In recent years, discontent with migration and migrants in the wealthy global north has manifested in disturbing ways: cue Brexit, xenophobia, border paranoia, far-right nationalism and its bedfellow white supremacy. On the surface, Aotearoa New Zealand appears to have escaped the uglier aspects of this nativism. Despite the grumblings of the New Zealand First Party, no serious popular or political anti-immigration movement has appeared, and racially motivated attacks against migrants are relatively rare. This is despite the fact that Aotearoa has a much higher relative foreign-born population share than the United States or United Kingdom,¹ and ‘superdiverse’ Auckland – which comprises at least 40 per cent migrants – now has the ignominious claim to being the fourth-least affordable city in the world, far outstripping London and New York.²

For some, the apparent absence of a strong anti-immigration sentiment reflects an inherent fairness in this country’s cultural, political and social fabric. In this volume a number of contributors will put paid to this rosy image, revealing the ways in which policies fall short of delivering a fair deal for migrants, and particularly migrants of colour. Our chapter begins with a Māori perspective and reflects on where Māori, as tangata whenua, fit in contemporary migration policy and discourses.

Bridging the immigrant–indigenous divide is no easy task. In Aotearoa New Zealand, as in the other colonial settler societies, there is a yawning hole in policy making and research relating to immigration; that is, the exclusion of indigenous peoples and perspectives. The treatment of immigration and Māori affairs as entirely separate has effectively (and, we argue, deliberately) erased Māori from national conversations on immigration. The exception is when individual Māori vocally challenge the state’s approach to immigration. Then – as, for instance, Dame Tariana Turia and Professor Margaret Mutu learned – the response is often widespread vilification by mainstream media and politicians.

We begin by putting immigration in Aotearoa
New Zealand in its colonial context. In settler societies such as ours, colonisation and immigration are deeply intertwined, but this fact is rarely acknowledged. We also consider who benefits from existing arrangements which insist upon the integration of ‘ideal’ migrants into an implicitly Eurocentric mainstream. We conclude by reflecting on how Māori–migrant relationships might be fruitfully reimagined through a Treaty-based approach founded on rangatiratanga and manaakitanga, while also giving substance to the fullness of multiculturalism.

COLONIALISM AND IMMIGRATION: NEVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET?
It hardly needs saying that Māori experiences with immigration have been fraught. The deleterious consequences of colonisation were far-reaching, involving the usurpation of Māori tino rangatiratanga (ultimate authority); the replacement of tikanga (Māori law, customs and values) with a system built on English common law; large-scale alienation of land including outright confiscation; and coercive policies of cultural assimilation. Māori had little time to adjust to their rapid conversion from sovereign majority to disempowered minority.

The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi can be seen as this country’s first immigration policy, referring to the need to protect Māori ‘just Rights and Property’ given the ‘great number of Her Majesty’s Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand and the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in progress ...’ Many iwi saw opportunities to benefit from migration. Waikato, Hauraki, Northland and East Coast iwi had vibrant trading and export relationships from at least the 1830s onwards, all of which depended on fostering relationships with tauiwi (foreigners). But the assumption was that mana motuhake would remain intact, buttressed by demographic dominance. In 1840 the ratio of Pākehā to Māori was about one to forty. By 1860 the groups had reached parity and after 1874 Māori were less than one-tenth of the national population. Māori demographic ‘swamping’ was largely driven by intensified migration from the United Kingdom, but also reflected increased Māori mortality as a consequence of exposure to introduced diseases.

This history of colonisation is critical to contemporary discussions about immigration and continues to shape, in myriad ways, the New Zealand nation-state and those who call it home. Immigrants to Aotearoa New Zealand enter into a society that (like all other settler societies) is racialised and unequal, and in which too many Māori occupy the lower rungs. Compared to non-indigenous New Zealanders, Māori lead shorter and
less healthy lives; are more likely to leave high school with little or no formal attainment; have poorer labour market outcomes; and experience higher rates of child abuse, suicide and incarceration. For some indicators, Māori outcomes resemble those of African Americans – a group with a unique history of slavery and racial exclusion.

Less obvious than the negative impacts of colonisation are the privileges that it has afforded Pākehā New Zealanders, who live in a political, economic and social system that largely reflects their culture and values. This, in turn, has implications for how national identity, belonging and citizenship are represented to those seeking to make Aotearoa New Zealand home. Take, for example, the oath of allegiance, which requires new citizens to swear to be ‘faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Her heirs and successors’. Although there is now an option to take the oath in te reo Māori, and some councils have the occasional marae-based citizenship ceremony, the substance of citizenship is wholly geared towards one Treaty partner. Take also a recent high-profile report on immigration which describes the New Zealand national identity and way of life as aspiring to ‘meritocracy, freedom of association and speech, and equality before the law’. Such a whitewashed understanding of national identity would be laughable, were it not so deeply ingrained. Nominal biculturalism and demographic multiculturalism aside, the ‘mainstream’ into which migrants are expected to integrate remains, at its core, a fundamentally Pākehā one.

Given all of this it is unsurprising that Māori are uneasy about rising immigration. This unease reflects a number of concerns: the inevitability of losing ‘majority minority’ status as Māori population growth fails to keep pace with Asian net migration; the implications of this demographic shift for Māori political power; perceived competition for jobs and cultural resources; and uncertainty over the status of the Treaty and biculturalism. These concerns are easily misinterpreted as xenophobia or racism when decoupled from contemporary structural inequalities and the wider colonial context. Memories of displacement and domination are not relegated to the past; for many Māori they are real and raw. Tensions are further exacerbated by populist politicians and unbalanced media reports that pit Māori against migrants, and particularly against Asians. Such was the case with a national media report trumpeting that Māori ‘dislike Asian immigrants more than any other group of New Zealanders’, and that ‘Asians are blamed for taking jobs from Maori, driving Maori to Australia, lacking understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi and
competing for cultural funding’. The evidence? A nationally unrepresentative survey which included only a hundred Māori participants, and which showed that Māori were much more likely to say that New Zealanders felt less warm towards people from Asia compared with twelve months earlier.

The separation of Māori and migrants is also enabled by the very different mainstream articulations of how each contributes to the collective national good. Māori still tend to be framed as a drain on the nation, with the goal of ‘development’ being to ‘bring Māori up’ to an implicit Pākehā standard. A genuine commitment to tackling structural inequalities is, of course, a desirable policy goal. However, all too often narratives about Māori are filtered through a deficit lens, which situates poor Māori outcomes as the result of ‘bad’ individual behaviours, choices or preferences. This deficit approach is a stark contrast to immigration policy which situates migrants as a national resource whose human capital can contribute to a ‘modern’ market economy. Indeed, one of the ways in which governments have been able to ignore Māori aspirations to influence immigration is to construct dominant narratives around the role of immigration as essential for economic growth and global competitiveness – something that lies beyond the ambit of Māori development. We give these claims closer attention below.

INTEGRATION INTO A EUROCENTRIC ‘MAINSTREAM’

Much has been written about how New Zealand’s immigration policy served settler colonialism by keeping migrants white. Until the mid-1970s, entry was readily granted to citizens of Britain and Ireland, as traditional source countries. The place of Aotearoa New Zealand in the Pacific, and the connections of Māori to other Pacific peoples, were largely ignored. People from some Polynesian island states were granted citizenship or entry as temporary migrant workers to fill labour shortages, but when economic conditions changed and they were no longer needed, so-called ‘ overstayers’ were targeted for deportation as part of the infamous ‘dawn raids’.

From the late 1980s onwards, the government embarked on a series of reforms designed to maximise the economic contribution of migration while dismantling the more overt aspects of racial preference. Preferential entry by nation was replaced first by a system aimed at filling specific skill shortages, then by a points system in 1991. While, in theory, the points system did not discriminate by race, it included English-language criteria that fluctuated according to political whim. In the mid-1990s an ‘English language bond’ of $20,000 was introduced, reminiscent of the notorious poll tax imposed on Chinese migrants in the 1880s. These
language stipulations were justified as necessary to ensure social cohesion. Unsurprisingly, no points were allocated for proficiency in our other official languages: te reo Māori or New Zealand Sign Language. Racial criteria may have been expunged from immigration policy but the spectre of race continues to shape what ‘successful’ integration entails.

While social cohesion was espoused as an important immigration goal, more recent policy shows that the ideal immigrant need not fit in if the government can cash in on their presence here. Migrant categories were introduced in 2009 that allowed investors residency without requiring that they actually live or work in Aotearoa. A range of temporary workers’ permits have also been introduced over time. In the case of both investors and temporary workers, the goal is not so much for these migrants to integrate as it is for them to contribute to the New Zealand economy. Rachel Simon-Kumar’s insightful analysis of racial politics and migration policy deftly shows how the desirable migrant is now constructed as someone who shares similarities in global, consumptive ‘culture’, regardless of race.¹⁰

ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR WHOM?
Given the emphasis that current immigration policy places on economic benefit, it is only fair to ask: who reaps the benefits? Immigration to Aotearoa New Zealand tends to increase productivity and gross domestic product per capita.¹¹ The average contribution of immigrants to the New Zealand economy far exceeds that of New Zealand-born citizens, in part because a much higher proportion of the latter are at post-retirement age. However, the negative economic impacts of population growth, including growth through immigration, disproportionately affect Māori.

For much of the last twenty years, natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) has been the major contributor to population growth. However, since 2013 net migration has exceeded natural increase by a significant margin.¹² Some of this is due to returning New Zealanders, but the majority of net migration comprises the overseas-born. Population growth will inevitably put additional pressures on infrastructure. Historically, where new infrastructure has been required, it has often come at the expense of Māori property rights. This is not only a feature of our colonial past, but also of our present. The Public Works Act 1981 is one instrument the state continues to use excessively to alienate Māori land. Recently, the Act was used in an attempt to confiscate the culturally significant lands of nationally revered author Patricia Grace and her whānau for highway construction. The Grace whānau successfully
challenged the confiscation. However, their legal victory only pushed development on to lands of neighbouring whānau within Te Ātiawa. The Grace whānau saw this as no victory and are now working with Green Party MP Catherine Delahunty in support of her member’s bill to protect Māori land (both freehold and customary) from alienation under the Public Works Act, which is currently being deliberated on in select committee. The intention here is not to suggest that immigration leads directly to Māori land alienation, but to ensure that Māori interests are protected as we accommodate a growing population. Preventing Māori land from confiscation through the Public Works Act is an important step towards that goal.

In addition to stress on public infrastructure, migration-driven population growth also puts pressure on housing markets. While immigration alone has not caused New Zealand’s current housing crisis, it certainly adds to housing demand. Housing supply shortages have grossly inflated house prices, particularly in Auckland, where the median house price exceeds $1 million, with Queenstown not far behind. Increases in house prices might benefit existing homeowners, but at the pointy end of the housing crisis, where many Māori live, it is becoming increasingly common for households to spend more than half of their income meeting housing costs, as workers’ earnings trail behind rising accommodation costs. As inequality increases, many Māori find themselves severely housing-deprived, in temporary or inadequate housing, or homeless.

While Māori suffer from housing deprivation, initiatives to increase housing supply are not always beneficial to Māori. Where Māori are included, housing initiatives can work well. For example, Ngāti Whātua recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the government to develop 400 homes in Hobsonville Point. However, where Māori interests are ignored, housing initiatives can be detrimental to Māori. Lands at Ihumātao, Māngere, have been targeted by Fletcher Residential for a housing development, despite concerns being raised by the mana whenua, Te Wai-o-Hua, that the development would have a catastrophic impact on the neighbouring Māori heritage site of national significance, and would lead to gentrification of the nearby 800-year-old papa kāinga (settlement). An occupation/reclamation of the contested land by members of the local Māori community began on 5 November 2016 and is ongoing at the time of writing. The protectors of Ihumātao are concerned that the housing crisis is being used as an excuse to pass legislation (the Housing Accords and Special Housing Act 2013) that allows the government to subvert Māori Treaty rights to be part of decision-making processes, rights which are affirmed in

The impact of immigration on labour markets is also disproportionately detrimental to Māori. Immigration is great for business owners, as the flow of labour allows skills shortages to be met, and competition within the labour market lowers wages. The effect of immigration on wages is usually small and short-lived. However, given the lenient visa criteria for temporary migrants in a range of categories, coupled with the flow of returning expatriates escaping the stagnating Australian economy, the labour market is potentially saturated with low-skilled workers, causing concerns within Māori communities that low-skilled jobs will become more difficult to secure and less well remunerated.

Tensions in this space are not helped by claims that migrant workers are required because local workers are unwilling to fill jobs or are unable to pass drug tests, despite Work and Income’s drug-screening programme yielding negligible positive results. Rather than setting Māori and migrants against each other for these jobs, complementary strategies are needed that provide opportunities to temporary migrants and enable iwi to partner with businesses to meet labour shortages by removing barriers to labour-force participation such as transport and accommodation shortages.

In addition, there is a need to ensure that the ‘floor’ in how low wages are able to fall is set at a level that enables workers’ needs to be met. And as migrant workers may be vulnerable to exploitation, businesses that use temporary migrant labour should be placed under closer scrutiny.

There are ample opportunities to create partnerships that are mutually beneficial for Māori and migrants. Many Māori businesses have a strong international presence, and larger iwi organisations are at a stage in their economic development to be looking internationally for investment opportunities. The Taniwha Dragon Economic Summit that took place in February 2017 was a significant example of engagement between Māori and overseas economies. There is scope to provide positive incentives for migrant investors to invest in industries in which Māori are involved, and for iwi to take a more substantial role in influencing migration policies that are meant to benefit the regions. In regions that are struggling to deal with demographic and economic decline, iwi leadership is critical, and this ought to extend to matters involving immigration. Big business already has substantial influence over policy and public opinion. The New Zealand Initiative, which is sponsored by major New Zealand corporations, recently commissioned a report entitled The New New Zealanders: Why Migrants Make Good Kiwis,
which received a good deal of press. Among the report’s recommendations is preferential entry to citizens of English-speaking, white-majority nations via the awarding of additional points. Providing for a much greater measure of Māori influence on migration policy is long overdue.

A TREATY-BASED MODEL OF MANAAKITANGA
While a key theme animating this collection is the concept of ‘fairness’ as it relates to immigration, we return to tikanga as first law of the land, and reflect on what might be considered ‘tika’ – that is, right, just, fair or proper. What might a ‘tika’ approach to immigration look like – one that recognises the unique status and rights of Māori as tangata whenua, but also gives substance to the fullness of multiculturalism?

Manaakitanga is a core Māori value that can be defined as ‘the process of showing and receiving care, respect, kindness and hospitality’. It is often used in reference to the hosting responsibilities of mana whenua (local authorities) when met with visitors, but also extends to care that is taken to manage and protect resources. The root of manaakitanga is mana (power, prestige, authority); ‘aki’ indicates reciprocal action (the suffix ‘tanga’ is added simply to nominalise the verb manaaki). The concept of manaakitanga, then, captures notions of mutual care and respect for people, honouring one another or power sharing, and the protection of our environments. For this reason manaakitanga provides a useful framework when envisaging a tika system for immigration.

A system based on manaakitanga would still address economic imperatives, as the mutual benefits – economic or otherwise – for immigrants and the nation would continue to be a key feature. However, a system underpinned by care and respect would go further in accommodating new migrants once they arrived, for example by easing the difficulties currently faced in obtaining family reunification visas. Such a system would also need to reflect our responsibilities to care for our neighbours across Te Moana Nui a Kiwa (the Pacific Ocean), a greater recognition of our whakapapa relationships, and the shifting needs of international communities. This country’s embarrassingly small refugee quota in the face of a major global refugee crisis, and our failure to recognise the plight of climate refugees, could not be tolerated within a system where care and respect are central. These concerns would need to be balanced against our responsibilities to care for existing communities within Aotearoa (including Māori communities) and to protect our environments.

Inherent in a manaakitanga system would be the recognition of mana whenua, not simply as
a historical footnote, but as genuine authorities with ongoing rights to self-determination and important contributors to the contemporary cultural fabric of Aotearoa. Recognition of mana whenua requires more than just window dressing in the form of a pōwhiri for new migrants. Having new citizens make an oath to both Treaty partners (rather than just the Crown) by pledging to uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi would be a small step towards this recognition of mana whenua.

Māori take hosting responsibilities seriously. But there can be no manaakitanga without mana. Most if not all Māori authorities find themselves in situations where many of their lands, waterways and other resources have been alienated and their authority undermined by the Crown. Without resources and authority it becomes very challenging for Māori to take care of their own, and others. Despite these challenges, Māori groups throughout the country often go out of their way to take care of others, with many marae routinely opening their doors to accommodate people in the face of natural disasters and accommodation shortages. Recognising mana whenua would allow this manaakitanga to be extended further. For migrants, this model of a ‘host’ society would not require integration into a Eurocentric mainstream. Respect for Māori culture does not require the suppression of others’ cultures, nor their reduction to consumptive forms such as ethnic festivals.

In this chapter we have advocated for the right of Māori to be included in immigration decision-making. However, inclusion in these decisions would be a very limited form of recognition of the tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) promised in the Treaty. Only when tino rangatiratanga is realised will Māori be in a position to fully express manaakitanga to manuhiri (guests). It is important to note that manaakitanga goes both ways; there are behavioural expectations placed on both tangata whenua and manuhiri. While our history proves that these expectations of care and respect have been grossly violated, there are now processes in place to address breaches of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and tauiwi have an opportunity to reciprocate manaakitanga by supporting Māori in their efforts to gain recognition and redress for Treaty breaches, and to realise tino rangatiratanga. Asians Supporting Tino Rangatiratanga and Racial Equity Aotearoa (founded by Māori) are examples of activist groups refusing to be divided and supporting each other’s political agendas.

So how might tino rangatiratanga be realised? Short of constitutional transformation, this would be difficult. A February 2016 report by Matike Mai Aotearoa, an independent iwi group working on ‘constitutional transformation’,
outlines constitutional arrangements that could better effect Te Tiriti o Waitangi, including a ‘three sphere’ model, with separate spheres for tangata whenua and tangata tauiwi decision-making and a relational sphere for joint decision-making. The vision of Matike Mai is to achieve constitutional change by 2040.

Māori and newer migrants have the opportunity to work together to create constitutional arrangements that are better suited to our diverse citizenry. During our own migration story, our ancestors were able to navigate to these shores due in no small part to their strength of vision. Our navigators were able to see the distant islands of Aotearoa and pull them forth. This same ability to see beyond the horizon will enable us pull forth a new constitution for this nation. The waka has been carved, and provisions are being loaded. Current political tides, treacherous though they may be, will not keep us from our destination: a fair, diverse and inclusive Aotearoa. Will you join us?