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A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Diversity in Political Islam

Towards A Multi-Dimensional Paradigm

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at The University of Waikato by SIMON REECE GRAY

2018
Abstract

This thesis addresses the challenge to holistically understand and accurately identify diversity in contemporary ‘Political Islam’. This topic and task has become increasingly import, as well as contested, as Political Islam appears to have been on the rise around the world since the mid-20th Century. Although not exclusive, this is especially the case in parts of the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, regions where Political Islam has increasingly impacted on the security and wider political, social and economic aspects of nations and their peoples. Moreover, Political Islamic actors have had wider international ramifications, including the deadliest terrorist attack to date perpetrated by al-Qaeda against the U.S on September 11th, 2001 (9/11), redefining global security ‘settings’. Accordingly, Political Islam is viewed as both a significant contemporary political force and a key threat to many societies and the wider international order.

This has led to an increase in, and demand for, scholarly studies which address a range of topics on Political Islam, including cause-and-effect. However, few have systematically examined the topic with the view of deducing a critical analytical model through which to holistically ‘map’ how and why contemporary Political Islam manifests. Consequently, scholarly understandings about diversity in contemporary Political Islam remains limited and, particularly, contested. This, in turn, has resulted in Political Islam being predominantly framed through two competing arguments, either violent and intolerant or as additionally manifesting moderate, progressive currents inclusive of liberal democratic norms and values.
Both impacting on and shaping security settings and wider political affairs globally, as well as public perception on the nature of contemporary Political Islam.

Through a qualitative analysis this thesis, therefore, critically examines multiple cases of Political Islam with the view of deducing a critical analytical model through which to holistically understand how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests. Analysis argues that ideology, tactics and objectives, as well as contextual factors, are the key underlying characteristics, or, ‘DNA’, determining diversity in Political Islam. Therefore, these can be harnessed as key sets a cognitive analysis. Together, it is argued that these sets of cognitive analysis provide a critical approach to the analysis of contemporary diversity in Political Islam. This, in turn, forms the analytical parameters of the hypothesised critical model of analysis applied to cases examined in this thesis.

The hypothesised critical model reveals a wide range of ideologies, tactics and objectives associated with Political Islam from extreme through to moderate. It further identifies contextual generative mechanisms linked to political, social and economic factors as impacting on and shaping their development, and hence the orientation of cases examined. Subsequently, such identified contours and casual factors respectively are formulated into a conceptual multi-dimensional paradigm and, combined, is argued in this thesis to represent how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests.

This is formulated into a prescription to address the contested understanding of contemporary diversity in Political Islam, arguing that the key theories considered in this thesis fail to comprehensively explain how and why it manifests. Thus, an
alternative argument derived from the multi-dimensional paradigm is proposed. It is suggested this argument best critically explains how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests, referred to in this thesis as Diversificationist theory.
Dedicated to my Family

Past, Present & Future
Acknowledgments

This thesis was made possible with the supervision, guidance and support given by a collection of people and institutions. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge and thank both of my supervisors, Emeritus Professor Dov Bing and Professor Douglas Pratt for their insight, advice, professionalism, and patience throughout the duration of the research process.

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In addition, it must be acknowledged here that some material used in this thesis I first published in a co-authored paper with Dr. Ibikunle Adeakin titled: “The Evolution of Boko Haram: From Missionary Activism to Transnational Jihad and the Failure of the Nigerian Security Intelligence Agencies” in African Security (No. 3, Vol 8, 2015).

Last, but by no means least, I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge my partner, Jasmine, for her steadfast support, patience and love throughout the duration of this thesis, as well as wider family for all their unwavering support and encouragement. I am truly grateful to you all, thank you.
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Maps

The Middle East & Africa Today

Southeast Asia Today

Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin.
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<td>AQI</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>HAMAS</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>IKIM</td>
<td>Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>Internal Security Act</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>JAKIM</td>
<td>Department of Islamic Development in Malaysia</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>1MDB</td>
<td>1Malaysia Development Berhad</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NEP</td>
<td>New Economic Plan</td>
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<td>NEM</td>
<td>New Economic Model</td>
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<td>PAS</td>
<td>Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>UMNO</td>
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Part One

Preliminary Considerations
Chapter One

Introduction

1.1: Significance of the Research

Since the beginning of the 21st Century CE, it has increasingly been noted by scholars, as well as politicians and in the global media and wider society, that Political Islam\(^1\) appears to be on the rise globally. The apparent rise in contemporary Political Islam is credited with increasingly impacting on and shaping domestic and international political affairs, especially in the context of security.\(^2\) Moreover, manifest within the observed rise in contemporary Political Islam there too appears to be an evolving diversity in actors, especially in terms of ideologies, tactics/strategies and objectives. This appears to be particularly the case in some Muslim majority nations where Political Islam appears to have manifested at unprecedented levels, especially radical and extremist manifestations. The latter suggested in a 2013 Pew Research Centre report to be the third most significant threat to contemporary global security after financial stability and climate change respectively.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) The term ‘Political Islam’ is often used synonymously with that of ‘Islamism’, however, in this study it is not. A detailed discussion on, and definition of, Political Islam is given in the terminology section of this chapter on page 28.


Such an observed increase in radicalisation and extremism especially has arguably led to the rise of some of the most violent organisations in recent history. These include al-Qaeda which perpetrated the September the 11th 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11) against the United States of America (U.S) that killed some 2977 people;\(^4\) Boko Haram in Nigeria which is also active throughout West Africa and has killed an estimated 10,000 people since 2014 alone;\(^5\) and the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) which is estimated to have killed thousands since its ascent in the early 2000s; albeit not referring to itself as IS until June 2014.\(^6\) Such observed proliferation in Islamic extremism has been described, by such leaders in the ‘Muslim world’ as King Abdullah II of Jordan, as a “third world war by other means”.\(^7\)

While it is not clear what the precise percentage of extremist and radical Political Islamic actors is today, in the wake of 9/11 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that al-Qaeda alone had the support of some six to seven million Muslims,


\(^7\) “Jordan’s King Abdullah “this is a third world war by other means” ”, March 1, 2015, \textit{Cable News Network}, Retrieved, 2/03/2015, From, \url{http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/03/01/jordans-king-abdullah-this-is-a-third-world-war-by-other-means/}, p.1.
of which an estimated 120,000 were willing to take up arms.\(^8\) This estimate was out of an overall global Muslim population reported to number some 1.3 billion in 2000.\(^9\) More recently, following the rapid rise and expansion of IS, al-Qaeda’s main rival, in Syria and Iraq in 2014, the CIA estimated that up to some 31,000 Muslim extremists from around the world formed the ranks of that extremist Political Islamic organisation.\(^10\)

It appears IS, moreover, is supported by a much wider basis, reportedly receiving up to an estimated 2.8 million ‘tweets’ of support per-day on the online social media site Tweeter as of November 2015.\(^11\) A report by the United Nations (UN) Security Council on the global phenomenon of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ published on the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) of May 2015, estimates that in addition to ‘domestic’ extremists there were at least 25,000 ‘foreign fighters’ from some 100 countries involved in Islamic extremist conflicts/groups globally. A number which the report indicated may have

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risen sharply by as much as an estimated 70% in the interim nine months between completing data collection and publication of the report.\textsuperscript{12}

This apparent increase in radical and extremist forms of politically motivated Islam moreover is credited by some scholars to have followed recent and contemporary contextual developments, especially political, economic and social changes, particularly in the ‘developing world’, in the wake of increasing ‘modernisation’ and ‘globalisation’, especially since the 1980s.\textsuperscript{13} Consequently, such contextual factors, and hence conditions, are identified by some scholars as being responsible for impacting and shaping the development and evolution of Political Islam.\textsuperscript{14} This, in turn, has led to increasing support by some contemporary scholars that context(s) is the primary variable(s) through which to best view and understand how and why Political Islam manifests, and hence diversity, as opposed to ideology; albeit appearing to be a key factor manifest in Political Islam.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{15} See: Political Islam: Context versus Ideology, Edited by, Khaled Hroub (London, London Middle East Institute at SOAS, 2010).
Over time, such an apparent rise in radical and violent forms of Political Islam throughout the first and second decades of the 21st Century, furthermore, has arguably led to the view that Political Islam is inherently intolerant, violent and extremist in nature.\textsuperscript{16} In particular, such a view holds that Political Islam, and by in large Islam, is essentially opposed to modernisation as well as coexistence and hence pluralistic values and principles and, therefore, apathetic to the ethos of liberal democracy, human rights and associated societal development.\textsuperscript{17}

These developments and observations associated with the rise of radical and extremist forms of Political Islam are identified by some scholars to indicate evidence of a growing ‘clash of civilisations’ between Islam and non-Islamic societies, especially the West and Judeo-Christian civilisation/tradition. A particular scholarly understanding of Political Islam is most famously argued by Samuel P. Huntington in his work \textit{The Clash of Civilisations}.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, such developments, and perhaps views, appear to be linked to growing anti-Muslim sentiment globally, including a rise in ‘co-radicalisation’ amongst non-Muslims towards Muslims.\textsuperscript{19} Additionally, the rise of radical and extremist manifestations of Political Islam have further generated concerns amongst Muslims themselves as

indicated in a 2014 Pew Research Centre report,\(^{20}\) thus indicating a growing ‘clash within Islam’.\(^{21}\)

As a result of the rise in radical and extremist currents of Political Islam, the vast majority of scholarly works and therefore predominant discourses and underlying narratives within the field of research are primarily concerned with such extremist and radical forms and their associated activities.\(^{22}\) Nonetheless, increased scholarly focus on these two phenomena has arguably been warranted, and will remain important research topics into the foreseeable future; topics which will be examined in this thesis.

Contextual developments and associated societal conditions evidenced by some scholars as generating the rise of radical and extremist manifestations, moreover, are too credited by some scholars to have generated manifestations in Political Islam that are neither extremist nor radical.\(^{23}\) The small but growing number of scholars arguing such a development(s) within Political Islam include, Carrie Wickham, Greg Barton, Graham Fuller, and John L. Esposito for example. These


\(^{22}\) See, for example, Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p.1.

scholars have framed such manifestations within the context(s) of, ‘moderate’, ‘modern/ist’, ‘pluralist’, or ‘liberal’ orientations of Political Islam, albeit seemingly a minority. This development and view appears to be supported by a 2012 Pew Research poll which found high levels of support amongst Muslims surveyed for the role of Islam in politics to be conducted through a democratic framework/system. Therefore, such scholarly observations and societal developments challenge claims that Political Islam is inherently radical, intolerant, predominantly violent/extremist, and incompatible with liberal, pluralistic and democratic norms and values.

Such an understanding and wider views about the nature of contemporary diversity, and hence orientations, in Political Islam, however, remains contested. This has resulted in a number of prominent and conflicting views amongst scholars. First, that Political Islam is inherently radical and intolerant and, in many cases, violent and extremist in nature, incapable of fostering liberal democratic norms and values. Second, that Political Islam is a ‘creative space’ generating not only

24 Ibid.
radical and extremist but, moreover, in which moderate manifestations too are emerging, akin to liberal democratic norms and values;\textsuperscript{29} albeit argued to be a minority phenomenon and a development that is in its infancy.\textsuperscript{30} Collectively, these two views form the key theories on the nature of and in turn diversity in contemporary Political Islam, widely referred to as ‘Confrontationist’, ‘Accommodationist’ \textsuperscript{31} respectively. Each of these competing scholarly views therefore are identified in this thesis as the key theories on diversity in contemporary Political Islam and will be discussed in detail in the theoretical orientation section of this thesis.

This situation of contested scholarly understanding on diversity in contemporary Political Islam furthermore appears to have transpired to political affairs with the rise in competing political narratives in support of a particular view and or agenda; including the debate over whether Islam is a religion or a political movement.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{29} See, for example, Hashemi, “Islam And Democracy”, in \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Islam And Politics}, eds. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 2013, op. cit., pp. 74-76.


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. See, for example, Liow, Joseph Chinyong, \textit{Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia} (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), p.75.

This has especially cascaded into the realm of international politics and security.  

As a result, this has led to the ‘politicalisation’ and constructing of associated competing meta-narratives, including by state actors; albeit appearing highly political in nature. For example, on June 24th 2015, the European Union’s (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, whose Master’s thesis examined Political Islam, endorsed non-extremist versions of Political Islam as legitimate tools through which to defeat such groups as IS and Boko Haram. Mogherini further reiterated this following the deadly terrorist attacks in Brussels, Belgium on the 22nd of March 2016.

This endorsement, to the alarm and criticism of many, in turn affectively signalled, by default or intentionally, the EU’s approval of Political Islam as a legitimate

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34 See, for example, Bassam, Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: From Jihadist to Institutional Islamism (Abington, Oxford, Routledge, 2014), pp. xiv-xv.


38 Ibid.
political force, at least in the context of non-extremist manifestations. Consequentially, this invoked an acknowledgment and narrative of the existence of moderate manifestations and hence diversity in Political Islam. Paradoxically, it has also led to a small but growing call be some state actors and politicians for a total ban on Muslims interring particular nations due to their perceived inherent support for Political Islam which they interpret to be inherently radical or extremist in nature. Suggesting an understanding that all Muslims engage in and that all forms of Political Islam are radical or extremist in orientation. Together, such division has consequently led to, at best, a contested and, worst, confused understanding and ability to discern clearly between the growing matrix of Political Islamic actors, profoundly impacting both domestic and international political affairs, as well as the wider public domain.

Collectively, such developments and understandings underscore both the importance and immediate need to build critical insight on diversity in contemporary Political Islam, especially given its growing impact on politics and security globally. Moreover, this is essentially threefold. First, it is key to clearly distinguishing between those Political Islamic actors which are radical, intolerant, hostile, violent, and extremist in nature, and those that are not and appear moderate.

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39 Ibid; “Federica Mogherini on political Islam”, op. cit.


This, in turn, limits the risk of ‘overreacting’ or ‘underreacting’ to a potential security threat. This is especially the case as many Political Islamic actors, particularly non-state actors, are viewed through the lens of security.42

Second, and as a result, it is key to identifying clearly between those Political Islamic actors which could potentially be allies and partners. This is both essential to and a ‘political reality’ in strengthening international relations and security admits a rise in Political Islamic actors globally, both state and non-state.43 This is amplified further due to an intensifying and evolving Political Islamic landscape wherein radicalisation, extremism and wider conflict(s) linked to Political Islamic actors, notably extremists, has been on the rise,44 as well as an apparent emerging moderate current(s). Hence, this appears to have been the underlying ‘political reality’ on which EU High Representative Federica Mogherini moved to endorse the latter so as to counteract the former (extremist) manifestation, for example.45

Third, it could potentially improve civic Muslim-non-Muslim relations by helping build ‘social resilience’ by reducing uncertainty and mistrust born of such contested, as well as confused, understandings of Political Islam. Hence, this could help stem ‘political space’ wherein radicalisation and indeed extremism can otherwise occur


45 “Federica Mogherini on political Islam”, op., cit., p.1.
and or generate from. Therefore, limiting the potential of Islamic radicalisation and extremism.\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, it could help counter ‘co-radicalisation’ and or anti-Islamic sentiment and ‘co-extremism’ evidenced amongst some non-Muslims, especially as a result of the former.\textsuperscript{47} Consequently, this is especially important to those societies wherein there is a significant minority Muslim population such as most nations in the West where there is a steadily growing Muslim community(s) in which Political Islam, as well as Islam, is active and widely seen as a threat.\textsuperscript{48}

For these reasons, contemporary diversity in Political Islam, especially those actors appearing to evidence moderate, radical or extremist developments and or evolutions, therefore demands clarity. In particular, it calls into question how and why such developments have accrued and in turn Political Islam manifests.\textsuperscript{49}

Consequently, an analytical approach through which to examine the contested diversity in contemporary Political Islam is thus required. This is especially the case in terms of a fundamental need for, and so lack of, a holistic analytical approach with critical ‘explanatory powers’ capable of illuminating both the scope of and associated casual factors generating contemporary Political Islam. Accordingly, an analysis which critically ‘seeks out’ and so examines and identifies a wide and

\textsuperscript{46} See, for example, Countering Extremism: Building Social Resilience Through Community Engagement, Edited by, Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerad and Salim Mohamad Nasir (London. Imperial Collage Press, 2013).

\textsuperscript{47} See, Islamophobia as Reactive Co-Radicalization”, op. cit., pp.205-218.


\textsuperscript{49} See, for example, Guide to Islamist Movements, Edited by, Barry Rubin (New York, M.E. Sharp Inc, 2010), pp. xiii-xiv.
diverse range of contours, as well as casual variables, is fundamental to holistically understanding key orientations of diversity in contemporary Political Islam.\(^\text{50}\)

Through a qualitative multi-case study comparative analysis this thesis therefore examines contemporary Political Islam with the view of identifying key diversity in contours manifest, as well as casual variables impacting and shaping their development and so diversity in orientations; thus how and why Political Islam manifests. Moreover, analysis is conducted with the view of deducing and hypothesising a critical framework of analysis through which to holistically examine such lines of inquire (how and why) concerning the nature of contemporary diversity in Political Islam. This, in turn, is applied to the analysis of selected case studies and findings are framed and formulated into a conceptual paradigm representing how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests. Additionally, findings will be assessed against the key theories’ claims about diversity examined in this thesis and in turn transcribed to form a prescription to the contested understanding on the nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

Therefore, analysis is geared to advancing a particular analytical model with critical explanatory powers through which to holistically illuminate both how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests. In essence, this thesis provides an original contribution and approach to the way contemporary diversity in Political Islam is theoretically examined and understood, consequently contributing to the

\(^\text{50}\) See, for example, Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., pp.25-32.
scholarly analysis and process of ‘theory building’, as opposed to ‘theory testing’, on the subject of contemporary Political Islam.

1.2: Scope of the Research

Since the mid-1900s, in the wake of independence, some nations have experienced both an increase and, according to some scholars, a diversification in Political Islamic actors.51 This especially appears to include some nations in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, for example. Mohammed Ayoob in his work *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*, Kumar Ramakrishna in his work *Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia*, as well as Barry Rubin in his work *Guide to Islamist Movements*, having identified such regions and a period in which a wide range of contemporary Political Islamic actors have emerged and or evolved, including some which have expanded globally.

For this reason, this thesis is concerned with the analysis of the diversity in contemporary Political Islam which emanates from and is active in parts of the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia since the mid-20th Century onwards; albeit some have expanded beyond these regions and will be examined as a key evolutionary development(s). However, while the focus here is concerned with cases of Political Islam emanating from these three regions since the mid-20th Century, it does not suggest that Political Islam is exclusive to them, that time

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period or that it is a religious-political anomaly. Rather, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, collectively, have both a long history as well as a matrix of contemporary Political Islamic actors and associated behaviours deriving from a wide and diverse range of Islamic beliefs, viewpoints, teachings, and traditions. These have increasingly influenced and impacted on each other and the development and, in turn, diversity in contemporary Political Islam emanating from these three regions, as well as globally. Therefore, although not exclusive, these three regions arguably represent both the historical and contemporary ‘heartland’ of Islam, as well as arguably that of Political Islam. Consequently, they have significant influence on the wider Islamic world and development and diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

The Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia furthermore collectively comprise, as at 2009, an estimated 809 million of the world’s total Muslim population which is set to rise, including the most populous Muslim nation

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53 For a detailed discussion on historical and contemporary dynamics in Political Islam in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, see: The Oxford Handbook of Islam And Politics, Edited by, John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 289-306; 379-390; 340-351.

Indonesia, from an estimated 1.5 billion Muslims globally at that time.\textsuperscript{55} This includes some of the fastest growing, youngest, and diverse Muslim demographics in the world.\textsuperscript{56} Many of these Muslims are from nations in these three regions that consist of failed, stagnant and rapidly growing economies and hence socio-economic diversity, challenges and opportunities. Moreover, political unrest and conflict are also factors in these regions, especially within states, and have transcended boarders in some cases and in which Political Islam is a significant factor.\textsuperscript{57} Collectively, while these societal factors are not contextually unique to Muslim communities from nations in these regions, nevertheless, they are increasingly present, appearing to impact on, as well as shaped by, wider transnational societal interactions and developments across an increasingly interconnected Muslim community(s) within these regions, as well as globally.\textsuperscript{58}


These regions so provide relevant contexts in which contemporary Political Islam has developed and evolved since the mid-20th Century. Consequently, such diverse yet interconnected regions collectively provide the necessary scope, and hence ‘laboratory’, through which to examine and deduce key diversity in contemporary Political Islam, as well as how and why it manifests.  

1.3: Case Study Justification

This thesis selects cases for analysis which emanate from and are active in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia and may or may not have evolved to expand activities beyond these regions since the mid-20th Century. This includes, the Islamic State (IS) which underwent rapid and expansive evolution in Iraq and Syria as well as developed an international network of cells and affiliates; Boko Haram which is active in Nigeria and parts of West Africa, as well as trained in Somalia, and has evolved from an essentially non-violent but radical actor to an extremist one affiliated with IS; Hizb ut-Tahrir which emerged in the Jordanian-administered West Bank and has evolved globally, including branches in Europe, Asia and Australia; and the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) in Malaysia which embraces the nation state, engages in democratic elections and has governed that nation since independence.

These cases are chosen for analysis moreover based on their perceived association with either extremist, radical or moderate manifestations of contemporary Political

59 Such diverse and multiple regions/contexts in which case studies are examined/selected are considered by some scholars to be key to gaining greater analytical insight into a social phenomenon: See, for example, Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods 4th Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.72-76.
Islam respectively, as suggested in the two key theories: Accommodationist and Confrontationist. Each case appears to evidence a variety of symptoms in behaviour(s) and in turn provide a wide and diverse range of contours needed in order to explore the diversity of contemporary orientations in Political Islam. Therefore, although each case is of a Sunni Islamic orientation, together, they provide the required ‘range’ needed to examine contemporary diversity in Political Islam. Thus, Political Islam is not suggested in this thesis to exclusively manifest in, or derive from, Sunni Islam. Additionally, cases are selected on the basis that each one emanates from, and is active in, one or more of the diverse range of contexts associated with the three regions noted above. This allows for cases examined in this thesis to be viewed within a greater range of contexts and so maximises insight into any societal conditions impacting on their contours and orientations, and hence observed diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

Selected cases are therefore examined through a ‘critical case purposive sampling’ approach. Collectively, cases provide qualified ‘units’ of analysis through which to apply this thesis’s hypothesised critical analytical model to examine, deduce and frame a range of contours, orientations and casual factors and, in turn, formulate a holistic conceptual paradigm of contemporary diversity in Political Islam. Therefore, the cases provide the necessary range in behaviours and contexts which arguably hold key insight into how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests.

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1.4: Methodology

Using a qualitative research strategy, this thesis employs a multiple-case study method. Although not exclusive, this approach allows for two or more contrasting case studies to be examined through the same lens of analysis based on the logic of comparison which asserts that social phenomenon can be better understood when two or more cases are compared. The multi-case comparative design furthermore is credited by some social scientists as an approach that best “…establishes the circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold”, as well as improving theory building. In addition, the comparative multi-case design is credited with playing a critical role in how causality (cause-and-effect) is understood, as opposed to a single case study as “…the researcher will be in a position to examine the operation of generative causal mechanisms in contrasting contexts.”

Such a method therefore provides the necessary approach to examine, deduce and compare a wide and diverse range of materials and data associated with contemporary diversity in Political Islam and, in turn, this thesis’s hypothesised critical analytical model and associated paradigm. This, in turn, provides a way to systematically examine, catalogue and compare materials and data evidencing and concerning a wide and diverse range of contours and, in turn, orientations of contemporary diversity in Political Islam pertaining to cases examined in this thesis. The method too allows for the systematic analysis of materials and data which

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63 Ibid.
illuminating casual factors identified as responsible for generating contemporary Political Islam, and hence diversity in contours and their apparent subsequent orientations: extremist, radical or moderate. Together, this allows for the systematic cataloguing of contours, orientations and casual factors which, combined, are argued in this thesis to provide critical and holistic insight into how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests.

Materials and data examined through this thesis’s methodology are collected from a range of historical and contemporary contexts and disciplines linked to Political Islam, forming an interdisciplinary style approach for greater insight and analytical accuracy. In particular, the methodology employed in this thesis derives from the wider Social Sciences, including Political Science and Religious Studies academic fields and entails an extensive review of primary and secondary materials and data. Primary materials include manifestos, publications, statements, interviews by Political Islamic actors examined in this thesis. Secondary materials include publications, reports, statements, and interviews which are directly linked to cases examined in this thesis and wider Political Islam which, however, are produced by scholars and within the wider public domain. Materials and data used in this thesis are obtained through university and public libraries, research institutions, think-tanks, the internet, and media.

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1.5: Theoretical Framework

This study is conducted through the theoretical analytical framework of ‘critical realism’, a theory widely credited to have been established by Roy Bhaskar in the late-1970s.65 This theory derives from the scholarly field of philosophy in the Social Sciences and deals with the epistemological (theory of how knowledge is derived) and ontological (theory of reality/being) understanding of how phenomena are examined and, in turn, how reality is understood, especially in terms of causation, in both the social and natural sciences.66

Critical realism moreover has been referred to as:

A specific form of realism whose manifesto is to recognize the reality of the natural order and the events and discourses of the social world and holds that ‘we will only be able to understand – and so change – the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate those events and discourses.67

Critical realism therefore implies two key ideas: First, a scientist’s conceptualisation of reality is purely a way of understanding that reality. Hence, Bhaskar notes: “Science, then, is the systemic attempt to express in thought the structures and ways of acting of things that exist and act independently of


67 Ibid.
Thus critical realism recognises and accepts the ‘provisional’ nature of science in its ability to understand reality and, in turn, “…that there is a distinction between the objects that are the focus of their [i.e. critical realists] enquiries and the terms they use to describe, account for, and understand them.”

Second, and as a direct consequence, critical realism allows for “…theoretical terms which are not directly amenable to observation” to be admitted into explanations. Therefore, hypothetical entities responsible for regularities in the social or natural orders which Bhasker refers to as ‘generative mechanisms’ are completely acceptable. These generative mechanisms “…entail the entities and process that are constitutive of the phenomenon of interest.” Hence, for critical realists such generative mechanisms which are not directly observable are, nevertheless, acceptable as they can be accounted for theoretically in so far as their effects can be observed. In the experimental context this is important as it allows the scientist to discern between the event(s), or, in this study, Political Islam(s), and what causes it; viz generative mechanism(s).

Additionally, “…crucial to a critical realist understanding is the identification of the context that interacts with the generative mechanism[s] to produce an observed

68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
regularity in the social world.” 73 Therefore, critical realism emphasises that understanding the context in which the observed regularity occurs is key in terms of explanations as it is “…the conditions that promote or impede the operation of the causal mechanism.” 74 Critical realism, as a result, seeks out generative mechanisms “…that are responsible for observed regularities in the social [or natural] world and how they operate in particular contexts.” 75

Critical realism therefore argues that “…the identification of generative mechanisms offers the prospects of introducing changes that can transform the status quo.” 76 Moreover, the type of reasoning manifest in critical realism “…involved in the identification of generative casual mechanisms is neither inductive nor deductive.” 77 Rather, it has been described as ‘retroductive’ reasoning, involving the process of “…making an inference about the causal mechanism [(s)] that lies behind and is responsible for regularities that are observed in the social world.” 78

Critical realism consequently is concerned with three key interlinked analytical strata of cause-and-effect and is represented in figure 1. 79 These can be identified

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, op. cit., p.74.
76 Ibid, op. cit., p.29.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Figure 1 has been recreated from Mingers and Willcocks (2004) and Lyubimov (2015): See, Social Theory and Philosophy for Information Systems, Edited by, John Mingers & Leslie Willcocks (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2004); “Critical realism theory”, op. cit., p.1.
as (1) ‘domain of real’ (2) ‘domain of actual’ and (3) ‘domain of empirical’. Hence, the domain of empirical consists of observed regularities experienced. The domain of actual consists of events which have been generated by mechanisms. Finally, the domain of real includes generative mechanisms which have caused the actual events to accrue.

In the context of this thesis, it appears critical realism’s three interlinked stratum of cause-and-effect reasoning can be directly applied to the analysis of Political Islam, especially in terms of understanding its contemporary diversity. In particular, through the lens of critical realism, this thesis adopts the theoretical view that diversity in contemporary Political Islam can be holistically understood through the process of analysis which identifies generative mechanisms. These are argued to impact on and shape key events, or, contours, manifest within a particular Political Islamic actor. In turn, it is argued that contours together produce observed

![Figure 1:](image-url)
regularities experienced and thus represent particular orientations in Political Islam. Together, this arguably provides a way to critical and holistically understand, and analyse, how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests.

Critical realism consequently provides a theoretical framework and hence scope and depth in explanatory power which can be harnessed and applied to the examination of the contemporary diversity in Political Islam. Therefore, the theoretical imputes applied to the analysis of the contemporary diversity in Political Islam in this thesis is threefold and seeks to illuminate three key interlinked stratum of cause-and-effect: (1) contextual generative mechanisms, (2) contours and (3) orientations in Political Islam. Collectively, this forms the framework of this thesis’s hypothesised critical analytical model through which to holistically examine and understand how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests.

Accordingly, critical realism’s threefold theoretical framework of analysis will be applied to each case of Political Islam examined in this thesis. In particular, Political Islamic actors will be examined with the view of identifying, firstly, their key contours through which to, secondly, illuminate their particular orientation and, thirdly, contextual generative mechanisms responsible for impacting on and shaping their development and or evolution. In turn, identified contours manifest in the cases examined will be deduced and framed and, together, represent observed orientations, as well as formulated into a theoretical paradigm of key diversity in contemporary Political Islam. Identified generative mechanisms will also be framed and formulated into the theoretical paradigm. This, in turn, allows for the key
theories’ claims examined in this thesis to be assessed by comparing them with the case studies findings and, therefore, formulate a prescription on the contested understanding on contemporary diversity in Political Islam.

Critical realism therefore provides a way to examine, identify and understand conceptual diversity in contemporary Political Islam. It especially provides a theoretical approach to the analysis and understanding of cause-and-effect in contemporary Political Islam, emphasising that the links between contours and generative mechanisms are key to understand orientations and thus diversity. For that reason, critical realism provides a way to formulate a hypothetical analytical model, paradigm and prescription through which to critically and holistically assess how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests. Thus, critical realism forms this thesis’s theoretical framework.

1.6: Terminology

This study employs various terminologies which have been developed within the Social Sciences. These terms collectively form a key component of this study’s identification and categorisation of Political Islam. Although these terms are limited and not exclusive in definition, nevertheless, they arguably provide by far the most accurate way of identifying the different concepts and observed regularities directly associated with Political Islam. Terms adopted in this study which are in need of further explanation include: Political Islam, Conservative, Salafist, and Jihadist.

These terms allow this study to define, identify and categorise key contours which collectively impact and shape the nature of and, in turn, observed regularities identified as manifest in Political Islam within a particular overarching terminology.
They provide a way to define, identify and catalogue particular orientations in Political Islam as identified in this thesis. Moreover, the latter three terms – Conservative, Salafist and Jihadist – represent particular bands on a spectrum that collectively forms part of this thesis’s hypothesised multi-dimensional paradigm of the contemporary diversity in Political Islam. All of these terms correlate to and represent a particular ideological orientation within the wider context of Political Islam.

The term ‘Political Islam’ was coined in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and, in a general context, means “…that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.” However, as noted by Mohammad Ayoob, Political Islam is more accurately defined as being “… a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organisations that pursue political objectives.”

While this definition inherently implies that political outcomes are the objective, Bassam Tibi also identifies that Political Islamic actors may alternatively pursue what are essentially religious outcomes and hence objectives. Nevertheless, these religious objectives are pursued through particular political acts/actions and thus Political Islam. Hence, Tibi defines Political Islam as both “…the religionization of

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81 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, op. cit., p. XI.

politics and the politicization of religion.” Notwithstanding, this definition is better understood as the ‘Islamisation of politics’ and/or the ‘politicisation of Islam’.

This study combines both Ayoob’s and Tibi’s definitions and adopts the following definitional framework:

Political Islam is the politicisation of Islam and/or the Islamisation of politics by individuals, groups and organisations that purse political and/or Islamic objectives. This definition captures the full expression and hence orientations of contemporary Political Islam, allowing for a wide and diverse range of Political Islamic actors and associated ideologies, tactics and objectives to be examined. The nature of Political Islam will be discussed further in chapter three.

The term ‘Conservative’ is adopted in this thesis and is employed by some scholars to refer to observed regularities within Political Islam which are widely defined as moderate. While operating within the confines of the state and engaging in elections when and where possible as well as advancing socio-economic development, education, and the rejection of puritanical, literal and violent interpretations of Islam, however, Conservative Political Islam is defined by scholars as essentially being ‘socially conservative’ as opposed to ‘liberal’ pre se.84

81 Bassam, Islam in Global Politics, op. cit., p.150.
Barton notes that:

At the polling booth these [Conservative] candidates appeal to those for whom Islamism [i.e. Political Islam] is an expression of conservatism. They, too, may talk of the application of the Shariah but the changes that they have in mind are modest and essentially symbolic rather than radical and profound.85

Additionally, Burhani notes: “…the conservatives tend to stick more closely to established and more literal readings of the sources, and to consider liberal ideas as a threat to the very essence of Islam.”86

This study therefore combines Barton’s and Burhani’s definition’s, as well as the other noted key characteristics identified, together forming the following definition:

Conservative Political Islam advocates social conservatism at an ideological level derived from a ‘traditional/classical’ understanding of Islamic teachings and practices, including Shari’a Law, and is applied in a modern and symbolic context.

While not liberal in outlook, Conservatives engage in mainstream political process and elections when and where available. They operate within the confines of the state and are essentially pluralistic in nature, support socio-economic development and education and reject violence, especially extremism.

85 Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p. 32.

The term ‘Salafist/Salafism’ (synonymous in this thesis with ‘Islamist/Islamism’) has become widely used, albeit also contested, in scholarly literature and, is a term often used interchangeably with that of Political Islam by scholars, which it is not in this thesis. Rather, its usage here refers to those actors and allied ideologies which purport to invoke and adhere to a literal interpretation of the original teachings of Islam as practiced during the 7th Century CE. This period is identified by Islamists as representing a time when Muslims adhered to ‘true’ Islam and hence reject all developments thereafter as ‘corruption’ or ‘deviation’. Islamists seek to emulate this period referred to as salaf al-salih or salafiyya, and thus Salafist/Salafism. This Arabic saying literally means ‘righteous ancestors’ and refers to the time of the Islamic Prophet, Mohammad ibn Abdulla (571-632) and the first four Rightly Guided Caliphs (collectively known as the ‘Rashidun’ Caliphate) and their close companions (the first three generations of Muslims which formed the original Islamic umma, or, community).

The term represents a radical shift away from ‘classical’ Islam which emerged some 150 years after the death of Mohammad following the codification of the Islamic texts (Quran and Sunna/Hadiths) into official Islamic schools of jurisprudence (Islamic philosophy and law). This was undertaken by Islamic ‘ulama’ and

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87 See, for example, Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam, op. cit., p.2; Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, op. cit., p. XI.


89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.
‘mujtahid’ (Islamic scholars and theologians) between the 8th and 11th Centuries CE during the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258CE); a period that represents the founding of what today is known as ‘mainstream’ Islam and hence tradition, practice and belief.91

Greg Barton notes that:

Islamism is a response to modernity that has transformed the religion of Islam into a political ideology. Islamism is therefore, pre-eminently concerned with changing society and political institutions and/or governments in order to bring both the state and, ultimately, society into conformity with an understanding of Islam. Among other things, this involves formalising the state’s constitutional and legislative recognition of Islam [i.e. Islamism] and, for radical Islamists, introducing the Shariah or Islamic law.92

While this definition has value and provides important insight into understanding the phenomenon of Salafism, it has been refined in this thesis into a narrower framework. This study adopts the following definitional framework:

Salafism/Islamism is inherently radical and, therefore, has broken from the tradition of classical Islam. It is fixated with bringing all aspects of the state (notably political and legal institutions) and society (public and private) in


92 Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.29.
which it operates or is concerned with into line with a particular Salafist ideology and hence understanding and application of Islam, especially Shari’a Law and, in particular, the harsh ‘hudud’ penal code. Additionally, in some cases, this extends to international institutions and organisations, both political and apolitical. This is pursued through non-extremist means, especially not militancy or terrorism, though such means are ultimately employed for radical totalitarian ends.

Salafism/Islamism is thus unlike Conservative Political Islam in terms of ideology(s), objectives and, in some cases, tactics.

The term ‘Jihadist/Jihadism’, which has also become widely used by academics over the past decade-and-a-half, was invented by those Islamists who employed political violence and extremist tactics, including militancy and terrorism, to refer to themselves. Moreover, this particular ideology appears to place the Islamic concept of al-jihad (holy struggle/fighting/conflict/war) at the cornerstone of its belief system, and in turn, defining the essence of a particular actor as well as the characteristic of their behaviour(s); albeit in the extreme. Therefore, in this study the term Jihadist refers to those actors who have broken from ‘mainstream’, and hence non-extremist, Islamism that adhere to and who advocate a doctrine which justifies and promotes extremism. Hence, Jihadists are essentially Islamists who

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94 Ibid, pp.28-29.
have further radicalised, especially in terms of ideology, tactics and, in some cases, objectives.  

This study therefore adopts the following definitional framework:

Jihadists are committed to a doctrine of violence, including extremism/terrorism, which they consider to be a legitimate personification of al-jihad through which to pursue particular political objectives against who they perceive to be the ‘enemies’ or ‘aggressors’ of Islam.

1.7: Chapter Descriptions

The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter one introduces the thesis topic and significance of the research and discusses the scope of the research, case study justification, methodology, theoretical framework, and terminologies employed in this thesis. Collectively, these points of enquire form the preliminary considerations of this thesis.

Chapter two examines the expanse and diversity of scholarly literature published on contemporary Political Islam and the key scholarly approaches employed within the literature to examine the topic. It then examines key theories on the development and evolution, and hence generative mechanisms, concerning contemporary Political Islam. It then moves on to examine the range of scholarly orientations of thought about the nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam and include,

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96 See for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.1; Bassam, Islam in Global Politics, op. cit., p.152.

97 See for example, Gerges, 2009, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.1, 4-5.
Accommodationist and Confrontationist theories. Collectively, these form what are identified in this thesis to be the primary overarching theories on diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

Moreover, analysis looks to deduce key contours identified in the theories as manifest in contemporary Political Islam. Together, identified contours will be harnessed as a set of cognitive analytical points of enquire through which to examine, deduce and frame conceptual diversity in contemporary Political Islam. This, in turn, forms the framework of this thesis’s hypothesised critical model of analysis which is presented here. Collectively, chapter two is concerned with illuminating and deducing key theoretical points of enquiry into generative mechanisms and contours through which to examine contemporary diversity in Political Islam. Therefore, this forms the theoretical orientation component of this thesis.

Chapters three, four, five, and six examine the selected case studies. Each chapter here corresponds with one of the four selected case studies and are examined with the view of illuminating and deducing diversity in key contours, and any evolutions in their diversity, hypothesised as manifest in contemporary Political Islam. Analysis also seeks out hypothesised contextual generative mechanisms responsible for impacting and shaping their development, and hence diversity in contemporary Political Islam. Collectively, these chapters and points of enquiry look to gain maximum insight into how and why diversity in each particular case manifests and form the case studies and empirical analysis component of this thesis.
Chapter seven presents a detailed analysis of each of the case study’s findings. Here analysis conducts an intra post-case study analysis of the identified contours and generative mechanisms which are systematically collated, framed and categorised. In particular, analysis chronologically presents the identified contours manifest in each of the cases examined and, together, are argued to represent particular orientations in contemporary Political Islam. Analysis then presents the identified generative mechanisms argued to be responsible for impacting and shaping each orientation of contemporary Political Islam. Collectively, these are formulated into a multi-dimensional paradigm and argued in this thesis to represent contemporary diversity in Political Islam, as well as how and why it manifests. Analysis then reassess the key theories’ claims about diversity in contemporary Political Islam in light of the research findings. Here analysis makes an inference and presents a particular prescription, and hence theory, about the contested understanding of contemporary diversity in Political Islam.

This is followed by chapter eight which presents a conclusion discussing qualified evidence presented in support of this thesis’s hypothesised critical model of analysis and associated multi-dimensional paradigm. Together, chapter’s seven and eight are concerned with and form the qualifying of analysis component of this thesis. Finally, a bibliography including all sources and materials used and examined in this thesis is listed.
Part Two
Theoretical Orientation
Chapter Two

Review of Literature

2.1: Introduction

This chapter will provide an analysis of the scholarly literature that has been published on the phenomenon of Political Islam. It will identify and discuss the expanse of different scholarly works associated with the topic and examine the different analytical approaches developed and employed as methodologies within this field of literature. In addition, this chapter will present key theories in the literature that seek to explain the development of Political Islam, as well as key scholarly orientations of thought on the nature of and diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

This study identifies that there are three major analytical approaches, through which to analyse Political Islam. These are: (1) the ‘essentialist’ approach; (2) the ‘contextualist’ approach; and (3) the ‘discourse analysis’ approach. Moreover, four key theories on the development of Political Islam are identified within the literature and include: (1) ‘colonialism and imperialism’ theory, (2) ‘sudden shock’ theory, (3) ‘social movement’ theory, and (4) ‘ideologisation’ theory. Additionally, two key overarching scholarly orientations of thought and therefore viewpoints are

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identified within the literature on the nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam: Accommodationist and Confrontationist theories. Together, these two orientations of thought are identified in this study as the key contemporary theories on diversity in Political Islam.

Collectively, these have contributed significantly to the development of the scholarly literature and debate within mainstream Western academia on the Political Islam. This topic has become increasingly important, notably in the Social Sciences, particularly in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran. It was during that revolution that the term Political Islam was coined and was first used to refer to the rise of ‘revolutionary’ and or ‘activist’ Islam that was sweeping the Shi’a Muslim world, ultimately leading to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The term Political Islam has subsequently been used to identify a much broader spectrum of Islamic political ideologies and associated actors.

2.2. Expansion of Scholarly Literature Published on Contemporary Political Islam

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran there have been an increasing number of works published on Political Islam and, though the term was developed later, Islamism, by mainly Western scholars. Moreover, in the wake of 9/11, there has been a flood of literature produced on the topic within the wider field of the Social Sciences.


100 International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., p.i.


However, in some instances these works have misrepresented or misunderstood the nature of and diversity in Political Islam, especially the complexities in contours manifest in particular actors and associated contextual casual mechanisms impacting and shaping their development and, therefore, that of Political Islam.  

The expanse of scholarly literature, particularly in more recent years, on Political Islam has especially focused on Islamist and Jihadist manifestations. While some scholars take a broad approach to the analysis of Islamist and Jihadist actors, focusing on political, social, economic, and historical trends in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world in general; other scholars analyse these trends within a particular region(s) or state(s) which has or is experiencing a particular Islamist or Jihadist manifestation. Yet other scholars have produced works that focus on specific Islamist and Jihadist organisations and individuals within political, social, economic and historical contexts. Moreover, most of these works have been arranged chronologically and are generally thematic in content with a noticeable reference to security implications, especially in the West.

Examples of works that analyse Islamism and Jihadism within a broad political, social, economic, and historical framework across a wide geographic context include: John Esposito’s *The Future Of Islam*; Fawaz Gergers’s *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*; Jarret M. Brachman’s *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*; and Bernard Lewis’s *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War And Unholy*

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Examples of works that focus on Islamism and Jihadism in a particular region(s) within the wider Muslim world include: Bernard Lewis’s *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*; Kumar Ramakrishna’s *Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia* and Christopher Deliso’s *The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West*. Examples of works that analyse a particular Islamist or Jihadist manifestation in a particular state(s) in the wider Muslim world include Greg Barton’s *Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah And The Soul Of Islam*; Zachary Abuza’s *Political Islam And Violence In Indonesia*; Mohammad Ayoob’s *The Many Faces of Political-Islam: Religion And Politics In The Muslim World*; Dilip Hiro’s *War Without End: The Rise Of Islamist Terrorism And Global Response*; and the book edited by Said Amir Arjomand; *From Nationalism To Revolutionary Islam*. Examples of works that analyse a particular organisation(s) or individual(s) include: Khaled Hroub’s *HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice*; Rohan Gunaratna’s *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network Of Terror*; the work edited by Walter Laqueur; *Voices Of Terror: Manifestos, Writings, And Manuals Of Al Qaeda, HAMAS, And...
Other Terrorists From Around The World And Throughout The Ages; Adnan Musallam’s *From Secularism To Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*; and the work edited by Abert Bergesen; *The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society*.¹⁰⁷

Increased scholarly analysis of Islamist and Jihadist manifestations of Political Islam appears to have generated questions about those actors which appear not to be of a radical or violent nature and, in turn, has led to a smaller but growing number of studies which have examined what are arguably non-Islamist and non-Jihadist forms of Political Islam. The key focus of such works has been to examine what is widely termed in the literature to be ‘moderate’ manifestations of Political Islam; thus an emerging pool of scholarly works which appears to indicate Political Islam’s evolving and diverse nature.

Like those works which examine Islamism and Jihadism, these too have focused on Political Islam in global, regional and local contexts with the view to illuminate political, social, economic, and historical trends and phenomena associated with a particular organisation(s) and individual(s).

Some prominent scholarly works that examine a particular moderate Political Islamic organisation(s) or individual(s) include: Martin van Bruinessen’s *Overview of Muslim Organizations, Associations and Movements in Indonesia* in *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative

Turn”; Sara Silvestri’s *Moderate Islamist Groups in Europe: the Muslim Brothers* in *Political Islam: Context versus Ideology*; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham’s *The path to moderation: Strategy and learning in the formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party* in *Political Islam: A Critical Reader*; Jenny White’s *Muslimhood and Post-Islamist Power: The Turkish Example* in *Between Dissent and Power: The Transformation of Islamist Politics in the Middle East and Asia*; and Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi’s *Abdolkarim Soroush* in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam And Politics*.

While these studies in their own right have made a significant contribution to examining the wider nature and hence diversity in contemporary Political Islam, nevertheless, scholarly analysis of so-called moderate Political Islam remains limited in comparison to radical and violent manifestations; albeit the fact that the majority of Muslims appear not to support such interpretations of Political Islam.  

2.3. Three Key Scholarly Approaches to the Study of Contemporary Political Islam

As noted, this study identifies three key analytical approaches or methodologies that have been developed and applied to the scholarly literature published on the wider subject of Political Islam: ‘essentialist’, ‘contextualist’ and ‘discourse analysis’ approaches.

The first of these, the essentialist, is also referred to by some as the ‘orientalist’ approach. Scholars such as Hakan Yavuz identify the essentialist approach in his

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work *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics*. This approach analyses the characteristics, values and ideas manifested in Political Islamic ideologies, movements and organisations and establishes the notion that these phenomena are the product of a ‘fixed’ set of principles inherent within the wider tradition of Islam.\(^\text{109}\)

Although this approach has some useful insights, critics such as Mohammad Ayoob argue that the essentialist approach fails to identify and examine the diversity of Political Islam. Consequently, it lumps all forms together into a monolithic phenomenon that is simply part of a wider singular Islamic ‘civilisation’ which is inherently at odds with Christian and Jewish traditions and wider Western civilisation.\(^\text{110}\) Moreover, Ayoob critically notes such an approach fails to analyse Islam and, in turn, Political Islam as a “…code of ethics that affects and is, in turn, affected by multiple cultural and geographic milieus.”\(^\text{112}\)

Agreeing with this notion is Barton: “Traditionally, the study of ideas in the Muslim world has been left to orientalists [i.e. essentialist approach], or ‘text-oriented’ experts, [with no] …consideration of social and political engagement and the real-


\(^{110}\) See, for example, Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., pp.25-26; Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, op. cit., pp.16-17.


\(^{112}\) Ibid.
world application of the documents they are studying.”  

However, Barton further notes that:

“At the same time, comparatively, few political scientists and commentators have a deep knowledge of the religious thought associated with the groups they are observing, and frequently all political parties and groups with an Islamic connection are lumped together.”  

Lewis, who employs a combination of both the essentialist and contextualist analytical approaches, notes in his work *The Crisis Of Islam: Holy War And Unholy Terror*, that “…Islamism [i.e. Political Islam], … is not a single homogeneous movement. There are many types of Islamic fundamentalism [i.e. Political Islam] in different countries and even sometimes within a single country.”

The second scholarly approach is contextualist analysis which is fundamentally concerned with the interactions and relationships between contextual conditions and Political Islam. In particular, this approach is geared to illuminating and understanding how and why Political Islam develops by seeking out those causal mechanisms impacting and shaping the development of Political Islam. Hence, the underlying argument is that contextual conditions are the key causal factors generating particular regularities and behaviours in Political Islam. Scholars who identify and employ this approach include Yavuz in *Islamic Political Identity in Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.26.

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114 Ibid.
Turkey, Greg Barton in his work *Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah And The Soul Of Islam*, as well as Khaled Hroub in his work *Hamas: Conflating National Liberation and Socio-Political Change*.

Barton contends moreover that the contextualist approach to Political Islam consists of three key analytical mechanisms and that: “Any sound understanding of the current reality must rest evenly on each of these three legs: [1] the seminal ideas, [2] the pattern of history; and [3] contemporary context.” 117 Yavuz identifies that the contextualist approach examines key political, social and economic factors and conditions in particular geographic and historical contexts in relation to the subject being examined. 118 Hroub notes that the contextualist approach identifies Political Islam and hence actors as “…the product of political, social and economic developments which themselves force further adaptations, using (and misusing) historical, religious and cultural legacies at each stage of their development.” 119 Moreover, Barton argues, and employs, an amalgamation of, first and foremost, the contextualist together with the essentialist approaches, thus providing a multidimensional approach to best engage the subject objectively. 120 Collectively, Barton, Hroub and Yavuz argue that context and hence casual mechanisms are key


to understanding how and why Political Islam manifests and, in turn, its nature and diversity.

The third scholarly approach is discourse analysis. Significantly influenced by, and primarily used by scholars from the ‘post-modernist’ field of academia, this approach focuses on an examination of the different and influential discourses manifest in Political Islamic actors’ rhetoric.121 One central theme deriving from the discourse analysis approach is the examination of how Political Islamic ideologies have been harnessed for popular culture, social symbolism, and identity by a wide and diverse range of social, political and extremist movements and organisations throughout the Muslim world. This theme and approach is identified in Jenny B. White’s work *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*.122

Discourse analysis is also employed by scholars such as Richard Jackson in his work *Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse*, and by Mansoor Moaddel in his work *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism And Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse*.123 This approach has also been employed by Chris Brown in his work *Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity*, and by Gerges in his work, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, as

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well as by Brachman in *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*; all of which analyse their respective topics through the discussion of discourses.\(^{124}\)

Collectively, essentialist, contextualist and discourse analysis represent the primary analytical approaches employed by scholars within the wider field of Social Sciences with respect to Political Islam. A number of prominent scholars have argued that in order to gain a deeper and clearer understanding of Political Islam and its diversity, it is useful to employ a combination of these approaches, if not all three; thus engaging a multidimensional approach. Barton notes that such an approach needs to give equal attention to “…the seminal ideas; the pattern of history; and the contemporary context.”\(^ {125}\) This is especially the case with regards to illuminating and understanding how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests.\(^ {126}\)

This study therefore makes the inference to adopt the contextualist approach within the overarching framework of critical realism. Hence, analysis is conducted with the view that context is key to understanding the nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam.\(^ {127}\) This approach appears to be especially relevant in terms of


identifying generative mechanisms and their impact on and shaping of contours manifest and, in turn, observed orientations in contemporary Political Islam, and thus diversity. However, analysis will also examine Islamic texts as well, by giving additional consideration to both the essentialist and discourse analysis approaches respectively; thus the thesis takes a multidimensional analytical approach.

2.4: Four Key Scholarly Theories on the Development of Contemporary Political Islam

The above identified three scholarly approaches applied to the analysis of Political Islam, moreover, have resulted in the formulation of four key theories in the literature that seeks to explain the ascent and development of Political Islam. These include ‘colonialism and imperialism’ theory, ‘sudden shock’ theory, ‘social movement’ theory, and ‘ideologisation’ theory.128

The first of these scholarly theories identified in this thesis is the colonialism and imperialism theory, which holds that Political Islam is the by-product and therefore the response to colonial and imperial powers that advanced into the Muslim world, especially from the 18th Century onwards.129 In particular, this theory regards the ascent and development of Political Islam, and hence Political Islamic actors, can best be understood as being a direct result of the political conditions imposed on much of the Muslim world by colonial and imperial powers (this is a particular contextualist approach). Moreover, this theory asserts that Political Islam is a force

128 Ibid, pp.15-16.

for political liberation against colonial hegemonic forces and, in particular, Western political and military control and dominance.\textsuperscript{130}

According to this theory, colonialism and imperialism were the key catalysts not only for the ascent of Political Islam but its development and evolution in the post-colonial period which endures to this day. Hence, Hroub notes: “Even in the post-colonial era, the various faces of Western domination – mostly seen in the backing of authoritarian regimes and support for Israel – provide the root causes of anti-Western sentiment, and continue to feed waves of Islamism [i.e. Political Islam].”\textsuperscript{131}

The second of these theories, sudden shock theory, argues that the ascent and development of Political Islam can best be understood as a response to the multiplicity of sudden cataclysmic events which took place in the Muslim world during the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century.\textsuperscript{132} Such shocks include the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 which followed its defeat in World War One (WW1) by the British Empire, France and allied powers, ending some 1400 years of an Islamic Caliphate; modernisation and Westernisation; and the creation of nation-states in the Muslim world, seen as a Western political construct geared to ‘divide and rule’ of the Muslim world along the lines of ethnicity and religion.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid. Also see, for example, Burgat, Francois, \textit{Face to Face with Political Islam} (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003); Mazrui, Ali, \textit{Between Globalisation and Counter-Terrorism} (Oxford, James Curry Ltd, 2006); Fuller, \textit{The Future of Political Islam}, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{133} Ibid. Also see: Fuller, \textit{The Future of Political Islam}, op. cit., pp.7-12.
Sudden shock theory therefore argues that “The shattering of the Muslim umma left deep collective wounds and disorientation. Islamism [i.e. Political Islam] offered a comfort zone – a hope that the glory of the past could be resorted.” 134 Hence, Islamic civilisation underwent a series of sudden military, political, social, as well as psychological shocks antithetical to what Muslims believed to be their divinely ordained dominant status that had come to define Islamic history prior to the 20th Century. All this generated the conditions for the ascent in Political Islam.135 In other words, by “Using the appeal of Islam as a unifying force against destructive fragmentation, and as an intellectual and overarching system that could preserve group identity, Islamism [i.e. Political Islam] emerged as a timely and powerful agency of mobilisation.” 136 Sudden shock theory is concerned with contextual events (and is rooted in the contextualist approach), which took place in the Muslim world in the 20th Century, and argues that such shocks have both generated and impacted the development and evolution of Political Islam.

The third theory is social movement theory. This argues that Political Islam can best be understood as a particular form of social movement resulting from a complex array of societal conditions and events and hence generative mechanisms. In particular, social movement theory argues that particular strains, including political, social and economic, experienced in the Muslim world, especially during the 20th


Century, provided fertile conditions which lead to “…unleashing local forces that seek to change the status quo.”

Such strains, moreover, are identified to especially include those which have been generated as the result of failing and failed states, lack of democratic rule, and marginalisation of citizens; corruption, poverty, and lack of nationhood due to inter- and intra-ethnic and religious rivalry; and failing or faltering economies. According to social movement theory, such strains and conditions led to Muslims generating and adopting alternative political ideas and belief systems, and hence ideologies, rooted in Islamic tradition and which claimed to offer an alternative to the political status quo, and revolutionary in nature. Social movement theory purports such conditions and events, and in turn generative mechanisms, are responsible for the ascent of Political Islam and are the key catalysts driving its subsequent development.

Scholars such as Hroub, furthermore, note that “The appeal of Islamist [i.e. Political Islamic] movements has been enhanced by their exploitation of the failure of two other ideologies: socialism and nationalism; and they have exploited an indigenous culture and value-system that is deeply rooted in the collective identity and history of the people: Islam.” Consequently, Hroub identifies such exploitation of Islam by Political Islamic actors, has resulted in Political Islam being amongst the most

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active forms of political ideologies and movements in the world.\textsuperscript{141} Such a view is further conveyed by Quintan Wiktorowicz in his work \textit{Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory} who argues that “…Islamic activism is one of the most common examples of activism in the world.” \textsuperscript{142}

Social movement theory’s concern with particular societal conditions and events is rooted in the contextualist approach. It argues that particular social, political and economic forces are key to understanding cause-and-effects linked to and responsible for the ascent and development of Political Islam as a revolutionary or activist social movement.\textsuperscript{143}

The fourth and final of the theories concerned with the ascent and development of Political Islam identified in this thesis is ideologisation. This particular theory claims that Political Islam’s ascent and development can be explained through, and as a result of, ideology rather than social conditions and events. In particular, it argues that Political Islam is essentially the result of a shift or mutation within Islam in terms of ideology – a system of ideas and beliefs. This shift has been from a religious-based ideological structure to a political-based ideology structure; therefore resulting with the ‘religious ideological framework’ of Islam being replaced with, or at least diminished by, a ‘political ideological framework’.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.


Ideologisation theory thus emphasises ideology as the defining factor through which to understand the ascent and development of Political Islam.\textsuperscript{144}

Ideologisation theory moreover approaches the study of Political Islamic ideology(s) through the careful analysis of ‘textual’-based analysis, and so is especially concerned with Islamic scriptures and the Hadiths as key sources. To that extent, it takes an essentialist approach.\textsuperscript{145}

Ideologisation theory argues that ideological structures play a key causal role in the ascent and development of Political Islam and, therefore, the nature and orientation of a particular Political Islamic actor. This is especially the case regarding the cause-and-effects generated between a particular Political Islamic actor’s ideas and beliefs and the ‘guiding’ Islamic teachings on which they justify and derive such views, understandings and behaviours. Thus ideology is responsible for observed behaviours in, as well as the ascent and development of, Political Islam.\textsuperscript{146}

The four theories collectively form the key arguments and understandings within the literature of why and in turn how Political Islam emerged and has developed. All but the latter argue that ‘context’ is essential to understanding the ascent and development and or evolution of Political Islam. In particular, they identify societal conditions and events, especially social, political and economic, as key generative mechanisms, while the latter identifies ideology to be the primary catalyst. Despite

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{144} See, for example, Ibid, p.16. Also see: Bassman, \textit{Islam in Global Politics}, op. cit., p.18-19


\textsuperscript{146} See, for example, Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., p.26.\end{flushleft}
their differences, each of the four theories nevertheless has contributed to
explaining and understanding the casual factors linked to the development of
Political Islam, especially in the contemporary context.

Both context and ideology therefore will be given consideration in the analysis of
diversity in contemporary Political Islam. In particular, and in accordance with
thesis’s contextualist approach outlined in the previous chapter, contextual
conditions and events, especially political, social and economic, will be examined
in terms of their impact on and shaping of cases of Political Islam examined in this
thesis, and hence why they manifest. Consequently, such contextual factors are
identified as key generative mechanisms. Ideology, rather, will be considered in
terms of its impact on, or presence in, key contours manifest in contemporary
Political Islam in the following analysis of key orientations of scholarly thought.
Therefore, the inference is made in this thesis that ideology is not a generative
mechanism and is thus unlike contextual political, social and economic factors
identified in this thesis to be responsible for the development and or evolution of
contemporary diversity in Political Islam.147

2.5: Two Key Orientations of Scholarly Thought on the Nature of Diversity
in Contemporary Political Islam

Much literature has been published on the scholarly examination concerning the
nature and diversity of Political Islam through the lens of one of two key

overarching orientations of scholarly thought: Accommodationist and Confrontationist. Moreover, these two overarching theories are formulated out of scholarly approaches and theoretical understandings on the development, as well as evolution, of contemporary Political Islam. Collectively, these two orientations form what is identified in this thesis to be the two primary conceptual viewpoints on the nature of and diversity in contemporary Political Islam. Thus we arrive at an understanding of the nature and diversity of contemporary Political Islam.

As previously noted, each of the two theories holds a particular competing view about Political Islam. This is especially the case in terms of what the nature of Political Islam is as well as diversity in actors manifest, especially in terms of the presence of democratic norms and values. Nevertheless, each of these orientations contributes to the analysis and understanding of Political Islam, providing particular conceptual viewpoints through which Political Islam may be understood and framed.

2.5.1: Accommodationist Theory

While acknowledging the existence of Islamist and Jihadist manifestations, in particular, Accommodationists hold Political Islam to be an idea and movement, a perpetual ‘creative space’ capable of, and which has generated, ‘moderate’ manifestations.\(^{148}\) Moreover, in more recent times, Accommodationists have increasingly noted that there appears to be a renaissance taking place within some circles of moderate Political Islam in terms of the embrace of modern democratic norms.

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norms and values; albeit appearing to be slow, and a minority phenomenon, within Political Islam.\textsuperscript{149}

Accommodationists assert that such moderate forms of Political Islam are especially likely to emerge when political systems in which they operate are ‘open’ to their engagement in the political process. Asserting, too, that the moderation of Islamists is possible when and wherever the opportunity to include them in the political process presents itself.\textsuperscript{150} This theory argues that ‘learned’ experiences gained through exposure to the political realities of governance and elections can and, in some cases, has ‘tamed’ particular actors. Moreover, it asserts that excluding Political Islamic actors from such political process provides fertile conditions for the festering of political utopianism(s), including in the extreme.\textsuperscript{151}

Results of such moderation appear to vary widely, however, Accommodationists claim evidence of this has been observed in one or more of three key characteristics, ideologies, tactics and objectives, as a result of learned experiences and engagement in the political process.\textsuperscript{152} Examples of such a development appear to include,


among others, the ‘Wasat’ party in Egypt which split from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1996,\textsuperscript{153} and the ‘Parti Amanah Negara’ (AMANAH) in Malaysia which split from the pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) in 2015.\textsuperscript{154} Both of these are credited to have fundamentally shifted from an Islamist to a more moderate orientation in Political Islam in terms of their ideologies, tactics or objectives.\textsuperscript{155}

Accommodationists argue that Political Islam is not only capable of but is generating moderate manifestations that coexist and operate within the confines of the modern nation-state, including engaging in the democratic process.\textsuperscript{156} Arguing that such moderate manifestations moreover appear progressive and or liberal in nature.\textsuperscript{157} Here Accommodationists often identify the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey as a prime example of where such behaviour is manifest.\textsuperscript{158} This is a party rooted in Political Islam which embraces and operates within the framework of Turkey’s secular constitution and democratic electrical system.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.


Therefore, according to Accommodationists, it appears the AKP is not only moderate in nature, but, democratic, at least in terms of tactics. Moreover, the AKP has won the majority of the popular vote in every decisive national election since 2002 thus far.

Fundamental to the Accommodationist argument, moreover, is the Islamic concept of ‘ijtihad’ (independent reasoning) through which Islamic teachings, values and concepts, derived from the Quran and Sunna, are essentially open to rational interpretation so as to ‘fit’ modern contextual times and realities. Therefore, Accommodationists argue that the concept of ijtihad has provided a small but growing number of Islamic political philosophers and, in turn, Political Islamic actors who seek a modern understanding of Islam. It asserts this provides a methodological approach through which to re-examine and apply Islamic teachings which are ethically compatible with contemporary democratic political norms and society. This appears to support the notion that Political Islam is both an inherent and legitimate function of the Islamic tradition. However, Accommodationists argue that for such a particular moderate Political Islamic orientation to take root is

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deeply dependent upon the societal conditions manifest within a particular nation, especially in terms of prevailing political, social and economic conditions.\textsuperscript{163}

The apparent lack of such moderate forms of Political Islam in Muslim majority nations and societies is credited by Accommodationists as being due to the fact that “…these values simply could not emerge over the centuries when international values were different and when the theological power structures of the Muslim world were in the hands of authoritarian regimes that interpreted Islamic law to their own benefit.”\textsuperscript{164} It asserts this situation emerged following the arrival of colonialism and, more recently, post-colonial secular and Muslim regimes, which for the most part deny any form of Political Islam, as well as other political groups, access to the political process.\textsuperscript{165} Such conditions it argues have been key catalysts for the observed increase in radicalisation amongst Political Islamic actors, especially from the mid-to-late-1900s onwards.

Accommodationists therefore argue their understanding explains the range of observed behaviours and diversity within contemporary Political Islam and includes, extremist, radical and moderate manifestations in Political Islam; albeit


\textsuperscript{164} Fuller, \textit{The Future of Political Islam}, op. cit., p.54.

the latter appears to be a minority. Consequently, Accommodationists reject the notion that Political Islam is inherently radical and extremist in nature.\textsuperscript{166}

2.5.2: Confrontationist Theory

Such observations, however, are quickly dismissed by the Confrontationist view which represents the second key scholarly orientation of thought on the nature of, and diversity in, contemporary Political Islam. In particular, scholars who adhere to the Confrontationist position hold that Political Islam is not a creative space in which liberal or progressive developments take place but, rather, is inherently radical and anti-democratic, illiberal, intolerant and, in some cases, extremist in nature.\textsuperscript{167} This theory attributes Political Islam to 19\textsuperscript{th} Century fascism and communism, committed to disempowering and destroying Western civilisation’s perceived dominance and values, especially in the ‘Muslim world’, as well as all other cultures and civilisations, and replace it with ‘Hakimiyiyat Allah’ (‘God’s rule’/Shari’a law).\textsuperscript{168}

Confrontationists moreover view Political Islam as a political ideological construct and so antithetical to the religion of Islam itself and, consequently, a manipulation and re-interpretation (‘ijtihad’) of the historical and enduring relationship between Islam and politics. This results in the ‘politicalisation of Islam’ and the quest for an


\textsuperscript{167} For a detailed analysis of Political Islam as a radical, anti-democratic, intolerant, and violent/extremist phenomenon – also referred to as “confrontationist” – see: Bassam, \textit{Islam in Global Politics}, pp.140-160; “There are no Moderates”, pp.48-52, 54.

\textsuperscript{168} Bassam, \textit{Islam in Global Politics}, op. cit., p.150.
'Islamic state(s)', which is argued to be a modern novelty. Confrontationists do not view Political Islam as an inherent or legitimate function of the Islamic tradition but, rather, to be a revolutionary political ideological movement. In particular, Political Islam is viewed as a radical and extremist ideological construct geared towards the theocratic absolutism of Islamic-based or inspired socio-political norms and values. This theory argues the key objective of Political Islam and hence actors is to implement such norms and values in both public and private domains and therefore within a particular political context, and in turn, nation or region throughout the world via particular tactics and or strategies, including extremism.

For Confrontationists, for example, and contradictory to the Accommodationists claims, evidence of Political Islam’s inherent radical nature can be observed in the AKP’s 2013 violent state suppression of the peaceful ‘Gezi protests’ and crackdown on freedom of the press in Turkey, including police raids and the eventual state-takeover of Turkey’s biggest newspaper Today’s Zaman in March 2016. This has reportedly led to that nation having some of the highest incarceration rates of journalists, especially those critical of the AKP. Moreover, Turkey’s ranking in

170 Ibid, pp. 140-150.
171 Ibid, p.150; “There are no Moderates”, op. cit., pp.48-54.
the World Economic Forum’s 2013 Global Gender Gap Report as being 120th out of 136 nations for the status of women in society has also lead to views that the AKP is fundamentally illiberal and hence anti-democratic.175 Furthermore, the AKP’s foreign policy support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its offshoot the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) in the Gaza Strip, widely considered Islamist and Jihadist organisations respectively, during and after the 2011-2013 Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, has also called into question the nature of that Political Islamic party, especially in terms of ideology and objectives. 176 Additionally, the AKP’s wider regional geopolitical strategy to assert Turkish influence in the Middle East, which appears to be crafted on and invokes that nation’s historical role as an Islamic world power, has further raised concerns about the nature of the AKP.177 Indeed, it is viewed by some International Relations and Security Studies scholars as well as commentators as essentially being ‘neo-Ottomanism’.178

Confrontationists therefore dismiss the Accommodationist claim that Political Islam is capable of and, in turn, has generated liberal democratic manifestations, noting that engaging in elections only does not necessarily warrant a particular


177 Ibid.

political group as ‘democratic’. Therefore, the ‘character’ of democracy matters. Confrontationists so assert that ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ democracies and actors which engage in the electoral political process is a key defining point. In turn, where Accommodationists see moderation, Confrontationists see such developments as simply tactical and hence strategic electocracy, not evidence of moderation as such, and therefore not liberal democratisation in terms of ideology or objectives.\textsuperscript{179} The Confrontationist scholarly orientation of thought is thus clearly antithetical to Accommodationist theory.

\textbf{2.6: Conceptual Contours \& Contexts: Hypothesising a Critical Analytical Model for the Examination of Diversity in Contemporary Political Islam}

In addition to contextual generative mechanisms, especially political, social and economic factors, identified in the previous theories concerned with why contemporary Political Islam manifests, analysis of Accommodationist and Confrontationist orientations of scholarly thought appear to provide important insight into how it manifests. In particular, they reveal that the contested nature of, and hence diversity in, contemporary Political Islam is especially rooted in consensus over, or lack of, the ‘true’ ideological nature of actors, as well as tactics employed and goals pursued by them.

Consensus is particularly divided over the presence of liberal and democratic values and norms, including engagement in elections as a means or end, as well as what appears to remain the primary objective of most Political Islamic actors, the

institutionalising of ‘Shari’a Law’ (Islamic Law) within a particular state or geopolitical construct; real or perceived.  

Such contention appears to be conveyed by scholars such as Carrie Rosefsky Wickham who, among others, notes: “…there is a world of difference between Islamists [i.e. Political Islamic actors] who publicly endorse democracy, pluralism, and human rights and those that do not.”  However, Wickham further notes too that: “Even scholars who appreciate the Islamic movement’s [i.e. Political Islam] international diversity, however, are often quick to point out the nondemocratic implications of what remains the primary objective of most Islamist [i.e. Political Islamic] groups, the call for Shari’a rule.” This is especially the case given that Shari’a Law, especially the hudud penal code, in its traditional application is fundamentally at odds with contemporary democratic, liberal norms and values.

Therefore, the nature of ideologies and associated tactics and objectives arguably are key points of contention concerning diversity in contemporary Political Islam and in turn determine a particular actor’s orientation identified in Accommodationist and Confrontationist schools of thought: extremist, radical or moderate. Consequently, analysis indicates that ideologies, tactics and objectives

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182 Ibid.

are essential to understand and analysing the nature of, and hence diversity in, a particular Political Islamic actor.

This especially appears to be the case in that actors derive a wide and diverse range of ideas and beliefs, and therefore, ideologies that either embrace or reject such tactics as political-violence, especially extremism, or have a willingness to engage in the political process when available while others reject it opting for alternative political tactics. Further, some appear to embrace political and religious pluralism and wider human rights while others do not. All this manifests in a particular geopolitical construct, real or perceived, including the nation-state or wider trans-national objectives. Therefore, although not exclusive, ideology, tactics and objectives are emphasised by some scholars to be key defining contours through which to separate extremist, radical and moderate orientations of contemporary Political Islam, and thus diversity.184

Ideologies, tactics and objectives, therefore, essentially divide and define the principal manifestations of Political Islam, especially between extremists and those that are not. Consequentially, these three underlying contours together can be

understood to form the ‘DNA’ of a particular Political Islamic actor.\footnote{Ibid.} Ideologies, tactics and objectives so are argued in this thesis to form the key contours manifest in and, combined, through which orientations in Political Islam can be observed, and hence diversity. Moreover, all of these are impacted and shaped by a complexity of social, political and economic contextual conditions and or events and hence generative mechanisms.\footnote{Hroub, “Hamas”, in \textit{Political Islam}, eds. Khaled Hroub, 2010, op. cit., p.161.} Such contours and generative mechanisms are argued in this thesis to form key points of enquiry and, therefore, can be theoretically harnessed as key sets of cognitive analysis. Consequently, these sets of analysis collectively form this thesis’s hypothesised critical analytical model through which to holistically examine how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests.

The hypothesised analytical model accordingly examines diversity in contemporary Political Islam with the view of illuminating the range of diversity in their three contours – ideologies, tactics and objectives – as evidenced by a particular Political Islamic actor examined in this thesis. Analysis too looks for key contextual generative mechanism identified in this thesis as being responsible for their development and or evolution. Each case’s identified ideology, tactics and objective(s) will be collated and framed to represent a particular orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Identified contextual generative mechanisms will also be collated and framed.
Consequently, the hypothesised analytical model forms the foundations of this thesis’s paradigm. In particular, all identified ideologies, tactics and objectives revealed through the hypothesised analytical model, as well as contextual generative mechanisms, together will be formulated to form a conceptual multi-dimensional paradigm representing key diversity in contemporary Political Islam. Subsequently, findings revealed through the hypothesised analytical model and associated paradigm will assess the key theories’ claims examined in this thesis on diversity in contemporary Political Islam. In particular, they will be transcribed to form a theoretical prescription to the contested understanding on diversity in contemporary Political Islam. Therefore, it is suggested that the hypothesised analytical model presented here provides a particular critical tool through which to examine and holistically observe how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests. Thus it is applied to the analysis of case studies in this thesis.
Part Three
Case Studies & Empirical Analysis
Chapter Three
Case Study 1: Islamic State

3.1: Introduction

With the proclamation of a ‘Caliphate’ spanning large areas of Syria and Iraq in June 2014, following the ‘blitzkrieg-like’ capture of large areas of land in those two countries, as well as its intended expansion throughout the region and beyond, the Islamic State (IS)\(^\text{187}\) became arguably the most infamous Islamic extremist organisation globally and, perhaps, in history. Led by Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri (aka Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi), IS appears to have even eclipsed al-Qaeda, albeit by no means defeated, which was at the forefront of the ‘global Jihadist’ movement since the late-1990s, responsible for the largest terrorist attack in history, 9/11.\(^\text{188}\)

The rapid rise and expansion of IS and its self-proclaimed Caliphate moreover coincided with, and appears to be particularly linked to, the civil war in Syria which erupted in 2011; a conflict that has emerged as the current global epicentre for

\(^{187}\) The Islamic State is also referred to as, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), or, in Arabic, ‘Daesh’. However, in June 2014 the group renamed itself “Islamic State” and is therefore referred to as such in this thesis.

Islamic extremism.\textsuperscript{189} However, the origins of IS appear to be much older than the Syrian civil war, dating back to the early-2000s.\textsuperscript{190}

Since its inception, moreover, IS appears to have undergone a number of key transformations, especially in terms of its objectives, tactics and ideology.\textsuperscript{191} In particular, it appears IS has shifted from an organisation which was originally concerned with Iraq and, then, Syria, to one that now has a much wider transnational objective(s).\textsuperscript{192} Hence, in addition to Iraq and Syria, IS now claims to seek the expansion of its Caliphate, and hence objective, throughout the entire Middle East, Central Asia and North and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2020. Furthermore, it has further indicated that it seeks to bring all Muslim majority nations and regions under its control and, ultimately, the entire world.\textsuperscript{193} Such transformations in IS appear


\textsuperscript{191} “Islamic State”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid. Prior to Iraq and Syria, the original leadership and hence objectives of IS were also concerned with Jordan and, though for purely strategic ends, Afghanistan in the 1990s and early 2000s.

\textsuperscript{193} “The ISIS map of the world”, op. cit.
manifest in a series of changes, or rebranding, of that Jihadist organisation’s name.\textsuperscript{194}

To this end, IS appears to have intensified its modus operandi and, so, tactics in its self-proclaimed campaign of al-jihad and hence violence and extremism.\textsuperscript{195} In particular, IS has engaged in carrying out attacks on U.S.-led Coalition Forces and Iraqi government officials, as well as systematically targeting Shi’a Muslims, Christians and other minority religious groups; especially the Yazidis.\textsuperscript{196} Moreover, IS has been accused of genocide against minority religious communities and the systematic rape and enslavement of woman, especially in the case of the Yazidis,\textsuperscript{197} as well as carried out extremist attacks around the world.\textsuperscript{198} Additionally, IS appears to have developed sophisticated non-violent methods to indoctrinate and recruit Muslims globally, employing social media and the wider internet; considered by some experts to be unprecedented in the context of Islamic extremism.\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{194} “Islamic State”, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{198} “Islamic State”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{199} Greg Miller and Souad Mekhennet, “Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State’s propaganda machine”, Confronting the Caliphate, November 20, 2015, The Washington Post, Retrieved,
These apparent shifts in objectives and tactics furthermore appear to have been underpinned by a hardening in IS’s ideology which derives from a particular belief system grounded in ‘Wahhabism’-inspired Salafist extremist teachings. This particular ideological belief system moreover is reportedly considered too extreme even by al-Qaeda’s standards, especially in terms of the justification of particular tactics employed, which, ironically, too adheres to a particular Wahhabi-inspired Salafist extremist doctrine. Therefore, the ideology of IS appears to represent the most extreme amongst Islamic extremist to date. Such ideology is widely referred to by scholars as Jihadism which, subsequently, IS, including its previous

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200 ‘Wahhabism/Wahhabi’ is a particular variant of Salafist ideology and is based on a ‘neo-Hanbali’ jurisprudential interpretation of Islamic thought and practice within Sunni Islam that was taught by the 18th Century Arabian Islamic scholar, Mohammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. It teaches that ‘true/pure’ Islam must be based on a literal interpretation of the practices and teachings associated with the ‘salaf al-salih’ (pious ancestors of Islam – this includes Prophet Mohammad and the ‘four rightly guided caliphs’/Rashidun Caliphs and their close companions/first three generations of Islam) in the 7th Century CE. Therefore, Wahhabism rejects any scholarly and hence rational interpretations which essentially ‘contextualise’ Islamic teachings, including religious, social and political teachings, rather, it is puritanical and exclusivist in nature. Moreover, in the context of Islamic sanctioned ‘holy fighting/war’ (political violence), or, ‘al-jihad’, both ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ forms, Wahhabism purports that such a measure is justified against non-Muslims and Muslims, especially Shi’a and Sunni’s deemed as ‘takfiir’ (apostates), if they do not adhere to such a doctrine/Wahhabism. Therefore, such a tactic, among others, is justified to convert or submit people to and expand Wahhabism geographically. For a detailed discussion on Wahhabism see: Meijer, “Salafism”, in Political Islam, eds. Khaled Hroub, 2010, op. cit., pp.37-60. Also see: Wiktorowicz, Quintan, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam” in Political Islam: A critical reader, Edited by, Frederic Volpi (Abingdon, Oxford, Routledge, 2011), pp.277-278; Gerges, A. Fawaz, Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (Orlando, Harcourt, 2007), p.106.

201 In a letter written by a senior al-Qaeda official to that organisation’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, which was found by the U.S. following his killing in May 2012 in his Pakistan hideout, it is noted that the Islamic State’s brutality is considered detrimental to al-Qaeda’s objectives. See: Steve Bird, “So wicked that even Al Qaeda disowned them: Letter found at Bin Laden’s hideout warned of Islamic State’s extreme brutality”, August 10, 2014, Mail Online, Retrieved, 20/3/2016, From, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2721417/So-wicked-Al-Qaeda-disowned-Letter-Bin-Ladens-hideout-warned-Islamic-States-extreme-brutality.html;
manifestations identified in this thesis, is considered to adhere to. Accordingly, IS is identified in this thesis as adhering to a particular form of Jihadism.

The rise and subsequent radicalisation and development of IS, therefore, arguably provides important clues into the nature of, and diversity in, key contours, and hence ideology, tactics and objectives, manifest within that Jihadist organisation thus far. Moreover, this provides important clues into key generative mechanisms impacting their nature and diversity and, so, the development of IS. This, in turn, provides a way to gain insight into the diversity in behaviours and regularities associated with ideology, tactics and objectives manifest within the Jihadist orientation of Political Islam.

Analysis of IS in this thesis is conducted chronologically, tracking the evolution of that organisation from its inception. In turn, this provides a way to illuminate the nature of, as well as any key transformations in, ideology, tactics and objectives manifest in IS responsible for observed behaviours and regularities in that organisation. Analysis also looks for key social, political and economic contexts and events impacting and shaping IS’s key contours, and so, that organisation’s development; thus generative mechanisms. Therefore, analysis of IS is geared to illuminating maximum insight into the nature of the diversity in contours manifest, as well as contextual generative mechanisms, within that organisation’s evolution thus far. Moreover, findings will be theoretically harnessed as key sets of cognitive analysis through which to frame primary contours and generative mechanisms

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manifest in contemporary Jihadist Political Islam. This, in turn, will provide essential insight into the wider conceptual diversity of contemporary Political Islam, as well as casual factors generating such diversity. Consequently, findings will be evidenced and formulated into this thesis hypothesised paradigm of contemporary Political Islam.

3.2: Tawhid & Jihad and the Origins of the Islamic State

The origins of what is today known as IS can be traced back to ‘Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad’, hereafter, ‘Tawhid and Jihad’ (Monotheism and Jihad), a Jihadist organisation established in Jordan by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in October 2002. 203 A Jordanian Sunni extremist who was imprisoned in Jordan for drug possession and sexual assault as a young man, al-Zarqawi’s roots in Jihadism can be traced back to the late-1980s. During this period al-Zarqawi travelled to Afghanistan to fight in the so called ‘Afghan Jihad’, an Islamic-inspired campaign to fight against the Soviet Union which invaded and occupied that country from 1979 to 1989. 204

Following the Afghan-Jihad, al-Zarqawi moved to Peshawar, Pakistan where he reportedly further embraced Islamic extremist teachings and beliefs under the guidance of Jordanian native and Jihadist ideologue, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. 205 However, al-Zarqawi returned to Jordan in the 1990s with al-Maqdisi and established ‘Bayat al-Imam’, a Salafist organisation that openly criticised and

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204 Ibid.

205 “Islamic State”, op. cit.
plotted against the Hashemite dynasty and which sought to establish a hard-line interpretation of Islamic Law in that country; by force if necessary. Subsequently, al-Maqdisi and, for a second time, al-Zarqawi were arrested and imprisoned in Jordan, effectively dissolving Bayat al-Imam.

In March 1999, as part of a general amnesty, al-Zarqawi was released from prison and returned to Afghanistan. Upon his return, al-Zarqawi become influenced by Sheikh Abdul-Rahman al-Ali (commonly known as, Sheikh Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir, or, Muhammad Ibrahim al-Saghir), an Egyptian native and veteran of the Afghan Jihad who operated the Institute for Faith Brigades, an ‘educational’ centre at the Khaleden Jihadist training camp near Khost, Afghanistan between 1996 and 2000. In particular, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s teachings which were compiled into a ‘legal manual’ known as ‘Fiqh al-dima’ focused on ‘takfir’ (excommunication of other Muslims who are accused for being apostates) and the justification of extreme violence as al-jihad. These teachings derived from those of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab (i.e. Wahhabism) and became the cornerstone of al-Zarqawi’s ideology and would manifest within Tawhid and Jihad which would evolve to become IS.

206 Ibid.


It was at this point in time (2000) that al-Muhajir and al-Zarqawi, along with many other Jihadist students of the Institute for Faith Brigades, reportedly become affiliated with al-Qaeda at the invitation of its leader, Osama bin Laden, in Kandahar, Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{209} This was despite the fact that bin Laden was reportedly concerned over ideological, tactical and strategic differences between the two Jihadist camps. In particular, it is reported that bin Laden was concerned over al-Muhajir’s and al-Zarqawi’s Wahhabi-based takfiri ideological beliefs which, among other things, sanctions the killing of Muslims who do not submit to such a particular doctrine, especially Shi’a.\textsuperscript{210} Moreover, bin Laden was reportedly concerned about their support for intensive suicide bombing tactics and strategy to target the ‘near enemy’ (local governments – both secular and Muslim), including indiscriminately targeting civilians (both non-Muslim and Muslim).\textsuperscript{211}

Such tactics therefore were in contrast to bin Laden’s strategy to target, in particular, the ‘far enemy’ (the West, especially America and its allies) and limit, if not avoid, attacks on Muslim civilian populations, including Shi’a which ideologically he did not advocate nor particularly believe in systematically killing.\textsuperscript{212} However, in comparison to al-Zarqawi and al-Muhajir, bin Laden’s apparent empathic view towards Shi’a Muslims has been reported as being due to Iran’s, a ‘Shi’a state’,

\textsuperscript{209} “Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi under influence”, op. cit; “Islamic State”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid; “Takfiri Lecture Makes Headway in Lebanon”.

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{212} “Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi under influence”, op. cit; “Islamic State”, op. cit.
strategic importance to, and or collaboration with, al-Qaeda; at least reportedly during this period (late-1990s – early-2000s) in the build up to 9/11. Moreover, al-Qaeda’s use of and support for suicide bombings up until 9/11 appear to have been limited to government and military targets as opposed to systematically targeting civilians, such as the 1998 U.S embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, as well as the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen in 2000.

It was these reported differences why, unlike al-Muhajir, al-Zarqawi apparently rejected bin Laden’s offer to formally join al-Qaeda, rather opting for financial support to establish a Jihadist training facility in Herat, Afghanistan. Nevertheless, while al-Zarqawi remained loyal to, and continued with, al-Muhajir’s teachings thereafter gravitated into the orbit of al-Qaeda, overseeing the training of up to an estimated 3000 Jihadists which could potentially be called upon by bin Laden. Therefore, al-Zarqawi appears to have further developed his credentials as a formidable leader amongst Jihadists, acting both independently of, but associated with, al-Qaeda during the pre-9/11 Taliban–al-Qaeda era in Afghanistan.


214 Ibid.

215 “Islamic State”, op. cit. Also see: “Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi under influence”, op. cit; “Takfiri Lecture Makes Headway in Lebanon”.
By October 2001, however, al-Zarqawi and much of his Jihadist ideologues had fled Afghanistan following the UN sanctioned invasion of that country by U.S-led NATO forces in an effort to destroy the Taliban and, in particular, al-Qaeda in the wake of 9/11. During this period it is reported that “Zarqawi and his men moved between Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Kurdish areas of Iraq”.\(^{216}\) By late-2002, al-Zarqawi had returned to his native Jordan where he established Tawhid and Jihad which claimed responsibility for the murder of USAid employee, Laurence Foley, in Jordan on the 28\(^{th}\) of October in that year; thus Tawhid and Jihad’s first known attack.\(^{217}\) However, as U.S-led military operations further extended to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 as part of a wider ‘global war on terror’, al-Zarqawi moved Tawhid and Jihad to Iraq to fight the U.S-led Coalition Forces.\(^{218}\) Moreover, following their arrival in Iraq, Tawhid and Jihad began perpetrating attacks which included:

…the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad in August 2003; the bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, 2003; the Najaf bombings on August 29, 2003, that killed Shi’a leader Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim; [and] the bombing of the Italian military headquarters in al-Nasiriyah on October 12, 2003\(^{219}\)

\(^{216}\) “Islamic State”, op. cit.

\(^{217}\) Ibid.

\(^{218}\) Ibid.

These attacks also included an intensified systematic targeting of Iraqi civilians, aid workers and, in particular, Shi’a Muslims who were regarded by al-Zarqawi and his fighters as apostates; a view fundamentally derived from their ‘Wahhabi’-inspired Salafist extremist doctrine.\textsuperscript{220} Such beliefs and hence ideological positioning as well as tactics formed the cornerstone of al-Zarqawi’s and Tawhid and Jihad’s ‘trademark’.\textsuperscript{221} Moreover, al-Zarqawi authorised the use of suicide bombings against civilians as well as combatants which was not a common tactic at that time in comparison to other Jihadist groups fighting in Iraq. The latter primarily employed tactics more in line with those of ‘guerrilla warfare’ and, hence, especially targeted U.S-led Coalition Forces.\textsuperscript{222} Therefore, Tawhid and Jihad signalled an intensification in that conflict; arguably the most extreme Jihadist group operating in Iraq and the wider Middle East at that time.

Collectively, these developments form the origins of what would manifest as al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004, followed by the Islamic State of Iraq in late-2006, and then the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in early-2013, and, finally, as it is known today, IS in mid-2014.\textsuperscript{223} Therefore, Tawhid and Jihad represents the first phase of IS’s evolution in ideology, tactics and objectives and hence contours manifest within that Jihadist group; albeit operating under a different name. In particular, based on


\textsuperscript{222} Ibid; “Islamic State”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{223} “Islamic State”, op. cit.
the above analysis, Tawhid and Jihad can be understood as a particular Jihadist organisation which sought to establish its doctrine and hence objective in, first, Jordan and, then, Iraq, as well as having links to al-Qaeda and that group’s wider international agenda. To this end, it primarily employed political violence, especially extremism. Consequently, Tawhid and Jihad can be defined as a particular trans-national extremist Jihadist organisation; thus the first phase of evolution in IS.

3.3: From Tawhid & Jihad to al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Formation of the Islamic State of Iraq

In October 2004, however, al-Zarqawi pledged his allegiance to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, resulting with Tawhid and Jihad being rebranded as al-Qaeda’s formal branch in Iraq: al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, or, commonly known as, al-Qaeda in Iraq and accordingly so in this thesis. 224 In the wake of this development moreover al-Zarqawi set about consolidating his powerbase and that of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s dominance amongst the growing number of Jihadist organisations which had emerged in that country shortly after the U.S-led invasion in 2003. 225 This resulted with al-Zarqawi successfully forging an alliance between al-Qaeda in Iraq and some five other independent Sunni Jihadist groups in Iraq during this period (late-2004). Collectively, this union of Jihadists formed an


225 Ibid.
official front known as the Islamic State of Iraq and was directed by al-Zarqawi, and in turn, al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{226}

Following the formation of this co-opt of Jihadists, the Islamic State of Iraq worked to intensify operations in Iraq. This included intensifying coordinated attacks on U.S.-led coalition forces and Iraqi government officials, as well as systematically targeting Shi’a Muslims, Christians and other minority religious groups.\textsuperscript{227} Additionally, al-Zarqawi continued to target Jordan in operations claimed by al-Qaeda in Iraq, including three suicide bombings targeting hotels in Amman on November 9, 2005.\textsuperscript{228}

This strategy therefore appears to have been twofold. First, seeking to generate a ‘power vacuum’ by intensifying what was then a localised insurgency consisting of Saddam loyalists, criminals and Iraqi Jihadists which fought against the U.S-led occupying forces, as well as U.S-appointed Iraqi governors. Insurgent forces especially emerged following their failure by U.S-led Coalition Forces to effectively establish law and order in the wake of dismantling the Iraqi State post-invasion.\textsuperscript{229} Second, by targeting Shi’a, Christian and other religious groups and holy sites, it appears this strategy sought to generate support amongst the Sunni

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid; “The ISIS map of the world”, op. cit; “Al-Qaeda is losing the battle for jihadi hearts and minds”, op. cit;

\textsuperscript{227} “Kerry”, op. cit.


population who were increasingly concerned with the idea of ‘power sharing’. This
was especially the case regarding Iraq’s Shi’a majority, as well as other religious
and ethnic groups such as the Kurds which previously had been excluded from
holding power during the Saddam era who was supported by most of Iraq’s Sunni
tribal leaders.230

The Islamic State of Iraq consequently sought to further destabilise Iraq in an effort
to limit and or erode the governability of that country, seeking to generate
conditions through which to further establish and expand their influence and
operations throughout Iraq.231 Moreover, such a strategy was ultimately geared
towards the objective of establishing an ‘Islamic state’ (emirate) in Iraq, and in turn,
a cornerstone of al-Qaeda’s envisioned wider international Caliphate throughout
the region and, ultimately ‘Muslim world’.232 Intended to be governed by strict
Shari’a Law, this envisioned geopolitical construct sought to encompass regions of
the world once part, or under the control, of the Islamic Caliphate which was
dissolved in 1924.233

231 “Islamic State”, op. cit.
Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 2013, op. cit., p.624; Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, op. cit.,
p.89.
233 The Islamic Caliphate was first established in the 7th century (Rashidun Caliphate: 632-661CE)
and end with the Ottoman Caliphate/Empire which was abolished on March 3, 1924 by the 1st
President of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, following the creation of that nation
state on October 29, 1923. Thus the Republic of Turkey replaced what remained of the Ottoman-
led Islamic Empire (1299-1922) which was defeated in World War One (1914-1818) and had
effectively been under the control of the Committee of Union and Progress and backed by the
Ottoman army following the establishment of a constitutional government and hence ‘Ottoman
Constitution’ by Sultan Abdulhamid Khan II in 1876. This was followed by the ‘2nd Constitution’
in 1908 and the establishment of the Turkish Parliament in that same year. See: The Ottoman
By 2006, the al-Qaeda in Iraq-led Jihadist insurgency threatened to destabilise the whole of Iraq, with Sunni and Shi’a violence at an all-time high in post-2003 Iraq. Moreover, al-Zarqawi had begun to systematic target Sunni civilians, Arab tribesmen as well as other Sunni Jihadists. This included such Jihadist groups as, among others, the Islamic Army in Iraq and Ansar al-Sunna who did not support al-Qaeda in Iraq’s ideology, tactics or objectives; a view also reportedly held by some of al-Qaeda’s leadership.234 In particular, it is reported that such concerns were held by Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s second in command, over al-Zarqawi’s methods and their potential to erode local support for al-Qaeda in Iraq.235 Nevertheless, bin Laden backed al-Zarqawi to remain ‘emir’ (leader) of al-Qaeda in Iraq, referring to him as al-Qaeda’s ‘prince’ in Iraq.236

Such an intensification in the nature of al-Qaeda in Iraq and so the Islamic State of Iraq co-opt appears to reflect a further hardening in ideology. In particular, it is reported that during 2006, the al-Qaeda in Iraq-led Islamic State of Iraq began to operate under its now infamous ‘black banner of Allah’ which has become synonyms with IS and supporters of ‘global jihad’ worldwide. This particular banner/flag is inscribed with the words, “there is no god but Allah and Mohammed


235 “Zarqawi’s Amman bombings”, op. cit.

is his messenger”; thus the Islamic ‘Shahada’ (Islamic creed).\(^{237}\) Moreover, the use of this flag by al-Qaeda in Iraq and its Islamic State of Iraq co-opt was intended by al-Zarqawi to encapsulate and convey a particular Islamic belief(s) which had emerged and was dominant during the ‘Umayyad Caliphate’ period; ruling from Damascus between 661-750CE.\(^{238}\) During this period, which followed the golden age of Islam in the 7\(^{th}\) century, it was prophesied that an ‘end-of-days’ Caliphate would appear under the ‘black banner’ (flag) of Prophet Mohammed. According to this prophesy, this signalled the arrival of the Mahdi, a heroic Muslim leader who would led Muslims into a victorious final apocalyptic battle against the ‘enemies of Allah’ before ‘judgment day’; thus the end of the world.\(^{239}\) Therefore, al-Qaeda in Iraq and its Islamic State of Iraq co-opt appears to have undergone a particular evolution and hence hardening in its Wahhabi-inspired Salafist ideology during this period.

The intensification in ideological outlook and so violence, especially along inter- and intra-sectarian lines, consequently trigged what had been feared by al-Qaeda’s leadership, a backlash towards al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was the case especially amongst Shi’a and minority communities, as well as increasingly amongst the local Sunni population.\(^{240}\) Moreover, such a situation provided U.S


\(^{238}\) Ibid.

\(^{239}\) Ibid.

\(^{240}\) “Islamic State”, op. cit.
forces, commanded by General David Petraeus, an opportunity to further turn Iraqi Sunni support against al-Qaeda in Iraq. This led to a revised counter-insurgency strategy consisting of a combination of military and political manoeuvres.\textsuperscript{241} In particular, this included U.S forces successfully containing the largest Iraqi Shi’a force known as the ‘Mahdi Army’ and led by Moqtada al-Sadr; significantly increasing the number of U.S troops in Iraq, especially in and around Baghdad, referred to as the ‘surge’ which helped stabilise that country at that point in time; establishing direct financial and military links with Sunni Arab tribes who had turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq and were organised into ‘Awakening Councils’ which worked alongside the U.S-led Coalition Forces leading to the so-called ‘Anbar Awakening’ in September 2006.\textsuperscript{242} Additionally, insurgent groups including the Islamic Army of Iraq and the Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance were co-opted and integrated into the ranks of the Awaking Councils to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq.\textsuperscript{243}

The revised U.S counter-insurgency strategy in the wake of such socio-political conditions, therefore, began to erode al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was especially made clear when U.S forces received intelligence on the whereabouts of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s leadership. Subsequently, al-Zarqawi was killed by a U.S drone strike in an


area known as ‘Hibhib’, Diyala Province north of Baghdad on June 7, 2006. This, in turn, eliminated arguably the most violent and deadliest of Iraq’s Jihadist leaders at this point in time, if not the world. Consequently, this signalled al-Qaeda in Iraq’s demise, as well as al-Qaeda’s strategic vision for the wider region and Muslim world.

The rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the formation of an Islamic State of Iraq co-opt of Jihadists by al-Zarqawi, together, are identified in this thesis to represent a second phase in the evolution of what would manifest as IS in 2014. Therefore, these developments signal a hardening in ideology, tactics and objectives manifest within IS. In particular, analysis suggests that al-Qaeda in Iraq and its Islamic State of Iraq co-opt adhered to a particular variant of Wahhabi-inspired Salafist Jihadist ideology. Its primary objective appears to have been to advance and establish its ideology, and hence rule, across Iraq as well as Jordan as part of al-Qaeda’s wider objective to establish a trans-national Caliphate throughout much of the Muslim world. To this end, analysis suggests extremism was especially employed along with other forms of violence and thus tactics. Therefore, like Tawhid and Jihad, al-Qaeda in Iraq too can best be understood as a particular trans-national extremist Jihadist organisation; albeit more intense in nature, especially in ideology, tactics and objectives.

3.4: From al-Qaeda in Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq

244 “U.S Strike Hits Insurgent Safehouse”, op. cit.

Following the killing of al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Iraq’s leadership moved to Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian who had trained in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Jihad period who specialised in explosives and bomb making. Masri continued with his predecessor’s strategy of suicide bombings and sectarian violence, though appearing to avoid some tactics of brutality inflicted under al-Zarqawi’s leadership, including video recording beheadings of hostages. However, by 2006, al-Qaeda in Iraq was faced with increasing civilian and, in particular, Sunni tribal hostility. This was the direct result of both the level and nature of the violence perpetrated by that organisation in Iraq, as well as a strengthened U.S-led Coalition Force.

In an effort to stem growing hostilities towards al-Qaeda in Iraq its leadership therefore moved to counter such conditions to its presence in Iraq. To this end, al-Qaeda in Iraq made two key strategic decisions. First, in October 2006, Masri formally merged al-Qaeda in Iraq with its Jihadist co-opt known as the Islamic State of Iraq to collectively form a signal homogenous Jihadist group under the latter’s same name; thus the official formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Second, Masri appointed Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with the current leader of IS), an ethnic Iraqi Sunni, as leader of the newly established ISI. Moreover, the establishment of ISI as a homogeneous Jihadist organisation, as opposed to a

246 “Islamic State”, op. cit.
249 “Islamic State”, op. cit.
250 Ibid.
co-opt, as well as the appointment of al-Baghdadi, appears to have essentially been a strategic public relations makeover attempt of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Hence, by merging local Jihadists with al-Qaeda in Iraq to form ISI provided the former group with operational ‘cover’. On the one hand, this development allowed it to remain a dominant actor amongst local Jihadists in the Iraqi theatre of conflict and, on the other hand, less prone to local hostility, especially amongst the Sunni majority. 251

In the wake of its formal establishment the view amongst the Iraqi civilian population, including most Sunni tribes, as well as some of the other Sunni Jihadists, however, was unfavourable if not hostile towards ISI. 252 Moreover, this situation was reportedly compounded by the fact that a large percentage of ISI’s fighters, even more so than al-Qaeda in Iraq beforehand, were foreign and hence not Iraqi; this despite the fact that its apparent leader, Baghdadi, was himself an Iraqi Arab Sunni. 253 Such a situation appears to have led to Baghdadi releasing a statement in December 2007 claiming that only 200 of his fighters were foreign. However, in that same year the U.S-led forces in Iraq captured documents from ISI which cast doubt over Baghdadi’s claims, revealing that between August 2006 and August 2007 some 700 foreign fighters alone had joined that Jihadist organisation. 254 Therefore, ISI was widely seen by both Iraqis and Coalition Forces to effectively


253 “Islamic State”, op. cit.

254 Ibid.
be under the control of foreign Jihadist influences, especially al-Qaeda and, hence, was still widely referred to as al-Qaeda in Iraq during this period too.255

By the end of 2007, it was clear the social and political as well as military conditions were eroding ISI’s ability to effectively carry out attacks and hold and control territory in Iraq. This was especially the case in the wake of the Anbar Awakening which had now spread to other regions of Iraq, increasingly uniting Sunni Arab tribes against ISI with support from U.S-led Coalition Forces, as well as Iraqi security forces. By 2008, moreover, the U.S-led counter-insurgency operations had killed an estimated 2,400 ISI fighters and operatives and captured an additional 8,800, as well as significantly stemming the flow of foreign fighters interning Iraq to join that Jihadist organisation in particular.256

Not entirely defeated however, ISI perpetrated attacks throughout 2009, and in August and October of that year began to especially target Iraqi government infrastructure, as well as civilians, which left hundreds dead. Nevertheless, facing overwhelming military, political and social conditions, an additional and fatal blow to ISI’s ability to wage their so-called campaign of al-jihad came following a joint U.S-Iraqi military operation near Tikrit on April 18, 2010. The operation killed both Baghdadi and Masri, ISI’s two most senior commanders and, so, devastated the leadership and operational command structure of that Jihadist organisation.257 Collectively, like al-Qaeda in Iraq beforehand, these contextual developments

255 Ibid.
257 “The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., p.2.
therefore appear to have significantly eroded ISI’s ability to assert any real operational or strategic hold in Iraq by mid-2010, thus significantly reducing the level of violence in that nation.\textsuperscript{258}

The improving security and political situation in Iraq in 2010, in turn, paved the way for a ‘power sharing’ deal between the three main rival political blocks: Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd. This resulted in the formation of a ‘unity-government’ and so arguably the most inclusive functioning Iraqi political system and hence state in post-2003 Iraq.\textsuperscript{259} This was led by re-elected Shi’a Iraqi PM, Nouri al-Maliki (2006-2014) of the National Alliance, while Jalal Talabani of the Kurdish Alliance was reappointed President of Iraq (2005-2014) and Sunni Arab leaders from the al-Iraqiya coalition were appointed both ministerial and institutional roles within the Iraqi State.\textsuperscript{260}

The security situation in Iraq therefore appeared to have now been brought under control in time for U.S President, Barak Obama to formally announce the end of the war in Iraq, as well as the transition of that nation’s security from the U.S-led Coalition Forces to the Iraqi government and security forces on October 11, 2011.\textsuperscript{261} Further announcing that all U.S forces would be out of Iraq by the end of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid; Romano, “Jihadists in Iraq”, in \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics}, eds. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 2013, op. cit., p.626.]
\item[Ibid. However, corruption and sectarian and ethnic relations were ongoing points of political difference in Iraq.]
\end{enumerate}
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that year; a goal set by the U.S government in 2008.\(^{262}\) Thus, signalling the final phase of the U.S draw down of troops from Iraq which had begun in December 2007 under U.S President, George W. Bush following the success of the U.S troop ‘surge’ and backed Anbar Awakening in eroding ISI. However, in 2007, President Bush warned that large cutbacks in troops would likely result in a resurgence of conflict in Iraq, especially Jihadist violence, and that setting a date to end combat operations could compound this; a view that some military advisors to the Obama Administration also argued.\(^{263}\)

The final withdraw of U.S-led Coalition Forces in December 2011, therefore, brought with it a new opportunity for Jihadists actors in Iraq to re-emerge. This was especially the case for ISI which was now under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (current leader), an Iraqi native who emerged as that Jihadist group’s leader following the death of his predecessors in April 2010.\(^{264}\) Moreover, despite trained and well equipped Iraqi security forces, throughout 2012 it become apparent that ISI had revived much of its former operational capacity, increasing and perpetrating significant attacks in Iraq. In particular, Baghdadi launched the “breaking walls” terror campaign against the Maliki-led government which also

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\(^{262}\) Ibid. The last U.S forces withdraw from Iraq on December 18, 2011, ending nearly 9 years of U.S-led Coalition Forces military operations in that nation.


\(^{264}\) “The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., p.2.
involved targeting prisons in an effort to free captured members of that Jihadist group.\textsuperscript{265}

Further compounding this situation was the resurfacing of sectarian divisions within Iraq’s unity government following the U.S withdrawal. This was made clear in late-2012 when Sunnis in Anbar Provence publicly protested against Maliki’s policies which they considered to favour Shi’a Muslims.\textsuperscript{266} In particular, Sunni Iraqi leaders, most of who were involved with the Anbar Awakening, accused the Maliki-led government of negating the agreed role of Sunni Arabs and hence influence within the political process and state institutions, especially the military and security forces which were dominated by Shi’a Muslims.\textsuperscript{267} The situation intensified when the Maliki-led government ordered Iraqi security forces to forcefully remove protest camps, resulting in an increase in Sunni attacks on Shi’a.\textsuperscript{268}

In 2013, ISI continued to intensify attacks in Iraq, with Baghdadi launching a new campaign of violence codename “soldiers harvest”, targeting the Shi’a dominated Iraqi security forces.\textsuperscript{269} This campaign of violence appears to have sought to further intensify Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divisions; a strategy embedded in the ‘DNA’ of ISI and hence pioneered by al-Zarqawi. However, unlike al-Zarqawi’s and his

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{266} “Islamic State”, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{268} “Islamic State”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
successor’s strategy to coerce local Sunnis through violence while seeking to eradicate Shi’a Muslims, it appears Baghdadi’s strategy to explicitly target the Iraqi security forces and hence Shi’a sought to win-over the sympathies of Sunni Arab tribal elites and their militias. This seems especially the case given that the majority of Iraq’s Sunni population had turned on the Islamic State of Iraq triggering the Anbar Awakening in late-2006; thus a support-base key to that Jihadist organisation’s operational capability if not survival in Iraq. Therefore, in 2013, Baghdadi appears to have moved to harness deepening and widespread anger amongst Sunnis towards the Maliki-led Shi’a dominated government and state in an effort to strengthen ISI’s relations with Sunni Arab tribes and hence foothold in Iraq.\(^{270}\)

The revival of ISI, moreover, appears to have been furthered by the deteriorating security situation across the border in Syria, following the uprising in that country against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early-2011.\(^{271}\) This socio-political uprising manifested within the context of the Arab Spring which erupted in Tunisia in December 2010, with revolutionary movements as well as armed revolts spreading throughout the wider Middle East and North Africa by early 2011. In particular, this was triggered largely in response to high levels of state corruption,

\(^{270}\) See, for example, “Taming the Militias”, op. cit; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., p.2.

\(^{271}\) Ibid; “Islamic State”, op. cit; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., p.2.
real and perceived, and widespread disenfranchisement of the peoples of these regions, including in Syria.\textsuperscript{272}

The intensifying political situation in Syria, as well as heavy-handed militarised responses by the Assad regime, therefore, triggered the rise of anti-government armed forces in Syria. However, the forces fighting the Assad regime increasingly included Jihadists, including al-Qaeda affiliates such as the al-Nusra Front.\textsuperscript{273} Hence, the situation in Syria too provided ISI with an important opportunity to establish cross-border networks with other al-Qaeda affiliates outside of Iraq. In particular, this allowed ISI to strategically harness these networks to help rebuild and strengthen that Jihadist organisation. To this extent, ISI especially appears to have worked with the al-Nusra Front, the dominate Jihadist organisation in Syria at the time.\textsuperscript{274}

The civil war in Syria therefore had become a major jihadist theatre of operation by 2013, as well as a key if not the primary ‘incubator’ for Islamic radicalisation globally. Consequently, thousands of Muslims travelled to Syria to fight in what was increasingly ‘framed’ as an internal Islamic holy war between Sunnis, backed by Arab Gulf states and to some extent the West, and Shi’a Muslims fighting on


\textsuperscript{273} Ibid.

behalf of the Assad regime and backed by Iran in particularly. However, many of those Sunni fighters, especially those with extremist views, so looked to join such Sunni extremist groups as al-Nusra Front and, increasingly, ISI. Some additional fighters have sought to join the more ‘moderate’ Western-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA); appearing to amalgamate Arab nationalist and, to a lesser extent, political Islamic ideological overtones which has reportedly cooperated strategically with the al-Nusra Front however.

The intensifying levels of intra-Islamic violence in Syria so expanded Sunni-Shi’a sectarian violence that had emerged in post-2010 Iraq, subsequently presented ISI with the opportunity to expand its strategy into Syria. Therefore, like in Iraq, Baghdadi moved to harness such intensifying levels of Islamic sectarian violence in Syria. In particular, ISI sought to gain direct support amongst the Sunni population in Syria, especially amongst Jihadists, both local and foreign. Moreover, such a move by Baghdadi as well as flexible recruitment ‘quality control’ appears to have led to increasing numbers of Jihadists joining the ranks of ISI, and so, generating a state of competition with the al-Nusra Front in Syria. As a result,

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277 “Al-Qaeda Shows Its True Colours in Syria”, op. cit.

278 “The Unanticipated Threat of ISIS”, op. cit., p.47.

279 Ibid; “Iraq Crisis”, op. cit.

280 “Iraq Crisis”, op. cit; “Al-Qaeda Shows Its True Colours in Syria”, op. cit.
these developments appear to signal a move towards establishing a permanent operational presence in Syria as well as Iraq.  

Collectively, a decline in security and resurgent sectarian political divides in Iraq, as well as the outbreak of civil war in Syria in particular, especially with rising numbers of Sunni Jihadists operating in that nation within the context of a Sunni-Shi’a holy war, appears to have provided Baghdadi with the required conditions to reгрупп and revive ISI between 2010 and early-2013.

Based on the above analysis between late-2006 and early-2013, therefore, ISI can best be understood as a particular Jihadist organisation that sought the establishment of its ideology in Iraq, especially within the framework of Shari’a Law. Additionally, it was increasingly operational in Syria and a formal affiliate of al-Qaeda and hence that organisation’s wider transnational objective during this period. However, it appears that it was not particularly concerned with Jordan during this period and, so, appears to have developed a more nuanced strategy in terms of its objective which remained trans-national in nature; albeit appearing to be especially concerned with Iraq. Moreover, ISI’s operational expansion into Syria especially appears to have sought to capitalise on the political and security situation in that country in an effort to revive and strengthen its capacity in Iraq. To this end, ISI fundamentally employed tactics of violence and, in particular, extremism throughout this period. It also appears to have developed and engaged in some public relations propaganda activities and hence tactics, especially through the use

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281 Ibid; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., p.2.

282 Ibid.
of media, in an effort to strengthen its foothold in Iraq as a means to its objective; tactics referred to hereafter in this thesis as missionary. Together, these developments represent the rise of ISI which also can be understood as a particular trans-national extremist Jihadist organisation; thus a third phase in the evolution of IS.

3.5: From ISI to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

By April 2013, it was clear that ISI had not only been revived but, moreover, had gained an additional foothold in Syria too. This was made explicit on the 8th of April when Baghdadi realised an audio message via ISI’s official media outlet, al-Furqan Media, publicly announcing that Jihadist organisation’s expansion of operations into Syria. Moreover, Baghdadi’s announcement of the expansion of operations into Syria in addition to Iraq was further manifest with a subsequent change in the name of that Jihadist group, declaring that ISI together with al-Nusra Front had merged under his leadership to collectively form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The announcement by Baghdadi of this development was based on his claim that al-Nusra Front was established by ISI following the outbreak of civil war in Syria. Hence, in the audio message Baghdadi stated:

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…we assigned Al-Golani who is one of our soldiers with a group of our sons and pushed them from Iraq to Al-Sham [Syria] to meet with our cells in Al-Sham and set for them the plans and drew for them the policy of work and supplied them with half of what is in the treasury every month and supplied them with men who became experienced from the battlefields from Muhajirin and Ansar so they did well next to their brothers from the ardent sons of Al-Sham, and the influence of the Islamic State expended to Al-Sham and we didn’t declare that for security reasons for the people to see the reality of the State away from the distortion, forgery and fabrication of the media…285

Therefore, according to Baghdadi, al-Nusra Front was the ISI’s branch in Syria which he had directed and aided from Iraq with the intention of further expanding the objective of establishing an ‘Islamic state’ into Syria. To this end, moreover, Baghdadi further stated:

[The] …time has come to declare before the people of Al-Sham and the whole world that Jabhat Al-Nusra is only an expansion for the Islamic State of Iraq and part of it and we are determined after making Istikhara of Allah Almighty and consulting whom we trust in his religion and wisdom to continue in the journey of ascending of the group by passing all that will be said since the pleasure of Allah is above everything, and no matter what

happens to us because of that so we declare keeping our trust in Allah abolishing the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and abolishing the name of Jabhat Al-Nusra, and joining them under one name “The Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham” and also unifying the banner which is the banner of the Islamic State the banner of the Khilafah Insha’Allah, Allah Almighty.\textsuperscript{286}

Two days later on April 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2013, however, this merger was rejected by al-Nusra Front’s leader, known by his alias as Abu Mohammad al-Golani (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani/Jawlani) who publicly declared in an audio message released via \textit{al-Manarah al-Bayda’ Foundation for Production} that no such merger had been agreed to.\textsuperscript{287} Although acknowledging in the recording ISI’s role in establishing al-Nusra Front, Golani stated:

There has been a talk about a speech attributed to sheikh Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi may Allah preserve him and it has been mentioned in the speech attributed to the sheikh that the Front subordination to the Islamic State of Iraq then he declared abolishing the name of the State of Iraq and Jabhat Al-Nusra and replacing them with one name the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham. We inform you that the leadership of the Front and its Majlis Al-Shura and the humble slave the general commander of Jabhat Al-Nusra

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.

have no knowledge of this deceleration except what they heard from the media. So if the attributed speech was accurate we weren’t consulted or ordered to do so, and I say seeking aid from Allah. 288

Rather, in the same audio message, Golani reconfirmed his pledged of allegiance and that of al-Nusra Front to al-Qaeda and so Zawahiri in which he stated:

And I’m responding the appeal of Al-Baghdadi may Allah preserve him of upgrading from lowest to highest and say that this is a Bay’a’a from the sons of Jabhat Al-Nusra and its general commander we renew it to the sheikh of jihad sheikh Aymen Al-Zawahiri may Allah preserve him. 289

Such public denouncement by Golani of Baghdadi’s claimed merger therefore appeared to signal an unprecedented level of tension between the two apparent Jihadist allies. This appears to have emerged as a direct result of heightened competition between Golani and Baghdadi following the latter’s and so the Islamic Sate of Iraq’s arrival and establishment of operations in Syria shortly after the outbreak of the civil war in that country in early-2011. 290

By June 2013, it was clear that a complete breakdown in cooperation, and so intensified fragmentation, between ISIS and al-Nusra Front was now the new status-quo, appearing to threaten to implode the al-Qaeda-led alliance in the

288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
290 “The Islamic State of Iraq And Al-Sham”, op. cit.
Therefore, this situation forced al-Qaeda to intervene in an effort to contain and deescalate the situation in what was now effectively an internal fight for control over the Syrian theatre of operations amongst the two largest and powerful Jihadists organisations in the al-Qaeda-led alliance. In turn, al-Qaeda’s leader, Zawahiri, ruled that al-Nusra Front was to remain ‘independent’ and continue to act on behalf of al-Qaeda in Syria. Subsequently, Baghdadi and ISIS were ordered to return to Iraq and strengthen operations in that nation, and thus to revert to its former organisational capacity: ISI.292

This situation, moreover, appears rooted in differences over strategy and, in particular, tactics, including al-Nusra Front’s development and tactical use of social services, or, ‘missionary’ tactics hereafter. Although limited, this particular tactic especially appears to have taken the form of ‘social outreach’ by providing free services such as food outlets through to rubbish disposal services.293 Moreover, such missionary tactics employed by al-Nusra Front therefore sought to generate sympathy and support amongst the local Sunni populace in an effort to ‘soften’ local attitudes towards that Jihadist organisation’s agenda(s) in Syria.294 Hence, the success of al-Nusra Front to gain control over key areas in Syria, including parts of Aleppo and Raqqa by early-2013, appears linked to favourable local social conditions amongst Syrians generated through its missionary works and hence tactics in that country. This appears to be the case despite al-Nusra

291 Ibid; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., p.2.
292 Ibid.
293 “The Islamic State of Iraq And Al-Sham”, op. cit.
294 Ibid.
Front’s allegiance to al-Qaeda, and was widely seen as acting in the strategic interests of anti-Assad regime supporters and rebels, particular the FSA.295

Notwithstanding the increasingly sophisticated use of propaganda and recruitment activities online, including through social media platforms such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook,296 Baghdadi, and hence ISIS, promoted and intensified the use of extremism as the primary tactic to achieve its objectives during this period. Consequently, ISIS gave little, if any, strategic consideration to such social services, rather engaging in non-violent missionary tactics by way of social media to further generate support for that group’s intensifying extremist ideology, tactics and objective.297 Therefore, this conflicted with al-Nusra Front’s, and in turn al-Qaeda’s, strategy in Syria which worked to amalgamate both ‘sort’ forms of missionary tactics with extremist ones to achieve its objectives: an ‘Islamic state’ in Syria.298 Nevertheless, such missionary tactics employed by ISIS too essentially were based on social outreach and, in particular, the Islamic concept of da’wa (preaching/sermons, or, ‘the call to Islam’) through which it sought to communicate and advocate its ideology and objectives especially.299


297 Ibid.

298 “The Islamic State of Iraq And Al-Sham”, op. cit; “Al-Qaeda Shows Its True Colours in Syria”, op. cit.

299 See, for example, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., p. 4–5,
On June the 14th 2013, despite Zawahiri’s efforts, the fragmentation of the al-Qaeda-led alliance in Syria and Iraq was confirmed. This was made clear when Baghdadi released a public statement rejecting Zawahiri’s orders and that ISIS had split from that alliance and was acting independently. Moreover, Baghdadi further stated that ISIS would remain operational in Syria which was to be incorporated into a future Islamic state.  

Despite the breakdown in the alliance, throughout this period ISIS continued to grow nevertheless. It attracted new members and intensified its extremist operations, as well as expanding and entrenching its territorial control over parts of Iraq and Syria. In particular, such developments coincided with the deepening civil war in Syria which had emerged as the global epicentre of Jihadist activity framed within the context of a Sunni-Shi’a conflict; the nature of which was having a further destabilising effect on the wider region.  This was especially the case in Iraq where Sunni-Shi’a divisions and violence climaxed following Iraqi security forces’ attempt to clear a protest camp in Ramadi in late-2013. This triggered a Sunni uprising which effectively expelled the Iraqi security forces out of Anbar Provence. Consequently, the Sunni uprising in Anbar Provence which spread to Nineveh Provence in effect left these regions of Iraq under the control of Sunni Arab tribes and their militias who were hostile towards

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300 Ibid; “The Islamic State”, op. cit; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., pp.2-4.

301 Ibid.

302 Ibid.
the Maliki-led government and Iraqi security forces; triggering fears that Sunni tribes might strategically side with ISIS in an effort to regain power.303

By early 2014, it was clear that ISIS had successfully regrouped and was operating at unprecedented strength in Iraq in addition to Syria.304 This was especially evident following the launch of a new wave of extremist attacks in Iraq, leading to the besiegement and capture of major cities, including Fallujah and Mosel in February and March of 2014 respectively. Moreover, the capture of these two cities, along with additional activities such as kidnapping, extortion and fundraising, bolstered the economic strength of ISIS by an estimated $U.S 2 billion, as well as capturing military hardware and weapons from the Iraqi army upon their retreat; some of who joined ISIS. 305 Therefore, while the former two activates of kidnapping and extortion are closely linked to violence, especially in the context of ISIS, fundraising however is not; albeit carried out by extremists for violent and radical ends. Rather, it invokes the Islamic concept of sadaqah, an obligation by Muslims to perform a monetary donation to a particular Islamic cause.306 Consequently, such an activity is essentially non-violent and therefore referred to as a particular form of missionary tactic hereafter.

303 “Islamic State”, op. cit.

304 “Taming the Militias”, op. cit; “The Islamic State”, op. cit; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., pp.2-4.

305 “The Islamic State”, op. cit.

Such a development effectively signalled the operational revival of ISIS in Iraq and, as a result, its subsequent expansion. Moreover, it appeared Baghdadi had successfully repaired strategic relations with local Sunni Arab tribes in north-western Iraq by late-2013; thus key to regaining any real operational and sustainable foothold in that nation.\textsuperscript{307} Hence, like in Syria, worsening sectarian conditions in Iraq appear to have provided ISIS an unprecedented opportunity to exploit this situation by acting as a ‘defender’ of Sunni Muslims against the oppressive majority Shi’ā government.\textsuperscript{308} Consequently, this appears to have led to ISIS being able to tactically ‘lobby’ some Sunni Arab tribes through which it (re)entrench itself in Iraq; conditions which were also key to the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq beforehand.\textsuperscript{309} This particular tactic is referred to as activism hereafter.

Collectively, the above developments that ISIS manifested during this period, especially in terms of its operational and polity expansion, hence the subsequent name change, therefore, signals an additional phase of evolution. In particular, these developments represent a hardening in ideological outlook, an evolution in tactics, as well as signalling that organisation’s efforts to expand its envisioned trans-national objective beyond Iraq into Syria. This, in turn, to advance its envisioned Islamic polity of the wider Muslim world, and so, an international Islamic state; albeit independently of al-Qaeda which was now a strategic rival.\textsuperscript{310}

\textsuperscript{307} See, for example, “Taming the Militias”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{310} The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate", op. cit., pp.2-4; “The Islamic State of Iraq And Al-Sham”.

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To this end, ISIS appears to have intensified its attacks in terms of their lethality, consistency and geographic expanse, and diversified its modus operandi, especially in terms of the style, execution and planning of attacks. ISI further engaged in social outreach activities, especially for recruitment, through social media and, therefore, missionary tactics. It also developed and engaged in non-violent political activism by way of lobbying through which to infiltrate and strategically position itself in an effort to realise its objective. Collectively, these developments signalled a hardening and sophistication in tactics throughout this period. For these reasons, ISIS can also be understood as a particular trans-national extremist Jihadist organisation which further employed supplementary missionary and activist tactics, and so, represents a fourth phase of evolution in ideology, objectives and tactics manifest in IS.

3.6: From the Islamic State of Iraq & Syria to the Islamic State and the Establishment of a Caliphate

Following the capture of Fallujah and Mosel in early 2014, ISIS continued to rapidly expand its influence in both Syria and, increasingly, Iraq, especially in terms of controlling large territories in those two countries.\textsuperscript{311} This was particularly evident when on June the 29\textsuperscript{th} 2014, the official spokesman for ISIS, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani whose real name is Taha Sobhi Falaha, proclaimed in a 34 minute speech released on Twitter that all territories under its control had merged

\textsuperscript{311} Ibid.
to form an ‘Islamic Caliphate’. In turn, this effectively signalled the establishment of a geopolitical Islamic entity, and so, a quasi ‘Islamic state’.

To reflect this development, al-Adnani further declared that ISIS had been renamed IS (Islamic State), although still widely referred to as ISIS or Deash. Moreover, al-Adnani announced Baghdadi as Caliph (Islamic ruler) of the newly formed Caliphate, and that all Sunni Muslims globally must submit to his rule and the Caliphate or face death, while Muslim minorities and non-Muslims alike must convert or suffer the same outcome. As Caliph, Baghdadi is responsible for overseeing the institutional development and administration of IS’s Caliphate. This includes all political, legal, economic, social, and religious affairs, and so total control over both public and private matters of the peoples living within it.  


313 Spanning vast regions of Iraq and Syria and incorporating a number of ‘provinces’ throughout the world, the Caliphate is consequently global in nature. This development is unprecedented in the context of contemporary Jihadist groups, especially in terms of declaring and administering a Caliphate as well as the amount of territory seized and controlled. For example, IS provinces were established in parts of Southeast Asia in July 2014, including in parts of Sulawesi, Indonesia, and Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago region of the southern Philippines by IS affiliates Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia and Abu Sayyaf respectively. The former is responsible for the gun attack and bombing in Jakarta and a foiled attack in Singapore in January and August 2016 respectively. See, for example, Rohan Gunaratna, “The Islamic States Eastward Expansion”, in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 39, No.1 (Routledge, Spring 2016): 49-67. Available: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1170479; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., pp.4.

314 “ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as ‘Islamic State’”, op. cit.


316 “The world According to ISIS”, op. cit; “ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as ‘Islamic State’”, op. cit; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., pp.2, 4; “The Kingdom and the Caliphate”, op. cit, pp.3, 8-10; “The Unanticipated Threat of ISIS”, p.47.
The establishment of a Caliphate by IS in Iraq and Syria, as well as proxy provincial enclaves such as those established in Southeast Asia, however, appears not to be its long-term objective. Rather, IS appears to seek to expand this geographically, incorporating not only the wider Muslim world, but, ultimately, the entire world and hence a global Caliphate. In addition to the purporting to represent all Muslims as well as the demand that Muslims globally submit to and support the Caliph and the Caliphate, al-Adnani further made this global intention clear in his June 29th 2014 speech in which he stated:

There only remained one matter, a ‘wājib kifā’ (collective obligation) that the ummah sins by abandoning. It is a forgotten obligation. The ummah has not tasted honour since they lost it. It is a dream that lives in the depths of every Muslim believer. It is a hope that flutters in the heart of every mujāhid muwahhid (monotheist). It is the khilāfah (caliphate). It is the khilāfah – the abandoned obligation of the era.

Allah (the Exalted) said, {And mention when your Lord said to the angels, “Indeed, I will make upon the earth a khalīfah”} [Al-Baqarah: 30].

The development of a Caliphate and IS-compliant provinces around the world, therefore, signalled the ability of IS to establish a state-like system which it envisions to manifest globally. Hence, al-Adnani’s statement explicitly refers to a ‘Caliphate on earth’. Moreover, al-Adnani states that supporting the Caliphate and

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317 “ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as ‘Islamic State’”, op. cit.
so Caliph is a religious obligation for all Muslims, including through the use of extremism; although rejected by the vast majority of Muslims around the world.318

Nevertheless, according to IS, the establishment of such a global Caliphate represents a divinely ordained religious and political entity. Thus a ‘pure’ system through which to implement and regulate a global Islamic polity(s), grounded in and guided by that Jihadist organisations Wahhabi Salafist interpretation of Islam, especially Shari’a Law. Moreover, rooted in such an ideology is the particular belief that the establishment of a Caliphate, and subsequently a Caliph, is evidence that IS legitimately represents and acts in accordance with the end-of-days prophecy, ‘phenomenologically’ invoking and ‘living-out’ such Islamic prophesy; hence the ‘black banner of Allah’. Therefore, at the heart of its ideology, IS believes it is the prophesised manifestation of Allah’s (God) divinely ordained Caliphate on earth which all Muslims must submit to; tasked with setting in motion an apocalyptic vision for the world which will led Muslims victoriously into a final global battle with non-Muslims before judgment day.319

Throughout the remainder of 2014, IS continued to expanded its control and entrench itself throughout Syria and, in particular, Iraq. However, by November of that year, IS began encountering significant armed resistance, especially by Shi’a and Kurdish (pesh merga) forces, as well as some Sunni Arab tribal resistance,

318 “The world According to ISIS”, op. cit.

which significantly slowed IS’s advance. Moreover, the U.S. had begun conducting airstrikes against IS in support of the Iraqi military and pesh merga forces. This included targeting key infrastructure such as IS controlled oil wells which began to erode their economic capacity and military operations; limiting the mobility and so military advance and capacity of IS. Nevertheless, despite military setbacks, IS expansion continued; evident when IS further captured the city of Kobani in northern Syria in November 2014.

Coinciding with this expansion, IS continued to successfully co-opt Jihadist groups as affiliates from around the world, and estimated to include some 43 by late-2015. All of these groups declared their allegiance to IS, and include Jihadist groups from across the Middle East and parts of Africa and Asia. Of these 43, it is estimated that 34 have established provinces in the name of IS in their local area of operation to date. A key example of such a development is the Jihadist group commonly known as Boko Haram in Nigeria, which declared its allegiance to IS on March the 7th 2015. Subsequently, Boko Haram now represents the ‘al-Wilayat al-Islamiyya Gharb Afriqiyyah, or, ‘Islamic State’s West African Provence’. In turn, all

320 “The Islamic State”, op. cit; “Taming the Militias”, op. cit.
321 “The Islamic State”, op. cit.
322 Ibid.
324 “The Islamic States Eastward Expansion”, op. cit., p.49.
territories controlled by Boko Haram across north-eastern Nigeria effectively became part of a wider IS-compliant state-like system of governance and, so, an extension of the IS-led Caliphate; enforced through violence and extremism especially. Moreover, IS had expanded operations into Libya by 2015, evident following an attack on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli which killed 10 people on January the 27th that year and claimed by a Libyan branch of IS. Additionally, IS made further advances in Iraq, capturing Ramadi in May 2015.

The continued advance of IS and its Caliphate during this period appears to have led to that Jihadist organisation’s ranks morphing. Estimated to have some 31,000 fighters in May 2015, many reportedly identified as foreign fighters, to as many as 50,000-60,000 by early 2016, with a further 20,000 IS affiliates made-up from ‘local’ Jihadist groups estimated around the world ready to carry out attacks. Additionally, a small but growing number of individuals who have no real link to IS have been inspired to take up the call by that Jihadist group to carry out attacks in their home countries; commonly referred to as ‘lone wolves’.


328 “The Islamic State”, op. cit.


331 “Al-Qaeda is losing the battle for jihadi hearts and minds”, op. cit.
The growing number of IS affiliated and inspired attacks around the world beyond that group’s immediate area of operations in 2015 and 2016, include, among others; an attack on a Russian jetliner which was brought down over the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, which killed 224 people in October 2015;\textsuperscript{332} multiple suicide bombings and gun attacks in Paris, France on November 13, 2015, which killed 130 people and injured more than 100;\textsuperscript{333} multiple suicide bombings in Brussels, Belgium on March 22, 2016, which targeted Brussels international airport and a metro station killing 32 and injuring an additional 340 people;\textsuperscript{334} multiple suicide bombings and gun attacks at Ataturk International Airport, Turkey on June 28, 2016, which killed some 41 people and injured more than 230;\textsuperscript{335} a gun attack at a nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey on January 1, 2017, which killed some 39 people.\textsuperscript{336}

The co-opting of Jihadist groups by IS and that group’s invoking of individuals to carry out attacks around the world in its name, moreover, appears reminiscent of al-Qaeda’s global Jihadist strategy. In particular, it is comparatively similar to al-Qaeda’s co-opting strategy which led to the formation of the coalition of Jihadists known as ‘The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews (Zionists) and

\textsuperscript{332} “The Islamic State”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{335} “Istanbul Ataturk airport attack: 41 dead and more than 230 hurt”, \textit{British Broadcasting Company}, June 29, 2016, Retrieved, 16/01/2017, From, \url{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36658187}.

\textsuperscript{336} John Bacon, “Islamic State claims credit for nightclub attack in Turkey”, \textit{USA Today}, January 2, 2017, Retrieved, 16/01/2017, From, \url{http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/02/istanbul-turkey-nightclub-attack/96077880/}.  

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Crusaders’, established in Afghanistan on the 23rd of February 1998.337 Moreover, the rise of IS-inspired lone wolf Jihadist attacks too are particularly a hallmark of al-Qaeda, rooted in that organisation’s post-9/11 ‘decentralisation’ strategy especially. Nevertheless, the majority of such attacks around the world throughout this period, especially since 2013, appear to have been carried out in the name of IS, not al-Qaeda. 338 Such lone wolf IS-inspired attacks include a gun attack by a husband and wife at a work party function in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015, which killed 14 and injuring some 21 people;339 multiple attacks in Australia including the stabbing of two police officers in Sydney by an 18 year old male IS supporter.340

Linked to such geographical advances, influence and attacks, moreover, IS appears to have further developed its online presence, or, ‘cyber jihad’ capabilities during this period. In turn, such a development indicates a further evolution in this particular type of non-violent tactic by IS; albeit employed to disseminate extremist propaganda, especially for recruitment purposes. In particular, as identified in a Brookings Institute report published in March 2015, IS had an estimated 46,000-70,000 Twitter accounts active globally as of late-2014. These accounts


338 “Al-Qaeda is losing the battle for jihadi hearts and minds”, op. cit.


disseminated propaganda and recruitment materials 24 hours a day in multiple languages, including videos of beheadings and mass killings; a social media campaign unprecedented amongst Islamic extremists groups.\textsuperscript{341} This, in turn, generated a hive of online Jihadist activity, including millions of messages of support for IS daily from Islamic extremists on social media platforms during this period, especially on Twitter as well as You Tube.\textsuperscript{342}

In addition to propaganda for the purpose of recruitment, IS has also increasingly made use of social media platforms to directly signal out and threaten individuals and nations, as well as promote acts extremism. This included posting a video on You Tube on the 18\textsuperscript{th} of August 2015, calling on Turks to revolt against their government and to join IS. In this video message, IS also declared its intention to conquer Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) in reference to the Republic of Turkey.\textsuperscript{343} Moreover, the IS spokesman in the video spoke fluent Turkish, therefore alluding to the likelihood that IS had further established a ‘cell(s)’ in Turkey.

Collectively, the developments IS underwent throughout this period in terms of territory controlled and global influence, therefore, appears to signal a further fifth phase of evolution in that Jihadist organisation. In particular, in the wake of


\textsuperscript{342} “From Indonesia, a Muslim challenge to the ideology of the Islamic State”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{343} Arwa Ibrahim, “Islamic Sate threatens Turkey”, \textit{Middle East Eye}, August 18, 2015, Retrieved, 6/11/2016, From, \url{http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/islamic-state-threatens-turkey-calls-erdogan-satan-88828510}. 
declaring its Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, as well as a burgeoning list of affiliates and provinces globally, IS now appears to further seek to advance its control beyond this region and the Muslim world to a wider global level.\textsuperscript{344} This, in turn, signals an apparent expansion of the objective of IS, as well as a hardening in ideological outlook and an evolution in tactics. Therefore, these developments together can be understood to represent the manifestation of IS as a global extremist Jihadist organisation.

\textsuperscript{344} “ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as ‘Islamic State’”, op. cit; “The ISIS map of the world”, op. cit; “The world According ISIS”, op. cit.
Chapter Four
Case Study 2: Boko Haram

4.1: Introduction

Since its inception in the mid-to-late-1990s in Borno State, north-eastern Nigeria, it appears Boko Haram, a Sunni-inspired Salafist group whose official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, or People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad,\(^{345}\) has undergone a series of transformations. This is especially the case in terms of ideology, tactics and objectives.

This is evident in that upon its formation Boko Haram, first in Borno State and then Yobe State, worked to propagate and advocate its Islamist ideology and wider polity through sermons and ‘educational’ means, or, da’wa. This included advancing the group’s interpretation of Shari’a Law; the view that science and discovery is antithetic to and hence forbidden in Islam; and that other religious practices and beliefs are to be resisted if not eradicated, among other beliefs. Additionally, Boko Haram challenged the legitimacy of the local authorities and Sunni elites, accusing them of unpious and corrupt behaviour(s). Nevertheless, Boko Haram did not engage in violence during the early years of its existence.\(^{346}\)


\(^{346}\) Ibid.
However, since the early-2003, Boko Haram has undergone a series of more radical and, in particular, violent transformations, especially in ideology, tactics and objectives. Boko Haram shifted from a non-violent actor concerned with implementing its Islamist polity in a solely local, Nigerian context, albeit appearing to have sinister intensions, to one that now especially engages in extreme violence underpinned by Jihadist ideology. It has expanded its operations throughout West Africa and now has direct links to international Jihadist organisations, including al-Qaeda and is currently a formal affiliate of IS: Islamic State’s West African Provience; seeking the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’ in the region and thus a wider objective.

In addition to calling into question how and why such transformation has accrued, moreover, such change arguably provides important clues into the nature of the three contours manifest within Boko Haram’s evolution thus far. This, in turn, provides key insight into the diversity in ideologies, tactics and objectives associated with Boko Haram and so the Jihadist phenomenon of Political Islam, which that organisation is widely referred to by scholars and accordingly so in this thesis.

This chapter therefore examines the ideology, tactics and objectives manifest in Boko Haram, as well as key contextual generative mechanisms impacting on and shaping these key contours, and hence the nature of that organisation thus far. Analysis is conducted chronologically tracking the evolution of Boko Haram from its inception. This provides a way to illuminate the nature of, as well as any key transformations in, ideology, tactics and objectives manifest in Boko Haram.
responsible for observed regularities in that organisation. Additionally, it provides a way to discern key social, political and economic contexts and or events impacting on and shaping their development and so that organisation, thus generative mechanisms.

This thesis’s analysis of Boko Haram therefore is geared to illuminating maximum insight into the nature of the diversity in contours manifest as well as contextual generative mechanisms associated with that organisation’s evolution thus far. Collectively, identified contours and generative mechanisms in turn can theoretically be harnessed as key sets of cognitive analysis through which to frame primary contours manifest within contemporary Jihadism and, moreover, provide essential insight into the wider diversity of contemporary Political Islam.

4.2: Formation and Ascent of Boko Haram

The collapse of Nigeria’s First Republic in 1966 and the civil war (1967-1970) that occurred thereafter, generated unprecedented political, as well as security and economic, instability in post-independence Nigeria. This, in turn, led to the military playing an important and dominant role in the Nigerian government and hence politics. Consequently, successive Nigerian military-led governments were primary concerned with maintaining law and order – at whatever cost – and oppressed any group perceived as a threat in challenging their regime(s).347

Such conditions generated an environment in which activist actors began to manifest, including Political Islamic ones which were also inspired and influenced

by international developments such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran especially. This included nation-wide demonstrations that supported the inclusion of Shari’a Law in the 1979 Constitution. This was being deliberated by the military-led Constituent Assembly (1977-79); mandated to fashion a new constitution for Nigeria’s Second Republic after the collapse of the First Republic. Consequently, the military-led Nigerian government intensified its repression throughout the Second Republic (1979-1983) until the return to civilian, democratic rule in 1999.

The return of democracy therefore opened the political space to a certain degree to various groups to openly engage and criticize the government of the day. In addition to secular political parties, as well as civil society groups which too gained greater freedoms, this included the emergence of ethnic and religious inspired political groups in Nigeria, both activist and violent manifestations. This included Political Islamic actors such as ‘Jama’at Izalat al-Bida’wa Iqamat as-Sunnah’ (Izala/The Movement for the Eradication of Heresies and the Implementation of Sunnah), a Salafist group founded by Sheikh Ismail Idris in Nigeria in 1978.

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351 Ibid.

Another group to emerge was the Islamic Da’wa Group, currently led by Sheikh Amin ad-Din Abu Bakr.  

In 1995, an additional Salafist organisation known as ‘Ahlulsunna wal’jamaah’hijra’ (The Muslim Youth Organisation) was founded by Abubakar Lawan. This group was known to be active at the University of Maiduguri and associated with the Alhaji Muhammed Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State at this time. Shortly thereafter, the Muslim Youth Organisation as well as members of Izala and the Islamic Da’wa Group reportedly merged under the leadership of Muhammad Ali and Abubakar Lawan who later left to continue Islamic studies in Medina, Saudi Arabia. Collectively, this formed the Salafist organisation which today is known as Boko Haram.

In an interview with Time magazine in 2009, Islamic scholar and Sociology Professor, Abdulmumin Sa’ad who thought members of Boko Haram who were students at the University of Maiduguri, noted that Boko Haram was initially non-

violent and that its focus was primarily concerned with studying the Quran; albeit a Salafist interpretation.\textsuperscript{359} Moreover, Boko Haram’s early activities were concerned with indoctrinating and recruiting Muslims in Maiduguri. This especially appears to have included invoking da’wa through which to propagate a hard-line Salafist narrative and rhetoric which, however, increasingly targeted the Borno State government and political and religious elites. This was especially in regards to that group’s view that society and the government had become corrupted through ‘Western-style’ (secular) education and wider civilisation which was immoral apathetical to ‘true’ Islamic teachings and practices.\textsuperscript{360}

As a result, Boko Haram become increasingly political, actively challenging the existing Islamic legal framework (Shari’a Law) and the Muslim elite who governed it,\textsuperscript{361} as well as denouncing Borno State’s political elite as corrupt and impure. Advocating for the implementation of hard-line Islamic (Salafist) governance and policy in their stead.\textsuperscript{362} Therefore, Boko Haram’s activities during this period appear to have primarily revolved around two key methods and hence tactics in pursuit of establishing Shari’a Law and hence Islamic governance in Yobe State; albeit Salafist in nature. First, it employed particular da’wa activities, referred to as missionary activities by some scholars and, hereafter in this thesis as

\textsuperscript{359} “Nigeria’s Taliban”, op. cit., p.1.

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{362} Ibid; “Boko Haram”, op. cit., p.2.
particular missionary tactics.\textsuperscript{363} Second, Boko Haram actively engaged in propagating anti-government sentiment by denouncing the legitimacy of the government of Borno and political and Muslim elites, a behaviour that is defined by some scholars as activism and, therefore, in this thesis as particular tactics pertaining to activism.\textsuperscript{364}

However, Boko Haram failed to galvanise significant support amongst Muslims in Maiduguri and throughout Borno State for its cause, therefore, resulted in that organisation declaring a ‘hijra’ (migration) to the small town of Kannama in neighbouring Yobe State in 2002. Like in Borno State, from its new base in Kannama Boko Haram established a semi-autonomous community and continued with recruitment and indoctrination activities, with the ultimate view of institutionalising its Islamist ideology throughout Yobe State.\textsuperscript{365} The hardening views propagated by Boko Haram in turn resulted in that group being considered a direct threat by political and Muslim elites as well as to the Yobe State government. Hence, like in Borno State, Boko Haram challenged and accused the Yobe State government and Muslim elite of corruption and practices that are contrary to Islamic teachings.\textsuperscript{366} In response, the Yobe State Council ordered the expulsion of Boko Haram in December 2003, where it had reportedly established a training camp modelled on Taliban camps in Afghanistan and was hence known

\textsuperscript{363} “Understanding islamism”, op. cit., pp.2–4.


\textsuperscript{366} Tanchum, “Al-Qaeda’s West African Advance”, op. cit., p.77.
as ‘Afghanistan’. Moreover, the organisation was widely referred to as the Yobe/Nigerian Taliban during this period.\textsuperscript{367}

Boko Haram’s expulsion, in turn, further galvanised the group’s view that the Yobe State government and Muslim elite were corrupt and ultimately apostates. Therefore, according to Boko Haram’s interpretation of Islamic Law and al-jihad, the Yobe State elected office holders and other Muslim elites within the state were essentially \textit{kafar} (apostates) and so could legitimately be removed from power via armed struggle.\textsuperscript{368} It is from this point on that the Jihadist phenomenon began to manifest within Boko Haram and hence Nigeria.

During this period, nevertheless, Boko Haram essentially engaged in non-violent activities in both Borno and Yobe State in pursuit of that organisation’s Islamist agenda.\textsuperscript{369} In particular, Boko Haram can best be understood during this period as a hybrid missionary activist Sunni Islamist organisation with ‘sub-state’ political objectives. That is, an organisation that ideologically adhered to a particular Sunni interpretation of Salafist Islam concerned with the institutionalisation of hard-line ‘Islamist law’ and hence governance in Borno and Yobe States, as opposed to the whole of Nigeria, employing tactics of missionary and activism to this end.\textsuperscript{370} Collectively, these developments between 1995 and late-2003 represent Boko


\textsuperscript{368} Tancbum, “Al-Qaeda’s West African Advance,” op. cit., p. 77.

\textsuperscript{369} Onuoha, “(Un)Willing to Die”, op. cit., p.1.

\textsuperscript{370} Ibid.
Haram’s ascent and formation and thus first phase of evolution as a sub-state missionary-activist Sunni Islamist organisation.

4.3: Boko Haram's Embrace of Political-Violence and al-Qaeda Connection

By December 2003, however, Boko Haram’s evolution into a Jihadist organisation was made clear when on the 24th of that month, following a confrontation with local authorities over fishing rights in the wake of their imminent expulsion, Boko Haram launched its first wave of extremist attacks in the village of Kannama in pursuit of its political agenda in Yobe State.371

These attacks targeted local and regional heads of government and the police. In response, Nigerian security forces carried out a series of counter-assaults that all but decimated Boko Haram.372 It was alleged by the security forces that the counter-assaults killed some sixty of Boko Haram’s known sixty-seven members including its leader, Muhammad Ali, while Abubakar Lawan had earlier left for Saudi Arabia. Thus the Yobe State government announced that Boko Haram was no longer a threat and that life had returned to normal.373

In the wake of Boko Haram’s attacks moreover the Nigerian government established a security joint commission in early January 2004 to investigate who and what was Boko Haram and any potential international links that it might


The newly formed joint commission task force consisted of police, military, and security (intelligence) expertise, therefore signalling a heightened state of concern as opposed to everyday law and order, which is solely the concern of the Nigerian Police Force and other civilian agencies. Moreover, this move by the Nigerian government to form the joint commission represented the genesis of the Nigerian State’s inter-agency counter-strategy toward Boko Haram. This task force would remain at the forefront of Nigeria’s counter-strategy against Boko Haram until it was further developed into the joint task force (JTF) in June 2011.

Following the outbreak of Muslim–Christian violence in Yelwa, Plateau State, in central Nigeria in May 2004, which left some 630 people dead, mostly civilians, Boko Haram re-emerged. While this outbreak of violence appeared religious in nature, however, it was rooted in ethnic and territorial disputes. This was triggered when the predominantly Christian Tarok ethnic group attacked the majority Muslim Fulani who had accessed grassing lands and water resources traditionally controlled by the Tarok’s. Nevertheless, in the wake of the violence the remaining elements of Boko Haram harnessed the situation in order to strategically recast the conflict into a religious one, further igniting additional Muslim–Christian violence in Kano State, which left several hundred more civilians dead.


377 Ibid.

378 Ibid.
It was during this second wave of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram which deliberately targeted the civilian population that signalled that organisation’s employment of terrorist tactics alongside militant ones. Following this second wave of attacks the Nigerian security forces intensified their counter-operations, hereafter arguably counter-terrorism operations, forcing Boko Haram underground. During this period it is reported that Boko Haram’s remaining members fled to neighbouring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Between 2004-2005, however, the remaining members of Boko Haram returned to Maiduguri where they reassembled under the leadership of Muhammad Yusuf, who set about covertly expanding the group’s operations across northern Nigeria. In particular, Yusuf established the Ibn Taymiyyah Masjid Islamic compound which housed a mosque, a free health care centre and Islamic schooling through which students were indoctrinated and recruited into Boko Haram’s ranks and made ready for *jihad* (holy war).

During this period (2005), shortly after the Nigerian security services claimed to have destroyed Boko Haram’s base and operational capabilities in that country, the U.S. government first received intelligence that the organisation was receiving training in Mali from the global Jihadist organisation al-Qaeda. This

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384 Perry, “Threat Level Rising”, op. cit., p.36.
was facilitated through that organisation’s regional branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which is active across the Maghreb, Sahel, and West Africa.\(^{385}\)

This development was confirmed by the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, Terence McCulley, who stated in an interview with *Time* magazine published in December 2011 that “the U.S. has seen reports of Nigerian [Boko Haram] militants travelling to northern Mali for training with AQIM since 2005.”\(^{386}\)

By 2009, following some five years of clandestine activity, Yusuf had successfully revitalised Boko Haram, which now sought to expand attacks and activities and further establish Islamist governance throughout northern Nigeria’s twelve ‘Islamic states’.\(^{387}\) This was made clear when in late-July of that year Yusuf unleashed a third wave of attacks by Boko Haram in Bauchi State in pursuit of this new political agenda.\(^{388}\) These developments, therefore, indicated a hardening in ideological outlook, tactics and objectives, widely viewed by experts as a direct result of Boko Haram’s newly found links with al-Qaeda.\(^{389}\)

However, the security forces in Bauchi State captured and arrested some one hundred members of Boko Haram in the wake of these attacks. This further infuriated Boko Haram’s leader, Yusuf, who, following the arrests, gave an interview to Nigeria’s *Daily Trust* newspaper. In the interview Yusuf demanded

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\(^{385}\) Tancbum, “Al-Qaeda’s West African Advance”, op. cit.; p.79.

\(^{386}\) Perry, “Threat Level Rising”, op. cit., p.36.

\(^{387}\) Onuoha, “(Un)Willing to Die”, op. cit., p.1.

\(^{388}\) da Costa, “Nigeria’s Taliban”, op. cit.

\(^{389}\) Perry, “Threat Level Rising”, op. cit., p.36.
that “democracy and the current system of education must change, otherwise this war that has yet to start will continue for a long time.” Yusuf’s statement as well as the attacks was seen as a declaration of war by both the local and federal Nigerian governments. Therefore, on July 30th, 2009, Nigerian security forces stormed Boko Haram’s compound in Borno State. The ensuing battle left some eight hundred people dead, including three hundred civilians, twenty-eight security and police personal, and some five hundred Boko Haram members. It also led to the capture of Yusuf who died while in police custody. In the wake of this round of counter-terrorism assaults against Boko Haram, the remaining fighting members, estimated to number some three hundred, again fled to neighbouring Niger and Chad, while the local authorities once again declared that the threat – Boko Haram – had been eliminated.

The developments that Boko Haram underwent between December 2003 and July 2009 therefore signalled both the manifestation of the Jihadist phenomenon in Nigeria and so the transformation of Boko Haram into a Jihadist organisation, as well as the inception of that organisation’s link with al-Qaeda. In particular, Boko Haram had radicalised from an essentially non-violent Islamist organisation concerned with Borno and Yobe States to an extremist and hence Jihadist organisation which additionally sought wider sub-state geopolitical objectives throughout Nigeria’s twelve Islamic states. These developments consequentially


represent a second phase in the evolution of Boko Haram’s ideology, tactics and objectives and thus transformation into a ‘sub-state Jihadist’ organisation.

4.4: Boko Haram's Intensifying Nigerian Focus and al-Qaeda Affiliation

Following the July 2009 counter-terrorism assaults, the surviving members of Boko Haram in Niger and Chad regrouped under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau who immediately set about rebuilding that organisation.393 This was confirmed on August 9th, 2009, when Shekau released a six-point written statement to the Nigerian newspaper Vanguard confirming that Boko Haram was not defeated. Moreover, the statement outlined, among other things, Boko Haram’s ideology and political objectives as well as the organisation’s declaration as an ‘affiliate’ of al-Qaeda with Shekau stating:

Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah.394

The statement therefore was unprecedented in that it declared that Boko Haram further sought to turn the whole of Nigeria into an Islamic state via jihad and that the group was now formally aligned with al-Qaeda. Hence, Shekau appeared to have further expanded Boko Haram’s political objectives from establishing Islamist


law and governance throughout the twelve northern states to all thirty-six states of Nigeria while signalling its allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Therefore, Shekau’s statement signalled the beginning of what appears to be a third phase of evolution and thus Boko Haram’s transformation away from a sub-state Jihadist organisation to a fully-fledged ‘national Jihadist’ organisation.

By late-2010, it had become clear that Shekau had successfully revived Boko Haram, when that organisation returned to Nigeria and began an unprecedented Jihadist campaign across several states in that country which began in July of that year. In particular, Boko Haram’s attacks became significantly more frequent, sophisticated, and expanded geographically and took on new forms of modus operandi. From an organisation which primarily used the tactics of shootings and assassinations to one that also carries out bombings, as well as mass-prison breaks of its members, while increasingly targeting civilians. These developments therefore indicate a further hardening in Boko Haram’s ideological outlook and,

395 Ibid.
397 Ibid.
according to some experts and security officials, an increase in collaboration with other Jihadist groups in the region, especially AQIM.400

In response, the Nigerian government established the Joint Task Force (JTF) on June 1st, 2011, codenamed JTF Operation Restore Order. The JTF mainly consists of military personal and is under the command of a military officer and operates on a mandate to ‘restore law and order’, especially in urban areas of north-eastern Nigeria. Building on the previous joint command strategy, the JTF includes expertise from within the Nigerian Armed Forces, Defence Intelligence Agency, Department of State Security, Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Immigration Service, and Nigerian Customs Service.401

While indications of Boko Haram’s imminent affiliation with AQIM moreover was revealed in Shekau’s August 2009 statement,402 tangible evidence confirming AQIM’s direct support for Boko Haram however first appeared in January 2010. This came following AQIM’s leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, publicly pledged his support for Boko Haram and offered to train and arm that organisation.403 This, in turn, provided AQIM with the opportunity to expand al-Qaeda’s ideological influence into Nigeria via Boko Haram.404 Therefore, evidence indicates that from

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400 Tanchum, “Al-Qaeda’s West African Advance”, op. cit., 81; Perry, “Threat Level Rising”, op. cit., p. 36.


402 “Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad”, op. cit.


early-2010 al-Qaeda moved to directly support Boko Haram in an effort to influence developments in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{405}

It appears furthermore that Shekau’s 2009 statement was a desperate attempt to reach out to al-Qaeda for direct support in the wake of intensive counter-terrorism operations by the Nigerian security forces, which appeared to have all but destroyed Boko Haram’s operational capabilities in July 2009.\textsuperscript{406} Moreover, Boko Haram’s revival in Chad and Niger following that organisation’s military defeat at the hands of the Nigerian military in July 2009 appears to be the catalyst for Shekau’s and hence Boko Haram’s formal affiliation with al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, sometime between Shekau’s August 2009 statement and AQIM’s public pledge of support for Boko Haram in January 2010, the two organisations established a formal relationship.\textsuperscript{407} Collectively, these developments signalled Boko Haram’s third phase of evolution and so transformation from a sub-state Jihadist organisation to a national Jihadist organisation and that organisation’s formal affiliation with al-Qaeda; thus representing a further hardening in ideological outlook, tactics and objectives.


\textsuperscript{406} Perry, “Threat Level Rising”, op. cit., p.37.

\textsuperscript{407} Daniel, “Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb Plays Puppet Master in Mali Occupation”, op. cit.
4.5: Boko Haram's Expanding West African Focus and Integration into al-Qaeda and the Islamic State

Since Boko Haram announced its formal affiliation to al-Qaeda the relationship appears to have further evolved. In particular, it appears Boko Haram became more integrated with al-Qaeda from 2010, especially AQIM, as well as with other Jihadist groups in the region and, most recently, IS. It has expanded operations beyond Nigeria into Mali, Cameroon, and Chad, especially in terms of training, armed conflict and attacks and activates such as kidnappings, as well as suicide bombings which Boko Haram first employed to target the United Nations office in Abuja on August 26th, 2011.

In turn, these developments collectively appear to signal a fourth phase in the evolution of Boko Haram’s ideology, tactics and objectives. Hence it now appears that Boko Haram has shifted from an organisation that previously had a purely Nigerian focus to an organisation that now has a regional one as well. In particular, it appears to signal Boko Haram’s shift away from a purely national

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Jihadist organisation to one that has wider geopolitical objectives and thus Boko Haram’s ascent as a ‘trans-national Jihadist’ organisation.

Concern over Boko Haram’s increasing links with al-Qaeda, and in particular AQIM, and therefore evolving ideology, objectives, and tactics, and hence growing threat to Nigeria and internationally, was confirmed on the 14th of September 2011 by the head of the U.S African Command (Africom) General Carter Ham. Ham stated:

If left unaddressed, you could have a [Jihadist] network that ranges from East Africa through the centre [sub-Saharan and West Africa]. Those three organizations [AQIM, al-Shabab, and Boko Haram] have very explicitly and publicly voiced intent to target Westerners and the U.S. specifically. To me, that is very, very worrying.411

Ham further stated in March 2012 that:

What really concerns me are the indications that the three organizations [AQIM, al-Shabab, and Boko Haram] are seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts, in other words to establish a cooperative effort amongst the three most violent organizations. And I think that’s a problem for America and for African security in general.412

411 Perry, “Threat Level Rising”, op. cit., p.36.

Ham also related that AQIM and Boko Haram are especially of concern, stating that “in the terms of the indications we have … they are most likely sharing funds, training and explosive material.”413 Moreover, weapons and other equipment captured from Boko Haram further indicate Boko Haram’s growing strategic links with AQIM.414 AQIM is at the heart of al-Qaeda’s pan-Jihadist network in Africa, which spans North, East, and West Africa and, in addition to al-Shabab and Boko Haram, includes the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Al-Dine.415

The Boko Haram–AQIM relationship moreover appears to have been developed outside of Nigeria, especially in northern Mali where it evolved through AQIM affiliates MUJAO and Ansar Al-Dine between late-2012 and early-2013.416 While having sent fighters to train in northern Mali from as early as 2005, however, it is reported that Boko Haram had some one hundred members fighting in that country alongside those of MUJAO and Ansar Al-Dine during this period.417 This development is unprecedented in that prior to it Boko Haram had not fought outside of Nigeria. Moreover, this development appears to have been a direct result of Boko Haram’s formal affiliation with al-Qaeda. Hence, this development can arguably be seen as the first tangible steps by Boko Haram transitioning from an al-Qaeda

413 Ibid.


416 Ibid.

affiliate, a partnership fundamentally strategic in nature – training, weapons transfers, and funding – towards integrating operationally into the AQIM-led pan-Jihadist network in Africa.\textsuperscript{418} Therefore, these developments appear to represent the inception of a fourth phase in the evolution of Boko Haram’s ideology and geopolitical objectives, while further developing its tactical capabilities.

Boko Haram’s integration into the AQIM-led pan-Jihadist network in Africa moreover was confirmed in a United Nations Security Council report on Somalia and Eritrea published in July 2013. The report cited a former al-Shabab Amniyat (a clandestine/elite branch of al-Shabab) operative who confirmed that al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, had directly instructed a Sudanese al-Qaeda operative known as ‘Hassan’ who was training al-Shabab members at that organisation’s Wabxo training camp in the Galgadud region of Somalia to also train African Jihadists who cannot travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{419} Furthermore, the report identifies that the African Jihadists included Kenyans, Ethiopians, and Nigerians, and that Hassan left for Nigeria with a group of Boko Haram members following their training in March 2011.\textsuperscript{420} These developments can also be corroborated with statements made by Boko Haram spokesman, Abu Qaqa, who reportedly claimed that hundreds of Boko Haram members have trained with al-Shabaab in Somalia.\textsuperscript{421}

\textsuperscript{418} Ibid; Perry, “Threat Level Rising”, op. cit., p.36.


\textsuperscript{420} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{421} Perry, “Threat Level Rising”, op. cit., p.36.
Further evidence of Boko Haram’s ascent into a trans-national Jihadist organisation was made clear by the group’s leader, Shekau, when he released three video recordings that were posted to YouTube on March 18th, 2013, following the kidnapping of seven French nationals by the group in February of that year. In the recordings Shekau stated, among other things, that:

This is a special message from the leader of Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad [Boko Haram], to world leaders, who are not on the path of Allah and the Prophet. We are certainly the ones that have the intention and commitment to establish [an] Islamic state in this country [Nigeria] and other countries of the world at large, by the Might of Allah.422

Hence, in addition to Nigeria, Shekau explicitly refers to establishing ‘Islamic states’ beyond Nigeria and, therefore, represents a further expansion in Boko Haram’s intended geopolitical objective(s). This development therefore is unprecedented as Boko Haram had not indicated that it sought any wider geopolitical objective outside of Nigeria.

Moreover, on August 27th, 2013, some twelve months after the United States placed a $U.S 7 million dollar bounty on Boko Haram’s leader,423 Shekau released an additional video via YouTube further underpinning Boko Haram’s growing transnational Jihadist agenda. In this video, Shekau stated that Boko Haram’s

422 Idris, “Nigeria”, op. cit.

“strength and firepower is bigger than that of Nigeria. Nigeria is no longer a big deal to us [Boko Haram] as far as we are concerned. We will now comfortably confront the United States of America.”

This statement is also unprecedented as, in addition to expanding its geopolitical objectives, activities, and attacks, it signalled Boko Haram’s willingness to directly attack U.S targets and, perhaps, inside that country as well, therefore indicating a further hardening in ideological outlook. Shortly thereafter, the U.S declared Boko Haram a ‘foreign terrorist organisation’ along with its offshoot, Ansaru (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa).

A further sign that Boko Haram is now developing a wider trans-national Jihadist agenda came following Shekau’s pledge of allegiance to IS in March 2015, in which Boko Haram declared it subsequently now also represents IS’s West African Province. Although the extent of this relationship is not yet fully clear and appears to be reminiscent of Shekau’s pledge to al-Qaeda in 2009, and hence primarily strategic in nature rather than full operational integration, this development appears to represent the end of Boko Haram’s formal affiliation with AQIM and hence al-Qaeda in favour of IS, al-Qaeda’s key strategic rival.

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Boko Haram’s allegiance to IS moreover appears to have developed as a result of the vacuum left in the wake of the killing of al-Qaeda’s leader Osama bin Laden on May 14, 2012 by the U.S, as well as that organisation’s perceived accelerated global demise under the current leadership of al-Zawahiri following, especially following the rise of IS. Hence, al-Qaeda has effectively been eclipsed by IS as the number one global Jihadist group, especially in terms of members, funding, operations, and ability to capture and hold territory. Therefore, such a development appears key to understanding Boko Haram’s shift in affiliation and, moreover, a clear trend by Shekau to integrate a wider trans-national Jihadist agenda within Boko Haram, especially if that resulted in operational support.

Collectively, these developments represent evidence that Boko Haram has undergone a fourth phase of evolution. In particular, Boko Haram is now not only a formal affiliate of IS but, therefore, a key member of a wider IS-led pan-Jihadist network that includes organisations from across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond. Boko Haram now has additional geopolitical objectives outside of Nigeria, though thus far these appear to remain secondary to its objective in Nigeria.

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430 “Islamic State’s 43 Global Affiliates Interactive World Map”, op. cit.
In turn, this has expanded the pool of resources and expertise from which Boko Haram now has access and, therefore, strengthened that organisation.431

The intensifying situation associated with Boko Haram’s fourth phase of evolution moreover has left thousands dead, killing some 6664 people in 2014 alone according to the Institute of Peace and Economics’ Global Terrorism Index; surpassing IS as the most deadliest Jihadist organisation and terrorist group in the world in 2014.432 In addition, an estimated three million people have been impacted, including the kidnapping of some 276 school girls on April 14th, 2014, in Chibok, Borno State. 433

This surge in violence triggered the unprecedented regional counter-terrorism initiative to combat Boko Haram declared in France on May 18th, 2014.434 This initiative brought together West African nations with support from Western powers including France and the U.S, 435 as well as a European Union allocated

431 Ibid.


‘humanitarian and protection’ fund of some €150 million as of 2015.\textsuperscript{436} Moreover, the initiative lead to the establishment of a four-nation integrated regional military response which includes Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad,\textsuperscript{437} which committed its military to fight Boko Haram on January 16\textsuperscript{th}, 2015.\textsuperscript{438} On June 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2015, this was extended with the formation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force which, in addition to the four-nation coalition, also includes Benin.\textsuperscript{439}

While it appears this regional response has had some desired results, including the release of twenty-seven hostages held by Boko Haram in Cameroon in October 2014,\textsuperscript{440} it also appears to have further radicalised Boko Haram and therefore intensified the conflict. This appears manifest in the wave of regional warnings and attacks by Boko Haram, which followed in the wake of the declared regional military initiative against Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{441} Moreover, in addition to Nigeria, This


\textsuperscript{437} “Suicide Bombers Kill Dozens in Chad’s Capital”, \textit{Aljazeera}, June 16, 2015, Retrieved, 28/06/2015, \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/suicide-bombers-attack-police-hq-chad-capital-150615095910055.html}.


\textsuperscript{439} “Suicide Bombers Kill Dozens in Chad’s Capital”, op. cit.


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has included ongoing kidnappings, including an estimated two hundred people in Gumsuri, Borno State, on December 18th, 2014, the killing of some four hundred people in Fotokol, Cameroon on February 4th, 2015, the reported killing of some two thousand people in Baga, Borno State, following a three day-long rampage, which began on January 3rd, 2015, the deadliest single attack by Boko Haram to date and arguably second in the world to 9/11.

Boko Haram is also suspected of the unprecedented spike in suicide bombings in Nigeria, including twenty seven for the first five months of 2015 alone, which have included female suicide bombers and the reported use of captives being used as suicide bombers. Additionally, Boko Haram also carried out two suicide bombings in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, which killed thirty eight people on June 15th, 2015, signalling the first use of such a tactic by Boko Haram in Chad and


447 “Bungled Suicide Bombings Feeds Fears Boko Haram Using Captives”, op. cit.
outside of Nigeria, as well as four suicide bombings in Fotokol, Cameroon which reportedly killed ten people on November 21st, 2015. Moreover, it appears Fotokol become a key operational centre outside of Nigeria for Boko Haram, especially for recruitment. This development was confirmed by the head of Cameroon’s counter-terrorism military force, Colonel Joseph Nourna who stated in an interview with CNN after the Fotokol suicide bombings that “there is no doubt that youths in Cameroon’s Far North region are joining Boko Haram.” Collectively, these developments therefore signal a fourth phase in the radicalisation of Boko Haram’s ideology, tactics and objectives.


449 “At least 10 people killed in bomb attacks in Cameroon”, op. cit.

5.1: Introduction:

Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation - also referred to as Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami, or, Islamic Liberation Party) was established in 1952 in East Jerusalem (al-Quds), then part of the Jordanian administered West Bank of Palestine, by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (also spelt Taqiuddin An-Nabahani or Taqi al-Din al-Nabhabi). Hizb ut-Tahrir is a self-declared Sunni Political Islamic organisation which states that its ideology is Islam. It purports to adhere to and advocate ‘true’ Islamic teachings and practices as set forth by Prophet Mohamad and the first four rightly guided caliphs, therefore, appearing to represent a form of Sunni-inspired Salafism.

Purporting to be non-violent, rather, Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to only engage in al-da’wa (preaching/sermons) activities through which it seeks to establish its stated objective(s) of an international Caliphate spanning all ‘Muslims lands’. This, in turn, through which “It [Hizb ut-Tahrir] also aims to bring back the Islamic guidance for mankind and to lead the Umma [Muslim community] into a struggle


with kufr [non-Muslims], its systems and its thoughts so that Islam encapsulates the world.”

Since its inception, Hizb ut-Tahrir has reportedly grown to include an estimated 40 or more branches internationally. These include branches throughout parts of the Middle East, Asia, Europe, Africa, North America, and Australasia. The exact location of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s current leader, Ata Abu Rashta, is not clear and it is reported that he travels regularly throughout the world since becoming the global leader of that group in 2003. However, a significant amount of its operations, including online media, publications, fundraising, and training, is conducted in London. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s membership numbers are also unclear, with estimates anywhere between tens of thousands and ten million members globally.

Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, has been banned in a number of countries in some of the regions it operates on the basis of being a dissident or extremist group, including in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Russia, China, and Germany among others. Nevertheless, it appears Hizb ut-Tahrir remains covertly active

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454 “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.


457 American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.

458 “Hizb ut-Tahrir and the fantasy of the caliphate”, op. cit.


460 Ibid.
and or operational in many of these countries, listing most of these nations, among others, on its official media webpage of where it is currently active.\textsuperscript{461} This includes Uzbekistan where an estimated 8,000 of its members were imprisoned in the early 2000s in relation to apparent terrorism links. Some of those arrested were reportedly brutally killed and tortured by that state according to former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray.\textsuperscript{462}

Concern about the nature of Hizb ut-Tahrir moreover has particularly been growing since the mid-1990s, especially in terms of that organisation's activities and hence tactics.\textsuperscript{463} In particular, it is reported that Hizb ut-Tahrir members have engaged in terrorism activities;\textsuperscript{464} associated with known extremists;\textsuperscript{465} overtly advocated violence towards non-Muslims, especially towards Jews;\textsuperscript{466} and refused to denounce extremist groups such as IS (Islamic State),\textsuperscript{467} albeit denouncing that

\begin{itemize}
\item[A detailed list of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s international network and activities can be found on its official Central Media Office website: \url{http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/}.
\item[462] “For Allah and the caliphate”, op. cit.
\item[464] Ibid, pp.5-6.
\item[465] Barton, \textit{Indonesia's Struggle}, op. cit., p.52.
\item[466] “Is Hizb ut-Tahrir Changing Strategy of Tactics?”, op. cit., pp.4-5.
\end{itemize}
groups caliphate in Iraq and Syria on the basis that it did not follow the ‘true’ path of Prophet Mohammad.468

It has been suggested moreover that Hizb ut-Tahrir has also shifted towards more ‘deceptive’ tactics in recent years as a result of the changing political and social contexts in which it operates, especially in the West. This includes engaging in activities which, on the one hand, indoctrinate and recruit Muslims into its fold while, on the other, downplay links to extremism as well as its radical global vision by presenting its ideology, the caliphate and its interpretation of Shari’a Law as non-threatening and a practical alternative to contemporary political systems including democracy.469

The latter aspect of this dual-tactical approach is of particular interest and appears to be advanced through that group’s publication New Civilisation. This professionally designed high-quality looking magazine, also available online, has been criticised as it “barley mentions its origins while trumpeting the prestigious central London address of its headquarters. Through the magazine, party spokesmen now seek out events at which they can project their “moderate” image.”470 Therefore, such tactical developments essentially appear to be a public relations makeover geared to a ‘Westernised-Muslim’ and wider Western audience.

468 American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.


470 Ibid.
through which to present Hizb ut-Tahrir as a moderate actor, while maintaining its radical doctrine and global objective.\textsuperscript{471}

Since its inception, Hizb ut-Tahrir therefore appears to have expanded significantly as well as become one of the most active contemporary Political Islamic organisations globally, especially in terms of its geographic expanse and activities. Although appearing to engage primarily in non-violent activities these appear diverse in approach and evolving. Moreover, some members appear to have carried out, and become associated with, violent activities, suggesting the presence of extremist characteristics in Hizb ut-Tahrir. Collectively, this indicates a hardening in ideology, a shift in tactics, and so, an intensification in achieving its political objective(s). In particular, it would indicate a potential shift from non-violence to violence/extremism, and hence the embracing of a Jihadist doctrine; albeit a development that would appear to be in its infancy and or associated with pockets within that group at the very least. Consequently, this would appear to suggest that Hizb ut-Tahrir, or elements within it, now operates within a ‘grey’ area between non-violent and violent political currents.

The ideology, tactics and objectives of Hizb ut-Tahrir, therefore, appear to provide important insight into particular forms of diversity, and hence contours, manifest within contemporary Political Islam. In particular, and unlike the previous case examined, it appears Hizb ut-Tahrir is essentially a non-violent Salafist actor which, however, is closely linked to and, perhaps, on the threshold of extremism. However, it appears that like some Jihadist groups such as IS, Hizb ut-Tahrir too has global

\textsuperscript{471} Ibid, pp.2-3.
political objectives, thus the establishment of a global Caliphate through which to implement its interpretation of Shari’a Law. Therefore, such apparent contours provide essential understanding about the nature of and diversity in Salafism.

This chapter therefore examines the ideology, tactics and objectives associated with Hizb ut-Tahrir, and hence the nature of that organisation thus far. In particular, analysis is conducted chronologically tracking the evolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir from its inception. This, in turn, provides a way to illuminate the nature of, and any key transformations in, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology, tactics and objectives, and so, observed behaviours and regularities in that organisation. Analysis also looks for key social, political and economic events and developments impacting and shaping Hizb ut-Tahrir’s key contours, and so, that organisation’s development; thus generative mechanisms.

Therefore, analysis of Hizb ut-Tahrir so is geared to illuminating maximum insight into the diversity in contours manifest in that organisation with the view of identifying key contextual generative mechanisms associated with that organisation’s evolution thus far. Moreover, findings will be theoretically harnessed as key sets of cognitive analysis through which to frame primary contours and generative mechanisms manifest in contemporary Salafist Political Islam. This, in turn, will provide essential insight into the wider conceptual diversity of contemporary Political Islam, as well as casual factors generating such diversity. Accordingly, findings will be evidenced and formulated into this theses hypothesised paradigm of contemporary Political Islam.
5.2: Formation and Accent of Hizb ut-Tahrir

The formation of Hizb ut-Tahrir in East Jerusalem by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani in 1952 came admits a rise in Political Islamic thought and actors in the Middle East in the early to mid-20th century, and were especially of a Salafist orientation.\(^\text{472}\) Much of the focus of the Salafist movement in the region during this period, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was geared to reviving the Islamic caliphate or establishing a particular Islamic state\(^\text{473}\) in an effort to reform society in accordance with ‘true’ Islamic teachings.\(^\text{474}\) Moreover, the Salafist movement at this time was particularly concerned with countering colonial advances into the Muslim world. This was especially the case in the Middle East where large areas of land had been divided under British and French Mandate’s following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire/caliphate in WWI.\(^\text{475}\)

It was against this backdrop of geopolitical instability and change that al-Nabhani grew up and was exposed to. According to Hizb ut-Tahrir’s official media website, al-Nabhani was born in Ajzam (also known as Ijman) near Haifa (modern-day Israel) in 1914, and reportedly could recite the Quran by the age of 13.\(^\text{476}\) Between 1928-

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\(^\text{474}\) According to Salafists, reviving the Islamic caliphate or establishing an Islamic state was required due to widespread Muslim impiousness born out of ignorance of Islamic teachings as a result of rational and analogous reasoning (*qiyas*) being applied to interpret Islam, as opposed to a literal one, from as early as the 8th century, leading to ‘innovations’ (*bid’\(\)a) and thus deviations from the true teachings of Prophet Mohammad. See: Meijer, “Salafism:” in *Political Islam*, eds. Khaled Hroub, op. cit., p.39.


\(^\text{476}\) “The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut Tahrir”, op. cit.
1932, he received a formal Islamic education at the prestigious al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, graduating with the equivalent of a Master degree in Shari’a: *Shahada tal ‘Alamiah in sharia*’.\(^{477}\) During his student years, al-Nabhani reportedly become an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt before going on to become a led figure in that organisations branch in Haifa following his return to Palestine in 1932.\(^{478}\) In Haifa, al-Nabhani worked for the Shari’a Education Department of the Ministry of al-Ma’arif until 1938. He then became a Shari’a court attorney at the Central Court of Haifa and then was appointed Assistant Judge of Haifa and then as Judge of Ramallah until his exodus from Palestine in 1948 sometime before, during or after the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war, or, ‘war of (Israeli) independence’.

This was the result of escalating conflict between Arabs and Jews over statehood in Palestine during this period, triggered by the UN partition of Palestine in November 1947 which led to Israel’s proclamation of statehood on the 14\(^{th}\) of May 1948 and, consequently, led to the Arab states of Egypt, Transjordan (Jordan), Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon mobilising forces alongside Palestinian Arab militia against Israel.\(^{480}\) Hence, this forced al-Nabhani to relocate from Ramallah. Travelling to Syria and then to Nablus in the Transjordan administered West Bank before settling in East Jerusalem in 1948 which too was Transjordan territory, where he was appointed

\(^{477}\) Ibid.


\(^{479}\) “The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut Tahrir “The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit.

judge of Shari’a courts (al-Quds) until his resignation in 1950. He then took up a position teaching Shari’a at the Ibrahimiya high school in East Jerusalem. Throughout these years, moreover, al-Nabhani had been a led figure in the Haifa branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and remained a member of that organisation in East Jerusalem.

It was in the immediate period following the establishment of Israel that al-Nabhani began writing on political issues concerning the wider Middle East. In particular, this included issues directly relating to the Islamic-Arab world, including the ‘threat’ of capitalism and communism/socialism, the demise of the Ottoman caliphate and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In December 1950, al-Nabhani published his first work Ingadh Filastin (Saving Palestine). This challenged the legitimacy of Israel and European colonial powers’ support for that nation’s establishment, notably Britain, as well as their wider role in the region during the late- and post-Ottoman era, and advocated for the liberation of Palestine through the creation of a pan-Arab ‘unity’ super state spanning the entire Middle East and North Africa.

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481 “The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut Tahrir "The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit.

482 “TAQI AL-DIN AL-NABHABI AND THE ISLAMIC LIBERATION PARTY””, op. cit., p.194. However, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Central Media Office website reports that al-Nabhani taught at Uloom e Islamia Collage in Oman (Amman), Jordan during this period. See: “The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut Tahrir "The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit.


To this end, *Saving Palestine* argued a particular political narrative and strategy which was twofold through which to liberate Palestine. First, al-Nabhani argued that through Arab unity, or, ‘pan-Arab uniformity/Arabism’, this would provide the necessary geopolitical framework through which to, second, liberate Palestine. However, according to al-Nabhani, Arab leadership and imperial colonial powers were the two political obstacles preventing the realisation of such an outcome, arguing:

Thus, it will be sincere and able thinkers who begin the process of social reform and carry it to schools, factories, farms, and homes. The starting point for this social movement is an inspired individual who serves as leader of a vanguard that then influences the rest of society. As the influence of the vanguard grows, it will turn into an organized political party that takes over Arab countries and unites them.

Such an Arab revolution al-Nabhani argued, moreover, would require a corresponding Islamic revolt. Despite not directly calling for the establishment of an Islamic state, but rather an Arab unity state, the fact that both Arab and Islamic revolts were equally advocated, as well as his devotion to the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nabhani’s ideological position in *Saving Palestine* appears to amalgamate both Arabism, with undertones of Salafism nevertheless. However, it appears al-Nabhani’s Salafist ideological views had yet to fully surface within this work.

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486 Ibid.
488 Ibid.
By early 1952, however, al-Nabhani had left the Muslim Brotherhood and, along with five other former members, established Hizb ut-Tahrir in East Jerusalem; applying to register that group as an Islamic political party with the Jordanian Ministry of Interior on the 17th of November that year.\textsuperscript{489} However, the Jordanian authorities rejected this application on grounds that it contradicted that state's constitution. Subsequently, al-Nabhani applied and succeeded in having the organisation registered as an official association in March 1953 under the Ottoman Law of Associations which was still legislative in Jordan during this period.\textsuperscript{490} Therefore, signalling the legal emergence of Hizb ut Tahrir as an Islamic association in Jordan; albeit actually a Salafist Political Islamic organisation.

The Salafist nature of al-Nabhani, and hence that of Hizb ut Tahrir, which had been somewhat obscured previously became apparent during this period following the 1953 publication of al-Nabhani’s work \textit{Nizam al-Islam (The Systems of Islam)}.\textsuperscript{491} In this, al-Nabhani advocates the idea that Islam is a complete ideological system, superior to all other forms of ideology in every way. This includes capitalism (synonymous to democracy according to al-Nabhani) and socialism which, collectively, were considered by al-Nabhani to be the three primary ideologies (\textit{mabda’}, or, rational doctrines containing an order) of that period.\textsuperscript{492} According to

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\item \textsuperscript{489} “The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut Tahrir "The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{490} “TAQI AL-DIN AL-NABHABI AND THE ISLAMIC LIBERATION PARTY”, op. cit., p.196
\item \textsuperscript{491} Ibid, p.197. An English translation of \textit{The Systems of Islam} is available on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s official website: \texttt{http://english.hizbutahrir.org/the-systems-of-islam}
\item \textsuperscript{492} “TAQI AL-DIN AL-NABHABI AND THE ISLAMIC LIBERATION PARTY”, op. cit., pp.197-199.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
al-Nabhani, this rests on the deductive logic that Islam, that is, the commands and laws revealed to Mohammad in the Quran, and manifest in his actions (Sunna), is not a human ideological construct but, rather, of Allah, and therefore beyond human comprehension. In turn, al-Nabhani’s quasi-rationalist approach asserts that such teachings commanded by Allah form the only true quintessential basis for a rational ideology through which to establish social order; arguing: “…Islam is rooted in a transcendent authority, its order is fixed and unchanging, guaranteeing forever human dignity, security, life, and property.”

For al-Nabhani, Islam is therefore a total system and divinely ordained for all of humankind which is to be applied to both private and public affairs, including politics, justice, economics, and all other aspects of society in accordance to Shari’a Law. However, by the 20th century, according al-Nabhani, such an Islamic system had essentially been ‘lost’ following the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 as a direct result of its defeat in WWI at the hands of the colonial Western powers. In particular, al-Nabhani asserts that such a situation was the result of non-Islamic, especially Western, ideas being imposed on Islamic society in an effort to modernise/Westernise Muslims by ‘programming’ them with capitalist-democratic liberal views. This included the Western notion of the separation of religion from politics, or, in the context of Islam, Quran and state, and

496 Ibid, pp.34, 37
so, the introduction of secular polity(s) and institutions such as civil courts in addition to Shari’a courts, as well as capitalist economic reforms such as those undertaken by the Ottoman caliphate from the late-19th century until the abolition of the caliphate.\textsuperscript{497}

Innovations, moreover, are identified by al-Nabhani as having accrued throughout Islamic history since the Umayyad caliphate which ruled in the 7\textsuperscript{th} and 8\textsuperscript{th} centuries CE. However, according to al-Nabhani, this was not the result of Islam being dominated by a foreign power or transcended by a more superior ideology, rather, it was the ‘misapplication’ of Islam, stating:

Although the Muslims translated books of philosophy, science, and different foreign cultures into Arabic, they never translated any legislation, canon or system of any other nation neither for implementation nor for research purposes.

However, Islam, in its quality as a system, was implemented soundly by some people and poorly by others; this depended on factors such as the strength or the weakness of the state, the accurate or erroneous perception of Islam, and the ardent or slack carrying of the intellectual leadership. Consequently, the misapplication of Islam in some eras caused some decline in the Islamic society, but this is an incidence found in every system, because the system relies on its implementation on humans.\textsuperscript{498}

\textsuperscript{497} See, for example, Ibid, p.32.

\textsuperscript{498} Ibid, p.38.
It was during the 8th century moreover, a period that followed the first Four Rightly Guided Caliphs and pious ancestors of Islam, that Muslims began to philosophically engage with non-Muslim civilisations, cultures and ideas. This was the result of the expansion of the Islamic caliphate beyond Arab lands, especially through conquest/jihad. This led to the transfer and amalgamation of ideas and knowledge to Islam, and vis-à-vis, especially from Judeo-Christian, Greco-Hellenistic, Persian, and Indian civilisations. Some of these had developed rational/scientific thought processes, with the former two influenced especially by such classical philosophers as Plato and Aristotle among others, and in turn, impacted significantly on Islamic scholars during this period. Consequently, this impacted how Islam was interpreted and practiced, leading to a wave of scientific and rational based analysis of Islamic teachings, as opposed to a predominantly literal one. This climaxed during the 9th and 10th centuries with the development of such progressive schools of Islamic thought as Mu’tazila, arguably the most progressive of its day and was well established during the Abbasid caliphate period (750-1258 CE). Hence, for Salafists such as al-Nabhani, this period represents the beginning of deviation and hence innovation within Islam.

According to al-Nabhani, Muslim ignorance therefore was the result of non-Islamic influences which had led to the demise of Muslims and, in particular, their understanding of Islam’s true teachings, especially in terms of linking the ‘Islamic

499 Ibid, p.35.
500 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.34-35.
501 Ibid.
idea’ with the ‘Islamic method’.\textsuperscript{503} In particular, this includes the failure to understand and, so, invoke Islam as an expansive political ideology.\textsuperscript{504} This is to be advanced through da’wa\textsuperscript{505} and, if need be, jihad (armed struggle/war).\textsuperscript{506} Hence, this represents both the idea and method to reviving Hizb ut-Tahrir’s envisioned Islamic state through which to implement Shari’a Law and, therefore, objective which is ultimately global in scope, as well as that organisations interpretation of the essence of Islam.\textsuperscript{507} For al-Nabhani, this situation moreover had been further compounded following the Mongol-Timurid invasion(s) and sacking of the Abbasid caliphate in 1258 CE, and confirmed in 1924 when the Islamic caliphate was abolished by Kamal Ataturk in the wake of the Ottoman caliphates defeat in WWI.\textsuperscript{508}

To reverse this state of ignorance and hence revive Islam as the dominant global religo-political civilisation/power, therefore, al-Nabhani asserts that only through a system based entirely on the commands and laws of Allah, and hence Shari’a Law, can this be achieved. Moreover, al-Nabhani claims that such a system can only be

\textsuperscript{503} An-Nabhani, \textit{The Systems of Islam}, op. cit., p.

\textsuperscript{504} Ibid, p.55.

\textsuperscript{505} Ibid, pp. 23-24; 45; 69.

\textsuperscript{506} Ibid, p.85. According to Article 90 of The Draft Constitution in \textit{The Systems of Islam}, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s blueprint of their envisioned Islamic state, jihad (armed combat/warfare) is mandatory for all Muslims over the age of 15 who meet specified requirements if and when called upon by the Islamic Caliph. The method and or concept of jihad is discussed in detail in al-Nabhani’s third major work \textit{The Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir} which was also published in 1953.

\textsuperscript{507} Ibid, pp.23-24; 45.

\textsuperscript{508} Ibid, p.34.
realised through politics and, in particular, an Islamic state, or, caliphate.\footnote{Ibid. p.55.} Arguing that the establishment of an Islamic state is commanded in the Shari’a as set forth by Allah and revealed to Mohammad in the Quran, and therefore an obligation for all Muslims to perform; stating:

> It was incumbent on Muslims to set up the Islamic state because Islam has no effective existence without the state and because their lands are not Dar al-Islam unless an Islamic state governs them. Under an Islamic state, the ruler enforces all aspects of the sharica [Shari’a], including worship rituals and moral behaviour, and conducts jihad to extend the dominion of Islam. Islamic education is weak because its condition depends on backing by the state. Under an Islamic state, the sharila [Shari’a] orders the economy, law, education, gender relations, and foreign policy.\footnote{“TAQI AL-DIN AL-NABHABI AND THE ISLAMIC LIBERATION PARTY”, op. cit., p.203.}

The fundamental ideological position advanced by al-Nabhani in \textit{The Systems of Islam} therefore purports that only through the Islamic obligation of preforming politics can an Islamic state be established and the system of Islam realised and expanded to the wider Muslim world and beyond. Hence, politics and the state are inherent tools in Islam through which to establish such a system over humankind, according to al-Nabhani who stated: “The state is the method of executing the rules of Islam and carrying its Da’awah. Any narrative denoting Islam's confinement to the spiritual sense and its isolation from politics and government must be
eradicated.” Moreover, al-Nabhani asserts that such a system and associated political-instruments and the requirements of an Islamic state directly derive from the teachings and practices of Mohammad, and so Allah, and which were correctly emulated by the first Four Rightly Guided Caliphs before Islam was ‘infected’ by foreign influences of thought and practice; thus the fundamental essence of Salafist belief.

The Systems of Islam therefore signalled the overt ascent of al-Nabhani’s Salafist ideological beliefs and, in turn, the foundations for what would become the Hizb ut-Tahrir. Moreover, following the publication of The Systems of Islam, Hizb ut-Tahrir set about recruiting members and building the infrastructure of that organisation in East Jerusalem and throughout Jordan. In particular, throughout the early 1950s Hizb ut-Tahrir intensified its activities, including hosting ‘study groups’ and or political meetings and distributed leaflets containing that groups Salafist teachings and political agenda derived from The Systems of Islam and were framed within three broad themes which included:

One theme is to persuade westernized Muslims that Islam is preferable to capitalism or socialism as the basis for a modern political, economic, and social order. A second theme is to analyze Muslim history with a view to identifying the causes of contemporary political weakness. The third theme

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512 See, for example, Meijer, “Salafism” in Political Islam, eds. Khaled Hroub, op. cit., p.38
concerns the measures Muslims should take to restore Islam through an Islamic state.\(^{513}\)

These teachings and associated political agenda moreover were expanded further in *The Concept of Hizb ut-Tahrir* published by al-Nabhani later in 1953.\(^{514}\) This work further addresses political, economic and social issues purported to be responsible for the decline of Islam as a global power, especially identifying non-Islamic influences between the 8\(^{th}\)-19\(^{th}\) centuries as catalysts for the demise of the Islamic caliphate.\(^{515}\) It further outlines how this resulted in the ‘method’ of Islam becoming askew to the ‘idea’ of Islam, especially in terms of the function and purpose of da’wa and jihad. *The Concept of Hizb ut-Tahrir* especially argues that these are the two key methods through which to rectify Islam as the dominant world power, and so, the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate and its global expansion.\(^{516}\)

To this end, al-Nabhani argues that da’wa must be understood in terms of a political tool through which to advance Islam as a total system to the world, rather than an apolitical one. Moreover, da’wa is to convey the teachings that Islam commands, therefore a method to establish an Islamic state through which Shari’a Law can be applied to society, rather than as a method for preaching on spiritual and moral

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\(^{515}\) Ibid, pp.1-2. This time period correlates to the Islamic calendar as between the 2\(^{nd}\)-13\(^{th}\) centuries AH (After Hijrah).

\(^{516}\) Ibid, p.5.
issues. In the context of jihad, al-Nabhani advances this concept to be both a ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ form of warfare, as well as the notion that jihad must be employed when Muslims face any resistance to the spread of Islam through da’wa, stating:

For instance they interpreted jihad as being a defensive rather than an offensive war, thus contradicting the reality of jihad. Jihad is a war against anyone who stands in the face of the Islamic Da’awah, whether he is a belligerent or otherwise. In other words, the aim of jihad is to remove every obstacle that stands in the face of the Islamic Da’awah. In fact jihad is the Da’awah to Islam and the fight for its sake, i.e. for the sake of Allah. When the Muslims attacked Persia, the Roman Empire, Egypt, North Africa, Andalusia and others, they did so because the Da’awah necessitated the initiation of jihad in order to spread it in those lands.

In addition to advancing such methods, and hence tactics, through which to establish an Islamic state, al-Nabhani further reveals in The Concept of Hizb ut-Tahrir the expanse of the envisioned Islamic state and thus Hizb ut-Tahrir’s objective. Stating that:

It is on this basis that Hizb-ut-Tahrir came into being and set about working towards resuming an Islamic way of life in the Arab lands, which would naturally yield the resumption of the Islamic way of life in the Islamic world,

517 Ibid, p.4
518 Ibid, p.5.
by establishing the Islamic state in one or more countries, to act as a support point for Islam and as a nucleus for the greater Islamic state that resumes the Islamic way of life by implementing Islam as a whole over all the Islamic lands and by carrying the Islamic Da’awah to the whole world.\(^{519}\)

Collectively, the Salafist teachings and views expressed in *The Concept of Hizb ut-Tahrir* essentially form Hizb ut-Tahrir’s central beliefs, and so, ideology as well as outlines intended tactics and objectives associated with that organisation. These teachings and views are revisited in some additional 27 separate works by al-Nabhan throughout his life, including in *The Islamic State* which provides a detailed constitution for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s planned Islamic state, including methods through which to achieve this and hence tactics.\(^{520}\) Collectively, these works form Hizb ut-Tahrir’s manifesto for their envisioned Islamic State through which to ‘carry’ Islam to the world via da’wa and, if need be, jihad.\(^{521}\)

The ideological and political nature of Hizb ut-Tahrir revealed in *The Concept of Hizb ut-Tahrir*, consequently, was viewed by the Jordanian authorities as a security issue, and especially al-Nabhan. For this reason, al-Nabhan as well as the central leadership were ordered to disband by the Jordanian authorities and subsequently banned Hizb ut-Tahrir in March 1953.\(^{522}\) Moreover, in November of that year, in

\(^{519}\) Ibid, p.6.


\(^{522}\) “The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut-Tahrir "The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit.
the wake of the publication of The Concept of Hizb ut-Tahrir, pressure from the Jordanian authorities “… induced Nabhani to leave the country for Syria, where he stayed until 1959, when he moved to Lebanon to organize the party there. He was never allowed back into Jordan.”.523

Nevertheless, Hizb ut-Tahrir remained active in Jordan throughout this period as an association, including running independent candidates in the 1954 and 1956 Chamber of Disputes elections; indirectly winning one seat in both elections.524 Hizb ut-Tahrir also formally reapplied for legal political status in Jordan in 1955, but again this was rejected by the Jordanian authorities due to its dissident and hard-line Islamic views towards the State of Jordan and wider international order.525 Moreover, despite being banned in Jordan, as well as al-Nabhani’s exile to Syria and then Lebanon during this period, in 1955 Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly expanded its activities into Egypt.526

These developments collectively represent the formation and ascent of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Therefore, it appears that throughout this period Hizb ut-Tahrir adhered to a political Salafist ideology and engaged in da’wa activities and hence tactics, or, referred to in this thesis, missionary tactics, in pursuit of its global objective; albeit operating to varying degrees in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria during this

526 Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir, op. cit., p.34.
period. Moreover, to this end, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have worked, firstly, to indoctrinate, or ‘Islamize’, society from the bottom-up, and, secondly, extend this into a mass socio-political base to achieve critical mass; two key aspects of that organisations stated strategy which it refers to as “the stage of culturing” and “the stage of interaction” respectively.527

5.3: Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Embrace of Coup D’état and Intensifying Regional Expansion

By 1960, however, it is reported that Hizb ut-Tahrir had expanded further in the Middle East, establishing operations in Iraq where it too sought to take power, including by way of coup d’état (coup) in 1962. 528 Such a plan was also conceived by Hizb ut-Tahrir in Syria in 1964 where that organisation had established roots following al-Nabhani’s exile from Jordan in and 1953.529 However, according to Hizb ut-Tahrir, it did not attempt such actions due to an apparent lack of support within both Iraq and Syria at this time.530 Nevertheless, despite the lack of support for staging coups in both Iraq and Syria in the early 1960s, such planed actions appear to have signalled a shift in that organisation’s modus-operandi, especially with regard to tactics as well as a hardening in ideological outlook and an intensifying resolve to achieve its objective.


529 Ibid.

530 Ibid.
Such a development moreover appears to be linked to the idea of ‘Islamic revolution’ advanced by al-Nabhani as early as 1950 in his work *Saving Palestine*.\(^{531}\) Subsequently, revolution as a means become a key aspect of Hizb ut Tahrir’s strategy.\(^{532}\) In particular, Islamic revolution is referred to by Hizb ut-Tahrir as being part of “the stage of establishing government”, or, “political struggle”.\(^{533}\) However, Hizb ut-Tahrir suggests that such revolutionary action is to be achieved through non-violence and, rather, by infiltrating government(s) institutions and recruiting officials and personal to its cause so to trigger revolutionary action, or a coup.\(^{534}\) Moreover, such revolutionary action is to be simultaneously carried out alongside other non-violent direct political actions against the West in particular. This includes activities which seek to unite Muslims living in the West under Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s manifesto, and so, ideology, tactics and objectives.\(^{535}\) To this end, Hizb ut-Tahrir states:

The political struggle, which is represented by the following:

- A struggle against the *Kufr* colonialist states which have domination and influence on the Islamic countries. The challenge against colonialism in all


\(^{535}\) Ibid.
its intellectual, political, economic and military forms, involves exposing
its plans, and revealing its conspiracies in order to deliver the Ummah
from its control and to liberate it from any effect of its influence.

- A struggle against the rulers in the Arab and Muslim countries, by
  exposing them, taking them to task, acting to change them whenever they
denied the rights of the Ummah or neglected to perform their duty towards
her, or ignored any of her affairs, and whenever they disagreed with the
rules of Islam, and acting also to remove their regimes so as to establish
the Islamic rule in its place.\(^536\)

This two pronged approach of direct political action collectively forms a third stage
of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s strategy after reaching critical mass, and hence stage two, and
is a fundamental prerequisite before establishing an Islamic state(s). This, in turn,
through which Hizb ut-Tahrir seeks to expand and ultimately realise its planned
global caliphate and so objective.\(^537\) Therefore, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a three-point
strategy.\(^538\)

According to al-Nabhani, this third stage of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s strategy of direct
political action, especially revolution, however, must only be undertaken once the
second stage of critical mass is achieved. Therefore, the ‘right’ political and social


\(^{537}\) Ibid; Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, op. cit., p.22; American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”,
op. cit.

\(^{538}\) A detailed account of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stated three-point strategy can be found in that group’s
tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def]; Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, op. cit., pp.21-23; American Foreign Policy Council,
“Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.
conditions must first be generated in a particular country where Hizb ut-Tahrir operates before it can proceed to the final stage of revolution.\(^{539}\) Henceforth, by 1962, some ten years after its formation, in addition to missionary activities and so tactics, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have shift towards actively pursuing revolution, as well as other forms of direct political action, as a primary means through which to establish a particular Islamic state(s) in an effort to realise its ultimate objective of a global caliphate. Therefore, these developments suggest an intensification and subsequently a second phase of evolution in Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Such evolution appears to have resulted in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s attempt to establish itself in Turkey in 1967 in purist of its objective. It is reported that:

In April 1967, several Jordanian HT members tried and failed to establish a significant presence in Turkey. They distributed leaflets with political communiqués and booklets outlining HT’s constitution and political philosophy but there was little response. The initial group of HT leaders was arrested in August 1967.\(^ {540}\)

The evolutionary intensification of Hizb ut-Tahrir moreover especially appears to have manifest following the 1967 Six-Day War, fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, including Egypt, Jordan and Syria, while Iraq provided ‘moral’ support. These Arab states were decisively defeated by Israel between June


\(^{540}\) Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, op. cit., p.35.
5th and June 10th of that year.\(^{541}\) This, in turn, resulted in the loss of territory for those three Arab states (Egypt, Jordan and Syria) captured by Israel during the conflict, including the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and the West Bank which includes East Jerusalem.\(^{542}\) Consequently, the Israeli capture of the West Bank from Jordan effectively ended Hizb ut-Tahrir’s operations in that territory, and East Jerusalem especially; albeit remaining active in Jordan.\(^{543}\)

For this reason, in addition to generating further anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli views within Hizb ut-Tahrir, that organisation increasingly accused those Arab states, among others, as being illegitimate and corrupt, viewing their defeat by Israel as ‘divine evidence’ of this.\(^{544}\) Additionally, for Salafists in general, it signalled that the cornerstone of Islamic civilisation, and hence the Arab states, had essentially abandoned Islam.\(^{545}\) For al-Nabhani, and hence Hizb ut-Tahrir, this was the latest in a consecutive line of events that signalled a deepening state of ‘ignorance’ amongst Muslims dating back to the 8th century CE, or 2nd century AH, following the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs.\(^{546}\) Moreover, in the context of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s historical worldview, such a humiliating defeat of those Arab states therefore was rooted in their collective geopolitical doctrine of Arab nationalism, and so, the

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542 Ibid.

543 American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.


545 Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir, op. cit., p.8.

546 See, for example, Ibid, pp.1-2.
failure to effectively implement Islam.\footnote{See: “The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut-Tahrir “The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit; Sankari, “Contemporary Radical Islamism”, in \textit{Political Islam and Human Security}, eds. Fethi Mansouri and Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2009, p.172.} Hence, such a political ideology is considered by Hizb ut-Tahrir to be derived from the capitalist, democratic, secular, and colonial West and, therefore, contradictory to Islamic beliefs and practices.\footnote{“The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut-Tahrir “The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit.}

According to Hizb ut-Tahrir, as a result, these Arab nation states which were once at the epicentre of the Islamic caliphate, the abode of the global Islamic umma through which to carry and establish Allah’s law (Shari’a Law) on earth, had essentially become corrupted by non-Islamic influences, especially Western.\footnote{Ibid.} Moreover, the defeated Arab states loss of territory during the conflict was to be used by Israel as a bargaining-chip in future ‘land for peace’ negotiations. This strategy by Israel sought to establish normalised relations with Arab states who, among others, had rejected Israel’s status as a legitimate state afforded by the UN in 1948.\footnote{“History of Mid-East peace talks”, July 29, 2013, \textit{British Broadcasting Company}, Retrieved, 11/05/2017. From, \url{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11103745}.}

For this reason, despite that the majority of Arabs living in these states identified as Muslim and that their leaders as well as some Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia also proclaimed an Islamic identity, Hizb ut-Tahrir increasingly viewed Arab nations such as Jordan, Iraq and Syria and their governments, and secular regimes in particular, as \textit{irtidad} (apostate), or, illegitimate non-Muslim states.\footnote{“The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut-Tahrir “The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit; Sankari, “Contemporary Radical Islamism”, in \textit{Political Islam and Human Security}, eds. Fethi Mansouri and Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2009, p.172.} Moreover,
the perceived view by Hizb ut-Tahrir that Arab states had essentially rejected Islam further crystallised that organisation’s notion that those nations, as well as the wider nation state system, so posed a direct challenge to the realisation of an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{552} For al-Nabhani and Hizb ut-Tahrir, Arab nationalism as well as all forms of nationalism so was a failure and, in particular, the key reason for the contemporary decline in Islamic civilisation and hence dominance; both within the Arab and wider Islamic communities.\textsuperscript{553}

Compounded with the rejection of, and hostility towards, Hizb ut-Tahrir by authorities as a legitimate political party, as well as towards al-Nabhani himself, therefore, Hizb ut-Tahrir increasingly took the view that such nations and their governments must be overthrown and replaced with an Islamic state through which society confirms to Islamic law (Shari’a) and thus Islam.\textsuperscript{554} Moreover, in the wake of the Six-day War, Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly shifted towards a cellular organisational structure which is “…heavily influenced by the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary model…” and effective in its ability to reduce infiltration of its leadership.\textsuperscript{555} Therefore, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have moved to increase its

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\textsuperscript{552} American Foreign Policy Council, “\textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{553} “The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut Tahrir "The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa””, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{554} See, for example, Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., pp.8; 34.

\textsuperscript{555} American Foreign Policy Council, “\textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}”, op. cit.
covert abilities and, in particular, intensify its activities throughout the region during this period.

By 1968, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s intensified resolve appears to have manifested when it staged its first concerted attempt to overthrow the Jordanian government. However, this plot was foiled by that nation’s intelligence services. In the wake of the failed coup, Jordanian authorities reportedly revealed that Hizb ut-Tahrir had infiltrated the military through which it recruited and co-opted serviceman in a plan to overthrow that nation’s government. Moreover, it is reported that this infiltration of, and recruitment within, the military had begun in the immediate post-Six Day War period. The failed coup resulted in an undisclosed number of Hizb ut-Tahrir members, as well as members of the Jordanian armed forces, being arrested and subsequently imprisoned for their alleged role in the coup plot.

Despite the coup being foiled, Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly began planning a second coup the following year which was also foiled by the Jordanian intelligence services in 1969. Again, it is reported that Hizb ut-Tahrir had worked with elements within the Jordanian armed forces in an attempt to overthrow that nation’s government. However, it is reported that this second coup attempt was better organised than the first and that “It was orchestrated by the Party and in concert and

557 Ibid.
558 Ibid; Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir, op. cit., pp.34
559 Ibid.
560 Ibid.
in synchrony with sympathetic military officers in Syria and Iraq.”\textsuperscript{561} Therefore, this attempted coup had been conducted by Hizb ut-Tahrir through its growing regional network, signalling a transnational planning and coordination effort, and hence capabilities, despite its ultimate failure and so was unlike the first. Moreover, such coordination and planning abilities suggests Hizb ut-Tahrir had successfully intensified its strategy and associated tactics of missionary and direct political action, or, activism, especially in regards to infiltrating and recruiting members from some three Arab states’ militaries. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s growing regional network and capabilities was further evident when it staged two more coup attempts in that same year in Iraq and Syria which were also foiled by those nations’ authorities in 1969. Again, Hizb ut-Tahrir had infiltrated and recruited members from with those two nations’ militaries.\textsuperscript{562}

In 1971, Hizb ut-Tahrir attempted a third coup to overthrow the Jordanian government but this was again foiled by that nations authorities.\textsuperscript{563} This third attempt and subsequent failure to oust the Jordan government by way of coup had significant consequences for Hizb ut-Tahrir. In addition to outlawing that organisation as a political party in 1953, the Jordanian authorities reportedly increased their monitoring of Hizb ut-Tahrir, arresting and imprisoning its members


\textsuperscript{562} Ibid, p.172-173.

\textsuperscript{563} Ibid, p.173.
which further forced that organisation underground in Jordan; effectively eroding its ability to function in that nation.\textsuperscript{564}

The unsuccessful coups in Jordan, Iraq and Syria and resulting crackdown on Hizb ut-Tahrir by those nations authorities, however, appears not to have diminished its overall operational capacity throughout the region. This was evident when Hizb ut-Tahrir staged a second attempted coup in Iraq in 1972 which too was foiled by the Iraqi authorities.\textsuperscript{565} Moreover, following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, fought between Israel on the one hand and, on the other, Egypt, Syria and Iraq which again resulted in the defeat of those Arab states,\textsuperscript{566} Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have further intensified its activities and associated tactics throughout the region.

This especially appears to have been the case in Egypt where “It was accused of being behind an attempted coup staged in 1974 at the Military Technical College in Heliopolis, and it was banned immediately afterwards.”\textsuperscript{567} However, unlike previous coups, this particular attempt was violent, perpetrated by a cell of Islamic militants led by Salih Sarriyeh. However, it is reported that this cell belonged to a splinter group known as Munazzamt al-Tahrir al-Islami (aka Shabab Muhammad), and so, former members and or associates of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Nevertheless, regardless of whether or not this attempted coup was directly instigated by Hizb ut-Tahrir such action, and in turn responsibility, appears to be at least indirectly linked

\textsuperscript{564} Ibid, p.172.

\textsuperscript{565} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{567} Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., pp.34.
to that group, especially through association despite its claimed rejection of violence.\footnote{Sankari, “Contemporary Radical Islamism”, in \textit{Political Islam and Human Security}, eds. Fethi Mansouri and Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2009, op. cit., p.173.} Further evidence of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s regional intensification came following a third coup attempt in Syria in 1976; again this was foiled by the Syrian authorities. The instigators of this particular coup attempt too were military personal and officials which had been successfully recruited by Hizb ut-Tahrir.\footnote{Ibid.}

Following some ten years of intensified but failed efforts to overthrow an increasing number of Arab states, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have sought to regroup while continuing to build that organisation and its political bass throughout the Middle East. Moreover, on December 11, 1977 Hizb ut-Tahrir’s founder and led ideologue, al-Nabhani, died in Lebanon at the age of 77. The leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir then passed to Abdul Qadeem Bin Yusuf Bin Yunis Bin Ibrahim Al Sheikh Zallum who was originally from Al Kahail (Hebron) in the West Bank, Palestine.\footnote{“The Departure of the Caravan of Hizb ut Tahrir "The Blessed Light that originated from Masjid al Aqsa’””, op. cit.} Moreover, throughout this period, Hizb ut-Tahrir further expanded its activities internationally, establishing a presence in the UK\footnote{Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., pp.34.} and Uzbekistan\footnote{Ibid, p.77; Sankari, “Contemporary Radical Islamism”, in \textit{Political Islam and Human Security}, eds. Fethi Mansouri and Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2009, op. cit., p.174.} in the late-1970s. In addition, Hizb ut-Tahrir had expanded into Tunisia and Libya by the 1980s.\footnote{Sankari, “Contemporary Radical Islamism”, in \textit{Political Islam and Human Security}, eds. Fethi Mansouri and Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2009, op. cit., p.174.} Therefore, it appears Hizb ut-Tahrir was engaged primarily in missionary activities and
associated tactics throughout this period, as opposed to direct political action, or, activism, especially not revolutionary activism.

By 1983, some thirty years after its founding, and following five years of clandestine activities, however, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have revived its political activism. This was made clear when Hizb ut-Tahrir staged a second coup in an attempt to overthrow the Egyptian regime in 1983. Further evidence of this followed when attempted coups were carried out in Tunisia and Libya in that same year. All three attempted coups were foiled by those three nations’ authorities.574 In addition, Hizb ut-Tahrir further expanded to Indonesia in 1983 where it was established by Abdur-Rahman al-Baghdadi who was of Jordanian-Lebanese descent. In 1985, the leadership of the Indonesian branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir was subsequently taken over by Ismail Yusanto who was a geology student at Gajah Mada University in central Java, Indonesia. It is reported that “What started as an underground campus movement today remains largely campus based and enjoys well-attended rallies and meetings without government restrictions.” 575 Moreover, these developments coincided with Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stipulated milestone to achieve the revival of the caliphate within thirty years of its establishment, and thus 1983, which it had failed to do.576

The failure to achieve its stipulated thirty year goal of re-establishing the caliphate moreover appears to have had some impacted on the credibility of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

576 Ibid.
Hence, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have again ‘shelved’ revolutionary activism in the immediate post-1983 years to regroup and further develop its international contours. This especially appears to have been the case in countries where political conditions were not repressive of the group such as in the UK where it intensified its recruitment and indoctrination activities during this period for example.\textsuperscript{577} In particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have primarily engaged in missionary activities and associated tactics, delivering sermons/speeches and producing publications as well as publicly campaigning and raising funds in an effort to advance that organisation’s ideology, tactics and objective and hence manifesto.\textsuperscript{578}

Notwithstanding its reverting to missionary activities as its primary method following the failure to realise its objective by 1983, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have further galvanised its resolve as a result which essentially radicalised that organisation or at least elements within it. This was evident when in 1988 members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were arrested and jailed in Tunisia for allegedly engaging in political revolutionary activities and so seeking to overthrow that nation’s government. However, it is alleged that this plot included some 30 “militants” belonging to Hizb ut-Tahrir who, therefore, sought to engage in ‘armed action’, as well as a further 19 military personal who had been recruited from within the Tunisian armed forces by Hizb ut-Tahrir.\textsuperscript{579} Moreover, additional arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir members were made by Tunisian authorities in that year, as well as in

\textsuperscript{577} Ibid, pp.43-44.
\textsuperscript{578} Ibid.
1990 and 1991 which effectively “decapitated the Liberation Party’s leadership in Tunisia.” Therefore, by 1988, it appears that Hizb ut-Tahrir had begun to manifest elements which sought to intensify that organisation’s methods towards armed struggle, or, jihad. This, in turn, suggesting a further evolutionary phase in Hizb ut-Tahrir was manifesting.

For this reason, these developments attributed to Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period represent a second phase in the evolution of that organisation. In particular, the attempted coups by Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period therefore signalled both a shift and an intensification in tactics. This especially include Hizb ut-Tahrir shifting from solely conducting missionary activities, including political sermons, meetings, public campaigns, and publications, as its primary tactics to recruit, indoctrinate and expand that organisation globally so as to advance its manifesto, and hence ideology, tactics and objective, to one that increasingly engaged in direct political action, or, activism, especially revolutionary political activism, as a key if not primary tactic as well. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s intensification in tactics moreover was mirrored by that group’s geographic expansion throughout the Middle East, as well as Europe, Central Asia, North Africa, and Southeast Asia respectively. In addition to tactics, such a development appears to represent a hardening in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideological convection and resolve to achieve its intended objective(s).

Such developments associated with Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period, consequently, can be deduced to reveal that organisation adhered to a particular Salafist ideology and engaged in both missionary and activist political activities and

580 Ibid.
so tactics. Moreover, this was in pursuit of its intended global caliphate through which to implement its interpretation of Shari’a Law on earth and thus objective; albeit operational to this end in Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, the UK, and Indonesia during this period.

5.4: Hizb ut-Tahrir's Expanding International Presence and Emerging De facto Association with Political Violence

By 1989, Hizb ut-Tahrir had established activities in the U.S. This was made clear when that organisation organised a party conference in Missouri on December 22 of that year. Moreover, it was during this conference that the shifting nature of Hizb ut-Tahrir from missionary-activism towards having an association with political violence was evidenced. This was revealed following the release of an ‘in-house’ report by Hizb ut-Tahrir: “This report also discussed the theological foundations of armed insurrection against any “unfaithful” government.”

This report, in turn, essentially outlined a new framework of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s views on, among other things, armed conflict and violence, and hence jihad, against particular states; a method previously considered to only be legitimate if employed by the leader (caliph) of that group’s envisioned Islamic state(s). Furthermore, it is reported that this development resulted from emerging dissatisfaction amongst members over that group’s commitment to non-violence; a method that reportedly

was increasingly perceived amongst the ‘new generation’ of members as being detrimental to the objective(s) of Hizb ut-Tahrir.  

The report presented at the party conference in Missouri “was later published and disseminated in many languages as “The Way to Renew Hizb ut-Tahrir”.” Therefore, the conference report and its subsequent publication signalled both an official and unprecedented development in that it called for a strategic and hence tactical shift in the method of Hizb ut-Tahrir through which to achieve its global objective. Consequently, such developments suggest a third phase in the evolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Calls for a shift towards political violence against any “unfaithful government”, and hence Arab or Muslim states, by elements within Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, appear not to have been acted on, at least not in the extent of all out armed conflict. Rather, such evolution, or radicalisation, appears to have manifest in the readiness to indirectly engage in violence by way of organising and supporting such acts, including assassination. This appears to have been evidenced when Hizb ut-Tahrir sought to carry out a forth coup in Jordan in 1993. In particular, it is reported that “…Jordanian security agents uncovered HT plots to use military elements to assassinate King Hussein and seize power. Party members were again arrested, prosecuted, and given heavy sentences.” For this reason, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s

582 Ibid.

583 Ibid.

method and so tactic of revolutionary activism evolved to include a deliberate but de facto association with political violence, or, jihad.

Alongside the shift towards developing a de facto association with political violence, Hizb ut-Tahrir further expanded globally and attracted new members throughout this period. This especially appears to have been the case in Central Asia where Hizb ut-Tahrir had begun to intensify its activities and attract new members under the leadership of a Jordanian named Salahuddin in the Ferghana Valley region of Uzbekistan in the mid-1990s.585 To this end, Hizb ut-tahrir continued to propagate its manifesto through missionary work and associated tactics, especially through the dissemination of materials and literature published by that organisation.586

The development of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan moreover came in the wake of significant geopolitical shifts in Central Asia, resulting from the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991.587 This, in turn, led to the five Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan gaining their independence; countries where most religious organisations, including Islamic, had been banned by the USSR in an effort to eradicate religion.588 However, such anti-religious laws as well as restrictions on speech were loosened following independence, leading to a revival of Islamic

586 Ibid.
588 Ibid, pp.70-71.
organisations and political groups which had otherwise been forced to operate covertly, including radical and violent ones which remained outlawed regardless.\textsuperscript{589}

Despite this, the post-soviet area in Central Asia was one of economic, political and social instability, with governments having limited means to effectively cure what was essentially a surge in Islamism throughout the region, especially fuelled by the previous decade-long ‘Afghan-jihad’ against the Soviets in Afghanistan between 1979-1989.\textsuperscript{590} Consequently, throughout the mid- to late-1990s, Hizb ut-Tahrir continued to intensify its activities in Uzbekistan while working to further expand that organisations influence in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{591} Moreover, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have further developed its roots in the UK and U.S during this period, as well as moved to establish roots in Pakistan, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, and Russia where it was banned in 1999.\textsuperscript{592}

In February 1999, moreover, the Uzbekistan authorities accused Hizb ut-Tahrir of carrying out an attack in Tashkent where a bomb was detonated, though this charge this was later retracted by the authorities.\textsuperscript{593} Following this development, Hizb ut-Tahrir published its first leaflet on Uzbekistan in April 1999 in which it reportedly responded to the authorities’ accusations of violence made by the group. This was then followed by a regular publication and dissemination of leaflets, including an

\textsuperscript{589} Ibid, p.74.
\textsuperscript{590} Ibid, p.73-74.
\textsuperscript{592} See, for example, Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., pp.36-42; “Hizb ut-Tahrir Overview”, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{593} Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., pp.77-78.
estimated 1000,000 copies or more of a particular leaflet print-run in some cases, which occurred about twice a month.\textsuperscript{594} It was from this point on, moreover, that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s dissident views began to target the Uzbekistan government. Subsequently, the Uzbekistani authorities intensified their efforts to suppress that group, as well as other Islamist groups, increasing surveillance and arresting its members on mass to this end.\textsuperscript{595} The Uzbekistan authorities estimated Hizb ut-Tahrir had some 1000 members in that country in 2000, \textsuperscript{596} while additional members reportedly relocated to the other Central Asian republics following the crackdown by authorities on that organisation in Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{597}

In addition to intensifying its missionary activities and associated tactics in Central Asia, as well as in the West, Russia and Pakistan, throughout this period, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have continued to develop its de facto association with political violence. This appears to have been the case when Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly attended a meeting alongside known Islamic extremist groups in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in 2000; an event organised by the leadership of the Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiyah which was closely associated with al-Qaeda at the time.\textsuperscript{598}

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\textsuperscript{594} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{596} Ibid, p.176.

\textsuperscript{597} Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., pp.78.

\textsuperscript{598} Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., p.52. JI is now a known affiliate of the Islamic State, among others, which pledged its allegiance to that extremist group in July 2014. See: Counter Extremism Project, “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)”, Retrieved, 31/05/2017, From, \url{https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jemaah-islamiyah-ji}.  

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Such a development moreover appears to have coincided with that organisation’s development of its online capabilities, particularly through its website(s) which increasingly published and disseminated pro-violent materials online. This was evidenced in June 2001 when Hizb ut-Tahrir revealed its support for violence, including suicide bombing attacks, in its Martyrdom Operations article published online in Al-Waie (Journal of Awareness); a magazine published in multiple languages and hence disseminated throughout that group’s global network.599 To this end, Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly stated:

all ways and means which a Muslim uses to kill unbelievers is permitted as long as the enemy unbeliever is killed—whether they are killed by weapons from afar or if their ranks are penetrated; whether their stronghold is captured and penetrated before their eyes, or whether you blow up their planes or shoot them down; or whether you blow yourself up amongst their military encampments or blow yourself and them up with a belt of explosives. All of these are permissible means of fighting unbelievers.600

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stated support for the use, and hence legitimacy, of such suicide attacks in Martyrdom Operations, moreover, reportedly made particular reference to Jewish women, children and the elderly, stating:

“It is well known that among the Jews in Palestine, men and women fight alongside one another. . . . This indicates that if a woman is a fighter, then one


600 Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir, op. cit., p.50.
is permitted to kill her... As for very old men, if they are involved in planning attacks in which Muslims are killed, then one is allowed to kill him.”

Further evidence of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s emerging de facto association with violence was revealed in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S when that organisation published and disseminated a leaflet titled, “Alliance with America is a great crime forbidden by Islam” on September 18, 2001. This particular leaflet reportedly “…advised Muslims not to help the United States.” Moreover, on that the very same day, Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly realised a “Political Comment” which essentially sought to justify the 9/11 attacks stating that “The American tyranny and arrogance has reached a level that led many to believe that the only way to dent her pride is to rub her nose in the sand.” Additional literature advancing pro-violent sentiments was reportedly published and disseminated by Hizb ut-Tahrir in October 2001, stating that the “U.S. and Great Britain declare war against Islam and Muslims” and consider from now on Muslims “are in a state of war”. This was realised in the wake of the U.S-led and UN-backed invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11 which, therefore, appears to have been the catalyst for this particular statement.

In February 2002, literature explicitly condoning violence was published in that month’s 204th edition of Al-Waie. In particular, it praised a 22 year-old Palestinian

602 Ibid.
603 Ibid.
604 Ibid.
mother of two who had blown herself up in a suicide bomb attack, describing her as a “female martyr” who was “heroic” and that her actions were “worthy of every Muslim”.\textsuperscript{605} Moreover, on March 31 of that year, Hizb ut-Tahrir published a leaflet which further evidenced that organisations de facto support for violence against Jews and Israel in which it stated:

The martyrdom operations that are taking place against them [Jews/Israel] are legitimate. … Today the Mujahideen in Palestine provide us with the best of examples: The youth are competing in the martyrdom operations. Young girls have started to compete with the young men for martyrdom. Mothers are pushing their sons to become shaheed, and they make Sujood in thanks to Allah when they hear the news of the martyrdom of their sons.\textsuperscript{606}

In that same year, Danish authorities prosecuted Hizb ut-Tahrir’s leader in Denmark, Fadi Abdel Latif who was “…convicted of incitement of racial hatred and sentenced to sixty days in prison after the group circulated the now infamous leaflet urging people to “Kill them, kill the Jews wherever you find them.”\textsuperscript{607} Subsequently, Danish authorities have considered banning Hizb ut-Tahrir in that country on the basis of propagating ‘hate speech’ but to date have not done so.\textsuperscript{608}

\textsuperscript{605} Ibid, pp.51-52.


\textsuperscript{607} Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., p.40; “Hizb ut-Tahrir Overview”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{608} Ibid.
These pro-violent and anti-Semitic activities also coincided with increased coordination by Hizb ut-Tahrir branches globally through which it appears to have ‘internationalised’ its activist campaigns, with the UK branch acting as its ‘international HQ’. 609 This was evidenced when Hizb ut-Tahrir began to protest in the UK against the Uzbekistan government following increased crackdowns by that state on that group. In particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir “…organized meetings and demonstrations in front of Uzbekistan’s embassy in London. On August 25, 2002, HT sent a copy of an “Open Letter” to the Uzbekistani embassy in London”. 610 Therefore, signalling a further intensification in that groups activist activities.

Hizb ut-Tahrir also disseminated anti-Jewish and pro-violent materials in Germany in 2002, including through a German language publication Explizit. To this regard, the German Interior Minister, Otto Schily, publicly stated that Hizb ut-Tahrir “spreads anti-Jewish and anti-Israel hate propaganda” and that it “promotes the use of violence to achieve political goals and also wants to provoke violence”, as well as that he organisation “pursues the political goal of destroying Israel and calls for the expulsion and killing of Jews.” 611 For this reason, Hizb ut-Tahrir was legally banned in Germany on January 15, 2003. 612

Such pro-violent literature published and disseminated by Hizb ut-Tahrir furthermore was followed by elements and former members of that group

611 Ibid, op. cit., p.38.
612 Ibid.
reportedly being responsible for a number of violent attacks. This included a suicide bombing that killed three people and wounded some 50 in Tel Aviv, Israel on April 30, 2003.\textsuperscript{613} This attack was carried out by Asif Muhammad Hani and Omar Khan Sharif who were both British citizens, however, the latter bombers explosives failed to detonate. Both men were identified as being associated with HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) and al-Muhajiroun, an extremist offshoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir which operated between 1996 and 2004. Additionally, Sharif was reportedly an associate of Hizb ut-Tahrir.\textsuperscript{614}

This indirect, but seemingly ‘linked’, association to such an act of violence was followed by the publication of a leaflet in May 2003 by Hizb ut-Tahrir that reportedly stated, “…that jihad against unbelievers is the only type of jihad. … and that September 11 comes every year”.\textsuperscript{615} This was followed by a statement on October 11, 2003 wherein Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly “…suggested that the Turkish military should kill Americans and work with HT to rebuild the Caliphate.”\textsuperscript{616} Moreover, such pro-violent literature disseminated throughout the early 2000s especially emphasised and sought to advance Hizb ut-Tahrir’s view of an inevitable and impending ‘clash of civilisations’ between Islam and the world, mainly with the West. It further sought to legitimise such violence, including suicide bombings, as a defensive and hence ethical method of jihad approved in

\textsuperscript{613} Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., p.53; “Hizb ut-Tahrir Overview”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{614} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{615} Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., p.52.

\textsuperscript{616} Ibid.
Islam. These activities emerged in the wake of the U.S-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 which appears to have further radicalised Hizb ut-Tahrir, especially with the view of inciting violence and establishing a caliphate.618

On June 9, 2003, moreover, Hizb ut-Tahrir was again linked to violence when some 121 Islamic militants were arrested in Moscow, Russia where it had been listed as a terrorist organisation in February that year.619 Russia’s Federal Security Services (FSB) identified 55 of the accused militants as suspected members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. FSB spokesman, Sergei Ignatchenko, stated: “These are terrorists who want to overthrow the existing regime by military means.”620 It was further reported that:

among those arrested were the cell’s leaders, Alisher Musayev, a Kyrgyzstani citizen, and Akram Jalalov, a Tajikistani citizen, who were found in possession of explosive material, detonator devices, three grenades and 15 HT leaflets. Since the outlawing of the group, more than 55 HT members have been arrested and prosecuted in court.621

617 Ibid.
618 Ibid, p.23.
620 Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir, op. cit., p.41.
621 Ibid, pp.41-42.
On December 16, 2003, the head of Russia’s FSB, Nikolai Patrushey, further stated that Hizb ut-Tahrir had “organized armed units and took part in these units”. 622

In 2004, Hizb ut-Tahrir was linked to extremism in the UK when British authorities arrested a known Hizb ut-Tahrir member who had reportedly joined al-Qaeda and who was plotting an attack in New York on financial targets. 623 In July that year, Hizb ut-Tahrir was linked to attacks against the American and Israeli embassies in Uzbekistan. These attacks were carried out by the Islamic Jihad Union, a splinter group of Hizb ut-Tahrir. 624 Moreover, it is estimated that Hizb ut-Tahrir had grown in Uzbekistan to anywhere between 7,000 and 60,000 members by 2004. 625 During this same period, it is reported that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s membership grow to include between “…3,000–5,000 members in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The number is much smaller in Kazakhstan, where there are estimated to be no more than 300 HT members. HT has also yet to establish a noticeable presence in Turkmenistan.” 626 However, as of mid-2017, it is estimated that Hizb ut-Tahrir has between 20,000 and 100,000 members in throughout the five Central Asia states where it is also banned. 627

622 Ibid, p.41.
623 “Hizb ut-Tahrir Overview”, op. cit.
624 Ibid.
625 Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir, op. cit., pp.78.
626 Ibid, p.78.
627 “Hizb ut-Tahrir Overview”, op. cit.
Additionally, despite being banned in Pakistan in 2003, following an increase in activities during the post-9/11 years, Hizb ut-Tahrir members were reportedly arrested in early 2004 for “…criticizing Pakistan’s Wana operation aimed at uprooting extremism and terrorists from South Waziristan”. It is reported that during this period Pakistani authorities also suspect Hizb ut-Tahrir of being “…supported by extremist groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Sepah-e Sahaba, and Tanzeem’e Islami Pakistan in its work to recreate the Caliphate in Central Asia.”

Coinciding with its growth in Central Asia and Pakistan and its reported links to violence and extremist groups there, moreover, Hizb ut-Tahrir shifted towards more direct political action and hence tactics in those regions during this period. In particular, by May 2005, Hizb ut-Tahrir began to stage public rallies and demonstrations as well as riot against the Uzbekistan regime. It is reported that during this revolt Hizb ut-Tahrir was further involved, along with other radical and extremist groups, in an attempted prison break in Andijon; thought this is denied by Hizb ut-Tahrir. For this reason, the authorities further intensified their counter-operations and measures against Hizb ut-Tahrir, as well as other

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628 Ibid.

629 Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir, op. cit., p.42.

630 Ibid.


632 “Hizb ut-Tahrir Overview”, op. cit.
Islamist groups, resulting in an estimated 169-745 people reportedly being killed in the crackdown that followed by the Uzbekistan authorities.\footnote{Sankari, “Contemporary Radical Islamism”, in Political Islam and Human Security, eds. Fethi Mansouri and Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2009, op. cit., p.176.}

On July 29, 2006, moreover, German authorities identified Hizb ut-Tahrir as being associated with Youssef Mohammed el-Hajdib, one of the two Lebanese men caught carrying suitcases containing propane-gas explosives onto trains in that country, though this is denied by Hizb ut-Tahrir. Additionally, in September 2007, three members of the Islamic Jihad Union splinter group were arrested in Germany for plotting an attack on military and civilian airports as well as night clubs and restaurants.\footnote{“Hizb ut-Tahrir Overview”, op. cit.}

Additional links to violence were reported between 2010 and April 2015. The Counter-Terrorism Project, a not-for-profit and non-partisan research organisation based in New York, Brussels and London, reports that Hizb ut-Tahrir has been linked, either indirectly or directly, to a further four violent plots and two attacks around the world. This includes:

- November 4, 2010: Russian police say they have prevented an HT cell from blowing up a railway track near a Moscow train station.
- November 2012: Early in the month, Russian authorities arrest 18 Russian and Tajik citizens allegedly plotting bomb attacks around Moscow. After searching their apartments, authorities find “counterfeit money worth $1 million and 2 million euros”, as well as guns and explosives. On
November 16, authorities charge nine Russian and Tajik citizens with belonging to HT, which is banned in those countries.

- December 2014: Iranian-born Australian Man Haron Monis takes more than a dozen people hostage at Sydney’s Lindt Chocolate Café. Monis and two hostages are killed after a 16-hour standoff with police. Monis had attended a June 2014 HT lecture on the failings of the West.

- March 2015: Bangladeshi police arrest Islamist blogger Farabi Shafiur Rahman in connection with the February 26, 2015, murder of atheist writer Avijit Roy. Police accuse Rahman of belonging to HT and threatening over social media to kill Roy prior to his murder in a knife attack.

- Late March 2015: Turkish police stop nine British citizens from crossing into Syria to join jihadist groups. British police reveal that one of the nine, Waheed Ahmed - a student at Manchester University and the son of Rochdale town councillor Shakil Ahmed - is a member of HT. HT Britain’s chairman, Dr. Abdul Waheed, denies that Ahmed is a member.

- April 2015: British media report that individuals associated with HT and the Nusra Front attacked civil activists in Aleppo, Syria. HT Britain denies the reports.635

These reported violent incidents, however, are categorically rejected by Hizb ut-Tahrir. Rather, according to its Australian branch leader, Uthman Badar who sated

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635 Ibid.
in an interview with the Guardian in 2015, “No Hizb ut-Tahrir member has been prosecuted (let alone convicted) for a terrorism-related offence.”

Throughout this period, moreover, Hizb ut-Tahrir continued to intensify its missionary and activist activities and associated tactics. This especially appears to have been the case in Pakistan, as well as Bangladesh where it emerged in the mid-to-late-2000s. In particular, on May 9, 2010, the Pakistan branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir released a video recording on YouTube titled “Declaration from Hizb ut-Tahrir Pakistan to the People of Power”. In this recording, Hizb ut-Tahrir advocated, among other things, the overthrowing of the Pakistan government and the establishment of the caliphate. Moreover, the incitement to overthrow the Pakistani government by Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have manifested when members of that group were arrested in an attempted coup in June 2011. Like previous coup attempts, Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly infiltrated the Pakistani armed forces and recruited personal in an effort to stage the coup and was organised by “…a brigadier and four other senior officers were arrested and found to have links to the group.”

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636 See, for example, “Hizb ut-Tahrir: is it now an offence to oppose government policy?”


With its growing support base in Bangladesh, where it was banned in 2009, Hizb ut-Tahrir reportedly plotted to overthrow that country’s government in January 2012. A Bangladesh military spokesperson reportedly confirmed in a press conference held on January 19, 2012, that the planned coup, which was allegedly organised by Major Syed Mohammad Ziaul Huq and foiled by Bangladeshi authorities on December 22, 2011, included:

“up to 16 Islamist military officers – including at least two retired officers were involved.” The spokesperson also added that these officers had “extreme religious views” and that, interestingly, the coup to oust Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government “was instigated by Bangladeshi conspirators living abroad.”

Evidence of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s expanding and intensifying global activities also emerged when that organisation established activities in Afghanistan during this period too, evidenced when that organisation organised a so-called conference on “corruption” in Kabul in April 2012. Moreover, Hizb ut-Tahrir incited and organised anti-U.S protests around the world following the release of the film *Innocents of Islam* in 2012, including in Sydney, Australia where it too became established and increasingly active in the post-9/11 period; investigated for links

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639 American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.
640 “Hizb ut-Tahrir and its failed coup in Bangladesh”, op. cit.
641 Ibid.
642 American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.
with extremism in 2005 and again in 2007. Protests were also staged in London and Jakarta where Hizb ut-Tahrir stated that such a film produced and disseminated in the U.S was “a declaration of war” and where protests stated “Under Islamic law, the film director must be punished by death,”. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir’s involvement in the protests appears to have been non-violent in nature, however, some protests quickly escalated into riots and violence such as in Sydney which Hizb ut-Tahrir denies instigating.

Such internationalised activism carried out by Hizb ut-Tahrir continued in the wake of the Arab Spring and, in particular, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war which erupted in late-2011. In particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have increased its focus on Arab states, especially Syria, staging demonstrations, as well as ‘conferences’ and public meetings, and hence missionary work, around the world since 2012. Such activism and missionary activities and so tactics have been carried out in the U.S, UK, Denmark, Australia, Jordan, Palestine, and Syria among other


646 Ibid.

647 American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.
countries. Hizb ut-Tahrir has also increasingly appeared on current affairs television shows in Western nations, especially in the wake of a terrorist attack in the West as well as the rise of IS. These interviews have sought to clarify that organisations manifesto, and hence ideology, tactics and objectives, admits concerns that group may support violence and extremism indirectly. This has included interviews in Australia on News Night in 2013 and ABC TV’s Lateline in 2013 and 2014 for example, as well as press realise to the wider media.

Although not a violent action in itself, in addition to providing a platform to further advocate its manifesto, such activities have alluded to Hizb ut-Tahrir’s de facto support for violence. This was evidenced in January 2015, when that group released a press statement refusing to condemn the Islamic extremist attack on the offices of the satirical news magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France. The statement, entitled “We Will Not Abandon Our Prophet”, released by the leader of the Australian branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Ismail Alwahwah, stated:

The group’s refusal to 'succumb to the woeful moral ambivalence of the West' should be seen as good news for Muslims, who must resist the vile and racist views of many European powers. …the political response to the massacre in Paris was unprecedented and disproportionate when compared with how many lose their lives every day.

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648 Ibid.


650 Sarah Carty, “Controversial Australian Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir refuses to condemn terrorist attacks in Paris... and calls on Muslims to resist the 'vile and racist' West”, Updated
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s refusal, and purported justification for this, to condemn Islamic extremism was again made clear when Australian branch leader, Badar, stated in an interview with the Guardian in February 2015:

That we would support Isis is absurd. But neither will we condemn them, despite the demands made of us by the media. We refuse the superficial politics of condemnation engaged in by western states to further a pernicious agenda of more war and intervention, which, importantly, is what gave rise to groups such as Isis in the first instance.651

Such statements appear to have sought to generate greater support for Hizb ut-Tahrir and its manifesto by essentially ridiculing the Western and other powers and accusing them of generating Islamic extremism, including IS. Moreover, to this end, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have increasingly engaged in activist activities which sought to harness such issues as human-rights, or, in particular, ‘Muslim rights’, and anti-war sentiment, especially in relation to conflicts wherein Muslims are being killed.652 For example, this included a protest in Sydney by Hizb ut-Tahrir in 2016 condemning abuses committed by some Arab dictatorships towards Muslims during and after the Arab Spring. Additionally, they opposed Russian, Iranian, Syrian, and U.S involvement in the Syrian civil war, referring these powers to an “axis of evil” while calling for Russia to end its support for the Assad regime and

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651 See, for example, “Hizb ut-Tahrir: is it now an offence to oppose government policy?”, op. cit.

652 American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.
for Muslims to reject the “tyrant” West. Rather, Hizb ut-Tahrir called on Muslims to reject democracy and to advance “global Islamic rule”. 653

Although these particular activities appear not to suggest any support for violence, indirectly or directly, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have simultaneously continued to advocate such de facto support for violence throughout this period nevertheless. This is especially evidenced in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ongoing view not to reject the use of Islamic armed struggle (jihad), a view explicitly revealed in that organisation’s online manifesto which states as of 2017:

Whenever there is a Muslim amir who declares jihad to enhance the Word of Allah (swt) and mobilises the people to do that, the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir will respond in their capacity as Muslims in the country where the general call to arms was proclaimed. 654

Such a statement therefore appears to evidence a link between Hizb ut-Tahrir and de facto support for violence. Moreover, as noted above, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s view on jihad is one that is to be employed upon the establishment of its envisioned caliphate and is a divine obligation so as to expand Islam and such a caliphate globally; a belief that group has held since its inception. 655 Therefore, jihad is impending upon the ‘right’ contextual conditions to emerge and so the establishment of an Islamic

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654 Hizb-ut-Tahrir, op. cit.


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state by Hizb ut-Tahrir. Nevertheless, this suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir is prepared to use violence when and if it establishes an Islamic state; thus rebuffing that groups purported commitment to non-violence. This approach towards violence by Hizb ut-Tahrir has been summarised in two ways: “The first is to say that they have been committed to non-violence for fifty years. The second is to say that they have been waiting fifty years for the right moment to begin violent struggle.”

Despite its purported official non-violence stance, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s views and associated activates evidenced between 1989 and 2017, therefore, allude to the fact that, in addition to having a polity supporting the waging of jihad following the establishment of a caliphate, it moved to establish de facto support for violence throughout this period. This appears to have intensified in the wake of 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in October 2001 and March 2003 respectively. In particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s missionary and activist activities and associated tactics shifted to advancing such de facto support for violence during this period. Consequently, despite unverified claims being made by some politicians and governments such as Russia for example, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears not to have carried out any act of terrorism, extremism or violence to date. Rather, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities during this period suggests that group has increasingly engaged in de facto support for violence and, therefore, is in the process of radicalising and, perhaps, a

656 Ibid; American Foreign Policy Council, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.

‘generator’ of extremism, or, both; a particular view supported by some academics and analysts.\textsuperscript{658}

It appears that such a de facto shift towards violence and so tactics during this period, furthermore, was underpinned by a hardening in ideological convection and a nuanced realisation of its objective. Therefore, throughout this period, Hizb ut-Tahrir can be understood as adhering to a particular Salafist ideological orientation of Political Islamic and sought the objective of a global caliphate, employing both missionary and activist tactics to this end; albeit advancing de facto support for violence. Collectively, these developments represent a third phase in the evolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir and its contemporary manifestation as a Political Islamic group.

\textsuperscript{658} Ibid; Baran, \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., p.50;
Chapter Six
Case Study 4: United Malay National Organisation

6.1: Introduction

This chapter examines the ideology, tactics and objectives of the UMNO, an organisation which appears to correspond to a moderate orientation of contemporary Political Islam. Analysis is conducted chronologically tracking the evolution of the UMNO from its inception which in turn provides a way to illuminate any potential transformations in ideology, tactics and objectives. Together, these are argued in this thesis to produce observed orientations in Political Islam, and hence the UMNO. Analysis also looks for key political, social and economic developments responsible for impacting and shaping these key contours and, hence, orientation of the UMNO; thus generative mechanisms. Analysis therefore is geared to illuminating maximum insight into how and why diversity has manifest in the UMNO thus far. Moreover, findings will be deduced, collated and harnessed as key sets of corresponding cognitive analysis through which to theoretically frame primary contours and generative mechanisms manifest in contemporary Political Islam. Accordingly, findings will be formulated and evidenced into the hypothesised multi-dimensional paradigm of contemporary Political Islam of this thesis.

Founded in 1946, the Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (United Malay National Organisation – UMNO) is Malaysia’s largest political party, currently led by Malaysian Prime Minister (PM), Najib Razak. It is a founding and the lead-
member of the multi-ethnic Barisan Nasional coalition (BN – National Front - formally the Alliance) and has dominated Malaysian politics since its inception. Hence, the UMNO has won all thirteen general elections since independence from Britain in 1957, with each of Malaysia's six PMs subsequently being UMNO members.659 Therefore, as at the time of this research, the UMNO represents the longest democratically elected single-party rule of a state, some 60-plus years.660

The UMNO is founded on the idea of and belief in ‘Malay nationalism’ which amalgamates ethnic Malay identity with Sunni Islam to form a particular ethnoreligious identity. The term Malay in the native bahasa melayu dialect is synonymous with, and so means, Muslim.661 Such identity forms the cornerstone of UMNO doctrine and is embedded in the Malaysian Constitution which states: “…Islam is the official religion of the country”662 and that the Malay Sultans which manage Islamic affairs in the nine states “…are the guardians and “protectors of Malay culture and religion.”663

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Malay nationalism therefore is fundamentally concerned with and advocates Malay, hereafter Malay-Muslim, dominance over other religious and ethnic groups. However, the UMNO appears to have sought to balance Malay-Muslim nationalism with polities that support ethnic and religious pluralism which, also, is embedded in that nation’s constitution as formulated by the UMNO. The UMNO has also sought to advance secular development, especially within the context of socio-economic development; albeit this has discriminated against minorities in favour of Malay-Muslims since the 1980s.

Notwithstanding its overt support for Malay-Muslims, the UMNO appears not to be a dogmatic form of Political Islam but, rather, has long sought to balance Malaysia’s multi-ethno-religious diversity in the context of ‘identity politics’. Moreover, such balancing has been evidenced in the UMNOs position on Shari’a Law in Malaysia which is applied through Shari’a courts and parallels civil/secular courts and applies only to Malay-Muslims. However, apostasy as well as

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668 The majority of Shari’a-compliant Laws in Malaysia are applied only to Muslims and, if desired, non-Muslims who may choose either judicial system. However, there is concern that non-Muslims Malaysians are not treated equally by Shari’a courts with rulings often appearing to favour Muslims over non-Muslims. See, for example, Jennifer Park, “Malaysia’s parallel judicial systems come up against legal challengers”, British Broadcasting Company, September 5, 2011, Retrieved, 30/04/2014, From, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-radio-and-tv-14630851, p.1.
blasphemy towards Islam, which is criminalised, applies to all members of Malaysian society.\footnote{Freedom House, Policy Belief: The Impact of Blasphemy Laws on Human Rights – Malaysia, October 21, 2010, Retrieved, 7/07/2017, From, \url{http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d5a700a2.html}.} Furthermore, in recent times, Shari’a Law appears to have become increasingly rigid in both application and enforcement, including the passing of a law criminalising \textit{khalwat} (close proximity) between men and woman out of wedlock, for example.\footnote{“Khalwat raids make Malaysia tougher than Saudi Arabia”, \textit{Free Malaysia Today}, December 17, 2016, Retrieved, 15/07/2017, From, \url{http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2016/12/17/khalwat-raids-make-malaysia-tougher-than-saudi-arabia/}.} Nevertheless, the UMNO has long rejected more hard-line interpretations of Shari’a Law, especially those which include the harsh \textit{hudud} penal code. Such interpretations are particularly embraced by Jihadists and Islamists such as the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) which seeks to establish an ‘Islamic state’ in Malaysia wherein Shari’a Law, including \textit{hudud}, would be mandatory for all Malaysians.\footnote{Peletz, G. Michele, “Islam and the Cultural Politics of Legitimacy: Malaysia in the Aftermath of September 11”, in \textit{Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization}, Edited by, Robert W. Hefiner (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 255.}

In essence, the UMNO opposes mandatory Shari’a Law and its intensification through \textit{hudud} which, if enacted, would transform Malaysia into an Islamic state based on what it considers to be ‘deviant/resurgent’ Islamic fundamentalist teachings and ideologies that have been on the rise since independence, and since the 1970s especially. Consequently, it appears the UMNO takes a somewhat moderate, yet also conservative, approach to Shari’a Law.\footnote{McAmis, \textit{Malay Muslims}, op. cit., pp.84-85.}
However, in the wake of rising levels of resurgent Islam, or Islamism, following the May 13, 1969 race riots there has been increased concern over UMNO engagement in activities and policies which, alongside the influence of Islamism particularly, have resulted in the ‘Islamisation’ of Malaysia, to the extent of “a phenomenon of social change with distinct political implications.”\textsuperscript{673} In particular, the UMNO intensified its support for Malay-Muslim supremacy by making it illegal to challenge “…the status of Islam, the special position of the Malays, the Malay language, and the Malay sultans.”\textsuperscript{674} Additionally, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the UMNO, as well as Islamists such as the PAS especially, further intensified their Islamisation program in Malaysia. This is evidenced in that organisation’s increased support for Islamic schools and education as well as the large number of UMNO-sponsored Mosques built since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{675}

Such Islamisation activities, and allied tactics, by the UMNO derive from and invoke the Islamic concept and activity of da’wa that propagates and advances that group’s doctrine within society and, ultimately, politically.\textsuperscript{676} The UMNOs da’wa program of state-sponsored Islamic institutions moreover is essentially a mechanism through which to monitor and develop Islam in Malaysia in accordance with UMNO doctrine.\textsuperscript{677} The use of such da’wa methods by the UMNO has

\textsuperscript{673} Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., p.43.


\textsuperscript{676} Ibid, p.591.

\textsuperscript{677} Ibid, pp.587; 594-595.
continued in the post-9/11 era, particularly following the rise of Jihadist ideologies and actors in Malaysia, some of which have reported links to al-Qaeda and IS. 678

The UMNO’s engagement in the Islamisation of Malaysia furthermore appears to be directly linked to that group’s fundamental belief that it is the “protector of Islam” in Malaysia.679 To this end, the UMNO has sought to counter non-Islamic influences seen as a threat to Malay-Muslim identity and aspirations, especially in the socio-economic sphere.680 In particular, the UMNO has sought to protect Malay-Muslims, as well as wider Malaysian society, from the rise of ‘radical’ national and pan-national movements which emerged prior to independence. The UMNO originally worked alongside the British Malay government to this end, despite having grievances with it.681 Moreover, such radical movements especially included deviant and or resurgent forms of Islam that have particularly threatened the stability of Malaysia, notably Islamism and Jihadism since the 1970s and 1980s respectively.682

The UMNO’s Islamisation program seemingly aims to protect Malay-Muslims by, ironically, increasingly seeking to ‘out Islamise’ such orientations of Political Islam, and to deny them ‘political space’, and thus a foothold in Malaysia. This, in turn, has led to the UMNO increasingly challenging and competing with such

678 Ibid, pp.593-594.

679 McAmis, Malay Muslims, op. cit., pp.87-88.


681 Ibid, pp.483-484.


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groups as the PAS for legitimacy as the ‘true’ Islamic party representative of Malay-Muslims.\textsuperscript{683} Consequently, in the midst of an environment of growing Islamisation, the UMNO has engaged in a concerted effort to, first, legitimise and advance its Malay-Muslim nationalist doctrine and, second, further cement its influence and control over Islamic affairs so as to protect such a doctrine and related institutions in Malaysia.\textsuperscript{684}

For these reasons, the UMNO’s doctrine of Malay-Muslim nationalism, through primacy and limited support for Shari’a Law as well as its Islamisation program, therefore appears neither Jihadist nor Islamist in nature. This appears to be especially evidenced in that the UMNO has long sought to balance key society issues, especially religious and ethnic, while at the same time combatting Islamism and Jihadism. Therefore, comparatively, the UMNO takes a more moderate, yet conservative, approach to governing on the spectrum of Political Islam, and indeed Malaysian politics; albeit increasingly engaging in activities closely associated with Islamism. In particular, the UMNO appears to represent a particular orientation of Sunni-inspired Conservative Political Islam. Moreover, it appears to operate within the confines of the Malaysian State through which it seeks to advance and protect Malay-Muslim identity and dominance within the context of a wider multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, and hence appears to have a national objective. To this end, the UMNO appears to engage in and employ a range of tactics associated with ‘mainstream’ politics, notably state and federal elections, as well engaging as da’wa activities and tactics as of the 1970s; referred to in this thesis as activist and

\textsuperscript{683} Ibid, pp.588-589.

\textsuperscript{684} Ibid, p.587.
missionary tactics. Consequently, the UMNO is unlike Jihadist or Islamist orientations examined elsewhere in this thesis, especially in terms of ideology, tactics and objectives. The apparent conservative ideological orientation of Political Islam observed as manifest in Malaysia, as well as the tactics and objectives of the UMNO, provide important insight into illuminating key diversity in contemporary Political Islam, which contrasts with previous cases examined in this thesis.

6.2: Formation and Accent of the UMNO

The formation of the UMNO in May 1946 came in the immediate wake of the signing of the MacMichael Treaties and Agreement between the Malay Sultans and British.685 This formed the legal basis for the planed Malayan Union advocated by the British following their return to power in 1945 after the defeat of the Japanese in WWII.686 In particular, the agreement determined that the Straits Settlements, Federated Malay States and the Non-Federated Malay States, which collectively formed British Malaya, would merge to form one state and thus the Malayan Union, while Singapore would become a separate colony.687 The Malayan Union agreement, which was underpinned by a democratic and secular orientated constitution, was formally released as a White Paper on the 22nd of January 1946.688

The constitution stipulated that the Malayan Union “...would transfer political power from the sultans to a central government in Kuala Lumpur and that would

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687 Ibid, p. 488.

grant all people in Malaya, regardless of race or religion, equal rights as citizens.”689 This, in turn, effectively negated all sovereignty of the Malay Sultans over the Malay states and extended citizenship to immigrant communities, and thus end Malay-Muslim primacy.690

Democratisation through the proposed Malayan Union, consequently, was precieved as detrimental to Malay-Muslims political standing and prestige. In addition, the Malayan Union become increasingly viewed as fundamentally threatening the socio-economic position of Malay-Muslims. This was especially concerned with the significant influx of Chinese and Indian labourers which had been brought in by the British and had come to play an important and intricate, if not dominant, role in the economic growth of British Malaya. This was in contrast to Malay-Muslims who had largely been left behind as a result of the British safeguarding traditional Malay-Muslim society, politically, economically as well as culturally.691

For these reasons, the Malay-Muslim community considered the proposed Malayan Union as a betrayal of the original treaties signed by the Malay Sultans and British between 1874 and 1914, awarding Britain the right to ‘govern by advice’ well safeguarding the Sultans’ sovereignty and Malay-Muslim prosperity.692 Indeed, the


692 Ibid, p.482.
treaties “…bound Britain to uphold the sovereignty of the Sultans, maintain the autonomy of the States, and respect the customs and religion of the Malay people.” Such a perception of betrayal generated a backlash towards British rule as well as resentment towards the Malay Sultans who had signed the agreement to form the Malayan Union. This was especially the case following Sultan Ibrahim of Johor who, “…having signed the MacMichael Agreement voluntarily and without consulting the State Council, departed for the delights of London.” Such actions were seen as a failure by the Sultans to protect Malay-Muslims who demanded that power and decisions of governance ultimately rested with the Malay-Muslim people, as opposed to the Sultans alone.

In response to the Malayan Union White Paper, Dato Onn bin Jaafar, an aristocrat educated in England and who was the adopted son of the Sultan of Johor and leader of Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjong Johore (Johore Movement of Peninsular Malays), and who would become the UMNO’s first President, published an appeal in *Majlis* on January the 24th. This called “…for a Pan-Malayan Malay Congress to discuss an all-Malay campaign against the proposed constitution.” This, in turn, resulted in the Malay Congress which was convened in Kuala Lumpur on the 1st of March 1946. This meeting brought together some forty nationalist organisations.

693 Ibid, pp.481-482.
694 Ibid, p.489.
695 Ibid.
696 Ibid.
697 Ibid, pp.491.
throughout British Malaya which opposed the Malayan Union, “…though stressing
Malay loyalty to the imperial connexion” with Britain to varying degrees.\textsuperscript{698}

It was decided that a national organisation was to be established to spearhead all
these groups’ anti-Malayan Union agenda, and was to be called the UMNO.\textsuperscript{699}
Moreover, the Malay Congress ruled the proposed Malayan Union’s constitution
illegal and called for a complete boycott of it, as well as threatening to withdraw all
support to any Sultans who finalised the constitution into law that was due for
inauguration on the 1\textsuperscript{st} of April 1946. However, on that same day, amidst
widespread public opposition to the pending Malayan Union, and in the wake of
the Malay Congress ruling, the Malay Sultans rejected the Malayan Union.\textsuperscript{700}

Following the agreement to form the UMNO, amidst unprecedented Malay-Muslim
solidarity generated out of common opposition towards the proposed Malayan
Union, a second Malay Congress was convened in Johor Bahru on the 11\textsuperscript{th} and 12\textsuperscript{th}
of May 1946. This meeting formalised the establishment of the UMNO and that
group’s charter of Malay-Muslim nationalism.\textsuperscript{701} Consequently, the UMNO gained
widespread support and formed the first unified mass-Malay-Muslim nationalist
political organisation to effectively challenge British rule, as well as rebel against
the Malay Sultans who originally favoured the Malayan Union.\textsuperscript{702}

\textsuperscript{698} Ibid, p.493.

\textsuperscript{699} Ibid, pp.492-493.

\textsuperscript{700} Ibid, p.494.

\textsuperscript{701} Ibid, pp.491-492.

\textsuperscript{702} Ibid, p.481.
The establishment of the UMNO and widespread support moreover forced the British to reconsider their terms of the Malayan Union. This, in turn, resulted in negotiations between the British Malay government, the Malay Sultans and the UMNO, which led to the formation of a Constitutional Working Group that published the *Constitutional Proposals for Malaya* on December the 24th 1946.\(^{703}\) Consequently, this formed the basis for a Federal Agreement and a Model State Constitution wherein:

> The proposals marked an attempt both to allay the fears of the Malays and to salvage certain key principles from the Union. On the one hand, the sovereignty of the Sultans, the individuality of the States and the special position of the Malays were safe-guarded; on the other hand, a strong central government, a common (though more limited) form of citizenship and the financial stability of the Peninsula were provided.\(^{704}\)

This proposed constitutional draft essentially sought a ‘middle ground’ between the UMNO and the British and led to the Federal and State Constitutions that, together, formed the Federation of Malaya, or *Persekutuan Tanah Melayu*, which was inaugurated on February 1\(^{st}\), 1948.\(^{705}\) To this end, like with the Johore Movement of Peninsular Malaya, Onn bin Jaafar set about directing the UMNO’s political engagement with the British, as well as increasingly dealing with growing unrest amongst the Malay-Muslim population amidst concerns over ‘British

\(^{703}\) Ibid, pp.495-496.

\(^{704}\) Ibid.

trustworthiness’ throughout the proposal process. In particular, on behalf of Malay-Muslims the UMNO engaged in direct political negotiations and in compromise with the British. Such political activities, and tactics, arguably constitute normal behaviour associated with the ‘mainstream’ political processes, as opposed to the often uncompromisingly inflexible and violent reactionary nature of Islamism and Jihadists.

The UMNO’s willingness to compromise with the British in establishing a Malay-Muslim nationalist polity, and hence the resulting Federation of Malaya, generated resentment towards the UMNO amongst some Malay-Muslims. In particular, the Islamist organisation Lembaga Islam Se Malaya (All-Malaya Muslim Council), later renamed Majlis Agama Tertinggi Malaya (MATA, or the Malayan Supreme Religious Council), accused the UMNO of failing to sufficiently incorporate Islam into the constitutional framework of the Federation of Malaya. Therefore, in an effort to counter the UMNO, in March 1948 the MATA established Hizbul Muslimin (Muslim People’s Party of Malaya), a Malay-Muslim nationalist party grounded in Islamism.706

Like the UMNO, Malay-Muslim dominance was fundamentally at the heart of the Hizbul Muslimin’s nationalist polity. However, the latter further sought the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’ based on Islamism and was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.707 This was unlike the UMNO’s nationalist Islamic-orientated doctrine which was concerned with, and influenced by, ‘local’ Malay-

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Muslim tradition, rather than that of a ‘foreign’ Arab-dominant Islamism, manifest in Hizbul Muslimin. This was especially evidenced in the fact that, despite scepticism, the UMNO continued to support the Malay Sultans as legitimate religious authorities, following their initial support for the Malayan Union. This was unlike Hizbul Muslimin and its wider support-base which accused both the UMNO and, in particular, the Sultans of “…not properly discharging their duties as defenders of the Islamic faith.”\(^{708}\)

In the wake of the challenge by Hizbul Muslimin, as well as growing support for Islamism in British Malaya following Britain’s growing international advance during this period, especially in the Middle East, South Asia and in parts of Africa, the UMNO moved to further develop its ‘religious credentials’ as an Islamic and, in particular, Malay-Muslim political party.\(^{709}\) To this end, the UMNO developed a ‘religious wing’, or, ulama, led by Shaikh Abdullah Pahim, as well as a Religious Affairs Department and was chaired by Haji Ahmad Faud Hassan (later the first President of the PAS).\(^{710}\) However, the UMNO, like the British colonial authorities, at this time was especially concerned with the impending threat to the Federation of Malaya posed by left-wing political groups, which they considered presented a ‘clear and present danger’.\(^{711}\)

Hizbul Muslimin’s association with radical left-wing nationalists, such as the Malay National Party (MNP) and Defenders of the Fatherland (PETA), as well as apparent

\(^{708}\) Ibid, p.20.

\(^{709}\) Ibid, p.21.

\(^{710}\) Ibid.

\(^{711}\) Ibid, p.22.
collusion with Communists such as the Malay Communist Party (MCP), all considered as direct threats by the British authorities, consequently also came to be seen as a threat. This, in turn, led to Hizbul Muslimin being targeted in the June 1948 Emergency that saw British authorities launch counterinsurgency operations against the MCP and that group’s collaborators, which included the arrest of key Hizbul Muslimin leadership and a crackdown on its activities. This effectively all but eradicated Hizbul Muslimin and, in turn, removed any credible political threats to the UMNO, as well as to British rule in Malaya.  

Throughout the post-Emergency period the UMNO continued with its moderate approach to Malay-Muslim nationalism and worked closely with the wider ethnic communities in Malaya, especially to insure the British of its willingness and ability to govern a secular orientated and multi-ethnic state. Moreover, it sought further to establish its Islamic credentials and consolidate its power-base as the dominant and/or legitimate Malay-Muslim nationalist party. To this end, the UMNO worked to spread what was essentially ‘state-backed’ Islamic teachings, education and welfare throughout Malaya which effectively sought to bring Malay-Muslims into line with UMNO doctrine. In particular, the UMNO-backed ‘Islamisation’ programme was rolled out across Malaya following the 1950 UMNO-sponsored conference in Johore which led to the development of the Persatuan Ulama Se-Malaya (PUM, or, Ulama Association of Malaya), which worked to this end.

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713 Ibid, p.22.
714 Ibid, p.23.
In August 1951, a second UMNO-sponsored conference was held in Kuala Lumpur and included attendees of the former Hizbul Muslimin who were reportedly invited as ‘evidence’ of, and to showcase, the UMNOs Islamic-centric Malay-Muslim polity. However, during this conference it was announced that the PUM would become a separate and independent organisation to the UMNO. This was followed by a conference in November in Butterworth, Penang at which the PUM was renamed Persatuan Islam Se-tanah Malaya (Pan-Malayan Islamic Association/PMIA).\(^{715}\) The PMIA primarily consisted of former members of Hizbul Muslimin and the MNP, as well as others.\(^{716}\)

The rise of the PMIA was underpinned by growing dissolution amongst Islamists over the UMNO’s Islamisation program. In particular, Islamists’ dissatisfaction was concerned with what they considered to be its fundamental lack of emphasis on fully incorporating Islam, especially Shari’a Law, as the guiding cornerstone of Malay-Muslim nationalist polity.\(^{717}\) This was especially the case in terms of establishing an Islamic state wherein Malay-Muslim dominance was absolute; politically, economically and ethno-religiously.\(^{718}\) This, in turn, ultimately led to those members within the UMNO, especially that party’s Religious Affairs Department, who were supportive of such an Islamist-aligned agenda breaking away and joining the PMIA. Thus the PMIA signalled a schism within the UMNO.

\(^{715}\) Ibid.

\(^{716}\) Ibid, p.24.

\(^{717}\) Ibid.

\(^{718}\) Ibid, pp.23-24.
as well as the re-emergence of a Malay-Muslim nationalist party grounded in Islamism that would be renamed the PAS on May 31st, 1955.\textsuperscript{719}

The formation of the PAS as an alternative Malay-Muslim nationalist party, rooted in Islamism, therefore generated a new challenge to the UMNO. It triggered the competition between the PAS and the UMNO in Malaya throughout the early 1950s, especially in terms of developing and legitimating their Malay-Muslim brands of nationalist Political Islamic ideologies.\textsuperscript{720} To this end, the UMNO continued to advance that party’s Religious Affairs Department’s Islamisation program across Malaya, which primarily focused on supporting Islamic education deemed as being in line with UMNO doctrine in order to improve its Islamic credentials amongst conservative Malay-Muslims; crystallised in the Education Act in 1956.\textsuperscript{721} Moreover, the UMNO backed the establishment of the “first all-Malaya Islamic institution with tertiary claims, the Kolej Islam,” in Klang (Selangor) in 1955.\textsuperscript{722} This later developed into the Islamic Studies Department in 1970 at the then newly established Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia). This, in turn, signalled the genesis of UMNO-sponsored Islamisation efforts within Malaya’s state educational institutions.\textsuperscript{723} Therefore, we can say that the UMNO

\textsuperscript{719} Ibid, p.25; McAmis, \textit{Malay Muslims}, op. cit., p.83.
\textsuperscript{720} Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., p.23.
\textsuperscript{721} Ibid, p.22.
\textsuperscript{723} Ibid.
engaged in activities which are referred to in this thesis as particular missionary tactics.

The UMNO also developed cross-cultural polity and alliances with Malaya’s significant ethnic-religious minorities.\textsuperscript{724} Hence the UMNO worked in concert with the British towards establishing a secular orientated, multi-ethnic and multi-religious Malaya. This was also due to the fact that the UMNO needed the support of these minorities and so took a pragmatic approach rather than a dogmatic one.\textsuperscript{725} This was especially evidenced in UMNO opposition to explicit calls by the PAS, as well as the Singapore Malayan Union, for the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaya in 1953.\textsuperscript{726} Collectively, these activities are referred to in this thesis as particular forms of political activism.

The UMNOs Conservative Political Islamic approach to Malay-Muslim nationalism, especially in the ‘balancing’ of Malay-Muslim dominance with multi-ethnic/religious pluralism and secularism was, moreover, especially evidenced in the Reid Commission in 1956. This was overseen by the British prior to Malaya’s independence.\textsuperscript{727} In particular, the UMNO-led Alliance was responsible for drafting a constitution of an independent Malaya and submitted its initial proposal, in which it made clear that “…while the religion of Malaya would be Islam, this

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\footnote{\textsuperscript{724} Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., pp.24-25.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{725} Ibid, p.22.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{726} Ibid, p.25.}
\end{footnotes}
fact would not prejudice the secular nature of the state.” However, in an attempt to satisfy some Islamist-leaning elements within the UMNO, as well as to limit ‘political space’ sought by the PAS and Islamists alike, the final draft of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya refrained from overtly stating that Malaysia is a secular state.729

Upon that nation’s independence on August 31st, 1957, the UMNOs deliberations on the constitution fundamentally assured that the Federation of Malaya (renamed/proclaimed as Malaysia on September 1st, 1963) was not solely an Islamic state, nevertheless. Rather, the Federation of Malaya granted both Malay-Muslim dominance and ethno-religious pluralism within a secular institutional framework.730 In particular, on the one hand, Malay Sultans retained their religious sovereignty, and Shari’a Law administered through Shari’a Courts was to remain a ‘private’ judicial affair overseen by Malay-Muslim rulers. On the other hand, secular institutions and laws in accordance with the Civil Law Act of 1956 specifies English Common Law as the ‘public’ judicial framework on which the Federation of Malaya’s constitution rests. Therefore, although not “characterized as secular”,731 by law the Federation of Malaya is first and foremost a secular state and, for Malay-Muslims especially, secondly Islamic.732 This was especially made

728 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.22.
729 Ibid, p.22.
731 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.22.
clear when the co-leader of the UMNO and the Federation of Malaya’s first Prime
Ministry, Tunku Abdul Rahman, stated in a speech before the legislative council on
May 1st, 1957: “I would like to make it clear that this country is not an Islamic state
as it is generally understood, we merely provided that Islam shall be the official
religion of the State.” 733

In the immediate post-independence period the UMNOs ‘constitutional balancing’
between Malay-Muslim rights/agendas and secularism, which granted ethno-
religious freedoms for minorities as well as economic liberalism, was increasingly
criticised by Malay-Muslim Islamists, especially the PAS. 734 Consequently,
although primarily focused on economic development, the UMNO moved to
intensify its state-backed Islamic program in Malaya. 735 This included developing
UMNO-sponsored Islamic education throughout Malaya, including the “…building
of some two thousand mosques and prayer houses within the first decade of
independence, conducting annual Qur’an-reading competitions, and launching
versus state-sponsored initiatives for the conduct of the haj pilgrimage.” 736

Throughout the late-1950s and 1960s, the UMNO further engaged in missionary
tactics. Moreover, the UMNO’s polity and associated activities expanded into the
former British colonies of Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak. The latter two
had merged with the Federation of Malaya to form the new state of the Federation

733 Ibid.
734 Mehdan, “Islamic Movements in Malaysia”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics,
735 Ibid, p.590.
736 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.22.
of Malaysia, hereafter Malaysia, proclaimed by PM Rahman in the capital, Kuala Lumpur on the 16th of September 1963.\textsuperscript{737}

Such missionary tactics moreover further sought to entrench UMNO ideological doctrine, and hence influence, as well as deflect inroads by Islamism, especially the PAS, within Malay-Muslim society and so was twofold in strategy. Frist, to advance UMNO Conservative Malay-Muslim nationalism and, second, to ‘protect’ the multi-ethno-religious pluralism awarded in the Malaysian Constitution, and hence that nation’s wider non-Muslim minorities, from the intolerance threatened by Islamism, notably the PAS.\textsuperscript{738}

The latter, furthermore, appears to have been especially influenced by the fact that the UMNO was part of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious government which formed the Alliance. Hence, in addition to countering Islamism, such tactics appear to have been key to insuring cross-party stability between the UMNO and its Alliance coalition parties, which were not of Malay-Muslim identity and essential to holding together the UMNO-led government.\textsuperscript{739}

This led to UMNO leadership ‘taming’ more hard-line elements within that party, especially amongst local-level UMNO members. This appears evidenced in that “… it was often said that a prospective national leader would aggressively emphasize his or her Malay and Islamic credentials until rising to national

\textsuperscript{737} See, for example, “The position of the Shariah Court in the Malaysian legal system”, op. cit., p.1.

\textsuperscript{738} McAmis, \textit{Malay Muslims}, op. cit., p.84.

leadership when the stance tended to be muted.” Therefore, by intensifying its own Islamisation program throughout the late-1950s and 1960s, the UMNO appears to have worked to counter any dissent, both externally and internally, which was antithetical to official UMNO polity, doctrine, and objectives: that of promoting Conservative Malay-Muslim nationalism and its realisation within the confines of a secular orientated and pluralistic constitutional framework of Malaysia.

Such developments throughout this period together represent the formation and early development of the UMNO, as well as a key phase in the orientation of that group’s ideology, tactics and objectives. In particular, analysis evidences observations that suggests throughout this period the UMNO manifested, and so can be understood as, a particular form of Conservative Political Islamic ideology that employed particular activist and missionary tactics for national objectives.

6.3: Entrenchment of the United Malay National Organisation’s Polity and Deepening Islamisation of the Malay State

The engagement by the UMNO in state-backed Islamisation efforts as well as political activism, notably through the election process, in Malaysia appears to have further intensified in the wake of the ethnic riots in Kuala Lumpur between Malay-Muslims and minority ethnic Malaysians on May the 13th 1969, following the general election. According to official UMNO-led government accounts, the riots left some 196 dead, mostly non-Malay-Muslims. However, this number is

740 Ibid.
741 Ibid.
suggested to be higher by some accounts, including those by foreign diplomatic sources.\textsuperscript{742}

It is reported by the UMNO, moreover, that the riots were triggered by Chinese-dominated opposition supporters’ provocative actions during their ‘electoral victory’ parade in Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur.\textsuperscript{743} This parade was the result of the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party and Gerkan winning the majority of the votes in the key state electorates of Kelantan, Perak, and Penang in Kuala Lumpur.\textsuperscript{744} This led to PM Rahman’s ruling UMNO-led Alliance Party suffering significant losses but retaining 66 of the 104 parliamentary seats, and hence power.\textsuperscript{745} Additionally, such ethno-political violence was reportedly linked to particular socio-economic conditions wherein emerging ‘state capitalists’, dominated by the Chinese especially, further sought influence and/or control in the Malaysian economy. This, in turn, was seen by Malay-Muslims as a direct threat to their socio-economic security and, subsequently, their own desired Malay-Muslim dominance.\textsuperscript{746}


\textsuperscript{746} See, for example, “May 13, 1969”, op. cit., p.1.
In the immediate aftermath of the riots, a State of Emergency was declared in Malaysia by Sultan Ismail Nasiruddin Shah, who was that nation’s then elected monarch, or, Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia). This was advised by the UMNO-led Alliance government. This, in turn, led to further voting in East Malaysia as a continuation of the general elections being suspended indefinitely (until 1970) and Parliament being deferred, with the National Operations Council (NOC) led by Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, hereafter Tun Razak, of the UMNO taking over the government as chief executive.\textsuperscript{747}

This development was seen by some within the UMNO as a failure of the then still-PM Rahman, especially by Mahathir bin Mohamad who had lost his Parliamentary seat in the election. In particular, he openly criticised the government in a letter to the PM Rahman accusing it of failing to uphold Malay-Muslim interests and calling for the PM’s resignation.\textsuperscript{748} This letter was subsequently published and circulated among student bodies at local universities and so became public knowledge, which led to largescale demonstrations and further rioting and the calling for ‘Malay sovereignty’ and the ousting of PM Rahman. Consequently, Tun Razak and the Home Affairs Minister, Ismail Abdul Rahman agreed to expel Mahathir from the party, along with former Executive Secretary of the UMNO, Musa Hitam, for breaching the UMNO ‘code of conduct’ – which itself nearly resulted in the PM having Mahathir arrested.\textsuperscript{749}

\textsuperscript{747} Means, \textit{Malaysian Politics}, op. cit., p.8.
\textsuperscript{749} Ibid, p.28.
In the wake of the May 13 riots the UMNO moved to curb heightened ethno-political tensions as well as to restore stable government. It resumed the suspended elections in East Malaysia, which were held in 1970, resulting in the UMNO-led Alliance government regaining a strong two-thirds majority in Parliament. This strengthening of UMNO power and predominance was further evidenced in PM Rahman’s announcement of ‘National Principles’ (Rukunegara) which purported to promote greater unity among all races in Malaysia through economic equality, as well as announcing that Parliament would be reconvened in on the 1st of February 1971, and that he planned to retire and stepdown as PM in favour of Tun Razak.\textsuperscript{750}

Following his appointment as Malaysian PM as well as UMNO leader, and in the wake of the 1969 elections and riots, Tun Razak moved to further strengthen that party’s control and Islamic credentials. This appears to have included advancing its credibility internationally as a founding member state of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC – renamed Organisation of Islamic Cooperation/OIC) in 1969.\textsuperscript{751} Hence, this effectively sought to strengthen Malay-Muslim support for the UMNO as well as wider international Muslim support for the UMNO-led government amidst rising dissent in Malaysia, including from within the UMNO itself. The UMNO also moved to assert itself in the Alliance more strongly, seeking to control the government outright.\textsuperscript{752} This was first evidenced in that the NOC, led by Tun Razak as the ‘transitional’ government, in the wake of the May 13 riots and

\textsuperscript{750} Means, Malaysian Politics, op. cit., pp.11-12.


\textsuperscript{752} Empires at War, eds. Francis Pike (London, I. B. Tauris, 2011), op. cit., p.228.
resulting State of Emergency until Parliament reconvened, consisted of seven Malays, one Chinese and one Indian. PM Tun Razak’s intensified Malay-centric approach to government was especially demonstrated following an inquiry into the 1969 race riots that had resulted in a government ‘white paper’ entitled *Toward National Harmony*. This sought out and identified the causal factors for the riots and led to PM Tun Razak implementing new legislation and amendments to the Malaysian Constitution, notably extending the 1948 Sedition Act. The resultant intensified legislation basically banned freedom of speech on what the UMNO, as well as wider Malay-Muslims and Eastern Malay bumiputra, considered ‘sensitive’ issues pertaining to their proclaimed dominant status in Malaysian society, especially in terms of political, economic, social, and religious ‘rights’. Moreover, PM Tun Razak moved to enact stricter legislations concerning the Internal Security Act in 1970, which was first introduced in 1960 in response to the rise of, and threat posed by, Communists in Malaysia. This was purportedly to insure “the preservation of intercommunal harmony”, granting the government greater powers to repress any ‘threat’ to the security of Malaysia. However, such legislative change by Tun Razak, as well as subsequent Malaysian PMs, was used to “block political changers and intimidate critics”. Indeed,

In practice, the ISA [Internal Security Act] was, and still is, the most powerful law preventing any individual from questioning sensitive matters.

The amendment to the ISA allowed the UMNO-led government to detain without trial anyone who may incite violence, cause public disorder, or promote hostility among races. [And] … the selective use of the ISA against political leaders, academics, trade unionists, NGO activists, and any critical individuals has effectively muted immediate and/or potential dissent.756

Additional efforts to strengthen UMNO control of the Alliance government also saw PM Tun Razak amend the Printing Press Act in 1971, as well as introducing the University Act that same year and the Official Secrets Act in 1972. All of these laws “…were, and still are, utilized to inhibit discussion of some of the country’s most controversial political issues.” 757 Collectively, such sedition laws were employed by the UMNO to repress political rivals and views challenging those of the UMNO, and hence dissent.

In addition to measures to repress political tensions identified in the government white paper as a key causal factor in the race riots, extra measures were taken by PM Tun Razak in an effort to address socio-economic disparities between the different ethnic communities. These new measures favoured Malay-Muslims, as well as the wider ethnic Malay bumiputra. This move resulted in the National Principles put forward by former PM Rahman now being manifest in the New Economic Plan (NEP) in 1971.758 The NEP was fundamentally geared to supporting Malay-Muslim socio-economic development, rather than being a genuinely

757 Ibid.
‘national’ polity to further develop the socio-economic standing of all Malaysians.759 This was evidenced in that the key emphasis of the NEP’s targeted objective was to insure a 30% Malay-Muslim share of the economy by 1990; a policy aim that according to the UMNO-led government would result in a ‘just society’ (‘Masyarakat Adil’).760 In particular, it sought to redress the imbalance in Malay-Muslim, as well as the wider ethnic Malay bumiputra, ownership of shares in Malay companies of which an estimated 62% of all “…shares in publicly traded Malay companies were owned by foreigners (non-Malaysians), 23.7 per cent by Chinese Malaysians and just 1.5 per cent by Bumis [bumiputra/ethnic Malays].”761 Moreover, it sought redress the income-gap and wealth distribution between Malays and non-ethnic Malays, of which it is reported that at the time “…74 per cent of Malays earned less than US$ 200 per annum; this compared with 33 per cent of Chinese.”762

In addition, the NEP led to increases in quotas for ethnic Malays in education and the civil service which were granted in the Malaysian Constitution as well as mandated by the government. Consequently, 30% of all shares in initial public offerings (IPOs) would be disbursed by the government to ethnic Malays. The old civil service hiring-quota ratio was intensified, resulting by 1973 in some 98% of

762 Ibid.
all new government workers employed being ethnic Malay.\(^{763}\) Taxes were also
directed to the development of five new universities, including two which focused
solely on the development of Malays and, in particular, Malay-Muslims who were
a minority in tertiary institutions prior to the NEP.\(^{764}\) Such developments in turn
signalled a shift in the ethno-religious makeup and ‘balance of power’ sharing that
had previously existed in the Alliance under former PM Rahman, albeit UMNO
dominated at the time, as well as the genesis of Malay-Muslim economic
dominance, especially of the state.\(^{765}\)

Such pro-Malay-Muslim socio-economic polity arguably represents particular
activist activities, and hence tactics, undertaken by the UMNO through which to
advance their Political Islamic ideological orientation of Conservative Malay-
Muslim nationalism, and so that group’s underlying objective. Moreover, the NEP
appears to have become a mechanism through which to prevent dissent, especially
in terms of deflecting ongoing criticisms and accusations by Islamists over lack of
support for Malay-Muslims and in regards to the role of Islam in Malaysia,
especially politics.\(^{766}\) In addition to the PAS, such criticisms and accusations by
organised Islamist groups had also begun to manifest in pockets of the Muslim
student population in the form of da’wa missionary organizations.\(^{767}\) For example,

\(^{763}\) Ibid, p.229.
\(^{764}\) Ibid, p.229; Mehden, “Islamic Movements in Malaysia”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and
\(^{765}\) Ibid, pp.27; 29; Means, Malaysian Politics, op. cit., pp.23-27.
\(^{766}\) Mehden, “Islamic Movements in Malaysia”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics,
\(^{767}\) Ibid, op. cit., 590; Roff, Studies on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p.105; Liow,
Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.45.
following the formation of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia), which first emerged in 1969 at the University of Malaya, sought to promote, through particular da’wa activities, “…a proper understanding of Islam to young people and the population in general.” The ABIM was formally registered as an organisation in 1972, and had become increasingly critical of the UMNO, Malay-Muslim religious elites in general, and the economic establishment, eventually transforming into an active political movement that became engaged in ‘pressure politics’ through which it sought to advance greater adherence to Islam in Malay-Muslim society.

In an effort to offset criticism and dissent by such Islamist groupings in Malaysia, the UMNO sought to place greater symbolic emphases on the Malay-Muslim nature of the NEP, as well as increased education opportunities for Malay-Muslims especially. This included scholarships for Malay-Muslims studying at Islamic institutions overseas, especially in the Middle East, as well as in similar Islamic education programmes at Western universities, notably in the UK. This, in turn, led to a significant increase in the number of Malay-Muslims attending university and undertaking studies in Islam especially, which, had the effect of countering dissent amongst Islamists. Furthermore, the UMNO appears to have intensified

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its efforts to counteract the dissent of Islamism throughout this period through the establishment of the Islamic Research Centre (Pusat Penyelidekan Islam/Pusat Islam) within the Religious Division (Bahagian Agama) of the Prime Minister’s Department in 1971. This was employed by the UMNO through which it sought “‘to promulgate correct Islamic teaching in society’.”\(^{773}\) This, in turn, provided the UMNO with a particular intuitional mechanism(s) through which it:

in addition to sponsoring lectures and publications embodying ‘correct Islam’, also began to collect information about the practice in Malaysia of what was deemed incorrect or deviant Islam, to publicize this, and where necessary to enable action to be taken against perceived errors and their perpetrators.\(^{774}\)

This institutional mechanism of the UMNO therefore served as a particular ‘surveillance’ tool so as to monitor Islamism especially, as well as to counter it through such state-backed da’wa activities as lectures and the disseminating of materials and publications. UMNO da’wa activities were furthered during this period following the establishment of the government-backed \textit{Yayasan Da’wa Islamiyyah} which “…published a glossy monthly, \textit{Majallah Da’wa}”.\(^{775}\) In addition, the UMNO expanded such da’wa activities in regards to propagating its own


\(^{774}\) Ibid.

\(^{775}\) Ibid, p.111; \textit{Majallah Da’wa} (aka \textit{Majalah Dakwah}) is an Islamic magazine/review which is available online at: \url{http://www.mdn.org.my/}. 

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interpretation of Islam, and hence it’s underlying ideological doctrine and polity, especially through the medium of television. The UMNO moved to harness Radio and Television Malaysia, a mechanism that is government-controlled through the Ministry of Information, which televised UMNO-approved Islamic content for around thirty minutes weekly. This was furthered by the development of the Religious Da’wa Unit which was established within Radio and Television Malaysia in 1973. Collectively, such da’wa propagation activities employed by the UMNO are referred to in this thesis as particular missionary tactics.

During this period, moreover, the UMNO moved to further support missionary activities through Islamic educational programs in Malaysia, referred to by PM Tun Razak as being essential in an effort to “check declining morals”. This was evidenced in 1972 when the Ministry of Education established “…a special division to improve the administration of all aspects of Islamic education, directed especially at the large and essentially separate Sekolah Arab/Sekolah Agama system – with schools either independent or granted-aided by state governments or Majlis Agama –”. Additionally, the UMNO extended that party’s institutionalization of its missionary activities through the formation of the Propagation and Teaching Institute (Institut Da’wa dan Latihan) in 1974. The function of this institute “…was to ‘strengthen the welfare of and eliminate the unbelief that increasingly strongly threatens Islamic society today’.” Collectively, these measures, along with

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777 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.46.

778 Roff, Studies on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p.104.
tightened legislation concerning Muslims such as stricter adherence to Ramadan protocol regarding breaching the fast, and socialising of the sexes, for example, sought to signal the UMNO’s commitment to institutionalising Islam within Malaysia. This was further emphasised by the UMNO as evidence of its, and the state’s, Islamic credentials amidst a rise in Islamism in Malaysia and, consequently, signalled a further expansion of and intensification in the UMNO’s own alternative Islamisation strategy.\textsuperscript{780}

Throughout this period, and in response to shock of the 1969 elections, PM Tun Razak also moved to strengthen that party’s political control. This included positioning the UMNO to form a strategic partnership with the PAS which joined the UMNO-led Alliance Party. Subsequently, this insured “the recognition that Islamic values would be propagated without restriction.”\textsuperscript{781} Moreover, in 1973 the UMNO formed the BN which replaced the Alliance Party.\textsuperscript{782} In addition to the UMNO and PAS, with the former essentially assuring non-Malay ethnic parties in the Alliance political and economic representation through the BN in turn for ‘supply and confidence’, this included the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), the Gerakan Party, MMC, Sabah Chinese Association, Sarawak Association, and the Malay Indian Congress (MIC). The BN was formally registered in June 1974 to contest that year’s general elections, winning a clear majority of seats in government. Consequently, UMNO officials assumed all major government posts, with all

\textsuperscript{779} Ibid, p.107.  
\textsuperscript{780} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{781} Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., p.33.  
\textsuperscript{782} Kheng, Cheah Boon, \textit{Malaysia: The Making of a Nation} (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 147–148.
important decisions, especially those relating to Islamic legislation and Malay-Muslims in particular, being made by the UMNO.\(^{783}\)

This, in turn, led to an intensified Malay and, in particular, Malay-Muslim nationalism within the UMNO. This was especially evidenced in the recall of more hard-line Malay-Muslim politicians, including Mahathir and Hitam, who had been expelled from UMNO after the 1969 race riots, as well as PM Tun Razak’s brother-in-law, Tun Hussein Onn, being promoted to deputy PM, while supporters of former PM Rahman were removed from government.\(^ {784}\) Non-Malays were also essentially barred from holding key ministerial positions, such as Finance Ministry which was traditionally held by a Chinese figure from the MCA; rather, Chinese government representation would increasingly be demoted to the deputy ministerial level.\(^ {785}\)

The UMNO’s intensified agenda of Malay-Muslim nationalism through the domination of the BN-led government and increasing Islamisation of intuitions and polity further manifested in the 1975 Industrial Relations Act which implicitly discriminates against non-Malays. Consequently, this generated greater levels of concern amongst Malaysia’s minorities, especially among Chinese Malaysians who viewed this as a direct threat to their socio-economic security and so infringing on the unwritten arrangement for MCA support for the UMNO-led BN and government. However, the UMNO-led government appears to have been relaxed in its implementation. Nevertheless, such legislation did signal the UMNO’s increased


\(^{784}\) Ibid.

\(^{785}\) Ibid.
move towards greater government involvement in the economy in favour of Malays and, in particular, Malay-Muslims, as especially evidenced in the acquisition of Malaysian corporations which in turn provided for the Bumiputra (Malay) Investment Fund. 786

Such UMNO-meddling in the Malaysian economy as a direct result of the NEP moreover effectively led to a decline in direct foreign investment, which was actively discouraged. As a result, business costs escalated and companies were often forced to employ extra managers to compensate for ill-qualified Malay executives. Additionally, and as a result of Malay and, in particular, Malay-Muslim executives who held a monopoly on economic as well as political power following the NEP,

…financial corruption also became a feature of everyday corporate life; although the figures for wealth transfer looked impressive, the beneficiaries were usually the UMNO political and bureaucratic elites. The traditional aristocratic and social elites also benefited from the gifting of free shares and positions as ‘token’ bumi [Malay] directors on company boards.

Despite these issues linked to the NEP, the Malaysian economy was recovering rapidly following the First Oil Crisis in October 1973, with an annual real GDP growth rate of 7.1% which contrasts to the initial target of 6.8%. Throughout this period the UMNO took significant steps to advance that party’s as well as Malaysian interests and security in foreign affairs and pursued a policy of non-alignment as part of a wider ‘neutral’ geopolitical bloc in the Cold War. Such a non-aligned position by the UMNO, and so Malaysia, was further extended through that nation’s membership in ASEAN. In particular, PM Razak adopted the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This was criticised by other ASEAN members as being unrealistic, including Singapore PM Lee Kuan Yew who instead aligned Singapore’s security with the U.S. However, PM Razak’s move to replace the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement with the Five Power Defence Agreement in 1971, which endures and includes the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, effectively signalled Malaysia’s alignment with the Western-bloc.

787 The 1973-1974 First Oil Crisis was triggered when the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries declared an embargo on oil exports against ‘supports of Israel’ in the wake of the Arab-Israel Yom Kippur War, sending shockwaves throughout global markets as prices/inflation increased some 400% which impacted Malaysia’s economy significantly. However, in the post-First Oil Crisis Malaysia moved to develop its oil production industry which accounted for an estimated 18% of that nation’s commodity exports by 1976; significantly benefiting Malaysia’s GDP growth. See: Empires at War, eds. Francis Pike (London, I. B. Tauris, 2011), op. cit., p.229.


789 Ibid.

790 Ibid.
PM Razak also became the first ASEAN leader to restore relations with China after U.S Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s rapprochement between those two nations in 1972. This, in turn, resulted in Premier Mao assuring Razak that he believed that Chinese citizens of Malaysia should be loyal to that nation – a matter that had been especially of concern for the UMNO since the 1969 race riots. However, PM Razak was unsuccessful in seeking neutrality assurances concerning the communist regime in Vietnam after the fall of Saigon which, too, was a key security concern for the UMNO that had supported a crackdown on communist elements in Malaysia, including by the British prior to independence. Such developments in economic and international relations polity by PM Razak throughout this period further advanced Malaysia, both domestically and in international standing and, in turn, promoted UMNO control and the advance of its polices within Malaysia.

Following the death of PM Tun Razak on the 14th of January 1976, power transferred to his brother-in-law and deputy PM, Tun Hussein Onn. Mahathir was promoted to deputy PM over Ghafar Baba and Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh. Together, PM Onn and Mahathir worked to further entrench UMNO control of the government, as well as within the ruling coalition party itself, which was reportedly experiencing a wave of infighting following Mahathir’s promotion as deputy PM that further strained relations within the BN bloc, which had emerged in the wake of the Industrial Relations Act the previous year. Nevertheless, the UMNO had effectively manifested as a ‘one-party government’ and by dominating the BN-led government outright, and so predominating within the Malaysian state.

791 Ibid.

792 Ibid.
Moreover, any opposition to the UMNO outside the BN was quickly eliminated. This was evidenced in the wake of the regional elections that year in Kelantan which resulted in a 22 to 14 seat victory for PAS over the BN – who had moved to pass a motion of ‘no confidence’ in the UMNO-appointed State Governor, Mohammad Nasir. In turn, PM Onn responded to this threat to UMNO power by declaring a state of emergency and imposing federal rule in Kelantan, as well as expelling the PAS from the BN, in 1977.794

Despite such efforts by the UMNO to counter dissent, such developments appear to have generated further anti-UMNO sentiment, especially among non-Malay ethnic parties as well as among the growing number of Malay-Muslim Islamist organisations. In particular, these organisations, especially the PAS, became increasingly active in denouncing the UMNO-led government and its policies.795 In addition, Islamist groups such as the Islamic Da ‘wah Foundation and ABIM, among others, had been gaining a foothold in Malaysia’s universities throughout the 1970s. These became increasingly active in the late-1970s, engaging in political da’wa activities such as holding public sermons criticising the UMNO and BN.796

By the late-1970s, moreover, “…there were half a dozen major dakwah [da’wa] organizations and dozens of smaller groups … [some of these] articulated radical agendas, an extreme example being the Army of Allah, accused of the distraction

793 Ibid.


of Hindu temples.”

Another Islamist da’wa group to emerge during this period was the Malaya branch of Jama’at Tabligh. This group emerged out of the Deobandi Islamic movement in the Indian subcontinent in the early 20th century. Collectively, these Islamist groups were of growing concern to the UMNO and its claim to represent and advance Malay-Muslim nationalism, as well as Islam in general, as its primary agenda. The PAS went as far as to publicly label the UMNO as infidels (kafir) in November 1979, therefore invoking the Islamic charge or practice of takfir (a practice by which Muslims are excommunicated from Islam on the basis they are no longer a practicing/’true’ Muslim).

In addition to its ascent globally, the intensification of Islamism in Malaysia throughout this period appears linked to greater exposure of Malay-Muslims to Islamist ideologies during government sponsored overseas Islamic education programs as a result of the NEP. This especially included exposure to the teachings of early 20th century Islamists such as Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, who were both key ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as the earlier Mawlana Mawdudi, who was the chief ideologue of Jamaat-e-Islami, which

797 Ibid.
798 Roff, Studies on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p.106.
is active throughout South Asia. Domestic increases in rural Malay-Muslims studying Islam in Malaysian universities, also as a result of the NEP, also appears to have underpinned the rise of Islamism during this period. Such rural Malay-Muslims “…came from small towns and initially were unaccustomed to requirements of institutions of higher learning. In this alien and often urban environment they frequently reacted negatively to what they saw as an un-Islamic environment.”

Coinciding with such educational links to Islamism resulting from the NEP, which was central to the UMNO’s Islamization strategy, key geopolitical events also appear to be linked to the rise in Islamism in Malaysia. This included events which took place in, and in turn affected, the wider Muslim world. In particular, amidst the backdrop of the Cold War, this included the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli and wider Arab-Israeli conflict(s), especially the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the related oil crisis; the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. All of these events are identified by such prominent scholars as Freed R. Von Der Mehden, to have further “…strengthened Islamic consciousness in Malaysia.” Moreover, intensified globalisation through increased communications and media throughout this period further underpinned this mood. Collectively, such international conditions provided greater political space for Islamism globally, including within Malaysia.

802 Ibid, p.591; p.111.
804 Ibid, op. cit., p.590.
Such political, economic and social policies as well as da’wa propagation activities generated by the UMNO throughout this period are identified in this thesis as particular activist and missionary tactics respectively. These become increasingly entrenched and or attached to the functions of state and were employed to advance the UMNO’s Conservative Political Islamic ideology in pursit of that party’s objective of Malay-Muslim nationalism. In particular, the UMNO appears to have moved to further Islamise the Malaysian state in line with official UMNO doctrine in an effort to ensure that organisation’s dominance and so that of Malay-Muslims in Malaysia. This was clearly an ongoing effort by the UMNO in order to offset any encroachment by, and dissent of, Islamists in Malaysia that had gained a foothold in the wake of the 1969 race riots, and throughout the 1970s.

Therefore, throughout this period, the UMNO was concerned, first, with advancing its Conservative Political Islamic ideology and objective of Malay-Muslim nationalism, and its realisation within the confines of Malaysia’s secular orientated and pluralistic constitutional framework. Second, the UMNO sought to counteract Islamism so as to protect the former. Arguably these developments represent a key second phase in the development of the UMNO, especially in terms of ideology, tactics and objectives as well as generative mechanisms. Consequently, the UMNO can be understood as evidencing a particular Conservative Political Islamic ideology throughout this period and employing a range of missionary and activist tactics in pursuit of a national objective.

6.4: Growing Islamist Rivalry and the Expansion of the United Malay National Organisation’s Islamization of Malaysia

By the 1980s, amidst a rise in Islamist movements and ideologies internationally, influenced especially by the success of the Iranian Revolution and growing support amongst Muslims for the Afghan Jihad resistance against Soviet occupation, demands for greater Islamization by Islamists especially of both the state and society in Malaysia too had reached unprecedented levels, with the PAS and ABIM having made significant inroads. These groups had begun to increasingly challenge the UMNO for political space and, in particular, presented alternative models to that of the UMNO on how to implement Islam in Malaysia. This, in turn, was viewed by the UMNO as an unprecedented threat to that party’s control over Islamic affairs, as well as to Malaysia. 806

For these reasons, the then newly elected PM of Malaysia and UMNO leader Mahathir “…moved immediately to harness and direct these social forces spawning from Islamic revivalism.” 807 This development has been argued by such scholars as Khoo Boo Teik to have been driven by “…the expediency of politics but also by the intense desire to locate Islam at the heart of the Malaysian socio-political orbit and contribute to the resurgence of Islam as an intellectual and cultural force.” 808

Therefore, notwithstanding the pragmatic, and hence strategic, necessity to strengthen its Islamic credentials in an effort to counteract growing challenges from

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808 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.46.
Islamist actors, the UMNO appears to have moved to further intensify its Islamization programme towards one that was equally ideologically geared; concerned with pursuing a much deeper Islamic polity throughout the state.\textsuperscript{809} This manifested with the UMNO expanding its Islamization programme throughout Malaysia through which it moved to further “…‘Islamize’ existing institutions and government machinery.”\textsuperscript{810}

This was evidenced in 1981 when the UMNO-led government organised and took recommendations from a “…group of ‘prominent international scholars’ [who were] invited to advise on how the machinery of government might be Islamized,”.\textsuperscript{811} This led to Mahathir and the UMNO pursuing a policy of \textit{Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam} (inculcation of Islamic values), “…which sought to create a Muslim work ethic to underscore the modernization of Malaysia.”\textsuperscript{812} According to PM Mahathir:

\begin{quote}
Islamization is the inculcation of Islamic values in government administration. Such inculcation is not the same as implementation of Islamic laws in the country. Islamic laws are for Muslims and meant for their personal laws. But laws of the nation, although not Islamic based, can be used as long as they do not come in conflict with Islamic principles. Islamic laws can be implemented if all the people agree to them.\textsuperscript{813}
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{809} See, for example, Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., pp.46-48.
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\textsuperscript{811} Ibid, p.108.
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\textsuperscript{812} Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., p.46.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{813} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Consequently, this development signalled a further intensification in the expansion and deepening of UMNO Islamization, and hence particular missionary as well as activist tactics, within the state and which would evolve throughout PM Mahathir’s twenty-two years in office.  \(^{814}\)

PM Mahathir’s move to intensify UMNO Islamization of the government was explicitly revealed at the UMNO general assembly in 1982 when he announced that the UMNO would be embarking on a new strategy focussing on “the struggle to change the attitude of the Malays in line with the requirements of Islam in this modern age.”  \(^{815}\) This, in turn, resulted in the UMNO organising a conference on ‘The Concept of Islamic Development’, as well as an advisory committee being established, so as to best determine how to achieve such an objective.  \(^{816}\)

This in turn led to PM Mahathir moving the UMNO towards strategically befriending some of that party’s opponents in an effort to enhance his Islamic credentials, and hence the image of the UMNO, as well as weaken the Islamist bloc in Malaysia. This was evidenced when the leader of ABIM, Anwar bin Ibrahim, aligned that organisation with the BN and so the UMNO-led government in 1982. Joseph Liow notes that:

> Anwar’s pedigree as both an Islamist and a populist, and the fact that he had also been courted by PAS, made his incorporation into the ranks of UMNO nothing short of a coup, a move of strategic consequence that further

\(^{814}\) Ibid.

\(^{815}\) Ibid.

strengthened and legitimized Mahathir’s Islamization campaign. Another compelling reason to bring Anwar into the UMNO fold was his vast support network within ABIM and the dakwah movement at large, many of whom eventually became ulama [scholars] and religious teachers.\textsuperscript{817}

Additionally, the UMNO reportedly gained the support of key Malay-Muslim Islamic scholars during this period “…through formal institutions such as the respective state offices of Mufti, the Majlis Ugama (Religious Council), and the National Fatwa Council.”\textsuperscript{818} This is further evidenced by Joseph Liow who noted that:

Aside from state mufti, the more prominent religious personalities in UMNO’s federal bureaucracy include Abdul Hamid Othman (chairman of the UMNO Religious Bureau), Wan Mokhtar (former secretary of the bureau), Yusuf Noor (chairman of the Federal Land Development Authority, or FELDA), Zainal Abidin Kadir (former director of Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, the Malaysian Islamic Development Department, or JAKIM), and Che Min Che Mat (also a former JAKIM director).\textsuperscript{819}

Such Islamic scholars and teachers provided important legitimacy for the UMNO as a Malay-Muslim Political Islamic party and so therefore its Islamization programme. In particular, it “…bolstered the Mahathir administration’s religious credentials and legitimacy, allowed him to concentrate power and stem potential

\textsuperscript{817} Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., p.47.

\textsuperscript{818} Ibid, p.48.

\textsuperscript{819} Ibid.
resistance from the religious elite, and enabled him to engineer a decidedly Islamic turn in the governing of the country.  

As a result of this development, PM Mahathir intensified the UMNO’s Islamization programme in Malaysia. The UMNO moved to further compete with and harness the ‘political space’ generated by growing support for da’wa movements and activities in Malaysia. To this end, state institutional mechanisms developed by the UMNO for that party’s Islamization programme, notably da’wa activities, were further expanded. This included the expansion of the role of the Islamic Research Centre (Pusat Islam), forming an association with the Religious and Da’wa Unit within Radio and Television Malaysia in 1981 – through which pro- and/or approved UMNO content was propagated. The expansion of the Islamic Research Centre too saw that institution morphed from one-hundred staff in 1982 to over eight-hundred by 1987, many of whom were UMNO-affiliated Islamic scholars. Moreover, the Islamic Research Centre was increasingly tasked “…to propose and discuss shari’a-based legal responses to a range of issues [as well as] … supervising and scrutinizing the drafting of shari’a legislation by the respective state religious authorities and preparing these proposed laws for parliamentary deliberation and adoption.”

820 Ibid, p.49.
821 Roff, Studies on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p.112. By 1990, this produced 10 per-cent of all television programming in Malaysia, some forty-eight hours a month. In 1994, the Islamic Research Centre took control of the production of all Islamic programming in Malaysia.
822 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.49.
823 Ibid.
In addition, the expansion of the Islamic Research Centre allowed for greater monitoring of activities and views of Muslims engaged in non-UMNO affiliated da’wa organisations. For example, the Islamic Research Centre advised the UMNO-led government and institutions on formulating ‘correct’ legal proclamations and counter-responses to religious and social matters advanced by the PAS. This included:

PAS’s persistent agitation for the introduction of the Islamic penal code encapsulated in hudud (restrictions), qisas (laws of retaliation covering homicide and injury), and ta’zirat (penal stipulations). In other words, UMNO’s response to PAS policies and positions on religious issues, as well as those of other religious groups such as ABIM …, were dependent on the proposals made by Pusat Islam (and later JAKIM).824

The expanded role of the Islamic Research Centre by PM Mahathir therefore effectively provided the UMNO with a strengthened tool through which to implement its da’wa activities as part of that party’s Islamization programme in Malaysia. This was in an effort to both counter dissenting forms of Political Islam, especially Islamist groups such as the PAS, as well as to deepen the UMNO’s control over Islamic affairs. Collectively, such developments during this period are described by William Roff as resulting from “…demands for more concrete forms

824 Ibid.
of Islamization [which] … the Malaysian government in the 1980s moved to meet or forestall such pressures.\textsuperscript{825}

In the wake of growing pressures, the UMNO’s intensified Islamization of the state under PM Mahathir was especially concerned with making further advancements in the legal and economic institutions of Malaysia.\textsuperscript{826} This was evidenced with the introduction of the Shari’a Courts Enactment in 1982, which was first adopted by the state of Kelantan. This piece of legislation sought to address growing concerns amongst Malay-Muslims over key societal issues, notably the rise in divorce rates amongst Malay-Muslims, which they considered to be linked to a lack of Shari’a Law being implemented and enforced in Malaysia.\textsuperscript{827} This revised the earlier Administration of Muslim Law and effectively paralleled the secular judicial system by providing “…a three-tiered system of courts, independent of the Majlis Agama and with enhanced status for Sharia judges.”\textsuperscript{828} This includes a hierarchy of Lower, Higher and Appeal courts; albeit operating at the state level only to date. This was followed by the Islamic Family Law Act in 1984, which was gradually enacted throughout individual states by 1991.\textsuperscript{829}

Further evidence of the UMNO’s move to deepen its Islamization of Malaysia during this period includes the Islamic Banking Act, passed in 1983. Subsequently,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{826} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{827} Ibid, p.109.
\textsuperscript{828} Ibid, p.108.
\textsuperscript{829} Ibid, p. 109. In 1993, the UMNO further moved to support amendments to the Administration of Islamic Law Acts (Federal Territories version).
\end{flushleft}
this led to the development of the Bank Islam Malaysia which was codified in accordance with ‘Islamic finance’ polity(s) derived of Shari’a Law. 830 This prohibits Islamic banks from profiting from interest (riba) on loans, which is the main source of income for non-Islamic banks. However, in a context of interest-based banking, Bank Islam Malaysia, as well as Shari’a banking in general, is nonetheless seen as operating in a very similar manner to conventional banks. 831

In 1984, the UMNO-led government moved to establish by federal statute, the Malaysian Mutual Assistance Insurance Company (Syarikat Takaful Malaysia). This was in response to increased calls for Shari’a-compliant insurance which must meet the requirements of the Takaful Act which states “…that the Company’s business must not involve any practices ‘not approved by Sharia’”. 832 However, the Takaful Act does not explicitly define what the term ‘approved/approval’ or ‘Shari’a’, rather, like with the Islamic Banking Act, if and when such interpretation is needed it is referred to a federal, and hence a UMNO-affiliated appointed council to decide.

Coinciding with such legal and economic legislative developments, the UMNO implemented further legislation to control dissent during this period. This was evidenced with the establishment of the Printing Presses and Publication Act in 1984, requiring newspapers as well as other publishers to obtain a yearly licence. It also requires that opposition parties can only distribute their materials to their own

830 Roff, Studies on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p.108.
members.\textsuperscript{833} This has become increasingly hard to control, with the arrival of the internet which, in turn, has intensified the UMNO-led BN government’s countermeasures, including through the ISA. Consequently, as Fred von der Mehden notes: “When combined with a virtual blackout of opposition criticism on national television, both religious and secular opponents have a very limited ability to present their views in public.”\textsuperscript{834} Moreover, it appears that amidst such intensifying measures by the UMNO-led government to contain dissent and, in particular, Islamism, villagers led by a PAS zealot reacted and engaged in violent clashes with government forces in 1985, leaving some eighteen people dead in what became known as the ‘Memali Incident’. This resulted in heightened tensions between the PAS and the UMNO with each accusing the other of causing the violence. This effectively signalled, some scholars argue, the first major incident pertaining to Political Islamic violence by Malay-Muslims in Malaysia, especially that involving ‘mainstream’ political parties; albeit both these parties have no history of political violence.\textsuperscript{835}

By 1987, however, following some six years of PM Mahathir’s leadership of the UMNO, an unprecedented level of dissent was emerging from within, as well as from outside, the UMNO.\textsuperscript{836} This was triggered by a number of internal UMNO conflicts stemming from Mahathir’s reported efforts to eliminate any potential

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\textsuperscript{834} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{835} Ibid, p.593.
\textsuperscript{836} See, for example, Means, Malaysian Politics, op. cit., p.201.
\end{flushright}
competitors and successors to his power, seen for example when PM Mahathir moved to back Musa Hitam against Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah for the office of Deputy President of UMNO in the 1984 party elections. This lead to Musa winning 59% of the vote and PM Mahathir’s long-time rival Tengku being removed from the office of UMNO Deputy President. In 1986, PM Mahathir replaced Musa who was then Deputy PM with Ghafar Baba. Hence, Musa and Tengku together sought to in turn oust PM Mahathir, seeking to obtain the offices of Deputy President and President of the UMNO respectively.\(^\text{837}\)

The two competing UMNO factions moreover were referred to in the media as Team A, led by PM Mahathir and his supporters, and Team B which was led by Tengku and included Deputy PM Musa, who was also Deputy President of UMNO and seeking re-election; as well as Datuk Suhami Kamaruddin who formerly oversaw the development of UMNO-affiliated youth activities.\(^\text{838}\) Events climaxed on the 24\(^\text{th}\) of April 1987 during the UMNO’s Annual General Assembly and triennial party election. PM Mahathir gained the support of the young radical politician and leader of the ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim, who enjoyed significant support amongst the rural Muslim vote-base. This secured the election, with PM Mahathir winning by a slim 43-vote margin over Tengku, while Baba won by a 41-vote margin over Musa.\(^\text{839}\)


\(^{839}\) Ibid.
This unprecedented level of internal UMNO strife furthermore appears to have been linked to Mahathir’s policies pertaining, in particular, to Malay-Muslim nationalism. This was especially the case concerning the NEP, which the UMNO Team B claimed had failed to benefit the poorest of Malay’s; as well they criticised PM Mahathir's leadership approach, accusing him of autocracy and acting unilaterally, without consulting fellow UMNO and government leaders in the BN. 840 Nevertheless, PM Mahathir survived the crisis and immediately moved to rid all remaining opponents within the UMNO and to centralise his power, including acquiring the Ministries of Home Affairs and Justice. 841 This, in turn, resulted in a complaint by 11 UMNO members that PM Mahathir tampered with the vote in the 1987 election. However, this was thrown out by the judiciary. Nevertheless, “…in the High Court, Justice Harun Hashim declared that UMNO had been in breach of the 1966 Societies Act.” 842

PM Mahathir ignored this judgement and when the case was taken to the Supreme Court he reportedly arranged for the Lord President, Supreme Court Justice Salleh Abas, to be removed from that institution. 843 Moreover, Mahathir moved to further purge the Supreme Court, dismissing five judges who had “…allowed Salleh’s writ of injunction against the tribunal of impeachment, which had been set up to try Salleh.” 844 This led to a revised constitution being promulgated which further

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841 Ibid, p.201.
843 Ibid.
844 Ibid.
entrenched Mahathir’s hold on power as well as UMNO control of the BN government: “In one blow, Mahathir had destroyed the independence of the judiciary on which Malaysia’s legal profession had long prided itself.”

The increasingly autocratic nature of the UMNO under PM Mahathir throughout the mid-1980s was concerned with placing further controls on the media in Malaysia, which was not under state control; especially those which advanced any opposition to the PM and or UMNO. Thus the UMNO moved to intensify its efforts to control the press through legislative mechanisms such as the Printing Presses and Publication Act and the Control of Imported Publications Act; revoking the licences and so effectively banning a number of key newspapers in Malaysia. This included the banning of the Wall Street Journal in 1986, following its publishing of a story alleging PM Mahathir was involved in state corruption pertaining to “…a share swap transaction involving his Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin.” In response, PM Mahathir accused the Wall Street Journal of being involved in a Zionist conspiracy against him and promised “… to take action against anybody whose thinking was not in line with the majority view.”

In an effort to further counteract dissent, the UMNO-led government ordered Operational Lallang in October 1987, which meant additional media publications being banned in Malaysia, including “The Star, Sin Chew Jit Poh and the weekly

845 Ibid.
Moreover, it further eliminated any opposition to the UMNO through the ISA, evidenced when some 106 people were arrested and detained in a crackdown, ordered by PM Mahathir, on opposition leaders and activists for allegedly engaging in activities invoking ‘sensitive issues’ which had triggered racial tensions amongst Malaysia’s ethnic groups. This involved the arrest of “Democratic Action Party deputy chairman Karpal Singh, Democratic Action Party secretary-general Lim Kit Siang, and PAS Youth chief Halim Arshat.”

This ‘emergency’ provided PM Mahathir the pretext through which to amend the Police Act following which a police permit was required to hold any political meeting, while rallies were all but outlawed. Moreover, PM Mahathir justified the use of such measures, including against fellow Malay-Muslim groups, under the ISA as key to “…upholding the faith of Muslims in Malaysia [untuk mempertahankan aqidah orang Islam di Malaysia], as well as to safeguard the integrity and faith of Muslim citizens in Malaysia.” Therefore, Operation Lallang signalled an intensified effort to rid the Malaysian political landscape of any potential threat to PM Mahathir’s power and that of the UMNO’s political dominance. Moreover, PM Mahathir purported that to ensure the protection of Malay-Muslims, as well as national security, measures such as those conducted through the ISA were crucial, especially amidst a rise in ‘deviant’ and ‘fanatical’ forms of Islamism in Malaysia, notably the PAS.

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850 Liow, *Piety and Politics*, op. cit., p.56.

851 Ibid.
Such legislative actions employed by the UMNO throughout this period to counteract dissent amongst non-BN political parties and social activist groups not aligned with the UMNO, as well as UMNO dissidents opposing PM Mahathir, were particular political tactics. These tactics are identified in this thesis as forms of political activism, used in both ‘defence’ and pursuit of UMNO Islamization polity(s) through which assure that party’s dominance, and hence ideology and objective.

By the 1990s, and in an effort to further counteract Islamism in Malaysia, PM Mahathir moved to intensify his approach to UMNO Islamization through the development of additional state-backed da’wa intuitions.\footnote{Liow, *Piety and Politics*, op. cit., pp. 57; 48.} This was evidenced with the expansion of UMNO-affiliated intuitions, including the establishment of the Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM/Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding). This “was established in 1992 with the explicit mandate to work with other national Islamic agencies to propagate “progressive” Islamic views congruent with UMNO’s version of “modern” Islam, or as some scholars term it, “Islamic Modernism”.\footnote{Ibid, p. 52.} Moreover, IKIM provided “…an intellectual channel for the UMNO interpretation of Islam, although it also is a vehicle for interaction with other faiths … It publishes extensively on Islamic subjects, has its own radio station, and maintains contacts within the international Islamic community.”\footnote{Mehden, “Islamic Movements in Malaysia”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, eds., John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 2013, op. cit., p.597.} Such da’wa

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}
propagation of UMNO-sanctioned teachings of Islam are referred to in this thesis as missionary tactics.

Notwithstanding his authoritarian and Conservative Political Islamic convictions, including the introduction of a Bill in 1993 which makes it illegal for a Muslim to change their religion,856 IKIM provided PM Mahathir with a tactical tool through which to further advanced UMNO-backed Islamization polity(s) in pursuit of a “…modern and moderate Islamic and economic system” of Malay-Muslim nationalism.857 Moreover, the UMNO-led government took further legislative measures to counteract ‘deviant’ forms of Islam, leading to groups such as the Muslim Coverts Association being viewed by PM Mahathir as a key threat to ‘correct’ Islamic teachings and practises as well as considered a direct challenge to the UMNO. Subsequently, this organisation was repressed and banned by the UMNO-led government in 1994, and by the following year was all but eliminated.858

Coinciding with these legislative measures, and amidst a backdrop of strong economic growth and increased political stability and strength following support from ABIM, PM Mahathir moved to promote Anwar Ibrahim to Deputy PM, who replaced Ghafar Baba in 1993, and hence was Mahathir’s favoured successor as both UMNO leader and PM. In September 1995, Mahathir declared, “I give the

856 McAmis, Malay Muslims, op. cit., p.89.


party to Anwar. Anwar is my heir apparent. He will take over from me.” 859

However, Anwar became overtly critical of the government’s bailout of the PMs son, Mirzan, as well as having deeper political and economic policy differences with Anwar siting concerns over rising corruption in the UMNO as a by-product of the prevailing ‘economic euphoria’ linked to the NEP. This led to tensions in their relationship and doubts over the future role of Anwar, as well as that of the ABIM, as UMNO leader and PM. 860

Throughout this period of internal disagreement the UMNO sought to further expand that party’s Islamization of Malaysia through its da’wa activities, and hence missionary tactics, to counteract Islamism and any antithetical variants of Islam to that of UMNO Islamic doctrine. This was evidenced with the unprecedented increase in scope of the UMNO-affiliated Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM/Department of Islamic Development in Malaysia) which replaced the Islamic Research Centre in 1996. This included JAKIM having its own da’wa foundation which was tasked with coordinating all da’wa activities in Malaysia.

“Thus, not only did JAKIM serve to “compete” with dakwah [da’wa] groups, it also sought to harness the popularity and efficacy of the dakwah movement [in Malaysia] to the advantage of the state”. 861 JAKIM was tasked with ‘correcting’ all aspects of social and private Islamic matters in accordance with UMNO–approved Islamic moral teachings and views, including those pertaining to issues of Shari’a Law and


860 Ibid.

halal (approved Islamic behaviour/practises), as well as expanded upon its predecessor’s role of monitoring da’wa groups and their activities throughout Malaysia.862

By 1998, amidst further political and economic disagreements in the wake of the fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, PM Mahathir sacked Anwar as Deputy PM, who, despite being assured that his succession was all but guaranteed, was then purged from the UMNO by the Supreme Council in 1998. He was replaced with Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. 863 Moreover, the ensuing political terminal that followed saw Anwar plot a revolt within the UMNO. This was evidenced when, at the UMNO General Assembly in 1998, “Mahathir’s government was denounced for corruption and nepotism by Datuk Zahid, UMNO’s new youth leader.”864 In response, the UMNO-led government quickly moved to incriminate Anwar and his supporters by publishing reported ‘economic favours’ granted to them. This was quickly followed by accusations against Anwar of homosexual ‘crimes’ and he was arrested in September 1998 and jailed in 1999.865 This generated considerable additional dissent among Malaysians towards PM Mahathir, including within the UMNO. Islamists such as the PAS staged street protests in the wake of Anwar’s

862 Ibid, pp.48-52.


864 Ibid., p.503.

865 Ibid; McAmis, Malay Muslims, op. cit., p.87. This charge was widely seen as being politically motivated and engineered by PM Mahathir. Moreover, following his release in 2004 Anwar become a lead figure in Parti KeADILan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party) which joined the opposition party Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) which he led to contest the 2008 and 2013 general elections until 2015 when a second sex crime case was upheld leading to his current five-year impressment sentence. However, in 2015 he became de-facto Leader of the Opposition of the then newly established Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope) with, ironically, former PM Mahathir as Chairman. 

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dismissal and jailing. Collectively these developments resulted in many Malaysians moving to support the opposition, including the PAS, which grew from some four hundred thousand to one million members during this period.

The deep rift generated over differences in political and economic policy, as well as social policy, within the UMNO was further evidenced when PM Mahathir reversed Anwar’s pro-International Monetary Fund policy that he had implemented following the Asian Financial Crisis. PM Mahathir then moved to enforce capital controls in an effort to prevent currency speculators, accusing them of being part of a worldwide ‘colonial imperialist plot’, stating: “‘Colonial control of land by military strength can no longer be accepted by societies worldwide . . . ’ [and that] ‘. . . control through currency trading has similar effects’.”

In the 1999 general elections, despite the UMNO’s share of the popular vote falling from 65% to 56.6%, PM Mahathir led the UMNO and BN-government to victory, winning 148 out of 193 seats. This signalled the effective return of stability for PM Mahathir and his polity(s) of Malay-Muslim Islamization. Moreover, in the wake of 9/11, the government’s hard-line approach to Islamism mobilized an increase in support for the UMNO-led BN amongst non-Malay-Muslims amidst fears over the growth in support for Islamism, and the emergence and threat of

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867 Ibid, pp.76-77.

868 This too was part of a Zionist plot according to PM Mahathir. See, *Empires at War*, eds. Francis Pike, 2011, op. cit., p.503.

Jihadist groups. In an effort to further counteract the rise of Islamism, especially the PAS which, in addition to Kelantan, gained control of Kedah and Terengganu states in the 1999 elections, PM Mahathir declared that Malaysia was already an “Islamic state” in September 2001. This signalled a heightened level of rivalry between the UMNO and the PAS especially, which increasingly sought to promote itself as a ‘moderate’ form of Political Islam so to compete for votes amongst both UMNO and BN supports. However, the true nature of the PAS was made clear in 2002 when it moved to introduce the Hudud Bill in Terengganu, thus legalising the harsh penal code of Shari’a Law. According to Rosol Wahid who was a UMNO legislator, this was not contested, however, as “UMNO legislators didn’t vote against the bill outright so that the fundamentalists could not brand them as being bad Muslims.” Therefore, such a decision by the UMNO appears to have been especially politically motivated, as opposed to being primarily ideological, and in turn it underscored the encroachment and support for the PAS and such Islamist orientated polity in Malaysia.

870 Mushahid Ali and Joseph Liow Chin Yong, “Malaysia: PM Abdullah Badawi’s Performance and Prospects”, in IDSS Commentaries (Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 25 February 2004), p.1. Available: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/600-malaysia-pm-abdullah-badawi/#.WgDjqFuCyUL; Mehden, “Islamic Movements in Malaysia”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, eds., John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 2013, op. cit., p.593. Jihadists, including al-Qaeda operatives, are known to have meet in Malaysia at a meeting during which the 9/11 attacks, among others, were discussed. The first known Jihadist group to emerge in Malaysia was Kumpilan Militant Malaysia (KMM) which was reportedly linked to the PAS and detected by Malaysian security services in 2001; albeit reportedly founded in 1995.


872 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.74.

873 Ibid, p.61.

874 Ibid.
Notwithstanding heightened competition with PAS, a rise in Islamism and the emergence of Jihadist actors, PM Mahathir maintained UMNO political dominance, as well as assured his style of Islamization for the advancement of Malay-Muslims would endure. Throughout the 22 years of Mahathir’s Prime Ministership, as well as Presidency of the UMNO, his overarching strategy to both advance and protect Malay-Muslim nationalism was fundamentally based on and around a particular approach to Islamization in Malaysia. This is perhaps best described as the ‘bureaucratisation of Islam’ in accordance with UMNO doctrine. Moreover, alongside direct political action through legislative actions, this was achieved through UMNO-affiliated/backed Islamic think tanks and associated da’wa activities. These are identified in this thesis as particular forms of political activism and missionary tactics. Joseph Liow notes the latter played a key role and, in particular:

were important because they made available to Mahathir and his government the necessary knowledge and expertise to design and implement Islamization policies that would undercut and outbid PAS by ensuring that the state was “pro-Islam” while still modernizing the country, and in particular the Malay community, without sacrificing Islamic values.

In 2003, PM Mahathir’s successor was all but confirmed, handing over the Presidency of the UMNO and the office of PM to Deputy PM Badawi on the 31st

876 Ibid.
of October 2003. Najib Razak, who is the son of former PM Razak and UMNO President, was appointed Deputy President of the UMNO.\footnote{\textit{“Malaysia”}, op. cit., p.1.} In his maiden speech, PM Badawi announced that he would continue with his predecessor’s policies and promised to work towards greater racial unity, stating: “I want you to work together with me … May Malaysia be more developed. May Malaysia be more successful.”\footnote{Sean Yoong, “Malaysia’s new leader vows to stay course”, November 2, 2003, \textit{Desert News}, Retrieved, 7/11/2017, From, \url{https://www.deseretnews.com/article/525035132/Malaysias-new-leader-vows-to-stay-course.html}, p.1.} Therefore, PM Badawi appeared to continue his predecessor’s purported ‘moderate’ doctrine of Malay-Muslim nationalism and called for a “modern and progressive” approach to Islamization; albeit one that advanced a less overtly ethno-religious discriminatory ethos.\footnote{“Election boost for Malaysian PM”, updated 21 March, 2004, \textit{BBC News}, Retrieved, 7/11/2017, From, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3554137.stm}, p.1.} Moreover, PM Badawi moved to launch a high-profile anti-corruption campaign and cancelled his predecessor’s U.S$2.5 billion cross-Malay railroad project which was the largest infrastructure project in Malaysia at the time.\footnote{“Cross-border bullet train project shelved due to high cost”, April 23, 2008, \textit{AseanAffairs}, Retrieved, 7/11/2017, From, \url{http://www.aseanaffairs.com/page/malaysia/infrastructure%20cross-border%20bullet%20train%20project%20shelved%20due%20to%20high%20cost}, p.1.}

In addition, PM Badawi continued to counteract Islamism, as well as Jihadist activities through the ISA,\footnote{Mehden, “Islamic Movements in Malaysia”, in \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics}, eds., John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 2013, op. cit., pp.593-594.} by intensifying UMNO competition with the PAS. In particular, PM Badawi sought to limit that party’s ability to challenge UMNO policy and doctrine, especially its Islamization polity and Malay-Muslim
nationalism which PAS had come to criticize as being contrary to Islamic teachings.\textsuperscript{882} This was evidenced in a number of key measures taken by PM Badawi of which, Joseph Liow notes:

first he dismissed the [PAS] Islamic party’s blueprint for the establishment of an Islamic state; second, he demonstrated that Islamic features of governance were already being observed by the current Malaysian government; third, he has publicly displayed his Islamic credentials by conducting prayers for a range of events, from opening government meetings to the breaking of fast during Ramadan.\textsuperscript{883}

These counter-measures employed to compete with and or combat the influence of PAS proved a success for PM Badawi. This was evidenced in the results of the 11th general election in 2004 in which the UMNO-led BN government won a landslide victory, including regaining control of Terengganu and Kedah states.\textsuperscript{884}

Consequently, this gave PM Badawi an even greater mandate to implement his UMNO Islamization polity to assure the continuity of Malay-Muslim nationalism. Moreover, PM Badawi oversaw the release of Anwar Ibrahim in 2005, as well as worked to improve Malaysia’s international relations which had become strained under his predecessor, especially with Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and the U.S.\textsuperscript{885}

\textsuperscript{882} Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., p.74.

\textsuperscript{883} “Malaysia”, op. cit., p.1.

\textsuperscript{884} “Election boost for Malaysian PM”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{885} See, for example, “Malaysia can't blame Singapore entirely for its woes: Former Malaysian PM Abdullah Badawi”, February 5, 2015, \textit{The Straits Times}, Retrieved, 9/11/2017, From,
Despite these advances, however, rising concern within the UMNO over the perceived relaxed approach to Malay-Muslim nationalism, especially amongst those supportive of the ‘old guard’s’ preferential-based polities, as well as a slowdown in business contracts being allocated due to growing institutional inefficiency and accusations he had failed to significantly stem crime and corruption, PM Badawi’s support-base for the UMNO Presidency, and in turn as PM of Malaysia, began to erode within that party. Further, Badawi’s approval rate amongst Malaysians in general had fallen to 60% by 2008, reportedly as a result of his failure to stem UMNO preferential policies for Malay’s and, in particular, Malay-Muslims. Consequently, in the 12th general election in 2008, the UMNO-led BN government experienced its worst election results, falling short of a two-thirds majority in the Malaysian Parliament for the first time since independence in 1957. This, in turn, led to UMNO Chief Ministers being ousted in Selangor, Kedah and Perak. For this reason, PM Badawi announced his resignation as UMNO President and PM of Malaysia, standing aside for Deputy PM Najib Razak to take control of both offices.

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887 Ibid.

After successfully winning the party election in November 2008 the new leader took office as UMNO President and as Malaysian PM in March and April 2009 respectively. PM Najib immediately moved to implement his policy of ‘1Malaysia’ that he had announced and campaigned on in the run-up to the party elections. In particular, through 1Malaysia, PM Najib moved to further promote and advance a modern and moderate Malay-Muslim nationalism. This essentially built on the concept of the NEP and also centres on the notion of greater ‘national unity’ as advocated by his predecessor. This purported to emphasise ethnic inclusivism, efficient government and socio-economic development and equality amongst Malaysians.\(^{889}\) Moreover, it is linked to the New Economic Model which essentially replaced the NEP and was announced by PM Najib in 2009. The NEM works to further transition Malaysia’s economy to a high-income and more efficient one by developing knowledge-based industries and increasing foreign direct investment and stimulus packages, as well as reforming state subsidies by reducing government expenditure on gas, petrol and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and so furthering economic liberalisation in Malaysia.\(^{890}\)

To this end, the UMNO-led government implemented unprecedented Key Performance Indicators through which to monitor and promote greater government accountability and was overseen by the Performance Management and Delivery Unit.\(^{891}\) Moreover, 1Malaysia introduced key socio-economic


welfare and community services for Malaysians, including free wireless internet and email services, discount grocery stores for the poor, state-funded healthcare clinics, as well as the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) which funds social welfare payments and discounted housing for middle-to-low income Malaysians. The 1MDB is a government-owned corporation which invests in key strategic development projects in Malaysia, including energy, tourism, real state, and agribusiness, seeking to attract both domestic and, in particular, foreign direct investment.\textsuperscript{892}

Although fundamentally a continuation of his predecessor’s polities linked to the NEP, which claimed to advance national unity, PM Najib noted 1Malaysia did, however, incorporate a new “…approach and methodology, to suit the era and generation,”.\textsuperscript{893} Moreover, 1Malaysia was promoted by PM Najib as being based on tolerance, acceptance, social justice, and shared values and that “…national unity could not be attained if the approach was not based on reality but on a utopian ideal which did not take into account contemporary sensitivities and realities.\textsuperscript{894} Therefore, 1Malaysia especially sought to offset any further ethnic tensions which had again played a key role in UMNO losses in the 2008 general election resulting in the opposition People’s Alliance making significant gains. PAS went from winning seven seats in 2004 to twenty-three seats in 2008,


\textsuperscript{893} “Working towards national unity”, op. cit., p1.

\textsuperscript{894} Ibid.
benefiting from growing disillusionment amongst minority Malaysians over UMNO preferential polity towards ethnic Malays.  

For this reason, 1Malaysia sought to contain advances made by non-BN parties such as the PAS which, since as early as the 1980s, had sought to strategically reposition itself as the chief party concerned with ‘Malaysian unity’ and social justice through Islam, while downplaying the rigidity of any future ‘Islamic state’ under PAS leadership, which was fundamentally concerned with institutionalising hard-line Shari’a Law.  

This was essentially in contrast to the UMNO’s ethnically more exclusivist Malay-Muslim nationalist doctrine responsible for decades of unprecedented levels of Islamic bureaucratisation, elitism and accusations of corruption.

The 1Malaysia policy thus provided the UMNO with an updated strategic polity through which to compete with and counteract the rise of the PAS, as well as Islamism in general, which increasingly challenged the UMNO in multi-ethnic states through its ability to harness ethnic disenchantment amongst minority Malaysians over UMNO favouritism of Malays. Therefore, amidst concerns by PM Najib over ethnic tensions fulling dissent and bolstering PAS, 1Malaysia appears to have sought to further insulate and assure the continuity of the UMNO as the dominant political party in Malaysia and in turn that party’s stated doctrine

896 Ibid, pp.73-74.
897 Ibid, p.74.
898 See, for example, Ibid, pp.73-74; “Malaysian Prime Minister Announces Resignation”, op, cit., p.1.
of a modern and moderate Malay-Muslim nationalism. Consequently, 1Malaysia signalled a further intensification in UMNO competition and efforts to limit political space for the opposition, especially PAS, to exploit. Notwithstanding increased socio-economic benefits for Malaysians, PM Najib was criticised for failing to prevent an apparent deterioration in race, as well as religious, relations in Malaysia during this period despite the implementation of 1Malaysia. Accordingly, the effectiveness of 1Malaysia as a counterweight to dissent born of ethnic and religious divisions did not translate into any increased support for PM Najib, and hence the UMNO-led BN government. This was evidenced in Malaysia’s 13th general elections which were held on the 5th of May, 2013 resulting in the opposition increasing its support to win a larger percentage of the vote, some 51% compared to the UMNO’s 47%. However, PM Najib’s UMNO-led BN coalition was able to form a government as it retained the majority of the 222 parliamentary seats in the House of Representatives, winning 133 compared to the opposition’s 89 in Malaysia’s first-past-the-post election system. Nevertheless, this result signalled an unprecedented defeat for the UMNO, winning less of the popular vote for the first time since independence, and in turn was the strongest result for the opposition block to date.

900 See, for example, Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2011-2012, Edited by, Michael J. Montesano and Lee Poh Onn (Singapore, ISEAS Publishing, 2011), p.49.
The election results triggered large-scale protests which were led by the opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim.\textsuperscript{903} Accusations were also made that Malaysian democracy was based on “…a gerrymandered system in which rural Malay votes held more sway than more mixed urban areas kept BN and Prime Minister Najib Razak in power.”\textsuperscript{904} In addition, following concerns over PM Najib’s economic policies and rising levels of ethno-religious divide in the wake of the elections and subsequent failure to stem the shift in Chinese Malaysian voters away from the BN to the opposition throughout his tenure, and therefore threatening the stability of the BN and its ability to govern, former PM Mahathir withdrew his support for the UMNO in 2014.\textsuperscript{905}

The shift in support by Chinese voters to the opposition led to reports of an increase in aggressive and racial rhetoric perpetrated by the UMNO against non-Malays and, in particular, those that no longer supported the UMNO-led BN government, meaning especially Chinese Malaysians.\textsuperscript{906} This was evidenced when in the wake of the elections PM Najib moved to blame the result on Chinese Malaysians, describing it as a “Chinese tsunami”.\textsuperscript{907} Moreover, in an effort to counteract such developments, especially the rise of the opposition, PM Najib and

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\textsuperscript{904} “Can Malaysia’s Opposition Win?”, op. cit., p.1.


\textsuperscript{906} “Can Barisan Nasional heal Malaysia’s racial and social divisions?”, op. cit., p.1.

\textsuperscript{907} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
the UMNO-led BN government appear to have sought to weaken the People’s Alliance. In particular, the government moved ahead with prosecuting and imprisoning opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim in 2015 for five years on a second alleged sex crime charge of sodomy, as well as reportedly prosecuting and jailing numerous other members of the opposition for Sedition, leading to the collapse of the Peoples’ Alliance. 908 Therefore, through what is widely considered to be trumped-up charges, PM Najib and the UMNO-led government effectively moved to repress the opposition through legal means; albeit politically motivated. 909 Such measures are identified in this thesis as particular forms of political action and in turn political activism.

The integrity of the UMNO-led BN government was further impacted when PM Najib was embroiled in allegations of corruption in 2015, revealed in the Wall Street Journal which published allegations that PM Najib had transferred some $700 million from the 1MDB into a personal account triggering demands for his resignation, especially amongst non-Malays. 910 To date, PM Najib has not faced any charges, however, it is reported that he is widely considered to be “Malaysia Official 1”, a term used in a 2016, and ongoing, U.S Department of Justice investigation that refers to a high-level individual suspected of misappropriating U.S funds invested in 1MDB. This development further undermined the


909 Ibid.

legitimacy of PM Najib and provided additional political space for the then newly-formed opposition Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope) to challenge the UMNO-controlled BN government. This new party is headed by Anwar Ibrahim.\(^{911}\)

In an effort to counteract the fallout of the 1MDB corruption scandal, and with the 14th general elections due in 2018, it is reported that PM Najib attempted to shut down media coverage about the scandal, as well as anti-government social activism which emerged in its wake.\(^{912}\) Moreover, the UMNO appears to have weaken the opposition further by way of character assassination. For example, in November 2017, UMNO ‘cyber troops’ claimed that Syed Saddiq who is leader of Bersatu Youth, the youth-wing of Parti Pribumi Bersatu (The Malaysian United Indigenous Party) led by Mahathir and part of the Alliance of Hope, was inappropriately on holiday in the UK and France and was paid for by the party. This claim appears to invoke a view of corruption endemic within that party and so in the opposition.\(^{913}\) Such action by the UMNO are identified in this thesis as particular tactics of political activism.

Throughout this period the UMNO also appears to have moved to intensify that party’s commitment to the Islamisation of Malaysia amidst calls for Islam to play a greater role in that country, notably amongst conservatives and Islamists. This was especially evidenced when on October 15\(^{th}\) 2017, UMNO member and

\(^{911}\) “Can Barisan Nasional heal Malaysia’s racial and social divisions?”, op. cit., p.1.

\(^{912}\) “Can Malaysia’s Opposition Win?”, op. cit., p.1.

Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki proclaimed that the UMNO-led BN government would ensure that Malaysia becomes an Islamic state. In addition, PM Najib has advocated the potential of working with the PAS in a coalition arrangement. However, like in their previous arrangement, such a development appears, and indeed is argued by some analysts, to be a strategic attempt by PM Najib to contain the PAS, particularly in the build-up to the 14th general elections and as a result of the fallout of the 1MDB scandal. Hence, positioning the UMNO as a potential coalition ally with the PAS effectively moves that party towards capturing conservative and, in particular, Islamist leaning votes, thereby limiting the ability for PAS to undermine and challenge the Islamic credentials of the UMNO and its control; a strategy long employed by the UMNO against PAS and Islamists in general.

Such developments in turn appear to have resulted in the UMNO supporting increased crackdowns by authorities on activities considered to be ‘offensive’ to Islam. For example, in October 2017, this included “…cancelling two annual beer festivals following political objections raised by leaders of the hardline Pan-


915 “Actually, Malaysia’s Multi-Ethnic Coalition Died in 1969”, op. cit., p.1

916 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.48.
Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)”. This appears to have also led to a more conservative Islamic identity amongst some Muslim Malaysian’s, leading to more hard-line and exclusivist behaviour. For example, in October 2017, “…a self-service laundromat in the southern state of Johor caused a social media uproar when it attempted to ban non-Muslims for ‘hygienic’ concerns, prompting a scathing rebuke from Johor’s Sultan Ibrahim Iskandar in defense of moderation and racial harmony.”

Despite the stated intention of the UMNO to develop a ‘modern and moderate’ Malay-Muslim nationalism, it appears such developments signal a shift towards an intensified expression of Islam amongst Malaysian Muslims. This appears to have been generated both as a result of UMNO polity(s) and a rise in Islamism throughout this period. Moreover, this has led to the UMNO increasingly competing for political space with the PAS and Islamist actors, resulting in deepening Islamization of Malaysian society. Consequently, a rise in intolerance towards non-Muslims and ethnic minorities as well as an eroding of liberty and democracy has increased in Malaysia.

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918 Ibid.

The political, economic, social and legal policies, as well as intensified da’wa propagation activities generated by the UMNO since the early 1980s, are identified in this thesis as particular activist and missionary tactics. Such tactics were key to the intensified Islamization of Malaysia throughout this period advanced by the UMNO and resulted in deeper institutionalisation of Islam within the state, or, the bureaucratisation of Islam in Malaysia. Such observed behaviours manifest in the UMNO appear to have been motivated by the key concern to, firstly, advance that party’s doctrine and objective of Malay-Muslim nationalism especially and, secondly, counteract increased dissent and rivalry to that, mainly by Islamists and the PAS particularly, which had gained further support during the late-1990s and 2000s. Consequently, throughout this period, the UMNO fundamentally became more exclusivist in nature, especially ethno-religiously, as well as repressive politically.

Collectively, analysis suggests that such developments manifest in the UMNO throughout this period can be understood as signalling a hardening in that party’s Conservative Political Islamic ideology and an intensification in missionary and activist tactics employed by it in pursuit of its nationalist objective. Collectively, these developments represent a third key phase in the development of the UMNO, especially in terms of ideology, tactics and objectives as well as generative mechanisms.
Part Four

Qualifying of Analysis
Chapter Seven
Towards a Multi-Dimensional Paradigm of Contempoary Diversity in Political Islam

7.1: Introduction

This chapter presents a detailed catalogue of findings deduced from the cases of Political Islam examined in this thesis. Here analysis will identify, collate and frame key diversity revealed through this thesis’s hypothesised analytical model, as well as formulate these findings into a multi-dimensional paradigm through which to view conceptual diversity in contemporary Political Islam. This, in turn, will be used to further formulate a prescription on the contested nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

This study identifies that the hypothesised analytical model reveals a wide and diverse range of key contours, and hence ideologies, tactics and objectives, manifest in the four cases examined. Moreover, the four cases examined have each undergone a number of key evolutionary phases. Analysis indicates such developments signal key shifts in, and or a hardening of, ideology, tactics and objectives, and consequently their orientation in Political Islam. Collectively, this study identifies and deduces the following key categories of contours as manifest: (1) Ideologies: Jihadist, Islamist and Conservative, (2) Tactics: Missionary, Activism and Violence/Extremism, and (3) Objectives: Sub-State, National, Trans-National and Global. Together, contours and their associated categories form
particular orientations which correspond to each case examined and hence represent observed diversity in contemporary Political Islam and is framed accordingly.

The hypothesised analytical model further indicates that a range of societal factors have impacted on and shaped each of the cases examined in this thesis. These too are deduced, collated and framed to represent key generative mechanisms responsible for the viewed diversity in the cases examined in this thesis. Analysis identifies the following categories of contextual generative mechanisms: (4) Political, Social, Economic. Combined, the deduced contours and generative mechanisms are argued to represent how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests respectively.

Collectively, the deduced range of contours and associated orientations and generative mechanisms identified in each of the four cases therefore are formulated to form this thesis’s conceptual paradigm of contemporary diversity in Political Islam. This too provides a way to further formulate a prescription on the contested nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam. The prescription presented in this thesis is referred to as ‘Diversificationist’ theory and provides an alternative orientation of scholarly thought to the current key theories examined in this thesis which can be applied to remedy the contested understanding about the nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

7.2: Diversity in the Islamic State: Key Contours, Orientations & Generative Mechanisms

The analysis of IS in this thesis reveals that organisation has undergone a number of key phases of evolution. In particular, analysis indicates that to date IS has
evidenced five key phases of evolution in contours, and hence ideology, tactics and objectives.

Although rooted in developments dating back to the 1990s and, in particular, the early 2000s prior to 9/11 in Jordan and Afghanistan respectively, analysis suggests that what is today known as IS first emerged with the formation of Tawhid and Jihad in Jordan in October 2002. Analysis indicates that the organisational and command structure of this early manifestation of IS was founded and led by al-Zarqawi, subscribing to a particular variant of Wahhabi-inspired Salafist ideology that purports to act in accordance with the Islamic concept of al-jihad, or, ‘holy struggle/war’. Therefore, although manifesting in the extreme, al-jihad and hence violence formed the cornerstone of belief and, in turn, behaviour manifest in Tawhid and Jihad. As such, this early manifestation of IS can be understood as adhering to a particular form of Jihadist ideology, or, Jihadism. Moreover, Tawhid and Jihad sought to bring society into line with such an ideology with the view of establishing an ‘Islamic state’ governed and based on Shari’ā Law; albeit an extreme interpretation of it.

Analysis suggests that Tawhid and Jihad worked to achieve this objective in, first, Jordan and, second, as of 2003, Iraq while building links with al-Qaeda and hence a wider international Jihadist network, and so objective, to this end. Therefore, Tawhid and Jihad manifested a trans-national objective; albeit more ‘localised’ as opposed to al-Qaeda’s wider pan-Islamic, trans-national objective. To this end, Tawhid and Jihad primarily employed tactics of political violence, especially extremism, which included an unprecedented use of suicide bombings. It targeted
both the Jordanian and Iraqi States and their citizens, especially Shi’a Muslims and other religious minorities, as well as U.S-led Coalition Forces.

The above identified contours manifest in manifest in Tawhid and Jihad, and hence the earliest organisational structure of what is today IS, throughout this first phase of evolution therefore are collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognative analysis. Combined, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, Tawhid and Jihad is identified during this period as a particular ‘trans-national Jihadist extremist’ actor and, consequently, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology = Jihadist
(2) Tactics = Violence/extremism
(3) Objectives = Trans-National

By October 2004, however, Tawhid and Jihad was renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq following al-Zarqawi’s formal pledge of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, therefore signalling the second evolutionary phase and so transformation in contours manifest in what is today known as IS. Like Tawhid and Jihad beforehand, al-Qaeda in Iraq too subscribed to a Wahhabi-inspired Salafist Jihadist doctrine; albeit of concern to bin Laden in terms of the level of extremism justified by such an ideology. In particular, al-Qaeda in Iraq employed widespread use of political violence and, in particular, extremism, intensifying attacks against both state and civilian targets in Iraq and, though to a much lesser extent, Jordan from late-2004. As a result, it appears al-Qaeda in Iraq was more refined than its predecessor in terms of its theatre of operations; albeit strategic in nature.

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The formation of the Islamic State of Iraq as a co-opt of Jihadist groups by al-Qaeda in Iraq, moreover, further signalled that organisation’s intensified efforts to harness the political and security situation in Iraq. However, despite al-Qaeda in Iraq’s strategically ‘focused’ area of operations, as a formal branch of al-Qaeda it therefore remained committed to establishing a wider pan-Islamic international Caliphate and thus objective. Therefore, al-Qaeda in Iraq ultimately pursued trans-national objectives through ‘local’ means. Collectively, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and so its ideology, tactics and objectives, represent a second phase in the evolution of what is today known as IS.

The identified contours manifest in al-Qaeda in Iraq throughout this phase of evolution therefore are collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Combined, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, al-Qaeda in Iraq is identified during this period as a particular ‘trans-national Jihadist extremist’ actor and, consequently, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

1. Ideology = Jihadist
2. Tactics = Violence/Extremism
3. Objectives = Trans-National

In October 2006, al-Qaeda in Iraq formally merged with five other affiliate Jihadist organisations in Iraq which, together, then formed the al-Qaeda-led alliance referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq. This merger resulted in al-Qaeda in Iraq, along with the five other Jihadist groups, being officially renamed ISI. Therefore,
this development signalled a third phase in the evolution of what would come to be known as the IS.

Notwithstanding the negative impact that the political and related security situation in Iraq appears to have had on undermining its operationally capabilities, especially from late-2009-2010, the rise of ISI suggests an additional hardening in ideology, tactics, and objects. Analysis suggests that while adhering to a particular Jihadist doctrine, this became more violent and extremist in nature in purist of that organisations objective to establish a trans-national Caliphate. As a result, ISI justified increased and intensified attacks on the Iraqi State and civilians alike, especially targeting Shi’a Muslims and non-Muslim religious minorities and therefore employing tactics of political-violence and extremism.

Analysis suggests, moreover, that ISI become fixated with the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’ in Iraq, hence the change in that organisations name. This, in turn, reflected that group’s intensified resolve to realise such a goal which sought to make Iraq the cornerstone of its wider pan-Islamic objective of a trans-national Islamic Caliphate. Collectively, ISI, and hence its associated ideology, tactics and objectives, represents a third phase in the evolution of what is today known as IS.

The above identified contours manifest in ISI throughout this phase of evolution hence are collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Consequently, ISI is identified during this period as a particular ‘trans-national Jihadist extremist’ actor and, so, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.
(1) Ideology = Jihadist
(2) Tactics = Violence/Extremism
(3) Objectives = Trans-National

Analysis indicates that in April 2013, however, a fourth phase of evolution accrued following the establishment of ISIS which emerged out of, and so replaced, its former self: ISI. Therefore, this development signalled an additional hardening in ideology, tactics and objectives of what would later emerge as IS. Moreover, this development was marked by a split between the leadership of ISIS and that of al-Qaeda in June 2013. This resulted in the former rejecting that latter and breaking-away as an independent Jihadist organisation, and so, signalling an unprecedented move by what had been a formal branch, and arguably the most significant, of al-Qaeda to date. Therefore, analysis suggests this development was especially rooted in disagreements over the extremity of tactics used by ISIS, especially suicide bombings and the strategic targeting of Muslim civilians; both Sunni and Shi’a alike. This, in turn, was directly linked to a hardening in Jihadist ideology manifest in ISIS.

Analysis indicates that alongside political-violence and extremism as its main tactic, ISIS also engaged in other tactics associated with violence, including kidnapping and extortion. Moreover, although realising statements beforehand, ISIS also developed non-violent missionary tactics during this period, including a dedicated media and or public relations function online, especially through its official media outlet al-Furqan. This sought to counter negative views towards ISIS by disseminating propaganda as well as being a recruitment tool through which ISIS
sought to communicate and advocate its ideology, tactics and objectives. Additionally, ISIS engaged in fundraising activities and hence missionary tactics throughout this period to support and expand its operations and hence objective(s). ISIS also appears to have further engaged in political activism during this period. In particular, analysis indicates ISIS successfully exploited escalating sectarianism between Sunni and Shi’a by essentially lobbying Sunni Arab tribes for operational ‘access’ in Iraq, as opposed to coercing them through violence, especially from late-2013. Such a tactic was especially employed in Anbar Provence, the epicentre of Sunni activism and armed rebellion against the Iraqi government.

Analysis suggests that throughout this period ISIS additionally sought to expand its envisioned ‘Islamic state’ into Syria as well as Iraq; reflected by the change of that organisations name. Therefore, this signalled that Jihadist group’s intention to incorporate Syria alongside Iraq as the cornerstone of its envisioned wider pan-Islamic objective; thus a trans-national Islamic Caliphate. Collectively, ISIS and its underlying ideology, tactics and objectives during this period manifest a fourth phase of evolution in what is today IS.

The above identified contours manifest in ISIS throughout this phase therefore are collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Combined, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, ISIS is identified during this period as a particular ‘trans-national Jihadist extremist missionary activist’ actor and, accordingly, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology = Jihadist
In June 2014, analysis indicates that a fifth phase of evolution accrued following ISIS’s transformation into what is today known as IS. In particular, the rise of IS signalled an additional hardening in that organisation’s Jihadist ideology which manifests an apocalyptic belief derived from Islamic prophecy that a ‘final battle’ (‘Armageddon’) will take place between Islam and non-Islamic (kafir/unbelievers) nations and their armies. Such intensified beliefs purport that this will result in the establishment of a global Caliphate, ushering in the ‘end of days’ and hence ‘judgment day’. Moreover, analysis indicates IS believes that it is divinely tasked with setting in motion a chain of events that will ultimately lead to this apocalyptic end.

Linked to such a hardening in ideology, analysis identified that IS declared all lands it controlled in Iraq and Syria to be formally part of an ‘Islamic State’ which is to be further expanded internationally and so represents the cornerstone of that organisation’s envisioned Caliphate which is intended to encapsulate the entire Muslim world and wider globe thereafter. Therefore, the objective of IS ultimately is the establishment of a self-appointed Caliphate that spans the globe.

To this end, IS primarily employs extremism and political violence as well as sadistic abuse, carrying out operations and attacks inside Syria and Iraq especially, as well as throughout the wider Middle East, Africa, Europe and Southeast Asia. In addition, it seeks to co-opt established Islamic extremist organisations into its fold, either directly or as affiliates through which to propagate its message and further
expand its geopolitical influence around the world. This has been the case especially in the Middle East where many Islamic extremist organisations have declared their affiliation and elegance to the Islamic State, as well as in Africa and Southeast Asia among other regions. Moreover, it seeks to inspire individuals (lone wolves) further afield to conduct acts of extremism in its name and or objective, with such attacks having taken place in Europe, Australia and the United States of America.

In addition to such politically motivated acts of violence and abuse, analysis indicates the Islamic State has further developed its media capabilities through which to showcase its activities and disseminate propaganda. This is particularly the case on the internet were it has developed a sophisticated online presence, including the development of websites and the use of social media platforms such as Twitter and YouTube especially. In particular, the Islamic State’s media activities showcase its brutality, including beheadings and mass-exsiccations, and glorifies such behaviour which it declares as ‘jihad’ through online videos, images messages, and publications in its purported battle against the ‘enemies of Islam’.

Such media activities moreover appear key to the Islamic State’s sustainability, especially in terms of recruiting fighters, geographic expansion and its ability to wage a protracted campaign of extremism. Such activities appear geared towards the recruitment and radicalization of Muslims, especially youth, around the world. Thus through which the Islamic State seeks to advance its ideology, tactics, especially extremism, and objectives.

920 “Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State’s propaganda machine”, op. cit.
The above identified contours manifest in IS throughout this phase fifth and current phase of evolution therefore are collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Combined, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, IS is identified during this period as a particular ‘global Jihadist extremist missionary activist’ actor and, consequently, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology = Jihadist
(2) Tactics = Violence/Extremism, Missionary, Activism
(3) Objectives = Global

Analysis indicates the identified diversity in contours and subsequent orientations of Political Islam manifest in IS and that organisation’s associated five phases of evolution, moreover, have been impacted and shaped by a range of contextual generative mechanisms. It identifies this to be particularly linked to political factors, especially those pertaining to conflict and security born of geopolitical events and conditions as well as socio-political ones, especially Islamic ‘identity politics’, or, sectarianism and tribal politics.

Although the organisational origins of IS can be traced back to the early-2000s with the establishment of Tawhid and Jihad in Jordan in late-2002, analysis indicates early generative mechanisms are rooted in developments in Afghanistan during the late-1990s. This especially appears to have impacted on and shaped that group’s ideology which, subsequently, played a significant role in determining the nature of the tactics employed, as well as objectives sought. Moreover, during this period Afghanistan was ruled by the Taliban and was where
al-Qaeda too was established in the wake of the Afghan Jihad; the latter of which was especially influential from the outset of Tawhid and Jihad. Therefore, such political, and especially security, conditions in Afghanistan in the late-1990s and early-2000s, which emerged following the Afghan Jihad triggered by the Soviet invasion of that country, appear to have provided a particular environment for the rise of Tawhid and Jihad and hence the origins of IS; thus the first phase of that organisation’s evolution.

The second evolutionary phase and, so, manifestation of al-Qaeda in Iraq in late-2004 also appears directly linked to such political factors. Hence, following the January 2003 U.S-led invasion of Iraq as part of a wider international military action of the U.S-led ‘war on terror’ in the wake of 9/11, which included the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Iraq was engulfed in conflict. Analysis suggests that this instability which included the dismantling of the Iraqi State, especially its armed forces, as well as the ensuing re-building of a democratic state, generated political rivalries and grievances which provided the conditions for the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

This especially appears to have been triggered by growing political sectarianism amongst Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. The former of which previously held key political positions as well as influence, and hence institutional control, of the Iraqi State during the Saddam Hussein era. Moreover, a democratic Iraq fundamentally meant that Sunni’s, especially elites and tribal leaders, would lose much of their former political power and influence to the Shi’a majority who, as a result, had gained unprecedented political power and sought retribution for decades of Sunni
political suppression. This, in turn, appears to have shifted much of the Sunni political block towards a poison that sought to undermine the democratic process in Iraq.

Such political instability, and sectarianism especially, which emerged in Iraq in the wake of the 2003 invasion, therefore, is identified in this thesis as providing an environment in which al-Qaeda in Iraq was not only able to emerge but to operate with relative success, at least until 2006; thus triggering a second phase in the evolution of IS.

The third phase of evolution and hence rise of ISI in late-2006 also appears to be linked to political factors, as well as social ones. Analysis indicates such a development was particularly triggered out of ‘strategic necessity’ following the rise of social-political hostility towards that Jihadist group. Specifically, such conditions were generated following intensified extremist attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq against civilians, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike. This, in turn, forced that Jihadist group to strategically ‘reinvent’ itself in an effort to sustain and hence survive in Iraq. Additionally, the rebranding and so rise of ISI appears to have also sought to counter views that it was a ‘foreign’ Jihadist actor which was not concerned with the interests of Iraqis. Moreover, analysis indicates that such conditions provided the U.S-led Coalition Forces with an opportunity to harness such socio-political developments against al-Qaeda in Iraq, successfully forging strategic alliances with Iraqi Sunni Arab tribal leaders which proved key to defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq. Consequently, such political, including military, alliances too are identified in this thesis as underpinning the rise of the ISI.
The failure of al-Qaeda in Iraq as the direct result of unfavourable socio-political conditions and linked tactics which had ‘alienated’ and so turned Iraqis against that Jihadist group, including much of the Sunni population which resulted in their support for U.S.-led forces, therefore, appears to have led to the rise of ISI. Although essentially a strategic development, nonetheless, analysis indicates that the rise of ISI resulted in a further hardening in ideology, tactics and objectives. For these reasons, the third phase of evolution of what would later emerge as IS is identified in this thesis to have been the direct result of the socio-political environment in which it operated, and in turn, was impacted and shaped by.

The fourth phase of evolution identified in this thesis of what is today referred to as IS manifested with the rise of ISIS in April 2013. Analysis suggests that this particular phase of evolution too was the result of socio-political conditions. In particular, this development appears to have been generated by Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism in Iraq as well as in Syria had become engulfed in civil war in the wake of Arab Spring uprisings in that nation against the Assad regime in early 2011.

In the context of Iraq, analysis suggests that such a development was generated following intensified levels of Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism which emerged as the dominant political driver following the draw-down and removal of U.S-led Coalition Forces from Iraq in late-2011. This was especially triggered when in late-2012 Sunni’s in Anbar Provence began to publicly protest against what they considered was the Maliki-led Shi’a dominated government’s negating on a political power-sharing deal; the cornerstone of the Iraqi unity government. Consequently, such conditions in Iraq were strategically harnessed by ISI through
which it appears to have gained the ‘support’ of some local Sunni Arab tribes and elites who had come to view ISI as a strategic ‘partner’ admits intensifying sectarianism in Iraq during this period.

In addition to Iraq, the deepening civil war in Syria had emerged as the global epicentre of Jihadist activity which, moreover, had become particularly framed within the context of Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism, or, an ‘Islamic civil war’ appear key to the rise of ISIS. Analysis indicates such conditions in Syria allowed ISI to further entrench itself in that nation and, subsequently, further develop its operational capacity. To this end, ISI especially worked alongside al-Nusra Front; al-Qaeda’s chief Syrian affiliate.\textsuperscript{921} As a result, such favourable conditions led to ISI not only being able to intensify its operations in Iraq, but to further expand into Syria too. Collectively, analysis suggests that such socio-political conditions in Iraq and Syria, therefore, provided an environment which triggered, and hence are responsible for, the rise of ISIS. As a result, such conditions are identified in this thesis as generating an intensification in ideology, tactics and objectives manifest in what is today known as IS; thus a fourth phase of evolution.

The fifth phase of evolution identified in this thesis is represented with the rise of IS in June 2014. Like previous phases of its evolution outlined above, analysis identifies that the ascent of IS was linked to socio-political conditions, especially sectarianism as well as intra-Jihadist divisions as a result of worsening security environments in Iraq and Syria throughout mid-to-late-2013. In particular, ISIS

\textsuperscript{921} Ibid.
appears to have further capitalised on Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism during this period which had come to define the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

Analysis indicates Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism especially climaxsed in late-2013. This followed Iraqi security forces’ ‘removal’ of protest camps in Ramadi to suppress increasing Sunni dissent against the Shi’a-dominated Maliki government which had begun in late-2012. This, in turn, triggered a Sunni uprising, resulting in the expulsion of Iraqi security forces in Anbar Provence as well as Nineveh Provence; leaving these regions of Iraq under the control of Sunni Arab tribes and their militias. Consequently, this appears to have allowed ISIS to further harness such conditions through which it galvanised increasing leaves of support amongst Sunni Arab tribes and elites in Iraq, including within the Iraqi army. These Sunni tribes therefore appeared to have viewed ISIS as a strategic partner in the wake of escalating sectarianism in Iraq as well as Syria during this period. This was furthered by support from fellow Jihadists from around the world.

Analysis suggests that by early 2014, such conditions resulted in ISIS gaining an unprecedented operational foothold in Iraq in addition to Syria, where it had split from al-Qaeda in June of that year following disagreements over strategy and, in particular, tactics. 922 Notwithstanding such intra-Jihadist divisions, analysis suggests that intensified leaves of sectarianism therefore were key to the continued advance of ISIS during this period. This was evident following the capture of additional territories, including the key Iraqi cities of Fallujah and Mosel in

922 “Taming the Militias”, op. cit; “The Islamic State”, op. cit; The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, op. cit., pp.2-4.
February and March of 2014 respectfully, while simultaneously gaining ground in Syria. Moreover, throughout this period ISIS gained a significant number of recruits, especially from outside of Iraq and Syria, as well as the wider region, further bolstering its strength. Collectively, such developments led ISIS to announce a Caliphate in the territories it controlled in June 2014 and that, subsequently, this geopolitical entity and ISIS together formed IS. Therefore, such conditions in Iraq and Syria are identified in this thesis as generating the rise of IS and, as a result, responsible for an intensification in ideology, tactics and objectives manifest in that Jihadist group; thus a fifth phase of evolution.

Analysis identifies that the five phases of evolution, collectively, have been generated by a series of key events and associated conditions which are rooted in particular contextual developments. This includes political developments born of particular geopolitical events and conditions, especially conflict, security and sectarianism, primarily in the Middle East. Consequently, between 2002 and 2016, such political factors are identified as directly generating observed regularities in ideology, tactics and objectives manifest within IS; albeit influenced also by events dating back to the 1990s. Therefore, these political events and conditions are collated and deduced as the following key sets of cognitive analysis and represent particular generative mechanisms linked to diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

(4) Generative Mechanisms: Political (geopolitical, conflict, security, sectarianism/tribalism).
7.3: Diversity in Boko Haram: Key Contours, Orientations & Generative Mechanisms

Above analysis indicates that Boko Haram has undergone a series of key transformations in ideology, tactics and objectives and thus contours since its inception in the mid-1990s. In particular, analysis reveals that Boko Haram has undergone four key phases of evolution to date. First, Boko Haram emerged in the mid-1990s as a non-violent Salafist organisation, employing a hybrid of missionary-activist tactics in pursuit of sub-state geopolitical objectives in Borno and Yobe States respectively until late-2003. These contours identified as manifest in Boko Haram signal that organisation’s first phase of evolution.

The above identified contours manifest in Boko Haram throughout this phase of evolution therefore are collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Combined, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, Boko Haram is identified during this period as a particular ‘sub-state Salafist missionary activist’ actor and, consequently, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology = Salafist
(2) Tactics = Missionary, Activism
(3) Objective(s) = Sub-State

By December 24\textsuperscript{th}, 2003, however, Boko Haram had undergone a second transformation into a Jihadist organisation and therefore ideologically justified the employment of political-violence and, in particular, by May 2004, extremism as a primary tactic, as well as missionary-activism which served as a Jihadist recruitment mechanism, in pursuit of sub-state geopolitical objectives in Yobe State.
This objective and hence tactics would be extended further into the twelve Islamic states in northern Nigeria by July-2009. This period also saw the inception of Boko Haram’s link with al-Qaeda, notably AQIM. Therefore, contours manifest in Boko Haram throughout this period represent a second key phase of evolution.

This phase of evolution in contours therefore can be collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, Boko Haram is identified throughout this period as a particular ‘sub-state Jihadist extremist missionary activist’ actor and, accordingly, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology = Jihadist
(2) Tactics = Missionary, Activism, Violence/Extremism
(3) Objective(s) = Sub-State

By August 2009, however, Boko Haram had further transformed as a Jihadist organisation. Ideologically justifying tactics of terrorism, which included bombings of state and civilian targets, and widespread political-violence, which extending to kidnappings (defined in this thesis as such due to the violence associated with this activity/tactic), in pursuit of wider national geopolitical objectives throughout Nigeria. During this period Boko Haram further established itself as a formal affiliate of al-Qaeda. This is a third phase of evolution manifest in Boko Haram.

The above identified contours manifest in Boko Haram during this phase of evolution therefore can be collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular
observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, Boko Haram is identified during this period as a particular ‘national Salafist extremism missionary activist’ actor and, accordingly, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology = Jihadist
(2) Tactics = Missionary, Activism, Violence/Extremism
(3) Objective(s) = National

Finally, from 2011 to date, analysis indicates that Boko Haram has undergone a fourth phase of evolution as a Jihadist organisation. In particular, Boko Haram has intensified its tactics of political-violence, especially terrorism which from August 2011 includes suicide bombings, and kidnappings, while further expanding these attacks and activities into other countries in West Africa, including Mali, Chad and Cameroon, while appearing to have limited concern for tactics of missionary-activism; pursuing a wider regional and hence trans-national geopolitical objective(s). Moreover, this period signalled deeper integration with al-Qaeda, especially AQIM and, as of March 2015, Boko Haram’s formal affiliation with IS. Collectively, this represents a fourth phase of evolution in Boko Haram.

The above identified contours manifest in Boko Haram throughout this phase of evolution therefore can be collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognative analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, the Boko Haram throughout this period is identified as a particular ‘trans-national Jihadist extremist’ actor and, accordingly, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology = Jihadist
(2) Tactics = Violence/Extremism
(3) Objective(s) = Trans-National

Analysis indicates that the range of identified contours manifest within Boko Haram’s four phases of evolution thus far, moreover, have been impacted and shaped by a combination of key contextual genitive mechanisms, especial political and socio-economic ones. Together, these contextual factors and associated conditions are identified in this thesis as transforming Boko Haram from what was essentially a non-violent but radical Salafist actor to manifesting a range of Jihadist orientations and thus that organisation’s radicalisation and shift to extremism.

Analysis especially identifies that the rise and early development of Boko Haram in Borno State in the mid-1990s was triggered by political instability and wider state corruption as well as repression of Islamism by authorities who viewed that group as deviant and a threat to their power. Additionally, analysis identifies poverty linked to systemic levels of prolonged unemployment too generated the rise of Boko Haram throughout this period. This is evidenced in that such contextual factors and associated conditions were key grievances, both real and perceived, argued by Boko Haram during this period as ‘justification’ for that group’s objective to establish a radical Salafist interpretation of Shari’a Law in Borno State. Moreover, these conditions appear to have emerged in the wake of the collapse of the third Nigerian Republic in 1966. Collectively, such political and socio-economic factors and associated conditions are identified as key generative mechanisms responsible for the first phase of evolution in Boko Haram. Hence, such generative mechanisms are argued in this thesis to have impacted on and
shaped the contours manifest in Boko Haram during this phase and so that group’s orientation as a sub-state Salafist missionary-activist actor.

Analysis argues that Boko Haram underwent a second phase of evolution in 2003. This was evidenced following that organisation’s use of violence and, by 2004, extremism as a tactic against Nigerian security forces in Yobe State, as well as intensified activist and missionary tactics through which it denounced authorities and sought to recruit members respectively. These developments were underpinned by a shift in Boko Haram’s ideology from Salafism to a Jihadism. This was triggered following a state crackdown which ordered the eviction of Boko Haram in the wake of a confrontation over fishing rights. This had been proceeded by accusations by Boko Haram that local politicians and Islamic leaders were corrupt and governed in a manner antithetic to ‘true’ Islam. Key justifications argued by Boko Haram in its quest to implement hard-line Shari’a Law throughout that state. Analysis too identifies Boko Haram developed relations with al-Qaeda during this period, signalling further evidence of that group’s radicalisation and hence embrace of a Jihadist doctrine.

Analysis suggests this development therefore resulted from counter-measures employed by local state authorities which sought to remove and or eliminate Boko Haram. This signalling a heightened state of concern and the genesis of the Nigerian State’s militarised approach to combat Boko Haram. Analysis identifies that such an approach further radicalised Boko Haram, evidenced in terms of the increasing number and intensity of attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in the post-2003 period. This was further exasperated moreover by socio-economic conditions pertaining to
poverty in north-eastern Nigeria, identified in the analysis as a key factor which bolstered Boko Haram’s ranks. This was especially evidenced with the development of particular social services offered by Boko Haram at its command in Maiduguri, including free health care and Islamic education through which to indoctrinate new recruits, including children. Collectively, counter-measures employed by local authorities, notably through state security forces, and poverty are identified as key contextual generative mechanisms. Consequently, these are argued in this thesis as responsible for the second phase of Boko Haram’s evolution in contours, and hence radicalisation to a sub-state Jihadist missionary-activist extremist orientation.

By 2009, however, analysis indicates that Boko Haram underwent a third phase of evolution. This was evidenced following that group’s announcement that it sought to further establish an ‘Islamic state’ throughout Nigeria through extremism. This period also witnessed Boko Haram’s formal affiliation with al-Qaeda. This was triggered following an intensified militarised response by authorities against Boko Haram, resulting in that group’s compound being raid in Maiduguri, Borno State. This left some five hundred Boko Haram members dead, including its leader Yusuf who later died in police custody following his arrest. Analysis suggests ongoing conditions of poverty too helped generate such developments, evidenced in the heightened levels of recruitment linked to that group’s social services. For these reasons, analysis argues that such a militarised response, as well as underlying conditions of poverty, led to a third phase of evolution and thus Boko Haram’s subsequent orientation as a national Jihadist missionary-activist extremist actor.
A fourth and final phase of evolution is identified as manifesting in Boko Haram from 2011, and endures. Analysis suggests that Boko Haram further expanded its objective to establish an Islamic state beyond Nigeria to include parts of wider West Africa, as well as intensified and expanded its tactics of extremism especially. It further integrated into al-Qaeda and, in March 2015, become a formal affiliate of IS, representing that Jihadist group’s ‘West African province’. These developments were arguably underpinned by a hardening in that group’s Jihadist ideology.

Analysis indicates that all these developments were triggered as a result of intensified counter-measures employed by the Nigerian security forces and had become increasingly militarised following the establishment of the multi-agency JTF Operation Restore Order in June 2011. This signalled a heightened state of concern and militarised approach to combat Boko Haram, as opposed to the earlier joint commission task force launched in January 2004. Moreover, the JTF was further developed into a four-nation coalition which formed the basis of the Nigerian-led Multi-National JTF established in June 2015 to combat Boko Haram in the wake of this fourth phase of evolution. Analysis indicates that such a militarised approach and associated strategy has increasingly been applied indiscriminately, creating resentment and distrust toward the Nigerian security services, and in turn government, amongst the Muslim population.

Additionally, ongoing socio-economic conditions pertaining to poverty are identified in the analysis as impacting on and shaping this development. This factor has been argued by both government and academic sources in Nigeria, and is further evidenced through Boko Haram’s expanding recruitment capabilities both within
and beyond Nigeria throughout this period. This includes in Cameroon where boys as young as 15 years old have joined that group for financial gain and carried out attacks for example.\textsuperscript{923} Therefore, poverty is argued to have generated new recruits for Boko Haram, as well further radicalised that group and the expansion and intensification of extremist tactics perpetrated by Boko Haram during this period.

Such a militarised approach which endures, reportedly favoured by the majority of Nigeria’s security advisors, therefore has viewed the ‘Boko Haram problem’ as a military one, requiring only a military response.\textsuperscript{924} Consequently, this view which endures ignores that it is a societal problem underpinned or exasperated by wider socio-economic and political grievances such as poverty and state corruption respectively, real or perceived. These are key factors which Boko Haram has based its legitimacy on since its inception. This, in turn, has resulted in little if any concern for key societal issues being factored into combating Boko Haram, leading to an inadequate and ineffective counter-strategy which, furthermore, appears short-sighted and ultimately counter-productive.\textsuperscript{925}

Despite recent military defeats and territorial losses inflicted on Boko Haram, efforts that seem thus far to have failed to defeat Boko Haram and stem attacks. Rather, analysis indicates that the four phases of evolution identified as manifesting in Boko Haram between the mid-to-late 1990s and 2017 are linked to political and

\textsuperscript{923} Ngala Killian Chimtom, “Cameroon in for long fight as its youth join Boko Haram”, \textit{Cable News Network}, March 3, 2015, Retrieved, 30/01/2016, From \url{http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/03/africa/boko-haram-recruiting-cameroon/}.

\textsuperscript{924} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{925} Ibid; Ross, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Reaches Deadliest Phase”, op. cit; “What Now after Nigeria’s Boko Haram Ceasefire Fiasco?”, op. cit.
socio-economic factors. This especially includes the militarised approach employed to combat Boko Haram, state corruption, political instability, as well as poverty. Collectively, these contextual factors and associated conditions are therefore argued in this thesis to have directly impacted on and shaped the ideology, tactics and objectives and hence contours manifest within Boko Haram. This has generated radicalisation which has transformed Boko Haram from a Salafist actor to manifesting a range of Jihadist orientations. Consequently, these political and socio-economic factors are collated and deduced into the below sets of key cognitive analysis and represent generative mechanisms linked to diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

(4) Generative Mechanisms: Political (security counter-measures, state corruption, state instability); Socio-Economic (poverty).

7.4: Diversity in Hizb ut-Tahrir: Key Contours, Orientations & Generative Mechanisms

Based on the above analysis, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have undergone a number of key phases of evolution and subsequent transformations in contours. In particular, analysis indicates that the evolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir consists of three key phases of transformation between 1952 and 2017, each representing shifts and or a hardening in ideology, tactics and objectives manifest within that organisation. Analysis identifies the first phase of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s evolution as manifesting between 1952 and 1959. Throughout this period, analysis identifies that Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to have been explicitly Salafist in terms of its ideological outlook, formulated by the group’s founder and hence ideologue, al-Nabhani. Analysis indicates this is especially concerned with the establishment of Shari’a Law and the
belief that Islam is the superior system through which to establish a moral and ethical society on earth; albeit a Salafist interpretation.

Throughout this period, analysis indicates Hizb ut-Tahrir sought the advance such beliefs throughout the Muslim world with the objective of establishing a caliphate. To this end, Hizb ut-Tahrir is identified as having operated in the Jordanian administered Palestinian West Bank, especially in East Jerusalem, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon during this period. Moreover, analysis identifies this particular objective seeks to encapsulate all lands that were once part, or under the rule, of the Islamic caliphate between the mid-7th and early 20th centuries. This extends to those nations which have majority Islamic populations or identify as ‘Islamic’ but were not historically part of the caliphate, as well as non-Muslim states throughout the entire world. For this reason, analysis indicates that Hizb ut-Tahrir sought the objective of a global caliphate, and so, ‘global Islamic dominance’ during this period.926

Analysis identifies that Hizb ut-Tahrir worked to achieve this objective by invoking the Islamic method, and hence tactic, of da’wa (missionary). This included engaging in preaching/sermons, meetings and publication activities, and hence tactics, through which to disseminate its Salafist ideology, recruit and build that organisation. Analysis further identifies that Hizb ut-Tahrir engaged in some, but limited, mainstream institutional political action. This included Hizb ut-Tahrir seeking to formally register as a political party and participating through independent candidates in the 1954 and 1956 Chamber of Disputes elections.

However, the latter appears to have been motivated with the objective of challenging the rulings rejecting Hizb ut-Tahrir as a legal political entity, rather than any strategic or tactical attempt to gain power through elections which are fundamentally rejected by that group. Moreover, analysis identified that Hizb ut-Tahrir has the intention to employ al-jihad (holy struggle/war) as a tactic. However, the latter was not employed during this period. Rather, this is to be used only upon the establishment of an envisioned Islamic state/caliphate as a means to expand Islam and such a caliphate if resisted.\footnote{Taqiuddin An-Nabahani, \textit{The Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir}, op. cit., pp.2; 5.}

The above identified contours manifest in Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this phase of evolution therefore can be collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, the Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period is identified as a particular ‘global Salafist missionary’ actor and, accordingly, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology: Salafist
(2) Tactics: Missionary
(3) Objectives: Global

By 1960, however, analysis indicates that Hizb ut-Tahrir was undergoing a second phase of evolution. This resulted in a shift, as well as an intensification and geographic expansion, in tactics and associated activities, especially throughout the Middle East.
In particular, analysis identifies Hizb ut-Tahrir shifted from solely engaging in missionary tactics to employing direct political action, or, activist tactics. This especially included revolutionary activism through which it instigated and engaged in attempted coups, including in Iraq (1962/1969/1972), Syria (1964/1969/1976), Jordan (1968/1969/1971), Egypt (1974/1983), and Tunisia (1988). Therefore, analysis suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir engaged in both missionary activities, including political sermons, meetings, public campaigns, and publications, and activism as its primary tactics to recruit, indoctrinate and expand that organisation through which to realise its objective of a global caliphate. Analysis identifies that in addition to the Middle East, such a shift and intensification in tactics moreover coincided was that groups geographic expansion into Europe, Central Asia, North Africa, and Southeast Asia respectively between the late-1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, analysis indicates that such evolution was underpinned by a hardening in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Salafist ideological convection as well as resolve to achieve its global objective; albeit working to first establish this throughout the Middle East during this period.

The identified contours, and so ideology, tactics and objectives, manifest within Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period, therefore, can be collated and deduced into the below key sets of cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, the Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period is identified as a particular ‘global Salafist missionary activist’ actor and, accordingly, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.
(1) Ideology: Salafism
(2) Tactics: Missionary, Activism
(3) Objectives: Global

From 1989, however, analysis suggests Hizb ut-Tahrir entered into a third phase of evolution. In particular, and especially in the post-9/11 era, analysis indicates Hizb ut-Tahrir shifted towards advancing de facto support for violence, including suicide attacks, as well as refusing to denounce extremism, including groups such as IS. Analysis indicates that such an intensification in that group’s views, and so Salafist ideology, were disseminated through publications, press releases, interviews, sermons, and meetings referred to in this thesis as missionary tactics. Additionally, to this end, Hizb ut-Tahrir engaged in direct political action, especially protests which became increasingly internationalised, as well as instigating and attempting revolutions in Jordan (1993), Pakistan (2011) and Bangladesh (2012), and hence activist activities, during this period.

Analysis identifies that such developments coincided with further geographic expansion and an intensification in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities internationally. This especially took place in the West, including in the U.S, UK, and some EU member states, and Australia, as well as in Russia, Central, Southeast, and South Asia during this period. Moreover, analysis suggests such developments signalled a further intensification in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ambition to realise its objective of a global caliphate. Thus, although not directly engaging in violence, analysis indicates Hizb ut-Tahrir’s third and current phase of evolution is closely linked to extremism nevertheless, especially in terms of ideology, tactics and objectives.
The identified contours in ideology, tactics and objectives manifest within Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period, therefore, are collated and deduced into the below key sets of cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation in contemporary Political Islam. Thus, the Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period is identified as a particular ‘global Salafist missionary activist’ actor and, accordingly, orientation in contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology: Salafism
(2) Tactics: Missionary, Activism (de facto support for violence and extremism)
(3) Objectives: Global

In addition to the identified diversity in contours and subsequent orientations manifest in Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout that organisation’s revealed three phases of evolution, analysis indicates this has been impacted and shaped by a range of contextual generative mechanisms. Analysis indicates this especially includes particular political factors, notably those concerning conflict, security and geopolitics. In particular, analysis indicates that phase one of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s evolution, and therefore its ascent and early development as a ‘global Salafist missionary’ organisation, is linked to particular events generated in the wake of rising geopolitical tensions in Palestine, as well as the wider Middle East, especially following WWI. This includes the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of the British Empire and its allies in WW1; abolishing of the Ottoman-led Islamic caliphate in 1924; colonialism and the creation of nation states; the partitioning of Palestine by the UN in 1947; and the war of independence and the creation of Israel.
in 1948 which led to Hizb ut-Tahrir cessing its operations in East Jerusalem and consequently the wider West Bank.

In addition to these events, analysis suggests Hizb ut-Tahrir was especially impacted by a number of key political factors during this first phases of evolution. This includes Hizb ut-Tahrir’s failed attempts to legally resister as a political party in Jordan in 1952 and 1955; banned as a political party in Jordan in 1953; and failure to win significant seats through independent candidates in both 1954 and 1956 Chamber of Disputes elections. Therefore, despite rejecting the idea of democracy, considered by to be both inferior and a contradictory system born of capitalist Western norms and values and so antithetic to Islam, such events are identified as crystallising Hizb ut-Tahrir’s emphatic distrust towards any voting system and or democracy. This, in turn, included rejecting the potential to strategically engage and benefit through a particular democratic system as a means to an ends, and therefore, a tactic through which to achieve their particular objective(s); unlike other Salafist organisations at the time which were strategically ‘open’ to using democracy as a means such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, al-Nabhani’s exile to Syria in 1953 and then Lebanon in 1959 further galvanised such anti-democratic views, as well as anti-nation state and or anti-nationalist sentiment(s) within Hizb ut-Tahrir. Analysis also suggests that such events triggered the geographic expansion of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

928 See, for example, “Hizb ut-Tahrir and the fantasy of the caliphate”, op. cit.

929 “Hizb ut-Tahrir and its failed coup in Bangladesh”, op. cit.
Collectively, these events are identified as influencing Hizb ut-Tahrir, especially that group’s founder and ideologue, al-Nabhani who too was influenced, at least in part, by the wave of Salafist movements active throughout the Middle East in the early-to-mid-1900, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, these events are explicitly evidenced by that organisation in *The Systems of Islam* and *The Concepts of Hizb ut Tahrir* published in 1953 as the cornerstone on why Hizb ut-Tahrir exists, and so, together forms the basis of its manifesto which subsequently outlines that group’s ideology, tactics and objectives. Consequently, such events are identified as key generative mechanism impacting and shaping Hizb ut-Tahrir during this period; thus phase one of that organisation’s evolution.

Generative mechanisms linked to phase two of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s evolution, and therefore transformation into a ‘global Salafist missionary-activist’ organisation which began in 1960, too are identified as linked to the above events, especially the latter events in the 1950s, as well as additional geopolitical and security factors in the Middle East in the post-1960s. Analysis suggests that the exiling of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s founder and ideologue, al-Nabhani to Syria and Lebanon which led to the initial expansion of that group and, subsequently, resulted new recruits and branches across the Middle East. This, in turn, further emboldened Hizb ut-Tahrir which intensified its activities throughout the region in the effort to realise its objective. For this reason, Hizb ut-Tahrir shifted to employing tactics of direct political action, especially revolutionary tactics through which it plotted to overthrow ruling regimes in both Iraq and Syria in 1962 and 1964 respectively.
Analysis indicates such intensification and geographic expansion moreover was especially impacted by the Six Day War in 1967 which resulted in Israel capturing territory from Egypt, Syria and the Jordanian controlled West Bank ending Hizb ut-Tahrir’s operations in that territory, and East Jerusalem especially. This, in turn, further galvanised Hizb ut-Tahrir’s resolve and activities throughout the region, especially towards those Arab states involved in the conflict which were increasingly viewed by Hizb ut-tahrir as illegitimate non-Muslim states. Consequently, these events led to Hizb ut-Tahrir instigating a series of coups in which it attempted to overthrow the governments in Jordan, Syria and Iraq between 1968 and 1969. Moreover, this was followed by additional coup attempts in Jordan and Iraq in 1971 and 1972 respectively. These coup attempts subsequently led to intensified crackdowns by those nations’ authorities. However, analysis suggests Hizb ut-Tahrir increasingly shifted to clandestine operations throughout the region to avoid the full impact of these counter-measures.

Analysis indicates that the intensification of Hizb ut-Tahrir continued throughout the Middle East following the 1973 Yomp Kippur War which led to the defeat of Egypt, Syria and Iraq by Israel, resulting in that group being linked to additional coup attempts in Egypt and Syria in 1974 and 1976 respectively. The failed coups throughout this period and resulting intensification in government counter-measures led to Hizb ut-Tahrir covertly regrouping in an effort to further build that organisation throughout the Middle East, as well as establishing roots in Europe and Central Asia in the late-1970s and branches in North Africa and Southeast Asia in the early-1980s. Further coups attempts were made by Hizb ut-Tahrir in Egypt and Tunisia in 1983 and 1988 respectively, resulting in state crackdowns which all
but eradicated that group. Collectively, analysis identifies these events as triggering an intensification in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideological outlook, tactics and resolve to achieve its objective(s); thus key generative mechanisms underpinning phase two of that organisation’s evolution.

The third phase of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s evolution identified as beginning in 1989 followed that group’s emergence in the U.S where it evidenced a shift towards actively advancing de facto support for violence; subsequently signalling a further level of intensification as a ‘global Salafist missionary-activist’ organisation. Analysis indicates that such a development was linked to prior events, as well as crystallised by particular political events and conditions throughout the wider world in which it operated. In particular, the rejection of the Hizb ut-Tahrir as a legal political party by governments and its subsequent inability to operate overtly and engage in any political process which triggered a wave of failed coup attempts, therefore, resulted in increasing disillusionment amongst members over that group’s commitment to non-violence. Hence, such events are identified as ‘force multipliers’ which built within Hizb ut-Tahrir’s and, consequently, actioned by that group’s leadership hereafter; despite their claims to only employ and advocate non-violent tactics. This was evidenced in the 1993 foiled plot in which elements in the Jordanian military planned to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan following which Hizb ut-Tahrir would seize power in that country.

Analysis suggests that these events also generated further geographic intensification of Hizb ut-Tahrir internationally throughout the mid-1990s. This was also linked to a surge in support for Islamism globally in the wake of the Afghan-Jihad which
followed the USSR’ invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, as well as the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This was especially evident in Uzbekistan where Hizb ut-Tahrir’s support increased while establishing roots throughout Central Asia, as well as in Europe, Russia and South Asia throughout the mid-to-late-1990s. Analysis indicates that increased government crackdowns, especially in Uzbekistan and Russia, during this period, moreover, further galvanised Hizb ut-Tahrir’s de facto support for violence. This was evidenced in that group’s attendance and association with Islamic extremists at a meeting in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in 2000, as well as publications which explicitly supported violence which included suicide bombings.

Events which are identified as further impacting and shaping Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout this period also include 9/11 and, in particular, the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively and wider, and ongoing, international ‘war on terror’. These particular events generated increased support both for and within Hizb ut-Tahrir for de facto violence, especially towards America and the U.K and their military coalition allies in the ‘war on terror’ as well as Israel and Jews. These events also led to further radicalisation of some members of Hizb ut-Tahrir towards acting out extremism, including the suicide bombing by former members in Tel Aviv, Israel on April 30, 2003, as well as a member who joined al-Qaeda and was planning an attack in New York in 2004. Additionally, increased crackdowns throughout this period, especially in Pakistan, Russia and Uzbekistan, on that group over alleged links to terrorism and political dissent generated an intensification in protests and rallies as well as increased membership and the development of Hizb ut-Tahrir globally, including in Central Asia and Australia by the mid-2000s. Moreover, in addition to these events, analysis suggests
that the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment globally in the 21st Century, and in particularly since 9/11, such as that reflected in the 2012 film *Innocents of Islam*, as a result of rising Islamic extremism internationally especially led to Hizb ut-Tahrir intensifying such activities, primarily in the West.

Analysis further indicates that the Arab Spring uprisings and, in particular, civil war in Syria which broke out in late-2011 resulted in Hizb ut-Tahrir intensifying its activities globally admits growing instability and support for radical and extremist Political Islamic groups and ideologies which too benefited from such events. This especially has included protests and rallies in the U.S, UK, Denmark, Australia, Jordan, Palestine, and Syria. These events too are identified as generating further de facto support for violence within Hizb ut-Tahrir during this period, including in Russia, Australia, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Syria respectively, as well as refusal to denounce IS and Islamic extremism in 2015 and continued support for violent jihad as stipulated and revealed through that groups official website in 2017. Collectively, these events and associated conditions are identified as key generative mechanisms linked to the third phases of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s evolution thus far, representing an intensification in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideological outlook, tactics and commitment to its objective of a global caliphate.

Collectively, analysis identifies the three phases of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s evolution have been generated by a series of key events and associated conditions which are rooted in particular contextual developments. In particular, this includes events and conditions generated from political developments, especially geopolitical, security and conflict, primarily in the Middle East. Consequently, between 1952 and 2017,
such political factors are identified as generating observed regularities in ideology, tactics and objectives manifest within Hizb ut-Tahrir. Therefore, these political events and conditions are collated and deduced into the below key sets of cognitive analysis and represent particular generative mechanisms linked to diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

(4) Generative Mechanisms: Political (geopolitical, security, conflict).

7.5: Diversity in the United Malay National Organisation: Key Contours, Orientations & Generative Mechanisms

This thesis’s hypothesised analytical model suggests that to date the UMNO has evidenced a range of diversity in key contours, and hence ideology, tactics and objectives. Analysis indicates diversity in contours in the UMNO especially manifested in three key evolutionary phases between 1946 and 2017. Consequently, each of these identified phases represent a hardening in ideology, tactics and objectives and, together, are argued in this thesis to form particular orientations of Political Islam manifest in the UMNO, and thus key diversity. Therefore, contours manifest in the UMNO throughout the three phases of evolution will now be collated and combined to formulate key orientations in contemporary Political Islam. Analysis will also catalogue identified contextual generative mechanisms argued to be responsible for such developments.

Analysis identifies that the first phase in the diversity in contours manifest in the UMNO accrued following that group’s inception in 1946 until 1969. Throughout this period, analysis identifies that the UMNO adhered to and advocated a particular form of Political Islamic ideology derived of ‘traditional’ Malay-Muslim
interpretations and teachings of Sunni Islam, similar to that advanced by Malaya’s Sultans which the UMNO seeks to protect.\textsuperscript{930} This includes aspects of Shari’a Law pertaining to the ‘private’ affairs of Muslims administrated through Shari’a Courts, but rejects the strict \textit{hudud} penial code, while supporting ethno-religious pluralism and secularism.\textsuperscript{931} Therefore, the UMNOs ideology during this period was somewhat moderate compared to Islamism and, in particular, Jihadism and in turn is identified and argued in this thesis as representing a particular manifestation of Conservative Political Islamic ideology.

Such a moderate yet Conservative ideology moreover formed the cornerstone of that party’s Malay-Muslim nationalism, and hence objective, which sought to advance a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and secular orientated nation state;\textsuperscript{932} albeit preferential to Malay-Muslim rights as ‘sons of soil’.\textsuperscript{933} Hence, although supporting Shari’a Courts, the UMNO rejected calls by such Islamist groups as the PAS for an Islamic state based on Shari’a Law, including \textit{hudud}. Rather, the UMNO sought to challenge British Malaya, especially with Malay independence imminent, and so pursued Malay-Muslim nationalism throughout British Malaya, including in territories of Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak, which the UMNO viewed as belonging to a future Malay nation state.

\textsuperscript{930} See, for example, McAmis, \textit{Malay Muslims}, op. cit., pp.87-88.

\textsuperscript{931} Liow, \textit{Piety and Politics}, op. cit., p.22.

\textsuperscript{932} Ibid; “Reid Constitutional Commission”, op. cit., p.1.

\textsuperscript{933} McAmis, \textit{Malay Muslims}, op. cit., p.85
To this end, analysis suggests the UMNO engaged in direct political action, including successfully working and negotiating with the British, as well as the Malay Sultans, to form key legislation leading to the Federation of Malaya in 1948, the Reid Commission in 1956 and subsequent Constitution of the Federation of Malaya in 1957. The UMNO also developed strong political relations and agreements with non-Malay-Muslim parties, notably Chinese and Indian, which formed the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Alliance coalition. Collectively, such political activities are identified in this thesis as particular tactics of political activism.

Additionally, in the post-independence period, the UMNO moved to increase state-sponsored Islamic da’wa activities. Analysis argues that these sought to advance that party’s ideology and objective throughout the Federation of Malaya, as well as in Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak which joined with the former to form the Federation of Malaysia (Malaysia) in 1963. This included UMNO-backed Islamic educational programs, including Quran-reading courses, competitions and the beginnings of an extensive mosque and pray house building program throughout Malaya, as well as support for haj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Together, these da’wa activities are collectively identified in this thesis as particular missionary tactics employed by the UMNO throughout this period.

The identified three contours of ideology, tactics and objectives manifest within the UMNO throughout this period are collated and deduced into the following key sets of cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a

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934 Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p.22
particular observed orientation of Political Islam manifest in the UMNO during this period. Thus, the UMNO is identified as a particular ‘national Conservative activist missionary’ actor and, accordingly, orientation of contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology: Conservative  
(2) Tactics: Activism, Missionary  
(3) Objectives: National

Analysis indicates that in the wake 1969 Malaysian general elections the UMNO underwent a second key phase of evolution. This is especially evidenced following the electoral defeats and ensuing ‘race riots’ resulting from growing dissent in what were otherwise UMNO-led Alliance political strongholds. Consequently, analysis indicates the UMNO became repressive domestically, as well as more integrated internationally, and deepened its control and polity of Conservative Political Islamic ideological so as to both protect and advance that’s party’s objective of Malay-Muslim nationalism.

To this end, analysis indicates the UMNO employed a range of tactics, including engaging in direct political action. In addition to elections, this manifested in new, as well as key reforms to, security and economic legislation. This included reforming the Sedition Act, Internal Security Act, Printing Press Act, and the introduction of the University Act and Official Secrets Act. All of these mechanisms sought counter dissent and limit discussion on ‘sensitive’ issues; thus special status awarded to Malay-Muslims and wider Malays (bumiputra) in the Malaysian Constitution. This was followed by the NEP which awarded Malays greater socio-economic status over minorities, including increasing funding to
support Malay-Muslims studying at Islamic institutions in Malaysia and overseas. This was further intensified by Industrial Relations Act. Moreover, the UMNO established the multi-ethnic and multi-religious BN coalition, including an alliance with the Islamist party PAS (later expelled in 1977), purged moderate UMNO members in favour of more hard-line elements, and limited non-Malays to holding non-ministerial positions. The UMNO also strengthened its international relations and security, joining the OIC, Five Power Defence Agreement and restored relations with China. Collectively, such political actions are identified in this thesis as particular tactics of political activism employed by the UMNO during this period.

Additionally, the UMNO further engaged in da’wa activities throughout this period, evidenced in the establishment of a number of institutions which worked to both counter dissent and advance that party’s ideology and objective. This was achieved by propagating materials and views that were consistent with and or supported those held by the UMNO. This was through lectures, publications, television and the internet and overseen by a number of key UMNO-backed and affiliated institutions such as the Religious Division of the Prime Minister’s Office, Islamic Research Centre, Yayasan Da’wa, Radio and Television Malaysia and its associated Religious Da’wa Unit, and the Propagation and Teaching Institute. Together, these developments are identified as corresponding with particular da’wa activities and are referred to in this thesis as missionary tactics used by the UMNO during this period.

The identified three contours of ideology, tactics and objectives manifest within the UMNO throughout this period are collated and deduced into the below key sets of
cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation of Political Islam manifest in the UMNO during this period. Thus, the UMNO is identified as a particular ‘national Conservative activist missionary’ actor and, accordingly, orientation of contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology: Conservative
(2) Tactics: Activism, Missionary
(3) Objectives: National

By the early 1980s, however, the UMNO appears to have undergone a third key phase of evolution, especially following the rise of Mahathir as both UMNO President and PM of Malaysia in 1981 and who particularly viewed Islamism as key threat to UMNO dominance. Analysis suggests this manifested in the UMNO becoming more assertive in terms protecting and advancing that party’s Conservative Political Islamic ideology and associated objective of a modern and moderate Malay-Muslim nationalism. Consequently, analysis indicates the UMNO become more repressive, especially politically, and further moved to deepen its control of the BN government and in turn Malaysian society.

This development in turn signalled a further intensification in, and expansion of, tactics employed by the UMNO. Analysis indicates the UMNO ‘doubled down’ on both da’wa activities and direct political action. This was linked to that party’s Islamization strategy which increasingly sought to, first, ‘align/realign’ both society (Muslims) and the state (Malaysia) with that of UMNO ideology and its objective. Secondly, to counteract political completion viewed as a threat to the UMNO, especially Islamism.
This was evidenced with an intensification in the propagation of pro-UMNO materials, content and views through meetings, publications, television and the internet. This was administered through a number of key UMNO-affiliated institutions and initiatives such as The Concept of Islamic Development, effectively leading to Muftis, the Religious Council and National Fatwa Council supporting, propagating and legitimizing the ideology and objective of the UMNO. This was intensified and expanded through the Islamic Research Centre (redeveloped into JAKIM in 1996), also tasked with monitoring non-UMNO affiliated Islamic groups; the Religious and Da’wa Unit within Radio and Television Malaysia; and Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding. Collectively, such activities are identified in this thesis as forms of missionary tactics employed by the UMNO throughout this period.

The UMNO also engaged in, and won, elections, co-opted Political Islamic actors into the UMNO-led BN, including Anwar Ibrahim (expelled in 1998) and increasingly competed for political space with Islamists. Additionally, it deepened and widened its Islamization of legal and economic institutions through additional legislative reforms. This included introducing the Shari’a Courts Enactment, resulting in Lower, Higher and Appeal courts; Islamic Family Law Act; Islamic Banking Act; and Malaysian Mutual Assistance Insurance Company to assure Shari’a-compliance. It introduced the Printing Press and Publication Act, Control of Imported Publications Act and amended the Police Act and ordered Operation Lallang.
All these measures sought to further limit dissent and views which challenged those of the UMNO, including the foreign media. The UMNO conducted character assassinations, sanctioned the arrests and jailing of journalists, activists and political rivals, including members of the Democratic Action Party, the PAS Youth leader, and Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. Furthermore, the UMNO introduced 1Malaysia which sought to offset dissent and in turn entrench UMNO polity, called for greater Islamization of the state and prohibited events considered offensive to Islam. Combined, these political actions are identified in this thesis as particular tactics of political activism employed by the UMNO during this period.

This third phase of evolution therefore represents an intensification in the ideology, tactics and objectives manifest in the UMNO. Consequently, developments corresponding to these three contours are collated and deduced into the below key sets of cognitive analysis. Together, these are argued in this thesis to represent a particular observed orientation of Political Islam manifest in the UMNO during this period. Thus, the UMNO is identified as a particular ‘national Conservative activist missionary’ actor and, accordingly, orientation of contemporary Political Islam.

(1) Ideology: Conservative
(2) Tactics: Activism, Missionary
(3) Objectives: National

In addition to the identified key diversity in contours and subsequent orientations of Political Islam manifest in the UMNO and that organisation’s associated three phases of evolution, analysis indicates this has been impacted and shaped by a range of contextual generative mechanisms. In particular, analysis indicates that phase
one of the UMNO’s evolution, and therefore its ascent and early development as a Conservative activist-missionary nationalist organisation, is linked to particular political events generated in post WWII British Malaya.

This was evidenced with the formation of the UMNO in response to the signing of the MacMichael Treaties Union between the British and Malay Sultans and the subsequent proposal of the Malayan Union in 1945 which the UMNO opposed. The political process leading to the Federation of Malaya in 1948 which too impacted and shaped the UMNO, resulting in that party being challenged by Islamist Malay-Muslim nationalists such as MATA, Hizbul Muslimin and PUM (renamed PMIA in 1951), as well as far-left and Communist groups including MNP, PETA and MCP. This, in turn, lead to the UMNO establishing a national Islamization program, overseen by that party’s newly formed Religious Affairs Department, through which to counteract such descent as well as further establish and so legitimize that party’s Islamic credentials.

Additional political factors throughout the 1950s further impacted and shaped the UMNO during this phase of evolution. Analysis especially identifies increased, criticism by, and competition with, the PAS especially of UMNO Islamic-centric policy, mainly that party’s rejection to institutionalise Shari’a Law, further resulted in the UMNO expanding its Islamization activities in Malaysia. This was especially in regarded to the UMNO’s support for a secular and pluralistic orientated state framework outlined in the Reid Commission, Constitution of the Federation of Malaya and then the Federation of Malaysia. Consequently, this lead to further advances in Islamic legislative and da’wa activities and therefore activist and
missionary tactics respectively being employed by the UMNO throughout the late-1950s and 1960s. This was in an effort to further counteract dissent and hence views that challenged the legitimacy of that party’s Islamic character, especially Islamists, both within and outside the UMNO particularly. Collectively, such political factors and events are argued in this thesis to represent the key contextual generative mechanisms responsible for the ascent and which impacted and shaped the early development of the UMNO and thus manifestation as a Conservative activist-missionary nationalist orientation in Political Islam.

By 1969, analysis suggests a second evolutionary phase in the orientation of the UMNO accrued. This was evidenced with the expansion and intensifying of missionary and activist tactics in pursuit of that party’s objective of Malay-Muslim nationalism while maintaining a Conservative ideological outlook; albeit arguably a hardened one. This resulted in the entrenchment of UMNO polity and deepening Islamization of Malaysia. Moreover, analysis identifies this development was linked to key political factors, notably the 1969 race riots which erupted in response to non-Malays who were celebrating their election victories in Kuala Lumpur, and hence dissent, over the UMNO-led government and its preferential treatment of Malays.

Despite purporting to seek greater ethnic harmony in the wake of the race riots, as evidenced in the National Principles, the UMNO moved to intensify stricter legislation which it justified was needed to prevent threats to ethnic cohesion. This included implementing key legislation which further repressed political and wider social opposition to ‘sensitive’ issues concerning special rights for Malays and the
role of Islam. This included amending the Sedition Act and Internal Security Act as well as introducing the Official Secrets Act. These laws, among others, were increasingly used to curtail free speech that was considered critical of the UMNO and or pro-opposition for example. Additionally, ethnic tensions and hostily towards non-Malays over their perceived economic dominance further moved the UMNO to intensify its ‘Malay-Muslim first’ agenda throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. This was especially underpinned by the NEP which worked to advance the socio-economic status of Malay-Muslims, as well as helped fund and expand that party’s Islamization program, including additional UMNO-backed Islamic education and religious programs for Malay-Muslims.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, furthermore, analysis argues that Islamist actors were an additional political factor impacting and shaping the UMNO, and hence that party’s second phase of orientation. This was the result of Islamist actors increasingly challenging and competing for political space with the UMNO. This especially included the Islamic Da’wa Foundation and the PAS which were particularly critical of UMNO policies, with the latter accusing it of being a kafir organisation which had failed to advance the socio-economic status of Malay-Muslims and, in particular, Shari’a Law in Malaysia. Consequently, the UMNO sought to counter the PAS and wider deviant forms of Islamist dissent which had become increasingly influenced by international ideologues, as well as events, including the Army of Allah. In particular, the UMNO sought to strengthening that party’s Islamic credentials as a Malay-Muslim party and in turn its support for Malay-Muslim superiority. To this end, the UMNO moved to expand its Islamization program in Malaysia through a range of missionary and activist tactics.
which resulted in increased government support for the role of Islam in society, notably through education, television, publications, and the building of mosques and prayer houses. This also extended to the state apparatus and was especially evidenced with the establishment of state institutions such as the Islamic Research Centre and the Propagation and Teaching Institute which engaged in extensive da’wa activities during this period for example.

Collectively, policies and legislation as well as da’wa activities and thus tactics implemented and employed by the UMNO-led government throughout this period in an effort to counter dissent and advance that party’s ideology and associated objective of Malay-Muslim nationalism, therefore, are argued in this thesis to have been generated by political factors. This especially includes political factors pertaining to ethnic tensions and socio-economics in the wake of the 1969 race riots as well as heightened competition from Islamist actors. This, in turn, is identified as the key contextual generative mechanism responsible for the intensification in contours manifest in the UMNO and therefore that organisation’s second phase of evolution as a Conservative missionary-activist nationalist actor and thus orientation in Political Islam.

By the early 1980s, analysis indicates that the UMNO underwent a third key phase of evolution. This was evidenced with a further expansion in, and intensifying of, missionary and activist tactics in pursuit of its objective of Malay-Muslim nationalism while remaining ideologically Conservative. Analysis identifies this development to be linked to key political factors, notably the rise of Islamist actors and wider political dissent, as well as the threat of Jihadists to a lesser extent, in
Malaysia from the 1980s onwards. In particular, the former two have increasingly challenged and competed with the UMNO for dominance. This has especially been the case in terms of Islamist actors which had become increasingly influenced by external political events such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet-Afghan war for example. This, in turn, led the UMNO to prodigiously view Islamist actors, especially those that were registered political parties such as the PAS, as the key threat to the party’s control of Islamic affairs as well as government. For this reason, the UMNO moved to further counter Islamist actors in Malaysia from the early 1980s, and to date continues to do so.

Analysis indicates this has resulted in the UMNO-led government implementing more ideologically-geared legislation and intensified da’wa actives, and hence tactics, in its effort to Islamize Malaysia in accordance with that party’s purported ‘modern and moderate’ doctrine. This was essentially strategic in nature and so pragmatic, seeking to limit the political and social space in which Islamist actors could gain any further foothold. This was especially the case in relation to the PAS and ABIM, both of which had made unprecedented gains, for example. Consequently, the UMNO introduced the Shari’a Courts Enactment, the Islamic Family Law Act, Islamic Banking Act, the Printing Press and Publication Act, Operation Lallang, established IKIM and JAKIM, and intensified the use of the Internal Security Act for example. Moreover, internal political divisions within the UMNO during this period are also identified in the analysis as having further impacted and shaped that party, triggered by deepening internal descent and resulting in further autocratic measures. This included purging the UMNO and the Supreme Court, as well as expelling and elements from within the UMNO-led BN
government, including ABIM leader and Deputy PM Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 who had supported government since the early 1990s.

Analysis identifies that the unprecedented rise and perceived threat of Islamist, as well as Jihadist, actors which increasingly challenged and competed with the UMNO, furthermore, continued to be the primary concern of the UMNO throughout the 2000s, and thus key contextual generative mechanism. This was especially the case following additional political gains by the PAS and the introduction of Hudud Bill in Terengganu in 2002. This, in turn, further triggered an expansion in the UMNO’s Islamization efforts. This was evidenced with heightened political competition, the implementation of additional legislation as well as da’wa activities. Collectively, this further sought to tactically contract such Islamist groups as the PAS especially, as well as to advance UMNO doctrine, and hence control. This included UMNO President and Malaysian PM Badawi intensifying competition with the PAS by advancing the notion that the UMNO had successfully implemented an Islamic polity and, in turn, that Malaysia was already an ‘Islamic state’; claims which resonated amongst Malay-Muslims as evidenced in the 2004 UMNO landslide election victory.

However, non-Malay support for the UMNO reduced to an all-time low in the 2008 general elections but, nevertheless, retained power. Analysis suggest this was triggered following concerns over heightened levels of corruption and the continued preferential treatment of Malays by the UMNO-led government. Moreover, such conditions were harnessed by the PAS, claiming this as evidence that the UMNO-led BN government and its policies were antithetical to Islam and wider ‘Malaysian
unity’; a strategic position that the PAS has sought to represent through ‘Islamic social justice’. Therefore, the PAS and non-Muslim opposition parties were increasingly viewed by the UMNO as key threats to that party’s control and in turn doctrine. Consequently, analysis indicates the UMNO moved to counteract such dissent through 1Malaysia. This grand socio-economic legislative strategy, implemented in 2009 by Malaysian PM and UMNO President Najib Razak, is geared to modernizing and developing Malaysia. This is especially in terms of the economy and socially through a range of linked welfare initiatives, as well as social justice and countering corruption through greater government accountability initiatives. Therefore, 1Malaysia has sought to stem such conditions and hence space in which Islamists such as the PAS and the wider opposition draws their political support.

However, dissent towards the UMNO has continued, evidenced in the 2013 elections which resulted in the UMNO-led BN government reviving less of the popular vote than the opposition but again retaining power. Analysis suggests this has resulted from deepening ethno-religious tensions born of ongoing preferential UMNO policy towards Malays and, in particular, Malay-Muslims. This is especially evidenced with unprecedented numbers of non-Malays shifting their support to the opposition (Alliance of Hope), especially Chinese voters. This has intensified in the wake of the 1MDB scandal which emerged in 2015 and endures. Consequently, and with the 2018 elections looming, the UMNO moved to intensify its political counteractions against opposition parties, including further media controls and character assassination of opposition party members, as well as calling for greater Islamization of Malaysia in an effort to contain the PAS and wider
Islamist actors. Moreover, and to this end, throughout the latter part of 2017 the UMNO has moved to align that party closer to the PAS as a potential coalition partner. This has triggered concerns, especially amongst non-Muslim Malaysians, over stricter and more expansive Islamization measures in Malaysia and in turn intolerance and exclusivist Islamic views and practices in Malaysia.

Therefore, analysis discerns that all these missionary and activist tactics were employed by the UMNO during this period in an effort to deepen that party’s control, especially over Islamic affairs, amidst rising dissent by Islamists and wider opposition, as well as from within the party. In response, the UMNO intensified and expanded its Islamization of Malaysia, seeking to both defend and advance its ideology and objective. Consequently, analysis identifies political factors pertaining to the unprecedented rise of Islamist actors, ethno-religious tensions and socio-economics as key contextual generative mechanisms. Together, these are identified in this thesis as responsible for the intensification in contours manifest in the UMNO and, therefore, that organisation’s third and current phase of evolution as a Conservative missionary-activist nationalist actor, and thus orientation in Political Islam.

Collectively, analysis identifies that the three phases of the UMNO’s evolution identified in this thesis between 1946 and 2017 were triggered by a range of political factors and associated conditions. Analysis has especially identified colonialism, the rise of Islamist actors, ethno-religious tensions, and socio-economic tensions as the key political factors. Combined, these represent key contextual generative mechanisms which are argued in this thesis to be responsible for impacting and
shaping the ideology, tactics and objective, and hence key contours, manifest in the UMNO since that organisation’s inception. Therefore, these political factors and associated conditions are collated and deduced into the below key sets of cognitive analysis and represent particular generative mechanisms linked to diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

(4) Generative Mechanisms: Political (colonialism, Islamism, ethno-religious tensions, socio-economic tensions)

7.6: Conceptual Diversity in Contemporary Political Islam

This thesis’s hypothesised critical analytical model has revealed a wide and diverse range of contours which manifest as ideologies, tactics and objectives in each of the cases examined. These are argued in this thesis to provide holistic insight into contemporary diversity in Political Islam. In particular, manifest in the cases examined analysis identifies three key categories of ideologies: Jihadist, Salafist and Conservative; three key categories of tactics: Missionary, Activism and Violence/Extremism; and four key categories of objectives: Sub-State, National, Trans-National, and Global.

All of these ideologies, tactics and objectives have been deduced as primary contours and, combined, are argued in this thesis to have manifest a range of key orientations pertaining to extremist, radical and moderate manifestations of diversity in contemporary Political Islam. In the context of extremism this includes, Global Jihadist Extremism Missionary Activism, Trans-National Jihadist Extremism Missionary Activism, Trans-National Jihadist Extremism, National Jihadist Extremism Missionary Activism, National Jihadist Extremism, and Sub-
State Jihadist Extremism Political Islam. In the context of radical orientations these include, Global Salafist Missionary Activism, Global Salafist Missionary, and Sub-State Missionary Activism Political Islam. Regarding moderate orientations, this includes National Conservative Activism Missionary Political Islam.

In addition the three sets of contours and key orientations, analysis has identified three key categories of contextual generative mechanisms argued to be responsible for impacting on and shaping contemporary diversity in Political Islam. These include, political, social and economic generative mechanisms which are argued to have impacted on and shaped the ideologies, tactics and objectives and in turn orientations in Political Islam identified as manifest in the cases examined in this thesis.

It is argued in this thesis that all of these identified categories of contours and associated orientations as well as generative mechanisms, combined, represent key diversity in contemporary Political Islam. Consequently, this thesis asserts that such categories together can theoretically be harnessed as key sets of cognitive analysis. This, in turn, provides a way to map and in turn formulate a critical paradigm through which to view and understand how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests. Therefore, contours, and hence orientations, and generative mechanisms are combined to form a multi-dimensional paradigm of conceptual diversity in contemporary Political Islam and is represented in figure 2.
7.7: Reassessing Theoretical Diversity in Contemporary Political Islam: Towards a Multi-Dimensional Prescription

The hypothesised critical analytical model and associated conceptual multi-dimensional paradigm advanced in this thesis reveals a wide and diverse range of diversity in contemporary Political Islam and, in particular, how and why it manifests. This, in turn, arguably provides important insight through which to consider and assess claims made about diversity in contemporary Political Islam, especially in terms of how and why it manifests. Consequently, this thesis too provides a way through which to reassess Accommodationist and Confrontationist
theories’ claims about, and the contested nature of, diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

As noted, Accommodationist theory argues that Political Islam is a creative space, both capable of and manifesting moderate orientations that are progressive and or liberal akin to democratic norms and values, as well as radical and extremist orientations. In the context of the former, this theory further argues such moderate orientations are essentially the bi-product of their engagement in democratic behaviour and systems when and if available to them, notably elections. Therefore, it asserts that democratic conditions act as a moderating force which generates democratic political behaviours and hence norms.

However, analysis was not able to confirm any such progressive or liberal developments. This was especially evident in the analysis of the UMNO which correlates to a particular moderate, yet, Conservative orientation of Political Islam. The UMNO has also increasingly engaged in ethno-religious discriminatory politics and intensified the Islamization of Malaysia. Accommodationist theory appears to be further called into question by the fact that the UMNO has led every government since independence engaging in every election, and hence the democratic process, in Malaysia since parliamentary elections began in that country in 1955; yet the UMNO has not shifted towards a liberal orientation, especially in terms of ideology, tactics and objectives.

In the case of Confrontationist theory which argues Political Islam to be extremist, of which analysis confirms both IS and Boko Haram are, or radical in nature which analysis evidences Hizb ut-Tahrir to be. Nevertheless, it essentially fails to
explain the moderate, yet, Conservative orientation of Political Islam identified as manifest in the UMNO. This theory’s claim is further questioned by the fact that the UMNO engages in the democratic process and, in particular, has sought to counteract radical as well as extremist variants of Political Islam, identified in the analysis as arguably the primary concern of that party since its establishment. Hence, unlike the other cases examined in this thesis, the UMNO is not a radical or an extremist form of Political Islam but a Conservative, yet, moderate orientation. Moreover, Confrontationist theory further argues that the inherent radical and extremist nature of Political Islam is generated by ideologies linked to Islamic teachings and practices deduced from religious texts. However, analysis indicates that while ideology is a key, if not defining, contour manifest in Political Islam, particular political, social and economic, or a combination thereof, are responsible for its development; thus generative mechanisms impacting on and shaping diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

Notwithstanding the contribution of these two theories, based on the above analysis both Accommodationist and Confrontationist theories therefore do not adequately provide an explanation to understanding the nature of contemporary diversity in Political Islam. This is especially the case in terms of holistically explaining how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests. Rather, deduced from the above analysis, this thesis proposes the idea that the contemporary Political Islam can best be understood as diverse in nature, especially ideologies, tactics and objectives, generated by a wide range of contextual generative mechanisms.
In particular, contemporary diversity in Political Islam has manifest three key ideologies: Conservative, Salafist and Jihadist. All these employ tactics of Missionary, Activism or Violence/Extremism, or a combination thereof, as well as seek objectives concerning Islamic government, including varying degrees of traditional applications of Shari’a Law, in either a Sub-State, National, Trans-National, or Global geopolitical context. Consequently, contemporary Political Islam is argued to be neither inherently radical nor extreme and that while theoretically capable of manifesting liberal democratic norms and values, to date this appears absent.935

This thesis therefore suggests an understanding about the nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam that is neither Accommodationist nor Confrontationist but, rather, ‘Diversificationist’; a term coined for the purpose of this thesis. The Diversificationist view of understanding therefore represents a third and ‘balanced’ theory through which to reassess claims about how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests; thus it is quite unlike Confrontationist or Accommodationist theories. Consequently, Diversificationist theory provides a particular prescription to the contested nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

This thesis has addressed the challenge and task to comprehensively discern and understand key diversity in contemporary Political Islam, argued to be of particular relevance for security and wider political affairs as well as society in general. It has argued this is an issue which has fundamentally been generated as a result of contested scholarly thought which in turn has resulted in two key competing scholarly views and understandings about the nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam; thus Accommodationist and Confrontationist theories.

The thesis presented qualified evidence that these two theories, combined, view and understand contemporary diversity in Political Islam as manifesting three key orientations: extremist, radical and moderate. However, the latter theory rejects the former’s claim that moderate manifestations akin to liberal norms and values have emerged, while the former rejects that latter’s claim that contemporary Political Islam is intently radical and extremist in nature. Consequently, the thesis has argued that these two theories have fundamentally led to a divided and, in some cases, confused understanding and therefore an inability to discern clearly between the growing range in contemporary Political Islamic actors, especially how and why they manifest.

It has argued and presented qualified evidence supporting that the two key theories have cascaded into and impacted on political affairs and security, as well as wider society. This too has resulted in a divided and, in some cases, confused
understanding about diversity in contemporary Political Islam amongst government officials, leaders and actors as well as within wider society in general.

It has argued that such a situation so calls into question the analytical approaches employed to examine contemporary Political Islam and, in particular, the need for an analytical tool which goes beyond the current understanding of Political Islam. It has argued that such a tool must be capable of critically examining a wide range of contemporary cases through which to holistically view and understand how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests. Therefore, this thesis has examined contemporary diversity in Political Islam with the view of deducing a critical model of analysis through which to holistically understanding how and why it manifests. This, in turn, has sought to provide insight into and clarity on the contested nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam.

To this end, the thesis presented qualified evidence supporting the argument that the threefold cause-and-effect theory advanced by critical realism provides a particular theoretical framework which is key to holistically understanding how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests. Consequently, critical realism formed the analytical framework of this thesis. Qualified support was presented which argued that such an approach identified four key points of enquiry concerning how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests. This includes, (1) Ideology (2) Tactics, (3) Objectives, and (4) Contextual Generative Mechanisms.

The thesis provided qualified support for the argument that the first three points of enquiry together form primary contours, or DNA, manifest in and which determine
the orientation of contemporary Political Islamic actors, while the fourth is key to illuminating societal factors and conditions responsible for their development. Subsequently, this thesis has argued that these four points of enquiry can be theoretically harnessed as key sets of cognitive analysis and, combined, formulate a critical model of analysis. It has been argued this provides a holistic approach through which to examine, deduce and frame how and why diversity manifests in contemporary Political Islam. This fourfold critical model of analysis thus formed this thesis’s hypothesis.

The hypothesised critical model of analysis was applied through a multi-case study approach. This is argued in this thesis to provide a way through which to view a wide and diverse range of cases appearing to fit within the parameters of extremist, radical and moderate manifestations of contemporary Political Islam. Thus, a selective sampling approach was used. This included, IS, Boko Haram, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the UMNO which emanate from parts of the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Qualified support was presented arguing that these regions are places where Political Islam has a long and enduring existence, including a diverse range of actors as well as contextual factors and conditions which impact on and shape their development. Therefore, it is argued that these actors emanating from these regions provided a way to illuminate maximum diversity in the four points of enquiry examined through this thesis’s critical model of analysis.

Manifest within the cases examined through the hypothesised critical model of analysis, qualified evidence was presented supporting the argument that there are
three key ideologies pertaining to extremist, radical and moderate orientations of contemporary Political Islam. This includes, Jihadist, Salafist and Conservative respectively. Qualified evidence was presented arguing that there are three key tactics and include, Missionary, Activism and Violence/Extremism. Qualified evidence has been presented supporting the argument that there are four key objectives which are concerned with the establishment of Islamic governance and law within a particular geopolitical framework and include, Sub-State, National, Trans-National, and Global. Collectively, all these ideologies, tactics and objectives in contemporary Political Islam have been argued in this thesis to represent a range of diversity in the three key contours and in turn how they manifest.

The thesis has presented qualified evidence that argues all these contours manifest in the cases examined in turn form particular orientations in contemporary Political Islam pertaining to extremist, radical and moderate. In the context of extremism these range from and include, Global Jihadist Extremism Missionary Activism, Trans-National Jihadist Extremism Missionary Activism, Trans-National Jihadist Extremism, National Jihadist Extremism Missionary Activism, National Jihadist Extremism, and Sub-State Jihadist Extremism orientations of Political Islam. In the context of radical orientations these include, Global Salafist Missionary Activism, Global Salafist Missionary, and Sub-State Missionary Activism orientations of Political Islam. Regarding moderate orientations, this includes a National Conservative Activism Missionary orientation of Political Islam. Together, it has been argued that these represent a range of diversity in key orientations in contemporary Political Islam and hence how it manifests.
Qualified evidence was presented supporting the argument that all of these contours and, in turn, orientations have been impacted on and shaped by a range of societal generative mechanisms. These pertain to three primary factors and associated conditions which have been collated into three key categories by this thesis’s critical model of analysis and include, Political, Social and Economic. It has been argued that such societal factors and associated conditions are responsible for and have generated such diversity in contemporary Political Islam and thus why it manifests.

The thesis has presented qualified evidence supporting the argument that the four key points of enquiry examined through this thesis’s hypothesised critical model of analysis have, therefore, revealed a wide and diverse range of contours through which to view key orientations and hence diversity in contemporary Political Islam. It has also revealed a diverse range of contextual factors and conditions which have impacted on and shaped their development. Together, the four key points of analysis, Ideology, Tactics, Objectives and Generative Mechanisms and each of their corresponding range of categories, thus provides a way through which to holistically view and understand how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests. Subsequently, this is argued in this thesis to form a multi-dimensional paradigm.

This thesis has presented qualified evidence arguing that the hypothesised critical model of analysis and associated multi-dimensional paradigm provides a way to consider and assess claims made by the key theories about diversity in contemporary Political Islam. This thesis presented qualified evidence supporting
the argument that Accommodationist theory understands contemporary Political Islam as a creative space, both capable of and manifesting moderate orientations that are progressive and or liberal akin to democratic norms and values, as well as radical and extremist orientations. In the context of the former, it has presented qualified evidence that supports the argument that this theory further asserts such moderate orientations are essentially the bi-product of environments wherein they engage in democratic behaviour and systems when and if available to them, notably elections. Hence, this theory asserts that contextual conditions pertaining to democracy act as a moderating force which generates democratic political behaviours and norms; thus a generative mechanism.

However, qualified evidence has been presented that rebuffs the claim that any such progressive or liberal developments have accrued. In addition to IS, Boko Haram and Hizb ut-Tahrir, this was especially evident in the case of the UMNO which is argued in this thesis to be a particular moderate, yet, Conservative orientation of Political Islam. Evidence was presented that the UMNO has increasingly engaged in ethno-religious discriminatory politics and intensified the Islamization of Malaysia resulting in illiberal developments, politically, economically and socially. Evidence has been presented that argues the UMNO has led every government since independence and, in particular, engaged in every election, and hence democratic conditions, in Malaysia since parliamentary elections began in that country in 1955. However, the UMNO has not shifted towards a liberal orientation, especially in terms of ideology, tactics and objectives. Rather, evidence argues it is remains ideologically Conservative and, to some extent, illiberal in nature; albeit to a much lesser degree than radical and
especially extremist orientations. Thus, Accommodationist theory is further called into question by this thesis.

The thesis has argued and presented qualified evidence supporting that Confrontationist theory understands Political Islam to be extremist, of which analysis confirms both IS and Boko Haram are, and radical in nature which analysis evidences Hizb ut-Tahrir to be. Nevertheless, this thesis too has rejected this theory’s claim. It has presented qualified evidence arguing that Confrontationist theory fails to explain the moderate, yet, Conservative orientation of Political Islam manifest in the UMNO. Evidence has been presented that further questions this theory’s claim, confirmed by the fact that the UMNO engages in the democratic process and, in particular, has sought to counteract radical and extremist variants of Political Islam; arguably the primary concern of that party since its establishment. Hence, evidence presented supports the argument that unlike other cases examined in this thesis, the UMNO is not a radical or an extremist form of Political Islam but a moderate, yet, Conservative orientation. This, in turn, rebuffs the claim the contemporary diversity in Political Islam is inherently radical and extreme, especially in terms of ideology, tactics and objectives.

Qualified evidence has been presented that argues Confrontationist theory further asserts that the purported inherent radical and extremist nature of Political Islam is, moreover, fundamentally generated by ideologies linked to Islamic teachings and practices deduced from religious texts. However, evidenced presented in this thesis has argued that while ideology is a key if not defining contour manifest in
contemporary Political Islam it is not a generative mechanism. Rather, evidence presented in this thesis supports the argument that particular political, social and economic factors and associated conditions, or a combination thereof, are responsible for its development.

Qualified evidence has been presented that argues Accommodationist and Confrontationist theories therefore do not provide an adequate understanding about the nature of contemporary diversity in Political Islam, especially in terms of holistically explaining how and why it manifests. Rather, qualified evidence has been presented which supports an alternative multi-dimensional viewpoint of understanding which challenges these two theories. In particular, evidence supports this thesis’s assertion that contemporary Political Islam is diverse in nature and manifests a range of orientations pertaining to extremist, radical as well as moderate which, however, are not liberal despite their engagement in democracy. Evidence presented supports this thesis’s claim that contemporary Political Islam is therefore neither inherently radical nor extreme or manifests liberal, moderate orientations; albeit theoretically possible.

Qualified evidence was presented supporting this thesis’s argument that such orientations have been generated by key political, social and economic factors and associated contextual conditions, and not ideology derived of religious texts; albeit a key if not defining contour manifest in Political Islam. Moreover, evidence has been presented that supports this thesis’s assertion that contextual conditions wherein democratic systems are in place have not generated liberal
norms and behaviours or orientations in contemporary Political Islam, at least not to date.

This thesis therefore has presented qualified evidence which argues an understanding about the nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam that is neither Accommodationist nor Confrontationist. Rather, evidence supports an understanding of contemporary diversity in Political Islam which has been argued and is referred to in this thesis as Diversificationist theory. Evidence argues this to represent a third and ‘balanced’ understanding about how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests; thus it is quite unlike Confrontationist or Accommodationist theories. Consequently, Diversificationist theory is evidenced as a particular prescription to the contested nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam. Thus an alternative multi-dimensional viewpoint of understanding has been proposed in this thesis about how and why contemporary diversity in Political Islam manifests through the hypothesised critical model of analysis.

It is asserted therefore that this thesis’s hypothesised critical model of analysis and associated multi-dimensional paradigm provides a way to examine and discern clearly between a diverse range of orientations in contemporary Political Islam, especially in terms of how and why they manifest. This includes those that are violent and hostile – which seek to impose puritanical and radical polices and laws – and those that are akin to moderate, yet, illiberal democratic norms and behaviours, and those in-between which are radical, as well as political, social and economic contextual casual factors. Thus it is asserted that the thesis has deduced a critical tool through which to comprehensively map how and why diversity in
contemporary Political Islam manifests. The thesis asserts that such a critical model of analysis is of particular concern in the context of security and wider political affairs as well as society in general and, as noted, is threefold.

First, it could be employed to clearly distinguishing between those Political Islamic actors which are radical, intolerant, hostile, violent, and extremist in nature, and those that are not and appear moderate. This, in turn, is argued to limit the risk of governments and security services ‘overreacting’ or ‘underreacting’ to a potential security threat, especially as many Political Islamic actors, particularly non-state actors, are viewed through the lens of security.

Second, and as a result, it could improve clarity between those Political Islamic actors which might potentially be allies and partners. This could improve what is both an essential factor and a ‘political reality’ in strengthening international relations and security amidst a rise in Political Islamic actors globally, both state and non-state. The importance of this is amplified further due to an intensifying and evolving Political Islamic landscape wherein radicalisation, extremism and wider conflict(s) linked to Political Islamic actors has been on the rise.

Third, it is asserted in this thesis that this could potentially improve Muslim-non-Muslim civic relations by helping build social resilience, reducing uncertainty, anxiety and mistrust born from a contested, as well as confused, understanding of contemporary diversity in Political Islam. This could help stem political space wherein radicalisation and indeed extremism can otherwise occur and or generate

from, thus limiting the potential of Islamic radicalisation and extremism. It is asserted this could help counter anti-Islamic sentiment and co-extremism evidenced amongst some non-Muslims, especially following rising levels of Islamic extremism. This is especially important to those societies wherein there is a significant minority Muslim population such as in most nations in the West where there is a steadily growing Muslim community(s) in which Political Islam, as well as Islam, is active and widely seen as a threat.

For these reasons, this thesis has argued that the contested nature of diversity in contemporary Political Islam has demanded clarity. It has asserted that such a contested understanding therefore underscores the significance of comprehensively understanding and, in particular, building critical insight about diversity in contemporary Political Islam. Thus this thesis was conducted with the view of deducing a critical model of analysis so as to clearly discern and comprehend key diversity in contemporary Political Islam. It concludes that qualified evidence supports this thesis’s hypothesised critical model of analysis and associated multi-dimensional paradigm of understanding. Thus the thesis has provided a critical tool through which to holistically view and understand how and why diversity in contemporary Political Islam manifests.
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