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Retribution-Style Adult Image-Based Sexual Abuse:

Crime Scripting, *CRAVED* and Situational Crime Prevention

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Security and Crime Science at The University of Waikato by Abigail O’Hara

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Abstract
The majority of Harmful Digital Communications Act (HDCA) prosecutions in New Zealand typically involved the misuse of an adult (female) victim’s intimate images by a current or former (male) intimate partner---“retribution-style” image-based sexual abuse (IBSA). Retribution-style IBSA encompasses abusive behaviours such as covert intimate filming or photography, the non-consensual storage of a victim’s intimate images, threats to disseminate such images and the actual dissemination of a victim’s intimate images. The harms of victimisation include significant emotional distress, job loss, and physical and online stalking and harassment by internet users who viewed their intimate images. Due to the ubiquity and permanence of the internet, retribution-style IBSA victims cannot be guaranteed that their intimate images would not resurface in future. This study aims to establish an evidence base for retribution-style IBSA. The crime-commission process of retribution-style IBSA is investigated using crime script analysis. The components of IBSA target selection are detailed using the components in the CRAVED framework, and barriers to prevention, tactical and strategic approaches for IBSA prevention are identified using a thematic analysis of 4 semi-structured interviews and 18 court transcripts. Crime intervention points and a situational crime prevention (SCP) framework would be devised to assist law enforcement and policy makers with IBSA prevention in New Zealand.

Keywords: Retribution-style image-based sexual abuse, Harmful Digital Communications Act, crime script analysis, CRAVED, thematic analysis, situational crime prevention
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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Background of Image-Based Sexual Abuse

The advancement of digital communications technologies in this information age has facilitated and improved human interconnectivity and interactions in the professional, social and intimate spheres. Unfortunately, individuals are exploiting these digital communication technologies to abuse, harass or commit acts of violence. Many of these offences fall into the category of image-based sexual abuse (IBSA), an umbrella term for all sexually abusive harms experienced by victims and includes the non-consensual creation of semi-nude, nude or sexual or sexually explicit photographs and/or videos (intimate images), the non-consensual distribution of those intimate images, and the threat of distributing a victim’s intimate images (see DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2016; McGlynn & Rackley, 2017; McGlynn, Rackley & Houghton, 2017; Henry & Powell, 2016; Powell & Henry, 2017). These researchers coined the term on the basis that all of these behaviours cause multiple and intersecting harms. McGlynn and Rackley (2017) have asserted that the term image-based sexual abuse (IBSA) accurately captures the severe harms inflicted on victims and that it is not limited to ex-partners seeking revenge and subscribing to non-consensual distribution of a victim’s images, but includes anyone who participates in the non-consensual distribution of a victim’s images (e.g., a joke, money or for no clear reason).

Powell, Henry, and Flynn (2018) created a typology for image-based sexual abuse with five categories (pp. 393-394):

(1) Relationship retribution, where revenge is a motivation within the context of a current or past intimate relationship;
(2) Sextortion, where the perpetrator seeks to obtain further images, money, or unwanted sexual acts using existing images, or the threat of images, regardless of whether or not they exist;

(3) Sexual voyeurism, where perpetrators are seeking to create or distribute images as a form of sexual gratification, including (but not limited to) “upskirting” and “down-blousing”;

(4) Sexploitation, where the primary goal is to obtain monetary benefits through the trade of non-consensual imagery; and

(5) Sexual assault, where perpetrators and/or bystanders record sexual assaults and rapes on mobile phones or other devices and then distribute those images via mobile phone or online.

Unlike previous definitions such as ‘revenge pornography’ (Salter & Crofts, 2015; Hall & Hearn, 2017) or ‘non-consensual pornography’ (e.g., Citron & Franks, 2014; Walker & Sleath, 2017; Suzor, Seignior, & Singleton, 2017), IBSA also acknowledges the non-consensual creation of intimate images and threats to distribute them. These researchers have established that the images may be a “selfie”-- taken by the victims themselves and shared with the offender, taken by another individual with or without the victim’s consent or the images may be digitally manipulated or superimposed to present a victim’s face or body in a sexual way. Offenders do not always inform the victim of their intentions to disclose the intimate images so not all victims are aware that their intimate images had been taken or distributed. In the most unfortunate circumstances, the offender also provides the victim’s personal information such as full name, e-mail address, employee designation and organisation, mobile phone number along with the images, known as ‘doxxing’, a web-based practice of the non-consensual
broadcasting of identifiable information about an individual. When such information accompanies the victim’s intimate images, viewers of the content are able to crowdsourced the contact details of those close to the victim such as the victim’s family members, friends, employers and co-workers and forward them the images and image hyperlinks and eventually make contact with the victim. This elevates the level of harm for the victim and increases the risk of repeat victimisation.

To stay abreast of global legislative trend against image-based sexual abuse, New Zealand’s Ministry of Justice introduced the *Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 (NZ)* (the HDCA) in 2015. This legislation empowers legal representatives in New Zealand with greater autonomy over deterrence, denunciation and accountability for perpetrators and to deter, prevent and mitigate harm for victims. Section 22(1) of the Act describes the offence as:

‘causing harm by posting digital communication’ and fulfills these conditions:

(a) the person posts a digital communication with the intention that it cause harm to a victim; and

(b) posting the communication would cause harm to an ordinary reasonable person in the position of the victim; and

(c) posting the communication causes harm to the victim. (p. 14)

In Section 22(2) of the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 (NZ), to determine whether harm has been inflicted on the victim, the court takes into account any of the following factors:

(a) the extremity of the language used;

(b) the age and characteristics of the victim;
(c) whether the digital communication was anonymous;
(d) whether the digital communication was repeated;
(e) the extent of circulation of the digital communication;
(f) whether the digital communication is true or false; and
(g) the context in which the digital communication appeared. (p. 14)

As of June 2018, 24 people have been incarcerated due to HDCA offences with most of the incarcerations being IBSA-related offences and the majority of prosecutions involving relationship breakdowns (Ministry of Justice, 2018) which is congruent with previous research (Bloom, 2014; Dawkins, 2015; Larkin, 2014; Matsui, 2015; Osterday, 2016; Tungate, 2014). With reference to the prosecutions in New Zealand, most IBSA perpetration does not occur in isolation but within a larger context of domestic violence as the abuse tends to be carried out by scorned ex-partners (Bloom, 2014; Osterday, 2016) or occurs when the relationship breakdown is hostile and virulent (Daniels, 2014; Salter & Crofts, 2015). In this vein, a significant number of prosecutions have referenced the Domestic Violence Act 1995. In addition to prior domestic violence offences (e.g., male-assaults-female) or gateway offences leading up to IBSA (e.g., intimate covert filming or blackmail), driving, drug and alcohol-related charges or convictions may also be present in the IBSA criminal context.

In the Domestic Violence Act (1995),

“domestic violence, in relation to any person, means violence against that person by any other person with whom that person is, or has been, in a domestic relationship.

(2) In this section, violence means—

(a) physical abuse:
(b) sexual abuse:

(c) psychological abuse, including, but not limited to,—

(i) intimidation:

(ii) harassment:

(iii) damage to property:

(iv) threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or psychological abuse:

(iva) financial or economic abuse (for example, denying or limiting access to financial resources, or preventing or restricting employment opportunities or access to education):

(v) in relation to a child, abuse of the kind set out in subsection (3).” (p. 13)

A report by the Ministry of Justice (2018) indicated 18 HDCA prosecutions from 2015-2016, 85 from 2016-2017 and 107 from 2017-2018. HDCA offences were disproportionately perpetrated by males (91%; 48 convictions) with nearly 25 offenders (47%) being less than 30 years old with the highest prevalence being in the age band of 25-29 years (10 convictions), followed by 20-24 years (9 convictions) and 30-34 years (8 convictions). These statistics seem to align with previous research that has identified older teenagers and young adults being the at-risk groups of ISBA perpetration and victimisation due to their engagement in digital communications and exploration of intimate (romantic and sexual) relationships (Arnett, 2014). However, there appear to be more cases of IBSA in adults in their early thirties which suggests that other adult age bands need to be investigated as well.

The majority of IBSA offences were carried out by European males (42
convictions), followed by Maori males (6 convictions) with Maori male convictions declining from 10 to 6 cases from mid-2016 to mid-2018. This contradicts in-the-flesh current family violence statistics in New Zealand where Maori are disproportionately overrepresented in family violence offences in 2017/2018 (54% of offenders are Maori male- 3,595, 33% are European male-2176 and 660 were Pacific males) (Ministry of Justice, 2018). In regard to IBSA cases, NetSafe (October, 2018) stated that 21,632 images were reported since August 2016 with consistently 2 out of 3 victims being female. NetSafe also released a report on adult experiences of IBSA. Among the 1001 participants surveyed, Maori as opposed to Pakeha reported receiving more threats of disclosure rather than being victims of non-consensual intimate image dissemination (NetSafe, 2019). To better account for this and rule out sampling bias from generic surveys, the survey needs to be replicated in other samples.

Hall and Hearn (2017) analysed the database of My Ex.com, a revenge porn website. An approximation of 10,813 posts were in English with 9,285 posts created in the United States, 796 in the United Kingdom, 496 in Canada, 214 in Australia and 22 in New Zealand. Unfortunately, in cases where offenders anonymously disclosed the victim’s intimate images on websites specifically dedicated to retribution-style IBSA (e.g., revenge porn sites) or file sharing platforms that have little to no privacy protections for potential victims, such platforms are not legally obligated to adhere to takedown requests by the victim, New Zealand’s law enforcement or intermediary even with the HDCA in place. This only prolongs the harm inflicted on the victim. According to a conference report by NetSafe in October 2018, the takedown request success rate of a victim’s intimate images is approximately 70%, with service-recipient satisfaction
rates being approximately 90%, resolution rates being approximately 60% and the number of complainants potentially going to court being 5%.

Although retribution-style IBSA is not as prevalent as in-the-flesh domestic violence in New Zealand, unlike the Scottish legislation, New Zealand does not make exceptions for “reckless” posting of intimate images. The number of incarcerations since the HDCA was introduced demonstrates New Zealand’s firm stance against retribution-style IBSA. In this vein, it is critical that New Zealand’s criminal justice system is revised constantly for future legal proofing and that law enforcement is able to respond swiftly and effectively to this new legislation and cases of retribution-style IBSA. Law enforcement and policy makers may need to consider allocating more resources towards preventing further displacement of intimate partner violence into cyber space where the latter is indisputably more difficult to contain. It is also critical that law enforcement stays ahead of offenders who are becoming increasingly sophisticated in concealing their crimes and escaping the law or at worst, driving victims to suicide through persistent IBSA perpetration.

New Zealand’s HDCA aligns with legal research on retribution-style IBSA (Dawkins, 2015; Larkin, 2014) which assert that legislation should best reflect the manner in which people communicate in this modern era. It seems to support the legal position that effective legislation would shift the responsibility from the original creator of the intimate images (victim) to the individual who non-consensually discloses the image (perpetrator), emphasise consent within the context of an intimate relationship and include the seriousness of harms from retribution-style IBSA (Slane, 2013; Albury & Crawford, 2012; Powell, 2010; Salter & Crofts, 2015). Other legal researchers report that such legislation would
have broader societal implications by reinforcing the importance of consent within relationships and that consenting to having a picture taken does not equate to consent for the recipient to distribute it to others (Barmore, 2015; Gissell, 2015). Virtual reality researchers also warn that there is a high probability of 3D virtual reality retribution-style IBSA accompanying the current demand of 3D virtual reality pornography (Ruberg, 2016; Stroud, 2014; Wood, Wood, & Balaam, 2017). As the HDCA was designed to be flexible and adaptable, as opposed to more traditional legislation that is more resistant to change, New Zealand is in an advantageous position to keep legislatively up-to-date with rapid digital advancements.

1.2. Research Objectives

Law enforcement would be able to more effectively control IBSA by understanding: (i) how the internet and/or digital communications devices translate into a virtual crime scene, (ii) the layers of the internet and the information cycle and (iii) worse-case scenarios of IBSA (i.e., no guaranteed removal of all intimate images from the internet and persistent re-surfacing of images) along with the severity of harm on victims. Even though harmful digital communications offences are perpetrated online and not offline as is with traditional offending, it has been contended that such cases should be dealt with similar severity as sexual violence cases (see McGlynn & Rackley, 2017; Bloom, 2014).

This explorative qualitative research aims to: (i) improve the understanding of offender decision making and perpetration of IBSA perpetrated by former or current intimate partners and the harms inflicted within the larger
spheres of domestic violence and the virtual environment (ii) understand the crime-commission process of IBSA perpetrated by former and current partners (retribution-style IBSA) through crime script analysis, (iii) improve police responses and crime prevention efforts to stay ahead of offenders in both technical and criminal sophistication through suggested crime script intervention points, (iv) assist with crime proofing and revising current legislation for retribution-style IBSA perpetrated through situational crime prevention measures, and (v) propose increased coordination and collaborative efforts among various stakeholders of the HDCA using thematic analysis.

Chapter 2 examines current literature relating to IBSA, drawing from various disciplines, and in Chapter 3, the context in dating, domestic violence and sexual abuse is established. Chapter 4 addresses crime theories and frameworks pertinent to the study, Chapter 5 details the Method for understanding the crime-commission process (Part I) and prevention (Part II) of retribution-style IBSA, and Chapters 6 and 7 address the Results of both sections. Lastly, Chapter 8 details the study’s general conclusions, limitations, future avenues for research.
Chapter 2. Literature Review of IBSA

The majority of literature on retribution-style IBSA has been dominated by sociological, gender studies and feminist legal approaches with sexting literature being mostly dominated by the psychological field. What remains a fact in New Zealand and many other countries alike is that adult perpetrated IBSA is not immediately or necessarily classified as “criminal” unlike adult-to-child IBSA perpetration (i.e., child pornography cases). Investigations on the latter tend to be investigated immediately and seen to completion by law enforcement. Being the first Crime Science study on IBSA, this research draws from multiple disciplines to aid in understanding the crime-commission process of retribution-style IBSA and examines the criminal actors, spaces and crime interactions of retribution-style IBSA in greater detail. This extensive review of literature also aids in proposing recommendations and streamlining the focus for situational crime prevention of retribution-style IBSA and potentially assists frontline law enforcement with identifying “criminal” variables of IBSA which warrant further investigation and responding more effectively to victims. An attempt is made to operationalise criminal forms of retribution-style IBSA for future attempts to study trends of IPV displacement into the virtual space and, to evaluate the effectiveness of the HDCA as a deterrent given the increasing complexity, pervasiveness, severity and concealability of cyber crime.

2.1. Knowing the perpetrator

Limited literature on gender and IBSA perpetration revealed that perpetrators were likely to report that their victim was male as female (Gámez-Guadix, Almendros, Borrajo, & Calvete, 2015; Lenhart, Ybarra, & Price-Feeney, 2016; Reed, Tolman, & Ward, 2016; Henry, Powell & Flynn, 2017) and that
males were more likely to self-disclose being IBSA perpetrators than females (Powell, Henry, Flynn, & Scott, 2019; Ruvalcaba & Eaton, 2019).

An international study by Powell et al. (2019) investigated the extent and nature of IBSA perpetration in a community sample of Australian residents aged 16 to 49 years. The researchers found that 1 in 10 participants engaged in IBSA perpetration behaviours such as the non-consensual taking of nude/sexual images of another individual, threatening to distribute or distributing the images.

With regard to perpetrator-victim relationship, of the study’s self-reported IBSA perpetration (covert intimate photo taking), 40.1% of participants reported ever taking a nude or sexual image of an intimate partner or ex-partner, followed by 20.5% targeting a friend and 20.2% targeting a family member. For IBSA perpetration (non-consensual distribution), 29.8% of participants targeted a friend, 22.8% targeted an intimate partner or ex-partner. For IBSA perpetration (threatening to distribute), 34.8% of participants targeted a friend, 24.7% targeted a family member and 22.2% targeted an intimate partner or ex-partner. The rest of the participants targeted work colleagues or ex-work colleagues, an acquaintance, a stranger or did not know the nature of their relationship with the victim. However, it was not clear in the study why IBSA perpetration (non-consensual distribution) targeted at a “friend” was higher than ex-partners and intimate partners or why IBSA perpetration (threats to distribute) targeting a family member was highest. A possible explanation could be that men underreported committing abuse against ex-partners and intimate partners due to social desirability bias and their awareness of societal condemnation of intimate partner violence (Cercone, Beach, & Arias, 2005). Non-heterosexual (gay or bisexual) male participants reported more IBSA perpetration behaviours compared to
heterosexual males or females. This is consistent with a study by Garcia et al. (2016) which found that more men (25%) than women (20%) had ‘shared a received sexy photo with someone else’ and that gay men were twice as likely as lesbian women to non-consensually distribute such images. Similarly, Ruvalcaba and Eaton’s (2019) U.S study found that overall, regardless of sexual orientation, men were significantly represented as perpetrators but gay men were more likely to perpetrate such behaviours compared to heterosexual men. These researchers suggest that gay and bisexual men are at greater risk of perpetration (and victimisation) than heterosexual men.

The findings from Powell et al. (2019) clearly support the five typologies of IBSA (see Powell & Henry, 2018) and contradict narrower definitions of IBSA such as ‘revenge pornography’ (Hall & Hearn, 2017, Salter & Crofts, 2015) or ‘non-consensual pornography’ (see Citron & Franks, 2014; Poole, 2015; Suzor, Seignior, & Singleton, 2017; Walker & Sleath, 2017). Their study was also significant in identifying relationships between sexuality and IBSA perpetration. Although the study lacked generalisability (e.g., overrepresentation of non-heterosexuals and a high level of educated participants in their large community sample) and the inability to provide insight into the experiences, perspectives and motivations of the self-reported IBSA perpetrators (e.g., in the larger context of domestic, sexual or family violence), the findings suggest that gender and sexuality are significant in understanding the degree and nature of IBSA experiences. Consistent with sexual violence literature, the vast majority of victims were known to the perpetrator (see Clay-Warner & Burt, 2005) with almost half of the perpetrators being intimate partners or ex-partners but the researchers have demonstrated that IBSA perpetration can be a method of
harassment or abuse in the context of intimate relationships including familial and friendship circumstances.

Hall and Hearn (2017) analysed texts that accompanied nude or sexual image uploads on a well-known ‘revenge porn’ website. From the texts, the researchers identified that the majority of images posted were of women and were posted by men who were communicating normative masculine identities and re-institutionalising themselves as ‘real men’ within the largely male community of website users. This suggests that male (as opposed to female) perpetration is largely prevalent on revenge porn sites. In a more extensive study, Uhl, Rhyner, Terrance, and Lugo (2018) conducted a content analysis of 134 non-consensual photos contained on seven different websites which may not function specifically for the purpose of hosting, promoting ‘revenge porn’ or explicitly harming victims. The researchers found that 92% of victims depicted in the images were women and that more than a third of the images had texts accompanying them which explained the perpetrator’s reasons for sharing the women’s image with the most common being that she was an ‘ex’ (22%), ‘hot’ or ‘sexy’ (22%), ‘a slut’ (15%), or unfaithful (6%).

These findings indicate that while some IBSA perpetration may be motivated by relationship retribution, in other instances, it may be more related to other motivations such as status-seeking among online male-dominated communities which is consistent with previous research by Yeung, Horyniak, Vella, Hellard, and Lim (2014) that found that male IBSA perpetration was motivated by demonstrations of sexual success. To-date, no studies have identified an overrepresentation of females in IBSA perpetration (threats to distribute, covert intimate photo taking or non-consensual distribution of nude or
sexual images) within or outside the intimate relationship context.

2.2. Individual Characteristics of IBSA Perpetrators

2.2.1. Sexist beliefs

Although the research is still in its infancy, there has been support for the association between psychological characteristics and the perpetration of retribution-style IBSA.

Henry and Powell (2016) argue that IBSA is a form of gendered violence with the risk of victimisation being higher for females and the negative impacts experienced by female victims being greater due to gender and societal expectations and norms. While some researchers emphasise the importance of examining sexist beliefs towards gender roles, behaviours, and relationships within a society in understanding sexual violence, especially towards women (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2011, 2018), others argue that in the context of retribution-style IBSA, it is too simplistic to solely attribute violence to misogynistic endeavours and pornographic practices that are aimed at degrading women. The latter argue the significance of the internet’s allowance for anonymity enhances freedom of expression and autonomy of constructing and altering the online self which in turn creates a culture of fast and anonymous relationship retribution, encouraging uncivil or criminal activity (Stroud & Pye, 2013; Hlavach & Freivogel, 2011; Stroud, 2014). However, other researchers have sought to quantify sexist ideologies such as the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and utilise this inventory to demonstrate the relationship between sexism and the perpetration of technology-facilitated violence and dating violence perpetration (Martinez-Pecino & Durán, 2016; Morelli, Bianchi, Baiocco, Pezzuti & Chirumbolo, 2016; Tang & Fox, 2016).
A study by Morelli et al. (2016) used self-reported perpetrators’ perspectives to examine the relationship between sexist beliefs, retribution-style IBSA perpetration and dating violence perpetration. In their Italian sample of 13 to 30 year-olds, IBSA perpetration was found to be weakly but significantly related to both dating violence perpetration and benevolent and hostile sexism after controlling for age, gender and sexual orientation. This means that benevolent sexism could act as a protective factor for retribution-style IBSA perpetration whilst hostile sexism could be a risk factor for retribution-style IBSA perpetration. These researchers support the deconstruction of gender stereotypes in “bystander” prevention programmes for retribution-style IBSA perpetration.

2.2.2. The Dark Triad

The socially aversive traits of Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism are referred to as the ‘Dark Triad’ of personality (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Collectively, the Dark Triad traits are characterised by high levels of callousness, low empathy, egocentrism and readiness to exploit others (Jones & Paulhus, 2011b, 2014). Individuals high in psychopathy possess psychopathic callousness which manifests behaviourally as the quick action for instant gratification. Such behaviour persists due to these individuals’ severe lack of empathy for others and poor self-control (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a) which contributes to their sudden and frequent abandonments of relationships without any discomfort or regard for their personal circumstances (Hare & Neumann, 2008). This impulsivity or poor self-control can be present in criminal (Hare & Neumann, 2008) and non-criminal behavioural presentations (Hall & Benning, 2006) of psychopathy. Machiavellianism refers to an individual’s constant strategic positioning in which alliances may be built as part of ruthless
manipulation and deception of others solely for personal gain or self-interest whilst narcissism is characteristic of individuals with high levels of self-perceived grandiosity and entitlement (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) that is motivated by ego reinforcement (Bushman, Bonacci, van Dijk, & Baumeister, 2003). Even though callous affect is present in all three socially aversive traits, it has different motivations (i.e., psychopathy is motivated by a lack of empathy and self-control, Machiavellianism is motivated by personal gain or self-interest and narcissism is motivated by ego inflation and reinforcement). When all three traits are combined, the individual would possess a disposition towards engaging in self-interested and anti-social behaviours to attain one’s own goals (Koehn, Okan & Jonason, 2018).

In this vein, researchers have demonstrated a relationship between the Dark Triad and technology-facilitated sexual violence perpetration behaviours such as greater proclivity to sexually harassing others (Zeigler-Hill, Besser, Morag, & Campbell, 2016), and deriving pleasure from partaking in such perpetration (Buckels, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 2014). Moreover, a higher endorsement of psychopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism was reported to be a significant predictor of ‘romantic revenge’ proclivity after experiencing infidelity (Brewer, Hunt, James, & Abell, 2015) and following a relationship breakdown (Rasmussen & Boom, 2014). Although Brewer et al., (2015) only utilised a female sample in their Dark Triad and romantic revenge study, they did not specifically examine the Dark Triad in retribution-style IBSA female perpetration.

On the other hand, a study by Kokkinos, Antoniadou and Markos (2014) identified that traits of psychopathy such as high levels of irresponsibility and low levels of self-control predict retribution-style IBSA perpetration. A more recent
study by Pina, Holland and James (2018) identified a relationship between higher endorsement of Dark Triad traits and ambivalent sexism and greater self-reported proclivity to engage in retribution-style IBSA perpetration behaviours. Although the latter study detected positive correlations with retribution-style IBSA enjoyment and narcissism and Machiavellianism, only narcissism was an independent predictor of retribution-style IBSA enjoyment. The researchers suggested that unlike Machiavellianism, narcissistic traits could be unique to retribution-style IBSA enjoyment as this enjoyment may enhance the narcissistic individual’s perception and experience of control, and provide the necessary ego reinforcement (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) which becomes important after a failed relationship. Although the study by Pina et al. (2018) comprised mostly female participants, their findings took into account the psychological characteristics of narcissism and sexism which have been consistently identified as being prevalent among male participants and retribution-style IBSA perpetrators in the broader context of sexual violence.

Contradicting findings were reported in a study by Clancy, Klettke and Hallford (2019) that used a large convenience sample of 505 young Australian adults and tested the hypothesis that non-consensual dissemination of a victim’s self-taken and shared intimate images (sexts) is associated with positive subjective norms and personal attitudes towards, and dark triad personality traits. The researchers identified four unique predictors of the increased likelihood of non-consensual sext dissemination: being sexually active, having stronger positive attitudes towards the non-consensual dissemination of sexts as being funny, having received a sext and more strongly normalising that sexts are usually disseminated or viewed by others. The only predictor of a decreased likelihood of
engaging in non-consensual dissemination of sexts was if the participant who had engaged in sexting had personally experienced negative consequences of their image(s) being shared without their consent. Although the researchers found significant associations between the Dark Triad personality traits and sext dissemination with Machiavellianism having the strongest relationship, the effect sizes were too small to detect any independent relationship between Dark Triad traits and sext dissemination. However, they acknowledged that the predictors used in their study (e.g., finding dissemination funny or not a big deal) could be proxies for dark-triad related disseminated motivations which point to a lack of empathy especially if participants were already aware of the potential negative consequences experienced by a victim of sex dissemination—all of which warrant further investigation into the potentially “dark” motivations of sext dissemination behaviours.

2.2.3. Sadistic Tendencies

Pathological (extreme) sadism manifests itself as a sadistic personality—an individual who intentionally incites physical, sexual or psychological harm upon others to demean and humiliate them, whilst being motivated by his/her quest for enjoyment and assertion of power and authority (O’Meara, Davies, & Hammond, 2011). Other researchers have investigated the subclinical form of sadism or ‘everyday sadism’ (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999) which extends beyond acting out (externalising) anger (Bushman & Whitaker, 2010), psychopathic instrumental aggression (Fedoroff, 2008; Malamuth, 2003; Woodworth & Porter, 2002), and callous narcissistic entitlement (Baumeister, Catanese, & Wallace, 2002; Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). To demonstrate that sadism is a self-sustaining pleasure-driven form of
aggression in sadists, Buckels, Jones and Paulhus (2013) used a white-noise-aggression paradigm. The researchers found that sadists, psychopaths, narcissists, and those low in empathy and perspective taking displayed aggressive behaviour towards an innocent person when unprovoked. However, among the dark personalities (i.e., subclinical psychopathy, subclinical narcissism, and Machiavellianism), only sadists increased the intensity of their attacks once they realised the individual would not retaliate and only sadists were willing to expend time and energy (i.e., incur a personal cost) towards hurting an innocent person. These researchers concluded that unlike other dark personalities, sadists possess an intrinsic motivation towards sadism and that sadistic behaviour may even be rewarding, outweighing any personal cost incurred by the sadistic aggressor (sadist).

Moving beyond research that limits sadism to a sexual disorder that is exclusive to hardened criminals (Mokros, Osterheider, Hucker, & Nitschke, 2011), everyday sadism has been a significant predictor of in-the-flesh sexual violence (Russell & King, 2016) and online sexual violence (Buckels et al., 2014). Although a more recent study by Pina et al. (2018) found no significant relationship between retribution-style IBSA perpetration proclivity and sadistic tendencies, these researchers attributed this to an unanticipated gender skewedness (i.e., 82 females and 16 males) in their sample. Moreover, (Buckles & Paulhus, 2012) found that males (as opposed to females) are disproportionately represented in those who endorse sadistic tendencies. This is consistent with males being overrepresented in retribution-style IBSA perpetration (e.g., threats to distribute, covert intimate photo taking and filming or non-consensual distribution of nude or sexual images) statistics.
In summary, there is currently only limited research into the extent and nature of IBSA perpetration, and individual characteristics of IBSA perpetrators.

2.3. Social Psychological and Sociological Processes of IBSA perpetration

2.3.1. Theory of Reasoned Action

The theory of reasoned action (Azjen & Fishbein, 1975) demonstrates that an individual’s participation in a specific voluntary behaviour can be predicted by the individual’s intention to engage in the behaviour. The intentions to voluntarily engage in any behaviour depend on an individual's attitudes (personal beliefs about the behaviour and positive or negative consequences of the outcome) and subjective norms (self-perceptions of peer perceptions towards engaging in the behaviour and the motivation to conform to peer norms). The theory of reasoned action posits that the behaviour would occur if the individual’s attitude towards the behaviour is positive and would be well-received by peers.

Building on Hudson and Fetro’s (2015) study that applied the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975) to the propensity to engage in sexting behaviours, Clancy et al. (2019) incorporated the theory of reasoned action to investigate whether subjective norms and attitudes concerning the non-consensual dissemination of sexts were related to non-consensual sexts dissemination behaviours and dark triad personality traits of Machiavellianism, psychopathy and narcissism. The study’s findings were consistent with the theory of reasoned action whereby participants who believed that non-consensual sext dissemination was a positive experience (amusing, harmless, no big deal and as a joke), that sexts are typically seen by a larger audience, that it is acceptable to disseminate sexts after a relationship breakdown and can enhance social status among peers were more likely to engage in non-consensual sext dissemination behaviours.
More specifically, when gender was analysed in relation to attitudes and norms, it was found that males (40.7%) were disproportionately more likely than females (5%) to endorse that non-consensual dissemination of sexts can enhance social status. Males were also more likely to perceive such disclosure as funny and that it is acceptable to engage in such behaviours after a relationship breakdown, suggesting the importance of gender roles and expectations around non-consensual sext dissemination and the perceived male gender-specific rewards (e.g., increased social status and male peer acceptance) associated with engaging in such behaviours compared to females.

Also consistent with the theory of reasoned action, the researchers found that negative attitudes towards non-consensual sext dissemination originate from having personally experienced negative consequences of sext dissemination which in turn reduce the proclivity towards engaging in non-consensual sext dissemination. The researchers acknowledged that only 20% of their sample reported IBSA perpetration and attributed this to social desirably bias (Edwards, 1953) whereby there is a possibility that the participants failed to disclose prior participation in IBSA perpetration behaviours and provided more socially acceptable responses. Although the study demonstrated the significance of norms and attitudes in shaping IBSA perpetration behaviours and gender disparities in norms and attitudes, the convenience sample utilised in this study limited the generalisability of the findings. Moreover, the survey did not query the perpetrator-victim relationship context (e.g., non-sexual acquaintance, former or current sexual partner in a committed romantic relationship, former or current casual sex partner), frequency of perpetration or the gender of the person in the image which limited the study’s ability to assist with the understanding of the
motivations and severity of IBSA perpetration.

2.3.2. Male Peer Support Theory

Opposing generic male stream theories (e.g., DeKeserdy, Dragiewicz, & Schwartz, 2017; Heimer & Messerschmidt, 1994), male peer support theorists argue that there are unmarked structures and normalised behaviours in online and offline spaces whereby male peer influence is a significant contributor to an individual male’s victimisation of women. More specifically, all-male groups encourage, justify and support the abuse and victimisation of women in the effort to repair “damaged patriarchal masculinity” inflicted on men by current or former female partners (Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 2010; Heimer & Messerschmidt, 1994; Raphael, 2001). In the context of a relationship breakdown whereby the woman exits a relationship, male peer support motivates a man to commit acts of violence against the woman he “can no longer control” (Bourgois, 1995, p. 214).

DeKeseredy and Schwartz (2013) argue that various offline environments are fertile platforms for the provision of male peer informational support (i.e., verbally and publicly disseminated guidance and advice) that support sexually violent and other abusive acts against women as legitimate avenues of upholding of patriarchal authority and control. These scholars argue that the male peer support theory influences the “patriarchal” male to model after the pro-abuse attitudes and behaviours of his equally (if not more abusive) male counterparts who engage in sexually, physically and/or psychologically abusive acts against their own intimate partners. Failing to restore patriarchal order when a woman is considering leaving or leaves a relationship with him would subject him to ridicule as he is unable to “control his woman” (DeKeseredy, Rogness, & Schwartz, 2004) and has lost his “sexual and reproductive property they can own
and exchange” (Wilson & Daly, 1992, p. 85).

In support of the male peer support theory in the online environment, there are patriarchal online communities that provide support for violence against women (see Crisafi, Mullins, & Jasinski, 2016) and other male peer support subcultures including men who patronise revenge pornography sites and “catalyse a campaign of harassment” against women they possess misogynistic attitudes towards (Salter & Crofts, 2015, p. 239). DeKeseredy and Schwartz (2016) argue that IBSA is an effective way to perpetrate violent acts against a woman when she cannot be physically located, is living abroad or if the offender knows her location but has received a restraining order and is therefore prohibited from physically meeting or contacting her through electronic means. Patriarchal online communities and other male peer support subcultures including men on revenge pornography sites IBSA perpetrators may share similar motivations of humiliation, degradation, and control with rapists and resort to in-the-flesh sexual violence and sexual violent acts via digital communications technologies and patriarchal online communities. However, as the literature suggests, no studies have explicitly compared the motivations of a sexual violence perpetrator with those of an IBSA perpetrator.

2.4. Perceptions of IBSA Perpetration and Victimisation

2.4.1. Public Perspectives of IBSA Victimisation

Much of the negative media attention on sexting has focused on the notion that careless young women indiscriminately share their nude images without considering the potential risks involved (Albury & Crawford, 2012). This is consistent with research of the blaming of predominantly female victims (Barmore, 2015; Dawkins, 2015; Gissell, 2015; Slane, 2013). Research has shown
that women generally do not send their nude images to strangers and that a level of trust is necessary before women partake in such an activity (Samimi & Anderson, 2014; Dir, Coskunpinar, Steiner & Cyders, 2013). This counters arguments about naive, irresponsible women “not knowing any better” and falling prey to retribution-style IBSA. Moreover, when comparing the negative consequences of retribution-style IBSA, women are more likely to have sexually violent acts committed against them by someone they know rather than a stranger (Clay-Warner & Burt, 2005). Unfortunately the fundamental attribution error otherwise known as an individual’s bias in attributing another individual’s behaviour to more internal than external (situational causes) (see Hogg & Vaughan, 2005) perpetuates victim blaming for IBSA victims.

On a policy level, online safety and anti-sexting campaigns have also fuelled female victim blaming with their focus being on “correcting” deviant female sexual self-image taking and sharing rather than males who are more likely to non-consensually disclose and circulate such intimate images (Fleschler Peskin et al., 2013; Karaian, 2013). These campaigns were implemented based on a ‘risk management’ model of sexual violence, whereby women’s bodies are defined as risks and hence women are inherently at risk and are accountable for the management and mitigation of this risk (Albury & Crawford, 2012). This shifts the blame away from the perpetrator and the perpetrator’s violation of the victim’s privacy.

Walker, Sanci and Temple-Smith (2013) established the importance of the gendered nature of sexting after interviewing a sample of 15 to 20 year-olds. The researchers reported that young women experience feelings of being pressured (e.g., coerced, bribed or threatened) by young males to send their sexual self-taken
images which could be used in future as blackmail or for retribution and uploaded on sites that are utilised by males who upload images of their female ex-partners. Young females who send such images were perceived as “slutty girls,” “whores,” “skanky little girls,” or “just an idiot for sending it in the first place” (Walker et al., 2013) and deserving of the negative consequences of sexting (i.e., non-consensual disclosure of their images). Young males also frequently blamed young female victims for their victimisation on the basis that the females consented to sharing their images. This is consistent with Jane’s (2012) argument on victim-blaming that emphasises the indifference towards the increasingly hostile and misogynic nature of the cybersphere. This indifference is exacerbated by notions that IBSA perpetration is a “harmless prank” and victim-survivors are “hypersensitive or humourless”. These misconceptions also explain why IBSA producers and site hosts are rarely admonished. Based on public narratives, sexualised private images of partially clad females are perceived as “slutty” and shameful whilst sexually explicit images of males are perceived as commonplace (Daniels & Zurbriggen, 2016). To-date, there is no literature exploring differences in how IBSA is experienced by male and female victims.

Another qualitative study that utilised samples of 13 to 15 year-olds (UK) and 15 to 17 year-olds (Australia) reported similar negative appraisals of female victims (as compared to male victims) whereby the females are responsible on the account that they volunteered for sexual self-taking and sharing of their intimate images such as “not thinking or “poor choices” by females (Dobson & Ringrose, 2016). The qualitative studies support the gendered nature of retribution-style IBSA victimisation which blames females and absolves male perpetrators of responsibility. Using a focus group of 18 to 25 year-olds, Burkett (2015)
conducted discourse analysis on gendered perceptions and experiences of retribution-style IBSA and demonstrated how the female subject was positioned as a “silly” young female victim or responsible for “sexting going wrong”. The discourse positioned the female as deviant and accountable for her own victimisation whilst the male was absolved of any responsibility in non-consensually disclosing her intimate images. Findings in other literature support this “deviant discourse” surrounding “female” sexting behaviours (Angelides, 2013; Karaian, 2013; Lee & Crofts, 2015). Lee and Crofts (2015) argue that the focus should not be on the female sexter’s behaviour but the perpetrator’s non-consensual disclosure of the victim’s intimate images and that educational campaigns should focus on the non-consensual distribution of the image as the problematic behavior that needs to be addressed (see Angelides, 2013; Karaian, 2013).

Drawing from literature on rape myth acceptance (e.g., Bohner, Eyssel, Pina, Siebler & Viki, 2009) and rape perpetrator leniency and victim blaming (e.g., Maier, 2014; Sleath & Bull, 2009), Hatcher (2016) examined victim and perpetrator blame in retribution-style IBSA using cases that focus on the contribution of relationship duration, the nature of media capture and victim cheating behaviour. It was found that both rape myth acceptance and victim infidelity were significant predictors of retribution-style IBSA victim blaming. Another study by Knieps and Hatcher (2016) investigated the effect of good and bad break ups on retribution-style IBSA and found that the endorsement of gender norms was a significant mediator for retribution-style IBSA acceptance and that a “bad” relationship breakup was a direct predictor for the acceptance of certain relationship retribution IBSA behaviours such as spreading lies about a victim.
These insights which take into consideration the context of relationships rather than specifically focusing on public perceptions and attitudes towards sexting behaviours, have implications on the understanding of retribution-style IBSA perpetration and the design of prevention programmes.

2.4.2. Sex of IBSA Victim, Perpetrator and Observer

Research has identified the importance of the sex of victims and perpetrators in shaping observers’ perceptions of severity and accountability intimate partner violence such as domestic violence, rape and stalking. In these contexts, with a male perpetrator and female victim, observers’ perceive intervention as necessary and the impact of the situation on the victim as more severe (Corbally, 2015; Runtz, & O’Donnell, 2003; Scott, Rajakaruna, Sheridan, & Gavin, 2015; Vandiver, & Dupalo, 2012). Conversely, in contexts with female perpetrators and male victims, male victims are less likely to be taken seriously and are more likely to be perceived as responsible for the situation (Seelau & Seelau, 2005; Sheridan, Gillett, Davies, Blaauw, & Patel, 2003; Gavin & Scott, 2016). Other research has reported that female (rather than male) observers are more likely to perceive such situations as serious (Finnegan & Timmons Fritz, 2012; Pierce & Harris, 1993; Scott et al., 2015; Seelau, Seelau, & Poorman, 2003) and that they are more sympathetic towards the victim and are less likely to hold the victim responsible (Grubb & Turner, 2012; Home, 1994; Whatley, 2005; Yamawaki, Ochoa-Shipp, Pulsipher, Harlos, & Swindler, 2012).

A UK university cohort study by Scott and Gavin (2018) that investigated the influence of a victim’s sex, observer’s sex and observer’s sexting experience on perceptions of severity and accountability in the context of retribution-style IBSA in a one-year relationship found that men were more likely to perceive
retribution-style IBSA as more severe when the perpetrator is male and the victim is female rather than vice versa. However, the sexes of the perpetrator and victim did not influence female observers’ perceptions of the severity of retribution-style IBSA. Respondents with sexting experience were more likely to perceive retribution-style IBSA as less severe and attribute less blame to the victim compared to respondents with no sexting experience. However, the sample was not representative of the general adult population, excluded observer’s perceptions of non-heterosexual individuals, retribution-style IBSA in longer-term relationships or other relationship contexts such as ‘married but separating’.

Similarly, Bothamley and Tully’s (2018) vignette study examined variables that may influence public perceptions of IBSA and victim blaming using an online survey administered to 168 adults from the UK. The researchers identified that harm minimisation and victim blaming attitudes towards IBSA victims were more prevalent among males than females and that females rated police intervention as more necessary compared to males across all conditions. Although their study cited a few limitations reducing the generalisability of the study’s findings such as a significant gender imbalance in the sample, the sample being skewed towards mental health professionals, and a lack of specificity in defining the length of relationship in their vignettes, the study did highlight the need for future research to examine the meaningfulness of a relationship and the length of a relationship and overlaps that might be present. The researchers did conclude that the public generally did not blame victims of IBSA which could serve as reassurance for IBSA victims in coming forward without being blamed for their victimisation.

However, a more recent UK-based evolutionary psychology study
presented contradicting findings between male and female participant appraisals of the severity of IBSA victimisation (Fido et al., 2018). It was hypothesised that females with higher levels of intrasexual competition (see Fisher & Cox, 2010) would resort to more rival derogation strategies such as ‘slut shaming’ towards female IBSA victims (see Ringrose & Renold, 2012) and therefore judge female victims more harshly. Contrary to the hypothesis, the researchers found that high levels of intrasexual competition was associated with more lenient judgments made by female participants about IBSA offences involving male victims. The researchers suggested that additional traits associated with high female intrasexual competition such as female sexual interest and sexual promiscuity could account for this result although these variables were not measured in their study. Female participants did not judge same-sex victims more harshly than male participants nor did their attractiveness ratings of the female victim have any effect on their judgments. The researchers explained that this could be due to the participants themselves participating in sexual image taking and sharing themselves and therefore being able to better empathise with victims. Evidently, further in-depth study is necessary to draw firmer conclusions about the leniency and/or harshness when judging same-sex IBSA victims. The main limitation of the study as acknowledged by the researchers was that the samples used are only “culturally” representative of the UK. This evolutionary psychology study on IBSA is a strong contender against the larger body of literature which contextualises IBSA within gender inequality stemming from patriarchal structures (see McGlynn et al., 2017).

2.4.3. Victim Help-seeking Behaviours and Challenges Reporting IBSA

In a more recent exploratory study by Ruvalcaba and Eaton (2019) on
IBSA victims’ help-seeking behaviours, when posed this question: “Who did you turn to for help when you discovered that images of you had been shared without your consent?” the three most common responses were no-one (72.95%), followed by friends (20.08%), and website(s) where the image(s) were uploaded (7.49%). In their sample of 3,044 U.S adults, only 34% of female and 18% of male victims sought help. Of the female victims who reported not seeking help, 39.07% reported that they were embarrassed, afraid (14.57%) and not bothered (12.58%) whereas for male victims who reported not seeking help, 59.14% reported that they were not bothered (59.14%), were embarrassed (12.90%) and afraid (4.30%). These findings are consistent with reactions by in-the-flesh sexual assault victims. Weiss (2010) reported that male victims of sexual assault blamed themselves, felt shame, were too embarrassed to report the assault to the police and feared that their private/sexual pasts would be exposed to the public. Koss (2006) also found that sexual assault victims were less likely to report acquaintances, current or former partners to the police compared to strangers due to feelings of shame, embarrassment and the belief that the police would turn them away. Other researchers found that among university students, acquaintance and/or ex-partner rape was treated as more severe than stranger rape with victims from the former being more susceptible to victim blaming (see Krahé, Temkin, & Bieneck, 2007). When applied to IBSA victims, these attitudes could negatively reduce victim help-seeking behaviours.

These gendered differences in reporting lend support to gender-frameworks of IBSA perpetration: the male (perpetrator) and female (victim) dyad (Henry & Powell, 2015; Salter & Crofts, 2015) and the negative mental health impacts (e.g., depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder-PTSD) on
female compared to male victims (Bates, 2017). The consequences for female victims were found to extend beyond humiliation and embarrassment with many victims being impacted professionally (i.e., they lose their job from the dissemination of their intimate images or out of fear that the perpetrator would carry out the threat and publish their images (Cooper, 2016; Kamal & Newman, 2016), suicide ideation and other maladaptive coping mechanisms (Bates, 2017). Researchers also found that bisexual women were at highest risk of IBSA victimisation, followed by other sexual minorities such as non-heterosexual (bisexual and gay) males. As sexual minorities are held to heteronormative standards by society (Dwyer, 2015) and in their own relationships (Rosenkrantz & Mark, 2018) and are assumed to be heterosexual (Nadal et al., 2011), they would face additional challenges seeking help for IBSA without exposing their stigmatised identities.

An online panel survey of 4053 Australian residents (aged 16-49 years) by Powell et al. (2019) reported that after controlling for other participant characteristics, self-reported retribution-style IBSA perpetrators tended to blame victims more and that attitudinally, participants who blamed retribution-style IBSA victims and accepted sexual image-based abuse myths included in the researchers’ newly developed sexual image-based abuse myth acceptance (SIAMA) scale (see Payne, Lonsway, & Fitsgerald, 1999; Powell & Webster, 2018), were more likely to have been/ be perpetrators themselves. These findings are consistent with attitudinal research on other forms of sexual aggression such as rape myths (see Payne et al., 1999; Pina et al., 2018; Powell & Webster, 2018). However, the researchers concluded that sexual self-image taking and exchanging is common among 16 to 49 year-olds and that the self-reported rates of
perpetration (1 in 10) in their study and victimisation in a prior study (1 in 5, see Henry et al., 2017) are far lower than overall engagement in sexual self-image (‘selfie’) behaviours. Hence, the majority of participants who engage in sexual self-image taking and sexting do not experience retribution-style IBSA victimisation or engage in perpetration (Powell et al., 2019) contradicting prior literature that has presented a deviant female discourse and self-image taking and sexting as the cause of victimisation.

2.4.4. Adult Sexting and Intimate Relationships

Other studies examining adult relationship satisfaction and self-image taking and sexting and behaviours have demonstrated that adult individuals in committed, romantic relationships are more likely to sext than those not in a relationship (Delevi & Weisskirch, 2013; Dir et al., 2013; Perkins, Becker, Tehee, & Mackelprang, 2014; Samimi & Alderson, 2014) and that sexting may be beneficial to adult relationship satisfaction (Parker, Blackburn, Perry, & Hawks, 2013; Stasko & Gellar, 2015) especially for married and unmarried couples with insecure (anxious) attachment styles (McDaniel & Drouin, 2015; Weisskirch & Develi, 2011; Weisskirvh, Drouin, & Delevi, 2016). Drouin, Coupe and Temple (2017) recruited 352 participants in their online study about adult sexting experiences. The researchers found that almost 58% of adult participants had engaged in sexting and about 50% of those who engaged in sexting experienced positive sexual and emotional outcomes in their intimate relationships. However, there were noticeable gender differences in sexting behaviours and appraisal of negative consequences in committed and casual relationships. For example, males were twice as likely to have sexted with a casual partner than with a committed partner whilst females were twice as likely to have sexted with a committed partner.
partner than with a casual partner. Overall, both sexes reported more negative emotional consequences (e.g., worry and regret) when they had sexted in a casual relationship but females reported more worry, regret and trauma when they had sexted in casual relationship. This research is consistent with prior literature highlighting the higher emotional costs and reduced emotional benefits in casual sexual hookups (Owen & Finchman, 2011; Mark, Garcia, & Fisher, 2015). For men, the casual or committed context of their relationship did not influence the amount of regret, worry and trauma experienced from sexting. Adult sexting and healthy relationships literature coupled with recent findings of sexual self-image taking and exchanging and rates of perpetration and victimisation have important implications for policy responses and particularly the prevention of retribution-style IBSA with regard to reducing “victim blaming” and increasing awareness of the “unethical and increasingly criminal nature of the non-consensual dissemination of a victim’s intimate images.

2.5. Policing IBSA Challenges: Victim credibility, Victim-blaming, Resourcing barriers and Difficulties procuring evidence

For many victims of sexual abuse, the police are gatekeepers to the criminal justice system (see Spohn & Tellis, 2012). Wentz and Archbold (2012) assert the importance of positive police response and support in ensuring that victims have fair access to criminal justice. Likewise in IBSA, a form of technology-facilitated sexual violence (TFSV) (see Powell & Henry, 2017), the police may be the first point of contact for many adult victims which emphasises the clear need for police regulation and effective redress for victims (Cooper, 2016). To date, only two studies have examined the policing of IBSA (Bond & Tyrell, 2018; Henry, Flynn, & Powell, 2018) with other studies investigating
police perceptions, responses, experiences and challenges in relation to generic cybercrime (Bossler & Holt, 2012; Vincze, 2016). Bond and Tyrrell’s (2018) UK national survey of 783 police, reported an overall significant lack of police understanding and confidence in investigating, responding to and managing IBSA cases whilst Henry et al. (2018) conducted a detailed examination of the nature of IBSA, legislative reform, barriers to reporting, jurisdictional challenges, police resourcing and stakeholder recommendations through 44 stakeholder semi-structured interviews with 52 participants.

Venema (2016) found that police engage in victim blaming and often fail to hold the perpetrator of sexual violence accountable and that victims of marital rape (Areh, Mesko, & Umek, 2009) and acquaintance-rape victims (Sleath & Bull, 2012) may be subject to more victim blaming than stranger-rape victims. The participants in Henry et al. (2018) attributed the underreporting of IBSA, inadequate police investigation and ineffective police response to IBSA victims to traditional masculine values within the police force, a poor understanding of gendered violence, and harm minimisation and victim blaming attitudes held by the police. In this study, other factors negatively impacting an IBSA victim’s chance of having their case investigated by the police are the victims’ reluctance to share their “adult” intimate images (as opposed to illegal child exploitation material) with the police out of fear that their images would be construed as enjoyable pornographic material by male police officers, fear of retribution by offenders if they reported threats of dissemination to the police and fear that their circumstances would be trivialised by the police, consistent with the rape acceptance myth of “he didn’t mean to” (see Page, 2008a) and, a heightened level of distrust in the police as socio-cultural disadvantaged (i.e., marginalised)
member of a community (see Dwyer, 2015; Nadal et al., 2011).

Police participants in Henry et al.’s (2018) qualitative study also highlighted jurisdictional and resourcing barriers which force the police to find a more serious offence to investigate, pursue substantive offences such as stalking or blackmail in addition to IBSA offences rather than a sole IBSA offence and/or investigate cases that have a police protection order in place. This is consistent with research by Powell and Henry (2016) which highlighted police prioritisation of contact (physical) offences over communication offences or technology-facilitated harms.

Victim credibility is particularly critical in determining whether the police would expend effort towards investigating a case, charge the perpetrator (Goodman-Delahunt, & Graham, 2011) and refer it to further legal processing (Campbell, Menakar, & King, 2015). The perceived lack of victim credibility that is guided by police misconceptions about sexual violence has also been cited as a key reason for high attrition from the police investigative process (Campbell et al. 2015). Patterson (2011) argues that if vulnerable victims disclose their victimisation and are not believed and blamed for their own victimisation, this could re-traumatise and harm them further.

In IBSA, victim credibility may be problematic due to technical resource constraints encountered by the police in procuring forensic digital evidence (see Vincze, 2016) aimed at securing the identity of the individual who created, disseminated or threatened to share the victim’s images or evidence supporting a “verbal” threat to disseminate a victim’s intimate images. An offender’s exploitation of the internet’s anonymity was cited as a major barrier to procuring evidence to investigate an IBSA case. Other participants highlighted that unlike
burglary victimisation where the police readily conduct investigations, in cases of sexual violence and IBSA victimisation, the onus is unfairly placed on the victim to produce the evidence which could initiate police investigation (Henry et al., 2018). Bond and Tyrell’s (2018) and Henry et al.’s (2018) studies reported poor police knowledge of criminal laws and harms of IBSA in addition to the provision of unhelpful advice provided to victims of IBSA by the police such as turning off their phones or deactivating their social media accounts. Given the present findings, combined with literature indicating that victim blaming occurs within the police, further research into whether the fact that many staff involved in receiving rape or retribution-style IBSA victim reports are male deters victims from reporting an offence, or re-traumatises the victim, is an area that would benefit from further research.

As highlighted by Henry et al. (2018), a further complication for law enforcement to assist a victim in accessing the criminal justice system is the fact that many victims are unaware that their intimate images are being circulated on the internet and may not be aware of the new legislation and be harmed or repeatedly harmed but not recognising this as an offence (see Bothamley & Tully, 2018). This is most applicable to IBSA victims whose perpetrators are not motivated by revenge or relationship retribution but by sexual gratification and/or to boost social status among a private group. When the victim does not report the images, the police cannot take any action.

No studies to-date have been conducted on policing IBSA in New Zealand. Given that current and former intimate partners are in closest proximity to potential IBSA targets, the former are readily presented with opportunities for perpetrating IBSA. Hence, this study would assume that current and former
intimate partners are just as if not more capable of committing IBSA than individuals outside the intimate relationship space.

Understanding literature on retribution-style IBSA offender profiling is critical in law enforcement and policy makers’ efforts to review and revise current tactical, strategic and/or operational approaches to control and prevent retribution-style IBSA and on a larger scale, technology-facilitated intimate partner violence. Increased knowledge on the “criminal” context of retribution-style IBSA would enable law enforcement to police the IPV (dating and domestic) space more effectively and take perpetrators to task. As mentioned previously, it would be challenging to disrupt crime if it (retribution-style IBSA) is not deemed abusive or criminal by the police and third parties who are the first point of contact for victims.

Indeed broad socio-political or cultural theories and discourse on IBSA perpetration and its harmful effects on victims are useful but as a standalone, such theoretical perspectives cannot justify the weight of the term image-based “sexual” abuse. Although there is no empirically supported typology devised for IBSA as a “sexual” abusive crime, the reviewed literature is useful in providing more context to the construction of crime scripts of various types of retribution-style IBSA (e.g., accessing victim’s mobile device, covert filming, blackmail and soliciting unwanted sexual favours). These specialised crime scripts are critical in enhancing the evidence base for retribution-style IBSA and aiding the construction of intervention points and more effective policing of IBSA.
Chapter 3. Contextualising IBSA: Dating, Domestic and Sexual Violence

Central to IBSA is the relationship between the non-consensual creation and/or use of private sexual (intimate) images and other forms of sexual violence (McGlynn & Rackley, 2016). Referencing Kelly’s (1988, 2012) continuum of sexual violence, McGlynn and Rackley (2017) argued that IBSA falls within the continuum of sexual violence along with other abusive actions that attack or violate a woman’s fundamental rights of sexual identity, expression, integrity and autonomy.

Researchers have argued the appropriateness of classifying IBSA as a sexual offence (Bloom, 2014) rather than a communications offence (i.e., breach of privacy) taking into account that the abuse is sexualised as sexual images are central to perpetration (McGlynn et al., 2017) and IBSA and sexual assault victims share similar negative mental health effects (Bates, 2017). Other researchers assert that a wider acceptance of IBSA as a sexual offence would ensure that resources are channeled adequately into providing support and protection for victims (Strid, Walby, & Armstrong, 2013; Salter & Crofts, 2015; McGlynn et al., 2017). Kelly (1988) identifies various harms and tactics used to predominantly control women such as abuse, coercion, intimidation, threats, intrusion and force that fall along the continuum of sexual violence. Depending on the severity of harms associated with IBSA victimisation, IBSA may encompass one, more than one or all the aforementioned characteristics.

Feminist perspectives of sexual assault or rape outline male domination over women as central to the sexual abuse and that such sexual acts are rationalised, purposive and goal-driven (i.e., motivated by power and control, misogyny and the need to reestablish patriarchal order by regaining control over a
woman) (Chapleau & Oswald, 2010; Day, 1995; Ellis, 1989; Burt, 1991; Bohner et al., 1998) rather than a consequence of pathological (uncontrollable) sexual urges or compulsions (Burt, 1980; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995). Priming studies have reported that rapists and high risk sex offenders maintain a strong memory association between sex and power (see Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Wesselmann, Pryor, & Palmieri, 2002) and this sex-power (dominance) association distinguishes rape from sexual acts or activities that are mutually consensual with shared power. Chiroro, Bohner, Viki, and Jarvis’s (2004) study on rape myth acceptance utilising a survey sample of 310 male participants reported that sex was an optimal method for men to exert power over women and that being able to dominate a woman through sex is stimulating. When applied to IBSA, a former or current male partner who disseminates a woman’s intimate images online reaps the “reward power” (Dutton & Goodman, 2005) of enjoyment, domination and control over the female victim’s chances of employment, familial and social relationships and self-worth and the degree of suffering he is able to inflict.

Henry and Powell (2016b) also argue that technology expands the repertoire of intimate partner violence (IPV) as further abuse can be perpetrated via digital media such as monitoring, controlling, threatening, harassing, pressuring or coercing a current or former intimate partner (see Reed et al., 2016). According to Melander (2010), digital media heightens an intimate partner’s risk of public exposure, mockery and degradation and provides ample opportunities for unwanted (frequent and/or harmful) digital communications and privacy intrusions (covert monitoring and tracking of activities and movements) by an abusive former or current intimate partner (Patchin & Hinduja, 2006; Draucker &
Martsolf, 2010; Tokunaga, 2010). Draucker and Martsolf’s (2010) qualitative study on young adults established that surveillance behaviours (e.g., phone calls and accessing the target’s e-mails and social networking accounts) intensify when the perpetrator suspects infidelity and that digital media significantly contributes to the escalation of arguments and unwanted prolonged contact between couples after separation. In this vein, IBSA was created with the knowledge that the line between online and offline sexual violence perpetration and victimisation has become increasingly blurred (Bluett-Boyd, Fileborn, Quadara, & Moore, 2013).

A large body of research supports the concurrent perpetration of in-the-flesh IPV behaviours in addition to digital dating abusive behaviours (Marganski & Melander, 2018; Ojanen et al., 2015; Brem, Spiller, & Vandehey, 2015; Reed et al., 2016). For instance, Reed et al. (2016) measured hypothetical reactions to sexting between male and female undergraduates and detected a relationship between online dating abuse behaviours and offline physical, sexual, psychological perpetration and victimisation. Similarly, Marganski and Melander (2018) found that cyber victimisation was a significant predictor of in-the-flesh IPV among 540 college students whereby individuals who experienced cyber victimisation by an intimate partner were 28 times more likely to experience in-the-flesh psychological abuse, four times more likely to experience in-the-flesh sexual violence and 52 times more likely to experience in-the-flesh physical violence by the same partner over a period of 12 months. This literature lends support to IBSA perpetration being along the continuum of in-the-flesh IPV.

3.1. Technology-Facilitated Coercive Control and IBSA Perpetration

Stark (2012) defines coercive control as “an ongoing pattern of domination by which male abusive partners primarily interweave repeated
physical and sexual violence with intimidation, sexual degradation, isolation and control. The primary outcome of coercive control is a condition of entrapment that can be hostage-like in the harms it inflicts on dignity, liberty, autonomy and personhood as well as to physical and psychological integrity” (p.6) More specifically, coercive tactics are targeted at threatening, intimidating, frightening, harming and shaming victims whilst tactics of control are directed at isolating, depriving, exploiting and regulating victims. Myhill and Hohl (2016) analysed data from risk assessments of coercive control in England and Wales and identified that controlling, stalking and sexually coercive behaviours by perpetrators and isolation and fear by victims were most salient in intimate partner abuse.

According to Stark (2007), the closeness present in an intimate relationship enables a perpetrator to have privileged access to information about a target and identify existing vulnerabilities that are unique to a target and can be exploited for incipient IPV or coercive control. For example, a female target may have entrusted her intimate images and/or related her conservative upbringing and cultural values around nudity and sexual activity to her partner. At a later time, during a relationship conflict or separation, he may threaten to disseminate her intimate images if she does not re-enter a relationship with him, break-up with her new partner or agree to post-breakup unwanted sexual favours.

A review by Hamberger, Larsen and Lehrner (2017) identified three dimensions of coercive control in an intimate relationship: (i) the perpetrator must have the intent and motivation to gain control over the target, (ii) the target must perceive the perpetrator’s behaviour as negative, and (iii) the perpetrator must have the ability to make a credible threat (see Dutton & Goodman, 2005; Bair-
Merritt et al., 2010; Day & Bowen, 2015). More comprehensively, the term “technology facilitated coercive control” (TFCC) was proposed by Dragiewicz et al. (2018) to encompass the technological and relational aspects of abuse in the specific context of coercive and controlling intimate (dating and domestic) relationships that have an undercurrent of violence. TFCC acknowledges the role of digital media in facilitating coercion and controlling behaviours such as harassment on social media, cyberstalking via fake social media accounts and GPS data, covert intimate filming and phototaking, threats via digital communications technologies, monitoring and unauthorised access of a victim’s e-mails and social media accounts, falsely impersonating a former or current partner, endangering the safety of the individual and threatening to or disclosing private information (doxxing) or intimate images of a victim without consent (Woodlock, 2017). These researchers emphasise that former or current intimate partners exploit the social convergence and ubiquity of digital media by tightening control over a victim’s activities, relationships and self-concept and self-worth and that physical separation poses little to no inconvenience. Furthermore, doxxing could further elevate levels of humiliation and embarrassment for the IBSA victim including the potential for online and physical harassment and stalking by strangers (Stroud, 2014).

3.2. Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Relationship Grievances and Resorting to Violence

Coercive control without physical violence has the capacity to instill fear in victims and this can continue after couples have separated (Crossman, Hardesty, & Raffaelli, 2016). Separation is perceived as a provocation and experienced as a threat to the abusive partner’s power and coercive controlling
violence (CCV) (Kelly & Johnson, 2008), hence around the time of separation, acts of severe physical, sexual and emotional abuse, harassment, coercive controlling behaviours are likely to continue and escalate (Myhill, 2015; Ornstein & Rickne, 2013). Post-separation coercive control tactics are also employed by divorced men to maintain power and control over their ex-wives (Brownridge, Chan, Hiebert-Murphy, & Ristock, 2008; Hayes, 2012; Zeoli, Rivera, Sullivan, & Kubiak, 2013). In IBSA, offenders in custody battles may to resort to using a victim’s intimate images to gain access to children. As coercive controlling tactics are difficult for law enforcement to detect and investigate, this makes it more challenging for women or mothers to seek criminal justice or leave an abusive relationship with their abusive partners (Bond, 2015).

To explain marital separation violence, Sev’er (1997) revised Pence and Paymar’s (1993) power and control wheel and highlighted the more salient power and control assertion tactics that divorced men use on their ex-wives during or after marital separation such as increased intimidation by turning her children and other loved ones against her, sabotaging her employment or financial independence or exploiting (abusing) the legal system aimed at making her lose custody over her children, coercion, threats and actual physical violence. In the context of marital separation, coercive control tactics include sexual denigration, entitlement and ownership over her (e.g., unfairly criticising his wife’s abilities to carry out her domestic and maternal duties) (Pitman, 2017; Velonis, 2016). When applied to an ex-husband’s dissemination of his former wife’s intimate images, the negative impacts of such IBSA may be experienced differently by married women or divorced women. Marital violence and dating violence should be studied separately.
3.3. Grievance Escalation Theory and Bypassing Interpersonal Violence

Luckenbill and Doyle’s (1989) grievance escalation theory incorporates situational aspects of a violent interpersonal interaction complements Felson and Steadman’s (1983) situational approach towards disputes leading to criminal violence. The grievance escalation theory (Luckenbill & Doyle, 1989) comprises three transitional stages to demonstrate how grievances escalate into interpersonal violence. This model can be used to explain IPV or how a female’s intimate images get disseminated after a relationship separation. In this model, Stage 1 (Naming) takes effect when the (male) recipient of a harmful act (relationship breakdown or separation) blames the (female) aggressor (who initiated the break-up or exited the relationship) and holds her personally accountable for the harm (insult to his masculine power and authority and her violation of relationship rules). At Stage 2 (Claiming), the male recipient of harm demands reparation from the (female) aggressor (e.g., relationship reparation or sexual favours) and if that is not obtainable (his threats come across as incredulous or she refuses to comply with his demands), what follows is an escalation to the final stage which embodies the use of force (i.e., the dissemination of her intimate images). Luckenbill and Doyle (1989) emphasised that those grievances that escalate into violence satisfy two psychological conditions: (i) disputatiousness - the willingness to seek revenge and maintain the grievance and, (ii) aggressiveness - the belief that violence would solve the problem and that he is willing and competent enough to deliver it.

Collins (2009, 2013) expanded on Luckenbill and Doyle’s approach by including a tipping point between violence and non-violence which includes the experience of a state of confrontational tension or fear or shared emotional tension
by the aggressor and target. According to Collins (2009), this emotional tension acts as a barrier to violence and the aggressor backs away. However, this stage can be bypassed completely. This may be especially pertinent to interpersonal crimes perpetrated via digital media such as IBSA as the victim and aggressor are typically not in physical contact when threats to disseminate a target’s intimate images are made. Collins and Walby (2013) highlights four principle methods to bypass emotional/ confrontational tension: (i) selecting a target who is easy to dominate and control emotionally, (ii) seeking out and aligning oneself to other individuals who provide encouragement and support for perpetrators of violence, (iii) maintaining distance when launching weapons of attack without a face-to-face confrontation with the target and, (iv) adopting a covert tactical approach by feigning the absence of conflict until initiating the final attack. According to Collins (2013), the first two principle methods are commonly found in interpersonal violence and the latter two, perpetrating violence at a distance are more relevant to military combat or terrorism (see Dutton, 2012). However, in relation to interpersonal crimes in cyberspace or retribution-style IBSA, all four principles may apply due to the online disinhibition effect (see Suler, 2004).

Exploring the conceptual underpinnings of IPV and the situational opportunities/variables that lead to the perpetration of abuse within various interpersonal spaces enhances understanding of retribution-style IBSA. The next chapter would provide the building blocks of this study.
Chapter 4. Crime Theories and Frameworks

There are a number of theories relating to the motivation for crime. In this chapter, two of these theoretical approaches are outlined, followed by a discussion of the framework for offending provided by the Internet.

4.1. Rational Choice Approach (RCA)

Rational choice theories explain how individuals consciously and rationally choose to commit criminal acts. Clarke and Cornish (1983, 1986, 2006) developed a sophisticated understanding of how individuals make rational choices about whether to commit a crime. More specifically, the rational choice theory posits that potential offenders make deliberate and goal-directed decisions that maximise personal benefits and minimise personal costs (e.g., risk of apprehension) when choosing to commit and while committing a crime.

Unlike classical ideologies of the rational choice theory that aim to ascertain the degree of rationality attributed to criminal activities, Clarke and Cornish (1983) emphasise that decisions to commit crimes need not be completely rational or carefully calibrated. Instead, offenders vary in their perceptions, attitudes, motivations, skills and abilities to analyse a situation and conduct choice structuring (weighing of benefits and costs) in order to achieve favourable outcomes (Cornish & Clarke, 1987). Hence, regardless of the type, frequency or severity of crime, offending decisions are considered deliberate and goal-directed (see Brantingham & Brantingham, 1978; Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Walsh, 1978; Cusson, 1983) rather than senseless even in criminal cases where clinical delusions (symptomatic of psychotic episodes) or pathological compulsive behaviours are valid reasons for offending (Cornish & Clarke, 2006). Clarke and Cornish (1985) also argue that offenders act on criminal opportunity and their
decisions take into account the environment of opportunities that facilitate criminal activity and constraints that prohibit crime. When applied to IBSA perpetration by former or current partners, offending arises out of an offender’s assessment of perceived risks and efforts involved in perpetrating retribution-style IBSA and the expected rewards (e.g., revenge, power, sexual gratification, money, unwanted sexual favours) (Cornish & Clarke, 2008).

Einstadter and Henry (2006) introduced the term “bounded rationality” to explain how an offender arrives at an acceptable decision. Instead of considering the maximisation or optimisation of outcomes (cost-benefit analysis), offenders make quick decisions at a given time period based on personal schema or scripts of past success. Similarly, Clarke (2008) argues that offenders are making decisions even if the decisions are split-second made and that offender decision-making is dynamic-- an offender’s readiness varies according to his/her current personal goals and frequent self-evaluations of their involvement in criminal activity and prior involvement in similar activities and the extent that the offender has learned from the consequences.

Cornish and Clarke (2008) support the use of the rational choice perspective as a heuristic for developing crime control strategies rather than a theory. Also, this perspective shifts the focus away from the origins of criminal behaviour and “criminal” personality traits (Waldo & Dinitz, 1967) to offender decision-making and the crime event or crime-commission process. Offender decision-making and behaviour can only be analysed if a crime is specific and contextualised (e.g., IBSA perpetration by former or current partners versus IBSA perpetration by strangers). In the context of retribution-style IBSA perpetration, the pragmatic nature of the rational choice theory enables crime scientists to focus
on the interaction of the offender with the immediate environment, the role of opportunity and situational variables and implement crime controls such as increasing the risks and efforts involved and disrupting criminal actions by reducing rewards associated with retribution-style IBSA perpetration.

4.2. Routine Activities Theory (RAT)

Cohen and Felson’s (1979) Routine Activities Theory (RAT), a subsidiary of rational choice theory takes into consideration situational factors that influence offenders to choose to commit crimes. Like the RCA, RAT assumes that offenders are rational and hedonistic. The RAT posits that criminal opportunities arise when there is a convergence of time and space of a (i) motivated offender, (ii) suitable target, and (iii) a lack of capable guardianship. Without this convergence of daily routine activities, direct-contact crime between the offender and victim cannot occur.

The Internet and digital media have been identified as conducive environments for the convergence of motivated offenders and suitable targets in the absence or lack of capable guardianship (Holt & Bossler, 2013; Grabosky & Smith, 2001). The convergence between cyber criminals and cyber victims occurs through digital communications devices and platforms rather than in physical time and space (Holt & Bossler, 2013). Felson and Clarke (2010) provided examples of characteristics and/or behaviours that render targets attractive and suitable to offenders such as social activities, economic status and drug and alcohol use. Although no studies to date have utilised RAT to solely explain the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images by former or current adult intimate partners, some research has identified variables that make victims attractive. For example, Kranenbarg, Holt and van Gelder (2017) concluded that for both
perpetrators and victims, having more computer skills was a significant predictor of a general measure of cybercrime perpetration and victimisation. When applied to retribution-style IBSA, a level of technological competency is required to utilise a smartphone camera and image-sharing platforms or mobile applications to engage in sexual self-image taking and sharing (sexting).

Research by Marganski and Melander (2018) and a review by Chen, Ho and Lwin (2017) identified risky online behaviours such as disseminating passwords as significant in increasing a target’s exposure to motivated offenders. Although both studies did not explicitly measure retribution-style IBSA victimisation, due to an intimate couple’s routine activities, intimate partners may have more opportunities to access a target’s mobile device or personal computer folders and download, store and later disseminate a target’s intimate images. Reyns, Henson and Fisher (2011) applied RAT to predict undergraduate student cyber harassment (stalking) victimisation and found that being female and being in an intimate relationship predicted cyber harassment victimisation and not online exposure variables commonly associated with cyber victimisation. Overall, there is limited RAT empirical support for generic cyber offending and victimisation with the exception of visibility.

According to Felson (1995), a motivated offender refers to physical (socio-environmental) factors rather than criminal disposition or motivation to commit a crime. Similar to the RCA, Felson and Clarke (1998) emphasise the importance of other important aspects of crime for more effective crime prevention to supplement other analyses aimed at deciphering the purposes and capacities of the aggressor in relation to intrinsic characteristics of potential targets (Felson, 2008). Capable guardianship refers to methods to protect the
target from crime. These can take various forms such as online platforms’ front-end, user-facing features and back-end architectures and algorithms (Suzor et al., 2017), women’s advocates and agencies that have developed their own initiatives to promote women’s online safety and encourage participation online (see Dragiewicz et al., 2018), search engines’ and social media platforms’ removal of revenge porn links from search results that have been reported (Singhal, 2015; Suzor et al., 2017) and individual advice on how online platforms can enhance their settings to protect victims of online abuse (e.g., Harper, 2016). However, these online platforms’ technologies have been criticised for lack of opaqueness, inconsistent and contradictory enforcement (Gillespie, 2017; Salter, 2017a; Suzor, Van Geelen, & West, 2018).

McMahon and Banyard (2012) have demonstrated that on college campuses, capable guardians are likely to be present before, during or after incidents of sexual assault and intimate partner violence. Other researchers have reported that college students are more willing to intervene if they know the victim (Burn, 2009; Casey & Ohler, 2012, Bennet & Banyard, 2016; Palmer, Nicksa, & McMahon, 2018). However, there is minimal research on the relationship between capable guardians, and perpetrators of sexual assault with the exception of a recent study that found that college capable guardians were less willing to report sexual assault if it were perpetrated by a friend (Nicksa, 2014). Situational variables such as relational distance and the degree of involvement in other people’s lives influence perpetration (Black, 1976). These situational variables could also be significant in the context of online forms of interpersonal violence or IPV.

Unfortunately, when targets and offenders are engaging in sexting and/or
sexting coercive behaviours, these behaviours are typically conducted in private, indoors and in isolated locations and are at times part of a series of attacks by the same intimate partner (threats to disseminate intimate images) may go unnoticed by capable guardians. The unregulated/ poorly regulated nature of the online environment and the intimate relationship space create a lack/ absence of capable guardianship over the use of harmful digital communications and cyber-technology that increase opportunities for a motivated offender to harass or abuse an intimate partner. There has also been limited research on the impact of guardianship (female rape resistance strategies) on sex offending (Ullman, 2007) especially guardian intervention in different situational contexts (Hart & Miethe, 2008). The most recent examination of sexual offences perpetrated against women by acquaintances (i.e., non-stranger offenders previously known to the victim) was conducted by Chiu and Leclerc (2017). These researchers utilised the RCA and crime script framework to devise intervention points at each crime script stage. However, to date, no prevention studies have been conducted on retribution-style IBSA.

Targets can be humans or property but in order for a potential offender to select a “suitable” target, the target must more or less satisfy the criteria in the acronym, VIVA (value, inertia, visibility and access) created by Cohen and Felson (1979). A target is deemed suitable if it (human or property) is valuable (real or symbolic) to the offender, transportable (lightweight and not bulky or odd shaped), visible (vulnerable to exposure or proximity to contact and attack) and accessible (the environment is conducive for carrying out an attack). Although VIVA was originally designed for property crimes (e.g., theft) and predatory crimes (e.g., sex offending), more research has applied this framework to explain
cyber crime (Grabosky & Smith, 2001; Holt & Bossler, 2013). Inertia was identified as least relevant not to cybercrime (Yar, 2005) whilst other elements such as value, visibility and accessibility are significant (Yar, 2005; Miró, 2012, 2015; Leufeldt & Yar, 2016).

Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED framework was proposed as a revision of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) VIVA heuristic. It was designed specifically for theft of “hot” products and includes more dimensions (i.e., Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, and Disposable) in the suitable targets checklist (CRAVED; Petrossian and Clarke, 2014). Petrossian and Clarke (2014) emphasised the utility of this framework to specific and contextualised types of crimes. Concealable- targets that are harder to identify and can be concealed more easily are more likely to be selected by offenders. Removable- targets that can be easily transported are more likely to be selected by offenders. Available- an inanimate object or a victim has to be visible and accessible. Valuable- valuable products (intimate images) are more likely to be targeted by offenders of IBSA. Enjoyable- IBSA offenders will select products that can bring them pleasure (e.g., a victim’s intimate images with identifiable features) over other things of similar value (victim’s non-intimate images). Disposable- IBSA offenders would need to be careful to select targets that are unwilling to and incapable of taking legal action or reporting the matter to the police. Victims must be easily controlled, harmed and humiliated enough to be disposable (i.e., not obligated to keep target’s intimate images private as both offender and target are no longer in an intimate relationship).

4.3. Digital Architecture: Creating Opportunities for IBSA

Although physical (geographical) space is irrelevant to cyberspace, it is
still a real space where people use the Internet for communications and interactions (Kellerman, 2016) and crimes perpetrated in cyberspace have real consequences in the real world (Newman, 2009). However, there are clear differences in how individuals communicate and interact in physical space and in cyber space (Yar, 2005; Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016). Miró (2012) asserts that these clear differences stemming from ICT’s impact have significant implications for how crime is understood and prevented in cyberspace (Capeller, 2001; Grabosky, 2001; Pease, 2001). However, the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images is better understood as technology-facilitated interpersonal violence whereby new electronic technologies (e.g., smart phones and computers) are utilised to perpetuate acts of intimate partner violence (IPV) (Dixon & Bowen, 2012; Melander, 2010).

Using the rational choice perspective, Wortley (2008) posits that the immediate environment can encourage or induce individuals who would not have contemplated crime in the first place to commit crime. In other words, the environment can precipitate criminal behaviour. This can be better explained using four precipitators: prompts, pressures, permission and provocations (Wortley, 2008). When applied to retribution-style IBSA perpetration, prompts could represent the storing of digital images in an offender’s phone, scrolling through the image folders storing the victim’s intimate images, viewing and consuming the images for pleasure or attempting to track the victim’s whereabouts and activities. Pressures could include peer pressure from others asking if the offender has his former or current partner’s intimate images or pressure to re-establish patriarchal order. Permission include weakening moral prohibition such as blaming anger and bitterness after relationship breakdown or
on alcohol problems. Examples of provocations could be relationship breakdowns, (actual or perceived) infidelity or the former partner has moved on.

4.3.1. Ease of interactions

Researchers have identified the ease of interactions in cyberspace otherwise described as the contraction of distance and freedom to occupy and utilise multiple online spaces simultaneously (Grabosky, 2001; Hutchings & Hayes, 2009). Through electronic technologies and digital media, individuals have the ability to interact with one and many people simultaneously with ease and these variables have the potential of multiplying the effect of criminal opportunities that has no precedent in history or real life crimes (Clough, 2010).

Researchers (Bernasco, 2018; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984) have demonstrated that physical crime in urban areas often occurs in proximity of the offender’s residence due to constraints of movement (e.g., additional transport costs) and their heightened awareness of opportunities in their area of residence rather than further away. Zipf’s (1949) principle of least effort (see Hollingshead and Zipf, 1949) can be applied to cyber crimes as well. In the context of cyber space (as opposed to urban crime), the role that geographical distance plays in the choices available to offenders and physical costs is less significant (Brenner & Clarke, 2005; Jones, 2007; McQuade, 2006; Miró 2012). This facilitates opportunities to offend in cyber space. Jaishankar (2008) who proposed the space transition theory argues that cybercrimes have unique causes compared to crimes that occur in physical spaces.

In cyber space, language barriers and cultural differences appear to play an ambivalent role in offending. In the context of digital communications, cultural differences and language barriers may minimise the quality of social interactions.
However, in the context of retribution-style IBSA, where explicit images rather than words are used, cultural differences and language barriers may have minimum effect on reducing opportunities for offending. Moreover, the removal of these constraints by allowing “images” to speak for themselves makes for effortless offending and could multiply the harm inflicted on the victim. The accessibility, retention, reach and replicability of content in digital media (Baym, 2015) enable text (i.e., cases of doxxing) and media objects (IBSA) to be utilised in the abuse and be persistently visible and tied to the victim’s identity. Bates’ (2017) interviews with victims of non-consensual dissemination of intimate images explained the constant anxiety victims experience over where and when their images would next appear.

A physical crime committed by a single person is limited to one place at a time. Unfortunately, on the internet, a single individual can upload a victim’s intimate images on as many platforms as possible and circulate them to as many people as they want regardless of geographical location or spatial boundaries (Woodlock, 2017). A single act of non-consensual dissemination of intimate images on the internet means that the act can be more easily multiplied through the process of diffusion in cyberspace, with other internet users distributing or consuming the victim’s explicit content without the offender’s instruction or participation (see Nazario, 2004).

4.3.2. Perception of Time

The Internet affects how time influences activity (Lee & Liebenau, 2000). The contraction of space (distance) reduces the time needed for social communication and interactions (Kitchin, 1998) and accelerates the subjective experience of time (Green, 2002). Unfortunately, synchronous communication on
digital media enhances the sense of placenessness and makes communications more immediate and personal, magnifying the harms of abuse (Baym, 2015). Types of communication in online spaces can make communicative expressions more persistent. Cyberspace increases an offender’s capacity to control how long communications or actions persist resulting in victims constantly feeling unsafe and unable to stop the spread of their images and escape from the abuse even though they are no longer in contact with the offender (Dimond, Fiesler, & Bruckman, 2011).

4.3.3. Perception of Transnational Boundaries

The absence of a central authority or the blurring of borders on the Internet and digital media create opportunities for offending. Countries need to collectively exercise authority in cyberspace as a single country’s legislation is often inadequate in controlling the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images. There are also significant challenges in regulating the Internet (Hiller & Cohen, 2002) and the lack of international legal structures to consistently and thoroughly enforce the removal of abusive material complicates the prosecution of the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images online (Citron & Franks, 2014; Salter & Crofts, 2015). Business models of online intermediaries or digital media platforms also work against victims. For instance, hate generated or circulated online (e.g., wider networks of misogyny) improve traffic to the media or online content, communications and interactions about it. The skyrocketing of viewership and/or reviews boost economic revenue for these platforms could explain their lackluster performance in responding to online abuse (Langlois & Slane, 2017; Massanari, 2017) and non-consensual intimate image takedown.
requests. These systemic loopholes translate to opportunities that can be exploited by offenders.

4.3.4. Dynamic and Rapidly Changing Perceptions of Online Behaviour

According to Goodman and Brenner (2002), perceptions of what is deemed socially and/or legally acceptable on the Internet are ambiguous. For instance, changes initiated by users (e.g., flagging or reporting certain nude images and not others) or what is considered normative is subject to change and is unclear especially since the boundary between public and private seems to have shifted from one of censorship to an informed consumer culture, better explained as pornographication (Attwood, 2009), the mainstreamification of pornography (Empel, 2012) and the sexualisation of culture Western societies (Dines, 2010). Offenders can also exploit public perceptions of victim blaming and slut shaming (Salter, 2017a) similar to public rape endorsement of statements such as “Women who are raped ask for it” or “Most rapists are oversexed” (see Longway & Fitzgerald, 1994).

4.3.5. Contact Online is “Indirect” and Often “Anonymous”

Cyberspace changes how people interact, the perceived and actual risks associated with offending and getting caught, and the likely effectiveness of the actions of guardians who might attempt to make offending more difficult. Anonymity can provide offenders with a sense of safety and reduce their fear of getting caught (Pittaro, 2007). Utilising online privacy platforms such as The Onion Router (Tor) enables offenders to control how much of their information is available and therefore conceal their crimes from law enforcement and others known to the victim. Yar (2005) identified other ways offenders remain anonymous such as impersonating someone else, constantly revising their online
identities and adopting multiple virtual personalities through multiple accounts which they consecutively or simultaneously utilise to offend. This could be a technique for criminally sophisticated IBSA perpetrators. Other Internet or digital media users can displace responsibility as they did not hurt the female in the image. Instead, they would rationalise their consumption behaviours (i.e., viewing, masturbating to and circulating intimate images) by claiming that the content was publicly available and therefore meant for sexual arousal of a public audience (Whisnant, 2010).

4.3.6. Online Disinhibition Effect

Researchers have argued that habitual Internet users experience the disinhibition effect which leads them to verbalise or engage in behaviours that they would not normally partake in during face-to-face interactions (Jaishankar, 2008; Agustina, 2012). In devising his psychology of cyberspace model, Suler (2004) identified six elements in the virtual environment that contribute to internet users’ collapse of healthy psychological barriers that control and regulate hostile feelings, and other feelings and needs or online disinhibition effect.

The first element is dissociative anonymity which outlines an individual’s separation of online and offline activities, forming two distinct identities that do not overlap. The second element is invisibility which relates to the fact that individuals are able to secretly or privately access websites and chat rooms that they otherwise would never partake in for fear of shame, apprehension and damage to their own reputation. The third element is asynchronicity in which interactions are not necessarily produced in real time. Interactions can be regulated according to an individual’s construction and revision of his/her online persona, providing a false sense of security and authenticity. It also facilitates
impulsivity and hostility, otherwise termed as an ‘emotional hit and run’. The
forth element is solipsistic introjection which refers to a subject assigning
imaginary traits to the other party he/she is interacting with to compensate for the
absence or lack of reliable data on the other party. These fantasies of the
imagination can also spill over into real life although these fantasies are
considerably unregulated online. The fifth element is dissociative imagination
which refers to the conscious or unconscious perception that the self-constructed
imaginary characters (i.e., the digital self along with the personas of others online)
exist in a separate dimension and are devoid of demands and responsibilities in
real life. This element involves dissociation between the fictional online world
and the facts of real offline life. The sixth element is the minimisation of status
and authority on the internet which refers to internet users losing distinctive
attributes of their authority and status which would otherwise be significantly
pronounced in the real world and lead to social distancing.

According to Agustina (2015), these online disinhibition effects increase
Internet users’ susceptibility to engage in risky online behaviours which could end
up in cyber victimisation. More specifically relating to IBSA, Reynes, Burek,
Henson, & Fisher (2013) argue that sexting significantly predicts eventual forms
of cyber victimisation such as extortion, blackmail, vengeful or frivolous actions
(Agustina, 2012). However, sexting may not be an online risk taking behaviour in
contexts where IBSA is perpetuated by former or current long term committed
intimate (abusive) partners. This elevates the level of complexity in explaining
and preventing victimisation in the context of “not-so-naive” IBSA adult victims
and abusive dating/ domestic partners as offenders.
Central to this study is the *CRAVED* framework which would largely assist with the operationalising of IBSA behaviours which can assist with streamlining police investigations and facilitating retribution-style IBSA victims’ fair access to the criminal justice system. The operationalising of IBSA behaviours would expand the limited quantitative crime data on IBSA. Moreover, in worst-case scenarios whereby serious emotional distress has been inflicted on the victim, the perpetrator appears undeterred and the spread of the damage is extensive (see Section 22 of HDCA), swift action by the police is of paramount importance. Chapter 5 would elaborate on data collection methods, crime analytical approaches (i.e., *CRAVED*, crime script analysis and thematic analysis), and IBSA crime prevention frameworks (i.e., crime intervention points and situational crime prevention) in greater detail.
Chapter 5. Method and Analysis

Unlike conventional Crime Science research, this study sought to combine secondary data and primary data given that quantitative crime data is limited and that the research in this area is still in its infancy. Using two data sources enables triangulation which enables retribution-style IBSA to be examined more closely and identify unexpected contradictions and insights.

5.1. Understanding the Crime-Commission Process of Retribution-style IBSA

5.1.1. Participants

4 participants from an intermediary in New Zealand that specialises in providing practical support to IBSA and other Harmful Digital Communications victims were recruited based on criterion and snowball sampling. The purpose of these interviews was to capture more accurately the IBSA cases that are not reported to and/or investigated by the police.

5.1.2. Materials and Procedure

For primary data collection, a semi-structured interview format was adhered to. (Refer to Appendix B). For secondary data collection, 18 court transcripts that were publicly released by The District Court of New Zealand under the search category of Harmful Digital Communications Offences were utilised. Court transcripts that did not explicitly reference a victim’s intimate images being used in the IBSA perpetration were excluded from the study. IBSA perpetrated by acquaintances with no prior romantic or sexual relationship with the victim and technology-facilitated adult sexual offences involving minors and child pornography content were also excluded. The transcripts were reviewed to ensure none of them overlapped. The interviews were administered over the course of two consecutive days (24th and 25th October 2018) with two interviews scheduled
on each day and took place at the workplaces of the participants. Each interview took no longer than 60 minutes. The interviewees were asked to respond to questions in 3 main sections: (i) Offender, Victim and Bystander Profiling, (ii) Crime Opportunities and Situational Variables in Cyberspace, (iii) Five specific research domains (i.e., the continuum of intimate partner violence in real life and in the virtual space, concepts of harm and victim blaming, the gendered nature of IBSA, possible ways to deter offenders- prevent IBSA and, how bystanders can intervene safely and effectively). A debrief followed this. All interviews were audio recorded with the participants’ consent. The interviews were transcribed and the participants were given two weeks to review and revise their transcripts. In order to protect the confidentiality of participants and victims of IBSA, participants were allocated alphabets and all identifying data was removed from the results. The Human Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Waikato approved the collection of interview data for this study.

5.1.3. Content Analysis of Court Transcripts

Qualitative analysis, particularly content analysis has been employed by researchers to categorise crime data into scripts for organised and interpersonal crimes (see Chi, Leclerc, & Townsley, 2011; Chi & Leclerc, 2017). According to Porter (2008), archival court data cites multiple sources of evidence such as offender, witness and victim statements and forensic evidence and collectively, these have been subject to strict legal examination or fact checking. Citing multiple sources makes court data more credible and reliable than data gathered from a single source (e.g., victim or offender interviews or surveys) which are prone to biases. As these open-source court data are easily accessible to the
public, this suggests that care has been taken by the Courts to maintain confidentiality of protected parties, namely victims of IBSA. Cornish and Clarke (2002) also emphasise the dynamic nature of crimes and the need for crime scripts to be progressive and be constantly revised to keep pace with increased criminal and technical sophistication of crimes. The ease and affordability of court data enable researchers of technology-facilitated intimate partner violence to meet the increasing demand for an evidence base in support of the HDCA and prevention of IBSA. This study is a partial replication of work by Chi and Leclerc (2017) which utilised content analysis to investigate and propose intervention points for sexual offences by acquaintances.

5.1.4. Crime Script Analysis of Court Transcripts

Cornish (1994) developed combined the concept of rational choice and cognitive scripts and introduced a systematic methodology of analysing crimes. Crime scripts represent the complete sequence of actions required to initiate and complete specific crimes. Crime script analysis systematically investigates all crime stages: Preparation, Entry, Pre-condition, Instrumental precondition, Instrumental initiation, Instrumental actualisation, Doing, Post-condition, and Exit. This structure enables a detailed analysis of a specific crime’s crime-commission process including offender decisions and actions and the resources employed in the successful completion of a crime. Crime script analysis is best applied to understand specific rather than generic crimes and identify intervention points for situational prevention. To systematically and thoroughly investigate “intimate partner abuse” in IBSA perpetrated by former or current intimate partners, this study would employ Leclerc, Wortley and Smallbone’s (2011) child sexual abuse crime script’s eight crime stages: entry to setting, instrumental
initiation, instrumental initiation (continuation), instrumental initiation (continuation), instrumental actualisation, completion, outcomes and post condition used in An additional stage, offender-victim prehistory (see Chiu & Leclerc, 2017) would be added to provide some contextual background to the IBSA perpetration types.

5.1.5. CRAVED to Predict Type of Victim Targeted by Offenders

CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) would be applied to the court transcripts and interviews to guide the examination of the type of victim or images targeted by current or former intimate partners who perpetrator IBSA and inform crime script intervention points. To date, CRAVED has not been applied to qualitative data. Previous research by Beuregard and Martineau (2015) applied CRAVED to the choice of victim in sexual homicide. Using the sexual preference hypothesis by Abel et al. (1987), the researchers sought to apply CRAVED to demonstrate that sexual murderers share similar characteristics with property offenders. This was further supported by Felson’s (2002) support of CRAVED being applied to human targets of predatory and sexual crimes. Felson (2002) explains that a violent offender needs to conceal the criminal act in addition to the steps preceding and following it, remove himself from the crime scene, locate a convenient and valuable human target to launch an attack, enjoy the criminal act or avoid getting hurt in the process and dispose of incriminating evidence, including the victim. Although it is not possible to physically dispose of a target of IBSA, the negative consequences of victim blaming after the victim’s intimate images are non-consensually disseminated could result in isolation and deter the victim from reporting to the authorities or incite victims to contemplate and attempt suicide.
5.2. Prevention of Retribution-style IBSA

5.2.1. Thematic Analysis of Interviews

Thematic analysis is a useful method for gathering valuable insights from participants and investigating similarities and differences in perspectives across participant responses (Braun & Clarke, 2006; King, 2004). Most importantly, it can be useful for producing qualitative analyses appropriate for informing policy development and improvement.

5.2.2. Situational Crime Prevention Approach

Cornish and Clarke’s (2003) Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) approach utilises 25 techniques that orientate police efforts in managing, designing and manipulating the immediate physical environment to reduce crime opportunities and prevent concrete crime phenomena. However, other researchers have applied SCP techniques to virtual environments (Reynes, 2010) in addition to other instruments tailored towards preventing cyber crime such as cyberstalking, grooming, and online child pornography (Wortley & Smallbone, 2012). According to SCP, there are five main ways to modify a situation to reduce crime opportunities: (i) increasing the effort required for an offender to carry out a crime, (ii) increasing the risks the offender must face in completing the crime, (iii) reducing the rewards or benefits the offender expects to obtain from the crime, (iv) reducing or avoiding provocations that may tempt or incite offenders into criminal acts, and (v) removing excuses that offenders may use to rationalise or justify their actions. The 20 types of situational crime prevention measures for cyber-criminality by Miró (2012) would be used to guide the SCP of IBSA, a technology-facilitated crime as opposed to pure cyber crime (crime that takes place through computer systems) or physical crime (crime that takes place in
5.2.3. Crime Script Intervention Points

Although Cornish (1994) developed crime scripts for the purpose of matching situational crime prevention strategies to stages in crime-commission process, a few studies have used the crime script framework directly to identify intervention points where crime opportunities can be disrupted and risks of offending can be increased (e.g., Clarke & Newman, 2006; Chi et al., 2011; Leclerc et al., 2011; Chiu & Leclerc, 2017). Chiu and Leclerc (2017) conducted a crime script analysis and devised intervention points for sexual offences perpetrated against women by acquaintances which has been identified as the most common type of sexual violence perpetrated against women (Myhill & Allen, 2002). Given the similarities between acquaintance perpetrated sex offending against women and IBSA perpetrated by former and current adult intimate partners, Chiu and Leclerc’s (2017) work would be used in this study including the research objectives: understanding the crime stages involved in IBSA perpetration by former and current intimate partners and applying situational crime prevention measures to disrupt the crime-commission process of retribution-style IBSA perpetration.
Chapter 6. Understanding the Crime-Commission Process of Retribution-style IBSA

Among retribution-style IBSA prosecutions, women comprised the majority of victims whilst men comprised the majority of perpetrators. Retribution-style IBSA appears to be present in different relationship contexts and circumstances.

Results

6.1. Content Analysis of Court Transcripts for IBSA

Table 1

Content Analysis of Court Transcripts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social elements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors involved</td>
<td>Offender, victim, co-offenders, third parties (victim’s children; partners; extramarital partner, victim’s parent, male peers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between victim and offender</td>
<td>Partner, ex-partner and victim’s parent (Mother disapproves relationship, offender sends partner’s mother a sex video of her daughter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Circumstances**          | Relationship status: Separated, in the process of separating  
Type of relationship: Committed partner, casual sex partner and cheating partner (see Drouin, Vogel, Surbey, & Stills, 2013). “Cheating” is unclear in context of marital separation and victim is spending time with new “male” friend  
Relationship length: several months, 1 year, more than a couple of years, approximately 7 years, approximately 10 years, 10+ years  
Children: has biological children together, children living with victim or offender either part-time or full-time  
Cohabitation status: once lived together, separated residences, unclear  
Other: Extramarital affair (husband concealing marriage from ex-girlfriend and infidelity from wife), on-off relationship  
Met online: 1 case  
Met offline: 17  
Heterosexual relationships: 17 female victims and 1 male heterosexual victim |
| **Approach method**        | Wanted to reconcile with, patch up failed relationship with victim, get victim to stop seeing new partner, initiated break-up |
and moved on to ex-partner’s friend, threatened with images if ex-partner did not stop contact

| Surprise | Possesses/ still possesses intimate images of victim/ kept images not withstanding victim’s constant requests that offender deletes them, non-consensual and consensually taken intimate images (with and without face), breach of trust |
| Gateway offences | Blackmail while soliciting unwanted sexual favours from victim  
Intimate covert filming (Crimes Act 1961)  
Covert surveillance by installing smart phone monitoring and control app on victim’s mobile device without victim’s authorisation or accessing victim’s Google Maps account  
Physical stalking  
Accessing victim’s mobile device, accessing victim’s social media account directly from mobile device or through victim’s e-mail account and password |
| Blitz | Victim’s intimate images (self-taken and shared with offender before meeting in-the-flesh and getting into a relationship and during relationship, phone and webcam videos)  
Victim’s face fully identifiable in nude/ semi-nude images, close-up images of genitalia and intimate visual recordings of victim engaging in sexual acts e.g., oral sexual activity and sexual intercourse  
Victim’s personal details (e.g., address, phone number  
Internet (various online platforms)  
Digital communications (work-based website or social media page or page of significant corporation) |

**Setting**

| Location | Online platforms/ digital communications/ digital media/ smartphones |
| More than one crime scene | Yes/ No |
| Time | Daylight, darkness |

**Interaction**

| Victim reaction | Resistance, ignoring offender, carry out sexual requests of ex-partner, filed police report, approached intermediary for help |
| Offender reaction | Used threats, ignored victim’s pleas not to disclose images, refused to delete victim’s intimate images, blackmail, negotiation, ceased to demand, posting image on victim’s social media account Timeline (private settings) or sending image via instant messenger (IM) to victim’s family (e.g., son or daughter – can be minors, mother etc.), repeated uploading of intimate visual recordings, no informing victim of intention to upload victim’s intimate images |
Image-based sexual abuse behaviours

- Disclosing content to a specific target audience (victim’s closest family or friends- usually 1-2 individuals)
- Disclosing content to a larger audience (victim’s friends or public) using multiple platforms
- Disclosing personal information e.g., direct reference to name, mobile phone number, e-mail
- Attaching a price tag “$1” to each image (advertising victim’s body for sexual services)
- Disclosing victim’s intimate video recordings on pornography site
- Offensive labelling of images or video footage (e.g., “Dirty whore” and “Slut begs for it in the arse”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other variables</th>
<th>Third party intervened/ disrupted, victim sought help before images were posted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exit</td>
<td>Offender and victim stopped virtual and offline contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats/ force</td>
<td>Verbal threats used (in-the-flesh and digital communications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools/ transport</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-action</td>
<td>Conceal/ delete digital evidence/ attempts to reconcile with victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Potential ‘triggers’ (date/ sexual advance rejection, prior relationship break-up), prior alcohol and drug problems or convictions (e.g., driving dangerously or driving with access breath alcohol), prior history of domestic violence or convictions (e.g., male assaults female, breach of protection order), mental health problems (e.g., self-harm, substance abuse/ addiction)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Note:** The term ‘trigger’ refers to factors or offender-victim prehistory that may result in the offender being in a heightened emotional state (e.g., stress/anger), and is not intended to imply causality
- Some cases when the victim is the recipient (e.g., mother did not approve of the relationship. He sent daughter’s sexual video to mother. Does not know mother personally.

There are five main types of IBSA perpetrated by current or former intimate partners, threats to disseminate images, dissemination of images with or without threats, extorting unwanted sexual favours from a victim (sextortion), covert intimate filming/ photography/ screen captures during webcam sexual
activity, and unauthorised access of a victim’s mobile device and disseminating the victim’s images using the victim’s mobile device. Three crime scripts have been devised: threats, sextortion and dissemination (Fig 1.1), unauthorised access of victim’s mobile device and dissemination (Fig 1.2), and covert intimate filming (Fig 1.3).

6.2. Crime Script Analysis of Court Transcripts and Interviews
Figure 1.1. Image-based sexual abuse crime script: Threats, Sextortion and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images (victim shared images with offender)

Source: Adapted from Leclerc, Wortley, and Smallbone, 2011

1. Offender-victim prehistory

The most common retribution-style IBSA occurs in the context of a former intimate relationship, followed by a current intimate relationship. The majority of cases involved intimate images that were consensually taken by the victim and/or offender, with another case involving unauthorised retention of the victim’s intimate images when the offender was instructed by the victim to delete them, a couple of cases of covert filming and screenshots during webcam sexual activity.

2. Entry to Setting (circumstances, location, time, third parties)

Threats, Sextortion and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: The setting in which the victim is first encountered can be in the physical or virtual space. More commonly, the setting used would be the virtual space such as social media platforms and/or the offender’s own mobile device with stored intimate images of their former or current partner.

Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: The setting is the physical place where the victim leaves his/her mobile phone unattended and/or unlocked and stores their intimate images. This enables the offender to access the victim’s images with little resistance.

Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: This can be a physical and private location such as the bathroom or bedroom. The victim may be present or
absent. The virtual space is relevant in cases involving private webcam sessions with the victim.

3. Instrumental initiation

*Threats and Dissemination of victim's intimate images:* Confrontations are typically initiated by the offender (former or current intimate partner) with the purpose of repairing a broken relationship, soliciting unwanted sexual favours from the victim, regulating a former or current partner’s relationships and activities or creating discord between parent and child. In one case, the victim confronted the former partner (offender) about his initiation of a break up and his decision to move on to date her friend. The offender retaliated with threats to disseminate her intimate images if she interfered in his new intimate relationship. In other cases, there were no clear confrontations after the break-up or threats to disseminate a victim’s intimate images and hence, this can be labeled as contemplating dissemination.

*Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination:* This would be the planning phase before accessing a victim’s mobile device and intimate image folder. The offender’s activities may include manipulating the victim into leaving his/her mobile device unattended and/or unlocked or monitoring the victim’s routine activities around their mobile phone storage and digital hygiene (online safety practices or lack thereof).

*Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”:* This involves the preparation for covert photography, screen capturing or filming of the victim involves
assessing if the victim is comfortable enough to engage in webcam sexual activity or is preparing to undress in the bathroom or bedroom.

4. Instrumental initiation (continuation)

*Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images:* The offender proceeds to access the victim’s intimate images stored in victim’s mobile phone device.

*Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination:* The offender proceeds to the physical setting where the victim is most likely to have left his/her mobile phone unattended/ unlocked.

*Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”:* If the victim is present in the bathroom or bedroom, the offender would plan where and how to best capture the victim in nude and/or sexual positions without the victim knowing. Although no court transcripts evidenced the installation of camera devices in the bedroom or bathroom, this possibility was included in addition to covert filming via the offender’s smartphone.

5. Instrumental initiation (continuation)

*Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images:* The offender browses through his/her mobile phone device and selects images to be disseminated, the target audience, texts accompanying the images (e.g., derogatory and degrading texts, doxxing) and which online platforms to use in the dissemination.

*Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination:* The offender waits for victim to abandon his/her mobile device.

*Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”:* The offender installs cameras and/or video recording device(s), accesses camera phone function on
mobile phone, snipping tool or webcam recording function on the computer.

6. Instrumental actualisation

Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: The offender resorts to blackmail or sextortion, threats and isolating the victim.

Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: The offender accesses the victim’s mobile device and browses image folders for intimate images.

Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: The offender turns on the recording device, snipping tool function or webcam recording function and ensures victim is nude/semi-nude and/or engaging in sexual activity.

7. Completion

Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: The victim refuses to yield, ignores, provokes or challenges offender.

Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: The offender selects the victim’s intimate image(s) and logs into victim’s social media account

Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: The victim is nude/semi-nude and/or is engaging in sexual activity and oblivious to being photographed or filmed.

8. Outcomes

Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: This refers to the amount of time the victim’s intimate images remain on the internet since the first upload, third parties’ reactions (e.g., downloading, storing and
consuming and disseminating images or contacting victim for sexual services)

*Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination:* This refers to the amount of time taken to access the intimate images, create texts and disclose image to target audience, victim’s participation (i.e., time away from their phone, leaving phone unlocked and social media account automatically logged in) third parties reactions (e.g., downloading, storing and consuming images, disseminating images or contacting victim for sexual services).

*Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”:* This refers to the duration of nudity and/or sexual activity while being photographed or filmed, the victim’s participation (i.e., the victim being unaware that she/he is being filmed) and the offender’s non-consensual creation of an intimate visual recording(s) of the victim.

**9. Post condition**

*Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images:* Avoiding disclosure strategies are employed by the offender would be more complex if the offender maintained “abusive” contact with the victim (i.e., coercive control tactics and psychological harm through threats to disseminate the victim’s private self-taken sexual images and sextortion).

*Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination:* Avoiding disclosure strategies would be less complex if the victim successfully avoided detection by the victim.
**Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”:** Avoiding disclosure strategies would be less complex if the offender was not suspected by the victim or if the offender stored these covert intimate visual recordings safely.

*Figure 1.2. Image-based sexual abuse crime script: Unauthorised Access of a victim’s mobile device (victim does not disclose images to offender)*

*Source: Adapted from Leclerc, Wortley, and Smallbone, 2011*
Figure 1.3. Intimate covert filming crime script: Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism” (victim does not disclose images to offender)

Source: Adapted from Leclerc, Wortley, and Smallbone, 2011
6.3. Applying ‘CRAVED’: Intimate Images as “Hot” Products

In Chapter 6, Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED framework described in the previous chapter can be readily applied to retribution-style IBSA.

*Concealable* takes the form of the offender concealing his/her own identity and criminal behaviour. This means being aware of and exploiting the anonymity of the internet by setting up multiple “fake” accounts on multiple online platforms for a given period before closing them down or creating new accounts on other platforms, making it difficult to collect conclusive digital evidence on the origin of IBSA offences and remove “all content” from the internet. Only “known” content can be removed and depending where and how many images have been uploaded and circulated, there is a risk of the content re-surfacing on the internet at a later time. The offender can also pretend to delete all of the victim’s images in front of the victim when back-up copies have already been made and stored in his/her storage devices (e.g., a folder on the desktop, USB) or in the Cloud. It is easier to conceal the act of non-consensual dissemination as most bystanders would not be able to foresee and/or pre-empt this threat for the target. The targets themselves may not even be aware of their images being posted on the internet. If the offender has the resources to remain hidden on the internet (e.g., hiding IP addresses), this makes the origin of the crime and distributors of the content more concealable.

**Abuse anonymity of Internet and erasing forensic digital evidence**

Opportunities for IBSA perpetration:

1= no contact with victim (victim notified by someone other than offender)

2= pretending to delete images when instructed by victim
3= uploading images using an online privacy platform (concealing identity and location)
4= relying on second and third degree perpetrators to circulate content
5= denying involvement in dissemination of victim’s intimate images

*Removable* refers to the ease in which an offender is able to extract intimate images from the target. In the majority of retribution-style IBSA cases, the images were readily provided by the victim to the offender (e.g., sexual self-image taken and shared). Here, the offender “abuses” the safety of the intimate context by establishing a false sense of trust only to breach confidentiality afterwards through blackmail or the non-consensual dissemination of the victim’s intimate images.

As opposed to the removal (i.e., stealing) of an item from a physical site, the removal in this context would be the removal of privacy rights and control the victim has over his/her own intimate images. This process of removal is completed once the potential offender is in possession of the victim’s intimate images. As the images are digitalised rather than in polaroid form, they are able to be transferred or transported from one device to another or from one device to multiple platforms with considerable ease and speed. Digitalised images are highly removable, downloadable and can be easily uploaded. Videos take longer to download and transfer and would be less removable than photographs. Videos also take up more storage space in an offender’s phone and uploads (if any) are more or less restricted to pornographic sites.

On the other hand, removability decreases if the target is unwilling to provide their intimate images to the offender or if the target insists on their images being deleted from the offender’s mobile device/computer. Evidently, removability is lower if the target does not consent to the sharing of his/her intimate images with
the offender or if the target has requested the deletion of all intimate images from the offender’s mobile device or Cloud Storage. In these situations, the potential offender may need to resort to other covert and/or overt strategies to preserve the images in his/her mobile device or extract intimate images from the target through webcam screenshots, covert intimate filming in the bedroom and bathroom or personally accessing the victim’s phone or computer for intimate images without permission. Pre-emptive personal online security measures (e.g., passwords and 2-step authentication) taken by the target may considerably reduce the removability as well. It would also be more difficult for the offender to disseminate the victim’s intimate images to the victim’s family, friends on social media and employers if these groups of individuals and the victim do not have a social media account or an online presence which are rare in this digital age. If the target has a social media account with his/her friends and family and if the offender is “familiar” with the target’s social circles, removability increases significantly.

**Exploiting “intimacy” in an intimate relationship context**

Opportunities for IBSA perpetration:

1= non-consensual dissemination of consensually taken and shared intimate images

2= unauthorised webcam screen captures during a shared sexual webcam experience

3= covert intimate filming and photo taking

4= unauthorised access of a target’s smartphone containing intimate image folders or email and accessing social media accounts

5= using previous intimate relationship history to extort unwanted sexual acts from victim
Available refers to the target’s visibility (attributes that expose a target to contact or an attack) and accessibility (the site and placement of the intimate images or human target that increase the risk of an attack). When applied to retribution-style IBSA perpetration, availability explains why former or current intimate partners are disproportionately represented in IBSA perpetration statistics. In an intimate relationship context, the offender and target spend time together (in-the-flesh and online) and there is ample time and opportunities for sexual self-taken images to be shared by the target with the potential offender. The target becomes more available if there is already a history of abusive or violent behaviours in the relationship, if the target (former dating partner) has moved on to date another individual or if there are signs of infidelity by the target (married but separated or cohabitating but separated). Hence, availability for an attack increases after a relationship breakdown and a pattern of abusive/violent behaviours that can persist after separation. Unattended and unlocked mobile devices or image folders that are not saved in the target’s phone as private and encrypted with a secure password and social media and e-mail accounts that are not logged out of are highly available to an attack. Former or current partners are able to exploit “trust” in the intimate relationship space and gain access to a target’s intimate images via sexting, unauthorised access of a target’s personal mobile device and/or covert intimate filming. Potential offenders whose targets neither participated in sexting behaviours with them nor authorised the continued storage of their intimate images in the potential offender’s mobile device/computer would be less available compared to targets who have shared their intimate images with the potential offender. Online platforms that advocate and promote retribution-style IBSA, revenge porn sites or other sites that allow the sharing of nude images (e.g.,
porn sites), online trading sites or social media sites without clear terms and conditions against the non-consensual dissemination of a target’s intimate images increase availability and offending.

**Locating a suitable target (Target Accessibility and Visibility Variables)**

Opportunities for IBSA perpetration:

1. target engaged in sexual self-image taking
2. target stores sexual self-images in smartphone
3. target engaged in sexting
4. target engaged in in-the-flesh sexual activities while being consensually filmed
5. target engaged in sexual activities while being covertly filmed
6. target engaged in sexual activities via webcam while screen captures were covertly made without consent
7. target shared passwords of social media accounts and e-mails
8. target leaves smartphones or personal computers unlocked and/or unattended
9. relationship breakdown (dating separation)
10. suspected spousal infidelity (marital separation)
11. suspected spousal infidelity (marital conflict; no separation)

*Valuable* is similar to Felson’s (1998) value where the target (or misuse of a target’s intimate images) satisfies non-monetary (e.g., power and control and relationship retribution) and/or monetary goals of the offender. In IBSA, the “hot” product is evidently the target’s semi-nude, nude or sexual images and are immediately construed as pornographic material meant for consumption regardless of context (i.e., no distinction is made between nudity, sexuality and
pornography). If the images are that of a female, this feeds the culture of violence against women and offending may be perceived as a means to repair patriarchal damage and re-establish order. The potential offender considers the images valuable if they clearly identify the target and feature the target as fully nude and/or engaging in sexual activities. The potential offender can also increase the sexual value of the target’s images through doxxing—attaching the target’s personal details such as full name, contact details (e.g., mobile, e-mail addresses) along with the target’s intimate images. If the images featuring the target’s private areas are blurred out, lack identifying features (e.g., face, tattoos, scars) or are not skillfully sexually photoshopped, their value decreases and there would be less motivation to share them.

**Attaching context, meaning, personal information and/or price to a victim’s intimate images.**

Opportunities for IBSA perpetration:

1. doxxing
2. using texts indicative of sexual objectification, subjugation and debasement
3. attaching a price tag to victim’s intimate images (advertising for sexual services)

*Enjoyable* refers to the offender reaping positive feelings from participating in offending behaviours. The enjoyment reaped from the non-consensual dissemination of a target’s intimate images also increases with the knowledge that the offender has complete control over the harm inflicted on the target with a click of a button. The level of enjoyment also increases if the offender has knowledge of which individuals would judge the target most harshly. Revenge porn site
visitors and internet users who encounter the target’s intimate images by chance or deliberately, may download them and circulate the target’s images, further increasing the extensiveness of damage. This knowledge of the power and control an offender has over the target could justify atonement for previous relationship grievances.

**Sexual Gratification, Sexual Excitement, Sexual Aggression, Sexual Sadism, Sexual Debasement and Subjugation**

Opportunities for IBSA perpetration:

1. disseminating intimate images of victim to porn and trading sites
2. persisting in offending behaviours (e.g., persistent threats to disseminate images, uploading new content when older ones get taken down by site hosts)
3. setting up victim (former intimate partner) for sexual harassment, stalking or sexual assault
4. coercing victim (former intimate partner) into performing unwanted sexual acts (sextortion)
5. aligning oneself to other individuals who provide encouragement and support for violence (see Collins, 2013)

*Disposable* refers to the offender avoiding detection after the crime has been committed. Ways of disposing the evidence include personally removing original posts, deleting all of the victim’s intimate images from the personal storage devices, only sending the images (pictures and/or videos) to the victim to threaten the victim directly, frame the crime to resemble that of a hacker breaking into the victim’s phone/ computer and disseminating the images and avoiding responsibility and relying on the victim blaming culture on sexting. The offender
may or may not remind the victim of the risks or harms involved in seeking help from the authorities. These harms include losing friends, strained parent-child relationships (e.g., a bad mother/child), if non-heterosexual, the risk of being “outed” or not taken seriously if this is brought to the police and public’s attention and negative economic consequences (e.g., getting fired, losing financial independence or incurring heavy financial losses if the victim chooses to seek legal redress). Exploiting loopholes in the criminal justice system contributing to underreporting can also increase disposability of the victim.

**Deterring victim from help-seeking behaviours, reporting offending to authorities or being apprehended**

Opportunities for IBSA perpetration:

1= employing coercive tactics (e.g., delivering credible threats, shaming victim through dissemination of intimate images and harming victim psychologically, socially, culturally, occupationally and financially)

2= employing control tactics (e.g., blaming abusive behaviour on mental health problems, attempting to reconcile with victim, preventing victim from pursuing new relationships)

3= maintaining distance when uploading images strategically to various platforms without a face-to-face confrontation with the target (see Collins, 2013)

4= adopting a covert tactical approach by feigning the absence of conflict (concealing signs of disputatiousness or aggressiveness) (see Luckenbill & Doyle, 1989) until enough forensic digital evidence has been gathered for a criminal prosecution (see Collins, 2013).
Chapter 7. Prevention of Retribution-Style IBSA

This chapter outlines key themes and unexpected yet important findings targeted at improving current tactical, strategic and operational systems in areas of response, intervention and prevention.

Results

7.1. Thematic analysis of Interviews

A. Nature of Images

Most of the disseminated intimate images were self-taken sexual images by the victim and privately shared with the victim’s former intimate partner.

Mainly images more than videos but more commonly images. We do not get too much stuff superimposed but we get cases that are tricky where the person’s head is not in the shot but it is still their image. Proportionately, it is more images taken with consent but not with consent to share. We definitely get covert snaps taking and covert filming and things that people are not aware of but the majority would be taken with consent. (Participant A)

If it is a relationship they have had for a while, we have seen some where it is obvious that the perpetrator has taken the photos. Most of the time, the victim knows and is consenting to it but there are a few cases we get in which where the victim does not know and has not consented to them even taking the footage which ramps up the seriousness of it. It would be more common that the victim has consented to providing the images. (Participant D)

B. Temporal Patterns of Reporting

IBSA reporting peaks during certain times of the year, week and time of day.

We definitely have higher number of reports over the winter [July, August and September] rather than the summer months, the key school holiday months of December or January for all report types not just IBSA. For whatever reason, people reporting to us these types of incidences [IBSA] tends to peak in the middle of the week, Wednesday, Thursday. (Participant A)

We see a lot more incidents reported in the evenings of this nature. (Participant C)

C. Victimisation-Offending Temporal Gap

Participants explained the time lag between IBSA victims finding out that their images had been circulated and them reporting their victimisation.
There can be a time lag between something being shared if it has not gone directly to the target before they are even aware of it. Even a time lag between them then deciding to report it because it is a very big thing for something to report something like this, so there could be a quite a significant time lag. (Participant A)

I’ve had ones where they have been pretty immediate. They’ve been alerted by a family or friend or the actual perpetrator has made a threat and followed through with the threat and it’s been pretty immediate within like a couple of days or a couple of hours. But I’ve also had ones where content has been discovered two years on from its original posting so that’s just stumbled on someone to either typing their name or it’s been indexed in Google or when someone else has alerted them to it... It really depends on whether the person offending discloses [their intention to offend or their offending behaviour] or not. (Participant C)

D. Spatial Patterns of Offending

i. Similarities in Spatial Patterns of Offending

One participant outlined the overlaps between offline (physical) and online (virtual) spaces of intimate partner abuse with the majority of criminal cases of IBSA occurring within the context of domestic breakdowns.

Most people of the older age groups [28 and above] have an offline relationship that develops into an online component. Where the relationship is both offline and online, it’s common for the abuse to be occurring in both worlds. That’s why it can be hard to totally resolve cases when we can only deal with the online bit...The legislation has been used far more for domestic breakdown type cases and it’s not uncommon in domestic breakdown cases that there can be images used inappropriately. [HDCA policy makers and law enforcement] have been surprised that the criminal side of the cases has been used more than they thought it would be for domestic partnership breakdowns. That would back up the overall trend for what the legislation has been used for. (Participant A)

The same participant highlighted the extensiveness of IBSA in it not being exclusive to teenagers or younger adults. Technical competence rather than age of the offender was identified as a more salient characteristic of offending.

[IBSA] is more prevalent amongst younger people which we categorise as 21 and under but it is certainly not exclusive to them. It can come from anybody from any professional background, any stage in their life in a variety of situations. We see enough of it across all of the age groups. Probably not the upper age groups, 60s but certainly the highest reporting age group [for domestic breakdown cases that are on the criminal path] is 26-40. So it is not exclusively the domain of teens at all... In relationship breakdowns, things can get nasty when there are custody battles over kids and the ability to use images like that. Where those images go depends not so much on the relationship type or the age but the technical competence of the person doing it, whether they know there is anything beyond [name of social media platform deleted]. (Participant A)
Other participants spoke about adult IBSA more generically. Relationship breakdowns were identified as a trigger for IBSA perpetration.

In terms of age, most commonly between 20 to 35 based on my experiences. We do get older. These are heterosexual [male perpetrator and female victim dyad] most of the time. We have seen ones who have been in relationships for 5 years, 10 years and they have agreed to have photos taken and obviously you trust your partner. We have seen a few where they only met online. There are a lot of sextortion cases. They have just met online and they have shared nude content really quickly and the victims are males in most cases... Usually separated or just broken up or sometimes extra-marital affairs. It is across the board but it occurs often after break ups. (Participant D)

It’s often a break-up. We’ve had people going through family court and people who aren’t. (Participant C)

1. **Differences in Spatial Patterns of Offending**

Adult male IBSA victims tend to report IBSA in the form of financial sextortion scams where they had engaged in casual sexual activity on webcam while being covertly recorded by someone overseas and later blackmailed. On the other hand, adult female victims tend to report IBSA perpetrated by former intimate partners.

It appears to me that men are very quick to get their clothes off and masturbate online if someone is doing it at the other end of the webcam but that’s actually a scam so we classify that differently because the purpose is to extort money... majority of females as targets. We do get some males as targets. We do get a majority of males as producers and we do get some females as producers. But adults can often be in long term committed relationships where they’ve shared intimate photos and then it all goes wrong and those are used against them. (Participant B)

In rare circumstances, a woman would disseminate a man’s intimate images.

I can think of one but that’s because he shared an unsolicited dick pic with her and she distributed it on-- out of [name of dating site deleted]. “I’m going to teach you a lesson because I can ask for that”. One other case I’ve had was a masturbation video. More often than not, 90% of the reports I deal with are not of this nature. (Participant C)

The same participant explained a case of “unintentional” IBSA which has implications for interventions.

I have had image-based abuse with quite a serious one with a Fijian Indian young woman but that was more the fact her ex-partner’s device had been taken into a repair shop and subsequently, her images had been distributed and uploaded on [name of file sharing platform deleted] and they weren’t actually able to be removed. They were distributed by a group of men in Fiji. (Participant C)
E. Situational opportunities for IBSA

One participant identified three types of online platforms with the weakest takedown success rates that are frequently utilised by IBSA perpetrators.

It’s so easy to cause so much harm. Because of the “ease”, it’s only click of a button unlike if you try to harm someone face-to-face, [you probably have] a history of violence... How [name of blog platform deleted] works is different to other platforms. On [name of social media platform deleted], if you share an image, it’s all connected to the original post. It might be re-shared a thousand times but as soon as you take down the source, all the shares disappear. [Name of blog platform deleted] doesn’t work like that so people re-share content and re-distribute it. There might not have been that many images but it was harder to contain and obviously that repetition of that offending isn’t necessarily from the perpetrator. That could be other people re-distributing it. Because of the anonymity of the type of platform, it is so difficult to determine where the source is... [There is] a public trading group where men traded images and women were categorised by name. There could have been over 100 women, so many images and obviously of ex-partners but that was on [name of file sharing platform deleted]. Men had the account password and could access it from anywhere. They’re those file sharing platforms that they’re using. It’s the Cloud. The one that stands out for me was that the platform didn’t see that as a violation of their terms and never removed the content so unfortunately, that was not resolved. For most platforms, nudity is prohibited or like if it’s on a porn platform and obviously it’s for this, it’s prohibited. It’s considered abuse. (Participant C)

F. Maximising Harm with IBSA

A participant identified abusive behaviours that retribution-style IBSA perpetrators resort to using that inflict serious emotional distress on their victims.

If [offenders] want to maximise harm, they get the images in many places as possible, get the images into hard to reach places. If they are clever, they know that [names of two social media platforms deleted] are going to take it down so if they want to maximise harm, they’d stick it in porn websites etc. If they want to maximise harm, they just keep doing it so every time it gets taken down, it gets put back up again. They would share images with as many people as possible and not just any people but people close to the target. It’s to getting it to as many people as possible, putting it in places where it is hard to get down and continually putting them back up. Those are the worst cases, when it keeps going back up. Sharing personal details-- there are cases where people put inappropriate things on [name of dating site deleted] or something and give contact details of somebody else. You’re getting double the harm, basically. (Participant A)

Another participant highlighted the similarities between abusive patterns in retribution-style IBSA and intimate partner (dating and domestic) violence.
It’s the violation of trust and consent with something that is so intimate. [Intimate images are] something they’ve got over that person so they’re often used to coerce someone to come back to a relationship. I can think of a couple of cases where there are children involved but more of dating as opposed to a marriage. (Participant C)

Another participant explained how IBSA is sexual abuse as degrading and derogatory texts are often attached to a woman’s intimate images, putting her well-being in danger.

To distress the victims most is sharing them with a wide circle of contacts, like friends, like employer—we’ve had that. On some of those porn sites, we’ve had people who have had a profile set up by the offender saying, “I did blowjobs for $20 so here’s my phone number” so they’ve had people ringing them saying, “Want to hook up?”-- even on dating sites, so that’s distressing so they keep getting these calls from people wanting sex. That can be one area of distress. (Participant B)

The same participant and another participant shared how the harm is not limited to the victim but extends to the wider family and community in certain cultures. When the offender uses culture to threaten a victim, this is a type of technology-facilitated coercive control and if a victim’s images are disseminated to family members, this could be a form of family violence. The other area is when that is shared amongst wider family and friends and it can be quite disturbing culturally in that context. (Participant B)

Culturally, sometimes, when you share it with a victim’s family, that victim is going to get in trouble with the family. The perpetrator knows that sometimes. (Participant D)

Where there has been something obscene written along side the image, some sort of descriptor or identifying the person by their name and it would also say whom they are sharing the content with. If it’s a targeted recipient as opposed to popping it on a platform where anyone can see it. It’s probably the fact that they’ve actually gone through and either identified the recipients’ loved ones and often I have seen that culturally, the threat to share possibly, more like with the Indian community or where it is more collectivist or family oriented so that’s going to cause more harm. There’s often that threat there, I’m going to share that with your family. In some cultures, families may not be aware of the relationship that they have had online. Probably more around being targeted at who is going to see the content and making sure it’s people known to them as opposed to everyone, also informing the person before they do it and who specifically they are going to share it with. (Participant C)

G. Loss of Control for IBSA Victims

One participant explained why the use of intimate images might be more harmful
than abusive texts.

Harassment by text, often a lot of the initial stuff to gain control back can be taken by the victim so they can take away any immediate risk. So they can block, change privacy and security settings. It can resolve via that way. Often, it doesn’t. There needs to be further action taken but I just wonder for the fact of that [images] are outside of their control. For that, I perceive it as more harmful. For images, it is not aimed at the victim directly whereas the other stuff is directly aimed at the victim. (Participant C)

Another participant explained why “doxxing” elevates the severity of IBSA victimisation.

It is less harmful if they have not got their face in it but often their name will be attached to the images somehow and they will be identifiable. The person knows it’s them anyway which still makes it harmful. (Participant D)

Another participant explained that the internet shortens the time and escalates violence and the irreparable damage associated with IBSA perpetration.

I think what makes it worse is that it can get out of control a lot quicker online than if you physically see somebody. When it gets out of control online, it is difficult to get back when it’s all online. I think things escape quicker and deeper online. (Participant A)

**H. Signs of IBSA**

The participants provided mixed responses when asked if there were visible signs of IBSA.

[If there are] threats, a history of abuse in the relationship, the victim is suffering abuse from this person anyway and feels they have no choice to share, there is probably awareness on some level that they will be shared at some stage. Aside from that, I don’t know if people can see it coming. (Participant D)

The threats or there could be abusive communication, not necessarily threats but it’s going down that way where there is some sort of volatile nature to it... Being aware of a new relationship. When I’ve spoken to the perpetrator, they’re still grieving about the relationship break up and the other person’s moved on. (Participant C)

**I. Reporting and other help-seeking behaviours**

**i. IBSA victims’ reactions and responses to victimisation**

The participants reflected on perceptions victims may have about how others would perceive their victimisation. One participant explained differences in
reporting tools used by victims. Scams seem to be reported more openly than sext dissemination by former intimate partners.

Images would be quite shaming to them because other people would perceive that as dirty and pornographic and so the external party’s lens on what the person did with and without consent would be aimed to shame them... If you compare when people who have been scammed, there seems to be a preference to call but when people have something intimate like this, their initial contact tends to be through a web-form, electronically rather than call us. (Participant A)

Another participant relayed the shame victims experience when reporting and how attempts were made to soothe victims.

I’ve dealt with people who were talking to the other person and they’re threatening it and they’re talking over text and I’ve been talking to them on the phone. They’ve called like panicking but generally we get reports online. It could be that people feel ashamed. We have to try to make them feel as comfortable as possible... The reality is that once the image is gone unfortunately and if they’ve had it happen, I just wonder how violating it would be to have multiple people see that content, something so personal... Often it’s that the person that has disclosed that to us and have confided in and they really want you to walk along beside them through the process of reporting. (Participant C)

The participants shared the negative emotional responses and psychological state of female victims of IBSA.

They are horrified and distressed because they did not ever imagine at the time when they were taken consensually, that this would ever happen. (Participant B)

Most of the time extremely distressed, extremely humiliated, guilty as well. Sometimes suicidal...not wanting to go outside, that everyone’s going to look at me, that paranoia state. (Participant D)

We’ve had people who... it’s triggered prior sexual abuse and re-traumatised them so they’re more susceptible and possibly more at risk. [We have had people] wanting to end their lives, [feeling] violated, exploited, incredibly distressed and overwhelmed. [One case] was just so prolific and [the images] spread and [they had] all been indexed on [search engine named deleted]. She was suicidal and had made attempts and it was horrific. There was no resolution for her, so those ones stand out. (Participant C)

**ii. Cultural barriers to reporting**

When asked about the socio-cultural backgrounds of victims who report IBSA perpetrated by former intimate partners, certain racial groups were identified as being more likely to report IBSA than others.
You might have people from particular ethnic backgrounds to not want to go through the reporting... Culturally, making a report may not be their way of resolving the process. (Participant A)

We see a lot of European, Indian, Filipino. This is all going on the victim. (Participant D)

Racial groups, we get reports from people with Indian background, we get Pakeha. Those will be the two main groups that have reported to us, more Pakeha than anyone... I think it probably is, given that a lot of Pacific and other cultures have strong religious restraints. So, that could be a factor where there is the possibility of shared nudes or semi-nudes coming to light within the family or wider culture. (Participant B)

Social minorities may experience harm minimisation and less action taken when they report IBSA to the police.

So it was, “What? Don’t be ridiculous.” He got turned away twice [by the police] and that was enough for him to be disillusioned with that. He felt that because he was a gay male that he wasn’t taken as seriously than if he was a female that fit the typical female possible victim. (Participant C)

iii. Confusion over reporting

One participant reflected on the confusion faced by IBSA victims in reporting.

They are probably confused. If it’s something where it is online, the police will more likely than not tell them to come to us. Although having said that, there are a lot of convictions on the criminal side so obviously the police are taking these and working on these cases. There are a lot of referrals that come to us by the police. Other people may come to us directly but a real mixture, probably almost like 50-50. (Participant A)

Sometimes a family member would call or put in a web form but that’s less often than the victims themselves. They may be referred from the police. Sometimes, it’s another agency. Sometimes, it’s just because they know or they’ve looked up where they can report. [Name of organisation deleted] and other Helplines that know that something would be able to be done about that by contacting us. (Participant C)

Another participant explained various reactions from bystanders who contemplate intervening on behalf of the victim but decide not to get involved when they realise they have to contact the victim directly and can only support the victim in reporting their victimisation.

We need the report from the target and they’ll be reluctant to inform the target so they’re only ringing for advice about what we can do but we can’t take any action for the victim. “You need to have a conversation.” “I don’t want to do that.” “What action have you taken?” “Nothing.” They don’t want to intervene. It’s personal. It’s not anything to do with them, especially if they’re not close to the victim... I’ve talked about it with older
people and they haven’t even been aware of what [IBSA] even is. I don’t think it’s prevalent enough for it to be upfront online. (Participant C)

iv.  Police response

A participant highlighted the fear of being turned away, experienced by IBSA victims who approach the police for help.

[There is] fear of going to the police, and the police’s reaction might not be as favourable towards males. We have seen cases of image-based sexual abuse in which the police don’t necessarily take as seriously as we think they should be. We do see that a little bit but I think our relationship with the police is improving and also it’s probably improving in terms of their knowledge cause it’s new legislation. I think that’s the issue there. (Participant D)

Other participants reported victim blaming and the provision of unhelpful harm minimisation advice by the police.

From the police. They often feel they’re at fault for sharing something. That’s really common... It really depends on what station they get to unfortunately and what officer is going to pursue the report and if they have the technical know-how and expertise and resources to pursue that. If they are turned away by the police, then they can’t pursue criminal charges. It’s up to the police and under the civil harm, there is nothing punitive. (Participant C)

Yes, a lot of that. We’ve had people come to us who have gone to police who have told them to get off social media or that they were “stupid” to do that in the first place... The police have prosecuted a lot of revenge porn type cases because it’s pretty obvious where there was an intent to harm and it has harmed so they seem to go to court. (Participant B)

v.  Perceived lack of support or support services

One participant identified that adults tend to help themselves through their own victimisation rather than seek help and acknowledged the need to improve collective support for IBSA victims.

With adults, sometimes they have spoken to a friend. You ask adults if they have got any support? They often say, “No, I don’t want to talk to anyone about it. I don’t want anyone to know.” But sometimes they have support... There are but there may be issues with everyone collaborating to support that person. We have started a connection with organisations like [names of organisations deleted] to better assist in these situations. Collaboration with more agencies would help. (Participant D)

Another participant outlined the possibility of IBSA victims’ lack of awareness of the services they provide.
I think possibly it could be that we are not reaching hard to reach demographics, or their honesty in terms of their awareness of our services, or they could not have the means and tools to access a service like us. (Participant A)

Another participants highlighted that the governmental support may not be convincing enough for IBSA victims.

Often, what they’re wanting is those things to be removed and for the person to say they’d stop but whether they’d do it or not long term, there isn’t a resolution because the thought of the photos being in the hands of anyone can cause ongoing stress. Whatever we’ve brokered, there’s no enforcement behind it. (Participant B)

vi. **Cannot afford civil redress**

A participant explained financial challenges encountered by IBSA victims seeking legal civil redress and IBSA victims whose cases have not been investigated by the police.

If it’s legal or they can’t afford or they don’t qualify for some sort of legal aid and that’s from preparing their application to court, it’s a little bit complex. We can’t provide assistance with that. It often falls over because they don’t want to invest in it. It’s too pricey and they don’t qualify for legal aid. (Participant C)

J. **Technical and criminal sophistication of IBSA**

The participants reflected on the possibility of new emerging opportunities for offending, maximising harm for victims and concealing IBSA.

There’s some technology now that allows you to photoshop video so that you could put a different person’s head on a pornographic video. It’s even more disturbing than a still, than a photo. (Participant B)

It’s only going to increase in terms of where they’ve been placed, where people recognise where it’s a safe place to place the content, where it’s going to have the lasting damage or they’re never going to release who uploaded this content here so possibly that could become more sophisticated. (Participant C)

K. **Takedown Confidence and Success**

One of the participants explained instances when takedowns are easier and expressed confidence in New Zealand’s criminal justice system in combatting IBSA.

The ideal scenario would be that the image is taken down from any platform that it is on but that the person who has the image has deleted it. Until the person has deleted the
image, it can still go back up again. How many cases do we get that cast iron resolution? Probably very very few. How many cases do we get where we get all the images down? Quite a few. But it would depend just how far they have gone. If somebody wants to keep putting them back up again, then it is very very hard. In simpler cases where the images have gone on one or two platforms, and we want to get them removed from that platform, very good success rate. When it has gone to multiple platforms and websites, lower success rate. Actually getting assurance that that image or the source image is deleted, very very hard... We’ve got a criminal side to legislation that the police can enforce. We’ve got a non-criminal side for legislation which tries to get parties to do the right thing which we can do. We’ve got courts to back it up. I think New Zealand is in a quite strong position. (Participant A)

Another participant shared that their takedown success tend to be better if IBSA perpetrators consented to negotiations. This could highlight an area for more police support.

The fact that we have gotten down all “known” content online. There is no “known” content online and we have had consent—cause often we don’t get consent to reach out to the perpetrator. (Participant C)

L. Difficulties Containing the Spread of Damage

The participants shared that there is always a possibility that the intimate images could resurface in future as the primary offender along with other individuals circulating the content could be discreetly storing and circulating the images. Others have expressed that it is impossible to provide victims with the assurance that their images have been completely removed or deleted from the internet.

[Name of social media platform deleted] might take it down from their site but you have no idea where else that has been shared. So, there might be places you wouldn’t even know of. There might be porn sites you might not even know of. Someone might have taken screenshots and is keeping it on their phone. (Participant D)

You don’t know what you don’t know. I’ve had ones where you talk to the perpetrator where they’d deny it and I’ve had about 3 or 4 where the men have run back, they’ve thought about it... because we could never guarantee that we’d got all content down. It was just so prolific and it spread and they’d all been indexed on [name of search engine deleted]. You can never guarantee to someone that all content is removed or that the perpetrator doesn’t continually have content. (Participant C)
Another participant expressed that it is difficult to stop offenders in their tracks and that motivated offenders somehow will find their way around any legal system.

I think laws will never be able to do it all together similarly with social media platforms. You can go Dark net, you can do these things that are just not in the control of any particular platform. I think if friends and bystanders were challenging the producers of these material, that would be one thing but if they’re friends of the victims, that’s not going to stop the people who think it’s okay to do this... No matter what a person says they're doing or even if police say they have deleted them off their phone in front of us, you can never know if someone who has shared them with one other person. I don’t think we can ever say something is completely deleted from the internet. (Participant B)

The same participant explained how indexing of images on the internet, lack of moral and social responsibility commitment from online platforms and limitations of cyber security/ technical measures make it difficult to protect IBSA victims from further harm.

The indexing on [name of search engine deleted] is still there so you can still have the name [deleted] naked photos, [deleted] performs sex. Even though you click on them and there is no content, the indexes are still there. It’s complicated because of the nature of the internet. People maintain the roads but they are not responsible for bad drivers. That’s the analogy that we hear from content hosts sometimes. Content hosts, to be fair, have improved their reporting mechanisms and improved the way they handle things that are reported to them. There are rogue sites out there, people motivated by greed and making money by clicks who are not necessarily going to be moral and ethical about how they run something. I don’t know that security can fix it or what technology can or cannot do. Certainly there is the thing about having a photo marked so it cannot go up on the net again but does that mean that it cannot go anywhere on the net? Or someone invent a way to unmark it? Probably. They can hack into any computer anywhere, they can probably work their way around unmarking. (Participant B)

Another participant emphasised poorest takedown success rates being in instances when the images have gone viral and online platforms are slow to act and/or are uncooperative.

The case of [a 10-year marriage ending in divorce] was horrific because her children found that and there were 600 explicit images. The ex, father of their children... It was horrific. The police looked at it and they decided not to pursue it through the court, to lay criminal charges. They gave him a warning because [name of blog site deleted] wouldn’t engage with New Zealand law enforcement so they weren’t going to pursue the case. The one that we struggle with most is [name of blog site deleted] and because it is not such a
pillar anymore, it has become more difficult with reporting. They will eventually take it down but they’d take a while. (Participant C)

Another participant highlighted how indexing on the internet increases the social and occupational harms associated with IBSA victimisation.

Sometimes, it’s a one-off. Other times it’s very persistent. Somehow a victim’s name [would be linked] to porn site URLs. So if you searched your name, you would find your name on a particular porn site. You click it open, sometimes there may be content, sometimes they are not of you. But just having your name there is quite harmful because if you were looking for a job and someone Googled you, and all of that came up, that would be harmful as well. Those are the ones we keep seeing that are persistent so you might get some down but they would just keep putting them up. (Participant D)

**M. Resources and Accountability**

The participants provided their reflections about the effectiveness of current legislation, law enforcement efforts and resourcing unevenness, prioritisation and constraints.

Because there is no money in that and would rely more on the online content hosts doing a huge amount of investment in that space. I would say realistically, online safety. Politically, I just don’t imagine it going down that avenue so it would be online safety. It’s such a tall ask for cyber security but there are way much more child exploitation material that is huge but that is totally under-resourced anyway but I couldn’t imagine this in itself be seen as a priority any time soon. (Participant C)

Another participant commented on the challenges faced by the criminal justice system in staying ahead of IBSA offenders and disrupting their abusive actions.

The law is strong in New Zealand. [There are] cases going down the criminal path for Section 22, and there are other criminal leaders that the police can use. The police are using them. Can they use them more effectively? Probably. We certainly get people reporting to us saying that the person at the police station said, “Why did you send the image in the first place?” We’ve got the legislation. We’ve got the police force which is getting to grips with it...“Why haven’t the police done XYZ?” There are so many different crimes the police have to solve. We are very niche in one of them but they have to cover everything. The complexity of everything that is happening in the criminal and the civil harm that is online is hard for society to keep up with the limited funds it has got. The online world is moving very quickly and unfortunately, institutions that put funding and resources into places don’t move as quickly. As much as we’ve got governments to regulate stuff and social media sites that can always make improvements to their trust and safety policies and processes but ultimately the people responsible at the end of the day are the people committing the crime. (Participant A)
Another participant highlighted the need for online safety prevention of IBSA to be rolled out in schools.

Obviously education is a really big part of that. If the Ministry of Education were to put things in the curriculum around online safety, that would be a good thing because it is not compulsory in the curriculum here in New Zealand. (Participant B)

Another participant expressed the urgent need for more action and fewer excuses when committing to protecting and supporting IBSA victims.

Absolutely the social media sites. Police, Ministry of Justice. Obviously the platforms but there is only so much that they can do. There needs to be more accountability because they obviously keep falling back on the fact that it is not in their jurisdiction. And we’re such a small fry in New Zealand so we don’t have any weight to throw around. It needs to be the offender, followed by the government and police. I see them as the same. We have very little power with platforms without the government and police. When you’re hearing people’s experiences all day, every day, it does bias you. It has had an impact of the opinion that there needs to be more action taken. It’s really upsetting for people. You can hear that but I suppose if you’re removed because it’s not what you do day-in, day-out maybe you’d think it’s not that important. (Participant C)

Discussion

The participants refuted the common misconception that IBSA only concerns teenagers or young adults who actively and recklessly engage in sexting and/or short-term casual relationships. The participants’ views based on victim reports aligned with previous literature reporting that adults in committed, romantic relationships are more likely to sext than those not in a relationship (see Develi & Weisskirch, 2013; Dir et al., 2013; Perkins et al., 2014; Samimi & Alderson, 2014; Powell et al., 2019).

A participant outlined the need for a shift in focus from the age of the offender to the technical competence of the individual (i.e. an offender’s understanding of how to maximise harm using technology, the internet and various internet spaces and conceal their crimes) to improve the understanding and effective disruption of IBSA. In more complex domestic violence cases, the
police must be equipped to detect technology-facilitated coercive control tactics employed by the abuser (see Dragiewicz et al., 2018) through the misuse of a victim’s intimate images aimed at satisfying a goal of exerting power and preventing abused partners from escaping further abuse in their estranged marriages and domestic partnerships (see Dutton & Goodman, 2005; Woodlock, 2017; Rivera et al., 2013). For these retribution-style IBSA victims, the level of harm is significantly elevated (see Stark, 2012).

The participants’ records of IBSA victim reporting and inferences on IBSA offending and victimisation seasonal trends open avenues for further research inquiry. Although this study was not designed to examine links between thermal climate conditions and higher seasonal trends of IBSA offending and victimisation (see heat hypothesis; Allen, Anderson, & Bushman, 2018; Anderson, 1989; CLASH; Van Lange, Runderu, & Bushman, 2017), seasonal patterns of IBSA reporting have implications on routine activities theory.

Applying the logic of the theory, during the winter months, potential offenders could be spending more time indoors and hence be spending more time browsing intimate images of their current or former intimate partners on their smartphones, ruminating about prior relationship grievances, accessing pornographic sites and/or online platforms that encourage or provide opportunities for the non-consensual dissemination of a victim’s intimate images. A greater access of smartphones and increased internet activity during certain seasons could increase prompts, pressures, permission and provocations to perpetrate IBSA and other technology-facilitated intimate partner abuse (see Wortley, 2008). Adult routine activities such as their routine work schedules may also account for IBSA victim reports peaking mid-week and in the evenings. Adult victims are also more
likely to be notified by bystanders who encountered their intimate images or the victim’s name indexed on a search engine and/or while accessing pornographic sites towards the end of a workday.

The routine activities theory is also significant in situations whereby third party offenders had gained access to a woman’s intimate images by accessing her former partner’s smartphone. The tendency to carelessly retain intimate images of a former intimate partner after a relationship breakdown does not only increase opportunities for IBSA to be perpetrated by the victim’s former intimate partner but also by others who covertly download and circulate the intimate images through the former partner’s smartphone. This has implications for situational crime prevention in protecting the victim against physical-level security threats otherwise known as target hardening (see SCP; Cornish and Clarke, 2003).

The participants also identified the gendered differences in IBSA reporting with women being more likely to report the non-consensual dissemination of their intimate images by former or current intimate partners whilst men being more likely to report financial sextortion scams perpetrated by strangers they met online and engaged in online sexual activity with. Inferences can be drawn from this difference in reporting such as more severe forms of IBSA (that are experienced by victims as “serious emotional distress”) are perpetrated by former and current intimate male partners against females (see Henry & Powell, 2015; Salter & Crofts, 2015; Cooper, 2016; Kamal & Newman, 2016), harms of IBSA victimisation being more pronounced for heterosexual women than heterosexual men (see Bates, 2017) leading to more reports by females and/or victims being held to heteronormative norms and standards which reflect on their reporting and help-seeking behaviours (see Rosenkrantz & Mark, 2018; Dwyer, 2015; Nadal et
al., 2011; Ruvalcaba & Eaton, 2019). Perhaps, more police attention directed at socio-cultural differences in IBSA reporting, offending and victimisation would improve police responses towards victims who have suffered “serious emotional distress” from their victimisation.

The victimisation-offending gap tends to vary considerably in IBSA. Victims may have the opportunity to seek help quickly if the offender threatens the victim and follows through with the threat with the victim’s knowledge. However, as the participants explicitly stated, not all offenders make online or offline contact with their victims prior to, during or after the non-consensual dissemination of a victim’s intimate images. Victims whose offenders disseminate their intimate images to their close family members and friends through messaging apps and platforms tend to be notified sooner than victims whose offenders disseminate their intimate images to a variety of audiences using a number of platforms and online spaces within platforms (e.g., blogs, file sharing platforms, trading groups, social media public and private groups).

The participants also commented on the lack of direct face-to-face contact and how violence escalates online a lot quicker than in real life with more extensive and irreparable damage which is consistent with Suler’s (2004) online disinhibition effect or asynchronicity which explains that delays in feedback in virtual environments may result in an acceleration and exacerbation of an individual’s neutral thoughts into deeper expressions of toxic disinhibition in the form of an ‘emotional hit and run’. In retribution-style IBSA, the offender could be putting it (the victim’s intimate images) out there (online) where it (a relationship grievance) can be left behind (online).

The participants’ mixed responses with regard to signs of retribution-style
IBSA suggest that although there are prior signs of intimate partner abuse (whether acknowledged by the victim or not), many IBSA victims experience the non-consensual dissemination of their intimate images as unprecedented and unanticipated. This lands support for the internet’s role in concealing an offender’s disputatiousness and aggressiveness even after a relationship breakdown (see Luckenbill & Doyle, 1989), facilitating an offender’s attempts to bypass emotional/confrontational tension with the victim, and the perpetration of violence and abuse at a distance with greater ease (see Collins, 2008; 2013).

The participants expressed concern regarding support for victims who cannot afford civil redress, have reached the threshold for serious emotional distress under Section 22 yet have been turned away by the police on grounds that their case not being “criminal” enough. Another problem for victims is that online “threats” to disseminate their images alone may not provide sufficient grounds for immediate police investigation. In unfortunate circumstances, an offender may disseminate a victim’s intimate images once made aware of a victim’s intention to report or reporting of the matter to the police (see Henry et al., 2018). More effective prevention efforts and controls would protect these victims from repeated and persistent victimisation.

Participants outlined inconsistencies in police willingness and readiness in investigating IBSA based on their IBSA victim reports. This is more salient for adult victims attempting to gain access to the criminal justice system in the following instances: (i) IBSA offenders do not have a prior history of intimate partner violence or criminal convictions (e.g., breach of police bail or police protection orders, physical and/or sexual assault charges), (ii) police prioritisation of IBSA cases that are perpetrated in addition to contact (physical) offences or
possession of child pornographic material (see Powell & Henry, 2016), (iii) police orientation towards victim responsibility and victim blaming (e.g., an adult victim’s failure to take steps to minimise his/her own victimisation victim’s engagement in sexting) rather than the offender’s abusive behaviours (e.g., threats to disseminate and disseminating a victim’s intimate images, covert intimate filming and continuing to retain a victim’s intimate images against the victim’s requests to delete them) (see Venema, 2016; Sleath & Bull, 2012; Henry et al., 2018), (iv) police lack of awareness of the “serious emotional distress” experienced by IBSA victims in addition to the cumulative harms inflicted on a victim whose intimate images have gone viral on the internet (see Bates, 2017; Stroud, 2014; Goldberg, 2014), in turn resorting to harm minimisation behaviours (e.g., providing unhelpful advice to prevent or reduce further IBSA victimisation) (see Bond & Tyrell, 2018; Henry et al., 2018), and (v) lack of police technical competencies and resources to initiate and follow through with investigations into all IBSA cases requiring criminal redress. Other participants acknowledged police efforts in cases that had reached the threshold of “serious emotional distress”—typically observed in contexts of in-the-flesh dating and domestic violence (see Bluett-Boyd et al., 2013).

The following recommendations are proposed based on the interview findings: (i) more time and quality conscious streamlining of information and support services for victims of IBSA (see Salter & Crofts, 2015; McGlynn et al., 2017), (ii) more allocation of police resources into IBSA prevention efforts, (iii) more resource allocation in police training to improve safe and effective police responses to IBSA victims regardless of whether the cases end in criminal courts or prosecutions, and (iv) more government protection for IBSA victims (see EU’s
The Right To be Forgotten, 2014) in the most extreme of IBSA cases where the images have gone viral and cannot be contained (the right to data protection and privacy and legitimate public interest in accessing information) and there are suicide attempts and significant long-term mental health impacts on the victim. These interview findings would help propose a situational crime prevention framework for IBSA perpetrated by former and current intimate partners.

7.2. Situational Crime Prevention and Crime Intervention Points for Retribution-style IBSA

Discussion

Crime script intervention points were constructed for each crime script stage (see Chiu & Leclerc, 2017) and the three elements (offender, place and victim) of Clarke and Eck’s (2005) problem triangle that must converge for criminal forms of IBSA to occur. According to Felson (2008), ensuring the presence of capable guardianship and place management are likely to reduce criminal opportunities. In this vein, several situational prevention strategies were proposed to increase offender handling, capable guardianship and place management to disrupt and prevent criminal forms of IBSA. The crime script intervention points are also based on the rational choice perspective (Clarke & Cornish, 1985) which posits that offenders exploit opportunities in their immediate (online and/or offline) environment(s) when the perceived benefits outweigh the costs (see Table in Appendix C).

As IBSA perpetration, a type of technology-facilitated sexual abuse occurs in both online and offline environments, situational prevention strategies are
catered to both spaces, including a mix of prevention of cybercrime and in-the-flesh sexual or domestic abuse. The most effective intervention points in the offender-victim prehistory stage appear to be for the guardian-target and handler-offender rather than the manager-place. Taking into account the data generated from the interviews and court transcripts, the majority of IBSA criminal offences perpetrated by former or current intimate partners are based on intimate relationships that originated in the real world. On occasion, an adult couple would meet online and would nurture an intimate relationship online (due to geographical constraints) before meeting physically. At the offender-victim prehistory stage, there could be more education and awareness initiatives in areas of healthy relationship building and management, understanding the realities of intimate relationships (e.g., relationships can fail), post-relationship self-management, signs of intimate partner abuse, online and offline consent and privacy in different relationship contexts and engaging in communication and negotiation of personal boundaries, harms perpetuated and amplified by the internet for IBSA victims, negative consequences for IBSA offending (e.g., criminal conviction) and promoting safe and effective bystander interventions and increased institutional and police support for whistleblowers (increasing presence of capable guardianship).

Drawing from Chiu and Leclerc’s (2017) study on sex offences perpetrated against women, recommendations have been provided (Appendix C). In the crime set up phase, specifically the setting and instrumental actualisation stages, many effective intervention points are present. As place managers, online platforms can increase their technical controls for IBSA perpetration and enhance
their security and privacy features and settings for potential targets to utilise whilst intermediaries (if present) can increase their level of support for IBSA victims. The police can also adequately support the intermediary by intervening in cases where offenders are non-compliant and persistent in their offending. Social media platforms can also constantly prompt users to log out of their accounts when not in use. Increased public awareness of the harms inflicted by offenders on IBSA victims and support for more aggressive IBSA prevention efforts would improve the presence of capable guardianship (i.e., friends and family of the target including third parties). Capable guardians are less likely to resort to harm minimisation and victim blaming attitudes and would be more efficient and effective in supporting a potential IBSA victim. Capable guardians can be present in at-risk online platforms and maintain a strong online presence to deter offenders. The police can also more actively utilise digital and print media to deter potential offenders. These can reduce criminal opportunities for IBSA perpetration.

During the offender approach stage, smartphone, online platforms and information service providers could strengthen their general and security privacy settings and to bolster against personal online risk and physical-level security threats. These should be user-friendly and include compulsory security features to reduce the risk of victimisation (e.g., mandatory two-step authentication and logging out of social media and e-mail accounts). Smartphone providers can also enhance their intimate image protection systems by prompting targets to delete, securely store and exclude self-taken intimate images from cloud back-ups. Smartphone providers can also use algorithms to alert users that their self-taken intimate images capturing identifying features would be deleted and outstanding
intimate images would be wiped out from their smartphone in addition to the recipient’s smartphone according to the terms of the sender. Education initiatives on how third parties can detect commonly used coercive control strategies in IBSA (e.g., blackmail and threats) and build resilience against participating in the circulation of a victim’s images would also improve capable guardianship. The police also have a role in removing excuses for potential IBSA offenders and alerting the public to the risk of incarceration and enforcing basic physical-level security (e.g., not leaving smartphone unlocked and unattended and deleting all intimate images when disposing, repairing or trading-in smartphone) and the negative impacts of neglecting basic security.

At the continuation and interaction and crime completion stages, the aim of situational prevention strategies is targeted support for IBSA victims from intermediaries and online platforms in ensuring immediate action for takedown requests and takedown success. Capable guardians can also help support a victim in maintaining a positive online presence in the unfortunate circumstance that the intimate images are circulated widely on the internet. The criminal justice system also has a significant role to play in leading and supporting initiatives against intimate partner violence, technology-facilitated domestic and sexual violence and reducing harm minimisation and victim blaming attitudes in the public. Effective legislation of IBSA as a communications offence and domestic and/or sexual violence offence would improve support for victims seeking fair access to criminal justice. At this point, more clarity on what types of IBSA are deemed “criminal” rather than “civil” would ensure that police resources are channelled adequately towards supporting IBSA victims through reporting and where necessary, the entire investigative process. IBSA victims who have reached the
threshold of serious emotional distress and fulfil the criteria in Section 22 of the HDCA would benefit greatly from immediate police intervention (as opposed to being turned away and redirected to the intermediary) should these victims approach the police before the intermediary. Streamlining IBSA victim support information would assist with protecting IBSA victims from further harm and possibly re-victimisation. When IBSA victims are adequately supported, this could deter potential offenders. The police could also increase their investigative efforts in IBSA offences involving doxxing which expose an IBSA victim to further harm and risk of physical stalking, sexual harassment and sexual assault. Online platforms could continue to remind users to maximise use of their privacy and security settings and encourage online safety.

In the post-action and exit stages, the collaboration between intermediaries, online platforms and law enforcement must be robust. Guardians play a significant role in situational prevention by not circulating, storing or consuming the non-consensually disseminated intimate images or inadvertently contributing to further dissemination by third parties. Capable guardians are also individuals who are able to support the victim through reporting, filing takedown requests, maintaining a digital evidence folder in the event that their IBSA victimisation requires criminal investigation, counteracting the indexing on search engines and directing the victim to emotional support hotlines or mental health services if “serious emotional distress” was suffered. Finally, more targeted effort must be directed at minimising victim blaming. An attempt has been made to address prevention strategies for threats to disseminate a victim’s intimate images and the non-consensual dissemination of a victim’s intimate images in IBSA perpetrated by former and current intimate partners (see Table in Appendix C).
The situational crime prevention framework would better address all types of IBSA offending including the unauthorised access of a victim’s mobile device, covert filming (see Table 2). This situational crime prevention framework adapted from Cornish and Clarke (2003) allows for prevention of IBSA in both offline and online spaces. Several strategies were borrowed from the 20 situational prevention measures for cyber-criminality by Miró (2012) to adequately prevent IBSA which is largely perpetrated on online platforms.
### Table 2. 25 Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for IBSA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase the effort</th>
<th>Increase the risks</th>
<th>Reduce the rewards</th>
<th>Reduce provocations</th>
<th>Remove excuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Harden Targets:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Extend guardianship:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conceal Targets:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reduce frustrations and stress:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Set rules:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Smartphone hidden camera detector</td>
<td>- Password and fingerprint-locked smartphone (biometric identification and authentication)</td>
<td>- Not revealing passwords to significant others</td>
<td>- Negotiating terms and conditions for sexting, storage, deletion and dissemination of intimate images in various online contexts (e.g., after relationship breakdown) and recording webcam sexual activity (if any) and doxxing</td>
<td>- International legal harmonisation; “Netiquette”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Educational campaigns on risky sexting and Red flags for IPV</td>
<td>- Online and offline neighbourhood watch for misogynist groups</td>
<td>- Changing account passwords regularly and storing passwords in encrypted password storage folder</td>
<td>- Documenting evidence of agreements</td>
<td>- Seamless coordination between domestic intermediary and law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Women’s online safety, legal and mental health support services</td>
<td>- Reminding one another about digital hygiene and physical level security</td>
<td>- Using 2-factor authentication</td>
<td>- EU’s “The Right to Be Forgotten” (worst case scenarios)</td>
<td>- IBSA is a sexual offence and a communications offence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cultural minorities’ online safety, legal and mental health support services</td>
<td>- Forum moderators</td>
<td>- Storing intimate images only in “hidden” password encrypted private image folders and create decoys</td>
<td>- Locking doors during shower</td>
<td>- Not engaging in webcam sexual activity if the other party does not show</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Insurance and legal protection (specialised service) for technology-facilitated sexual violence)</td>
<td>- Echelon</td>
<td>- Locking doors during shower</td>
<td>- Sleeping with private areas covered</td>
<td>- Frequently asking the other party to make specific gestures on webcam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Not engaging in webcam sexual activity if the other party does not show</td>
<td>- ENFOPOL (not in NZ)</td>
<td>- Cover webcam with privacy shield</td>
<td>- Cover webcam with privacy shield</td>
<td>- Cover webcam with privacy shield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frequently asking the other party to make specific gestures on webcam</td>
<td>- Carnivore and Dark Web systems</td>
<td>- Shutting off visual stream on webcam software application when threatened</td>
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<tr>
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| **Control Access to Facilities:**  
- All terms and conditions regarding the prohibition and legal consequences of non-consensually taken and uploaded intimate images must be read, understood and agreed upon by all digital platform and smartphone users  
- Smartphone providers investing in more innovative security features for “sexts” and “nude selfies”  
- Mandatory personal information required by site users (e.g., personal e-mail address and verification) | **Assist natural surveillance:**  
- Bystander intervention programmes  
- Utilise online privacy settings on social media sites  
- Supporting whistleblowers  
- Improve IP identification systems  
- Reconstruct architecture with defensive ends using machine learning and AI | **Remove Targets:**  
- Deleting intimate images from potential target’s and offender’s smartphone devices and the Cloud  
- Not leaving smartphone unattended  
- Logging out of all e-mails and social media accounts  
- Content filters | **Avoid disputes:**  
- Healthy relationships  
- Healthy ways to end relationships  
- Marriage counseling if separated  
- Seeking legal advice  
- Seeking advice from the police | **Post instructions:**  
- Online platforms (e.g., porn, trading and social networking sites, bogs, file sharing platforms, software telecommunications applications and encrypted messaging apps) should have clear terms and conditions against IBSA and display them clearly  
- Fines for IBSA |
| **Screen Exits:**  
- Tracking IP address  
- AI and computer simulation models monitoring and collecting data on user activity | **Reduce Anonymity:**  
- Ban and block VPN services and Tor, selling and promoting Tor  
- Identify IPs  
- Registration on web forums  
- User identification systems | **Identify Property:**  
- Copywriting intimate images  
- Documenting digital evidence  
- Using AI to detect intimate images before they are viewed | **Reduce emotional arousal:**  
- Managing thoughts and emotions after relationship breakdown | **Alert conscience:**  
- Raise consciousness about psychological, cultural, financial and occupational harms of IBSA  
- Raise consciousness about bystander support  
- Raise consciousness about privacy breaches and physical and online forms of sexual abuse |
<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deflect Offenders:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Utilise Place Managers:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disrupt Markets:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Neutralise peer pressure:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assist Compliance:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| - Encouraging counselling to facilitate healthy grieving post-break up, support services for alcohol problems | - Reward vigilance by content providers and hosts, file and image sharing platforms, dating apps | - Breaking up online male-dominated misogynistic “hate” groups | - “Idiots seek revenge and resort to IBSA”  
- “If he forces a sext out of you, stay away”. | - Regular prompts by online platforms (e.g., “Violation of Community Standards)  
- Remind users of the consequences (fines) if found out to be participating in IBSA |
| - Flagging mechanisms on online platforms  
- A user-friendly system to report and request removal of illicit content  
- Automatic closure of accounts and ban of accounts using same IP address | | - Imposing hefty fines on any civilian that promotes IBSA  
- Control direct file download sites | | |
| **Control weapons/ tools:** | **Strengthen formal surveillance:** | **Deny benefits:** | **Discourage imitation:** | **Control drugs and alcohol:** |
| - Disabling smartphones that are stolen  
- Crunching down on revenge porn sites, social media and blogs promoting hate speech  
- Search engines removing URLs of revenge porn sites  
- Government regulation over pornography | - Planting undercover officers in social media groups, trading platforms and sites  
- Routine checks with content hosts and providers about at-risk groups  
- Dark web surveillance and employing decoys by specialised intelligence team for cyber crime persecution  
- Algorithm/ AI, data mining techniques and linguistic software identifying male hate speech, doxxing, and high traffic content  
- Control networks through proxy | - Compensation to be paid by IBSA offender to content hosts and providers for defaming reputation  
- Compensation for defamation to be paid to victim  
- Downloading, storing, distributing and trading another individual’s intimate images without their consent is illegal and enforce persecution and legal backing (HDCA) | - Rapid facilitation of takedowns by intermediary  
- Downloading and storing someone else’s intimate images without their consent is illegal | - Not engaging in drugs and alcohol before online or physical sexual activity to detect signs of being covertly filmed |
To increase the effort required for an offender to carry out IBSA, educational campaigns outlining the risks associated with adults engaging in sexting in casual sexual relationships and committed but abusive relationships, safety precautions prior to and while engaging in webcam sexual activity and online safety for women and socio-cultural minorities who might be at greater risk of victimisation and experience higher emotional costs from victimisation. To harden themselves against covert intimate filming, potential targets may scan locations where a reasonable level of privacy is expected (e.g., bedroom and bathroom) using hidden (spy) camera detectors made available through smartphone applications, free network scanners or sensors. Couples already in coercive controlling (abusive) relationships and individuals engaging in casual sexual activity in a physical settings and/or over the webcam may be at increased risk of being covertly filmed or photographed. The police can also educate the public on common hidden camera locations such as smoke detectors, alarm clocks, mirrors, books, pens and soft toys and emphasise preventive vigilance in the general public. Various online platforms and smartphone providers can work together to increase user accountability should they engage in unlawful practices (i.e., non-consensual dissemination of intimate images) and be more conscientious in maintaining their records of users’ particulars and IBSA behaviours perpetrated on their sites and agree to assist with criminal investigations should they be approached by the police. Support services for individuals grieving relationship separation and facing mental health issues can be put in place. Flagging mechanisms and a system for reporting and requesting the removal of illicit content on all social media, pornographic, file sharing and trading platforms should be in place including automatic closure of accounts using the same IP.
address. Smartphone providers can also remind users to delete all their intimate images and provide guidance on how to disable their stolen phones with immediate effect. Lastly, the government can regulate access to pornography by blocking pornographic sites and banning access to revenge porn sites.

To increase the risks the offender must face in perpetrating IBSA, guardianship can be extended in the form of password and fingerprint-locked smartphones, bystander online and offline engagement in breaking up misogynist groups, instilling and reinforcing online safety and physical-level mobile and computer security and bystander intervention programmes. Forum moderators can be better invested in keeping their virtual spaces safe and digital spaces can be redesigned to integrate machine learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to detect and delete intimate images that have been uploaded online before anyone views them. Linguistic software and data mining techniques can also aid in formal surveillance to detect doxxing, male hate speech, threats to upload a victim’s intimate images, sexual harassment, cyberstalking and attempts to extort unwanted sexual favours from victims. Anonymity needs to be reduced to ensure that digital evidence can be traced back to the IBSA offender despite attempts to conceal unlawful activity.

To reduce the rewards or benefits of IBSA, potential targets can not disclose their smartphone, computer, social media and e-mail passwords even to their significant others. Using two-factor authentication to lock their smartphones would conceal targets and storing the images in password encrypted private folders would make accessing the victim’s intimate images more difficult. Locking doors during showers and sleeping with private areas covered, covering the webcam with a privacy shield and shutting off the visual stream on the
webcam software application when feeling threatened during webcam sexual activity, deleting intimate images from smartphone devices and cloud back-ups can reduce victimisation. Hefty fines can be imposed on individuals who promote IBSA and image download sites can be controlled such that no one is allowed to download, store and circulate non-consensual intimate images without paying legal compensation to the state, the online platform and the IBSA victim. This would deter second degree perpetrators (i.e., hackers and third parties who received the non-consensual intimate images directly from the IBSA perpetrator and circulated them) and third degree perpetrators (i.e., visitors on online platforms who are aware that the intimate images were non-consensually disseminated but used them for pleasure).

To reduce or avoid provocations that may incite IBSA offenders, it is important that couples discuss and reach a mutual agreement on the terms and conditions regarding sexting, storage, deletion and dissemination of intimate images in various contexts including relationship breakdowns and recordings of webcam sexual activity and doxxing. As an added assurance, this formal agreement must be documented. Potential targets can seek legal advice and police support early to minimise further harm to themselves or risk of provoking the offender further. Rapid action by intermediaries and online platforms in responding to takedown requests are also critical to discourage imitation and prevent irreparable damage to the victim. The police could also enforce that downloading and storing another individual’s intimate images without consent is illegal.

To remove excuses that offenders may use to rationalise their criminal actions, international legal harmonisation is critical as offenders of different
nationalities and online content hosts based abroad are not subject to domestic laws. This would apply in adult long distance relationships and casual sex and sexting encounters with foreigners. In cases of widespread indexing and spread of a victim’s intimate images, the state can intervene to get search engines to remove the images from their search results and get reputational management organisations to assist the victim with maintaining a positive online presence. Instructions can be made visible by all online platforms that allow the uploading of images. Fines for IBSA can also be imposed by websites and stated clearly in their terms and conditions. Not engaging in drugs and alcohol before online or physical sexual activity is critical in prevent accountability from being shifted from the offender to the victim. Potential targets being under the influence of alcohol and other substances that compromise alertness also negatively impact their ability to protect themselves against covert intimate filming and photo-taking. This would also apply to acquaintance rape victims (see Chiu and Leclerc, 2017).
Chapter 8. General Discussion and Conclusion

The study sought to examine retribution-style IBSA and construct crime scripts based on specific IBSA behaviours. The results from the primary data proved to be valuable in proposing IBSA prevention measures and provided compelling support for more police intervention in such cases including public outreach.

To demonstrate how IBSA perpetrated by current and former intimate partners is situated along the continuum of domestic and sexual violence, there are actual examples evidencing displacement of real domestic and sexual crimes into cyberspace. For example, to overcome police protection or restraining orders in the real world, the offender can initiate contact with the victim through harmful digital communications such as threats to disseminate a victim’s intimate images or proceed to disseminate a victim’s intimate images without warning.

Coercive controlling tactics (e.g., intimidation, fear and control) are also evidenced in marital separation or extramarital affairs whereby the retribution-style IBSA offender covertly films the victim (former extramarital partner) and threatens to disseminate the intimate images of the victim (current spouse but separated) when suspected of infidelity. As identified in this research, certain cultural groups are at higher risk of emotional distress than others due to their cultural orientations. Sexual violence is evidenced through the soliciting of unwanted sexual favours by former intimate partners and/or forcing an unwanted sexual relationship with a victim. This type of IBSA perpetration is akin to acquaintance-perpetrated rape. Sexual abuse is also evidenced when the offender endangers a victim’s physical safety through “doxxing”—publicising the victim’s
personal information and advertising her for sexual services which directly exposes her to stranger and acquaintance stalking, harassment and rape.

There are implications for IBSA offences whereby the parent or an adult in the extended family has disseminated the other parent’s intimate images to their child, indicating that IBSA may also be situated in family violence. In the IBSA prosecution case of a mother being victimised by her daughter’s partner after he sent her a video footage of her daughter engaging in sexual acts with a third party while being consensually filmed, the police recognised the cultural harm and psychological abuse behind the IBSA offender’s actions directed at the mother of the daughter’s abusive partner. This criminal case also highlights that IBSA offending and victimisation need not solely occur between intimate partners. However, it is challenging to gauge whether the police would have investigated the mother's case if the offender did not have prior male-assaults-female convictions and other convictions.

A few limitations exist in this study. The use of court data may be susceptible to inaccuracies due to incorrect recording, lack of details or a prioritisation of certain areas of a crime (Porter, 2008). For instance, it was difficult to find meaningful trends for offending as some court transcripts were more detailed in documenting offending patterns than others. Future research could use police case files and offender interviews to address the gaps in IBSA offending literature which this study could not. The interview findings indicated that the majority of IBSA cases do not make it to civil or criminal court and that there is underreporting of IBSA. As this study relied on victim impact statements in the court transcripts and interviewees’ accounts of victim experiences rather than victim interviews, it was difficult to get a first hand and detailed
understanding of the specific problems IBSA victims face in contemplating whether to report their victimisation, whom to approach for help and their recommendations for prevention and protection for future IBSA adult victims. It is also difficult to conclude how or why some IBSA cases are successfully resolved by the couple whilst in other circumstances, the abuse persists in spite of warnings from the intermediary. More research needs to be conducted on the actual and perceived challenges for reporting IBSA victimisation in New Zealand.

Due to a lack of quantitative data on the types of IBSA perpetrated in New Zealand, this study may not be representative of all IBSA cases in New Zealand but it is a start. In light of sextortion scams being the most commonly reported IBSA victimisation for New Zealand men and retribution-style IBSA for New Zealand women, future research can explicitly measure and explain gendered differences across all types of IBSA. As identified by the research findings, reports for IBSA victimisation is evidently more prevalent in certain cultures than others (e.g., European and Indian community rather than Maori community). Future cross-cultural research can be conducted in IBSA offending and victimisation. The study’s insights on capable guardianship were limited to perspectives of the interviewees. Future research could investigate guardianship in greater scope and depth – comparing different levels of closeness between the bystander and victim/ perpetrator with their willingness to intervene and actual intervention (i.e., when the bystander (guardian) knows the victim, when the bystander does not know the victim/ perpetrator very well and/or the bystander does not know the victim/ perpetrator at all). There clearly needs to be more research conducted on capable guardianship in IBSA prevention.
The recommendations provided in this study counter anti-sexting literature in the effort to minimise victim blaming, increase offender accountability and highlight additional police support. As adult intimate relationships are central to this research, the recommendations are also pitched at young and mature adults rather than adolescents with the latter being more susceptible to online risk taking behaviours and therefore victimisation. It is also difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the HDCA in deterring IBSA offenders and minimising victimisation or if other factors are responsible for “crime” drop or desistance.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Table of Publically Accessible Cases

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Appendix B: Interview Questions

A. Generic Cases of Image-based Sexual Abuse and Revenge Pornography

(i) Profiling of Offenders, Victims and Bystanders
1. Who are usually involved in cases of image-based abuse and revenge pornography (e.g., victims, offenders, bystanders and other parties—age and age gaps, gender identity, sexual orientation, racial group, education level, employment status, mental and physical health status etc.)

(ii) Crime Opportunities and Situational Variables
2. When do these unfortunate events typically happen (temporal patterns of offending and victimisation—e.g., trends, seasons, time of day, repetition of offending, time lag between offender posting/sharing images and victims finding out, time lag between victimisation and reporting etc.)?
3. Are these relationships generally abusive?
4. How long does the abuse typically last since the onset of the relationships? Could you describe the abusive patterns?
5. What type(s) of image-based sexual abuse are used (e.g., videos and/or personal photos)?
6. Are these images “usually” taken by the victim or by the perpetrator or without the victim’s consent?
7. How do the victims typically find out about the posting and/or distribution of their images?
8. How are these images posted/shared (e.g., social media, pornographic (or revenge porn) websites, private message, Public or Private group—> most frequent mode used)?
9. Which social media platform/medium do you think is most vulnerable to image-based sexual abuse?
10. Could you describe the steps taken and virtual spaces used by offenders to maximise harm?
11. How do the victims feel and what are their thoughts when they find out?
12. How do the victims react and how do they go about reporting it?
13. What do you think are the factors that lead to offending and victimisation? (predisposing: genetics, life events, temperament?)
14. What triggers the postings/sharing? (precipitating: trigger/stressful situation?)
15. Is the abuse in real life and the image-based sexual abuse persistent and recurrent? (perpetuating: what made it continue?)
16. How are these matters typically resolved?
17. Are the victims (and their loved ones) usually satisfied with the outcome(s)?

B. Specific Research Domains:

(i) The continuum of intimate partner violence in real life and in cyber space
1. Do you think intimate partner violence/abuse is far worse in real life?
2. To what extent (i.e., large or small extent) is the virtual environment to be blamed for the offending behaviour? (e.g., the anonymous nature of the internet, the click of a button, poor surveillance, cultural acceptance of pornographic material)?
3. Do you think that anyone who resorts to revenge pornography has a history of interpersonal violence?
4. Are drug and/or alcohol problems typically present in the abusive context?
5. What are some real life intimate partner abusive behaviours that translate to an online platform (e.g., controlling, aggressive, violent behaviours etc.)?

(ii) The concepts of anonymity, harm and victim blaming
1. Do you think that revenge pornography is far more harmful than online harassment e.g., threats of physical or sexual violence or cyber monitoring to track a partner’s movements and activities?
2. What makes a partner/ex-partner use images instead of text as a medium of abuse?
3. Do you think there is normalisation of access to and use of pornography in New Zealand?
4. What makes a suitable target for image-based sexual abuse (i.e., revenge pornography)?
5. Have you experienced cases of victim blaming (i.e., Why do people blame the victim?)?
6. In your opinion, do adults from Rainbow communities experience more victim blaming than heterosexual victims?
7. Do you think Maori experience harm differently or more severely compared to Pakeha victims?
8. Do you think there are sufficient support services for heterosexual victims and victims in Rainbow communities of all racial groups (especially Maori and Pacific Peoples) in New Zealand?
9. Do you think deeply ingrained “institutional distrust” could be the cause of underreporting of
image-based sexual abuse by victims in Rainbow communities in New Zealand?
10. Is more harm inflicted if the victim is recognisable/identifiable?

(iii) The gendered nature of image-based sexual abuse
1. Do you think victims from Rainbow communities (compared to heterosexual victims) experience the impacts of image-based sexual abuse differently?
2. What are your experiences about female-to-female revenge pornography cases (e.g., extramarital affairs)?
3. Do you think harm experienced by victims in Rainbow communities is downplayed or overlooked in New Zealand?
4. Do you think that the harm experienced by female victims regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity is more severe compared to that experienced by males?
5. Why do you think younger females are usually targeted?
6. Why do you think most of the convicted offenders for Harmful Digital Communications Offences are mature European males and not of another demographic group?

(iv) Possible ways to deter offenders--Prevention
1. What is it about the virtual space that facilitates image-based sexual abuse perpetration and victimisation (e.g., place managers, offender handlers, capable guardians) ---> victim-offender interactions in place and time
2. What do you think would make it more difficult for offenders to plan and commit image-based sexual abuse? (disrupting motivation, offender decision making and behaviour) ---> increasing effort, increasing risks, reducing rewards
3. Should the approach towards crime prevention for image-based sexual abuse be hard or soft?
4. Should law enforcement focus on organising people (online watch group) or changing the physical environment through online security features (virtual space?)— e.g., place managers, formal surveillance, increase visibility, assist with natural surveillance, extend guardianship?
5. What are your thoughts about the effectiveness of the Harmful Digital Communications Act (HDCA, 2015) and do you think there is enough public awareness about the HDCA in New Zealand?
6. Do you think the HDCA is a step in the right direction by the Ministry of Justice in ensuring online safety?
7. Are you generally satisfied with the efforts and synergy of the organisations in New Zealand (that specialise in reducing image-based sexual abuse and providing victim support)?
8. Who do you think should be most responsible for image-based sexual abuse (e.g., victims, offenders, bystanders/witnesses, family and extended networks, friends and peers, owners and moderators of social networking and dating sites, computer scientists/cyber professionals, the NZ Government/Ministry of Justice, NZ Police or the Media)?
9. Could more be done in New Zealand to prevent image-based sexual abuse (i.e., posting and circulation of images)?

(v) How bystanders can intervene safely and effectively in image-based cyber abuse -- Intervention
1. Do you think bystanders play an important role in reducing the motivation of offenders in posting and/or distributing images of victims (i.e., revenge pornography)?
2. Do you think bystanders (real life and/or online) know how to intervene in general?
3. Should a bystander intervene or not when he/she encounters images of the victim?
4. How should a bystander intervene to minimise harm on the victim?
5. How should a bystander intervene to minimise harm on himself/herself?
6. Are there any instances or situations when/where it would be best for bystanders in real life and/or cyberspace not to intervene?
7. What would you advise the public to look out for when identifying signs of revenge pornography before the image posting/sharing occurs in cyber space?
### Appendix C: Crime Intervention Points Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Script Stage</th>
<th>Manager-Place</th>
<th>Guardian-Target</th>
<th>Handler-Offender</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Offender-victim and prehistory</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Establish clear boundaries</td>
<td>- Public awareness of IBSA (issues around online and offline privacy, consent, intentional non-consent and potential contexts: e.g., break-ups, refusal to get back together, infidelity, new partner) (Barmore, 2015; Gissell, 2015; Salter &amp; Crofts, 2015)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- General education regarding IBSA and potentially risky circumstances (i.e., reputational damage, psychological and physical harm)</td>
<td>Partners:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partners:</td>
<td>- Pre-establish boundaries, discuss boundaries, discuss concepts regarding IBSA perceptions, definitions, acceptable and non-acceptable behaviours, possible scenarios relating to consent and respect for online and offline privacy (Dawkins, 2015)</td>
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<td>- Understanding both partners’ attitudes and perceptions about IBSA will bring more awareness in the event of any ‘triggers’ (e.g., break-ups, fights, saying “No”), online and physical privacy and respect for consent</td>
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<td>- Be aware that changes in the relationship (e.g., rejection, break-ups) may influence partners’ actions and potentially alter dynamics and safety around them</td>
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<td>- Be aware that gateway offences to IBSA (e.g., intimate covert filming and blackmail) are more latent</td>
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<td>- Be aware that offending does not always occur immediately after a break-up</td>
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<td>- Be aware that repeat victimisation and offending occurs more easily on the internet (i.e., images disclosed on the internet could resurface in future)</td>
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<th>Handler-Offender</th>
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| 2. Setting offline and online | - Social media sites testing tools to help people manage how they interact with former partners on social media after a relationship  
- Online platforms and intermediaries specialising in providing practical support to IBSA victims  
- Online platforms increasing technical controls against potential IBSA | - Monitor offline and cyberstalking behaviours, verbal abuse on social media  
- Check on female (e.g., “How is ex responding to new male friend?”), signs of blackmail (e.g., abuser demanding sexual favours in exchange of non-disclosure) and other coercive control techniques (e.g., cutting off social support or financial support for child)  
- If non-heterosexual male or cultural minority, check for signs of blackmail, verbal threats (e.g., threats to “out” victim or inform victim that law enforcement/intermediaries would not help them due to their gender/sexual/cultural orientation) | - Presence of friends/family can act as handlers  
- Law enforcement’s online and offline presence and efforts against IBSA |
### 3. Instrumental Actualisation

<table>
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<th>Script Stage</th>
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<th>Guardian-Target</th>
<th>Handler-Offender</th>
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</table>
| **3. Instrumental**   | - Have guardians present in location on at risk sites (social media) and maintain a strong online presence  
                        | - Prompts to log out of social media when not in use                      | - If in direct contact with abuser, do not provide positive reinforcement and discourage IBSA  
                        |                                                                 | - Alert victim immediately of the risk  
                        |                                                                 | - If there is a high risk of disclosure, support victim to contact intermediary for additional advice and practical support for “potential” takedown requests and future actions.  
                        |                                                                 | - If aware of the content of the images and the platforms that will be used in the disclosure, support the victim in reporting this possibility to the respective platforms  
                        |                                                                 | - Increase public awareness in terms of guardianship and the role and practices required by encouraging young people to actively look out for each other and identify circumstances in which men and women may be vulnerable |
Appendix C (continued)

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<th>Script Stage</th>
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<th>Guardian-Target</th>
<th>Handler-Offender</th>
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| 4. Offender        | - Having general security and privacy settings in place  
| approach method    | - Having reporting and flagging of images protocols in place  
|                    | - Information Service Providers (ISPs) and Social Media organisations should recalibrate anonymity standards to deter “anonymous” IBSA using the same tools and collaborative techniques they are utilising to fight terrorism | - Education regarding common coercive control strategies (e.g., blackmail and threats) and ways to respond safely and effectively  
|                    | - Education and encouragement against peer pressure and to develop resilience  
|                    | - Education on online and physical safety --- fully utilising general security and privacy settings on mobile devices and mobile apps to protect against physical level threats (Imgraben, Engelbrecht, & Choo, 2014) (e.g., two-step authentication to access phone, logging out of social media apps and e-mail accounts when not in use, storing intimate images in “hard-to-reach” folders that are encrypted with strong passwords, not disclosing passwords to partners, disabling automatic password saving functions and location settings, not allowing anyone to physically handle or use your mobile device without your supervision, if you have intimate images, never capture identifying features/ backgrounds- face, tattoos etc.) being careful to delete all intimate images (including Cloud back ups) when sending phones for repair, trading-ins or disposing of them  
|                    | - How to report and flag images | - Remove excuses- general education on severe “privacy” and “trust” violations in relation to intimate partner violence and IBSA (e.g., “not knowing it is abuse” or “just for fun”) (Albury & Crawford, 2012; Powell, 2010; Salter & Crofts, 2015)  
|                    | | - International legal harmonisation (e.g., the criminalising of IBSA and EU’s ‘The Right to Be Forgotten’)  
|                    | | - Intermediaries maintaining close ties with online platforms  
|                    | | - Law enforcement alerting public that there are convictions and incarcerations for IBSA |
### Appendix C (continued)

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<td><strong>5. Continuation</strong></td>
<td>- Domestic intermediaries’ and information service providers ability to take immediate action on takedown requests and combat IBSA</td>
<td>- Support victim in maintaining a positive online presence</td>
<td>- Remove excuses- widespread messages against intimate partner violence and family violence and offences through digital communications technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- “IBSA is committed by those who have complete disregard for “consent” and online and offline “privacy”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- “IBSA is a domestic (sexual) violence offence and a communications offence</td>
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<td>- Alerting the public to the potential criminal consequences of “doxxing” (online disclosure of a victim’s personal details such as the victim’s full name, e-mail address, residential address, designation and place of employment or mobile number multiplies “risk” to a victim’s personal and online safety (i.e., possible identity theft, in-the-flesh and online stalking and harassment)</td>
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<th>Handler-Offender</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Interaction and</td>
<td>- Online platforms to regularly prompt users to maximise use of security and privacy settings</td>
<td>- Support victim with personal online safety strategies (e.g., disable settings for location and</td>
<td>- Support victim with information on how to flag and report images</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Completion</td>
<td>- Have effective avenues for IBSA victims to report their victimisation and flag new intimate</td>
<td>friends tagging you in photos and checking you into places, control visibility)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>images that surface or resurface</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Script Stage</th>
<th>Manager-Place</th>
<th>Guardian-Target</th>
<th>Handler-Offender</th>
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</table>
| 7. Post-action | - Assist intermediaries and law enforcement with criminal investigations | - Do not download, consume for personal pleasure or distribute intimate images of victim  
- Do not inform anyone else where to find the images and the contents of the images  
- If others have encountered and threaten to circulate the victim’s images, inform them that they might be interfering with police investigations and risk incriminating themselves in the process  
- Support victim with creating a digital evidence folder (documenting dates for online disclosure and victim finding out, URLs, screen names and usernames, taking screenshots and downloading copies of images from website, reporting abuse to the online platforms and flagging abusive content)  
- Supporting the victim with monitoring new content through Google reverse image searches for image file names, victim’s phone number, name or other words or usernames associated with victim’s images  
- Supporting victim with setting up a Google Alert to notify victim of new content about victim that needs to be removed | - Education regarding victim blaming, slut shaming by law enforcement and intermediaries: “Sexting is a safety issue and not a moral issue.” (Slane, 2013) |
### Appendix C (continued)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Script Stage</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 8. Exit      | - Keep digital evidence intact  
- Monitor repeat offending on same account or new accounts with similar image-based abusive patterns | - Encourage victim not to delete personal social media account (doing so would make it harder to push negative content off top search pages of internet search engines)  
- Assist victim with creating new positive content on highly indexed pages  
- Establishing emotional support hotlines for victims  
- Education for friends and family regarding victim support  
- Encourage reporting  
- Continue to support victim in maintaining a positive online presence | |

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