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**Political Parties, Strongmen and Populism:
Why Jair Bolsonaro won the 2018 Brazilian Election**

A thesis
submitted in fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of
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ABSTRACT

Paul Tait: Political Parties, Strongmen and Populism: Why Jair Bolsonaro won the 2018
Brazilian Election

(Under the direction of Daniel Zirker)

The election of Jair Bolsonaro as President of Brazil in 2018 is an example of the recent global phenomenon of election victories by right-wing populist leaders, such as Donald Trump, Rodrigo Duterte, and Viktor Orbán. However, Bolsonaro's election victory was driven by a range of critical domestic factors, not just by populism. This thesis explains how the nature of Brazil's political parties and electoral system contributed to Bolsonaro's victory. Bolsonaro was the candidate of a minor party, the Social Liberal Party (PSL), and exploited weaknesses in two major parties, the Workers Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), who won Brazil's elections from 1994 to 2014. Brazil's two-round system enabled Bolsonaro to consolidate the support of a broad coalition of voters frustrated with PT rule and the traditional opposition.

Bolsonaro also campaigned as a change candidate and as a pro-military strongman, rather than as a conventional politician reliant on the support of a political party organization. He appealed to voters dissatisfied with former governments, constant corruption scandals, and economic turmoil. Bolsonaro's victory is consistent with José Nun's argument that the middle classes support democracy in good economic times but accept authoritarian options when they start struggling. Bolsonaro successfully used a style of exclusionary populism in his election campaign, to gain media attention and voter support. Nevertheless, populism was a communication method and campaign tactic, and not the fundamental basis of Bolsonaro's unexpected election as president.

Key Words: Jair Bolsonaro, Brazilian Elections, Brazilian Parties, Political Change, Strongman, Corruption, Exclusionary Populism.

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Paul Tait

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Meaning	Translation
Alianza PAIS	Patria Altiva i Soberana	PAIS Alliance - Proud and Sovereign Homeland
CADE	O Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica	Administrative Council for Economic Defense
CIDE	Contribuições de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico	Contribution for Intervening in the Economic Domain
CPOR	Centro de Preparação de Oficiais da Reserva	Reserve Officer Training Center
DC	Democracia Cristã	Christian Democracy
DEM	Democratas	Democrats
FN	Front National	National Front
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	
IBAMA	Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis	Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
IBGE	O Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia Estatística	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
IBOPE	Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística	Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics
ICMBio	Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade	Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation
IPI	Imposto Sobre Produtos Industrializados	Tax on Manufactured Products
IPRI	Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais	International Relations Research Institute
MAS	Movimento al Socialismo	Movement to Socialism
MDB	Movimento Democrático Brasileiro	Brazilian Democratic Movement
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MST	Movimento Sem Terra	Landless Workers' Movement
MVR	Movimento Quinta República	Fifth Republic Movement
NOVO	Partido Novo	New Party
PATRI	Patriota	Patriot
PCdoB	Partido Comunista do Brasil	Communist Party of Brazil

PDS	Partido Democrático Social	Democratic Social Party
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista	Democratic Labour Party
PFL	Partido da Frente Liberal	Liberal Front Party
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro	Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
PODE	Podemos	We Can
PP	Progressistas	Progressive Party
PPS	Cidadania	Citizenship
PR	Partido da República	Party of the Republic
PRB	Partido Republicano Brasileiro	Brazilian Republican Party
PRN	Partido da Reconstrução Nacional	National Reconstruction Party
PRTB	Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro	Brazilian Labour Renewal Party
PSB	Partido Socialista Brasileiro	Brazilian Socialist Party
PSC	Partido Social Cristão	Social Christian Party
PSD	Partido Social Democrático	Social Democratic Party
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira	Brazilian Social Democracy Party
PSL	Partido Social Liberal	Social Liberal Party
PSOL	Partido Socialismo e Liberdade	Socialism and Liberal Party
PSTU	Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado	Unified Workers' Socialist Party
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores	Workers' Party
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro	Brazilian Labour Party
PTC	Partido Trabalhista Cristão	Christian Labour Party
REDE	Rede Sustentabilidade	Sustainability Network
RTS	O Regime de Tributação Simplificada	Simplified Taxation Regime
SD	Solidariedade	Solidarity Party
SECOM	Secretaria Especial de Comunicação	Communication's Special Secretary
STF	Supremo Tribunal Federal	Supreme Federal Court
TSE	Tribunal Superior Eleitoral	Superior Electoral Court

CHAPTER 1: *INTRODUCTION*

OVERVIEW

Why was Jair Bolsonaro elected President of Brazil in October 2018? In every Brazilian presidential election from 1994 to 2014, the winning candidate and runner-up were from either the Social Democracy Party (PSDB) or the Workers' Party (PT). However, political change in Brazil saw Bolsonaro of the Social Liberal Party (PSL) elected president in 2018. Since 1988 voting has been a requirement for all literate voters between the ages of 18 and 70.¹ Early polls conducted between the 2014 and 2018 elections did not favor Bolsonaro's candidacy. In June 2015 Bolsonaro was not even included in the presidential options of a *Datafolha* poll.² Bolsonaro polled at 6% in February 2016, at 9% in December 2016,³ and at 15% in April 2018.⁴ However, six months later in the actual election, he led the first-round on October 07 with 46.03% of the vote.⁵ In the second-round on October 28, he received 55.13% of the vote to defeat PT candidate Fernando Haddad and be elected president.⁶

Bolsonaro won in 2018 as an outsider from a minor party with a low campaign budget.

He was a veteran politician running for president for the first time. However, he did not have

¹ Power, Timothy J. (2009). 'Compulsory for Whom? Mandatory Voting and electoral Participation in Brazil, 1986-2006'. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*. 1 (1): 97-122. pp.98-99.

² Datafolha is a major reliable opinion poll in Brazil. The product of Folha de São Paulo. Folha de São Paulo (2015). "Em simulação, Aécio lidera corrida eleitoral com 35%, mostra Datafolha." June 21, 2015. (Accessed November 15, 2019).

³ Gazete do Povo (2016). "Pesquisas Eleitorais." July 16, 2016. (Accessed November 15, 2019).

⁴ Estado de Minas. (2018). "Datafolha: Lula tem 31%, Bolsonaro, 15%, e Marina 10% das intenções de voto." April 15, 2018. (Accessed November 15, 2019).

⁵ Estado de São Paulo. (2018). "Apuração 1º turno." October 09, 2018. (Accessed November 15, 2019).

⁶ Folha de São Paulo. (2018). "Resultados da apuração para presidente no 2º turno." October 29, 2018. (Accessed November, 15 2019).

a similar personality to either the person he replaced or to other earlier presidents. He was a detractor of President Dilma Rousseff and said “I hope that her term ends today, from a heart attack or cancer, or by any means. Brazil cannot continue suffering from someone incompetent, we are too big for that.”⁷ He dedicated his vote for Dilma’s impeachment in 2016 to Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra,⁸ who had tortured Dilma during the military dictatorship.⁹

The nature of the candidate and of the result were not consistent with earlier Brazilian election outcomes.¹⁰ The successful candidate, Bolsonaro, was not traditional, yet he won in what seemed to be an uphill battle. He criticized and defeated established parties whose presidential candidates were veterans with good reputations. This was an unusual election. Brazilian elections tend to be between the poor and the rich and political parties are considered crucial.¹¹ In 2018 Bolsonaro ran against unpopular candidates during an era of economic and political crises. Boosted by the *bolsa família* (family stipend), Brazil’s middle-

⁷ Jornal Opção (2015). Vitor, Frederico. “Bolsonaro: “Espero que Dilma saia. Infartada, com câncer, de qualquer jeito.” September 17, 2015. (Accessed January 05, 2020). Author’s translation of the original quote: “Espero que o mandato dela acabe hoje, infartada ou com câncer, ou de qualquer maneira. O Brasil não pode continuar sofrendo com uma incompetente, somos grandes demais para isso.”

⁸ BBC Brasil (2016). Della Barba, Mariana and Wentzel, Marina. “Discurso de Bolsonaro deixa ativistas ‘estarcidos’ e leva OAB a pedir sua cassação.” April 20, 2016. (Accessed January 05, 2020).

⁹ Veja (2019). “Bolsonaro afirma que torturador Brilhante Ustra é um “herói nacional”.” August 08, 2019. (Accessed January 05, 2020).

¹⁰ Lucas, Kevin and Samuels, David. “The Ideological “Coherence” of the Brazilian Party System, 1990-2009,” (2010) in: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 2, 3, 39-69.; Mainwaring, Scott. “Presidentialism in Brazil: The Impact of Strong Constitutional Powers, Weak Partisan Powers, and Robust Federalism.” (1997). Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.; Singer, André. *O Lulismo Em Crise* (2018). Companhia das Letras.; Walker, Ignacio, Krause, Krystin. and Bird, Holy. and Mainwaring, Scott. (eds.), *Democracy in Latin America: Between Hope and Despair*. (2009). University of Notre Dame Press.; Memória Globo (2013). “Eleições Presidenciais – 1989,” nd. (Accessed December 11, 2019).; UOL Brasil Escola (2019). Pinto, Tales dos Santos. “Eleições de 1994,” nd. (Accessed December 11, 2019).; Memória Globo (2013). “Eleições Presidenciais – 1998,” nd. (Accessed December 11, 2019).; Folha de São Paulo (2002). “Lula É Presidente.” October 28, 2002. (Accessed December 11, 2019).; Folha Online (2006). “Apuração - Presidente (2º turno).” October 30, 2010. (Accessed December 11, 2019).; G1 (2010). “Dilma Rousseff é a primeira mulher eleita presidente do Brasil.” November 01, 2010. (Accessed December 11, 2019).; G1 (2010). “TSE proclama resultado do primeiro turno das eleições.” October 05, 2010. (Accessed September 22, 2019).; and G1 (2014). “Eleições 2014.” October 27, 2014. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

¹¹ Singer, André. (2018). *O Lulismo Em Crise*. Companhia das Letras.

class behaved like Nun's middle-class by electing a strongman. Nun argues that when middle-classes are doing well economically they support democracy, but when they are struggling they revert to support for authoritarianism.¹² Bolsonaro won as an exclusionary populist, a different phenomenon to other elected Latin American populists who have been inclusionists.¹³ Bolsonaro's victory was remarkable, unlikely, and unexpected.

Another factor that is unique to Bolsonaro's victory is the overall performances of Brazilian political parties preceding the election of 2018. In the 1994 to 2014 elections the first- and second-best performers were the PSDB or the PT. They were winners and runners-up in the second-round of each presidential election.¹⁴ Bolsonaro defeated both parties in 2018 and he also defeated the MDB with whom Itamar Franco and Michel Temer served their presidential terms. On the surface, it would seem that Bolsonaro had overcome strong opposition, although there are other explanations.

This study considers all of the elections from 1989 to 2018 and their test results. The pattern observed is not a two-party first-past-the-post system but, rather a dominant minority system in which every election has seen the PT as one of the parties with the first or second highest number of votes. The pattern that has existed since 1989 is one that is limited to only two options. Elections have either voted in favor of, or against, the PT. In the 1989 to 2018 elections, parties tended to benefit from factors outside of their party platforms. The starting point for understanding Bolsonaro's electoral victory becomes a problem-solving exercise in which clarification as to why other candidates lost becomes paramount.

¹² Nun, José (1966). *América Latina: La crisis hegemónica y el golpe militar*. in *Desarrollo Económico*, Vol. 6, No. 22/23, América Latina 3: América Latina como proyecto. pp.355-415.

¹³ Mudde, Cas and Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal. "Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America." (2012). *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 48, No. 2. p.148.

¹⁴ In Brazil the President and Vice-President are elected via a two-round system. If the most-voted candidate takes more than 50% of the overall vote in the first-round, he or she is declared elected. If the 50% threshold is not met by any candidate, a second-round run-off is held. In the second-round, only the two most-voted candidates from the first-round participate. The winner of the second-round is elected President of Brazil.

On November 12, 2019, Jair Bolsonaro announced he was leaving the PSL to set up a new, ninth political party, the *Aliança pelo Brasil*. In a political career which has spanned three decades the PSL was his eighth political party affiliation.¹⁵ As shown by the 2018 presidential candidates, switching political parties by major candidates is frequent in Brazil. Of the thirteen presidential candidates in 2018 João Amoêdo (NOVO) and Fernando Haddad (PT) had previously been affiliated with single political parties; additionally, prior to the PSOL, Guilherme Bolos has also been an MST member since 2002. The other presidential candidates had previously been members of other parties.¹⁶

Politicians often switch parties in Brazil; this is neither new nor out of the ordinary. In addition to presidential candidates, former presidents have also changed parties. Tancredo Neves (PMDB), the ‘elected’ candidate at the end of military rule, died before officially taking office and had changed parties three times in his career. His running-mate and successor, José Sarney (1985-1990), who became the first civilian president after the dictatorship, was a member of the PMDB after 1985. The winner of the 1989 election, the first direct presidential election after the dictatorship, Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) changed from the PMDB to the PRN in 1989. His career has subsequently involved eight parties. Collor’s vice-president, Itamar Franco (PMDB, 1992-1994) replaced him as president in 1992. He changed to the PMDB in 1992 and was also a member of three other parties during his political career. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, (1994-2002, PSDB) was a PMDB member from 1974-1988. His successor, Lula (2003-2010) was a founding member of the PT

¹⁵ G1 (2019). “Bolsonaro anuncia saída do PSL e criação de novo partido.” November 12, 2019. (Accessed November 14, 2019).

¹⁶ Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) was MDB from 1972-1988; Cabo Daciolo (Patri) changed to PODE in 2019; Álvaro Dias (PODE) was previously in the MDB and the PSDB, among others; José Maria Eymael (DC) was previously in four other parties; Ciro Gomes (PDT) was previously from six other parties including the MDB, and the PSDB; João Goulart Filho (PPL) is now PCdoB; Vera Lúcia (PSTU) was previously PT; Henrique Meirelles (MDB) was PSDB in 2002-2003 and changed from PSD to MDB in 2018; Marina Silva (REDE) is formerly of PT and two other parties.

in 1980 and is a lifetime member. Dilma (2011-2016) joined the PT in 1986, switching from the PDT. Her replacement after impeachment, Temer (2016-2018) has been a PMDB member since 1981. In other words, Bolsonaro is the first president since the end of military rule in 1985 to change his party membership while in office.¹⁷

Why was Bolsonaro elected? This investigation examines key factors that contribute to the workings of Brazilian politics. The hypotheses rely upon three broad concepts: parties, authoritarianism and populism. We will seek to explain why an outsider became president, and why he won when he did.

EXISTING RESEARCH

As expected for an election that occurred less than two years ago, there has been limited academic research published to date on why Bolsonaro won in 2018. That is one reason why this thesis is able to make a timely contribution. However, a small number of scholars have examined various factors that may have enabled the Bolsonaro victory.

The role of the media is one focus of research. For instance, Araújo and Prior argue that Brazil's media were able to naturalize and normalize Bolsonaro in the eyes of voters, and to sway public opinion toward him and away from Haddad.¹⁸ From their perspective, Brazilian media outlets were motivated by economics, and downplayed Bolsonaro's authoritarianism because they wanted to end left-wing economic policies.¹⁹ Machado and his colleagues emphasize the role of social media, arguing that Bolsonaro's campaign dominated social

¹⁷ R7 (2019). "Bolsonaro anuncia saída do PSL e criação do Aliança pelo Brasil." November 12, 2019. (Accessed November 14, 2019).

¹⁸ Araújo, Bruno and Hélder Prior. 2020. "Framing Political Populism: The Role of Media in Framing the Election of Jair Bolsonaro." *Journalism Practice*, 1-17. pp.14-16.

¹⁹ Araújo and Prior, p.16.

media discourses on platforms such as Twitter.²⁰ Social media has replaced television as a major source of campaign information.²¹

Some scholars see racial politics as critical to Bolsonaro's success. Bacelar da Silva and Larkins argue that an "antiblack backlash against race-conscious laws and policies implemented during the Workers' Party era" was a major theme of Bolsonaro's campaign.²² They quote Jaime Alves and João Costa Vargas, who suggested immediately after Bolsonaro won that: "It is clear from the results of the latest Brazilian elections that antiblack hatred remains an effective symbolic and practical political tool."²³ Bledsoe agrees that identity politics and racial antagonism were deliberately used to polarize Brazil.²⁴ During the campaign, Bolsonaro frequently attacked a wide variety of marginalized groups and emphasized racial divisions. Bledsoe says that "Bolsonaro's campaign was unique in that it explicitly named *quilombos* and poor (black) urban communities as enemy territories and openly advocated violent treatment of their populations."²⁵

A democratic crisis is a further line of research. Daly says "there is a compelling argument that Brazil can be said to be suffering democratic decay."²⁶ From his perspective, "the rise of Bolsonaro is just the latest inflection of a long-term democratic crisis, and must

²⁰ Machado, Cair, et al. 'News and Political Information Consumption in Brazil: Mapping the First Round of the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Election on Twitter'. Computational Propaganda Project, October 5, 2018. <https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/brazil2018/>.

²¹ Duque, Debora, and Amy Erica Smith. 2019. "The Establishment Upside Down: A Year of Change in Brazil." *Revista De Ciencia Política* 39(2): 165-189, p.177.

²² Bacelar da Silva, Antonio José and Erika Robb Larkins. 'The Bolsonaro Election, Antiblackness, and Changing Race Relations in Brazil.' *Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology*, 24(4), pp. 893–913. p.893.

²³ Bacelar da Silva and Larkins, p.894.

²⁴ Bledsoe, Adam. 'Racial Antagonism and the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Election.' *Journal of Latin American Geography*, (2019). 18(2): 165-170.

²⁵ Bledsoe, p.167.

²⁶ Daly, Tom Gerald. (2019). 'Populism, Public Law, and Democratic Decay in Brazil: Understanding the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro.' *Law and Ethics of Human Rights* (LEHR) journal 2-3 January 2019. p.18.

be understood as the culmination of a broader and more diffuse pattern of dysfunction and decay that has afflicted Brazilian democracy for some time, which has gathered pace since 2014.”²⁷

The decline of the PT is also seen as a key factor, as opposed to just focusing on Bolsonaro’s rise. Duque and Smith point out that if Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had been the PT candidate in 2018, polls indicated he would have beaten Bolsonaro.²⁸ However, without the popular Lula on the ballot, some PT voters were willing to switch. In their view, “PT partisans were more attuned to government performance and more likely to blame the party for shocks,” such as scandals, recession, and political instability.”²⁹ Hunter and Power agree. They argue that the PT lost because it was “blamed for the serious downturn in the economy after 2013; the massive corruption scheme uncovered since 2014 by the *Lava Jato* investigation; and the unprecedented levels of crime on the streets of Brazil.”³⁰

KEY CONCEPTS

Three key concepts relevant to this research include: (a) the nature of Brazilian political parties, (b) state development, and (c) exclusionary populism. Each of these contribute to the puzzle as to why Bolsonaro won the election, and will need to be addressed in this research. Works that are particularly insightful in understanding parties in Brazil include Scott Mainwaring’s *Presidentialism in Brazil*, which describes the workings of the Brazilian

²⁷ Daly, p.22.

²⁸ Duque and Smith, p.171.

²⁹ Duque and Smith, p.173.

³⁰ Hunter, Wendy and Timothy Power. 2019. “Bolsonaro and Brazil’s Illiberal Backlash.” *Journal of Democracy* 30(1): 68-82, p.69.

presidential system and the president's relations with Congress.³¹ Of particular note is Mainwaring's observation that Congress has the power to rule but not the responsibility, while the president has the *responsibility* to rule but not the *power*.³² Brazilian politics features an unusually large number of political parties, compared to other democracies. Thirty parties are currently represented in Congress.³³ With so many parties in contention, a president has to seize power where he or she can make compromises.

Another work of significance to this study is Kevin Lucas and David Samuels' "The Ideological "Coherence" of the Brazilian Party System, 1990-2009." They demonstrate that besides the PT there are no clear ideological differences between the other large parties. They characterize the Brazilian party system as a case of the PT vs 'the rest.'³⁴ These two works are central to interpreting Brazilian elections and governance since re-democratization.

The second key concept is state development. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson's *Why Nations Fail* examines why some countries develop and others do not and argues that politics, or institutions, are the explanation. They contend that it is human-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic development.³⁵ André Singer's *O Lulismo em Crise* describes the Brazilian political party system during the years of the Dilma administration. He argues that the ongoing struggle between the wealthy and the poor is the fundamental tension at the heart of politics in Brazil.³⁶ The rich manipulate politics to control

³¹ Mainwaring, Scott. (1997). "Presidentialism in Brazil: The Impact of Strong Constitutional Powers, Weak Partisan Powers, and Robust Federalism." Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

³² Mainwaring. (1997). pp14-48.

³³ Congresso Nacional. (2020). <https://www.congressonacional.leg.br>.

³⁴ Lucas and Samuels (2010) "The Ideological "Coherence" of the Brazilian Party System, 1990-2009,' in: *Journal of Politics in Latin America*," 2, 3, 39-69. pp.40-64.

³⁵ Acemoglu, Daron. and Robinson, James. *Por que as Nações Fracassam: as origens do poder, da prosperidade e da pobreza*; tradução de: *Why Nations Fail*. (2012). Crown.

³⁶ Singer. Kindle Edition.

the poor, and educated, middle-class voters may have supported Bolsonaro for this reason. Jorge Washington de Queiroz effectively supplements Singer. Queiroz argues that corruption is the biggest political problem in Brazil, and that Brazil's growth depends upon ending massive corruption.³⁷ Corruption is typically defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.³⁸

Other works offer cogent explanations for regime change and the rise of Jair Bolsonaro. Marcos Mendes' *Por Que o Brasil Cresce Pouco?* and Fabio Giambiagi and Alexandre Schwartzman's *Complacência* concern Brazil's economic growth. The former notes that growth was comparably slow during the commodities boom. It points out that this was by design owing to Brazil's tax rates, investments in infrastructure, and public spending.³⁹ The latter work argues that government-stimulated growth was successful under Lula, but not Dilma, following the commodities boom.⁴⁰

The remaining key concept is *populism*. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser's "Exclusionary vs Inclusionary Populism" compares populists in Europe and Latin America and identifies subtypes of populism.⁴¹ They argue that, historically, "European populism is predominantly exclusive, while Latin American populism is chiefly inclusive."⁴² However, populists in both regions have begun to innovate, with a recent rise of exclusionary politics in Latin America.⁴³ Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski's 'Varieties of Populism' develops a

³⁷ de Queiroz, Jorge Washington. *Corrupção o Mal do Século: Entender para vencer o maior crime contra a sociedade*. (2018). Rio de Janeiro: Alta Books.

³⁸ Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Palifka, Bonnie J. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform*. (2016). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.9.

³⁹ Mendes, Marcos. *Por Que O Brasil Cresce Pouco?* (2014) Campus.

⁴⁰ Giambiagi, Fabio, and Schwartzman, Alexandre. *Complacência* (2014). Elsevier.

⁴¹ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, pp.147-174.

⁴² Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, p.148.

⁴³ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, p.168.

theoretical understanding of the term populism and offers insight into the study of populists. They want scholars to appreciate the variation in populist politics across different countries.⁴⁴ Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave's 'Populism as political communication style' offers a working definition of populism, derived through quantitative analysis of a case study of Belgium.⁴⁵ They define populism as "a political style essentially displaying proximity to the people, while at the same time taking an anti-establishment stance and stressing the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by excluding specific population segments."⁴⁶ Despite being a single case, this model provides a valuable context for understanding Bolsonaro.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

The research topic is a case study analysis with generalizable characteristics. It is an investigation into the outcome of Brazil's 2018 presidential elections and examines factors dating from 2018 and earlier. The research aims to understand results in a comparative context and to contribute to the study of Brazil since the end of military rule in 1985. Included in this focus are political parties, presidents, and other conditions which affected electoral results and contributed to key political events.

The study seeks to illuminate the processes of Brazilian democracy in order to provide insights as to why Bolsonaro won the election, and how candidates tend to win in the Brazilian context. The research aims to contribute to the study of Brazilian election results by identifying contributory factors, including the concept of populism. In addition, the research aims to offer explanations that may assist in projecting winning candidates in the future.

⁴⁴ Gidron, Noam and Bonikowski, Bart. "Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda." (2014). Working Paper Series, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, No.13-0004.

⁴⁵ Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). "Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium." *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 319–345.

⁴⁶ Jagers and Walgrave, p.319.

HYPOTHESES

The study of elections has always been a significant field within the discipline of political science.⁴⁷ When trying to predict or explain election outcomes, a distinction can be made between two major approaches. Some scholars emphasize campaign factors and other scholars emphasize fundamentals.⁴⁸

Campaign factors is a label for a range of generally short-run phenomena, in the period leading up to an election. Often these factors are under the control of the campaign of a candidate or party to a certain degree, or at least are subject to an amount of influence.⁴⁹ Examples of campaign factors include: how a candidate performs in debates or interviews, the places a candidate chooses to visit or not visit, the amount and content of campaign advertising, the policies a candidate advocates and their level of popularity, the choice of which demographic or social groups a candidate prioritizes in appealing for support, the name recognition, character, and public reputation of a candidate, and how effective a candidate is at raising money or obtaining positive media attention.⁵⁰

Fundamentals refers to phenomena outside the control of any campaign, which are relevant to the election and which may involve long-term trends. Fundamental factors provide a political environment and context in which a campaign or candidate must operate.⁵¹ Candidates can offer voters ways to interpret the context, but have limited ability to create or adjust that context. In other words, fundamentals are the objective operating conditions

⁴⁷ Bartels, Larry. (2010). "The Study of Electoral Behaviour." In *The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behaviour*, ed. J. Leighley. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁸ Gelman, Andrew, and Gary King. 1993. "Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23(4): 409-451.

⁴⁹ Jacobson, Gary. 2015. "How Do Campaigns Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 31-47.

⁵⁰ Brady, Henry, and Richard Johnston, (eds.) 2006. *Capturing Campaign Effects*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

⁵¹ Lewis-Beck, Michael, and Tom Rice. 1992. *Forecasting Elections*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

surrounding an election. Examples of fundamentals might include: the state of the economy in the year of an election (as measured by GDP growth or the unemployment rate), the popularity of the incumbent government, the public's level of satisfaction with the direction of the country (such as whether people feel the country is in crisis or is enjoying a boom), and the length of time that a political party has been in office.⁵²

Fundamentals are like the weather that occurs on any given day. Campaign factors are like the attire, activities, and accessories a person chooses for that day, such as whether or not to wear a coat, or the amount of time they spend outdoors. In practice, most election outcomes are shaped by the effect of both fundamentals and campaign factors. For example, in the U.S., the Republican Party lost the 1992 presidential election in part because it had been in power for twelve years and an economic recession occurred in an election year (fundamental factors) and in part because Democratic candidate Bill Clinton came across as likable and empathetic, and ran an energetic campaign (campaign factors).⁵³ In any specific election, scholars need to carefully evaluate the relative importance or contribution of different fundamentals or campaign factors in determining the result.

Understanding Bolsonaro's victory requires analyzing both the campaign factors and the fundamentals of the 2018 presidential election. This thesis investigates a set of four hypotheses (H₁, H₂, H₃, and H₄) that seek to answer the research question, and makes arguments in support of each hypothesis. The hypotheses and arguments are as follows:

⁵² Campbell, James. 2006. "The Fundamentals in US Presidential Elections: Public Opinion, The Economy, and Incumbency in the 2004 Presidential Election." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 15(1): 73-83.

⁵³ Shaw, Daron, and Brian Roberts. 2000. "Campaign Events, the Media and the Prospects of Victory: The 1992 and 1996 US Presidential Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 30(2): 259-289.

- H_0 is the null hypothesis and states that none of the other hypotheses provide an adequate explanation for the election of Bolsonaro. The goal of this research is to be able to reject the null hypothesis.

- H_1 states that the weakness of Brazilian political parties contributed to the election of Bolsonaro.

To support this hypothesis, these arguments are made:

- That most political parties in Brazil have little party discipline and invoke limited loyalty from voters.

- That Brazilian parties rely upon strong leaders as their prime source of electoral vitality.

- H_2 states that Bolsonaro won because he was the strongest alternative to the PT.

To support this hypothesis, these arguments are made:

- That the PT evinces strong party discipline and can field relatively weak election candidates as a result

- That the two-round electoral system used in Brazilian presidential elections provides an advantage that can help apparently-weak candidates to become stronger.

- That Bolsonaro was perceived as a strong candidate in the second (run-off) round, in contrast to PT candidate Fernando Haddad, who was perceived as a weak candidate.

- H₃ states that Bolsonaro's strongman behavior and strongman image as a "man on horseback" contributed to his election victory.

To support this hypothesis, these arguments are made:

- That Bolsonaro's campaign appealed to the economic insecurities of middle-class and working-class Brazilians.

- That Bolsonaro was perceived as a strongman by voters, particularly with his call for the return of elements of the dictatorship.

- That, historically, during times of economic turmoil in Brazil, strongman candidates have had an electoral advantage.

- That Bolsonaro's senior political appointments of military officials after the election confirms the accuracy of claims that he campaigned as a strongman.

- That the media in Brazil did little to oppose Bolsonaro and social media promoted his strongman image.

- H₄ states that Bolsonaro's use of exclusionary populism contributed to his election win in 2018.

To support this hypothesis, these arguments are made:

- That Bolsonaro fits the criteria of exclusionary populism.
- That Bolsonaro gained electoral benefits from his populist rhetoric, especially with regard to the problem of corruption.

STRUCTURE

Chapter two examines H₁ and H₂, discusses political parties in Brazil, and has three subsections. The first explores the outcome of the 2018 election and how it was unlike other elections. It considers the pattern of earlier elections and offers an alternative explanation to the orthodox account of the 1994 to 2014 results. The second subsection argues that Brazil's main parties realigned and that this was a contributing factor to Bolsonaro's victory. It notes that the PT vs 'the rest' shape elections and why this affected the results. The third subsection examines election results before 2018. It investigates the strength of Brazilian parties and candidates.

Chapter three examines H₃, discusses political leadership in Brazil, and contains six subsections. The first examines the presidential campaigns and regimes of Cardoso and Lula. It explores why they won their way into office and what was the subsequent focus of their administrations. The second subsection examines the presidencies of Dilma and Temer, noting why voters in 2018 had grounds to feel that impeachment did not bring about change. The third subsection considers Bolsonaro as a *caudillo* who campaigned against the PT. Of significance, was his rhetoric against the party and Venezuela. It notes other examples of *caudillos* and asks if Bolsonaro has authoritarian tendencies. The fourth subsection identifies three types of men on horseback. It notes their respective characteristics, their pathways to the presidency and the role of the state. Support came for the candidate from forces who

sought a pro-business candidate with different views on the environment. The fifth subsection considers the impact of candidates as individuals, noting Bolsonaro as a strongman. It notes a political aspect of the Bolsonaro presidency - the militarization of Brazil. The sixth subsection points out how Bolsonaro's support was not only unusual but also dependent upon social media.

Chapter four examines H₄, investigates how populism helps us to understand the rise of Bolsonaro, and has five subsections. The first defines and looks at differing forms of populism in past and present-day contexts. The second subsection notes that Bolsonaro represented a new form of populism. The third subsection examines how the *Lava Jato* operation changed Brazilian politics. It provided the conditions for a charismatic leader to succeed, damaged political parties and involved other countries. The fourth identifies how corruption as an issue changed over time. It discusses the response to corruption before *Lava Jato* and how the operation's outcomes favored political change. The final subsection explains how the use of exclusionary and politically incorrect speech favored Bolsonaro's candidacy and that advice from Olavo de Carvalho, the 'Rasputin from Virginia', contributed to Bolsonaro's victory.

The concluding chapter has three subsections. The first brings together all of the factors to explain Bolsonaro's presidential victory. The second subsection addresses the testing of the hypotheses discussed throughout the thesis. The final subsection offers suggestions for future research.

METHODOLOGY

In his work 'Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,' Harry Eckstein argued in favor of a number of applications of case studies including the "*crucial-case approach*." He

described a crucial-case as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed.”⁵⁴ John Gerring supports Eckstein’s expectations that a case such as this could provide useful evidence for (or against) a general causal proposition.⁵⁵ Bent Flyvbjerg argues that there are grounds for a case study as a contributor to scientific development, through generalization as a supplement or alternative to other methods.⁵⁶ In short, Eckstein, Gerring, and Flyvbjerg all contend that one can generalize from an individual case study. I draw upon this as my point of departure to generalize my study of why it was that Brazil elected the most unlikely candidate, Jair Bolsonaro, as president in 2018.

The 2018 Brazilian election expands upon our existing knowledge in the field of political science and provides new insights into populism and electoral politics. Chapter two unravels the results and their implications as regards Brazilian political parties over the course of the democratic period since the end of military rule in 1985. Furthermore, it relates to the re-militarization of the Brazilian political system beginning in 2018. It will argue that understanding why the outcome of the 2018 elections was different to 2014 and earlier requires an appreciation that similar, not new characteristics contributed to the results. This will build on the concept of Lucas and Samuels of ‘the rest’ vs the PT⁵⁷ by presenting an argument that, although main parties performed well over multiple elections, these results were misleading because Brazilian political parties are fundamentally weak. In this sense the methodology is using theory to explain empirical reality.

⁵⁴ Eckstein, Harry. Case studies and theory in political science. in F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science. Political science: Scope and theory*. Vol. 7, (1975). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. pp.94-137.

⁵⁵ Gerring, John. “Is There A (Viable) Crucial Case Method?” *Comparative Political Studies*. (2007). 40(3), 231-253. p.249.

⁵⁶ Flyvbjerg, Bent. (2006). “Five Misunderstandings About Case-study research.” *Qualitative*. pp.8-13.

⁵⁷ Lucas and Samuels., pp.39-69.

Chapter three offers a theory of three varieties of Brazilian elected men on horseback. This theory notes Brazil as a single case in trying to explain the 2018 election results. It presents the results as a broad rise of exclusionary populism. Chapter four makes use of the methodology to outline a new form of populism. This new form of populism is different to other Latin American forms both past and present as well as to additional instances of populism in other regions. It underlines both Brazil as a case study and Bolsonaro as representative of a powerful form of populism, one that has heretofore been unusual in Latin America.

CHAPTER 2:
POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE BOLSONARO ELECTION

RETHINKING ELECTION RESULTS

“Brazil is almost ungovernable,” argues Helio Jaguaribe, in part because of the notably fragmented nature of its political system.⁵⁸ The first hypothesis states that the weakness of Brazilian political parties contributed to the election of Bolsonaro. To demonstrate this, the first part of this chapter will review empirical data on the role and functioning of political parties in Brazilian politics. It will explain why most Brazilian political parties are electorally weak, with little party discipline and loyalty, and why Brazilian parties usually rely upon strong leaders as their source of electoral vitality.

Electing Jair Bolsonaro as president of Brazil in 2018 marked a changed direction for the country’s political parties. He was an opposition candidate who was not a member of and not aligned with an existing major political party. He ran against the traditional parties who had dominated the political scene in elections for more than two decades. Bolsonaro went up against an order that had contained the same parties from 1994 to 2014. In all six presidential elections during this period, PSDB or PT candidates received the highest proportions of first-round valid votes.

The 2018 election saw neither the PSDB nor the PT leading the voting at the end of the first-round. Instead, the candidate with the most votes was Bolsonaro of the PSL. His popularity not only demonstrated a radical shift in voting behavior, but also re-shaped the political set-up of the presidential election. Bolsonaro and the PSL both rose out of obscurity

⁵⁸ Jaguaribe, Helio. ‘Brazil and the 21st Century.’ *Estudos Avancados* 38 (April 2000), pp.13-19, p.15.

to reach the summit in a brief period. The focus of this chapter is to discuss Bolsonaro's victory compared to earlier elections. In so doing, it will consider whether the result was the first of its kind since the end of military rule in 1985.

Bolsonaro's victory requires a rethinking of traditional explanations used for Brazilian electoral results. The variables causally used to interpret and describe patterns in Brazilian election results did not include room for an outside candidate like Bolsonaro to win. In fact, they suggested that such a possibility was low. This chapter will look at earlier outcomes, suggesting why the results transpired as they did, and why Bolsonaro's victory may be explained by earlier results and not in contrast to them.

The background for assessing this framework is to determine whether long-term voting patterns meant that the PSDB and the PT had a durable base of popular support. This argument will affirm that while Bolsonaro was an unusual case, his win should not be reduced to his approach as a populist candidate in an age of right-wing presidents in neighboring countries.⁵⁹ Two key points that will be discussed are, first, that hostility against the PT helped determine the election results, and second, that despite six consecutive elections as the opposition to the PT, the parties opposing the PT were weak. Consistent election results established a guise which masked the reality that the PSDB received high voting because it was the leading opposition to the PT and not because it was an inherently popular party. In other words, the weakness of the principal traditional opposition to the PT contributed to Bolsonaro's win.

⁵⁹ At the start of 2018 four regional countries had right wing presidents: Argentina (Mauricio Macri), Chile (Sebastián Piñera), Paraguay (Horacio Cartes), and Peru (Pedro Pablo Kuczynski Godard).

In the first-round of the 2014 presidential elections, the PSDB and the PT won a combined 75% of the vote.⁶⁰ This number represented a fall from 80% from the 2010 elections, and a comparable number to the first-round results from 1994. Over six elections the PT and PSDB candidates won a combined 81% (1994), 85% (1998), 70% (2002), 90% (2006), 80% (2010), and 75% (2014) of the first-round vote.⁶¹ The fall from 80% first-round votes in 2010 to 75% in 2014 was therefore not out of the ordinary. A larger fall occurred from 1998 to 2002 and first-round voting numbers for the PT and PSDB decreased from 2006 to 2010.

The cycle of the PT and PSDB leading first-round votes every four years is, at face value, an indicator that Bolsonaro should not have won. Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro note that having these two parties as the main contenders for the presidency offered Brazil's party system stability.⁶² They point out that the six elections during this time period saw no new party created after 1990 winning more than 6.2% in the Chamber of Deputies.⁶³ This paints a grim picture for new candidates. However, a different outcome transpired in 2018 so a different explanation is needed to account for the results. This applies to both the first round and second round of the 2018 presidential election.

There is no question as to which Brazilian political parties gained the largest number of votes over the six consecutive elections before 2018. There is, however, a need to clarify if this was because these two parties had a durable and loyal base of support among the population or whether other factors were also significant. The results from the 1994-2014

⁶⁰ Mainwaring, Scott, Power, Timothy J., and 'Bizzarro Fernando. The Uneven Institutionalization of a Party System: Brazil' in Mainwaring, Scott (eds.) *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay and Collapse*. (2018). Cambridge University Press. pp.171-174.

⁶¹ Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro., p174.

⁶² Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro., p171.

⁶³ Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro., p171.

presidential elections may have led to the misrepresentation of the long-term standing of the political parties in Brazil. Popular support for the PSDB may have been shallow and fickle, and the party may have benefited from voters supporting the PSDB mainly as a convenient means to challenge the PT, rather than because of the PSDB's own merits. The PSDB may have gained a disproportionate number of votes, over the six elections, compared to the true support for the party or its presidential candidates. These possibilities are the focus of the following subsection.

PARTY REALIGNMENT

Lucas and Samuels characterized the Brazilian party system as a case of the PT vs 'the rest.' They determined that voters do not see a clear distinction of ideological differentiation between the three other main parties which they looked at – the PSDB, the PMDB and the PFL (now DEM).⁶⁴ Such a difference meant that voters ultimately had the choice of voting either for or against the PT. This perspective indicates that the 1994-2014 election results divided voters with those opposed to the PT voting for the PSDB as the party of choice. This was not because of what it offered ideologically, but because it was the party that most non-PT voters determined as the strongest to prevent the PT candidate from being elected president.

It is worth noting an expression in Brazil used to refer to political parties and to politicians: "*no Brasil é todo farinha do mesmo saco.*" Literally, it means that in Brazil it is all flour from the same sack. This is an idiom translated into English to refer to belonging to the same group or "tarred with the same brush." The definition offers insight into the change in the voting behavior wherein traditional parties lost to the PSL with Bolsonaro elected as

⁶⁴ Lucas and Samuels., pp.40-64.

president. In not resembling other candidates, Bolsonaro appeared to be ideologically distinguishable. Moreover, the unlikelihood of such a victory is further noted by Lucas and Samuels not including the PSL in their analysis.

As displayed in Figure 1, Bolsonaro's victory was not the result of a low voter turnout. With 107,050,749 valid votes,⁶⁵ it was the highest of all first-round elections since re-democratization. During this period, voter turnout increased from 67,631,012 valid votes in 1989 to 107,050,749 in 2018. There was a rise of 3 million from 104,023,802 first-round valid votes in 2014⁶⁶ and a reduction in the number of blank and null votes from 2014. Blank and null votes are an indicator that voters are dissatisfied with all of the candidates on the ballot. When people are upset they turn in a blank or a null vote. The number fell from 9.6% in 2014⁶⁷ to 8.8% in 2018.⁶⁸ Of the eight elections, 2018 ranked fourth for blank and null votes. Higher percentages were recorded in 1994 (18.8%), 1998 (18.7%), 2002 (10.4%) and 2014 (9.6%).⁶⁹ In contrast, abstentions increased slightly from 27,698,475 (19.4%) in 2014⁷⁰ to 29,941,265 (20.3%) in 2018,⁷¹ which marked the highest percentage of abstentions since 1998.⁷² In short, there were differences from 2014 to 2018, but not sufficient to attribute to the outcome.

⁶⁵ Estado de São Paulo (2018). "Apuração 1º turno," nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁶⁶ TSE (2014). "TSE divulga dados gerais sobre primeiro turno das Eleições 2014." December 06, 2014. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁶⁷ UOL (2018). "Resultado da eleição para presidente no 1º turno," nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).


⁶⁸ Estado de São Paulo (2018). "Apuração 1º turno," nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁶⁹ UOL (2018). "Resultado da eleição para presidente no 1º turno," nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷⁰ TSE (2014). "TSE divulga dados gerais sobre primeiro turno das Eleições 2014." December 06, 2014. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷¹ Estado de São Paulo (2018). "Apuração 1º turno," nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷² UOL (2018). "Resultado da eleição para presidente no 1º turno," nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).



Sources: Terraço Econômico,⁷³ Folha de São Paulo⁷⁴, G1,⁷⁵ TSE⁷⁶ G1,⁷⁷ UOL.⁷⁸

Figure 1 does not help explain why Bolsonaro was elected, but the data offers insight into prior results. Cardoso won in 1994 with a lower turnout than in 1989 and was re-elected in 1998 in an election with 4.4 million more valid votes than in 1994. The rise represented an increase of 91553 valid votes compared to 1989. His two victories coincided with a surge in abstention from 11.9% in 1989, to 17.8% in 1994 and 21.5% in 1998. There was also an increase of blank and null votes from 6.5% in 1989 to 18.8% in 1994 and 18.7% in 1998.⁷⁹

⁷³ Terraço Econômico (2017). Solow, Arthur. “A eleição de 2018 como reedição de 1989: o que a história nos ensina?” August 30, 2017. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷⁴ Folha de São Paulo (1994). “FHC é o presidente mais votado desde 45.” October 18, 1994. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷⁵ G1 (2018). Paixão, André. “Abstenção atinge 20,3%, maior percentual desde 1998.” October 08, 2018. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷⁶ TSE (2003). “Relatório das Eleições 2002.” p89. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷⁷ G1 (2006). “Eleições 2006 Apuração 1º turno,” nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019)., and G1 (2010). “Apuração 1º turno Eleição presidencial,” nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷⁸ UOL (2014). “Eleições 2014. Apuração 1º turno,” nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

⁷⁹ UOL (2018). “Resultado da eleição para presidente no 1º turno,” nd. (Accessed December 28, 2019).

With over double the percentage in 1994 and 1998 compared to 2018, Cardoso seemed to have an electoral advantage from blank and null votes in these years. The PSDB's first win came from a decreased turnout and the second with a comparable number of valid votes to 1989. These components of the voting in 1994 and 1998 were not replicated in subsequent PSDB campaigns. They were also different to how Bolsonaro won. He was elected with an increased turnout of over forty million more valid votes than Cardoso in 1994.

In 2018, Bolsonaro was one of fourteen candidates for the presidency. Both the PSDB and the PMDB were among his rivals. Former São Paulo governor, and runner-up in the 2006 presidential election, Geraldo Alckmin, was the PSDB candidate. As the leader of the opposition, he loomed as a strong candidate, more so than a candidate challenging from the tiny PSL. Based on election voting behavior and the status of him and others, there ought to have been a stronger basis to campaign from for the presidency than was the case of Bolsonaro. Polling data supported this, with Ibope noting on August 3, 2018, that in a scenario without Lula as a candidate, Alckmin led with 19%, then Bolsonaro with 16%, Marina Silva (REDE) with 11%, Ciro Gomes (PDT) with 8%, and Fernando Haddad (PT) with 4%.⁸⁰

The PMDB ran with Henrique Meirelles as the party's presidential candidate. He was a former president of the Brazilian Central Bank and the Minister of Finance and Social Security during the Presidency of Michel Temer. This made him a candidate with strong elite credentials who represented one of Brazil's traditional parties. Like the case of Alckmin, such a foundation should have positioned him well against the PSL and Bolsonaro. For Meirelles and the PMDB, the campaign came under a re-branded party name in 2017 from the PMDB

⁸⁰ Folha de São Paulo (2018). "Alckmin tem 19% e Bolsonaro tem 16% de intenções de voto em SP, diz Ibope." August 03, 2018. (Accessed September 06, 2019).

back to the MDB. As a presidential candidate, Meirelles did not resonate well with voters. In the above-mentioned poll, he obtained only 1% of the vote, well outside of the top five. The 2018 results showed that voters opted not for Alckmin or Meirelles, but for an alternative.

Opinion polls in the lead up to the election were not consistent as candidates polled higher and lower at differing times. Also, the presidential candidacy of Lula was uncertain. Until he was officially blocked from running by the Electoral Court (TSE) on September 1, polls had the former president well positioned. On August 22, *Datafolha* published the findings of two scenarios: (a) Lula as the PT's presidential candidate and (b) Haddad as the PT's presidential candidate. The poll results reported that Lula would beat Bolsonaro by 39% to 19%, but Bolsonaro would beat Haddad by 22% to 4%. Alckmin did not perform well in either scenario and polled at 6% against Lula and 9% against Haddad.⁸¹ In other words, although the Ibope and *Datafolha* results differed, they positioned Bolsonaro ahead of Alckmin as the front-runner to challenge the PT.

Haddad's popularity was low, according to the polling results. This signified a changed presidential race compared to other elections from the twenty-first century. It also tested H₂, that the PT evinces strong party discipline and consequently fields relatively weak political candidates. The research results suggested that, regardless of who the two leading candidates were, there was a low possibility that it would come down to a second-round battle between the PT and the PSDB. Caution was thus required to interpret the scoring of 4% for Haddad. It was a poll option upon the assumption that Lula would not be permitted to run for the presidency. Such a scenario would mean the disgracing of the PT. Therefore, a poll asking for the alternative situation may not provide reliable data from those polled.

⁸¹ G1 (2018) "Pesquisa Datafolha: Lula, 39%; Bolsonaro, 19%; Marina, 8%; Alckmin, 6%; Ciro, 5%." August 22, 2018. (Accessed September 06, 2019).

In addition to implying that the PT was in for a tougher fight than in 2014, the polls demonstrated that voting for or against the PT had been reformulated. A scenario with Haddad outside of the top two would see him eliminated in the first-round. The polls indicated that it was plausible. However, it was unlikely because the polls were reacting to the shaming of the party based on an outcome that Lula was not permitted to run for office. An alternative scenario was that no candidate would receive a first-round win. Instead, the PT candidate would be one of the top two voted upon in the first-round. This outcome would be consistent with H₂, serving as a new test for ideological distinction in the form of the PT vs ‘the rest’ and it would enable the candidate to campaign along these lines.


As it transpired, Haddad received 31,342,005 (29.28%) valid votes in the first-round and Bolsonaro received 49,276,990 (46.03%).⁸² By way of comparison, Dilma was the top first-round candidate in 2014, winning 43,267,668 votes (41.59%), while runner-up Aécio Neves (PSDB) received 34,897,211 valid votes (33.55%).⁸³ This was an improvement from 2010 when José Serra (PSDB) won 33,132,283 valid votes (32.61%) in the first-round.⁸⁴ In that presidential election, Dilma won 47,651,434 valid votes (46.91%) in the first-round.⁸⁵ The number was larger than in both 2014 and 2018, yet was 1,625,556 below the amount Bolsonaro won in the first-round of 2018. The results appear to indicate that Bolsonaro received votes from multiple sides as a response to political and economic crises and to the PT.

⁸² Gazete do Povo (2018). “Resultado da eleição para Presidente no Brasil no 1º turno,” nd. (Accessed September 22, 2019).

⁸³ G1 (2014). “Dilma e Aécio decidirão eleição para presidente no segundo turno.” October 05, 2014. (Accessed September 22, 2019).

⁸⁴ TSE (2010). “Candidaturas, votação e resultados - Eleições 2010,” nd. (Accessed September 22, 2019).

⁸⁵ G1 (2010). “TSE proclama resultado do primeiro turno das eleições.” October 05, 2010. (Accessed September 22, 2019).



Source: Folha de São Paulo.⁸⁶

As displayed in Figure 2, traditional parties were outperformed in the first-round of the 2018 presidential election. It produced a new form of ideological distinction with prior presidential parties, the PSDB and the MDB, both eliminated. Alckmin was not popular with the PSDB candidate coming in fourth with 4.76% of the vote and Meirelles finished seventh with 1.2% of the vote. Bolsonaro had been opportunistic on the one hand and advantaged on the other, by his non-PT rivals. First-round voting illustrated Alckmin and Meirelles' unpopularity. Neither candidate achieved comparable first-round support to MDB and PSDB candidates from prior elections, nor to Bolsonaro in 2018. The appeal of Bolsonaro positioned him as the leader who best sensed and delivered the popular response to what the audience desired.⁸⁷ The comparative results are indicative not only of his appeal, but also that

⁸⁶ Folha de São Paulo (2018). "Resultados da apuração para presidente no 1º turno," nd. (Accessed September 06, 2019).

⁸⁷ Panizza, Francisco. Introduction: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. in Panizza, Francisco (eds.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*. (2005). London: Verso. Verso. p.10.

the audience did not seek partial change or change in the form of a return to a familiar opposition leader.

What transpired was a response to a lack of clarity from traditional parties, aside from the PT. Bolsonaro seems to have convinced voters that he was different to Alckmin and Meirelles. For Alckmin and the PSDB, the result was failure. Their performance in 2018 could be attributed to voters deeming that alternative opposition to the PT were (a) more credible representatives and (b) more likely to defeat the PT in the presidential race. This would suggest why Bolsonaro's win was against the odds, and that the PSDB had not connected with the voting public. To a certain point this was comparable to the 1990 Peruvian presidential election. Outsider Alberto Fujimori argued that the economy was on the brink of collapse. His support came from disapproval towards established parties which garnered him sympathizers as Peru's option for change.⁸⁸

Peres provides an account of the muddy waters of Brazilian political parties that is relevant to the outcome of the 2018 presidential elections. His analysis outlined that Brazil had high party electoral volatility coexisting with relatively low ideological electoral volatility. He suggested that this explained why parties organized themselves in ideological terms, were in competition with other parties of comparable ideologies and that the largest competition was between those of a common ideology.⁸⁹ This description applies to Alckmin in 2018, by suggesting that Bolsonaro's campaigning attracted voters as the means to the end of keeping the PT out of office. With it, a crucial component of determining the 2018

⁸⁸ Levitsky, Steven and Ziblatt, Daniel. *How Democracies Die*. (2018). Penguin. pp.72-73.

⁸⁹ Peres, Paulo Sérgio. Sistema partidário e instabilidade eleitoral no Brasil. in Marengo dos Santos, André and Pinto, Céli Regina. (eds.) *Partidos no Cone Sul: Novos ângulos de pesquisa*, (2002). Konrad Adenauer/UFRGS. p.42.

presidential election came before the first-round in the form of a contest between candidates running against the PT.

Evidence that voters interpreted Bolsonaro differently came in the first-round. As displayed in Figure 2, Alckmin received below 5% of the vote, while Bolsonaro came within four points of an outright majority, winning 46.03% of the vote. The second placed performer was Haddad with 29.28% of the vote.⁹⁰ Figure 3 shows that the PSL fielded candidates in the 2006 and 2018 presidential elections. Limited PSL experience in elections is a signal of how unlikely it was that Bolsonaro would be elected president. The graph displays the first-round results since the end of military rule in 1985. It is limited to five political parties because no other party held the presidency during this period.

Figure 3 illustrates the extent to which Tancredo Neves (PMDB) was the preferred option of the electoral college vote in 1985. However, the party has struggled to compete for the presidency in subsequent elections. Ulysses Guimarães placed seventh in the first-round with 4.7% of the vote in 1989⁹¹ and Orestes Quécia received 4.43% of the vote in 1994.⁹² Therefore, like Meirelles in 2018, neither Guimarães nor Quécia performed well in the presidential race. All three were veteran PMDB politicians who were beaten in the first-round by change candidates. Figure 3 also notes that PMDB candidates lost to parties that gained popularity. Meirelles' loss to Bolsonaro in 2018 was the MDB's third such defeat in as many attempts to directly win the presidency. In other words, in comparative terms, Bolsonaro's win against Meirelles ought not be regarded as unexpected nor unprecedented.

⁹⁰ G1 (2018). "Mapa da Apuração no Brasil." October 07, 2018 (Accessed December 23, 2019).


⁹¹ Folha de São Paulo (2009). "Eleição de 89 foi "ensaio geral" democrático." September 12, 2009. (Accessed December 22, 2019).

⁹² Folha de São Paulo (2005). "Sem sucesso nas urnas desde 1990, Quécia mantém controle do PMDB." December 16, 2005. (Accessed September 12, 2019).

When considering the positioning of the PSDB and the PT in prior elections, Figure 3 illustrates how unlikely a PSL victory was in 2018. In the first-round of the 2006 election, Alckmin (PSDB) and Lula (PT) each received over 40%, yet Luciano Bivar (PSL) received 0.06% of the vote.⁹³ The changes from 2006 to 2018 display the surge of support for the PSL. However, as theorized by H₁ and H₂, it was representative of Bolsonaro's popularity and that the PSDB and PT fielded weak candidates. In the case of the PSDB, long-term voting suggests that the party's historic support base voted for Bolsonaro rather than Alckmin. This presented Alckmin as unpopular in 2018, noting that parties must field a strong presidential candidate.

The first-round results signaled that Haddad's pathway to the *Palácio do Planalto* was unlikely. Bolsonaro required far fewer additional votes in the second-round than did Haddad. The results indicated that the PT, PSDB and the MDB were out of favor and suggested caution when evaluating trends from the Brazilian presidential elections during the 1994-2014 period. On the one hand, the conditions appear to have been exploited by Bolsonaro. On the other hand, perhaps the indications of observers of Brazilian parties and the system were suggestive rather conclusive? This would offer an explanation as to why long-term trends were not replicated in the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections.

⁹³ G1 (2006). D'Elia, Mirella. "TSE Anuncia Segundo Turno Para Presidente." October 02, 2006 (Accessed September 12, 2019).



The author's rendering of data. Sources: O Povo,⁹⁴ Exame,⁹⁵ Estado de São Paulo,⁹⁶ Folha de São Paulo,⁹⁷ Gazete do Povo,⁹⁸ G1,⁹⁹ TSE.¹⁰⁰

The point of Lucas and Samuels is not only relevant, but explanatory in this regard. The results elaborated on their perception that parties, over the twenty years until 2010, had not clarified to voters what it was that they stood for. This meant that voters had trouble differentiating parties and that parties confused Brazil's citizens.¹⁰¹ Such an account suggests

⁹⁴ O Povo (2015) "Morria há 30 anos Tancredo Neves, 1º presidente civil eleito pós-1964." April 21, 2015 (Accessed September 12, 2019).

⁹⁵ Exame (2018). Abrantes, Talita. "O sobe e desce dos candidatos a presidente nas últimas 7 eleições." April 24, 2018. (Accessed September 12, 2019).

⁹⁶ Estado de São Paulo (2018). "Apuração 1º turno," nd. (Accessed September 12, 2019).

⁹⁷ Folha de São Paulo (2009). "Eleição de 89 foi "ensaio geral" democrático." September 12, 2009. (Accessed December 22, 2019).

⁹⁸ Gazete do Povo. (2018). "Resultados de todas as eleições presidenciais desde 1989." (Accessed September 25, 2019).

⁹⁹ G1 (2016). "Cronologia - as eleições presidenciais desde a redemocratização." October 29, 2006. (Accessed September 25, 2019). and (2006). "Eleições 2006 - Apuração 1º turno," nd. (Accessed September 25, 2019).

¹⁰⁰ TSE (1999). "Resultados das Eleições 1994 - Brasil. Resultado final exterior - 1º turno." May 01, 1999. (Accessed September 25, 2019).

¹⁰¹ Lucas and Samuels., p.63.

why Brazil, in 2018, may have been ripe for a leader to present what the PSDB and MDB could not. In other words, this suggests further that Bolsonaro obtained votes from previous PSDB supporters to trample Alckmin at the polls. This also implies that Bolsonaro distinguished himself from rivals and gained the popular backing of the non-PT voting public. Such an account signifies that Bolsonaro appealed to voters as a change candidate. This distinguished him from traditional party options whose candidates were not popular and had not outlined reasons why they could improve the lives of Brazilians.

Such a possibility supports both H_1 and H_2 . It also addresses the shortcoming of the PSDB and the loss of votes for the PT from 2014 and 2010. Gideon and Hall argued that working-class voters, who believe that their social status or material circumstances have suffered under an incumbent governing party, are prime to vote differently with populist parties benefiting from retrospective voting because of challengers to the establishment.¹⁰² In the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, the point applies to both the PT and the MDB. These were the parties of the elected president and vice-president from the 2014 elections. The argument also pertains to the PSDB based on voters having evaluated the options and responding to their interpretation of a vote of no-confidence to the former opposition leaders, the PSDB.

STRONG CANDIDATES AND WEAK PARTIES

The 2018 outcome for Alckmin and the PSDB suggest the need for caution when evaluating prior election results. This is the subject of the present subsection. It builds on the considerations that Brazilian parties are weak and that candidates are the strength. It will

¹⁰² Gidron, Noam, Hall, Peter A. "The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right." (2017). *British Journal of Sociology*. p.6.

address the hypothesis that Bolsonaro won because he was the strongest alternative to the PT. Three arguments are made to support this hypothesis. First, that the PT evinces strong party discipline and consequently fields relatively weak political candidates. Second, that the second-round of Brazilian presidential elections allows otherwise electorally weak candidates to become far stronger in contrast. Third, that Bolsonaro was perceived as a strong candidate in the second (run-off) round, in contrast to PT candidate, Fernando Haddad, who was perceived as a weak candidate.

The route to winning the presidency is by beating all others. H_1 implies that it was plausible by exposing the candidacies of those opposing the PT. 2018 was not the first time in which the outcome provided empirical evidence that there is more at play than the colors of the party. It is on this note that the point raised by Mainwaring, Power and Bizzarro is of interest. The indications were that Bolsonaro should not have won because of (a) the stability of the PSDB against the PT from 1994-2014 and (b) because no new party had won more than 6.2% of the lower chamber vote in these years.¹⁰³ The 2018 results did not replicate this pattern. Instead, the PSL won 52 seats (11.92%)¹⁰⁴ out of the 513 in the Chamber of Deputies and it was founded in 1994. These points further the case for a forethought of research into Brazil's political parties and election results.

The PSL did not have the strongest starting point. Evidence for this comes not only from the historical placement, but also from factors including campaign budgets and the radio and TV time that they received. Alckmin acquired almost half of the 25 minutes of airtime of election advertising,¹⁰⁵ which began on August 31. However, with the first-round of the 2018

¹⁰³ Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro., p.171, 174.

¹⁰⁴ G1 (2018). Caesar, Gabriela. "Saiba como eram e como ficaram as bancadas na Câmara dos Deputados, partido a partido." October 10, 2018. (Accessed September 08, 2019).

¹⁰⁵ UOL (2018) "Foco errado e pouco ativismo digital atrapalharam Alckmin, dizem analistas." October 04, 2018. (Accessed September 08, 2019).

elections taking place on October 7, the use of funding in such traditional means of political campaigning, appears to have been ineffective. Investing in such a plan of action did not resonate with traditional PSDB voters who demonstrated in the polls that they did not support the Alckmin candidacy.

The PSDB's timing and use of its budget were problematic, although the same cannot be said about the size of the party's campaign budget. Regardless of how much money the party invested into Alckmin's campaign, his pathway to victory was impractical. This can be demonstrated by considering the budgets of all parties with a presidential candidate. As displayed in Figure 4, Alckmin's campaign budget of R\$54,061,398 (US\$14,115,247 on the election date) was the second highest of all candidates. It was lower than Meirelles' budget of R\$57,030,000 (US\$14,890,339 on the election date), of which Meirelles invested R\$54 million of his own money.¹⁰⁶ Bolsonaro's campaign budget was R\$4,390,140 (US\$1,146,256). This represented less than one tenth of the value of the respective budgets of the PSDB and MDB candidates. In terms of all candidates, Bolsonaro's budget was closer to the bottom. He ranked as eleventh overall out of fourteen presidential candidates who represented a range of political orientations.

The PT had a large budget, which included funding the campaigns of two presidential candidates. With Lula's candidacy unknown during the campaign process, the party invested in both Lula and Haddad. Overall, the PT had the second highest presidential candidacy expenditure following Meirelles. The third highest budget was Haddad's R\$35,364,040 (US\$9,233,432), while Lula's R\$20,599,420 (US\$5,378,438) was fifth. This meant that both PT candidates were afforded well-funded budgets in overall terms and in comparison to the

¹⁰⁶ G1 (2018). "Meirelles investe R\$ 54 milhões na própria campanha, mas fica fora do segundo turno." October 07 2018. (Accessed December 23 2019).

PSL. Individually, the Lula and Haddad expenditure was more than five times the size of the Bolsonaro campaign and the combined PT budget was larger than that of the PSDB.

Figure 4: Budgets of Brazil’s 2018 Presidential Candidates

Presidential Candidate	Political Party	Budget
Henrique Meirelles	MDB	R\$57.03 million
Geraldo Alckmin	PSDB	R\$54.06 million
Fernando Haddad	PT	R\$35.36 million
Ciro Gomes	PDT	R\$24.22 million
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	PT	R\$20.59 million
Cabo Daciolo	PATRI	R\$10.93 million
Marina Silva	REDE	R\$8.19 million
Guilherme Bolos	PSOL	R\$6.2 million
Alvaro Dias	PODE	R\$5.4 million
João Amoêdo	NOVO	R\$4.72 million
Jair Bolsonaro	PSL	R\$4.39 million
José Maria Eymael	DC	R\$0.8 million
Vera Lucia Pereira da Silva Salgado	PSTU	R\$0.57 million
João Goulart Filho	PPL	R\$0.46 million

Source: TSE.¹⁰⁷

The PT and PDT budgets illustrate no correlation between budget size and party orientation on the political spectrum broadly speaking, of the left, center, or right. Instead, the range is indicative that the budget sizes and uses were not paramount factors that contributed to the voting. In the case of the PT, budget size may have been influential because of the first-round results, but for the MDB and the PSDB they were ineffective. Moreover, the MDB

¹⁰⁷ Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (2018) “Divulgação de Candidaturas e Contas Eleitorais,” nd. (Accessed September 08 2019).

budget was closest to the permitted limit of R\$70 million (US\$18,276,762).¹⁰⁸ This affirms that Bolsonaro was not elected because of financial contributions. Instead, he won in spite of the fact that opponents, from across the political spectrum, outmatched the PSL's financial resources.

The PSDB's budget allocation could be described as dated. Research indicates that voters favored the internet to television or radio in 2018. The results of a poll conducted by the *Instituto Paraná Pesquisas* listed 42.5% of respondents as preferring the internet as their primary means of information for the 2018 elections. Another 36.7% responded that they preferred television, 6.3% printed newspapers, 5.6% the radio, 3.7% gave no preferred answer, and 5.1% responded to not using any of the means of information for the elections. The research noted that of all ages, it was the 60 and above group which preferred television over the internet as the primary source of information for the 2018 elections. 44.1% of this age group listed television as their preference compared to 32.4% preferring the internet and social networks.¹⁰⁹ The expenditure of the PSDB did not compute with these preferential patterns. Instead, the largest proportion of the party's budget (38%) went on producing programs for radio and television.¹¹⁰

Bolsonaro's budget may not have been the largest, yet empirical data implies that it was sufficient. Regardless of resources, he attracted support through his campaigning tactics. His performance suggests that he, unlike Alckmin, was considered by voters, as not belonging in the 'flour from the same sack' category. For the voters, it gave them a different candidate to

¹⁰⁸ TSE (1999). "Resultados das Eleições 1994 - Brasil. Resultado final exterior - 1º turno" May 01, 1999. (Accessed September 25, 2019).

¹⁰⁹ UOL (2018) "Pesquisa aponta internet como principal fonte de informação dos eleitores." August 01, 2018. (Accessed September, 09 2019).

¹¹⁰ UOL (2018) "Foco errado e pouco ativismo digital atrapalharam Alckmin, dizem analistas." October 04, 2018. (Accessed September 09, 2019).

those that the PSDB had put up against the PT from 1994-2014. Of note is that despite losing in the two presidential elections of the 1990's, Lula was a charismatic leader and an opposition candidate to the neoliberal agenda of the Cardoso administration like Carlos Menem of Argentina.¹¹¹ Johnson described Lula's first win as a popular response to economic liberalization and its perceived social consequences.¹¹² This combined with Lula's charisma were leading reasons to purport why the PSDB was voted out of office in 2002.

A feature of the 2018 election was Bolsonaro's charisma. While Alckmin campaigned with soft criticism of the PT on the one hand, and a warning of Bolsonaro being too extreme on the other, this combination supports H₂, as it was ineffective. With tactics which attempted to isolate Bolsonaro, Alckmin's campaign failed to attract support. The use of television and radio space missed the target as did his mild and uncharismatic tones. The road to victory seems to have required, not a held back or careful campaign, but a methodically aggressive one. Herein lies a reason why Bolsonaro's budgetary limitations were not crippling. He had the tactics to gain appeal by replicating one of Lula's strongest weapons of the past - the use of charisma. This was a hallmark of his campaigning as Bolsonaro's allure resembled the Weberian definition put forward by Conger, as charisma referring to the forces of change and innovation in society.¹¹³ Indeed, the Weberian tradition of charismatic authority was evident in Bolsonaro's campaigning and it was absent in the strategies of rival candidates.

Obtaining public backing is part of the presidential election process. Another part is getting over the finish-line. In Brazil this means an outright win in the first-round or in the run-off in the second-round. In order to win in the first-round, a candidate requires half (50%)

¹¹¹ Zirker, Daniel. "José Nun's 'Middle-class Military Coup' in Contemporary Perspective: Implications of Latin America's Neoliberal Democratic Coalitions." (1998). *Latin American Perspectives*., Vol. 25, No. 5 p.77.

¹¹² Johnston, Michael. *Syndromes of Corruption*. (2005) Cambridge University Press. p.14.

¹¹³ Conger, Jay A. "Max Weber's Conceptualization of Charismatic Authority: Its Influence On Organizational Research." (1993). *Leadership Quarterly*, 4(3/4), 277-288. JAI Press Inc. p.278.

plus one of all valid votes. This means that only votes for candidates count because blank and null votes are not included. In the first-round, Bolsonaro was the most voted candidate, with 46.03% of the vote. In second place was Haddad with 29.28%. The difference was notable, as was the gap between second and third. Of the remaining candidates, only Gomes (12.47%) received above 10% of the vote. Alckmin (4.76%) was fourth and Amoêdo (2.5%) was fifth. The eight remaining candidates each received less than 2% of the vote.¹¹⁴ The results set up a second-round run-off on October 28 between Bolsonaro and Haddad.

Understanding why Bolsonaro won became clearer at the end of the first-round of voting. In support of H₁, the PSL candidate had replaced the PSDB as the leading challenger to the PT. The PSDB was humbled as voters responded, not to the PSL, but to Bolsonaro. This meant that in one swoop two achievements had taken place: (a) Bolsonaro had defeated the PSDB, and all others, to win the support of those wanting political change and (b) he had outperformed the PT candidate by 16.75 points.¹¹⁵ In other words, this suggests that the political crisis that followed Dilma's impeachment culminated in the election victory of a charismatic leader. This, and other variables, assisted in Bolsonaro's presidential election triumph. His route to victory is the first part of the process of analyzing how unlikely it was that Bolsonaro would be elected president.

¹¹⁴ Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. (2018) "Divulgação de Resultados de Eleições." October 07, 2018. (Accessed October 07, 2018).

¹¹⁵ Estado de São Paulo (2018). "Apuração 1º turno." October 09, 2018. (Accessed December 23, 2019).

Figure 5: Brazilian Presidential Election Results 1985-2018

	First-round Winner	First-round Runner-Up	Second-round Winner	Second-round Runner-Up
1985	Tancred Neves (PMDB) 72.73%	Paulo Maluf (PDS) 27.27%	-	-
1989	Fernando Collor (PRN) 30.47%	L Lula da Silva (PT) 17.18%	Fernando Collor (PRN) 53.03%	L Lula da Silva (PT) 46.97%
1994	F H Cardoso (PSDB) 54.24%	L Lula da Silva (PT) 27.07%	-	-
1998	F H Cardoso (PSDB) 53.06%	L Lula da Silva (PT) 31.71%	-	-
2002	L Lula da Silva (PT) 46.44%	José Serra (PSDB) 23.19%	L Lula da Silva (PT) 61.27%	José Serra (PSDB) 38.72%
2006	L Lula da Silva (PT) 48.61%	Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) 41.64%	L Lula da Silva (PT) 60.83%	Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) 39.17%
2010	Dilma Rousseff (PT) 46.91%	José Serra (PSDB) 32.61%	Dilma Rousseff (PT) 56.05%	José Serra (PSDB) 43.95%
2014	Dilma Rousseff (PT) 41.59%	Aécio Neves (PSDB) 33.55%	Dilma Rousseff (PT) 51.64%	Aécio Neves (PSDB) 48.36%
2018	Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) 46.03%	Fernando Haddad (PT) 29.28%	Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) 55.13%	Fernando Haddad (PT) 44.87%

Sources: Exame,¹¹⁶ Gazete do Povo,¹¹⁷ G1.¹¹⁸

Bolsonaro's first-round lead over Haddad placed him as the front-runner to win the second-round. In relation to H₂, for every vote he required to reach the mark Haddad needed five. These odds were insurmountable for the PT who, despite an improved performance at

¹¹⁶ Exame (2018). Abrantes, Talita. "O sobe e desce dos candidatos a presidente nas últimas 7 eleições." April 24, 2018. (Accessed September 12, 2019).

¹¹⁷ Gazete do Povo. (2018). "Resultados de todas as eleições presidenciais desde 1989." (Accessed September 25, 2019).

¹¹⁸ G1 (2016). "Cronologia - as eleições presidenciais desde a redemocratização." October 29, 2006. (Accessed September 25, 2019). and (2006). "Eleições 2006 - Apuração 1º turno," nd. (Accessed September 25, 2019).

the ballot box, lost. Bolsonaro won the presidency with 55.13%, or a total of 57,797,847 valid votes. Haddad received 44.87% with 47,040,906 valid votes.¹¹⁹ The margin of 10.26 points differed by 10.7 million votes, which represented a drop of 7.46 million from the Dilma Rousseff - Michel Temer campaign in the second-round of the 2014 elections. Decreased support since then meant that Bolsonaro faced a weakened PT in 2018. This furthers H₂, in indicating that Haddad was not a strong PT candidate. Figure 5 suggests that Haddad was a weak presidential candidate. It illustrates that his first-round performance was the worst from a PT candidate since 1994. Moreover, Haddad followed the 2014 election which, as displayed in Figure 5, was the tightest of all of Brazil's second-round elections. In 2014 Dilma received 54,501,118 second-round votes compared to Aécio Neves' (PSDB) 51,041,155 votes. Unlike Bolsonaro in 2018, the PT were not challenged by a charismatic and popular opponent. Instead, the PT's biggest challenge was dissatisfaction to the Dilma regime, which may explain the respective first-round performances of Neves and Bolsonaro in 2014 and 2018.

As displayed in Figure 5, Bolsonaro won the presidency with a party that had neither previously won an election nor finished as the first-round runner-up. Why this was not the case is because of the different approaches of the respective non-PT candidates and other factors involving the PT which are to follow in later chapters. The win transformed the PSL from a minor party to a significant one. In the Chamber of Deputies, the PSL's 52 seats, were the second most of all parties after the 54 seats won by the PT. The MDB and PSDB won 34 and 32 respectively. These results represented falls from 68 (PT), 66 (PMDB) and 54 (PSDB) in 2014 and a rise from 1 to 52 for the PSL from 2014 to 2018.¹²⁰ These results support H₁

¹¹⁹ Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. (2018) "Divulgação de Resultados de Eleições." October 07, 2018. (Accessed October 07, 2018).

¹²⁰ Câmara dos Deputados (2014). "PT e PMDB elege novamente as maiores bancadas." October 06, 2014. (Accessed December 23, 2019).


and H_2 . They highlight a lack of loyalty for most Brazilian political parties and indicate that electoral vitality comes from strong leaders, rather than parties.

Jair Bolsonaro's second son, Eduardo Bolsonaro (PSL), received the most votes for the Chamber of Deputies. He secured re-election for a second term with a Brazilian record of 1.8 million votes, or 8.74% of the vote.¹²¹ In the 2014 elections, he was the 61st placed candidate with 82,224 votes, or 0.39% of the vote.¹²² He changed parties in 2018, leaving the PSC to join his father in the PSL. Changing parties does not explain why Eduardo Bolsonaro received so many votes; leaving one for another to campaign under the same banner as Jair Bolsonaro does. In other words, direct association with Jair Bolsonaro seems to have resulted in success for Eduardo Bolsonaro and the PSL in the 2018 elections.

Figure 6 compares the Chamber of Deputies results from the 2018 election to the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 elections. It does so by comparing the top four parties from 2018 to how they performed in the previous four elections. The four parties have been deliberately chosen because of each party having competed for the presidency in 2018. For this reason, parties who did not compete for the presidency have been excluded. It is a test of H_1 , to identify similarities and differences in the performances of candidates for the presidency and for the Chamber of Deputies. The sample begins in 2002 to compare Lula's two terms to Dilma's two terms and to 2018. It also compares them against Bolsonaro's win, which was the first PT defeat since the party's inaugural win in 2002. The four surveyed parties finished first, second, fifth, and ninth for seats won in the Chamber of Deputies in the 2018 elections.

¹²¹ Folha de São Paulo (2018). "Eduardo Bolsonaro é o deputado federal mais votado da história." October 08, 2018. (Accessed September 22, 2019).

¹²² El País (2014). Martín, María. "Eduardo Bolsonaro: "Não vejo por que teria que ir desarmado ao protesto"." November, 03 2014. (Accessed December 23, 2019).



Source: Câmara dos Deputados.¹²³

As displayed in Figure 6, the PSDB acquired identical results in 2010 and 2014. In these elections the party won 54 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. It marked a fall from 66 seats in 2006 and this continued in 2018 with the party winning 29. The MDB also lost support over this period. It fell from 89 in 2006 to 34 in 2018. In 2006, the PMDB won more seats than all others. It was then second to the PT in 2010 and 2014 but ranked fifth in 2018. The PT improved from 83 seats in 2006 to 86 in 2010 but fell to 68 in 2014 and 54 in 2018. The PT's improvement from 2006 to 2010 corresponded to three fewer seats than what the PMDB won in 2006. However, it was lower than in 2002 when the PT won 91 seats.¹²⁴

The decline of the MDB and PSDB in the Chamber of Deputies coincide with the 2018 presidential election results. In both instances, support for Bolsonaro seems to have resulted

¹²³ Câmara dos Deputados (2014). "PT e PMDB elegend novamente as maiores bancadas." October 06, 2014. (Accessed December 23, 2019) and Câmara dos Deputados. (2018). "Bancada na Eleição," nd. (Accessed December 27, 2019).

¹²⁴ Câmara dos Deputados. (2018). "Bancada na Eleição," nd. (Accessed December 27, 2019).

in the PSL pulling voters away. They voted for Bolsonaro's party and candidates attached to it. Moreover, the PSL's performance in 2018 compared to 2006, as noted in Figure 3, and in 2014, as noted in Figure 6, helps understand why the party's candidate was elected president. In so doing, this supports H₁. First, it notes the fragility of two traditional parties in 2018 compared to the PSL, a party which improved from zero seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2006, to one in 2010 and 2014, and 52 in 2018. Second, it indicates that the PSL performed well because of the strength of Bolsonaro as the party's vitality. Third, in spite of the PT losing support in 2018, it did reach the second-round of the presidential elections. The party also won the most seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This serves as an indication that the PT is the exception as regards Brazilian party weakness. In short, the 2010 and 2014 elections illustrate (a) how unlikely it was for Bolsonaro to be elected president in 2018 and (b) that the public voted for Bolsonaro the leader. This notes that the PSL and members benefited by association with the presidential candidate. An additional explanation to come from Figure 6 is why the PT and PMDB ran together in 2010 and 2014. Lula's first-round leads in 2002 and 2006 carried over to see him elected in the second-round. Instead of running for the presidency, the PMDB was aligned with the PSDB against Lula in 2002 and 2006. In 2002 this included Rita Camata (PMDB) as Serra's vice-president running-mate. The PMDB was on the losing side of these elections, although it won more votes than the PT in the Chamber of Deputies in 2006. In a trade-off, the PMDB aligned with the PT to campaign together in 2010. Dilma ran for the presidency with Temer (PMDB) as her vice-president candidate. The parties were the top two performers in 2010 and 2014, winning a combined 164 seats in the

Chamber of Deputies in 2010 and 133 in 2014. The alliance ended during Dilma's second term as the PMDB left the government in March 2016¹²⁵ to seek Dilma's impeachment.¹²⁶

The impeachment replaced a PT president with a PMDB president. Temer became the third Brazilian president to take office from the PMDB since the end of military rule in 1985. In 1985, 1992 and 2016, the PMDB did not win the presidency through the ballot box and the party did not perform well in the following elections. Figure 6 notes that support for the PMDB fell from 2010 to 2018. In other words, the decision to run with the PT appears to have contributed to the party winning fewer seats in 2010 and 2014 than in 2006. The end of the PT-PMDB partnership led to separate campaigns in 2018. However, by 2018, a PT-PMDB alliance was untenable as the MDB was weaker than it had been in 2006-2014. Voters were turned away by the party as evidenced (a) by 2018 losses in the Chamber of Deputies and (b) by Meirelles' performance in the 2018 presidential election. This partially explains why Bolsonaro was elected because the MDB was weaker in 2018 compared to 2006-2014. Furthermore, it should be noted that the MDB's decision to ally with the PT in 2010 and 2014 coincides with reduced support for the party in the 2018 elections.

In terms of percentages, the PSL won 10.33% of the seats compared to the PT's share of 10.52%. The results support H₁. First, because they suggest that the MDB and PSDB are electorally weak, with little party discipline and loyalty. Second, they indicate that the PSL's comparative results from 2014 to 2018 are because of Bolsonaro. Third, they illustrate that the PT won the most seats and did not lose as many seats as the MDB or the PSDB from

¹²⁵ G1 (2016). Passarinho, Nathalia. and Calgaro, Fernanda. "Por aclamação, PMDB oficializa rompimento com governo Dilma." March 03, 2016. (Accessed December 27, 2019).

¹²⁶ UOL (2016). "Após romper com Dilma, PMDB vai apoiar impeachment." March 29, 2016. (Accessed December 27, 2019).

2014 to 2018. This suggests that the PT has greater party discipline, and this has allowed it to field relatively weak political candidates.

During the 2014 elections, Bolsonaro ran for congress but not for the presidency. He did so not for the PSL but for the PP. The changes in voting in 2018 to that from 2014 show that the rise of Bolsonaro saw the PSL becoming the major winner. It was the party with the second highest number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the MDB and PSDB won 32 and 22 fewer seats in 2018 than in 2014. In addition, fragmentation also saw the PT dropping 14 seats as the party went from 68 in 2014 to 54 in 2018.¹²⁷ In other words, the rise of Bolsonaro and the PSL did more than remove votes and seats from one side of the political spectrum.

The changed landscape that the 2018 elections produced was not restricted to Bolsonaro as the benefactor. As previously noted, Gomes outperformed the MDB and the PSDB candidates in the 2018 presidential election. He finished third overall in the first-round with 12.47% of the vote.¹²⁸ His party, the PDT, also gained notable ground in 2018. It improved from 19 seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2014 to 27 in 2018.¹²⁹ As was the case of Bolsonaro and the PSL, Gomes and the PDT succeeded in winning supporters from a traditionally strong party. This occurred with the PDT differentiating itself, not from the PSDB or the MDB but, rather from the PT. The regional strength of the PDT came in Ceará state where Gomes had previously been state governor. This made him a candidate for the

¹²⁷ Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. (2018) “Divulgação de Resultados de Eleições.” October 31, 2018. (Accessed September 08, 2019).

¹²⁸ Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (2018) “Divulgação de Candidaturas e Contas Eleitorais,” nd. (Accessed September 08 2019).

¹²⁹ G1 (2014). “Composição da Câmara dos Deputados,” nd. (Accessed December 23, 2019). and G1 (2018). Caesar, Gabriela. “Saiba como eram e como ficaram as bancadas na Câmara dos Deputados, partido a partido.” October 08, 2018. (Accessed December 23, 2019).

poor from a less developed state. This contrasted to the PT which had emerged in the southeast based on the interests of factory workers in the wealthiest state, São Paulo.

Neither Bolsonaro nor Gomes ran for the presidency in 2014, although this did not mean that either politician was a newcomer. To the contrary, both were veteran figures with Gomes having previously ran for President in 1998 and 2002. He did so for the PPS for a comparable return to that of 2018 under the PDT. Gomes won 10.97% of the first-round vote in 1998, while in 2002 he won 11.97%. In both elections, as well as in 2018, he was the highest voted presidential candidate in Ceará state. The results support the suggestion that Brazilian parties are weak by offering an instance wherein it was the strength of the candidate Gomes, who changed parties without losing support. Despite his backing in Ceará, Gomes did not do well in other states. None of the eight other North-Eastern states voted for Gomes above other candidates in any of these three elections.

The voting behavior from the three elections that Gomes ran in support H_2 . They demonstrate that his voters transferred their support from him to the PT in the second-round. In both 2002 and 2018, Ceará's most voted party in the second-round was the PT. Ceará therefore joined the North-Eastern regional voting direction, which saw all states, aside from Alagoas, voting for the PT in 2002. In 2018 all nine states from the region voted for Haddad in the second-round. This contributed to Haddad's improvement from 29.28% in the first-round to 44.87% in the second. In nationwide terms, support for the PT was a decreasing red area on the Brazilian map. The PT won all states excluding Alagoas in 2002. By way of comparison, Alckmin won seven states in 2006, Serra won eleven in 2010 and Neves won twelve in 2014. The red map was reduced to a minority in 2018 with Bolsonaro winning sixteen states in both rounds. Haddad won ten in the first-round and gained Ceará in the

second-round to win eleven states. Of the states that voted for Haddad, nine were North-Eastern. The remaining two were the Northern states of Tocantins and Pará.

Decreased support for the PT in the Midwest, South, and Southeast did not advantage the MDB or the PSDB. This further explains why Bolsonaro won because it demonstrates that voters turned away from traditional parties in these disputed regions. The decision taken by Bolsonaro and Gomes to change parties did not impact either negatively. The chopping-and-changing that took place over the 1994-2014 period happened to not only have taken place in 2018, but it has been a common occurrence in Brazilian politics. Santos and Vilarouca suggested that although the Brazilian party system is not as chaotic as its detractors sometimes imply, there are certain distortions which continue to “hamper the system’s intelligibility for voters.”¹³⁰ This suggests that making it plain to the voters was the means to the end for Bolsonaro. He campaigned against the PT to present himself to the public by distinguishing himself from others. This simplified the equation for voters who could prevent the PT from winning the election by backing Bolsonaro.

This chapter explained why not identifying with a party can bring about results which are consistent over time. In so doing, it has addressed H₁ and H₂. First, this noted that those regularly performing well do not necessarily have popular support. Second, other than the PT, Brazilian parties are weak. Third, the source of electoral vitality was Bolsonaro, not the PSL. Fourth, second-round presidential elections in Brazil can boost weak candidates to present them as much stronger. Fifth, Bolsonaro was perceived as a strong candidate in the second-round, in contrast to a weak PT candidate. The PSDB under Cardoso had popular backing, yet neither Alckmin nor Serra were able to win comparable support from voters. Neves

¹³⁰ Santos, Fabiano, and Márcio Grijó Vilarouca. *From FHC to Lula: Changes and Continuity in Political Institutions and Impact upon the Political Reform Debate*, in: Kingstone, Peter and Power, Timothy J. (eds.), *Democratic Brazil Revisited*, (2008). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. p.80.

performed better, although a range of factors offer an explanation and they shall be discussed in later chapters. In short, it was not the party which drew voters to almost vote Neves into the presidency in 2014 against Dilma. He was the leader of ‘the rest’ vs the PT when Brazil was experiencing a financial crisis, inflation, rising unemployment and a corruption scandal. This was at a time when Brazil lacked a strong president. These factors respond to the question - if parties’ matter, then why did the PT fail in 2018?

In summary, Bolsonaro’s election victory in 2018 was not with a popular nor an experienced party and this was not the first such instance. In 1989 Collor won with the PRN. The 2018 election was also not the first election defeat for the PT, but the fourth. Nonetheless, it was the PT’s first electoral defeat after 2002 and, like all elections from 1989-2018, the PT was one of the two top-voted parties. The 2018 election therefore was not an isolated case in the history of Brazilian democratic elections. It was the latest reincarnation of the repeated election cycle every four years since, and including 1989, of ‘the rest’ vs the one strong Brazilian party, the PT. It did not take a strong party, but a charismatic leader to connect the dots. Bolsonaro did so without needing the same financial might as traditional parties. The party realignment saw an outsider, not the MDB or PSDB, assuming the mantle as the opposition challenger to the PT. Bolsonaro was a strong candidate who defeated the strongest, albeit still weak, parties.

CHAPTER 3:
THE STRENGTH OF MEN ON HORSEBACK

In politics, the term “man on horseback” has long been used to describe a military leader who presents himself as the savior of his country during a crisis; a general “who sits in the wings waiting to take over the government from civilians.”¹³¹ Historic examples of generals who seized this opportunity include Napoleon Bonaparte and Charles de Gaulle.¹³² In his classic work on civil-military relations, *The Man on Horseback* (1962), Finer popularized the term.¹³³ Finer argued that the political power of the military should be taken seriously, especially in certain parts of the world. He insisted that “the military as an independent political force is a distinctive political phenomenon,” and that “there is a distinct class of countries where governments have been repeatedly subjected to the interference of the armed forces.”¹³⁴ Finer was particularly worried about Latin America, where he described military interventions in politics as “endemic” and “persistent.”¹³⁵

The man on horseback concept was used to explain why and how militaries intervened in politics throughout the third wave of democratization¹³⁶ between 1974 and 1997.¹³⁷ Brazil

¹³¹ Healey, John. “Some Reflections on the General Staff.” *Air University Quarterly Review* (1960), 12(2): 115-122, p.115.

¹³² Thody, Philip. *French Caesarism from Napoleon I to Charles de Gaulle*. (1989). New York: St. Martin’s Press.

¹³³ Finer, S. E. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. (1962). London: Pall Mall Press.

¹³⁴ Finer, pp.3-4.

¹³⁵ Finer, p.3.

¹³⁶ Huntington, Samuel. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century*. (1991). University of Oklahoma Press.

¹³⁷ Diamond, Larry. “The End of the Third Wave and the Global Future of Democracy.” (1997). IHS.

was among the countries which transitioned from military rule to a democratic system during the third wave. The Brazilian military has been out of the equation, yet the man on horseback concept has not. Instead, it remains alive, albeit in an altered form. Zirker argued that instead of military men on horseback there were some surviving traditions that led to civilian or democratic men on horseback.¹³⁸ These elected leaders appeal to the middle-class and working-class voters in the Nun tradition, in which the middle-classes abandon democracy in the face of chaos.¹³⁹ It would not seem at first glance that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Fernando Henrique Cardoso were men on horseback. However, in a new modern context this chapter will discuss how they were democratic men on horseback.

This chapter explores whether Jair Bolsonaro fits the above mold. It will test the hypothesis, H₃, that Bolsonaro's strongman behavior and strongman image as a "man on horseback" contributed to his election victory. Five arguments are made in this chapter to support this hypothesis. First, it will be demonstrated that Bolsonaro's campaign appealed to the economic insecurities of middle-class and working-class Brazilians. Second, it will be shown that Bolsonaro was perceived as a strongman by voters, particularly with his call for the return of elements of the dictatorship. Third, it will be established that, historically, during times of economic turmoil in Brazil, strongman candidates have had an electoral advantage. Fourth, it will be discussed how Bolsonaro's senior political appointments of military officials after the election confirms the accuracy of claims that he campaigned as a strongman, in the military tradition of a man on horseback. Finally, the role of the media in Brazil in not opposing Bolsonaro and in promoting his strongman image will be evaluated.

¹³⁸ Zirker, p.69.

¹³⁹ Nun, José. "The Middle-Class Military Coup." In Veliz, Claudio. (eds.) (1968). *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*. Oxford University Press.

CARDOSO AND LULA: STABILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE, COMMODITIES AND POVERTY.

Bolsonaro was not the first example of a man on horseback obtaining the Brazilian presidency. However, he may be the first of his kind. This chapter will explore whether he was different to those before him and if this implies that men on horseback can come in different shapes and sizes. It will also consider possible instances of Brazilian elected leaders from the left, center or the right who may be described as men on horseback. In so doing, the chapter will formulate and test a theory that three varieties of elected men on horseback have existed in Brazil since 1985 – Cardoso, Lula, and Bolsonaro.

Cardoso achieved success as President Itamar Franco's finance minister from 1993 to 1994, and was then elected president in 1994. Cardoso's economic stabilization program included the Plano Real, the introduction of the Brazilian Real currency.¹⁴⁰ It proved successful and Brazilians elected him to a second presidential term in 1998. The stability that the Cardoso regime brought to the economy was uncommon for much of Brazil's population. Inflation was frequent under the three presidents before Cardoso, as well as during the later years of military rule. Despite stability, it did not mean that the country had an economy being enjoyed by the masses. Instead, the Plano Real combated inflation without addressing poverty or inequality.¹⁴¹ This meant wealth distribution remained uneven at the end of Cardoso's eight years in office. In 2002 there were 23.2 million Brazilians living below the poverty line, compared to 24.2 million in 1999, and 24 million in 1998.¹⁴² Lula used these

¹⁴⁰ Zirker, p.80.

¹⁴¹ Flynn, Peter. "Brazil: The Politics of the 'Plano Real'." *Third World Quarterly* (2010), 17(3): 401-426.

¹⁴² Mendes, pp.81-84.

conditions in his campaigns to be a provider for the poor. He was also a man on horseback, or a *caudillo*, who won his way into office as a charismatic politician.

In this study the term *caudillo* is used interchangeably with civilian or democratic men on horseback. Azpuru, Malone, and Pérez describe such leaders as “strongmen” who “mobilize disenfranchised voters who feel left behind.”¹⁴³ They are alternatives who promise to be unlike other candidates and present themselves as the solution to “act decisively to fix the country.”¹⁴⁴

Social programs under Lula proved more effective than Cardoso in tackling inequality. Mendes reports that the per capita income of Brazil’s poorest 10% increased at an average rate of 6.7% per year from 2001-2011.¹⁴⁵ In comparison there was an increase of 1.5% per year for the richest 10% and overall poverty fell approximately 15%.¹⁴⁶ In this respect, Lula followed through with his campaign promises for the poorest sections of Brazilian society. His means to this end were not strictly a case of the will of a leader to lift the poorest out of poverty. He governed during the commodities boom, when there was a high demand for commodity purchases, notably from China.¹⁴⁷ During this cycle, Brazil’s economy grew at an annual average of 3.4% from 2002-2013 compared to 2.3% from 1994-2002.¹⁴⁸ This raises the possibility that growth during the boom advantaged the PT, but the end of the commodities boom harmed the party. In other words, the commodities boom offered access to a supply of taxation that contributed to the PT’s fight against poverty and seems to have

¹⁴³ Azpuru, Dinorah, Mary F. T. Malone, and Orlando J. Pérez. 2016. “American Caudillo: The Rise of Strongmen Politics in the United States and Latin America.” OSF. October 26. (2016). osf.io/sphkc. p.2.

¹⁴⁴ Azpuru, Malone and Pérez, p.2.

¹⁴⁵ Mendes, pp.81-84.

¹⁴⁶ Mendes, p.85.

¹⁴⁷ Sharma, Ruchir. “Bearish on Brazil: The Commodity Slowdown and the End of the Magic Moment.” *Foreign Affairs* (2012), 91(3): 80-87.

¹⁴⁸ Giambiagi and Schwartzman, p.24.

assisted in election wins. In turn, Lula's decisions and outside factors carried appeal to middle and working-class voters as the civilian and democratic man on horseback.

The commodities boom combined with Lula's charisma led to domestic and international recognition. At the 2009 G20 summit in London, U.S. President Barack Obama greeted him with the words "that's my man right there, the most popular politician on earth."¹⁴⁹ In addition to his approval ratings, Lula governed in ways that Fernando Collor de Mello and Franco could not. He acted on declarations such as "we have to give a little more to those who earn less."¹⁵⁰ An example is the *Bolsa Família* (family stipend) program which rose in costs during and after the commodities boom. It increased from 0.13% of GDP in 2002 to 0.49% in 2014.¹⁵¹ Overall it represented 2.6% in 2014, a low figure compared to the costs of other areas that were both notably larger and underwent increases. The two investment areas that grew the most were education and social security, which saw an increase from 35.7% in 2004 to 38.9% in 2014.¹⁵²

The slowing down of the Chinese and global economies had ramifications for the PT. The end of the commodities boom and how governments had operated helped foster conditions of economic insecurity that led to Bolsonaro's campaign victory. The investment strategy from the PT in poverty reduction was not replicated in government expenditure in other areas. Instead, Giambiago and Schwartsman explain that investments in infrastructure were lower under Lula than Cardoso. As a proportion of GDP, Brazil spent more on

¹⁴⁹ G1 (2009). "Lula 'é o cara', diz Obama durante reunião do G20, em Londres." April 02, 2009. (Accessed September 26, 2019).

¹⁵⁰ Newsweek (2009) "Brazil's Lula: The most popular politician on earth." September 21, 2009. (Accessed September 26, 2019).

¹⁵¹ Holland, Márcio. *A Economia do Ajuste Fiscal: Por que o Brasil Quebrou?* (2016). Elsevier. p.96.

¹⁵² Holland. pp.96-99.

infrastructure in 2001 than in 2012.¹⁵³ In 2001, the spending was 3.22%, compared to 2.32% in 2012 under Dilma Rousseff. The peak under Lula was 2.46% in 2008.¹⁵⁴ The levels of investment in infrastructure under the PT administration, compared to that of the PSDB, decreased despite there being more economic growth during the Lula years than the Cardoso years.¹⁵⁵ This meant that Lula had more money to spend than Cardoso. It saw progress in reducing misery from 24.1% in 2002 to 6.6% under Dilma in 2014. Furthermore, by considering the reduction to combine those living in poverty with the poor, the number dropped from 53% to 30% during this period.¹⁵⁶

Improved conditions for vulnerable sectors of society coincided with the re-election of Lula in 2006 and Dilma's 2010 election victory. However, the PT's popularity eroded as evidenced by the second-round of the 2014 Brazilian presidential elections. It was at this time that the impact of the slowing down of the economy came to show itself. The lowered costs of commodities made it complicated for the government to cover expenses. Brazil was in a recession, which saw GDP falling by 3.8% in 2015. This was the most of any year since 1990.¹⁵⁷ The effects led to income levels falling by 5%,¹⁵⁸ 2.7 million people returned to

¹⁵³ Giambiagi and Schwartzman., p.103.

¹⁵⁴ Giambiagi, and Schwartzman., pp.103-104.

¹⁵⁵ Giambiagi, and Schwartzman., p.59.

¹⁵⁶ Quadros, Waldir. 'Paralisia econômica, retrocesso social e eleições.' (2015). IE/Unicamp. pp.1-10.

¹⁵⁷ Folha de São Paulo (2016). Villas Bôas, Bruno and Patu, Gustavo. PIB do Brasil cai 3,8% em 2015, o pior resultado desde 1990. March 03, 2016. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

¹⁵⁸ UOL (2016). de Andrade, Hanrikson. Pnad. "2015 aponta aumento do desemprego e queda na renda de ricos e pobres." November 25, 2016. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

misery and 3.6 million returned to poverty.¹⁵⁹ As a result, in April 2016, the unemployment rate reached 11.2% with 3.38 million people having lost their jobs.¹⁶⁰

The Dilma regime approached the recession by looking to increase tax revenues. This came in the form of tax adjustments with consumers paying more. In January 2015, the IPI tax on cosmetics rose to 42%, which was an increase of 12.5% above inflation.¹⁶¹ Also in January, the IPI tax on domestically manufactured automobiles increased from 3% to 7% on economy cars, from 9% to 11% for flexible-fuel mid-sized vehicles and to 13% for gasoline vehicles.¹⁶² Fuel taxes increased that month with gasoline rising 7.3% and diesel 5.5%. This corresponded to increases of BR\$0.22 and BR\$0.15 per liter for consumers.¹⁶³ Such measures contributed to the fall in President Dilma's popularity. In August of 2015, 8% of respondents to a *Datafolha* survey rated Dilma's presidency as good or great and 71% evaluated Dilma as bad or terrible.¹⁶⁴

As displayed in Figure 7, Lula did not experience comparable difficulties to those of Dilma as president. Lula's lowest approval rating was 29% in December 2005.¹⁶⁵ It followed *Mensalão*, a scandal which saw Lula's Chief of Staff José Dirceu jailed for corruption. Lula and the PT overcame the controversy and won the 2006 presidential elections. He was not up

¹⁵⁹ O Globo (2016). Almeida, Cássia., Carneiro, Lucianne., Costa, Daiane., Lavor, Thays., and Gullino, Daniel. "Mais de 3,6 milhões de brasileiros entram na pobreza, mostra pnad." November 26, 2016. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

¹⁶⁰ Folha de São Paulo (2016). Vettorazzo, Lucas. "Desemprego Atinge 11,2% Em Abril e a Renda Real do Trabalhador Recua 3,3%." May 31, 2016. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

¹⁶¹ Jornal do Comércio (2015). "Aumento Do IPI Preocupa O Setor de Cosméticos." May 27, 2015. (Accessed October 01, 2019).


¹⁶² Veja (2014). "IPI de carros terá aumento em janeiro de 2015." November 20, 2014. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

¹⁶³ G1 (2015). "Tributação sobre gasolina e diesel sobe a partir de fevereiro, diz Fisco." January 29, 2015. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

¹⁶⁴ G1 (2015). "8% aprovam e 71% reprovam governo Dilma, diz Datafolha." August 06, 2015. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

¹⁶⁵ Folha de São Paulo (2010). "Na reta final da eleição, avaliação de Lula volta a subir e bate recorde, diz Datafolha." October 15, 2010. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

against low commodity prices, a recession, or social unrest. Moreover, Lula ended his presidency with an 83% approval rating.¹⁶⁶ This suggests that voters responded to investment in poverty and misery reduction. Moreover, they did so during a period of economic growth when middle-class and working-class fortunes had improved.



The author's rendering of data. Sources: Datafolha,¹⁶⁷ Folha de São Paulo,¹⁶⁸ G1,¹⁶⁹ Veja.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ Datafolha (2010). "Acima das expectativas, Lula encerra mandato com melhor avaliação da história." December 12, 2010. (Accessed October 03, 2019).

¹⁶⁷ Datafolha (2002). "FHC encerra mandato com reprovação maior do que aprovação." December 15, 2002. (Accessed October 02, 2019)., Datafolha (2010). "Acima das expectativas, Lula encerra mandato com melhor avaliação da história." December 12, 2010. (Accessed October 02, 2019)., Datafolha (2012). "Primeiro ano de Dilma tem a maior aprovação desde redemocratização." (Accessed October 02, 2019)., January 20, 2012. Datafolha (2017). "Para maioria, governo de Michel Temer é pior que o de Dilma Rousseff." December, 04, 2017. (Accessed October 02, 2019)., Datafolha (2019). "Mais impopular desde Collor, Temer fecha com reprovação em baixa." January 03, 2019. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁶⁸ Folha de São Paulo (1997). "Desemprego justifica 56% da rejeição a FHC." November 13, 1997. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁶⁹ G1 (2016). "Relembra a trajetória política de Dilma Rousseff." May 12, 2016. (Accessed October 03, 2019)., and G1 (2016). Matoso, Filipe. "Governo Temer tem aprovação de 14% e reprovação de 39%, diz Ibope." October 04, 2016. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁷⁰ Veja (2018). "Temer bate próprio recorde e é o presidente mais rejeitado da história." June 10, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

Investments during the PSDB and the PT governments had different consequences for both parties. Changing demands of the population saw the parties defeated at the polls. Leaders used the situations to cater to the demands of voters. Economic conditions facilitated changes which suggested selective policy-driven investment. Frischtak argues that investment in infrastructure can reduce poverty in the long-term.¹⁷¹ The PT's peak investment in infrastructure was 2.46% in 2008.¹⁷² Nonetheless, he estimates Brazil needs to invest no less than 3% of GDP in infrastructure. This is required to pay for maintenance, to keep up with growth in demand, and to offer nationwide water, sanitation and electrical energy services. Frischtak observed that 53.3% of the population remained unconnected to a sewage system in 2012.¹⁷³ Addressing such an issue required the will of the government in addition to resources. This example suggests why conditions were different for PT-led governments during and after the commodities boom. They also serve as a reminder of how the economy impacted the Collor regime's ability to govern.

FROM DILMA TO TEMER: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

The end of military rule in Brazil in the 1980s represented more than a transfer of power to a civilian democratic government. It saw a society reconfigured. Mendes points out that the transition to democracy saw the government converted from a closed regime to an open one. Because of this transition, all people could be represented and pressure for redistribution exploded. Lula and the PT provided representation for many groups in Brazilian society, compared to the limited interest group representation faced by prior

¹⁷¹ Frischtak, Cláudio R. "O Investimento em Infra-Estrutura no Brasil: Histórica Recente e Perspectivas." (2008) *Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico*, v. 38. n.2. pp.307-348.

¹⁷² Giambiagi and Schwartzman., pp.103-104.

¹⁷³ Frischtak, Cláudio R. *Infraestrutura e desenvolvimento no Brasil*. in Veloso, Fernando et all (eds.), *Desenvolvimento Econômico: uma perspectiva brasileira*. (2012). Elsevier.

regimes.¹⁷⁴ Attending to the people required state expansion, resulting in new costs to fund initiatives such as universal retirement. In the area of Previdência (Social Security) the annual costs increased from BR\$182.6 billion in 2001 to BR\$402.1 billion in 2014. This represented a disproportionate rise as the population aged 60 or above was 15.5 million (9%) in 2001 compared to 23.5 million (12.1%) in 2011.¹⁷⁵

The state's expenses not only represented new costs, but the changes also came about quickly. The new form of public management and productivity brought about improvement to the lives of many sectors of society. This included the removal of Brazilians from misery and poverty in record numbers. Paying for programs was passed on to companies and consumers. It worked under Lula but contributed to low economic growth and inflation under Dilma.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, the level of dissatisfaction with her regime and her impeachment did not see the economy return to the heights of the commodities boom. Instead, the points to follow will further test H₃. First, they will consider if impeachment brought a new president, but not policies to benefit middle-class and working-class fortunes. Second, they will examine if the policies aided Bolsonaro's trajectory. The Temer government had the same expenses and responded similarly to Dilma. This involved correcting the deficit through taxation. In 2017, finance minister Henrique Meirelles doubled the tax on gasoline from BR\$0.38 cents to BR\$0.79 cents per liter.¹⁷⁷ With the return of the CIDE tax on gasoline there was a further BR\$0.10 cents per liter added, making it an increase of BR\$0.89 per liter.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ Mendes, Marcos. *Os Conflates Federativos na Democracias Brasileira*. in: Felipe Salto and Mansueto Almeida (eds.), *Finanças Públicas* (2016). Record. pp.285-286.

¹⁷⁵ Holland., pp.98-102.

¹⁷⁶ Mendes, (2016). pp.285-286.

¹⁷⁷ Veja (2017). Machado, Felipe. "Governo divulga aumento de imposto nos combustíveis." July 20, 2017. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

¹⁷⁸ G1 (2017). "Martello, Alexandre. Governo eleva tributo sobre combustíveis e corta mais R\$ 5,9 bilhões em gastos." July 20, 2017. (Accessed October 01, 2019).

The Temer government was a stabilization regime to bridge Dilma's impeachment and the 2018 elections. This took on the meaning not only of ensuring democratic solidarity with the former, but also in terms of economic stabilization. Inflation was 10.7% in December 2015 and 9.3% in May 2016, when Dilma left office. Twelve months later it was 4%, which was the lowest rate in Brazil since July 2007.¹⁷⁹ However, this did not result in Meirelles becoming a popular option in the 2018 presidential elections. His rejection was because of other factors, such as public dissatisfaction with Temer's government. A *Datafolha* survey in December 2017 found that 62% of Brazilians considered Temer's government worse than Dilma's.¹⁸⁰ In addition, in June 2018, *Datafolha* showed that Temer was the most unpopular Brazilian president in history: 82% of respondents said Temer's presidency was bad or terrible, 14% regular, and 3% good or great.¹⁸¹

Faced with declining middle-class fortunes, the people seem to have sought more than low inflation. They also wanted greater returns on their investments. Temer's unpopularity could be attributed to his lack of charisma, although this was minor in comparison to the financial reality. Related to H₃ is the point that doubling fuel taxes meant Meirelles was not perceived as a stabilizer nor an intermediary between the state and the public.¹⁸² Instead, it contributed to Bolsonaro's emergence as a representative for change. This occurred in May 2018 when the consequences of fuel taxes boiled over. A nationwide truck drivers' strike brought much of the country to a halt. More than 90% of gas stations in some states ran out

¹⁷⁹ Instituto Liberal (2017). "Balassiano, Marcel. Um ano do governo Temer: grandes mudanças na economia brasileira!" May 12, 2017. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁸⁰ Datafolha (2017). "Para maioria, governo de Michel Temer é pior que o de Dilma Rousseff." December 04, 2017. (Accessed December 27, 2019).

¹⁸¹ Veja (2018). "Temer bate próprio recorde e é o presidente mais rejeitado da história." June 10, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁸² Albala, Adrián. *Introduction: Political Parties and Social Movements in Latin America (2011-2016)*, in: Albala, Adrián. (ed.), *Civil Society and Political Representation in Latin America (2010-2015): Towards a Divorce Between Social Movements and Political Parties?* (2018). Springer. p5.

of fuel. The impacts included restricted public transportation and food shortages in certain locations. Those on strike demanded reduced diesel prices. Under Temer prices had increased by more than 50% over the previous year.¹⁸³ This outcome aided the government financially, but it did not satisfy the public. The reaction to increased fuel costs symbolized that truck drivers were unsatisfied with the Temer government.

The truck drivers' strike just months before the elections was an opportunity for presidential candidates to gain support. Gomes labeled the fuel prices as "monstrous."¹⁸⁴ Amoêdo stated that "we have a bloated government, which demands high taxes from the population for its maintenance."¹⁸⁵ Bolsonaro declared his support for the protestors and opposed the fines, imprisonment and confiscation against them.¹⁸⁶ Alckmin neither confirmed nor denied his support of the strike.¹⁸⁷ However, indications are that the public was in favor of the strike. The *Instituto Methodus* conducted research in Brasília and the states of Bahia, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo. Results showed that 86% of those interviewed supported the strike compared to 9% who did not and 4% were undecided. In addition, the survey results showed that 97% believed that fuel prices were high.¹⁸⁸

Public opinion of the strike suggests that presidential candidates who supported the protests were not harmed. For Alckmin and the PSDB the decision to not offer support did

¹⁸³ BBC Brasil (2018). "Greve dos caminhoneiros: a cronologia dos 10 dias que pararam o Brasil." May 30, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁸⁴ Folha de São Paulo (2018). "Ciro diz que a política de preços de Temer e de Parente é uma fraude." May 25, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁸⁵ Poder 360 (2018). "Pré-candidatos ao Planalto comentam greve de caminhoneiros e Petrobras." May 24, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019). Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: "Temos um governo inchado, que demanda altos impostos da população para sua manutenção."

¹⁸⁶ Folha de São Paulo (2018). "Bolsonaro diz que apoia caminhoneiros, mas critica bloqueios de estradas." May 24, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁸⁷ Folha PE (2018). "Presenciáveis comentam medidas do governo sobre greve dos caminhoneiros." May 24, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁸⁸ Correio do Povo (2018). "Maioria apoia greve dos caminhoneiros, aponta pesquisa." May 25, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

not help their election campaign. However, the publicity that Bolsonaro obtained from the truck drivers' strike was an example of how he countered the budget of the Alckmin candidacy. In taking the side of the publicly-supported strike, he presented himself to voters as distinctive. In contrast, the public had no reason to differentiate Temer's party from *Lulismo* or the PT. Moreover, the fact that the PMDB had supported the PT in Dilma's two presidential campaigns meant there was a lack of trust in the party. As a result, the truck drivers' strike seems to have served as an instance to underline Bolsonaro as a popular option to challenge the PT in the 2018 elections.

As noted in chapter two, the MDB did not perform well in the race for the presidency or in winning seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Figure 7 notes the situation for the MDB. As displayed, Temer left office with a 7% approval rate in December 2018. It ended a bad year for the MDB, although there were indications that the party was in trouble ahead of the election. Weeks after the truck drivers' strike, a *Datafolha* survey showed that 92% of respondents would reject a presidential candidate endorsed by President Temer.¹⁸⁹ The rejection of the MDB is displayed in Figure 7. It notes Temer as the worst placed in all categories. First, as president, his highest approval rating was 14%,¹⁹⁰ compared to Cardoso with 47%,¹⁹¹ Dilma with 79%¹⁹² and Lula with 83%.¹⁹³ Second, Temer's highest disapproval

¹⁸⁹ Veja (2018). "Temer bate próprio recorde e é o presidente mais rejeitado da história." June 10, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁹⁰ R7 (2016). "Com 14%, aprovação do governo Temer é melhor que gestão Dilma." October 04, 2016. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁹¹ Datafolha (2002). "FHC encerra mandato com reprovação maior do que aprovação." December 15, 2002. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁹² G1 (2016). "Relembra a trajetória política de Dilma Rousseff." May 12, 2016. (Accessed October 03, 2019).

¹⁹³ Datafolha (2010). "Acima das expectativas, Lula encerra mandato com melhor avaliação da história." December, 20 2010. (Accessed October 03, 2019).

rate was 82%,¹⁹⁴ compared to 29% for Lula,¹⁹⁵ 56% for Cardoso¹⁹⁶ and 71% for Dilma.¹⁹⁷

Third, his final approval rate was 7%,¹⁹⁸ compared to Dilma with 10%,¹⁹⁹ Cardoso with 26%²⁰⁰ and Lula with 83%.²⁰¹

The performance of the MDB is a test of H₁, H₂, and H₃. Figures 6 and 7 imply that it was electorally weak against Bolsonaro. In addition, the party lacked strong leaders and it was harmed by its time in office. The Temer presidency left economic insecurities of the middle- and working-classes unresolved. In so doing, unresolved economic turmoil in Brazil seems to have resulted in Bolsonaro obtaining electoral advantages with the middle- and working classes in the 2018 presidential elections. In addition, Figure 7 suggests that impeachment brought presidential change without popular backing. Replacing Dilma with Temer did not satisfy middle- and working-classes insecurities and the data indicates that Temer was a less popular president than Dilma. Moreover, at the height of her popularity, Dilma's approval rate was 79% and Cardoso's was 47%.

As a strongman, Cardoso had an advantage over the PT during the instability of the 1990s. His stabilization appeal garnered the support of the middle- and working-classes. This

¹⁹⁴ G1 (2018). "Reprovação ao governo Temer é de 82%, aponta pesquisa Datafolha." June 10, 2018. (Accessed October 03, 2019).

¹⁹⁵ Datafolha (2010). "Acima das expectativas, Lula encerra mandato com melhor avaliação da história." December 12, 2010. (Accessed December 22, 2019).

¹⁹⁶ Veja (2018). "Temer bate próprio recorde e é o presidente mais rejeitado da história." June 10, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

¹⁹⁷ Folha de São Paulo (2015). "Mendonça, Ricardo. Reprovação ao governo Dilma cai de 71% para 67%, aponta Datafolha." November 29, 2015. (Accessed December 22, 2019).

¹⁹⁸ Datafolha (2018). "Mais impopular desde Collor, Temer fecha com reprovação em baixa." January 03, 2019. (Accessed December 22, 2019).

¹⁹⁹ G1 (2016). Matoso, Filipe. "Governo Temer tem aprovação de 14% e reprovação de 39%, diz Ibope." October 04, 2016. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

²⁰⁰ Datafolha (2002). FHC encerra mandato com reprovação maior do que aprovação. December 15, 2002. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

²⁰¹ Veja (2010). "Lula encerra mandato com aprovação de 83%, afirma Ibope." December 19, 2010. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

aided the PSDB win in 1994 and 1998. It also offers an explanation as to why Cardoso lacked the popularity enjoyed by PT presidents, despite his success at the ballot box. In addition, this suggests that neither Cardoso nor the PSDB experienced comparable appeal to the PT, Lula, or Dilma because of the relative economic conditions. Lula, Dilma and the PT were successful during the commodities boom, which followed the end of Cardoso's governance. When it ended, a recession unfolded, and Dilma's support dwindled before she was impeached. In short, Figure 7 documents the popularity of presidents while in office. The final approval ratings of Temer and Dilma suggest that conditions were unusual. These circumstances aided an outsider's prospects of winning the Brazilian presidency in 2018.

A CAUDILLO OPPOSES THE LEFT

Bolsonaro championed the sentiment that Brazil's economic situation was a result of government mismanagement. His campaign against the PT argued that Haddad represented a "threat to democracy."²⁰² Bolsonaro gained support by claiming that the PT had run the country into the ground. The PT also played into his hands when party president Gleisi Hoffmann defended Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela. This helped Bolsonaro to argue that the PT needed to be defeated in the elections to avoid the country moving in a comparable direction to Venezuela.²⁰³ The warning that Brazil may replicate Venezuela was both a critique of the PT and a reason to vote for Bolsonaro.

Approval for Bolsonaro was boosted by initiatives from his supporters. Social media fan pages such as '*A Última Esperança da Nação*' (the last hope of the nation) and

²⁰² Exame (2018). "Do hospital, Bolsonaro ataca PT e fala em risco de 'fraude' nas eleições." September 16, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

²⁰³ BBC Brasil (2018). Franco, Luiza. "Bolsonaro presidente: Os erros-chave do PT na campanha contra Jair Bolsonaro." October 28, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

'*Bolsonaro o Mito*' (Bolsonaro the Myth) attracted interest. Supporters made use of *o mito* to define Bolsonaro as a hero. The pro-Bolsonaro movement spread anti-PT messages on social media, smartphones, and messaging services such as WhatsApp. For example, during the week of the second-round, one message warned of "Holocaust scenes in Venezuela, a regime supported by Haddad and by the PT and this is what they want to install here."²⁰⁴ It was an example of different ways to promote the man on horseback as the person to defeat the PT and to take the country forward.

Throughout the leadup to the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, positive and negative stories about Venezuela circulated. One negative story said that Maduro governed his country as a non-democratic leader. Walker notes that the region has had three varieties of leftism: a Marxist left, a populist left, and a social democratic left. He argues that the first two have established an alliance.²⁰⁵ Conservatives in Brazil painted a picture of Haddad and the PT as Marxist leftists. However, on Walker's spectrum, the positioning of the PT government was as the social democratic left and not like Venezuela. Walker argues that although there were differences between the presidents and their parties, both Cardoso and Lula belong in this category. As a test this supports H₃. First, it narrows the presidential options presented to voters with Alckmin not being a change candidate. Second, it implies a move from the PSDB to Bolsonaro, who was perceived as a strongman, with his calls for the return of elements of the dictatorship.

Lula was a *caudillo* president during the commodities boom. He was a different form of a man on horseback to Cardoso. It was the change from a civilian elected on economic

²⁰⁴ Isto É (2018) "Partidários de Bolsonaro agitam o fantasma do Brasil virar uma Venezuela." October 23, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019). Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: "Cenas de holocausto na Venezuela, regime apoiado por Haddad e pelo PT, é isso o que eles querem implantar aqui."

²⁰⁵ Walker, Ignacio. (eds.), *Democracy in Latin America*. (2009). University of Notre Dame Press. p.155.

grounds to a civilian elected on the promise of social change. They did not match the *caudillo* tradition of authoritarianism, although both were critical of the other and used non-democratic terminology. On the one hand, as leader of the opposition in 1998, Lula declared Cardoso as “a thief” and “corrupt.”²⁰⁶ On the other hand, during the lead-up to the second-round of voting in the 2006 presidential elections, Cardoso said “Lula is a Peronist *caudillo* more so than a Chávista.”²⁰⁷ Such a comparison serves as a reminder of the strength and regularity of *caudillo* leaders in the region dating back to Simón Bolívar.

Like Bolívar, Cardoso and Lula governed in the *caudillo* style of a commander described by Weber. He noted that leaders legitimized themselves as the savior of the people, which he identified as being charismatic.²⁰⁸ In Brazil since 1985, this has come in the form of presidential candidates presenting themselves as options for change. They have been alternatives not to what O’Donnell described as ‘traditional authoritarian domination,’²⁰⁹ but to policies. The custom of convincing voters for change occurred in Brazil for a third time, with the election victory of a different *caudillo* in 2018. This raises three points that address this change in regard to H₃. First, that Bolsonaro came as a response to the PT governments of Lula and Dilma. Second, that Bolsonaro was a response to other leftist 21st century presidents in the region. Third, that he was an alternative to non-charismatic leaders from traditional parties, namely Alckmin and Meirelles.

²⁰⁶ Estado de São Paulo (2005) “Lula esquece passado e vê ameaça à democracia em crítica ao governo.” August 07, 2005. (Accessed September 29, 2019). Author’s translation. Quotes in Portuguese: “ladroão” and “corrupto.”

²⁰⁷ La Nacion (2006). “Para Cardoso, “Lula es un caudillo peronista más que chavista.”” October 06, 2006. (Accessed September 26, 2019). Author’s translation. Quote in Spanish: “Lula es un caudillo peronista más que chavista.”

²⁰⁸ Vélez Rodríguez, Ricardo. *Neopopulismo na América Latina*. in Álvarez, Gloria and Kaiser, Axel. *O Embuste Populista*. (2019) São Paulo: LVM. p.15.

²⁰⁹ O’Donnell, Guillermo. *Populismo in: Dicionário de Ciências Sociais*. (1986). Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas. p.935.

Bolsonaro's impact and charisma on the campaign trail rivaled the devotion previously seen for Lula.²¹⁰ Lechín compared the fascist parties of Hitler and Mussolini to legislation and declarations from Castro, Chávez and Morales. He deemed that the three Latin American leaders had obtained control by damaging liberal institutions. Moreover, he used the term 'Caudillo Fascist' and defined such a leader as "messianic" and "charismatic."²¹¹ This comparison offers a distinction between Brazil's social-democratic left of Cardoso, Lula, and Dilma to the authoritarian left in Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia. It also suggests why the campaigning of Bolsonaro, and factions of his supporters, achieved results. The Bolsonaro *caudillo* combined with his charisma, furthered the power of speech against Haddad to present him as dangerous.

Nun argued that in the past the Latin American middle-class often turned to authoritarianism, abandoning democracy when faced with deteriorating threats to stability and their socio-economic status.²¹² Moreover, Tedesco and Barton argued that the middle-classes press for their own inclusion. They noted that including lower classes depends on whether the middle-class needs an alliance.²¹³ H₃ suggests that Bolsonaro's appeal shared characteristics of an authoritarian who won through allied supporters from across the political spectrum. The *caudillo* convinced millions to vote for him rather than candidates from traditional parties. His persuasiveness as 'the Myth' implies that he may be considered as a pseudo-authoritarian figure. This is because he won via the ballot and has governed democratically, yet he has done so with authoritarian tones.

²¹⁰ UOL (2020). Britto, Marco., and Schelp, Diogo. "Bolsonaro supera Lula em carisma e impacto pessoal que causa, afirma autora." January 18, 2020. (Accessed May 18, 2020).

²¹¹ Lechín, Juan Cláudio. *Las Masacres del Fascismo*. (2015). La Paz: Plural. pp.32-39.

²¹² Nun. (1967).

²¹³ Tedesco, Laura and Jonathan R. Barton. *The State of Democracy in Latin America: Post-transitional Conflicts in Argentina and Chile*. (2004). Routledge.

THREE TYPES OF MEN ON HORSEBACK

This subsection has two considerations. First, it discusses whether Cardoso, Lula, and Bolsonaro won their way into office as differing types of men on horseback. Second, it discusses if different conditions are the settings for distinct varieties. The three presidents were elected through tactical maneuvering. They each presented themselves as the solution to the country's current problems. In order to consider this phenomenon, it is useful to distinguish between the three. All had certain characteristics. For instance, they were all protagonists and reformist candidates, yet they are three varieties of elected men on horseback. Their respective paths to winning the presidency were different. Figure 8 displays the three variations. They are (a) the Platform Type, (b) the Protector Type and (c) the Peremptory Type. Each variety identifies the electoral characteristics used on the campaign trail and what the presidents considered the role of the state.

Figure 8: Types of Elected Presidential Man on Horseback

	President	Electoral Characteristics	Role of the State
Platform Type	Cardoso	Stability appeal	Lay the foundation and solidification for progress
Protector Type	Lula	Emotional appeal	Provide progress
Peremptory Type	Bolsonaro	No-nonsense appeal	Enable progress

Source: Author's rendition of the election of men on horseback.

As the Platform Type, Cardoso is characterized as offering stability. His time as finance minister does imply that he contributed to neoliberal economic stabilization and that this aided his campaigns for the presidency in 1994 and 1998. He stood-out as the go-to person for reform, in contrast to Sarney, Collor and Franco. The role of the state under Cardoso could be summarized as aiding business confidence. It involved both strategic and careful

investment as pillars of government policy. This may explain why investment in infrastructure was higher under Cardoso than under subsequent administrations. However, the use of the state to encourage economic performance also appealed to the opposition. It enabled Lula to use it to his advantage in the second form of a democratically elected man on horseback.

In distinguishing between (a) the Platform Type and (b) the Protector Type, it is useful to recall Walker's categorization of both Cardoso and Lula as social democratic left forms of leftism in Latin America. Their respective governments operated differently, although Cardoso and Lula both leaned closer to the center than to the center-left. They did so despite having had ties to the left. Lula's road to the presidency involved the use of emotional appeal to improve the lives of millions by lifting them out of misery and poverty. This made him a social reformist and a strongman to dismantle inequality barriers. He campaigned against Serra in 2002 and Alckmin in 2006 as a Protector Type by urging voters that Brazil needed him. In 2006 his team used the reverse of the PT vs 'the rest' approach. His political consultant João Santana noted "if there is a second-round, we will divide the country and win."²¹⁴

PT administrations required an increased state capacity to combat inequality. A downside, as described by Maria do Socorro Braga, was that the use of public money for social programs became a target of the 2015 call for Dilma's impeachment. In what could be described as an indication of H₃, she pointed out that one of the motives that led to protests was the reduction of middle-class purchasing power, notably in São Paulo state. Socorro Braga contended that the conservative middle-class protestors felt outraged at having less

²¹⁴ Folha de São Paulo (2006). "PT cogitou apostar na cisão do país entre ricos e pobres." October 30, 2006. (Accessed October 03, 2019). Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: "Se tiver segundo turno, a gente divide o país e ganha."

money, despite paying higher taxes.²¹⁵ Such an account is comparable to that of the 2018 truck drivers' strike. The motive in that instance was that they did not approve of paying higher fuel prices for the government to use the revenue for national expenses. In other words, being the provider of progress is like a double-edged sword. It also meant that Santana's strategy for Lula to defeat Alckmin in 2006 complicated the campaigns of future PT presidential candidates.

After the Platform Type of man on horseback came the Protector Type. It was not a sequel, but a response. The same is true of the Peremptory Type, which came as a reaction to policies from the Protector Type. As an elected man on horseback, Cardoso was a stabilizer, Lula was a redistributor, while Bolsonaro was a savior-authoritarian. As a no-nonsense candidate, he appealed to the voters who had taken to the streets of São Paulo to plead for Dilma's impeachment. Evidence for this exists in the second-round voting, wherein Bolsonaro received more than double the votes of Haddad in São Paulo state. Bolsonaro won in a landslide, claiming 67.97%, compared to Haddad's 32.03% in the state. Bolsonaro won in 631 of the state's 645 municipalities with Haddad winning in only 14.²¹⁶

The Peremptory Type campaigner was voted into office as the answer to calls for immediate attention on the part of the middle- and working-classes. There was a search for alternatives to social inequalities during the presidential elections. In the second-round, the choice was a return to the PT with Haddad as president, or reformism by voting for Bolsonaro. In policy terms, the candidates gave voters the choice of the state operating as the provider for the marginalized or for a reduction in the state under Bolsonaro. As a Peremptory

²¹⁵ R7 Notícias (2015). "Classe média de São Paulo concentra ódio contra políticas sociais do PT, diz cientista política." March 23, 2015. (Accessed October 03, 2019).

²¹⁶ G1 (2018). Reis, Tiago. "Bolsonaro vence em 631 das 645 cidades do estado de SP; na capital, Haddad ganha apenas em 6 das 58 zonas eleitorais." October 28, 2018. (Accessed October 03, 2019).

Type, Bolsonaro's role of the state was to enable progress. This differed to the Protector Type, who had proclaimed that poverty and misery needed to be addressed. Under the Peremptory Type, progress via redistribution is not assumed as being in the general interest. Instead, widespread backing is required as authorization.

All three were elected as change candidates. They were protagonists and reformists carrying out the determined needs of the country in pre-election issue terms. In all cases, the economy was a focal point. Of note is how the Platform and Protector Types attended to economic issues while in office. Their respective governance came under question as voters changed sides in 2002 and 2018. Both suggest that, in Brazil, economic conditions and performance are significant in altering voting behavior. This supports H₃. A characteristic of Cardoso and Lula's governance was their abilities to acquire support from Congress. In other words, features of the strongmen have been to first win the election and to second govern effectively. A third feature of the strongman concept, which others lacked, is long-lasting support, as measured by candidates from their parties inheriting a similar percentage of votes.

Circumstances before the election wins of all three men provided the conditions for a man on horseback to swoop in. In all cases this came in the form of a strongman according to trends. Prior roles came to underline the credentials of all three men at the time of their candidacy in their winning campaigns. They were all different. First, for Cardoso this was his intellectual past combined with his year as the minister of finance. Second, for Lula it was his experience as a union leader. Third, for Bolsonaro it was his military officer background. In all instances, these matched the profile of a strongman to respond to what shaped the socio-economic situation during their campaigning. What this implies is that different conditions are the settings for different forms of men on horseback. In connection, it is valid to suggest that in 2018 a Platform Type leader would have struggled to defeat the Peremptory Type

candidate that was Bolsonaro. Similarly, in 2010 there were minimal grounds to suggest that a Peremptory Type could have campaigned against Dilma and won.

The military stance of the three presidents could be characterized as responsive to trends. Cardoso downsized the role of the military in Brazilian politics. This included the removal of five military ministers from the presidential cabinet from 1992-2000. At this time there was a push in Brazil, in the form of a moral duty to repair the damages inflicted on the families of victims of the military regime.²¹⁷ Nonetheless, under Cardoso the military budget almost doubled by 1997 in comparison to the last year of the Franco government. The increase made it three times the cost of what it had been under the Collor regime.²¹⁸ Bilateral relations with the U.S. improved under Cardoso, although there was no overall alteration for Brazil's international standing during his presidency. Externally, he operated as the Platform Type through the use of his universalism policy. This assisted in new commercial opportunities such as China becoming Brazil's second largest trading partner in 2002.²¹⁹

Military spending increased under Lula. During his years in power, investment in the armed forces increased from BR\$52.6 billion to BR\$82.23 billion.²²⁰ Stolle Paixão e Casarões argues that despite the behavior being similar to Cardoso, Lula's foreign policy had aspirations beyond making Brazil a global trader. The Lula government sought a role for Brazil in world affairs.²²¹ In 2004 this resulted in a Brazilian General leading the

²¹⁷ Martins Filho, João Roberto. "O Governo Fernando Henrique e as Forças Armadas: um passo frente, dois passos atrás." (2000). *Revista Olhar*. pp.2-3.

²¹⁸ Martins Filho. p.7.

²¹⁹ Vigevani, Tullo. and Fernandes de Oliveira, Marcelo. Translated by Timothy Thompson. "Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era." (2007) *Latin American Perspectives*, Issue 156, Vol. 34 No. 5. pp.66-67, 74.

²²⁰ Sommer Vaz, Gabriella. "Política de Defesa do Governo Lula: Processo de Reaparelhamento das Forças Armadas." (2017). Dissertação submetida ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina para a obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Relações Internacionais. Orientador: Profa. Dra. Graciela de Conti Pagliari. pp.132-133.

²²¹ Stolle Paixão e Casarões, Guilherme. "Media and Foreign Policy in Lula's Brazil." (2012). *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, 1(2): 201-224. pp.206-207.

MINUSTAH. The mission was in response to crises, including poverty and misery in Haiti, a country ravaged by natural disasters including earthquakes and hurricanes. The intervention was an example of the Protector Type in action. It provided Lula with the means of achieving two outcomes at the same time. First, it provided Brazil with added importance on the international stage. Second, it underlined the PT's commitment to fighting inequality.

Lula's use of the military in Haiti followed simultaneous U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was during this period that a number of Latin American leaders employed anti-American behavior. Ali notes that while Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales were influential in challenging neoliberalism, Lula's administration moved away from the PT's basis in favor of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus.²²² Hence, as pointed out by Henriques Ferreira and Holanda Alves Costa Filho, despite the Lula regime operating with anti-American values, these values were not converted into a meaningful form of bilateral relations with the U.S.²²³ Instead, Lula's foreign policies suggest that his government had different relationships with a diverse range of politically oriented states. In short, as president he reacted to regional and global trends in different ways.

Bolsonaro included his military background in his campaigning to seek a new direction in foreign relations. This tests H₃ in two ways. First, by considering whether the Peremptory Type of man on horseback underscored the administration's push for close relations with the Trump administration. Second, by considering whether Bolsonaro pressed for no-nonsense governance to enable progress. These factors may explain why there was hostility towards states that the right associated with the PT, notably Cuba and Venezuela. The campaigning saw anti-Americanism end as Bolsonaro employed a Pro-U.S. line. It came as part of blaming

²²² Ali, Tariq. *Pirates of the Caribbean: Axis of Hope*. (2006). Verso. pp.53-56, 206.

²²³ Henriques Ferreira, Túlio Sérgio; Holanda Alves Costa Filho, Hildeberto. "O antiamericanismo e a política exterior de Lula da Silva (2003-2010)." (2017). *Diálogos*, v.21, n.3. pp.229-246.

socialism and communism for Venezuela's crisis. Bolsonaro promised to move the Brazilian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem in 2018.²²⁴ In addition, like Donald Trump, he promoted domestic interests ahead of global concerns or responsibilities. His foreign minister, Ernesto Araújo responded to concerns from world leaders over the Amazon by calling climate change a "Marxist conspiracy." Araújo stated that "Cultural Marxism had kidnapped globalization."²²⁵ Olavo de Carvalho indicated Araújo to Bolsonaro a month after the 2018 elections.²²⁶ In addition, Diplomat Nestor Forster introduced Araújo to Carvalho. In June 2019, with the backing of Bolsonaro, Araújo promoted Forster to Brazilian ambassador in Washington D.C.²²⁷

While on the campaign trail, Bolsonaro put Brazil ahead of the environment. He promised that no more land would be demarcated for indigenous reserves.²²⁸ He seems to have won supporters by backing the U.S. in pledging to withdraw from the Paris agreement in August 2018. The environment minister under Temer, Edson Duarte said that "instead of spreading the message that he will fight deforestation and organized crime, he says he will attack the ministry of the environment, IBAMA and ICMBio."²²⁹ Duarte's comments came in response to Bolsonaro who criticized both agencies. The elected president called fines for environmental crimes an 'industry' that needs to be abolished. During the first six months of

²²⁴ G1 (2018). "Bolsonaro diz que Brasil transferirá embaixada de Tel Aviv para Jerusalém." November 01, 2018. (Accessed December 04, 2019).

²²⁵ Veja (2019). "Ernesto Araújo: 'Justiça social e clima são pretextos para a ditadura.'" September 11, 2019. (Accessed October 05, 2019). Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: "globalização sequestrada pelo marxismo."

²²⁶ Folha de São Paulo (2018). Campos Mello, Patricia. "Novo chanceler, Ernesto Araújo foi indicado por Olavo de Carvalho." November 14, 2018. (Accessed October 05, 2019).

²²⁷ Veja. (2019). "Diplomata amigo de Olavo Carvalho é promovido a embaixador por Araújo." June 13, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²²⁸ AP (2019). Jeantet, Diane. "AP Explains: Brazil's environmental changes under Bolsonaro." May 15, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²²⁹ The Guardian (2018). Maisonnaive, Fabiano. "Amazon at risk from Bolsonaro's grim attack on the environment." October 09, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

the Bolsonaro regime, IBAMA environmental actions were reduced by 20% compared to the same period from 2018. Since taking office the Bolsonaro government has supported industries that want greater access to protected areas of the Amazon. His government has also sought to weaken Indigenous land rights and has reduced efforts to fight against illegal logging, ranching and mining.²³⁰

Bolsonaro received backing from large landowners in the Amazon. He won the election in all rural, mid-western states and in all but one of Brazil's Amazonian states.²³¹ After his win, Bolsonaro also surrounded himself with pro-business politicians. In 2018 lawyer Ricardo de Aquino Salles, argued that climate change talks threatened Brazilian agribusiness.²³² In December 2018, Bolsonaro named him as his environment minister.²³³ This positioned a representative of agribusiness in a key position.²³⁴ It suggested that the elected strongman was surrounding himself with friendly officials and removing pro-environment forces.

²³⁰ New York Times (2019). Simões, Mariana. "Brazil's Bolsonaro on the Environment, in His Own Words." August 27, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²³¹ New York Times (2019). Simões, Mariana. "Brazil's Bolsonaro on the Environment, in His Own Words." August 27, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²³² Folha de São Paulo (2019). Esteves, Bernardo. "The Environment as an Obstacle." June 2019 nd. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²³³ Correio Braziliense (2018). "Bolsonaro anuncia Ricardo Salles para o Ministério do Meio Ambiente." December 09, 2018. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²³⁴ Folha de São Paulo (2019). Esteves, Bernardo. "The Environment as an Obstacle." June 2019 no day. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

THE IMPACT OF CANDIDATES AS INDIVIDUALS

The pathways to the presidency of Cardoso, Lula, and Bolsonaro suggest that candidates as individuals can have a profound impact on election results and leadership behavior. Bolsonaro's use of zero tolerance towards corruption and conservative speech propelled him into becoming a household name. Such tactics positioned him in the right place at the right time as *o mito*. To transmogrify himself from rival candidates, he took a strong stand on polarizing issues. His speech against liberal values included taking a tough stance on crime, defending the right to bear firearms, reducing the defense of infancy, defending the nuclear family, and calling for the respect and appreciation of the armed forces.²³⁵

A feature of Bolsonaro's candidacy was that despite being a veteran, he was not a traditional politician. Rather than building strength through alliances, Bolsonaro did so through popular appeal. As a strongman, he was the person challenging the system, or Brazil's equivalent of the leader to do what Trump called 'draining the swamp.' Supporters were contributing comments such as "the PT is the cancer and Bolsonaro, is the chemotherapy."²³⁶ This is illustrative to further consider why Alckmin, Meirelles, and their parties were unsuccessful in the 2018 elections. The use of strongman positioning and charisma could be described as coming together to make Bolsonaro the candidate for 'the rest' vs the PT. He then occupied that position to leave traditional options as sitting ducks. Their experience and campaign budgets were insufficient against a strongman during political and economic crises. Bolsonaro's win noted Alckmin and Meirelles as weak candidates, from weak parties. By factoring in his military background, Bolsonaro appeared the aggressive

²³⁵ G1 (2018) Mazui, Guilherme Mazui and Calgato, Fernanda. "De capitão a presidente: conheça a trajetória de Jair Bolsonaro." October 28, 2018. (Accessed October 06, 2019).

²³⁶ UOL (2018). Amaral Luciana, and Militão, Eduardo. "Um capitão no Planalto." August 30, 2018. (Accessed October 06, 2019). Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: "PT é o câncer, e Bolsonaro, a quimioterapia."

option in the presidential race. This caught on, further placing Bolsonaro as the candidate to change Brazil through being the no-nonsense Peremptory Type of man on horseback.

A component to test H_3 is to consider the formation of his government. Bolsonaro's military background and his vice-president running mate were elements of his candidacy. This contrasted to the PSDB and MDB president and vice-president candidates. Alckmin's running mate was former journalist, Ana Amélia Lemos (PP) and Meirelles' was career politician and former Rio Grande do Sul state governor, Germano Rigotto (MDB). In other words, voting for a PSDB or an MDB government was routine. It was not a vote for a charismatic candidate and the results indicate that this contributed to how the PSDB and MDB performed against Bolsonaro. This furthers the suggestion that candidates as individuals can affect election results. Moreover, the strongman element was not new. Instead, it was the third variety of a man on horseback outperforming traditional ruling parties or opposition leaders. In this sense, Bolsonaro was in the right place at the right time; opportunity suited a Peremptory Type campaigner.

Following his win, Bolsonaro transferred his military connections into his government. This included militarizing presidential communications and restructuring SECOM. Divisional General Otávio Santana do Rêgo Barros was named Spokesman for the Presidency.²³⁷ Santana do Rêgo Barros subsequently appointed Lieutenant Colonel Alexandre Lara as Press Secretary.²³⁸ Furthermore, in the Federal Executive Branch, close to 130 representatives of the Armed Forces hold positions in Bolsonaro's government. They have a range of functions across different management areas, although at the first-tier level they represent eight out of

²³⁷ Estado de São Paulo (2019). Weterman, Daniel. "Após recuos, comunicação de Bolsonaro será coordenada por militares." January 22, 2019. (Accessed December 12, 2019).

²³⁸ UOL (2019). Amaral, Luciana. "Ex-GSI, tenente-coronel será secretário de imprensa de Jair Bolsonaro." January 22, 2019. (Accessed December 12, 2019).

twenty-two ministers. These include institutional security, infrastructure, public transport, energy, science and technology.²³⁹ This is a higher number than that of some governments during the military dictatorship of 1964-85.²⁴⁰ Notwithstanding, poll results in April 2019 showed that 60% responded positively to Bolsonaro militarizing ministries.²⁴¹ These results support Nun's assertion that the military fulfilled the role of the protector of the middle class.²⁴²

The re-militarization described above is more than a shift in policy. It is a reversal of the downsizing of the role of the military in Brazilian politics under Cardoso. As the Platform Type of man on horseback, Cardoso laid the foundation for progress. This is evidenced by the removal of military ministers in what was a response to the ethical trends of the time. In contrast, by placing trust in military officials, Bolsonaro applied his no-nonsense attribute as a strongman standing against crime and corruption. On the one hand, it provides grounds to question if the military is back in power in Brazil?²⁴³ On the other hand, it offers an account of the impact that candidates can have as individuals.

During his campaigning in July 2018, Bolsonaro said he would appoint generals to lead ministries. He said that it was "not because they are generals, but because they are competent."²⁴⁴ Bolsonaro named Hamilton Mourão (PRTB), a retired army general, as his

²³⁹ Estado de São Paulo. (2019). "Mapa dos militares: onde estão os representantes das Forças Armadas no governo Bolsonaro." May 02, 2019. (Accessed October 06, 2019).

²⁴⁰ Le Monde diplomatique (2019). "Zibechi, Raúl. Is Brazil's military now in power?" February 04, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²⁴¹ Folha de São Paulo (2019). Bächtold, Felipe. "Maioria aprova a participação de militares no governo, diz Datafolha." April 08, 2019. (Accessed December 12, 2019).

²⁴² Nun. (1967). p399.

²⁴³ Le Monde diplomatique (2019). "Zibechi, Raúl. Is Brazil's military now in power?" February 04, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²⁴⁴ New York Times (2018). Londoño, Ernest and Andreoni, Manuela. "Brazil's Military Strides Into Politics, by the Ballot or by Force." July 21, 2018. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

running-mate one month later. In 2015, while in command of the southern military forces, Mourão criticized the Dilma government. At a lecture at the CPOR in Porto Alegre, he said Brazil needed to “awaken to the patriotic struggle.”²⁴⁵ The statements by both Bolsonaro and Mourão carried significance because of Dilma having been a former political prisoner who was tortured during the 1970s by the military government.²⁴⁶ Mourão’s comments were followed through as military personnel were sought to replace civilians for 20 of the 27 IBAMA administrative offices.²⁴⁷ Bolsonaro in power has aspects of re-militarization, although it is debatable if there are sufficient grounds to deem the governance as an attack on democratic institutions.

ROLE OF THE MEDIA

During the 2018 election campaign, the image of Bolsonaro as a strongman was promoted in Brazil through traditional media and through social media. Social networks had targeted Dilma and the PT in the 2013 protests. Álvarez and Kaiser argued that such influence demonstrates how social networks can be effective at controlling political power. The technology contributed to the downfall of Dilma by causing reactions to her presidency.²⁴⁸ Bolsonaro turned to social media to strengthen his support base. This was a different approach to the norm wherein candidates tend to restrict campaigning to the election period. At the start of 2014, Bolsonaro had 204,000 followers on Facebook. By October 26, 2018, two days before the second-round of the election, he had 8 million followers. On

²⁴⁵ G1 (2018). “Bolsonaro anuncia general Hamilton Mourão como vice.” August 05, 2018. (Accessed December 11, 2019). Author’s translation. Quote in Portuguese: “despertar para a luta patriótica.”

²⁴⁶ New York Times (2018). Londoño, Ernest and Andreoni, Manuela. “Brazil’s Military Strides Into Politics, by the Ballot or by Force.” July 21, 2018. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²⁴⁷ Estado de São Paulo (2019). Cantanhêde, Eliane. “A militarização do governo.” February 17, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

²⁴⁸ Álvarez, Gloria and Kaiser, Axel. *O Embuste Populista*. (2019) São Paulo: LVM. p.290.

Twitter and Instagram, he had 1.9 million and 5.4 million followers. By way of comparison, Haddad had 1.7 million followers on Facebook, 931,000 on Twitter and 975,000 on Instagram.²⁴⁹ The numbers suggest that Bolsonaro's social media strategy connected with many voters. An explanation for this comes from research conducted by Deloitte in October 2018. It found that 92% of Brazilians have or use smartphones often.²⁵⁰

How did the mainstream media portray Bolsonaro and his campaign? According to a column by Rafael Silva Fagundes, the media provided Bolsonaro with strong, yet unusual support. Silva Fagundes argued that Bolsonaro had hidden support from prominent Brazilian media outlets, including *Folha de São Paulo*, *Globo* and *Rádio CBN*. The support came from using negative words such as 'vulgar' but by avoiding criticizing Bolsonaro's economic projects. Silva Fagundes suggested that there was a form of manipulation whereby media enterprises supported Bolsonaro's economic policies while criticizing him superficially.²⁵¹ The success of this strategy was evident in the results. The pathway could also be observed before the elections. A 2017 study, conducted by Reuters Institute and Oxford University, ranked Brazil as the country with the second highest percentage of online readers who believe that reported information is correct.²⁵²

The description of a compliant and credible domestic media suggests a pathway to the presidency. For Bolsonaro it signified a way to attract followers on social media and a place to voice his ideas. This would explain how his anti-PT campaigning received exposure, even

²⁴⁹ G1 (2018) Mazui, Guilherme Mazui and Calgaro, Fernanda. "De capitão a presidente: conheça a trajetória de Jair Bolsonaro." October 28, 2018. (Accessed October 06, 2019).

²⁵⁰ Revista Época Negócios (2018). "De cada 10 brasileiros, 9 usam o celular para trabalhar fora do expediente." October 18 2018. (Accessed October 08 2019).

²⁵¹ Revista Forum (2018). "Como a mídia apoia Bolsonaro e faz o povo acreditar que não." July 30 2018. (Accessed October 08 2019).

²⁵² G1 (2017). "Brasil é segundo país com a maior confiança na mídia, diz estudo." June 29, 2017. (Accessed October 08, 2019).

though his ideas were not transmitted via traditional forms. With an audience paying attention, statements such as ‘the PT ruined our country’ became central on the campaign trail. This strategy differed to other electoral campaigns from parties opposing the PT. Furthermore, there were not comparable campaign messages from the PSDB in 2002-2018. Voters responded to the approach, which partly indicates why Bolsonaro was the leader after the first-round and why his opponents were unsuccessful in the 2018 presidential elections.

In summary, this chapter has argued that Bolsonaro’s strongman conduct and strongman image as a “man on horseback” significantly contributed to his election victory. It has been argued that Bolsonaro’s campaign appealed to the economic insecurities of middle-class and working-class Brazilians. Bolsonaro sought to be perceived as a strongman by voters, such as with his call for the return of elements of the dictatorship. During times of economic turmoil in Brazil, strongman candidates have had an electoral advantage. Bolsonaro’s appointments of military officials after the election confirms the accuracy of his strongman intentions. Media and social media support in Brazil also helped Bolsonaro and promoted his strongman image.

CHAPTER 4:
REGARDING EXCLUSIONARY POPULISM

Exclusionary populism has influenced presidential and legislative elections around the world. It is an increasingly prominent phenomenon in Asia, Europe, and North America. Exclusionary populist politicians today include Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, Recep Erdogan in Turkey, Narendra Modi in India, Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Donald Trump in the U.S.²⁵³ However, before Jair Bolsonaro, the exclusionary form of populism was rare in Latin America.

Gidron and Bonikowski argue that exclusionary populism is “a set of ideas characterized by an antagonism between the people and the elite, as well as the primacy of popular sovereignty, whereby the virtuous general will is placed in opposition to the moral corruption of elite actors.”²⁵⁴ They identify three approaches to populism: (a) populism as an ideology, (b) populism as a discursive style, and (c) populism as a political strategy.²⁵⁵ In addition, they note that “in Europe, an exclusionary right-wing variant of populism emerged in the 1980s—and has intensified since—targeting mostly immigrants and national minorities.”²⁵⁶ However, Brazil’s exclusionary populism differs to Gidron and Bonikowski’s three approaches, to populism in Europe and, immigration is not a factor in Bolsonaro’s exclusionary populism. Inclusionary populists have been the norm in Latin America, such as

²⁵³ Kyle, Jordan, and Limor Gultchin. *Populism in Power Around the World* (2018). Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. pp.17-18. This source refers to exclusionary populists as ‘cultural populists.’

²⁵⁴ Gidron and Bonikowski., p.6.

²⁵⁵ Gidron and Bonikowski., pp.5-14.

²⁵⁶ Gidron and Bonikowski., p.4.

Cristina Kirchner of Argentina. Unlike in Argentina or Europe, Bolsonaro heavily used misogyny and strongman tactics.

Brazil's 2018 election shows that past election results are not a reliable indicator of long-term party strength. The results for the PSDB and MDB suggest their earlier popularity was not durable. That is to say, prior performances did not make them strong parties.

Bolsonaro won office with a series of favorable factors. Understanding why and how this happened was the subject area in earlier chapters. The present chapter aims to add to the understanding of how populists emerge, and to explain the role of populism in Bolsonaro's victory.

As an outsider, the rise of Bolsonaro and of exclusionary populism were not anticipated outcomes of the 2018 presidential election. However, as noted in earlier chapters, the electoral victory of Bolsonaro was not the first of its kind. Instead, the result was the third variety of a democratically-elected Brazilian man on horseback since the end of military rule in 1985. An additional point noted the weakness of Brazil's political parties. This provides conditions for which individual candidates can emerge and outperform traditional parties. As a *caudillo*, Bolsonaro became a presidential candidate for 'the rest' vs the PT.

Chapters two and three discussed evidence that supports H₁ to H₃. These hypotheses sought to unravel the rise of Bolsonaro in terms of political party competition, being the main alternative to the PT, and Bolsonaro's strongman image and actions. To add another layer of analysis, the current chapter tests an additional hypothesis, H₄, that Bolsonaro's use of exclusionary populism also contributed to his election win in 2018. Three arguments are considered in this chapter to support this hypothesis. First, it will be established that Bolsonaro fits the criteria of exclusionary populism. Second, it will be investigated whether or not Bolsonaro's election in Brazil was part of a global wave of exclusionary populism.

Third, evidence will be presented to suggest that Bolsonaro gained electoral benefits from his populist rhetoric, especially on the topic of corruption.

POPULISM AND ITS FORMS

There is an on-going academic debate about how to define populism.²⁵⁷ For the purpose of this study, populism is a strategic path for leaders to gain popular backing to challenge the governing regime, to acquire support, or, when in power, to keep it. This understanding draws upon Weyland's definition, which described populism as a political strategy through which a personalized leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct support of large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.²⁵⁸ Also considered is the point from Jagers and Walgrave, that populism can take the form of the left or right to mobilize support.²⁵⁹ Gidron and Bonikowski showed that populists can vary in ideology.²⁶⁰ Stanley noted that in theory populists can emerge from anywhere, and can combine with different ideologies. He noted that populism is an ideology, yet its thin nature means that it is unable to stand on its own.²⁶¹ This pieced together account of populism offers examples of past and present leaders.

Having identified and defined what populism is, the next step is to place it into past and present-day contexts to appreciate its importance. Freidenberg outlined populism in Latin America by noting three periods with differing forms of populism.²⁶² The first was that of classic populism, including the regimes of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina and Getúlio

²⁵⁷ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). p.2.

²⁵⁸ Weyland, Kurt. "Clarifying a Contested Concept. Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics," (2001). *Comparative Politics*, 34(1): 1–22.

²⁵⁹ Jagers and Walgrave., p.3.

²⁶⁰ Gidron and Bonikowski., pp.21-23.

²⁶¹ Stanley, Ben. "The thin ideology of populism." (2008). *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13:1 p.108.

²⁶² Freidenberg, Flavia. *La tentación populista: Una vía al poder en América Latina*. (2007). Madrid: Síntesis.

Vargas in Brazil. Neoliberal populism was next. It took place in the 1990s and included the regimes of Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos Menem in Argentina and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil. The third form saw a swing to the left with Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia. This was described as the Latin American form of populism after the 2000s.²⁶³

Mudde and Kaltwasser described Latin American populist leaders from the above periods as having commonalities. They also noted the three varieties as three “waves” of populism. They described the classic populists as anti-imperialists who obtained power through their political language, which centered on ‘the people.’ They categorized the second wave as the era of neoliberal populists, who formulated responses to economic crises. The third wave, unlike the second, was anti-imperialist and anti-American. This wave started with Chávez’s win in 1998 and, unlike in the first wave, the third wave employed socialist ideas that opposed the free market.²⁶⁴ Vargas ran for the presidency in 1950 as a reluctant candidate who could only be persuaded to return to politics based upon the ‘will of the people.’²⁶⁵ In 1989, Collor presented himself as a candidate without party connections who used anti-politics in his campaigning, and offered to restore good government.²⁶⁶ Like Menem and Fujimori, Collor benefited from hyperinflation, which, according to Weyland and Madrid, discredited the political class and therefore strengthened their electoral victories.²⁶⁷ Lula’s anti-poverty measures and anti-Americanism differed to the second wave and shared

²⁶³ Freidenberg, Flavia. *La tentación populista: Una vía al poder en América Latina*. (2007). Madrid: Síntesis.

²⁶⁴ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). pp.28-31.

²⁶⁵ Conniff, Michael L. *Populism in Latin America*. (2012). University of Alabama Press. p.53.

²⁶⁶ Conniff. p.64.

²⁶⁷ Weyland, Kurt and Madrid, Raúl. *Introduction - Donald Trump’s Populism*. in Weyland, Kurt and Madrid, Raúl.(eds.), *When Democracy Trumps Populism: Lessons from Europe & Latin America*. (2019). New York: Cambridge University Press. p.5.

commonalities with third wave populists in Latin America. However, Bolsonaro does not fall into any of these categories.

The past and present examples of Brazilian populists show that there have been left and right winged populists. The varieties of a populist also exist as inclusionist or exclusionist leaders. In Latin America third wave populists were inclusionists with policies that targeted the discriminated. For instance, in Venezuela this meant a reduction in poverty and in Bolivia it expanded to include ethnic groups.²⁶⁸ Gidron and Bonikowski noted the transformation under inclusionist populists: “populism can in fact support inclusionary politics that expand democratic participation to previously marginalized groups, as might be the case with the recent wave of left-wing populism in Latin America.”²⁶⁹

Inclusion politics were a feature of the Lula and Dilma administrations, but not the Cardoso administration. The PT governments shared commonalities with the socio-economic dimensions of third-wave Latin American populism. They were different to European populism, which was exclusionary. In the former, including the poor was the centerpiece of the third wave. Conversely, in Europe, under Jörg Haider (FPÖ) and Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN), populism was exclusionary and resentment against immigrants was the direction. This contrast meant that Latin American populism was socio-economic, but in Europe it was socio-cultural.²⁷⁰ The redistribution intent of inclusionist populists contrast to exclusionist populist values. Bolsonaro cannot be categorized as belonging to either.

²⁶⁸ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). p.32.

²⁶⁹ Gidron and Bonikowski., p.18.

²⁷⁰ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012). p.167.

BOLSONARO'S EXCLUSIONARY POPULISM: AN UNUSUAL CASE

Despite being an exclusionist, Bolsonaro did not campaign in a similar manner to the European cases. There were no anti-immigration or ethnic components. Moreover, despite making cuts in certain areas, the increase of the *Bolsa Familia* suggests that he could not be categorized as an exclusionist in budgetary terms. Increasing the investment in that program was an inclusionary action. An explanation for this came from Dahl. He described political exclusion as being a situation wherein specific groups cannot fully participate in the democratic system and are consciously unrepresented in public consultation.²⁷¹ The lack of representation was one of the factors that led to the middle and working-classes to call for Dilma's impeachment, only for dissatisfaction to not go away under Temer. As noted earlier, the Temer administration's lack of contrast with the PT's policies contributed to the victory of an outside candidate; Dahl's point is relevant in this regard. There was displeasure to both the ruling order and the opposition. This meant the middle and working-classes felt unrepresented and prevented from participating because of politics not serving them.

The rise of Bolsonaro was more than a demonstrated rejection of the PSDB, and the MDB. It underlined anger to the PT from sections of the population who sought inclusion. For this reason, Bolsonaro's win offered inclusion for the majority. It came with popular backing through his targeting of middle and working-class voters. The voters deemed alternatives as exclusionist with Bolsonaro being the inclusionist representational option. In other words, Bolsonaro represented a new form of populism. His victory was a reversal of the third wave of populism in Latin America. It saw him sharing the characteristics of regional populists of the twenty-first century. He was the pathway for political representation of

²⁷¹ Dahl Robert. *Democracy and its Critics*. (1989). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

groups that felt discriminated against with the establishment not taking their considerations into account.²⁷²

Chávista populism is an instance of excluded groups obtaining representation. In the case of Bolsonaro, populism in Brazil was not about what Panizza described as the beginning of the representation.²⁷³ To the contrary, it was a response to four election wins by the PT and to two years of the Temer regime. In other words, Bolsonaro's exclusionary populism could be described as a middle and working-class representational return. This contrasts to the representational beginnings elsewhere in the region. Bolsonaro fits Gardner's description of a successful leader, in that he was the one who sensed and delivered what the audience desired.²⁷⁴ The timing of his decision to run for the presidency was opportunistic. Following Dilma's win in 2014, he sensed that this was the case. He won supporters to challenge and defeat all-comers through his tactics.

LAVA JATO AND THE RISE OF CORRUPTION

The factors outlined thus far come together to offer an explanation for the rise of Bolsonaro. This subsection considers whether this would have eventuated without corruption. Perhaps corruption could be described as the phenomena from which the PT could not recover from? Regardless of how it is labeled, the impact that corruption had on the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections was enormous. This was not because of corruption being a new or a recent occurrence but, that there was an altered landscape. The conditions provide a further test of H₄, by them having served as grounds for a charismatic leader to campaign for

²⁷² Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser., (2012). p.162.

²⁷³ Panizza., pp.10-11.

²⁷⁴ Gardner, Howard. *Leading Minds. An Anatomy of Leadership*, (1966). London. p.17.

political change. This was different to the situation that Aécio Neves campaigned under in 2014. It is also a test of H₄, by considering whether Jair Bolsonaro gained electoral benefits from anti-corruption rhetoric.

As explained by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, corruption is typically defined as “the abuse of an entrusted power for private gain.”²⁷⁵ They note that this definition captures the principal-agent problem at the root of all types of economic and political corruption. This includes bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, influence peddling, conflicts of interests, accounting fraud and electoral fraud. Moreover, they regard entrusted power as the key term and note that it refers to the tasks one is expected to perform. This power may be entrusted by an employer to an employee, or by the populace to a government leader.²⁷⁶

At the time of running for the presidency, Neves had a basis from which to campaign. The slowing down of the economy and the lack of economic adjustments under Dilma contributed to job losses and decreased revenue. There was a problem to target, analysis to offer voters and a variety of regime change with Neves as the solution. Neves campaigned against a financial crisis and it worsened during Dilma’s second term. Under Temer there were 26.3 million people unemployed in June 2017 and GDP per capita had fallen from US\$13167 (GDP of US\$2.616 trillion) in 2011 to US\$8649 in 2016 (GDP of US\$1.796 trillion).²⁷⁷ Put differently, the series of circumstances that favored regime change in 2014 increased for the 2018 elections. Independent of who ran against the PT in 2018, unemployment and the economy were issues and corruption increased in stature to favor an outsider.

²⁷⁵ Rose-Ackerman and Palifka., pp.9-10.

²⁷⁶ Rose-Ackerman and Palifka., p.9.

²⁷⁷ de Queiroz., p.20.

The episode which propelled corruption into the mainstream was Operação *Lava Jato* (Car Wash Operation). What began in March 2014 as a money-laundering investigation, uncovered corruption that indicted and jailed businesspersons and politicians. The investigations centered on the semi-public multinational corporation Petrobras. The Federal Police arrested the company's former supply director, Paulo Roberto Costa during the second phase of the investigations. Costa explained that independent of values, the company that performed the service for Petrobras always had a profit margin between 10% and 20%. With a further 1% to 3% of the price added to this value it meant millions of *reais*. This money was passed on to the political group which dominated the directory. Costa noted that “the rule was clear: without falsification and bribery the company would not be called for future bids. The director even created problems in the contracts: they weren't paid, they were late, additives were not included. It suffocated the company.”²⁷⁸ He received US\$23 million from Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht in bribes²⁷⁹ and was sentenced to seven years and six months in prison in 2015 after having been confined since his arrest in 2014.²⁸⁰

Costa's arrest followed the discovery that he had been given a luxury vehicle as a bribe from black-market dollar dealer, Alberto Youssef. It was evidence of the money laundering operation under the Petrobras corruption scheme. Costa and Youssef were both arrested in March 2014. They gave statements in investigations throughout the year. They received media coverage that ensured corruption became a central issue. Two days before the first-round, on October 03, 2014, Youssef said that Lula, Dilma, and their former chiefs of staff,

²⁷⁸ Netto, Vladimir. *Lava Jato: O juiz Sergio Moro e os Bastidores da Operação que abalou o Brasil*. (2016). Rio de Janeiro: Primeira Pessoa. p65. Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: “A regra era clara. Sem o superfaturamento e a propina, a empresa não era chamada para as próximas licitações e o diretor ainda criava problemas no contrato: não pagava, atrasava, não aprovava os aditivos, sufocava a empresa.”

²⁷⁹ Netto., p.213.

²⁸⁰ Netto., p.254.

Antonio Palocci and José Dirceu had known about the scheme all along.²⁸¹ The timing of his deposition was ominous for Dilma and the PT. It seems to have affected the elections with Neves almost winning the second-round. For his corruption crimes, Youssef received 9 years and 2 months in prison.²⁸²

A range of people gave post arrest testimonies against Lula and Dilma. Another to link the presidents with *Lava Jato* was former PT spokesperson in the Brazilian senate, and head of the Senate's economic affairs committee, Delcídio do Amaral. His arrest in November 2015 followed accusations of accepting bribes from Petrobras. In March 2016, he signed a plea bargain where he accused other politicians in the scandal. The former senator from Mato Grosso do Sul state gave a deposition stating that "Lula knew about everything and commanded the scheme."²⁸³ Amaral delivered evidence against politicians from the PT, the MDB and the PSDB. First, he argued that Belo Monte contractors paid bribes to finance the campaigns of Dilma in 2010 and 2014. Second, he accused Temer of being connected to arrested former Petrobras director, Jorge Zelada. Third, he implied that Aécio Neves had received bribes in another scheme from Furnas, a subsidiary of Eletrobras, the largest power utility company in Latin America.²⁸⁴

The timing of Amaral's depositions coincided with the largest demonstrations in Brazilian history. On March 13, 2016, 6.9 million protesters²⁸⁵ took to the streets around the country against Dilma, Lula, the PT and corruption.²⁸⁶ The protests represented an outcry

²⁸¹ Netto., p.72.

²⁸² G1 (2015). "Vaccari e Duque são condenados por corrupção e lavagem de dinheiro." September 21 2015. (Accessed October 18 2019).

²⁸³ Netto., p.328. Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: "Lula sabia de tudo, comandava o esquema."

²⁸⁴ Netto., pp.326-329.

²⁸⁵ G1. (2016). "Manifestantes fazem maior protesto nacional contra o governo Dilma." March 13 2016. (Accessed October 18 2019).

²⁸⁶ Netto., p11.

against the ruling class, including both the PT and the opposition. This was demonstrated by protestors not carrying signs in support of parties or politicians. Moreover, protestors on São Paulo's Avenida Paulista antagonized both Neves and Alckmin upon their arrival at the demonstration.²⁸⁷ Such reactions support the consideration that the PSDB was not a popular party. The response to them attending the protest could therefore be described as a prelude to defeat in the 2018 presidential elections. The streets were yet to receive a populist candidate, although a commonality across the nationwide protests was support for the *Lava Jato* investigation and for Judge Sergio Moro.²⁸⁸


The March 2016 protests were not related to the 2016 Brazilian municipal elections. Nonetheless, the protests occurred in the same year. It was a year in which the PT lost more than 60% of the municipalities that it had won in 2012. As shown in Figure 9, the PT won 254 in 2016, compared to 638 in 2012. The MDB and PSDB improved, the latter doing so by 15.5%, from 695 municipalities in 2012 to 803 in 2016.²⁸⁹ On the surface these results suggest that the PSDB is a strong party and that it was well placed to win the presidency in 2018. However, the PSDB's gains in 2016 could be described as a middle- and working-class reaction to the PT and not as a sign of PSDB strength. For this reason, the electoral strength of the PSDB in 2016 did not influence the 2018 presidential elections. Instead, hostility to Neves and Alckmin in 2016 demonstrated that voters lacked options to challenge the PT. This presented a vacancy for candidates running against the PT and made the 2018 elections an open race rather than a PSDB vs PT second-round contest. In an illustration of dissatisfaction, voters preferred Bolsonaro to Alckmin; with Haddad an unfavorable PT

²⁸⁷ G1. (2016). "Alckmin e Aécio são hostilizados na chegada à manifestação na Paulista." March 13 2016. (Accessed October 18 2019).

²⁸⁸ Netto., pp.354-355.

²⁸⁹ R7 (2016). "Eleições 2016: PT sofre maior derrota eleitoral da história, enquanto PSDB avança pelo País." December 16, 2016. (Accessed December 29, 2019).

candidate. Moreover, Rossi noted that Haddad’s 2016 loss to João Doria (PSDB) “was affected by the party’s image, shaken by the *Lava Jato* operation, by the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and by the discontent of the population with the economic crisis and rising unemployment, attributed to the poor mismanagement of Dilma Rousseff.”²⁹⁰



Sources: G1,²⁹¹ R7.²⁹²

Dilma was not the first president targeted for impeachment. *Lava Jato* was also not the first arrests of businesspersons in Brazil on corruption charges. However, two variables were different in 2016. First, never had so many executives been arrested at the same time and taken to jail in a police operation.²⁹³ Second, never had so many politicians been under

²⁹⁰ El País (2016). Rossi, Marina. “O quase de Fernando Haddad.” October 03, 2016. (Accessed December 29, 2019). Author’s translation. “Foi afetado pela imagem do partido, abalada pela Operação Lava Jato and pelo impeachment de Dilma Rousseff, e pelo descontentamento da população com crise econômica e o aumento do desemprego, atribuídos à má gestão de Dilma Rousseff.”

²⁹¹ G1 (2016). “PSDB conquista 14 prefeituras no 2º turno e PT, nenhuma.” October 30, 2016. (Accessed December 29, 2019).

²⁹² R7 (2016). “Eleições 2016: PT sofre maior derrota eleitoral da história, enquanto PSDB avança pelo País.” December 16, 2016. (Accessed December 29, 2019).

²⁹³ Netto., p.93.

investigation at the same time in Brazil.²⁹⁴ This change signified a hard line on corruption in Brazil with *Lava Jato* being the voice of reason for a public seeking change. The scandal served as the catalyst for a man on horseback and had the result of Moro becoming a national celebrity.²⁹⁵ It brought mutual benefits for both Moro and Bolsonaro. Following his election victory, Bolsonaro made Moro the minister of justice. It was a combination which suited the Peremptory Type of a man on horseback, a man who carried no-nonsense appeal and enabled progress by standing against corruption.

Moro was more than a winner of Bolsonaro's exclusionary populism. He was also a contributor to Bolsonaro's success. The nomination for minister of justice occurred on October 29. He formally accepted the appointment on November 01, four days after the second-round of the presidential elections. The backing of his role in *Lava Jato* suited Bolsonaro's politics. So too did his sentencing of Lula, with the former president handing himself over on April 07, 2018. Thirteen months later, Bolsonaro declared his intention to nominate Moro to the STF as a replacement for Justice Celso de Mello.²⁹⁶ In September 2019, Moro planned to run as Bolsonaro's vice-president in the 2022 presidential elections.²⁹⁷ However, in April 2020, Moro stood down as minister, accusing Bolsonaro of crimes of falsehood and responsibility.²⁹⁸ The PSL and Podemos then approached Moro as a potential presidential candidate to run against Bolsonaro in the 2022 elections.²⁹⁹ Prior to the

²⁹⁴ Netto., p.142.

²⁹⁵ Netto., p.169.

²⁹⁶ G1 (2019). "Bolsonaro diz que vai indicar Sérgio Moro para vaga no STF." May 12, 2019. (Accessed November 12, 2019).

²⁹⁷ IG (2019). "Moro já cogita compor chapa com Bolsonaro em 2022." September 28, 2019. (Accessed November 12, 2019).

²⁹⁸ Poder 360 (2020). "Sergio Moro sai e acusa Bolsonaro de crime de responsabilidade." April 24, 2020. (Accessed April 26, 2020).

²⁹⁹ UOL (2020). Venceslau, Pedro., Reverbel, Paula., and Galhardo, Ricardo. "Partidos já vão atrás de Sergio Moro por eleição em 2022." May 10, 2020. (Accessed May 11, 2020).

separation, Bolsonaro had referred to Moro as a strong presidential candidate.³⁰⁰ Becoming either Bolsonaro's running mate or challenger could be an indicator of what exactly it is that Moro desires.

Lava Jato led to politicians, businesspersons and Petrobras staff receiving sentences on charges including corruption, criminal organization and money laundering. Over the five-year period from March 2014 to March 2019 the *Lava Jato* operation included 1644 searches and seizures, 262 coercive conductions, 347 preventive arrests and 196 temporary arrests. This period accounted for 283 sentences which totaled 3093 years, 11 months and 23 days of imprisonment.³⁰¹ In October 2019, former Rio de Janeiro state governor, Sérgio Cabral (MDB) received his twelfth *Lava Jato* sentencing. His penalty was 33 years, 3 months and 13 days jail time for accepting a bribe of US\$3 million from Odebrecht. It increased his imprisonment to 267 years.³⁰² Cabral held public positions, including senator, state deputy and state governor. He served as governor from 2007 to 2014, which demonstrates the scale of crimes, their condemnation and that *Lava Jato* was not restricted to the PT.

Lula is not the only president implicated in the scandal. In 2017 José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Mello, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Dilma Rousseff were also mentioned or subject to inquiry based on testimonies from Odebrecht whistleblowers.³⁰³ Suspicions raised by investigations saw Michel Temer arrested in March 2019.³⁰⁴ He was the sixth Latin

³⁰⁰ Correio Braziliense. (2020). Vasconcellos, Jorge. "Bolsonaro demonstra preocupação com possível candidatura de Moro em 2022." May 06, 2020. (Accessed May 06, 2020).

³⁰¹ Poder 360 (2019). Freire, Sabrina. "5 anos de Lava Jato: 285 condenações, 600 réus e 3.000 anos de penas." March 17, 2019. (Accessed October 17, 2019).

³⁰² G1 (2019). "Sérgio Cabral é condenado pela 12ª vez e pena chega a 267 anos de prisão; juiz vê versão 'fantasiosa'." October 10, 2019. (Accessed October 17, 2019).

³⁰³ DW (2017). "Delações da Odebrecht envolvem todos os ex-presidentes vivos." April 13, 2017. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

³⁰⁴ G1 (2019). "Temer se entrega à PF em São Paulo após nova ordem de prisão." May 09, 2019. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

American president arrested following Lula, Panama's Ricardo Martinelli, El Salvador's Mauricio Funes and Peru's Ollanta Humala and Alejandro Toledo.³⁰⁵ Moreover, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski resigned from the Peruvian presidency on March 21, 2018, after the discovery that Odebrecht paid him US\$782,000 when he was a government official.³⁰⁶ There was a warrant for the arrest of a fourth Peruvian president. However, Alan García died after shooting himself in the head when authorities arrived at his house.³⁰⁷ In November 2019, Operation Patrón issued a warrant for the arrest of former Paraguayan president Horacio Cartes for money laundering.³⁰⁸

The arrests demonstrate that the scandal has regional implications. Odebrecht admitted that from 2011-2016 it paid US\$788 million in bribes to government officials, representatives of government officials and political parties from Brazil and other countries, including Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.³⁰⁹ Government officials in Angola and Mozambique were also implicated. From 2006-2013, Odebrecht paid over US\$50 million in bribes to officials in Angola in order to receive public contracts.³¹⁰ In Mozambique, former minister of transport and Communications, Paulo Zucula was accused of receiving bribes from Odebrecht to construct the Nacala International Airport. Odebrecht admitted paying US\$900,000 to Mozambique

³⁰⁵ Gazete do Povo (2019). "Investigações da Lava Jato levaram à prisão de 6 ex-presidentes na América Latina. Veja a lista." March 21, 2019. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

³⁰⁶ USA Today (2019). "Briceno, Franklin. and Armario, Christine. Latin America's huge graft probe: Construction giant paid \$800 million to Peruvian politicians." April 18, 2019. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

³⁰⁷ New York Times (2019). Zarate, Andrea. and Casey, Nicholas. "Alan García, Ex-President of Peru, Is Dead After Shooting Himself During Arrest." April 17, 2019. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

³⁰⁸ UOL (2019). "Ex-presidente do Paraguai é alvo de desdobramento da Lava Jato." November 19, 2019. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

³⁰⁹ Jota (2019). Angélico, Fabiano. "Grande corrupção: dados inéditos apresentam raio x sobre atividade de órgãos de investigação da América Latina no caso Odebrecht." May 29 2019. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

³¹⁰ DW (2019). "Caso Odebrecht: Caíram Presidentes na América Latina, mas há "silêncio" em Angola." June 12 2019. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

officials.³¹¹ Moreover, the company is under suspicion of paying millions of dollars to secure the contract.³¹²

The *Lava Jato* operation investigated politicians from across the Brazilian political spectrum. Not only did this see the arrest and sentencing of leading politicians, but it also involved many parties. The operation implicated fourteen political parties. They were the DEM, the MDB, the PCdoB, the PP, the PPS, the PR, the PRB, the PSB, the PSD, the PSDB, the PT, the PTB, the PTC and the SD.³¹³ Of the fourteen parties, six had politicians sentenced. The results in Figure 10 note that the PT has the most arrests with five. The MDB is second with four, while the PP has two and the PSDB, the PTB and the SD each have one. The results do not show a link between corruption and the PT. What they do imply is that the PT had a minor role. For this reason, claims that the PT and corruption destroyed Brazil were inconclusive.

Figure 10 also suggests that the parties did not recover for the elections. The election results imply that the PT suffered, and that the operation was damaging to political parties across the board. Not involved in the investigations was the PSL, making it an option for Bolsonaro to join and to run from. He became affiliated with the PSL in January 2018. It was his ninth party in a career which began as a Rio de Janeiro councilman in 1988.³¹⁴ The candidate and party were absent from the *Lava Jato* investigation and corruption headlines.


³¹¹ O País (2019). Beúla, Emídio. “Caso Odebrecht: Acusação contra Paulo Zucula já foi submetida ao tribunal.” June 29 2019. (Accessed November 27, 2019).

³¹² DW (2019). “Caso Odebrecht: Caíram Presidentes na América Latina, mas há “silêncio” em Angola.” June 12 2019. (Accessed November 26, 2019).

³¹³ Globo (2018). “Em quatro anos, Lava-Jato já alcançou 14 partidos.” April 08, 2018. (Accessed October 17, 2019).

³¹⁴ G1 (2018). “Deputado Jair Bolsonaro anuncia filiação ao PSL.” January 05, 2018. (Accessed October 17, 2019).

Figure 10: Lava Jato Arrests per Political Party



Sources: El País,³¹⁵ Gazete do Povo,³¹⁶ G1,³¹⁷ UOL,³¹⁸ Veja.³¹⁹

The MDB and the PSDB had different approaches to win the presidency. The PT and the MDB were winners of the 2014 elections. Temer won the vice-presidency for a second

³¹⁵ El País (2019). Rossi, Marina. “A volta à prisão de José Dirceu pela quarta vez, condenado por corrupção.” May 18, 2019. (Accessed November 27, 2019).

³¹⁶ Gazete do Povo (2017). Kadanus, Kelli., Martins, Fernando and Viapiana, Tábata. “Moro condena Lula a 9 anos e meio de prisão.” July 12, 2017. (Accessed November 27, 2019).

³¹⁷ G1 (2016). Fonseca, Alana., Dionísio, Bibiana and Kaniak, Thais. “Justiça condena ex-senador Gim Argello a 19 anos de prisão.” October 13, 2016. (Accessed November 27, 2019)., G1 (2017). Justi, Adriana. “Moro condena lobistas ligados ao PMDB em processo da Lava Jato.” October 20, 2017. (Accessed November 27, 2019)., G1 (2017). Fonseca, Alana., Dionísio, Bibiana and Kaniak, Thais. “Eduardo Cunha é condenado a 15 anos de reclusão por três crimes na Lava Jato.” March 30, 2017. (Accessed November 27, 2019)., G1 (2018). “Condenado na Operação Lava Jato, ex-deputado Luiz Argôlo é transferido e ficará em presídio na Bahia.” January 23, 2018. (Accessed November 27, 2019). G1 (2019). Mazza, Malu., Kruger, Helena and Kaniak Thais. “Ex-governador Beto Richa é preso pela 2ª vez no Paraná.” January 25, 2019. (Accessed November 27, 2019)., G1 (2019). Vianna, José and Hising, Ederson. “Condenado na Lava Jato, João Vaccari Neto tem indulto natalino concedido pela Justiça do Paraná.” August 29, 2019. (Accessed November 27, 2019).

³¹⁸ UOL (2017). Garcel, Fernando. “Delúbio Soares, Ronan Maria Pinto e mais três são condenados por lavagem de dinheiro na Lava Jato.” March 02, 2017. (Accessed November 27, 2019).

³¹⁹ Veja (2015). Borges, Laryssa and Mattos, Macela. “Lava Jato: ex-deputado Pedro Corrêa é condenado a 20 anos de prisão.” October 29, 2015. (Accessed November 27, 2019). Veja (2018). “Condenado na Lava Jato, João Cláudio Genu se entrega em Brasília.” May 22, 2018. (Accessed November 27, 2019)., Veja (2019). “TRF4 mantém condenação por fraudes na Petrobras.” April 03, 2019. (Accessed November 27, 2019).

term and had a two-year presidential term after Dilma's impeachment. The PSDB's road to the presidency was to win at the ballot. Impeachment saw the removal of the PT from power, which both the MDB and PSDB gained from. The former was the short-term winner with the later positioning itself as the long-term benefactor. Dilma's impeachment damaged the party that the PSDB had lost to in the 2002-2014 elections. This ought to have presented the party with an opportunity to win the presidency at the ballot in 2018.

The 2018 results indicated a lack of charisma and popularity from the PSDB's candidate. In effect, both Alckmin and Meirelles failed to tick boxes. They had the resources, experience, and structure, but not the winning formula. What they lacked was out of their hands. Bolsonaro's unlikely pathway to victory was boosted by not being investigated by *Lava Jato*. PSDB members were under investigation and Alckmin was accused of corruption. In December 2017, Brazil's largest General Contracting companies, Odebrecht and Camargo Corrêa admitted to CADE that they had established cartels to secure contracts in six states and the district capital over sixteen years.³²⁰ The companies reported their activities from 2004-2015. Alckmin was São Paulo state governor from 2001-2006 and 2010-2014. As governor he oversaw the Greater São Paulo beltway project and lines two and five of the city's subway system. Both were accused of fraud.³²¹

The assertions against Alckmin and the *Tucanos* (PSDB) did not result in his arrest nor did they prevent him from running for the presidency in 2018. When asked on television, Alckmin denied the allegations while stating his support for *Lava Jato*. He retained a clean record, although the party's relations to scandals involving Aécio Neves and Eduardo

³²⁰ Exame (2017). Vassallo, Luiz. and Macedo, Fausto. "Camargo Corrêa confessa fraudes em metrô de 7 estados e DF." December 18 2017. (Accessed October 19 2019).

³²¹ Exame (2017). Martins, Raphael. "Alckmin e a Lava-Jato: uma questão para 2018." December 19 2017. (Accessed October 19 2019).

Azeredo were brought up.³²² Azeredo received twenty years and one month in prison in 2015 for embezzlement and money laundering during the *Mensalão* scandal.³²³ The questions posed to Alckmin note corruption in comparison to earlier elections. This raises the point that *Lava Jato* affected Brazilian politics by elevating corruption as an issue. The questioning of the PSDB was a test of this, giving voters reason to turn to Bolsonaro instead of voting for a traditional party. Deductions such as Meirelles masterminded the fuel tax hikes or Alckmin was a politician with links to *Lava Jato* were not burdensome.

Over a brief period, which begun in 2013, corruption had fulminated to become a central issue in elections and parties involved in the scandal suffered. The MDB and the PSDB did not recover and corruption added to the PT's concerns following impeachment. *Lava Jato*, combined with factors covered in earlier chapters, contributed to an altered political landscape. The public responded to the options placed in front of them to reconstruct their representation. This came by electing an exclusionary populist who was a Peremptory Type of man on horseback. Bolsonaro's appeal reflected not only that the MDB and the PSDB had ties to corruption, but also that both had governed from or close to the left. Voting behavior suggests that in 2018, Brazil's majority was not interested in more of the same. Instead, they were repelled by traditional parties and their politicians.

CORRUPTION AS AN ISSUE

A legacy of Portuguese colonization in Brazil is slavery. The impacts of this are demonstrated by most Brazilians being categorized as black or *pardo*. In 2018, the IBGE

³²² Exame (2018). Dearo, Guilherme. "Alckmin sua para escapar de perguntas sobre corrupção no Jornal Nacional." Augusto 29 2018. (Accessed October 19 2019).

³²³ UOL (2018). Prazeres, Leandro. "Condenado à prisão pelo mensalão tucano, Eduardo Azeredo entrega-se à polícia." May 23 2018. (Accessed October 19 2019).

reported that 46.5% of Brazilians were *pardo* and 9.3% were black. This meant that 55.8% of the population declared themselves as black or mixed-race and 43.1% identified themselves as white.³²⁴ Furtado argued that in the mid-19th century life in Brazil was similar to the three earlier centuries. Independence brought little change and the economic structure remained primarily based on slavery. He deemed slavery to be responsible for the lagging behind of industrialization.³²⁵ Brazilian independence in 1822 retained what Acemoglu and Robinson note as extractive institutions. They describe inclusive institutions as being a set of rules which allow individuals to freely make decisions in the economic sphere. These allow for innovation and expansion. The theory is that inclusive institutions create incentives and opportunities for growth in society, while extractive institutions do not.³²⁶ By remaining until 1888, slavery contributed to Brazil's lack of first world status. Also established by the colonizers was another factor - corruption.

With a prolonged history, corruption is not a new phenomenon in Brazil. It had long been a burden on the economy. However, this raises the point that it took the economic crisis during Dilma's first term for corruption to become an issue of paramount importance. Often deficits created by corruption result in governments increasing taxes.³²⁷ Such a response may not resonate well, as shown by the 2018 truck drivers' strike. Covering the costs is not something that Brazilian governments have excelled in. Moreover, Friedman et al argued that countries with higher levels of informal economies tend to have higher levels of

³²⁴ UOL. (2019). "Número de brasileiros que se declaram pretos cresce no país, diz IBGE." May 22, 2019. (Accessed October 21, 2019).

³²⁵ Furtado, Celso. *Formação Econômica do Brasil*. (1959). Companhia das Letras. pp.70-71, 171.

³²⁶ Acemoglu and Robinson., pp.58-60.

³²⁷ de Queiroz., p.67.

corruption.³²⁸ In Brazil the informal economy in 2004 corresponded to an estimated 40% of GDP. This area is also associated with poverty and tax evasion.³²⁹ The PT sought inclusive institutions in society. However, with the middle- and working-classes not experiencing a smooth rise in living standards, the slowing down of the economy contributed to the rise of corruption as an issue. In relation to H₃, this change opened an opportunity for the Bolsonaro 2018 campaign.

For the first time on record, corruption became recognized as Brazil's biggest problem in 2015. Research showed that in the 1990s, 5% of the population considered corruption as the country's biggest problem. In June 2013, it increased to 11% and in February 2015 to 21%. Then in November 2015, 34% of the population considered it Brazil's biggest problem.³³⁰ This put Dilma up against more than previous presidents. She faced obstacles ranging from the economy to political crises and from the PT's alliance with the MDB to corruption. Herein lies a difference between what the Lula and Dilma regimes faced. On the one hand, the *Mensalão* scandal occurred when the economy was booming, with high commodity exports. On the other hand, the *Lava Jato* operation unfolded during recession.

Two further factors suggest that there was a different political climate during Dilma's presidency, compared to earlier presidents. They also played a part in corruption becoming recognized as Brazil's biggest problem. First, scandals show an inconsistent application of selective corruption. Second, the time involved. In the case of the civil construction company *Encol*, which went bankrupt in 1999, the company's irregularities left 710 projects paralyzed

³²⁸ Friedman, Eric. and Johnson, Simon. and Kaufmann, Daniel. and Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo. "Dodging the Grabbing Hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries." (2000). *Journal of Public Economics*. Elsevier, vol. 76(3). pp.459-493.

³²⁹ de Queiroz., p.38.

³³⁰ Folha de São Paulo. (2015). "Mendonça, Ricardo. Pela 1a vez, corrupção é vista como maior problema do país, diz Datafolha." November 29, 2015. (Accessed October 18, 2019).

and had a loss of US\$3.5 billion. 42,000 families and 12,000 employees were victims as a result. The company's owner and executives avoided severe punishment.³³¹ In November 2014, an investigation into former president, José Sarney concluded. He withdrew BR\$2 million from *Banco Santos* the day before the Brazilian Central Bank decreed an intervention.³³² On the one hand, there were thousands of people who lost their savings and received minimal compensation.³³³ On the other hand, Sarney retained his post of President of the Federal Senate. It took a decade before the Supreme Court concluded the investigation, deeming that no crime had been committed.³³⁴

The *Encol*, *Banco Santos*, *Mensalão*, and *Lava Jato* scandals all saw losses in the BR\$ billions and affected millions of Brazilians. Of them, *Lava Jato* was severer on corruption and far swifter in operation. To further this point, it is instructive to recall the removal of one of the central figures of Dilma's impeachment, Eduardo Cunha. Following his arrest, he awaited trial on October 19, 2016.³³⁵ Five months earlier, on May 05, 2016, he was suspended by the supreme court as president of the Chamber of Deputies because of allegations of obstruction of justice, intimidation of lawmakers, and corruption.³³⁶ One month prior to his arrest, the Chamber of Deputies voted 450 to 10 to expel Cunha from his position and ban him from politics for eight years.³³⁷ His downfall occurred during the third year of

³³¹ de Queiroz., p.107.

³³² G1 (2014). "Ministro arquiva investigação sobre suposto favorecimento a Sarney." June 03, 2014. (Accessed May 28, 2020).

³³³ de Queiroz., p.119.

³³⁴ G1 (2014). "Ministro arquiva investigação sobre suposto favorecimento a Sarney." June 03, 2014. (Accessed May 28, 2020).

³³⁵ G1 (2016). "Eduardo Cunha é preso em Brasília por decisão de Sérgio Moro." October 19, 2016. (Accessed October 22, 2019).

³³⁶ The Guardian (2016). "Speaker of Brazil's lower house Eduardo Cunha suspended." May 05, 2016. (Accessed October 22, 2019).

³³⁷ DW (2016). "Brazil's former speaker Cunha banned from politics for eight years over Swiss accounts." March 09, 2016. (Accessed October 22, 2019).

the *Lava Jato* operation. At that time Dilma was unpopular and the economy was in recession. Thus, in summary, *Lava Jato* was a cracking down on corruption with outcomes that favored political change after the commodities boom.

EXCLUSIONARY AND POLITICALLY INCORRECT

Populism's rise, in the form of Bolsonaro, was opportunistic. However, it is also symbolic that it occurred in a different form to past instances. This is important to understand how populists emerge. It notes that as an exclusionary populist, Bolsonaro used controversial speech to his advantage. In speaking against politically correct education, he said "no father wants to come home and find his son playing with a doll because of school influence."³³⁸ In a video which went viral days after the opening-round of the 2018 elections, he elaborated that homosexuals do not want equality but privileges. He argued that he is a "proud homophobic if it means defending children at school."³³⁹ Earlier comments included a response to PT congresswoman, Maria do Rosário who called him a rapist in 2003 by saying "a few days ago you called me a rapist and I said that I wouldn't rape you because you don't deserve it."³⁴⁰ Another was "I would rather have my son die in an accident than have him show up with a mustache."³⁴¹

³³⁸ The Washington Post (2017) "A Trump-like politician in Brazil could snag the support of a powerful religious group: evangelicals." November 28 2017. (Accessed October 23 2019).

³³⁹ Catraca Livre (2018). "Sou homofóbico, sim, com muito orgulho", diz Bolsonaro em vídeo." October 11 2018. (Accessed October 23 2019).

³⁴⁰ G1 (2016). "Bolsonaro vira réu por falar que Maria do Rosário não merece ser estuprada." June 21, 2016. (Accessed October 23, 2019). Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: "Há poucos dias, tu me chamou de estuprador, e eu falei que não ia estuprar você porque você não merece."

³⁴¹ Terra (2011). "Bolsonaro: "prefiro filho morto em acidente a um homossexual"." June 08, 2011 (Accessed October 23, 2019). Author's translation. Quote in Portuguese: "Prefiro que um filho meu morra num acidente do que apareça com um bigodudo por aí."

A range of remarks resurfaced during his campaigning. This saw no shortage of outrage with labels in the Brazilian media describing Bolsonaro as homophobic, racist, and sexist. In support of H₃ and H₄, rather than harming him, it propelled him as a no-nonsense candidate. It suggested that Bolsonaro used misogyny with a twist. For instance, in a public speech in April 2017, he noted that he is the father of five children. He joked that “I have five children. There were four men and then, for the fifth, I had a weak moment and a woman came.”³⁴² This use of misogyny was not necessarily an attack on all women but was likely directed at politicians including Maria do Rosário and Dilma.

The frequency of non-politically correct speech signifies provocative intentions. Brazilian polemicist and philosopher, Olavo de Carvalho encouraged anti-left populism. Famous for not adhering to political correctness, he wrote that ‘*gayzismo*’ (gayism) is incompatible with democracy.³⁴³ He claimed that *gayzismo* imposes an arbitrary legal privilege.³⁴⁴ This corresponds to Bolsonaro’s argument that homosexuals do not want equality but privileges. Carvalho denies being Bolsonaro’s ideologue,³⁴⁵ yet Bolsonaro has been influenced by Carvalho’s political ideas and attacks on the left since 2013.³⁴⁶ Carvalho declared his support for Bolsonaro in 2017 and the pair discussed ideas on how to win the presidency. He argued that “Bolsonaro was one of only two or three politicians not involved in a corruption scandal,” that he was a “nationalist candidate” and “a man who loves

³⁴² Exame (2017). “Piada de Bolsonaro sobre sua filha gera revolta nas redes sociais.” April 06, 2017. (Accessed November 04, 2019). Author’s translation. Quote in Portuguese: “Eu tenho cinco filhos. Foram quatro homens, aí no quinto eu dei uma fraquejada e veio uma mulher.”

³⁴³ The Washington Post (2019). McCoy, Terrence. “He’s the Rush Limbaugh of Brazil. He has Bolsonaro’s ear. And he lives in rural Virginia.” July 14, 2019. (Accessed November 04, 2019).

³⁴⁴ Olavo de Carvalho’s Facebook page. Accessed November 04, 2019. <https://www.facebook.com/carvalho.olavo/posts/548284751990270/>

³⁴⁵ Folha de São Paulo (2017). Fleck, Isabel. “Ideólogo de Bolsonaro, Olavo de Carvalho critica nova direita.” October 10, 2017. (Accessed November 04, 2019).

³⁴⁶ Isto É (2019). Lima, Wilson. “Olavo, o ideólogo.” November 23, 2018. (Accessed November 03, 2019).

Brazil.”³⁴⁷ In addition, the Bolsonaro family has connections to Carvalho and view him as influential. During Bolsonaro’s election night speech one of Carvalho’s books was on display. Furthermore, Jair Bolsonaro’s third son, and Brazilian Federal Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, noted “he is our philosophical base.”³⁴⁸ He said that “Olavo de Carvalho is an inspiration and without him Jair Bolsonaro would not exist.”³⁴⁹

Carvalho seems to have been more than an influence on the Bolsonaro candidacy. He was also not just an ally. His influence on Bolsonaro made him the *Rasputin from Virginia*, a reference to the effect that his advice had on Bolsonaro’s victory. Well-known for his conservative ideas, Carvalho left Brazil during the first PT administration to live in Richmond, Virginia. Despite living abroad, his influence grew throughout the years of PT governance. His criticisms of the PT saw him becoming a leading proponent of Brazil’s ‘new right.’³⁵⁰ A common cause united Olavo de Carvalho and Jair Bolsonaro: their fight against the left, specifically against the PT. As such, despite being in different countries, their relationship strengthened during the campaigning. Their relationship and Carvalho’s support encouraged thousands to vote for Bolsonaro.³⁵¹

In addition to being labeled Rasputin, Carvalho was described as “Bolsonaro’s Sorcerer.”³⁵² Similar to Grigori Rasputin who guided Tsar Nicolas II, Carvalho has been

³⁴⁷ Folha de São Paulo (2017). Fleck, Isabel. “Ideólogo de Bolsonaro, Olavo de Carvalho critica nova direita.” October 10, 2017. (Accessed November 04, 2019).

³⁴⁸ Revista Fórum (2018). “Guru intelectual da família Bolsonaro, Olavo de Carvalho diz que “mulher sincera e homem valente” são raros.” November 23, 2018. (Accessed November, 04 2019). Author’s translation. Quote in Portuguese: “É nossa base filosófica.”

³⁴⁹ Gazete do Povo (2019). Campos Mello, Patricia and Dias, Marina. “Sem mudanças, Olavo prevê queda de governo em seis meses e chama vice de golpista.” March 17, 2019. (Accessed November 04, 2019). Author’s translation. Quote in Portuguese: “Olavo de Carvalho é uma inspiração e sem ele Jair Bolsonaro não existiria.”

³⁵⁰ BBC Brasil (2016). “Olavo de Carvalho, o ‘parteiro’ da nova direita que diz ter dado à luz flores e lacraias.” December 15, 2016. (Accessed November 16, 2019).

³⁵¹ Isto É (2019). Filgueira, Ary. “O Guru Manda Bala.” March 15, 2019. (Accessed November 16, 2019).

³⁵² Isto É (2019). Filgueira, Ary. “O Guru Manda Bala.” March 15, 2019. (Accessed November 16, 2019).

influential on the Bolsonaro regime. As a central figure of Bolsonarismo, Carvalho has sway beyond the Bolsonaro's and is protected by the government. An example is diplomat Paulo Roberto de Almeida who, after criticizing foreign policy under Bolsonaro, was stood down from the post of President of the IPRI by foreign minister, Ernesto Araújo. In explaining his firing, Almeida said that "the real reason seems to have been my strong criticism of the supposed intellectual mentor, Olavo de Carvalho, who I called the 'Sophist from Virginia' and the 'Suburban Rasputin', which in a way left him uncomfortable because he often refers to this bizarre character as a teacher."³⁵³ The role of Carvalho in the dismissal of Almeida expands on the appointments of Araújo and Forster mentioned in chapter three.

A further factor to note is Brazilian irony, or dark humor in the form of hyperbole or sarcasm. Described as a way of dealing with issues such as death, disease, sexual discrimination and violence, dark humor is common in Brazil in a humorous, rather than a literal form.³⁵⁴ In other words, a claim that Bolsonaro would rather have his son killed in an accident than be a homosexual could be interpreted in a number of ways. Aside from the literal interpretation, it could come across as meaning that people do not intend to have homosexual children.

In response to criticisms, be that dark humor or not, Bolsonaro pressed forward. He made use of his appeal to compare his own pathway to the *Palácio da Alvorada* to Donald Trump's 2016 victory. He responded to the media by saying "the American people didn't

³⁵³ Pragmatismo Político (2019). "Diplomata é demitida após chamar Olavo de "Rasputin de Suburbio"." March 20, 2019. (Accessed November 16, 2019). Author's translation. Quote from Portuguese: "A razão real parece ter sido minhas fortes críticas ao suposto mentor intelectual desse chanceler, [seu patrono na escolha para o Itamaraty,] Olavo de Carvalho, a quem eu chamei de "sofista da Virgínia" e de "Rasputin de subúrbio", o que de certa forma deixou-o desconfortável, pois costuma referir-se respeitosamente a esse bizarro personagem, a quem chama de professor."

³⁵⁴ Super Interessante (2018). Moióli, Júlia. "Quais são os tipos de comédia?" July 04, 2018. (Accessed October 22, 2019).

swallow that, and he was elected.”³⁵⁵ Bonikowski argued that Trump appealed to exclusionary understandings of American identity by fusing together populist, authoritarian, and nationalist political frames, which provided Trump with strong backing.³⁵⁶ Similarly, Bolsonaro gathered support from exclusionary understandings of Brazilian identity. His non-politically correct statements were exclusionary. Like Trump’s immigration stance, they seem to be sentiments that people responded to. Bolsonaro’s exclusionism fought fire with fire in different ways. First, it presented Dilma as weak. Second, it enabled him to stand out as different to establishment politicians such as Alckmin and Meirelles. Third, it used homophobia and misogyny to present himself as strong.

The tones of Bolsonaro’s words were well received. For instance, 74% of respondents to a *Datafolha* survey in October 2018 noted that society should accept homosexuality.³⁵⁷ This is common to the stance of the Catholic Church. Pope Francis noted that “we are all human beings, we have dignity. If a person has one tendency or another, this does not remove them of their dignity.”³⁵⁸ Archbishop Manoel Delson from Paraíba state noted that “the Church welcomes homosexuals without excluding them from what they seek in Catholicism.”³⁵⁹ This offers insight into exclusionary populism under Bolsonaro. The claim

³⁵⁵ Washington Post (2017) “A Trump-like politician in Brazil could snag the support of a powerful religious group: evangelicals.” November 28, 2017. (Accessed October 23, 2019).

³⁵⁶ Bonikowski, Bart. *Trump’s Populism: The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages and the Future of US Democracy*. in Weyland, Kurt and Madrid, Raúl. (eds.), *When Democracy Trumps Populism: Lessons from Europe & Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p.113.

³⁵⁷ Folha de São Paulo (2018). “Para 74%, homossexualidade deve ser aceita pela sociedade, mostra Datafolha.” October 27, 2018. (Accessed October 22, 2019).

³⁵⁸ Exame (2019). “Pessoas que rejeitam homossexuais “não têm coração humano”, diz Papa.” April 19, 2019. (Accessed October 22, 2019). Author’s translation. Quote in Portuguese: “Todos somos seres humanos, temos dignidade. Se uma pessoa tem uma tendência ou outra, isso não lhe tira a dignidade como pessoa.”

³⁵⁹ Portal Correio (2019). Monte, Rammon. “Entenda como algumas religiões enxergam a homossexualidade.” May 14, 2019. (Accessed October 22, 2019). Quote in Portuguese: “a Igreja acolhe os homossexuais, sem excluí-los do que eles buscarem no catolicismo.”

that homosexuals are seeking privileges, not equality is explanatory as no-nonsense talk. It is also common with the Catholic position as given by the Archbishop.

The exclusionary grounds differ to inclusionary populists. This applies to Lula and Cristina Kirchner as well as to Vargas. As suggested, Bolsonaro appeared as an exclusionary populist, although he has implemented certain inclusive measures. On the other hand, his use of exclusionary sentiments was effective. His form of populism is not comparable with recent instances from the left in Latin America nor from the right in Europe. As a populist, he was different to earlier instances from these regions. However, the rise of exclusionary populism in Brazil was comparable to Trump. Bolsonaro campaigned with the slogan “Brasil acima de tudo, Deus acima de todos” (Author’s translation: Brazil above everything, God above everyone) and Trump declared “Make America Great Again.” Similarities aside, Bolsonaro’s exclusionary populism ought to be recognized as unusual and with reason as it differs to Madrid’s description. Madrid argued that populism has economic policies and repertoires of mobilization which seek economic redistribution and nationalizing natural resources. He attributes populist mobilization as consisting of anti-establishment and anti-system appeals.³⁶⁰ However, in the case of Bolsonaro the changes which saw him elected were different. First, they were not because of mass calls for economic redistribution. Second, they were not about nationalizing natural resources.

In drawing the above parallel another distinction can be made between Bolsonaro and Alberto Fujimori. Both were outsiders to leading parties. However, they were not the same form of populists and they also differ as presidents. Both men rose to power during political and economic crises.³⁶¹ Unlike the Peruvian president, Bolsonaro campaigned for stability to

³⁶⁰ Madrid, Raúl. L. “The rise of Ethnopolitism in Latin America.” (2008). *World Politics*, Vol. 60(3). p.482.

³⁶¹ Panizza., p.12.

enable progress. Crabtree described Fujimori's pathway differently. The Peruvian campaigned as an outsider with no links to the political establishment. This propelled him above the alternatives who appeared less attractive.³⁶² The two presidents were differing responses to instability. Fujimori did not have corruption scandals in his favor and Bolsonaro did not have to contend with hyperinflation or a domestic guerrilla group.

In summary, this chapter addressed H₄ and expanded on previous hypotheses. It suggested that the unexpected rise of Bolsonaro in Brazil was a new direction of responding to economic and political crises as well as to oligarchic control. His emergence and populist projection accelerated sentiments of economic hardship placed on sectors of the population. This contributed to the middle-class rejection of the MDB, the PSDB and the PT. Rather than the exclusionary populist tending towards corruption, Bolsonaro emerged while political and economic crises implicated others. This chapter also furthered the argument that the 2018 voting reflected a quest for new responses to familiar problems. In addition, it noted that despite being an exclusionary populist, Bolsonaro is not part of a global wave of exclusionary populism. Instead, the rise of Bolsonaro was a different form of populism which is unlike earlier cases. As a new form, it contributes to the understanding of the field of populism. For this reason, Bolsonaro's exclusionary populism may (a) offer an enhanced understanding of populism, (b) contribute to identifying the nature and causal relation of populism, (c) contribute to the study of future instances and (d) it may clarify why Bolsonaro was elected president of Brazil in 2018.

³⁶² Crabtree, John. "Populisms Old and New: The Peruvian Case." (2000). *Bulletin of Latin American Research*. vol. 19, no. 2. pp.163-176.

CHAPTER 5: *CONCLUSION*

WHY WAS BOLSONARO ELECTED?

The 2018 presidential election in Brazil was unusual. Jair Bolsonaro was virtually unsupported by a party. He lacked a substantive political message, yet he was able to use misogyny and strongman tactics to win on a low campaign budget. Traditionally, elected Brazilian parties have strong candidates. Resentment to political and economic crises appear to have contributed to an electoral victory of a former military officer. His win followed the popularly-focused governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. Was this inevitable? It does not seem to be so. Instead, Brazilians elected Bolsonaro as a response to a multitude of factors. Prior Brazilian governments could not juggle government expenses and a recession. Decisions that were made by the Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer regimes seem to not have appeased middle-class and working-class voters. Moreover, traditional opposition parties did not have a straight-talking politician who appealed as an alternative.

Unlike Bolsonaro's exclusionary approach to populism, Latin American populists were inclusionary in the "third wave" of democratization. Furthermore, populism had been transformed in Brazil from exclusionary to inclusionary populists by the middle of the twentieth century. Before and during his inclusionary populist presidential campaign of 1950, Vargas proclaimed that "the petrol is ours."³⁶³ Lula responded in the 2000s to criticism from

³⁶³ Quote in Portuguese: "O petróleo é nosso." Globo. (2013) "Campanha 'O petróleo é nosso' mobilizou o Brasil no final da década de 40." October 17, 2013. (Accessed February 16, 2020).

other countries, averring that “the Amazon is ours.”³⁶⁴ The pattern of inclusionary populism was retained, even though a twenty-one year military dictatorship had intervened. Why was this enduring pattern so significantly changed in 2018?

Why did Brazilians elect Jair Bolsonaro president in 2018? This study addresses this question by breaking it down into four major hypotheses. For each hypothesis, evidence has been discussed, organized into multiple arguments. In 2018, the conditions were in place for significantly altered voting behavior and a new political direction.

The Bolsonaro candidacy seemed to benefit by differentiating itself from alternatives and by capitalizing on anti-PT as well as former PT voters. The 2018 elections were unlike the previous six if only because neither the PT nor the PSDB won. Not only did the PSL have the winning presidential candidate, but it was also the leader after the first-round. This ended the PSDB vs the PT as the constant pattern in 1994-2014 presidential elections. In its place, the PSL and the PT emerged as Lucas and Samuels’ version of ‘the rest’ vs the PT.³⁶⁵ The rise of Bolsonaro came in the form of hostility towards the PT and dissatisfaction to traditional options. This partly explains why Bolsonaro was able to outperform the MDB, the PSDB and the PT. Moreover, he did so despite the relative campaign budgets. Figure 4 illustrates that he defeated well-funded opponents. This suggests that budget size did not cause the outcome. That is not to say that PT and PSDB budgets may have helped contributed to previous election results, but they did not cause them.³⁶⁶ This could shed light on the PSDB’s

³⁶⁴ Quote in Portuguese: “A Amazônia é nossa.” *Folha de São Paulo* (2009). “Lula diz que Amazônia é brasileira e critica países ricos.” June 05, 2009. (Accessed February 16, 2020).

³⁶⁵ Lucas and Samuels., pp.40-64.

³⁶⁶ *Folha de São Paulo* (1998). Fagundes, Renato. “Campanha de FHC gastou mais do que arrecadou.” November 03, 1998. (Accessed January 14, 2020).; *G1* (2006). “Vale lidera lista de doadores a campanha de reeleição de Lula.” November 29, 2006. (Accessed January, 14 2020).; and *G1* (2014). Oliveira, Marina. “Dilma, Aécio e Campos obtêm 94% das doações a presidentiáveis.” August 08, 2014. (Accessed January 14, 2020).

performances prior to 2018. The budget size of the PSDB may have led to longevity as the leader of ‘the rest’ vs the PT.

Comparative politics and case study analysis suggest that Bolsonaro was not elected based on his political experience. However, it was also not the first time Brazil elected an outsider. Fernando Collor de Mello (PRN) won the 1989 elections by defeating Lula and the PT in the second-round. This study regards it as Brazil’s first instance of ‘the rest’ vs the PT. The PSDB replaced the PRN as the chief opposition party. The PSDB vs the PT became “the norm” from 1994-2014. The PRN was an insignificant party in the 1994 elections. The PSL was established in 1994, yet it was never a strong party before the 2018 election.

As presented in the study, it is important to consider why candidates lost against Bolsonaro. Brazil had nine elected presidents, 1985-2018. The MDB, the PSDB and the PT occupied the presidency for all but two of these years. The exception is Collor’s presidency from 1990-1992. No MDB president took office through the ballot; José Sarney, Itamar Franco, and Michel Temer, all MDB presidents, assumed office as vice-presidents. The party fielded presidential candidates in the 1989, 1994, and 2018 free elections.³⁶⁷ The electoral returns of the PMDB were 4.73%, 4.38% and 1.2% of the first-round vote. This is displayed in Figure 3, which notes how MDB presidential candidates performed compared to candidates of other parties. In running against Bolsonaro, Meirelles’ budget did not appeal to voters. He lacked Bolsonaro’s charisma. Moreover, his time as finance minister and his attachment to Temer seem to have harmed his candidacy.³⁶⁸ Figure 6 noted that Meirelles also faced the difficulty of representing a significantly weakened party. It had lost seats in the

³⁶⁷ The elections of 1964-1985 were dominated by a military dictatorship.

³⁶⁸ UOL (2016). “Governo Temer é reprovado por 39% e aprovado por 14%, diz Ibope.” October 04, 2016. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

Chamber of Deputies in 2010 and 2014. The MDB's performances coincided with the party's alliance with the PT.

The PSDB was in office from 1995-2002, with Fernando Henrique Cardoso as its elected president. His two victories are the only occasions in which a Brazilian presidential candidate was elected in the first-round. As displayed in Figure 3, the party has not been able to achieve comparable results since 1998. It was defeated in 2002, and the runner-up in the 2006-2014 elections. The PSDB, on the other hand, finished fourth in the first-round of 2018. Despite his election performances, Cardoso's approval rating was below the level of the two PT presidents. As displayed in Figure 7, Cardoso's highest approval rate was 47%,³⁶⁹ compared to 83% for Lula³⁷⁰ and 79% for Dilma.³⁷¹ His disapproval rate reached 56%,³⁷² while Lula's highest was 29%.³⁷³ Upon completing eight years in office, Cardoso and Lula had approval ratings of 26%³⁷⁴ and 83%³⁷⁵ respectively. These numbers indicate that Cardoso was less popular in office than Lula, even though he had defeated the PT politician in two first-round elections.

The approval and disapproval comparisons support the theory that Brazil is not a two-party first-past-the-post system. Instead, it could be categorized as a dominant minority

³⁶⁹ Datafolha (2002). "FHC encerra mandato com reprovação maior do que aprovação." December 15, 2002. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

³⁷⁰ Datafolha (2010). "Pela terceira semana seguida, aprovação do governo Lula quebra recorde histórico." October 15, 2010. (Accessed October 03, 2019).

³⁷¹ G1 (2016). "Relembre a trajetória política de Dilma Rousseff." May 12, 2016. (Accessed October 03, 2019).

³⁷² Veja (2018). "Temer bate próprio recorde e é o presidente mais rejeitado da história." June 10, 2018. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

³⁷³ Datafolha (2010). "Acima das expectativas, Lula encerra mandato com melhor avaliação da história." December 12, 2010. (Accessed December 22, 2019).

³⁷⁴ Datafolha (2002). "FHC encerra mandato com reprovação maior do que aprovação." December 15, 2002. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

³⁷⁵ Veja (2010). "Lula encerra mandato com aprovação de 83%, afirma Ibope." December 19, 2010. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

system in which the PT and one other party tended to decide the outcome. It is this structure which provided the grounds for Cardoso to be elected ahead of Lula without comparable popularity once in office. Furthermore, it suggests that voters elected Cardoso, and not the PSDB, to govern Brazil. This implies that other PSDB candidates made it to the second-round to face the PT, because PSDB candidates were considered as the most electable to run against the PT. In 2002, 2006 and 2010, the PSDB lost the second-round by wide margins. The 2014 election was the exception, although this was a reflection that recession had profoundly harmed the PT. It did not mean, however, that the PSDB was a strong party.

The research results indicate that the PSDB and the MDB are intrinsically weak political parties. The PSDB benefitted from circumstances, but it did not have the popular backing of middle- and working-class voters. Bolsonaro's win over Alckmin is explanatory in this regard. Alckmin's 2018 campaign received the lowest votes of all PSDB presidential candidates. It revealed that the PSDB did not have popular support. Alckmin was outmatched by a strongman who apparently appealed to middle- and working-class voters. For Alckmin, the party alone was an insufficient base from which to run for the presidency. This raises two additional points. First, leaders, not parties, are successful at running against the PT for the presidency. Second, Alckmin was not a popular candidate.

Economic and political crises harmed the PT. Dilma and the PT were up against an array of issues. Among them were inflation, recession, decreased purchasing power, increased unemployment, nationwide protests and corruption. This led to a "snowball effect" which diminished Dilma's ability to govern. Moreover, unrest saw Dilma's approval rate change from 79% in March 2013³⁷⁶ to 30% in June that year. This included a fall from 57%

³⁷⁶ Terra (2013). "Presidente Dilma tem apoio de 79% dos brasileiros, governo tem 63%." March 19, 2013. (Accessed December 18, 2019).

to 30% approval in a three-week period.³⁷⁷ This coincided with Brazil's hosting of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup. In June 2014, Dilma's approval rate was 33%.³⁷⁸ Her rating four months out from the 2014 elections was four points higher than Lula's 29% approval rate in December 2005.³⁷⁹ Given the 2006 and 2014 election results, this difference is indicative of the impact that the economy can have on Brazilian elections. On the one hand, Lula recovered his approval rating in time to defeat Alckmin in 2006. He did this during the 2000s commodities boom. On the other hand, recession prevented the possibility of Dilma recovering her popularity. This aided her opposition, Aécio Neves (PSDB). Furthermore, Neves' performance in 2014 was not indicative of a strong candidate, nor of a strong party. Instead, disapproval towards Dilma and the PT seems to have benefited the PSDB candidate.

In the final Ibope survey during her presidency Dilma had a 10% approval rate.³⁸⁰ This suggests that, regardless of candidate, the PT's pathway to victory was unlike the 2002-2014 elections. Fernando Haddad was neither a charismatic nor a popular politician. Moreover, he ran with a party that was defending itself from Dilma's impeachment and Lula's sentencing for corruption. In 2016 Haddad had lost his bid for re-election for mayor in São Paulo. That year he had a 16% approval rate,³⁸¹ and won 16.7% of the vote. He was the PT's least popular mayoral candidate in the city in twenty years.³⁸² In other words, the PT had sought to reclaim

³⁷⁷ Datafolha (2013). "Aprovação a governo Dilma Rousseff cai 27 pontos em três semanas." June, 29, 2013. (Accessed December 18, 2019).

³⁷⁸ Datafolha (2014). "Reprovação a Dilma é a maior desde início de mandato da petista." June 06, 2014. (Accessed December 18, 2019).

³⁷⁹ G1 (2006). "Lula conclui 1º mandato com a maior popularidade desde que assumiu o cargo." December 18, 2006. (Accessed December 18, 2019).

³⁸⁰ Terra (2016). "Governo Dilma é aprovado por 10% da população, diz Ibope." March 30, 2016. (Accessed October 02, 2019).

³⁸¹ G1 (2016). "Ibope: Haddad é ótimo/bom para 13%; 19% aprovam sua forma de governar." August 23, 2016. (Accessed December 30, 2019).

³⁸² UOL (2016). "O declínio do PT," nd. (Accessed December 30, 2019).

the presidency with an unpopular candidate during economic and political crises. The combination placed the PT candidate in an untenable position. As Nun said this new middle-class, that was boosted by the *bolsa família*, ultimately acted like a middle-class.³⁸³

The MDB, the PSDB and the PT won far fewer total seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 2018 election than it had in 2002. As presented in Figure 6, the PSDB won 70 seats in 2002, 66 seats in 2006, 54 in 2010 and 2014, and 29 in 2018. The MDB fell from 75 seats to 34 during this period. The party won 75 in 2002, 89 in 2006, 78 in 2010, 65 in 2014, and 34 in 2018. In comparison to other parties, the MDB won the most seats in 2006, the second most in 2010 and 2014 and the fifth most in 2018. The PT won 91 seats in 2002, 83 seats in 2006, 86 in 2010, 68 in 2014, and 54 in 2018. The falls from the three parties differed to the PSL. The party won 1 seat in 1998, 2002, 2010 and 2014, and zero in 2006. However, it won 52 seats in 2018.³⁸⁴

The decline of the MDB and PSDB in the Chamber of Deputies coincides with the 2018 presidential election results. The PSL seems to have outperformed traditional options, primarily because of its association with the presidential candidate. It did not gain supporters because it was a strong party. It did so because of Bolsonaro. This demonstrated that voters backed members of his party due primarily to their association with the candidate. They did not do so because of PSL politics or campaigning. Furthermore, unlike the MDB, PSDB and the PT, no PSL politician was arrested in the *Lava Jato* operation. Involved were members of two of Bolsonaro's former parties, the PP and the PTB. In 2018 he joined the PSL and it was the second-ranked entity in the Chamber of Deputies. Why, then did Bolsonaro win the 2018 election?

³⁸³ Nun (1966).

³⁸⁴ Câmara dos Deputados. (2018). "Bancada na Eleição," nd. (Accessed December 27, 2019).

In summary, the MDB and PSDB were weak parties with weak candidates, and the PT suffered from protractive recession and a weak candidate who had been nominated just before the election. Bolsonaro outperformed the MDB and the PSDB with the PSL, which won 51 more seats in 2018 than in 2014. The PT won more seats than the PSL, yet the party's support was significantly down compared to prior campaigns. The PT's 2018 campaign seems to have been affected by three variables. First, political and economic insecurities that remained after Dilma's impeachment. Second, Haddad's popularity and record as mayor of the country's largest city was significant. Third, his candidacy was confirmed less than a month before the first-round of the election.³⁸⁵ Haddad was the PT's weakest performer in the first-round of the presidential elections since Lula in 1994. He improved against Bolsonaro in the second-round because voters had been presented with two options. Bolsonaro campaigned as a strongman to defeat the PT and unpopular candidates from the MDB and the PSDB. As a strongman, Bolsonaro appealed to the economic insecurities of the middle- and working-classes.

MAJOR ARGUMENTS

Chapter two discussed how Bolsonaro won the presidency. It offered arguments to support two hypotheses. The first hypothesis, H_1 , stated that the weakness of Brazilian political parties contributed to the election of Bolsonaro. It has been demonstrated in this thesis that most Brazilian political parties are electorally weak, with little party discipline and loyalty, and that as a result parties rely upon strong leaders as their primary source of electoral vitality. The second hypothesis, H_2 , stated that Bolsonaro won because he was the

³⁸⁵ G1 (2018). "PT anuncia candidatura de Fernando Haddad à Presidência no lugar de Lula." September 11, 2018. (Accessed December 30, 2019).

strongest alternative to the PT. It has been demonstrated that the PT's internal mechanics can lead to the nomination of unpopular presidential candidates. The second-round of Brazilian presidential elections allows weak candidates to assemble support from across multiple parties as the election is whittled down to the last options. Bolsonaro was perceived as a strong candidate in the run-off, compared to PT candidate Fernando Haddad.

One point raised was the extent to which hostility to the PT contributed to the result. After her win in the 2014 elections, Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 2016. She was replaced by Michel Temer of the MDB, her vice-president. Dilma and Temer were not popular during the 2014-2018 term and neither the PT nor the MDB parties won as many seats in 2018 as in 2014. Figure 6 shows that the MDB's alliance with the PT coincided with a loss of seats in 2010, 2014, and 2018. Following Dilma's impeachment, the former PT-PMDB alliance resulted in Temer becoming president. In other words, maneuvering may have resulted in the presidency, but the party lost supporters. This was evidenced in the 2018 presidential election results and it partially explains why Bolsonaro was elected president.

The opponents to the PT were weak parties. The PSDB finished first or second in the 1994-2014 elections, although this alone does not mean the PSDB is a strong party. The party won in 1994 and 1998 with a stabilizer as candidate. The first win came after prior governments had lost the battle against hyperinflation. Unlike the 2018 candidacy of Alckmin, Cardoso's wins in 1994 and 1998 were what the audience wanted. As shown in Figure 4, Lula defeated José Serra in 2002 and Alckmin in 2006. He did so by winning 61% and 60% in the second-round. Then in 2010 and 2014, Dilma won with 56% and 51% against Serra and Neves in the second-round. However, in 2018 Bolsonaro defeated Fernando Haddad, winning 46% in the first-round and 55% in the second-round. The results show that Bolsonaro won by defeating the PT and options of 'the rest' in the first-round. This made

Bolsonaro the main challenger to the PT in 2018 and ended the PSDB as the leader of ‘the rest’ vs the PT.

Bolsonaro’s victory gave the PSL power that other Brazilian political parties created since 1990 have lacked. The PSL won 10% of the overall seats. No other Brazilian political party created after 1990 has won more than 6% of the lower chamber vote.³⁸⁶ The 2018 results suggest that the parties who performed well against the PT in 1994-2014 were not strong. This supported H₁, by suggesting that Brazilian political parties rely upon strong leaders as their sole source of electoral vitality. Bolsonaro was thus the source of electoral strength who brought positives for the PSL and not the reverse.

The PSDB’s performances against the PT in earlier elections did not mean it was a strong party. Rather, it seemed to be the party backed by the non-PT voting public. This suggests that the PSDB had performed well in 1994-2014 due, in part, to what it was up against. Moreover, it had a charismatic leader when it won in 1994 and 1998. This relates to H₁ and H₂, noting that the PSDB performed differently in the second-round in 2002, 2010, and 2014. In 2002, Serra received 23% of the first-round vote and 38% in the second-round. In 2010 he received 32% in the first-round and 43% in the second-round. In 2014, Neves received 33% in the first-round and 48% of the second-round vote. Overall, it represented a similar rise to that of Serra in 2002. In support of H₂, these results note that the two PSDB presidential candidates were electorally stronger against the PT in the second-round.

In contrast to Serra and Neves is Alckmin’s candidacy in 2006. Alckmin did not receive comparable second-round support as the PSDB’s candidates in 2010 or 2014. His performances in 2006 and 2018 support H₂. They suggest that Alckmin did not provide the PSDB with electoral vitality. Of note is that Alckmin scored higher in the first-round of 2006

³⁸⁶Mainwaring, Power., and Bizzarro. p.171.

than did the PSDB candidates in 2002, 2010, and 2014. However, unlike Serra and Neves, Alckmin lost support from the first-round to the second-round in 2006. He received 41% of first-round votes compared to 39% in the second-round in 2006. This was at the height of the commodities boom.

A further account for why Alckmin lacked strong leader attributes came in the first-round of the 2018 presidential election. He placed fourth with 4% of the vote. This was the first time that a PSDB candidate was outside of the top two since Mário Covas in 1989. On that occasion, Covas received 11% of the first-round vote.³⁸⁷ As such, Alckmin's first-round performance in 2006 contributes to H₂. It suggests that the PSDB candidate lacked charisma. Moreover, he is the only PSDB candidate to make it to the second-round yet receive fewer votes than in the first-round. In other words, despite being an electorally weak candidate, Alckmin performed well in the first-round of 2006. His second-round performance, during the commodities boom, relates to H₃. First, it is an indication of why Bolsonaro won, noting that he appealed to the economic insecurities of the middle- and working-classes in 2018. Second, that during times of economic turmoil in Brazil, strongmen have had an electoral advantage.

It is therefore established that the Alckmin 2006 candidacy differed to other elections involving the PSDB. But, how does it compare to 1989 and 2018? In 1989 Collor and Lula were the top performers in the first-round with 30% and 17% of the vote. Both improved in the second-round. Collor was elected president with 53% over Lula who finished with 46.97%. These results support H₂. They demonstrate that in the second-round of the 1989 presidential election, PRN and PT presidential candidates received different support than in

³⁸⁷ Gazete do Povo (2018). Éboli, Evandro. "Por que Ciro Gomes lembra muito o tucano Mário Covas da eleição de 1989?" September 15, 2018. (Accessed December 23, 2019).

the first-round. In addition, in 2018, Haddad received 29% of the vote in the first-round and 44% in the second. This outcome supports H₂. First, it presents the PT, in contrast to other Brazilian parties, as being able to compete with a relatively weak political candidate. Second, Haddad won 15 more percentage points in the second round, a comparable figure to second-round gains from Serra in 2002 and Neves in 2014. Third, the results show that Bolsonaro did not lose support from the first-round to the second-round. This implies that voters perceived him as a strong candidate in the second-round, in contrast to a weak PT candidate.

Bolsonaro defeated the PT and Haddad, but did Alckmin and the PSDB lose in the first-round against Bolsonaro, the PSL or both? Bolsonaro the candidate, rather than his party, was central to the outcome. The seats that the party won in the Chamber of Deputies support H₁. This raises two points. First, that it was a response to Bolsonaro's popularity, not to the party. Second, it suggests that there are fertile grounds for populists to rise in Brazil. In short, the study offers the explanation that it was Bolsonaro, not the PSL, who defeated traditional parties and their candidates.

Chapter three examines the hypothesis, H₃, that Bolsonaro's strongman behavior and strongman image as a "man on horseback" contributed to his election victory. It has been demonstrated that Bolsonaro's campaign appealed to the economic insecurities of middle-class and working-class Brazilians, that Bolsonaro was perceived as a strongman by voters, particularly with his pro-military statements, and that, historically, during times of economic turmoil in Brazil, strongman candidates have had an electoral advantage. In addition, Bolsonaro's senior political appointments of military officials are evidence that his pro-military campaign claims were plausible, and the media in Brazil did little to oppose Bolsonaro and social media promoted his strongman image.

Bolsonaro was not Brazil's first strongman, but he ought to be noted as the first of his kind. His campaigning and stance on issues were different to Cardoso and Lula. Cardoso won the presidency as a strong leader who offered economic stability. Economic conditions favored the PT in these electoral years and the PT won with a strongman candidate in 2002 and 2006. The commodities boom advantaged the PT under Lula, but the end of it harmed the PT under Dilma. It provided the PT with support to win elections and for Lula to overcome the *Mensalão* scandal. The end of the commodities boom and a corruption scandal influenced the party's performance; this contributed to change. Economic conditions in 2014 strengthened the PSDB. This contributed to the contest between Neves and Dilma and advantaged Bolsonaro in the long-term.

The policies of the Temer regime aided Bolsonaro and harmed the Meirelles candidacy in 2018. Voting for Bolsonaro meant backing a candidate who was different. MDB governance signified that voters could not rely on traditional options. This assisted the pathway of an outsider in three ways. First, there was a way for Bolsonaro to maneuver to the top. Second, he benefited from the campaigning of others. Third, Bolsonaro emerged in response to trends during the 2014-2018 period. In other words, declining middle- and working-class fortunes contributed to Bolsonaro gaining support.

Bolsonaro was a response to more than the PT. He was opposed to the left in Latin America and was distinguishable to non-charismatic leaders from other parties. Bolsonaro's campaigning presented characteristics of re-militarization. Bolsonaro was open about placing trust in the armed forces. He put this into practice by appointing individuals whom he deemed to be competent. As a result, eight out of Brazil's twenty-two ministers have a background in the Armed Forces. This is a higher number than in some governments during

the military dictatorship of 1964-85.³⁸⁸ Notwithstanding, polls indicate that the majority support Bolsonaro militarizing ministries.³⁸⁹ This suggests that voters supported Bolsonaro's strongman candidacy.

Political change saw Collor and Dilma forced out of office before completing their presidential terms. Cardoso himself supported Mainwaring's point. He noted that presidents are unable to govern on their own as they cannot deliver on their power without the backing of congress. The president and party need to build alliances in order to acquire the backing of congress.³⁹⁰ This was evident under the PT. President Lula ran the country with the support of multiple parties. In contrast, Dilma experienced difficulties as her support base eroded during her second term. Moreover, the economy, recession, unemployment, government spending, charisma, leadership and corruption contributed to her losing support prior to her impeachment.

Another argument considered Cardoso, Lula and Bolsonaro's wins as three types of men on horseback. The model assessed whether certain conditions are the settings for different varieties. The author's rendition of the three presidents characterized them as (a) the Platform Type, (b) the Protector Type and (c) the Peremptory Type of elected men on horseback. Cardoso was the Platform Type, a leader who offered voters stability. He campaigned for the presidency following his term as President Itamar Franco's finance minister. His neoliberal economic stabilization appealed to voters. His first term performance carried through to see him winning a second term. As the Platform Type, he governed

³⁸⁸ Le Monde diplomatique (2019). "Zibechi, Raúl. Is Brazil's military now in power?" February 04, 2019. (Accessed December 11, 2019).

³⁸⁹ Folha de São Paulo (2019). Bächtold, Felipe. "Maioria aprova a participação de militares no governo, diz Datafolha." April 08, 2019. (Accessed December 12, 2019).

³⁹⁰ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. *Structural Reform and Governability: The Brazilian Experience in the 1990s* in Mainwaring, Scott, and Scully, Timothy. *Democratic Governance in Latin America*. (2009). Stanford University Press. p.349

differently to Sarney, Collor and Franco. This saw him shaping the role of the state as the facilitator of business confidence. Lula campaigned against Cardoso in 1994 and 1998 and against Serra in 2002. Lula defeated Serra by being a Protector Type of man on horseback. Through emotional appeal, he convinced millions that they needed him. This made him a social-reformist; a strongman to dismantle inequality barriers.

Cardoso and Lula were not only strongmen but were also charismatic and governed with the support of other parties. They were different *caudillos* to each other and were unlike Bolsonaro who was a Preemptory Type of a man on horseback. The three examples suggest that democratic men on horseback can come in different shapes and sizes. The ability to govern depends on a multitude of factors. Economic conditions helped shape what they had to offer in their campaigns. Reduced poverty under Lula, during the commodities boom, produced more economic growth than what the country had experienced under Cardoso. However, investments targeting poverty reduction were not replicated in other areas. Instead, Lula invested less in infrastructure than Cardoso. During the Dilma years, the slowing down of the economy affected the 2014 elections. Hence, different conditions benefit different Brazilian candidates, which partly explains why Haddad was unsuccessful against Bolsonaro in 2018.

Changing demands and trends favored men on horseback. First, the Platform Type was a response to a lack of economic stability under Sarney, Collor and Franco. Second, the Protector Type was a response to Cardoso's government. Third, the Preemptory Type was a response to former PT governments, to regional leftist populists and was an alternative to the flour from the same sack candidates. Unlike the Platform Type of Cardoso, Bolsonaro did not campaign against hyperinflation. Both Cardoso and Meirelles were finance ministers before presidential candidates. The former was elected in 1994 but the latter was unpopular against

Bolsonaro. Instances such as Bolsonaro's support for the truck drivers' strike in 2018 advantaged his candidacy.

The role of the state also differed according to the leader. As the Protector Type, Lula was a man on horseback who governed from an interpretation that the state was the provider for change. This differs to Bolsonaro, who campaigned as the Peremptory Type, a leader who places the role of the state as enabling progress. In contrast to the PT, this perspective does not consider social assistance programs as a function or duty of the state.³⁹¹ The ideology of the state under the Platform Type was similar to the social democratic left of Lula, yet it differed to Cardoso. The 1995-2002 president's government defined the role of the state as laying the foundation and solidification for progress. This was different to being the provider of progress. The three men on horseback show that candidates as individuals can impact election results. Cardoso in 1994, Lula in 2002 and Bolsonaro in 2018 won at opportunistic moments. Their political messages may have struggled to win elections in different years.

Chapter three also noted that the mainstream domestic media was compliant with Bolsonaro. This provided him with an opportunity to voice his ideas. Outlets including *Folha de São Paulo*, *Globo* and *Rádio CBN* did not criticize his projects directly.³⁹² In addition, he built a digital support base that expanded from 204,000 Facebook followers in 2014 to almost 8 million in 2018. Haddad had 1.7 million followers at the same time and Bolsonaro also outperformed Haddad on Twitter and Instagram.³⁹³ This indicates that social media activity and a compliant media may have contributed to his success.

³⁹¹ do Amaral, Oswaldo E., and Menguello, Rachel. *The PT in Power*. in Kingstone, Peter R., and Power, Timothy J. (eds.), *Democratic Brazil Divided*. (2017). University of Pittsburgh Press. p.43.

³⁹² Revista Forum (2018). "Como a mídia apoia Bolsonaro e faz o povo acreditar que não." July 30 2018. (Accessed October 08 2019).

³⁹³ G1 (2018) Mazui, Guilherme and Calgaro, Fernanda. "De capitão a presidente: conheça a trajetória de Jair Bolsonaro." October 28, 2018. (Accessed October 06, 2019).

Chapter four discussed the fourth hypothesis, H₄, that Bolsonaro's use of exclusionary populism contributed to his election win in 2018. It was demonstrated that Bolsonaro fits the criteria of exclusionary populism and that Bolsonaro gained electoral benefits from his populist, anti-corruption rhetoric, in an era of great public concern about corruption.

There are varieties of populists, from the right and the left. Studies on populism in Latin America show three waves. The first was classic populism, which included Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil. In 1950 Vargas campaigned as a populist and reluctant candidate. He did so as one who could only be persuaded to return to politics by 'the will of the people.'³⁹⁴ The second wave saw populists elected as responses to crises. They were neoliberal including Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos Menem in Argentina and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil. Collor campaigned to restore good government as a candidate without party connections. The third wave was from the left. Examples include Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.³⁹⁵ Lula's anti-poverty measures and anti-Americanism were common with the inclusionism of Latin American third wave populists. The examples illustrated that populism can come in different forms.

Brazil is an unusual case and Bolsonaro is a different form of populist. This thesis found that he is an anomaly. He is different to the three waves and does not fall into any category. Bolsonaro also differs to socio-cultural forms of populism. In Europe this has used resentment against immigrants as exclusionary populism. Thus, while populists can come in a variety of forms, Bolsonaro is different to prior instances. The characteristics of his exclusionary populism note why he is an unusual case.

³⁹⁴ Conniff., p.53.

³⁹⁵ Freidenberg., and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser. (2017)., pp.28-32.

The fourth point explored the idea that corruption benefited Bolsonaro and greatly contributed to political change in Brazil. The *Lava Jato* scandal affected the political landscape. It provided conditions for a charismatic leader to campaign for political change. Bolsonaro and the PSL were absent from the investigations that saw testimonies delivered against politicians from the PT, the MDB and the PSDB. This implicated the ruling parties and the opposition. The MDB and the PSDB suffered from the allegations which ranged from Sérgio Cabral's sentencing to Alckmin being accused of fraud. Corruption accusations and charges indicate that H₄ is a sound hypothesis. It suggests that the exclusionary populist gained an edge from *Lava Jato*.

Corruption is not a new issue in Brazil, but the issue became paramount under Dilma. The subsection 'Corruption as an Issue' showed responses to scandals that occurred at different times. Support for *Lava Jato* was dissimilar to previous scandals and corruption was neither new nor unusual. Instead, it was a legacy of Portuguese colonialism. *Lava Jato* had consequences for political parties and the timing of the operation contributed to change. Bolsonaro's support for *Lava Jato* was part of a set of circumstances that catapulted him from obscurity into the leader of 'the rest' vs the PT. It took his charisma and no-nonsense campaigning to present himself as the opponent to corruption.

Economic and political crises saw *Lava Jato* take on a meaning of its own. This meant a different response to earlier scandals. This was evident from the public as well as from the opposition. In 2006, the MDB turned down Lula's offer to formally back his re-election to run against the PSDB. Notwithstanding, in 2010 and 2014, the MDB ran together with the PT. It did so with Michel Temer as the vice-president candidate. The MDB subsequently switched sides to seek the removal of Dilma via impeachment. Both the MDB and PSDB had gains to make from impeachment. However, the investigations and arrests seem to have

harmed their campaigns for the 2018 elections. Bolsonaro won the election as an outsider. In this regard there were factors that did not favor his MDB and PSDB opponents. First, Bolsonaro and the PSL were not involved in the scandal. Second, he had not previously governed or backed the PT. Third, he was a strongman. Fourth, he was an exclusionary populist. Fifth, he stood against corruption and was not under suspicion. This boosted Bolsonaro's strongman image. Olavo de Carvalho noted Bolsonaro as a rare Brazilian politician who was not involved in a corruption scheme.³⁹⁶

The final point of chapter four considered similarities between Bolsonaro's campaign and the 2016 Trump victory. Despite the fact that both men spoke as exclusionary populists, the comparison is limited. Weyland and Madrid noted that it is unusual for a populist to be elected with the help of an established party. Cases in point include Chávez in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Silvio Berlusconi in Italy. They formed new parties which are different to Carlos Menem in Argentina and Donald Trump in the U.S. who obtained the presidency by running with the long-established Peronist and Republican parties.³⁹⁷

Bolsonaro did not form a new party, although he did transform a minor party into a major one. The party had previously run for the presidency, with Luciano Bivar as the presidential candidate in 2006. In other words, Bolsonaro was a distinct form of an elected populist.

Jair Bolsonaro seems to have been elected for a variety of reasons, although none of them stand out as forcibly as his appeal to disenchanting middle classes. Why was he elected? It was a variety of casual factors that combined to change the democratic nature of post 1985 Brazil. This went against the patterns that had persisted from 1989-2018. The irony is that

³⁹⁶ Folha de São Paulo (2017). Fleck, Isabel. "Ideólogo de Bolsonaro, Olavo de Carvalho critica nova direita." October 10, 2017. (Accessed November 04, 2019).

³⁹⁷ Weyland and Madrid., p.3, 25.

this democratic election may be leading to the end of the democratic period. This has been intensified by the mixed response that Bolsonaro has had to the COVID-19 pandemic.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Donald Trump won in 2016 with an established party. However, Jair Bolsonaro won in 2018 by campaigning without a traditional party. The two countries both have presidential systems. The U.S. is a two-party system, in which third party candidates struggle, but Brazil is open to different outcomes. Bolsonaro's win is not unique in Latin America. Alberto Fujimori (Cambio 90), Hugo Chávez (MVR), Evo Morales (MAS) and Rafael Correa (Alianza PAIS) are all instances of leaders rising to power in the wake of the decline of traditional parties.³⁹⁸ Bolsonaro was a populist running against traditional parties.

Notwithstanding, as argued in this study, the PSDB was not a popular party in 2018. The MDB and the PSDB won 32 and 22 fewer seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2018 than in 2014. These results suggest that Brazilian party weakness can facilitate the rise of a populist. Future research into Brazilian elections should take this into account with emphasis placed less on parties and more on leaders. Moreover, focus should be placed on individuals running against the PT.

Bolsonaro's win may serve as a test case for populist rule. As argued, the presented model of men on horseback offers a populist pathway of differing forms of candidates to the Brazilian presidency. Bolsonaro, Lula and Cardoso were different men on horseback. They were also dissimilar to Collor, who was a populist but not a man on horseback. Bolsonaro's populism may also be an indicator for countries with little variation in the number of strong

³⁹⁸ Weyland, and Madrid., p164.; and Hicken, Allen, and Riedl, Rachel Beatty. *From the Outside Looking In: Latin American Parties in Comparative Perspective*. in Mainwaring, Scott (eds). *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse*. (2018). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.438.

political parties. For instance, as noted by Pappas, Argentina has experienced decades of populist rule which has left the people exposed to constant political instability and economic crises.³⁹⁹ In this regard, future research could investigate three areas. First, if the number of parties produces a pattern that contributes to obtaining populist rule. Second, if there are trends of populist rule that tend towards progress or collapse. Third, whether there are patterns of where populists sit on the political spectrum.

An additional area of recommendation for future work concerns regional categorizations. As theorized in the study, Bolsonaro's exclusionary populism differs to the first, second and third waves of Latin American populism. In order to not have Bolsonaro as an anomaly a recontextualization of the terminology may need consideration. In relation to this, research into reconsidering Latin American populism as Spanish-American populism may suffice. Alternatively, if comparable populists do emerge within Latin America, then a new category, possibly a fourth wave, will merit consideration.

Bolsonaro's election victory may represent a black swan case, as discussed by Karl Popper. A single black swan falsifies the claim that all swans are white, and it implies that what appears as 'white' may be 'black'.⁴⁰⁰ Despite being an exclusionary populist, Bolsonaro has certain inclusionary traits. As a Latin American populist who was democratically elected during the third wave, Bolsonaro's win contributes to the area of populism. In addition, as a black swan the Bolsonaro case study furthers the basis for generalizing based on a single case. As argued, he is an example to expand upon existing understandings of populism, as well as to offer an alternative. Bolsonaro's win does not replicate existing definitions of Latin

³⁹⁹ Pappas, Takis. "Populists in Power." (2019). *Journal of Democracy*, April 2019, Vol.30(2), p.82.

⁴⁰⁰ Flyvbjerg, Bent. pp.11-12.

American populism and suggests that Brazil is not a common sample of the Latin American region.

Why did Bolsonaro win the 2018 election? There was a recession that prior Brazilian governments had not handled well. There was a corruption scandal which connected politicians from a range of political parties. There was also an impeachment which replaced one unpopular president with another. For a frightened middle-class and working-class for whom a strongman was the answer. Media outlets did not complicate his route to the presidency. Before Bolsonaro, Latin American populism had been inclusionary, but he was an exclusionary populist. Bolsonaro's win supports Stanley's point that populism is a thin campaign strategy.⁴⁰¹ For Bolsonaro this was a communication method and campaign tactic. The most unlikely of candidates found himself president of Brazil.

⁴⁰¹ Stanley.

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