although because of the possibility of intrusion by a raider or submarine there should be trained personnel available for watchkeeping if needed.¹⁰⁹ The DNI noted on 6 October the Chiefs of Staff had decided to discontinue night watchkeeping in the Central War Room, and watchkeeping hours were now 0800-1700 Monday to Friday, and 0800-1230 Saturday and Sunday.¹¹⁰

Intelligence still continued to be promulgated, nonetheless. The contents of KIWI signal no.106 of 12 October 1943¹¹¹ was representative of these now occasional signals bringing British authorities up to date on recent operations in the South Pacific. It noted the American build up in the Ellice Islands, the appearance of an aircraft probably from a Japanese submarine over Fiji on the night of 8 October, and D/F bearings on 9 October of a Japanese submarine 15 deg.30' south 177 deg. 30' east. A US auxiliary had fired on a Japanese submarine not far from that position, while days earlier a US LST had sunk under tow following an enemy attack off Vella Lavella. Reporting on the progress of New Zealand ground forces in the Solomons in late September and early October:

2 N.Z. patrols landed MUNDI MUNDI and PARASO N. VELLA LAVELLA 21/9 contacted enemy. Strength increased to 2 battalions by 22/9 base established DOVELI COVE 24/9. By 28/9 N.Z. troops had surrounded 300 Japs resisting strongly.

Brigade headquarters heavily bombed a.m. 2/10 but no material damage. Troops in contact with Japs with artillery assisting eliminating M/G positions. On 7/10 remainder 500 Japs being attacked from north and south and all resistance eliminated by evening 9/10. Party 12 Japs contacted 8/10 N.E. NEW GEORGIA.

At this time of improving fortunes in the war, an old problem resurfaced. Towards the end of the year, the SO(O) was moved to raise concerns to do with security which came within his orbit and that of the DNI. He minuted on 23 November:

For some weeks past I have noticed a considerable number of persons (officers and civilians) in the Merchant Shipping Office. On making enquiries...it has been apparent...in many cases, sufficient grounds did not exist for their entry into the room. ...

In view of the fact that the routeing policy and shipping lanes are clearly marked on the wall plot and only a few moments perusal can give an intelligent person a general idea of the policy at present in force, it is desired to restrict entry into the Merchant Shipping Office to a list of named persons only. [sic] ¹¹²

He emphasised that there was no intention to reduce the amount or the time taken to distribute legitimate information to other departments, but he asserted that the interests of security compelled restriction of admittance to only officers and civilians whose duties concerned protection of trade. ¹¹³

The arrival of 1944 brought the demise of the standard short signal of operational intelligence used since early 1942. GENSIT no.732 of 22 February 1944 addressed to the New Zealand Naval Liaison Officer, Suva was the last to be issued. After the summary of operational intelligence on air and naval operations in the Bismarcks and around New Guinea, it noted

Unless you particularly require GENSIT it is proposed to discontinue regular transmission and substitute occasional signals when news of N.Z. interest occurs. Presume you are fully informed by U.S. authorities on S. and S.W.PACIFIC matters. Request your comments. ¹¹⁴

The Naval Liaison Officer, Suva agreed, noting that the US authorities 'also agree with discontinuance of regular transmissions.' ¹¹⁵

The new year also saw Beasley step down as DNI, being replaced by Lieutenant-Commander H.S. Barker, who had been his understudy for some time. Beasley was only

on a two year appointment and apparently a smooth transition was arranged.¹¹⁶ There was a further reminder of times that should have been long past. It had taken a lot of effort to get a combined intelligence organisation in the form of a COIC and a central war room. On 29 May 1944 the Commissioner of Works had asked the Minister of Defence if the 'Secret War Room' on the 2nd Floor of the Stout Street building was still required. G.R.Laking, now Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, passed this query on to the Chiefs of Staff on 8 June. The CGS replied the next day that he had no objection to closing the Central War Room, but noted that the other two services might take a different position. It was perhaps a not surprising short-sighted stance by the Army. The same day the CAS firmly asserted the Central War Room should be retained until the end of the war with Japan. The Naval Secretary sent a sharp response on 10 June, making a number of points.

No space in this building can be spared by the Navy where accommodation is already heavily taxed. The War Room has recently been reduced to a somewhat inconvenient size to make additional room for the Communications Branch who urgently needed it.

The Central War Room is necessary because it is the only place where maps, etc. may be conveniently displayed for the information of staff officers. All intelligence received by the three services is made available in the War Room, which is used as the daily meeting place for staff officers of the three services.

From a security viewpoint, it would be extremely ill-advised to turn the War Room over to a civilian department. Thin walls separate it from the Naval signals office which is engaged in handling a large volume of the most highly secret material, and from the Merchant Shipping Office, which handles material no less important.¹¹⁷

He went on to say that both naval intelligence and air force intelligence and operations rooms were actually overcrowded. He noted the Navy had already withdrawn from another building in Wellington to make space for 'other purposes', and observed that the

Naval Board were surprised and concerned that the existence and location of the Central War Room was so widely known.¹¹⁸

The diminution of the COIC's intelligence function continued. On 7 August 1944 it was noted that the COIC Daily Summary was no longer to be sent to the High Commissioner in Canberra, as they now had access to Allied 'West Pacific Communiques' and the '... South Pacific Area has become operationally inactive...'¹¹⁹

On 28 September 1944, COIC Daily Summary no.1007 was issued, containing eleven items of operational intelligence.¹²⁰ Each of these was headed, as usual, with a geographical location, all dealing with Allied operations, mostly air attacks in the Solomons, Bismarck Archipalego and New Guinea. It was distributed to twelve recipients, all located within New Zealand. Attached to the Summary was a note indicating

This will be the last issue of the C.O.I.C. Daily Summary. A digest of the operational information contained in the Daily Summary will be found in a Weekly summary which will replace it.¹²¹

Similarly, the weekly COIC Intelligence Summary no.102 for 15 September was the last issue of this COIC product.¹²² There were more changes. Lieutenant-Commander Brackenridge stood in for Barker as DNI when the latter became ill in September. Barker was discharged in early 1945.¹²³ The intelligence organisation still continued to function, although Air Intelligence had become a separate department outside the COIC.

In October-November 1944 the COIC proper had been reduced once more to a naval intelligence body. This is reflected in the production of intelligence summaries. On 5 October 1944, the first of a series entitled 'Weekly Intelligence Summary' was produced by the vestigial intelligence body. These Weekly Intelligence Summaries ran

from October through to no.13 on 28 December 1944. The New Year opened with the next issue, no.14 on 4 January 1945, and the Weekly Intelligence Summaries then continued to run on through to August 1945.¹²⁴ The Weekly Intelligence Summaries contained a mixture of operational and background intelligence. Thus, Part I of no.14 contained eleven sections of varying length.¹²⁵ The first three of these outlined the state and location of all RNZN vessels, while items four to six described operations around Mindoro, in the Bismarcks and Solomons, and the bombardment of Iwo Jima. Under 'JAPANESE SHIPPING', there was another description of enemy activity in East Asian waters followed by a table that set out the particulars of reported sightings of enemy vessels off the Philippines, Iwo Jima, in the South China Sea and the Dutch East Indies. This was quite detailed and mainly concerned small enemy vessels, from destroyers and patrol craft down as far as luggers and barges. The last item drew attention to a previous report (no.13 of 28 December 1944) of an enemy submarine's sinking of the US Liberty ship the *Robert J. Walker* south of Jervis Bay on Christmas Day. Subsequent reports in January and February provided a similar spread of intelligence on the RNZN's naval units, and operations in East Asian waters.¹²⁶ Weekly Intelligence Summary no.21 of 21 February 1945 had a small report which probably went almost unnoticed. It read:

On the 6th February [the] United States Liberty Ship "Peter Silvester" (7,176 tons) bound from Melbourne to Calcutta was torpedoed 800 miles west of Fremantle. Reports say that survivors were picked up.¹²⁷

There was a connection between the sinkings of the *Robert J. Walker* in December and the *Peter Silverster* in February: that they were both sunk by the same submarine on the same patrol was perhaps unremarkable. That the submarine was the German U-Boat U-862, and that in the intervening month she had circumnavigated New Zealand unnoticed,

was intriguing. That this would remain relatively unknown for decades after the war said something else: had there been a failure of intelligence? Weekly Intelligence Summary no.22 of 28 February¹²⁸ gave an item not unconnected, as it turned out much later, with U-862. A two page section entitled 'GERMAN SUBMARINES IN SOUTH WEST PACIFIC' dealt with the sinking of U-168 in the Dutch East Indies by the Dutch submarine *Zwaardvisch* on 6 October 1944 and intelligence gleaned from the survivors. This included Japanese-German operational arrangements, technical innovations (the Schnorkel and the Submarine Bubble Target), the poor engine oil supplied by the Japanese, relations between Germans and Japanese, and operational procedure in the Far East. We will return to this last later, but suffice it to say that U-168 had inadvertently been the victim of a lapse in one of those aspects of operational procedure. It was also noted that the fleet submarine USS *Flounder* had also ambushed and sunk another U-Boat on 10 November 1944 as it was about to pass through the Lombok Straits, heading south. This was not identified in the Summary, but was in fact U-537, also heading out on an Indian Ocean patrol.¹²⁹

The Weekly Intelligence Summaries were naval intelligence summaries. They covered much the same range as their predecessors, although the detail of air operations of the latter COIC Daily Summaries now dropped out of the picture. The air intelligence organisation produced their own summaries.

The naval intelligence organisation was headed by the DNI, with a small number of personnel under him (not counting the 'Y' Room staff and the Merchant Shipping Office). A lieutenant with a civilian assistant looked after Enemy Intelligence; what was termed 'Own Intelligence' was under a Lieutenant with a Wren assistant. Historical

Archives and Publicity was taken care of by a civilian historian, S.D. Waters, and Security Intelligence came under a lieutenant. In addition there were two typists and one Able Seaman messenger.¹³⁰ As the war had receded from New Zealand, all that was required from the organisation was to keep the service chiefs informed of the world situation and update the Admiralty publications on the Pacific islands.¹³¹

The COIC had shrunk back towards its shadowy beginnings. Under the circumstances, there was an irony in this situation. From 1940 to 1945, not a year passed without at least one enemy naval unit intruding within New Zealand's three-mile limit. Moreover, none of these vessels were in any danger while doing so, other than inadvertently running aground. It is paradoxical that having been surprised in 1940 by the *Orion* off Auckland, the precipitate reduction of operational intelligence capability in 1944 coincided with the only visit by a German U-boat to the New Zealand coast. That U-862 should come here in January 1945 on a voyage exploring the potential for waging an undersea war in Australasian waters is interesting. Even this late in the war the Germans were prepared to explore new possibilities in the Antipodes. Korvetten-Kapitan Timme specially requested to do so because of his experience as a merchant captain in these waters.¹³²

In March 1945 Brackenridge once more took up a naval intelligence liaison post, this time as British liaison officer to CINCPAC. His replacement was another long-serving member of the COIC. Robert Cheyne had joined as a Sub-Lieutenant watchkeeper in the early days. As Lieutenant-Commander Cheyne he was to be the last DNI for the war, and remained long into the postwar period.¹³³ By June 1945 the COIC and the CWR had been run down to a small establishment, although provision remained

for expansion once more should the need arise. The COIC , the CWR and the MSO occupied a series of eight offices with a total staff of up to twenty-six personnel, not counting the Teleprinter Room, Coding Office or the Cypher Room. The DNI, Lieutenant Commander Cheyne, occupied Room 238 with one civilian assistant; Rooms 234,236, 237 were occupied by Naval Intelligence with up to eight naval personnel, and Room 233, the D/F Plotting Room, had two personnel (with up to nine in emergencies). Rooms 239-240 now constituted the CWR, staffed by eight Air Force personnel (and could expand to twelve). The Teleprinter, Cypher, Coding Rooms and the Signals Distribution Office lay between the CWR and Room 245, the Merchant Shipping Office. The MSO had a staff of six (which could expand up to thirteen).¹³⁴ It was left to Lieutenant-Commander Cheyne to record the final extinguishing of the wartime operation, on 28 August 1945.

The Chiefs of Naval and Air Staffs have instructed that the Wednesday morning talk in the Central War Room is to be discontinued forthwith.¹³⁵

And that was the end of it. The British officer who came to look after 'Y' intelligence in 1946 was surprised at what he found when he arrived. There was virtually nothing left.¹³⁶

If the emergence of a combined intelligence organisation was the most significant New Zealand intelligence initiative during the war, its late materialisation and early decline is a commentary on the priority accorded it. It has been clearly demonstrated that naval intelligence played the central role in the development of a combined intelligence organisation in New Zealand. Yet even within the Navy, the job of the naval intelligence officer, the Staff Officer(Operations & Intelligence), was overloaded. It was not until the naval intelligence officer no longer had operations duties and Beasley was appointed as

Staff Officer(Intelligence), and subsequently Director of Naval Intelligence, that the combined intelligence organisation had a chance of functioning properly.

The matter of changing personnel at the top of naval intelligence and combined intelligence throughout the war weakened the CIB and the COIC. The departures and complications of the roles of Ellis, St.Aubyn, Nicholson and Hannay disrupted movement in the direction of an effective combined intelligence body. Beasley, it is true, marked the period of stability from July 1941 to 1944, the time during which the COIC was most useful. Although Beasley's replacements had been in the COIC - first Barker, then Brackenridge in September 1944, and Cheyne in March 1945 - they presided over an essentially truncated intelligence organisation.

The slow evolution towards some form of combined intelligence organisation begun well before the outbreak of hostilities was a considerable impediment to effectiveness. Even the shattering of comfortable illusions of security, courtesy of the German Navy in June 1940, did little to stimulate developments, other than to convene yet another of the interminable committees on intelligence. The Combined Intelligence Bureau could not be effective with too few resources, too few staff and too many tasks. It was an entirely unsatisfactory temporary arrangement. Necessary reforms were delayed far too long, stretching out over eight months from late April to December 1941. The war with Japan compounded matters, even if it provided an urgent spur to get the COIC sorted out. Delays in properly establishing the process for the production of useful intelligence summaries may have been understandable, but not excusable. The ambivalent role of the Police Department, their internal security focus and the hampering of the CIB should not be forgotten. It was not until the police seized control of the new security

service in early 1943 that the attitude of the Police Commissioner ceased to be a problematical factor.

The sudden albeit expected expansion of the war brought matters to a head and caught the combined intelligence organisation changing horses mid-stream. For the War Cabinet and the service chiefs, partially blind in terms of their own intelligence resources, the problem was compounded by the deteriorating operational circumstances to the north. It was only the Allied intelligence connections with Britain and Australia that prevented complete blackout, assisted by local proficiency in technical intelligence collection. It was the operational effectiveness of these connections, which included the development of the 'Y' Room's role, that gave useful insights as to the whereabouts of the enemy's main naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The entry of the United States into the war greatly assisted in transforming this adverse situation.

The emergence of the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre was the high point of the combined intelligence initiative. The functions of intelligence and security became properly separated. John Prados has described the Royal Navy's celebrated Operational Intelligence Centre as

a place where data regarding friendly and enemy forces could be pooled and put in focus for commanders to make operational decisions...a fusion of information...combining inputs from all the many sources available, and displaying the result to those making the decisions.

The Royal Navy called its concrete application of this fusion concept an operational intelligence center [sic]....¹³⁷

This was what lay behind the concept of the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre. How far the New Zealand COIC made progress in the direction of fusion is something of a moot point. New Zealand's Chiefs of Staff seldom had to face situations where immediate action was required. In 1940 and 1941 with German raiders operating with

impunity in New Zealand waters, the CNS recognised he lacked the kind of combined organisation necessary to prosecute defensive maritime operations, which was what led to the appointment of a DNI and the establishment of a COIC. Even once this occurred, the relative fragility of resources and sources of intelligence in relation to geographical realities, presented an extremely formidable task.

The establishment of the daily briefing sessions in the Central War Room, the institution of the COIC Daily Summary of intelligence and the weekly COIC Intelligence Summary, the GENSIT signals and later the KIWI signals marked the apex of the useful production of operational intelligence by the COIC. That four lengthy weekly Intelligence Summaries would get lost in the mail, to put it mildly, with the potential to cause more damage than they did, was an unfortunate accident that remained an isolated aberration. The production of the fortnightly General Intelligence Summary ameliorated to some extent the demand for access to information by parties who had no business perusing operational intelligence, like the Police Commissioner.

The 'Y' Room, while an integral part of the COIC, had proceeded in its operational development from 1940, and provided a flow of useful operational intelligence in and out of New Zealand throughout the difficult period of transition from the CIB to the new COIC. Its contribution to the production of intelligence by the COIC was vital.

It was the co-ordination of operational intelligence from a wide variety of sources, both local and external, that was most important. The operational intelligence provided to the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff gave quite a comprehensive 'handle' on the South Pacific situation, from the low point in 1942, past the critical turning of the tide in

1943, through 1944 when an ultimate Allied victory became increasingly apparent. There were certain limitations: the relative immunity of enemy naval units in New Zealand waters was both a problem and a warning, and it is somewhat sobering to note that no enemy surface raider or submarine suffered any inconvenience whatsoever operating this far south.

The steady movement of the war northwards, the decline of urgency, and the increasing difficulties in remote intelligence collection, led to a perceived decline of the requirement for operational intelligence products like the COIC Daily Summaries, KIWIS, the GENSITS, and the weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries. The wind-down in September 1944 was understandable, although rather precipitate (given the experience of 1940), as running down the COIC entailed a lowering of intelligence capability. Maritime intelligence had been demonstrated to be of prime importance to a tiny state isolated in ocean wastes far larger than the North Atlantic.

Behind the co-ordination of the collection and analysis of intelligence lay, as has been said already, the sources of intelligence. The next five chapters consider those sources as they related to New Zealand's combined intelligence effort, which were centred on the problem of obtaining timely information on the location of the enemy, through listening to him and watching for him.

Part II

The War in the Ether

Chapter Five

The Heart of the Matter: 'Y' and H/F Direction-Finding

New Zealand's contribution to the signals intelligence war, the 'war in the ether' is considered in these three chapters of Part II. Chapter Five deals with the New Zealand naval 'Y' organisation, a Special Intelligence sub-section, and the development of the high frequency direction-finding (H/F D/F) stations at Awarua, Musick Point, Waipapakauri and Suva. Chapter Six details the interesting role of the REB station near Blenheim. Chapter Seven covers the small but significant interception operation conducted by the Army 'Y' section at Nairnville Park. Although the interception of signals for intelligence purposes occurred long before 1937 to well beyond 1945, the peak of this activity in wartime New Zealand began in late 1941 and extended through to at least the middle of 1944. This period coincided to a large extent with what was the most productive period for the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre.

The RNZAF did not get involved directly with the war in the ether; their burgeoning intelligence effort late in the war was primarily directed towards offensive operational intelligence in the Solomons. The naval and army 'Y' interception of enemy communications were separate but symbiotic, in the provision of intelligence to the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, and the interception of military and diplomatic traffic.

The two personalities at the centre of New Zealand 'Y' activity for the Navy and the Army were obscure junior officers. Both began the conflict at non-commissioned

officer level, were commissioned but remained low-ranking practitioners of their arcane art. They were both very different men from different backgrounds, but both served their country well in the back room world of wartime signals intelligence.

The most important aspect of the intelligence war was the interception of enemy radio and cable communications, and the use that could be made of intercepted traffic. This communications intelligence conflict had been going since the inception of the use of cable and radio for communications. British success with the Admiralty's Room 40 OB in the First World War pointed the way of the future in interception. After 1918, the efforts to obtain advantage by this means continued, although at less of a pace. The importance of reading other government's communications cannot be underestimated, for it promised an ongoing and convenient supply of information on intentions, decisions, operations, strengths, weaknesses and background. Accurate or not, it was an insight into what governments or military formations thought about themselves. It is understandable that the higher reaches of this form of intelligence were highly secret. The British term for the higher end of interception was Special Intelligence, which is often accepted as referring to Ultra during the Second World War. However, the term Special Intelligence was used at least as early as 1926, long before German Enigma figured in signals intelligence.

One of the main difficulties of the war at sea was the location and identification of enemy naval units, surface or sub-surface, in expanses of ocean often beyond the range of land based aerial reconnaissance. This was potentially a pressing problem for New Zealand, given the realities of its geographical location and the need for merchantmen and troopships to have safe passage to and from local ports. The only advantage was the

huge expanses of empty ocean, which made lone vessels difficult to find. The ability to locate and identify enemy warships at long range assisted the husbanding of scarce maritime defence resources (which in New Zealand's case were extremely slight, amounting effectively to two cruisers and a small number of aircraft), to be used where they might be effective. As the perceived level of threat from direct invasion rose and receded, the prospect of the enemy conducting a protracted *guerre de course* remained a durable menace. Perceptions to do with the magnitude of that menace varied over the course of the war. When Allied naval and airborne assets could not be used for one reason or other in the protection of distant trade (a basic problem dictated by both geography and resources in Australasian waters), the re-direction of merchant shipping away from located enemy units aided in frustrating enemy intentions. The derivative applications of certain methods of wireless interception showed promise to be used in this way. Interception of enemy communications however, was not just about the security of shipping. There were advantages in the greater Allied interest in other areas, including diplomatic traffic, for instance.

The wireless war in New Zealand centred on the 'Y' organisation, and the high frequency direction-finding stations (H/F D/F) provided the most useful local means to gather location and identification intelligence, to begin with. They depended, however, on the interception of enemy radio traffic, and so if enemy units kept wireless silence or only transmitted occasionally or very briefly, their immunity in terms of position and identity could be preserved. One case in particular when wireless silence was kept clearly illustrates the point and the problems posed as late as 1945: the cruise of U.862. The high frequency direction-finding stations (H/F D/F), the REB station, and the Army's

'Y' section were to function as small components of a huge multi-faceted Allied effort in the collection of signals intelligence about the Axis powers. They represented the pinnacle of New Zealand signals interception and intelligence collection during the Second World War. This high technology effort was supplemented by coastwatching, aerial reconnaissance, the sightings from vessels at sea, and last but by no means least the exchange of intelligence with British, Australian, Canadian and American intelligence authorities. The New Zealand interception effort facilitated entrée as a minor participant in the Allied signals intelligence offensive.

A couple of terms stand in need of further general explanation. D/F and W/T intelligence and 'Y' crop up in any discourse on the signals intelligence war, although definitions are rather flexible. The British Official History on intelligence's definition of direction-finding or D/F is straightforward enough.

A direction-finding station took a bearing on a transmission, and the intersection of the bearings from two or more stations – usually at least three were needed – indicated the whereabouts of the transmitter.¹

This was the famous 'cocked hat' in which the triangle formed by the three bearings suggested (if they were accurate) that the location of the vessel was in the centre of the triangle. The triangle could be very large, of course, but the general location of a vessel might be thus established. This was useful if the vessel was to be intercepted by warships, or avoided by convoys or single merchantmen.

On 'Y' intelligence, the British Official History notes:

Before wireless messages could be decyphered they had to be intercepted (the process which came to be called Y). As well as providing material for cryptanalysis, their place of origin could be discovered by means of direction-finding (DF) and they could be studied (by the process which came to be called Traffic Analysis) as the product of communications networks whose behaviour, procedures and techniques could yield further information. In the event of their

being decyphered, finally, their contents still called for interpretation by specialists if their significance was to be fully and accurately assessed; and the immediate or operational interpretation of individual messages might well depend on long-range research based on the analysis of many.

It was not until the middle of the Second World War that a standard terminology was laid down for these activities.²

There is, however, a certain flexibility about 'Y' matters. In a footnote, the British Official History explains that the above terminology is that as standardised in October 1943. It observed that while the 'Y' Service stood for the interception of signals, including the operation of direction-finding, and Traffic Analysis for the study of communication networks and of signals procedures, callsigns, low-grade codes and plain language, together with direction-finding and 'other technical aids' (like radio fingerprinting, for instance),

Until 1943 these terms were used in different ways and others also existed, leading to much confusion. Thus for TA [Traffic Analysis] itself other terms existed like W/T Intelligence, W/T Operational Intelligence, Wireless Network Research and even Operational Intelligence. Y, again, sometimes meant only interception and sometimes interception and Traffic Analysis and also came to cover the breaking and exploitation of low-grade signals in the field.³

Yet some light can still be shed by the earlier usage, as the declassified 'Notes on the History of Operational Intelligence Centre in Canada', illustrates:

Operational Intelligence is based mainly on W/T Intelligence (known as W/T Procedure "Y") in all its phases. It is, of course, essential that this work be carried out in close conjunction with a Direction Finding organization.

W/T Intelligence (as distinct from D/F) is a complicated problem to which a safe and satisfactory solution can only be obtained by laborious collection and analysis of data. The object of the analysis is to obtain identification of ships through their call signs, and an idea of their movements and operations from a study of the nature and volume of their W/T signals. Much has been learned in the past but there is very much more to learn of the art of extracting intelligence of operational value from wireless signals.

"Y" work including H/F D/F remains the province of the highly trained and intelligent operator and its application, as a source of information, that of the skilled investigator and the painstaking and cautious intelligence officer.

Since its very inception, about 1918, “Y” work has been a bastard child whose ownership has been claimed by various great Departments at the Admiralty ...

There are no textbooks on W/T procedure “Y”. Throughout its history it has been considered as “Most Secret” and the majority of officers who have been exposed to this work have been trained either at Scarborough or Flowerdown and the Admiralty. In its early stage Signal Officers with a knowledge of Foreign Languages were chosen ... In peacetime the number of fully trained “Y” Officers was limited. At the Admiralty a very small group of these Officers formed Section 9 in the Naval Intelligence Division, and the Technical side of “Y”, i.e. D/F, “Y” Stations, etc., also Section 9 in Signal Division [sic].⁴

In Britain, the ‘Y’ Service was an inter-service organisation with central control in the hands of a ‘Y’ Board, a ‘Y’ Committee and ‘Y’ Technical sub-committee. The ‘Y’ Board was made up of the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (CSS or ‘C’), the Head of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS, later called Government Code Headquarters or GCHQ) and the Chairman of the ‘Y’ Committee. The ‘Y’ Committee was to co-ordinate W/T intelligence and direction-finding bearings and concealed messages in plain language traffic. There were five organisations with ‘Y’ interests: the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office and the Radio Security Service. The Foreign Office intercepted commercial and diplomatic messages.⁵

‘Y’, or W/T procedure, was the interception of enemy signals traffic for the purpose of recording it and/or reading it (which if in code, or cipher, or a mixture of both required cryptanalysis), to understand the meaning of the messages, the identity of the originator, and to whom it was directed. The intention was to provide cryptographers with material as fast as possible.⁶ It went increasingly hand-in-hand with high frequency direction-finding, which functioned to take bearings of signals of other than cryptographic value.

A code can be defined as a system for concealing the meaning of a message by replacing each word or phrase in the original with another character or set of characters. A cipher is any general system for hiding the meaning of a message by replacing each letter in the original message with another letter, and should have some built-in alterable flexibility, known as the key.⁷

For the moment, it is useful to turn to the more straightforward matter of the development of New Zealand signals interception in the First World War and the continuing refinements in direction-finding and interception in the 'twenties and 'thirties. These direct connections with the past had a bearing on the establishment of the small wartime New Zealand naval 'Y' organisation in 1940.

The interception of enemy wireless signals had been around for a considerable period in New Zealand. With the outbreak of the First World War, Commander Newton, the first Naval Intelligence Officer in Wellington, reported on 6 August 1914 that 'Wireless Telegrams' in German and Dutch had been intercepted and 'are now being translated'.⁸ Apart from the elimination of the German Telefunken station in Samoa with New Zealand's occupation of Samoa, it was the movements of the powerful German cruiser squadron in the Far East in 1914 that caused the most concern and lent a degree of urgency to signals interception. Admiral Graf von Spee's East Asiatic Squadron's ability to range across the Pacific was particularly significant as troop convoys outward bound from both Australia and New Zealand might be vulnerable to attack.⁹ Between August and December 1914, interception of German signal traffic in the Antipodes attempted to keep abreast of von Spee's movements. It was assisted by the exchange of intelligence between British Empire posts in Ottawa or Esquimalt, Hong Kong, Melbourne and

Wellington. There was an early form of radio-fingerprinting, that is an attempt at recognition of the transmitter and/or the ‘hand’ of the operator. It was noted, for example, that the *Scharnhorst* had a thin Telefunken spark, with a double tone at times, while the operator sent each letter quickly but with greater spaces between letters than usual.¹⁰ Telegrams exchanged between the Naval Intelligence Officer in Wellington and the naval intelligence authorities in Melbourne in early October recorded the interception of the signals traffic from Von Spee’s warships. For example, on 5 October, the Naval Intelligence Officer sent the following:

Wellington radio [sic] intercepted at 8.8. p.m., Sunday messages sent by DASV to DAFO --- strength 2, cipher, eight words.

This is apparently same signal as heard by Suva.

Awarua reports thirty-six minutes after midnight on Sunday high double – toned telefunken sending separate letters/, numbers of times, strength two.

In regard to this Wellington Radio states they are fairly certain it is “Scharnhorst’s” note.¹¹

Melbourne replied to this and other signals, at 0120 hours on 6 October:

Urgent your 1825 call sign is “SCHARNHORST” to “DRESDEN”.
Please telegraph message and have careful watch kept to-night.

Message heard by SUVA translated (Begin)

“SCHARNHORST” on the way from MARQUESAS to EASTER ISLs.
[sic] Waihu present position. (Ends)¹²

The RAN had captured the German Handelsverkehrsbuch (HVB) code used by the Admiralstab (German Admiralty) early in the war, along with its current key settings, so Melbourne was able to read the intercepts of Von Spee’s signals.¹³

In May 1916 the P&T Department assessed the effectiveness of the New Zealand radio stations’ interception work as follows. Awarua, near Invercargill, was able to maintain an almost continuous watch. Awanui, near Kaitaia, listened to enemy signals for a considerable period. Apia could have a fair amount of time for interception.

Wellington listened for the enemy continuously, but was not as important as Awarua or Awanui as the range of its equipment was not as good. The Chatham Islands kept a close watch for enemy signals over a wide area.¹⁴ Interception work was detailed, demanding close attention, as these instructions for Apia illustrate.

In view of rumour of presence of German raider in the Pacific a continuous watch should be kept at Apia for suspicious wireless signals: enemy signals possibly not in code but en clair in the form of messages between neutral stations. Record all work overheard and carefully scrutinize for hidden meaning. Communicate suspicious messages with particulars as to call signs wave lengths and any other information likely to be useful, to "Naval" Wellington who will report to me.¹⁵

The Naval Intelligence Officer in Wellington, Paymaster W.J.A. Brown, analysed incoming signals, and interesting ones were immediately sent to Melbourne. Intelligence was circulated to the Admiralty, the ACNB, the C.-in-C. China Station, the Director of the Naval Service in Canada and the Intelligence Officer in Montevideo.¹⁶ This exchange was Pacific-wide co-operation, a feature to be repeated on a grander scale between 1939-1945. The operational connection between the Admiralty Intelligence Centre in Wellington and the P&T Department radio stations in Wellington, Awarua, Awanui, the Chathams and Apia also signified an internal pattern of co-operation. The passage of just two decades between the world wars also meant that junior personnel in the P&T Department stations in 1914-1918 were likely to be senior staff in 1939, with the advantage of previous (or even continuing) experience in interception work.

The linkage between the Navy and the civilian shore radio stations continued in the 1920s. A memorandum to the Admiralty on 12 April 1924 gave details of radio equipment at Awanui, Awarua and Apia with a view to seeking advice on modernisation.¹⁷ The Admiralty's reply advised the use of 'valve apparatus' for naval needs, observing this would be valuable for direct work with HM warships or

merchantmen, or for extending the interception area covered by Singapore, Rabaul and Darwin.¹⁸

Internally in New Zealand a continuing liaison between the Navy and civilian departments can be discerned with the Marine Department D/F station at Cape Maria Van Dieman. The SO(I) in Wellington requested details of this station in August 1926 from the Marine Department, and a direction-finding exercise was carried out with the station using HMS *Diomedé* in July 1929.¹⁹ A routine letter in 1935 from the Naval Secretary to the Secretary, the Marine Department, which had jurisdiction over lighthouses, noted the lighthouse keepers at Puysegur Point were to send radio D/F signals to H.M. ships on request being made through Awarua Radio.²⁰

The second half of the 1930s saw increasing requirements from the Admiralty for D/F stations. On 4 August 1936, the Admiralty communicated to Wellington that they were considering the requirements for more shore direction-finding stations working on the commercial wave located near focal areas of sea trade. These stations were to obtain bearings of distress messages, etc. from ships under attack from enemy naval units or aircraft, and also take bearings on enemy radio transmissions jamming distress reports. These wartime duties could be carried out by existing commercial D/F stations.²¹ The Admiralty listed a number of existing stations in the Empire: St. Johns in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Malin Head, Demarara, Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi. The Royal Navy was investigating the possibilities of additional D/F stations in wartime, and while equipment need not be purchased in peace, useful work on site selection could be carried out. It was suggested that Auckland and Wellington were suitable places.²²

Appended to this request were 'Site Qualifications' for D/F stations.²³ Noting there should be preferably landline or W/T communications from the D/F site to a 'Naval Centre', it suggested that good accommodation for personnel was necessary. Local power supply was important, and could only be substituted by petrol generators. The D/F station should be easy to protect against sabotage and attack. As to the equipment,

The D/F sets to be used would employ rotating frame coils with pedestal mountings. The weight of the frame aerial is about 125 lbs. To install the D/F set in a room in an existing building it is very desirable that the room should have a flat roof on which to mount the Pedestal. Since the wheel for operating the rotating coil is normally fitted about 3ft. to 4ft. below the base of the Pedestal, for convenient operating the roof of the building should not be too high. The minimum dimensions of the D/F room are approximately 6 ft. by 6 ft. If however a flat roofed building is not available it would be possible to support the coil on a Pedestal inside the room provided that a height of 15 ft. was available. The D/F building must be non-metallic, e.g. brick or wood...²⁴

As to D/F requirements, the following criteria needed to be met:

2. Local conditions. The centre of a large horizontal field is the ideal to be aimed at, no buildings other than that housing the set, masts, aerials; or overhead telegraph wires within 100 yards.

3. General Geographical considerations. Experience shows that the path of the wave in travelling from transmitter to D/F station is liable to be deflected under the following circumstances:-

- (a) D/F station on the coast, particularly when the coast line is rocky. [sic] The D/F station should therefore be situated not less than one mile inland.
- (b) Where the wave passes over mountainous country. Low lying, flat land is therefore generally to be preferred.

4. For a station which is expected to operate on all bearings, a general symmetry both local and geographical is desirable, but where, as is more frequently the case, the station is expected to work chiefly in certain arcs, it is important that the path of the wave in these arcs should be chiefly over sea at an angle of not less than 20 degrees to the general directions of the coastline, and be undeflected by large mountains or valleys.²⁵

The Naval Secretary in Wellington asked the P&T Department about site suitability, and the Department responded on 16 October, setting out the New Zealand potential, and noting that New Zealand was a difficult country for direction-finding.

In many cases the most desirable geographical position will not be suitable on account of the entire absence of flat sites, while in other cases, such as the North Auckland peninsula, severe coastal refraction must be anticipated unless more than one station is established in a particular area.

.... insofar as trade routes to the north of New Zealand are important, the Admiralty should bear in mind the advantages in war of providing for a direction-finding station on the North Auckland peninsula, perhaps in the vicinity of Kaitaia, where suitable land is known to be available.²⁶

Awanui had been near Kaitaia. There would be no difficulty in locating a site in Auckland, possibly in Mangere or Papatoetoe, although there were limitations imposed by the peninsula to the north. Palmerston North had a good choice of sites, while north Taranaki and Hawke's Bay might be appropriate for 'auxiliary stations'. Observing that the Admiralty had not mentioned the South Island, it was pointed out

.... there are certain advantages in having bearings available from comparatively remotely situated stations, and with a site so ideal for the purpose as Awarua, it is considered that the installation of equipment in a special hut on this Department's radio station site would be fully warranted as an adjunct to the position-finding service for the Tasman Sea.²⁷

Perhaps unsurprisingly, and not unconnected with Awarua, the memorandum added:

Fortunately, the establishment of directional receiving equipment in connection with the Government's policy in providing radio aids for civil aviation, will result in information becoming available during the course of the next few years as to the accuracy which can be expected from the direction-finding equipment....

Within two years, the usefulness of this would be borne out. High-frequency direction finding equipment was installed first at Awarua and later in 1939 at Musick Point in Auckland, to monitor the TEAL flying-boat flights crossing the Tasman Sea. The Awarua H/F D/F facility would demonstrate its usefulness to the Admiralty and the Navy in New Zealand in 1938.

Awarua Radio (callsign ZLB) was the oldest of the operational stations. Awarua had originally and ironically been built by the German Telefunken Company in 1913, along with the station at Awanui and the station in Apia. The head of Awarua in the late 'thirties was Superintendent A.W.'Hec' Head, who been at Awanui in the First World War. Awarua Radio carried out a number of other functions apart from high frequency direction-finding. These roles included the receipt of British Official Wireless messages, maintaining a Distress Watch on 500 Kc/s, a Small Ships Watch on 2162/2182 Kc/s and a loudspeaker watch to Campbell Island and the Auckland Islands on 5965 Kc/s (which was also an emergency frequency for Jacksons Bay and Milford Sound), and weather reporting to the Weather Office in Wellington (locally and from other stations like Puysegur Point (ZMU), Milford Sound (ZMV) and Jacksons Bay (ZLQ)).²⁸

Awarua's work as a marine radio station was important, but its most significant role for the Navy Office centred on the Marconi-Adcock high frequency direction-finding equipment. With the rising international tension in the late 'thirties, Awarua Radio slipped back into the pattern established in 1914. Tom Clarkson, who with George Searle oversaw the technical side of the P&T stations, recalled that in 1938 at the

time of the Munich crisis they observed the callsigns of German marine stations, indicating naval movements or intentions, a very significant item at the time and appreciated by the Admiralty....²⁹

The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee noted on 16 December 1938 that

The recent crisis has shown very clearly that operations by Armed Merchant Cruisers on our distant Trade Routes will probably commence immediately on the outbreak of war.³⁰

With the increased number of naval tasks carried out by Awarua as war approached, there was a requirement for more staff to give 24-hour coverage. A Creed

teleprinter link with Wellington was installed to cope with the flow of incoming signal traffic, and to pass this on securely.³¹ Awarua was linked by landline to Navy Office in Wellington and Musick Point Radio (ZLF) (and later to Waipapakauri (WPP) and a very different sort of W/T station at Rapaura (RNW)), and, significantly, to the cable terminal of Cable & Wireless Ltd in Auckland. A senior officer of the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) reflected that

As expansion took place and additional H/F D/F Stations were erected, they were located at sites very easily accessible to cable stations in order that bearings obtained by such stations could be easily transmitted to the Far East intelligence centre [ie FECB] wherever it was located.³²

This was to prove both useful and prudent, for when the war expanded dramatically, FECB was compelled to relocate for operational reasons.

In August 1939 the Admiralty requested an update on the state of the New Zealand direction-finding stations. The P&T Department's response to the Naval Secretary listed the following D/F stations as operational, or in the process of installation or calibration as at 25 August.³³ Awarua's high frequency direction-finding equipment was a

Marconi-Adcock short-wave direction finder 10 to 100 metres. High frequency channel on 6820 kc/s or 10650 kc/s with Musick Memorial station Auckland, for check bearings with similar direction-finding equipment at Auckland.³⁴

The Auckland Musick Point station had the identical equipment, which could be operationally linked with Awarua.³⁵ There was also a series of M/F D/F installations being established: a medium-wave Marconi-Adcock direction finder (500 to 1053 metres) at Mangere airfield; and Bellini-Tosi crossed loop medium-wave direction finders (500 to 1053 metres) under calibration at Wellington (linked to Wellington Radio), Nelson and Palmerston North.³⁶ The function of the M/F D/F stations in wartime was to monitor the

distress frequencies of merchant vessels at sea.³⁷ By October, the New Zealand H/F D/F stations working as part of the British direction-finding organisation were achieving good results, with their significance 'already apparent.'³⁸

The first major naval engagement of the war, the Battle of the River Plate, was the occasion for local celebration with the role of the New Zealand cruiser HMS *Achilles* in company with HMS *Ajax* and HMS *Exeter*. Another New Zealand dimension remained undisclosed. Clarkson of the P&T Department recalled

I was told at the time that Awarua and Bombay had a fix on the *Graf Spee* and had tracked her movements in the South Atlantic.³⁹

Indeed, on 17 November 1939, the Far East Direction-Finding Organisation (FEDO) had

obtained bearings on the "GRAF SPEE" South of Madagascar, which shewed [sic] that she was proceeding southward after sinking the "AFRICA SHELL" and not continuing up the Mozambique Channel; this despite the fact that it was only safe to say she was within 200 miles of a certain position. The stations which fixed her were Kranji, Stonecutters and Awarua, the nearest one being 3800 miles from the D/F position.⁴⁰

This monitoring continued, assisted by the Royal Canadian Navy's very recently acquired H/F D/F stations of St.Hubert in Quebec, Shediac in New Brunswick and Botwood in Newfoundland, as the *Graf Spee* steamed into the South Atlantic.

From about 29th November to 14th December, 1939, St.Hubert, Shediac and occasional bearings from Botwood gave fair indication of a German unit in the South Atlantic.

Excellent localities were obtained by these bearings between these dates; for instance, bearings of 135 degrees from St.Hubert, 148 degrees Shediac, 153 degrees Botwood, gradually increasing. These bearings, when plotted, gave a fairly good track of "Graf Spee" from the Cape [of Good Hope] toward Montevideo prior to the encounter off River Plate.⁴¹

It is interesting to note that as early as 0144 hours on 3 December Commodore Harwood had been instructed 'to assume that the raider would not round the Cape [of Good Hope] a second time and there were clear indications that she was moving towards South

America ...’⁴² The ‘clear indications’ suggest the correct inferences from the direction-finding fixes on *Graf Spee*’s signals were being made.

The H/F D/F station at Awarua had proved its value in operational co-operation from stations in different countries. The First World War foundation of naval signals intelligence co-operation was repeating itself. The significance of the New Zealand stations was within a British Commonwealth rather than a local context. For Awarua there was some official, if discreet recognition. A message from the Admiralty to the Chief of Naval Staff was passed on to the Superintendent, Awarua Radio on 14 May 1940. Under the heading ‘Far Eastern D/F Organisations’, it conveyed their Lordships’ appreciation ‘of the excellent service rendered by the New Zealand Government W/T Station at Awarua in connection with the special work that is being carried out.’⁴³

There was one limitation about direction-finding, and it was exemplified in this case. It was assumed at the time of the search that the raider was the *Admiral Scheer*, not the *Admiral Graf Spee*. This problem of the identification of enemy naval units at sea from their signals transmissions was to be addressed through something called REB by May 1941, a topic to be dealt with later.

It is interesting to compare the Royal Canadian Navy’s arrangements for signals interception at the start of the war with those of New Zealand. The RCN had no ‘Y’ organisation nor any H/F D/F stations prior to 1939. A ‘Y’ centre had been added to the RCN station at Esquimalt in the 1920s to provide raw intercepts for the Admiralty from the Pacific, and work was under way by 1939 to set up a ‘Y’ station and H/F D/F facilities at Gordon Head in British Columbia. The ‘Y’ staff at Esquimalt had mostly trained with the FECB in Singapore and at Stonecutters Island at Hong Kong with a full

course in Japanese Morse or Katakana.⁴⁴ However, the RCN made arrangements on the outbreak of war to use the two Canadian Transport Department's H/F D/F stations at St. Hubert and Shediac for naval work. These had been in use for air traffic purposes (in the same way as Awarua and Musick Point). The RCN also secured the Air Ministry H/F D/F station at Botwood,⁴⁵ and all three stations were involved with tracking the *Graf Spee*. More H/F D/F stations were under construction.⁴⁶

The New Zealand 'Y' and W/T intelligence organisation was established in 1940 with four aims. It was to supply intelligence to the Captain on the Staff, Singapore, that is, to the Far East Combined Bureau. It would liaise with the RAN 'Y' organisation. Intelligence was to be provided to the New Zealand Combined Intelligence Bureau. It was also to link the intelligence and communications establishments.⁴⁷ The 'Y' Room was located to begin with in the naval intelligence quarters in Featherston Street. At this time, the H/F D/F effort rested on the two P & T Department stations at Awarua and Musick Point. In January 1940 it was decided that the New Zealand and Australian H/F D/F Stations should exchange bearings, in addition to supplying them to FECB.⁴⁸

The head of the New Zealand Naval 'Y' organisation was Warrant Telegraphist Halson Philpott. He had joined the Navy at the age of seventeen in February 1924, and had been involved with wireless telegraphy in the Royal Navy ever since. He returned to *Philomel* in 1935 and on 14 August 1939 was posted to the Navy Office, where he would remain for most of the war. He had the reputation of being somewhat difficult to work with. In 1939 his position at Navy Office had to do with 'Wellington W/T', and the Navy List for 1940 described his post as Port W/T Officer, a convenient euphemism. A memorandum on 9 July 1940 on calibration tests on Awarua's equipment referred to

'Mr.Philpott of your office.'⁴⁹ His position as 'Wireless Intelligence Officer' is listed from 1 May 1941, and he was promoted to the rank of Telegraphist Lieutenant (Temporary) on 15 June 1941.⁵⁰ Philpott was in charge of wireless intelligence ashore from the outbreak of hostilities. He would receive an MBE in 1943 for his wartime work on 'Y' and Special Intelligence, though this was not officially acknowledged in the citation.

Captain Wylie, the departing head of FECB, looked in on Philpott on his visit to Wellington in January 1941, noting,

A "Y" room (W/T and D/F Intelligence) is in operation, staffed by a Warrant Telegraphist and 3 telegraphist ratings. Excellent work is being carried out here, including maintaining a D/F etc. warship plot similar to that in the F.E.C.B.⁵¹

Wylie suggested that there would be advantages if the 'Y' sections in Australia and New Zealand working on W/T and D/F intelligence and W/T interception were to work in close co-operation under general instructions from FECB.⁵² The New Zealand H/F D/F stations were already hard at work on Japanese callsigns, as the 'Y' section was using 'untransposed versions of call signs internally'.⁵³ Awarua had been developing interception work on Japanese, Philippines and Dutch East Indies stations from as early as July 1939, and a report on W/T interception was submitted in February 1940. Japanese merchant shipping messages were being intercepted and copied at Awarua from March 1941.⁵⁴

The possibility of extending H/F D/F facilities to Fiji was raised as a consequence of unforeseen circumstances. Nicholson, the Station Signals Officer (the SSO and Philpott's immediate superior) asked Wylie about the projected station in Suva whose staff had been lost when their ship was torpedoed en route. It was suggested New Zealand

naval personnel might man the station.⁵⁵ Wylie informed him that the station was to be operated by the FECB and administered by the RNZN. Accordingly, four telegraphists were sent on a course in Wellington on Katakana or Japanese Morse. This was followed by practical familiarisation at Musick Point between 8 and 19 March 1941, also attended by one of the Awarua operators, Frank Barlow. 'From Awarua Radio we were trained [in Katakana] one at a time at the Navy Office ... Wellington on the top floor.'⁵⁶ The training of telegraphists in Kana was expanding rapidly. J.G Williamson was on the 'Y' Room staff.

...in... '41 I was suddenly drafted to Wellington. Interviewed by Warrant Telegraphist Philpotts [sic], three of us were given the task of learning Japanese morse and W/T procedure, ditto Russian and German. Japanese morse has an alphabet of sixty-two odd letters and symbols against our twenty-six letter alphabet, and is termed Katakana or Kana for short. Learning the special characters took about a week, but getting up to speed, about thirty words per minute, took one to two weeks intensive tuition. We were to become instructors of a nucleus of senior Post Office operators to be incorporated into what was known as the 'Y' network, a world-wide net of direction-finding stations and monitoring stations. Some seventy odd were trained by us to man the high frequency D/F stations at Awarua, Musick Point, and Kaitaia [Waipapakauri], plus some twelve ex P&T RNR telegraphists for overseas stations, mainly Suva. The officers in charge of these stations had to be trained in 'Y' procedures.⁵⁷

Five telegraphists were sent to set up the new Suva H/F D/F station in a swamp site at Tamavua. They were led initially by a civilian with First World War experience, Mr.A.D.Hathaway, the other telegraphists being Leading Telegraphist D.T.Ingram and Telegraphists A.H.Packer, J.A.Kirkwood and C.J.Murphy. Ingram took over as the charge hand.⁵⁸ They arrived in Suva in early April, but it was not until 14 May that the Suva H/F D/F station was ready for operation. Under operational direction of the Captain on the Staff, Singapore Suva D/F began duty on interception watch. The directing instructions read:

Request Suva D/F station assume D/F duty on German Series B... Watch is to be changed for periods 15 to 20 minutes, 35 to 40 minutes, and 55 to 60 minutes past each hour as follows: ...

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
2000 to 0559	16,975 Kc/s
0600 to 1159	12,700 Kc/s
1200 to 1959	8,470 Kc/s

All times G.M.T. The 3 periods in each hour are used by raider for communicating with NORDDEICH. These transmissions are additional to those on series B. In order that bearings transmission to NORDDEICH may be obtained accurately G.M.T. is essential. Bearings should be prefixed "important" and passed to C.O.S. Singapore (telegraphic address Ambition Singapore) and N.Z.N.B.⁵⁹

Norddeich, otherwise known as DAN, was a prewar commercial transmission that continued to be used throughout the war. Although not so popular with U-boats, Norddeich carried enough traffic to require monitoring. It was used by German blockade runners, although they were very careful with regard to W/T security. The raiders used DAN frequencies too on occasion, particularly when operating south of approximately 30 degrees north, but were even more discreet. Series B was controlled by Kiel (JDU) and used unusually high frequencies, making it very useful for ships operating in distant waters. The German raiders by this time had become a persistent problem, with every effort being made to intercept their traffic, hence the targets for Suva H/F D/F.

Suva put out its first monthly report to FECB on 12 June.⁶⁰ Delays to the completion of the station were due to a hurricane and subsequent bad weather, including flooding preventing the erection of power lines. No modern equipment and only limited manpower was available. However,

Watch [was] being kept on Japanese Naval units in the Japanese Mandated Islands and the Combined Fleets [sic]. Callsigns, Frequencies and Times being logged for future reference. Check bearings were also taken during this period for calibration purposes.⁶¹

As to German traffic

Kiel has been logged on all frequencies but reception... for the greater part of the twenty four hours is not good. A lot of interference from American and Japanese shore stations is experienced during the hours at which Kiel's signals are received at their best. It is of the opinion here that Kiel does not transmit every hour. For example Kiel is very rarely heard between 1800 and 1900 but sometimes comes up about 1845 calling "All Stations" (CQ). At 1900 sharp he commences sending traffic. Similarly between 0001 and 0100 it is reasonable to expect to hear of him on 11,260 Kc/s but so far nothing has been heard of him on this frequency at this hour but between 0100 and 0200 has been located on 8,400 Kc/s.⁶²

Alterations in transmitting power were noted as low for an "All Stations" call, but increased power was used when transmitting traffic.

Norddeich is received here fairly well for the greater part of the twenty four hours. He is never received on 8,470 Kc/s except between 1800 and 1900. Only on one occasion has German type traffic been heard during one of his Silent Periods. It was unfortunate that the strength of signals were so weak and interference so great that the prospect of obtaining a bearing was out of the question.⁶³

The 'German type traffic' was probably a raider. As to that other area of interest, Japanese callsigns,

Between 1500 and 1900 G.M.T. whilst listening on Norddeich Silent Periods on 8,470 Kc/s Figure Kana Kana Type Callsigns have been heard. Figure Letter Letter Type have also been heard calling the former type. No traffic has been received from these stations. Japanese traffic is received well for practically the whole of the twenty four hours.⁶⁴

How was the interception work carried out by the H/F D/F operators? At Awarua Radio in 1942 the Marconi DFG 12 Radio Direction Finder was used for H/F D/F work. The H/F D/F No.1 was located in a little hut on a track well away from the main transmitting station and accommodation. The H/F D/F No.2 post further along the track was equipped later on with a more powerful Marconi direction-finder, the DFG 24/2. The DFG 12 of H/F D/F No.1 post was

designed on the Adcock principle, with [ten metre] vertical masts (aerials) at each cardinal compass point [about six metres apart]. The [flat-roofed weatherboard

little hut] installation was in an isolated area well away from any other buildings and sources of electrical interference.⁶⁵

Inside the hut, the operator with his headphones on, sat at a bench with his Post Office D/F pad prepared in triplicate to note the bearings, and a red Naval signal pad with ruled lines and five columns to copy the Katakana traffic. The operator faced twin tasks of obtaining bearings on the enemy transmission, and recording the enemy traffic. The receiving equipment sat in front of him. To his right was a large Morse key,

a double current one on the long distance landline to Auckland [Musick Point] and Waipapakauri D/F stations. The line could be extended to [the] Suva D/F [station] when required by activating an alarm (long dash) at [the] Auckland Cable Station.⁶⁶

To the operator's left was the Goniometer unit connected to the four aerials and

bearings were determined by rotating the pointer to find the null point of the signal and reading the relative degrees off the circular scale.⁶⁷

The interception of the Japanese Morse signals depended on the operator's

ability to transcribe their "Katakana" Morse code, of around 57 different characters. This was done by quickly printing the characters from top to bottom of a ruled Naval signal pad. Later the characters would be transcribed into phonetics alongside to allow for transmission over a teleprinter. The Japanese operators were good, and as most of them used "sideswipers" [a type of Morse key], it was a struggle at times to keep up with them.⁶⁸

Apart from enemy units at sea, there was also selected shore station traffic to intercept. Frank Barlow recalled that signals from the Japanese base at Rabaul were intercepted round the clock at Awarua. As Rabaul was the same distance from Awarua as from Tokyo, the signal traffic was steady and consistent.⁶⁹ It was time consuming work demanding a high standard of accuracy to be effective.

By early 1941, the 'Y' Room's co-ordination of the interception attack by the H/F D/F stations on enemy transmissions was making progress.

.... the majority of 'flashes' were originated by Admiralty and concerned German U.Boat reports...and German commerce raiders operating world wide. A 'FLASH' originated a 'SNAP' from Navy Office which put all the Pacific net on to the frequency designated and the bearing obtained were passed into the Y office, encrypted and passed direct to [the] Admiralty. Although we were half a world away, weekly and monthly analysis reports from [the] Admiralty showed that the Pacific net was providing some very useful confirmation of the UK and Atlantic results. A very small portion of the 'flashes' concerned Russian activity. Towards mid-1941 and onwards our activity became more concentrated on Japanese activity, particularly in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands groups....

Since 'Barbarossa' had been launched against Russia in... June '41, we had dropped monitoring traffic around Vladivostok which left more time to concentrate on the Japanese...., particularly [on] Jaluit, the rapidly expanding Japanese naval base. Random reports and sightings from the island groups south of the Marshalls indicated a fair proportion of the build up was of submarine activity. These sightings plus H/F/ D/F bearings plus stations controlling transmissions [sic] all added up to Jaluit W/T being in control.⁷⁰

In October 1941 a certain amount of Russian traffic was still being received from the New Zealand 'Y' Room by FECB.⁷¹

The 'Y' co-operation with Far East Combined Bureau deepened. Lieutenant-Commander S.W. Francis, Head of 'Y', D/F and Special Intercepts Organisation at FECB from November 1939 to September 1942, recalled the extent and function of the expanding interception activity in the Far East.

The 17 H/F D/F stations known as Far East D/F organisation were grouped according to their geographical location in such a way the cross bearings of German and Japanese Naval transmissions [sic] were obtainable. In doing this one had to bear in mind...all the relevant technicalities involved. The results from the H/F D/F stations were sent by the D/F station to the Far East Combined Bureau organisation by cable by means of the use of the cable FLASH system. Special gnomonic charts were used for the plotting of D/F bearings. All fixes of German units in detail were sent direct to D.N.I. London. Fixes of Japanese units were used in the F.E.C.B. daily summaries which were promulgated to all Far East intelligence authorities affected.⁷²

Four of those were New Zealand stations. This was a far and wide effort, for the RCN W/T Station at Gordon Head in British Columbia was, like Suva, operationally under the FECB. Intercepted traffic was cabled directly to the Captain on the Staff, Singapore. In

addition to direction-finding bearings, details of Japanese air and naval movements were sent to the Admiralty as well as FECB, using cable transmission for security. A close study of Japanese wireless traffic was made using all available methods to confirm movements including sighting reports. Along with callsign identification confirmed by the use of radio-fingerprinting equipment, this enabled the FECB to warn the Admiralty of squadrons and ships leaving Japan for Indo-China and the South China Sea in late 1941.⁷³ A letter from Francis to Nicholson on 7 July 1941 indicated the extent of this practical collaboration between the New Zealand 'Y' Room, its four H/F D/F stations and the FECB.

Your Special Shipping reports i.e. noon positions are of great value to us and we hope they will be continued. You need not send any Red forms of merchant shipping as, apart from your valuable Special Intelligence Signal, we only require merchant shipping information if it is in any way suspicious.

I hope you will be able to make headway with the Special Consular material we requested.⁷⁴

He had a number of technical questions to do with calibration corrections concerning the Awarua and Waipapakauri Marconi DFG 12 equipment, recalling earlier consultations about the Musick Point direction-finder. Suva's calibration report had just been completed and further information would follow. Another Callsign Summary, the monthly list of frequencies and the Far East Direction-finding Organisation Periodical Analysis 2100(8) would be sent shortly to the 'Y' Room. Francis added that a further SNAP test of the New Zealand H/FD/F stations would be conducted to explore the potential for all four being used as a working combination. The Special Shipping noon position reports referred to were regular intercepts of certain Japanese traffic; the Special Consular material concerned the cable communications between the Japanese Consul in Wellington and the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. These could be flagged for perusal and

routed through Singapore or Hong Kong, courtesy of Cable & Wireless Ltd, the P&T Department and the Navy.

The immediate Japanese naval target of the 'Y' Room in 1941 concerned Japanese naval and air movements in the Marshall Islands. Familiarity with regular Japanese operators' habits allowed the interception telegraphists to conduct a simple form of radio-fingerprinting as they intercepted traffic.

An operator has a distinct 'signature' when sending Morse Code regardless of whether its Kana or international [sic]. Similarly, the transmitters have a signature, note (tone) and keying characteristics which can be recognized by experienced operators and our D/F stations were manned by very experienced operators. This became known as "finger-printing a transmission" and formed a sound basis for the identification of a particular unit...we were ninety-five percent certain that our area of interest was submarine traffic controlled by a master station Jaluit W/T.⁷⁵

The reliability of this form of radio-fingerprinting depended on the 'ear' of the intercept operator. There was one way to get closer to check and confirm the inferences from the Jaluit traffic. Williamson of the 'Y' Room

did two trips on *Achilles* supernumary [sic], not shown on my papers, trained four more operators in Kana and D/F techniques and when in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands had a 24 [hour] watch set on Japanese M/F frequencies being used by Jaluit Radio, the control station for Japanese submarines operating in that area. Bearings were taken on the ship's M/F D/F from various positions in an endeavour to pinpoint the areas of most activity including the precise position of the bases. [sic] We had to stay out of air surveillance range for obvious reasons. The [Japanese] M/F transmissions could not be heard by the Pacific net as M/F has only a comparatively short range. There was little doubt that activity in the region was increasing at a high rate. All this activity was of course promulgated to the Y organisation world wide per medium of the weekly intelligence summaries.⁷⁶

In a routine exchange on 18 August, the RAN DNI revealed to Beasley some Australian success in breaking into certain Japanese traffic.

The bi-weekly return setting out positions of Japanese shipping is not compiled from D/F sources, but from 'Y'. It is the practice of Japanese vessels

engaged in overseas trade to transmit to the head offices of their companies the daily position reports, prepared in a specially improvised code. Payr.Cdr.Nave was successful in breaking these codes some time ago. Japanese vessels engaged in the coastal trade and 'Near-Seas' trade do not conform to the practice.⁷⁷

Another instance of this reading of Japanese merchant shipping radio traffic can be seen in the following signal from the Staff Officer Intelligence in Kingston on 29 August.

....from Special Intelligence report MONTEVIDEO MARU reported being closed and spoken to by a British auxiliary cruiser on Wednesday 6 August in position 29 degrees 02'S 129 degrees 29 W.⁷⁸

Special Intelligence meant Most Secret Sources, or Ultra. The Japanese merchantman's traffic was clearly being read. This sharing of intelligence from intercepted messages is further illustrated in an exchange revealing difficulties with Japan's diplomatic representative in Wellington. On 1 October, a letter from Lieutenant Commander Barker of the CIB's General Intelligence Section to the Director of the Security Intelligence Bureau disclosed:

The following signal arrived 30/9/41 from the Australian Liaison Officer at Batavia:-

'I learn from special intelligence that the departure of 'Nieuw Amsterdam', 'Aquitania' and 'Coptic' from Wellington on 15th September was reported on the same day to the Japanese M.[inistry of] F.[oreign] A.[ffairs] by the Japanese Consul at Wellington.'⁷⁹

These ships were 2NZEF troop transports bound for the Middle East and the Consul's cables threatened their security should the Japanese pass on such information to the Germans. Australia conducted surveillance on diplomatic traffic between Japan and Australasia, and to this end the RAN DNI requested Beasley on 3 October,

MOST SECRET. Copies are required of all telegrams to and from Japanese Consul. Can you ensure that all outbound traffic is routed via Sydney and forward by airmail copies of any detour messages not passing through Sydney.⁸⁰

Four days later, the Captain on the Staff, Singapore, sent an intelligence summary to Beasley.

Consular Special Intelligence Report dated 7th October:

1. Consul-General Wellington sends Tokyo details of New Zealand purchases of aircraft as follows: 1938 – 30 Vickers bombers, 5 Oxfords; 1939 – 29 Baffins, 40 Gordons, 30 Vincents; 1940/41 – estimated 200 to 250 aircraft.
2. Unknown number of Hudson and Harvard [sic] have arrived May 1941 and 100 Tiger Moths manufactured in New Zealand in addition to 395 civil aircraft.
3. Squadrons located Auckland, Christchurch, Ohakea and Wellington.
4. 12,162 personnel volunteered for aircrew up to March 1941.
5. Comments – This is probably a reply to Tokyo's request. My 0301 7th October 1941... Please treat as Most Secret. Inform RNZAF.⁸¹

The conventions for these summaries were that the content did not replicate the enemy's textual message, as a precaution against hostile interception. The contents were the analyst's paraphrasing of the enemy signal. 'Comments' [sic] indicated the analyst's interpretations, as distinct from the rest of the summary. This report was brought to the attention of the CAS, who sent a memorandum to the PM, the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department and the War Cabinet on 13 October.⁸² The CAS noted that most of the information seemed to come from published Air Department Annual Reports to Parliament. The first paragraph information was contained in Annual Reports for 1938, 1939 and 1940; the Hudsons, Harvards and Tiger Moth numbers from 1939 and 1940. The civilian aircraft numbers were inexplicable and incorrect. The bases mentioned was the Consul's interpretation of a statement on the 1939 Report, while personnel numbers came from the 1940-41 Report. The CAS observed:

It had always been thought that the Japanese Consul was acting as an intelligence link in New Zealand but so far the intelligence regarding the RNZAF which he has despatched to Tokyo appears to have been gleaned from official non-secret papers and is not up to date.⁸³

He added the significant caution to the recipients.

Your attention is specially directed to the fact that this report should be treated as Most Secret so that there should be no possibility of compromising this source of information.⁸⁴

On 27 October, the Captain on the Staff, Singapore, sent a further signal to the DNI Melbourne, Beasley in Wellington and the DNI Admiralty.

Personal: Consular Special Intelligence Report dated 24 October. Tokyo telling Minister, Melbourne and Consul, Sydney and Wellington [sic] that General Staff have asked him [sic] to collect geographical information on Australia and New Zealand. Any material obtained should be sent [to] Investigation Bureau Foreign Office by [diplomatic] bag. General Staff want maps of all kinds, geographical photographs and statistics, guide books and directories.

Comments – [sic] text indicates Japanese residents will be used to obtain material. NO repetition NO action should be taken which could compromise irreplaceable source...⁸⁵

It is interesting to note the intention to use Japanese living in Australia and New Zealand to obtain information. On 29 October, Beasley drew attention to the Japanese action in a memorandum to the Secretary ONS and the Director, Security Intelligence Bureau.

The report recalls the practise of many Japanese consulates in various countries of bringing in objectionable propaganda material in the diplomatic bag. The extent to which the Japanese consulates have regularly misused their cypher and bag privileges not only to evade the censorship [sic] but also passing the results of espionage safely out of the country is well known. The inconvenience to which the Japanese consulate and the Japanese resident military officer in India have been put by their withdrawal on 30 August 1941 of all cypher and bag privileges in India has been correspondingly great. The order came to them as an unexpected and most unpleasant shock of course and no little perturbation.⁸⁶

The Japanese Consul was becoming a nuisance.

Further changes were envisaged for the 'Y' Room, as the Naval Secretary explained to the Captain on the Staff, Singapore on 15 October.

.... the existing organisation for W/T and Special Intelligence will continue in its present form, as desired by you ... it is realised that the information derived from "Y" and Special Intelligence is complementary and for this reason, together with your view that it is desirable to have the nucleus of both "Y" and Special Intelligence centres in as many parts of the Empire as possible, consideration is now being given to the possibility of inaugurating a small Special Intelligence

Section in New Zealand. For this...it is proposed...to send an officer to Australia with a view to improving co-operation in "Y" and Special Intelligence, and also for...obtaining such basic training in the latter as may be possible in a ...short time.

Suitable action is being taken to forward the Japanese Naval 5-figure traffic to you and all Kana traffic to Australia.⁸⁷

The 'Y' Room was moving in the direction of adding a small Special Intelligence dimension to its interception role.

The FECB reflected in October 1941 that the co-operation of Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma and other stations had permitted the co-ordination of the interception of wireless and cable traffic 'in such a way that maximum...coverage is given to all diplomatic traffic of importance emanating from countries in the Middle East and Far East.'⁸⁸ Japanese, German, French, Italian naval, consular and diplomatic traffic were intercepted, plus some Russian and Thai traffic.⁸⁹ At this time Musick Point was working on Italian and Japanese traffic, Waipapakauri intercepted German traffic until August when it reverted to Japanese, and Awarua was on Japanese traffic until the end of August, when it once more took up German duty. The H/F D/F bearings on Japanese naval units from Awarua and Waipapakauri were also assessed as very good. Suva was employed on German traffic. Two German Norddeich frequencies, 8,470 kc/s and 12,700 kc/s were in continuous use by the Japanese.⁹⁰

Co-operation with the Americans was making progress with the circulation of intelligence on movements of Japanese naval units. On 27 November the Captain on the Staff, Singapore signalled the DNI Admiralty, DNI Melbourne and DNI Wellington, noting

U.S. Naval Intelligence reported that 10 aircraft carriers were in commission and this has since been confirmed FECB from W/T traffic. It was also established from W/T traffic (and confirmed by Manila) that these carriers

were organised in five squadrons which are believed to be numbered 1 to 5 inclusive. There is in addition no doubt that there are two carriers in each squadron.

The following ships are definitely identified by W/T. Each squadron is as follows:

1 st Squadron	Akagi	Kaga
2 nd Squadron	Soryu	Hiryu ... ⁹¹

'Manila' was the US naval signals intelligence unit on Corregidor. The Japanese carriers' callsign identifications were made by FECB's radio-fingerprinting. A signal on 28 November from the Captain on the Staff to the DNI Admiralty, repeated to NZNB, ACNB and the SO(I) Hong Kong, illustrated the tracking of carrier movements.

From W/T traffic 4th aircraft carrier Squadron returned to Japan before 26 November. 5th aircraft carrier Squadron believed to be in Saipan area. 7th Squadron probably in Samma. [sic] 3rd Destroyer Squadron South China Sea.⁹²

If they maintained wireless silence, of course, they could not be tracked.

In the run down to hostilities with Japan, there were a few clues for the New Zealand 'Y' organisation that something was brewing, although these were more transparent in hindsight. The Suva H/F D/F station recorded a spectacular rise in signal traffic on 8,470 Kc/s from Japanese naval and air transmissions in the Mandated Islands during November (see diagram overleaf).⁹³ On Friday 28 November 1941, Report No.7 from the Suva station gave a run down on currently intercepted traffic to the SO(Y) in Wellington. On the German traffic

Suva D/F maintained watch on Series "B" until November 15th. Up to this time reception was rather poor. This was mainly due to frequencies employed by Kiel e.g. 5,315 Kc/s being far from suitable of daylight reception at this station. No transmissions from German Mobile Units were heard on these frequencies...

Reception of Norddeich has been very poor for practically the whole month...probably due to seasonal effects. ...

Only one transmission has been heard on Norddeich's frequencies during Silent Periods. This occurred on 17th November between 0835 and 0838. Station was sending Japanese letters but note of transmitter and style of sending were typically German. Bearing obtained was 290 degrees 3rd Class.⁹⁴

FROM	8,400 Kc/s.	TO
KO RU 0		KO RU 0
MI MO 3		MI MO 3
RE YU 0		RE YU 0
TA KI 4		TI KI 4

FROM	8,470 Kc/s.	TO
E ME 6		E ME 6
HA 0 NU		HA HU 6
HA HU 6		HO MI 3
HO MI 3		ME TU TU
KA MO 0		MU TU RA
KO RU 0		N NE 3
NA WA 6		NA WA 6
O TA KA		RI A 1
O SI 0		SI SU 1
RI A 1		TI WA 5
RI E 1		TO SE 9
SI SU 1		TO P 9
1 A WI		TU KE HU
1 MI SO		TU TU ME
1 NU WI		U MO 2
2 HU ME		0 NU NE
2 KU SE		1 A HO
2 TI KE		1 A WI
3 KU TU		1 MI SO
4 KI NI		2 HU ME
4 NU YU		2 KU SE
4 RE A		2 TI KE
4 RE YU		2 TI HA
5 HA NI		3 KU TU
5 HA SA		3 NA A
5 RI WA		4 KI NI
5 TE KA		4 NU YU
5 WA MU		4 RE A
6 NI TE		5 HA HI
6 TE HE		5 HA SA
6 TE TU		5 I KA
7 E I		5 NA WA
7 HU SE		5 RI WA
7 NE SE		5 TE KA
7 NE TE		6 NI TE
7 TO HU		6 TE TU
8 TA U		7 E I
9 MI HA		7 NE SE
3756		7 NE TE
		7 NI U
		7 RO WI
		7 TO HU
		8 NE KU
		9 MA HA
		9 TO A
		9 MI HA
		9 TO SO
		9 TO SU

DECLASSIFIED

The SO(Y) annotated 'there has been no evidence of disguised transmissions of this type [before].' On the co-ordination of 'Snap' routines, the Suva report continued

This has been very poor during the past month and the majority of "SNAP" messages have had to be obtained from Auckland on tape. Delays in receipt of these messages at the D/F Station average from three to eight minutes, consequently when operator has shifted to frequency nothing has been heard of the transmission. As majority of these messages are for 5,455 Kc/s have now got the operators to go over to this frequency on spec. [sic] while awaiting a repetition of the signal from Auckland. If nothing is heard on this frequency they shift to 8,470 Kc/s.⁹⁵

A 'Snap' was the direction of all the New Zealand stations to intercept a transmission on a particular frequency and take a D/F bearing, several bearings producing the 'cocked hat'. 8,470 Kc/s was the most prolific frequency in the rise in radio traffic in the Marshall Islands in November. Suva reported

Reception of Japanese Naval has been quite good during the dark hours but during daylight hours little has been heard other than Shore W/T Stations Intercommunicating [sic]. Callsign list in use here is out of date so it is not possible to distinguish whether callsigns received are Air, Mobile or Shore Stations. Most of these however appear to be in two areas viz in the Marshalls and around Indo-China.⁹⁶

The lack of a current callsign list was unfortunate at this time, although the activity concentrated in two regions were clues. For the prescient, however, Suva noted

Very little has been heard of any Japanese Merchant Shipping transmissions during the past month.⁹⁷

Where were the merchantmen? Returning to Japan or friendly ports? Why? The Japanese Consul in Wellington meantime received interesting instructions. The Captain on the Staff, Singapore signalled the DNI Admiralty, DNI Melbourne and DNI Wellington at 0905Z/2 December:

Personal. Consular Special Intelligence Report dated 2nd December. Tokyo sends message to Consul, Wellington, but with Circular No.2446 of which following is gist:

1. On receipt of message take following secret action – (a) burn all cyphers except one copy each of OITE and L code, and signal HARUNA en clair when this is done. (b) burn (? Group) file and secret documents.
2. Tokyo says these are in preparation to cope with any possibility but Consul is to continue to function as usual.
3. Comment – No indication as to circulation of message which has second degree of priority.⁹⁸

This was a war warning message. Beasley passed it to the PM and Berendsen, the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department.⁹⁹ The signal was part of a pattern repeated in Australia and Washington in the days preceding the landing at Khota Baru in Malaya and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Y Room's watch on the enemy continued with increasing apprehension after Pearl Harbor, the invasion of Malaya, and the loss of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*. The new COIC Daily Summaries, followed by weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries, displayed the focus of attention during this difficult period. The 'Y' Room continued to monitor closely enemy operational traffic. A consideration that further offensive operations southwards were undoubtedly in the offing, provided motivation for close attention. Two days before Christmas, little change and normal movements were noted in the Marshalls plus increased air activity around Wotje and Truk.¹⁰⁰ On Boxing Day, the assessment of the Y Room was mostly unchanged.

W/T traffic tends to show an increasing connection between 1st Fleet units in the Marshalls, Truk, Saipan areas with 4th Fleet units in the same area, C. in C. 4th Fleet and C. in C. South China Fleet. Air activity in the Marshalls area is also linked with this traffic.

There is some indication from W/T traffic of a possible change in disposition of certain South China and 1st or Combined Fleet units.¹⁰¹

On 30 December, the Y Room was making inferences from traffic about commanders.

The Senior Officer of the Marshall Island Area is possible [sic] TE TI 33 (unidentified callsign). His Staff Officer (Air?) is probably at Wotje. TE TI 33 himself is probably at Jaluit while the mobile unit (TE TI 3) in which he is borne is at sea.

From W/T traffic there is a strong link between TE TI 33 and C. in C. Combined Fleet, C. in C. 4th Fleet, C. in C. Southern Expeditionary Fleet, Japan and Air and Naval Units in the Mandates. [sic]¹⁰²

By 5 January 1942, the 'Y' Room estimated there were at least six important naval units in the Marshalls, and two in the Truk area, and one might be the commander of the 4th Fleet. Other movements of naval and air units were noted and there were over 150 auxiliary naval units throughout the Mandated Islands. W/T traffic continued to show strong connections between TE TI3, the senior air or naval officer in the Marshalls, the Yokohama and Chitose squadrons, Wotje air base, the Combined Fleet, the 4th Fleet, the "Combined Air Force" and a further unknown airfield.¹⁰³ The following day

From W/T traffic there are now fifteen Naval units in the Marshalls area and eight Naval units in the Truk area. Five of the units in the Truk area and seven in the Marshalls area are of considerable importance judging from the volume and addresses of messages addressed [sic], repeated or originated by them.

The unit normally carrying the flag of the Senior Officer, Marshalls (TE TI3) is in company with one other Naval unit and an auxiliary.¹⁰⁴

The weight of W/T and D/F evidence revealed Jaluit as a main base for surface units and submarines. Wotje was the main air base, Kwajalein was an air base, but Mejit was difficult to assess.¹⁰⁵

Keeping track of the enemy was a constant problem in a situation of great operational fluidity, and depriving the enemy of surprise was most important. On 21 January, the 'Y' Room disagreed with an American estimate that the Combined Fleet was concentrated in the Eastern Carolines and the Marshall Islands.

From W/T traffic it appears unlikely that the Combined Fleet is in the Marshalls, Palao or Truk areas. It seems possible that it might be in the Saipan

area, though there is no definite evidence of this. The 2nd Fleet may be detached and possibly in the Truk or Marshalls areas.

Air activity in the Palao area has greatly increased and is connected with 1st Fleet Air Command, an aircraft carrier, the Combined Fleet, the 23rd Aircraft Squadron [sic] and the 4th Fleet at Truk.¹⁰⁶

The number of naval units in the Marshalls had risen to 25, with not less than 14 at Truk.

Radio traffic had increased in Truk and Palao, but slightly decreased in the Marshalls.¹⁰⁷

W/T traffic and D/F bearings by 6 February indicated the likelihood of the movement of substantial enemy units.

It is clear from W/T traffic that a movement of some importance is about to take place or has already started, and is connected with the 2nd Fleet. This appears mainly to concern Palao but there is one indication linking the Marshalls area with the 2nd Fleet, which is at present in the Saipan area.

The 3rd Battleship Squadron, one Cruiser Squadron and a Destroyer Flotilla have been reported as moving to the Celebes area. Comment. This may be the movement predicted two days ago of the possible southward move of the Combined Fleet – actually a part of it only by this report. [sic]

The 2nd Carrier Division is possibly in the vicinity of Helens Reef (Palao area). This is the division which has been operating in the Celebes area...¹⁰⁸

It is possible to see the ‘Y’ Room’s contribution in context through the deployment list of Japanese warships in the weekly COIC Intelligence Summaries in January 1942. These were the summaries that annotated the sources of the intelligence for each entry on the list, a practice fortunately drawn to a close in February, and because of the capture of the weekly Summaries nos.12-15 later on, not a moment too soon. The COIC Weekly Intelligence Summary for 29 January had 74 entries on the location of Japanese units. Of these, sixteen came from the ‘Y’ Room’s analysis of enemy traffic.¹⁰⁹

The benefits from FECB and RAN ‘Y’ were augmented by the US Navy’s Mid-Pacific Strategic Direction-Finder Net. This centred on the Radio Unit of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu (renamed in June the Combat Intelligence Unit, and later as Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet or FRUPAC). It was furiously producing Combat Intelligence

Bulletins (no.1 on 16 January and no.12 by 27 January), and came under US Naval Intelligence, OP-20-G. OP stood for OPNAV, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The 20th Division of this body was the Office of Naval Communications. G Section was the Communications Security Section.¹¹⁰ The other naval signals intelligence unit, the Radio Unit of the 16th Naval District on Corregidor, was withdrawn to Australia, where it became the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne – or FRUMEL. The RAN suggested in February that some of the US personnel might go to New Zealand (the total unit being pulled out consisting of 8 officers and up to 68 other ranks),¹¹¹ but this does not seem to have been taken up.

The advantage of having the United States in the war, in terms of intelligence, was offset for the first few months of 1942 by the partial disruption of the Royal Navy's and the US Navy's intelligence efforts with the withdrawal from Corregidor and the FECB's evacuation to Colombo.¹¹² Beasley suggested to the Australian DNI on 9 January 1942 that as FECB moved to Colombo, the ACNB should co-ordinate and pass RAN and RNZN 'Y' intelligence to the US Navy's C.-in-C. Pacific Fleet.¹¹³

The Royal Canadian Navy's Operational Intelligence Centre 3 (previously called Far Eastern Intelligence) had, since a visit by Captain Harkness in 1940, supplied intelligence to the FECB, and to the RAN and New Zealand 'Y' organisations. This contact dwindled rapidly after the entry of the United States in the war. However, the close co-operation between the FECB and the RAN and RNZN 'Y' units continued. An example of this was a signal on 11 February from the DNI Melbourne to the Captain on the Staff Colombo and the DNI Wellington listing callsign identification of a number of Japanese callsigns, and requesting information.

1. From routing of traffic, and originating number consider:-
 - (A) That HUKU 3, INE 3, MH 508, are alternative call signs for the same submarine unit.
 - (B) That RESE 4 and WAH 18 are alternative call signs for another submarine unit.
 - (C) That HEMI 2, HIKU 8, NOSA 7, NINU 1, OE 8, and MU 4 are alternative for C.in C. fourth fleet. [sic]
 - (D) That KUMD 0 [and] MOO 7 are alternatives.
 - (E) That HAN, HEI 3, IRI 9, MENO 7, NNU 4, and NEYO 2 are alternatives for C.in C. second fleet.
 - (F) That RIHE one [sic], TUWI 4, UI 2, HUMA 7, KONE 8, RESI 5, SETU 7, TEKE 9, and YOWI 0 are alternatives for C.inC. Combined Fleets. [sic]
2. Consider call sign sheet line commencing with 9, repetition 9, allocate only to shore units, principal minor defence force detachments 3. Suggest decode meaning for terminal figure, add KANA KANA figure call sign: 20 medical, 32 supply and account 49 communications 58 probable operations, but in any case is applicable only to flag and senior officers 4. Request information. 1132Z/10¹¹⁴

The 'Y' Room in Wellington on 25 March sent a D/F signal to CINCPAC concerning a

German naval unit located by Awarua on 8400 kilocycles 020 degrees
Time of origin German message 1740/25 four letter groups.¹¹⁵

In early April the Captain on the Staff, Colombo raised concerns on delays from Wellington in the transmission of 'Y' reports to the Bombay Fort and to FECB in Colombo. The SO (Y) requested the P & T Department allocate three free periods on the 1kw AWA transmitter at Wellington Radio for 'Y' intelligence.¹¹⁶

The 'Y' Room at Navy Office moved into a new building as part of the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre in 1942. One of the staff described it.

The 'Y' section consisted of two small rooms and a map room tucked away in one corner of an area on the Second Floor of the Stout Street Building under twenty four hour security guard. [The] staff consisted of a Warrant Telegraphist (later Lieutenant) Philpotts [sic] in command, three P.O.Tels, two Wren coders and Dr.Campbell from Victoria University where he was the Maths Professor. All D/F bearings, Kana traffic copy, D/F station, operator comments were mulled over for the first hour or so of every day at a discussion by all the staff and added into or compared with Coastwatching reports and Admiralty sitreps from world wide 'Y' stations.¹¹⁷

The 'Y Room was expanding its business under trying conditions. A Special Intelligence section was formed within the 'Y' organisation with Philpott in charge. Officially new to the section, although he may have helped out informally before, was a 35 year old Scotsman, Professor James Campbell, professor of mathematics from Victoria University of Wellington. He joined the Navy as a Temporary Lieutenant (Special Branch) on 23 January 1942. In May, Campbell went to Melbourne on a two month course 'for instruction and practical experience in Special Intelligence.'¹¹⁸ Another who had informally joined the section in a part-time capacity as a translator was Mr. Robert Boulter, CMG, Trade Commissioner at the United Kingdom High Commission in Wellington. Boulter, over fifty years old, had been at the High Commission since 1934, and remained there until 1949. He originally entered the British Consular Service in Japan as a student interpreter and eighteen years later transferred to the Commercial Diplomatic Service, being appointed to the British Embassy in Tokyo. In 1929 he transferred to the Trade Commissioner Service in Singapore. He was awarded a CMG in 1933 for services during the 1923 Yokohama earthquake, where he was Consul-General at the time. His title altered to Senior Trade Commissioner and Economic Adviser to the High Commissioner in 1946. He was to be awarded an OBE in 1947 'For services rendered to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand during the war.'¹¹⁹

Another senior intelligence officer from FECB, visiting Australia and New Zealand to assess the W/T and Special Intelligence position, commented favourably on progress in the Wellington 'Y' organisation. Speaking of 'keen co-operation and enthusiasm' shown by the small, efficient and 'most capable' 'Y' staff, he noted that 'New Zealand is now able to tackle problems connected with Minor codes and Plain

Language [intercepts] in addition to W/T intelligence.’ He referred to Campbell (the Victoria University mathematics professor) as a most promising student of Special Intelligence, and Campbell travelled with the officer to Australia en route to the Special Intelligence course. The ‘Y’ staff listed were Philpott, Campbell, and Mr. Boulter, a ‘Half-time translator’, with two women assistants, one of whom knew ‘quite a bit of Japanese.’¹²⁰

The work of the Special Intelligence section partly involved the passing of selected intercepted traffic to the RAN intelligence authorities by cable, either as complete messages or extracts. If a whole message was requested, the message heading was to be separately encyphered and despatched. This was followed by a second message with the text in the form it was intercepted.¹²¹ At this time the RAN was receiving Naval Attache Code and other traffic from the RNZN Special Intelligence section. These intercepts were included with Australian messages forwarded to the Admiralty, and this was to continue. Fuji and ‘B’ Machine traffic also came from New Zealand and any of that not already intercepted in Australia was cabled to London.¹²² ‘B’ Machine (better known as ‘Purple’) and Fuji were the only high grade ciphers in use by the Japanese Foreign Ministry at the time. The Australian Diplomatic Section concentrated on the Fuji material and passed all new ‘B’ Machine material to GCHQ’s diplomatic intelligence off-shoot, the 500 strong Government Communications Bureau in Berkeley Street, Mayfair, to be worked on there.

A further part of this work concerned the circulation of current working reports between British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Special Intelligence authorities. There were two categories of these working exchange signals. The first type looked

carefully at lists of Japanese naval callsigns assigned to specific Japanese surface warships, submarines, communication centres and shore stations (the callsigns changed irregularly and often). These were known as Japanese naval callsign allocations or callsign recoveries. The second type consisted of daily reports considering the external features of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages to do with date, time message number, originator and so forth. These reports did not deal with encrypted texts of messages.¹²³

The FECB suffered a second bout of dislocation, and by 27 April only half the Special Intelligence and 'Y' organisation remained in Ceylon, although 'Y' and Zymotic signals would continue to be sent from Colombo. The other half of the organisation under Shaw and Francis had been withdrawn to Kilindini in East Africa.¹²⁴ This dislocation had ensued through having to destroy stations and recreate them as a result of the Japanese mounting a carrier-borne attack on Colombo on 5 April.¹²⁵ The disruption of the British and part of the American signals intelligence organisations and the offensive operations of the Japanese Navy had an impact even on New Zealand's slender 'Y' contribution. This delicate stage of the war put pressure on the operators of the radio stations and the direction-finding equipment. At times the urgency of immediate operational requirements dictated short cuts. For example, as the Battle of the Coral Sea raged between 3-8 May 1942, the H/F D/F operators at Awarua.

were not really concerned with intercepting or copying Jap traffic, but only with taking bearings on the stations they were directed onto by station "NIT" (US Pacific Fleet HQ in Hawaii). It was very busy over this period as we were directed onto numerous Jap callsigns.¹²⁶

During March, the Japanese had penetrated the three-mile limit of the New Zealand coast. On 8 March 1942, the Japanese submarine I-25 entered Cook Strait and

reconnoitred Wellington harbour using its spotter plane in the early hours of the next morning. It despatched the aircraft over Auckland on 13 March while in the Bay of Plenty. The I-25 was not located by direction-finding equipment.¹²⁷ A group of Japanese submarines from the Eighth Submarine Group were despatched into Australasian waters in May as a result of the March reconnaissance, to seek out concentrations of enemy warships. This group was under the command of Captain Hanku Sasaki, the commander of Submarine Division 3.¹²⁸ Towards the end of May 1942, Sasaki's own submarine, the I-21, headed south, making a reconnaissance of Suva Harbour using his spotter plane. He then proceeded to New Zealand, and flew off the float-plane once more to reconnoitre Auckland Harbour. This flight took place in the very early morning hours of 24 May, but because the Waitemata Harbour was shrouded in mist, the pilot was unable to spot any shipping. The fog was so bad that the low-flying aircraft lost its way, and was only assisted when the lights of Mangere aerodrome were turned on to help what sounded like an aircraft in difficulties. The aircraft made the 140 mile return leg to I-21 without further incident.¹²⁹

The New Zealand H/F D/F stations located the I-21 on 26 May as Sasaki transmitted a long signal in the Tasman Sea en route for Sydney, well to the southeast of Lord Howe Island and almost due west of Cape Reinga. Bearings were taken from the signal, and the Katakana was copied by the operators at Awarua, Musick Point and Waipapakauri. The 'Y' Room in New Zealand was unable to 'read' the code (JN25b) at the time. The Katakana signal would have passed from the 'Y' Room in Wellington to the RAN's cryptographic team under Captain Nave and to the US Navy's codebreaking unit, FRUMEL, in Melbourne. These two units were reading JN25b with some delay. It

may also have been passed to FECB, which read JN25b. It seems this signal was not read in time in Australia (Nave could not recall the message and could not say when it had been decrypted),¹³⁰ and nothing was passed to the naval authorities in Sydney.

The I-21 transmitted in JN 25b a report on the state of Suva Harbour while en route to Auckland, which made the FRUMEL Daily Digest for 31 May¹³¹ for Commander US 7th Fleet. The Suva message sent by I-21 to Jaluit Radio included '1 2nd class cruiser (Guruso Class), 7 type [sic] 8 small patrol boats. No merchant ships at anchor.' It is probable JN25b could only be read with some delay as the Suva message in the FRUMEL Daily Digest ascribes I-21's Suva signal being sent between 19 and 23 May. If the contents of the message transmitted by I-21 on 26 May was not read until 1 June, then the information in it would have been too late as a warning message for Sydney. This was a pity, for the signal intercepted by the New Zealand stations read as follows. Telegraphic Order No.3 was transmitted at 2230M/26 May, reading,

1. Day of attack will be as instructed.
2. Order of departure of the to's [short for Kakuno, or 'cylinder', a term used for the midget submarines when they were being transported by the mother submarine] will be I-27, I-22 and I-24. The to from I-27 will pass through the heads 20 minutes after moonrise, followed by those from I-22 and I-24 at 20 minute intervals.
3. The choice of targets is left to the to commanders but every effort should be made to attack the following targets.
 - a. If there is a battleship and a cruiser east of the Harbour Bridge, I-27's to and I-22's to are to attack the battleship and I-24's to the cruiser. If there are two cruisers, the craft from I-22 and I-24 will attack them while I-27's to attacks the battleship.
 - b. If there is a battleship or aircraft carrier in front of Harbour Bridge, this should be attacked.
 - c. If there are no suitable targets east of the Harbour Bridge efforts should be concentrated on those targets west of the bridge.
4. The cardinal position for recovery on the first day will be a point four nautical miles, 170 degrees from the first point. I-24, I-22, I-27 and I-29, in that order, will be deployed in the direction of 110 degrees from the cardinal point with a distance of 4000 metres between each boat. I-21 will be positioned at 6000

metres, 02 degrees of the recovery deployment centre. Parent submarines should take new recovery position off Port Hacking without further order on the second day.¹³²

This was complete operational intelligence for the raid, sufficient to prepare a trap for the three midgets and the five accompanying submarines (the four mentioned in the signal plus the command boat, I-21). The New Zealand COIC Daily Summary noted the bearings for I-21's signal.

D/F bearings from Awarua and Auckland placed a Japanese submarine in approximate position 34 degrees S 165 degrees E at 2230M/26. It is possible that this may be the same unit which was placed off the Australian coast by D/F 24/5. Aircraft for search to be in position dawn 27/5.¹³³

The Daily Summary for the next day noted:

Following D/F bearings placing a Japanese submarine in approximate position 34 degrees S. 165 degrees E. at 2230M/26, Hudson aircraft from Whenuapai carried out a search along the submarine's estimated course from 0317M/27 to dusk and throughout the moonlight hours and the search is being continued today ...¹³⁴

The search for the submarine was continued the next day, with no result.¹³⁵ Following a reconnaissance flight over Sydney in the early hours of 30 May, Sasaki transmitted another signal, Telegraphic Order no.4. This order gave an update on the targets inside the harbour. This may or may not have been intercepted, but if it was received, it could no longer be read as a new code, JN25c, had just come into force two days earlier. Whether it was this transmission or another routine signal not long before the attack in the evening of 31 May, something was intercepted during the night in New Zealand. The duty officer in the 'Y' Room in Wellington that night, Leading Telegraphist Williamson, had

modified my own receiver [at home] to cover the 6 MHZ frequency being used...and when not on watch at night in the Y Office [I] monitored this frequency ...About three hours before the Sydney Harbour attack, when I was the night watch 'controller' in the Y Office, my wife rang to say there seemed to be

activity on the frequency on our home set. I took a chance and alerted Awarua who immediately instigated a 'SNAP' to all stations. The bearings coming in confirmed a big southern shift abeam of Sydney, these being passed on receipt to ACNB and [the] Admiralty, 'OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE'. All D/Fs remained on the frequency passing in bearings on every transmission. Lieutenant Philpotts [sic] and all the staff spent the rest of that night waiting for some information as to what was happening. About 0900 the next morning after reading wild reports in the morning paper, we received the Y report from [the] Admiralty detailing the damage caused....¹³⁶

Between 1 and 3 June, D/F bearings were obtained on Japanese submarines off Sydney by Awarua (301 to 304 degrees), Musick Point (265 to 270 degrees) and Waipapakauri (268 to 270 degrees).¹³⁷

The RAN had been warned, but had taken few precautions. Sydney Harbour had been raided overnight by three Japanese midget submarines, which did little damage other than sink an accommodation vessel, HMAS *Kuttabul*, killing nineteen sailors on board, a torpedo meant for and narrowly missing the American heavy cruiser *Chicago* which had just got under way. All three midget submarines were lost along with their crews, a result which appeared to be more good luck than good management by the RAN. A timely warning was thus sheeted home. Had I-21's signal of 26 May been decrypted in time and passed on to the right place, the consequences may have been more expensive for the Japanese submarines. A New Zealand H/F D/F report in the early morning noted

At 0600 June 1 an approximate fix was obtained of the Japanese submarine reported 70 miles S.E. of Sydney on 29/5. The submarine appears to have moved down the Australian coast about 120 miles.¹³⁸

The same day a

Japanese unit presumably connected with submarines was by D/F at 1958M/1 in possible position 36 degrees S. 153 degrees 30'E. approximately 180 miles S.E. of Sydney.¹³⁹

The New Zealand H/F D/F stations continued to intercept signals and take bearings of the enemy off the Australian east coast over the next few days. On 2 June

At least four enemy units are reported by D/F to be in the vicinity of Sydney between 1950M/2 to 2155M/2.¹⁴⁰

On 3 June

Two sets of D/F bearings from Awarua, Auckland and Waipapakauri at 2001M/3 and 2205M/3 placed two Japanese units (probably submarines) in vicinity of Jervis Bay and Port Jackson respectively.

At 2230/3 the Australian coastal steamer "IRON CHIEFTAIN" was torpedoed in position approximately 28 miles east of Sydney Heads and at 2310M/3 the Australian steamer "AGE" was shelled for 20 minutes... The second attack took place 18 miles to the north eastward of the first...¹⁴¹

The attack on the *Age* was carried out by Sasaki's I-21 while I-24 under Commander Hanabusa sank the *Iron Chieftain*.¹⁴² A signal from the Captain on the Staff, Colombo sent to the ACNB at 1209Z/4 June, repeated to NZNB, observed

D/F bearings from Auckland, Waipapakauri, and Awarua show Japanese units Edward Orange RE KU KE TA and R1 to Southwest of Sydney between 0700 and 1400 GMT 2nd. Assume you are obtaining these.¹⁴³

On 8 June the COIC Daily Summary noted

D/F bearings were obtained of two Japanese submarines; one off Sandy Cape at 2050M/8 and one in approximate position 33 degrees S 151 degrees E at 2142M/8.¹⁴⁴

Ten days later, in the wake of the heightened vigilance created by the Sydney Harbour raid, there was an understandable flurry of concern when the Cook Strait ferry

"RANGITIRA" reported passing in dense fog at 0945M/18 a suspicious object that had the appearance of a small submerged submarine in position 43 degrees 25'S 173 degrees 02'E approximately 14 miles N.E. of Godley Head, Port Lyttelton. Thick fog prevented aircraft from Wigram carrying out a search. A Hudson fitted with A.S.V. from Nelson searched the area and reported a log about 3 miles south of the... position.¹⁴⁵

Two days later

H.M.N.Z.S. "FUTURIST" at 0710M/20 reported sighting a suspicious object which looked like a submarine in position 6 miles south of Island Bay, about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile away from ship ...¹⁴⁶

There were no contacts by the H/F D/F stations, however.

By the second half of 1942, the plotting centre for the results of direction-finding bearings was staffed with Wrens (the Women's Royal New Zealand Naval Service), and incoming D/F intelligence was first passed to Room 233 under the 'Y' Room's control. This was very important work, and for a period the centre plotted all D/F bearings for the US Commander of the South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC). Around three to four hundred bearings were received over a twenty-four hour period from stations around the world, and the daily results summarised and promulgated. The movements of all Japanese submarines were particularly closely followed.¹⁴⁷

Meantime, Philpott, the SO(Y), visited the US Navy's intelligence centre in Honolulu and the intelligence organisations in Australia in early 1943, and as a consequence, the co-operation between Wellington, Melbourne and Pearl Harbor was much improved with regard to operational intelligence.¹⁴⁸

By early 1943, New Zealand's H/F D/F network worked for immediate operational purposes to the American D/F set up. The US Mid-Pacific D/F Net was run by the Pearl Harbor control station 'NIT'. H/F D/F stations at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, Bainbridge, Imperial Beach, Midway, Oahu, Palmyra, Samoa, Guadalcanal, Awarua, Musick Point, Waipapakauri and Suva, worked to the control station. The RAN stations of Coonawarra, Harman and Jandakot supplied bearings but were not controlled by Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor initiated flashes to all H/F D/F stations on the net with the

frequency and usually the callsign of the enemy transmission. Flashes in New Zealand were received by Awarua, the New Zealand controlling station and passed by landline.

In addition, Awarua is able to originate a "Snap" message in plain language...by a suitable automatic relay system, over the cable to Suva. At present, the "Snap" messages override any "flashes", in order to cover the frequent occasions when submarine transmissions in the South Pacific area are heard by New Zealand stations and not by the control at Pearl Harbor.¹⁴⁹

Plotting centres were maintained at Pearl Harbor, Wellington for South Pacific and Bainbridge for North Pacific. The New Zealand stations passed bearings in to centres by cable in plain language which had up to four hours delay. The system was being reorganised with control at Pearl and Wellington and Bainbridge being sub centres. Wellington had taken over the task of plotting fixes for COMSPAC who passed them on to task forces. In addition, close liaison and exchange of bearings also took place with the RAN, the FECB, the RCN and the Intelligence Centre Pacific Ocean Area (ICPOA) in Honolulu.¹⁵⁰

Towards the end of 1942, a new and highly secret form of intelligence collection was introduced in New Zealand that would enhance the work of the H/F D/F stations, filling out the picture for the 'Y' Room, under the guidance of Lieutenant Merlin Minshall, RN. It was part of the leading-edge of the technical means of gaining insights from the physical characteristics of enemy signal transmissions. This was REB or radio-fingerprinting, and the role of the New Zealand station established is covered in the next chapter.

In 1943, Room 233 of the 'Y' organisation was staffed by a Petty Officer and seven Wren ratings working on callsign identification, frequency lists, frequency

indicators and Japanese W/T, while consolidating D/F, radio-fingerprinting and Special Intelligence.¹⁵¹

Across the Tasman, the RAN's fourteen strong Special Intelligence Section (Diplomatic) had recently been taken over by the Australian Army, but the RAN continued to pass on all raw traffic received from the NZNB, which was 'greatly valued.' This included the texts of locally intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages for handling in Melbourne. The Australian Army Special Section (Diplomatic) wished the flow to continue and offered their weekly Special Intelligence Precis to the New Zealand Army's Director of Military Intelligence in return, enclosing the latest copy. The Precis offered good background information although distribution was restricted to the service intelligence bodies and the high command. It was assumed similar limits would apply in New Zealand, although 'You may think it is desirable to show these precis to Mr. Boulter whose comments might prove of value.' The New Zealand DMI contacted the DNI and the offer of the weekly Precis was accepted, with an extra copy requested for the DNI. A copy would be passed to Boulter in the Special Intelligence section for perusal.¹⁵²

By December 1942, an internal AIF Special Intelligence Section (Diplomatic) minute estimated that on average some 3,000 groups of Japanese diplomatic traffic were being passed to London per day. Japanese military and naval attache traffic amounting to about 800-900 messages per month was microfilmed and despatched.¹⁵³

An addition to the Wellington 'Y' Room's Special Intelligence section was Alan Carter, who joined as a Temporary Sub-Lieutenant (Special Branch) on 9 March 1943. Carter was a 'statistical clerk' who had joined the Army on 14 January 1941, aged nineteen. He completed a military intelligence course and went to Army Signals at

Narrow Neck. He was granted leave without pay and took a job as a clerk outside the Army in August 1941, and was placed in the military intelligence reserve pool in early 1943. Carter remained with the Special Intelligence section where his mathematical skills were put to good use until early 1945.¹⁵⁴

The Special Intelligence section now consisted of three officers, Philpott, Campbell, Carter, plus Mr. Boulter and four Wren ratings, working under general guidelines from FRUMEL. In November 1942, it had been proposed that they work on 'J.N. F [sic] J N 54 [and] Current J.N. 15 GUERILLA.' By May 1943 their efforts were concentrated on three Japanese naval ciphers, JN15D, JN20H (Minor All Purposes Code) and JN180 (Honshu Shipping Control Cypher), as well as on low grade language codes. Commander Laird, a visiting FECB intelligence officer, thought the section should be used as an exploitation centre for small special tasks.¹⁵⁵ Commander Saunders, ex-Hut Three at Bletchley Park, evaluated the section in favourable terms on his tour of British, Canadian, American and Australian interception centres during September and October. He called on 4 October 1943, noting its remarkably good productivity in relation to its tiny size. He thought it should continue to intercept 'traffic unique to its location...and to recovering call-signs as at present.' More assistance for Philpott with technical information and recoveries on low grade ciphers was required.¹⁵⁶

There was co-ordination of Allied signals intelligence in the Pacific, but it remained incomplete. This was not simply because American, British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand intelligence organisations were not wholly integrated. It had to do fundamentally with the split between the US Navy's intelligence organisations (based on OP-20-G) and MacArthur's intelligence set-up (with the focus on the Central

Bureau). In the background to this was the mutual hostility between the US Army and the US Navy on intelligence matters. This was not merely because of the strong personalities of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur: it went back to interservice rivalries.¹⁵⁷ Slightly compounding this split was the ambiguous Allied Intelligence Bureau, which seems to have served principally British and Australian interests in South-East Asia Command (SEAC).

Although the co-operation in naval intelligence had been proceeding fairly steadily since December 1941, it was not until early 1944 that the US Navy's OP-20-G came up with a proposal for 'complete integration'. A memorandum from the Assistant Director of Naval Communications at OP-20-G in March 1944 set out a plan for a Trans-Pacific Coverage Plan. This suggested:

During April it is desired to start unification of all Japanese intercept coverage into a fully coordinated plan, maintaining at the same time the present autonomy of the various processing centers.¹⁵⁸

Noting that 'in recent months' there had been 'considerable progress' towards that end, it was felt that the time was ripe for full coordination. The important rider was the autonomy of the processing centers, which included S/N West Coast/Washington, FRUPAC in Honolulu, FRUMEL in Melbourne, Flowerdown in the United Kingdom, and the Captain on the Intelligence Staff in Colombo (COIS). The OUTLINE OF TRANS-PACIFIC COVERAGE PLAN indicated that these processing centres would be linked in Washington in a Trans Pacific Network Center run by OP-20-G.¹⁵⁹ The central location at OP-20-G had the function of maintaining

an hourly record...of what is being covered by all the processing point networks....[S/N, FRUPAC, FRUMEL, Flowerdown, and COIS] and the number of messages received hourly on each circuit by each processing point.¹⁶⁰


The autonomy of the processing centres was indicated:

Each processing point...[S/N, FRUPAC, FRUMEL, Flowerdown, and COIS] shall determine its own coverage priorities in accordance with its own needs, control its assignments to its component receiving stations, and report composite figures hourly to the Trans-Pacific Network Center at OP-20-G.¹⁶¹

What was being suggested was an assessment of the size of the intercepted traffic flow each processing centre was receiving, to look for gaps and fill these in, particularly where traffic faded but was being received clearly by other stations. It would be possible to see thinly covered areas and steps could be taken to fill the gaps. Similarly, too much overlap could be minimized. Thus interception could be tracked but not get in the road of the priorities of individual networks.¹⁶² Those linked by teletype could report hourly; others could send in by mail to complete the coverage picture. The sketch plan for the coverage set down 'Nairnville' in New Zealand as linked to FRUMEL as a centre that would send in coverage reports probably by mail. (See diagram overleaf)¹⁶³ Nairnville Park in Wellington, referred to the interception facilities of the Special Section of the New Zealand Army Signals Company, for a considerable amount of locally intercepted traffic was provided by this unit. The analysis cell of the unit, made up of Lieutenant MacKenzie (the GSO3 (Intelligence and Y), a cryptographer, Dr. Edward Bennett, and a translator, Gilbert Lennox-King, worked closely with Philpott's Special Intelligence section. A full evaluation of this unit is the subject of Chapter Seven.

At the beginning of May 1944, listening watches for the interception of enemy radio transmissions – the 'Y' watch – were maintained at Awarua, the new naval W/T Station at Waiouru, in Suva, and by the Army at Nairnville Park. Most of the intercepted traffic from these stations went to the 'Y' Room at Navy Office. The H/F D/F net in New Zealand remained the four stations of Awarua, Musick Point, Waipapakauri and

SECRET



Schematic Diagram

TRANS PACIFIC COVERAGE NETWORK

Op-20-G 17 March 1944

- Available at once
- - - Available in near future
- Mail Traffic Station
- ⊕ Teletype Traffic Station
- ⊗ Individual Network Control
- ⊙ Trans Pacific Network Center

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PAGE 3

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Suva. They could be operated as a complete unit under the 'Y' Room, or in conjunction with both the US and Australian H/F D/F organisations.¹⁶⁴ The big change for the Navy came with the establishment of the large Naval W/T Station at Waiouru, which postwar became HMNZS *Irirangi*. This was equipped with very powerful high speed transmitters and receivers which were tuned to communicate with the Admiralty, Kilindini, Esquimalt, Belconnen, Honolulu and Bombay. The potential of the station was substantial, and would carry the communications of the British Pacific Fleet for the last phase of the war.¹⁶⁵

The great perennial problem for New Zealand during the war was its basic vulnerability to incursions by enemy naval units. The slow large converted merchantmen that served as the German Navy's poor man's commerce raiders were nonetheless effective in the South Pacific and in New Zealand waters. Their careful practice of wireless security permitted them to cruise largely uninterrupted, only noticed when they struck. The mines laid off Auckland underlined this great weakness in 1940, but although a number of vessels were sunk by the raiders, tying up cargoes in ports when alerts were on, the impact was negligible on trade and the movement of men and supplies overall. Even the sinking of the *Turakina* and the *Rangitane* did not have more than a passing impact, cushioned by a Government concerned not to panic the population. If 1940 and 1941 were the German years in New Zealand waters, the Japanese took over in 1942. This time New Zealand was aided by a foe with what can only be described as a ludicrous doctrine for the employment of submarines. While some ships were sunk in the Tasman by Japanese submarines, they were not many, and again, few got into difficulties in New Zealand waters. The cruises of the I-25 and I-21 in March and May 1942

demonstrated just how unprepared New Zealand was for surprise attacks on shipping. Despite signals interception, the enemy units remained largely unnoticed and undetected and unhurried.

In late 1944 the arrival the submarine arm of the German Navy in the Far East had not gone unnoticed. In August the RCN's diary of German W/T traffic intercepted noted:

Six incoming enigma messages were recorded on the Indian Ocean service (Series 7) originated complete with a serial number in the range X1-X100. This traffic was deemed to have been sent to control by a shore station at the German naval base at Penang.¹⁶⁶

This was intercepted at Colombo. On 26 September the SO(Y) in Wellington received from C. in C. Eastern Fleet:

A shore station fixed in the PENANG AREA has been heard handling German naval traffic as follows:- Time GMT; 0000 to 1000 on 31700 and 7365 kilocycles/second, 1000 to 1630 on 11470 and 4265 kilocycles/second.... Control used call sign 6K8 but other stations are also active. Traffic consists of five letter code and naval engims [sic] bearing serial number X 001 to 100. Frequencies in paragraph 1 have been heard being used by U-boats east of about 88 east to 6K8, probably when direct touch with GERMANY cannot be used. Normal U-boat procedure is used....¹⁶⁷

An annotation by Phipott instructed this be referred to Awarua, requesting monitoring of the frequencies and to 'report any results with bearings.'¹⁶⁸ The German U-boat U862 later departed for a patrol cruise around the coast of Australia, into the Tasman Sea, around New Zealand, back across the Southern Ocean and to return to Batavia in February 1945. Although the sinking of two Liberty ships, one in the Tasman and one in the Indian Ocean signalled its presence, the circumnavigation of the New Zealand coast remained unknown in New Zealand for decades.¹⁶⁹ U862 had kept wireless silence in New Zealand waters. This submarine's patrol points up the limitations obvious in signals interception. Wireless silence meant no detection.

The end of the operation of the Special Intelligence section of the 'Y' organisation was signalled with the departure of Professor Campbell back to Victoria University on 23 February 1945, and the secondment of Alan Carter to FRUMEL on 12 February 1945. Carter remained there until September, working in the JN11 Department under Lt.-Col.A.P.Treweek on research attached to the routine reading of current JN11 traffic, with key and additive strip recoveries.¹⁷⁰ Whether Boulter still popped into the 'Y' Room from time to time is not known. Interestingly, the Army 'Y' analysis cell's personnel, namely MacKenzie, Bennett and Lennox-King, were all seconded to signals intelligence posts in Australia in 1944-45.

On the grand scale that the Allies fought the intelligence war from the late 1930s to beyond 1945, New Zealand's contribution to the war in the ether was minute. This could hardly be unexpected, given the tiny defence resources of a small population of one of the world's less strategically significant archipelagos. The nature of the direct New Zealand naval experience in the signals intelligence war can be seen in a number of factors. The lengthy history of operational involvement in signals interception, the co-operation that tended to permeate throughout, and the existence of vital overseas linkages were fundamental. Foresight, the contributions to operational success, and the dedication of the intelligence personnel sketched the boundaries of this little war in the ether.

The long experience of the Navy, with the indispensable condition of its practical working relationship with the P&T Department, laid down a foundation in the First World War that underpinned New Zealand signals interception in the second conflagration. The maintenance of that relationship in the interwar years, and the practices of co-operation between naval intelligence and the civilian radio stations,

allowed the threads to be taken up quite quickly in 1939. The personnel slipped into those pre-existing patterns of practice, and required only relatively small adjustments to become operationally effective. The acquisition of the ability to read Katakana was one of these adjustments. It is not accidental that it was in signals intelligence that more progress was made more speedily and effectively than in any other area of New Zealand's intelligence activities between 1939 and 1945. While the Navy, with its Admiralty pedigree, provided the leadership in the field, it was the existence and availability of the large pool of P&T wireless operators that made the little interception offensive possible.

New Zealand signals interception was marked by co-operation at different levels within the interception units throughout. The 'Y' organisation would have got nowhere at all without the civilian H/F D/F stations, for it was these (along with the Army intercept unit) that provided the bulk of the locally obtained raw material for analysis. The monitoring of enemy transmissions by naval, civilian and military wireless operators and the smooth passage of intercepted traffic to the centre could only be achieved through durable co-operative operational practices. The P&T Department staff bridged both the Army and Navy interception units, providing the essential technical staff to make it work. Without them, technical innovation like the REB post – staffed by outsiders – would have been impossible.

The overseas linkages were vital. The whole 'Y' offensive was largely an Admiralty initiative, springing from the Naval Intelligence Division in London, which also had its roots in the success of Room 40 in the First World War. The Far East Combined Bureau re-established the co-operative ventures in signals interception

pioneered in 1914-18, but on a grander scale. The New Zealand 'Y' organisation's operational linkages with first Singapore, then Colombo, were also enhanced by the ubiquitous Australian connection, itself coming from past practice. This was a fundamental relationship that spanned the awkward period of the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the withdrawal of FECB from Singapore. All these in turn led into the new working relationship with the United States, and in particular the US Navy's OP-20-G units, FRUPAC and FRUMEL. There was an operational transformation of the signals interception effort in the Pacific, spear-headed by OP-20-G, MacArthur's United States-Australian Central Bureau in Brisbane, and the British-Australian Allied Intelligence Bureau of South-East Asia Command. The transformation more than compensated for the reduction in British effectiveness, in the aftermath of the events of early 1942. For the RNZN interception work it meant still closer links between Melbourne, Wellington and Honolulu.

Foresight was important.. Germany offered herself through past experience, not least because of the potential of her small navy to wage an expensive *guerre de course*. Japanese intentions in East Asia were signalled early, and the possession of large capable air and naval forces to permit her to drive south and across the Pacific made those forces favourite targets for signals interception. The picking up of the threads in 1939 was merely a first stage. The quickening of the pace of operational interception in 1941 brought on the time of greatest success in 1942 and 1943. But it was the foresight of interception personnel at quite low levels that ensured the proficiency of that attack. The putting together of a combined intelligence organisation at a snail's pace stands in stark contrast to the operational inroads in interception achieved by tiny units early in an

expanding conflict. The slender interception teams were ready for war with Japan, against the odds. The 'Y' organisation and its Special Intelligence section, the W/T listening watches and the H/F D/F stations were far further ahead in terms of effective operational intelligence collection and analysis than the CIB/COIC. If any effectiveness was lost in 1941-42, it was in the combined intelligence organisation rather than the component interception stations.

'Y', W/T listening watches, Special Intelligence, H/F D/F and REB only made sense in an Allied context. By themselves, their efforts were puny. Within the larger Allied operational framework, however, they made important contributions. The 'Y' monitoring of Japanese forces in the Mandated Islands both prior to and subsequent to 7 December 1941 was significant at a time of repeated tactical reverses. When the shift of the FECB occurred, the necessary adjustments were made. The Blenheim REB station was an outgrowth of those reversals. Operational successes against Japanese submarines assisted in the destruction of enemy units and the re-routeing of shipping. If the D/F work against the submarines off Sydney was ignored, there was much closer trans-Tasman co-operation as a result. The co-ordination of tactical signals interception by the British and then the Americans made quite effective use of the Australasian resources at their disposal. While the Americans, particularly the US Navy, became most important players, for the RNZN and the New Zealand Army the links with the British intelligence organisations remained effective and durable.

There was for the Navy a perceptible winding down of interception effort during 1944. This was connected to the perception of the departure of conflict in a northerly direction. The earliest casualty was the closure of the REB station. As the COIC slowed

down and diminished in importance, the Navy put considerable effort into expanding its communications facilities with the establishment of the Waiouru W/T Station. Watch was maintained for enemy surface raiders or submarines in vain. The raiders and the Japanese submarines had caused problems that could not be solved by signals interception alone. Their impunity, and the case of U-862, posed both tactical and strategic question marks for New Zealand's maritime defence both at the time and for the future. Wireless silence and wireless security were the greatest threats to operational intelligence derived from signals interception. It remains to look a little more closely at the radio fingerprinting station and the Army's interception unit.

Chapter Six

REB: Radio Fingerprinting

Towards the end of 1942, a new and highly secret form of intelligence collection was introduced in New Zealand providing another dimension to 'Y' intelligence. It was on the leading-edge of the contemporary technical methods of obtaining insights from the physical characteristics of enemy signal transmissions. It was noted earlier that although the German pocket battleship, *Admiral Graf Spee*, had been tracked by H/F D/F from the Indian Ocean into the South Atlantic before the Battle of the River Plate, she was thought to be the *Admiral Scheer*. The problem of how to identify warships at sea from their signals transmissions was a difficult one. Enemy vessels at sea put up barriers to identification with encrypted traffic, callsign alteration, rapidly changing frequencies, and high-speed transmissions, and through maintaining wireless silence for long periods.

The Royal Navy had gone some way towards solving the identification question through the employment of REB or 'Z' Intelligence. REB was a letter convention used to disguise the initials RFP, standing for radio-fingerprinting. REB was a form of radio fingerprinting using particular mechanical devices. As Nigel West has commented,

RFP was a crucial element of traffic analysis and enabled Sigint specialists to deduce considerable data from signals that resisted decryption. That remains true today for it is the only reliable method of distinguishing between manual operators.¹

Radio-fingerprinting has already been referred to as recognising the 'hand' of an operator, that is to say, peculiar characteristics exhibited by operators transmitting using a Morse key. Another shade of this was to be able to recognise the tone of a transmitter. These measures relied upon the acute 'ear' of the intercepting operator. This could work quite well at times, given large amounts of traffic and familiarity with the enemy wireless

operators' keying patterns. Experienced interception operators could recognise particular transmitting counterparts. With large numbers of warships at sea, and several operators per vessel on large warships, this was a more problematical.

The new method was devised to recognise enemy transmitters, not by sound, but by a visual representation of a series of transmissions. In early 1938 an article in an American scientific journal had indicated that it could be feasible to take a photograph of a transmission to enable the transmitter to be identified.² It was based on the principle that although callsigns might change and the operators too, the radio transmitter located in a vessel remained the same. Transmitters did not, as a rule, get moved from ship to ship. If the transmitter in use could be recognised, a breakthrough for the purpose of identifying the vessel or shore station could be made. By November 1939, the radio-fingerprinting device was actively experimental, and further improvements were made on it from then onwards.³ The former head of FECB, Captain K.L.Harkness, put it this way:

[The] Principal strength of [the] Y organisation in Colombo [ie FECB, which had earlier been in Singapore] was its ability to read the fingerprints of individual Japanese ship's distinctive transmissions. Individual operators, of course, had their own recognisable styles of using their keypad, and signals intelligence had earlier perfected the art of reading individual transmissions. But W/T transmitters also left their own tell-tale evidence, so that even though operators came and went, W/T equipment remained. Before the war [with Japan], the FECB had employed sophisticated equipment to photograph Japanese high frequency transmissions as they appeared on a cathode ray tube and thus established a substantial dictionary of images by which to identify ships solely on the strength of their characteristic transmissions. These were called Radio Fingerprints (RFP) and functioned in much the same way as a library of fingerprints. Thus, regardless of changes in callsigns or efforts to disguise a ship's location, individual ships could be tracked by their W/T transmissions.⁴

In the United Kingdom, the REB units were based at Flowerdown and Scarborough. In charge of the REB unit at Flowerdown was a certain Lieutenant Merlin Minshall, whose significance will be appreciated later. Minshall was first briefed on the

REB equipment by Reginald Bainbridge-Bell, who worked with Robert Watson-Watt on the development of radar. Minshall ascribed the invention of the REB machines to Bainbridge-Bell, although Arthur Marder asserted it was the work of the marine biologist Professor A.C. Hardy, Professor of Zoology and Oceanography at Hull.⁵

One of the first operational successes using REB equipment in conjunction with H/F D/F was in the *Bismarck* chase in May 1941. *Bismarck* and *Prinz Eugen* were sighted by the Swedish cruiser *Gotland* as they passed through the Kattegat, and the *Gotland* sent a report identifying *Bismarck* to Stockholm.⁶ Swedish naval intelligence informed the Norwegian Military Attache who passed the information on to the British Naval Attache. His Most Immediate signal to the DNI at the Admiralty read:

Kattegat today, 20 May. At 1500 two large warships escorted by three destroyers, five escort vessels, ten or twelve aircraft passed Marstrand course north-west. B3.⁷

Bismarck sent a signal to Gruppe Nord when the *Gotland* spotted her, and this transmission was picked up by REB equipment at Flowerdown.⁸ A good photograph was taken of the cathode ray tube display of the warship's transmission and filed. The REB photo record with its timing, when put together with the sighting report from Stockholm, identified the transmission source as *Bismarck*. She subsequently made 22 signals to Germany during her cruise. These signals were intercepted by H/F D/F stations and the twelve REB machines at Flowerdown. When *Bismarck* disappeared after the loss of HMS *Hood*, three signals from her were intercepted in the forenoon of 25 May, providing D/F bearings on an enemy unit. Two Flowerdown REB machines obtained useful photographs of the transmissions. These, when compared with the earlier ones from the *Gotland* incident and subsequent traffic, clearly revealed *Bismarck* as the source.⁹ The

D/F bearings plus this identification, proved very useful to Admiral Tovey in marshalling his scattered units to run her down. Another transmission suspected to be from the battleship was correctly distinguished by REB as another German unit.¹⁰ Further transmissions from *Bismarck* simply assisted in refining her location. The codebreaking efforts at Bletchley Park played little part during the chase, for the content of *Bismarck*'s signal traffic was not read until after she was sunk.¹¹

In early 1941 an REB 'outfit', as the device was termed, was installed at the Royal Navy W/T Station at Kranji, Singapore, and by mid-year a 'library' of film of Japanese radio transmissions had built up. These filed segments of film were compared with other 'Y' intelligence including H/F D/F stations, and thus annotated was literally a dictionary of samples of wireless transmissions of the main high frequency sets of all Japanese major naval units and shore stations. This was useful in establishing the identity of particular vessels, regardless of the transmitted callsign.¹² The callsigns were being changed once a month before hostilities opened, but were altered far more frequently afterwards. These were identified using REB without too much difficulty.¹³ It is obvious, but needs noting, that wireless silence defeated this kind of intelligence (and should be remembered with regard to Admiral Nagumo's wireless silence before Pearl Harbor).

The withdrawal of the FECB 'Y' organisation from Kranji to Colombo in January 1942, and from Colombo to Kilindini (Mombasa) in April, was disruptive for REB work, because of an immediate lack of availability of specialised REB equipment.¹⁴ The dislocation was limited as far as possible, though there was a requirement for REB equipment to be located elsewhere. Elsewhere included Canada, Australia and New Zealand, being closer to East Asia and the central Pacific than Colombo or Kilindini,

while the United States had developed its own radio-fingerprinting machines. In December 1941, the Royal Canadian Navy received REB equipment from the Admiralty and in January 1942 began using REB on an experimental basis, getting the equipment properly calibrated. (The technical details of the apparatus will be considered when we turn to the New Zealand station shortly.) In March 1942, Dr.N.I. Hendy arrived from England to spend several weeks with the Canadian 'Z' organisation to assist in getting their radio fingerprinting classification system under way. On 29 March 1942, the first REB intercept of an enemy vessel was recorded in Ottawa, and during May, June and July, 19% of all transmissions intercepted at the 'Z' station were classified. This is said to have compared quite favourably with other stations elsewhere with better equipment. Most of this was concerned with U-boat tracking during the so-called 'Paukenschlag', as the submarines made heavy inroads into shipping in the eastern Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. Later in the northern autumn of 1942 with a change in U-boat tactics, a further application now became apparent. This was the use of REB in assessing by transmission discrimination the number of U-boats involved in the early stages of a convoy attack.¹⁵ This became a regular feature during the period of the great convoy battles of 1942-43.

Between January and September 1942 TINA equipment, a further refinement of radio fingerprinting, began to be used in Canada. TINA and REB equipment operated at three temporary locations in Ottawa. Sufficient material was obtained to allow a satisfactory system of TINA classification to be drawn up. The 'Ottawa System' of TINA classification was adopted by both the US Navy and the Royal Navy, and although alterations were made to it in later years, the basic principle remained the same.¹⁶ TINA

was the 'study of the morse characteristics of individual wireless operators.'¹⁷ Tape recordings of transmissions were made. This consisted of reading a transmission on an undulation tape. By measuring the symbols, the characteristic touch of the operator could be distinguished.¹⁸ Careful systematic analysis followed, for which the 'Ottawa System' formed a basis. TINA was less successful than REB, but remained a useful supplement in traffic analysis.

The object of the US-British Radio Intelligence Conference, 6-16 April 1942, was to consider the latest developments in British and US 'Y' technology. It included many matters connected with 'Y' and W/T Intelligence, direction-finding and radio fingerprinting. It was also concluded that the interception of Japanese naval traffic was not receiving enough attention in terms of physical means of collection, as there were too few listening posts. This in turn meant the British and American processing agencies were no longer getting enough raw material to meet the requirement for operational intelligence. More operators and more sets were needed. The installation of more REB equipment was a supplementary measure to improve the situation.¹⁹ In the light of this it is not difficult to see why an REB station would be established in New Zealand at the end of the year.

On 10 April 1942, REB and TINA were discussed at the United States-British Radio Intelligence Conference. Dr Hendy gave a presentation on REB and TINA, describing the general principles of REB and TINA classification. Discussion of more detailed technical aspects of the operational use of both methods followed. For instance it was noted the quality of REB photograph could be altered by equipment changes in coils and cathode ray tubes.²⁰

In October 1942, the head of the Canadian 'Z' organisation, Lieutenant J.H. Low, visited the US Navy's 'Z' set up and made arrangements for an exchange of classifications between the RCN and the US Navy. Approved in December, a daily exchange of classifications started in January 1943.²¹ In early 1943 the head of the RCN's 'Y' German organisation, the head of the section dealing with U-boat traffic, and Lieutenant Low of the 'Z' organisation visited England, including Bletchley Park, the Operational Intelligence Centre in London, and the naval station at Scarborough. Low spent most of his time at Scarborough which was the main centre for REB and TINA. He found the Royal Navy's and the RCN's classification methods similar, and obtained useful information on technical matters to do with frequencies that had been confusing the classifiers in Canada. Scarborough, as one of the most important signals interception stations, left the visitors impressed by its immense array of aerials, the size of the operating room, the completeness of the 'Z' intelligence section and the efficiency of the direction-finding operators.²² Arrangements were made for the RCN to receive the Scarborough and Flowerdown Daily Reports. These were very useful, if a little delayed. Low noted that most REB personnel in England were Wrens, and recommended that the RCN staff the REB posts with women.²³ The Royal Canadian Navy's first volume of Japanese naval callsign identifications was promulgated on 18 August 1942, with a second volume on 30 August. Positive identifications and callsign changes were sent to the Admiralty, Kilindini (part of FECB), the ACNB, and the NZNB.²⁴

The first steps on REB in New Zealand were taken towards the end of 1942. An obscure, isolated property at the end of Wratts Road, Rapaura, near Blenheim was visited by Lieutenant Philpott, the SO(Y), Lieutenant Merlin Minshall, RN, and the Deputy

Director of the Wrens, Helen Fenwick. Minshall was sent to New Zealand by the Admiralty to set up an REB station, although on his own account he persuaded the DNI in Wellington that such a station would be a good thing.²⁵ He was listed as part of Philpott's 'Y' organisation. Minshall was an eccentric character, but he had a great deal to do with getting the New Zealand REB station established and operational, based on his experience with the REB unit at Flowerdown.

The SO(Y) noted on 15 September 1942 that preliminary work for the proposed REB station near Blenheim was complete, and that it was intended to staff it with Wrens. Dr. Hendy from the Naval Intelligence Division was in Australia and would visit New Zealand to assist in the establishment of the station. Financial approval for the REB station was urgently requested.²⁶ The SSO concurred, noting that there were separate entry arrangements for the new Wrens, who needed to be trained as soon as possible.²⁷

A memorandum to the Minister of Defence on 18 September 1942 outlined the REB station proposal, though it refrained from spelling out exactly the station's task. Noting that most secret and specialised W/T equipment had recently arrived from Britain, it suggested that its purpose was 'designed to solve one of the outstanding problems in direction finding intelligence and has been used with conspicuous success... in England.' An officer of the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division had been sent out to train personnel and install the equipment, and he was expected shortly.²⁸ The Minister was reminded of the value of the 'Y' organisation's wireless intelligence since it provided the only definite knowledge of enemy movements beyond the range of air reconnaissance.²⁹ It was proposed to install the equipment at a new station near Blenheim for 'technical reasons', and it was necessary for the station to be on the landline linking Awarua,

Musick Point and Waipapakauri H/F D/F stations. The site was a ¼ acre property with a seven-room farmhouse belonging to R.Dosser, an Army Port Security officer.³⁰ The station would be staffed by eight Wrens, including the Wren in charge. The house required furnishing and alterations and additions for the work required, plus to ensure reasonable living conditions for eight women isolated in the countryside. A small car was required for supplies, stores and for taking daily reports to Woodbourne to be sent by air to Wellington.³¹ Cost estimates came to 2,665 pounds, 15 shillings and threepence, plus extra charges for rent and phone. It would be necessary to provide a military guard. As the equipment was of 'immediate value' operationally, it was essential that the REB station proposal be treated as very urgent.³² The proposal obtained War Cabinet approval on 8 October.³³

The Blenheim W/T Station was under the administrative control of Wren Petty Officer Jetta Keay. She stayed at Rapaura for most of 1943, and was replaced by WPO Margaret Finlay, who was in early 1944 succeeded by WPO Joan Sayers. The Wren staff divided into wireless operators and classifiers, and there were to be four of each. The telegraphists were Nan Barker, Nell Luttrell, Bunty Pigott, and Margaret Scott. The classifiers were Dorothy Shroff, Marguerite Boxer, Philippa Tweed and Janet McLeod. Janet McLeod left early and was replaced a little later by Marion Pitt.³⁴ They were being introduced to highly secret work, arguably the most secret of any New Zealand intelligence establishment during the war, aside from the 'Y' Room itself. The work was totally outside their experience, and indeed, apart from Minshall, outside that of everyone else in Wellington. The Wrens, leaving aside the Wren Petty Officer in charge, were all brought in from outside the Navy. All well educated, they were told they would have

officer status after a short time,³⁵ although this turned out to be false. A guarded house full of women naval officers would have attracted attention. In any case, the SO(Y) himself was only relatively recently commissioned,³⁶ and as a regular was probably disinclined to support commissioned rank for the Wrens.

The Wrens were put on short and separate courses, one for telegraphists and one for the classifiers, the latter lasting for some seven to ten days. The courses were overseen by Dr Hendy.³⁷ He had assisted the establishment of the REB stations in Canada in March and April, and was doing the same thing in Australia. He has been described as

...of middle height, chunky, stocky, not much hair, a solid little man. I think we got on well with him. I mean he went straight in with the information. We were possibly less in awe of him than we would have been of 'uniforms' at that stage... He was ex-British Museum.³⁸

The telegraphists were given a crash course in Katakana and were briefed to some extent on what they would be doing at the REB Station. Petty Officer Allan Packer had a good deal to do with this and the familiarisation at Blenheim. Packer was one of the original telegraphists sent to establish the Suva H/F D/F Station in 1941. The classifiers were introduced to their role, the processing and classification of the product of the telegraphists' work. At the heart of this lay the photographs of signal transmissions displayed on a cathode ray tube. Hendy

...was talking all the time about wavelengths and the theory that there was an electrical trip at the beginning of every signal that became identifiable ...³⁹

Put another way,

...if the millisecond or so of the film which followed the pressing of the transmitters key was examined with a magnifying glass, the film, unless reception conditions were bad, allowed the transmitter to be identified with certainty.⁴⁰

In mid-November an advance party of Wrens Keay, Luttrell, Boxer and Tweed, with Hendy who had 'certain equipment' set off from Wellington to the W/T station via Picton.⁴¹ A safe for document storage was ordered by Minshall and sent to the Royal Naval Officer at Picton on 16 November. This was to be, possibly, a matter of no small significance.⁴² The station was already set up by the time the Wrens arrived. The house itself was surrounded by a seven-foot tall barbed-wire perimeter fence, with a gate guarded by an armed sentry 24 hours a day. To begin with, a second sentry patrolled the perimeter fence, but this was discontinued at the request of the Wrens in the interests of privacy.⁴³ The guard detail, seven to ten strong, was provided by an Army Guards Vital Points detachment, quartered outside the fence and not permitted to venture inside. Entry was permitted only for personnel with passes signed by the SO(Y), Philpott. This was strictly adhered to. This put effective obstacles in the way of the curious.

The house itself had three bedrooms upstairs, and the rooms downstairs had certain modifications. The Operations Room containing the REB equipment was at the front on the ground floor. Directly behind the Ops Room was a small laboratory and a dark room. Entry to this was from the Ops Room. The only sign on the house itself that there might be anything interesting inside was an unobtrusive bracket on the wall outside above the bay window of the Ops Room. This was an aerial lead-in for the radio receivers.⁴⁴

One of the most unusual matters to be attended to by the advance party was the erection of the aerial. One might have expected a large lattice aerial for the 'W/T Station', but Lieutenant Minshall had a more discreet arrangement. The 'Apparatus for

erecting aerial array' consisted of 4 ¾ lbs of rope, 1 longbow, 3 arrows, 4 balls of twine, and an aerial lead-in tube, plus 200 feet of copper wire. Minshall noted:

The method of using a bow to get the aerals up was the only one practicable as a 120 foot blue gum which was considered unclimbable was used to support the aerals. The alternative method was to erect masts.⁴⁵

Using the bow, Minshall shot a line into the treetops. Blueprints in the Station's file for two very tall conspicuous masts were unnecessary. Minshall's method cost under six pounds, as against 220 pounds per mast.⁴⁶ Although there was an initial problem with the aerial coming adrift in February, treetops remained the 'masts' for the duration of the Station's existence. The radio receivers and the special equipment were all set up. Under the guidance of Minshall, Hendy, Packer and Leading Telegraphist Prichard, the Wrens got down to the serious business of using what Marion Pitt would call in her diary 'the gear'. The haste of assembling of 'the gear' had nearly serious consequences. The considerable amount of power used was not securely earthed, and Wren Pigott received a considerable jolt when she went into the toilet at the back.⁴⁷

An interesting aspect of the tight security surrounding REB was the position of the Wren Petty Officer-in-charge, the redoubtable Mrs Keay, whose popularity was not universal. While administratively in command, she had nothing to do with the radio fingerprinting operation. She was not cleared to see the equipment, and not permitted inside the Operations Room. One Wren who disliked her found the Ops Room something of a refuge.⁴⁸ The others seem to have got on with her, or put up with her. While it may have seemed necessary to have a firm hand in charge of a group of intelligent and energetic young women adrift in the countryside, the fact that she was reduced to a purely administrative role was a basic weakness. Mrs Keay's two successors

had similar limitations imposed on them. It was a restriction that inadvertently put an artificial limit on operational effectiveness. It meant there was no-one with authority to demand action when things went wrong, which was probably an intentional oversight. But it led to one particular problem.

A technical manual existed for the use of the REB staff, which explained the principles behind the equipment and its purposes. Most of the content of this was covered in the detailed instruction and briefings the Wrens received from Hendy. Unfortunately, it was attached as an appendix to the document 'Orders for Naval W/T Station, Rapaura (Blenheim)'. There is little doubt that the Wren Petty Officer would have had access to the orders document. She was not cleared to see the Most Secret 'Appendix V to Orders for Naval W/T Station Rapaura (Blenheim), Technical Instructions', and 'Notes on "Z" Procedure for Classifiers'. On the title page of Appendix V a note personally signed by Philpott on 10 December 1942 read:

When not actually in use it is to be kept locked up in a steel chest, and may be shown ONLY to those officers and ratings to whom a knowledge of its contents is essential for the performance of their duty.⁴⁹

The title page also noted there were only three copies. Copy 1 was held by Philpott at Navy Office. Copies 2 and 3 were held at the Naval W/T Station Rapaura. Appendix V noted that the operators were to make themselves familiar with the 'Handbook for Outfit R.E.B. 2 H 401 dated March 1942', and the classifiers similarly with the 'Notes for "Z" Procedure for Classifiers dated 1st December 1942'.⁵⁰

The problem was that none of the Wren wireless telegraphists or classifiers ever sighted the document. Indeed, the five Wrens interviewed only became aware of its existence when shown a copy in the 1990s. Having read it, they reflected it would have

been very useful reference. The safe delivered to the Resident Naval Officer, Picton, was not seen by the Wrens at the Station. It is just possible, therefore, that the copies of the Most Secret Appendix V were inside this safe, and stayed in Picton. The RNO, Picton, was responsible to the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Wellington, for administration of the personnel and the conduct of the station, so the idea that the safe stayed in Picton might not be surprising.⁵¹ He was certainly not cleared to see the manual, and was probably unaware of the safe's contents other than that there were documents inside deposited for safekeeping. This is, of course, speculation. Another view is that the SO(Y) never sent the copies of the manual to Blenheim or Picton. As Philpott was extremely wary about security, and as this was very secret indeed, it may not have been out of character for him to have kept it all to himself. The ambiguity posed by the position of the Wren Petty Officer may have led to this restriction on useful procedural information for the operational staff. Had she been cleared like her subordinates, there would have been no point in concealing the manual. Whatever the case was on this issue, it had a few operational consequences.

The Wren operators and classifiers had been given to understand that Hendy would return after he visited Australia, and they had a good number of technical questions for him. He never came back, so they were to a large extent left in the dark, although Minshall, who was familiar with REB, remained for a time.⁵² It is therefore surprising that the operators and classifiers worked as well as they did.

When the Station got under way, Petty Officer Packer supervised the telegraphists, training them to check and maintain the REB equipment safely.⁵³ This last measure was important, as the REB machine was quite dangerous. It was necessary

when adjusting it to wear a large heavy rubber glove on one hand and keep the other hand behind one's back to avoid electrocution.⁵⁴ Any serious problems necessitating internal adjustments with the power on were not to be carried out by the staff, but were to be done by radio mechanics sent from Wellington.⁵⁵ It would have been more useful to have had a technician based in Blenheim, but for whatever reason this was not considered. Interestingly enough, when the P&T Department staff had to repeatedly attend to the telephone and landlines to the station they simply posted a man to the Post Office in Blenheim.

Lieutenant Minshall spent some time adjusting the REB set and supervised the settling-in period over two to three weeks.⁵⁶ The Operations Room was set up and worked as follows. A tall metal structure like a free-standing wall cabinet stood in the centre of the Ops Room. This whole contraption was the 'Outfit R.E.B.2 H 401'. This was made up of the metal framework for the Outfit REB (2) no.4 Oscilloscope, and the 35mm ultra secret cine-camera Model 3419B, using very sensitive film at a very high lateral speed. Integral to this structure was a Collier & Beale H.R.O. 941 Radio Type Receiver and a Collier & Beale Calibration Type 443 HF Receiver. The telegraphist sat in front of the middle of the contraption with headphones on. In front of her was the oscilloscope with its cathode ray tube to provide a visual presentation of the signal being intercepted. To her right was the camera, built in to the apparatus. The telegraphist was very busy when tuning in on an enemy transmission, which might be very short. She had to find the frequency, take down the Katakana callsign on a notepad, and decide the precise moment to take a photograph of the oscilloscope display. Timing was all-important. The photograph was taken by the telegraphist by pressing a button in front of

her and holding it down for three seconds, counted as “One-higgledy-piggeldy, two-higgeldy-piggeldy, three-higgeldy-piggeldy, off.” The signal had to be strong and clear for a good photo.⁵⁷ The operator logged the details of the transmission, including the time of receipt, the callsign to and callsign from the Katakana preamble if possible, and the frequency. She assigned a monthly number to the interception. To this would be added any other details which might assist in locating or identifying the transmitting station.⁵⁸

One of the duty operator’s tasks was to keep watch on the N7 landline. The Blenheim W/T Station with the callsign RNW was connected with the H/F D/F stations of Awarua (ZLB), Musick Point (ZLF) and Waipapakauri (WPP). The H/F D/F operators were not told the function of the new station, as there was no need for them to know. They were told, however, that they were to co-operate fully with RNW. They were also unaware for a while that RNW was staffed by Wrens. Not surprisingly, the more experienced P&T operators were much faster than the Wrens with their Morse. After some time with a technical adjustment to their Morse key the Wrens cut in one day on the rather dubious chatter on the landline and ‘there was silence for a while – and then one started again, and we indicated we heard so they stopped.’⁵⁹ The landline was used between the H/F D/F stations to co-ordinate the taking of bearings and RNW sometimes tracked around with the direction-finding stations. Mostly its frequencies had been directed from the ‘Y’ Room in Wellington, and the operators became skilled at fishing around at night for their particular targets, enemy submarines at sea. Most of the REB interception work was carried out at night.

After the photo was taken by the W/T operator, the high-speed film in its cassette was removed from the camera when convenient, developed by the classifiers in the dark room, and the strips of film hung to dry. Each strip could be about a metre long. When dry, the classifiers took the strips of film to the classifying table located between the REB machine and the bay window of the Ops Room. The two duty classifiers then classified the strips, entered the details in the Classifiers Log, and compared them visually with previous strips filed away. A match of the film image would reveal that the transmitter was the same as the one compared with. Details were entered in the Classifiers Log, as in the following example taken from the manual.⁶⁰

G.M.T. Date:-

Monthly Serial No.	Time of Receipt G.M.T.	Callsign	Frequency K/cs.	Disposition	
				Group No.	R.F.P. No.
1	1052	NA RA E	10,000	70/KEN	100
2	1123	KA KE F	16,800	55/IKE	110

The strips of film were then mounted by stapling them onto filing sheets and stored away for reference. The sheets were marked with the time and date (GMT), the callsign, frequency, group number and RFP number.

Once all this had been completed – there might be a batch, or in urgent cases singly – a phone call on the secure line (the secraphone) was put through to extension 846 at Navy Office. This was Room 233, part of the ‘Y’ organisation, and the details passed on. These were the date and time (GMT), the callsign, frequency, the RFP no. and an assessment of reliability, A,B,or C. A meant ‘definitely identified’, B ‘probably identified’, C ‘possibly identified’. At all times the words ‘film’, ‘pictures’, ‘photograph’ etc. were to be avoided, and the phrase ‘RFP records’ [sic] was to be used instead.⁶¹

The 'Y' Room in Wellington then incorporated the intelligence received into their analysis of the situation. The REB product, along with that of the H/F D/F stations, was shared with FRUPAC in Honolulu and the FRUMEL in Melbourne.⁶²

All of this describes generally the procedures carried out for the radio fingerprinting operation at Blenheim. However, it should be noted that there were no doubt variations from time to time. Everything depended on what the operators and classifiers had been taught by Hendy, Minshall and Packer. Hendy had been there initially to supervise the processing of the film, the type of results the operators and classifiers were obtaining, and the beginning of the library of filmed records for comparative purposes.⁶³ Hendy had gone, but Minshall remained in Wellington until June 1943. During this early period the operators and classifiers were gaining experience of intercepting and photographing enemy transmissions and comparative analysis of developed film. The targets of the Blenheim W/T Station from the outset were Japanese submarines, and their traffic was distinguished because they invariably transmitted 'RSN/' (RSN-bar) in their signals. Japanese submarines were located by H/F D/F and the radio fingerprinting permitted the 'Y' Room to estimate the number of submarines involved (was it one submarine making two transmissions but with different call signs, or two submarines, or more, etc.).

It has to be remembered that there were also Canadian, Australian, American and British REB units operating at this time in concert with H/F D/F stations. The Blenheim station only made sense in conjunction with H/F D/F reporting. However, this kind of combination of location bearings and identification analysis could prove lethal for the submarine provided friendly surface forces were in a position to intervene. An example

of this kind of location intelligence from H/F D/F, a US Naval intelligence report on 25 January 1943, included the following:

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox (5) fixes were obtained on seven enemy submarines. SUBS by Dog Fox South and East x 12155 x OT166 x 07161 x 07158 x 01161 x and also one at Zero One North One Seven Four West x.

(B) SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE

D/F fixes for 24 January 1943:

NEW GUINEA – SOLOMONS

IDENT	FREQ	PLOT & AREA	TIME
SUB	6385	166-E 07-S	1648/23
SUB	6385	162-E 07-S	1700/23
SUB	13220	162-E 07-S	2110/23
SUB	6385	162-E 01-N	0345/24 ⁶⁴

Dog Fox stood for direction-finding. The New Zealand COIC Daily Summary for the 23/24 January noted two enemy submarines reported to be 15 miles SE of Port Moresby at 1030M/23 January. The Daily Summary for 25/26 January 1943 reported an enemy submarine placed by D/F near 020 degrees S 165 degrees 30' east or 165 miles northwest of Noumea at 0150 hours local time on 25 January.⁶⁵

The Japanese submarine I-1 was attacked on the night of 29-30 January 1943 by the RNZN minesweepers HMNZS *Kiwi* and HMNZS *Moa*, and after a spectacular action was sunk in shallow water off Guadalcanal.⁶⁶ HMNZS *Matai* made four visits to the wreck between 1-13 February. The salvage operation on the hulk of the I-1 carried out by the salvage ship USS *Ortolan* was very fruitful, as the submarine had been carrying a large amount of code material. A signal on 9 March noted that '...all documents and publications from item-1 [I-1] have been forwarded to CINCPAC...'. It was to provide valuable insights into Japanese naval traffic.⁶⁷ The action was interesting because movements of Japanese surface vessels and submarines down the 'Slot' in the Solomons were often predicted by traffic analysis from H/F D/F and REB location and

identification reports. The intercepted traffic provided localities based on last transmissions. Allied warships were often patrolling on the basis of predicted enemy movements, although successful interdiction came down to the alertness of the ships' crews. It is known that the New Zealand minesweepers had been ordered to patrol a set line four miles long across Kamimbo Bay. It may well be that the Blenheim W/T Station had a hand in location intelligence that led to the I-1 night action, but it is very difficult to prove. Elphick has argued this was the case, but this argument only amounted to the existence of the Blenheim post, a general comment on its usefulness against Japanese submarines, and the fact that the New Zealand corvettes sank the I-1 (and he has the date wrong).⁶⁸

Maintenance work at Blenheim was carried out by Leading Telegraphist Pritchard. He went to Blenheim on 8 February to correct a minor fault on the REB equipment, install a second receiver, adjust the power supply, check the aerial which had recently blown down and replace locally, and to calibrate and draw frequency curves for both receivers.⁶⁹ The work had certainly picked up in pace. On 24 February the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Wellington, reported on his recent visit to the Blenheim W/T Station. The complement of one Leading Wren and seven Wrens [excluding the Petty Officer] was too small. At least two Wren operators were always on watch, and more, at times. They had to do be involved in the domestic work of the station as well with cleaning and cooking, and he considered efficient watchkeeping over a period of time would deteriorate. This added at least two hours daily to a 56-60 hour week, which increased in the event of leave or sickness. One Wren had already found the strain to be beyond her, and the Leading Wren in charge felt the others were feeling it. He suggested either three

more Wren wireless operators be sent or a Wren cook, steward and another operator were needed.⁷⁰

The Wren who left was Janet McLeod.⁷¹ The staff were definitely at a disadvantage having to do all their own cooking (they found initially that not all could cook), and they were rightly aggrieved.⁷² Had the personnel been male, a cook and a steward would certainly have been provided. The SO(Y) sharply disagreed with the NOIC Wellington, whose comments were based on a misconception.

The hours worked by the Wrens, allowing for two hours daily for domestic duties, are –

W/T operators 44 hours per week

Classifiers Average, 56 hours per week

The misconception lies in the statement that at least two Wren operators are always on watch. This is not correct. During a proportion of the day no operators at all are on watch at present.⁷³

He noted that steps had been taken to increase the complement by one Classifier to reduce their hours, which would average 42 hours per week, and only be slightly extended with leave or illness.⁷⁴

There were other problems. On 27 February the SO(Y) on 27 February outlined the P&T Department's difficulties in maintaining the landline link to the H/F D/F stations in an efficient condition because of heavy dew, rain or atmospheric disturbances, entailing adjustment over each 24 hour period. The SO(Y) noted that the landline's efficiency was crucial 'since the co-ordination of the D/F net and REB depends upon it.' The P&T Department decided to have a repair man stay in Blenheim each night.⁷⁵ The SSO annotated his concurrence in view of the Blenheim station's 'operational value', which had been 'strikingly illustrated' that week.⁷⁶

This referred to events over the last few days. On the night of the 22-23 February 1943, the COIC Daily Summary no.431 noted that a radar contact had been made by the Cape Turakirae RDF Station at five minutes past midnight on a bearing of 150 degrees about ten miles distant. Ten minutes later a 'fair' D/F fix of a Japanese submarine from four stations indicated its presence in the Cook Strait area, possibly off the southern entrance.⁷⁷ Airborne and sea searches were mounted and a long thin streak of oil found. Searches continued over the next two days and a radar contact was made in Cook Strait by the Cape Campbell radar. Anti-submarine air cover for shipping was provided by RNZAF aircraft. At 0604 hours on 24 February a D/F fix was made of a Japanese submarine at 29 degrees 30' south, 165 degrees east, about 150 miles west of Norfolk Island.⁷⁸ At 2135 hours on the evening of 25 February

a Japanese submarine was placed by D/F in position 123 degrees from Portland Island, east coast NORTH ISLAND, distant 50 miles. This was identified as the same unit mentioned in Summary 431 ... Shipping has been warned.⁷⁹

An air search was mounted and anti-submarine escorts for shipping continued to be provided. Four days later, there was a further D/F fix on the same submarine on a northerly course about 660 miles north of Auckland.

A further D/F fix was obtained on the Japanese submarine (mentioned in Summary 434) at 0020M/1 [March] indicating a general northerly course. The cut was very narrow and would indicate an approximate position 26 degrees S., 175 degrees E., about 660 miles north of AUCKLAND.⁸⁰

The submarine was fixed by the H/F D/F stations and identified by the Blenheim REB station.

A replacement Wren classifier, Marion Pitt, joined the Blenheim W/T Station on 26 March, having only been in the Navy seventeen days. She spent the next days settling

in and finding her feet with the work. When people went out, she noted in her diary that 'there must always be two people left at the station.'⁸¹

A senior British officer visiting Wellington noted in his report to the Admiralty that an REB Section had been functioning since December 1942 'and is staffed by Wrens and has provided useful information in [the] case of Japanese S/M [submarine] transmissions. A library is being built up ...'⁸² In conjunction with the interceptions of the direction-finding stations, the REB station contributed its identifications to the 'Y' Room's analysis of the daily submarine position. The increased proficiency in the tracking and identification of enemy submarines by H/F D/F, REB and led to a move for a daily submarine chart in mid-1943 in the COIC. In April-May seven submarine fixes by local D/F were taken of enemy units in the Tasman or the Tonga-Fiji area.⁸³ An example on 11 April the Daily Summary indicated

Intercept signals place an enemy submarine in an approximate position 30 miles, bearing 115 degrees, from GABO ISLAND light, Victoria, at 1700M 11th. A D/F fix was also obtained at 0608M 12th within the area mentioned.⁸⁴

During this busy period the Blenheim W/T Station was visited on 3 June, as Marion Pitt noted in her diary:

Lt.Minshall & Cheyne [sic] arrived by plane 2p.m. Took photos of us in uniform...mainly the operators. Had quite a banquet for dinner – 12 of us as Pritchard is down to fix gear – roast meat served by Minshall & Cheyne, vegs, fruit whip, peach shortcake, walnuts, choc, coffee etc. Quite a lot of backchat.⁸⁵

The next day the night's interceptions were under scrutiny.

Up at the ungodly hour of 5.30 & was occupied most of morning running after Cheyne and Minshall – work point of view only – In afternoon Cheyne gave us an interesting talk on our "little pets." Had an early tea as they were leaving for plane...⁸⁶

The visit of Minshall and Cheyne was to ensure that everything was going satisfactorily with the radio fingerprinting procedures. The “little pets” referred to the Station’s principal targets, the Japanese submarines. Life at the Station was a mixture. On 22 June 1943,

Wet again! Seemed to be working most of morning. Surprise in afternoon – three Air Force at gate asking for Midge! Was Keith Hancock & 2 others asking Midge & Bunty to dance on Thurs – lucky things. They had only gone about ¼ hr when [Mrs] Keay arrived – a great piece of luck! Bunty, Midge & Schroff went to pictures with one old guard...while I was on watch! Poured with rain and we nearly had a flood as river almost reached the top of the bank.⁸⁷

On 23 July, the REB apparatus, the ‘gear’, needed attention.

Mrs Keay left today to go on her course in Auckland. Barks arrived back after being recalled from leave & Mr Davies came over on boat [from Wellington] also with part of our gear. He fixed it up fairly soon so Scotty & I drove him over to Picton.⁸⁸

The Station was inspected on 28 July.

Great day – visit of the big noises. Intended time arrival 10.30, actual time 10 A.M., hence we were caught in slacks etc – gems cooking in oven. They gave us ten minutes to change – what a rush as we arranged ourselves calmly (we hope!) in mess...to meet Capt.Boyle who fortunately was only one who came with Keay. Had morning tea with us & looked over place – was quite impressed!⁸⁹

The next day, a small metal component of the REB outfit flew off.

In early hours of evening lost minute part of gear – kids spent 1 ½ hrs looking for it. Most amusing sight: Pip sprawled full length under table, Schroff on top of cupboards & Bunty searching in cracks!!! Rang Philpott who said “It must be in room somewhere!!” Lost...[therefore] no work.⁹⁰

On 30 July the Station remained non-operational.

Still out of action due to the small missing part! We spent a whole hour searching room from top to bottom again but all to no avail – it is most elusive.⁹¹

Traffic continued to be monitored by the H/F D/F and REB stations. On 7-8

August, for example

A submarine was placed by D/F in position 15 degrees 15'S 161 degrees 30'E (approximately 300 miles west of ESPIRITU SANTO) at 2015M 7th ...

An intercept indicates that an Allied vessel sighted and attacked a submarine in position 14 degrees 05'S 166 degrees 45'E (approximately 30 miles south east of VANUA LAVA) at 0135M 8th ...

A submarine was placed by D/F in position 14 degrees S 164 degrees E at 0212M 8th. (200 miles west of VANUA LAVA, NEW HEBRIDES). [sic]⁹²

While the watch on the enemy continued, in early September there was more trouble with the REB apparatus.

Ah! Woe is me! On house again – do I love it?! Kids having trouble with the gear – beats me why they don't send down someone who knows the gear as it is hopeless the kids trying to do it themselves as they have no idea.⁹³

At the same time, the head of the 'Y' organisation was regarded with little esteem. Philpott was a difficult person to work for, and the Wrens at Blenheim had little time for him, as this biting portrait of the SO(Y) shows.

...our forgotten officer – Philpott. NOT a pleasant being either: rather slow & fat as from overdrinking, dark greasy hair, small black “mo” looking out of place above a large mouth which displayed a gap due to loss [of] front teeth.⁹⁴

On 30 September, there was yet another maintenance visit.

We sang our little theme song to Mr Davies “ My dear Mr Cheyne, please let me explain, these ----- cannot possibly be the same. I could say 212 or even 266, but I would not agree to call them 313!” He was most amused. He didn't find much wrong with the gear so we think he thought the trip rather a waste of time.⁹⁵

The value of discriminating between individual submarines to assess the enemy's strength can be seen in the COIC Daily Summary for 1-2 October, when D/F fixes (and REB) indicated three or four enemy submarines operating in the western Solomons, Vitiaz Strait, southern Bismarck Sea area.⁹⁶

On the night of 3/4 November the radar station at Cape Campbell reported a series of radar contacts and sighted a low-lying object heading south-east. The Fairmiles from

Wellington were ordered to sea and the ferry *Maori* was screened as she crossed Cook Strait. The Blenheim W/T Station was alerted.

Was pulled out of bed at 2 this morning by Lutt to do an important piece of work – 266 only 150 miles away! Got back to bed at 3 – up again at 6.30. Great life!⁹⁷

This suggested that if there was a transmission from a submarine, it was one that had been identified before. The motor launches depth-charged an object but nothing further was sighted.

Other stations were intercepted by REB for identification purposes. On the evening of New Year's Day 1944, for example, the duty telegraphist had taken twelve seconds of film of shore station transmissions. This led to over five hours of classification work next morning.⁹⁸

The topic of the security of the Station was raised on 8 January by the owner of the farmhouse, Dosser, who was visiting neighbours.

He told us about the irate Army Capt. who was refused admittance here even tho' he had pass signed by Prime Minister – sent in a 9 –page report – the P.M. was rung up – he said “If my signature isn't good enough, whose is?” !!!⁹⁹

Dosser, although a Port Security Officer for the Security Intelligence Bureau in Auckland, had corresponded repeatedly with the Naval Secretary to get his house back early.¹⁰⁰

The business of locating submarines by the H/F D/F stations and REB continued routinely. The Daily Summary for 15/16 January noted two enemy submarines in the New Hebrides, one near the position of a reported attack on a ship.¹⁰¹ Philpott decided to send Leading Wrens Luttrell and Barker on a month's elementary maintenance training for the station's electrical equipment. The SO(Y) calculated on 22 January that as the

situation at Blenheim was fairly quiet for the moment, the loss of efficiency could be accepted temporarily.¹⁰² Just as the two operators were setting off to the course, a classifier, Wren Tweed, was requisitioned by Navy Office for 28 days because of short staffing at Navy Office. On 27 January, Marion Pitt reflected:

Midge and I doing all the work between us as Scottie on leave – hence I was on duty in ops room both morning & evening while Midge was on house. Things not too happy. Midge has another job in view so is anxious to get out & Schroffie is not too pleased about she and Bunty being left to do all the [telegraphy] work.¹⁰³

By 31 January:

On house. – household not very bright today, heaven knows what we will be like after five weeks. Philpott has a nerve and no one here has a good word for him. I bet it doesn't worry him, though.¹⁰⁴

On 11 February Wren Petty Officer Margaret Finlay was informed she was leaving on 15 February.¹⁰⁵ The REB outfit developed a fault in the cathode ray tube next day, Wren Pitt indiscreetly recording 'The tube in the gear has gone bung so no records...'¹⁰⁶ Wednesday 16 February saw a breach of security. The new Petty Officer, Joan Sayers, was inadvertently at fault on her first full day.

While Schroff and I were doing dishes after lunch, we suddenly heard a man's voice in the mess room! We crept into kitchen and there was a Lieut-Col[onel]. Apparently he was an intelligence bloke going over all secret stations & had a pass signed by the Naval Sec. Of course Joan [Sayers] didn't know about Philpott['s] pass so she let him in. What a shock for the kids esp. as Bunty was in dressing gown, Midge in shorts & Scottie bare feet. He wanted to look over station but in Scottie's words "Midge won't let him into the ops room."...He showed his identity card, said he knew what we were doing but then gave himself away as said we were [the] same as other stations. Ha! Ha! Altogether atmosphere was rather strained & he says he's going to complain to Naval Sec. about it. Prichard arrived in the evening to fix gear – soon found trouble – a resistor.¹⁰⁷

The Wrens reported the incident to Philpott, and nothing more was heard of the Lieutenant-Colonel.¹⁰⁸ Thursday saw more problems, this time with the radio.

Kids drove Prich to Picton after lunch: then Bunty & Schroff put in receiver which had been returned from Wellington & it won't work. Poor kids, they are having a hard time.¹⁰⁹

The next day Prichard was back to fix the receiver.¹¹⁰ Four days later, on 22 February, the

Power and phone went off early this morning so Midge went to store to ring up. The repair man came out and met Midge and the following conversation took place: "Are you 319S?" "No, I am the Naval Station!" "Oh yes! Your Morse line is interfering with your phone lines." Strikes me that most people know part of our secret...¹¹¹

Wren Tweed was due back from her stint in Wellington on 1 March, but Marion learned over the phone that something untoward was afoot.

We sure are forgotten down here in the country. There is a flap on & no-one told us! I was talking to Percy [Wren Percival] on the phone & she said Pip won't be back to-night as there is no boat running. She was most evasive & talked in riddles so I left it. At 5.30 Midge rang up to find out definitely about Pip & heard the whole tale. One of our cats [a Jap sub] was off Auck.[land] – fired a torpedo, next sighted off Napier by a tanker then last night fired another torpedo at 'Rangitira'. It is hovering now off our coast! We were furious at not being told and we may have been of some use – makes it look as though they are not interested in us.¹¹²

This was an extraordinary turn of events. On the 26 and 28 February, two vessels had reported torpedo attacks well off the New Zealand coast. At 0157 hours on 1 March the ferry *Rangitira* reported a torpedo passed astern. The report of the Staff Officer (Operations) to the CNS indicated in outline the action taken. The first report resulted in a warning to shipping in the vicinity; an air search was not possible 'owing to shortage of aircraft.' The second report had stimulated responses, including the sailing of two minesweepers to escort the *Rangitira*, the diversion of a ship at sea and a zig-zag order for all shipping of the east coast of the North Island, and the sailing cancellation of the coastal steamer *Pukeko* from Napier until daylight. The ferry was to proceed at best speed, zig-zag and expect air cover at dawn. The torpedo passing the *Rangitira* resulted

in considerable panic. Air searches from Lyttelton to Gisborne were instituted, the ferry herself was to make port at maximum speed. The other ferry, the *Arahura*, was to zig-zag and proceed to Wellington as fast as possible, two other vessels were recalled and two further ships diverted to the north of New Zealand. The ports of Wellington, Lyttelton and Dunedin were closed until further notice.¹¹³ The telegraphists at Blenheim meantime learned nothing. The 'Y' Room had not alerted Blenheim that anything was amiss. It was probably a typical breakdown of communications, but not one that did much good. After all, the REB operators' main targets were enemy submarines.

The work of the H/F D/F stations and the REB station continued, nevertheless.

The COIC Daily Summary for 4/5 March predicted

Estimated position of enemy submarines a.m. 5/3:-

Possibly 1 approaching RABAU from S.E.

1 estimated west-bound from BUKA.

1 on BUIN run, estimated off S. NEW IRELAND.

1 may be patrolling Central SOLOMONS.

1 or 2 in RABAU HARBOUR.

1 on reconnaissance mission in SUVA-TONGA area.

Recent sightings indicate supply runs being made from TRUK to BUIN area.

One indicated now proceeding on this run.¹¹⁴

The suspicion of isolated enemy units returning to New Zealand waters remained, along with the obvious physical vulnerability of shipping. Nervousness in the wake of the ferry incident returned on 8 March, with an Asdic contact reported eleven miles south of Wellington heads. No results were observed,¹¹⁵ but that evening HMNZS *Wakakura* reported a periscope 40 miles off Godley Head and attacked with depth charges, with an air bubble and slight oil patch but no wreckage.¹¹⁶

Luttrell and Barker returned on 10 March bringing the REB station back to full strength.¹¹⁷ By April questions were being raised about the REB Station's continuing role, as the SSO commented to the CNS.

I have discussed the present situation as regards this Station with SOY. It is that watch is kept for 18 out of 24 hours, and it was only when 2 Wrens were undergoing a course at Petone that watch was only kept at night.

With the Pacific war, as it is, moving North, it is natural that the value of the Station has decreased from when it was commissioned. On the other hand when there was a real scare in March, it was very much to the fore. Taking everything into consideration I think it fairly accurate to say that its future might be reviewed at the end of 1944 when we shall know more about the situation in the Pacific.¹¹⁸

The business about the 'real scare in March' was, of course, rubbish, as the REB Station had not been alerted about the situation that developed. Nevertheless, clearly something had arisen to get the SSO and the SO(Y) to contemplate the Station's future. That pressure might be coming from elsewhere is hinted at in an annotation by the CNS that it 'will be possible to review this matter sooner than the end of '44.'¹¹⁹

At the end of April people began to be posted out and not replaced. Marguerite Boxer, a classifier, was first to go. On Friday 28 April, Midge's last day, minor irritation surfaced when the duty telegraphist intercepted and photographed an enemy transmission.

Scottie and I were on in work room & when Barks took a record at 9 A M Scottie said "Did you have to do that today of all days?"¹²⁰

As Scottie was also leaving in a few days, her mind was clearly not on the job. The arrival of May on Monday brought the news that Luttrell and Barker were to go to Waiouru on Thursday. On Tuesday, Margaret Scott departed.¹²¹ The next day brought things up short with a jolt.

Black Wednesday! Was on duty in work room & about 9.15 came out of our little room to find Shroff writing up diary. "We are all going – leaving here next Tues" she says [sic] & I laughed as I thought she was pulling my leg. But it was only too true. Davies had just rung up to say "Station was to close forthwith." Shroff & I sat with tears in our eyes it didn't seem possible that we could be leaving this place so suddenly. We are so attached to it & it has so many pleasant associations.¹²²

Thursday was no easier. It was all over.

Mr Davies, Prich & Mr Wolfe arrived to wreck our little home – started work in ops room & it was a sorry sight when the gear was all pulled to pieces. To think that we would never work in that little room again. Barks & Lutt left this morning... Davies has told us that Bunty and Shroff may be going to Waiouru, Pip into [Room] 233 [part of 'Y'] – Miss Herrick has something for me but he wouldn't say just what.¹²³

The next day, 5 May, a little of the mystery was dispelled.

Friend Dosser has duly installed himself on the farm & is very anxious to get in the house.... When we talked to him we found out the inside story of our hasty departure. Dosser gives a bottle of whisky to [the] Minister of Defence's sec[retary] & so gets an interview with Jones [the Minister], after interviews with Naval Sec. having come to nought. Result is that Jones says station must be closed down & we are thrust out at a moment's notice. Nice way to carry on a war! Boy, we were mad and we let Dosser know it too.¹²⁴

A sad anti-climax to fifteen months of highly secret work. If it really was the agitation of Dosser that produced the result, that does not say much for the priority put on maintaining intelligence capabilities. The war was not yet over. Yet, as had been observed, the war had moved north, and the opening range made successful radio-fingerprinting difficult. This was a time of reorganisation and cutbacks. The REB equipment was moved into storage in H.M.Dockyard, Lower Hutt. It was still there in 1946, and later on was moved to the Waiouru W/T Station where it was used for calibration purposes.¹²⁵

Elsewhere, radio-fingerprinting was winding down. In Canada, 'Z' operations had been commenced at a new REB/TINA set-up at Coverdale in February 1944. Results

from this were disappointing, particularly from the REB which had become much more important than TINA, because most signals transmitted by U-boats were now short signals. During March only about 5% of them were classified. There was some improvement when a new receiver was tried. When two RCN officers visited England, they found that Naval Intelligence had concluded that TINA had ceased to be of operational value against U-boats, and even REB was now doubtful as U-boat signals security improved. Accordingly the 'Z' operations at Coverdale were reduced in June, while those at Harbour Grace were discontinued altogether. The RCN came to the conclusion that REB had been of only limited success against the German U-boats, but this did not mean that the principle was not sound. Employed by others on different assignments, particularly against the Japanese, with better facilities, REB proved to be 'of great operational value.'¹²⁶ The limited success of the RCN 'Z' operations were partly caused by the fact that the German U-boat transmissions had become highly standardised and had very few faults making positive identification of individual transmitters difficult. As well as this, U-boat transmitters operated at low power output so signal strengths were low, and REB pictures were often rendered useless or doubtful, marred by low amplitude or noise.¹²⁷

The operation of the radio-fingerprinting station at Blenheim was part of the cutting edge of contemporary signals intelligence technology, and was in fact New Zealand's first venture into what is today called electronic warfare. It was a singularly different aspect of 'Y', fitting in to the H/F D/F network as part of the 'Y' Room's attack on Japanese communications. Waters' draft history came to the conclusion that Blenheim's 'R.E.B. results on Japanese submarine transmissions proved to be extremely

valuable. A method of exchanging identification between Honolulu, Melbourne and Wellington was evolved and put into operation, helping still more to produce a picture of submarine activities.¹²⁸ REB widened the spectrum of the New Zealand 'Y' attack on enemy submarines at sea, contributing to both local anti-submarine intelligence and allied theatre anti-submarine operations.

Chapter Seven

The Army 'Y' Operation

While the Navy's venture into signals interception was wide ranging in its scope, the New Zealand Army's foray in this field was more modest. In 1942 the New Zealand Army seems to have begun to be involved in the interception of enemy signal traffic, although, some preparations in terms of training may have been in train before the outbreak of the war with Japan. There were to be connections between the Army's signals interception operations and the naval 'Y' organisation, largely consisting of the evaluation and distribution of intercepted enemy traffic.

The Army's venture into 'Y' intelligence began with the setting up of a Special Wireless Section. Instrumental in this was an enigmatic very junior officer, Lieutenant Kenneth MacKenzie. Neville Barnaby, his second-in-command, assessed him in this way:

The Special Section [Army Signals] originated through MacKenzie, who was...a commercial radio operator, with marine experience....I think he took a personal interest in it at the beginning of the war...He was not a very talkative bloke, rather reserved...[He seemed] to have a personal interest in Kana which he may have had experience of while he was at sea before the war...[in the]merchant navy....I think the Section originated from his personal interest.¹

MacKenzie was apparently involved with the training of telegraphists in Katakana for the Army before the opening of hostilities with Japan. This training took place in a warehouse on Customhouse Quay, using a staff of six marine radio operators and was quite separate from that carried out by the Navy. One K. Smith is said to have succeeded MacKenzie in running the instruction in Katakana.² Later on, Katakana was taught in the Special Section.

MacKenzie may have been recruited into the Army by Colonel Wrightman who knew him personally, and in particular his ability to read Katakana.³ Joining the Army on 3 March 1942, MacKenzie was promoted to corporal and then acting sergeant two days later. On 9 March he was posted to Army Signals at Nairnville Park. On 28 April he was commissioned as a Territorial Force lieutenant. Aged 34, MacKenzie had listed his occupation as 'clerical' or as a 'Credit Manager for Wright Stephenson & Co.', and attested that he had had eleven years experience in the merchant navy as a wireless operator.⁴ It seems he taught himself Katakana during his time at sea.⁵ He spent twelve days in September 1942 teaching a General Knowledge Course for Army Signals personnel.⁶

On 29 June 1942, the Chiefs of Staff noted that special wireless sections were being raised by the Army to listen to enemy radio traffic.⁷ One of the functions of the new Special Wireless Section, Army Signals Company, was to monitor illicit radio transmissions within New Zealand by means of radio direction-finding equipment installed in trucks. This effort was only a small one set up to plug a gap, but in the event seems to have found nothing of real interest within New Zealand.⁸ The two wooden vans were used to survey sites from which to conduct D/F monitoring of any clandestine traffic, and when any such transmissions were detected, they would drive out to intercept and take bearings on the signals. This was done in conjunction with the Police Department, and not, be it noted, with the Security Intelligence Bureau.⁹

The Special Wireless Section was based to begin with in a railway hut at Nairnville Park, Ngaio.¹⁰ Known more commonly as simply the 'Special Section', its most important operational role was to intercept Japanese wireless traffic, described as

Army 'Y' procedure. By the end of 1942, the Special Section was having increasing success in its interception operation. In October, the Section intercepted and recorded over 6,500 enemy signals. The Section Notes for November, signed by 2nd Lieutenant K. MacKenzie, O.C. Special Section, recorded that

During the month of November 1942 the Special Section received and transposed of 6902 Enemy W/T Messages, an increase of approx 300 on the previous month...

Reception conditions during the month were generally good on the lower frequencies but considerable difficulty was experienced on some of the day frequencies.¹¹

This trend continued, and the following month MacKenzie reported:

In December 7748 messages were intercepted from enemy stations and transposed. This total shows an increase of approx 800 over the November figures.¹²

The increasing enemy traffic demanded more operators. Alongside the 24-hour interception watch, the training of new personnel went on.

MacKenzie's own notes on Katakana are worth briefly considering, as they provide an insight into training in Katakana. The notes, 'Some Examples of K/K Used in Communications', opened with a caution

the Japanese language...It must be pointed out that there exist no short cuts enabling one to acquire a comprehensive knowledge of this language. Years of unremitting labor [sic] are required to master even the fundamentals of writing Japanese KANJI (the classic language, which is basically Chinese;) however, KANA, or phonetic Japanese writing, can be learned in a short time. Communications personnel may, with practice, intercept and transcribe some portions of coded messages which use KANA.¹³

Even a cursory reading of the notes gives an idea of the complexity facing the telegraphists in mastering the subtleties of Katakana.

In KATAKANA and HIRAGANA each character represents a sound but, unlike English letters, each is made up of a consonant followed by a vowel, i.e. ka, ki etc. Exceptions are the vowels a.e.i.o.u, and the consonant n. The

KATAKANA consists of 50 somewhat angular symbols which, apart from their use on aircraft are used by the Japanese mainly for transcribing foreign sounds, and in notices, official documents, telegrams, ships' names, etc. Inscriptions in KATAKANA are usually written from the right, either vertically or horizontally, but on occasions are written from left to right as in English. The HIRAGANA syllabary compares with KATAKANA as our script letters (*a*) compare with block printing (**A**). It also consists of 50 forms, but they are cursive in shape and are used in writing letters, in some newspapers, etc. These characters are seldom used for aircraft markings or for depicting ship's names.¹⁴

Setting out some fifty Katakana syllables, the notes mentioned that 'sometimes Katakana symbols are used with Japanese numerals and the result is confusing.'¹⁵

The notes outlined the scope of the language task confronting the trainee operators. A couple of examples illustrates the difficulties. In dealing with the subject of the use of Katakana with maps, the grid referencing system was referred to along with a diagram. The maps referred to related to thirteen maps, retrieved along with a diary and other material from the 'Reconnaissance Satchel' of a Japanese airman shot down in April 1942. While the Katakana symbols sometimes followed the sequence of the syllables set out in the notes, they sometimes followed

...the sequence in which they are found in a well known Japanese poem called the "Iroha Song." The poem includes all the K/K syllables. To say a man knows his IROHA UTA is to say that he knows his ABC's.¹⁶

The syllables in the Iroha Uta arrangement were set out in Katakana, in Romaji (Japanese Roman letters) and in Japanese Morse. Later, the notes observe:

When the kana syllabary is used in radio or telegraphic communications, K/K is habitually employed. It should be remembered that this is the printed or typewritten form, and that the receiver of the message, when transcribing the code, would use HIRAGANA. This corresponds to ordinary penmanship as compared to the typewritten or printed letter.¹⁷

A considerable inventory of Japanese Morse filled the last few pages under the heading "Communications in Code". Consisting of lists, they were set out in sections:

Kana Code Signals with Morse Equivalents; Code Signals for Numerals; Code Signals for Punctuation; Abbreviations and Procedure Signals; and the Airman's Code of Abbreviations.¹⁸

In November 1942, the Special Section's 'Monthly Notes' recorded the equipping of a new room for operator training in Special Section work and the commencement of Course 1M for new personnel on 9 November.¹⁹ Examinations for the course were held on 18 December with 'very satisfactory' results.²⁰ Course 2M for new operator training began in early December, and some members of the previous course were placed on interception watch with experienced Special Section operators to gain valuable experience in actual operational work and handling of the equipment.²¹ Thus new operators could be brought straight into interception work, assisting a relatively smooth expansion in required personnel. According to Barnaby, the Special Section

...had a very good team of operators (telegraphists). A very large proportion of them were ex-Post Office [staff]. Some of them were Grade I in the Army, but the Army even in the early stages preferred to keep those operators in New Zealand. They'd been picked out for this particular job.²²

There were alterations in the work and structure of the Special Section. The internal security function - the monitoring conducted for illicit signals was reduced (because of the lack of such traffic), - and there were alterations to the command arrangements. The 'Special Section Notes for June 1943' noted that the continuous 'Policing Watch' was discontinued on 17 June and replaced by a random twenty-four hour watch once a week. At the same time, the Special Section was reorganised. On 14 June MacKenzie moved to Army Headquarters, leaving Barnaby with the day-to-day running of the Section.²³ Captain K.J. Coates seems to have taken over the 'Special W/T Section' at the end of June, and was later succeeded by Barnaby.²⁴

At Army Headquarters, Lieutenant MacKenzie remained head of the Special Wireless Section as GSO3 (Intelligence and 'Y'). Above him was the GSO3 (Intelligence) at the COIC, Captain Dawson, and further up the chain of command was the GSO1 (Operations and Intelligence), who in 1942 was Major J.H. Beale.²⁵ MacKenzie was still running the Army interception operation, in the same way as Philpott with naval 'Y'. The small Special Section was divided into two compartments: a straightforward traffic intercept station and an analysis section, neatly separated from each other. Out at Nairnville Park, the Special Section's signals platoon of the Army Signals Company maintained round-the-clock interception of enemy traffic, plus the random radio security watch. In 1943, the strength of this signals platoon comprised two officers, twenty-four operators, six advanced trainees, thirteen ordinary trainees, and nine NZEF trainees, making a total of fifty-four personnel. Total strength of the Special Section plus the cryptographer, the translator and the 'I clerk at Army Headquarters, came to fifty-seven personnel, although this varied with postings and leave. Somewhere between fifty and sixty appears to have been the norm.²⁶

The interception station of the Special Section was moved from Nairnville Park up onto a hilltop site at Johnsonville, into a small collection of nondescript huts. The Special Section acquired the curious nickname 'OGPU', the acronym for Stalin's secret police in the 1930s. Set among the gorse bushes, the station had leaky roofs and the tin shed toilets away from the wireless rooms were just holes in the ground. Four WAACS were posted to the Special Section in October 1943, B. McGlynn, M. Murray, A.I. Stratford and M. Hart. One of them reflected:

At 'OGPU', in the wireless room, there were two hot stoves for warmth, and these were also used to supply us with a snack which was usually on the hour, every

hour, when we were on night shift. It would usually be cheese melted on an enamel plate with onions added, served with some fried bacon – very good on cold nights.²⁷

The radios were manned twenty-four hours a day in four shifts, the night shift being the busiest,²⁸ the best time for short wave signals reception. There was bench space for five operators and their wireless receivers along one side of the wireless room with its bare floorboards and two pot-bellied stoves.²⁹ The usual listening watch in the wireless room comprised a warrant officer operator in charge of four telegraphists. The signals platoon operators intercepted and copied the Katakana traffic, transposing it into Romaji script.³⁰ These intercepts were passed by secure phone or despatch rider to Gilbert Lennox-King at Army Headquarters. This was a neat cut-out barrier, obviously for security reasons. Barnaby related:

We had an officer [Lennox-King] in Army Headquarters who took our results day by day and they were just hand written on the usual message form and that was it – we didn't see any more of them. We used to hear rumours and rumblings from time to time, but that was it. Nothing official.³¹

The analysis section (or Headquarters Special Wireless Section located at Army Headquarters) under MacKenzie comprised a cryptographer, Dr. Ted Bennett, the translator Gilbert Lennox-King, and an 'I' Clerk, Irene Fitzpatrick.³² Bennett was a biologist, and was seconded to the Central Bureau in Brisbane later in the war.³³ MacKenzie's analysis cell closely collaborated with Philpott's Special Intelligence Section of Campbell, Carter and Boulter, not least because a proportion of the intercepted traffic was diplomatic and of interest to Boulter in particular. The Army's Special Section intercepted traffic went to a number of addressees, sent through the naval Special Intelligence Section or direct.³⁴ According to Lennox-King

... much of the information gleaned from the 'Kana' messages was of importance and where applicable was passed by the H.Q. Special Section to Melbourne and later to Brisbane. As the action moved north the value of our readings fell away from the point of view of 'combat' action, but we did get interesting material from as far afield as Java.

The naval intercepts were in many cases in a one-off code or a code that was not deciphered by the Americans until later in the war. I think that one of the features of New Zealand's part was that on many occasions our stations picked up messages that the stations in Australia did not even hear. Of course, a lot of intercepted messages related to minor matters in a particular area, such as weather forecasts, but other 'briefs' when put together produced some surprises. By the time I left the Section in 1945 and went to Australia I think our good work was over, but during the 'peak' it was indeed an interesting time.³⁵

There was a range of Japanese traffic intercepted. These included Tokyo-Batavia traffic, Tokyo-Saipan, Tokyo-Truk, and a 'high-speed link' and diplomatic traffic between Tokyo-Irkutsk.³⁶ The Tokyo-Batavia traffic seems to have been best received in New Zealand, partly because of the time of day the signals were intercepted, the equatorial effect on communications (better quality signals received further back), and the bounce effect of high-frequency short wave transmission.³⁷ The diplomatic traffic probably also included material intercepted from diplomatic posts in South America. Fuji and 'B' Machine ('Purple') material went from New Zealand to the Australian diplomatic section, as mentioned earlier, and was sent on to the Government Communications Bureau at Berkeley Street, the diplomatic branch of GCHQ. Some intercepted traffic was not Japanese, and was collected for longer-term interests. This accumulated traffic was given to Captain Roy Kendall, who visited Wellington from time to time.³⁸

Kendall ran Secret Intelligence Australia (SIA), which was an MI6 organisation working for London and Mountbatten's South East Asia Command (SEAC). Secret Intelligence Australia was Section B of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, a British-Australian umbrella organisation (not to be confused with MacArthur's American-

Australian Central Bureau). It has been asserted that Kendall's SIA was controlled directly by London 'on the understanding that it kept out of the South-West Pacific.'³⁹ It seems to have largely done so. SIA also had interests in both operational and tactical intelligence collection.

According to MacKenzie himself, encoded Japanese weather messages were intercepted, copied and passed to Dr. Gabites at the Meteorological Office. Gabites is said to have broken the simple code.⁴⁰ Weather reports were of operational significance for Japanese and Allied aircraft and ships at sea. If these messages were read, their routine contents were quite likely to be found in other messages in other codes. This might provide a 'crib' into that code, a lever by which to unzip the rest of the message.

In mid-1944 MacKenzie departed for duty in Australia from 5 July 1944.⁴¹ On 3 August, Captain Perkins conducted a handover from Captain Barnaby, who left the Special Section on 8 August.⁴² The interception operation continued for the rest of the war, and 'Nairnville' has already been noted as one of the US Navy's OP-20-G's sources of intelligence in its March 1944 plan. The Special Section Army Signals finally ceased its operations on 18 July 1945.⁴³

MacKenzie had been required for work elsewhere. Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Melbourne, requested his services for 'special duties'. He possessed 'special qualifications for the duties concerned and has previously worked with the [Allied Intelligence] Bureau.'⁴⁴ This reference was connected with the Special Section's intercepts passed to the Allied Intelligence Bureau, partly the material of interest to Kendall of the SIA. From 5 July 1944, MacKenzie was 'seconded to British Special

Ops.'and he reported to the SIA two days later.⁴⁵ MacKenzie was employed in an SIA sub-section known as "M" Special Unit. A memorandum on 9 November 1945 noted

Lt. MacKenzie has technical radio qualifications necessary for the operation and maintenance of special radio equipment employed by SIA Section of Allied Intelligence Bureau.⁴⁶

At the end of hostilities MacKenzie was in the Dutch East Indies, and he came across a Japanese wireless station in Batavia still under the control of a Japanese Marine officer. Taking this station over with the threat of force, MacKenzie discovered the station was one end of the Tokyo-Batavia link that the Special Section in Wellington had monitored. He souvenir-ed the crystals, a head set, and a Morse key.⁴⁷ He was promoted to captain on 19 December 1945⁴⁸ and remained with the SIA until 5 June 1946.⁴⁹

An off-shoot of the Special Section, Army Signals Company, was created and deployed into the forward area. This was a 'Y' section that was sent to the Solomons with 'A' Wireless Section of the 3rd New Zealand Division. According to Coates, the commander of the 'Y' section:

The operators were trained in Wellington. Ken MacKenzie was given the job of training and putting the Section together as an Interceptor Group [sic] and attached to Army Signals, Army HQ Wellington. Ken MacKenzie was later transferred to other intelligence duties and it was at this time I replaced him as officer in charge.⁵⁰

The 'Y' Section consisted of an officer and five operators. They were deployed on Green Island (Nissan) and conditions were quite good as the 3rd Division Headquarters had been established for a period prior to the Section's arrival. This Section also acquired the nickname 'OGPU'. Using a No.107 receiving station, the operators maintained a 24-hour watch intercepting Japanese traffic. They recorded Katakana messages 'at high speed' by hand and passed them to 3rd Division Headquarters 'for translation', 'for

decrypting' and 'for interpretation by Japanese "language experts."'”⁵¹ The operators were skilled ex-Post Office telegraphists. The Section operated for around a month, and recorded 'over 400 loggings'.⁵²

The Army's venture into 'Y' intelligence was distinctive. It added its small measure to the Allied intelligence attack on enemy communications. It provided raw intercept material for FRUMEL, the Central Bureau and the SIA, while the analysis cell closely linked in with Philpott's Special Intelligence Section. From 1942 to July 1945, the Special Section provided an interception service well regarded by the Australian, American and British intelligence authorities in the South Pacific and Southwest Asia. Tiny in size, the virtue of its geographical location made it useful for collecting signal traffic more difficult to intercept elsewhere.

Part III

The Watch on the Coast

Chapter Eight

Coastwatching – New Zealand Shores

There is nothing so fundamental to intelligence gathering and the maintenance of security as simply keeping a good look out. It is unsurprising that an island state with extensive maritime boundaries would expend some effort in mounting direct surveillance on its borders. The possibility of the enemy putting ashore somewhere, the need to keep a physical eye on the approaches to the country's ports, the fear of raids or the worst nightmare of all: invasion, were all powerful motivations to obtain immediate warning should such trouble arise. The watch from the coast, 'looking out to sea', encapsulates in its entirety the activity of coastwatching. How this kind of operation was conducted around and beyond New Zealand's borders is the object of attention of the next two chapters, including as it did outlying islands far away, some of which were not New Zealand sovereign territory. If New Zealand, with its coastline larger than Britain and a population of a million, was faced with an unacceptable mathematical proposition to begin with, the assumption of further coastwatching responsibilities in island territories distributed across ocean wastes as large as the North Atlantic might be regarded as unreasonable. Yet this exactly describes what occurred. Conveniently, as this assumption of dual duties arose, it is useful to deal with coastwatching around New Zealand in this chapter, with plans, coastwatching stations opened, the arrival of the enemy, and the rundown of the requirement. The other half of the dual duties is the subject of Chapter Nine, concerning New Zealand coastwatching in more distant islands, from sub-Antarctic waters to beyond the equator. The most important question was how

effective were the coastwatchers? A related issue was whether, under the circumstances of the time, it was surprising that anything substantial was achieved at all.

In 1929 a draft plan was conceived by the Naval Board which outlined a scheme for coastwatching on New Zealand's borders.¹ Although suggesting that these be manned by naval reservists, the Board later gave consideration to using Marine Department personnel, as coastwatchers did not need to be fit for active service. As might be expected, it would fall to the ubiquitous P&T Department to equip the posts with telephones, wireless operators and wirelesses.² In mid-1935 the Naval Board confirmed that Marine Department staff could man coastwatching stations rather than the naval reservists, who were then freed for active service. The coastwatchers' tasks were to keep a lookout and report sightings of ships and aircraft and anything unusual about these to a naval officer. Both the North and South Islands were subdivided into Northern and Southern Groups, four in all, each under a naval District Intelligence Officer. The Northern Group, North Island was centred on Auckland and was to have eight coastwatching posts. The Southern Group, North Island had seven posts, with Wellington as the centre. The Northern Group, South Island would have twelve stations, with Christchurch as the hub, and the Southern Group, South Island had ten posts focussed on Dunedin.³

On 14 January 1937, representatives of the Naval Board, Army GHQ, the RNZAF, the P&T Department and the Marine Department met to revise the scheme. The Naval Secretary had expressed the intent in a memorandum on 30 December 1936 that '...the proposed organisation allows for watchers along almost the whole coast of New Zealand.'⁴ The coastwatching organisation, according to this meeting, was to be under

the Marine Department, the core being lighthouse personnel, plus postmasters and other P&T Department staff and civilian volunteers. Four Naval District Intelligence Officers would be appointed to the four main ports, and either telephone or telegraph were to be the means of communication between the posts and the DIOs.⁵

The departmental representatives at the January meeting were re-constituted as a committee of the ONS, the War Watching Committee, which had its first meeting on 2 August 1937. Unexpectedly, the Admiralty threw a spanner in the works with a communication on 28 July that expressed the view that:

...the intention to use lighthouse keepers, operating from lighthouses, as part of the War Watching Organisation was contrary to Admiralty policy, which is opposed to such a practice on the grounds that lighthouses and lightships are by international usage non-belligerent, and that any established system of using them for intelligence purposes would reacte [sic] adversely on the immunity normally accorded them.⁶

Very sensibly, the second and third meetings of the War Watch Committee considered the Admiralty's views and declined to accept them: lighthouses would be used.⁷ While further objections were raised by the Admiralty, it was pointed out by the Committee that the lighthouse staff lay at the heart of the local scheme, that the country was thinly populated, and there was not a large pool of people to draw on for coastwatching duties.⁸

In September 1938, the coastwatching scheme had a list of some fifty-eight proposed stations, divided into four districts around Auckland (seventeen stations), Wellington (fifteen), Lyttelton (eighteen) and Dunedin (eight). Each post was to have sufficient personnel to maintain a twenty-four hour watch. The Air Department would patrol the unguarded coast between Okura and Puysegur Point.⁹ In July 1939, the Army agreed to take over the manning of thirteen posts to be run by the P&T Department and

three Marine Department stations.¹⁰ By 1940 the War Watching Committee had been renamed the Coastwatching Committee.

In March 1940 there were said to be sixty-two coastwatching stations, which broke down into the following categories. The three Port War Signal Stations and one Coastal Battery Observation Post were part of port defences. Some eighteen coastwatching stations were located in Marine Department lighthouses, while a similar number were manned by local Harbour Board workers. These personnel were all familiar with ship recognition. Finally, twenty-two stations were staffed by military reservists, and located in remote areas, often with poor access, but with commanding views of long stretches of coastline. This last consideration was thought important to detect vessels hiding in uninhabited localities or putting landing parties ashore unhindered. A few lengths of coastline were covered by periodic commercial or RNZAF air patrols, the most important of which was the two hundred mile stretch between Puysegur Point and Jackson's Bay.¹¹ This was a very thin cordon for a very long coastline. It is therefore surprising to note that the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided early in 1940 to close down between twenty-four and twenty-seven stations leaving thirty-eight or thirty-five open, compensating with more air patrols.¹²

A closer view of the distribution and type of station can be seen by considering the posts of the Wellington District. Here seven stations were staffed by the Army, four by local Harbour Boards, three by the Marine Department, one by the P&T Department and one by naval reservists. The P&T post was at Waitangi on the Chatham Islands, with W/T communications. All other communication links were by telephone. There were posts at Table Cape, Napier, Bare Island, Cape Turnagain, Flat Point, Sinclair Head,

Foxton, Patea, and New Plymouth (five Army and four Harbour Board). These nine stations were to be closed. Seven stations remained: Castlepoint (Marine Department), Cape Palliser (Marine Department), Baring Head (RNVR), Beacon Hill (Army), Cape Terawhiti (Army), Cape Egmont (Marine Department) and the station on the Chathams (P&T). This was a major reduction, even if it was envisaged that posts could be re-opened, if required (the full list is in Appendix Two).¹³

A document, 'GUIDE TO PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN COAST WATCHING DUTIES' was issued, directing the attention to what should be reported and how to report it. Reports were to go urgently to the 'District Naval Intelligence Officer' by telephone or telegraph, concerning unusual movements of aircraft or vessels, landing of enemy parties or enemy agents.¹⁴ Ships and aircraft movement reports were to include the time sighted, a calculation of direction and distance from the post or a geographical feature, numbers of vessels or aircraft and nationality if known. Distinctive marks, name, type, direction heading, estimated speed, and date and time the report was made were added.¹⁵

Warships or suspicious craft required additional details describing features, size, shape and location of masts and funnels, the colour of the hull, upper works and funnel, shape of bow and stern, estimates on length and tonnage, gun numbers-size-position, ditto torpedo tubes. Was the ship well-decked or flush, were there conspicuous ventilators or derricks, did it have W/T, and why was it considered suspicious? ¹⁶ Submarine reports were to include whether the submarine was on the surface or whether just a periscope sighted, description and estimation as to size and number of guns, and the name of any ship attacked (and if so, the state of the ship). Aircraft messages, where the

aircraft could not be identified, were to include features: biplane or monoplane, number of engines, boat-shaped fuselage, floats or wheels.¹⁷

Reports of mines were to be particular about the date, time and position, whether it was a moored mine, a moored mine awash, or a drifting mine. The type and appearance of the mine including any marine growth or not (this related to how long it had been in the water), its colour, and if any horns were showing, were significant points to cover. Other matters to have a variety of details to be reported were gunfire (sharp or thunder, continuous or intermittent, near or distant, direction, wind force, visibility, date and time), and enemy landings or agents (exact location, movements and activities, numbers, vehicles, who observed landings, etc.).¹⁸

The objects of the coastwatchers' attention were to be reported in a commendable amount of detail, provided that was available. The location, role and circumstances of the coastwatching stations varied widely, but an idea of the translation of the guidelines into operational activity can be gained by looking at an example. This can be seen in the main features of the reporting and receiving activities contained in the Communications Orders for the War Signal Station on Stephens Island. The Station was to maintain radio schedules during the day at 0550 hours, 0840, 1130, 1510 and 2100 for routine traffic and the passing of meteorological reports to the Meteorological Office in Wellington. A loudspeaker watch was to be kept for ten minutes each hour on 1840 kilocycles for calls from Wellington, and it was noted that a constant loudspeaker watch was maintained at Wellington W/T Station on 2012 kilocycles. In an emergency, Stephens Island could call on 500 kilocycles. All coded messages used NZSPO2 and SYKO codes, and all signals were to be addressed to 'Navycharge, Wellington'. Stephens Island was to report on all

eastbound and westbound shipping other than small craft, and all aircraft movements. Where the name of the latter was unknown, the type, the time of sighting, bearing, distance, course and markings if visible were to be noted. Any reports of vessels behaving in a suspicious manner were to be prefixed "IMPORTANT".¹⁹

It was an ongoing round-the-clock business. To do this effectively was to spend time and be alert doing it. Yet, as the Official History of the Coastwatchers noted:

The duties of the coastwatcher are not spectacular. His role is passive or preventive rather than active or aggressive, but the information he obtains can be of vital importance...

The coastwatcher's duty is tedious. He has to spend long hours looking out over the inconstant but unchanging ocean or struggling with his radio, groping for contact with the outside world. He has to endure, perhaps to an exaggerated degree, all the monotony and boredom of service life... It is only near a few main ports that he will have enough to do to keep healthily busy.²⁰

In June 1940, the watch on the coast was brought up with a jolt. On the night of 13 June, the German auxiliary cruiser Ship 36, the *Orion*, arrived in the approaches to Auckland with 228 mines. It was a cloudless night with visibility for about twelve German nautical miles, with bright moonlight, with a very light wind from the southwest. The raider had listened into the voluble radio traffic of the New Zealand shore stations. The lighthouses were working, which was of assistance in navigation. At 1926 hours, the first moored contact-type mine was dropped overboard, for a row stretching across the eastern passage between Great Mercury and Cuvier Island. The second line of mines was laid across the approach to Cuvier Island in a zig-zag. A third, longer line was laid right across the northern approaches to the Hauraki Gulf, extending from off the northern end of Great Barrier Island in an arc some six and a half miles off Moko Hinu Island and then around in a line to the northwest. The last mine went overboard at 0236 hours on 14

June, the end of a seven hour operation. Captain Weyher of the *Orion* recorded in his War Diary that:

It was not possible to approach closer than 8 German nautical miles to the CUVIER lighthouse without being sighted by the signal station...

During the [seven hour] operation three outward bound steamers and one inward bound vessel were sighted...the track selected lay well away from the steamers and this fact combined with the clouding of the sky at 2300 hrs. allowed the mine barrage to be laid unnoticed and without incident.²¹

Once finished, the raider turned onto a course of 50 degrees, and slipped away.

The New Zealand cruiser *Achilles* and the armed merchant cruiser *Hector* arrived at Auckland between 2100 hours and midnight. Two ships had sailed from Auckland, one at 2100 hours and the other at 0045 hours, while the coastal vessel *Port Waikato* arrived at midnight.²² Nothing had been noticed, which doesn't say much for the watchkeeping on those ships. The Marine Department coastwatching station on Moko Hinau had seen nothing, although the raider nearly circumnavigated the island. Nor had the Port War Signal Station manned by naval reservists on Tiritiri Matangi, or the station at Cape Colville manned by the Army.²³ It was an appalling lack of vigilance. Five days later, when the Canadian-Australian mail steamer *Niagara* struck a mine just before 0344 hours on 19 June and sank, there was a great deal of confusion. This was, after all, just what the coastwatching stations were intended to prevent.

Over seven months later, doubts were still being raised as to the effectiveness of coastwatching. On 26 February 1941 it was noted:

The Chiefs of Staff are not satisfied that the methods of passing reports from Coastwatching Stations to the Central War Room are entirely adequate and efficient and are also of the opinion that a review should be made of the Stations at present manned with a view to seeing that the most effective organisation necessary is in operation.²⁴

The Chief of Naval Staff was to initiate action on this matter. Nearly two months later, Captain Rotherham, the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Auckland, raised questions on the efficiency of coastwatching stations in his area, including the provision of very basic items, according to a minute of 21 April 1941:

Captain Rotherham also raised the question of the proper provision of Coast Watches at the Coast Watching Stations manned by the Marine Department and the provision of binoculars.

In general he said that he could not report that the Coast Watching Stations kept an efficient look out...²⁵

So had the undisturbed mining of the approaches to Auckland been just an isolated incident, an aberration? It was isolated, certainly insofar as enemy naval units that came within the New Zealand three mile limit from 1940 to 1945 were infrequent visitors. The visit of the *Orion* was not the only glitch of this kind to occur, however.

The discreet passage of the *Adjutant* a year after the *Orion* in mid-1941 is a case in point. This British-built 350 ton whale chaser *Pol IX* was part of a Norwegian whaling fleet captured by the German raider *Komet* in the Southern Ocean. The ten other vessels were sunk, and this one was taken as a prize, and put into service at Kerguelen Island as a small raider, renamed the *Adjutant*. Sailing up from the south, she arrived off Lyttelton with a load of twenty magnetic mines on the night of 24 June 1941 which had been cross-loaded from the *Komet* thirteen days earlier.²⁶

The *Adjutant* proceeded to lay ten mines off Godley Head and Baleine Point outside Port Lyttelton in the early morning hours of 25 June. It was a dark night with a wind blowing. The light on Godley Head was burning, and the raider used this as a reference point.²⁷ At least seven of those mines were laid within three nautical miles of

Godley Head, and a couple less than two miles away.²⁸ Nothing seems to have been sighted by the Port War Signal Station manned by naval reservists on the headland.

She then headed for Wellington. According to her War Diary, her captain, Lieutenant Karsten, noted the *Adjutant's* sighting of the Baring Head light at 2100 and Pencarrow Head at 2200 on 25 June. He goes on:

...Here again as at Lyttelton, everything is lit up peacefully. The harbour is barred by two searchlights, located between Palmer Head and Pencarrow Head. One acts as a constant barrier and the other sweeps the approach sector at irregular intervals, ending up at three patrol boats with masthead lights, lying to port of the *Adjutant* as she approaches. Minefield is to be laid at full speed (14 knots) and not at seven knots as arranged. Get-away to be covered by smoke screen. Events developed as follows:

- 2312 Challenge from Baring Head. *Adjutant* does not reply. Steams through at full speed on course 12 deg. [north by east]. Baring Head makes morse signal to searchlight which, however, sweeps right over *Adjutant* four times.
- 2316 Order to lay mines, although initial position has not yet been reached.
- 2320 When laying fourth mine, *Adjutant* is picked up by a searchlight.
- 2321 Smoke made. The fifth and sixth mines are laid on the run in, the remaining four under cover of the smoke screen, after turning back, and on a slightly different course from the one intended.
- 2328 Last mine laid. Depth of mines between 26 and 33 metres...
- 2329 Smoke stopped. Course set for Baring Head. The searchlight continues to sweep the smoke screen which now separates *Adjutant* from the patrol boats. Shortly after passing Baring Head, the vessel turns landwards and so becomes obscured from the searchlights.²⁹

Karsten then summarised the measures taken after the laying of the smoke screen.

Three searchlights were used, one from Palmer Head, one from Pencarrow Head and one from the southwest. There were three patrol boats that he assumed were motor torpedo boats and a minesweeper. He described them as burning navigation lights and moving into the beam of the centre searchlight, and he noted they were exchanging morse signals with Beacon Hill.³⁰ The *Adjutant* had hastily laid a double row of ten magnetic mines off Pencarrow Head directly in front of the main entrance to Port Nicholson. They sank to the bottom, designed to be set off by vessels over 5,000 tons.³¹

Waters, the Official Historian, has suggested that there were no suspicious sightings at either port during the two nights in question.³² With regard to the Wellington mining, this was not the case. The activity described by Lieutenant Karsten suggested some sort of response to the appearance of the whale chaser.

A report by Major C.A. Williamson, the Deputy Fire Commander at Beacon Hill noted that he and Lieutenant-Commander Bottomley had been alerted at 0018 hours by the Port War Signal Station at Baring Head about the sighting of a dark object.³³ The sighting was reported to the Naval Control Service and Army District Headquarters.³⁴ It would seem the timings described by Karsten were slightly out. Nevertheless, the descriptions on file by at least two observers fitted the *Adjutant* very well. The Duty Officer at the Fire Commander's Post on Beacon Hill, Captain Mathers, viewed the vessel this way:

...[the vessel] had a foremast and a high bow similar to the tug *Toia*. Distinctly saw wash as the vessel turned away. Definitely showed no lights and gave impression that she was attempting to pass Baring Head without being detected, very close in...³⁵

The little fishing boat was manoeuvring in a position almost directly between the FCP on Beacon Hill and Baring Head. At the coastal battery's Forward Observation Post co-located with the Naval Port War Signal Station at Baring Head, Lance-Bombardier Blackett, reported that a searchlight beam gave a good description of the nature of the dark object:

...when [the] beam [of the searchlight] was exposed, [it] disclosed small vessel 2 masts, funnel and bridge amidships...³⁶

This description also fitted the *Adjutant*. Others at the FOP saw the vessel too as it turned and attempts were made to get the range, but were prevented by 'smoke' or 'haze'. [sic]³⁷

It would seem that the mines had been laid in haste at a greater speed than desirable, and not quite as close as intended. While the anonymous intruder had scurried away, the minelaying was completed. No pursuit was mounted after the small vessel sighted, and the *Adjutant* got clear away. The alarm had been raised, but an opportunity missed. Although she headed off at her full speed of fourteen knots, the little raider's engine had persistently given trouble over the past few days. She was compelled to stop at 0440 hours about seventy miles off the coast. She limped on, the engine knocking badly, and it was not until five days later that she made a rendezvous with Ship 45, the *Komet*, northeast of the Chatham Islands.³⁸ This missed opportunity of interception of the raider was more than compensated for shortly after the mines were laid. Just six hours later the cruiser HMNZS *Achilles* steamed over the mines into Wellington Harbour.³⁹ Nothing happened – the mines, for some reason, did not go off. They still lie there today.

The Naval Officer-in-Charge, Wellington, noted in a memorandum to the Naval Secretary later that day that the sighting by the shore battery was not suspicious, and that he was 'practically certain' the vessel was a fishing vessel called the *Korowai*.⁴⁰ A minute on file of 1 July noted that the vessel was the *Korowai* taking the coastal route to Tokomaru Bay.⁴¹ The Naval Secretary sent a minute the next day to the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Wellington, to the CGS and the CAS noting that 'it is considered that the vessel' was the *Korowai*.⁴²

The events at the entrance to Port Nicholson on the night of 25-26 June demonstrate the fine line between what, one is tempted to suggest, farce and tragedy with regard to coastwatching. Had the mines gone off under *Achilles*, the responses from the shore stations and the patrol vessels would have come under heavy scrutiny, and no doubt

the attribution of the sighted boat's identity to the *Korowai* might have been less than acceptable. It should be noted that the coastwatchers had done their job: they sighted the little raider, could not identify it, and reported it, and measures were taken (the use of the searchlights). It is simply the case that those measures were not enough, that no attempt to apprehend the vessel was made, no pursuit mounted. If a repeat of the *Niagara* had occurred, involving New Zealand's most famous warship, or a later Cook Strait ferry, the night's operations would have become notorious. In the event, and not unexpectedly, the coastwatchers' observations were explained away.

The other established instances of this kind of close encounter around New Zealand have already been mentioned, so can be dealt with quite briefly here. On the night of 8-9 March 1942, the Japanese submarine I-25 entered Cook Strait from the west, and proceeded through on the surface under a full moon to Palliser Bay, passing within five miles of a well-lit Cook Strait ferry.⁴³ The I-25 remained unnoticed by the Port War Signal Station at Baring Head, the Fire Commander's Post at Beacon Hill, the Marine Department post on Cape Palliser and the Army coastwatching station at Cape Terawhiti.⁴⁴ In the early hours of 9 March, the I-25's floatplane launched off Palliser Bay, and the aircraft flew over Wellington Harbour. It returned unnoticed to the submarine, which retrieved it, and headed up the East Coast of the North Island.⁴⁵ Once more, a lack of vigilance allowed the enemy to pass unremarked.

In the Bay of Plenty on 13 March, the I-25's floatplane was launched once more, this time on a return flight to Auckland to reconnoitre Waitemata Harbour, which it did successfully.⁴⁶ The submarine was sighted at 2130M/13 March by the fishing vessel *Waimana* to the west of Cape Runaway, and 'hydrophone effects' were picked up near

the same location by HMS *Viti* at 2130M/13 March.⁴⁷ A further report was made by a fisherman, Mr. George Meredith, of Tauranga.⁴⁸ He had had the unpleasant experience of anchoring his launch in Honeymoon Bay at Mayor Island in the small hours of 13 March, to get an early start for the day's fishing. As the sky lightened with the dawn, he discovered his launch had company. Less than 800 metres away lay the I-25. He and his companions kept still, and after ten minutes there was a boom and a cloud of black smoke from the submarine as her engines started. After a short time she turned away to the east. Meredith's launch slipped out, kept inshore to Southeast Bay, and headed for Tauranga, which he made by mid-morning.⁴⁹ He reported to the Chairman of the Harbour Board and a controller of the Emergency Precautions Scheme. An emergency meeting of the EPS committee was held, and the members laughed at the reported sighting.⁵⁰ The NOIC Auckland was notified. All the reports were duly noted by the Navy, although the assessment was that the *Waimana* had probably mistaken the *Viti* for a submarine.⁵¹ This was unlikely, for the *Viti* in no way resembled the I-25.

In May 1942 the Japanese submarine I-21, the command boat for the Sydney Harbour raid, was en route to Sydney via New Zealand. The I-21 launched her aircraft in the early hours of 24 May, a discreet 140 miles off Auckland.⁵² There was fog over Auckland, and the aircraft briefly lost its way. Obliging, the airfield lights at Auckland airport were turned on for what sounded like a low flying aircraft in distress. This was enough to re-orientate the crew, and the floatplane made the return journey to the submarine without trouble.⁵³

Both of these visits came to light much later, according to the COIC General Intelligence Summary no.13 of 28 November 1944. Headed:

12. JAPANESE SUBMARINES IN NEW ZEALAND WATERS.

Evidence of Japanese U-Boat activity off New Zealand and Australia in 1942 is corroborated by a translation of a captured enemy document recording the use of submarine borne aircraft for reconnaissance. The document states that flights were made over Wellington and Auckland in March 1942, and over Auckland in May 1942. The flights in March were made from the I-25 and the May flights from the I-21.⁵⁴

The Summary then went on to note the details of the sightings in the Bay of Plenty and the interpretation placed on them at that time, including the fisherman's report from Tauranga.⁵⁵

The early part of 1942 was a fraught time in New Zealand. It might have been expected that there was a heightened degree of watchfulness. It is remarkable that Cook Strait ferries were travelling lit up at this period the war, or that aircraft incursions could be made unchallenged over Auckland and Wellington. The same could be said for Sydney, which was to have a lesson on the consequences of being incautious, in the form of the Sydney Harbour raid.

Apart from the tracking of Japanese submarines by H/F D/F, REB and the local radar posts in 1943 and 1944, the last close encounter with the enemy was with the German submarine U862 in January 1945. Once more, a total lack of caution ashore and a return to peacetime procedures was perceived by the U-boat's crew.⁵⁶ U-862 seems to have encountered less difficulties than the *Orion* in 1940. There were certainly better anti-submarine defences in place in Auckland and Wellington at that time, in terms of indicator loop systems and patrol craft, but there was little danger in getting in close in Gisborne and Napier, or loitering with intent off Cape Brett or Cook Strait. There had been a possible lapse in coastwatching at the Portland Island Marine Lighthouse, although this remains unproven.

The problem of false, inaccurate or inconclusive sighting reports was always a hazard of the coastwatching business, and from early on in the war difficulties surrounded these. Some were simply incredible, others less so. The effect of them cumulatively made for scepticism on the part of those receiving the reports. One interesting example right at the heart of the COIC occurred in the small hours one night in 1942, when a watchkeeper woke Commander Hannay, the senior Duty Officer, to say that an unidentified aircraft was flying over Wellington. Hannay was said to have growled 'It's probably just a seagull with some burning waste up its arse.' And went back to sleep.⁵⁷ What follows is a small sample of the kinds of things that could contribute to ambiguity and disbelief.

A signal from the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Auckland, to Navy Office, Wellington at 1930M/27 March 1942 noted a report from Great Barrier Island. A small vessel was seen between the Barrier and Channel Island at 1600 hours on Wednesday. It disappeared suddenly, giving the impression that it submerged. The:

Day before our wireless transmitter was jammed at 1700, for 30 minutes. At 6am today fishing boat "Tryphena" reported a loud explosion near the boat and smoke – master called in to complain that he had been shelled.⁵⁸

The message came from Great Barrier at 1625, was at District Headquarters at 1905, and was sent by NOIC Auckland to the Navy Office in Wellington twenty-five minutes later. This was then followed by an exchange of signals between the DNI in Wellington and NOIC Auckland to get further information, including an enquiry as to whether anything had come in from the Army coastwatching station at Port Jackson, Cape Colville. Nothing came of the enquiries.

On 1 April the Marine Department post at East Cape reported to NOIC Auckland, who relayed to Navy Office Wellington that:

2 ships sighted without lights off Hick's Bay.
2052M/1⁵⁹

Another unidentified ship was sighted by the 'watchers at East Cape' on 3 April at 1711 hours, so NOIC Auckland informed NOW at 1713 hours. Less than an hour later NOW signalled NOIC, Auckland, at 1811 hours a possible identification as the 'Waipiata?'⁶⁰

Another report was a commentary on the state of the local coastwatcher's communications, as much as the content of the message. A roundabout message was received at 1110 hours on 13 April from the Police Commissioner who had a telephone message from the Police Inspector in Greymouth at 1055 that the:

Coast Watching Station at Okarito reported to the Police at Wataroa [sic] that at 1a.m. today two lights were seen out to sea about 17 miles away travelling north. Only visible for about ten minutes then disappeared.⁶¹

The police noted that the lights seen was probably the steam vessel *Totara*.

Nearly a year after the *Adjutant*, there was a greater readiness for action in Wellington, particularly in the wake of the Sydney Harbour debacle. At 0015 hours on 20 June 1942, the Fire Commander's Post on Beacon Hill sent a sighting report to Navy Office that 'small vessels' had been picked up by searchlights and a search was proceeding.⁶² The minesweeper HMNZS *Futurist* was one of the searching units. Later that morning, the *Futurist* encountered an intruder. At 1020 hours the Staff Officer (Operations) sent a signal to COMSOPAC that a minesweeper had sighted a submerging submarine at 0710 hours, 240 degrees and six miles off Baring Head. Sailing from Wellington were suspended, and if necessary a broadcast to shipping would follow.⁶³

At 1245 hours the US naval radio station in Auckland signalled the Cypher Office at Navy Office that they were sending a submarine warning to all US warships in the South Pacific and to COMSOWESPAC, CINCPAC, COMINICH and COMAIRSOPAC, and requesting the RNZN to send a signals to all other warships in the area, and to notify the NZNB that these messages were being sent.⁶⁴

By 1620 the RNZN had decided to take precautionary measures. The NOIC Wellington signalled that all navigational aids in Port Nicholson were to be extinguished immediately after the sailing of the ferry *Rangitira*. Sailings for all vessels over 400 tons were suspended from 1730 to 0700. Lighting over areas facing the harbour was to be put out other than that required for handling cargo.⁶⁵

This was indeed decisive action. However, the written reports that followed after the return of the *Futurist* to port revealed some disagreements about what had been seen, and suggested certain deficiencies on the part of the minesweeper's crew. Captain Elyuious, the NOIC Wellington, was particularly critical.⁶⁶ It probably confirmed his scepticism about sighting reports like that of the fishing vessel *Korowai* the previous year.

A signal from the NZNB to all British merchant shipping at 0100 on 31 August 1942 reported that gunfire had been heard on the Chathams from the direction of Pitt Island just after midnight on 30 August.⁶⁷ It was another alarming report not substantiated. The worst kind of report was the hoax, and an example of this occurred in Northland. Under the heading 'Perverted Sense of Humour' in COIC General Intelligence Summary of 16 November 1944 it was noted that a person had caused needless difficulties with unreliable sighting reports of submarines off Reef Point at the

southern end of Ninety Mile Beach. The 'Humourist' produced a report and photograph of a submarine he claimed to have sighted. He indeed sighted a submarine, but on close analysis it turned out to be a model in a bucket of water, which would result in 'considerable trouble for the photographer'!⁶⁸

Lights, gunfire, shapes, an aircraft carrier off New Plymouth, submarines that may have been whales, mixed in with the odd concrete evidence of the enemy's close proximity, made for intelligence noise, promoted cynicism, and possibly resulted in a lowering of the guard. It only took a very short period of inattention for a real intruder to pass by unseen. This was compounded by the cold fact that large stretches of coast were not watched by anyone for long periods of time.

Approval for eleven extra coastwatching stations around the North Island had been given in the middle of 1942, but not all of these, nor a proposed one on Stewart Island, were put into operation. In the early part of 1943 with the improvement in the war in the South Pacific, the War Cabinet approved on 25 May a large reduction in the number of coastwatching posts.⁶⁹ Of the total of seventy-six stations, seventeen were abandoned and thirteen reduced to care and maintenance. The latter remained fully equipped and could be immediately used in an emergency. Later in 1943, nine more were abandoned and seven others reduced to maintenance level, leaving thirty in operation.⁷⁰ At the end of April 1944, a bare twenty-one coastwatching stations were listed, with Auckland retaining five, Wellington nine, Lyttelton five and Dunedin two.⁷¹ The reporting system stayed constant, that is, the posts reported to the Naval Officer-in-Charge of the main port, who in turn reported to the DNI in Wellington. This level would

fall further. By 11 July 1945, only twenty coastwatching and radar stations around the New Zealand coast were operational.⁷²

This was quite a reduction, and it has already been suggested that by the time of the intrusion of U-862 in January 1945, the dwindling number of posts reflected a considerable dilution of the watch. Basic coastwatching had been too little too late to begin with, and was now being wound back too soon. The advent of a different form of coastwatching modified the rapid decline a little. This was the use of shore-based radar interwoven with the traditional coastwatching posts and port defences. Before turning to the radar stations, however, a short digression is necessary to note another form of watching that made a brief appearance on the New Zealand scene.

An Air Observer Corps was set up by the RNZAF to facilitate the rapid reporting of incursions or raids by enemy aircraft. The Chief of Air Staff outlined in some detail these proposals to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which became the basis for COS Paper no.133 of 25 May 1942.⁷³ The Observer Corps system would incorporate the existing coastwatching system but 'amplified' by observer posts at military centres, aerodromes and other points. All observer posts would be connected to observer centres, and these in turn would be linked to a reporting centre at each of the Combined Headquarters in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. It was noted that the existing landline system used by the Navy was 'inadequate for the transmission of reports' of air movements, which needed to be rapidly sent to Fighter Headquarters 'without delay.'⁷⁴ The construction of 'Radio Location Stations' was acknowledged, but it was clearly felt that an Observer Corps system would fill in the gaps in tracking the movements of enemy aircraft.

The establishment of the observer reporting centres would supplement 'the existing air warning system' which might be damaged or suffer breakdown; provide 'the only accurate source' on types and numbers of enemy aircraft, while giving warning to areas not yet covered.⁷⁵ Inland targets would get some warning, and should the enemy 'get established' in the Dominion, there could be 'more complete observation of the movements of enemy aircraft.'⁷⁶

Communications were clearly the key to this, with special priorities needed over existing landlines, and special lines would be required from the Observer Centres to the Combined Headquarters. There were going to be complications in the provision of extra lines by a quite hard-pressed P&T Department. It seemed that even in simple terms there would need to be one or two switching points and exchanges between the Observer Posts and the Observer Centres, according to the P&T Department.⁷⁷

The Observer Centres were not to be on the coast, and the density of posts was related to the appreciation of the vulnerability and importance of the area as regards invasion or raids.⁷⁸ It was considered that the use of the coastwatching stations, aerodromes, Vital Points guards, and military headquarters could be made without needing to develop 'an extensive volunteer system or the fulltime employment of a large number of civilians for these duties.' In isolated areas, it might be necessary to get the voluntary co-operation of farmers or other civilians 'for some hours during the day.' Small staffs would be needed for the training and running of the Observer Centres and Observer Posts in each locality. The Observer Corps was to be developed on a priority basis from north to south,⁷⁹ it being assumed that the main threat would come from the north. It was noted that inland posts need not be manned continuously. Some seventeen

Observer Centres of varying priority were envisaged for the North Island. Thus, to give three examples, the Observer Centre at Kaitaia (Priority A/1) was to have nine Observer Posts of which three were existing coastwatching or radar stations); the Warkworth Observer Centre (Priority A/4) had three Observer Posts; while Auckland (Priority A/1) had eleven Observer Posts.⁸⁰ The Auckland Observer Centre's posts consisted of: the naval coastwatching station on Tiri Tiri Matangi, the army coastwatching post on Waiheke Island, posts at Clevedon, Papakura, Pukekohe, Otau, Waipipi, the Harbour Board coastwatching station at Manukau Heads, the radar station in the Waitakeres, and posts at Helensville and Silverdale. An inland Observer Centre at Hamilton (Priority A/3) had Observer Posts at Raglan, Ngaruawahia, Te Aroha, Morrinsville, Matamata, Tirau, Te Awamutu, and the Guards Vital Points posts at Arapuni and Horahora.⁸¹

The War Cabinet took note of COS Paper no.133 on 4 June, although approval had already been given for the formation of the Observer Corps.⁸² The Observer Corps Centres were located in buildings in towns, eg the Union Bank Building in Hamilton, the Laloma Tearooms in Blenheim, and Wardell's Building in Christchurch.⁸³ Each of the Observer Posts was to be manned by six or more people, equipped with binoculars and connected by phone to the Observer Centres. One of the main sources of personnel was to be the Home Guard.⁸⁴

The Observer Corps was never completed, and operated on a reduced basis. On 6 July 1943, a memorandum recorded that the Chiefs of Staff perceived a reduced level of threat. The strategic situation had changed, New Zealand was not likely to be invaded, heavy air attack on New Zealand was no longer feasible, New Zealand airfields were not likely to be attacked, and any enemy aircraft operations were likely to be small scale.⁸⁵ It

was assumed there would be six months' warning of a change for the worse flagged by a deterioration in the 'Forward Area' to the north. In the event of a surprise attack there would be no time to get a full Observer Corps into operation, and it would be the radar posts and the coastwatching stations that would report aircraft movements. This situation therefore did 'not justify the retention in being of an Observer Corps organisation', and it was decided to let the Observer Corps lapse until the resumption of Alert level 3.⁸⁶

If the Observer Corps was to pass quietly away, the radar stations introduced a durable medium-ranged surveillance option that continued into the postwar period and beyond. Once the fear of invasion subsided, the radar stations obviated the need for the Observer Corps. The radar stations were in the long run permanently to alter in certain respects how the watch off the coast was kept.

The operation of radio location sets is neatly encapsulated in this DSIR memorandum.

In radio location a short burst of radio waves on very short wavelengths is sent out and reflected back by the object to be detected. Time to and from the object is measured and this gives the range, the measurement being carried out by a cathode ray tube, a device which sweeps a beam of electrons across a fluorescent screen...time for the waves to go 1,000 yards and back is 6 microseconds...⁸⁷

Radar gave a visual representation with a greater range than line of sight and a position bearing on the physical object. It could, and did, however, pick up a lot of clutter, like waves, whales and kelp, for instance, so it was by no means infallible. Dr.E. Marsden, a physicist and the Director of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, travelled to England in 1939 to find out about a 'secret device connected with air defence'. Two radar sets - one ground set and an airborne air-to-surface vessel (ASV) set - were ordered by the Government. Marsden brought back many drawings and

specifications and the ASV set in October.⁸⁸ The ground radar set is said to have been used for training at the RNZAF Electrical and Wireless School at Wigram, and was sent to Fiji after the opening of the war with Japan.⁸⁹

It should be noted in passing that the design of a number of different radar sets was later undertaken by Professor F.W.G. White and Mr.T.R. Pollard of Canterbury University College and D.M. Hall and F.A. McNeill of the DSIR. Further work in new radar development was carried out at the Wellington East Post Office by C.W.N. Watson-Munro, E.R. Collins and I.K. Walker.⁹⁰

The Wellington firm of Collier & Beale (whose radio sets were extensively used in the interception of enemy signals) built the first operational ground radar set in New Zealand. This was set up at Fort Motutapu off Waitemata Harbour by the DSIR. This Tower set gave a warning of the approach of aircraft up to forty miles plus, and to the horizon for surface vessels.⁹¹

Ship Warning and Ship Warning Gunnery radar sets were installed in the major warships *Achilles*, *Leander* and *Monowai* during late 1941 and early 1942, and twenty ASV sets made by the P&T Department equipped the Vildebeeste torpedo-bombers and the Airspeed Oxford training aircraft.⁹² The Radio Physics Board, comprising the Chiefs of Staff, the Director DSIR, the Director-General of the P&T Department and the Secretary ONS, set the policy priorities to do with the manufacture of radar. These were aircraft and ships first, coastwatching second, and coastal defence last.⁹³ Apart from ships and aircraft, it was thought fifteen Coast Warning sets were needed, along with four Chain Low Flying sets and sixteen Coast Defence sets, plus a small number of more specialised sets. The Navy's radar requirements were for ships and coastwatching ; the

Army for coastal battery range finding, anti-aircraft batteries and the control of searchlights; the Air Force's requirements centred on airborne sets, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) beacons, and the ground radars for the approach of aircraft. The manufacture of radar sets and the training of personnel for service overseas became one of the features of radar development in New Zealand.

The Chiefs of Staff's decision to set up sixteen radar coastwatching stations in New Zealand run by the Navy was approved by the War Cabinet in July 1940. These were to be located to give cover to the approaches to the main harbours and Cook Strait and Foveaux Strait. They were to be self-contained stations, with a staff of an officer, eight or nine operators and two mechanics.⁹⁴

These quite comprehensive intentions were a little short of fulfilment over eighteen months later. The state of play by the end of 1941 showed that the six Army Shore Defence or Coast Warning radar stations were unfinished, the Navy's six Coast Warning stations were unfinished or 'not sited', and the Air Force's four CH and two CW radars were similarly incomplete, not least because of an uncertain supply of valves.⁹⁵

The RNZAF radar units were first organised into flights, and later into squadrons, so that, for instance, Special Radio Flight No.1 became 60 Squadron; SRF No.2 became 61 Squadron. SRF No.1 took in all the Air Force radar stations around Auckland. SRF No.2 looked after all RNZAF radar stations from New Plymouth to the Clarence River.⁹⁶ As examples around Auckland, RNZAF Radar Units Nos.1,2,4,5,6,and 7 were set up over nine months from mid-March 1942 to mid-January 1943. RNZAF Unit No.1 was the original radar station set up by the DSIR and P&T Department in 1940 on Motutapu Island. This was moved to Mokohinau Island late in 1941, and the Unit equipped with a

British Admiralty 79Z Tower set became operational on 16 March 1942, three days after I-25's aircraft flew over Auckland. This station was said to have picked up the floatplane from the I-21 in May 1942, but that the plots were 'disbelieved.' RNZAF Radar Unit No.2 at Hot Water Beach, Coromandel, was fully operational on 2 July 1942. Units 4, 5, and 6 were operational late in 1942, and Unit 7 in January 1943.⁹⁷

By May 1943 there were some sixteen radar stations operating around the coast, most of them in the North Island.⁹⁸ We have already noted in passing the alarm raised by the four RDF stations covering Cook Strait on the night of 3-4 November 1943, when the REB station was also alerted and the Fairmile motor launches from Wellington were sent out to check on a suspected submarine contact. The RDF stations did valuable work, but could be deceived. Three examples illustrate this quite well. On 26 February a radar bearing was made on a contact 180 degrees and twenty miles from the Flat Point RDF post, although a search by a Vincent from Rongotai proved fruitless.⁹⁹ During the night of 27-28 February radar plots were made at 2100 hours and 0138 hours off Godley Head. The search that followed was negative and a whale was sighted from Godley Head after dawn.¹⁰⁰ On 2 March 1943, there were three separate RDF contacts made by the Cape Egmont 'Air R.D.F.station No.11' between 1825 and 2057 hours. One of these was identified as a ship that left New Plymouth at 1800 hours. Another series of contacts remained unidentified from what was thought to be a vessel eight and a half miles east from Cape Egmont travelling four to eight miles from the coast between 1935 and 2000 hours. Weather conditions in the area at the time were 'misty rain' with visibility down to one mile.¹⁰¹

This is not to suggest the stations were always ineffective. Far from it. There were simply limitations of a different order from those of normal line of sight coastwatching. Contacts could be obtained, but identification was not so easy.

The radar units began to be reduced in 1944, partly because the war had moved north and partly because radar personnel were needed for service in the Pacific Islands.¹⁰² For instance, around Auckland, the RNZAF Radar Units Nos. 1 and 2 ceased operations in January and September, while control of Nos.4,5,6, and 7 were taken over by the Air Department.¹⁰³

The naval shore radar position in Auckland in April 1944 can be described as follows:

The port of Auckland is given radar coverage from Cape Brett by an older pattern CW radar and a similar set at Bream Head. Three microwave sets are situated at Great Barrier Island (Nagel Cove), Cape Rodney and Cape Colville, to guard the outer approaches to the Hauraki Gulf, whilst at Takapuna a British Naval Type 271 set operates in conjunction with the Army Coastal Artillery to cover the inner harbour approaches against possible attacks by submarines.¹⁰⁴

Radar Post No.4 on Cuvier Island had been reduced to care and maintenance, and Radar Post No.7 on Bream Head was similarly run down in late April. Down south around Wellington at this time,

The Cook Strait area is covered by four Naval Radar units situated on Stephens Island, Cape Campbell, Turakirae Head (adjacent to Baring Head) and Paekakariki. The two former are of the older CW pattern, whilst the two latter are microwave with CW sets in reserve.¹⁰⁵

The slow introduction of shore-based radar into New Zealand from as early as 1940, but more effectively from mid-1942 onwards, brought a new dimension to the watch off the coast. Coastwatching around New Zealand in certain localities now

consisted of a layering of line-of-sight stations, the relatively all-weather radar posts, and other specialised stations.

This interwoven system in the Wellington District, for example, was made up of radar posts, coastwatching stations, a coastal defence command post, a naval W/T station, a radio-fingerprinting station, and anti-submarine fixed defence stations. These comprised: the Radar Post MW 5 (microwave) at Turakirae, Radar Post MW 6 at Paekakariki, Radar Post No.9 on Cape Campbell, Radar Post No.11 and the War Signal Station on Stephens Island, the Coastwatching Station on Farewell Spit, the Coastwatching Station at Cape Terawhiti, the Brothers Coastwatching Station, the Port War Signal Station at Baring Head, the Fire Commander's Post on Beacon Hill, the Port W/T Station on Tinakori Hill, the Coastwatching Station on Cape Palliser and the Anti-Submarine Fixed Defence Station at Worser Bay. Still in the Wellington District were the Coastwatching Station at Robinhood Bay, the Port War Signal Station and the Anti-Submarine Fixed Defence Station in Queen Charlotte Sound, the W/T Station at Wedge Point, the War Signal Station in Tory Channel and the Blenheim W/T (REB) Station.¹⁰⁶ Further afield, but still under Wellington's jurisdiction, were the Port War Signal Station at Portland Island and the Coastwatching Station at East Cape, and the Waiouru W/T Station. The Blenheim REB station closed down in May, and the naval W/T Station at Tinakori was to be abandoned in June, transferring its work to Waiouru.¹⁰⁷

This was a considerable range of posts engaged wholly or partly in coastal surveillance in the Wellington area. All were connected to either the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Wellington, or directly to the Navy Office through the DNI and the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre. It looked impressive, but was it enough?

Although the radar coverage was far from complete, there were now larger areas watched over around-the-clock. Shore-based radar, related to H/F D/F and REB, greatly increased the effective use of the electronic spectrum for surveillance purposes in New Zealand. It was supplemented, of course, by the ASV radar mounted in patrol aircraft, while the few major warships were reasonably outfitted with SW and SWG sets. One of the by-products of this process may have been the growth of a comforting fallacy that radar replaced the need for vigilance on the coast. This could not have been further from the truth. Radar, like REB, was an extremely valuable supplementary tool. It needed to be used in conjunction with a range of other measures as part of a surveillance package, including line-of-sight coastwatching.

Coastwatching around the New Zealand coast, while always struggling against the geographical and demographic realities of too large a coastline and too few people, was at least an attempt to deal with a fundamental weakness. Belatedly leavened by radar and other means, it was not a total failure, so long as the enemy's activities remained modest and small scale. But chillingly, coastwatching did not cause any real discomfort to any enemy units close by, other than to briefly worry the crew of the *Adjutant* outside Pencarrow Head, or mildly concern U862 near Portland Island. A Cook Strait ferry sent to the bottom might have provided a salutary antidote to the illusion of security proffered by existing coastwatching operations.

A number of conclusions can be drawn concerning the effectiveness of coastwatching from New Zealand's shores. The first of these is the slow start in establishing a national system. New Zealand coastwatching underwent a long leisurely gestation period from the plans of 1929, the deliberations from 1937 onwards by the War

Watching Committee of the ONS, through to the projected sixty-two stations of 1940. The planned reduction of more than twenty posts in mid-1940 to leave thirty-five to thirty-eight stations in operation revealed muddled thinking on coastal surveillance at the highest level. From the top level of government, the ONS committees, that is, the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the War Watching Committee (renamed the Coastwatching Committee), appeared to minimize the risks of a slender watch on the coast, and were only dissuaded from cutting back drastically by direct enemy action. It took active enemy mines to put a brake on retrenchment for a time. Even then, the extra number of posts on the New Zealand shoreline was quite small. This was a reactive 'stop-go' approach to coastal surveillance, depending on a demonstrable enemy presence. It did not assist the development of an integrated surveillance system, if indeed that was the intention.

The thin spread of coastwatching posts pointed up the deficiencies. This was so thin that intermittent air patrols were conducted (weather permitting) to plug the vast gaps. While it may be conceded that a very thin line was unavoidable in absolute terms, it was abundantly clear that between sixty and eighty posts to cover the coastline was insufficient. Even where there was quite good coverage, as in Cook Strait, the cordon was still slender. Many posts, aside from the three main ports, were quite isolated.

The channeling of incoming intelligence from the coastwatching stations seemed to be on a firmer footing. The centralisation of reporting, with the flow of coastwatching intelligence to a central body, was essential if the sighting reports were to be of use at all. On the New Zealand shore, watching reports went via the local Naval Officer-in-Charge at Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch and onwards to the COIC.

The interweaving of the various kinds of watching posts and the radar stations in the areas of the three main ports hinted at ways of increasing potential strength with interlocking and overlapping surveillance. Line-of-sight coastwatching stations, coastal battery observation points, radar stations, anti-submarine fixed defences (indicator loop systems), patrol craft (and in daylight ASV-equipped aircraft) brought the possibilities of detecting intruders within reach. Combined on occasion with M/F or H/F direction-finding and REB, this was a reasonably credible mix. It indicated at the very least future directions for coastal surveillance, but it needed to be highly organised and well coordinated. The interwoven system, where it existed, was not quite that integrated, although it was a beginning. It may in fact have been a great missed opportunity.

The multi-departmental approach to coastwatching was a positive feature, affecting matters from policy to the personnel deployed at the stations. The representation of the civilian departments and the three services on the ONS War Watching Committee or Coastwatching Committee involved several departments from the outset. The Navy lay right at the centre of the system. The Army and the Air Force (in the radar stations) were committed in various ways. The P&T Department, as usual in these matters, provided a high level of support in both communications equipment and personnel. The Marine Department lighthouse chain gave an established series of fully manned posts. Even the Harbour Boards at the ports furnished personnel for coastwatching. Although there was a little inter-departmental friction, the participation of a diverse range of organisations spread the load.

Efficiency and effectiveness in the face of the enemy were in the end the measure of the watch on the coast. The tedium of looking for long hours out to sea worked

against the essential alertness and watchfulness coastwatching required. This was particularly so in backwaters where nothing unusual occurred for lengthy periods of time. Unfortunately, this aptly described the situation of most New Zealand coastwatching posts. The age-old problem of alarms, rumours, false sighting reports, mistakes and plain hoaxes conspired to furnish a layer of noise which distracted from the watch for the enemy, and made the recipients of coastwatching intelligence wary or cynical.

The unnoticed visit of the *Orion*, manifested with the detonation of an active mine, was a signal failure of the coastwatching stations in the approaches to Auckland, matched only, it may be said, by the slack watchkeeping on certain vessels in and out of the port over a seven hour period! In the wake of this mishap, and the sinking of the *Turakina* in the Tasman in August, it was surprising to note the doubts expressed by the Chiefs of Staff and Captain Rotherham in Auckland in early 1941 as to the usefulness of the coastwatching stations (down to reminders about binoculars). The small whale-chaser *Adjutant* further demonstrated this same lack of vigilance off Lyttelton by the station on Godley Head, a year after the *Niagara* sinking. Off Wellington, it was a little different. The alarm was raised by the coastwatching posts. The failure to heed further back in the system, which but for the fortuitious hitch in the German mines might have ended with the loss of HMNZS *Achilles* off Pencarrow Head. The overflight of Wellington in March 1942 by a Japanese aircraft showed a lack of alertness, as did the flights over Auckland in March and May. Only one radar post in Auckland was operational at this time. The unproven lack of vigilance at Portland Island in 1945 was more than matched by the slackness at Gisborne and Napier, where any watching posts seem to have been closed down. The use of lighthouses for navigation, the lights ashore

at night, and the indiscreet chatter of radio stations were most useful for both the *Orion* in 1940 and U-862 in 1945.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that coastwatching was largely a failure on the New Zealand shore for a variety of reasons, the most important of which was a lack of commitment and a lack of application to the task. Many posts were not, of course, put to the test. But as the most significant deficiencies in the watch occurred at the main ports, the prime targets of enemy interest (and focal points for merchant shipping), the coastwatching organisation was plainly not very effective. The Combined Operational Intelligence Centre in Wellington was not well served by the coastwatching posts on the New Zealand coast. Ironically it was better informed by coastwatchers on outlying and very remote islands.

Chapter Nine

Coastwatching – The Islands

New Zealand's island possessions were also to have coastwatching teams placed upon them, and New Zealand assumed coastwatching responsibilities extending to the tropics. There were different reasons and different approaches for this great arc of outlying coastwatching posts that stretched from the Southern Ocean far northwards to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The Gilberts lay in close proximity to the mandated Marshall Islands under Japanese rule, the main intelligence target area of the 'Y' Room in 1941.

The RAN's extensive coastwatching system in the western Pacific island territories was established earlier and was more effective than the New Zealand system thanks to the foresight of the RAN Director of Naval Intelligence, Commander Long, and his coastwatching organiser, Eric Feldt. The RAN took responsibility for coastwatching in the Solomons and the New Hebrides, and a number of New Zealand coastwatchers (including a few RNZN telegraphists) served with distinction during the Japanese occupation, notably Donald Kennedy (who gained a DSO) in the Solomons.

New Zealand's island coastwatching was slower to get off the ground. The coastwatching activities run by New Zealand from the sub-Antarctic to the tropics was incremental in its development. Thus Fanning Island and Pitcairn along with the Cooks were the first to come into focus. German raiders operating in New Zealand waters spurred the development of posts on the Chathams, the Auckland and Campbell Islands and the Kermadecs, and were a factor in the extension of the co-ordination of

coastwatching across a range of Pacific Island groups. The Japanese entry into the war underlined this expansion which anticipated the outbreak of hostilities in December 1941. This New Zealand-British initiative resulted in the establishment of a Controller of Pacific Communications, effectively a co-ordinator of coastwatching based in Suva, working to Wellington. Networks of parent stations and outstations were set up in Fiji, the Gilbert & Ellice Islands, the Phoenix group, Samoa, the Cooks, Tonga and Fanning. The widening of New Zealand island coastwatching responsibilities is the subject here, and to the north this was to be tested by direct contact with the enemy.

The first post to be set up was of a different kind, for particular reasons, and one of the furthest away. During August 1939 HMS *Leander* transported a platoon of thirty soldiers and two officers to the cable station at Fanning Island to the north of the Equator. This was to prevent a repeat of the First World War experience when one of Von Spee's cruisers made a surprise raid and damaged the cable link with New Zealand. The New Zealand Army established coastwatching posts in the Fanning Group, the main station being at the cable station on Fanning with the callsign VQN, and subsidiary posts at English Harbour and Washington (BYM). A post was also set up on Christmas Island (ZGZ). The number of troops on Fanning increased in 1941 to company strength, rising to 113 all ranks. Fanning was taken over by 150 American troops in May 1942.¹

Another far-flung outpost was the British possession of Pitcairn Island, refuge of the *Bounty* mutineers. In late 1939, Nelson Dyett who was a 'ham' radio operator and married to a Pitcairn Islander, was approached by the Navy to establish a coastwatching post on the island. He took his own home-built transmitter, set up his station on Pitcairn in December 1939, and was provided with the Playfair Code for communications. He

had previously worked for the T&G Insurance Company, and was essentially an amateur spy in Government service.² His civilian status ought to be noted, along with those civilians in many other posts, for this had its own hazards, as will presently be seen. The Pitcairn post got operational quickly and remained that way until much later in the war.

The GBMS (Great Britain Merchant Ships) station in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands became the parent station for all coastwatching outposts in the Cook Islands. One of the first of these was the station set up on uninhabited Suwarrow or Suvarov Island in October 1940, as it was regarded as one of the few such islands in the South Pacific with a really good anchorage, which would be useful for enemy surface ships.³ A party of three were put ashore on Suwarrow on by the Government schooner *Tagua* on 26 October. It consisted of a surveyor from the Public Works Department, a P&T wireless operator and a native assistant.⁴ On 29 December a hurricane struck the island, with seas breaking over large parts of it.⁵ A proportion of stores were lost. In January 1941 a somewhat plaintive request for relief was made, but the new party did not arrive until April.⁶ The expansion of the war did not affect Suwarrow, but another hurricane in February 1942 did a great deal of damage, with waters rising up the trunk of the tree where coastwatchers had taken refuge and waves over twenty feet high breaking over the beach. The radio was destroyed and it took over a month before a set cobbled together from parts made contact with Rarotonga again.⁷ The *Tagua* arrived with a third party on 7 June, this time consisting of a radio operator and two soldiers. A concrete and Jarrah log twenty foot tower was built before the next hurricane season.⁸ Unfortunately, the radio operator fell out with the two soldiers, so he and his radio were housed in a tent some distance away.⁹ The hurricanes were the only matters of significance on Suwarrow

for the entire war. The station was transferred to the Air Department as a meteorological post in July 1945 and subsequently closed.¹⁰

Much closer to home were the Chatham Islands. The P&T Department radio station in the Chathams conducted a coastwatching service from the beginning, as a memorandum of 28 June 1940 makes clear.¹¹ In 1941 following the sinking of the *Holmwood* which plied between the Chathams and the mainland, there was increasing apprehension on the islands about possible raider activity. A signal on 30 January 1942 noted the:

Disappearance of 97 sheep MANGERE ISLAND (44 degrees 16' S 176 degrees 18' W) between August and late November, indicates possible raider responsibility. D/F fixes 28th September, and 4th October may connect.¹²

The unease engendered led to a Security Intelligence Bureau officer being despatched to the islands to report on the situation. This report in June 1942 was taken into account in part, when it was decided to set up a number of posts throughout the Chathams equipped with 15 watt transportable R/T sets which would communicate with a central post. War Cabinet approval was granted on 23 June,¹³ and the Chathams' coastwatching organisation was established with the covername 'HAT'. The personnel strength on the Chathams was one officer and twenty other ranks. The main station, HAWK, was at Waitangi (ZLC) with posts on Manakau (WREN), Kiangaroo (ROBIN), Matakaitaki (THRUSH) and Pitt Island (PENGUIN). Waitangi communicated with Wellington by W/T.¹⁴ The Chathams coastwatching stations operated through until March 1944, when WREN and THRUSH were closed, and then ceased completely by July.¹⁵

Far to the south of New Zealand, the Auckland Islands and Campbell Island lay in remote forbidding waters. Back in September 1938, a letter from the Minister of

Industries and Commerce to the Minister of Marine had drawn attention to a report by L.C. Walker of the Latex Rubber Co. on 'The Influence of the Auckland Islands on New Zealand's Defence', accompanied by a letter from R.A. Falla on the neglect of scientific investigation in the Auckland Islands.¹⁶ Walker had noted the comments of the French explorer D'Urville on the potential of Port Ross and Carnley Harbour as natural refuges, while Falla had noted that natural science investigation of the islands had been largely limited to visits in 1909 and 1929. In April and May 1939, F.R. Field wrote to the Governor-General expressing concern about the possibility of a hostile power taking Port Ross, only three hundred miles from New Zealand and using it as a base from which to attack New Zealand and Australia, noting the attributes of Carnley Harbour and Port Ross as anchorages.¹⁷

The Chiefs of Staff took a different view in July, however, noting that the Auckland Islands were four thousand miles from the nearest Japanese base in the Marshalls, and that they were unlikely to make use of such a base so far south. The Chiefs of Staff thought a visit from a naval vessel from time to time was sufficient.¹⁸

The cruiser *Leander* visited the Auckland Islands and Campbell Island at the end of September. Having closely examined Campbell Island on 28 September, the next day she inspected Port Ross, steamed down the east side of the main island and stood off two miles from the eastern entrance to Carnley Harbour in a gale, the visibility down to six miles between squalls. As nothing was seen, she departed for Wellington on 1 October.¹⁹ This was not the same as confirming that nothing was there. The cruiser returned to the islands in November, sailed in to Carnley Harbour, and examined some inlets, as well as going to Port Ross, checking out other inlets with the ship's aircraft.²⁰

By the end of 1940, there was a change of tune. The *Niagara* in June revealed just how close the war could come. In August the merchantman *Turakina* had been sunk by an unknown raider in the Tasman en route to Wellington (this was the *Orion* again). The loss of the small Chathams' steamer *Holmwood* on 25 November and the *Rangitane* two days later confirmed the ability of German raiders to range freely in New Zealand waters.²¹ The possibility arose that the raiders might be using southern uninhabited islands as bases. This was fuelled by the fact that one of the *Turakina*'s survivors related that after the *Turakina* was sunk the raider had gone far south, and the prisoners had glimpsed steep cliffs and snow.²²

In December 1940, approval was granted by the War Cabinet for parties to be placed on Campbell Island and the Auckland Islands, and on 21 January approval for financing the setting up of coastwatching stations at Carnley Harbour, Port Ross and Perseverance Harbour was granted.²³ The covername for the operation was the CAPE EXPEDITION, which began when the schooner *Tagua* left Wellington on 5 March 1941. There was not a little apprehension as to what might be found. In mid-February two unidentified southbound ships had been sighted off the coast of New Guinea (as it turned out these were the *Orion* and her supply ship *Ole Jacob*). Added to a sighting report of the German pocket-battleship *Admiral Scheer* heading south in the Indian Ocean on 22 February, it was surmised that these vessels might have met somewhere in southern waters.²⁴

The arrival of the *Tagua* at Port Ross on 10 March, and the entry to Carnley Harbour three days later, was rather cautious. If the enemy was encountered, the occupants of the schooner were to say they were on a fishing trip, which was a trifle thin

as a cover story. On board were portable huts, stores for many months, radio equipment and code-books. As this first party of coastwatchers were all civilians on what was obviously a military expedition, this would have entitled the enemy to summarily execute them.²⁵ This careless oversight was to be repeated again and again.

The lack of the enemy's presence did not dispel the fears immediately. At the head of the North Arm of Carnley Harbour, around five acres of bush had been recently cleared by persons unknown. It had been suspected that the German merchantman *Erlangen* which hurriedly put to sea on 26 August 1939 from Dunedin with insufficient coal aboard might have gone south to collect wood. So it turned out, and subsequent German accounts confirmed she was anchored in the North Arm of Carnley Harbour for five weeks taking aboard four hundred tons of wood to be able to steam to a neutral port. It is clear that while *Leander* lay off Carnley Harbour at the end of September, the *Erlangen* lay concealed inside.²⁶ When conducting searches, it paid to be thorough.

The Cape Expedition provided a dramatic contrast in living and operating conditions to stations elsewhere. Three shore radio stations were set up, No.1 at Port Ross (ZLB2), No.2 at Carnley Harbour on Auckland Island, and No.3 at Perseverance Harbour on Campbell Island.²⁷ They reported directly to Awarua Radio (ZLB). Only one signal a day at staggered hours was made at the start. The small 57 ton motor vessel *Ranui* remained for use as required, its four-man crew looking after an observation post at her anchorage at Waterfall Inlet on Auckland Island. Each station had a dinghy and outboard motor.²⁸

Portable double-plywood huts with double-paned windows were constructed, and three years' food supply was provided, as relief from New Zealand was unpredictable.

Wild pigs and cattle and rabbits on the Auckland Islands and sheep on Campbell Island added fresh meat to the diet. Clothing was abundant, and windproof material was of fundamental importance as cloud cover was more or less permanent and the wind constant. To begin with, the emphasis was on concealment, and emergency radio posts were set up away from the shore stations.²⁹

For administrative purposes, the personnel came under the Aerodrome Services Branch of the Public Works Department, an interesting departure from the other coastwatching stations. The numbers of personnel were small, a mere fifteen to eighteen in 1941, rising to twenty in 1943 and 1944, and dropping back to nine in 1945. Only four men were located at each post in 1941, and five from 1942. All staff were civilians, but they were all inducted or 'attested' into the Army as privates in December 1942. Geologists and naturalists were members of the second and subsequent relief parties. Surveyors were also sent down, so a good deal of scientific work was carried out over the years.³⁰

In June 1942 daily weather reports were sent by signal and from 1943 meteorologists were based in the islands. Over the whole period, only two Allied merchant ships were sighted by the northern coastwatchers, one westbound on 21 July 1943 and the other eastbound on 15 October. Another small task was that of research to do with the ionosphere, collecting data on shortwave radio reception for Awarua.³¹ The closest the enemy came after the islands were occupied was a long way to the north, when U-862 rounded the south of New Zealand in January 1945.

When the coastwatching parties were finally withdrawn in 1945, the Perseverance Harbour station on Campbell Island was retained as a permanent meteorological station.³²

The coastwatching stations in the Auckland Islands and Campbell Island had not been failures in any direct sense, although they were not put to the test. They simply represented a wise precautionary measure, a tripwire that wasn't tripped.

Two coastwatching stations were set up on Raoul Island in the Kermadecs to the north of New Zealand around August 1941. The staff of these posts, two operators and four soldiers, lived in a Public Works Department camp in the north of the island. A hut was built on the south coast to look out over Denham and Boat Cove, about a mile and a half from the camp which was linked by field telephone. Raoul (ZME) linked direct with Wellington Radio (ZLW), although a constant watch was kept by Auckland Radio.³³

The Auckland Islands and Campbell Island along with the Chathams and the Kermadecs formed an outer chain of stations connected directly to New Zealand. Further to the north, leaving aside the special position of Fanning Island with its cable station, New Zealand was to exercise effective operational control of a large number of coastwatching posts scattered across the island territories of the South Pacific. These comprised the farthest away coastwatching commitments, and had to be organised somewhat differently.

It seems that as early as July 1939, the Commodore Commanding the New Zealand Station raised the subject in Suva of co-ordinating coastwatching and communications in a reporting network in the South Pacific. It was left to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific and Governor of Fiji, Sir Harry Luke, to sort out. Rather familiarly, by early 1941, nothing effective had been done! The alarm was raised by the Communication Advisory Committee which noted that there were seven authorities controlling communications: the Colonial Secretary in Suva, the New Zealand

armed services in Fiji, Amalgamated Wireless Australasia (AWA), the Department of External Affairs (NOT the Department formed in 1943 but its tiny predecessor that mainly looked after Samoa), the Cook Islands Department and the Tongan Government.³⁴

The Committee urged that the British Government be asked to request the New Zealand Government to appoint under New Zealand direction a Controller of Communications in the Pacific Islands.³⁵ The Chairman, Mr.W.R. Newall followed this up with a letter on 5 February to the Secretary ONS in Wellington. This was passed on to the War Cabinet, which was 'startled', and the matter was handed over to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for deliberation.³⁶

A meeting was held in the office of the CNS on 19 March 1941. Sir Harry Luke, the CNS, the CAS, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary ONS, the 2nd Naval Member, the SSO (Nicholson), and the GSO1 (Goss) from Army Headquarters were present. They discussed ONS Papers no.169 and 170, respectively entitled 'Control and Co-ordination of Radio Communications in South Pacific Area' and 'Coast Watching Organization in the South Pacific.'³⁷ A number of decisions were taken to put to Cabinet, and it was noted that Sir Harry Luke had agreed to the proposals. These included that a New Zealand Controller of Pacific Radio Communications be appointed and based in Suva, assisted by the Governor of Fiji, and that if war broke out the Controller became directly responsible to the New Zealand Government for operational control of Pacific communications. European wireless operators were required for Tonga and the Gilbert and Ellice Island groups. The operators were to be required for a period of six months or more. It was noted that because of isolation, it was proposed that each operator might be accompanied by two soldiers drawn from 8th New Zealand Brigade

(around eighteen men and nine civilian operators). Colonel Goss saw no difficulty in making these arrangements.³⁸

Mr.L.H. Steel was appointed as Controller of Pacific Communications on 28 June 1941. He was to advise and co-ordinate and liaise with the Governor of Fiji/High Commissioner for the Western Pacific on radio communications of all kinds. It was noted that the Director-General of the New Zealand P&T Department would continue to control and coordinate all wireless traffic between New Zealand and its dependencies, but Steel could advise and take independent action on urgent matters.³⁹

Suva had obvious advantages as a control centre for South Pacific communications as it already had a powerful radio station, was linked by cable to New Zealand, Australia and Canada (through Fanning Island), and was centrally located. Apart from the central station on Viti Levu, the main coastwatching stations in Fiji were located on Vanua Levu, Lau and Kandavu.⁴⁰

Suva was fed by a series of parent stations in the island groups, while these collected reports from their outlying coastwatching posts. In 1941, the parent stations were Ocean Island for the Gilberts (later replaced by Beru) with ten stations, Funafuti in the Ellice Islands (seven stations), Canton for the Phoenix group (four stations), Apia in Samoa (eight stations, including three in the Tokelaus), Rarotonga in the Cook Islands (eleven stations), Nukualofa in Tonga (six stations), Fanning Island (three stations). Suva was naturally parent station for Fiji (nine stations).⁴¹

In the Phoenix Group, a station was set up on Canton Island before December 1941, and from July the radio on Niue became a coastwatching station. More stations in the Cooks were established in 1942 and 1943, as were further posts in Tonga in 1942.⁴²

The coastwatching station on Ocean Island in the Gilberts Group had been operating for quite some time already. In 1939, Ocean Island (callsign VQK) handled some 6,858 messages and a year later (up to November 1940) dealt with 7,658 messages. Over 95% of the traffic was handled on shortwave. It was noted the receiver was 'totally inadequate' and there was a need for two receivers.⁴³ Some of these were routine messages, and others were not. A series of signals illustrates the traffic of intelligence gleaned from coastwatching very well. It also demonstrates a flow of intelligence from the coastwatching station to Wellington, reference from Wellington to further afield and back. At 1655 hours on 21 November 1940, the Resident, Ocean Island, sent a signal to the Staff Officer Intelligence in Wellington, repeated to the DNI, Melbourne:

Following information has been received from reliable European at Butaritari but source is not stated. Begins.

250 planes at Wodje [sic] Island and 2500 Japanese. 80 planes on Jaluit and 4000 Japanese. Trees on position of both Islands destroyed to make way for aerodromes. Quantity of rifles and other arms landed Jaluit during October. Ends.⁴⁴

Commander Hannay sent a signal later the same day to the Captain on the Staff in Singapore, the C.-in-C. China Station and the DNI, Melbourne, repeating the information but not mentioning Butaritari, another island in the Gilberts.⁴⁵ Six days later, a signal from the Admiralty in London to the SO(I) in Wellington, repeated to the Captain on the Staff, Singapore, the China Station and the DNI Melbourne, asked for further information:

Following from D.N.I. YOUR 2112/21.

Request data aircraft observed. Does number represent a recent increase? What type and number were observed? Please grade [intelligence].

1840/27⁴⁶

The SO(I) in Wellington signalled the Resident, Ocean Island at 1231 hours 29 November.

Your 1655/21st November re JALUIT. Admiralty requests:-

- (1) Data aircraft observed.
- (2) Whether number represents a recent increase.
- (3) If any, types of aircraft and their numbers.
- (4) Grade of reliability [of report]

Signal me as much of this information as possible. Any further information on this subject would be of great value.⁴⁷

On 3 December, the Resident, Ocean Island replied by signal to the SO(I).

Noting that the Admiralty's request for amplification had been passed on, he indicated that obtaining the intelligence might not be easy:

I will forward as much of such information as possible but communication between Butaritari and Marshall Island [sic] is only approximately four times a year and reports must therefore be infrequent.

I expect shortly to receive a fuller written report from Butaritari wireless operator.⁴⁸

Getting access to Jaluit from the Gilberts was clearly a tricky business. Nevertheless, information could be obtained, and the proximity to the Japanese held islands made the Gilberts attractive for coastwatching. Sightings and agent reports supplemented the intelligence gained by signals interception.

A report on Ocean Island 'at the request of Mr.Philpotts' [sic] of the 'Y' Room on 28 December outlined the state of the coastwatching station, its staff and equipment. The station was now in a new building on the north side of the island, 150 feet above sea level. It was equipped with combination shortwave/medium wave Gambrell Type 581 transmitters, and a six year old Marconi Type 352 receiver. There were two European and four native operators. The maintenance of the equipment, the routing and supervision of the signal traffic, and the logging of the traffic was done by the European

staff, while the actual watchkeeping was done by four native operators in six hour shifts. The Europeans took over when difficulties in traffic handling were encountered. It was later reported that the radio equipment was overhauled in February 1941, and now provided a constant watch on 500 kilocycles in addition to other routines.⁴⁹

There had been a fair amount of German raider activity in this area of the Pacific, including something of a minor debacle in early December 1940. A number of phosphate ships were sunk by the raiders *Orion* and *Komet* in company with the *Kulmerland*. They had disguised themselves as Japanese ships and fooled the radio operator on Nauru by jamming distress messages, then transmitting bogus signals of reassurance. On 27 December the *Komet* returned to Nauru and shelled the British Phosphate Commission's facilities, causing extensive damage, and reducing phosphate production for a considerable period.⁵⁰

In October 1941 Ocean Island became the parent station for the nine new posts in the Gilbert Islands. The period July to October 1941 had seen the despatch of fourteen teams of radio operators and soldiers on HMS *Viti* to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The wireless operators selected for the coastwatching posts were from the P&T Department, while the soldiers came from 8th Brigade in Fiji.⁵¹ For the coastwatchers in islands not far south of the Japanese Marshall Islands, this was to be the riskiest New Zealand coastwatching undertaking of the war. For some, it would prove fatal.

July saw the parent station of the Ellice Group set up at Funafuti with one wireless operator, Mr. Don Vaughan. There were other Europeans on the island, so no soldiers were left there. Nukufetau and Nui were set up the same month, Nanumea in

August and Nurakita in October. These posts worked to Funafuti and each had one operator and two soldiers.⁵²

In August, the new posts in the Gilberts were established. Beru was set up as the other parent station (along with Ocean Island) with one operator, Mr.A.L. Taylor. Butaritari followed along with Abaiang, Abemama, Nonouti, Maiana, Kuria, and Tamana, and finally Little Makin in September. Each station had a complement of three, except for S.R. Wallace, the lone operator on Abaiang. On Abemama, for example, the post was staffed by Mr.J.J. McCarthy, the P&T wireless operator, Private R.I. Hitchon and Private D.H. Howe.⁵³ A full list of the Gilbert and Ellice coastwatchers is contained in Appendix Three.

The radio equipment at the main stations in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands consisted of a Collier & Beale 100 watt transmitter, a Collier & Beale receiver, and an AWA Teleradio 3B 10 watt transmitter and matching receiver. Teleradios were the communications equipment for the sub-stations. Spare radio sets were concealed in working order to be used if the Japanese came, and the Morse signal LLLL followed by the callsign signified a landing.⁵⁴

The coastwatchers were to arrange a twenty-four hour watch and establish lookouts in concealed locations with the help of the local islanders. These lookouts were not to be more than two hours journey from the wireless station. The sub-stations worked on a common crystal-controlled frequency, for which the parent stations kept a constant listening watch.⁵⁵ Communication went from the sub-stations through the parent station to Suva, and thence to Wellington. A Playfair code was supplied, and was initially regarded as reasonably secure (full instructions for Playfair are in Appendix Two).

According to Commander Nave of the RAN in a message to the SO(I) on 5 September 1941:

Regarding Playfair Code, we use a separate key word with each message. Each station is issued with a list of 100 key words and they select at random a key word for each message. This is indicated by the appropriate number appearing in plain in the preamble of the message. Therefore, unless the list has been compromised, there is no indication what the key word is from previous messages and the material for breaking down the code is dependent on the length of the message sent.⁵⁶

This may have been so, and parent station operators like Vaughan and Taylor had particular obscure sources for key words for back up, if necessary.⁵⁷ But given the level of success on the Allied side against encoded or enciphered traffic, it was unlikely to be a code that could withstand concerted attention, particularly if there was a lot of traffic, and the messages were standardised.

The opening of hostilities had an immediate effect. Within hours of Pearl Harbor Ocean Island was bombed by Japanese aircraft, and some confusion ensued, with the main radio station being destroyed on orders which were later rescinded. After a time the island was back on the air, using other equipment modified by the wireless operator Mr.Third. As a consequence Beru in the Gilberts now became the parent station.⁵⁸

The Japanese began to occupy the northern islands of the Gilberts, with Little Makin's coastwatchers being captured and taken to Butaritari where the three coastwatchers and the District Officer were also made prisoner. The operator on Abaiang was taken on 23 December. All these captives were taken to Japan in January 1942, where they spent the duration as POWs.⁵⁹

In the wake of the sudden expansion of the war and the obviously fragile position of the coastwatchers in the remainder of the Gilbert Islands, a special meeting was called

to discuss the question of evacuating Europeans from the Gilbert and Ellice Group. The December meeting had been convened at the instigation of Sir Harry Luke, the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Prime Minister Fraser was present, and the general idea was discussed as to whether it would be wiser at least for the European coastwatchers and some islanders to make their way down in canoes to Beru, or if necessary, to Funafuti. A report dated 31 December 1941, referring to this meeting, recorded,

We were unanimous that the coast-watching personnel must remain at their posts, until as the Prime Minister said, "A Japanese places his hand on their shoulder."⁶⁰

The High Commissioner for the Western Pacific still remained perturbed about his administrative officers on those islands.⁶¹ This was carelessness and callousness, if not downright stupidity by officials as well as the Prime Minister. It was also needless. Clearly the Japanese had declared their intention to come south, and it is questionable as to what intelligence purpose was being served by allowing the coastwatchers to fall into the hands of a ruthless enemy. The posts in the Gilberts were highly exposed, and unlike the situation on the Solomons, there were few places to hide effectively. It is axiomatic to try to avoid handing over personnel engaged in intelligence work to the enemy. The policy made it inevitable that this would occur. The previous December's debacle was to be deliberately allowed the chance of repetition on a larger scale.

On 19 April 1942 it was decided belatedly to induct the civilian P&T radio operators into the Army retrospectively, in order to prevent them being shot as 'franc tireurs', as the enemy was perfectly entitled to do, for the civilian radio operator

coastwatchers were operating as spies.⁶² This decision was to remain secret in order not adversely to affect the fate of those Gilbert's operators already in enemy hands.

The rest of the Gilbert and Ellice Island stations continued to function, monitor the enemy's movements and make weather reports. The New Zealand Government ninety-three foot 35 ton schooner *New Golden Hind* brought supplies to the Ellice Islands in early July. She could only make 3-5 knots on her motor, supplemented by sails, and was thus highly vulnerable. As the stations would report sightings of unknown vessels immediately, clearly a string of messages would let the Japanese know a vessel was in the area. The delivery of supplies was a slow business. Indeed, off Nanumea, interception of the schooner by enemy aircraft was only frustrated by cloud cover. A US naval intelligence officer on the *New Golden Hind* spent some time during the visit to Funafuti checking if there was room for an airfield.⁶³

The enemy continued his expected probes south, and in July, August and September, Japanese reconnaissance and bombing of islands intensified to try to put wireless stations out of action. On 26 August, Ocean Island sent its last message when the Japanese shelled the island. In September, the rest of the Gilberts were overrun.⁶⁴

On 25 September the Maiana station stayed on the air and gave a description of the Japanese landing and their search for the station. Just as the enemy reached them, the message 'Japanese coming, regards to all' was transmitted.⁶⁵ That evening, Don Vaughan on Funafuti was in contact with Beru (ZCC), which was taken the next day. On Beru, Taylor and Murray avoided capture for a week, but could not get their hidden radio into operation. Don Vaughan noted after the war:

[They] had given themselves up a week later to avoid threatened reprisals against the natives at Beru. Altogether a very unenviable situation to end up in!⁶⁶

Taylor and Murray had planned to escape but the Japanese had threatened the locals if the coastwatchers were allowed to slip away. On 3 October the Japanese returned and took them prisoner, the Japanese soldiers ill-treating them and smashing their glasses into their faces.⁶⁷ Part of an official report from Vaughan to the Controller of Pacific Communications was sent to the Naval Secretary coincidentally on 3 October. It quoted Vaughan's observation:

Mr. Taylor is, as you know, doing a great job up there and both he and Murray are resigned to their fate. The suspense over the last year has been considerable and you can imagine their feelings when each of their stations is taken without an LLLL call being heard. We are indeed fortunate to be so far south – not enough for me!! Personally I shall be very glad when the opportunity to return to civilization occurs.⁶⁸

All those who were captured, some seventeen radio operators and soldiers, were taken to Tarawa. Along with a few European inhabitants, they were tied to coconut palms for three days, and then were put in an enclosure. Required to labour on wharf construction at Betio, they faced a grim fate. After the bombardment of Tarawa by a US warship on the afternoon of 15 October, the seventeen New Zealanders and five other Europeans were beheaded or otherwise killed as a reprisal.⁶⁹ The hand of the Japanese had done more than touch their shoulders.

The implications for the Ellice Islands were clear. Don Vaughan noted on 12 October:

When Beru failed precautions were taken at Funafuti to guard against a surprise attack by enemy forces. The coastwatching system was overhauled and the number of watching points increased. Fuel for the wireless station was stored in several places although only one of these was underground. A large axe, matches and several tins of petrol were placed inside the wireless station, and preparations made for demolition of the apparatus and destruction of codebooks etc, should these steps become necessary. Several crates of foodstuffs were transported to Funafola at the south end of the lagoon. Funafola is adjacent to the

islet of Telele on which the emergency wireless station was erected and suitably camouflaged.⁷⁰

By remaining operational in the face of the Japanese advance into the southern portion of the Gilberts, the coastwatching stations carried out their tripwire function to the letter. The personnel had become expendable as a matter of policy, yet for the tripwire to work, the coastwatchers had to remain dedicated to their tasks to an extraordinary degree. It flagged the progress of the enemy but cost them their lives and handed the Japanese a whole section of the coastwatching system. As not all stations had been able to destroy all communications materials and equipment, skilled interrogation might have yielded quite a bit to the Japanese. Their brutality seems to have precluded such exploitation.

Some idea of the level of traffic still being passed under such trying circumstances can be gleaned from Funafuti's (ZJU) Monthly Reports.⁷¹ These provide snapshots of a parent station operating as a junction node between the main station in Suva (BZO) and Funafuti's sub-stations of Nanumea (BYP), Nukufetau (BYI), Nui (BYR), Vaitapu (BYF), Niutao (BYC) and Nuilakita (BYY) during July, August and September 1942.⁷² The information gained came from the scattered outposts of largely native watchers to each sub-station and was passed to ZJU. The parent station, along with its own information from the outposts on Funafuti, sent the accumulated intelligence to Suva, to be forwarded to Wellington.

Funafuti (ZJU), as the parent station for the Ellice Islands, maintained regular round-the-clock schedules, communicating to facilitate the throughput of required information. In August 1942, for instance, between 0100 hours and 0830 hours ZJU communicated with the sub-stations four times, with BZO (Suva) thrice, and similarly

with ZCC (Beru) – the parent station of the Gilberts. From 1015 to 1805, Funafuti linked with BZO four times, with VPD (another Suva station) once, with the sub-stations twice, with Beru once, along with ZIU (Hull Island) and VQS (Rotumah). From 1825 to 2250 hours, BZO was in contact twice, and each sub-station twice. Weather messages were received and sent in batches in the early morning (0815-0830), early afternoon (1315-1330), and in the early evening (one at 1745, others 1830-1850).⁷³ Apart from these regular schedules, other signals were exchanged depending on operational urgency. If the reports for July, August and September are examined, the direction of the volume of traffic through the parent station is revealed, the bulk of the messages going one way, from the outposts to Suva.

In July Funafuti handled 1333 messages in all. Some 513 messages were received and 820 transmitted. The traffic between Funafuti and Suva amounted to 636 messages. Of these, 560 were sent from Funafuti to Suva, of which 511 were weather messages (a fair proportion of ‘weathers’ were generated by Funafuti itself). In return, Suva sent 76 signals to Funafuti including 22 weathers. Funafuti’s traffic with the sub-stations amounted to 466 messages handled. Most of these were the 311 inward weather signals, plus 78 other messages. Funafuti sent 77 signals to the sub-stations. Funafuti also handled 61 other signals in communication with other stations, mostly in the Gilberts.⁷⁴

The following month Funafuti dealt with 1157 messages, 427 being received and 730 sent. The Funafuti-Suva traffic comprised 533 signals. Some 517 signals went from Funafuti to Suva (491 weathers), and just 16 messages were sent from Suva to Funafuti. Funafuti’s traffic with its sub-stations amounted to some 421 messages handled. The sub-stations sent 310 weathers and 59 other signals to the parent station, while Funafuti

dispatched 52 messages. Funafuti also handled 51 messages in communication with other stations, most of which was traffic with the Gilberts' stations.⁷⁵

September, the month when the parent station in the Gilberts, Beru (ZCC), fell to the enemy, showed an increase in traffic handled by Funafuti. Signals handled totalled 1405 messages, of which 552 were received and 853 sent. The Suva-Funafuti traffic comprised 669 signals, 645 of which went to Suva (including 569 weathers). A mere 24 signals were despatched from Suva to Funafuti. The traffic between the sub-stations and the parent station amounted to 507 messages. It was made up of 422 weathers and 48 others from the sub-stations, while the parent station sent 37 signals in return. Funafuti handled some 82 other messages, 24 transmitted to other stations and 58 received. Most of these latter were connected with the deteriorating situation in the Gilberts.⁷⁶

Funafuti could be described as busy. While much of the information was routine, the operational context was not. This was a period of increasing enemy activity, reconnaissance overflights and bombing raids, while the landings following one another to the north hinted at what lay in store if the Ellice Islands too remained undefended.

If that was not enough, by late 1942 it had become clear that the Playfair code was no longer secure and the enemy was listening, as might have been expected. Both Vaughan in Funafuti and Taylor in Beru were under this impression before September 1942. They adopted their own particular counter-measures in late July, using the second volume of a certain technical manual as a book code. Both of them had used the book on a course in Suva previously.⁷⁷ On 2 November a NZNB signal to the New Zealand Naval Liaison Officer in Fiji noted the successful Japanese interception of Playfair, and looked at ways of limiting the damage.

1. It is now certain that the Japanese are aware of the type of code in use for communication with British Coastwatching Stations in the Pacific, as well as the W/T frequencies used. Consequently it must be realised that even with the frequent changes of keywords at present employed no (R) no message sent in Playfair code is secure for more than a few hours at the most.

2. In order to deny the enemy even the smallest piece of information, it is therefore essential to refrain from transmitting any messages, except in exceptional circumstances, to Coastwatching Stations other than those of a short and completely innocuous character such as "Yes", "Concur".

3. In particular, names, positions, dates, movements, place names connected with friendly forces, shipping or aircraft should on no account be referred to in signals in this code.

4. It is realised that this prohibits practically all messages to (R) to Coastwatching Stations but this must be accepted in the interests of security.

5. Request you will inform His Excellency [the Governor] and Controller Pacific Communications.⁷⁸

An instruction from Navy Office in Wellington as early as 11 July had instructed coastwatching stations not to report the visit of friendly vessels by Playfair code. The Monthly Report from Funafuti in November reflected:

With reference to the above signal (2356Z/11th July, 1942): it has not yet been possible to deliver this instruction to the operators at BYP Nanumea or BRY Nui who are now the only ones unaware of the proximity of friendly units. All stations in this group have, however, been advised that the Playfair code is to be considered unsafe, and the number of messages between the substations and the parent station has been reduced almost to nil.⁷⁹

The transmission of sighting reports in code was now problematical. The arrival of the US forces at Funafuti on 2 October made things considerably more secure in the Ellice Islands, if less comfortable. The radio station not too long after this found itself right on the edge of the island's new 7,000 foot long and 200 foot wide runway, from which numbers of fighters and bombers now operated. In early 1943 it was upgraded to take heavy bombers like Liberators and Fortresses. Life was no longer quiet for the wireless operators.⁸⁰ The Ellice Island stations remained open into 1945, becoming less important as the war moved northwards.

There were other changes. Mr. Steel was succeeded by Mr.J.H. Hampton as Controller of Pacific Communications in November 1942. Hampton returned to New Zealand in March 1944 for urgent medical treatment. He was not replaced, as the requirement for a fulltime Controller of Pacific Communications was no longer regarded as necessary. His centralising role was undertaken instead by the O.C. Suva Aeradio station (BZO), Captain W.A. Perry, as additional duties.⁸¹ In a somewhat bizzare postscript, Steel and Hampton were retrospectively given military rank in early 1945, Steel as a Lieutenant-Colonel and Hampton as a Major.⁸²

In 1943 a British and Allied Merchant Shipping (BAMS) station was established on Pitcairn Island by the RNZN at the request of the US Navy.⁸³ There was a fair amount of shipping transiting the area with inadequate radio equipment, and the Pitcairn BAMS station furnished communication requirements.⁸⁴ The operation's covername was the PAN Expedition, which sailed from Auckland on the American merchantman, *J.Stirling Morton*, on 15 December 1943. The party comprised a member each of the Western Pacific High Commission, the Public Works Department and the P&T Department. The coastwatcher on Pitcairn, Nelson Dyett, was incorporated into this scheme, having been attested into the Army. Four P&T Department operators with Army rank and Dyett got the station into operation by early 1944, and it stayed open until October 1945.⁸⁵ The station then transferred to the Western Pacific High Commission with Dyett as the operator, and he stayed until 1948.⁸⁶

During 1944, as the tide of war moved inexorably northwards, a large number of coastwatching stations in the Pacific Islands were shut down. In May, June and July, stations were variously closed in the Phoenix group, the Tokelaus, Fiji, Tonga and the

Cook Islands.⁸⁷ A memorandum from the Naval Secretary to the Assistant Secretary of the War Cabinet on 17 July 1945 noted:

...the last of the Stations in the Pacific Islands Coastwatching net-work was closed in December 1944.⁸⁸

The war had moved away, and the operational requirement for tripwire listening posts no longer existed.

What then can be made of New Zealand's island coastwatching initiatives? The outposts strung across the island territories of the South Pacific were inevitably spread thinly. The more remote coastwatching stations entailed calculated risks or assumptions of expendability. The stations on Fanning Island, the Auckland Islands and the Gilbert Islands were all occupied with the possibility, however remote, that the enemy might appear in force. The platoon (and later company) on Fanning, the civilians at Carnley Harbour, and the small teams scattered through the Gilberts posed little problem for the enemy other than to carry out their tripwire function and signal his arrival. The isolation was compounded for the stations in the Gilberts, being cut off from convenient or adequate resupply. The logistical support in terms of shipping from the sub-Antarctic islands to the Gilberts was pathetic, as it seems to have largely consisted of HMS *Viti*, the Fijian administration's motor vessel *Degei*, and the three New Zealand Government schooners *Tagua*, *Ranui*, and *New Golden Hind*. Apart from the first vessel, these were too small and too slow. Inadequate logistics compounded difficulties in running the widely dispersed stations.

The routing of intelligence from the island coastwatching stations seemed to be on a reasonably sound footing. Reports from the sub-Antarctic islands went via Awarua to the COIC. The Controller of Pacific Communications and the main station in Suva

provided the central node connecting the Pacific island parent stations with Wellington. This appears to have been a fairly efficient system, even if one of the main codes used between islands became compromised. This flow of coastwatching intelligence to a central body was essential if the sighting reports were to be of use at all.

The revelation that the *Erlangen* had sheltered in Carnley Harbour in the Auckland Islands signalled the possibilities for enemy vessels in remote island possessions. In the South Pacific island territories, there was a better level of vigilance assisted by the evident proximity of the Japanese. With far less resources than the New Zealand stations, the Gilbert and Ellice Island outposts provided a steady stream of routine and operational intelligence concerning enemy movements. Failing to heed the warning in December 1942, the New Zealand authorities made one cynical calculation too many, which cost the lives of the personnel in the southern Gilberts.

In the Gilbert and Ellice islands the coastwatching was effective and the enemy detected and his presence extensively reported. The Combined Operational Intelligence Centre in Wellington was well served by the coastwatchers of the outlying and remote islands in marked contrast to those on the New Zealand coast. Although the expansion of New Zealand coastwatching in the islands was incremental and improvised for the most part, a good deal of useful intelligence work was carried out with slender resources under at times (and in particular places) difficult circumstances. Above all, the requirement for a useful tripwire in the forward area seems to have been met.

Part IV

The Struggle Over Internal Security

Chapter Ten

A New Security Service

While the watch on the coast suffered from the limitations imposed by geographical and demographic realities, it might be expected that internal security was far less problematical in a small population in wartime. It can be said with some confidence that this turned out to be the case. However, internal security, the watch for enemy agents, for saboteurs, for subversion, for maintaining the security of certain areas of information of importance, is not an easy task in a democratic state. Apart from the efforts of the Police Department in this direction, there was no special security intelligence body entrusted with this task at the outset of the war. It is clear that the Police Department regarded internal security as an integral part of their own province. The establishment of a specialist security service in early 1941 was an indication that all was not considered well with internal security in Police Department hands, however satisfied the police might be with their own arrangements. The intrusion of the new Security Intelligence Bureau (SIB) was destined to be an unhappy one, resolved inconclusively by a police takeover in early 1943. The requirement for security intelligence to preserve internal security, while recognised in general terms, was interpreted in different ways.

Part IV considers the troubled development of the first New Zealand security service. The establishment of the security service and its first two years of operation comes under scrutiny in this chapter. It includes the plan to set up a security body, its size

and shape, the appointment of the director, the problems of independence and serving two masters, along with the implications and direction taken for expansion.

Chapter Eleven contemplates the debacle of the Ross affair in mid-1942, a watershed for the continued operation of the SIB. The Ross fiasco had far-reaching effects on the SIB and its direction, resulting in a successful takeover bid of a military intelligence organisation by a civilian department. It 'cured' the Prime Minister once and for all of taking close interest in an independent security service. Chapter Twelve compares the intelligence product of the SIB and the Police Department, touches once more on the vexed question of port security, and looks at the possibilities afforded possible penetration of New Zealand government departments by a foreign power under these circumstances.

In New Zealand, two factors coincided in contributing towards the establishment of a separate security service. These were the issues of port security and the fifth column menace. Port security was an area of concern for much of the war, with the prospect of direct sabotage of shipping through cargo handling, or the leaking of information to the enemy on vessel arrivals and departures. The Police Department took the view they had internal security and port security very much in hand,¹ while the naval authorities were far less confident. Port security was an element that led the Chiefs of Staff to press for a separate security service.

By March 1940, complaints were surfacing on the lack of effective wharf surveillance and the absence of effective measures to prevent unauthorised persons from boarding vessels.² Masters of merchant shipping reported instances of inadequate provision for dockside sentries against sabotage and the openness of the wharves for

anyone to obtain particulars of vessels to be passed on to the enemy. Communist stickers were being placed on vessels in all sorts of places. Explosive devices could easily be substituted for them. Security precautions at Auckland were said to be non-existent.³ In the wake of sinkings by German raiders, the anxiety increased.

The fifth column fear was a product of the early reversals of the war in Europe. Suggestions for the setting up of special bodies to deal with security can be found in a telegram on 29 June 1940 outlining the War Office's view of the fifth column threat. In the wake of the invasion of Denmark and Norway, the collapse of the Low Countries and the fall of France, the telegram drew particular attention to what was said to be a worldwide organisation 'of Italians and Germans'.⁴ This body was supposedly highly organised for carrying out paramilitary and fifth column activities. It noted that recent experience of German fifth column activity had shown it to be very efficient and that it had largely contributed to the German military successes on the Western front.⁵ German plans and preparations for future fifth column action were alleged to be advanced. While measures may have already been taken to prevent these sorts of activities, the telegram suggested urgent action was needed elsewhere, and proposals had been put forward for a Special Branch to be set up in New Zealand. The purpose of this Special Branch would be to take action against enemy fifth column and para-military activity, and to undertake similar fifth column activity in territory likely to be under threat of enemy occupation.⁶ Para-military activities were defined as being allegedly 'many operations' not previously held to come under military operations, like 'raids, demolitions, sabotage by specially trained personnel' in the front or behind the lines. Friendly powers could assist in countering this kind of activity through establishing a fifth column of their own,

including the setting up of self-contained independent units comprising specialist personnel trained in special tactics, using sub-machine guns, grenades and explosives.⁷ Preparation and distribution of stores to such units and education of the civilian population in methods of countering fifth column activities were essential.⁸

This idea of creating organisations to mirror Germany's alleged fifth column juxtaposed the use of a security intelligence body in conjunction with independent armed special forces. By the end of 1940, the fifth column panic had lost something of its appeal in Britain. The investigations of the intelligence and police authorities had found no evidence of a fifth column movement, and as early as July, the security service, MI5, was 'very much inclined to doubt' that an organised fifth column existed.⁹ The desire to shore up security and carry the offensive back to the enemy in Britain resulted in the creation of the sabotage organisation, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), from MI(R) and Section D of MI6, both fledgling sabotage units.¹⁰ The irregular independent fighting organisations were the independent companies, which became more widely known later as the Royal Marine Commandos. As MI5's B Division and the celebrated Twenty Committee took control of the German Abwehr's espionage offensive against Britain,¹¹ the response to the largely groundless fifth column fears resulted in sharp intelligence and irregular force counter measures, with deleterious results for the enemy.

The arrival of the British 104 Military Mission in New Zealand in November 1940, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mawhood, accompanied by Captain Freddie Spencer-Chapman, Captain J. Michael Calvert and two NCOs, signalled the move towards setting up a security service and independent fighting companies.¹² Mawhood's Mission had similar business in Australia and Malaya as well. Mawhood had been born

in India and served in the Australian Imperial Forces during the First World War. He transferred to the Indian Army in 1918, apparently later worked for the British Secret Service in Persia, and ended up in MI5.¹³

On 23 November 1940 Mawhood addressed the Chiefs of Staff Committee on security measures in Britain, and at this time was apprised of the stand-off between the service chiefs and the Prime Minister over the intelligence summaries of the Combined Intelligence Bureau.¹⁴ He may also have become aware of certain sensitivities between the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Police Commissioner, as a proposal for adequate liaison between the Combined Intelligence Bureau and the Police was discussed, an issue which had given rise to friction a month earlier. It was noted that Mawhood would meet the War Cabinet, and officers of the Combined Intelligence Bureau.¹⁵

Following his meeting with the War Cabinet, Mawhood reported to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 26 November 1940 with an organisational outline for a security service.¹⁶ Those present were the CNS (Parry), the CAS (Saunders), the acting CGS (Sir Andrew Russell), Colonel Goss of the Army Department, and the Secretary ONS (Shanahan). The Chiefs of Staff Committee accepted Mawhood's outline and recommended a security intelligence bureau along those lines should be set up without delay. Personnel should be selected and despatched to Australia for training; 'a suitable officer' should be invited from the United Kingdom to run the bureau; and 'the Bureau should be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff.' The Committee decided the Secretary ONS should prepare a paper setting out Mawhood's proposals for submission to the War Cabinet.¹⁷

The Chiefs of Staff paper asserted that an independent 'Security Intelligence Service' [sic] should be set up in New Zealand separate from military intelligence and the police, although there should be close co-operation with both.¹⁸ On the grounds that the Army was responsible for both internal security and intelligence, the organisation established should have the same relationship to Army Headquarters as MI5 had to the War Office in the United Kingdom.¹⁹

Security personnel were to be deployed in a central headquarters and regional branches. The headquarters, located in Wellington, consisted of the head of the service – the 'Chief Security Intelligence Officer' – and two 'Assistant S.I. Officers', five intelligence sergeants, and five women clerks. In Auckland, Palmerston North and Christchurch (to reflect the Northern, Central and Southern Military Districts) there would be regional bureaux, each consisting of a 'District S.I. Officer', an 'Assistant S.I. Officer', a Sergeant-Major, twelve intelligence Sergeants (fourteen for Christchurch because of 'extra' ports), and one shorthand typist. Personnel needed to be specially selected and their backgrounds 'thoroughly checked' before they were taken on. Military districts were to submit the names of potential personnel, preferably well educated 'and of high intelligence and integrity'. Those who appeared and passed a preliminary interview were to be checked out by the police. Mawhood would do final interviews after he returned from Australia and select the required officers and NCOs. He noted that it might be necessary to detach officers to the Pacific Islands, and if so, their numbers should be added to the headquarters' establishment in Wellington.²⁰

While it was 'desirable' for the general public to know that a security service had been established, it was 'most important' that the personnel, organisation and operations


remained secret. The headquarters would be best set up in a private house, the personnel wear plain clothes and use unmarked cars and motorcycles.²¹ The initial training of personnel might have to take place in Australia, but the headquarters should be able to train all subsequent members.²²

Fiscal independence was necessary for the security service, for it would often be impossible to disclose the reasons for 'many disbursements'. Pay and allowances of military personnel in the organisation should come from ordinary Army accounts. All civilian personnel must be paid and employed directly by the security service and not be under any other department. It was 'strongly recommended' that the Chief Security Intelligence Officer have a 'Secret Service Fund' which he would not be asked to account for, apart from 'a quarterly certificate' which gave no details of particular expenditure.²³

The chart attached to the Mawhood report (reproduced overleaf) set out the relationship between the proposed security service and other government departments. The notes below the diagram underlined the need for the security personnel to 'be given complete freedom of action' to report directly to the person concerned to avoid delay in obtaining information and passing it on 'to the right quarter', this being later confirmed through official channels. This included 'ready right of entry' to carry out investigations, for which a pass would be needed. The notes showed that while solid lines on the diagram depicted 'control and administration', the dotted lines showed the quite direct routes by which information might be passed, or investigations undertaken.²⁴ This showed a certain practical flexibility. The dotted two-way arrows indicated 'channels for passing of information and requests for investigation' to a variety of bodies. These included the CAS and the CNS, the Commissioner of Police, the Prime Minister's

CHART SHOWING RELATION OF PROPOSED SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

ORGANIZATION WITH SERVICES AND DEPARTMENTS.



DECLASSIFIED

NOTES. (i) In order to avoid delay in obtaining information and in passing it on to the right quarter, Security Intelligence personnel must be given complete freedom of action to report direct to the person immediately concerned, confirming the report later through official channels.

(ii) They must, moreover, have ready entry into places in which they wish to make investigations. This can best be arranged by a pass signed by a Minister of the Crown.

(iii) They will operate largely in multi.

(iv) For the above reasons stated above in Note (i), the control and administration is shown by a continuous line, while the channels for passing of information and requests for investigation are shown by dotted lines.

Department, other Ministers and other government departments, as well as 'Security Intelligence Organisations' in other 'Empire' countries. There would also be this kind of liaison with the tri-service 'Combined Intelligence Centre' [sic], ie. the CIB. This was to be problematical, not least because of the continuing procrastination by the services in setting up a really effective combined intelligence centre, and this did not eventuate for another twelve months. At a lower level, the three proposed 'District' bureaux would similarly have close contact with the 'District Intelligence Centre[s]' which were subordinate to the 'Combined Intelligence Centre'. The flaw was, of course, that these latter bodies had not been set up. The same close working relationship was envisaged with the local police. Visits by security personnel to ports, industrial areas, coastal localities, the local police, army units and headquarters, Air Force stations, and naval vessels and shore stations were to be very much routine.²⁵

The chart depicted administrative control of the security intelligence service to be directly from the War Cabinet, through the CGS and the Colonel, General Staff, to the Wellington headquarters of the 'Central Security Intelligence Bureau'. Below Wellington headquarters were the 'District' bureaux and officers 'detached overseas'. Colonel Goss, as Colonel, General Staff in the command arrangements, neatly underlined the intent of the Chiefs of Staff paper in a memorandum in early December. Noting the close liaison between the security intelligence organisation and the projected special companies, he observed that this only applied for the passing of information. The chain of command through the CGS and the Colonel, General Staff was merely for administrative and policy purposes, as 'the Army is the organization responsible for the internal security of the county in war.'²⁶ This assertion would have been of some surprise to the police.

Goss affirmed the independence of the security service at all levels. While there was to be a Bureau in each Military District, it was 'entirely independent' and did not come under the Officer Commanding the District. This independence applied to the whole security service vis-à-vis its relations with the three armed services and the police. Goss noted that while the Military Districts would receive information from these Bureaux and although the Bureaux might investigate matters brought to their attention by the OC Military District, control and the methods of the Bureaux were not the concern of the local Military District. This principle applied at the top level of the services and the police.²⁷ Here was a potential source of conflict.

There was a certain measure of ambivalence. Reflecting the emphasis of the current fifth column concerns in his linkage of the special paramilitary companies and the new security service, Goss asserted that the special companies were intended to be deployed in New Zealand and 'the Pacific territories'. These units were to deal with 'situations' uncovered by the security service. The special companies were nonetheless independent of the security service, and both bodies were 'to be controlled by Army Headquarters.'²⁸ Clearly this linkage of security intelligence with separate clandestine special forces formations reflected a certain direct command function by Army in some circumstances. There was to a definite echo of this at a critical moment in the Ross affair in 1942.

On 27 November the War Cabinet considered the Chiefs of Staff paper on the 'Security Intelligence Organisation'. The Prime Minister advised adoption of the Chiefs of Staff's recommendations and War Cabinet approval was given the same day.²⁹ The acting CGS sent an urgent memorandum to the Minister of Defence with a number of

supplementary suggestions which the Minister 'approved verbally'.³⁰ The training arrangements for the 'Special Companies' being raised to be used in conjunction with the security service required attention, as did suitable buildings for the Central and District bureaux, nominations for potential personnel from the services, and an officer to head the organisation. Mawhood suggested a cable to the CIGS at the War Office was more direct and preferable than via the Dominions Office or the High Commissioner. The memorandum included the following draft cable, subsequently sent:

Government has approved formation in New Zealand of a Security Intelligence organisation and would appreciate the loan of a qualified officer to control this service STOP While any nominee from you would be acceptable, Lieut.-Colonel Mawhood, after study of local conditions, suggests Lieutenant Kenneth Folkes, Security Intelligence Officer, Eastern Command, as being most suitable STOP Can offer him rank of Major at British Army rates pay and allowances STOP³¹

This was to be an unfortunate choice. Mawhood left for Australia on 28 November, leaving arrangements to be made by the Army for the new security service. He returned to New Zealand with Calvert in mid-January 1941 for a period of six weeks to select personnel. Around thirty were selected and a security intelligence course was conducted by Mawhood at Trentham Military Camp. The course was visited by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, Semple, Coates and Hamilton. Fraser is said to have told them they would be doing a very important job.³²

Personnel selection was completed early the following month and the new Security Intelligence Bureau (the SIB) staff took up their duties on 10 February 1941.³³ Apart from the small Headquarters staff in Wellington and the Wellington Bureau, the outstations in Auckland, Palmerston North and Christchurch consisted of merely twenty security officers. The Auckland branch, for instance, was made up of Captain H.C.

Meikle, Lieutenant S.R. Ellis, Warrant Officer R.C. Steven, Sergeant M.O. Sherlock, Mr.C. Shelley and Mr. F.S. Goulding.³⁴

In command of the SIB was the new Director, Major Kenneth Folkes, much later described by the Prime Minister as 'an obvious misfit', and by one of his officers, Lieutenant T.P. McLean, as 'a slimy Limey'.³⁵ Others thought differently of him. His secretary, Molly Bishop, reflected that

Major Folkes was not a fool – he was a solicitor so did have a trained mind. He was certainly odd and didn't go out of his way to endear himself to either the armed services or the Police who regarded him and the Bureau with some suspicion.³⁶

She added:

It seemed to me that he did nothing to try to adjust to New Zealand conditions and did not go out of his way to co-operate with the heads of the various services and [the] Police, so therefore they did not co-operate with him. At that time there were some Englishmen who regarded New Zealanders as colonials and therefore inferior human beings – he was one of them and that did not endear him to the services and police.³⁷

Another officer, Captain R.S. Cutfield, observed

Major Folkes was a qualified solicitor, had a great personality, was very astute. He spoke with a very clear diction, and to a lot of people made them appear as underdogs.³⁸

Major Folkes looked down his nose at people, a feature that rubbed local established bureaucrats up the wrong way. With the police already opposed to a separate security service, the stage was set for conflict. The nature of a security service is to pry into matters (an inevitable part of the job), but unlikely to win friends.

Out in the military districts, the SIB staff set about their business. As one of them recalled

There was no set routine for the staff. A lot of our work was based on counter-espionage, sabotage and propaganda. The type of inquiry being

undertaken controlled whether a uniform or civilian clothes be worn. An Army uniform was the norm.³⁹

Port security remained in the hands of the police. Considerable doubts were being raised about public access to shipping information. A private letter to the Minister of Defence on 28 December 1940 questioned indiscreet commercial radio broadcasts, shipping information in the press nearly disclosing sailing dates and the easy availability of departure times. The correspondent who enquired about a passenger liner bound for England was given the official departure date three months ahead, with the additional information that the actual sailing was ten days after that date. The writer was not asked for any identification.⁴⁰ In response the CNS observed that departures and arrivals needed to be known a little distance before for cargo handling purposes to prevent shipping delays.⁴¹ He asserted that shipping owners, shipping agents and masters had been warned of the necessity to keep movements as secret as possible. Noting the writer's concerns, the CNS took the view that there was too much public discussion of shipping matters.⁴² This, of course, somewhat begged the question, as it was unlikely public interest would diminish as troopships continued to depart and raider sinkings persisted. At the same time, newspapers like the New Zealand Herald and the Waikato Times were advertising specific details of sailings and arrivals, as well as future voyages, full particulars of which were noted as obtainable by applying to shipping offices.⁴³

Concern was also being expressed across the Tasman as a Sydney Morning Herald item on 18 February 1941 headlined 'Lack of Secrecy in N.Z. – Crowds See Ship Go. – Peace-Time Scenes on Wharf' spelt out.⁴⁴ Auckland was most unfavourably contrasted with Sydney. The CNS expressed his misgivings about the situation to the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department on 3 March.⁴⁵ The Police

Commissioner, responding the same day to doubts raised by the Australian Prime Minister on 26 February, put the onus of gangway security on the ship's masters, who should provide guards for gangways and cargo handling. The Commissioner asserted that wharf security was covered by permits checked by a constable located at the approach to each wharf. The New Zealand measures were better than those in Australia, according to the Commissioner.⁴⁶ This did not square, of course, with what was being reported. The dissatisfaction with police handling of shipping security would not go away.

In June 1941, the Chiefs of Staff noted that the procedure for dealing with information on subversive activities or matters pertaining to the security of the armed forces were to be within the purview of the Security Intelligence Bureau. In cases where it was difficult to decide whether they should be handled by the SIB or the Police Department, the information would go to the SIB which would send them on if it became clear that they were a police matter.⁴⁷ This discretionary power was unlikely to be acceptable to the police.

Three months later, the Chiefs of Staff found themselves at odds with the SIB.

The Chiefs of Staff understand that reports have been requested by members of the Government from the Officer in Charge of the Security Bureau [sic] concerning questions connected not only with the security of the Armed Forces but also on matters which are not properly the concern of this organisation.⁴⁸

Although the reports requested had been passed to the relevant Chief of Staff by the Director SIB, this was not before they were sent 'direct to the Government.'⁴⁹ While the Bureau should consider security deficiencies in the armed forces, the Chiefs of Staff took the view that operational matters were not the Bureau's concern.⁵⁰ The Chiefs of

Staff tactfully raised the issue of SIB reports on 'matters of an operational nature' with the War Cabinet.⁵¹ Their paper referred back to the original chart setting up the organisation, drawing attention to the fact that the diagram

...provides that the Officer in Charge of this Bureau shall have the right of direct reference to the Prime Minister and to other Ministers.⁵²

It went on to suggest that it was more desirable that such security reports should be passed to the appropriate service chief at the same time as the person requesting it, even if the report was 'requested direct by a member of the Government.' This would enable comment to be made to complete the picture.⁵³ Any report which touched on two or more services should go to all the service Chiefs via the Secretary ONS. The distribution of a copy to a 'Government member' was to include forwarding to the appropriate Chief of Staff, with a note from the Director SIB that comment should be expected. A request for a report on an operational matter should go direct to one of the service chiefs (or if more than one, through the Secretary ONS), and the Director SIB should inform the government member that the request was one for the Chief or Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁴

The War Cabinet considered the Chiefs of Staff concerns on 29 September, at which point

A general discussion took place on this paper and no very definite conclusion was reached. The P.M., however, insisted that Folkes is directly under himself and may report direct to him on any subject. However he engaged himself to send any operational question direct to the Chief of Staff concerned. This answer is not satisfactory but the argument is not worth taking further.⁵⁵

It was noted that

...in view of the right of direct access to the Rt.Hon. the Prime Minister which the Security Intelligence Officer possesses it was considered that reports should still be furnished in the usual way by this officer.⁵⁶

The Prime Minister indicated that any report he received on one of the services would go 'immediately' to the service for 'an expression of opinion.' The Prime Minister added that he wished to consider the functions of the SIB shortly and he proposed that the Chiefs of Staff should have an input to those discussions. The Director SIB's access to the Prime Minister was underlined.

Like the matter of the CIB intelligence summaries, this was yet another difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. The comment in the Brooksbank report, written around the same time, had observed that it was unclear where the responsibilities of Major Folkes' organisation began and ended.⁵⁷ The real problem lay in the dual responsibility of the Director SIB to both the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister in the War Cabinet. This put Folkes in an invidious position because of the existing differences between Fraser and the Chiefs of Staff. Folkes' personality compounded the difficulty. He lacked the skilful diplomacy needed to serve both masters, something that the Secretary ONS by contrast clearly understood. The latter had McIntosh to turn to, in any event, whereas the Director SIB was caught between the PM and the service chiefs.

Opposition to the new security service manifested itself in the circulation of a scurrilous pamphlet on the SIB in Wellington in August 1941. Entitled 'This Fair Country Now Has its Himmler and its S.S.Men', it attacked the SIB as constituting a Gestapo-type body (the full text is in Appendix Eleven).⁵⁸ It did, apart from running a contradictory line between menace and stupidity, publish the names and personal details of a large number of SIB personnel, often interpreting those details in a malicious or sarcastic light.⁵⁹ The SIB was made up of 'mediocre journalists, clerks', 'counter-

jumpers', 'misfits, unfits, shirkers' and 'pimps'. Folkes was New Zealand's Himmler. Folkes' income of 1,100 pounds, the headquarters address, the alleged annual cost of the SIB at 50,000 pounds, former occupations of personnel, and slurs on character and intelligence were included. Almost every officer mentioned got a derogatory comment, although Captain Meikle and Captain Lindsay were excepted, along with the Auckland Bureau staff. Wellington and Palmerston North staff got a real barrage. It suggested the SIB's attempts to test security by obtaining illegal access to restricted areas or classified documents was unfair.⁶⁰ The detailed information provided on named personnel suggested that much of it came, if not directly from government files, then certainly from persons with access to that information from within the public service. This was black propaganda designed to discredit the security service.

Despite this opposition, the Folkes organisation continued to expand, partly as result of dissatisfaction with police performance on port security. In September 1941, the Vital Points Committee's report on the 'Safety of Wharves and Shipping' criticised measures in hand.⁶¹ The system of guarding gangways by ships' crews was found to be ineffective by both the police and the SIB, and it was proposed that fifty-two extra police be allocated for these duties. The shipping companies did not want to pay for this, although they were prepared to meet half the costs. Pass proliferation was another issue. Shipping companies issued boarding passes and strongly resisted the suggestion that this be a police responsibility. The police and the harbour boards issued wharf passes. The Committee decided that ship passes needed to be separate from wharf passes, and that a wharf pass plus a boarding pass were necessary to get onto a moored vessel. It was noted that wharf entry was controlled only at Auckland and Wellington. A great variety of

passes and exemptions operated. Police, customs officers and naval personnel had passes issued by the police, as did harbour board staff. Watersiders simply had their union card, and non-union members gained restricted passes with the Social Security card. Special passes were issued to ships' crews, while travel documents sufficed for passengers. Shipping company staff had their own passes.⁶² With only Auckland and Wellington attempting entry restrictions, pass proliferation and exemptions provided opportunities for abuse.

Major Folkes drew attention in December to a further problem. An officer of the SIB saw a launch put out to a ship anchored in the stream which had not yet been cleared by Customs, and return with the ship's master and possibly other persons from the ship. On enquiry it became clear that unauthorised landings were a local practice, although usually verbal permission was obtained from customs officers. This was most irregular. If a master could land in this way, so could anyone else. It was clearly wrong for a launch to contact a foreign ship when it had not been cleared. Folkes considered that this added weight to the case for a port security organisation.⁶³

Uneasiness surfaced about outward bound mail handling between the Post Office and ships docked at Wellington. On 4 February 1942 the Naval Secretary drew attention to the unsatisfactory procedures at Wellington. The route a ship would follow could be generally deduced from port destinations stencilled on mail-bags. They could be seen by mail room staff, van drivers, wharf stevedores and anyone with access to the mail room, the wharves or the ship. The Naval Secretary requested the labelling be altered so that the destination port was known only to those who needed to know.⁶⁴

On 26 February 1942 the War Cabinet approved the establishment of a Port Security Control under the SIB.⁶⁵ The Prime Minister directed that the Police Department, the Customs Department, the Department of Internal Affairs and the Justice Department co-operate with the SIB in port security.⁶⁶ Up to 45 staff were to be drawn from two sources: officers from the SIB and other ranks from the Army's Field Security Wing. The accommodation, facilities and transport requirements of the Port Security Control were to be met by Army. The personnel strength began with four staff in Auckland, seven in Wellington and three in Christchurch. It was proposed to increase to eight in Auckland, fifteen in Wellington (including three for a small headquarters element) and four in Christchurch.⁶⁷

The aims of the Port Security Control were quite wide and varied. It was to prevent movements of undesirable persons in and out of the country or monitor such persons. It was to gather intelligence from people passing through the ports, and to furnish security details during troop embarkation.⁶⁸ A watch was to be kept on small craft movements and illicit mail channels, and passport checks conducted. Port Security was to receive intelligence from, and provide intelligence for, overseas security bodies like MI5. Liaison within New Zealand was essential, and the services, seven other government departments, the harbour boards and the Waterfront Control Commission were points of contact. So were consulates, shipowners, shipping companies, shipping agents, airlines, US War Shipping, and the Norwegian shipping and trade mission. Trade unions, Lloyds' Surveyors and allied armed forces were also to be consulted when appropriate.⁶⁹

The liaison with the Customs Department was very close. In April 1942, the Comptroller of Customs minuted staff in eight ports regarding the new Port Security

Control organisation and anticipated close contact with the SIB. Responses from local Collectors of Customs outlined arrangements made. Thus, for example, Captain Lindsay of the Christchurch SIB Bureau had an agreement in place for his men to accompany the Customs' Boarding Inspector or Searcher when ships arrived in Lyttelton or Invercargill, and it was noted that the importance of avoiding unnecessary delays was understood.⁷⁰

Keeping a watch for undesirable persons included maintaining the Consolidated Black List. This was in turn compiled from the C.S. War Black List, the Suspect Seamen List, the Home Office Suspect List and the Far Eastern Black List. The Consolidated Black List contained about 15,000 names, updated by amendments from MI5. The Port Security Control compiled the Dominion Port Security Suspect Index based on shipping moving through New Zealand ports.⁷¹

Embarkation security for troopships was another routine task. An example in Wellington between 1600 hours 20 November and 1600 hours 22 November outlines what was involved.⁷² Twelve SIB personnel were rostered on in four hour watches. They were to be available on the wharf in that time and have contact with the ship's duty officers. The gangway guard's entry book was to be checked. Restrictions placed on military personnel and mail needed attention, as all leave had ceased for those on board from embarkation. No-one was to come off without a signed pass by one of two named army officers. US naval personnel on board were similarly restricted. The vessel had to be patrolled several times in the course of each watch. Civil passes were not accepted unless the bearer was actually on duty. An eleven strong section of Field Security personnel were to help out when required.⁷³

The expansion of the war and the arrival of the Port Security Control put further pressures on the still quite small security service. In early January 1942 the Chiefs of Staff paper considered an application by the Director SIB for an increase in establishment of the SIB of twelve officers (one more major, three captains and eight lieutenants).⁷⁴ This was based on the grounds of the SIB's increasing workload, the need for effective liaison contact with the armed forces, limited promotion prospects, and the desire to employ personnel with specialist qualifications, like lawyers. The Secretary ONS affirmed the increase as reasonable and necessary to support the valuable work of the SIB. However, as the Director SIB was directly responsible to the Prime Minister and War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff passed approval of the increase on to the War Cabinet.⁷⁵

To reinforce his case, Folkes sent a memorandum to Shanahan on 14 January pushing for further expansion of the SIB. He outlined the SIB's work.⁷⁶ Military security came under four headings: the security of information, the security of material, the security of personnel and operational security. The task of security intelligence was to prevent these areas being eroded by espionage, sabotage and propaganda.⁷⁷ He emphasised the preventative nature of security intelligence. The function of the SIB was to seal up as far as possible all channels by which information might reach the enemy. With secret or confidential information this amounted to restricting circulation to the minimum number of persons and as late as possible, which might involve modifying systems of circulating information.⁷⁸ The SIB's role with security of material was to test the efficiency and effectiveness of the guarding of military points, and to make recommendations when weaknesses were found.⁷⁹ As to military personnel, adverse propaganda, rumours, poor morale emanating from political extremists, defeatists and the

disloyal needed attention. Judgements had to be made on whether activities were subversive or calculated to impede the war effort. If such activities were detected, the SIB was to provide advice on what remedial steps needed taking to at least neutralise the them.⁸⁰ On security of operations, the fullest security measures should be adopted from the start of the development of operations, and here the SIB might offer suggestions on those measures.⁸¹ Folkes asserted that a considerable amount of effort was being expended in security briefings and security courses for personnel, and that a security reporting system had been set up. From these reports some attempt was made to establish 'an accurate picture of the security position within the Armed Forces' each month.⁸²

The other side of the SIB's role was to deal with 'CIVIL security'[sic]. This included the detection of bribery and corruption in Government departments; 'concentric associations of aliens' and their movements; the actions of pacifists and conscientious objectors and disaffected organisation; illicit signalling and photography; censorship evasion; subversion; international suspects; and the sources of rumours. Prevention of sabotage in industries engaged in war production by vetting personnel was a further activity, as was the security of the wharves and shipping information. Communications in Government departments needed to be secure, while from time to time investigations might need to be carried out for MI5.⁸³ All this work entailed practical liaison with other government departments like the police, customs and the censorship authorities. Apart from issues to do with aliens which overlapped with the police, the SIB's relations with the other two centred on port security, mail and foreign crews.

Folkes listed his present establishment as forty-three sergeants, three warrant officers, four lieutenants, four captains, and one major (himself) to deal with all these

matters. Of these, eleven NCO positions were vacant.⁸⁴ The Wellington Headquarters in January 1942 consisted of the Director, a captain, a lieutenant, three NCOs and three typists. The Wellington Bureau was run by 2nd Lieutenant McLean, with eleven NCOs and two typists. Auckland, under Captain Meikle, had one warrant officer, three NCOs and three typists. The Christchurch Bureau under Captain Lindsay had one lieutenant, eight NCOs and two typists. Palmerston North was run by Captain Park with one lieutenant, five NCOs and one typist.⁸⁵

Folkes wanted the officer establishment raised substantially, on the grounds that the pay and rank were unattractive to NCOs and for the practical reason of the rank difference. This had proved problematical when NCOs had to liaise with commanding officers at army bases, air force stations and naval establishments. Moreover, the proliferation of security courses and the addition of responsibility for the selection and training of the Army's Field Security personnel necessitated using officers for course lecturers. As the Auckland district was a large and important one, he asked that the officer in command be raised to the rank of major, and that in addition, three captains and eight lieutenants be added to the SIB overall. He also asked 'for consideration concerning my own rank' as, after all, the SIB were now responsible for 'directing and controlling' military and civil security, as well as the Army's Field Security Wing. The last remained 'under direct Army command.'⁸⁶ Pushing for urgency, Folkes argued that the scope and volume of the SIB's work was rapidly increasing. He hoped the Wellington Headquarters and the Wellington Bureau could be transferred to the New Government Building in Stout Street.⁸⁷

The Chiefs of Staff responded favourably, acknowledging the Bureau's increased workload with the expansion of the war. There were indications from information received that the enemy was adopting all possible means to obtain details of shipping movements and to place their agents on the armed forces staffs.⁸⁸ The Chiefs of Staff considered the SIB valuable and judged the establishment increases reasonable. They approved increasing the Director's rank to Lieutenant-Colonel. There was no immediate room to move the SIB into Stout Street, but there might be later in the Defence Services Building.⁸⁹ Interestingly enough, the Prime Minister failed to get around to the promotion of the Director, the prospect being overtaken by adverse events in mid-year.

This was a very positive picture of the security service. During 1942 to the middle of the year, the SIB was conducting a large range of activities: investigations, security courses, security briefings, advice on security and setting up the Port Security Control. A number of examples illustrate the preventive direction of security intelligence. Accuracy was important, but security investigations were not infallible by any means.

In January Folkes received a report from No.2a Group of the Home Guard in Rotorua, entitled 'Report on Ratana Activities'. Dated 8 January it suggested some disaffection in Te Puke, Whakatane, Taupo and possibly Opotiki.⁹⁰ One Lieutenant Ngata, lately returned from overseas service and last heard of at Tokomaru Bay, was referred to as causing trouble on the East Coast. The report also commented on two Japanese living on the East Coast who had recently sold their businesses and not been seen lately. One of these was a storekeeper and billiard saloon owner, J. Kamizona, who was married to 'a Maori woman from Te Araroa', with one son. The other was a baker, H. Kimioika, married to a 'white woman', lived at Ruatoria. The information on the

former was inaccurate: Morinosuke Kamizona died in 1938, leaving a wife and four children. She died two years later and the business was sold.⁹¹ The baker apparently, according to an SIB officer, was of interest to the security service. This was an attempt by Japanese interests 'to infiltrate the Maoris, by putting an agent named Kimioika amongst them at Ruatoria, by promising all sorts of wild things about returning their land to them.'⁹²

A Chiefs of Staff paper, considering the custody and distribution of secret documents referred to the SIB's testing of access by unauthorised persons. Using SIB staff, it was found that secret documents were not always adequately guarded. The simple point was made that what SIB personnel could achieve could also be done by enemy agents. In the deteriorating climate of early 1942, the possibility of such activity could not be easily dismissed.⁹³

A selection course for Field Security personnel was an occasion of friction between the Director SIB and the Army. This was a time of gravely deteriorating fortunes in the Pacific war, a time for urgency. On 7 April, the Brigadier commanding the Northern Military District sent a memorandum to Army General Staff critical of the way the selection course was organised and the lack of appropriate paperwork.⁹⁴ There was too much reliance on phone messages. The G3 Training at Army General Staff ran for cover, noting that the course had not been arranged by the Training Branch. All arrangements had been made by Major Folkes: two days of lectures followed by motorcycle, pistol and map reading, the last three days to be done by Trentham personnel. At 0845 on the first morning the Camp rang Army General Staff to say the instructors had not arrived, and the course was being taken on bayonet fighting.

However, it was discovered that Folkes was en route to Trentham. The GSO1 (Operations & Intelligence) asked Folkes to submit a report.⁹⁵ On 15 April Folkes responded waspishly that he had decided to say nothing about the unsatisfactory circumstances surrounding the course, but now it was raised he would comment.⁹⁶

He noted that he had, for reasons beyond his control, put the course on at short notice (four days). When he arrived at Trentham, he found that only the personnel from the Southern Military District had arrived, while those from the Central Military District would only make it by 1700 on the first day.⁹⁷ It is interesting to note that personnel from across Cook Strait made it in time, whereas those from Palmerston North didn't. Was this because war didn't occur on Sundays? Folkes started the course with the personnel for the Suva Field Security Section absent, in spite of the fact they were due to sail three days after the course ended. He re-arranged part of the course for the late-comers. The last three days (map, pistol, motorcycle) were to be taken by Trentham Camp staff, and the course was to be extended by one day. Folkes was told the Camp Instructional Staff did not work on Good Friday and so would have to add two more days.⁹⁸ This was a veritable caricature of an idle peacetime army. Folkes was then rung on Saturday to say the men were waiting for him, when he had arranged for camp staff to take the course for map-reading! He had this corrected and finished the course himself on the Monday.⁹⁹ In a separate memorandum Folkes noted that twenty-four personnel had been selected for the Field Security Sections.¹⁰⁰ The GSO1 (Training) sent a strong memorandum to Folkes pointing out how his 'unsatisfactory' arrangements had resulted in criticism from a Brigadier.¹⁰¹ Folkes annotated this memorandum and returned it, noting that he assumed the GSO1 had written in ignorance of Folkes' own memorandum of 15 April.¹⁰² While

this demonstrated shortcomings on the Army side, the fallout indicated a level of friction between Folkes and certain staff officers at Army General Staff.

Addressing departing troops on security precautions was another role for the SIB, though it probably did little good. On 10 May, Major Folkes gave a security address to a parade of NZEF reinforcements at Trentham bound for the Middle East.

... This morning you men are thinking that you are likely to be moved out in the not very distant future, and you will probably realise you are undertaking a perilous journey. The situation in the Pacific is serious, and it is of vital importance that no word as to the date or port of embarkation or names of the transports are discussed ...

I tell you that information does go out of New Zealand; information concerning movements of troops and ships, which is vital information to the enemy. It is cheaper for the enemy to destroy the troops before they arrive at their destination instead of having to fight them ...

You have your orders not to give away information. Some of you do not think of the seriousness of these things; others do not pay any attention, because they think they are clever. I want to tell you plainly that it is not clever, it is stupid and criminal; and I cannot emphasise too strongly the vital necessity of keeping quiet on any matter concerning Military movements ...

It does matter to the enemy when you are going and where you are going, and from which port you are sailing. So I appeal to every one of you to say nothing at all of these vital matters to your friends or relatives.¹⁰³

The safe passage of troopships was of great concern. Coincidentally, later this day, the SS *Nankin* was intercepted in the Indian Ocean by a German raider. On board were sensitive New Zealand COIC weekly intelligence summaries which fell into enemy hands. Japanese submarines added to the raider menace, although the visit of I-25 in Cook Strait had gone unnoticed in March, and that of I-21 off Auckland was yet to come.

The fears connected with raiders led to a different kind of security investigation. On 23 April the DNI contacted Major Folkes with regard to the situation in the Chatham Islands. He drew attention to the Chiefs of Staff Committee's minutes that outlined the nervousness of the islanders, the loss of the sheep presumably to a raider's crew on Little

Mangere Island, the concerns of the local magistrate to do with morale and the need for some co-ordination of security measures. He asked if Folkes could send a security officer to investigate and report.¹⁰⁴ Folkes duly sent Sergeant J.M. Allison with the cover rank of captain. Allison prepared a detailed 44-page report in June,¹⁰⁵ noted sourly by the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff as too long, and:

... could be summed up generally by saying that the Chatham Islanders are simple and credulous, mainly loyal, and almost entirely untrustworthy as far as sighting reports are concerned.¹⁰⁶

For all that, the tenor of Allison's report was quite objective.¹⁰⁷ It included observations on roads, telecommunications, the operation of fishing vessels, blackout precautions, wireless reports of vessel sailings, liquor, cars, the airfield and the Home Guard.¹⁰⁸ By this time a decision had been taken to set up four coastwatching stations on the islands.¹⁰⁹ Allison's report provided an outsider's view, fulfilling the requirements of the DNI's original request for an investigation.

Increases in security intelligence tasks notwithstanding, the Director SIB continued to push for expansion. On 21 May, Major Folkes sent a memorandum direct to the War Cabinet on the subject of the New Zealand Intelligence Corps.¹¹⁰ It opened with a catalogue of the SIB's achievements in military, civil and port security and in setting up reporting systems for the services. He had advised the Deputy Chief of the General Staff that the Army's security would be improved with the establishment of Field Security Sections. This had been accepted and the Minister of Defence approved the formation of an Intelligence Corps, with a Field Security Wing under the Corps. Folkes had selected and trained personnel for four Field Security Sections, three of them being deployed in New Zealand and one in Fiji.¹¹¹ Observing that Army intelligence had only provided for

an 'Ia' formation, that is 'Intelligence Operations', he noted an 'Ib' formation, 'Security Intelligence' was omitted. From his 'conversations' with Army General Staff it was desirable to fill the gap.¹¹² Where the GSO1 Ia fitted into the chain of command, the SIB covered de facto the absent Ib post. The Field Security Sections' efficiency was severely reduced without the unifying direction from a Commandant of the Intelligence Corps. As field security personnel were 'Territorial Troops', the Commandant needed a New Zealand Army commission. The SIB could no longer look after the Army's security.¹¹³ There was general agreement in Army General Staff that an 'Ib' Security Intelligence chain be set up, that a Commandant of the Intelligence Corps was necessary, and that it was 'expedient' and 'essential' that Folkes should hold both posts 'of Commandant and the Ib officer in the Army'.¹¹⁴ Folkes was the only qualified person for the post and the Intelligence Corps relied on the Director SIB for training, direction and daily security intelligence.¹¹⁵ The problem was the DCGS had informed him of 'obstacles' over such an appointment and that he should approach the Minister of Defence. This memorandum to the War Cabinet was the result.¹¹⁶

Of course, most of this was bunkum. First, field security sections were established with the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Middle East, long before Folkes arrived on the scene. Second, the post of Commandant of the Intelligence Corps did not have the centralising and directing role in quite the way Folkes described it. Third, there were doubts at Army General Staff about allowing the Director SIB to take over the Intelligence Corps (an echo of Brooksbank's comment). In fact, as Folkes revealed, Army General Staff had out-manoeuvred him. One of his subordinates, Captain R.S.Cutfield, had been appointed Commandant of the Intelligence Corps. Folkes felt this

was ill-conceived. Cutfield lacked the necessary depth of experience for the post, was too young, and did not have 'available the Intelligence material which is essential for the efficient running of the Corps.'¹¹⁷ This was a gross, if confidential, slur on Cutfield. Folkes ignored the fact that he himself had moved from Lieutenant to Major in one easy bound on appointment as Director SIB. He considered that he already fulfilled the duties unofficially, and making him Commandant would unify the concept of security. It would not obstruct his present obligations to the Prime Minister or the Army. Unified direction would bring security intelligence completely under one hat, as in the United Kingdom.¹¹⁸ It would be cheaper.¹¹⁹

This was self-serving stuff. In the United Kingdom, in fact, the posts of the Director-General of MI5 and the Commandant of the Intelligence Corps were separate. The memorandum was vintage Folkes, playing his Prime Ministerial card against the Army. It was not a very wise thing to do. He was not appointed head of the Intelligence Corps, however, for events now took a very different course. The early period of the SIB was about to end in calamity. At the end of March 1942 a security investigation got under way that would dramatically affect the fortunes of the SIB and its colourful Director.

By mid-1942 the SIB was engaged in a range of security intelligence tasks under difficult conditions imposed by the expansion of the war. Yet the SIB existed within a difficult climate right from its inception, even before the arrival of Major Folkes. Given the varying degrees of tension between the Chiefs of Staff and the Police Department, and the differences between the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister, setting up a security service in the face of police opposition was asking for trouble. With an awkward Director bent on increasing his empire while working for two powerful masters, an

accident was on the cards. The SIB expanded and friction increased, not least with the Police Commissioner. Quite apart from anything else, the SIB and the Police Department were two agencies competing in one arena, but with wholly disproportionate resources at their disposal. Insistence on the independence of the SIB from the services and Folkes' direct access to the Prime Minister, while leaving the security service under the Army, posed problems. The Director's access to the PM at least rivaled the Police Commissioner's, and probably gave the Secretary ONS and others in the Prime Minister's Department food for thought. Serving two masters – the service chiefs and the Prime Minister – required a Director with great diplomatic qualities, a mandarin's mandarin. But Folkes was not like that; quite the reverse. Really effective liaison with the police was precluded. The SIB was too small from the outset, creating pressure for expansion, but an enlarged SIB was unlikely to be viewed favourably by opponents. The Port Security Control and the attempt by Folkes properly to establish (and absorb) the Intelligence Corps along with Army's Field Security Sections, were further grounds for suspicion. Resentment about the SIB's testing of security measures added to the mixture. It was not surprising, then, that if the SIB got into difficulties, few hands might be lifted in support of the security service and its idiosyncratic Director.

Chapter Eleven

Fiasco – the Ross Affair

A security investigation began in very peculiar circumstances in late March 1942 and the ramifications from it would shake the very foundations of the security service and alter the relationships between the Prime Minister, the Police Commissioner and the Chiefs of Staff. It became the touchstone for smearing the competence of the SIB and its Director, and was focussed on in later published works as the most memorable aspect of the SIB.¹ It was also highly political, an aspect not so widely publicised, leaving a number of unanswered questions. How was it that a single investigation could result in the SIB becoming the victim of a takeover by a civilian department? The affair from the outset was to embroil the political leadership and potentially the head of the SIB. A great opportunity was presented to (or created by?) opponents of the security service.

On Saturday 27 March 1942 a prisoner released from Waikeria Prison near Te Awamutu made a phone call to Semple, the Minister of Railways, and obtained an appointment to see him in Wellington the following day.² Whatever was said to the Minister on a public telephone line caused the Minister to agree to meet him. The prisoner got to Wellington, presumably by the overnight train, and on the Sunday met Semple. Semple took the man to the Prime Minister. Fraser, having met the convict, then rang Major Folkes at about 2 pm and asked him to come ‘immediately’ to Fraser’s office in Parliament. The Prime Minister did not get in touch with the Police Commissioner, Mr. D.J. Cummings, in spite of the fact he was dealing with a convicted criminal. As the Secretary ONS in the Prime Minister’s Department had been receiving

fortnightly Police Intelligence Summaries since late 1939 dealing with internal security,³ the failure to phone Commissioner Cummings is puzzling. It was done so at the request of the convict, a man neither Semple nor Fraser had ever met before.

Folkes arrived at the Prime Minister's office, where he found Fraser, Semple and another man introduced to him as Mr. 'Calder'. Fraser explained that 'Calder' was a criminal called Ross, who 'was really a very bad man', and an expert in the use of explosives, who had just served a term for the misuse of gelignite.⁴ Folkes later reflected, according to a transcript of an interview with the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General,

Mr. Fraser then told me that Calder had contacted Mr. Semple by telephone early that morning following which Calder had had an interview with Mr. Semple following which Mr. Semple had had an interview with the Prime Minister [sic]. At the latter interview Calder was present when, according to the Prime Minister, Calder told a long story of being contacted at Frankton Junction by a gentleman calling himself Barrett, and a scheme in rough outline was proposed to Calder whereby certain sabotage should be effected and suggestions of assassination had been made. Mr. Fraser requested that I take Calder to my office and interrogate him again and then have the matter investigated... Accordingly I took Calder to my office in a motor-car and I had an interview with him lasting an hour. He then told me a story concerning the meeting at Frankton Junction.⁵

There is an inconsistency here about when 'Calder' rang Semple first, whether on the Saturday or early on the Sunday. Before he left, the Prime Minister told Folkes that he was on no account to inform the Police Department of this matter.⁶ The reason was an undertaking given by the Prime Minister at 'Calder's' request.⁷ Folkes took 'Calder' back to the SIB Headquarters in the APA Building. Apparently, according to Colin Hanson, who has talked to the duty officers,

There were two SIB officers on duty in SIB that Sunday, and both of them, in addition to Major Folkes, were aware of the Prime Minister's strict instructions with regard to the Police.⁸

As 'between...[the Police] Force and Folkes [there] existed a deadly hatred',⁹ this may not have been a difficult instruction to keep, to begin with. Folkes said he was told by 'Calder' that he'd received disguised messages while in prison, and 'Calder' expected to be contacted on release. The name of H.W. Klein was mentioned in connection with communication. Barrett was said to have told 'Calder' he would be contacted in Auckland early that week. Folkes evidently questioned the ex-prisoner, one Sidney Gordon Ross, as to his motives in coming forward – money and other reasons – but Ross asserted that he was a patriotic New Zealander in spite of being a criminal.¹⁰

Apparently, Ross's story told separately to Semple checked out with that told to Folkes.¹¹ Folkes sent Ross to the District Security Officer of the SIB's Auckland Bureau, Captain Meikle, with instructions for Ross to be permitted to meet Barrett. Meikle was to have operational charge of the case, and particularly to look for any evidence that Ross was lying.¹² It was Meikle and his senior NCO, Warrant Officer R.C. Steven, who were to conduct the investigation.¹³

After Ross was supposed to have met Barrett in Auckland, he was allegedly sent by the latter to R.A.K. Mason, the editor of the left-wing publication In Print.¹⁴ Steven asserted that Ross indicated he was to meet Mason, and 'We saw that he did meet Mason.'¹⁵ With what was later to come to light, one might wonder as to what he talked about with Mason. This meeting may also have triggered police interest, for it is very clear from the Police Intelligence Summaries that Mason was under police surveillance. The police, of course, knew very well who Sidney Gordon Ross was, including the fact that among his criminal convictions was a history as a confidence trickster.¹⁶ If they did become aware at this point, it was a lot earlier than was subsequently admitted.

Ross was sent by Mason, so he said, to 9 Boston Terrace in Wellington, where he was to meet with some conspirators. Ross informed Steven and Meikle that the man behind the plot was one Remmers who lived at Ngongotaha near Rotorua. As well as Remmers, there was also a house in Rotorua occupied by four others involved.¹⁷ Meikle's investigation proceeded, although hampered by caution and his inability to use the police. Ross, as 'Captain Calder' of the Merchant Navy, based himself in the Grand Hotel in Rotorua. Steven accompanied Ross on a number of occasions, and by this time there were trips to Rotorua, to New Plymouth and other places.¹⁸ It needs to be appreciated that the roads in the central North Island were not that good, and there were long stretches of main roads that were unsealed. Trips tended to be quite long, and keeping an eye on a developing investigation in Auckland, Rotorua and New Plymouth using a small number of security officers was quite difficult, given the sensitivity of the case. Perhaps this was just what Ross intended.

Ross was good at keeping Steven from directly overhearing his conversations with those allegedly involved, including Remmers. An opportunity to eavesdrop occurred when Remmers was admitted to hospital in Auckland. This attempt to see if Ross was lying was described by the Attorney-General as

....quite a skilful one. A naval rating was installed in the hospital ward in Auckland in which Remmers was laid up. The idea was a good one. The naval rating proved himself an accurate reporter of what he heard and saw. It was bad luck for the Security Department [sic] that the result appeared to confirm Ross's story. This probably helped greatly to mislead Captain Meikle.¹⁹

It is said that this only touched on a small part of Ross's story and the edge of the plot, and only showed 'Remmers was an able man', whatever that might mean.²⁰ Nevertheless, it did show a partial check on Ross. For nine and a half weeks the

investigation continued. At some point the police had become aware that Ross was leading a lifestyle which was well-accommodated, with transport, and in the company of SIB personnel. It was later said that this was because of an alert police officer.²¹ It has also been suggested that Folkes at some point got hold of Ross's criminal record,²² and this would also have alerted the police. After all, what reason could Folkes have for wanting Ross's record? And was the record provided complete? This request could hardly have failed to come to the attention of senior police officers involved in internal security matters, but such was the level of hostility at the top level that nothing was done to warn off the SIB. Was that, if true, intentional? If the police were aware, why did they not warn the Prime Minister that his security service was using a known confidence man in some investigation?

Matters now came to a head. Having been specifically tasked by the Prime Minister to investigate, and having kept Fraser and Semple abreast of progress,²³ Folkes decided it had gone far enough. In a letter to the Prime Minister on Wednesday 10 June 1942, he outlined the situation as he saw it:

Sir,

I have the honour to record, as directed by you, the facts, as I know them, concerning an organisation operating in this Dominion, for the purpose of fifth column activities in assisting an invading force in the conquest of this country.

Simply, but plainly, the position is as follows: There is established in the centre of the North Island a Headquarters of this organisation, at the head of which is an elderly man with a criminal record in this country, and I believe, in England. I am satisfied that the name by which he has been known in this country for many years is not his true name. Closely [sic] associated with him are several persons of foreign origin or association. The existence of some of these persons is unknown to the Authorities, and I am satisfied that they entered this country by unlawful means. Also connected with this organisation in a lesser degree are two New Zealanders, one a journalist and the other an expert wireless technician at present holding a post in the most important Wireless Station in the North Island. The total number of persons involved... is as follows:

14 Germans

- 1 Russian
- 1 Asiatic (believed Japanese)
- 1 Swiss
- 2 New Zealanders

After many weeks observation and surveillance, the following plan emerges: Immediately prior to the invasion...counterfeit money is to be circulated, rumours disseminated, water-works, tunnels and viaducts to be destroyed. The assassination of important Ministers is freely discussed between the parties as the culminating factor in the destruction of public morale as a basis for successful invasion.

To implement this plan, the organisation obviously requires persons experienced in the use of explosives and gunmen. They have already enlisted the aid of an expert in the use of gelignite – who has been detailed to perform the destruction of ARAPUNI and WAIKAREMOANA WATERWORKS. The explosives required are available at any time. This expert is now about to enlist the aid of other persons up and down the country whose functions will be localised in their own particular district. The organisation has already enlisted a marksman. In this connection it is important to observe that four of its members are armed, night and day. Highly subversive pamphlets are already in draft form. Soon after I commenced investigations into this case, I was able to sheet home to a soldier at Trentham the authorship of a pamphlet (copy of which is attached). It so happened that I was able to prevent distribution of this pamphlet without impairing investigations into the organisation as a whole. The case of the soldier in question – one KLEIN – who is linked with the organisation – is now engaging the attention of the Solicitor-General.

At this stage it is convenient to discuss:

- (a) When the plan is to be put into effect.
- (b) What steps are to be taken by the Government to prevent it

With regard to (a) I opine that it is likely to occur sometime in July. It is clear that the leader of the organisation in this country is expecting intelligence to reach him by the arrival of one, probably two, individuals from outside the Dominion. The event has been delayed it seems, but pending that, plans are being carefully formulated.²⁴

Folkes thought it was possible that the persons bearing the intelligence would come from Australia, and he noted that the 'wireless technician' was supposed to visit Australia, although the travel plans had come to nought.²⁵ He observed that there seemed to be similarity between the New Zealand organisation and the Australia First Movement, which was the subject of contemporary criminal proceedings. There were, however, difficulties in obtaining evidence in New Zealand.

I have to make it perfectly plain that I am unable to adduce evidence which would fix the guilt of the parties concerned within the ordinary criminal code. The reason for this is the acute appreciation of the organisation of the desirability of avoiding details of their plans being reduced into writing and for clandestine meetings and secret conversations. Therefore, to bring them within the criminal code it would be necessary to produce indisputable viva voce testimony concerning the conspiracy. This is impossible to do at this stage.²⁶

This was a very clear statement that proof for judicial proceedings had not been obtained.

Folkes also wished to make it plain that if the Government took and exercised certain powers, then he would be able to stop the conspirators and the conspiracy. Probably fatally, he underlined his assessment:

Every possible action has been taken by me to prove the truth or otherwise of intelligence which I have received, by checking and cross-checking, and in every single case where this has been possible, the result has been positive. In other words, I believe my Informant. The question arises, therefore, what is to be done? As I have said above, I cannot make out a case for a criminal trial.²⁷

He went on to note that no case could be made until the plan was put into effect. Folkes had not proved his case at all. Had he merely asserted that all his findings now required further checking by the police he might not have put himself at risk. The words 'I believe my Informant' put his personal credibility on the line. When the Police Commissioner saw this letter, he must have rubbed his hands. Folkes had delivered himself into the hands of his opponents, although on 10 June 1942 only the Prime Minister was apprised of his conclusions.

Two weeks passed, and what occurred during that time is unclear. Certainly, it is probable the Prime Minister talked to one or two senior officials – perhaps McIntosh or Shanahan in the Prime Minister's Department. The latter as Secretary of the ONS routinely consulted with Folkes and the Police Commissioner. Perhaps the Police

Commissioner was informed? Certainly, the Secretary ONS would have been consulted if Folkes needed to talk to the Chiefs of Staff.

On 24 June 1942, a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting was attended by Air Commodore Goddard, the CAS, Commander Stirling-Hamilton (the DCNS) who was standing in for the CNS, the Secretary ONS, with the meeting being chaired by the CGS, Lieutenant-General Puttick. Folkes was there to address the meeting.

Major Folkes, Director of Security Intelligence Bureau, stated that he had been requested by the Prime Minister to inform the Chiefs of Staff that there existed in New Zealand a Fifth Column Movement which, so far as could be judged, was well organised and extended to a number of centres. The information which he possessed indicated that there were three full German nationals controlling the organisation, who were unknown to the Police authorities and had obtained entry to the country by illegal means. In addition, it is believed that there are up to 37 other members of the Movement, making a total of 40. He added that it was proposed to arrest these persons very shortly, and that it would be essential that they should all be arrested at the same time and on the same date in order to prevent evidence being destroyed. As it was known that many members of the Movement were armed, it would be necessary for personnel effecting the arrest to be armed and so overcome any possible opposition.

2. Major Folkes therefore asked that the Army might agree to help him in the arrest of these persons by making available up to 100 selected personnel.

3. There was some discussion as to whether this request should be met. It was agreed that it was not for the Chiefs of Staff to decide whether or not such an organisation existed, whether danger could be apprehended from it, the numbers of its members, nor indeed when the proper time to strike should be. It was therefore agreed that the Chief of the General Staff would make arrangements for the necessary number of men to be provided for Major Folkes on request.²⁸

It is interesting to note the subtle nuances of the meeting minutes. Clearly the Chiefs of Staff were taken aback. The third paragraph implies that Folkes was not believed by his audience, although the meeting agreed that Puttick, the CGS, would arrange to provide the requisite number of troops to Folkes on request.²⁹ A sidelight on this situation is that here was the security service providing the Army with information

concerning classic so-called 'fifth column' activity. In the original concept, the Special Companies should then be employed in dealing with this activity.

Was the Prime Minister still backing Folkes at this point? According to Folkes' letter, he had communicated to the Prime Minister that he had taken the matter as far as he could, and that the Police Commissioner and the Chiefs of Staff must be informed, and Fraser had agreed.³⁰ Hence the meeting.

On 2 July, eight days later, Folkes met with the Prime Minister and Police Commissioner Cummings in the Prime Minister's office.³¹ At this point the investigation was handed over to the Police Department. A special team of police officers was sent to Rotorua and it took two days for them to establish that Ross's conspiracy was a hoax. On 29 July the story broke in the N.Z. Truth newspaper, which recounted flamboyantly how the SIB had been hoodwinked. However, the 'best detective officers in the Dominion' under 'the ablest criminal investigator the New Zealand Police Force has produced' sorted it out.³² These were Detective A.M. Harding, P.J. Nalder and P.Doyle.³³ Harding, it will be recalled, was the Police representative on the Combined Intelligence Committee who pushed the Police's internal security barrow. They were led by Superintendent James Cummings,³⁴ an officer in his mid-fifties, the Police Commissioner's brother.

Quite obviously, the press had good police contacts by the way the story came out. Much was made of the accommodation and expenses incurred in the course of the SIB's investigation, the bogus rank of 'Captain Calder' the 'Impudent Gaolbird' and flights to and from Rotorua. They mentioned how a convict the day after his release was interviewed by a cabinet minister who passed him on to another cabinet minister.³⁵ This, of course, neatly disguised the Prime Minister's role. The two 'hard-headed Ministers'

passed the prisoner on to the SIB to see if he was ‘a lunatic, a liar or genuine.’³⁶ There was a need for an investigation and overhaul of security before blunders and an ‘orgy of jitterbug spending’ was repeated.³⁷ What was required was New Zealanders with ‘solid commonsense and alert minds who will not fall for the fantastic humbug of the first glib-tongued imposter who comes along.’³⁸ As quickly as the furore erupted, the lid was slammed down. On 30 July the press censor suppressed any further mention in the media of the SIB or the hoax.³⁹

An inquiry was conducted by the Attorney-General, H.G.R. Mason, and the Solicitor-General, H.H. Cornish. Mason spoke first to Captain Meikle. Mason and Cornish conducted a lengthy interrogation of Major Folkes on 26 and 27 August, and Cornish interrogated Warrant Officer Steven on 15 September. On 18 September Mason produced a six page report for the War Cabinet.⁴⁰

It is quite clear from the transcripts of the interviews with Folkes that Mason and Cornish were out to trap him, and equally that Folkes was attempting to squeeze out of the tight spot he had got himself into. In discussing methods of investigation, this exchange took place:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: ...Let us have no misunderstanding. The methods are the very essence of it because the question begins to present itself in my mind whether your whole establishment is not an establishment, and the methods of it, suited to another country and other circumstances!

MAJOR FOLKES: I am obliged to you for that because I have not been able quite to appreciate the drift of this interrogation.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And unsuited to our circumstances – that certainly is beginning to present itself as possibly a main question.⁴¹

There were numerous attempts to ensnare Folkes as he tried to back away from the categorical assertion of his letter to Fraser in saying he believed Ross.⁴² However, it was also obvious that both Fraser and Semple had been kept informed of the case as it

developed over the weeks.⁴³ The interrogation of Steven by Cornish on 15 September was more neutral.⁴⁴ Cornish's unfortunate public experience in the Ostler case the previous year probably made him more cautious and sympathetic.⁴⁵ The aim was to get something on Folkes. Cornish was sceptical of the SIB's handling of the investigation, as might be expected. Steven observed that the case was difficult right from the outset.

MR. STEVEN: To begin with we were in a difficulty because we were instructed that the police had not to come into it but we knew we could not conduct any inquiry into Ross's allegations. We have no executive authority and without police co-operation the case could not go on. It went on longer for the lack of co-operation than it normally would have done.⁴⁶

Asked by Cornish as to why the SIB did not put people in close in Rotorua, planting men round the house.

MR. STEVEN: I would not recommend that if we had to do it all over again.

MR. CORNISH: Why not?

MR. STEVEN: Because it is easy now when you look back and know all the facts to know that in doing that you would not be taking any risk, but when you are living with it and you do not know the risk you are taking and in any case when Ross is given to us and he is the man on whom we have to rely, we as the Northern Bureau had no right to do anything else but just what we did and that is carried out our instructions. [sic]⁴⁷

The Attorney-General's report to the War Cabinet was based on the more than six hundred pages of the SIB file on the case, a mass of Police reports 'and a final statement by Ross himself'.⁴⁸ The interviews with Meikle, Folkes and Steven were not mentioned as part of this, although remarks about them in the report reveal conclusions based on personal contact.⁴⁹ Having outlined the familiar ground that led to the case, the Attorney-General had this to say about Remmers:

Ross usually referred to Remmers as "the master" and never spoke of him except with a respect that was most impressive and might even be called reverential. This admiration was probably as genuine as it was undoubtedly deserved, for Remmers, an old man, is indeed a master artist in the sphere of false pretences, with a record vastly more imposing than Ross's. There is reason to

think Ross's plans owed something to Remmers at critical points. The Security Department [sic] was unfortunate in meeting this combination of talent.⁵⁰

Indeed. If Remmers was a better confidence trickster than Ross, the tenor of Mason's remarks indicates this was known to the police. Remmers was another with a long police record. At the heart of Mason's criticism was the way the SIB compiled its reports. He compared the SIB's approach with that of the Police.

It [the SIB] explains that it does not send a man to take a statement, as the Police do. The Security Department observes, tabulates, accumulates reports, and slowly builds up a picture. It does not check, test, and verify (as far as it can) as it goes along... the method can accumulate... much rubbish.⁵¹

There are two observations to be made on this point. The first is that banging on doors asking questions and taking statements is not going to stay secret for very long. The second is that it is the quality of the analysis and recommendation for action that is critical. It can also be argued that the Police Department with its extensive nationwide resources and its draconian powers in wartime, including the ability to compel people to assist them with their inquiries, had far more inherent advantages than a few SIB staff. More importantly, their purposes were different. The Police focus was on detection of criminal activity and bringing the villains to book, although it should be noted that in the case of Communist organisations, for instance, it was quite content to simply keep them under close surveillance. The SIB's job was to watch and advise.

Was the SIB investigation all rubbish? Mr. R.A.K. Mason, the poet and the editor of In Print, was under investigation by the Police for breaches of the Censorship and Publicity Regulations, according to the Police Intelligence Summary for 24 February 1942.⁵² Reference was made to In Print in a number of these summaries, and there was some obvious satisfaction in the monthly summary for July 1942 dated 8 August that its

circulation had dropped from 15,000 to 12,000 and the Communist Party owed the printer the sum of 233 pounds.⁵³ As Mason featured in the Ross case as one of the latter's first contacts, it is unlikely this would have remained unnoticed by the police. So both the Director SIB and the police had doubts about Mason. Similarly H.W. Klein, a law clerk who was a soldier in Trentham, featured in the Ross case: indeed he is named in Folkes' letter to the Prime Minister on 10 June, and in the Attorney-General's interrogation of Folkes. Klein appeared in the Police Intelligence Summaries for 9 November 1942. He had been convicted on 27 October

...for "having in his possession material with a view to making or felicitating [sic] the publication of a subversive statement. Klein has twice previously been before the Court for similar offences. At the time of his present offence Klein was serving in the Army. His previous offence related to the publication of the seditious pamphlet "THE SPARK".⁵⁴

One would have to say that some of Folkes' suspicions about Klein appeared justified. Klein was mentioned once more in the Police Intelligence Summary for 15 December 1942.

Inquiries have been made regarding the appearance at Trentham and Military Camps of certain seditious pamphlets. They are probably the work of a soldier offender, Harold Klein, who was recently sentenced to a term of imprisonment. There is no evidence of it being an organized effort.⁵⁵

This was rather intriguing, for quite apart from the Ross case, Klein and a farmer, Mr. L. Sim, were convicted back in June 1940 at Palmerston North for cyclostyling The Spark pamphlet for the New Zealand Bolshevik Party. This urged civil war in New Zealand and condemned the Communist Party as pacifist, Trotskyite, and controlled by petty bourgeois intellectual adventurers.⁵⁶ One wonders how Klein came to be in the Army after that, or maybe the Army was not too discriminating.

The view taken of Klein and Mason by the Attorney-General while interrogating Major Folkes on the Ross affair is of interest. Dismissing the suspects in the conspiracy, the Attorney-General proceeded to contradict himself. He observed, according to the transcript:

ATTORNEY GENERAL: ...and not one of them in the whole lot from the beginning to the end as to whose loyalty there could be the slightest question. The most glaring one is the fellow Mason. A good deal of suspicion attaches to Mason. Mason is a most unreliable fellow. He is not a Communist but is tarred with the Communist brush. As soon as Russia came in they are super patriots in that they are devoted to their country in that their country is an ally of Russia and must be upheld. They rushed forward to do everything possible and scorned the feeble patriotism of the rest of the community. [sic] I have not the least doubt that Mason would be of that type. Klein is the odd man out. With Klein the Bolsheviks are not nearly Bolshevik enough. He is a man on his own.⁵⁷

The Attorney-General formed his view from information supplied by the police investigation. Was it a matter of coincidence that Ross selected Mason and Klein to be part of his fake conspiracy, and the police had prior knowledge of these two? How did Ross know about Klein to include him in the plot, if Ross was in prison up to the day before he went to see Semple, Fraser and Folkes? How did he know to include Mason once Folkes handed over the case to Meikle and Steven from the Auckland SIB? At the very least, if the police were suspicious of Mason, Klein and Remmers, the interest of the SIB in them is unremarkable.

The Attorney-General made six recommendations in his report on the Ross affair. Port and civil security should be handled by the police. There should be a proliferation of small security bureaux. Each service should operate its own security bureau. A small security bureau should act as a clearing-house between the services and the police. The rump bureau should pass all civil investigation to the police. The small bureau should be under the Chiefs of Staff and it should have access to police files. Finally that there

should be an advisory but not executive Security Committee.⁵⁸ These were all matters that needed to be taken further.

The Ross affair resurfaced in Parliament on 21 October with a pointed question by John A. Lee MP, who wished to know whether the NZ Truth report was correct, how much public money had been used, and when that expenditure would be presented to Parliament. The Prime Minister replied that the newspaper report was under investigation, but that 'it is not advisable in the public interest to discuss publicly the question of the means adopted to ensure public security.'⁵⁹

The Navy was concerned about the future of the SIB. The new CNS, Commodore Lake, only arrived after the Ross affair came to a head. On 19 November Lieutenant-Commander Barker minuted that he understood a report had gone to the War Cabinet recommending in effect the abolition of the SIB.⁶⁰ He listed a number of positive points about the SIB. The personnel of the SIB were young and well educated. Their investigations were 'a very different type of work to Police work or investigating crimes.' The SIB had a stimulating effect on the Army and other guards, watchmen and Police. Port Security Control was particularly useful.

Port security especially is amassing information and started a system of control of the coming and going of seamen which is most valuable. Until lately when Port Security started there had been no apparent check on the arrivals and departures of merchant seamen and individuals passing as such.⁶¹

The Police on wharf work, by contrast, appeared to be short of staff. On the same minute underneath the DNI annotated on 20 November that the SIB

...such as it is...[is] a very mild replica of Gestapo and...is, of course abhorrent to New Zealand officials who strongly resent the mildest control over their activities. I am convinced, however, that it is valuable...

This campaign against the S.I.B. is, of course, inspired by the Police who all along have resented this encroachment as they consider it on their preserves [sic].

The matter is undoubtedly aggravated by the personality of Major Folkes who has perhaps not been as tactful in his dealings as he might have been, but it is impossible for a man in his job to be popular with Government Departments.⁶²

The DNI felt the new CNS should be warned of what was brewing because the issue would probably go to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the SIB needed support.

He noted:

As will be seen from another paper which is going round at the moment the Police measures for the security of the wharves and of shipping have recently been open to very serious criticism. This may be due to their lack of personnel but is undoubtedly an argument in favour of S.I.B. and especially Port Security, which...is performing a most valuable service...in a field...never even scratched by the Police before Port Security took over.⁶³

The paper referred to resulted in a memorandum from the Naval Secretary to the Secretary ONS on 27 November, drawing attention to police shortcomings in providing gangway guards, something they had agreed to rectify in 1941. A number of disturbing instances illustrated the Naval Secretary's points. Thirteen ships were listed, and only three of them were provided with a police guard. Moreover, on these occasions the guard was late coming on, by two or three or more days. Most of the cargoes involved ammunition, explosives or other munitions.⁶⁴ The police, of course, always seemed to find some excuse for not carrying out this duty.⁶⁵

The DNI concluded his annotation on Barker's minute by stating that he was unsure how these matters could be brought to the Chiefs of Staff's attention before any decision on the SIB was made.⁶⁶ The DCNS added underneath that the

Sec[retary] ONS informs me that this is being treated entirely as a political matter, to be dealt with by War Cabinet without reference to the C[hief]s of S[taff]. I believe that consideration is being given to augmenting the Police to take over Security's duties but this will not solve the problem of co-ordination

with all the other Service units... nor will it allow the Services any check or "say so" in the security activities of the Police which affect them vitally.⁶⁷

On 24 November, the DNI added to the minute sheet:

I realise it is difficult and probably impossible for us to take any action about the continuance of the S.I.B. unless the Government asks us our opinion, but I bring this up again because you will see from the tabbed memo that the whole question of the S.I.B. was originally brought up by the Naval Secretary, and the arguments produced then are still valid.⁶⁸

The DCNS concluded on the side: 'There is nothing positive that we can do, but the tabbed memo may be of interest to CNS.' The signature of the Secretary ONS was there, indicating the naval minute sheet was passed to him.⁶⁹

The political fallout was indeed potentially dangerous for the Prime Minister. It was kept in check only by not publicly acknowledging that he was intimately involved, using censorship suppression of media comment. But somebody would have to pay. There were by now enough axes sharpened by the police, the Army, probably the Prime Minister's Department, and certainly the War Cabinet, and it did not take too many guesses whose head would be on the block.

On 22 December the Chiefs of Staff decided to lend a hand. Having received a suggestion from some quarter that the SIB should test the security precautions with regard to physical access at Naval, Army and Air Force establishments and police stations, they turned their attention on the SIB instead.⁷⁰ It is not hard to imagine the suggestion of testing security precautions in the wake of the Ross affair may have been a red rag to a bull. Who planted the red rag is another matter. The Chiefs of Staff took into account that the Attorney-General had conducted an investigation. They directed their criticism to Folkes personally.

We are satisfied that Major Folkes is not fitted to control the Security Intelligence Bureau. Some months ago he approached us and asked that a number of soldiers be placed under his orders to assist in the arrest of certain persons who were alleged to be Fifth Columnists and about to engage in a huge plot which was to synchronize with an attempted invasion at or near the port of New Plymouth. In the course of the discussion it transpired that Major Folkes had been in possession of knowledge of the alleged invasion for some months but notwithstanding this he had never, as he should have done, advised the Chiefs of Staff who are responsible for the defence of the Dominion. The inherent improbabilities and indeed the ridiculous nature of the alleged invasion attempt were quite patent to us at the time but we cannot emphasize too strongly that it is the duty of any person who possesses information of this kind to communicate it to those who are responsible for the defence of the country. While this duty might be imperfectly understood by a civilian, there can be no occasion on the part of a person with military training failing to recognize it.

Despite the fact that at the time of the interview we expressed the strongest scepticism regarding the alleged invasion and sabotage plot Major Folkes was most definite that it was true and that it was necessary to take immediate action to arrest and detain the conspirators.

In the event, this alleged invasion and sabotage plot was proved to be nothing more than a gigantic hoax and what little we know of the incident gives very strong reasons for believing that the leaders of the Security Intelligence Bureau were negligent and indeed distinctly incapable.

In the circumstances we strongly recommend that the services of Major Folkes should be immediately dispensed with...

We are not at this juncture in a position to say whether or not the whole organization should be disbanded. Before furnishing our views on this question we would wish to discuss the position with the Commissioner of Police. The Security Intelligence Bureau has been of value in testing and providing security precautions particularly in connection with shipping and wharves. A certain amount of duplication does exist but with proper organization this can be eliminated.⁷¹

The paper was signed by the CGS, the CAS and the new CNS (Lake). The CNS had not been at the earlier meeting, for he had not arrived in New Zealand. It was a peevish performance, and the CGS had forgotten his role in agreeing to arrange for troops for Folkes. The Director SIB was castigated for not approaching the Chiefs of Staff, yet it was the Prime Minister himself who had insisted on keeping the matter from even the police. Here once again was the problem of serving two masters. The Director SIB with official direct access to the Prime Minister had been given a Prime Ministerial instruction

to keep the investigation under wraps. It was the Prime Minister who summoned Folkes in the first place. But the Director SIB was answerable to both the service chiefs and the Prime Minister. In fact, the Director SIB had proceeded as far as he should with the case, and at the right time requested Fraser to inform the police and the service chiefs. It fitted the model for dealing with fifth column organisations outlined by Goss right back before the SIB was established.⁷² The Chiefs of Staff's consideration for the Police Commissioner contrasted with earlier attitudes. Judicious fence-sitting on the future of the SIB was the order of the day. Interestingly, they had not been given the Attorney-General's report, and it is a matter of conjecture as to what the Secretary ONS might have said off the record.

In spite of the press ban, the Ross case once more got into the papers on 2 February 1943. John A. Lee MP at a bye-election meeting was reported in the Dominion as demanding to know about the man from Mount Eden who sold the assassination story and the waste of four thousand pounds of public money by 'some Sherlock Holmes department....for which a Minister alone was responsible.' The government had been 'uncommunicative' on the man from Mount Eden's adventures.⁷³ This was a nasty little jab, for responsibility for the SIB lay with Fraser.

The axe fell. Folkes resigned by 6 February. The new Director of the SIB from 19 February 1943 was none other than Superintendent James Cummings, investigating officer for the Ross case, the Commissioner's brother. A memorandum declared Folkes no longer connected with the SIB, and Cummings took over 'at the direction of the Prime Minister.'⁷⁴ The SIB was now in the hands of the Police Department. Later on, Detective P.J Nalder, also from the Ross case, would become Superintendent Cummings' deputy,

and eventually succeed Cummings, when the latter succeeded his brother as Commissioner. A singular coup, one way or another.

On 24 February the Chiefs of Staff agreed to convene a sub-committee from the three services and the police to look at the SIB. The following day the Secretary ONS finally provided the Chiefs of Staff with copies of the Attorney-General's report, with a covering note mentioning that the future of the SIB was to be discussed.⁷⁵ The sub-committee met on 26 February, chaired by Shanahan. Army was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke-White and Captain Fraser, Navy by Lieutenant-Commander Beasley and Lieutenant Studholme, and the Air Force by Squadron Leader Wright and Flight Lieutenant Brown. Detective Sergeant Harding from the Ross team represented the Police.⁷⁶

There was almost total capitulation to the Police Department. The praises of the police were sung throughout. The police had an 'organised Security Service' although it was not constituted that way, being made up of 'certain selected officers'. By contrast the SIB personnel were 'relatively untrained in this work.'⁷⁷ There was a plug from the Navy for the Port Security organisation. However, the consensus of the meeting suggested the SIB would have to come under the police, or the Navy would have to do it themselves.⁷⁸ The Navy's November criticism of the police role in the courts was pushed aside. The two naval officers were clearly minority dissenters at the meeting, although the DNI as head of the COIC was the senior and most experienced intelligence officer present. Perhaps when democracy rules in these matters, intelligence goes out the window, so to speak.

While all 'duplication' of the Police Department's work should cease, the sub-committee felt there was a need for a liaison agency between the services and the police. The officer in charge would be called the Defence Security Officer and needed to have the confidence of the services and the police. He could be accommodated in the Police Department. He would be the service correspondent with MI5, and the Police Commissioner would be the civil correspondent with MI5.⁷⁹ In other words, the Cummings brothers working together. An Advisory Committee on security should be formed responsible to the Vital Points Committee. It would consist of the service chiefs and the Cummings brothers.⁸⁰ The records of the SIB were to be taken over and disposed of by the Police Commissioner in consultation with his brother, the Defence Security Officer.⁸¹ The committee decided that the SIB should cease to exist, and the Defence Security Bureau should stand in its place.⁸²

The interesting thing to note is that all mention of the role of the Prime Minister had vanished. However, as the Police Commissioner had direct access to the Prime Minister and his brother was running the security service (and Fraser had cause to be grateful to him now for political reasons), there was not likely to be much problem. Perhaps the Prime Minister now had a firewall between himself and the Chiefs of Staff. The meeting of the Vital Points Committee on 8 March noted receipt of the sub-committee's deliberations on the future of the SIB and the recommendation that the SIB be disbanded. It was decided to leave consideration of the report until the views of the Police Commissioner and the new Director of the SIB could be taken into account.⁸³

This bright picture of the demise of the SIB, and the apparently gleeful mopping up by the Police Department, was not subscribed to by all observers. A confidential letter

from the British High Commissioner to London on 16 March 1943 gave an interesting and different perspective on Folkes' 'colourful' career. Folkes had vigorously established his security service, and after a year the Chiefs of Staff had expressed the view that the SIB served a useful purpose (still the view of the present CNS).

Unhappily it is almost impossible to keep anything secret in this Dominion, and perhaps it was early realisation of this that dissuaded him from making any effort to conceal the nature of his activities, of which he delighted in painting vivid pictures in club rooms and social gatherings... [Despite this] a leaflet was soon in circulation giving the names of the members of the organisation and relating odd anecdotes in illustration of their methods. So far as the list of names is concerned the leaflet, was, I understand, accurate, and this blaze of publicity cannot have facilitated their work. Some stir was also caused by the revelation that among the characters whose bona fides had been investigated and past records raked over was at least one member of the Cabinet.

The isolation of New Zealand has bred the belief that noxious pests that infest the rest of the world do not exist here. To this type of thinking the operations of a secret service appear to be redundant and offensive, and some antagonism was experienced by the Bureau in official quarters from the first, e.g. in the Prime Minister's Department.⁸⁴

Noting Folkes was directly responsible to Fraser, the High Commissioner went on to state that matters were not assisted when questions were raised concerning a refugee residing with one of the principal members of the Prime Minister's staff. The latter when confronted rebutted the allegations as old wives tales and xenophobia.

Naturally enough the relations of Folkes with the police force, who resented his activities with the jealous eye of a professional rival, were also not easy. Dislike spread from officialdom to the press and it emerged last year that the Bureau had been the dupe of an elaborate hoax by an ex-convict, who lived in great comfort at public expense, on the basis of a melodramatic cock and bull story of a plot against the lives of ministers.⁸⁵

A press clipping of the fiasco was enclosed, evidence of the issue of the defence of public reputations being taken up by the 'gutter press' against over-zealous gullible secret police officials. The Bureau had since been sniped at by the Democratic Labour

Party about extravagance and expenditure. The approaching election made the SIB an embarrassment. It was now under a senior police officer.

So far as I am aware the Bureau has not unearthed any enemy activities in New Zealand, but it seems only fair to give it some of the credit for the absence of any sabotage or incidents in New Zealand ports. In this connection I enclose a circular produced under its auspices to tighten up shipping security.⁸⁶

This was a very different perspective on the debacle. The opposition to the SIB from the Prime Minister's Department is intriguing, for at this time it comprised a relatively small number of officials. If the letter was even reasonably accurate, Folkes had managed to array a large well-placed group of enemies located in a spread of powerful positions against him.

The DNI, writing to his RAN counterpart on 22 March, was frank in his assessment of the outcome of the Police victory.

You may perhaps have heard that we have had a showdown with our Security Intelligence Bureau here. The Police have won the battle hands down and the Director of the S.I.B., Major K. Folkes, has resigned. His place has been taken over by a senior Police officer, Mr.D.J. Cummings, and all the Port Security etc. has now come under the control of the Police. Undoubtedly, there were many things about the S.I.B. which needed overhaul, but it had been useful to us as regards Port Security and we stood out against this coming under the Police. However, we were shouted down and are now waiting to see how the new organisation will work. It is not going too badly at present.⁸⁷

The security service now embarked on a quite distinctive course, remaining a nominally army organisation run by a civilian department of state. In the wake of Folkes' departure there were further changes in personnel. In May, Captain Lindsay of the Christchurch office and Lieutenant McLean of the Wellington branch office left for overseas service. Lindsay was killed in action, while McLean ran a battalion intelligence section in the 2nd New Zealand Division. Mr.E. Daniels replaced McLean in Wellington. Mr. C.R. Hervey replaced Lindsay, and Mr. H.R. Moss replaced Hervey as Port Security

Control Officer in Christchurch. In April, Warrant Officer R.C. Steven left the SIB. In June, Captain A.W. Yortt became Deputy Director in SIB Headquarters.⁸⁸ Captain Yortt was succeeded a year later as Deputy Director by Detective Sergeant P.J. Nalder on 17 March 1944.⁸⁹ The two senior SIB posts were occupied by police officers. Intriguingly, Captain H.C. Meikle stayed on in charge of the Auckland office beyond the end of hostilities in 1945, attaining the rank of Major.⁹⁰ The man in charge of the day-to-day running of the Ross fiasco was curiously untouched in the aftermath.

In August 1943, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs sent a secret cable to the High Commissioners in Wellington and Canberra.⁹¹ He noted the 'security service', MI5, was anxious to establish closer and more personal contact with the security services in Australia and New Zealand. The snag was that after the 'past unfortunate incidents' connected with the Mawhood Mission in Australia 'and Folkes in New Zealand', they were unsure how to broach the subject. They thought the best course would be to invite a senior officer from both countries to visit the UK. Batterbee, the High Commissioner in Wellington wrote to Fraser on 13 August.⁹² The Prime Minister was clearly in no hurry on this, and did not reply until 6 January 1944, noting it to be a good idea. He would send 'Superintendent J. Cummings, the Head of Security Intelligence', and he expected him to visit the FBI in the United States as well.⁹³ This was duly arranged, along with a visit to Ottawa and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.⁹⁴ Cummings secured Nalder's appointment just before he left in March, and Nalder was left in charge during his absence.⁹⁵ The police were not about to let their grip on the organisation slip.

The Dominion on 11 September 1944 reported the Prime Minister's announcement of the closure of the Security Intelligence Bureau that month. All

documents had been transferred to the Police Department. The Director SIB, Superintendent Cummings, would be in due course, Police Commissioner.⁹⁶ Four days later, in response to a question in Parliament on the SIB, the Prime Minister gave an extraordinary account of his recollections of the organisation. The extract from Hansard (which can be amended by MPs to say what they thought they would have said) read:

Rt. Hon. Mr. Fraser (Prime Minister): With regard to the so-called secret service he assumed that the Security Intelligence Bureau was referred to. That was a branch affiliated with the Services set-up, at the express request of the British Government, to co-operate with the branches of the same Department throughout the Commonwealth. The officer in charge was one of the ablest police officers the country had ever known – Superintendent Cummings, who, in due course, would be Commissioner of Police. It was expected that before long that branch would be absorbed into the Police Department.⁹⁷

However, the Dominion report of Fraser's reply published the next day differed somewhat. Fraser said that the man who was the original head of the SIB had come from Britain. He was 'an obvious misfit', and later became involved in one of the silliest affairs he (Fraser) had ever heard of, and one which was worthy of Jules Verne. This was a hoax put across the officer by a criminal in Rotorua. And

As soon as it came to my notice I asked Mr. Cummings to step in, and the whole thing was cleared up in 24 hours... We asked Britain to take the officer back because he was quite unfitted for the work, which is now in the hands of a New Zealander... Superintendent Cummings a most able police officer and brilliant detective.⁹⁸

If accurately reported, Fraser had lied to Parliament. Not that this was easy to contest at the time. However, a feature in the New Zealand Observer of 11 October 1944 by 'Spotlight' took Fraser to task over his remarks, and considerably redressed the balance. Not uncritical of Folkes, it gave him his due, noting that the Ross case had come to the SIB from Semple and Fraser, and that the SIB had been unpopular in Government circles. Not least of this unpopularity had stemmed from the SIB's uncovering of a corrupt

scheme of interfering with ballot cards in the National Service Department. The story emphasised that the Ross affair had been the occasion of political embarrassment for the Prime Minister, and this was why he had it in for the organisation and the first Director.⁹⁹ From the detailed content of the article, it was clear that 'Spotlight' had assistance from SIB staff or was an SIB officer himself. Whatever the case, his sources were well-informed.

The recollections of the Ross affair by late 1944 were long in the past. The SIB continued to function under Superintendent Cummings, and then Nalder. After the SIB was shut down there was no security service until a totally new organisation was formed in the mid-1950s. The Ross affair cast a long shadow. A Police Department Special Branch was formed in the late 1940s while James Cummings was still Commissioner. It was headed by Nalder.

Who benefitted from the police takeover of the SIB? Clearly the Police Department. Their view from the late 1930s was that internal security was their responsibility, and they simply regarded the SIB as an imposed and unnecessary competitor. Faced with the prospect of taking it over, absorbing it or closing it down altogether, it is interesting that the Police Commissioner and his brother found it more useful to keep the SIB alive under police command. Where the recommendation was to disband the SIB, they made a different decision. The Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff acceded to their wishes.

Given the curious nature of the Ross debacle, what was the role of the police in the shambles? Did the police put Ross up to it in the first place? There is no proof of that. Equally there is no question but that the Police Department exploited the situation

to the full as it developed, letting the SIB get deep in trouble, then intervening just in time to save the Prime Minister from embarrassment. It put Fraser heavily in debt to the Cummings brothers and burnt the fingers of the Chiefs of Staff. By ensuring Folkes was removed, the police left themselves as the unchallenged experts on internal security in New Zealand. Whether they were as good as they thought they were is another question. In all, it was a curious result achieved in atypical circumstances, ie. the close connection of the Prime Minister to the affair. In the ordinary course of events, the first Director could have been replaced by another Army officer. The plot itself was far-fetched, but it did develop during a quite tense period of the war when a lot of things were uncertain. During the period of the fiasco, the New Zealand coast was visited twice by enemy submarines, which could easily have put parties ashore with impunity, just as their launching of reconnaissance aircraft went unhindered.

The Ross affair substantively modified the role of New Zealand's first security service. It was now an adjunct of the Police Department. In consequence, was the SIB's effectiveness much reduced?

Chapter Twelve

Aftermath

The severe jolt of the Ross fiasco left the SIB firmly under police command, and the concept of an independent security service a fading memory. The swift and complete takeover took the SIB away from the orbit of the military. Internal security was now a police matter, and as an adjunct of the police the SIB would undertake some work in this area only under the firm guidance of sensible senior police officers. The SIB continued its half-life on routine tasks, with the advantage of access and much closer liaison with the civil department with greater expertise on internal security. The tensions caused by interdepartmental hostility were eliminated at a stroke, and the Prime Minister and the service chiefs could trust a security service run by Superintendent Cummings.

How did the security service go about its business in the aftermath? The SIB produced regular intelligence bulletins about their investigations, although the products of the earlier period disappeared into police custody. The SIB's post fall intelligence products bear useful comparison with the regular Police Intelligence Summaries, in that they demonstrate some differences in perspective on internal security. Port security continued to be a problem with a weak Port Security Control and inadequate policing. The question of whether the SIB's focus was now directed firmly downwards into minor security details and away from the possibility of penetration of the government administration is one that must be asked.

The Police Commissioner had passed Police Intelligence Summaries to the Secretary ONS since the outbreak of war. They continued to go to the Assistant Secretary

to the War Cabinet Secretariat after the internal reorganisation of the Prime Minister's Department in 1943.¹ The summaries varied in regularity, commencing as weekly summaries, becoming fortnightly in mid-1941, then monthly from April 1942, and were generally one or two pages long (occasionally three).²

The first Police Intelligence Summary on 9 October 1939 dealt with the registration of aliens, raised the possibility of internment, assessed the strength of the Army's Guard Vital Points detachments as adequate, and noted the extension of the Police patrol at the ports. In the Police Commissioner's view,

I consider we are well informed regarding conditions and that there is no cause for apprehension regarding the internal state of the country ...

The public reaction to the conduct of the war is most favourable. I would say that communism and anti-war organizations are not likely to gain ground...

There has been the usual spate of "spy stories", a considerable number of allegedly suspicious happenings being reported. Each one has been investigated as it is not wise to ignore any but the most obviously fantastic story.

A close liaison with the three Defence Services is being maintained.³

On 31 October the Commissioner's Intelligence Summary noted 'that internal conditions continue to remain normal.'⁴ From late 1940 the summaries contained the sentence 'Internal conditions remain satisfactory', usually just before the Commissioner's signature, underlining the fact that for the Police Department at least, the internal security situation was always under control.⁵ Apart from aliens and the reporting of suspicious occurrences or possible acts of sabotage like fires in warehouses or on ships in port, the summaries devoted a considerable amount of attention to the extreme political left, with a focus on the Communist Party. It is quite clear that the police kept the Communist Party, its supporters and similar groups under close scrutiny. The police must have penetrated the party well and truly, given the intimate knowledge of the party's financial position, its membership and its publications. The watch on the communists was a regular feature and

something of an obsession in the summaries, and there is almost a detectable disappointment when Germany's invasion of Russia brought the Communist Party on side. This did not lessen the surveillance on the communists and their fellow-travellers.⁶ Pacifists, conscientious objectors and those who ran foul of the law in terms of emergency regulations figured from time to time, and their court convictions were noted. Most were for very minor matters.

An instance of a very different sort was a suspected break-in at the DSIR laboratory in the Wellington East Post Office building on the night of 21 December 1942. Careful investigations were made, as the strong room door was found to be open and 'there was much secret material in the place.' However, it was concluded that someone had forgotten to lock the door and left the light on.⁷ The reason for such close attention was not mentioned, for the laboratory was working on secret radar development.⁸

In 1944, the objects of the summaries were much the same. The Communist Party and the pacifist organisations were still coming in for close attention. Klein's partner on The Spark, L.Sim, surfaced in the summary for 25 February with the New Zealand Bolshevik Party, which was concluded to be a one man band.⁹ The same summary concerned releases of aliens from internment, listed breaches of the Emergency Regulations and other minor matters. Co-operation was noted between the Police and the SIB in investigating letters to WAAFs inciting sabotage, and a suspicious sighting near Gisborne was reported.¹⁰ The Police Intelligence Summaries provided a fairly regular diet of information on activities within the country and assured the recipients that the internal security situation was assessed and under control.

The SIB's intelligence publications consisted of Internal Security Intelligence Bulletins, External Security Intelligence Bulletins and Port Security Control Bulletins.¹¹ Each dealt with a variety of matters. For example, External Security Intelligence Bulletin no.8 of 28 May 1943 covered army deserters hiding as seamen, visa fraud, methods of sabotage, the grading of intelligence, internees, a statement by the Australian Navy Minister, Censorship and Press Releases, the vetting of radio operators, the surveillance of German agents, the security of letters, illegal communications from enemy POWs in Canada, and the International Free World Association.¹²

The SIB's intelligence bulletins were amalgamated from 1 July 1943 into one publication, 'The New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin.'¹³ Twenty one issues followed, from no.1 in July 1943 to no.21 in April-May 1945.¹⁴ Six came out in 1943, twelve in 1944 (the last being December 1944-January 1945), and four in 1945. Around ten or eleven pages in length, they were divided into internal security intelligence, external security intelligence and port security control.¹⁵ Occasionally they overlapped with the Police Intelligence Summaries, but for the most part did not.

An interesting example of leakage of shipping information appeared in New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin no.8 of February 1944.¹⁶ An investigation began when a reliable informant reported a security breach. A trainee dental nurse sent a letter to her mother telling her that a particular number of ships carrying US Marines had sailed in the morning to attack Japanese positions in the Gilbert Islands. The information was accurate, and the informant who was told about this by the mother was concerned enough to contact the SIB.¹⁷ It transpired that three young women had taken up socially with US Navy and US Marine Corps officers. The women were entertained at Service Clubs,

parties, camp messes and on board ship. The officers were pumped for information on ship movements, arrivals and departures. The women pieced the indiscreet talk together¹⁸ to keep track of “their” men, and through this got advance information of the large convoy’s departure from Wellington preceding the attack on the Gilberts. It was potentially a case of ‘careless talk costs lives’.

Although the summary did not say so, the instance was particularly worrying because the attack referred to Operation ‘Galvanic’, the landing on Tarawa on 20-23 November 1943. The Marines had suffered heavy casualties, and the coincidental leakage was a serious matter. The young women had, by careful collection and collation, gathered a good deal of accurate secret information.¹⁹ As the casualties sustained in the operation had been unexpected, and the SIB’s informant produced the report of the possible leak only eleven days after the assault went in, the SIB’s interest was understandable. However, the casualties had come as a result of the amphibious operation’s bungled planning, in which significant data concerning tides was ignored. The point was that the women had managed to gather operational intelligence which would have been most useful to the enemy.

In Bulletin no.16 for October 1944, the SIB noted with some prescience the dangers posed by German submarines. It was observed that as the war moved north, the general public was inclined to be relaxed about disclosing shipping movements. The bulletin flagged the rise of German U-boat operations closer to home, with the rise in merchant shipping sinkings in the Indian Ocean.²⁰ Part of this rise was caused by U862’s bag in August, and shortly after this summary the submarine was making preparations for a cruise to Australasian waters.

The police and the SIB produced intelligence summaries similar in some respects but very different in others. The role of the police was to catch criminals and waylay those in breach of security measures. Their attention focussed inwards for the most part, and was very much predicated on judicial results: convictions in court, imprisonment or internment. The SIB viewed security intelligence from another angle, as well as blocking leaks. They tended to look at the larger picture, at what was going on overseas as well as within New Zealand. Their summaries reflected that difference. The summaries of the two organisations complimented each other, and taken together provided a comprehensive round-up on current security intelligence. Ironically, once the SIB were under the police, they were able to proceed better, because they were assisted rather than hindered in their work, and could tap into police resources. It is intriguing to reflect that the Cummings brothers were satisfied with the situation. Had the SIB been of no use at all, the Police Department could easily have shut it down forthwith.

Security of shipping information remained problematical. At the time when the SIB was in pieces on the floor at the end of 1942, there occurred an unexplained and undetected slip. The serious leak came to light much later. On 22 May 1944, the Naval Secretary minuted the Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, the Police Commissioner and the Director SIB.

Among papers captured at Salamaua on the 18th September 1943 is a collection of Japanese 51st Division Intelligence Reports. These are graded Military Most Secret.

2.-In report No.14, dated 20th January, 1943, is the following information: "3,500 American Army troops who left Wellington are apparently heading for Noumea or Port Moresby".

3.-Four transports and one destroyer left Wellington on 26th December, 1942, for Noumea. From the way the above is worded it appears to information which leaked out of New Zealand.²¹

Shanahan, now Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, informed the Naval Secretary, the Police Commissioner and the Director SIB on 26 May that the War Cabinet was 'today' concerned to know whether the Japanese intelligence report was accurate.²² Cummings as Director SIB replied to Shanahan (with copies to his brother and the Naval Secretary). Prior to receiving the latest memorandum

I had ascertained that on the 26th December 1942 four small transports carrying 3,500 troops and accompanied by one destroyer left Wellington for Guadalcanal via Noumea.²³

He added:

Although the date of departure from Wellington was 25 days prior to the date of the Japanese intelligence report, it is clear from the report itself that the information must have been in the hands of the Japanese while the convoy was still at sea. You will notice that the statement in the report refers to troops which were 'apparently heading for Noumea or Port Moresby.' It is clear therefore that while the convoy was still at sea the Japanese knew not only that the troops had left Wellington, but the precise number of the troops.

I think the time lag between the date of the convoy's departure and the date of Japanese 51st Division Intelligence Report No.14, may well be accounted for by the fact that the report was one found among a collection of Divisional Intelligence reports at Salamaua, and was probably an extract from, or repetition of, an earlier report from Japanese Intelligence Headquarters.

The discovery of this report certainly seems to indicate the probability of a serious leakage of information from New Zealand.²⁴

This raised some interesting questions. How could such information have reached the Japanese while the convoy was still at sea? The timing would exclude ordinary mail, so cable or radio remained possible sources. The Japanese might have had a break-in to allied signals traffic is one possibility. The German B-Dienst was reading quite a lot of British merchant and naval traffic for much of the war. Direct illicit radio transmissions from New Zealand cannot be ruled out, but seem unlikely. Or perhaps again, like the unexpected arrival of the German raider off Auckland in 1940, this was

just another accident waiting to happen, the product of more careless talk. Had the convoy been intercepted and sunk, the leakage would have been more than academic.

The Port Security Control continued doing its work throughout the troubled period for the SIB from mid-1942 into 1943, and on into 1944.²⁵ While the work was carried out reasonably efficiently, the lack of commitment by the Police left holes in the physical security of shipping at the wharves. Port Security personnel, with minimal staff, could not fill the gap, and after the police takeover of the SIB were unable to do so. Port security and the safe arrival and departure of merchantmen was a standard maritime requirement for the duration of the war. For the most part, merchant shipping was not interfered with, more by good luck than good management. Police shortcomings in guarding wharves and gangways were a commentary on their attitude to port security. The SIB's tiny presence in the ports was a useful addition to the surveillance provided by customs officers, but little more than that. Not set up until 1942, it was too little far too late. The leakage of information from Wellington in December 1942 pointed up basic problems unresolved during hostilities. The ubiquitous inertia and failure to develop capabilities took over once operational urgency was perceived to have ebbed away from the New Zealand coast. The Port Security Control, thanks to the Police coup mounted on the SIB, was under police direction for most of its existence. If it failed to live up to its potential, the responsibility lay with the police.

One of the main tasks of a security service is the prevention of the penetration of the government bureaucracy by hostile powers. The most usual form this penetration takes is through the cultivation of useful sources of information. Some sources of

information may be willing contributors, others unwitting contributors. Did this happen with the New Zealand civil service?

The great Allied success in the intelligence war was not inevitable, nor was it an all-pervasive continuous catalogue of success. It does seem to be the case that the Germans and the Japanese had limited success against their enemies, although in terms of the cultivation of sources in the civil service and the armed services, none at all in New Zealand. The great British success against the Germans in the intelligence war was qualified by the penetration of a number British government departments by the Russian secret services, the NKVD and the GRU. It is only in relatively recent times that the extent and shape of this penetration in the form of agents has begun to be discerned, although the main cases have been well known for a considerable period. It is one of the great ironies of the intelligence history of the Second World War that just as German military intelligence and certain German communications were being pulled inside out by the British, so the Russians were doing the same to parts of the British bureaucracy. The Russian intelligence services penetrated MI6, MI5, the Foreign Office, Treasury, GCHQ at Bletchley Park and one or two other places (like the office of the Minister of State outside Cabinet, Lord Hankey) besides.²⁶ The so-called Cambridge spies and their Oxford counterparts plus a leavening of other agents produced a remarkable stream of intelligence for the Russians at Moscow Centre. Based on an energetic, talented and diverse collection of both illegal and legal agent runners like Mally, Deutsch, Orlov, Reiss, Grafpen, Gorsky, Kreshin, Shishkin and others, the penetration ran against the burgeoning tide of technical intelligence.²⁷ Indeed, the agent penetrations benefitted from the breakthroughs in signals intelligence, as the main codebreaking centre was infiltrated.

The penetration might have been even more extensive had Stalin's purges not taken their toll on the Russian intelligence services. There is also the question of just how well the intelligence obtained was used. One has only to think of the paranoia of Modrzhinskaya at Moscow Centre throwing doubt on Blunt, Burgess, McLean, Philby and Cairncross in wartime to see that the Foreign Department of the NKVD had a patchy performance on occasion.²⁸

Of the agents themselves, some are known but others still remain buried. Tudor-Hart, King, Glading, Harvey, Klugman, Uren, Oldham, Burgess, Blunt, McLean, Philby, Cairncross, Long, Straight and others like Fuchs and Nunn May are well known.²⁹ But there were a number of other agents – those of the Oxford ring, or the agent at Bletchley Park operating before John Cairncross arrived – that remain unidentified, or have only recently surfaced, like Norwood.³⁰ The verdict remains very much open on which side was the more successful, or rather how the intelligence balance between the western Allies and the Russians panned out. The access to Russian intelligence archives in recent times and the books based on those files by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev (Deadly Illusions Century 1993) and Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev (The Crown Jewels Harper Collins 1998) thrust the door ajar. The collaborative works of Christopher Andrew and the defector Oleg Gordievsky, followed by the ongoing study with Vasili Mitrokhin (The Mitrokhin Archive 1999) have charted new waters on the extent of Soviet intelligence.³¹

Given the extent of the penetration of the British government's intelligence organisations and bureaucracy in general, it would seem most unlikely that a slight public service like New Zealand's could be immune. Australia was not, so why would New Zealand be special, particularly when two important Soviet agents in Australia were New

Zealanders, revealed by Desmond Ball's and David Horner's seminal work on the Moscow –Canberra Venona traffic.³² The purpose of penetrating the New Zealand government lay in the links with Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States. Intelligence circulated to New Zealand would be a convenient check on material extracted elsewhere. The Ross fiasco's effect on the SIB and the allergic reaction within the public service to security measures in general appear to have made New Zealand a very soft touch. Two of the best places in the government administration for an agent in place were the Prime Minister's Department and the new Department of External Affairs. Given that they were run by the same team, there was considerable interchange of information at the heart of government. The best vantage points were occupied by McIntosh and Shanahan and those who worked for them. Not that one is suggesting for a moment that either McIntosh or Shanahan had anything to do with the Russians. But their posts were extremely convenient, with oversight of incoming communications of all kinds from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand diplomatic posts abroad.

Suspicion fell on two persons in the civil service, and a few early retirements from the Department of External Affairs in the 1950s had question marks about them.³³ The well-known economist Dr. W.B. Sutch, who was eventually to head the Department of Industries and Commerce, had a shadow cast over him as early as 1937, when Lord Hankey is said to have fingered him for a leak from the Imperial Conference (a great irony, for Hankey would subsequently employ a top-line Russian spy in his own office - John Cairncross, no less.).³⁴ Rather incredibly, in the immediate postwar period, Sutch was tipped to head an office in New York to establish a permanent link with the UN

Economic and Social Council. Berendsen, New Zealand Minister in Washington, advised against the appointment, noting that Sutch had the ability, but 'I don't think the judgement, and I would not take the risk.'³⁵ After his appointment, Sutch was supposed to return to New Zealand, but was delayed by a lengthy illness.

Early in 1948, something of a crisis erupted around Sutch. On 19 March 1948, Berendsen was constrained to write to McIntosh expressing his concern about receiving a letter from Thorn in New York expressing anxiety on Sutch's pro-Russian views.³⁶ Sutch was Secretary-General at the Office of the Permanent Delegation of New Zealand to the United Nations. McIntosh wrote to Berendsen on 20 March that he had received complaints from Thorn on Sutch about mismanagement, judgement and behaviour. McIntosh had taken it further.

I told the Prime Minister ... that the position appeared to be impossible and too dangerous to be allowed to continue. If what Thorn said about consorting with the Russians was correct, I was all for pulling him out on the spot, but Mr. Fraser was anxious not to be unjust, and suggested that we should ask Thorn to consult with Nash and yourself, and then for Nash to report [on returning to New Zealand]... I have never liked the interference of Nash in our affairs, and I expressed strong opposition to this course ... I sent a telegram off to Thorn asking him to make an official complaint and recommendation, and stating that I took the view that recall would probably be the wisest course.

Mr Thorn replied that his letter to me could be taken as official, that he would write but that he wanted to consult you first about any recommendations. As a result we are letting matters ride, which I think is a mistake.

...As the Prime Minister told you himself, he did not think that Sutch should have political responsibilities...

I made it quite clear to Bill [Sutch], when he was here, that this was a last chance, and that if he made any mistake or fell under suspicion he was definitely and irrevocably out. Thorn's one specific complaint would not perhaps be sufficient to justify the action now suggested but, knowing Bill and knowing Thorn, I was pretty certain that there must be many other instances...³⁷

McIntosh went on to say that he was worried that Sutch was ill and that this may have accounted for his failure to attend to his work thoroughly and conscientiously.³⁸ The

trouble was, McIntosh did not see anyone suitable to replace Sutch. Berendsen, by his reply to McIntosh on 30 March, was extremely angry, as his earlier opposition to Sutch's appointment had been 'so pointedly and repeatedly' ignored. He felt Sutch should be confronted as it was basically unfair to be considering dismissing him without getting his side of the story, although it is clear that Berendsen was quite unsympathetic to Sutch if it was true he had been pro-Russian.³⁹ Sutch remained in New York. At the end of 1949, Berendsen still wanted Sutch replaced. In May 1950, McIntosh observed to Berendsen that

The Minister insists on Sutch being recalled, and he has two other Overseas officers marked down as being equally unsuitable, because of their political outlook. This particular situation I have found most disturbing and difficult. So far as Sutch is concerned, all that I have been able to do is to put off the eventual time of his withdrawal for a variety of reasons. First of all, we have no job for him here. Secondly, we have no suitable replacement for him in New York, and, thirdly, I have been trying to use this period to persuade Bill to get himself another job. So far he has had no success, mainly for the reason...that when a United Nations opening comes up he is pushed aside because he is not liked or trusted. As to replacing him, Doidge does not think we should have anybody as expensive as Sutch, and Mr Holland sees no reason why the Post should be maintained at all.⁴⁰

McIntosh continued to press for Sutch to get a UN position. Persisting to push Sutch was almost counter-productive, as Berendsen sharply noted on 16 July.⁴¹ He wrote to McIntosh to say he regarded it as unfair to be asked to persuade the UN to take Sutch on as a competent and suitable officer, when 'I and I believe you and everybody else concerned' considered him to be the opposite. Berendsen thought he was entitled to a written instruction for the file before embarking on such a course.

So I decided to do nothing until I could talk to Sutch, who has always been fully aware of my high opinion of him as a person and very low opinion of him as an officer (to say nothing of his political views and record, the doubts on which held by Cummings and Coy are almost certainly known to the FBI and to the UN

and may indeed be a factor, for all I know, in their unwillingness to give him a post.).⁴²

But Berendsen noted the matter had been brought to a head, as Sutch rang about some immediate technical jobs that had come up and asked him to write on his behalf. Berendsen had done so, but there was no favourable response. The 'doubts by Cummings' referred to the Police Commissioner and the Special Branch in Wellington. Sutch continued in his career as a public servant, but always carried this odium of suspicion. In retirement, he was to be tried under the Official Secrets Act in the mid-1970s, and was acquitted of a charge of espionage after suspicious meetings with Russian diplomatic staff in Wellington. It is most likely Sutch was a source of sorts for the Russians. Was he a stalking horse for someone else?

The other civil servant was Paddy Costello. A quite startling claim over a number of years is that one of the senior intelligence officers of the 2nd New Zealand Division turned out to be a spy for the Russians.⁴³ Although it is prosaic to say so, there is no doubt that Desmond Patrick Costello was a spy. It is merely a question of who he worked for. All intelligence officers are spies, and Costello was an intelligence officer. The question marks about him have to do with whether he spied for the Soviet Union as well as New Zealand.

Costello, a New Zealander of Irish extraction, was educated at Auckland Grammar School and Auckland University College. He had an outstanding academic record, winning a scholarship to Trinity College at Cambridge in 1931. He was awarded first class honours in the classical tripos.⁴⁴ His time at Cambridge coincided with that of a number of the Cambridge spies – Philby, Burgess, McLean, Blunt and Cairncross. Costello most definitely held Marxist views and was a friend of John Cornford. He later

admitted to being a member of the Communist Party in his student days.⁴⁵ He married Bella Lerner, a communist of Russian parentage.⁴⁶ After Cambridge, Costello obtained an assistant lectureship at the University of the South-West at Exeter. He was said to have spoken out at Exeter against British government policy on a number of issues, and was supposed to have been dismissed from his post for associating with a student who was convicted of offences under the Official Secrets Act.⁴⁷

In 1940, Costello enlisted in the 2NZEF as a private and was posted to the 21st Infantry Battalion of 5 Brigade, 2nd New Zealand Division. He listed his languages at this time as French, Italian, German, Modern Greek and Russian. In the calamity that befell this Battalion in the disastrous campaign in Greece, Costello's linguistic abilities came to the fore, and he was instrumental in securing a boat on which he and others escaped.⁴⁸ Returning to Egypt, he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant on 20 September 1941, being posted to the Long Range Desert Group from 11 December to 5 February 1942. In February Costello moved to A Branch, General Staff Intelligence at British Army General Headquarters in Cairo. In May he returned to the 2nd New Zealand Division as Divisional Intelligence Officer with the rank of Lieutenant. Promoted temporary Captain on 20 September 1942, he succeeded Geoffrey Cox as GSO III (I) of the Division on 4 June 1943. He remained in this post until the opening phase of the Second Battle of Cassino, handing over to Dan Davin on 15 February 1944.⁴⁹ Much later he was accused of being a possible source of Ultra material for the Russians in his time with the Division in the Middle East. Geoffrey Cox, also a diplomat, took a different view.

Costello was a tall, well built man, with a confident, though quiet bearing, and a tendency for sardonic humour. His views, which he did not parade, were

undoubtedly Marxist, but I think it highly unlikely, indeed virtually inconceivable, that he was a source of information for the Russians during his time in the Army. He could not have informed them himself of Ultra, because neither Davin nor myself, and I believe Costello, had any knowledge of Ultra at the time. We knew that the British had valuable high level information about the enemy, but put that down either to skilled espionage out of Germany, or localised intercepts of a kind made tactically in the field. Any information available to Costello during his time with the Division or during his time in GHQ in Cairo, would have been of little if any value to the Russians.⁵⁰

This is not quite the same as saying Costello would have been of no use to the Russians, but nearly.

During three months leave, Costello was interviewed in London in May 1944 by Fraser and McIntosh for a diplomatic post with the new New Zealand Legation in Moscow. Attention had been drawn to Costello from a press item featuring a New Zealand intelligence officer speaking and joking with a group of visiting Russian officers when they visited the Division in December 1943.⁵¹ Geoffrey Cox had gone to a diplomatic posting in Washington, and Costello wrote to Cox asking if he would support him being considered for the Moscow post. Cox wrote to McIntosh describing Costello's formidable linguistic abilities matched by rather rigid left-wing views. Cox hedged his support

...with the following qualifications which clearly must also be put forward:

(1) his rigidity of mind may mean that he is another Sutch, if not in views exactly, certainly in his insistence on his own attitude. He would insist on his views openly and in no indirect way for he is the most positive of people.

(2) he is married to a Russian wife, actually of Ukrainian stock, whose family have been in England for, I think, only one generation.⁵²

When Fraser asked Costello about his politics, Costello is supposed to have said that he was afraid he was a bit left wing, to which Fraser allegedly replied, 'oh well, it won't hurt us to have one or two Communists in Moscow.'⁵³ Following his successful interview, Costello spent a few weeks at the Northern Department of the Foreign Office

preparing for his Moscow post. The Foreign Office reported to the British Ambassador in Moscow that Costello had 'made an excellent impression in every way.'⁵⁴ Trouble loomed on the horizon in March 1945 when McIntosh wrote to Costello advising him that MI5 had reported his wife's current connection with the Communist Party and his record of problems at Exeter before the war. In his reply, Costello asserted that

I am not, and have not been since well before the War, a member of the Communist Party ...as to my wife, your assumption that she would have broken off her political activities is of course correct. She ceased to have any connection with the Communist Party from the time I arrived in England last April, and has had none since to the best of my knowledge.⁵⁵

This put something of a blight on Costello's diplomatic career. A diversion came up in 1945 with the despatch of a party from the British Military Mission in Moscow to Katowice in Poland. Costello was attached with the temporary rank of Major to track down missing New Zealand POWs from camps liberated in Poland.⁵⁶ He was the senior officer of this three-man mission, and while they did not find any New Zealanders, they reported on conditions in Poland, and on the extermination camps at Maidanek and Auschwitz-Birkenau. He managed to free a French officer, Captain Lequeux, and Dr. Olga Lengyel from the Russians.⁵⁷ A point that might be made is that if Costello was working for the NKVD, he would hardly have been in any position to press the issue hard about locating New Zealand POWs.

Costello returned to the Legation in Moscow, where he was very much the mainstay of the diplomatic post. This meant that the bulk of the political reporting from Moscow was done by Costello, and he adopted a very *realpolitik* stance in his approach to developing events in Eastern Europe. Cox noted that Costello adhered to Marxist analysis, accepting that the ends justified the means, and had, for example, little

sympathy for the fate of Czechoslovakia and Masaryk. This did not prevent him from making some very perceptive political reports. The Cabinet of the incoming Holland government in New Zealand decided to close the Moscow Legation on 24 March 1950, although Costello stayed behind to dispose of the Legation's assets, the post finally closing on 13 June 1950.⁵⁸

Costello went to the New Zealand Legation in Paris. According to the Mitrokhin material, Costello was one of the Russians' most useful sources in Paris, his codename at this time being LONG.⁵⁹ The British government objected to Costello's continued employment in the New Zealand diplomatic service. Although the Charge d'affaires at the Legation, Jean McKenzie, was strongly convinced of Costello's loyalty,⁶⁰ the new Prime Minister was determined to have Costello moved out. By mid-1953 Costello was put on notice that he would have to go.

It should also be noted that there were a few resignations from the New Zealand diplomatic service in the early 1950s, which have not been explored yet. At least two of them had connections with Costello back into the period of his war service, both of them from the 2nd New Zealand Division. Certainly one of those was brought to Shanahan's attention by MI5, although what was made of it is unclear.⁶¹

Costello left to become Professor of Russian at Manchester University, unsurprisingly for a man of his linguistic attributes.⁶² This was not to be the end of the matter. In January 1961 the Portland spy-ring was broken up by the British MI5 and the Special Branch, acting on information from a Russian defector to the CIA. The illegal agent runner, Molody (alias Gordon Lonsdale or BEN) and his spies, Houghton and Gee, were picked up, along with his communications team.⁶³ The communications team

was a married couple, Peter and Helen Kroger, who were, according to their passports, New Zealand antiquarian booksellers. They were in fact Maurice and Lona Cohen, Foreign Department agents of Moscow Centre. They had narrowly escaped being apprehended when the so-called Atom Spy ring was rounded up in the United States.⁶⁴ The problem with the Cohens was that their New Zealand passports are said to have been personally authorised by Costello when he was at the Paris Legation.⁶⁵ It is also said that the Russian defector to the CIA, 'Anatoli Golitsyn', fingered Costello. Whatever the case, it seems that Costello was put under surveillance and was observed meeting persons suspected of being Soviet agents.⁶⁶ Costello was not apprehended, arrested or charged with anything.

On 23 February 1964, Costello died suddenly of a heart attack at the relatively young age of fifty-three.⁶⁷ Later that year, the Soviet agent Sir Anthony Blunt underwent his interrogation by MI5 that was part of his immunity-from-prosecution deal. He informed MI5 that Costello had been an agent of the Soviet KGB, which was painless, seeing that Costello was deceased.⁶⁸

The New Zealand government public service was penetrated by the NKVD/KGB. The question mark over Sutch remains to be conclusively resolved. Blunt and the Mitrokhin material show that Costello certainly worked for Moscow Centre. If Sutch and Costello were agents, just what sort of sources are we talking about? Clearly, if they worked for the Russians, questions about their reliability were raised early on. The danger lay only if those questions on their soundness were ignored. They were useful as long as they had access to information of interest. But it is an insufficient assumption that because a person's position in the bureaucracy is obscure he cannot get access to

more interesting material. Contacts between civil servants and the routine circulation of material between departments and committees suggest avenues. The resourceful person finds ways and means and one only has to look at Guy Burgess and Donald McLean to see this easily demonstrated.⁶⁹ While Burgess, Philby and McLean certainly worked far harder than has hitherto been imagined in providing information for Moscow Centre,⁷⁰ the case of John Cairncross stands as an interesting warning about resourceful spies. Cairncross found it very difficult, in spite of undoubted intellectual brilliance, to hold down a post for any length of time. He moved from the Foreign Office to the Treasury, to the office of the Minister of State outside Cabinet (Lord Hankey), to Bletchley Park and thence to MI6, and back to Treasury.⁷¹ Yet even in an apparent intelligence backwater like the Treasury, Cairncross managed to obtain a great deal of useful intelligence through carefully positioning himself to see all sorts of interesting material circulating through. While the Treasury post was interesting, Lord Hankey's office was a goldmine, as much secret material was circulated to him. These included incoming and outgoing Foreign Office telegrams, Secret Intelligence Service reports, War Cabinet minutes, reports from the Chiefs of Staff and a mass of other material. During 1941, Cairncross supplied 3,449 documents.⁷² One consignment of these had a covering letter from his agent handler summarising the contents.

We are sending 60 films with material from LIST [Cairncross's codename]: Foreign Office cryptograms, weekly SIS, Foreign Office and General Staff bulletins, 2 reports from the commission of the BOSS [Lord Hankey] on the results of an investigation of the counter-intelligence service [MI5] with the characteristics of leading members of the staff and the functions of individual sections; a report on radio measures against night bombers; a report from the commission of the BOSS on means and methods of bacteriological warfare; documents from the Y Committee...⁷³

The comprehensiveness of the material from a variety of sources was its real strength. The penetration of Hankey's office is a cautionary tale in itself and the result of a careful reading of Hankey's personal habits by Cairncross's agent runners. Hankey's vegetarianism, plus acquaintance with one of Hankey's sons, was used as a lever to get Cairncross into his office.⁷⁴ At this time, 1941, Philby was in MI6, McLean was in the Foreign Office, Blunt had just joined MI5, and Burgess had good connections in MI6, MI5, the Foreign Office and the BBC, and there was already another un-named agent at Bletchley Park.⁷⁵ Not to mention the obscure but valuable service rendered over 40 years by Melita Norwood.⁷⁶

It would be very strange indeed if the New Zealand public service was immune to outside attention. It is quite well known that the Petrov defection in Australia in 1954 produced the allegation that the Russians had a source in the New Zealand Prime Minister's Department. It has been assumed that this was Sutch, but it was not cleared up.⁷⁷ Certainly, the running together of the Prime Minister's Department and the Department of External Affairs, with the same head from 1946 to 1966 would have made it extremely convenient for long term agents.

In all of this, the takeover of the SIB by the Police in 1943 lessened the chance of effective checks being routinely instituted in the New Zealand public service. The transformation of the SIB occurred in the same year as the reorganisation involving the Prime Minister's Department, the establishment of the small Department of External Affairs and the War Cabinet Secretariat, making the co-ordination of much top level government policy easier. This was completed when McIntosh took over as Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department while remaining Head of External Affairs. If

there was any problem of security in External Affairs or the Prime Minister's Department, there was no security service to sort it out by then, and any such attention would have been most unwelcome while Fraser remained Prime Minister. The prospect of penetration of government departments in any serious way does not seem to have been considered.

The arrival of the SIB on the intelligence scene in New Zealand was flawed from the outset. Advocated by the Chiefs of Staff to fill a perceived hole in security, it was established in the face of hostility from the Police Department. The linkage of the SIB with the Special Companies through the fifth column fear quickly fell away, and the SIB embarked on a course of widening its responsibilities. The personality of the first Director was most unfortunate and no doubt contributed substantially to SIB losing support in even sympathetic quarters. To the conventional security intelligence aims of maintaining within the military the security of information, security of material, security of personnel and operational security, were added further responsibilities. The whole dimension of civil security - prevention of bribery and corruption in government departments, matters to do with aliens and disaffected persons, subversion and sabotage - suggested the requirement for a much larger service. The security service was in direct competition with the Police Department from the outset. Given the relative disparities in resources, personnel numbers and local knowledge, it was quite obvious who would win in the long run, given that both heads of the SIB and the police had access to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Department.

The assumption of the further responsibility for raising and training the Field Security Sections in New Zealand dissipated effort further, as the expansion of SIB staff

did not keep pace. This problem was compounded with the establishment of the Port Security Control. Ironically, the attempt to form a New Zealand Intelligence Corps under SIB auspices was a wake up call for the Army to retain control of their own intelligence organisations.

The Ross debacle was a poisoned chalice right from the start handed to the SIB by the Prime Minister himself, and the only interesting remaining question concerns whether it was a set-up. It is not proven that this was the case. That aside, this particular investigation had political ramifications from the outset by design, and Folkes should have seen the implications. Folkes, the outsider, lacked local radar within the bureaucracy and was already at odds with too many powerful personages. There is no question that the police, whenever they became aware of Ross's role, exploited the affair to the full, as it tactically detached the SIB from the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet, the Prime Minister's Department and the Chiefs of Staff in one fell swoop. Once the debacle hit the papers and came up in Parliament, the Prime Minister was compelled to smartly cover his tracks and put as much distance between himself and the fiasco as possible. An independent security service was thenceforth an anathema to Fraser. The positive assistance of the Police Commissioner and his brother was vital in this respect. The police seized the proffered opportunity to reclaim and expand their empire, and by absorbing the SIB they cleverly foreclosed any possibility for an independent security service to be revived. The SIB under police direction remained a small but useful adjunct to the police efforts in maintaining internal security. As a security service still nominally under the military but controlled by the civilian Police Department, it was a unique situation.

The intelligence summaries produced by the police and the SIB retained their different focus, but all security investigations were now firmly under police control. Police command also removed the problems that arose surrounding the access of the Director SIB to the Prime Minister. The Cummings brothers saw to that. The Prime Minister was no longer so interested in security matters, so the prospect of independent security reports evaporated. This in turn no doubt pleased the service chiefs.

The SIB's Port Security Control was established too late with too few resources to be any more than a useful supplement to the activities of the Customs Department and the police. The police were most deficient with regard to port security, when they mistakenly equated low risk as the same as low priority. Having seized control of the SIB, they failed to beef up and use the Port Security Control effectively. This was an area where a good deal could have been achieved, and which posed no threat to police interests. The leakage of information from local ports remained a largely untreated problem, in the context of general slackness in security arrangements.

The possibility of dealing with penetration of the New Zealand public service by the enemy or any other power never got off the ground. The police fixation with the Communists and the left was directed with a high degree of interest at the low-level political machinations of a tiny minority. In other words, if there was any useful penetration from the intelligence point of view, the Police Commissioner's gaze was directed elsewhere, that is to say, downwards. Doubts about Sutch were not acted upon, and Costello was not regarded as problematical. The prospect of other more significant long-term moles was not considered at all. Even less was any idea that New Zealand's access to certain Allied intelligence might be used as a litmus test by a foreign power.

Under the circumstances, it would be unwise to assume a clean bill of health with regard to penetration.

The SIB was prevented by the circumstances of its inception from becoming an independent and effective security service. The Police Department bears the responsibility for the way the SIB developed, and the police approach to security matters was crude and inept. For the duration of the war, New Zealand in fact did without a useful security service. Whether it paid a price for this, albeit a concealed one, remains to be disclosed.

Part V

Other Service Intelligence

Chapter Thirteen

Army Intelligence and Security

Intelligence collection by the Army and the Air Force had an operational focus. Part V considers both services' intelligence organisations, and the reasons for the divergence from the Navy in the combined intelligence area become clearer. The Army's main thrust in intelligence was to provide tactical or operational support for formations deployed overseas, while a certain reserve capability was developed at home. The Air Force's air intelligence effort took a long time to get off the ground. Once it did, a steady expansion unfolded directly related to the deployment of No.1 Islands Group. Air intelligence pushed its single service interests and achieved substantial proficiency in intelligence collection, its expertise well recognised by the conclusion of hostilities.

While the SIB was skilfully hijacked by the Police Department, although under nominal Army Command, the Army's other exertions in military intelligence proved to be more productive. The Army's venture into signals intelligence has already been discussed. For the most part, the Special Section of the Army Signals Company was engaged in the interception of enemy signals traffic for customers outside the Army. It was more appropriate to consider the Army's 'Y' intelligence in the context of the whole New Zealand 'Y' offensive, hence its treatment in Chapter Seven. The Army 'Y' organisation was small but highly regarded (and highly secret) for all that. The main effort in military intelligence for the New Zealand Army during the war was in tactical intelligence collection and field security. This was centred on the formations deployed overseas for the most part, that is, the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, comprising

the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean theatre and the 3rd New Zealand Division in the Pacific. A variety of intelligence and field security sections were formed on the British pattern and deployed. Field security sections were also formed in New Zealand, and the Home Guard carried out some intelligence functions.

Operational intelligence and security were the most important dimensions of intelligence for the Army, for without good intelligence and the maintenance of security, formations in the field could not conduct operations effectively and were at risk. It is intended to examine intelligence collection in the first part of this chapter, field security in the second, and lastly to touch on a couple of other minor areas connected with military intelligence.

The New Zealand Intelligence Corps has shadowy origins which have not become transparent with the passage of time. There may have been a corps formed during the First World War, but nothing has come to light. The question of a Commandant of the New Zealand Intelligence Corps was raised by the Director of the SIB in 1942 with the object of the SIB taking control. As noted earlier, this was rebuffed by Army General Staff, and the Commandant who was appointed commanded one of the New Zealand Field Security Sections. However, it can be argued that the New Zealand Intelligence Corps came into existence earlier, when on 16 October 1939 Army Headquarters approved the raising of a number of units for the First Echelon of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Among them was the 2nd New Zealand Divisional Intelligence Section, New Zealand Intelligence Corps. This was creation by the stroke of a staff officer's pen on a memorandum.¹ The New Zealand Intelligence Corps existed de facto, although it did not have any central over-riding influence on the intelligence and security

sections. It was merely a matter of administrative convenience and for practical purposes, an irrelevance.

There were a range of intelligence units raised by the Army during the war. The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Intelligence Section was formed in 1939.² Each of the Division's three infantry brigades had brigade intelligence sections, and each infantry battalion a battalion intelligence section. A variety of field security sections were set up in New Zealand and the Middle East. The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section was established in 1940 in Egypt and served with the Division from Greece to Trieste. A New Zealand Base Field Security Section was raised in Maadi Camp. In June 1942 this Section's name was changed to 6th New Zealand Division Field Security Section as a deception measure, to fool the enemy into thinking another New Zealand division had arrived in Egypt. In November 1944, the name of the Section was altered to New Zealand Maadi Companies Field Security Section.³

In January 1942 the Northern Divisional Field Security Section was established in New Zealand in the Northern Military District, and its name was changed later to 1 Field Security Section. At the same time a Central Divisional FS Section was set up, the name being changed subsequently to 2 FS Section. The officer in command of this Section held the appointment of Commandant, New Zealand Intelligence Corps, the first being Captain R.S. Cutfield. A Southern Divisional FS Section was raised also in January 1942, and later became 3 FS Section.⁴ 4 FS Section was created in New Zealand to serve with the 3rd New Zealand Division in the Pacific. 5 New Zealand FS Section was raised in Egypt in 1944. A further New Zealand FS Section was set up to serve with 'J' Force in Japan in 1946.⁵

In addition to these there was a small unit, 1 Interrogation Section, set up in Egypt, and interrogation was also carried out at Featherston POW Camp when the establishment of a Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) was contemplated. To deal with mail, two New Zealand Field Censor Sections were established in Egypt.⁶

Before turning to the development of the 2nd New Zealand Division's intelligence section, there is one special case that needs mentioning. This was the first occasion during the war when operations had been executed on the basis of what shortly afterwards became known as Ultra (from June 1941). It was the only occasion when a New Zealand commander used this kind of signals intelligence to make plans while commanding a corps-sized formation. This was the defence of Crete carried out by the commander of 2NZEF, Major-General Bernard Freyberg, VC.

It is necessary to address this issue, because in spite of my consideration of the role of the German Enigma intelligence on Crete elsewhere,⁷ impressions have been conveyed more recently by historians like Paul Freyberg and Anthony Beevor that General Freyberg made decisions that led to the loss of Maleme aerodrome on the island. According to them he was ensuring the security of those 'Most Secret Sources' or that he misread the Enigma summaries, fearing the attack from the sea more than from the air.⁸ These contentions do not hold up because Freyberg's preparations were sufficient to hold the island, if by a small margin.

Freyberg was first briefed by Wavell personally on a new source of intelligence when he was unexpectedly given command on Crete on 30 April 1941. He was told that information from a well placed agent in Athens, codenamed BONIFACE,⁹ was

absolutely reliable, and that he would be receiving this intelligence as it came to hand. The intelligence consisted in fact of summaries of the German Luftwaffe Light Blue Enigma traffic, and the enemy, believing their communications to be secure, were quite voluble during the next twenty days until the invasion was mounted. Freyberg was told he needed to take great care of this intelligence, as the British did not wish to lose this most reliable source. The signals sent to Freyberg were prefixed ORANGE LEONARD or OL. Those sent to Wavell in Cairo were numbered with three digits, as in OL258 or OL262 for example. Those sent to Crete were numbered with four digits, the OL2000 series. It is said that those sent to Freyberg were prefixed with 'PERSONAL FOR GENERAL FREYBERG – MOST IMMEDIATE'.¹⁰ Apparently a British officer at Creforce Headquarters would decode the signal from London and pass it to Freyberg. Once read, the signal was burnt.¹¹ It should be noted that Freyberg had to rely on his memory once he had read the signal, as the content could not be kept. No doubt, although he had a good memory, he would not recall everything. How much notice he took of this intelligence was reflected in his plans for the defence of the island.

The most important Enigma messages Freyberg received were as follows. OL2155 on 1 May revealed that the Luftwaffe was not going to destroy the airfields or mine the harbour at Suda Bay on Crete.¹² On 3 May OL2157 noted that air transport could not be ready for large scale operations before 6 May.¹³ An attack on the island with a projected date was outlined in OL2167 of 6 May:

Preparation for operation against Crete probably complete on 17 May. Sequence of operations from zero day onward will be parachute landing of 7th Fliegerdivision plus corps troops 11th Fliegerkorps to seize Maleme Candia [Heraklion] and Retimo. Then dive bombers and fighters will move to Maleme and Candia. Next air landing of remainder 11th Fliegerkorps including headquarters and subordinated army units. Then flak units further troops and

supplies. Third mountain regiment from 12th Army detailed...Admiral South-East will provide protection with Italian torpedo boat...flotillas minesweepers and possibly U boats. Sea transport by German and Italian vessels. Operation to be proceeded before zero day by sharp attack on RAF military camps and anti-aircraft positions.¹⁴

By 7 May he had a good overall picture of the enemy's plan of attack and was further briefed by a senior officer sent by Wavell on 11 May. By 13 May, he had already received a more extensive run down on the enemy's refined plan of attack in OL302 (which he may have been given the day before).¹⁵ OL302 is a very long signal detailing further the sequence of the coming attack.

What is crucial is the appreciation promulgated by Freyberg through his BGS (K.L.Stewart) at Creforce Headquarters on 12 May, of which some 45 copies were distributed. They conveyed in no uncertain language the objects of the enemy's attentions. This document, 'BGS Appreciation – German Plan for Attack on Crete' set out the following:

2. The first objective will most certainly be the three aerodromes, HERAKLION, RETIMO, and MALEME, the possession of which is an essential preliminary for the landing of troop carrying aircraft.
3. The second objective will be the seizure of SUDA BAY and HERAKLION ports to enable ships to land further troops and heavy equipment required for the complete occupation of the island.
4. ...
 - (g) *D[day]2*. Having seized and provisioned aerodromes, this day will be devoted to securing with the aid of further airborne troops, the ports of HERAKLION and SUDA BAY. Dive bombers will operate in close support of ground tps.
D 3 and subsequently
 - (h) Ships will commence to arrive on this day, and the complete occupation of the island will follow as quickly as possible.
5. From the above appreciation, it will be noted that the entire plan is based on the capture of the aerodromes. If the aerodromes hold out, as they will, the whole plan will fail...
7. It is further to be noted, that up to the present, the aerodromes have not been bombed, nor have the ports been mined. The obvious deduction is that the Germans hope to use both themselves in the near future.

8. Although this appreciation has not mentioned sea landings on beaches, the possibility of these attacks must not be overlooked; but they will be of secondary importance to those from the air.¹⁶

It could hardly have been more clear: ‘...the entire plan is based on the capture of the aerodromes. If the aerodromes hold out...the whole plan will fail...’ Freyberg had made very good use of his intelligence. He planned to defend the airfields and the two ports. What occurred when things went wrong at Maleme had nothing to do with holes in the defence, Freyberg’s concern about the projected sea attack, or covering for source BONIFACE. It had everything to do with the failure of the acting commander of the 2nd New Zealand Division troops on Crete, Brigadier Puttick, to get a grip on his Division; the failure of the commander 5 Brigade, Brigadier Hargest, to see that orders were carried out; and the failure of the commanders of 22nd Battalion, 23rd Battalion and 21st Battalion, to execute the planned response to the German attack. Above all, this meant that Maleme, along with the Kastelli airstrip, had to be held.

The deployment of 1st Greek Regiment at Kastelli rather than west of the mouth of the Tavronitis river bed deprived the enemy of a rough but usable airstrip. The failure of 23rd Battalion to be permitted by Brigadier Hargest to attack in support of the airfield battalion was the key to the loss of the airfield. This was compounded when the 22nd Battalion pulled off the airfield and the hill overlooking it. The failure to remedy that situation lies at the door of the 5 Brigade commander and his battalion commanders, in particular, Hargest, Leckie and Andrew. It had nothing to do with Freyberg not making good use of the Special Intelligence of the Enigma summaries.

What lost Crete was a substantial failure within the New Zealand Division and 5 Brigade to follow standing counterattack orders based on the 12 May appreciation.

Freyberg's defence plans came apart because subordinate New Zealand commanders responsible for holding Maleme, unlike the British commanders at Heraklion or the Australian commanders at Retimo, proved incapable of obeying quite straightforward directions. Crete, on paper, should not have had any chance of being held. Freyberg's use of his intelligence advantage plus the Germans' intelligence failure with regard to their plans and appreciations brought him within an ace of victory. It was the first time that Enigma intelligence had been used by a commander in fighting the enemy head on (in Greece it had permitted most of the rapid withdrawal of Lustre Force to succeed). It almost worked. The arguments as to the development of the battles on Crete aside, Freyberg's handling of the Enigma summaries demonstrated that he was prepared to take due cognizance of reliable intelligence, in this case in defence of an island.

The 2nd New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean theatre was under General Freyberg's command for much of the war. The Division's intelligence set-up developed over a period of time, and became practiced in providing useful tactical intelligence. There were three levels of intelligence within the Division: at Divisional Headquarters, at the three Brigade Headquarters and at the various Battalion Headquarters. As one of the senior intelligence officers of the Division, Sir Geoffrey Cox observed:

The relation between Divisional Headquarters Intelligence and the Brigades Intelligence officers rested on the fact that they supplied us with information, particularly documents from prisoners, about the enemy on their front, and about its terrain. We in turn provided them with information about the enemy facing them, and about the terrain, particularly in the form of air photos. One form in which such information was transmitted was the daily I Summary.¹⁷

There was no intelligence chain of command as such between the Intelligence Officers (or IOs) at different levels:

There were no administrative or command links between Divisional Headquarters Intelligence and the Brigades. Since there was no New Zealand Intelligence Corps, all Intelligence Officers were ordinary infantry officers assigned to Intelligence duties. Some may have attended a course in Intelligence work. Brigade IOs were responsible to their Brigadier and their Brigade Major, not to the G III (I) at Div.HQ. We at Div. had no direct or formal link with Battalion IOs, who passed their information to their Brigade IO, and in turn got their information from him. But we had informal links, based on personal contact, with the COs and IOs of individual Battalions. In Italy I had, for instance, close personal contact links with Sandy Thomas [CO 23rd Battalion], Angus Ross [IO 23rd Battalion] and Peter Awatere [CO 28th Battalion]. They would call in at the I[n]telligence truck when they visited Div.HQ, and I would from time to time go forward to their HQs. But this was more to maintain liaison than for any specific Intelligence purpose.¹⁸

The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Intelligence Section came within the orbit of the General Staff Officer Grade III (Intelligence) or GSO III (I), but was run by the officer on the next rung down, the Divisional Intelligence Officer or IO. The Section itself was basically a cipher section, and in Italy its title was altered to New Zealand Divisional Cipher Section. It comprised around a dozen personnel, and for instance in October 1941 consisted of four warrant officers, one staff sergeant, three sergeants and one private, run by two officers, Lieutenant J.V. Hollis and 2nd Lieutenant G.S. Cox.¹⁹

The intelligence work at Division was done by the GSO III (I) and the IO. The development of the effectiveness of intelligence at this level took time, and it was probably not until Cox took over as G III (I) that Divisional Intelligence began to function well, although progress had been made before this. Robin Bell, the Divisional IO on Crete, became G III (I) once the Division returned to Egypt, with Hollis as IO at first, but he was quickly followed by Cox. There was a tendency at this time for Divisional Intelligence to be regarded by other senior staff officers as something of a

spare part. The regular NZ Staff Corps officers, who provided cadres for division and brigade staffs at this time, tended to view intelligence collection in First World War terms. With static trench warfare, identification of enemy formations relied mostly on raids to obtain documents and prisoners. These could occur from time to time and did not demand rapid assessment.²⁰ There was little manoeuvre, nor swift development in new weapons as there was in the Second World War, where unexpected changes could greatly influence the outcome of battles. Thus,

Detailed information about the enemy was regarded as interesting but not necessarily significant.

This tended to diminish the role of the I[n]telligence staff as estimators of the enemy's strength and intentions, and to lead to their employment for other tasks, more in the liaison and operational field. Indeed there was a tendency in the early stages... to see the Div. IO, if not the G III (I), as a spare general purpose officer on Div. HQ, available for a variety of jobs. In Greece, for instance, Bell was sent back on one occasion during the retreat to blow up a bridge – an operational task if ever there was one. Similarly, in the opening stages of the Sidi Resegh campaign I [Cox as IO] carried out the operational task of placing the lamps by which the night advance of the Division was guided. Once into Libya, I manned rear Div. HQ until a new HQ had been set up twenty miles ahead.

These operational tasks interfered with the discharge of my true intelligence duties. Bell had left to me the task of studying the information about the enemy available to us before the battle. This was copious... On the night we crossed the Wire [sic] and advanced into Libya in November 1941 the General called for an assessment of the strength of the German and Italian artillery around Tobruk. By the time this requirement reached me I had already spent a long day in the field preparing the route for the advance, and was very tired. I had to study the many documents involved, and work out the assessment by the light of a hand torch, lying under my truck to mask even that weak light. It made my work doubly – indeed trebly – difficult. Similarly manning the rear HQ, and bringing the rear party forward during the night, cost me an entire night's sleep, impairing my work in estimating the evidence of the enemy's activities the next day.²¹

The 'Crusader' operations were something of a watershed, however.

Before, during and immediately after Sidi Resegh, the pattern became established of the General sending for Bell to give him information about the enemy and the terrain, and of Bell being included in planning discussions with the G I [GSO I] and other operational officers. At this stage there were no regular conferences of the type which later became an integral part of the General's

method. I, as IO, was not called to them....but prepared briefs for Bell about the enemy situation.²²

The value of useful intelligence at Sidi Rezegh was apparent.

Once...battle was truly joined, and Rommel's swift and unpredictable movements came into play, the importance of the role of Div. Intelligence in establishing the strength and intentions of the enemy became manifest. By the end of the [Crusader] campaign these were clearly established as being the central role of the Intelligence staff. Our ability to identify the unexpected German infantry units on the Tobruk front; to interpret the map captured with von Ravenstein; to identify von Ravenstein; and to establish beyond doubt that Rommel had turned back from the frontier to attack us were all events which reinforced this view. From Sidi Resegh onwards not only was the role of Div. Intelligence clearly established, but was increasingly respected by officers on the operational side.²³

While progress had been made, there were a couple of drawbacks.

Bell was not a scholar, though he had a strong natural intelligence. He preferred to leave to me the task of studying the enemy forces opposite us, based on the copious flow of information from Corps and Army before the battle, and on our own identifications during the battle. He had little inclination for written reports, and made no effort to establish a daily written I Summary whilst we were in action. Nor did Gentry, then the G I, make any effort to encourage him to do so.²⁴

Nevertheless, it was during Bell's tenure as G III (I) that Freyberg's practice of referring direct to the G III (I) rather than through the G I, was established. From this point, this was to be the central feature of the functioning of intelligence at Divisional Headquarters.²⁵ The practice came from Freyberg himself.

The General had a keen interest in information about the enemy, not only on his immediate front, but in the Western Desert as a whole. This stemmed in part from his own sharp, inquiring mind, and very acute sense of responsibility...After the debacles in Greece and Crete the Government were very concerned that their troops should not again be committed to hazardous enterprise without their prior knowledge and consent. This led Freyberg to take a view of the Middle East as a whole. There was also the fact that he was one of the most experienced commanders of British forces in the Middle East at the time, who in the British Army would have been a candidate for command of a Corps, and who naturally looked at issues on a wider front than that of the enemy immediately facing him.²⁶

Cox took over from Bell as G III (I) in 1942, and Lieutenant Paddy Costello became the Divisional IO on 29 May.²⁷ While the direct contact with the General elevated the importance of intelligence, there was a dividing line within the Divisional staff. The Intelligence staff were sharply differentiated from the Operations staff.

In those days, before command vehicles came into being, Div.HQ offices were in lean-to's attached to either side of a 3 ton truck. The I Department worked in a lean-to on one side, the Ops in one on another. For security reasons, we of the I side were not allowed into the Ops side, though Bell may occasionally have been called in there for conferences. This pattern persisted throughout the war, so that we on the I side worked without any knowledge, except in the broadest terms, of the deployment of the troops on our own side. Similarly the Ops officers seldom visited what – after Sidi Resegh – became the I caravan. During battle we were, of course, in constant touch with the Ops side, feeding them immediately any information which came our way, and dealing with any queries they had. And when the pattern of daily conferences developed – a procedure which came about, I think, at the battle of El Alamein in October 1942 – the Ops side were getting the briefings on the enemy situation which the G III (I) put before such conferences, and of course were recipients of the daily I Summary, which also came into being, as a regular... publication around about the time of Alamein.²⁸

Cox left the Division to take up a diplomatic post in Washington, and his position as G III (I) was taken over by Captain W.F. Liley, MC, with Costello (now a captain) as IO.²⁹ It is however interesting to note that Freyberg had clearly recognised Costello's intellectual brilliance, for at the pre-battle briefing for the New Zealand Corps operation to punch through Tebaga Gap in March 1943 it was Costello, the IO, who gave the intelligence brief. The presence of the G III (I), or on occasion the Divisional IO, at pre-battle conferences became an integral part of Freyberg's preparations for battle. Freyberg would get the senior intelligence officer to open the briefing with the intelligence appreciation of the situation. The General himself would follow with an outline of the thrust of his plan for battle, which would then be open for discussion. Once the

discussion was over, the General then made his decisions, and gave his orders. It was up to his senior staff officers and heads of departments to draw up the plan for battle in the form of an operation order. The role of the intelligence officer was critical, and the tactical intelligence collected to enable the appreciation to be made had to be good. A poor intelligence assessment could lead to a faulty operation order with all the consequences that that entailed. Divisional intelligence assessment was therefore an integral component of the General's planning process, a regular and unremarkable feature of the Division's preparations to engage the enemy. From Alamein onwards, battles like Medenine, Tebaga Gap, Takrouna, Orsogna, Cassino, Faenza, the Senio and Gaiana River and other engagements went through this planning cycle of the pre-battle conference. In the war of movement, intelligence at the Divisional level was one of the essential factors for success.

Costello was appointed G III (I) in June 1943, with Dan Davin as his IO, a post which Costello held until 15 February 1944. Costello and Davin were the Divisional Intelligence team during the bloody opening to the Italian campaign, first on the Sangro and then at Cassino. Davin became G III (I) on 16 February in the middle of Cassino when Costello left on leave before taking up his post in the New Zealand Legation in Moscow.³⁰ In June Davin left to take up an intelligence position at the War Office in London,³¹ and Cox returned from Washington to be G III (I) once more, with Captain S. Martin as his IO.³² Cox remained as G III (I) until the end of the war.

Cox, Costello and Davin were the longest serving G III (I)s, representing an almost unbroken continuity (apart from Liley) from 1942 to 1945. Cox in fact served longest of them all. The contact between the General and the G III (I) allowed

intelligence at the Divisional Headquarters level to become an integral useful component of the Division's command. In Cox's view Freyberg was easy to work for, provided you were alert, fully briefed, able to describe the situation clearly, and handle close questioning in detail.³³ The General relied on good intelligence and took notice of it. Cox could not recall any situation when Freyberg was commanding the Division where an error was made because of disregarding intelligence on the enemy.³⁴ The contact remained a working relationship.³⁵ It made a difference, nevertheless.

The General's avid interest in Intelligence set this pattern of his direct contact with the G III (I), for whom he would send whenever he wanted a particular query answered. This put the G III (I), a relatively low ranking officer, a Captain, in direct contact with a General, who on the Ops side would normally deal directly only with his G I and G II, his CRE, AA/QMG, CRA, and ADMS, the Infantry Brigadiers, and – at times, the commander of Battalions – all officers of the rank of colonel and above. This established a close working relationship between the General and the three of us... Costello, Davin and myself.³⁶

The General's attitude towards his intelligence officers helped.

The link was also strengthened by the fact that we were all three University men, and the General had... a respect for University men... There was also the fact that we knew, from our years in England, the English background, against which much of his own life had been lived. We too had an interest in world affairs in general, and some knowledge of them. This knowledge we were able to augment for the General in a way not open to the I staffs of other British Army Divisions. Because all three of us had worked at GHQ in Cairo (my contact was brief, a matter of 3 weeks in December 1941) and because of our University backgrounds, we had personal and working links with the I staffs on Eighth Army, some key members of whom had been at Oxford and Cambridge. This enabled us to secure information about, for instance, the progress of the war on the Eastern Front beyond anything a Div. I staff was entitled to. We were able to justify securing this information on the grounds that the General, as commander of 2NZEF as well as of the Division, required it. The General took all this information with avidity,[sic] and enjoyed discussing it with us.³⁷

While this made for the smooth running of intelligence at Division, there may have been unintended consequences, not major, but intriguing. Costello had other loyalties. Cox, as noted elsewhere, had picked up on the fact that Costello was a Marxist.

Certainly, getting information in the name of the General might have been a very useful lever if used carefully. Cox was of the view that nothing useful to the Russians could have been learned,³⁸ but some information might have been useful as a check against other sources. It can be noted that one of the Division's cipher staff, who came under the G III (I) and IO, later had a diplomatic career which also had a little cloud cast over it.³⁹ Avenues, contacts and opportunities were there. That said, it needs to be noted that such speculation remains unproven at this point.

A perhaps more important dimension was the need for the junior intelligence officers to be culturally accepted in the top of the Division. In Cox's view,

Dan Davin and Costello were admirable G III (I)s, because of their mixture of rigorous intellectual training, and commonsense. One important aspect of that commonsense was the realisation that their ability to get their opinions listened to by senior officers of the Division rested in part on their being able to convince those officers that they were not ivory tower intellectuals, but men who shared many of the tastes of most people in the Div., capable of drinking their share of a bottle of whisky when out of the line, being able to hold their own in the banter of men facing hard choices and hard times, ready to take their share of the risks of war ...

But in their work their intellectual training made them able to scrutinise information carefully, to summarize and express it clearly, and to draw deductions from it.⁴⁰

This was the mark of good intelligence officers. The production of the daily Intelligence Summary, started in the Western Desert, was a central feature of the work of the G III (I) and the IO. A brief look at three examples gives an idea of the extent and detail of the analysis. The ability to appraise, to summarise the most important features, and to present them with clarity was what was required.

An Intelligence Summary from Costello as G III (I) on 19 January 1944 paints a short, vivid and grim picture. It is rather chilling when it is realised that the remarks

about St. Angelo refer to the exact place where the US 36th Texas Division was to attempt to cross the Rapido river the next day, only to be bloodily repulsed.

The CASSINO or GUSTAV line closely follows the west bank of the river RAPIDO from where the narrow river valley widens into a plain at G8627 through CASSINO and SANT'ANGELO to the confluence with the river LIRI at G8812. North of CASSINO the line consists of machine-gun positions and weapon pits supported by field artillery. Houses have been demolished and trees felled along the river bank to improve fields of fire. At CASSINO anti-tank ditches have been dug and an area flooded between the main road and the railway. Demolitions are seen to have been carried out within the town, and many of the buildings have doubtless been fortified.

Considerable progress has been made between CASSINO and the LIRI-RAPIDO confluence. Wire is almost continuous and numerous machine-gun positions, weapon pits and mortar positions are sited on the rising ground west of the river. The village of SANT'ANGELO has been turned into a large strong point and other strong points are sited at irregular intervals of five hundred to fifteen hundred yards all along the line. This section of the line is strongly supported by field artillery. Trees east of the river and along the river bank have been felled so that at no point could good cover approaches to the river be made. In the area of the LIRI-RAPIDO confluence large tracts have been flooded. Forward of the line many of the road and rail bridges have already been blown.⁴¹

Standing on the ground today, which consists of a flat open pan half surrounded by the river with the village on rising ground on the opposite bank, the implications of Costello's portrait of the strength of the St. Angelo defences can be all too readily appreciated.

A New Zealand Corps Intelligence Summary on the February attack by elements of 4th Indian Division and 2nd New Zealand Division gives a perspective on the difficulties encountered and the implications for further operations. This Summary was produced by Davin on 18 February, three days after he had taken over from Costello, and had this to say about the failure of the 28th Maori Battalion to hold onto the railway station at Cassino:

The enemy has also been able to qualify the success of our attack up the railway line towards CASSINO station. Though he could not prevent our taking

the station his defences on the hummocks at 860199 held out and fire from these and the houses North of the station stopped our further advance. CASSINO station commands access to Route 6 and the town. Our holding it contained also the threat of junction with our forces in the Monastery area and the consequent cutting off of enemy troops in the town. Therefore the enemy lost no time in counterattacking. With tanks from the North and infantry from the west he won back the station this afternoon. Now that he knows where to expect our thrust and the implications of a failure to meet this second threat, the enemy may be expected to put up a fierce struggle to hold the station and the roads North of it....⁴²

This short extract captures the essence of the situation very well. Not only had the attack been stopped, but the same way into the town was bound to be more heavily contested in the future.

The third Intelligence Summary by contrast was produced on 10 April 1945, the day following the Division's assault across the Senio. Cox was G III (I) once more, and his Summaries are masterly in their detail. Cox was evaluating the success of the attack, which had busted the enemy's front wide open, with a rapidly changing situation. Excellent use of tactical airpower plus artillery and flamethrowers had permitted the rapid crossing of the embankments.

PW and captured documents have today proved conclusively that on the SENIO we fought the enemy on ground of his own choosing, where he was still holding with the available strength of 98 Division, and where he hoped to be able to check us, if not on the river itself, at least on the two defensive belts of casas linked by fieldworks, from 1000 to 2000 yards behind. The enemy commanders had clearly appreciated the great importance of the South...bank of the river. Their files are full of documents ordering its preparation for defence....

Even with the South bank gone, the policy was to hold the North bank and fight us there....

Beyond the North bank were two switch-lines, CAESAR and NERO, on which it was again hoped the battle might have been stabilised if part of the bank was lost but other parts were held. But the main defences in depth consisted of two lines of diggings and wiring, already known to us from air photos. Behind these were grouped the reserve companies and stationed over in front of 289 and 290 Regts were six Tigers in support. They and SP guns were to form the spearheads of the counter-attacks....

The bombardment and the flame-throwers, though not apparently causing heavy casualties in wounded and dead on most of the line...reduced the garrison of the North stopbank to a fit state for surrendering in great numbers. The barrage, and the advance in depth, carried us through the remaining lines before any counter-attacks could be mounted...

The result was that at first light today the enemy found himself not only off the SENIO, but with a considerable gap in his front, with I and II Bns of 289 Regt virtually out of action (we have 337 OR and 4 officers from them), and II/290 badly mauled...

In our sector, therefore, the enemy undoubtedly has no alternative but to get back behind the SANTERNO as quickly as possible...⁴³

A breakdown of enemy prisoners by regiment and battalion followed, with a total of POWs noted as 581 men, 10 officers and 36 wounded. Three captured and translated documents were appended, one being a sketch of enemy positions between the Senio and the next river line, the Santerno. Much could be learned after a battle which might be of use in further operations. The mention of air photos is interesting, for in Italy the Division had an officer attached to Divisional Headquarters who was an expert in interpreting aerial photographs. This was Captain Fred Kersh, whose title of Mediterranean Air Interpretation Unit (West) was shortened to 'Mae West'. He became part of the intelligence set-up for obvious reasons.⁴⁴

A cycle of practice had been built up between the Divisional commander and his G III (I). Consulted by the General for all manner of intelligence matters, producing a daily intelligence summary to be promulgated to the senior officers and the Brigades, providing appreciations for pre-battle conferences, obtaining and collating intelligence from a wide variety of sources, the Divisional intelligence officers were kept busy. Intelligence was collected from prisoners, from captured equipment and documents, from patrols and other reports upwards from the Battalions and the Brigades, while other

intelligence was passed down from higher headquarters (from Corps or Army). On occasion, this included Ultra material, suitably disguised.

The Brigade Intelligence Sections were more of a clearing house for intelligence passing down from Divisional Headquarters to the Brigades and Battalions, and upwards from the Battalions to Brigade and also to Division when appropriate. There were at least three Brigade Intelligence Sections, and four in 1945. The Brigade Intelligence Officer who ran the Brigade Intelligence Section was responsible to the Brigade Major. The Brigade IO was to identify enemy units, pass on news and deductions about enemy intentions, distribute intelligence upwards and downwards, issue ciphers and codes, write up the Brigade War Diary, prepare the intelligence paragraphs in Brigade operation orders and check map co-ordinates mentioned in orders. The Brigade IO was to keep in close touch liaison officers, Battalion IOs, flanking Brigade IOs, and the G III (I) at Divisional HQ. The Brigade Intelligence Section could be employed to give warning of enemy movement, to watch the progress of own troops, to provide observation reports from particular positions on the battlefield, to sort out obscure situations by personal reconnaissance, and to collect and collate incoming information from Brigade units.⁴⁵

If the Brigade was the clearing house for intelligence within the 2nd New Zealand Division, the infantry battalions were the grass-roots level of intelligence. The Battalion Intelligence Officer was the Battalion Commander's right-hand man in intelligence matters, being responsible for the provision of up to date operational intelligence on the basis of which the Battalion Commander conducted his operations.

The duties of a Battalion IO both in action and out consisted of liaison between the CO, 'O' Group conferences and the Section. Out of the line he was mainly occupied with arranging training courses for aspiring recruits

and... various leave arrangements. The courses were run by the I Sergeant, with the assistance of some of the experienced members of his Section.⁴⁶

As well, the Battalion IO and the Intelligence Section Sergeant had regular contact with the Brigade intelligence section, and to a lesser extent with Division. There was also routine liaison with Field Security.⁴⁷ The size of the Battalion Intelligence Section varied slightly from time to time, in part because of personnel leaving and new recruits coming in, and also depending on casualties suffered. Thus, 26th Battalion's Intelligence Section is described as consisting of one officer, one sergeant, eleven 'ORs' and two drivers, one of the latter for the section's jeep and the other for the stores' pickup truck.⁴⁸ In 1944, the same Section was under a second lieutenant, a sergeant, a corporal and five 'ORs' plus two drivers with a jeep and a 30 cwt truck.⁴⁹

Training consisted, in the case of Ted Ross who joined the 26th Battalion early in 1942, of a short intelligence course at the British Army's Middle East School of Intelligence, another course at 26th Battalion headquarters, and a course on Aerial Photograph Interpretation. For Warwick Anderson and W.D. Dawson of 23rd Battalion reinforcements, there was a three week intelligence course at the same place from 18 January 1943.⁵⁰

The work of the Battalion Intelligence Section was varied.

General information mainly came to us from Div. Intelligence via Brigade, and was passed to the CO and Company Officers by the IO at pre-battle conferences. At times we briefed and de-briefed fighting or information patrols and the resulting information was immediately passed to the CO by word of mouth and to Brigade and Division by coded messages...⁵¹

Practical skills came to the fore. Geoff Duff, who joined 26th Battalion's Intelligence Section in January 1944 in Italy noted:

All personnel were required to be specially skilled in all respects of map reading, to be able to locate and mark on a map any ground position, ...to be skilled in accurately enlarging any portion of a map, and to be able to interpret aerial photos. They had to be able to take compass bearings, both day and night, convert them to grid bearings and transfer them to maps and generally have a good sense of direction and ability to memorize landmarks and features.⁵²

This could sometimes involve a much closer view of the enemy than one might prefer. One night in April 1944, Duff recounted:

By midnight the following night I had completed a trace of all our companies' dispositions which I then had to take down to Battalion HQ... I had to report to the Colonel who questioned me closely on many aspects of our new positions. One cause for concern was the lack of knowledge of the enemy's positions and the layout of the country beyond our forward positions. I was given the job of remedying this and wrote about it in a letter saying, 'At 4am before daylight, loaded with compass, map, protractor, binoculars, field telephone and a long length of telephone cable, I climbed the hill to our most forward position. Here I made liaison with the platoon sergeant, plugged in the cable to their telephone and then proceeded cautiously forward to crawl into an empty sangar situated on a razor back some two or three chains forward in No Man's Land. I had a mate, Jim Cummings, to keep me company. After testing the telephone I waited for daylight and then took up my watch at a peep-hole in the side of the sangar. I could see a lot of the enemy positions and got these plotted on my map. As the day wore on I saw lots of Jerries and from their movements was able to judge their dugout positions and get these plotted. I also made a number of field sketches showing all these things and altogether had a busy day.' At one stage I directed mortar fire by means of the telephone ... on to a suspected enemy lookout on the crown of the hill opposite.⁵³

While the Battalion Intelligence Section worked on its various tasks as a unit, detaching personnel when necessary, on operations the Section dispersed. Ted Ross in 26th Battalion reflected:

...in 1942 shortly before I was recruited into 'I' work, Sgt. Ray Street... of 26th Battalion began a system of deploying members of the Section during an action. What happened was just prior to an action one member of the Section was sent to each of the rifle companies as a staff man for the Company Commander. His job was to assist with navigation (particularly at night), generally to assist with map reading, record the Company positions when their objectives had been reached, put this information into code and see that it was dispatched by radio or runner to Battalion HQ without delay. Each of these men stayed with the particular

Company until the action was totally completed, or when he was relieved by another Section member.

Another function of these members at the various Companies was to take compass readings on the flashes of any gun which was annoying our particular area at night. These readings taken from say 3 or 4 Company positions were relayed to Battalion and immediately passed to the artillery for harassing fire to be brought down on the area indicated.⁵⁴

Each member of the Section was equipped similarly. This equipment included

...a prismatic compass with luminous markings for night work, a map case, small sheets of talc [used for map overlays], a supply of chinagraph pencils and of course his rifle which he was required to use when the occasion demanded.⁵⁵

Codes were used for communication from the companies back to the Intelligence Section at Battalion HQ.

With relation to codes they also changed a great deal. For instance, when I first joined [in 1942] the main code used was a double transposition cipher followed by a Codex system and ultimately replaced by Slidex, which was a much simpler and [more] secure code.⁵⁶

Geoff Duff recalled Section personnel

...had to be able to operate the simple system of codes used at battalion level, which were taught to them only after joining the Section. This was a precaution against a possible leakage of the code system. The simplest code we used, called Codex, consisted of a large card containing a long list of common five or six letter words, each of which stood for words likely to be used in messages. For example: DONKEY – midnight, WIGWAM – headquarters, COWBOY – shelled, and so on. Thus if the 'I' Sergeant at Battalion Headquarters received the message WIGWAM, COWBOY, DONKEY he would at once translate it from his card as 'HQ shelled midnight' and pass it to the duty officer. It was rather a clumsy method and was later superseded by a much simpler, flexible and speedier system called Slidex, in which the key was on separate strips which were changed every few days.⁵⁷

The Battalion War Diary was another matter that concerned the Intelligence Section. Although the IO was responsible for it ultimately, keeping the War Diary rested with the Section Sergeant, and as soon as the Battalion came out of operations the

Sergeant had to compile the War Diary entries which were a resume of events over the last few days.⁵⁸

So what was this like on operations? W.D. Dawson was a member of the 23rd Battalion's Intelligence Section, joining the Battalion in early 1943. Three diary entries give something of the flavour of the experience, from the mundane to the risky. On the day of the attack by the New Zealand Division through Tebaga Gap, 26 March 1943, Dawson recorded:

Spent whole day out of sight in trench, reading and listening to intermittent artillery, with a sinking feeling that increased as time went on, but seemed to disappear when attack started. Got shelled just before starting, when tanks came up from behind and passes [sic] right through us. Set off at 4pm sharp and advanced three miles behind tanks. I had the job of counting paces (5000). Had my first taste of machine gun fire, and didn't like it. Struck trench full of Jerries on a hill, but the tanks going ahead scared them so much that they got up and ran downhill with their hands up... Reached objective before dark, occupied Jerry slit trench, and I had to talk to some prisoners....⁵⁹

A year later, Dawson's battalion was committed to the bloody March battle in Cassino town. Nothing could move by day in the open, and Dawson and another I Section member were sent in to relieve two others at Battalion HQ inside the rubble on 24 March 1944:

Left soon after 10[pm] on 2 mile walk into Cassino, in the middle of a barrage by our guns, and had uneventful if uncomfortable walk, with occasional shells landing on Montecassino above us, and a few Jerry mortars coming back on our left. Bn HQ was in cellar of a ruined church. On arrival I took over ciphers and codes from Warwick.

Sat Mar 25. Unable to move much in daylight, as Jerry mortared our church regularly, and a sniper had the entrance covered... Place a sort of catacomb, low, dusty, and crowded with our own and Maori Bn HQ...⁶⁰

In April 1945, 23rd Battalion was in the offensive across the Senio. On the day the attack went in, 9 April, Dawson wrote in his diary:

.Busy all day getting map boards fixed up with all the details of big attack across Senio which was taking place that night. In early afternoon swarms of bombers came over and did over Jerry's positions thoroughly, and all afternoon a tremendous artillery barrage interspersed with air attacks went on, making things very noisy. Attack went in 7pm, and news of its success came drifting in, as well as a lot of prisoners on their way back. Questioned a few of them without learning much.

Tue Apr 10. Called forward 4 am, as bridge across Senio was now firmly established...My job was to guide companies across river, a 3-mile walk...Evidence of effectiveness of our barrage everywhere across river...Called forward [again] in early afternoon, went forward in jeep, and had to find a place for Bn HQ...had to dig in...with fighting going on 200 yards ahead. Stayed there all a long weary afternoon, while 23 Bn went through and did an attack. Held up by Jerry tanks, which had a nasty habit of firing fast shells low over our heads...[at night] I had to question some prisoners...

Wed Apr 11.Busy afternoon preparing for another advance across Santerno in evening...I had to go up...with a few of Bn HQ and make a tactical HQ just short of Santerno. Went up with Sandy Thomas [the Battalion Commander] in his jeep...were fired on by a Spandau from Santerno bank on the way. Got settled in a house by the road leading straight up to the river, and had to make out traces of artillery tasks while Sandy issued orders to company commanders for immediate attack across Santerno....

Thu Apr 12. Logged progress of attack in small hours.⁶¹

The intelligence section shared the same risks on the battlefield as other Battalion personnel. Their work was of practical importance, building a picture for the Battalion commander and providing tactical intelligence for Brigade and Division. It was the lowest level of intelligence collection in the Division.

The 2nd New Zealand Division developed an extensive net of intelligence sections, around seventeen in all when support units were counted. Under one divisional commander for most of the war, it is not surprising that by April 1945, in spite of the ups and downs of campaigning, the intelligence collection system had become a well-drilled scheme. The IOs at each level, from the G III (I) down to the Battalion IO, and their Intelligence Sections, existed to support the commanders at each level, Division, Brigade

and Battalion. Their intelligence activities focussed on tactical intelligence, although there were slightly wider interests by the General at the top of the tree.

Similar arrangements applied in the under-strength 3rd New Zealand Division, a two-brigade group formation committed to the Solomons on Vella Lavella, the Treasuries and the Green Islands. The Division only committed its brigades one at a time on operations in its island-hopping campaign, each of the landings being a one-off operation, intended to clear the islands of the Japanese. The Intelligence Sections at Division, Brigade and Battalion did not operate in quite the same way as those in the Middle East, but this was only because of the nature of each Brigades' operations. These were amphibious operations and once ashore the troops were largely engaged in quite small actions in the jungle. There was not the same need for a constant flow of intelligence upwards and downwards as only part of the Division was used at any one time. There was also quite close co-operation with the US forces as well. The emphasis was on intelligence required for particular operations, and compared with the 2nd Division in the Middle East, those for the 3rd Division were few and far between.

Reconnaissance parties were put ashore for the direct collection of intelligence at times. For example, Sergeant W.A. Cowan of 8th Brigade's Intelligence Section was put ashore on Mono Island on 22 October 1943 with an Australian coastwatcher and two NCOs of the Solomon Islands Defence Force to collect intelligence on the Japanese dispositions. He produced a valuable report assessing the Japanese strength on the island, and returned on the night of 26/27 October to cut Japanese telephone communications on the morning of the landing.⁶²

At home, the Army's intelligence effort was somewhat different. In terms of total aggregate manpower, the Home Guard on paper had a large number of intelligence personnel, there being nominally 137 Home Guard Battalions spread throughout the country.⁶³ If there were intelligence sections for each battalion and similar sections for each Home Guard Group and senior command levels, there should have been over 1,000 intelligence personnel. However, such an estimate is doubtful, as no record has been found of the number of extant intelligence sections. Even if each battalion had an intelligence section, it was unlikely to be fully staffed.

According to the War History Narrative of the Home Guard,⁶⁴ each Home Guard Battalion theoretically had an Intelligence Officer and an Intelligence Section made up of one Intelligence NCO and six other ranks.⁶⁵ While there were 26 Home Guard Groups listed, each with an Intelligence Officer slot, not all of these may have been filled. Numbered 1-12, some Groups were numbered, for example, as Group 7, Group 7A, Group 7B etc. Each Group was a locality, thus, Group 2 was Morrinsville, with Captain B.H. Horner as the Intelligence Officer; while Group 4 was based on Hamilton, with Lieutenant C.V. Vennell as IO.⁶⁶ An example of how the intelligence side of a Home Guard Battalion operated can be seen from the Hawera Battalion, in Group area 8A. The Battalion had three companies, with Headquarters Company based in Hawera and the other two in Patea and Manaia. There was an Intelligence Platoon consisting of the IO, Captain Rod Syme and 18 men. Training for Home Guard IOs was given at two courses run by the Army in Palmerston North. Part of this included cartography of a defensive area for company defence.⁶⁷ Home Guard intelligence centred on ensuring close familiarity with the local terrain. As only a small part of New Zealand had been covered

by the mapping section of the Lands and Survey Department at this time, Home Guard units were encouraged to produce detailed hand-made maps for Company areas. These were often of a very high standard, as the one overleaf shows.⁶⁸

A brief word may be said about some odd formations known as Home Guard 'Guides' units. These were the Special Companies that Mawhood's Military Mission proposed to operate as counter-fifth column units in conjunction with the security service. They did not, however, cooperate with the SIB to any great extent. The 'Guides Platoons' according to a directive of 19 January 1942 were to be around twelve to seventeen strong. They appear to have been made up 'hard-bitten farmers, musterers, deer cullers and bushmen'. The Guide Platoons were to establish concealed hideouts and caches of weapons, rations, explosive and wireless sets. The Home Guard Narrative notes that about 100 of these units were developed. Night operations were to be a speciality. They had an intelligence function in that they were to obtain information on enemy intentions, movements and strengths for more regular units.⁶⁹ They seem to have been a civilian cross between commando units and straight out sabotage teams, designed to be used when the enemy landed in New Zealand.

The operational intelligence focus of the Army applied equally when it came to security matters. During the course of the war a number of field security sections were raised. Two field security sections undertook security duties in the Middle East with regard to the main New Zealand operational formation, the 2nd New Zealand Division, and the base elements of 2NZEF at Maadi Camp in Egypt.

The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section was established in 1941 in Egypt and lasted through past the end of hostilities in 1945. The Division itself was the

centre of attention for this Section, and its security concerns altered as the Division moved from place to place. The Division's great odyssey went from Greece, to Crete, to Egypt, into Palestine and Syria, back to Egypt, across Libya to Tunisia, and back to Egypt. Then it crossed to Italy, moving from Taranto to Trieste via Cassino and other places en route. The Divisional Field Security Section had to be adaptable, and learn to fit in depending on the current location.

The 2nd New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section was formed on 20 February 1941 at Helwan in Egypt consisting of one officer, Lieutenant N. Bancks, three Sergeants: H. Hyrons, G. Parker, R. Coury, and six other ranks: R. Allum, L.H. Annett, R.W. Cairns, N.N. Bryant, O.C. Wood and A.S Parker. The personnel came from a variety of backgrounds: electrical engineer, agriculturist, Wanganui Collegiate, journalist, bank clerk, farmer, civil servant in the East Indies, and a soldier of fortune from the French Foreign Legion. After a course in field security at the British Army's Field Security Wing and five days instructional duty at Abbassia Barracks, the personnel came together to form the Field Security Section to be attached to Divisional Headquarters.⁷⁰

The Divisional FS Section was tossed straight into the thick of operations, moving with the Division to Greece. During this period, any corners were rapidly knocked off. Owen Wood recalled that they apprehended a peasant building fires some distance behind some gun positions which, by the fires' location, gave the placement of the artillery away to the enemy. A Greek Army intelligence officer was present while this was being dealt with, and simply took the peasant out the door and shot him.⁷¹ The evacuation to Crete brought little respite and the Field Security Section was dispersed variously around Galatos, and NCOs were detached to units. Owen Wood and another were sent to 22nd

Battalion defending Hill 107 and the airfield at Maleme. Wood was with the airfield company when the invasion opened on 20 May, was engaged with the paratroopers, shot a paratroop officer in the course of the day, and was on the end of the line of the last section off the perimeter of the airfield during the night.⁷² Crete was a shambles, and it was impossible to do effective field security work. The return to Egypt was welcome, as it allowed a lengthy period in which routines could be properly established.

The Divisional FS Section had particular roles which are outlined in a document entitled 'Employment of the Field Security Section in the Western Desert', dated 8 October 1941. The duties of the Section in the field were concerned with the civilian population in the area in which the Division was operating. However, in the desert forward areas the lack of civilians allowed the Section to be used in support of the intelligence sections, such as by recovering documents.⁷³ Captured documents were very important (and indeed there had been a great haul on Crete), and it was suggested that two FS NCOs be attached to each Brigade HQ with instructions to look for enemy documents when headquarters were overrun. They were also to be of assistance to the various IOs and Intelligence Sections. They could also look after security in the Brigade area and do regular security checks of units.⁷⁴

Moving around in the forward area dealing with enemy documents and prisoners could have its moments, as one FS NCO found out during Operation 'Crusader'. Having dropped off some enemy prisoners, a number of New Zealand troops piled into an enemy truck and, escorted by the FS NCO on his Matchless motorcycle, set out to find 6th Brigade. The Brigade had moved, but they soon caught up with a convoy in the gathering gloom. The realisation dawned that these were German vehicles. They slowed

down and eased their way out of the line of traffic, the enemy not noticing their presence.⁷⁵

By October 1942 there were further refinements to the activities of FS personnel detached to Brigades. The security duties of the FS personnel remained paramount, and assistance in document collection was a core task. Identification of troops needed checking where troops were directing traffic. There was a whole list of instructions to be carried out when entering a town or village. The telephone system was to be disconnected, and signal sections should assist the FS in locating civilians operating transmitting sets. A list of inhabitants needed to be obtained from the local authority. A proclamation was to be issued forbidding all movement in or out of the area, and any persons apprehended who were blacklisted were to be sent to 308 POW cage. It was noted that while Arabs would inform on Italians and Italians on Arabs, little advantage could be taken of this because of the lack of time spent in any one locality. The FS personnel were also to look out for enemy deserters.⁷⁶

As the Division mounted its 1942 –1943 offensive against the Axis forces in the desert, the Divisional FS Section found itself from time to time doing different things. In Tripoli from 24 to 30 January they were given port security duties, to check entry and passes to the port area. This was punctuated by the CO, Lieutenant Nathan, being severely wounded 'by a bomb presumably thrown through his bedroom window.'⁷⁷

The security of information, the security of material, relations between troops and civilians, the problem of rumours, enemy prisoners and security in towns remained the focus of the FS Section. An FS report on 4 April 1943 noted that on 28 March a sheet of paper which had fallen from a 2nd NZ Division vehicle contained full details in

handwriting of the present operation, including its objective, method of attack, the units taking part, the air cover, artillery support, supporting troops and the time of the attack.⁷⁸ This referred to the Tebaga Gap battle that had just taken place. The same report noted a list of stolen material recovered, rumours (all relatively positive), the wandering of Arabs into the New Zealand lines, enemy documents recovered, the handling of POWs, and problems encountered in the villages of Gabes and El Hamma. The move of the New Zealand Division to Italy involved the FS Section in more of the same work, although clearly the larger population and access to alcohol posed different problems.

The New Zealand Base Field Security Section was located in Maadi Camp, and its role was to secure the base area of 2NZEF in the Middle East. The usual aspects of field security in a static location applied: security of information, security of personnel, security of material, security of operations, the morale of troops and the relations between civilians and military personnel. The Base FS Section had a strength of around 11 or 12 personnel. Made up of an officer, a Warrant Officer, seven other NCOs and three privates in July 1942, the Section covered Maadi Camp, with a detachment out at Tura Caves. Weekly Reports were produced on the security work. On 4 July 1942, for instance the range of matters included the following.⁷⁹ Troops still failed to appreciate the importance of not talking about military matters in front of civilians, particularly in the 'recent crisis' – it was thought Rommel was going to break through to Cairo. Military movements with the front so close were difficult to conceal from the civilian population. There were rumours that the British and the Americans had landed in the Germans' rear, and also that 2NZEF was returning to New Zealand. Pass checks of military and civilians continued; telephone security was very poor, and there were worries about labour unrest

among the local population with enemy propaganda in circulation. It was noted in general that

Events during the past week produced an immediate state of restrained panic among certain sections of the civilian population. This section could be classed as ex-GERMAN refugees, members of the local JEWISH population and others who have been giving active support to the British cause, all of whom would certainly have found themselves in danger in the event of an AXIS occupation...

The beginning of the crisis was marked by an increased antipathy towards the BRITISH, but at the most critical stage when an AXIS occupation loomed up as a possible reality there was a definite swing back in favour of the BRITISH even by many who were regarded as pro-AXIS.

On the night of 2/3 July AXIS propaganda leaflets were distributed in many areas including CAIRO, MAADI, HAWAMDIYA and other nearby villages...⁸⁰

A year later things had settled down considerably and base security was relatively quiet. The name of the FS Section at Maadi had changed for deception purposes to 6th New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section.⁸¹ The Weekly Security Report for 4 June 1943 divided into Military Security, Morale, and four Zones covered by the Section: Maadi Camp, Mena Garrison, Sigla Garrison and Tura Garrison. Under Military Security concern was raised about the leakage of information, in particular foreknowledge of the arrival of New Zealand reinforcements, careless talk about equipment, and insecure phone calls. Fires had been frequent around Tura, a pistol had been stolen, and a certain cargo had been landed at Port Said 'under proper supervision.' Morale among the troops remained high although the behaviour of New Zealand troops towards women in the street and other complaints of assault left a lot to be desired. The administration of security measures at the different Zones was adequate, although there were problems at Tura with illegal entry, and it was noted that in future intruders would be summarily shot. The FS Section's strength remained at ten with an officer in command, eight being based

at Maadi and one each at Mena and Tura. A number personnel had been serving with the Section for quite some time.⁸²

The FS Sections in the Middle East had a more active time than those sections established in New Zealand in 1942. The initial titles for the latter sections were the Northern Divisional Field Security Section, the Central Divisional FS Section and the Southern Divisional FS Section. These were subsequently altered to 1 Field Security Section, 2 FS Section and 3 FS Section. Not a great deal went on with the first two sections, but the South Island unit recorded a considerable amount of activity in the 3 FSS War Diary. There was a fair amount of co-operation with the Police and the SIB on occasion.

Nothing much happened to 1 FS Section in Northland. In July 1942, for instance, a number of lights were reported out to sea at different times, an investigation on 6 July was made into a submarine sighting report between Pakiri River and Goat Island by a farmer at Leigh, a missing file return was looked into, and a course was run for a subsection.⁸³ The theft of petrol and the security of documents were among the activities recorded in November; and petrol was stolen by the FSS from 1 Brigade Headquarters at night to test security, which was indeed wanting. In the following months, activity wound down. In July 1943 1 FS Section was involved in looking into a fire at Albany Hall and giving two security talks to 10th Reinforcements at Papakura. The Section was disbanded on 31 July 1943.⁸⁴

4 FS Section had a more interesting time. Raised in Hamilton for service with 3rd New Zealand Division, the unit went to New Caledonia in late November 1942, where it was engaged in routine security duties. When the Division moved up into the Solomons,

4 FS Section deployed from time to time as an infantry patrol under the Section commander, Lieutenant D. Lawford, on an island off Vella Lavella, and later on Sirot Island.⁸⁵

The FS Sections had a necessary but unglamorous role, for much security work was preventive and therefore negative. Even non-involvement could have its moments. A detachment from the New Zealand Base FS Section under WO Nat Cohen was detailed for protection duties for Lord Moyne. His Lordship decided he did not need the New Zealand FS detail and dispensed with their services. He was assassinated that day by Jewish terrorists.⁸⁶ That aside, the FS Sections served an important purpose for the units deployed overseas. They worked in well with the Intelligence Sections to the benefit of both sides of the intelligence coin.

One further activity deserves a brief mention. An Interrogation unit served with the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Middle East and in Italy under Captain Heywood, a British officer. Quite a good deal of useful intelligence was collected from enemy prisoners, and the Field Security and Intelligence Sections were also involved in this task.

In New Zealand, the interrogation of enemy prisoners took a couple of interesting turns. The first was that at the end of July 1942 the RAN DNI brought up the topic of a Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (or CSDIC) for Brisbane in a letter to the DNI in Wellington.⁸⁷ A New Zealand Chiefs of Staff paper in July put forward the idea that a CSDIC should be established in New Zealand.⁸⁸ The Army was against this move, pointing out that such a Centre would be expensive to run, and that there was a lack of skilled interpreters who would be essential to make it work. The Army argued solidly against the CSDIC again in October, just after the POW camp at Featherston had

been set up in September.⁸⁹ On 29 October, the Chiefs of Staff made a decision that a CSDIC should not be established in New Zealand on the grounds of lack of interpreters and the feeling that such an organisation would not do any good against Japanese prisoners.⁹⁰ Although a CSDIC was not set up, the function was carried out for a time.

A quite sizeable number of Japanese prisoners were captured in the Solomons, passed through American hands in New Caledonia and were sent on to Featherston. A proportion of these were Japanese marines. One of the naval officers from the COIC in Wellington visited Featherston in November. The Japanese prisoners interrogated there proved willing to talk fairly openly. This was in part because they had no training in how to behave when captured, as it was not envisaged that they would find themselves in that position. The other factor may have been that by quietly encouraging them to brag about their forces, a certain amount could be learned. At least this was how it appeared to Lieutenant V. Jaynes of the COIC.⁹¹

Much earlier a Special Intelligence signal of 12 February 1942 had come from the Captain on the Staff, Colombo. It concerned the C.in C. Combined Fleet.

IMPORTANT

Naval Special Intelligence dated 12th February. C. in C. Combined Fleet transfers his flag to YAMATO at 0100Z/12th. Comment. No record of YAMATO. May be new battleship.

0707Z/13⁹²

The *Yamato* had turned up repeatedly since then. However, when Jaynes was interrogating Japanese prisoners at Featherston with the help of the Camp interpreter, he unearthed the following small item. According to him,

The most significant thing that came out of these [interrogations] was that we interrogated a Chief Petty Officer who had seen the battleship *Yamato*, and he told us she was armed with 18-inch guns.... He drew a silhouette of the battleship and told us of its armament. ...⁹³

The gun size was significant, for it was not known she mounted such guns, larger than those on any Allied battleship. There was a little contretemps as a result of this interrogation. The Americans expressed concern that something new could be found. According to a memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff to the Secretary ONS on 1 December, it was observed that

Recently the first Japanese Naval prisoners of war have arrived in New Zealand and were interrogated by a New Zealand Naval Officer at the Prisoners of War Camp, Featherston. In this connection one or two points have arisen which seem to need clarification particularly as regards the previous interrogation carried out by United States Authorities, and what information, if any, is required by the U.S. Authorities from the interrogation carried out in New Zealand.⁹⁴

There was quite a bit of huffing and puffing about all this, and it does seem that later on after the riot at Featherston the Navy was excluded from interrogating prisoners, at least for a time.⁹⁵ There were in fact some quite useful interrogations of POWs conducted at Featherston.

The Army's efforts in intelligence were most effective where they were connected with operational units. It is obvious that the great bulk of Army intelligence collection went on in the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean theatre. After concentrating in Greece in 1941, the Division remained in theatre until the end of hostilities, operating in the Greece and Crete, the Western Desert campaign and the Italian campaign. A great deal of cohesion in intelligence collection was developed in the 2nd Division over the course of the war. The Division's intelligence set-up was an example of good practice in the collection, analysis and dissemination of operational intelligence. The movement of information up and down between the different levels in the Division was very important for the effective execution of operational plans based on

good intelligence. It is also a commentary on the professional application of the intelligence personnel.

While the security intelligence of the Field Security Sections by its very nature doomed them to a less spectacular war, nevertheless they functioned usefully in the Middle East. The Section deployed with 3rd New Zealand Division was not so useful on the surface, but then the nature of island-hopping operations, and the fact that it was always deployed on islands, made its work much easier. That it could take on infantry tasks suggests that once operations were underway in the islands, there was little role for the usual business of the Field Security Section.

The Field Security Sections in New Zealand did not have a great deal to do, apart from co-operating with the police and the SIB on internal security from time to time. Once the war moved north, they were wound up quickly. The Home Guard had potentially the largest intelligence organisation in New Zealand, but the intelligence sections were locally focussed, and their usefulness was never put to the operational test. The preparation of detailed local maps filled a gap for contingency planning.

Intelligence and security for the Army had an operational focus with most effort expended in support of the largest Army formations in the field. The Army adopted a practical approach to intelligence and security that paid off in the operational and tactical context.

Chapter Fourteen

Air Force Intelligence

As the most junior of the three services, the Royal New Zealand Air Force was very small to begin with, and it is perhaps not unexpected that intelligence was not regarded as a priority area. A substantial amount of time passed before any progress was made in the area of air intelligence, and that was quite rudimentary to begin with. Yet by August 1945, the RNZAF's air intelligence organisation was well enough regarded for the Allies to contemplate a significant role for it in the coming final offensive against Japan. This was quite a shift for a service intelligence organisation that began the war with just one intelligence officer.

RNZAF intelligence falls into two periods of development. The first ran from the outbreak of the war in 1939 through to the end of 1942, which might be termed the slow period. There were changes that took place towards the end of that time that led into the more hectic second period of growth. From 1943 to the end of hostilities, air intelligence had an increasingly important operational role in support of the New Zealand fighter, dive bomber and light bomber squadrons in the Solomons. In contrast to the RNZN's intelligence effort which declined towards the end of the war, RNZAF intelligence reached its peak in the same span. Air intelligence had become an important integral component for this small air force operating inside the large Allied air umbrella in the Pacific islands.

The period 1939 to the end of 1942 is considered first: the early development of RNZAF intelligence and the signposted directions leading into an increasing commitment

from 1943 onwards. Thirty months of continuous change from 1943 to August 1945 is dealt with subsequently, completing the contribution of the RNZAF to the New Zealand intelligence scene. Finally, an assessment is made of the effectiveness and utility of RNZAF air intelligence.

There was only a nod in the direction of intelligence when the Royal New Zealand Air Force was established on 1 April 1937. That day, Flight Lieutenant A. deT. Nevill became 'Staff Officer Air Staff and Intelligence', the RNZAF's sole intelligence officer. This modest beginning for RNZAF intelligence was to be cut short as Nevill's intelligence duties were to lapse after five months.¹ In September 1937, an Army officer, Major C.W. Free, MC, was seconded to the Air Department for a year. During this time he represented the Air Department on the Combined Intelligence Committee and other ONS committees.² He was replaced by Squadron Leader E.M.F. Grundy in late 1938. Grundy, as seen earlier, was associated with the moves towards forming a combined intelligence organisation. He was appointed to the Air Staff as Air I, responsible for operations and operational training in 1939.³

After the outbreak of war in 1939, Flight Lieutenant J.D. Canning became the first wartime Air Force intelligence officer, rather by accident. Appointed to the Air Staff as Air II, he was responsible for intelligence and security.⁴ At this time, those duties included the collection and reading of intelligence reports, keeping intelligence records, the preparation and issuing of intelligence summaries, a range of security matters (sabotage, subversion, vital point security, internal Air Force measures), liaison with Army and Naval Intelligence, the SIB, and RNZAF stations, and the Police Department, as well as writing up the War Diary.⁵ He was given the title of Air Intelligence 1 or A.I.1

for his position in the Combined Intelligence Bureau. As the only RNZAF intelligence officer extant, he represented the Air Force in the Combined Intelligence Bureau. His main role was to collect information on flying-boat landing areas and aerodromes in the Pacific Islands.⁶ The Air Force contribution to the combined intelligence organisation was slight to begin with.

It was not until 22 August 1941 that a second Air Force intelligence officer was appointed to the Combined Intelligence Bureau. This was Pilot Officer T.G. Tyrer, a journalist, who was now designated Air Intelligence 1(a). Initially his tasks involved mainly reading intelligence publications, mostly from the Navy, and getting familiar with geography in the Pacific.⁷ He also had security duties, which entailed liaison with the newly created SIB. It has been observed that the Chief of Air Staff, Air Commodore H.W.L. Saunders, had his doubts about the Director of the SIB, Major Folkes. Saunders told Tyrer to report to him direct if there was any trouble. As it turned out, no problems arose in liaison with the SIB.⁸ A third officer, Flying Officer R.S. Grant, posted to the RNZAF headquarters in Fiji, was to liaise with naval and army intelligence officers in Suva to form a small Combined Intelligence Bureau in 1941. Just two air intelligence officers in Wellington and another one in Suva were, however, not going to amount to much.

In October 1941 Air Commodore R.V. Goddard replaced Saunders as the Chief of Air Staff. Goddard had been involved in air intelligence at the Air Ministry in London from 1937 to 1939, and took an interest in the fledgling RNZAF intelligence. On 20 March 1942 Goddard wrote to the Minister of Defence outlining his plans for the development of the RNZAF Air Staff. On the subject of intelligence, he wrote:

The function of Intelligence is, in cooperation with other Services, to represent, as far as possible, the Air Staff of the enemy. That is to say, the head of Intelligence should view the war from the stand-point of the head of enemy air operations, basing his opinions on the knowledge of enemy organization, personnel, tactics and equipment. From a study of these and past actions in relation to enemy national policy, he should deduce the future actions of the enemy, his strength and weakness. Intelligence Branch is also responsible for security matters.⁹

This was a fairly clear statement of the objects of air intelligence. Only by familiarity with the enemy could headway be made. This was easier said than done. More intelligence personnel were obviously required.

In mid-1942 Pilot Officer Tyrer was able to concentrate on intelligence duties full time with the arrival of three New Zealand officers recently returned from Singapore. These were Flight Lieutenant W.M. Brown, Pilot Officer C. Zimmerman and Pilot Officer L.A. Amodeo. Zimmerman and Brown took over the security duties, while Amodeo joined Tyrer with intelligence.¹⁰ Other officers followed, including Flying Officer P.T. Curran and Pilot Officer H.W. Brady, who had been a bank official in Singapore. Born in Japan, Brady had also worked for the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank in Japan. As he spoke Japanese he became the RNZAF intelligence expert for Japan.¹¹ Flight Lieutenant Canning was now the Staff Officer (Intelligence) for the RNZAF, with a staff of six intelligence officers and two security officers who worked in the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre and the Air Staff.¹²

The intelligence duties of the Air Force officers in the COIC were redistributed in the following way. The senior intelligence officer, Air Intelligence I (A.I. – Canning), looked after the direction and administration of air intelligence in the COIC, and liaised with his Army and Navy counterparts, along with Censorship and the SIB. He was responsible for the War Diary and for operational intelligence. A.I.1 (Curran) was to

produce weekly air intelligence summaries, look at foreign aircraft performance and bomb and gas intelligence, the Japanese Order of Battle and air tactics. A.I.2 (Porter) was to keep records of all aircraft passing in and out of New Zealand airspace, amend maps and circulate current operational 'hot' intelligence, and keep updated information on airfields in New Zealand and Fiji. A.I.3 (Tyner) was responsible for silhouettes of aircraft and ships, intelligence from photographs, and keeping the War Diary. A.I.4 was to compile operational information on the Pacific Islands and Australasia, and distribute operational intelligence. A.I.10 (Morton) focussed on security precautions, censorship control, police liaison and the issuing of passes.¹³

The RNZAF itself was expanding rapidly. Three new Group Headquarters, Northern Group, Central and Southern were established in mid-1942, and an air intelligence officer was appointed to each. Flying Officer Curran went to Northern Group; Flight Lieutenant P.E Laughton-Bramley, an experienced RAF intelligence officer on loan, went to Central Group; and Squadron Leader Tony Lester to Southern Group. Central Group was disbanded in October 1943.¹⁴

To begin with, there was no formal training of air intelligence officers. The appointment of Intelligence Officer in the squadrons before 1942 simply fell to an aircrew member, who just added it to his normal duties.¹⁵ The first RNZAF intelligence course seems to have been conducted over a twenty day period in July 1942. Two 'Operations' courses were held in September-October and October-November 1942, attended by intelligence officers. Another intelligence course, the Photographic Interpretation and Intelligence Course, was held in January 1943.¹⁶ In spite of a slow

start, there was a steady stream of intelligence officers recruited by the RNZAF from 1943 to the end of the war.

The first two RNZAF Squadron Intelligence Officers appointed to squadrons from outside were sent in November 1942 to No.3 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron at Guadalcanal and No.9 BR Squadron on New Caledonia. They were Pilot Officer R.G. Lund, editor of the Southland Times, and Pilot Officer J.E.L. Baldwin, a patent attorney. Lund made an impression on Guadalcanal on the morning of 8 February 1943. The US intelligence interpretation of the presence of a number of abandoned Japanese barges found floating was that more Japanese reinforcements had arrived on Guadalcanal. Lund argued instead that an evacuation had taken place, or otherwise the barges would have been up on the beaches. He was able, in spite of being a very junior officer, to convince COMAIRSOLS (Commander Air Forces Solomons) that he was correct at the morning briefing. This appears to have been the first intelligence assessment that the Japanese had been evacuating troops, and events over the next days proved Lund to be correct. The US commanders were impressed with Lund.¹⁷

The first period from 1939 to the end of 1942 had been marked by a distinct lack of progress in the area of air intelligence, until Goddard became CAS in October 1941. In one sense this is somewhat surprising in view of the difficulties encountered with the searches for raiders in New Zealand waters, a large number of which were conducted by aircraft. Indeed, as has already been seen, the coastwatching system was shored up by air patrols. It might have been thought that air intelligence was a little more important than the attention accorded it up to October 1941. The new CAS, the onset of the war with Japan and the great underlining of New Zealand and Australia's absolute vulnerability

proved to be powerful stimuli for action. During 1942 the seeds were sown for a more substantial thrust in air intelligence. As more RNZAF squadrons were committed in 1943 and 1944 to operations in the forward area, so the requirement for good operational intelligence had its effect in the expansion of air intelligence.

This second period of the expansion of air intelligence from 1943 to 1945 was littered with changes as the circumstances and requirements altered. It is during this time that the RNZAF intelligence organisation reached its peak in numbers of personnel and importance.

On 22 February 1943, a memorandum entitled 'AIR DEPARTMENT REORGANISATION' signified changes to the RNZAF's contribution to the COIC. At this time, it was decided that the Air Force intelligence section of the COIC would function separately from the Navy and the Army, although liaison would continue. The COIC would cease to figure in Air Force intelligence products as such, and a COIC (Air) Operational Intelligence Bulletin would henceforth be called the RNZAF Intelligence Bulletin.¹⁸

Much later in 1943, Flight Lieutenant Amodeo suggested to the Deputy Chief of Air Staff (DCAS) that the efficiency of air intelligence would be improved if the position of Staff Officer (Intelligence) at the Air Department in Wellington and that of Staff Officer (Intelligence) in No.1 (Islands) Group were rotated between the two officers every four months. After the first rotation both officers would be fully familiar with the situation in both the Air Department and in the forward area. Amodeo recommended that he should replace Flight Lieutenant Tyrer at No.1 (Islands) Group, and Tyrer become Staff Officer (Intelligence) at the Air Department for the four month period.¹⁹

On 24 April 1944 a major report on the state and functions of RNZAF intelligence was promulgated.²⁰ By this time air intelligence had grown substantially. The strength of the RNZAF Intelligence organisation was now thirty-eight officers. At least ten intelligence officers were based in New Zealand: five at the Air Department and one at each of the RNZAF Stations of Ohakea, New Plymouth, Ardmore and Whenuapai. In No.1 (Islands) Group there were three at Headquarters, an intelligence staff officer at COMAIRSOLS Headquarters, one officer at RNZAF Headquarters in Suva, one at the Base Depot on Espiritu Santo and one at the RNZAF Station at Guadalcanal. There was one intelligence officer on the strength of each of seventeen RNZAF squadrons. The average age of the intelligence officers was 33 years, and their selection had been largely based on their civilian occupations, quite a few from law and journalism.²¹

Amodeo's rotation scheme had expanded with pairing between intelligence posts on a six monthly rotation. Thus, the three intelligence officers from the Air Department (the Staff Officer (Intelligence) and his two assistants) changed with the equivalent three officers at No.1 (Islands) Group Headquarters. The intelligence officer at Northern Group Headquarters exchanged with the intelligence officer from the RNZAF Fighter Wing in the islands. The Station Intelligence Officer at RNZAF Ardmore rotated with the Headquarters Intelligence Officer, RNZAF Fighter Wing. And so on.²² This ensured that all RNZAF Intelligence Officers had recent overseas operational experience no matter where they were posted.

The RNZAF Air Intelligence Section at the Air Department was an intelligence organisation for the Air Staff. As such it was responsible for the collation and

distribution of intelligence from No.1 (Islands) Group, the US Navy, the US Marine Corps, and the US Army, and from American and British intelligence organisations.²³

There were five intelligence publications produced by the Air Intelligence Section. These were an Intelligence Digest, an Intelligence Summary, Intelligence Memoranda, Japanese Pamphlets and 'RNZAF Readiness'. The RNZAF Intelligence Digest was a secret weekly review of operations over the last week in the South Pacific, along with some background intelligence. It was designed to be used for briefing purposes for aircrew being sent to the forward area.²⁴ The fortnightly RNZAF Intelligence Summary, graded 'Secret' was limited to officers and aircrew. Divided into three sections, it covered a review of South Pacific operations, the modifications and changes in enemy equipment, and general intelligence.²⁵ RNZAF Intelligence Memoranda were published from time to time, either as secret or confidential documents. They were for operational aircrew but were too long for either the Intelligence Summary or the Intelligence Bulletin.²⁶ A fortnightly series of RNZAF Japanese Pamphlets graded 'Secret' were limited in distribution to operational aircrew. They were compiled from POW reports and captured enemy documents and covered background intelligence not dealt with in the other summaries and bulletins.²⁷ The monthly 'RNZAF Readiness' was published with the widest circulation among all ranks for general 'informative spare time reading'.²⁸ Aircraft and ship recognition training for operational units also became a responsibility of the Air Intelligence Section of the Air Department.

On all the operational RNZAF Stations in New Zealand there was a Station Intelligence Officer, and each Squadron had its own Intelligence Officer (as did the Operational Training Units). Apart from lectures on intelligence at the OTUs, each

Squadron or Station Intelligence Section had an Intelligence Library containing large-scale maps of South Pacific areas, plus target maps and air photographs of main bases. The Intelligence Section at Northern Group Headquarters kept an eye on and supported the work of the Intelligence Officers on all Stations in New Zealand.²⁹

In the forward area, the air intelligence set-up was more comprehensive. The Intelligence Section at No.1 (Islands) Group Headquarters, now located at Guadalcanal, looked over and directed the work of all RNZAF Intelligence Officers in the South Pacific. In addition to distributing intelligence from the Air Department in Wellington and Allied intelligence organisations, No.1 Group Intelligence produced the RNZAF Intelligence Bulletin. This publication consisted of tactical intelligence of immediate operational use as it came to hand, and was produced usually twice a week. It was distributed to all RNZAF operational units in the South Pacific, graded either secret or confidential depending on its contents. It provided the latest intelligence on Japanese aircraft types, equipment and performance, along with relevant extracts from RNZAF and Allied combat and mission reports, with details of enemy tactics.³⁰

Liaison with Commander Air Forces South Pacific (COMAIRSOPAC), Commander Air Forces Solomons (COMAIRSOLS) Intelligence, the RAN coastwatching organisation, and the intelligence arm of the US 13th Army Air Force was carried out by No.1 Group Intelligence. To this end a RNZAF Intelligence Officer was attached to the COMAIRSOLS staff.³¹ There was considerable contact with USAAF, US Marine Corps and US Naval intelligence organisations in the Solomons.

The RNZAF Fighter Wing based at Torokina airfield on Bougainville commanded four squadrons of fighters. Aircraft numbers operating off Torokina varied at

times. When another airstrip at Piva was evacuated because of Japanese artillery fire, there were aircraft from sixteen squadrons operating from Torokina for about a week in March. Later in June there would be three RNZAF squadrons and one USAAF squadron.

In April 1944 the Fighter Wing consisted of two RNZAF squadrons, a US Navy squadron and a USAAF squadron. The Combined Fighter Intelligence, Torokina, was run by the senior RNZAF Intelligence Officer, Flight Lieutenant Curran, with the assistance of three US intelligence officers. Briefings for combined strikes was carried out by Combined Fighter Intelligence, which also collated and distributed Combat and Strike Reports received from the Squadron Intelligence Officers (these were then passed on to COMAIRSOLS intelligence). An RNZAF Fighter Wing Intelligence Section was also run to coordinate intelligence for RNZAF squadrons operating through Torokina, and maintain the Library with displayed up-to-date target information.³²

Curran's outline of the role of the intelligence sections of the fighter wing on Torokina in 1944 summarises their duties. The squadron intelligence section had the dual role of briefing pilots prior to sorties, and passing the results of air operations to higher authority. Intelligence provided adequate information for operations, and guided the squadron intelligence officers when debriefing returned aircrew. Both oral and written evaluations were passed to Air Command. Reports requiring urgent action were phoned through to Fighter Command, and from June 1944 by phone and teletype links to COMAIRSOLS. The scope of these concerned operations reports, downed aircrew locations, enemy sightings and other emergencies. The intelligence sections also sent weekly reports on squadron operations to Fighter Command and COMAIRSOLS. These detailed flying hours and daily averages for a variety of missions, from routine patrols to

direct offensive operations. They gave weekly squadron statistics on pilot and aircraft availability, loss returns, aircrew lost, missing or rescued, plus monthly assessments of squadron losses. The intelligence section was responsible for delivering a series of publications, from intelligence summaries to maps. Command orders and other material received by teletype were mounted on a dispatch board under headings, including enemy sightings, shipping, rescues, and weather. Target and flying briefs were prepared by the Torokina Intelligence Officers, who kept close touch with other intelligence units. Oral and written briefings, maps, photographs passed intelligence to aircrew, while current daily plots were maintained on the location of shipping, enemy sightings, A/A batteries and the state of targets.³³

The two RNZAF Squadron Intelligence Officers at Torokina acted as Operations Officers as well as running small intelligence sections. They worked very long hours based in the Squadron Readiness Huts during the two months' tour of duty on Bougainville.³⁴ The pilots of each Squadron were briefed and interrogated by the Squadron Intelligence Officer in the normal way with each operation.

The duties of Squadron Intelligence Officers varied, as did their routine. A Summary of Duties of the Intelligence Officer of No.1 Squadron for December 1944 on Green Island noted that daily hours were not easy to establish. Operating Ventura light bombers, the hours on duty might be just four or twenty, depending on the operations in progress. The Intelligence Officer at No.1 Squadron was to maintain the crew room and keep the intelligence material from all sources up-to-date. Information needed to be collated for future operations. All crews for routine flights had to be briefed, and a supply of maps and route manuals kept ready. The Intelligence Officer was to help

decide targets and obtain information on them. Material had to be prepared for operations briefings, and the Intelligence Officer briefed the crews. Constant liaison with Allied squadrons needed to be preserved especially when combined strikes were made. Crews returning from routine and bombing operations had to be debriefed. The results of those interrogations had to be sent immediately to Air Intelligence. The Intelligence Officer had to be there at take-off for all strike and important operations, ready to assist with any detail. The Squadron Operations Book (Form 541) and the Squadron History (Form 540) was kept by the Intelligence Officer, and the Squadron's Weekly Operational Summary was prepared by him. The Intelligence Officer was also the Photographic Officer. On every third morning he was to take over the Squadron Operations Watch at 0130 hours in return for assistance given by the Operations Officer.³⁵

A routine day at Emirau in December 1944 for the Intelligence Officer of an RNZAF fighter squadron began with him being woken at 0400 hours. At 0430 the Intelligence Officer would go by jeep with the Met Officer to the Army Weather post some two and a half miles away, then call at Air Intelligence Command to find out where the fighter patrols would drop their bombs etc. He then headed to the New Zealand Signals Office to collect copies of signals received in the night, and returned to the Army Weather post to collect the Met Officer. By just after 0500 hours, the Intelligence Officer would be in his office reading and filing signals for use in briefing the early sortie. At 0530, the dawn patrol was briefed, and from 0615 to 0700 briefings were carried out for the search patrols. At 0830, a briefing for the strike operation took place. At 0930, the returning dawn patrol would be interrogated, and an hour later the strike mission also debriefed. From 1145 to around 1215 the search patrols were debriefed. Shipping and

truck spotting operations were briefed at 1300, and they were interrogated on their return at around 1515. The briefing for the dusk patrol was done at 1545. At 1815, the Intelligence Officer went to the New Zealand Signals Office, collected signals and awaited the return of the dusk patrol. The dusk patrol debriefed, one copy of their intelligence and any others not already sent were despatched to Air Operations. The "Daisy" signal was prepared, and briefing notes checked and readied for next morning. At around 2015, the Intelligence Officer went to Air Operations with a copy of the last report, and called at the Signals Office to send the "Daisy" signal.³⁶ The Squadron Intelligence Officer's lot was quite demanding in the forward area. It was an important role on which the aircrew depended to successfully prosecute operations.

There were two RNZAF squadrons operating Grumman Avengers from Bougainville under the operational command of COMAIRSOLS Strike Command. There were two groups of three squadrons, one RNZAF, one US Navy and one US Marines in each group. The Intelligence Officers were pooled to carry out their duties. All briefings were done by Strike Command officers, while interrogation of pilots returning and the compilation of Strike Reports were carried out by the Duty Intelligence Officers who dealt with crews from any squadron as they came in.³⁷

There were three RNZAF Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons in the forward area. One operated from Fiji. Another was based at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides for shipping escort and anti-submarine patrols under US operational control. The Squadron's own Intelligence Section did all briefing and interrogation of aircrew. The third Squadron was at Munda where it operated with seven US squadrons, sharing a Combined Intelligence Section, although most briefings and interrogations were done by the

Squadron Intelligence Officers.³⁸ The RNZAF Catalina Squadron at Halavo on Florida Island had an advanced flight of four aircraft at Treasury Island. The US forces handled intelligence for the Treasury flight, while the Squadron Intelligence Section operated as normal at Halavo.³⁹

In addition to the wide liaison with the US forces in the Solomons, eight US intelligence publications were routinely circulated to all operational RNZAF units, while terrain studies, air photographs and target maps were provided by US intelligence organisations.⁴⁰ Unsurprisingly, information on survival was another important feature of air intelligence in the South Pacific, and the RNZAF produced its own manual on the subject and a variety of other bulletins and pamphlets as well. Apart from 'Survival Hints for Aircrew', these included 'Pidgin English Statement for Natives', 'Notes for Aircrew Down in Jungle', 'The Raft Book' and 'Food is Where You Find it.'⁴¹

The emphasis for RNZAF intelligence in 1944 centred on the requirements of the operational squadrons. On 30 May 1944 a reshuffle of tasks among the Intelligence Officers of the Air Intelligence Section at the Air Department in Wellington reflected this core focus.⁴² The Staff Officer (Intelligence) still had the same role, that of supervision and oversight of the RNZAF Intelligence Section, the recording, co-ordination, appreciation and distribution of enemy intelligence, and liaison with the other Services. A.I.1 was concerned with the distribution of intelligence to operational units and Groups and to the Air Staff, as well as looking after the Air Intelligence filing system and the sorting of inward correspondence. A.I.2 was the Narrative Officer for the briefings in the Central War Room. He looked after the enemy order of battle, enemy

airfields, target maps and charts, and liaised with the Navy's 'Y' Intelligence organisation.⁴³

A.I.3 deputized as Narrative Officer for the Central War Room, but his prime responsibility was the production of the RNZAF Intelligence Digest, the RNZAF Japanese Pamphlets, the RNZAF Intelligence Memoranda and the RNZAF 'Readiness' bulletins. A.I.4 was concerned with aircraft and ship recognition training, the collation of performance data on Japanese aircraft and weapons, and the compilation of lecture notes on those subjects. Each of the Intelligence Officers spent part of each day keeping abreast of current trends and developments in air intelligence publications. A.I.5 and A.I.6 were a filing clerk and typist respectively.⁴⁴ The Section was also responsible for the production of the Air Intelligence section of the COIC Daily Summary produced each day for the Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister and the Governor-General.⁴⁵ It will be recalled that by 1944 most of the COIC Daily Summaries were taken up with air intelligence material.⁴⁶

In January 1945 further changes were made. The Staff Officer (Intelligence), Squadron Leader Amodeo, had his usual role. A.I.1, Flight Lieutenant Muir, was now the Narrative Officer for the Central War Room. He looked after enemy order of battle, target maps and charts, and distributed intelligence to the Air Staff and units. A.I.2 was to produce the four RNZAF intelligence publications, be stand in Narrative Officer and look after 'Survival Intelligence'. A.I.3, Flying Officer R.F. Meadows was concerned with ship and aircraft recognition, data on Japanese types and weapons. An Air Intelligence Security Section under a Staff Officer Intelligence (Security) was instituted. Flight Lieutenant G. Meyers was appointed to the post, his role being to advise on

security policy, look after security matters, and liaise with the SIB and the Police Department.⁴⁷

A.I.4 was restored in yet another reorganisation, this one in June 1945. The Staff Officer (Intelligence), Squadron Leader Tyrer remained in command with the same oversight duties. The A.I.1, Flying Officer J.A. McBride (formerly of the SIB), was now known as the Deputy Staff Officer (Intelligence), and was the Narrative Officer for the CWR. He was to look after the RNZAF Intelligence Bulletin, Part II of the RNZAF Intelligence Digest and the RNZAF Japanese Pamphlet. He also was to send a daily intelligence signal to the Air Ministry in London and a weekly signal to the Royal Canadian Air Force War Room in Ottawa. A.I.2 was now known as the Operations Staff Narrative Officer; he was to prepare Part I of the RNZAF Intelligence Digest (Norsols [northern Solomons] Intelligence), assist with the Japanese Pamphlet and look after escape and evasion and survival intelligence. A.I.3, Flying Officer Brady, was to maintain the Section's filing and record system. There were clearly operations further northwards in mind, for Brady was to collate terrain and target data on Japan, China, the Netherlands East Indies and South East Asia Command's area. He was also to collect and collate reports on Japan, including its remaining war potential, national psychology, morale and other intelligence for the Secretary of the War Cabinet. Flying Officer Meadows as A.I.4 would look after the ship and aircraft recognition business, and the data on Japanese aircraft and so forth.⁴⁸ The Air Intelligence Security Section's Staff Officer Intelligence (Security) – Meyers - still had the same duties as before.⁴⁹

There was one last interesting flicker at the end of hostilities. In 1945, the final offensive against Japan was to include a Commonwealth Air Task Force, to comprise

squadrons from the RAF, the RCAF, the RAAF and the RNZAF. They would be working in conjunction with the United States air forces. The base for this Air Task Force was to be Okinawa. Mountbatten's South East Asia Command (SEAC) was contemplating the formation of an Intelligence Directorate to support the Commonwealth Air Task Force. On 6 August, the RNZAF's CAS, Air Vice Marshal Isitt, received a signal from SEAC informing him that the provision of an Intelligence Directorate had been given to the RNZAF. The Director of this Directorate was to join the Advance Headquarters forming at Labaun in Borneo.⁵⁰

The CAS sent for his Staff Officer (Intelligence), Squadron Leader Tyrer, and informed him of SEAC's decision. The CAS concurred with SEAC's signal. Tyrer was instructed that as he was only a substantive Flight Lieutenant with acting Squadron Leader rank, he was to prepare a paper for the CAS to pass to the Air Member for Personnel confirming Tyrer as substantive Squadron Leader, granting him acting Wing Commander rank and posting him to Labaun. Tyrer went back to his office to hear the news which had just been broadcast on the BBC of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. With the end of hostilities in the days that followed, no further action was taken with respect to the RNZAF Intelligence Directorate for Labaun.⁵¹

There were two other small areas connected with intelligence that only got off the ground late in the war. Photographic Intelligence or PI did not begin until late 1944. This was because the RNZAF had relied on somebody else to provide Photographic Intelligence, viz. the Americans. The US PI units were withdrawn for redeployment further north, so the RNZAF had to do something or go without.⁵² After a minor bureaucratic hassle, Flying Officer J.S. Barraud established the first RNZAF PI unit on

Bougainville in 1944. This unit produced a complete re-assessment of the location and strength of enemy air defences in the Bismarcks and the North Solomons and provided important target information. This usefulness was duly acknowledged by the Allied commands.⁵³

The Missing Persons Investigating Unit (MPIU) was supposed to have been set up in 1943, but it was not established until August 1945. Apart from searching for missing personnel, the MPIU had an intelligence function, in that one of its tasks was to assess the effectiveness of RNZAF bombing of certain targets, and to collect any other intelligence of interest on enemy equipment. Three sections were formed, No.1 Section on Bougainville, No.2 Section on New Britain and No.3 Section on New Ireland. The MPIU sections collected a substantial amount of intelligence material on a large variety of subjects.⁵⁴

The RNZAF's foray into air intelligence demonstrated that a fair amount could be achieved in spite of the most inauspicious beginnings. The long period from the end of the 1930s through to October 1941 may just as well have been a blank as far as useful air intelligence was concerned. This was in part the fault of the then CAS, who clearly did not understand the implications of his own lack of interest: an air force without eyes. Such lack of interest amounted to incompetence. The advent of Goddard as CAS was critical for air intelligence, and it is fair to say that the commitment of No.1 (Islands) Group to the Solomons would have been totally dependent on the Americans without an RNZAF intelligence organisation.

The continual changes and adjustment of tasks within the Air Intelligence Section in Wellington and the leadership provided by Tyrer and Amodeo in particular enabled the

RNZAF's intelligence effort to flourish rather than wither. The rotational scheme between the forward area and New Zealand kept the focus on what was most important for the Air Force, the provision of useful timely operational intelligence.

The RNZAF did not get into the signals intelligence field. Given the late start in intelligence per se, it is hardly surprising that this was so. The need for operational intelligence precluded any ideas of moving in that direction, in any event the Air Force would have been far too far behind to catch up.

The RNZAF's achievements in air intelligence were limited for the most part to useful tactical information for operational purposes. The amount of detail in the various intelligence publications, and the rapidity with which they were compiled on a regular basis and promulgated to operational units testified to a quite prodigious effort by a relatively small number of personnel. In mid-1944, there were still less than forty RNZAF intelligence personnel in the entire Air Force. By limiting themselves to that practical end, the RNZAF Air Intelligence organisation proved their utility and honed their skills, working within a self-imposed orbit. That SEAC contemplated entrusting a large slice of air intelligence for a projected final assault on Japan to the RNZAF, and not the RAAF or the RCAF, says much about the Air Department's Air Intelligence organisation's established track record. The RNZAF's air intelligence was a case of very late, but well done.

Intelligence collection for field units and operational squadrons made the pursuit of single service interests inevitable in the Army and the Air Force, particularly as those units for the most part were deployed within larger formations distant from New Zealand. Resources were only put into intelligence when considered necessary, and it was a matter

of judgement as to when the intelligence function was no longer needed. For the Army and the Air Force, the dictates of campaigns and operational necessity meant intelligence collection continued beyond the conclusion of hostilities in Europe in the case of the Army, and up to the end of the war with Japan for the Air Force.

Conclusion

Could a small country like New Zealand be expected to achieve more in the intelligence field? How important was New Zealand in the intelligence efforts against the Axis powers? Were there any lessons to be learned about the difficulties of operating an intelligence organisation in a small country? Can a small country like New Zealand compensate for its limited military strength with a focussed intelligence effort?

Given the range and diversity of the intelligence organisations and their application to collection activity, it is in quality and sharpness of focus that there could have been useful improvements during the war. Although New Zealand had manpower problems, the numbers of personnel involved in intelligence work were very small. What was lacking was recognition of the usefulness of timely intelligence, with certain notable exceptions in the signals intelligence area. It led to lethargy in the case of setting up the combined intelligence organisation, the security service, and an effective local coastwatching set-up. Had there been better efforts made to get organised more quickly, the collection and flow of intelligence may have increased. This contrasted sharply with 'Y', H/F D/F (and REB) and the Army and Air Force intelligence elements, all of which were driven by clear operational imperatives. It is, then, less about widening the range of New Zealand's intelligence activities and more to do with increasing the quality of both collection and production of intelligence. New Zealand could have made more effective efforts in coastwatching, internal security and combined intelligence.

The importance of New Zealand's intelligence contribution within an Allied context is more difficult to gauge. Tactical intelligence for deployed Army and Air Force units served those formations well. As the units were operating as part of larger Allied

formations, and were often cooperating directly with other Allied units, intelligence collection and dissemination was an essential and integral part of standard operational practice. Signals intelligence was even more valuable and indeed only made sense within an Allied context. Its very nature and the size of effort mounted meant it could not stand alone. Its usefulness and strength came from its practical application in cooperation with Anglo-American signals intelligence. New Zealand daily played a small but valued role in interception and interpretation of traffic, the taking of bearings and the supply of special intelligence. Here the cooperation ran very deep and had a long history that went back to the First World War. From the late 1930s to the end of 1941, New Zealand signals intelligence carried out useful work for the Admiralty. From 1942 onwards the United States became a larger part of this picture. Australian-New Zealand naval intelligence liaison was a constant sub-theme.

If more could have been achieved in certain areas of intelligence, there were a number of difficulties in operating intelligence organisations in a small, remote country. There had to be a clear recognition of what the organisation was required to do. Turf wars between different departments were to be avoided, and the dangers of small numbers of persons and powerful personalities needed to be appreciated. Interservice rivalry had to be restricted if tri-service intelligence initiatives were to make headway. Poor allocation of resources, poor support and limited staffing led not only to poor intelligence: it meant wasted effort. There was always the temptation to assume (repeatedly in this war) that the apparent absence of the enemy signified the decline of threats. Although this was not the case, the assumption remained a particular New Zealand weakness.

Could a focussed intelligence effort have compensated for New Zealand's lack of military strength? It might have assisted in shoring up some of the holes in New Zealand's threadbare defence posture, but in this war the fundamental military weakness would have remained. A focussed intelligence drive required far more support than the appropriate authorities demonstrated they were willing to give. Further high level thinking about intelligence would have been necessary, and there is no evidence to suggest this sort of analysis was available in cabinet, at chiefs of staff level or at the intelligence committee level. Given the lethargic and rudimentary deliberations of the latter, this is not surprising. Implementation of measures to ensure a focussed effort was for the most part too high a hurdle.

The intelligence collection organisations of the New Zealand armed forces during the Second World War were small and relatively fragile in terms of their duration. The organisations existed as a result of requirements for certain kinds of intelligence by the servants of the government, whether uniformed or not. Those servants were persuaded by intelligence authorities outside New Zealand to contribute to a particular effort in the interests of the wartime Allies - signals intelligence falls into this category. They were not convinced as to the efficacy of certain types of intelligence, or were ambivalent to it - as in the case of the security service. There were divisions between services, and between departments as to whether one kind of intelligence was useful or not. The relationship between the Services, other departments of state and the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet fluctuated with regard to intelligence gathering. Sometimes there was quite close direction, for example with combined intelligence and internal security. There were also areas of intelligence that by their nature or remoteness were exclusive of close

direction from the top of the intelligence tree. This was either for technical reasons, as with 'Y' intelligence, or to do with deployed formations overseas, like the army's field intelligence and security sections with the 2nd and 3rd New Zealand Divisions, and air intelligence with No.1 (Islands) Group in the Solomons.

Intelligence collection organisations were closed down or reduced in size once it was perceived that there was no longer a requirement for a particular kind of intelligence to be collected (for technical reasons, radio fingerprinting) or for maintaining such extensive coverage (coastwatching). The size, shape and composition of the intelligence collection organisations varied enormously. There were single service organisations (for example the Army's field security sections), multi-service bodies (the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre), and multi-service and multi-departmental ramshackle constructions (the coastwatching organisation).

More by circumstances than deliberate design, the over-arching co-ordinating function of the Organization for National Security made it a junction point for New Zealand's intrusions into intelligence. Service intelligence came under the ONS umbrella through the influential Chiefs of Staff Committee. All service intelligence collection ultimately went back to the service chiefs. Moreover, service interests were represented on many of the other committees. The Secretary ONS welded the linkage between the Prime Minister's Department and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the connection to both Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. The Secretary ONS was very much a linch-pin post, for he represented the Prime Minister's and the Prime Minister's Department's interests to the service chiefs, though Shanahan was not averse to working against the Prime Minister if the need arose.

Under the ONS, there was multiple departmental representation on a number of committees overlooking intelligence collection activity. The number of government departments involved in any one area of intelligence was laudable from the point of view of interest, and a source of weakness for possible friction and division. If the services were well represented on committees, so were other departments like the P&T Department, the Police, the Marine Department, Customs, Public Works, Censorship and Publicity and so on. This multi-departmental layering effect produced much paper and many resolutions, and in the case of coastwatching, much practical action. Yet the more parties involved, the greater the chance of the collection of appropriate and sufficient intelligence going astray.

The Chiefs of Staff lay at the heart of any consideration of service intelligence matters. On intelligence in the ONS committees, the Chiefs of Staff gave direction on intelligence policy. The Prime Minister and the War Cabinet approved, blocked or deferred the service chiefs' decisions in many areas during the war, and intelligence collection was no different. Thus the deliberations on combined intelligence, on signals intelligence, on coastwatching and on internal security, the decisions to convene sub-committees to look at these matters, and the outcomes in those areas, hinged on decisions made by the Chiefs of Staff, approved by the War Cabinet.

In 1943, the ONS was regarded as having outlived its usefulness as a coordinating body. The reorganisation established the War Cabinet Secretariat in its place, which for intelligence meant a re-jigging of oversight of collection. The McIntosh-Shanahan linkage strengthened, with McIntosh as Secretary to the War Cabinet, de facto head of the Prime Minister's Department and inaugural Permanent Head of the new

Department of External Affairs. It is a notable coincidence that the reorganisation took place at the same time as a major security intelligence shake-up, the police takeover of the security service. As the war was perceived to move far away to the north, there was a reduction in intelligence collection and oversight co-ordination. And as requirements for certain intelligence activities were seen to be less important, so the Chiefs of Staff, with War Cabinet approval, had the executive role in the reduction and redeployment of resources.

Prewar preparations in the direction of combined intelligence amounted to the deliberations of an intelligence committee, little more than a declaration of intent to form a combined intelligence centre in wartime. Nothing substantial resulted. The Navy's long established practice of the collection of operational intelligence through the SO (O&I)'s reporting officer system and signals intelligence through its local and overseas connections was the only means of collecting useful operational intelligence. The army intelligence and field security sections were not effective until the 2nd New Zealand Division fully deployed in the Middle East in 1941. Low-level internal security collection was carried out by the police. Air intelligence, as a one-man band, was almost non-existent. Even the response to the shock of June 1940 was simply to set up yet another committee to consider an intelligence centre, and the decision by the Chiefs of Staff to set up the Combined Intelligence Bureau was not taken until September 1940. The service chiefs were tardy in putting in place resources and personnel, having postponed resource allocation decisions repeatedly since 1937.

The CIB was too small and got off to a bad start with the hiatus over intelligence summary production though disagreements between the Chiefs of Staff, the Prime

Minister and the Police Commissioner. The result of this was to weaken the already frail CIB, reduce its production of summaries, and limit its focus to merchant shipping movements in the face of raider activity. Increasing nervousness about the possibility of war with Japan, uninterrupted commerce raider operations, and the unsatisfactory intelligence collection situation led the CNS to request a fulltime SO(I) from the Admiralty in early 1941, and to drive the reorganisation of the CIB. The decisions made in August led to a larger combined body, the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre , but the transition was still under way when hostilities began with Japan.

There was a scramble to cope with the rapidly deteriorating situation. The COIC commenced issuing Daily Intelligence Summaries in late December 1941, based on the collection of current operational intelligence, the first of a variety of intelligence publications. Operational connections with the FECB were disrupted by the fall of Singapore, the DNI departed overseas, and the COIC moved into a new building with a rapidly expanding staff. The shock of the expanded conflict produced the daily briefing meeting for the Chiefs of Staff on the latest intelligence collected. A 24-hour watch was instituted in the COIC, a remarkably late measure at this point in the war. Much of the useful operational intelligence came from the 'Y' organisation, and the British, Australian, American and Canadian signals intelligence authorities. If 1942 was a year of expansion for the COIC, 1943 was the year in which single service interest reasserted itself in the combined organisation. The growing RNZAF air intelligence organisation deliberately tip-toed away from the COIC, its attention focussed on operational intelligence collection for the squadrons in the forward area. The army role in the COIC remained insignificant. The combined intelligence organisation reverted to a naval

intelligence organisation by default. The increasing operational effectiveness of H/F D/F and REB led to efforts to set up a daily enemy submarine plot in the COIC. The following year saw a reduction of activity in the COIC, the progressive cessation of intelligence publications, and the end of daily briefings and the 24-hour watch. The rump naval intelligence body left in its place wound up in 1945.

The New Zealand venture in combined intelligence synthesis during the war was a tri-service failure, largely because of different intelligence collection priorities on the part of the army and the air force. The CIB and the COIC were irrelevant to those two services. Combined tri-service intelligence was an illusion that never materialised. The unwillingness of the air force to commit itself early enough and army's slender participation reflected a short-sightedness on the part of the senior officers of those services.

The COIC was an extension of naval intelligence modelled in miniature on the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre run by the Naval Intelligence Division. This fusion model was useful in bringing together in one place a variety of collected operational intelligence, available for use by the service chiefs. The COIC did produce intelligence for the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff, and exchanged intelligence with overseas Allied intelligence authorities.

Combined intelligence only got off the ground in New Zealand with the assistance of the Kriegsmarine and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Strategic and operational necessity compelled action. The great northern focus subsequently reversed this trend. The Chiefs of Staff collectively were careless about external security, in that they preferred not to

draw conclusions about the incursions of the enemy inside the New Zealand three-mile limit.

The war in the ether, the procurement of over-the-horizon intelligence was naval driven, with a small and symbiotic army contribution. This was the high technology end of the intelligence war with cross-departmental and interservice co-operation that worked. It was built on a low-key foundation of co-operative practice between the Navy and the P&T Department going back to 1914, with development work on direction-finding in the twenties and thirties - the return of hostilities meant that the habits and skills of interception were up-graded and refined. The introduction of H/F D/F from 1936 and its operational test in the Munich crisis meant that Awarua was well prepared for war in 1939. This immediately paid off with the tracking of the *Admiral Graf Spee*. The reliance on P&T Department personnel for a pool of operators and the Department's technical equipment says a great deal about the relationship with the Navy in an area of real, if discreet, operational importance. The four H/F D/F stations of Awarua, Musick Point, Waipapakauri and Suva were joined by the REB station at Blenheim at the start of 1943.

Operationally, the H/F D/F network worked for the FECB up to 1942. In the transition that following FECB's withdrawal to Colombo and Kilindini, there was a switch to greater operational co-operation with the US Navy's FRUPAC in Honolulu and FRUMEL in Melbourne. The British connection remained significant, as the periodic visits by British naval intelligence officers attest, and the collaboration with Australia strengthened in certain respects.

Philpott's 'Y' organisation was established and expanded to exploit and co-ordinate the collection of intercepted enemy cable and wireless traffic. The addition of radio-fingerprinting provided a further dimension to the collection of location and identification intelligence on enemy vessels at sea. The introduction of a Special Intelligence section led into work on low grade naval codes and diplomatic traffic. The Army's Special Section at Nairnville Park fed into this effort and dealt directly with overseas recipients as well. The Special Intelligence section and the Army's Special Section analysis cell collaborated effectively in the attack on intercepted traffic.

While it is important not to exaggerate the New Zealand role in the war in the ether, nonetheless it was a considerable effort for a country lean in intelligence collection resources. Perhaps because it was technical and so discreet, there was good case for interservice co-operation, and partly because it was run by junior staff. The range of activity was relatively extensive and clearly valued by the British, the Americans and the Australians. The quality of the intelligence personnel was reflected on a number of them being seconded to intelligence posts overseas: MacKenzie to the AIB, Bennett to the Central Bureau, Carter to FRUMEL, and Jaynes and Studholme to HMS *Anderson* in Ceylon.

New Zealand's signals intelligence war was the foundation for this country's postwar development in signals intelligence, including participation with wartime allies, from the Holden and BRUSA agreements leading to the UKUSA umbrella of the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Signals intelligence was the most significant, if not the most important, intelligence collection activity of New Zealand in the intelligence war.

By contrast, coastwatching was a fundamental requirement and a great failure. Distance and demography set parameters that needed careful handling if progress was to be made in this relatively simple area. Yet there was an early attempt to wind down the fledgling organisation, only to have to reverse the process in late June 1940. While some progress in the setting up of stations was made, it was not long before the guard dropped again. The interweaving of line-of-sight posts with radar stations was heading in the right direction, if a trifle late. This was the area of intelligence collection with the largest cross-departmental and interservice involvement and proved to be the most ineffective. Enemy naval units repeatedly visited the New Zealand coast, and for the most part went unnoticed and untroubled, even off the main ports. The coastwatching organisation failed to fulfill its main task on the New Zealand coast, which is to condemn the watch but not the function.

Coastwatching in the islands was by contrast quite well executed with limited resources, and good operational intelligence was collected. The range of off-shore stations manned was impressive, stretching from the sub-Antarctic islands to the tropics. The rush to set up posts spoke of a lack of foresight and preparedness, even of desperation to have a trip-wire. Leaving coastwatchers to die in the Gilberts was not unavoidable.

The prospects for an independent security service were bleak from the start, although if the Police Department had carried out its internal security tasks properly, the perceived need to fill a hole might never have arisen. Significantly, the limits of the relationship between the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister sharpened with regard to internal security and the Police Commissioner, firstly with certain CIB intelligence

summaries, and then far more spectacularly with the SIB. The combination of a hostile Police Department and a security service headed by an ambitious Director made for trouble. The SIB was too small, had too few resources, took on too many tasks quickly, and proceeded rapidly to lose friends in high places, the last and most significant being the Prime Minister himself. The Ross affair handed the SIB over to the Police and severely embarrassed the Prime Minister, whose sensitivity to the very concept of a security service persisted ever after. Internal security intelligence became off limits for the service chiefs, by general agreement all round. The police, having decried the need for such a service, ran it themselves. This concedes the point of the requirement for such a service, albeit with a close collaborative relationship with the police. The vexed question of port security was never properly sorted out, and the Port Security organisation established was far too small. Throughout the war, the police declined to properly undertake their responsibilities in this area, through a general lack of concern for the safety of shipping.

Just as interesting was the question of the penetration of the government administration by enemy agents. Clearly the Germans and the Japanese had no success in this, but the Soviet Union did, to an extent yet to be finally measured. The Police Commissioner's obsession with the Communists was ironic, for he clearly failed to consider the possibilities in the top levels of government departments. The two suspected cases were in overseas posts, but it seems that the usual assumption of trustworthiness applied to those at home. Just how far the Soviet Union's intelligence services succeeded in their New Zealand penetrations remains to be seen, with Costello identified and other possibilities quite likely.

For the duration of the war, New Zealand did not have an effective security service. Aside from the problem of penetration and shipping security, this probably did not matter. However, prevention of penetration and port security were basic security tasks. The legacy of the SIB's debacle was the postponement of any effort to establish another such organisation for more than a decade after the cessation of hostilities.

The Navy's operational intelligence spread across the combined intelligence organisation, the signals intelligence organisation and coastwatching. The combined organisation was a partial success for a time in 1942 and 1943, signals intelligence was operationally effective, and coastwatching a local failure while useful offshore. What of the other two services' operational intelligence?

The Army's intelligence sections were effective in the field under operational formations. The main effort was in the Middle East, where the system for intelligence gathering within the 2nd New Zealand Division became finely honed after a hesitant start. The intelligence arrangements permitted the smooth passage of collected intelligence from division through brigade to battalions and vice versa. This said a good deal for the management of intelligence at the top by talented officers like Bell, Costello, Davin and Cox. Field security was competently managed both with operational units and in the base area in Egypt. Similar remarks can be made about the same efforts in the 3rd New Zealand Division, albeit on a far smaller scale. The Army's intelligence collection focus was tactical, as most of its energies and resources went into the overseas units.

At home, the field security sections fairly rapidly became redundant. The intelligence activities in the Home Guard were what might have been expected, though it

is fair to say that efforts were made to get to grips with the local area. The map-making activity within the Home Guard was most competent and filled in gaps.

Air intelligence hardly existed when New Zealand was most under threat during the war, then prospered with the burgeoning requirements of the formations committed to the forward area. While the move away from the COIC was inevitable given the direction air intelligence took, its organisation continued to expand. RNZAF intelligence ended the war with a core of highly experienced air intelligence officers, regarded well enough to be earmarked for greater responsibilities under South East Asia Command had not peace intervened. Although the RNZAF had no signals intelligence capability, it is interesting to observe the postwar thrust engaging in this area.

New Zealand's service intelligence organisations ran right across the intelligence spectrum, although there was no equivalent to an espionage body like MI6, and the security service might as well not have existed. The growth, performance and duration of the organisations varied. The most useful collectors were the signals intelligence units, the Army's intelligence sections with the 2nd Division, and RNZAF air intelligence from 1943 onwards. They were, by distance or by technology, detached from close control by the service chiefs. Least successful for particular reasons were the SIB and the coastwatching organisation, both subject to higher order interference. Where the services' operational focus was the determinant for intelligence requirements, the intelligence collection organisations were at their most effective. The strongest collectors had a dominant single service in support, while the weakest relied on interservice or interdepartmental co-operation.

Notes

Introduction

1. See Chapters 5-7.
2. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky KGB Hodder & Stoughton 1990; John Barron KGB Hodder & Stoughton 1974; Harry Rositzke The KGB Doubleday 1981.
3. David Kahn Hitler's Spies Hodder & Stoughton 1978; Andre Brissaud The Nazi Secret Service Bodley Head 1972; Ladislav Farago The Game of the Foxes Hodder & Stoughton 1972.
4. Ibid.
5. Bradley F. Smith The Ultra-Magic Deals Airlife 1993; Alan H. Bath Tracking the Axis Enemy University of Kansas Press 1998.
6. Nigel West (ed.) British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas St. Ermin's Press 1998.
7. Nigel West MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-45 Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1983; F.H. Hinsley et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War vols 1-III Part II HMSO 1981-1988.
8. Nigel West MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909-45 Bodley Head 1981; F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins British Intelligence in the Second World War vol. IV HMSO 1990.
9. Nigel West GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1983.
10. F.H. Hinsley et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War vol. I HMSO 1981.
11. Anthony Clayton Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps Brassey's 1993.
12. Nigel West Secret War: The Story of SOE Hodder & Stoughton 1992.
13. MI9, MEW, SIME, GCB, RSS and so forth.
14. See Desmond Ball and David Horner Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network Allen & Unwin 1998, Chapters 1-3.
15. Bradley F. Smith The Ultra-Magic Deals Airlife 1993.
16. Rupert Allason The Branch: A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch 1883-1983 Secker & Warburg 1983.
17. Kim Philby My Silent War Coronet 1967; Dusko Popov Spy Counter Spy Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1974; Nigel West (ed.) British Security Coordination St. Ermin's Press 1998.
18. There are areas of intelligence where there is still difficulty in piecing together the past, even after five or more decades have passed. Some of this is simply because large collections of source material were destroyed, or in other cases where matters remain closed off, for a variety of reasons. The work of the Berkeley Street branch of GCHQ, the Government Communications Bureau, has in the past been one of those, although much more is known now about its work on diplomatic traffic.
19. See Bradley F. Smith 'New Intelligence Releases: A British Side to the Story.' In Intelligence and National Security vol. 14 no. 1 Spring 1999, Richard J. Aldrich 'The Waldegrave Initiative and Secret Service Archives: New Materials and New Policies.' In Intelligence and National Security vol. 10 no. 1 January 1995, Robin Denniston 'Diplomatic Eavesdropping, 1922-44: A New Source Discovered.' In Intelligence and National Security vol. 10 no. 3 July 1995.
20. Releases of intelligence documentary materials in the United States represent the largest collections of declassified documents in the West.

21. There is a great diversity in intelligence memoirs, not merely because of the quality of the recollections, but also simply by the variety of intelligence organisations that can be found in a tiny sample, for instance: F.H.Hinsley, Kim Philby, Desmond Bristow, Dusko Popov, Nicholas Elliott, Gordon Welchman, John Cairncross, Robert Cecil, Ralph Bennett, Juan Pujol, Hugh Verity, John Masterman, Merlin Minshall: GCHQ, MI6, NKVD/KGB, the Abwehr, 'B' Division MI5 and the XX Committee, SOE, and NID.
22. Interception of communications has a very long history, and cable and wireless traffic are merely further extensions to previous practice.
23. 'Y' relates to wireless and cable interception work: there is a full discussion of the New Zealand 'Y' role in Part II of this thesis.
24. Initially, intercepted Enigma traffic produced as intelligence summaries was 'Boniface' material, the latter being an agent-type cover story, and was replaced by the term Ultra in June 1941. Boniface still continued to be used as well.
25. See Bradley F. Smith The Ultra-Magic Deals Airlife 1993.
26. It was the mass of corroborative evidence produced by the variety of sources that could be useful, not only for operations, but also in making further progress in reading other intercepted encrypted material (in providing cribs, for instance). It demanded the commitment of considerable resources: Bletchley Park had well over 6,000 personnel, growing from less than 100 just before the war; its little known offshoot in Berkeley Street had over 500 staff.
27. ISOS – Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey; ISK – Intelligence Service Knox: these were the summaries of German Military Intelligence traffic, the first being the hand ciphers, the second the machine ciphers. They assisted in the development of the Double-Cross system, the turning of the German agent offensive against Britain into a useful extension of British counter-espionage and deception, among other things.
28. See Hinsley and Simkins vol.IV of the Official History on British intelligence, and other publications, like John Masterman's The Double-Cross System, Nigel West and Juan Pujol's Garbo.
29. Ibid.
30. See the British Official History on intelligence, and numerous other works listed in the Bibliography.
31. B-Dienst, for example, made excellent progress in its war against British merchant and naval traffic.
32. Bradley F. Smith The Ultra-Magic Deals Airlife 1993, Alan H. Bath Tracking the Axis Enemy University of Kansas Press 1998, John Prados Combined Fleet Decoded Random House 1995.
33. See Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin The Mitrokhin Archive Allen Lane 1999; Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev The Crown Jewels Harper Collins 1998; John Costello and Oleg Tsarev Deadly Illusions Century 1993; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky KGB Hodder & Stoughton 1990; Genrikh Borovik and Phillip Knightley The Philby Files Little, Brown & Co. 1994; Desmond Ball and David Horner Breaking the Codes Allen & Unwin 1998; Nigel West Venona Harper Collins 1999.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ball and Horner; West Venona. Indeed, some Russian traffic continued to be intercepted beyond June 1941 even in New Zealand, and this was inevitable given the rising interest in Japanese diplomatic traffic and Japanese posts abroad.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Andrew and Gordievsky, Costello and Tsarev, West and Tsarev, Borovik and Knightley. Robert Cecil 'Philby's Spurious War.' In Intelligence and National Security vol.9 no.4 October 1994; Sheila Kerr 'KGB Sources on the Cambridge Network of Soviet Agents: True or False?' in Intelligence and National Security vol.11 no.3 July 1996; Sheila Kerr 'Familiar Fiction, not Untold Story.' In Intelligence and National Security vol.9 no.1 January 1994; Frank Cain 'Intelligence Writings in Australia.' In Intelligence and National Security vol.6 no.1 January 1991.
46. Philby is a classic case of misleading information creeping in, but for a purpose, in his book.
47. David Kahn The Codebreakers Sphere 1977.
48. Philby, op.cit.
49. The three most recent being Phillip Knightley Philby:KGB Master Spy Andre Deutsch 1988; Anthony Cave Brown Treason in the Blood Robert Hale 1995; Rufina Philby The Private Life of Kim Philby St.Ermin's Press 1999.
50. M.R.D.Foot SOE in France HMSO 1966.
51. John Masterman The Double Cross System Yale University Press 1972.
52. Ladislav Farago The Game of the Foxes Hodder & Stoughton 1972.
53. Dusko Popov Spy Counter Spy Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1974.
54. F.W. Winterbotham The Ultra Secret Dell 1974.
55. 1977.
56. Patrick Beesly Very Special Intelligence Hamish Hamilton 1977; Ronald Lewin Ultra Goes to War Hutchinson 1978.
57. Hinsley et al, op.cit. 1981.
58. Volumes IV and V on counterintelligence and deception.
59. This was clearly stated, and it seems that Far East material was less likely to surface in the near future from the perspective of the Official Historians on British intelligence in the early 1980s.
60. West, op.cit.
61. For example, Ralph Bennett Ultra in the Mediterranean Strategy Hamish Hamilton 1989; Peter Calvocoressi Top Secret Ultra Sphere 1981; Gordon Welchman The Hut Six Story:Breaking the Enigma Codes McGraw-Hill 1982; Alan Stripp Codebreaker in the Far East Oxford UP 1995; F.H.Hinsley and Alan Stripp Codebreakers – the Inside Story of Bletchley Park Oxford UP 1993.
62. Ronald Lewin The Other Ultra Hutchinson 1982; John Winton ULTRA in the Pacific Naval Institute Press 1993; Arthur Marder Old Friends, New Enemies vol.I Oxford

- UP 1981, and vol.II with Mark Jacobson and John Horsfield, Oxford UP 1990; Bradley F.Smith op.cit.
63. Bath and Prados, op.cit.
 64. D.M.Horner 'Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area in World War II.' In Australian Outlook vol.32 no.3 December 1978.
 65. Richard Hall The Rhodes Scholar Spy Random House 1991.
 66. D.M.Horner High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy, 1939-1945 Allen & Unwin 1982.
 67. Frank Cain The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia Angus & Robertson 1983.
 68. John W.Chapman 'Pearl Harbor: The Anglo-Australian Connection.' In Intelligence and National Security vol.4 no.3 July 1989.
 69. Christopher Andrew 'The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American Connection.' In Intelligence and National Security vol.4 no.2 April 1989.
 70. James Rusbridger and Eric Nave Betrayal at Pearl Harbor O'Mara Books 1991.
 71. Geoffrey Ballard On ULTRA Active Service Spectrum 1991.
 72. Jack Bleakley The Eavesdroppers Australian Government Publishing Service 1992.
 73. Babara Winter The Intrigue Master: Commander Long and Naval Intelligence in Australia 1913-1945 Boolarong Press 1995.
 74. Michael Bialoguski The Petrov Story Mandarin 1989; Robert Manne The Petrov Affair: Politics and Espionage Pergamon Press 1987.
 75. Hall op.cit.
 76. David McKnight Australia's Spies and Their Secrets Allen & Unwin 1994.
 77. Ball and Horner op.cit.
 78. Desmond Ball 'Over and Out: Signals Intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong.' In Intelligence and National Security vol.11 no.3 1996.
 79. O.A. Gillespie The Pacific War History Branch 1952.
 80. D.M.Davin Crete War History Branch 1953.
 81. S.D.Waters Royal New Zealand Navy War History Branch 1956 [henceforth referred to as Waters OH].
 82. S.D.Waters 'History of Naval Intelligence Organisation in New Zealand.'
 83. Michael Parker The SIS Dunmore Press 1979.
 84. Nicky Hager 'The Origins of Signals Intelligence in New Zealand.' University of Auckland Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no.5 1995; and Secret Power Craig Cotton Publishing 1996.
 85. Malcolm Templeton Top Hats Are Not Being Taken New Zealand Institute of International Affairs 1988.
 86. Ian McGibbon (ed.) Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters Between Carl Berendsen & Alister McIntosh 1943-1952 Auckland University Press 1993.

Chapter One – The Secretary and the ONS

1. Organisation for National Security, General, NA EA 1 81/6/1.
2. F.L.W.Wood The People at War War History Branch 1958 p.84; W.David McIntyre New Zealand Prepares for War University of Canterbury Press 1988 p.178.
3. ONS, General, NA EA 1 81/6/1.
4. McIntyre p.178, notes the ‘virtual competition’ for the new name; note that W.G.Stevens wanted it to be the National Security Council. Foss Shanahan commented that the title of the Organization for National Security was something of a misnomer. Noting its establishment in 1932 as the New Zealand Committee for Imperial Defence, its function was to co-ordinate and prepare the plans and the transition from peace to war. As the United Kingdom body was the Committee for Imperial Defence, it was decided in 1935 that the New Zealand organisation should be the Organization for National Security. In Britain when the war came, the CID became an integral part of the War Cabinet, responsible for the co-ordination of plans during hostilities. The ONS had a similar function in New Zealand. In 1943 it was noted that ‘We will continue to do this work, but under the more satisfactory title of [the] “New Zealand War Cabinet Secretariat”.’ – F.Shanahan to T.H.Donaldson, British Phosphate Commissioner, 19 March 1943, War Cabinet Secretariat, General, 1940-1945, NA EA 1 81/7/1.
5. ONS, General, NA EA 1 81/6/1; Wood p.86; McIntyre p.179.
6. W.G.Stevens ‘History of the Organisation for National Security.’ 4 June 1940, ONS, General, NA EA 1 81/6/1.
7. Ibid.
8. McIntyre p.180.
9. ONS, General, NA EA 1 81/6/1.
10. Ibid.
11. ONS List of Committees, 14 June 1938, ONS, General, NA EA 1 81/6/1.
12. Memorandum from Fraser to all Ministers, 18 September 1939, War Cabinet Secretariat, General, 1940-1945, NA EA 1 81/7/1
13. Ibid.
14. ONS Paper no.161, 21 August 1940 and ONS Paper no.162, 6 December 1940, NA EA 1 81/7/1; memorandum from Secretary ONS to Army HQ, Naval Secretary and Air Secretary, 14 September 1938, Central War Room & Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, NA EA 1 85/1/11; letter Secretary ONS, 14 September 1938, Formation & Functions of Intelligence Branch, NA AD 11 16/11.
15. ‘History of the Organisation for National Security.’ cont. 7 June 1940, ONS, General, NA EA 1 81/6/1.
16. ‘History of the Organization for National Security’ cont. 20 August 1940, ONS General, NA EA 1 81/6/1.
17. ‘History of the Organization for National Security’ cont. 7 June 1940, ONS General, NA EA 1 81/6/1.
18. Ibid.
19. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes, 23 January 1940, NA EA 1 81/4/2a.

20. Note of War Cabinet approval, 19 March 1943, War Cabinet Secretariat, General, 1940-1945, NA EA 1 81/7/1.
21. F.Shanahan to T.H.Donaldson, 19 March 1943, War Cabinet Secretariat, General, 1940-1945, NA EA 1 81/7/1.
22. Memorandum from Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs to Permanent Heads of Departments, 9 April 1943, War Cabinet Secretariat, General, 1940-1945, NA EA 1 81/7/1.
23. Memorandum from Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs to Permanent Heads of Departments, 9 April 1943, War Cabinet Secretariat, General, 1940-1945, NA EA 1 81/7/1; letter F.Shanahan to M.Nihotta, Belgian Consul-General, 14 May 1943, War Cabinet Secretariat, General, 1940-1945, NA EA 1 81/7/1.
24. I.McGibbon (ed.) Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters between Carl Berendsen & Alister McIntosh 1943-1952 Auckland U.P. 1993 p.1.
25. Ibid, pp.4-5.
26. New Zealand Who's Who Whitcombe & Tombs 1961 p.195.
27. Ibid, p.255.
28. Malcolm Templeton (ed.) An Eye, and Ear and a Voice: 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade 1993 p.72.
29. Ibid, p.80.
30. Ibid, p.36.
31. Ibid, p.37.

Chapter Two – Prewar Preparations

1. Memorandum from Senior Naval Officer, New Zealand Division, Royal Navy to Governor-General, 19 September 1914, Naval Intelligence Reports & Telegrams August 1914-December 1915 NA G 46/1; memorandum from Senior Naval Officer, New Zealand Division, Royal Navy to Commander R.A.Newton, Naval Intelligence Officer, 4 August 1914 NA N 1 13/8/4; cable from Governor-General to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 November 1917, NA N 1 13/8/4.
2. S.D Waters 'History of Naval Intelligence Organisation in New Zealand.' This draft document was compiled by Waters as a New Zealand contribution to the New Zealand section of the secret history of naval intelligence compiled by the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty. This latter adaption was PRO ADM 223/494 Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, Internal History, New Zealand Section. The Admiralty adaption is hand written and is a less full account summarising Water's draft. Water's 'History of Naval Intelligence Organisation in New Zealand' is henceforth referred to as Waters HNIO. A copy of Water's draft with amendments is retained by author.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Memorandum from Commodore Beal to Naval Board, 25 August 1925, Intelligence Centres, Wellington 1921-1939 NA N 1 08/1/1; Waters HNIO.
6. Memorandum from PM to Governor-General, 26 August 1925, Intelligence Centres, Wellington 1921-1939 NA N 1 08/1/1, confirms this situation; Waters HNIO.
7. Memorandum from Commodore Swabey, 15 March 1927, Intelligence Centres Wellington 1921-1939 NA N 1 08/1/1; Waters HNIO.
8. Memorandum from Chief Staff Officer to Minister of Defence, 8 April 1927, Intelligence Centres, Wellington 1921-1939 NA N 1 08/1/1; Waters HNIO.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Memorandum from PM to Govenor-General, 27 April 1927, Intelligence Centres Wellington 1921-1939 NA N 1 08/1/1; Waters HNIO.
12. Memorandum from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Governor-General, 12 August 1927, Intelligence Centres Wellington 1921-1939 NA N 1 08/1/1; Waters HNIO.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Waters HNIO.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. A telegram notes some concerns with the possibility of incoming communications being compromised through Reporting Officers failing to observe 'revised procedures' in sending Movements Forms – in this case, HMB Consul in Papeete, but notes others as well. Telegram from Staff Officer (Intelligence) Wellington (SO(I)) to Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), Admiralty, 1 August 1939, Intelligence Centres Wellington NA N 1 08/1/1; Waters HNIO.
20. Waters HNIO; F.H.Hinsley, E.E.Thomas, C.F.G.Ransome & R.C.Wright British Intelligence in the Second World War HMSO 1979 vol.1 p.40; Arthur Marder Old

Friends, New Enemies: the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy – Strategic Illusions 1936-1941 Clarendon Press 1981 vol.1 p.357; Nigel West GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War Coronet 1987 p.137.

21. Waters HNIO.
22. Naval Intelligence Reports & Telegrams August 1914-December 1915.
23. Waters HNIO.
24. Ibid.
25. Waters HNIO; S.D.Waters Royal New Zealand Navy War History Branch 1956 p.435 – the Royal New Zealand Navy Official History: hereafter referred to as Waters OH.
26. WatersHNIO.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. W.G.Stevens 'Recall Without Repining.' Unpublished MSS Alexander Turnbull Library Acc.84-86 p.116.
30. 17 March 1938, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA N 1 08/1/18.
31. Combined Intelligence Committee meeting, 29 March 1938, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA N 1 08/1/18.
32. Combined Intelligence Committee meeting, 28 April 1938, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA N 1 08/1/18.
33. Ibid.
34. Combined Intelligence Committee meeting, 4 May 1938, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA N 1 08/1/18.
35. Ibid.
36. ONS Minute 5 May 1938, Central War Room and Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (CWR and COIC) NA EA 1 85/1/11.
37. Combined Intelligence Committee meeting, 16 June 1938, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA N 1 08/1/18.
38. Ibid.
39. Combined Intelligence Committee meeting, 14 July 1938, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA N 1 08/1/18.
40. Combined Intelligence Committee meeting, 18 July 1938, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA N 1 08/1/18.
41. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to Naval Secretary, Army Headquarters [sic] and Air Secretary, 6 September 1938, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11
42. Ibid.
43. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to Naval Secretary, Army Headquarters [sic] and Air Secretary, 14 September 1938, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11; extract from letter from Secretary ONS, 14 September 1938, Formations and Functions of Intelligence Branch GHQ NA AD 11 16/11.
44. Extract from COS Committee Minutes, 19 September 1938, NA AD 16/11.
45. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to Naval Secretary, 28 January 1939 and memorandum from Secretary ONS to Naval Secretary, Army Headquarters and Air Secretary, 30 January 1939, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Memorandum from Police Commissioner to Secretary ONS, 21 June 1939, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.

50. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to Police Commissioner, 5 July 1939, CWR
and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.

Chapter Three - The Outbreak of War and the CIB

1. Waters, OH p.435.
2. Waters, HNIO.
3. Ibid.
4. Chiefs of Staff meeting 16 December 1938, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA E 1 81/4/3.
5. 'Report of Progress in Naval Defence for Period ended 8 October 1939.' New Zealand-Australia War Intelligence Liaison 1938-1940 NA EA 1 84/3/37.
6. Ibid. (Distribution was to the Minister of Defence, Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, Secretary ONS, CGS, CNS, CAS, Governor of Fiji, High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, and Australian Government.)
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. This was now re-titled as 'Navy Office Weekly Report and Intelligence Summary.' 17 December 1939, New Zealand-Australia War Intelligence Liaison 1938-1940 NA EA 1 84/3/37.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Waters OH pp.119-120; 20 June 1940, 5 July 1940, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes NA EA 1 81/4/2a.
13. Waters OH p.436.
14. Ibid, p.435.
15. Ibid, p.436; Waters HNIO.
16. Meeting on the Formation of a Combined Intelligence Centre, 16 August 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
17. Ibid, enclosure with the above meeting, entitled 'Sources of Naval Intelligence.'
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Letter from Lieutenant Commander Alderton to Secretary ONS 20 August 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
32. Letter from Squadron Leader Grundy to Secretary ONS 20 August 1940, and letter from Lieutenant Commander Alderton to Secretary ONS 20 August 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
33. Report by Combined Intelligence Committee, ONS Paper no.157, 6 September 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
34. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to Police Commissioner, 12 September 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
35. Ibid.

36. Ibid, annotation by Secretary ONS on file copy.
37. Waters HNIO.
38. Ibid.
39. Waters OH p.441.
40. Waters HNIO; Central War Room, Wellington, Draft Orders, October 1940 CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
41. Central War Room, Wellington, Draft Orders, October 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11. ..
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid. These personnel were: the CNS, 2nd Naval Member, SO(O&I), Merchant Shipping Officer, SSO, Port W/T Officer (Philpott's euphemistic temporary title), RNZAF Duty Officer or Air 1 who would inform CAS; and if the Army, CGS and GSO1.
44. Central War Room, Wellington, Draft Orders, October 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
45. Ibid.
46. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Secretary ONS 17 December 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
47. Telegram from PM Wellington to PM Canberra, 4 October 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 85/1/11.
48. Memorandum from CNS to RAN CNS, 11 October 1940; letter from RAN CNS to CNS NZ, 12 October 1940, CWR and COIC NA EA 1 85/1/11.
49. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to PM's Private Secretary 7 May 1941: this pointed to the enclosure of the CIB Weekly Intelligence Summaries nos.1-8 for Mr.Nash, and noted that 'No.2 was suppressed by direction of the Rt.Hon. the Prime Minister.' NA N 1 08/6/14 Intelligence Reports: New Zealand Naval Intelligence Summaries.
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134. DS 27-28 May 1942, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
135. DS 28-29 May 1942, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
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139. DS 1-2 June 1942, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
140. DS 2-3 June 1942, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
141. DS 3-4 June 1942, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
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145. DS 18-19 June 1942, COIC Daily Summaries; Waters OH pp.217-218.
146. DS 20-21 June 1942, COIC Daily Summaries.
147. Waters HNIO.
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149. enclosure 3 signed Commander R.Laird 1 May 1943, from C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet to Admiralty, PRO ADM 223/496.
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151. Ibid.
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154. NZDF Base Records, Personal File, Alan H.Carter, and personal information given to author.
155. Signal ACNB to NZNB (R) Admiralty, CinC Eastern Fleet, C/S Kilindini 18 November 1942, PRO ADM 223/496; Enclosure no.3 from C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet, signed Commander R.Laird 1 May 1943, to Admiralty, PRO ADM 223/496.
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163. Ibid.

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168. Ibid.
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Chapter Six – REB: Radio Fingerprinting

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6. Ludovic Kennedy Pursuit Collins 1974 p.33; Hinsley op.cit. vol.1 p.340; Patrick Beesly Very Special Intelligence Sphere Books 1978 p.111; Minshall p.227.
7. Signal in Beesly pp.111-112.
8. Minshall p.227
9. Hinsley vol.1 pp.342-343.
10. Ibid p.344.
11. Ibid p.339.
12. Marder vol.1 p.359 letter J.W. McClelland to Marder 26 February 1979. Captain McClelland was administratively in charge of the RFP/REB unit at Kranji and the H/F D/F stations.
13. Francis 'History of the Special Intelligence Organisation...' op.cit. May 1979.
14. RCN, S-1440-18 1942.
15. Ibid, 1942 pp.7-8: TINA.
16. Hinsley vol.1 p.271 fn.
17. RCN, S-1440-18 1942 p.2 and OIC.3 Japanese p.2.
18. Ibid, p.5, and W/T 1943 p.1.
19. Canadian Report on US-British Radio Intelligence Conference, 6-16 April 1942, in Washington DC, National Archives Canada, NAC RG 24 vol.3806, 1008.75.20.
20. Ibid, discussions on 10 April on RFP and TNIA.
21. RCN, S-1440-18 1942-1943.
22. Ibid, Appendix on German W/T p.3.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Minshall p.236.
26. Minute from SO(Y) on 'REB Station at Blenheim.' 15 September 1942, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
27. Ibid.
28. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Minister of Defence 18 September 1942, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid, notice of War Cabinet approval 8 October 1942.
34. Interviews with Mrs. B Longuet 6 March 1993, Mrs. Phillipa Corkill 6 March 1993, Mrs. Marguerite Scott 18 March 1993, Mrs. Marion Murdoch 10 February 1993, Mrs. Nell Collie 15 August 1993 [last a telephone interview].
35. Ibid.
36. Philpott PF.

37. Letter from Marguerite Scott to author 1 March 1993.
38. Scott interview 18 March 1993.
39. Ibid.
40. Marder vol.1 p.359, letter McClelland to Marder 26 February 1979.
41. Minute from SO(Y) ,12 November 1942, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
42. Minute from Lieutenant M.T. Minshall, 12 November 1942, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
43. Scott letter 1 March 1993.
44. Plan for REB Station Blenheim, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
45. Minute from Lieutenant Minshall, 30 November 1942, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
46. Ibid.
47. Longuet interview 6 March 1993.
48. Scott interview 18 March 1993.
49. Orders for Naval W/T Station Raupara (Blenheim), Appendix V, Technical Instructions & Notes for Classifiers on 'Z' Procedure. Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
50. Ibid.
51. Orders for Naval W/T Station... Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
52. Longuet, Corkill, Scott, Murdoch, Collie interviews.
53. Scott letter 1 March 1993.
54. Orders for Naval W/T Station... Appendix V. Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17; Longuet, Corkill, Scott, Murdoch interviews.
55. Longuet, Corkill, Scott, Murdoch interviews.
56. Scott letter 1 March 1993.
57. Orders for Naval W/T... Appendix V, and Stores List Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17; letter from Mrs. B. Longuet 4 July 1993; Scott letter 1 March 1993; Collie interview; Marder vol.1 p.357 fn. Letter McClelland to Marder 26 February 1979.
58. Orders for Naval W/T... Appendix V. Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
59. Frank Barlow 'Awarua Radio (ZLB) – the RNW Connection.'; Collie interview.
60. Orders for Naval W/T... Appendix V p.2. Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
61. Ibid.
62. Waters HNIO.
63. Scott interview.
64. Hanson Papers, copy of US National Archives Washington, RG 457, NSA, US Naval Messages SRNS-1518, naval intelligence report 25 January 1943. Also RG 457, NSA SRH-036/144: message intercepted on 24 January reads:
From: STAFF GUADALCANAL OPERATIONS FORCE
To: CHIYODA BASE GUADALCANAL
2ND COMM DET KAMIMBO
THE EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL BY THE SUBMARINE I-2 ON THE 26TH, I-17 ON THE 27TH, AND THE I-1 ON THE 29TH IS CANCELLED.

Whether this message was passed in time is uncertain, and whether it was taken to give an indication of activity by submarines is a moot point. The cancelled message may simply have been to do with pulling troops out, but not with interfering with the supply runs to the Solomons. Given the propensity of the Japanese submarine commanders to

use their radios, it was more probable that H/F D/F and REB would pick up the enemy at night. Certainly submarines were being located and identified as separate vessels during this period – the New Zealand stations and the RNZN may have coincidentally got lucky with the I-1 on the night of 29 January 1943.

65. DS 25/26 January 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
66. DS 31 January/1 February 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11; Waters OH pp.218, 307-309.
67. W.J. Holmes Double-Edged Secrets Naval Institute Press 1979 pp.123-124; Winter p.213; Boyd & Yoshida p.105.
68. Elphick pp.384, 479 fn.
69. Minute from SO(Y) to SSO, 3 February 1943, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
70. NOIC Wellington to Naval Secretary, 24 February 1943, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
71. Longuet, Corkill, Scott, Collie interviews.
72. Ibid.
73. Minute from SO(Y), 25 February 1943, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
74. Ibid.
75. Minute from SO(Y), 27 February 1943, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
76. Ibid, annotation of SSO underneath.
77. DS 22/23 February 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11; Waters OH p.219.
78. DS 23/24 February 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11; Scott interview.
79. DS 25/26 February 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
80. DS 28 February/1 March 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
81. Marion Pitt's Diary 1943-1944 (hence referred to as MPD), entries for 23, 24, 25 March 1943.
82. Enclosure no.3 from C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet to Admiralty, signed Commander R.Laird, 1 May 1943, PRO ADM 223/496.
83. DS's April-May 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
84. DS 11/12 April 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
85. MPD 3 June 1943.
86. Ibid, 4 June 1943.
87. Ibid, 22 June 1943.
88. Ibid, 23 July 1943.
89. Ibid, 28 July 1943.
90. Ibid, 29 July 1943.
91. Ibid, 30 July 1943.
92. DS 7/8 August 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
93. MPD, 8 September 1943.
94. Ibid, 28 September 1943.
95. Ibid, 30 September 1943.
96. DS 1/2 October 1943, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
97. MPD 4 November 1943; Waters OH p.220; 3/4 November 1943, Report of Submarine in Cook Strait NA N 1 16/8/44.

98. MPD 1-2 January 1944.
99. Ibid, 8 January 1944.
100. Repeated correspondence by Dosser with the Naval Secretary, 1942-1944, NA N 1 10/7/17.
101. DS 15/16 January 1944, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
102. Minute of SO(Y), 22 January 1944, NA N 1 10/7/17.
103. MPD 27 January 1944.
104. Ibid 31 January 1944.
105. Ibid 11 February 1944.
106. Ibid 12 February 1944.
107. Ibid 16 February 1944.
108. Longuet interview.
109. MPD 17 February 1944.
110. Ibid 18 February 1944.
111. Ibid 22 February 1944.
112. Ibid 1 March 1944.
113. SOO to CNS, 1 March 1944, Submarine Attack on *Rangitira* NA N 1 16/8/46.
114. DS 4/5 March 1944, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
115. DS 7/8 March 1944, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
116. DS 8/9 March 1944, COIC Daily Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/11.
117. MPD 10 March 1944.
118. Minute from SSO to CNS, 11 April 1944, Blenheim W/T Station NA N 1 10/7/17.
119. Ibid, annotation by CNS.
120. MPD 28 April 1944.
121. Ibid 2 May 1944.
122. Ibid 3 May 1944.
123. Ibid 4 May 1944.
124. Ibid 5 May 1944.
125. Return on Permanent Loaned Stores, now located at H.M.Dockyard Lower Hutt; Holland-Goodwin interview.
126. RCN, S-1440-18 1944 p.8.
127. Ibid.
128. Waters HNIO.

Chapter Seven – Army Y

- 1 Mr. Neville Barnaby interview with author, 16 June 1992.
- 2 Colin Hanson MSS: the late Ken MacKenzie was interviewed by Colin Hanson.
- 3 Talk with Colin Hanson.
- 4 Kenneth MacKenzie: NZDF BaseRecords Personal File.
- 5 Colin Hanson; Neville Barnaby 16 June 1992.
- 6 MacKenzie PF.
- 7 29 June 1942, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes, NA EA I 81/4/2a.
- 8 Colin Hanson.
- 9 Army Signals Company November 1942-September 1943, NA WAI 1 Z49/1/1-11; Colin Hanson.
- 10 Iris Latham The WAACs Story Reed p.107.
- 11 Special Section Notes for November 1942, Army Signals Company, NA WAI 1 Z49/1/1-3.
- 12 Special Section Notes for December 1942, Army Signals Company, NA WAI 1 Z49/1/1-3.
- 13 Hanson Papers, MacKenzie's notes on Katakana.
- 14 Ibid.
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- 20 Special Section Notes for December 1942, Army Signals Company, NA WAI 1 Z49/1/1-11.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Barnaby interview, 16 June 1992.
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- 24 Letter 11 June 1943, MacKenzie PF.
- 25 MacKenzie interview with Colin Hanson.
- 26 MacKenzie interview with Colin Hanson; Neville Barnaby 16 June 1992: Barnaby estimated the Special Section strength around 60.
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- 32 MacKenzie interview with Colin Hanson.
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- 34 MacKenzie interview with Colin Hanson.
- 35 Letter Gilbert Lennox-King to John Tonkin-Covell 4 November 1992.
- 36 MacKenzie interview with Colin Hanson; Barber & Lord p.109.

- 37 Colin Hanson.
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- 40 MacKenzie interview with Colin Hanson.
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- 42 MacKenzie interview with Colin Hanson.
- 43 Ibid.
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- 45 New Zealand Army Efficiency Decoration, 3 May 1954, MacKenzie PF.
- 46 Memorandum from NZLO to Army General Staff, Wellington, 9 November 1945, MacKenzie PF.
- 47 In possession of Colin Hanson.
- 48 New Zealand Army Efficiency Decoration, 3 May 1954, MacKenzie PF.
- 49 Affidavit sworn by MacKenzie 3 April 1946, MacKenzie PF.
- 50 Letter Ken Coates to John Tonkin-Covell 20 December 1993.
- 51 Letter Ken Coates to John Tonkin-Covell 20 December 1993; anon. 2NZEF in the Pacific Reed 1960 p.258.
- 52 Letter Ken Coates to John Tonkin-Covell 20 December 1993; anon. 2NZEF in the Pacific p.258.

Chapter Eight – Coastwatching – New Zealand’s Shores

1. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Secretary, Admiralty, 11 November 1937, Coastwatching Organisation, War 1939-40 NA N 2 030/19/1; Waters HNIO; D.O.W.Hall Coastwatchers Episodes and Studies Series, War History Branch 1951 p.3.
2. Waters HNIO.
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4. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to GOC, 30 December 1936, Coastwatching Organisation, War 1939-40 NA N 2 030/19/1.
5. Waters HNIO.
6. Ibid.
7. 29 October 1937, 17 June 1938, Coastwatching Committee Minutes NA EA 1 94/2/3.
8. Waters HNIO.
9. Ibid; Narrative of Coastwatching Services in the Pacific – Hall MSS NA WAI 1 DA401.364/1; Hall The Coastwatchers p.3.
10. Waters HNIO.
11. Ibid: draft lists 62 stations, the breakdown given here, whereas 59 posts are listed, 12 June 1940, ONS Papers NA EA 1 81/6/2; Hall MSS p.2 NA WAI 1 DA401.364/1.
12. The divergence in figures is between Waters HNIO and 24 June 1940 Coastwatching Committee, ONS Papers NA EA 1 81/6/2.
13. Supplementary List of Stations 1940, Coastwatching Committee, ONS Papers NA EA 1 81/6/2.
14. Guide to Personnel Engaged in Coastwatching Duties, 14 September 1938, Coastwatching Committee, ONS Papers NA EA 1 81/6/2.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
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19. Copy of Communications Orders, War Signals Station Stephens Island, NA N 1 10/9/9.
20. Hall The Coastwatchers p.3.
21. German Naval Operations in Australasia: “Orion” Ship 36. Translation Admiralty PR.23764, 13/14 June 1940, US National Archives, RG 457 NSA acc.no.3109N Box 10 CX.CMG 1150.
22. Waters OH p.120.
23. German Naval Operations in Australasia: “Orion” Ship 36. Translation Admiralty PR.23764, 13/14 June 1940, US National Archives, RG 457 acc.no.3109N Box 10 CX.CMG 1150; Waters OH photograph of *Orion’s* chart between pages 118-119; ‘Coastwatching Position as at 12 June 1940’ Appendix to ONS Paper no.151, ONS Papers NA EA 1 81/6/2; see also A.K.Muggenthaler German Raiders of World War II Robert Hale 1978 pp.171-173.
24. 26 February 1941, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA EA 1 81/6/2.
25. Minute from SA/SO to SO (O&I), 21 April 1941, War Signal Station Stephens Island NA N 1 10/9/9.
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29. Quoted in Waters Raiders p.27.
30. Ibid, p.29.
31. Ibid, pp.29-30; Waters OH p.157.
32. Waters OH p.157.
33. Report of Major C.A.Williamson, Deputy Fire Commander, 26 June 1941, Suspicious Vessels and Signalling NA N 2 016/22/15.
34. Ibid.
35. Report of Captain Mathers, Duty Officer at Fire Commander's Post, Beacon Hill, 26 June 1941, Suspicious Vessels and Signalling NA N 2 016/22/15.
36. Report of Lance Bombardier Blackett, Forward Observation Post, Baring Head, 26 June 1941, Suspicious Vessels and Signalling NA N 2 016/22/15.
37. Ibid.
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39. From deck log of *Achilles*, 26 June 1941, Movements of H.M.Ships – HMNZS *Achilles*; Jasper Harker HMNZS *Achilles* Hodder & Stoughton 1976 p.161.
40. Memorandum from NOIC Wellington to Naval Secretary, 26 June 1941, Suspicious Vessels and Sightings 016/22/15.
41. Minute, 1 July 1941, Suspicious Vessels and Sightings 016/22/15.
42. Minute from Naval Secretary to NOIC Wellington, CGS, CAS, 2 July 1941, Suspicious Vessels and Sightings 016/22/15.
43. Jenkins pp.41-42; Waters OH pp.214-215.
44. Appendix, list of coastwatching stations, ONS Paper no.155, 12 June 1940, ONS NA EA 1 81/6/2.
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47. George Meredith's report, 13 March 1942, sighting from HMS *Viti*, and two signals 15 and 19 March 1942, Suspicious Vessels and Sightings NA N 2 016/22/15; GIS no.13, 28 November 1944, COIC General Intelligence Summary, Intelligence General NA AIR 120 5.
48. Ibid; Lincoln Vincent 'Enemy Overhead.' in NZ Aviation Historical Society Journal August 1991.
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55. Ibid.
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57. Mr.V.E.Jaynes interview with author, 16 July 1993.
58. Signal NOCA to NOW 1930M/27 March 1942, Suspicious Vessels, Reports of Sightings NA N 2 08/31/3.
59. Signal NOCA to NOW 2052M/1 April 1942, Suspicious Vessels, Reports of Sightings NA N 2 08/31/3.
60. Signal NOCA to NOW 1713 hours 3 April 1942, NOW to NOCA 2027 hours 3 April 1942, Suspicious Vessels, Reports of Sightings NA N 2 08/31/3.

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62. Signal NOCW to NOW 0015 hours, 20 June 1942, Submarine Activities in Cook Strait NA N 1 16/8/37.
63. Signal NZNB to COMSOPAC 1020 hours, 20 June 1942, Submarine Activities in Cook Strait NA N 1 16/8/37.
64. Signal US Auckland to Cypher Office 1245 hours, 20 June 1942, Submarine Activities in Cook Strait NA N 1 16/8/37...
65. Signal NOCW to NOW 1630 hours, 20 June 1942, Submarine Activities in Cook Strait NA N 1 16/8/37.
66. Memorandum from NOCW to Naval Secretary, 20 June 1942, Submarine Activities in Cook Strait NA N 1 16/8/37.
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72. Minute from NI (1) to DNI, 11 July 1945, Defence of New Zealand and Pacific Islands, Coastwatching NA N 1 20/9.
73. Chiefs of Staff Paper no.133, 25 May 1842, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Air Observer Corps NA EA 1 94/1/3.
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91. Ross p.115; RDF Organisation NA N 2 030/72/5.
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96. Ross p.116; I.M.Sexton Radar Stories Air Force Radar 1993 pp.1-10.
97. Sexton pp.1-10; Ross p.117.
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99. DS no.435, 26/27 February 1943, NA EA 1 84/3/11.
100. DS no.436 27/28 February 1943, NA EA 1 84/3/11.
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103. Sexton pp.1-10.
104. 30 April 1944, Section VIII Communications, Radar, Royal New Zealand Navy and Naval Facilities in New Zealand, Naval Historical Section, RA-G-20 Department of Defence, Canberra.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. 30 April 1944, Section IX New Zealand Naval Intelligence, and Section XI Coastwatching, Royal New Zealand Navy and Naval Facilities in New Zealand, Naval Historical Section, RA-G-20, Department of Defence, Canberra.

Chapter Nine – Coastwatching: The Islands

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2. Gillespie p.228; interview with Mr. Nelson Dyett by Mr. Dale Williamson; letter from High Commissioner for Western Pacific, Suva, to Chief Magistrate, Pitcairn Island 17 November 1941, War 1939-1941, Codes and Cyphers, Procedures, NA N 2 030/33/13.
3. COS Paper no.36, 16 February 1940, Intelligence, Operational, Suvarov Group, NA AIR 1 132/13/1.
4. Memorandum from Air Department to Engineer-in-Chief Public Works Department, 13 August 1940, and memorandum from Director-General GPO Wellington to Public Works Department, 27 August 1940, Suvarov NA W 1 23/434/14.
5. Message no.9 from Williamson to Summit Wellington, 29 December 1940, Suvarov NA W 1 23/434/14.
6. Message no.21 from Williamson to Summit Wellington, 30 January 1940, Suvarov NA W 1 23/434/14.
7. Ellenden notes located by Dale Williamson.
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9. Memorandum from Resident Commissioner, Rarotonga to Secretary Cook Islands Department, 13 August 1943, Coastwatching Pacific NA N 1 20/8.
10. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs 7 April 1948, Coastwatching Pacific NA N 1 20/8.
11. ONS memorandum, 28 June 1940, Coastwatching Services NA AD 1 340/1/1.
12. Signal DNI Wellington to DNI Admiralty, DNI Melbourne, COS Colombo, 30 January 1942, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Chatham Is. NA N 2 08/10/19.
13. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to PM, 9 June 1942, War, Defence of Pacific, Chatham Is. Coastwatching NA EA 1 82/22/4; War Cabinet approval, 23 June 1942, Coastwatching, Pacific Islands, Coastwatching Stations Chatham Islands NA N 1 20/8/3.
14. Memorandum from QMG to COIC, 28 April 1944, Coastwatching, Pacific Islands, CW Stations, Chatham Is. NA N 1 20/8/3; Narrative of Coastwatching Service NA WAI DA401.364/1.
15. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Army Secretary, 21 March 1944, and memorandum from Naval Secretary to NOIC Wellington, 24 July 1944, Coastwatching, Pacific Islands, CW Stations, Chatham Is. NA N 1 20/8/3.
16. Letter from Minister of Industries & Commerce to Minister of Marine, 8 September 1938, with Walker's report and Folkes's letter, War, Defence of Pacific, Auckland Islands, General NA EA 1 86/8 1.
17. Letters from F.R. Field to Governor-General, 5 April and 11 May 1939, War Defence of Pacific, Auckland Islands, General NA EA 1 86/8 1.
18. Chiefs of Staff Committee Paper, 10 July 1939, War Defence of Pacific, Auckland Islands, General NA EA 1 86/8 1.

19. Waters OH p.75.
20. Ibid.
21. Signal from DNI Wellington to DNI Admiralty (R) DNI Melbourne, Captain on the Staff Colombo 1802 hours, 30 January 1942, Intelligence, Pacific, Chatham Is. NA N 2 08/10/19; Narrative of Coastwatching Services p.2, NA WAI DA401.364/1; also Commission of Enquiry into Losses of Merchant Ships, 7 May 1942, NA N Series 1 22/5/58.
22. Narrative of Coastwatching Service p.2, NA WAI DA401.364/1; Hall MSS; and Hall The Coastwatchers War History Branch 1954.
23. Memorandum from CNS to Secretary ONS, 31 December 1940, and War Cabinet approval, 21 January 1941, War, Defence of Pacific, Auckland Is., General, NA EA 1 86/8/1.
24. Narrative of Coastwatching Service NA WAI DA401.364/1, and Hall MSS; Bruce Evetts "Coastwatching in the Auckland Islands 1941-1942." in Historical Review (Bay of Plenty Journal of History) vol.40 no.2 November 1992.
25. Ibid.
26. Waters OH pp.75-76.
27. Narrative of Coastwatching Service NA WAI DA401.364/1 and Hall MSS; Dale Williamson MSS.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid; and memorandum from Naval Secretary to Army Secretary 25 July 1941 War 1939-1941, W/T & Communications, Control of W/T and Coastwatching in South Pacific NA N 2 030/33/17.
34. Communication Advisory Committee Meetings, 31 January and 3 February 1941, Controller of Pacific Communications, NA EA 1 86/1/14.
35. Ibid.
36. Letter from Mr.W.R. Newall to Secretary ONS, 5 February 1941, Communication Advisory Committee, Controller of Pacific Communications, NA EA 86/1/14.
37. ONS Paper no.169, 19 March 1940 [NOTE wrong date on file copy: should be 1941], Controller of Pacific Communications, NA EA 1 86/1/14; ONS Paper no.170, 19 March 1941, ONS Papers, NA EA 1 81/6/2.
38. Ibid.
39. Warrant for Appointment of Controller of Pacific Communications, 28 June 1941, Controller of Pacific Communications NA EA 1 86/1/14.
40. Narrative of Coastwatching Service NA WAI DA401.364/1 and Hall MSS.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Report summary from R. Third to DNI Wellington, 28 December 1940, Operations, W/T and Communications, Ocean Is. NA N 1 16/12/21.
44. Signal from Resident, Ocean Is. to SO(I) Wellington (R) DNI Melbourne, 1655hours 21 November 1940, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Japanese Mandated Islands 1940-1943 NA N 2 08/10/20.

45. Signal from SO(I) Wellington to Captain on the Staff, Singapore, C-in-C. China Station, (R) DNI Melbourne, 21 November 1940, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Japanese Mandated Islands 1940-1943 NA N 2 08/10/20.
46. Signal from Admiralty to SO(I) Wellington (R) Captain on the Staff, Singapore, DNI Melbourne, C-in-C. China Station, 1840hours 27 November 1940, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Japanese Mandated Islands 1940-1943 NA N 2 08/10/20.
47. Signal SO(I) Wellington to Resident Ocean Is., 1231hours 29 November 1940, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Japanese Mandated Islands 1940-1943 NA N 2 08/10/20.
48. Signal from Resident Ocean Is. to SO(I) Wellington, 3 December 1940, Operations, W/T and Communications Ocean Is. NA N 1 16/12/21.
49. Report by R.Third, 28 December 1940, and minute from SA/SO, 23 February 1941, Operations, W/T and Communications Ocean Is. NA N 1 16/12/21.
50. Waters OH pp.144-149; 7 May 1941, Commission of Enquiry into losses of Merchant Shipping NA N Series 1 22/5/58
51. Narrative of Coastwatching Service NA WAI DA401.364/1; Don Vaughan Report on Coastwatching Radio Stations in the Gilbert & Ellice Islands 1941-1945. DV print 1990.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Vaughan , Report...., part 9 p.2.
55. Narrative of Coastwatching Services p.10, NA WAI DA401.364/1.
56. Memorandum from Paymaster Commander T.E. Nave, Melbourne to SO(I) Wellington, 5 September 1941, Codes & Cyphers 1939-1941 NA N 2 030/33/13.
57. Mr. D. Vaughan interview with author, 14 July 1995; Vaughan Report...., part 17 p.1.
58. Vaughan Report...., part 11 p.1.
59. Ibid, part 11 p.2; Narrative of Coastwatching Service p.12 NA WAI DA401.364/1; Gillespie p.233.
60. Report on visit of Prime Minister to Fiji and Tonga, dated 31 December 1941, Control of W/T and Coastwatching, NA N 2 030/38/17.
61. Ibid.
62. Narrative of Coastwatching Service p.18 NA WAI DA401.364/1.
63. Vaughan Report...., part 15 p.1; note the small vessel *Degei* had made a supply trip through the Gilbert & Ellice Is. in February 1942, dropping off Tom Murray on Beru. Murray was to suffer the same fate as Taylor.
64. Narrative of Coastwatching Service p.13 NA WAI DA401.364/1; Gillespie pp.234-236.
65. Narrative of Coastwatching Service p.13 NA WAI DA401.364/1.
66. Vaughan Report...., part 17 p.3.
67. Narrative of Coastwatching Service p.14 NA WAI DA401.364/1.
68. Vaughan Papers, memorandum from Controller of Pacific Communications, Suva, to Naval Secretary 3 October 1942: Steel quotes Vaughan's report.
69. Narrative of Coastwatching Service p.15 NA WAI DA401.364/1.
70. Vaughan Papers: a collection of monthly reports from the parent station ZJU at Funafuti in the Ellice Islands, entitled 'Report on Communications, Personnel and

Equipment in the Ellice Islands for the Month of September 1942' dated 12 October 1942.

71. Ibid, monthly reports.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid, 'Report... August 1942', radio schedules, dated 3 September 1942.
74. Ibid, 'Report... July 1942', dated 5 August 1942.
75. Ibid, 'Report... August 1942', dated 3 September 1942.
76. Ibid, 'Report... September 1942', dated 12 October 1942.
77. Vaughan Report....., part 17 p.1.
78. Signal from NZNB to NZ Naval Liaison Officer, Suva, 2 November 1942, W/T & Communications, Codes & Cyphers NA N 2 016/12/30.
79. Vaughan Papers, 'Report... November 1942', dated 4 December 1942.
80. Vaughan Report....., part 18 pp.3-4.
81. Dale Williamson MSS.
82. Letter from Shanahan to W.H. Curtis P&T Department 5 March 1945 and memorandum from Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee to CGS, 26 March 1945, Controller of Pacific Communications NA EA 1 86/1/14.
83. Hall The Coastwatchers p.28; Gillespie p.228.
84. Ibid.
85. Report by E.W. Lee, undated, Pacific Islands, Pan Expedition NA W 1 23/434/27; Narrative of Coastwatching Service NA WAI DA401.364/1, and Hall MSS.
86. Dale Williamson MSS – Mr Dyett interviewed by Williamson.
87. Narrative of Coastwatching Service NA WAI DA401.364/1; Gillespie p.239.
88. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Assistant Secretary War Cabinet, 17 July 1945, Defence of the Pacific, Coastwatching, NA EA 1 86/26/1.

Chapter Ten – A New Security Service

1. Police intelligence summaries started on 9 October 1939, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
2. Security of Shipping 1941-1945, NA EA 1 84/1/18.
3. Letters from Captain T.N.Hill, Canadian-Australian Line 18 March 1940 and Captain A.E.Taylor, New Zealand Shipping Company, 18 March 1940, NA EA 1 84/1/18.
4. Telegram Troopers London to Defender Wellington, 29 June 1940, Special Companies Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.
5. This was, of course bunkum: it was the effectiveness of the tactical employment of air and armour that lay at the heart of the Wehrmacht's success.
6. Telegram Troopers London to Defender Wellington, 29 June 1940, Special Companies Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. F.H. Hinsley & C.A.G. Simkins British Intelligence in the Second World War vol.4 Security and Counter Intelligence HMSO 1990 p.59.
10. Nigel West Secret War: the Story of SOE. Coronet Books 1992 pp.11-28.
11. John Masterman The Double Cross System Yale University Press 1972; Hinsley & Simkins vol.4, Chapters 2 & 6.
12. Winter p.72.
13. Ibid.
14. 23 November 1940, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA EA 1 81/4/2a.
15. Ibid.
16. Chiefs of Staff Paper no.60, 26 November 1940, Intelligence Centres, Security Intelligence Organisation New Zealand [to be referred to hence as ICSIONZ] NA N 2 08/1/25.
17. 26 November 1940, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes NA EA 1 81/4/2a.
18. Chiefs of Staff Paper no.60, 26 November 1940, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Memorandum from Colonel Goss to Brigadier Weir, 5 December 1940, Special Company Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid; see also 'Notes on a Talk by Lieutenant-Colonel Mawhood' in Wellington, 18 January 1941, which underlines the 5th Column fear and outlines the role of the independent companies. Special Company Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.
29. Chiefs of Staff Paper no.60 Note, 27 November 1940, Security Intelligence Organisation: Policy and Organisation, NA AIR 1 130/25/1; memorandum from

- CGS to Minister of Defence 27 November 1940. Special Companies Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.
30. Memorandum from CGS to Minister of Defence, 27 November 1940: handwritten annotation of verbal approval by Minister of Defence, 29 November 1940, Special Companies Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Winter p.72; a talk was delivered in Wellington on 18 February 1941, indicating his presence. Special Companies Training NA AD 1 300/1/42; 'Spotlight' – 'Mr.Fraser and Intelligence.' In New Zealand Observer 11 October 1944.
 33. Memorandum from Colonel Goss to Headquarters NMD, CMD, SMD, 7 February 1941, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
 34. Ibid.
 35. Prime Minister's misfit comment in 'Spotlight' article in New Zealand Observer 11 October 1944; letter Mr. T.P. McLean to author, 8 February 1992.
 36. Letter Mrs. Molly Buckleton to author, 11 July 1993.
 37. Letter Mrs.Molly Buckleton to author, 11 August 1993.
 38. Letter Mr.R.S. Cutfield to author, 2 December 1993.
 39. Ibid.
 40. Letter W.L.Sims to Minister of Defence, 28 December 1940, Security of Shipping 1941-1945 NA EA 1 84/1/18.
 41. Letter CNS to Secretary ONS, 28 January 1941, Security of Shipping 1941-1945 NA EA 1 84/1/18.
 42. Ibid.
 43. See, for instance, New Zealand Herald and Waikato Times advertisements on shipping in January 1941.
 44. Item in Sydney Morning Herald, 18 February 1941, Security of Shipping NA EA 1 84/1/18.
 45. Letter CNS to Permanent Head of Prime Minister's Department, 3 March 1941, Security of Shipping NA EA 1 84/1/18.
 46. Letter Police Commissioner to Minister of Police, 3 March 1941, Security of Shipping NA EA 1 84/1/18.
 47. Chiefs of Staff Paper no.91, 17 June 1941, Chiefs of Staff Committee Meetings NA EA Series I 81/4/3.
 48. 15 September 1941, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes NA EA 1 81/4/2a.
 49. Ibid.
 50. Ibid.
 51. Chiefs of Staff Paper, 16 September 1941, Chiefs of Staff Committee Meetings NA EA 1 81/4/3.
 52. Ibid.
 53. Ibid.
 54. Ibid.
 55. Extract from War Cabinet 30 September 1941 – extract after notes makes clear discussion took place on 29 September 1941, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
 56. Chiefs of Staff Paper no.99: comment on discussion in War Cabinet on 29 September, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
 57. Brooksbank Report, 13 September 1941, COIC NA N 2 08/1/18.

58. 'This Fair Country Now Has Its Himmler and Its S.S.Men.' Undated, but internal evidence from text shows its circulation to be August 1941. Pamphlet in Roth Papers, MS Papers 6218-05, Alexander Turnbull Library.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Report of the Vital Points Committee on 'Safety of Wharves and Shipping.' ONS Paper no.179, 27 September 1941, ONS NA EA 1 81/6/2.
62. Ibid.
63. Memorandum from Director SIB to DNI and Police Commissioner, 17 December 1941, Port Security, General 1941-1944 NA N 1 17/5.
64. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Secretary ONS, 4 February 1942, Security of Shipping NA EA 1 84/1/18.
65. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to Naval Secretary, CAS, CGS Commissioner of Police, Comptroller of Customs, Undersecretary of Internal Affairs, Justice Department, 26 February 1942, Establishment of Port Security Control NA AD 1 353/1/11.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid, enclosure to memorandum; and 'Operations and Objects of Port Security Control.' 1942, Port Security Control, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
68. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to Naval Secretary et al, 26 February 1942, Establishment of Port Security Control NA AD 1 353/1/11.
69. Ibid, enclosure; and 'Operations and Objects of Port Security Control.' 1942, Port Security Control, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
70. Memorandum from Comptroller of Customs to Collectors of Customs at the ports of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin, New Plymouth, Napier, Wanganui, Invercargill, 20 April 1942, and Timaru, 10 August 1942; Collector of Customs Christchurch to Comptroller of Customs Wellington, 28 April 1942; Collector of Customs Invercargill to Comptroller of Customs Wellington, 6 May 1942, Port Security Control 1941-1944 NA C1 41/6/11.
71. Memorandum from Secretary ONS to Naval Secretary et al, 26 February 1942, Establishment of Port Security Control NA AD 1 353/1/11 and enclosure; and 'Operations and Objects of Port Security Control.' 1942, Port Security Control, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
72. Security Personnel: Embarkation 2NZEF Aotea Quay, Wellington, from 1600 hours 20 November 1942, Port Security, General 1941-1944 NA N 1 17/5; Staff – Security Intelligence Organisation, Personnel, Nominal Roll, NA AD 1 319/1/92.
73. Ibid.
74. Chiefs of Staff Paper, 2 January 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid; Staff – Security Intelligence Organisation, Personnel, Nominal Roll NA AD 1 319/1/92.
86. Memorandum from Director SIB to Secretary ONS, 14 June 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
87. Ibid.
88. 20 January 1942, Chiefs of Staff Meeting Minutes, Security Intelligence Bureau: Policy and Organisation, NA AIR 1 130/25/1.
89. Ibid.
90. Report from No.2a Home Guard Rotorua, 8 January 1942, Japanese Propaganda Activities Among Maoris NA AD 11 16/18.
91. Ibid; New Zealand Herald 4-5 December 1999, p.A3.
92. Cutfield letter. 2 December 1993.
93. Chiefs of Staff Paper no.117, 30 January 1942, Chiefs of Staff Committee Meetings EA 1 81/4/3.
94. Memorandum from Brigadier NMD to AGS, 7 April 1942, Field Security Sections, Establishment NA AD 1 300/1/50.
95. Minute by Captain Monk GSO3 Training, 10 April 1942, and annotation by GSO1 (Operations & Intelligence), Field Security Sections, Establishment NA AD 1 300/1/50.
96. Memorandum from Director SIB to Colonel, General Staff, 15 April 1942, Field Security Sections, Establishment NA AD 1 300/1/50.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Memorandum from Director SIB to Colonel, General Staff, 15 April 1942, Staff – Security Intelligence Organisation, Personnel, Nominal Roll NAAD 1 319/1/92.
101. Minute from GSO1 Training to Director SIB, 18 April 1942, Field Security Sections, Establishment NA AD 1 300/1/50.
102. Ibid, Folkes' annotation on GSO1's minute.
103. Address by Major Folkes to parade 2NZEF at Trentham, 10 May 1942, Cutfield Papers.
104. Letter from DNI to Director SIB, 23 April 1942, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Chatham Is. NA N 2 08/10/19.
105. 'Captain' Allison's 'The Chatham Islands – General Security Report.' June 1942, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Chatham Is. NA N 2 08/10/19; Staff – Security Intelligence Organisation, Personnel, Nominal Roll NA AD 1 319/1/2.
106. Minute of DCNS, 30 June 1942, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Chatham Is. NA N 2 08/10/19.
107. Allison Report, June 1942, Intelligence, Pacific Islands, Chatham Is. NA N 2 08/10/19.
108. 6 July, 15 July 1942, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes NA EA 1 81/5/3.
109. Ibid, 15 July 1942.
110. Memorandum from Director SIB to War Cabinet, 21 May 1942, Special Companies Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.

111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.

Chapter Eleven – Fiasco – The Ross Affair

1. Nancy Taylor The Home Front Historical Publications Branch 1986 vol.II pp.884-885; F.L.W. Wood The New Zealand People at War War History Branch 1958 pp.160-162; Michael Parker The SIS Dunmore Press 1978 pp.11-14.
2. Attorney-General's Report to War Cabinet [hence referred to as Mason Report], 18 September 1942. Mason puts the release date as 28 March. Yet is it clear that the interviews in Wellington took place on the Sunday of that weekend. As the Sunday was actually 28 March, Mason is mistaken and Ross must have been released on Saturday 27 March 1942. ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
3. Police Intelligence Summaries 1939-1944 NA EA 1 84/3/8.
4. Transcript of interrogation of Major Folkes by the Attorney-General, Mr. Mason and the Solicitor-General, Mr. Cornish, at Parliament Buildings, on 26 and 27 August 1942 [hence referred to as Folkes' interrogation] – copy in author's possession; Mason Report.
5. Folkes' interrogation.
6. Ibid; Mason Report.
7. Folkes' interrogation.
8. Hanson MSS.
9. T.P. McLean letter 8 February 1992.
10. Folkes' interrogation.
11. Ibid; Mason Report.
12. Mason Report.
13. Ibid; Folkes' interrogation; Transcript of interrogation of Mr.R.C. Steven by the Solicitor-General, Mr. Cornish, in Attorney-General's Office, 15 September 1942 [hence referred to as Steven interrogation].
14. Mason Report.
15. Steven interrogation.
16. See Police Intelligence Summaries 1941, 1942, NA EA 1 84/3/8; and the fact that the Police had put Ross in prison.
17. Mason Report; Folkes' interrogation; Steven interrogation.
18. Mason Report; Steven interrogation.
19. Mason Report.
20. Ibid.
21. NZ Truth 29 July 1942.
22. Hanson MSS.
23. Folkes' interrogation.
24. Letter from Director SIB to Prime Minister 10 June 1942, copy in author's possession.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. 24 June 1942, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes NA EA 1 81/4/2a.
29. Ibid.
30. Folkes' interrogation.
31. Ibid.

32. NZ Truth 29 July 1942.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Taylor vol.II p.884.
40. Mason Report.
41. Folkes' interrogation.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Steven interrogation.
45. Taylor vol. II pp.898-901.
46. Steven interrogation.
47. Ibid.
48. Mason Report.
49. Ibid; Folkes' interrogation; Steven interrogation.
50. Mason Report.
51. Ibid.
52. Police Intelligence Summary, 24 February 1942, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
53. Police Intelligence Summary, 8 August 1942, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
54. Police Intelligence Summary, 9 November 1942, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
55. Police Intelligence Summary, 15 December 1942, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
56. Taylor, vol.I p.214; Dominion, 25 June 1940.
57. Folkes interrogation.
58. Mason Report.
59. New Zealand House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) vol.261, p.875, 21 October 1942.
60. Minute of Lieutenant-Commander Barker, 19 November 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
61. Ibid.
62. Minute of DNI, 20 November 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
63. Ibid.
64. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Secretary ONS, 27 November 1942, Port Security, General 1941-1944 NA N 1 17/5.
65. Police Department Narrative (by Detective Harding) pp.187-191, NA WAI 21/43d.
66. Minute of DNI, 20 November 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
67. Minute of DCNS, 20 November 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/24.
68. Minute of DNI 24 November 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
69. Annotation DCNS 24 November 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
70. Chiefs of Staff Paper no.156, 22 December 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.

71. Ibid.
72. Memorandum from Colonel Goss to Brigadier Weir, 5 December 1940, Special Company Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.
73. Dominion 2 February 1943.
74. Memorandum from Director SIB, Mr.J. Cummings, to CNS, 23 February 1942, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25. Folkes resignation was reported by the PM on 6 February in letter UK High Commissioner to Sir John Stephenso, 16 March 1943, copy in author's possession.
75. Covering note for CAS, CGS, Naval Secretary (for CNS) 25 February 1943, for Mason Report of 18 September 1942, Security Intelligence Bureau: Policy and Organisation NA AIR 1 130/25/1.
76. Minutes of meeting of Security Organisation Committee, chaired by Secretary ONS, 26 February 1943, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Vital Points Committee minutes, 8 March 1943, Security Intelligence Bureau: Policy and Organisation NA AIR 1 130/25/1.
84. Letter from UK High Commissioner Wellington, to Sir John Stephenson, 16 March 1943, copy in author's possession.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Letter from DNI Wellington to DNI Melbourne, 22 March 1943, COIC NA N 2 08/1/18.
88. Memorandum from Director SIB to DNI 11 May 1943, and memorandum 21 June 1943, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25; Steven departed 22 April 1943, Lindsay 3 May 1943, McLean 4 June 1943, Staff – Security Intelligence Organisation, Personnel, Nominal Roll NA AD 1 319/1/92.
89. Director SIB to Comptroller of Customs, Wellington, 17 March 1944, Port Security Control 1941-1944 NA C1 41/6/11.
90. Meikle left 1 October 1945. Staff – Security Intelligence Organisation, Personnel, Nominal Roll NA AD 1 319/1/92.
91. Telegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to UK High Commissioner, August 1943, Superintendent J.Cummings visit to US and UK 1944 NA EA 1 59/2/16.
92. Mentioned in letter from Prime Minister to UK High Commissioner 6 January 1944, Superintendent J.Cummings visit to US and UK 1944 NA EA 1 59/2/16.
93. Ibid.
94. Letter from A.D McIntosh to Assistant Secretary New Zealand High Commissioner's Office, Ottawa, 18 March 1944, Superintendent J.Cummings visit to US and UK 1944 NA EA 1 59/2/16.
95. Director SIB to Comptroller of Customs Wellington, 17 March 1944, Port Security Control NA C1 41/6/11.

96. Dominion 11 September 1944.
97. New Zealand House of Representatives. Parliamentary Debates vol.266 p.367, 15 September 1944.
98. Dominion 16 September 1944, reporting on the Prime Minister in the House on 15 September 1944.
99. 'Spotlight' 'Mr Fraser and Intelligence.' In New Zealand Observer 11 October 1944.

Chapter Twelve – Aftermath

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2. Ibid.
3. Police Intelligence Summaries, 9 October 1939, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
4. Police Intelligence Summary, 31 October 1939, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
5. Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8, passim.
6. Ibid, passim.
7. Police Intelligence Summary, 8 February 1943, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
8. Ibid.
9. Police Intelligence Summary, 25 February 1944, Police Intelligence Summaries NA EA 1 84/3/8.
10. Ibid.
11. New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin, 7 July 1943-11 July 1945: note on cover of New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin no.1., New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin NA PM 84/1/3.
12. New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin no.8, 28 May 1943, ICSIONZ NA N 2 08/1/25.
13. New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin NA PM 84/1/3.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. NZSI Bulletin no.8 February 1944, New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin NA PM 84/1/3.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. NZSI Bulletin no.16 October 1944, New Zealand Security Intelligence Bulletin NA PM 84/1/3.
21. Memorandum from Naval Secretary to Assistant Secretary War Cabinet, 22 May 1944, Security of Shipping 1941-1944 NA EA 1 84/1/18.
22. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary War Cabinet to Naval Secretary, 26 May 1944, Security of Shipping 1941-1944 NA EA 1 84/1/18.
23. Director SIB to Assistant Secretary War Cabinet, 31 May 1944, Security of Shipping 1941-1944 NA EA 1 84/1/18.
24. Ibid.
25. Memorandum from Port Security Control to all Shipping Companies, 14 February 1944, Port Security, General 1941-1944 NA N 1 17/5.
26. see, for instance Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev The Crown Jewels Harper Collins 1998; John Costello and Oleg Tsarev Deadly Illusions Century 1993; Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky KGB Hodder & Stoughton 1990; Anthony Cave Brown Treason in the Blood Robert Hale 1995; Anthony Cave Brown The Secret Servant Michael Joseph 1988; Anthony Glees The Secrets of the Service Jonathan Cape 1987; Genrikh Borovik The Philby Files Little Brown & Co. 1994; Barry

- Penrose & Simon Freeman Conspiracy of Silence Grafton Books 1986; Nigel West Molehunt Wiedenfeld & Nicolson 1987; John Costello Mask of Treachery William Morrow & Co. 1988; Phillip Knightley Philby: KGB Masterspy Andre Deutsch 1988; Kim Philby My Silent War Coronet 1967 and others.
27. West and Tsarev; Costello and Tsarev.
 28. Borovik 212-214,232,234; West & Tsarev Chapters VII & IX and passim; see also Costello and Tsarev.
 29. West and Tsarev; Costello and Tsarev; Cave Brown Treason in the Blood; Penrose & Freeman; West Molehunt; Costello Mask of Treachery; Gleees; Andrew & Gordievsky.
 30. West and Tsarev.
 31. Costello and Tsarev; West & Tsarev.
 32. Desmond Ball and David Horner Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network Allen & Unwin 1998.
 33. Private information given to author.
 34. Ian McGibbon (ed.) Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters Between Carl Berendsen & Alistair McIntosh 1943-1952 AUP 1993 pp.118-119,152-155, 158-62, 209-10, 227, 236-7; West & Tsarev Chapter 9.
 35. McGibbon p.119, fn 1 refers to Berendsen's letter to McIntosh of 21 January 1947.
 36. Ibid, p.155: letter Berendsen to McIntosh 19 March 1948.
 37. Ibid, pp.158-169: letter McIntosh to Berendsen 20 March 1948.
 38. Ibid.
 39. Ibid, pp.159-161: letter Berendsen to McIntosh 30 March 1948.
 40. Ibid, p.227: letter McIntosh to Berendsen 12 May 1950.
 41. Ibid, p.236: letter Berendsen to McIntosh 16 July 1950.
 42. Ibid.
 43. see, for instance, Chapman Pincher Too Secret Too Long Sidgwick & Jackson pp.328, 346, 498, 787; John Costello Mask of Treachery Preface pp.7-8; West Molehunt.
 44. Malcolm Templeton Top Hats Are Not Being Taken NZ Institute of International Affairs 1988 p.20 [hence referred to THNT]; Keith Ovenden A Fighting Withdrawal OUP 1996 p.153; NZDF Base Records Personal File – D.P. Costello.
 45. Templeton THNT p.22.
 46. Ovenden p.154; Templeton THNT pp.21-22.
 47. Templeton THNT p.22.
 48. Templeton p.20; Ovenden pp.154-155.
 49. Costello PF.
 50. Letter Sir Geoffrey Cox to author, 20 August 1993.
 51. Costello PF.
 52. Templeton p.21 and p.100 fn.5: letter Cox to McIntosh 7 January 1944 in NA PM 7/2/85.
 53. Templeton p.21.
 54. Ibid.
 55. Ibid p.22 letter Costello to McIntosh 29 April 1945.
 56. Costello PF; Templeton Chapter 7.
 57. Templeton Chapter 7.

58. Ibid pp.23, 55-56.
59. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West Allen Lane The Penguin Press 1999 pp.534,600.
60. Templeton pp.22-23, 101 fn.14.
61. Private information given to the author. One of these may have served under Costello at one stage.
62. Templeton p.23; Ovenden p.264. Costello took up the appointment from October 1955.
63. West and Tsarev p. 271.
64. Costello Mask of Treachery pp.7-8; Andrew and Mitrokhin pp.173-4, 193-5.
65. Costello pp.7-8; Templeton pp.22,24; Andrew and Mitrokhin pp.534-537.
66. Costello Mask of Treachery pp.7-8; West Molehunt p.110.
67. Ovenden p.320.
68. Peter Wright Spycatcher Heinemann, 1987; Templeton p.22; Costello Mask of Treachery p.8; West Molehunt p.110; letter from Rupert Allason (Nigel West) to author 28 July 1992 observes: '...there is no question that Paddy Costello was regarded by the British Security Service as a KGB FCD [First Chief Directorate] agent. The suspicion was created by his involvement with the Krogers...I think it has been generally accepted, probably on Blunt's evidence, that he was a long-term ideologically motivated spy.'
69. West and Tsarev.
70. Costello and Tsarev; West & Tsarev.
71. West and Tsarev, Chapter 9.
72. Ibid, p. 214.
73. Ibid. extract from Cairncross's file in Moscow Centre. LIST File no.83896 Vol.I p.181.
74. Ibid, p.216.
75. Ibid,p.217.
76. Andrew and Mitrokhin p.152-3,168, 518-520, 535, 539,548.
77. Parker p.21; private information given to author.

Chapter Thirteen – Army Intelligence and Security

1. Informer Summer 1991; and discussion with Ray Hurle.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; 2 New Zealand Divisional Field Security Section, February 1941-September 1945 NA WAI I DA 89/1/1-56; NZ Base Field Security Section, March 1941-May 1942 NA WAI DA 152/1/1-15; 6 NZ Divisional Field Security Section, June 1942-October 1944 NA WAI DA 152/1/16-44; NZ Maadi Companies Field Security Section November 1944-December 1945 NA WAI DA 152/1/45-58.
4. Informer Summer 1991; memorandum from Director SIB to War Cabinet 21 May 1942 Special Companies Training NA AD 1 300/1/42.
5. Informer Summer 1991.
6. Ibid.; POW Interrogations held in New Zealand NA AD 1 336/3/59.
7. Hinsley, volume I, pp.417-421; Laurie Barber & John Tonkin-Covell Freyberg: Churchill's Salamander Century Hutchinson 1989, Chapter Two; Paul Freyberg Freyberg V.C. Hodder & Stoughton 1993; Anthony Beevor Crete John Murray 1991.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. PRO DEFE 3/686 Crete 14 March-29 May 1941, OL1-500 (incomplete); DEFE 3/687 Crete 14 March-29 May 1941; DEFE 3/891 Crete 14 March-29 May 1941; DEFE 3/894 Signals to Allied Commands Conveying Special Intelligence, Cairo and AOC Crete series 28 April-28 May 1941.
11. Beevor p.349.
12. PRO DEFE 3/894.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. CX/JQ 911 – OL302 of 1745 hours, 13 May 1941, PRO DEFE 3/686.
16. 'BGS Appreciation – German Plan for Attack on Crete.' Force Headquarters, 12 May 1941, Freyberg Papers, BGS file March-May 1941 NA WAI 8/16.
17. Letter Sir Geoffrey Cox to author, 20 August 1993.
18. Ibid.
19. War Diary, October 1941, 2 New Zealand Divisional Intelligence Section NA WAI 1 DA 85/1/2.
20. Cox letter to author, 20 August 1993.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.; NZDF Base Records, Personal File D.P. Costello.
28. Cox letter to author, 20 August 1993.
29. Ibid.; Costello PF; Akarit to Enfidaville 1943, Freyberg Papers NA WA II 8/31.
30. Keith Ovendon A Fighting Withdrawal Oxford UP 1996 p.182; NZDFBR Personal File D.M. Davin; Costello PF.

31. Cox letter to author, 20 August 1993.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. New Zealand Division Intelligence Summary, 19 January 1944, Freyberg Papers, Historical Operational, January 1944 NA WAI 8/49.
42. New Zealand Corps Intelligence Summary, 18 February 1944, Freyberg Papers, Historical Operational, February 1944 NA WAI 8/50.
43. 2 New Zealand Division Intelligence Summary, 10 April 1945, Cox Papers 9100230/1-25 QEII Army Museum.
44. Ovenden p.179; Mr.Fred Kersh interview with author, 19 Jul 1995.
45. Warwick Anderson, 'Notes from Intelligence Course' in Egypt January-February 1943.
46. Letter Ted Ross to author 22 May 1992.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Geoff Duff, in Informer Winter 1993.
50. Ross letter, 22 May 1992; Mr.Warwick Anderson interview with author, 19 July 1995; W.D. Dawson diary 1942-1945.
51. Ross letter, 22 May 1992.
52. Duff op. cit.
53. Ibid.
54. Ross letter, 22 May 1992.
55. Duff op.cit.
56. Ross letter, 22 May 1992.
57. Duff op.cit.
58. Ross letter, 22 May 1992; Duff op.cit.
59. W.D. Dawson diary, 26 March 1943.
60. Ibid, 24-25 March 1944.
61. Ibid, 9-11 April 1945.
62. Gillespie pp.146-147; Mr.Ray Starr interview with author, 14 February 1995.
63. Hanson MSS.
64. Home Guard Narrative NA WAI 21/70a.
65. Ibid.
66. Hanson MSS.
67. Ibid.
68. Home Guard Narrative NA WAI 21/70a.
69. Ibid; Nancy Taylor The Home Front Historical Publications Branch 1986, p.476.

70. 20 February 1941, 2 New Zealand Division Field Security War Diary 1941-1945 NA WAI DA 89/1/1; Mr. L. Annett interview with author, 20 March 1992; Mr. O. Wood interview with author, 25 March 1992.
71. Wood interview, 25 March 1992.
72. Ibid.
73. Memorandum on 'Employment of NZ Field Security Section.' 8 October 1941, 2 New Zealand Division Field Security War Diary NA WAI DA 89/1/1-56.
74. Ibid.
75. Wood interview, 25 March 1992.
76. 'Instruction for Field Security NCOs attached to Brigades.' 17 October 1942, 2 New Zealand Division Field Security War Diary NA WAI DA 89/1/1-56.
77. 24-30 June 1943, 2 New Zealand Division Field Security War Diary NA WAI DA 89/1/1-56.
78. Field Security Report, 4 April 1943, 2 New Zealand Division Field Security War Diary NA WAI DA 89/1/1-56.
79. Field Security Report, 4 July 1942, New Zealand Base Field Security War Diary NA WAI DA 152/1/16-44.
80. Ibid.
81. Field Security Report, 4 June 1943, New Zealand Base Field Security War Diary NA WAI DA 152/1/16-44.
82. Ibid.
83. Monthly Report for July 1942, 1 Field Security Section War Diary 1942-1943 NA WAI Z77.7/1/1-11
84. Monthly Reports for November 1942 and July 1943, 1 Field Security War Diary 1942-1943 NA WAI Z77.7/1/1-11.
85. Gillespie pp.141, 179, 183; 4 Field Security Section War Diary 1942-1943, NA WAI Z121.7/1/1-10.
86. Mr. N. Cohen interview with author, 5 March 1991; Mr. D. Crosby interview with author, 5 March 1991.
87. letter from DNI Melbourne to DNI Wellington, 31 July 1943, Prisoners of War 1918-1943 NA N 1 8/7.
88. Chiefs of Staff meeting, 29 October 1942, POW Interrogations held in New Zealand NA AD 1 336/3/59; the COS Paper referred to was No.140 1 July 1942.
89. Memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel Donaldson to ACGS 15 October 1942 and undated commentary on COS Paper No.140, 1 July 1942, POW Interrogations held in New Zealand NA AD 1 336/3/59; W.W. Mason Prisoners of War War History Branch 1954 pp.356-357.
90. Chiefs of Staff meeting, 29 October 1942, POW Interrogations held in New Zealand, NA AD 1 336/3/59.
91. Mr.V.E. Jaynes interview with author, 16 July 1993.
92. copy of signal from Captain on the Staff, Colombo to DNI Admiralty (R) ACNB, NZNB, ABDAFLOAT, BAD Washington 13 February 1942 Rusbridger & Nave, op.cit. p.190.
93. Jaynes interview, 16 July 1993.
94. Memorandum from DCNS to Secretary ONS, 1 December 1942, Prisoners of War 1918-1943 NA N 1 8/7.

95. Memorandum from DNI, 13 March 1943, POW interrogations held in New Zealand:
on 15 March NA AD 1 336/3/59: V.Jaynes noted underneath no information on
POWs 'since I went to Featherston in November.'

Chapter Fourteen – Air Force Intelligence

1. New Zealand Gazette 8 March 1937
2. Combined Intelligence Committee Meeting 29 March 1938, COS Committee Minutes, NA N 2 08/1/18; Colin Hanson MSS.
3. J.M.S. Ross Royal New Zealand Air Force War History Branch 1955 p.49.
4. Ibid, p.49; Hanson MSS: 'a senior Air Force officer is supposed to have said when Canning was mentioned when appointments were being made "Oh, give him intelligence!" '
5. Organisation of Intelligence, February 1941, Organisation RNZAF, NA AIR 1 1/1/5.
6. Hanson MSS.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. memorandum from CAS to Minister of Defence, 20 March 1942, Organisation Air Headquarters, Staff Development, NA AIR 1 131/1/1.
10. Hanson MSS.
11. Ibid.
12. memorandum of Naval Secretary 19 May 1942, Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, NA N 2 08/1/18; Hanson MSS; the intelligence officers were Pilot Officers Tyrer, Amodeo, Brady, C.A.Morton, G.G.Muir, R.Porter, and the security officers Brown and Zimmerman. Flying Officer P.T.Curran joined the COIC intelligence team for a short period through to April 1942.
13. Organisation RNZAF, NA AIR 1 1/1/5; Hanson MSS.
14. Hanson MSS.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Air Intelligence Reorganisation, Air Department Organisation Memorandum No.73, 22 February 1943, NA AIR 106 7.
19. memorandum from Flight Lieutenant L.A. Amodeo to DCAS 18 November 1943, Air Intelligence Organisation, NA AIR 1 1/1/30.
20. Report on Strength, Organisation and Functions of RNZAF Intelligence, 24 April 1944, NA AIR 1 127/4/h.
21. Ibid; the seventeen RNZAF Squadrons were Nos.1,2,3,4,6,9,14,15, 16,17,18,19,20,25,30,31 and 40.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.

33. Hanson Papers, H.L. de la Perelle collection, Fighter Intelligence Summary of Operations at Torokina, 1944, written by Flight Lieutenant P.T. Curran.
34. Report on Strength, Organisation and Functions of RNZAF Intelligence, 24 April 1944, NA AIR 1 127/4/h.
35. Hanson Papers, H.L. de la Perelle collection, A Summary of Duties of the Intelligence Officer of No.1 Squadron, December 1944. No.1 Squadron were operating Ventura light bombers off Green Island at this time (Ross, loc. cit. p.321.)
36. Ibid, A Representative Day for an Intelligence Officer at a Fighter Squadron at Emirau, December 1944.
37. Report on Strength, Organisation and Functions of RNZAF Intelligence, 24 April 1944, NA AIR 1 127/4/h.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Air Intelligence Section – Organisation, 30 May 1944, Organisation RNZAF, NA AIR 1 1/1/5.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Daily Summaries, December 1941-September 1944, Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, NA EA 1 84/3/11.
47. Hanson MSS.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid, information from Mr. T.G. Tyrer.
51. Ibid.
52. memorandum from Squadron Leader L.A. Amodeo to Director of Operations, 31 October 1944, in response to bureaucratic haggling over RNZAF establishing a PI unit, Organisation Policy, Photographic Interpretation Unit, NA AIR 1 131/1/14.
53. Flying Officer John Slingsby Barraud's OBE citation, 1946, quoted in Hanson MSS.
54. Hanson MSS.

Glossary

ACNB	Australian Commonwealth Naval Board
AIB	Allied Intelligence Bureau
AIF	Australian Imperial Forces
BAMS	British and Allied Merchant Shipping
BGS	Brigadier General Staff
BONIFACE	Early British covername for ULTRA
BRUSA	Britain United States of America Agreement
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
CIB	Combined Intelligence Bureau
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet
CNS	Chief of Naval Staff
CO	Commanding Officer
COIC	Combined Operational Intelligence Centre
COIS	Chief of the Intelligence Staff, also known as 'Captain on the Staff'
COMAIRSOLS	Commander Air Forces Solomons
COMAIRSOPAC	Commander Air Forces South Pacific
COMANZAC	Commander in Chief, ANZAC Area
COMSOPAC	Commander in Chief, South Pacific
COS Committee	Chiefs of Staff Committee
CSDIC	Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre
CSS	Chief of Secret Service or MI6
CWR	Central War Room
DCAS	Deputy Chief of Air Staff
DCGS	Deputy Chief of the General Staff
DCNS	Deputy Chief of Naval Staff
D/F	Direction-Finding
DMI	Director of Military Intelligence

DNI	Director of Naval Intelligence
DSIR	Department of Scientific & Industrial Research
FECB	Far East Combined Bureau
FRUMEL	Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne
FRUPAC	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet
FS	Field Security
FSS	Field Security Section
GBMS	Great Britain Merchant Shipping
GC&CS	Government Code & Cypher School: Bletchley Park
GCB	Government Communications Bureau, Berkeley Street
GCHQ	Government Code Headquarters: Bletchley Park
GHQ	General Headquarters
GRU	Soviet Military Intelligence
GSO1 or G1	General Staff Officer, Grade 1
GSO1 (O&I)	General Staff Officer, Grade 1, Operations and Intelligence
GSO3 (I), or GSOIII (I), or GIII (I)	General Staff Officer, Grade 3, (Intelligence)
GSO3 (O&I)	General Staff Officer, Grade 3, Operations and Intelligence
GVP	Guards Vital Points
H/F D/F	High Frequency Direction-Finding
HYPO	US Navy codebreaking centre, 14 th Naval District, Pearl Harbor
IO	Intelligence Officer
ISK	Intelligence Service Knox: Abwehr machine cipher
ISOS	Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey: Abwehr hand cipher
JN10, JN15, JN20, JN40 etc	Japanese naval ciphers
JN25	Main Japanese naval cipher
KGB	Committee of State Security
LRDG	Long Range Desert Group
LST	Landing Ship Tank
MF/D/F	Medium Frequency D/F

MI(R)	Military Intelligence (Research)
MI5	British Security Service
MI6	British Secret Intelligence Service
MPIU	Missing Persons Investigation Unit
NID	Naval Intelligence Division, Admiralty
NIT	Control Station, Pearl Harbor
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
NOIC	Naval Officer in Charge
NSA	National Security Agency
NZCID	New Zealand Committee of Imperial Defence
NZEF	New Zealand Expeditionary Force
NZNB	New Zealand Naval Board
'O' Group	Orders group
ONS	Organisation for National Security
OP-20-G	US Naval Intelligence
OTP	One time pad
P&T	Post and Telegraph
PI	Photographic Intelligence
POW, PW	Prisoner of War
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RDF	Radio Direction-Finding
REB	Radio Fingerprinting: covername
RFP	Radio Fingerprinting
RHSA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt: Reichs Security Main Office
RN	Royal Navy
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
RNZN	Royal New Zealand Navy
RSS	Radio Security Service
SD	Sicherheitsdienst: Nazi Security Service
SEAC	South East Asia Command
SLA	Secret Intelligence Australia: Section B of Allied Intelligence Bureau

Appendices

Appendix One

**Handling instructions for Ultra and Zymotic
[N 2 16/12/30]**

APPENDIX ONE

MOST SECRET

Office of the Commander-in-Chief

Eastern Fleet

EF 4964/17.

16 July 1942

MEMORANDUM

"ULTRA" AND "ZYMOTIC" MESSAGES

Messages containing information from Special Intelligence from the Admiralty, are prefixed "Ultra" and are sent in SP 02405 series. Messages containing similar information from other authorities are prefixed "Zymotic" and are sent in the most secret cypher available.

The following instructions are to be followed as regards these messages:

1. They are to be decyphered (and in the case of local "Zymotic" encyphered) by the following officers only:

(a) Afloat Staff

Paymaster Lieutenant CLP Matheson,
R.N.V.R. (Principal Cypher Officer)
Paymaster Lieutenant BS Cave-Chinn,
R.N.V.R.

(b) Ashore Staff

Paymaster Lieutenant TO Tatlow,
R.N.V.R. (Principal Cypher Officer)
Paymaster C Hunter, R.N.V.R.

2. SP02403 series are to be kept separate from the ordinary series.

3. Two logs are to be kept.

(a) By the Secretary for afloat staff.

(b) By the Secretary to Deputy Commander-

in Chief for the ashore staff.

4. Copies are only to be made and distributed as follows:-

(a) Afloat and Ashore

One to Secretary (for the Commander-in-Chief and log.)

One to Staff Officer (Intelligence).

(b) Ashore

One to Secretary to Deputy Commander-in-Chief and log.

One to the Chief of the Intelligence Staff (C.O.I.S.)

One to the Officer in Charge, Ambition House, Mombasa. (ie Paymaster Captain Shaw, Royal Navy.).

5. Messages are only to be passed by hand of officer or in double sealed envelope.

6. Messages are to be marked "MOST SECRET" TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

7. All groups and rough working are to be kept separate from those of other messages and are to be burnt when no longer required for reference. This should normally be immediately and in any case not longer than a week from date of receipt or despatch.

8. The log copies are to be numbered serially by Secretary and Secretary to Deputy Commander-in-Chief and are to be burnt when no longer required. This will normally be not longer than one month from date of receipt or despatch. Other recipients are to burn their copies when no longer required which should be as early as possible.

9. Knowledge of these messages is to be restricted to as few officers as possible. The Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Commander-in-Chief will decide as to whom their copies are to be shown. Other recipients are to keep their copies to themselves.

10.If it is necessary to pass on information contained in these summaries (other than to normal recipients of the messages, ie to holders of SP02403 series and addresses of Zymotics) this is to be done in the form of an operational order so worded that if it is captured or intercepted by the enemy it cannot be traced back to Special Intelligence.

11.In the case of paragraph 10 above, reference to actual names of enemy ships should be avoided; positions should be expressed in a form different from that given in the Ultra or Zymotic messages.

12.No reference to information in these messages is to be made in war diaries, reports of proceedings etc., however limited the circulation.

13.Bulletins and Digests from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board need no longer be treated as Zymotic but are to be given A.I.D.A.C. distribution with a copy to the United States Naval Liaison Officer.

RALPH EDWARDS

CHIEF OF STAFF

Distribution:-

The Principal Cypher Officer, Afloat.

The Principal Cypher Officer, Ashore.

Chief of the Naval Intelligence Staff.

Paymaster Captain H.L.Shaw, R.N. (Retired).

Staff Officer Plans.

Staff Officer Intelligence - Afloat.

(Copies to:- The Deputy Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet.

The Secretary to the Commander in Chief,

Eastern Fleet.

The Secretary to the Deputy Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet.

A slip is attached to this document. It reads:

EF4964/17 dated 15 June 1942.

Addressed to: The Flag Officer, Delhi.

The Flag Officer, Ceylon.

(Copy to each and to:

Australian Commonwealth Naval Board
New Zealand Naval Board).

The attached copy of a memorandum I have issued containing instructions for the handling of Ultra and Zymotic messages, is forwarded to you for your information.

2.I shall be glad if you will forward to me a copy of the instructions you have issued.

RALPH EDWARDS

For ADMIRAL

(annotated as seen by:)

CNS

SSO

SOY - I do not think
we are called
upon to answer

Agree 3/10

(Stamped:

Received

2 Oct 1942

Navy Office

Wellington

NZ

SOURCE: NA N2 16/12/30

Appendix Two

**Entry to Combined Operational Intelligence
Centre, 19 May 1942
[N 2 08/1/18]**

N.A. 08/1/18

Navy Office,
Wellington.

19th May, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

ENTRY INTO THE C.O.I.C. AND C.W.R.

The following have the right of entry at any time:-

Navy

Army

Air Force

W.S. Commodore Sir Atwell H. Lake, Bt., O.B.E., R.N.

G.O.O. Lt. General Patrick M.S.O.

G.A.S. Air Commodore V. Goodard

M. Captain M.U. Yeatman, R.N.
Paymaster Captain N.E. Beall, O.B.E., R.N.

D.C.G.S. Brig. Stewart D.S.O., O.B.E.
G.S.O.1 (C of I) Lieutenant Donaldson.

D.C.A.S. Group Captain A. de T. Nevill, R.N.Z.A.F.

N.S. Commander R.W. Stirling-Hamilton, R.N.

M.I. (1) Lieut. W. Dawson.

D. of O. Wing Commander H.G.L. Allsop, R.A.F.

(0) Commander G.F. Hannay, R.N.
Lieutenant-Commander F.M. Beasley, R.N.

A.G. Brigadier Conway, O.B.E., A.D.C.

Operations I. Sq/Ldr. Moen, R.N.Z.A.F.

S. Pay Lt. Cdr. H.R. Sleeman, R.N.Z.N.

Q.M.G. Brigadier Avery, C.M.G., D.S.O.

Operations 2. F/Lieut. Robertson, R.N.Z.A.F.

(NS) Pay. Lieut. H.S.T. Osborne, R.N.

G.S.O.3 (I) Captain Moffat.

Flans. Wing Commander R.W.K. Stevens, R.A.F.

NO. Lieutenant-Commander N. Napier, R.N.

Tel. Lt. H. Philpott, R.N.Z.N.

A.I. Squadron Ldr. J.B. Gunning, R.N.Z.A.F.

NY. Lieutenant R. Blampied, R.N.Z.N.R.

(5) Lieutenant W.W. Brackenridge, R.N.Z.N.V.R.

A.I. (1) P/O Porter, R.N.Z.A.F.

(1) Sub-Lieutenant N.H. Newcomb, R.N.Z.N.V.R.

(2) Sub-Lieutenant C.J. Whitmore, R.N.Z.N.V.R.

A.I. (2) P/O Tyrer, R.N.Z.A.F.

(2) Sub-Lieutenant P.H.M. Williams, R.N.Z.N.V.R.

(5) Sub-Lieutenant V.E. Jaynes, R.N.Z.N.V.R.

A.I. (3) P/O Morton, R.N.Z.A.F.

(4) Lieutenant G.E. Law, R.N.Z.N.V.R.

(5) Lieutenant G.E. Law, R.N.Z.N.V.R.

A.I. (4) P/O Morton, R.N.Z.A.F.

LO. Miss Hunter

Group Captain Findlay, R.N.Z.A.F.

Group Capt. Buckley, R.A.F.

Miss Mead

Group Captain Hodson, R.A.F.

Group Captain Hodson, R.A.F.

Personal Clerk: Mrs. N. Brookman.

Typist: Miss A. Benson.

Group Captain Hodson, R.A.F.

Seaman Hooker (Attached to C.O.I.C.)

Clerk: Miss J. Arthur

Group Captain Hodson, R.A.F.

Allied Officers:

Civilian

Civilian

N.A. Captain J.P. Olding, U.S.N.

H.C. for U.K. Sir Harry Pattenbes.

H.C. for U.K. Sir Harry Pattenbes.

U.S.N.A. Lieut. Cdr. C.W. Stephenson, J.N.

N.A. Col Nankivell.

N.A. Col Nankivell.

b. Lieut. Cdr. Haitzma

b. Lieut. Cdr. Haitzma

b. Lieut. Cdr. Haitzma

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Appendix Three

Playfair Code Instructions
[N2 030/33/13]

N 2
030/33/13
Codes and
Cyphers

SECRET.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PLAYFAIR CODE.
(SHORT TITLE "P.C.")

The following is an explanation of the code to be used for transmitting commercial messages by Radio. Keywords are contained in the sealed envelopes supplied.

2.- Precautions when coding messages.- In messages to be coded by this code stereotype wording, particularly in the beginning or end, must be avoided.

3.- Key words are to be changed as explained in "C.M." para. 4.

Method of Coding.-

4.- Construct a square containing 25 spaces and insert from left to right the letters of the key word, one in each space, and then the remainder of the alphabet, commencing at the first letter of the alphabet which does not occur in the key word. Should the same letter occur more than once in the key word, all repetitions of that letter must be omitted when filling in the square. The letter "I" is to be treated as "J" (see diagram below) and always written as such, thus reducing the alphabet to 25 letters.

5.- The following diagram shows a square filled in, using "EXHAUSTIVELY" as the key word:-

E	X	H	A	U
S	T	J	V	L
Y	B	C	D	F
G	K	M	N	O
P	Q	R	W	Z

DECLASSIFIED

6.- The process of coding is :-

- (a) Divide the letters from the message into pairs. If both letters of a pair are the same, a dummy letter must be inserted to separate them.
- (b) Count the letters thus produced and add to the end as many dummy letters as are necessary to make the total number of letters a multiple of 5.
- (c) Substitute for each pair of letters the equivalent pair obtained from the square, except in the case of a single letter remaining over at the end which remains uncoded. Dummy letters are to be similarly coded.

Substitution to be carried out as follows :-

- (1) If the pair is in the same vertical column each letter is coded by the one next below it. A letter occurring at the bottom of the column is coded at the top letter of the same column.

e.g. SP becomes YE.

(ii) If the pair is in the same horizontal line, each letter is coded by the one next on its right in the same line. A letter on the extreme right of the line is coded by a letter on the extreme left of the same line.

e.g. OM becomes GN.

(iii) If the pair is neither as at (i) nor as at (ii), the letters must form opposite corners of a rectangle. The pair is then coded by the pair at the other corner of the same rectangle, each letter being coded by the one in the same horizontal line.

e.g. TO becomes LK.

(d) Write the message out in 5 letter groups before despatch.

When dummy letters are inserted as directed in paragraph 6, (a) and (b) above they must be chosen so that they will become obvious on decoding, but will not be conspicuous otherwise. It is therefore essential to vary them, the letters Q, X, Y and Z being preferably avoided.

7.- Example.

Key word "EXHAUSTIVELY".

Message - Commence firing 1645.

Divided into pairs and completed to 35 letters becomes:-
The letters underlined are dummies.

CO ME ME NC EF JR
JN GS JX TE EN FO
RT YF JV EK TL E

Coded version:-

FM KC GH MD
UY CH VM PY
TH SX AG OZ
QJ BY VL XG
JS F

DECLASSIFIED

As despatched:-

FMKCG HMDUY CHVMP
YTHSX AGOZQ JBYVL
XGJSF

8.- How to decode.- The same process applies for decoding as for coding; except that the decoder must take the letters above when the pair is in the same vertical line (see paragraph 6 (c) (i) above) and the ones on the left when on the same horizontal line. (See paragraph 6 (c) (ii) above).


L. Koope

Naval Secretary.

Navy Office, Wellington.
13th June, 1941.

Appendix Four

Orion's Chart from S.D.Waters
German Raiders in the Pacific p.13



This reproduction of the Orion's chart of her course across the approaches to the Hauraki Gulf shows also the position of ships sighted while her minelaying was in progress. The numbers added in black give a key to translations of the notes on the map:


- (1) vessel in sight; (2) steamer in sight; (3) steamer in sight; (4) position of sinking of Niagara; (5) steamer in sight; (6) Moko Hinau light; (7) blacked-out vessel; (8) vessel; (9) moon bearing at 2100 hours. The main heading at the bottom of the map states that it is to be superimposed on British 2543, enclosure No. 2 to Report No. 201 of 7 August 1940. The thin line shows the raider's course, the thicker line shows mines about 800 metres apart, and the double lines show mines about 400 metres apart.

Appendix Five

RNZN Museum: Map on U-862's track

Based on passage data.

[Lieutenant-Commander Peter Dennerley RNZN]



U862 PASSAGE DATA

25 - 27 Dec 44	120NM	64 ² / ₄ hr	= 1.9 kt
27 Dec - 1 Jan 45	290NM	101 hr	= 2.7 kt
01 - 05 Jan 45	740NM	96 hr	= 7.5 kt
05 - 12 Jan 45	240NM	7 day	= 1.4 kt
12 - 15 Jan 45	275NM	72 hr	= 3.5 kt
15 - 19 Jan 45	240NM	72 hr	= 3.2 kt
19 - 21 Jan 45	425NM	48 hr	= 9.0 kt
21 - 25 Jan 45	1060NM	5 day	= 8.5 kt
26 Jan - 5 Feb 45	2410NM	10 day	= 10.0 kt
05 - 15 Feb 45	1870NM	226 hr approx	= 8.3 kt

* NOTE: By the nature of the original data the majority of the figures are approximate but are estimated to be accurate to within 10%

U862 in New Zealand Waters

In late 1944 the presence of the German Navy in the Far East had not gone unnoticed. In August, for instance, the RCN's diary of German W/T traffic intercepted noted:

Six incoming enigma messages were recorded on the Indian Ocean service (Series 7) originated complete with a serial number in the range X1-X100. This traffic was deemed to have been sent to control by a shore station at the German naval base at Penang.¹

This was also intercepted at Colombo, and on 26 September a signal from C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet to the Staff Officer (Y) Wellington read:

A shore station fixed in the PENANG AREA has been heard handling German naval traffic as follows:- Time GMT; 0000 to 1000 on 31700 and 7365 kilocycles/second, 1000 to 1630 on 11470 and 4265 kilocycles/second....

Control used call sign 6K8 but other stations are also active. Traffic consists of five letter code and naval engims [sic] bearing serial number X 001 to 100.

Frequencies in paragraph 1 have been heard being used by U-boats east of about 88 east to 6K8, probably when direct touch with GERMANY cannot be used. Normal U-boat procedure is used. ...²

An annotation by Lieutenant Philpott, the SO(Y) and head of the New Zealand naval 'Y' organisation, instructed the matter be referred to the high-frequency direction-finding (H/F D/F) station at Awarua, requesting these frequencies be monitored, and Awarua was to 'report any results with bearings.'³

The German U-boat U862 arrived in Penang in September 1944 on her first war patrol all the way from Germany. A long-range Type IX D 2, she was commanded by Korvetten-Kapitan Heinrich Timm. U862 had enjoyed an eventful cruise, having sunk five merchantmen en route, four of these in the Mozambique Channel between 13-19 August and shooting down a 265 Squadron Catalina on 20 August when it attacked the

submarine on the surface. Timm made his report to Germany which appears in the B.d.U. War Log on 14 September 1944, by which time U862 had reached Singapore. Apart from the details of the sinkings, he also put in a request for a new patrol.

...U862 requested permission for subsidiary operation of SW-Australia, pointing out time which had been saved at sea, good conditions of the crew, boat and batteries. In spite of a low battery capacity U168 has made the same request before base overhaul in Japan. Commander in Chief Submarines concurs with suggestion (Commander of U862 has sailed this route before as a Merchant Navy Officer).⁴

U168 proceeded on this patrol on 5 October, but was ambushed by a Dutch submarine the following day. The survivors were picked up, and an assessment of German submarine operations in the Far East and U168 would appear in the Royal New Zealand Navy's Weekly Intelligence Summary no.22 of 28 February 1945.⁵ U168 had been caught because the Japanese warned their own shipping as to the German U-boat's course in the initial part of its patrol, and the Japanese signals were intercepted and read by Colombo. U862 did not suffer a similar fate, possibly because of a delay in decryption, and probably also as she took a more direct route from Batavia through Sunda Strait, and headed safely south.

U862 appeared in the daily ULTRA U-boat disposition signal as 'ST' from 2 October 1944 onwards. From as early as 4 October it was noted that ST was going to sail for a patrol in Australian waters. Her presence was deduced by 11 December from the action (below) two days earlier. Similarly, action on 25 December would lead to an estimated relocation 'Off Sidney' [sic]. On 19 January, being last fixed off Sydney, her recall to Batavia was noted. Her estimated position was wildly out. It was not until 11 February that the daily signal noted that ST may have sank another Liberty ship five days before. ULTRA summaries were based on traffic read, including obviously, SKL. By

keeping silence, U862 kept the daily ULTRA signal making estimates, only revised as other physical evidence of presence (surface action, torpedo attacks) came to light. The detail of most of U862's cruise need not concern us here. The U-boat proceeded south in the Indian Ocean and turned east along the southern coast of Australia. On 9 December she attacked the Greek ship *Ilissos* with gunfire southeast of Adelaide, but the merchantman managed to get away. On the night of 24/25 December U862 attacked and eventually sunk the Liberty ship *Robert J. Walker* (7176 tons) about 160 miles southeast of Sydney. On 6 February 1945, the submarine attacked another Liberty ship, the *Peter Silvester*, sinking her several hundred miles off Freemantle.⁶ What was not appreciated at the time, and remained unknown for decades after 1945, was that in the interval between the two sinkings, U862 had sailed around New Zealand.⁷

On New Year's Day 1945 U862 was on course for Cape Maria van Dieman, rounded on 5 January.⁸ She patrolled out to sea from Cape Brett, and navigation being assisted by the aid of the Cape Brett lighthouse. Timm failed to intercept a steamer which his IWO (or First Officer of the Watch) Oberleutenant zur See Gunther Reiffenstuhl, surmised went into a harbour north of Cape Brett, in reality the Bays of Islands harbour at Opuia. They cruised south past Great Barrier Island, down the Coromandel into the Bay of Plenty, and rounded the East Cape lighthouse close in on 13 January. On 15 January U862 lay off Gisborne, Reiffenstuhl recording in his journal:

Close to the land running along by the coast. We are wanting to have a look during the day submerged in the roads by Gisborne to see whether any ships are anchored there or at the docks. But navigating is, one has to say, a pretty nerve-wracking touch and go because we've got very little water below our keel. During the day you can see through the periscope people walking along the street. On the beach one man lights a fire. In the evening we are off the entrance to the harbour, nothing to be seen, the night is again very dark. At the entrance to the harbour we surface and charge our batteries. A bright light lifts from the horizon, which is actually coming from the 12,000 inhabitants

who haven't blacked out their town. We go into the harbour. The docks are brightly illuminated, behind them a big factory. You can see cars with their lights driving along the streets. The street lighting is also very bright, we are absolutely dazzled by it. The houses are all brightly illuminated... Our hopes however, are not fulfilled, because there's no worthwhile ship at anchor or at the docks, which we could have sunk. The people here are all so magnificently unsuspecting. We go about carefully, slip out of the harbour and later are taken up into the open sea without being noticed...⁹

At midday on 15 January the US registered Liberty ship *Stepas Darius* (7176 tons), sailed from Napier, the next port down the coast, bound for Los Angeles. This was just the kind of target U862 was searching for.¹⁰ The following day U862 rounded Portland Island and checked out the coaling pier at Waikokopu, but nothing was there. The U-boat headed across Hawkes Bay for Napier.¹¹

Tied up alongside at Napier was the *M.V. Pukeko* a small 742-ton vessel unloading a cargo of cement. Built by Goole Shipbuilding in 1928 and owned by the Richardson Company, she had just undergone a check that day on three new cylinders installed on the main engines, conducted by the local Surveyor of Ships of the Marine Department.¹² The *Pukeko* was due to sail at 11.45 p.m. that night.¹³

U862 made a careful approach to the Napier harbour entrance after dark and quietly sat off at a distance of around 300-400metres. Timm used the occasion to let most of the crew, in groups of four, come up the conning tower to look at Napier at night. Reiffenstuhl's journal observed:

We... go on the surface at night into the roads of Napier (15,000 inhabitants). As everywhere, no blackout. You can see the beach café with bright red lights, and the dance music is playing old tunes, to which the couples are moving. The town on its hill is glittering with thousands of lights. We don't quite get into the roads, because the lighthouse for inexplicable reasons is not on and a very heavy unpleasant phosphorescence is prevalent. We lay still and just want to have a look around the joint first of all.¹⁴

It was nearly midnight as *Pukeko* slipped her moorings. As she moved away from the wharf, she was being watched. Reiffenstuhl recorded,

After a short while a little steamerling comes out of the harbour, it has even got its running lights set according to peacetime regulations. Everybody in New Zealand seems to feel very safe. Ah well! What is easier than following a steamer with burning lights. We go out of the harbour with it, come very close to another little steamer which just didn't see us because it didn't expect us to be there. In the dawn we dive for the attack – the Kommandant missed! Presumably the steamer at this short distance had seen our very very cautiously raised periscope (the aiming periscope with which you can see better, but which is bigger) or it had seen the track of the torpedo as it turned away. It was 1,000 BRT. Immediately it began sending off Morse signals to the signal station on Portland Island. Now they know about us here and we must push off...¹⁵

The U-boat positioned itself ahead of the *Pukeko* for the attack and fired the torpedo from around 200 metres off the port bow.¹⁶ It may also be the case that the torpedo dinged the side of the ship without exploding as a 'defective plate' on the port side was replaced many months later. If Captain Stan Petley of the *Pukeko* did use his Hamilton Wilson Type TL3 transmitter to signal Portland Island that morning, the message was not received.¹⁷ While the ship's logs have been burnt, the log of the Marine Department Lighthouse on Portland Island does not mention any signal received.¹⁸ Things were not perfect at the lighthouse that day. The tower in the lighthouse was not manned between 0450 hours and 1940 hours. The Principal Keeper, H.R.Young went off ill from 0900. the 1st Assistant Keeper, L.G.Brennan, was to look after charging the radio batteries, the meteorological report, keep a lookout, assist in cleaning out the Benzine tank, and do some gardening. J.G. Puflett, the 2nd Assistant Keeper was to keep lookout, help with the Benzine tank, the met duty, and deal with a 44 gallon oil drum. Brennan was lookout from 0450 to 0800 hours, Young from 0800 to 0900 hours, and Puflett from 0900 to 1500 hours. The radio does not appear to have been manned, as the 'Wireless Watch' section of the log is empty, whereas up to 13 January 1945 this had been consistently filled in as

‘Skeds’.¹⁹ It appears quite likely that if the *Pukeko* radioed, it went unnoticed. It would also seem to be the case that the crew of the ship, if they had been aware of something amiss, were not in the long run concerned about it, for nothing was reported. A metallic clang on the side may have been simply dismissed, after a while. All of this is speculation, but the U-boat slipped away to the south. The 17 and 18 January was spent heading south towards Wellington. On 19 January the U862 was off Cook Strait, waiting for shipping.²⁰ A Cook Strait ferry would have made a nice target. Unfortunately, the U-boat was abruptly ordered by a signal from SKL in Berlin to return immediately to Batavia. Timm kept wireless silence. U862 ventured south to round the bottom of the South Island on 21 January,²¹ and after a long unpleasant passage in the face of the Roaring ‘Forties, she found the Liberty ship *Peter Silvester* in the Indian Ocean on 6 February, and sank her. On her passage back, U862 kept wireless silence until she was not far from Batavia. On 9 and 14 February Timm signalled a short breakdown of his patrol and his imminent arrival at the rendezvous point.²² It was U862’s last war patrol.

What then can be concluded about U862 in New Zealand waters in January 1945? Firstly, it indicated that in spite of Awarua being careful to watch for signal traffic from the Indian Ocean U-boats and their bases, if a submarine kept wireless silence, its location was secure until an attack was mounted or a sighting made. Even then, the attack would have to be recognised as such. Secondly, getting a D/F fix was in any case not a guarantee the submarine would be located by hunting forces. Thirdly, it is clear from the impressions of the crew of U862 that New Zealand had fallen back into a full peacetime environment, as loose as that which prevailed when the *Orion* mined the approaches to Auckland in 1940. Kapitan Timm with a little more luck could have made

a modest killing on his cruise down the east coast of the North Island, as an analysis of shipping movements discloses. Some thirty-one ships sailed from New Zealand ports in January 1945, not counting local coasters, fishing vessels or miscellaneous small craft. Of those larger vessels, only a small proportion were at sea in the general area of U862.²³

There were a number of ships shuttling back and forth between the main New Zealand supply ports of Auckland and Napier and the Allied forward area in the Pacific Islands. The US Naval auxiliary AF19 *Roamer* sailed from Napier for Noumea on 9 January, presumably passing U862 in the Cape Brett area. On 9 January the AF20 *Taurus* left Auckland at 0700 hours for Espiritu Santos, passing through the waters off Cape Brett. Another US Naval auxiliary, the AK71 *Adhan* departed Auckland the same day for Noumea, but does not appear to have been sighted by the U-boat. Another US Naval auxiliary, AF24 the *Delphinus* departed Napier for Noumea on 10 January. This illustrates the difficulties of sighting vessels in uncrowded waters. That said, U862 had sunk four ships in four days in the far wider Mozambique Channel in August 1944.²⁴

A tempting naval target was to hover unseen in front of U862 over a few days. At 0640 hours on 10 January, HMNZS *Matai* set off towing the minesweeper HMNZS *Arbutus*, heading out through Colville Channel past Cuvier lighthouse bound for Lyttelton. The submarine was still off Cape Brett, but she would head south following the two New Zealand warships over the next few days. Having dropped off *Arbutus*, the *Matai* steamed back to Wellington, arriving as the submarine headed down the Wairarapa coast.²⁵

As U862 passed the Great Barrier Island, the Greek registered *George M. Ebiricos* departed Auckland on 12 January for Sydney. Heading directly towards U862

the same day was the US Naval auxiliary AK96 *Sterope* from Wellington, steaming in through Colville Channel at 1628 hours. A little later, and she would have run into the U-Boat. On 14 January, the AK91 *Corcaroli* left Auckland at 0747 hours for Wellington, arriving there on the afternoon of 16 January. She must have passed the submarine en route. We have already noted the good fortune of the *Stepas Darius* sailing from Napier on 15 January, and the even better luck of the *Pukeko*.²⁶ AK76 *Celeno* left Wellington on 15 January and arrived in Auckland on 17 January. AK75 *Cassiopeia* arrived in Wellington from Torokina on 18 January.

There was one other long shot. The alternative of returning north via New Caledonia to Yokohama or to Batavia through the Southern and Indian Oceans were discussed by the officers as U862 headed down the Wairarapa coast in the direction of Wellington and the approaches to Cook Strait. If they had decided to proceed north and taken a leisurely pace, they may have run into the battleship HMS *Howe* in company with HMNZS *Achilles* and the destroyers *Queensborough*, *Quality* and *Quadrant* en route to Auckland from Sydney between 2 and 5 February.²⁷ There were clearly targets around for the U-boat, and it was simply good luck that nothing was sunk. To compound matters, the RNZAF Catalina Squadron was deployed in the Pacific Islands, and the small number of Sunderlands that had just arrived were not equipped with depth charge racks, so a swift and effective response to an attack may not have been forthcoming.²⁸

¹ German Atlantic W/T Organisation, Traffic and Procedure, Royal Canadian Navy, S-1440-18 OIC3.

² Signal C.inC. Eastern Fleet to SO(Y), 26 September 1944, W/T Intelligence – Foreign Broadcasts, April 1940-September 1945, New Zealand National Archives N 2 08/36/10.

³ Ibid.

⁴ B.d.U. War Log, 14 September 1944, Translation of PG/30361, University of Canterbury Microfilm Library.

⁵ WIS no.22, 28 February 1945, Weekly Intelligence Summary NZNA N 11 no.8.

⁶ U-boat Dispositions, 2 October 1944-17 February 1945, ULTRA PRO HW 4/2; S.D.Waters Royal New Zealand Navy War History Branch 1956 p.222; David Stevens U-Boat Far From Home Allen & Unwin 1997 Chapters 12 & 14; David Jenkins Battle Surface! Japan's Submarine War Against Australia 1942-44 Random House 1992 pp.286-287.

⁷ Stevens Chapter 13; Reiffenstuhl Journal, December 1944-February 1945 U-Boat Archives, Cuxhaven. Gunther Reiffenstuhl was IWO on U-862.

⁸ Reiffenstuhl Journal, translated by Dr.Stan Jones, German Department, University of Waikato May 1992; entry for 5 January 1945.

⁹ Reiffenstuhl Journal 15 January 1945.

¹⁰ Letter from A.J.de Landes, Port of Napier, to author, 23 July 1992, reference shipping movements 15-16 January 1945 in and out of Napier; 15-16 January 1945, Navy Office War Diary 1939-1945 NZNA N 14/2.

¹¹ Reiffenstuhl Journal 15-16 January 1945.

¹² J.G.Shackie, Surveyor of Ships to Chief Surveyor of Ships, Wellington, 16 January 1945, M.V.*Pukeko* Box 146, Marine Department Ship File, NZNA M 22; *Pukeko* NZNA BAAD A 195/42e.

¹³ Letter de Landes to author, 23 July 1992.

¹⁴ Reiffenstuhl Journal 16 January 1945; maps show three wharves, dredged channel to 30' to 35', and outer mole, Defence of Minor Ports – Napier, March 1942-June 1944, NZNA N 2 020/7/1.

¹⁵ Reiffenstuhl Journal 16 January 1945.

¹⁶ Letter from Gerald Shone, 9 December 1997, and June questions to crew of U-862 by Gerald Shone at reunion in Germany.

¹⁷ *Pukeko* NZNA BAAD A 195/42e.

¹⁸ Enquiry to Union Steamship Company elicited that the deck logs of the Richardson Company ships were destroyed when Union Steamship Company took over Richardsons; Daily Journal, 16 January 1945, Marine Lighthouse Portland Island NZNA ML 1 no.12.

¹⁹ Daily Journal, 16 January 1945, Marine Lighthouse Portland Island NZNA ML 1 no.12.

²⁰ Reiffenstuhl Journal 17-19 January 1945.

²¹ Reiffenstuhl Journal 21 January 1945.

²² Signals from U.862 on 9,14 February 1945 noted in Stevens op.cit. footnote 25, p.260.

²³ January 1945, Navy Office War Diary NZNA N 2 14/8.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Letter from Mr.Brian Layne, Sunderland pilot, to author, 23 November 1994.

File

ULTRA

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

U-Boat Dispositions.
(U-Boats in Indian Ocean underlined).

Date: 24th November, 1944.

U-Boat.	Location.	Remarks.
A)	JAPAN.	Fitting new battery.
E)		
X <u>FB</u>	Either between <u>SABANG</u> and <u>PENANG</u> or approaching <u>BATAVIA</u> .	
<u>N</u>	<u>PENANG</u> .	
<u>P</u>	On patrol off North or West Coast of <u>AUSTRALIA</u> , possibly in vicinity of <u>DARWIN</u> .	
<u>Q</u>	<u>PENANG</u> .	
<u>SD</u>	<u>41°30'S 19°E.</u> <u>41 degs S.</u> <u>24 degs E.</u>	On passage to <u>EUROPE</u> with cargo of rubber.
<u>SF</u>	<u>BATAVIA</u> .	
<u>SS</u>	<u>BATAVIA</u> .	
<u>ST</u>	<u>SCURABAYA</u> .	Will probably sail shortly to operate in <u>AUSTRALIAN</u> area, possibly off South West or South Coast.
<u>SV</u>	<u>28°S 31°30'E</u> <u>31 degs S.</u> <u>36 degs E.</u>	If not sunk, will proceed through the <u>MOZAMBIQUE</u> Channel to operate West of <u>OSCOTRA</u> .
<u>T</u>	<u>SINGAPORE</u> .	
I-8)	JAPAN.	Refitting.
I-765)		
<u>RO-109</u>	Possibly in <u>SINGAPORE</u> .	
<u>RO-111</u>)	May shortly arrive to join 8th Submarine Squadron.	
<u>RB-112</u>)		
<u>RO-113</u>)	<u>PENANG</u> .	
<u>RO-115</u>)		
	Distribution: F E T O Kandy	

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U L I M

File.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

U-Boat Dispositions.

(U-Boats in Indian Ocean underlined).

Date: 7th January, 1945.

U-Boat.	Location.	Remarks.
A	Japan.	Fitting new battery. . . Completes 5th Feb. May then operate off LEYTE.
<u>E</u>	Batavia.	Docked on arrival from Japan on 23rd. To sail for Europe in early January.
<u>FB</u>	Batavia.	
<u>FC</u>	Batavia.	
<u>N</u>	Batavia.	To sail for Europe early January fuelling from "SS".
<u>Q</u>	33° 84' E. 31° 568' E.	Proceeding to Bergen. Has only two torpedoes.
<u>SD</u>	Batavia.	To sail for Europe before 15th January, possibly fuelling "E".
<u>SS</u>	Sourabaya or Batavia.	Will sail to fuel "N" for passage to Europe. Not clear whether she will continue or return to Batavia, possibly carrying out patrol on way back.
<u>ST</u>	On patrol off S. Australia.	Last fixed on 24th December off Sidney.
<u>T</u>	Singapore.	Leaves for Japan 15th January.
<u>WE</u>	Japan.	Completes repairs, docking and alterations 10th Feb. To be used as Supply U-boat in East Asia.
RO-115	Probably now returning to Base	

File

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

U-Boat Dispositions.

(U-Boats in Indian Ocean underlined).

Date: 19th January, 1945.

U-Boat.	Location.	Remarks.
<u>A</u>	Japan.	Completes fitting new battery 5th February, after which operates in Philippines area.
<u>E</u>	15° S, 99° E.	Sailed from Batavia 13th January for Europe. To be fuelled by "FB".
<u>FB</u>	Batavia, or may have now sailed to overtake "E" and fuel her.	
<u>FC</u>	Docking, probably	in Singapore. Proceeds to Sourabaya on completion.
<u>N</u>	¹⁷ 20 ° S, 95° E.	Sailed from Batavia 11th January for Europe. To be fuelled by "SS".
<u>Q</u>	40° S, 36° E.	Proceeding to Bergen.
<u>SD</u>	Penang.	Repairing. May proceed to operate in Philippines area on completion.
<u>SS</u>	14° S, 100° E.	Sailed Batavia 14th January to overtake "N" and fuel her.
<u>ST</u>	Possibly in vicinity of 36° S, 131° E.	Ordered on 17th to return to Batavia forthwith.
<u>WE</u>	Japan or Malaya.	Completes refit 10th February. To be used as supply U-boat in East Asia.
<u>WH</u>	Singapore.	Proceeding to Japan on 23rd, presumably to fit new battery.
RO-113 RC-115)Sail from Penang)be the U-boats, previously thought to be leaving on 16th, who are to fuel at Singapore and proceed to operate in Philippine area.	These are believed to

Appendix Six

**Reporting Officer's Report to Staff Officer (Intelligence)
On von Luckner.
[RNZN Museum]**

FROM. The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "PHILOMEL".
DATE. 24th February, 1938. No. P. 38/8/2916
TO. The Commodore Commanding New Zealand Station
(Copy to Staff Officer(Intelligence), Wellington.)

SUBJECT. GERMAN SCHOONER "SEA DEVIL".

0139/1/1

Count Felix von Luckner, accompanied by the Countess and the following crew, arrived in Auckland from Apia on 20th February, onboard his yacht, the "SENTEUFEL":-

Faul Krause	1st Officer
Paul Kunert	Engineer
Gregor Rietzmaier	Radio Operator
Karl Muller	Boatswain
Frederick Thiele	A.B.
Otto Katschke	A.B.
Helm Winter	Cook
Hans Oesterreich	Camarero

2. The yacht has been berthed near the slipway in St. Mary's Bay and it is anticipated that the duration of the visit will be 2 to 3 months.

3. The Count expressed a desire to call on myself and the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. "WELLINGTON", accompanied by the Countess, he called onboard "PHILOMEL" on 23rd February, during the forenoon. He was extremely friendly, theatrical and verbose, talking continuously for nearly an hour on Jutland, his prisoner of war time in New Zealand and present day Germany's aims. There was no necessity at any time to ask him questions or express an opinion as the Count 'held the floor' and went from one subject to another. The fact that he had been court-martialled in my cabin when the "PHILOMEL" was in Wellington was of interest to him and was the means of starting him talking about his time as prisoner of war.

4. It was noticed that the Countess, who spoke English very well indeed, was thoroughly conversant with all the Count had to talk about; she had evidently heard it many times before and one was left with the impression that she was listening, ready to change the subject if his enthusiasm carried him away and lead him to subjects which might have been indiscreet.

5. The Count voluntarily expounded Hitler's policy which was as follows :- 'That Germany has no intention of fighting England or France but intended to stamp out Bolshevism, i.e. Russia. Germany was glad that Mr. Anthony Eden had resigned as he was against their expansion to the East and it was felt that things would be better with Viscount Halifax as Foreign Secretary. The control or conversion to Fascism or Nazism of Austria, Roumania and Czechoslovakia was all part of Hitler's plan to ensure that when he attacked Russia, all countries to the East of Germany would be on Germany's side. Japan, after her campaign in China, would then attack or at least hold Russia in the East. Count von Luckner gave it as his opinion that next August or September, when the harvest was in, would see the start of Germany's expansion to the East, in other words, Germany and Japan against Russia.

6. Why the Count... ..

6. Why the Count should have made these remarks is difficult to understand but it is certain that his cruise, which he says is being made for pleasure, includes preaching the aims of Germany or the gospel of Nazism wherever he goes. Since his arrival in Auckland he has been speaking on the wireless daily and intends giving a lecture in the Town Hall on the 24th February.

7. The list of persons forming the crew of "SEETEUPEL" has been checked and agrees with the list given in the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Wellington's No. N.A. 16/8/4 of 24th January, 1938, with the exception that a boy named Frederick Kurt Hufnagel-Bathen whose father is a member of the Samoan administration was given a passage from Apia to Auckland.

8. Echo-sounding gear is installed.

9. Long, medium and short-wave wireless sets are installed and it is believed that a D/F set is also fitted.

10. It has not yet been possible to find out if the "SEETEUPEL" called at any 'unusual' ports in the South Atlantic or Indian Oceans.

11. No mention has been made regarding showing of films.

12. Particulars of "SEETEUPEL" are :-

Tonnage. 54 tons.

Oil fired. Diesel engine developing 150 h.p.

COMMANDER IN COMMAND.

Appendix Seven

**Coastwatching Organisation and Guide to Personnel
1938
[EA1 81/6/2]**

EAI

3/6/2

ONS

Papers

(To be distributed to Coast Watching
Stations).

PAPER O.N.S. 90.

SECRET.

Copy No. 6

ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.

COAST WATCHING ORGANIZATION.

- Notes:
1. The Coast Watching Organization explained herein will not be brought into force until a definite instruction to that effect is received.
 2. Your attention is directed to the necessity of keeping these instructions and all other Coast Watching Papers in a safe place, and of treating all correspondence as SECRET.

OBJECT OF THE ORGANIZATION.

1. (a) To maintain a watch on ships and aircraft which can be seen from the coast of New Zealand;
- (b) To report any abnormality in the movements of or appearance of the ships or aircraft sighted to a responsible Naval Officer.

List of Coast Watching Stations:

2. The list of stations to be established in an emergency is given in Appendix A to this memorandum. The list is divided into four Districts for convenience of administration.

Communications:

3. It is essential that a suitable means of communication be provided without delay between each of the stations enumerated in Appendix A and the office of the Naval Intelligence Officer of the District in which the station is situated. To this end the Post and Telegraph Department will provide whatever extension lines are necessary between the actual Coast Watching points and the nearest telephone or Public Telephone Office. Some details of these requirements are given in Appendix A.

4. It is not considered necessary to extend the telephone lines or to instal W/T equipment prior to an emergency taking place.

Personnel:

5. Each Station should have sufficient personnel to maintain a watch continuously throughout the full 24 hours each day. Hands additional to peace-time requirements are not to be engaged for this purpose until the instruction is received (see Note at head of Paper).

Detailed Instructions:

6. Attached also to this Paper is a Guide (O.N.S.91) for issue to the watchers, giving detailed instructions about the reports and information that are required.

Equipment:

7. The equipment of a Coast Watching Station should comprise the following:-

- (a) A suitably sheltered position in which to keep watch;
- (b) Means of communication with the Naval District Intelligence Officer;
- (c) Binoculars or telescope;
- (d) Telegraph forms and record book.

E A I
21/6/2

Copy No. 6
14th September, 1938

ONS
ONS P. 15
D. 3

GUIDE TO PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN COAST WATCHING DUTIES.

Coast Watching Station: _____

District: _____

Officer to whom reports should be sent: "District Naval Intelligence Officer" - _____

Telephone No. of D.N.I.O. (To be supplied when available)

Telegraphic code address of D.N.I.O: "NAVYTELL"

Introduction.

Coast Watching Stations are established in time of war or proclaimed imminence of war to ensure that any information of normal or unusual movements off the coast of vessels or aircraft, of landings, activities of what may be suspected to be enemy parties on the coast and of activities of enemy agents, are reported immediately to the proper authorities.

Reporting.

2. All reports are to be made by urgent telegram (or telephoned immediately) to the District Naval Intelligence Officer (D.N.I.O.) as above. All messages are to be numbered consecutively and carbon copies kept for reference.

3. It is most important that information is passed to your D.N.I.O. as soon as possible after it becomes available, so that immediate action can be taken by the authorities concerned if necessary. The initial report can always and should always when possible be supplemented by a further message giving a more detailed description of the sighting or incident (see paragraph 5).

INFORMATION REQUIRED.

Ships and Aircraft.

4. As soon as a ship of war, aircraft, merchant vessel or fishing craft of any nationality has been sighted, a message is to be written out on a telegram form in the following form and despatched immediately by telegraph or telephone to your D.N.I.O. (see paragraphs 1, 2 and 3).

- (1) Number of message (in figures).
- (2) Time sighted.
- (3) Direction and distance in miles from your Station or from a well defined position.
- (4) Number of vessels or aircraft sighted (in words).
- (5) Nationality (if unknown, fact to be reported).

- (6) Name(s) or distinguishing mark(s) (when practicable) or type(s). (If name or distinguishing number cannot be ascertained, fact to be stated).
- (7) Direction in which proceeding.
- (8) Estimated speed.
- (9) Date and time message is written out.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED.

5. Any additional information, if attainable, should be reported later in a further message. The following will give you a guide as to the information required.

Merchant vessels or fishing craft on their normal routes.

6. Unless a considerable alteration in course is made, it is not necessary to report the further movements of a friendly or neutral ship which has already been reported.

Warships or suspicious craft.

7. In reporting the sighting of warships or suspicious craft, however, the following additional details should subsequently be reported in so far as it is possible for them to be distinguished:-

- (a) Number and position of masts and funnels, whether upright or sloping and, in the case of funnels, whether squat or high.
- (b) Colour of hull, upper works and funnel(s).
- (c) Shape of bow and stern.
- (d) Estimated length and tonnage.
- (e) Number, position and size of guns.
- (f) Number of torpedo tubes.
- (g) Particulars of construction or painting; whether well-decked or flush decked; conspicuous derricks or ventilators.
- (h) Whether fitted with W/T.
- (i) Reasons for which considered suspicious in the case of suspicious craft.
- (j) Date and time of previous message (if any) to which this information refers.

Aircraft.

8. In the case of aircraft, when the distinguishing marks cannot be given, as full details as possible as to type are required, especially whether biplane, or monoplane, number of engines, and whether fitted with boat-shaped hull, floats or wheels.

Submarines.

9. In reporting the sighting of submarines the following additional details should be forwarded if possible when obtainable:-

- (a) Whether submerged (i.e., whether the periscope only was seen) or on the surface.
- (b) Description of submarine, stating estimated dimensions, number and position of guns.
- (c) Name of ship attacked (if any).
- (d) Whether ship sunk, sinking, damaged or escaped.
- (e) Date and time of previous message (if any) to which this information refers.

Mines.

10. In reporting information about or the sighting of mines, the following particulars are required, the message taking the following form:-

- (1) Number of message (in figures).
- (2) Date, time and exact position sighted.
- (3) Whether moored mine, moored mine awash or drifting mine.

Note: The nomenclature given in 6(3) is invariably to be used:-

Moored Mine	- A submerged mine attached to its moorings.
Moored mine awash	- A moored mine showing on the surface.
Drifting mine	- A mine detached from its moorings, but which is floating on the surface, at the will of the wind and tide.

- (4) Type, if recognized, otherwise a brief description giving full particulars as to horns visible.
- (5) Appearance (i.e., old, fairly new or new. This can be estimated by the amount of marine growth or its absence).
- (6) Colour painted.
- (7) Date and time message is written out.

GUN FIRE.

14. In reporting sounds of gun fire endeavour is to be made to give some indication of its character, the message taking the following form :-

- (1) Number of message (in figures).
- (2) Nature of gun (i.e., sounds are sharp or resembling thunder).
- (3) Whether continuous or intermittent.
- (4) Near or distant.
- (5) Direction from which sound comes.
- (6) Direction and force of wind.
- (7) Visibility in direction from which sound comes.
- (8) Date and time message is written out.

LANDINGS AND ENEMY ACTIVITIES.

12. Information regarding the landings, activities and movements of enemy parties should be reported in a message written out in the following form:-

- (1) Number of message (in figures).
- (2) Date and time landings or enemy activities were noticed.
- (3) Exact, or approximate, locality landing party was sighted or activity of enemy agent took place.
- (4) Details of landings, activities and movements of enemy parties (approximate number of troops, vehicles, how landed etc.).
- (5) Whether landings, activities etc. were observed by you; if not, source of information should be indicated.
- (6) Date and time message is written out.

MINOR ORDERS RE MESSAGES.

13. All messages sent by a War Watching Station are to be signed by the name of the War Watching Station only. This name is to be written at the foot of the form.

14. The originals of all messages received and carbon copies of all messages sent are to be kept for reference until orders for their destruction are received from your D.I.O.

15. The information contained in this guide is not to be communicated to unauthorised persons.

Appendix Eight

Map showing Post Office Radio September 1942
[N1 10/19/1]

MUSICK POINT:

COMMUNICATIONS & DIRECTION-FINDING SERVICES TO TASMAN EMPIRE AIRWAYS, PAN-AMERICAN AIRWAYS & SIMILAR SERVICE TO R.N.Z.A.F. & ALLIED FORCES AIRCRAFT; BOTH INTERNAL, & TRANS-OCEAN.
 COMMERCIAL SCHEDULES WITH U.S.A. (R.C.A.)
 " " " UNITED KINGDOM
 METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES.
 POINT TO POINT SERVICES WITH SUVA, NOUMEA, SYDNEY ETC.
 CONTINUOUS WATCH ON 500 kc/s FOR SHIPS IN DISTRESS: ALSO 2012 kc/s SMALL SHIPS WATCH.
NAVAL SERVICES:-
 DIRECTION-FINDING ON H.F. & M.F.

WAIPAPAKAURI:-
NAVAL: HIGH FREQUENCY & MEDIUM FREQ. DIRECTION FINDING SERVICES. 500 KC/S CONTINUOUS WATCH FOR SHIPS IN DISTRESS. DIRECTION FINDING FACILITIES PROVIDED TO R.N.Z.A.F.

U.S.A. FORCES STATION: AUCKLAND FROM THIS STATION CERTAIN OF THE TRANSMITTERS AT MUSICK PT. ARE KEYED.

WAIOURU:-
 PROPOSED COMBINED ARMED SERVICES STATION.

MAKARA: RADIO RECEIVING CENTRE TO COVER ALL RECEIVING REQUIREMENTS OF WELLINGTON, INCLUDING THOSE OF NATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICE.


JOHNSONVILLE: TRANSMITTING CENTRE. AUXILIARY TO WELLINGTON - RADIO FOR DIVERSITY PURPOSES.

WELLINGTON RADIO SERVICES:-
 NAVAL SERVICES
 METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES
 COMMERCIAL SERVICES U.S.A. (MACKAY RADIO).
 " " UNITED KINGDOM.
 " " PACIFIC ISLANDS, SUVA, APIA, TONGA, NIUE, TAHITI, ETC.
 24 HOUR WATCH ON 500 KC/S (MERCHANT VESSEL DISTRESS WATCH).
 2012 KC/S SMALL SHIP SERVICE
 AERADIO SERVICES
 SERVICES TO LIGHTHOUSE STATIONS

AT NAPIER, BLENHEIM, TAIERI
 AERADIO STNS. A 24 HOUR WATCH ON 500 KC/S IS MAINTAINED FOR SHIPS IN DISTRESS. & D.F. BEARINGS TAKEN ON SUCH VESSELS, ON BEHALF OF NAVAL AUTHORITIES.

AWARUA RADIO SERVICES:- NAVAL SPECIAL WATCHES:
 M.F. & H.F. DIRECTION FINDING: RECEPTION BRITISH OFFICIAL PRESS:
 500 KC/S CONTINUOUS MERCHANT VESSEL DISTRESS WATCH:
 2012 KC/S WATCH FOR SMALL SHIPS: METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE:
 SERVICES TO OUTLYING STATIONS JACKSONS BAY, MILFORD SD. & TO MARINE DEPTS. LIGHTHOUSE STATIONS, ETC.

APPROXIMATION OF POST OFFICE RADIO SERVICES SEPT. 1942.



SECRET

Appendix Nine

**Coastwatchers in trouble: Controller of Pacific Communications
On the situation in the Gilberts 3 October 1942.
[Vaughan Papers]**

CONTROLLER OF PACIFIC COMMUNICATIONS,
SUVA.

3rd October, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM for:

The Naval Secretary,
Navy Office,
WELLINGTON, C.1.

(Through the Director-General,
Post and Telegraph Department;
WELLINGTON, C.1.)

(Copy to N. J. N. F. O. Suva)

N.A. 030/33/17, 24.8.42. N.Z.C.B. 017 Part II, monthly reports by parent stations.

PLEASE NOTE
2 PAPERS
CIRCULATED
HEREWITH.

I attach for your information further reports submitted by Mr. D.L. Vaughan, Operator in Charge, Radio Funafuti, covering the operation of coast-watching stations in the Ellice Group for the months of July and August.

The following extracts from a further communication received from Mr. Vaughan are submitted for your information:-

- "1. The gear for BYC, Niutao, has been ready for some time now although the receiver is not very good. We can hear very little on it in the daytime but of course it is only a TRF. I found that the inter-stage transformer was open-circuited recently and have now changed the plate circuit of the detector to Impedance-Coupling. This equipment for BYC has again been erected in the bush almost at the northern-most end of the main islet here. The transmitter can be operated anywhere between about 24 and 45 metres.
2. All of the equipment is working very well at present although I have been alarmed at the number of things which have become open-circuited, possibly owing to the humidity.
3. Mr. Taylor is, as you know, doing a great job up there and both he and Murray are resigned to their fate. The suspense over the last year has been considerable and you can imagine their feelings when each of their stations is taken without an LLLL call being heard. We are indeed fortunate to be so far south - not far enough for me!! Personally I shall be very pleased when the opportunity to return to civilization occurs.
4. I anticipate that our present supply of fuel will (if necessary) last until about the middle of March of next year. Three drums have been set aside for BYC but it appears that the installation of that station will not now take place.

26
69
162



FOR A...
please.
A.L.L.
/ /

File N.A. 030/33/17

13 OCT 1942

night that he expected it any day and I understand that he has equipment hidden in the bush. We have for a considerable time had codes and call-signs decided upon in the event of an attack on either parent station. If the Japs leave Beru Mr. Taylor may be able to get on the air on a frequency of 6520 kc/s on which frequency we will listen henceforth, at suitable times. We have a crystal for that frequency while he will have a small self-excited rig.


6. I shall now assume control of the remaining three substations and I understand that BYL, Kuria, (Mr. Hearn) will come in only if he has traffic. At 9.30 a.m. this morning we contacted BYM, Tamana, (qsa 3) who then contacted BYX, Nonouti, and both stations gave us qru. BYX, Nonouti, is still experiencing receiver trouble and ~~and~~ gave BYM only qsa 1. We are of course only able to copy these stations when the channel on 7 mcs is clear.

7. Beru is a very hard place to get on to and as the warships approached in daylight there is no doubt that the operators were able to completely demolish their equipment. ZCC kept his usual schedule with us at 5 a.m. but did not call his subs at 6.30 a.m. He commenced calling LLLL at 7.6 a.m. on 3.7 mcs but could not hear our replies. He then called several times on 7 mcs and received our qsl ok. He was last heard at 7.15 a.m."

There have been no reports of signals from Beru on 6520 kc/s and it would appear that Mr. Taylor was not able to bring the emergency station into operation. It is also assumed that during the period that the native operator was transmitting the LLLL signals on the Teleradio set, Messrs Taylor and Murray may have been engaged on the destruction of documents and the 100 watt transmitter.

A. F. Steel
4

Controller of Pacific Communications.



~~SECRET~~

COAST WATCHERS - PACIFIC ISLANDS.

NOMINAL ROLL PERSONNEL WITH SERVICE ON CW STATIONS WHO HAVE NOW BEEN TRANSFERRED TO FIJI OR RETURNED TO N.Z.

Post:	Duty	No:	Rank:	Name:	Date embarked:	Date of return to N.Z. or Transferred to Fiji:
Nanumea	SC	64911	Pte.	Rayner, C.W.	19.7.41*	Tr. to Fiji 8.8.43.
	SC	64920	"	Walker, F.H.	19.7.41*	Tr. to Fiji 8.8.43.
	P&T	012799	"	Hopkins, M.H.	13.7.41	Tr. to Fiji 31.5.43.
	"	250993	"	Goodman, R.O.	13.7.41B	Tr. to Fiji Jan 1943.
Nui	SC	64030	"	Beaton, D.R.	19.7.41*	Tr. to Fiji 11.10.41.
	SC	64343	"	Corin, C.E.	19.7.41*	Tr. to Fiji 8.8.43
Nukefetau	SC	64425	"	Love, A.	19.7.41*	To NZ 1.5.43.
	SC	64411	"	Hall, A.R.	19.7.41*	To NZ 29.11.42.
Niulakita	SC	64333	"	Burns, R.C.	19.7.41*	Tr. to Fiji 8.8.43.
	SC	63922	"	Cooper, J.T.	19.7.41*	Tr. to Fiji 8.8.43.
	P&T	805264	"	Anderson, N.I.	13.7.41*	Tr. to Fiji 25.5.43.
	* Embarked from Fiji.					
Nomuka	SC	69405	L/Adr.	Lock, J.J.	2.1.42	To NZ 26.2.43.
	SC	69407	Gnr	Henderson, H.E.	2.1.42	To NZ 26.2.43. Re-embarked for Kermadecs 16.7.43.
Fiji	SC	801096	L/Cpl	Thorpe, G.W.	17.10.42	To N.Z. 26.2.43.
Fata	SC	61178	L/Bdr	Hutchinson, G.	2.1.42	10.4.43. To NZ.
	SC	69408	Gnr	Barnsdall, H.	2.1.42	19.8.42, "
Kermadecs	SC	47914	Pte	Drylie, D.	16.8.41	31.12.41 "
	SC	47862	"	Baker, W.N.	16.8.41	5.5.42 "
	SC	47915	"	Jacobsen, W.J.	16.8.41	5.5.42 "
	SC	74839	"	Lusk, R.W.	25.4.42	24.10.42 "
	SC	47869	Sgt	Hatton, G.	16.8.41	24.10.42 "
	SC	74836	Pte	Collis, R.W.	25.4.42	9.4.43 "
	SC	72387	"	Lewes, E.	22.1.42	9.4.43 "
	+SC	76507	Cpl	Goodwin, F.H.	9.6.42	9.4.43 "
	+Re-embarked for Rakahanga 1.9.43					
	SC	590698	Pte	Spooner, B.G.	13.10.42	8.7.43 "
	SC	70880	"	Sharpe, B.	24.3.43	21.8.43 "
Rakahanga	SC	47868	"	Hatherly, G.E.	16.8.41	6.7.42 "
	SC	47867	L/Cpl	Murray, J.J.	16.8.41	6.7.42 "
Nassau	SC	47863	"	Blanchfield, A.G.	16.8.41	6.7.42 "
	SC	47864	Pte	Clarke, W.H.	16.8.41	6.7.42 "
Suwarrow	SC	74838	L/Cpl	McAngus, A.D.	14.5.42	28.8.42 "
Chatham Is.	CW	175405	Pte	Bloomfield, W.	24.8.42	16.2.43 "
	CW	580645	"	Wright, F.	24.8.42	5.4.43 "
	CW	8743	L/Cpl	Timmins, C.W.	24.8.42	5.4.43 "
	CW	491428	Pte	Neilther, J.	23.9.42	5.4.43 "
	CW	497943	"	Gensik, J.F.G.	23.9.42	5.4.43 "
	CW	809126	L/Cpl	McDavitt, C.M.	11.9.42	9.3.43 "
	CW	454636	Pte	Miller, A.	11.7.42	9.3.43 "
	CW	375387	"	Bareham, W.G.	19.1.43	15.3.43 "

AD1 323/510

Coastwatchers, Pacific Islands, Nominal Roll

Post:	Duty:	No.:	Rank:	Name:	
Kermadecs	SC	417480	Cpl	Miller, D.E.	
	SC	590361	Pte	Moffat, J.	24.3.43
	SC	81345	Sgmn	Wilton, R.A.	25.6.43
	SC	69407	Gnr	Henderson, H.	16.7.43
	SC	251038	Pte	Medland, A.J.	24.3.43
	P&T	085660	Sgt	Gardner, A.L.	16.7.43
	P&T	644222	Pte	Ingram, A.W.W.	1.9.43
(a) Rakahanga	SC	67887	L/Cpl	Henderson, J.	Returning to N.Z. Embkd ^{from NZ} 14.5.42
	SC	67899	Pte	Paterson, E.J.	" " 14.5.42
	SC	76507	Cpl	Goodwin, F.H.	Replacement. " 1.9.43
	P&T	001143	Cpl	Pittaway, H.E.	Returning to N.Z. " 19.8.41B
	P&T	641031	Cpl	Littler, J.W.	Replacement. " 1.9.43
(a) Nassau	SC	6442	L/Cpl	Bryant, L.J.	Returning to N.Z. " 14.5.42
	SC	74837	Pte	Moir, A.W.	" " " 14.5.42
	SC	506619	Cpl	McCarty, W.R.	Replacement. " 1.9.43
	SC	525714	Pte	Hickey, L.F.	" " 1.9.43
	P&T	441953	Cpl	Williams, T.E.	Returning to N.Z. " 14.5.42
	P&T	459726	Cpl	Gordon, D.L.	Replacement. " 1.9.43.
(a) Suwarow	SC	521461	Pte	Bourke, S.W.	Returning to N.Z. " 27.9.42
	SC	74849	Pte	Tither, J.	" " " 14.5.42
	SC	545920	Cpl	Muir, A.	Replacement. " 1.9.43
	SC	623691	Pte	Lupton, D.R.	" " 1.9.43
	P&T	252391	Cpl	Smart, H.	Returning to N.Z. " 14.5.42
	P&T	622767	Cpl	Heron, A.J.	Replacement. " 1.9.43
Pukapuka	SC	507551	Cpl	Willcock, H.E.J.	1.9.43
	SC	499857	Pte	Hair, H.G.	1.9.43
	P&T	639282	Cpl	Davis, L.J.	1.9.43
Tonga	P&T	461564	Cpl	Wasley, J.E.	2.1.42
	P&T	30576	"	Burt, T.	2.1.42
	P&T	299506	"	Reading, G.A.	28.9.41 B
Fiji Group	SC	804797	Pte	Shine, J.E.	17.10.42
	SC	465825	L/Cpl	Dalrymple, W.	17.10.42
	SC	804796	Pte	Harman, H.	17.10.42
	SC	558067	L/Cpl	Bowler, J.	17.10.42
	SC	509063	Pte	Wilton, A.	17.10.42
	SC	300427	L/Cpl	Shone, W.H.	17.10.42
	SC	491605	Pte	Thurlow, A.C.	17.10.42
	SC	307097	L/Cpl	McCausland, G.I.	17.10.42
	SC	407887	Pte	Brown, J.	17.10.42
	SC	578637	L/Cpl	Thomas, G.A.J.	17.10.42
SC	462517	Pte	Coombe, H.	17.10.42	
Ono-i-Lau	P&T	294713	Cpl	Young, F.H.	10.11.42
	P&T	437532	Pte	Simmons, I.T.	10.11.42.
Chatham Is.	OC Party	198448	2/Lt	Ramwell, J.B.	24.8.42.
	CW	613581	L/Cpl	Chetham, A.B.	24.8.42
	CW	162958	Pte	Edøy, A.G.	24.8.42
	CW	103652	"	Barnes, P.	24.8.42
	CW	532821	"	Campbell, E.E.	24.8.42
	CW	414661	"	Ellis, A.C.	24.8.42
	CW	491456	Cpl	Shepherd, D.A.	11.9.42
	CW	506104	L/Cpl	Hannan, D.	11.9.42
	CW	171102	Pte	Bartle, S.T.	11.9.42
	CW	547804	"	Evans, F.J.	11.9.42
	CW	2/4/1380	"	Leith, J.F.	11.9.42
	CW	417052	"	McLees, H.	11.9.42
	CW	129183	"	McLoughlin, E.J.	11.9.42
	CW	516718	"	Webb, S.G.	11.9.42
	CW	092604	"	Betridge, A.R.	19.1.43
	CW	247161	"	McNab, G.I.	19.1.43
	CW	298971	"	Robertson, R.A.	19.1.43
CW	417298	"	McGregor, H.	6.4.43.	

a) Relief now in process. Replacements embarked 1.9.43.



In memory of twenty
 two British subjects mur-
 dered by the Japanese at
 Betio on the 15th of
 October 1942.
 Standing unmoved
 to their posts, their
 matched by bravery and
 gallantry and met death
 with fortitude.

- R. G. MORON
- B. G. LEARY
- T. R. HANDLEY
- A. M. M. EARLTHUR
- A. U. S. ABDIN
- A. G. HEENAN
- J. J. HEARNEY
- L. R. W. KENNY
- A. E. TAYLOR
- A. G. MURRAY
- T. A. PEARSA
- L. B. SPEED
- G. U. OWEN
- D. H. HOWE
- R. J. HITCHCOCK
- R. J. O'NEILL
- R. A. ELLIS
- G. A. KILPIN
- J. H. NICHOL
- W. A. R. PARKER
- R. M. KENZIE

Appendix Ten

**Examples of Intercepts of Japanese Naval Traffic:
From JN4F3, JN20F, JN25D, JN40
(PRO HW 23/10)**

MOST SECRET

J.N. 4 F.3

8743.

S J

28th January

1740

4464

1950

To: OMINATO Area Defence
Force

From: OMINATO W. T.

To: OMINATO Area Defence Force

F/I: KLEHD NO

From: Chief of Staff OMINATO

[Three groups] ([Two Groups]J) YAMATURI Maru [Two Groups]

left MURORAN at 1600 on the 28th and will arrive at PARAMUSHIRO

(KASHIWABARA [Bay]) at 2100 on the 2nd of February. Speed 8 knots.

✓
Noon Positions.

29th	144°	41° East	42°	19' North.
30th	147°	44° East	43°	50' North.
31st	149°	21° East	45°	55' North.

February

1st	151°	31° East	48°	0' North
2nd	154°	0° East	49°	55' North.

23rd January, 1943.

MOST SECRET

J.N.20E/81

Keep secret
1069

T.O.O.231520 4860kcs T.O.R.2100

ku HA YO South East Operations Force
de WI NI TA TRUK Radio

To:- I SA SU 3 O.C. HIKAWA MERU
HI HA 1 -
RI WO 5 -
F/1: SO TE 80 Second Fleet
KI WO 00 Combined Fleet
HE WO 1 Inner South Seas Force
HU RA TO 2 O.C. Forty Second Guard Division
TI TU MA 3 O.C. Sixty Second Guard Division
TI HA 50 Fourth Fleet
From:- SO HU 9 (Suggest Carolines Area Defence Force)

Carolines area defence force orders No.27.

Leave JALUIT at 0700 on January 24th; turn North from HALUIT at 0900. You will expect to arrive at the following points:-

A (unread) 40' North, 158° 57' East at 1730 on 26th
B (unread) 30' North, 161° 30' East at 1530 on 27th
C 6 23' North, 169° 25' East at 0600 on 30th

The Commander of No.80 Submarine Chaser will assume the rank of Captain, and is appointed to direct control from JALUIT to Point "K"

✓
MOST SECRET

J.N. 25 D/92

SJ

8004

29th January 1943

292233

17.44 Koa.

300615

6th Fleet
de TOKYO

To: Sub Unit
F.I. GUADALCANAL Ops. Force
From: Sub. Force

If they have not sighted the enemy, submarines will take up the following stations at dawn on the 30th.

B line of deployment (in order from the north).

I 176, I 17, I 26, I 25.

b line of deployment (in order from the north)

I 4, I 16, I 35, I 20, I 32, I 11.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

B is OTSU in the Japanese series. KOO, ORSU, HEI, TEI etc
and has always been translated as B. e.g. B sub force

b is in Roman series A B C.

2nd June.

MOST SECRET

2120

29.1.43

JIN:40/1425

T.O.O. C/S Freq. T.O.R. To: O RU TO MILLE COMM.BASE
1440 776/0 4310 1950 From: E SE TO JALUIT W/T.

To: TA NI A 5 Mille WX Cndr.
WE CODE
TI I A 1 -
NU HE SO 3 -
YU SO KE 8 -
KE U HA 4 Cnd. WOTJE W/X
F/I: KO MO YA 3 -
From: KO TI WI 2 -

TEXT:- As from Feb.1st you are to use the second month part of
HE A 1 in transmission of meteorological telegrams. If
this code book has not reached you yet you are to use the
first month part of HE RI 1.

Appendix Eleven

**Pamphlet circulated in Wellington August 1941
'This Fair Country Now Has Its Himmler and its S.S.Men.'**

(Roth Papers, MS Papers 6218-05, Alexander Turnbull Library)

THIS FAIR COUNTRY NOW HAS ITS HIMMLER

AND ITS S.S. MEN

Who is the second best paid soldier in New Zealand? MAJOR KENNETH FOLKES, £1100-a-year head of the Dominion's Gestapo, an assortment of mediocre journalists, clerks and even "counter jumpers". Folkes himself was gazetted an acting lieutenant in the Imperial Army little more than a year ago (July, 1940). This was not in a fighting force but in the British security police; in fact, what Folkes does not know about soldiering was indicated by a recent appearance at Army Headquarters wearing a field service cap with battledress!

Folkes is a Midlands solicitor; at a pinch he might just make what is commonly known as the middle class in England. Pale, thin, weakly looking, with semi-thick spectacles, he has all the appearances of an unfortunate clerk who has never seen the sunshine. His light camel hair greatcoat, in distinction to the proper khaki, makes him conspicuous in the Midland Hotel private bar where, not so long ago, police officers found him after hours. With commendable presence of mind he flourished his "Security" card that both police and all the semi-intoxicated after-six hangers on might know who he was. And this is the originator of the Don't Talk Campaign. Imagine a man receiving his first appointment to a commission, and then in a "pimping" job, being appointed New Zealand's Himmler. Perhaps it's not strange. No soldier, no Man, would take on the job.

In pay, he is next to Major-General Puttick.

THE WALLS HAVE EARS

The Army does not own Folkes. He is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. In fact, the name of Folkes and all his crowd stinks in Army circles. It is not to be wondered at when the private life of every Army officer, what he spends, whether he bets, plays billiards or cards for money, is the subject of attention from Folkes's snoopers in clubs, hotels and elsewhere. Folkes's pimps tap conversations over telephones into and out of Army Headquarters. Privacy is now impossible. Every Army officer who opens his mouth these days has to look about first to see if any of Folkes's pimps are about.

Folkes was brought to New Zealand by a Colonel Mawhood. He was an acting lieutenant when he left England and became a major while flying across to New Zealand. But no ordinary major's pay for the Gestapo chief; instead, £1100 a year, and a car for all occasions, business and social.

This outfit of Folkes's, known officially as Security Intelligence, costs the country more than £50,000 a year.

Its offices are in the A.P.A. Building, corner of Grey and Featherston Streets, Wellington. With drawn blinds and a sentry at the door, it is the essence of secrecy. In fact, so blatantly secret that it is the laugh of the town and specially the tenants of the building.

THE PEOPLE WHO CARRY THE TALES

Second in command of the Gestapo is Lieutenant CUTFIELD, an ex-hardward shop assistant from Stratford. Obviously a man of intelligence. Selling hardward gives a superior insight into humannature and makes recognition of a spy a certainty.

Another hanger-on in Wellington is Lieutenant STAVELEY ELLIS, one of the "Younger Set", who once told the world he would not enlist but has secured safety with Folkes, despite ballot call-up.

Then there is Second Lieutenant TERENCE McLEAN, once an ornament of that influential highbrow journal, the "Sports Post." McLean married, too late to be "married" within the regulations, a daughter of Mr. Percy Coyle, secretary of the Licensed Victuallers'

MS Papers 6218-05
See index date, 1917-1994 Page 5 (MS 6218-05)

association, and got shoved into camp with early ballotees. But not for long. He reappeared in civilian clothes as a member of Folkes's staff. And this when his father-in-law, as a member of the No. 4 Armed Forces Appeal Board is packing the lads off to war as fast as he can. This commissioned pimp Folkes considers to be one of his brightest boys. He is a brother of the publicity officer of the National Party, who was once "New Zealand Observer" editor.

Also at Wellington (there are no privates in Folkes's army; nothing less than a sergeant):

Sergeant DOSSER, ex-stud stock salesman, wright Stephenson's.

Sergeant ETHERINGTON, formerly in charge of advertising for W.D. and H.O. Wills.

Sergeant NICHOLLS, ex-James Smith's mercery department.

Sergeant RINK, ex-passenger agent at Panama.

Sergeant NOBLE (now commissioned), once Parliamentary reporter for "Otago Daily Times." Enlisted for overseas service. Recommended by Minister of Defence for Officers Training School but Army took no notice. Then got leave of absence for domestic reasons and reappeared as one of Folkes's first snoopers. Did great work in tapping telephone conversations; another of those spirited out of the N.Z.E.F.

Sergeant D.H.S. TAYLOR, fired from "N.Z. Truth" and turned his training to good account by joining Folkes. Hard to keep track of - in battledress one day and mufti the next; looks really mysterious.

Sergeant PROTHEROE, ex-National Broadcasting Service.

Sergeant WHITE, prominent Wellesley Club member and Wellington "socialite". Married daughter of Professor Hunter. Snoops at club on Army Headquarters heads.

Sergeant DOUGLAS, a Wellington importer and agent.

Sergeant MEAKIN, ex-General Motors.

MISS MOLLY BISHOP, daughter of secretary of N.Z. Mineowners' Federation. The head of the female section. Snoops at social gatherings and poses as member of Navy office staff.

MISS JOAN YOUNG, Public Service Queen in this year's queen carnival, daughter of Director General of Post and Telegraph Department. Did those who shoved in their pennies for her in the carnival know they were polling votes for a skirted pimp?

These young "ladies" try to put it across unfortunate gallant guards at defence headquarters by stating they want to go in to see girl friends or relatives. Obliging a lady, the guards get it in the neck when Folkes complains.

At Christchurch:

Captain D. LINDSAY, ex-schoolmaster and N.Z. Champion swimmer.

Lieutenant MAX WHATMAN, ex-"Star-Sun" reporter. Went to islands to bring back party of invalided soldiers but real purpose was to spy on military administration for Folkes. He struck an ex-journalist in the ranks at Fiji who told him where to get off. On return, pimped on those who entertained him as supposed representative of N.Z. Army.

Sergeant McDONALD, ex-stock agent.

Sergeant THOMAS, ex-Union Steamship Co. clerk.

At Palmerston North:

Lieutenant J.B. NICHOLL, ex-secretary of Ashburton Racing Club. Given three presentations in home town before proceeding (as the people thought) overseas!

Second Lieutenant C. GAIR, ex-bank clerk, of Wellington. Lived at Eastbourne. And Sergeants LEI (ex-Taranaki), SMITH (ex-Taranaki) and T. ROWE (ex-"Evening Post" cadet reporter), also female to attend social gatherings.

Rowe has now been made a driver at Army Headquarters, presumably to listen in to conversations of military chiefs and convey the information to Folkes and in turn to the Prime Minister.

At Auckland:

Captain MEIKLE, formerly Major Meikle of Rifle Brigade.

Four sergeants and one typist.

This office stinks less than the others, possibly because Meikle, being an ex-serviceman, will not stoop as low as Folkes and his stay-at-homes.

LIES, TRICKERY, THEFT

The duties of the S.I. are to test security measures, and this involves trying to get access to wharves, guard posts etc. by pitching tales to police or sentries. Also theft of keys, documents etc has been resorted to. Witness the occasion when one pimp used his uniform to get into Trentham Camp and then stole a bag of papers. Smart work!

There was the famous attempt to trap a suspected spy at the Hotel St. George. Four sergeants were installed in the next room and, two by two, stayed there five days. An Otago Varsity student, Bradley, was imported to help. A very secret job, except to the innocent suspect, the hotel staff and half the town. And then there was the stealthy pursuit of Mr. Braun, an American in New Zealand drilling for an oil company.

One of the big jobs is compiling dossiers, written by the staff and their associates, concerning all sorts of individuals. Any of their opinions are faithfully recorded in these Gestapo files. What suitable men they are to pass judgment on decent citizens. In addition to their ordinary lack of qualifications they are misfits, unfits, shirkers. Some of them pitch the tale that they were forced into the job by the Army. Nothing is further from the truth. The two or three who were balloted and found unfit took the job because they preferred pumping to doing a man's job on coast defence or similar duties. They are all in the job because they sought it.

NO DIFFERENT FROM GERMANY

Folkes's wife and family arrived this year from England, so he evidently thinks the Gestapo is here to stay. They live at 51 Sefton Street, Wadestown.

All the officers have cars with private number plates, provided by the State, with unlimited petrol. Home to lunch is the rule. And when Himmler travels far Air Force plane is the transport.

Take this official description of the Nazi Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei) and see what difference there is between it and Folkes's outfit:

This organisation is responsible for combating any movement subversive to the present regime, and with this object in view keeps constant watch on former members of the Socialist and Communist parties and other political suspects, as well as the constabulary, and the rank and file of the National Socialist Party and indeed the whole population. All its members belong to the Schutz Staffel (S.S.), constituted primarily to ensure internal security, prevent strikes and any movement against the regime.

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Mr. R.S. Cutfield
Group Captain Colin Hanson OBE
Mr. Charles Holland-Goodwin
Mr. Ray Hurle
Mr. Vic Jaynes
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Mrs. Bunt Longuet
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