Islam Ex Situ

The ‘Othering’ of the Ottoman At and After the Great Exhibition

1851-1901

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KATHERINE LAURA JENNINGS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis takes a material culture approach to one aspect of Anglo-Ottoman relations, that of the ‘othering’ of the Ottoman by the Anglo-Christian observer. I analyse how Ottoman objects were assembled, ordered, exhibited, and interpreted at the Great Exhibition. The Sublime Porte sent 3380 articles to be exhibited at the Crystal Palace. I examine what messaging their classification and exhibition gave to Anglo-Christian audiences regarding Islam and ‘the Turk’—both a religious and racial ‘other.’ Part I surveys the exhibitionary complex, beginning with the Great Exhibition (the material dimension); and Part II deals with the ways Anglo-Christian commentators characterised Ottoman Turks between 1851 and 1901 (the social dimension). The conclusion I have drawn is that a material dimension reflected and served to reinforce the social dimension to historical Anglo-Ottoman relations. Although some turcophile observers during the mid-to-late nineteenth century sought a sincerer, more empathetic engagement with Turkey and her empire, tropes that cast Ottoman Turks as ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ persisted and were manifested at the Crystal Palace—itself a structure that physicalised binaries between east and west, crescent and cross, ‘other’ and ‘self.’ Ottoman objects ex situ were read with reference to an existing canon of tropes/types. This research shows how Islam and the Ottoman Empire have been conceptualised, materialised, and ‘othered’ since the Great Exhibition by way of object, text, and space.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Othering and ‘the Turk’</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 ‘The Turk’ as an historical construct</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Islam and ‘the Turk’</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Materiality</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Central research questions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Applying the social and material dimensions to the subject</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Material culture</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 The approach: ‘object-driven’</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 The method: ‘thick description’</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 The literature: defining the field</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 The Eastern Question</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 The Tanzimat</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART I

The Material Dimension: England, Turkey, and the Great Exhibition, 1851

CHAPTER 3

PROCESS AND PEDAGOGY

Introduction ................................................................. 51
3.1 Anglo-Ottoman exchange: the early stages ............... 51
3.2 Anglo-Ottoman exchange: the arrival .................. 54
3.3 Anglo-Ottoman exchange: the installation .......... 57
3.4 Was the Great Exhibition a Christian event? .......... 57
3.5 An opportunity to evangelise ............................... 60
3.6 Visitors as “invaders” ........................................... 61
3.7 Visitors as objects .................................................. 62
3.8 The Crescent in the Official Descriptive and

Illustrated Catalogue .................................................. 64
3.9 A “Mohammedan” exhibit .................................... 66
3.10 Carpets at the Crystal Palace .............................. 68
CHAPTER 4

BAZAAR AND HAREM

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 80

4.1 Trope and site .......................................................................................................... 80

4.2 Muslim topographies at the Crystal Palace: the bazaar ........................................ 83

4.3 Responses to the bazaar ......................................................................................... 87

4.4 Weapons at the bazaar and the ‘barbarous Turk’ ................................................ 88

4.5 From the bazaar to the harem ................................................................................ 92

4.6 Muslim topographies at the Crystal Palace: the harem ........................................ 95

4.7 *The Lustful Turk* ................................................................................................ 96

4.8 The hookah and the harem ................................................................................... 97

4.9 Contrasting perspectives on the harem ............................................................... 99

4.10 *The Greek Slave* ................................................................................................ 102

Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 106

PART II

The Social Dimension: Shifting Sympathies in Anglo-Ottoman Relations, 1851-1901
CHAPTER 5

ISLAM AND IDOLATRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>110</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 “Islâm and the idol could not exist”</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Müller and Clair-Tisdall: praise for Muhammadan “Protestantism”</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Muhammadan iconoclasm from a Muslim perspective</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Art authorities on Muslim material culture</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 6

CROSS AND CRESCENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1 “Turk and Mohammedan must not be confounded”</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Porter and the missionary movement</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Porter, Davies, and Farley: scepticism, pessimism, and turcophobia</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Christians in Turkey, 1863</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 The ‘enlightened Turk’</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6 Turcophilism</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7 The tide turns again, 1880</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 An overview</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Restating the research questions</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Critical discussion</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 A final thought for future studies</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY 173
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the ‘othering’ of the Ottoman Empire within the exhibitionary arena and the English press, beginning with the Great Exhibition (London, 1851). I will examine the material and social dimensions to that grand-scale event. A bipartite structure distributes analyses between both textual and material data—a balance that has generally been missing from interreligious studies, which tend to privilege the word above material culture. Material culture provides the methodological basis for Part I, which surveys various aspects of the Turkish bazaar at the Great Exhibition. Part II then examines Anglo-Christian attitudes towards, and perceptions of, Ottoman Turks according to a turcophile-turcophobe paradigm, making particular reference to the *tanzimat* and trope construction. The aim is not so much to determine whether Ottoman objects were sacralised or secularised at the Crystal Palace as it is to understand the socio-religious context within which they were acquired and consumed and thus to be able to answer: to what body of knowledge did members of the hosting nation refer, when mounting and responding to Ottoman objects? I assess what messaging the classification and exhibition of those objects suggested to an Anglo-Christian audience becoming more familiar with Islam and Muslim material heritage by way of object, text, and space. More broadly, the research seeks to illustrate how ‘the Turk’ has been conceptualised and materialised in this particular western context.
1.1 Othering and ‘the Turk’

What Božidar Jezernik (2009) calls ‘stereotyping’ I will refer to as ‘othering.’ More scholars are beginning to address how stereotyping or othering has functioned within interreligious and interstate relations, historical and contemporary. Othering is a discursive strategy deployed by one in-group to differentiate itself from a particular out-group and to justify negative attributions to that party, thereby enforcing epistemic assumptions about identity and inherent difference. Several semiotic, artistic, and linguistic devices can be used by the in-group to render an out-group dangerous, different, and potentially hostile: metaphor, synecdoche, fallacy, counterfactual, quotation and topos are a few. Othering is a reductive process. To critique it or to consider how it might produce negative portrayals is not to condemn historical figures or movements, however; and neither is othering only practised by European parties. Renée Worringer (2014) and Ussama Makdisi (2002) have each considered how Ottoman writers and artists have othered or ‘orientalised’ peoples in literature and art. Selim Deringil (2003) has argued that, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, Ottoman elites “adopted the mindset of their enemies, the arch-imperialists,” to undertake a “colonial project” with regard to their own people: part of their project was to uphold “civilising motifs” while casting nomadic populations as savages and

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1 Jezernik writes that “stereotyping is a common practice in the west and in the east.” See “Stereotyping the Turk,” in Božidar Jezernik, Imagining ‘the Turk’ (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 1-3.
fanatics—they had othered peoples within their own political purview, often with reference to European source material. Deringil, Makdisi, and Worringer make clear that othering is relational as well as reductive and that it is not an exclusively European phenomenon. My research is concerned with the othering of, not by, the Ottoman.

According to Beyza Ç. Tekin (2010) othering is a “core strategy in the formation of individual, and collective identities.” As an ‘other’ is created a ‘self’ can be consolidated. Tekin adds that othering imposes a hierarchy on persons and peoples by asserting not only that two groups are distinct from one another but that one is superior: “the Turkish Other is inferior to the Self.” Here, the self is European and Christian and the other is the Ottoman Muslim.

Othering or stereotyping is a process that produces a type or trope. A type is assigned attributes and characteristics and the out-group to which that type belongs is effectively ‘othered’ as well. Thus it applies to the individual—‘a’ or ‘the’ Turk—and to the collective, to Ottoman Turks. Jezernik and Krystyna Pisarkowa (1976) describe ‘the Turk’ as being semantically commensurate with ‘the Scot’ or ‘the Swiss’ because it is a national designation; but they note that religious as well as cultural and psychological

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4 Selim Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery:’ The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” Comparative Studies in Society and History vol. 45; no. 2 (2003): 311/318.  
5 Tekin, Representations and Othering in Discourse: The construction of Turkey in the EU, 11. Tekin cites several scholars who have argued that difference is essential to identity, that without an other, the self cannot be realised. See also William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 64/144. Tekin agrees with Connolly that identity can only exist in a relational sense.  
6 ibid, 165-166.
connotations are often attached to it, even today.\footnote{7} To address how Ottoman Turks were othered during the mid-to-late nineteenth century—how ‘the Turk’ was imagined and perceived—it is important to examine the “traits, characteristics, qualities, and features” that have been attributed to them.\footnote{8} Historically, the term Turk has been used by European parties in a pejorative sense, coupled with a descriptive, derisive word.\footnote{9} According to Michael Curtis (2009) the word itself has, in the European literary canon, “often been used in a derogatory fashion, connoting cruelty and lasciviousness, and also as a synonym for the word Muslim.”\footnote{10} Curtis introduces a few ideas that form a foundation for this thesis: the first is that Ottoman identity has habitually been associated with cruelty and lasciviousness, expressing the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’

\footnote{7}{See Jezernik, *Imagining ‘the Turk,’* 148/160. Jezernik is citing and translating (from Polish) Krystyna Pisarkowa, *Konotacja semantyczna nazw narodowości,* Zeszyty Prasoznawcze no. 1, 5-36. Each author addresses the many semantic connotations attached to the term ‘the Turk.’ Turk as a proper noun is an ethno-linguistic and national designation, however: not exclusively an historical trope/type. It can refer expansively to those who speak Turkic languages or more specifically to the ethnic group, the Anatolian Turks (*Anadolu Türkleri*). Within the current Turkish constitution (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası*) it is stated “every individual who is bound to the Turkish state by ties of citizenship is a Turk.” Translation taken from *Turkey: violations of free expression in Turkey* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 93. Article 88 from the earlier constitution (1924 *Türk Anayasası*) formed under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had declared that “in Turkey, from the point of view of citizenship, everyone is a Turk without regard to race or religion.” Translation taken from Bertil Emrah Oder, “Turkey,” in Markus Thiel [ed.], *The ‘Militant Democracy’ Principle in Modern Democracies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 275. Oder writes that Atatürk (1881-1938) defined citizenship as a “constitutional bond” and therefore ‘references like ‘Turk’ and ‘every Turk’ does not refer to racial or ethnic identity” or to religion but rather to national citizenship. Constitutional language dissociates the term ‘Turk’ from ethnicity, faith, or any other professed identity, and instead claims a binding relationship between all Turkish citizens and the state. Ethno-religious distinctions used to differentiate one Ottoman group from another—Armenian Christians from Iberian Jews, for example—may have been made at least nominally redundant by the modern republican lexicon.}

\footnote{8}{Tekin, *Representations and Othering in Discourse,* 22. Tekin writes how “othering in discourse” has “constructed” Turkey in the collective European imagination. Although she is writing here about the Turkish republic and the European Union, her definitions and research questions are equally pertinent for historical-critical studies like mine. Tekin also “explores the lineages [sic]” between contemporary tropes and the “earlier images, representations, stereotypes” that “fanaticized” the “Turkish Other.”}

\footnote{9}{To this point, see Kevin M. McCarthy, “The Derisive Use of Turk and Turkey,” *American Speech* vol. 45; no. 1/2 (1970): 157-159.}

\footnote{10}{Michael Curtis, *Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 23.}
tropes respectively; and another is that Ottoman Turks were recognised as and assumed to be Muslims. Their ‘cruelty’ and ‘lasciviousness’ were treated as faith characteristics.

1.2 ‘The Turk’ as an historical construct

Therefore, in order to identify major aspects of this multifaceted image of the Turkish way of government, Turkish religion, character, culture or civilisation, all in constant evolution through the course of time, one should decide on a starting point.\textsuperscript{11}

Tekin acknowledges that ‘the Turk’ is a multi-dimensional figure. Just as collective self-identity is plural rather than singular, perceptions of the ‘other’ are intricate and multi-faceted. Various tropes have been co-constructed by Anglo-Christian commentators to personify Ottoman faith, character, culture, and civilisation to European and western audiences. Doğan Gürpınar (2012) cites several manifestations that were ubiquitous during the nineteenth century: the reforming Turk, the fanatical Turk, the dignified Turk, the rural Turks and the official and military Turks, and the old Turks and the young Turks.\textsuperscript{12} Othering is a complex phenomenon that can produce many varied, and even contradictory, tropes.

\textsuperscript{11} Tekin, \textit{Representations and Othering in Discourse}, 28.
\textsuperscript{12} Doğan Gürpınar, “The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism in Nineteenth-Century British Discourses: Visions of the Turk, ‘Young’ and ‘Old,’” \textit{British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies} vol. 39; no. 2 (2012): 347-372. Jezernik concurs with Gürpınar and Tekin that although certain tropes were popular and persisted for several hundred years, ‘the Turk’ has “never had just one face” in the “gaze of Westerners” but rather has “always had many difference faces” subject to “a range of changes during the times.” See Jezernik, “Stereotyping the Turk,” 2. This is an interesting reference to a contemporary art-historical concept, that of the gaze. A useful summary of ‘the gaze’ can be found in Anne D’Avella, \textit{Methods and Theories of Art History} (London: Laurence King, 2005), 106-108.
I have chosen two tropes—to take a “starting point” as Tekin recommends—which will be examined later. Both the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ tropes were popular and well-established by the mid-nineteenth century and I believe they were manifested materially and conceptually at the Great Exhibition. Many more tropes existed and were constructed by nineteenth-century writers and artists, some of whom treated Ottoman Turks with more empathy (turcophile) than enmity (turcophobe). Indeed it would be valid and very productive to consider which tropes, if any, were critiqued or challenged as Europeans had better access to Ottoman materials within the exhibitionary complex. A researcher might also emphasise positive interpersonal exchanges rather than collective perception: exhibitions and fairs facilitated encounters between visiting Muslims and hosts, not only in London in 1851 and 1876 but also in New York (1853), Philadelphia (1889), Paris (1893; 1900), and Brussels (1897). Although I have considered the positive as well as negative attributions given to Ottoman Turks by Anglo-Christians, my research demonstrates that negative tropes tended to be enforced within the exhibitionary arena. Despite variances in tone and a divergence of public opinion regarding the tanzimat, Ottoman Turks were othered more negatively than positively. Texts and images that exaggerate ‘barbarism’ and ‘lustfulness’ speak to this general pattern.

Individual motives may or may not be considered significant to trope construction: how consciously was ‘the Turk’ othered by Anglo-Christian writers, artists, and orators and to what end? A parliamentarian might well have different motivations when describing Ottoman Turks to his constituents than a churchman has when addressing his fellow Christians, for example. While I have taken tone, tenor and potential efficacy into
account—*Punch* magazine satirises for comedy as well as commentary, for example, which makes it fundamentally different from a parliamentary paper—motivation and agenda are outside my scope. My analyses will not draw conclusions about whether commentators were sincere or performing rhetorically. Neither do I attempt to discern which tropes had some factual basis, or to what extent, or which were entirely baseless. Some scholars have worked in a corrective mode and have done so effectively, namely Norman Daniel (1960; 1963) and more recently Shahin Khattak (2008). My work treats texts as data and their publication, circulation, and content as significant.

1.3 Islam and ‘the Turk’

From the very beginnings of interactions between the Muslims and Christians, Turks represented for the European the “other” par excellence. Islam contributed to the profile that othered ‘the Turk,’ though to what degree is debatable. Some scholars have suggested that after the reformation fractured Europe,
European states conducted diplomacy with Istanbul with a view to securing economic and diplomatic advantage more than representing or defending the “common corps of Christendom.”15 Certainly, from the sixteenth century—an English embassy was established in Istanbul in 1583, a half-century after the French built theirs there—Anglo-Ottoman relations did tend carefully to military issues and commercial interests and to myriad other, secular concerns.16 A clear example is the 1838 Balta-Limani Commercial Treaty, which lowered tariffs on English goods entering the Ottoman market.17 Nevertheless there is ample evidence that relations between the Sublime Porte and London had a striking religious tenor, inherited from medieval conflict, which continued well into the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries.18 Franklin L. Baumer (1944) states that in spite of any political expediencies, trade agreements, and the religious schism that separated England from the papal domain, the “common corps of Christendom continued to hold its ground to an astonishing degree in official as in other circles.”19 Here Baumer refers to English-language publications and policies that cast ‘the Englishman’ as a Christian representative and ‘the Turk’ as a common enemy to Christianity—they are bannermen, one for the cross and the other for the crescent.

15 Franklin Baumer cites several scholars who claimed that by 1600, if not earlier, the “common corps of Christendom” had dissolved and diplomatic relations between European states and the Ottoman Empire were secularised: Ernest Charrière (1805-1865), René de Maulde-La Clavière (1848-1902), Ernest Nys (1851-1920), and Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940). See Franklin L. Baumer, “England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom,” The American Historical Review vol. 50; no. 1 (1944): 26-27. Baumer adds that “historians of the special English phase of the subject tend to share this view.”

16 For a diplomatic history, see G. R. Berridge [ed.], British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the present: A study in the evolution of the resident embassy (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009). Religious issues are not emphasised in this essay collection.

17 For a more thorough explanation of this treaty and its implications for Anglo-Ottoman trade, see Candan Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War, 1835-1856 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 290-291.

18 The Sublime Porte is a synecdochic term for the Ottoman central government. It references the tall gates of the Topkapı Palace, Bâb-i Hümâyûn, from which the sultans issued their decrees. It is also sometimes referred to as the Ottoman Porte or the High Porte.

Both state and church would continue to sponsor rhetoric that othered ‘the Turk’ on a religious as well as racial basis.

Sources from the 50-year period between 1851 and 1901, which are the textual data for my thesis, show a preoccupation with Islam and the ummah. Doğan Gürpınar (2012) concludes from available evidence that “many perceived Islam to be the main cause of the savagery of the official Turks.” His comment refers to mid-nineteenth century writers and thinkers who were considering and constructing ‘the official Turk’ type amid the tanzimat and the wider Eastern Question—two historical phenomena I will introduce later (2.7-8). Responses to the tanzimat and any proposed solutions to the Eastern Question were influenced by the notion that the war between cross and the crescent had never entirely ceased. Moreover, commentators tended to narrate from their own denominational positions, conflating religion and race when addressing the other, thereby combining a “moralising racist perspective” with a “Christian ethical essentialism.” To the mid-century English/European mind, Islam was closely associated with Ottoman civilisation and the majority of the Ottoman population.

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21 ibid. According to Gürpınar, a “racialist vision” was “embedded within a theological framework.” He states that this ethno-moralist position was “peculiar to a certain mindset at a certain historical juncture.” Here, he implies that nineteenth-century commentators ‘othered’ ‘the Turk’ in quite a different way from their European predecessors or at least with different emphases.

22 James Harper is another contemporary scholar who, like Gürpınar, has underscored connections/conflations between Ottoman Turks and Muslim identity within the historical European psyche: “Through process of translation that often involved multiple stages, the figure of the Turk (and by extension that of the Muslim) underwent a multiplicity of interpretations that reflect and reveal Western needs, anxieties, and agendas.” The title Harper gives to his edited volume, The Turk and Islam in the Western Eye, bears out the same idea. His statement also makes clear that representations of Turks/Muslims in western sources often have more to do with projection than reality. James G. Harper [ed.], The Turk and Islam in the Western Eye, 1450-1750: Visual Imagery Before Orientalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), i. The first edition was published in 2011.
Ottoman Turks were known to be Muslims; their behaviours and characters were considered to be fortified and guided by Islam. With religion and race conflated, ‘the Turk’ was othered more emphatically.

As has already been stated, ‘othering’ produces hierarchy and binary. Ottoman Turks (others) have historically been cast as racially and religiously inferior to the European (self). Muslims were habitually perceived as militant, zealous, and predisposed to hostility to the Christian west. Though the Muslim warrior trope predates the crusades—armies had campaigned visibly and actively since Muhammad and were recognised to be Muslims spreading Islam by the sword—it came to occupy the collective European imagination to a discernible degree from the twelfth century and by the nineteenth was expressed with even more vigour. While the trope did not persist without critique—Charles Dickens (1812-1870), for example, referred to war between cross and crescent as literary hyperbole—the notion that Ottoman Turks are savage, barbaric, and ignorant because Islam breeds savagery, barbarism, and ignorance among susceptible peoples, gained greater currency as the fin de siècle approached.23 There was usually a material as well as linguistic element to this type-casting.

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23 See Imagining ‘the Turk,’ 93-94: Jezernik cites Household Words, a weekly magazine that Dickens edited. According to Jezernik, Dickens “shredded all to pieces” the “Turkish myth” and the Ottoman warrior trope. Dickens suggested that although it was unlikely to be a “popular or agreeable sentiment” the Ottoman soldier in fact would “go listlessly into battle” rather than fanatically or ferociously.
1.4 Materiality

‘Muslim-made’ objects have been acquired peacefully by European traders and missionaries since the eighth century.\textsuperscript{24} During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, English and European crusaders returned from campaigns with stolen goods. They had kept as war booty saddles, stirrups, sabres and shabracks—any trappings that could be stripped forcibly from a Seljuq soldier or from his horse and claimed for the cross.\textsuperscript{25} Rudolf Distelberger (1985) notes that objects were chosen to be paraded at home not only because they were dangerous: things that were deadly and decorative were preferred, such as a sabre with an elaborate handle, carved and gilded with gems.\textsuperscript{26} Muslims were imagined to be warlike and ostentatious, as evidenced by the care craftsmen took to beautify killing instruments. Conflicts between cross and crescent facilitated the movement of military items from Anatolia to England and wider Europe. While a preoccupation with war and weapons persisted, such objects would not be displayed coherently, or arranged into collections, until the sixteenth century.

Between 1500 and 1800, collecting was for the privileged and display was private. Walter Cope (1553-1614) amassed the first English wunderkammer on record.

\textsuperscript{24} ‘Muslim-made’ is a term used sparingly throughout the thesis, to refer to objects whose meaning and significance is primarily derived from the assumed faith of the maker.
\textsuperscript{25} A shabrack (Turkish: çapak) is a saddle-cloth that was used by light cavalrmen. Often, they bear embellishment and military signifiers such as coats of arms or regional crests.
\textsuperscript{26} Rudolf Distelberger: “ostentatious objects from the empire of the Turkish arch-enemy made a strong impression on the visitor to the treasury, for these objects brought home the duel for power, the constant threat from the East, and the changing fate of the two powers.” See “The Hapsburg Collections in Vienna during the Seventeenth Century,” in Oliver Impey and Arthur MacGregor [eds.], The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of Curiosities and Seventeenth Century Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 43-44. A new edition (2017) has been printed by the Ashmolean Museum with revisions and photographic additions. Ian Heath references Distelberger as “Dislelberger” in The Representation of Islam in British Museums (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2007), 33/347.
Although comparatively rare in England, *wunderkammer*—cabinets of curiosities—were fashionable in continental Europe from the mid-sixteenth century or so.\(^{27}\) These were encyclopaedic collections, with mixed media displayed in a domestic space, designed to educate and entertain. Cabinets might have minerals, antiquities, *objets d'art*, weaponry and religious relics and much more to show to a private audience. Julian Raby (1985) notes that “Islamic objects” within early *wunderkammer* and the later *kunstkammer* were treasured for their “historical associations” and for their relative otherness.\(^{28}\) They were different and distinctly non-European.

Ian Heath (2007) concludes that the “collection of Islamic material” for curiosity cabinets and for private collections was “not only an attempt to understand the Other” but as well a means to consolidate “European identity.”\(^{29}\) Here he has recognised that othering is a co-constructive process, whereby the self is enforced in relation to the other. Furthermore, collecting and display can reinforce that self/other binary.

According to Heath, the “presence of Turkish material” in pre-nineteenth century collections is notable and reflects the “significant relationship between various

\(^{27}\) See “Museums Arrive in England,” in Ken Arnold, *Cabinets for the Curious: Looking Back at Early English Museums* (London: Routledge, 2017), n.p. *Wunderkammer* or *kunstkammer* predate my research area but are crucial to museology and museum history. *Wunderkammer* can be considered to be proto-museums of sorts.

\(^{28}\) Materials from Muslim-majority regions were classified as ‘artificial’ as opposed to natural. Julian Raby, “Exotica from Islam,” Oliver Impey and Arthur MacGregor [eds.], 253. Raby states that the rationale behind *wunderkammer* was to “display both God’s and Man’s ingenuity.”

\(^{29}\) Ian Heath, *The Representation of Islam in British Museums* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2007), 35. Heath begins his work by stating that museology has missed an important phenomenon, that is, “the collection and display of Islamic material.” ‘Islamic’ is used repeatedly to refer to material culture generally and to individual objects. Whether it is an appropriate or qualifying term, able to be applied to artworks and art objects, is debated among contemporary art historians as well as Islamic philosophers.
European powers and the Ottoman Empire from the fifteenth century” onwards.\(^{30}\) Private collectors treasured Ottoman (as well as Persian) carpets in particular.\(^{31}\) Prospective buyers might be royals or courtiers, churchmen, statesmen, or bourgeoisie, but they all belonged to privileged social classes. As a court practice carpet-collecting reached all the way to the monarchy, beginning with Henry VIII.\(^{32}\) By 1547, upon his death, the Tudor inventory registered some 400 Ottoman-made carpets. Well before acquisition was undertaken by public institutions, Ottoman material heritage had been acquired piece by piece and exoticised by English collectors.

Several hundred years later, collecting was undertaken by the middle class (private) and at the state level by museum curators and gallery owners (public). Ottoman Turks were still perceived as enemy combatants and yet contradictory tropes were evidently popular at the time. One was that Muslims, marshalled by Allāh, are militant, fanatical, and warlike (‘barbarous’ Turks) but another was that they are indulgent and licentious (‘lustful’ Turks). Both types were manifested at the Crystal Palace.

\(^{30}\) ibid, 32-33.
\(^{31}\) Jane Fawcett, *Historic Floors: Their Care and Conservation* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 156. *Historic Floors* draws focus to what Fawcett considers a “neglected subject which deserves worldwide attention”—the maintenance and preservation of historic floors and floor-coverings in designated heritage buildings. She provides a conservation-oriented perspective to textiles studies in chapter 14, 129-163, where she addresses parquetry and pile carpets.
\(^{32}\) King Henry VIII commissioned Hans Holbein to paint him, in full regalia, standing squarely upon an Ottoman carpet acquired from Üşak. Sadly, it was destroyed by fire in 1698. A cartoon by Holbein is kept at the National Portrait Gallery, London, and a to-scale copy is extant, which is useful as a source reference for the carpet chosen for the sitting: *Portrait of Henry VIII, 1536/7*, oil on canvas, Liverpool: Walker Art Gallery. The year King Henry died, his son struck a similar pose for the official coronation portrait. Edward VI, the boy-king, plants his feet firmly atop a richly coloured star carpet. *King Edward VI*, c. 1547, oil on panel, London: National Portrait Gallery.
Conclusion

My research is based upon two corresponding assumptions that should be declared. One is that collecting, classifying, and exhibiting is a deliberate, considered process with implications well beyond the formal; the other is that English/European collectors have, historically, collected Ottoman objects with particular intensity and classified and exhibited them with special reference to their Muslim provenance—to emphasise their ‘otherness.’ Both assumptions have been asserted and borne out by earlier scholars, notably by Raby and Heath. Acquisition functions as a transaction between individual persons and the peoples they represent. An acquired object has not been looted, stolen, claimed as a war trophy or otherwise taken without consent; it is given as a gift or exchanged for currency, monetary or material. Acquiring an object from its place of origin and designating a new space for its display is a pedagogically-loaded process, which is why academic inquiry into collecting and display can be so productive.
CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE

Approaching the Subject

This social or institutional dimension of religion almost inevitably becomes incarnate in different ways, in material form, as buildings, works of art, and other creations.33

Ninian Smart (1927-2001) defined religion as an “organism with seven dimensions.”34 His biocentric phraseology is meant to convey the sense that religions are active, alive, and made of interconnected parts that, combined, create a whole. If a single dimension is injured the entity will be impacted. During the nineteen-eighties, Smart formulated a sevenfold schema that portions religion and religious experience into elements that are identifiable across all faiths. Each dimension can be examined in isolation or in relation to others. They are: (1) practical/ritual; (2) experiential/emotional; (3) narrative/mythic; (4) doctrinal/philosophical; (5) ethical/legal; (6) social/institutional; (7) material/artistic. By adding ‘material’ as a seventh dimension—his six-dimensional formula had been issued two decades earlier (1969)—Smart acknowledged that objects


34 Cited by Andrea Diem-Lane, When Scholars Study the Sacred: An Introduction to Religious Studies (California: MSAC Philosophy Group, 2008), 7. This quote, referring to religion as a seven-dimensional organism, has been transcribed from a conversation between Smart and philosopher-theologian Paul Johannes Tillich (1886-1995).
are significant locators that can shape religious experience and facilitate interreligious exchange.35 My research is concerned with the social and material dimensions.

Neither the social nor material dimensions can be properly examined without some reference to one another. Smart argues that the social (social/institutional) and material (material/artistic) dimensions have a particular, mutually-reinforcing relationship. While the other dimensions can generally be “considered in abstract terms” and are unseeable, the latter two have more “to do with the incarnation of religion” and are manifest and tangible.36 The social and material elements that contribute to the composition of all religious organisms are the two that externalise and institutionalise what would otherwise remain internal, ephemeral and invisible. Because they are closely related and are both observable phenomena, the social and material dimensions are fitting as a framing device for my work.

This thesis is organised in two parts, each defined by a different dimension. Part I is a study of the Great Exhibition and the modes deployed at it for displaying Ottoman objects, under the heading of the material dimension. Whether and to what degree Ottoman-made items were read with reference to their Muslim provenance is a major theme. Part II is text-based, discursive, and deals with the social dimension to historical Anglo-Ottoman relations. Broadly speaking, it offers critical-contextual substance by addressing mid-to-late nineteenth-century relations between two socio-religious

bodies—the Ottoman Empire (Islamic) and the British Empire (Christian)—but it would be more precise to say that it is concerned with individual and collective Anglo-Christian perceptions of the Ottoman ‘other’ as expressed by English-speaking sources. Part II complements and supplements Part I and the function of the conclusion is to relate them to each another.

### 2.1 Central research questions

- **The Material Dimension** (Part I): what information did the Great Exhibition, 1851, relay to Anglo-Christian audiences about ‘the Turk’ and Islam?
- **The Social Dimension** (Part II): between 1851 and 1901, how and to what degree was ‘the Turk’ othered on a religious basis?

### 2.2 Applying the social and material dimensions to the subject

Before it is possible to answer these research questions it is necessary to establish why I have chosen to examine Anglo-Ottoman relations from an interreligious—and social and material—perspective.

Smart defines both the church and the ummah as global social institutions.\(^{37}\) Social organisation is one of the “dimensions of the sacred”—to take the titular phrase from his 1996 text—that renders faith a manifested, organised, observable phenomenon.\(^{38}\)

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\(^{37}\) *Ummat al-Islamiyah*: the community of the faithful. Smart refers broadly to both the church and the ummah without making denominational distinctions. Both socio-religious institutions are treated here as universal.

Dimensions of the Sacred also takes particular care to navigate the complex relationship between empires, nations, and faith. Smart perceives the nation as being “analogous to a religion” because it is a constructed, defined social body.\(^{39}\) Here, he acknowledges that governing centres such as the Sublime Porte have historically co-constructed religious and national citizenship to encourage duality between religious and political identities.\(^{40}\) In other words, it was advantageous from a governance position that belonging to the Ottoman polity would also mean belonging to the ummah. Moreover, Smart notes that religion, as well as history and language, has defined citizenship to the English nation and the British Empire since \textit{cuius regio eius religio} lost currency.\(^{41}\) Empires, with nations at their centres, can thus be defined as socio-religious bodies. This definition does not seek to claim that the church and the ummah are perfectly comparable, nor does it homogenise either context according to a singular faith. Denominational variance is dealt with from the Anglo-Christian perspective during the following chapters; and from the Ottoman perspective, it is true that the Ottoman Empire was tremendously diverse, ethnically, culturally and religiously.\(^{42}\) Because my work is primarily about perception and trope construction, however, approaching those empires in terms of collective identity, as Smart has, is appropriate.

\(^{39}\) Smart, \textit{Dimensions of the Sacred}, 259. Here, Smart is speaking to the theme of the “relation between national histories and religious values.” He adopts the same biocentric language that is evident in the opening quote: the nation has “various arms and organs” that can be unified by a “national faith.”


\(^{41}\) \textit{Ibid}, 259/254. \textit{Cuius regio, eius religio} is a Latin phrase meaning “whose realm, his religion.” It is a principle that the faith to which a ruler adheres automatically be the faith of his/her dominion. Smart argues that it was “considerably softened with the rise of nationalism,” particularly in Britain.

The idea that objects can play a significant role in externalising religion and solidifying its social infrastructure can be traced back to Smart and to earlier phenomenologists.\footnote{There is a scholarly basis for material culture that precedes Prown, who will be discussed soon, and even Smart. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) formulated a phenomenological inquiry model to “get back to the things themselves.” Although Husserl referred to recorded events and recordable experience rather than objects, \textit{per se}, his rhetorical framework is applicable to contemporary material culture. See Josef Seifert, \textit{Back to Things in Themselves: Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism} (London: Routledge, 2013), 53.}

A theoretical foundation for relating objects to religion has helped to establish material culture, a still-developing subdiscipline.

### 2.3 Material culture

Although art museums, historical societies, museums of history and technology, and museums of ethnography, science, and even natural history, have long collected, studied, and exhibited the material of what has come to be called material culture, no comprehensive academic philosophy or discipline has as yet been developed.\footnote{Jules David Prown, “Mind in Matter: An Introduction to Material Culture Theory and Method,” \textit{Winterthur Portfolio} vol. 17; no. 1 (1982): 1. Prown describes his essay as an attempt to “define material culture and consider the nature of the discipline.”}

Jules David Prown published an \textit{Introduction to Material Culture Theory and Method} in the \textit{Winterthur Portfolio}—a pioneering interdisciplinary journal—in 1982, seven years before Smart amended his six-dimensional formula by adding material/artistic to the lexicon. Prown acknowledged that a scholarly basis for material culture had been established within history (even natural history) and museology but that it had not been satisfactorily defined as a discipline or subdiscipline, nor had methodologies or theories been devised to assist scholars and students. His formative essay filled this lacuna.
Material culture can best be defined as a “singular mode of investigation” that uses objects as “primary data.” It is an approach that can be deployed by specialists in established fields, such as religious studies, history, and art history (my literature review will focus upon these three fields). Here, the material in question is the object itself; the culture refers to the conditions and context in which it was made. Natural forms are excluded from coverage because they have not been crafted by human hands. This is where material culture departs from phenomenological models that use ‘material’ to refer to any ‘thing’ that has physical mass or can be associated with divine creation, such as the elements. According to Prown, hand-crafted objects are “concrete evidence of the presence of a human intelligence operating at the time of fabrication.” They have been designed and deliberately made. They therefore “convey meaning” and because they can survive across time and space are valid as data, as evidence whose meaning has been “transmitted better than verbal documents.” Objects have solid form and continue to engage anyone who touches, views, or uses them. Many objects on display at the Great Exhibition, for example, are observable today in contemporary English museums and galleries.

46 Prown considers these terms to be at least superficially contradictory. The ‘material’ refers to “base and pragmatic things” whereas ‘culture’ is associated with “lofty, intellectual, abstract things.” Prown states that this division has its roots in our “fundamental human perception of the universe” as divided between high and low, sky and land, heavens and earth. Material things can rot, break, waste away or get lost, while the abstract is “pristine” and “free from such worldly debilities.” ibid, 2.
47 ibid, 2-3.
48 ibid, 16. Moreover, objects do not require literacy to make or use, which makes their meaning more universal; this negates the elitism inherent in approaches that value the written more than material, limiting scope to historically privileged—educated, moneyed, literate—classes.
Material culture seeks to solve what Dick Houtman and Birgit Meyer (2011) have described as a “nagging dissatisfaction with approaches that take ideas, concepts, ideologies, or values as immaterial abstractions that are regarded as the prime movers of history,” thereby privileging the abstract over the material, physical, and tangible. They argue that the relationship between material culture and related fields such as religious studies has often been mischaracterised as antagonistic. Material culture gives researchers space to operate between humanities fields, making artefactual evidence central rather than peripheral to their work. As Prown says, material culture is a “singular mode of investigation”—and a very useful one.

Prown is careful to call material culture a discipline rather than a field. Established fields of study, such as phenomenology and history, and, more obviously, art history, pre-date material culture and specialists might still describe their scholarship as operating within those fields. Distinctions between material culture and art history may appear vague but there is a meaningful difference. To borrow an analogy from Prown, for art historians, the object is often the end rather than the means; in material culture it is the reverse. Art history also tends to privilege fine arts over applied arts. Even in phenomenology and history—fields that have, as Houtman and Meyer say, formerly discounted objects as core data—material culture has gained currency. This shift is observable in the way that Smart added the material to his *Dimensions of the Sacred*.

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2.4 The approach: ‘object-driven’

Material culture is a still-developing subdiscipline that spans many fields. Broadly defined as the study of historical or contemporary phenomena via objects, it has particular currency for cross-disciplinary scholars and students, myself included. Bernard Herman (1992) defined a bipartite approach to material culture a decade after Prown published his pioneering essay; it addressed many issues Prown identified and has since had considerable influence. Herman distinguishes between ‘object-centred’ and ‘object-driven’ work. Object-centred studies lean towards aesthetics, taste, fashion and formalism; they are heavily connoisseurial. The alternative, which I subscribe to, is an object-driven approach. Without precluding formal analysis altogether, object-driven research regards objects as “autonomous and active” rather than merely decorative. From a methodological perspective, object-driven material culture treats objects as a means to an end, whereas object-centred research places the object at the centre. Object-centred work would serve an art historian well but it is the object-driven approach that best suits a history or religious studies scholar. Herman adopted a method known as ‘thick description’ that helps to differentiate between the two approaches.

2.5 The method: ‘thick description’

Herman worked predominantly in object-driven material culture, seeking to “reconnect objects to their historical contexts” by constructing “collective biographies of objects and sites through a process of thick description.” This is a reference to the process

51 ibid.
that Clifford James Geertz (1979) popularised in his own work. Thick description involves close examination of a wide range of primary sources, both textual and material. It is the method I am using for Parts I (text/material) and Part II (text-based).

Karen Harvey (2009) summarises thick description as it is applied to material culture: “Using many written sources, as well as material ones, Herman peels off past layers of meaning around objects, and in doing so finds out things about the people that made, used and lived with those objects.” This is the method that my work deploys. I aim to build “collective biographies” of collections—the Great Exhibition—and the sites that housed them—the Crystal Palace—where Ottoman objects were displayed, arguably for the first time, to the Anglo-Christian public.

Part I has a formal-analytic element and uses visual material, such as photographs and illustrations, but, like Part II, it is also text-oriented. The Great Exhibition initiated a great rush at the printing press. By examining mid-century publications from scholarship to satire—from, for example, the official guide to the Great Exhibition to *Punch* magazine—it is possible to give a nuanced and detail-rich picture of the period. Some of these are the types of texts that Harvey (2017) in her most recent book has called “alternative sources” and they are essential to the thick description methodology;

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52 Herman adopted an existing ethnographic method, adapted it, and applied it to material culture. ‘Thick description’ is a reference to a concept and corresponding term adopted by Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist and theorist. See Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973). For Geertz, thick description was a form of descriptive ethnography. The term was coined initially by Gilbert Ryle in 1949.

53 Karen Harvey, *History and Material Culture* (London: Routledge, 2009), 2. Harvey differentiates between Prown and Herman on the following basis: that Herman placed more emphasis on “past lives and experiences.” That critical-historical approach has informed my own.
the basis for chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.\(^{54}\) Although chapter 6 does not deal at all with specific objects, it consolidates the contextual or ‘biographical’ setting for the preceding chapter wherein Anglo-Christian perspectives on Islam and idolatry are examined. As Harvey (2009) notes, thick description allows scholars to move “repeatedly away from the object, to context.”\(^{55}\) My thesis mimics this methodological action, beginning with a particular event before broadening the scope and setting.

Thick description is useful in its methodological emphases. Pedram Khosronejad (2012) defines his descriptive process thus: as assessing the “form, distributions and changing character of the objects and their environments.”\(^{56}\) His model for producing thick description—examining form, distribution, and context—is applicable to my research area, one that necessarily has to address multiple times and places. Wherever possible I pay attention to materiality, or display methods, not only because aesthetic appeal motivated collectors to a certain degree but because it allows focus to move with relative ease between origins (primary) and consumption (secondary). Analysing objects and the exhibitionary format within which they were displayed, as well as architecture, can help to avoid a centre-periphery method that would otherwise fail to acknowledge that each object is tangible, physical and extant. Khosronejad also discusses distribution. To ensure the scope is limited to significant collections, I will

\(^{55}\) *ibid.*
\(^{56}\) Pedram Khosronejad [ed.], “On Material Culture,” in *The Art and Material Culture of Iranian Shi’ism: Iconography and Religious Devotion in Shi’i Islam* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 5. Khosronejad notes the same pattern that Houtman and Meyer had, that, unlike historians, who might often dismiss artefactual evidence, or approach it as supplemental to the main subject, or use it only to illustrate historical themes, material culture specialists “derive meaning from the objects themselves.”
take the Great Exhibition as a case study: it was a staged event with a discernible agenda. Finally, Khosronejad discusses how the “changing character of the objects and their environments” is important. Harvey (2009) uses a similar phrase to validate object-driven material culture, that being that it “encapsulates not just the physical attributes of an object, but the myriad and shifting contexts through which it acquires meaning.”\footnote{Harvey, \textit{History and Material Culture}, 3.} The method, thick description, and the broader approach, object-driven material culture, are both constructive in considering how meaning can shift as the context changes from one socio-religious setting to another.

The object-driven approach that views “material culture as a text to be read in context” has received criticism from some material culture specialists.\footnote{Harvey [ed.], \textit{History and Material Culture: A Student’s Guide to Approaching Alternative Sources}, n.p. Under “Approaches to Material Culture,” Harvey states, I think correctly, that there is less tension between object-centred and object-driven than critics might suggest: “the focus on matter in object-centred approaches and on social context in object-driven approaches has, in practice, always overlapped.”} Navigating the space between text and material can be problematic. Scholars who prefer an object-centred approach are concerned that object-driven scholarship denies the “very materiality of things” and relegates objects to a “separate sphere” where they are only “carriers of meaning that are created by the people who handle them.”\footnote{\textit{ibid.}} Here, the implication is that Herman might have unintentionally practised the very thing that Houtman and Meyer mentioned historians are prone to: refusing to acknowledge materiality as significant in its own right. Because my work is in the humanities—I am working in the intersection between religious studies, history, and art history—an object-driven
approach is more appropriate than an object-centred approach would be. Thick description is a viable method, well-suited to cross-disciplinary pursuits like mine. Herman deploys thick description for his object-driven work because, ultimately, he seeks to approach “objects as evidence of other complex social relationships.” His methods have been formative for theorists such as Harvey and Khosronejad and for scholars and students across multiple fields.

By taking the Great Exhibition as a case study—the Crystal Palace was a public space with a stated pedagogical agenda—I approach particular objects therein as artworks. Prown describes artworks as a “special category” because they have “inevitable aesthetic and occasional ethical or spiritual” components to them. Whether explicitly or implicitly, a handmade object expresses beliefs and positions held by the patron and the maker (primary) and the consumer (secondary). They can therefore be categorised separately from natural by-products or non-art objects—a distinction that is important to make if examining the Great Exhibition, where raw materials, machinery, and manufactures, were displayed alongside fine arts. Water-pipes and weapons are emphasised, for example: the former is a hand-crafted decorative object, though still a utility, while the latter is made by machine. Part I considers how objects were coded at the Crystal Palace and what information their presentation conveyed to the hosts about Islam as a monotheism, Muslims as a faith community, and Ottoman Turks as a people.

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60 Herman, *The Stolen House*, 7.
Although productive work addressing the Turkish display at the Great Exhibition has been already undertaken by Gülname Turan (2009) and Francesca Vanke (2009), religion falls outside their scopes. The work done by Vanke does offer a methodological foundation for mine because it deals with ‘otherness’ and othering. Vanke begins by acknowledging that despite a paucity of primary evidence about the precise forms of objects—very few items at the Crystal Palace were photographed or drawn in close detail—textual responses to the Great Exhibition “may be used to throw considerable light on contemporary British attitudes towards the East.” Her essay is essentially a comparative study of the ways that two ‘eastern’ exhibitors, the Ottoman and Chinese, presented and were received. Vanke concludes that unlike China, whose officials took little interest in the event, the Ottomans had prepared for it expertly and with enthusiasm and had a significant presence at the Crystal Palace. However careful the preparatory work had been by the Sublime Porte, visitors to the exhibition were, nonetheless, “seeking otherness” when they encountered ‘eastern’ objects. My thesis adds bibliographic and art-historical detail to those earlier studies by Turan and Vanke. I relate the objects at the Great Exhibition to a broader socio-religious context, considering how Islam was conceptualised and materialised at the Crystal Palace.

63 Vanke, “Degrees of Otherness: The Ottoman Empire and China at the Great Exhibition of 1851,” 191.
64 *ibid.*, 204.
2.6 The literature: defining the field

My first research aim was to collect primary sources to build a comprehensive, nuanced, and representative picture of the period (1851-1901). Primary analysis is the basis for Parts I and II. I have already introduced a precedent for this detail-rich, discursive approach—the thick description that Herman modelled off the Geertzian method, whereby both objects and texts from a given period are treated as data that can be gathered, assessed, and used to better understand a broader socio-religious context. Now that a methodological foundation has been established, the following sections survey secondary scholarship that has guided my research. I have consulted literature from religious studies, history, and art history. These are not incompatible fields but they do have different emphases. I identify where my work sits in the contemporary research landscape and what it can contribute to cross-disciplinary scholarship. A guiding question to focus the literature review is:

- What issues, ideas, and phenomena have scholars identified and emphasised in their research into nineteenth-century Christian-Muslim relations and Anglo-Ottoman relations?

I begin by defining a few phenomena that are central to the research and positioning them in relation to my study, namely the Eastern Question, the *tanzimat*, and the exhibitionary complex. Each section is a brief sketch, which will serve the purpose of introducing terms that occur repeatedly within the primary and secondary data.
2.7 The Eastern Question

Two related phenomena that are discussed in detail in the following chapters are the so-called Eastern Question and the *tanzimat*. The first is a rhetorical framework deployed by European commentators to discuss the Ottoman Empire, which they saw as an ailing empire and well within their diplomatic and political purview.

Alexander Lyon Macfie (2014) frames the Eastern Question as the “question of what should become of the Ottoman Empire.”65 Indeed, the term itself poses a query and implies a problem to be faced. Coined by Russian officials at the Wiener Kongress (1814-1815) to refer to increasingly antagonistic relations between Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839AD/1223-1255AH) and his Greek Christian subjects, the Eastern Question relates more generally to the many events, ideas, and issues that influenced diplomatic and geo-political jostling between European governments and the Sublime Porte from the late-eighteenth century to the early twentieth. Central to Eastern Question discourse was the notion that the Ottoman polity was frail and in terminal decline: “the sick man of Europe.”66 The Ottoman Empire was personified as a diseased body, once robust, even formidable, but now approaching death.

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65 Alexander Lyon Macfie, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923: Revised Edition* (London: Routledge, 2014), 1. 1774 is much-debated as the date the Eastern Question first rose to real prominence. This is when the Russo-Turkish War was concluded, with a resounding Russian victory. From at least the late-eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire would be viewed as a problem to solve or a ‘question’ to answer—the question being, “what should become of the Ottoman Empire?”

66 This phrase can be traced back to the late-eighteenth century but was popularised during the nineteenth. Personifying the Ottoman Empire as the “sick man of Europe” was a common tactic within European intellectual discourse. For thorough and lively examination of this trope, see Aslı Çırakman, *From the “Terror of the World” to the “Sick Man of Europe: “ European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002).
Scholars and informal observers have been preoccupied with the Eastern Question since its introduction to civic discourse. I refer to it and to related issues in Part II: chapter 6, for example, begins with a passage from *Papers on the Eastern Question*, 1877, that claims the Eastern Question is a fundamental conflict between cross and crescent, Christians and Muslims. Foreign policy agendas and popular opinion shifted multiple times between 1851 and 1901. Some major events that marked my chosen research period were the Crimean War (1853-1856) and, later, the occupations in Cyprus (1878) and Egypt (1882). Many writers since the early twentieth century have written about the Eastern Question as a domestic political issue. Others are more concerned with it as an international diplomatic issue concerning the British, Russian, and Ottoman empires. My thesis is neither a political nor diplomatic history but it is important to acknowledge that for several scholars, in fact for a majority, the Eastern Question is not purely or primarily a subject for religious consideration.

Doğan Gürpınar has been influential for my research process. His 2012 essay traces the “rise and fall of Turcophilism in nineteenth-century British Discourses” with a religious studies emphasis—polar responses to the Eastern Question can be defined by two contrary positions, turcophile and turcophobe. Gürpınar does so by discussing the “Christian dimensions of the positive and negative attitudes towards the Ottomans.” This phrase aligns well with my own approach to examining Anglo-Ottoman relations. My work is principally concerned with whether and to what degree English-speaking

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commentators wrote from religious positions. Diplomatic, political, and other secular issues should not be ignored but my aim is to assess Anglo-Ottoman relations within the wider parameters of Christian-Muslim relations.

2.8 The Tanzimat

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, where my study is situated, Sultan Mahmud II had already ordered and overseen substantial changes to Ottoman infrastructure, watched closely by British and French governments.69 His son and successor Sultan Abdülmecid I (r. 1839-1861AD/1255-1277AH) initiated the tanzimat—from tanzımat, which translates as ‘measures to install order’ or more simply ‘reorganisations’—in 1839 with a royal edict (ferman) entitled Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif or the Supreme Edict of the Rosehouse.70 During their successive reigns, Sultans Mahmud II and Abdülmecid I re-negotiated the relationship between Istanbul and Islam.

Although Ottoman Muslims were able to practise Islam as devoutly as they had prior to the tanzimat, and did so, the state started to conceive itself less as a spiritual authority and more as a temporal governing body. Core institutions were regulated, disbanded, or otherwise modified. For example, clerical autonomy eroded as ulamā lost control of administering waqfs; many scholars withdrew from civic life under Mahmud. The

69 Mahmud II is credited with engineering a transition from ancien régime to the tanzimat. Early tanzimat reforms and those enforced prior to 1839, by Mahmud, are outside my investigative field. See “European Domination and Islamic Response,” in John Obert Voll [ed.], Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 84-151. 85-91 assesses how pre-1839 reforms modified Islamic institutions within the Ottoman bureaucracy.

70 Doğan Gürpinar, “The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism in Nineteenth-Century British Discourses,” 347.


tanzimat cannot be called a secularist project, however. According to Bülent Şenay (2004), the process delineated “religious” and “temporal” life in Ottoman lands—a dynamic played out beyond the Sublime Porte, among the general population, between traditional Muslims and reformers. Several researchers have examined the tanzimat by considering how clerical offices conflicted with reforming mechanisms.

The privileges of ulamā were further weakened by orders to terminate the janissary corps, which destabilised its foundation for military enforcement. Many European observers favoured the decision to disband the janissaries, not only because it decentralised military might but also because janissaries were Christian-born boys who were compelled to convert to Islam, garrisoned, and pledged to protect the Ottoman household. Their release from duty was therefore treated as an emancipation of sorts. More than five decades after the Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif was passed, officials from the Sublime Porte responsible for representing the Ottoman Empire at the Chicago Columbian Exhibition, 1893, debated whether to send janissaries to America for show: a decision was reached to refrain because “this would evoke unpleasant memories


72 From a Christian-Muslim and military-historical perspective, the janissary corps (yeniceri ocağı) is a fascinating institution, one that dates back to the late-fourteenth century. For a summary of janissary history, see Gilles Veinstein, “On the Ottoman janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth centuries),” in Erik-Jan Zürcher [ed.], A Comparative Study of Military Labour (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 115-134. Though his emphasis is military organisation, Veinstein does discuss conversion, among other janissary practices.
among the Christians." Despite the entertainment value having battle-ready janissary troops displayed to a foreign public might yield, the commission recognised that Christian Americans and Europeans had felt kinship with Ottoman Christians whose sons had been pledged by law to the Sublime Porte and converted to Islam—a physical reminder of that institution was deemed ill-judged.

Questions of whether the tanzimat would benefit Ottoman Christians, whether it was a sincere effort by the Sublime Porte, and whether it could be successfully executed, continued to supplement the broader Eastern Question. Early reforms, which had been executed piecemeal, were adapted and codified under an order called Islâhat Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu or the Islâhat Fermanı, issued in 1856. A more holistic implementation was possible as the Crimean conflict drew to a close—Britain had allied with the Ottoman Empire during the war, incurring significant losses, which galvanised public opinion regarding the tanzimat and directed more English attention towards the Sublime Porte. For Christian observers, the Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu had one potent outcome more important than all the rest: would it protect Christians across Ottoman lands?

Nineteenth-century thinkers expressed a preoccupation with the tanzimat. For many turcophiles, the tanzimat signalled a less dogmatic Muslim government willing to enact policy that would expand Christian rights; they therefore welcomed what they perceived to be a re-negotiation of the relationship between Istanbul and Islam. For

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73 This is according to Selim Deringil, “The Ottoman ‘Self-Portrait,’” in The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 154. Deringil recounts this episode in detail, with texts translated from the Ottoman Archives. The Well-Protected Domains was originally published in 1998.
others, the sultanate was perceived as being neither capable of nor committed to executing meaningful reform. They greeted the *tanzimat* with suspicion and scepticism, citing Muslim fanaticism and prejudice against Christians.

### 2.9 The exhibitionary complex

During the mid-nineteenth century, art-collecting expanded beyond the elite sphere. Acquisition was undertaken by museum collectors to supply a state-funded exhibitionary apparatus (public) and by the middle class for domestic display (private). The first phenomenon is known as the exhibitionary complex.

The exhibitionary complex has a fascinating theoretical history that begins with Tony Bennett (1996) making a critical response to Michel Foucault (1926-1984) by adapting his theories on the asylum to the museum.\(^74\) Foucault was influential for scholars beginning to define museum studies as a discipline because he spoke to the relationship between site, discourse, knowledge, and institutional authority—Sharon Macdonald (2011) reports that a discernible “Foucault Effect” lasted through the late nineteen-eighties and well into the nineties.\(^75\) Bennett recognised that what Foucault had

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\(^74\) More specifically, it is also a response to Douglas Crimp who, when reviewing *Discipline and Punish*, wrote that “another institution of confinement” that would be “ripe for analysis in Foucault’s terms” is the museum. See Douglas Crimp, “On the Museum’s Ruins,” in Hal Foster [ed.], *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture* (Washington DC: Bay Press, 1985), 45. Both Crimp and Bennett are critiquing the original text by Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Allen Lane, 1977). This text was translated by Alan Sheridan.

\(^75\) Sharon Macdonald, *A Companion to Museum Studies* (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 23. Indeed, Bennett and other museologists/theorists such as Eilean Hooper-Greenhill address nineteenth-century museum history within a Foucauldian framework. Greenhill (1992) wanted to understand “the ways in which states began to deploy public museums as a means of ‘civilizing’ their populations.” See Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 168. Greenhill has written several texts that are important as source material for any
discussed with reference to the asylum, an institution that confines and classifies, could be applied to Britain-based public museums and ancillary sites: he defines the agenda behind the exhibitionary complex in academic terms, as being to institutionalise emerging disciplines and to develop new technologies, but also, and perhaps more significantly, as a means to possess data and thus to exercise authority and ‘power.’ The exhibitionary complex exposed the public to objects and information previously inaccessible, which presented a new opportunity for “inscribing and broadcasting the messages of power” across Britain and Europe. How that message was inscribed and shared and to what end was dependent largely upon modes of display and established frames of reference.

Semantically it is very useful to describe the physical and pedagogical infrastructures that facilitated the Great Exhibition with a single term. The exhibitionary complex refers to the myriad public institutions founded during the mid-to-late nineteenth century; from museums, exhibitions and galleries, to libraries and schools, to arcades, fairs and department stores: together they formed an apparatus capable of holding and displaying as well as selling vast quantities of materials. Bennett writes that the Crystal Palace had a “profound and lasting influence” upon the way that objects would be gathered, ordered, and presented to the general public after the mid-century. 1851 is rightfully considered a seminal year for the exhibitionary complex.

scholars interested in the institutional history of the museum. Most recent is Museums and Their Visitors (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

76 ibid, 74.

The premium the exhibitionary complex placed upon the “presentation of material things rather than images” has been thoroughly documented by art historians and material culture specialists such as Martin Hewitt (2006), who suggests that curators after the mid-century became uniquely “preoccupied with the problems and possibilities of seeing, representing, and displaying.”78 Any problems or possibilities associated with sight, representation, and display were tested to the fullest extent by Ottoman objects. Part I of my thesis addresses how the exhibitionary complex classified Ottoman objects, taking the Great Exhibition as a case study.

2.10 **Orientalism** and its influence

It is difficult to navigate my research area without acknowledging Edward Said, whose famous and equally contentious *Orientalism* has preoccupied much art-historical and post-colonial scholarship since 1978.79 *Orientalism* does not inform my material culture approach to content—Said uses text as his source material and, generally, fine arts rather than applied arts—but it is necessary to identify where *Orientalism* is located within the field now, particularly as I am addressing trope construction. When Said notes how the ‘lustful Turk’ type was fashioned and exploited in nineteenth-century pornographic material, for example, he applies the critical lens to primary sources that I am indebted to, even if our methodologies and emphases differ (I will address the ‘lustful Turk’ trope in chapter 4).

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78 Martin Hewitt, “Why the Notion of Victorian Britain Does Make Sense,” *Victorian Studies* vol. 48; no. 3 (2006): 415. Hewitt also points out that, though the Great Exhibition is often considered to be the foundation upon which the Victorian exhibitionary complex was built, it was, in many ways, “the culmination of a series of developments” that had been visible since the mid-eighteen-thirties.

Said has been criticised by both late-twentieth century scholars, who argue that his thesis was ‘anti-west’ and academically tenuous, and also by contemporary scholars who state that his work reinforced the very notions he tried to critique. Deringil (2003) contributes the specific analysis that Said had “dismissed” the Ottoman Empire as a “sort of epiphenomenal creature” and by doing so he fell into “much the same trap as the writers he critiques ...”\(^80\) It is not within my purview to add to those debates or to defend Orientalism. To give too much attention to this dialectical back-and-forth between Said and his critics, and those critics and their critics, detracts from the research focus and would not be possible within the given word-limit.\(^81\) Indeed, Orientalism is such a contested text that using it as a reference for content is problematic unless one is engaging in a direct response to it, which I am not.

Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge Said because he has influenced post-colonial culture studies, and art history, for more than three decades. His framing argument, that the ‘west’ and ‘east’ are manifestly evident and divided, and that the former has subjugated the latter by manufacturing knowledge systems that cast ‘eastern’ peoples as other, base, and lesser than ‘western’ peoples, is the general basis for studies like mine. The perceived gulf between west and east that Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) wrote was pre-ordained and would persist until Judgment Day had

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\(^80\) Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery:’ The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” 313.

\(^81\) The most substantial and fully-realised critique, which summarises the state of scholarship regarding Orientalism since 1978, is Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2007). Ibn Warraq concludes that Said conducted faulty analyses that resulted in very tenuous conclusions. His own work has been criticised as polemical, however—Ibn Warraq is a secularist.
currency among nineteenth-century writers and thinkers and within popular culture. Therefore, it is a valid paradigm to employ to begin assessing Christian attitudes towards Muslims and English perceptions of ‘the Turk’ (chapter 6 is titled *Cross and Crescent* to reflect this west/east divide).

### 2.11 Defining the period: 1851-1901

These images of the Orient implicate the West in its creation of an East for its own purposes (Said 1991); but it is also the case that the West appears fractured in its ideological orientation. Hunt and Seddon reveal the unease evident in the Victorian world regarding faith, history and nature as much as they disclose a unified ideology of confident imperial power.

Simon Coleman (2002) refers in his statement to Said as well as to two historical figures, William Holman Hunt (1827-1910) and John Pollard Seddon (1827-1906)—contemporaneous artists who painted ‘eastern’ and ‘orientalist’ landscapes and still-lifes for the domestic English market. It is a revealing passage for several reasons. Firstly it establishes a connection between historical and contemporary sources: my research is a continuation of and addition to this corpus. Secondly, it takes for granted there is a tangible relationship between visual and written data: how Hunt and Seddon painted the ‘east’ reflected and reinforced how Islam and Muslim-majority regions were imaged and constructed for English-speaking literary audiences. My study

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82 *The Ballad of East and West* earned Kipling his reputation, according to literary scholars: *Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet/Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgement Seat; But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth/When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth!* Eileen Gillooly, *Rudyard Kipling* (New York: Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., 2000), 26. Stanzas three and four contradict the first, which Gillooly notes. Usually it is the first line that is cited in isolation.

addresses a collection rather than canvas but the approach is similar. Third and lastly, Coleman notes how fraught the mid-to-late nineteenth century was from an interfaith perspective. According to him, a sense of “unease” charged the “Victorian world.”

I agree with Coleman that primary sources from the period, considered as a whole, indicate a “fractured ideological orientation” that cannot be reduced or simplified to one particular pattern. Every pro-Ottoman (turcophile) position had an anti-Ottoman (turcophobe) counter and many authors took positions in between.

Much historical-critical scholarship aims to discern the degree to which Christian-Muslim relations shifted between the early-nineteenth century and the fin de siècle. This period is usually referred to in popular media and by scholars as the Victorian age, from 1837-8, when Queen Victoria was crowned, to 1901, when she died. Its outer extremities are the late eighteen-twenties to the early twentieth century, though some count the first year of World War One as the final departure from the Victorian order. Hewitt acknowledges that there is a certain “evasiveness” and even “embarrassment” about the chronological certitude that Victorian Studies—a well-established subdiscipline—implies. My work will not seek to construct a perfectly linear

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84 Hewitt, “Why the Notion of Victorian Britain Does Make Sense,” 395. Hewitt is writing in defence of ‘Victorian’ as a valid designation for the people and the period, in response to scholars like Morse Peckham, who charged that “if we think that there once actually existed a ‘Victorian culture’ we shall for ever be hopelessly confused.” Hewitt acknowledges that a willingness to complicate and delineate “periodization” is academically healthy and that any chronological parameters will be reductionist to some degree but he states it is meaningful to define the late eighteen-twenties through to the early twentieth-century as a Victorian period, with its own economic, cultural, industrial, and religious agendas and values, set by the state and generally upheld by the populace.
trajectory for Anglo-Ottoman relations from 1851 to 1901, though it does follow a broadly chronological format.

There is a fortuitous alignment that benefits scholars looking to assess nineteenth-century Anglo-Ottoman relations. Abdülmecid I, who implemented the *tanzimat*, inherited the sultanate the year after Queen Victoria took her throne, which helps to define 1837-1839 as a formative time for interstate and interfaith relations. Another reason scholars give their attention to the so-called Victorian age is that, during it, the Sublime Porte implemented several decrees that can be viewed as western-leaning or at the very least designed to secure alliances with European states, including England.

Clinton Bennett (1991) produced a literary survey of nineteenth-century sources, considering what attitudes “Victorian Christians” took toward Muslims. His work was published at a time when transactions and encounters between Christians and Muslims had “acquired increasing significance” among scholars—a pattern initiated by the Birmingham-based Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, which was founded 1976. Bennett begins *Victorian Images of Islam* by asking three related questions: “How did Christians in the Victorian era make theological sense of Islam? Did nineteenth-century Christians merely perpetuate medieval images of Islam, almost all negative? Or did they develop new approaches based on better scholarship?”85 These questions anchor most scholarly inquiry into this area. What is

interesting is that Bennett and other historians of the Victorian age generally do not consider the exhibitionary complex when pursuing their answers. Their sources tend to be textual or, less often, visual; but not material. This is where an object-driven material culture approach can contribute to existing scholarship.

Conclusion

The approach I subscribe to is the object-driven material culture that Herman introduced with *The Stolen House*; correspondingly I have adopted his preferred methodology, that of thick description. To conduct the bulk of the secondary research I consulted scholarship from religious studies, history, and art history. This chapter has introduced my method and given a summation of the state of that secondary literature that is relevant to my research—a partial but representative survey. I began by defining three phenomena that are central to my two-part thesis: the Eastern Question, the *tanzimat*, and the exhibitionary complex. Then I discussed how contemporary scholars have characterised the mid-to-late nineteenth century period from an interfaith and interstate relations perspective. I have concluded that a material culture approach to the content can be both constructive and original, as artefactual data has generally been overlooked by historians. With a review of secondary sources complete, primary sources will be the basis for Parts I and II.
PART I

THE MATERIAL DIMENSION

England, Turkey, and the Great Exhibition, 1851

Around the mid-nineteenth century, art-collecting expanded beyond the elite sphere. Acquisition was undertaken by museum collectors and curators looking to supply a developing state-funded exhibiting apparatus (public) and also by the middle class for domestic display (private). My focus is the first phenomenon. 1851 is considered to have been a seminal year for the exhibitionary complex. The emphasis it placed upon public presentation, and on objects rather than images, was unprecedented at the time. Martin Hewitt suggests that after the Great Exhibition curators and collectors became “preoccupied with the problems and possibilities of seeing, representing, and displaying.” Any possibilities or potential problems associated with sight, representation, and display were tested to the fullest extent by Ottoman objects.

Previous paragraphs (2/2.2) established that historical Anglo-Ottoman relations can be approached from a socio-religious perspective. I begin with a study of the material dimension that Smart came to view as essential to all religious phenomena. Handmade objects that have been crafted within a particular socio-religious setting and sent to a foreign site for display are significant, particularly when a collection is gathered and curated for an international event with a stated agenda. Part I takes the Great Exhibition

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as a case study. By addressing display methods and curatorial choices at the Crystal Palace, and the substantial volume of written responses to them, I have used thick description to illustrate the process by which Ottoman objects were acquired, exhibited, and received at the Great Exhibition.
CHAPTER 3

Process and Pedagogy

Process and Pedagogy examines the religious positions that shaped the administrative and architectural infrastructures mounted for the Great Exhibition. I propose that the Great Exhibition was understood by the Royal Commission and the general public as an event with a firm Christian foundation and that Turkey was viewed as a “Mohammedan exhibitor” representing Islam—the Sublime Porte conceived itself in much the same way. Responses to the carpet collection at the Crystal Palace are given particular emphasis. First, this chapter begins with a survey of the origins of the Great Exhibition, chronologically described. Biographical detail specific to the Great Exhibition has often been overlooked by scholars, but, in order to understand how interfaith and interpersonal dynamics defined the early stages of the planning of that event, and to assess the pedagogies at work, it is necessary to begin here.

3.1 Anglo-Ottoman exchange: the early stages

The following three sections are modelled off The Ottoman Self-Portrait, a chapter Deringil (1998) dedicated to international exhibitions that offers considerable detail regarding Ottoman oversight of the Chicago Columbian Exhibition, 1893. Deringil examines the communications between the exhibiting nation, Turkey, and the hosting nation, America, which are fundamental for understanding how each party navigated
what he calls “intertwining of self perception and perception by the outside world.”

Even the physical and mental well-being of the Ottoman organisers and performers, gleaned from their personal writing, is considered noteworthy. Porte-appointed administrators were crafting, to borrow a metaphor from Deringil, a self-portrait—one that would reflect Ottoman identity, honour it, and sell to a foreign market.

Nineteenth-century exhibitions and world fairs were spectacular staged events. The Sublime Porte took them very seriously, far more seriously than any other Muslim administration. For Sultan Abdülmecid and his ministers, international display offered opportunity for self-promotion—a way to consolidate identity as a Muslim state and, at the same time, to cultivate an identity as a modern, healthy, competitive one, committed to the tanzimat. They recognised the profits and prestige that could be reaped from a robust appearance at the Crystal Palace. Abdülmecid established a commission, comprising 12 Ottomans and one European advisor who communicated directly with the foreign commissioner, Edward Zohrab.

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88 Their names have been recorded in an official document: “Ismail Pasha”—not to be confused with another Ismail Paşa who ruled as Khedive of Egypt and Sudan—is listed first as Minister of Commerce and president of the commission. His vice-presidents were “Salik” Bey and “Said” Bey and the “Secretary to the President” is one M. Lafontaine, who acted as a correspondent between Istanbul and London. The nine core members, then, were: “Nejeeb Effendi, Hajji Bekir Aga, Yusuf Hajjab, Seid Mustapha Effendi, Hajji Hashim Zadeh Emin Effendi, Balmoonji Zaden Salik Effendi, Gorghi Alesioolon, Yacoob Vartores, and Ella Hava [sic].” It is important to note disparity among sources regarding Ottoman terminology and especially the spelling of Turkish names. There are inconsistencies across virtually every catalogue or record. Report of the Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851 (London: Spicer, 1852), 61. Zohrab was registered as attaché to Turkey and the Sublime Porte, and as the London-based consul-general. The British Imperial Calendar for the Year of Our Lord or General Register of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and its Colonies (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1854), 161. Administrators associated with Turkey are catalogued under the ‘colonial department’ heading, alongside those assigned to Switzerland, Tuscany, Venezuela, and the historical Württemberg territory. Zohrab had been sent to London in 1843, after a decade of diplomatic service for the Ottoman government, where his tenure was characterised by “care and
the Turkish display that would be sent to the Crystal Palace. More than 3300 objects—a staggering sum—were displayed there. All items were sourced within Anatolia and from the furthest edges of the Ottoman Empire.

On 1 September 1850, Abdülmecid issued a call to his constituencies via Ceride-i Havadis. His order to begin gathering materials was distributed wide, to the east, to Erzurum; to Konya, in Central Anatolia; to Edirne, the former Ottoman capital; to Halepognito (Syria) and Saïda (Lebanon); to Eastern European regions such as Filibe (present-day Plovdiv) and Eflâk (Romania); and to Jerusalem and elsewhere. Appointed officials from each region formed local sub-committees, each charged with sourcing and selecting the choicest items to showcase industrial and agricultural capacity and artistic facility to a foreign audience. Turkey had a larger commission than any other Muslim-majority group: Persia was represented by one official, for example, and other nations by none at all.

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active superintendence” and particular attention to arts and industry. See Charles Macfarlane, *Turkey and Its Destiny: The Result of Journeys Made in 1847 and 1848 to Examine into the State of That Country* (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1850), 13. I refer to MacFarlane later (4.9; 7.3).

89 *Ceride-i Havadis*, which translates as Journal of News, was an Ottoman newspaper active from 1840 to 1877. It was established by an Englishman named William Nosworthy Churchill (1796-1846) but was a Turkish-language print. Churchill, an Istanbul resident, had been the subject of a diplomatic incident a few years prior to opening his press. While hunting in Kadıköy, a coastal district, he accidentally wounded the son of a civil servant and was subsequently imprisoned and reportedly badly beaten. His release was secured after diplomatic intervention from Lord John Ponsonby, ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, but the event had chilled relations between London and Istanbul. To minimise the fallout, the Sublime Porte presented Churchill with the Nişan-i Iftihar (Order of Glory) and offered monetary compensation. See Birten Çelik, “The Levantines and their Legacy in the Ottoman Newspaper Press: A Case Study about William Nosworthy,” *The Levantine Heritage Foundation Conference* (London: 2016). It is a fascinating story, one that reminds us that interstate or interfaith relations cannot be conveyed in too-broad terms. They are shaped by individual relationships, can shift quickly, and require constant and careful maintenance from both parties.
Administratively and logistically, preparing for the Great Exhibition was a monumental undertaking. Objects had to be packaged, labelled and priced once they were chosen—they would be for sale after the Crystal Palace was closed—and transported to Istanbul either overland or by ship. After an inspection period there, where the collection was approved by Abdülmecid himself, they were dispatched to London with 307 sailors, officers, and officials.\(^9\)

### 3.2 Anglo-Ottoman exchange: the arrival

The Ottoman convoy drew considerable attention upon arrival. Their frigate, *Feizi-Bahri* (or *Feiza Baari, Skimmer of the Sea*) was the first steam powered vessel to dock at an English port. *Feizi-Bahri* anchored overnight off Portsmouth, at the Spithead, before landing at Southampton on 27 April 1851. The *Times* covered the reception, noting the novelty and pageantry on display, with particular reference to dress:

> Excepting the characteristic red Fez cap universally worn on board, the dress, uniform, and appointments of the officers and seamen do not present any features of the ordinary Turkish costume, which appears to be slowly disappearing in the military and naval services of the Sultan. There are but a few turbans to be seen on board, and those we understand are worn by the priest and some few other rigid Mohametans.\(^9\)

\(^9\) A *Times* reporter described Abdülmecid as having “taken a great interest in the whole details connected with the origins and progress of the Great Industrial Exhibition in London” and as being “most anxious” Turkey would be well represented. Sultan Abdülmecid reportedly “minutely inspected the majority of the specimens” before they were sent to London. The writer adds “this disposition is plainly proven by the determination to despatch to England on a special mission so large and fine a vessel as the Feiza Baari.” See following footnote.

\(^9\) “Arrival of the Turkish Frigate *Feiza Baari,*” *Times* [London]: 28 April 1851. The *Times* correspondent also notes that several officers aboard spoke fluent English and French and that three engineers, all Englishmen, were in employ. As well as the 320-strong crew, in cargo were 207 packages to be “forwarded to the palace” and inspected by Zohrab.
This is a reference to the contemporary fashion in Ottoman centres, initiated by Mahmud II, to favour the fez rather than the turban. Mahmud and later his son, Abdülmecid I, legislated against the turban, a marker of Muslim identity and the ancien régime; beards could also be shaved if a person so desired. Christians were allowed to wear fezzes as well as Muslims but the ulamā would keep wearing turbans. The Times correspondent suggests only a few turbans were donned by Ottoman delegates; a cleric and “some few other rigid Mohametans.” Commentators were evidently aware that the tanzimat had partially removed religious iconography from Ottoman dress.

The Times also notes the cargo aboard Feizi-Bahri: “silk stuffs from the Government factory, Turkish cloths, sword blades, fire-arms, embroidered stuffs, [and] carpeting from Melemen and Koniah”—Menemen, in İzmir Province, and Konya—all of which are “striking objects of interest” and “of great beauty and value.” That the silks Turkey sent had been processed in a government factory is considered noteworthy by this writer. Government factories were a new development to Ottoman industry and some were under English direction. Sites such as the Feshane-i Hümayun, an imperial

92 The fez would itself be outlawed in 1925 by Atatürk, who deemed it outdated and conservative and therefore incompatible with a republican Turkey—an interesting narrative quirk, given that Mahmud had transitioned from turbans to fezzes in 1829 to neutralise religious iconography in public spaces. As well as fezzes, the so-called Hat Law banned turbans even for clerics. In 1934, garments for women considered too religious would also be gone. See Simon Wendt and Pablo Domínguez Andersen [eds.], Masculinities and the Nation in the Modern World: Between Hegemony and Marginalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 222-225.

93 A key source in this area is Sanayi devrimi yıllarında Osmanlı saraylarında sanayi ve teknoloji araçları by Büyük Millet Meclisi and Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı (Beyoğlu: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2004). Meclisi and Başkanlığı survey institutional and technological developments in the capital and other Ottoman centres during the mid-century industrial revolution. Turan, too, discusses government factories (66-67). There is also an intriguing reference to Edward Zohrab in an English civil-engineering journal dated to 1837. It involves the construction of a wool-weaving factory in İzmit, in Kocaeli ili. According to this passage, the build was co-ordinated by “his Excellency Ali Effendi, the ambassador to the court of England,” and Zohrab, and was intended to “[ameliorate] the state of the Turkish community by introducing useful arts and manufactures.” The Civil engineer and
factory that produced fezzes to meet new supply demands, were European-run, though they employed Muslim-majority staffs. Wares from the state factory for porcelains and glass, Beykoz İncirköy Seramik, won an award at the Great Exhibition for their fine craftsmanship. Beykoz porcelain was stamped with the Eser-i İstanbul seal, meaning Product of Istanbul, a trademark widely recognised in England.

Given their familiarity with Ottoman imagery, Anglo-Christians keenly anticipated the Ottoman delegate and the Turkish display. Primary sources make it abundantly clear that an existing trade relationship, fostered for at least the last decade, had ensured that Turkey would have a unique role to play at the Crystal Palace. Commissions from both parties, based in London and Istanbul, reported back and forth frequently within an already-established communications network. Interfaith dynamics must have coloured contact between them: Christians were managing Muslim labour forces in Ottoman factories, and, when the Ottoman delegation landed at Southampton, members were quickly divided between conservative Muslims and modern, less dogmatic, Turks. Relations between the two empires were inevitably defined, at an interpersonal level, by faith and culture as well as commerce.

_94_ Mustafa Erdem Kabadayi cites a ledger that registers 506 workers in Feshane-i Hümayun employ, dated to 1876: 388 employees were Muslim (either Sunni or Alawīte), 89 Armenian, 7 Orthodox, and 2 were Jews. 20 are unaffiliated. See Kabadayi, “Working in a Fez Factory in Istanbul in the Late Nineteenth Century: Divisions of Labour and Networks of Migration Formed Along Ethno-Religious Lines,” in Touraj Atabaki and Gavin D. Brockett [eds.], _Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labour History_ (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 69-90.
3.3 Anglo-Ottoman exchange: the installation

Even discounting displays for semi-autonomous Ottoman regions, namely Egypt, Greece, and Tunisia, the Turkish collection was still by far the largest gathered by any Muslim-majority nation: Appendix XII in the Report of the Commissioners for the Exhibition records the space designated to each exhibiting nation. The net horizontal space allotted to Turkey was 10,000 square feet, of which 6192 were used.\(^{95}\) To compare to a regional neighbour, Persia was assigned 1000 square feet and used little over half. Arab states had also been designated 1000 square feet but none exhibited.

Here, with installation, is where my research shifts away from interpersonal exchange, logistical efforts, and Ottoman curatorship—areas that Deringil and Özge Girit Heck deal more thoroughly with (see 3.8)—and towards the Anglo-Christian perspective.

3.4 Was the Great Exhibition a Christian event?

Queen Victoria opened the Great Exhibition on 1 May 1851. Popular success and monetary return—6,039,795 people paid to see the event—meant that Muslim material culture was, arguably for the first time, displayed to a Christian audience, in an English setting, on a grand scale. On the busiest day, 109,915 people visited the Crystal Palace, itself a monumental prefabricated structure erected in Hyde Park.

\(^{95}\) Report of the Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851, 73. 397,800 square feet were assigned to the foreign nations, in total, and the floor space occupied by the British Empire totalled 544,320 square feet.
Geoffrey Cantor (2011) has argued convincingly why the Great Exhibition can be addressed from a religious studies perspective: “Given the centrality of religion in the lives of the Victorians, in the art and literature of the period, and in the machinery of state, it would be surprising if religion did not play a significant role in the history of the Exhibition.”96 His summary is effective because it recognises the intangible; that Christianity to a significant degree defined self and state, as well as the tangible; that data from the time—the critical texts, art, and popular literature on record—often employ religious language, motifs, and themes. I would add that religion influenced not only the public responses to the Great Exhibition but the entire process of planning, publicising, and staging it. Commissioners appointed by Prince Albert to administer the Great Exhibition understood Britain to be representing Christian civilisation as well as British industry, just as Turkey was treated as a representative of Islam.

The Great Exhibition was officially billed as *The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations*.97 First and foremost it laid an international stage for exhibiting

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96 Geoffrey Cantor, *Religion and the Great Exhibition of 1851* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2. Cantor writes that his study “offers a reassessment of the historical significance of the Great Exhibition by interpreting it as a religious event or, more precisely, an event possessing many diverse religious dimensions.” His approach has informed my own.

97 During the nineteenth century, for the English, industry was not limited to commercial enterprise, that is, the production and output of products for profit. Industry also referred to the extraction, refinement, and manufacture of raw materials as well as artistic output. There had been some hesitation at the outset about which industries the Great Exhibition ought to be dedicated to. The broader implications of that debate—whether aesthetics or processes would be emphasised, and which better represented British industry—complicated curatorial decisions at the Crystal Palace. Ultimately the Royal Commission decided to organise exhibits according to four categories: raw materials, machinery, manufacture, and fine arts. The first three reflect contemporary manufacturing procedure: raw material is excavated, worked by machinery, then, in finished form, a rendered item enters the market for purchase. The fourth category, fine arts, offered a partial solution to the problem mentioned above. Decorative objects could be displayed alongside machine-made ones, without privileging mechanical processing over handicraft. There was, however, a residual philosophical tension. After all, perceived incompatibility between the machine-made and the hand-made helped to birth the Arts and Crafts Movement.
raw materials and manufactures from “all nations” and, second, it enabled the hosting nation and her empire to assert authority as an industrial and artistic-cultural centre. That mandate is not overtly or solely religious. However, the Royal Commission explicitly stated that a Christian presence would need to be an “important feature of the Exhibition.”\(^98\) The hosts are repeatedly referred to as a “Christian people.”\(^99\) One commissioner even distinguished between a temporal viewing—which ought to “elevate taste and instruct in economizing taste and labour”—and a loftier experience that would teach “enduring lessons of higher moment.”\(^100\) For the latter to be effectively realised—to make the “effect of the Exhibition the more lasting”—it would have to appeal to Christian virtues and values. Clearly, a religious agenda was set at the Great Exhibition by the Royal Commission.

There are five Christian societies and four committees registered in the *Report of the Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851*, a text that will be cited frequently in the following paragraphs (the title refers to the Royal Commission). Communions in multiple languages were held at Hyde Park, where the Crystal Palace was erected, for Anglicans and other Protestants and for various “private denominations,” organised by religious groups “in connexion with the Exhibition.”\(^101\) Though it is not clear what their advisory capacity was, or precisely how much influence they exerted upon the Royal Commission, what is evident is that the Church of England, other denominations, and

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\(^98\) *Report of the Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851* (London: Spicer, 1852), 125-126. This appendix, *Arrangements Made by the Clergy, by Religious Bodies*, was composed by a commissioner who gives his name as Alex Redgrave.

\(^99\) See 3.6, “visitors as invaders.”

\(^100\) *Report of the Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851*, 125-126.

\(^101\) *ibid.*
various church-affiliated groups invested considerable resources in the event. They sold bibles for reduced prices at the Crystal Palace; London-wide, parishes mobilised to offer extra services, ensuring that lay Christians could worship while in London for the season. At every administrative level, beginning with the Royal Commission, organisers and affiliates attempted to utilise the Great Exhibition to faith-based ends.

3.5 An opportunity to evangelise

Clergymen as well as laypeople responded to the Great Exhibition from faith-based positions. Their reactions were mixed. A letter to The Church of England Magazine, published shortly before the Crystal Palace opened to the public, appeals to readers to “pray for those good and zealous men who are making wise and seasonable preparations to instruct and convert the multitude of foreigners from popish, Greek, Turkish, Jewish, and heathen lands and places” expected to travel to London during the six-month season.¹⁰² It has been established that several religious groups registered with the Royal Commission had a presence at the Great Exhibition, either informally or in an exhibiting capacity, but this letter conveys a discernible religious agenda. For some, the event offered an opportunity to convert Catholics and Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Jews, and others from “heathen” regions. Later, not long after the Crystal Palace closed, the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge declared the Great Exhibition a success because “such as to comport with the character of a Christian

¹⁰² G. E. S and J. Burns [eds.], The Church of England Magazine Volume 30 (London: Church Pastoral-aid Society, 1851), 350-351. The following groups are listed as participants, some of which are listed in the Report of the Commissioners: the Christian Knowledge and Tract Societies, the British and Foreign Bible Society, the Evangelical Alliance for Foreigners, and the Bible Society, which displayed the “holy scriptures in more than 150 languages.”
people” it had spread knowledge by gathering nations to a “truly universal meeting” that could fulfil Isaiah 66: It shall come, saith the Lord, that I will gather all nations and tongues, and they shall come, and see my glory. Both texts, one circulated before the Great Exhibition and one after it, describe that event as a pageant for foreigners coming to see the glories of God, gathered and curated by the hosting Christians.

3.6 Visitors as “invaders”

While some saw the potential to evangelise, several observers voiced concerns about the perceived moral threat presented by a non-Christian influx. Any potential efficacy regarding conversion, or fulfilling scriptural promises, would not be worth the risk to Christian civil order. A song-sheet titled The Exhibition and Foreigners refers to foreigners as religious and ethno-cultural others. Listeners and singers are reminded that any Ottoman Turks visiting the Crystal Palace and the Ottoman performers hired to inhabit the bazaar, marked by their tunics and turbans, are Muslims—at the Great Exhibition live models accompanied exhibits to visually reinforce the relationship between the cultures on display and their material and manufactural productions. An illustration shows a bearded man wearing a plumed turban and below are the lyrics to be sung, which cite the “Russian, Prussian, Turk and Jew” about to come to London. One stanza warns that although the sight might be a wonder to behold, onlookers should practise vigilance: “I fear the Foreigners are all permitted to triumph.” Within the same

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103 Isaiah 66:18, cited by The industry of nations, as exemplified in the Great exhibition of 1851 (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1852), 268.
section is a call to Anglo-Christians to fortify themselves, to protect their virtue so they may “best the world” and “shout triumphantly Victory and Liberty.” According to Cantor, jingoistic and alarmist lyrics were common at the time, often conveying a fear that non-Christian “invaders” would “[trample] underfoot every aspect of British life” and that Anglicanism was “under threat.” Ottoman Turks are thus identified by their religion and it is implied they will tempt Anglo-Christians to corruption or conversion.

Muslims and other non-nationals were considered likely to be antagonistic to Christianity and viewed as uncivilised at best and heathen at worst. Race and religion tended to be conflated when writers and lyricists expressed hostility and anxieties. However, whether foreigners should be targeted for conversion through exposure to proselytism or avoided altogether was disagreed upon.

3.7 Visitors as objects

There was a performative element to the Great Exhibition that *Punch* satirised with a cartoon it ran in 1851 titled *The Happy Family in Hyde Park.* Cartoonist John Tenniel conceives the distinctive rounded transept façade of the Crystal Palace as an elaborate, transparent, multi-levelled cage. Within are peoples such as Native

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105 Cantor, *Religion and the Great Exhibition of 1851*, 26. Cantor cites another primary text that expresses fears about the masses about to ‘descend’ upon Hyde Park: Joseph Barrett, a Quaker, who warned his fellows to resist “all those enticements of dishonesty, intemperance, and vice” that would come with a visit to the Crystal Palace. *Friend* vol. 9 (1851): 89.
106 *The Happy Family at Hyde Park* is referenced in multiple secondary sources, most recently by Sadiah Qureshi, *Peoples on parade: exhibitions, empire, and anthropology in nineteenth century Britain* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 235. Qureshi aptly refers to the Crystal palace conceived by Tenniel as a “colossal greenhouse” filled with “exotic botanical specimens.” Similar metaphors might also come to mind—a zoo, for example.
Americans, Cossacks, and Ottoman Turks, represented by live models. Costumes and articulated movements mark their identities: the Cossack man wears a high fur hat called a *papaha* and is tilting as he performs a *hopak* dance and ‘the Turk’ is shown in profile, staring ahead, his long beard and turban accentuated—it is similar to the illustration in *The Exhibition and Foreigners* but is more exaggerated. Tenniel had evidently noticed that ‘the Turks’ performing at the Crystal Palace wore turbans rather than the red-felt fezzes that were virtually universally worn by Ottoman dignitaries and delegates attending the event to see their homeland represented. The inhabitants are cramped together, pressed against the glass. Outside the transept, looking in, are a gentleman with a walking cane and a bonnet-wearing lady peering at the display from behind his shoulder, and across from them, more onlookers have mixed expressions. Among the leftmost tableau it is again a woman who appears to feel some trepidation while her male counterpart stares with wide eyes. Mr Punch himself is shown in the foreground, inviting us to participate with a fixed gaze and a knowing smile. They, and we, are objectifying, othering, and exoticising the inmates, who have been served to the public as *curios*. Altogether the scene jars uncomfortably with the title, *A Happy Family in Hyde Park*, because the display is fodder for voyeurism. The ethnic and religious ‘other’ becomes an object.

As well as objects, people exhibited at the Great Exhibition—or rather, they were themselves the exhibits.\(^{107}\) Live models in historical dress were displayed to the public,

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\(^{107}\) Recognising this, Victor Buchli makes an insightful parallel between Semper and the curatorial and architectural agendas that appeared around the mid-century: “as with Gottfried Semper, the occasion of the Great Exhibition and the Crystal Palace marked an important moment not only for the understanding of architectural form but for the development of comparative understandings of human
part ethnography, part entertainment. The presence of bodies in space made tangible the association between the inanimate objects installed and the people who made them. Certainly, visitors to the Crystal Palace were meant to compare and contrast material heritages and to draw conclusions about culture and civilisation from the artefactual record they were presented with.

Deringil (1998) writes that by the eighteen-nineties, representatives from the Sublime Porte charged with mounting displays at world fairs were conscious of and careful about the live element that *A Happy Family in Hyde Park* alludes to, adding that their “sensitivity to becoming the ‘object’ of display was not exaggerated or misplaced.”  

Ottoman officials were particularly careful about any presentation that might be “injurious to the modesty of Muslim women or damaging to national pride.”  

Proposals to have Ottoman women dancing in harem-themed presentations or to hire Sufi dervishes to perform, for example, were censored by the Sublime Porte

### 3.8 The Crescent in the *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue*

The *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue* is the official record for all displays at the Great Exhibition.  

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110 See *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue of the Great Exhibition of the Works and Industry of all Nations* (London: London Spicer, 1851), 1385-1399. The following paragraphs are referring to the registry for Turkey in this illustrated catalogue.
are introduced to the English-speaking public in its pages. Özge Girit Heck (2015) raises similar questions in her essay about the labelling of the Ottoman Empire as Turkey at the Chicago Columbian Exposition, 1893.\(^{111}\) As was the case there, at the Great Exhibition, the Sublime Porte was presented not as an empire but as ‘Turkey.’ Turkey is introduced in the *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue* by a crest bearing the *Türk bayrağı* (flag/banner) stamped with a crescent moon (*hilāl*) and star. By that time, the crescent moon had become a universally-recognised symbol for Islam, generally considered to be equivalent to the cross—conflicts between Muslims and Christians, as early as the crusades, had been cast dramatically as wars between the crescent and the cross.\(^{112}\) However, the compendium describes contemporary Turkey as an ally rather than an adversary. Referring to the *tanzimat*, it endorses “liberal policies” put forward by the Sublime Porte and expresses hope that Turkey, though still a “non-industrial” nation, may soon be self-sufficient.\(^{113}\) Abdülmejid is also praised for attempting to revive and modernise technology and manufacture: his domains had thus taken “the position of one of the most favoured of nations.”\(^{114}\)

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\(^{112}\) The flag depicted in the *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue* was made official with a *tanzimat* decree in 1844—Abdülmecid had adopted a five-pointed star for the empire but shown here is the old eight-pointed star used by the Ottoman navy. That the crescent-and-star is a symbol for Islam is not universally accepted, given that its origins were not with the Prophet Muhammad. To be more precise, it is an Ottoman-Islamic insignia, though it did exist in pre-Ottoman forms. See Micah Lee Issitt and Carlyn Main, *Hidden Religion: The Greatest Mysteries and Symbols of the World’s Religious Beliefs* (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 97.

\(^{113}\) Government factories are praised as solutions to a problem Turkey was perceived to be facing, that its own population was unable to afford to buy handicrafts such as pile carpets.

\(^{114}\) Textiles are addressed specifically in a preamble to the official registry. It says that although Turkey continues to excel in embroidery and “articles of gorgeous work” common to Muslim-majority nations, the Ottoman economy relies too exclusively upon European states, chiefly England, for textile exports and profits. *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue of the Great Exhibition of the Works and Industry of all Nations*, 1385-1386.
Turkey is consciously disassociated from the *ancien régime*, historically a foe to Europe. Turkey was given a correspondingly privileged role at the Crystal Palace.

### 3.9 A “Mohammedan” exhibit

As has been stated earlier, contemporary observers responded to the Great Exhibition from Christian positions. Their anticipation of and responses to the event were influenced discernibly by their denominational affiliation and their understanding of the relationship between ‘the Turk’ and Islam. I am not the first researcher to consider how and to what extent Ottoman objects were associated with Islam by nineteenth-century European audiences. Mark Crinson (2013) calls the Crystal Palace the “largest and most obvious site for understanding Islam” that existed during the period.\(^{115}\) Crinson is not suggesting that religion was a defining feature: after all, the Great Exhibition was mounted to exhibit *works of industry* and to showcase industrial and manufactural advances.\(^{116}\) Later, I will look at how the display was received from this perspective, in terms of the health of state industry—with particular reference to carpets (3.10)—to consider whether assessments of the collection were purely technical or had a religious element to them. I agree with Crinson when he states that Islam was well represented at the Great Exhibition, but I suggest that it was not physicalised with the same specificity and clarity as came to be the case at subsequent exhibitions.

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\(^{116}\) Turkey was expected to show the “latest results of improvements [in] manufactures” and progress made in “processes and materials used in such manufactures.” *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue of the Great Exhibition of the Works and Industry of all Nations*, 1385.
Heck describes a mosque built onsite at the Chicago Columbian Exposition, commissioned by Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909AD/1293-1327AH) so that Muslims attending the event could pray free from interruption or spectatorship. With a gilded dome and a lone minaret, some sixty feet tall, it was a substantial and imposing structure and one that would have drawn attention and clear associations between Turkey, the exhibitor, and Islam. Visiting Muslims worshipped there, guided by an imam. There is no evidence to suggest that state-appointed prayer leaders were present at the 1851 exhibition; and neither had the Sublime Porte sent sacred texts to the Great Exhibition or sanctioned any displays thereof—at the Midway Plaisance, which was the Chicago equivalent to the Crystal Palace, qurʾānic passages were inscribed upon surfaces for reading. After multiple decades amassing collections for international exhibitions, the Sublime Porte exercised more authority regarding display modes. Although Heck deals with a later event, her conclusion concurs with Crinson and is equally resolute, that the Ottoman Empire wished to present as “an Islamic state” at international exhibitions and fairs and was received as such: European and American officials “saw the Ottoman Empire as a Turkish and Muslim state and found Ottoman architecture to be unique compared to the architecture known to the Western and Christian world.” I observe the same correlation between texts to do with ‘the Turk,’ Turkey, and the Ottoman Empire, and those written regarding the Great Exhibition.

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117 Heck, “Labelling the Ottoman Empire as ‘Turkey’ in the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893,” 122. Heck notes that attendance by Muslims was fairly limited and, as such, it is fair to conclude that the “mosque was most likely built to attract American fairgoers as a cultural or religious curiosity.”

118 ibid, 122/120.
John Tallis (1817-1876) produced an authoritative history of and guide to the Great Exhibition: *History and Description of the Crystal Palace*, published shortly after the Crystal Palace closed to the public.\(^{119}\) Tallis discerned a “close analogy” between the 3300-odd objects that Turkey exhibited and “what the ancients have left us behind.”\(^{120}\) His impression was that contemporary Ottoman material culture had changed very little over time because it had its roots in ancient Islam. Tallis writes that “Moslems in the countries which they have conquered” have replicated their arts and architecture “with little alteration” since the time of the Prophet Muhammad.\(^{121}\) The Ottoman display is associated with the *ummah* and early Muslim conquest.

Although the Royal Commission endorsed Turkey in the *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue*, popular reception was less favourable. Public responses to the Ottoman objects at the Crystal Palace were informed by pre-existing notions that Turkey was a non-industrial nation populated by Muslims whose material culture, rigidly dictated by faith and tradition, was primitive and in a poor state.

### 3.10 Carpets at the Crystal Palace

There is little primary data available to analyse individual carpets formally, although two colour illustrations give a general picture of the collection *in situ*.\(^{122}\) Referring to

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120 *ibid*, 218.
121 *ibid*, 183. Tallis nevertheless recognises that his own nation and Turkey have a close diplomatic relationship. He writes, the Ottoman Empire “must always be regarded by the Englishman as of vital importance,” Turkey being “one of the foremost, the sincerest, and the most potent” allies to Britain.
122 Joseph Nash, Louis Haghe, David Roberts, and John Waldie [eds.], *Dickinson’s comprehensive pictures of the Great Exhibition of 1851 from the originals painted for H. R. H. Prince Albert* (London:
these two supplementary images and to the official catalogue, what is possible to deduce from the Great Exhibition is how carpets were classified and arranged on-site—the bazaar setting will be addressed later (4.2)—as well as what their provenance was and, most significantly, how they were read in relation to Ottoman industry.

To begin with a brief survey, the *Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue* registers more than 60 carpets and rugs. 25 items are described as rugs with camel-hair, silk, cotton, or felt piles, some embroidered with silk and gold. A distinction is made between manufactured rugs and those produced by “household industry” which helps to delineate gender roles and to separate mechanically-produced rugs from hand-woven rugs—one example is listed as “manufactured by Hassan Dayi.” Division between traditional handicraft and the industrial method was a thematic preoccupation at the Great Exhibition and given special attention regarding Turkey, whose capacity as an “industrial nation” was keenly debated by onlookers and officials. Hassan Dayi was more likely to have been a worker at a commercial loom than a household weaver because virtually all domestic weaving was undertaken by women whereas men tended to populate workshops and industrial enterprises. If the weavers were women it is explicitly stated, however, and they are named either as individuals, by their marital affiliation, or in groups, by region, such as “household industry, women of Tripoli.” Four rugs were produced in Bursa; one is attributed to Hüdavendigâr, a romanticised

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Dickinson Brothers, 1854). “Turkey II,” n.p. These images are reproduced, figs. 1 and 2, in Turan, “Turkey in the Great Exhibition of 1851,” 70/71. Fig. 1 gives a general view of the interior of the display; fig. 2 offers a view facing toward the north transept.

term for Bursa Viyalet. Another major provenance is Aydın ili (formerly Güzelhisar). Tribal affiliations are sometimes recognised in The Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue—Yörük weavers from the Aydın region are attributed to one piece, for example—but it does not appear they were conveyed to audiences via text in situ.\footnote{124} As well as 25 rugs there are 36 carpets, most likely distinguished by their dimensions or quality.\footnote{125} Six carpets were made in Moldavia or Boğdan Iflak, an historical Eastern European principality subject to territorial jostling between Ottoman and Russian empires, using wool and vegetable dyes native to that region. Other carpets and rugs at the Crystal Palace were also sourced from outside western Anatolia. An absence of woven piles from Uşak, a region well known to European collectors, is conspicuous.

Above all the Great Exhibition was mounted to exhibit works of industry and to showcase industrial and manufactural advances. According to the Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue, Turkey was tasked with showing the “latest results of improvements [in] manufactures” and progress made in “processes and materials used in such manufactures.”\footnote{126} The afore-mentioned label of “household industry” that was applied to more than half the carpets sent to London was not used exhibition-wide nor by any other nation, which suggests it had been formulated specifically for that

\footnote{124} Although Yörük can be considered a tribal designation, the term essentially means ‘nomad’—deriving from yürü, which means “to walk.”
\footnote{125} Prior to the nineteenth century the English had called any soft covering a carpet, even wall tapestries and tablecloths. As the market expanded and the public had better access to hand-woven piles, the terms ‘carpet’ and ‘rug’ were used to refer specifically to piled carpets, though sometimes they were distinguished by size and function—a rug might be smaller, less than two metres vertically, whereas a carpet would be larger and fixed firmly to the floor. To arrive at the figures for carpets sent by the Sublime Porte, I included carpets and rugs but I excluded carpet-related products, such as “carpet saddle-bags” or pile cushions.
\footnote{126} Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue of the Great Exhibition of the Works and Industry of all Nations, 1385.
collection. Carpets selected for show were mostly woven in domestic settings, by hand; not in government factories or state-sponsored workshops. Partly because they were modest examples, they appeared to some English observers to be crude.

Contemporary viewers, disappointed, did not feel compelled to describe the carpets in much detail, nor were any exceptional examples noticed. A French economist named Jérôme-Adolphe Blanqui (1798-1854)—who was cited by several English-speaking outlets, from the *Athenæum* journal to the more substantial compendium, *The Crystal Palace and its Contents*—began his widely-read report about the Ottoman collection with a critique of the carpets therein:

> In giving you an account of the Turkish exhibition, I must commence by saying I have been greatly surprised only to find vulgar carpets, strong and almost unchangeable as are nearly all they make, but of an unhappy choice. The Turkish carpets are probably those articles most adapted for barter which come from that country, and care should have been taken to exhibit those most remarkable in point of pattern and colour.  

Blanqui continues, however, by saying that the bazaar at the Crystal Palace was beautiful, even “lighter and more coquettish” than any across the Ottoman Empire. To his mind the carpets and rugs spoiled that beauty. Their patterning and colouring was unremarkable even if they were sufficiently sturdy and hardy owing to their piles. This lack of fineness was surprising to Blanqui, and judged inexcusable, given how

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128 *ibid.*
popular so-called ‘Turkey carpets’ were with English, French, and European collectors. They were dismissed as poor representatives from a once-noble weaving tradition.

Blanqui was quoted by a major publication, the more than 400-page *The Crystal Palace and Its Contents*, regarding the east-west division evident at the Crystal Palace—his comments regarding the collection were far from purely formalist. Blanqui refers to Turkey and Egypt both as “barbarous states” belonging to the “little East”—as distinct from the Chinese and sub-continental “Great East”—where resources were rich but a “poorness of workmanship” rendered weavers and craftspeople reliant upon European influence: “even in their greatest flights they bear the imprint of the West.”129 Blanqui concluded his critique of the rug/carpet collection at the bazaar with a suggestion that “the Turks will do much better if they devote themselves to the production of raw materials” such as animal skins and dye-stuffs.130 Turkey is characterised again as a non-industrial and even “barbarous” region.

Most published accounts that mention the textiles were very critical. The Dickinson survey concluded that despite the “efforts made by the present Sultan to revive the manufactures which once existed”—and Abdülmecid was given an honourable mention by the Royal Commission for modernising Ottoman industry with European consultation—the “display of Turkish productions in the Great Exhibition forcibly

129 Anonymous, *The Crystal Palace and Its Contents: Being An Illustrated Encyclopaedia of the Great Exhibition of the Industry of All Nations, 1851* (London: W. M. Clark, 1851), 2010. This passage is also cited in Auerbach and Hoffenberg [eds.], *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851*, 177, where Blanqui is described as taking a “demeaning attitude.”

reminded the spectator that the glory of that nation had passed away.”

That the carpet collection at the bazaar was poorly curated and occupied by crude piles was taken for fact by Blanqui and many others and as evidence that Turkey and the Ottoman Empire were declining as industrialised European nations were ascendant.

3.11 East and West at the Crystal Palace

The Crystal Palace was partitioned between east and west. A ferro-vitreous transept with a panelled façade, bearing north-south, was flanked by two wings: the entire western wing was given to England and the British Empire while the eastern wing was occupied by objects from beyond Britain and her colonies. This orientation had been designed to reflect an east-west paradigm; where the transept met the nave would be “declared the equator of the world in Hyde-Park.” To get to the Turkish bazaar one had to pass through the so-called Torrid Zone, which refers to Turkey and Egypt, Tunisia, Persia, “the Brazils” and China. That nexus enforced both symbolic and physical distance between the two extremities.

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132. For a thorough survey of mechanical and material features, see The Crystal Palace: An Essay, Descriptive and Critical (London: Walton and Maberly, 1854). Building the Crystal Palace reportedly required 10,000 tons of iron, 100 tons of nails, 294,000 panes of glass, 15,000 yards of brickwork, and 50 miles of piping. According to the anonymous surveyor, such details “amuse rather than impress.” The structure was prefabricated and considered by many to embody the industrial complex expanding across England—similar terms would be used to describe the Eiffel Tower, built 40 years later, but permanently, in Paris.
134. ibid. The Torrid Zone was known then, as it is today, as the Tropics, the region clustered around the equator that separates the hemispheres.
Objects were gathered in great numbers for the Great Exhibition. They were all sorted by nation, with the ‘west’ to the west and the ‘east’ to the east—a formula that invites comparative analysis between the two and the peoples they represent. Significantly, John Burris (2001) notes that “religious understanding was always central rather than peripheral to the developing art of cultural comparison as a whole.”

Objects were often displayed within hierarchical schema that emphasised divides between west/east, Christian/Muslim, high/low art.

Visitors to the site were encouraged to process through each exhibit and to experience the displays *in toto*. A room-by-room guide to the Great Exhibition, written in plain language, for children, was published shortly after the Crystal Palace was inaugurated: it is staged as a conversation taking place between a father and his son Henry as they proceed together through each department. Henry asks his ‘Papa’ questions that we, the reader, might also ask—he is unfamiliar with media he views in the eastern wing. Papa warns Henry that “the East is the land of despotism.” Because wealth is concentrated so densely among a few despotic rulers with a taste for dress, jewellery, and weapons, he says, they and other objects that belong to the rich are commonplace. Papa concludes that eastern nations prefer to produce riches whereas, for what he calls common comforts, Turkey cannot equal “the more civilised nations.” Here the west is

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136 The opening scene introduces a daughter, Rose, but she does not accompany them to the Crystal Palace. Samuel Prout Newcombe, *Little Henry’s Holiday at the Great Exhibition* (London: Houlston & Stoneman, 1851).

137 For example, Henry notices that the ‘African’ and ‘Asian’ displays are very textile-heavy, showing a particular fondness for embroideries, and he wonders where those cultures came from: he guesses the makers must be related to Celts but is corrected by his father, who says “they belong to a different race.” The following quotes are taken from 158-161.
plainly equated with democracy and civilisation, which echoes the call The Exhibition and Foreigners made to the English to “shout triumphantly Victory and Liberty.”\textsuperscript{138} Turkey represents the ‘other’ and the east.

Papa imagines the east as a lavish, inequitable environment, as is evidenced by its material output. Any beauty therein is considered to result from ruthless and ostentatious patrons commissioning costumes, jewels, weaponry and armour. The text relegates craftspeople to an almost serf-like role. Exposure to Ottoman craftsmanship does not shake Papa from his conviction that only the western wing represents the civilised world. Elsewhere he refers to “Christian nations” from history and says to his son that the western displays prove that Englishmen have learned well how to work iron and steel: they “know now what God sent it for.”\textsuperscript{139} Henry is thus instructed by a paternal figure to divide what he sees into two spheres, one for the civilised Christian west and another for the despotic Islamic east.

3.12 “The Asiatic-ornamental, fertilized by Islam”

A German-born London-based architect named Gottfried Semper (1803-1879) was hired to design the Turkish display at the Crystal Palace; he built a bazaar. His services had been supplied on a list compiled by the Royal Commission, advertising available architects and designers to assist nations with their installations. Three non-Muslim

\textsuperscript{138} Refer back to 6.6 for citation.
\textsuperscript{139} Samuel Prout Newcombe, \textit{Little Henry’s Holiday at the Great Exhibition}, 33/119. This dialogue between father and son has followed a visit to the Turkish bazaar, where Henry and Papa saw “famous Turkey carpets” and “beautiful specimens of coffee-cups,” and is a preamble to entering the Tunisian exhibit.
countries—Canada, Denmark, and Sweden—also employed him. The bazaar blueprint provided him with a framework for the entire Turkish display, beginning with the broad concept. Semper helped to develop methodologies that would influence display techniques after 1851, in particular the simulation of far-off environments. Significantly, his theoretical output reflects a belief in the east-west binary.

Semper studied Islamic architectural history during his early career. His paper on toreutics—intaglio, or relief—begins by stating that for better or worse, art and architecture are “the consequence and result of general religious, political, and social conditions.” To his mind, Muslim art-makers had been regulated too rigidly by clerics and this hindered their creativity and limited their output:

By contrast, Oriental art, always paralyzed by the constraints imposed by the statutes of craft, church, and court, could develop in one direction only—the Asiatic-ornamental, fertilized by Islam, and cultivating new seeds that came from within. To the same degree as the arts, the entirety of the spiritually free culture of the West managed to free itself from the general anarchy that threatened the West.\(^{141}\)

Here, Semper echoes William Simpson, William Henry Goodyear, and John Ruskin (see 5.3). They each articulated the opinion widely-held among art circles at the time; that religious dogmatism could ‘paralyze’ and ‘constrain’ artistic activity and that

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\(^{140}\) Gottfried Semper, *Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts, Or, Practical Aesthetics*, trans. Harry Francis Mallgrave (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2004), 850. Semper wrote the original text in German: *Der Stil in den Technischen und Tektonischen Künsten oder Praktische Ästhetik: ein Handbuch für Techniker, Künstler und Kunstfreunde* was published in 1860 in Frankfurt and again in Munich in 1863.

\(^{141}\) *ibid.*
Muslim builders had responded to regulations the only way they could, by pursuing ornament, geometry and relief, thereby dispensing with depth, volume and naturalism. Semper used the term “Asiatic-ornamental” to refer to Ottoman architecture—a style he believed had been ‘fertilized’ by Islam originally but latterly “paralyzed” by conservatism and constraint. Semper repeatedly described the east and the west in binary terms, one as shaped by Islam and the other by Christianity. Elsewhere, for example, he made reference to the “bestiary” of the “Muslim Orient.”

How art-makers and architects are regulated and whether they are free to innovate had, according to Semper, affected Christian and Muslim art-makers very differently. Semper held that western nations fostered a “spiritually free culture” that had managed to liberate itself from forces that threatened it—which is not to say that it had freed itself from faith. His 1860 paper states that European artists and architects all benefited a great deal from the “spirit of Christianity” that had “penetrated and magnificently reawakened” their forebears since the middle ages. Despite his fascination with Islamic architecture and textiles, Semper delineated a contrast between a backwards “Muslim Orient” and the “spiritually free” Christian west.

Semper also understood that Europeans had, historically, enjoyed collecting and displaying eastern objects, noting a particular “preference for Oriental fabrics, carpets,

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142 ibid, 206. Semper is speaking about the embroidery of “Oriental fabrics” for ecclesiastical use. His reference to the “Muslim Orient” excludes Istanbul, which he mentions as being distinct from it.
143 ibid, 852.
and metal goods.” As well as recognising textiles and metalwork for their commercial and popular viability, he saw their greatest value as being educational. Semper helped to pioneer classification systems for textile collections. Textiles had been wasted in private cabinets, Semper said, scattered as they were “among other art objects in mixed collections” and secreted away or “still buried” in churches and monasteries; he criticised the collectors, particularly “Catholic clerics and their associated artistic party,” for using carpets for “propagandistic purposes” rather than to educate and elevate. The Great Exhibition must have appealed to his sensibilities. Not only was the Crystal Palace open to the public—shilling days ensured the masses could attend as well as the more moneyed classes—but it was organised systematically, coherently, and with a view to comparative reading. Just as they would have been in an authentic bazaar, objects in the Turkish area were displayed according to medium.

Conclusion

This chapter, Process and Pedagogy, has addressed the religious components to the administrative and pedagogical processes that facilitated the Great Exhibition. It began by considering interpersonal and interfaith dynamics that coloured exchanges between the Royal Commission and the Sublime Porte—a productive collaboration—before

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144 *ibid*, 851. Additionally, see Mallgrave, *Gottfried Semper: architect of the nineteenth century*, 13. While textiles and carpets from the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and North Africa attracted his eye, Semper had a very diverse range of references. As well as studying Central Asian carpet-weaving techniques native to Anatolia and Iran, Semper examined Maori flax-weaving (*harakeke*) and regional African grass-weaving traditions.

145 Semper claimed to be “one of the first to have indicated the value of textile museums arranged according to technical and historical principles and to have noted their usefulness for the study of art and for this industry in particular.” Translated and quoted in Mallgrave, *Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts, Or, Practical Aesthetics*, 167-168.

146 *ibid*.
examining the Great Exhibition as a religious event where east and west and their corresponding faiths, Islam and Christianity, were drawn together for comparison. An aspect of the collection that confirmed to Anglo-Christian observers that the west was ascending as the east, headed by the Ottoman Empire, was declining—the carpets and rugs—was addressed specifically. The following chapter shifts focus to the Turkish bazaar and a sculpture called *The Greek Slave* by Hiram Powers which, although exhibited by a western nation, America, alludes to the harem and speaks to themes about Christian minorities suffering under Muslim militancy. Chapter 4 will service a broader discussion about the way the bazaar and harem were reconstructed and reimagined at the Great Exhibition with reference to the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ Turk.
CHAPTER 4

Bazaar and Harem

This chapter addresses how Muslim topographies—namely the bazaar and the harem—were reimagined, reconstructed, or referenced at the Great Exhibition. As well as dealing specifically with bazaars and harems, it evaluates the ways the exhibitionary complex began to respond, creatively and pedagogically, to the ‘problems’ and ‘possibilities’ that came with presenting Ottoman objects *ex situ*. Although emphasis will be given to the Turkish display at the Crystal Palace, as is fitting, I also expand the scope to a western exhibit, that of *The Greek Slave*, which consolidated tropes that cast ‘the Turk’ as being both ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful.’ This is how I have read the exhibition as a unit, lending some texts and objects closer analysis than others—an appropriate method given that viewers to the Crystal Palace were encouraged to see the exhibition *in toto*, to better compare and contrast the displays therein.

4.1 Trope and site

Two notions seemed to be competing within the collective Anglo-Christian imagination. One was that Muslims are militant, aggressive, and fanatical because Islam rewards militancy; the other is that Muslims are predisposed to indulgence, laziness, languor, and lustfulness. George Thomas Bettany (1850-1891) expressed the same contradiction evident in sources related to the Great Exhibition: Bettany describes Ottoman Turks as a “proselytising company of Mahometans” and casts the individual
Turk as “primarily a warrior.” Bettany then disparages Ottoman diplomacy by suggesting that the Sublime Porte was populated by “largely effeminate” governors, however, weakly emulating European leaders. This perceived distinction between Muslim masses and the Ottoman elite will receive more attention later (6.5) but it was not the only way Anglo-Christian observers made sense of superficially contradictory tropes regarding Muslim character. Bettany proposes that the general population was barbaric but the Istanbul-based elite, by contrast, was effeminate, opulent and politically impotent: other nineteenth-century sources suggest instead that ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ tendencies operate not so much among different parts of the population as within the same person. A submission to the Alliance of the Reformed Churches states that although Turks are “dozing rather in the soft luxury of the bazaar and harem” and are not “marshalled for conquest,” they are, nonetheless, Muslims, with “all the old fanaticism and tolerance ready to burst into flame.” Turks are characterised as having two modes, reclining in soft, sensual luxury, but with a violent, fanatical condition, latent, ready to be marshalled for the sultan and Allāh.

Rana Kabbani (1986) expertly summarises this contradictory quality to the tropes assigned to Ottoman Turks by nineteenth-century sources:

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147 George Thomas Bettany [ed.], “The Turks,” in The World’s Inhabitants, Or Mankind, Animals, and Plants: Being a Popular Account of the Races and Nations of Mankind, Past and Present and the Animals and Plants Inhabiting the Great Continents and Principal Islands (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1888) 208-212. Bettany adds that the Qurʾān is the only text taught to Turks with any real efficacy and that, otherwise, education in Turkey is in a poor condition.

148 The writer goes further to qualify that Islam regards Christians as “infidels” and “dogs and swine” and that Muslims look with “certain disdain upon all Christians, however learned, however wealthy, and however good.” George D. Mathews [ed.], Proceedings of the General Council (London: J. Nisbet, 1896), 185. The Alliance, holding its third annual General Council in 1884, had offices in London, Belfast, and Edinburgh. This passage is taken from minutes from that meeting, in a session on the “Evangelization of the Mohammedan Peoples.”
Among the many themes that emerge from the European narration of the Other, two appear most strikingly. The first is the insistent claim that the East was a place of lascivious sensuality, and the second that it was a realm characterized by inherent violence. These themes had their significance in medieval thought, and would continue to be voiced with varying degrees of forcefulness up to the present time. But it was in the nineteenth century that they found their most deliberate expression, since that period saw a new confrontation between West and East—an imperial confrontation.  

Kabbani argues that the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ tropes were, among all the tropes that ‘othered’ the Muslim, the two most striking and ubiquitous. Nineteenth-century authors, artists, and curators, influenced by the civic and popular discourse of the day—that of a conflict between eastern and western empires—gave a more “deliberate expression” to existing tropes than ever before. If Muslims could be convincingly drawn as people “preoccupied with sex, violent, and incapable of self-government,” the imperial project would be justified and western Christian superiority secured, according to Kabbani. Her claim, applied to the Ottoman other, is borne out by the texts quoted previously. Kabbani takes text and image for her data and does not consider object but I believe that material evidence further supports her thesis. The Great Exhibition was a forum within which ideas about east and west, about Muslims and Ottoman Turks, were given the “deliberate expression” that Kabbani describes. Dividing the Crystal Palace between east and west is the first and perhaps most significant example. Within the bazaar, objects were presented and interpreted with reference to those two ubiquitous tropes.

150 ibid.
Each manifestation is assigned an aesthetic, with material features and/or an imagined space to occupy. A ‘barbarous’ Turk is mobile, mounted, ready for battle, and carries beautiful but deadly weapons with him. His horse is finely decorated. A ‘lustful’ Turk occupies a bazaar or a harem, smoking, reclining among cushions, silks, and textiles. Objects that adorn the imagined Turk were displayed at the Crystal Palace and the spaces that figure occupies, both the bazaar and harem, were simulated either explicitly or implicitly on-site. The following paragraphs will give emphasis to hand-weapons and water-pipes and the images of ‘the Turk’ that they summoned.

4.2 Muslim topographies at the Crystal Palace: the bazaar

At the Crystal Palace, the bazaar not only referenced but reconstructed—a marketplace for Muslims, yet a space Europeans were very familiar with by way of text, image, and theatre. Semper installed the bazaar off the central transept. To arrive at the Turkish display, one would take the southern entrance, passing China and Tunisia, to proceed under the light, spacious atrium, some 40 metres high, before reaching the north transept; there was India to the left and Persia to the right and, a little further past Persia, a much grander, larger exhibit, bearing north-east: the space given to Turkey. Sketches, photographs, and watercolours show a calligraphic panel suspended above the entrance with signage for Egypt to the left and for Turkey on the right, and within, hanging curtains drape from the centre to immerse viewers inside a rich red landscape. It is a closed space, which disguises the iron, glass, and steel above and beyond, and a lofty space, topped with minarets and crescents—the iconography of Islam. With this grand entrance leading from the main atrium, the display took a privileged position.
Beyond that threshold are stalls and arcades packed with carpets and various textiles, furs, arms and armour, costumes, saddle cloths, beaten silver; there are 3380 listed items altogether. A Dickinson guide has a full-colour rendering of the first room, where an Ottoman ‘model’ wearing a black tunic with a yellow sash, and a turban, stands with his hand resting over embroideries and textiles laid out along the western wall. Above his head are pelts splayed out with their horns intact, one belonging to the Anatolian Bezoar Ibex or dağ keçisi, identifiable by its distinctive hooked, notched horns, and another to the corkscrew-horned African Addax. Lining the eastern wall is a costume display behind glass panels. Although the objects are too numerous to recount, what is immediately clear is that media were varied, packed in close proximity. One print published in a commemorative album describes the effect as “resembling one of the Turkish Bazaars, where the goods are displayed in the Eastern fashion.”

The writer goes as far as to say that the “variety and richness of the articles” rivalled Smyrna (Izmir), Adrianople (Edirne), and Constantinople (Istanbul). Attendees to the Crystal Palace recognised the installation as a bazaar, familiar as they were with the subject.

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153 Another commentator exclaimed that now there would be “no need to go to Constantinople to see a Turkish bazaar” because there was one ready-made in Hyde Park. William and Robert Chambers [eds.], “Things Talked of in London,” Chambers's Edinburgh Journal vol. 15 (1851): 411. Tallis also reasoned that, since Turkey was now an “essential part” of the ‘grand tour’ and the public had become so familiar with Ottoman subjects through popular entertainment, many “who paced the Crystal Palace may have had comparatively little new to see in the Turkish department.” History and Description of the Crystal Palace, and the Exhibition of the World Industry in 1851, 183.
The bazaar is a marketplace that facilitates commercial and cultural activity in Turkey and supports many Muslim-majority economies.\textsuperscript{154} For Anglo-Christian observers, however, it was as much a concept as it was a tangible space—it could manifest the exotic east and the tropes associated with it. During the nineteenth century, the bazaar was understood as an institution common to all Muslim countries with little distinction made between, say, a Turkish \textit{pazar} and an Egyptian \textit{sūq}. A fact-book published to supplement the Great Exhibition notes that “the word \textit{bazaar} is Persian” and its primary meaning is “a \textit{market}” or “a \textit{forum}” as found in “Turkey, Egypt, Persia, and India.”\textsuperscript{155} More often than not \textit{bazaar} was a generic term that applied to a multiplicity of regions associated with Islam, namely the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the mid-east. A primary source for picturing the bazaar was \textit{Arabian Nights}.

\textsuperscript{154} The bazaar as an ‘Islamic’ institution has a rich history that marries commerce and culture. \textit{Bâzâr} in Ottoman Turkish derives originally from Old Persian \textit{vāčar} and the Pahlavi \textit{baha-char}, which means “place of prices.” From Iran the term \textit{bāzār} spread to Turkey, where it is commonly called the \textit{pazar}, and beyond, to the mid-east and Africa and to sub-continental Asia. Despite terminological and regional variances, \textit{bazaar} refers broadly to an enclosed marketplace that has items and services offered for sale or exchange. One covered market might show textiles, minerals, woodwork, foodstuffs, and animals, for example, and may have adjoining spaces for social and religious activity—coffee shops, baths, mosques and masjids. Although bazaars were often described by European travellers to the Ottoman Empire as jumbled and chaotic, perhaps due to the variety and volume on display, spaces were subdivided coherently between media. Prices were also regulated by local authorities, and merchants were represented by head brokers (\textit{simsars}) who were, in turn, accountable to government agents (\textit{kethüdas}). During the late-nineteenth century there were more than 4000 stalls active in Kapalıçarşı Istanbul, the Grand Bazaar. By then, in centres like Istanbul, many wood and cloth structures had been fortified with stone, making the bazaar almost like a city within a city. For comprehensive analysis, see Mohammed Gharipour, \textit{The Bazaar in the Islamic City: Design, Culture, and History} (Cairo and New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012).

\textsuperscript{155} Timbs, \textit{The year-book of facts in the Great Exhibition of 1851}, 3. An almost identical definition can be found in Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, \textit{The industry of nations}, 10. Here, “Oriental Bazaars” are described as common to Persia, India, Egypt, and “Asiatic Turkey.”

\textsuperscript{156} See Yuriko Yamanaka and Tetsuo Nishio [eds.], \textit{The Arabian Nights and Orientalism: Perspectives from East and West} (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006). Margaret Sironval contributes an essay (219-244) to this volume that deals with nineteenth-century English editions of the \textit{One Thousand and One Nights}. \textit{One Thousand and One Nights} is a famous collection of mid-eastern folk stories: in romanised Arabic it is titled \textit{kitābu ‘alfu laylatin wa-laylah} and in Persian, \textit{ezār o yek shab}. 
topographies to European eyes. A cityscape with minarets and crescents is recognisably a city built by and for Muslims; the bazaars therein distinguish them from western, Christian, spaces.

At and after the Great Exhibition, the bazaar became a framing device for Islam-themed displays, architecturally and conceptually. Crinson writes that within such tableaux, “Islamic objects became both specimens and commodities, displayed in spaces that were part-museum, part-bazaar.” Curators and architects wanted immersive three-dimensional environments to fit a dual purpose: they built “mock-up Islamic settings.” A public exhibition could be half-museum and half-bazaar, making viewers feel as if their experience was entertaining but also educative, because the bazaar was deemed to be the best fit for subject matter, pedagogically-speaking—a natural setting for showing Muslim material culture. Simulating Islamic structures validated the works displayed inside. Additionally, just as they would be in a bazaar,

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157 Gharipour goes on to state that the bazaar has a role in “recent rhetorical frameworks” and is considered in this context as a “quality rather than a physical realm.” The Bazaar in the Islamic City: Design, Culture, and History, 2.

158 Crinson, Empire Building: Orientalism and Victorian Architecture, 62. Crinson pays attention to the quantity and variety on display: “In the Turkish Court there were hookahs, narghiles, horse-cloths, silks, embroidery, coffee sets, Turkish Delight, Egyptian rose-water, and brushes made of date fibre.” Otherwise, he emphasises non-art objects which makes his work a useful supplement for material culture studies. Inderpal Grewal uses similar phrasing to Crinson, calling the Crystal Palace both “a museum and a market.” See Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and the Cultures of Travel (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1996), 121.

159 ibid, 62/65. Other “mock-up Islamic settings” were built during the mid-to-late nineteenth century, for example, baths, based on Ottoman formats. See John Potvin, “Vapour and Steam: The Victorian Turkish Bath, Homosocial Health, and Male Bodies on Display,” Journal of Design History vol. 18 no. 4 (2005): 319-333. Potvin does not define the Ottoman bath as having any religious function—rather, a social one, though it is stated clearly that ‘Victorian Turkish’ baths were orientalised, exoticised, and eroticised.
items were displayed to visitors as objects for commercial consumption as well as aesthetic appreciation.\textsuperscript{160} They were up for sale.

4.3 Responses to the bazaar

The Crystal Palace promised a sensory experience for viewers, not just a visual one. Visitors were convinced by the simulation. They could try Turkish coffee and tea at a bar; spices were burned and live music was played throughout, thereby activating taste and smell and sound as well as sight. Playing regional music and serving native foodstuffs, as well as employing live models to populate exhibits, all served to legitimise spaces—they had to be convincing enough to feel authentic to attendees. Reverend Henry Christmas (1811-1868) would remember how the “fairy-like” installation at the Crystal Palace had effectively replicated the “heterogeneous assemblage” offered by the “Eastern bazaar,” where one can be “enticed by one beautiful object after another, until miles have been traversed.”\textsuperscript{161} Christmas marvelled at the diversity and variedness of the thousands of articles sent from Istanbul to London. His description is revealing—a “heterogeneous assemblage” creates a “fairy-like” effect to his mind, which suggests the bazaar setting had a charm and appeal that was

\textsuperscript{160} As well as providing both entertainment and education, the Great Exhibition encouraged consumer culture. The extent to which the Crystal Palace can be defined as a commercial space has been debated by museum studies scholars. Some have argued that because items were not priced \textit{per se} they were not commoditised. Barbara Black disagrees, writing that “even without price tags” visitors to the Great Exhibition were nonetheless being “educated as consumers.” She notes that The Times relayed prices to potential customers and that, after 1851, museums began to list prices with their educational displays—including the V&A, which absorbed items \textit{en masse} from the Great Exhibition. Later, Black also cites a Punch submission that calls the Crystal Palace the Crystal Store. See Barbara J. Black, \textit{On Exhibit: Victorians and Their Museums} (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 198.

\textsuperscript{161} Rev. Henry Christmas, \textit{The Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Medjid Khan: a brief memoir of his life and reign} (London: John Farquhar Shaw, 1854), 118-119. It is a history text monographing Abdülmecid I.
almost magical. Responses to the bazaar were largely positive and marked by enthusiasm, even delight.

This sense of marvel or awe was not unanimous but many guests were curious to see Ottoman objects and impressed by the collection, however badly received some elements, such as the carpets and rugs, might have been. A medium that earned special attention was the arms and armour.

4.4 Weapons at the bazaar and the ‘barbarous’ Turk

At the bazaar, a robust weapons display showed cartridge-boxes, shot-boxes with silk tassels, ramrods, oil-boxes, pistol-locks—the tiniest trappings of warfare. However it was the more substantial objects that were the most remarked upon, those that were handsome, deadly, and decorative: sabres mounted in silver and steel, daggers mounted in gold and steel, pistols with gilt silver and delicate filigree work and other guns inlaid with gold or silver or Mediterranean coral. Decorations for horses were exhibited such as bridles, brass-stirrups, saddle-cloths, and “ornaments for the necks of beasts ...”\(^\text{162}\)

It bears repeating that arms and amour sent by the Sublime Porte were for sale and were self-curated. Deringil has referred to this curatorial process as an “active effort to present the desired image.”\(^\text{163}\) Evidently, displaying military prestige was a crucial part of that “desired image.” At the Crystal Palace were not only swords and sabres and wrought-iron cannons, but modern guns and pistols. Ottoman officials hoped to be seen


as competitive militarily and technologically with Britain, France, and Germany—the states that Deringil calls nineteenth-century “giants.”¹⁶⁴ Decisions regarding what and how much weaponry to show were made with purpose, and historical and modern weapons were viewed by Anglo-Christians with as much anxiety as admiration.

Kabbani cites the orientalist paintings European audiences were so familiar with, scenes packed with “daggers, swords, knives, pistols; fire arms that represented an explosive and dangerous place where murder was a simple occurrence, where barbaric cruelty and opulence displayed themselves openly.”¹⁶⁵ Her observation registers that material opulence and violence were often coupled in literary or painterly treatments of the Muslim ‘other.’ Audiences at the Crystal Palace were not simply seeing visual references to weapons, second-hand, on a two-dimensional surface: they were encountering objects that equip the ‘barbaric’ east first-hand. Having tangible access to Ottoman weapons, likely for the first time, the public made associations between what they saw and the tropes they had inherited. Experts and critics did the same.

John Tallis (1817-1876) surmised from the offering at the bazaar that the “military character of the Turks was sufficiently recognisable in the collection.”¹⁶⁶ What he had

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¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 154. It is partly because the western “giants” were present that, according to Deringil, the Sublime Porte “felt obliged to participate” and would sponsor the exercise at and after the Great Exhibition.

¹⁶⁵ Kabbani, *Europe’s Myths of Orient: Devise and Rule*, 6. For a study of the way Ottoman militaries have used guns, and how their manufacture relates to Ottoman industry generally, see Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Ágoston describes the Ottoman Empire as “the only Islamic empire that threatened Europe on its own territory in the age of the Gunpowder Revolution.”

seen at the Crystal Palace was, to his mind and eye, artefactual evidence of a militant, nomadic people, mobile and primed for warfare: “military locomotion” is a phrase he used to describe the motions of Ottoman cavalrmen, a martial Muslim faction.167 Textiles and weapons made for cavalry combat were viewed with keen interest.

Indeed, horse-mounted objects had been popular with Europeans collectors and elites since well before the nineteenth century: decorated saddle-clothes were even gifted in diplomatic exchanges between Ottoman and European officials.168 1851 thus marked the first mass display of Ottoman cavalry weaponry to an Anglo-Christian audience already very familiar with the popular image of the armed Turk atop his mount, both he and his horse finely-decorated, ferocious, and prepared to fight to the death.

One salted paper print from a Great Exhibition album shows a precious war item that featured prominently enough at the bazaar to be photographed.169 It is an embroidered saddle-cloth and sword, displayed together. The velvet cloth is embroidered from the corners with gold thread; the furling foliate motifs are exquisitely handled, leaving bare only the portion that would rest under the horseman, beneath his legs. Across the bare fabric rests a sword. It is a light cavalry sword with a silver handle called a kılıç. Curved swords might be wielded by either sipâhi—riders in the Ottoman cavalry corps

\[^{167}\text{ibid.}\]
\[^{168}\text{For an insightful study of material exchange in a diplomatic gift-giving context, see Michael Talbot, “Gift-giving,” in British-Ottoman Relations: Commerce and Diplomatic Practice in Eighteenth-century Istanbul (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2017), 105-140.}\]
\[^{169}\text{Royal Trust Collection, Embroidered saddle-cloth from Turkey, https://www.royalcollection.org.uk/collection/2800055/the-great-exhibition-1851-embroidered-saddle-cloth-from-turkey (accessed 6 September 2017). The photograph was taken by Hugh Owen (1808-1897) and is itemised under RCIN 2800055. It is kept in the Royal Trust Collection because the compendium of which it is part was presented to Queen Victoria.}\]
assigned to provinces or the palace—or akıncı, unpaid raider-warriors who functioned as scouts and advance troops for the Ottoman army. This kılıç is sheathed but the form and quality are immediately identifiable. Like all others it is single-edged with a distinctive curve at the distal half and a flared tip, known as a yalman, which is a false edge that gives the weapon greater capacity for cutting and an even more lethal look. The grip and cross-guard are slim and it bears a knuckle bow that curves gently from the base to the cross-guard, to better service one-handed, horse-mounted combat. An illustrated handbook for the Great Exhibition registers the swords and daggers and mountings at the bazaar that belong to a genre “pertaining to warlike weapons” and are “suggestive of a wandering fighting life.” Objects were interpreted according to use, not only formal qualities. Delicately-woven saddle-cloths and polished steel weapons, all handsome objects, helped to materialise images of sipâhi or akıncı riding to war.

Looking at arms and armour at the bazaar, according to the Dickinson guide to the Great Exhibition, onlookers “remembered how the peculiar doctrine of the Koran made a profound impression upon the ferocious, ignorant, and superstitious minds of the Turks, after they had embraced the Mohammedan faith, when they literally believed that the sword was the key to Heaven, and that to fall fighting in defence of the true faith was the most glorious of deaths, and was followed by the largest portion of eternal felicity.” Once again we see a clear association being made between the objects on display and trope—and, significantly, the history and faith those tropes try to sketch.

The ‘barbarous’ Turk type is blood-related to the idea that Islam is a faith spread by the sword (a theme examined in better detail in chapter 6). Ottoman Turks are characterised as a primitive people prone to ferocity and ignorance, therefore susceptible to, and made more violent by, Islam, a monotheism whose god rewards violence and martyrdom with a rich afterlife. This is not to say the objects were not admired. Items like the saddle-cloth and mounted *kılıç*—striking, well-crafted, and deadly—piqued curiosity and were viewed with considerable interest, enough to be photographed for an album that would be presented later to Queen Victoria. Ottoman arms and armour presented at the bazaar inspired a mixed appreciation for, and anxiety towards, the Muslim ‘other’ that bore them. At the Crystal Palace, the public could now see and touch the sword that represented the “key to Heaven” for Muslim martyrs.

### 4.5 From the bazaar to the harem

The Bazaar, as essentially oriental, carries us away to Cairo and Constantinople [and] we find ourselves in the crowded alley of some vaulted building, with shops of a similar kind presenting goods of the same general description, lining either side the way. Provisions, wares, and fabrics, both mean and gorgeous, rude and ornamented, simple and ornate, are piled or spread forth to please and entice the passer-by, while, in some cases, the moody Turk, who sits cross-legged amidst his stores, smoking his pipe, is so absorbed in the enjoyment of that soporific luxury, that he seems hardly to care about attending to the wants of his customers.\(^{172}\)

When nonconformist minister and historian John Stoughton (1807-1897) visited the Crystal Palace, he remarked not only of the Turkish display but of the entire building:

\(^{172}\) John Stoughton, *The Palace of Glass and the Gathering of the People: A Book for the Exhibition* (London: W. Jones, 1851) 84. Stoughton concludes that the “Hyde Park Bazaar will be less surprising to Eastern visitors than to the people of the West.”
“the Exhibition is a great Bazaar.”\textsuperscript{173} His book about the Great Exhibition, published within the same year, has a chapter titled \textit{Associations, Secular and Sacred}. Stoughton refers here to the Crystal Palace as the Hyde Park Bazaar—repeatedly, too, he writes about the east and west as ideologically, as well as geographically, divided. For Stoughton, the association the bazaar setting invoked was the picture of the “moody Turk” who occupies that space, smoking his pipe, surrounded by his wares, enjoying “that soporific luxury.” The Turk Stoughton has imagined is idle and has neglected his duty to sell and tend to his customers, consumed as he is by the scented smoke.

Contemporary Europeans had a particular obsession with the bazaar but also with other Muslim topographies such as mosques, baths, and harems. The passage published by the Alliance of the Reformed Churches that describes Turks “dozing rather in the soft luxury of the bazaar and harem” demarcates two spaces occupied by caricatured Turks: the bazaar and the harem, both defined by excess and luxury. This type of language is ubiquitous within the substantial volume of literature published in response to the Great Exhibition. The illustrated Dickinson guide refers to the “pomp and luxury” on display at the bazaar and makes particular reference to the Ottoman water-pipes shown there: “the care taken in the manufacture of Narguilles [sic] or hookahs, beautifully ornamented with silver, shows how indispensable an article of luxury the pipe is to the Turk; indeed he would hardly be recognized as such were he not luxuriously reclining in soft cushions, and dreamily listening to the ‘hubble, bubble’ noise made by the passage of the fragrant smoke of the tobacco through the scented waters.”\textsuperscript{174} Objects

\\[\textsuperscript{173} \textit{ibid.}\]
\[\textsuperscript{174} \text{Nash, Haghe, Roberts, and Waldie [eds.], “Turkey II,” n.p.}\]
that furnish imagined bazaars and harems are opulent, luxurious, and conducive to reclining among soft textiles and fine silverware.

Here there is an obvious caveat to considering the narghile and the bazaar within which the pipes were displayed as pure construct or invention—both are real, one an object and the other a space that played a significant role in Ottoman life. The harem, too, is neither a fictional concept nor incompatible with Ottoman reality. Leslie Pearce (1993) has written at length about the harem as an Ottoman/Muslim institution. Her analyses are not concerned with European representations of the harem, which might only obscure a thorough historical reading from the Ottoman perspective, but she does note that “Europe elaborated a myth of oriental tyranny and located its essence” with the imperial harem, where sensuality and “orgiastic sex became a metaphor for power corrupted.”175 Harems, like bazaars, were constructed imaginatively and sometimes with little factual restraint: Ruth Bernard Yeazell (2000) indicates as much with the title taken for her own text on the subject, Harems of the Mind.176 Looking at the way water-pipes were described at the Crystal Palace and how harems were understood by Anglo-Christian observers is the basis for the next section.

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176 Ruth Bernard Yeazell, Harems of the Mind: Passages of Western Art and Literature, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2000. In the abstract it is made clear that, to the European imagination, “concealing the women of the household from the eyes of alien men” was a “Muslim practice.” Yeazell emphasises that studying reconstructed harems in European contexts is “in large part a study of the imagination.”
4.6 Muslim topographies at the Crystal Palace: the harem

Only a few paragraphs after the Dickinson guide describes Turks fighting ferociously for Allāh, the text calls Turks “excessively sensual”—and adds that this sensuality or lustfulness is a “consequence of the peculiar nature of the Mohammedan paradise.”

More than any other Muslim space, the harem was associated with lustiness and excess.

Nineteenth-century artists painted genre scenes from bazaars, mosques, baths, and harems. Muslim-exclusive spaces were also deployed to stage theatre productions and were used by fictional authors setting their stories. To the Anglo-Christian mind the harem was a Muslim indulgence—the harem is a space for segregation, luxury, and immorality. By definition Europeans were not privy to this gender-exclusive enigmatic space. Tropes caricaturing barbarity and violence were typically gendered male whereas harems were associated with both the femininity and masculinity attributed to the Muslim ‘other.’ According to Khattak, the “British mindset of the time when they describe the Turks as being unfit for incorporation into Europe because their domestic customs were partly a result of their eastern origin and partly of their religion”—in so many words, because of their racial as well as religious ‘otherness.’

Khattak continues by citing the harem as a symbol to Europeans of enforced segregation, of Muslim female invisibility and Muslim male lustfulness.

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178 Khattak, Islam and the Victorians: Nineteenth Century Perceptions of Muslim Practices and Beliefs, 35-36.
4.7 *The Lustful Turk*

For English writers and artists, the harem offered the ideal *mise en scène* for stories about Muslim men sexually conquering and corrupting Muslim and non-Muslim women. Particular anxiety was expressed regarding European women being sold into harems, converting from Christianity to Islam, and suffering both bodily and spiritual debasement. An anonymous erotic novel published in 1828, *The Lustful Turk, or, Lascivious Scenes from a Harem*, is an example of this portion of literary canon. In it, slavery and sexual appetite are both associated with Ottoman Turks and the harem is set as the space in which the ‘lustful’ Turk operates.\(^{179}\) We meet Emma, a young Englishwoman who has been captured by Moorish pirates and sent to the harem of Ali, dey of Algiers (the Regency of Algiers, Al Jazā‘ir, was an Ottoman region until 1830). Ali rapes her and subjects her to sexual violence until Emma submits; she begins to love Ali and relish her harem life. Her friend Sylvia is a conduit for rationality, propriety, and Christianity, and she tells Emily that she is appalled by the “libidinous scenes acted between you and the beast whose infamous and lustful acts you so particularly describe.”\(^{180}\) Emma has become a symbol of debasement and enslavement. Her eventual submission and corruption is a testament to the cruelty and sexual hunger of the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ Ali, whose own immorality is a fact of his nature.

4.8 The hookah and the harem

George Thomas Bettany writes that the harem is a space for seclusion, “expensive luxury” and “extravagance.” Bettany includes an illustration that suggests a lingering fascination with harems although he roundly criticised the institution as luxurious, extravagant, and effeminate. It is titled *Harem Beauty*. The titular figure reclines among cushions and textiles. Her left hand holds an ostrich-feather fan; in the right is a petite porcelain coffee cup: both objects connote luxury. One slipper has fallen to the floor, which does not concern her, and next to her forgotten shoe is a hookah/narghile. The floor underfoot is richly carpeted. Altogether, the tableau recalls a poem Lady Emmeline Stuart-Wortley wrote to celebrate the Great Exhibition, which imagines a “cushion, thick o’erflourished with rich broideries, scroll, and streak/Where an Eastern Odalisque, star-eyed, might press her sumptuous cheek.” Odalisques (*odalsıks*) were the concubines who had reached high status in the Ottoman harem hierarchy. The luxury and excess Bettany and Stuart-Wortley ascribed to the harem is marked by material opulence. Objects referenced in *A Harem Beauty*, such as the coffee cup, feather fan, and water-pipe, were all displayed at the Great Exhibition, providing artefactual evidence of the Muslim-occupied spaces described by authors and artists.

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182 *Ibid.*, 212. Bettany describes Turks in his text as “proselytising company of Mahometans” but he states that “however devoted to Mahometanism” they may be, “the Turk is primarily a warrior.” Seemingly contradictorily, Bettany disparages Ottoman diplomacy and suggests the Sublime Porte was populated by governors weakly emulating western culture: “largely effeminate, hemmed in by its enemies, Turkey must decline.”
183 Emmeline Charlotte Elizabeth Stuart-Wortley, *On the Approaching Close of the Great Exhibition; and Other Poems* (London: G. Barclay, 1851), 42. Lady Stuart-Wortley (1806-1855) was a writer and editor with a scholarly interest in Ottoman Christians. She died *en route* to Beirut, in modern-day Lebanon.
Malek Alloula (1986)—whom Khattak refers to as “writing on behalf of the ‘other’”—writes specifically about Algeria, the formerly-Ottoman setting for The Lustful Turk, and about more general European perceptions of the harem. Alloula is attentive to the way materiality constructed the harem for the west, going as far as to state that “there is not Orient without the hookah.” Hookahs or the Ottoman form, the narghile, were, according to Alloula, a popular “symbol of the inner harem.” Despite the fact that Ottoman pipes were not typically used to smoke hashish, the effect it has upon the ‘the Turk’ is still one of soporific self-abandon, as if drug-induced, and sensuality.

The Sublime Porte evidently took a great deal of care with the pipe collection sent to London for exhibition and sale—most were elaborate and expensive—which suggests an understanding of what would appeal to the audience. At the bazaar, there were several pristine narghiles, some mounted in silver or brass, as well as smaller tobacco paraphernalia. One amber mouth-piece from Istanbul was set with a diamond and several elegant pipe-sticks were displayed, carved with wood from jessamine, cherry, plum trees, and quince trees. Western Anatolian artisans specialised in making earthenware water-bowls known as lules: at the bazaar were lules mounted in silver and brass, and one was decorated with gold gilt. Coloured glass bowls were also represented. An illustration made for the fifth volume of the Official Descriptive and

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185 Alloula, The Colonial Harem, 74.
Illustrated Catalogue, 1851, depicts two fine water-pipes.\(^{186}\) To the left is a free-standing pipe whose base is bell-shaped and elaborately engraved; to the right is a narghile with a rounded base, painted with delicate foliage. Both are silhouetted against a peacock feather ornament. Each has a bowl or \textit{lule} to hold perfumed tobacco and a strainer screen that sits at the top, to keep tobacco from entering the pipe, called a marpitch—this might be straight and elegant or long, slender, and snake-like. At the terminal end is the mouthpiece. The mouthpiece belonging to the rightmost pipe is simpler, set with stones, whereas the other is more flamboyant, with a flare at the bottom and a pronounced taper to the tip. Both forms were drawn again and again to decorate harem scenes, for illustrations and images such as \textit{A Harem Beauty}.

4.9 Contrasting perspectives on the harem

Having considered the harem first from a material perspective, the following paragraphs offer the textual analysis necessitated by the thick description method. Although it is a brief survey, the intention is to provide a representative summary of texts related to the harem, whether academic, apologist, or polemic, that reveal how and to what degree harems were associated with Islam. For example, the pre-eminent scholar William Muir (1819-1905) traced contemporary harem practices back to the Prophet Muhammad. His analysis suggests the Prophet—whose wives are called “inmates”—kept a harem to satisfy a “passion for fresh nuptials.”\(^{187}\) Texts written by


\(^{187}\) Women “placed in the harem” were confined to “the Mosque.” Muir, \textit{Life of Mahomet}, 59.
non-westerners for English readership also attested that Ottoman harems were a Muslim tradition, albeit without establishing a Muhammadan precedent for them, as Muir had. Some texts criticised the harem just as others defended it. With a textual base better established, chapter 5 can then conclude with formal analysis of an American-made sculpture at the Crystal Palace, *The Greek Slave*.

An Ottoman writer named Sadik Shahid Bey published *Islam, Turkey, and Armenia and how they happened* in 1898 in English. His subtitle, *Turkish Mysteries Unveiled*, suggests an attempt to strip away the tropes that exoticised and othered Ottoman Turks: it is an academic text but also has an apologist tenor. According to the text, the harem is a sacred domestic space: it is the “department in the Mahometan home where no man is allowed to enter” unless he is a blood relative, therefore ineligible to marry any women within. Sadik Bey adds that Qurʾānic law permits exceptions to the rule in extreme circumstances: the Qurʾān is the basis for “Harem law.” Clearly conveyed is the association between Muslims and the harem within Ottoman society, starting at the top, with the *Harem-i Hümâyûn*, or Imperial Harem, all the way to the more modest ‘Mahometan home’ described here for non-Muslim readers.

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188 Sadik Shahid Bey, *Islam, Turkey, and Armenia, and how they happened: Turkish mysteries unveiled* (St. Louis: C. B. Westward, 1898), 146. I have been unable to find relevant biographical information for Shahid other than a reference to his Turkish ethnicity in John Kirakosyan, *The Armenian Genocide: The Young Turks Before the Judgement of History* (Connecticut: Sphinx Press, 1992), 33.

189 Sadik Bey, *Islam, Turkey, and Armenia, and how they happened: Turkish mysteries unveiled*, 146. He adds that “some exceedingly fanatic Turks do not allow even Christian women to enter their harems.”
Bursa-born Kalliope Kehaya (1839-1905) also emphasised that harems are born from Islam but, unlike Sadik Bey, she is deeply critical. Her essay contribution to *The Women Question in Europe*—a clear reference to the Eastern Question—quotes an anonymous author to communicate to her readers that women are belittled and objectified “on account of the religion of the Koran and the life of the harem.”

Kehaya concludes that women in harems are confined to an “exclusive and sensual existence” that stunts development and diminishes personhood. Islam is described as a yoke and one that weighs too heavily upon all Muslims but especially Muslim women, who are “so wrapped up in their religious beliefs” that they may not realise they are oppressed. Kehaya perceived a particular threat to Christian women from Muslim men.

Polemical writers presented Ottoman women, Muslim and non-Muslim, as victims. Two related ideas reinforced each other: that Muslim women are forcibly oppressed by their male counterparts, who, predisposed to ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ instincts, pose an even severer threat to Christian women.

Charles MacFarlane (1799-1858) had travelled to the Ottoman centre in 1847 and, recounting his experiences in *Turkey and Its Destiny*, he informed his Christian readership that harem culture bred ignorance, indolence, and sensuality in women due

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190 Kalliope A. Kehaya, “The Orient,” in Theodore Stanton [ed.], *The Woman Question in Europe* (London: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1884), 458. Kehaya was educated in Athens and lived for two years in London. I have included her text because it shows a contrasting view to that put forward by Shahid but also because the female voice has not been heard much in this thesis, if at all. For a biography of Kehaya, see Xinogalas Theodoros Konstantinou, “The educator Kalliope Kehaya (1839-1905): Approaches about her life and work” (PhD diss. Greece: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2011). The language is Greek but excerpts and the abstract are translated to English. Konstantinou describes Kehaya as a fierce campaigner for women and their access to education.
to their seclusion and separation. MacFarlane saw this as symptomatic: “the ignorance of the women is very naturally allied with Turkish pride and Mussulman bigotry.” Incompatible with Christianity and with civilisation, the harem must be abolished. This is the canon of text to which Khattak refers when he states that harems were taken as evidence of immorality and incompatible with Christian civility. Certainly, MacFarlane was far from alone in his thinking that women, particularly Christian-born women, needed protection from “Mussulman bigotry” and faith-enforced patriarchy. Reverend William Denton (1823-1883) was another critic who argued that because Christian testimony was disregarded in criminal and civil courts outside Istanbul, Christian women in the empire had been left vulnerable. According to Denton, Muslims can and do “forcibly abduct” non-Muslim women and force their conversions, but their families have no “safeguard” against their “ravishers” because sharī’ah subjugates non-Muslims. Kehaya shared a similar sentiment to both MacFarlane and Denton, stating that Christian Greek women across the Ottoman Empire were oppressed more than any other Ottoman demographic. One notable display made this struggle manifest at the Great Exhibition.

4.10 The Greek Slave

With the Eastern Question still pressing, and public tolerance for the first stage of the tanzimat, initiated with the Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif, starting to wane, viewers had varied responses to a polished marble sculpture at the Crystal Palace by American artist Hiram

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191 “The Harem System,” in Charles MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, 159-160. MacFarlane, a Scot, had also written a text titled Constantinople in 1848 based off his travels through Ottoman cities.
Powers (1805-1873). *The Greek Slave* is life-sized.¹⁹³ A nude woman stands in delicate contrapposto, looking left and downward. Bound at the wrists, she is marked out as a slave awaiting sale at a bazaar. Her hands are shackled to a post that has a shawl draped over it, with a locket pendant—a portrait of her husband, we wonder—and a cross tucked into the folds. This rosary motif signifies her Christianity.

Although displayed in the American Court, distance from the bazaar did not render any less stark the association between *The Greek Slave* and images of Muslim barbarism. Jeffrey Auerbach (2007) writes that the sculpture “depicts a brutish Turkish Orient.”¹⁹⁴ His conclusion is supported by primary texts that made explicit the narrative implied by the work. In the guidebook for children, Papa, having reached *The Greek Slave*, educates his son Henry about how “the cruel Turks” had “conquered Greece” and that, since then, “female prisoners” had been taken against their wills “to the bazaar in Constantinople for sale.”¹⁹⁵ His appeal to the young boy to “look very long at this statue and think of it very often” is meant as moral instruction for all Anglo-Christian visitors to the Crystal Palace, but particularly the children. Papa sets the bazaar as a conveyer for slave trading and human suffering. Hardship for *The Greek Slave* begins at the bazaar, where she is objectified and her body commoditised, and will culminate in the harem, where her Christianity and virtue will be renounced.

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¹⁹³ Hiram Power, *The Greek Slave*, marble, Connecticut: Yale University Art Gallery, 1851. Neoclassical sculptural works were exhibited by the United States and by Britain, not by Greece. As a style neoclassicism had become very popular in North America and England.

¹⁹⁴ Auerbach and Hoffenberg [eds.], *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851*, 181: a contemporary observer, John R. Davis, said *The Greek Slave* “immediately appealed to liberals and Christians.”

¹⁹⁵ Newcombe, *Little Henry’s Holiday at the Great Exhibition*, 78-79.
Powers described his own work in similar terms. His subject, whom he calls The Slave, “has been taken from one of the Greek islands by the Turks” and is “now among barbarian strangers” and now stands naked, “exposed to the gaze of the people she abhors,” those Muslim captors who have murdered her family and “all her kindred.”

Powers and Nash perceived Ottoman Turks as barbaric oppressors and so they sympathise with the slave-girl, whose stoicism is attributed to her Christian virtue: she is fortified by her “reliance upon the goodness of God.” That she is a Christian, and that her slaver is Muslim, is implicitly understood. Powers rightly assumed his audience would recognise the narrative immediately.

European audiences were familiar with the tropes of ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ Turks. Moreover, they were also familiar with events from the Greek war for independence (1821-1832) or the Greek Revolution—the Sublime Porte referred to the more than decade-long conflict as Yunan İsyanı, the Greek Uprising. Britain had assisted Greece, claiming kinship with a Christian population agitating to loose itself from Muslim rule. Although the war achieved independence for mainland Greece, Cretan and Cypriote Christians remained under the Ottoman government. Heck observes that England as well as France and Russia were actively promoting “liberal and democratic” ideologies during the mid-century “among the Christian religious minorities of the Ottoman

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196 Quoted in Julia A. Shedd, Famous Sculptors and Sculpture (New York: Houghton, 1896), 285. The 1843 original is held by the Smithsonian American Art Museum; the first copy of that mold is kept in Raby Castle in Durham, England. Six to-scale marble copies were produced mechanically and it was one of these that was exhibited at the Great Exhibition.

197 Ibid. Power suggests that, fortified by Christian virtues, “no room will be left for shame” for the slave-girl. Nash et al, however, describe her expression as one of both “shame and disgust.”
Empire,” namely Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians. Within the broader Eastern Question rhetorical framework, autonomy for Ottoman Christians across the Mediterranean islands remained a divisive issue.

Gender heightens the danger faced by the Christian slave. Her nakedness and femaleness render her vulnerable. It is conveyed to us that she will be auctioned off and confined to a harem, where she will live in servitude under a Muslim patriarch, subject to his sexual appetite. What follows will be her conversion from Christianity to Islam. Upon entering a harem she will recite aš-šahādah, in Arabic: lā 'illāha 'illā llāh muḥammadun rasūlu llāh: there is no God but God alone and Muḥammad is His prophet. This is the fate that Emma from The Lustful Turk had faced.

A post-modern appraisal of The Greek Slave reveals that, however keenly-felt anxieties regarding Muslim violence towards women might have been at the time, the European gaze reserved the right to fetishize and exoticise women, both Christian and Muslim. Auerbach concludes as much, stating that Powers had crafted a “romantic picture of modern Greece as feminine, helpless, Christian, European, and abused by the Orient.” The marble is remarkably softly modelled; flesh and curvatures are accentuated. While contemporaries remarked upon her fortitude and resignation, her

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200 Auerbach and Hoffenberg [eds.], Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851, 180.
expression could just as plausibly be regarded as passivity imposed by the sculptor and enjoyed by the audience. Her downcast eyes give us license as voyeurs. Our sympathy for her current state is elicited, but still, we are invited to look at her breasts and nude body without discomfort, challenge, or self-critique. That *The Slave Girl* was exhibited by a slave-trading nation is another irony that cannot escape the modern viewer.

Part I has concluded with chapter 4, which examined in detail the bazaar at the Crystal Palace and then *The Greek Slave*, a sculpture that reminded Anglo-Christian observers of their kinship with Greek Christians and animosity towards ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ Turks. Ottoman objects of note were hand-weapons and water-pipes, both read with reference to Muslim-occupied spaces, the bazaar and harem. Object and space functioned together at the Crystal Palace to construct vividly an Ottoman east *ex situ*.

Conclusion

By taking the Great Exhibition as a case study I was able to address how exhibits and particular objects were associated with tropes/types that confirmed ideas about Ottoman Turks as a people and Muslims as a faith collective. At least two tropes were manifested at the Crystal Palace, those of the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ Turk—both types that attribute barbarism and licentiousness to Muslim nature, fortified or rewarded by Islam. The preceding chapter, *Process and Pedagogy*, argued that the Great Exhibition was conceived by commissioners and the public at large not only as material exhibit but also as a means to assert Britain as a Christian, European, enlightened empire. Altogether, chapters 3 and 4 have determined that the material
dimension reinforced the social dimension to historical Anglo-Ottoman relations between 1851 and the fin de siècle. Objects and their configuration in space affirmed rather than contradicted existing tropes regarding the Ottoman Empire. The displays at the Great Exhibition thus materialised Islam and the corresponding image of ‘the Turk’ that was so familiar to the Anglo-Christian observer.
PART II

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

Shifting Sympathies in Anglo-Ottoman Relations, 1851-1901

The insurgent and disaffected inhabitants of the European provinces of Turkey are Christians, and the Turks who claim to rule them are Mussulmans. Two great religions have thus been brought into deadly conflict with each other. Looking at the struggle in Eastern Europe from the religious point of view, we see on the one side followers of the Cross, on the other side followers of the Crescent. Is this all that English Christians need to know about the matter? Are we to take for granted that it is our duty, because we are Christians, to sympathise with our struggling fellow-Christians, and to help them to throw off the yoke of an alien race and religion?201

The passage above comes from an essay contribution to Papers on the Eastern Question, 1877, penned by Reverend John Llewelyn Davies (1826-1916). Differences are drawn sharply along religious lines. Eastern Europe is imagined as a theatre for “deadly conflict” between “two great religions”—between the cross and the crescent, Christians and Muslims. Davies conflates religion and race. ‘The Turk’ is a Muslim by default; Ottoman Turks represent an “alien race and religion.” Ottoman Christians in the Balkans and across Anatolia are feared to be suffering under Muslim absolutism. Davies presents one response to the so-called Eastern Question, taking a firmly anti-Ottoman position based at least partly upon religious antipathy towards Muslims. Around the mid-century, however, sympathies tilted towards the Sublime Porte for

three or so decades. Turcophiles, as they were called, credited the sultanate with crafting policies that would grant Ottoman Christians equal status with Muslims. Turcophilism is not so much a movement as it is a position—a distinctly pro-Ottoman one. Many Anglo-Christians who wrote about the Eastern Question took positions that complicate a turcophage/turcophile binary. Their analyses, which convey contrasting perspectives, are the basis for the following chapter. Part I was a case study of the Great Exhibition and an examination of the material dimension to Anglo-Ottoman relations: Part II shifts to the broader context, the social dimension. Then, following Part II is a conclusion that draws the two dimensions together for final analyses and argument.
CHAPTER 5

Islam and Idolatry

Islam and Idolatry addresses the relationship between Islam and idolatry as perceived and explained by nineteenth-century Anglo-Christian observers. A debate emerged during the mid-nineteenth century between those who held that Islamic iconoclasm was barbaric and regressive, and had induced “intellectual sterility” among Muslim peoples, and those who welcomed it as fortification against idolatry and polytheism. Denominational positions influenced the perspectives each author took. Whatever their differences, virtually every commentary from the time subscribed to the belief that Islam is fiercely iconoclastic. At the Great Exhibition, Ottoman objects had their aniconism attributed to Islam. Turkey assembled more than 3000 objects and non-figurative artworks to send to the Crystal Palace—and among them, no item transcribed nature or the human figure accurately. The following paragraphs will examine how Anglo-Christian writers understood the way Islam dictates to Muslim art makers; the discussion is no longer limited to the Great Exhibition or Ottoman objects. This chapter is brief but it functions as a necessary bridge between Part I and Part II.

5.1 “İslâm and the idol could not exist”

William Muir described the “universal annihilation of Idolatry” as the “declared mission of Islam.”203 This was not an outlandish opinion to hold at the time—nor would it be today—and it has qur’ānic validity.204 A majority of mid-century writers concurred with him. Where they disagreed had more to do with whether iconoclasm had been detrimental to Muslim civilisation as a whole and whether it was admirable or born from ignorance. Their positions appear to reflect their own denominational affiliations. As we shall see, writers from Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Unitarian churches tend to praise Islamic injunctions against images and icons, expressing the same favourable attitude they showed towards harām laws that prohibit khamr (wine/alcohol). For others, however, it only enforced the cruder tropes introduced previously that cast Turks and Muslims as barbaric and base.

Islam expressly forbids idol-worship. The Qur’ān is explicit regarding tawḥīd, which asserts the oneness of Allāh and prohibits against šīrk, the fundament of service of worship, being given to entities other than Allāh: Muṣrikun are those who practice al-

203 William Muir, The Life of Mahomet and History of Islam: To the Era of the Hegira (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1858), 271. Muir was a preeminent scholar. His works, such as The Life of Mahomet, The Caliphate, and Mahomet and Islam, were received with keen public interest, critical praise, and were circulated by the Religious Tract Society and the Magazine for Christian Literature. See The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall: From Original Sources (London: Religious Tract Society, 1891); Mahomet and Islam: A Sketch of the Prophet’s Life from Original Sources and a Brief Outline of His Religion (London: Religious Tract Society, 1895).

204 Khattak calls it “common misrepresentation” to consider Islam to forbid picture-making as there is no qur’ānic injunction against figural representation—only a hadīth. Interestingly, he suggests this misconception has “acquired widespread circulation amongst Muslims” as well as non-Muslims and has “produced almost no malevolent results.” For Khattak, discouraging literal image-making to emulate the Prophet is understandable, given that Islam is “essentially iconoclastic” and that idol worship is expressly forbidden. It may also have “contributed to the creation of beautiful works of art such as the arabesque.” Khattak, “General Misconceptions: Figural Representation,” in Islam and the Victorians, 131-132.
'Ibadah, a form of greater širk that venerates gods other than Him as well as objects, images, or icons. 'Ibadah can be sinful if misdirected. God cannot have any equal and He alone is al-muṣawwir, the Creator or Maker. Because al-muṣawwir derives from the same root as the word for images and image-makers, it might follow that creation is His purview and beyond ours. Nowhere in the Qur'ān, however, is there a law against handicraft or human invention. Quranic law forbids worshipping objects but not making them, looking at them, or using them. The Prophet was more thoroughly iconoclastic, according to early sources, ordering images, statuary, even textiles, which were non-figurative, to be removed from his presence. Al-Azraḳī (d. 858AD/244AH) recorded that before taking Mecca, Muhammad had every image and idol at the Ka‘bah felled or torn from the walls and destroyed, apart from one—an icon of the Virgin and Child. Other hadīth cite his aversion to entering homes with hanging curtains.

Qur'ānic injunctions against idolatry are enforced by a few hadīth. Anglo-Christian writers cited both scripture and secondary canon as evidence that Islam dictates to Muslims about what art, if any, they are permitted to make. Familiar with Azraḳī and Balāḏurī (d. 892AD/278-9AH), Muir recounts the iconoclastic purge at the Ka‘bah for his English-speaking readership. His narrative arc follows Muhammad, who used

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205 Nomi Heger draws the same conclusion as Khattak does, that there is no “directive regarding human creation of any forms in general or painting in particular” to be found within the Qur’ān. Heger, “The Status and the Image of the Persianate Artist,” PhD diss. (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1997), 29-33. Her doctoral work relates to Iranian artists working for Shi'a courts.

206 Al-Azraḳī refers to Abu ’l-Walīd Ahmad b. Muḥammad and his grandson, Abu ’l-Walīd Muḥammad b. ’Abd Allāh. Both were Meccan historians. The former, whose own grandfather was contemporary to the Prophet, published a history that has Muhammad taking the Ka‘bah (630AD; 8AH) by clearing all of its 360 statues idols, and pictures, but for one. For the translation I am consulting, see Jonathan M. Bloom [ed.], Early Islamic Art and Architecture (London: Routledge, 2017), 62.
his persuasive powers—“unparalleled art and a rare supremacy of mind”—to convert peoples where he campaigned, beginning first with the Quraysh, whom Muir calls the “idolaters of Mecca.”

Muir seems to endorse the Muhammadan campaign against the Quraysh, calling them impious stewards who practised idolatry and therefore were “not the rightful guardians” of the temple at the Ka‘bah. Otherwise Muir avoids casting judgements upon the effect iconoclasm had upon Muslim material culture one way or the other. Nevertheless, he excludes the passage in which Azraḵī notes that Muhammad spares a Christian icon and later adds that Christians were compelled to convert by casting aside their “idolatrous worship of Jesus and his Mother.”

Life of Mahomet introduces two corresponding ideas: that Muhammad warned his followers against worshipping images so they could worship only Allāh and that, due to scriptural tawḥīd, “Islâm and the idol could not exist.”

5.2 Müller and Clair-Tisdall: praise for Muhammadan “Protestantism”

Josias Lee Porter called iconoclasm a “truth that was calculated” by Allāh and His prophet to “counteract the gross and degrading idolatry” that had corrupted Arab tribes and “nominal Christians of the East.”

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207 Muir, Life of Mahomet, x/67. Muir acknowledges that Muhammad was met with resistance initially from the Quraysh: “Idolatry might be wrong, but what guarantee had the idolater that Islâm was right?” Later sources concur. According to Muzaffar Iqbhāl, the Quraysh were “deeply troubled” by laws that “demanded that they give up their practice of worshipping idols” in favour of worshipping one God, Allāh the Creator. See The Qur’ān, Orientalism and the Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2009), 2.

208 Muir, Life of Mahomet, 67.

209 ibid, 51.

210 ibid, 467.

211 Porter, England’s Duty in the Eastern Difficulty; a Lecture, 14. Porter continues that “the Koran forbids the use of wine; and in the virtue of sobriety the despised Turks set an example for Christian nations, even including highly favoured Britain.” Many sources suggest that Islamic prohibitions against idols and khamr have worth because they encourage civility and sobriety.
the Anatolian plateau were also “idolatrous” and had been enlightened by contact with monotheism. To his mind, the Islamic position on icon-worship was cause not for derision but for admiration. Many Protestant voices extolled a similar view. Unitarian minister William Maccall (1812-1888) claimed that Islam is “in effect” the “very natural Protestantism of the human soul” and is even “much diviner” than either Lutheranism or Calvinism. Maccall describes the Prophet Muhammad as an Idol-Breaker and a Miracle-worker; he was not alone in his thinking. Friedrich Max Müller (1826-1900) and Reverend St. Clair-Tisdall (1859-1928) both agreed with Maccall that iconoclasm had been a noble cause, however violently executed.

Max Müller criticised his contemporaries for continuing to denounce Islam. Instead, he perceived meaningful parallels between Protestant and Islamic iconoclasm—to ignore this commonality was to promote hostility and ignorance. Müller argues for a return to Elizabethan diplomacy, which showed “more tolerant feeling” towards Islam: “Queen Elizabeth, when arranging a treaty with the Sultan Murad Khan, states that Protestants and Mohamadans alike are haters of idolatry, and that she is the

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212 *ibid*, 5-6.
214 Friedrich Max Müller, “Mohammedanism and Christianity,” in *Last Essays: Essays on the Science of Religion* (London, New York, Bombay: Longmans, Green and Co., 1901), 240-258. Müller praises heterodox scholarship that he considers academically commendable and morally instructive in freeing Christians from a resurgent crusading mentality: “With us the feeling of the multitude about Mohammed and Islam is still much the same as it was at the time of the Crusades and during the Middle Ages, though of late several weighty voices have been raised against the ignorant condemnation of both the Prophet and of his Religion.” Those “weighty voices” against “ignorant condemnation” belonged to Thomas Carlyle and Reginald Bosworth Smith. Müller refers to an “essay on Mohammed” by Carlyle, presumably *The Hero as Prophet* (New York: Maynard, Merrill & Co., 1882). The second text cited is R. Bosworth Smith, *Mohammed and Mohammedanism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1875).
defender of the faith against those who have falsely usurped the name of Christ.” An aversion to image-worship is given as grounds for mutual sympathy between a reformed church laity and Dar al-Islam. Müller also cites a Tudor-appointed ambassador to Istanbul who cast “the Spaniards” as “the idolaters” to seal alliances with Muslims against a Catholic foe. All Christians, Muslims, and Jews should remember their shared Abrahamic history and past co-operations to reassert their “strong antagonism to idolatry and polytheism.” Müller views idolatry as Catholic corruption. For him, the worshipping of inanimate idols, like objects or images, was dangerous, blasphemous and likely to breed superstition and divert attention from scripture—even if the idol itself had not been designed for veneration or ritual efficacy.

Müller casts Muhammad as a reforming figure who freed the Quraysh and other Arab tribes from “ignorant and idolatrous” practices and polytheism, akin to the way Protestant founders would later liberate Roman Catholics from papal idolatry. His most dramatic (if untenable) claim is that, had Muhammad encountered Christianity without any idolatrous trappings, Muhammad may himself have converted to the church.

While Müller concedes that religions “must make allowances for anthropomorphic   

215 Müller, Last Essays, 242. Here, Müller refers to an inter-empire/faith alliance struck between Sultan Murād III (r. 1546-1595AD/953-1003AH) and Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1533-1603). Elizabeth, excommunicated by the papacy, had also sought support from Shi’a rulers against the Catholic church, establishing the first embassies at the Saadi capital, Marrakesh, and Safavid Qazvin. Müller accurately states that a shared anti-idolatry stance had helped to rouse sympathy between Protestant England and Sunni Turkey. For example, Robert Horne, Bishop of Winchester, wrote in 1566 that “the Pope is a more perilous enemy unto Christ, than the Turk: and Popery more Idolatrous than Turkery.” See Jerry Brotton, This Orient Isle: Elizabeth England and the Islamic World (London: Allen Lane, 2016).

216 Müller supports his contention by arguing that theological differences between Islam and Christianity are so minor that as little as a century ago Turkish Muslims “considered Protestants as Mohammedans in disguise.” Last Essays, 243. Such claims were met with criticism, which I will discuss later. Müller, German-born and raised Lutheran, was appointed to Christ Church College, Oxford, where he established comparative religious studies—still a very new field that had little currency among theologians. His repeated attempts to examine Christianity alongside Indian polytheisms, for example, made him a controversial figure at the time.
imagery” and literary metaphor, he views aniconism as a safeguard against idolatry. Islamic emphasis upon Qur’anic teaching, unfettered by aesthetic aid, aligns well with his Protestant sensibilities.

Religion of the Crescent, by Reverend William St. Clair-Tisdall, conveys a similar opinion. Tisdall organises his appraisals of Islam into “strengths” and “weaknesses” as is indicated by his supplementary title, Islam: Its Strengths, Its Weaknesses, Its Origin, Its Influence. Muhammadan iconoclasm is placed in the former category; it is considered a great strength. Like Müller, Tisdall casts the Prophet as a reformer, stating that, prior to “reforms instituted” by Muhammad, the Ka‘bah had been corrupted by the more than 360 idols installed within the temple there and that “idolatry prevailed very largely” among the Quraysh, until the Prophet entered Mecca, where he ordered “every one of these idols” destroyed and “even obliterated every picture.”

Iconoclasm and monotheism are mutually reinforcing, according to Tisdall, which is why he praises the Prophet for being “irreconcilably opposed to polytheism in whatever form” and for being “the bitter enemy of all idol-worship.” Tisdall notes the few exceptions that are permissible, as Müller had. Although objects such as charms and

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217 Müller, Last Essays, 254.
219 His source here is William Muir, who himself had translated Abu ’Abdullah Muhammad Ibn ‘Omar Ibn Waqid al-Aslami, known as al-Waqidi (747-823/130-207). A sūrah is referenced at length that recounts how the Prophet had purged images and idols from Mecca and from the Ka‘bah. According to Muir, “the great image of Hobal, reared as the tutelary deity of Mecca in front of the Kāaba, shared the common fate” as Muhammad ordered it and other idols be “hewn down.” Life of Mahomet, 127. Hubal, or Hobal, was a pre-Islamic deity worshipped by the Quraysh. Tisdall adds that “if ever iconoclasm was needed in the world, it was needed then.” To his mind this was as true for Christians as it was for those who worshipped Hubal. The Religion of the Crescent, 17-19.
talismans may be kept by Muslims, and some reverence given to saints and shrines, idol-worship has “never been able to gain entrance into the religion of the Musalmâns.”\textsuperscript{221} Here, Tisdall implies that religion will relapse into idolatry if its followers allow themselves to be tempted. To emulate their Prophet, every “true Muslim” must be “animated by the same hatred of idolatry.” Tisdall compares Muslims favourably to Christians on this count, for pursuing iconoclasm wholly and for abstaining from corruptions that plagued the seventh-century church. When Muhammad was alive, Christians and Quraysh tribespeople alike had succumbed to “shameful spectacle” and pantheistic worship. Tisdall thus conceives of Islam as a gift, one that cannot be properly received until idolatry and polytheism are disavowed.

5.3 Muhammadan iconoclasm from a Muslim perspective

Unlike Müller, who chastises Roman Catholics for flaunting idolatry, Tisdall does not venture to critique contemporary Christianity. Abdullah Quilliam (1856-1932) had written texts in a comparative mode, notably \textit{The Faith of Islam}, with mixed success, and so he began lecturing and publishing without comparing Islam favourably to Christianity to reach a wider audience: despite a strong sales record, Abdullah had been branded a “monomaniac” after \textit{The Faith of Islam} was published.\textsuperscript{222} His later material

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{ibid}, 19.

\textsuperscript{222} Jamie Gilham and Ron Greaves, \textit{Abdullah Quilliam and Islam in the West} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 47. Gilham and Greaves describe this process as “soul-searching” by Abdullah, who sought a “strategy” that could make “Islam appear more acceptable to a British public.” \textit{The Faith of Islam} had been widely read but was also controversial, and cost him his lodgings—accused of proselytising, he was evicted from his address at Mount Vernon. W. H. Quilliam, \textit{The Faith of Islam: An explanatory sketch of the principal fundamental tenets of the Moslem Religion} (Liverpool: Willmer Brothers & Company, ltd., 1892). The first edition, 2000 copies, had been published three years earlier. This edition was printed 20,000 times.
such as *Fanatics and Fanaticism*, despite a sensational title, modified his messaging to avoid direct comparisons between Islamic and Christian tenets. Nonetheless, Quilliam continued to endorse Muslim charitable works (*zakāt*) and prohibitions against *khamr* (alcohol). His interpretation of Muhammadan prophetic origins is similar to those put forward by Müller and Tisdall, but it should be noted that Quilliam is speaking about his Prophet and the faith he follows. His tone is more reverent.

Quilliam describes Muhammad as a humble uneducated man who “with the rest of his nation had been brought up among the grossest forms of superstition and idolatry” before receiving “an inspired message from the Almighty God to denounce the worship of idols, and proclaim the Unity of the Deity and call the world to the worship of the Most Merciful, Compassionate and Just God.” Once again, iconoclasm is treated as the primary means by which polytheism is purged. Idolatry activates polytheism and was largely responsible for making pre-Islamic peoples prone to superstition: it is also symptomatic of religious degeneracy. Answering the call from Allāh to reject idol-worship and proclaim His divinity is foundational for the Qur’ān and lays a path for conversion to a pure monotheism.

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223 *The Faith of Islam* had, for example, asserted that Islam was superior as a monotheistic religion, compared to Christian trinitarianism, and that Cardinal Virtues are more compatible with Muslim life. See W. H. Quilliam, *Fanatics and Fanaticism: A Lecture* (Liverpool: T. Dobb & Co., 1890).

224 Cited by Jamie Gilham and Ron Greaves, *Abdullah Quilliam and Islam in the West*, 47. Interestingly, the phrase “grossest forms of superstition and idolatry” can be found, word for word, in an earlier source by Reverend Henry Christmas: “And every kind of idolatry, however poetical or glorious may be the idea in which it takes it origin, must, and ever will lead man further and further from truth every step, till at last it plunges him into the grossest forms of superstition and idolatry.” Christmas, *The World of Matter and its Testimony: An Attempt to Exhibit the Connection Between Natural Philosophy and Revealed Religion* (London: J. M. Robeson, 1848), 48.
Müller, Tisdall and Quilliam all cast Prophet Muhammad as an iconoclastic campaigner who felled idols and “obliterated every picture” he came across.\textsuperscript{225} At this juncture it becomes necessary to ask, how did nineteenth-century thinkers apply their theological positions to Ottoman artworks they had either seen \textit{ex} or \textit{in situ} or read about? Abdullah collected Muslim-made objects from the mid-east and Central Asia for display in his public museum.\textsuperscript{226} His own aversion to idolatry, informed by Muhammadan precedent, does not carry to all objects and did not preclude Muslims from making and admiring them. Quilliam distinguished between conforming artworks and ones that were used to distract from scripture and corrupt worship.

\section*{5.4 Art authorities on Muslim material culture}

Polemical authors discuss iconoclasm as military action initiated by Muhammad and his first followers, spreading Islam by the sword. Destructive violence—perpetrated not only in the seventh century by early converts, but since and beyond, under the crescent banner—is conflated with religious fanaticism. Iconoclastic campaigns were cited as evidence of the warrior Muslim trope that would be applied to the Ottoman ‘other’ during later centuries. Art critics tended to focus less upon the means and more upon the ends. From his post at the British Museum, Stanley Lane-Poole (1854-1931) submitted an article to \textit{Academy and Literature} stating that by discouraging music-making “Mohammad made a mistake” as he had “in most of his dealings with the fine

\textsuperscript{225} Rev. W. St. Clair-Tisdall, \textit{The Religion of the Crescent}, 19.
\textsuperscript{226} Sadly, scant information has survived from the museum Quilliam curated at the Liverpool Mosel Institute. Nonetheless it is a fascinating case and would be a worthy pursuit for future research.
Restricting the arts and regulating subject matter too severely—through “Muslim suppression”—had had the opposite effect, according to Poole, rendering Muslim-made art forms primitive, “illicit” and “shady.” Poole claimed that religious injunctions had stagnated art production, as evidenced by a propensity for aniconic work and a lack of fine music. His concern was not whether iconoclasm had historically come with violence but what effect it had upon Muslim material culture. Gottfried Semper, who designed the bazaar at the Crystal Palace a quarter-century before Poole wrote to Academy and Literature, had identified the same pattern, that Islam “paralyzed” the fine arts while the “spiritually free culture of the West” fostered artists and craftspeople. Iconoclasm is therefore explained as a movement initiated by a misguided Prophet. Although his tone is less polemical than Waddell and Elliot, Poole also associates “suppression” and regression with Muslim religiosity.

Art authorities, well-acquainted with objects woven, smithed, or carved by Muslims, attributed their formal qualities to Muhammadan injunctions against representational imagery. Artist and war correspondent William Simpson (1823-1899) submitted an essay to the London-based Journal of the Society of the Arts about the process by which “the Mohammedan, with his iconoclastic tendencies” had stripped verisimilitude, symbolism and spatial depth from his/her visual vocabulary. Smith suggests the “Mohammedan style of art might be called monotheistic [sic]” because it adheres to

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227 Stanley Lane Poole, “History of Eastern Civilisation Under the Khalívehs,” The Academy and Literature vol. 8 (1875): 236.
228 ibid.
229 Semper, Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts, Or, Practical Aesthetics, 850.
proscribed restrictions on figural representation: “the Mohammedan religion forbade a representation of anything having life.”  

Objects such as carpets and ornamental architecture are viewed as clever solutions to prohibitive rules—a means to make art without offending Allāh or straying too far from al-sunan. Art and architectural historian and curator William Henry Goodyear (1846-1923) would draw the same conclusion regarding architectural ornament, arguing that “well-known laws of Mohammed forbidding imitations of human or animal form” found no “obvious violation” in scrolls and trefoils; arabesque patterning had thus originated as a response to faith. Any art form that is non-representational may be permissible.

John Ruskin (1819-1900) agreed with both Simpson and Goodyear as well as Müller, Tisdall, and Quilliam that Muslims after Muhammad “banished all of creature form from [their] temples” and proclaimed “there is no god but God.” Ruskin writes in his celebrated work Stones of Venice, published the same year the Great Exhibition opened, that the “spirituality and sanctity” of the pointed arch was born first from “Ismael, Abraham, and Shem.” Animating language—that is, describing an object or architectural element as possessing spirituality or sanctity—was not unusual at the

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231 ibid, 492. This portion of the quote is attributed to William George Trewby, writing in response to Simpson.


234 ibid, 13.
time. Indeed, Ruskin believed that nature is the principal inspiration for all art-making. Nature had been shaped by God and it is under His eternal dominion.

For Ruskin, art-making and aesthetic appreciation are akin to religious devotion. Enacting them is a necessary duty, one that must be practised rigorously and without which we will regress into idolatry and sinfulness—Ruskin held that to make art and to admire it is to remind ourselves that God is not inactive and distant but, rather, active and omnipresent. An impulse to draw or paint or sculpt or weave honours God and is a simulation, on a small scale, of His divine creative facility. Studying and inscribing nature as faithfully as possible on canvas is thus a religious act and prerequisite for producing fine art: art that deviates from or abstracts nature is crude and deviant. Faithful art, well executed, should praise the bounty and beauty that God had manifested. True art is the “expressions of the mind of a God-made great man” and the finest artists have a “God-given supremacy” that can be neither taught nor copied.

Beholders are similar to a laity. Laypeople must be able to distinguish between art and idols and be willing to consume “the natural food which God intended for their intellects.” To live without art or among corrupt art is to starve intellectually and morally. Repeatedly, Ruskin related material culture to religious and moral purity.

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235 Crinson pithily summarises this point: for Ruskin, “natural ornament praised God and gave expression to labour.” Labour is conceived in the divine sense—God labouring to form the earth, as told in Genesis. Art-making is a humble recreation of that labour. *Orientalism and Architecture*, 58.


237 *ibid*, 448. Here, Ruskin is speaking about “modern education” and its antipathy to religion.
Ruskin maintained that material culture was related intimately to geography and that individual socio-religious institutions were bound to develop distinct art traditions due to physical distance and separation. His notions that fine art is “God-given” and that great artists are “God-made” applied only to Christian, European artists. By establishing a binary—not between good art and bad art, *per se*, but between pure art and deviant art—Ruskin had a model for dividing ‘west’ from ‘east’ and Christian artists from Muslim. West is progressive and pure; east is regressive, primitive and impure. For Ruskin, English art was necessarily Christian art and any art crafted by Muslims belonged to Arab tradition, itself derived ultimately from Abraham (Ibrāhīm).

Ruskin spoke at the South Kensington Museum shortly after it opened, January 1858, delivering an inaugural lecture titled *The Deteriorative Power of Conventional Art over Nature*. Therein he expounds that “since the race of man began its course of sin on this earth” humanity had developed along divergent lines, some towards brutality, barbarism and “bestial degradation” and others towards civility and high culture. Cultures from the east may be barbaric but, according to Ruskin, their artists nonetheless possessed the capacity to make art because art has “shown itself always to be active in the service of luxury and idolatry” and is often “directed to the exaltation

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238 John Ruskin, *The Two Paths—Being Lectures on Art, and its Application to Decoration and Manufacture Delivered in 1858-1859* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1879), 18-19. Further to the original lecture, see “Ruskin V Jones” in Crinson, *Empire Building: Orientalism and Victorian Architecture*, 54-71. Crinson examines the pedagogical jostling that occurred between Ruskin and two of his contemporaries, Owen Jones and Henry Cole, during the eighteen-fifties. All were widely-read authors and influential thinkers. Crinson cites *The Deteriorative Power of Conventional Art over Nature* to prove that Ruskin took a hostile view towards Muslim material culture, which I think is a fair assessment, but here, Ruskin compares Indian art with highland Scottish art and while it is true that India has a significant Muslim minority, as Ruskin well knew, he does not mention Muslims or Hindus by name. Hence, I have referred here to “non-western” rather than “Muslim” art-makers.
of cruelty.” Ruskin thus accounts for Muslim material culture: “races who live by depredation and slaughter nearly always bestow exquisite ornaments on the quiver, the helmet, and the spear.” It is conveyed that Muslims began to make objects first by decorating weapons to bear in conquest, further reinforcing the relationship between Islam and iconoclastic violence. Muslims are characterised as militant and zealous. Even weaving an exquisite carpet or illuminating a Qurʾān are skills that are sullied by luxury, cruelty, and extravagance. Philosophically, Ruskin has made it possible to reconcile the notion that Islam had birthed barbaric and primitive civilisations with an artefactual record that evidences a plentiful and virtuosic material culture. If art does not mimic nature with fidelity, it is idolatrous.

This inaugural public lecture at the South Kensington Museum was essentially a polemic against acquiring and displaying objects that fail to recreate nature truthfully, which would have precluded virtually all Ottoman objects—many objects amassed for the foundational holdings at the South Kensington were sourced from the Crystal Palace collection. Ruskin implies that objects from the east and west should not be mixed or permitted to share the same public space. His concern is that the museum founders may unwittingly have become “Catilines assembled to devise the hasty degradation of our country” or, even worse, “midnight witches” summoning the

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240 *ibid*. Ruskin accuses non-western artists of having spoilt “the whole spectacle of creation” by casting a ‘veil’ over it and rejecting all “possible sources of healthy knowledge or natural delight.”
241 *ibid.*
“demons of luxury, cruelty, and superstition.”\textsuperscript{242} However exaggerated his rhetoric is, Ruskin seems to have been compelled by a genuine fear that the “innocent and unartistical public” would be attracted to non-representational works at the South Kensington Museum. Undiscerning, Anglo-Christian viewers may lose their ability to distinguish between art and idolatry. They may be corrupted by the “demons” to which Ruskin refers: eastern luxury, cruelty, and superstition.

\textit{Process and Pedagogy}, chapter 3, discussed how the Crystal Palace reinforced an east-west binary, architecturally and conceptually. The South Kensington Museum had a less overtly separatist programme than was evident at the Great Exhibition—perhaps this is why Ruskin feared that objects were not organised hierarchically enough. Ruskin warned the “hasty degradation of our country” would come about if artworks from barbarous and warlike lands were to be exhibited alongside naturalistic works by Christian, western artists.\textsuperscript{243} His anxiety has a similar tenor to the way Anglo-Christian commentators expressed anxiety regarding the Great Exhibition; that having objects and foreign peoples from ‘the east’ present in London would have a deteriorative effect and pose a threat to Christian civil order. Even physical proximity between Christian and Muslim-made art was worrisome for Ruskin.

\textsuperscript{242} \textit{ibid}. Catiline, or Lucius Sergius Catilina, was a first century BC Roman senator who plotted to overthrow the republic multiple times. Ruskin to his audience: “Does it not seem to you … more than questionable whether we are assembled here in Kensington museum to any good purpose? Might we not justly be looked upon with suspicion and fear, rather than with sympathy, by the innocent and unartistical public? Are we even sure of ourselves?”

\textsuperscript{243} \textit{ibid}.
Later, William Morris (1834-1896) would concede that an objection might be made to emulating Muslim material culture on the grounds that decorative arts “have been the handmaids of luxury, of tyranny, and of superstition” across Anatolia and Persia.\(^{244}\) Morris was more measured than Ruskin had been, however. His 1882 lecture, *The Lesser Arts*, defends the decorative arts against charges that might sully their origins. Morris suggests that although patrons such as “popes, kings, emperors” have their names gilded to great buildings and the finest artwork, it is the makers we ought to remember, rather than the rulers, because “decorative arts have flourished among oppressed peoples, who have seemed to have no hope of freedom.”\(^{245}\) Elements that he associated with eastern despots, luxury and tyranny and superstition, contributed to the trope of the ‘lustful’ Turk that was popular during the nineteenth-century. Morris also harks back to history to visualise a “clashing of East and West” over their “rich and beautiful daughter Byzantium”—Istanbul (Constantinople, formerly Byzantium) has often been cited as the temporal and spiritual crux between the cross and crescent.\(^{246}\) Morris admires that unnamed labourers had survived the “rise, dissensions, and the waning of Islam” and that even those “terrible empires of ancient East”—from which the Ottoman Empire was born—were capable of producing fine arts and crafts. Many art authorities were compelled to try to reconcile the fact that so many exquisite objects, the very kind avidly collected by Morris and displayed at the Crystal Palace, had been made by Muslims from the ‘tyrannical’ and ‘oppressive’ east.

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\(^{244}\) William Morris, *Hopes and Fears for Art* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1882), 6. See 1-37 for his lecture, *The Lesser Arts*. Morris was essentially an idealist; he believed that art could help to radically change society for the better. People making objects, crafting them beautifully, and using them, would come hand in hand with the advent of an ideal civil society.

\(^{245}\) ibid.

\(^{246}\) ibid, 8.
Conclusion

Not only did Anglo-Christian observers between 1851 and 1901 assume contrasting, sometimes contradictory attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, but the subjects they broached were far-ranging enough to extend to material culture. *Islam and Idolatry* emphasised how writers—historians, clergy, and art critics—viewed the relationship between Islam and Muslim-made art. Part I had already established that Ottoman Turks were often perceived as a primitive people, dictated to, in their actions and art-making, by a regressive faith. Responses to the carpet collection at the Crystal Palace made clear that Turkey was a non-industrial nation with an ailing art industry. This chapter has supplemented that portion of the discussion. Ottoman objects were associated with Islam and Islam was known by Anglo-Christian observers to be fiercely iconoclastic. Whether iconoclasm had been beneficial or detrimental to Islamic civilisations such as the Ottoman Empire was where the debate emerged, however: Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Unitarian ministers, for example, tended to look positively upon any injunctions that prohibited image and icon worship whereas art critics, Morris and Ruskin among them, saw iconoclasm and aniconism as evidence of why Ottoman Turks and other Muslims were less civilised and productive than European, Christian art-makers. This chapter has thus shifted the discussion from the material to the social dimension.
CHAPTER 6

Cross and Crescent

Cross and Crescent considers the Eastern Question and the tanzimat from a religious position (a theme introduced by the opening quote to Part II). This thesis has followed a broadening pattern, beginning with an historical event, the Great Exhibition. Now it enters a final chapter that casts a wide net. It is text-based and offers a Christian-Muslim context for the aspects of Anglo-Ottoman relations already examined: it also advances the chronology beyond the mid-century to the turn of the twentieth. Evident in the primary data is a preoccupation with the sincerity and potential efficacy of the tanzimat. By the late-nineteenth century, many observers framed Anglo-Ottoman relations as a conflict between cross and crescent that could not be resolved by reforming movements or diplomatic measures. Commentators proposed very different, sometimes contradictory, solutions to the Eastern Question; their positions reflect general perceptions of Ottoman Turks and the Muslim ‘other.’ Cross and Crescent analyses Anglo-Christian attitudes towards Ottoman Turks within a turcophile-turcophobe paradigm, making reference to the tanzimat and trope construction. Whether positive or negative, responses to the Eastern Question had a striking religious tenor to them.

6.1 “Turk and Mohammedan must not be confounded”

Some writers, though well and truly in the minority, were careful to differentiate Turkish ethnicity from Muslim. Presbyterian minister and missionary Josias Leslie
Porter (1823-1889) was one such author. Porter published a lecture he had given to the Glasgow Conservative Association, titled *The Eastern Question*, wherein he states that because “Turkey and the Turks” had never been more significant to European diplomacy than they were then—with the Eastern Question pressing upon the public consciousness—a weighty “responsibility rests upon England” and the English polity to access “full and accurate information” regarding Ottoman history and current affairs.  

Attempting to impart useful information to educate his listeners and readers, Porter begins by registering that the “names Turk and Mohammedan must not be confounded as they often have been by speakers and writers.” His observation reflects the fact that his contemporaries generally conflated religious and ethnic identities. To distinguish better, Porter clarifies that ‘Mohammedan’—the term Owen Jones used to describe Turkey at the Great Exhibition—is a religious designation that applies to many non-Turk peoples. A Mohammedan is a follower of Mohammedanism, “or, as it is more properly called, *Islam*.” Porter thus separates Turkish ethnicity from Muslim religiosity, which he viewed as a precondition to answering the so-called Eastern Question meaningfully. Although Porter claims that religion ought to be considered separately from race, he viewed Islam as central to Ottoman identity.

Porter seems to have been chiefly interested in achieving rhetorical precision. Appraising the Ottoman Empire in its current state, he writes that Ottoman Turks have

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248 ibid, 4.
“a still deeper religious claim extending to the whole followers of Mohammed” and that the Sublime Porte is “essentially and exclusively Moslem.” Porter also calls Muslim governance “a radical evil.” Here, his role shifts from observer to polemicist.

6.2 Porter and the missionary movement

When Edwin Aiken (2010) describes Porter as having come from a “polemical order” he is referring to the Jewish Mission, an historical organisation allied to the Irish Presbyterian Church to which Porter belonged. Porter served with the Jewish Mission in Syria (ash-Shām) for a decade, from 1849 to 1859. Under Ottoman governance, Syrian Christians, Jews, and all other believers were categorised collectively as ahl ul-ḏimmah—a dhimmi was a protected non-Muslim subject. Damascus during the eighteen-forties and fifties saw bitter interfaith conflicts that divided Muslims from ahl ul-ḏimmah and caused bloodshed. Porter left his post in that city less than a year before Damascene Christians would be targeted by violence and murdered in great numbers. His experience there evidently confirmed ‘barbarous’

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249 *ibid*, 9.

250 Generally, though not always, Christian writers treat the Sublime Porte as a manifestation of Muslim absolutism. Gürpınar concludes that “for British observers, the Ottoman state was merely an embodiment of the ideological and mental disposition of the Muslim ruling elite.” “The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism in Nineteenth-Century British Discourses: Visions of the Turk, ‘Young’ and ‘Old,’” 355. I agree with his assessment.

251 Edwin James Aiken, “The Polemical Order: Josias Lee Porter,” in *Scriptural Geography: Portraying the Holy Land* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 89-132. This is an insightful if brief biographical survey. Aiken notes that while no monograph of Porter has yet been written, it is "possible to reconstruct his illustrious and crowded life" from documentary sources. For my work, it is texts published by Porter himself that are significant. His often-hostile positions towards Turkey and Islam more generally—Aiken considers Porter to be a polemicist—will be cited frequently in the following paragraphs.

252 It is not clear whether Porter left because civil war had begun to stir in the region but it is likely that this was the case. Foreign consulates across Syria and Lebanon (al-Jumhūrīyah al-Lubnānīyah) had been targeted during the eighteen-fifties—one consequence of the Crimean war. Missions were also attacked. For historical context, see Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (California: University of California Press, 1994). Fawaz recounts in
tropes already well established at the time, one being that Muslims were prone to violence. Porter believed that only conversion to Christianity could ‘civilise’ Muslims. A few things pointed Porter to his conviction that Turkey might be more viable for mass conversion than either Syria or Egypt, principally that the Sublime Porte allowed an active and “liberal” printing press—Porter cites that 40 depots across Turkey sold bibles—and permitted non-Muslims to worship publicly. His acknowledgment that “opposition to mission work in Turkey” existed is not elaborated in any detail and did not shake Porter from his optimism that an Ottoman capital undergoing reform would be more receptive to mission than other Muslim-majority areas.

It is important to note that people such as Porter had travelled to Muslim-majority regions to proselytise. Their literary output can be understood within the context of mission.

The Jewish Mission that Porter represented was only one among many groups attached to various churches, active at the time, that sponsored missionaries to go to Ottoman and other Muslim-majority nations to proselytise and convert Muslims. They all benefited from foreign policy expansion. Faith-based organisations used diplomatic and commercial infrastructures to travel, such as trade routes and steam transportation. Routes standardised during the eighteen-thirties and forties, facilitating travel to previously remote regions; access had never been easier to Ottoman centres and to Egypt and Syria (both Ottoman protectorates). However, not all mission was church-

considerable detail the way relations between Damascene Muslims and Christians deteriorated between June and July 1860, and how sporadic violence against Christians escalated to a massacre. 101-131 covers the “international response” to the ‘Damascus incident.’

253 Porter, England’s Duty in the Eastern Difficulty; a Lecture, 23
254 ibid.
sponsored. Ruth Hummel and Thomas Hummel (1995) note that clergymen of “dissenting” persuasion as well as “educated and pious lay people” visited Muslim-majority areas. Many such missions could be characterised as curiosity tours and attempts to convert Muslims in any considerable number were manifestly unsuccessful. Nonetheless, a sense persisted that Christian pilgrims to ‘eastern’ lands pursued a cause that was both morally and spiritually admirable.

I have indicated here that London was not isolated or a fixed centre for constructing the tropes that would define Ottoman Turks and Muslims during the mid-nineteenth century, even if most authors published from London-based presses. Lay and ordained Christians with diverse denominational affiliations travelled to Muslim-majority regions to proselytise, including into the Ottoman heartland. They were mobile and missionary-minded. They wrote about the Eastern Question after travelling from the ‘west’ to the ‘east’ to spread Christianity. Concomitance between Christianity and civilisation legitimised missionary work for people like Porter, who believed that the “advancement of Christianity and civilisation” would be mutually reinforcing and was worth pursuing abroad, particularly in Istanbul but also in Ottoman provinces (ili). The Ottoman Empire was an attractive destination for proselytisers.

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6.3 Porter, Davies, and Farley: scepticism, pessimism, and turcophobia

Many sources express bitter resentment regarding Christian citizenship under Muslim government. Overwhelmingly, they imply that Christian subjects under Muslim rule are in a precarious, unnatural position and that Muslims are predisposed to exercise authority aggressively and with prejudice, especially against non-Muslims. Porter claims that once “Moslem fanaticism” has been roused, Ottoman Christians will be left to suffer and are always “without sufficient protection” under shari‘ah.257 His concern comes from the fact that appointees to the Sublime Porte were at every administrative level—top to bottom, so to speak—Muslims by faith. Because central and provincial officials and the judiciary were Muslim it was perceived as inevitable that a “wide opening for every species of injustice, extortion, and oppression” would continue to exist.258 Porter offers a caveat: that violent incidents are only sporadic and tend to occur outside administrative centres, where a “lawless mob” or “brutal soldiery” are more likely to stir violence; but he states that Muslim-run government makes such instances “possible, and even probable.”259 According to Porter, Ottoman Christians were the most obvious target for Muslim brutality.

Reverend John Llewelyn Davies, whose text prefaces this chapter, also held to the idea that Christians will meet oppression wherever Muslims rule. Davies wrote that rather than being receptive to reforms, it would be shrewd to be “contemptuous” of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif and the following Islâhat Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu because their

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257 *ibid*, 20.
258 *ibid*.
259 *ibid*. 
“hollowness” was “too well known” and should have been predicted. Here Davies implies not only that the tanzimat was too difficult to implement in a Muslim-majority setting but that the entire endeavour had been disingenuous and misguided. His argument that “Turks can promise nothing, decree nothing, which they have not repeatedly promised and decreed before” expresses one turcophobic response to the Eastern Question that resonated widely after the mid-century. Ottoman administrators were deemed unreliable, untrustworthy, and unconcerned with Christian welfare.

James Lewis Farley (1823-1885) concurred with both Porter and Davies, denouncing the “disproportionate” influence Muslims had over Christians, both in government and among the general population. Farley had travelled for lengthy periods to Ottoman regions—unlike Porter he did so in a diplomatic capacity, as accountant-general to the state bank in Istanbul—but his interests were not confined to the commercial sphere. In 1876, Farley published Turks and Christians and Cross or Crescent, two homologous texts that both treat Anglo-Ottoman relations as a Christian-Muslim issue by conceiving the Ottoman Empire as a loosely composed socio-religious body united by the crescent banner more than by the central government. Farley describes Sunni Islam as a “common quest” among an “aggregate of nationalities” and then calls Anatolia a “battle-field” wherein “Islamism and Christianity have contended.”

According to Farley, within this battlefield, the Ottoman Christian minority had been

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260 Davies, “Religious Aspects of the Eastern Question,” 6-7. He adds that “the very promises and new decrees of the Porte imply that the complaints of the Christians are well founded.”
systematically persecuted for more than four centuries, facing atrocities and massacres at regular intervals, being subjected at all times to “the most barbarous cruelty, the most grinding tyranny and the most inhuman persecutions” that readers could imagine.\textsuperscript{263} Farley typecasts ‘Turks’ as ‘barbarous’ by nature: “the Turk is the same to-day as he has ever been—fanatical, corrupt, and brutal.”\textsuperscript{264} His language resoundingly ‘others’ ‘the Turk’ and renders that type incapable of compassionate government or change. Farley implies that the \textit{tanzimat} will do little to alleviate Christian suffering or to shift conditions for the better. If the Sublime Porte is corrupt to the core and if the Muslim populace is inherently ‘barbarous’—tropes Farley accepted—it follows that Christian rights will continue to be abused, empire-wide, by Ottoman elites and the \textit{rayah}.

Farley argued that the \textit{tanzimat} could only be successful if Muslim authority were curtailed—here he expressed the majority opinion—but he staked a more extreme position than either Porter or Davies had, claiming that legislative authority should pass from Muslims to Christians; he even urged the sultan to “order the Turks to burn the Koran and read the Bible.”\textsuperscript{265} What is clear is how deeply he mistrusted a Muslim-majority government to administer fairly to non-Muslims.

Farley felt that kinship should thrive among Christians whether the empires to which they belong are friendly or at war. In \textit{Turks and Christians}, he petitions his readership to treat Ottoman Christian welfare as a domestic issue: “is there no sympathy to be felt

\textsuperscript{263} ibid.
\textsuperscript{264} ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{265} ibid, 154.
in England for those Christians who, during upwards of four hundred years, have held their faith unsullied in the midst of the enemies of the Cross? Entreaties to disregard geographical distance and to consider Ottoman Christians as neighbours had been made before, even explicitly at the Great Exhibition, where children were instructed to see The Greek Slave as kin and to sympathise keenly with her plight. Farley urges his Anglo-Christians peers to remember that Ottoman Christians were living not far from but rather in the very “midst of the enemies of the Cross”—an existence The Greek Slave, sold into a harem, had to endure—and therefore deserved support from their English co-religionists. Ottoman Turks are cast as the oppressor; the slave-owners, the enemies of Christianity. The stage for conflict between cross and crescent is set again.

Farley, Porter, and Davies all agreed that Ottoman Turks were fanatical and ‘barbarous’ and incapable of, or unwilling to, govern justly. Their comments resonate with the kind made earlier by guests at Great Exhibition, some of whom described “the East” as a “land of despotism.” They ask their Anglo-Christian readers to treat the tanzimat with considerable scepticism because Islam is an aggressive faith that has fostered fanaticism and brutality and is unlikely to be compatible with reform. However, other observers looked to the tanzimat with reserved optimism or would at least concede that it might present practical benefits for Ottoman Christians. For clergymen such as

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266 ibid, 105-106. Farley goes on to say that resisting “the Christian element” had been detrimental to Ottoman civilisation because Christians “are more intelligent and better educated than the Turks.” It is this type of rhetoric that Porter had referred to when he said that contemporary writers too readily conflate religion with racial or ethnic identity. Farley often compares “the Turk” to the Christian or the Moslem to the Englishman—he does so even in the title, Turks and Christians. Many authors treated those identities as interchangeable, taking it for granted that Ottoman Turks are Muslim and the English are Christians. Enmity towards each other is therefore preordained.

267 Newcombe, Little Henry’s Holiday at the Great Exhibition, 158-161.
Reverend William Denton, it was incumbent upon Christians internationally to watch the *tanzimat* closely and to intervene whenever possible to encourage positive outcomes, especially where they could improve Christian lives. Denton published *Christians in Turkey* less than a decade after the Islâhat Fermanı was issued.

### 6.4 *Christians in Turkey*, 1863

Reverend William Denton laid out expectations for *islâhat*, from a socio-religious perspective, in *Christians in Turkey*.268 Any hopes he had for Christian autonomy lay specifically with *islâhat*, which meant those reforms that pertained to Ottoman Christians. Five conditions are advanced that will help to achieve the “freedom of the Christian races of Turkey.”269 First is that Christians and Muslims receive equal judgment under *sharīʿah*; second and third, Christians should have equal inalienable rights to hold land and property, and they should be taxed at the same rate as their Muslim neighbours; a fourth condition is that Christians be eligible to enter the military; fifth and finally, any and all “compulsory conversion to the Mohammedan faith” must be outlawed.270 Denton prefaces his text by acknowledging that he is a clergyman rather than a diplomat but says he feels compelled to correct the “wrongs” and “bitter suffering” experienced by “so many millions of our brethren.”271 While he is more pragmatic than polemicists such as Porter and Farley, both of whom wrote contemporaneously to him, Denton also viewed Ottoman Christians as a historically

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269 *ibid*, 52.
270 *ibid*, 52-53.
271 *ibid*, 2.
persecuted minority. The Islâhat Fermanı therefore came to be seen as a necessary solution to an urgent and troubling problem.

Denton remarked that reasserting reform was only necessary because negligence and non-fulfilment had followed the 1839 Gülhane. Farley, too, would later recall that at “the close of the Crimean War promises were made to the Western Powers that thenceforward the Christians and the Turks should stand on a footing of perfect equality.” The promises he refers to are the Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu. Partly to service what had proven a decisive alliance between empires, Abdülmecid removed legislative restraints preserved within the Gülhane, extending relative equality to Christian subjects and pledging they would be eligible for both government and the military. This fulfilled the fourth condition Denton had put forward in *Christians in Turkey*.

William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898) published reviews on both *Christians in Turkey*, by Denton, and *Turks and Christians*, by Farley, which is notable, considering his prominence and that his bid for Prime Minister was largely predicated upon guarantees to protect Christians from Ottoman atrocities in the Balkans. Overwhelmingly, Christian welfare within the Ottoman Empire was treated as a domestic issue.

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272 Farley, *Turks and Christians*, 105.
273 Anscombe suggests that reforms had to be moderated because “modernizers could not permit efforts to woo Christians to imperil Muslim support.” He concludes that “Islam was necessary for defence of the land, even though it was not sufficient in itself, a truth realized by many long before any serious reform was every attempted.” Anscombe, “Islam and the Age of Ottoman Reform,” 188.
274 This is according to Rebecca Gill, *Calculating Compassion: Humanity and relief in war, Britain 1870-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Gill examines the Eastern Question as it relates to the Balkans Crisis, 1876-1878. She suggests that William Ewart Gladstone “differentiated Islam” from “the Turk” and argued for intervention in the region to protect Christians from Muslim hostility, which Gladstone perceived was a matter of misgovernment, not religious fanaticism.
6.5 The ‘enlightened Turk’

However fragmentary expansions to Christian autonomy had been, whatever their practical limitations, Islâhat Hatt-ı Hûmâyûnu or the Islâhat Fermanı was received with cautious optimism by some Anglo-Christian commentators sympathetic to Ottomans. Turcophiles often expressed their views by conceding that if the general population—the rayah, governed locally by askeri—posed a threat to the tanzimat and to Christian welfare, Istanbul was at least populated by ‘enlightened’ and reform-minded Turks.

William Howard Russell (1820-1907) described a type called the “enlightened Turk” who—unlike the “pashas in distant provinces”—would appreciate that the Qurʾān was “little suitable to be the basis and textbook of civil law.” Russell reasons that Qurʾānic justice was antithetical to contemporary rule just as the Old Testament would be if it were the basis for British jurisprudence. Islam is thus perceived as an obstacle to true reform, incompatible with moderate rule. Russell held the view that the tanzimat was a modernising, perhaps westernising, project that could only be undertaken by educated elites at the Sublime Porte, able and willing to subdue zealous Muslim masses. This ‘enlightened’ type was diametrically opposed to the ‘barbarous’ Turk.

275 W. H. Russell, The British Expedition to the Crimea (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1877), 20. Russell reported for The Times during the Crimean War and was a well-known war correspondent. Similar turcophile opinions were expressed elsewhere in western press. An 1875 submission to the United States House of Representatives, for example, states plainly that the Sublime Porte is “sufficiently liberal and enlightened” and that only “questionable friends or undoubted cynics” would disagree: “Turkish Empire—the Ottoman Porte,” Executive Documents: The House of Representatives (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1875): 1149. For a European response, see S. Chase Gummer, “The Politics of Sympathy: German Turcophilism and the Ottoman Empire in the Age of Mass Media 1971-1914” (PhD diss. Washington DC: Georgetown University, 2010).
Correspondent reporters often expressed favourable attitudes towards the Sublime Porte. Russell and other press-members perceived a meaningful divide between the general population and the ‘enlightened’ Turks who occupied central government, whom they saw as sympathetic to the west, well educated, and less religiously dogmatic. The *Times*—for which Russell worked as a war reporter—published regular reportage from Istanbul-based writers following the Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu, assuring English readers that the *tanzimat* was an earnest effort to redress religious absolutism.

During the eighteen-fifties and sixties, several foreign correspondents reported to the English press that religious tolerance was practiced in Istanbul and would be admired by any who had an opportunity to see. One such reporter wrote optimistically to The *Times* from the Ottoman capital, convinced that the Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu, which had just been passed by Abdülmeclid, would certainly grant “equal rights to all the subjects of the sultan, of whatever religion they may be.”

His account describes an official reading at the Topkapı Palace attended by the “Sheik-ul-Islam, the patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops” and various Christian groups as well as dignitaries from “among the Mussulman and non-Mussulman population of Constantinople.” Diversity and interreligious diplomacy are emphasised. It is deemed noteworthy, for example, that the honorary head of the caliphate—the Shaykh al-Islãm (Ottoman Turkish: Şeyhülislâm)—had invited Jewish and Christian leaders to attend a festival celebration following the Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu. This article can be taken as an endorsement of the *tanzimat* freely given; it starkly contrasts the opinions expressed by polemical authors

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276 “Turkey,” *Times* [London]: 4 March 1856. Published in early March, the writer is recounting a 21 February festival.
who believed that the Sublime Porte was populated by corrupt leaders committed to preserving Muslim supremacy over the Christian. For this writer to The Times, the tanzimat represented a sincere effort to correct historical injustices.

Another writer to that paper argued that Ottoman Christians had not suffered as gravely as some imagined. According to an editorial titled The Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Christians had historically fared well under the sultanate, even before the Gülhane and the later Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu were signed. Readers are urged to be “divested of passion” and to remember that “while upholding their own faith” Ottoman Turks had allowed Christians to worship publicly, a right that religious minorities were denied elsewhere: “Christian churches, charitable institutions and schools, and religious foundations of all kinds, have always found liberal aid from the Sultan [either] in grants of land, money, or the protection which they require for their maintenance.”277 Whereas Porter and Farley and turcophobic authors agreed that Christians had been proactively persecuted for their faith by Muslims, both leaders and citizen alike, turcophiles were keen to differentiate between government and the general population. This anonymous writer to The Times, when he refers to the “liberal aid” offered to Christians by the sultanate, praises the education and civility that Ottoman officials were sometimes credited with. A liberal, western-leaning Istanbul was viewed by sympathetic observers as a reforming centre.

277 “The Ottoman Empire,” Times [London]: 3 August 1864.
Perceived distinctions between the Ottoman elite and the masses were not only drawn by outside observers. Urban/rural divides are commonly articulated inside a single polity, especially if it has a diverse and heterogeneous population, which the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire certainly did. Heck notes that during the 1893 Chicago Columbian Exposition, the Sublime Porte and the sultan had “resorted to orientalism” by presenting the minorities under their jurisdiction, particularly the Bedouins and the Kurds, as ‘other’ and as ‘orientals’ to the Anglo-American public. By juxtaposing the “civilised Ottoman against a savage Oriental” within the exhibitionary space, by assigning value to objects according to ethnic provenance, they were “alienating their Muslim populations” and enforcing so-called ‘barbaric’ and ‘unspeakable’ tropes. Heck suggests Ottoman officials had consolidated their own identity as modern, educated, and competitive with the European ruling elite—the very attributions Russell and the Times correspondents had given them complimentarily—at the expense of minorities and the rayah. Evidently, the ‘enlightened’ Turk was a trope with some appeal to, and currency among, Istanbul-based officials.

### 6.6 Turcophilism

Turcophiles expressed contrasting views on whether the tanzimat was reliant upon the Sublime Porte dispensing with Islam but they did concur with each other in their thinking that Ottoman officials were educated, ‘enlightened’ and earnestly pursuing religious tolerance. Some thought this would be sufficient to enforce the tanzimat, and islâhat specifically, in rural regions hostile to Christians.

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278 Heck, “Labelling the Ottoman Empire as ‘Turkey’ in the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893,” 131.
After 1856 turcophilism had majority support in parliament with Henry John Temple Palmerston as Prime Minister. Under the Palmerston government (1855-1858) many Anglo-Christians appeared convinced, as were the writers to The Times, that Abdülmecid was inclining the Sublime state towards Europe through the tanzimat. They staked their position on whether reform would benefit Ottoman Christians and whether Ottoman reformers were genuinely committed to granting Christians greater autonomy. Lord Palmerston assured parliamentarians that “without fear of contradiction from anyone who knows anything about it that so far from having gone back, Turkey has made greater progress and improvement than any other country in the same period.” This speech and his more famous testimony endorsing the tanzimat—“there is no reason whatsoever why [Turkey] should not become a respectable power”—have been quoted widely since 1853; but the preceding statement is even more significant. Palmerston refers to the Ottoman majority as ‘Mohammedans’ or ‘Mussulmans’ and rails against the notion that Europeans should interfere with territorial sovereignty in wrong-headed efforts to “relieve Europe of the blighting presence of the Moslem.” Palmerston conceded that maintaining the “integrity” of the Ottoman Empire might also mean recognising the sultanate as a Muslim governing body.

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280 ibid, 1808. This speech is cited by Gürpınar (362) and by several other scholars, most recently in Jens Hansen and Max Weiss, Arabic Thought Beyond the Liberal Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 130. See also Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press 2007), 20; Fred M. Dallmayr, Akif Kayapınar, Ismail Yaylaci [eds.], Civilizations and World Order: Geopolitics and Cultural Difference (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2014), 127.
Turcophilism may have been a dominant discourse under Palmerston but it failed to take a permanent foothold and was never without opposition, particularly during the mid-eighteen-seventies.\(^{281}\) An entry to The London Quarterly Review (1877) takes exception to the term itself. Here, the writer trivialises turcophilism as a fashion, claiming that it would be “absurd to accuse any serious party or statesman in England” during the Palmerston years of “having been Turcophile” because they had only allied with the Sublime Porte for pragmatic gain; no pro-Ottoman politician could genuinely be considered “a friend of the Turk.”\(^{282}\) Civilians who chose to adopt the turcophile mantle are called “eccentric” and are dismissed as a radical minority. According to this review, the majority recognised that a Muslim-led government “unreformed and unchanged” would remain “an anomaly in Europe.”\(^{283}\)

Turcophiles were even cast as characters in popular culture, which suggests public opinion was thoroughly engaged with civic discourse at the time. One satirical excerpt submitted to Fun, titled A Curious Misconception, offers a dialogue between a Mr Brown—“a sensible person of no particular party”—and a Mr Jones, a “specimen of a certain class of conservative.” Brown and Jones argue over whether Turks are friends or foes. The Tory Jones is a caricature turcophile. His opening line is to ask Brown,

\(^{281}\) This ‘waxing-and-waning’ process is what gives Gürpınar his title, “The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism.” I have avoided parsing political affiliations to better focus upon the Christian-Muslim aspect to the Eastern Question debate. For political analysis, see R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question (London: Routledge, 2012). It is difficult to describe Palmerston as a Liberal or a Whig. Turcophilism was adopted at the policy level by his government and later by Disraeli, a one-nation Conservative.


\(^{283}\) A familiar refrain is then repeated: that the Sublime Porte will continue to enact policy that is “hurtful and insulting to Christians.” Ottoman Christians live as a “subject race” under “the Mussulmans.” ibid, 148-149.
“these Turks are very good fellows/as nearly saints as mortals can well be/aren’t they? They’ve been nothing less than martyrs all through this war/they’re always in the right, eh?”

Their conversation descends into farce as Jones calls Brown a Russophile just as a third character, a Liberal, Mr Smith, accuses Brown of turcophilism. Stuck in the middle, Brown finally tells his peers he is neither. *A Curious Misconception* satirises the fervour that had been stirred amid the Eastern Question, with each party scrambling to assert his own position without allowing room for concessions or moderation. Significantly, it also anticipated the fall from favour the Conservative Party would experience during the 1880 election.

6.7 The tide turns again, 1880

Having held shakily under the Disraeli government (1874-1880), turcophilism was all but stamped out with a Liberal election victory that saw William Ewart Gladstone enter office following an intense campaign that criticised Conservative foreign policy as weak, ineffectual, and immoral.

The following year, *The Times* ran a letter-to-the-editor titled *The Union of Islam* that lucidly conveys the shift in sympathies that had manifested between the eighteen-fifties and seventies. In it George Percy Badger (1815-1888) writes that since the Palmerston

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284 “A Public Monument,” *Fun* vol. 27-28 (1878): 160. Discourse around the Eastern Question often landed in *Punch* magazine, as well, in a satirical mode. One dialogue takes place between two characters under the epithets “Candid Inquirer” and “Perplexed Personage” that is titled *Poor Humanity*. The latter tells the inquirer: “Turcophile railings and Turcophile recriminations wholly confound me … it is no particular concern of mine whether Turcophile or Turcophobe have the better argument. But it is a concern of mine that they should argue fairly and not make me a pander to party passion masquerading in the guise of philanthropy or patriotism.” Fleet Street satire can be useful because it provides an alternative perspective. In comic spirit, it represents the everyday citizen observing the clergy or political elite with incredulity. *Punch* (1877): 29.
era—when the Sublime Porte “was always ready to listen and follow the advice of Great Britain”—policy had unwisely begun to agitate “the followers of Islam” and to “alienate the affections of the Moslems.” Badger was a prominent Anglican missionary and scholar who had been writing about the Eastern Question since the Gülhane was signed; he was troubled by the turcophobia signalled by the Gladstone government and the deteriorative impact it could have on Anglo-Ottoman relations.

Many Anglo-Christians had indeed lost faith in the tanzimat by then, Badger discerned, with more commentators reverting to jingoistic and turcophobic rhetoric that framed Christians and Muslims, cross and crescent, as fundamentally hostile to one another. Badger expresses particular concern about the way that “Christian Powers” were wresting Muslim-majority regions from Muslim rule, actions that he believed had caused the ummah to begin to direct its allegiances towards “the Sultan of Turkey”—by now a foe more than a friend to England. By that time the anti-Ottoman position had parliamentary and general public support; turcophobia would hold sway during the eighteen-eighties and nineties.

Sir Edwin Pears (1835-1919) lived and worked for four decades in Istanbul and from his post there, he published several tracts relaying Ottoman affairs to the English public—Gladstone cited his works to campaign against the Disraeli Tories. His 1886

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285 “The Union of Islam,” *Times* [London]: 26 November 1881. According to Geoffrey Roper, Badger was not a great orientalist scholar but had contributed sufficiently to nineteenth-century scholarship to be a figure of note. His bibliographic list is particularly useful as it cites major works that Badger had published, though it omits more obscure editorials like this one in The Times. Roper, “George Percy Badger (1815-1888),” *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 11; no. 2 (1984): 140-155.

286 *ibid.*
book, *The Fall of Constantinople*, is ostensibly historical, but it offers moral judgements and strikes a distinctly polemical tone. Pears suggests that Islam has historically promoted and rewarded aggression and that, as a result, violence against infidels motivates Muslims now as it had since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Islam is compared negatively with Christianity, which Pears believes to be based upon “self-sacrifice, meekness, and humility”—qualities that would be foreign to a “barbarous and warlike” people like the Ottoman Turks.\(^{287}\) Again we encounter the ‘barbarous’ trope that casts Ottoman Turks as warlike and primitive. We also re-enter the conceptual space between race and religion. Pears describes Islam as a “poison” adopted by “savage or barbarous” races.\(^{288}\) Later he argues that while Christianity and Islam are both missionary faiths, Muslims have proselytised more forcefully than Christians because they propagate holy war by the sword (*jiḥād bis saif*) far more violently; unlike Christians who even in wartime hold to a “lurking belief” that “fighting is an unchristian occupation.”\(^{289}\) Pears concludes that Muslims are by nature fanatics and believe it is their missionary duty to make war with infidels as they are promised an opulent afterlife (*ʾĀkhirah*) in reward.

Pears draws two more polarities that handicap Islam: that Christianity appeals to the highest side of humanity, whereas Islam appeals to the lowest; and that Muhammad


\(^{288}\) *ibid.*, 21-22. See 23 for his elaboration: “The inevitable and invariable history of Moslem races after the first spurt has been spent which the adoption of Monotheism had given them has been the same—decay in the family life; spasmodic attempts to bring about a revival of religious and political life; steady but sure to decay.” Contemporary degenerationist theory and inherited tropes like these combined to enforce the notion that Islam, and the Ottoman Empire, were in terminal decline.

\(^{289}\) *ibid.* According to Pears, the crusader soldier was a Christian “in spite of his profession.”
was a warrior while Christ was meek and a pacifist. A third less polar comparison is that Muslims insist Allāh is great, while Christians insist their God is good. In sum, Pears states that the “Moslem ideal during life and its haven after death were in every way as welcome to the barbaric mind as those of Christianity were repugnant.”

Ottoman Turks are characterised as being ‘barbarous’ because they are ignorant and slavish to a ruthless god. Like-minded readers held that a reformed Sublime Porte ruling non-Muslims peaceably and fairly was incongruous or, at worst, impossible.

Polemical authors perceived relations between the Ottoman Empire and the English as a conflict between cross and crescent that could not be resolved by reform; divisions ran too deep. Turcophiles rejected their turcophobic rhetoric but ultimately formed a minority opinion that had virtually disappeared from public discourse by 1880, despite initial optimism that the Gülhane and the later Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu would keep Christians safe across Anatolia, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean. Pears evidently had remained unmoved by the tanzimat. His most famous book, Turkey and Its People, was published in 1911, after his return to England. From the first paragraph, Pears designates a “battlefield between the East and West.”

Between the first and last page—there are 463 altogether—Islam is mentioned 117 times and Mahometans or Moslems 410 times; references to Christians or Christianity can be found 406 times. There is little doubt Pears and his contemporaries viewed interstate relations as having a significant religious dimension.

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290 *ibid.*
Conclusion

Part II has concluded with chapter 5, which examined what can be understood as the social dimension to Anglo-Ottoman relations between 1851 and roughly 1901. It offered a critical survey of primary texts that communicate how attitudes towards, and perceptions of, the Ottoman ‘other’ were coloured by faith positions. I approached England and Turkey and their respective empires, British and Ottoman, as collectives each defined to a significant degree by religious identity—a majority of Ottoman Turks belonged to the ummah and the English to a church. My conclusion is that, although opinions varied a great deal, Islam continued to be perceived as a threat and an oppressive faith. Ottoman Turks were othered owing to their religion as well as their ethno-heritage: Ottoman material culture was likewise associated with ignorance and iconoclasm. When Farley claimed that “industry and art are absolutely foreign” to Turks, for example, he means that technology and art-making are markers of civilisation and that, without them, the Ottoman Empire descended into “buffoonery” and “barbarism.”292 The conclusion will relate Part I to Part II to consider how the material dimension to Anglo-Ottoman relations, especially the Great Exhibition, both reflects and reinforced the social dimension. Tropes that caricatured Ottoman Turks as ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ were materialised at the Crystal Palace and the objects therein were read with reference to an existing canon of tropes.

292 Farley, Turks and Christians, 111-112. Farley concedes that once “the Mussulman East” had been the “home of civilization, of literature, of science, and of art,” as was evidenced by booty brought back to Europe during the crusades, but, according to his text, the Ottoman Empire had experienced a “four-century decline” since. Farley does quote a Turkish source, Teraki, translated to English, which offers rebuttal of sorts: “Civilization must not be confounded with sciences, arts, and machinery … Turks! if [sic] the Europeans talk about civilization, you can hold your heads up …”
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis has addressed one aspect of historical Anglo-Ottoman relations, 1851-1901, by researching the ways objects from the Ottoman Empire were assembled, displayed, and received at the Great Exhibition. I examined material and social dimensions to that half-century period. My aim was not to state definitively whether Ottoman objects were sacralised or secularised at the Crystal Palace. Rather, I demonstrated the socio-religious context in which they were displayed and what messaging their exhibition conveyed to Anglo-Christian audiences regarding ‘the Turk’—a religious ‘other.’

7.1 An overview

Part I is titled The Material Dimension. Comprising chapters 3 and 4, Process and Pedagogy and Bazaar and Harem, Part I examined how ‘the Turk’ and the Ottoman Empire were conceptualised and materialised at the Crystal Palace.

Process and Pedagogy was largely concerned with the ways religion and religious positions influenced the administrative, architectural, and pedagogical infrastructures that supported the Great Exhibition. I argued that the Great Exhibition was conceived by the Royal Commission, church-based affiliates, and the general public not only as a manufactural and artistic exhibition but also as a means to assert England and her empire as a Christian, European power. Moreover, Turkey—by far the best-represented
Muslim-majority nation at the Crystal palace—was viewed as a “Mohammedan” exhibitor and a representative of Islamic culture and civilisation. How carpets were critiqued at the bazaar is a clear example of how Ottoman objects were interpreted in the broader terms of Muslim material culture and Ottoman industry. I also discussed how Gottfried Semper approached his architectural commission, making reference to his own theories about the “bestiary” of the “Muslim Orient” and the freer “spirit of Christianity.”

Bazaar and Harem continued to examine the Great Exhibition by looking first at the Turkish bazaar and second at The Greek Slave. I demonstrated how Muslim topographies were conceptualised and physicalized architecturally at the Crystal Palace, namely the bazaar and the harem. Mid-nineteenth-century sources show a keen fascination with bazaars and harems: texts and images from the period exoticised these spaces to a significant degree and, as I have said, related them to the ‘barbarous’ Turk and ‘lustful’ Turk tropes. Each trope was assigned material features, which is why Bazaar and Harem gave particular emphasis to hand-weapons and water-pipes.

Part II is titled The Social Dimension. Comprising chapters 5 and 6, Islam and Idolatry and Cross and Crescent, Part II compared and contrasted the positions Anglo-Christian observers took towards Ottoman Turks and Islam after 1851.

Islam and Idolatry looked at how the relationship between Islam and idolatry was understood by Anglo-Christian observers. Just as Muslims were often perceived as primitive people, their material culture was often disparaged as conservative or crude.

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Virtually all commentators agreed that Islam is fiercely iconoclastic. Where the debate diverged had more to do with whether the regulation of artists by religion had been fruitful or detrimental to civilisation. Writing on that subject was not confined to artistic circles. Many clergymen considered material culture when theorising and writing about theology and Islam: Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Unitarian ministers tended to praise injunctions against images and icons. However, for art critics, iconoclasm and a tendency toward non-figurative artforms only confirmed the notion that Turks were uncivilised and slavish to Islam, itself a regressive and dogmatic faith. *Islam and Idolatry* functioned as a bridge between my discussion of the material and social dimensions, and broadened the scope sufficiently for a final critical-contextual chapter.

*Cross and Crescent* made particular reference to the Eastern Question, which characterised the Ottoman Empire as a declining body approaching a fall. Parties emerged with radically contrasting solutions to the Eastern Question, each debating if the *tanzimat* was sincere and would benefit Ottoman Christians and whether the Ottoman Empire—“the sick man of Europe”—should be supported by Europe or be shunned. I consulted primary sources penned by both turcophile (empathetic) and turcophobic (polemical) writers as well as others that challenged, critiqued, or at least complicated that turcophile/turcophobe binary. By the mid-eighteen eighties, many observers treated Anglo-Ottoman relations as a conflict between cross and crescent that had taken root with the crusades and would not be resolved by reforming movements or diplomatic measures. Whether positive or negative, responses to the Eastern Question and the *tanzimat* were usually coloured by religious and racialised thinking.
Both Part I and Part II, chapters 3-6, were detail-rich, discursive, and used thick description to gather, organise, and analyse primary sources—a methodology adapted by Bernard Herman to material culture. This bipartite structure treats textual and artefactual data as equally important—a balance that has generally been absent from historical research, which tends to overlook materiality.

I borrowed terminology from Ninian Smart, whose *Dimensions of the Sacred* provides the framing device for the work; that is, the material and social dimensions. Each has guided one of the two parts that form the thesis proper—Smart believed the material and social dimensions have a mutually-reinforcing relationship, which means neither can be wholly examined without reference to one another. I approached Turkey and England and their empires, Ottoman and British, as social collectives that defined citizenship and belonging to a significant degree along religious lines. It follows that handmade objects crafted within one particular socio-religious setting and sent to another for display—*ex situ*, so to speak—have innate historical significance and can reflect more broadly how states, empires, and faith groups have interacted and related. I adapted a social and material framework from Smart to craft my research questions and organise my findings.

7.2 Restating the research questions

- *The Material Dimension* (Part I): what information did the Great Exhibition, 1851, relay to Anglo-Christian audiences about ‘the Turk’ and Islam?
• The Social Dimension (Part II): between 1851 and 1901, how and to what degree was ‘the Turk’ othered on a religious basis?

With the primary data gathered, collated, and analysed across chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, and having restated the guiding research questions, I can elaborate a critical discussion and clarify the conclusions I have reached. I propose that the material dimension reflected and reinforced the social dimension to historical Anglo-Ottoman relations.

7.3 Critical discussion

The Ottoman Empire was the last great Muslim world empire to survive into the age of modernity. The Ottoman state, together with its contemporaries, Habsburg Austria and Romanov Russia, was engaged in a struggle for survival in a world where it no longer made the rules. As the nineteenth century approached its last quarter, these rules were increasingly determined by the successful and aggressive world powers, Britain, France, and after 1870, Germany. As external pressure on the Ottoman Empire mounted from the second half of the century, the Ottoman centre found itself obliged to squeeze manpower resources it had hitherto not tapped.

Here Selim Deringil (2003) gives his sense of this historical period from the Ottoman perspective: that the Sublime Porte was the only Muslim administration to govern an empire into the fin de siècle; that the Ottoman Empire had been fighting for survival since, from the mid-nineteenth century, Britain and her European allies had begun to contribute more aggressively to “external pressures” mounted on the Ottoman centre; and that, to respond, Ottoman officials looked to the population they governed as a

294 Deringil, “They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery:” The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” 311.
resource. Although Deringil is writing critically about the relationship between the Sublime Porte and the Ottoman population, rather than relations between Ottomans and Europeans, his statement is applicable to my research. Presenting at the Crystal Palace was a part of the survival strategy that Deringil describes. I propose that the Great Exhibition offered the Sublime Porte the opportunity to display resourcefulness and innovation in a way that would impress European states and redress the pejorative image of Turkey as “the sick man of Europe.” To what extent that correction was successful, or even possible, is debatable, however. Ottoman objects were given mixed reviews—contemporary reports form the basis for my conclusions—and were read with reference to the “sick man of Europe” trope and others that cast Ottoman Turks as ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ and perhaps implicated in the downfall of their own empire. My research is concerned with intention and reception but gives much more emphasis to the latter; to the ways objects such as pile carpets, weapons, and water-pipes materialised the Ottoman Empire and Muslim faith and life for Anglo-Christian audiences. This half-century period that Deringil has described as intense and so consequential was influenced considerably by the massive display at the Crystal Palace. Indeed, for both the British and Ottoman empires, the Great Exhibition would prove to be a significant phenomenon with lasting effects.

I propose that the material dimension reflected and reinforced the social dimension to Anglo-Ottoman relations, 1851-1901. Any public exhibition with a stated agenda is both the product of the conditions in which it is mounted and an agent for giving information and ideas to the attendees present. It might critique or challenge cultural norms or protest a political regime, for example; alternatively, it could secure norms.
Whether responding positively or negatively or with ambivalence to current events, the exhibitionary space is pedagogically loaded. It can assert individual and collective identities, too. What objects are selected for show and how they are displayed—the very nature of the curatorial process—is careful, considered, and devised to create desired effects. At the Great Exhibition, a major exhibitor, Turkey, gathered some 3380 materials that were together intended to promote Ottoman identity and industry abroad; the hosting nation had curatorial authority after that initial stage and the purview to commission architects for specific exhibits and the entire building. How those objects were read was influenced by the modes of display and any corresponding text that was available—object, space, and text work in concert—but this is also a matter of context and canon. At the Crystal Palace, virtually all Anglo-Christian observers were viewing Ottoman objects *en masse* for the first time: however, the spaces referenced explicitly or implicitly therein, like the bazaar and harem, were vividly realised already within popular culture and the collective imagination. Hand-weapons and water-pipes were read enthusiastically with reference to existing tropes, especially the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ Turk. Ottoman objects gave tangible evidence of a Muslim-occupied ‘east’ which had been imagined and exoticised by Europeans for centuries.

It bears repeating that all nations asserted their identities at the Great Exhibition: England and her empire and Turkey and hers. The Sublime Porte took that event and the later exhibitions that followed, across Europe and America, deeply seriously. Sultan Abdülmecid recognised that economic profit and international profile could yield from robust and successful showings at exhibitions and fairs. For him and his ministers, display gave an opportunity for self-promotion on a grand scale. As well as proving
themselves resourceful and effective administrators, they were committed to consolidating Ottoman identity as both Muslim and modern. Their agenda was to present the Ottoman Empire as healthy, productive, and advancing—already benefiting from the *tanzimat*, for example—and also as a Muslim state. Deringil and Özge Girit Heck have each researched the Ottoman perspective thoroughly, with sensitivity to modes of display and materiality. Deringil writes that since the Great Exhibition the Sublime Porte had wished to “present the Ottoman Empire as the leader of the Islamic world yet a modern member of the civilised community of nations.”²⁹⁵ My thesis has focused on Anglo-Christian reception and perception, as communicated by contemporary texts. Heck speaks to this potential tussle between the intention of the visitor and the interpretation of the host: within the exhibitionary complex, she writes, displays “become microcosms of the world, with the country who held it representing the macrocosm; that is holding the power to possess all of it.”²⁹⁶ At the bazaar, which was distanced from Britain by an expansive atrium—called the equator of Hyde Park—Anglo-Christian crowds could compare and contrast east and west, Christian and Muslim-made art. Ottoman objects were understood as exemplary of Muslim material heritage, just as Turkey was considered a “Mohammedan” representative. This was not at odds with what the Ottoman commission had hoped for; to present, as Heck says, as “a Muslim state.”²⁹⁷ Whether the collection was modern would be questioned by critics and the public, however. Generally, Turkey was judged a non-industrial nation whose material output suggested a lack of health and decline from high Ottoman glory.

²⁹⁶ Heck, “Labelling the Ottoman Empire as ‘Turkey’ in the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893,” 112.
²⁹⁷ *ibid*, 107.
My research is based upon two corresponding assumptions: that collecting and exhibiting is a pedagogically loaded process and that European collectors have, historically, classified and exhibited Ottoman objects with particular reference to their Muslim provenance or to exaggerate their ‘otherness.’ I am not the first researcher to suggest that established associations with history and religion have influenced how Europeans read Muslim-made arts and crafts. Ian Heath observes that “the collection of Islamic material was not only an element in attempts to understand the Other” but had also “formed a crucial part in the formation of a ‘corporate’ European identity” since formal collections first began to appear, during the sixteenth century.298 Collecting objects crafted by Muslim ‘others’ might serve as a means to understand them as well as to classify the civilisation to which they belong as different and exotic. Othering is a process that exaggerates difference to enforce self-identity. Francesca Vanke explicitly relates the Great Exhibition to the patterns of othering underway during the mid-nineteenth century. Her short but convincing essay, Degrees of Otherness, states that China and the Ottoman Empire, and their corresponding exhibits, took “positions on what could be termed a sliding scale of otherness.”299 Both exhibitors represented an ‘eastern’ ‘other’ to the hosting nation. The so-called east or ‘orient’ was a complex abstraction that had several manifestations and could well apply to non-Islamic cultures, which is important to note; but the east that Turkey belonged

298 Heath, The Representation of Islam in British Museums, 35. Heath is paraphrasing from Susan Pearce, On Collecting: An Investigation into Collecting in the European Tradition Pearce (London: Routledge, 1995), 40. Pearce writes that by the sixteenth century Europeans “had been conscious of their own corporate identity” for some time, “chiefly through exploring their relationship with the Islamic world.”
299 Vanke, “Degrees of Otherness: The Ottoman Empire and China at the Great Exhibition of 1851,” 191.
to was a civilisation born from Islam—Semper (1860) had referred to “the Muslim orient” to distinguish it from China, Japan, and India.  

Turkey and Persia and the Arab states, all offered a place at the Crystal Palace, represented the crescent banner. Heath concedes that although collections gathered and displayed ex situ, in England, attracted curiosity and great interest, conflict had been a pronounced “feature of the relationship between Britain and the Islamic world” for several centuries prior to the nineteenth: the way Ottoman and other Muslim-made objects were interpreted inevitably reflected a strong sense of struggle between east and west. How museums after 1851 manifested constructs like ‘the east’ and ‘the Turk’ and related them to Islam—with or without reference to conflict—is a rich area for research.

A major focus of mine has been how Islam featured in that ‘othering’ phenomenon. Ottoman Turks were othered on a religious as well as racial basis between 1851 and 1901. Although many issues that preoccupied politicians and diplomats could be characterised as secular—military, commercial, economic, geo-political, and more—Anglo-Ottoman relations were nonetheless rooted in fundamental religious thinking. English-speaking sources from the mid-century period almost unanimously concur with Josias Lee Porter, who said that Turks have “a still deeper claim extending to the whole followers of Mohammed” and as such the Ottoman polity is “essentially and exclusively Moslem.” Turks were associated with the ummah; they represented an ‘other’ people and the religion they practised. Islam was also perceived as a threat to

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Christianity. Several hundred years had passed since the crescent and the cross fought the crusades but the notion that Muslims and Christians were predestined to be hostile to each other persisted. Doğan Gürpınar aptly describes Islam as a “disquieting issue” for nineteenth-century observers; I agree with him that Islam was addressed amid the Eastern Question and the *tanzimat* with palpable unease. Commentators often attributed the state of the Ottoman Empire to the influence Islam had upon the Sublime Porte and the population it governed. James Lewis Farley, for example, who authored the widely-read *Turks and Christians*, claimed that “industry and art are absolutely foreign” to Turks because Islam breeds superstition and intellectual sterility. His meaning is that modern technology and artistic refinement are exclusive to the west and that the Ottoman Empire was populated by a people incapable of industry and fine art—but it was the capacity for both that was being judged at the Great Exhibition.

The Great Exhibition was a marquee moment for modernity, industry, and technology. Officially titled *The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations*, the mandate was to demonstrate industrial capacity to process and refine raw materials. The evidence shows that people still responded to the collections at the Crystal Palace from faith-based positions. With his book *Religion and the Great Exhibition of 1851*, Geoffrey Cantor gave a thorough and engaging reappraisal of the Great Exhibition, which has been “routinely portrayed” as “manifestly secular” by other historians. My thesis concurs with Cantor but the content is specific to Anglo-Ottoman exchange.

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304 Farley, *Turks and Christians*, 111-112.
Sections 3.4-5 were given to illustrating the extent to which the Great Exhibition was perceived by the Royal Commission and the lay public as having a Christian basis, Christianity being coupled ideologically with civilisation—they were considered to be mutually-enforcing. I have not sought to prove whether Ottoman objects were sacralised or secularised at the Crystal Palace, though it would be a worthy line of inquiry, given that contemporary writers were explicit about the many “Associations, Secular and Sacred”—to borrow a phrase from John Stoughton (1854)—to be experienced there. What is significant here is that it is appropriate and valid to approach the Great Exhibition from a religious perspective because the objects on display were repeatedly and explicitly related to ideas about Muslim material heritage, the health of Ottoman industry, and how severely Islam restricted artistic creativity.

Nineteenth-century commentary on Ottoman materiality was rarely disengaged from broader discourse. Prominent art authorities published texts that related the health of Ottoman industry to a pre-conceived notion of Turkey as the head of a declining eastern empire—a sense of the “sick man of Europe.” Architect and art theorist Owen Jones (1809-1874) would recall in his 1856 Grammar of Ornament that “the productions of the Turks at the Great Exhibition of 1851 were the least perfect of all the Mohammedan exhibiting nations.” In particular, the carpet collection at the Crystal Palace was

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307 Owen Jones, The Grammar of Ornament by Owen Jones: illustrated examples from various styles of ornament (London: Day and Son, 1865), 63. The Grammar of Ornament, published in its first folio edition in 1856, was a seminal text, adopted almost universally as a sourcebook for practitioners of design and architecture. Egyptian, Assyrian and Persian, Greek, Pompeian, Roman, Byzantine, Arabian, Indian, Chinese and Celtic forms are given their own chapters—as is “Turkish ornament.” The most recent edition, distributed by Princeton University Press, was published in 2016 with an introduction by art historian Iain Zaczek.
roundly criticised for offering poor examples from a formerly noble weaving tradition. Jones even added that any examples of “perfect ornamentation” to be observed in contemporary Ottoman carpets would have been woven by other communities and “most probably not by Turks.” 308 Although negative responses are interesting from a formal-analytic perspective, the more meaningful critique is of Turkey as an enfeebled Mohammedan exhibitor. Jones compared “Turkish” art and architecture to “Arabian” and Persian forms because their shared origin, with Islam, invited and necessitated such comparisons. Turks are described in Grammar of Ornament as “unimaginative” compared to their Muslim counterparts, however. Sensitive to secondary artistic differences rather than to sectarian or ethno-cultural divergence, Jones recognised them all—Turks, Persians, and Arabs—as members of the “Mohammedan races.” Turkey was viewed at the Crystal Palace as a representative of Islam and the wider east. Negative receptions to the objects at the bazaar were often deployed to paint the Ottoman Empire as declining, evidenced by the diminishing quality of Ottoman piles. Decline was deemed natural and inevitable for Muslim-majority empires.

At the Great Exhibition, displays were arranged to fit a clear conceptual template. Within the western wing was England and the British Empire: to the east were the ‘other’ nations. Within this format, two pre-existing tropes/types were referenced or realised at the Crystal Palace. One was that Muslims, marshalled by Allāh, are fanatical, violent, and warlike by nature, and another was that they are licentious, indulgent and immoral. Rana Kabbani relates tropes to broader perceptions of the

308 ibid. The following quotes are from Jones, 63-64.
Muslim-occupied east, as expressed by English-speaking sources from the nineteenth-century period: “the first is the insistent claim that the East was a place of lascivious sensuality, and the second that it was a realm characterized by inherent violence.”

Each type is assigned material features. A ‘barbarous’ Turk is mobile and mounted atop his heavily-ornamented horse; he wields beautiful but dangerous weapons. A ‘lustful’ Turk is given spaces to occupy as well as an aesthetic—reclining in harems surrounded by cushions and textiles and silverware, for example, or smoking a pipe at a bazaar. These characteristics, tropes, and traits were constructed with material elements that made them tangible, entertaining, and sometimes threatening to Anglo-Christian audiences. Objects that ornament imagined Turks and the spaces they operate within were either implied or explicitly reconstructed at the Crystal Palace.

The ‘barbarous’ Turk was a well-established trope that casts Ottoman Turks as barbaric, brutal, and rewarded for their militancy by their god. While the Great Exhibition was by far the single most substantial offering of Ottoman objects ever displayed to the general public, private collecting patterns, and earlier, smaller, public exhibits, already showed a particular fascination with Ottoman war items. Heath notes that pre-nineteenth century collections were “characterised by objects from the Ottoman Empire reflecting the level and type of contact between Europe and the Muslim world and thus were mostly weaponry/militaria.”

During the nineteenth century the materials made available to the public diversified significantly but the

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310 *Militaria* is a term for collectable military materials, such as replicas or examples of swords, guns, and war medals. Heath, *The Representation of Islam in British Museums*, 35.
fascination with hand-weapons and armour lingered and, indeed, the British and Ottoman empires would continue to encounter one another in various war theatres. After viewing the bazaar at the Crystal Palace, John Tallis concluded that the “military character of the Turks was sufficiently recognisable in the collection.”311 Barbarism was usually associated with primitivism and religious fanaticism. A substantial volume of published text, both amateur and academic, described Turks as savage and barbaric because Islam rewards savagery and barbarism. Despite a turcophile movement that elicited empathy for the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim population, the majority discourse after 1851 cast Islam as an aggressive and oppressive faith fundamentally at odds with Christianity. Max Müller, who himself wished for better understanding between the faiths, traced attitudes he saw among his contemporaries to the crusades, lamenting that, “with us the feeling of the multitude about Mohammed and Islam is still much the same as it was at the time of the Crusades and during the Middle Ages.”312 This ‘othering’ of Islam and the Muslim—often personified by ‘the Turk’—can be related to the Great Exhibition and later displays that showed deadly and decorative objects such as pistols, cannons, cavalry ornamentation, daggers and sabres; a notable exhibit was the embroidered saddle-cloth and kılıç which gave shape to the popular image of a soldier or raider fighting from his mount. Together they were, as one guide to the Great Exhibition makes clear, “suggestive of a wandering fighting life.”313 Turks were generally characterised as a primitive people vulnerable to Islam, a faith that

312 Müller, Last Essays, 242.
rewards holy war by the sword (jihād bis saif). Viewing arms and armour at the Crystal Palace confirmed this conviction for many Anglo-Christian onlookers.

Commentary from the social sphere about Muslims and their perceived barbarism or the Ottoman Empire as the “sick man of Europe” is not independent of, or at odds with, the commentaries that acknowledge, admire and appreciate Ottoman objects—of which there is a substantial volume. There is a philosophical tension there, however. Jones, John Ruskin and William Morris were among the many who faced a contradiction that appears within the popular discourse, raising the question: if Islam has birthed ‘barbarous’ and primitive peoples, how is it possible to account for the volume, variety, and virtuosity of Muslim-made arts and crafts? Ruskin wrote that the peoples who live “by depredation and slaughter” have, historically, always produced “exquisite ornaments on the quiver, the helmet, and the spear.” This is a theme that is referenced repeatedly in the literature responding to the Great Exhibition, which admires the craftsmanship of war items, acknowledging they are not only effective weapons but “exquisite ornaments” worthy of display, while associating them at the same time with “depredation and slaughter” and the bloodshed that each object could inflict in battle.

Swords and spears were beautiful and also a mark of a ‘barbarous’ and warlike people. Although Morris was heartier with his admiration for high Ottoman arts he maintained that Ottoman craftspeople had been the “handmaids of luxury, of tyranny, of superstition.” Moreover, he suggested that contemporary Ottoman arts and crafts had

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declined severely in certain areas, such as weaving. Carpets at the Crystal Palace were criticised, taken as evidence that Ottoman industry had been ailing rather than thriving. Objects that were appreciated formally for their beauty, unlike the textile display, Morris considered to have been delivered in the service of Muslim despots who sullied art with their appetites for tyranny and sensuality—qualities that contributed to the profile of both the ‘lustful’ and ‘barbarous’ types.

While aiming to tease out the relationship between the exhibitionary complex and negative trope construction, I have not tried to argue that the bazaar at the Crystal Palace was designed with hostile intent or meant to malign the people it represented. The bazaar was chosen as a suitable space for displaying Ottoman goods because it could designate function—to view and buy curiosities/commodities, in that items were available for purchase—and was specific to the ‘east’ to which Turkey belonged. Mark Crinson has called such simulations “mock-up Islamic settings.”316 Several spectators even called the Crystal Palace itself a giant bazaar, owing to the unprecedented variety and volume of items on display and for sale within a single site. Guests were delighted by the space. There is no evidence that the Sublime Porte was dissatisfied with the format for the display, either. My conclusion does not mute positive receptions to the bazaar, nor does it suggest that the objects therein received no admiration or interest. What I argue is that between object and space, together with a textual canon from which to access information about the Ottoman Empire and Islam, the display reflects and contributed to the othering processes underway during the mid-century period; and that

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objects were correspondingly treated as artefactual evidence of existing tropes like the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ Turk. The scale, success, and historical significance of the Great Exhibition render those negative attributions to ‘the Turk’ meaningful and worthy of study in a post-colonial research context.

Two types were co-constructed during the latter nineteenth century with particular intensity by Anglo-Christian press. One was a ‘barbarous’ Turk; militant, fanatical, and zealous, and another was the ‘lustful’ Turk who was predisposed to indulgence, excess, and licentiousness—the former is gendered male whereas the latter can apply to both the male and the females present in the imagined harem. A submission to the Alliance of the Reformed Churches reconciles these two tropes: Turks may be “dozing rather in the soft luxury of the bazaar and harem” and as such are not “marshalled for conquest” but they remain ever-capable of violence, with “all the old fanaticism and tolerance ready to burst into flame” if called upon by their god or their sultan.317

Significantly, the ‘lustful’ Turk and the space that figure occupies, whether male or female, was partly defined by material opulence, as was the harem itself.

At the Crystal Palace, where the bazaar was built physically, the harem was only referenced, by the presence of objects that decorate that staged space, such as narghiles, and the American sculpture The Greek Slave, which sculpted a Christian slave sold at the bazaar to have her virtue stolen from her by a Muslim oppressor. The Greek Slave implored audiences to regard the bazaar as a conveyor for slave trading and human

suffering and the harem as a site for sensuality and sexual violence. Harems were cited by many Anglo-Christian writers as evidence that Islam was incompatible with Christianity and civility. Charles MacFarlane called for the institution to be abolished, for example, because it bred ignorance and irrationality in women due to seclusion and confinement and abasement. There is an abundance of sources from the mid-to-late nineteenth century that express anxiety regarding the way women fare in Muslim households and the Imperial Harem. Yet harems were also fodder for entertainment. Artists and authors reimagined harems creatively and with a free range of references to render images of Muslim men and concubines in a sensual, debauched environment. A passage written from the Ottoman perspective by Ahmet Mithat Efendi (1844-1912) depicts the typical harem that was constructed by European artists and authors towards the fin de siècle vividly and with a note of critique:

[This] loveable person lies negligently on the sofa. One of her slippers, embroidered with pearls, is on the floor, while the other is on the tip of her toes. Since her garments are intended to ornament rather than to conceal, her legs dangling from the sofa are half naked and her belly and breasts are covered by fabrics as thin and transparent as a dream ... In her mouth is the black end of the pipe of a narghile, curving like a snake ... This is the Eastern woman Europe depicted until now ... What a misconception!

Space, atmosphere, and the occupant herself are all transcribed: the drug-like element, with the concubine presenting as loose-limbed, almost sedated and unaware or uncaring

that her clothes do not cover her flesh; the association between harems and hookahs or narghiles, the neck of which is described in nearly phallic terms; and excess opulence, as evidenced by rich materials like slippers and sheer fabrics. Ahmet Mithat also registers that, to his mind, the mise en scène composed here is a stark misconception. Within the exhibitionary complex—not initially at the Great Exhibition but certainly later, at subsequent showings—Ottoman observers and officials were careful to censor and correct depictions of Muslim women that were deemed salacious or injurious to the Sublime state. At the Crystal Palace, objects associated with luxury and lustfulness and opulence were displayed, from water-pipes and coffee cups to ostrich and peacock feather fans. Ottoman curators chose elaborate and expensive narghiles for display, which signals their anticipation of what would appeal to the sensibility of the hosting nation. The collection materialised Muslim institutions for Anglo-Christian guests who were already very familiar with literary and theatrical harems. Tropes that cast Turks as both ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ were given dimension and greater detail by the objects and sites at the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations.

### 7.4 A final thought for future studies

Cailah Jackson (2016) notes handily that “for the nation and the museum, material culture was the objective evidence of achievement and identity.”[^320] Here she refers to

[^320]: Cailah Jackson, “Persian Carpets and the South Kensington Museum: Design, Scholarship and Collecting in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain,” *Journal of Design History* (2016): 1-17. This article takes a similar approach to my work, applied to the Iranian carpet collection, but it discounts religion as a factor that contributed to acquisition and consumption. Jackson describes Safavid carpets as ‘Islamic’ and notes that Iran came to “dominate nineteenth-century conceptions of Islamic art and culture” but does not examine whether their Muslim provenance was significant to consumers and collectors. Iran is not described at all as a Shi'a state.
the South Kensington Museum but her statement, that material heritage was considered at the time to manifest civilisations and to assert their identities publicly, is more broadly applicable. Mark Crinson calls the Crystal Palace “only the largest and most obvious site for understanding Islam” and adds that “detailed imitations of Islamic architecture became especially popular in its aftermath.” A little more than a decade after the Crystal Palace had been deconstructed, another ambitious exhibition was mounted in South Kensington, with funding from profits made at the Great Exhibition. Billed as the Great London Exposition, the Sublime Porte again invested in displaying there, looking to offer “objective evidence of achievement and identity” once more to Europeans. Researching that event from a religious studies perspective or with a view to Anglo-Ottoman relations would be productive. By way of object, text, and space, European audiences became increasingly familiar with Islam, partly owing to exposure to Ottoman materials and simulated sites within the exhibitionary complex. After 1851, curators and collectors continued to devise and develop curatorial techniques to display Ottoman-made objects to the Anglo-Christian public. The Turkish and Oriental Museum, the Panopticon Museum, the Islamic Room at East India House, the Oriental Court at the South Kensington Museum, designed by Owen Jones, and the Museum of Ornamental Art, were all built, between 1854 and 1864, according to conventions that conceived displays as installations—simulating Islamic structures and environments authenticated the works displayed within for the audience. Expanding administrative and architectural infrastructures facilitated the continued acquisition of Ottoman objects which flooded the English market after 1851. A majority of the 3380 articles

321 Crinson, Empire Building: Orientalism and Victorian Architecture, 65.
sent from Istanbul to the Crystal Palace was acquired for the Museum of Ornamental Art, for example; they formed the foundation of the Islamic collection there and later were transferred to the South Kensington, which is now the Victoria & Albert Museum. How those environments and their contents challenged, critiqued, or reinforced the ‘othering’ aimed at Ottoman Turks deserves more scholarly attention. There is a rich artefactual and archival record that would service this kind of work.

Conclusion

My thesis has examined material and social dimensions to historical Anglo-Ottoman relations, 1851-1901. I took a material culture approach to the content, analysing how the more than 3000 Ottoman objects at the Crystal Palace were gathered, classified, displayed, and interpreted (most emphasis is given to the latter). Part I explains what information the Great Exhibition relayed to Anglo-Christian audiences about Ottoman Turks as a people, Muslims as a faith group, and Islam as a religion. I asked how pre-existing tropes such as the ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ Turk were confirmed or manifested by way of object, text, and space. Ottoman objects, particularly carpets, hand-weapons, and water-pipes, and an American sculpture, *The Greek Slave*—all remarked-upon features of the collections—were analysed with closer detail during chapters 3 and 4, as was the east-west architectural agenda at the Crystal Palace and the theories that influenced Gottfried Semper, who devised and designed the bazaar. Both objects and the space, examined for Part I, *The Material Dimension*, are transmitted to us by text. Thick description has been an appropriate and useful method for my work because, apart from illustrations and a few rare photographs, it is chiefly with the written word
that we access contemporary responses to the Great Exhibition to answer the question: how did Anglo-Christian observers engage with objects they saw as representing not only Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, but Islam? Primary texts also form the basis for Part II, The Social Dimension. Even as turcophile commentators between 1851 and 1901 sought an empathetic engagement with Turkey and her empire, tropes that assigned ‘barbarous’ and ‘lustful’ characteristics to ‘the Turk’ persisted, having been made tangible at the Crystal Palace—a structure that was divided between east and west, crescent and cross, the other and the self. My research seeks to contribute a material culture perspective to Anglo-Ottoman studies. I have done so by examining how Islam and the Ottoman Empire were conceptualised and materialised, ex situ, at and after the Great Exhibition.
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Note: The bibliography is organised by chapter

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Chap. 5: Islam and Idolatry


Chap. 6: Cross and Crescent


Chap. 7: Conclusion


