http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/

Research Commons at the University of Waikato

Copyright Statement:

The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand).

The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act and the following conditions of use:

- Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.
- Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be made to the author where appropriate.
- You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the thesis.
INDONESIA-PNG BORDER SECURITY

A thesis
submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree
of
Masters in Arts
at
The University of Waikato
by
PASCAL NOROTOUW

2017
Abstract

The field of international relations and security studies is among the most dynamic and challenging aspects of politics. Relationship between states depend on various factors such as politics, economic cooperation and socio-cultural partnerships. Despite the growing interdependency between states through the means of bilateral, multilateral or regionalism, security issues have remained to play a vital role in determining their level of cooperation and coexistence. This qualitative research entitled: Indonesia-PNG Border security, underlines Indonesia and PNG’s foreign policy while addressing the impacts of Papuan separatism on the 750km border. The relationship of Indonesia and PNG has remained cordial and robust over the years; however, the existence of the Papuan conflict has often threatened to destabilize mutual understandings between the parties. The findings specify that the issue of Papuan separatism is one the sensitive and complicated political and cultural problems of the modern era. The sensitivity that lies behind the Papuan separatism issue has often caused difficulties to Indonesia and PNG policy makers. Border policies are designed to obtain the state objectives; however, cultural aspects have always benefited the third party (OPM) in their existence along the border. Subsequently, the Papuan autonomy has allowed for the acknowledgment of Papuan’s cultural rights. Moreover, the Papuan separatism has managed to gain support from many external parties. The growing participation of external parties have triggered internal security concern. This study indicates that the Papuan separatism issue will remain to influence Indonesia-PNG border security in the years to come. The designing of border policies should focus and encourage more on building trust as means of overcoming misunderstanding. More cooperation between all relative authorities such as the CIQS is vital to maintain a good and favorable a relationship.
Acknowledgements

This paper is a combination of half academic and half personal experiences. As a child that was born and raised in the refugee camps in Papua New Guinea and spent half of my age moving from one camp to another camp, I experienced the struggle of living ‘on the run’ as an impact of political situation during the rise of West Papua Freedom Movement in 1980s. That struggle has inspired me to choose Indonesia and Papua New Guinea relations regarding the border security as the topic in my dissertation. Through this writing, I want to provide a clearer view on Indonesia and Papua New Guinea relations in a matter of the border security perspective and few insights from my own perspective. I realize that this paper is far from perfection and probably is not enough to satisfied the readers that want to explore more on this topic. However, I hope at least some of my personal thoughts and experiences that I put here will be added to the uniqueness of this paper and provide some valuable information.

I would like to give my first acknowledgement to God Almighty, the Owner of my life and Source to my hopes and strength. To my beloved parents, John Norotouw and Fien Afasedanya, whose had brought me to this world and taught me everything I needed to know, especially through the hardships we face in times of struggle during our stay in Papua New Guinea. I can never thank you enough, you are my heroes. Also to my dear brother Rudy his wife Sophie and daughter Eve, my sister Helena and brother Pala Your love and prayers are what made me who I am today. To my dear wife, Veronica, and our daughter Neya, you are the reason I can make it this far, thank you for always being there for me. We will be entering a new phase of our life soon. My big families, uncles and aunties, sisters and brothers, cousins, nieces and nephews, from both sides, thank you for all the supports.

I would never be here without the Government of New Zealand who gave me this great opportunity through the NZAid scholarships. I have the advantages to learn in this beautiful country and in an excellent institution,
the University of Waikato. I am one of the luckiest to be able to pursue my Master Degree in International Relations and Security in Waikato, provided with excellent staffs whose always eager to help me during my study and the best teaching that enlightened me with new knowledges in my field. To Professor Dov Bing, the one who approved my application to the Uni, thank you for the chance given. My excellent and kind-hearted supervisor, Dr. Mark Rolls, thank you for all that you have done in guiding and assisting me, especially the patience and understanding you have shown me when I am struggling to finished this paper.

Finally, the last but not the least, my fellow brothers from Papua New Guinea, whose have been with me during good and bad for these past two years, especially Tony, Jean, daughter Marson, Emanuel Keleli, Roweng Bomen, Imange Dau Wakpi, Connely Kekun, Albert Gigmai, David Skoroh and the others that I may not mentioned here, thank you for the wholeheartedly friendships and being my second family in New Zealand, time will change everything but memories will last. To all my friends, from Papua and other parts of Indonesia under the NZAid program, to my good friends from Timor Leste, whom I cannot mention here one by one, and to the PNG Students Association of Waikato, thank you for the good times and chances given to get to know each other and to make some good friends.

Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my late sister Evelyn Rebecca Norotouw
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii  
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... iii  
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ v  
Chapter 1 ........................................................................................................................................ 1  
  Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1  
  1.1 Background ......................................................................................................................... 3  
  1.2 Research Identification ........................................................................................................ 14  
  1.2.1 Research Limitation ......................................................................................................... 18  
  1.2.2 Research Question .......................................................................................................... 20  
  1.3 Purpose of the Research ....................................................................................................... 20  
  1.3.1 Purpose of the Research ................................................................................................. 20  
  1.3.2 Benefit of the Research ................................................................................................. 20  
  1.4 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................................... 20  
  1.5 Research Methods and Data Collecting Technique ......................................................... 24  
  1.5.1 Research Method .......................................................................................................... 24  
  1.5.2 Data Collecting technique ............................................................................................ 25  
  1.6 Organization of the Thesis ................................................................................................. 25  
CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................................. 27  
  Indonesia and PNG’s Policies and Implementations .............................................................. 27  
  2.1 PNG Foreign Policy ........................................................................................................... 30  
    2.1.1 General Foreign Policy ............................................................................................... 30  
  2.2 West Papuan Separatism ...................................................................................................... 33  
    2.2.1 Indonesia-PNG Relations and Border Security ........................................................... 43  
    2.2.2 Indonesia’s National Approach and Border Policy ..................................................... 54  
  2.3 Indonesia-PNG Relations ................................................................................................... 57  
    2.3.1 Foreign Relations ......................................................................................................... 58  
    2.3.2 Political Relations ........................................................................................................ 60  
    2.3.3 Economics, Investment and Trade .............................................................................. 61  
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................................. 62  
  The Political Impacts of Separatism on Border Security ......................................................... 62  
  3.1 Political Factors Influencing Separatism ........................................................................... 69  
    3.1.1 Separatism and Human Rights .................................................................................... 77
3.2 Indonesia’s Political Reaction .......................................................... 88
  3.2.1 Political Reactions in the South West Pacific and Impacts on
Papua’s Domestic Politics .................................................................. 95
  3.2.2 PNG’s Political Reactions ......................................................... 98
3.3 Basic Agreement ........................................................................... 102
  3.3.1 Factors Affecting the Designing and Implementing of
Security Policies ............................................................................ 105
  3.3.2 The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces ............................. 109
CHAPTER 4 ....................................................................................... 114
  The Making of Foreign Policy ......................................................... 114
  4.1 Indonesian Cabinets and Foreign Policy .................................... 120
  4.2 PNG Government and Parliament ............................................. 122
    4.2.1 The Involvement of Political Elites ...................................... 127
    4.2.2 Civil Society ....................................................................... 128
  4.3 Democracy and Foreign Policy Making ................................... 132
CHAPTER 5 ....................................................................................... 139
  Conclusion and Recommendation ................................................. 139
CHAPTER 1

Introduction
The subject of power and interest are evidently prominent to the study of politics in any sphere, (Lawson, 2015) Security, as (Buzan, 1991) explains, concerns vital issues affecting people both domestically and internationally with countries possessing power and influence over most of the factors that dominate the nature of security. States are often unable to evolve peacefully because one’s existence deliberately threatening the function of the other. Hence, the emergence of the need for security whether domestic or international has become one of the most significant challenges dating back to the end of the Second World War. According to (Snow, 2016) security is defined into 2 parts; first, the physical and second the psychological. The physical threats represent the objective of the state's capabilities in attaining military means and its potential to use it carelessly for securing national interest, while the psychological threats refers to insecurity driven by the human mind and its abilities to analyze conceptions based on vigorous security challenges. Thus, in this case states turn to consider a more reliable and peaceful form of relations either bilateral or multilateral as mechanisms to minimize the risks of war or jeopardizing national security. Nonetheless, the devastating impacts of WWII has introduced a massive change in the global international system. Also, (Lawson, 2016) argues that the increase in security dynamics has forced states to deliver safety first out of their fundamental interest while ignoring the greater international system.

Furthermore, (Buzan, 1991) argues that the power and economic build-up of countries in the name of securing national interest often triggers tensions resulting in clashes among states. The nature of national security shifts over time ranging from higher to lower pressures leading to a closer coordinated partnership role. However, regardless of the change, the question of national security remains unanswered. Nonetheless, the condition of insecurity did not entirely apply to real ambitions of the state to foster the power approach, but also to the hands of armed civilians and networks of irresponsible trans-international criminal organization capable of harming
both citizens and state. As a result, out of the many vital issues that determine the standard of national security this paper focuses on the issue of border security and the need for states to manage and maintain their borders and territories, scrutinizing the rapid growth in security challenges that have gained much attention throughout the decades such as threats of terrorism, illegal transactions of narcotics and drugs, international crime, human smuggling, illegal border crossing, piracy and armed robbery at sea and illegal fishing etc.

This paper will concentrate on the border security issues of the Republic of Indonesia; an archipelagic state that comprises of an estimated 17000 plus islands that stretch throughout the vast area of the Asia-Pacific region. As (Simons, 2000) writes, the overall length of Indonesia ranging from East to West equals the distance between New York and London. Also, Indonesia’s is the world’s fourth most populous state with the largest population of over 250 million people in Southeast Asia and the largest Islamic democratic state in the world. On the one hand, it attributes to provide Indonesia a strategic platform to part take in the regional and global level, however, on the contrary, provides a significant challenge to the basic need of securing and maintaining its border security along the vast region of Asia-Pacific. According to (McInnes & Rolls, 1994) security in Asia-Pacific is a clear system consisting of complicated and sensitive issues that are common in the domestic, regional and global level. Based on this assumption this research will primarily aim to analyze the secure borders of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG).

As part of this particular task, this study will also examine the processes of how politics is conducted on both the domestic and international level and to what extent these policies provide or influence the countries’ goals and ambitions bearing in mind the cultural and structural aspects (Viotti & Kauppi, 2001). This research will focus on the RI-PNG international border, with its links to separatism which makes it one of the quietest yet most sensitive areas of the relationship between Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea. It is apparent that domestic and foreign policies do play a significant role in the management of the RI-PNG Border.

1.1 Background
The end of World War II saw an increase in nationalism throughout the world. Like many other states, victory for the allied forces provided the Indonesian nationalist the momentum to launch a coordinated resistance big enough to the over-through the Dutch occupation. It ended the Dutch Empire's rule from what used to be the Dutch colonial territories to what is called the Indonesian territory of Sabang in the far west to Merauke in the far east which in Bahasa Indonesia is often referred to as Nusantara. As (Hatta, 1957) explains, “the recent birth of states is driven by the greater sense of belonging crafted by the extreme demand to preserve its dignity. The colonial experience over hundreds of years has poisoned their ideologies so that no single person would ever consider being ruled again”. Indonesian history recalls the challenge towards gaining independence as a rather long and dreadful path. However, since the proclamation (proklamasi) of independence just two days after the Japanese forces surrendered to America and its allies, Indonesia was on track to become a nation based on Pancasila the official philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state that consists of two old Javanese Sanskrit “panca” meaning five and “sila” meaning principles, (Encyclopædia Britannica, 1998) bonded by Bineka Tuggal Ika, which primarily means unity in diversity. Although the proclamation of independence together with the ideology of the state confirmed the birth of a new Indonesia from the ashes of World War II, the Dutch forces never give up the region quickly; the inexperienced Indonesian state was still quite vulnerable as it faced a major challenge to overcome security risks that threatened its territorial integrity. On the 17th of August 1945, just few days after the Japanese surrender, Ir. H. Sukarno, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia and prominent leader of the revolution, proclaimed the country’s independence. Independence did not eliminate all problems encountered throughout the revolution; the Dutch remained in control of most of the territory until after the ‘round table conference’ at the Hague in 1949, that saw a formal agreement to the transfer of sovereignty from the former Dutch East Indies
to the Republic of Indonesia, (May, 2009). However, the Eastern New Guinea (Irian Jaya), or what is called the provinces of Papua and West Papua today, was never included within the transfer of sovereignty due to specific reasons. The exclusion of Papua then gave every right for the Dutch influence to remain in the eastern part of Indonesia for an additional four years. This illustrates that Indonesia’s history of national security dates back to the early years of independence. The Dutch influence in Papua threatened Indonesia’s national security so that Sukarno had to consult with the major powers to determine the removal of the Dutch Empire in the east. Nonetheless, the impact of the Cold War had to rescue the interests of the capitalist world and input democracy in the best interest of the majority that in the end, the growing tensions caused a national uprising of communism. This drew the concern of the United States to decide that Papua is given to Indonesia as payment to prevent Sukarno from joining the Communist bloc. The security risks and challenges during the vulnerable Cold War era lead to the establishment of the non-alignment foreign policy approach that allowed Indonesia to sail neutrally between the two largest reefs of the Soviet and the United States. Furthermore, Indonesia maintained a ‘free and active’ foreign policy approach as the basis of its political and international relations.

Fast-forwarding to today, Indonesia is a major force in Southeast Asia, with a medium influence in the greater Asian region. (Lowry, 1996) has seen the country after the Cold War predicted to be a potential giant in the area. This has upgraded status quo to its role within ASEAN. Indonesia is a founding member of the ASEAN that sees regional cooperation somewhat promising in providing secure pathways toward achieving some of the long-term development goals, including the achievement of a stable regional security that is a great concern, which is an important instrument in protecting Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, (Rolls, 1994) argues, that though ASEAN is founded to promote ‘regional stability and security cooperation’ and to some extant might be the best medium to comprehend a future of stable relations such as emphasized by the 1976 Declaration that produced the ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation’ primarily
focuses on the interest of encouraging peaceful relations among members, is still unforeseeable. As a consequence, Indonesia faces great security challenges in maintaining and implementing security measures to counter the external threats by now capable of tormenting the country’s internal security. For example, the international terrorist networks operating in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippine, such as Abu Sayyaf, Al-Qaeda, Darul Islam, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Jemaah Islamiyah etc. Such has in recent years illustrates a rather worrying image on the region especially to the internal security of Indonesia as (Parameswaran, 2016) reports, video footage of several Philippines militant groups pledging allegiance to IS has stocked fears that the group may be moving closer to its goal of establishing a foothold in Southeast Asia. Another similar attack believed to be linked to IS was launched early 2016 in center of Jakarta involving a gun battle with Indonesian security forces before bombs went off to at least claim lives of 6 people. In addition, Inspector-General of the Malaysian Police Khalid Abu Bakar told CNN that a grenade attack on June 28, 2016 at a nightspot near Kuala Lumpur was organized by Malaysian Islamic fighter in Syria. According to a report published by ( Straitstimes, 2016) over 200 suspects were being detained with links to terrorist networks such as ISIS, including 27 foreigners.

Providing the external security threats imposed by the region it is no doubt considered to be a high priority threat to the internal stability and security of Indonesia. Thus setting a platform for Indonesia to balance its role within the region and internationally by projecting a rather friendlier approach to foreign policy of a “million friends and zero enemy” under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Piccone & Yusman, 2014) Such actions seem more promising in enhancing cooperation’s on various aspects including the security aspect. However, matters of national security resulting from external threats still portrays a huge challenge to the internal stability especially the case of RI-PNG Border.

These genuine threats truly underline the importance to improve safety measures that will serve the best interest of the state primarily to provide
security to all its citizens. Indonesia's status as the largest archipelagic state makes it one of the biggest in the world which shares sea borders with ten neighboring countries and land borders with three neighboring countries. Indonesian borders are widely spread out with various typologies ranging from hinterlands to the most outside islands. This difference in conditions provides a major challenge towards organizing and implementing an effective framework to monitor and secure and regulate its territorial boundaries. As (Hatta, 1957) writes, primarily, it is the duty of the state to oversee that independence, freedom, sovereignty and its borders be well protected from internal and external and abstain from any possible war or conflict besides the purpose and defending itself against domestic and international threats.

The challenges faced in securing the Indonesia borders differ from one another due to the distinctive conditions and characteristics found on each border. Issues surrounding the border areas are most commonly related to geographical locations, the availability of both the human and natural resources, socio-economic factors, political and cultural determinants and in some cases the level of development in the neighboring state. The underlying problems found in the majority of Indonesia's border areas are mostly related to poverty and the lack of basic structures and infrastructure. Border management has, over the years, become a strategic and urgent issue that relates to the territorial integrity of the Republic. Among the many factors that contribute to the lack of obtaining an optimum outcome is the low level of coordination between institutions that are specifically designed to coordinate and conduct all border affairs on the domestic and international level. Besides, the central government's idea of decentralizing power through various constitutions between the central government, provincial government, regional government and the municipal government has, in most cases, seen its policies deteriorate over the long line of bureaucracy that in most cases are determined by politics and other self-driven interest.
State cooperation is vital to the management of border security, in particular between related institution internally and in neighboring state to consider and improve coordination to maintain and uphold democratic norms of dealing with security measures. In Indonesia's case, most of the problems that often arise in the border areas are dealt with in a bilateral form. Such cases are being communicated through diplomatic channels to notify and involve related parties. Some common cases that need urgent attention are often dominated by particular misunderstandings that commonly occur regarding border demarcations and human settlement based on given coordinates that position the border markers whether on land or at sea. Over the years it has been a high-profile issue within bilateral border discussions as its sensitivity deals with land ownership and other traditional variables that link both peoples. One of the biggest challenges that the Indonesian border authorities face along most of its border areas is the agreement on state border lines; this includes maritime borders. As mentioned above, the sensitive nature of this issue often results in disputes among local villages and sometimes involves the state and its neighbors forcing the authorities to take strong legal actions. This problem forms a gap between the people and government, peoples’ demands are often turned-down by the government or the government simply deals with other people outside the traditional systems, this is one of the reason why some border problems overlap and remain in agendas of annual bilateral border discussions.

Indonesia's extensive maritime territory borders ten countries which provides easy access for illegal border crossers, who are usually local fishermen who end up fishing in hot waters, due to the minimum availability of resources and knowledge that points out the exact direction and location of maritime border lines such as indicators based on precise coordinates. Thus, enforcing security requires more active cooperation between government institutions to pursue an overall outcome. In most cases, the local fisherman is detained and later fined for illegal fishing and illegal border crossing, authorities have been forced to work extra hard along the boundaries. Transactions of illegal substances or materials that are prohibited from entering Indonesian soil, suggest that these illicit activities
are more likely via sea transportation as local villagers, whether fishermen, gardeners or hunters, are among the most suspected entities that participate in illegal activities along border areas. Development throughout Indonesia has been progressing quite well. However, the lifestyle of the people along the border has been significantly affected due to the lack of development in previous decades. Villagers have to seek other ways to obtain income, and some means were involvement in buying and selling illegal goods to neighboring countries. Illegal fishing has over time cost Indonesia's economic sector millions of dollars, the exploitation of maritime resources by foreign fishing companies has implied a negative impact on the local fishing industry, as local fishermen are losing income in local markets.

Another problem is that traditional border crossers are often classified as illegal border crossers due to the similarity found through culture, custom, and traditions that exist along border areas. In this particular case, it is considered to be an old issue, however, with the importance of securing border surveillance it has been brought to the attention of border authorities, this is common in Kalimantan, Lesser Sunda Islands (Nusa Tengara, and Papua (Ichsan, 2015). Most cases see that individuals abuse the use of the exemption of traditional border crossing, this refers to people using the regular border crossing passes who by legal terms do not qualify to be classified as a traditional border crosser.

Relations, traditions and cultures shared among the peoples of Indonesia and its neighbors have existed for centuries making it rather impossible to deal with security issues. The tolerance for these norms and values to a great extent does affect the overall function of border security. Therefore, at most occasions, traditional chiefs and landowners are included in low-level dialogues with related institutions to consider the best approach to dealing with such issues, so that misunderstandings between people and state representatives are not triggered.
Among other major border issues in Indonesia comes the problem of armed robbery at sea, which until today most officials and related authorities still encounter difficulties in combating piracy, due to the limited availability of resources. According to the (ICC, International Maritime Bureau), ‘Live Piracy & Armed Robbery Report 2016’ shows the attack of a product tanker with attack number: 151-16, Thursday, Oct 20, 2016 over the Malacca Strait exactly in Dumai, over the coast of Pekanbaru a province in Indonesia’s was ‘unknown’. These types of crimes occur near sea borders and are mostly sensitive triggering tension between armed security personnel as it generally interferes with national jurisdictions. Indonesia is facing a tougher security challenge as concerns over abductions and piracy continues to bother policy makers and strategists along the ‘tri-border area’ (TBA) between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea (Espenilla, 2016).

Indonesia’s growing role in maintaining border safety in the region includes combating piracy, armed robbery on the high seas, with terrorist attacks of great importance to Southeast Asia and the Pacific region because most of the exports and imports of the region pass through Indonesian borders. Together on this level arises the issue of drug trafficking; in recent years Indonesia has taken a tough stance on Illegal drug trafficking which had made international headlines. Such as the execution of the Bali 9 including two Australian citizens who had their clemency pleas rejected. (BBC News, 2015) Reports suggest that a lot of this illegal substance is transported by sea and air from foreign entities. Therefore, steady security improvements in Indonesian airports and harbors to scan for unwanted substances that are banned are seen. Human trafficking is also among the issues that affects border management: made though most of this happens offshore, the impact is quite devastating to Indonesia as criminals brainwash the victims. Another important and dangerous issue that complete the range of tasks that border officials combat is the problem of arms smuggling along borders. This crime commonly occurs along the maritime boundary. However, this is not to say that it does not take place on land borders, often linked to black markets along the boundaries of Indonesia-Malaysia and
Thailand. Indonesian police authorities recorded 170 cases of armed robberies involving 193 suspects from the first four months of 2000. Recently, Indonesian authorities arrested illicit arms traders from the Philippines heading to North Maluku and South Maluku provinces where religious conflicts have been going on for more than a year. Members from the secessionist group Free Aceh Movement are believed to be receiving weapons smuggled from Malaysia, (Dursin, 2000).

Like other issues relate to terrorism in Indonesia, maritime terrorism has forced the Indonesian security forces to triple their efforts to counter possible attacks that target one of the world's biggest trade lanes. Illegal logging also contributes to border security issues because almost half of Indonesia's rainforests are found along land border areas which are prone to dangerous exploitations, even though this area is incredibly rich with natural resources criminals take advantage to conduct illegal activities. The difference in border regulations is also identified as a major contributor to the ongoing criminal acts.

The growing security challenges to Indonesia’s borders have prompted the central government to establish an institution on the 17th of September 2010 called the National Border Management Agency, (Badan Pengelola Perbatasan National) or abbreviated as BNPP. The intent was later amended through the Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia (PERPRES) No.12 of 2010, as a follow-up to the National Constitution (UU) No.43 of 2008, concerning territorial boundaries. Headed by the Minister for Internal Affairs, over the last five years, the central government, through the national border management agency, has been very committed to working tirelessly to develop its border areas with the aim of transforming its borders from what used to a forgotten backyard into becoming the nation's gateway or the country's pride. (Ichsan, 2015). The agency is tasked to perform and regulate programs based on the grand design of the management of state borders covering a long-term goal planned for 2005-2025. The agency is mandated to prioritize five main areas namely: the determination and affirmation of state boundaries, an increase in defense, security and law
enforcement, boosting economic growth in the area, the improvement of social and essential public needs, and strengthening organizations that manage the country's borders.

Overall, Indonesia's border policy does have a lot in common; most approaches are carefully designed and implemented to serve an overall purpose of maintaining the state from either internal or external threats. However, the border on the eastern part of Indonesia, the RI-PNG international border, slightly differs from the other western borders of the country. One fundamental reason relates to the history of today's Indonesian provinces of West Papua and Papua also known as West Irian or Irian Jaya (Western New Guinea) as it used to be called back in the 1950's. The history has often determined the functions of the border through the view of local Papuans. Pauans and Papua New Guineans have a 100% similarity that cannot be differentiated and separated by imaginary borderlines. The ideology derived from these similarities have contributed to most border issues since the integration of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia. Local villagers cross the frontier and reside without the officials’ knowledge causing fluctuations in census counts as people in this area migrate places in search of basic welfare. The lack of appointed institutions to pinpoint these matters have grown to affect other areas linking to the security chain.

The demand for Papuan independence has, through the early 1960's and towards the late 1990's, seen a massive impact on border security violations and the approach that it has gone through since the independence of Papua New Guinea. Various administrations have in the past dealt with the Indonesian authorities regarding the border, such as the British and Australian governments that influenced the policies before PNG's independence. Having that history, PNG, however, since having its sovereignty transferred from Australia has rather softened its policies to indirectly permit the settlement of Papuans refugees in PNG who according to Indonesia, had illegally crossed the border into PNG territory. PNG's position in providing refuge also impacted on the state of border surveillance by both countries in the early 1980s. Reports indicate that the Indonesian
armed forces have deliberately stormed into PNG territory on several occasions in search of Papuan activists or armed members of the OPM and, in doing so, the PNG government often raised fears of the possibility of an Indonesian armed forces intervention along the border. Like in the past, in April 2015 around 8 Indonesian armed military personnel were spotted inside PNG territory walking across the border and along the beach of Wutung Village (Radio New Zealand, 2015). Further reports, also state that the Indonesian troops opened fire on PNG defense force (PNGDF) patrol in May 2015. This events are believed to be fueled by recent conflicts between the OPM fighters and the Indonesian military leading to frequent border incursions (Scoop, 2015).

The brutal acts of Indonesia’s New Order regime under General Suharto quickly set in place a different function to the boundary between RI-PNG; this particular Indonesian border was used as a way to safety for Papuans who fled in fear of their lives due to the authoritarian style of leadership. Human security versus national security has led to massive human rights violations around Jayapura and nearby towns. The border is derived to be highly sensitive as most rebels operate along the frontier implementing successful guerilla techniques. The border then obviously developed to be a war zone.

Also, the Indonesian political change in Jakarta has impacted the methods and approach to security over the years. Suharto’s fall in 1998 paved the way for little change to take place, even though the changes did not last for an expected five-year period it did provide some room to advocate the rights of local people and the use of the border. Consecutive changes of Indonesian presidents from Suharto, to B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), and Megawati Sukarnoputri did allow for little change, almost unnoticeable. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, however, things started to look different as more attention was given to strengthen the security approach in the border areas basically to regain more focus on physical developments. The primary focus during this era was to implement a style of leadership based on a more straight-forward approach to speed
up development such as infrastructure, social and economic services that could transform this forgotten backyard into a symbolic icon of the state. The approach had a huge impact on infrastructure developments such as road construction linking the town of Jayapura and the Skouw-Wutung border and the upgrade of local border posts into national borders with a lot of funding made available to house the projects. The primary aim of this approach is to develop border regions especially through capacity building. In relation to the management of the RI-PNG border, both states have inclusively depended on the Basic Agreement on Border Arrangements, the "Treaty of Mutual Respect Friendship and Cooperation" (May, 2009). Along with another subsidiary, bilateral agreements have served as the foundation and guiding principles for healthy and constructive neighborly ties between the Republic of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Mostly, the relationship between the two countries in the twenty-first century has seen characterized by the two countries common land border. Despite the affinity between the two sides of New Guinea, a border drawn down the middle by European colonialists in 1895 and 1910 officially separated them, (Saltford, 2003b). Furthermore, as (Saltford, 2003b) argues, that the traditional boundary between the two states decides the form and manner of its relationship, in other words, the sensitivity surrounding the issues that occur determines the overall communication and relationship between Jakarta and Port Moresby depending on the potential threats. The necessity to maintain good relations based on shared product paved the way for the initial signing of the Agreement concerning Border Administrations. The collective spirit of understanding between the two states has positively shifted the state of border affairs from a highly suspicious and or hostile situation, to a more mutual and friendlier area of cooperation which has reduced fear on both sides of the frontier.

Furthermore, to ensure the practical implementation of the 'Basic Border Arrangements,' some formal subsidiary arrangements have been concluded such as; the Joint Border Committee (JBC), Border Liaison Officers Meeting (BLOM), Border Liaison Meeting (BLM), and Joint Border Committee (JBC) (Bandoro, 2007). Such meetings are scheduled on an annual basis to settle
any relevant concerns on the shared border to foster stable relations between the two countries. With the background experience of certain sensitive border issues such as illegal border crossings, environmental degradations, health problems, illegal fishing, Traditional Border Crossing (TBC) remains one of the major challenges among the inexplicit issues. In some cases, residents who by legal terms do not qualify for a TBC permit illegally obtains it by providing false information. Others simply cross over using bush tracks on various unattended locations of the border. As a circumstance, the complexity has impeded on the success of recent BLOM, BLM and JBC meetings; contentious issues are then referred to the Ministerial Joint Commission for deliberations and concrete actions at the highest level.

As (Radio New Zealand, 2015) asserts, that the 750 plus kilometer border is extensive and penetrable, difficult to secure and an artificial barrier to tribal groups existing along the area. The growing links between the people of the Indonesian province of Papua and Papua New Guinea communities along the border are inevitable and becoming increasingly blurred. Traditional links in and across the border is one of the main purposes people of both sides travel to and from for customary purposes some of course legal others illegal. Traditional Border Crossing (TBC) cards are normally required which is visa exempted. Another issue that adds to the complexity, is the presence of OPM elements, armed fighters who has troubled the Indonesian armed forces over the years. Due to the complexity surrounding the disputes it is important to analyze the role of policy makers who at the end of the day are responsible for the day to day operations of the border.

1.2 Research Identification

In designing border policies, the process of decision making is considered as a fundamental principle. It is regarded as an important part amid the constantly developing nature of politics. Such systems act as anchors that determine the state’s position toward attaining national interests. Therefore, the decision-making processes remains a far-reaching part in conducting international relations. Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ foreign policy has
positioned Indonesia in a strategic point to select and pursue goals based on its national objectives freely.

Border issues between Indonesia and PNG has been one of the most sensitive domestic issues of Indonesia. In particular, this issue is essential to state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Local uprisings due to the issue of separatism have over time posed the need for Indonesia to guide and adjust its policies regarding border security. The involvement of other parties such as states and non-government organizations (NGO’s) have substantially internationalized the issue that poses a threat to internal security. The relationship between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea has required the use of foreign policy as a guiding principle toward decision-making process in dealing with border security. Apart from the many causes of unstable border relations (May, 1986) argues, that a possible borderline conflict occurs when officials from one state reach a certain conclusion that the country’s objectives have been significantly threatened by actions of its neighbor on borders.

The two countries border problems started after the departure of the Netherlands from Papua in 1962. (May, 1986) argues, that the main issue along the New Guinea border is that its location is so remote that even the two countries cannot determine the precise locations regarding border demarcation. It was in 1965 that the frontier problems initially become more political as movements across the border increased. The cycle of repeated border crossing to PNG throughout the late 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s until the fall of the ‘new order regime’ had a common motive of fleeing the Indonesian military government. Among the many that crossed over about 80 percent of the people were in some way linked to the resistance. (May, 1986) defines, as a ‘flight of rebels and refugees resisting Indonesian rule,’ this lead to the creation of some rebel camps on the Papua New Guinea side of the border.

Movements of this kind, of course, threatened to harm the national interest of both states. Records indicate by the end of 1960’s the Australian administration across the border had recorded an increase in border...
movements of about 1,695 people as the result of what the Papuan people claim as a failure of the Act of Free Choice. Since then, in total, including the great influx of border crosses recorded in 1984 forced the Australian authorities to establish a sizeable refugee settlement in East Awin in West Sepik Province under auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees. Since then, there are more than 10, 400 West Papuan living in Papua New Guinea (Matbob, 2012). Despite the Australian influence in PNG between the 1960’s and early 1970’s the Indonesian military expansion inflicted fears of a possible conflict escalation due to the use of force along the border.

During this period, the Indonesian army conducted massive raids along the boundary area, which due to the isolation, was not properly demarcated and caused some operations to be carried out in PNG territory. This misconduct caused by the Indonesian armed forces along the border triggered Australian concerns for the security and safety of the border crossers that prompted the Australian administration to quickly established camps. The massive influx is believed to be fueled by information that there is safety and security on the other side of the border. The border crossers who fled into PNG in the 1980’s was mostly linked to the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) the Papuan Freedom Movement who aided the organization’s resistance to Indonesian rule. Border developments during these years signaled a sympathetic view that Papua New Guinea was indirectly concerned of the security and safety of its Melanesian brothers. The movements across the border saw a deteriorating relationship between the Indonesian armed forces and the armed OPM guerrilla forces and the government of Papua New Guinea. Though there were empathies within the PNG government relating to the situation in West Papua, Papua New Guinea significantly maintains a firm position to respect the Indonesian rule over the Melanesian’s of West Papua and Papua.

Apart from PNG the border crossers then went on to seek asylum in other parts of the world such as Australia, England, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the USA. As time went on these former refugees have come back to
influence the stability along the RI-PNG border causing several political hiccups such as organizing mass demonstration that completely disturbs the daily activities in Papua. Today this groups of people campaign under various umbrellas such as the Free Papuan Movement or the recent Unification of all parties under the banner of United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) that is currently an observer to the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), such ambition is of significant impact to the struggle of West Papua. Today there are various organizations and NGO that support the fight. According to the (Free West Papua org) this organization are based in 12 countries, including New Zealand under the Peace Movement Aotearoa - Wellington and West Papua Action Auckland.

The Papuans who reside in Papua New Guinea today have been around for over 30 years, most of the young generation were born and educated in PNG still believe in a free West Papua. These refugees have been living in PNG since then; the PNG government has given them special permissions (permissive resident) that grants them almost the same rights as Papua New Guineans, such as equal access to basic health and education, job opportunities, etc.

The granting of permissive resident status to refugees has, in other words, increased their bargaining position. Some even remain along the border area to operate rebel resistance that mostly affects the regular use of the border. The use of the border area and PNG as a buffer zone to seek neutral grounds has managed to contribute together to the other ongoing campaigns to cause an upgrade of the Papuan issue into one of international concern. Out of the many initial refugees that settle in PNG, some managed to re-establish themselves through education and careers within the PNG government; others had links to PNG political elites that often seen the issues of Papua being debated in PNG. The Papuan issues have thus remained an important part of PNG politics as political candidates have linked their personal interest with the West Papuan issues that sees them gain much success in national elections. The ideology of one people one solwara, a Melanesian solidarity slogan, often whole-heartedly influences the level of support from the greater Melanesian community. As
a result, it affects the domestic political stability in Indonesian West Papua and Papua regions; the PNG government has often seen criticized for turning a blind eye at the human rights violations that occur in neighboring West Papua and Papua regions. The RI-PNG border has presented a major problem to the border authorities due to the public pressure that are launched in relations to issue. According to International Peace Academy (1989) Indonesia and PNG agreed that illegal border crossers who enters PNG must be turned over to Indonesian authorities and not harbored by PNG locals.

The primary challenge found in this part of the Indonesian border is the political issue caused by human rights violations and pleas for self-determination. The problems that occur along this particular border are in most cases substantially influenced by the political ambitions of pro-Papuan individuals and groups who operate under a secret network. The relationship between local based pro-Papuan activists and internationally based ones, whether in PNG, the Pacific, Europe or the United States today has been focused on increasing the awareness of human rights violations in West Papua and Papua provinces which is focal point of the Free West Papua organization. This has forced both Indonesia and PNG to address the concurrent border issues in a more intensive manner so as to provide security and welfare to the peoples of the border. In most cases, rebel groups have proven their ability to cause disturbances along the border that affect the relationship between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

1.2.1 Research Limitation
To gain a proper understanding on the dynamics surrounding this sensitive issue, this research begins with a brief history of the range of security challenges threatening Indonesia’s national security, particularly, West Papua’s plea for Independence that have plagued the Indonesian authorities for over 5 decades and its impact surrounding policy making on RI-PNG border security. The RI-PNG border security, like other issues is of course a very sensitive one due to the involvement of a third party (OPM) that often-tested Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial legitimacy. This
paper will also seek to analyze the significant involvement of various agency in managing the security affairs of the shared border. However, in constructing this research the writer must clearly acknowledge the limitations throughout the research. Firstly, the factor of time and cost is a major determinant to the completion of this research, in covering the length and size of the border requires more time and schedule visits to border locations in some of the rural parts, therefore most of the data and information gathered are from the Skow-Wutung and Keerom regency border area. Secondly, the research would be more challenging if access to classified government documents were granted. Third, the timing of located research collided with the preparations for the 2016 annual bilateral meetings between senior border officials of RI-PNG, this means that heads and senior authorities of related border agencies were all out of office completing all necessary documents for the trip, which had to restrict the progress of the findings. Fourth, the excess to the third party were strictly not permitted for safety reasons, thus most of the sources used to analyze the third party’s involvement would be mainly secondary sources.

Another major obstacle that the writer came across was the case of decentralization of power that saw the regional governments in the province of Papua gain more autonomy in running its own affairs, this simply caused a major hiccup in obtaining the required information, bureaucratic formalities also minimized the use of up-to-date official documents for comparison in further analyses. Overall, the writer seeks to admit that the given length of research has in most cases restrict the writer to spend more time digging out more information to accomplish a more positive result. Despite the limitations, this research will try to examine the issue West Papuan separatism and its relations between various border security policies under multiple Indonesian governments, however, the main focus of this research will be based on President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 10 years in office (2004-2014).
1.2.2 Research Question
How do internal and external factors affect the making of Indonesian and PNG’s policy in dealing with Papuan separatism and its impacts on border security?

1.3 Purpose of the Research
1.3.1 Purpose of the Research
This paper, like other previous research, aims to examine Indonesia’s policies in dealing with the issue of Papuan separatism and their overall impact over the 750 plus kilometer borderline between Indonesia and PNG. Furthermore, this research aims to concentrate explicitly on those external and internal factors that by nature have extensively influenced the decision making and implementation of border management and security policies.

1.3.2 Benefit of the Research
This research aims to contribute to the literature in the field of international relations and security studies, and to provide useful analysis for scholars, students and government institutions interested in the issues of Papuan Separatism in Indonesia and its relations in managing border security on the Indonesia and PNG border. To gain a deeper knowledge regarding the dynamics of RI-PNG border issues it is significantly important to take into account the historical and cultural aspects that continue contribute in shaping interests over the decades.

1.4 Theoretical Framework
The Issue of Papuan separatism, classified as a dispute over territory which in the past had the Dutch and Indonesia go head to head, remains a national issue consisting of cross-border disputes that have significantly characterized the relationship of Indonesia and neighboring PNG. In this case, it then makes the border a priority zone of interest within the relationship of both countries. Indonesia’s domestic issues of separatism are by far different from one another providing its history and ideological background. Separatism issues in Indonesia have long involved 3 separate indigenous groups, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, (GAM), the Republic of South
Moluccas (RSM) and of course the OPM. However, the OPM’s plea for Independence have directly impact on the common border causing it to develop into an important aspect of relationship between RI-PNG since PNG’s Independence. Thus, scholars and researchers have to utilize various concepts and theories to analyze perceptions on separatism. Nonetheless, knowledge raised regarding Papuan separatism has resulted in the need to construct effective policies to enhance cooperation along the boundaries. Furthermore, (Lentner, 1974b) argues that foreign policy is the focal point of the internal and external aspect of the country’s development thus causing all policies to reflect the overall purpose of engaging particular resources to obtain the ultimate result.

Also, (Lentner, 1974b) further elaborates that policy is a set of customary recommendations that highly demands the achievement of selected objectives, secondly the mobilization of means for achieving those goals and lastly, the actual process of implementing, or the actual expenditure of the efforts of resources in pursuit of selected goals. In relations, (Rosenau, 1980) adds that external behavior of nations was considered to be exclusively a reaction to external stimuli. In other words, domestic issues such as separatism have to an extant provided the need to adjust security measures to assure it meets the internal needs. Propositions of this sort are considered to be partial and not part of the general theories. This partial of the theory best explains how internal and external factors affect the making of border security policies. According to Jose Balazs, international security is determined using the internal and external security of the range of social systems (Buzan, 1991).

This research is centered on how Indonesia deals with its domestic issues and conducts its internal policies to counter external pressure. Furthermore, it will cover the objectives that are achievable and non-achievable. The Papuan separatism issue has developed into an international problem that often challenges Indonesia’s sovereignty, stability, and security through international forums such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Pacific Islands Forum and United Nations General Assembly (UN). It is common
that when an issue like separatism has been linked to massive human rights violations, it will no longer be bilateral in nature. The inclusion of non-government bodies, sympathetic groups of both ethnic and non-ethnic persons have mobilized international support from various concerned states upgrades the problem into a regional concern; this has automatically lure in interests of other regional organization such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group’s (MSG) increasing support for is Melanesian brothers. Thus, it is evident that sensitive domestic issues do greatly influence foreign policies while, on the other hand, local issues do the same in return.

In relation to the effectivity of theories and the securing of selected objectives surfaces the extreme importance of the aspect of implementing the selected objectives. Thus, providing a bargaining position for Indonesia to secure matters that related to its internal security. The sensitivity that lies beneath the border problems is often connected to the increasing media publications and propaganda on both domestic and international levels. However, Indonesia’s border policies have maintained a flow of positive response from PNG. The overall maintenance and management of the boundary areas, especially in preventing instability, have forced both Indonesia and PNG to reposition their policies conforming to the dynamics of the border problem amid international pressure that are elaborated within the research. As previously explained, the implementation process will determine the success of strong border security policies. This research will examine the effectiveness of the policies and the level of tolerance that both states apply on certain issues that in reality affects the design of systems. In emphasizing border security, the role of decision makers is extremely vital in providing critical outcomes that will serve as guidelines to maintain a safer and stable border relations. Furthermore, Rosenberg’s rational choice theory argues, “that the decision making process includes: (i) the search for significant information regarding the conditions of choice; (ii) integrating that information so as to discover existing alternatives for action; (iii) drawing upon empirical generalizations to deduce the likely results each alternative will yield; (iv) judging which will best satisfy his or her want; (v) choosing a course of action accordingly” (Redd & Mintz, 2013).
Also, (Griffiths, 1999) asserts that theorists such as Morgenthau emphasize the importance of the state that decides which circumstances affect the process of decision making in obtaining selected goals, the precise objectives aimed at, the means used to attain selective objectives and suitable strategies to prevent the failure of achieving the selected goals. Furthermore, (Buzan, 1991) has emphasized Richard Ullman's definition of national security as an action or sequence of events that (i) threatens severely across a lengthy period of time to vitiate the value of life for the citizens of the country, or (ii) threatens drastically to restrict the sort of policy preference available to the state, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the country.

Overall, decision making whether foreign policy or national security decision are key elements in providing the basic structure toward achieving national interest. Instruments such as negotiations, diplomacy and international cooperation have been vital part to the process of acquiring selected national goals. These have indeed set the pace to ensure that the relationship between countries do not deteriorate into a relation characterized by hostility and tension, however, to achieve a more friendly and peaceful cooperation. Such theories relate to the rational choice theory as mentioned above, that underlines the role of man as the “rational actor” capable of impacting the degree of decision on different levels of decision making at any given time (Redd & Mintz, 2013). The theories of decision making are often identified to be influenced the behavior of the man who is capable of making an impact on a particular decision before it reaches its final stage, or in other words, before it is finalized and set for implementation as government standing position.

The dynamics of foreign policy and security in recent times has shown what power is becoming less transferable from one issue to the other, less coercive and less tangible (Viotti & Kauppi, 2001). The need to pursue other aspects such as economic and social developments have caused states to rely heavily on one another causing a high level of interdependency that in
the event warns out the coercive use of power to replace it with soft power approaches such as international cooperation and settlement of issues based on mutual agreements. Countries through its authorities are official decision makers that have every right to represent the government in any particular cases dealing with national interest.

Regarding Indonesia-PNG relations, the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation have provided a straightforward foreign policy that in most cases evidenced to be a reliable means of achieving the selective national security objectives, such as the exchange of information relating to sensitive security matters, coordinating joint verification visits, joint military patrols along the border, combatting the illegal transactions of drugs and narcotics, and transporting and selling of motor bikes and petroleum products etc. The democratic norms adopted by both states appears as a guiding principle and are a foundation to pursue goals on a win-win basis. Nevertheless, policy makers are highly influenced by the context of the internal and external environments, that to some extant are interrelated. Thus, theories of decision making suggested above aim to provide a more accurate and concrete base to the analysis of the research.

1.5 Research Methods and Data Collecting Technique

1.5.1 Research Method
In this research, the writer uses a descriptive, analytical method aimed at defining the issues based on collected data. The descriptive type adopted here seeks to openly analyze the characteristics of specific issues of the problem based on data, facts, and documents including information from reliable sources that can be observed. This research applies a qualitative method of research aimed at providing answers to the research question through collecting, describing and analyzing data. In fact, many writers have found it difficult to restrict themselves from providing a subjective view. Therefore, through this method the author seeks to make certain that personal opinions do not interfere with the phenomena’s that take place in reality so that objective explanations are analyzed based on data collected.
Qualitative research, according to (Creswell, 2007), starts with assumptions, a global view, the potential usage of theoretical approaches, and the review of analytical issues that question the definition provided by individuals and groups that relates to a social problem. Therefore, this study seeks to expand on an emerging qualitative approach to examine the depth of the range of problems that impend on Indonesia’s national security, thus, asserting a tougher exertion on sensitive border security decision making.

1.5.2 Data Collecting technique
The use of data and documents in this study are obtained mostly from primary and secondary sources, such as books, journals, newspapers, speeches and other official documents this implies that in doing the analysis, the writer uses data and documents that were written previously by another person.

1.6 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis will consist of five chapters. The first contains the introduction covering research background, research identification, research limitation, research question, the purpose and benefit of the research, theoretical framework, and the research method and the data collecting techniques.

The second chapter will provide an overview of Indonesia's foreign policy towards PNG in general. Furthermore, it will also explicitly provide a clear understanding of Indonesia's foreign policy towards PNG in relations to the struggle for West Papuan independence and issues affecting border security along the RI-PNG border. Also, it will also explain the role, position, action and function of Indonesia and PNG within the structure of foreign policy.

The third chapter will explain comprehensively, based on detailed information collected, regarding the process of foreign policy decision making in Indonesia regarding border security. Hence, the writer will also discuss and account for the selection of objectives, the ways of achieving
those goals and the implementation of selected foreign policy. Explanations provided include general definitions, the purpose of assessment, and various agreements or recommendations that have been agreed upon by the government of Indonesia and PNG. This chapter is considered as the core content of the research.

In the fourth chapter, the writer will explain to what extent the West Papuan independence struggle has affected the political playground in Indonesia, PNG and the Pacific and its implications that affect security issues along the 750 plus kilometer borderline. Here, the writer aims to make an evaluation based on chapter's II and III explaining what Indonesia have done so far in relations to the West Papuan struggle for independence and its role in implementing safer border security.

Finally, the fifth chapter will contain the summary of the whole research and answer the research question of "How internal and external factors affect the making of Indonesian foreign policy in dealing with Papuan separatism and its impacts on border security."
CHAPTER 2

Indonesia and PNG's Policies and Implementations

Lentner (1974a) argues that foreign policy is the outcome of international politics containing the essentials of cooperation and conflict, demand and support, disruptions and regulating. In addition, Diez, Bode, and Da Costa (2011) argue that traditionally foreign policy is the outcome of decision making toward external parties and in specific other states. Nonetheless, Diez et al. (2011) emphasise that this traditional definition has been somewhat transformed into a more problematical concept, specifically as it blends together with the trends in globalisation and regional integration, making it difficult to differentiate between those that are considered domestic factors and those that are foreign.

Despite the complexities surrounding both domestic and foreign policy, states maintain their role as solitary actors, rightfully responsible for the task of influencing, designing and implementing both foreign and domestic policies. In general, a spill over effect of instabilities and conflicts generated by internal and external factors has in one way or the other affected the general outcome of border policies over a certain period of time. Hence, border policies often reflect the goals of foreign policy, although in a rather more detailed aspect, with the overall aim of securing the national interest. In this case, it is the Indonesian government’s border policies that are being reviewed. The government of Indonesia has undertaken its foreign policy orientation to peacefully improve international cooperation through bilateral and multilateral means to purposely protect its ideology, national security, national interests and economic prosperity. The end of World War II presented the need for an increase in foreign policy dealings, with almost all the states in the world now coexisting with each other in some form of interaction through diplomatic means. The goal of this thesis is to cover major foreign and domestic policy determinants that impact the aspect of border security between Indonesia and PNG. Concurring to the realist assessment, the governments of Indonesia and PNG retain the absolute
right to solely influence their affiliation, even though it is certain that the relationship centres on their common border, and that the presence of the third party (OPM) is critical to the interstate relationship between Indonesia and PNG.

Even though the task to design and implement border policies in Indonesia is no longer fully exercised by the central government, the central government, through the National Border Management Agency (BNPP), sets out the national goals that are in line with state interests. More specifically, today the provincial governments of Papua and West Papua enjoy more freedom to deal with issues concerning border and security affairs, something that was not attainable in the past. The decision to transfer power to the provincial governments specifically aims to encourage more local participation with the overall aim of minimising the spread of separatist movements. Therefore, this allow provincial governments to take up more responsibilities in administrating their own affairs. In addition, the decision to allocate more power to the provinces in Indonesia is a result of the central government’s strategy to decentralise its government systems to cater for the growing demand that has arisen due to long established dissatisfaction. The dissatisfactions of the Papuan people have obtained a legal basis through the constitution for autonomy that allows provincial government agencies to perform duties such as designing policies that are of interest to their provinces and at the same time they must portray policies set out by the central government. In the case of the Indonesia-PNG border, the responsibilities carried out by Papua’s border and international cooperation board are enacted through the 2001 constitution on Special Autonomy for Papua. The central government’s decision to offer autonomy was purposely to divert secessionist demands that resulted in violent conflicts between the armed forces and supporters (McGibbon, 2004). As a result, the decision now enables the provincial government to design and implement policies on behalf of the central government including the task of designing and implementing border policies. Although the provincial government is given the task to exercise its power by constructing and executing border policies, it remains a necessity that the provincial
government continues to harness a profitable relationship with the central government that could cater for continuous consultation regarding certain high-profile issues concerning national security.

It is important to understand that apart from the mechanisms set out within the constitution on special autonomy to the provinces of Papua (and later West Papua), there are two important aspects of the government that are purposely not outlined within the agreement. These include the right to conduct foreign and diplomatic relations, and the right to have their own security forces (police and military). Although both Papuan provinces do take part in international affairs in relation to the common border, internal and external security remain the responsibility of the central government which is carried out by the Indonesian police and military (POLRI/TNI). Despite the 2001 constitution, Papua and West Papua still retain the right to coordinate and perform their day to day duties in line with the national constitutions that legally identifies them as Indonesia’s eastern, most provinces. The governors are the heads of the provinces who represent the Indonesian President in making sure that the design of policies, whether domestic or international, must be coordinated with the central government before it is amended through the provincial house of assembly prior to its implementation.

Although important aspects such as security and foreign relations are excluded from many rights granted under the special autonomy, Papua and West Papua province still maintain the right to pursue, manage and execute policies in line with amendments as set out in the Indonesian national constitution (Undung-Undang 1945) as the overall benchmark. Another important part of the implementation of policies that will be considered in detail is the distribution of power between Papua province and its regencies. Specifically, at this stage, the distribution of power and legislative rights equally and legally permits municipalities and regencies to act on their own grounds under the constitution, which enables them to attend to their own regional affairs including those concerning the border. As a result, major miscommunications are often the case in the processes of designing and
implementing border policies between provincial governments, the municipal government, regional governments and, in the end, the outcome has often falls short in meeting the criteria set out by the central government’s endorsements. Hence, in most cases the agendas put forward by the border committees regarding the aspects of border security between Indonesia and PNG remain unanswered in bilateral forums, despite the case that meetings are being held annually. Also, such bilateral meetings are often prone to experiencing a repeat in discussions on the same unsettled issues for a length of time, due to the different policies that all respective agencies put together.

2.1 PNG Foreign Policy
2.1.1 General Foreign Policy
Unlike Indonesia, PNG’s independence came with a rush, and it was granted before any serious uprisings. Dorney (2000) argues that independence would have not been chosen by the majority of the people if a referendum had been put forward in the early years of the 1970s. Evidence of this claim can be illustrated by Sir Michael Somare’s immediate nation-wide drive to seek support from his local Papua New Guineans on the importance of independence and also his bold initiatives to influence the local people to support PNG’s independence. Despite the reasons mentioned, PNG went on to become a sovereign state with Somare becoming PNG’s first Prime Minister. As independent sovereign nations, Indonesia and PNG have both had their share of difficulties in dealing with domestic instabilities. As an example, PNG has also gone through political skirmishes on the Gazelle Peninsula and Bougainville (Dorney, 2000), where the vast majority did not believe in the idea of independence. On the contrary, Indonesia itself has had to put up with separatist conflicts in Aceh, Ambon and Papua. Despite these domestic instabilities, both countries have had to apply a friendlier foreign policy approach to make room for further cooperation. Today, the ongoing nature of friendly bilateral ties between the governments of Indonesia and PNG has been made possible through various government initiatives aimed at maintaining and preserving a
positive and harmonious environment ideal for cooperation between both countries.

Dorney (2000) reports that, back in 1983, a radio broadcast was aimed at reassuring the people of PNG that an Indonesian invasion was not possible. Somare went on to tell the people of PNG that the fears of invasion were just after effects of the expansionist era of the Sukarno regime. In this same report, Somare was later quoted saying that “ever since General Suharto took over power, Indonesia has consistently strived for regional peace and stability” (p. 200). The continuation of such interpretations began to formalise relationships between both countries that in the end produced the non-aggression pact (Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation) of which in Article 7 states that “Indonesia and PNG shall not threaten or use force against each other” (Dorney, 2000).

Primarily, PNG introduced itself into the world of politics by adhering to its foreign policy outlines which very much portrayed universalism and successively active and selective engagement, which led the newly independent PNG to avoid the prejudices of the Cold War era and the configuration of its geo-political military alliances. Like other states, PNG has likewise set forth its foreign policy, mainly its trade policy, to fulfil requirements and take advantage of the merits of regional integration arrangements and globalisation consistent with its comparative and cooperative benefits based on their essential structural features. In the scope of the Asia-Pacific, PNG aspires to be a suitable partner in seeking mutually beneficial forms of constructive cooperation that yield practical outcomes for its citizens. Externally, PNG strives to implement good partnerships with other countries to consolidate, strengthen and diversify its involvement in the Asia Pacific region. In relation to its foreign policy progressions, PNG consistently applies a rather more win-win system by making use of limited opportunities for its benefit. Primarily, PNG aims to make the most of its mutual participation in return for strategic financial benefits that would increase its total revenue.
PNG’s foreign policy was first reviewed by the government of Sir Michael Somare and succeeded by the “Selective and Active Engagement” of his predecessor, Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan in 1980, under which emphasis was placed on selected issues around the different aspects of foreign policy management to pursue international relations (PNG Embassy, 2008). The governments of PNG under Prime Ministers, Sir Rabbie Namaliu and Paias Wingti further reviewed foreign policy respectively, wherein the latter’s “Look North” foreign policy of 1992 has had a profound impact on PNG’s relations with ASEAN member countries (including Indonesia), South Korea and China. The initiative was aimed at further consolidating the existing relationship with PNG’s development partners in the northern regions of Asia. The government of former Prime Minister Sir Julian Chan elaborated further on the “Look North and Work Pacific” in 1994 (PNG Embassy, 2008). During those years, PNG made sure that bold commitments produced real, tangible results, thus enabling PNG to also strengthen its relationships pertaining to economic cooperation. In particular, and more recently, PNG is playing a more prominent role in arrangements of political and economic cooperation with its Asian and Pacific neighbours, including Indonesia.

One such very important initiative is the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration of 2004, which had the following priority goals: economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security. Specifically, strengthening regional cooperation and integration should result in increasing the levels of sustainable returns to the Pacific; ensuring the successful implementation of regional cooperation at national levels; meeting common responsibilities and providing services cost-effectively; and developing partnerships with its neighbours and beyond (PNG Embassy, 2008). Essentially, the application of Indonesia-PNG relations has, to a certain extent, reflected the implication on PNG’s conduct in the Asia-Pacific region and in the global context.

PNG’s foreign policy principles guide its international relations within the parameters of the existing geopolitical conditions. Structurally, the Department of Foreign Affairs of Papua New Guinea, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Immigration, has been the state apparatus responsible for the formulation and discharge of foreign policy directions.
and goals within its function of international relations. May (2013) argues that despite PNG’s public-sector reforms being highly guided by major donors such as AusAid, and other multinational organisations like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, PNG’s policy making and implementation has often failed to fulfil both domestic and international expectations.

2.2 West Papuan Separatism

The preamble of Indonesia’s *Undang-Undang Dasar* (UUD) (1945 national constitution) underlines that, as an independent state, Indonesia vows to participate towards the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and social justice (Indonesia, 1945). On this specific note, Indonesia introduces itself as a peaceful nation that by virtue primarily adheres to the values of pluralism that in general constitutes the unitary Republic of Indonesia. On the other hand, there have been many contradicting phenomena that have occurred within the diversity that is found among Indonesia’s societies. In fact, the differences in societies do not comply with the values that were initially formulated in Indonesia’s national constitution upon its independence. Problems arising within the factions of Indonesia’s pluralist society have been difficult for the government and its agencies, who are responsible for preventing, containing and managing internal conflicts amid the ever-growing international pressure. Nevertheless, since its independence, Indonesia has been quite vulnerable to internal conflicts created by differences in ideology, ethnicity, race and religion that form the very basic values of its vibrant society.

Similarly, with respect to the Papuan issue, it was the difference in societies that caused the dispute between Indonesia and the Dutch throughout the first decades of Indonesia’s independence (Van der Kroef, 1958). This was made possible through the growing uncertainties in domestic affairs that occurred during the early stages of Indonesia’s independence. With this, the Dutch continued to maintain superiority over the territory of Papua. This was possible because of the difficulties Indonesia had to deal with due to the
international pressure instigated by the unstable conditions of post-World War II, which exhibited political and military tensions. Moreover, it is also important to highlight that as a young republic, Indonesia had to ensure that it was progressing within profoundly benign conditions free from the upheavals of the post-war period. In fact, not only did the impacts of World War II change the face of world politics, more importantly, it also paved the way for the birth of countries due to the growing sense in nationalism. Nationalism, as Griffiths (1999), argues, is becoming more popular, threatening to split-up some present day countries and unite others into new nation-states. This notwithstanding, Indonesia’s independence proclamation in 1945 proved no link to the territories of West New Guinea and Irian Jaya (now Papua and West Papua provinces). The conflicted island (Tanah Papua) has been home to local Papuans (Melanesians) for over 3000 years (King, 2004). It was on these grounds that the Dutch managed to install a Papuan nationalism that up to this date has remained one of the most complicated and recurring political conflicts in international politics.

Consequently, negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch failed to find a breakthrough, allowing the Dutch to maintain their occupation Western New Guinea. More specifically, as a relatively young nation born out of the aftermath of the Japanese conquest, Indonesia had to cautiously confront a deteriorating domestic economic and political situation which included a battle for power between the rising communist party and the armed forces. The failure in negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch urged President Sukarno to pursue an outside approach of expansionism which included the procurement of Papua and West Papua, by force if necessary (May, 1986). Indonesia’s Permanent Mission to the UN made mention that the developments in domestic disputes portrayed Indonesia’s legitimate battle to liberate the territory of Papua from its colonial Dutch rulers. Van der Kroef (1958) argues that to understand the claims put forward by Indonesia and the Dutch regarding the territory of Papua, a distinction should be made between:

1. Conflicting legal arguments;
2. Relevant historic and ethnological factors;
3. The problem of the development of the West New Guinea area itself and of the expressed needs of its inhabitants;
4. The general character of Dutch-Indonesian relations since Indonesia officially acquired her independence and;
5. The international aspect of the New Guinea dispute, especially in so far as it has involved the United Nations and as it influenced relations between East and West.

Since then, there have been many types of agreement between Indonesia and the Dutch regarding the territory of Papua and West Papua provinces, such as the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements that vowed to transfer sovereignty of the entire territories of the colonial Dutch to the Republic of Indonesia. This was followed by other agreements that fueled the conflict; for example, the 1949 agreement that left out the Papuan territory (Dorney, 2000). With Papuan nationalism already set in place in the 1950s, it seemed almost impossible to contain the issue as it began to fuel more disputes linked to separatism based on ideology, racial and ethnic claims and religion. It was through these developments that Papua and West Papua began to refuse Jakarta’s occupation of the conflicted territory.

New Guinea’s border problems have been around from as early as colonial times, fuelling random friction between neighbouring administrations (May, 2004). In addition, May (2004) also argues that the recent border problems between Indonesia and PNG have been accredited to four sources: first, villagers from the border area who repeatedly cross to and from the border for traditional and customary purposes; second, the presence of West Papua nationalists vying for political asylum in PNG; third, West Papuan villagers that cross the border for short-term shelter from the militarised Indonesian side; and fourth, the presence of OPM fighters operating between the borders. In this case, the first point refers to the local villagers who travel across the border either from PNG or Indonesia’s side to conduct traditional rituals, whether paying of bride price or dealing with deaths, while some may be for such reasons as gardening or harvesting crops, fishing and visiting their relatives. This type of border crosser travels to seek the
advantages found on either sides of the border that are more developed. Furthermore, May (2004) claims that during the Dutch colonial era, many PNG villagers moved across into Jayapura because it was more developed than the PNG side. The second is of course related to Indonesia’s concern regarding a handful of West Papuan nationalists who have been granted asylum and permission to settle in PNG and other parts of Europe. The third point is undoubtedly caused by the military aggression in the Indonesian side that prompted local villagers to cross the border to seek safety with relatives on the PNG side. The fourth and most sensitive of all the points is the OPM network of freedom fighters that often uses the border as shelter, or what May (2004) refers to as “R & R” (rest and recreation) to avoid Indonesian military operations. All these points have contributed to the various border problems; though there have been efforts to control the issues, it remains challenging for both governments.

Fast forward to today, with respect to the Free West Papua Movement (OPM) and the achievements it has received for over 50 years, the separatist conflict in Papua and West Papua province has progressed from a minor and unpopular domestic conflict to be identified as a relatively more complex, international, political problem of this generation. Moreover, the ongoing struggle for independence has lured in more interest from various stakeholders: for example, local and international political elites, businessmen, governments, non-governmental organizations, international human right lawyers, advocates and activists who have dedicated their time and effort to denounce Indonesia’s rule by standing together with the people of West Papua in their struggle to demand political freedom. Actions from these supporters can be illustrated by the growing criticism that has bombarded Indonesia on various diplomatic stages, like the Melanesian Spearhead Group Forum (MSG), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the United Nations (UN) General Assembly sessions concerning claims of ongoing human rights violations in both the Papuan provinces. In addition, widespread campaigns from the Free West Papua organizations over allegations representing “systematic neglect, terror, killings, genocide and government deprivations” (Wenda, 2015) have managed to capture
international attention. Accusations of such a kind are supposedly aimed at condemning the oppressive role of the Indonesian military.

Similarly, human rights campaigns on the abuses instigated by the brutal rule of the Indonesian armed forces in both Papuan provinces have been the revolutionary force behind the success in increasing in global awareness. Several global petitions have been signed to provide motivation and support. Furthermore, the struggle seems to be gaining more and more supporters through its promotions via social media. Although, arguably, many from the Indonesian government may argue that the progress of the West Papuan campaigns has been biased, it seems that there are real indications of a rapid increase in followers both domestic and internationally. For example, the official West Papuan campaign page on Facebook has reached about 260,907 followers (Free West Papua Campaign, 2004b), and other Facebook pages with the same interest have secured about 2000-5000 followers which illustrates the success in promoting the issue via the use of social media. Social media such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram have all played a huge part in transferring information around the globe in a faster and more reliable manner. Those social media accounts also act as a tool of networking that channels sensitive information between campaigners and people back in Papua and West Papua, linking their ideas and strategies to continue to fight against the Indonesian occupation. Information shared on Facebook, for instance, is absorbed and later coordinated through the existing channels of organisations that are present on the ground in both West Papua and overseas. In most cases, it triggers a rather more dangerous outcome as it does help to build-up anti-Indonesian sentiments. In addition, the people’s continuing participation in acts of mass demonstrations and rallies has often been practiced as a part of fulfilling democratic obligations.

The problems of separatism are not the only reason behind the fight for separation from Indonesia. There are also other major factors that are at the core of these conflicts. Issues relating to political involvement, socio-economic and cultural deprivations are among the factors related to this
long and complicated conflict. Conflicts of such nature are commonly ascribed to the increase in dissatisfaction among the people and government over a period. In fact, some may be caused by a history of conspiracy, while others may involve pure government interest, or even multinational corporations and profit making. Subsequently, at some point, citizens may have given up on the government for reasons that the government’s sole interest is only to exploit the natural resources, but it does not provide enough infrastructural and human development in return. Despite Indonesia’s state ideology of the Pancasila (5 principles) that aims to uphold unity in diversity, others such as Papuans continue to find ways to exclude themselves from the republic based on their history, difference in ethnicity, race, religion and ideology.

Indonesia’s internal conflicts have been relatively well-known across various international media for a long time, starting with the historical wiping out of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)—communist party—then the separatist conflicts of East Timor, Aceh, Ambon and Papua, making headlines across the globe over the last two decades. In fact, media reports illustrate the lack of government actions to strategically tackle matters that surface from the country’s diverse ethnic, racial, religious and social groups, thus indicating the Indonesian authority’s failure to address the various internal problems that have evolved within its society. Also, internal conflicts in Indonesia often involve violence, especially when the armed forces are involved in conflict prevention. However, military involvement has often fallen short in providing a proper long-term solution to the problems. In general, government and other related stake-holders have failed to provide long-term solutions because these conflicts have forced many people into fear and trauma, thus refusing to take sides with the government. Some attempts to control this internal conflict have actually had opposite outcome by instead fueling domestic differences that in the end threaten to cause major separatism issues for the Indonesian state, despite all the efforts and measures that have been implemented to provide a possible long-term solution. It is obvious that one of the factors influencing this unique struggle for independence is the involvement of various international stakeholders
such as sovereign states, political elites and NGOs. This can be illustrated by the involvement of the United States, Australia and the Dutch, together with the United Nations, during the handover of Papua to Indonesia. With respect to the Act of Free Choice, the Papuan issue continues to demand for the rights of the indigenous inhabitants of the island. Another point to consider is that international support from individuals, political elites and lawyers throughout the years has become an inspiration in the struggle for freedom. This group of activists find motivation in themselves, heavily reliant on the dark history of the early Indonesian occupation, which helps to regenerate the struggle of West Papuans to surge on and to rightfully question the legal aspects of the disputed Act of Free Choice (Pepera), which to many Papuans was an act of no choice (May, 1986).

To gain a deeper understanding of separatism issues in West Papua, it is essential to recall the day the Netherlands decided to deliberately exclude the territory of Irian Jaya, now the Indonesian Provinces of Papua and West Papua, from the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 to the Republic of Indonesia. Specifically, the move by the Dutch began to generate an anti-Indonesian sentiment. The Dutch claimed that it was the people’s desire to separate from the greater Indonesian republic because they were different in ethnicity in terms of different language and dialect, different cultural and traditional practices including a different religion with a Christian majority. Identifying as totally Melanesian, a Melanesian culture forced into becoming Asian was something most Papuans consider to be unacceptable until this day. Sentiments have grown into doctrines used to provide the foundation to build a resistance; this then developed into a struggle for an independent state of West Papua.

At the beginning of the struggle, the idea of freedom and independence promised a lot of beneficial norms. These ideas and norms began to lure more and more local Papuans into accepting that it was true that they were different from the Indonesians as far as skin colour was concerned, and in the end, a resistance was quickly established to oppose Indonesian rule. The nature of politics during the early years seemed in favour of Papuans
so that, by the 1980s, the majority of the young men left school to quickly establish themselves with the OPM. Training camps were built in the deep jungles of Papua to train Papuan rebel fighters. Most of the young were well trained by local Papuans who were ex-members of the armed forces. Despite the progress, the OPM did not possess enough guns and ammunition to come into contact with the Indonesian armed forces.

Negotiations between the Indonesians and Dutch representatives continued to encounter an unsatisfactory result. In the end the outcome forced President Sukarno to what (May, 1986) was defined as adventurous or expansionist motivations that signalled fears among its neighbours, including PNG. Australia, which initially supported the early Indonesian nationalism, began to realise that the growing instability caused by an economic and political struggle for power amongst the communists and the army was dangerous and threatening to security in the region; especially the eastern half of New Guinea, now PNG.

Since its independence, PNG has always recognised West Papua as an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, any related matters concerning the West Papuan independence movements such as the OPM remained an Indonesian domestic issue, despite ongoing concerns about a possible spill over effect along the border, with massive influxes of Papuan locals seeking asylum over the border. PNG, being a young country during the early 1980s, was aware of the dangers and the long-term effects of the presence of OPM elements in PNG territory; therefore, it did everything necessary to maintain good and stable relations with Indonesia. Despite the willingness to build an understanding with Indonesia, the OPM managed to build camps on the PNG side of the border. The border then became an important route in the rebels’ operations. Although it seems that the OPM had gained momentum, including the possession of safer ground in PNG territory to get away from Indonesian military operations, there was still disunity among the OPM factions. The two prominent OPM leaders, Jacob H. Prai and Seth J. Rumkorem, kept the OPM divided due to political interests until they united to join their factions in Vanuatu in 1985 in an
agreement whereby it was decided that Mr Prai would head the political mission while Mr Rumkorem would command the military operations (Dorney, 2000). During these years, the Indonesia-PNG border was almost impossible to cover due to its length and rugged geography. The size and strength of the Indonesian military often caused fears. The biggest concern for PNG was to prevent an escalation of Indonesian military patrols within PNG territory on the border. PNG denied any means of protecting OPM elements hiding in its territory. PNG, like other democracies, has always been obliged to preserve the value of humanity so that, in this case, PNG has welcomed West Papuan refugees who claim to have been deprived of basic human rights under the military rule of General Suharto, who was very well-known for unaccounted military operations which claimed the lives of many innocent Papuans.

Until today, West Papuan human rights activists and independence supporters, both domestic and international, have often protested against the number of human rights violations in Papua and West Papua provinces. Among the top issues illustrated are major breaches of civil and political rights. Individual rights have been denied through military operations aimed at combating separatism. Indeed, in relation to the issue, the Indonesian government under Suharto has violated various articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), as stated below:

- The right to life, liberty and security of person (article 3);
- The prohibition of torture (article 5);
- The prohibition of arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (article 9);
- The right to fair trial (article 10);
- The right to freedom of movement (article 13);
- The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (article 17);
- The right to freedom of opinion and expression (article 19);
- The right to freedom of assembly and association (article 20);
Indonesia’s independence and the exclusion of Papua and West Papua provinces from the transfer of sovereignty, together with the Dutch success in establishing an anti-Indonesian sentiment, has grown into a more complex issue that has claimed the lives of around five hundred thousand of Papuans over the course of 50 years. In reality, OPM leaders have come and gone, some vanishing without seeing what they had fought for over decades; time has indeed become an important part of the struggle for independence. Despite the ongoing campaigns carried out in both Papuan provinces and some being able to gain popularity in Europe, Australia and the Pacific, the issues are yet to make an impact on Indonesian politics. Nonetheless, the Indonesian government has renewed its commitment by ratifying several other international agreements to take up responsibilities to improve the standard of living in its provinces of Papua and West Papua. Despite developments implemented under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s term in office, most Papuans still consider that the real factor motivating the call for a separate Papuan nation was not about infrastructural developments, but about being different people, with a different culture and tradition. Such demands have been high because many Papuan lives have been lost, and the people are traumatised with their own experiences of the brutal Indonesian military operations. Stories and testimonies have been told to the younger generations over and over again that take more than just infrastructural and economic developments to erase.

More importantly, May (1986) argues that the changing nature of President Sukarno’s regime forced Australia to tighten its New Guinea border and rethink its position to allow the Dutch to work on a joint development program on political, economic, social and educational advancements of peoples in their territories, including strengthening the Australian-Dutch ties. In total, the precipitous transformation in Indonesian policies triggered an American interference to conclude that Australia and the Dutch should agree that West New Guinea be a small price to pay to keep Sukarno out of the Communist camp abroad.
2.2.1 Indonesia-PNG Relations and Border Security

Indonesia and Papua New Guinea’s relations have, over time, been consequently subjected to the issues that are constantly evolving within the vicinity of the two countries’ common land boundary. Whether at sea or on land, international borders of this kind can be somewhat sensitive in accordance with the number of various security risks the border sustains over time. Although political, economic and socio-cultural factors, for example, are of significant importance to the overall function of the border, safety and security remains the highest and most sensitive agenda that tops the priority list in the relationship between Indonesia and PNG. The prevailing security dynamics in and around the border area will determine the stability of the relationship between them. In addition, a safe and secure border is, of course, beneficial to both Indonesia and PNG in the long run, specifically, to the tens of thousands of villagers that call the sizeable length of the border home. Frankly, throughout the years, the Indonesia-PNG border issues has not been much talked about. One of the main reasons behind the lack of publicity is generally linked to the sensitivity that surrounds various political issues that come into direct contact with the border. One of the issues is certainly separatism and its effect on the increase in illegal border crossings (people who cross over the border from unattended sections of the border). In fact, some problems that occur along this border do seek special attention from both society and government; these include land disputes that strictly require traditional and customary solutions. Movements of people from one part of the border to the other in search for proper basic services like health and education have lately gathered more attention, and it has all been blamed on poor government services. Nevertheless, this specific border separates two indistinguishable Melanesian people that by race and culture have no difference. Besides, it is also known to be the only land border that is simultaneously separating and linking the vast regions of Southeast Asia to the Pacific.

In particular, though not as popular to the international media as other borders have been, this unique border has been known to be quite vulnerable to security threats in recent times. The border itself is often
exposed to external and internal threats that, at some point, have violently impinged on a couple of high profile matters sensitive to national security, state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of both Indonesia and PNG, thus making it the most important aspect of the relationship between both countries. Moreover, PNG, as a democratic state, has always maintained its position to respect Indonesia’s sovereignty across the border; this has been attained through the ongoing border cooperation that oversees the daily management of the border. Nonetheless, it can be claimed that today the border stands tall as a token of pride, emphasising the endless efforts and hard work that both governments have agreed to accomplish throughout their relationship. In general, the basic agreement remains the cornerstone of the achievements obtained through bilateral means.

The border has gone through a major infrastructural development, portraying the political goodwill of both governments. Despite current progress, May (2012b) argues that the border itself was once poorly defined, as only fourteen border markers stood along the vast area of the boundary throughout the 1980s. One of the basic reasons is, of course, the tough geographical features of the border, which complements its isolation, causing it to be very difficult to access with other forms of transportation such as vehicles. This Indonesia-PNG border extends through a long range of rugged limestone terrains passing through cliffs, forming the extraordinary Star Mountains of New Guinea. Hence, most parts of the border are still left unattended (are under-developed). Moreover, this specific land boundary between Indonesia and PNG stretches for some 750 kilometres. The border itself runs from the centre of the Northern top of the Island between the capital cities of Jayapura (Papua Province) and Vanimo (Sandaun Province), here it is referred to in Bahasa Indonesia as *Perbatasan Skouw-Wutung* (Skow-Wutung border), located in the *Muara Tami* sub-district of Jayapura. The borderline later continues to cut further inland through to the regency of Keerom where it ascends further up to the highland towards the regency of *Pegunungan Bintang*–Star Mountains slicing south through to the regency of Boven Digoel, before it finally descends down the coastlines of the regency of Merauke’s Torasi basin.
The geographical features found across the border differ from one to the other causing difficulties in engaging with local villagers. In addition, goods and services also take a while to arrive at these isolated locations along the border, due to the deteriorating conditions of the roads and airstrips. For example, health workers have to walk then travel by canoe to be able to provide services. Despite multiple inconveniences, the locals still love to perform their daily routines such as traditional trade, bride price ceremonies and visiting fellow wantoks (tribesmen) across the border.

In total, this 750-km long land border is covered by six different administrations on the Indonesian side. Indonesia’s current system of border management has come about after Jakarta’s decision to formally decentralise and distribute more power to allow for provinces, municipalities and regency governments to manage their own affairs, including those of the border. The transfer of power to the provinces of Papua in 2001 and later West Papua in 2003 (formerly Irian Jaya) to be self-governed within Indonesia has been made possible via the 2001 constitution for Papua’s Special Autonomy (Tosiks, 2011). This allows ethnic Melanesians to run their own affairs based on identified characteristics such as ethnicity, race, tribe, language, religion and also territorial distribution that has ended up with two Papuan provinces, two municipalities and 40 regencies. As far as this even distribution of power is concerned, the administrative chain of the border management in Papua starts with the provincial government through Badan Pengelola Perbatasan dan Kerjasama Luar Negeri (the border and international cooperation board) which is responsible for the overall function of the border. Second, the municipal government of Jayapura is also tasked with the responsibility to see out the day-to-day functions of the Jayapura-Vanimo (Skouw-Wutung) border through its border and cooperation board. Third, the regencies of Keerom, Pegunungan Bintang, Boven Digoel and Merauke also have the same administrative responsibilities under their own border cooperation boards to cover for each of their regency’s border affairs. In addition, all border-related issues encountered by either the municipal government and regency governments are later brought forward to the provincial government’s border and international cooperation board as the
agency in charge, to be discussed in accordance with the mechanism set out in the provincial constitution that underlines the autonomous responsibilities of departments within the provincial government system. Nonetheless, discussion such as those of the Border Liaison Officers Meeting (BLOM) are treated as low-level discussions, through which all border authorities from the municipality and regencies meet with the provincial border authorities annually (Indonesia-PNG, 2013). On the other hand, the PNG side of the border has only two provinces that border Indonesia. Sandaun Province borders Jayapura (Skouw-Wutung) and the regency of Keerom on the Northern side, while Western Province borders the regencies of Pegunungan Bintang, Boven Digoel and Merauke on the Southern part of the border.

The Indonesia-PNG international boundary is known to have indirectly witnessed various setbacks in recent times. Border shootouts between the OPM armed rebel group and the Indonesian military have often been the disturbing factor along the border. As a result, border incursions by Indonesian forces often take place; some are reported and protested through diplomatic channels while others continue to be ignored. In relation to this, the dense jungles of the New Guinea border have, over time, provided the armed resistance with a strategic hide-out to set up base camps, regroup and continue to fight for their rights to be free from the Indonesian occupation; most attacks occur along the roads to the border in Jayapura-Papua (May, 2012a, 2012b). The involvement of the third-party (OPM fighters) from time to time has proved crucial to the stability and security of the 750-km border, thus leaving it vulnerable to tensions fuelled by a high degree of suspicion between Indonesia and PNG. Nonetheless, the increasing presence of West Papuan nationalists, together with the armed members of the OPM rebels along the border and in other parts of PNG, has also helped in aiding concrete evidence of struggle and motivation in ideology for an Independent West Papua.

For these Papuans, resisting the Indonesian authoritarian military rule is a matter of do or die. Therefore, most of these pro-independence activists and
fighters found themselves seeking cover in the territory of the neighbour. Their uninvited arrival in PNG was a breath of fresh air and a new chapter to the ongoing struggle to politically pronounce a self-governing Melanesian state of West Papua. Border crossings of such nature were illegal in character; however, it was, on humanitarian grounds, that the PNG government treated refugees who crossed the border respectfully. As indicated in the previous chapter, the escalation of Papuan refugees into PNG territory in 1984 displayed the spill over effect of the brutal military operations of the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces) under the Suharto regime, now known as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), after a split between the Indonesian Military and Police.

Between 1980-1990, more and more local Papuans consisting of men, women, and children made their way into PNG to seek shelter and, most importantly, security. The more West Papuan activists and villagers who arrived on the PNG side of the border, the more unsettled the Indonesian military were. In attempts to seek cooperative outcomes, Indonesia has at times tried to convince the PNG government to conduct joint military operations along the border purposely to eliminate suspicion that PNG is indirectly harbouring the rebels to mount anti-Jakarta attacks from PNG territory. Continuing attempts to conduct joint military operations along the border were later dismissed by Papua New Guinea’s Defence Force Acting Commander, Tom Ur, in a statement to the PNG Post Courier stating that under no circumstance will PNG hold any joint military exercises with Indonesia and that each country is responsible for its own part of the border (“PNG will not hold joint military operations with Indonesia against OPM rebels," 2003). Hence, the existence of the OPM elements within PNG’s part of the border provided concrete evidence that future relations between Indonesia and PNG would heavily rely on the role and function of the OPM, whether domestically or internationally. As part of both Indonesia and PNG’s security concern, it is of equal importance and duty that the safety of villagers along the border area be considered as a significant feature of border security initiatives. Whether or not the OPM will make an impact
along the border depends on how Indonesia and PNG set out their border security policies to counter and manage their common interests along it. Once a two-way approach towards security matters between two countries, border security issues between Indonesia and PNG have now developed into a seemingly triangular patterned. The resistance, through its multiple umbrella organisations trading under the Free West Papua Movement (OPM), is increasingly becoming an important player equipped with the capabilities to determine the future prospects of issues surrounding border security. One of the many reasons for this is the growing influence of OPM sub-groups on both the international and domestic political sphere. Moreover, the growing international recognition, because of continuing lobbying and awareness across the globe, has been highly accredited to the hard work and brilliance of some of West Papua’s finest generation of diplomats who promote the struggle world-wide. The Free West Papua diplomats, through the various sub-groupings, have succeeded in seeking wider recognition such as that of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP). The ULMWP was initially formed on 6 December 2014 in Port Vila, Vanuatu; following a long week of consultations and consolidation between the various sub-resistance groups of the OPM, they came to a single consensus that all shall unite under one umbrella representing the fight for a free and independent Melanesian nation of West Papua. The consultations ended in an agreement called the Sarlana Declaration. The agreement acts as a binding instrument uniting several groups such as the Federal Republic for West Papua (NRFPB), the West Papuan National Coalition of Liberation (WPNCL) and West Papuan National Parliament (WPNP/New Guinea Raad) under the ULMWP banner (“Soldiers injured at border,” 2014). Today, the ULMWP is headed by Octovianus Mote (Secretary General), Benny Wenda (International Spokesman), Jacob Rumbiak, Rex Rumakiek, Leonie Tangahma (Executive Members), Edison Waromi (President of Federal Republic of West Papua), and Buchtar Tabuni (Chairman of the National Parliament of West Papua) (ULMWP).

The surge in support for the independence of West Papua has been making waves all over the globe including in Papua and West Papua.
Communication networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram have played an enormous part in the West Papuan campaign. The way information is spread today has been very effective, in that it helps to mobilise and regroup all Papuan sympathisers and activists to support the overall purpose of freedom. One sector of the campaign that this research primarily focuses on is the impact of information between campaigners and rebels operating along the border. On various occasions when the ULMWP has attempted to gain further recognition, such as in the attainment of full membership in the Melanesian Spearhead Group, it always triggers domestic chaos including several incidents of unreported unrest along the border. To be more precise, the Skouw-Wutung Border has at times experience gun battles between the rebels and the Indonesian armed forces.

The increase in the presence of Indonesian military personnel, together with their sophisticated defence systems, along the Indonesia-PNG border has tried to provide maximum security for border crossers who travel to and from Vanimo-Jayapura. Nonetheless, the OPM resistance has always applied pressure via its military wing known as Tentara Papua Nasional (TPN) (Papuan National Army) and Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat (TPNPB) (National Freedom Revolutionary Army of West Papua) by causing disturbances that threaten the security and stability of the border area. Major locations in the border area, such as main trading routes from Jayapura to Skouw-Wutung and business sites are located just a kilometre in radius from the boundary (Border Market). Although the border remains a high risk in security concerns, the majority of villagers from both sides of the border still continue their daily traditional and customary routines that have existed since the day of their ancestors. The routines involve the basic needs for survival such as fishing, hunting and gardening or visiting family and relatives across the border.

Apart from the risk on land, security issues at sea are also among the important aspects discussed bilaterally. Illegal fishing and illegal transporting of drugs and narcotics, together with other illegal trading, are
contributing to criminal activities along the sea border. Although fishing along the border has, in recent years, attained special attention from the local media, illegal fishing is still treated as a low threat because in most cases local or traditional fishermen are forced over by sea-currents or swelling tides into foreign territory. Some cases illustrate that in the excitement of fishing these locals forget to keep track of coordinates thus ending up being arrested by authorities in either one of the territories. Another important illegal activity that occurs at sea is the transportation of drugs like marijuana from Vanimo PNG to Jayapura-Papua in exchange for illegal petroleum products such as petrol and diesel. These illegal crimes are often done by local people that are in one way or the other related by family. Apart from illegal fishing and the illegal transfer of petroleum products, it is also important to point out that in comparison to other routines, activities such as hunting and gardening pose a greater security risk because of the involvement of local innocent lives which are at risk in the act of performing traditional rituals of this type.

Moreover, it is clear that advancements in science and technology have contributed towards the shift in developments of the border region; specifically, the border posts up in the Skouw-Wutung area that have seen more infrastructural developments that are not only moving to the forefront, but also becoming an icon that proudly promotes various development success (Timisela, 2015). In addition, infrastructural developments like roads, bridges and buildings along various parts of the border have forced traditional hunting grounds to shift further inland into isolated territory (often unmonitored parts of the border). These sections of the border are only accessed by foot and recently motorcycles that share bush tracks (jalan tikus). They are limited in transportation options due to their unique geographical features that require basic knowledge and understanding of nature. The unmonitored sections of the border are by far geographically more suitable to the resistance because these parts of the border are usually unattended, giving more space and opportunity for illegal activities to take place.
Armed OPM separatist elements that operate along these parts of the border often trigger a sense of insecurity among the locals that use the land for traditional purposes. Like some of the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph, the presence of armed OPM elements sparks fears among the local landowners along the border because their daily activities have been limited to fears of being blamed by either the OPM or the military for spying. Young women and children are among the most vulnerable due to the demands of intermarriage. Another reason is because the OPM experiences shortages in food supplies causing them to raid villagers’ gardens in search for basic food so as to continue to operate.

Over the years there have been several recorded accounts of OPM guerrilla attacks mounted on local businessmen and traders who constitute the economic supply chain at the Skouw-Wutung border post. Incidents of this kind have significantly disrupted the flow of goods and services, including the number of tourists and visitors that contribute to the border’s economy and trade. The sequence of attacks along the border has mostly targeted non-Melanesian (Asian) businessmen and traders. These local Indonesian businessmen are exposed because of the anti-Indonesian sentiments that were inherited from the ideological doctrines of the OPM. Despite the presence of the Indonesian military and police, the border continues to be often recognised as a hostile territory. Although disturbances are prone to occur at any time, the pasar berbatasan (border market) at Skouw-Wutung continues to operate under maximum supervision from the regional, provincial and central levels together with their counterparts from PNG who try to make sure that the trade along the border is benefiting the communities. Nevertheless, the market is located within a kilometre of the border’s main entrance and is always maintained and heavily guarded by the military and police to ensure that the objective of security is attained to mutually boost their relationship. The presence of the army and police at the Skouw-Wutung border post is often tested with surprise attacks involving heavy artillery such as the shooting in May 2014 ("Another Shooting at PNG Indonesian border," 2014), shootouts and threats. The military, being subjected to an internal security dilemma, often reacts with high caution as
in most cases the actions of the military and police are used against them as violations supporting anti-human rights campaigns. The armed forces have often been caught off guard in the act of preventing conflicts or maintaining law and order because the victims of such military activities would use the evidence against the Indonesian government as being human rights violations. This strategy has been heavily used in the Free West Papuan campaigns to promote human rights violations in Papua and West Papua provinces.

Many of the victims are non-Melanesians who are of different ethnicities from people from South Sulawesi (Makassar) and Java that own businesses such as trade stores and market stalls at the Skouw-Wutung international market. They travel to and from Jayapura city every day to operate their stores, and their supplies are also transported from Jayapura by road to the border. Another of the major security determinants is the border’s locations that make travelling rather unsafe, because the roads linking to Jayapura cut through the lower jungles of the Blue Mountains, known to be OPM territory. Even though there are routine military and police patrols, still some parts of the roads are prone to be used as ambush points by the rebels. The OPM rebels carry out surprise attacks by shooting at passing vehicles, local villagers, visitors, tourists or other Indonesian businessman who travel to the border; in some cases, they shoot at the armed military forces. An example, in mid-2014, it was reported that a few hours after the reopening of the Skouw-Wutung border, it came under ambush by the OPM rebels who shoot two Indonesian soldiers. After the shootings, the rebels took cover in PNG territory causing the Indonesian military to stop in pursuit due to territorial jurisdictions ("Soldiers injured at border," 2014). The person in charge of the Papua New Guinean Defence Force (PNGDF) operations, Col. Dominic Bulungol, delivered a statement saying that the OPM rebels were not targeting the PNGDF; however, they could end up in the middle of crossfire between Indonesia’s TNI and the OPM Rebels ("Soldiers injured at border," 2014).
Separatism, as Knight (1982) argues, whenever it is linked to the idea of nationalism, is intended to be linked with forms of territorial separation, thus confirming the linkage between separatist motivated activities along the border and other related events such as international lobbying and organised mass demonstrations in West Papua by diplomats of the free West Papua movement through networking and synchronising with each other. In total, the overall accomplishments of the Free West Papua campaign indicate evidence of success. For example, the international recognition of West Papuan Independence leaders like Benny Wenda in Oxford UK and Octo Motte in leading the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) in the Melanesian Spearhead Group Forum (MSG) as an observer. It seems all this progress, whether domestic or international is instrumental, in setting the momentum for the supporters and also the rebels that operate along the border. For instance, border security is tightened in the lead up to MSG Forum meetings for fear of the border being used as a transit zone to major MSG destinations like Vanuatu or the Solomon Islands and also to prevent the armed OPM members from manipulating politically driven agendas.

Hence, Indonesia and PNG are faced with extraordinary challenges in designing and implementing border security policies. Indeed, sentiments derived from the relationship between Indonesia and PNG in relation to the ever-increasing presence of refugees and the armed OPM has always been at the rear of the two countries’ border security issues. Policy makers and other designated officials from both governments have tried to contain and design policies that will provide a win-win solution for the two governments. Nonetheless, security policies do not always portray Indonesia’s military power despite the advancements of its military compared to PNG. Although there are certain indications that show an unequal distribution in military size along the border, Indonesia has always maintained a friendly and cooperative bilateral approach in regard to the designing and implementing of border security policies.
Although the relationship between Indonesia and PNG has expanded and strengthened over the years (PNG Embassy, 2012), the common border remains the most complex aspect of the two states’ relations. Issues arising from the disputes along the border, whether they are between government and government or people and people or government and people, have always remained at the top of all agendas. The reason as to why this has maintained special attention is based on the fears that if not properly contained, or should a dispute break out or escalate, it might generate potential harm to the relationship between Indonesia and PNG. Furthermore, it might trigger separatism in Indonesia. Therefore, problem-solving mechanisms such as annual border meetings, are vital for addressing issues and making available all means to maintain the stability of the border area and, most importantly, a harmonious relationship between both governments.

2.2.2 Indonesia’s National Approach and Border Policy
Indonesia has moved on from a series of financial, political and environmental catastrophes to be distinguished as an important partner in attempts to address global challenges. The post-Suharto era showed promising signs of possible developments in both government and society. The removal of Suharto’s military regime provided the citizens with more space to contribute and influence the different sectors of the state. Eventually, the country transformed from a highly militarised and centralised authoritarian state into a relatively open, stable and democratic one (Harris & Foresti, 2010). Like many other countries, the government of the Republic of Indonesia has, over the years, undertaken to review and improve the decision making and implementation of its security policy orientation to protect its national interests, national security, and ideological and economic prosperity. To achieve its objectives, Indonesia has 132 missions abroad, consisting of 95 embassies, 3 permanent missions to for the United Nations in New York and Geneva, and for ASEAN in Jakarta, 31 Consulates General and 3 Consulates as well as appointed 64 Honorary Consuls (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2010). In respect to this, the Indonesia-PNG relations have been stable as a result of successful
peaceful and friendly cooperation through the mechanisms set out within the bilateral, multilateral, regional and international agreements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic Of Indonesia, 2005).

Considering the range of domestic and international factors that impinge on Indonesian political stability and security, one example is the historical riotous violence of May 1998 that shattered Indonesia’s main cities, including Jakarta, and which terrorised the whole country (Purdey, 2002). Nationwide concerns over the impact of the Asian financial crisis sparked a massive domestic uprising against President Suharto’s regime in May 1998, which was subsequently caused by the devaluation of the Baht in Thailand that triggered a region-wide economic convulsion dragging Indonesia down with it (Donald, 2000). The riots that brought down the Suharto regime signified a revolution inspired by the mounting external pressure, igniting internal political and security instability that was affected by anarchy and chaos, thus rationalising the impact of external and internal factors and its role of overcoming potential security risks. These factors greatly contributed to the reform of the government systems through the various constitutions favourable to supporting the growing demand for the allocation of domestic power to provinces and regencies. The domestic transfer of power through the democratic mechanisms of decentralisation clearly demonstrates the strategic decision making that guided Indonesia to develop into an important global partner willing to cooperate with other governments including PNG in the security sector. Likewise, Harris and Foresti (2010) argue that Indonesian policy makers have been quite successful in endorsing strategies to pursue the shift they needed to the advantage of the Indonesian people despite the lack of “good governance” found in various regions of Indonesia.

Historically, Indonesia’s post-reformasi (the reform movement and program initiated after Suharto’s downfall after 1998) has set the foundation for a relatively open, stable and democratic government system, which is signalled through the range of policies such as “pembangunan ekonomi” (economic development) and national stability achievable through “benar
membangun demokrasi” (building a strong democracy) (Roberts, Habir, & Sebastian, 2015) under the leadership of the country’s first democratically elected, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY). A measurement of the success of relative stability and high growth was the subsequent decision to democratically decentralise its system by utilising political and economic devolution to reduce the power of the central government, which cut the deeply embedded legacy of Suharto’s rule, encouraged more local involvement in politics and economic, and increased the people’s sense of belonging to the polity (Kurlantzick, 2012). Political manoeuvres of such sort have taken the lead in massive conversions within the different government sectors, and have been cornerstone of the institutional reforms and a focal point toward the decision making and implementation of programs and policies. An example of these decentralisation processes was the granting of otonomi khusus (special autonomy) to provinces of Papua and Aceh (McGibbon, 2004).

McGibbon (2004) argues that Jakarta’s decision to transfer power to other provinces including Papua, was a matter of answering the growing demand for separation due to the rapid increase in violence after the fall of Suharto, with the aim of diverting the secessionists’ demands. Power to exercise more political freedom between provinces and the regencies within the country then breathed new life into government institutions to purposely transform a direct form of cooperation between the regency, and the provincial and the national levels. In addition, the creation of Badan Pengelola Perbatasan Nasional (National Border Management Agency) proved to be a legal form of decentralising power that was aimed at enhancing the roles of the provincial and regional border authorities. The national government’s decision to exercise more political flexibility also played an advantage in legitimising more rapid cooperation among the provincial and regional border agencies (Ichsan, 2015).

Nonetheless, security dynamics in the twenty-first century have contributed to a rapid rise in the significance of border security measures, with essentially all countries around the globe now being able to work together
in some subtle system. In addition, (Buzan, 1991) argues that the intensity and character of the national security problem varies dramatically over time, moving into periods of lower tension and increased cooperation. The aim of this thesis is to cover major border security policy aspects of the Indonesian-PNG bilateral relations, concurring with the realist perspective that governments do exhibit absolute power to define and affect foreign policy, meaning they do not take orders from anyone higher (Morgan, 2006). Indonesia and PNG also face the challenge of addressing security issues that impact the relationship between them; although it is clear that the relationship centres on their shared border, the presence of the third party (OPM) is crucial to the subsistence cooperation among intergovernmental institutions, for instance the security sector and border management.

2.3 Indonesia-PNG Relations
Evidence of numerous border incursions made by the Indonesian military has regularly prompted the PNG government to raise their concerns in international forums ("Sarlana Declaration," 2014). Reports on skirmishes in West Sepik province between the Indonesian military and PNG citizens ("Border issues present new challenge to PNG's relationship with Indonesia," 2013) have alerted both sides that there is yet more work to be done to maintain a solid relationship. Given the peaceful co-existence between both countries, interactions at the political level have continued to be robust compared to economic trade and socio-cultural areas; an example of the continuity of cooperation is the joint ministerial commission that was subsequently formed to facilitate bilateral relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2010).

The relationship has over time been represented by a significant increase in specially arranged visits such as that of the annual joint verification exercises—carried out throughout specified parts of the border—mandated by the annual bilateral border meetings. The usual joint exercise is mostly aimed at inspecting the ongoing progress of initial programs that are jointly funded by both governments. Multiple delegations ranging from district councils, provincial authorities to even ministerial visits have painted rather
friendlier and cooperative relations throughout 41 years of relations. Those high-level exchanges of visits between heads of state and government ministers have continued to consolidate the understanding and cooperation between the two governments. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s visit to Port Moresby in 2010 has alerted the PNG government to Indonesia’s interests in improving relations with its neighbours. The meeting symbolised Indonesia’s interests in venturing into key issues including cooperation along common borders and economic and trade and defence cooperation. (Thom, 2012).

Given the peaceful co-existence of the Indonesia-PNG border relations, interactions at the political level have continued to be robust; however, with recent progress, there has also been an increase in interactions in both the economic and socio-cultural sectors. Overall, there has been a significant increase in exchange of visits by respective delegates of both governments. Those high-level exchanges of visits between heads of state and government ministers have continued to consolidate understanding and cooperation between the two states. Moreover, outcomes of political relations have successfully created more opportunities in other sectors; for example, Law and Order focusing on Trans-National Crime, Fisheries, Agriculture and Livestock, Youth and Cultural Exchange Matters and Health Matters have been part of the agendas in recent years (Indonesian Government, 2013).

2.3.1 Foreign Relations
Much of the literature confirms that relations between the two countries existed prior to the independence of PNG. However, PNG’s independence in 1975 paved the way to official relations between both countries (PNG Embassy, 2012); (May, 2012b). Among other important accomplishments throughout their relationship it is important to point out the significant impact of the initial agreement that yielded the “Treaty of Mutual Respect Friendship and Cooperation” and recently the “Joint Commission,” which serve as major pillars of existing cooperative relations (PNG Embassy, 2012). The agreement laid emphasis on the, interests as immediate
neighbours. The treaty, being a reciprocal covenant, responded to the people’s common desire for peace, progress, and prosperity, in accordance with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as stated in the official document of the treaty (*Treaty of mutual respect, friendship and cooperation*, 1986). Moreover, the current status of pleasant, consensual dealings between Indonesia and PNG has been accredited to continuous government determination and pursuance of the state goals through their strategic approaches within the broad scope of foreign policy frameworks. For example, successive PNG governments have constantly stated their objection to the OPM guerrillas mounting attacks from PNG soil, and this has been followed with an increase in the PNG military’s budget for the purpose of border patrol throughout the years (May, 2004).

The treaty, now a benchmark to various “special arrangements” including that of the border security, has, in particular, developed to become the spine of a strong two-way interaction. Besides, Papua New Guinea’s growing role in the Asia-Pacific (Wallis, 2014) region is boosting the relationship as Indonesia seeks Papua New Guinea’s close cooperation as a special partner to address present and future security challenges. Strategically, the notion has become more evident in that, currently, the two nations continue to enjoy a very peaceful and harmonious state of relations. Moreover, inaugural visits by high ranking officials from both sides have painted a rather more serious sense of cooperation portraying the political goodwill of each state. Despite all means of cooperation, including that of the high-level talks between heads of states, border issues still remain the main cause of tension between Indonesia and PNG because of the sensitive political links connected to the issue of separatism.

Whilst the mutual dialogues and interactions between leaders of the two countries continue to provide the political will for enhancing cooperation between the two governments, it is apparent that tangible areas of cooperation like trade and investment opportunities, technical and technological assistance, transportation and security have not been vigorously pursued as substantive matters. The establishment of the
bilateral Joint Commission in June 2003 between Indonesia and PNG elevated the level of dialogue between Foreign Ministers to oversee and effectively deliberate on core bilateral issues affecting relations between both countries at the ministerial level. In addition, this dialogue substitutes as a proactive forum for both countries to discuss technical frameworks of cooperation to further diversify and expand potential areas of tangible mutual benefits. Close cooperation and follow-ups should be appropriate for other functional ministers of both countries to also participate in the Joint Commission meetings with reference to the Inter-governmental Relations Minister of PNG and the Home Affairs Minister of Indonesia, who are both involved at the annual JBC meetings (PNG Embassy, 2008).

2.3.2 Political Relations
Before and after independence, PNG was considered amongst other states in the Asia Pacific region as a strategic partner for relations with Indonesia. This was later confirmed in 1973 during the self-government period when there were attempts made by Sir Albert Maori Kiki (First PNG Foreign Minister) who willingly offered himself to become a negotiator in secret talks with the OPM and his Indonesian counterpart, Mr. Adam Malik (Dorney, 2000). The initiatives taken were not entirely appreciated by Indonesia, which later forced Sir Maori Kiki to provide a report stating that Prime Minister Somare had conducted a meeting with OPM frontman Seth Rumkorem. At this time, Indonesia and PNG relations were heavily dependent on the OPM issues; Seth Rumkorem and Jacob Prai, leaders of the two OPM factions, were invited for talks in Port Moresby in early 1977 with then the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Olewale, Defence Minister Louis Mona, Foreign Secretary Tony Siaguru, and PNGDF Commander Ted Diro, in which Rumkorem and Prai were told that PNG recognised Papua as an integral part of Indonesia and would continue to prevent its territory from being used for anti-Indonesian acts (Dorney, 2000). Such bold commitments from the PNG government have from time to time become the core of political relationships between both countries.
2.3.3 Economics, Investment and Trade

In retrospect, the level of the Indonesian investment in PNG also remains relatively low in comparison to other states. In aggregate value, investment opportunities have obtained a rather low profit; for example, between 1992 and 1998, Indonesian investments in the sector of retailing and forestry were valued at only K3.2 million (Soerjanto, 2007). Nonetheless, there have been indications of regular growth inclusive of the mining sector within the highlands and the West Sepik province of PNG (Soerjanto, 2007). Other prospective investors that have indicated interest in areas of oil and gas, telecommunication and agriculture in PNG include Indonesian companies like Greencom Dawamiba Mobile Telecommunication company and Indorama Petrochemical Company (PNG Embassy, 2008).

Moreover, foreign investments between Indonesia and PNG have been one of the important developing issues behind more negotiations on the conclusion of the “Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA)” (Soerjanto, 2007), which needs to be revisited as a matter of utmost priority for subsequent signing, signing the agreement is intended to technically protect investments from high risk insecurity. On the domestic scale, the government should focus on the main aspects that counteract likely investment such as excessive service charges, law and order conditions, land compensations, political instability and, most importantly, language barriers. For example, many problems that arise in relation to the common border are often not handled well due to the different languages spoken along the border, where Pidgin and Bahasa Indonesia seem more dominant. Despite being used in exchanges more frequently, both languages often fall short in playing an important role in the settlement of disputes. Hence, disputes are later forced to be settled with the help of English speaking officials, which in Indonesia’s case, still need to increase. Evidence illustrates that a stable society and financial security are deemed as paramount preconditions for attracting of foreign investments between both countries.
CHAPTER 3
The Political Impacts of Separatism on Border Security
Conflicts relating to the issue of separatism or self-determination are among the most significant factors affecting the domestic and international stability of states. Indeed, instabilities triggered by such conflicts threaten the level of national security. Moreover, security, as Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde claim, concerns survival as it deals with issues that “pose a threat to a designated referent object” (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporates government, territory, and society) (Anthony, Emmers, & Acharya, 2006). Nonetheless, the Copenhagen School has divided the elements of security into five categories; military, environmental, economic, societal, and political security.

In relation to the existence of separatist movements, levels of security along international border areas are often maximized or tightened to safeguard national interest. In fact, such conflicts bring vulnerability to the state’s political, economic and social development. Despite the number of attempts to prevent such sensitive conflicts from taking place, it seems that the fragile nature of separatist conflicts does not accommodate for short-term solutions. One of the main reasons behind this argument is because separatism involves human lives (citizens) who are by law entitled to safety and basic human rights. Hence the state in this case is tasked with the challenge to simultaneously maintain its integrity and at the same time protect its sovereignty and citizens from both external and internal threats. The issue of separatism remains a problem that requires immediate cooperation and bargaining to secure a favourable outcome.

It is important to point out that separatism concerns movements of political interests’ hostile to a sovereign government or nation. Separatist movements in the past were considered domestic problems with the aim to politically disaffiliate from a sovereign state. The main idea was to basically configure a new self-governing state in accordance with their own ideologies.
and principles. Nowadays, the advancement in information technology deserves huge credit for its role in converting a once domestic struggle to a more global one. Furthermore, contributions from the internet through social media and other forms of media have rather transformed separatist conflicts from their traditional form to a more advanced and organized movement. For instance, by capitalizing on these developments, the separatist movements intend to take up a more advanced role in diplomatic lobbying at the international level through their global campaigns.

The ongoing ambitions and affiliations of separatist movements have captured the attention and interest of more than one sovereign state, non-government organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IGOs), multi-national corporations, together with civil societies, individual political elites and individual sympathizers around the world who are concerned with the issues surrounding human rights, environmental conservation or animal welfare that affect the lives of people in the separatist region. The NGOs have become more instrumental because of their role and connections around the globe. With respect to NGO support, separatist movements are likely to gain more support as the issue becomes a commodity within NGO markets. Such contributions from the NGOs are prone to add more fuel and motivation which supports the activists. Sometimes the relationship between separatist movements and NGOs is questioned, because the role of NGOs can complicate and prolong the conflict.

Accordingly, the existence of separatist movements is driven by the people’s desire to politically determine their own destiny as a nation-state. Separatist conflicts are, mostly, fuelled by the ongoing dissatisfaction caused by the disturbances found among the various aspects of statehood and society. For example, the “losses of lives and property among the civilian population” (Singh, 2007) are some points that describe the factors that dictate the conditions upon which the struggle for separatism is built. Furthermore, separatist movements cause “threats and insecurities on individuals as well as communities” (Anthony et al., 2006). Consequently, human security can be imperilled by the existence of separatism.
Nonetheless, separatist conflicts remain a great threat to the “national sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-states, which include individuals and respective societies” (Anthony et al., 2006).

Besides human rights violations, other factors such as religion, ethnicity, history, race, language, political, economic and social deprivations or environmental catastrophes make up some of the issues that give rise to the existence and continuation of separatist conflicts. In relation to the basic factors mentioned above, some of these have developed to become the demands and desires that feature as the core components that underline the structural motive behind separatist movements. Similarly, others are undoubtedly caused by political and economic distress, hostility or trauma that emerged from an oppressive government system, poor handling of domestic affairs, minimum availability of basic services, inequality in the implementation of policies whether it be economic, political or social justice etc.

Despite the measures taken by the government to improve related conditions, dealing with such conflicts remains complicated and long-lasting because almost all the reasons above are known to have successfully formed a strong bond within the hearts and minds of separatists and their supporters. Individuals and communities affected by the problems of separatism, often find themselves trapped. Overall, the psychological fight motivates and aspires separatist movements to remain solid as an organization, even though, at times, some activists physically suffer at the hands of the government’s armed forces.

Another important factor to consider is the involvement of the armed forces in the process of securing national interests. More specifically, the increase in the deployment of security personnel (military and police) to areas marked for separatist conflicts commonly illustrates the presence of danger and insecurity found among the state and its citizens. The growing insecurities among a state and its citizens thus accumulate to accommodate potential domestic and international instabilities. The main reason is that
most separatist conflicts obtain international support. On the other hand, the use of armed forces is well-known as a method to release direct pressure off the central government. However, in doing so, the armed forces often end up committing human rights violations because, most of the time, they take matters into their own hands.

Some may argue that the government takes cover behind the armed forces, while letting the armed forces handle the field work. Moreover, the armed forces are faced with huge challenges as their conduct might turn out to violate human rights laws or be just simply just protecting national interest. In this case, the armed forces are often left to face a domestic security dilemma. Despite who gets the first call to maintain order, the use of armed forces can paint a bad image. The armed forces are known to threaten citizens with great force when asking them to cooperate according to laws and regulations set out by the central government. Nonetheless such security strategies are imposed to provide a peaceful and harmonious platform for the development of government programs. However, many may argue that these practices are normal in a corrupt and oppressive system of government. Ironically, the increase in the number of military personnel in separatist marked areas often creates tensions that fuel the conflict.

In the case of this research, the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) is a separatist movement that operates today through its leading organization, the Free West Papua Movement, and the United Liberation Movement for Free West Papua (ULMWP) on the international level. The OPM’s involvement on the international stage has been widely credited to the benefits of information technology. Together, these two organizations and some other of its sub-organizations, continue to reject the Indonesian occupation in the territories of both Papua and West Papua provinces. Again, such rejections are aimed at condemning the acts of the Indonesian authorities and armed forces for their illegal large scale human rights violations (Rutherford, 2012). Even though there are many other aspects that have contributed to fuel the prolonged fight for self-determination, one of the major issues raised inside the Free West Papua campaign is the
allegations that lead to a human rights violations report on the “genocidal” operation which claimed the lives of over 4000 Papuans between 1977-1978 that included helicopter bombings (Rollo, 2013).

Accordingly, with respect to such infringements, the Indonesian government has been continuously criticized for failing to meet international standards that have been set out in conventions, such as, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even though Indonesia continues to receive criticism from other concerned parties, the initial relationship of Indonesia and PNG remains cordial. Moreover, the focus that sustains much criticism remains the border when it comes to dealing with suspected border incursion by the Indonesian armed forces. The PNG government has often raised concerns regarding reports of Indonesian soldiers spotted in PNG territory. The Indonesian government simultaneously blames the PNG government for harbouring OPM elements. Political disruptions remain possible due to the existence of high levels of suspicion between both countries. Nonetheless, Indonesia and PNG has been cooperating within their existing mechanisms and paradigms to make sure that cautious security measures are executed on their common border.

To gain a thorough understanding of the impacts of Papuan separatism on the Indonesia-PNG international border, it is vital to consider the kinds of internal and external influences. Indeed, international and domestic factors do somewhat come into direct contact with the border and its role in providing the line of defence. It is also equally valuable to examine the impact it produces on understanding the processes of designing and implementing border security policies. In this context, internal and external forces are at some point linked to each other due to their “resonance and credence in the light of emerging threats and uncertainties” (Anthony et al., 2006). Hence, such impacts are prone to have many security implications along the PNG-Indonesia border. First, the impact of Papua’s struggle to separate from Indonesia through various political and social platforms (such as the ones existing in Europe, Africa, America, Asia, Australia, and the
South-West Pacific) has greatly enhanced the level of security and the role of the Indonesia-PNG border.

In terms of interests, the border has become a central element in the relationship of Indonesia and PNG. Moreover, the presence of West Papuan activists and supporters on PNG soil has often instigated a series of misunderstandings between Jakarta and Port Moresby. Such misunderstandings come at a price, and are considered to be beneficial to the OPM. In relation to the factors that determine the level of security, such advantages are perceived as an external force that influences both countries’ internal security. As a result, this often leads to tensions between the OPM rebels and the Indonesian armed forces (TNI/POLRI) at the border, because the OPM takes advantage to influence the security of the border. Actions taken by the OPM are sometimes desperate in the hope of gaining more international media exposure. Despite accounts of several border clashes between the OPM and the TNI, the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) has kept a rather low profile in maintaining its role. Such behaviour would be deemed as taking a more cautious approach to security, keeping in mind the size and might of the TNI. Otherwise, it would be interpreted as not interfering with Indonesian domestic issues as it might cause misunderstandings.

Secondly, the common border accommodates several interests of both Indonesia and PNG including the OPM as the third party. At some point, conflicts of interest are bound to occur given the political and economic developments taking place along the border. For instance, the border has been home for the OPM rebels for over 50 years. This means the OPM and some of its factions, have been using the border to escape from Indonesia’s military patrols and operations ever since the OPM was first established. Despite the ongoing Indonesian military surveillances and operations inside the jungles and along the mountain ranges, the border continues to serve an important political and security purpose for the OPM’s military wing and other sub-organizations that seek to procure independence from Indonesia. From an economic perspective, the impact on border security will surely
affect the economic trading that take place approximately a kilometre from the border. The border market, existing not too far from the border entrance, is a market well known for supplying the grassroots with a wide range of goods and service. Moreover, the market has been making huge financial gains in the last few years because of the increase in buyers that come from PNG. The market itself is deemed as one of the important assets of the Jayapura municipality. Despite its importance as a state property, that portrays the image of Indonesia on the forefront the market also serves a special purpose for the OPM and other resistance forces. Recent attacks have been launched purposely to frighten away buyers from PNG. Indeed, attacks carried out by the OPM on the border portrays its role as one of the players determining the case of border security. Despite the heavy presence of the Indonesian armed forces, the OPM still has control of much of the border areas. The main reason is that most areas along the border remain unmarked which makes it a prefect getaway zone for the resistance forces.

A third point to note is that the campaign for self-determination has been greatly internationalized over the years, thus bringing different political interests from other important regional players such as Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and other small Pacific Island countries plus Australia. Therefore, the function of the border remains influential to the relationship of Indonesia and PNG amid growing international pressure. In some cases, the developments of the OPM through the Free West Papua Organization and the ULMWP in the MSG has often motivated OPM fighters along the border to increase tensions with the Indonesian armed forces. The main aim behind such hostility serves the purpose of synchronizing support in a search for wider international recognition and thus by creating instabilities along the border, economic activities are disturbed due to fears of a possible surprise attack from the rebels. As tension intensifies, the PNG counterparts are well informed of the situation on the ground within Indonesia. The sharing of information also helps to minimize inconveniences within their relationship specially to maintain order along the border.
This chapter seeks to elaborate on the major political determinants that internally and externally affect the relationship of Indonesia and PNG with respect to the existence of the OPM and the impact of separatism on Indonesian and PNG's border security. In relation to this, it will also focus on the factors that affect the designing and implementing of border security policies. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to identify the relationship between separatist movements from both domestic and international spheres and the significant role it plays in affecting the daily functioning of the Indonesia-PNG border. The role of Papua’s provincial bureaucrats -from the autonomous government- who are responsible for designing and implementing border security policies will be reviewed to justify the link between separatism and the internal and external factors that impact border security in general.

3.1 Political Factors Influencing Separatism

Throughout this research, it is understood that the act of separatism occurs based on several factors that directly affect the area of its origination. In this case, Papua’s separatist conflict has been the result of various unsuccessful political deals which occurred for over 50 years of the Papuan struggle for self-determination. The Papuan struggle for self-determination began first when the Dutch prepared Papua for independence. Nevertheless, the political dynamics regarding the status of the territories of Papua and West Papua provinces didn’t turn in favour of the Dutch, and basically the Dutch government failed to maintain its control over the said territory which then resulted in the Indonesian take-over (Saltford, 2003b). In an attempt to win back the prematurely introduced self-determination, the OPM quickly established a military wing that later became the main faction serving as a resistance to counter the Indonesian armed forces. In this context, there are many factors that play a significant role in undermining the relationship of Indonesia and PNG.

Like other separatist organizations around the world, the OPM, together with the Free West Papua Organization and some of its sub-organizations, is a political actor that has gradually grown in influence within the last decade.
Today, the OPM and its allies can’t be eliminated from the general relationship of Indonesia and PNG. The main reason is due to their involvement in the issues that directly impact on national security. More specifically, their developments are bound to have an influence along the common border of Indonesia and PNG. Secondly, the OPM as a political movement seeking to attain self-determination has managed to successfully cooperate with various groups to launch several internationally organized campaigns.

The Free West Papua Organization for example, was launched in Oxford, in the United Kingdom by Benny Wenda, a prominent leader of the West Papuan Independence movement and senior spokesperson for the ULMWP. The ULMWP is also another organization that was purposely set up as a symbol of unification among the various factions of the West Papuan separatist movement. The ULMWP is currently an observer in the Melanesian Spearhead Group Forum (MSG). Despite being an observer at the MSG, the ULMWP is gaining more support from the governments of Vanuatu and Solomon Islands in its bid to upgrade its membership to full MSG member. (“Solomon Islands and Vanuatu to support full ULMWP membership at the MSG,” 2016).

Another point to consider is that besides the two groups mentioned above, there are also many other small sub-organizations (campaign groups) that operate to help support West Papua’s struggle for self-determination. For instance, the National Liberation Council for West Papua in the Netherlands (Nasution, 2014). Likewise, the Free West Papua Organization claims that campaign groups exist in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, PNG, Poland, USA the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Indonesia and Spain (Papua, 2004a). In general, these groups aim to secure further international political recognition, something that the prominent West Papuan independence leaders hope can help educate and influence more people and governments to support their pleas. More importantly, they aim to persuade the United Nations General Assembly to revisit the decision that granted legitimacy to the Act of Free Choice (Saltford, 2003a).
In relation to the pleas for self-determination, Saltford (2003a) argues that a genuine process for self-determination did not take place in 1969. Although there was direct UN supervision of the so-called Act of Free Choice, only 1,022 local Papuans were hand-picked to participate. As a result, the integration of the territories of Papua into Indonesia is still deemed as illegal to many Papuans and their sympathisers around the globe including the OPM as an organization. In relation to the Act of Free Choice, Chauvel and Bhakti (2004) argue that, despite Jakarta having secured Papua, the general conduct of the Act of Free Choice has become a significant factor that determines both Papuan resistance and further international scrutiny. Moreover, according to Papua (2004b), the main purpose of this campaign is to lobby for more political recognition from the wider international community whether it be in the form of governments, NGOs, IGOs, multinational corporations, political elites, political parties, or ordinary citizens. The OPM and its sub-organizations hope that with more organized international backing, the fight for freedom and justice can prevail. Furthermore, hopes of achieving freedom and justice are deemed vital in bringing an end to the conflict and violence that have occurred for almost five decades in the territories of Papua. One of the main political strategies that the organization applies is by finding ways to get engaged in international organized forums. Most forums are used to promote the issue of human rights and conduct awareness on other issues that have greatly affected the areas under Indonesian control.

In fact, it is through international organized forums and meetings that the issue of West Papua begins to gain momentum. Today, campaigns and demonstrations occur more often both in Papua and overseas (Free West Papua Campaign, 2004a). This triumph has been made possible because of the successful international lobbying conducted by senior Papuan politicians. Another important point to consider is that the use of social media has contributed greatly to the international action of the pleas for self-determination of West Papua. Demonstrations occurring at Indonesian consulates and embassies around the world have often captured the attention of the international media. One of the main reasons these
campaigns make the headlines is because of the involvement of local sympathisers and NGOs that help to fight for the cause of an Independent West Papua. NGOs and local supporters help to make up numbers in demonstrations and also help to provide finance and ideas to run the campaigns in a more organized manner.

Another point to consider is the strategy which the campaigns and demonstrations are using to gain support. An example would be the materials used in demonstrations. Videos and photographs showing torture and killings are used in the campaigns and demonstrations and are incredibly successful. More and more people are being encouraged by this type of campaign. Likewise, the organization has been using social media to educate ordinary citizens around the world on what has happened in Papua since the Indonesian takeover. More specifically, the movement is trying to seek more support from various interested parties who can continue to make known their desire to legally question what they claim as a “violation of international law and an illegal occupation of Papua” (Janki, 2010) by the Indonesian government.

It is clearly obvious that separatism occurs due to several factors that openly influence the area of its origination. In this case, separatism in Papua has been the result of various misdeeds which had taken place throughout the struggle for independence. Originally, the Netherlands are to be blamed for their failure to maintain control over the territory of Papua that in the end resulted in the Indonesian takeover of Papua (Saltford, 2003b). Despite Papua falling into the hands of Indonesia, the Papuans still maintain the ideas and doctrines that the Dutch had left behind. It was because of the ideologies planted by the Dutch that Papuans began to organize themselves to try to form an independent nation of their own. In this context, there are many factors that play an important part in the colliding of political interests between Indonesia, PNG and the OPM.

The history of West Papua’s campaign for self-determination illustrates many of the events that have taken place over a long time, that contributed
neither to amplifying the Papuan struggle nor to lessening their chances of obtaining independence. It is through these crucial circumstances that the issue of separatism in Papua attained a more global recognition. Notwithstanding, the political arena through which the issue of Papua evolves is determined by a democratic political approach. Furthermore, in affiliation with democratic principles, both Indonesia and PNG recognize the need to continue to apply democratic means to gain and overcome certain inconveniences that occur in their relationship, especially that of the border area. Accordingly, the occurrence of political events in relations to the issue of separatism in Papua undoubtedly constitutes the political arena within which the relationship of both Indonesia and PNG takes place.

At times, the political atmosphere was not conducive to providing solutions to both Indonesia and PNG because West Papuan politics had put them into a situation which they had no idea how to contain. It was extremely difficult for both Indonesia and PNG to deal with the separatism issue due to the involvement of several other political elements that are critical to the existence of the OPM. Hence, the development of political relations between Indonesia and PNG could not identify a straightforward answer to the issue. The Indonesian government was expecting the PNG government to cooperate more on the relationship specially to control movements of individuals linked to the separatist movement across the border into PNG territory. Despite expectations, the PNG government continued to let local Papuan refugees settle in PNG.

The term political arena used in this context refers to the domestic politics of Indonesia and PNG and their relationship to the issue of separatism. Also, it accommodates for the addition of foreign politics that are aimed at securing a reasonable solution. The political arena is an invisible space whereby all conflicting parties come to pursue their political interests. Nonetheless, the inclusion of other stakeholders such as governments and NGOs has created a rather larger political playing field whereby different interests will collide with one another thus causing the issue to be complicated and difficult to settle in the short-term. In relation to the overall
struggle for separatism, the presence of prominent Papuan leaders and activists around the world seems to be boosting the political wing of the separatist movement in their fight for self-determination. There is no doubt that the separatism issue in Papua is among the most significant and sensitive issues within the Asia-Pacific region and something the Indonesian government protects as an internal issue. Despite Indonesia’s efforts to cover up the issue, the OPM has been making huge progress globally and the impacts have not only tested Indonesia’s diplomatic sector, but raised doubts about Indonesia’s role in geopolitics.

The OPM has managed to channel its interests as a rebel group that operates along the border of Indonesia and PNG. With respect to border security, there have been certain occasions where rebels infiltrated the border. Moreover, there were various accounts of where the OPM rebels had opened fire (using guns) on the border post or at army and police officers. Such irresponsible action has caused great fear and instability, especially to the locals who have made the border a part of their daily routine, either to visit the border market or their families across in Skouw-Jayapura.

Another point to consider is that the active role of the ULMWP as an observer in MSG has often place great pressure on the relationship of Indonesia and PNG. PNG, as the largest country in the MSG, officially recognizes and respects Indonesia’s sovereignty over the territories of Papua and West Papua provinces in accordance with the UN Charter. Despite PNG’s position in the MSG, other MSG members like Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the Kanaks strongly condemn PNG for turning a blind eye ("Huge support for West Papua bid to join MSG, says under cover journo," 2015) eye to the minority of Melanesians in Papua’s two provinces. The support from the governments of Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the Kanaks have rallied positive results in their respective countries, for example, the solidarity support demonstration in the Solomon Islands capital of Honiara in June 2015 ("Huge support for West Papua bid to join MSG, says under cover journo," 2015).
Nonetheless, Indonesia and PNG remain the top actors involved despite interest from other parties in the region. Even though, geographically, Papua’s locations seem to confuse a lot of people, the Indonesian province is in both Southeast Asia and the Pacific with its integration to Indonesia (history) being one part and the other is its cultural relations with the people of the Pacific. Despite Papua being an Indonesian province, the origins of its people remain intact with the greater Melanesian ethnicity. Moreover, the term “One people One soul” found on the West Papuan state emblem used by the ULMWP, symbolizes its links to the greater Melanesian community. It is through this slogan that the Melanesian people from other countries recognized the people of West Papua’s pleas for self-determination.

Lately, the ULMWP, through its leading supporters in the MSG (Vanuatu and Solomon Islands) has the opportunity to engage in more international cooperation. In terms of wider recognition, in 2015, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) made the Indonesian province a priority in their leader’s agenda ("ULMWP welcome forum focus on West Papua," 2015). Similarly, Vanuatu has often raised the West Papuan issue in various UN forums. For instance, in a statement to the 25th Session of the Human Rights council on 4 March 2014, the Prime Minister of Vanuatu stated his country was “here in this conference to amplify the concerns for human rights in West Papua ("Vanuatu PM raises West Papua in Geneva," 2014). On the contrary, it is obvious that PNG and Fiji have taken a different position regarding West Papua’s future. PNG and Fiji’s Foreign Ministers have occasionally made it clear that they will support Indonesia’s application to the MSG. Thus, PNG and Fiji are largely responsible for making Indonesia an associate member of the MSG in 2015 and further planning on supporting Indonesia to obtain full membership in the future (Mononimbar, 2016). Even though PNG and Fiji still maintain their support for Indonesia, it seems that Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the Kanaks will still find a way around to vote the ULMWP into becoming a full member of the association as well. The West Papuan issue has successfully managed to secure top placing among the other agendas in the MSG. It is likely the that issue of West Papua will divide the MSG.
Whether it does or not will depend on how much it influences the struggle for self-determination in West Papua and abroad.

The Free West Papua Organization and the ULMWP’s success in the MSG and other related forums have posed another domestic problem in Indonesia, particularly in the provinces of Papua and West Papua. The Melanesians of Papua view the success as a huge boost thus greatly affecting the people’s imagination of a free and independent West Papua. Such imaginations have been deemed to be a significant factor that influences the mind-sets of the local Melanesians of Papua. Many of these local Papuans still believe and support the cause of an independent West Papua. Despite the physical and economic developments taking place in both the Papuan provinces such as roads, bridges or buildings, agricultural projects and support for local business, most local Papuans still hope for that moment of freedom.

One way this is identified is that whenever the Free West Papua Organization or the ULMWP makes a move in the MSG on behalf of West Papua, the people backing Papua always support these movements. For example, when ULMWP was promoted to the status of observer in June 2015, many local Papuan churches and groups gathered to hold prayers and demonstrations to show support. This support didn’t just take place in towns but also in villages and remote areas. It is from this belief that the West Papuan people keep their hopes alive. Such emotions are also shared among the OPM fighters that still operate in the jungles of the Indonesia-PNG border continuing their struggle to maintain political rights by occasionally putting pressure on Indonesia-PNG relations.

It is also important to note that the struggle for West Papua’s self-determination has developed into a racial and cultural struggle to defend and preserve the rights of the people of Melanesia. For instance, in 2013, the Melanesian Spearhead Group first provided its support to recognize the “inalienable rights for West Papua for self-determination” (Wenda, 2016). The recognition was later amended in the MSG constitution that provided
the legal standings for the ULMWP to manoeuvre in search of more support. Basically, what this amendment does is that it strengthens the core purpose of the organization which is to fight for the rights of the Melanesian people. Despite the view that the Papuan issue is an Indonesian internal issue, the people of Melanesia regard the Papuan issue as part of the Pacific and not Asia and that Papua should be given the chance for a referendum.

3.1.1 Separatism and Human Rights

Recently, separatist movements have gained more attention due to the fact that human rights violations have become more associated with the separatist struggles. Human rights violations and other issues such as environmental degradation and animal welfare have become demanding, especially in territories known for separatism. Activists have managed to promote the campaign on different levels, involving a wide range of stakeholders. In fact, human rights issues do attract different interests. Moreover, both separatism and human rights violations relate to each other. Generally, human rights violations are usually the outcome of separatist demands and resistance to the ruling government. Nonetheless, both separatist movements and governments have seen the need to engage in a more peaceful and diplomatic manner. Such developments and engagements are seen to be more considered in approach. One of the reasons is to minimize security risks and possible violence and maintain stability while, at the same, time promoting the need to negotiate agreements to promote political goodwill between the parties.

Despite such positive intentions, it is likely that either one of the concerned parties would disagree on the outlined terms and conditions. Indeed, such conditions are inevitable as these deal with state ideologies and principles that can’t be sacrificed for another. In fact, all these attributes and symbols remain irreplaceable to both parties. Another point to consider is the security risk that threatens economic stability, and whether or not they’re both willing to sacrifice their interests. In most separatist cases, regardless of geographical location and time, there will always be military action taken as part of preserving and safeguarding the national interest and territorial
integrity of the ruling state. Counter separatist-strategies have fallen short in providing a peaceful and promising outcome. Moreover, countries dealing with separatism issues are generally criticized for their approach because in most cases such dealings come at the cost of human security and generate outrage. Thus, the challenge to promote human rights arises as it threatens to harm the lives of citizens and make conditions on the ground worse. Countries with the threat of separatism are most likely to be held responsible for violating human rights laws. Despite acknowledging the need to submit under international conventions and resolutions, bilateral agreements and multilateral arrangements, states are more likely to first and foremost prioritize their own interests before others.

States dealing with internal issues such as separatism are often victims themselves due to widespread international condemnation in regard to human rights abuses and violations. It is also important to note that the involvement of governments and human rights activists around the issue has contributed to more suspicion and deception. On the other hand, the support obtained through international mechanisms such as international human rights forums and conventions have increased the influence of separatist activists and leaders around the world. In relation to separatist movements, human rights cases have often become the benchmark in regenerating and remobilizing separatist interests and strategies over time. In general, separatist movements avoid dealing directly with the ruling state because it would only minimize their chances of obtaining international support for self-determination. For example, the ULMWP has refused to deal with the Indonesian central government because the Indonesian government will offer a different solution that is why the ULMWP has maintained its position within the MSG forum to have its dialogue with Indonesia observed by a third party.

With respect to Papuan separatism and human rights abuse and violations, the role of both the local and international media has proven to be a vital part in promoting separatist interests at the international level. Various states and NGOs have pledged to support West Papua. Supporting states
have been voicing their concerns over the need for a UN approved international intervention to investigate human rights violations. Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer (2008) argue that a tremendous and astounding accomplishment in human rights movements has set a universal standard for nations and societies to respect. In fact, such accomplishments have produced distinctive arrangements in the form of treaties that rallied governments and NGOs to commit themselves to combatting issues linked to human rights abuse and violations. Hence, the more committed states and NGOs are in tackling human rights issues, the more influential separatist movements become. The main reason behind this claim is that when nations and other interested parties begin to show interest in the issue of human rights, separatist movements, especially the leaders, take their chance to manipulate the political atmosphere to their own advantage thus providing separatist movements with more political space to manoeuvre. As a result, the issue is further politicized forcing the government to implement strict security policies and actions to crack down on separatist ideologies, including the use of force when necessary.

In general, separatist movements seek to project the issue of human rights violations whilst promoting and indoctrinating other parties on the need to end such anarchy and violence. One of the main arguments is that self-determination is the only and best solution in ending such suffering caused by inhuman behaviours. The internationalization of domestic violence that lead to human rights violations have continually asserts more pressure on the state as the executor. Successful international awareness carried out on the campaign for Papua's self-determination has been heavily dependent on the support it receives from organizations that fight against violence caused by human rights violations. Despite the connection found between both separatist actions and the human rights violations, governments are still held accountable for all the anarchy and chaos. In this case, the Indonesian government has been denounced on various occasions regarding their role in protecting their sovereignty in both the Papuan provinces. Moreover, the primary use of armed forces in containing issues that are sensitive in nature, like that of the Papuan separatism issue,
continues to trigger potential outbreaks. Overall, the longer the struggle for Papuan self-determination has been around, the more complicated it becomes.

Notwithstanding Indonesia’s record on human rights violations, Indonesia still maintains close relationships with other states such as its neighbour PNG, Australia or the U.S in the fields of security, economics and trade. However, human right issues have often become a key problem in their relationships (Vaughn, 2011). The Indonesian government’s decision to directly employ the military in the handling of separatism in Papua (in the name of national interest) has painted a negative image. Ironically the military involvement has actually prolonged the Papuan conflict. Overall, the involvement of the military triggers a wide range of concerns regarding Indonesia’s commitments to a peaceful outcome as outlined through its initiatives in ratifying international resolutions and human right conventions. Subsequently, the armed forces under Suharto’s regime used power to confine Papua’s self-determination. Here the armed forces pretended to protect Jakarta’s interests while simultaneously asserting overall control over Papua’s unlimited supply of natural resources. Nonetheless, Jakarta’s main interests lie in benefiting from the resource rich island. Thus, the role of the military was aimed to protect natural resources that have been deemed as important state assets. King (2004) argues that Papua’s natural resources acts as the “main glue” that holds Indonesia together, meaning that Indonesia heavily depends on gold and copper mines (e.g. Freeport) for its survival. Accordingly, many Papuans argue that Jakarta’s main interests lie in the natural resources and not its people.

The conflict in Papua is more complicated. One of the main reasons to support this claim is because the conflict itself is not limited to political disintegration: it strongly involves other important values such as human, economic and social security. Another reason will, of course, be the involvement of international stake-holders as laid out in the history of the conflict, such as the involvement of international powers. Indeed, the impact caused by involving the international community will increase the chances
of addressing serious issues of human rights. In Papua’s case, it is vying for international support to force the United Nations to appoint an independent committee to investigate related claims of human rights violations and genocide. Despite such claims from the OPM and ULMWP, the Indonesian government continues to foster diplomatic relations with other countries in the region. Indeed, the increase in international pressure on the Indonesian government would mean that the separatist movement is gaining momentum. An important point to consider is that every time the separatist movement makes a mark, tensions are bound to occur in Papua. In general, there is some correlation between domestic and international campaigns for self-determination.

With respect to the impact caused by the OPM's international diplomatic activity, operating overseas is regarded as more effective. It seems that on certain occasions, it has been known to influence ground conditions. In this context, ground conditions are basically related to the situation that takes place at a particular time and space. Papuan activists are somewhat dependent on the outcomes of human rights violations as the driving force behind their pleas for self-determination. For example, claims of genocide in both the Papuan provinces continue to bombard Indonesia on the international arena. Despite all the accusations, countries such as PNG and Australia have claimed that there are no records of genocide in both the Papuan provinces. Ironically the same pleas have continued to become the basis of the separatist movements. Indeed, the prolonged struggle has claimed over five hundred thousand of human lives, however, the continuing appeal for an internationally supervised investigation has often been rejected. The unfortunate situation faced by Pauans has also revealed the stigma that labels every Papuan who disagrees with the government as a member of the OPM, therefore providing the armed forces with the legitimacy to violently commit human rights violations. The violations mainly occurred during the New Order regime of Suharto. Although Papua was no longer considered to be an area of regional military operations after 1998, many Pauans still live in fear.
The sensitive nature of the conflict remains the driving factor that often leads to anarchy and chaos during times of “peaceful demonstrations”. The main reason is that Papuans have indeed lost far too many lives over the course of their 50 years of struggle for self-determination. Most Papuans today live with trauma that motivates them to take action when necessary. In many cases, peaceful demonstrations often turn nasty with the loss of human lives, relatives and loved ones so they are often considered to be a high risk. For instance, provocations from both the pro and contra-independence groups have led to clashes that lead to deaths. The Indonesian military has no doubt performed unaccountable inhuman acts. Indeed, it can’t be denied that inhuman acts such as rape, torture and murder have become the trademark of the Indonesian armed forces over the course of 50 years in Papua.

Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Papuans have perished under the brutal military occupation. There have been numerous accounts of military involved violence that have not been clarified. For example, the tragedy in Wamena (Wamena Berdarah) on 6 October 2000 that claimed the lives of 30 innocent people and leaving at least leaving 40 others severely injured (Itlay, 2016). A similar incident in 2014 in Enarotali, Paniai also called the Paniai tragedy (Paniai Berdarah) claimed the lives of 4 students, leaving dozens injured (Yogi, 2016). The Paniai incident did involve a team of investigators assigned by Jakarta ahead of a human rights task force to collect evidence. The team consisted of senior investigators from the TNI and POLRI headquarters, together with the Papuan provincial police and army representatives. What happened during the investigations was that the Jakarta assigned team of military and police investigators swept clean the scene of hard evidence and then later left before the human rights task force arrived. Interestingly, the human rights task force lead by Indonesia’s human rights watchdog Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia), encountered a rather more difficult task. There was barely any remaining evidence or proof; there were only “written evidence and photographs of the incident” (Yogi, 2016).
In addition to the human rights cases in Papua, there is another report on an outbreak between student riots and the Indonesian armed forces on 16 March 2006. The incident was later dubbed as the UNCEN Incident or Abepura’s bloody tragedy (*UNCEN* / *Abepura Berdarah*). Students from the university of Cenderawasih together with the majority of local Papuans gathered in front of the university in Abepura to demand three points. First, the closure of PT. Freeport Mc Moran; second, the removal of all Indonesian armed forces based at the Freeport mine site and thirdly, that the seven activists arrested after riots in Timika be released from jail (Belau, 2015). The related incident ended in clashes between students and armed forces leaving three victims shot by police and around 73 people detained; among the detainees 10 were later put on trial for treason. Indeed, such outcomes reveal Jakarta’s overall capacity to downplay evidence of human rights violations. ULWMP has accused the Indonesian government of waging slow-motion genocide in Papua. Furthermore, the organization claims that there are evidence of existing armed conflicts, unrest, extra-judicial killings and the jailing of Papuans and marginalization of the Papuan culture (Radio New Zealand, 2017).

Another death of a promising activist and a prominent Papuan leader and Paramount Chief (*Ondofolo*) Theys Eluay from Sentani, Jayapura bravely stood up against the Indonesian government. His actions were to proclaim Papua’s intentions to separate from Indonesia. However, like other terrifying human rights abuses in Papua, Ondofolo Dortheyes Hiyo Eluay was found murdered on the eve of celebrating the anniversary of the Indonesian special forces (*Koppassus*). Even though Major-General Hartomo was later convicted for the incident, it seemed that the Indonesian had no respect at all for human dignity. In a report published by human rights advocating group, Elsham Papua (*Lembaga Study dan Advkoasi Hak Asasi Manusia*) in 2001, it emphasized the importance and political motives surrounding the murder of the late Ondofolo Eluay. Based on the report, it was understood that the murder was arranged and set up following numerous meetings between the *Koppassus* and Police in specific locations within Jayapura including in Koya where Theys was later found dead on 10 November 2001.
("Against forgetting, the kidnapping and murder of Theys H. Eluay by Kopassus with Political Motive (second phase)," 2014).

Although it seemed obvious that such killings were done to politically maintain Jakarta’s influence over Papua after Suharto’s expulsion, Jakarta’s ongoing instabilities sparked tensions across Indonesia. The fall of Suharto revived separatism across Indonesia, especially in Papua, East Timor and Aceh. Nonetheless, tensions were a result of both unconstrained anger and joy at finally toppling Suharto after 31 years of militaristic power. In fact, this event shows how significant peoples power can be in influencing the government and its functions, especially when the people themselves have fallen victims to such oppressive and brutal rule. This is when human rights are considered an important tool in configuring political interests.

The instabilities then forced a quick change in Presidential portfolios. When Suharto stepped down in 1998, his replacement, was Vice President B.J Habibie who was later made President. However, B.J Habibie’s time in office was also cut short due to a quick scheduled Presidential election (the first ever election after Suharto). Even though President B.J Habibie spent less time in his role as the nation’s third President, Habibie remains well known for his efforts in ending the long crisis in East Timor. Indeed, the East Timor case had a lot of human rights violations and many Timorese had lost their lives. The fight in East Timor brought new hope to Papua’s own struggle for self-determination. Despite being geographically miles away from each other, Papua and East Timor have a lot in common. Especially in cultural terms, the impact of being culturally related in some senses provided the motivation to stand up and fight back.

The crisis in East Timor sparked international concern as the number of human victims increased. Fighting in East Timor triggered an outrage in Papua. The OPM and its resistance forces began to organize for international support. During this time, the PNG chapter of the OPM was activated to seek more international assistance. At this time, Papuan leaders thought that if they were to stand up against the Indonesians, there
would be a greater chance for self-determination; something similar to what the East Timorese had achieved. Nonetheless, Papua was not prepared to lose more human lives. A long history of missing people, killings and torture had implanted long-lasting trauma in their minds. Today it remains certain that the unsettled human rights violations in Papua continues to be the subject underlining numerous problems in their separatist struggle.

Similar to those that occurred in the past, human rights abuses in Indonesia, especially in Papua’s provinces, have often been manipulated to cover for Jakarta’s wrong doings. Moreover, the appointment of teams of investigators actually serves as a cleaning up process. Usually after a human rights incident, a team of investigators arrive to clean up the mess before human rights organized teams arrive at the scene. Therefore, there has been very little evidence to actually prove that Papua is under threat of an ongoing systematic genocide. Despite continuous condemnations, Indonesia has managed to avoid dealing with the accusations. Although international pressure has been raised by concerned governments, such as Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, Indonesia has always defended the allegations with solid evidence from the investigations. PNG, on the other hand, refuses to get its hands dirty. PNG since its independence has continued to pursue a cordial relationship with Indonesia. However, PNG’s border with Indonesia remains under threat if the issue of separatism in Papua continues to exist. Several incidents near the border have shown that the border itself is quite vulnerable.

Separatist movements, it must be recognized, often create violence while demanding self-determination. The violence or chaos triggers a reaction from the armed forces. With respect to military involvement in Papua, King (2004) argues that the military is more likely to play a double role: first, to provide security and second, to manipulate government bureaucracy and the economy as a whole. Indeed, such arguments best describe the New Order regime of Suharto who in person relied heavily on the armed forces to execute economic interests in the name of stability. The military’s
involvement across Papua remains solid until today; most businesses are backed by high-ranking military officers responsible for maintaining security. The early post-Suharto era was at one point regarded as the perfect timing for Papuans to proclaim self-determination. Jakarta’s massive riots that claimed the lives of many made a point that human rights were sacrificed through the violations conducted by Indonesian armed forces in the name of securing the national interest. Indeed, the human rights violations that occurred in 1998 remained a significant part of Indonesia’s modern history. It displayed the role of the brave students, including both men and women bringing in about a change in Indonesia’s government system. In relation to the chaos in 1998, Papuan leaders from both domestic and international levels quickly revived their struggle for independence and used the momentum of Suharto’s dismissal as a stepping stone toward seeking further international recognition and support.

Not long after, President B.J. Habibie was replaced by President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in 1998. President Gus Dur was Indonesia’s first ever President to be democratically elected by the people. Moreover, the human rights situation under President Gus Dur seemed promising in Papua’s case. Papuans were allowed to meet in Congress. In the year 2000, under Gus Dur’s orders, Papuans were allowed to hold a congress meeting in Jayapura, the capital of Papua, to discuss its future. The congress, which was attended by around 350 plus Papuan independence leaders from both Papua and overseas, began to increase the opposition to the President in Jakarta (King, 2004). Congress or Mubes (Musyawarah Besar), is regarded by Papuans as the most rational approach to have ever been implemented by an Indonesian President throughout Papua’s history for self-determination.

It was also at this time when President Gus Dur gave permission to raise the Morning Star flag as a symbol of the people’s aspirations and the name of the Province was changed from Irian Jayaprua to Papua (King, 2004). However, it was made clear that the Morning Star flag was to be flown only as long as there were not too many and that none was “larger and elevated
higher” than the Indonesian *Merah Putih* (the Red and White flag of Indonesia) (King, 2004). Nonetheless, Gus Dur was later condemned for “lack of achievements and political obstruction” and was later forced to step down in 2001 handing power to Megawati Sukarno Putri (Daughter of Sukarno) (King, 2004). Despite Gus Dur’s removal from office, he remains the only president in the history of the prolonged conflict to show great concern for the welfare for the people of Papua.

Moreover, Suharto’s dismissal didn’t end the armed forces’ role in determining politics and economics in Indonesia. In 2000, according to a Sydney press report, there were clashes between the Red and White Militia (*Satgas Merah Putih*) and the Papuan Militia (*Satgas Papua*) (King, 2004). Both groups are believed to have been set up by the Indonesian armed forces. Indeed, such military strategies illustrate the role of influential TNI officers that were loyal to ex-President Suharto. Moreover, the involvement of the armed forces proved relevant in that it was planned to not look like human rights violations. Meanwhile growing tensions quickly added more than 3000 new mobile paramilitary police and non-organic Kostrad troops to Papua (King, 2004).

As a replacement for Gus Dur, President Megawati Sukarno Putri’s (from the PDIP or *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*) time in office was also quite short. However, during Mega’s time in office from 2001-2004, human rights abuses and violations in Papua began to rise and were back in media reports. It was the death of Ondofolo Theys Eluay that shook the world about Indonesia’s ongoing human rights atrocities. Despite violence and the heavy presence of the military, Papuans were getting used to the situation. Daily routines with military supervision or having spies tailing them were just another usual thing. Indeed, there was a lot of trauma involved because the military and police imposed curfews to monitor and control the people’s movements and activities.

Even though President SBY (Indonesia’s 6th President after Megawati) had a good reign in office that saw him finish two terms from 2004-2014, the
conflict in Papua under President SBY remained under international security. At some point, there were several cases of human rights violations, especially after peaceful demonstrations when the situation became tense resulting in several wounded and others arrested. Ongoing arguments in relation to democratic rights have provided the platform for Papuans to pursue a peaceful and effective dialogue with Jakarta. However, on multiple occasions, such an approach has failed to find a solution. One of the main reasons is because past traumas caused by military involvement have become the drive that causes the people to totally refuse Jakarta’s proposed agendas. Unsteadily, human rights violations in Papua have greatly affected the lives and opportunities of the young generation.

To sum up, the role of human rights in separatism and vice versa do have an effect on each other. Human rights bring out the importance of humanity and in situations where conflicts such as separatism are prolonged, it becomes risky for both state and citizens. Another point to consider is the level of interest at stake and the number of stakeholders involved. Despite global recognition of human rights violations, states are protected by the law of sovereignty. However, states should apply a more transparent measure to deal with separatism because the more hidden the agenda is behind interests, the more complicated separatism issues become. Papua’s human rights case has been around for a long time and to see that none of the perpetrators are being held accountable for committing crimes against humanity simply illustrates Indonesia’s growing influence in geopolitics and economics around the region.

3.2 Indonesia’s Political Reaction
The Universal Declarations of Human Rights has made it such that the principles of human rights have become the norm of practice for most governments around the world. With respect to the territorial integrity of Indonesia, the territories of Papua and West Papua provinces remain the sovereign territory of Indonesia which basically means that the issue of Papuan separatism remains an Indonesian domestic problem. Indonesia, as the largest Muslim democratic state today, takes up an important role in
geopolitics and global politics. Recent outcomes prove that Indonesia’s influence in global politics has given the country more power to protect its interests, including the issue of Papuan separatism.

With respect to human rights, it places Indonesia into a rather more difficult situation because of the amount of human rights violations occurring in the Papua and West Papua provinces. The issue has no doubt, put Indonesia’s international political participation under pressure. It has become more challenging for Indonesia in various international and multilateral forums. In detail, the issue of Papuan separatism has often made it impossible for Indonesia to pursue its interests in the wider Pacific region. The issue of West Papua has given a bad image of Indonesia internationally. Overall, the human rights violations occurring throughout the struggle for West Papua’s self-determination reflects the characteristics of both Sukarno and Suharto’s regimes.

The impact of West Papuan separatism on Indonesia was quite problematic because Indonesia as a sovereign state guided by its free and active foreign policy, interacts freely with all states including all the small Pacific island countries. In Indonesia’s view, the Pacific was a potential partner in building its international reputation which would set a positive image, enabling Indonesia to further promote its influence in other regions. A somewhat similar mechanism to that of ASEAN was intended to be pursued in the Pacific region, specifically the MSG.

The violations of human rights in the territory of Papua and West Papua provinces are the most controversial factors that often affect Indonesia’s political participation within the Pacific region. The main reason is because Pacific island countries are aware of the human right issues that take place in Papua. This has meant that Indonesia has been unable to expand its influence in the Pacific because these violations have earned Indonesia a bad image in the Pacific. Nonetheless, until today, Indonesia is still trying to convince the Pacific community of the need to accept its participation in the region. There have been several initiatives undertaken by the Indonesian
government to maintain its influence in the Pacific. Moreover, Indonesia deals with PNG directly because most of the refugees have settled in PNG territory. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s interests in the Pacific greatly lies in the hands of PNG. PNG’s support for Indonesia is determined by PNG’s size and economic capacity. As the biggest Melanesian state in the region, PNG has the power to influence the region’s political playground. Concrete developments show that Indonesia’s political influence in the Pacific has less impact ever since it denied West Papua the right to self-determination and, therefore, there has never been an Indonesian diplomatic office stationed in the Pacific region.

PNG, Australia and New Zealand have Indonesian Embassies which also represent Indonesia’s diplomacy in the Pacific. The diplomatic relations clearly show how Indonesian political interests in the Pacific was indeed not beneficial to Indonesia’s governments before President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s term in office. If Indonesia had more power in the Pacific, it would mean that the West Papuan separatist issue would have been easily contained. However, up until the present day the government of Indonesia is still searching for options to try to get the issue under control in the Pacific region. Also, another important point to consider together with the arguments above would be that Indonesia was never a member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group - a political organization similar to the ASEAN that consisted of mainly the Melanesian countries of the Pacific until late June 2015 (Fox, 2015). In the past, the Indonesian government was refused by the MSG to participate in the leaders’ summit. Nonetheless, the Indonesian government’s intention was to be part of the MSG because it was an important political platform where the Indonesian government could easily lobby for international cooperation in the region.

Indonesia’s membership in the MSG would not only benefit its position regarding the West Papuan separatist issue but would also guarantee the role of Indonesia at the MSG to create more political avenues to accommodate Indonesian interests within the wider Pacific region. It is believed that Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Nauru were among the
governments that refused to accept Indonesia into the Pacific community. On the other hand, it seemed exceptionally difficult for Indonesia to progress with its ties in the Pacific due to the facts that were reported through local newspapers in PNG (The National and Post Courier) and other broadcasting media around the Pacific such as Radio New Zealand (RNZ) prior to the establishment of special autonomy. However, today it seems that after the granting of special autonomy to both the Papuan provinces, it has opened more doors for Indonesian involvement in the Pacific region. The actual purpose of the special autonomy in Papua was to be an instrument of peace building between the Indonesian government and Melanesian people of Papua. In fact, special autonomy was endorsed for Aceh before Papua. However, the growing instabilities in Papua after the granting of Independence to East Timor provided Jakarta no choice but to quickly plan for Papua. The autonomous decree in reality was focused at addressing the problems of equality and diversity in the social cultural life of the Melanesian that inherit the Papuan island. East Timor’s independence increased Papua’s hopes for self-determination. The central government knew that it had to act quickly to address the situation in Papua. Another reason for the implementation of the special autonomy in Papua is to actually cut down on secessionist movements. Before the actual autonomy, Jakarta had planned for Papua to be split into three provincial administrations. Of course, this idea was totally rejected by the Papuans, as it would actually add further complications.

The Presidential change from Habibie to Gus Dur provided the momentum for Papua to begin visualizing their demands and Jakarta’s acknowledgment of their equal rights to social and cultural life. Together, with the help of the Papuan Council Presidium (Presidium Dewan Papua) the Papuan elites quickly elected Jab Solossa as governor Papua. Mr Solossa’s appointment encouraged a team of Papuan elites lead by then Chancellor of the University of Cenderawasih (UNCEN) Mr Frans Wospakrik and other Papuan intellectuals to draft a bill on special autonomy. The drafting of the bill caught Jakarta by surprise with the inclusion of strong independence aspirations. The team in charge of the drafting included a wide range of
elites ranging from academics and activists, from other supporting organization such as, Forker LSM Papua (Forum Kerjasama Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat papua-Cooperative Forum of Papuan Non-governmental Organizations), and various human rights NGOs were all part of the early draft (King, 2004).

The final bill drafted by the Papuans were later taken to Jakarta in which the initial draft become a reference to the current bill that constitutes Papua’s special autonomy. Nonetheless, the bill itself was an impressive document, “better then Indonesia’s own constitution” (King, 2004). In detail, the special autonomy decree in Papua entails measures to successfully obtain a genuine autonomy for the protection of human rights and Papuan traditional (adat) rights in coexistence with extra proposals that would official order an uncompresing response to the problems of Papua’s dark past by ‘straightening history’ (King, 2004). The bill provided the more legal room for representation from the adat, churches and women that were among the most endangered sectors of society in Papua. Nonetheless, the autonomy bill did allow for the name of Irian to be changed to Papua; the acknowledgement of nameless symbols and anthem of the province, the Morning Star (Bintang Kejora) flag was interpreted to be of cultural identity and most of all the acceptance of native Papuan (Melanesian) as Governor. In security terms, the decree will seek approval from the Papuan Parliament especially in the police context as entail in Article 48 which proposed that security (keamanan) (King, 2004) points out the provisions of the bill that was concerned with the so-called ratification of history. In this case, the autonomous police force was installed while the role of the TNI was restricted to purely safeguard the nation from external threats. In which was entailed in under Article 6 (4) of the draft:

the government shall arrange the placement of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) units in Papua Province after consultation with the Papuan Parliament and the Provincial Government (King, 2004).

Article 43
1. To thoroughly and comprehensively solve the differences of opinions on the history of Papua’s integration into the Republic of Indonesia, a Commission for the Ratification of Papua History shall be established;

2. The arrangement, task implementation and financing of the Commission shall be carried out by Provincial Regulation.

Article 69
If the result of history revision as intended in article 43 of this Law indicates that the process of Papua integration into the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in the past was not based on the international law of the right to self-determination of a nation, the government and people of Papua through the Papuan Parliament shall take measures for settlement.

Article 75
After 5 years of enactment of this Law if it is apparent that it cannot be executed effectively, the Papuan people through the Papuan Parliament shall ask the MPR of RI to sit in session to make a referendum for determining the political attitude of the Papuan people.

With regard to special autonomy, Wanggai (2009) argues that in nature, special autonomy is defined to be asymmetric and is widely acceptable because most states around the world such as Czech, Sudan, Albania etc. have adopted the system in search for a solution to the vertical conflicts that occur between the central government and the conflicting party which at this point refers to provinces. In this case, the applications of an asymmetric approach illustrate the involvement of other local institutional actors including individual elites in designing and conducting Papuan special autonomy. Despite its acceptance, the biggest problem that the asymmetric approach faces are how to conduct every single article in the constitution of the special autonomy. The main aim of the asymmetric approach is basically to make sure that the “perceptions that are obtained through government
institutions, private institutions, and the civil society must be attributed to good governance” (Wanggai, 2009). With respect to the goodwill of Indonesia to practise good governance, there is hope for better political relations in the future with the Pacific region.

Furthermore, Wanggai (2009) explains that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has reiterated the government’s commitment to special autonomy. Solving the problem in Papua in a civilized and just manner was one of the government’s top priorities. With this, the special autonomy which had been opted for will be further strengthened to increase the level of prosperity and the welfare and dignity of the people of both Papua and West Papua provinces until these are truly realized. In doing so, Indonesia has promoted the Papuan special autonomy in PNG with programs such as the repatriation exercise in which Papuan refugees who reside in PNG are encouraged to return to Papua and take part in developments that will take place as part of the special autonomy. Apart from the special autonomy, there has been a “New Deals for Papua” based on the Presidential Instruction No. 5, 2007. New policies are to be prioritized in both the Papuan provinces (Wanggai, 2009) to;

1. Speed up developments
2. Increase the quality of education
3. Increase the quality of health
4. Increase infrastructure so that isolated areas could be reachable.

In terms of political development, the granting of Papuan special autonomy has played a significant role in maintaining and increasing Indonesia’s bargaining power in the Pacific region. Indonesia’s current politics is penetrating throughout the Pacific in a more promising way. The Indonesian government’s initiatives to solve the Papuan issue within a diplomatic paradigm is beginning to gain support from institutions both local and international. Despite various support, there are several other countries in the Pacific such as the Kingdom of Tonga, Nauru and the Republic of Palau that still require Indonesia’s transparency in handling the West Papuan issue. Currently, Indonesia aims to further promote the Papuan issue
internationally. This strategy is aimed to counter promote the Papuan autonomy on a global scale in the hope that the policy does attain a more positive outcome. The strategy to introduce Papuan autonomy is aimed to settle the Papuan issue once and for all in a more transparent manner based on good governance. Today, Indonesia is enjoying a little more success because Indonesia has been made an associate member of the MSG despite being rejected previously.

3.2.1 Political Reactions in the South West Pacific and Impacts on Papua’s Domestic Politics.

The nature of the acceptance of Papua as a member of the Pacific family relates to an ideology of being part of one big ethnicity called Melanesian. The initial idea of being Melanesian was being black in skin colour together with curly hair and equally important is the culture and traditions of being Melanesian. Nonetheless, the application of the Melanesian culture positively shows the bond among the people of Melanesia regardless of distance among the islands. Furthermore, the ideology is inherited to motivate and encourage the people of Melanesia to boldly proclaim their connections as members of a large and unique ethnic group. Moreover, in relation to the Papuan case, it has been confirmed that Papua’s ethnic political groups such as the OPM and ULMWP have gained more support from the Melanesian countries in the Pacific. In general, there have been several Pacific island countries that have been showing their concern regarding the human rights allegations in Papua’s two provinces. Indonesia’s interest in the Pacific solemnly relies on PNG and Fiji because of their recent show of support to promote Indonesia as an associate member of the MSG in 2015. Besides, PNG and Fiji are the most influential countries in the MSG. Therefore, some ongoing bilateral relationships between Indonesia and PNG or Indonesia and Fiji could boost an interest in reaching a common understanding and cooperation between the parties. The process of formulating a common understanding leading to trust has produced various positive outcomes between Indonesia, PNG and Fiji. Such important understanding has been illustrated in PNG’s ongoing support for Papua’s integration into Indonesia. The PNG government has often stated
its recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Papuan issue. Moreover, the PNG government has made sure that Indonesia is guaranteed a role in the Pacific region. Furthermore, it is clear that based on mutual trust Indonesia and PNG have successfully installed a good relationship to provide Indonesia with the credibility to expand its influence into the Pacific region. In relation to this, Indonesia successfully become a dialogue partner in the “Pacific Island Forum and furthermore strongly euphemized on the creation of the South-West Pacific Dialogue” (Bandoro, 2007).

In relation to the impact of Papuan separatism in the Pacific region, it has been reported through a publication that Papuans do obtain a great deal of support from the Pacific islands. The publication was based on a series of data gathered through a first ever telephone poll conducted by the Pacific Institute of Public Policy across Melanesia in 2011. The record showed that out a total of the 363-people surveyed from four different Melanesian nations, 42% of the overall respondents considered the territories of both the Papuan provinces as part of the Melanesian family of nations. In detail, respondents in PNG voted 40.5% in favour of being Melanesia, 39.3% voted against while 22.6% said they didn’t know. Fiji samples proved the same with about 40.4% voting for West Papua, 28.1% voting against, while 31.5% said they didn’t know. Vanuatu’s sample proved there was slightly more support for West Papua at 43.5%, however, a significant minority also voted against with 42.4%, while 14.1% didn’t answer. The Solomon Islands recorded around 43.3% voting that West Papua was part of the Melanesian family, 30.8% voting against, while 26.0% didn’t answer (Policy, 2011).

The public judgement above illustrates that the issue of Papuan separatism still holds a key point in the politics of the Pacific region. The Melanesian people’s claim over Papua as being a brother promises to maintain its pressure on the Indonesian government regarding the plea for self-determination. The public judgements are also likely to bring pressure upon elected leaders in the Pacific region to show support on the West Papuan issue. Lately the Papuan issue has increased its radius of sympathizers causing it to become an important debate within Pacific parliaments. More
importantly, the issue has managed to become the most significant and sensitive in the MSG because the MSG as an organization was mandated to facilitate the common interests of the Melanesian people and governments.

In general, the issue of Papuan separatism has been dramatic within the Pacific region. The issue threatened to put off several treaties of cooperation between Indonesia and its potential Pacific island partners, thus showing that the issue of Papua had a significant impact in the Pacific, due to its cultural and ethnic ties. In fact, the impact of the Papuan issue in the Pacific when traced back, shows that it had already displayed signs of threat to the Pacific during the Dutch colonial era. For instance, during the Dutch era, the Australian ambassador to Indonesia warned Australia that the Dutch plans for Papuan self-determination posed a threat. The ambassador argue that it would be dangerous to keep Indonesia out of a territory that it had already claimed as its own (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004).

Despite, the PNG government’s continual recognition of the Papua provinces as being an internal issue of Indonesia, it can be argued that on a daily basis, PNG has been more open to local Papuans. The tolerance towards the incoming West Papuan asylum seekers in PNG and to the Pacific has captured the attention of the Melanesian communities around the Pacific. Moreover, West Papuan refugees that crossed over to PNG were granted ‘permissive resident’ status as part of PNG’s humanitarian conduct. The granting of permissive residency status to Papuan refugees meant that Papuans were given equal chances to pursue life in PNG. Education and health were among the most important aspects made available to the Pauans upon their arrival in PNG. However, the permissive residency status did not allow Papuans to get involved in any form of political activities. Although there were restrictions set in place to encourage goodwill, Papuans were also granted the right to freely move ad interact with PNG citizens. Also, Papuans were given the right to pursue equal economic needs such as being allowed to work and get involved in small business. Overall it is suspected that civil societies in both PNG and the other Pacific
islands have indirectly contributed to determine the continuation of the conflict in Papua.

3.2.2 PNG’s Political Reactions

Until today, PNG has been the home and safe refuge for most of the Papuan activists who fled from the brutal Indonesian military occupation of the New Order regime (Orde Baru). The Papuan activists who now reside in PNG are victims that came from both the two Papuan provinces. Nonetheless, the existence of the common land border between Papua’s city of Jayapura (Skouw) and PNG’s city of Vanimo (Wutung) enabled safe passage for local Papuans to travel across into PNG in massive numbers. During this time, Papuan activists and members of the OPM were surely aware that by entering PNG territory, they would be saved and protected by PNG’s territorial shield of integrity and sovereignty. The assurance of seeking safety in PNG soil motivated a lot of Papuans toward abandoning their homeland. Some Papuans who later became refugees thought that by crossing the border into PNG, support would come from PNG and perhaps from Australia. Despite their attitude, there was no such support. There was never a deal to achieve in terms of military aid to the OPM because, the issue itself was rather complicated and so sensitive that neither PNG nor Australia had prepared itself to counter the growing Indonesian military influence.

Despite the security tension along the border, PNG’s policy toward Indonesia had to be considered based on merits. Moreover, PNG-Indonesian policy could not expand to achieve its goals due to the fact that PNG was home to Papuan activists who had fled Indonesia and who the Indonesian authorities claims to be a “group of terrorists” (Osborne, 2001). Indonesia’s main reason behind such a claim was to promote its overall sovereignty and state ideology (Pancasila) over the territories of both the Papuan provinces. Therefore, it is based on the sovereignty of Indonesia that by default defined the OPM as an illegal organization that resisted the sovereign government that by right was installed upon Indonesia’s Independence.
Today, most Papuans consider Indonesia as a foreign entity that intends to take hold of Papua’s natural and environmental resources; a new system of colonialism. For instance, campaigns against Indonesia’s occupation of Papua have often involved environmentalists, conservationists and human rights activists. Despite such demands the Indonesian government continues to reject accusations that its only interests are on the natural resources and not on the people of Papua. The Indonesian government’s moves to promote Papua’s special autonomy was also criticised by Papuans who claim that the special autonomy was nowhere near to providing the solution to the long conflict although Indonesian authorities have always proposed the Papuan special autonomy as a potential long-term solution to the conflict. Chauvel and Bhakti (2004) argue that Papuan special autonomy was somewhat a concession to the Papuans because it had not involved them in the initial formulation of the constitution. Furthermore, special autonomy was considered a step toward independence, with local Papuans having given the right to lead the provinces under legal terms, triggering an understanding that would collide with Indonesian nationalism.

Before PNG gained its independence, Australia was a prominent player in the Papuan conflict, possibly because during that time, PNG was still under Australia’s administration that was supervised by the United Nations. At the same time, Australian observations of Indonesia under President Sukarno was that it was becoming a communist state. The observation further complicated the relationship with Indonesia and its eastern neighbour PNG. Regarding the type of communist rule and Sukarno’s links to communism, Australia was not surprised with the early border crossing activities of the Papuan refugees to PNG. Despite developments in the border crossing activities, Australia had always displayed a rather sympathetic approach (Osborne, 2001). A parliamentary statement was made by then Australian Prime Minister, Sir Garfield Barwick, in 1962, as part of PNG’s foundation that problems arising from both political asylum and other aspects will be dealt with a very humane approach (Osborne, 2001).
The refugees that entered PNG territory were placed in concentration camps near the border. The Indonesian armed forces, were known to be attacking nearby refugee camps alongside the border. In this case, reports stated that an Indonesian attack had claim the lives of a district official and another two civilians in PNG (Osborne, 2001). Indonesian military operations were at times conducted in PNG territory which further caused instabilities the relationship between Indonesia and PNG. Such military operations were illegal under international law because Indonesia had violated PNG sovereignty and territorial legitimacy. To counter such irresponsible military conduct, the Australian government responded by pledging 50 of its defence force personnel to monitor the activities along the border area. Despite the presence of Australian defence personnel, there was an Indonesian military attack on a nearby refugee camp that held about more than 250 refugees just 12 miles inside the PNG border. Furthermore, the next day, Indonesian forces killed 6 PNG locals who were part of the Australian patrol unit (Osborne, 2001).

However, the Australian administered territory of PNG did not respond to provocations conducted by Indonesian armed forces. A new policy was issued to have the Papuan refugees relocated to Manus Island (an island located just of the North Coast of the mainland of PNG). Even before PNG’s independence Sir Albert Maori Kiki conducted a secret meeting with senior OPM leaders to discuss several issues regarding the threat that OPM appears to pose against PNG and Indonesia. In the meeting between Sir Maori Kiki and the senior OPM leaders he also expressed his concern that Indonesian military attacks would prompt the OPM to retaliate against the Indonesians. Of course, a retaliation would have caused the two countries relationship to deteriorate drastically. Indeed, such retaliation would cause major problems for PNG. Sir Maori Kiki then the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade later stated that Indonesia should not see the OPM as a military threat but rather as a bunch of low class protestors (Osborne, 2001).
Indonesia and PNG’s political relations have depended heavily on the developments of the Papuan struggle for self-determination. Political relations among the two states remain unstable due to the presence of Papuan guerrillas within PNG territory which has disappointed the Indonesian authorities. The presence of OPM guerrillas in PNG territory caused the Indonesians to be suspicious regarding OPM activities conducted within PNG’s side of the border. An important point to consider is that despite Indonesia’s military capabilities, fears that OPM guerrillas were planning their attacks from PNG side of the border have worsened and complicated the relationship of both countries. The growing political instabilities caused by military tensions along the border have posed a great concern for the PNG authorities. Such fears and instabilities in their relationship during the early years forced Sir Maori Kiki, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, to produce a secret letter to the Australian High Commission stating that:

In relations to strengthening our policies on OPM border crossing, our authorities fear that the OPM might regain their influence that have been concentrated at a secret Camp named Victoria. There is a possibility that our forces along the border will be attacked. It has been briefly explained in the previous meeting to your staff at the Australian High Commission, that there has been indications of OPM activities influencing our local villagers and there have been clear evidence that OPM possess a threat to both PNG and Indonesia (Osborne, 2001).

Despite the increase in Indonesian military provocations, PNG government policy remained technically in line with its foreign policy of treating the OPM issue as an integral issue of Indonesia. Therefore, all Indonesian movements along the border were managed confidentially. The decision to keep things confidential with Indonesia was criticized on the floor of the National Parliament by both pro-government and opposition members. The critics then prompted the Indonesians to raise security concerns regarding the mass migration of refugees. Despite PNG having declared its position to respect Indonesia’s sovereignty over Papua indirectly, developments
both in and out of the National Parliament indirectly showed an interest in supporting the Melanesian OPM.

In relations to the presence of supporters and non-supporters in the PNG national parliament, Papuan activists began to manoeuvre in search of support from the PNG government. During this time support from individual parliamentary elites seemed relative, although it was not in the form of pure government support. Despite the PNG government’s overall view that Papua remains an Indonesian domestic issue, in a visit to Jakarta via Jayapura Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare, was quoted as saying that the “feeling at that time when he shook hands with Papuan leaders in Jayapura felt like that he was shaking his own brother’s hand” (Osborne, 2001). Moreover, the PM’s statement was interpreted by the OPM as a potential gateway to obtain more support from the PNG government on ethnic grounds. Such information has been quite important to the OPM as a movement. The main reason is because it motivates the struggle and brings hope that one day PNG will support the OPM movement. The OPM as an organization thoroughly depends on such information that could help them plan their next moves or even capitalize on the momentum to gain more recognition.

3.3 Basic Agreement
The Basic Agreement between Indonesia and PNG was signed in 1986 was a symbol of political goodwill. The Basic Agreement on Border Arrangements (May, 1986), the Treaty of Mutual Respect Friendship and Cooperation along with other subsidiary bilateral agreements has served as the foundation and guiding principles for good and constructive neighbourly bilateral relations between Indonesia and PNG. Essentially, the relationship between PNG and Indonesia has been characterized by the two countries common land and sea border. Despite the affinity between the two sides of the island of New Guinea, a border placed in the middle of the island by European colonialists in 1895 and 1910 is the only imaginary line that differentiates them (Saltford, 2003b).
The common border of the two countries determines the structure and mode of the relationship which gave birth to the initial Agreement concerning Border Administration. According to this, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik had declared that Indonesia already had a border agreement with Australia, part of which included an Australian undertaking to return every border crosser to West Irian (Saltford, 2003b).

The common spirit of understanding between Indonesia and PNG has positively shifted the state of the border affairs from a highly suspicious and hostile situation to a more mutual and friendlier area of cooperation. Such initiatives taken by both governments have effectively reduced fear on both sides of the border. Accordingly, a number of reviews have been undertaken on the Basic Agreement on Border Arrangements of 1973, 1984, 1989 respectively and the latest in 2003 in the capital of PNG (PNG Embassy, 2008). Indeed, attempts from both Indonesia and PNG to respect each other’s sovereignty has been underlined as an important part in maintaining profitable relations. The undertaking of the Basic Agreement deliberately shows that PNG maintains its position as an independent state and member of the UN that obeys UN constitutions to not intervene in Indonesia’s domestic politics.

Moreover, in relation to the efficiency of implementing Basic Border Agreements, a number of formal subsidiary arrangements have been concluded such as: the Joint Border Committee (JBC), the Border Liaison Meeting (BLM) and the Joint Border Committee (JBC) (Bandoro, 2007). Meetings like this are held annually to resolve pertinent issues that arise from the common border to foster stable relations between Indonesia and PNG. With respect to the background of certain sensitive border issues such as border crossings, environmental degradation, health issues, illegal fishing, traditional border crossing status abuse not swiftly resolved at successive BLM and JBC meetings, contentious issues should be referred to the ministerial level such as the JBC for further deliberations and concrete actions to be taken at the government level.
In relation to the basic border agreement, PNG has reviewed and taken stock of impediments from within its status quo border arrangements; for instance, on the acceptance and settlement of border crossers inside PNG who are in most cases not qualified for refugee status under UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Matbob, 2012). The PNG government has compounded with the existence of the so-called OPM elements in PNG territory that should also be removed swiftly to enhance relations between PNG and Indonesia but protect PNG’s overall international image.

The bilateral agreements between Indonesia and PNG in relation to the border issues are intended to eliminate tensions along the border. However, it is not easy because the involvement of foreign parties also makes it almost impossible to manage border affairs. For instance, the support that the OPM receives from MSG countries such as Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and the Kanaks of New Caledonia has been quite instrumental in shaping border policies because this has been known to add to tensions along the border. The presence of OPM rebels along the border has in most cases, prevented Indonesia and PNG from building a strong relationship. OPM rebels have used PNG as a solid sanctuary from which to attack the Indonesian armed forces. Growing fear between both countries substantially affects the possibility of maintaining and gaining trust. The involvement of the OPM in determining security along the border has rather challenged Indonesia and PNG’s border arrangements. It is almost impossible for both Indonesia and PNG to actually focus on building trust due to the amount of threat and attacks that often occur on the common border. It is important to note that continuous border infringements caused by the OPM have always been followed by Indonesian border incursions. Despite the issue being regarded as under control by both Indonesia and PNG, at times, tensions along the border increase disagreements.
3.3.1 Factors Affecting the Designing and Implementing of Security Policies.

Security, as Morgan (2006) describes, is the quality of being and feeling safe which is a fundamental value in societies. It is the condition to live without being anxious over one’s own safety. Furthermore, when such conditions are threatened, people do all they can to protect themselves or the people they love. Like people, the state when threatened will take all necessary precautions to make sure that, first and foremost, security is guaranteed and its interests are safeguarded. The presence of security means stability is achieved to maintain a peaceful environment and retain the feeling of safety. Security policies are a set of important measures taken to act as guidelines with the aim to protect the national interests of states. Threats, either external or internal, often cause harm to the overall interest of states and therefore government officials and strategists are considered to provide the best advice in the designing of policies that will negate such impacts. In border areas, security policies are considered an important part of maintaining relations and providing the basic foundations for cooperation in the field of military, policies, customs, health, quarantine and other government related sectors.

Security has become one of the most important aspects of foreign policy in recent years. For instance, powerful states like the US, Russia and China appears to take security matters seriously. Hence, security issues are a central part to their foreign policies because it comes at a huge expense with the pursuit of serious harm and real risks (Morgan, 2006). On the other hand, weaker governments have tried to maintain the balance or either face the threat of going to war. With regard to Indonesia and PNG relations, security policies remain an important component of their existence as neighbours, especially in terms of providing security along the borders. Border security policies have been adjusted and nurtured to serve for mutual gains. As outlined in the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation, Indonesia and PNG vow to accommodate each other’s interests with mutual understanding and goodwill. Nonetheless, the issue of Papuan separatism has often caused inconvenience in the relationship.
Threats that arise along the border have, to some extent, affected the level of trust between both countries. Despite such inconveniences, Indonesia and PNG have taken initiatives to closely cooperate to eliminate those threats.

First of all, it is important to understand that the issue of Papuan separatism has not only been around for decades, but it has been psychologically indoctrinated throughout generations of Papuans who’s, whether old or young, understands his or her identity. Identity is known to be one of the most sensitive aspects of nationhood. Identity whether social or individual as defined by Tajfel (2010) is based on “self-concept” that relates to their relations to a particular group (family, tribe) that possess the same values with significant attachment to each other. Papuans, for over five decades, have tried to tell the world that identity is one of the main causes that drives separatism while suffering at Indonesia’s violent military hands.

Secondly, the armed conflict, unrest, extra-judicial killings and jailing of Papuans and the marginalisation of their culture (Radio New Zealand, 2017) have all contributed toward Papuanization. The term Papuanization in this case simply means the feeling of being Papuan, or being Melanesian. The tribe that is totally different from Asian Indonesians. The suffering and trauma over decades of military occupation and violence have forced Papuans to develop a sense of dislike. Indeed, such mentalities would create more opposition which is unwilling to cooperate with an Indonesian nationalist. There is no doubt that Papuans have long suffered at the hands of the Indonesian armed forces. As a result, today Papuans simply display a don’t care attitude. Whether or not Jakarta is willing to develop Papua is entirely up to Jakarta. Moreover, Papuans are known to take around with them such mentalities. Driven by a disappearing sense of belonging, is often the cause of poor performance in carrying out responsibilities and duties. Basically, Papuans who work for the autonomous governments are also affected from this syndrome. Hence, the outcome of their responsibilities often portrays a lack of seriousness and effectivity (because of the ‘don’t care’ attitude). For instance, in dealing with the designing of policies,
Papuans who work for the autonomous government of Papua sometimes perform below standard. It is surely not because of poor education and training but has been accredited to a long history of Indonesian occupation. Papuan policy-makers for years have also failed to shine under the special autonomy. Despite the name being ‘special autonomy’, many Papuan bureaucrats reckon that there is nothing special about it. Therefore, policy makers are faced with the challenge to either come up with high quality and efficient policies that will defend Indonesia or defend Papuans. In most cases Papuan policy makers are trapped because the final policies will endanger or have adverse effects on their own kind. Indeed, policy makers are left with no choice, thus resulting in the designing of policies that will at least benefit both the local Papuans and the rest of Indonesia. Hence, when policy makers from Jakarta arrive, they find out that policies lack connection to national interest and that these need to further accommodate Jakarta’s interests.

Thirdly, the designing of border security policies often illustrates the problem between designing and implementing border security policies itself. Even though border security policies are often designed to cater to the overall interests of Indonesia, the implementation of the policies have often become the problem. Border policies are often meant to provide safe passage to the people who use the border, especially travellers and locals. However, in most cases, the Indonesian military often takes charge in the implementation process. The involvement of the military is where it all goes wrong. In Papua, under special autonomy, it gives the autonomous provincial government the right to be involved in the processes of designing and implementing security policies.

Basically, what has happened here is that the autonomous government has tried to minimize the involvement of the military along the border apart from providing security. The military in this case is only needed to provide security and maintain stability. When the military is more involved, it overlaps the responsibility of other institutions that are part of the CIQS (Customs, Immigrations, Quarantine, Security). An overlap in responsibilities means
that the implementation of policies will experience problems because not all the institutions get to function according to their job descriptions. Mostly, the border policies would focus on trust-building and engaging all required institutions to improve credibility, stability and relations.

Fourthly, is the impact of relationship between Papuan decision makers and the OPM. Decision makers and policy makers are faced with the challenge to provide effective policies that will benefit the relationship of Indonesia (Papua) and PNG. However, at some point, the decision makers are faced with situations that will force them to come up with policies that will not entirely be in Jakarta’s interests. Papuans who are involved in the designing and implementing of border policies are aware that either way they may also be in danger, thus causing them to try to implement policies that will also indirectly benefit the OPM and its people.

Despite the OPM not directly being involved in the designing of the policies, Papuans who work inside are somewhat representing their aspirations on a low scale. For example, the operational hours of the border market are 8:00 am to 4:00pm, however, sometimes the markets are open till 8:00pm for locals after hours to cater for local needs. Sometimes the border is open over long weekends or special occasions such as Easter and Christmas. Another would be the engagement of government officials which excludes the military; this method has been strictly based on a people-to-people approach. In this case, the Papuan government deals directly with the PNG border officials to address problems directly in order to find solutions.

It is common in Papua that the implementation of policies be conducted in such a manner that it accommodates various interests. Another example would be the border portal; even though it is closed, the gate-keeper opens it when locals come after hours. Such actions have often created problems between the autonomous government officials and the armed forces who are stationed at the border. The main reason is because the armed forces carry direct orders from Jakarta, while the autonomous government officials are protected by the autonomy law to run the border’s daily management.
The autonomy law provides the legal basis for Papua province to design and implement border policies. The autonomy law accommodates for traditional and cultural approaches to settling issues that affect border security. For example, land disputes are dealt with traditionally in a dialogue form with related authorities. Basically, what the autonomous government does via its Border and International Cooperation Board is to try to maintain a good relationship with all parties; both domestic and in PNG.

### 3.3.2 The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces

The motto “Kartika Eka Paksi”, which symbolizes an unrivalled brave bird that upholds high values and ideals, illustrates Indonesia’s TNI Army (Angkatan Darat-AD) land troops as a strong force that upholds the values and ideals of the nation and true soldier (The role of TNI AD in Indonesia’s Border Security, 2012). In the past, TNI AD used to be most feared because of its direct contact with the people. Despite its long, dark history under the rule of the dictatorship of the New Order regime, the TNI has undergone various reforms to transform as an organization. Vaughn (2011) claims that the TNI’s role in Indonesia has changed since 9/11 as it showed more concerns in combatting Islamic terrorist groups. Furthermore, he claims the US influence on Indonesia to pursue the war against terrorism has transformed the TNI as an organization, whilst at the same time improving its human rights record. In particular, Indonesia has received great support from senior US strategists regarding its increased role in geopolitics in the regions of Southeast Asia and East Asia, have been accredited to the government’s reforms.

Such evidence illustrates internal reforms which have transformed the role of the TNI into a more important part in Indonesia’s national interest. Today the TNI together with the Police, has transformed itself to protect and defend the rights of Indonesian citizens. Moreover, the reforms in the TNI have been focused to improving its human rights records which, while losing much of its influence on the political sphere, this has helped it to improve its professional standards (Mietzner, 2006). TNI improvements are considered part of an ever-changing democratic process in Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia
has often boasted its democracy as one of the most vibrant and unique democracies in the world. Moreover, the Indonesian army has always claimed to be the protector and upholder of NKRI (*Negara Kesatuan Indonesia*) Indonesia’s Unitary Republic.

Until April 1999, the armed forces, together with the police who were subordinated to them, were collectively called ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* – Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). When the POLRI gained notional autonomy under reformasi in 1999, the armed forces, including the air force and navy, became TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* – literally, the National Army of Indonesia, and the original name of the army in fact). As one American expert points out, the army (as the usual voice of the armed forces) regards itself as alat negara rather than alat pemerintah, the instrument of the nation rather than the government. The Soldier’s Oath potentially flies in the face of the law of war by commanding ‘devotion’ to superiors ‘without questioning their orders or decisions’.


Moreover, Indonesia has managed to significantly democratize and transform its institutions and civil society. Indeed, Indonesia’s transformations has led to an ever-expanding civil society and more open media. In relation to the institutional transformations, the military’s role in politics has decreased and the police have been separated from the military (Vaughn, 2011). In general, TNI is considered to be the most solid organization in Indonesia. Furthermore, Vaughn (2011) argues that in a traditional sense, the TNI has been literally centred in politically protecting its territorial integrity –mainly from internal threats- rather than concentrating on external security threats. However, the TNI’s role in maintaining a vigorous attachment to secular nationalism has greatly contributed to maintaining a unified Indonesia. Although the TNI’s focus is aimed at overcoming internal threats, separatism for instance, level of alertness to also cater for external threats has increased. As we know, separatism has
imposed a wide range of threats to Indonesia. One of the reasons is because separatism do attract international interests.

Interestingly, in the case of Papua’s separatism, the TNI has also transformed itself to meet and cater for the growing demands in civil society. Despite the ongoing allegations of human rights abuses, the TNI as an organization has been changing itself to meet the needs of Papuans. Interestingly, under the leadership of President SBY, between 2004-2014, the TNI has been mobilized to uphold a rather different approach. In dealing with separatism in Papua, and especially along the Indonesia-PNG border, the TNI has managed to cut down its influence. The downsizing of the TNI presence along the border can be seen clearly. Although the TNI still maintains its role as the protector of Indonesia national security from external threats, it has managed to implement the ‘thousand friends zero enemy’ policy along the border with PNG.

Moreover, the TNI’s role along the border has undergone huge changes. In Papua alone, the TNI’s influence on border management has decreased. Decision making for instance does not entirely show pure TNI influence. The autonomous government through BPPKLN (Badan Perbatasan dan Kerjasama Luar Negeri) Border and International Cooperation Board of Papua Province has been taking the leading role in managing border affairs. With regard to BPPKLN’s roles in the field of foreign relations cooperation, border potential, infrastructure and trans-border issues, it has downplayed the role of the TNI, therefore, giving the TNI a back-seat role in border affairs. The TNI’s position as the protector of Indonesia’s sovereignty and integrity has been transformed to paint a good image. With less involvement in bureaucracy and politics, the TNI is forced to focus on deterring national threats that surface along the border.

Although the TNI’s operations involved preparations for war, it is also vital that the TNI’s involvement in border areas helps deter illegal activities and makes sure that the law is upheld. In Papua, the TNI’s Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih is tasked with the role of maintaining a conducive
atmosphere along the border. This includes showing military strength and force if necessary to protect its borders from external threats (The role of TNI AD in Indonesia’s Border Security, 2012). Furthermore, the main purpose of the TNI on the border is to prevent the neighbouring countries from infiltrating and carrying out illegal activities on Indonesian soil. Although it seems that the TNI’s function at the border should be focused on addressing problems that arise from PNG, nevertheless, domestic issues are so serious that they need to be addressed by the TNI.

The issue of separatism in Papua has at times put the TNI under pressure along the border. Even though the TNI maintains a heavy presence along the Skouw-Wutung border in Jayapura (Northern Border), the OPM has at times caused inconvenience. This illustrates that the role of the TNI has changed since the new order regime of Suharto. Today the TNI has implemented an open approach to accommodate people-to-people contact (“RI-PNG agrees to increase the cooperation of people to people contact,” 2015). Transparency in the hope of creating a better image for the TNI is vital towards trust-building in Papua. International pressure has been quite immense on the role of the TNI, however, under President SBY, the TNI has showed signs of openness to dialogue with the people. The transformations that the TNI has undergone has proved to be a determinant within border relations, because it has opened new doors for further dialogue between counterparts in the PNGDF. Military cooperation among the TNI and the PNGDF have been discussed in annual border meetings such as the BLM (“BLM must provide contributions to the governments of RI_PNG,” 2015).

Overall, the role of the armed forces especially the TNI has been limited in recent years. One of the main reasons is because of past human rights violations. Today, the TNI still maintains a considerable influence along the border, but its overall function has been monitored by various parties including the provincial government. The provincial government, under the autonomous constitution, legally has the right to conduct border arrangements, however, it does not have the right to control the armed forces. Therefore, the provincial government has tried to keep the military
influence out of border arrangements as it will ignite more suspicion between PNG and Indonesia. Basically, the autonomous government represents the TNI, police and other institutions as a whole after their internal issues are sorted out.
CHAPTER 4

The Making of Foreign Policy

In the aim to procure a substantial relationship with other countries, the government of Indonesia has over the years demonstrated the significance of adopting and maintaining its ‘free and active’ (bebas-aktif) foreign policy as the mother of all policies (Hatta, 1953). Accordingly, Indonesia’s founding fathers (Sukarno and Hatta) chose to implement the ‘free and active’ foreign policy as the means for guiding the young Indonesian republic throughout the uncertainties of the dangerous Cold War era. This was later illustrated through Indonesia’s leading role in the ‘non-alignment’ movement of 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia (Piccone & Yusman, 2014) which practically empowered Indonesia to became an important partner in geopolitics. Apparently, Indonesia’s foreign policy has undergone key strategic developments throughout the number of leadership changes (Presidential Cabinets) since the post Suharto era. Subsequently, Indonesia’s foreign policy has yielded concepts such as the ones outlined within the ‘treaty of mutual respect friendship and cooperation’ with PNG (May, 1986) as discussed in the previous chapter of this research.

The Republic of Indonesia realizes that cooperation with other countries is essential if these ideals are to become a reality. It has made the United Nations the focal point of its over-all policy of seeking good relations with all other nations. More specifically, its objectives in foreign policy are: 1, to defend the freedom of the people and guard the safety of the state; 2, to obtain from overseas those articles of daily necessity required for increasing the standard of living of the population—food, especially rice, consumer goods of various kinds, medicines, and so on; 3, to obtain capital equipment to rebuild what had been destroyed or damaged, and capital for industrialization, new construction and the partial mechanization of agriculture; 4, to strengthen principles of international law and to aid in achieving social justice on an international scale, in line with the U.N. Charter, with special reference to Articles 1, 2 and 55, in particular by endeavouring within the U.N. framework to help people still living within the colonial
system to achieve freedom; 5, to place special emphasis on initiating good relations with neighbouring countries, the majority of which have in the past occupied a position similar to Indonesia; and 6, to seek fraternity among nations through the realization of the ideals enshrined in the *Pancasila* (Five Postulates) which constitute the basic Indonesian philosophy. In short, Indonesia will pursue a policy of peace and of friendship with all nations on a basis of mutual respect and non-interference with each other’s structure of government (Hatta, 1953).

In order to clearly understand the ‘the making of Indonesia’s foreign policy, firstly, it is important to note that the end of (the dictatorship) Suharto’s new order era practically made possible the dramatic changes in the measures leading toward a vibrant and dynamic foreign policy approach. Secondly, it is equally important to note the process by which foreign policy is designed and implemented in Indonesia today. Accordingly, it is profound that during the Suharto days, a large amount of strategic decision making was particularly decided by the high-ranking officials from the military (ABRI, now the TNI) who were highly trusted by Suharto. Basically, Suharto’s authoritarian era did not allow for other external powers to intervene in decision making, as it was considered a threat to national security. Anwar (2010) argues that during the Suharto period, there was hardly any intervention from individuals or elites’ outside the appointed executives who played the most part in decision making. On the other hand, the function of the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* - the House of Representatives) did not fulfil its overall mandate as the (only) legal body that was tasked to ratify treaties and dealing with major policies that needed further consultations. The House of Representatives was hardly consulted during the Suharto era (Anwar, 2010). Nevertheless, Anwar (2010) claims that the resignation of President Suharto in 1998 paved the way for the development of a more pluralistic democracy in Indonesia. Furthermore, in spite of the growing domestic political and economic pressure throughout the post Suharto and in some point the reformasi period, Anwar (2010) further claims that
Indonesia managed to secure four successful amendments of the 1945 constitution which strictly emphasized on:

1. The abolishment of the armed forces in socio-political related role
2. The clear separation of power between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary
3. The incorporation of Human rights into the constitution
4. Encouragement of the development of a multiparty system.

Nevertheless, during the Suharto era, the role of foreign policy decision making was only limited to the few who were among the high ranking military bureaucrats that topped his trusted people list. The thirty-two years of Suharto’s monopoly left a huge dent in the Indonesian political life. This can be illustrated by how the authoritarian president managed to manipulate the consultative assembly to vote him back as president for five straight years. In contrast to Suharto, the post Suharto governments of Gus Dur, Megawati and SBY democratically pursued the executive, legislative and judicial levels of government to amend the constitution, purposely to prevent another dictatorship like government. In their efforts, they also managed to set the terms by which the president and vice president are to be elected, and this time, it’s the people who gets to vote their president through presidential elections, unlike Suharto’s monopolistic appointments. Furthermore, elected presidents and vice presidents are allowed to be in power for just a non-renewable ten-year period. Nonetheless, the changes have greatly benefited Indonesia’s foreign policy because it allows for a more open and transparent decision-making process, free press and more vibrant civil society involvement.

Today, Indonesia’s decision-making process goes through a long list of checks and balances. Moreover, not all the decision making is done at the executive level, some are executed at the legislative and judicial levels. Others are referred to the regional level (provincial) as part of regionalism to encourage more regional participation in politics. However, the policies that are mandated to be dealt with at the regional level are compulsory to
be synchronized with state objectives. Despite it being easy to explain, Indonesia did go through a lot of political instabilities between 1998-2004. The Suharto legacy was full of problems and domestic conflicts were among some problems that needed direct attention. Armed conflicts between the TNI and local separatist movements in Ache, Ambon, Papua and East Timor were so sensitive that it considered a strategic foreign policy approach was required.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s term in office also exposed Indonesia’s difficult transition due to the ongoing armed conflicts as mentioned above except for East Timor which had already been independent by then. One of the main causes of conflicts in Indonesia was separatism. Separatist movements have over the years prompted Indonesia to implement certain strategic foreign policy approaches to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Changes in the foreign policy approach began to take actual form under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s first five years in office. In particular, the roles of the House of Representatives were re-activated to serve the purpose of a transparent and democratic decision-making system.

Nonetheless the newly open democratic system under President SBY paved the way for a more persuasive foreign policy approach with the aim of overcoming domestic issues. It was during this time that Indonesia began to build a new international image by engaging in global issues. According to President SBY in 2005, Indonesia’s ‘international identity’ was made up of three important elements. Firstly, Indonesia is the fourth most populated country in the world. Secondly, Indonesia is the largest Muslim democratic nation, and thirdly Indonesia is ranked the third largest democracy in the world (Anwar, 2010). Furthermore, the international identity propelled Indonesia to pursue democracy as the new foreign policy agenda. Subsequently, the legacy of President SBY remains one of most impressive among other presidents, due to his efforts in building a strong foundation in Indonesia’s relationship with other countries and setting a benchmark in Indonesia’s role as the third largest democracy.
international arena has rather increased in the last decade, due to more international engagements. Back at home, Indonesia increased the participation of its citizens as part of fixing its international image that was ruined in the past.

The Newly democratic Indonesia recognizes freedoms of expression and association as key principles, giving rise to a vibrant and increasingly critical civil society, free-wheeling media, and numerous political parties (Anwar, 2010).

In this research, Indonesia’s foreign policy to PNG refers to the (border security) sets of policies that are designed and implemented to firstly, protect state sovereignty, secondly protect state interests, and finally protect its citizens from external and internal threats along the Indonesia and PNG border. Nonetheless security policies implemented along the border represent a set of guidelines which regulates and accommodate for mutual interest by further encouraging cooperation between the government of Indonesia and PNG. In fact, Indonesia’s ‘non-alignment and pragmatist’ approach in foreign policy seemed to encourage greater desire in dealing with democracy and human rights matters under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Piccone & Yusman, 2014). Furthermore, such cooperative desires have activated the initiatives to comprehend an essential bilateral relationship with PNG. As a result, both Indonesia and PNG have formally agreed to mutually participate in the strengthening of political and security measures. Accordingly, the security measures taken in this context are actually aimed at downplaying the role of the OPM along the two countries border. Their policies are also aimed at gaining a more favorable and stable cooperative relationship.

Moreover, President SBY’s foreign policy of “a million friends and zero enemies” (Piccone & Yusman, 2014) has guided Indonesia to achieve more international praise. Accordingly, the approach did set the momentum by providing the basis to strengthen the developments of Indonesia’s democracy and economy since the Asian financial crises. The approach itself has provided concrete outcomes through the use of various measures
which include, increasing Indonesia’s geopolitical participation in various fields such as political, economic, international security and human rights. This can be seen in Indonesia’s active involvement in forums such as the G20 (the group of twenty) (Mustafa, 2016) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and the WHRF (World Human Right Forum) etc. Indeed, Indonesia’s involvements in related forums have been pivotal in consolidating relationships with neighboring states and other states in the region.

In particular, it has also provided Indonesia with more room to improve and pursue its relations with PNG. As sovereign states, both Indonesia and PNG has agreed to pursue and maintain a stable relationship with each other within the guidelines of the United Nations Charter ("Chapter I: Purpose and Principles," 1945). With respect to sovereignty and territorial integrity, Indonesia has always welcomed PNG’s sovereign argument (position) in regard to the separatist conflict in the provinces of Papua and West Papua as an Indonesian domestic issue. Despite the fact that their relationship has been cordial as outlined in an understanding, both countries still endure difficulties in coping with the issue of separatism as it causes security risks along their common border. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the previous chapters, separatist insurgencies operating along the border have been the prominent factor in determining the conditions of the two countries’ relationship. The presence of the OPM has caused Indonesia and PNG to continuously strive in improving their relations and border security.

In particular, this chapter examines the designing and implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially its border security policy based on Lentner (1974a) foreign policy theory. Lentner (1974a) argues in his book entitled Foreign Policy Analysis that policies are forms of actions which involve three important parts: first comes the ‘selection of objectives’, second, is the ‘mobilization of the means for obtaining those objectives’ and third is the ‘implementation, or the actual expenditure of the efforts of resources in pursuit of selected objectives’. Moreover, this part of the chapter explores the set of objectives that the Indonesian government has
considered as its interests. Furthermore, the chapter will emphasize more on the mobilization of means that the Indonesian government applies as necessary in obtaining those objectives. The next section emphasizes the applications of certain instruments as a means to secure its interests. In addition, it will focus on the implementation process of the Indonesian foreign policy and furthermore discuss the link between democracy and Indonesian foreign policy.

4.1 Indonesian Cabinets and Foreign Policy

Until today, different Indonesian cabinets have illustrated the significance of the ‘free and active’ foreign policy (Hatta, 1953). The policy has in detail been the spine of Indonesia’s international relations. In fact, the non-alignment approach introduced by Indonesia’s first ever cabinet lead by Sukarno did greatly benefit Indonesia both politically and economically ever since it was introduced during the Cold War era. The decision to remain neutral without claiming alliance to either of the super powers presented Indonesia with the opportunity to propel itself forward. Indonesia took this opportunity to build stronger relationships with other countries, for example, the non-aligned. The momentum of Indonesia’s international relations gained more popularity, especially before the Asian financial crises in 1998. However, Indonesia’s neutrality in foreign policy has often been questioned especially under the dictatorship of Suharto. In general, Suharto’s strong connections with the US confined the role of the ‘free and active’ foreign policy. The relationship began to show strong signals that in actual terms the free and active foreign policy may seem to be the perfect tool in pursuing state objectives.

Despite Suharto’s robust links with Washington, the free and active foreign policy also displayed weaknesses. In particular, during the post-Cold War period, when superpower rivalry was considered no longer active. Nonetheless, if the government of Indonesia was to continue practicing neutrality it would have faced major challenges in achieving national objectives. As a matter of fact, international relations itself has rather developed to become more interdependent. International relations in this
case, refers to the relationships among independent sovereign states. Countries have rather turned to focus on building trust and stretching cooperation.

In fact, the post Suharto era provided the shifts in foreign policy’s strategic decision making that basically embarked on strengthening further international participation whilst at the same time projecting Indonesia’s national interest. Indonesia was introduced into pursuing wider peace and stability as the means of obtaining more friendly relationships with other countries. The main reason behind Indonesia’s outward push was that its international relationships with other countries would activate the alternatives and open more doors in obtaining its national interest. For example, Indonesia’s growing international relationships with USA, China and Australia have often down played domestic issues such as separatism. Despite all the ups and downs in the pattern of Indonesia’s foreign relations throughout the post Suharto period, President SBY’s period between 2004-2014 stands out to be the most effective period of Indonesia’s foreign participation.

Before sinking deeper into discussion, it is important to firstly understand the process in which foreign policy and other related policies are carried out within the Indonesian government. As a sovereign state, Indonesia’s foreign policies are being designed by the government. In this case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia is tasked with the responsibility to design the strategic structure of foreign policy aspects. Since its Independence, the principles of the free and active policy have been the core aspect in pursuing diplomacy. Despite the fact that the foreign policy has been around for decades, especially as a guideline to maintaining neutrality and stability in international relations, it seemed that developments in both global and regional trends in international relations has caused Indonesia to strategically re-think its direction in achieving state goals ("The Ministry of Foreign Affairs discusses the essentials principles of the free and active policy," 2016).
Nevertheless, it is for sure that the ‘free and active’ foreign policy approach will always maintain a dominant role in guiding Indonesia toward achieving its national objectives. Moreover, Indonesia’s foreign policy will always be designed in such a way that it will always benefit the state and other major pillars of democracy. In order for foreign policy to be deemed as successful, it has to be considered as a benefit to the citizens as a whole. As part of Indonesia’s growing global influence, Indonesia has partaken in several important aspects of building international cooperation such as anti-terrorism, sustainable developments, international peace keeping operations and other international issues (“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs discusses the essentials principles of the free and active policy,” 2016).

Indeed, Indonesia’s growing international participation has proved to increase Indonesia’s bargaining power. In addition, Indonesia’s position as the world’s third largest Muslim democracy has indeed provided Indonesia with the platform to actively strengthen ties with other states. Overall, Indonesia’s involvement in both regional and global politics have forced Indonesia to take up a leading role in maintaining peaceful international relations. For instance, Indonesia’s leading role in ASEAN in relation to the South China dispute. In the context of Indonesia and PNG relationship, foreign policy has rather maintained the overall initiative as outlined in the ‘treaty of mutual respect, friendship and cooperation’. However, border policies are designed differently to foreign policy. Foreign policy does not change in this context. In the Indonesian side border policies are widely managed by the BNPP (*Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan*).

### 4.2 PNG Government and Parliament

In PNG, the government sector is highly responsible for the making of foreign policy. The national executive council (NEC), also known as members of the cabinet, is the executive branch of the government that is responsible to determine the foreign policy of the country. The national executive council basically consists of the prime minister, deputy prime minister and other ministers of the government such as foreign minister, defense, police, health, etc. However, the presence of other political elites
is considered vital in the making of PNG Foreign policy to Indonesia in the context of the Papua separatism issue. Some members in the government have been showing support for separatism over the years and it has affected the implementation of PNG Foreign Policy. In fact, the PNG government’s position has been quite clear. Despite the clear foreign policy approach, there have been members of the parliament showing some sympathies to the Papuan separatist movement.

In pursuit of its foreign policy to Indonesia in the context of the Separatism issue, PNG has always denied negotiating with the OPM on multiple occasions where the OPM leaders such as Seth Rumkorem who persuaded the PNG government by asking the government to acknowledge the existence of the OPM within PNG territory. In response, PNG foreign minister Sir Albert Maori Kiki stated that PNG has refused to deal with the OPM and that the separatism issue remains an Indonesian domestic affair (Osborne, 1985). It was during this time that the PNG government officially made its point by addressing that it will use all means possible to protect its borders. First by play down of the existence of OPM elements within PNG territory. Second, to consider all members of the OPM in PNG as illegal immigrants and to return them to the Indonesian authorities at the border. Third, to order PNG citizens to stop helping the OPM with food and basic supplies along the border.

Despite the government of PNG’s initial moves to pursue its foreign policy as outline in the previous paragraph, practically, the system does not operate very well. The government of PNG has often failed to live up to their policies. Moreover, the PNG government is also known to have not properly executed their policies towards Indonesia, thus, it was once stated by a visiting Australian consultant that ‘PNG had no capacity for problem solving’ (May, 2009). The statement shows that there have been several failed outcomes and misdiagnoses as well as ineffective responses to reform initiatives.
PNG does not have any advantages in securing its national interest in regard to the separatism issue. Within this environment, the policies aimed at resolving the Papuan separatism issue can’t be implemented successfully because the government can change its approach or either substitute the policy with another policy at any time. Even though the policies have been agreed upon if, there is a slight change, then the policies can be twisted to benefit other parties. As a result, it is quite hard for the PNG government to maintain control over the implementation process of its policies, because the government is often influenced by political elites. Therefore, the policies that are being implemented seem to produce the opposite outcome. This has showed that the policies have failed to obtain the national objects.

For over four decades, PNG has always maintained and developed a good relationship with Indonesia. One way of making sure that PNG and Indonesia’s relationship would remain stable to achieve growth and developments depends entirely on how PNG designs its policy to tackle the Papuan separatism issue. In the past, consecutive PNG governments have tried to deal with the Papuan separatism issue but only a few succeeded. So far, the relationship is stable but it is not always guaranteed due to the sensitivity that surrounds the separatism issue. More importantly it is important to note that even today the issue of separatism in Papuan remains an important problem that both governments need to find ways to solve, especially given the impact if there is conflict along the common border. May (2009) argues that another reason why the government of PNG often fails to tackle the separatism issue is because at the national level of PNG is missing a “synergy between active individuals in the bureaucracy and committed individuals who have a shared vision and trust with their bureaucrats.

Resistance to change is neither unique to PNG nor exclusive to the public sector. Comparative studies of public sector reform provide copious example of behaviour by public servants and ministers designed to delay, stall or generally undermine proposed changes in established policies and practices. In PNG this tendency has
probably been exacerbated by the unusual influential role which ministers public officials play in policy implementation (May, 2009)

The PNG government’s weakness to design policies to tackle the Papuan separatism and also to make sure that both domestic and foreign policies do not collide, absolutely gives the OPM the edge to pursue their political rights in PNG, including their existence along the common border. In addition, (May, 2009) argues that “ministers frequently dictate to their departmental officials and the appointment of senior officials has tended to become increasingly politicised”. According to Mays’ research, this has been true up until now because it is:

Also true in the sub-national level, where in some provinces, notwithstanding formal procedures, provincial governors (who are normally national MPs) have selected provincial administrators and even district administrators who can be relied on to carry out their wishes (May, 2009).

It is clearly not a good way of conducting polices because when individuals are driven with their own ambition for power, it is likely that the policies are being carried out according to their individual interests. For instance, previous figures show that PNG is known to have a “high turnover of MPs (50-55 percent from 1972 to 2002, about roughly 80 percent in 2002 and just over 60 percent in 2007), and an even higher turnover of cabinet portfolios has reinforced this trend. Moreover, Defence had seven ministers and seven secretaries, and between 1975 and 2002, there were twenty-four changes of ministers (May, 2009)

Political parties in PNG are not sharply differentiated by ideology or policy; as a result, changes of government are unlikely to produce major changes in policy direction. Nevertheless, the constant turnover of ministers and senior bureaucrats, and frequent if often relatively minor shifts in policies, create a lack of stability which makes commitment to a given set of policy actions difficult to maintain (May, 2009).
In these realistic examples, it can demonstrate that the Papuan issue to some extant is not dealt with seriously by the national government of PNG. Thus, the existence of Papuan organizations in PNG is a failure of poor control of the national government. Which did not portray the national government objectives because policies where not executed as planned due to the internal instabilities that often occurred. The issue of Papua separatism did not only affect the government policies in PNG by also managed to penetrate other neighbouring Pacific governments. The Papuan struggle for self-determination has gained more support from other neighbouring Pacific Islands like Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the Kanaks of New Caledonia. In return, several Pacific islands, have been voicing their support through their respective governments and also through their civil society. Amongst the pacific Islands state, Vanuatu has been the most influential actor in the Pacific that raises concerns over Papuan separatism. Several Vanuatu governments in the past have pledge continuous support for Papua’s self-determination.

The difference between the support for Papuan independence in PNG and Vanuatu is that in PNG, the government denies its support for the Papuan issue. However, in reality there is still support for the Papuan issue from several political elites and also from the civil society. Thus, Papuan people in PNG are given the freedom to participate in all sectors. On the other hand, Vanuatu is the most dominating Pacific island state that is always vocal in regard to the Papuan issue. The support for Papuan independence has been around for a long-time in Vanuatu and even up till today following the opening of a Papuan office in Vanuatu to deal with issues relating to Papuan independence. Unlike Vanuatu, PNG does not allow Papuans to permanently build an office in PNG in order to maintain a good relationship with its neighbour Indonesia. The different roles that PNG and Vanuatu have in the Papuan issue contribute to completing the acceptance of Papuan people and the Papuan issue in both states. However, in PNG it is not really clear and to some extent hard to pinpoint the interest of PNG itself within the Papuan issue.
The existence of OPM and its supporters in PNG is a result of contractionary government news. In one way, it can be said that PNG is directly violating its foreign policy to Indonesia or it can also be said that PNG is supporting the OPM. Despite the possibilities mentioned above, it can also be seen that the outcome is also a result of a failure of the government in carrying out its duties. Especially in implementing its policies, the government can be seen to be weak because even after the objectives of foreign policy have been set the government cannot work towards achieving its objectives. Once the objectives can’t be restored, it makes it absolutely hard for the government to mobilize its means in order to achieve those objectives. This totally creates a problem when it comes to implementation because the government has already lost control within its functions. As a result, it often shows a completely different foreign policy outcome in regard to Papuan separatism.

4.2.1 The Involvement of Political Elites

With regard to PNG’s democratic government practice, political elites often get involved with policy making. Political elites in PNG have a lot contributed to its domestic and foreign policies. Political elites are amongst the most influential individuals who possess the power to mingle with politics. Political elites in PNG sometimes to some extent misuse their political role to gain an outcome that best suits their interests. Elites are highly considered in making the foreign policy due to a high level of experience and a well-educated background. Elites of every country in the world value their own protection safety and well-being and strive for self-respect and some measures of deference. These universal values are embodied in the goals of sovereignty, independence, and security. These means of achieving these goals vary as situations and the relevant determinants vary, but the values are widely shared (Pahre, 2006).

In some cases, political elites significantly appear with a great deal of ideas and opinions as to how the government would work towards pursuing its national interests. Some results have shown that political elites in PNG do have a significant part in the government decision making despite its status.
Some elites that are influential are retired politicians such as ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers. In the case of Papuan separatism, several political elites from the PNG government have come up to support the Papuan plea for independence. Several high profile political elites are known to be great supporters of the Papuan Separatism. Several governors also had their opinion to what the PNG government should do to help Papuan separatism. These efforts earned these political elites fame. Their criticism and opinions were making impacts in PNG and these elites knew as to how it would benefit them politically. Keeping in mind that PNG is home to around ten thousand Papuan people, it is quite a large number to make an impact.

These political elites try to convince the PNG government to be part of the Papuan campaign. The problem that occurs is that the government still allows the Papuan issue to be brought to the public’s concern despite clear efforts to refrain from dealing with the Papuan issue as clearly stated in its foreign policy in the beginning of this chapter. The ongoing Papuan struggle for independence has brought up concerns from PNG political elites such as Members of parliament voicing their support for an independent Papua. For example, a newly elected PNG MP says he “wants to raise the issue of self-determination for the people of Indonesia’s Papua region.” (Campaign, 2011) Powes Parkop is the governor of PNG National Capital District. He is also a lawyer and human rights activist, having headed an NGO called Melanesian Solidarity. Mr. Parkop says he:

Respects the diplomatic relations the country has with Indonesia but he says he has a moral obligation to speak out about Papua. I will speak on the issue of West Papua so that it is raised as a serious issue in Papua New Guinea and in the region so it can be addressed, because this is a real issue. It’s been pushed under the carpet for too long (Campaign, 2011).

4.2.2 Civil Society
As a democratic state, the civil society is regarded as an important part of a country’s life. It also the same in PNG. Civil society is included as a
determinant to foreign policy decision making. Normally the civil society is included to find out if government policies are good policies. The greater the support, the greater the success of that policy will be in implementation. Within this research, PNG’s civil society supports the Papuan separatism issue, therefore, it is complicated for the government to include the voice of the civil society. The simplest excuse to their support is due to the ethnic similarity to Papuans. Being fellow Melanesian tribesmen is what tends to make them feel a part of them. Equality is most often taken to mean that all are the same in some important respect. Being part of the civil society can also be classified as citizens with citizenship to a particular state. With citizenship to the independent state of PNG the people have the ability to decide what is best for “oneself; a capacity of rational thought; an economic stake in the country; the ability to defend one’s country” (Catt, 1999).

Another reason that the civil society is giving its support to Papuan separatism is because there are a large number of Papuans who reside in PNG and have already managed to mix around with PNG people. It is hard to identify Papuans from Papua New Guineans because as part of Melanesia there is no difference. It is a problem because some Papuans have managed to be important figures in PNG, therefore, it is easier for the civil society to raise their concerns over the Papuan issue. The civil society is easily motivated due to its feeling of belonging to a particular ethnic group. The Melanesian culture has a significant impact in both Papua and PNG. These cultural ties create a common understanding. The Melanesian ethnicity bonds the peoples of PNG and Papua together which in this case have contributed to the support that Papuan activists are getting from their brothers in PNG.

The ability to mix amongst themselves creates a problem for the government because the government often identifies Papuan activists as its locals. Indonesia also faces the same problem because they cannot identify Papuan activist’s due to being the same ethnic as Papua New Guineans. Demonstrations that occur in PNG often ignite supports in the neighboring Vanuatu and Nauru. Demonstrations often provoke the Indonesian
government to question PNG’s role in the issue however PNG denies having contributed directly to the demonstrations that occur in PNG and its neighboring Melanesian states. Basically, the civil societies of Melanesian states demand that Papua be given the right to be equal like them and that Papua should also be given the right to choose its path of destiny.

When all individuals are seen as equal it follows that no person is deemed to be any better or any worse than any other person. That is, all should be seen as the same as far as rights and treatment are concerned. Given this understanding of equality as treating people in the same way, two important ideas follow for the democratic decision making (Catt, 1999).

These refer to equality and respect in that no one should be deciding for another, which means all the people are expected to participate in decision making; no matter of their status within the civil society. Furthermore, the democratic system needs to cater for the involvement of participating members of the society. In this way, all will have the same chance to participate in the decision-making process. These refers to equality and respect that no one should be deciding for another, and all the people are expected to participate in decision making no matter of their status within the civil society. Furthermore, the democratic system needs to cater for the involvement of participating members of the society. In this way, all will have the same chance to participate in the decision-making process.

Civil society in this case, refers to both individuals and organizations. Non-governmental organizations or NGOs are also part of the civil society. In relations to the Papuan issue, there have been a number of NGOs supporting the Papuan plea for independence. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) is one of the most influential NGO groups voicing its opinion through to the governments of Melanesian background. A basic example that can be used to show that civil society is part of the Papuan campaign in PNG is that because Papuans are given the freedom of speech, Papuan activists do small campaigns in public whereby the public is then conscious of what is happening in its surroundings. The Papuan activists in PNG are
made up of different groups. In PNG, it is known that there are several groups operating under the OPM but is almost impossible to identify whether the motive of the groups is in relation to Papuan Independence. There have been several Papuan leaders influencing the groups of civil society through campaigns such as carrying out awareness about Papuan independence and human rights violations in Papua. These campaigns are often being broadcast on television stations such as EM TV a national television company and the NBC (National Broadcasting Commission) radio station and often published in daily newspapers. This form of campaign is highly productive in a democratic state such as PNG because the citizens are being directly engaged with the issue, therefore, it is where civil society comes in with opinions as to why and how the government should deal with the Papuan people.

The civil society often comes up with strong reasons that PNG is a Melanesian state, therefore: it should be leading the campaign for an independent Papua. There have been other reasons that state that because PNG is a Christian country, it should also give support to its fellow Christian brothers of Papua to form an independent state. As a result, the Papuan issue is also known to gain the support from churches in PNG through its joint programs with churches from Papua. The Churches have been working together to find solutions to solve the Papuan issue. The exchange studies of church leaders in PNG and Papua have strengthened the relationship amongst churches to voice out their opinions. Churches have always been supporting the Papuan case because of the brutal violence that the Indonesian military often carries out in the name of national security. It is simply the tortures and abuses that occur in Papua which concerns the churches to work together to find a solution to put an end to those bad practices. It is politer to say that religion also plays a part in creating a supportive part of the civil society.

It is important to know that civil society places an influential role in foreign policy in PNG. The role that the civil society places directly puts pressure on the government. When the pressure increases, the government often
fails to select its objectives because the civil society has a very strong impact on the decision making. Civil society does not make the policies; however, they have the right to protest against the government policies. In PNG case, it often occurs that PNG’s civil society has the power to make the government fail to implement its policies on Papua. It is impossible to mobilize the means of achieving its goals because the civil society tends to slow down the process. As a result, the policies are often not implemented because civil society together with the political elites appear to force the government not to implement. Sometimes the failure to implement comes with the help of certain political elites who are linked to the civil society.

4.3 Democracy and Foreign Policy Making
The end of the War in 1945 seemed to make the world safe for democracy. New nations evolved with a democratic system and PNG was also among those nations. Democracies tend to have a greater support compared to authoritarian regimes because democracies may also be more responsive to public opposition to certain policies, changing course or modifying them consistent with public opinion. One difference in democratic governments is that in democratic governments public opinion is highly considered whereas it is not considered in authoritarian regimes. The process of foreign policy making in PNG is linked with a democratic system of government. Today a majority of the world’s governments are democratic including PNG and Indonesia. With the exception that both PNG and Indonesia are democratic states, it can be seen clearly that “democracy plays a central role in foreign policy (Pahre, 2006). Besides, authoritarian regimes play a central role in foreign policy because there is only one actor which is the government. It is also common in authoritarian regimes that public opinion is not considered. In PNG and Indonesia’s case, democracy acts as guidelines to foreign policy whereby each state and its citizens are involved in shaping their national interest towards achieving their goals. In addition, PNG was democratically guided by Australia. Australia is the most influential state in PNG’s development both prior to independence and post-independence. Especially in the early years of PNG independence, Australia guided PNG on special matters of foreign policy such as border issues with Indonesia.
because Australia was afraid that Indonesia’s expansion under the communist regime of President Sukarno and then later the authoritarian regime of President Suharto, might invade PNG.

Today, PNG is an independent state with a democratic system of government which more or less adopts and implements its foreign policy like any other democratic state. It is assumed that all the decisions taken, including the process of foreign policy making, are based on democracy. In the context of Papuan separatism, it is important to understand the process of PNG foreign policy making in order to be able to understand the PNG-Indonesian relationship in regard to the Papuan separatism issue, although PNG and Indonesia are democratic states that share a similar attribute. It is perhaps premature to say that they are similar and that there should be no problem in handling certain issues such as the Papuan issue. In democracies, the implementations remain different depending on its interests. The Papuan separatism issue has shown that even democracies face difficulties in implementing their foreign policies because policies are vulnerable to change at any time.

In linguistic terms, “democracy is derived from the Greek demokatia that can be broken down into demos meaning the people and kratos meaning rule” (Catt, 1999). In summary democracy means “rule by the people” which basically implies that decision making is guided by the will of the people. Democracy is also used to mean a set of rights or an entire way of organizing the political and economic life of a state. Democracy is also used in governments in order to reach collective decisions with the participation of its citizens. In line with democracy and its gradual acceptance are the basic ideas of “equality and individual liberty” and what these concepts entail (Catt, 1999).

PNG’s a member of the Commonwealth of Nations joins British and Australia alongside many other countries by having a democratic parliamentary system of government, although most Commonwealth members do not have parliamentary systems and many are not
democracies. In parliamentary democracies, the government is led by the Prime Minister as the leader elected based on a democratic voting system to lead the government. There is sometimes a coalition of political parties forming the government. On the other hand, the opposition is led by the opposition Leader who maybe a candidate for prime minister who failed to gather the majority of votes. Normally the losing candidate automatically forms the opposition to counter the government’s policies. This type of leadership contributes significantly to the domestic and foreign policy making because the parliament has to decide based on the valid guidelines of democracy to achieve an outcome.

Each country has its own procedures, each claiming to be democratic but based on a distinctive mix of beliefs about what is important for democracy, what is feasible and what is acceptable to the population (Catt, 1999).

In this type of leadership, it is common to have debates in parliament to consider a certain outcome as its policies. In PNG, it is common that domestic and foreign policies are debated in parliament before they are implemented. The reason that a debate is held is to encourage the members of parliament to have a chance to express their views. It is through these debates that the public become aware of the dynamics of the issues. The final outcome should be in the best interest of the government in working towards achieving its goals. It is said that “Democracy at home shapes foreign policy making” (Catt, 1999). With the presence of democratic norms in domestic politics it sets the foundation for foreign policy to build up. For PNG’s case, democratic norms have been dominating the policy making since independence. Despite the efforts of the PNG government in making sure that its domestic and foreign policies are set to bring the best outcomes especially on the Papuan separatism issue. PNG has to an extent fallen short of achieving that goal. Research has shown that;

There were plenty of policy recommendations and ample policy making. There was also considerable interest and funding from donors. But policy design and implementation were often poor while consistent political support from top decision makers was not forthcoming (May, 2013).
It seems that the PNG government is supporting the Papuan separatist movement because the PNG government often violates its foreign policy aims as stated in the beginning of this chapter. Another reason would be that the PNG government's domestic policy tends to collide with its foreign policy when it comes to implementations of policies. In other words, the PNG government sees domestic policies as more important than its foreign policy, despite the recognition of the Papuan separatism issue as an integral issue of Indonesia, PNG’s domestic policy in reality is totally opposite to its foreign policy.

Under PNG’s democratic governments, several potentially useful reforms have not been implemented, either because senior public officials or politicians were unsympathetic to changes proposed or were inhibited by inertia, or because the resources needed to effect change were not provided, or because the proposed changes had not been adequately communicated to personnel down the line of command (May, 2013).

It is important to note that in democratic governments such as PNG, national interest remains the most important aspect. Despite the importance, on the other hand it is also important to understand that “democracies differ from one another” (Pahre, 2006). In democracies, citizens are regarded as an important part because it is through citizen’s disagreements that democracy is actually born. Despite the important role of citizens in democratic governments, “many observers have argued that democracy is somehow bad for foreign policy” (Pahre, 2006).

The presence of democracy clearly shows that the PNG government has selected its objectives as a means to secure its national interest based on its relations to Indonesia. Regarding the objective of foreign policy, since independence, PNG has come up with different foreign policies on different issues concerning its national interest. With an independent democratic system of government, PNG has always implemented its policies both its foreign and domestic policies based on the nuances of democracy. Despite
the successes of repetitive foreign policies by the PNG government, the most crucial foreign policy issue within the history of PNG foreign policy is the issue of Papuan Independence which is subjected to Indonesia.

Papua’s plea for independence has surely put the PNG foreign policy to test because in reality PNG’s foreign policy is a straight forward policy aimed at recognizing the Papuan issue with respect to Indonesian sovereignty. PNG has always treated the Papuan issue as an integral issue of Indonesia. Although there have been certain failures, PNG foreign policy has always been designed to favour Indonesia and at the same to build trust and cooperation, aimed at maintaining a good relationship. The better the relationship between PNG and Indonesia, the more chances there are for PNG to benefit. PNG foreign policy is conducted in accordance to democratic norms and guidelines whereby the government decides to pursue its national interests in a more transparent and public manner. The formation of PNG foreign policy is based on its universal approach which is aimed to make PNG a friend to all countries. This approach also includes Indonesia. The PNG foreign policy is made by the political elites by setting their objectives in order to acquire a set of rules that can be implemented as guidelines to in dealing with the Papuan issue. In relations to the issue, the PNG government aims to protect its integrity by refusing to support the Papuan independence movement. PNG foreign policy is created by the elites or the National Executive Council aimed to secure its national interest. Foreign policy passes three levels of government before it is finally implemented.

- The National Government
- The Provincial Government
- Local Level Government

After PNG, foreign policy is made and finalize then later it is being handed over to provincial governments to be executed. The provincial government later passes down the policies to the local level governments and then to the district administrators to be implemented. In a democracy like PNG it is
normal and also welcomed by the government to get the civil society involved in deciding its domestic and foreign policies. The citizens are welcome to make known their ideas and opinions before the decision making process. Political elites are specialists who also have a say in policy making including political parties with their own interests. Also involved are government departments who are involved based on the issue of concern. Not forgetting the NGO’s who work tirelessly to voice the unheard voices of a particular group of the civil society. It is important that we classify the levels of power that is basically found in PNG.

Figure 4.1 The pyramid of the distribution power

![Pyramid of distribution power]

According to the diagram above, it can be seen that in PNG, political elites do have an influential role in the making of both domestic and foreign policy. Here, elites tend to have a greater influence on the resources that are available. Not only do they dominate the business sector, however, in the case of PNG these elites also contribute to the making of policies. Political elites are made up of major political figures like the Prime Minister, members of the cabinet, other higher ranking officials, major businessmen and high ranking military official who make up the higher level of the pyramid.

The second layer of the pyramid is made up of members of the provincial government, city administrators and leaders of the important organizations. The last level of the pyramid is made up of the civil society which is the general public. The general public in PNG do not have the power to make decisions, however, it has the power to raise concerns or to influence the
government to make decisions. PNG’s approach to the Papuan issue can be said that it implies a democratic approach in implementing its domestic and foreign policies. The permission for Papuan activists to be permissive residents in PNG have showed that even though PNG is against the Papuan struggle for independence, it cannot just close its eyes on the Papuan people. PNG is aware that Pauans are culturally blinded, therefore, it can not completely turn its back on its own race.

Therefore, it can be seen that even though PNG’s foreign policy towards Indonesia says that PNG has nothing to do with Papuan separatism, still behind its foreign policy PNG gives space for Pauans to interact with local communities even to the extent of forming groups who are sympathetic to Papuan separatism. This actions has simply shows that PNG still supports Pauans, however, the support is not transparent enough to be an evidence of failure or sometimes it can be said that the support appears to be a result of a democratic government applying a democratic approach in its foreign policy. Pauans live and interact alongside with Papua New Guineans on a daily basis. Pauans are also given the right to education and the freedom of speech whereas in this case, it completely gives the Pauans the advantage to participate in voting during the election period. All these rights that are being granted to Pauan people are part of the democratic norms which are implemented by the PNG government.
CHAPTER 5

Conclusion and Recommendation
As a Papuan born in Papua New Guinea to parents who were part of the great influx of refugees that fled into PNG territory in the 1980s, it has provided the drive and motivation to explicitly and sincerely express ideas and viewpoints regarding this research entitled: ‘Indonesia-PNG border security’. The writing of this research has no doubt brought back many fond memories of my early life and struggles as a Papuan refugee living in PNG. It all started from the concentrated refugee camps situated along the border, in the hostile jungles of PNG’s Sandaun and Western provinces to eventually finding the comforts of Port Moresby, the capital of PNG. Indeed, it’s not easy to explain the causes of history, especially to have lived and experienced life in exile for most of my early childhood period. However, it can be understood that all of these experiences together with the experiences of other Papuans have provided the basic reasons for Papuans that chose to escape the brutal occupation of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, growing up as a Papuan refugee in PNG territory provided different challenges for survival and opportunities in education. Thankfully, the PNG government recognizes the rights of individuals and it made it a priority to house the Papuan refugees by providing food and education. PNG was generous enough to take in refugees while at the same time PNG had to face difficulties in maintaining a good relationship with Indonesia, especially during the Suharto era.

Among all the experiences from living in PNG, till moving back to Jayapura-Papua in 2007, one thing remains a great privilege. It was the chance to have ever witnessed the brilliance and kindness of the early generation of Papuan leaders, who are indebted to the internationalization of the Papuan separatism conflict. In fact, to be able to grow up amidst some of Papua’s finest leaders such as the Late Mr. (Bapak) Clemens Runawery and Late Mr. (Bapak) Wilhelm Zonggonau was arguably the moment that had shaped and given meaning to a struggle of identity that in reality was somewhat unreachable to Papuans. Overall, such experiences have also installed the
purpose to understand and inherit a sense of belonging that simply referred to a certain ethnicity (Melanesian) that until today has never stopped fighting to reclaim what rightfully belongs to their ancestors and their generations to come. The land of Papua remains to motivate the young Papuan generation about the values of human dignity and the right to freedom which is the reason why the Papuan fight for self-determinations has never stopped.

Nonetheless, spending my early childhood education in PNG provided the basic knowledge to understand the role of PNG within the Papuan separatist conflict. Moreover, it provided more background knowledge to analyze the role of the Papuan conflict itself on border security and the impacts it had on the overall relationship status of Indonesia and PNG. However, it is important to consider that the sensitivity that lay behind this topic has provided difficulties in gathering and analyzing up to date information and references, apart from the references that have been considered. It is also important to note that there is also not much research on the topic itself. Furthermore, the availability of references was also limited from both Indonesia and PNG. Since the Suharto era, not much information on domestic issues and especially on border security is perceived to be valid. The ban on foreign journalists and researchers in Papua and West Papua had a great impact on the availability of research materials. Despite the changes in the government system from Suharto’s new order towards SBY’s term in office, there is still very little research done in this field. Other researchers have been forced to comply with certain terms in order to be published. Accordingly, such restrictions have also limited the scope of this research.

Despite such deficiencies, decades of instability and violence instigated by the Indonesian military rule in Papua has in reality resulted in more than five hundred thousand deaths of both men and women of all ages. Many Papuans have vanished into the earth without any trace. The violations caused by the Indonesian military is the main reason why Papuans never trust Indonesians. Whether it be government or people, Papuans have learned that surely identity is worth protecting. Although the Papuan
struggle has claimed many lives, Papuans still consider fighting for their indigenous rights as inhabitants of the Melanesian island of Papua. The Island of Papua is known for its rich natural resources, diverse culture and traditions. Papuans have been trying to protect the resources but today, it is the Indonesian government that has the power to decide. These are some of the basic factors that Papuans demand. The Indonesian government has dealt with the same demands for a long time however, different governments have failed to answer same questions.

As an ex-refugee living on a permissive residential status for over 20 years in PNG, it was certainly challenging to be brought up under such immense political and psychological conditions as a young child. It is understood that morally, the Papuan issue was something most Papuans found to be part of their daily routines. Papuan refugees in PNG are used to gathering in groups; every Papuans knew themselves. Different from PNG, the Papuan refugees in PNG treated each other as family. The bond they formed in exile was something the Indonesian government nor the PNG government could ever take away from them. The bond to come together and celebrate family gatherings, Easter or Christmas was considered important moments. Nonetheless it is from this bond that the Papuan struggle continues to be voiced. It can be concluded that such bond has also developed over the Indonesian and PNG border. The bond between Melanesian brothers, PNG and Papuan people has greatly benefited the existence of the OPM along the border. Therefore, both Indonesia and PNG will never ever succeed in addressing the security issues along the border.

The bond between Papuans, and Papua New Guineans is just one of the many reasons that continues to remind them of their existence as refugees in PNG. Meetings after meetings of senior Papuan leaders were held in PNG throughout the 80s and 90s as a sign of hope for the struggle for Papua’s self-determination. Subsequently, the younger generation of Papuans who were born in PNG found themselves entangled within the doctrines of Papuan nationalism and separatism. Nevertheless, the Papuan it seems the Papuan conflict is here to stay for a long time. The challenge
remains in the hands of Indonesia and PNG. Whether or not the conflict will stop will depend on the policies that decision makers from both sides come up with. The designing of border policies will actually need to consider the overall development of the Papuan conflict from both the domestic and international point of view.

Today, the dynamics of Papuan politics has managed to influence both the internal and external spheres of interests. Papua’s current political map shows that there are more and more international parties interested to support the Papuan struggle. The involvement of international actors would mean that the Papuan struggle will set sights on yet another milestone. To Papuans it will definitely mean that there has been progress. The idea of progress will be interpreted to be a success. The meaning of success in this context will then trigger more and more support. The support that occurs domestically in Papua will definitely be countered with force by the Indonesian authorities. Despite the involvement of the TNI and Police, Papuans will move forward to fight their rights under the Papuan autonomy constitution with reference to the declaration of human rights. Nonetheless, the domestic tensions will trigger wider public involvement thus activing the OPM wing that operates along the border to add more pressure on the Indonesian authorities.

The links between domestic instabilities and border security incidents have illustrated strong indications that both factions of the struggle cannot correspond with each other. The idea behind the border incidents is actually to portray the OPM’s power, in addition to the developments of Papuan politics in the international arena. OPMs back in Papua have taken the initiative to support one another. One way of showing support is simply to instigate border security issues. During the SBY period, there have been records of shooting done by the OPM along the border. This shows that even SBY could not provide the remedies needed as a solution to the prolonged struggle. At one stage border shootings occurred so often that the border market had to be closed by the Indonesian border authorities with consultations with the PNG border authority for safety reasons. Such
incidents illustrate the OPM's role along the border. Despite Indonesia’s
tireless diplomacy, the OPM as the resistance surely has the upper hand,
because on various occasions the attacks that occurs along the border have
c caught both Indonesia and PNG surprise.

In relation to the role of the OPM in the separatist conflict, it can be
concluded that the Indonesia and PNG border has been a crucial factor in
the OPM’s survival. Ever since PNG took over control of the responsibilities
of its own border from Australia, PNG has dealt with the OPM. With respect
to the border and its role, there are several factors that illustrate the border’s
importance: First, the border is the only line that distinguishes Indonesia and
PNG’s territorial integrity and national jurisdictions. Second, the border has
been a line of protection to the tens of thousands of Papuan refugees who
fled the province during the Suharto era. Third, the border extends both
internal and external security threats to both Indonesia and PNG due to the
existence of the OPM (third party). Fourth, the geographical features of the
border make it difficult to cover the exact area of the border, which tends to
become the weak points that are continually used by the armed resistance.
Finally, Indonesia’s massive military size, border patrols and surveillances
have often resulted in border incursion, which has often sparked concerns
from PNG and its citizens.

Nonetheless, security concerns surrounding Indonesia and PNG’s common
border will remain to become the most sensitive and dangerous issue
affecting their relationship in the decades to come. In addition, the separatist
conflict in Papua has been around long enough to establish itself as one of
the most complicated and serious political and humanitarian conflicts of the
modern era. Although the relationship between Indonesia and PNG has
strengthened and flourished over the years, it seems that the issue of
Papuan separatism will remain to be the prominent factor in determining
stability and development between the relationship of both countries. In fact,
Papuan separatism is the only problem that stands between the
governments of Indonesia and PNG and the challenge to further harness a
fruitful relationship. Basically, the issue of Papuan separatism will increase
border insurgencies and tension between the TNI the PNGDF and the OPM if not carefully managed.

Accordingly, such effects would encourage military build-up on the Indonesian side, which is something both Indonesia and PNG have tried so hard to eliminate over the years. Indeed, the increasing presence of the OPM continued with border threats will suggest to the TNI of the need to increase its military power along the border. The PNGDF will not counter Indonesian power because of its size and incompetency. PNG will look to maintain further cooperation with Indonesia by adhering to formally cut down on the OPM’s activities on PNG soil. This is not to say the PNGDF is incapable of covering its borders, however, PNG would see the diplomatic approach as the best option to negotiate terms and conditions. The government of PNG through the PNGDF has occasionally showed the OPM that it does tolerate such irresponsible acts. This includes several raids on the OPM camps that was conducted on the PNG side with consultations with the TNI.

The relationship between TNI and the PNGDF will prosper in the coming years despite the vulnerability along the border. The recent joint navy program between the Indonesian Navy and the PNGDF Navy along the cost of Sumatera illustrates the willingness to cooperate. In addition, the regional security condition will enhance Indonesia and PNG relations, thus catering for the cooperation of both the military and the police. Overall, this will see huge changes within the relationship of Indonesia and PNG. Developments of this kind need to accommodate local tolerance and changes within the ideology and frameworks that have been constituting border security policies. Future cooperation between the PNGDF and TNI will definitely be subjected to public condemnation, especially to the PNG public due to their restless support for the Papuan issue.

Moreover, the separatist conflict in Papua has proved on many occasions that the Indonesia and PNG border is quite vulnerable. Attacks from the OPM have on several occasions, ended with a cross fire between the TNI,
the police and the OPM. Furthermore, domestic instabilities such as violence, anarchy and chaos that result from peaceful demonstrations and protests in Papua will of course become the subject of the deteriorating border cooperation if the OPM’s involvement along the border is to be intensified. Moreover, it will affect the general relationship of Indonesia and PNG will. The Papuan separatism issue has strong connections to the border and therefore will encourage other related problems such as illegal border crossings, illegal transactions of drugs and narcotics, illegal transactions of firearms and motor cycles and other economic goods if not carefully dealt with by decision makers. In reality, the Papuan conflict is more than capable of sabotaging and ruining the relationship of Indonesia and PNG. In fact, the Papuan separatism issue can also ruin Indonesia’s international reputation.

Furthermore, the issue of Papuan separatism will be highly subjected to impact the level of security along the border despite the continuity of annual bilateral talks between Indonesia and PNG. Bilateral talks between Indonesia and PNG will need to discuss more on the solutions part instead of discussing more on the problems. Border security issues remain a high priority issue in the annual bilateral meetings. Despite of its importance, both countries have failed to provide clear and tangible outcome to counter the issue. There is a strong need to further involve specialists on border security issues to provide first had advice on how to tackle various types of border threats. In most case, the bilateral meetings are boring because it covers the same topic has the previous meeting. If this is the case then border security issues will remain influential regardless of annual border meetings. In this case, both the Indonesian and PNG decision makers need to meet more often so that border meetings will cater for mutual solutions.

Moreover, the Indonesia-PNG border security will also be determined by external factors that result from ongoing international campaigns. Papua’s international campaigns on human rights issues have regained worldwide recognition, and has proved to be effective in stirring up the domestic political conditions in Papua. Developments in the Melanesian Spearhead
Group (MSG) has sent a very strong signal to policy makers that externally, the issues do impact domestic security in Papua. The research identifies that when domestic security in Papua is threatened causing instabilities, the activities of the OPM along the border usually simultaneously intensify. Furthermore, the involvement of the NGOs and other concerned political elites has also proved to provide hope. In separatism conflicts hope is known to immensely provide the moral boost toward the fighting spirit, thus the issue of separatism is not an easy issue to contain in the short term.

The issue of separatism has been around long enough that it has emotionally blended to become the part and parcel of Papuan lives. Papuans that hold peaceful demonstrations in the towns across Papua are exposed to the high risk of being detained by the TNI and the Indonesian police. In this case, when a Papuan is being detained, it actually forces different forms of retaliations from the other Papuans. For instance, if member of the community or the protesting group of Papuans is being attacked and arrested by the Indonesian security forces then the other Papuans will demand his release. The demands will first peacefully be relayed to the related authorities, however, when the authorities fail to consider a solution the people then becomes violent. The violence that occurs here is purposely to protest their democratic rights, however, some peaceful demonstrations does actually violate the existing laws and regulations that have been enshrine in Indonesia 1945 constitution.

For several years the peaceful demonstrations tend to affect the activities of other Papuans or the general public. The demonstrators will need to be reminded by the TNI and police that their actions have put someone innocent in danger. In this case, sometimes there is a misunderstanding between the TNI, the police and the demonstrating group. To the demonstrating group it is their right to democratically protest, however to the TNI and police their protest have violated the constitution because it a form of disturbance. Such misunderstandings tend to ignite conflicts, when the situation is in an uproar, someone instigates it by shooting a firecracker to the police or throwing rocks at the TNI this is when further chaos happens.
The sort of violence that occurs on the streets in Papua mainly in Jayapura is quickly communicated to the OPM along the border and in a response the OPM along the border tries cause inconvenience. The main purpose of this acts by the OPM is to attract international attention. The ULMWP, the OPM and other related organization hopes that through these acts there will be more recognition on the Papuan issue.

Indeed, special autonomy has provided legal terms for the conduct of peaceful rallies and protests. However, the protests are sometimes being manipulated by other groups within Papua that support the ULMWP’s progress in the MSG. International coordination among the ULMWP and other sub organization of pro Independence supporters have in recent times proofed vital to the conditions of domestic politics and security. Indonesia and PNG’s border security and the issue of Papuan separatism does somewhat correspond with each other, the correlation found between them has by far become the basis of the ongoing security threats instigated along the common border ever since the birth of the resistance. The presence of the OPM along the border has increased the level of suspicion from the Indonesian government.

The Indonesian government has accused the PNG government for allowing OPMs to operate from PNG soil. Recent attacks and hostage taking from the OPM along the border has increased the level of security concerns because the OPM has increased its game along the border. Even though Indonesia and PNG continues to engage themselves in attempts to counter the resistance it seems that their cooperation needs more focus on building trust between governments. More specifically this thesis seeks to answer the research question “How internal and external factors affect the making of Indonesian policy in dealing with separatism and its impacts on border security”. After analyzing the relationship of Indonesia and PNG based on the achievements of their border policies, the thesis has drawn the following conclusions.
the Papuan conflict has remained one of the hottest political issues in Indonesia for over 5 decades, including the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The issue of separatism in Papua has been one of the main issues threatening Indonesia’s domestic political stability and international political influence. Today, the conflict remains a massive problem for Indonesia because of the number of interests surround the issue and in addition, the number of interested parties willing to be involved. The more other countries and organization are involved the more complicated the Papuan issues becomes. Despite the wrong doings of the Suharto era, which has claimed the lives of thousands of Papuans and also left Papuan psychologically affected, the Indonesian government under President SBY has not actually done enough to provide the solutions to the Papuan conflict.

The Indonesian government under SBY promised to change its policies from a security oriented policy to an economically driven approach in Papua. The change was focused to encourage more developments in the economic sector which will increase the involvement of local Papuans. The aim of the change is to downplay the role of the TNI while encouraging more local participation in sectors such as agriculture and livestock, tourism, farming and small businesses across both Papua and West Papua provinces. Another aim of the SBY government was to adversely remove the stigmas behind the TNI and set a positive image internationally. Despite the willingness from the SBY administrations to increase investments and focusing its policies on further developing the economic sector in Papua, in reality the situation was far worse than what they had expected. Papuans were showing signs to refuse the autonomy funding with reasons that Jakarta was systematically giving and taking back the money to Jakarta through its development programs.

Moreover, the constitution on special autonomy promised huge sum of funding for Papua’s political and economic and social development. Accordingly, the program would last for twenty-five years of Indonesian developments in Papua. Papua’s huge autonomy budgets created more
problems. Problems such as corruption and mismanagement of funds were rather usual. As result the situation in Papua become more complicated because a lot of funding has been credited into Papua with very little supervision. Many programs were designed to increase the welfare of the Papuan people which prompted the government to speed up developments and infrastructure in Papua and West Papua provinces. Despite the huge allocation of autonomy funding throughout both the Papuan provinces, the lack of human resources has been one of the issues that affects the outcome of programs. Papua’s human resources are lack the capabilities to manage and use the funds appropriately. One thing the central government wasn’t aware off was that autonomy in itself has been known to increase more difficulties in the relationship between Jakarta and Jayapura. Local Papuan elites were who are in charge at the provincial government to some extent pretend to overlook these problems.

Another important factor that contributes toward instability in Papua is the function of the DPRP (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Provinsi - Provincial House of Representatives). The DPRP has in many occasion fail to fulfil its functions as the people’s representatives. In fact, the DPRP has not been able to play its function to accommodate the interests of the local Papuan people such as focusing on the realization of laws and regulations which are interpreted within the actual implementation of the Papua’s autonomy. The DPRP has also played very little role in determining border security policies. One of the main reason is because the lack of professionalism and commitment to address security related issues with PNG. On the other hand, there are indications that the government of SBY did not run the special autonomy with a vengeance that is visible from the efforts of the government to just splash out huge sum of money as the answer to the ongoing conflict in Papua. The situation in Papua is becoming more and more complicated because of the magnitude of demands from the community. Other groups also take advantage to voice their demands which purposely aims to acquire Independence. The impact of the protracted relationship has in such a way attracted more international attention such as the US Congress that raised concerns of Papua’s status or even when
dozens of Papuans who seek asylum to PNG, Australia, Vanuatu or Solomon Islands. This indicates that there is a serious problem in Papua but not well handled by the government.

Since the implementation of government policies are inconsistent and does not provide Papua with long term solution, therefore the conflict in Papua remains active. Indonesia and PNG’s relationship has remained cordial regardless of the threats that occur along the border. Their stable relationship has been accredited to PNG’s recognition of the Papuan conflict as an Indonesian domestic issue. PNG’s commitment to refrain from addressing the Papuan conflict has been highly appreciated by Indonesia. Indonesia and PNG as members of the UN have undertaken the need to respect each other’s sovereignty, meaning there will be no interference. As supporting evidence the PNG government has maintained its position by addressing its foreign policy to officially request the Indonesian government to withdraw all its military operations form PNG soil, PNG vows to further crack down on OPM elements operating in PNG soil, PNG considers OPM elements who operate on PNG soil as illegal immigrants and will be subjected to deportation, stop PNG locals from providing basic support to them to the Papuans.

The insignificance and inaccuracy of the government in implementing policies for Papua is also illustrated from the lack of government regulations. Government regulations fail to comprehend and provide support in the realization Papua’s special autonomy. In practice the central government, breaks its own rules that exist in the constitution of the special autonomy. For instance, the central government prohibits the expression of identity from within Papuan communities. Such expressions and aspirations are regarded as intolerable by the government because it is seen as acts of separatism. The decision to bypass the autonomy and to take matters into their own hands as at times deteriorate relations between the Papuan people and the central government. The Indonesian government is known to have violate its own constitution in Papua therefore it has become the
basis of the conflict. Thus, many local Papuans consider to be free and independent than being ruled by the ruthless government of Indonesia.

Of the discrepancy, it looks clear that the government policy has not been able to facilitate the basic needs of communities regarding development, access to political expression, identity, and security in Papua. Meanwhile, to solve problems that exist, the view between the government and the people of Papua are clearly different. This has been a result of poor government policies simply do not match in terms of Papua, thus, igniting the need to fight for self-determination. Indeed, poor government policy toward Papua have been the result of the ongoing fight for self-determination. As long as the central government continues to reject the peoples’ aspirations for self-determination, human rights violations or other historical claims. The people of Papua will continue to sue the Indonesian government.

As a recommendation to the Indonesian government; Firstly, it is absolutely vital to enhance internal cooperation between the provincial and the regional border authorities in Papua. The enhancement cooperation the provincial border authorities will provide the basic platform for the further enhancement cooperation with the national border authority BNPP *(Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan)*. Such cooperation will allow for a concrete internal cooperation that will involve all aspects of like the CIQS (Customs, Immigration, Quarantine, Security). A solid internal cooperation is likely to be the best counter solution to the existing external threat. The coordination should intimately involve authorities such as the TNI and the police from various posts along the border.

Secondly, Indonesia needs to continue its efforts to maintain a high quality of relationship with PNG. The relationship needs to be natured without sacrificing the national interest of Indonesia. It is also vital to consider the aspects of diplomacy, not only the by the Indonesian representatives in PNG but also through the bureaucrats that are in charge of the border authorities in Papua province. In this case, it referrers to the BPPKLN (the
border and international cooperation board of Papua Province) both in the provincial and regional level in order to support the management of the border and the relationship of Indonesia and PNG. The relationship of Indonesia and PNG needs to be enhanced with mechanisms that will allow for more intergovernmental cooperation that will mutually benefit their relationship. Overall their security cooperation between Indonesia and PNG needs to be further enhanced in order to cater for mutual trust, including the responsibility to secure the entire Indonesia PNG border.

In addition, the Indonesian border authorities in Papua especially the BPPKLN should also focus on developing the human resources along the border. Infrastructural developments have been the main focus during the SBY period has managed to transform the border into a more urban outlook. Despite the progress in border developments there is still some weakness. The main weakness in maintaining a strong border cooperation with PNG is the role and function in developing the border area. The problem of coordination and planning is vital to the implementation of development programs along the border. So far, the level of cooperation and planning has not yet reached its full capacity. The overall infrastructural developments along the Indonesia PNG border has not yet reached its maximum capacity because not all the areas along the border will be developed. In maintaining a crucial role in the development of its relationship with PNG, Indonesia has to optimize the role of the national border agency. The national border agency should in this case be the highest in commend to make sure that all the policies are being implemented to serve the national interest. The national border agency (BNPP) should be the sole institution tasked to coordinate border security and developments with other related Ministries such as the Coordinating Ministry for Security and Justice, the TNI and the police etc. it also needs to implement a system of monitoring and evaluating in order to minimize the potential failures while addressing priority issues such as border cooperation.
In PNG’s case, firstly it recognizes that Papua is an integral part of Indonesia. Therefore, PNG as an active member of the United Nations is obliged to respect the sovereignty of Indonesia. In its official foreign policy to Indonesia PNG has officially stated that it will; Request that the Indonesian government withdraw all its military operations from the territory of PNG; Crack down on the existence of the OPM; Consider members of the OPM in Papua New Guinea as illegal immigrants and will return them to the Indonesian authorities at the border; Order PNG citizens to stop their aid to the OPM as mention in chapter four. This has shown PNG’s interest in cooperating with Indonesia toward establishing a secure and trouble-free border.

However, PNG has been facing difficulties in implementing its foreign and border policies due to internal factors that affect the processes of foreign policy making. Internal factors refer to factors that occur within the national government system such as government turnovers and frequent changes to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. These changes have caused instabilities within the state system. Frequent changes of senior departmental positions in turn affect the consistency of the national government’s aim to deal with the Papuan issue. In addition, the failure also rests upon the poor design and decision makings that often affect the implementation process. Outcomes were often poor because there is also less support from PNGs top decision makers.

Elites also appear to have their own individual interests which often force policies to change course. PNG elites have an influence in dealing with the Papuan issue because it is also through this issue that PNG elites find fame. Nevertheless, political parties also have an important part to play within this issue because political elites represent the political parties in parliament therefore political elites often recommend their party’s interests in foreign policy making to pursuing their interests. The internal factor discussed above clearly influence the fact that PNG fails to implement strictly border policies to back its foreign policy statements. The presence of OPM members in PNG clearly shows that PNG fails to implement its border
policies because in the beginning PNG stated that it has nothing to do with Papuan separatism issue but in reality, PNG is it not strict with implementing its policies. In addition, the permissive resident status granted to the refugees automatically violates its original policy.

Secondly, external factors refer to factors that contribute from outside the national government system such as the involvement of the media and the general public or the OPM activities that are carried out along the border. Like many other countries, the public is made aware of certain issues through the media. It is the media that plays an important role in keeping the public up to date with the latest news. The civil society does have direct influence to make decisions but the civil society has the right to know what decisions are made after long debates in parliament on the Papuan issue. The growing public support for Papuan separatism in PNG is a good example of the external factors that affect the PNG and Indonesian relationship. As part of the concerned civil society several NGO's, churches and other public institutions have vowed to support the Papuan activists.

In additions, there have been support for the cause of Papuan separatism from the Pacific that has been linked with Melanesian societies also has an impact in the making of PNG foreign policy. The supports from the Melanesian societies such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group has over the years given spirit and hopes to the Papuan activists to keep on struggling for independence. These supports from the civil society have as a whole the implementations of PNG foreign policy. So far PNG have not taken any major actions such as capturing and detaining Papuan activists who operate in PNG soil because of both failure and sympathetic governments that indirectly allows Papuan activists to carry out its campaigns in PNG.

Thirdly, it can be stated that democracy plays a central part in relationship of PNG and Indonesia, in particularly the making of foreign and border policies. PNG and Indonesia are both democratic states. However, it can’t be said that both states have the same democratic system of government.
PNG has a parliamentary system of democracy which is led by the prime minister while Indonesia has a presidential system of government which is led by the president. Nevertheless, both states possess the same attributes which are based on the values and norms of democracy. Furthermore, both states are faced with the common need to make decisions as part of a democratic society. Democracy means ruled by the people and clearly points out the involvement of civil society in democracies. Since PNG’s independence, its relationship with Indonesia has so far been steady. Even though some-times situations go out of control along the border still both states have never used cohesive power as means of problem solving.

Fourth and finally, over the years of their relationship PNG and Indonesia have been faced with the issue of Papuan separatism, so far, the one and only major issue affecting that relationship. The Papuan issue is capable of causing damage to the relationship. Moreover, the Papuan separatism issue still remains the most vital issue with the capacity to affect the border cooperation and the relationship of PNG and Indonesia in general.

Despite neglecting to support the Papuan plea for self-determination in a direct manner, PNG have been contributing a lot to the development of Papuans. Today there are almost 10,000 Papuan refugees who reside in PNG with permissive residence status. The permissive residence status enables Papuans to participate in all sectors society and the economy. Several Papuans have proven to be amongst the top PNG elites. The failure to compromise with its foreign policy to Indonesia can’t be seen because there is no evidence to prove that PNG is directly supporting the Papuan separatists. If PNG was to completely say no to Papuans it would have implemented strict policies to limit the refugee’s activities in PNG. However, with respect to human rights and democratic norms the government of PNG has allowed the refugees to settle in PNG with the freedom like any other citizen of PNG to pursue their basic rights in PNG. Papuan children are given right to education while Papuan adults are given the chance to be part of the Papua New Guinean workforce. Although it is straight forward that PNG regards the Papuan separatism as a domestic issue of Indonesia and
that PNG denies allegations of supporting the Papuan separatism issue, it can also be seen that PNG has contributed a lot in shaping Papuans. The chance to live without fear and to forget their traumas, gives Papuans the edge to learn more and develop into becoming more productive people. The Papuans who are granted permissive residence do not belong to a particular state. PNG has accommodated them to live under the seal of PNG. The right to be protected and the right to be free is what PNG is lending to Papuan refugees for decades.

PNG itself is faced with several challenges within its government bodies. Several turnovers of ministers and secretaries within the Departments of Defense and Foreign Affairs have contributed to the internal failure of policy implementation. PNGs internal problems such as the Sandline crisis which led to the military coup in 1997 after the PNG government under the leadership of Sir Julius Chan hired foreign mercenaries to fight in Bougainville shows a failure by the national government to maintain stability within the state itself. Over the years PNG has been facing difficulties in policy implementations. This is due to the lack of discipline from the members of parliament. Also amongst several reasons PNG was once said to have lost its capability to solve its problem because the function of the government has been designed to serve individual interests. In reality, the national government of PNG sets the foreign policy, later it is socialized to department secretaries who transfer it to several levels before it is finally being implemented. The corrupt use of power by certain politicians in the national executive council creates a misunderstanding amongst members. This misunderstanding is later transferred to the bureaucrats, then being transferred to other senior officers. The long line of political functions also turns to create a potential breakdown of communication which leads to the malfunction of individual political units.

Internal political problems that occur in PNG also create more chances that a particular foreign policy can fail. PNG have been faced with several changes in the leadership roles. The changes in government also slow down the implementation process of foreign policy, in this case the PNG
foreign policy to Indonesia based on the Papuan separatism issue. As one leader steps, down and another takes his position there can be misunderstanding that could lead the end of that policy. Different individuals come up with different ideas based on different interests. It is common that nepotism becomes one of the main reasons of the unsuccessful implementation of foreign policies. Over the years PNG have been facing problems such a misappropriation of funds or corruption. This has also contributed to the downsizing of the public servants especially in the Foreign Affairs Department where it had to close several postings. It also contributes substantially to the Papuan issue because PNG has no capacity to come out clearly on the issue of Papuan struggle for determination because leaders have been corruptly using their power and also misusing public funds for personal interests.

The Papuan issue has been used as a political tool when it comes to elections. A lot of elites see the Papuan issue as a good excuse to pursue political interests. Therefore, at most occasions political candidates give support for the Papuan issue only prior to elections. After elections, the Papuan issue usually disappears. The media also plays an important role in promoting the Papuan campaign. Several on air interviews with several leaders or activists is enough to pull some strings with the political arena. The main problem affecting the relationship of PNG and Indonesia is that Indonesia suspects PNG of being the breeding ground of Papuan activists. Indonesia sees PNG as not cooperating to its agreement. PNG on the other hand denies allegations of turning its back on Indonesia. Several agreements have been signed as part of the deal to maintain friendship and mutual cooperation based on common understanding. On the other hand, the Papuan cause is gaining more support from PNG elites and also several NGOs within PNG.

Apart from this, also several churches have been committed to support the Papuan struggle. Despite the growing support caused by the external factors it can be concluded that the Papuan issue seems to be losing the interests of its Melanesian brothers of the Pacific in the long run. Support
from countries like Vanuatu and Nauru, who used to be vocal on the Papuan issue in international summits, are beginning to fade because these countries have been put up by the challenge of globalization. New trending topics such as climate change, natural disasters, and terrorism have been dominating the political arena therefore the Papuan struggle for self-determination is losing support. Recently Vanuatu has accepted Indonesia as a special observer in the MSG, showing that Vanuatu is changing its course to pursue other interests with Indonesia.

In order to avoid future conflicts PNG and Indonesia should enhance further cooperation in all sectors such as economy, social, political etc. By doing so, this could contribute to trust building and a stable environment in which Indonesia could have the chance to pursue its interests in the Pacific region while PNG could also have the chance to pursue its interests in ASEAN. Papua New Guinea’s acceptance that Papua is an integral part of Indonesia means that it would be Indonesia’s responsibility to find a better solution to solve the Papuan issue. PNG can help to facilitate in communicating with the refugees. It is Indonesia’s responsibility to meet the demands of the Papuan people. The best way would be to seek help from the international community to settle the Papuan separatism issue once and for all. PNG has made it plainly clear that it has nothing to do with the Papuan issue. Therefore, it is totally left to the Indonesian government to decide the future of Papua.

In this case, it can be said that PNG failed to keep up to its foreign policy because it is still indirectly giving support to Pauans. On day to day basis Pauans are tolerated with freedom whereas in the foreign policy it is straight forward that PNG has nothing to do with the Papuan struggle for self-determination. It is premature to state that PNG is supporting the OPM because at the same time internal factors also affect PNGs foreign policy implementations. PNG is also faced with internal government problems of which corruption and nepotism are the main ones. Political parties also contribute to what failures of implementing foreign policy. Because new leaders come up with new expectations and new ideas which makes it hard
for the government to carry out its foreign policy. An example would be the change of ministers are sworn in to power the next day they fire their secretary then the secretary would be either a tribesman (wantok sistem) or a member of the same political party.

Hence it can be seen like war amongst the government itself. Each member of the government is pursuing his or her own interests or political party’s interests, having no concern for their main purpose which is to serve the government and the people. In conclusion although failures in both internal and external factors turn to give the Papuan activists the advantage to continue their campaign for independence, it seems hard because, the national government still denies its role in the Papuan issue but maybe one day it can change its mind on the Papuan issue. Politics is all about the interest based on gains and losses so if the Papuan deal is of benefit to PNG then maybe PNG will reconsider to support Papuans but for now it is clear that based on its foreign policy to Indonesia that PNG has nothing to do with supporting Papuans for independence but failures in the government system tends to create a negative image of PNG in Indonesia with respect to this issue of border security.
Reference List
BLM must provide contributions to the governments of RI_PNG. (2015, 16 October). Cenderwasih Pos, p. 1.


Indonesia-PNG. (2013). Record of Discussions The Northern Border Liaison Officers Meeting between Indonesia and PNG. Jayapura.


RI-PNG agrees to increase the cooperation of people to people contact. (2015, 23 April). *Cenderawasih Pos*, p. 2.


Rolls, M. G. (1994). In C. McInnes & M. G. Rolls (Eds.), Post-Cold War security issues in the Asia-Pacific region (pp. 64). Essex, UK: F. Cass.


168


