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Teacher Pedagogy as an Act of Moral Answerability: A Self-Study of an Infant Teacher’s Answerable Acts in Infant Pedagogy in New Zealand ECEC

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education at The University of Waikato by Bridgette Redder

2018
Abstract

Typically, educational research considers how teachers are ethically accountable to learners, their families, teacher colleagues and society as a whole. But this thesis set out to explore the extent to which teachers are also morally accountable for their pedagogical acts. My route to such insight drew upon the notion of moral answerability (Bakhtin, 1993), which invites dialogic processes of meaning-making between (my) pedagogical acts from multiple standpoints across time and space. As an infant teacher myself, I selected a self-study method aligned with dialogic methodology in order to connect (my) self, others and pedagogical practices in consideration of infant practice. This thesis is therefore based on the premise that teacher pedagogy is an act of moral answerability.

My self-study took place in a community based early childhood education and care (ECEC) service. Initially, I video recorded my practice engaging with infants which I took to separate staff meetings where footage was analysed by my teacher colleagues in dialogue with me. Subsequently, I analysed the staff meeting dialogue. Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability was applied as the unit of analysis in order to analyse pedagogy as an act of moral answerability.

Insights from (my) dialogic self-study have revealed that as an answerable self I have numerous accountabilities to different selves in relation to others. These accountabilities were evident in the way I exposed (my) answerable self in the dialogue, upheld the best interests of infants, ensured infants’ perspectives were taken into account, and was aware of not denying my subjectivity. The discovery that as a teacher I am an answerable self in relationship with others, summons a re-conceptualisation of professional identity as a plural concept. This challenges the traditional conceptualisation of professional identity as singular, in ownership of a defined set of assets valued by the teaching profession.
Acknowledgements

I have always been aware of the interconnectedness of life and how the moral choices I make have the potential to alter not only the course of (my) life but the lives of so many others. I learnt very early, from my Mum, to respect and value the right to freedom of choice because attached to the decisions I made there were always consequences for my actions. Coming from a family who value standing up for what you believe in and never giving up, even when giving up was staring you in the face, knowing that someone would be (and still will be) there to carry me until I was strong enough to persevere and carry them when they faced life struggles has influenced greatly, the teacher, and human being I am today. From the depths of my heart I thank my supportive family, especially my mum and children Ben, Tom and Isabella, for being there for me, every step of the way as I travelled this journey over the last three years.

I have so many people that I am indebted to, for being there for me, as I was so deeply entrenched in my PhD world, you know who you are. I will forever be thankful for Professor Jayne White, Doctor Carol Murphy and Professor Bronwen Cowie for being such a warm and supportive team of supervisors. Bronwen you always had a smile, thank you. Carol, thank you for being such a wonderful inspiration, even from the land of Oz. Jayne, I could not have asked for a more incredible chief supervisor, thank you for filling this journey with kindness and in true Bakhtinian style lingering lovingly at every turn, with openness, honesty and integrity. I also extend an enormous thank you to the infants and teachers who were part of (my) dialogic self-study, without them I would not have discovered (my) answerable self.
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Chapter one: Introduction — A Study of the Self

As an infant teacher I am a member of a profession. As such, I have been introduced into a social practice with its own code of conduct, standards and values that are shared. I chose teaching as a profession because of a fundamental moral commitment to make a positive difference in the lives of children, to give back to society and to help others learn those things that are judged to be worthwhile. The moral commitment that drew me to teaching has deeply implicated me in all that I do as an infant teacher because of the potential for my actions to alter the lives of the very children that I teach. Because of the close and intimate nature of working in an early childhood education and care (ECEC) teaching team, my actions also implicate me in the pedagogical practices of the teachers with whom I work. I found few areas for guidance in this regard, in research or professional guidelines. Yet, how people morally respond to one another in dialogue shapes the meaning that they come to know and value. It has been my deeply held view that research pays little attention to the moral accountabilities of infant pedagogy, it is the ethical accountabilities of the teacher and how they are applied in practice that is typically illuminated.

As a teacher it seemed to me that far less attention was focused on moral accountabilities and responsibilities because of externally mandated prescriptions and standards that tended to neglect fundamental moral aims in education. I was often confronted in my practice with making pedagogical decisions, that I distinguished as either ethical or moral acts as I strove to ‘do the right thing’ in the context of my work as an infant teacher. What was highlighted for me, as an issue, was what I ironically describe as ‘doing the right thing’, when applied to infant teacher practice, could mean a raft of different things depending on the particulars of a situation, the personalities present, time and space. The moral value and judgement that I expressed in these everyday pedagogical practices as I responded to and for infants and teachers could not be prescribed by an ethical code or practice. These were moral moments which I was personally responsible and accountable for, which have the form shaping potential to alter the lives of others. I realised the importance of evaluating the self because of moral
implications that derive from practice. It is therefore my assertion that infant pedagogy is comprised of moral acts for which I am answerable.

Throughout the thesis I employ the phrase ‘doing the right thing’ ironically. I understand that the employment of the phrase ‘doing the right thing’ is underpinned by the implication that there is a singular or universal ‘right thing’. Indeed, in systems of ethics (such as Kant’s, which I explore critically in chapter two of this thesis) it is anticipated that everyone will essentially ‘do the right thing’. However, from the methodological stance that I employ it is my understanding that there is always an alternative way of viewing the situation — a loophole — which means the meaning I take from a particular situation may, indeed, be different to the meaning that you take from the same situation. Viewed in this way, understanding what it means ‘to do the right thing’ will depend on the meaning that is created in the moral reality of the here and now that anticipates the future and is shaped by the past. This thesis, therefore, renders the phrase ‘doing the right thing’ as problematic.

This thesis speaks to the moral imperative of being self-aware, as an infant teacher, of how my acts imbued with moral meaning and consequence, implicated me as I strove to ‘do the right thing’ by infants, their families, teacher colleagues, centre management, society as a whole and (my)self. As a study of the self this thesis was a moral act in itself because it constituted that set of my internally held truths (beliefs) and understandings which are evaluative in nature — distinguished between what I and others considered to be and not to be ‘doing the right thing’ pedagogically.

1.1 ‘Doing the right thing’

If everyone chose to ‘do the right thing’ there would be no need for a police force (Snook, 2003). But what does it mean to ‘do the right thing’? In my endeavours to articulate my own understanding of what I mean by morality and the moral, I would like to emphasise that this effort is not a finalised understanding. How morality and the moral are seen, from my perspective, continues to alter depending on those with whom I come into dialogue. This thesis does not explore moral education or teaching morality but rather attends to the value-infused nuances and moral complexities of teachers’ pedagogical acts that enrich and sometimes muddy the waters of teaching. For that reason, throughout this thesis I
make a deliberate distinction between morals and ethics. Ethics refers to codes of ethical conduct and practice (Buzzelli & Johnstone, 2014). In this light, teachers as members of a profession have universal codes, principles, standards and often core values imposed on them by a collective teaching body which they are obligated to follow. Ethics have direct impact on human conduct and activity and are designed for this purpose.

My orienting conceptualisation of morality draws from the writing of Mikhail Bakhtin, a Soviet Russian philosopher. Bakhtin was an experienced and much loved teacher amongst other things, who according to Holquist (2002), was interested in how people interpret and experience the world. I employ Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism as the methodological approach for this study. Like many of Bakhtin’s concepts, dialogism is difficult to define. In the words of Hirschkop (1999, pp. 4–5) dialogism:

is indeed about the two-sided aspects of meanings, but not in any sense necessarily about two people. Rather it refers to what other writers would call the intersubjective quality of all meaning: the fact that it is always found in the space between expression and understanding, and that this space — the “inter” separating subjects — is not a limitation but the very condition of meaningful utterance.

A primary focus of Bakhtin’s dialogic work was the understanding he built on relations between the self and other which was dependent on the interaction between: i.) how the ‘self’ and ‘other’ shape one another in dialogue, and ii.) the sensation of self in dialogue or how the self “looks and feels to its own consciousness in action” (Sullivan, 2007, p. 106). It is through dialogue that people come to know themselves, other human beings and the world (Haynes, 2013). Dialogue in Bakhtin’s view is conceptualised as a way of being in relationship with others, whose ideologies, perspectives, cultures and pedagogical practices are often different (Shields & Edwards, 2005). According to Bakhtin (1986) meaning is always generated out of the interaction in the place of in-between-ness of different voices and different points of view.

When considering a Bakhtinian dialogic perspective people are compelled to act in ways that are determined by the meaning that they come to know being in dialogue with others. As participants in dialogue people are morally answerable
for the meanings that they create. For Bakhtin people’s ontology is relational and therefore thoroughly intertwined with their morals (Sidorkin, 2002a). From a Bakhtinian (1990; 1993) viewpoint what people value is at the very centre of meaning and people give one another shape and value in dialogue as a moral act (Bakhtin, 1990; 1993). The learning and the meaning that is conceived in dialogue will affect past, present and future answerable acts or deeds alongside ways of morally being and becoming for participants in the dialogue.

1.2 Moral answerability, a pedagogical act

I have to answer with my own life for what I have experienced and understood in art, so that everything I have experienced and understood would not remain ineffectual in my life.

(Bakhtin, 1990, p. 1)

Moral answerability underpins Bakhtin’s (1990;1993) moral philosophy that speaks about lingering lovingly and intently in relationships with others in an endeavour to understand them (their ideologies, views of the world) outside of ourselves. I take this to mean that a teacher can endeavour to ‘do the right thing’ by others as others, without ceasing to be her or his self.

For Bakhtin (1990; 1993), being in the world with others involves social encounters that place extreme importance on the moral responsibility a person carries towards relationships — what Bakhtin termed answerability. Bakhtin’s moral philosophy focuses on the significance of responsibility understood as “answering to and answering for the other without alibis” (Ponzio, 2008, p. 292). Answerability and non-alibi-in-Being are attitudes of consciousness (Zubeck, 2004). Central to Bakhtin’s (1990, 1993) concept of answerability is the notion of non-alibi-in-Being which means people cannot remain inactive or abstain from action in life altogether. As such non-alibi-in-Being implicates people for how they act, respond and participate in all aspects of life, regardless of what comes their way (Holquist, 2002). A person’s non-alibi-in-Being affirms and acknowledges “the uniqueness” of their “participation in Being” (Bakhtin, 1993, p.41).

When applied to teacher practice moral answerability implicates me as personally responsible for the decisions I make in encounters with others and their implications in practice. This means how I respond to others, or if I choose not to
respond, will potentially alter the other’s subjectivities and experience in terms of all aspects of their learning i.e., relationships, communication, contribution, sense of belonging and their well-being. In the context of this thesis, ‘others’ refers to all the people connected to the ECEC setting such as teachers, infants, and their families. In this regard, infants, teachers and families are viewed as joint learners.

An answerable act for Bakhtin (1993) is one that a person takes ownership of through their moral answerability to the other person/s involved in the event of-Being and for the way they interpreted the response and intonated or shaded it with both their “own meanings and those compelled by the other” (Hicks, 2000, p.230). The ‘other’ for Bakhtin is not always physically present but can also relate to those people who are figuratively speaking sitting on a person’s shoulder from past, present and even future. Applied to my dialogic self-study moral answerability implicates me to reflect openly on what it is that I value that underpins my views in relation to infant pedagogy.

My Bakhtinian view acknowledges that as an ethical teacher I am bound by a code of professional ethics and standards, that there are rules and regulations stipulated by a series of external authoritative bodies to whom I must comply. However, Bakhtin (1990, 1993) does not advocate for a person to passively submit to the external voice of authority such as a professional code of ethics. Bakhtin (1993, p. 37) asserts:

it is an unfortunate understanding (a legacy of rationalism) to think that truth [Pravda] can only be the truth [istina] that is composed of universal moments; that the truth of a situation is precisely that which is repeatable and constant in it.

From a Bakhtinian perspective, it is only in relation to the answerable act that universal codes, principles and standards (e.g., code of ethical conduct) are properly understood. Bakhtin advocates for people to consider the particulars of the situation that they are encountering with its distinctive demands, when actions are performed in relation to codes, laws and standards. Bakhtin, did not imply any moral relativism:

… it should be noted that both relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all argumentation and all genuine dialogue, either by
making them unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism).

(Bakhtin, 1973, p. 56)

Bakhtin, therefore, viewed relativism and dogmatism as not conducive with authentic dialogue. Bakhtin (1990, 1993) explains that every moment of living involves a choice of response and people have the freedom to decide whether to act in any particular situation. Viewed in this way, a Bakhtinian (1990, 1993) conceptualisation of morality informs that people are not obliged to act morally based solely on abstract principles, rules or imperatives. Instead, a Bakhtinian approach to morality claims that a person’s moral position or attitude (ought) is embedded in their decision to act in a particular situation for which the person accepts personal responsibility and is accountable for their actions. As such, a person “understands the ought of his performed act, that is, not the abstract law of his act, but the actual, concrete ought, conditioned by his unique place in the given context of the ongoing event” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 30). From a Bakhtinian perspective the self is a plural concept, hereafter described in terms of an answerable self.

1.3 Infant teacher pedagogy is an act of moral answerability

Infant pedagogy has been increasingly described as deeply emotional and values-laden work in the research because of the presence of infants in ECEC (Brennen, 2014; Elfer & Page, 2015; Elfer, 2012). Research has explored infant pedagogy in relation to love (White, 2016a), relationships (Degotardi & Pearson, 2014; Recchia, Lee & Shin, 2015) as an intersubjective act (Jung, 2013). However, very little has been said about infant pedagogy as a deeply moral act that infant teachers are answerable for. When infant teacher pedagogy is viewed as an act of moral answerability a means is provided for me as the teacher to gain a better understanding of the pedagogical decisions I am making in relation to my practice because this notion pays particular attention to how I evaluate my axiological position (value laden basis of one’s moral judgements and responses) from the perspective of others.

From a Bakhtinian (1990) perspective I recognise my need for others to give me value because I do not possess an autonomous value-oriented self-consciousness. It is only in relation to moral answerability that the Bakhtinian subject is autonomous (Steinby & Klapuri, 2013). Bakhtin (1990) explains “I myself cannot be the author of my own value, just as I cannot lift myself up by my own hair”
(Bakhtin, 1990, p.55). This authoring takes place with others in dialogues that place moral answerability for any response given to others on the self in the course of co-authoring lives (Gardiner, 1996). It is in dialogue, that what people value is heard, as judgements are expressed in the many forms of language as people respond to one another. It is in the dialogue that what is valued is born between participants. From a dialogic stance morality is therefore never just about the self. When viewed through a Bakhtinian lens it is through emotions that I bestow a form and a value upon others — my emotions and values are therefore implicated through the act of authorship. These values are evident, for instance, in the tone of our speaking voice. As such, authoring the other is a morally charged act “that is emotionally responsive to the needs of the other” (Sullivan, 2007, p.110). We can never be outside our own experience, only outside the experience of the other.

The moral answerability carried by infant teachers toward others is subjective, and specific to context. A New Zealand ECEC community based service is the context for this self-study (see section 4.6.1). According to Clark and Grey (2010) ECEC is not compulsory in New Zealand, however numbers of children, notably infants, receiving an early years education have increased over the years. For many infants spending the majority of their day with non-familial adults at an ECEC service is a daily occurrence. According to Clark and Grey (2010), it is not unusual for infants ranging in age from three months to 18 months spending 40-50 hours per week in an early years setting. Many infants will spend a considerable amount of time attending an ECEC setting until they transition to school (Clark & Grey, 2010). It is therefore not difficult to understand the importance of the role of an ECEC teacher, particularly an infant teacher, because of their influence on the lives of very young children — emotionally, relationally, physically, pedagogically and morally.

From a Bakhtinian theoretical perspective it is not only the influence of me as the teacher on the learning of others but also the influence of others’ responses (i.e., infant, teacher, parent, members of society) on my subjectivity and all aspects of my learning and understanding too. Each person’s moral answerability although always already entrenched in a person’s relations with another (others from past, present and future), remains essentially “answerability for my own uniqueness, for my own being … that which can be done by me can never be done by anyone
else” (Bakhtin, 1993, pp. 40-42). As such, moral answerability for an act arises out of the individual’s “unique center of value” (Bakhtin, 1993, p.59) which is continuously being shaped by evaluative responses in dialogue with other unique human beings. Ideas for Bakhtin are more than merely theoretical constructs. Lived exchanges of ideas, are imbued with values and judgements (Sullivan, 2012) which in Bakhtin’s eyes, reflect the shape of human consciousness and flow out into events (Zubeck, 2004). Viewed in this light, infant teacher pedagogy is an act of moral answerability that is incredibly values-laden, as my pedagogical practices reflect those approaches, ideas, strategies and other constructs that I value. This thesis argues that infant teacher pedagogy is an act of moral answerability. Seen in this way infant pedagogy is not only an ethical act but a deeply moral act for which I am answerable.

1.4 An example of an answerable act

As an infant teacher I am faced with making moral choices that derive from practice every day. I am required to respond to each infant — whose communication differs from my own — and work to meet their needs as group members, within a team of other (qualified and unqualified) teachers. I believe it is imperative that I have an awareness of the significance of my acts as a result of the choices I make because my acts have the potential to alter the learning, development and well-being of all others in the dialogic space of an ECEC environment. Often these acts create inner and outer emotional turmoil if they challenge personal values or core values shared with others. In these situations, I am often faced with the struggle of how to be accountable to and for multiple others.

Moments of “doing the right thing” can bring about much personal challenge as infant teachers struggle with the inner turmoil of “doing right” by ALL others including self because of pedagogical differences in what is valued. I see these kinds of moral challenges infused in the pedagogical practices of teachers, particularly in a teaching team environment, where teachers are moving in and out of one another’s interactions with children and one another as they shape practice and are shaped. For example, on one particular day I walked outside, and instead of being greeted by the happy sounds of children, was taken aback by the sound of an infant sobbing in the distance. As I approached to see why she was upset and to comfort her, a senior teacher cautioned me to ignore the infant because in her
opinion the infant wanted to be picked up all the time. The senior teacher who I held in high esteem further explained that she had “told the infant off” and the infant did not like it. For me in that moment wrapped up in the senior teacher’s words and in the expression on her face was an unspoken message directed at me about how infants do not have to be picked up all the time — this was how I interpreted the meaning that was being born in that dialogue. What should I do? In this moment I was torn between the accountability I felt toward this teacher as the voice of authority, and the accountability I felt toward the infant as her teacher. The relationships I valued with each one of these human beings was hanging in the balance. Every moral fibre in my body wanted to respond in a way that was true to the moral values that were and are significant to me as a teacher and a human being. Values that were and still are important to me were compromised in that moment, such as responding to, rather than ignoring others.

Obeying the voice of authority in the form of the senior teacher, a feeling of helplessness washed over me, as I resisted picking up the infant. Instead, I responded to her with a look that I hoped communicated in its expression how I understood her pain but was powerless in that moment to do anything. The infant looked at me. In her eyes I saw my own sense of disappointment and disapproval reflected at me. I felt sick! What had I done? How could I rewind time by just a few seconds? I knew I had to put things ‘right’ between this infant and me. The infant turned away from me and walked toward the sandpit, continuing to quietly sob. Moments lapsed. The personal and moral responsibility I felt toward my relationship with this infant continued to weigh heavily on me. I felt I had to put this situation right, there would be consequences for my actions — that I knew. “Doing the right thing” for the infant meant that I approached the senior teacher, expressed my concern for the infant’s well-being and suggested that I spend time engaging with the infant in her play.

In this moment, as with so many other fleeting moments of this nature in my work with infants I was faced with making a decision that spoke to my allegiance to the voice of teaching authority in the form of a senior teacher. At the same time, it spoke to the faithfulness I carried toward the unique personality that I brought to my practice. Expressed on the face of the infant in that moment when our eyes met was a look of not being listened to, let alone heard. Her response to me in this way touched my inner being; I felt if I didn’t put things right the consequences of
knowing the ‘right thing to do’ and not doing it would be too much to bear. The inner turmoil I felt in that moment was as if time was racing in slow motion as I struggled to understand what meaning would be created, for the infant, for the teacher, depending on my response. Could I live with the potential consequences to my relationships with these others? No, I could not. I had to make a moral choice. I felt answerable for the meaning that had been created in the dialogue particularly between the infant and (my) self.

Regardless of how I responded I was implicated. To respond to an infant (or anybody for that matter) by ignoring is not a pedagogical approach I employ because I value others knowing that they matter, and therefore respond to them through my attention. Making the pedagogical decision to account for the learning of the infant and the relationship I shared with her left me with a feeling of inner peace, because I had found a way to be morally answerable to the infant, senior teacher and self. However, those initial few moments of not actualising my deed in that lived experience has stained my soul.

As an infant teacher I therefore ground my thesis in the notion that like all other teachers I am morally answerable for the well-being and learning of infants. I am correspondingly accountable for the pedagogical acts I make as a teacher. The urgency I felt in finding a way to put things right by the infant in a way that spoke to my interpretation of what she was saying was because I believed how a person responds to another (or if they do not respond), has potential to alter how someone learns, interacts, cares, respects, communicates, and forms relationships with others. Infants cannot easily advocate for themselves and this makes infant pedagogy very interpretive work. Interpretation of meaning is a primary challenge faced by infant teachers (White, 2016a). When infant pedagogy is conceptualised as an answerable act, I am deeply implicated and answerable for the interpreted meanings and associated acts. This experience was a catalyst in cementing in me the absolute importance of not only being aware of the self and how my actions can impact on multiple others but also how others can contribute to my pedagogical practice through their responses. I see this example as an act of moral answerability and assert that infant teacher pedagogy as an act of moral answerability is a moral imperative.
1.5 Self-study introduced

While in many respects it would have been easier to orient my research towards the pedagogical acts of other teachers, as others have done before me, I turned to the ‘self’ as a source of research in order to better understand and improve my practice as opposed to a study of other teachers. For the purposes of this research I employ Hamilton and Pinnegar’s (1998) definition of self-study as “the study of one’s self, one’s actions, one’s ideas, …” (p. 238). Which means self-study is “autobiographical, historical, cultural, and political and takes a thoughtful look at texts read, experiences had, people known and ideas considered” (Hamilton & Pinnegar, 1998, p. 236) and their associations to teachers’ and teacher educators’ practices (Craig, 2009). Self-study research has its origins in the United States of America. In 1993 a group of teacher educators developed their own form of practitioner research to align with the particularities of their practice—educating student teachers (Vanassche & Kelchtermans, 2015). This group of self-study scholars established the Self-Study of Teacher Education Practices Special Interest Group (SIG) of the American Educational Research Association (AERA).

Self-study is concerned with improving the understanding of teacher education in general and the exploration and immediate improvement of one’s own professional practice (LaBoskey, 2004; Pinnegar & Hamilton, 2009; Samaras, 2011). Oriented toward improvement (Samaras, 2011), self-study provides a means of developing one’s professional self-understanding as a teacher (Hamilton, 1998), it is also self-initiated, self-focused, employs multiple methods and involves critical friends, and the data is valid and trustworthy (LaBoskey, 2004).

Turning to the ‘self’ enabled me to reflect on my answerable acts in interaction with infants as a source of data. This data were reflected upon and critiqued at staff meetings in dialogue with teachers, and in turn, the staff meetings provided a further data source for reflection and analysis. I achieved a much richer study by combining a Bakhtinian methodology with a self-study approach with moral answerability as the unit of analysis. While it is acknowledged that self-study is valuable for the improvement of the individual’s own practice and for his or her individual professional growth (Cochran-Smith, 2005), critique that self-study research lacks methodological rigour and transparency exists (Loughran, 2010). As such, my decision to connect a self-study approach to dialogic methodology
combats the critique that self-study has the potential to be limited by a lack of theoretical basis. On these grounds, selecting a self-study method for this research was appropriate for the research questions and inquiry. Engaging in dialogic self-study meant working with layers upon layers of complexity. Not only was I exploring issues surrounding moral choice, pedagogical acts and accountability, but I used a dialogic self-study approach to explore the importance of dialogic self-study for infant teacher pedagogy as an act of moral answerability.

1.6 Research questions
As the research participant inside the research, the researcher outside of the research and the teacher both in between the research spaces my research questions are as follows:

- In what ways am I morally answerable to (my) self and others through my practice?

- What does ‘doing the right thing’ mean for infant pedagogy and for the professional ECEC teacher?

The rationale for these research questions was based on the need to better understand my personal and moral answerable accountabilities in order to better understand what ‘doing the right thing’ means in infant pedagogy. This study was undertaken as a response to my past lived experiences as an infant teacher in the hope that the dialogue I share with the readers of these pages will create new meanings of what it means to “do the right thing” in life. I also hope that the insights and discoveries of this study may have relevance within discussions of educational discourses in connection to infant pedagogy and dialogic self-study.

1.7 Navigating the thesis
The following section provides a map of the chapters presented in this thesis. The opening chapter introduces you, the reader, to this Bakhtinian dialogic self-study with an overview of the conceptualisation of infant teacher pedagogy as an act of moral answerability. The Bakhtinian notion of moral answerability is explained in tandem with my endeavours to define morals and ethics from a Bakhtinian stance. This section presents a story that was a catalyst for me embarking on this dialogic self-study. The story presented has significance for me as a human being, a
teacher and a person who strives to “do the right thing” by infants and infant pedagogy. Finally, I introduce the research questions and a rationale for this dialogic approach to studying the self. Importantly, this chapter explains that when infant pedagogy is conceptualised as an especially moral act, the teacher is morally answerable to and for her responses without an alibi.

Chapter two presents a more in-depth look at the notion of moral answerability, exploring its philosophical roots particularly its Kantian influences. This chapter foregrounds Bakhtin’s concept of the ‘I’ as a moral plural voice, followed by an outline of a Bakhtinian approach to answerability in the early years. This chapter concludes with the view that ‘doing the right thing’ deeply implicates the teacher in all aspects of her or his lived experiences with others in an ECEC environment that is uniquely shared.

Chapter three explores the literature on ‘doing the right thing’ in terms of how education sees this and how it plays out in terms of evaluation and reflection. I argue that being accountable for the learning of learners requires more than ethically accounting for one’s actions in accordance with a code, regulation, principle, policy, curriculum document, or core value. This chapter highlights the importance of teachers’ accounts of their pedagogy noticing, recognising and responding to the unique moral particulars of everyday moments of living. I conclude with a section on the strong allegiance to some form of self evaluation in New Zealand ECEC discourse which makes those important links between self-study and self-review in support of a self-study method.

Bakhtin’s dialogic methodology underpinned by the notion of moral answerability is presented in chapter four in tandem with self-study as a method for exploring (my) teacher pedagogy as an act of moral answerability. The research design featuring multiple layers of data collection and analysis is explained alongside introducing the participants and New Zealand context where the research occurred.

Chapter five presents three selected events in chronological order drawn from three staff meeting dialogues. The first staff meeting illustrated that as an answerable self, I have numerous accountabilities to different selves in relation to others. The second event provided insight into how deeply held values can be challenged in order to “do the right thing”. The third event revealed an important
discovery in that there is no universal personal moral code. Instead, what is morally valued is shaped in the space in between answerable selves.

Finally, chapter six concludes by looking back on this dialogic self-study, its contributions, limitations and looks ahead to the potential for future dialogic self-study research. Overall, the context for the dialogic self-study points to the deeply moral nature of work with infants and highlights the importance of bringing (my) answerable self to the role. A dialogic approach to self-study provides a way to better understand how I am implicated for my acts as an infant teacher by connecting self, other and practice in dialogue. I like to think as you read through the pages of this thesis that Bakhtin is smiling down on you, as I believe he was on me, and smiling on this dialogic self-study which celebrates the acts of an answerable self.
Chapter Two: Answerability: A Bakhtinian Principle for Understanding Moral Acts

It is only from within my participation that the function of each participant can be understood. In the place of another, just as in my own place, I am in the same state of senselessness. To understand an object is to understand my ought in relation to it (the attitude or position I ought to take in relation to it), that is, to understand it in relation to me myself in once-occurrent Being-as-event, and that presupposes my answerable participation, and not an abstracting from myself. It is only from within my participation that Being can be understood as an event, but this moment of once-occurrent participation does not exist inside the content seen in abstraction from the act qua answerable deed. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 18)

As a teacher I am morally answerable for how I interpret the meaning of the value that I come to know from the responses of others, with whom I am in dialogue, in their authoring of me and how I in turn respond through my authoring of others. For this reason, it is critical, that as a teacher, I am aware of the importance I place on what I value, in dialogue with others because how others — infants and teachers — interpret the ideas that I value, has a bearing on the meaning that they come to know being in dialogue with me. Of importance to Bakhtin (1993) was the particular way people interpreted contextual meanings, language, ethical and moral responses when they shared moments of living and knowing with one another because words for Bakhtin are always half someone else’s. So too, is the meaning generated in communicative acts of living and knowing with others. From this perspective there is a suggestion that participants in dialogue share accountability for the meanings that are generated (White, 2013).

2.1 Philosophical roots of moral answerability

There is no escaping that I am morally answerable for the meaning that infants and teachers come to know being in dialogue with me. In the following section, I argue that at the heart of this view lies an essentialist versus relativist philosophical approach which orients from moral philosophy. There is a
fundamental philosophical debate that Bakhtin centres himself at concerning relativism and essentialism. While some scholars have argued that in spite of Bakhtin’s critique of Kant’s formalism, he did not disregard the content of Kant’s three postulates of practical reason, which Kant insisted people are required to follow if they are to act ethically (Nielsen, 1998; Emerson, 2011) and others have argued for a position that acknowledges Simmel’s views around individual laws that provided a source for Bakhtin’s interest in individuality in relation to his moral philosophy (Nielsen, 2002). I concur with Brandist (2004) who suggests that Bakhtin found a way to reconcile his issues surrounding a systematic conception of ethics (universals) and relativism, by connecting the content-sense (theoretical) of an act with its actual performance (lived reality). In this way, Bakhtin sought to overcome the “law-like morality” of Kantian ethics with its “disembodied ideas” (p. 28) at the same time resisting the laissez faire attitude of ethical relativism. The position I argue, is that Bakhtin achieved a means of not privileging systems of ethics over moral reality through his notion of moral answerability. Therefore, on this ground, I argue, moral answerability provides a way to understand infant pedagogy.

Bakhtin’s emphasis on answerability as a moral endeavour owes its genesis to his neo-Kantian theories. The following section also provides an overview of these as a means of understanding the considerable influence of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophies on Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability.

2.1 Bakhtin’s early work (1919-1926)

Amongst other things Bakhtin was a philosopher who advocated for a dialogic approach to human relations (Holquist, 2002). His writings were first published in the 1960s and have had significant impact across a diverse range of fields such as psychology, literature and literary theory, philosophy, theology, biology (Haynes, 1995; Sullivan, 2007) and education (Matusov, 2009; Wegerif, 2013; White & Peters, 2011). This study draws primarily upon Bakhtin’s earlier works (1919-1926): his first published essay *Art and Answerability*; Bakhtin’s second recorded piece of work *Author and hero in aesthetic activity*; and his unfinished philosophical composition which was published posthumously under the title *Toward a Philosophy of the Act.*
I am drawing primarily upon Bakhtin’s earlier philosophical writings (1990; 1993) because in these works, he endeavoured to emphasise the importance of answerability or responsibility explicitly. In addition, Bakhtin’s earlier works are testament to his interest from the beginning in moral dilemmas (Ponzio, 2008) and people as morally acting subjects (Steinby & Klapuri, 2013). According to Steinby and Klapuri (2013) academics often do not credit Bakhtin’s early manuscripts with the scholarly weight that they deserve. An exception to this view is found in Brandist (2002b) who acknowledges the merit of these early works by highlighting how Bakhtin’s moral philosophy added fresh new ideas to his German predecessors because of the attention he gave “to the question of art in general and of authorship in particular” (p. 40). For other scholars, answerability is the philosophical antecedent and basis for Bakhtin’s later thoughts and ideas in relation to dialogic discourse (Hicks, 2000; Holquist, 2002). As Steinby and Klapuri (2013) assert Bakhtin’s later projects are testament to his “continuous commitment to problems of ethics” (p. xv), as presented in his early moral work. The notion of answerability was to form the foundation for Bakhtin’s moral philosophy; a philosophy that was enriched by a circle of Bakhtin’s intellectual and artistic friends.

2.1.2 The Bakhtin Circle and moral philosophy

Bakhtin’s development as a moral philosopher was enhanced by a group of his friends who met on a regular basis in Nevel and Vitebsk. Formed in 1918, the Bakhtin Circle consisted of Bakhtin himself as a leading figure, and a group of his friends including philosopher and mathematician Matvei Isaevich Kagan, Konstantin Konstantinovich Vaginov, Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov, Mariia Veniaminovna Iudina, Ivan Ivanovich Kanaev, Pavel Nikolaevich Medvedev, Lev Vasilievich Pumpianskii and Ivan Ivanovich Sollertinskii (Brandist, 2002b). The group of friends met at a time when adversities and excitement were being felt by the Russian people as a result of the Russian revolution aftermath (Brandist, 2002b). The Bakhtin Circle provided an intellectual and social context for this group of friends to discuss their thoughts and ideas and engage in philosophical debate (White, 2016). It was apparently on a walk in the countryside around the provincial town of Nevel that Bakhtin first told his friends about the fundamental ideas of his moral philosophy (Erdinast-Vulcan & Sandler, 2015). Kagen, who had studied at the Marburg School of neo-Kantian philosophy with Hermann
Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer, played a pivotal role in the discussions of the Bakhtin Circle. Kagen was not only an original philosopher in his own right but was also a source for the latest works and ideas from the Marburg School which was deeply interested in moral philosophy and its outcry. According to Brandist (2002b), in 1924 the Bakhtin Circle moved meetings to Leningrad. However, the arrest of some of the members, as part of a general eradication of intellectuals, resulted in meetings being shut down in 1929. Nevertheless, Bakhtin continued to work on the topics that were of great interest to the Bakhtin Circle until his death (Brandist, 2002b).

Pumpianiskii’s notes on Bakhtin’s *The Problem of Grounded Peace* lecture suggest Bakhtin may have been influenced in some way by theology (see Felch & Contino, 2001, Appendix). I do not want to make any grand claims as to whether or not Bakhtin was a religious man as there are no reliable accounts of him being affiliated with Christian theology of which I am aware. Further, Emerson (1997) asserts that just because Bakhtin was emphatic that he did not like the atheism of the Revolution does not mean that he was a “mainstream Christian believer or that his work was a theology in code” (p.124). There are some who recognise Bakhtin as a thinker who was influenced by Christianity and who assumed faith as an apriori (see Clark & Holquist, 1984; Nollan, 2004).

In understanding the influence of Kantian and neo-Kantian moral philosophy on Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability, it is my assertion that it is important to engage with both in conversation with one another.

2.1.3 Kantianism & neo-Kantianism influence on moral answerability

The influence of Kant (1724-1804) and neo-Kantian moral philosophy on Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability is contestable. Sandler (2015) claims German neo-Kantian philosophy and the central figures of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, particularly Hermann Cohen, had much influence on Bakhtin. Indeed, Bakhtin’s early works demonstrate the strong influence of German philosophy on his thoughts and ideas (Brandist, 2002a). In an interview in 1973, Bakhtin acknowledged Cohen, “He was a remarkable philosopher, who has had an immense influence on me” (Bakhtin, 2002 [1973] as cited in Sandler, 2015, p. 3) and commented that in the first half of the 1920s “I was such a zealous (zaiadlyj) Kantian” (Bakhtin, 2002 [1973] as cited in Sandler, 2015, p. 1).
However, Holquist asserts that Bakhtin was more concerned with Kant than Cohen—avidly reading, lecturing and debating on Kant whilst working on *Toward a Philosophy of the Act* (see Foreword in Bakhtin, 1993). Nevertheless, by his own admission there was a time when Bakhtin considered himself to be a Kantian or neo-Kantian and yet as expressed earlier in his work *Toward a Philosophy of the Act* Bakhtin criticises the core principles of neo-Kantian philosophy and offers a critical evaluation of Cohen and Kant. Perhaps, Sandler (2015) suggests Bakhtin may have been trying to establish his own form of neo-Kantian philosophy more in line with what is known today as existentialism. According to Nollan (2004), Bakhtin shared the Neo-Kantian view that morals and the range of ways that value, functions in people’s lives should be a primary concern of philosophy.

### 2.1.4 A Kantian approach to morality

Although Bakhtin rejected many of the central principles of Kantian morality, these differences are not to be overlooked as they were instrumental in the formation of his moral philosophy, in which he “expressed his overarching concerns” (Nollan, 2004, p. xv). Bakhtin did not wholeheartedly adopt the ideas from the Marburg School but saw them as a starting place for engagement with dialogue. For instance, theoretism is an approach that Bakhtin argues against in *Toward a Philosophy of the Act* (1993), yet the central claim of the Marburg school was that the world is comprised by the theoretical sciences which are grounded in logic. Bakhtin was critical of this approach because he viewed it as privileging objective knowledge obtained by the theoretical sciences above the actuality of the deed (Erdinast-Vulcan and Sandler, 2015). Bakhtin (1993), therefore, refuted Kantian approaches to universal or categorical imperatives — a stance that he called theoretism. Kant’s principles of morality require:

> that morality be derived from human reason in the form of universal principles that are abstract and formal … morality consists of a set of principles that are universalizable, impartial, concerned with describing what is right. (Tronto, 1993, p. 27)

From a Kantian viewpoint a categorical distinction is offered between right and wrong which applies to and is accepted by all rational thinking members of society regardless of their social and historical context or circumstances. An
individual, acts morally by understanding the moral law and its requirements; by freely choosing the basis for their actions as required by the moral law rather than participating in their own self-interests and desires; by believing that the objectives imposed by morality are achievable (Guyer, 2014). Kant’s moral theory is therefore an example of deontology (duty-bound ethics) — people make their own ethical decisions and to have moral worth it is imperative they be created and enacted out of a sense of duty rather than obedience to a higher authority such as God, inclination or love.

As a deontologist, Kant considered an act is not considered right or wrong based on its consequences but whether it fulfils its duty as outlined in the categorical imperative. For Kant ethical acts are not aesthetic or creative events but rather duties. Kant had no concern for how individuals should act confronted with other individuals in a particular situation, individuals whose emotional-volitional or axiological orientation were in harmony or conflict, but rather, of importance to Kant was how the individuals should act regardless of other axiological positions provided in a given context (Nielsen, 1998). From a Kantian perspective morality depends on the ‘categorical imperative’: _I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim (principle) should become a universal law_ (Guyer, 2014). Consequently, moral imperatives from a Kantian perspective must be categorical and a priori, not dependent on experience or on what we happen to desire. From this view it is possible for the Kantian moral subject to determine what comprise universal moral obligations because the subject is rational, stable, objective, autonomous, “separate from and stands above empirical reality” (Tronto, 1993, p. 27). In order to protect democracy, the task for education stems from Kantian origins to cultivate the growth of an autonomous, rational thinking subject, often linked to outcomes which encourage the child’s developing self-awareness and exploration of the environment in ECE settings (Broström, Jensen, & Hansen, 2017). Further, Tronto (1993) asserts fulfilling one’s moral obligations “makes one the bearer of rights” and in turn rights are seen as the glue of social order and “as the most important way people can engage in orderly social relations” (p. 55). From a Kantian perspective society is viewed as a contract “a series of legally determined agreements on the central aspects of human society” one is moral if one “has the ability and the authority to exercise rights and fulfil obligations” (Tronto, 1993, p. 55).
The idea of moral relationships depicting how people should relate to each other in society is evident in universal codes which “govern practice and evaluation” made visible in “curricula, goals and targets, standards, quality measures, standardised measures of assessment” (p. 67). According to Dahlberg and Moss (2005) an approach based on Kantian universal principles underpins much ECEC policy and practice in westernised countries. Underlining this is often a view of the ECEC teacher as one who is delivering a prescribed curriculum (Albon & Rosen, 2014). However, Snook (2003) informs there is no recipe for teaching. Therefore, as De Vocht (2015a) advises pedagogical approaches that embrace the concept of moral answerability go “beyond teaching as a technical approach with universal strategies, to provide guidance for teachers in the unique lived experiences with their students” (p. 2). This is achieved by participating in the dialogue in ways that also pay attention to the particulars of a situation.

This view is shared by Noddings (1984) whose perspective considers, codes of ethical conduct to privilege rationality over an ethic of care for others. For example a teacher may recognise a child’s right to play but she does not play with him solely out of respect for a Kantian categorical imperative, Noddings would argue she acts from an ethic of care (Taggart, 2011). Furthermore, Sumsion (2000) acknowledges that principles rooted in codes of ethics are there to guide and support a teacher’s practice. However, she asserts codes of ethical conduct are limited in the practical assistance they can offer teacher educators in resolving ethical dilemmas that they face in their everyday practice. Snook (2003) echos this view but extends it to all teachers, proposing that moral philosophy take a pivotal role in teacher education programmes. Snook (2003) upholds if initial teacher education programmes endorsed philosophical discussion surrounding ethics and moral philosophy this would support student teachers’ abilities to analyse critically their own personal views and practices.

2.1.5 A Bakhtinian approach to morality

Bakhtin’s moral philosophy calls for thought beyond Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative. Bakhtin opposes Kant’s formalism which asserts that morals could be embedded in the notion that all “moral agents should make judgements “as if” their consequences did not apply to a particular case involving the agent’s own interests but rather “as if” each judgement might affect any person at anytime” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. x). According to Hirshckhop (1999),
Bakhtin’s critique of theoretism was primarily oriented toward Kantian formalism in ethics. Bakhtin’s rejection of a Kantian view of morality is evidenced in his essay *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*:

“Formal ethics starts out from the perfectly correct insight that the ought is a category of consciousness, a form that cannot be derived from some particular “material” content. But formal ethics (which developed exclusively within the bounds of Kantianism) further conceives the category of the ought as a category of theoretical consciousness, i.e., it theoretizes the ought, and, as a result, loses the individual act or deed. And yet the ought is precisely a category of the individual act; even more than that—it is a category of the individuality, of the uniqueness of a performed act, of its once-occurrent compellentness, of its historicity, of the impossibility to replace it with anything else or to provide a substitute for it. The universal validity of the imperative is substituted for its categoricalness which can be thought of in a manner similar to the way theoretical truth is conceived”. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 25)

The point Bakhtin (1993) was making was that laws alone are not sufficient as they can only deal in universalities, demanding “a sense of obligation to the abstract paradigm or perspective itself” (p. 84). From a Kantian viewpoint, each teacher carries the same universal law within them, and teachers are acting morally when these universal moral imperatives are applied in practice. However, Bakhtin (1993) contended that by reducing all morality to law, the ought (the position or attitude I take toward performing a morally answerable act) that arises in a particular situation is not generated but rather sifted out resulting in people not acknowledging their personal responsibility for an act. As such, guidelines for how a teacher is to act may exist (based on what a culture values and believes to be true) in forms such as systems of ethics, standards, curricula, policies and regulations (or rational objectives). However, they can only guide or prescribe teachers who are committed to being moral on how to conduct themselves professionally or behave in certain situations — when viewed through a Bakhtinian lens they are not moral imperatives. Bakhtin (1993) asserted:
What is needed in addition to that is something issuing from within myself, namely, the morally ought-to-be attitude of my consciousness toward the theoretically valid-in-itself proposition. (pp. 23-24)

2.1.6 The uniqueness of the answerable act

This refusal of systematisation characterised Bakhtin’s view of morality which emphasised the uniqueness of each human being. Consequent of Bakhtin’s (1993) view that every human being is unique with unique conscious awareness, unique human experiences and engaging in unique acts he argued this uniqueness involves a moral imperative such as to be just, to be fair, to trust, to cooperate, to respect, to be kind. As such, everyday moments of living are participative (evaluative) and the moral moment of an act takes place uniquely within the answerable act itself — “the answerable act is, after all, the actualization of a decision” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 28). Further, an answerable act is defined as the act which is “performed on the basis of an acknowledgment” of the morally obligating orientation of my uniqueness (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 42). Bakhtin (1993) explained, “This acknowledgement of the uniqueness of my participation in Being is the actual and effectual foundation of my life and my performed deed” — a participation which Bakhtin characterised as moral answerability (p. 41). Therefore, to acknowledge personal responsibility (non-alibi-in-Being) for my ideas — my thoughts actualised as deeds — by taking ownership of them, is considered by Bakhtin to show good judgement and understanding as well as to be morally answerable.

Bakhtin does not dismiss the relevance of knowledge but insists that it must be acknowledged and evaluated according to the particular situation. For Bakhtin theory cannot provide the foundation for morally answerable action in the world because “it does not translate directly into everyday life and experience” (Haynes, 2013, p. 19). Conversely, a person’s particular acts or deeds do provide a basis for evaluating what is most meaningful and for generating an acceptable orientation in life (Haynes, 2013). A code of ethics cannot know the morally obligating orientation of a teacher’s consciousness. This point is emphasised by Sumsion (2000) who called upon Caputo (1993), to highlight the limitations of codes of ethics because they cannot anticipate the “moral messiness” and unpredictability of educators’ obligations that arise from professional responsibilities and which
are many and varied (p. 173). Consequently, Bakhtin (1993) advocates for a moral philosophy that is embedded in actual lived experience and action that offers a phenomenological description of subjectivity.

Erdinast-Vulcan and Sandler (2015) explain that the concept of the actuality of the deed — a decision as deed actualised in a concrete act for which the self is answerable, its moral reality — is at the heart of Bakhtin’s philosophy and is specifically where it differs with the type of neo-Kantianism exemplified by Kagen. For Bakhtin (1993), philosophies which attempt to determine the abstract, universal laws of different domains of culture as evidenced in Kant’s categorical imperative neglect the unique moral act of a person involved in a concrete or real event of Being. Bakhtin’s (1993) insistence of the actuality of the deed in its concrete form as an answerable act provides evidence of how being immersed in the topics that neo-Kantians worked on significantly influenced his moral philosophy.

In contrast to imposing value through universal principles and standards by the consensus-producing power of law, which the Kantian subject is obligated to follow, Bakhtin (1993) places faith in the “moral subject … on which one must rely” (p. 85). Bakhtin (1993) speaks of theoretical validity (such as laws) on its own as analogous to a document without a signature “not obligating anyone to anything” (p. 44) because people are “no longer present in it as individually and answerably active human beings” (p. 7). A Bakhtinian (1993) approach to morality means one’s actions cannot be justified by roles, rules, theories or knowledge. These are viewed by Bakhtin as alibis for being. Acting in this way, with an absence of personal responsibility for one’s actions cannot be described as being morally answerable (Albon & Rosen, 2014). Instead, Bakhtin (1993) advises everyday moments of living are participative and the moral moment of an act takes place uniquely within the act itself. According to Steinby and Klapuri (2013) Bakhtin considered a person’s thinking in a concrete act to be unindifferent (participative) thinking “in which cognition contains a moment of ought” (p. xvi). As such Bakhtin posed an alternative principle to Kant’s categorical imperative — “that of “no alibi” in existence” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. xii).

As stated in the introduction chapter of this thesis Bakhtin’s moral philosophy emphasised that people have no-alibi-in-Being. As such people must take full personal responsibility for their responses to others — which means, they must be
morally answerable. A transcendental viewpoint that may free a person from the weight of holding a particular and unique place in-Being is inconceivable in Bakhtin’s moral philosophy because of the uniqueness of each and every human being. Therefore, without an alibi-in-Being, each person is answerable for their unique place in existence and has moral answerability for the way that they relate their uniqueness to others in the world. It is this unique place in-Being where deeds are performed. Moral activity for Bakhtin (1993) is considered to be a deed. As such a person’s values become visible in their deeds. According to Clark and Holquist (1984) the deed is not only a physical action but can also take on other forms such as utterance, a piece of written text, a person’s thoughts. In their seminal work Mikhail Bakhtin, Clark and Holquist (1984) inform Bakhtin was not concerned with the outcome of an action but instead on the moral deed “as an act in the process of creating or authoring an event that can be called a deed” (p. 63).

2.2 Understanding the ‘I’ as a moral (plural) voice
According to Walter (2011) Kant’s moral subject was required to abstract himself from lived experience before he could act. Following Kant’s line of thinking, a person is expected to make a decision on how to proceed with an act without taking into account human consciousness and the particularity of context. Bakhtin, on the other hand, “required a near reversal of this, arguing that the subject must live from within his embodied self” (Walter, 2011, p. 193):

> These basic moments are I-for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the-other. All the values of actual life and culture are arranged around the basic architectonic points of the actual world of the performed act or deed: scientific values, aesthetic values, political values (including both ethical and social values), and, finally religious values. All spatial-temporal values and all sense-content values are drawn toward and concentrated around these central emotional-volitional moments: I, the other, and I-for-the-other. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 54)

For Bakhtin (1993) the fundamental concrete moments that make up an answerable act are I-for-myself, the other-for-me, I-for-the-other and I-for-thou (see section 4.8.3). The particular and unique answerability of people’s responses is expressed in the answerable act (Bakhtin, 1993). From a dialogic standpoint
people are connected to others through moral responsibility, as such they accept the consequences for the impact of their answerable acts on others. The self is deeply implicated in and with the other in the answerable act. Bakhtin (1993) highlights the existential freedom of an individual to make the decision to act or not to act in a particular situation. Because people are morally answerable and therefore accountable for the meaning that is created in dialogue with others it is important to understand how this is achieved in order to gain an understanding of how it is applied in pedagogical practice. For Bakhtin, from the moment a person is born, if not before, until they die, they are always in a process of becoming. According to Haynes (2013) Bakhtin’s unique approach to aesthetics was not based on traditional aesthetic values such as truth, goodness or beauty. Instead aesthetics for Bakhtin was concerned with how people give form to their experience, how an object, text or another person is perceived and how that perception is shaped into the “whole of the object it is” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. xxiv). This shaping of meaning in action or *consummation* is what Bakhtin referred to as an act of *authorship*.

Moral action takes place when we make a moral judgement about another in our authoring of them from our *outside* position. Bakhtin’s authoring of self is much more complex than other philosophers’ concepts of self (for example see Mead, 1964). Bakhtin’s authoring self is not separated from other individuals, although unique, the self from a Bakhtinian dialogic perspective is always in relationship with others and therefore inextricably connected to the other (Bakhtin, 1993). Bakhtin and Mead’s definitions of the subject meet at the point that a subject includes both the ‘I’ (I-for-myself) and the ‘me’ (I-for-you). However, Mead’s (1964) concept of self includes a generalised other. According to Bender (1998) this generalised other is not “a real flesh and bone ‘other’, the generalised other is an abstraction that represents the rules of the game or the given rules of society” (p. 186). Whereas, Bakhtin’s (1990) dialogic notion of self requires a continuous negotiation between the ‘I’ and the other in an endeavour to reach an understanding of the self’s or the other’s subjectivities.

According to Bakhtin two non-coinciding consciousnesses are necessary for a moral act to occur. Bakhtin (1993) insists on people being aware of and attentive to difference and their unique outside position because these features are vital to an answerable deed and all voices being heard. If moral action is to be undertaken
on behalf of others, then *outsidedness* (active empathising/otherness) is essential if a phenomenological distance from the other is to be achieved. Haynes (2013) explains, Bakhtin was critical of the neo-Kantian concept of *aesthetic empathy* which is the melding of another’s consciousness or co-experiencing an event with another person as grounds for moral action. In Bakhtin’s view this type of empathy was impossible given spatial and temporal considerations (Haynes, 2013). From a Bakhtinian perspective experiencing empathy alone does not provide grounds for moral action; effective action “is the result of the complex interplay of cognitive, moral and aesthetic decisions” (Haynes, 2013, p. 44). Therefore, author-hero (self-other) relations are fundamentally active and productive, rather than merely being revealed. The important point Bakhtin was making was that *the outside* is not possible without a transgredient relation and that the relation between the self’s inner and external bodies is not possible without the consummation between the self and the other.

Bakhtin draws upon his notion of outsideness which takes into consideration the necessary separation between subjects and the importance of individuals not losing their unique position in being. Although, it is necessary for the self to imagine, through a transgredient relation, the projection of him or herself into the other, to experience the other’s life from his or her perspective and in doing so “consummate him aesthetically” (p.25), “I do not lose myself completely, nor my unique place outside it, even for a moment” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 15).

From a Bakhtinian (1990; 1993) perspective human self-understanding and self-awareness derives from two aspects. First, thoughts and feelings that originate from the unique viewpoints of the acting and thinking self (I-for-myself) which is essentially un-representable (I cannot represent my inner thoughts and feelings like others can provide representations of my external body). In Bakhtin’s (1990) words “I calculate and evaluate all my movements internally … I see an object from the standpoint of a future inner experience” (p, 44). The second aspect to human self-understanding and self-awareness derives from representations and judgements that others convey about the self and then express in dialogue. Each viewpoint is necessary in order to overcome the limitations of the other’s excess of seeing — what they can see from their viewpoint that I cannot.

Meaning is created in this way by an author (self) choosing to step across in order to enter or empathize actively into a hero (other), experience her or his life, but
then return to herself or himself and her or his own place in the world. From this position of outsidedness, the author bestows a form on the other, using their own *excess of seeing* (what they can see that the other does not), to consummate the other and give them meaning; the aim “of such interaction must be the creation of meaning, not solipsistic narcissism or domination. In other words, the author (self) must become incarnated (but not identical), redemptive” (Felch and Contino, 2001, p.17) and potentially altered.

According to Holquist (as cited in Pollard, 2011, p.11) outsidedness makes answerability possible because the uniqueness of a person’s position (physical and attitude toward a position) also grants an “ontologically imposed” answerability for the judgement or evaluation of what a person perceives. Outsidedness is the genesis of a moral moment. For Bakhtin (1993) emphasis is placed on how individuals intone their “acts of living and knowing” with evaluative responses “through the particularities of interpretation, feeling, and moral valuing” (Hicks, 2000, p. 230). Bakhtin addressed his theory to the issue of how self should act with moral responsibility toward the other and how the choices a person makes in achieving these acts, are to be seen as acts in the event-of-Being. Therefore, moral answerability can be conceptualised as a dialogic construct which speaks to the process of the self being in the world from multiple standpoints across time and space (I-for-me, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-thou, I-for-us).

### 2.3 Moral answerability in the early years

Amongst other things teaching requires a continually developing sense of judgement regarding not only how to engage learners in subject matter, but also how to interpret learners’ understandings (Hansen, 2015). Moral answerability might be evident in a teacher’s practice in the way she or he produces language, ‘opens up’ or ‘shuts down’ opportunities for relationships to be sought, writes a learning story assessment, comforts, advocates or negotiates dialogue with ‘others’. Moral answerability may also be evident in a teacher’s practice when she reviews a policy or is challenged by an aspect of the curriculum. For instance, one teacher in an interview carried out as part of a study by Rockel and Craw (2011) reflected upon the moral responsibility of ensuring the well-being of infants as learners:
I question myself am I ‘doing the right thing’ by these children? … what’s actually happening for each individual child … how they are changing, how happy they are to be there?” (Teacher interview)

Few studies have specifically used the notion of moral answerability in early years teacher practice, but there are exceptions in the very recent work of de Vocht (2015a), Rosen (2014) and White, Peter and Redder (2015). As a participant observer Rosen’s ethnographic work of children aged 2 to 4 years old in an early years context employed the concept of answerability to explore the negotiation of meanings in relation to children’s ‘screams’. Rosen (2014) highlights the importance of answerable acts that consider not only children’s verbal expressions but also their “embodied vocal productions” (p. 50) in order to bring meaning and value to others. The notion of answerability has also been employed in research exploring teacher and infant interactions in order to gain insight into the ‘work of the eye’ as a gaze, glance or watch and its responses by teachers in an ECCE setting (White, Redder & Peter, 2015).

DeVocht (2015b) foregrounds the notion of moral answerability to explore the interaction between teachers and young children aged between 3.5 to 5 year olds in an early years setting. By emphasising teacher-child dialogue as open-ended and children as active agents in the dialogue, DeVocht’s (2015b) study offers an alternative view to “dominant discourses with universal teaching strategies that are aimed at the encultration of children in an existing world” (p. 319). The researcher and two teachers engaged in collaborative discussions in relation to a selection of video recordings of teacher-child interactions. These discussions were analysed as a meaning making process during the collaborative meetings.

De Vocht’s (2015b) findings showed teachers’ changed their practice as a morally answerable response to the children’s utterances, after viewing the recordings and participating in reflective dialogue. For example de Vocht (2015b) explains that teachers’ moral answerability was present in the way they reflected on how they were limiting children’s water play because it caused added work in changing children when they got wet. Teachers in de Vocht’s (2015b) study felt that they were morally answerable in the way they changed their practice, promoted water activities and gave children free access to this type of play. By applying moral answerability to the collaborative dialogic approach employed between teachers and researcher, De Vocht (2015a) was able to view teaching
beyond a technical approach with universal strategies “to provide guidance for teachers in the unique lived experiences with their students” (p. 2).

Similar to DeVocht (2015a,b) I have applied the notion of moral answerability to teacher interactions but instead of observed teachers’ interactions with young children my study drew upon my own interactions with infants as a data source and explored my teacher colleagues’ critique of my practice in the data source events. Further, DeVocht’s (2015b) study looked closely at how teacher-child dialogues are “shaped and/or understood in a teacher-researcher dialogic research process” (p. 322) by working alongside teachers; whereas my study focused on answerable acts and the potential of moral answerability to alter the experience of the other in the dialogic space.

I assert that Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability provides a way to explore and better understand infant pedagogy as a series of moral acts that implicate the self because of his philosophy being embedded in “strong subjectivity” in the act (Sandler, 2015, p.16). Oddly, I could find few research precedents that align with this assertion beyond de Vocht (2015a,b) whose work was with older children. In the following chapter the literature covers teacher ethical and moral accountability in relation to the way teachers’ pedagogical acts are currently understood.
Chapter three: ‘Doing the right thing’ in Pedagogy

How each of us views the world will depend on through whose eyes we look. As accountable members of a society there are various codes of ethics, standards, rules and regulations specified by external authoritative bodies whose ideologies influence how different bodies of people understand and comply with what it means to ‘do the right thing’ — to be accountable. When I look through the eyes of the professional teaching body, I am aware of how educational settings have long been recognised for preparing learners both academically and morally for life so that they can become responsible, capable and contributing members of society (Johansson, Brownlee, Cobb-Moore, Boulton-Lewis, Walker & Ailwood, 2011). Society expects teachers to do a “reasonable job” at promoting children’s learning and holds teachers accountable for this learning taking place (Snook, 2003, p. 41).

Society’s accountability manifests itself in a variety of practices and mandates that require teachers to abide by ethical codes in tandem with professional standards — documents which call for professional integrity and personal agency in their application. In response, some of these will be examined alongside the literature concerning teacher accountabilities. I will then establish an argument for the contested nature of ethical responsibility concerning teacher pedagogy, and the associated moral implications that derive from practice when views of ‘doing the right thing’ are seen through different eyes. I argue in this chapter that there are no codes, rules or regulations that can fully address the complexity of pedagogy, especially infant pedagogy.

3.1 No ‘recipe’ for teaching

As members of a profession, teachers across Western societies are introduced to a social practice with the long-established professional expectation that they will use and abide by objective and rational core values, ideals and principles that prescribe standards of conduct, curricula, rules, practice and decision-making processes (Snook, 2003). To this end, it is generally assumed that adhering to the Kantian formulistic justice-oriented approach to ethics, will provide teachers with support for decisions and actions through a shared understanding that is universally applicable to everyone. Consequently, an ethical focus is often
privileged that leans toward social rather than individual good — this is what ‘we’ all do.

An approach that follows objective and rational core values, ideals and principles implies that learners’ rights will be protected through the promotion of equality and fairness — firmly grounded in the principle of justice (French-Lee & Dooley, 2015). According to O’Neill and Bourke (2010) this is achieved through the willing commitment by teachers to endorse what the profession “regards as ‘right’ or ‘good’ in its relations with the community” (p. 160). However, universal principles and core values do not always respond to learners’ right to autonomy and justice. Osman’s (2005) study employed a qualitative research approach that embraced the child as an autonomous agent in her right. The voices of six primary aged children in a state funded Australian school were captured using a focus group method and children’s artworks. The duration of the two focus group discussions were one hour and forty five minutes each. Through discussions and drawings that depicted the child as significantly smaller than the teacher, Osman’s (2005) findings highlighted a power struggle between learners and teachers. All the children consistently described teachers’ acts as “unfair”; they felt “devalued” and “not respected” (Osman, 2005, p. 185). The children felt controlled by adults with little choice but to do what they were told. Osman’s study reveals how an ethical code of practice does not guarantee teachers’ acts will not be interpreted as undesirable restrictions on the freedom of learners.

Through shared desirable pedagogical practices, values, and principles it is assumed that the teaching profession has an ethical process in place to hold teachers accountable on behalf of society for the judgements they make (O’Neill & Bourke, 2010). This means day-to-day pedagogical decisions by teachers can be queried by external bodies of authority such as team leaders, principles, senior teachers and external evaluation organisations both inside and outside of educational contexts. In her or his quest to be a ‘good’ teacher (whatever that means) who aspires to do the right thing by others, the ethical teacher can be conceived as one who follows a set of agreed upon principles, values, or virtues that she can draw upon to reason and justify her practice when called to account. Under this guise the ethical teacher is considered to act morally if her actions reflect these universal ways of being and doing.
An example of how teachers are expected to account for their pedagogy through mandated evaluation processes is reflected in how core values as part of a teacher’s pedagogical practice are mandated nationally in some parts of the world (e.g., Australia). Australia provides an established example of the teaching of moral values which became a policy priority 16 years ago. A further emphasis on values education was provided in 2005 with the development of the *Australian National Framework for Values Education in Australian Education* (Department of Education, Science and Training [DEST], 2005). It was assumed that moral values education would enable children to reach their full learning potential as moral agents who could contribute responsibly to society. Core moral values that underpin a democratic way of life where justice is considered as the right of all people such as fairness, integrity and respect make up the framework. In order to promote the nine core values that constitute this framework specific pedagogical strategies are advocated which include explicit and implicit teaching, discussion and reflection (DEST, 2005). Moral and values-based education is also weaved implicitly through the *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* (Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs [MCEETYA], 2008) document, which explicitly advocates for children to become citizens who “act with moral and ethical integrity” (p. 9).

A critique by Johansson et al., (2011) notes that the incorporation of values into the Australian curriculum pays little attention to children’s voices being included in the teaching of moral values, as a result emphasis is often on the teachers’ perspectives of what should be learnt. In their Australian based study which employed ecological systems methodology, Johansson et al. (2011) explored the pedagogical practices described by ECEC teachers as significant for teaching moral values. An online survey method was used to interview 379 teacher participants. Findings suggested teachers tended to hold moral values as absolute. This was reflected in the way the teachers valued transmissive teaching practices such as the modelling of core values for the learning of morals. Johansson et al’s research (2011) illuminates the importance of teachers who ‘can think outside the box’ as opposed to enacting practices that ‘shut down’ opportunities for children to actively participate in the generation of moral-meaning and perspective. Sharing this view Taggart (2011) suggests “a code of ethics, whilst beneficial,
may suggest that morality is defined completely by acts of mental reasoning in which people judge their behaviour against a list of values (p. 86).

To be deemed accountable there is a professional expectation that teachers will meet objective standards of conduct and justify decisions made and subsequent courses of action by following agreed upon universal principles, values and codes (O’Neill & Bourke, 2010). In their study, informed by a dialogic approach to practice Fecho, Falter and Hong (2016) tackled the issue faced by many teachers caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to responding to the particulars of learners and prescribed mandates in the form of a standardised curriculum. Highlighting the dialogic space created in the classrooms of four high school teachers Fecho et al (2016) illuminate the ethical and moral dilemmas that derive from practice when what teachers believe is good pedagogical practice is “put into sway” (p. 5). The authors highlight the importance of teachers ‘opening up’ dialogue by teaching “outside the box but inside the standards” in order to account for pedagogy in ways that comply with mandated requirements but also speak to teachers’ moral answerability for ‘doing right’ by the learners they teach and themselves (p. xviii). Consequently, Fecho et al (2016) alongside others (Newman & Pollnitz, 2002; Snook, 2003) illuminate there is no recipe for teaching; and everyday moments of living cannot be prescribed or pre-empted — particularly moral moments (Shotter, 1989). Being accountable for children’s learning involves more than obediently abiding by abstract rules and principles; or delivering a curriculum by the book or making visible, values and philosophies that support one particular worldview.

3.2 The moral dimensions of teaching

Being accountable for the learning of learners also requires being morally accountable for every lived moment that is experienced in relationship with an ‘other’ and often through another. Such a focus is also called for by Snook (2003) because of the personal being central to the act of teaching. Frequently implicit, the moral act of teaching is imbued with moral meaning and consequence as teachers’ choice of pedagogy expresses teaching values and moral judgements in the everyday moments that make up educational spaces (Hansen, 2013). In agreement, Berthelsen (2005) calls for teachers to be more attuned to the moral significance of their acts in order to better understand the link between teachers’ values and how they connect with the morality of the children they teach. Indeed,
Rosenberg’s (2015) stance is that all pedagogical acts have a moral centre. The moral act of teaching exposes learners to social and cultural values as they learn how to relate to others in ways that may alter from what is valued outside of an educational context. In his ethnographic study of children in a kindergarten based in the United States of America (USA), McCadden (1998), employed a sociological perspective to focus on children’s moral narratives. He found that the content of the curriculum alone had little influence on a child’s moral understanding. Instead, his insights illuminated how moral connections and relationships developed between children and teachers in everyday concrete experiences. This research highlights how a teacher’s personality, values and beliefs encroach on every facet of her or his teaching. Which means a distinct line cannot be drawn between the personal and the professional as is typically the case with other professions (Snook, 2003) — interconnectedness prevails. In line with this thinking Colnerud (2006) agree, explaining close relationships are essential if a teacher is to understand a child and help them learn.

Research in education typically values the ethical over the moral, which Colnerud (2006) explains refers to the everyday, “often not reflected upon, conduct” (p. 367) and is more likely to focus on moral issues between teacher and child as opposed to teacher and teacher. The conceptualisation of teaching as a moral act is recognised by many researchers with an interest in the moral dimensions of teaching, regardless of their theoretical or philosophical perspective (Bullough, 2011; Hansen, 2001; Noddings, 1984; Sanger and Osguthorpe, 2013). In a literature review of articles spanning 20 years that have explored the moral dimensions of teaching, Bullough (2011) asserts “to teach is to be embedded in a world of uncertainty and of hard choices, where what a teacher does and how she or he thinks is morally laden” (p.27). Further Hansen (2001) explains, teaching “can be described as moral because, in very general terms, it presupposes notions of better and worse or good and bad” (p. 828). Conversely, Buzzelli and Johnston (2001) disagree explaining their view of morality does not concern whether practice is good or bad. Using Bernstien’s (1996) notion of pedagogic discourse, Buzzelli and Johnston (2001) were provided with a moral lens through which to explore the dynamics of power, authority and morality as it takes place in moments of interaction between teacher and child. This was their focus of investigation because few studies had examined the interplay between power,
authority and morality in classroom discourse. They were interested in how discourse employed by the participants brought about certain ideological ends. One of the classroom dialogues selected for analysis highlighted the struggles that were faced when a teacher was torn between enacting her own pedagogical beliefs in practice and wanting to find ways for children’s voices to be heard. The teacher in the study placed value on encouraging that which is ‘good’ and discouraging that which is not in the classroom. When one of the children incorporated beer drinking as an aspect of his story issues for the teacher arose around how to exercise her authority for moral ends, recognising that the child’s way of thinking had become intertwined with the instructional (nurturing children’s competencies in the form of emerging writing skills and expression of voice) and the regulative (maintaining social order) “into a single pedagogic discourse” (Buzzelli & Johnston, 2001, p. 880). The teacher responded to the child by not shutting down the beer drinking element in his story. Instead, she employed a dialogical approach which conveyed her concern but allowed the child to still follow through on his line of thinking. The teacher was able to exercise her authority by responding with a moral message that was not authoritative. The work of Fecho et al (2016) and White (2016a) inform that in order to follow a dialogical pedagogical stance openness to the uncertainty, complexity, out of comfort zoneness and moral messiness of dialogue is imperative.

As professionals, it is assumed teachers should be able to take personal responsibility for decisions. However, Lauermann and Karabenick (2013) advise there is sparse research evidence in relation to teachers’ views on their own responsibilities as teachers and the circumstances under which they are willing to accept personal responsibility. In their critical review of existing teacher responsibility scales in relation to the learning of primary school aged students they determined that a better conceptualisation is required of what personal responsibility entails in practice for both initial teacher education and in-service teachers. This is important for the development of a teacher’s professional sense of identity and to reconcile their own perspectives of responsibility with professional demands in terms of meeting learners’ academic and social needs in tandem with professional expectations and norms.
3.3 On the same page — is it moral, ethical or both?

Being ‘on the same page’ is typically when consensus or a mutual understanding has been reached between members of a society. Shotter’s (1989) seminal work calls attention to “communually shared ways or means for making-sense” (p. 138) that often place sanction on people’s ways of being in order to ensure that they account for all of their experiences in terms which are agreed upon within a particular social group. What Shotter (1989) means is that people often endeavour to reproduce a certain manner of engaging with others, that takes into account shared ways in order to act routinely and in an accountable way. It is assumed that actions informed by consensus enable accountable action because people can account for themselves to themselves and to others for their acts, which can be related to their acknowledgement of how they are placed in relation to the others around them. International consensus about human rights is visible in The Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989), which calls for the inclusion of children’s voices in teaching practices, including the teaching of values (Bertheson et al, 2009). These shared ways often manifest in educational settings in the forms of philosophies, core values, mission statements, curriculum, code of ethics, policies.

However, Shotter (1989) contends being on the same page can render people’s voices invisible because they may feel restricted in what they can say or do. He explains, from a person’s youngest age they learn how to be the kind of person required in the space of the particular social group within which they are momentarily positioned, in order to replicate those ‘communally shared ways’ of being. In this way, a person learns how to act, taking their relations to others into account in the enactment of their actions. We are shaped by those with whom we are in dialogue. If a person’s voice is muzzled, then meaningful dialogue is denied because a person’s point of view from their perspective as an autonomous being in the world has been silenced. When this happens there is no opportunity for a person to participate in meaningful dialogue with other people about their points of view on them, consequently rendering a person’s personal point of view partially complete.

Shotter (1989) emphasises the interconnectedness of a person’s relations with another, explaining that a person does not simply act “out of” their “own plans or desires” unconstrained by the social particulars of their acts. Instead, he suggests
people act “in to” the opportunities offered by others for them to act, otherwise their endeavours to communicate may not succeed or will be sanctioned in some way (p. 139). A person’s action in being situated in this way incurs an “ethical or moral quality” because she or he cannot relate without consideration to and for others with whom he or she is in relationship (Shotter, 1989, p. 139). Importantly, Shotter (1989) points out that this is because the relationship a person has with another is not owned by one person over the other but rather it is shared. Acting within this shared relationship means “I must proceed with the expectation that you will intervene in some way if I go ‘wrong’ — only with a highly developed skill at anticipating and pre-empting such interventions, can I proceed as I please” (Shotter, 1989, p. 139). When ‘we’ are all ‘on the same page’ ‘we’ feel that ‘we’ must conform to established shared ways in order to meet “the demands placed upon us by our need to sustain our status as responsible members of society” (Shotter, 1989, p. 137).

According to Mattsson, Ax, Ponte and Rönnerman (2008) a culture of compliance means teachers risk getting caught in a system compelling them to follow abstract rules, standards and codes and behave instrumentally. When this happens, moral agency is taken from teachers alongside their will and ability ‘to do the right thing’. Walker and Lovat (2017) add when differences are denied pressure is put on people to conform. When people act counter to the core values within a context there is a risk of fragmentation occurring (Walker & Lovat, 2017).

In an early years study Nuttall (2006) employed a symbolic interactionist approach to explore one teacher’s personal account of the struggle she experienced when her pedagogical practice conflicted with the other teachers’ practices with whom she worked. Nuttall (2006) suggests teachers are immersed in multiple opportunities to negotiate their subjectivity with teachers, children and families throughout their day at work in an ECEC setting. However, these opportunities for negotiation of teacher subjectivities can be problematic as Ngaire, the teacher whose story of practice is the feature of Nuttall’s (2006) study, encountered. A particular moral concern for staff and management at the centre was the guidance of children’s behaviour. The shared consensus was that a well organised programme was valued and a way to ensure children would settle in with ease. However, Ngaire’s practice was understood by her colleagues to be the cause of concern as it did not, in their view, conform to the centre’s image of
itself. Yet, no one had raised this issue with Ngaire, as her team leader avoided situations of conflict when addressing what she believed to be inappropriate practice in favour of role modelling best practice. Ngaire’s account of her experience, responding to being challenged by a child whose behaviour she found problematic, provides an example of how she denied her subjectivity when giving her account in order to be ‘on the same page’ as the practices of the team — even though what actually happened in reality was that she was living out her subjectivity but was trying to pretend otherwise. Nuttall’s study highlights the emotional fear that can be felt by a teacher when her practice is not ‘on the same page’ as the practices of her colleagues. Interestingly, in an earlier study at the same ECEC service Nuttall (2004) noticed that other teachers’ practices with children did not reflect the child-centred approach to teaching their shared philosophy subscribed to.

Ngaire’s experience is not uncommon in the busy environment of an ECEC context (Nuttal, 2006). White’s (2009) doctoral research study explored metaphoricity as symbol-sharing and the capacity of teachers to notice, recognise and respond to toddler language cues in a New Zealand ECEC context. This dialogic study involved a teacher, one infant and one toddler aged 18 months and 23 months. The teacher in White’s (2009) study experienced an inner moral struggle surrounding having to “fit” in with her centre management’s approach to assessment even though it conflicted with her assessment practice (p. 164). With an emphasis on the subjective nature of infant care “in socioculturally informed infant pedagogies”, Brennan (2016) has argued recently that infant pedagogy remains under researched (p. 317). Brennan’s (2016) research highlights teachers’ avoidance of talking about the personal and emotional aspects of their work with infants. In addition, she draws upon Elfer’s (2012) study to raise concern about the psychological detachment of some teachers in order to cope with the emotional demands of infant pedagogical practice. External factors were a feature of Elfer’s (2012) work when teachers made pedagogical decisions in relation to their practices which were in conflict with their centre’s policies.

In a birth to threes study, which focused on teacher self-awareness in relation to the physical and emotional dimensions of practice, Manning-Morton (2006) observed marked contrasts between teachers’ practices in relation to meeting children’s emotional needs. In this study Manning-Morton (2006) summoned
teachers to account for their pedagogy through greater self-awareness in order to better understand how they respond to learners and how their actions alter meaning. Significantly, Manning-Morton emphasised the importance of teachers being aware of what they do because what they do contributes to others’ practices and the learning of children. In all, these studies highlighted the moral and ethical certainty and uncertainty of either being on the ‘same page’ where teachers strove to reproduce shared understandings of how to engage with others so they were acting in ethically accountable ways, or facing moral struggle for not complying with their teacher colleagues.

3.4 Moral, ethical or answerable agent?

The central role or persona of the individual professional teacher is as a moral agent (Campbell, 2008). However, when contemplating the construct of teacher as moral agent it is important to bear in mind that much of the contemporary literature surrounding moral agency has origins in Aristotle’s concept of virtue ethics and the Kantian notion of rational autonomy (Rosenberg, 2015). From this perspective the moral agent is someone who acts consciously in search of valuable ends or according to codes of conduct (Sockett, 2012). Adding to this view, Fenstermacher and Osguthorpe (2000) note, “a moral agent is one whose choices can be accounted for by the giving of reasons and these reasons explain and justify their choices” (p.9). Further, Hansen (2013) suggests, that moral agents embrace life with a “humane, reflective, and responsible approach toward other people and the shared features of public life” (p. vii). Clearly visible in these definitions of a moral agent is the Kantian voice of a proscriptive ethical system, seeking to ‘norm’alise people through externally imposed universal criteria. Consequently, a conceptualisation of the professional teacher as an ethical agent rather than a moral agent could be considered a more appropriate term. I see this as problematic for how teachers approach reflective practice which is filtered through everything that teachers do as members of a teaching professional body.

Reflective practice for teachers encompasses thinking about how you teach, pausing to consider teaching practices and the reasons for them, thinking critically about alternative perspectives and altering practices based on new understandings (O’Connor & Diggins, 2002). Reflection and self-evaluation are considered important if teachers are to think critically about the continually altering practices that shape their pedagogy (O’Connor & Diggins, 2002). According to Arthur
Beecher, Death, Dockett, and Farmer (2015), self-reflection exhorts informed pedagogical decision-making by teachers being able to see things in alternative ways. However, ideas about the importance of reflection as an integral part of a teacher’s pedagogy, which became noticeable in the education literature in the 1980s (for example see Schön, 1983 who was most prominent) appear to have moved away from their “radical roots” as education has become professionalised (Bradbury, Frost, Kilminster, & Zukas, 2012, p. 2).

The current focus of reflection is on how well teaching supports student attainment in curriculum areas, and less about moral answerability and learner voice. Campbell (2008) is one researcher who has focused on moral responsibility through the emphasis on how the teacher is answerable for the decisions that she or he makes individually or collectively with others, for the motivations that orient choices, and for his or her actions in educational spaces (Campbell, 2008). Colnerud’s (2006) study, related to ethics and morals, illuminated the absence of detailed studies of what professionalism entails and the absence of research in terms of moral responsibility. This lack of knowledge raises concern for a potential disconnection between the educating of how to be a reflective teacher and what this means in practice. Teachers are faced with lived realities that call for them to “look beyond ethics toward morals” (Walker & Lovat, 2017, p. 439) in making pedagogical decisions that will inform concrete acts in the pluralistic society in which people exist.

3.5 Reflection as a moral act
Reflection is a process that focuses on a person’s inner thought processes and personal responsibility for their actions. It is therefore considered to be a moral endeavour because it can be viewed as an act of conscience (Greene, as cited in Buzzelli & Johnston, 2014). For Greene (as cited in Buzzelli & Johnston, 2014) conscience means “reflexive judgement about things that matter” (p.21). Teachers enter educational settings with views about particular pedagogical practices that may be in conflict with other teachers’ practices (Elfer, 2012) and values (O’Connor & Diggins, 2002) with whom they work. Often these views are based on teachers’ lived experiences and cultural upbringings which make up their personal histories (Gonzalez-Mena & Shareef, 2005).
In a comparative study of research that was carried out in the 1990s with data collected between 2008 to 2010, Colnerud (2015) explored how teachers perceive and cope with ethical dilemmas and moral challenges in their everyday practice. Data were collected using the critical incident technique which is a method used when asking participants for their experiences. Three primary schools participated in the study with children in years one to nine. Seventy-five teachers responded to the critical incident question that was given to them at a staff meeting. A qualitative content analysis was carried out. Colnerud’s study found dilemmas were encountered where external factors such as rules and service constraints came into conflict with a person’s conscience. Challenges were also experienced in situations where a choice had to be made between different moral options where no universal principle or rule was evident. Further, Colnerud (2015) determined that dilemmas were likely to cause moral stress when teachers’ values attached to keeping children safe from harm were put at risk. He recommended future research examine situations in which teachers do not follow their conscience.

An understanding of the choices and pedagogical decisions that teachers make about their moral acts is central to teachers’ understandings of themselves, their worlds and how their actions impact on others. As asserted in the previous section, Moate and Sullivan (2015) agree that it is widely accepted that ongoing reflective practices hold a pivotal place in teacher education and teacher professional development. They also acknowledge that reflective practices are important in order for teachers to better understand and develop their professional and pedagogic selves (Moate & Sullivan, 2015; O’Connor & Diggins, 2002). However, they contend that very little is known about “the moment-to-moment, inner moral conflicts and emotions attached to reflection” (Moate & Sullivan, 2015, p. 412).

Moate and Sullivan (2015) employed action research based on Dewey’s cycle of intelligent deliberation-action-reflection to investigate student teachers’ moral experiences either identifying with or resisting the moral order associated with learning a new pedagogy. This study took place with 12 students in a Finnish tertiary teaching context. What they found was a “dynamic interplay” unfolding for the participants between endorsing the authority of a moral order, for example the values attached to dialogic pedagogy, questioning it and “irreverently” poking
fun at it (Moate & Sullivan, 2015, p. 431). According to Moate and Sullivan (2015) teacher education programmes offer students a range of pedagogies with which to engage. Yet, how student teachers’ appropriate moral values is not well understood (p. 411). Moate and Sullivan (2015) emphasise the importance of research inquiring into why reflection leads to some people altering their practices and others resisting change. Acknowledging that moral assumptions are often implicit in teaching pedagogies Moate and Sullivan (2015) emphasise the lack of educational research into the impact of moral assumptions on student teachers. This seems ironic when the practice of teaching is frequently referred to as a moral act. They suggest future research could explore comprehension not only as a cognitive undertaking but also as a moral endeavour.

As active participants in dialogue, teachers are morally answerable for the meanings that are generated in dialogue. Teaching is morally complex, ambiguous and uncertain. Indeed, at the turn of the 21st century, this was the very reason Sumsion (2000) expressed her concerns surrounding the ethical challenges faced by teachers in all areas of education that arise from practice. In line with Snook (2003) she highlights the centrality of relationships to pedagogy. Sumsion illuminates both the importance of grounding her practice in an ethic of care (Noddings, 1984) while being respectful of feminist critiques of this stance which caution against power imbalances between students and teachers. From a feminist perspective caring can equate to disclosure and unintentional abuses of power — evidence of a dilemma that can arise from morally grounding one’s practice in deeply held values. One form of answerability for Sumsion (2000) is reflecting on her practice as a way to inform her pedagogical decision making and support her with how she responds to the complex factors in educational practice that can cause much moral distress and discomfort.

Through self-evaluation and reflective practice teachers can think critically about their decisions and the continually altering practices that shape their pedagogy. That said, the literature highlights how teachers are often not aware of the moral consequences of their personal actions and practice (Shapira-Lishchinsky, 2011). In her call for answerability Shapira-Lishchinsky (2011) highlighted the lack of research exploring teachers’ responses to the moral and ethical dilemmas they face in their practice. According to Shapira-Lishchinsky’s (2011) findings, ethical dilemmas faced by teachers were the result of experiences where they felt a sense
of failure to act appropriately and a lack of confidence in their abilities as teachers. In addition, further analysis highlighted how the teachers in Shapira-Lishchinsky’s (2011) study responded differently to similar ethical challenges. For example when there was conflict between accountability to the learner’s family and to the school’s educational standards agenda, one teacher responded by conforming with the family’s expectations and another teacher asked for support from colleagues so that she did not compromise her professional values; in another example one teacher followed the rules while another teacher acted in a manner that was true to his personal values.

3.6 A strong allegiance to self-evaluation

In a New Zealand context ECEC teachers share the same teacher registration processes and ethical codes of responsibilities and standards as teachers in primary and secondary education sectors (Farquhar & Tesar, 2015). In alignment with many Western countries, the ECEC sector in New Zealand is bound by legislation, Education (Early Childhood Services) Regulations (New Zealand Government, 2008), policy directives, an early years curriculum (Ministry of Education [MoE], 2017), ECEC accrediting and credentializing bodies such as the Ministry of Education (MoE), Education Review Office (ERO) and the Education Council. In a global context, ECEC services in New Zealand are shaped by United Nations articles protecting the rights of the child (United Nations, 1989) and reviews and recommendations by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2006) “to the economic and social development plans of its member nations” (Farquhar, 2012, p. 292). In addition, all registered teachers in New Zealand are required to abide by the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi).

Professionalism constitutes initial teacher education programmes and students are assessed by teacher educators accordingly. A consequence of foregrounding professionalism is the formalisation of reflective practices by regulatory organisations as a way of developing the professionalism of student and in-service teachers. This is achieved through professional development programmes, and assessment and evaluation practices of student and in-service teachers (Bradbury et al., 2012). Further, “the growth of managerialism and the audit culture fuel demands … for evidence to demonstrate reflective practice” (p. 3), in New Zealand teachers record reflections of their practice for the purposes of teacher
registration and to provide evidence of their practice for the Education Review Office (ERO) auditing purposes. Bradbury et al., (2012) assert that the formalisation of reflective learning may encourage simplistic explanations of reflection resulting in watered down prescriptive outcomes. This means instead of reflective practice being the foundation for the radical alteration of practice, there is potential for teachers’ reflections to be procedural as if he or she were compliantly following a recipe, rather than questioning and challenging.

The Education Council in New Zealand (Education Council, 2017) provides teachers with a resource to support and guide their implementation of the code of professional responsibilities in practice. Although the Education Council offer a cautionary note, in terms of the resource not being used “as a checklist to be assessed on or measured against” it does offer examples as a way of clarifying the “expected professional behaviour” to be reflected in practice and the “unacceptable behaviour” to be in breach of the code (p.2). In doing so potentially “normalising external criteria. The Education Council (2017) acknowledges that teachers will face “complex ethical dilemmas and professional tensions every day” (p.2). Although this authoritative body recognises that they cannot account for how every situation should be “managed”, the predominant expectation is that all teachers will reflect in practice “high professional standards and sound ethical decision-making” (p. 2). It is assumed that by acting in this way teachers will “uphold the reputation of the teaching profession” and maintain “the trust and confidence” of “learners, their families and whānau and the public” — interestingly teacher colleagues are omitted from this list. I am not advocating for teachers to not abide by the ethical expectations as set out by the Education Council — to do so would be immoral. What I have intended to illuminate is how the ethical is often interpreted as professionalism in an external normalised way.

In New Zealand ECEC discourse, there is already a strong allegiance to some form of self-evaluation. The significance of self-evaluation is emphasised by O’Connor and Diggins (2002) who explain it is through reflective practice and self-evaluation that teachers can gain new insights and challenge deeply held assumptions, beliefs and values that influence their views on education and pedagogical practices. Designed to support New Zealand ECEC services “to develop quality improvement systems and undertake quality reviews” (Ministry of Education, 1999, p.1) the Quality Journey written and developed by Anne Meade
and Anne Hendricks was the document that laid the foundation for self-review practices in New Zealand. Self-review is “a review that is undertaken within an early childhood education service in order to evaluate practice” (Ministry of Education, 2006, p.8). Further, self-review is a deliberate and ongoing process which is employed in order to determine how teacher practice fosters children’s learning and development (Ministry of Education, 2006). Self-review processes are supported by many in education as a sincere initiative by the government to assist quality practices in New Zealand (Grey, 2002; Wansbrough, 2004; White, 2004). However not everyone supports this view (see May, 1999). Self-review is also regulated accordingly via the Education Review Office (ERO). However, the regulatory eye of ERO may tie teachers to an obligation to “perform in response to an external professionalisation and standards agenda” that does not sit well alongside teachers’ educational ideologies and ideas of infant pedagogy (Powell & Gooouch, 2017).

In a New Zealand context, the embedded nature of self-study is closely aligned to teacher practices due to existing evaluative frameworks such as self-review, and accreditation systems such as evidenced in teacher reflections of their practice for practising teacher registration requirements. Because these pedagogical practices are not typically valued as forms of research, they often go unnoticed and may not be conceptualised as representing research. There are exceptions to this view noted in programmes such as Centres of Innovation. The primary aim of self-review is *improvement* of practice. Improvement of practice is also a central aspect of self-study.

I close this chapter by pulling together the threads of past researchers which indicate that self-review aligns with self-study. I assert self-study is a legitimate method for ECEC pedagogy. As such, the next chapter outlines an argument for the dialogic self-study approach employed in my research to reflect upon and evaluate my own teacher practice.
Chapter four: A Dialogic Self-Study of Morally Answerable Teacher Acts

What is it that guarantees the internal connection among the elements of personality? Only the unity of responsibility. For what I have experienced and understood, I answer with my life. (Bakhtin in Morson, 1986, p. x)

Through a moral answerability frame it was possible to explore what it means to ‘do the right thing’ in infant pedagogy alongside issues surrounding inner and outer emotional struggles that I faced in making moral choices that shaped pedagogical acts. Connecting dialogic methodology to a self-study method enabled a way for me to interrogate the ways I am morally answerable to myself and others in an ECEC context that is shared.

From a Bakhtinian standpoint (1990; 1993) each human subject is a unique individual who is constituted and shaped by the particular meanings they come to know by being in dialogue with others. Bakhtin emphasises the need for humankind to take responsibility for their unique place in existence through sensitivity and acts of kindness that they exhibit in deeds for others and the world. Meaning is realised through the deed — the word made flesh, in Bakhtin’s words: “Every thought of mine, along with its content is an act or deed that I perform — my own individually answerable act or deed” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 3). As a participant in the dialogue I am implicated for pedagogical decisions I make actualised in concrete acts.

A dialogic approach to self-study, paves the way to a greater awareness and understanding of the self and the self’s axiological position from the perspective of others. The importance of greater self-understanding and self-awareness is asserted by Macintyre-Latta and Olafson (2006) to be at the heart of all learning and must be known in order to promote such understandings in others. By taking a more self-aware approach as opposed to this is what ‘we’ do as teachers it is possible to better understand how one’s internally held truths, values, actions, previous lived experiences, and subjectivity as a teacher, alters external relationships with others and shapes pedagogy.
4.1 Bringing dialogic methodology to bear on self-study

For Bakhtin dialogue is not only a form of communication but the most fundamental human relation (Sidorkin, 2002a, p.94). A dialogical relation is a moral endeavour because it begins with the recognition of another person’s unfinalizability. Looking through a dialogic lens, Frank (2005) explains dialogue depends on the never-ending openness to the capacity of human beings to become someone other than whoever they are at this particular time and space in history. King (2017) further explains that the Bakhtinian concept of ideological becoming is central to relational pedagogy because it highlights how people’s different ways of acting and thinking are influenced by being in relationship with another. In the context of this thesis a dialogic approach upheld the openness required for a study of the self as one who is always in the process of becoming.

Through the lifelong process of ideological becoming each person’s way of seeing and understanding the world, the ideas that they form, how they are seen by others and by themselves is constantly altering (White, 2016a). Viewed in this way, truth, knowledge, meaning, reality and the self are never fixed but instead are always in a process of being created in dialogue with others (Bakhtin, 1984). It is through the process of negotiating relationships, in lived experiences with others that subjectivities are constructed (Albon & Rosen, 2014). Seen in this way a teacher’s pedagogical self is also in a process of becoming. By connecting a dialogic approach with self-study, which emphasises improvement of practice, provided a means to view the self and the self’s practice as not transformed (which is another self-study premise) but rather in a process of being potentially altered. Notwithstanding the growing body of research taking up dialogic methodology and its orienting frame (eg., Shotter & Billig, 1998; Cohen, 2009; Dysthe, 2011; Edmiston, 2008; Fecho et al., 2016; Junefelt, 2011; King, 2017; Rosen, 2015; Sisson & Kroeger, 2016; Tallant, 2015; Wegerif, 2013) it is only more recently that ECEC research has ventured into this field. In a recent special issue bringing dialogism to bear in the early years several researchers have drawn upon the notion of moral answerability specifically (deVocht, 2015b; Gradovski & Lokken, 2015; White & Redder, 2015) and it is reflected in the recent work of Redder & White (2017).

LaBoskey (2004) draws upon Bullough and Pinnegar (2001) to explain that the aim of self-study research is to “provoke, challenge, and illuminate rather than
confirm and settle” (p. 20). Samaras (2011) points out that the focus of self-study is teacher practice. However, she emphasises that it is important to remember the significance of self-study research is also what it can do for learners and education. Self-study research is traditionally undertaken by teacher educators but is used by teachers in educational contexts outside of teacher education (for example see Crowe’s, 2010 social studies classroom self-study). Self-study appears to be sparse in a formal capacity in early years research. A recent study by Green, Wolodko, Stewart, Edwards, Brooks and Littledyke (2013) who made up a team of six ECEC teacher education colleagues from Australia employed a socioconstructionist methodological approach to collaborative self-study in order to explore their pedagogical practices in an online environment. The intention of Green et al’s (2013) study was to build a dialogic online learning environment that promoted learners creating knowledge together as opposed to a learning context that viewed students as isolated learners who were passive receivers of knowledge. The primary aim of Green et al’s (2013) study was to achieve professional learning through active participation and reflection on their pedagogical practices. Self-study enabled these researchers to better understand the theories that were informing their practice.

Bakhtin’s attention to the particular as opposed to the universal is echoed in a self-study approach, which views events surrounding context, process and relationship as the basis of teaching and teacher education (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001). From a self-study perspective the self in a self-study method is less about looking at the self per se than it is about looking at the relationship between self and pedagogical practice (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; Samaras, 2011). From a Bakhtinian dialogic point of view the self, although unique, is inseparable from the other. Therefore, the interconnectedness of self, practice and other are brought into focus when dialogic methodology is aligned with a self-study method. Selecting a self-study method aligned with dialogic methodology provided a way to connect (my) self, others and pedagogical practices in consideration of infant practice.

Bakhtin (1981) informs that words become flesh — alive — through dialogue “because they are harmonizing with some elements in this environment and striking a dissonance with others” (p. 277). A dialogic approach to self-study celebrates both the alteric and intersubjective experiences I encountered because
of the new perspectives and ideas that were generated through dissonance and harmony. Inviting alternative perspectives from others in tandem with the development of new ideas is crucial to a self-study if interpretations of situations are to be achieved that do not solely re-inforce existing perceptions (Loughran & Northfield, 1998). A dialogic approach to critical friend inquiry therefore enabled a dialogic understanding to be sought where “meaning only arises when different perspectives are brought together” (Wegerif, 2006, p. 146). Importantly, this approach aligned to self-study research which considers ways to apply new knowledge to improving teaching practices (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; Samaras, 2002). A vitally important intersection between dialogic methodology and self-study is the primary emphasis that is placed on voice. For Bakhtin the self is made up of multiple voices; self-study is auto-biographical which means it is about (my) voice, which is being brought to bear on dialogism.

Although a dialogic approach is not uncommon within self-study research (Brubaker & Loughran, 2014; Dean, Dean & Danilchick, 2014; Martin & Dismuke, 2014), I could only find a handful of self-studies that had employed a specific application to Bakhtinian dialogic methodology (Olan and Kaplan, 2014; Stewart & McClure, 2013). A search of the self-study literature showed that when reference is made to a dialogic approach, researchers often did not articulate the theoretical or philosophical perspective of the dialogic approach applied. In the work of Olan and Kaplan (2014) that drew specifically upon Bakhtin’s work to investigate teachers’ perceptions of narratives and dialogic interactions as part of a writing workshop in a university setting. I can find no studies in the early years that have employed a Bakhtinian dialogic self-study approach to infant pedagogy. Although sparse, literature does exist in relation to self-study as a methodology which employs a dialogic approach, drawing upon the notion of answerability. Such research work is evident in the work of Macintyre-Latta and Olafson (2006) who followed three young women in a middle school setting in order to explore the development of identity.

As the exploration of Bakhtin’s moral philosophy in relation to education showed in chapter two, I have already asserted that moral answerability is the nexus between Bakhtinian dialogic methodology and self-study as a method. Answerability is the moral element of dialogue, as such participants in dialogue are personally responsible for the meanings, they create with others — past,
present and future. Self-study research is situated within one’s own practice. Unlike studies where the researcher is positioned as a participant observer (for example see Albon & Rosen, 2014) in an attempt to be situated “outside of the institutionalised responsibilities and authority embedded in an educator role” (p. 38), this dialogic self-study doctoral research positions me, as the teacher, inside the boundaries of responsibilities and authority that encompass my existing role as a teacher in the social context of an infant centre. Moral answerability requires me as the teacher-researcher to be engaged with and personally responsible to bringing a sense of value and meaning to infant participants and teachers in the critical friend inquiry staff meetings. This is achieved by adopting insider and outsider positions and all participants bringing their excess of seeing to one another in the relationship.

4.2 Moral self

Lived encounters in dialogue with others matter. For it is in the “living act of dialogue” with others that meaning is discovered (White, 2016a, p. 20). Recognising that the moral self makes moral choices in everyday practice beyond any stipulated rules, codes or competencies a dialogic self-study approach for infant pedagogy as an act of moral answerability provides a way to better understand the moral me that sits behind my pedagogy. Dependent on personal responsibility and accountability, moral answerability necessitates a moral self to actively take “an axiological stand in every moment of one’s life or to position oneself with respect to values” (Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 87-88). In doing so, the moral self’s responses become subject to the judgement and perceptions of others with whom self is in dialogue. Bakhtin’s dialogic approach views a person’s subjectivity (identity, Being) as unique to them but at the same time it is dependent on a person’s relationships with other people. Even though Bakhtin was of the opinion that a person can never know exactly what another person is thinking or what another person is actually experiencing, he believed a person needs other people to endow meaning on their experience — for which they are answerable. As a morally answerable self I am personally responsible for the meanings I generate in dialogue engaging with the infants in practice, teachers at the staff meetings, and self as author, research participant, teacher, and researcher.

Expanding on the links to authoring introduced in chapter one (see section 1.3), Bakhtin (1990) asserted that each individual’s moral life mission is to constantly
author self that is in a continually altering moral relationship with others that they engage with socially. In dialogic encounters people are exposed to sides of their idea of themselves that can only be accessed from an-other’s perspective (Sullivan, 2012). These different understandings of our subjectivities are also “constantly altering and altered in relations with others” (White, 2016a, p. 22) as selves give value, through authorship to others either in a positive or negative way (Sullivan, 2012). People anticipate and respond to participants in dialogue depending on how they think they may be authored or are authored by others (Sullivan, 2012). This means people also author their own subjectivities in anticipation of how others may author them or expect them to ‘be’ (Sullivan, 2012). Dialogue, therefore, “entails a form of answerability that is morally responsive to unique others and particular relationships” — ways of morally being and becoming are learnt in these relationships (Hicks, 2000, p. 227).

When seen in this way a Bakhtinian conceptualisation of dialogue is not about ‘my’ subjectivity versus ‘my’ teacher colleague’s subjectivity versus the infant subjectivities it is about what is created together in the dialogue that is of significance. Because from a dialogic point of view each moral self is interconnected, each voice influences and interanimates the other depending on the values, ideas and ideologies that infuse the language used. The social knowledge, lived truth and experience created between participants in the dialogue is a mutual endeavour but one that each moral self is personally responsible and accountable for. When a dialogic process is considered, paying close attention, as a teacher, to what it means to “do the right thing” by self and others matters, because of the potential for my internally held truths and values to alter my own, and others’ internal states and external social conditions.

4.3 The dialogic self

Dialogism from a Bakhtinian (1981) standpoint highlights the interconnectedness of self and other both in language and being, people exist in relation to other people – which means experiencing the world is possible only because people are interconnected with others. Bakhtin (1984) explained “a person’s consciousness awakens wrapped in another’s consciousness” (p. 138). Although Bakhtin (1981; 1984; 1986) emphasised the interconnectedness of human beings to one another, he also expressed that people do not merge with others. Instead, people remain different from other people – not isolated from one another but distinct.
The way in which I create myself is by means of a quest: I go out to the other in order to come back with a self. I live into another’s consciousness; I see the world through the other’s eyes. But I must never completely meld with that version of things, for the more successfully I do, the more I will fall prey to the limits of the other’s horizon. A complete fusion … even if it were possible, would preclude the difference required for dialogue” (Clark & Holquist, 1984, p. 78).

Human beings need other human beings to furnish their experience with meaning (Bakhtin, 1990). From a dialogic viewpoint subjectivity is “social, relating to self as well as well as to others … and conscious. It anticipates ideas and judgements of others” (Sullivan, 2012, p.43). A Bakhtinian dialogic view recognises the role social, relational and discursive practices play in the formation of the self as a moral agent. From a Bakhtinian perspective identity is not formed as an isolated characteristic of individuals and identity development is not viewed as a primary function of internal cognitive processes (Tappen, 2010). Bakhtin’s view of the self needs other people to come to know her or his ‘self’. The self can never “coincide” with her or his self (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 59) and is therefore interdependent on the other. Dialogical insight illuminates how no one person’s voice is ever their own. Therefore, when I refer to ‘my’ (i.e., voice, self, values, morals or answerability etc.) in this study the ‘my’ is always permeated with the voices of others — past, present and future.

As explained in chapter one (see section 1.3) the self cannot be the author of her or his own value. “Inner thoughts and feelings and an incomplete perceptual field” on their own are insufficient in understanding ourselves (Gardiner, 1996, p. 134). It is the experience of relating to others in everyday moments of living — both in interaction with infants (when data was initially collected) and with fellow teachers in the staff meeting dialogues — that I am given form alongside access to self-understanding and self-awareness through my evaluation of their experience of me, without losing sight of my own uniqueness. As such (my) self is deeply implicated in and with the other in the answerable act.

The perspective of the ‘other’ is integral to both a dialogic approach and a self-study. I do not draw upon the work of Hermans (2001) who developed dialogical
self theory, drawing on Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue and James’ (1890) notion of the extension of self. Notwithstanding Sullivan’s critique that Herman’s theory of competing voices within the dialogical self acquires “an abstract quality, as they become disembodied from a self sensing itself acting with thought and emotion in relation to others … Bakhtin’s central concern with the experiencing self is lost in this account” (Sullivan, 2007, p. 108), it would be remiss of me not to acknowledge the usefulness of Herman’s work in understanding the dynamics of the self-other relationship. Herman’s (2001) work contributed to the dialogical self, made up of multiple ‘I’ positions e.g., I-as-researcher, I-as-teacher, I-as-participant, that are bestowed with a voice. However, there is sparse attention paid to the answerable self. As such, my study takes a point of departure from Herman’s work. Through a conceptualisation of a plural self who is morally answerable for acts, I assert that the “sense of unity and integrity to the self that exists amongst its multiplicity of dialogues” that Sullivan (2007, p.108) explained was missing from Herman’s work, is made visible in the answerable self.

4.4 Recap on conceptual framework

By employing moral answerability as my unit of analysis as set out in the section (see 4.8.3), I will be exploring my pedagogy as act of moral answerability in the following ways outlined by Bakhtin:

… an intense interaction takes place between I and other: their struggle (honest struggle or mutual deception), balance, harmony (as an ideal), naïve ignorance of one another, deliberate ignoring of one another, challenge, absence of recognition…including the confessional word. (Bakhtin, 1984, pp. 294-295)

The following conceptual framework explains the relationship between a dialogic approach to self-study underpinned by moral answerability as the unit of analysis. The associated self-study method is discussed in section 4.6:

Model 1: from Methodology to Method
4.5 Self-study as a legitimate method for ECEC pedagogy

Self-study is considered to be a methodology in its own right, derived primarily from post-modern, feminist and post-colonial paradigms (La Boskey, 2004). However, it is at times critiqued for its lack of methodological rigour (see section 1.5). As such, I have employed self-study as a method to study the self in relation to my pedagogical practice. I therefore make the distinction between dialogism as my methodology and self-study as my method. Intentional acts of reflection are rooted in self-study in order to bring about transformation of self, practices, and systems (LaBoskey, 2004). According to Loughran and Northfield (1998) self-study research is “an extension of reflection on practice, with aspirations that go beyond professional development” to the “wider communication and consideration of ideas, i.e., the generation and communication of new knowledge and understandings” (Loughran & Northfield, 1998, p.15). Advising the necessary steps for self-study, Samaras (2011) informs they are rigour, reflection and critical thinking. Through inquiry teachers are able to see themselves as learners with the
potential to improve practice. A primary critique of Schön’s (1983) reflective practice approach is that it omits the “social dimension of learning … focusing on introspection rather than through conversation and interaction with people” (Kotzée, 2012, p. 6). This is not the case for a self-study which considers understanding of pedagogy to derive from contextualised knowledge, by reflective subjects in a particular teaching space (Bass, Anderson-Patton, & Allender, 2004). As such self-study provides a valuable alternative to reflection that goes beyond studying the self in isolation (Bass et al., 2004).

According to Senese (2017), when reflection is undertaken in isolation without the perspectives of others there is potential for the layers of meaning intrinsic in teaching to not be uncovered. Without others new ways of seeing and understanding that might have been gained if experiences were shared in dialogue could go unseen. With this in mind, Senese (2017) asked her class of adult learners to each carry out an action research as reflective practice self-study. Senese (2017) asked each member of the class to write their inquiry question on the whiteboard. Class members then spent 20-30 minutes critically discussing each question and its meanings as a group. Two opportunities were also made available throughout the term for each class member to review their research questions with peers. What Senese (2017) noted, was that the dialogue that class members shared with their peers provoked them to think differently and enriched their understanding of their focus of inquiry. Through action research self-study, Senese (2017) was able to provide an alternative route to reflect on practice, overcoming self-study’s emphasis on the ‘I’ and critical friend inquiry involvement is what typically sets it apart from action research or practitioner research.

Self-study as a method aligns beautifully with Bakhtinian dialogic methodology because fundamental to both is the authoring of self and the form shaping potential of others to alter self and practice. By connecting self-study as a method to dialogic methodology I author the self AND the other in dialogue. When viewed through a dialogic methodological lens, self-study’s auto-biographical focus — I as the teacher become the subject of the study — is enhanced because of the emphasis on meaning that is created in the dialogue between I and other. Further, Bakhtin’s (1990, 1993) view that self-awareness and self-understanding could not be achieved through introspection on its own because people evaluate
themselves from the perspective of others adds value to self-study’s requirement for a critical friend inquiry audience.

For Bakhtin (1986) evaluation is essential in the creation of meaning, for without evaluation understanding is not possible. Through his concept of moral answerability people are able to evaluate and understand themselves from the perspective of others — reflection for Bakhtin takes place in the words and deeds of the other. With no recipes for teaching, I need to be able to evaluate how I can morally respond to others in every day moment-by-moment interactions that are impossible to pre-empt and potentially sit outside the guidelines of an ethical code of practice. Informed by Bakhtin (1993), Shotter (2010) explains people engage with one another in everyday situations that are unique unrepeatable events of-Being. No one can foresee how an encounter with another is going to play out, responses are anticipated, but no amount of crystal ball gazing will guarantee the exact manner in which one person will respond to the intention of another — life by its very nature is unpredictable (Bakhtin, 1981). Therefore, pedagogical moments of living cannot be planned in advance — a teacher cannot know ahead of time everything that someone is going to say or do — this is figured out moment-by-moment. An example of what I am articulating is evidenced in White’s (2016b) study which employed dialogic methodology to explore Bakhtin’s notion of excess of seeing to the field of video research. The main participants included a 4-month-old male infant, a 10-month-old female infant and two female teachers. White (2016b) highlights how there are no predetermined ‘recipes’ for teaching. In a re-probing interview one of the teachers in this study highlighted “We’re figuring it out all the time. We’d never say we know because it is always different” (p. 8). Moral answerability for this teacher was visible in the value that she placed on the importance of fleeting pedagogical moments as a source of intersubjectivity. The previous chapter concluded with the assertion that ‘doing the right thing’ in New Zealand ECEC discourse includes carrying out self evaluation typically in forms such as self-review, reflection, and evaluative appraisals. It is my assertion that self-study as an extension of self-review processes is a legitimate method for ECEC practice.

By aligning dialogic methodology to a self-study method my own practice was foregrounded within the broader notion of moral answerability. Self-study research is not technical in application, although there are guidelines for
undertaking self-study research, it is very much about starting from a deep need to study the self’s practice and the self’s role in it (Samaras, 2011). The self-study method I used was consistent with the five primary characteristics of self-study identified by LaBoskey (2004):

i.) The study was from the beginning self-focused and self-initiated; I chose to study my practice engaging with infants in an ECEC context; (my) practice was later critiqued at staff meetings.

ii.) The primary aim of my study was to improve practice; I wanted to better understand and be more self-aware of my own practice because of the potential for my deeds and acts to alter infants’ and teachers’ learning and subjectivities. Infant pedagogy is an area of educational research that is growing, and it was my intention that this study would contribute to that body of knowledge; in doing so enhancing teaching and learning practices for infants. I also hoped my self-study would support teacher evaluation and reflection practices in relation to the moral dimensions of teaching.

iii.) It was interactive; my teacher colleagues were my ‘critical friends’ critiquing my practice in dialogue with myself and others at three separate staff meetings.

iv.) (My) self-study included multiple, mainly qualitative methods; I used self-study as the overarching method to study self in tandem with critical friend inquiry method, reflexive journaling, polyphonic video which were employed to collect data across two different phases of analysis.

v.) Defining validity as a validation process based in trustworthiness; validation was achieved through the critique of my teacher practice by colleagues.

Based on an analysis of the research literature undertaken by (Vanassche & Kelchtermans (2015) validity is redefined as trustworthiness. These characteristics are also shared by dialogic researchers (for example see Sullivan, 2012; White, Peter, Redder, 2015).

The primary purpose of this thesis was to explore my own pedagogy as an act of moral answerability in order to better understand i.) my pedagogical acts and their complexity; in tandem with ii.) the pedagogical decisions I made in relation to practice, particularly when engaged in dialogue with other teachers because of the influence these decisions actualised as concrete acts can have on the lives of infants. The reason for conducting doctoral research that is self-initiated, self-focussed, improvement oriented, employs multiple methods, and involves
interaction with others (LaBoskey, 2004) was because it will extend the professional knowledge, pedagogical understandings and practices of infant teachers. It was anticipated that new meaning will be generated as diverse perspectives meet “in the tension of a dialogue” (Wegerif, 2013, p. 151). Operationalised in tandem with dialogic methodology, self-study provides a means of interrogating moral answerability and its dialogic roots through lived pedagogical encounter — from this perspective it could be conceptualised as a moral imperative.

4.6 Research design

In this section I describe the research design implemented in order for me to study self, using a dialogic self-study method. By placing emphasis on the self as dialogic and therefore always located “on the threshold” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 147) and never whole without the defining presence of the other (Sullivan, 2012), the process of analysing my practice engaging with infants, in staff meeting dialogues with teachers, took into account the interconnectedness of voices in dialogic relationships with ‘others’. When people meet in dialogue regardless of whether or not they share the same perspective, they take on elements of the other. A Bakhtinian dialogic approach to self-study provided an effective framework for the exploration of my pedagogy as an act of moral answerability because it ‘opened up’ a space for answerable acts to come to the fore, providing a way to address my research questions.

Explained in the following sections is how the research design had multiple layers in terms of data collection and analysis. The multi layered design was necessary in order to capture answerable acts in practice that I could take to a staff meeting to be analysed by teachers, in order to provide the dialogue that I could later analyse in tandem with my inner dialogue in the form of a reflexive journal. The research design responded to my quest to better understand my accountability in tandem with my personal and moral responsibilities as a teacher for pedagogical acts and the decision-making that sits behind them. The following sections present ‘how and what’ I did to encompass both my pedagogy with infants who shape my practice and the form shaping dialogues I had in the staff meetings with teacher colleagues.
4.6.1 The context of a New Zealand dialogic self-study study

The ECEC service that provided the context of the research and the data collection was a New Zealand community based centre where I was employed on a part time basis in my role as an infant teacher. This ECEC service was comprised of three separate areas: a unit for infants aged birth to 18 months; a unit for toddlers aged 18 months to three; and a unit for children aged over three. The ECEC centre is governed by a Board of trustees and their representative who I was directly responsible to is the centre coordinator. My research was carried out in the infant setting. The infant setting is licenced to accommodate a maximum group size of 16 infants per day. On the days that I video recorded my practice the group size fluctuated, there were times when the group size was made up of eight infants and other times when the size of the group comprised 14 infants.

The infant setting comprised of inside and outside environments which were accessible to infants, who were not constrained developmentally, at any time throughout the day — weather permitting. As my research was exploring my own pedagogy as an act moral answerability it was vital that this study be undertaken in an ECEC setting where I was an existing and accepted teacher in the social context because I had established trusting and meaningful relationships with infant participants, their families and teacher colleagues. This meant being able to participate in interactions with infants, their family members, and teacher colleagues, that were not different to what would typically have taken place in their everyday experiences with me.

4.6.2 Introducing the participants

The infants attending the centre and the teachers were the primary participants in this PhD study. Not all infants attended on a full-time basis. Therefore, there were a total of up to approximately 31 infants attending the centre at different times and on different days. In total 31 parents or caregivers were approached in relation to their infant’s participation. One parent did not give consent for her child to participate in the research. The ages of the infants ranged between 3 months and 18 months. Six teachers, not including myself, made up the teaching team in the infant unit — 5 teachers were qualified and 1 was not; teacher ratios were 1:4. Although I was focusing on and video recording my own practice; my teacher colleagues were captured in some of the footage. Staff meetings at this centre took place on a two weekly basis. Staff meetings commenced at 5:30 pm with a shared
dinner. Teachers from the three teaching teams remained together for a general staff meeting for one hour duration. At 7 pm each teaching team went to their respective units and had a further team staff meeting for another hour. Evaluation practices carried out in the context of this setting at the time my study took place included each teacher participating in:

i. their own self-review which involved researching a topic of inquiry related to their practice with the aim of improving practice. Teachers had opportunities to share developments in their self-review research at staff meetings with members from their team.

ii. a wider internal centre self-review which focused on a topic of inquiry related to the centre as a whole. Time was set aside at each general staff meeting to discuss a particular aspect of the focus for self-review.

iii. evaluative appraisals undertaken 3–4 times annually requesting teachers to evaluate their practice in relation to an extensive list of questions often linked to the New Zealand ECEC curriculum Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 2017), the Code of Professional Responsibilities and Standards (Education Council, 2017), or documents published by the Education Review Office (ERO).

iv. Reflecting on practice in order to provide evidence to account for their pedagogy as part of the Practicing Teacher Criteria for quality teaching in New Zealand which has to be met by all teachers in New Zealand (Education Council, 2017).

v. external centre performance review and appraisal evaluation carried out by ERO with the aim of complementing and strengthening an ECEC service’s internal evaluation processes.

The context of a staff meeting as a dialogic space to critique my pedagogical practice was chosen because staff meetings are generally a time when discussions about practice take place.

**4.6.3 Equipment**

I used a polyhonic video approach to data collection in order to capture my movements from multiple visual perspectives (see 4.6.5.1) because of the emphasis placed on the particularities of context from both a dialogic and self-study perspective. This meant using multiple video recording devices to capture the different views of the self — what could be seen and unseen. The three devices I chose were video recorder glasses which I sourced from the United States of America, a Swivl tracking camera which I loaned from the Wilf Malcolm Institute.
of Educational Research (WMIER) Video Lab and a polaroid cube video recording device which I purchased from a local retailer.

Image 1. Video recording devices

The recorder glasses provided access to my excess of seeing, the tracking camera recorded my movements around and between spaces and the cube provided a wide angled view of the context as a whole from one visual perspective. The tracking camera was positioned opposite the wide angled cube recorder in order to capture the view from an alternative visual perspective (see appendix 1 for layout of video recording devices and views from each camera).

Prior to data collection taking place I visited the centre on three separate occasions in order to familiarise the infants and teachers with the recording devices and to scope out where to place the devices. Figuring out where to place the devices was challenging because of the considerable size of the outdoor environment, heightened because I was video recording (my)self. I was aware that I would be moving around and between inside and outside environmental spaces because data collection occurred ‘inside’ my typical work day rather than ‘outside’ of it. It was therefore important to take this time to trial the recording devices to ensure devices: i.) captured my movements, ii.) could be positioned in a way that was not intrusive, and iii.) were positioned in a way that did not cause harm to infants. I initially positioned the tracking camera on the ground as I felt this would be the best place to capture (my) self and the infants because of their height. However, the tracking camera positioned on the ground was too much of a distraction for these babies So, after one particular ‘scary’ moment which involved an older
infant, swinging the tracking camera from the cord that attached it to the ipod (for just a few seconds), I decided to place the tracking camera on top of a bird cage which was a feature of this centre’s outside environment. This meant purchasing a tripod which angled the tracking camera in a way that captured both (my)self and the infants. Since my data collection took place early 2016, video recorder glasses have been used as a tool to collect data in a Master’s thesis study by Morgan (2017) which employed dialogic methodology to capture the complexity of adult second language learners’ discussion in a classroom environment. Recent research has used Swivl tracking video recording to capture two-year-old dialogues in an early years setting in tandem with recorder glasses (White, Redder, Bennett, De Manser, Geddes & Hjorth, 2018).

4.6.4 Procedure
Data collection comprised of three phases:

i. Phase 1 polyphonic video recording of my practice in the infant setting.

ii. Phase 2 video recording of staff meeting dialogue

iii. Phase 3 reflexive journaling

The first layer comprised of collecting data of my practice engaging with infants in the setting in order to identify answerable acts, this process is presented in the following section as phase one. The second layer of data collection occurred at staff meetings when I collected data in the form of dialogue between (my) self and critical teacher friends analysing the answerable acts I presented at the staff meetings, this process is reported in the subsequent section as phase two. The final layer and third phase involved collecting data in dialogue with self in the form of reflexive journaling. The three approaches I drew upon to collect data were: Polyphonic video, critical friend inquiry and reflexive journaling. These approaches are explained in the following section prefaced by model 2.

Model 2: Data Collection Approaches
4.6.5 Phase 1 data collection — original data source event

The approach used to collect data of my interactions engaging with infants was polyphonic video.

4.6.5.1 Polyphonic video

I summoned a polyphonic video method to self-study method as a way to engage in dialogic methodology. A polyphonic process for capturing footage, based on Bakhtin’s notion of excess of seeing (White, 2016b) was employed for this dialogic self-study. The employment of video technology in research has made it possible for researchers to make valuable contributions to infant research (see for example Selby & Bradley, 2003; Johansson, 2011; White, Peter, & Redder, 2015; White, 2009). Video technology made it possible to visually capture the experiences of the participants in the dialogue as they interacted with me and one another.

I video recorded my practice as I interacted with infants for 1 hour per week in total, for a period of 8 weeks. Video recording of my pedagogical practice engaging with infants occurred between February 2016 and May 2016. Polyphonic video recording was employed in the present study by time synchronising the footage from my visual field with the visual fields of the other two recording devices after each filming session occurred. Time synchronisation of footage was achieved using an editing software programme called Final Cut Pro (Final Cut Pro, n.d.). The 8 hours of polyphonic footage of the three different visual perspectives of the one moment in time was uploaded to Studiocode (Vosaic, n.d) for identification and selection of answerable acts.
The three combined visual fields collectively captured answerable acts as they occurred in dialogue. The advantage of employing a polyphonic video approach for phase 1 of data collection rather than a single view enabled the dialogic event to be captured from multiple visual views enabling “multiple interpretations of the act” (White, 2009, p. 79). Having access to multiple visual views meant that teachers at the staff meeting dialogue were able to evaluate my practice from multiple visual views as evidenced in the following excerpt:

Do you look at George on the slide properly? When I was trying to watch I don’t see your glasses peer to him but do you recognise he’s there? Do you remember? You don’t look at him but you might have been peripherally. [Celine, staff meeting 2]

In total, 72 Answerable acts were identified, of these, 15 were selected prior to critical friend inquiry staff meetings, for viewing and analysis with teachers at the staff meetings. The 15 selected answerable acts are referred to as original data source events. The following is a screenshot of an original data source event (see image 2). It was significant because I was answerable in the way I shared (my) self with teacher and infants in this event. This screenshot image relates to vignette 2, section 5.5.

Image 2 original data source event

Answerable acts (original data source events) totalling up to 12 minutes in duration were viewed by the teachers — my critical friends — at three, monthly staff meetings as explained in the following section.
4.6.6 Phase 2 data collection of external staff meeting dialogue
The staff meeting provided a legitimate place to explore self in the context of teaching. The staff meeting dialogues provided a dialogic space for me to act upon my moral answerability and highlighted the potential for me to see self differently through the teachers’ evaluations of my practice. The approach to self-study used to collect data of my dialogue with teachers at the staff meeting was critical friend inquiry.

4.6.6.1 Critical friend inquiry staff meetings
From Bakhtin’s perspective the other is a vital part of understanding and existing as a self. I draw on the critical friend inquiry approach from self-study (Samaras, 2011), as a means of engaging in dialogic inquiry. Critical friends are viewed as vital in self-study research because they provide divergent views as a way to access alternative perspectives (Samaras, 2011). A person can be seen and approached differently through the other. I video recorded the dialogue between (my) self and the infant teachers at staff meetings on a monthly basis for 3 months, undertaken between February 2016 and May 2016. It was important to video record these meetings because of the emphasis Bakhtin places on both the aural and visual forms of communication. In total 15 original data source events were viewed by the teachers at these three staff meetings. At each monthly staff meeting no more than 12 minutes in duration of footage was viewed by teachers.

Image 3. Critical friend staff meeting
The teachers watched the polyphonic video of each answerable act from my laptop in order to provide access to my interactions with infants from multiple visual perspectives of the one moment in time. Teachers viewed, reflected upon, evaluated and critiqued my practice in dialogue with me. These teachers were my critical friends and their perspectives were integral to this research. Critical friend inquiry was also the approach used for phase 1 of my analysis which occurred simultaneously with data collection of staff meeting dialogue as teachers were analysing my pedagogy in the form of an act of moral answerability. The video of each of the three critical friend inquiry staff meetings were transcribed. Transcript conventions used are presented in Appendix 2. The video recording of these meetings was not polyphonic, only one video recorder was used to capture a single view.

4.6.7 Phase 3 data collection of inner dialogue
The third phase of data collection involved keeping a reflexive journal of my inner dialogue with (my) self.

4.6.7.1 Reflexive journal
I employed a reflexive approach to enhance my understanding of my teacher practice and to recognise (my) self by looking back on my thoughts, feelings, language and actions. Daily entries were made into my journal, of events and experiences in the field, at both data collection sites. It is my assertion that a dialogic approach to self-study highlights the importance of dialogue beyond the dyad regardless of whether or not participants are physically present, for example a participant may be present in a written text or absent from the staff meeting but “sitting on my shoulder” (p. 100) a term I use frequently but one also expressed by Stewart and Mclure (2013, p. 100). As such, reflections written as part of my everyday pedagogical practice during this period are identified as forms of dialogue. Indeed, this self-study is a dialogue with self. My reflexive journal aimed to extend the dialogic space of the ECEC context from an educationally shared space to a more private dialogue.

4.7 Ethics
Ethical approval was sought from the University of Waikato and approved on the 10th September 2015. The acceptance number is EDU079/15 (see Appendix 3).
Prior to commencing my research, I approached the centre co-ordinator informally and she gave her verbal assent to my research taking place in the infant setting. Once approval had been gained from the University of Waikato confirmation panel, I formally approached the centre co-ordinator as the management representative to gain her consent for my research to be undertaken at the centre (see Appendix 4 & 5). The centre co-ordinator approached the Board of Trustees to inform them of my PhD research self-study and to seek their approval for the commencement of my research. Once consent had been received an information letter explaining my doctoral research and accompanying consent form was issued to teachers inviting them to give consent (see Appendix 6, 7 & 8):

i. for me to use any video recorded footage that they may feature in when I am video recording my interactions with infants; and

ii. to be video recorded as they participate in the viewing, reflecting and discussing of events I have selected that are of pedagogical significance to me, related to my practice at 4 separate monthly staff meetings.

There was no turnover of staff during the period of data generation. The participation of teachers depended on consent being received from each teacher. Each teacher in the infant teaching team of six gave their consent to participating in this PhD research study. An information letter explaining my doctoral research and accompanying consent form was also sent to parents or caregivers of infants enrolled at the centre (see Appendix 9 & 10). All infants attending the centre were selected to participate. However, their participation was dependent on consent being received from parents or caregivers of the infants. Selection was based on whether or not parents or caregivers gave consent to their infant participating in this research. One parent did not give consent for her child to participate in the research. Consequently, filming occurred when the infant for whom consent was not given was not present (i.e., at home) or present but asleep. There were no situations where the non-consenting infant was inadvertently evident in the footage; if there had been this footage would have been eliminated from the data set. Although they were not recruited as participants, consent was also obtained from family members of infants who featured in the video recording footage when they were present in the infant setting during the process of video recording my interactions with infants.
In working with infants in an ECEC context I was aware of the ethical issues related to the position of power. However, as I was an employed infant teacher at the ECEC setting where the collection of data took place, I ensured no infants were treated differently regardless of whether or not their parents gave consent to them participating in this research. I was not in a primary caregiver role (key teacher), because I was employed on a part time basis at the infant setting. Therefore, if parents did not consent to their infant participating in this study, the child concerned was not harmed or disadvantaged in anyway by me not being their key teacher because I did not fulfil this role under usual circumstances. As I was wearing a video recording device it was imperative that infant assent be monitored and evident throughout the video data collection process. It was my responsibility as the researcher to ensure ongoing monitoring of the infant/s for evidence of agreement throughout the research process occurred. Therefore, dissent on the part of infants themselves was monitored by me, the centre coordinator and parents or caregivers of infants. This was clearly expressed in the respective consent agreements. If infants expressed discomfort or distress this was acknowledged as an expression of dissent, and video recording ceased immediately for that day. If infant teachers felt compromised in any way I requested they inform me or the centre coordinator and they were informed filming would cease on that day or at the staff meeting. I introduced the cameras I was using into the setting on three separate occasions prior to data collection. This enabled the infants to become familiar with the placement of the video recording devices in the environment and the video recorder glasses which I wore, before commencement of recording.

Due to the visual nature of the data it was not possible to assure confidentiality. This was clearly expressed in participant information letters and consent forms. A pseudonym was used for the early childhood centre’s name. Infant teachers and parents or caregivers of infants were only named with the expressed permission of each participant. Where permission was not given, a pseudonym was assigned by me. Of the 30 infant participants, 10 were assigned pseudonyms at their parent’s or caregiver’s request. Three of the teachers also requested pseudonyms. Participants were informed in participant information letters and consent forms that data would be kept private through storage on a password protected laptop. Both the video footage of my interactions with infants and the video footage of
teacher reflections and discussion at staff meetings were kept secure on a password protected laptop. Participants were informed that while every effort would be made to ensure confidentiality in reporting findings through downloadable publications, conferences and in other oral and visual presentations, this could not be guaranteed. The consent process also sought permission from participants to disseminate the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives in my PhD thesis at conferences, in other oral and visual presentations, and in downloadable publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum. The consent process also sought permission from participants to use the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives for teaching purposes. It was important to obtain consent from participants for dissemination of research and teaching purposes in light of a self-study approach and its emphasis on making results public in order to contribute to a public-knowledge base of teacher education (Vanassche & Kelchtermans, 2015)

4.8 Approach to data analysis

This section presents moral answerability as the unit of analysis, followed by a description of the two-pronged approach to data analysis. Data analysis took place in two phases as detailed in the sections that follow.

i. Phase 1 Analysis of my practice engaging with infants by teachers at the staff meeting

ii. Phase 2 Analysis of the staff meeting dialogue (external dialogue) in tandem with my reflexive journal (inner dialogue)

4.8.1 Answerability as the unit of analysis

For the purposes of this thesis Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability was the unit of analysis. By applying moral answerability as the unit of analysis it was possible to analyse pedagogy as an act of moral answerability. Moral answerability was employed for the purpose of: i.) initially identifying answerable acts from the video footage which I took to staff meetings; and ii.) analysing the critical friend staff meeting dialogues in relation to the three selected answerable acts presented at the critical friend inquiry meetings.
The distinctiveness of using Bakhtin’s concept of moral answerability as opposed to other notions encompassing responsibility (for example see Levinas’ (1969) notion of the call to responsibility with its emphasis on the ‘other’) lies in the fact that moral responsibility for self is not privileged over moral responsibility for other and vice versa; the self is equally as responsible for her or his-self as he or she is for others’ selves.

4.8.2 Phase 1 Data analysis of my practice engaging with infants

My initial approach to data analysis was framed around the 15 original data source events which I considered to be answerable acts sourced from the video recordings of my practice interacting with infants in the infant setting (4.6.5). Data analysis of my practice took place at three staff meetings by teachers as my critical friends in dialogue with me. This is the point where analysis and data collection intersected because the staff meeting was not only a source of data collection but also a site of analysis. Each original data source event was analysed by the teachers at the staff meetings in the form of a critique of my practice. An event is an encounter between human beings that Bakhtin considers ‘co-being’ which is closely linked with the shared experience of two or more subjects (Brandist, 2002b). The following provocations were considered by teachers:

- What do you see?
- How did this event speak to you?
- What, if any, do you see as pedagogical tensions in this event and/or our discussions?
- In what ways do you think I am being or not being answerable to infants in this event?
- As someone who knows these infants well, is there anything in particular you could add to my understanding of this event?

Participants in the critical inquiry meeting were able to co-experience what one another had said because of their insider view as teachers in the same infant setting but then were able to return to their outsider positions in order to offer their unique perspective on my pedagogical practice. As explained in chapter two my outside position enabled me to perceive myself and my actions through the eyes of my critical friends. Bakhtin (1993) highlights the importance of people not losing or downplaying their unique position by taking on the voice or authority of
someone other than themselves. When people do this, they speak from an alibi and reduce the moral content and “oughtness” (morality) of the act itself (Bakhtin, 1993, pp. 40-42). Bakhtin (1981) calls the “links and interrelationships of the multiple social voices that collide at any given time in dialogue” heteroglossia (p. 263). The heteroglossic environment of the staff meeting opened up a dialogic space to provide insight and more in-depth understanding of the complexities of what it meant for me as a teacher to be morally answerable in this context. Each answerable act selected for analysis at the critical friend inquiry meeting was chosen because it had moral meaning for me. The teachers’ analyses of my practice engaging with infants provided the data for me to analyse self in dialogue with my teacher colleagues as explained in the following section — an analysis of an analysis!

4.8.3 Phase 2 Data analysis of internal & external dialogue

The design of this research was at times challenging and often confusing if I am to be honest with (my) self and you the reader. The multiple layers required for data collection and for analysis, which I hope I have been able to articulate in a way that you can make sense of, were unavoidable because of the interconnectedness of all that ‘we’ do in education, particularly early years education where team teaching is a significant feature of ‘our’ work. Trying to capture this interconnectedness was extremely important for me because lived experience has taught me that my pedagogy is shaped as much by the infants that I teach as it is by the teachers with whom I work and not in an isolated way. By this I mean the infants although not physically present at the staff meeting were very much there “sitting on my shoulder” as the answerable acts (original data source event) were being discussed and analysed by the teachers in the staff meeting dialogue.

This section presents phase 2 of analysis which explains how I analysed the form shaping dialogue I had in the staff meetings with my teacher colleagues. By analysing dialogue about dialogue about my pedagogical practice provided a way to understanding moral answerability in order to be more self-aware of my acts, how I account for my pedagogy and what it means ‘to do the right thing’ as an infant teacher. The reflexive journal entries used for analysis were those that represented my internal dialogue. The transcripts and video footage from the staff meeting represented the external voices of the teachers and self in dialogue.
Moral answerability (Bakhtin, 1993) as my unit of analysis invited dialogic processes of meaning-making between (my) pedagogical acts from multiple standpoints across time and space. Employing moral answerability to underpin my analysis provided a way for me to evaluate my axiological position from multiple selves’ viewpoints because as Jacobs (2001, p.34) pointed out:

True answerability is achieved only when I realise the “fact of uniqueness” imposes a responsibility upon me that I cannot avert. When I acknowledge my responsibility and act upon it — whether in a conversation with a friend or in reading a novel — I realise the authentic “I-for-myself” and “I-for-another”. This is true love; this is the incarnated deed.

Moral answerability is acknowledged in the answerable act when I respond to my personal responsibility by acting upon it in dialogue with the infants. I further undersign my deed, which was actualised in the act, when I presented the answerable acts at the staff meetings later in time committing myself more, to an acknowledgement of moral answerability. As explained in chapters one and two an answerable act is one where how I participate takes into account the moral position or attitude I should take in relation to the other based on what it means for me to ‘do the right thing’ as the other would want, it also speaks to my moral position and what it means to also do the right thing by the I-for-myself at this unique moment in time. Because moral answerability is never just about the I-for-myself, it always includes the I-for-you and the you-for-me I developed an analytic frame that spoke to Bakhtin’s ‘I’ as a moral (plural) voice (see 2.2).

Based on the fundamental concrete moments that make up an answerable act: I-for-myself, the other-for-me and I-for-the-other the analytic frame provided a way for me to analyse the: i) inner dialogue, and ii) external dialogue with teachers from multiple viewpoints (see Appendix 11 for an excerpt from my analysis table). Being able to analyse my reflexive journal entries (inner dialogue) and the staff meeting dialogue (external dialogue) was critical for this phase two final analysis phase because of the importance of capturing the multiple different ways the world and those in it can be perceived (I-for-me, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-us, I-for-thou). By considering these different points of view a route was provided to better understand moral answerability through dialogic self-study.
From a Bakhtinian stance the self is made up of multiple voices. The following table presents the different Answerable ‘I’ orientations that were used for analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answerable ‘I’ orientations</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-for-myself</td>
<td>How (my)self looks and feels to my own consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-for-you</td>
<td>How (my)self appears to others outside her; how (my)selves are shaped from the outside by others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You-for-me</td>
<td>How others appear to (my)self; How (my)selves shape others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-for-us</td>
<td>How I appear to others as a group i.e., the teaching team; How (my)selves are shaped by the team as a collective ‘we’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-for-thou</td>
<td>How form is given from external bodies of authority from the outside i.e., Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Answerable “I” orientations

A dialogic self-study enabled me, as a teacher, to not only analyse inner and external dialogue from my inside perspective (I-for-myself) but also to reflect on and evaluate my pedagogy from an outside perspective (I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-us, us-for-me, I-for-thou). As explained in chapter two, dialogue from a Bakhtinian perspective is always moral because we need others to give a value to self (see 2.2). For Bakhtin there is no universal self “I exist and a particular concrete other exists. If I remain in communion with immediate experience and the concrete other, then I can maintain a relation of answerability to other selves, and the world at large, and can accept full responsibility for my actions and words” (Gardiner, 1996, p. 32).

By analysing moral answerability from multiple standpoints, it was possible to “maintain a relation to other selves” and their experience of the world — overcoming the limitations of my excess of seeing. Hicks (2000) emphasises Bakhtin’s focus on acts of emotion and value that accompany dialogue. Because moral answerability underpinned my analysis, I was able to explore how the
meaning (content) of what the teachers said took shape in my experience of them from multiple viewpoints. Sullivan & McCarthy (2005) highlight the importance of paying attention to “our nascent feelings of love, indifference, or dislike for our participants, for instance”, because these feelings influence how a person comes to understand “the meaning of their actions and gives their experience a value that it formally did not have” (p. 626). I assert that the analytic frame I use for analysis addresses what Bakhtin (1990, 1993) achieved in uniting the aesthetic (the shaping of meaning in action) and the moral into a unified event of Being. In other words, analysing the inner reflexive dialogue and the external staff meeting dialogue from multiple standpoints aimed to unite experience and meaning (content) through a fully answerable response without an alibi.

I selected three events for in depth analysis from the overall total of 15 presented at the three staff meetings. I chose these events for analysis because they represented different but interconnected dimensions of moral answerability. The transcripts from the staff meeting dialogue, entries from my reflexive journal and the video recording of the staff meeting dialogue were analysed simultaneously from (my) self’s multiple viewpoints (I-for-me, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-thou, I-for-us, us-for-me). Which meant I reflected upon the staff meeting dialogue and the reflexive journal from I-for-myself (inner), I-for-you, You-for-me, I-for-us, I-for-thou (external) multiple viewpoints that comprise the answerable act.

My analysis revealed that I am made up of multiple selves each with numerous accountabilities to different other selves. In my analysis ‘doing the right thing’ in infant pedagogy meant being paying attention to how each of my multiple selves see the world from their multiple different viewpoints. With a focus on multiple selves, analysis revealed that to be answerable to myself and others without losing myself meant

i. having the courage to expose of my feelings and values in dialogue, with others, when this happened opportunities were opened up for voices to be heard in the dialogue.

ii. actively participating in the dialogue not passively agreeing

iii. celebrating people challenging my practice because it opened up opportunities to voice my perspective, when this takes place in an environment where we are not being subsumed by the voices of others.
My insights and discoveries from my interpretation of the analysis are presented in the subsequent chapter.

4.9 (My) selfhood as a reflexive researcher

Prior to having the dialogic door opened, reflections for me were very much influenced by Schön’s (1983) approach, focusing on the ‘I’ trying to understand the experience from my perspective with an understanding of the interconnectedness of personal experience to the social dimensions and how all learners are active participants in understanding what they are experiencing — Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural influence on me. Once I entered the world of dialogism my eyes were opened to a new way of seeing reflective and reflexive practice. In essence I discovered ‘you’. Suddenly, the significance of the other and what it meant to step outside myself momentarily, to see myself reflected in your eyes, returning with an enriched view altered the way I reflected on and in life. This thesis has further augmented the value I place on a dialogic self-study approach to reflection and reflexivity through the new insights gleaned from connecting with self-study.

Video provided an effective means for me to “step outside” of my own lived experience as a teacher “inside” the dialogue and take up a position as author from outside of (my)self as subject. The Cartesian interpretation of the subject is that it is always open to itself in an act of self-reflection (Nikulin, 2011). Contrary to this standpoint, Bakhtin’s dialogic view considers the self as “not immediately accessible and fully transparent to itself” (p. 61). A dialogic self-study provides a way for one to reflect and be reflected in the eyes of the other. In the context of my thesis this means self-reflection alone is like looking in a mirror it only offers a partial view of (my) self, practice and axiological position. Rowe (2016) explains that people depend “on being able to engage in meaningful dialogue with other voices about their points of view on them as agents in the world” (p. 188). According to Rowe (2016) when practice is studied with others the possibility is generated for “real dialogue amongst multiple points of view, and particularly between phronetic accounts of ourselves (or our selves) as actors in the world and episteme accounts of teaching and learning as universal, generalizable experiences” (p. 189).
The video footage of the answerable acts presented at staff meetings provided a way for me to view the particulars of (my)selves and the situation that I typically would not have had access to because of my limited excess of seeing. The video of the staff meeting dialogue also provided a way for me to again analyse the dialogue (internal and external) by moving between spaces and being prepared to be altered through the experience from each different viewpoint without being subsumed by the other: I-for-myself (inner), I-for-you, You-for-me, I-for-us, I-for-thou (external).

Self-confidence is an attribute that Loughran and Northfield (1998) note is important for positive self-study experiences because “one needs to be comfortable with the sense of vulnerability necessary to genuinely study personal practice and the over-arching need to learn through self-study inevitably creates personal conflicts and a sense of dissonance” (p. 14). This point was also raised by Lisa in Fecho et al’s (2016) work who expressed the importance of vulnerability and feeling uncomfortable for “true learning” (p. 35) to take place (p.35). Although there are many times throughout my life when I would not describe myself as an overly self-confident person, I do feel comfortable in my own skin and embraced the deeply personal nature of the self-study experience in the face of closely held assumptions, ideas and values being challenged.

4.10 Validity

Defining validity as a validation process based in trustworthiness; validation was achieved through the critique of my teacher practice by colleagues. The employment of a critical friend inquiry self-study method as discussed in Samaras (2011) avoids researcher bias as my practice was shared with and critiqued by my teacher colleagues as critical friends. My critical friends therefore contributed to the validation of findings because the analysis extended beyond one’s personal views and therefore addresses any potential bias. This was important for my self-study since my own practice and associated subjectivity was at the centre of theorisation.

4.11 Looking back, looking forward

In this chapter I have presented an argument for a dialogic methodological approach to self-study in order to better understand what it means “to do the right thing” as an infant teacher who is answerable. I have provided an argument for
dialogic methodology in tandem with self-study method underpinned by moral answerability as the unit of analysis. The New Zealand context for this study was introduced alongside the infant and teacher participants. The research design comprised two primary phases of data analysis. The first involved the analysis of answerable acts in relation to my practice, which were analysed by teachers at staff meetings. The second analysis phase involved me analysing the staff meeting dialogue from multiple answerable ‘I’ orientations. The chapter that follows presents my insights, discoveries and discussion as a source of insight concerning (my) moral answerability and what this means for infant pedagogy.
Chapter five: Discoveries, Insights & Discussion

A dialogic study of the self in dialogue with others provided a way for me to better understand (my) self and the pedagogical decisions I make actualised as deeds in concrete acts in relationship with others. My discoveries and insights are presented in three primary sections in the following chapter. This chapter begins with an overview of how Bakhtin’s perspective on dialogue overlaps with and differs from other influential perspectives.

5.1 Bakhtin’s location in dialogue

Bakhtin was not the only thinker to discuss dialogue. According to White and Peters (2011) scholars “from Plato to Gadamer, from Wittgenstein and Marx to Freire and the post moderns such as Foucault and Rorty”, have, in their own ways contributed to the understanding in Western tradition of “philosophy, pedagogy, and culture as dialogue, as somehow essentially dialogical” (p. 2). An in-depth discussion of these significant works is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, I recognise that there are other scholars besides Bakhtin who have addressed dialogue.

Although Bakhtin did “not adopt dialogue as a theory of education” in line with his contemporaries such as Freire; dialogue and dialogism “implicitly defined Bakhtin’s philosophy of culture” (White & Peters, 2011, p. 5). Born a generation apart, there is no evidence that Bakhtin and Freire (1921-1997) engaged with one another’s ideas, however, they share a deep interest in language and ideas about dialogue (Rule, 2009). Like Bakhtin, Freire was neither a relativist nor did he condone dogmatism (Roberts, 2005). In line with the thinking of Buber, both Bakhtin and Freire regarded “dialogue as an authentic way of being rather than simply as a technique or type of communication” (p. 4). A meeting place for Bakhtin, Freire and Buber is in their immense moral concern for the relationship between self and other. However, it was the influence of Dostoevsky, particularly his interpretation of Christ, that many of Bakhtin’s ideas such as the importance of outsidedness and self-other difference were personified. The point of difference for Bakhtin in relation to Buber and Freire was that he brought morality into conversation with dialogue through his concept of answerability. I interpret answerability to be for Bakhtin, the moral element of dialogue.
5.2 Presentation of discoveries & insights

Discoveries and insights are presented in three primary sections. Each section opens with a vignette describing the original data source event (answerable act) that was presented to teachers at the staff meeting to analyse in dialogue with me (see section 4.6.5). Presented here are the insights and discoveries from my ‘analyses’ of the external dialogue (staff meeting dialogue) in tandem with the inner dialogue (reflexive journal entries). External and inner dialogue are presented in a variety of ways: An excerpt (partial or full) from my ‘analysis’ table, dialogue between (my) self and teachers from staff meeting transcript, inner dialogue from reflexive journal entries, or a combination of all of these. The internal and external dialogues were ‘analysed’ using an ‘I’ voice and a ‘you’ voice and have been presented this way in places in this section i.e., excerpts from ‘analyses’. The format I chose to present the dialogue depended on how it spoke to me at the time of writing this chapter. I have been consistent with presenting my discoveries and insights in relation to the I-for-myself, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-us, us-for-me, I-for-thou viewpoints.

Following each primary section is the discussion. The following table lists the three original data source events I chose to analyse in more depth and presented in this section:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Vignette</th>
<th>Explanation of heading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ditch the infant!</td>
<td>When abstracted from reality the act took on a new life, with multiple moral meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-evaluating values</td>
<td>Deeply held values were challenged in order to be morally answerable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shock, horror!</td>
<td>How practice that is not valued is trivialised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. List of original data source events

5.3 A dialogic self-study approach to teacher pedagogy

Undertaking a dialogic self-study approach to teacher pedagogy provided a way for me to better understand what it means for me ‘to do the right thing’ in relation to my pedagogy as an infant teacher. The morally laden nature of my pedagogy infiltrates all that I do. It is therefore imperative that if I am to lead a meaningful existence, as a human being and as a teacher that I endeavour to genuinely understand how I am morally answerable for my responses to others and self in
the shared space of an ECEC setting. The following sections address the research questions:

- What does ‘doing the right thing’ mean for infant pedagogy and for the professional ECEC teacher?

- In what ways am I morally answerable to (my) self and others through my practice?

5.4 Answerable Self with multiple accountabilities in relation to pedagogy

I begin by foregrounding the first of the three selected events. Events are presented in chronological order according to staff meeting (i.e., staff meeting 1,2,3). The following event took place at the first staff meeting. The event provoked dialogue at the first staff meeting around the moral dilemma of sharing (my) self in practice with infants. The event is presented to you here as vignette 1. Endeavours to engage with infants simultaneously in a way that upheld my personal responsibilities and accountabilities to attend to the responses of both infants challenged me pedagogically.

Vignette 1. Ditch an infant!

_I am interacting with Rex and Ashton on a mat outside. I notice another infant Olivia is pushing a swing back and forth at the end of the outside environment. I make eye contact with her and interpret her action with the swing as a request for help. I attempt to stand up. Before I move to help Olivia, I offer a toy to Rex and Ashton as I gently rub Ashton’s back. Ashton cries, I respond “Do you want to come with me?” Ashton stretches out his arms, I pick him up saying “We’ll go and help Olivia get into the swing”, Rex plays with the toy. Holding Ashton, I walk toward Olivia saying “Look, here’s Olivia she wants a lift up into the swing”. As we approach, I say “Olivia, I’ll help you hop in”. I momentarily try to place Ashton on the ground, he cries, “I’m just here”, he pushes back on me and gestures to be held. I pick him up move close to Olivia but cannot physically lift her into the swing and simultaneously hold Ashton. I turn to Olivia who is holding on tightly to the swing and say “I’ll go and get someone to help”._
By exploring my inner dialogue (I-for-myself), in relation to my external dialogue at the staff meeting with the teachers (I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-thou, I-for-us) it was possible to see across all 3 selected events how, as a teacher, I had numerous accountabilities to different selves in relation to others (other selves). As a scholar who embraces dialogism, I was aware of the importance of self-other relations and of the plural self in relationship with others. However, what I was not expecting to discover was the numerous accountabilities to different selves in relation to others that are taking place in every lived moment-by-moment as evidenced in the staff meeting dialogue. The following table (see Table 3) provides an example of an excerpt of my interpretation of the external dialogue in tandem with my internal dialogue. This excerpt is in relation to the original data source event (answerable act) expressed in vignette 1 and provides an example of my multiple different selves’ accountabilities. Although this is an excerpt from event 1, multiple different selves’ accountabilities were a feature of all three events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff meeting Dialogue</th>
<th>I-for-myself</th>
<th>I-for-you</th>
<th>You-for-me</th>
<th>I-for-us</th>
<th>I-for-thou</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| "In that moment ... I couldn't physically put Olivia in the swing."
| Mult. (It felt like you were going to hand’s clapped over mouth and nose (like you shouting)). Poor Ashton ..."
| It (smile), (head nod in agreement)"
| Mr. ... (just to help someone else, it's a tricky situation that happens all the time. You’re always in conflict about it)."
| It does, it does"
| I see that I need to share myself in my practice."
| I felt alarmed that I was potentially being defined as someone who would ‘ditch’ an infant. This goes against every fibre of my moral being."
| When you said this is a tricky situation that does happen all the time. I felt that my moral struggle with being answerable."
| I was nodding my head in agreement with you when you were saying that it felt like I was going to “ditch” poor Ashton. Yet my inner thoughts were screaming that this was not my intention. I felt compelled to put this right by explaining to you all that I was going to seek help in order to ensure both infants had the attention they were seeking."
| By nodding, my head I felt that this gesture I was informing you that I agreed with you. My actions could have been perceived by you as my team leader that what you were saying as the authoritative figure was right."
| By stating, “You’re always in conflict about it” – I felt you were speaking for the team when you say “you’re” – suggesting this is a moral dilemma shared by all of us."
| Article 3 UNCRSC
Best interests of the child.

| I, for others |
|----------------------------------|------------------|
| Affirmation for the group that this dilemma “does” happen “all the time” |
| Article 12 UNCRSC
Respect for views of the child. |
| Code of professional responsibility & standards (NZ) |
| Findings from research projects that I have been part of how impacted on my practice and given me insight into the importance of responding to infants. |
| Family values of giving of self for others |

Table 3 Excerpt from analysis of external and internal dialogue.

Illustrated in table 3 is how in this excerpt of the external and internal dialogue I was accountable to: myself (I-for-myself), the infants (I-for-you), their family (I-for-you), Mel my team leader (I-for-you), Celine another teacher (I-for-me) to documents that as a teacher I am bound to abide by (I-for-thou), knowledge that I have gained from working in a research team (I-for-thou), and family values.
passed down to me from ancestors that I hold dear (I-for-thou). In studying self, I found that I have a plural self with moral answerabilities to multiple relationships with others as evidenced in the excerpt from the staff meeting dialogue (see Table 3). The plural self is, therefore, answerable. As such, (my) plural self is comprised of different voices that have the potential to be altered by others and vice a versa, depending on relationships that are shared, the particulars of the situation and who I was responding to at that time in the context of the staff meeting. What was also apparent was each of (my) answerable selves had unique moral accountabilities that were specific to a particular relationship such as denying my subjectivity as a way to be answerable to Mel my team leader. The multiple ways that I was morally accountable are expanded upon in the following section. This discovery was evident in each event studied. This insight aligns with the work of Petrilli (2013) who draws upon Welby to view the self as comprised of multiple selves that are unique but interconnected. Petrilli (2013) locates the self in a place of in-between-ness. My insights reveal the self is understood in terms of unfinalised plurality with numerous fragmented but interconnected answerable selves. Instead of multiple selves, my discoveries have illuminated an answerable self. When viewed in this way the traditional view of a universal professional identity is challenged. I suggest a re-conceptualised view of professional identity be considered in the form of a plural concept. This discovery suggests that instead of a universal focus on what ‘we’ do as a teaching profession, opportunities would be opened up to better understand the uniqueness of professional identities in the process of becoming depending on their relationships with other selves and what that means for pedagogy. According to Kopisto (2014, p. 146) confusion surrounding roles and responsibilities exists in many respects because of the ‘multiprofessional’ environment with teachers from a diverse range of educational backgrounds (kopisto et al., 2014, p. 146). I suggest that confusion may exist not solely because of the different backgrounds of teachers but potentially because of the ways different answerable selves interact in relationship with other selves.

5.4.1 Responses of obedience, denial, doubt & manipulation

In establishing that I am an answerable self with multiple accountabilities to others, I noticed that my pedagogy altered depending on who my answerable self was in relationship with. What this shows is how my axiological position, had the potential to be altered each time (my) answerable self was in a lived experience in
relationship with other selves. In studying (my) answerable self, I found that how I accounted for the moral answerability that existed in the relations between the infants and (my) answerable self (see vignette 1) later through the staff meeting dialogue, had the potential to be viewed differently in my accounting of it, perhaps even altered depending upon which answerable self-in-relationship-with-other I was responding to. This was demonstrated in the way I denied my subjectivity (I-for-myself) when obediently (I-for-you) responding to Mel in her position of authority as my team leader (see Table 3).

Evidence of denying my subjectivity was demonstrated in the way I was alarmed (I-for-myself) at how I was potentially being defined as someone who could ditch an infant (I-for-you) because this goes against “every fibre of my moral being” (I-for-myself). Yet, as demonstrated in table 3, my initial response by nodding my head in the form of a gesture of acknowledgment (you-for-me) hid the personal responsibility I felt toward acting in a way that upheld the best interests of the infants (I-for-you) and their right to have their perspectives taken into account by me as stated in the UNROC (I-for-thou). My act of masking how I really felt in that moment meant I suppressed the value of standing up for what I believed in, which is ensuring infants know they matter — I supressed what was morally important to me and my pedagogical practice as a teacher. My use of a gesture to respond in a way that outwardly confirmed Mel’s initial view that I was potentially going to ‘ditch’ the infant, illuminates how feelings and emotions can be masked to agree with others and comply. This was a fleeting moment that took place in the dialogue but the choice I made to mask my ‘true’ feelings to be ‘obedient’ caused me inner emotional turmoil that did not reflect in reality what I was actually experiencing inside. I began to see that this particular answerable self when in relationship with Mel as the authoritative figure offered some form of obedience, in this example the nod of a head in agreement. What I noticed was that by obediently choosing to take on the words of the other as received truth, there was potential for this to lead to the ‘shutting down’ of dialogue around this dilemma, and values such as advocating for what I believed to be ‘doing the right thing’, that underpinned answerability in this situation, going unnoticed.

At other times, the act of denying my subjectivity (I-for-myself) was evident in the dialogue when my perspective did not align with the perspective of the group.
Again, I externally agreed with the group by gesturing “no”, as evidenced in table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Dialogue Staff Meeting</th>
<th>Inner Dialogue: I-for-myself</th>
<th>I-for-you</th>
<th>You-for-me</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sue: But Olivia would never say anything (gestures no with head).</td>
<td>I place importance on tuning into the language of the infants and responding in ways that show I have listened to their voices.</td>
<td>However, you made me feel frustrated that you still didn’t seem to understand that my reason for not doing what was suggested by you now (at the staff meeting), at the time, was because Ashton was telling me through his embodied language that he did not want to be placed on the ground.</td>
<td>By gesturing ‘No’ I confirm that I agree with what you are saying in relation to Olivia not saying anything.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgette: (gestures no with head)</td>
<td>By not advocating for this position I felt I was not true to myself. Do I remain silent because I felt misunderstood, or is because I felt frustrated with myself.</td>
<td>I felt you did not value my practice because I perceived you could not see the value in what I was</td>
<td>By agreeing with you I valued your understanding of Olivia over mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celine: No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue: She would just stand there and wait, that’s her personality.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue: Because when you’re like that it’s not like you’re ditching Ashton. You would put him down here beside you (gestures with hands to the ground), lift Olivia in and then pick</td>
<td>I was annoyed at myself for not advocating for the importance of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ashton back up. It’s not like you’re walking away from him. Celine: you’re just trying to solve both problems really quick.

B: Even with the pushing, you would have still put him down, maybe in that moment I could have?

I started to doubt my practice, not the values I uphold, but I started to wonder if there had been an alternative way to have responded to the infants that I had not considered.

I felt that you doubted my practice and that made me doubt me.

By acknowledging your suggestion of an alternative way to respond, I am letting you know that I am open to your pedagogical approaches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Responses of denial, obedience and masking truth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Having established the answerable self as a plural concept it was also possible for me to recognise the different types of accountabilities ‘my’ different selves were responding to. Typically, (my) answerable self were responding obediently when responding to teachers, who in the staff meeting, I believed were in a position of authority because they knew the infant “better than me” (I-for-myself). For example, Sue, Celine and Eliza had spent more time with Olivia than I had as a part-time teacher, in their roles as full time key and buddy teachers. I was</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By acknowledging your suggestion of an alternative way to respond, I am letting you know that I am open to your pedagogical approaches.
surprised to find some of (my) answerable selves acting in this way, I did not realise that in dialogue with others I was responding with embodied language that denied what other selves were thinking. At these times I identified as being accountable in ways that as a teacher I doubt (my) self, am obedient, likes to fit, doesn’t want to hurt the feelings of others and continually tries to please.

What these insights revealed for me was that ‘doing the right’ thing in infant pedagogy meant paying attention to those responses of denial wrapped up in obedience — often masked — that rested within and ‘in between’ answerable selves in dialogue. What I found was they were sprinkled throughout the dialogue and could have remained unnoticed had I not been for (my) dialogic self-study and had I not video recorded the staff meeting dialogue. These moments of denial were important to notice because they pin pointed places in the dialogue where there was potential for meaning to be altered in a way that generated a different truth from how truth was perceived by me in the living event with the infants. Had I not doubted my practice and my moral judgement that the infant was speaking to me through her embodied language (see table 4 & vignette 1) I could have offered the teachers an alternative view with which to evaluate their practice — potentially creating a different truth for them from the one they understood i.e., that Olivia would never say anything. I could have opened up a potential opportunity for them to learn the importance of silent forms of infant language.

I now realise that I am not being answerable to (my) selves or others when I shut down dialogue in this way by passively agreeing rather than actively participating. For me this very personal self-discovery resonated with Lisa’s story presented in Fecho et al’s (2016) study. Although Lisa did not passively agree when she perceived her practice was being challenged, she ‘shut down’ herself and ceased the dialogue. What Lisa found was that ‘doing the right thing’ in her situation would have been to “keep talking, even if the conversation was an uncomfortable one” (p. 33). When one voice reigns supreme over another opportunities are lost for a richer, deeper, more creative and meaningful dialogue (White, 2016a). What is demonstrated in my study is that by being aware of (my) answerable selves in relationship with pedagogy I am able to identify which of my selves in relationship with other multiple selves is likely to respond to the voice of authority in this way. In doing so, becoming more self-aware of how others’
multiple selves are shaping my pedagogy and how my actions are shutting down the dialogue in and through dialogue.

On more than one occasion I denied my subjectivities (I-for-you), evidenced in the way I confirmed the moral position of another (you-for-me) through my gestures of affirmation such as when I nodded my head in agreement or disagreement (see Tables 3 & 4). This finding is in alignment with Nuttall’s (2006) study which highlighted the potential for teachers to subscribe to the subjectivities of others and in doing so denying their own subjectivities. My study extends on Nuttall’s work suggesting that as the teacher (my) answerable selves not only had the capacity to deny my own subjectivity (I-for-myself, I-for-you) in the staff meeting dialogue but also they also had the capacity to deny the subjectivities of multiple others through the new meaning I assigned to their words in dialogue with them (you-for-me). This was evidenced in the way I altered the meaning of Eliza and Sue’s words to fit with my own when I said:

Bridgette: So I felt in that moment exactly what you just said then [both of you] that [I felt] I had to respond to her as well …[(gesture with one hand to Eliza and with the other hand to Sue)] … but how do you do that when there is more than one infant. You know it is an interaction beyond one to one.

Group: pause [Teacher transcript staff meeting 1]

Manipulation of the teachers’ words in my endeavour to be answerable by advocating for the infants, by bringing about a consensus, shut down the dialogue, silencing the teachers’ voices. This surface agreement instigated by me through the authoring of the teachers’ words (you-for-me) did not solve the problem or the moral dilemma I was experiencing in trying to get them to understand my pedagogical approach in the answerable act with the infants. I would never have defined myself as manipulative (I-for-me) but in this situation this is what I interpreted was happening because I was trying to persuade other teachers to hold the same moral position as me (you-for-me). Manipulation was born out of the dialogue because of the strong pull on my part for us to be all on the ‘same page’ (I-for-us) and ‘doing the right thing’ in this moment meant using what was at my disposal to combat their resistance.
The shutting down of dialogue when the authorial voice had spoken, often bringing about a consensus, suggests that situations where dissensus or alterity prevailed had the potential to provoke dialogue. Moments of alterity may not necessarily have solved the issue at hand but opened up a dialogic space that offered ways to better understand the different moral approaches that underpinned (my) answerable selves’ values and attitudes which informed practice. This was evidenced on several occasions when the teachers opened up an opportunity for me to be answerable in the dialogue through potentially misunderstanding or bringing my answerable act (to be answerable to both infants) into question. This was visible when one teacher misinterpreted what I said; opening up the floor for me to ‘put right’ what I meant pedagogically. Similarly, when another teacher queried my practice (See Table 5):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Dialogue</th>
<th>Inner Dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S: …or do you think you would have done it any different if you thought you weren’t being videoed?</td>
<td>I emphatically said “No”. I perceived you were challenging my pedagogical practice by suggesting that I would have potentially engaged with the infants in another way had I not been video recorded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: <strong>No</strong>, in my practice I try to respond to the voices of each child [Teacher transcript]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Challenging me pedagogically

The opportunity to be answerable in the dialogue by advocating for and defending a moral stance personal to me made visible in the dialogue the self’s internally held moral values concerning sharing oneself and being there for everyone, that initially had been masked. If my practice had not been challenged by the teacher this opportunity to voice my moral position would not have occurred — her challenge opened up dialogue. This discovery reveals how valued moral perspectives such as ensuring infants know they are being listened to and heard can be brought into question when what others’ value is brought to bear on one’s practice.

This section has highlighted the potential for teachers’ perspectives to alter my view on how I could have responded to both infants in a way that I felt would be valued by the infants, evidenced in my response when I said “maybe in that moment I could have?” In light of the potential for others’ perspectives to inform
my practice, I suggest it is important for ‘opening up dialogue’ in ways that challenge, provoke, and query as a form of moral answerability. If the opening up of dialogue was promoted in this way opportunities to better understand teachers’ moral approaches to values that could potentially inform the practices of multiple selves in an early years setting would be made available. Also illuminated is how a dialogic space that opens up dialogue provides a way for what is potentially valued from the infants’ perspectives to be considered — emphasising how answerable acts in different dialogic spaces can influence practice later in time.

5.4.2 Moral and ethical messiness

I have struggled with where to place this section because it links to all the aforementioned tables. In my efforts not to confuse you, the reader, I have placed it here — I hope that it fits. Demonstrated in this dialogic self-study is how the received truth from the authoritative words of the codes, standards and articles although acknowledged and recognised amongst each member of the teaching team (I-for-thou) were received and applied by me in my practice differently (see Table 3). In accounting for my answerable act in the staff meeting dialogue, about simultaneously sharing self with both infants (I-for-you), it was possible to see how as a teaching team the same code of ethics, standards and articles can be shared (I-for-us) but teachers make different pedagogical decisions (I-for-me, I-for-you) depending upon each person’s interpretations on how to apply them in practice, according to how each teacher evaluated the particulars of the situation. Consequently, codes, standards, policies, regulations and articles can generate multiple different meanings when considered in tandem with the particulars of a situation by different people. A conflict of moral positions existed even though there was a shared agreement between teachers that I had highlighted a moral dilemma that was experienced often and by all (I-for-us) (see Table 3). This is evident in the way I see I need to share myself in my practice (I-for-me) but this moral attitude was not shared by my fellow teachers who, although they recognised the dilemma, offered alternative ways for me to be answerable to both infants (I-for-us) (see Table 4). When analysed through a moral answerability lens different perspective are illuminated in relation to practices surrounding situations where there is moral challenge regardless of whether there is agreement or disagreement (Table 6).
This discovery highlights the importance of being self-aware of my axiological position because of its influence in shaping pedagogical practice and being shaped in dialogue with others. How I interpreted professional responsibilities, that were shared, and actualised in practice was influenced by the values that I drew upon in that moment of living. For example in the original data source event (vignette 1) the value I placed on ensuring all voices in the dialogue were heard, listened and responded to made visible my allegiance to codes, standards and articles that apply to all (I-for-thou) in tandem with the moral answerability I felt toward responding to both infants (I-for-you). However, later in time, in the staff meeting dialogue the teachers offered their alternative views on how they saw I could have engaged with the infants in the situation (see Table 4). In doing so, they offered me an alternative way to be answerable that had implications for me morally because their suggestions were at odds with the dialogic philosophy that informed my practice.

At the time of the staff meeting dialogue, I felt frustrated that the teachers had not interpreted the reasoning behind my actions as I had intended them. However, through the process of voicing her alternative perspective Sue opened up an opportunity for me to re-evaluate my axiological position in the staff meeting dialogue by stating that “it’s not like you’re ditching Ashton” (see Table 4). This was important for me personally and professionally because I did not want to be seen as someone who had the capacity to neglect or ‘ditch’ an infant, particularly when this was in total contrast to my actualised deed in reality.

As my interpretations of the internal and external dialogue have shown different values can be assigned to the same event depending on the perspective from which it is being viewed. The emotional and moral struggle that I was trying to cope with internally and externally was illuminated for me in interpreting this lived moment. Feelings of not being valued, doubt, frustration, annoyance, advocating for my values and then feeling valued, all tied together (Tables 3 & 4). Codes of ethics could not sort out how I was to act in these moral moments of living that had challenged my practice. It was as if my commitment to learners and teacher colleagues, as set out in the code of ethics (Education Council, 2017) were in conflict with one another and then at other times in synch — my moral compass was spinning!
I agree with Taggart (2011) when she articulated that the moral dimensions of our practice need to be a “central plank of professionalism” (p. 85). If the teaching profession seeks teachers who are critical thinkers, as stated in the code of ethics (Education Council, 2017) that I abide by, then consideration needs to be given to the moral messiness of teaching that cannot be defined by universal lists of values. At the turn of the century Sumsion (2000) recognised the significance of principles embedded in codes of professional conduct but emphasised their limited role in guiding and supporting teachers with ethical and moral dilemmas that arise in everyday pedagogical situations. I contend that nearly 20 years later the seriousness of this issue still prevails. Shapira-Lishchinsky (2011) summon teachers to an amplified self-awareness and understanding because of ethical challenges that they may encounter pedagogically. I agree wholeheartedly but emphasise the imperative of also turning up the volume on an amplified self-awareness in relation to moral challenges in tandem with the moral implications of ethical challenges.

5.5 Re-evaluating values

I chose the following event to take to the second staff meeting because it highlighted an answerable act that was interconnected with multiple members of the teaching group. I had been holding a young infant for 20 minutes, while engaging with three other infants, I was aware that I was not his key teacher. Earlier that day I had offered to help Sandy, another teacher, who was settling an older child, I asked if she wanted me to hold the older infant as she was on nappy duty and could then attend to the younger infant Bryn, what I was not expecting was for the older infant to be holding a cracker which caused an ethical and moral dilemma for me:

Vignette 2. Re-evaluating values

I am sitting outside on a platform attached to the slide outdoor equipment, holding Bryn. One of the teachers, Sandy, asks me to hold and bottle feed Lucia. Sandy passes me a cracker that Lucia is holding; this is a ritual for Lucia who arrives at the centre with crackers from home. An informal policy within the infant setting and amongst teachers is that children are to eat food at the table.
However, without anybody saying a word an allowance is made for Lucia in this situation.

Although this event is separate to event 1, it is connected in that it meant ‘sharing myself’ but this time in order to help another teacher who was settling an older infant. In the staff meeting dialogue Sandy acknowledged that this was an answerable act for her too:

Sandy: …Like the fact I’ve had to hand you Lucia while she’s having a bottle just to cope. Bryn, was overdue to bed to go to sleep so. I felt quite bad doing that.

Bridgette: So, to you, that would have been an answerable moment for you?

Sanvi: Having to pass her while she’s having a bottle.

Sandy: Yeah, just because it was crazy.

Although my practice was being critiqued by the teachers, I noticed that the dialogue also opened up opportunities for the teachers to reflect on their I-for-myself practice and sense of morality, evidenced in the way Sandy said she felt “quite bad for doing that”. This highlighted how a dialogic self-study is never just about the individual ‘I’ — although I was studying (my) self, other teachers queried their practices. Sandy’s words also demonstrated how she was faced with a moral choice in relation to which infant to share herself with — highlighting the interconnectedness of answerable acts. Another member of the team queried if the answerable act that I was referring to in that moment was: “having to pass her while she’s having a bottle”. This insight illustrates for me how what I considered to be answerable was different to what another teacher considered to be answerable — different but connected. For me the moral dilemma was not so much about the bottle feeding as it was about interrupting an interaction with one infant to engage with another and what that potentially was saying to Bryn when he was ‘placed on the ground’ (I will come back to this point later) so that I could hold Lucia — the value I placed on not interrupting another’s interaction challenged again. However, Sanvi’s reference to “passing her while she is having a bottle” brought to the surface for me how different philosophical perspectives can impact on how pedagogy is viewed as an act of moral answerability. As a team ‘we’ had shared our individual philosophies at staff meetings outside of this
research, because of that I was aware that Pikler’s (1970) philosophy was an influence for this teacher and therefore I understood her focus on the intimate nature of care moments such as bottle feeding.

What stood out for me was how in the staff meeting dialogue my acknowledgement of an answerable act and my deed within it created opportunities for other teachers to affirm their deeds. In doing so opening up a dialogic space for a richer understanding of the meaning of one another’s acts as different philosophical perspectives that informed pedagogies were illuminated.

Visible in this event was how Sandy, later in time at the staff meeting, was able to make a connection to an answerable act that she took ownership of, which was the catalyst for (my) selves’ answerable act (original data source event). This intertwining of different people’s answerable acts illuminates how people are implicated in the answerable acts of others. I related to Sandy’s confession regarding her feelings because earlier that day I had myself felt ‘bad’ and a sense of guilt (I-for-myself) for interrupting Sandy’s engagement with Lucia in an endeavour to offer help with the intention of being answerable to both Sandy and the infant (I-for-you). This provoked me to ask:

Bridgette: … Sandy, what is your perspective on when I actually interrupt your interaction in the beginning with Lucia because I was aware that you were on nursery [sleep room], Bryn was tired, I had been holding him he didn’t want to go down.

Sandy: That was fine because I didn’t really know Lucia that well either because Eliza had spent a lot of time with her so I was happy for any input yeah into what I could do to either calm her…[Teacher transcript, staff meeting 2]

Initially, feeling bad (I-for-me) was a result of being aware of the importance of not interrupting an infant’s engagement with someone else, which linked back to my initial teacher education (I-for-thou). Both Sandy and I revealed feeling ‘bad’ (I-for-us) about our individual actions but when brought to the surface in the dialogue I perceived ‘we’ could see how one another’s actions in that situation were welcomed by the other (you-for-me). Although interrupting a teacher’s engagement with an infant is a practice I do not value (I-for-myself), it was a practice I drew upon to rescue a colleague (you-for-me) from the ‘craziness’ of
the moment a term used on more than one occasion in the staff meeting dialogue. It meant Bryn would get a well overdue sleep even though it meant Lucia who was settling into her day would be with me. I did feel comfortable with this (I-for-myself) because I had spent time with Lucia previously and felt we had built a relationship (you-for-me). What the staff meeting dialogue revealed for me was the importance of being able to expose inner emotions and feelings externally in dialogue with others because of the new meaning that was able to spring forth.

What I discovered was that values take on new meaning depending on the particulars of unique moments of living — what is not valued in one situation is valued in another depending on the particulars of the situation, and the relationships with the people involved. This dialogic self-study was showing me more and more that it is not so much about understanding self or understanding infants or teachers but understanding (my) selves in relationship with infants and/or teachers and my pedagogy within that, and how that shapes my relationships with children and colleagues. This discovery expands on the work of Brennen (2014), and Elfer and Page (2015) who illuminated the importance of shifting focus from the infant to the infant in interaction with teacher. I suggest that an answerable pedagogy is one that pays attention to the teacher in relationship with infant.

This particular self was prepared to comprise deeply held values, concerned with not interrupting someone else’s interaction with a child in order to be answerable for my response to a colleague. Sandy and I created a ‘new’ morality in the dialogue at that unique moment in time. This insight speaks to Bakhtin’s (1990; 1993) notion of moral answerability where moments of living are continuously altered in the event of-Being as people shape one another in response to the moral realities that they create in dialogue together. ‘Doing the right thing’ for infants pedagogically is extremely complex because of the entanglement of routines, policies, emotions, values, professional integrity and personalities that make up every day lived experiences. I have come to realise that there is no universal personal moral code. What my study is foregrounding, I believe, is the continuously never-ending interplay of the shaping and re-shaping of personal moral codes bouncing off one another in dialogue.

The opportunities offered in the staff meeting dialogue to answerably account for the decisions I made to respond in particular ways to both teachers and infants
(you-for-me) illuminated how I-for-myself can misinterpret how others receive the meaning behind their actions i.e., I initially perceived Sandy was annoyed that I interrupted her interaction with the infant. The form shaping potential of dialogism is evident in the new meanings that were generated when perspectives were shared and exposed through the staff meeting dialogue and which contributed to my practice. Instead of feeling ‘bad’ a new way to morally see was made visible — altering each other’s personal moral code in the process. What was initially interpreted as ‘bad’ could in this context be viewed as ‘good’. This highlighted for me how there is no fixed universal truth (istina) in relation to being morally good or bad, wrong or right. It re-enforced the importance of ensuring the voices of individual personalities within a group are heard and the particulars of lived experiences considered in order for truth (pravda) to be visible.

The influence of teachers’ personal moral codes on me and vice versa was further evidenced in the staff meeting dialogue when discussion oriented to Lucia holding a cracker which she brought from home when Sandy passed her to me to hold and bottle feed. Although, I am aware that the infant setting has an informal policy amongst teachers (I-for-us) that infants are to eat food at the table, the decision I made to not remove the cracker in this context was influenced by Sandy’s decision to not take the cracker from Lucia (I-for-you) when she passed her to me. This highlights how others’ values can be imposed on self’s pedagogical decisions (I-for-you). However, in this event Sandy’s act (I-for-you) also resonated with my internally held truth that it is important for infants to feel emotionally safe, build trust and a sense of belonging (I-for-myself, you-for-me). As such, I also felt that Sandy had offered me a route to be morally answerable in a way that spoke to my internally held truths. However, the implication of this decision for my practice meant potentially sending mixed messages to the other infants (you-for-me) as one teacher in the staff meeting dialogue highlighted:

Celine: I love how you’re trying to keep them all busy at the same time whilst also trying to feed Lucia. Like Abby trying to come through them, like all trying to get the cracker.
Bridgette: Yeah, yeah.

Although it was not explicitly stated, I felt Celine’s comment drew attention to how my decision to be answerable to Lucia could have been perceived as not
'doing the right thing’ by the other infants (I-for-you) or the informal policy amongst the teachers as a group concerning food (I-for-us). Celine’s comment also opened up a space for the perspectives of others to be brought into dialogue:

Sue: That’s probably something we need to watch with that too is her coming in with crackers and being out in the playground.
Mel: She did that a few times, coming in with a cracker, maybe twice in a row.
Sue: She should probably sit down with them.
Bridgette: And what do you think the other children were thinking, that’s what I was thinking in that moment too.
Mel: Yeah.
Sue: Yeah, they all want a cracker.
Sandy: It was one of her first days, that’s probably why.
Bridgette: So, yeah in some ways we are being answerable to the parent because that’s what they want but how do you think the other children may have felt knowing that policy is you eat food at the table.
Sandy: Yeah.
Sue: We always keep telling them to sit down and Lily knows enough to know that you’re supposed to sit down while you’re eating them. That’s something we will probably have to follow through with her and make sure that. Ashton’s mother does the same when she comes in but she always sits him down at the table with a biscuit.
Mel: I think it was only the first two days that she did that Lucia.
Sue: She has them in the car.
Sue: I must be fair, what date was that?
Sandy: I remember it was one of her first days.

This situation highlights the tension between ethics and morals that I raised in chapter 3 — it also illuminates how Kantian transcendental aprioris cannot address ethical and moral problems and dilemmas that unfold within every day lived experiences (see 2.1.4). The staff meeting dialogue makes visible the different perspectives: either ethically following through on a universal informal policy or
rule (I-for-us) that is typically followed by all teachers in the infant setting what we all do or making a pedagogical decision, like I did, that took into account the moral ramifications if I had taken away the cracker from Lucia. My inner dialogue reflected the turmoil I felt in this moment:

“I feel torn between my accountabilities to this infant, her family, the other infants, their families, the teachers who potentially saw my actions as ‘breaking the rules’. I want to please everybody but am starting to see that this cannot always be. Can I be ‘doing the right thing’ and not ‘doing the right thing’ at the same time???
[reflexive journal]

The staff meeting dialogue had me questioning if ‘doing the right thing’ by Lucia and by (my) selves, had pedagogical consequences for the other infants. I noticed that I started to use the I-for-us voice in dialogue with the teachers “in some ways we are being answerable to the parent”. In in my endeavour to bring about a consensus I ended up more or less justifying my practice because it was important for me to let the team know that I had thought about the other infants and although I had potentially broken an unwritten ‘rule’; Lucia was not actually eating the cracker she was being bottled fed and positioned on my lap not walking around. I even find (my) self now defending my practice and wonder if this is what often happens, limiting what teachers can learn from one another pedagogically because of the fear of being exposed. Bakhtin (1990, 1993) explains that when we justify our deeds by recourse to an abstract ideology or in this case a rule we are provided with an alibi for evading personal responsibility — I therefore acknowledge moral answerability for this act as I sit here and write. But wonder if it is at all possible for multiple selves to be simultaneously answerable to the numerous number of different demands to be accountable pedagogically in a given moment — particularly when ethical and moral dilemmas can arise from rules that are often in play in an ECEC context but not mandated. I now see that accountability is not about pleasing everybody all the time.

I have to confess many of (my) answerable selves and (my) personal and professional identities are trying to find ‘peace and that harmony’ but I also see how that in itself can be a problem because of the culture of obedience it can conjure up. The struggle to find the ‘right’ balance between being an answerable
self who is morally ‘doing right’ by others and (my) selves without losing (my) selves in the process is not for the faint hearted.

I end this section with final words from (my) answerable self’s critical teacher friends, intoned with genuine light-hearted laughter they said to me:

Sue: do you realise you say “right” quite a lot? It’s quite funny you’ve sorted something out and you go right.

Bridgette: I gesture by moving my hands from up to down

Sue: It’s like let’s re group

Eliza: That’s because you want harmony and happy days (does same up-down motion with her hands as me) when you say right

Celine: It’s like your mantra to live by.

[Teacher transcript, staff meeting 3]

I had not noticed that I do this, these teachers on more than one occasion made visible my personality in the dialogue. What this insight suggests is that a dialogic self-study with the aim of critiquing my practice was also about me.

5.5.1 Looking back

Earlier I highlighted a point that I said I would return to in relation to placing Bryn on the ground. This is evidence of how my pedagogical practice was altered by the dialogue from the first staff meeting. An alternative way to engage with infants when faced with the moral dilemma of sharing (my)self in practice was highlighted in the first staff meeting: “you would put him down here beside you (gestures with hands to the ground)” [teacher transcript, staff meeting 1] (see 5.4.1). Although this was a different situation with its own particulars, it connects to the previous answerable act in that I was faced with the same dilemma with having to share (my) selves with others but this time I altered my practice by placing the infant on the ground and communicating to him my intention to do so. It was as if the teachers were sitting on my shoulder in this moment (I-for-you).

What I am highlighting here is the form shaping potential of others’ practices on the self. Also, how in one situation I felt morally compromised but in this situation I did not. Another teacher was physically present, so I knew there was someone on hand who was going to pick up the infant immediately. But I felt that by exposing feelings and values in dialogue at the first staff meeting (although frustrating), somehow aided me in making this pedagogical decision later in time.
This shows me that answerable acts are not isolated events in time but are interconnected across time and space.

5.6 Shock, horror!

This event took place at the third staff meeting. I played the original data source event to the teachers and although it was not long in duration it provoked much discussion about my practice. I chose this original data source event (vignette 3) because I value infants having opportunities to communicate with one another. Moral answerability was evident in the decision I made to not ‘shut down’ the ‘cup banging’ that was initiated by three infants sitting at a table.

Vignette 3. Shock, horror!

I was sitting at the same table as three infants, they start to bang their cups, I say smiling “water is going everywhere” as their cups slide across the table in a sideways motion. Celine, who is writing on the daily communication sheet, notices what is happening, she walks toward us leans down and takes a cup from one of the infants then pauses and gives it back. Celine leaves, then returns with a cloth without saying a verbal word she wipes the water that has been spilt on the table.

This event stood out for me because it highlighted the morally laden nature of infant pedagogy. In this particular situation I was drawing from both the lived experiences of the infants in that moment (truth Pravda) in tandem with an authoritative source (truth istina) in the form of an article (I-for-thou) that my chief supervisor had written on carnivalesque (see White, 2017) which highlighted the important benefits of children engaging in this way i.e., cup banging. In the dialogic space of the staff meeting answerability was altered because of the different moral attitudes and authoritative sources teachers were drawing from. After I played this particular piece of footage at the staff meeting, I invited the teachers to critique my practice. Celine was the first person to speak:

Celine: What did I come across to do?
SV: You took a cup away or something.
Celine: Emm because I am writing something at the bench. Aww am I coming to steal someone’s cup.
SV: Yeah.
Celine: Shock, horror. [Teacher transcript, staff meeting 3]

My inner dialogue reflects how Celine’s words of “shock, horror” altered the way I looked at the original data source event:

I felt your words trivialised my practice. I realised you said these words in jest, but they diminished the value I placed on infants having the opportunity to engage with one another in this way.

[I-for-myself]

Celine’s words made me feel trivialised [I-for-me] as if my pedagogical practice could be dismissed, as if it didn’t matter. The tone that Celine used was bordering on a ‘big deal’ tone with a touch of sarcasm (I-for-you). The irony of this event for me was that I perceived Celine was poking fun by using a bit of carnivalesque (I-for-you), which I also perceived the infants were doing (I-for-you). I did not consider (my)self to be a voice of authority (I-for-you) in the infant unit as I held a part-time position, so I waited before responding in the staff meeting dialogue because “I did not want to sound like the voice of authority, that’s me in life” (I-for-myself). In this moment I wondered if I was being dethroned. Re-enforced by Celine’s words when she said:

Celine: Without telling them, I’m just non-verbally telling them to stop banging their cups. By placing them in front of them again?

Bridgette: So, you’re non-verbally telling them Celine. By you non-verbally telling them were you silently telling me something?

Celine: Probably, probably. In my head I was probably thinking, well I think that all the time in there [sleep room] when a child is banging something on the wall, you’re like, why is someone not fixing the problem that’s going on and on and on and on. I don’t know cups just irritate me on the table. [Teacher transcript 3]

I perceived that the words “I don’t know cups just irritate me on the table” were an indication to me that pedagogical practice that I valued was not valued by Celine (I-for-you). Being accountable to the infants was potentially not being accountable to a colleague because of the struggle between what is valued. This insight highlighted for me how my moral position in relation to what I valued such as fostering infants’ contributions to their own learning through their
engagement with one another was seen differently when viewed through the eyes of another (I-for-you). This discovery expands on Anton’s (2001) work which highlighted that people can fail to do the right thing for others when they try to do the right thing for themselves. I reveal that in an ECEC context ‘doing the right thing’ for a colleague can potentially mean failing to do the right thing for oneself, which in turn, often, as I have shown, risks ‘doing the right thing’ by infants from the self’s perspective. This insight extends on previous work (Redder & White, 2017) which emphasised how teachers are implicated in dialogues with infants and peers as well as infants and teachers (White & Redder, 2015) regardless of whether they are present or not, to suggest that teachers are also implicated in relationships with one another’s pedagogies. The meaning that was created in this “shock, horror” dialogue opened my eyes to how an aspect of my pedagogy was not valued by all the teachers with whom I work, if indeed, any of my colleagues, in relation to this element of my practice. Although, Celine’s response was confronting it provided me with an opportunity to be answerable and account for my decision to foster infant’s learning in this way and have my viewpoint considered by the group and vice a versa. The teachers in the team challenged my practice asking (I-for-you):

Sandy: Were you going to take the cups off them?
Celine: But if you were focussing on something else.
Bridgette: Well I actually thought they were having this interaction you see …
Eliza: Aww
Bridgette: … that’s my thinking. They’re engaging in this interaction and their cup banging is a form of language that they are using to respond to one another …
Sue: I suppose you get to the stage where you think, I probably look at it and think if I don’t stop that I’m going to have these 3 children they are going to have to be completely changed, which I suppose isn’t an issue but when you’re busy it can be an issue.
Sue: But do we let them sit with their bowls at the big table and bang them? Bang and crash them.

And then re-enforcing the proverbial ‘we’ voice (I-for-us):
Celine: No, we ask them to stop it.
Sue: So, it’s like the same thing, we’ve got to actually say well hang on a minute your food is for eating your water is for drinking. If you’re out in water play, then yeah you go for it. But I don’t know that’s how I look at it.
Mel: You know we have to have **clear expectations** as a team really. So that the children know what those expectations are because if you never stop them doing it and I always take their cups away when they do it, that’s really sending quite a mixed message don’t you think?
Sue: And I think every one of us says to them please don’t bang your bowl, please put your bowl nicely in front of you…. Celine: or you motion …
Mel: Food and water come hand and hand. I mean we are not allowed to play with food as far as a cultural thing goes. So I think maybe when there is water and water cups it’s for drinking. When it’s water play, play in it.
Mel: I think it’s nice if you look at the positive of what you want them to do.
Sue: Emm.
Mel: water is for drinking, it’s as **simple** as that, not - don’t bang the cups, that’s all the incredible years stuff coming through focusing on what you want not what you don’t want.

What this dialogue further revealed, was how there is no universal personal moral code. The research that I drew upon shaped my practice and the research that others in the dialogue drew upon for example the “Incredible Years” programme meant they were making morally different judgements. It is not that anybody came out and said I was not being answerable, but I perceived my colleagues felt that I was not complying with the ‘rules’ of the infant ECEC space. This event is connected to event 2 in that “we have to have **clear expectations** as a team … So that the children know what those expectations are”. I felt that although I was on the inside, I was actually on the outside. Prior to the staff meeting dialogue I had not viewed my actions in this way. In her thesis which explored self-review processes Grey (2010) emphasises the importance of moral accountability that
derives from building “respect and understanding” (p. 276) as opposed to accountability that comes from pleasing the group to stay in the good books so to speak. I expand on Grey’s (2010) view, suggesting that more attention be focused on teachers holding themselves morally answerable for their pedagogical acts.

Although, I appreciate the value of rules and codes, I thought in this situation they were limiting what it meant for me to be answerable to infants and (my) self. Again, there is no formal policy or philosophy to say that complying in this way is what we, as a teaching team, are required to do but it is an unwritten rule which presumably will keep us all on the same page. Shotter (1989) informs, that people often endeavour to reproduce a certain way of engaging with others, that considers shared ways, in order to routinely respond in an accountable manner. This study offers an alternative to the view that accountability is primarily achieved when shared ways of being in a teaching team are agreed upon, by drawing attention to the moral complexity in decision making that goes beyond a shared set of rules and guidelines. I have highlighted in this thesis, how the application of universal sets of values alone or rules, whether written or unwritten, cannot ensure accountability beyond passive obedience. ECEC spaces are filled with endless amounts of shades of grey, which call for pedagogical decision making that considers the particular in tandem with the universal (the moral and the ethical) in order for an answerable decision to spring forth. Building on the work of Snowden and Boone (2007), who contend that spaces of complexity do not lend themselves to certainty and easy-fix solutions, this thesis highlights the importance of teachers’ self-awareness in terms of how their values are compromised, confronted and created anew each time pedagogical decisions are made in dialogue with others.

The teachers’ voices highlighted for me the implications of playing with water in relation to playing with food from a bi-cultural perspective. I had not thought of water in this way, and the lived truth of this moment bears witness to the fact that if infants were tipping their food out, I would be concerned that they were not eating. But that was not my interpretation of what the infants were engaging in as evidenced by the original data source event. However, rather than justifying my practice, this event opened my eyes to pedagogical practice that I had not considered but which I could try and understand and be altered by it and potentially alter the pedagogical practice of my colleagues in some way.
My thoughts are that when pedagogical practice is suffocated by universally applied standards alone, the opportunities for creativity, relationship building, communication and dialogue are often snuffed out. I suggest attention be paid to an answerable pedagogy that pays attention to the moral implications when universal rules are applied. Colnerud (2006) illuminated how teachers through their dialogues with teachers are implicated in the lives of children regardless of the decisions they make to respond in particular ways. I add to this view that perhaps if teachers were less concerned with understanding infants or less concerned with understanding one other and more focused on understanding their multiple selves in relationship with infants and how that ultimately influences their relationships with infants, one another and infant pedagogy. As this event has uncovered, I made moral choices beyond any stipulated rules, as such I assert that teachers are answerable selves and pedagogy is an act of moral answerability.

The discoveries and insights that I have illuminated and discussed in this chapter question whether there can ever be a definable universally good teacher, but instead, an answerable teacher who is morally accountable and deeply implicated in her or his pedagogical acts. The subsequent and concluding chapter looks back on what I have learnt in relation to the research questions. It makes links to implications, limitations and future research.
Chapter Six: ‘Doing the Right Thing’ Revisited: By Way of a Conclusion

Throughout this thesis I set out to interrogate my everyday acts of ‘doing the right thing’ as a pedagogical force of moral answerability. I did so through the route of dialogic self-study. Dialogic self-study research begins with a deep need to study one’s own practice and one’s role within it. It is about finding self and not losing self. However I discovered that there were many times along this journey where I had to let go of layers upon layers of myself, in a way it was as if I had to lose (my)self in order to find (my) self, so that I was not suffocated by the self who is constantly challenged with ‘doing the right thing’. Self who is constantly challenged by ‘doing the right thing’ is accountable to self and others who will read this work, like you, to ensure I have opened (my) answerable self up to the possibilities at my disposal. Possibilities which are free from the reigns that restrict creativity and harness the potential to expose (my) plural self and their thoughts and ideas in order to find me on these pages.

6.1 Going back to the beginning

I began this thesis highlighting an issue that I recognised in my early days as a practising teacher in relation to moral accountability. It was my assertion that often teachers are challenged in their practice pedagogically and morally when they find themselves in a position where they are unsure of whom to be accountable to. In my situation all those years ago an event happened where I found myself struggling between accountabilities to myself, the infant, and the teachers who were in the physical space. Faced with a moral choice, the significance of my acts on this infant’s learning and subjectivity weighed heavily on me — in that moment and still today. I also felt the weight of accountabilities that I had to the teacher and the teaching team as a whole, my actions had the potential to either pull me away from or toward consensus with the rest of the team. My fundamental aim of joining the teaching profession, at the risk of sounding cliché, was to make a positive difference in the lives of children. But in that moment my axiological position was being challenged because this situation that derived from practice had left me in what felt like a pedagogical no man’s land. It suddenly dawned on me that this was not just about me and ‘my’ practice but that whatever pedagogical decision I made was also being shaped in that
moment by other contributing factors such as the look in the infant’s eyes, the
eexpression on the teacher’s face and tone of voice. Aware that whatever choice I
made would have an influence on this infant’s subjectivity and every aspect of her
learning I responded in a way that was morally answerable. Consequently, I end
this thesis with the view that an awareness of how teachers are morally
answerable for their pedagogical acts is central to all professional practice. It
matters how one’s actions are interpreted by others in that dialogic space and vice
a versa and this has been especially true for me as an infant teacher because of the
value I place on people knowing that they matter. In this context, I am morally
answerable, regardless of any hierarchy statutes or beliefs I might hold for the
meaning that is created in that space and its influence on the lives of infants.
Fundamental to this view based on my previous lived experiences is an awareness
of how other external factors such as practices of other teachers, family
expectations, centre management requirements, codes of ethics and core values
have the potential to alter my practice and in doing so my acts.

6.2 What was it all about and why?
(My) dialogic self-study adds to the existing research base encompassing infant
pedagogy by bringing the Bakhtinian notion of moral answerability (Bakhtin,
1993) to the fore in order to better understand the pedagogical decisions and acts I
made as a teacher in relation to my practice in dialogue with teachers as critical
friends about practice that involved infants. The issue, as I saw it, was that ‘doing
the right thing’ can mean many different things for different people in particular
contexts at a particular time in a particular space. When applied to practice ‘doing
the right thing’ pedagogically can mean a raft of different things depending on the
particulars of a situation, the personalities present, time and space. With no
universal ‘right’ way (as I see it) challenges can derive from practice when how a
teacher acts intersects with the practices of other teachers, infants, their families
and society as a whole. In many Western educational settings ‘doing the right
thing’ is prescribed in the form of professional codes of practice, standards,
policies, rules and regulations. These documents demand adherence by members
of a professional body to ensure we are universally ‘doing the right thing’ by
teacher colleagues, learners and the societies within which we live. These
mandated codes, rules and standards typically do not set out principles for ‘doing
the right thing’ that considers self. With the many subjective ways codes of ethical
conduct, standards and practices can be interpreted ‘doing the right thing’ may not be as universal as it looks from this viewpoint — highlighting the contested nature of ethical responsibility concerning teacher pedagogy. I have also expressed in previous chapters how teaching is a moral endeavour because it concerns human relations and actions (for example see Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2013; Hansen, 2001). As such moral implications derive from practice when views of ‘doing the right thing’ are seen through different eyes.

I have illuminated in this thesis how typically in education and educational research consideration is given to how teachers are ethically accountable as opposed to morally accountable to learners, their families, teacher colleagues and society as a whole. As such, I have brought to the surface how teachers are expected to account for their pedagogy through mandated evaluation processes such as self-review (in a New Zealand context), which often neglect the moral impact on teaching and learning acts — evidenced in the way they are often linked to ethical codes and standards. I therefore argue that there are no codes, rules or regulations that can fully address the complexity of pedagogy, especially infant pedagogy. It is (my) assertion that through greater self-awareness I and perhaps other teachers too can better understand what it means pedagogically to do the right thing by all others and (my) self without losing self in the process.

Moral answerability (Bakhtin, 1993), which invites dialogic processes of meaning-making between (my) pedagogical acts from multiple standpoints across time and space was the means I used to better understand pedagogical decisions and acts and their complexity in relation to practice, particularly when engaged in dialogue with other teachers. Selecting a self-study method aligned with dialogic methodology provided a way to connect (my) self, others and pedagogical practices in consideration of infant practice. This thesis was therefore based on the premise that teacher pedagogy is an act of moral answerability.

To support my argument for a dialogic self-study approach I made links to evaluative requirements that exist in my New Zealand ECEC context. Both dialogic self-study and self-review are processes concerned with evaluation of the self. The alignment of self-study places the lens firmly on self-evaluation from the perspective of the other in order to evaluate one’s axiological position. It was important to better understand my axiological position because this is the value
laden basis for my moral judgements, perceptions and responses. From a Bakhtinian perspective I need others to give me value because I do not possess an autonomous value-oriented self-consciousness. When pedagogy is viewed as an act of moral answerability a means is provided for teachers to gain a better understanding of the pedagogical decisions they are making in relation to their practice because this notion pays particular attention to how individuals evaluate their axiological position. In this thesis I explained how it is vital that I understand my axiological position because from a Bakhtinian perspective morality is comprised of the value systems of each person that orient their actions and behaviours as human beings in the event of co-Being. Which means with a greater understanding of my axiological position, from the perspective of others, I will better understand the morality concerned with the decisions I make which for better or worse will alter my life and the lives of others for which I am answerable. Turning to the research questions I asked in what ways am I morally answerable to (my) self and others through my practice and what does ‘doing the right thing’ mean for infant pedagogy and for the professional ECEC teacher.

6.3 Dialogic self-study insights and discoveries

This dialogic self-study responded to the issues surrounding moral choice, pedagogical acts and accountability that I as a teacher in an early years context are faced with in everyday moments of living. Often, I have wondered why teachers do what they do. I am sure they (other teachers) have wondered what it is that I do and why I do it too. But seldom do we ever give such ponderings the status they deserve in shaping pedagogy. I am also quite sure that the babies whom ‘we’ teach must so often be bemused by the acts that take place in the “craziness” and “busy-ness”, to use the words of several critical friends, of the space that makes up the ECEC space that many infants spend a considerable amount of time at. Looking back on the insights and discoveries of this thesis it is possible to see how dialogic self-study opened up a way for me to better understand how I am implicated in ‘doing what I do’ in my endeavours ‘to do the right thing’.

6.3.1 In what ways am I morally answerable to (my) self and others through my practice?

My dialogic self-study has shown me the extent to which I am accountable to (my) answerable self simultaneously through responses that orient toward
multiple others, for example the teaching team leader, other teachers, codes of ethics and family members all in the same dialogic event. This discovery highlights the complexity of infant pedagogy when being answerable means being accountable to different selves in the same moment. I now realise, more keenly than ever, that ‘doing the right thing’ can mean different things for different people illuminating the moral complexity of infant pedagogy. Each answerable act (original data source event) provided evidence of how pedagogical practices that I considered ‘to be doing the right thing’ were not valued by all members of the teaching team.

By stripping back, the layers upon layers of complexity that comprise (my) plural self, which was at times daunting, I discovered the answerable self who has numerous accountabilities to different others, that are taking place in every lived moment-by-moment. Insights revealed not only the complexity but also the moral weight experienced in endeavours to be answerable to multiple relationships with others both in the present and in the past, known and unknown. In discovering that self is answerable I am better able to notice, recognise and respond to different ways of being and becoming in dialogue with others. I recognised that some of (my) answerable self’s ways of being morally accountable meant being aware of when I was denying my subjectivity or the subjectivity of others, upholding the best interests of the infant and valuing the infants’ rights to have their voice heard.

When viewed in this way it was possible to see more clearly how different lived and received answerable positions pulled in different directions depending on the particulars of the situation. The significance of better understanding how I oriented the impact of others’ evaluations on answerable self’s axiological position is brought to the surface. This is important because of the everyday form shaping potential of others to shape and alter (my) answerable self’s ways of being in relationships and practice. I have discovered that I cannot talk about pedagogy without talking about the person, the personality and the relationship that sits behind it. So often in education people are told to leave ‘the personal’ at the door in exchange for the ‘professional’, as if it were possible to shed all those emotions and values that make up a personality before entering the educational space.
The personal being central to the act of teaching is more integral to the teaching profession than to any other professional group because personal relationships are “an intimate part of teaching” and a teacher’s personality encroaches on every facet of this interpersonal work (Snook, 2003, p. 79). I assert that professionalism is a discourse that could potentially get in the way of people being really truly morally answerable.

I suggest a re-envisioned view of professionalism be sought one in which the teacher as answerable self becomes the main starting point in understanding and stimulating professional development. Ironically, although in many respects this thesis was a study about my teacher pedagogy it was all about “me”! The discovery that as a teacher I am an answerable self in relationship with others summons a re-conceptualisation of professional identity as a plural concept. This challenges the traditional conceptualisation of professional identity as singular, in ownership of a defined set of assets valued by the teaching profession. I was surprised to find that being answerable meant (my) answerable self was implicated in ways that were foreign to me such as in my role as a manipulator in order to bring about a consensus because I valued how I had engaged with the infants but perceived that my teacher colleagues did not place the same importance on my pedagogical approach so when I got the opportunity to have us all on the same page I stole it! I did this by speaking for the other teachers in the dialogue in a way that restricted and made invisible their voices.

By viewing professional identity as a plural concept, I was able to see how in some situations the professional plural “I” was answerable through practices that were manipulative. The art of manipulation may not typically be included in a ‘best practice’ list of valued qualities that are sought after by the teaching profession, but I was advocating for the voices of both infants to be heard and respectfully attended to. I am not suggesting that the moral positions of the other teachers were wrong because they did not align with mine. On the contrary, there is no universal right or wrong, in my opinion, but their moral attitudes toward ‘doing the right thing’ in this situation were different to mine. As such, they motivated me to respond to them in a way that denied their subjectivities. But at the same time my endeavour to have us all on the same page was an answerable response to the infants and what I considered to be in their best interests, alongside their right to have their views respected (in line with UNCROC), it
spoke to the received truth from research projects I had participated in (surrounding infant-teacher dialogue and the importance of response, see White et al., 2015), it also spoke to my interpretation of the teachers code of professional ethics and responsibilities. This discovery highlighted for me how accounting for infants’ learning and their relationships is not isolated to following universal codes of ethics, standards, or rules. Being morally accountable and answerable to infant pedagogy encompasses being aware of the morality that is created between participants in the dialogue.

This study has shown me that there can be no universal perfect professional teacher — she or he does not exist because as I showed my values are constantly being re-created in every unique situation. Through the visibility of my values in the dialogue the answerable selves are born in that moment. My personality is what makes the professional me, me! Bakhtin (1990; 1993) constantly re-iterates the uniqueness of individuals and the uniqueness of the particulars of a situation. As explained in chapters one and two, it is from this position — of my outsidedness to your experience of yourself and the world and your outsidedness to mine — that Bakhtin (1990; 1993) believed people can offer moral value to one another. This is achieved through evaluations and judgements that accompany the knowledge and orientations (my) answerable selves make in relation to others based on differences in terms of all (my) answerable selves varying aspects such as values, culture, gender, sexuality, different experiences, particular situation in the world, beliefs, and personality. It is in relationship with the other that (my) answerable selves see themselves in relation to their pedagogy.

As I have been at pains to point out moral answerability arises from one’s axiological position which is imbued with the voices from one’s past. I was answerable in the staff meeting dialogue for the infants in the events that had occurred previously which was because of my deeply held values such as relating to sharing of selves, that placed importance on ensuring people know they matter. This was visible in the staff meeting dialogue when I felt compelled to advocate for the way I responded to the infants, even though my fellow teacher colleagues explained they would have engaged differently. It is my assertion that answerable acts are linked across time and space. As such, there is not one isolated answerable moment. Instead the interconnectedness of moral answerability across time and space — acts with infants shaping my practice from one perspective
interconnected with staff meeting dialogue with teachers shaping my practice from another perspective, codes, articles and valued research shaping my practice from another perspective and then family values in relation to giving of self, shaping my practice from yet another vantage point — all intertwined. These discoveries emphasise the significance of considering the moral impact on pedagogical practices from multiple different perspectives in order to better understand the moral consequences of actions.

Although, insights have not made infant pedagogy any less interpretive, what this dialogic self-study has provided is a way to better understand the moral seriousness of how I am implicated through my pedagogical interpretations — with infants and with other teachers. The discoveries of this thesis suggest that being answerable to (my) self and others means not only being aware of my axiological position but also ensuring attention is focused on what is valued and the values that are continuously being shaped and taking on new meanings in dialogue with infants as active rather than passive participants in their learning and relationships — and ultimately (my) answerable self’s learning and relationships with all others in the shared ECEC space.

I now have a greater awareness of how being morally answerable to (my) self and others in one situation has the potential to alter pedagogical practices of and with others in another context. The never-ending potential for pedagogy to alter and be altered suggests there is no universal infant pedagogical approach but rather one continually created anew in the dialogue. Which means there can be no ‘best practice’, instead I suggest there is an answerable practice which beckons teachers to expose their vulnerabilities in order to notice, recognise and respond to parts of themselves that had previously been untapped.

6.3.2 What does ‘doing the right thing’ mean in my infant pedagogy and for the professional ECEC teacher?

As a teacher whose pedagogy is answerably driven, I, like many, perhaps all, of my colleagues are motivated by a personal conviction to ‘do the right thing’. The issue is less my desire to do so but its origin and, importantly, its consequences for infants. When the professional ECEC teacher is viewed as an answerable self, focus is placed on responses in relation to the particulars of what is valued in each lived experience in tandem with what is universally agreed upon. Viewed in this
way, what is valued professionally and pedagogically is not fixed but born between the answerable self in relationship with others. Although this dialogic self-study was about my voice, the alternative voices of my teacher colleagues were implicated in relation to my self-understanding and self-awareness. Listening to and hearing the teachers’ voices, gaining access to their excess of seeing, enabled me to see aspects of (my) self that were previously unseen, this was made possible through dialogue. Telling my story in this dialogic self-study has given me the opportunity to see that being accountable for infants’ learning and relationships, by ‘doing the right thing’, does not mean having to comply and please without question. I now see that ‘peace and harmony’ can be a problem because if everybody just passively agrees the status quo remains unaltered and creativity and new meanings may remain buried under a cover of compliance. It is not to say that ‘peace and harmony’ are not welcome, of course they are but in a space that also celebrates challenge and alterity. Being answerable to infants, teachers and self, meant exposing self in dialogue and being exposed by others. Insights reveal that it was often in the moments of struggle, challenge, vulnerability and discomfort that dialogue was opened up and new ways of seeing were born. An openness for new ways of seeing came about I believe from the exposure of my values, feelings and emotions in the dialogue — the rawness of (my) inner dialogue lay bare in these moments. What I found was that often when consensus was sought the dialogue was shut down or silenced because inner emotions remained disclosed. I now understand the importance of recognising the self who wants to stand up and say hey wait a minute, I disagree. That self deserves to have a voice rather than being continuously suffocated by the self who passively complies without question or contemplation in order to share the same page with others and not cause any waves. I can better recognise how my resistance or willingness to expose my multiple selves’ values, emotions, and feelings shapes infant pedagogy and the lives of infants. Insights have already had an impact on my practice and how I respond to others in life in general because I am more aware of how I mask my inner thoughts with people in dialogue. Prior to this dialogic self-study I did not realise the potential for (my) embodied language to mask my ‘true’ feelings for example when I nodded my head in agreement when I was actually not in agreement with what people were saying. I have recognised through dialogic self-study that
‘doing the right thing’ often means not being part of the ‘we’. Although not being on the ‘same page’ can be challenging, by having the opportunity to evaluate (my) answerable selves from the perspectives of the team enabled me to discover more about me and the person I am pedagogically in relationship with others.

These discoveries present a significant challenge to contemporary literature which highlights the importance of pedagogical relationships with children, their families, other teachers but does not often talk about a person’s relationship with their pedagogy. These relationships are very intimate and personal located in the constantly altering contexts of living moments. The values that each teacher brings are shaped by these moments. I now better understand that to improve my pedagogical practice it is important to understand that I am also in a relationship with pedagogy. I discovered that ‘doing the right thing’ meant not always being on the ‘same page’ as my teacher colleagues and that moral answerability requires deep reflection and courage. An implication of this insight for my practice meant recognising the negative impact for myself and others (especially infants) of denying my subjectivity and masking what I was really thinking and feeling to align with the group. At other times alternative opportunities for me to be answerable were opened up when teachers challenged my moral stance. This insight highlighted how as a teacher my own personal moral code is always in dialogue with the moral codes of multiple others. I suggest that there are no universal personal moral codes.

What I have also realised throughout this self exodus is that ‘doing the right thing’ means paying attention to fleeting moments of response because of the potential for these moments to alter the dialogue and the truth of a situation. With this new realisation, I am now more aware of how others’ (e.g., teachers, infants, and families) contributions to my practice will depend on which of the answerable selves is engaging. Indeed, multiple different selves could be engaging with different others simultaneously. This insight highlights the complexity of moral answerability in any given situation because how I responded from the perspective of each of these different selves in the dialogue had the potential to affirm or alter my axiological position causing me to experience a feeling of inner peace or turmoil as one moral position provoked another. In this, I believe I am a better, if greatly challenged, teacher.
6.4 Contributions of this dialogic self-study research

The insights I have gained throughout this thesis are, however, not for me alone. The broader contributions of this research are both methodological and pedagogical with a particular emphasis on infant research. This dialogic self-study has highlighted the moral messiness of infant pedagogy. The messiness of pedagogy has previously been foregrounded in a study which urged teachers to embrace aspects of the curriculum, characterised by uncertainty, that were typically swept under the carpet (White, 2011). In this thesis, the messiness has not been swept under the carpet but rather rests within and ‘in between’ different answerable selves. Dialogic self-study for infant teacher pedagogy as an act of moral answerability provided an alternative approach to infant teacher practice. Dialogic self-study contributes to the infant research knowledge base by illuminating the importance of moral answerability in order to better understand the complexity of acts, accountabilities and moral choices that derive from practice. Dialogic self-study has the potential to make an important, previously unexplored contribution as a formal self-study method. This dialogic self-study makes a contribution by demonstrating to self-study researchers that Bakhtinian dialogic methodology is effective as a means to explore current practices in order to better understand the impact of infant teacher practices on those they teach and beyond.

Moral answerability as a theoretical perspective is a contribution to the field of education and more explicitly, ECEC. Research employing the Bakhtinian notion of moral answerability is limited in ECEC research. By focussing on moral answerability as a moral imperative in the early years this dialogic self-study informs infant pedagogy by providing insight into the ways teachers are morally responsible and accountable to infants in ECEC contexts through their everyday moments of interaction. Moral answerability as a moral imperative provides a way for teachers to explore the complexities and dynamics of all areas of their pedagogical practice and its impact on others in the dialogic space of an ECEC context and beyond.

A strength of this research was the alignment of dialogic methodology to a self-study method in order for a way to be provided for me to reflect on and evaluate the self’s inner dialogue (reflexive journal) beyond a traditional view of how the experience affected an individualised me in relation to (my) selves’ external
dialogue with other teachers, about my practice. Teachers often face challenges making explicit their own reflections particularly in relation to moral occurrences in their everyday lived experiences (Colnerud, 2006). According to Bradbury et al (2012) there is often an individualistic lens shone on reflection. This critique is taken up by Kotzee (2012) who bring centre stage Schön’s (1983) reflective approach to illuminate its focus on the inner life of the teacher and her own interpretations of her learning experiences. Although these authors recognise its stronghold in mainstream education, they feel it has lost its “critical edge” (p. 5). In agreement Boud (2010) points out the challenge from professional practice that confronts teachers and researchers to find new ways of thinking about reflection that recognise the complexities and the relational qualities of practice. A dialogic self-study offers alternative ways for the social dimensions of reflection to be viewed and evaluated by not only considering the perspectives of others but also the perspectives of multiple ‘I’ orientations (I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-us, I-for-thou). When viewed through a Bakhtinian dialogic lens it was possible to study the self by reflecting upon and evaluating my inner dialogue with self in tandem with my external dialogue with others from both inside and outside perspectives.

**6.5 Implications and future dialogic self-study research**

A dialogic self-study, while profoundly confronting at times, provided a way for me to be an active author of my own experience within it. As the subject of my own research, dialogic self-study provided a way for my voice to be heard. I began to know ‘myself’. In returning to the research questions it would have been very easy for self-study to rest solely within the self. But dialogic self-study is never just about me, this would have been an indulgence. A dialogic self-study is also about what is taking place in the dialogue ‘in between’ teacher colleagues and (my) answerable self. Although this was a study of the self, the alternative voices of my ‘professional’ teacher colleagues were implicated as what they valued was responded to by me in the dialogue. According to Hansen (2013) teacher education pays little attention to programmes that enable preservice teachers to better understand how the moral aspects of teaching are enacted through their practice. Building on this view I assert teacher education programmes consider dialogic self-study as a way for beginning teachers to better understand the moral dimensions of teaching in order to better understand and improve their practice. As student and teacher populations become increasingly diverse, educational
settings face the challenge of promoting pedagogical environments that are sensitive to pedagogical participants’ multiple ways of being beyond solely delivering academic curricula (Husu & Tirri, 2001).

My dialogic self-study has highlighted the need for teachers, who work with infants, to be critical and philosophical thinkers who are not afraid to challenge the dominant discourse in order to advocate for infants. I agree with Shapira-Lishchinsky (2011) who suggest programmes be developed for teachers to enrich their moral knowledge and empower them to “develop pluralistic attitudes and more complex moral understanding of the choices open to them” (p. 655). However, as my dialogic self-study illuminates, as an infant teacher who was part of a team, I was not always well prepared when I disagreed with or was challenged by my teacher colleagues.

An implication for practice is that when teachers’ views sit outside the views of others this often causes further issues. It is my suggestion that teacher education programmes not only focus on the moral dimensions of teaching but also on what it means to work in an ECEC teaching team so that teachers can enter the profession better equipped with the skills and insight required to face the potential struggles of being morally answerable for pedagogical decisions and acts without losing self but also being answerable for others as others. According to Flores and Day (2006) beginning teachers are often not well prepared for the moral aspects of teaching. My research suggests that teachers with experience, like (my) self are also not always well equipped with how the moral dimensions of teaching impact on their work. As such I suggest a further contribution would be the potential for dialogic self-study to be considered as an extension on self-review practices by paying attention to the moral impact of teachers’ work in order for teachers to better understand in dialogue with others how the moral aspects of teaching are enacted through their practice. A dialogic self-study is also not regulated by a regulatory body such as ERO.

Self-study is about studying the self that is self-explanatory. However, highly evident throughout this study was that a dialogic self-study is not just about the self. The assertion that a self-study is not about the individual ‘I’ was reflected in the way meanings were generated in the dialogue that shaped what I valued in relation to (my) self, my pedagogical practice and my axiological position. Also, the infants and teachers were continually referring to their practice or relating the
meanings that were being created in the dialogue to their lived experiences and moral attitudes even though this was a self-study about my pedagogical practice. However, in undertaking a study of the self the challenge is in not being able to carry out self-study on your colleagues.

Time and time again in my interpretation of the data I had to remind (my) self that this was a self-study about me and ethically and morally I did not have a right to analyse the practice of my teacher colleagues. However, it was challenging not critiquing their practice at the same time as I was analysing how they had critiqued mine. I suggest this is an issue about self-study as a method and perhaps as a methodology when yoked with dialogism which orients my focus far beyond the ‘self’ while retaining the centrality of me as plural selves! To cope with this issue I had to continually remind (my) self that this was a dialogic self-study about how I received what the teachers had said about my practice in the dialogue and how it impacted on the way that I looked at the event NOT how the teachers looked at the event — that is a different study for future research. At times my supervisors were at pains to remind me not to fall into the ‘moral trap’ that people fall into when they start to assert other people’s values to other people’s contributions in a dialogue, which is another issue to be cautious of when undertaking this type of research.

This dialogic self-study took place in one ECEC context and drew upon my practice as the only source of research. It did take place across a range of different contexts — in dialogue with infants and teachers separately. This dialogic self-study makes the claim that as a teacher I have multiple answerable selves who are implicated in unique relationships with others’ multiple answerable selves. As this research has shown each of these multiple selves has the potential to be altered depending on the particulars of the situation and other selves’ moral answerabilities that may be part of the encounter. This research did not analyse the pedagogical practice of my teacher colleagues as an act of moral answerability. It also, did not, nor did it set out to, consider the pedagogical practices of teachers outside of an infant context or outside of a teaching team context. Nevertheless, it would be valuable for future research to consider a collaborative dialogic self-study approach in order to analyse the pedagogical practices of multiple teachers from multiple different plural ‘I’ perspectives (I-for-myself, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-us, and I-for-thou). A collaborative dialogic
self-study would provide insight into the form shaping potential of my practice to alter the practices of my teacher colleagues which was not explored in this study.

Future research could use a dialogic self-study approach to explore the different types of professional identities that teachers’ answerable selves identify with and what that would mean working in an educational environment particularly teaching team situations. An understanding of self as a plural construct opens up potential to better understand what is meant by ‘quality’ relationships for which the self is answerable. For example an investigation into the different identities a teacher’s answerable selves have with different infants’ selves could uncover different layers of quality depending on the accountabilities and how she or he is answerable in a particular situation i.e., there could be a difference if a teacher is in a key teacher role or if a parent is present, in a ‘we’ or ‘us’ situation.

A dialogic self-study provided the opportunity for me to account for the moral answerability that existed in the relations between the infants and my selves as they played out through the staff meeting dialogues. What became very apparent to me was how my account of pedagogical acts that had taken place between the infants and me had the potential to be viewed differently at the staff meeting dialogue and consequently shaped depending upon which selves-in-relationship-with-other I was responding to. This discovery made me aware of the importance of having the video footage available to the teachers to view so that the infants’ voices could be seen and heard as opposed to no video account which would have meant only my words in relation to the event would have been heard. The video made it possible to transcend time and space by bringing the past forward into the present.

6.6 Concluding words

This research informs infant pedagogy, policy and practice by highlighting infant pedagogy as an act of moral answerability that deeply implicates the infant teacher in every lived moment. As others who have gone before me have explained (White, 2016a; de Vocht, 2015b) finalising words in ECEC pedagogy challenge a dialogic way of thinking. However, in my endeavours to close this chapter of my thesis, I end by saying how I am so much more aware of (my) answerable self in relationship with others especially how the dialogue is opened up or shut down when selves are exposed or often brought to a consensus when the authoritative voice speaks. Dialogic self-study has opened my eyes to the
importance of understanding the many different answerable selves that make up me in my relationships with others. I have such a greater self-awareness of the pedagogical decisions that I make as an infant teacher and associated acts in practice having undertaken this dialogic self-study.

By viewing infant pedagogy as an act of moral answerability it was possible to see beyond externally mandated standards, codes and rules to how I was personally responsible and accountable for the particulars of my acts in the moment. My study implies that if teachers are to be accountable for the learning of learners it is essential that the moral dimensions of teaching in everyday lived experiences are prioritised in tandem with an ethical allegiance to externally mandated codes, prescriptions and standards. Bakhtin’s (1990; 1993) notion of moral answerability provides a way for this to be achieved. This thesis was my response to a greater awareness surrounding moral answerability in educational settings — in particular infant pedagogical contexts. It is my hope that (my) dialogic self-study will generate further responses that will alter the way ‘we’ think about moral and ethical accountability in education.
References


Emerson, C. (2011). *All the same the words don’t go away: Essays on authors, heroes, aesthetics and stage adaptations from the Russian tradition*. Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press.


Appendix 1

Layout and positioning of video recording devices
# Appendix 2

Transcript conventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>[</code></td>
<td>Point overlap in conversation starts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>]</code></td>
<td>Point overlap in conversation ends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>(0.0)</code></td>
<td>Lapsed time in tenths of seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>( )</code></td>
<td>Non-verbal language e.g. (smile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>word</code></td>
<td>Speaker emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>word</code></td>
<td>Loud tone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>Word</code></td>
<td>Soft tone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>------</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>🙂</code></td>
<td>Laughter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3

University of Waikato Ethics approval letter

MEMORANDUM

To: Bridgette Redder

cc: Associate Professor Jayne White
De Nicola Bilino

From: Professor John Williams
Chairperson, Research Ethics Committee

Date: 10 September 2015

Subject: Supervised Postgraduate Research - Application for Ethical Approval (EDU9793)

Thank you for submitting the revisions to your application for ethical approval for the research project:

Teacher pedagogy as an accountable act in dialogic encounters with infants.

A call for the research interaction as a moral imperative.

I am pleased to advise that your application has been approved.

Please note that researchers are asked to consult with the Faculty's Research Ethics Committee in the first instance if any changes to the approved research design are proposed.

The Committee wishes you all the best with your research.

Professor John Williams
Chairperson
Research Ethics Committee
Appendix 4

Dear Centre Coordinator

As you are aware I am a teacher in the infant setting of the XXX. I am very interested in the way I am answerable to infants in pedagogical events and how my pedagogy impacts on infants’ subjectivities and relationships with people, places and things in an early childhood education (ECE) context. In addition, the interpretations of other infant teachers in relation to events of pedagogical significance surrounding my practice with infants are of great interest to me. I am writing to request formal approval from you, as the centre coordinator and representative of the Board of Trustees to undertake a PhD research study at the centre and to ask if you could please inform the Board of Trustees of my doctoral research and seek approval from them.

I would like to explore the following questions specifically:

- How am I, as an infant teacher, answerable to infants in everyday pedagogical events?
- How do my answerable acts in pedagogical events impact on infants in the dialogic space of an early childhood education context?
- How do my answerable acts influence the embodied language choices I make and how do these choices impact on infants’ subjectivities?
- What are the pedagogical tensions for teachers in infant based early childhood care and education.

I would like to video record my practice as I interact with infants for 1 hour per week in total, for a period of 16 weeks. Video recording would occur between February 2016 and August 2016. On a monthly basis, preferably at a staff meeting, I would like to invite infant teachers to view, reflect upon and discuss a selection of events I have selected that are of pedagogical significance to me; these teacher reflection discussions would also be video recorded.

I am also approaching you in the first instance, as coordinator of the centre, to seek your consent for me to approach teachers in the infant setting and parents or caregivers of infants with this in mind. In addition I am approaching you to request that if parents or caregivers of infants and fellow infant teachers feel distress, discomfort or compromised in any way with the video recording of my practice that they can contact you if they feel they cannot or do not wish to contact me to explain their situation, and recording will cease on that day or at the staff meeting. In your role as a potential mentor to participants it is important that video recording occur when you are not included in the teacher ratios. Participants will also have the option to contact my supervisors (Associate Professor Jayne White email: whiteej@waikato.ac.nz; or Dr Carol Murphy email: carolmm@waikato.ac.nz).
In giving your consent you would be agreeing to the following activities which would take place in your ECE setting during this time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td>Consent forms sent to teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 January 2016</td>
<td>Consent forms sent to parents or caregivers of infants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 February 2016</td>
<td>Completion of all consent forms from teachers, parents or caregivers of infants. Please note consent forms will need to be obtained from parents of new infants enrolling at the centre during the data collection period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 February 2016</td>
<td>Two days would be spent introducing the cameras to the infants in the ECE infant setting; this would include both the video recording device that I will wear and the tracking cameras that will be positioned in the inside and outside environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February to August 2016</td>
<td>1 hour filming on a weekly basis, across different times of the day and across different days of the week for 16 weeks. Video recording would take place between February and August 2016. I will wear a video recording device to record my practice from my field of vision and the tracking cameras will be positioned accordingly to capture my practice and the wider context from a different visual field. Other teachers in the infant setting and family members of infants may be captured in the video recording process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February to August 2016</td>
<td>Video recorded reflective discussions with infant teachers at staff meetings on a monthly basis for 4 months will be undertaken whereby a selection of events I have selected of pedagogical significance to me, related to my practice, of up to a total of 12 minutes in duration will be viewed, reflected upon and discussed by infant teachers in collaboration with me. The practice of other teachers could be part of an event of pedagogical significance related to my practice and would therefore be part of the dialogue at these meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February to August 2016</td>
<td>Parents/caregivers and infant teachers may approach you or me if they feel an infant is in distress or discomfort and recording will cease for that day. In addition, teachers can approach you or me if they feel compromised and recording will cease for that day or at the staff meeting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All participants would have the right to withdraw from the study at any time during the data collection period. Should the families of the infants choose to withdraw their child’s involvement, video recording will then take place on a day when their infant is either not present at the centre or it may be possible to undertake video recording when their infant is sleeping. If other adults or children in the setting feature on any footage that has been taken wish to withdraw, any video or notes where they are visible would be destroyed. The footage and notes would be accessed by me, as researcher and my PhD supervisors Associate Professor Jayne White, Dr Carol Murphy and Professor Bronwen Cowie.
All data collected, including notes taken by the researcher, footage and transcripts, will be transcribed or captured in an electronic format. This will then be stored on a password protected computer software programme and external hard drive for the duration of the PhD research study. At completion of the study all material will be stored for a subsequent five years on a password protected computer software programme.

Participants (or parents/caregivers of participants) would be given the opportunity to check any of the selected video recording excerpts which feature as part of the results. Any of these images that they do not approve of would be deleted from the data set and any future presentations. Infant teachers would also be given the opportunity to review, amend and approve the transcripts of the reflective staff meeting discussions.

Filming will continue during nappy changing procedures (because these are known to be prime times for infant-teacher interaction) — where private body parts are exposed the footage will be discretely edited. Those excerpts that are approved may be used for teaching purposes and/or shared with members of the public via presentations.

Due to the visual nature of the data, it is not possible to assure confidentiality or anonymity to the participants in this study. However, teachers will be given a pseudonym by me should they request one; and parents or caregivers will be given a pseudonym for their child should they wish to have one. Your ECE setting will not be named; instead I will give it a pseudonym.

The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will be disseminated in my PhD thesis at conferences, in other oral and visual presentations, and in downloadable publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum. The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives may be used for teaching purposes.

As a management representative of this ECE setting you can request a copy of any of these publications by contacting the researcher (bms17@students.waikato.ac.nz). An electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons — a link will be sent to you on completion of my thesis.

If you agree, please sign the attached consent form by the 5th December.

Yours truly

Bridgette Redder
Appendix 5

Teacher pedagogy as an answerable act in dialogic encounters with infants.

A self-study of teacher interactions as a moral imperative.

This form invites you to give consent for your early childhood education (ECE) service to participate in this PhD research study which explores my practice as an infant teacher and how it impacts on infants’ subjectivities and relationships with people, places and things in an ECE context.

Please indicate your consent by ticking the box beside each relevant statement below, and signing the accompanying form by 5th December 2015. In signing this sheet you are agreeing to the following statements:

□ I have read the explanatory letter, which I have kept for my own information, and have had the opportunity to seek clarification on any issues.

□ I have approached the Board of Trustees and informed them of Bridgette Redder’s PhD research study and they have given their approval for this doctoral research to be undertaken at the centre.

□ I understand that infants in this ECE setting will feature in the video recording that is taken.

□ I understand that although the focus of this research is on Bridgette Redder’s practice with infants (as the teacher and researcher) other teachers in this ECE setting and family members of infants may be captured in the video recording of Bridgette’s practice with infants.

□ I understand that video recording of Bridgette’s practice with infants will occur for 1 hour on a weekly basis, across different times of the day and across different days of the week for 16 weeks. Video recording would take place between February and August 2016. Bridgette will wear a video recording device. I also understand that 2 tracking cameras will be located, 1 inside and 1 outside to video record Bridgette’s practice, from a different visual perspective, as she interacts with infants.

□ I understand that infant teachers will be asked to view, reflect and discuss their interpretations, up to 12 minutes in total, of events selected by Bridgette which she considers to be of pedagogical significance in relation to her own practice. This will take place on a monthly basis for 4 months at a staff meeting, over a period of 6 months. These reflexive discussions will be video recorded. I also understand that the practice of other teachers may feature in these events of pedagogical significance related to Bridgette’s practice and maybe discussed as part of these reflexive discussions. I understand that teachers will have the opportunity to review, amend and approve
transcriptions of these reflexive discussions on a monthly basis.

- I understand that the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will also be disseminated in my PhD thesis, downloadable publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum, at conferences and in other oral and visual presentations.

- I understand that the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives could also be used for teaching purposes.

- I understand that an electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons. I understand that a link will be sent to me on completion of this PhD thesis.

- I understand that participants can ask that any images or other information about them are withdrawn at any point of data collection — at which time any footage containing images of themselves or their child will be destroyed.

- I understand that, due to the visual nature of this study, anonymity and confidentiality cannot be assured for the participants or the setting.

- I understand that parents/caregivers and infant teachers can approach me or Bridgette if they feel an infant is in distress or discomfort and recording will cease for that day.

- I understand that teachers can approach me or Bridgette if they feel compromised and recording will cease for that day or at the staff meeting.

- I understand that this ECE setting will not be named.

- I/we agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] for this ECE setting to take part in Bridgette Redder’s PhD research study as described in the information letter.

Name of ECE setting ..................................................

Name of Centre Coordinator .................................

Contact details .................................................

Signature of Centre Coordinator ............................

Thank you for completing this form. Please return it to me by 5th December 2015.

Bridgette Redder
Appendix 6

Dear Teacher

I am very interested in the way I am answerable to infants in pedagogical events and how my pedagogy impacts on infants’ subjectivities and relationships with people, places and things in an early childhood education (ECE) context. In addition, the interpretations of other infant teachers in relation to events of pedagogical significance surrounding my practice with infants are of great interest to me.

I have planned to undertake a PhD research study in which I would like to explore the following questions specifically:

- How am I, as an infant teacher, answerable to infants in everyday pedagogical events?
- How do my answerable acts in pedagogical events impact on infants in the dialogic space of an early childhood education context?
- How do my answerable acts influence the embodied language choices I make and how do these choices impact on infants’ subjectivities?
- What are the pedagogical tensions for teachers in infant based early childhood care and education.

As an infant teacher with whom I work, I am advising you that I will be video recording my own practice with infants for 1 hour per week, for 16 weeks between February 2016 and August 2016. Although I am focusing on my own practice, you may be captured on film as part of the video recording process as I will be wearing a video recording device and there will be 2 tracking video cameras located 1 in the inside area and 1 in the outdoor environment. This means that your practice could be part of an event of pedagogical significance. Therefore, I am approaching you for permission to include any footage that is taken involving yourself as a fellow teacher in the infant setting to be included in this PhD research study.

I would also like to invite you to view, reflect upon and discuss your interpretations of a selection of events I have selected that are of pedagogical significance to me, related to my practice, on a monthly basis at a staff meeting. There would be 4 reflexive staff meeting discussions which would be undertaken between February 2016 and August 2016.

Management of the centre has agreed for me to approach you to seek your consent. In giving your consent, you would be agreeing to the following activities which you would be involved in indirectly or/and directly:

February - August 2016: As I will be wearing a video recording device for 1 hour per week, for 16 weeks between February and August and because 2 tracking cameras will be located in the ECE environment, you may be video recorded as part of the data collection process involved in the video recording of my practice with infants.
February - August 2016: View, reflect and discuss your interpretations, up to 12 minutes in total, of events I have selected that are of pedagogical significance to me, in relation to my practice. This will take place on a monthly basis at 4 separate staff meetings. These reflexive discussions will be videotaped and transcribed. Your practice may feature in these events of pedagogical significance related to my practice and maybe discussed as part of these reflexive discussions. On a monthly basis you will be invited to amend, review and approve transcripts of the reflective staff meeting discussions.

You would have the right to withdraw from the PhD research study at any time during the data collection period.

The footage and notes would be accessed by myself, as the teacher-researcher, my supervisors Associate Professor Jayne White, Dr Carol Murphy and Professor Bronwen Cowie. All data collected, including notes taken by the teacher-researcher, footage and reflexive transcripts, will be transcribed or captured in an electronic format. This will then be stored on a password protected computer software programme and external hard drive for the duration of the PhD research study. At completion of the study all material will be stored for a subsequent five years on a password protected computer software programme.

You would be given the opportunity to check any of the selected video recording excerpts which may feature you as part of the results. Any of these images that you do not approve of would be deleted from the data set and any future presentations. You would also be given the opportunity to review, amend and approve the transcripts of the reflexive staff meeting discussions. Filming will continue during nappy changing procedures (because these are known to be prime times for infant-teacher interaction) — where private body parts are exposed the footage will be discretely edited. Those excerpts that are approved may be used for teaching purposes and/or shared with members of the public via presentations.

Due to the visual nature of the data, it is not possible to assure confidentiality or anonymity to the participants in this PhD research study. However, a pseudonym will be nominated for you by Bridgette should you request one. The centre will not be named in this PhD research study.

The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will be disseminated in my PhD thesis, at conferences, in other oral and visual presentations, and in downloadable publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum. The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives may be used for teaching purposes.
You can request a copy of any of these publications by contacting the researcher (bms17@students.waikato.ac.nz). An electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons — a link will be sent to you on completion of my thesis.

Please do not hesitate to contact me in relation to any further queries related to this research study. Alternatively, you may contact Associate Professor Jayne White whiteej@waikato.ac.nz; or Dr Carol Murphy carolmm@waikato.ac.nz).

If you agree, please sign the attached consent form by the 5th February, 2016.

Yours truly,

Bridgette Redder
Appendix 7

Teacher pedagogy as an answerable act in dialogic encounters with infants.

A self-study of teacher interactions as a moral imperative.

This form invites you to give consent to participate in this PhD research study which explores my practice as an infant teacher and how it impacts on infants’ subjectivities and their relationships with people, places and things in an ECE context.

Please indicate your consent by ticking the box beside each relevant statement below, and signing the accompanying form by 5th February 2016. In signing this sheet you are agreeing to the following statements:

☐ I have read the explanatory letter, which I have kept for my own information, and have had the opportunity to seek clarification on any issues.

☐ I understand that I may feature in the video recording of Bridgette Redder’s practice as she interacts with infants in the early childhood setting that we both work in for 1 hour per week for 16 weeks. Video recording will take place over a period of 6 months. I also understand that Bridgette will wear a video recording device and that 2 tracking cameras will be located, 1 inside and 1 outside to video record Bridgette’s practice, from a different visual perspective.

☐ I understand that my practice could be part of an event selected by Bridgette which she considers to be of pedagogical significance, for teachers to view, reflect and discuss in relation to Bridgette’s practice.

☐ I understand that I will be invited to view, reflect and discuss my interpretations, up to 12 minutes in total, of events selected by Bridgette which are of pedagogical significance to her in relation to her own practice. This will take place on a monthly basis for 4 months at a staff meeting. These reflexive discussions will be video recorded over a period of 6 months. I understand that teachers will have the opportunity to review, amend and approve transcriptions of these reflexive discussions on a monthly basis.

☐ If at any time during this video recording process I feel compromised in any way I understand that I can inform Bridgette as the teacher-researcher or Lauren as the centre coordinator. In such cases, I am assured that filming will cease on that day or at the staff meeting.

☐ I understand the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will be disseminated.
in my PhD thesis, downloadable publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum, at conferences and in other oral and visual presentations.

□ I understand that the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives could also be used for teaching purposes.

□ I understand that an electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons. I understand that a link will be sent to me on completion of this PhD thesis.

□ I understand that I can ask that any images or other information about me are withdrawn at any point of the data collection — at which time any footage containing images of me will be destroyed.

□ I understand that, due to the visual nature of this PhD research study, my anonymity and confidentiality cannot be assured.

□ I agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] to take part in Bridgette Redder’s PhD research study as described in the information letter.

Name of Infant Teacher ..........................

Please assign me a pseudonym (Please tick yes or no): □ YES

□ No

Contact details ................................................

Signature of Infant Teacher ..........................

Date ............................................................

Thank you for completing this form. Please return it to me by 5th February 2016

Bridgette Redder
Appendix 8

Schedule of Questions

The purpose of these reflexive staff meeting discussions is for us to engage in pedagogical dialogue based on a selection of events involving myself and infants that I have chosen because I consider that they represent rich contexts for discussion about pedagogy as an answerable act.

Answerability “in the early years provides a means through which we can consider the significant impact of our acts on the lives of infants … whether we recognise this or not” (White, 2016, p. 21).

The following questions will provide the framework for our reflexive staff meeting discussions:

• How do you see I am answerable in this pedagogical event? What do you see as pedagogically significant in these events? What I, as teacher, did or did not do? Why was this important?

• What are some of the implications for infant pedagogy and practice you can think of in contemplating these events.

• As someone who knows these infants well, is there anything in particular you could add to my understanding of this event?

• What, if any, do you see as pedagogical tensions in this event and/or our discussions?
Dear Family

I am very interested in the way I am answerable to infants in interactions with them as their teacher and how my practice impacts on infants’ subjectivities and relationships with people, places and things in an early childhood education (ECE) context. In addition, the interpretations of other infant teachers in relation to events of pedagogical significance surrounding my practice with infants are of great interest to me.

I have planned to undertake a PhD research study in which I would like to explore the following questions specifically:

- How am I, as an infant teacher, answerable to infants in everyday pedagogical events?
- How do my answerable acts in pedagogical events impact on infants in the dialogic space of an early childhood education context?
- How do my answerable acts influence the embodied language choices I make and how do these choices impact on infants’ subjectivities?
- What are the pedagogical tensions for teachers in infant based early childhood care and education.

To answer these questions I would like to video record my own practice interacting with the infants in the centre for 1 hour per week, for 16 weeks between February 2016 and August 2016. As your infant is one of the children presently attending the nursery, I am approaching you for permission to include your infant in this PhD research study. As I will be wearing a video recording device and there will be 2 tracking video cameras located, 1 in the inside area and 1 in the outdoor environment, you and any other children you may have with you, could potentially be captured in the video recording of my practice with the infants at the centre — if you attend the centre at this time. Therefore, I am also approaching you for permission to include any footage that is taken involving yourself and/or your other children to be included in the study.

In giving your consent, you would be agreeing to the following activities which your infant would be involved in directly and which you and your other children may also be involved in should you attend the centre at the time of recording:

| February - August 2016: Agreeing for me as the teacher-researcher to video record my practice as I interact with your infant for 1 hour per week, for 16 weeks. Video recording would take place over a period of 6 months between February and August 2016. |
| February - August 2016: As I will be wearing a video recording device and 2 tracking cameras will be located in the ECE environment, you and any of your other children may be video recorded as part of the data collection process involved in me video recording my own practice with infants at the ECE setting when you attend. |

You would have the right to withdraw your infant from the PhD research study at any
time during the data collection period.

Footage of a selection of events I have selected of pedagogical significance to me, which are related to my practice, will be viewed by, reflected upon and discussed with other infant teachers from the centre at a monthly staff meeting for 4 months.

The footage and notes would be accessed by me as the teacher-researcher, my supervisors Associate Professor Jayne White, Dr Carol Murphy and Professor Bronwen Cowie. All data collected, including notes taken by the teacher-researcher, footage and reflexive transcripts, will be transcribed or captured in an electronic format. This will then be stored on a password protected computer software programme and external hard drive for the duration of the PhD research study. At completion of the study all material will be stored for a subsequent five years on a password protected computer software programme.

You would be given the opportunity to check any of the selected video recording excerpts which feature your infant or you or any of your other children as part of the results. Any of these images that you do not approve of would be deleted from the data set and any future presentations. Though filming will continue during nappy changing procedures (because these are known to be prime times for infant-teacher interaction) — where private body parts are exposed the footage will be discretely edited. Those excerpts that are approved may be used for teaching purposes and/or shared with members of the public via presentations.

Due to the visual nature of the data, it is not possible to assure confidentiality or anonymity to the participants in this PhD research study. However, a pseudonym will be nominated by Bridgette for your infant should you request one. The centre will not be named in this PhD research study.

The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will be disseminated in my PhD thesis, at conferences, in other oral and visual presentations, and in downloadable publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum. The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives may be used for teaching purposes.

You can request a copy of any of these publications by contacting me as the researcher (bms17@students.waikato.ac.nz). An electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons — a link will be sent to you on completion of my thesis.
Please do not hesitate to contact me in relation to any further queries related to this research study. Alternatively, you may contact Associate Professor Jayne White whiteej@waikato.ac.nz; or Dr Carol Murphy carolmm@waikato.ac.nz).

If you agree, please sign the attached consent form by the 5th February, 2016.

Yours truly,

Bridgette Redder
Appendix 10

Teacher pedagogy as an answerable act in dialogic encounters with infants.

A self-study of teacher interactions as a moral imperative.

This form invites you to give consent for your infant to participate in this PhD research study which explores my practice as an infant teacher and how it impacts on infants’ subjectivities and their relationships with people, places and things in an ECE context. It also invites you to give consent for any footage that you and/or any of your other children may be captured in when attending the centre, to be included as part of this PhD research study also.

Please indicate your consent by ticking the box beside each relevant statement below, and signing the accompanying form by 5th February. In signing this sheet you are agreeing to the following statements:

☐ I have read the explanatory letter, which I have kept for my own information, and have had the opportunity to seek clarification on any issues.

☐ I understand that my infant may feature in the video recording of Bridgette’s practice with infants which will occur for 1 hour per week for 16 weeks over a period of 6 months and that Bridgette will wear a video recording device. I also understand that 2 tracking cameras will be located, 1 inside and 1 outside to video record Bridgette’s practice, from a different field of vision.

☐ If at any time during this video recording process my infant shows any signs of discomfort or distress, I understand that this will be monitored by Bridgette as the teacher-researcher in collaboration with the centre coordinator. In such cases, I am assured that filming will cease on that day. I understand that as my child’s parent or caregiver if I am concerned that my child is in discomfort or distress, I can notify Bridgette or the centre coordinator and filming will cease on that day.

☐ I understand that the footage will be analysed by Bridgette as the teacher-researcher and may be viewed by Bridgette’s supervisors: Associate Professor Jayne White, Dr Carol Murphy and Professor Bronwen Cowie.

☐ I understand that footage of a selection of events selected by Bridgette and related to Bridgette’s practice will be viewed by, reflected upon and discussed with other infant teachers from the centre at a monthly staff meeting for 4 months.

☐ I understand that I may feature in the video recording of Bridgette’s practice if I
attend the centre at times when video recording is taking place.

□ I understand that any of my other children who are with me when I attend the centre may feature in the video recording of Bridgette’s practice if I attend the centre at times when video recording is taking place.

□ I understand the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will also be disseminated in my PhD thesis, downloadable publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum, at conferences and in other oral and visual presentations.

□ I understand the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives could also be used for teaching purposes.

□ I understand that an electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons. I understand that a link will be sent to me on completion of this PhD thesis.

□ I understand that I can ask that any images or other information about my infant or my other children or me are withdrawn at any point of the data collection — at which time any footage containing images of my infant, my other children or me will be destroyed.

□ I understand that, due to the visual nature of this PhD research study, my infant’s and my own anonymity and confidentiality cannot be assured. I also understand that due to the visual nature of this PhD research study, the anonymity and confidentiality cannot be assured of any other of my children that may be with me at the time of attending the centre.

□ I agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] for my infant to take part in Bridgette’s PhD research study as described in the information letter.

□ I agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] for any video recording of Bridgette’s practice that may feature me when I attend the centre to be included in this PhD research study, as described in the information letter.

□ I agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] for any video recording of Bridgette’s practice that may feature my other children when I attend the centre to be included in this PhD research study, as described in the information letter.

Name of Family Representative: ………………………………………

Name of Infant ……………………………………………………………

Please assign me a Pseudonym (Please tick yes or no):  □ Yes  □ No
Contact details ........................................................................................................
Signature of family representative ......................................................................
Date ......................................................................................................................
Thank you for completing this form. Please return it to me by 5th February 2016
Bridgette Redder
### Appendix 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff meeting</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>(for myself)</th>
<th>(for you)</th>
<th>(for me)</th>
<th>(for us)</th>
<th>(for them)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R: In that moment ... I couldn’t physically put Olivia in the swing</td>
<td>Inner Dialogue</td>
<td>Reflexive Journal</td>
<td>I was nodding my head in agreement with you when you were saying that it felt like I was going to ‘ditch’ poor Ashton. Yet my inner thoughts were screaming that this was not my intention. I felt compelled to put this right by explaining to you all that I was going to seek help in order to ensure both infants had the attention they were seeking.</td>
<td>By nodding my head I felt that this gesture I was informing you that I agreed with you. My actions could have been perceived by you as my team leader that what you were saying as the authoritative figure was right.</td>
<td>By stating “You’re always in conflict about it” – I felt you were speaking for the team when you say “you’re” – suggesting this is a moral dilemma shared by all of us.</td>
<td>Article 3 UNCROC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: ... [not to help someone else, it’s a tricky situation that happens all the time. You’re always in conflict about it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 12 UNCROC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: It does, it does</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Code of professional responsibility &amp; standards (NZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Family values of giving of self for others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excerpt from analysis table