Quaker Peace Testimony and Pacifism

Colm McKeogh

Abstract: This paper looks at the Peace Testimony of Quakers (the Religious Society of Friends) and argues that, although Quakerism is commonly seen as pacifist (in some sense of that term) by many both within and without the Society, the Peace Testimony is best seen as not pacifist. The paper argues that the Peace Testimony grows from the Society’s spirituality and its commitment to corporate spiritual guidance and witness, as such, it is not reconcilable with the ethical absolutism that is pacifism (as often defined). The Quaker commitment to social justice means that outcomes matter, human well-being is very important, and circumstances must be taken into account in determining policy and behaviour. The paper concludes that, at a time of great change in armed conflict, Quakers must engage to make a detailed contribution to the emerging rules of restraint.

Introduction
The Quakers (or Religious Society of Friends) are a denomination that came into being in England in the 1650s. Christian in origin, they were universalist in their approach to Christianity from their earliest years as can be seen in the Quaker theologian Robert Barclay’s writings about the true church:

…I there may be members therefore of this catholic Church both among Heathen, Turks [i.e. Muslims], Jews, and all the several sorts of Christians, men and women of integrity and simplicity of heart, who... being upright in their hearts before the Lord, chiefly aiming and labouring to be delivered from iniquity and loving to follow righteousness, are by the secret touches of this holy Light in their souls enlivened and quickened, thereby secretly united to God, and therethrough become true members of this catholic Church.1

The Quakers seek to be spirit-led in their worship and ethics. ‘God is met in the gathered meeting and through the Spirit leads us into ways of life and understandings of truth which we recognise as Quaker,’ according to Quaker Faith and Practice, the anthology published by Britain Yearly Meeting that describes the practices and procedures of the Society in Britain.2 The Society has evolved social testimonies that capture elements of its understanding of truth and its way of life.3 My focus is the Peace Testimony, perhaps the best-known of the Quaker social testimonies. What is the peace testimony of the Quakers? What is their stance on political violence?

1 Politics programme, Waikato University, New Zealand; colm.mckeogh@waikato.ac.nz

2 Quaker Faith and Practice

3 Quaker Social Testimonies
Christian attitudes to political violence

Given the importance of morality to Christianity and the nature of Christianity as a revealed faith, thinkers in the Christian tradition can be expected to take a moral approach to political violence. They will be concerned with the moral rights and wrongs of political violence and with fidelity to Christian revelation. What moral approaches to political violence exist? Those who study this area may develop concepts and labels to describe the possibilities. For example, John Yoder highlights five moral approaches to political violence.  

A. Pacifism
B. Just War
C. Holy War
D. Realism
E. War of Honour

A. Pacifism

Pacifism is a moral approach to political violence that rejects violence in some form (maybe in all forms). Yoder’s first position can be immediately expanded to five to allow greater precision:

1. Non-resistance to evil
2. Passive resistance to evil
3. Non-violent active resistance to evil
4. Non-lethal violent resistance to evil
5. Anti-war

1. The strictest form of pacifism is a rejection of any form of resistance. Evil is not to be resisted in any way (passively or actively, coercively or non-coercively, violently or non-violently).
2. The next strictest form of pacifism permits only a passive resistance to evil. One does not comply with evil orders but one does not seek to avoid the consequences of that non-compliance.
3. Next is a pacifism that permits or requires a non-violent active resistance to evil. Evil is to be resisted but violent means may not be used. Only non-violent coercive means (such as protests, boycotts, strikes, sanctions) are permitted.
4. A weaker form of pacifism is one that permits or requires a resistance to evil that may include non-lethal violent means. Evil is to be resisted, coercion may be used, and violence may be used but life may not be taken. Destruction of property is permitted as is the use of non-lethal weapons and harmful techniques against people.
5. The weakest form of pacifism (but still a position that we would commonly label as pacifist) is one that rules out war, sometimes called ‘anti-warrism’. Violence may be used, even lethal violence, but there is something about war
that rules out this particular form of lethal political violence.

B. Just war
The second of Yoder’s approaches to war is the Just War approach. It holds some use of force to be right. Yoder presents the Just War stance as a compromise position between pacifism and realism, sharing something in common with each. In common with pacifism, it holds that morality applies to affairs of state as to all areas of life. In common with realism it accepts that force cannot be banished from history. The aim of the Just War position is the use of force as an instrument of order, justice, and good in world affairs. It accepts that force is part of this world but seeks to direct and limit it and to use it a route to relative good. To this end, the Just War approach forwards a set of restrictions on the resort to and the use of force, limiting when force may be used, for what ends, and the manner in which it may be used. Any set of rules or guidelines can be applied strictly, moderately or permissively and so Yoder’s Just War position can be expanded to encompass three approaches:

6. Just War (strict)
7. Just War (moderate)
8. Just War (permissive)

A strict Just War approach applies the criteria of a Just War strictly and limits the ruler’s freedom to wage war. Many uses of force are ruled out as unjust. The strict Just War position can merge into pacifism. The principles of a just war can be applied so strictly that they become prohibitively strict: all wars are found to be unjust. At the other extreme is a permissive Just War approach which applies the principles of Just War in a manner that gives great freedom to wage war. This permissive Just War position can be close to (and even merge into) Holy War or an amoral realism. The jus ad bellum requirement of ‘proper authority’ limits the resort to force to those in positions of leadership. However, if immense leeway is given to the political leader to determine just cause, ad bellum or strategic proportionality, last resort, etc., then really the leader’s freedom to wage war in the national interest is not restrained at all.

C. Holy War (or Crusade)
Yoder uses the terms Holy War or Crusade to denote more than a war declared by the church authorities, such as the crusade proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095 to claim Jerusalem from Muslim control. Holy War, to Yoder, is a moral approach to war that rejects the presumption in favour of peace that is a key to the Just War approach. It is war in a ‘holy cause’ rather than a ‘just cause’. The Just War approach’s presumption for peace requires a trigger of injustice to override it. The Just War is a response to a wrong done and the just cause is the stopping or undoing of the injustice committed by the other party. Whereas the Just War looks to the past (it is a response to an injustice committed), the Holy War looks to the future
good outcome that will be achieved). The Holy War approach requires no trigger such as an assault or breach of rights by the other party as it sees a good end as sufficient reason to go to war. The ‘holy cause’ can be non-religious and the good ends could be of any type: maintenance of the rule of law, personal freedoms, free markets, regime change, access to oil, or the imposition of democracy. There is no presumption for peace and no trigger of past wrong is needed. Religious ideologies may prompt Holy Wars or Crusades but so too may non-religious ideologies such as Communism, Fascism, romantic nationalism or neo-liberalism. If the supposed just cause of a ‘just war’ is no more than a pretext, then the conflict may be akin to a Holy War or Crusade than a Just War.

D. Amoral realism
Yoder’s fourth approach to morality and the state use of force is one that holds that morality does not apply to this issue. States may resort to war for any reason or to further their national interest in any way. Perhaps ideas of moral rightness and wrongness do not apply to war or perhaps they do not apply to any affairs of states.

E. War of Honour
Yoder’s fifth and final moral approach to war, one he terms War of Honour, is one in which no end, moral or non-moral, is required because violent means are held to be not in need of justification. It is good to use violence to get things done, to assert yourself, to prove yourself. It is admirable to engage in a contest and win. It is honourable to seek conquest, triumph and domination. We go to war because we like war.

In this way, drawing on work by Yoder, it is possible to conceptually distinguish eleven positions on war (five of which would be termed pacifist, and three Just War):

- Non-resistance to evil (any resistance is wrong)
- Passive resistance to evil (only non-coercive resistance is permitted)
- Non-violent active resistance to evil (only non-violent coercion is permitted)
- Non-lethal violent resistance to evil (violent resistance permitted but not killing)
- Anti-war (lethal resistance is permitted but not war)
- Just War (strict)
- Just War (moderate)
- Just War (permissive)
- Holy War (or Crusade)
- Realism
- War of Honour

Quaker attitudes to political violence
Which of these positions best describe the Quaker peace testimony? Perhaps none of these should describe it if the Quaker peace testimony is to be spirit-led. The Quaker
openness to spiritual leading affects how they perceive elements of Christian revelation such as the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount. There are not Biblical literalists. They seek to abide by the spirit and not the letter. This interpretation of Christianity greatly influences their ethics. The famous words of the elders at Balby must apply to the Quaker peace testimony:

Dearly beloved Friends, these things we do not lay upon you as a rule or form to walk by; but that all, with a measure of the light, which is pure and holy, may be guided: and so in the light walking and abiding, these things may be fulfilled in the Spirit, not in the letter, for the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life.6

Nevertheless the temptations for Quakers to describe their peace testimony as pacifist are many. It gives a social and self-identity to the Quakers. A group can be seen by outsiders in terms of how it differs from other groups; that social identity can then become part of the group’s self-identity. In religious groups a feature that is not a core belief (it may even be something minor like distinctive dress or avoidance of a particular food or drink) can come to be important in how non-members see the religious group and can then become more important to how members see their own group. They may become more attached to (or interpret more strictly) a feature that is part of their social identity and distinctiveness. Interpreting their peace testimony as pacifist may also help to maintain unity in their group as Quakers are more likely to agree on their social testimonies than on theology. Pacifism can be wrongly passed off as a religious principle and can also be wrongly offered as a policy prescription for every situation. The attractions of speaking on policy issues as a pacifist are clear. One has a firmly held policy position for every occasion and speaks immediately. However these temptations are to be resisted if Quakers wish to be spirit-led and not letter-bound. If they wish to avoid dogma in the Peace Testimony as elsewhere, then no designation as rigid as pacifism should be applied to it.

Augustine & Tolstoy
It is good that Quakers seek to be led by the spirit and not by the letter because abiding by the letter is not straightforward as shown by two Christian thinkers who attach great importance to the recorded words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount:

You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.’ But I tell you, do not resist (or resist violently) an evil person. If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also. And if anyone wants to sue you and take your cloak, hand over your tunic as well. If anyone forces you to go one mile, go with them two miles.7

The first is St Augustine. There are two aspects to Augustine’s treatment of the counsel of Jesus to ‘resist not an evil person’ and to ‘turn the other cheek’. First, he sees them as pertaining to one’s inward disposition rather than one’s outward actions:
If it is supposed that God could not enjoin warfare, because in after times it was said by the Lord Jesus Christ, ‘I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but if any one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him the left also,’ the answer is, that what is here required is not a bodily action, but an inward disposition.8

Second, when he does treat the counsel of Jesus as pertaining to actions, he treats it consequentially. Augustine assesses ‘resisting not evil’ and ‘turning the other cheek’ as means to an end. From the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, Augustine deduces the end that Jesus wished to achieve, namely, ‘that the evil which is in the wicked man may be overcome by good’.9 Clear as to the end which Jesus valued when he told his listeners to ‘turn the other cheek’, Augustine can look at other means to that end and assess the likely efficacy. If it overcomes evil, then ‘turning the other cheek’ is indeed the best means (‘it is a higher glory still to stay war itself with a word, than to slay men with the sword, and to procure or maintain peace by peace, not by war’, says Augustine10). However if ‘turning the other cheek’ seems unlikely to overcome evil then Augustine considers other courses of action to achieve the desired end including violent ones as failure to act effectively means that ‘the evil disposition, like an enemy within the man, is strengthened.’11

Important to Augustine’s consequentialist calculus of the best means to the desired end is the weighting of good and bad outcomes. He attaches great importance to the morally good and bad and much less weight to the human good and bad. Motive is more important than outcome as death to Augustine is merely a human bad:

What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that others may live in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, not any religious feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like....12

Augustine’s consequentialist approach to the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount leads him to advocate action that is the very opposite of turning the other cheek. His consequentialist interpretation of Christian ethics results in advocacy for non-pacifist action, indeed, for quite violent and oppressive action. Love of neighbour, to Augustine, is mostly about helping to repress the evil in them even when they do not wish the evil to be repressed and lethal violence may be used to this end when it offers the most effective route to repression.

An alternative to Augustine’s consequentialist approach to the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount is to make ‘turn the other cheek’ into an absolute rule about behaviour regardless of outcomes. One who took this approach was Leo Tolstoy who wrote:

The text that gave me the key to the truth was the 39th verse of the fifth chapter of St. Matthew: ‘Ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say unto you that ye resist not evil.’ The simple
meaning of these words suddenly flashed full upon me; I accepted the fact that Christ meant exactly what he said and then, though I had found nothing new, all that had hitherto obscured the truth cleared away, and the truth itself arose before me in all its solemn importance.13

To Tolstoy, Jesus’s command is to be taken literally and it prevails over all else. He dismissed any consideration of the consequences of our actions. With alarming consistency, Tolstoy works out the consequences of acquiescing, non-resisting love. He does this so starkly that it seems like a reductio ad absurdum of his interpretation of the Christian message but it is Tolstoy’s earnest interpretation of it.14

Tolstoy shows the attractiveness of firm adherence to a few principles. Against Tolstoy’s approach is that he seems to be putting a rule (or his own fidelity to the rule or his own moral well-being) above that of the other person. To abide by a rule of action regardless of the effect on the other person may reveal a greater concern for one’s own moral status than for the well-being of the other. To act in a certain way whether or not any good comes of it for others, to act in a certain way even if great harm comes of it for others, to act in a certain way while refusing to even consider the good or harm that comes to others, hardly seems to be motivated by a love of one’s neighbour. The love of neighbour must take into considerations outcomes and not only intentions. Love of neighbour is not love of a rule, love of particular means, or love of a law, or love of one’s own moral purity or exemplary behaviour. It is love of a person in their circumstances.

Tolstoy also shows the practical problem with a literal interpretation. Although he uses the term ‘non-resistance’ to describe his stance (and wishes to remain absolutely faithful to Jesus’ teaching), he in fact practised non-violent resistance. Tolstoy could not stop speaking the truth as he saw it. He could not put down his pen but wrote political protests at the harsh treatment of prisoners, peasants and pacifists. Indeed he campaigned to improve the education of children and to end the persecution of Christian sectarians in Russia. The legal position and the administrative treatment of the sects in Russia certainly amounted to persecution, and Tolstoy’s attempts to ameliorate their position constituted non-violent resistance to it. Tolstoy’s interpretation of ‘resist not evil’ as non-violence may seem questionable but so too does the interpretation of ‘resist not evil’ as a passive non-resistance that seeks no ends. Surely one ought to tell another that his act will cause harm (he may not know that it will) and one ought to tell him the extent of the harm (even if he wishes to harm, the effects may be more serious or far-reaching than he thinks).

**Standing of the Quaker Peace Testimony**

That the Quaker peace testimony is to be spirit-led and not letter-bound suggests that it may avoid some issues faced by Augustine and Tolstoy. But what then is the standing of the Quaker peace testimony? With what authority do they Quaker claim to speak about political violence? Can they be wrong? Do they accept that others
could start from the same Quakerly values and concerns and reach different conclusions about nuclear weapons? Some answers can be found by comparing a Quaker statement on nuclear weapons from the 1980s to a Catholic one.

In the 1980s, at the height of popular Western fears about the nuclear strategies of the Cold War adversaries, two statements on nuclear deterrence were released. In 1983, the Catholic bishops in the USA published a pastoral letter on war and peace, *The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response*. It was a tumultuous time in US foreign policy, with the breakdown of SALT 2 negotiations between the superpowers, heightened American hostility towards the USSR (dubbed the ‘evil empire’ by President Reagan) and the deployment of destabilising weaponry. The starting point for the Bishops letter on political violence (like all Catholic teaching on social policy) is God and the dignity of the human person. The Creation story is used to assert the sacredness and dignity of human life and the equal worth of all human beings regardless of nationality or political system. Before their near total rejection of nuclear deterrence and nuclear use, the Bishops address the authority with which they make their judgment. The Bishops distinguish two purposes for the Church’s teachings on war, two audiences for their letter, and two levels of authority with which they write. One purpose is to help Catholics form their consciences; the other is to influence the public policy debate in society at large. One audience for the letter shares the bishops’ faith; the other does not. The Bishops claim greater authority for their pronouncements on Catholic teaching and moral principles than for their guidance on defence policy options. As Aquinas had pointed out, policy requires political skills which the church lacks. The bishops accept that policy is a matter of prudence as well as principle and that people with the same morality can reach different conclusions on issues of policy. Their endorsement of nuclear no-first-use was a prudential judgement and not binding on members of the Church in the USA. Good Catholics could disagree with the Bishop and still see a place for nuclear weapons in US defence policy.

What about the Quakers? Instead of revelation, scripture and priestly expertise, they rely on corporate spiritual leading. Are they spiritually guided on policy positions as well as on fundamental norms? Can Quakers be wrong? Are non-Quaker positions wrong? In 1987, as the *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act* was passed into law, the Yearly Meeting of Quakers in New Zealand issued a Peace Statement in support. Like the Catholics, the Quakers start their statement on political violence from an assertion of the worth and dignity of the human being: ‘there is that of God in every one which makes each person too precious to damage or destroy’. On the basis of an ‘affirmation of life and the destiny of humankind’, it calls on the New Zealand public to ‘reject the clamour of fear and listen to the whisperings of hope’ and to oppose ‘all wars, all preparation for war, all use of weapons and coercion by force, and all military alliances’. The Quaker statement is less detailed (the Bishops’ letter is over fifty pages long and was issued after two
years of deliberations; the Quaker statement is one page long). The Quaker statement also directly connects a fundamental value of human worth to a particular policy position. Whereas the Catholic Bishops addressed both Catholics and non-Catholics, the Quaker statement addresses the public with a statement on which, it says of Quakers, ‘we all agree as one’. The New Zealand Quakers do ‘acknowledge that we ourselves are as limited and as erring as anyone else’ and they allow that they ‘do not have a blueprint for peace that spells out every stepping stone towards the goal that we share. In any particular situation, a variety of personal decisions could be made with integrity’. In contrast to the US episcopal letter, the New Zealand statement throws little light on the process by which a religious group connects its normative commitments and eschatological convictions to considerations of political violence.

A time of change in war/peace
The issue of nuclear weapons in the 1980s may have allowed the appearance of a direct connection from fundamental values to a policy position but the issues we face now require an approach that is less simple. One issue concerns the rule against targeting civilians, which was the central focus of post-1945 endeavours to restrain war.21 The rule has passed into customary international humanitarian law and has been authoritatively stated as follows:

The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.22

The rules are not eternal verities. They are of instrumental value. They serve human beings by guiding international society towards its good ends. All rules go out of date. Reality changes and they become inoperable or they no longer serve their end. The rule against targeting civilians is now under immense pressure at this time of great change in armed conflict. For political, cultural, and technological reasons, the category of the civilian is now under great stress and so too is the structure of power and ideas that gave rise to its prominence in law and custom. The status of the civilian is collapsing because of the changing nature of warfare, the practical and conceptual difficulties in differentiating civilian from combatant now, and the end of the world order that gave protected status to the civilian in law. The challenges to the civilians rule are many:

1. Militarization of foreign policy
   a) weakening of the war/peace distinction
   b) expansion of the concept of war
   c) militarization of foreign policy

2. Combatancy
   a) a humanisation of the combatant
   b) novel combatants: drone operators
c) novel combatants: private security contractors
d) novel combatants: cyberwar and fifth-dimension operations

3. Targeting
   a) novel targets: assassination
   b) novel targets: ‘signature strikes’
   c) novel targets: cyberwar and fifth-dimension operations

4. Context
   a) decreased respect for the civilian population
   b) decreased respect for the rules of IHL
   c) decreased respect for the ethics of war
   d) weakened international rules-based order

1. War/peace distinction
There has been an expansion of the concept of war, a militarization of foreign policy and a weakening of the war/peace distinction that have damaged the rule against targeting civilians. The blurring of the war/peace distinction started when the attacks of 9/11 were described not as a crime but as an act of war and the response to it was described as a war rather than as a criminal investigation seeking to culminate in apprehension and prosecution. The War on Terror blurred definitions of war and peace as it was waged on a global battlefield with no front lines, vague boundaries of conflict, no beginning or end to hostilities and a confusion of combatant and non-combatant. Mikhail Gorbachev talks starkly of the ‘militarisation of politics’.

2. Combatancy
A second change concerns combatants. In its War on Terror, the USA has faced an adversary of unconventional combatants who do not wear uniform or insignia, who hide among the civilian population and who may locate combatant personnel and assets in civilian facilities including schools and hospitals. The state party to this armed conflict has also blurred the combatant/civilian distinction through a humanisation of the combatant that undercuts the status of the civilian, and through its use of drones and private security contractors. Private military contractors blur the combatants/civilians distinction by being neither one nor the other. Drone operators are another novel combatant. In the USA agencies other than the armed forces have conducted lethal operations with weaponized drones. The USAF has carried out lethal drone operations but so too has the CIA with Predators piloted by civilians, both intelligence officers and private contractors (sometimes military and intelligence retirees). Cyberwar and fifth-dimension operations are carried out by personnel who blur the civilian/combatant distinction.
3. Targeting
The War on Terror has seen a new approach to the delineation of targets. The precision of drones and special forces on the ground have allowed violence to be focused so that it is akin to assassination. The Obama Administration has drawn up ‘kill lists’ of people they believe represent threats to the USA. With no defined battlefield, these high-value targets have been killed wherever they are found. Assassinations have included US citizens. Drone technology allows the targeting of people who are not engaged in hostilities at that time or posing an imminent threat and who are not in a country where the drone user is at war. With drones, assassination has become a tool of foreign and security policy.

4. Context
In all, however, the conclusion must be that the blurring of the combatant/civilian distinction has too many facets and causes for it to be reversed. Furthermore the protected status of the civilian was a product of a post-1945 liberal world order that is now fragmenting in the face of relative decline and democratic disillusionment. Now many of the countries that took the lead in creating this liberal world order have turned against it, both in government policy and popular support. Conflicts in the near future are less likely to be regulated by a set of global rules as the nature of conflict has changed, as authority at the global level is weaker, and as both states and non-state groups are less susceptible to global pressure.

Time of change
The demise of the rule against targeting civilians means that we must seek now new methods to reduce the harm done by armed conflict. New rules will emerge although, until those rules emerge, little more than considerations of proportionality may determine the use of violence for political ends. With no longer any distinction between civilians and combatants, a fundamentally different idea of proportionality will operate in war. Proportionality calculations will become complex when civilians can be sacrificed to save combatants. They will also be difficult to make in asymmetric and multi-lateral armed conflicts. The most important issue will be whether value is attached to the lives of adversaries. As the pace of change in warfare slows, new ideas about restraint in war will merge based on experience. They may struggle to gain the status of rules of international humanitarian law in an era of rejection of universal norms and global governance and vigorous assertions of national and religious distinctiveness. Nonetheless the cause of compassion in warfare must be promoted as well as the commitment to acknowledge the humanity of all in war, both the perpetrators of violence and its victims. Each group may bring its own ethics to armed conflict but each must be challenged to account for its resort to violence and its targeting choices.

At this time of change and uncertainty, Quakers can usefully offer, not a peace testimony interpreted as a rigid ethical absolutism, but an engagement to most
effectively restrain massacre and build the laws and rules of international society. We need an approach that is not bound to the letter but seeks the spirit behind it. The Quakers can bring much to this. Their truth testimony can be important as we enquire about the good sought and the harm that is likely, the chances and risks, the real motivation for the use of political violence. Their equality testimony can be important as a key issue in a proportionality calculation is the value given to the lives of adversaries. At this time of heightened risk of unrestrained warfare, Quakers can work with others to increase human dignity, to decrease human suffering, to maintain hope and persevere, to acknowledge the humanity of all, and to be creative in seeking enduring solutions.

5 An example of passive resistance is the non-rebellious refusal to obey wrongful orders that Martin Luther espoused in the 1520s. The apparent tension between Acts 5:29 (‘obey God rather than men’) and Romans 13 (‘everyone must submit to the ruling authorities’) is dealt with by establishing a duty of disobedience to an ungodly ruler and a duty of submission to the consequences of that disobedience. Luther is clear that, if a ruler is in the wrong, then his people are not bound to follow him as it is no one’s duty to do wrong: ‘if a prince desired to go to war, and his cause was clearly unrighteous; we should neither follow nor help such a prince…’ [Martin Luther, *Treatise on Good Works*, 1520 quoted in Stanley Hauerwas et al. (eds.), *The Wisdom of the Cross: Essays in Honor of John Howard Yoder* (1999), p.74]. However, although an ungodly ruler is not to be obeyed, nor is he to be actively resisted as to resist is to resist the will of God (even evil and tyrannical rulers are ordained by God because of people’s sin). If ruler orders the Christian to do wrong, they refuse; if ruler punishes him for the disobedience, the Christian submits; if the ruler seizes property as a penalty, the Christian lets it be taken. Tyranny is not to be obeyed neither is it to be actively resisted: “Oh no,” you say, “my lord would force me to do it; he would take away my fief and would not give me money, pay and wages. Besides, I would be despised and put to shame as a coward, even worse, as a man who did not keep his word and deserted his lord in need”. I answer: You must take that risk and, with God’s help, let whatever happens, happen.’ [Martin Luther, *Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved*, 1526 http://www.rockrohr.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Luther-WHETHER-SOLDIERS-TOO-CAN-BE-SAVED.pdf]
7 Matt 5:38-41 NIV.


17 The latter is nonetheless still bound by universal moral norms found in natural law: ‘all men and women find in the depth of their consciences a law written on the human heart by God’. *Challenge of Peace*, para. 258.

18 The Bishops write that they ‘do not intend that our teaching of each of these issues carry the same moral authority as our statement of universal moral principles and formal Church teaching’; *Challenge of Peace*, para. 280.


22 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter2_rule7#Fn_28_17.

23 The US Catholic bishops overstate the basis and permanence of the rule when they describe as ‘one of the central moral principles of a Christian ethic of war’ and give it religious resonance by connecting it to the concept of innocence, declaring: ‘Nothing, however, can justify direct attack on innocent human life in or out of warfare’; *Challenge of Peace*, para. 184, 286.

24 Richard Falk ‘Why Drones are more Dangerous than Nuclear Weapons’ in Marjorie Cohn (ed), *Drones and Targeted Killing: Legal, Moral and Political Issues* (Olive Branch, 2015), 33.


27 The rules against targeting civilians is not beyond criticism as the combatant/civilian distinction relied on very different values given to the lives of combatants and civilians and it can be queried why the lives of one’s own combatants are valued less than the lives of enemy civilians.