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**ELECTION PROGRAMMES IN NEW ZEALAND POLITICS: 1911-1996**

**A thesis  
submitted in fulfilment of  
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## Abstract

This thesis examines the policies New Zealand political parties have emphasised in their key policy statements, the ideological dimensions of party competition, how the political agenda has changed over time, and whether parties have acted in ways compatible with responsible party government and pluralist theories of democracy. These central political debates are studied using all the election programmes issued by the main New Zealand political parties between 1911 and 1996.

Content analysis results for the 1911-1996 period reveal enduring differences between left and right-wing parties on economic, foreign policy and some conservative themes. While some 'new politics' issues such as the environment and culture have become much more important over time, the data confirms that other new politics issues such as freedom and democracy have been on New Zealand's political agenda for most of the twentieth century.

When charted on a left-right dimension, parties' positions were largely as expected. The main left and right-wing parties have only crossed over once, and then only fractionally on the economic policy dimension. Contrary to theoretical expectations right-wing parties have often taken very moderate positions on the new politics-old politics dimension, although left-wing parties have usually been more supportive of new politics policies than right-wing parties. Differences between Labour and the main right-wing parties have usually been larger on economic than on new politics issues. However, between 1972 and 1990 differences between Labour and National on new politics issues were much larger than on economic themes.

In their programmes parties have usually campaigned in a manner encouraging rational voting, and have taken relatively similar positions on potentially divisive ethnic policy issues. There is one obvious case of agenda setting: the main parties have kept the most morally contentious issues out of party politics. The enduring policy differences between the main parties will have made it easier for less well informed voters to vote in a rational manner.

Party movement results indicate that only during the 1980s were National's and Labour's manifestos a poor guide to their subsequent policy direction.

Policy implementation results for New Zealand using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's methodology showed high implementation rates by international standards over the 1946-1994 period. Often the manifestos of opposition parties were positively associated with government expenditure trends. This shows that parties' commitment to mandate theory has been qualified by their support for pluralist norms of interest group consultation. The results indicated that between the early 1980s and 1994 the relationship between manifesto emphases and government expenditure for transfers and health has deteriorated. In other areas policy implementation rates remained high, indicating that politicians often still behaved in ways compatible with the principles of responsible party government. The regression equations Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge use to calculate policy implementation were also reformulated to produce better and theoretically stronger results.

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## Chapter One: Theories of Democracy, Political Cleavages and Value Change

### 1.1 Introduction

This thesis studies whether New Zealand political parties act in accordance with the requirements of theories of popular sovereignty, and how parties' policies and the ideological structure of party competition have changed over time. These two interrelated questions are vitally important and have been of enduring interest to political scientists both in New Zealand and overseas.

One key topic examined is whether New Zealand political parties behave in ways compatible with theories of popular sovereignty, and in particular the theory of responsible party government. According to mandate theories of responsible party government, parties should present coherent policies to voters in their election programmes, and then implement their pre-election commitments if they become the government.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the theory of responsible party government requires parties to accurately inform voters about the real problems facing a country, and to avoid making unachievable promises.<sup>2</sup> For parties to be acting in a pluralist way they should also be responsive to a wide range of interest groups once in government.<sup>3</sup> These theories are relevant to New Zealand because it is a country in which mandate theory and support for consultation with interest groups have traditionally been very strong. There have also been very few institutional constraints on governments, making the conventions of the mandate and interest group consultation very important as controls on governments.<sup>4</sup>

However, even supposing that parties' manifestos were a poor guide to their actions once in government, they would remain important for understanding

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<sup>1</sup> In New Zealand election programmes are often referred to as manifestos. The two terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.

<sup>2</sup> Andreas Schelder, 'The Normative Force of Electoral Promises', Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 10 (1998), p. 195.

<sup>3</sup> David Held, Models of Democracy, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 261.

<sup>4</sup> R.G. Mulgan, 'The Concept of the Mandate in New Zealand Politics', Political Science, Vol. 30 (1978), p. 89; Geoffrey Palmer, New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming our Political System (Dunedin: John McIndoe, 1992), pp. 1-9.

which social groups parties are trying to attract support from, and what parties' ideologies are. The second topic studied in this thesis concerns the policies and ideological beliefs of New Zealand political parties, and how parties' policies have changed over time. Historians and political scientists have argued that liberalism is New Zealand's dominant ideology, with conservatism and socialism being much weaker.<sup>5</sup> The class cleavage has been considered the main political division, although new politics issues have been increasingly important. There is some evidence that this has resulted in new politics issues becoming more important than the class cleavage at recent elections.<sup>6</sup>

In this thesis these debates have been studied using the first full collection of New Zealand election manifestos. These manifestos have been coded using the widely used Manifesto Research Group (MRG) coding system. This involves breaking sentences in manifestos down into statements consisting of only one point, and then allocating that statement a code. The manifesto data has been supplemented by other statistics, including a newly extended series on government expenditure. Although concentrating on New Zealand election manifestos, the New Zealand policy implementation results using the expenditure data are compared to those for ten other democracies.

This chapter summarises five main theoretical models of democratic policy-making which are relevant to New Zealand. Theories about variations in democratic accountability between different types of electoral systems are then covered. This is followed by a discussion of the main theories of electoral cleavages, political ideologies and party movement. After summarising content analysis methods the contents of later chapters are then introduced.

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<sup>5</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', *New Zealand Journal of History*, Vol. 21 (1987), p. 223; Francis Castles, *The Working Class and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Development of the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand* (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 55-56.

<sup>6</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Waiting for the Realignment? The New Zealand Party System, 1972-1993', *Political Science*, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 194-195.

## 1.2 Theoretical Models of Democracy

Debate about what form democracy should take, and to what degree public opinion can and should influence policy outcomes, extends back to the earliest democracy in ancient Greece.<sup>7</sup> In modern representative democracies, where voters choose between competing parties at national elections, differences over the role of elections and political parties, and about the competency of voters, remain contentious. This section outlines responsible party government, pluralist, democratic elitist, Marxist, and economic and demographic theories of democracy.

One key normative democratic theory is that of responsible party government. The traditional, very minimal, definition of responsible government is collective and individual accountability by Ministers to an elected assembly whose confidence they enjoy. A more modern, and much wider, meaning of responsible government, which is often referred to as responsible party government to highlight the importance of political parties in this concept,<sup>8</sup> hinges around the mandate theory of elections.<sup>9</sup> According to mandate theory political parties should aggregate related interests, each present different policies to the electorate in their election programme, and then implement their policy

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<sup>7</sup> Held, Models of Democracy, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 6, 27.

<sup>8</sup> Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1996), p. 246; Ian McAllister, Political Behaviour: Citizens, Parties and Elites in Australia (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1992), p. 252. There are other terminological variations. For instance, a number of political scientists, including Alan Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State: A Reappraisal (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 184-185, simply use the term “party government” to describe a system in which programmatic parties implement their manifestos after elections.

<sup>9</sup> A.H. Birch Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British Constitution (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 17-20; Dean Jaensch, The Australian Party System (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 215-217; Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 12. Birch states on p. 13 that “representative democracy” is sometimes used to describe a political system where politicians are responsive to public demands. On p. 17 he points out, however, that it is the power to choose members of parliament in free elections, rather than how representatives subsequently behave or their resemblance to their supporters, which is usually taken as the criterion of representative government. Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 2-8 also discusses how many earlier democratic theorists have argued that a representative government need not be responsive.

commitments if they become the government.<sup>10</sup> In addition to keeping their pre-election promises a party's accountability can be promoted by ensuring that the social background and political beliefs of its representatives resembles those of its supporters, and by its politicians listening to their party organization.<sup>11</sup>

'Responsible party government' also involves an obligation by parties to follow sound policies once in government. This obligation can only be reconciled with being responsive to voters if parties educate the electorate about the long-term problems facing a country, and if voters have realistic expectations of parties.<sup>12</sup>

Mandate theory has been influenced by popular sovereignty ideas about the rule of the people, and by the writings of democratic theorists. The belief within many trade unions that their leaders should be authorised by the membership to carry out certain policies has significantly contributed to the development of mandate theory in socialist and labour parties. However, mandate theory is also widely accepted by members of right-wing parties.<sup>13</sup> In addition, a belief in an electoral mandate is implicit in some liberal economic theories of democracy.<sup>14</sup>

Advocates of responsible party government argue that, once in parliament, elected representatives should act as partisans who support policies and long-term principles that have previously been agreed on by the party. This is because representatives have been elected as part of a party which has agreed to carry out particular policies, rather than as independent individuals.<sup>15</sup> The theory of the mandate has frequently been used by politicians after an election to persuade

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<sup>10</sup> Schelder, 'The Normative Force of Electoral Promises', p. 195; Gerald Pomper, Voters, Elections and Parties: The Practice of Democratic Theory (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 353.

<sup>11</sup> McAllister, Political Behaviour, pp. 252-254.

<sup>12</sup> Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, pp. 18, 20. An example of all three meanings being used together in complementary ways is in the American Political Science Association's, 'Toward a More Responsible Two Party System', American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, Supplement (1950), pp. 18-35.

<sup>13</sup> Richard Katz, Democracy and Elections (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 33; Anthony Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 64, 66.

<sup>14</sup> Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State: A Reappraisal, p. 57; Samuel Merrill III and Bernard Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 2, 22.

voters and civil servants that they have the authority to carry out unpopular policies included in their election programme. Sometimes the belief that programme commitments should be kept has even resulted in governments following policies that they have realised are unwise.<sup>16</sup>

Although mandate theorists acknowledge that some promises are emphasised more by parties than others, they argue that all are equal in obligation.<sup>17</sup> When voters are unaware of a policy the mandate is weakened, but not destroyed unless a party has sought to conceal its intentions. This is because details in an election programme are similar to the small print in a legal agreement or contract, which although often unread is still important.<sup>18</sup> However, unlike a legal contract voters cannot legally bind parties to their manifesto promises.<sup>19</sup>

Supporters of mandate theory argue that in order to maintain their credibility parties must accurately inform voters about the problems facing the country, and should avoid making unrealistic promises, or deceiving voters about what they intend to do. Failure to do so risks undermining support for democracy. Only changed circumstances, such as economic collapse or new information on voters' preferences, are seen as valid reasons for parties breaking their promises or departing from their principles. Even then they should call an election and seek a fresh mandate if there is time, and if the issue is very important.<sup>20</sup>

Advocates of responsible party government argue that it contributes to the making of policies that lead to democratic stability by promoting good government, and by ensuring people are satisfied that the political system is responsive. They believe that this form of democracy works because “the electorate is capable of judging its particular interests, and of sensibly reacting to events and leadership”. By highlighting issues and contrasting different policies

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<sup>15</sup> Birch, *Representative and Responsible Government*, p. 115.

<sup>16</sup> Dennis Kavanagh, ‘The Politics of Manifestos’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 34 (1981), pp. 9, 11, 14.

<sup>17</sup> Schelder, ‘The Normative Force of Electoral Promises’, p. 198.

<sup>18</sup> R.G. Mulgan, ‘The Concept of Mandate in New Zealand Politics’, *Political Science*, Vol. 30 (1978), pp. 91, 96.

<sup>19</sup> Richard Rose, *Do Parties Make a Difference?*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 61.

they argue that elections provide voters with a choice between alternatives, while also having an important educational function.<sup>21</sup> In addition, by authoritatively stating a parties' policies manifestos serve as an important mechanism for ensuring internal party discipline.<sup>22</sup>

In some countries theories of responsible party government are often closely linked to pluralist theories, which are the second democratic theory to be considered here. Like theories of responsible party government, contemporary pluralist theories have been influenced by populist theories which argue that public opinion should be an important influence on government policy.<sup>23</sup>

There are a very wide range of pluralist theories.<sup>24</sup> However, modern pluralists usually argue that in democracies power is, and should be, widely dispersed between different groups.<sup>25</sup> This ensures that while no group is able to get everything it wants, thereby reducing the risk of abuses of power,<sup>26</sup> the political system is still responsive to citizens' needs.<sup>27</sup> Pluralists see elections as ensuring that all voters' preferences are taken into account, and as providing a counterbalance for silent majorities against well-organized interest groups.<sup>28</sup>

In the United States, where there is a long tradition of distrust of parties,<sup>29</sup> supporters of pluralism have often seen it as an alternative to responsible party government. It has often been argued in the United States that disciplined parties there are undesirable because it is a large and heterogeneous country. According to this view more polarised parties in the United States would increase conflict,

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<sup>20</sup> Cecil Emden, The People and the Constitution: Being a History of the Development of the People's Influence in British Government, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 232, 307-309; Schelder, 'The Normative Force of Electoral Promises', pp. 198-202.

<sup>21</sup> Pomper, Voters, Elections and Parties, pp. 12, 261-262.

<sup>22</sup> Richard Topf, 'Party Manifestos', in Labour's Last Chance: The 1992 Election and Beyond, edited by Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994), p. 150.

<sup>23</sup> Anthony Arblaster, Democracy, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), pp. 28, 51.

<sup>24</sup> Gregor McLennan, Pluralism (Minneapolis: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. ix.

<sup>25</sup> Held, Models of Democracy, p. 203.

<sup>26</sup> William Livingstone, 'Britain and America: The Institutionalization of Accountability', The Journal of Politics, Vol. 38 (1976), p. 891; Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government, p. 160.

<sup>27</sup> Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 20, 31.

<sup>28</sup> Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Control (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 250.

and even the potential for violence, between groups.<sup>30</sup> American pluralists have also argued that interest group politics ensures that far more ideas get onto the political agenda than in a system of responsible party government where parties narrow and oversimplify policy debates.<sup>31</sup> They claim that sometimes representatives have a greater responsibility to the district they represent than to their party, with the negotiation necessary to pass legislation ensuring that the optimal decisions are achieved.<sup>32</sup>

In contrast to the United States, in many countries, including Britain and New Zealand, the theories of responsible party government and pluralism have often been seen as being at least partly compatible. This has resulted in politicians listening, and sometimes also responding, to all sectors of the community.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, pluralism has often been seen as broadening democracy from a situation where parties simply compete against each other.<sup>34</sup>

However, in the United States the strength of interest groups has often been seen as having the potential to undermine responsible party government, by reducing the unity of parties. Strong interest groups have been seen as making it more difficult for parties to solve problems, or for voters to hold parties to their programme. Because interest groups seek to accomplish specific, narrow tasks, supporters of responsible party government have argued that they can place an

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<sup>29</sup> Pomper, Voters, Elections and Parties, pp. 253-255.

<sup>30</sup> Evron Kirkpatrick, 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo Science?', American Political Science Review, Vol. 65 (1971), p. 969; Livingstone, 'Britain and America: The Institutionalization of Accountability', p. 880; Herbert Agar, The Price of Union (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 689.

<sup>31</sup> Kirkpatrick, 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo Science?', p. 969.

<sup>32</sup> Robert Dahl, 'Myth of the Presidential Mandate', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105 (1990), p. 371; Kirkpatrick, 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo Science?', p. 979.

<sup>33</sup> For instance, Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, p. 18 argues that under a system of responsible government ideally governments should "take heed of the views of all groups within society when determining their policies". Similarly, Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 379 argues that "Only in a totalitarian society would party government rule absolute". For an example of how responsible party government and pluralism have been seen as compatible in New Zealand see Richard Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland, Longman Paul, 1992), p. 513.

<sup>34</sup> Gregor McLennan, Marxism, Pluralism and Beyond: Classic Debates and New Departures (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 10.

economic burden on the country that makes strong parties necessary.<sup>35</sup> They also claim that only the existence of reasonably disciplined and cohesive parties makes the United States political system work in a satisfactory manner.<sup>36</sup> Since the 1970s these points have been seen as increasingly valid by political scientists outside the United States.<sup>37</sup>

Because of their emphasis on restraining the state, pluralist theories are sometimes close to a third normative theory of democracy. This theory is democratic elitism, or what is sometimes referred to as the liberal model of democracy.<sup>38</sup> Democratic elitists consider theories of responsible party government and pluralism to be unrealistic, and a recipe for political instability. They argue that involvement by most citizens in politics should be limited to choosing between parties at elections, with the ability to vote out unpopular leaders being the main mechanism of democratic control.<sup>39</sup> Supporters of democratic elitism see the main aim of democracy as being the protection of minority rights, and emphasise the need to restrain the state from unnecessary intervention in people's lives.<sup>40</sup> Democratic elitists believe that once in power politicians should act as trustees for voters, by implementing policies that are in the best interests of the country.<sup>41</sup>

The most important modern elitist writer has been Schumpeter (1943).<sup>42</sup> Schumpeter argued that responsible party government, which he inaccurately

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<sup>35</sup> E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Hold Rhinehart and Winston, 1942), pp. 108, 128, 192; Pomper, Voters, Elections and Parties, p. 276.

<sup>36</sup> Pomper, Voters, Elections and Parties, p. 249.

<sup>37</sup> Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, 168; J.J. Richardson, and A.G. Jordan, Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post-Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), pp. 4-7.

<sup>38</sup> Indeed, Katz, Democracy and Elections, pp. 53-61 even places pluralist theories in a chapter on liberal theories of democracy. However, on p. 57 he admits that modern pluralists such as Dahl are much more favourably disposed to citizen involvement in politics than early pluralists such as Madison.

<sup>39</sup> Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), pp. 151-152.

<sup>40</sup> Katz, Democracy and Elections, pp. 2, 47.

<sup>41</sup> The most famous proponent of this position was Edmund Burke, [1774] 'Mr Edmund Burke's Speech', reprinted in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Vol. 3. Party, Parliament, and the American War 1774-1780, edited by W.M. Elofsen and John Woods (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 69.

<sup>42</sup> Anthony Arblaster, Democracy, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), p. 49.

described as the classical theory of democracy,<sup>43</sup> was unworkable. Schumpeter's most influential criticism of responsible party government was that citizens were not competent enough to make this form of democracy work. He argued that most people lack a definite will on issues, and particularly when in crowds tend to become illiberal and irrational. In addition, Schumpeter claimed that because voters had no personal experience of politics they had a "reduced sense of reality" when it came to national politics. According to Schumpeter this makes it easy for politicians to manufacture public opinion.<sup>44</sup>

Schumpeter's arguments appealed to political scientists after the collapse of many European democracies into totalitarianism during the interwar period.<sup>45</sup> Postwar survey research findings seemed to support Schumpeter's view about the competency of voters, with researchers showing that most voters have a low knowledge about politics,<sup>46</sup> and that there seemed to be little stability or coherence to their beliefs.<sup>47</sup> This made the theory that voters are influenced by election programmes seem unrealistic. Democratic elitists also showed that many voters tended to be illiberal, and had little support for democratic norms compared to political elites.<sup>48</sup> As a result some political scientists argued that apathy by the electorate could indicate satisfaction with current outcomes, and therefore could contribute to stability. This was particularly seen to be the case if

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<sup>43</sup> Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, pp. 51-52.

<sup>44</sup> Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Unwin, 1954), pp. 261-262.

<sup>45</sup> Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 2-3.

<sup>46</sup> Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 307-311; Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 173-187.

<sup>47</sup> Philip Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in Ideology and Discontent, edited by D. Apter (New York, Free Press, 1964), p. 213. Similar results were also found by David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 193-214.

<sup>48</sup> Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, Vol. 58 (1964), pp. 364-365; Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1970), pp. 127-140.

non-voting was concentrated among the least well educated and least knowledgeable members of the electorate.<sup>49</sup>

As economic problems mounted in many developed democracies during the 1970s and 1980s democratic elitists increasingly argued that parties' responsiveness to interest groups was resulting in governments being overloaded with demands. According to elitists excessive demands by pressure groups, together with an inability by politicians to resist these demands, were resulting in economic policies being followed that were contrary to the public good.<sup>50</sup>

Elitists also criticise models of responsible party government on the grounds that it is not possible to aggregate voters' preferences in a way that will produce rational outcomes. Because at elections voters are restricted to choosing between different bundles of policies dictated by politicians, there is also never going to be a party offering exactly what each voter wants. This problem of full-line supply means that parties' policies are always going to be a disappointment to voters.<sup>51</sup> Voters therefore cannot be considered to have consented to the wide range of policies contained in a party's election programme.<sup>52</sup>

The most influential writer on the problems of preference aggregation has been Riker. In the 1980s Riker abandoned his earlier support for responsible party government<sup>53</sup> to argue that "outcomes of voting cannot, in general, be regarded as accurate or fair amalgamations of voters' values". Riker supported this position by building on earlier research by Arrow which shows that it is impossible for a voting system to meet reasonable criteria of fairness, while ensuring a rational transitive ordering of alternatives. As a result every method of voting is in some way unfair or inadequate. According to Riker attempts to create a fair voting system would generate a voting cycle because politicians would

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<sup>49</sup> Seymour Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 185, 227-228; W.H. Morris Jones, 'In Defence of Apathy: Some Doubts on the Duty to Vote', *Political Studies*, Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 35-37.

<sup>50</sup> One of the best known works is Anthony King, 'Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s', *Political Studies*, Vol. 23, (1975), pp. 162-174. Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) has also been very influential.

<sup>51</sup> Iain McLean, *Public Choice: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 57, 52.

<sup>52</sup> Kavanagh, 'The Politics of Manifestos', p. 9.

<sup>53</sup> See, William Riker, *Democracy in The United States*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 86-87.

always be able to find a different amalgamation of choices which a majority of people would prefer.<sup>54</sup>

Riker also argued that strategic voting and manipulation of the agenda mean that politics is constantly in disequilibrium. This means that voting outcomes lack meaning because “often they are manipulated amalgamations rather than fair and true amalgamations of voters’ judgements”. Indeed, because there are strong incentives for voters to vote strategically, it is never possible for politicians to be sure what voters’ real preferences are. Any imposition of a majority viewpoint is therefore an arbitrary selection from a wide range of alternatives. These findings led Riker to argue that systems of responsible party government could not survive, and resulted in him advocating a more restricted elitist model of democracy.<sup>55</sup>

The debate between those supporting responsible party government or pluralist theories of democracy, and those supporting elitist models of democracy, remains very salient both at a theoretical and at a policy making level. Political scientists sympathetic to voter involvement in politics have shown that although many voters are confused about politics, most do hold some reasonably coherent beliefs and images of parties that influence their voting.<sup>56</sup> They also point to evidence showing that voters’ knowledge and understanding of politics was never as bad as claimed by elitists, and has improved over time.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, the statistical evidence for claims that voters are less tolerant than elites has been questioned,<sup>58</sup> while it has been argued that Schumpeter and other elitists overestimate the extent to which public opinion can be manufactured.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1982), pp. xiv-xviii, 111.

<sup>55</sup> Riker, Liberalism Against Populism, pp. 236-242; Albert Weale, ‘Review Article: Social Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker’s Political Theory’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol 14 (1984), p. 383.

<sup>56</sup> Elinor Scarbrough, Political Ideology and Voting: An Explanatory Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 162, 181; Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, The Loyalties of Voters: A Lifetime Learning Model (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 6-11.

<sup>57</sup> Dalton, Citizen Politics, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 21-22, 26-29.

<sup>58</sup> Paul Sniderman, et al., ‘The Fallacy of Democratic Elitism: Elite Competition and Commitment to Civil Liberties’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21 (1991), pp. 362-370.

<sup>59</sup> Held, Models of Democracy, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 292-293.

Supporters of responsible party government also claim that parties can deal with economic crises by getting a mandate from voters to make necessary changes, and that this happened in most advanced democracies during the 1980s.<sup>60</sup>

While supporters of responsible party government and pluralism have admitted that Riker has identified theoretical obstacles to accurately aggregating preferences, they argue these problems are based on unrealistic assumptions about human behaviour and democratic practice.<sup>61</sup> They also argue that the “second-best” solution of responsible party government is preferable to elitist democracy.<sup>62</sup> This is because it is more responsive to public concerns and reduces abuses of power by elites,<sup>63</sup> while also promoting other goals such as participation and citizens’ intellectual development.<sup>64</sup>

Theories of responsible party government, pluralism and democratic elitism all argue that governments influence policy outcomes. This view has been challenged by Marxist power elite theories, which are the fourth model of democracy to be discussed here. Supporters of Marxist power elite theories have argued that it is unimportant who controls the government because real power is held by dominant elites.<sup>65</sup> These attacks on western liberal democracy have frequently been criticised by pluralists. From studies of specific decisions in political systems pluralists concluded that competition between interest groups and political parties makes the elites which lead these organizations responsive to society. Although pluralists admitted that there were some inequalities in the distribution of political power, they argued that these tended to be

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<sup>60</sup> Arnold Heidenheimer, Hugh Hecto, and Carolyn Adams, Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in America, Europe and Japan, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 14; Jacques Thomassen, ‘Economic Crisis, Dissatisfaction and Protest’, in Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), edited by M. Kent Jennings and Jan van Deth, p. 134.

<sup>61</sup> Iain McLean, Public Choice: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 186-187; Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State: A Reappraisal, pp. 10-11.

<sup>62</sup> Albert Weale, ‘Review Article: Social Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker’s Political Theory’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14 (1984), p. 384.

<sup>63</sup> Dalton, Citizen Politics, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 29.

<sup>64</sup> Jack Lively, Democracy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), p. 140.

<sup>65</sup> John Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 408; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 9.

noncumulative so that people from almost all backgrounds were able to shape policy outcomes.<sup>66</sup>

While Marxists have seen a pluralist distribution of power as a desirable objective, they have argued that it has not been achieved. A key reason for this is that the political agenda can be controlled. For instance, drawing on Gramsci's notion of ideological hegemony Lukes has argued that the social structure of society can exclude potential issues from the political agenda, and even shape people's preferences so that grievances do not arise.<sup>67</sup> The pluralist model of power has also been criticised on the grounds that cumulative inequalities in the distribution of political resources mean that some groups are much more powerful than others.<sup>68</sup>

In turn, Marxist theories have been attacked on the grounds that they often seem to be unprovable and unfalsifiable; with agenda-setting or minority dominance being a matter of faith rather than demonstrable fact.<sup>69</sup> However, the examples Lukes cites have been convincing enough for pluralists to acknowledge that agenda-setting can occur.<sup>70</sup> Pluralists have also conceded that some interest groups are considerably more powerful than others, and that some groups are ignored by political parties.<sup>71</sup>

The fifth and final model of democracy to be considered here is economic and demographic models of democracy. Supporters of economic and demographic theories of government and welfare state growth argue that the level of economic development, rather than parties' ideological principles, determines policy outcomes. For instance, in a famous study of 76 nations Wilensky showed that

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<sup>66</sup> Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 197, 97; Nelson Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 29, 55-56, 90.

<sup>67</sup> Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 47, 21, 25.

<sup>68</sup> K. Newton, 'A Critique of the Pluralist Model', *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 12 (1969), p. 214.

<sup>69</sup> Birch, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*, p. 195; Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 279.

<sup>70</sup> Gregor McLennan, *Marxism, Pluralism and Beyond: Classic Debates and New Departures* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 56.

<sup>71</sup> Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985), p. 60; Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 171-188. Pluralists have always considered there to be some inequalities between groups. However, McLennan, *Pluralism*, p. 95 notes that during the late 1970s and early 1980s pluralists saw business groups as being particularly powerful.

social welfare expenditure was determined by the level of economic development, the age of the social security system, and the age structure of the population.<sup>72</sup> Although Wilensky and other political scientists in this tradition have admitted that economic effects are sometimes mediated through interest groups and tight electoral competition, they still see economic factors as being the main influence on welfare state expansion.<sup>73</sup>

Wilensky's study was criticised by Castles who pointed out that the results were skewed by the inclusion of both very rich and poor countries. Castles found that this disguised the fact that among different wealthy nations political factors heavily influence differences in welfare expenditure.<sup>74</sup> Recent, increasingly sophisticated, studies using pooled time-series expenditure data for a number of countries have confirmed that the partisanship of the party in power does have a substantial influence on the level of welfare expenditure and the size of the government.<sup>75</sup> Studies based on manifestos have been able to test more rigorously theories about the influence of parties on policies by showing that in a number of expenditure areas parties implement the policies they specifically emphasised in their most recent election programme.<sup>76</sup>

### 1.3 Theoretical Models of Electoral and Party Systems

Traditionally the literature on party systems has argued that democratic accountability and effectiveness is highest in majoritarian two-party systems. These systems are characterised by unitary centralised Parliamentary

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<sup>72</sup> Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 47.

<sup>73</sup> See, for instance, Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality, p. 47; Fred Pampel and John Williamson, Age, Class, Politics and the Welfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 62.

<sup>74</sup> Francis Castles, 'The Impact of Parties on Public Expenditure', in The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States, edited by Francis Castles (London: Sage, 1982), p. 29.

<sup>75</sup> Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, 'Politics, Institutions and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-1982', American Political Science Review, Vol. 86 (1992), p. 667; Andre Blais, Donald Blake, and Stephane Dion, 'Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37 (1993), p. 56.

<sup>76</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert, and Ian Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 255.

governments, where there is a fusion of power between the legislature and the executive, two main parties which are elected by a plurality electoral system that alternate in government, interest group pluralism, and an unwritten constitution.<sup>77</sup> Majoritarian systems have been seen as responsive because they usually generate one party governments that have the power to implement their policies. In contrast, in multi-party systems potential coalition partners will often have to haggle over policy after the election, making it difficult for voters to hold individual parties accountable.<sup>78</sup> It is also more difficult for voters to dismiss a government.<sup>79</sup>

However, Lijphart has argued that consensual democracies, whose characteristics include proportional electoral systems, several important parties, coalition governments, decentralisation, bicameralism, corporatist interest group systems, independent central banks, and written constitutions, are more democratic. This is because they result in a wider range of views being represented, and include more parties in decision-making than majoritarian systems.<sup>80</sup> Indeed, Nagel has argued that “pluralitarian” would be a more accurate name than majoritarian because in countries with first past the post electoral systems usually the winning party only receives a minority of votes.<sup>81</sup> In some proportional representation electoral systems parties also announce their intended coalition partners before the election, thereby enhancing accountability.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 6-9, 106-114; Arend Lijphart, ‘Democracies: Forms, performance and constitutional engineering’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 25 (1994), p. 1; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 3-4.

<sup>78</sup> Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 148.

<sup>79</sup> Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 272.

<sup>80</sup> Arend Lijphart, ‘Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 33 (1989), p. 44; Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, pp. 3-4.

<sup>81</sup> Jack Nagel, ‘Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalization in New Zealand’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28 (1998) p. 226.

<sup>82</sup> G. Bingham Powell, ‘Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 3 (1989), p. 117.

## 1.4 Cleavages and Ideologies

### 1.4.1 Traditional Political Cleavages and Political Ideologies

As well as being indispensable for studying whether parties keep their pre-election promises, manifestos are also useful for studying which political cleavages exist between political parties, and what parties' main ideological principles are. Political cleavages are persistent divisions between different social or political groups. They are usually based in the social structure, influence voters' values, and when mobilised can result in the formation of political parties.<sup>83</sup> These enduring differences between different types of political parties are essential if elections are to provide voters with a choice between policy alternatives.

The most important study of electoral cleavages has been by Lipset and Rokkan (1967),<sup>84</sup> who outlined four ideal types of cleavages that existed in democratic countries. Lipset and Rokkan claimed that national revolutions had created the first cleavage, which had resulted from the growth of the state generating conflict between the dominant nation-building culture and resisting subject populations. National revolutions had also generated the second cleavage, which involved conflict between the state and the church. Lipset and Rokkan argued that industrial revolutions had created the third cleavage, which was between urban and rural groups. Similarly, industrial revolutions had shaped the fourth cleavage, which grouped owners and employers against tenants, labourers, and workers. Lipset and Rokkan found that although not every cleavage existed or had been mobilised in every country, the influence of the class cleavage was virtually universal and had eroded most previous cleavages.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Oddbjorn Knutsen and Elinor Scarbrough, 'Cleavage Politics', in The Impact of Values, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 494.

<sup>84</sup> Hanspeter Kriesi, 'The transformation of cleavage politics: The 1997 Stein Rokkan lecture', European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33 (1998), p. 165.

<sup>85</sup> Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter alignments: An Introduction', in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National

Lipset and Rokkan noted that cleavages often overlapped and reinforced each other, and were usually aggregated by political parties into a smaller number of dimensions of competition. One of their most controversial claims was that in Western Europe and elsewhere “the party systems of the 1960’s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920’s”.<sup>86</sup>

Although Lipset and Rokkan’s model of cleavages has been very influential, it has also been challenged and reformulated.<sup>87</sup> One change has been that the issues related to the class cleavage have primarily been seen in terms of differences over economic and redistributive issues, rather than Lipset and Rokkan’s example of differences over international loyalties. For instance, when Lijphart modelled cleavages he separated economic and foreign policy dimensions.<sup>88</sup> It has also been shown that in some countries divisions over conservative values, which often result from regular contact by voters with dominant institutions such as the established church, also divide the electorate. Conservative values often heavily influence voting, even in countries such as Britain where the class cleavage has often been seen as the only important political division.<sup>89</sup> In some countries regime support issues resulting from challenges to the democratic system are also electorally important.<sup>90</sup>

Political scientists have also looked more closely at the ideologies of political parties. Ideologies are systems of thought that are both descriptive and normative, which help people to structure how the world is to be understood and

Perspectives, edited by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 14, 20-21.

<sup>86</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, ‘Cleavage Structures’, pp. 46, 50. For a discussion of some of the literature on this claim see Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 111-116.

<sup>87</sup> Oddbjorn Knutsen and Elinor Scarbrough, ‘Cleavage Politics’, in The Impact of Values, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 492.

<sup>88</sup> Arend Lijphart, ‘Political Parties: Ideologies and Programs’, in Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections, edited by David Butler, Howard Penningham and Austin Ranney (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 30, 34.

<sup>89</sup> Bob Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp. 150, 259; John Barnes, ‘Ideology and Factions’, in Conservative Century: The Conservative Party Since 1900, edited by Anthony Seldon and Stuart Bull (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 336.

<sup>90</sup> Lijphart, ‘Political Parties: Ideologies and Programs’, p. 38.

explained. They are usually in a constant state of flux, with ideas being revised and redefined. Few beliefs are exclusive to one ideology.<sup>91</sup>

Parties on the political right are usually primarily ideologically based around classical liberal beliefs, conservative beliefs, or a mixture of these two ideologies. Classical liberal ideas are based upon a belief in the importance of the individual, and freedom from coercion by others. Other traditional liberal beliefs include support for equality of opportunity in the market place, and equality before the law; constitutional government; free markets and property rights; and reason.<sup>92</sup> Because they believe in a natural harmony of interests between different groups and countries liberals are usually internationalist, although many also favour collective security arrangements.<sup>93</sup> New, or popular, liberal ideas also see a positive role for the state in providing social services and intervening in the economy.<sup>94</sup> This means that there is now often very little difference between new liberal ideas and left-wing social democratic thought. Indeed, in the United States since the 1930s the term liberal has been associated with left-wing beliefs and policies.<sup>95</sup> Since the 1970s, however, in many western democracies restated and often theoretically improved classical liberal economic policies, which have often been called neo-liberal or new right, have enjoyed renewed popularity.<sup>96</sup>

In contrast to liberalism the essence of conservatism, as a political ideology, is a desire to conserve a traditional social order. Core conservative ideas include the belief that society is an organic whole; an emphasis on the importance of authority, social stability, and law and order; a strong sense of nationalism, support for the military and a realist foreign policy; and a belief in the importance of property ownership for giving people a stake in the community. These right-wing conservative values have often been tempered by a belief in

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<sup>91</sup> Elinor Scarbrough, Political Ideology and Voting: An Explanatory Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 83; Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, p. 2.

<sup>92</sup> Klaus von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies (Aldershot: Gower, 1985), p. 32; Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, pp. 21-36.

<sup>93</sup> Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, pp 25, 39; Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 31.

<sup>94</sup> Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 30.

<sup>95</sup> von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 37.

<sup>96</sup> Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), p. 51; Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), p. 72.

social obligation towards the less fortunate. This has frequently resulted in conservative parties pursuing paternalistic economic and welfare policies.<sup>97</sup> However, higher support for classical liberal economic policies in right-wing parties since the late 1970s has often been paralleled by greater faith in right-wing socially conservative beliefs.<sup>98</sup>

Left-wing parties have traditionally been ideologically based around socialist, social democratic and new liberal beliefs. Socialism is a collectivist ideology that sees people as social creatures who are able to work together to overcome problems. Socialists emphasise the desirability of cooperation between individuals and countries; social and economic equality; and collective ownership through cooperatives or nationalisation.<sup>99</sup>

Since the 1920s more immediate and less idealistic social democratic beliefs about improving the living standards of the working class by modifying capitalism through democratic means have also frequently motivated left-wing parties.<sup>100</sup> Similarly, new liberal theories such as labourism, which emphasises the importance of defending the interests of workers, and welfarist and humanitarian beliefs in the desirability of the state providing social services, have been important to left-wing parties.<sup>101</sup> Demand management theories such as Keynesianism and underconsumption theories such as Social Credit ideas have also appealed to the left. However, both these theories have also been seen at times by those on the political right as ways of preserving capitalism.<sup>102</sup> In left-wing parties there has also always been limited support for some classical liberal beliefs, while traditional conservative values have often appealed to many of their working-class members. Many classical liberal beliefs, such as an

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<sup>97</sup> Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, pp. 53-71.

<sup>98</sup> Andrew Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 36-39.

<sup>99</sup> Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, pp. 97-103.

<sup>100</sup> Vincent, *Modern Political Ideologies*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 87.

<sup>101</sup> Peter Beilharz, *Labor Tradition and the Labor Decade in Australia* (Melbourne: Canberra University Press, 1994), pp. 30-31.

<sup>102</sup> Robert Skildesky, *Keynes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 28, 49; John Findlay, *Social Credit: The English Origins* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), pp. 111, 235.

acknowledgment of the efficiency of capitalism, have tended to become stronger in left-wing parties over time.<sup>103</sup>

#### 1.4.2 Party Movement

Party movement theories have often been heavily influenced by Downs' economic theory of democracy. Downs developed a spatial theory in which parties' positions could be mapped on a left-right dimension. He theorised that people vote for the party which will give them greater benefits than any other. Using rational choice methodology, Downs argued that because the primary objective of parties was to get elected, parties formulated policies designed to maximise their vote, rather than because they wished to carry out certain policies.<sup>104</sup> He predicted that in a two-party system where parties were acting competitively they would ideologically converge in an attempt to maximise their share of the vote. In contrast, in a multi-party system parties would try and remain ideologically distinct because the distribution of voters' preferences usually meant that there was no incentive for them to move closer together.<sup>105</sup>

During the 1950s and 1960s some writers took a different view, arguing that an "end of ideology" was undermining traditional conflicts in all liberal democracies.<sup>106</sup> For instance, Lipset found that by the mid-1950s there was a general belief among political scientists and politicians that "the traditional issues separating the left and right had declined to comparative insignificance" in western democracies. Although class conflict continued it was in a very muted form.<sup>107</sup> Similarly, Kircheimer wrote that ideological differences between the

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<sup>103</sup> Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, pp. 129-130.

<sup>104</sup> Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 36, 30.

<sup>105</sup> Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 115.

<sup>106</sup> Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Illinois: Free Press, 1960), p. 373.

<sup>107</sup> Seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 440, 445.

main political parties had shrunk dramatically since the Second World War as they sought to become more inclusive “catch-all” parties.<sup>108</sup>

A different view to that taken by Downs and convergence theorists was taken by Robertson. Robertson argued that Downs’ model had underestimated the importance of constraints on party movement. These constraints included politicians’ long-term ideological commitments to certain types of policies, parties’ dependence on the party organisation for campaign resources, and parties’ likely loss of credibility if they tried to abandon their traditional policies. He claimed that these restraining factors meant that left and right-wing parties would remain distinct. Robertson argued that not only would there be no cross-over between left and right-wing parties, but that there would sometimes be incentives for them to move away from the centre to satisfy their members and core supporters.<sup>109</sup>

Robertson’s research led to the development of the saliency theory of party competition. The saliency theory of party competition differs from the traditional view, taken by Downs and other rational choice theorists, that at elections parties try to conduct a debate on common issues about why their policies are better than those of other parties.<sup>110</sup> According to saliency theory, parties usually avoid making definite statements about their policies except in peripheral areas.<sup>111</sup> This means that the most important aspect of parties’ election programmes is the relative emphasis they put on different policy areas.<sup>112</sup>

Saliency theory is based on the belief that because positive outcomes in particular policy areas are usually associated with different types of parties, normally only one type of party in each country would benefit from the salience

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<sup>108</sup> Otto Kirchheimer, ‘The Transformation of the West European Party Systems’, in Political Parties and Political Development, edited by J. LaPolombara and M. Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 184-188.

<sup>109</sup> David Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition (London: John Wiley, 1976), p. 64.

<sup>110</sup> Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 23; Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, ‘Party Competition – Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation? An Alternative View with Data’, in Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, edited by Hans Daalder and Peter Mair (London: Sage, 1983), p. 270.

<sup>111</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 25.

<sup>112</sup> Budge, ‘The internal analyses of election programmes’, p. 24.

of a particular policy area. For instance, Budge and Farlie argued that because left-wing parties were associated with positive outcomes in social services, such parties should emphasise these issues in their manifestos. In contrast, left-wing parties should avoid making more than token references to issues such as taxes, crime, and economic controls that help right-wing parties electorally.<sup>113</sup> Saliency theory builds on earlier research into ‘valence’ issues by Stoke, and has also been supported by other studies of election campaigns.<sup>114</sup>

The most significant contribution to party movement theories since Robertson has been by Dunleavy, who found that existing rational choice theories failed to allow for preference shaping by parties.<sup>115</sup> Dunleavy showed that over time parties could shape the preferences of voters to their advantage by partisan social engineering. For instance, a right-wing party could improve its electoral chances by expanding the size of the private sector and by selling public housing to tenants, to increase the relative size of social groups which tended to vote for the right. Dunleavy found that the electoral gains from stigmatising small groups could be large, while manufacturing crises in areas such as foreign policy could also help parties.<sup>116</sup>

#### 1.4.3 New Cleavages and Values

In many democracies convergence between left and right-wing parties, together with changes in the social structure, such as the decline in the size of the working class, have resulted in existing social cleavages becoming less important since the Second World War. This has been reflected in the way that in most developed democracies traditional cleavages have been explaining less and less voting behaviour over time.<sup>117</sup> This dealignment from existing cleavages has

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<sup>113</sup> Budge and Farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections, pp. 24, 25, 32.

<sup>114</sup> Ian Budge, ‘Estimating Party Policy Preferences: From Ad Hoc Measures to Theoretically Validated Standards’, Paper at Mannheim ECPR, pp. [8-9].

<sup>115</sup> Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 100.

<sup>116</sup> Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, pp. 120-125.

<sup>117</sup> Mark Franklin, et al., Electoral Change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 8, 385.

contributed to some political scientists arguing that new cleavages are emerging in postindustrial democracies.

The most influential writer on new politics theories has been Inglehart,<sup>118</sup> who argues that a new cleavage resulting from a value shift from modern to postmodern values is emerging in developed countries where economic prosperity and physical security have increased. Postmodern values result in people emphasising postmaterialist aesthetic, social, and intellectual needs, rather than traditional materialist goals such as economic growth and physical security. According to Inglehart the rise of postmodern values has been reflected in the emergence of new issues such as the environment, women's rights, abortion, gay and lesbian emancipation, increased concern with free speech and participatory democracy, and pressure for a less impersonal society.<sup>119</sup> Much of the evidence to support Inglehart's theory has come from survey evidence indicating a gradual change from materialist to postmaterialist values as intergenerational replacement occurs. However, he argues that this is only indicative of a much wider process of value change.<sup>120</sup>

Inglehart has argued that in countries with proportional representation electoral systems new politics issues are usually advocated by new parties. In contrast, in countries with first past the post electoral systems left-wing parties have often captured the support of postmaterialists by incorporating new politics concerns into their policies. Because of the rise of postmaterialism Inglehart argues that working class voters are increasingly voting for right-wing or nationalist parties that continue to emphasise materialist and traditionalist values. Inglehart has claimed that because of these changing voting patterns, a shift from a class based political polarisation to a postmodern materialist-postmaterialist polarisation is occurring in Western societies.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Jan W. van Deth, 'Introduction: The Impact of Values', in The Impact of Values, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 9.

<sup>119</sup> Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 237. Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 67-69, 133-135.

<sup>120</sup> Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 4, 42.

<sup>121</sup> Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 267-273. Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 236-

A slightly different position has been taken by political scientists who have found that the new cleavage is really between voters with traditional authoritarian values, and voters who have more libertarian attitudes. For instance, Kitschelt has argued that many voters are becoming more libertarian because of increasing levels of education, labour market changes, the inflexibility of the welfare state, and to a lesser extent because of greater affluence. At the same time the growth of social liberalism has prompted an authoritarian backlash among the less educated. According to Kitschelt increasing global economic competition has also resulted in many voters becoming more right-wing.<sup>122</sup> As a result of these developments new right-wing parties have emerged which combine free market appeals with authoritarian and ethnocentric policies.<sup>123</sup> The differences between materialist-postmaterialist and authoritarian-libertarian theories of new cleavages are only slight, however, with both Inglehart and Kitschelt arguing that the other's results really support their theory.<sup>124</sup>

Both of these theories of new cleavages have been controversial. Some question the concept of postmaterialism itself, arguing that there is a weak theoretical relationship between support for different postmaterialist concerns. Indeed, survey data shows that concern about the environment is much higher than for other postmaterialist issues.<sup>125</sup> Similarly, Gibson and Duch have shown that high support for democracy, which Inglehart sees as a postmaterialist priority, may simply be because it is the best way of achieving materialist

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<sup>122</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 20-23. Other writers have also taken similar positions. For instance, Chris Flanagan, 'Value Change in Industrial Societies', American Political Science Review, Vol. 81 (1987), pp. 1305-1307 argues that the most important value shift is towards libertarian social values, creating an important cleavage between those who hold libertarian social values and those who support more traditional authoritarian values. Similarly, Oddbjorn Knutsen, 'The Materialist/Postmaterialist Value Dimension as a Party Cleavage in the Nordic Countries', West European Politics, Vol. 13 (1990), p. 268 shows that in the five Nordic countries the libertarian-authoritarian divide has much more influence over voting behaviour than divisions over economic growth.

<sup>123</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. viii.

<sup>124</sup> Paul Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, Value Change in Global Perspective (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 1; Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 252-253; Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, p. 28.

<sup>125</sup> Masja Nas, 'Green, Greener, Greenest', in The Impact of Values, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarborough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 292.

goals.<sup>126</sup> Some of the other issues Inglehart and Kitschelt describe as new politics concerns, such as disarmament and free speech, are also not really new issues.<sup>127</sup>

Even if levels of postmaterialism are increasing, many argue that it is unlikely that increasing levels of postmaterialism will create a new politics cleavage. For instance, because survey evidence shows that most people pursue both materialist and postmaterialist goals, making some of them relatively consensual, it is only on a few issues that voters are likely to become polarised on a materialist-postmaterialist dimension.<sup>128</sup> Because of the emphasis by postmaterialists on traditional liberal goals, such as freedom and individual autonomy, McAllister and Vowles have suggested that some postmaterialists may be attracted to right-wing neo-liberal parties rather than to left-wing parties.<sup>129</sup> Research has also shown that although postmaterialist and libertarian issues are often important in influencing voting behaviour, older cleavages still usually have the biggest effect.<sup>130</sup> Indeed, there is strong evidence that electoral change has been considerably overstated, with most people continuing to vote for traditional parties.<sup>131</sup> However, there is now general agreement among political scientists that voters' values have been changing, although the exact nature of these value changes remains contentious.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> James Gibson and Raymond Duch, 'Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy', Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47 (1994), p. 28.

<sup>127</sup> Ian Budge, et al., The Politics of the New Europe: Atlantic to Urals (London: Longman Paul, 1997), p. 199; Lijphart, 'Political Parties: Ideologies and Programs', p. 40.

<sup>128</sup> Clive Bean and Elim Papadakis, 'Polarized priorities or Flexible Alternatives? Inglehart's Materialism-Postmaterialism Scale', International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 18 (1994) p. 277.

<sup>129</sup> Ian McAllister and Jack Vowles, 'The Rise of New Politics and Market Liberalism in Australia and New Zealand', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24 (1994), p. 384.

<sup>130</sup> Oddbjorn Knutsen, 'Value Orientations and Party Choice: A Comparative Study of the Impact of Old Politics and New Politics Value Orientations on Voting Intention' (Paper presented at the 16th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, August 1994), p. 60.

<sup>131</sup> Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. xvii; Peter Mair, 'Myths of electoral change and the survival of traditional parties', European Journal of Electoral Research, Vol. 24 (1993), pp. 122-126.

<sup>132</sup> Dalton, Citizen Politics, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 94; Elinor Scarbrough, 'Materialist-Postmaterialist Value Orientations', in The Impact of Values, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarborough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 156-157.

### 1.5 Content Analysis of Election Programmes

In this study these debates about models of democracy and ideological cleavages are examined using content analysis data from New Zealand election programmes. Although political historians have always used election programmes as an important source material, since the 1960s sophisticated content analysis of manifestos has also taken place in many countries. This content analysis has been based on data derived from coding sections of election programmes according to an invariant coding scheme. Content analysis has been used for analysing manifestos because it is more systematic than impressionistic textual analysis.<sup>133</sup> This ensures that important aspects of party policy are not overlooked, and that other aspects are not considered more important than they really are.

Initially studies based on content analysis of election programmes were carried out in isolation from each other, with researchers failing to build on earlier work. However, since the establishment in 1979 of the Manifestos Research Group (MRG) most studies have used its coding framework. A slightly modified form of the MRG coding framework has been used in this study to code the manifestos issued by the major New Zealand political parties since the beginning of effective party competition at the 1911 election.

Research on whether parties implement their election programmes is central to determining whether responsible party government or another model of democracy, is the most accurate description of reality. Although election programmes do not show whether voters' behaviour is compatible with responsible party government, they can show whether parties act in ways that make it possible. For instance, if parties simplify choices for voters by emphasising the same types of policies and ideas over time, this makes it easier for voters to understand politics and to choose between parties. It also reduces the chance of voting cycles.<sup>134</sup> Election programmes can also be used to see

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<sup>133</sup> T.F. Carney, Content Analysis: A Technique for Systematic Inference From Communications (London: B.T. Batsford, 1972), p. 15.

<sup>134</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, pp. 246-249.

whether parties campaign in ways that encourage rational voting by discussing important issues rather than playing on voters' emotions.

The content results in this study provide firmly grounded data to study issue change, measure the ideological differences between New Zealand political parties, and track party movement. Other studies of these issues have relied upon analysis of aggregate data of voting behaviour, survey data, or expert judgements by a number of political scientists of party positions. All these methods have some drawbacks compared to content analysis results. Although aggregate voting data can be used to estimate which broad groups have been more likely to vote for particular parties, it has only limited usefulness when trying to find which factors caused them to do so, and even less for calculating party movement over time. The main problem with analysis of survey data is that it is usually only available for recent elections.<sup>135</sup> Similarly, surveys of experts on party positions are also usually unavailable over time, and are influenced by both the initial positions of political parties and their subsequent behaviour.<sup>136</sup>

### 1.6 Chapter Outline

Chapter two describes the New Zealand party system and the importance of election manifestos. Because of its uniquely majoritarian political system, parties' election manifestos and a tradition of consultation with interest groups have been crucial constraints on the actions of governments. When these conventions have broken down a situation of "elective dictatorship" has developed.<sup>137</sup>

Chapter three shows that for many countries there is now a very large literature based on content analysis of election programmes. For instance, in Britain and the United States studies have regularly been published since the 1970s, while in countries such as Ireland and Australia the literature is also

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<sup>135</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Aspects of Electoral Studies, Present and Past: New Zealand Voters and 'the System', 1949-1996', *Political Science*, Vol. 50 (1998), p. 90.

<sup>136</sup> Budge, 'Estimating Party Policy Preferences: From Ad Hoc Measures to Theoretically Validated Standards', p. [4].

<sup>137</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 513-518.

rapidly expanding.<sup>138</sup> Unfortunately there has been no specific study of New Zealand election manifestos, while New Zealand has not been included in the main cross-national study of policy implementation.<sup>139</sup> This makes further research based on analysis of New Zealand election programmes well overdue.

Chapter four discusses the selection of documents, the time period and parties included, and how the content analysis methodology was applied to New Zealand. Chapters five and six respectively discuss parties' policies on industrial revolution economic issues, and national revolution and new politics themes in detail. These chapters reveal differences and similarities between parties' policies on particular groups of issues, and how parties' policies have changed over time. Insights are also provided into whether parties have campaigned in a way that promotes rational behaviour by voters.

In chapter seven the main dimensions of competition are found and changes in parties' overall positions over time are graphed. By summarising the data in this way it is possible to test political historians' perceptions of party movement, and the relative importance of different types of political cleavages. It will also be shown whether parties provide voters with a choice between different policy directions at elections.

Chapter eight examines changes in the length of election programmes. This provides insights into parties' attitudes towards the role of the state and their views on democracy. Chapter nine studies policy implementation in New Zealand between 1946 and 1994. The equations used in an overseas policy implementation study are run in two different ways for New Zealand to see which method produces the theoretically best results. From the results it can be seen during which time periods, and in which policy areas, there has been a strong association between parties' manifesto emphases and subsequent government expenditure trends.

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<sup>138</sup> See, for instance, David Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition* (London: John Wiley, 1976); J. Zvi Namenwirth and Harold Lasswell, *The Changing Language of American Values: A Computer Study of Selected Party Platforms* (California: Sage, 1970); Peter Mair, *The Changing Irish Party System: Organization, Ideology, and Electoral Competition* (London: Frances Pinter, 1987), pp. 138-206; Ian McAllister and Rhonda Moore *Party Strategy and Change: Australian Election Speeches Since 1946* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991).

<sup>139</sup> See, Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*.

Chapter ten is the conclusion. After summarising the results it suggests areas for future research. For instance, the manifesto data could be supplemented by collecting information on other influences on voters' perceptions of parties, such as the background and personalities of politicians. Many of the methods used to analyse the manifesto data in New Zealand could also be applied to other countries.

## Chapter Two: Democracy in New Zealand

### 2.1 Introduction

Because of New Zealand's culture of populist democracy and uniquely majoritarian system of government, New Zealand governments have been very powerful, even compared to governments in other Westminster democracies.<sup>1</sup> As a result the doctrine of the manifesto, together with a tradition of consultation with interest groups and members of the public, have assumed unprecedented importance as constraints on government actions.<sup>2</sup> When politicians have ignored these conventions there have been very few limits on their actions, creating a situation of "elective dictatorship".<sup>3</sup>

Party competition in New Zealand has usually been on a left-right dimension dominated by economic issues.<sup>4</sup> Because of New Zealand's history of recent settlement and relatively high living standards liberalism has been the dominant ideology, with both conservatism and socialism being much weaker.<sup>5</sup> Since the 1970s new politics issues have been increasingly important, with new postmaterialist parties being formed and existing parties modifying their policies. Indeed, there is some evidence that at several elections between 1981 and 1990 new politics issues became more important at influencing voting decisions than economic issues.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 16; Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and Government, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', in The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand, edited by Martin Holland and Jonathan Boston, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, edited by Hyam Gold, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 513-516.

<sup>4</sup> Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand, (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), p. 30; Peter Aimer, 'The Future of the Party System', in New Zealand Politics in Transition, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 193.

<sup>5</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', New Zealand Journal of History, Vol. 21 (1987), p. 223; Francis Castles, The Working Class and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Development of the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 55-56.

<sup>6</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Waiting for the Realignment? The New Zealand Party System, 1972-1993', Political Science, Vol. 48 (1997), p. 194-195.

This chapter provides background to the remainder of the thesis by explaining the New Zealand political system and the strength of mandate theory. It begins by outlining the establishment of democracy in New Zealand and the existing literature on electoral cleavages and changes in parties' policies. The strength of the convention of responsible party government, examples of policy implementation, and deviations from the convention of the mandate in New Zealand are then outlined.

## 2.2 The Establishment of Democracy in New Zealand

Large-scale European settlement of New Zealand began in the late 1830s, and rapidly accelerated after the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), which the British government used to assert its sovereignty. From 1856 New Zealand had a system of responsible government in the sense that the country was governed by Ministers who were accountable to Parliament. New Zealand's constitution was based on the British Westminster system, with a House of Representatives elected under a simple plurality electoral system, and a nominated Legislative Council.<sup>7</sup> Initially the British Governor retained control over some issues; with full control over internal affairs only being achieved in 1891, and over external affairs during the 1920s.<sup>8</sup>

In 1867 four seats for the indigenous Maori minority were established, although Maori were initially significantly underrepresented in proportion to the size of their population.<sup>9</sup> The initial five year electoral term was shortened to three years in 1879, establishing a very tight electoral cycle. Universal suffrage was achieved in New Zealand in 1893 when women were given the vote, making New Zealand one of the world's longest established democracies.<sup>10</sup> However, it

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<sup>7</sup> Richard Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), p. 56

<sup>8</sup> W. David McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 338, 346.

<sup>9</sup> Ann Parsonson, 'The Challenge to Mana Maori', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 196.

<sup>10</sup> Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', p. 218.

was not until the abolition of the country quota in 1945 that the number of voters in all general electorates was required to be within the same range.<sup>11</sup>

### 2.3 Electoral Cleavages and Political Parties in New Zealand

During the 1880s New Zealand's very fluid political groupings began to solidify, with the formation of a Liberal Party.<sup>12</sup> From 1891 onwards a Liberal Government built on existing state activism with land being opened up for settlement, urban workers benefiting from industrial legislation, and means-tested old age pensions being introduced.<sup>13</sup> The high level of state activism, together with the low level of ideological thinking, led Metin, a visiting French writer and intellectual, to claim that New Zealand was practising 'socialism without doctrines'.<sup>14</sup> However, historians now argue that the Liberal Party was very heavily influenced by new liberal beliefs prevalent in England at the time.<sup>15</sup> Many of the Liberal Party's policies were also intended to promote classical liberal goals, such as self-reliance through property ownership. New liberalism in New Zealand differed from liberalism overseas because politicians were much more influenced by radical democratic thought. This created a unique form of interventionist "popular liberalism", which, in sharp contrast to classical liberalism, was often very majoritarian and intolerant of the wishes of minorities.<sup>16</sup> Liberal Party politicians were also strongly nationalistic, and often claimed that New Zealand was showing older countries the way by eliminating 'Old World' evils such as severe poverty and class divisions.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> B.S. Gustafson, *Constitutional Changes Since 1870* (Auckland: Heinemann, 1969), pp. 34-35.

<sup>12</sup> Len Richardson, 'Parties and Political Change', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 206.

<sup>13</sup> David Hamer, *The New Zealand Liberals: The Years of Power, 1891-1912* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 40, 33, 55-56.

<sup>14</sup> Albert Metin [1901], *Socialism Without Doctrine*, translated by Russel Ward (Sydney: Alternative Publishing, 1977), p. 161.

<sup>15</sup> David Hamer, 'Introduction to Second Edition', in *Democracy in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by David Hamer (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1982), p. xxxiv. Hamer further surveys the literature on how ideological the Liberals were in *The New Zealand Liberals*, pp. 37-40.

<sup>16</sup> Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', pp. 218-219.

<sup>17</sup> Hamer, *The New Zealand Liberals*, pp. 52-63.

Despite the Liberal Party's efforts to prevent the rise of factionalism, during the first part of the twentieth century the growing strength of unions, farmers' organizations, and employer groups, together with slower economic growth, contributed to the gradual mobilization of the class cleavage. In 1909 the Opposition changed its name to Reform and "staked out a claim to become the government of New Zealand".<sup>18</sup> Reform was a right-wing party with economic policies which were designed to appeal to both urban and rural property owners and business people. With conservatism a perjorative term in New Zealand because of its associations with the British class system,<sup>19</sup> Reform posed as the defenders of "true liberalism" by promising to reduce state activity in some areas of the economy, while also committing itself to maintaining many of the Liberal Party's policies.<sup>20</sup>

Historians such as Gardner, Sinclair and Oliver have largely agreed with Reform's claims to be a liberal rather than a conservative party.<sup>21</sup> In the most detailed analysis of conservatism in New Zealand, Oliver argued that because of New Zealand's history of recent European settlement, conservatism, as a political ideology, has much weaker social foundations than in western Europe. This is because New Zealanders lack many conservative beliefs, such as a reverence for the past, while the institutions which sustain conservatism in other countries, such as the Established Church and landed gentry, are nonexistent. Reform was also much more economically interventionist than conservative parties in other countries.<sup>22</sup> However, Oliver has seen elements of conservative policies in Reform's support for the British Empire and the preservation of public order.<sup>23</sup> Commentators from overseas have also seen New Zealand as a

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<sup>18</sup> Hamer, *The New Zealand Liberals*, p. 320; Richardson, 'Parties and Political Change', p. 213.

<sup>19</sup> Hamer, *The New Zealand Liberals*, pp. 18, 353.

<sup>20</sup> Richardson, 'Parties and Political Change', pp. 210-214.

<sup>21</sup> W.J. Gardner, 'The Reform Party', in *Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics*, edited by Robert Chapman (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1961), p. 26; Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, revised edition (Auckland: Penguin, 1980), p. 252.

<sup>22</sup> W.H. Oliver, 'Problems and Prospects of Conservatism in New Zealand', *Impact*, Vol. 1 (1965), pp. 17-19; Austin Mitchell, *Politics and People in New Zealand* (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), p. 104; Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, revised edition, p. 252.

<sup>23</sup> Oliver, 'Problems and Prospects of Conservatism in New Zealand', pp. 17-19.

very authoritarian society,<sup>24</sup> with Reform's leader, William Massey, being firmly based in this tradition.<sup>25</sup> This provides further evidence that there were aspects of conservatism in Reform's policies.

At the same time right-wing groups were mobilising, new parties were being formed on the left. Although left-wing parties existed from the turn of the century, initially their success was limited. Their tentative steps towards merger were accelerated by the First World War, with the current New Zealand Labour Party being formed in 1916 as a workers' party with close ties to affiliated trade unions.<sup>26</sup> Labour's main ideological beliefs were new liberalism, and associated theories such as labourism and humanitarianism; pacifism and internationalism; social democracy and socialism; with all these ideologies sometimes being expressed in religious terms.<sup>27</sup>

The emergence of parties to the left and right of the Liberal Party marked the beginning of a left-right class cleavage, dominated by economic and social policy issues, that was closely related to an urban-rural division.<sup>28</sup> Conflicts between different regions have been politically unimportant since the abolition of the provincial governments in 1876.<sup>29</sup> Since the nineteenth century ethnic divisions have been minor, while religious divisions have always been weak.<sup>30</sup>

Figure 2.1 shows the main parties' share of the vote at every election between 1911 and 1996. Because parties have sometimes changed their names,

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<sup>24</sup> Beatrice Webb, 'The Diary', in *The Webbs in New Zealand 1898*, edited by David Hamer (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1974), pp. 38-39; R.S. Milne, *Political Parties in New Zealand* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 11.

<sup>25</sup> W.J. Gardner, *William Massey* (Wellington: Reed, 1969), pp. 16-17.

<sup>26</sup> Jack Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom?', in *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand*, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 23.

<sup>27</sup> Gustafson, *Labour's Path To Political Independence*, p. 151; Barry Gustafson, 'The Labour Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 268-272; Bruce Brown, 'The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935' (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1955), pp. 51-52; Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', pp. 223-224.

<sup>28</sup> Mitchell, *Politics and People in New Zealand*, p. 30; Peter Aimer, 'The Future of the Party System', in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 193.

<sup>29</sup> Raewyn Dalziel, 'The Politics of Settlement', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 101, 104; Gustafson, *Constitutional Changes Since 1870*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>30</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Politics', in *New Zealand Society: A Sociological Introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1994), p. 178; Gustafson, *Labour's Path To Political Independence*, p. 125.

they are identified in this study by the names they used for longest.<sup>31</sup> The Liberal Party remained in government until it was brought down by a no-confidence vote by Reform in 1912.<sup>32</sup> Figure 2.2, which shows when parties have been in government, and who has been Prime Minister, indicates that 1912 marked the beginning of a long period of Reform hegemony. During the 1910s and 1920s Reform drew its support from wealthier rural areas and suburban electorates, while Labour was strongest in working class electorates. The Liberal Party usually continued to try and appeal to all groups, but its strongest support came from small town and poorer rural electorates.<sup>33</sup>

At the 1919 election a very left-wing programme cost the Liberal Party rural electorates while failing to stop the drift of working-class voters to Labour.<sup>34</sup> Political scientists and historians are divided about what policy differences existed between the Reform and Liberal parties after 1919. Burdon and Chapman have stated that by the 1920s the Liberal Party had largely accepted Reform's policy changes.<sup>35</sup> However, Bassett has found that after 1919 the Liberals usually remained a centre party, internally divided between those who wanted to merge with Reform and those who favoured a loose pact with Labour.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> The source of the voting data up to 1931 is from Bassett, Three Party Politics In New Zealand: 1911-1931, pp. 66-67. Thereafter it is from 'General Election Results, 1935-1996', in New Zealand Politics Source Book, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Stephen Levine and Paul Harris (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1999), pp. 182-188. The 'Labour' results for 1911 are calculated by adding together the Labour and Socialist parties' share of the vote, and for 1914 by adding together the Labour and Social Democratic parties' share of the vote. Although the Liberal Party contested the 1922 election as the United Progressive Liberals, the 1925 election as National, and the 1928 election as United, it is called the Liberal Party throughout this study. This is because during the 1920s newspapers, and even some of its politicians, frequently continued to refer to United and National as the Liberal Party. This practice has also been adopted by historians: see, for instance, Bassett, Three Party Politics In New Zealand: 1911-1931, pp. 31, 35, 38.

<sup>32</sup> Gardner, William Massey, pp. 16-17.

<sup>33</sup> Robert Chapman, 'The Decline of the Liberals', in Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics (Auckland: University of Auckland, 1961), pp. 22-23.

<sup>34</sup> Bruce Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), p. 135.

<sup>35</sup> Burdon, The New Dominion, p. 64; R.M. Chapman, The Political Scene, 1919-1931 (Auckland: Heinemann, 1969), pp. 5, 25.

<sup>36</sup> Michael Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Bibliography (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 251.




Figure 2.1: The main parties' share of the vote, 1911-1996

Figure 2.2: Government Alternation and New Zealand's Prime Ministers, 1900-1998

1900	Liberal 1891-1912	Seddon
		Ward
1910	Reform 1912-1928	Massey
1920		Coates
	Liberal 1928-1931	Ward, Forbes
1930	The Coalition 1931-1935	Forbes
	Labour 1935-1949	Savage
1940		Fraser
1950	National 1949-1957	Holland
		Holyoake
	Labour 1957-1960	Nash
1960	National 1960-1972	Holyoake
		Marshall
1970	Labour 1972-1975	Kirk, Rowling
	National 1975-1984	Muldoon
1980		
	Labour 1984-1990	Lange
1990	National 1990-1996	Palmer, Moore
		Bolger
	National-NZF 1996-1998	Bolger, Shipley

In the most detailed study of Labour's policies before the Second World War, Brown has shown that Labour's policies were initially heavily influenced by its socialist objective of "the socialisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange". It was not until after the 1925 election that Labour realised that its radical socialist policies were likely to remain unpopular with voters, despite its attempts to sway them. To try and widen its electoral base before the 1928 election Labour distanced itself from the electorally insignificant communist party, dropped its controversial land nationalisation policies, and introduced more moderate policies designed to humanise capitalism. At the 1931 election Labour's policies were even more moderate on issues such as state ownership, but also included new demand management and monetary reform policies.<sup>37</sup> This move to the centre brought Labour increasingly within New Zealand's popular liberal tradition.<sup>38</sup> Although Labour's socialist objective remained in its constitution until 1951, after 1925 it was rarely mentioned by Labour politicians.<sup>39</sup>

Because of the deepening economic depression in late 1931 Reform reluctantly agreed to join the Liberal minority government. These two parties then successfully contested the election as the Coalition. At the 1935 election Labour decisively defeated the government, which campaigned as National, by winning seats in suburban and rural areas as well as in its urban working-class heartland. The magnitude of Labour's victory was increased by vote splitting on the right, partly due to the formation of the very right-wing Democrat Party which advocated further economic retrenchment.<sup>40</sup> The Democrat's share of the vote is shown in Figure 2.3, which depicts the share of the vote captured by the larger and most important minor parties.

In 1936 the remnants of the Reform, Liberal and Democrat parties formally merged to form the current New Zealand National Party. Like Reform, National has been a broad-based right-wing party which has combined classical liberal

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<sup>37</sup> Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour*, pp. 25, 77, 151, 216.

<sup>38</sup> Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', p. 223.

<sup>39</sup> R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson, and A.V. Mitchell, *New Zealand Politics in Action: The 1960 General Election* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 14.

<sup>40</sup> Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, revised edition, p. 269.



and new liberal ideological beliefs with some elements of conservative thought.<sup>41</sup> For instance, National's principles have always included a strong classical liberal emphasis on individualism and the encouragement of individual effort and initiative, together with a new liberal desire to promote "progressive and humanitarian legislation". National has also supported some conservative objectives, such as maintaining links with Britain and encouraging cooperation between different groups within society.<sup>42</sup> When they have discussed their ideological beliefs National politicians have usually identified themselves as liberals.<sup>43</sup> However, since the 1970s they have been more willing to acknowledge conservative elements in National's policies.<sup>44</sup>

Until the 1930s all the Maori seats had been held by Liberal and Reform MPs. During the 1930s Labour developed links with the Maori Ratana religious and political movement. Once in government Labour provided the growing Maori population with greater equality and economic assistance. As a result by 1943 Labour had captured all four Maori seats, and was to retain control of them all until the 1993 election.<sup>45</sup>

At the 1943 election, which by agreement between Labour and National had been delayed because of the Second World War, Labour's vote share was reduced by the short-lived breakaway Democratic Soldier Labour Party. Democratic Labour's policies chiefly differed from Labour's because of its plans

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<sup>41</sup> Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', pp. 225-226; G.A. Wood, 'The National Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 301-302.

<sup>42</sup> Wood, 'The National Party', p. 302; Barry Gustafson, *The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party* (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), p. 9.

<sup>43</sup> John Marshall, *Memoirs, Volume One 1912 to 1960* (Auckland: Collins, 1983), pp. 112, 223. Marshall's 1947 maiden Parliamentary speech on liberalism, which is reprinted in his *Memoirs*, pp. 304-309, was highly influential within the National Party. R.D. Muldoon, *The Rise and Fall of a Young Turk* (Wellington: Reed, 1974), p. 29 notes that in his maiden speech he also identified as a liberal.

<sup>44</sup> D. O'C, 'Liberals in Crisis', *Here and Now*, Vol. 2 (1952), p. 3, notes that in 1952 National politicians were still unwilling to identify as conservatives. However, J.R. Marshall, 'And that was it', in *Right Out: Labour Victory '72, The Inside Story*, edited by Brian Edwards (Wellington: Reed, 1973), p. 48; and Hugh Templeton, *All Honourable Men: Inside the Muldoon Cabinet 1975-1984* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), p. 14, both admit that conservative ideas have had some influence on National's policies.

<sup>45</sup> Michael King, 'Between Two Worlds', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 300; Claudia Orange, 'Fraser and the Maori', in *Peter Fraser: Master Politician*, edited by Margaret Clark (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1998), pp. 91-107.

to make greater use of state credit as an alternative to borrowing, and to increase state control of the banking and financial systems.<sup>46</sup>

The two-party duopoly was next broken by Social Credit in 1954, which was to contest every election until 1990.<sup>47</sup> Like the Democratic Soldier Labour Party, Social Credit was originally based on monetary reform ideas, although this traditional doctrine was downplayed as it sought to increase its electoral viability. The most authoritative analysis of Social Credit's policies has shown that on other issues it was initially a right-wing party. Social Credit was also socially conservative, and received disproportionately strong support from rural areas. However, by the 1980s it had drifted towards the political centre on most issues, in the process losing many of the reasons for its existence. Despite winning on average 9.6% of the vote over the 1954-1990 period that it contested elections, Social Credit only ever won eight seats and never had more than two representatives in Parliament at the same time.<sup>48</sup> Much of Social Credit's support was a negative protest vote, with its support being highest when voters were disillusioned with the two main parties.<sup>49</sup>

After finally defeating Labour in 1949, National dominated throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with Labour winning only one brief term in 1957. During this period New Zealand was characterised by an increasingly strong national consensus. This national consensus involved general acknowledgement by the main parties of the need for state intervention and control over the economy, coupled with private ownership and enterprise, full employment, a universal welfare state, and defence policies based on membership of the Western

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<sup>46</sup> Barry Gustafson, *From the Cradle to the Grave: A Biography of Michael Joseph Savage* (Auckland: Penguin, 1988), pp. 201, 235; Erik Olssen, *John A. Lee* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1977), pp. 184-185.

<sup>47</sup> Although Social Credit changed its name to the Democratic Party in 1985, it is called Social Credit throughout this study.

<sup>48</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Democratic Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 247, 253-259.

<sup>49</sup> David McCraw, 'Social Credit's Role in the New Zealand Party System', *Political Science*, Vol. 31 (1979), pp. 54-60.

alliance.<sup>50</sup> The first representative survey research data, which is from the 1963 election, showed modest class voting but higher urban-rural differences.<sup>51</sup>

This national consensus first began to fray in the late 1960s when National's decision to involve New Zealand forces in the Vietnam war resulted in many students from middle class backgrounds joining the Labour Party which opposed New Zealand's involvement.<sup>52</sup> Further unravelling of the consensus occurred in 1972 when a wide range of postmaterialist issues were brought onto the main stream political agenda by the newly formed Values Party. Values' policies included environmental protection, a steady-state economy, withdrawal from New Zealand's military alliances and strong anti-nuclear policies.<sup>53</sup> Despite winning 5.2% of the vote at the 1975 election, due to New Zealand's first past the post electoral system Values won no seats in Parliament. When, following the 1975 election, Values was crippled by internal strife, Labour began to give new politics issues greater emphasis to attract support from the expanding middle class.<sup>54</sup> As a result the class cleavage became less important from the early 1970s as Labour and National converged on economic policy issues, but diverged on new politics policies. Indeed, National's support for continuing sporting ties with South Africa helped it win vital provincial seats at the 1981 election.<sup>55</sup>

Disillusionment with National's failure to free up the economy and with its policy of state-led development led to the formation in 1983 of the New Zealand Party by former National Party member Bob Jones. Advocating "liberal capitalism with fresh confidence", the New Zealand Party emphasised the need for greater individual freedom, private enterprise and less economic regulation

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<sup>50</sup> Chapman, Jackson and Mitchell, New Zealand Politics in Action, pp. 14-15; Jack Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), p. 4.

<sup>51</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Social Groups and Electoral Behaviour', in Electoral Behaviour in New Zealand, edited by Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 98-101.

<sup>52</sup> Barry Gustafson, 'The National Governments and Social Change', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 282-294.

<sup>53</sup> Stephen Rainbow, Green Politics, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. ix.

<sup>54</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Waiting for the Realignment?', p. 204.

<sup>55</sup> Alan McRobie, 'The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 398; Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), p. 144.

and government expenditure.<sup>56</sup> When, after its 1984 election victory, Labour began to move in a radical right-wing economic direction and National elected a leader more sympathetic to market liberalism, the New Zealand Party rapidly faded away. However, Labour's increasingly right-wing policy direction after 1987 resulted in the formation of a breakaway NewLabour Party in 1990 which was committed to traditional Labour policies. The 1990 election was also contested by a new Green Party formed by former Values members.<sup>57</sup>

Survey research findings show that class voting was low at the 1984 and 1987 elections, while Labour's anti-nuclear policies were critical to its victories at these elections.<sup>58</sup> McAllister and Vowles have also found that attitudes towards social liberalism had the greatest influence on voting behaviour at the 1990 election.<sup>59</sup>

In 1991 the Alliance Party was formed from a coalition between the NewLabour, Green, Social Credit, and ethnic Mana Motuhake parties.<sup>60</sup> The Alliance has been seen as advocating similar economic policies to those traditionally supported by the Labour Party.<sup>61</sup> It was joined in Parliament after the 1993 election by the New Zealand First Party, which had been formed that year by a dissident National MP who was unhappy with National's right-wing policy direction. New Zealand First has combined populist messages about corruption and anti-immigration with pragmatic centrist economic policies.<sup>62</sup> The 1993 election was also notable for the success of a referendum changing the electoral system to a mixed member proportional (MMP) system of proportional representation, based on that used in Germany.

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<sup>56</sup> Peter Aimer, 'The New Zealand Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1985), p. 194.

<sup>57</sup> Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 241.

<sup>58</sup> Jack Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom', in The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 27; Jack Vowles, 'Nuclear Free New Zealand and Rogernomics: the Survival of a Labour Government', Politics, Vol. 25 (1990), p. 87.

<sup>59</sup> McAllister and Vowles, 'The Rise of New Politics and Market Liberalism in Australia and New Zealand', p. 395.

<sup>60</sup> Jonathan Boston et al., New Zealand Under MMP: A New Politics? (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), p. 48.

<sup>61</sup> Vowles et al., Towards Consensus?, p. 54.

<sup>62</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The New Zealand First Party', in New Zealand Politics in Transition, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 165-174.

At the 1996 election National, Labour, New Zealand First, the Alliance, and the new right-wing ACT (Association of Consumers and Taxpayers) Party all won over 5% of the vote, and qualified for list seats.<sup>63</sup> Under proportional representation the Christian Coalition did much better than any previous religious party and got 4.3% of the party vote.

There was a reversion to the class cleavage at the 1993 and 1996 elections compared to the 1990 election. This occurred because differences between Labour and National on new politics issues have narrowed, with National accepting many of the policy initiatives introduced by Labour. In contrast, differences between Labour and National on old politics issues have widened.<sup>64</sup>

## 2.4 Responsible Party Government and Pluralism in New Zealand

### 2.4.1 The Emergence of Responsible Party Government

The emergence of disciplined political parties in New Zealand paved the way for the development of responsible party government. Although mandate theory has been taken seriously by New Zealand politicians since at least the 1870s,<sup>65</sup> it was not until the formation of the Liberal Party that for the first time all the MPs from a party were committed to a common programme.<sup>66</sup> During the period between 1890 and 1912 the Liberal Party claimed a broad right to legislate in accordance with the general policy that the electors had approved, with this marking an important step towards the establishment of responsible party government. The Liberal Party's tendency to act in advance of public

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<sup>63</sup> Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, 'The 1996 General Election', in New Zealand Politics in Transition, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), p. 228.

<sup>64</sup> Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, pp. 20, 106; Jack Vowles, 'A New Post-MMP Party System', in Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation, edited by Jack Vowles, et al., (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), pp. 32-35.

<sup>65</sup> D.G. Harper, 'The Doctrine of the Mandate with Particular Reference to its Development in New Zealand', (M.A. thesis, Victoria University College, Wellington, 1955), pp. 16, 48.

<sup>66</sup> David Hamer, 'Centralization and Nationalism', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 125-126.

opinion and its emphasis on retrospective approval by the electorate, however, meant that its actions often departed from the requirements of mandate theory.<sup>67</sup>

In contrast to the Liberal Party, Reform and Labour were much more sectional and programmatic.<sup>68</sup> After Reform became the government in 1912 a convention developed that there should be a close correspondence between a party's election programme and its subsequent actions. Because of this convention New Zealand political parties have presented manifestos at elections which have usually been drawn up in accordance with their principles and past record, and after consultation with interest groups. Cabinets have normally been prevented from deviating from their manifesto commitments by caucus, while the extra-parliamentary party organization and public opinion have also placed pressure on the government to implement its programme.<sup>69</sup> High policy implementation by parties has created a situation where elections have usually provided a "meaningful choice" between policy alternatives.<sup>70</sup> Because of New Zealand's culture of populist democracy the doctrine of the mandate has been very strong, and has been more widely accepted than in other countries such as Britain where there is a long-established opposing democratic elitist tradition.<sup>71</sup>

The convention of the mandate has been particularly important for ensuring accountability in New Zealand because of the comparative absence of institutional constraints on governments.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, Lijphart has found that over the postwar period New Zealand has been near the majoritarian ideal, with power being even more concentrated than in Britain.<sup>73</sup> Governments in New Zealand have been very powerful because except during the First and Second World

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<sup>67</sup> K.J. Scott, The New Zealand Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 49-50.

<sup>68</sup> Scott, The New Zealand Constitution, pp. 49-50.

<sup>69</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, edited by Hyam Gold, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 518.

<sup>70</sup> Robert Chapman, 'Political Culture: The Purposes of Party and the Current Challenge', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), p. 21.

<sup>71</sup> Harper, 'The Doctrine of the Mandate', Preface.

<sup>72</sup> Geoffrey Palmer, Constitution in Crisis: Reforming our Political System (Dunedin: John McIndoe, 1992), p. 2; Gary Hawke, 'Direct or Indirect Decisions: MPs, Trust and Effective Policy', in Changing Politics: The Electoral Referendum 1993, edited by Gary Hawke (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 1993), p. 152.

<sup>73</sup> Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 16; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of

Wars, and briefly during 1931, there were no coalition governments until 1996. In addition, there has been executive dominance over the legislature, with no government being defeated in a confidence vote in Parliament since 1912. Since 1935 party discipline has been almost inviolable.<sup>74</sup> New Zealand has also been consistently majoritarian because it has a unitary government and an unwritten constitution with no provision for judicial review.<sup>75</sup> Although there was an upper house until 1950, during the twentieth century this was completely lacking in power with governments having no difficulties enacting legislation they were committed to.<sup>76</sup> Select committees have also been weak,<sup>77</sup> while until 1989 the Reserve Bank was under the direct control of the government of the day.<sup>78</sup>

#### 2.4.2 Pluralism in New Zealand

Although the convention of the mandate has been an important check on New Zealand governments, it has been supplemented by the pluralist belief that interest groups from all ideological viewpoints have a legitimate role to play in policy making.<sup>79</sup> New Zealand's first past the post electoral system has meant that it has usually been governed by broad based parties, which have had to attract support from a wide range of social groups. Because of its low population and comparative lack of social stratification New Zealand has also traditionally been a very close knit and intimate society, where politicians have prided

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Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 25.

<sup>74</sup> Keith Jackson, The Dilemma of Parliament (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 8, 46-50. Jackson notes that Labour candidates sign a pledge to act in accordance with the majority decision of the caucus. Although National has often claimed that its members are allowed to vote according to their judgement, on the rare occasions its members have failed to support National's position severe sanctions have been imposed.

<sup>75</sup> Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power, pp. 2-3, 212-230.

<sup>76</sup> W.K. Jackson, The New Zealand Legislative Council: A Study of the Establishment, Failure and Abolition of an Upper House (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1972), pp. 98-99, 121.

<sup>77</sup> Jackson, The Dilemma of Parliament, pp. 113-126.

<sup>78</sup> Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. p. 138.

<sup>79</sup> Richard Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 16; Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', p. 518.

themselves on regular contact with a wide range of people.<sup>80</sup> This has resulted in politicians being very accessible to voters and to pressure groups.<sup>81</sup>

Conciliation of interest groups became particularly important to political parties from the 1950s as electoral competition intensified and long-term ideology became less important. Mitchell has even argued that during the then prevailing economic prosperity interest groups had more influence over policy outcomes than parties' policies or their long-term ideology. He found that the public service also tended to moderate policy differences between governments.<sup>82</sup> Although the direct effect of these influences on policy outcomes has often been seen by New Zealand political scientists as compatible with responsible party government,<sup>83</sup> it will be shown in section 2.4.5 that they have sometimes reduced the importance of parties' manifestos. First, however, examples of policy implementation, and then how responsible parties' policies have been, will be discussed.

### 2.4.3 Instances of Policy Implementation

Historians, political scientists and political parties have frequently detailed instances when parties have kept closely to their programme commitments. Once Reform became the government in 1912 it moved quickly to implement its programme by providing the opportunity for farmers to cheaply freehold their

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<sup>80</sup> Austin Mitchell, 'Politics', in *The Pattern of New Zealand Culture*, edited by A.L. McLeod (New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), pp. 69, 89; Austin Mitchell, *The Half-Gallon Quarter-Acre Pavlova Paradise* (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1972), pp. 18-25. On p. 25 he details a case where the Prime Minister got up late at night and went to the railway station to help a woman who had rung to say her suitcase had gone missing.

<sup>81</sup> Margaret Hayward, *Diary of the Kirk Years* (Wellington: Cape Catley and Reed, 1981), pp. 105, 126 notes that during the 1970s security precautions at Parliament consisted of one policeman who spent most of his time giving directions. Mulgan, *Democracy and Power in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 102-133 describes the strength of interest groups in New Zealand.

<sup>82</sup> Austin Mitchell, *Politics and People in New Zealand* (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), pp. 54-57, 135. T.P. Shand, in 'Foreword', *Government by Party: Parliament and Politics in New Zealand*, edited by Austin Mitchell (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1966), p. 5 also notes that it was commonly felt in the 1960s that the "Public Service runs the country regardless of Parliament".

<sup>83</sup> For instance Mulgan, *Politics in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, fuses the concepts of responsible party government and pluralism. See, in particular, p. 322 where he sees pluralist democracy as principally requiring competing disciplined and programmatic parties. See also Palmer, *Constitution in Crisis*, p. 8.

land, opening up further Maori land for settlement, and introducing the Public Service Act which established a politically neutral public service.<sup>84</sup>

Labour has also traditionally taken the doctrine of the mandate very seriously. The first Labour government implemented its promises to restore economic prosperity through minimum wages and prices, and the elimination of remaining cuts to wages. Its policy of state control of credit resulted in the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank. Labour also expanded social services, and started large-scale state housing projects, while increasing benefits. It delayed the implementation of the Social Security Act (1938), which provided for free health care and the world's most comprehensive system of benefits, until after the 1938 election so that it could claim a mandate for this legislation.<sup>85</sup>

Historians have noted that the second Labour government between 1957 and 1960 implemented its promises to provide a tax rebate during changes to the tax system, and to improve social services.<sup>86</sup> Following its 1972 landslide election victory Labour also kept closely to its election commitments, with its leader Norman Kirk always keeping a copy of its manifesto close at hand.<sup>87</sup> When Labour did break an important commitment by stopping a tour by the South African rugby team, Labour went to great lengths to justify it in terms of changing circumstances.<sup>88</sup>

National governments have also usually implemented their programme. For instance, during the 1950s National implemented its promises to increase economic freedom by eliminating irksome wartime regulations and introducing policies making it easier for state house tenants to buy their home. National even called an early election in 1951 to seek approval for its use of draconian

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<sup>84</sup> W.J. Gardner, William Massey (Wellington: Reed, 1969), p. 17.

<sup>85</sup> Robert Chapman, 'From Labour to National', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 352-361.

<sup>86</sup> Chapman, 'From Labour to National', p. 380; Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, revised edition, p. 293.

<sup>87</sup> Tony Garnier, Bruce Kohn and Pat Booth, The Hunter and the Hill: New Zealand Politics in the Kirk Years (Auckland: Cassell, 1978), pp. 91-94; Michael Bassett, The State in New Zealand 1840-1984: Socialism Without Doctrines? (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), p. 302.

<sup>88</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', in The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand, edited by Martin Holland and Jonathan Boston, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 14.

emergency regulations to help crush a strike by waterfront workers.<sup>89</sup> During the 1960s, when Keith Holyoake was National's leader, he boasted of always checking its manifesto before making decisions. Holyoake argued that since his government had been elected mainly on the basis of its election policy, "there is an obligation to the electors to fulfill those promises".<sup>90</sup> Indeed, Holyoake's named copy of National's 1966 manifesto survives in the National Party Papers.<sup>91</sup>

Similarly, Muldoon, who was Prime Minister between 1975 and 1984 treated National's manifesto as his "bible" during his first years as Prime Minister, and frequently resolved cabinet debates on policy alternatives by simply implementing what National had promised in its manifesto.<sup>92</sup> One important commitment Muldoon made at the 1975 election was to replace Labour's new compulsory contributory superannuation scheme with a universal scheme funded from general taxation.<sup>93</sup> Once in government Muldoon instructed employers to cease their contributions to the compulsory scheme, even though the necessary legislation had not yet been passed. Although this meant breaking the law, Muldoon considered a mandate from voters sufficient justification for this.<sup>94</sup> A court injunction was successfully sought by a participant in the scheme to require compliance with the law. However, the Chief Justice suspended its enforcement on grounds that the new government had signalled its intention to change the law.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Barry Gustafson, 'The National Governments and Social Change (1949-1972)', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 276-278; Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, revised edition, pp. 290-291.

<sup>90</sup> Anthony Wood, 'Holyoake and the Holyoake years', in Sir Keith Holyoake: Towards a Political Biography, edited by Margaret Clark (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), p. 38.

<sup>91</sup> National Party Papers, Alexandra Turnbull Library, MS 89-075-109-5. Other copies of this manifesto with the names of different Ministers and department heads on the cover are also in this file. This suggests that after the election copies of the manifesto were handed out like telephone books for easy consultation by policy makers.

<sup>92</sup> Templeton, All Honourable Men: Inside the Muldoon Cabinet 1975-1984, p. 14.

<sup>93</sup> Alan McRobie, 'The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 391-392.

<sup>94</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', p. 14.

<sup>95</sup> Stephen Levine, The New Zealand Political System: Politics in a Small Society (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), p. 30.

#### 2.4.4 Policy Responsibility?

Although the high rate of policy implementation by parties has indicated that they have taken their commitments very seriously, their policies have sometimes deviated from the mandate theory requirement that policies be responsible. For instance, historians have argued that Reform borrowed too much during the 1920s, making it difficult for governments to borrow further for public works during the Great Depression in the 1930s.<sup>96</sup> Labour's policies at the 1938 election also departed from the principles of responsible economic management because they disregarded economic constraints. As a result, after the election Labour faced a severe balance of payments crisis that threatened its ability to fulfill its policies. This problem was only resolved when on the outbreak of the Second World War the British government offered to buy all New Zealand's meat, dairy and wool exports.<sup>97</sup>

Historians have sometimes claimed that during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s elections increasingly became auctions, with parties seeking to outbid each other.<sup>98</sup> Indeed, National's very generous superannuation policy at the 1975 election has been described as the "biggest ever bribe in New Zealand politics". This policy has often been considered particularly ill-timed because it greatly increased government expenditure at a time when sharply declining terms of trade meant that the economy was increasingly fragile.<sup>99</sup> Critics of the National governments during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s have argued that indecision and a desire to keep faith with voters and interest groups resulted in problems rarely being solved.<sup>100</sup>

Those sympathetic to theories of responsible party government believe that government policies have had a relatively minor effect on economic outcomes during periods when policy implementation has been high. Instead they argue

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<sup>96</sup> Miles Fairburn, 'The Farmers Take Over', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 209; R.M. Chapman, The Political Scene, 1919-1931 (Auckland: Heinemann, 1969), p. 59.

<sup>97</sup> Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1976), pp. 170-171, 189.

<sup>98</sup> Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, revised edition, p. 293; Bassett, The State in New Zealand 1840-1984, p. 14.

<sup>99</sup> McRobie, 'The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991', pp. 391-392.

that external factors have had an “overwhelming” influence on the economy. Supporters of responsible party government claim that New Zealand’s relatively poor economic performance during the postwar period was largely due to weaker demand for its agricultural products, and the loss of privileged access to markets in Britain from the 1970s. They also point to research showing that between the mid-1950s and the early 1980s the New Zealand economy diversified more quickly than any other OECD economy, with this in part being due to substantial government assistance to the productive sector.<sup>101</sup>

#### 2.4.5 Deviations From Election Promises

While parties have generally kept to their manifesto commitments, there have always been exceptions. For instance, Reform never met its pledge to move to an elected upper house because it found the nomination system a useful source for patronage.<sup>102</sup> Similarly, while National technically met its 1960 pledge of introducing a Bill of Rights, as a result of public opposition this legislation was later dropped. After consultation with business groups, National’s policy of voluntary unionism was also effectively abandoned in both the 1950s and 1960s on the grounds that high rates of trade union membership diluted the influence of more militant members.<sup>103</sup> The latter two examples show how National’s commitment to interest group consultation sometimes overrode its commitment to its manifesto. During its 1972-1975 term Labour, like many other governments, was unable to meet all the expectations it had generated.<sup>104</sup>

The most important deviation from the convention of the mandate before the 1980s occurred at the 1928 election. At this election Sir Joseph Ward, the

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<sup>100</sup> Wood, ‘Holyoake and the Holyoake years’, p. 33; Brian Easton, The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), p. 7.

<sup>101</sup> John Gould, The Muldoon Years: An Essay on New Zealand’s Recent Economic Growth (Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), pp. 7-8, 38-39; Brian Easton, In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1997), pp. 3, 68.

<sup>102</sup> Jackson, The New Zealand Legislative Council, p. x; Gardner, William Massey, p. 18.

<sup>103</sup> Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), pp. 82, 88-89. National Party legislation theoretically abolished compulsory unionism, but allowed for industrial awards which gave preference to union members.

Liberal Party's aged leader, misread his notes while delivering his campaign speech and promised to borrow seventy million pounds overseas for economic development immediately, rather than over the ten years he had originally envisaged. Ward's failure to correct this error, together with its high degree of economic irresponsibility,<sup>105</sup> marked a substantial break from the mandate theory requirements that politicians be honest about their intentions and make realistic promises. The willingness of voters to believe this promise, however, reflects poorly on their credibility. Once in government Ward was unable to borrow the money promised, with him justifying this breach on grounds of economic responsibility.<sup>106</sup>

Because of the deepening depression at the 1931 election the Coalition asked voters for a "free hand to meet new conditions as they might arise".<sup>107</sup> Although this showed an awareness of the importance of mandate theory, in effect this request meant asking for permission to insulate economic policy-making from public influence. Despite considerable public criticism, in 1932 the Reform-Liberal Coalition extended its term to four years, arguing that it had been given a mandate by the electorate to do so.<sup>108</sup> However, since it was widely felt that the "blank cheque" the electorate had given the Coalition only applied to economic matters, this was regarded by most voters as a very serious violation of their trust.<sup>109</sup>

Despite these breaches of promises by the 1928-1931 Liberal government and by the Coalition, the convention of the mandate was re-established by subsequent Labour and National governments and endured until the 1980s. Opinions differ as to when during the 1980s parties began to move away from the convention of the electoral mandate. Chapman and Vowles have stated that it began in the early 1980s when National's 'Think Big' industrialisation projects

<sup>104</sup> Ray Goldstein, 'Introduction: Assessing Government Performance', in Labour in Power: Promise and Performance: Evaluations of the work of the New Zealand Government from 1972 to 1975, edited by Ray Goldstein (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1975), p. 10.

<sup>105</sup> Michael Bassett, Three Party Politics in New Zealand: 1911-1931 (Auckland: Historical Publications, 1982), pp. 40-41.

<sup>106</sup> Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, p. 272. Although Scott does not comment on this broken promise it would seem to support his theory in the New Zealand Constitution, pp. 49-50 that Liberal Party politicians were not as committed to mandate theory as those from Reform and Labour.

<sup>107</sup> Burdon, The New Dominion, p. 138.

<sup>108</sup> Scott, The New Zealand Constitution, p. 50.

angered many National Party members by breaking with its private enterprise philosophy.<sup>110</sup> In contrast, Mulgan has argued that Muldoon had gained a mandate at the 1981 election for these projects.<sup>111</sup>

There is agreement, however, that after its election victory in 1984 Labour substantially moved away from the conventions that parties have an obligation to fulfill their manifestos, and to consult widely with interest groups. One clear promise Labour broke early in its term was its pledge not to change the conditions for national superannuation payments, with an additional surtax being placed on superannuitants in higher income brackets. In other areas Labour also followed an increasingly neo-liberal economic path, with deregulation of internal markets, the economy being opened up to international forces, sharp reductions in support for the productive sector, corporatisation of state enterprises, cuts in taxation for the better off, and monetarist policies to control inflation.<sup>112</sup> These measures reversed the economic policies introduced by the first Labour government, and differed both from Labour's manifesto commitments to continued state activism and its tradition of protecting the interests of the less well off.<sup>113</sup> In contrast, Labour kept faith with key groups of supporters by keeping other promises including banning visits by nuclear ships, establishing a Ministry of Women's Affairs, and reintroducing compulsory unionism.<sup>114</sup>

By the time of the 1987 election Labour admitted that its manifesto was of little significance, with its leader David Lange taking a democratic elitist position by arguing that his government should simply be judged on its record.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, because of differences within the Labour Party over policy, only a brief policy statement was issued before the election, with Labour's full manifesto not being in general circulation until after the election.<sup>116</sup> Labour retained power in

<sup>109</sup> Harper, 'The Doctrine of the Mandate', pp. 61-62.

<sup>110</sup> Chapman, 'Political Culture', pp. 27-28; Jack Vowles, 'The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 16 (1995), p. 100.

<sup>111</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', p. 14.

<sup>112</sup> Simon Collins, *Rogernomics: Is there a better way?* (Wellington: Pitman, 1987), pp. 35-128 gives an excellent account of the economic changes during Labour's first term.

<sup>113</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', pp 15-16.

<sup>114</sup> Margaret Wilson, *Labour in Government 1984-1987* (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1989), pp. 48, 63, 94; Jack Nagel, 'Social Choice in Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalization in New Zealand', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 28 (1998), p. 255.

<sup>115</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', p. 16.

<sup>116</sup> Anthony Hubbard, 'Broken Promises', *Listener*, 16 April 1990, p. 20.

1987 with many of its core voters suspending judgement in the expectation that in its second term Labour would move back to more traditional policies.<sup>117</sup> Instead, Labour broke a number of manifesto commitments in its second term including promises not to sell state owned enterprises, not to restructure the state sector without consultation with its employees and unions, and not to increase student fees.<sup>118</sup> However, both total government expenditure and the amount spent on social services continued to rise.<sup>119</sup>

Labour was willing to break its promises because many of its cabinet Ministers took the democratic elitist view that New Zealand's economic problems were attributable to the party organization, election manifesto commitments and interest group activity preventing governments from implementing sound non-political economic policies.<sup>120</sup> Both Labour's leader and its Minister of Finance argued that the economy was in a state of crisis, with the relative standard of living having fallen from consistently being one of the highest in the world during the first half of the century to near the bottom of the OECD.<sup>121</sup> Most of the Labour cabinet also came from middle class backgrounds, and had little commitment to traditional Labour Party goals or to the practice, if not the theory, of the electoral mandate.<sup>122</sup> Because they usually had a low knowledge of economics the Labour cabinet were also heavily influenced by the New Zealand Treasury, which considered economic reform essential.<sup>123</sup> The

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<sup>117</sup> Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer, Voters' Victory: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), pp. 2-3.

<sup>118</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', pp. 16-20.

<sup>119</sup> Chris Rudd, 'The Changing Structure of Public Expenditure', in Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution, edited by Jonathan Boston et al. (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 144, 149.

<sup>120</sup> Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', p. 518.

<sup>121</sup> David Lange, 'Foreword', in The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. ix; Roger Douglas, Toward Prosperity (Auckland: David Bateman, 1987), p. 13.

<sup>122</sup> Nagel, 'Social Choice in Pluralitarian Democracy', p. 235; Simon Sheppard, Broken Circle: The Decline and Fall of the Fourth Labour Government (Wellington: PSL Press, 1999), pp. 7-8. Ironically Geoffrey Palmer who was Prime Minister between 1989 and 1990 when Labour broke a number of key promises later wrote a book which criticised politicians for their departures from the convention of the mandate. See, Palmer, New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis, pp. 9-10.

<sup>123</sup> Brian Easton and Rolf Gerritsen, 'Economic Reform: Parallels and Divergences', in The Great Experiment: Labour Parties and Public Policy Transformation in Australia and New Zealand, edited by Francis Castles, Rolf Gerritsen and Jack Vowles (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), p. 35; Jonathan Boston, 'The Treasury: Its Role, Philosophy and Influence', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland:

Labour cabinet was able to push measures through caucus because the growth in the size of cabinet meant that it constituted a majority in caucus.<sup>124</sup> Although historically the desire to be reelected has acted as a restraint on governments, since many of the Labour cabinet were not planning to stand again Labour's declining support did not concern them.<sup>125</sup> This created a situation of "elective dictatorship" with few constraints on the government until the election.<sup>126</sup>

At the 1990 election, the National leader Jim Bolger stated that he considered it a personal challenge to "rebuild confidence in the political process".<sup>127</sup> After the election, however, National broke key promises including its unqualified pledges to eliminate the superannuation surcharge and tertiary education fees. Unsignalled radical surgery on the health system and sharp cuts in benefits were also introduced. Other changes, such as deregulation of the labour market, had been indicated in National's manifesto, but were far more extreme than most voters expected. National also failed to reach its unrealistic goal of halving unemployment by 1993.<sup>128</sup> Bolger justified these breaches of National's pre-election commitments on the grounds that before the election Labour had concealed a massive budget deficit and the desperate financial situation of the state owned Bank of New Zealand.<sup>129</sup> However, both Bolger and his Finance Minister expressed regret that they had been forced to break their promises, indicating that they retained some support for mandate theory.<sup>130</sup>

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Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 202-203; Treasury, Economic Management (Wellington: The Treasury, 1984), p. 103-121.

<sup>124</sup> Chapman, 'Political Culture', p. 20; Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', pp. 522-523.

<sup>125</sup> Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 122.

<sup>126</sup> Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', p. 518.

<sup>127</sup> Gordon Campbell, 'Who Cares?', Listener, 4 June 1990, p. 17.

<sup>128</sup> Jane Kelsey, Rolling Back the State: Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1993), pp. 83-85; Raymond Miller and Helena Catt, Season of Discontent: By-elections and the Bolger Government (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1993), pp. 20-24; Palmer, New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis, p. 10.

<sup>129</sup> Jim Bolger, Bolger: A View From the Top (Auckland: Viking, 1998), pp. 38-41.

<sup>130</sup> Bolger, Bolger: A View From the Top, p. 30; Ruth Richardson, Making a Difference (Christchurch: Shoal Bay Press, 1995), p. 79.

### 2.4.6 The Current State of Mandate Theory in New Zealand

The disregard by successive Labour and National governments for their manifesto promises and for consultative procedures resulted in very deep disenchantment among voters about the democratic process.<sup>131</sup> It also shifted New Zealand away from its tradition of pragmatic activist governments. The breakdown in trust in the main parties during this period led to the establishment of the NewLabour, Alliance and New Zealand First parties, all of which promised to keep their promises.<sup>132</sup> Loss of faith in the democratic process was also a crucial reason why the majority of voters voted for proportional representation in the 1993 binding referendum on the electoral system. This was because since MMP makes coalition governments more likely, it reduces the power of the main parties to make rapid changes without public support.<sup>133</sup>

Because of its collapse in public support from 1992, National began moderating its policies, particularly in health and superannuation. At the 1993 election National promised to avoid unachievable “big spending promises”.<sup>134</sup> After clinging to power, National’s leader appointed a new Finance Minister, signalling that it had abandoned further radical and divisive change in favour of more traditional and moderate policies.<sup>135</sup> Similarly, after the 1990 election Labour increasingly distanced itself from its 1980s reforms, and committed itself to returning to more traditional policies and rebuilding the trust of voters.<sup>136</sup> Indeed, by the late 1990s the convention of the mandate remained important, even though the much greater likelihood of coalition governments under MMP means that it is unlikely that any party in the future will be able to implement its entire manifesto.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, pp. 132-133; Mulgan, ‘The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand’, p. 513.

<sup>132</sup> Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 323.

<sup>133</sup> Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, p. 180; Vowles, ‘The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand’, pp. 100-102.

<sup>134</sup> New Zealand National Party, Manifesto '93: Stepping Out on the Path To 2010 (New Zealand National Party, 1993), Prime Minister’s Message.

<sup>135</sup> Bolger, Bolger: A View From the Top, p. 120.

<sup>136</sup> New Zealand Labour Party, Jobs, Health, Growth: Labour’s Manifesto for New Zealand (MMS Ltd, 1993), pp. 12-13; NZPA, ‘Labour apologises for Rogernomics mistakes’, Dominion, 27 May 1996, p. 2.

<sup>137</sup> Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 258.

The renewed support by the main parties for the convention of the manifesto probably reflects an awareness that breaking their pre-election commitments sharply reduced their support, and at times seemed to endanger their survival as the largest parties.<sup>138</sup> An increase in electoral pressures resulting from MMP has further threatened Labour's and National's dominance. The main parties are also now much more ideologically cohesive, with many Labour and National MPs having shifted to parties with values closer to their own.<sup>139</sup> By 1993 low inflation, strengthening economic growth and the anticipation of a series of large budget surpluses also made further economic reforms less urgent.<sup>140</sup> In addition, National's Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994) made it much more difficult for governments to either hide the financial situation before the election, or claim ignorance of the real situation afterwards.<sup>141</sup>

Possibly there has also been an awareness by politicians that elitist policy-making methods frequently do not produce more successful policies and desirable outcomes than responsible party government. Supporters of democratic elitism argue that the willingness of governments during the late 1980s and early 1990s to make tough economic decisions set the economy on a path for economic recovery.<sup>142</sup> In contrast, those sympathetic to mandate theory and to pluralism argue that because economic reforms during this period were not subject to prior scrutiny they were often poorly planned and too extreme. For instance, because the New Zealand dollar was overvalued economic growth was very low during the 1985-1996 period.<sup>143</sup> They point to Australia as an example of a country where economic reform was carried out in a much more consensual

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<sup>138</sup> Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, pp. 7-9.

<sup>139</sup> Shephard, Broken Circle, p. 4; Jonathan Boston, et al., New Zealand Under MMP: A New Politics? (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), pp. 47-58.

<sup>140</sup> Treasury, Briefing to the Incoming Government 1993: An Overview of Issues (Wellington: Treasury, 1993), pp. 7-8.

<sup>141</sup> Although Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 316-317 argues that the Fiscal Responsibility Act strengthens the power of business, surprisingly he fails to discuss how it makes politicians more accountable.

<sup>142</sup> Roger Douglas, 'The Politics of Successful Structural Reform', Paper delivered to the Mt. Pelerin Society, 28 November 1989, pp. 4-5; Richardson, Making a Difference, pp. 79, 87.

<sup>143</sup> Easton, In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy, pp. 241, 258; Len Bayliss, Prosperity Mislaidd: Economic Failure in New Zealand and what should be done about it (Wellington: G.P. Publications), p. 22.

and planned way, and where the economic outcomes were much better.<sup>144</sup> Indeed, OECD economists have shown that had exchange rate policy in New Zealand been better managed, economic output in New Zealand would be considerably higher.<sup>145</sup> Similarly, reorganizations in areas such as health failed to produce the predicted efficiencies, while the unwieldy and costly organizational structures established often had to be simplified later.<sup>146</sup> Many state assets were also sold for well below their real value.<sup>147</sup>

Because Labour and National failed to develop public support for their policy changes some have been reversed. For instance, in 1998 the National-New Zealand First coalition government dropped the superannuation surtax. If superannuation changes had been carefully explained in parties' manifestos there might have been greater public support and understanding of the need to reduce expenditure in this area.<sup>148</sup> As a result business people and groups have increasingly lectured politicians on the need to build support for economic reforms so that they will survive changes in the government.<sup>149</sup>

#### 2.4.7 Demographic and Economic Theories of Democracy in New Zealand

In addition to responsible party government, pluralism, and elitism, other theories of democracy have also been important in New Zealand. For instance, economic and demographic models of government expenditure have been seen as explaining policy outcomes in some areas. One example has been welfare expenditure, which Rudd has argued increased from the early 1970s partly

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<sup>144</sup> Easton, *In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy*, p. 257; Easton and Gerritsen, 'Economic Reform: Parallels and Divergences', pp. 40-46; Philip Wrigley, 'A Government But Not At Any Price', *National Business Review*, 6 December, 1996, p. 18.

<sup>145</sup> Isabelle Jourmand and Helmut Reissen, 'Real Exchange Rate Overshooting and Persistent Trade Effects: The Case for New Zealand', *World Economy*, Vol. 15 (1992), p. 387.

<sup>146</sup> Brian Easton, *The Commercialisation of New Zealand* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), pp. 162-163.

<sup>147</sup> This has been admitted even by those sympathetic to privatisation. See, for example, Ian Duncan and Alan Bollard, *Corporatization and Privatization: Lessons From New Zealand* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 42.

<sup>148</sup> Susan St John, 'Superannuation in the 1990s: Where Angels Fear to Tread', in *Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 283, 296.

<sup>149</sup> Douglas Myers, 'Growing Pains', in *Growing Pains* (Wellington: New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1995), pp. 9-10; 'BIL chief points out virtues of open market', *Dominion*, 27 October, 1996, p. 11.

because of demographic factors, such as an ageing population, and economic factors, such as growing unemployment.<sup>150</sup> Other policy changes, such as the growth of education expenditure during the 1960s, have sometimes been associated by historians with demographic factors rather than parties' policies.<sup>151</sup> Indeed, almost all the examples of policy implementation cited in this chapter come from a government's first term. This is because parties have made relatively few high profile policy changes thereafter.

#### 2.4.8 Marxist Theories of Democracy in New Zealand

New Zealand political scientists have also sometimes admitted that Marxist theories about the dominance of elites have some validity. For instance, Mulgan, who sees power in the New Zealand political system as being widely dispersed has still admitted that business groups are in a "persistently privileged position", while groups such as Maori face systematic disadvantages.<sup>152</sup> Taking a Marxist position, Roper has gone considerably further, arguing that that because of the State's financial dependence on business, business groups have considerably more power than other groups. Roper has argued that business groups became much more powerful during the 1980s and 1990s as capital ownership became more centralised, and the economy became more open to international forces. According to Roper this allowed business groups to exert a much greater influence on government policy.<sup>153</sup> Other Marxists in New Zealand have concentrated on the ideological dominance of right-wing ideas.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Chris Rudd, 'The New Zealand Welfare State: Origins, Development, and Crisis', in State and Economy in New Zealand, edited by Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 229. Brian Easton, Pragmatism and Progress: Social Security in the Seventies (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 1981), p. 9 argues that increased social distress also made National more amenable to welfare state innovation.

<sup>151</sup> Barry Gustafson, 'The National Governments and Social Change', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 288.

<sup>152</sup> Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition pp. 310, 295, 25.

<sup>153</sup> Brian Roper, 'A Level Playing Field? Business Political Activism and State Policy Formation', in State and Economy in New Zealand, edited by Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 150-151, 154.

<sup>154</sup> See, for example, Bruce Jesson, Fragments of Labour: The Story Behind the Labour Government (Auckland: Penguin, 1989), p. 43; W. Rosenberg, New Zealand Can Be Different

## 2.5 Conclusion

This century New Zealand parties have usually been divided by a class cleavage dominated by economic policy issues. However, since the 1970s new politics issues have become much more important. This resulted in the formation of new parties and the adaptation by existing parties to value changes. At the 1993 and 1996 elections the class cleavage became more important again as the largest parties converged on new politics issues but diverged on left-right issues.

The doctrine of the mandate was particularly strong in New Zealand between 1912 and the early 1980s, with parties publishing manifestos and implementing their commitments. Parties sometimes did less well in terms of following sound economic policies. Although there were major deviations from the convention of the mandate in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the convention was restored by later governments. During the 1980s and early 1990s parties' policies deviated considerably from their pre-election commitments. This severely reduced democratic legitimacy and did not produce improved economic results. Since the early 1990s there has been a partial return to the convention of the mandate. This reflects the introduction of proportional representation and tighter competition from the minor parties, greater ideological cohesion within the main parties, and a realisation that elitist policy-making methods do not always produce good policy outcomes.

## Chapter Three: Review of the Literature

### 3.1 Research on Election Programmes

Although in most countries relatively few voters read election programmes, they indirectly influence what the campaign issues are and shape voters' perceptions of parties' policies. This is because election programmes are usually launched by parties' leaders at the start of their election campaign. Comments by the media and candidates on policies contained in parties' programmes then dominate subsequent debate during the campaign. While in many countries election campaigning is now largely centred on television, detailed studies in Scandinavia of all campaign material have shown little difference in party emphases in different mediums.<sup>1</sup>

This chapter surveys the rich and increasingly sophisticated literature based on content analysis data from election programmes that has developed on many countries since the 1970s. Content analysis is a research technique designed to make comparisons of texts transparent and replicable.<sup>2</sup> As improvements in computer technology have made possible analysis of large quantities of data, content analysis results from election programmes have been used for an increasingly wide range of purposes. In contrast to other developed countries, however, there has been little analysis of New Zealand election programmes using replicable content analysis techniques.

Six main types of research involving election programmes relevant to this thesis will be discussed in this chapter. One type of analysis of election programmes has been exploring and comparing the share of space taken up in parties' manifestos by different topics, and how this has changed over time. A second has focussed on the main dimensions of competition, and how these have varied between countries. A third type of research into election programmes has

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<sup>1</sup> Ian Budge, 'The internal analyses of election programmes', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 18-21.

been testing theories of party movement, and investigating which cleavages have been most important at dividing parties at particular elections. A fourth type of research based on election programmes has been using changes in their length to study changes in parties' attitudes towards democracy and the role of the state. A fifth type of research has inquired into whether governments keep policy commitments made within election programmes. The sixth type of research based on election programmes is detailed studies of coalition formation. This will only be briefly outlined since it will not be studied in this thesis. This chapter concentrates on studies that use the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) coding framework, or earlier versions of its coding scheme, because they are most relevant to the research carried out in this thesis.

### 3.2 Methodology of Content Analysis Studies

#### 3.2.1 Coding Schemes

Although a much fuller description of content analysis methods is given in chapter four, it is necessary to look briefly at coding schemes to understand this chapter. The MRG's widely used methodology involves breaking the content of sentences down into quasi-sentences consisting of only one point, and then allocating one of 56 coding categories to that point. The examples of the main MRG codes included in Table 3.1 show that the coding system has been shaped by theories of ideologies and cleavages. For instance, categories such as market regulation and controlled economy measure left-wing economic policies, while categories such as environmental protection measure attitudes towards new politics issues. Similarly, the national way of life: positive category often measures support for conservative themes, while the traditional morality category measures support for attitudes related to religious beliefs. Because some

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<sup>2</sup> Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), p. 21.

of the categories are very similar, closely related coding categories have often been merged for analysis.<sup>3</sup>

Sometimes a separate count has been made of each party's references to opposition parties and their policies.<sup>4</sup> The MRG codes are divided up into seven main domains. For instance, categories such as free enterprise, incentives, nationalisation and 13 other categories make up the economic policy domain.

Table 3.1: Selected coding categories and brief descriptions

Categories	Brief Descriptions
Military: Positive	Need to maintain or increase military expenditure, conscription.
Peace	Peace as a goal, belief in peaceful means of solving crises.
Free Enterprise	Favourable mentions of free enterprise capitalism, favourable mentions of private property rights.
Incentives	Need for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise.
Market Regulation	Need for regulations designed to make private enterprise work better, actions against monopolies.
Controlled Economy	General need for government control of the economy, control over prices, wages, etc.
Environmental Protection	Preservation of countryside, forests, etc, environmental improvement.
National Way of Life +ve	Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism, support for established national ideas.
Traditional Morality +ve	Favourable mentions of traditional moral values, maintenance and stability of family.

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, M.J. Laver and Ian Budge, 'Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation', in Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J. Laver and Ian Budge (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 23-25.

<sup>4</sup> Ian Budge and David Robertson, 'Do parties differ and how? Comparative discriminant and factor analyses', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 389-391.

There have been a number of other coding schemes based on coding specific sentences,<sup>5</sup> or identifying specific pledges within manifestos.<sup>6</sup> Political scientists have also used coding schemes based on scanning data to measure references to ideological values or norms contained within the text of election programmes.<sup>7</sup>

### 3.3 The Main Types of Research into Election Programmes

#### 3.3.1 Parties' Policies and Agenda Setting

From comparing average references by parties to issues over time political scientists have been able to see which issues have been present on the political agenda. For instance, Mair has found that in Ireland issues such as productivity and technology featured prominently in parties' programmes, while topics such as corruption have been rarely mentioned.<sup>8</sup> Researchers using the MRG coding scheme have usually found that the economic policy domain is dominant in most countries, with the relative importance of other domains differing between countries and over time.<sup>9</sup> Content analysis results have also shown which issues differentiate different types of political parties. For example, Hearl has found that although liberal parties' policies have generally been close to those of all parties in European democracies, as might be expected they place substantially

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<sup>5</sup> See, for instance, Gerald Pomper and Susan Lederman, Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics (New York: Longman, 1980), pp. 133-134.

<sup>6</sup> These studies are all referenced in the section on policy implementation.

<sup>7</sup> See, for instance, Richard Topf, 'Party manifestos', in Labour's Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond, edited by Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice with Bridget Taylor (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994), p. 159; Michael Laver and John Garry, 'Estimating Policy Positions from Party Manifestos', Paper at the 26th Joint Sessions Workshops, ECPR, 23 to 28 March 1998, at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom, pp. 12-13; John Garry, 'Using Computer-Coded Content Analysis of German and Norwegian Election Manifestos to Estimate Party Policy Positions', Paper at Mannheim ECPR 1999, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup> Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organization, Ideology and Electoral Competition (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987), p. 156.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, William P. Irvine, 'Canada 1945-1980: party platforms and campaign strategies', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 78; Ian McAllister and Rhonda Moore, 'The Issues that Divided the Parties, 1946-1990', in Party Strategy and Change: Australian

more emphasis than average on core liberal themes such as freedom and human rights, and democracy.<sup>10</sup>

Results gathered from content analysis studies have supported the saliency theory hypothesis that parties compete by emphasising issues on which voters favour their policies, rather than by conducting a debate on common issues. Indeed, research has confirmed that parties rarely directly attack other parties in their manifestos, with references to other parties and their policies on average making up less than 10% of the content of manifestos.<sup>11</sup> Parties also usually avoid referring to the negative consequences of their policies, such as cuts to social welfare programmes, and instead concentrate on positive aspects, such as tax reductions.<sup>12</sup> In addition, research has supported the belief that parties' long-term ideology often influences and constrains parties' policies. For instance, Budge and Farlie (1983) argued that the British Labour Party could not completely drop electorally unpopular references to state ownership and economic planning. This was because doing so would cause splits within the Labour Party.<sup>13</sup>

Parties' selective emphasis on issues means that they are continually trying to set the political agenda. However, research in Britain and the United States has shown that all election issues which secondary sources had noted were important were referred to in at least one of the main parties' election programmes.<sup>14</sup> The results from studies that have tracked changes in the saliency of issues over time have also indicated that parties have usually been responsive to changes in society and the economy. For instance, results in Europe have shown that whereas issues to do with traditional morality were important until

Electoral Speeches Since 1946, edited by Ian McAllister and Rhonda Moore, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991), p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Derek Hearl, 'Ambivalence revisited: an analysis of liberal party manifestos since 1945', in Liberal Parties in Western Democracies, edited by Emil J. Kirchner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 445.

<sup>11</sup> Ian Budge and David Robertson, 'Do parties differ and how? Comparative discriminant and factor analyses', p. 391.

<sup>12</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert, and Ian Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, (Boulder: Westview, 1994) p. 26.

<sup>13</sup> Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 141.

<sup>14</sup> Budge and Farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections, p. 138.

the late 1950s; since then they have become much less significant. In contrast, since the 1970s new politics issues, such as the environment, have been emphasised much more by parties.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, from studying post-war results in Ireland Mair found that economic development has been accompanied by an increase in references to modernisation, and growing support for expanding social services.<sup>16</sup> Policy changes have often been prompted by poor electoral performance, with research based on British, United States, and German manifestos showing that poor electoral performance is usually a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to produce major changes in a party's programme.<sup>17</sup>

The main case noted where a party has invented a major issue has been the high proportion of references by the Australian Liberal Party during the 1950s to the danger of internal communist subversion.<sup>18</sup> However, this issue was also very important in other countries including the United States and New Zealand.

The most theoretically sound tests of the statistical relationship between the economic situation and political parties' references to particular economic policy categories has been by Keman. Keman found that parties' policies were responsive to deteriorating economic and labour market situations.<sup>19</sup> Although Pennings has found low responsiveness by parties to the economic situation, his tests of whether increases in unemployment and inflation influence parties' references to market and planning themes<sup>20</sup> would seem to be measures of party responsiveness. This is because there is a weak theoretical link between increases in unemployment and inflation, and parties' references to market and planning categories.

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<sup>15</sup> Kees van Kersbergen, 'Between Collectivism and Individualism: The Politics of the Centre', in The Politics of Problem-Solving in Postwar Democracies, edited by Hans Keman (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997), p. 126.

<sup>16</sup> Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organization, Ideology and Electoral Competition (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987), p. 165

<sup>17</sup> Kenneth Janda, Robert Harmel, Christine Edens and Patricia Goff, 'Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos', Party Politics, Vol. 2 (1995), pp. 188-189.

<sup>18</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 30.

<sup>19</sup> Hans Keman, 'The Politics of Problem-Solving: Democratic Responsiveness and Political Accountability', in The Politics of Problem-Solving in Postwar Democracies, edited by Hans Keman (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997), p. 174.

<sup>20</sup> Paul Pennings, 'Party Responsiveness And Socio-Economic Problem-Solving In Western Democracies', Party Politics, Vol. 4 (1998), pp. 399-401.

Although the content analysis results for the ten categories emphasised most by the New Zealand Labour and National parties were briefly listed in one book on manifestos, there was much less analysis of the results than was the case for most other countries.<sup>21</sup> The only other content analysis of New Zealand election manifestos using a replicable methodology has been by Levine, who made a frequency count of 18 values in parties' 1972 election manifestos. Levine found that National and Social Credit referred to freedom much more than to any other value. As expected Labour emphasised equality the most, but also showed strong support for the environment. Values put most emphasis on the environment, while the middle class background of its supporters was evident by the way it showed much greater support for freedom than equality.<sup>22</sup>

New Zealand political scientists have frequently discussed the major themes in election programmes in a more impressionistic manner. For example, McLeay has used the manifestos of the main parties to find which issues were been important at the 1993 election.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, Miller has made estimates about the declining importance of monetary reform issues in Social Credit manifestos.<sup>24</sup> Historians and political scientists have also frequently structured accounts of electoral politics around changes in the content of parties' election manifestos.<sup>25</sup>

These have all been excellent studies, which have enhanced knowledge of New Zealand politics. They have also often carried out types of analysis, such as identifying subtle changes in the wording of policies,<sup>26</sup> which are not possible using a set coding scheme. However, their reliance on qualitative analysis leaves a

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<sup>21</sup> David Robertson, 'Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 1946-1981, an initial comparative analysis', p. 50. Most countries were dealt with in a individual chapter with the content analysis results being discussed in much more detail.

<sup>22</sup> Stephen Levine, 'Values and Politics: A Content Analysis of Party Programmes', in New Zealand Politics: A Reader, edited by Stephen Levine (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1975), pp. 118-120.

<sup>23</sup> Elizabeth McLeay, 'Political Issues and the Policy Agenda', in Double Decision: The 1993 Election and Referendum in New Zealand, edited by Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer (Wellington: Victoria, University of Wellington, 1994), pp. 37-64.

<sup>24</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Democratic Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), p. 254.

<sup>25</sup> Robert Chapman, 'From Labour to National', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 352-354, pp. 363-364; R.S. Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 48-67.

sizeable gap in the New Zealand political science literature for a study based on a standardised coding scheme. This study provides the opportunity to study content analysis results for New Zealand in detail, by measuring differences in references to issues such as the welfare state and state intervention by the main parties, and by examining changes in references to issues over time.

### 3.3.2 Identifying Ideological Dimensions

A second type of research based on election programmes has been investigating which ideological dimensions have separated political parties. This has usually been done using factor analysis, which is a statistical technique that makes data easier to understand by grouping a large number of variables into a smaller number of factors or dimensions. Variables group together in a factor when references to them go up and down together. In a bi-modal factor, variables will load at the opposite ends if references to one set of variables are consistently high at the same time that references to another set of variables are consistently low.<sup>27</sup>

The largest study of political cleavages based on content analysis data from election programmes was made in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change (1987), using a methodology developed by Budge that was later also applied to Norway.<sup>28</sup> Other studies of the countries covered in that text using similar methodologies have also derived relatively similar main dimensions.<sup>29</sup> In the countries where Budge's methodology was used, first stage factor analysis of the categories in each domain was carried out. The main factors from each domain were usually then used as variables in a second stage factor analysis.

In 15 of the 20 democracies in which Budge's factor analysis methodology has been used a left-right dimension dominated by economic issues

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<sup>26</sup> See, for instance, Bruce Brown, 'The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935', (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Victoria, University of Wellington, 1955), pp. 51-52.

<sup>27</sup> Budge, 'The internal analyses of election programmes', p. 28.

<sup>28</sup> Kaare Strom and Jorn Leipart, 'Ideology, strategy and party competition in postwar Norway', European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 17 (1989), p. 263.

was either the first or the second second stage factor. This left-right dimension usually contrasted left-wing economic policies, such as government regulation, against right-wing economic priorities, such as free enterprise and economic orthodoxy. In some political systems international relations and traditional morality categories also loaded on the main left-right factor.

The five political systems where a left-right dimension did not clearly emerge were the Irish Republic, Northern Ireland, Israel, West Germany and Luxembourg. Budge and Robertson argued that for the first four of these countries national revolution concerns over national identity and security meant that issues associated with these cleavages dominated. In Luxembourg, and to a lesser extent also West Germany, Budge and Robertson claimed that left-right class conflict had been reduced in importance by a high degree of consensus on domestic economic management.

The dominance of a predominantly economic policy left-right dimension in most countries supported Lipset and Rokkan's theory of cleavages. Budge and Robertson argued that the reason why factor analysis rarely produced a religious issues dimension, even though religious issues often have a high influence on voting behaviour, was that voters' concerns are sometimes different to the issues that parties emphasise.

Often the second dimension reflected a modified form of left-right contrasts between an emphasis on old concerns and new concerns. Usually this conflict was between "New Left" concerns, such as the environment, culture, pacifism abroad, and other quality of life categories; versus "Old Left" concerns over welfare and economic controls, and "Rightist" concerns such as economic orthodoxy and development. The existence of this modified left-right dimension provided some support for Inglehart's value change hypothesis.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> See Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition*, pp. 80-81; Mair, *The Changing Irish Party System*, pp. 171-175; McAllister and Moore, 'The Issues that Divided the Parties, 1946-1990', pp. 12-15.

<sup>30</sup> Budge and Robertson, 'Do parties differ and how? Comparative discriminant and factor analyses', pp. 394-397. See Strom and Leipart, 'Ideology, strategy and party competition in postwar Norway', p. 277 for the Norway results. Budge and Robertson, p. 394 note that both the dimensions in Germany include some economic policy issues. On pp. 403-405 Budge and Robertson experimented with using discriminant analysis to find differences between all the recent conservative, centre, socialist and communist party manifestos collected. They found that

Robertson carried out the factor analysis of the New Zealand content analysis results. He found that the first second-stage factor was a “straightforward Left/Right Economic policy factor”, which first order factors for welfare policies, labour groups versus agricultural groups, and the government efficiency and law and order categories loaded on. Robertson saw the second second stage factor to emerge for New Zealand as mainly being about foreign policy. This was a somewhat surprising interpretation because the economic orthodoxy, incentives, and economic interventionism categories loaded much better on the second second-stage dimension than on the first.<sup>31</sup>

The results derived using Budge’s factor analysis methodology have been very influential, and are frequently cited.<sup>32</sup> However, inadequate prior theorising about matters such as which relationships existed among the variables weakened these early studies. Prior theorising is essential when undertaking factor analysis because without a pre-specified theory there are few guidelines on how to conduct factor analyses or criteria to evaluate the results by.<sup>33</sup> For example, one limitation in early factor analysis studies was that theoretically related categories were usually not collapsed. This made complex and difficult to interpret second stage factor analysis necessary, because there were too many categories to include them all in the same factor analysis.<sup>34</sup> Early factor analysis studies are also often difficult to understand because they frequently derived more factors than there were ideological divides between parties.<sup>35</sup> In addition, early factor analysis studies usually failed to adjust for differences in manifesto emphases over time. This risks distorting the dimensions produced.<sup>36</sup>

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discriminant analysis produced similar results to the factor analysis, with left-right and new-old contrasts emerging.

<sup>31</sup> Robertson, ‘Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 1946-1981, an initial comparative analysis’, pp. 65-66.

<sup>32</sup> See, for instance, Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 272-274; Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, p. 20.

<sup>33</sup> J. Scott Armstrong, ‘Derivation of Theory by Means of Factor Analysis or Tom Swift and His Electric Factor Analysis Machine’, American Statistician, Vol. 21 (1967), p. 20.

<sup>34</sup> Budge, ‘The internal analyses of election programmes’, p. 32.

<sup>35</sup> Budge and Robertson, ‘Do parties differ and how? Comparative discriminant and factor analyses’, p. 393.

<sup>36</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, ‘Electoral programmes in West Germany 1949-1980: explorations in the nature of political controversy’, in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of

During the 1990s the authors of manifesto studies have improved on earlier exploratory factor analysis studies by merging theoretically related variables, and extracting fewer factors from factor analyses. Researchers have also been prepared to put aside factor analysis results when other methods work better. The effects of time on factor analysis results, however, remain largely unquantified.

One very sound study of dimensions has been by Laver and Budge, who constructed a common left-right scale for western democracies. Laver and Budge reduced the number of categories included in their factor analyses by amalgamating theoretically related variables, and excluding ambiguous categories. From factor analyses of the remaining variables they found that the state intervention and peace and cooperation categories consistently loaded on the left, whereas the capitalist economy and social conservatism categories usually loaded on the right. Laver and Budge then found empirical and theoretical grounds for adding other categories such as democracy and welfare state expansion to the left end of the scale, and categories such as freedom and human rights and military: positive to the right end.<sup>37</sup> Laver and Budge also found that the quality of life, decentralisation, and underprivileged minorities categories frequently loaded together, forming a new politics factor. However, this dimension was much less important than the left-right scale, and was sometimes theoretically ambiguous.<sup>38</sup>

While Laver and Budge initially used factor analysis to help construct their dimensions, other studies have dispensed with it altogether. For instance, both Topf and Oates have simply used their content analysis results and their

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Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 302 found that when time effects were controlled for this had relatively little effect on the results. However, Budge and Robertson, 'Do parties differ and how? Comparative discriminant and factor analyses', p. 397 noted that further research was necessary.

<sup>37</sup> Heemin Kim and Richard C. Fording, 'Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989', European Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33 (1998), p. 92 note that over the post-war period the categories included in Laver and Budge's left-right dimension on average make up 47% of the content of the manifestos of parties in OECD countries.

<sup>38</sup> Laver and Budge, 'Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation', pp. 26-29. The quality of life category included the environment and culture.

knowledge of the political system to develop scales for party movement.<sup>39</sup> While most measures of party positions have been soundly theoretically based, an exception has been a “new politics” dimension developed recently by Laver and Garry. The main problem with their dimension was that for the “liberal end” they included regime support categories such as political corruption and constitutionalism: negative.<sup>40</sup> They should have instead used the quality of life and underprivileged minorities categories that Laver and Budge’s earlier factor analysis had shown formed a new politics dimension.

The left-right equation developed by Laver and Budge has been widely used to measure and compare party positions and movement. Because this dimension includes left-right themes that in earlier national factor analyses were often spread across several dimensions it is usually a better measure of parties’ positions.<sup>41</sup> However, since the issues that divide left and right-wing parties vary between countries a study on Western European democracies by Klingemann has used factor analysis of domestic policy variables to derive a left-right dimension for each nation. Like Laver and Budge, Klingemann amalgamated related categories and extracted a single main dimension, which was usually dominated by economic policy issues, from his factor analyses.<sup>42</sup>

Klingemann’s decision to exclude foreign policy categories from the factor analysis had disadvantages because in many countries these have a substantial effect on parties’ left-right positions.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, studies that have used just the categories from the economic policy domain in factor analyses<sup>44</sup> should have included categories from other domains, such as welfare state expansion and the

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<sup>39</sup> Topf, ‘Party manifestos’, p. 164; Sarah Oates, ‘Party Platforms: Towards a Definition of the Russian Political Spectrum’, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, (1998), p. 84.

<sup>40</sup> Laver and Garry, ‘Estimating Policy Positions from Party Manifestos’, p. 17.

<sup>41</sup> Tove Schou and Derek Hearl, ‘Party and Coalition Policy in Denmark’, in Party Policy and Government Coalition, edited by M.J. Laver and Ian Budge (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 156.

<sup>42</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, ‘Party Positions and Voter Orientations’, in Citizens and the State, edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 187-189.

<sup>43</sup> See, for example, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, ‘Electoral Programmes in West Germany 1949-1980’, p. 317.

<sup>44</sup> See, for instance, Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 197-198.

labour groups categories. This is because these categories are also important in influencing parties' left-right positions on economic policy issues.<sup>45</sup>

Earlier manifesto studies have shown that a left-right dimension dominates in most countries, with more recent studies often just using the factor analysis results for guidance to develop scales to measure party movement. Previous studies have also shown the importance of prior theorising about what results can be expected from the factor analysis, the need to control for time effects, and the desirability of including all important categories in order to construct accurate measures of party movement. This study applies these lessons to New Zealand data.

### 3.3.3 Party Movement

Results from election programme data have confirmed Robertson's hypothesis that Downs underestimated the constraints on party movement. This is because the results show that in most countries left and right-wing parties maintain separate positions from each other on the main dimension of competition. This gives voters a choice between policy directions, and makes it easier for them to perceive the differences between the main parties.<sup>46</sup> The ideological immobility of the largest parties also minimises the risk of voting cycles because the largest parties do not jump around in an attempt to manufacture a majority. Centre parties tend to move around more, although they often try to downplay the significance of the left-right divide, and compared to other parties place more emphasis on themes weakly related to this dimension.<sup>47</sup>

In most political systems there was some convergence between the main parties during the late 1960s and early 1970s, which lasted throughout the 1980s, indicating that end of ideology arguments had some validity. Unexpectedly, convergence occurred irrespective of the number of parties or the type of

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<sup>45</sup> Ali Carkoglu, 'Election manifestos and policy-oriented economic voting', European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 27 (1995), p. 299.

<sup>46</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies and Democracy, p. 246; Carkoglu, 'Election manifestos and policy-oriented economic voting', p. 305.

<sup>47</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies and Democracy, pp. 60, 191.

electoral system. This contradicts Downs' and Sartori's theories that these variables influence party polarisation.<sup>48</sup> As expected, however, the results show that the closer blocks of parties are to each other the higher electoral volatility is.<sup>49</sup>

There have been a few exceptions to the general tendency for the main parties in developed countries to remain ideologically distinct.<sup>50</sup> On Laver and Budge's left-right scale there has been repeated crossover between left and right wing parties in Italy, partly because this dimension is not entirely appropriate there.<sup>51</sup> Left and right-wing parties have ideologically crossed occasionally at elections in several other countries on this dimension, but not in New Zealand.<sup>52</sup> Frequent crossover between the two main parties in both Canada and Ireland confirms that in general left-right terms there are few differences between them.<sup>53</sup> In contrast, in the United States where the two main parties are often thought of

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<sup>48</sup> Budge and Robertson, 'Do parties differ and how? Comparative discriminant and factor analyses', pp. 397-399; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies and Democracy, pp. 247-249, 254. Using a dimension constructed just from the economic policy domain categories Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, 'Policy Competition, Spatial Distance and Electoral Instability', West European Politics, Vol. 13 (1990), pp. 6-7 point out that in most European countries polarisation between parties has sometimes increased. However, their results show that by the mid-1980s the distance between the most extreme parties in European countries was on average smaller than it had been during any previous ten year period, and was considerably less than it had been during the immediate post-war period. Although data on the 1990s is not yet available Ian Budge, 'Estimating Party Policy Preferences: From Ad Hoc Measures to Theoretically Validated Studies', Paper at Mannheim ECPR 1999, p. [27] notes that a major study on party movement extending up to 1996 is in progress.

<sup>49</sup> Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability, p. 206.

<sup>50</sup> Judith Bara, 'Sri Lanka 1947-1977: elite programmes and mass politics', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 107 notes frequent cross-over between parties in Sri Lanka. However, since the Sri Lankan party system is still developing it is not covered by Robertson's hypothesis.

<sup>51</sup> Alfio Mastropaolo and Martin Slater, 'Party Policy and Coalition Bargaining in Italy, 1948-87', in Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J. Laver and Ian Budge (New York, St Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 319-321.

<sup>52</sup> Ian Budge, 'A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24 (1994), p. 460. Slightly different results would be found using the Ideology, Strategy and Party Change data. However, these results are generally less accurate because politically divisive categories are often spread over several factors. Shaun Bowler, 'Voter Perceptions and Party Strategies: An Empirical Approach', Comparative Politics, Vol. 23 (1990), pp. 76-78 finds frequent overlap in several countries including New Zealand. However, each of his left-right dimensions also only measure some components of left-right divisions.

<sup>53</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies and Democracy, p. 270; M.J. Laver, 'Coalition and Party Policy in Ireland', in Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J. Laver and Ian Budge (New York, St Martin's Press, 1992), p.48.

as having very similar policies several studies have found that they are always ideologically distinct.<sup>54</sup>

Whereas during the 1960s and early 1970s parties in most western democracies took relatively left-leaning positions for the post-war period, during the 1980s parties from all ideological families moved to the right. As a result, by the late 1980s on average the political centre in western democracies was further to the right than ever before.<sup>55</sup> This has been taken to indicate that parties are responsive to changing political and economic circumstances,<sup>56</sup> and have usually signalled major changes in their policy direction. Although political scientists have often tested decision rules on left-right party movement between elections,<sup>57</sup> almost all of the results could be explained by chance rather than a deliberate decision on the part of political parties.<sup>58</sup>

In European democracies the shift by parties to the right during the 1980s improved an already close relationship between these parties' positions and the average left-right positions of their supporters. This indicates that parties were better performing their role of representing voters. Parties are also usually less ideological than their supporters, indicating that they perform a containing function.<sup>59</sup>

While most political scientists have argued that party movement results support theories of responsible party government, Robertson has used results from Britain to attack idealised models of democracy. Robertson argued that

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<sup>54</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies and Democracy, pp. 140-141, 270; Budge and Farlie, Voting and Party Competition, p. 427.

<sup>55</sup> Kim and Fording, 'Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989', pp. 85-86; Klingemann, 'Party Positions and Voter Orientations', p. 191.

<sup>56</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies and Democracy, pp. 247, 254.

<sup>57</sup> The biggest and most theoretically sound study is by Budge, 'A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition', pp. 461-467. As Budge notes on p. 452 earlier studies of decision rules have been based on the unrealistic assumptions that parties know in advance the election result, and that parties' policies do not influence the election outcome. A further unrealistic assumption noted by Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 106 is that the distribution of society's preferences and the political centre remain fixed over time.

<sup>58</sup> Gordon Burt, 'Party Policy: Decision Rule or Chance? A Note on Budge's New Spatial Theory of Party Competition', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27 (1997), p. 653.

<sup>59</sup> Klingemann, 'Party Positions and Voter Orientations', pp. 198-199. Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Voting and Party Competition: A Theoretical Critique and Synthesis Applied to Surveys from Ten Democracies (London: John Wiley, 1977), p. 439 also found a close relationship between parties' and voters' positions over several elections in Britain and the United States.

party competition differed from the democratic ideal because sometimes one party would become so unpopular that it was unlikely to be elected. When this happened his results showed that both the main British parties would offer extreme policies, which were away from the average policy position of voters. Robertson also demonstrated that strategic political considerations influenced parties' policies, with their positions on an economic constraint dimension varying according to whether they were in government or opposition. However, Robertson argued that his results did not challenge a minimum defence of democracy, similar to that taken by democratic elitists, which sees democracy as a "protective mechanism" for voters.<sup>60</sup>

Robertson's findings about how political factors can alter parties' attitudes towards economic constraint is important, because it shows that because of their desire to be in government parties do not always act in the best interests of voters. His claim that sometimes one party would be too extreme to be a viable choice for most voters also exposes a weakness in the operation of democracy. However, the results from later studies have shown that there are relatively few instances when one party becomes very extreme.<sup>61</sup>

Studying changes in party positions is also useful for examining which electoral cleavages have been most important. Manifesto studies have found that in countries such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands traditional clerical and conservative issues remain more important in influencing the positions of Christian parties on Laver and Budge's left-right dimension than economic issues.<sup>62</sup> In Australia McAllister and Moore have found that since the late 1960s party competition over economic issues has become more heated, while divisions over foreign policy and the risk of communist subversion have become unimportant.<sup>63</sup> Party movement results also provide quick, but very valuable, insights into whether coalitions have been formed by the ideologically closest parties.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition*, pp. 186-190.

<sup>61</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 267.

<sup>62</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 265.

<sup>63</sup> McAllister and Moore, 'The Issues that Divided the Parties, 1946-1990', pp. 12-16.

<sup>64</sup> See, for instance, Mair, *The Changing Irish Party System*, p. 199.

Although the accuracy of parties' positions found from manifesto data has been seen by researchers as usually very convincing<sup>65</sup> and occasionally as enlightening,<sup>66</sup> a critic of the MRG's coding scheme has argued that parties' positions using manifesto data are "frequently implausible".<sup>67</sup> To some extent this debate is unresolvable because there is no "real" or "true" position of a party.<sup>68</sup> However, there are high correlations between parties' recent positions on Laver and Budge's left-right scale, expert survey results from the 1980s and 1990s, and results from other coding schemes.<sup>69</sup> Kim and Fording's ideology scores, which weigh parties' positions by their share of the vote and then average the results, also produce intuitive results. This is because they show that during the postwar period Norway and Sweden have been the most left-leaning states, while Ireland, followed by Australia and the United States, have been the most right-wing.<sup>70</sup> The only study to compare parties' positions using MRG data on a "new politics" dimension to their positions using other measures was undermined by the flawed construction of the dimension.<sup>71</sup>

While the results for party movement in New Zealand using manifesto data have been graphed in one publication, they only covered the 1946-1981 period, and were not analysed in much detail.<sup>72</sup> This study will show New Zealand political parties came very close during the 1970s and early 1980s on the main dimension of competition. If Labour signalled its move to the right at the 1984 election, it can be expected to have been more right-wing than National. The positions of New Zealand political parties will be matched up with those of their

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<sup>65</sup> Richard Hofferbert and Sean Blinn, 'Left-Right Orientations of Party Election Programs in Modern Democracies: Some Unanticipated Findings', Paper at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1992, p. 15.

<sup>66</sup> Mastropaolo and Slater, 'Party Policy and Coalition Bargaining in Italy, 1948-87', p. 368.

<sup>67</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 139.

<sup>68</sup> Laver and Garry, 'Estimating Policy Positions from Party Manifestos', p. 1.

<sup>69</sup> Kim and Fording, 'Voter Ideology in Western Democracies', p. 81; Carkoglu, 'Election manifestos and policy-oriented economic voting', p. 313; Laver and Garry, 'Estimating Policy Positions from Party Manifestos', pp. 17-18.

<sup>70</sup> Kim and Fording, 'Voter Ideology in Western Democracies', p. 85. New Zealand was slightly left of centre.

<sup>71</sup> See the critique of Laver and Garry, 'Estimating Policy Positions from Party Manifestos' in section 3.3.2 on identifying ideological dimensions.

<sup>72</sup> David Robertson, 'Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 1946-1981, an initial comparative analysis', pp. 68-69, 72. Indeed, the results are only plotted for averages over subperiods.

voters during the 1990s, which is the only period data on the ideological positioning of voters is available from a representative survey of voters.<sup>73</sup> There is no need to test whether electoral factors influence parties' economic policies, because other studies have researched the electoral budgetary cycle.<sup>74</sup> However, comparing the importance of different cleavages has obvious applications in New Zealand. This is because there has been considerable debate over whether during the late 1980s new politics issues became more important than the old politics divide over economic issues at dividing the Labour and National parties.

### 3.3.4 Length of Election Programmes

A fourth type of research based on election programmes has been using changes in the length of manifestos as an indicator of parties' attitudes towards democracy and the role of the state. During the post-war period election programmes have grown in length in most countries, in the process often changing from brief pamphlets to documents the size of a short novel.<sup>75</sup> The trend for manifestos to grow longer over time has normally been attributed to parties' policies becoming more specific and less ideological, the expansion of the role of the state in the economy, and growth in the number of electorally significant social groups.<sup>76</sup> There has been very little analysis of how manifesto length varies between types of parties.<sup>77</sup>

There has been no analysis by political scientists of why programmes in some political systems such as Australia, Israel, and Northern Ireland have

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<sup>73</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Aspects of Electoral Studies, Present and Past: New Zealand Voters and "the System", 1949-1996', *Political Science*, Vol. 50 (1998), pp. 91-92.

<sup>74</sup> The Monetary and Economic Council, *Economic Growth in New Zealand* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1962), p. 10 found that "Triennial elections have, not surprisingly, been a source of triennial economic crises", with government expenditure and the trade deficit increasing. Similarly, Treasury, *Economic Management* (Wellington: The Treasury, July 1984), p. 195 argued that government spending has tended to increase in election years. However, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, *Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy* (Wellington: Hazard Press, 1986), pp. 160-161 found that the budget deficit had fallen before some elections, and noted the difficulties politicians faced if they attempted to manipulate the economy for electoral gain.

<sup>75</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 21.

<sup>76</sup> Rose, *Do Parties Make A Difference*, p. 55; Topf, 'Party manifestos', p. 150.

remained short.<sup>78</sup> However, the way that party programmes are distributed in these countries would appear to be significant. In Australia, for example, the party programme, which is the leader's speech at the start of the election campaign, is constrained in length by the need for the party leader to be able to read it, and for broadcasters to want to air it. Similarly, in Israel and Northern Ireland the parties have almost entirely relied on newspapers to distribute their manifestos, and therefore have had to keep their programmes short enough for newspapers to want to print them.

New Zealand newspapers, historians, and political scientists have frequently commented on the length of parties' manifestos. However, their comparisons are usually scattered throughout texts, and generally only cover brief periods or a single party.<sup>79</sup> The most systematic study has been by Robertson, who found that compared to other countries New Zealand parties' election programmes were relatively long at the start of the post-war period. Robertson also discovered that New Zealand political parties' election programmes steadily grew in length between 1946 and 1981.<sup>80</sup>

One study of recent British election manifestos has found that they had sometimes become shorter on the instructions of party leaders. This occurred when leaders saw electoral advantage in avoiding expensive promises by campaigning on more general principles, or when they felt a long manifesto at the previous election had lacked a clear focus.<sup>81</sup> Mulgan has reported similar findings for recent New Zealand elections. Using changes in total page length as a

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<sup>77</sup> However, McAllister and Moore, 'The Issues that Divided the Parties, 1946-1990', p. 4 found that in Australia the Labor Party had tended to have the longest manifestos.

<sup>78</sup> See McAllister and Moore, 'The Issues that Divided the Parties, 1946-1990', p. 4; Judith Bara, 'Israel 1949-1981', in *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies*, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 118; Michael Laver, 'Northern Ireland 1921-1973', in *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies*, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 165. In *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change* there is insufficient information in the chapters on Sri Lanka, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, and Japan to tell how the length of programmes in these countries has varied.

<sup>79</sup> See, for instance, 'A Statement of Policy', *Dominion*, 13 October 1919, p. 4; Bruce Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour* (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), pp. 71-73.

<sup>80</sup> Robertson, 'Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 1946-1981, an initial comparative analysis', p. 47.

<sup>81</sup> Topf, 'Party manifestos', p. 153.

measurement of the length of manifestos Mulgan found that Labour issued a very brief manifesto at the 1987 election. This reflected a desire among many senior Labour cabinet ministers to give themselves maximum policy autonomy as part of a move to a very elitist approach to policy making.<sup>82</sup> This thesis provides an opportunity to track more accurately changes in the length of the main New Zealand political parties' manifestos. It will also be possible to test other researchers' assumptions about the factors leading to changes in the length of programmes.

### 3.3.5. Policy Implementation

A fifth type of research involving election programmes has been comparing parties' pre-election policies to their actions in government after the election. Although these studies have used a variety of methodologies, almost without exception their results have supported theories of responsible party government by showing a strong relationship between programme content and subsequent government policies.

One method of studying implementation of election programmes has involved identifying specific promises within policy documents, and then examining government actions to check whether these promises were met. Studies for several countries, all using slightly different methodologies, have usually found that around 70 to 80% of promises by parties that won a particular election, and a smaller proportion of promises by parties that lost the election, are implemented. Policy implementation tends to be lower for minority governments, and in policy areas where interest groups are weak.<sup>83</sup> The lowest

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<sup>82</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', in The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand, edited by Martin Holland and Jonathan Boston, 2nd edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 16-17.

<sup>83</sup> Pomper and Lederman, Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics, p. 167; Colin Rallings, 'The influence of election programmes: Britain and Canada 1945-1979', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 13; Eftalia Kalogeropoulou, 'Election Promises and government performance in Greece: Pasok's fulfilment of its 1981 election pledges', European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 17 (1989), p. 295; Rose, Do Parties Make A Difference, p. 65; Terry Royed, 'Testing the Mandate Model in Britain and the United States: Evidence from the Reagan

recorded implementation rate for specific promises has been 54% in the Netherlands, which is the only country with coalition governments that has been studied.<sup>84</sup>

The main limitation with studies that have analysed the implementation of pledges has been that parties usually make very few specific promises. Those promises that they do make are usually in relatively unimportant policy areas.<sup>85</sup> To avoid these problems methods of comparing programme content to government policies have been developed that use a higher proportion of the content of election programmes.

One study of United States party platforms has found a strong correspondence between platform emphases, and subsequent legislative changes that favoured these commitments.<sup>86</sup> However, because increased expenditure is often necessary for policy implementation, most studies have tested whether there is an association between policy emphases in election programmes, and the proportion of government expenditure allocated to equivalent areas. Although a number of articles have been written using this methodology, most of their content was incorporated by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994) into a cross-national study covering ten countries.<sup>87</sup> This thesis adopts their methodology.

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and Thatcher Eras', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26 (1996), pp. 60-65. Despite lower policy implementation in areas where interest groups are weak Alan Monroe, 'American Party Platforms and Public Opinion', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 27 (1983), pp. 36-37 has shown that in the United States the fulfillment of platforms is not a spurious relationship. The reason for this is that the link between platform commitments and policy outcomes has been largely independent of the distribution of public opinion. This indicates that parties are not just implementing promises which the majority of voters support.

<sup>84</sup> Robert Thomson, 'The Party Mandate: Election Pledges and 'Government Actions on Socio-Economic Policy in the Netherlands, 1986-1998', Paper at the 26th Joint Sessions Workshops, ECPR, 23 to 28 March 1998, at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom, p. 9.

<sup>85</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 25.

<sup>86</sup> Benjamin Ginsberg, 'Elections and Public Policy', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70 (1976), p. 48.

<sup>87</sup> For the journal articles see Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge, 'The Party Mandate and the Westminster Model: Election Programmes and Government Spending in Britain, 1948-1985', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 22 (1992), pp. 151-182; Ian Budge and Richard Hofferbert, 'Mandates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84 (1990), pp. 111-131; François Petry, 'The Party Agenda Model: Election Programmes and Government Spending in Canada', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 28 (1995), pp. 51-84; François Petry, 'Fragile mandate: Party programmes and public expenditure in the French Fifth Republic', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 20 (1991), pp. 149-171; Richard Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'The

Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge tested three models of the relationship between party programmes and government policy priorities. The first model they tested was an agenda model. The agenda model was based on the hypothesis that variations in policy priorities would reflect variations in the programme emphases of the major parties, irrespective of which party became the government. Their second model was a mandate model. There was considerable ambiguity in the text over exactly what the mandate model was meant to do. The equations and some of the sentences in the text suggest that the mandate effect was intended to be the additional effect a party's manifesto had when it was in government, after controlling for the constant agenda effect of its manifesto irrespective of whether it was in or out of government. However, the majority of the text suggested that the mandate model was meant to be measuring the separate effects of a party's manifesto when it was in government or in opposition. Their third model was an ideology model, which was intended to test whether the long-term ideological orientation of parties influenced policy outcomes independently of their manifesto commitments.<sup>88</sup>

Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge tested their models using national expenditure series, which usually ran between the late 1940s and the mid to late 1980s. Between six to ten expenditure categories, covering on average about 70% of all central government expenditure, were able to be collected for each country. The relationship between parties' left-right party positions and a left-right scale of expenditure patterns was also calculated for every country.<sup>89</sup>

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policy impact of party programmes and government declarations in the Federal Republic of Germany', European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 18 (1990), pp. 277-304. Another article using a relatively similar methodology was by François Petry, 'The Policy Impact of Canadian Party Programs: Public Expenditure Growth and Contagion from the Left', Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 14 (1988), pp. 376-389.

<sup>88</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, pp. 44-52. Gary King and Michael Laver, 'Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending', American Political Science Review, Vol. 87 (1993), pp. 744-747 successfully replicate the results for an equation in an earlier journal article which is the same as Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's mandate equation. This suggests that Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge ran their equations as they algebraically specified them. Helmut Thome, 'Party mandate theory and time-series analysis: a methodological comment', Electoral Studies, Vol. 18 (1999), pp. 571-574 also finds the explanation of negative mandate effects confusing. The different ways the mandate equation can be modelled and how the results should be interpreted are discussed in more detail in chapter nine.

<sup>89</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, pp. 39-40.

On average in the countries covered by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge their best-fitting models explained just over half of the variance in government expenditure, while the number of contradictory coefficients was low. However, in seven of the ten countries surveyed the linkage between left-right programme trends and left-right expenditure patterns either explained less than a quarter of the variance, or the relationship was the reverse of what it should have been. These results showed that although there was a generally strong relationship between party programmes and policy, this was in specific areas rather than at the general level of left-right confrontation. The other area where contradictory variables were concentrated was social services. This was attributed to welfare expenditure frequently being regarded as an entitlement, so that expenditure is often directly influenced by demographic and economic factors rather than by parties' policies.<sup>90</sup>

Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge examined whether constitutional or institutional differences affected the ability of governments to implement their programme commitments. One theory they tested was whether governments in the Westminster democracies of Australia, Britain, and Canada, which have traditionally been seen as very powerful, had greater success at implementing their programme commitments than governments in other countries. Surprisingly, they found that in the Westminster democracies they had studied the best-fitting policy models had a lower average explanatory power than in countries with coalition governments, or strong Presidents. More in keeping with theoretical expectations, the two countries where the policy models failed to work well were Belgium and the Netherlands. Both these countries have been characterised by relatively high party fragmentation and political volatility.<sup>91</sup>

Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's results supported theories of responsible party government, because they showed that parties implemented their policy priorities once in power. In contrast, their findings weakened elitist

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<sup>90</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, pp. 240-243. Subsequent research by Kim and Fording, 'Voter Ideology in Western Democracies', p. 84 qualifies both these exceptions. This is because they found a strong relationship between the mean national left-right positions of political parties, weighted by their vote share, and welfare state decommodification.

theories that claim that because of theoretical problems, such as voting cycles, the democratic process produces chaos. Similarly, because over time parties had placed an increased emphasis on social services in their programmes, and this had also been reflected in government expenditure priorities, their results cast doubt on the validity of power elite theories.<sup>92</sup>

Thome has criticised Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge for their reliance on the  $R^2$ , which measures the proportion of variance explained, as a measurement of policy implementation. This is a limitation because the  $R^2$  usually just measures the spread of points around a regression line rather than the strength of a relationship.<sup>93</sup> Using United States data Thome found that even when the  $R^2$  explained was high, overlaying manifesto emphases and expenditure trends indicated in several instances that the relationships did not support mandate theory. He also found that even when there was a close relationship between calculated and actual expenditure, the residuals did not appear to be stationary.<sup>94</sup>

However, since  $R^2$  values are useful for comparing two equations with different explanatory variables and identical dependent variables they can be used to find which statistical model best explains government expenditure in a particular area.<sup>95</sup> Because of the high cross-national correlations between expenditure trends, and to a lesser degree manifesto emphases,<sup>96</sup> to some extent they are the same variables in different countries. This means that policy implementation rates can be roughly compared between countries on the basis of the  $R^2$  results.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, pp. 259-260.

<sup>92</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, pp. 254-255.

<sup>93</sup> Christopher Achen, *Interpreting and Using Regression*, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), p. 59.

<sup>94</sup> Thome, 'Party mandate and time-series analysis: a methodological comment', pp. 581-582.

<sup>95</sup> Gary King, 'How Not to Lie with Statistics: Avoiding Common Mistakes in Quantitative Political Science', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30 (1986), p. 677.

<sup>96</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, pp. 249-253.

<sup>97</sup> A further test might seem to be adding up the significant parameter estimates for each country, and comparing them to see where they were largest. However, this has even more limitations than using the  $R^2$  values. This is because Larry Schroder, David Sjoquist and Paula Stephen, *Understanding Regression Analysis: An Introductory Guide* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1986), p. 32 note that coefficients with different units of measurement cannot be compared. In this case the

Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's methodology has also been criticised on the grounds that they should have controlled for long-term expenditure trends. King and Laver have argued that the failure to detrend expenditure data leads to autocorrelation, as the previous year's budget figures explain a high proportion of expenditure during the current year.<sup>98</sup> In reply, Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge have defended their methods on the grounds that they are just measuring a correspondence rather than causation in a strict sense.<sup>99</sup> This could be seen as a very damaging concession because there is little reason to be interested in non-causal relationships.<sup>100</sup> However, because politicians take the content of election programmes very seriously, and often check their policies against their manifesto commitments, it would seem that manifestos play a key role in the process of government decision-making.<sup>101</sup> In addition, even if changes in government expenditure are incremental this is usually compatible with manifesto effects because parties' manifesto emphases usually also only change incrementally. Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge have also pointed out that lagging expenditure controls for all past influences on expenditure including parties' manifestos.<sup>102</sup>

However, long-term expenditure trends do influence the ideology results, which as a result often appear to be measuring non-ideological factors. For instance, in Germany there is a very big negative coefficient for the relationship between Christian Democratic Party led governments and military expenditure. This result probably occurs because of historical factors that have led to the Christian Democrats following different policies to their ideological inclinations. Similar counter-intuitive ideology effects occur in a number of other countries.<sup>103</sup>

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agenda and mandate effects are measured by parties' manifesto emphases, while the ideology effects are measured by years in government.

<sup>98</sup> King and Laver, 'Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending', pp. 745-746.

<sup>99</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 282; Richard Hofferbert, Ian Budge and Michael McDonald, 'Response to King and Laver', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87 (1993), pp. 748.

<sup>100</sup> Gary King and Michael Laver, 'Many publications, but still no evidence', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 18 (1999), pp. 597-598.

<sup>101</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, pp. 5, 9.

<sup>102</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 284. Their position on this point has recently been supported by Thome, 'Party mandate and time-series analysis', p. 577.

<sup>103</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, pp. 196-202. The results on p. 74 for Britain show that every year the Conservative Party has been in power there

In the cases where the “ideology” variable appeared to be measuring non-ideological factors, it should have been dropped, because the aim was to measure the influence of parties’ policies on policy outcomes, not explain the maximum possible variance in expenditure.<sup>104</sup> Reanalysing the results after dropping counter-intuitive ideology effects shows, however, that this has relatively little effect on the results.<sup>105</sup>

Recently McDonald, Budge and Hofferbert have reexamined the issue of causality by matching up United States platform emphases and a Presidential liberalism indicator. Since the policy liberalism indicator was not constrained by the bureaucracy and the legislature in the same way as expenditure, this allowed a more direct test of causality. After controlling for lagged Presidential liberalism they found that the winning party’s mean platform score together with its individual platform scores have a major influence on policy positions, and that this effect occurs almost immediately once a party takes office.<sup>106</sup>

McDonald, Budge and Hofferbert also tried to get around the problem of too short a time period to isolate the effect of parties’ manifestos, compared to other effects, by pooling IMF expenditure data on 16 nations over the 1972-1991 period. They used a model which included controls for expenditure in the previous year, and other influences on welfare state growth such as the degree of government decentralisation, the proportion of the population aged over 65 and the level of inflation. Despite these extremely strict controls they still found that parties’ manifestos had a small but positive independent effect on welfare state growth.<sup>107</sup>

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has been a 6% cut in defence expenditure. Similarly, the results for Canada on p. 109 show that every year the Progressive Conservatives have been in power there has been a 2.7% increase in housing expenditure. These instances, along with other cases of counter-intuitive ideology effects, were not counted as contradictory coefficients.

<sup>104</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 53.

<sup>105</sup> The average variance explained over all ten countries is 55% compared to 57% with all the ‘ideology’ effects included. In these calculations ‘ideology’ effects indicating increases in defence or administration of justice under left-wing governments were dropped, as were increases in housing, education and social services expenditure, or a shift to the left on the left-right expenditure dimension under right-wing governments.

<sup>106</sup> Michael McDonald, Ian Budge and Richard Hofferbert, ‘Party mandate and time series analysis: a theoretical and methodological response’, *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 18 (1999), p. 592. Methodologically using mean party positions seems more satisfactory than using a dummy variable to measuring ideology effects.

<sup>107</sup> McDonald, Budge and Hofferbert, ‘Party mandate and time series analysis’, pp. 593-594.

Although the literature on policy implementation in many countries is now very sophisticated, studies of policy implementation in New Zealand are less advanced, and have been dominated by the main political parties. For instance, once in power Reform provided information to its candidates on how it had kept to its manifesto pledges.<sup>108</sup> Since then parties have published a large literature about how their policy implementation rates are much higher than those of other parties.<sup>109</sup>

Chapter two outlined the literature on policy implementation in New Zealand by historians and political scientists. This literature tends to concentrate on a few very important and high profile promises, which have usually been made by governments in their first term. As a result it ignores the very vague statements which dominate the content of election programmes.<sup>110</sup> The only very detailed study has been on the third Labour government's attempts to fulfill its manifesto between 1972 and 1975. It showed that although Labour had implemented many of its commitments, due to unrealistic assumptions in its manifesto and worsening economic problems it had been unable to keep all its promises.<sup>111</sup>

This study uses Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's method of investigating how well variations in emphases in manifestos explain changes in New Zealand government expenditure trends. Their mandate and ideology models are also algebraically reformulated to measure the government and opposition

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<sup>108</sup> See, for instance, Reform, General Election Campaign 1914 (Wellington: Reform, 1914), p. 8; Reform, Reform's Record and Achievements 1912-1922 (Wellington: Reform, 1922), p. 51.

<sup>109</sup> See, for instance, James Thorn, The New Zealand Labour Government: Its First Year of Office (Wellington: New Zealand Labour Party, 1937), p. 4; New Zealand National Party, The Work of the National Government, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Wellington: New Zealand National Party, 1953), p. 56; New Zealand Labour Party, Labour Achieves: Manifesto in Action (Wellington: New Zealand Labour Party, 1974), p. 1; New Zealand National Party, Broken Promises II – Quotes, Statements and Events From Life Under Labour (Wellington: New Zealand National Party, 1988).

<sup>110</sup> Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), p. 153.

<sup>111</sup> See, for instance, Bryan Philpott, 'The Economy', in Labour in Power-Promise and Performance: Evaluations of the work of the New Zealand Government from 1972 to 1975, edited by Ray Goldstein (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1975), pp. 48-49; Barry Gustafson, 'Education, health and social welfare', in Labour in Power-Promise and Performance: Evaluations of the work of the New Zealand Government from 1972 to 1975, edited by Ray Goldstein (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1975), pp. 71, 75, 80.

party effects they discuss throughout the text. Because research is restricted by the availability of expenditure data it is only possible to calculate policy implementation in New Zealand for the 1946-1994 period. In Appendix D the revised models are also applied to expenditure data for Britain provided by Professor Hofferbert, which was the only expenditure data that was available.<sup>112</sup> This acts as an additional check on how the different ways of running the mandate and ideology equations affects the results.

### 3.3.6. Coalition Formation

Coalition formation is the sixth main type of research carried out using data from content analysis of election programmes. The most systematic study, which was edited by Laver and Budge, calculated the distance between parties both on a left-right dimension and on key categories. The results confirmed that in most countries policy was an important factor in the formation of coalition governments.<sup>113</sup> Because New Zealand has had very few coalition governments, and until the 1996 election they had not issued detailed coalition statements, this type of research has only just become applicable to New Zealand. Research into comparing the content of election programmes and coalition agreements will probably become more relevant to New Zealand in the future because the new MMP electoral system means that coalition governments are more likely.

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<sup>112</sup> Email from Professor Hofferbert, 24 November 1998. He noted that the expenditure data was extremely complex, and had not been kept in an easily accessible state. The United States data Thome uses in 'Party mandate and time-series analysis' was originally from a journal article by Klingemann and Budge that covers a shorter time period than the chapter on the United States in Parties, Policies, and Democracy.

<sup>113</sup> Ian Budge and Michael Laver, 'The Relationship Between Party and Coalition Policy in Europe: An Empirical Synthesis', in Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J. Laver and Ian Budge (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), p. 428. Ian Budge and Michael Laver also get similar results in 'The Policy Basis of Government Coalitions: A Comparative Investigation', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23 (1993), pp. 499-519. A much smaller study of coalition formation covering only two cases is by David Baron, 'A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems', in American Political Science Review, Vol. 85 (1991), pp. 137-164.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Most overseas manifesto studies of election programmes have coded the text into invariant categories. The most widely used coding scheme has been developed by the MRG, and has been applied to programmes from over 50 political systems during the post-war period. Most of the literature on election programmes, however, is about a smaller number of OECD countries.

Studies of election programmes have tracked changes in the importance of different issues, and investigated agenda setting. The results have indicated that parties have been responsive to economic and social changes. The saliency theory hypothesis that parties compete by emphasising themes on which they are associated with positive outcomes, and by downplaying issues on which voters favour opposition parties' policies has been upheld.

Election programme studies have used factor analysis to show the dominance of a left-right ideological dimension in most developed countries. Although during the 1990s political scientists have continued to use factor analysis as an exploratory tool, increasingly they have relied more on content analysis results and on their theoretical knowledge of political systems to develop measures of parties' positions. Party movement results from election programmes show that in most countries left and right wing parties maintain separate positions from each other on the main dimension of competition. This gives voters clear choices, and minimises the risk of voting cycles. While in most countries the biggest polarization between parties is on economic policy issues, in some countries pre-modern cleavages remain important. Party positions using manifesto data have usually been seen as very accurate.

From studying changes in the length of election programmes, political scientists initially found a seemingly endless trend towards longer election programmes. In some countries this pattern has been reversed since the early 1980s by parties seeking to improve their credibility in times of economic constraint.

Studies have shown a strong relationship between parties' programme content and subsequent government policies. The results in the main comparative

study of policy implementation have challenged prevailing beliefs by showing that implementation in Westminster systems is lower than in other countries. Its methods have recently been challenged, opening up the opportunity for further research.

Although very little has been written on New Zealand election manifestos using content analysis data, in other countries a rich and increasingly mature literature has developed. This leaves a substantial gap in the literature on New Zealand politics that this study remedies. Before this is done, however, the data used in this study will be outlined in chapter four.

## Chapter Four: The Manifesto Data

### 4.1 Introduction

Election programmes were collected for this study because they are the most authoritative and comprehensive version of parties' policies. Chapter two showed that in New Zealand traditionally politicians have felt a strong obligation to implement their manifesto commitments, and to not introduce major policies not contained in their programme.<sup>1</sup> Although other policy statements have also been issued by party leaders and candidates, these policy statements have often summarised sections of the election manifesto while their content has been constrained by the need to be compatible with the official manifesto.<sup>2</sup> When assessing their success at implementing their policies parties have also compared their record to the manifesto, rather than to alternative policy statements.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter first outlines the time period covered, which parties' manifestos were collected, and the difficulties encountered collecting the manifestos. The coding procedures and rules, and the new codes and subcodes developed to ensure that the coding frame worked well in New Zealand, are then described. Finally it is discussed how the results were analysed, and the proportion of parties' manifestos taken up by different types of issues is briefly studied.

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<sup>1</sup> R.G. Mulgan, 'The Concept of Mandate in New Zealand Politics', Political Science, Vol. 30 (1978), pp. 92-93.

<sup>2</sup> Ian Budge, 'The internal analysis of election programmes', in Ideology, Strategy And Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', in The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Martin Holland and Jonathan Boston (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 14.

## 4.2 The Manifesto Collection

### 4.2.1 The Period Covered

Election programmes were collected back to the beginning of effective party competition at the 1911 election when the dominance of the Liberal Party was challenged by the new Reform Party.<sup>4</sup> Even at the 1911 election the Reform and Liberal parties remained weak, with some candidates refusing to state which party they would support. On the left of the political system the parties remained divided, as they would until the creation of the current New Zealand Labour Party in 1916.<sup>5</sup> Despite the fragmented state of the parties 1911 made a good starting point because this made it possible to track changes in parties' policies and measure differences between parties' positions from the beginning of party competition. 1996 was chosen as the finishing date for this study because work was too far advanced to include the 1999 election.

### 4.2.2 The Parties Included

This study collected the manifestos of all the important parties in New Zealand politics. A modified version of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) criteria was used as a guideline for deciding whether a party's manifesto was important enough to include.<sup>6</sup> This policy involved collecting for every election the manifestos of parties that had received more than 4% of the vote, although two other manifestos were also included. The collection included a total of 94 election manifestos, six of which were alternative policy statements issued by the main parties. As well as including the main left-wing and right-wing parties, the

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<sup>4</sup> David Hamer, The New Zealand Liberals: The Years of Power, 1891-1912 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1988), p. 320; Len Richardson, 'Parties and Political Change', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 213.

<sup>5</sup> Michael Bassett, Three Party Politics In New Zealand: 1911-1931 (Auckland: Historical Publications, 1982), pp. 2-5.

<sup>6</sup> Budge, 'The internal analysis of election programmes', p. 31 notes that one guideline was that the manifestos of parties that got more than 5% of the vote at one postwar election were included in the initial study. However, he states that this was only a very general guideline.

collection also included the environmentalist Values Party's 1972 and 1975 manifestos and the Green Party's 1990 manifesto, and the religious Christian Coalition's 1996 manifesto.

The average share of the vote captured by each of the parties that have received over 4% of the vote at more than two elections is shown in Table 4.1. The larger parties' share of the vote at every election was shown in chapter two in Figure 2.1, while the minor parties' share of the vote was shown in Figure 2.3. Table 4.1 shows that during the 1911-1928 period Reform tended to receive the largest proportion of the vote, followed by the Liberal and Labour parties. The results for the 1931 election, which a Reform-Liberal Party coalition contested as the Coalition, are only shown in Figure 2.1. Over the 1935-1996 period when Labour and National have been directly competing against each other they have both averaged over 40% of the total vote. Finally, Table 4.1 shows that during the 1954-1990 period when Social Credit was directly competing against Labour and National on average it received 9.6% of the votes cast.

Table 4.1: The main parties' average share of the vote

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
Average share of the vote	19.3 (8.8)	39.6 (5.9)	31.3 (7.9)
1935-1996	Labour	National	
Average share of the vote	43.6 (6.1)	43.2 (5.7)	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
Average share of the vote	43.0 (3.9)	43.6 (3.7)	9.6 (5.0)

The first figure below each party's name measures that party's average share of the vote, while the statistic in brackets measures the standard deviation.

The results in Table 4.1 establish a format that will be followed throughout the next three chapters. Although the periods for the averages are very different they divide the results up into intervals when groups of parties were directly competing against each other. Because of the obvious limitations of this and other tables the largest parties' positions will usually also be graphed. For space and presentational reasons the minor parties' positions will be graphed less often. Because parties have sometimes changed their name throughout this study they

are referred to by the name they were known by for longest. For both the 1911 and 1914 elections only one of the platforms issued by Labour's predecessors was coded. There were minor policy differences between the left-wing parties at these elections.<sup>7</sup> However, the emphasis on left-wing parties in this thesis is on the much greater change in their policies over time.

A 4% share of the vote was used as a guideline for inclusion in this study because a higher cut off would have meant excluding two important parties. One of these parties was the Christian Coalition, which won 4.3% of the party vote at the 1996 election. It was important to include the Christian Coalition's manifesto to provide a contrast to other parties on moral issues, and so that it could be seen whether it would have made a suitable coalition partner for National if it had won any seats. The second party a 4% threshold made it possible to include was the Democratic Soldier Labour Party. This party could have influenced Labour's policies at the 1943 election, even though New Zealand's first past the post electoral system contributed to it winning no seats and only receiving 4.3% of the vote.

Lowering the threshold for inclusion below 4% of the vote would have usually meant including parties that have had little effect on New Zealand politics.<sup>8</sup> It would also have generated considerably more data, making it much harder to analyse by increasing the number of parties that had only contested a few elections.

Two exceptions were made to the policy of excluding a party's manifesto when it received less than 4% of the vote. The first of these was for Values at the first election it contested in 1972, when despite receiving only 2.0% of the vote it had a very substantial effect on political debate.<sup>9</sup> The other exception was for Social Credit at the 1990 election, when after receiving more than 4% of the vote for the previous 12 elections Social Credit's share of the vote fell to only 1.7%. Social Credit's 1990 manifesto was included because this made it possible to

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<sup>7</sup> Bruce Brown, 'The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935' (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Victoria, University of Wellington, 1955), p. 20.

<sup>8</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Minor Parties', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 310-311.

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Levine, *The New Zealand Political System* (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), p. 80.

study its position at every election it contested, and to test the rationality of its 1991 decision to join the NewLabour Party dominated Alliance.

#### 4.2.3 Selection of Documents

The most authoritative policy representation of the main parties have usually been printed brochures or booklets outlining policy statements. The main exception was for the Liberal Party when it was led by Sir Joseph Ward. Then Ward's speech at the start of his election campaign, which was reported on in full by the newspapers most sympathetic to the Liberal Party, took the place of a normal manifesto.<sup>10</sup> At the 1951 snap election Sydney Holland's speech on radio at the start of National's election campaign was also treated by newspapers as his party's manifesto.<sup>11</sup>

During the 1910s manifestos were sometimes called platforms, and were often the same as the long-term statement of principles of the party. Since the 1920s, however, Labour has campaigned on manifestos that are increasingly more moderate than its platform.<sup>12</sup> As a result in New Zealand the term 'platform' has come to be usually used only to describe a party's statement of long-term principles.

Parties' official manifestos were always used except for Social Credit at the 1954 and 1957 elections, when a mass distributed booklet and pamphlets were respectively used. These alternative policy statements were used because Social Credit's policies received virtually no coverage by newspapers until the 1960 election. As a result, before then Social Credit put most of its campaign effort into these mass distributed documents rather than its manifesto.<sup>13</sup>

Parties have frequently produced shortened versions of their manifestos for mass distribution. When more than one manifesto was issued by a party the document referred to by the party as the full manifesto was usually treated by

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<sup>10</sup> Dr Michael Bassett, letter to the author, 17 May 1996.

<sup>11</sup> Editorial, 'A Fair Share In Nation's Prosperity', Evening Post, 14 August 1951, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Bruce Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour: A History of the New Zealand Labour Party from 1916 to 1940 (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), p. 15.

<sup>13</sup> R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson, A.V. Mitchell, New Zealand Politics in Action: The 1960 General Election (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 86, 127.

this study as the official programme. The exceptions were Labour in 1987, when its full manifesto was only widely available after the election,<sup>14</sup> and again in 1996 when its manifesto was only supplied to targeted elite groups.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, in 1996 New Zealand First only put together a selected group of policy statements, described by the party as a manifesto, after the election.<sup>16</sup> Further details justifying the choice of documents are given in the section on manifestos in the primary sources bibliography.

The most significant discovery was that at the 1931 election the Coalition issued two manifestos that were printed in newspapers. Its first, very brief, manifesto has been the one normally quoted by historians.<sup>17</sup> According to Farland the Coalition's second, considerably longer, manifesto was the same as the draft Reform manifesto prepared before it agreed to contest the election in a coalition with the Liberal Party.<sup>18</sup> Because further research showed that both manifestos had been printed together as a pamphlet the results from the manifestos were added together.

It was necessary to concentrate on election programmes because it would have been impossible to collect, let alone code, all the policy statements issued by the parties. For instance, at the 1996 election the economics forecasting group Infometrics collected over 1000 pages of economic policy releases by the main parties, and admitted that its collection was far from complete.<sup>19</sup> It is unlikely that the concentration by this study on election programmes skews the results because overseas studies that have collected different types of policy statements by the same party have found few differences in the results.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', p. 17 states that the full version of Labour's 1987 manifesto was "not published until nearly two weeks after the election". However, Anthony Hubbard, *Listener*, 16 April 1990, p. 20 quotes Ruth Dyson, who was then Labour's President, as saying that loose leaf versions of the full manifesto were sent to all Labour candidates before the election.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Murdo MacMillan, Assistant General Secretary, New Zealand Labour Party, Wellington, 21 June 1999.

<sup>16</sup> Telephone conversation with Maureen Guy, Winston Peters' Tauranga electorate secretary, 14 October 1996.

<sup>17</sup> See the entry for the Coalition's manifesto in the primary sources bibliography for details.

<sup>18</sup> Bruce Farland, *Coates' Tale* (Wellington: Bruce Farland, 1995), pp. 90, 187.

<sup>19</sup> Bob Edlin, 'Infometrics runs its rule over party policies', *Independent*, 4 October 1996, p. 38.

<sup>20</sup> Ian Budge, 'The internal analysis of election programmes', pp. 20-21.

#### 4.2.4 How Election Programmes are Written In New Zealand

There is a very small literature on who writes New Zealand election programmes. Early Reform manifestos were written by the party leader, although they took advice from a policy committee.<sup>21</sup> No information is available on who wrote the Liberal Party's programmes, although it seems unlikely Ward would have let anyone else write his speeches.<sup>22</sup> In the Labour Party programmes were traditionally drafted by members of the Parliamentary Party, and then revised after consultation with the party's national executive.<sup>23</sup> Since the 1960 election, when sections of Labour's manifesto were hurriedly written by the party leader during a plane flight, Labour has had a formal policy committee.<sup>24</sup> This committee contains representatives from the Labour caucus, representatives chosen by the annual conference, and representatives from sectional councils. Under Labour's current constitution the final policy must be confirmed by both the National Council and the parliamentary caucus.<sup>25</sup> National has been more democratic than its right-wing predecessors, with its manifesto being decided by a policy committee containing both MPs and representatives from the wider party.<sup>26</sup> As in the Labour Party, in practice the party leader tends to have the biggest say.<sup>27</sup>

Social Credit's election policy has been drafted by a policy committee, although at times it has used outside advisers to help improve the presentation of

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<sup>21</sup> W.J. Gardner, 'W.F. Massey in Power, 1912-1925', Political Science, Vol. 13 (1961), Vol. 1, p. 15.

<sup>22</sup> Michael Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 179.

<sup>23</sup> Barry Gustafson, From the Cradle to the Grave: A Biography of Michael Joseph Savage (Auckland: Penguin, 1988), pp. 133, 165.

<sup>24</sup> Barry Gustafson, 'The Labour Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 281.

<sup>25</sup> Richard Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), p. 259.

<sup>26</sup> G.A. Wood, 'The National Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 302.

<sup>27</sup> R.S. Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 176-179. This is a topic parties are very uncommunicative about. An interview was arranged with Murdo MacMillan, Assistant General Secretary, New Zealand Labour Party, 21 June 1999, in Wellington. However, he was unwilling to provide any information not already available in secondary sources. Attempts to arrange interviews with National Party officials were fruitless, while letters to party office holders were never replied to.

its policies.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, in the Alliance and ACT the manifesto is decided by a policy committee. Although New Zealand First consulted widely when writing its 1993 manifesto,<sup>29</sup> its 1996 policy was written by a small group of its leader's advisers.<sup>30</sup>

#### 4.2.5 Locating Election Programmes

Locating original copies of all election programmes proved extremely difficult. Although New Zealand historians and political scientists have frequently referred to election manifestos and leaders' speeches, previous attempts to locate them all have been unsuccessful. For instance, although in the early 1980s the New Zealand collector for the MRG found all but one of National's election programmes for the period between 1946 and 1981, she could only find eight of the thirteen Labour programmes, and four of the ten Social Credit programmes. Less reliable newspaper versions of manifestos were used to fill in the gaps.<sup>31</sup> More recent studies have encountered similar problems locating New Zealand election programmes.<sup>32</sup>

The election programmes used in this study were located by systematically checking bibliographic guides, visiting libraries and archives, and writing to political parties and political historians. Full details of the search strategy are given in the primary sources bibliography. A very high level of success at locating manifestos was achieved, with the only cases where newspaper versions of election programmes had to be used being for some elections between 1911 and 1935. However, it is very likely that the text in the newspaper versions for this period is the same as in the pamphlet versions. This is because when

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<sup>28</sup> R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson, and A.V. Mitchell, New Zealand Politics in Action: The 1960 General Election (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 86; Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), pp. 156-157.

<sup>29</sup> Ian Shearer and Cheryl Shearer, 'New Zealand First' in Double Decision: The 1993 Election and Referendum in New Zealand, edited by Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer (Wellington: Victoria, University of Wellington, 1994), pp. 28-29.

<sup>30</sup> Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 260-261.

<sup>31</sup> See 'Documentary Sources', in Ideology, Strategy And Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 448-449, and compare to the bibliography of this thesis.

pamphlet copies of election programmes could be located for this period it was always found that the text had been printed with at most only very minor changes in newspapers which were sympathetic to that party. When no booklet copy could be found comparisons of the texts of particular manifestos in different newspapers also revealed no significant differences.<sup>33</sup> Because the finances of parties were usually weak during this period<sup>34</sup> it seems likely that until the late 1930s political parties printed very few copies of their manifestos, and primarily relied upon newspapers to distribute copies of their policies. Other writers on New Zealand politics have also regarded the newspaper versions of early programmes as the full versions.<sup>35</sup>

Although since the late 1930s either large sections of programmes or detailed reports on them, have often been printed in newspapers, the full versions have been printed less frequently. This probably reflects the rapid growth in the length of election programmes, which would have made it virtually impossible to print the full text.

Because of the time and effort it took to locate the programmes detailed information on where each programme is held is given in the bibliography. This will make it possible to collect them relatively easily in the future.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> 'Part 3-Political Parties', The New Zealand Politics Source Book, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Paul Harris and Stephen Levine (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1994), p. 129.

<sup>33</sup> Different texts have been compared in this way by a number of manifesto studies. See, for instance, Michael Laver and Sydney Elliot, 'Northern Ireland 1921-1973: Party Manifestos and Platforms', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp.162-163.

<sup>34</sup> O'Farrell, Harry Holland, p. 203; Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History Of The New Zealand National Party (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), p. 4.

<sup>35</sup> See, for instance, O'Farrell, Harry Holland, p. 189; Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, pp. 71, 82.

### 4.3 The Coding Procedures

#### 4.3.1 The Coding System

As photocopies of manifestos were collected they were coded using the coding methodology developed by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) of the European Consortium for Political Research. Using the MRG coding framework had several advantages. One of these was that the MRG framework was designed after extensive experimentation to cover all political issues, and has since been used to code over 1700 election programmes from 50 different countries.<sup>37</sup> This meant that there were good reasons to believe that the MRG coding framework would work in New Zealand. Using the MRG methodology also meant that the results could be compared, both in this study and in the future, with the results for similar studies in other countries.

#### 4.3.2 Coding Methodology

The MRG's methodology involves coding the content of each quasi-sentence in election manifestos into one of 56 categories. A brief summary of the description of some of the codes most frequently used was given in Table 3.1 in the Literature Review. The full descriptions of all the codes are given in Appendix A of this thesis.

Although it would have been possible to get hold of the MRG's coding results for New Zealand, which existed for the 1946-1990 period, this would have reduced the accuracy of the results.<sup>38</sup> One reason for this is that the MRG were unable to collect all New Zealand manifestos and instead had to rely on less reliable newspaper reports. These reports would produce less accurate results because since the late 1930s newspapers have frequently passed quickly over

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<sup>36</sup> The Political Science and Public Policy Department at the University of Waikato eventually hopes to scan all the manifestos and make them available on CD Rom. This will be subject to permission from political parties, and the libraries and archives holding the manifestos.

<sup>37</sup> Andrea Volkens, Dataset CMP95: Programmatic Profiles of Political Parties in 27 Countries, 1945-1994 (Berlin: Comparative Manifestos Project, 1995), p. 4.

<sup>38</sup> The results have now been updated to 1996 for the MRG by the author.

sections in manifestos where the policies had already been released and discussed in the newspaper at an earlier date.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, while the MRG usually had experts on the politics of each country code manifestos, the initial coding of the New Zealand documents was conducted by graduate students in England who are likely to have had little knowledge of New Zealand politics.<sup>40</sup> The most important reason, however, for not using the original MRG results was that recoding allowed the addition of codes and subcodes to cover elements of policies not originally measured. In several countries overseas similar factors have led to researchers collecting clean copies of election manifestos and recoding them.<sup>41</sup>

### 4.3.3 Coding Rules

The MRG's methodology involves breaking the content of manifestos down into statements consisting of only one argument, and then allocating that statement a code. Sentences containing more than one argument are divided into quasi-sentences, each containing only one political idea. Although if the same argument is repeated several times within a sentence it still counts as one quasi-sentence, each quasi-sentence is considered to end at a full stop. Lists of arguments are treated as if they were separated by full stops.

In accordance with the Handbook, coding was carried out by first reading the content of paragraphs, next marking in the quasi-sentences, and then deciding

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<sup>39</sup> For instance, in 'Labour Party Policy', New Zealand Herald, 30 October 1946, p. 7, it was noted that in Labour's manifesto "Considerable attention is given to Labour's five-year education plan". However, because the Herald had already covered the education plan in an earlier issue it did not provide any details about the plan in the manifesto article. This sentence would probably still have acted as a cue which would have reminded readers that Labour regarded its education plan as important, and prompted them to think further about the various aspects of it. But since the coding scheme measures the importance of issues just by the proportion of sentences they make up, the results from the coding of this report would falsely suggest that Labour put relatively little weight on education in its manifesto.

<sup>40</sup> David Robertson, 'Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 1946-1981, an initial comparative analysis', in Ideology, Strategy And Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 48. There is no mention of New Zealand students being used to code the manifestos, whereas in some other chapters it is made clear that people familiar with the country carried out the coding.

<sup>41</sup> See, for instance, Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organization, Ideology and Electoral Competition (London: Frances Pinter, 1987), p. 155; and Ian McAllister and Rhonda Moore, 'Preface', in Party Strategy and Change: Australian Electoral Speeches Since 1946, edited by Ian McAllister and Rhonda Moore, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991), p. xiii.

which of the coding categories best fitted each quasi-sentence. The code for each quasi-sentence was then written in the margin. When more than one category seemed to apply to a statement its context was taken into account. For instance, references to welfare measures within Maori Affairs sections, which seemed to equally involve support for the welfare state and supporting Maori as a special interest group, were coded as helping Maori.<sup>42</sup> Coding sentences into more than one sentence was not practicable because it would have made the results very complex and difficult to interpret when the aim of content analysis is to simplify data.

The MRG rule that every section of the party programme is coded except for sections such as the contents page, tables of statistics, and section headings was followed. Introductory remarks by leaders were also ignored because they have not always been considered to be an authoritative statement by the party.<sup>43</sup> In addition, sections in Maori in Labour's 1972 and 1990 manifestos, and the Christian Coalition's 1996 manifesto, were excluded. This was because they appeared to repeat sections printed in English.

#### 4.3.4 Subcodes and New Codes

Although the MRG methodology covers most political issues and values, some changes were necessary to ensure that differences between the parties were properly measured. This was because trials of the coding framework revealed several situations where the coding framework was more general than desirable. In particular, some codes such as social justice measured both economic and new politics issues, and therefore had to be broken up. Other codes, such as the non-economic demographic groups category measured references to such disparate groups as Maori, women, youth, and the elderly. Because these groups are so different, subcategories were introduced so that a much more detailed picture of parties' policies could be developed. Since the MRG coding framework dealt

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<sup>42</sup> Andrea Volkens, Content Analysis of Party Programmes in Comparative Perspective: Handbook and Coding Instructions (Berlin: Comparative Manifestos Project, 1992), pp. 14-17.

<sup>43</sup> Andrea Volkens, Content Analysis of Party Programmes, p. 11.

poorly with sentences measuring a postmaterialist concern about individual personal development, an additional code was introduced for these sentences.

There were also difficulties with coding sentences dealing with monetary reform policies, which have been on the New Zealand political agenda much more than in any other country. Tests of the methodology showed that many statements about monetary reform theories, which were particularly important in Social Credit manifestos, did not fit into the existing coding frame. To measure the monetary reform statements four additional codes were developed. Full details of the subcodes and new codes are given in Appendix A.

#### 4.4 Analysing the Data

##### 4.4.1 Computerising the Data

Once the manifestos were coded the results were counted up and entered into a computer file. To ensure that the data had been entered correctly the results were then printed off and checked against the original totals. The data was then recoded into percentages. This made it easy to generate statistics showing what proportion of parties' manifestos were about particular issues at any election, and average references by parties to issues over a certain period of time. Further details about how the statistics were used are given in later chapters. The full dataset, which is very large, will be archived at the Social Science Data Archives at the Australian National University. It will be available from there for further analysis.

##### 4.4.2 Aggregating Categories

One problem that has been found overseas with the MRG coding scheme is that many of the categories measure very similar issues. This makes it difficult to interpret the results, and creates the potential for coding variations to generate a

false appearance of changes in policy emphases. In order to generate clearer results several studies have aggregated categories that measure similar concepts.<sup>44</sup>

A modified version of the aggregation methods used in other texts has been used in this study. For example, the market regulation, economic planning, protectionism, controlled economy, nationalisation, and Marxist analysis categories were collapsed into a new category called state intervention. Aggregation of categories was also necessary to measure the proportion of manifestos taken up by references to issues about each type of cleavage. Full details of the new categories used in subsequent chapters are listed in Appendix A after the coding descriptions.

#### 4.4.3 Reliability and Validity

The MRG coding Handbook was found to be very useful, and even included coded extracts from a New Zealand manifesto. Before coding of New Zealand programmes began the reliability test was completed and posted to the MRG in Berlin. Dr Andrea Volkens, who coordinates the coding for the MRG, advised that the author did “very well”. The corrected version of the reliability test was posted back to the author by Dr Volkens.<sup>45</sup>

The accuracy of the coding of the manifestos was greatly improved by the offer by Dr Volkens to answer any coding questions the author had. The answers received, such as coding tax credits for those who were married under the traditional morality code, seemed to solve coding difficulties very well. All manifestos were reread after initial coding to ensure that the quality of coding was as high as possible. Because the national way of life code seemed potentially theoretically ambiguous, notes were later taken about the content of every sentence. They indicated that it correctly measured nationalist themes in New Zealand. Checks were also made of the multiculturalism and political authority codes.

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<sup>44</sup> M.J. Laver and Ian Budge, ‘Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation’, in Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J. Laver and Ian Budge (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 24; Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System, p. 155.

Table 4.2: The average proportion of the main parties' manifestos that were uncodeable

1911-1928 000 Uncodeable	Labour 7.1 ((8.4)	Reform 7.8 (7.0)	Liberals 8.1 (10.1)
1935-1996 000 Uncodeable	Labour 1.8 (2.2)	National 3.8 (6.7)	
1954-1990 000 Uncodeable	Labour 1.1 (0.9)	National 1.8 (2.3)	Social Credit 3.7 (7.5)

The first number in each column shows the average proportion of parties' manifestos that were uncodeable. The statistic in brackets shows the standard deviation, which shows the extent of variation over time in parties' references to uncodeable issues.

Table 4.2 shows the average proportion of uncodeable sentences in the main parties' manifestos for different time periods. These results indicate that the proportion of uncodeable sentences was consistently low. The highest proportion of uncodeable sentences was 6.7% in the internet version of New Zealand First's 1996 programme, where some of the comments were too general to be codeable. The next highest was 3.9% in the Liberal Party's 1928 manifesto. In 20 election programmes there were no uncodeable sentences.

Although parties' programmes are mainly about short-term policy, from analysing programmes it is possible to gain insights into parties' longer term values and beliefs. However, it is important to remember that election programmes are a party's public face, and one of their primary purposes is to attract voters. As a result there are aspects of a party's values, beliefs, and doctrines which are not stated in their programmes.<sup>46</sup> Since coding schemes treat every sentence equally they may sometimes miss substantive differences in parties' policies.<sup>47</sup> More qualitative analysis of manifesto texts is also necessary to interpret the results. In addition, election programmes do not include

<sup>45</sup> Dr. Andrea Volkens, email to the author, 19 June 1996.

<sup>46</sup> Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 20.

<sup>47</sup> Laver and Garry, 'Estimating Policy Positions from Party Manifestos', pp. 3-4.

information on the party leaders' background or personality.<sup>48</sup> These are limitations that will be considered further in later chapters.

#### 4.4.4 The Importance of Issues from Different Cleavages

Before going on to look at the content analysis results in detail, the relative importance of different types of issues will now be briefly looked at. Table 4.3 shows the proportion of election programmes taken up by different types of issues. The results in Table 4.3 are less reliable than those elsewhere in this thesis because many categories fit into several cleavages. However, this table provides a valuable perspective on the importance of different types of issues that it is easy to lose when looking at the results for individual policy areas in later chapters.

Table 4.3: The average proportion of the main parties' manifestos about the main types of issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
Socio-Economic Issues	73.0 (7.1)	68.3 (10.2)	66.8 (13.4)
Foreign Affairs	5.7 (3.3)	6.2 (4.0)	6.2 (7.4)
Ethnic Issues	0 (0)	1.9 (2.3)	.5 (.8)
Conservative+ Anti-Establishment Issues	7.8 (7.6)	17.1 (9.1)	20.1 (10.1)
New Politics Issues	11.9 (4.7)	4.9 (3.4)	3.9 (3.1)
Other Issues	1.6 (1.7)	1.6 (1.8)	2.5 (1.6)
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
Socio-Economic Issues	64.9 (10.6)	71.3 (7.7)	63.7 (8.9)
Foreign Affairs	7.2 (3.5)	5.5 (2.6)	4.4 (3.1)
Ethnic Issues	5.7 (2.6)	4.6 (2.1)	3.2 (1.2)
Conservative+ Anti-Establishment Issues	5.4 (2.8)	7.1 (3.1)	8.4 (7.1)
New Politics Issues	14.3 (9.0)	9.7 (5.0)	17.0 (6.4)
Other Issues	2.5 (1.7)	1.8 (1.2)	3.2 (2.2)
1935-1996	Labour	National	
Socio-Economic Issues	68.5 (10.4)	69.6 (9.2)	
Foreign Affairs	6.7 (3.4)	4.7 (2.5)	
Ethnic Issues	5.2 (2.5)	4.8 (2.7)	
Conservative+Anti-Establishment Issues	5.5 (3.0)	10.1 (7.5)	
New Politics Issues	11.9 (8.5)	9.0 (5.2)	
Other Issues	2.1 (1.7)	1.8 (1.3)	

<sup>48</sup> Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Voting and Party Competition: A Theoretical Critique and Synthesis Applied to Surveys from Ten Democracies (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), p. 423.

Table 4.3 shows that economic policy issues have dominated the content of New Zealand election manifestos. Indeed, on average, economic issues have usually made up more than two-thirds of the content of the main parties' manifestos. It has been extremely rare for the main parties' references to economic issues to fall below 50% of the content of a programme. The first occasion when this occurred was at the 1914 election. In 1914 the Liberal Party's references fell to just 46.7% of the content because its high wartime foreign policy references resulted in less attention to other issues. At the 1990 election internal divisions within Labour over economic policy<sup>49</sup> seem to have led to these issues being played down, with them only making up 46.3% of the content of its manifesto. At the 1990 election, which was the last it contested as a separate party, Social Credit's emphasis on economic issues also fell to just 46.9% of its manifesto content.

The minor parties based on new politics or moral issues cleavages have often made relatively few references to economic issues. For instance, just 17.4% of Values' 1972 manifesto was about economic policy issues, although 39% of its 1975 manifesto was about economic issues suggesting that it felt that it had to deal with them at greater length. In its 1990 manifesto the Green party was very strongly focussed on postmaterialist themes, with only 9.1% of its manifesto being about economic issues. The Christian Coalition appears to have had less influence on the political agenda. Although just 45.6% of the content of its 1996 programme was on economic issues, this was considerably larger than the 31.5% which was about conservative cleavage issues.

The next chapter discusses parties' policies on economic policy issues. Then in chapter five the content analysis results for national revolution foreign policy, ethnic policy, social conservatism and anti-establishment issues are outlined, together with the results for new politics issues. The categories in the residual other issues category are not discussed because they are not closely theoretically linked to any electoral cleavage.

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<sup>49</sup> Jonathan Boston, 'The 1990 General Election: Economic Strategies', in The 1990 General Election: Perspectives on Political Change in New Zealand, edited by Elizabeth McLeay

#### 4.5 Conclusion

Every election programme issued by the main New Zealand political parties since the beginning of effective party competition at the 1911 election was collected by this study. Earlier studies of New Zealand election manifestos have been unable to locate them all. The election programmes were then coded using a modified version of the MRG coding frame. This methodology involved breaking sentences down into quasi-sentences containing only one point, and then allocating the code which best fitted that sentence. To ensure that differences between New Zealand political parties were fully measured subcodes and additional codes were added. Initial study of the content analysis results shows that economic policy issues have dominated parties' manifestos. It is parties' policies in that area that will be looked at in more detail in the next chapter.

## Chapter Five: Parties' Policies on Economic and Redistributive Issues

### 5.1 Introduction

Economic policy issues have usually dominated both New Zealand politics and academic analysis of it. The class cleavage, stemming from divides created by the industrial revolution, has usually been the most electorally important division in New Zealand politics, although the overlapping urban-rural dimension has also been important.<sup>1</sup> This chapter uses the manifesto data to examine which economic and social policy issues have divided New Zealand political parties, find which issues have been less contentious, and study how parties' policies have changed over time. The discussion of parties' economic policies is divided into theoretically distinct sections on economic philosophy, economic groups, social services, economic constraint, economic development, and monetary reform issues.

As well as providing unique insights into parties' policies and their ideological beliefs the results will help show whether parties campaign in ways which make responsible party government possible. If the results show that parties simplify choices for voters by emphasising similar policies over time this will make it easier for voters to understand parties' policies.<sup>2</sup> For parties to be acting in accordance with the requirements of theories of responsible party government and pluralism they should also be sensitive to public opinion, and to the policy environment.<sup>3</sup> The results should also shed some light on debates over when parties have signalled major changes in their policies in advance through their manifestos.

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Aimer, 'The Future of the Party System', in New Zealand Politics in Transition, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 193; Jack Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus: The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge, Parties, Policies and Democracy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 26.

### 5.3.1 Economic Philosophy Issues

Table 5.1 shows the average emphasis by the main parties on issues relating to free market economic policies and state intervention in the economy. The first number in each column measures average references by a party to that topic, while the figures in brackets measure the standard deviation. Entries in bold in the table are totals for the categories listed immediately above. The time periods for the averages shown have been shaped by when parties have been directly competing against each other. Because of the limitations of the averages, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 respectively graph the largest parties' references to state intervention and market economy themes over the 1911-1996 period.

Table 5.1 shows that between 1911 and 1928 state intervention themes dominated Labour's manifestos, on average making up 25.2% of the content. This reflected Labour's strong support for socialist economic policies, particularly nationalisation. Figure 5.1 shows that during the 1911-1928 period Labour's state intervention references fluctuated, but trended sharply downwards over time. The biggest drop occurred at the 1928 election, following Labour's decision to completely drop its unpopular land nationalisation policy, and to sharply curtail its plans for nationalisation of other areas of the economy.<sup>4</sup> On average a much lower, but still important, 6.3% of the right-wing Reform Party's election programmes were about support for state intervention themes. The Liberal Party, which has often been seen by historians as being slightly to the right of the political centre,<sup>5</sup> usually took a slightly more interventionist

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<sup>3</sup> A.H. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British Constitution (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 17-18.

<sup>4</sup> Bruce Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), pp. 86-95 concentrates on changes in Labour's land policies between 1925 and 1928. However, comparisons of Labour's 1925 and 1928 manifestos shows that its 1925 manifesto also includes detailed plans to increase state ownership of insurance and banking which are substantially watered down in its 1928 manifesto.

<sup>5</sup> R.M. Burdon, The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand 1918-1939 (Wellington: Reed, 1965), p. 3; R.M. Chapman, The Political Scene, 1919-1931 (Auckland: Heinemann, 1969), pp. 5, 25.

Table 5.1: The main parties' average references to economic philosophy issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
201E Economic Freedom	0	0.6 (1.5)	0.3 (0.4)
401 Free Enterprise	1.7 (2.0)	4.8 (4.1)	1.1 (0.9)
402 Incentives	0.4 (0.7)	1.2 (1.5)	1.5 (0.9)
4021 Incentives for home ownership	0	1.0 (1.2)	0.7 (0.9)
407 Protectionism: Negative	0.5 (0.9)	1.1 (1.3)	0.6 (0.6)
<b>Market Economy</b>	<b>2.6 (2.3)</b>	<b>8.7 (5.7)</b>	<b>4.2 (1.5)</b>
403 Market Regulation	8.1 (6.2)	4.7 (3.6)	5.9 (1.3)
404 Economic Planning	0.2 (0.5)	1.1 (1.7)	0.4 (0.7)
406 Protectionism: Positive	0	0.3 (0.8)	0.1 (0.2)
412 Controlled Economy	1.8 (1.4)	0.2 (0.4)	0.5 (0.8)
413 Nationalisation	15.2 (7.9)	0	1.8 (1.4)
415 Marxist Analysis	0	0	0
<b>State Intervention</b>	<b>25.2 (10.0)</b>	<b>6.3 (2.9)</b>	<b>8.7 (2.2)</b>
1935-1996	Labour	National	
201E Economic Freedom	0.1 (0.1)	0.3 (0.4)	
401 Free Enterprise	1.1 (0.7)	4.6 (3.0)	
402 Incentives	1.7 (1.3)	2.9 (1.6)	
4021 Incentives for home ownership	1.4 (1.2)	1.3 (1.0)	
407 Protectionism: Negative	0.6 (0.8)	1.9 (2.8)	
<b>Market Economy</b>	<b>4.9 (2.2)</b>	<b>11.0 (5.0)</b>	
403 Market Regulation	2.6 (1.6)	1.6 (0.7)	
404 Economic Planning	1.2 (0.9)	1.0 (1.2)	
406 Protectionism: Positive	0.8 (0.6)	0.8 (0.6)	
412 Controlled Economy	1.5 (1.6)	0.6 (0.8)	
413 Nationalisation	1.0 (0.7)	0.3 (0.8)	
415 Marxist Analysis	0	0	
<b>State Intervention</b>	<b>7.0 (2.6)</b>	<b>4.3 (2.4)</b>	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
201E Economic Freedom	0.1 (0.1)	0.4 (0.4)	0.6 (0.5)
401 Free Enterprise	1.1 (0.5)	4.1 (2.3)	2.4 (1.0)
402 Incentives	2.0 (1.2)	3.3 (1.6)	1.1 (1.1)
4021 Incentives for home ownership	1.5 (1.0)	1.6 (1.0)	0.7 (0.6)
407 Protectionism: Negative	0.7 (0.8)	2.5 (3.3)	0.4 (0.4)
<b>Market Economy</b>	<b>5.4 (1.3)</b>	<b>12.0 (5.0)</b>	<b>5.2 (1.6)</b>
403 Market Regulation	3.4 (1.2)	1.5 (0.6)	2.0 (1.2)
404 Economic Planning	1.3 (0.8)	1.3 (1.3)	0.5 (0.5)
406 Protectionism: Positive	0.8 (0.5)	0.9 (0.5)	0.4 (0.6)
412 Controlled Economy	0.9 (0.6)	0.5 (0.8)	1.4 (0.9)
413 Nationalisation	1.0 (0.5)	0.1 (0.1)	0.4 (0.5)
416 Marxist Analysis	0	0	0
<b>State Intervention</b>	<b>7.3 (2.2)</b>	<b>4.3 (1.7)</b>	<b>4.6 (2.2)</b>

In this table, and in later tables, the first figure in each column measures average references by a party to that topic, while the statistic in brackets measures the standard deviation. The statistics in bold are aggregations of the categories directly above. Because of rounding the totals may slightly vary from the sum of the categories above them.

Figure 5.1: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about support for state intervention, 1911-1996





Figure 5.2: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about support for a market economy, 1911-1996



position than Reform, with positive references to state intervention on average making up 8.7% of the content of its manifestos. As well as making much lower state intervention references than Labour, the Reform and Liberal parties' state intervention references are concentrated in the market regulation category. This category measures their support for moderate new liberal measures, such as policies to prevent land aggregation, and for pragmatic intervention in the economy.<sup>6</sup>

Reform's support for classical liberal goals, such as freehold land ownership and free enterprise,<sup>7</sup> which Figure 5.2 reveals was strongest in its early manifestos, results in on average 8.7% of its manifesto content being about support for a market economy. During the 1911-1928 period Labour put the least emphasis on the market economy category, with these issues taking up on average only 2.6% of the content of its manifestos. The Liberal Party's market economy references were only slightly higher, with these themes on average making up 4.2% of the content of its programmes.

Parties' positions at the 1931 election, which are shown only in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, confirm that the Coalition emphasised support for state intervention less than Labour, and emphasised market economy themes more than Labour. Table 5.1 shows that over the 1935-1996 period references to state intervention themes on average made up 7% of the content of Labour's manifestos, but only 4.3% of the right-wing National Party's manifestos. In contrast, positive references to market economy issues on average made up 11% of the content of National's manifestos, but just 4.9% of the content of Labour's manifestos.

Labour's state intervention references after 1935 are always much lower than previously. In contrast Labour's market economy references since 1935 are often within a very similar range to those over the 1911-1931 period. This is because even in its earliest platforms Labour accepted private ownership and

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<sup>6</sup> W.J. Gardner, 'The Reform Party', in *Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics*, edited by Robert Chapman (Auckland: University of Auckland, 1961), p. 26; Michael Bassett, *Coates of Kaipara* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 73, 107.

<sup>7</sup> Len Richardson, 'Parties and Political Change', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 213-214; W.J. Gardner, 'Massey-The Farmer Politician', *New Zealand Heritage*, Part 17 (1972), p. 1967.

showed support for small-scale individual enterprise.<sup>8</sup> The results for the market economy and state intervention categories might seem to suggest that Reform was less right-wing on economic issues than National. However, many other issues also influence parties' left-right positions. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also indicate that there have been times when National has taken a relatively left-wing position on market economy and state intervention issues.

Overlap between Labour's and National's positions, and changes in their policies, are usually relatively easy to explain. For instance, National's state intervention references at the 1935 election were much higher than Labour's because National wanted to help the economy recover by retaining its legislation to reduce the value of mortgages, and had to justify the establishment of the Reserve Bank to manage the economy. In contrast, Labour advocated reflating the economy through increasing government expenditure.<sup>9</sup>

A declining faith by Labour and National politicians in interventionist economic policies in recent decades is clearly evident in Figure 5.1. Labour's state intervention references have been trending downwards since the mid-1960s, and at the 1996 election plunged to just 1% of the content of its manifesto. Similarly, National's state intervention references have also declined from a peak during a very interventionist period in the 1970s.

Figure 5.1 shows National's 1981 manifesto gave voters little forewarning of the increase in state involvement in the economy that was to be produced by its 'Think Big' industrialisation policies after 1981, and by its 1982 wage and price freeze. These results weaken Mulgan's claim that at the 1981 election National gained a mandate for more interventionist policies.<sup>10</sup> Instead they support the view that after 1981 National moved away from following the spirit

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<sup>8</sup> Jack Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom?', in The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 17.

<sup>9</sup> New Zealand National Party, 'National Government's Policy: Leaders Issue Manifesto to Electors', Dominion, 29 October 1935, p. 12; Michael Bassett, Coates of Kaipara (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 227-230; Michael Bassett, The State in New Zealand 1840-1984: Socialism Without Doctrines? (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), pp. 176-182. See also section 5.3.4.

<sup>10</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', in The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Martin Holland and Jonathan Boston (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 14.

of its manifesto, in the process weakening the convention of the mandate.<sup>11</sup> Because of these interventionist policies National's relatively modest state intervention references and very high market economy references at the 1984 election are also unexpected. Closer analysis of National's 1984 election manifesto shows that these results occur because it heavily emphasised its support for free trade and the limited market liberalisation policies it had introduced, while avoiding mentioning the wage and price freeze, or how the state had become involved in industrial development.<sup>12</sup> The results also confirm that Labour's 1984 and 1987 manifestos also give little warning of the extreme free market economic policies it was to introduce after its victories at these elections.<sup>13</sup>

The results for the home ownership incentives category shown in Figure 5.1 are very significant. This is because Fairburn has argued that a crucial reason why Labour failed to win an election until 1935 was that Reform and Liberal party policies which promoted home ownership resulted in many workers voting for these parties. However, Table 5.1 shows that the Reform and Liberal parties made very few references to encouraging home ownership, weakening Fairburn's claim that they campaigned on this issue.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, the home ownership incentive results for the 1935-1996 period provide little support for Chapman's theory that National attracted voters away from Labour during the 1940s by policies designed to increase home ownership.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, during the 1940s

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<sup>11</sup> Robert Chapman, 'Political Culture: The Purposes of Party and the Current Challenge', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), p. 28; Jack Vowles, 'The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand', International Political Science Review, Vol. 16 (1995), p. 100.

<sup>12</sup> New Zealand National Party, National's 1984 Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 1984), pp. 3, 9. Coding the Sunday Times description of National's policies as a check on the results showed that a similar level of National's policies were about market liberalisation and state intervention.

<sup>13</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', p. 15; Simon Sheppard, Broken Circle: The Decline and Fall of the Fourth Labour Government (Wellington: PSL Press, 1999), p. 139.

<sup>14</sup> Miles Fairburn, 'Why Did the New Zealand Labour Party Fail to Win Office Until 1935?', Political Science, Vol. 37 (1985), p.119; Miles Fairburn, 'The Farmers Take Over', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 206.

<sup>15</sup> Robert Chapman, 'From Labour to National', The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford, 1992), p. 372.

Labour often emphasised encouraging home ownership more than National did.

Despite these results, changes in the rate of home ownership have undoubtedly had important electoral effects by gradually altering the economic status of some voters. Home ownership tends to result in voters becoming more right-wing because it reduces their income and support for high taxes while they are paying off the mortgage, increases their long-term wealth and economic security, and reduces their need for cash transfers in old age.<sup>16</sup> Home ownership rates have always been high in New Zealand compared to many European countries, however, so that changes in home ownership rates have probably had much more minor electoral effects than in countries such as Britain.<sup>17</sup>

The results in Table 5.1 for just the 1954-1990 period show that on average Social Credit tended to make slightly more references to the state intervention categories than National did. Despite usually being considered a centre-right party,<sup>18</sup> Social Credit made fewer market economy references than Labour. However, the positions of Social Credit and the minor parties on the state intervention and market economy categories, which are shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, indicate that Social Credit's references to both themes have varied

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<sup>16</sup> Francis Castles, The Working Class and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Development of the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 94-97. Clive Bean, 'New Zealand', in Electoral Change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western Countries, edited by Mark Franklin, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 298-299 found that at the 1963 election those renting were 18% more likely to vote for Labour than homeowners. Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer, Voters' Vengeance: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 36 employ additional controls and get much more modest effects for the 1990 election.

<sup>17</sup> The New Zealand Official Yearbook (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand, 1997), p. 128 graphs census data on New Zealand home ownership rates between 1916 and 1996. Home ownership rates in New Zealand increased during the 1920s. However, home ownership rates fell during the Great Depression, and had fallen to 50% by 1936. Thereafter they steadily increased. Home ownership rates peaked at 74% in the 1991 census. Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher Husbands, British Democracy at the Crossroads: Voting and Party Competition in the 1980s (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 23 show that in 1950 the level of home ownership in Britain was only 29%. Francis Castles, Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-War Transformation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), p. 251, which tracks changes in home ownership rates in the OECD since the 1960s, shows that by the early 1990s home ownership rates in Britain had reached 68%.

considerably over time. The totals for the aggregated categories also tend to underestimate the difference between Social Credit's economic policies, and those of Labour and National. For example, rather than simply being in between Labour and National on each of the state intervention categories, Social Credit's dislike of monopolies results in its state intervention references being concentrated in the market regulation and controlled economy categories. Similarly, Social Credit's traditional distrust of the state<sup>19</sup> results in it making even fewer references to nationalisation than National.

Figure 5.3 confirms that even though Labour has virtually abandoned interventionist economic policies, the NewLabour Party at the 1990 election, and the Alliance at the 1993 and 1996 elections continue to support these traditional left-wing policies. Figure 5.4 shows that the Democratic Party, the New Zealand Party, ACT and the Christian Coalition have all heavily emphasised market economy themes. ACT also shows unexpectedly strong support for state intervention, mainly because of its intention to regulate the markets it planned to create in health and education.<sup>20</sup> New Zealand First shows relatively little support for state intervention. Its support for a market economy was relatively high in 1993, but much lower at the 1996 election.

Values' state intervention references at the 1972 and 1975 elections were similar to those of the other parties, and considerably higher than its references to market economy themes. Its state intervention references include the only mentions of Marxist analysis made by a party in its election programme.<sup>21</sup> This topic made up 0.4% of the content of Values' 1972 manifesto, and 2.2% of its 1975 manifesto. Typically Values' Marxist analysis references were about the injustices of the international trading system and the need to reduce the power of

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<sup>18</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Democratic Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), pp. 253-254; Bean, 'New Zealand', pp. 284-285.

<sup>19</sup> Miller, 'The Democratic Party', p. 253.

<sup>20</sup> See, ACT New Zealand, *ACT New Zealand Campaign Manifesto: General Election 1996* (ACT New Zealand, 1996), p. 5.

<sup>21</sup> Although Labour's constitution included a socialist objective until 1951, this was not referred to in any of its platforms or manifestos.

Figure 5.3: Proportion of the minor parties' manifestos about support for state intervention, 1935-1996





Figure 5.4: Proportion of the minor parties' manifestos about support for a market economy, 1935-1996



international capital.<sup>22</sup> In contrast, Values' references to the statist nationalisation category are low, indicating that it held a more middle class, new left, approach towards state intervention than Labour. At the 1990 election the Greens made no references to either state intervention or market economy themes.

### 5.3.2 Economic Groups

Table 5.2 shows the economic groups results for the main parties. The results in Table 5.2 show that during the 1911-1928 period on average 15.4% of Labour's manifestos were about labour groups: positive, with this reflecting its strong links with trade unions and support for labourist ideals.<sup>23</sup> Although during this period the Liberal Party had the next highest labour groups: positive average, Figure 5.5 shows that there were large fluctuations in its references between elections. On average 1.6% of Reform's manifestos were about positive references to labour groups, because despite introducing policies that restricted the power of militant trade unions it still pursued the votes of working class voters.<sup>24</sup> Reform made no direct criticisms of labour groups in its manifestos. However, its references to social harmony, which will be discussed in the next chapter, sometimes implicitly criticised radical trade unions.

There is clear evidence of an urban-rural divide between Labour and the other parties during the 1911-1928 period. This is because between 1911 and 1928 on average positive references to agriculture took up 10.4% of the content of Liberal Party manifestos, and 10.7% of the content of Reform's manifestos, but only 3.3% of the content of Labour's manifestos. The results support Chapman's observation that after 1919 the Liberals particularly tried to appeal to country voters, with Figure 5.6 showing that at the 1922 and 1925 elections

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<sup>22</sup> Values, Blueprint for New Zealand: An Alternative Future (Values Party, 1972), p. 12; Values, Beyond Tomorrow: 1975 Values Party Manifesto (Values, 1975), pp. 45, 47, 49.

<sup>23</sup> Barry Gustafson, 'The Labour Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 268, 271.

the Liberal Party emphasised agriculture more than twice as much as Reform did.<sup>25</sup> The very high agriculture and farmers references made by the Coalition at the 1931 election reflect the established belief that it was only by keeping established farmers on the land, and by encouraging greater agricultural production, that economic recovery would occur.<sup>26</sup>

Table 5.2: The main parties' average references to economic groups

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
701 Labour Groups	15.4 (8.5)	1.6 (1.5)	2.7 (2.5)
702 Labour Groups: Negative	0	0	0
703 Agriculture and farmers	3.3 (1.3)	10.7 (3.5)	10.4 (6.7)
704 Middle Class and Professionals	0.2 (0.3)	0	0
7041 Civil Servants	0.5 (0.9)	1.4 (3.0)	0.5 (0.8)
7051 Returned Servicemen	0.1 (0.3)	1.1 (1.5)	1.6 (2.5)
1935-1996	Labour	National	
701 Labour Groups	4.4 (2.2)	1.9 (1.0)	
702 Labour Groups: Negative	0	0.7 (1.1)	
703 Agriculture and farmers	6.5 (4.5)	7.3 (3.9)	
704 Middle Class and Professionals	0.1 (0.1)	0.2 (0.3)	
7041 Civil Servants	0.2 (0.3)	1.0 (1.0)	
7051 Returned Servicemen	1.5 (2.8)	0.9 (1.8)	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
701 Labour Groups	3.7 (1.0)	1.8 (1.0)	1.9 (1.0)
702 Labour Groups: Negative	0	0.4 (0.4)	0.1 (0.1)
703 Agriculture and farmers	5.8 (3.7)	6.7 (2.5)	6.1 (2.9)
704 Middle Class and Professionals	0.1 (0.1)	0.1 (0.2)	0.5 (0.5)
7041 Civil Servants	0.2 (0.3)	1.1 (1.2)	0.5 (0.8)
7051 Returned Servicemen	0.5 (1.0)	0.3 (0.6)	0

<sup>24</sup> W.J. Gardner, *William Massey* (Wellington: Reed, 1969), pp. 18-19; Richardson, 'Parties and Political Change', p. 218.

<sup>25</sup> R.M. Chapman, 'The Decline of The Liberals', p. 23.

<sup>26</sup> 'Purpose of Coalition Sound Financial Basis', *New Zealand Herald*, 17 November 1931, p. 11; Richardson, 'Parties and Political Change', p. 250.





Figure 5.5: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about labour groups: positive, 1911-1996

Figure 5.6: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about support for agriculture and farmers, 1911-1996



During the 1935-1996 period labour groups: positive references have on average made up 4.4% of the content of Labour's manifestos, and only 1.9% of the content of National's manifestos. Labour's labour groups: positive references fell throughout the 1910s and 1920s. However, unlike state intervention themes, which Labour has emphasised much less at recent elections, Figure 5.5 shows that Labour has continued to show strong support for protecting the interests of workers and trade unions. Indeed, Labour's positive references to this old left theme have been relatively stable since the mid-1930s, despite its MPs becoming much more likely to come from middle class backgrounds, and sporadic attempts to reduce trade union influence within the party.<sup>27</sup> However, following a resurgence of union influence within the party<sup>28</sup> Labour emphasised labour groups: positive considerably more than usual at the 1996 election.

On average 0.7% of National manifestos have been about labour groups: negative. This average is skewed, however, by high references to "unscrupulous wreckers" and irresponsible trade unions in National's 1951 programme, which were qualified by praise of the dominant moderate trade unions.<sup>29</sup> Because National's attacks on trade unions have been specifically centred on small militant unions this result does not undermine the saliency theory assumption that parties avoid directly attacking important interest groups.<sup>30</sup>

Social Credit has tended to place only a slightly higher emphasis on labour groups than National. This is probably because its traditional support base has been small towns and provincial centres, where working class consciousness is often relatively low.<sup>31</sup> Minor left-wing parties such as the Democratic Labour Party, NewLabour, and the Alliance have all shown strong support for labour groups. In contrast, positive references to labour groups by the right-wing

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<sup>27</sup> Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom?', pp. 23-24; Barry Gustafson, *Social Change and Party Reorganization: The New Zealand Labour Party Since 1945* (London: Sage, 1976), p. 28; 'Report of the Working Party on the Relationship Between the Trade Unions and the New Zealand Labour Party', presented to the 1982 Annual Conference of the N.Z. Labour Party.

<sup>28</sup> Simon Sheppard, 'The Struggle for the Agenda: New Zealand Labour Party Candidate Selections 1987-93', *Political Science*, Vol. 49 (1998), p. 227.

<sup>29</sup> 'Broadcast Address by Mr. S.G. Holland, 13th August 1951, Theatre Royal, Christchurch', p. 5.

<sup>30</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies and Democracy*, p. 25.

<sup>31</sup> Miller, 'The Democratic Party', p. 247.

Democratic Party, New Zealand Party, ACT, and Christian Coalition have all been in a similar range to National's. The postmaterialist Values and Green parties have also made very low labour groups references. This reflects their middle class membership, and dislike of the hierarchical and confrontational style of many trade unions.<sup>32</sup> Although New Zealand First's labour groups references were low at the 1993 election they were much higher in 1996.

While the labour groups results are relatively stable over time, the agriculture and farmers results in Figure 5.6 indicate that since the late 1940s Labour's and National's references have trended downwards. This mirrors a gradual decline in New Zealand's economic dependence on farming, and a more dramatic reduction in the size of the rural electorate.<sup>33</sup>

One surprise with the agriculture and farmers results is that there is a much smaller difference than might be expected between National and Labour. Table 5.2 shows that over the 1935-1996 period on average 7.3% of National's manifestos were about agriculture and farmers, compared to 6.5% of Labour's. Indeed, Figure 5.6 shows that Labour placed a higher emphasis on agriculture in its manifestos than National at six of the nine elections between 1949 and 1972. Labour's emphasis on agriculture and farmers seems unexpectedly high because although Labour won some farming seats in its 1935 landslide victory, farmers quickly switched back to voting for right-wing parties. Since the 1943 election no farming electorate has elected a Labour MP.<sup>34</sup> There are few apparent differences between Labour's and National's agriculture and farmers references.<sup>35</sup>

Although Social Credit's agriculture references have been only slightly higher than Labour's, it has also been much more successful in rural and semi-

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<sup>32</sup> Raymond Miller, 'Postmaterialism and Green Party Activists in New Zealand', *Political Science*, Vol. 43 (1991), p. 51.

<sup>33</sup> Gary Hawke, 'Economic Trends and Economic Policy, 1938-1992', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 420, and graph 4. His results show that the economic importance of agricultural products peaked in the early 1950s when they made up just over 90% of the value of New Zealand's exports. Figures in the *New Zealand Official Yearbook* (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand, 1996), p. 493 show that by 1995 agricultural products accounted for just over half New Zealand's export earnings.

<sup>34</sup> Chapman, 'From Labour to National', p. 368.

<sup>35</sup> For instance, even after controlling for references to non-traditional agricultural groups such as plantation forest owners and fishermen, Labour's and National's positions have been very

rural seats.<sup>36</sup> The results for the other minor parties also show that high references to agriculture and farmers have sometimes been made by all types of parties, although some parties, such as ACT, have not referred to them at all.

Probably the main reason why Labour has been so unsuccessful in farming electorates, despite the high emphasis in its manifestos on agriculture between the 1940s and early 1970s, was because a high proportion of farmers had unfavourable attitudes towards Labour's other policies. In New Zealand most farmers own their own farm and employ little farm labour. Farmers' main dissatisfaction with governments usually has not been that they receive insufficient direct support, but that politicians have undermined their financial position by increasing public expenditure, pushing up prices by protecting manufacturing, and by giving unions too much power. Farmers in New Zealand have usually been right-wing on these economic issues because since agricultural products have been the most important export earners it has been impossible for governments to effectively insulate farmers from downward trends in international prices for their products.<sup>37</sup>

Labour probably continued to place a high emphasis on agriculture in its manifestos until the 1970s because of the importance of agriculture to the economy,<sup>38</sup> and because to win an election it needed to win town seats which included some farming areas.<sup>39</sup> Its high agriculture references appear to have had a positive effect on its support in rural electorates. This is because the sharp slide in Labour's agriculture references since the mid-1970s has been paralleled by a decline in its support in rural areas.<sup>40</sup>

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similar. Comparing the agriculture sections in Labour and National manifestos for the same elections also exposes many similarities.

<sup>36</sup> Miller, 'The Democratic Party', pp. 246-247.

<sup>37</sup> Simon Collins, *Rogernomics: Is there a better way?* (Wellington: Pitman, 1987), p. 61; Robert Bremner, 'Federated Farmers And The State', in *State and Economy in New Zealand*, edited by Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 118, 122-124.

<sup>38</sup> R.S. Milne, *Political Parties in New Zealand* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 88-89.

<sup>39</sup> Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Transforming the Political Agenda', in *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand*, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 12.

<sup>40</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Waiting for the Realignment? The New Zealand Party System, 1972-93', *Political Science*, Vol. 48, January 1997, pp. 199-200.

Although labour groups and farmers have been the main economic groups referred to in election programmes, other groups have also received some attention. Social Credit is the party which has shown the most support for the middle class, although on average these themes make up only 0.5% of its manifesto content. National has made significantly more references to civil servants than the other parties, although almost all these references occurred before the 1970s. Its promises to improve civil servants' pay and conditions reflected an attempt to reassure the public service after reductions in their pay by right-wing governments during the 1920s and early 1930s,<sup>41</sup> and National's much more modest plans during the 1940s and 1950s to gradually reduce the size of the bureaucracy.<sup>42</sup> Since the mid 1980s there have been no references by any party to helping civil servants. This suggests there has been widespread acceptance of the restructuring of the public sector that has taken place since the late 1980s, which has attempted to increase its efficiency and effectiveness. This restructuring has undermined the unity of the civil service, reduced staffing levels and job security, and cut real pay levels for all staff except senior managers.<sup>43</sup>

Another economic group has been returned servicemen, although unlike other groups they have been defined by their former rather than their current occupational status. References to returned servicemen in manifestos were low after the First World War, when they were given very limited assistance by the state. Improved economic circumstances and the desire to avoid the hardship former soldiers had suffered resulted in much more generous policies being developed during the Second World War.<sup>44</sup> As a result throughout the 1940s and 1950s several percent of Labour and National manifestos were always about policies to help returned servicemen reestablish themselves economically.

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<sup>41</sup> R.M. Chapman, *The Political Scene 1919-1931* (Auckland: Heinemann, 1969), pp. 14-15; Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand* (Auckland: Penguin, 1980), revised edition, p. 256.

<sup>42</sup> For instance, National in *Policy General Election 1949* (New Zealand National Party, 1949), section 6, p. 2 stated that "its pledge[s] to the Civil Service ... come even before tax reductions".

<sup>43</sup> Jonathan Boston, et al., *Public Management: The New Zealand Model* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 54-55, 207-211.

### 5.3.3.Social Services and Redistribution


Table 5.3 shows the differences between the main parties on issues related to social services, while Figure 5.7 shows the main parties' welfare state expansion references less their welfare state limitation references. Labour's welfarist principles are reflected in the way that between 1911 and 1928 on average 11.5% of its manifesto content was about welfare state expansion.<sup>45</sup> Somewhat unexpectedly, between 1911 and 1928 welfare state expansion references on average also made up 11.5% of the content of Reform's manifestos. With only 4% of its manifesto content being about welfare state expansion, the Liberals stood out as being the party that showed the least support for the welfare state. No references were made by any party to welfare state limitation during this period.

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
5031 Social Justice: Economic	4.6 (5.6)	3.0 (2.3)	3.5 (2.6)
504 Welfare State Expansion	11.5 (6.0)	11.5 (6.0)	4.0 (4.6)
506 Education Expansion	5.3 (2.1)	1.9 (1.9)	3.0 (3.9)
505 Welfare State: Limitation	0	0	0
507 Education Limitation	0	0	0.3 (0.7)
1935-1996	Labour	National	
5031 Social Justice: Economic	4.4 (3.6)	2.4 (1.0)	
504 Welfare State Expansion	12.5 (5.9)	8.5 (3.4)	
506 Education Expansion	6.3 (2.7)	5.0 (3.4)	
505 Welfare State: Limitation	0.3 (0.5)	0.6 (1.1)	
507 Education Limitation	0	0	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
5031 Social Justice: Economic	2.5 (1.3)	1.7 (1.6)	2.0 (1.7)
504 Welfare State Expansion	9.2 (3.2)	7.9 (2.9)	7.1 (2.9)
506 Education Expansion	6.0 (1.5)	5.5 (3.2)	6.3 (4.3)
505 Welfare State: Limitation	0.4 (0.6)	0.8 (1.4)	0.2 (0.2)
507 Education Limitation	0	0	0.1 (0.1)

<sup>44</sup> Chapman, 'From Labour to National', pp. 368-369; Tom Brooking, Milestones: Turning Points in New Zealand History (Mills Publications: Lower Hutt, 1988), p. 177.

<sup>45</sup> Barry Gustafson, Labour's Path to Political Independence: The Origins and Establishment of the New Zealand Labour Party 1900-19 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1980), p. 23.

Figure 5.7: Welfare state expansion minus welfare state limitation references by the main parties, 1911-1996



Although surprising, Reform's high welfare references are still credible. This is because recent research by Strang has challenged earlier historical accounts by showing that the welfare state considerably expanded under Reform governments between 1912 and 1928.<sup>46</sup> The relatively high emphasis by Reform on promises to expand the welfare state, together with its actions once in office, provides an important rival reason to Fairburn's home ownership theory for why many working class people voted for Reform rather than Labour during this period. Reform's high welfare state expansion references may have occurred because it wished to reduce Labour Party support. This would provide some support for class politics theories of the welfare state, which argue that which party is in government has less influence on the welfare state growth than working class pressure.<sup>47</sup> However, Strang has argued that Reform politicians considered expanding the welfare state, albeit in a fairly modest way, intrinsically desirable.<sup>48</sup>

Because of its socialist beliefs a Labour government might have been expected to have constructed a more universal and generous welfare state than Reform. However, rereading the manifestos shows that Labour gave voters very few indications of this. Indeed, Labour's 1925 manifesto was its first to give a proposed monetary figure for any benefit.<sup>49</sup> Probably the reason for Labour's relatively low welfare state expansion references is that its plans to increase state ownership and improve wages would have redistributed wealth.

Table 5.3 shows that Reform's high emphasis on the welfare state expansion category did not result in a corresponding commitment to the social justice: economic category. Labour made the most references to the social justice: economic category, followed by the Liberal Party. Similarly, Reform's education expansion references were significantly lower than Labour's, and slightly lower than the Liberal Party's.

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<sup>46</sup> Justin Strang, 'Welfare in Transition: Reform's Income Support Policy, 1912-1928' (Unpublished M.A thesis, Victoria, University of Wellington, 1992), p. 11.

<sup>47</sup> Castles, *The Working Class and Welfare*, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> Strang, 'Welfare in Transition: Reform's Income Support Policy, 1912-1928', p. 18.

<sup>49</sup> See, "Endowment of Motherhood" section, in 'Election Manifesto of the New Zealand Labour Party: Labour's Bold Effort for the Common People', *New Zealand Worker*, 21 October 1925, p. 10.

Table 5.3 shows that over the 1935-1996 period on average 12.6% of Labour's manifestos have been about welfare state expansion, compared to 8.5% of National's. The differences between Labour and National on the welfare state expansion category are relatively small compared to the differences on other categories such as market economy and labour groups. This is because although National politicians have sometimes been very critical of the growth of the welfare state, its objectives have always included the new liberal goal of promoting humanitarian legislation.<sup>50</sup>

Welfare state limitation references on average made up only 0.3% of the content of Labour's manifestos, and 0.6% of National's. This indicates that Labour and National have not usually explicitly opposed expansion of social services, with opposition to the welfare state usually being indicated by a low emphasis on the welfare state expansion category. The main exception was National's 1990 manifesto, when just over 5% of the content was about welfare state limitation themes. This challenges the widespread view among political scientists that "few in 1990 could have predicted from the National manifesto very heavy cuts in benefits".<sup>51</sup> Indeed, since National's 1990 manifesto is littered with phrases such as "we will cut the expanding cost of welfare", it would seem to give some warning of National's later policies.<sup>52</sup> Probably National's benefit cuts seemed unexpected because National politicians repeatedly stated before the election that benefit levels would not be cut, with changes being restricted to tighter eligibility for "add-on" supplementary assistance and a crack down on benefit cheats.<sup>53</sup> Because these comments were much more widely reported than National's manifesto, which was covered only

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<sup>50</sup> Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History Of The New Zealand National Party (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), p. 183.

<sup>51</sup> Colin James, New Territory: The Transformation of New Zealand 1984-92 (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1992), p. 272. Similar sentiments are expressed by Jonathan Boston, 'Redesigning New Zealand's Welfare State', in The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic and Social Policies (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 16.

<sup>52</sup> New Zealand National Party, National Party Policies for the 1990s (New Zealand National Party, 1990), p. 10.

<sup>53</sup> Gordon Campbell, 'Learning the Lines', Listener, 29 October 1990, pp. 15-16; Bob Edlin, 'Doing the decent thing', Listener, 12 November 1990, p. 7; Jane Clifton, 'Bolger pledges tough but fair government', Dominion, 1 October, 1990, p. 2; Jane Clifton, 'National says it would run deficit', Dominion, 21 September, 1990, p. 2.

briefly and in an extremely superficial fashion by newspapers,<sup>54</sup> they undermine subsequent claims by National's leader to have had a mandate to cut benefit levels.<sup>55</sup>

Figure 5.7 reveals that there has been considerable variation over time in parties' positions on the welfare state. For instance, between 1935 and 1957 Labour's welfare state expansion references ranged between 12 and 20% of its manifesto content, and were higher on average than they had been during the 1911-1928 period. This provides a strong contrast to Labour's moderation on the state intervention and labour groups: positive categories during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, compared to the 1910s and 1920s. It also suggests that expanding the welfare state was popular with the electorate between the mid 1930s and late 1950s.<sup>56</sup>

Between 1960 and 1990 National was often more supportive of expanding the welfare state than Labour. During this period Labour's support for the welfare state was always significantly lower than it had been between 1935 and 1957, while National's stayed at much the same level as before. Labour's support for the welfare state was low between 1960 and 1990 because of its belief that tax increases to fund higher welfare expenditure during its 1957-1960 term had cost it electoral support, and an ambivalent attitude by trade union leaders towards expansion of the welfare state.<sup>57</sup> Labour, and to a lesser extent National, then showed a much more positive attitude towards the welfare state at the 1993 and 1996 elections. This increase in Labour and National's support for the welfare state occurred because concern among voters about the deterioration

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<sup>54</sup> Andrew Stone, 'Booklet directed at undecided voters', *New Zealand Herald*, 18 September 1990, p. 4 fails to cover any of the policies in National's manifesto, although he does describe the cover photo, the number of copies that will be printed, and how National intends to distribute it. Similarly, NZPA, 'Bolger vows to stick to basics', *Dominion*, 17 September 1990, p. 2; Jane Clifton, 'National's manifesto minus the Kidd factor' and 'Policies a programme of positive action – Bolger', *Dominion*, 18 September, 1990, p. 2 concentrate on the description by Jim Bolger, who was National's leader, of the contents of National's manifesto, rather than what the actual text says.

<sup>55</sup> Jim Bolger, *A View From the Top* (Auckland: Viking, 1998), p. 46.

<sup>56</sup> Subcategories used in the coding, but not included in the tables, show that from the 1950s National tended to make a similar number, and sometimes even more, references as Labour to health spending, which often benefited middle class National voters. In contrast, National usually made fewer references to transfers and state housing assistance, which usually benefited Labour voters the most.

<sup>57</sup> Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, pp. 293-294; Castles, *The Working Class and Welfare*, p.

of the welfare state resulted in many supporting higher expenditure,<sup>58</sup> while higher economic growth than during the 1980s made additional spending seem possible.

Table 5.3 confirms that National has been less concerned about economic equality than Labour, with on average these issues making up 4.4% of the content of Labour's manifestos, and only 2.4% of National's manifestos. In contrast, because of its new liberal belief in promoting opportunity, National has placed a similar emphasis on education expansion to Labour.<sup>59</sup> Although the changes in Labour's and National's emphasis on education have been relatively small over time, their education expansion references trended upwards from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. This shows that they were responsive to demographic and economic factors that increased demand for education.<sup>60</sup>

Although during the 1954-1990 period on average Social Credit made fewer references to welfare state expansion than National, Figure 5.8 shows that this result is skewed by the very low proportion of its programmes about welfare state expansion at the 1954 and 1957 elections. From 1960 onwards its welfare state expansion references were about the same level as the other parties. Social Credit's social justice references have on average been only slightly higher than National's. However, Social Credit made slightly more references to education

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
100.

<sup>58</sup> Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, p. 82; Richard Johnston, 'Issues, Leaders, and the Campaign', in Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation, edited by Jack Vowles, et al., (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), pp. 75-76.

<sup>59</sup> Gustafson, The First 50 Years, p. 183.

<sup>60</sup> Barry Gustafson, 'The National Governments and Social Change', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 288.

Figure 5.8: Welfare state expansion minus welfare state limitation references by the minor parties, 1935-1996



expansion than either Labour or National, with this reflecting the strength of teachers within the party.<sup>61</sup>

The Democratic Soldier Labour Party, New Labour, the Alliance and New Zealand First have all made relatively high welfare state expansion references. A concern about the bureaucracy associated with the welfare state together with the middle class status of their members led to Values' low support for expanding the welfare state at the 1972 and 1975 elections, and the Green Party's failure to make any welfare state references.<sup>62</sup> The results for the minor right-wing parties vary in response to changes in public attitudes towards the welfare state. For instance, whereas at the 1935 election the right-wing Democratic Party was strongly supportive of welfare state expansion, at the 1984 election, in response to right-wing concern over the growth of the welfare state,<sup>63</sup> the New Zealand Party made more welfare state limitation than expansion references. Despite strong criticism of the cost of the welfare state by its politicians,<sup>64</sup> ACT actually made more welfare state expansion than limitation references at the 1996 election. The reason for this was that ACT promised to maintain many existing benefits, at least in the short-term, and was reluctant to propose specific cuts. ACT also proposed to spend additional money to try and help dysfunctional families to reduce their dependency on the state.<sup>65</sup> This result suggests that ACT lacked the resolve to outline a definite plan to rapidly dismantle the welfare state.

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<sup>61</sup> Miller, 'The Democratic Party', pp. 247-250.

<sup>62</sup> Values, *Beyond Tomorrow*, p. 78 reviews the attitudes towards the welfare state which it says shaped Values' 1972 and 1975 policies; Miller, 'Postmaterialism and Green Party Activists in New Zealand', p. 51.

<sup>63</sup> Peter Aimer, 'The New Zealand Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1985), p. 195.

<sup>64</sup> Roger Douglas, *Unfinished Business* (Auckland: Random House, 1993), pp. 53, 74-75; Richard Prebble, *I've been thinking* (Auckland: Seaview Publishing, 1996), p. 40.

### 5.3.4 Economic Constraint and Keynesian Demand Management

The differences between the main parties on issues relating to economic constraint and Keynesian demand management are shown in Table 5.4. During the 1911-1928 period the Liberal Party stands out for making the most references to economic constraint themes, with them taking up on average 15.3% of the content of its manifestos. In contrast, Labour made the least economic constraint references, with them taking up on average only 1.1% of the content of its manifestos. Reform was midway between them, with economic constraint references on average taking up 8.6% of the content of its manifestos. Figure 5.9 shows that the Liberal Party was consistently more right-wing on macro-economic policy than Reform.

Table 5.4: The main parties' average references to economic constraint and Keynesian demand management issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
303 Government Efficiency	0.2 (0.5)	4.1 (2.1)	4.8 (4.5)
414 Economic Orthodoxy	0.9 (1.3)	4.5 (2.6)	10.5 (5.6)
<b>Economic Constraint</b>	<b>1.1 (1.7)</b>	<b>8.6 (4.3)</b>	<b>15.2 (3.4)</b>
Keynesian Demand Management	0	0	0.1 (0.2)
1935-1996	Labour	National	
303 Government Efficiency	2.6 (2.5)	3.2 (1.6)	
414 Economic Orthodoxy	2.2 (1.4)	4.3 (4.4)	
<b>Economic Constraint</b>	<b>4.8 (2.6)</b>	<b>7.5 (3.9)</b>	
Keynesian Demand Management	1.3 (2.4)	0.5 (1.0)	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
303 Government Efficiency	3.9 (2.4)	3.1 (1.0)	2.7 (1.9)
414 Economic Orthodoxy	2.3 (1.4)	2.6 (2.2)	4.5 (5.6)
<b>Economic Constraint</b>	<b>6.2 (2.0)</b>	<b>5.7 (1.9)</b>	<b>7.2 (4.9)</b>
Keynesian Demand Management	0.6 (1.1)	0.3 (0.6)	0

<sup>65</sup> See, ACT New Zealand, ACT New Zealand Campaign Manifesto: General Election 1996, pp. 3-4.

Figure 5.9: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about economic constraint themes, 1911-1996





Figure 5.10: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about Keynesian demand management, 1911-1996



Although the large gap between Reform and the Liberals on the economic constraint categories was not expected, it is also not entirely surprising because the Liberal Party frequently criticised Reform for allowing the size of the government debt to increase.<sup>66</sup> The Liberal Party's high emphasis on economic constraint themes, together with its low emphasis on welfare state expansion, suggests that during this period it was more heavily influenced by classical liberal beliefs favouring limiting government expenditure than Reform was.

Despite the Liberal Party's high emphasis on economic constraint, Figure 5.10 shows that traces of Keynesian demand management policies were evident in its 1928 manifesto proposals to stimulate the economy through increased overseas borrowing.<sup>67</sup> These references to demand management precede Keynes' General Theory, which was not published until 1936. Since the 1910s, however, increasing numbers of European and American academic economists had advocated higher government expenditure on public works, financed by budget deficits, to counter falls in economic output.<sup>68</sup> By the late 1920s Keynes was also usually taking this view.<sup>69</sup>

Figures 5.9 and 5.10 confirm that at the 1931 election the main parties had very different ideas about how to deal with the growing economic collapse.<sup>70</sup> This was because Labour took the strongest Keynesian position during the period covered, with 10.5% of its manifesto content being about support for demand management. In contrast, economic constraint themes made up 21% of the content of the Coalition's election programme, which is more than in any

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<sup>66</sup> Michael Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 247; Fairburn, 'The Farmers Take Over', p. 209.

<sup>67</sup> 'Election Campaign: United Party Policy: Sir J. Wards' Outline', New Zealand Herald, 17 October 1923, p. 15.

<sup>68</sup> M. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 672-675; Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, 'State Structures and the Possibilities for "Keynesian" Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States', in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 126, 133.

<sup>69</sup> Robert Skildesky, Keynes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 28

<sup>70</sup> Michael Bassett, Three Party Politics in New Zealand: 1911-1931 (Auckland: Historical Publications, 1982), p. 60.

other manifesto collected in this study. This shows that it had a mandate for its retrenchment of government expenditure after 1931.

Over the 1935-1996 period National has usually placed more emphasis on economic constraint themes than Labour has. On average these topics have made up 7.5% of the content of National's manifestos, but only 4.8% of the content of Labour's. Keynesian demand management policies have been emphasised much less, with them taking up on average 1.3% of the content of Labour's programmes and 0.5% of the content of National's. Labour's and National's positions have varied considerably over time on these issues, with Figures 5.9 and 5.10 showing that there has often been overlap between them.

Although National's economic constraint references were very high at the 1935 election, unlike the Coalition's 1931 manifesto they were all about the need to maintain the existing sound national financial position, rather than about further economic retrenchment.<sup>71</sup> In contrast, Labour's 1935 Keynesian demand management references were again high, reflecting continuing differences between Labour and National over fiscal policy. As New Zealand came out of the depression National's economic constraint references and Labour's Keynesian demand management references fell sharply. Despite gradual acceptance in most countries of Keynesian policies, Figure 5.10 confirms that it was not until the 1943 election that National indicated its support for demand management.<sup>72</sup>

National's economic constraint references rebounded during the late 1940s and early 1950s when it promised to eliminate wasteful government expenditure and fight inflation.<sup>73</sup> From the late 1950s onwards, however, Labour often made more economic constraint references than National. Until the late 1970s this largely reflected Labour's emphasis on economic orthodoxy themes resulting from its increasing concern with National's willingness to run government and current account deficits. This supports the view that Labour increasingly became the party of economic discipline, because it thought that government debt and

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<sup>71</sup> As well as being evident by rereading the manifestos, this is reflected in changes in the composition of the economic constraint total. Whereas in 1931 almost all the Coalition's economic constraint references were about the need for government efficiency, in 1935 all National's economic constraint references were about economic orthodoxy.

<sup>72</sup> Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, p. 49.

<sup>73</sup> Chapman, 'From Labour to National', pp. 372-374.

greater foreign ownership increased economic vulnerability and reduced the standard of living. In contrast, it has been argued, National took the more popular position of downplaying New Zealand's macroeconomic problems.<sup>74</sup> However, recent research has shown that although there was a persistent current account deficit, until the mid-1970s real government debt actually fell, while until the early 1970s inflation was low by international standards. This suggests that Labour's concern about the macroeconomic situation was partly misplaced until the 1970s.<sup>75</sup> From the late 1970s onwards Labour's economic constraint references also increased because it was eager to restructure areas such as the state sector and local government that National, as a middle class party of the status quo, was unwilling to disturb.<sup>76</sup>

High inflation by pre-war standards, together with full employment<sup>77</sup> probably account for why Labour and National showed low support for Keynesian policies during the 1960s. Because Labour and National continued to make some references to Keynesian policies this indicates that they remained committed to demand management. However, the results suggest that they did not see their macroeconomic policies as particularly Keynesian. National's low Keynesian references during the late 1970s and early 1980s, despite a growing budget deficit, supports the observation that its management of the economy during this period was improvised and poorly thought out rather than a carefully applied Keynesian strategy.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), p. 138; Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1976), p. 307; Chapman, 'From Labour to National', pp. 380-381.

<sup>75</sup> Brian Easton, In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1997), pp. 128-130 notes the tendency for there to be a small current account deficit between 1951 and 1974, and a much larger one after that, resulted in higher foreign ownership of some areas of the New Zealand economy. However, on pp. 131-132 he notes that during this period inflation tended to erode the real size of total internal and external government debt faster than borrowing added to it. As a result real public sector debt levels declined until the mid-1970s. Although real public debt levels grew thereafter, they remained lower than during the immediate post-war period. On pp. 90-91 Easton compares postwar New Zealand inflation rates to those in other countries.

<sup>76</sup> Bassett, The State in New Zealand 1840-1984, p. 280.

<sup>77</sup> Gary Hawke, The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 173-174.

<sup>78</sup> Brian Roper, 'The End of the Golden Weather: New Zealand's Economic Crisis', in State and Economy in New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 6-9 discusses criticisms of National's macroeconomic policies during this period by both monetarist and Keynesian economists.

The increase in Labour's economic constraint references during the 1970s and 1980s shown in Figure 5.9 proved to be very significant. This is because Labour's concern with controlling state expenditure and restructuring the state sector resulted in it accepting Treasury proposals, such as the corporatisation of state owned enterprises, after it came to power in 1984.<sup>79</sup> The success of corporatisation at improving the performance of state enterprises, together with concern over the nominal level of state indebtedness, resulted in many Labour politicians believing that there would be further economic gains from privatisation.<sup>80</sup> Corporatisation therefore frequently became a stepping stone to privatisation, and Labour's breaches of its 1984 and 1987 manifesto commitments not to sell state assets. At the 1993 and 1996 elections there was a restoration of traditional policy differences between Labour and National on economic constraint, with National's references being considerably higher than Labour's.

Over the 1954-1990 period Social Credit's economic constraint references were higher than both Labour's and National's. This often reflected an attempt by Social Credit to portray its monetary reform policies as being compatible with objectives such as low inflation.<sup>81</sup> Probably because of its commitment to continually expanding demand through monetary reform, Social Credit made no Keynesian demand management references. Minor left-wing parties have invariably made fewer economic constraint references than minor right-wing parties, showing that they have been more polarised than Labour and National. Values and the Greens stand out, however, for showing the least support for economic constraint themes, suggesting that, unlike the environment, this is one area where they have not been concerned about the future.

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<sup>79</sup> Robert Gregory, 'The Reorganization of the Public Sector', in The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.111.

<sup>80</sup> Ian Duncan and Alan Bollard, Corporatization and Privatization: Lessons from New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 38; Sheppard, Broken Circle: The Decline and Fall of the Fourth Labour Government, pp. 139-141.

<sup>81</sup> See, for instance, Social Credit Political League, Official Policy for 1960 Election (Social Credit, 1960), p. 3; Social Credit Political League, N.Z. for ALL N.Z.'ers (Social Credit, 1972), pp. 6-7.

### 5.3.5 Productivity and Technology


The results for productivity and technology in Table 5.5 show that during the 1911-1928 period these issues respectively made up on average 12.6% and 11.3% of the content of Reform and Liberal party manifestos. In contrast productivity and technology themes only made up 2.2% of the content of Labour's manifestos. Indeed, Figure 5.11 indicates that Labour only made its first productivity and technology references in its 1922 manifesto. Productivity and technology might not seem to be a divisive issue between left and right-wing parties. However, social policy in New Zealand has traditionally concentrated on economic development designed to enable people to become economically self-sufficient.<sup>82</sup> This has resulted in the state playing a central role in the provision of infrastructure such as roads, railways, communications systems and electricity.<sup>83</sup> Although Reform and the Liberals clearly saw economic development as important, the results show that initially Labour had other priorities.

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
410 Productivity	0.9 (1.1)	5.1 (3.1)	4.5 (3.7)
411 Technology and Infrastructure	1.3 (2.0)	7.5 (4.5)	6.8 (5.4)
<b>Productivity and Technology</b>	<b>2.2 (2.5)</b>	<b>12.6 (7.6)</b>	<b>11.3 (6.7)</b>
1935-1996	Labour	National	
410 Productivity	4.7 (2.5)	6.5 (5.2)	
411 Technology and Infrastructure	8.3 (4.6)	9.6 (5.4)	
<b>Productivity and Technology</b>	<b>13.0 (6.3)</b>	<b>16.1 (7.9)</b>	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
410 Productivity	5.3 (2.6)	7.5 (6.3)	3.3 (1.6)
411 Technology and Infrastructure	9.3 (4.7)	12.5 (4.5)	6.4 (3.7)
<b>Productivity and Technology</b>	<b>14.6 (6.2)</b>	<b>20.0 (7.2)</b>	<b>9.7 (4.8)</b>

<sup>82</sup> W.H. Oliver, 'Social Policy in New Zealand: An Historical Overview', in The Royal Commission on Social Policy (Wellington: Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1989), Vol. 1, p. 3.

<sup>83</sup> Tom Brooking, 'Economic Transformation', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 244-245.

Figure 5.11: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about productivity and technology, 1911-1996



During the inter-war period the highest productivity and technology references were made by the Liberal Party at the 1928 election when it promised massive overseas borrowing to fund increased immigration and rapidly finish public works projects.<sup>84</sup> The gap between left and right-wing parties then closed at the 1931 election. This partly occurred because of Labour's increasing concern with boosting economic growth to increase New Zealand's national income.<sup>85</sup> In contrast, because of its initially very orthodox approach to the Great Depression, and because of disillusionment with the Liberal Party's failure to carry out its development programme, the Coalition showed very little support for state-led development.<sup>86</sup>

Table 5.5 shows that only a small gap appears on productivity and technology between Labour and National over the 1935-1996 period. On average these issues made up 16.1% of the content of National's manifestos and 13% of the content of Labour's manifestos. Although Figure 5.11 shows considerable variation in Labour's and National's productivity and technology references over time, most of these fluctuations are due to changes in references to the technology and infrastructure category. Technology and infrastructure references trended upwards until the late 1960s, then fell. This decline partly reflected a reduction in population growth that lowered the need for public works.<sup>87</sup> Technology and infrastructure references also fell because of growing protests by the conservation movement about the detrimental effects state supported development often had on the environment.<sup>88</sup> In contrast, Labour's and National's economic growth references have been relatively stable over time. This suggests that Labour and National have adapted to the rise of environmentalism by reducing their support for the most environmentally destructive development projects, while still maintaining their support for improving living standards.

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<sup>84</sup> Chapman, *The Political Scene 1919-1931*, p. 49.

<sup>85</sup> Erik Olssen, *John A. Lee* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1977), p. 41.

<sup>86</sup> Michael Bassett, *Three Party Politics in New Zealand: 1911-1931* (Auckland: Historical Publications, 1982), pp. 53, 60.

<sup>87</sup> David Thorns and Charles Sedgwick, *Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand: Historical Statistics* (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), p. 107.

The spike in National's productivity and technology references in 1984 occurred because despite increasing opposition from environmentalists its manifesto heavily emphasised the need to continue its export led 'Think Big' economic development strategy.<sup>89</sup> Since the mid-1980s the influence of neo-liberal beliefs about a minimal role for the state in the economy has also contributed to a reduction in Labour's and National's infrastructure references.<sup>90</sup>

Social Credit's productivity and technology references were very low at the 1954 and 1957 elections, but thereafter were consistently higher. Understandably considering their concern with curbing economic growth<sup>91</sup> the postmaterialist Values and Green parties showed very little support for economic development themes. The results for the other minor parties show little sign of left-right differences until the 1990s. At the 1996 election ACT and the Christian Coalition showed very weak support for productivity and technology, with this probably indicating a right-wing belief that only private enterprise can bring about economic development. In contrast NewLabour at the 1990 election and New Zealand First at the 1993 and 1996 elections both showed strong support for productivity and technology. Although at the 1993 election the Alliance also strongly emphasised productivity and technology themes, at the 1996 election it downplayed them. This change reflected tensions inside the Alliance between pro-growth working class supporters, and middle class environmentalists who favour reducing growth.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Ton Buhrs and Robert Bartlett, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 41.

<sup>89</sup> New Zealand National Party, National's '84 Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 1984), pp. 2-3.

<sup>90</sup> Buhrs and Bartlett, Environmental Policy in New Zealand, p. 90; Chris Rudd, 'The Changing Structure of Public Expenditure', in Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution, edited by Jonathan Boston, et al., (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 148.

<sup>91</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Minor Parties', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 317

<sup>92</sup> Miller, 'Postmaterialism and Green Party Activists in New Zealand', pp. 52-53.

### 5.3.6 Monetary Reform Policies

Monetary reform policies have been more important in New Zealand politics than in other western democracies. Figure 5.12 is a logarithmic graph of all parties' references to monetary reform references. It differs from the previous graphs in this chapter, which have all been linear, because every interval on the scale measures a tenfold increase in references to monetary reform.

Figure 5.12 shows that even before the emergence of Social Credit as a political party monetary reform issues had been brought onto the political agenda by Labour at the 1928 election, and then heavily emphasised by Labour in 1935. Table 5.6 shows that Labour's monetary reform references were concentrated in the government control of credit category. They reflect a belief among Labour politicians that better control of the financial system would make it possible to preserve the existing economic system. Because of Labour's traditional distrust of the banks, it also wanted to control their activities and prevent perceived profiteering.<sup>93</sup> The results also confirm that while Labour dropped its monetary reform policies after the 1935 election, monetary reform was heavily emphasised by the breakaway Democratic Soldier Labour Party at the 1943 election.<sup>94</sup> In contrast, National's manifestos have only ever included very low positive references to monetary reform topics.

Social Credit's monetary reform references were at their peak at the first elections it contested in 1954 and 1957, when these issues respectively made up 59% and 31% of the content of its election programme. Despite a strong belief by Walter Nash, who was Labour's leader, in orthodox economic policies, Figure 5.12 shows that Labour increased its emphasis on monetary reform issues at the 1957 election in an attempt to minimise its vote loss to Social Credit.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, pp. 166-167, 192.

<sup>94</sup> Sinclair, Walter Nash, p. 192; Olssen, John A. Lee, pp. 184-185.

<sup>95</sup> Barry Gustafson, From the Cradle to the Grave: A Biography of Michael Joseph Savage (Auckland: Penguin, 1988), p. 201; Sinclair, Walter Nash, p. 299.




Figure 5.12: Proportion of all parties' manifestos about monetary reform, 1911-1996

Table 5.6: The main parties' average references to monetary reform issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
801 Cheap Loans	0.1 (0.3)	0	0
<b>Monetary Reform</b>	<b>0.1 (0.3)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
1935-1996	Labour	National	
801 Cheap Loans	0.2 (0.3)	0	
802 General Monetary Reform	0.1 (0.5)	0	
804 Government Control Credit	0.6 (1.0)	0	
805 Reform Monetary System	0	0	
<b>Monetary Reform</b>	<b>0.9 (1.5)</b>	<b>0</b>	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
801 Cheap Loans	0.3 (0.4)	0	5.9 (9.4)
802 General Monetary Reform	0.2 (0.6)	0	1.7 (4.4)
804 Government Control Credit	0.4 (0.7)	0	1.1 (1.6)
805 Reform Monetary System	0	0	2.6 (5.2)
<b>Monetary Reform</b>	<b>0.9 (1.6)</b>	<b>0.1 (0.1)</b>	<b>11.4 (16.2)</b>

Since the 1960s monetary reform policies have been much less prominent in Social Credit's manifestos, rarely making up more than 10% of the content. This confirms that Social Credit was willing to greatly deemphasise its monetary reform policies in an attempt to try and improve its credibility and electoral viability.<sup>96</sup> Social Credit made the least number of references to monetary reform at the 1987 election, when only 2.3% of its manifesto was about monetary reform.

Social Credit's influence as part of the Alliance since 1991 has been reflected in the way that the Alliance made several references to cheap loans for infrastructure developments at the 1993 and 1996 elections. However, these echoes of traditional Social Credit policies made up less than 1% of the content of the Alliance's manifestos, and are therefore too insignificant to appear in the graph.

#### 5.4 Conclusion

Clear differences between left and right-wing parties' policies are apparent on most of the economic policy issues examined in this chapter. The socialist,

<sup>96</sup> Miller, 'The Democratic Party', p. 254.

social democratic, and new liberal principles of Labour and other left-wing parties are reflected in the way that they have almost always emphasised the state intervention, labour groups: positive, and social justice: economic categories more than the right-wing parties. Left and right-wing parties have usually also been divided on welfare state expansion, although because of their new liberal belief in humanitarianism sometimes right-wing parties have emphasised this theme more than left-wing parties. Similarly, left and right-wing parties have frequently agreed on the importance of education expansion. While Keynesian demand management has been emphasised more by left-wing than right-wing parties, since the late 1940s this has been a relatively unimportant issue.

Labour's state intervention and labour groups: positive references fell very sharply during the 1920s as it became more moderate. At recent elections Labour has placed a low emphasis on state intervention themes, although minor left-wing parties, such as the Alliance, have placed a similar emphasis on them to Labour during the 1950s and 1960s.

Because of their classical liberal principles right-wing parties have consistently emphasised the market economy category more than left-wing parties. Although economic constraint themes have usually been emphasised more by right-wing than left-wing parties, between the late 1950s and late 1980s there was sometimes overlap between Labour's and National's positions. At some elections right-wing parties have emphasised the agriculture and productivity and technology categories more than left-wing parties, although there have been a number of exceptions to this pattern. Indeed, Labour frequently made more agriculture and farmers references between 1949 and 1972 than National, suggesting that it was other economic issues which made farmers more likely to vote National than Labour.

Social Credit emphasises monetary reform themes more than the other parties, although sometimes left-wing parties have also shown some support for monetary reform policies. The new politics Values and Green parties stand out for their very low support for productivity and technology themes. On some issues, such as labour groups and welfare state expansion, Values and the Greens

are positioned close to right-wing parties, but on other issues, such as state intervention, they are closer to left-wing parties.

There is a high level of theoretical coherence between the types of issues the main parties emphasise most, making the differences between left and right-wing parties easy for voters to understand. Parties have frequently changed their policies to accommodate public opinion, deal with changes in the policy environment, and to improve their electoral prospects. However, sometimes parties' responsiveness has been at the expense of promoting responsible economic policies. A very wide range of economic policy issues have been referred to in election programmes, supporting pluralist theories which see the political agenda as easily penetrable, rather than Marxist theories about elite manipulation of the agenda. These results show that parties have usually campaigned in ways that make responsible party government possible.

Although policy implementation has only been looked at briefly, the results largely support existing interpretations of policy implementation in New Zealand. For instance, the Liberal Party's very high productivity and technology references at the 1928 election serve as a reminder for why voters were disillusioned with its failure to increase economic development. Contrary to previous studies it was found that National did provide some indication that it intended to cut benefits in its 1990 manifesto. However, these messages were overshadowed by other commitments from National politicians not to reduce benefit levels.

Examining parties' policies in the disaggregated manner they have been discussed in this chapter adds considerably to our knowledge of parties' economic policies, and how they have changed over time. In the following chapter parties' policies on non-economic national revolution and new politics issues will be studied.

## Chapter Six: Parties' Policies on National Revolution and New Politics Issues

### 6.1 Introduction

While economic policy issues have been divisive in New Zealand politics, national revolution and new politics issues have also been very important. This chapter uses the manifesto data to study parties' policies on national revolution and new politics issues, and how they have evolved over time.

National revolution issues involve conflict over the authority and the territorial boundaries of the state.<sup>1</sup> The national revolution issues discussed in this chapter include foreign policy issues, ethnic policy issues, social conservatism and anti-establishment issues about attitudes towards social and political change, and political authority issues. The social conservatism results will be particularly important for understanding New Zealand political culture because most historians and political scientists have argued that conservatism has always been weak as an ideology in New Zealand.<sup>2</sup>

New politics issues concern divisions between quality of life postmaterialist aesthetic, social and intellectual needs, and traditional materialist goals such as economic growth and physical security.<sup>3</sup> Since many issues relating to this cleavage, such as law and order, are also part of other cleavages they have sometimes already been discussed, either earlier in this chapter, or like productivity and technology in the previous chapter. The issues discussed in the new politics section of this chapter include freedom and democracy, environmental protection, culture, and the position of women and other new politics interest groups. Although some of these issues, like freedom and democracy, are hardly new issues, the results will support Inglehart's and

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<sup>1</sup> Ian McAllister, Political Behaviour: Citizens, Parties and Elites in Australia (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1992), p. 111.

<sup>2</sup> W.H. Oliver, 'Problems and Prospects of Conservatism in New Zealand', Impact, Vol. 1 (1965), pp. 18-19; W.J. Gardner, William Massey (Wellington: Reed, 1969), p. 29; Jack Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', New Zealand Journal of History, Vol. 21 (1987), p. 224.

<sup>3</sup> Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 133-135.

Kitschelt's new politics theories if these issues have become more important in parties' manifestos over time.

The results will be carefully checked for signs of agenda setting by political parties, and for indications that parties' campaigning discourages rational voting. The suppression of important issues by parties, or the manufacturing of issues to win elections, would indicate that an important requirement for responsible party government was not being met in New Zealand. Because national revolution issues are often the most emotion-filled and divisive issues, agenda setting there could have particularly negative consequences.<sup>4</sup> As with the economic policy issues parties will also usually facilitate responsible party government if they make politics easier for voters to understand by keeping their policies reasonably consistent over time.<sup>5</sup>

## 6.2 Results for National Revolution Issues

### 6.2.1 External Relations

The foreign special relations: positive, military: positive, and peace and cooperation categories capture almost all of New Zealand political parties' foreign policy references. At every election Reform contested its main foreign policy emphasis was on foreign special relations: positive, with these themes on average taking up 4.7% of its manifesto content. Reform's high foreign special relations references reflected an enduring British identity even among native born New Zealanders, and a conservative desire to maintain defence and trading links with Britain.<sup>6</sup> Although Figure 6.1 shows that in its 1914 manifesto the Liberal Party placed a strong emphasis on foreign special relations: positive, from 1919

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<sup>4</sup> Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 302.

<sup>5</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> Malcolm McKinnon, 'New Zealand in the World (1914-51)', in *The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 237; W. David McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 344; W.J. Gardener, 'Massey-The Farmer Politician', *New Zealand Heritage*, Part 171 (1972), p. 1965.

onwards it usually placed the most emphasis on peace and cooperation themes. The Liberal Party's peace and cooperation references were dominated by military: negative references about reducing military expenditure. This suggests that its foreign policy was shaped by its classical liberalism concern with limiting government expenditure that was noted in the previous chapter.<sup>7</sup> At the 1931 election the Coalition's only foreign policy references were to foreign special relations: positive.

Table 6.1: The main parties' average references to foreign affairs issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
101 Foreign Special Relations: Positive	0.2 (0.3)	4.7 (3.3)	2.4 (4.0)
104 Military: Positive	0	0.9 (0.4)	1.7 (2.9)
103 Anti-Imperialism	0.7 (1.1)	0	0.3 (0.6)
105 Military: Negative	2.2 (2.3)	0	1.1 (0.9)
106 Peace	1.3 (1.3)	0	0.2 (0.3)
107 Internationalism: Positive	1.3 (1.3)	0.3 (0.5)	0.3 (0.6)
<b>Peace and Cooperation</b>	<b>5.5 (3.2)</b>	<b>0.3 (0.5)</b>	<b>1.9 (1.3)</b>
1935-1996	Labour	National	
101 Foreign Special Relations: Positive	0.9 (0.7)	0.9 (0.7)	
104 Military: Positive	1.5 (1.6)	2.0 (1.6)	
103 Anti-Imperialism	0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.3)	
105 Military: Negative	0.8 (0.9)	0.2 (0.3)	
106 Peace	0.4 (0.4)	0.1 (0.1)	
107 Internationalism: Positive	2.7 (1.5)	1.4 (1.2)	
<b>Peace and Cooperation</b>	<b>4.1 (2.1)</b>	<b>1.7 (1.4)</b>	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
101 Foreign Special Relations: Positive	0.8 (0.6)	1.1 (0.7)	0.5 (0.4)
104 Military: Positive	1.5 (1.2)	2.2 (1.5)	1.3 (1.3)
103 Anti-Imperialism	0.1 (0.1)	0.2 (0.4)	0.1 (0.1)
105 Military: Negative	1.3 (1.0)	0.3 (0.3)	0.7 (0.8)
106 Peace	0.4 (0.3)	0.1 (0.1)	0.2 (0.2)
107 Internationalism: Positive	2.9 (1.5)	1.7 (1.2)	1.3 (1.3)
<b>Peace and Cooperation</b>	<b>4.7 (2.1)</b>	<b>2.2 (1.3)</b>	<b>2.3 (2.1)</b>

<sup>7</sup> W. David McIntyre, *New Zealand Prepares for War: Defence Policy 1919-39* (Christchurch: University of Canterbury Press, 1988), p. 53 notes that pacifist sentiment only became widespread in New Zealand towards the end of the 1920s.

Figure 6.1: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about foreign special relations: positive




Figure 6.2: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about military: positive references, 1911-1996





Figure 6.3: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about peace and cooperation references, 1911-1996



During the 1911-1928 period Labour's main foreign policy emphasis was on peace and cooperation themes, with these taking up on average 5.5% of its manifesto content. This reflects Labour's traditional pacifist idealistic approach to international relations.<sup>8</sup> From 1925 onwards Labour also made some foreign special relations: positive references, because of the support of many of its more conservative voters and members for a continued, although much looser, association between nations settled by Britain.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, Reform's foreign special relations references fell sharply, and it began mentioning peace and cooperation themes. This indicates that foreign policy issues had become less divisive by the mid-1920s.

Figure 6.1 shows that over the 1935-1996 period, when Labour and National have been directly competing against each other, foreign special relations issues have been much less heavily emphasised than previously. This occurred because of declining British military power, a belated realisation since the early 1930s that New Zealand could no longer rely almost entirely on Britain as a market for its exports, and an erosion of emotional links with Britain.<sup>10</sup> Since the 1940s, the results for subcodes, not shown here, reveal that references to foreign special relations have also increasingly been about relationships with Pacific neighbours, and more recently Australia, rather than about maintaining links with Britain or the Commonwealth in general. Although manifestos have frequently discussed the importance of defence and trade links with the United States, the existence of a special emotional relationship has never been implied.

Over the 1935-1996 period Labour's main foreign policy emphasis has continued to be on peace and cooperation themes, with these taking up on average 4.1% of its manifesto content. Since the pre-war 1938 election, Labour

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<sup>8</sup> W. David McIntyre, 'Labour Experience in Foreign Policy', in New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Benton Ross, 1985), p. 11; David McCraw, 'Realism and Idealism in New Zealand's Foreign Policy', New Zealand International Review, Vol. 23 (1998), pp. 20-21.

<sup>9</sup> Bruce Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), pp. 109, 123-124.

<sup>10</sup> Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, revised edition (Auckland: Penguin, 1980), pp. 261, 309; W. David McIntyre, 'From Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 525-533.

has also usually made military: positive references in its manifestos. The 1938 election was also the only time it made more military: positive than peace and cooperation references. Significantly, the composition of Labour's peace and cooperation references changed in the mid-1930s from usually being about peace and military: negative themes to generally being about internationalism. This change occurred because of a less secure international environment, Labour's loss of some of its early idealism, and its growing faith in collective security and international organisations.<sup>11</sup>

In contrast to Reform, National's main external relations emphasis over the 1935-1996 period has been on military: positive. This reflects National's traditionally realist belief that because the international system is potentially anarchical strong defence forces and foreign alliances are essential.<sup>12</sup> However, military: positive references on average only take up 2.0% of National's manifesto content, indicating that it has not usually regarded defence as a pressing concern. Since the addition of world peace and support for the United Nations to National's objectives in the late 1960s,<sup>13</sup> it has usually made more references to peace and cooperation issues than to military: positive themes. This change by National towards a more liberal internationalist foreign policy reflects declining cold war tensions and an increasing awareness of the need for good relations with other countries in order to gain access to their markets.<sup>14</sup> However, National did take a more conservative position at the 1981 and 1987 elections when it strongly committed itself to improving the defence forces and maintaining military links with the United States.

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<sup>11</sup> Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), pp. 14-16; McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for War: Defence Policy 1919-39, pp. 143, 169.

<sup>12</sup> McCraw, 'Realism and Idealism in New Zealand's Foreign Policy', p. 18; G.A. Wood, 'The National Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 302.

<sup>13</sup> Compare 'Objects', section A, in New Zealand National Party, 1969 General Election Manifesto (New Zealand National Party, 1969), with 'Party Objects', section A, in New Zealand National Party, 1966 General Election Manifesto (New Zealand National Party, 1966).

<sup>14</sup> McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, pp. 146, 219; Stephen Levine, The New Zealand Political System: Politics in a Small Society (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), p. 171.

The results for the minor parties show that the left-wing Democratic Labour Party, NewLabour, and the Alliance, and the postmaterialist Values and Green parties, have all shown greater support for peace and cooperation than for any other foreign policy theme. There has been more variety in the stances of minor right-wing parties. At the 1935 election the Democratic Party's only foreign policy references were to foreign special relations: positive. Like National, Social Credit's manifestos initially made more references to military: positive than to any other foreign policy category. However, at every election after 1972 it made more references to peace and cooperation themes. At the 1984 election, the New Zealand Party strongly emphasised peace and cooperation themes because of its neutrality policies.<sup>15</sup> In contrast, at the 1996 election ACT took a more conventional right-wing position by placing a strong emphasis on military: positive. The Christian Coalition emphasised peace and cooperation themes most, although it also showed some support for the military, and for maintaining traditional ties with Britain. New Zealand First has almost completely ignored international relations issues.

Foreign policy differences between parties on nuclear weapons have frequently been seen as part of a new politics cleavage. One potential problem with the theory that parties' positions on nuclear weapons have changed voting patterns is that Figure 6.3 shows that Labour has traditionally followed a more idealistic foreign policy than National. This indicates that although opposition to nuclear ships was a relatively new issue, Labour's anti-nuclear position was a continuation of its traditional foreign affairs policies. However, opinion poll data on issue salience indicates that the debate over nuclear ships over the 1984-1987 period was one of the few occasions when foreign policy issues have been important to most voters.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Peter Aimer, 'The New Zealand Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1985), p. 196.

<sup>16</sup> National Research Bureau Opinion Polls, 1969-1992. Barry Gustafson, *Labour's Path to Political Independence: The Origins and Establishment of the New Zealand Labour Party 1900-1919* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1980), pp. 105-119 discusses the importance of the First World War in increasing Labour's support. Barry Gustafson, 'The National Governments and Social Change', in *The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 284-285 notes that the Vietnam War also polarised public opinion in the second half of the 1960s.

### 6.2.2 Ethnic Policy Issues

Table 6.2 and Figure 6.4 show that between 1911 and 1931 the Liberal, Reform and the Coalition only rarely made references to Maori: positive, while Labour made none at all. No party made positive references to multiculturalism. These results indicate that the indigenous Maori minority were highly politically marginalised during this period. Indeed, re-reading the earliest manifestos from this period shows that most references to Maori involved plans making it easier for white Pakeha settlers to settle on land owned by Maori.<sup>17</sup> Because the main thrust of these sentences was helping settlers, with the adverse effects on Maori not being considered, these sentences were coded under the agriculture and farmers category.

Table 6.2: The main parties' average references to ethnic policy issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
7063 Maori	0	0.9 (2.2)	0.5 (0.8)
503M Equality for Maori	0	0.6 (1.5)	0
<b>Maori: Positive</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1.5 (2.4)</b>	<b>0.5 (0.8)</b>
607 Multiculturalism: Positive	0	0	0
608 Multiculturalism: Negative	0	0.4 (0.9)	0
1935-1996	Labour	National	
7063 Maori	3.5 (2.2)	3.3 (2.2)	
503M Equality for Maori	0.3 (0.4)	0.3 (0.2)	
<b>Maori: Positive</b>	<b>3.8 (2.4)</b>	<b>3.6 (2.3)</b>	
607 Multiculturalism: Positive	1.1 (1.0)	1.0 (0.8)	
608 Multiculturalism: Negative	0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.1)	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
7063 Maori	3.5 (2.4)	3.1 (2.0)	1.1 (0.7)
503M Equality for Maori	0.3 (0.4)	0.2 (0.2)	0.1 (0.2)
<b>Maori: Positive</b>	<b>3.8 (2.7)</b>	<b>3.3 (2.1)</b>	<b>1.3 (0.8)</b>
607 Multiculturalism: Positive	1.5 (1.0)	1.2 (0.8)	1.7 (1.4)
608 Multiculturalism: Negative	0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.1)	0.2 (0.3)

<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, native land section in 'Sir Joseph Ward At Winton: "Reform" Policy Criticised', *New Zealand Times*, 17 November 1914, p. 7; native lands section in 'The Fight For Reform: Great Meeting At The Town Hall', *Dominion*, 7 July 1911, p. 6. Many later promises to open up new blocks of land also implicitly involved settling land previously owned by Maori.

Figure 6.4: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about Maori: positive, 1911-1996





Figure 6.5: Multiculturalism: positive references in the main parties' manifestos, 1911-1996



Between 1935 and 1996, parties' references to Maori have made up a much higher proportion of their manifestos than previously. This happened because of greater awareness of the disadvantaged position of many Maori,<sup>18</sup> together with the belief that the government had an important role to play in improving their situation.<sup>19</sup> There has usually been a high level of agreement between the main parties on the need to help Maori, with on average Labour's references to Maori: Positive taking up 3.8% of the content of its manifestos, compared to 3.6% of the content of National's manifestos. Table 6.2 shows, however, that during the 1954-1990 period Social Credit made comparatively few references to Maori. While references to helping Maori and promoting multiculturalism have consistently been in parties' manifestos from 1938 onwards, weakening claims that they have been overlooked by political parties,<sup>20</sup> Maori have received much less attention in the main parties' manifestos than other interest groups such as farmers.

Figure 6.4 shows that Labour's and National's references to Maori: positive fell during the 1960s and early 1970s. However, Figure 6.5 shows that this decline was paralleled by a relatively similar increase in both parties' references to multiculturalism: positive. These multiculturalism references are usually implicitly about Maori. This switch suggests that Labour and National have increasingly been emphasising new politics concerns with promoting Maori language and culture at the expense of materialist promises to improve the economic status of Maori.

Because, however, multiculturalism references are frequently about transferring resources to Maori, this shift partly measures a reorientation in policies towards Maori rather than a radical change. Devolving control of resources to Maori organizations and preserving Maori culture have also often been seen as essential steps towards improving the economic status of the Maori

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<sup>18</sup> Claudia Orange, 'Fraser and the Maori', in *Peter Fraser: Master Politician*, edited by Margaret Clark (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1998), p. 92.

<sup>19</sup> Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 275.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Mulgan, *Democracy and Power in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 85-86.

people.<sup>21</sup> Although multiculturalism: negative references have consistently been low, this result is somewhat misleading in terms of understanding government policies. This is because successive governments have seen a high degree of integration between Maori and Pakeha as a desirable aim which is occurring naturally.<sup>22</sup>

The only other ethnic minority group which has been specifically positively referred to in manifestos has been Pacific Islanders, who since the 1960s have made up an increasing, but still small, proportion of New Zealand's population.<sup>23</sup> Since 1975 references to this group have on average made up 0.5% of the content of Labour's manifestos, but only 0.3% of the content of National's manifestos. Some multiculturalism references are also general enough to apply to Pacific Islanders and other ethnic groups.

These small differences between Labour and National on ethnic policy issues are consistent with the limited data on ethnic voting available. Political scientists have theorised that parties' policies on ethnic issues have had a relatively modest influence on voting behaviour. Very high Maori support for Labour between the late 1930s and the early 1990s has mainly been attributed to their underprivileged economic situation.<sup>24</sup> Labour's alliance with the Ratana church has also been seen as important during the early years of this period, although this was also based on Labour's promises to improve the economic position of the Maori people.<sup>25</sup> The only indepth survey research on Maori voting, which is very recent, has largely supported this class voting theory.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Richard Mulgan and Will Sanders, 'Transforming Indigenous Affairs Policy: Labour's Contribution to "Internal Decolonisation"', in The Great Experiment: Labour parties and public policy transformation in Australia and New Zealand, edited by Francis Castles, Rolf Gerritsen, and Jack Vowles, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), p. 130.

<sup>22</sup> M.P.K. Sorrenson, 'Modern Maori: The Young Maori Party to Mana Motuhake', in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 343.

<sup>23</sup> Richard Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), p. 33.

<sup>24</sup> R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson and A.V. Mitchell, New Zealand Politics in Action: The 1960 General Election (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 284 "estimate" that Maori largely vote on a class basis. Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), p. 30 also states that Maori vote on a class basis, but does not provide any supporting evidence.

<sup>25</sup> Ann Sullivan and Jack Vowles, 'Realignment? Maori and the 1996 Election' in Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation, edited by Jack

Because National has not usually come close to winning the seats reserved for Maori it is initially difficult to understand why it has bothered including large sections on helping Maori and promoting multiculturalism in its manifestos. This is because according to saliency theory it would have been rational for National to make only minimal references to Maori issues. Instead it should have emphasised themes which would help it win in marginal electorates. One possible reason why National has continued to emphasise helping Maori could be that because New Zealand has been very proud of its treatment of Maori,<sup>27</sup> National may have needed to reassure its predominantly Pakeha membership and voters that it was helping them. Maintaining even the low level of support that National has received from Maori electorates may also have been very important to its image as a broad-based 'national' party.<sup>28</sup> A further possibility is that National may have been attempting to capture support from Maori enrolled on the general roll, whose voting behaviour has been much more difficult to analyse. In addition, National's support for multiculturalism fits in with its liberal ethos of allowing people to choose their own lifestyle. This provides a contrast to conservative

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Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, and Jeffrey Karp (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), p. 172.

<sup>26</sup> Clive Bean, 'New Zealand', in Electoral Change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western Countries, edited by Mark Franklin, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 289 notes that ethnicity was left out of both the important 1963 and 1981 election surveys. Hyam Gold, 'Society and Party in 1990', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman, 1992), pp. 477, 480 finds that the correlation between ethnicity and voting is high, but becomes much smaller once other factors are controlled for. Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer, Voters' Vengeance: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 34 find that Maori and Pakeha voted in similar ways in 1987, but that more Maori stayed loyal to Labour in 1990.

<sup>27</sup> W.H. Oliver, The Story of New Zealand (London: Faber, 1963), p. 247; Keith Sinclair, A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity (Auckland: Unwin, 1986), p. 200.

<sup>28</sup> Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History Of The New Zealand National Party, (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), p. 240; Wood, 'The National Party', p. 291. The picture of National as a moderate party on racial issues which emerges from analysing its manifestos has sometimes been denied by other comments by its members. For instance, when Robert Muldoon was National Party leader he threatened to force urban Maori convicted of crimes to live on tribal marae in the countryside. See, Robert Muldoon, My Way (Wellington: Reed, 1981), p. 8 for details. Ironically, Muldoon's bullying and often brutal political style together with his paternalistic policies for unemployed Maori resulted in an unparalleled level of respect developing between him and Maori gang leaders. Before Muldoon's 1992 funeral members of the notorious Black Power gang insisted on performing a haka to commemorate him.

parties overseas, which have sometimes opposed multiculturalism as a threat to national homogeneity.<sup>29</sup>

The results for ethnic policy categories at recent elections are worth looking at in detail. This is because Kitschelt has found that in Europe new right-wing parties have usually taken a much tougher position on ethnic policy issues than left-wing parties.<sup>30</sup> If this was the case in New Zealand, minor right-wing parties would make very low references to Maori: positive and to multiculturalism. The results in Figure 6.6, however, show that Kitschelt's findings do not seem to apply in New Zealand. Certainly the right-wing New Zealand Party placed a low emphasis on these issues. However, the right-wing ACT and Christian Coalition parties have emphasised ethnic policy issues more than the left-wing Alliance, which incorporates the Maori nationalist Mana Motuhake party.

The support by ACT and the Christian Coalition for Maori issues and for multiculturalism suggests a widespread recognition among political elites of the legitimacy of Maori needs and aspirations. These results support research which shows that on ethnic policy issues the elites in these parties who write the manifestos are more liberal than many of their voters.<sup>31</sup> However, because of high church attendance rates among Maori, and very high church attendance rates among Pacific Islanders, it may have made electoral sense for the Christian Coalition to target them.<sup>32</sup> High interracial marriage rates in New Zealand also constrain the flexibility of right-wing parties on ethnic policy issues, with both the marriages of the leader of ACT having been to Pacific Islanders.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> William Drozdiak, 'Germans Grapple With Race', Guardian Weekly, September 24 1998, p. 14.


<sup>30</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, 'European Party Systems: Continuity and Change', in Developments in West European Politics, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997), p. 138; Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. viii.

<sup>31</sup> Jack Vowles, et. al, Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 204-205, 116-117.

<sup>32</sup> Unpublished New Zealand Election Study Data.

<sup>33</sup> Simon Sheppard, Broken Circle: The Decline and Fall of the Fourth Labour Government (Wellington: PSL Press, 1999), p. 82.

Figure 6.6: References to Maori: positive and multiculturalism in minor parties' manifestos, 1935-1996



Comparing the results in Figure 6.6 to those in 6.4 and 6.5 shows that at the 1993 election when New Zealand First took a Maori seat away from Labour it emphasised the Maori: positive and multiculturalism categories slightly more than Labour had. Although New Zealand First made no references at all to helping Maori or to multiculturalism in its 1996 election programme, it still won all five Maori constituency seats. New Zealand First captured the Maori electorates at the 1996 election because its leader was a Maori, it had high profile candidates in the Maori seats, and it campaigned effectively in these seats using pamphlets mailed to all Maori voters.<sup>34</sup> However, its failure to refer to Maori in its 1996 election programme indicates insecurity about the likely reaction to policies to help them by its Pakeha supporters. Unlike New Zealand First's Maori supporters, its Pakeha support base was often very unsympathetic to the needs of Maori.<sup>35</sup>

### 6.2.3 Social Conservatism and Anti-Establishment Issues

Table 6.3 shows that between 1911 and 1928 Reform emphasised conservative issues more than the other parties, with these issues taking up 9.4% of the content of its manifestos, compared to 5.8% of the Liberal Party's and only 0.9% of Labour's. Figure 6.7 shows that the difference between Reform and the other parties was largest at the 1919, 1922 and 1925 elections. At these elections, national way of life sentences in Reform's manifestos frequently included highly emotional references to the need to protect New Zealand from the revolutionary change it argued that a Labour government would bring. Similarly, Reform placed a high emphasis on social harmony, arguing that there would be crippling social division if Labour entered the government.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The New Zealand First Party', in New Zealand Politics in Transition, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 165. New Zealand First did release 'Te Marangatanga: New Zealand First's Maori Policy 1996', but this document did not have the status of the manifesto and had a very limited distribution.


<sup>35</sup> Sullivan and Vowles, 'Realignment? Maori And The 1996 Election', p. 187.

<sup>36</sup> The best example of these references is in the 'Under Which Flag?' passage in Reform, The Man and the Policy: Sound, Progressive and Liberal (Reform, 11 October, 1919), p. [3]. See also, Reform, The Prime Minister's Manifesto (Reform, 1922), p. 2.

Table 6.3: The main parties' average references to social conservatism and anti-establishment issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberals
203 Constitutionalism: Positive	0.1 (0.2)	0	0.3 (0.8)
601 National Way of Life: Positive	0.2 (0.6)	4.9 (4.9)	3.4 (2.5)
6011 National Way of Life: left-wing	0.5 (0.6)	0 (0)	0.1 (0.3)
603 Traditional Morality: Positive	0.1 (0.2)	0.5 (0.6)	0.9 (1.4)
605 Law and Order	0	0.2 (0.5)	0
606 Social Harmony	0	3.8 (2.2)	1.0 (1.1)
<b>Social Conservatism</b>	<b>0.9 (1.0)</b>	<b>9.4 (7.6)</b>	<b>5.8 (2.7)</b>
204 Constitutionalism: Negative	1.5 (1.9)	0.6 (1.5)	0
304 Political Corruption	0	1.8 (2.8)	0.7 (0.9)
602 National Way of Life: Negative	0.8 (1.1)	0	0
604 Traditional Morality: Negative	0	0	0.1 (0.2)
609 Postmaterialism	0	0	0
<b>Anti-Establishment Views</b>	<b>2.3 (1.3)</b>	<b>2.4 (4.3)</b>	<b>0.8 (0.8)</b>
1935-1996	Labour	National	
203 Constitutionalism: Positive	0.1 (0.2)	0	
601 National Way of Life: Positive	0.7 (0.6)	1.1 (0.9)	
6011 National Way of Life: left-wing	0 (0.1)	0 (0)	
603 Traditional Morality: Positive	0.5 (0.5)	1.3 (1.2)	
605 Law and Order	1.7 (2.0)	2.6 (3.3)	
606 Social Harmony	0.3 (0.5)	0.9 (0.8)	
<b>Social Conservatism</b>	<b>3.3 (2.3)</b>	<b>5.9 (3.6)</b>	
204 Constitutionalism: Negative	0.2 (0.2)	0.1 (0.2)	
304 Political Corruption	0.1 (0.1)	0.2 (0.3)	
602 National Way of Life: Negative	0	0	
604 Traditional Morality: Negative	0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.2)	
609 Postmaterialism	0	0	
<b>Anti-Establishment Views</b>	<b>0.4 (0.4)</b>	<b>0.4 (0.5)</b>	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
203 Constitutionalism: Positive	0	0	0.2 (0.3)
601 National Way of Life: Positive	0.7 (0.5)	0.9 (0.5)	0.6 (0.5)
6011 National Way of Life: left-wing	0 (0.1)	0 (0)	0.1 (0.1)
603 Traditional Morality: Positive	0.6 (0.5)	1.2 (1.1)	1.3 (0.5)
605 Law and Order	2.1 (1.9)	2.4 (1.7)	1.0 (1.1)
606 Social Harmony	0.2 (0.2)	0.7 (0.5)	0.7 (1.0)
<b>Social Conservatism</b>	<b>3.7 (2.4)</b>	<b>5.2 (2.5)</b>	<b>3.8 (1.9)</b>
204 Constitutionalism: Negative	0.2 (0.2)	0.1 (0.1)	0.2 (0.2)
304 Political Corruption	0.1 (0.2)	0	0.5 (0.4)
602 National Way of Life: Negative	0	0	0.1 (0.1)
604 Traditional Morality: Negative	0.2 (0.3)	0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.1)
609 Postmaterialism	0	0	0
<b>Anti-Establishment Views</b>	<b>0.6 (0.4)</b>	<b>0.2 (0.3)</b>	<b>0.9 (0.7)</b>

Figure 6.7: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about social conservatism references, 1911-1996



As well as being lower than Reform's, the Liberal Party's social conservatism references tended to be much more mild. Typically they emphasised New Zealand's progress under the previous Liberal administration, and the need for New Zealanders to work in the national interest.<sup>37</sup>

Labour's social conservatism references are concentrated in the national way of life: left-wing emphasis subcategory. This measures national way of life sentences with a primarily left-leaning emphasis, such as Labour's 1922 promise to again make New Zealand a world leader in "progressive industrial and social legislation".<sup>38</sup> These sentences reflect attempts by Labour to legitimise its policies by portraying them as being part of a tradition of New Zealand social reform, rather than, as Reform politicians charged, being the product of radical overseas theories.<sup>39</sup> Some of the Liberal Party's national way of life references also fit into this subcategory. Although none of Reform's references to national way of life themes are in this category, some come very close.<sup>40</sup>

The prominence given to social conservatism themes in Reform's manifestos challenges the view that conservatism, as a coherent set of beliefs and policies, has always been weak in New Zealand.<sup>41</sup> However, the results support Oliver's position, in the most influential analysis of conservatism in New Zealand, that there have been important differences between conservatism in New Zealand and in European countries.<sup>42</sup> In particular, Table 5.3 shows that Reform's constitutionalism: positive and traditional morality references were very low. Anti-establishment policies also took up 2.4% of the content of Reform's manifestos. This is slightly more than in Labour's manifestos, where

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<sup>37</sup> See, for instance, 'Sir Joseph Ward has Crowded Meeting: Liberal Principles and Policy', Lyttelton Times, 11 November 1919, p. 7; 'Sir Joseph Ward At Winton "Reform" Policy Criticised', New Zealand Times, 17 November 1914, pp. 7-8.

<sup>38</sup> 'Election Manifesto of the New Zealand Labour Party: Policy to Reduce Toilers' Burdens and Secure an Abundant Life', Maoriland Worker, 8 November 1922, p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, p. 268; Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, p. 174.

<sup>40</sup> See, for instance, the claim that because New Zealanders have "refused to be led astray by false doctrine" New Zealand has earned a "world-wide reputation for sound government and advancement in social welfare", in 'The Election Campaign: Reform Party's Policy', New Zealand Herald, 3 October 1925, p. 13.

<sup>41</sup> See, for instance, Oliver, 'Problems and Prospects of Conservatism in New Zealand', pp. 18-19; Gardner, William Massey, p. 29; Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', p. 224.

<sup>42</sup> Oliver, 'Problems and Prospects of Conservatism in New Zealand', p. 19.

they made up 2.3% of the content, and considerably more than in Liberal Party programmes where they made up only 0.8% of the content. Reform's high emphasis on anti-establishment issues reflects its policies to reform the public service by eliminating political influence and patronage, and its initial intention to replace the nomination system for the upper house of Parliament with a system of election by proportional representation.<sup>43</sup> This support for constitutional reform is highly unusual for a conservative party.<sup>44</sup>

These results indicate that during the 1911-1928 period the social conservatism category measures a particular New Zealand type of conservatism. This form of "conservatism without traditions"<sup>45</sup> involved defending a very new social and economic order, where the government was already more interventionist and supportive of welfare measures than many governments overseas. These conservative themes would have appealed to many working class voters, particularly because of the high living standards and low level of working class consciousness that existed in New Zealand.<sup>46</sup> The conservatism results are therefore important for understanding why so many working class people voted for Reform during this period.

Reform always denied its policies were conservative, with its leaders considering themselves to be liberal on the grounds they supported classical liberal goals, while also continuing a New Zealand tradition of an active state.<sup>47</sup> Although these claims have some validity, there are considerable similarities between Reform's policies and those advocated by conservative parties overseas. Reform's tendency to see New Zealand society as being under threat from internal subversion also indicates that it had a more conservative outlook than the other parties.

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<sup>43</sup> See, 'The Fight For Reform: Great Meeting At The Town Hall', p. 6.

<sup>44</sup> Oliver, 'Problems and Prospects of Conservatism in New Zealand', p. 17.

<sup>45</sup> W.J. Gardner, 'The Reform Party', in *Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics*, edited by Robert Chapman (Auckland: University of Auckland, 1961), p. 26.

<sup>46</sup> Albert Metin [1901], *Socialism Without Doctrine*, translated by Russel Ward (Sydney: Alternative Publishing, 1977), pp. 188-190; Miles Fairburn, 'Why Did the New Zealand Labour Party Fail to Win Office Until 1935', *Political Science*, Vol. 37 (1985), pp. 104-116.

<sup>47</sup> Gardner, 'The Reform Party', p. 26.

While Chapman has argued that Reform's emphasis on conservative issues was a cynical attempt to retain power,<sup>48</sup> other historians have pointed out that support by many Labour politicians for the communists during the Russian revolution made these issues politically salient.<sup>49</sup> After Labour became more moderate following a 1927 policy review,<sup>50</sup> conservative themes were downplayed by Reform in its 1928 manifesto. This suggests that Reform's emphasis on conservative categories reflected a genuine concern with avoiding revolutionary change to society, rather than it inventing an issue to stay in power. Although the Coalition's 1931 election manifesto and the National Party's 1935 election manifesto make some social conservatism references, they contain no sentences which imply that a Labour victory would produce social division.

The results in Table 6.3 show that over the 1935-1996 period National has emphasised social conservatism issues considerably more than Labour. Conservative issues have on average taken up 5% of the content of National's manifestos, but only 2.7% of Labour's. National's social conservatism references were initially relatively stable, although it emphasised them heavily at the 1943 election when it campaigned on the need for wartime unity.<sup>51</sup> Since the late 1960s, National's, and to a lesser extent also Labour's, conservatism references have trended upwards, with this occurring because of a sharp increase in their law and order references. Law and order themes have gone from below 1% of the content of Labour's and National's manifestos until the 1950s, to the point where at the 1996 election they made up 5% of the content of Labour's manifesto, and 12% of the content of National's. During this period all references to law and order have been about stopping and punishing crimes committed by individuals and gangs. In contrast the sole law and order reference before the

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<sup>48</sup> R.M. Chapman, *The Political Scene, 1919-1931*, (Auckland: Heinemann, 1969), p. 27.

<sup>49</sup> P.J. O'Farrell, *Harry Holland: Militant Socialist* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1964), p. 111; Barry Gustafson, *Labour's Path to Political Independence: The Origins and Establishment of the New Zealand Labour Party 1900-19* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1980), p. 147.

<sup>50</sup> Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour*, p. 94.

<sup>51</sup> Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, p. 41.

1940s, which occurred in Reform's 1922 manifesto, was about maintaining civil order.<sup>52</sup>

This massive increase in law and order references by Labour and National is an important change in political priorities towards a topic which measures an old politics concern about personal safety in Inglehart's value change index.<sup>53</sup> Labour's and National's increased emphasis on law and order reflects a high concern by voters about crime<sup>54</sup> resulting from a seven-fold increase in reported crime rates since the 1950s.<sup>55</sup> Although Labour's and National's increased emphasis on law and order indicates that they have been responsive to public opinion, the massive increase in crime rates shows that they have been very unsuccessful at coming up with effective solutions.

The results show that other social conservatism categories have been referred to much less often. For instance, social harmony references have consistently been low, although National has emphasised this theme, which is often implicitly about avoiding industrial strife, more than Labour has. Similarly, traditional morality references have always been low in Labour's and National's manifestos. They are also mainly about helping families and preventing delinquency rather than about more divisive moral issues.<sup>56</sup> National way of life references have sometimes been more controversial. In particular, National's national way of life references in its 1951 election manifesto moved New Zealand away from the democratic ideal. This was because National's election programme inaccurately described the leaders of the striking unions as communists who were leading "a conspiracy to overthrow constitutional Government".<sup>57</sup> National way of life references have sometimes also measured promises to restrict migration,

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<sup>52</sup> Reform, The Prime Minister's Manifesto: Reform Government's Policy and Programme (Reform, 30 October 1922), p. 2.

<sup>53</sup> Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 40; Inglehart, Culture Shift, p. 134.

<sup>54</sup> Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, p. 106.

<sup>55</sup> 'Report shines light on crime in NZ', Massey News, Monday 5 October 1998, p. 1.

<sup>56</sup> For instance, in its 1987 manifesto National completely ignores the contentious homosexual law reform legislation which had been passed the previous year amid massive public protest.

<sup>57</sup> 'Broadcast Address By Mr S.G. Holland, 13 August 1951 Theatre Royal, Christchurch', p. 5; Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, p. 287.

although these references have usually been very low.<sup>58</sup> Occasionally in Labour's manifestos, and very occasionally in National's manifestos, the national way of life category continues to measure left-wing themes.

Over the 1954-1990 period Social Credit's social conservatism references were on average only slightly higher than Labour's. Figure 6.8 shows that other minor parties have sometimes stood out more on conservative issues. In particular, 30.7% of the Christian Coalition's 1996 manifesto was about social conservatism, with most of these references being about traditional morality. At the 1996 election New Zealand First also heavily emphasised social conservative themes, with these taking up 13.7% of its election programme. Almost half these references were about protecting New Zealand's national way of life, with all these national way of life sentences being about controlling migration.<sup>59</sup> Values' social conservatism references were relatively high at the 1972 election, with this reflecting a nostalgic, backward looking, element in its policies<sup>60</sup> which was much less pronounced in its 1975 manifesto, and completely absent from the Green Party's 1990 manifesto. NewLabour and the Alliance have shown very low support for socially conservative policies, mainly because of their low concern about law and order.

On average less than half a percent of Labour's and National's manifestos has been about the anti-establishment themes. This indicates a low concern with problems such as corruption, and little desire for social change. These themes have been more important in Social Credit manifestos, on average taking up 0.9% of its manifesto content. Its main emphasis has been on political corruption which reflects its members' distrust, rarely well based in reality, of government and bureaucracy.<sup>61</sup> Despite New Zealand First's image as a populist party which

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
<sup>58</sup> The highest references are in the short version of National's 1975 manifesto where 3 national way of life references in a manifesto of 394 sentences are about limiting immigration or ensuring that it comes from "traditional sources".

<sup>59</sup> See the 'Immigration' section in New Zealand First, *The Kiwi Spirit* (New Zealand First, 1996), p. [3].

<sup>60</sup> Levine, *The New Zealand Political System*, p. 82. Andrew Vincent, *Modern Political Ideologies*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 212-213 notes that this is a common element of Green thought.

<sup>61</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Democratic Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold, (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), p. 253.

Figure 6.8: Proportion of minor parties' manifestos about social conservatism references, 1935-1996



has crusaded against corruption,<sup>62</sup> anti-establishment themes at the 1993 election made up only 1.6% of its manifesto content, and none of its manifesto content at the 1996 election. This suggests that concerns over corruption may be more important to party activists than as a campaign message.

The new politics Values and Green parties stand out for their support for anti-establishment themes. These themes took up 12.9% of Values' 1972 manifesto, 6% of its 1975 manifesto and 5.4% of the Green Party's 1990 manifesto. As well as opposing traditional national and moral beliefs, 6.0% of Values 1972 manifesto, and 1.7% of its 1975 manifesto was about promoting explicitly postmaterialist values such as self-actualisation and self-development. These postmaterialist goals were also important in the Green Party's 1990 manifesto, where they made up 4.5% of the content. Postmaterialist goals have also occasionally been referred to in Social Credit manifestos, but at much lower levels. No other party has mentioned them.

One important aspect of the social conservatism results that deserves further attention is that in contrast to the United States and some European countries,<sup>63</sup> in New Zealand traditional morality has never been an important issue in the main parties' manifestos. This has been because parties have usually avoided taking positions on divisive moral issues, rather than because moral issues have been unimportant in New Zealand politics. For instance, traditionally parties have avoided taking stances in the heated debate over liquor laws, which were decided by referendums that coincided with national elections. Indeed, studies of newspaper election advertising have found that at elections between 1919 and 1928 "one forms the impression from the incidence and size of advertising ... that the major issue was prohibition".<sup>64</sup> More recently, changes to

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<sup>62</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The New Zealand First Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 167.

<sup>63</sup> David Robertson, 'Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1946-1981: An Initial Comparison', in *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses Of Post-War Election Programmes In 19 Democracies*, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 49; Kees van Kersbergen, 'Between Collectivism and Individualism: The Politics of the Centre', in *The Politics of Problem-Solving in Post-War Democracies* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997), pp. 124-126.

<sup>64</sup> S.F. Newman, *New Zealand in the 1920s* (Wellington: Hicks Smith and Sons Limited, 1969), p. 56; Bruce Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour*, p. 29.

laws on divisive moral issues such as abortion have been decided by free votes in parliament.<sup>65</sup>

The decision by the main parties to avoid taking positions on moral issues has been seen by Mulgan as enhancing the quality of democracy in New Zealand by preventing splits in parties.<sup>66</sup> However, the refusal by all parties except the Christian Coalition to take stances on most moral issues has meant that many voters have been unable to choose a party with moral views similar to their own. It has also meant that parties have not led public opinion on moral issues,<sup>67</sup> and that laws on these issues have often been confused and illogical.<sup>68</sup> This is only likely to change in the unlikely event that a Christian party becomes electorally important in New Zealand, and succeeds in forcing the other parties to also take a stand on moral issues.

#### 6.2.4 Political Authority

In New Zealand political authority references frequently measure a conservative concern with strong government and effective leadership. Table 6.4 shows that over the 1911-1928 period the parties' attention to political authority themes were all similar, with on average political authority references taking up 7.1% of the content of Labour's manifestos, 7.8% of Reform's, and 8.1% of the Liberal Party's. However, Figure 6.9 indicates that there was considerable variation over time in parties' references. For instance, the Liberal Party's political authority references took up over 20% of its programme at the 1911, 1914, and 1928 elections, while its references were also high in 1919. At all these elections the Liberal Party was led by Sir Joseph Ward, with its high political authority references reflecting his tendency to present himself to voters as a financial magician.<sup>69</sup> In contrast, when very lacklustre leaders led the Liberals at

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<sup>65</sup> Mulgan, *Democracy and Power in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 99.

<sup>66</sup> Mulgan, *Democracy and Power in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 99.

<sup>67</sup> R.S. Milne, *Political Parties In New Zealand* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 274.

<sup>68</sup> Robert Chapman, 'Political Culture: The Purposes of Party and the Current Challenge', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), p. 18.

<sup>69</sup> Bassett, *Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography*, p. 238.

the 1922 and 1925 elections<sup>70</sup> its programmes made no political authority references.

Table 6.4: The main parties' average references to political authority issues

1911-1928 305 Political Authority	Labour 7.1 ((8.4)	Reform 7.8 (7.0)	Liberals 8.1 (10.1)
1935-1996 305 Political Authority	Labour 1.8 (2.2)	National 3.8 (6.7)	
1954-1990 305 Political Authority	Labour 1.1 (0.9)	National 1.8 (2.3)	Social Credit 3.7 (7.5)


Reform's and Labour's political authority references grew slowly, probably because compared to the Liberal Party they lacked a proven record in government. By the 1928 election, however, both Reform's and Labour's references were high. This indicates the increased confidence of both parties, but probably played into the hands of the Liberal Party by increasing the saliency of an issue on which Ward still had a great deal of credibility.<sup>71</sup> Political authority references were also high at the 1931 election, with this reflecting deep policy differences over how to handle the worsening economic depression.

During the 1935-1996 period political authority has generally been a less important issue. On average these themes have taken up 1.8% of the content of Labour's manifestos, and 3.8% of National's. The difference between Labour and National, however, is due to very high political authority references by National at a few elections. For instance, National's political authority references took up almost 20% of the content of its 1935 election manifesto, when it attempted to defend the Coalition's record during the depression. National's political authority references then slumped, before taking up a record 25% of its manifesto content at the 1951 snap election which it called in response to a strike

<sup>70</sup> Chapman, *The Political Scene, 1919-1931*, pp. 17, 26.

<sup>71</sup> Bassett, *Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography*, pp. 239-242, 266-267; Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour*, p. 100.

Figure 6.9: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about political authority themes, 1911-1996



by waterfront workers. At this election National argued that it was the only party which had the courage to prevent industrial anarchy and communist subversion.<sup>72</sup>

Although National won the 1951 election the content analysis results suggest that its agenda setting capacity was limited. This is because at the following election its political authority references were much lower, and were also all about economic issues. This result weakens Chapman's theory that because of the waterfront strike National established a belief in voters' minds that it was more effective at governing than Labour.<sup>73</sup> This is because if National did acquire a reputation for effectiveness in 1951 it is surprising that it failed to reinforce this belief in later manifestos. Possibly National saw campaigning on its effectiveness as unsuccessful because the number of votes it received increased only slightly in 1951.<sup>74</sup> Since the 1951 election National's political authority references have since only been high at the 1984 election when its leader, Sir Robert Muldoon, attempted to make his leadership and record the main election issue.<sup>75</sup>

Table 6.4 shows that over the 1954-1990 period Social Credit made more political authority references on average than either Labour or National. However, Social Credit's high political authority references occurred only in its first two manifestos, when it heavily criticised the established parties for not implementing its monetary policies.<sup>76</sup> The party at recent elections which has made the most references to political authority has been New Zealand First, with 8.5% of its 1993 manifesto and 6% of its 1996 manifesto being about political authority. Not surprisingly for parties which value individual autonomy and

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<sup>72</sup> 'Broadcast Address by Mr. S.G. Holland, 13th August 1951, Theatre Royal, Christchurch', p. 1.

<sup>73</sup> Robert Chapman, 'From Labour to National, in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 375.

<sup>74</sup> 'General Election Results, 1935-1993', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Paul Harris and Stephen Levine (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1994), p. 122.

<sup>75</sup> David McLoughlin, 'Show Arrives at Main Road', *New Zealand Herald*, 2 July 1984, p. 3.

<sup>76</sup> See, for instance, New Zealand Social Credit Political League, *Social Credit's Solution To The Problems Of Today and Tomorrow* (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1954), p. 12; any of the brochures that make up Social Credit's 1957 programme.

participatory democracy,<sup>77</sup> Values' and the Green Party's political authority references have been extremely low.

Commentators from overseas during the postwar period have often considered New Zealand to have a very authoritarian culture.<sup>78</sup> However, the relatively low references by parties to political authority themes during recent decades, compared to the much higher references during the first half of the twentieth century, suggests that New Zealand has become a much less authoritarian society. This result strongly supports new politics theories that emphasise a shift away from authoritarian values as a core component of value change.<sup>79</sup> As a result of this value change even during periods of economic crisis, such as the mid 1970s and late 1980s, it may not have been worthwhile for parties to campaign on promises of strong government. Since the late 1980s political authority references have probably also been low because of a general distrust among voters of politicians and political parties, even when they have never been in government.<sup>80</sup>

The coding system probably understates the importance of political authority relative to other policy areas. This is because the coding scheme is text-based, while political authority is often indicated by pictures of leaders on the covers of brochures, and their body language and tone of voice during speeches, rather than explicit statements. Nevertheless, the changes in political authority references are probably still indicative of an important change in the structure of political debate.

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<sup>77</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Minor Parties', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold, (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 317-318.

<sup>78</sup> David Ausubel, The Fern and the Tiki: An American View of New Zealand National Character, Social Attitudes and Race Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 31; Levine, The New Zealand Political System, p. 155.

<sup>79</sup> See, for example, Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 20; Chris Flanagan, 'Value Change in Industrial Societies', American Political Science Review, Vol. 81 (1987), pp. 1305-1307. Reviewing his earlier research Inglehart, Culture Shift (1990), pp. 70-71 argues that attitudes towards authority are poorly correlated to postmaterialism. However, in Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 275 he sees changing attitudes towards authority as a key element of value change.

<sup>80</sup> Vowles, et. al, Towards Consensus?, pp. 132-133.

## 6.3 Results for New Politics Issues

### 6.3.1 Freedom and Democracy

Table 6.5 shows the differences between the main parties on freedom and democracy. These results, together with those in Figure 6.10, immediately confirm that one weakness with new politics theories is that freedom and democracy issues have been on the political agenda for a very long time.<sup>81</sup>


Table 6.5: The main parties' average references to freedom and democracy issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
2012 Freedom: Non Economic	2.0 (1.0)	0.7 (0.9)	0.1 (0.2)
202 Democracy	7.7 (3.9)	1.8 (1.4)	2.3 (1.1)
301 Decentralisation: Positive	0	0.8 (1.5)	0.7 (1.7)
<b>Freedom and democracy</b>	<b>9.7 (4.2)</b>	<b>3.3 (2.8)</b>	<b>3.1 (2.6)</b>
1935-1996	Labour	National	
2012 Freedom: Non Economic	1.1 (1.3)	1.3 (1.0)	
202 Democracy	2.3 (1.8)	1.8 (1.5)	
301 Decentralisation: Positive	0.6 (0.8)	0.4 (0.4)	
<b>Freedom and democracy</b>	<b>4.0 (3.3)</b>	<b>3.5 (2.4)</b>	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
2012 Freedom: Non Economic	1.6 (1.4)	1.4 (0.8)	2.2 (1.5)
202 Democracy	2.8 (1.9)	1.3 (1.0)	3.4 (1.3)
301 Decentralisation: Positive	0.9 (0.8)	0.5 (0.5)	1.2 (1.0)
<b>Freedom and democracy</b>	<b>5.3 (3.6)</b>	<b>3.2 (2.0)</b>	<b>6.8 (2.3)</b>

Indeed, Table 6.5 shows that during the 1911-1928 period freedom and democracy references on average made up 9.7% of the content of Labour's manifestos, which is a higher proportion than over the 1935-1996 period. Labour's democracy references were particularly high during the 1911-1925 period, when it supported policies such as proportional representation to make the political system more responsive, and industrial democracy.

<sup>81</sup> Arend Lijphart, 'Political Parties: Ideologies and Programs', in Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections, edited by David Butler, Howard Penningham and Austin Ranney (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 40.

Figure 6.10: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about freedom and democracy, 1911-1996



Labour's democracy references then fell sharply from the late 1920s, as its growing electoral success under first past the post resulted in it seeing advantages in the prevailing system.<sup>82</sup>

The Liberal and Reform parties' freedom and democracy references were usually much lower than Labour's. The main exception to the Reform and Liberal parties' low freedom and democracy references was the Liberal Party's 1922 manifesto, which strongly supported the introduction of a proportional representation electoral system.<sup>83</sup> These results reflected their authoritarian outlook, which resulted in severe restrictions on civil liberties throughout the 1910s and 1920s.<sup>84</sup> Together with their high social conservatism and political authority references, the freedom and democracy results call into question claims by Liberal and Reform to be liberal, at least on non-economic issues.

Table 6.5 shows that on average over the 1935-1996 period freedom and democracy references made up 4.0% of the content of Labour's manifestos, and 3.5% of the content of National's. However, Figure 6.10 shows that there have been very large fluctuations in Labour's and National's freedom and democracy references over time. One clear trend has been a long-term downward slide since the late 1930s in references by the National Party to freedom and democracy themes, which suggests that on these issues it has become less liberal over time. In contrast, the concern of Labour's increasingly middle class membership with civil liberties and democracy explains the sharp increase in Labour's freedom and democracy references between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s.<sup>85</sup> The Labour-National gap was largest at the 1981 and 1984 elections when the National government was led by Robert Muldoon. Despite the passing of the Official Information Act (1982), his period as Prime Minister was marked by a reduction

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<sup>82</sup> Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour*, p. 172.

<sup>83</sup> Election Campaign: The Opposition Policy Outlined by Mr Wilford', *New Zealand Herald*, 1 November 1922, p. 11.

<sup>84</sup> Miles Fairburn, 'The Farmers Take Over', in *The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 186-187; B.S. Gustafson, *Constitutional Changes Since 1870* (Auckland: Heinemann, 1969), p. 26.

<sup>85</sup> Jack Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom?', in *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand*, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 24, 20-21.

in individual freedom, and an authoritarian decision-making style.<sup>86</sup> At the 1978 and 1981 elections Labour also won fewer seats than National, even though it won a higher proportion of the total vote, with this reviving its interest in reforming the electoral system.<sup>87</sup>

Figure 6.10 shows that Labour's concern with freedom and democracy issues has fallen sharply since the late 1980s. This happened because of the dumping in late 1984 of Muldoon as National Party leader, together with Labour's success in passing legislation, such as the Bill of Rights (1990), to promote individual freedom.<sup>88</sup> Labour's democracy references have probably also fallen because of its poor record at implementing its election promises between 1984 and 1990,<sup>89</sup> the difficulties it encountered during the 1980s with devolution,<sup>90</sup> and declining support within the party for investigating electoral reform.<sup>91</sup>

During the 1954-1990 period Social Credit tended to emphasise freedom and democracy themes more than either Labour or National. Freedom and democracy references have also been heavily emphasised by Values and the Greens, partly because of their support for traditional left-wing themes such as participatory democracy.<sup>92</sup> NewLabour, the Alliance, and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand First have also emphasised freedom and democracy themes more than Labour and National at recent elections. This is largely because of their strong emphasis on keeping election promises, and their support for proportional representation and participatory democracy.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, pp. 130, 146.

<sup>87</sup> Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie, *New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation: Accident? Design? Evolution?* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 38-43.

<sup>88</sup> For details of the significance of the Bill of Rights and other legislation promoting freedom introduced by Labour see Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer, *Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 264-277, 173, 177.

<sup>89</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 519.

<sup>90</sup> See, Geraldine Johns, 'Clark Strips Area Health Board of its Powers', *New Zealand Herald*, 22 March 1989, p. 3 for an account of how difficult Labour found it to get elected health boards to stay within their budgets.

<sup>91</sup> Jackson and McRobie, *New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation*, pp. 53-54.

<sup>92</sup> Miller, 'The Minor Parties', p. 318.

<sup>93</sup> Mulgan, *Politics in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 260, 261.

Although during the 1980s Labour's freedom and human rights references were higher than those of the other parties, Table 6.5 shows that on average over the entire 1935-1996 period Labour made fewer freedom references than National and Social Credit. This is because as well as being a postmaterialist value, individual freedom is a core classical liberal value<sup>94</sup> which National and Social Credit have valued highly.<sup>95</sup> The freedom and human rights: non-economic category has been even more heavily emphasised by small right-wing parties such as the New Zealand Party. In contrast, parties on the left have traditionally shown a greater support for democracy than parties on the right. This indicates a greater faith among parties on the left in the effectiveness and fairness of collective decision-making. The long-term differences between the parties on the democracy category are likely to remain small, however, because New Zealand's culture of popular liberalism has resulted in support for democracy being deeply embedded in society.<sup>96</sup>

### 6.3.2 Quality Of Life Issues

While the results have shown that issues to do with freedom and democracy have been on the political agenda for a long time, the environment and culture can justifiably be considered new politics issues. This can be seen from Figures 6.11 and 6.13, which show that these issues have been emphasised much more by parties over time.

Table 6.6 shows that over the 1911-1928 period Reform made the most environment references, with these issues on average making up 1.7% of the content of its manifestos. Parties' environmental protection references during this period reflected a growing public desire for town planning, and the first wave of concern about the destruction of New Zealand's natural environment.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), p. 18.

<sup>95</sup> Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, p. 182; Miller, 'The Democratic Party', p. 253-254.

<sup>96</sup> Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', p. 220.

<sup>97</sup> Erik Olssen, 'Towards a New Society', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 259; Ross Galbreath, *Working for Wildlife: A History of the New Zealand Wildlife Service* (Wellington: Bridget

Table 6.6: The main parties' average references to quality of life issues

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
501 Environmental Protection	0.2 (0.3)	1.7 (1.1)	0.3 (0.6)
502 Culture	0	0	0
416 Anti-Growth Economy	0	0	0
1935-1996	Labour	National	
501 Environmental Protection	2.8 (3.1)	2.8 (3.1)	
502 Culture	2.6 (1.8)	1.6 (1.7)	
416 Anti-Growth Economy	0	0	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
501 Environmental Protection	3.4 (3.0)	2.9 (2.3)	5.4 (3.8)
502 Culture	2.8 (1.6)	2.4 (1.7)	2.1 (1.7)
416 Anti-Growth Economy	0	0	0

On average over the 1935-1996 period environmental protection references have made up 2.8% of the content of both Labour and National party manifestos. Figure 6.11 shows that Labour's and National's environmental protection references both began trending upwards during the 1960s, indicating that they were responsive to gradual value change in society. However, their environmental protection references increased sharply at the 1972 election because of heightened concern about the environment, and the formation of the Values Party.<sup>98</sup> Since then Labour's and National's environmental protection references have fluctuated, although the environment has usually taken up between 5% to 10% of their manifesto content. With the exception of National's 1984 manifesto Labour and National have always also made more references to the environment than they did at elections before 1972.

Figure 6.12 shows references by minor parties to the environment between 1935 and 1996. In Values' 1972 and 1975 manifestos respectively 7.9% and 10.7% of its manifesto content was about environmental protection. In contrast, at the 1990 election just over one third of the Green Party's manifesto was about

Williams Books, 1993), pp. 13-14.

<sup>98</sup> Ton Buhrs, 'Environmental Policy', in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 288.

Figure 6.11: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about environmental protection, 1911-1996





Figure 6.12: Proportion of the minor parties' manifestos about environmental protection, 1935-1996



the environment. This indicates that the Greens were much more of a single issue party than Values had been. Figure 6.12 shows that at recent elections all parties have shown at least very minimal support for environmental protection. This supports the survey research finding that concern about this issue is widespread among the electorate.<sup>99</sup>

Both Values and the Greens stand out, however, as the only parties to have shown support for the extreme environmentalist policy of halting economic development. Support for the anti-growth category made up 21.2% of the content of Values' 1975 manifesto, 10.3% of its 1975 manifesto, and 20% of the Green Party's 1990 manifesto. In contrast, this issue received only a few token references in other parties' manifestos during the 1970s, and has not been referred to since in any programme collected. This indicates that the other parties' environment references have concentrated on moderate 'light green' reformist measures.

The results for most parties support the finding by a survey research study showing that the environment has declined in political importance since the 1990 election.<sup>100</sup> However, Figure 6.11 shows that National has continued to heavily emphasise the environment in its manifestos. Green Party dissatisfaction with how its environmental policies were watered down when it was part of the Alliance at the 1993 and 1996 elections<sup>101</sup> appears justified. This is because Figure 6.12 shows that the Alliance has not placed a higher emphasis on the environment than most other parties.

Figure 6.13 shows that although no references to the culture category were made before the 1943 election, since then mentions have often trended upwards. Between the 1943 and 1951 elections Labour's references to culture were higher than National's, although Labour's culture references then slumped until the late 1960s. This pattern suggests that Labour's high culture references during the 1940s and early 1950s were due to the influence of Peter Fraser, who while

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<sup>99</sup> Vowles and Aimer, *Voters' Vengeance*, p. 142; Jack Vowles, et al., *Towards Consensus*, p. 116.

<sup>100</sup> Jack Vowles, et al., *Towards Consensus*, p. 106.

<sup>101</sup> John Mitchell, 'Greens have high election hopes', *Daily News*, 3 April 1998, p. 2.




Figure 6.13: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about culture, 1911-1996

Prime Minister showed a very high personal interest in promoting culture.<sup>102</sup> The decline during the 1950s reflects Labour's policy revision after Fraser's death,<sup>103</sup> and the prevailing suspicion of intellectuals.<sup>104</sup>

Labour's and National's culture references grew during the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the 1980s policies to promote culture usually made up several percent of Labour's and National's manifestos. This increase is compatible with Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism, which sees issues associated with aesthetic needs becoming more important.<sup>105</sup> However, National's culture references slumped to near zero during the 1990s, indicating a policy of cultural relativism. Labour's culture references were also very low at the 1996 election.

Social Credit's culture references have usually been lower than either Labour's or National's. Despite the apparent theoretical link between culture and postmaterialism, culture references made up a very low 0.4% of the content of Values' 1972 and 1975 election manifestos, while at the 1990 election the Greens made no culture references. More in keeping with new politics theories, culture references have made up several percent of NewLabour Party and Alliance manifestos. The only other party to make a significant number of culture references was the minor middle class right-wing New Zealand Party, with these themes taking up 4.6% of its 1984 manifesto. This result is significant because it shows that postmaterialist policies and beliefs can be important to right-wing neo-liberal parties.

The culture results provide a sharp contrast to the widespread support among parties at recent elections for protecting the environment. They suggest that the environment has become a universal concern, while promoting culture is a more narrowly based issue which parties often ignore. These differences

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<sup>102</sup> Rachel Barrowman, 'Fraser, Heenan and Cultural Patronage', in Peter Fraser: Master Politician, edited by Margaret Clark (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1998), pp. 109-110; Michael Bassett, 'The Political Context of the Prime Ministerial Years', in Peter Fraser: Master Politician, edited by Margaret Clark (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1998), p. 52.

<sup>103</sup> Although Fraser died in December 1950 Labour's high culture references at the September 1951 snap election can be explained on the grounds that its policies would not have been fully revised for this election.

<sup>104</sup> Ausubel, The Fern and the Tiki, p. 29.

<sup>105</sup> Inglehart, Culture Shift, p. 133; Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, p. 40.

probably exist because environmental protection references, such as promises to reduce pollution, can measure materialist concerns about physical well being.<sup>106</sup> In contrast, the culture category tends to predominantly measure support for postmaterialist aesthetic and self-actualisation goals.

### 6.3.3 New Politics Interest Groups

The two interest groups categories which closely relate to new politics issues are the women's issues and the minority groups categories. Both categories measure a postmaterialist concern with marginalised groups. Over the 1911-1928 period Labour emphasised helping women the most. This reflects an early concern with equality for women that previously has gone unexpressed. However, women's issues on average took up only 2% of the content of Labour's manifestos, and declined in importance over time.

Figure 6.14 shows that during the late 1930s National brought women's issues onto the political agenda again. Although women's issues are usually thought of as new politics issues, National's references to women often involved more traditional measures to help housewives and mothers. Even National's paternalistic promises often contained aspects of postmaterialist beliefs, however, because they included measures intended to make motherhood easier, and to help women enter the workforce.<sup>107</sup>

Labour's and National's references to women's issues fell during the 1960s, supporting the view that their concerns were neglected during this period.<sup>108</sup> Because of increased lobbying by women's groups Labour's and

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<sup>106</sup> Masja Nas, 'Green, Greener, Greenest', in *The Impact of Values*, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 288; Stephen Crook and Jan Palulski, 'Shades of Green: Public Opinion in Environmental Issues in Australia', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30 (1995), p. 51.

<sup>107</sup> See, for instance, New Zealand National Party, *Policy General Election 1946* (New Zealand National Party, 1946), section 5; New Zealand National Party, *A Record of Progress: Policy General Election 1954* (New Zealand National Party, 1954), p. 8.

<sup>108</sup> Anthony Wood, 'Holyoake and the Holyoake Years', in *Sir Keith Holyoake: Towards a Political Biography* (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), p. 33.

National's references to women's issues rose sharply at the 1975 election,<sup>109</sup> with them taking up more than 3% of the content of each party's manifesto.


1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
503NP Equality for new politics groups	0	0	0
705 Underprivileged minority groups	0	0	0.4 (0.8)
<b>Minority groups</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.4 (0.8)</b>
503W Equality for women	1.6 (1.2)	0	0
7062 Demographic groups: women	0.4 (0.9)	0	0.2 (0.4)
<b>Women's issues</b>	<b>2.0 (1.0)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.2 (0.4)</b>
1935-1996	Labour	National	
503NP Equality for new politics groups	0.3 (0.3)	0.1 (0.1)	
705 Underprivileged minority groups	0.9 (0.9)	0.4 (0.6)	
<b>Minority groups</b>	<b>1.1 (1.1)</b>	<b>0.5 (0.6)</b>	
503W Equality for women	0.7 (0.8)	0.2 (0.5)	
7062 Demographic groups: women	0.7 (.9)	0.5 (0.6)	
<b>Women's issues</b>	<b>1.4 (1.5)</b>	<b>0.7 (1.0)</b>	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
503NP Equality for new politics groups	0.3 (0.3)	0.1 (0.1)	0.3 (0.3)
705 Underprivileged minority groups	1.1 (1.0)	0.3 (0.3)	1.7 (1.6)
<b>Minority groups</b>	<b>1.3 (1.0)</b>	<b>0.4 (0.4)</b>	<b>2.0 (1.6)</b>
503W Equality for women	0.7 (0.7)	0.3 (0.6)	0.2 (0.3)
7062 Demographic groups: women	0.8 (0.9)	0.5 (0.6)	0.3 (0.6)
<b>Women's issues</b>	<b>1.5 (1.3)</b>	<b>0.8 (1.1)</b>	<b>0.6 (0.7)</b>

While National's women's issues references fell again to very low levels at the 1981 election, Labour's have remained high and reached a record level of just over 5% of its manifesto content at the 1996 election. Labour's recent policies for women have covered a range of issues, although they have often been about postmaterialist concerns, such as ensuring women are treated with dignity in hospital, and affirmative action programmes.<sup>110</sup> National dropped specific

<sup>109</sup> Christine Dann, Up From Under: Women and Liberation in New Zealand 1970-1985 (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 19.

<sup>110</sup> See, for example, New Zealand Labour Party, 1984 Policy Document (New Zealand Labour Party, 1984), p. 99; New Zealand Labour Party, Our Policies For The 1990s (New Zealand Labour Party, 1990), p. 172.

Figure 6.14: Proportion of the main parties' manifestos about helping women and equality for them, 1911-1996



policies for women from the early 1980s because its policy makers felt that there were very few differences between women's and men's concerns.<sup>111</sup>

Despite its general concern with new politics themes, women's issues made up only 0.2% of the content of Values' 1972 manifesto. Although 9.2% of the content of Values' 1975 manifesto was about women's issues, Values' commitments to improving the position of women would seem to be undermined by the persistent use of sexist language throughout its manifesto.<sup>112</sup> This shows how ingrained into society traditional attitudes to women were.<sup>113</sup>

A lower proportion of Social Credit's manifestos were about helping women than either Labour's or National's. Besides Labour, the only parties to show support in their manifestos for women at recent elections have been the Greens, the NewLabour Party, and the Alliance. However, their references have been lower than Labour's.

Minority groups have also been given more attention by political parties over time. This indicates a growing concern with eliminating discrimination against groups such as homosexuals, and with the quality of life of the disabled and mentally ill. Until the 1960s virtually no references to these groups were made in manifestos. Since then, however, Labour's, and to a lesser extent National's, references to these groups have increased. Social Credit made more references to minority groups than either Labour or National, indicating that this was a constituency it saw them as neglecting. Values at the 1972 and 1975 elections heavily emphasised minority groups concerns, although surprisingly at the 1990 election the Green Party lagged behind the other parties in this policy area.

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<sup>111</sup> Gustafson, The First 50 Years, p. 282; 'Discussion - Political Issues and the Policy Agenda', in Double Decision: The 1993 Election and Referendum in New Zealand, edited by Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington, 1994), pp. 66-67.

<sup>112</sup> Values, Beyond Tomorrow: 1975 Values Party Manifesto (Values, 1975). One of the best examples of sexist language is on p. 9 where a paragraph on equality for women is followed by the sentence "The task ahead is not to assimilate the Maori, but to help him".

## 6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has used the manifesto data to study New Zealand political parties' policies on national revolution and new politics issues. The results confirm that Labour, other left-wing parties, and new politics parties have almost always emphasised peace and cooperation themes more than any other foreign affairs topic. This reflects their idealistic liberal-internationalist and occasionally pacifist approach to international relations. Whereas Reform's main foreign policy emphasis was always foreign special relations: positive, National's has usually been on military: positive. However, since the late 1960s peace and cooperation themes have frequently been more important than military: positive references in National's and other right-wing parties' manifestos.

Although before the mid-1930s political parties gave helping Maori and multiculturalism: positive very little attention in their manifestos, since then these issues have been more important. The results reveal a high degree of consensus over the 1935-1996 period between Labour and National on the need for policies to help Maori and to promote multiculturalism. Contrary to expectations, minor right-wing parties have usually made just as many positive references to ethnic minorities as left-wing parties.

However, right-wing parties have nearly always emphasised social conservative themes more than left-wing parties. Social conservatism themes were particularly heavily emphasised at some elections between 1911 and 1928, when Reform argued that it was the only party which could protect New Zealand from radical change. Because of a sharp increase in law and order references since the 1980s there has been a considerable increase in Labour's and National's social conservatism references. Political authority issues were also particularly important up to the mid-1930s. Since then they have become much less salient, although right-wing parties have continued to emphasise them more than left-wing parties. The social conservatism and political authority results are

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<sup>113</sup> Possibly because of the more formal style used in other parties' manifestos there have always been very few instances of gender specific language.

significant because they provide strong evidence that some conservative policies have been very important in New Zealand politics.

The 'new politics' issues results present a complex picture. They confirm that rather than being new issues, freedom and democracy have been important since the beginning of party competition at the 1911 election. Although they were emphasised more over time by Labour between 1960 and 1984, its references have since fallen sharply. While the environment has been emphasised much more in parties' manifestos since the early 1970s, there has often been a consensus between Labour and National on its importance. Values and the Greens are the only parties to show support for reducing economic growth. Culture references by parties increased over time, although this topic has also often been ignored by them. Women's issues increased in importance in parties' manifestos in the mid-1970s. During the 1980s and 1990s they have been emphasised much more by Labour than National. The results provide some support for new politics theories, although they also support the view that value change has been considerably more complex than in Inglehart's and Kitschelt's models.<sup>114</sup>

Parties' policy emphases on national revolution and new politics issues have largely been consistent with the requirements of responsible party government and pluralist theories of democracy. An important reason for this is that parties have usually campaigned in a way encouraging rational voting. The biggest exception was National's social conservatism and political authority references at the 1951 election, when it inaccurately argued that the unions were attempting to overthrow orderly government. Parties' social conservatism references have also sometimes measured illiberal promises to restrict immigration, although these references have usually been low.

The results for categories such as law and order and the environment show that parties have been responsive to the policy environment and social change. The main type of issue that has been kept off the political agenda has been moral

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<sup>114</sup> Elinor Scarbrough, 'Materialist-Postmaterialist Value Orientations', in *The Impact of Values*, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.

issues, with the main parties avoiding these issues to prevent internal divisions. However, the time it took Maori, women and the disabled to get their concerns onto the political agenda points to power imbalances within society, confirming that New Zealand politics does not meet the pluralist ideal.<sup>115</sup> On most issues parties' policies have changed only incrementally over time, making their policies relatively easy for voters to understand.

The results in this chapter, and in the previous chapter, have substantially extended knowledge of New Zealand political parties' policies. The next chapter studies how parties' overall positions have changed over time, and which dimensions have been most important at particular elections.

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156; Klaus von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1985), p. 132.

<sup>115</sup> Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 158; Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 315,316.

## Chapter Seven: Dimensions of Competition and Party Movement in New Zealand Politics

### 7.1 Introduction

In this chapter parties' positions on general left-right and economic left-right dimensions, and on a new politics-old politics dimension are studied. The results are used to compare historians' and political scientists' assessments of the positions of political parties with the results from manifesto data. From studying party movement it will be shown whether the results support convergence theories of party movement, or Robertson's theory that the main parties will usually remain ideologically distinct. It will also be possible to see if parties' positions are compatible with the responsible party government requirement that parties be responsive, yet still provide clear alternatives. In addition, the results will indicate when parties have signalled major changes in their policy direction, and when they have failed to do so. Since parties' policies are usually influenced by the beliefs of their supporters, they often provide unique insights into changes in public opinion.

The results for the new politics dimension will be particularly important because the previous chapter found such mixed results for the new politics categories, with some, such as the environment, considerably increasing in saliency, while others, such as culture, often being ignored by parties. Some old politics issues, such as political authority, have become less important, while others, such as social conservatism, have fluctuated in importance over time. From examining parties' positions on a new politics-old politics dimension this chapter will show whether parties have taken a stronger new politics position over time. By overlapping the differences between parties on the economic and new politics dimensions the results will reveal which dimension has been most important at dividing Labour from the main right-wing parties.

This chapter begins by discussing the factor analysis results, and describing the indexes used to measure parties' positions. The results for parties' positions on the left-right dimensions are then discussed, followed by

analysis of changes in parties' positions on the new politics-old politics dimension. Finally, the relative importance of the economic and new politics dimensions for dividing Labour from the main right-wing parties is studied.

## 7.2 Factor Analysis Results

Factor analysis was used to investigate which issues separated the main parties. Full details are in Appendix B of this thesis. The factor analysis results tended to generate dimensions which clearly measured elements of left-right and new politics-old politics divisions. However, because of distortions created by time effects the results were frequently different from those expected on the basis of the content analysis results and theoretical knowledge of New Zealand politics. The failure of factor analysis to generate the optimal possible dimensions is a common limitation of factor analysis that was discussed in section 3.3.2 of the literature review.

On the basis of the content and factor analysis results, and theories of cleavages, three indexes to measure parties' positions were constructed. The first two of these were left-right dimensions. The economic policy left-right dimension just included economic policy issues about the role of the state in the economy, such as the market economy, state intervention and welfare state expansion categories.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, the general left-right dimension also included national revolution foreign policy and conservative themes.<sup>2</sup> This index is similar to Laver and Budge's widely used left-right dimension,<sup>3</sup> indicating that

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<sup>1</sup> The right end of the economic issues index was calculated by adding together references to the market economy, economic constraint, and labour groups: negative categories. From this total was subtracted all references to the state intervention, social justice: economic, welfare state expansion and labour groups: positive categories.

<sup>2</sup> For the general left-right index the right end was calculated by adding together all references to the market economy, economic constraint, labour groups: negative, social conservatism (except national way of life: left-wing), political authority, military: positive, foreign special relations: positive, and freedom and human rights: non-economic categories. From this was subtracted all references to the state intervention, social justice: economic, welfare state expansion, labour groups: positive, national way of life: left-wing, peace and cooperation, and democracy categories.

<sup>3</sup> Laver and Budge, 'Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation', in Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J. Laver and Ian Budge (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 26-27.

the most divisive issues in New Zealand are much the same as those elsewhere in the world.

Because the general left-right index covers a much wider range of issues than the economic issues index it is a superior representation of overall policy differences between parties. Parties' references to predominantly non-economic categories such as social harmony also have some influence over their economic policies. The economic left-right index, however, is probably a better representation of how voters view parties' policies. This is because recent survey research has shown that New Zealand voters see non-economic issues as being somewhat different to economic policy and redistribution issues.<sup>4</sup>

The third index contrasted old politics, postmaterialist, or to use Inglehart's latest terminology, postmodernist, themes such as environmental protection, freedom and democracy, and peace and cooperation against old politics, materialist and modernist,<sup>5</sup> themes such as productivity and technology, military: positive and social conservatism.<sup>6</sup> There is some overlap between the general left-right and new politics-old politics dimensions because both Inglehart's and Kitschelt's slightly different theories of value change include many issues from existing cleavages. For instance, the inclusion of the peace and cooperation category meant that the new politics index included elements of long-standing divisions over foreign policy. However, the new politics-old politics dimension includes many issues, such as the environment, which are not included in the indexes for parties' left-right positions.

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<sup>4</sup> Jack Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 107-109.

<sup>5</sup> Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> The results for the new politics end of the index were calculated by adding together parties' references to the freedom and democracy, environmental protection, anti-growth economy, culture, women's issues, minority groups, Maori: positive, Pacific Islanders, multiculturalism: positive, traditional morality: negative, postmaterialism, and peace and cooperation categories. The old politics end of this index was calculated by adding together references to the social conservatism, political authority, productivity and technology, multiculturalism: negative, foreign special relations: positive, and military: positive categories.

### 7.3 Party Movement on the Left-Right Dimensions: 1911-1996

Table 7.1 shows the main parties' average positions on the general left-right and the economic left right dimensions, while Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show how parties' positions on these dimensions have changed over time. The dotted line at zero indicates a position where parties make the same number of references to left-wing policies as right-wing policies in their manifestos. Left and right-wing parties have almost always maintained separate positions, supporting Lipset and Rokkan's theory about the persistence of traditional cleavages.<sup>7</sup> The enduring differences between left and right-wing parties will have meant that voters will always have had a choice between different policy positions, while also making politics relatively easy for them to understand.

Table 7.1 shows that on the general left-right dimension between 1911 and 1928 Labour was very left-wing, with on average it making 59.1% more left-wing than right-wing policy statements in its election manifestos. Labour was only slightly more moderate on the economic left-right dimension. The results in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that Labour's policies were most extreme between 1911 and 1925, when it was heavily influenced by socialist principles. They strongly support the most authoritative interpretation of Labour's policies by Brown, who found that Labour then moved sharply towards the centre at the 1928 election, before making a smaller shift to the centre at the 1931 election. Labour's policies changed at these elections as it adopted more moderate social democratic and new liberal policies which were closer to the preferences of most voters.<sup>8</sup> Table 7.1 indicates that the categories included in the left-right dimensions make up a high proportion of the main parties' manifestos.

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<sup>7</sup> Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, edited by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 50.

<sup>8</sup> Bruce Brown, 'The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935' (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Victoria, University of Wellington, 1955), pp. 135, 218.

Table 7.1: The average position of the main parties on general and economic left-right dimensions

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
Position on general left-right dimension	-59.1 (20.5)	+18.1 (14.3)	+24.1 (19.2)
Proportion of manifesto in dimension	81.6 (5.2)	67.1 (6.5)	71.1 (10.3)
Position on economic left-right dimension	-53.0 (12.2)	-5.1 (11.7)	+0.5 (7.8)
Proportion of manifesto in dimension	60.4 (11.8)	39.6 (11.7)	38.2 (9.7)
1935-1996	Labour	National	
Position on general left-right dimension	-12.6 (11.9)	+16.9 (13.0)	
Proportion of manifesto in dimension	55.1 (10.6)	57.1 (10.6)	
Position on economic left-right dimension	-17.4 (10.7)	+3.33 (9.2)	
Proportion of manifesto in dimension	37.4 (7.0)	36.4 (6.1)	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
Position on general left-right dimension	-5.7 (6.9)	+14.2(12.4)	+5.4 (16.4)
Proportion of manifesto in dimension	54.8 (8.2)	52.8 (6.4)	48.1 95.2)
Position on economic left-right dimension	-10.7 (4.3)	+3.2 (10.0)	-2.9 (8.8)
Proportion of manifesto in dimension	34. (4.10)	34.6 (4.9)	28.3 (4.8)

Although the Labour Party's positions at early elections conforms to expectations, the Reform and Liberal Party results challenge existing views about their relative positions. This is because they show that on average on both dimensions Reform was to the left of the Liberals, whereas historians have placed them the other way around.<sup>9</sup> Table 7.1 shows that on the general left-right dimension on average Reform made 18.1% more right-wing than left-wing policy statements in its manifestos, whereas the Liberals made 24.1% more. On the economic dimension Reform was usually well left of centre, with on average it making 5.1% more left-wing than right-wing policy statements. In contrast, the Liberal Party was very near the centre, with it making only 0.5% more right-wing than left-wing policy statements. These results highlight the importance of conservative domestic and foreign policies in ensuring the Reform and Liberal parties' reputations for being right-wing, and the very strong influence of new

<sup>9</sup> R.M. Burdon, *The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand 1918-39* (Wellington: Reed, 1965), p. 3; Michael Bassett, *Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 251.

Figure 7.1: The main parties' positions on a general left-right dimension, 1911-1996





Figure 7.2: The main parties' positions on a economic issues left-right dimension, 1911-1996



liberal beliefs on their economic policies.

One very unexpected result is that at the 1919 election on the general left-right dimension the Liberal Party is only slightly more left of centre than Reform, while on the economic policy dimension it is slightly to the right of Reform. This is surprising because some, but by no means all, historians have argued that at this election the Liberal Party issued a very left-wing manifesto, which brought its policies close to those of the Labour Party.<sup>10</sup> Re-reading Ward's policy speech, however, indicates that the Liberal Party has been placed correctly. Probably some historians have misjudged the Liberal Party's overall position at this election because they have been misled by its plans for limited nationalisation. As a result they have missed the Liberal Party's high commitment to right-wing themes, such as economic constraint, and its relatively low emphasis compared to the other parties on welfare state expansion.<sup>11</sup>

Although the results for the 1911-1928 period challenge the dominant existing perceptions about the relative positions of the Reform and Liberal parties, they seem plausible. This is because historians such as Oliver and Gardner have long noted the moderation of Reform's policies.<sup>12</sup> These results also give some credence to accusations by business groups that Reform's policies verged on being socialist.<sup>13</sup> The Reform and Liberal parties' very moderate positions on economic issues help explain Labour's lack of electoral appeal during this period. Left-leaning historians have often regretted Reform's grip on power, arguing that it reversed the social and economic progress that had

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<sup>10</sup> Bassett, *Sir Joseph Ward*, p. 246; Bruce Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour* (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), p. 38. One exception is Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, revised edition (Auckland: Penguin, 1980), p. 243.

<sup>11</sup> Historians have sometimes attributed greater significance to the Liberal manifesto issued just after it left the coalition in August 1919 than to Ward's November speech. However, the Liberal Party's positions on both dimensions in the August manifesto are slightly further to the right than in Ward's November policy speech.

<sup>12</sup> W.H. Oliver, 'Problems and Prospects of Conservatism in New Zealand', *Impact*, Vol. 1 (1965), p. 19; W.J. Gardner, 'The Reform Party', in *Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics*, edited by Robert Chapman (Auckland: University of Auckland, 1961), p. 26. Indeed, W.J. Gardner, 'Reform Party', in *An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand*, Vol. 2, edited by A.H. McLintock (Wellington: Government Printer, 1966), pp. 810-811 acknowledges that there were always "leftward tendencies" within Reform which exerted a strong influence over the party's economic policies. However, he still concludes that Reform was essentially a party which supported right-wing economic interests.

<sup>13</sup> Michael Bassett, *Coates of Kaipara* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 108-109.

occurred under earlier Liberal governments. However, the results confirm Fairburn's belief that these historians have overlooked the more progressive elements of Reform's policies.<sup>14</sup>

Up to 1928 the results seem to conform to a pure rational choice model of party competition with the established Reform and Liberal parties taking relatively similar positions on both dimensions, while the new Labour Party converged towards the political centre. The Reform and Liberal Party results differ from Downs' model because he argues that parties cannot ideologically move past each other.<sup>15</sup> However, even though Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show Reform and the Liberals in relatively similar positions, chapters five and six showed that there were a number of differences in their policies. In particular, the results revealed that Reform emphasised the welfare state expansion, market economy, and social conservatism categories considerably more than the Liberal Party. In contrast the Liberal Party consistently emphasised economic constraint themes, and usually also political authority issues, more than Reform. These enduring policy differences indicate that the Reform and Liberal parties' policies were not as flexible as Figures 7.1 and 7.2 suggest.

At the 1931 election Labour again moved towards the centre, but the Coalition took strongly right-wing positions on both policy dimensions as it reacted to the onset of the Great Depression. Section 4.3.3 in chapter four noted that the Coalition issued its manifesto in two instalments at the 1931 election, with the results for the Coalition in this thesis being based on the average for the two documents. The Coalition's position in the first manifesto it issued, which is the one usually quoted by historians, is considerably more extreme. In contrast, the second Coalition manifesto, which Farland argues was Reform's draft manifesto, is much more moderate.<sup>16</sup> This suggests that if Reform had contested

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<sup>14</sup> Miles Fairburn, 'The Farmers Take Over', in *The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 185.

<sup>15</sup> Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), p. 122.

<sup>16</sup> Bruce Farland, *Coates' Tale* (Wellington: Bruce Farland, 1995), pp. 90, 187. Full details on the Coalition manifestos are given in the section on election programmes in the bibliography. The Coalition's first manifesto contains 29.4% more right-wing than left-wing policy statements on the economic policy dimension, and 94.1% more right-wing than left-wing on the general left-right dimension. The Coalition's second manifesto includes only 6.3% more right-wing than left-

the election by itself, which it probably would have easily won,<sup>17</sup> it would have followed much milder policies than the Coalition did.<sup>18</sup>

Turning to the results for the 1935-1996 period Table 7.1 shows that on the general left-right dimension on average National has made 16.9% more right-wing than left-wing policy statements in its manifestos. The results for the economic dimension show that on average over this period National has made only 3.3% more right-wing than left-wing policy statements. In contrast, during the same period Labour made 12.6 % more left-wing than right-wing policy statements on the general left-right dimension, and 17.4% more on the economic left-right dimension. Contrary to expectations these results indicate that National has been slightly more extreme than Labour on the general left-right dimension. However, they confirm that National is more moderate than Labour on economic issues.<sup>19</sup>

Comparing National's average position with those of the Reform and Liberal parties indicates that on the general left-right dimension National has been slightly more moderate than Reform, and considerably more moderate than the Liberal Party. In contrast, on the economic policy dimension National has been more right-wing than both the Reform and Liberal parties. This indicates that National has generally taken heed of claims by business groups during the 1920s and 1930s that the established parties were too left-wing.<sup>20</sup> Figure 7.2 shows, however, that during some periods, such as the 1970s, National has moved a considerable distance to the left, with its policies reflecting new liberalism rather than classical liberalism principles.

On average over the 1935-1996 period Labour has been more moderate than at earlier elections, although there have been some exceptions to this trend. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 weaken Sinclair's assertion that during the Second World

wing policy statements on the economic policy dimension, and 18.7% more right-wing than left-wing policy statements on the general left-right dimension.

<sup>17</sup> Farland, *Coates' Tale*, pp. 84-89; Gardner, 'Reform Party', pp. 810-811.

<sup>18</sup> Farland, *Coates' Tale*, pp. 109-110 notes that government economic policy became much more interventionist once Gordon Coates, who was Reform's leader, became Finance Minister in 1933. The same point is made even more strongly by Bassett, *Coates of Kaipara*, pp. 190-191.

<sup>19</sup> Barry Gustafson, 'The National Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 139; Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, revised edition, p. 290.

<sup>20</sup> Bassett, *Coates of Kaipara*, pp. 210-213; Farland, *Coates' Tale*, p. 130.

War Labour's policies became much more moderate,<sup>21</sup> with the results suggesting that Labour only slowly moved towards the political centre. In comparison, Chapman's finding that during the 1940s National accepted much of the essence of Labour's policies is supported. The results also confirm that National moved to the right at the 1949 election, when it successfully campaigned on the need to free up the economy.<sup>22</sup> At the divisive 1951 election ideological polarisation between Labour and National reached its peak.

Labour and National then converged during the rest of the 1950s, with this reflecting increasing national consensus. In line with expectations Labour's and National's policies were ideologically close from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s.<sup>23</sup> The only cross-over between Labour and National occurred at the 1975 election, when Labour was fractionally to the right of National on both the general and economic left-right dimensions.<sup>24</sup> This cross-over reflected not only National's left-leaning policy stance, but also a move to the right by Labour under a relatively right-wing leader.<sup>25</sup>

This convergence between Labour's and National's policies shows that end of ideology theories partially held for New Zealand until the mid-1970s. This result also provides some support for Downs' claim that in a system dominated by two main parties they will ideologically converge towards the position of the median voter.<sup>26</sup> However, this convergence was by no means constant, with polarisation sometimes increasing sharply. Since 1975 policy differences between Labour and National have also grown again. This supports Robertson's theory that although the desire to become the government encourages parties to converge, because of ideological commitments and the need to retain credibility with long-term supporters, left and right-wing parties usually remain distinct.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Keith Sinclair, *Walter Nash* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1976), p. 269.

<sup>22</sup> Robert Chapman, 'From Labour to National', p. 373.

<sup>23</sup> Austin Mitchell, *Politics and People in New Zealand* (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), p. 141; Jack Vowles, et al, *Towards Consensus?*, pp.3-4.

<sup>24</sup> Alan McRobie, 'The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 381, 386.

<sup>25</sup> John Henderson, *Rowling: The Man and the Myth* (Auckland: Australia and New Zealand Book Co, 1981), p. 91.

<sup>26</sup> Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 116.

<sup>27</sup> David Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition* (London: John Wiley, 1976), p. 64.

The very weak support for more extreme minor parties and interest groups during the 1960s and 1970s<sup>28</sup> indicates that voters favoured this convergence. National's very moderate position during this period, however, shows that it was failing to properly initiate and articulate right-wing policies and concerns. This is because there is agreement among most New Zealand economists that much faster deregulation of protected areas of the New Zealand economy was necessary by the 1970s, while by then inflation also needed controlling.<sup>29</sup> National's emphasis on such a consensual decision-making style hurt the New Zealand economy in the long-term, supporting claims by democratic elitists, and also by some advocates of responsible party government, that a very high emphasis by parties on responding to public concerns can have negative economic consequences.<sup>30</sup> This shows that responsiveness by parties is only compatible with good economic policies if parties take a long-term view of economic management, and avoid reactive strategies which will win them votes in the short-term. Similarly, voters need to take a long-term view of economic policy.

Comparing the positions of the main parties in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 with those for the minor parties in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 confirms that the short-lived Democrats took a very right-wing policy position at the 1935 election.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, at the 1943 election the Democratic Soldier Labour Party was at very similar positions to the Labour Party on both dimensions.

It would be unwise to assume that Social Credit's positions on the left-right dimensions at the 1954 and 1957 elections were perceived by voters to be as extreme as Figures 7.3 and 7.4 suggest. This is because the content analysis results in chapter five showed that most of Social Credit's manifestos at these elections were about monetary reform. Many of these sentences implicitly either

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<sup>28</sup> R. S. Milne, *Political Parties in New Zealand* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 37, 66-67.

<sup>29</sup> See, for example, Brian Easton, *In Stormy Seas*, pp. 179-185; Treasury, *Briefing to the Incoming Government* (Wellington: The Treasury, 1990), p. 159. The only economists not to support at least partial deregulation have been those influenced by Marxist theories. See, for instance, W. Rosenberg, *New Zealand Can Be Different and Better: Why Deregulation Does Not Work* (Christchurch: Monthly Review Society, 1993), p. 86.

<sup>30</sup> David Held, *Models of Democracy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 242; American Political Science Association, 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, Supplement (1950), pp. 19, 22.

<sup>31</sup> Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, revised edition, p. 269.

Figure 7.3: The minor parties' positions on a general left-right dimension, 1935-1996





Figure 7.4: The minor parties' positions on a economic left-right dimension, 1935-1996



promised greater state control of the banking system or made expenditure promises. From the 1960 election, when its monetary reform references were much lower, as expected Social Credit's position was very close to the centre of the political spectrum on both dimensions.<sup>32</sup> During the early 1970s Social Credit moved slightly left of centre, crossing over Labour on both dimensions at the 1975 election. It then stayed in a relatively similar position throughout the remainder of the 1970s and 1980s. At the 1972 election Values was only slightly left of centre, but by the 1975 election was well left of centre on both policy dimensions.

Looking back at Figures 7.1 and 7.2 again shows that Labour moved slightly to the left at the 1978 election. Labour then took a very centrist position at the 1981 election. This suggests that one reason why some Labour politicians, such as Roger Douglas, perceived Labour's promises as too expensive<sup>33</sup> were that their personal views were already moving to the right.<sup>34</sup>

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show National taking a slightly more right-wing position at the 1981 election, and then at the 1984 election moving further to the right on the economic policy dimension than it ever had before. These results are unexpected because political scientists and historians have argued that during the 1981-1984 period National followed a very interventionist policy direction, while government expenditure increased.<sup>35</sup> National's relatively right-wing 1981 manifesto position seems plausible, however, when it is considered how by the early 1980s there were deep differences within the National Party on economic policy, with many National MPs and much of the party organization advocating a more right-wing policy direction.<sup>36</sup> These results provide further evidence to support the position, previously commented on in section 5.3.1, that after 1981 National not only deviated from its traditional philosophical beliefs, but also

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<sup>32</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Democratic Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), p. 254.

<sup>33</sup> W. Hugh Oliver, 'The Labour Caucus and Economic Policy Formation, 1981-1984', in *The Making of Rogernomics* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1989), p. 25.

<sup>34</sup> Simon Collins, *Rogernomics: Is there a better way?* (Wellington: Pitman, 1987), pp. 12-13.

<sup>35</sup> G.A. Wood, 'The National Party' in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold, (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 292; Gary Hawke, 'Economic Trends and Economic Policy', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 438.

moved away from following the spirit of its manifesto.<sup>37</sup> This result suggests that even before Labour had become the government in 1984 the convention of the mandate had been significantly weakened.

National's 1984 position seems surprising, with Figures 7.5 and 7.6, indicating that at the 1984 election the neo-liberal New Zealand Party and National took almost the same position. However, large sections of National's manifesto were reprinted in newspaper advertisements, indicating that National's manifesto was still an authoritative statement of its policies.<sup>38</sup> When the Sunday Times summaries of National's policies were coded as an additional check they also placed National in a very similar position on the economic policy dimension. National's right-wing 1984 position reflected an attempt by its organisational wing to set a new long-term direction for the party.<sup>39</sup> By 1984 even National's leader Sir Robert Muldoon was being influenced by neo-liberal demands for a free market economy, with him advocating privatisation of Air New Zealand and Petrocorp during the election campaign.<sup>40</sup>

The results in Figure 7.6 show that at the 1984 election Labour took a slightly left of centre position on the economic policy dimension. The results support the belief that at the 1987 election Labour indicated a move to the left on economic policy in its manifesto. After the election, however, Labour introduced

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<sup>36</sup> Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History Of The New Zealand National Party (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), pp. 138-149.

<sup>37</sup> Hugh Templeton, All Honourable Men: Inside the Muldoon Cabinet 1975-1984 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 168, 172; Robert Chapman, 'Political Culture: The Purposes of Party and the Current Challenge', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), pp. 27-28; Jack Vowles, 'The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand', International Political Science Review, Vol. 16 (1995), p. 100.

<sup>38</sup> See, for instance, New Zealand National Party, 'New Zealand you're winning', Dominion, 27 June 1984, p. 7 and 30 June 1984, p. 7.

<sup>39</sup> Linley MacKenzie, 'Party 'bibles' lightweight', Waikato Times, 26 June 1984, p. 4 cites Sue Wood, the National Party's President, as stating that National's manifesto outlines its future direction.

<sup>40</sup> 'Air NZ sale under study', Waikato Times, 15 June 1984, p. 7.

Figure 7.5: Parties' positions on a general left-right dimension, 1984-1996





Figure 7.6: Parties' positions on a economic issues left-right dimension, 1984-1996



very right-wing economic policies, in the process further weakening the convention of the mandate.<sup>41</sup>

At the 1990 election National took one of its most right-wing positions. This is unexpected because most voters and political scientists believed that National was promising relatively mild policies.<sup>42</sup> Rechecking the results for individual categories from this manifesto showed that National is correctly placed on this graph. Probably the reason why voters subsequently felt that National moved away from its pre-election promises was that in contrast to earlier elections the focus of its campaign often differed from the tone of its election programme. For instance, National's campaigning was often centred on expensive promises such as its plan to abolish the superannuation surtax, while its campaign slogan was 'The Decent Society'.<sup>43</sup> In contrast, chapter five showed that National's election manifesto discussed the need to reduce government expenditure on areas such as social services.

Figures 7.5 and 7.6 confirm that at the 1990 election the breakaway NewLabour Party was considerably to the left of Labour. Similarly, at the 1990 election Social Credit moved considerably to the left of Labour on both policy dimensions. At the 1990 the Green Party, like Values at earlier elections, was also left of centre. However, because chapter five showed that Values and the Greens showed low support for many left-wing themes, such as the welfare state expansion and labour groups: positive categories, there were important differences between their economic policies and those of the traditional left-wing parties.

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<sup>41</sup> Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer, Voters' Vengeance: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 3. The full, much longer, version of Labour's 1987 manifesto that was only widely available after the election was considerably further to the right than the short pre-election manifesto included here in the graphs. This suggests that the main objection by right-wing Labour MPs to the long version of the manifesto was the reduction in autonomy its pre-election release would have involved, rather than over its general policy direction.

<sup>42</sup> Vowles and Aimer, Voters' Vengeance, p. 80; Jonathan Boston, 'The 1990 General Election: Economic Strategies', in The 1990 General Election: Perspectives on Political Change in New Zealand, edited by E.M. McLeay (Wellington: Department of Politics, Victoria University of Wellington), p. 80.

<sup>43</sup> Boston, 'The 1990 General Election: Economic Strategies', p. 86; Jonathan Boston and Paul Dalziel, 'Preface', in The Decent Society: Essays in Response to National's Economic and Social Policies, edited by Jonathan Boston and Paul Dalziel (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. iii.

Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show that at the 1993 and 1996 elections Labour, and National moved to the left, while the Alliance, and New Zealand First moved to the left at the 1996 election. Indeed, Figure 7.2 shows that on the economic dimension at the 1996 election Labour took its most left-wing position since 1925, in the process crossing over the Alliance. The swing by the main parties to the left at the 1996 election challenges Kitschelt's view that because of increasing global economic competition the political centre has been moving to the right in western democracies.<sup>44</sup> An important reason why New Zealand parties have moved to the left is that there has been high demand for additional expenditure on social services, partly as a consequence of the increased social need generated by economic restructuring.<sup>45</sup>

Although Labour's 1996 position might seem implausible, when its position on the economic left-right dimension was calculated for Helen Clark's leader's speech at the start of the election campaign the results also placed Labour in exactly the same place. This indicates that Labour's leap to the left, which was part of a Labour Party plan to draw back disenchanted left-wing voters,<sup>46</sup> was not confined to its manifesto.<sup>47</sup>

Figures 7.5 and 7.6 indicate that although at the 1993 election New Zealand First was in between Labour and National on both policy dimensions, its policies were closer to National's than to Labour's. In the mass distributed brochures that served as New Zealand First's 1996 manifesto it again positioned itself in between Labour and National. On the general left-right dimension at the 1996 election New Zealand First was slightly closer to National than to Labour.

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<sup>44</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 20.

<sup>45</sup> See section 5.3.3.

<sup>46</sup> Jack Vowles, 'A New Post-MMP Party System?', in *Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation*, edited by Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), p. 44.

<sup>47</sup> However, the coding scheme does not measure how Labour's long-term ideological commitments and the beliefs of its MPs have become much more moderate since the 1920s. The ideological proximity of Labour's 1925 and 1996 positions also only indicates that they were emphasising the same types of issues. Labour's 1996 manifesto does not seem as extreme as its 1925 manifesto because its move to the left in 1996 was largely due to its very high emphasis on reformist welfare state expansion and social justice references. In contrast, 14% of its 1925 manifesto was about nationalisation references that would probably have had a much greater effect on the economy. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the 1996 election was the first since the 1920s when Labour had placed such a high emphasis on pleasing its core supporters.

However, on the economic policy dimension, which is closer to how voters see parties' policies,<sup>48</sup> New Zealand First was much closer to Labour than to National. Compared to parties' positions during the 1970s and 1980s it was also well to the left of any party during that period. These results show why many New Zealand First voters were shocked by its decision to enter a coalition with National after the election. They also confirm that New Zealand First's decision to form a coalition with National marked a breakdown of the principles of democracy and accountability that it was formed to promote.<sup>49</sup>

Figures 7.5 and 7.6 also indicate that at the 1996 election the new ACT and Christian Coalition parties both took positions close to those taken by National at recent elections. The proximity of these parties to National's position shows why before the election National said that it would form a coalition with these parties if they won enough seats.<sup>50</sup>

The average polarisation between left and right-wing parties over the entire period has been 42.6% on the general left-right dimension, and 32.8% on the economic left-right dimension. In contrast to Downsian theory, overseas studies have found that in multiparty systems the distance between the most extreme parties is not influenced by the number of parties, or by electoral laws.<sup>51</sup> However, in New Zealand the increase in the number of significant parties at the 1990 and 1993 elections was associated with increased ideological polarisation. The introduction of proportional representation at the 1996 election coincided with a further increase in polarisation to the highest level since before the Second World War. Partly this was because proportional representation encouraged the formation of new parties such as ACT, and the coalescence of Christian parties into the Christian Coalition. There was also a perception among many

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<sup>48</sup> Vowles, et al., *Towards Consensus?*, pp. 107-109.

<sup>49</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The New Zealand First Party', in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 174. There was some warning of New Zealand First's move to the right. This is because its second policy statement, which it issued over the internet just before the election, was much closer to National's policy position on the economic policy dimension than to those of Labour and the Alliance. Even so, in its second policy statement New Zealand First was still well left of centre.

<sup>50</sup> NZPA, 'National rallies likely partners on Centre Right', *Dominion*, 27 April 1996, p. 2.

<sup>51</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert, and Ian Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 247; Paul Pennings, 'The Triad of Party System Change: Votes, Office and Policy', in *Comparing Party System Change*, edited by Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 86.

politicians, even surprisingly among the Labour leadership, that to be successful under proportional representation parties had to be more differentiated than in the past. This belief influenced the extent to which Labour moved to the left at the 1996 election.<sup>52</sup>

An increase in consensus in the future, or the realisation that an extreme position is electorally costly, could result in parties converging. This would mean that despite the increased number of parties there would be low polarisation again. Notably, although at the 1996 election National moved towards the political centre it lost far fewer votes than Labour. Because the magnitude of Labour's move to the left at the 1996 election was probably to its electoral cost,<sup>53</sup> this may encourage Labour to take a more centrist position in the future. Some of the minor parties may also struggle to survive in the long-term, and this could reduce polarisation. Indeed, the Christian Coalition broke up immediately after the 1996 election into its two constituent parties.

Although it would be desirable to compare voters' and parties' positions at every election, unfortunately only very recent survey research data on voters' left-right positions is available. Table 7.2 compares the positions of parties on the economic left-right dimension with the positions of their voters and candidates at elections between 1990 and 1996.<sup>54</sup> To make analysis easier all the positions are on a zero to ten scale.

For the 1990-1996 period the average position of parties is 4.3 compared to 4.5 for voters, indicating that parties were on average fractionally to the left of their voters. While over the 1990-1996 period all types of parties have sometimes been to the left of their voters, right-wing parties tended to be most to the left of their voters. In particular, at the 1996 election National and ACT were

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<sup>52</sup> Vowles, 'A New Post-MMP Party System?', p. 44; Fiona Barker, 'Party Policy Positioning: The New Zealand Labour Party In Opposition 1990-1996' (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1998), pp. 80-81.

<sup>53</sup> Vowles, 'A New Post-MMP Party System?', p. 44.

<sup>54</sup> The 1990 data on voters' positions comes from self-placement data in Vowles and Aimer, *Voters' Vengeance*, p. 89. Although Vowles and Aimer do not define 'left' and 'right' for respondents, the copy of their questionnaire on pp. 237-238 shows that this question had been preceded by a series of questions on economic and redistributive issues. The 1993 and 1996 data comes from the "Old Politics Issues" section 'Appendix C: Supplementary Tables', in *Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation*, edited by Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), p. 251.

considerably to the left of their voters, indicating that they gave a higher priority to pursuing the support of the median voter than pleasing their supporters. Parties also tend to be closer to the political centre than their voters are. These results mirror the findings by a study of voters' and parties' positions in Europe.<sup>55</sup> For the 1993 and 1996 elections data on the position of parties' candidates is also available. This data shows that the average position of parties' candidates was both more right-wing than the programme of the party they were standing for, and more right-wing than the average positions of their voters. On average parties' manifesto positions are closer to their voters' positions than to their candidates' average positions, indicating that programmes were designed more to attract support than to please their candidates.

Table 7.2: The positions of parties on the economic policy left-right dimension, and the average positions of their voters and candidates on economic issues according to survey research, between 1990 and 1996

	Position of parties	Position of voters	Position of candidates
1990 election			
Labour	4.7	4.3	-
National	5.6	6.1	-
NewLabour Party	3.6	4.5	-
Greens	4.8	4.8	-
1993 election			
Labour	4.1	3.6	3.4
National	4.9	5.0	7.2
NZF	4.6	3.7	3.1
Alliance	3.5	3.5	2.0
1996 election			
Labour	2.8	3.7	3.6
National	4.6	5.5	7.3
NZF	3.4	3.7	3.7
Alliance	3.3	3.2	1.7
ACT	5.4	6.2	7.9
Christian Coalition	4.9	4.7	5.3
Average position 1990-1996	4.3	4.5	-
Average position 1993-1996	4.2	4.3	4.5

All positions are on a zero to ten scale where high numbers are on the political right, and low numbers are on the left. The centre of the scale is at five.

<sup>55</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Party Positions and Voter Orientations', in *Citizens and the State*, edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),

#### 7.4 Party movement on the Old Politics-New Politics Dimension: 1911-1996

Turning now to the results on the new politics-old politics dimension, the ground-breaking results in Table 7.3 and Figure 7.7 provide several surprises. In particular, they show that during the 1911-1928 period Labour emphasised new politics themes more than might have been expected. However, in accordance with Inglehart's theory that left-wing parties are more receptive than right-wing parties to new politics postmaterialist ideas<sup>56</sup> the results show that Labour has usually emphasised new politics themes more than right-wing parties have.

Table 7.3: The average positions of the main parties on a new politics-old politics dimension

1911-1928	Labour	Reform	Liberal
Position on new politics dimension	10.0 (12.3)	-26.9 (20.8)	-28.0 (19.5)
Proportion of manifesto included in dimension	24.9 (7.6)	40.3 (15.6)	41.4 (14.0)
1935-1996	Labour	National	
Position on new politics dimension	0.6 (12.1)	-13.1 (13.9)	
Proportion of manifesto included in dimension	40.0 (10.5)	40.6 (9.0)	
1954-1990	Labour	National	Social Credit
Position on new politics dimension	3.1 (11.8)	-13.7 (13.4)	3.3 (11.1)
Proportion of manifesto included in dimension	46.5 (7.6)	46.8 (5.0)	47.1 (5.9)


During the 1911-1928 period Labour stands out for having the strongest new politics position, with on average it making 10.0% more new politics than old politics references. During this time period on average Reform made 26.9% more old politics references than new politics references, while the Liberal Party made 28.9% more. However, Figure 7.7 shows that there were dramatic variations in the positions of these parties over time.

Over the 1911-1928 period Labour took its strongest new politics positions at elections before 1919, with its position then moving towards the old politics end of the dimension. This early emphasis on new politics themes by Labour

pp. 194, 198-199.

<sup>56</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 278.

Figure 7.7: The main parties' positions on a new politics dimension, 1911-1996



reflects the idealistic concern of the party delegates who wrote its initial platforms with peace and cooperation themes, and with promoting individual self-development by making New Zealand more democratic and by improving civil liberties.<sup>57</sup> Labour's shift towards the new politics end of the dimension occurred because its references to new politics categories such as freedom and democracy fell. Chapters five and six also showed that throughout the 1920s Labour considerably increased references to materialist, conservative and authoritarian concerns that were of greater interest to its supporters. Figure 7.7 shows that Labour's quest for electoral success after the 1925 election<sup>58</sup> resulted in a particularly strong move towards old politics policy priorities at the 1928 election. This parallels its sharp move to the right on economic themes shown in Figure 7.2.

At the 1911 election Reform also took a strongly new politics stance. Reform then abandoned this position at subsequent elections, with the content analysis results showing that like Labour it emphasised materialist, conservative and political authority themes more. The Liberal Party took a firmly old politics position at all elections except those in 1922 and 1925, which were the only elections when they were not led by the charismatic Sir Joseph Ward.<sup>59</sup> The Liberals took a very centrist position at these elections, mainly because unlike other elections they made no political authority references. Although at the 1931 election Labour took its strongest old politics position ever, the Coalition's position was more moderate.

Over the 1935-1996 period on average Labour has made 0.6% more new politics references than old politics references in its manifestos. In contrast, on average National has made 13.1% more old politics than new politics references. Both parties' references have trended gradually upwards since the mid-1930s. This shows that despite the uneven pattern of value change on individual items,

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<sup>57</sup> Jack Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom?', in The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 16.

<sup>58</sup> Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, p. 96.

<sup>59</sup> Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, pp. 263-264.

the results support Inglehart's theory of a gradual switch towards new politics priorities in developed democracies.<sup>60</sup>

The switch to new politics priorities has been a slow process, and particularly for National there have been periods when there has been a reversion to old politics priorities. An important reason for this is that since the late 1930s New Zealand has consistently had one of the lowest economic growth rates among developed countries, and had the lowest in the OECD between the early 1960s and early 1990s.<sup>61</sup> This low growth rate is significant because Inglehart argues that formative economic affluence has the biggest influence on people's attitudes towards new politics issues, while current growth rates also have important effects.<sup>62</sup> As a result of New Zealand's low growth rate the change to new politics values could be expected to be less than in countries that have experienced higher growth rates.<sup>63</sup> Chapter six also showed that because of increasing crime rates concern about law and order, which in Inglehart's framework is an old politics priority, had become much more important over time.

In contrast to the results on the left-right dimensions, where with the exception of the 1975 election Labour and National remain distinct, on the new politics dimension their positions temporarily cross-over at the 1938, 1946 and 1960 elections. At other elections including 1949, 1963 and 1975 Labour and National's positions are also very close. The only periods when there have been big differences between Labour and National on the new politics-old politics dimension have been 1951-1957 and 1981-1990. These results, together with the cross over between Labour and the Coalition in 1931, suggest that left and right-wing parties are less constrained by their ideology on new politics issues than they are on old politics issues. This is probably because they have long-term historical commitments, based on differences in the social structure, to certain

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<sup>60</sup> Inglehart, *Culture Shift*, p. 55; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, p. 28.

<sup>61</sup> Francis Castles, *Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-war Transformation* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp. 30-33.

<sup>62</sup> Inglehart, *Culture Shift*, pp. 86, 162; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 257, 136-137.

<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, Brian Easton, *In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1997), pp. 23, 27 notes that real living standards have more than doubled in New Zealand since 1950.

types of policies on economic issues. In contrast many new politics issues, such as the environment, are not rooted in social divisions<sup>64</sup> and are potentially universal needs.<sup>65</sup> Even so, parties do not jump around in an opportunist fashion on new politics issues, with Robertson's modification to Downsian theory still having some applicability. Together with the restraints on changes in parties' positions on the left-right dimension this minimises the risk of voting cycles.<sup>66</sup>

Large differences emerged between Labour and National on the new politics dimension at the 1951 snap election, which was called by National in response to a crippling strike by waterfront workers. At this election chapter six showed that National campaigned on the need for strong government and the need to maintain civil order. In contrast, Labour increased its emphasis on postmaterialist themes. Figure 7.7 shows that a large Labour-National difference persisted on the new politics-old politics dimension throughout the 1950s. This difference was then temporarily reversed at the 1960 election, when National emphasised new politics themes more than Labour.

Figure 7.8 shows that both the Democrats and Democratic Soldier Labour Party took positions very near the centre on the new politics dimension. During the 1960s Social Credit's new politics references also tended to be significantly higher than either Labour's or National's. This reveals a hitherto unnoticed element of Social Credit's policies.<sup>67</sup>

During the 1960s and 1970s the established parties only adapted to the rise of new politics issues to a very limited extent, leaving considerable policy space available to Values. For instance, at the 1972 election in their manifestos Labour and National respectively made 10.9% and 0.2% more old politics than new politics references. In contrast, at the 1972 election Values made 47.9% more new politics than old politics references, sharply differentiating itself from the other parties. At the 1975 election Values took an even more extreme position,

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
<sup>64</sup> Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane, 'Introduction', in *Comparing Party System Change*, edited by Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 14.

<sup>65</sup> Masja Nas, 'Green, Greener, Greenest', in *The Impact of Values*, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 288.

<sup>66</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 254.

<sup>67</sup> Miller, 'The Democratic Party', p. 253 emphasises Social Credit's social conservatism during this period.

Figure 7.8: The minor parties' positions on a new politics - old politics dimension, 1935-1996



making 51.8% more new politics than old politics statements.

Figure 7.7 shows that during the 1970s Labour's references to new politics issues tended to be higher than National's. It is also likely that the National Party had much less credibility with middle class voters on new politics issues than Labour. This was because the increasingly authoritarian political style of Robert Muldoon, who was National's leader from mid 1974 to the end of 1984, was anathema to voters holding postmaterialist attitudes.<sup>68</sup>

The differences between Labour and National on new politics issues widened at the 1978 and 1981 elections. However, in contrast to claims that Labour targeted former Values supporters,<sup>69</sup> the increase in differences on new politics issues was mainly because National took a stronger old politics position. Probably Labour took only a slightly stronger new politics position because of a fear by its MPs that if Labour heavily emphasised new politics themes it was in danger of losing more of its core working class support to National.<sup>70</sup>

The Labour-National difference on the new politics-old politics dimension reached its maximum at the 1984 election, when National made 48% more old politics than new politics references. The content analysis results show that this reflected an attempt by National, which proved to be electorally unsuccessful, to campaign on materialist and authoritarian topics. Because of National's controversial development legislation, which had reduced protection of the environment and overridden usual legal and consultative procedures,<sup>71</sup> National also needed to de-emphasise these issues. Figure 7.8 shows that in contrast to National at the 1984 election the New Zealand Party took a position very near the centre on new politics issues.

Although Figure 7.7 shows that National's position rebounded towards the new politics end of the dimension after 1984, Labour still emphasised new

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<sup>68</sup> Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, p. 146; Tony Garnier and Stephen Levine, *Election '81: An End to Muldoonism?* (Auckland: Methuen, 1981), p. 20.

<sup>69</sup> Jack Vowles, 'Waiting for the Realignment: The New Zealand Party System, 1972-93', *Political Science*, Vol. 48 (1997), p. 204; Stephen Rainbow, 'New Zealand's Values Party: The Rise and Fall of the First National Green Party', in *Environmental Politics in Australia and New Zealand*, edited by Peter Hay, Robyn Eckersley and Geoff Holloway (Tasmania: Centre for Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 1989), p. 178.

<sup>70</sup> Mike Moore, *A Labour of Love* (Wellington: MMSC, 1993), pp. 49-50; Henderson, *Rowling: The Man and the Myth*, p. 143.

politics themes considerably more than National at the 1987 and 1990 elections. Indeed, at the 1990 election Labour took a stronger new politics position than at its previous peak in 1919. There was a further narrowing of the gap at the 1993 election, when Labour significantly reduced its new politics references in response to declining public concern with new politics issues such as the environment.<sup>72</sup> Labour then took a stronger new politics position at the 1996 election. This reflects its 1993 post-election leadership change that saw Mike Moore, who is socially conservative, replaced by Helen Clark, who is more socially liberal.<sup>73</sup> At the 1996 election National also increased its emphasis on new politics themes, with it making more new politics than old politics references for only the second time ever.

The minor party results in Figure 7.8 show the expected single-minded emphasis by the Green Party on new politics topics at the 1990 election,<sup>74</sup> with it making 87.3% more new politics than old politics references. At the 1990 election NewLabour and Social Credit both made just over 20% more new politics than old politics references. Together with their proximity on the general left-right dimension this provides a strong policy basis for NewLabour's and Social Credit's 1991 decision to form the Alliance. The large distance between these parties and the Greens on new politics themes also helps explain why the Greens' support for the Alliance was initially only provisional.<sup>75</sup>

The Alliance stood out for its strong support for new politics themes, with it making at the 1993 and 1996 elections respectively, 19% and 26% more new politics than old politics references. These results weaken Green Party claims that the Alliance did not accommodate its policies.<sup>76</sup> However, on the new

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<sup>71</sup> Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and Government (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 198-200.

<sup>72</sup> Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, pp. 102-105.

<sup>73</sup> Vowles, 'A New Post-MMP Party System', p. 44.

<sup>74</sup> Raymond Miller, 'The Minor Parties', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 318.

<sup>75</sup> Bruce Jesson, 'The Alliance', in New Zealand Politics in Transition, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 158.

politics dimension there was still a massive difference between the Alliance's policies and those of the Greens at the 1990 election. This suggests that there were sound policy reasons for the Green Party's decision to leave the Alliance and stand as a separate party at the 1999 election.

Figure 7.8 shows that New Zealand First's shift on economic issues has been paralleled by a sharp change in its new politics position. This is because whereas at the 1993 election it made more new politics than old politics references, at the 1996 election it took a strongly old politics position. At the 1996 election the Christian Coalition also made considerably more old politics than new politics references, while ACT was on the political centre.

These results confirm that at the 1996 election both New Zealand First and the Christian Coalition were attempting to attract the support of voters who held old politics attitudes.<sup>77</sup> Looked at historically, however, their positions seem very mainstream, and are similar to Labour's and National's during the early 1960s. This indicates that even New Zealand First and the Christian Coalition have been influenced by the swing towards new politics priorities. Although polarisation on the new politics dimension increased with the introduction of proportional representation at the 1996 election, it was less than in 1990 or 1984.

The centrist positions by the Democrats at the 1935 election, the New Zealand Party in 1984, New Zealand First in 1993, and National and ACT in 1996 show that in contrast to Kitschelt's and Inglehart's predictions<sup>78</sup> right-wing parties' positions on a new politics-old politics dimension are sometimes very moderate, or are even supportive of new politics policies. This is probably

<sup>76</sup> John Mitchell, 'Greens have high election hopes', *Daily News*, 3 April 1998, p. 2

<sup>77</sup> Colin James, 'Policies, Issues and Manifestos', in *From Campaign to Coalition: New Zealand's First General Election Under Proportional Representation*, edited by Jonathan Boston, et. al (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), p. 77; Stephen Rainbow and Simon Sheppard, 'The Minor Parties', in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 179-180.

<sup>78</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 2; Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 259-261; Paul Abramson and Ronald

because parties such as National, the New Zealand Party and ACT contain some middle class liberals and postmaterialists who are generally sympathetic to many new politics concerns.<sup>79</sup> As a result the Democrats, the New Zealand Party and ACT are best classified as right-libertarian parties. This means that they have more in common with the new neo-liberal parties in countries like Denmark and Sweden<sup>80</sup> than with central European right-authoritarian parties.<sup>81</sup> Because all parties have moved towards new politics policies this limits the potential for a permanent shift from a class-based to a materialist-postmaterialist voting alignment in New Zealand.

In Table 7.4 the positions of parties at the 1993 and 1996 elections are compared to those of their voters and candidates.<sup>82</sup> The results show that on average parties are less supportive of new politics policies than either their candidates or their voters. Parties are also almost invariably closer to the centre of the scale than their voters or candidates. This suggests the potential for electoral gains by parties if they moved closer to the median position of their supporters. However, unlike voters' preferences, parties' positions are always constrained by the need for their policies to be practicable.<sup>83</sup>

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Inglehart, Value Change in Global Perspective (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 1.

<sup>79</sup> Gustafson, The First 50 Years, pp. 182-183; Peter Aimer, 'The New Zealand Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1985), pp. 194, 196; Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, pp. 204-205.

<sup>80</sup> Peter Aimer, 'The rise of Neo-Liberalism and Right Wing Protest Parties in Scandinavia and New Zealand: The Progress Parties and the New Zealand Party', Political Science, Vol. 40 (1988), p. 2; Michael Mickenberg, 'The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-modernity', Government and Opposition, Vol. 35 (2000), p. 173.

<sup>81</sup> Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, p. viii; Piero Ignazi, 'New Challenges: Postmaterialism and the Extreme Right', in Developments in West European Politics, edited by Martin Rhodes, Paul Heywood and Vincent Wright (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997), p. 315.

<sup>82</sup> The 1993 and 1996 data comes from the "New Politics Issues" section 'Appendix C: Supplementary Tables', in Voters' Victory, p. 251.

<sup>83</sup> Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, p. 64.

Table 7.4: The positions of parties on the new politics-old politics dimension, and the average positions of their voters and candidates on a similar dimension according to survey research, between 1993 and 1996

	Party positions	Voter positions	Candidates positions
1993 election			
Labour	5.1	6.4	6.6
National	4.8	5.0	2.8
NZF	5.1	6.3	6.9
Alliance	5.9	6.5	8.0
1996 election			
Labour	5.7	6.3	6.4
National	5.2	4.5	2.7
NZF	3.9	6.3	6.3
Alliance	6.3	6.9	8.3
ACT	5.0	3.8	2.1
Christian Coalition	4.0	5.3	4.7
Average position 1993-1996	5.1	5.7	5.5

All positions are on a zero to ten scale where high numbers indicate strong support for new politics themes, and low numbers low support for new politics themes. The centre of the scale is five.

### 7.5 Comparing the Importance of the Main Dimensions: 1911-1996

The difference between Labour and the largest right-wing parties on economic and new politics-old politics dimensions are shown in Figure 7.9. Because different dimensions are important to different people<sup>84</sup> the results do not show which dimension had the most influence on voting behaviour. However, it will be possible to tell to what extent variations in voting behaviour noted by historians and political scientists are consistent with differences between the main parties' campaign messages in their election programmes.

Over the 1911-1928 period the solid black and grey lines in Figure 7.9 respectively show the differences between Labour's and Reform's positions on economic and new politics dimensions. Similarly, for the 1911-1928 period the dotted black and grey lines respectively show the difference between Labour's

<sup>84</sup> Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, 'The Potentiality of Dimensional Analyses for Explaining Voting and Party Competition', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 6 (1978), p. 205.

and the Liberal Party's positions on economic and new politics dimensions. These results indicate that during this period policy differences between Labour and the Reform and Liberal parties were always greater on economic issues than on new politics topics. However, at some elections, such as 1914 and 1919, the difference between Labour and Reform on new politics issues was almost as great as on economic issues. Similarly, at the 1928 election the differences between Labour and the Liberals were almost as large on the new politics dimension as on the economic issues dimension.

Together with the results in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, which show the moderate positions of the Reform and Liberal parties on economic issues, these findings help explain Labour's lack of electoral appeal, even to many manual workers, until the electorate was radicalised by the economic crises of the 1930s. This is because they show that new politics issues frequently constituted an important secondary cleavage. The Reform and Liberal parties would have benefited electorally from their popular old politics positions on conservative domestic and foreign policy themes, and on productivity and technology. The results in this chapter provide a broader explanation than alternative theories, such as high home ownership rates, for low Labour Party support during this period.<sup>85</sup>

A black square and circle respectively indicate the results for the difference between Labour and the Coalition on economic and new politics dimensions at the 1931 election. Because the circle is below the zero line this indicates that at the 1931 election the Coalition made more references to new politics themes than Labour.


With the exception of the 1957 election the difference between Labour and National was always greater on economic than new politics issues between 1935 and 1969. However, between the 1972 and 1990 elections there was always a bigger difference between Labour and National on the old politics-new politics dimension than on the economic dimension. This suggests that Lipset and Rokkan's theory about the dominance of the class cleavage<sup>86</sup> holds for New

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<sup>85</sup> Miles Fairburn, 'Why did the New Zealand Labour Party Fail to Win Office until 1935', *Political Science*, Vol. 37 (1985), p. 122.

<sup>86</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', pp. 20-21, 46, 50.

Figure 7.9: Importance of the difference between Labour and the main right-wing parties on economic and new politics cleavages, 1911-1996



Zealand until the 1970s, but that thereafter the new politics dimension was usually more important at ideologically dividing the largest parties.

The large gap between Labour and National on the new politics-old politics dimension, together with the smaller difference on the economic policy dimension, helps explain why many middle class liberals from traditionally National Party backgrounds supported Labour rather than National during this period.<sup>87</sup> Because no multivariate analysis of new politics and old politics beliefs on voting behaviour is available for the 1970s, these results are extremely valuable. The wide gap between Labour and National on the new politics dimension at the 1981 election supports the view that National's support for the controversial and divisive 1981 Springbok rugby tour was a decisive factor in its very narrow election victory that year.<sup>88</sup> Similarly, the results are compatible with Vowles' finding that Labour's anti-nuclear policy was critical to its victories at the 1984 and 1987 elections.<sup>89</sup>

From 1978 to 1984 the policy differences between Labour and National on both the economic and the new politics-old politics dimensions grew. Ideological polarisation then fell at the 1987 election. At the 1990 election the Labour-National difference on new politics issues was considerably greater than on the economic dimension. This supports survey research by McAllister and Vowles that found that social liberalism was particularly important at influencing voting behaviour at the 1990 election.<sup>90</sup>

Since 1990 differences between Labour and National on the new politics dimension have fallen, while at the 1996 election there was a substantial increase in differences on the economic issues dimension. As a result at both the 1993 and 1996 elections economic policy differences were again most important at differentiating Labour and National. A study using aggregate census data has

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<sup>87</sup> Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom?', p. 24; Colin James, *New Territory: The Transformation of New Zealand 1984-1992* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1992), p. 239.

<sup>88</sup> McRobie, 'The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991', p. 398; Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, p. 144.

<sup>89</sup> Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom?', p. 27; Jack Vowles, 'Nuclear Free New Zealand and Rogernomics: the Survival of a Labour Government', *Politics*, Vol. 25 (1990), p. 87.

<sup>90</sup> Ian McAllister and Jack Vowles, 'The Rise of New Politics and Market Liberalism in Australia and New Zealand', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24 (1994), p. 395.

also found traditional economic cleavages had the greatest influence on voting at the 1993 election.<sup>91</sup> Research on the 1996 election also suggests that economic and welfare concerns were most important.<sup>92</sup>

Changes in the policy differences between Labour and National on the economic dimension are poorly related to changes in class voting.<sup>93</sup> One reason for this is that other factors such as long-term party identification, organisational memberships and party leadership also influence voting behaviour. Class dealignment, particularly during the 1975-1990 period, also occurred because of the increasing difference between Labour and National on the new politics dimension. This was because Labour's stronger new politics position attracted traditional middle class National votes to Labour, while pushing traditional working class Labour voters towards National.<sup>94</sup> This partly realigned the support bases of the main parties, at least temporarily.

## 7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter parties' positions were studied both on general and economic policy left-right dimensions, and on a new politics-old politics dimension. On the left-right dimensions the results confirmed that while Labour was initially extreme, to try and increase its support from the 1928 election onwards Labour was much more moderate. Unexpectedly on a economic policy dimension Reform emerges as a moderate, slightly left of centre party, while as expected the Liberals take a very centrist position. On a general left-right dimension the high emphasis by these parties on conservative themes pushes them to the right. The results showed that the Labour and National parties converged from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s, with National's shift to the left

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<sup>91</sup> Vowles, 'Waiting for the Realignment? The New Zealand Party System, 1972-1993', p. 195.

<sup>92</sup> Richard Johnson, 'Issues, Leaders, and the Campaign', in Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), p. 73.

<sup>93</sup> See, Jack Vowles, 'A New Post-MMP Party System?', in Voters' Victory: New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation, edited by Jack Vowles, et al. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), p. 34 for changes in class voting.

<sup>94</sup> James, New Territory, p. 239; Jack Nagel, 'Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalization in New Zealand', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28 (1998), p. 237.

showing that it was failing to develop appropriate economic policies. Since the 1975 election Labour and National have diverged, with them both frequently taking more traditional policy positions. Social Credit moved to the left over time, while Values and the Greens were both on the left on the left-right dimensions. The movement results support Robertson's revised model of party competition, rather than Downs' original model, with the main parties usually keeping their distance from each other.

Parties usually seem to have signalled their subsequent policy line reasonably accurately. However, the results indicate that the interventionist policies National followed after the 1981 election were sharply at variance with its manifesto policy position. Similarly, at the 1984 and 1987 elections Labour did not signal the right-wing policy direction it followed in government. While at the 1990 election National indicated a right-wing policy direction in its manifesto, the effects of this were negated by other campaign messages which suggested a more moderate policy direction. New Zealand First's relatively left-wing position on economic issues at the 1996 election shows why many of its voters were shocked by its decision after the election to enter a coalition with the National Party.

The results for party movement on the new politics-old politics dimension indicate that although Labour and Reform initially heavily emphasised new politics themes, they then downplayed them to increase their popularity. Since the early 1930s Labour and National have tended to move towards the new politics end of the new politics-old politics dimension, but this process has been very slow. Although Labour has usually emphasised new politics issues considerably more than right-wing parties, there has also been some crossover between them. Contrary to Inglehart's and Kitschelt's theories, minor right-wing parties sometimes take very moderate positions on the new politics-old politics dimension, showing that they do not necessarily oppose value shift.<sup>95</sup> The postmaterialist Values and Green parties naturally take very strong new politics positions on the new politics-old politics dimension.

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<sup>95</sup> Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, p. 2; Inglehart, *Culture Shift*, pp. 259-261; Abramson and Inglehart, *Value Change in Global Perspective*, p. 1.

The persistent differences between different types of parties on left-right and new politics-old politics cleavages will have made it easy for even poorly informed voters to vote in a rational way. The constraints on party movement will also have minimised the risk of voting cycles.<sup>96</sup> These results indicate that parties have usually campaigned in ways which make responsible party government possible.

Comparisons of the overall differences between Labour and the main right-wing parties show that there have usually been bigger differences between them on the economic policy dimension than on the new politics dimension. The results, however, show that new politics issues were more important at dividing Labour and National between the 1972 and 1990 elections. At the 1993 and 1996 elections the economic policy dimension again became most important.

This chapter and the previous two have examined differences in parties' policies, and how they changed over time. The next chapter takes a slightly different direction by studying changes in the length of parties' election programmes, and how these changes are related to parties' attitudes towards democracy.

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<sup>96</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 254.

## Chapter Eight: The Length of Election Manifestos

### 8.1 Introduction

Studying changes in the length of election programmes is important for understanding politicians attitudes towards mandate theory, interest groups, and the role of the state in the economy. When Robertson examined changes in the length of New Zealand election manifestos between the mid 1940s and the early 1980s he found that they had been becoming longer over time.<sup>1</sup> Overseas studies have argued that election programmes become longer as parties' policies become less ideological, expectations of the state increase, and society becomes less homogenous.<sup>2</sup> The acceptance of the convention that parties should make pre-election promises to the electorate would also appear to be significant.

Since the 1980s New Zealand political parties' manifestos have usually been shorter than in the past.<sup>3</sup> This has at least partially reflected elitist attitudes towards democracy among politicians, which have resulted in them wanting maximum autonomy once in government.<sup>4</sup> Data collected by this thesis makes it possible to accurately see how the length of parties' manifestos has varied over time.

### 8.2 Changes in the Length of Election Manifestos

Figure 8.1 is a graph of the length of the main parties' manifestos between 1911 and 1996. Manifesto lengths are measured by the number of quasi-sentences they contain. Usually each sentence in a manifesto counted as a quasi-

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<sup>1</sup> David Robertson, 'Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 1946-1981, an initial comparative analysis', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference?, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 55; Richard Topf, 'Party manifestos', in Labour's Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond, edited by Anthony Heath, et al., (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994), p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', in The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Martin Holland and Jonathan Boston (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1990), p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> Margaret Wilson, Labour in Government 1984-1987 (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1989), p. 134.

sentence, although when different topics were referred to in the same sentence each topic made up a separate quasi-sentence. Because the length of manifestos has varied from less than fifty sentences to several thousand the length scale is logarithmic. This means that each interval on the scale measures a tenfold increase in the length of manifestos.

Figure 8.1 shows that the longest programmes at early elections were Sir Joseph Ward's leader's speech at the start of the Liberal Party's 1911 and 1914 election campaigns. Both these speeches were just over 400 quasi-sentences long. Ward's speeches were long because of his attempt to appeal to all social and economic groups, and his preference for vagueness over concrete policies.<sup>5</sup> This is a case where the length of a party's manifesto has not been an indicator of support for the norms of responsible party government. In contrast, Labour's and Reform's election manifestos were much shorter. Indeed, Reform's 1911 platform, which was only 27 quasi-sentences long, was the shortest programme collected by this study. The brevity of Reform's and Labour's manifestos probably reflects the more distinct constituencies they were trying to appeal to. As a result they had fewer policy areas to cover, and could afford to be more direct. However, the results are somewhat deceptive as both Reform and Labour politicians elaborated on their early platforms, although not to the same extent as Ward did.<sup>6</sup>


The length of Ward's speeches were heavily criticised by Reform politicians and many newspapers, who argued that it was indicative of the way

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<sup>5</sup> Michael Bassett, *Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 246.

<sup>6</sup> At the 1911 election Massey's speech when he launched Reform's platform covered three quarters of a page in the *Dominion*, which supported Reform, whereas Ward's campaign speech took up two pages in the *New Zealand Times*, which supported the Liberal Party. Reports on speeches by Labour politicians in papers supporting Labour tended to be very short. See, for instance, 'Dominion Doings: Special Reports of the Movement in the Centres', *Maoriland Worker*, November 12 1911, p. 12.

Figure 8.1: The length in quasi-sentences of the main parties' election manifestos, 1911-1996



in which he was trying to bribe voters.<sup>7</sup> Figure 8.1 suggests that Ward responded to these criticisms, with his 1919 leader's speech being much shorter than his earlier ones. Under new leaders at the 1922 and 1925 elections the Liberals issued very short programmes aimed at maintaining its remaining support in less prosperous rural areas.<sup>8</sup> Despite the return of Ward as Liberal Party leader at the 1928 election his speech was relatively short. This may have reflected Ward's declining stamina: he was 72 years old at the time of the 1928 election, and suffered a diabetic blackout during his leader's speech that left him unaware of both his surroundings and exactly what he was promising.<sup>9</sup>

Reform's 1914 election manifesto was several times the length of its 1911 platform, suggesting that to maintain its support it had to cover a wider range of issues. After 1914, however, the length of its manifestos grew very slowly. An important reason for this was that its leaders were resistant to increasing the size of government, which they associated with the number of commitments parties made.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, taxation as a proportion of national output was no higher when Reform was defeated in 1928 than when it had first formed a government in 1912.<sup>11</sup> Since Reform had criticised the length of the Liberal Party's manifestos further growth in the length of its manifestos would also have reduced its credibility.

Until the 1920s Labour's election programmes remained very short because it continued to campaign on its brief long-term platform. The length of Labour election programmes rose sharply at the 1922 and 1925 elections when in its

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<sup>7</sup> For instance, in The Man and the Policy: Sound, Progressive and Liberal (Reform, 1919), p. [2] Reform stated that it had "no intention of attempting to outbid other competitors for the favour of the electors". Similarly, in General Election, 1928: Prime Minister's Manifesto (Reform, 1928), p. [1] Reform reiterated its 1925 promise to limit the number of pledges it made. The pro-Reform Dominion was particularly critical of the number and cost of Liberal Party promises. See, 'Back To Old Ways', editorial, Dominion, 18 October 1928, p. 10 for a review of its past attacks on the length of Liberal programmes.

<sup>8</sup> R.M. Chapman, The Political Scene 1919-1931 (Auckland: Heinemann, 1969), pp. 20, 26.

<sup>9</sup> Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, p. 266; R.M. Burdon, The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand 1918-1939 (Wellington: Reed, 1965), pp. 120-121.

<sup>10</sup> Reform, General Election, 1928: Prime Minister's Manifesto (Reform, 1928), p. [4].

<sup>11</sup> Michael Bassett, The State In New Zealand 1840-1984: Socialism Without Doctrines (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), p. 15; Knox Lovell, and Johanna Branson, Working Papers on Monitoring the Health of the Tax System: A Growth Maximising Tax Structure for New Zealand (Wellington: Inland Revenue Department, 1997), Table 12.

manifestos it attempted to explain and justify its controversial policies in areas such as land nationalisation.<sup>12</sup> Labour then issued shorter manifestos at the 1928 and 1931 elections when it stripped its policies down to narrower and more moderate measures, that were harder for critics to quote out of context.<sup>13</sup> At the 1931 election the Coalition also issued a short manifesto because the onset of the great depression made it reluctant to make any promises involving expenditure.<sup>14</sup>

Figure 8.1 shows that from 1935 until the early to mid-1980s there was a tendency for Labour and National Party manifestos to grow longer over time. Indeed, the growth in the length of Labour's manifestos is statistically best modelled as trending upwards between 1911 and 1981. Similarly, the rate of increase in the length of National's manifestos is best statistically modelled by combining National's manifestos with Reform's manifestos and the Coalition's 1931 programme. Curve fits show that the growth in the length of Labour's manifestos and those for Reform's, the Coalition's and National's manifestos added together strongly resemble exponential and power relationships.<sup>15</sup> This indicates that Labour's manifestos and the combined manifestos of the main right-wing party at each election tended to grow at a faster and faster rate over time between 1911 and 1981.

During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s there were frequent short term deviations from the trend for the length of Labour and National manifestos to increase over time. In particular, during the early 1950s Labour's manifestos were often significantly shorter than they had been at some earlier elections. This may have reflected Labour's growing conservatism towards change, which some newspapers argued left it short of policy ideas.<sup>16</sup> The 1951 snap election probably also contributed to the decline in the length of Labour's manifesto at

<sup>12</sup> Bruce Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour* (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), p. 71-73.

<sup>13</sup> Brown, *The Rise of New Zealand Labour*, pp. 90-91; Barry Gustafson, *From the Cradle to the Grave: A Biography of Michael Joseph Savage* (Auckland: Penguin, 1988), p. 133.

<sup>14</sup> 'Purpose of Coalition Sound Financial Basis: Lower State Expenditure', *New Zealand Herald*, 17 November 1931, p. 11.

<sup>15</sup> The exponential equation for Labour is  $y=24.136 * 10^{0.023x}$ , with an  $R^2$  of .809. The exponential equation for Reform, Coalition and National combined is  $y=24.993 * 10^{0.025x}$ , with an  $R^2$  of .919. In these equations  $x$  is the last two digits of the year. For instance, to calculate the expected length of manifestos in 1960  $x$  would be 60. Modelling these relationships as a power relationship has no significant effect on the  $R^2$ .

that election. National's manifestos also sometimes declined in length, although less often. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, both Labour's and National's manifestos were longer at every election than at the election before.

Matching up the results in Figure 8.2, which shows the length of minor parties' manifestos, with those in Figure 8.1 shows that minor parties' manifestos have generally been about the same length as Labour's and National's. The main exception is that the Democratic Party's manifesto at the 1935 election was considerably shorter than either Labour's or National's. During the 1960s and 1970s Social Credit followed the move by the main parties to ever longer manifestos. In 1972 Values' manifesto was a similar length to those of the established parties, but its 1975 manifesto was slightly longer than any other party's.

The main reasons why the programmes of the main parties grew in length between the 1910s and the late 1970s were a high commitment among politicians and voters to mandate theory and to a belief in the desirability of an active state. During this period there was widespread acceptance of the belief that politicians should be responsive to the wishes of voters and interest groups.<sup>17</sup> An active state which regulated, encouraged and fine-tuned the economy was also seen by both left-wing and right-wing parties as promoting the common good.<sup>18</sup> These two beliefs resulted in manifestos becoming very detailed and exact in traditional policy areas. From the 1960s New Zealand parties added new politics sections to their manifestos as issues such as the environment, multiculturalism, and women's rights also came onto the political agenda.<sup>19</sup>

The unbroken increase in the length of Labour's, National's, and Social Credit's election programmes between 1963 and 1978 probably also reflected ideological convergence, which was discussed in the previous chapter, together


<sup>16</sup> 'Labour's Mixture as Before', *New Zealand Herald*, 2 November 1949, p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', pp. 13-14; Robert Chapman, 'Political Culture: The Purposes of Party and the Current Challenge', in *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), p. 17.

<sup>18</sup> Bassett, *The State in New Zealand 1840-1984*, pp. 12-14; Simon Collins, *Rogernomics: Is There a Better Way?* (Wellington: Pitman, 1987), p. 21.

<sup>19</sup> Barry Gustafson, 'The National Government and Social Change', in *The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 287.

Figure 8.2: The length in quasi-sentences of the minor parties' election manifestos, 1935-1990



with tight electoral competition. As a result ignoring any interest group in a manifesto could be electorally disastrous. Issuing a detailed manifesto also became crucial to establishing the credibility of a minor party.<sup>20</sup> Revision of a long manifesto was also a mammoth task, encouraging parties to make incremental changes and additions to an existing text rather than start anew before each election.<sup>21</sup> The very sharp increase in the length of Labour's manifestos at the 1978 and 1981 elections was caused by the demands of a new generation of middle class party activists who wanted to shape public policy.<sup>22</sup>

The accelerating rate of increase in the length of manifestos between the 1930s and the 1970s might seem to give credence to the elitist view that elections became auctions, with parties recklessly trying to "outdo each other with competing promises to spend the taxpayers' money".<sup>23</sup> Certainly, government expenditure and taxation increased rapidly while Labour was in government between 1935 and 1949, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). Although total government expenditure continued to increase during the 1950s and 1960s, when National was in government for all except the 1957-1960 period, it was only in the late 1970s, when the economy slowed, that government expenditure again began to grow as a share of GDP.<sup>24</sup> Even then this growth was less than commonly assumed. This indicates that any growth in the size of government between the 1950s and the mid 1970s occurred through increased regulation and fine tuning of the economy rather than an increase in the proportion of national income it consumed.<sup>25</sup> As a result growth in the length of manifestos is poorly correlated with the proportion of GDP consumed by the central government.

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<sup>20</sup> Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', p. 12.

<sup>21</sup> John Marshall, Memoirs, Volume One: 1912 to 1960 (Auckland: Collins, 1983), p. 292; Jim Eagles and Colin James, The Making of a New Zealand Prime Minister (Sydney: Cheshire, 1973), p. 107.

<sup>22</sup> Wilson, Labour in Government 1984-1987, p. 40.

<sup>23</sup> Bassett, The State In New Zealand 1840-1984, p. 14.

<sup>24</sup> New Zealand Planning Council, Public Expenditure and its Financing: 1950-1979 (Wellington: New Zealand Planning Council, 1979), pp. 33-37.

<sup>25</sup> Gary Hawke, The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 300-306.

The longest manifesto collected by this study was Labour's 1981 programme. This manifesto was just over 4000 sentences long, and was physically larger than most telephone books. By 1981, National's and Social Credit's manifestos had both fallen slightly from their 1978 peaks. However, it was only at the 1984 election that the length of their manifestos fell substantially. Although it was National's leader, Sir Robert Muldoon, who called a surprise snap election in June 1984, Labour was the only party even partly ready for an election, and its manifesto was still incomplete.<sup>26</sup> The scramble by political parties to prepare manifestos for the 1984 election resulted in every party's manifesto except Labour's being much shorter than manifestos had been since the 1950s.


Figure 8.3 shows the length of all parties' manifestos between 1984 and 1996. Comparing it with the previous two graphs shows that since the 1984 election parties' manifestos have usually been much shorter than they had been during the 1960s and 1970s. Labour has been the main exception to this trend with it issuing long election manifestos at the 1990 and 1993 elections. At the 1996 election, however, National had the longest election programme. Indeed, Figure 8.3 shows that at the 1996 election National's manifesto, which contained just over 600 quasi-sentences, was more than twice as long as any other party's manifesto.

The trend to shorter manifestos since the early 1980s reflects several influences, with these often varying between parties. One factor that has contributed to manifestos being shorter has been the acceptance among many politicians, particularly those with right-wing beliefs, of elitist models of democracy. By the early 1980s many Labour politicians were supporting elitist versions of democracy. For instance, Roger Douglas argued that Labour had lost credibility at the 1981 election by making large numbers of seemingly contradictory promises when the economy was in a weak state. Douglas and other elitists within Labour argued that politicians should make minimal

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<sup>26</sup> Wilson, *Labour in Government 1984-1987*, p. 28; Barry Gustafson, *The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party* (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), pp. 153-155; Linley MacKenzie, 'Party "bibles" lightweight', *Waikato Times*, 26 June 1984, p. 4; 'Sticking to policy', *Waikato Times*, 28 June 1984, p. 3.

Figure 8.3: The length in quasi-sentences of all parties' election manifestos, 1984-1996



promises before the election, and once in power they should follow policies which were in the best interests of the country.<sup>27</sup>

The ascendancy of this elitist view of democracy within the Labour Party before the 1987 election was the main reason why it issued such a short manifesto, with general distribution of the full policy statement being held back until after the election to reduce its significance.<sup>28</sup> During Labour's second term elitist beliefs about democracy and government overload were institutionalised in legislation that reduced the power of governments by corporatising and privatising many former government departments. As a result decisions over issues such as investment and prices in areas like telecommunications are now made by the private sector, rather than by politicians. Public sector reforms have also limited the power of Ministers to interfere in the day to day policies of their departments, with greater power being devolved to chief executives.<sup>29</sup> The conciseness of parties' manifestos indicates that there is little desire to return to day to day political intervention in these areas.

Chapter two discussed how during Labour's second term the elitist beliefs of many of its cabinet Ministers resulted in them breaking many of the promises Labour had made in its very short 1987 manifesto. Similarly, after National's 1990 election victory it broke many of its policy commitments, arguing that now that it knew about the severity of the economic situation different policies were required. These breaches of promises have resulted in very high levels of distrust of politicians.<sup>30</sup> For instance, at the 1990 and 1993 elections Labour's pre-election commitments were described by some newspapers as unaffordable, and

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<sup>27</sup> W. Hugh Oliver, 'The Labour Caucus and Economic Policy Transformation, 1981 to 1984', in The Making of Rogernomics, edited by Brian Easton (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1989), pp. 26-27; Roger Douglas, Toward Prosperity (Auckland: Bateman, 1987), p. 24.

<sup>28</sup> Anthony Hubbard, 'Broken Promises', Listener, 16 April 1990, p. 20.

<sup>29</sup> Richard Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1994), pp. 133, 145; Jonathan Boston, et al., Public Management: The New Zealand Model (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 4.

<sup>30</sup> Jack Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 132-133; Jack Vowles, 'The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand', International Political Science Review, Vol. 16 (1995), p. 102.

were regarded by many voters as unachievable.<sup>31</sup> Although there is now greater support for mandate theory within a number of parties, including Labour and National, they have been careful not to be seen to be making too many pre-election commitments. This is so that after the election they can keep those promises they do make.<sup>32</sup>

As well as the rise of elitist beliefs and the emergence of cynicism among voters, election programmes have become shorter because of the discovery that a brief manifesto can be more effective for attracting undecided voters than a longer programme. This is because it can be more easily distributed to voters, and is more likely to be read by them. For instance, at the 1993 election the Alliance found that its brief free manifesto was very well received by voters. In contrast, the Labour Party President noted that its long and expensive to buy manifesto had not been suitable for mass distribution.<sup>33</sup> The decline in respect for politicians, the proliferation of the number of political parties, and changes in political reporting styles towards stories based on opinion poll data has meant that since the late 1980s detailed summaries of the main parties' manifestos are no longer printed in newspapers. Television and radio news has also become more questioning of politicians, and less likely to simply broadcast what they say. This has reduced the agenda setting power of the main parties through the mass media.<sup>34</sup> The realisation that a short manifesto can be more effective than a

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<sup>31</sup> Denis Welch, 'Lights on, nobody home', *Listener*, 29 October 1990, p. 5; Simon Collins, 'PM unveils Labour manifesto', *New Zealand Herald*, 12 October 1990, p. 4; Warren Freer, 'Major parties forfeit any claim to respect', *New Zealand Herald*, 31 May 1993, p. 8; Vernon Small and Stephen Harris, 'Labour's Hidden Costs', *National Business Review*, 15 October 1993, pp. 18-19; Ruth Laugesen, 'Labour plans to cut spending to pay for election promises', *Dominion*, 15 October 1993, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> See, for instance, Jim Bolger, *A View From the Top* (Auckland: Viking, 1998), pp. 126-127; 'United Labour scents election win', *Dominion*, 24 November 1997, p. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Dave MacPherson 'Alliance', in *Double Decision: The 1993 Election and Referendum in New Zealand*, edited by Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer (Wellington: Department of Politics, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994), p. 19; Marryan Street, 'Discussion', *Double Decision: The 1993 Election and Referendum in New Zealand*, edited by Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer (Wellington: Department of Politics, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994), p. 30.

<sup>34</sup> Ruth Laugesen, 'A Media Perspective of the 1996 Election Campaign', in *From Campaign to Coalition: the 1996 MMP Election*, edited by Jonathan Boston, et al., (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), pp. 67-69. See Andrew Stone, 'Countdown to the watershed election of '96', *New Zealand Herald*, 13 July 1996, p. 7 for details of how New Zealand's largest daily newspaper deliberately changed from reporting on what politicians said to writing about voters' concerns. The Christchurch *Press*, which is New Zealand's second largest daily newspaper, also

long document has resulted in parties putting detailed policies into separate policy statements for each policy area.<sup>35</sup>

The shift to proportional representation at the 1996 election also contributed to shorter manifestos. This is because parties knew that they would have to be flexible enough to form a coalition if they wished to enter the government. As a result manifestos were more about values than specific promises at the 1996 election.<sup>36</sup> Increased polarisation by political parties also means that they have been trying to appeal to a narrower range of the political spectrum. They therefore do not need to try and deal with the concerns of every interest group.

These factors mean that election manifestos are likely to remain short in New Zealand in the future. Indeed, the Alliance's belief that its 1996 manifesto was "too wordy" for undecided voters' attention spans,<sup>37</sup> indicates that programmes may become even shorter in the future. Manifestos could become longer again if New Zealand abandons proportional representation, or if one of the two main parties seeks to blur its image in an attempt to capture most of the support of minor parties with similar policies. If levels of public trust of politicians improve election manifestos could possibly again gradually grow in length as public expectations increase again. Historically the length of parties' manifestos has also crept up, even when politicians have been aware that this reduces the potential readership.<sup>38</sup> Possibly the length of manifestos may even fluctuate for several decades, as they did during the first decades of the twentieth

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heavily used opinion poll data collected by the University of Waikato's Survey Research Unit. See, for example, Howard Keene, 'Votes want healthy nation as their legacy', *Press*, 21 June 1996, p. 16. In addition, Wellington's *Dominion*, which is the capital's morning newspaper, heavily relied upon panel responses to different issues in its election coverage.

<sup>35</sup> The political ephemera collection at the University of Waikato Library includes three boxes of material from the 1996 election, and it only collected a fraction of what the parties issued. The widespread use of the internet by parties at the 1996 election means that they did not even have to bear the cost of printing their propaganda, and that there is virtually no limits on the amount of material that they can make available to the public.

<sup>36</sup> Ruth Laugesen, 'Detailed manifesto unlikely - Bolger', *Dominion*, 4 June 1996, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> Rod Donald, 'The Alliance Campaign: MMP and Missed Opportunities', in *From Campaign to Coalition: the 1996 MMP Election*, edited by Jonathan Boston, et al., (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), p. 46.

<sup>38</sup> Keith Sinclair, *Walter Nash* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1976), p. 111.

century, before beginning another seemingly inexorable, and initially imperceptible, rise.

### 8.3 Conclusion

Until the early 1980s most parties' manifestos tended to grow longer at an accelerating rate over time. This reflected the widening social bases of the main parties, general acceptance of the responsible party government and pluralist beliefs that politicians should be responsive to the wishes of their party and interest groups, and the belief that an active state promoted the common good. From the 1960s the emergence of new politics issues also contributed to growth in the length of election manifestos. Before the 1980s the only party whose manifestos consistently became shorter over time was the Liberal Party. Its manifestos were initially very long, mainly because it was trying to aggregate the interests of a wider range of interest groups than the other parties. The Liberal Party's manifestos fell in length during the 1920s as it narrowed its targeted constituency.

Since the mid 1980s parties' manifestos have usually been much shorter than they had been since the 1950s. Initially the steep decline in the length of manifestos was caused by the main parties being unprepared when National called a snap election in 1984. Since then manifestos have either remained short, and sometimes have further fallen in length. One of the most important reasons for this was strong support among politicians for elitist models of democracy. Since the 1990s high levels of political distrust after successive governments broke their promises, the discovery by parties that a shorter manifesto is more likely to be read by voters, and the need to maintain maximum flexibility under MMP have also restricted the length of manifestos. The latter reasons mean that even when parties strongly support mandate theory there are strong incentives for them to issue a short manifesto.

## Chapter Nine: Policy Implementation

### 9.1 Introduction

Election manifestos play a crucial role as a binding statement of parties' policies in mandate theories of responsible party government. Chapter two showed that historically New Zealand political parties have placed a very high emphasis on keeping their manifesto commitments. When a party has broken its promises there has usually been a dramatic decline in its support, a loss of democratic legitimacy, and often internal splits within the party.

This chapter applies the policy implementation methodology developed by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge to New Zealand over the 1946-1994 period. The policy implementation methodology used tests whether there is a strong association between changes in policy emphases in election manifestos and subsequent variations in equivalent areas of central government expenditure. As well as running the mandate and ideology models as Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge algebraically specify them, their models are also run in the way in which they usually analyse them. The results from these two methods are then compared. The New Zealand implementation results will then be compared to those for other countries. Additional policy implementation tests and statistical analysis is also included.

The method of calculating policy implementation used in this chapter uses a much higher proportion of parties' manifestos than previous accounts which have concentrated on the few high profile specific promises parties make. It is also much more systematic than the comparisons between parties' pre-election promises and expert assessments of their post-election actions made in previous chapters. The results will show whether the perception that policy implementation was high in New Zealand until the early 1980s is supported by

an association between parties' manifesto emphases and government expenditure trends. It will also be possible to see whether the breaking of promises by parties thereafter weakened the link between their manifesto emphases and government expenditure.

The policy implementation models will now be outlined. This will be followed by a brief analysis of the expenditure data, and how government expenditure patterns have changed over time. The results for the models will then be discussed, and the best-fit results will be compared to those for other countries. Finally, actual and predicted expenditure will be graphed for each policy area.

## 9.2 Policy Implementation Models

### 9.2.1 Agenda Model

The first of Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's policy implementation models applied to New Zealand was the agenda model. This model is based on the hypothesis that variations in government expenditure reflect variations in the programme emphases of all parties, irrespective of which party has been in government.

Because of the high priority given by parties to implementing their election manifestos, few New Zealand political scientists have argued that parties' influence on policy outcomes has been unaffected by whether they have been in or out of government. However, the agenda model may apply in some policy areas because of the high post-war consensus noted by many political scientists, the substantial influence of interest groups on policy, and the close contact New Zealand politicians have had with voters.<sup>1</sup> As a result of these factors the

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<sup>1</sup> Jack Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 3-5; Austin

policies of all parties may have been partially adopted by the governing party, either to appease interest groups, or because of the intellectual persuasiveness of their policies.<sup>2</sup> The agenda model therefore reflects pluralist rather than responsible party government ideas about democracy.

The agenda model is most likely to work in areas where there was a high consensus between parties. The content analysis results for New Zealand showed that these high consensus areas were education and foreign policy.

For New Zealand the regression equation for the agenda model takes the form:

$$E_i = a + bN_{ati} + bL_{abi} + bSC_i$$

In this equation  $E_i$  is the percentage of central government expenditure for policy area  $i$ ;  $N_{ati}$ ,  $L_{abi}$  and  $SC_i$  are respectively the percentage of National, Labour, and Social Credit programmes that are in the category or categories that have been matched up with that expenditure area;  $a$  is the constant, and  $b$  represents the unstandardised regression coefficient for each independent variable.<sup>3</sup>

### 9.2.2 Mandate Model

The second model used in this study was the mandate model, which adds controls for which party is in power. Two different versions of the mandate model were applied to New Zealand. Both mandate models can be expected to

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Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), pp. 141, 178.

<sup>2</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> This model is based on the agenda model outlined by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 45.

explain more variance in most expenditure areas than the agenda model. This is because chapter two showed that political scientists argue that over the 1946-1994 period covered by this chapter New Zealand had a uniquely majoritarian political system, which gave the governing party the capacity to implement its programme.<sup>4</sup>

The first version of the mandate model used, which is mathematically the same as how Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge specify the equation, is shown below.

$$E_i = a + bNati + \mathbf{bNati * NatPM} + bLabi + \mathbf{bLabi * LabPM} + bSC.$$

All the symbols are identical to those in the agenda equation except for LabPM and NatPM. LabPM is a dummy variable with the value of 1 when there is a Labour government, and 0 when there is a National government. Similarly, NatPM is a dummy variable with the value of 1 when there is a National government, and 0 when there is a Labour government. Because Labour and National have always alternated in power, when LabPM=1, NatPM=0 and vice versa. The \* sign indicates multiplication.

In this model bNati, bLabi and bSCi are agenda effects that measure the rate at which these parties' programmes are reflected in expenditure trends irrespective of whether they are in government or opposition. The new terms **bNati\*NatPM** and **bLabi\*LabPM**, which are in bold in the equation, measure the mandate effects. These measure the additional association, over the constant agenda correlation, between Labour's and National's programmes and expenditure trends when they are in government. There is no interactive variable

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<sup>4</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'State and Democracy in New Zealand', in The Political Economy of New Zealand, edited by Chris Rudd and Brian Roper (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 226; Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 1.

for Social Credit because it has never been in government, and it is assumed that the association between its manifestos and policy outcomes remains constant irrespective of which party has been in government.<sup>5</sup>

The second, or revised, version of the mandate model, which is based on how Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge usually interpret the mandate model results is shown below.

$$E_i = a + b_{\text{Nati}} * \text{LabPM} + b_{\text{Nati}} * \text{NatPM} + b_{\text{Labi}} * \text{NatPM} + b_{\text{Labi}} * \text{LabPM} + b_{\text{SC}}.$$

The only new terms compared to the first version of the mandate model are  $b_{\text{Nati}} * \text{LabPM}$  and  $b_{\text{Labi}} * \text{NatPM}$ , which replace  $b_{\text{Nati}}$  and  $b_{\text{Labi}}$ . These two new terms respectively measure how Labour and National programme emphases are reflected in government expenditure trends when they are in opposition. The mandate terms,  $b_{\text{Nati}} * \text{NatPM}$  and  $b_{\text{Labi}} * \text{LabPM}$ , now measure the total rate at which National and Labour party manifestos are associated with government expenditure when they are in government.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> This model is mathematically very similar to Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's mandate equations on p. 49, and how the mandate model equation is specified for particular countries throughout *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*. Although Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge use brackets in this model, and in the ideology model, they have been excluded here as they are superfluous.

<sup>6</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge first interpret the mandate model as producing separate winners' and losers' effects on p. 3. On p. 49, when mathematically specifying the mandate model, they state that it separately measures governing and opposition party effects. Similarly, on p. 68 when discussing the mandate results for Britain in detail they state that  $b_{\text{Con}}$  and  $b_{\text{Lab}}$  now measure "opposition" effects. However, since  $b_{\text{Con}}$  and  $b_{\text{Lab}}$  do not include a dummy variable for which party is in government, theoretically, as in the agenda model, they measure these party's influence on policy both when they are in and out of government. Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge sometimes correctly note that how they have specified the mandate model the mandate effect is an extra effect governing parties have over a constant agenda, or base-line, effect. An example is on the bottom half of p. 69.

### 9.2.3 Ideology Model

The third model applied was the ideology model. The ideology model is an extension of the mandate model that adds controls for the long-term ideological positioning of a party and how this is associated with policy outcomes. The ideology model should at least slightly increase the proportion of variance explained. One reason for this is that New Zealand political scientists and voters have traditionally expected a Labour government to react differently to a National government in most political situations, irrespective of their manifesto commitments. This is because of the different long-term objectives of the parties, and because since their MPs tend to come from different social backgrounds they are closer to different interest groups.<sup>7</sup> The ideology model should also increase the proportion of variance in government expenditure explained because the coding categories do not fully capture the differences between parties' policies. For instance, National Party welfare state expansion references tend to be narrower in scope than Labour references are.

The ideology model for New Zealand, using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's algebraic specification, is shown below.

$$E_i = a + b_{\text{NatG}} + b_{\text{Nati}} + b_{\text{Nati} * \text{NatPM}} + b_{\text{Labi}} + b_{\text{Labi} * \text{LabPM}} + b_{\text{Sci}}$$

The revised version of the ideology model, which is based on how Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge usually interpret the ideology model results, is shown below. It incorporates the changes made to Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's mathematical specification of the mandate model.

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<sup>7</sup> Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 68-69.

$$E_i + a + \mathbf{bNatG} + bNati * LabPM + bNati * NatPM + bLabi * NatPM + bLabi * LabPM + bSCi.$$

The only change in these equations, compared to the equivalent mandate equations, are the addition of the dummy variable  $\mathbf{bNatG}$ , which is in bold in the equations.  $NatG$  has a value of 1 when National forms the government, and 0 when Labour is in power and National is in opposition.<sup>8</sup> This dummy variable is similar to the independent party variable in comparative policy research, because it is not influenced by changes in parties' policies over time.<sup>9</sup> However, if manifestos are associated with policy outcomes most of the effects normally measured by the party variable should already have been measured by the programme variables in the mandate model. For this reason the ideology models will probably only explain slightly more variance than the mandate models.

#### 9.2.4 Other Models of Democracy

All the previous models have assumed that parties' manifesto emphases are associated in a logical way with subsequent changes in government expenditure trends. However, there may be contradictory or poor relationships between manifesto emphases and government expenditure patterns. Contradictory relationships between a party's manifesto emphases and expenditure priorities once they are in office occur when coefficients are the opposite sign to what was expected. If the relationship between manifesto

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<sup>8</sup> This dummy variable is exactly the same as Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge add in Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 52. Because no interactive variables are involved only one dummy variable is needed. However, the changes made to the mandate result in two different versions of the ideology model. Michael McDonald, Ian Budge and Richard Hofferbert, 'Party mandate and time series analysis: a theoretical and methodological response', Electoral Studies, Vol. 18 (1999), p. 592 use parties' mean manifesto emphases in place of the ideology variable in their implementation model. Although this would seem to be a theoretical advance, it has not been done here to maintain comparability with the Parties, Policies, and Democracy results.

<sup>9</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 52.

emphases and government expenditure is poor the proportion of variance explained will be low.<sup>10</sup>

Although political scientists have usually argued that policy implementation in New Zealand has traditionally been high, some have argued that demographic and economic factors have had a large influence on particular areas of government expenditure. These demographic and economic effects are compatible with high policy implementation by parties, providing they have been reflected in changes in the content of election manifestos. However, in some areas demographic and economic factors may have had an independent effect on government expenditure. For instance, chapter two discussed how Rudd has argued that government expenditure on social welfare transfers increased from the early 1970s partly because of demographic factors such as an ageing population, and economic factors such as growing unemployment.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Easton has seen welfare state innovation during the 1970s as being influenced by social science trained public service technocrats.<sup>12</sup> In overseas countries social services have also tended to be the area where the policy implementation models work least well.<sup>13</sup>

The move to a more elitist approach to policy making by governments since the mid-1980s can be expected to diminish the association between parties' manifesto emphases and government expenditure. The regression equations will be used to calculate predicted expenditure on the basis of parties' manifesto emphases. From comparing actual and predicted expenditure it will be possible to identify during which time periods there has been poor implementation.

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<sup>10</sup> Some of the description of this model is taken from Francois Petry, 'Fragile mandate: Party programmes and public expenditures in the French Fifth Republic', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 20 (1991), p. 154.

<sup>11</sup> Chris Rudd, 'The New Zealand Welfare State: Origins, Development, and Crisis', in *State and Economy in New Zealand*, edited by Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 229.

<sup>12</sup> Brian Easton, *Pragmatism and Progress: Social Security in the Seventies* (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 1981), pp. 10, 108.

### 9.3 Technical Details

#### 9.3.1 The Expenditure Data

Finding accurate government expenditure statistics to use in New Zealand was difficult because, as in most countries, they have not been kept very consistently. Unfortunately attempts to persuade either Statistics New Zealand or Treasury to retrofit existing series were unsuccessful. The government expenditure statistics used in this chapter were developed by reworking and extending existing statistical series to create a valuable new dataset. Further details on the expenditure data are provided in Appendix C of this thesis.

#### 9.3.2 Lagging the Programme Data

When Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge ran their policy implementation models they lead the expenditure data by two years relative to the programme data. They justified this on the grounds that normally budgetary processes are on a two-year planning lead. This lead occurs because at any one time agencies are spending money allocated the previous year, supply for the following year is currently being debated, and departments are preparing estimates for the year after that. The programme data for a particular election was used for every year until replaced by data from the subsequent election programme. Parties, which won elections after 1 July, were considered to take power in the subsequent year.<sup>14</sup>

A two year lag seemed very long for New Zealand because it has a short three-year electoral cycle. However, because it was found that using a two year

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<sup>13</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 245.

<sup>14</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 43.

lag produced slightly better results than a one year lag, only the two year lag results are reported.

### 9.3.3 Expenditure Trends

The graphs for government expenditure in different areas as a proportion of total government expenditure are shown in Figures 9.1-9.9.<sup>15</sup> On average over the 1950-1994 period these expenditure areas include 69.3% of government expenditure, with the standard deviation being 8.2%. The proportion of government expenditure is lower at the start of the time period because no expenditure data is available for land use or transport until 1963. The vertical axes of the graphs have been truncated to highlight changes over time.

Visual inspection of the expenditure graphs suggests that in several areas which party is in government seems to have little influence on policy outcomes. For instance, looking at Figure 9.1, increases in the number of school age students and improved secondary school retention rates together with greater demand for tertiary education probably pushed all governments towards increasing education expenditure until the early 1970s. A decline in the number of school aged students then allowed them to reduce education expenditure until the mid 1980s.<sup>16</sup> Sharp increases in secondary and tertiary education enrolments resulting from growing unemployment would then seem to account for higher government expenditure on education during the late 1980s and early 1990s.<sup>17</sup> Although these results would seem to provide some support for demographic and economic theories of government expenditure, the results for the policy

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<sup>15</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, in Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 41 justify using expenditure as a proportion of government expenditure rather than as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) on the grounds that the latter statistic is influenced by fluctuations in economic activity and changes in the tax take.

<sup>16</sup> New Zealand Planning Council, The Welfare State? Social Policy in the 1980's (Wellington: New Zealand Planning Council, 1979), p. 49.

<sup>17</sup> Rudd, 'The New Zealand Welfare State: Origins, Development, and Crisis', p. 153.

implementation models may show that demographic changes have been paralleled by changes in manifesto emphases.

Earlier research by Castles over the 1950-1979 period showed that Labour's 1957-1960 and 1972-1975 terms reversed a decline in the proportion of government expenditure spent on social welfare benefits.<sup>18</sup> Even allowing for lags in changes in government expenditure, however, transfers expenditure over the 1950-1994 period, which is shown in Figure 9.2, appears to have been influenced by long-term trends which are relatively unaffected by which party is in government. For instance, the rate of increase in transfers expenditure under the Fourth Labour government between 1984 and 1990 is no higher than under the previous National government between 1975 and 1984. Similarly, the trends in health expenditure in Figure 9.3 also seem to be relatively uninfluenced by which party was in government. Figure 9.3 confirms that although there was growth in health expenditure up until the mid-1970s, the popular belief that thereafter government health expenditure continued to spiral out of control is incorrect.<sup>19</sup> The total services graph in Figure 9.4 shows that combined expenditure on transfers, health and education increased from 44% of total government expenditure in 1950 to 64% by 1994.

Figure 9.5 shows that defence expenditure peaks during the Korean war, and gradually falls thereafter. There is also a noticeable increase during the Vietnam war. Foreign affairs expenditure in Figure 9.6 trends upwards, although there was a substantial decline during the late 1970s. Law and order expenditure, which is graphed in Figure 9.7, consistently tracks upwards at an increasing rate over time.

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<sup>18</sup> Francis Castles, The Working Class and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Development of the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand, 1890-1980, pp. 33-34. This was because benefits were increased, and eligibility made less selective. In contrast, Castles found that changes in government had less effect on education or health expenditure.

<sup>19</sup> Toni Ashton, 'Reform of the Health Services: Weighing Up the Costs and Benefits', in The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic and Social Policies, edited by Jonathan Boston and Paul Dalziel (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 150.

Figure 9.1: Proportion of government expenditure on education, 1950-1994




Figure 9.2: Proportion of government expenditure on social welfare transfers, 1950-1994




Figure 9.3: Proportion of government expenditure on health, 1950-1994




Figure 9.4: Proportion of government expenditure on total social services, 1950-1994




Figure 9.5: Proportion of government expenditure on defence, 1950-1994




Figure 9.6: Proportion of government expenditure on foreign affairs, 1950-1994




Figure 9.7: Proportion of government expenditure on law and order, 1950-1994




Figure 9.8: Proportion of government expenditure on land use, 1963-1994




Figure 9.9: Proportion of government expenditure on transport, 1963-1994




Figure 9.8 shows that transport expenditure falls sharply over the period covered. This indicates that even before the election of the Fourth Labour government transport was an area where governments were gradually reducing state investment. Land use expenditure, which is in Figure 9.9, fluctuates considerably, but has fallen to nearly zero since the mid-1980s. This has occurred because the Fourth Labour government sharply cut land use expenditure by ending a tradition of state supported settlement of undeveloped areas, removing most direct assistance, and shifting remaining services like farm advisory towards full cost recovery.<sup>20</sup> National has accepted this reduced support for agriculture. As a result since National became the government in 1990 its policies for farmers have been centred around improving the economic environment for farmers by reducing tariffs and deregulating the economy, and by pursuing freer international trade in agricultural products, rather than by direct financial assistance.<sup>21</sup>

#### 9.3.4 Matching Programme Emphases and Expenditure

The justification for the pairings of manifesto and expenditure data used in the tables in this chapter are explained further in Appendix A of this thesis. Usually alternative pairings also generated good results. Only data from Labour, National and Social Credit manifestos were used in the policy implementation models because Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge also excluded many short-lived or small parties. On average over the 1946-1994 period the specific pairings used 38.7% of the content of Labour's, National's and Social Credit's manifestos.

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<sup>20</sup> Collins, *Rogemomics: Is there a better way?*, p. 60.

<sup>21</sup> New Zealand National Party, *National Party Policies for the 1990s* (New Zealand National Party, 1990), pp. 24-25; New Zealand National Party, *Manifesto '93: Stepping Out on the Path to 2010* (New Zealand National Party, 1993), pp. 29-30.

### 9.3.5 Matching Overall Party Positions and Expenditure Trends

Tests were also carried out on how well Laver and Budge's scale for party movement explained changes in a scale measuring left-right expenditure trends. Initially factor analysis was used to try and derive an expenditure scale, but the results made little sense. To get an accurate measurement of left-right expenditure movement a scale was then created on theoretical grounds. This scale subtracted spending on the right-wing priority expenditure areas of defence and law and order, from expenditure on the left-wing areas of welfare and health.<sup>22</sup>

Laver and Budge's left-right party movement scale is constructed by adding together references in manifestos to left-wing issues such as nationalisation and welfare state: expansion, and subtracting from this references to right-wing issues such as free enterprise and law and order.<sup>23</sup> The graphs for the left-right expenditure dimension and the left-right policy dimension are displayed in Figures 9.10 and 9.11. The expenditure data shows that during the early 1950s and under the 1960-1972 National government the proportion of government expenditure spent on left-wing expenditure priorities fell. However, during other periods of National Party rule, such as the late 1950s and between 1975-1984, expenditure on left-wing priorities increased. Labour governments during the 1957-1960 and 1984-1990 periods both seem to have resulted in a sharp increase in expenditure on left-wing priorities. In contrast, the 1972-1975 Labour government seems to have had relatively little effect. Despite these variations considerably more expenditure has always been on left-wing

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<sup>22</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge in Parties, Policies, and Democracy usually used factor analysis to find the expenditure dimension, although on pp. 175-178 they simply created a scale for Austria where time effects distorted the results. Possible time effects on the expenditure dimension in other countries may help explain why they find on p. 243 that the congruence between general left-right party movement and the expenditure dimension is often very poor.

<sup>23</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 40.

Figure 9.10: Percent government expenditure trends are more left-wing than right-wing





Figure 9.11: Labour's, National's and Social Credit's positions on the left-right policy dimension, 1946-1990



expenditure priorities than right-wing expenditure priorities. The policy dimension in Figure 9.11 shows a relatively similar pattern of party movement to the results in Figure 7.2 in chapter seven, although of course this graph covers a shorter time period.

## 9.4 Results

### 9.4.1 Agenda Model Results

The agenda model results are shown in Table 9.1. In this table expenditure areas are listed first, with the manifesto category or combination of categories that they have been paired with then being given in brackets. The constant 'a' is the estimated initial value in each regression equation. The 'b' regression coefficients show to what extent a 1% change in party programme emphases is associated with a subsequent change in the proportion of government expenditure spent in that area. For instance, in Table 9.1 the bNat results show that a 1% increase in National Party manifesto references to social justice and education is associated with a .21% increase in expenditure on education two years later. Unless there is an early election this increase also occurs in each of the following two years.

Coefficients that are not significant at a .05 level are in brackets to indicate that their value may be unstable over time. As an additional statistical check, standard error values have been included. The standard error measures how far on average the dependent value, which in this case is the expenditure category, differs from its forecasted value. If a coefficient is not twice the size of the standard error this also indicates that it cannot be relied upon.

Usually Labour's and National's b coefficients can be expected to be positive. An exception is defence expenditure, which has been paired with references to internationalism. The b coefficients for this regression can be

Table 9.1: Agenda model for New Zealand, with programme data lagged by two years, 1946-1994

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	bLab	S.E.	b Nat	S.E.	b SC	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>
Law and Order (Law and Order)	1.09	.21	.05	(0)	.05	.58	.10	.80
Land Use (Agriculture)	-2.32	(.04)	.11	.26	.10	.54	.17	.36
Health (Justice & Welfare+)	9.27	.13	.06	(-.03)	.05	.34	.06	.62
Education (Justice & Education)	7.61	(.21)	.12	.21	.08	.25	.05	.60
Defence (Internationalism)	8.23	(.06)	.14	-.80	.17	-1.01	.17	.55
Transport (Productivity and technology)	.80	.36	.04	(.03)	.03	(-.09)	.10	.78
Foreign Affairs (Internationalism)	.61	(0)	.02	.16	.03	.19	.03	.67
Transfers (Justice & Welfare+)	22.48	(.36)	.31	(-.32)	.26	(.28)	.27	-.02
All Social Services (Welf, Just, Educ)	52.34	(-.03)	.29	(-.14)	.19	(.29)	.16	.11
Left-Right (Left-Right policy)	44.46	-.64	.10	-.10	.04	(-.06)	.04	.45

expected to be negative in this model, and in subsequent models. This is because the internationalism category measures support for international organisations and international cooperation, which in New Zealand have often been seen as a substitute for high military spending. Social Credit's b coefficients can also be negative without being contradictory. This is because since it has always been in opposition the agenda model is always measuring its influence as an opposition party. In the agenda model 2 out of 15 of the coefficients that pass both the significance tests are contradictory coefficients, which are in the opposite direction to that expected. These are the Labour and National coefficients for left-right movement.

The adjusted  $R^2$  at the end of the rows indicates the proportion of variance explained. For instance, in Table 9.1 the  $R^2$  of .36 at the end of the row for land use indicates that 36% of variance in land use expenditure is explained by knowing what proportion of Labour, National and Social Credit manifestos is about agriculture.<sup>24</sup> The average adjusted  $R^2$  value is relatively high at 49%, indicating that the agenda model works surprisingly well in New Zealand. However, the proportion of variance in transfers expenditure explained is negative, showing that this is an area where the agenda model works extremely badly.

#### 9.4.2 Mandate Model Results

The results for the mandate model using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's specification and the revised governing and opposition parties specification are respectively shown in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. There are important differences between the tables in what most of the variables measure.

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<sup>24</sup> All the  $R^2$  values referred to in this chapter are adjusted  $R^2$ s. These are lower than ordinary  $R^2$  values because they control for the number of variables in the equation. Adjusted  $R^2$  values also control for the different lengths of time covered by different regression equations.

Table 9.2: Mandate model for New Zealand using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's equations, with programme data lagged by two years, 1946-1994

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab	S.E.	bLab	S.E.	b Nat	S.E.	bNat	S.E.	bSC	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>	M +
				*LabPM				*NatPM					
Law and Order (Law and Order)	1.08	.15	.01	0.46	0.1	-.34	0.1	0.42	.11	0.48	0.1	.86	.06
Land Use (Agriculture)	-3.90	(.01)	.09	.76	.22	(-.11)	.16	.63	.18	.52	.15	.54	.18
Health (Justice & Welfare+)	7.96	.17	.06	(.14)	.08	(-.14)	.09	(.13)	.11	.39	.06	.66	.04
Education (Justice & Education)	8.84	(-.06)	.12	.39	.08	(-.06)	.10	.43	.11	.24	.04	.74	.14
Defence (Internationalism)	8.72	(.03)	.82	-.54	.24	-.71	.26	(-.18)	.33	-.99	.16	.60	.05
Transport (Productivity & technology)	-2.46	.34	.03	.21	.07	(-.05)	.03	.20	.04	(.04)	.07	.89	.11
Foreign Affairs (Internationalism)	.61	(.02)	.02	(-.06)	.03	.26	.04	-.15	.05	.20	.02	.73	.06
Transfers (Justice & Welfare+)	9.69	.65	.24	1.61	.32	-1.75	.35	1.85	.44	.64	.22	.44	.46
All Social Services (Welf, Just, Educ)	36.48	(.24)	.22	1.28	.23	-1.10	.23	1.39	.29	.46	.12	.50	.39
Left-Right (Left-Right policy)	41.54	-.51	.11	(.08)	.08	-.16	.05	(.15)	.08	(-.05)	.04	.50	.05

Table 9.3: Mandate model for New Zealand using revised equations, with programme data lagged by two years, 1946-1994

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab	S.E.	bLab	S.E.	bNat	S.E.	bNat	S.E.	bSC	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>	M +
		*NatPM		*LabPM		*LabPM		*NatPM					
Law and Order (Law and Order)	1.08	.15	.01	0.61	0.1	-.34	0.1	(0.08)	0.05	.48	.08	.86	.06
Land Use (Agriculture)	-3.90	(.01)	.09	.77	.23	(-.11)	.16	.53	.12	.52	.15	.54	.18
Health (Justice & Welfare+)	7.96	.17	.06	.30	.11	(-.14)	.09	(-.01)	.06	.39	.06	.66	.04
Education (Justice & Education)	8.84	(-.06)	.12	.33	.10	(-.06)	.10	.37	.07	.24	.04	.74	.14
Defence (Internationalism)	8.72	(.03)	.14	(-.50)	.27	-.71	.26	-.89	.20	-.99	.16	.60	.05
Transport (Productivity & technology)	-2.46	.32	.02	.48	.06	(-.03)	.03	.16	.03	(.04)	.07	.89	.11
Foreign Affairs (Internationalism)	.61	.34	.03	.56	.08	(-.05)	.03	.11	.03	.20	.02	.73	.06
Transfers (Justice & Welfare+)	9.69	.65	.24	2.26	.41	-1.75	.35	(.10)	.25	.64	.22	.44	.46
All Social Services (Welf, Just, Educ)	36.48	(.24)	.22	1.52	.34	-1.10	.23	(.29)	.18	.46	.12	.50	.39
Left-Right (Left-Right policy)	41.54	-.51	.11	-.43	.14	-.16	.05	(-.02)	.06	(-.05)	.04	.50	.05

The increase in variance explained by each equation, in comparison with the equivalent agenda equation, is shown by the M+ column at the end of the tables.

In Table 9.2  $b_{Nat}$ ,  $b_{Lab}$ , and  $b_{SC}$  show the constant agenda effect these party's programmes have on government expenditure, irrespective of whether they have been in government or opposition. In contrast, the variables  $b_{Lab*LabPM}$  and  $b_{Nat*NatPM}$  show the additional mandate effect Labour's and National's manifestos have on expenditure when they are in government. For instance, in Table 9.2 the  $b_{Lab}$  column shows that every 1% increase in Labour's references to social justice and welfare state expansion results in a non-significant .65% increase in transfers expenditure, regardless of whether it is in government or opposition. However, when Labour wins an election every 1% increase in Labour's references to justice and welfare also results in an additional 1.61% increase in transfers expenditure over the constant agenda effect.

In Table 9.3 the terms  $b_{Lab*LabPM}$  and  $b_{Nat*NatPM}$  now respectively measure the effects Labour and National manifestos have on government expenditure only when they win an election. In comparison, the new variables  $b_{Lab*NatPM}$  and  $b_{Nat*LabPM}$  and the retained variable  $b_{SC}$  measure the rate at which these parties' programmes are reflected in government expenditure trends when they lose an election. For example, the  $b_{Lab*LabPM}$  column in Table 9.3 indicates that a 1% increase in Labour references to social justice and welfare state expansion before it wins office is reflected two years later in a 2.26% increase in transfers expenditure. However, the  $b_{Lab*NatPM}$  column indicates that a 1% increase in Labour's references to justice and welfare state expansion when Labour loses an election only results in a .65% increase in transfers expenditure.

Comparing the results in Tables 9.2 and 9.3 shows the only coefficients to change in value are those in the columns  $b_{Lab*LabPM}$  and  $b_{Nat*NatPM}$ , which measure the mandate effects. Because the revised mandate model zero-sums the agenda effects when a party is in government, it tends to increase the size of the mandate effects. As a result the mandate effect for a party in the revised model is

equal to the same party's mandate effect plus its agenda effect in Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's version of the mandate model.<sup>25</sup> The changes to the equations have no effect on the magnitude of any other coefficients, or on the proportion of variance explained. This is because the equations have only been slightly refined, with the same data still being used. However, even though the bLab and bNat values in Table 9.2 are respectively the same as the bLab\*NatPM and bNat\*LabPM values in Table 9.3, theoretically they measure different effects. This is because the bLab and bNat values measure a constant agenda effect, whereas the bLab\*NatPM and bNat\*LabPM values measure opposition party effects.

Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge defined contradictory coefficients for this model as those where the mandate effect is the opposite direction to what is expected.<sup>26</sup> Using their specification of the mandate model no significant coefficients are contradictory. In the revised mandate model the only significant contradictory coefficient is for left-right expenditure trends when there is a Labour government.

The revised mandate model would seem to produce theoretically sounder results than Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's version. This is because the essence of mandate theory is that a party's manifesto guides its actions once it is in government.<sup>27</sup> That a party's manifesto is also positively correlated to government expenditure trends when it is in opposition should not detract from the mandate effects its manifesto has when it is in government. Indeed, this suggests a hegemonic influence over policy outcomes. These results suggest that Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's specification of the mandate model tends to underestimate the size of mandate effects.

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<sup>25</sup> Thanks to Dr Jack Vowles for pointing this out. Because of the rounding of the figures in the tables this relationship may not always appear to be perfect. Mandate effects are smaller in the revised model when agenda effects in the original mandate model were negative.

<sup>26</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 74.

The  $R^2$ s in the mandate models are usually higher than for equivalent regression equations in the agenda models, with the average variance explained increasing by 16% to 65%. The increases are particularly large for transfers and the left-right policy dimension. However, even when the  $R^2$  only increases slightly the unstandardised regression coefficients tend to make much more sense.

One reason for the small changes in  $R^2$  is that the manifestos of parties out of power often appear to have a large positive effect on policy. For instance, an increase in Labour's and Social Credit's references to justice and welfare state expansion when they are out of government is strongly associated with an increase in transfers expenditure. This 'opposition effect' suggests that public pressure, interest group activity, and electoral factors have traditionally pushed National governments towards adopting Labour's and Social Credit's social welfare policies. Large opposition party effects indicate that once in power parties are responsive to others' concerns. These out party effects are more compatible with pluralist models of democracy and Lijphart's consensus model of democracy than with pure mandate theories of responsible party government.<sup>28</sup>

Table 9.3 also shows that there are also several instances of a 'negative mandate', where governments reject the opposition's policy emphases. For instance, in Table 9.3 the  $b_{\text{Lab}^* \text{NatPM}}$  coefficient of  $-.51$  on the left-right expenditure dimension indicates that every 1% Labour has moved to the left before elections it has lost, has been associated with a .51% move to the right on the expenditure dimension by the National government after the election. This effect means that once in government National has moved government expenditure in a right-wing direction, and that this tendency has been greater the

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<sup>27</sup> Richard Rose, *Do Parties Make a Difference*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 26; Andreas Schelder, 'The Normative Force of Election Promises', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 10 (1998), p. 195.

<sup>28</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, pp. 50, 256-263.

more Labour's overall left-right policy position moved to the left before the election.<sup>29</sup>

The negative mandate for Labour on the left-right expenditure dimension suggests that National governments have attempted to reject Labour's policies more than they have attempted to implement their own policy direction. This result supports the view that National has often got its identity from a rejection of Labour's policies.<sup>30</sup> Negative mandates do not count as contradictory coefficients, because it is compatible with mandate theory for a party to reject opposition parties' policies once in power.<sup>31</sup>

### 9.4.3 Ideology Model Results

Tables 9.4 and 9.5 show the results for the ideology models. The ideology models are the same as the two different mandate models, except for the addition to both equations of the term  $bNatG$ , which is intended to measure the effect of the ideology of the party in government on policy. The ideology effects and the proportion of variance explained are exactly the same in both versions of the ideology model.

The ideology effect works as intended in Table 9.5 where it can be seen that every year a National government has been in power has resulted in a 3.35% increase in defence expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure. As in the mandate models the addition of the new variable usually influences the value of every other coefficient. The addition of  $bNatG$  increases the average percent of the variance explained by 2% to 67%.

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<sup>29</sup> Although the  $bLab$  and  $bNat$  coefficients in Table 9.2 have the same value as the  $bLab*NatPM$  and  $bNat*LabPM$  coefficients in Table 9.3, there are theoretical problems with interpreting the  $bLab$  and  $bNat$  coefficients as negative mandates. This is because  $bLab$  and  $bNat$  influence government expenditure both when Labour and National are in and out of government.

<sup>30</sup> G.A. Wood, 'The National Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, edited by Hyam Gold, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 51.

<sup>31</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 51.

Table 9.4: Ideology model for New Zealand using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's equations, with programme data lagged by two years, 1946-1994

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab	S.E.	bLab *LabPM	S.E.	b Nat	S.E.	bNat *NatPM	S.E.	bSC	S.E.	N govt	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>	I+
Law and Order (Law and Order)	1.59	.17	.03	.40	.07	-.45	.07	.60	.08	.49	.06	-.81	.13	.93	.07
Land Use (Agriculture)	-4.06	(-.03)	.12	.83	.28	(-.09)	.17	(.52)	.30	.50	.15	(1.20)	2.49	.53	-.01
Health (Justice & Welfare+)	8.67	.18	.06	(.07)	.12	(-.12)	.09	(.14)	.12	.39	.06	(-1.11)	1.44	.66	-
Education (Justice & Education)	7.58	(-.27)	.18	0.69	.21	(-.01)	0.1	.34	0.1	.24	.04	(3.64)	2.43	.75	.01
Defence (Internationalism)	6.20	(-.13)	.13	(.55)	.38	-.56	.24	(-.47)	.30	-.95	.14	3.35	.98	.68	.08
Transport (Productivity & technology)	-.01	.36	.03	(.06)	.10	(-.05)	.03	.24	.05	(0)	.08	(-2.94)	1.49	.90	.01
Foreign Affairs (Internationalism)	.76	(.03)	.02	(-1.12)	.06	.25	.04	-.13	.05	.19	.02	(-2.0)	.16	.74	.01
Transfers (Justice & Welfare+)	3.63	.59	.24	2.16	.44	-1.91	.35	1.73	.44	.68	.21	(9.52)	5.41	.47	.03
All Social Services (Welf, Just, Educ)	33.60	(.18)	.24	1.50	.43	-1.13	.24	1.37	.30	.45	.12	(4.98)	8.19	.49	.01
Left-Right (Left-Right policy)	62.74	-.46	.11	(-1.08)	.57	(-.08)	.06	(.08)	.08	(-.04)	.04	-22.13	10.82	.54	.04

Table 9.5: Ideology model for New Zealand using revised equations, with programme data lagged by two years, 1946-1994

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab *NatPM	S.E.	bLab *LabPM	S.E.	b Nat *LabPM	S.E.	bNat *NatPM	S.E.	bSC	S.E.	bNatG	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>	I+
Law and Order (Law and Order)	1.59	.17	.03	.57	.07	-.45	.07	.15	.04	.49	.06	-.81	.13	.93	.07
Land Use (Agriculture)	-4.06	(-.03)	.12	.81	.25	(-.09)	.17	.42	.25	.50	.15	(1.20)	2.49	.53	-.01
Health (Justice & Welfare+)	8.67	.18	.06	(.25)	.13	(-.12)	.09	(.02)	.08	.39	.06	(-1.11)	1.44	.66	-
Education (Justice & Education)	7.58	(-.27)	.18	.42	.12	(-.01)	.10	.34	.07	.24	.04	(3.64)	2.43	.75	.01
Defence (Internationalism)	6.20	(-.13)	.13	(.42)	.36	-.56	.23	-1.03	.19	-.95	.14	3.35	.98	.68	.08
Transport (Productivity & technology)	-.01	.36	.03	.42	.10	(-.05)	.03	.19	.04	(0)	.07	(-2.94)	1.49	.90	.01
Foreign Affairs (Internationalism)	.76	(.03)	.02	(-1.10)	.06	.25	.04	.12	.03	.19	.02	(-2.0)	.16	.74	.01
Transfers (Justice & Welfare+)	3.63	.59	.24	2.75	.49	-1.91	.35	(-1.18)	.29	.68	.21	(9.52)	5.41	.47	.03
All Social Services (Welf, Just, Educ)	33.60	(.18)	.24	1.68	.44	-1.13	.24	(.24)	.20	.45	.12	(4.98)	8.19	.49	.01
Left-Right (Left-Right policy)	62.74	-.46	.11	-1.55	.57	(-.08)	.06	(-.01)	.05	(-.04)	.04	-22.13	10.82	.54	.04

The increase in variance explained by each equation, in comparison with the equivalent mandate equation, is shown by the I+ column at the end of the tables. When the change is not statistically significant at two decimal places a plus or minus sign has been used to indicate the direction of change.

A major problem with some of the results from the ideology models is that there was strong evidence of almost perfect multicollinearity between independent variables. As a result for some expenditure areas, such as health, there is a decline in the number of significant coefficients compared to the equivalent mandate model equations. Further evidence of multicollinearity existed because when one of the highly correlated variables was excluded from each equation, the remaining coefficients sometimes significantly changed in value. For instance, the increases in education and transfers expenditure under National governments in Table 9.5 are reversed once some of the coefficients are dropped from the equation. These results indicated that more accurate results with a higher number of significant coefficients could be achieved by dropping some of the highly correlated independent variables from the models.<sup>32</sup>

When multicollinearity occurred in Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's study it was been dealt with by dropping the variable for long-term ideology.<sup>33</sup> Applying this criteria to New Zealand results in the ideology variable being dropped from the equations for transfers, health, education, transport and left-right expenditure priorities using both versions of the ideology equation.

A further problem with the ideology results is that the left-right expenditure and law and order ideology coefficients are in the opposite direction to what might be expected. This is because they are negative, even though a National government would be expected to move expenditure in a right-wing direction and increase law and order expenditure. This suggests that the ideology variable is measuring non-ideological influences on government expenditure. Because the aim of this study is to measure the influence of parties on policy outcomes, rather than to explain the maximum amount of variance, it makes

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<sup>32</sup> Dominick Salvatore, *Schaum's Outline of Statistics and Econometrics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 182.

<sup>33</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 121. Rerunning the equations with just the agenda and ideology variables confirmed that the mandate model produced higher adjusted  $R^2$  values than the agenda and ideology variables did together. This

sense to drop the counter-intuitive ideology effects for left-right expenditure and law and order.

## 9.5 Analysing the Results

### 9.5.1 Summary of the Results

Tables 9.6 and 9.7 are summary tables which respectively show the equations that explain the highest  $R^2$  for each expenditure area using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's models and the revised models after excluding results affected by possible multicollinearity and contradictory ideology effects. These tables are similar to Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's national summary tables, with coefficients which are not significant at a .05 level being left blank. All the coefficients which passed the significance test were also at least twice the size of their standard error.

The results in Tables 9.6 and 9.7 indicate that policy implementation was very high in New Zealand between 1946 and 1994. This is because after excluding the total social services equation, which was not included by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge,<sup>34</sup> the average adjusted  $R^2$  is 67%. Unlike many other countries there were no null results where the  $R^2$  was below 25%. These results compare very favourably with the average  $R^2$  of 55% for the 10 democracies covered by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, particularly since the averages for other countries exclude policy areas in which less than a quarter

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showed that the mandate effects were always higher than the ideology effects, and that dropping the ideology variables had been the right decision.

<sup>34</sup> However, this matchup is included by Ian Budge and Richard Hofferbert, 'Mandates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures', American Political Science Review, Vol. 84 (1990), p. 122.

Table 9.6: Best fitting models for New Zealand using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's method, with programme data lagged by two years, 1946-1994

Expenditure and manifesto emphases										
Best fit mandate	a	b Lab	bLab *LabPM	b Nat	bNat *NatPM	bSC	R <sup>2</sup>	M+		
Law and Order (Law and Order)	1.08	.15	.46	-.34	.42	.48	.86	.06		
Land Use (Agriculture)	-3.90		.76		.63	.52	.54	.18		
Health (Justice & Welfare)	7.96	.17				.39	.66	.04		
Education (Justice & Education)	8.84		.39		.43	.24	.74	.14		
Transport (Productivity and technology)	-2.46	.34	.21		.20		.89	.11		
Transfers (Justice & Welfare)	9.69	.65	1.61	-1.75	1.85	.64	.44	.46		
All Social Services (Welf, Just, Educ)	36.48		1.28	-1.10	1.39	.46	.50	.39		
Left-right (Left-right policy)	41.54	-.51		-.16			.50	.05		
Best fit ideology	a	b Lab	bLab *LabPM	b Nat	bNat *NatPM	bSC	Govt	R <sup>2</sup>	M+	I+
Defence (Internationalism)	6.20			-.56		-.95	3.35	.68	.05	.08
Foreign Affairs (Internationalism)	.76			.25	-.13	.19		.74	.06	.01

Table 9.7: Best fitting models for New Zealand using revised method, with programme data lagged by two years, 1946-1994

Expenditure and manifesto emphases										
Best fit mandate	a	b Lab	bLab *LabPM	bNat *LabPM	bNat *NatPM	bSC	R <sup>2</sup>	M+		
Law and order (Law and order)	1.08	.15	.61	-.34		.48	.86	.06		
Land Use (Agriculture)	-3.90		.77		.53	.52	.54	.18		
Health (Justice & Welfare)	7.96	.17	.30			.39	.66	.04		
Education (Justice & Education)	8.84		.33		.37	.24	.74	.14		
Transport (Productivity and technology)	-2.46	.32	.48		.16		.89	.11		
Transfers (Justice & Welfare)	9.69	.65	2.26	-1.75		.64	.44	.46		
All Social Services (Welf, Just, Educ)	36.48		1.52	-1.10		.46	.50	.39		
Left-right (Left-right policy)	41.54	-.51	-.43	-.16			.50	.05		
Best fit ideology	a	b Lab	bLab *LabPM	bNat *LabPM	bNat *NatPM	bSC	bNatG	R <sup>2</sup>	M+	I+
Defence (Internationalism)	6.20			-.56	-1.03	-.95	3.35	.68	.05	.08
Foreign affairs (Internationalism)	.76			.25	.12	.19		.74	.06	.01

of the variance is explained.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, Figure 9.12 shows that the only country where a higher proportion of variation was accounted for was France, where on average 80% of variance in expenditure was explained.<sup>36</sup>

The results also show that policy implementation has been high because the results using the revised models in Table 9.7 show that only one of the 33 significant coefficients is contradictory. This coefficient is the left-right mandate coefficient for Labour in the mandate model, with there being a negative relationship between Labour's left-right positions and subsequent government expenditure trends.

These results provide further evidence that manifestos have an important role in policy making in New Zealand. The high proportion of the variance explained in most areas means that the results do not provide much support for pure economic and demographic models of policy-making, which see parties' pre-election policies as having no influence on policy outcomes. The expenditure graphs shown in section 9.3.3 suggested that in some areas demographic and economic trends do have an influence on government expenditure. However, clearly these trends have usually also resulted in changes in parties' manifesto emphases.


In Table 9.6 where Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's specification of the mandate and ideology models is used the number of significant coefficients is the same as in the revised models in Table 9.7. However, since different variables are significant in the different models versions of the mandate and ideology equations this limits the prospects for further comparisons with

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<sup>35</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 243 state that instances where policies did not attain an  $R^2$  of .25 or better made up 12% of cases. They note that the only countries where all the  $R^2$ 's were higher than .25 were Sweden, Austria and France.

<sup>36</sup> This statistic is slightly lower than the average  $R^2$  of 57% for the ten countries listed in Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 257. This is because in this calculation counter-intuitive ideology effects showing increases in defence or law and order expenditure under left-wing governments were dropped, as were increases in housing, education and social services expenditure, or a shift to the left on the left-right dimension when a right-wing party was in government.

Figure 9.12: The average percent of variance explained by the best-fitting policy implementation models in eleven democracies



Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's results for other countries.<sup>37</sup>

As expected the mandate or ideology models always have a higher explanatory power than the agenda models. This shows that in New Zealand government expenditure priorities have been influenced by which party is in government. However, the increase in variance explained by the mandate and ideology models, which are respectively shown by the M+ and I+ columns, is usually modest. The high variance explained by the agenda model reflects the strong link between parties' manifestos, even when they are in opposition, and government expenditure priorities.

In Table 9.7 out of 33 significant coefficients 19, which is 58% of the total, are mandate, ideology or negative mandate effects. The other 14, which make up 42% of the total, are agenda effects resulting from the manifestos of parties which are out of government being positively correlated with government expenditure. These results include considerably more agenda effects than might be expected considering New Zealand's highly majoritarian political system. They support the belief by political scientists that pluralist avenues of influence on government policy in New Zealand have been very important,<sup>38</sup> and provide very strong evidence that this has traditionally curbed governments.

The results for Britain in Figure 9.12 with 'MG' printed below were calculated by the author using data provided by Professor Hofferbert. Although it was hoped that this replication would definitely show how Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge ran their equations, the differences in the results indicate that the author received an improved version of the British expenditure data. Further details on the attempted replication are in Appendix D.

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<sup>37</sup> Using the appendix in *Parties, Policies, and Democracy* it is possible to work out what the mandate effects for each equation would be if the author's revised mandate and ideology equations had been used. However, there is no way of working out which coefficients would be significant using the revised models from the data in that text.

<sup>38</sup> Mitchell, *Politics and People in New Zealand*, pp. 54-57, 135; Richard Mulgan, *Democracy and Power in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 79, 103-130.

The change in the position of Britain means that of the Westminster democracies included New Zealand, Canada and Britain have above average policy implementation rates. The only Westminster system with below average implementation rates has been Australia. However, since some countries with proportional representation electoral systems have high implementation rates the results still support Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's finding that institutional factors have relatively little influence on policy implementation rates.<sup>39</sup>

### 9.5.2 Comparing Actual and Predicted Expenditure

By substituting parties' manifesto emphases and government alternation into the best-fit equations for each area, the predicted level of expenditure for each year was calculated. In Figures 9.13 to 9.22 predicted and actual expenditure are graphed. Actual expenditure is shown by the solid black line, whereas predicted expenditure is shown by the dotted line. These results should help identify during which periods parties' manifesto emphases have been a good or poor guide to government expenditure.<sup>40</sup>

King and Laver have suggested that autocorrelation between error terms is a problem with this method of policy implementation. Autocorrelation is correlation between different error terms. Although it does not affect parameter estimates it can lead to downwardly biased standard errors.<sup>41</sup> Using a runs test with a 99% confidence interval indicated that in every area except health, defence and transfers the pattern of residuals, which are the difference between

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<sup>39</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 260.

<sup>40</sup> This has previously been done by Helmut Thome, 'Party mandate theory and time-series: a methodological comment', Electoral Studies, Vol. 18 (1999).

<sup>41</sup> Salvatore, Schaum's Outline of Statistics and Econometrics, p. 183; Damodar Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 1995), p. 410.

actual and predicted expenditure, was random.<sup>42</sup> While there is clearly some autocorrelation, this is not surprising because the same manifesto emphases are used for each year during a parliamentary term. As a result it is likely that any deviation between actual and predicted expenditure will occur over the entire term of a government.<sup>43</sup> As well as providing further information on the prevalence of autocorrelation, examining the difference between actual and predicted expenditure will show whether heteroscedasity occurs. Heteroscedasity happens when the size of error terms increases over time. In contrast to autocorrelation, heteroscedasity inflates the size of standard errors. It can sometimes be eliminated by dropping either the start or the finish of the time period.<sup>44</sup>

Table 9.7 shows that the fit for transport is exceptionally good, with an  $R^2$  of .89. This is much better than in many other countries, where the relationship between manifesto emphases and infrastructure expenditure areas has often been very poor.<sup>45</sup> In contrast, for land use the  $R^2$  is relatively low at .54, and Figure 9.14 shows that the difference between actual and predicted expenditure is often quite large. This is probably because since agriculture has been New Zealand's main export governments have usually been unable to offer more than transitional financial support to established farmers.<sup>46</sup> As a result land use expenditure has varied considerably from year to year.

The law and order results are a closer fit, with the  $R^2$  of .86 indicating that the rise in law and order emphases in manifestos discussed in chapter six is closely correlated with the growth in law and order expenditure. Despite the apparent influence of demographic and economic factors on education

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<sup>42</sup> Education, land use and transport also pass a runs test using a 95% confidence interval. Different tests sometimes produce different results, with transport, land use and foreign affairs all passing a Durbin-Watson test using a 5% cutoff.

<sup>43</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 284.

<sup>44</sup> Salvatore, *Schaum's Outline of Statistics and Econometrics*, p. 183.

<sup>45</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 245.

<sup>46</sup> Robert Bremner, 'Federated Farmers and the State', in *State and Economy in New Zealand*, edited by Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 118-119.

Figure 9.13: Actual and predicted transport expenditure using the mandate model




Figure 9.14: Actual and predicted land use expenditure using the mandate model




Figure 9.15: Actual and predicted law and order expenditure using the mandate model




Figure 9.16: Actual and predicted education expenditure using the mandate model




Figure 9.17: Actual and predicted health expenditure using the mandate model




Figure 9.18: Actual and predicted military expenditure using the ideology model




Figure 9.19: Actual and predicted foreign affairs expenditure, using the ideology model




Figure 9.20: Actual and predicted transfers expenditure, using the mandate model





Figure 9.21: Actual and predicted total social services expenditure, using the mandate model



expenditure, actual expenditure is consistently close to predicted expenditure with an  $R^2$  of .74. This shows that demographic and economic factors influencing the demand for education have been reflected in parties' manifestos. Figure 9.16 shows that the biggest difference between predicted and actual expenditure for education is during the early to mid 1950s, suggesting that during this period parties failed to correctly read demographic trends when writing their manifestos. For health the  $R^2$  is reasonably good at .66, although the deviations between actual and predicted expenditure in Figure 9.17 are clearly correlated. Restricting the time period covered just up to the 1980s improves the proportion of variance explained, and substantially reduces the autocorrelation. In contrast, when earlier decades are dropped the association between manifesto emphases and government expenditure deteriorates.

For defence Figure 9.18 shows during the Korean War actual expenditure was considerably higher than predicted expenditure. This increase in defence expenditure does not breach mandate theory, which allows for governments taking unannounced action during emergencies.<sup>47</sup> Once the Korean War effects are eliminated by dropping the 1950s from the regression the proportion of variance explained increases, and the size of the residuals falls dramatically. Using a runs test with a 99% confidence interval also indicates that the pattern of residuals is random. For foreign affairs there is always a much closer fit between actual and predicted expenditure.

Transfers stands out having the lowest  $R^2$ , with only 44% of variance being explained. This supports the finding by Rudd and Easton that demographic and economic factors have sometimes had effects on welfare expenditure that

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<sup>47</sup> Cecil Emdin, The People and the Constitution: Being a History of the Development of the People's Influence in British Government, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 307-309; Schelder, 'The Normative Force of Election Promises', p. 202; R.G. Mulgan, 'The Concept of Mandate in New Zealand Politics', Political Science, Vol. 30 (1978), pp. 93-94.

have been independent of parties' policies.<sup>48</sup> However, since transfers has dominated government expenditure it is worth looking at the results in more detail.

Table 9.7 shows that Labour's manifesto emphases have a large positive association with transfers expenditure when it is in government. This is partly reversed by National's justice and welfare state expansion references being negatively correlated with transfers expenditure when Labour is in government. However, this effect is less than it might seem because on average, over the period covered by this chapter, Labour's justice and welfare references are about 4% higher than National's. When National is in government its manifestos only have a small, and statistically insignificant positive association, with transfers expenditure. Labour's manifesto emphases have a moderate positive association with transfers expenditure even when National is in government, although this is less than when it was in government. Social Credit's manifestos consistently have a small positive correlation with welfare expenditure. These results suggest that Labour, and to a lesser extent Social Credit, have had a hegemonic effect on transfers expenditure.<sup>49</sup>

Substituting parties' average references to justice and welfare state expansion into the transfers equation produces a clearer picture. Before Social Credit came onto the political scene, every year Labour was in government transfers expenditure was on average about 5.2% higher than if National was in government. This dropped to 3.4% once Social Credit was formed.<sup>50</sup> These results suggest that if Labour had spent more time in government transfers expenditure would have been considerably higher.

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<sup>48</sup> Rudd, 'The New Zealand Welfare State: Origins, Development, and Crisis', p. 229; Easton, Pragmatism and Progress: Social Security in the Seventies, pp. 9-10, 23.

<sup>49</sup> This and other Social Credit effects may seem implausible. However, National has always had to guard against a tendency for disenchanted supporters to defect to Social Credit.

<sup>50</sup> Although the Social Credit coefficient is the same irrespective of whether Labour or National is in government, on average Social Credit's social justice and welfare state expansion references were higher when National was in government than when Labour was in government.

The results for transfers in Figure 9.20 show increasingly sharp deviations between actual and predicted expenditure during the 1980s and 1990s. Actual transfers expenditure was considerably higher than predicted by 1984, showing that National had failed to meet its 1981 goal of reducing the size of the welfare state. By 1990 transfers expenditure was again considerably higher than predicted expenditure, indicating that Labour had also ended up spending more than it had intended. Under the Bolger National government a sharp reduction in the percentage of government expenditure on transfers, back to what they were in 1984 under the previous National government, could have been expected. However, the results show that National was unable to achieve this level in 1993 and 1994, despite sharp cuts in the level of some benefits and tighter targeting of other benefits. Although these figures are as a proportion of government expenditure, transfers expenditure also continued to increase in absolute terms.

An important why National was unable to reduce expenditure on transfers during the early 1990s was that high unemployment resulting from a sluggish economy increased total demand for benefits. In response to increasing family breakdowns and greater intolerance of domestic violence the number of recipients for the domestic purposes benefit also continued to increase. In addition, benefit cuts accelerated migration by the unemployed to higher paying benefits such as the disability and invalid benefits.<sup>51</sup> New housing subsidies, intended to replace low rents for state tenants, also quickly became far more expensive than Treasury had expected.<sup>52</sup> Finally, National lacked the political will to implement any of its short-lived policies for strict income and asset testing of national superannuation, which is the most expensive welfare

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<sup>51</sup> Robert Stephens, 'Poverty, Family Finances and Social Security', in Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 242-244. Statistics collected by David Thorns and Charles Sedgwick, Understanding Aotearoa/ New Zealand: Historical Statistics (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), pp. 118-119 show that expenditure on invalids benefits increased by 62% between 1990 and 1994, while expenditure on the sickness benefit increased by 44% over the same period.

<sup>52</sup> Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1994, B.6A, 'Economic and Fiscal Outlook', p. 185.

benefit.<sup>53</sup> These results show that, at least in the short-term, National was unsuccessful at achieving its 1990 manifesto goal of “reducing the demand for welfare”.<sup>54</sup>

Rerunning the regression equations for transfers just up to the early 1980s results in the residuals passing a runs test using a 99% confidence interval. Together with the health and defence results this shows that the high autocorrelation which occurred in these areas was restricted to particular time periods. When the results are just run up to the early 1980s the Labour and Social Credit opposition effects become much smaller, while the National mandate effect becomes larger. In contrast, rerunning the regression equations just over recent decades explains a lower proportion of the variance in transfers expenditure, and produces large, highly correlated residuals. These results provide additional evidence that for transfers the link between parties’ manifesto emphases and government expenditure has deteriorated over time.

The  $R^2$ s for both total social services and the left-right expenditure dimension are relatively low at only .50. The left-right results are further weakened by the contradictory coefficient for the Labour mandate effect. These results support Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge’s finding that the link between manifesto emphases and expenditure priorities is strongest on specific policies.<sup>55</sup>

It may seem surprising that transfers and health are the only areas where the relationship between manifesto emphases and government expenditure has deteriorated over time. Probably the reason for this is that when Labour was in government between 1984 and 1990 some politicians still made an effort to keep


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<sup>53</sup> Susan St John, ‘Superannuation in the 1990s: Where Angels Fear to Tread’, in Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 283. In 1994 superannuation payments accounted for 51% of total transfers expenditure.

<sup>54</sup> New Zealand National Party, National Party Policies for the 1990s, p. 10.

<sup>55</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 243.

Figure 9.22: Actual and predicted total left-right expenditure, using the mandate model



Labour's pre-election commitments.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, after the 1990 election National Party politicians tried to keep as many promises as possible.<sup>57</sup> Because New Zealanders had such high expectations, however, political scientists and voters have tended to concentrate on the commitments parties did not keep, rather than those that they did keep.

### 9.7 Conclusion

This chapter applied Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's policy implementation to New Zealand using both their equations and a revised version of the mandate and ideology equations. Although the revised version of their models did not alter the proportion of variance explained, they produced theoretically better results. This was because Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's method tended to underestimate the mandate effect of a party's manifesto as their magnitude was reduced by any positive association between that party's manifesto and government expenditure when it was in opposition.

The results indicate that between 1946 and 1994 New Zealand political parties' manifesto emphases were strongly correlated with government expenditure trends in most of the main expenditure areas. In only one of the eleven democracies in which this method has been used has a higher proportion of variance been explained. The lowest proportion of variance explained was for transfers. Transfers and health are the only areas where the relationship between manifesto emphases and government expenditure has clearly deteriorated over time. The transfers results suggest that governments have frequently lacked the will and ability to limit welfare expenditure, with demographic and economic factors increasingly directly shaping expenditure outcomes. In contrast,

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<sup>56</sup> See, Anthony Hubbard, 'Broken Promises', *Listener*, 16 April 1990, p. 20; Margaret Wilson, *Labour in Government, 1984-1987* (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1989), pp. 62-63.

<sup>57</sup> Jim Bolger, *A View From the Top* (Auckland: Viking, 1998), p. 46.

governments have been very successful at constraining health expenditure since the early 1980s, although this has occurred in a way which has reduced the link between manifesto emphases and health expenditure.

Mandate or ideology models, in which it matters which party is in power, always explained the most variation in government expenditure. However, unexpectedly strong links between emphases in the manifestos of parties out of government and expenditure patterns indicates that because of electoral pressures and the strength of interest groups in some policy areas opposition parties' priorities were sometimes implemented. This suggests that despite New Zealand's highly majoritarian political system sometimes very consensual outcomes have been achieved. This provides strong evidence that the doctrine of the mandate in New Zealand has often been curbed by pluralist conventions.

## Chapter Ten: Conclusion

### 10.1 Introduction

One key theoretical debate addressed in this thesis has been between different theories of democracy and decision-making. According to mandate theories of responsible party government, parties should present realistic policies to voters in their election programmes, and then implement their pre-election commitments if they become the government.<sup>1</sup> Pluralists, who have also been influenced by ideas about popular sovereignty, argue that interest groups should also influence policy outcomes.<sup>2</sup> In contrast, democratic elitists believe that the purpose of elections should simply be to allow voters to choose capable rulers, who after the election should be free to rule in the best interests of the country.<sup>3</sup> Those influenced by Marxist theories also downplay the role of elections in Parliamentary democracies, arguing that important issues are kept off the political agenda.<sup>4</sup> Supporters of economic and demographic theories of democracy argue that economic and demographic factors, rather than parties' policies, are the main influence on policy outcomes.<sup>5</sup>

Another, interrelated, theoretical debate examined has been which political cleavages divide parties, what their ideologies are, and how their policies change over time. Theories of cleavages have been heavily influenced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) who divided cleavages up into national revolution divisions over the authority of the state, and industrial revolution cleavages over economic

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<sup>1</sup> Andreas Schelder, 'The Normative Force of Election Promises', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 10 (1998), p. 195; A.H. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British Constitution (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 17-18.

<sup>2</sup> Gregor McClennan, Marxism, Pluralism and Beyond: Classical Debates and New Departures (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Unwin, 1954), p. 269; Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), pp. 122-123.

<sup>4</sup> John Elser, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 408; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1975), p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Francis Castles, 'Introduction: Politics and Public Policy', in The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982), p. 5.

issues.<sup>6</sup> Subsequent research by Inglehart, and other political scientists including Kitschelt, has uncovered a new politics cleavage. According to Inglehart the new politics cleavage divides voters with postmaterialist aesthetic, social and intellectual needs from those who continue to emphasise traditional materialist goals such as economic growth and physical security.<sup>7</sup> Political scientists have also studied party movement and parties' ideological beliefs in an increasingly sophisticated manner.

Data to test these theoretical debates was predominantly collected from content analysis of New Zealand election programmes. This content analysis was conducted using a slightly modified form of the widely used Manifesto Research Group (MRG) coding system. New Zealand election manifestos were collected for the period between the beginning of organised party competition at the 1911 election, and the 1996 election. Government expenditure data was reworked to form a new dataset for the 1950-1994 period, and was matched up to changes in parties' manifesto emphases. In addition, further tests were made on the relationship between British parties' manifesto emphases and subsequent government expenditure trends.

This chapter initially summarises the main findings about issue change, political cleavages and party movement. Whether parties' policies and their implementation of their programmes are compatible with the requirements of theories of responsible party government and pluralism is then discussed. The significance of these findings and areas for future research are then noted.

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<sup>6</sup> Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in Party Systems and Voter Alignments, edited by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 47.

<sup>7</sup> Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 45; Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 258; Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 237.

## 10.2 Key Findings

### 10.2.1 Political Cleavages, Value Change, and Party Movement

The results confirm that economic and redistributive issues have dominated New Zealand politics; on average they have made up about two-thirds of the content of the main parties' election programmes. Clear left-right divisions are apparent on economic issues, with Labour and other left-wing parties consistently emphasising the state intervention, labour groups: positive, and social justice: economic categories more than right-wing parties. Welfare state expansion themes have also usually been emphasised most by left-wing parties in their election manifestos, but the importance of education expansion has been less contentious. Right-wing parties have almost always emphasised market economy themes more than left-wing parties, and have usually also placed the highest emphasis on economic constraint themes. Contrary to expectations, parties' home ownership policies have not been very prominent in their election manifestos.<sup>8</sup>

Social Credit showed the most support for monetary reform topics, particularly in its early manifestos, although sometimes left-wing parties have also been sympathetic to these ideas. Left-right differences on productivity and technology, and on agriculture and farmers, have usually been small. The agriculture and farmers results suggest that farmers have usually voted for right-wing parties because of their right-wing economic outlook, rather than because of their specific policies for farmers.

These results generally fit well with existing interpretations of New Zealand political culture. This is because they support the view that left-wing parties' main ideological beliefs on economic issues have been socialism, social democracy, new liberalism, and associated theories such as labourism and

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<sup>8</sup> Miles Fairburn, 'Why did the New Zealand Labour Party Fail to Win Office Until 1935?', *Political Science*, Vol. 37 (1985), p. 119; Robert Chapman, 'From Labour to National', *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 372.

welfarism.<sup>9</sup> They are also compatible with the finding by earlier researchers that right-wing parties have been influenced both by classical and new liberal beliefs.<sup>10</sup>

The results for national revolution issues showed that the internationalism and pacifism of left-wing and new politics parties<sup>11</sup> has been reflected in the way that they have consistently emphasised peace and cooperation foreign policy themes the most. Whereas Reform's main foreign policy emphasis was on foreign special relations: positive, National's has been military: positive. Since the late 1960s, however, right-wing parties have usually emphasised peace and cooperation themes more than any other foreign policy topic in their manifestos. After being largely ignored until the late 1930s, policies benefiting ethnic minorities have usually been given similar levels of attention by different types of parties. This shows that in New Zealand minor right-wing parties have not been less sympathetic to ethnic minorities than other parties. These results expose an important cultural difference between New Zealand and central Europe, where new right-wing parties have often been very hostile to ethnic minorities.<sup>12</sup>

Social conservatism and political authority themes have nearly always been emphasised more by right-wing than left-wing parties. The main parties' references to social conservatism themes in their manifestos have increased since the late 1960s because of greater concern about law and order. However, political authority themes have become much less important since the 1950s,

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<sup>9</sup> Barry Gustafson, Labour's Path to Political Independence: The Origins and Establishment of the New Zealand Labour Party 1900-19 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1980), p. 151; Barry Gustafson, 'The Labour Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 268-272; Jack Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', New Zealand Journal of History, Vol. 21 (1987), pp. 223-224.

<sup>10</sup> Vowles, 'Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology', pp. 225-226; G.A. Wood, 'The National Party', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 301-302.

<sup>11</sup> David McCraw, 'Realism and Idealism in New Zealand's Foreign Policy', New Zealand International Review, Vol. 23 (1998), pp. 20-21; Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 15.

<sup>12</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. viii; Herbert Kitschelt, 'European Party Systems: Continuity and Change', in Developments in West European Politics, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997), p. 138.

suggesting that New Zealand has become a much less authoritarian society. The results for social conservatism and political authority are very significant. This is because they show that despite its recent history of European settlement, conservative beliefs and policies have been more important in New Zealand politics than often thought.<sup>13</sup>

The results confirm that some “new politics” issues such as freedom and democracy cannot be considered new because they have always been on the political agenda.<sup>14</sup> However, the results also show that other postmaterialist themes, such as the environment and culture, have become more important over time. The environmentalist Values and Green parties stand out, not only for their high emphasis on protecting the environment, but also for being the only parties to oppose economic growth. Values and the Greens are also the only parties to make more than token references to the importance of postmaterialist goals, such as self-actualisation and self-determination. They have shown very little support, however, for some new politics topics such as culture. These results support those who have cast doubt on the theoretical coherency of the concept of postmaterialism.<sup>15</sup>

The content analysis and factor analysis results confirmed that a clear left-right ideological cleavage between the main parties existed in New Zealand over the 1911-1996 period.<sup>16</sup> Scales were constructed to measure parties’ positions on a economic policy dimension, and on a general left-right dimension which also included foreign policy and social conservatism themes. On these dimensions left and right-wing parties have almost always maintained separate positions. This shows that at an ideological level Lipset and Rokkan’s theory about the

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<sup>13</sup> W.H. Oliver, ‘Problems and Prospects of Conservatism in New Zealand’, *Impact*, Vol. 1 (1965), pp. 17-19; Vowles, ‘Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology’, p. 223; Francis Castles, *The Working Class and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Development of the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand* (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 55-56.

<sup>14</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 140.

<sup>15</sup> Lijphart, *Democracies*, p. 140; Klaus Von Beyme, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1985), p. 132.

<sup>16</sup> Austin Mitchell, *Politics and People in New Zealand* (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), p. 30; Peter Aimer, ‘The Future of the Party System’, in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, edited by Raymond Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 193.

persistence of traditional cleavages is supported for New Zealand.<sup>17</sup> A new politics-old politics dimension is also apparent, on which there has been more overlap between different types of parties. In addition to including issues such as the environment and culture, which have become more important over time, this dimension included long-established issues such as social conservatism and political authority.

The results for parties' overall positions largely conformed to expectations, although there are also some very important divergences. As expected they show during the late 1920s and early 1930s Labour's policies followed a Downsian trajectory, with it moving towards the political centre as it abandoned its socialist policies in favour of more moderate social democratic and new liberal policies.<sup>18</sup> The results challenge perceptions about the relative positions of the Reform and Liberal parties on economic issues during the 1911-1928 period, with Reform appearing as a centre party and the Liberals as slightly more right-wing.<sup>19</sup> This reflects a tendency by historians to underestimate Reform's support for the welfare state, and to exaggerate the significance of the Liberal Party's limited support for state ownership. The Reform and Liberal parties' consistently very moderate positions on the economic issues dimension reveals an important obstacle to Labour's attempts to increase its vote share until right-wing parties moved to the right in response to the Great Depression.

On the economic dimension over the 1935-1996 period National has been more moderate than Labour. While National has been considerably further to the right on economic policy issues than both the Reform and Liberal parties, it has usually still been near the centre of this dimension. Sometimes, however, the classical liberal strand of thinking within National has resulted in it proposing

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<sup>17</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', p. 50.

<sup>18</sup> Bruce Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1962), p. 216; Jack Vowles, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means, and for Whom?', in The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> R.M. Burdon, The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand 1918-39 (Wellington: Reed, 1965), p. 3; Michael Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 251.

strongly right-wing economic policies.<sup>20</sup> Labour and National converged from the early 1960s, and on the economic policy dimension fractionally crossed-over each other at the 1975 election. Since then they have been more polarised, with Labour and National usually advocating more traditional and extreme policies. After being right-wing at early elections, Social Credit has usually been a centre party. New Zealand First was near the centre at the 1993 election, but more to the left in 1996. Other minor left and right-wing parties have tended to be more polarised than Labour and National. Both Values and the Greens have been well left of centre. However, they differ from traditional left-wing parties because of their very low support for some left-wing themes such as welfare state expansion and labour groups: positive.

These movement results show that in New Zealand post-war end of ideology theories<sup>21</sup> had considerable validity, in terms of political parties' left-right positions, up to the mid-1970s. They also provide some support for Downs' economic theory of democracy, which argues that in a system dominated by two main parties they will ideologically converge towards the position of the median voter.<sup>22</sup> Looked at over the entire period, however, the results best support Robertson's saliency theory of party movement. According to Robertson left and right-wing parties usually remain ideologically distinct because of their different goals, dependence on the party organization, and to maintain their credibility.<sup>23</sup>

On the new politics-old politics dimension the postmaterialist Values and Green parties place a very strong emphasis on new politics themes. The results also show that left-wing parties have usually been more supportive of new politics policies than right-wing parties have. Although Labour showed very strong support for new politics themes in its early manifestos, with Reform also doing so in 1911, it then moved to a strongly old politics position that was closer to the preferences of most voters. Labour and National have gradually moved to the new politics end of the new politics-old politics dimension since the mid-

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<sup>20</sup> Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), p. 9; Wood, 'The National Party', pp. 301-302, 309.

<sup>21</sup> Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Illinois: Free Press, 1960), p. 373; Seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 440, 445.

<sup>22</sup> Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), p. 116.

1930s, indicating growing public support for new politics policies. In contrast to Inglehart's and Kitschelt's theories minor right-wing parties have often taken very moderate positions on new politics issues.<sup>24</sup> These results indicate that although value change in New Zealand has taken place, it has been more complex and widespread than Inglehart and Kitschelt have theorised. The shift by the traditional parties towards new politics priorities has been very slow. This is probably because of New Zealand's low economic growth rate,<sup>25</sup> together with parties' growing concern about the vast increase in crime rates that has occurred during the postwar period.<sup>26</sup>

The generally moderate positions of right-wing parties on the new politics-old politics dimension has minimised the level of polarisation between left and right-wing parties on this dimension. As a result there have usually been greater differences between Labour and the main right-wing party on economic issues than on the new politics-old politics dimension. This supports Lipset and Rokkan's theory about the dominance of the class cleavage in western democracies.<sup>27</sup> However, differences between Labour and the Reform and Liberal parties over the 1911-1928 period were sometimes almost as large on the new politics-old politics dimension as on the economic left-right dimension. Since many workers would have held strong old politics views,<sup>28</sup> this reveals an important additional reason for why Labour's support was low during this period.

Between the 1972 and 1990 elections new politics issues were more important than economic policy issues at dividing Labour and National. This helps explain why many middle-class voters supported Labour during this period, while many working-class voters supported National. At the 1993 and 1996 elections divergence between Labour and National on the economic policy

<sup>23</sup> David Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition* (London: John Wiley, 1976), p. 64.

<sup>24</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 2; Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 267.

<sup>25</sup> Francis Castles, *Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-war Transformation* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp. 30-33.

<sup>26</sup> See section 6.2.3 in chapter six.

<sup>27</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', pp. 35, 46, 50.

dimension together with convergence on the new politics-old politics dimension resulted in the economic policy dimension again becoming most important.

### 10.2.2 Models of Democracy in New Zealand

As well as being indispensable for studying cleavages and value change, the manifesto data provides insights into parties' attitudes towards democracy, and into whether parties have campaigned in ways compatible with the theory of responsible party government. Data collected by this thesis shows that most parties' manifestos showed a strong tendency to grow in length between the 1911 and 1981 elections. This growth in the length of manifestos occurred because the social bases of parties widened, because it was widely held that an active state was desirable, and because of high support for the mandate theory belief that parties should be responsive to voters' demands. However, since the mid-1980s manifestos have usually been shorter than in the past. This reflects much higher support than previously among politicians for elitist models of democracy, high levels of public distrust of parties' promises, and the realisation that a short manifesto is more likely to be read by voters.<sup>29</sup>

Although parties' selective emphasis on issues means that they are continually trying to set the political agenda,<sup>30</sup> the existence of competing parties means that a wide range of issues have been raised in election programmes. The main topic that has been kept out of party politics has been moral issues, with all parties except the Christian Coalition downplaying these themes. While the exclusion of the most contentious moral issues from party politics has reduced internal disputes within parties,<sup>31</sup> it has meant that parties have provided little

<sup>28</sup> Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, pp. 259, 267.

<sup>29</sup> Margaret Wilson, *Labour in Government 1984-1987* (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1989), p. 134; Jack Vowles, et al., *Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 132-133; Marryan Street, 'Discussion', in *Double Decision: The 1993 Election and Referendum in New Zealand*, edited by Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer (Wellington: Department of Politics, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994), p. 30.

<sup>30</sup> Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, *Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 141.

<sup>31</sup> Richard Mulgan, *Democracy and Power in New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 99.

direction for society on these issues.<sup>32</sup> Maori also received very little attention in manifestos until the 1930s, while it has only been in recent decades that commitments to help groups such as women and the disabled have been significantly emphasised in manifestos. These results support Mulgan's finding that while most groups are able to get their concerns onto the political agenda, there are some persistent inequalities in New Zealand politics.<sup>33</sup>

Parties have also usually campaigned in ways compatible with the theory of responsible party government because their manifestos have largely been about important issues. Although highly emotional social conservatism phrases were prominent in Reform's manifestos between 1919 and 1925, Labour's extreme policies made these issues politically salient at the time.<sup>34</sup> Once Labour moderated its policies Reform downplayed these themes, providing further evidence that it was not inventing these conservative concerns. While National's social conservatism and political authority references have usually been about substantive issues, at the 1951 election it moved New Zealand away from the democratic ideal. This was because National falsely associated striking unions with communist activity.<sup>35</sup> Promises by parties to control migration have sometimes been illiberal, and about particular ethnic groups, although these references have usually been low. The widespread support since the late 1930s among all types of parties, including small right-wing parties, for helping ethnic minorities confirms that the elites who write manifestos are more moderate on these issues than many of their supporters.<sup>36</sup> These results show that parties have usually campaigned in a way encouraging rational voting, rather than by trying to appeal to voters' emotions.

Other studies of New Zealand politics have found that the convention of the mandate was weakened by the Liberal Party after 1928, when it was unable to implement its irresponsible promise to massively increase government

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<sup>32</sup> R.S. Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 274.

<sup>33</sup> Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 158; Richard Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), p. 316.

<sup>34</sup> P.J. O'Farrell, Harry Holland: Militant Socialist (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1964), p. 111; Gustafson, Labour's Path to Political Independence, pp. 93, 151.

<sup>35</sup> Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, revised edition (Auckland: Penguin, 1980), p. 287.

<sup>36</sup> Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus?, pp. 204-205.

borrowing.<sup>37</sup> In 1932 the Coalition then extended its term to four years, despite not having a mandate to do so.<sup>38</sup> The convention of the mandate was then re-established from the mid 1930s by successive Labour and National governments. This thesis has found additional evidence that the convention of the mandate was then sharply weakened by the 1981-1984 Muldoon government. The reason for this is that Muldoon's interventionist policies were the opposite of what National had promised before the election.<sup>39</sup> Labour also failed to signal its shift to the right on economic issues during the 1980s.<sup>40</sup> This thesis has shown that although National indicated a right-wing policy direction in its 1990 manifesto, it did not accurately signal its manifesto policies in other campaign messages. These results help explain the breakdown in democratic legitimacy which occurred during the 1981-1993 period.

Applying Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's policy implementation method confirmed that over the 1946-1994 period policy implementation in New Zealand was higher than in most other countries. Indeed, of the eleven countries where this method has been used New Zealand has the second highest implementation rates. This highlights the traditional importance to New Zealand political parties of mandate theory.<sup>41</sup>

Despite increasing support for democratic elitism among New Zealand politicians between the early 1980s and early 1990s, transfers and health expenditure were the only areas where the relationship between manifesto emphases and government expenditure weakened. Transfers expenditure sharply increased despite attempts by successive governments to limit expenditure, indicating that this is an area where economic and demographic effects have a

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<sup>37</sup> Michael Bassett, Three Party Politics in New Zealand: 1911-1931 (Auckland: Historical Publications, 1982), pp. 40-41; Michael Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 272.

<sup>38</sup> D.G. Harper, 'The Doctrine of the Mandate with particular reference to its development in New Zealand', (M.A. thesis, Victoria University College, Wellington, 1955), pp. 61-62.

<sup>39</sup> Robert Chapman, 'Political Culture: The Purposes of Party and the Current Challenge', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1989), p. 28.

<sup>40</sup> Chapman, 'Political Culture', p. 28; Richard Mulgan, 'The Changing Electoral Mandate', in The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Martin Holland and Jonathan Boston (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 11.

direct effect on government expenditure. In contrast, there is a poor relationship between manifesto emphases and health expenditure during recent decades, because government actions which have controlled expenditure have been poorly correlated to parties' manifesto emphases. The decline in implementation of expenditure priorities was probably confined to these two expenditure areas because despite the rise of democratic elitism many politicians still tried to keep as many promises as possible.<sup>42</sup>

Even in areas such as education, where expenditure appears to have been clearly influenced by demographic and economic trends, there is a strong association between manifesto emphases and government expenditure. This provides important evidence that when writing their manifestos parties have been sensitive to changes in the social context. In a number of cases there was a strong association between the manifesto emphases of parties out of government and government expenditure. This suggests that because of the strength of interest groups, electoral pressures, and the close links politicians had with voters, that in some policy areas opposition parties' priorities were sometimes implemented. These results show that the convention of the mandate in New Zealand has been qualified by a pluralist concern with the priorities of a wide range of interest groups, and by an awareness of demographic and economic trends.<sup>43</sup>

Together with high positive opposition party effects in Britain<sup>44</sup> this indicates that even in high majoritarian political systems, like New Zealand's and Britain's, opposition parties' policies may be accommodated. This challenges Lijpart's view that decentralized, bi-cameral, multiparty systems, with written constitutions, coalition governments elected by proportional

<sup>41</sup> K.J. Scott, The New Zealand Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 50; R.G. Mulgan, 'The Concept of the Mandate in New Zealand Politics', Political Science, Vol. 30 (1978), p. 92.

<sup>42</sup> Anthony Hubbard, 'Broken Promises', Listener, 16 April 1990, p. 20; Jim Bolger, A View From the Top (Auckland: Viking, 1998), p. 46.

<sup>43</sup> The strength of interest groups has been noted by other political scientists. See, in particular, Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand, pp. 54-57; Austin Mitchell, The Half-Gallon, Quarter-Acre Pavlova Paradise (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1972), p. 92; Richard Mulgan, 'The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 518.

<sup>44</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy (Boulder: Westview, 1994), p. 257; see also appendix D of this thesis.

representation, and corporatist interest group systems, tend to generate more consensual policy outcomes.<sup>45</sup>

The extreme policies of the Labour Party at early elections together with the much more moderate positions of right-wing parties suggest that business interests have had relatively little influence over parties' manifesto policies. The proportion of government expenditure on areas such as welfare and health has also increased over time. The results in this study would therefore seem to provide little support for traditional Marxist theories of democracy.<sup>46</sup> Instead, changes in parties' positions both on individual categories, and on the left-right and new politics-old politics dimensions show that parties have been responsive to social change and electoral pressures. At the same time the existence of enduring policy differences between different types of parties on the main dimensions of competition will have provided voters with clear choices between different types of policy alternatives.<sup>47</sup> They will also have kept the risk of voting cycles very low.<sup>48</sup>

During some periods, such as the 1970s, parties' responsiveness to electoral pressures has been at the expense of responsible economic policies,<sup>49</sup> supporting elitist fears about democracy. However, the persistent policy differences between parties, together with their generally high policy implementation rates, and economic policies which have for the most part been

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<sup>45</sup> Arend Lijphart, 'Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes and Consequences', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1 (1989), pp. 36-37, 40; Arend Lijphart, *Democracies*, pp. 21-25; Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 3-7. However, Lijphart, *Democracies*, pp. 15-17 admits that the "picture of an omnipotent one-party cabinet" in majoritarian systems is "false and misleading" because interest groups check the government of the day.

<sup>46</sup> The results could be seen as being compatible with class-balance theories of Marxism which see governments as making concessions to voters in order to maintain support for capitalism. However, the extent to which right-wing parties have been responsive to public opinion in New Zealand would seem to undermine the plausibility of these theories. In addition, Elser, *Making Sense of Marx*, p. 422 queries how Marxist class-balance theories are.

<sup>47</sup> Gerald Pomper, *Voters, Elections and Parties: The Practice of Democratic Theory* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 258.

<sup>48</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 254.

<sup>49</sup> Alan McRobie, 'The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 391-392; Michael Bassett, *The State in New Zealand 1840-1984: Socialism Without Doctrines?* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), pp. 20, 302.

responsible, indicate that New Zealand political parties have usually fulfilled most of the requirements of the theory of responsible party government.

Although the conventions of the mandate and interest group consultation were severely weakened by successive governments in the 1980s and early 1990s, since then Labour and National Party politicians have shown renewed support for these practises.<sup>50</sup> This reflects the collapse in Labour's and National's support which threatened their survival as the largest parties, greater electoral pressures arising from the introduction of proportional representation, and many of their most extreme politicians either joining other parties or leaving politics.<sup>51</sup> There may also have been an awareness that elitist policy making procedures frequently produce poor results. An important reason for this is that the New Zealand economy performed much worse during the economic reform process than the Australian economy where reform was signalled before elections, and subsequently carried out in a more moderate and negotiated way.<sup>52</sup> This suggests that in a Parliamentary democracy a move to a very elitist system of decision-making is likely to unleash forces that will force a return to more responsive government.

### 10.3 Future Prospects for Responsible Party Government in New Zealand

The conventions of the mandate and interest group consultation are likely to remain important controls on governments in the future. Recent legislative changes have usually reduced the potential for elective dictatorship in New Zealand, while making responsible party government more likely. In particular, the introduction of the MMP system of proportional representation at the 1996 election means that coalition governments will be much more frequent, with this

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<sup>50</sup> Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 258.

<sup>51</sup> Jack Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 7-10; Jonathan Boston, et al., New Zealand Under MMP: A New Politics? (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), pp. 47-58.

<sup>52</sup> Brian Easton, In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1997), p. 257; Brian Easton and Rolf Gerritsen, 'Economic Reform: Parallels and Divergences', in The Great Experiment: Labour Parties and Public Policy Transformation in Australia and New Zealand, edited by Francis Castles, Rolf Gerritsen and Jack Vowles (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), pp. 40-46.

encouraging compromise between parties.<sup>53</sup> Although no party will usually be able to implement its entire programme,<sup>54</sup> by increasing electoral competition proportional representation increases the costs for parties which depart from their pre-election policies and long-term principles.<sup>55</sup> The increase in the size of Parliament resulting from the introduction of MMP will also tend to dilute the power of the executive.

In addition, the potential for elective dictatorship has been reduced because the Fourth Labour government repealed legislation providing governments with a “blank cheque” to enact regulations to control the economy.<sup>56</sup> The Reserve Bank Act (1989) has made changes in government economic policies more transparent. Similarly, the Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994) constrains the ability of governments to hide the state of the economy, and means that parties will know the real economic situation when making their pre-election commitments. In contrast, public sector reforms have increased the power of governments to set a broad policy direction for the public service. However, the state sector is now much smaller, and politicians have surrendered control over many minor decisions.<sup>57</sup>

Further changes that could be made to restrain the executive include strengthening the freedom of officers of Parliament such as the Ombudsman, Auditor-General and the Commissioner for the Environment from influence by the government of the day.<sup>58</sup> Increasing the power of select committees would allow opposition parties greater influence, and should lead to better scrutiny of

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<sup>53</sup> Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 74.

<sup>54</sup> Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 258.

<sup>55</sup> Jack Vowles, et al., Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), p. 182

<sup>56</sup> Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and Government (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 165-170.

<sup>57</sup> Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer, Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 82, 310; Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie, New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation: Accident? Design? Evolution? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 9.

<sup>58</sup> Jane Kelsey, Rolling Back the State: Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1993), p. 179; Palmer and Palmer, Bridled Power, p. 311.

legislation. Strengthening the Prime Minister's office would reduce the power of Treasury by giving governments access to a wider range of policy advice.<sup>59</sup>

Although a longer parliamentary term might encourage governments to take a more long-term approach to policy-making, it would be unacceptable to voters because it would reduce their control over politicians.<sup>60</sup> An upper house would be unlikely to be effective without being an undesirable obstruction to decisions made by Parliament.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, referendums are usually "blunt and crude devices" for letting public opinion influence decision-making, and can adversely affect minorities.<sup>62</sup> While a statutory limitation on the size of cabinet would further curb its power, this is unlikely to be ever acceptable to politicians.

#### 10.4 Implications for Other Researchers

As well as improving our understanding of New Zealand politics, this thesis has made important contributions in terms of theoretical methods. In particular, a theoretical improvement was made to Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's policy implementation equations. This involved adding additional interactive variables to the mandate and ideology models to completely separately measure the association between parties' manifestos and government expenditure when they were in government, and when they were in opposition. When this refinement was applied to New Zealand and Britain it had no effect on the proportion of variance explained, or the number of significant coefficients. However, it did tend to strengthen the mandate effects. This was because in Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's original mandate and ideology equations positive agenda effects detracted from the mandate effects.

Theoretically this study has also shown the need for extreme caution when carrying out factor analysis of time series data. Both in the factor analysis of the

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<sup>59</sup> Jonathan Boston, 'The Treasury: Its Role, Philosophy and Influence', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 212.

<sup>60</sup> Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 102.

<sup>61</sup> Alan McRobie, 'Electoral System Options', in New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Hyam Gold (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), pp. 462-463

<sup>62</sup> Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Towards a Better Democracy (Wellington: Government Print, 1986), pp. 175-176; McRobie, 'Electoral System Options', pp. 466-468.

content analysis results and in the factor analysis of the expenditure data, time effects prevented the optimal dimensions from being generated. In these cases better dimensions were generated by using knowledge of the data together with factor analysis results and theoretical knowledge of politics to write equations to measure parties' positions and changes in expenditure trends. This reaffirms the importance of prior theorising when undertaking factor analysis so that there are objective standards to judge the results by.<sup>63</sup>

## 10.5 Limitations and Further Research

### 10.5.1 Further New Zealand Research

The findings by this study have been limited by the concentration on election programmes to measure parties' policies. This means that other variables, such as the background and personalities of politicians, which also influence voters' perceptions of political parties and parties' actions once in government have not been measured. Some research has already been carried out on ways of categorising New Zealand politicians by their social background, and further data has since been collected. However, collecting information on Parliamentary candidates, particularly those who have been unsuccessful, is very difficult.<sup>64</sup> Overseas the manifesto coding scheme has been used to code policy statements by individual candidates,<sup>65</sup> and this could also be done in New Zealand.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> J. Scott Armstrong, 'Derivation of Theory by Means of Factor Analysis or Tom Swift and His Electric Factor Analysis Machine', American Statistician, Vol. 21 (1967), p. 17.

<sup>64</sup> Alan Simpson, 'Those who stand, and also fall (New Zealand Parliamentary Candidates Project)', Australian Political Science Association Conference Paper, Melbourne, August 1984, p. 2; discussion with Alan Simpson, 24 June 1999. On p. 2 Simpson notes that information on successful candidates is often listed in Who's Who. In contrast, losers have usually quickly regained their anonymity. A problem Simpson does not note is that parties sometimes embellish or suppress the truth when providing information on candidates.

<sup>65</sup> David Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp. 137-173.

<sup>66</sup> A telephone conversation with the reference librarian at Hocken, 1 July 1996, revealed that they had been collecting candidate election brochures since the 1960s. John Marshall, Memoirs Volume One: 1912 to 1960 (Auckland: Collins, 1983), p. 98, and R.D. Muldoon, The Rise and Fall of a Young Turk (Wellington: Reed, 1974), p. 28 state that they have archived copies of their brochures. However, in many cases probably only newspaper versions will be available.

In addition, less formal statements by politicians, and political advertising could be coded. Politicians' speeches are often less rational than election programmes, and play more on voters' emotions. For instance, at the 1975 election National "took advertising techniques and social persuasion to the very depths" with a series of animated cartoons which played on public fears.<sup>67</sup> The most controversial of these advertisements suggested that Labour's contributory superannuation scheme would lead to Russian-style communism in New Zealand.<sup>68</sup> In the 1970s Labour also sought to scare voters by describing Robert Muldoon, who was National's leader, as a potential dictator.<sup>69</sup> Despite the crumbling of communism, even in 1990 references by National politicians to "reds under the bed" went down well with more conservative rural voters,<sup>70</sup> although it undoubtedly cost National credibility in urban areas.<sup>71</sup> However, greater cynicism by voters seems to have reduced the emotional effects of political advertising at recent elections in New Zealand.<sup>72</sup>

The application of the policy implementation methodology was limited by the availability of consistent time-series expenditure data. Currently Julia Crouch, a retired Statistics New Zealand worker, is recategorising central government expenditure from 1935 onwards into standard International Monetary Fund (IMF) categories.<sup>73</sup> Once this work is complete it will be possible to rerun the policy implementation results over an even longer time period. There also seems no reason why the expenditure dataset used in this thesis should end in 1994, and consideration should be given by Treasury to extending it to the present day.

Studying which cleavages have been most important using content analysis data from election programmes is likely to remain of interest to New Zealand

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<sup>67</sup> Bob Harvey, 'Inventing the Truth', in *Whose News?*, edited by Margie Comrie and Judy McGregor (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1992), p. 106.

<sup>68</sup> Chris Wilkes, 'The Great New Zealand Melodrama: Television and the 1975 General Election', in *Politics in New Zealand: A Reader*, edited by Stephen Levine (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p. 213.

<sup>69</sup> Barry Gustafson, *The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party* (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), p. 125.

<sup>70</sup> Brad Tattersfield, 'Bolger the red-basher', *National Business Review*, 18 October 1990, p. 2.

<sup>71</sup> Tim Murphy, 'Everyone out of step except Bolger', *New Zealand Herald*, 20 October, 1990, p. 5.

<sup>72</sup> Bob Harvey, 'Inventing the Truth', p. 109.

political scientists. With more coalition governments likely in New Zealand, manifesto data could provide a valuable check on the policy basis for coalitions.

Despite the vagueness of parties' policies a pledge-based study of parties' promises would also be valuable. This could investigate which specific promises parties have broken, and which major policy changes were not signalled in their manifestos. By measuring variations in the number of specific promises over time it would also be possible to test in greater detail theories of democratic overload during the 1970s and 1980s. The cost of promises could also be estimated, although this is very difficult to do.<sup>74</sup>

An aggregate level study of voting behaviour, examining which social groups have been most likely to vote for particular parties, would be a useful supplement to this study. Aggregate data would provide further evidence for the theory outlined in chapter five that farmers have been most likely to vote for right-wing parties because of these parties' general economic policies, rather than because of their specific policies for farmers.<sup>75</sup> However, aggregate analysis of voting data is unlikely to show the influence on voting behaviour of topics such as social conservatism, which this thesis showed were prominent in parties' manifestos.

### 10.5.2 Future Comparative Manifesto Research

Over the past twenty years the manifesto research project has been "one of the greatest success stories of international political science cooperation".<sup>76</sup> A major text on party, government, and voter positions to be published this year

<sup>73</sup> Julia Crouch, telephone conversation with author, 16 October 1998.

<sup>74</sup> Vernon Small and Stephen Harris, 'Labour's Hidden Costs', *National Business Review*, 15 October 1993, pp. 18-19; Elizabeth McLeay, *The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 196-197.

<sup>75</sup> Christian Leithner, 'Economic Conditions and the Vote: A Contingent Rather Than Categorical Influence', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23 (1993), pp. 339-372 examines economic voting in three countries, including New Zealand, between the First and Second World Wars. However, he does not examine urban-rural differences.

<sup>76</sup> Peter Mair, 'Searching for the Positions of Political Actors: A Review of Approaches and an Evaluation of Expert Surveys in Particular', Paper at ECPR Joint Sessions, University of Mannheim, 26-31 March 1999, p. 8

will undoubtedly enhance knowledge on party positions.<sup>77</sup> Analysis of the growing collection from the new democracies in Eastern Europe will further add to the literature. Computer based coding schemes also provide the potential for new and much quicker methods of coding manifestos and other textual material in the future.<sup>78</sup>

The policy implementation findings for New Zealand and Britain using the revised versions of the mandate equations suggest that it would be desirable to rerun the revised models for all countries, and then plot actual and predicted expenditure. However, reconstituting Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's dataset would be very difficult.<sup>79</sup> Another option would be to try and compare policy implementation between countries using standard IMF expenditure series, which extend back to 1972, or OECD figures which go back to the 1960s.<sup>80</sup>

Additional research into the persistence of traditional cleavages in countries with large Christian parties would be revealing.<sup>81</sup> The positions of overseas right-wing parties overseas could be investigated to examine whether they also take moderate positions on new politics issues, or whether New Zealand is an exception. In many countries it would be desirable to extend the manifesto dataset back in time. This would make it possible to test on a cross-national basis Lipset and Rokkan's hypothesis about the freezing of cleavages since the 1920s. Further research would be particularly valuable in Ireland, where Mair has argued that national revolution issues about Irish sovereignty and territorial unity have become less important since the 1930s.<sup>82</sup>

There is also potential for using the existing dataset for cross-national comparisons of parties' references to different types of issues. Graphing variations in the saliency of new politics issues such as culture and

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<sup>77</sup> Ian Budge, 'Estimating Party Policy Preferences: From Ad Hoc Measures to Theoretically Validated Studies', Paper at Mannheim ECPR 1999, p. [27].

<sup>78</sup> Budge, 'Estimating Party Policy Preferences', p. [23].

<sup>79</sup> In a letter to the author, 16 January 2000, Professor Budge estimated that this would probably take at least a semester's work using Hofferbert's original sources held at the State University of New York at Binghamton, and that it would be very difficult to do.

<sup>80</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert, and Ian Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 39; Email from Professor Hofferbert, 9 March 1999.

<sup>81</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, p. 265.

environmental protection would make it possible to see whether these themes have become more important in all countries. Similarly, by comparing parties' references to different economic policy categories it could be seen how the policies of different types of parties vary.

### 10.6 Conclusion

This thesis has shown that left-right and new politics-old politics cleavages have divided New Zealand political parties. The main parties have usually maintained separate positions on left-right dimensions, but often have been less sharply differentiated on the new politics-old politics dimension. All types of parties have become more sympathetic to new politics policies over time, indicating a general change in society's priorities. Differences between Labour and National were larger between 1972 and 1990 on the new politics-old politics cleavage than on the economic policy cleavage. However, at both the 1993 and 1996 elections differences between Labour and National on the economic policy cleavage were again more important than on new politics themes. It is difficult to predict which cleavage will be most important in the future.

In New Zealand parties' election manifesto policies have usually been compatible with the requirements of theories of responsible party government and pluralism. This is because there are few signs of agenda-setting, while parties have been responsive to changes in the policy environment and to value change. Differences between parties' policies have provided voters with choices between policy alternatives at elections. It has also been shown that implementation of parties' expenditure priorities during the 1946-1994 period was very high. In addition, governments have often been responsive to opposition party concerns. Parties have sometimes done less well in terms of ensuring that responsible economic policies have been followed. However, during a period between the early 1980s and early 1990s when New Zealand

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<sup>82</sup> Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organization, Ideology and Electoral Competition (London: Frances Pinter, 1987), p. 140.

politicians behaved in a very elitist way its economic performance was much worse than in previous decades.

Since the early 1990s New Zealand politicians have been working to rebuild trust by only making achievable commitments in their manifestos, and then striving to achieve them once in office. An improving economy has also made it easier for parties to keep their pre-election commitments. In order to ensure that they are able to keep to their pre-election commitments in the future parties will need to combine being responsive to the preferences of their supporters with developing policies that are in their long-term interests.

## Appendix A: Coding Definitions and Aggregated Categories

### A.1 Introduction

This appendix first gives the coding definitions contained in Andrea Volkens', Content Analysis of Party Programmes in Comparative Perspective: Handbook and Coding Instructions (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 1992), pp.55-65, and the new codes introduced for New Zealand. Only the sections of the coding descriptions relevant to New Zealand politics have been included. An asterisk has been put before the subcodes and new codes introduced for New Zealand. The aggregated categories used in the content analysis chapter, and the rationale for aggregating the categories in this way, are then outlined.

### A.2 The Manifesto Codes

#### Domain 1. External Relations

##### 101 Foreign Special Relations: Positive

Favourable mentions of the countries with which New Zealand has a special relationship. For New Zealand this was defined as Commonwealth countries.

##### \*101B Foreign Special Relations: Britain

Positive references to Britain and the British Empire.

##### \*101C Foreign Special Relations: Commonwealth

Positive references to the Commonwealth.

##### \*101P Foreign Special Relations: Pacific

Positive references to helping Commonwealth countries in the Pacific.

##### \*101A Foreign Special Relations: Australia

Positive references to New Zealand's special relationship with Australia.

#### 102 Foreign Special Relations: Negative

Negative mentions of countries with which New Zealand has a special relationship.

#### 103 Anti-Imperialism

Negative references to exerting strong influence (political, military or economic) over other states; negative references to controlling other countries as if they were part of an empire; favourable mentions of decolonisation; favourable references to greater self-government and independence for colonies; negative references to the imperial behaviour of the manifesto country and/or other countries.

#### 104 Military: Positive

Need to maintain or increase military expenditure; modernising armed forces and improvement in military strength; rearmament and self-defence; need to keep military treaty obligations; need to secure adequate manpower in the military.

#### 105 Military: Negative

Favourable mentions of decreasing military expenditure; disarmament; “evils of war”; promises to reduce conscription; otherwise as 104, but negative.

#### 106 Peace

Peace as a general goal; declarations of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises; desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries.

#### 107 Internationalism: Positive

Need for international cooperation; cooperation with specific countries other than those coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any international

goal or world state; support for United Nations. This code was varied to also include support for the League of Nations.

#### 108 European Community: Positive

Favourable mentions of European Community in general.

#### 109 Internationalism: Negative

Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty as opposed to internationalism; otherwise as 107, but negative.

#### 110 European Community: Negative

Hostile mentions of the European Community.

### Domain 2. Freedom and Democracy

#### 201 Freedom and Human Rights

Favourable mentions of the importance of personal freedom and civil rights; freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in political and economic sphere; individualism in the manifesto country and in other countries.

#### \*201E Economic Freedom

Freedom references where the main focus was economic or commercial freedom, including school choice.

#### 202 Democracy

Favourable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other organisations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalised support for democracy in New Zealand.

#### 203 Constitutionalism: Positive

Support for aspects of constitution; use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as general approval of the constitutional way of doing things.

204 Constitutionalism: Negative

Opposition to the constitution in general or to aspects of it; otherwise as 203, but negative.

Domain 3. Political System

301 Decentralisation: Positive

Support for devolution; more regional autonomy for policy or economy; favourable mentions of special consideration for local areas; deference to local expertise.

302 Decentralisation: Negative

Opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels; support for more centralisation in political and administrative procedures; otherwise as 301, but negative.

303 Government and Administrative Efficiency

Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration; cutting down civil service; improving government procedures; general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more effective.

304 Political Corruption

Need to eliminate corruption in political and public life.

305 Political Authority

Favourable mentions of strong government, including government stability; manifesto party's competency to govern and/or other party's lack of such competency.

#### Domain 4. Economy

##### 401 Free Enterprise

Favourable mentions of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems; favourable mentions of private property rights; personal enterprise and initiative; need for unhampered individual enterprises.

##### 402 Incentives

Need for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; encouragement to start enterprises; need for financial and other enterprises.

##### \*4021 Incentives: Home Ownership

Incentives for House Ownership.

##### 403 Market Regulation

Need for regulations designed to make private enterprises work better; actions against monopolies and in defence of consumer and small business.

##### 404 Economic Planning

Favourable mentions of economic planning.

405 Favourable mentions of the need for collaboration of employers and trade union organisations in economic planning through tripartite bodies.

##### \*4051 New Zealand Corporatism

Positive references to the Arbitration and Conciliation framework.

##### \*4052 Western Corporatism

All other 405 references, including references to an Australian-style compact.

406 Protectionism: Positive

Favourable mentions of the extension or maintenance of tariffs; other domestic economic protectionism.

407 Protectionism: Negative

Support for the concept of free trade, otherwise as 406, but negative.

408 Specific Economic Goals

Any economic goals not otherwise covered in domain 4.

409 Keynesian Demand Management

Demand-oriented economic policy; economic policy designed to reduce depressions and/or to increase private demand through increasing public demand and/or social expenditure.

410 Productivity

Need to encourage or facilitate greater production; need to take measures to aid this; appeal for greater production and importance of productivity to the economy.

411 Technology and Infrastructure

Importance of modernisation of industry and methods of transport and communication; importance of science and technological developments in industry; need for training and research. This does not include training in general.

412 Controlled Economy

General need for direct government control of economy; control over prices, wages, etc.

413 Nationalisation

Government ownership, partial or complete, including government ownership of land.

#### 414 Economic Orthodoxy

Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, e.g. reduction of budget deficits, retrenchment in crisis, thrift and savings; support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking system; support for strong currency.

#### \*4141 Low Inflation

Need to control inflation.

#### 415 Marxist Analysis

Use of marxist-leninist terminology.

#### 416 Anti-Growth Economy

Favourable mentions of anti-growth politics and steady-state economy; ecologism; “Green politics”.

### Domain 5. Welfare and Quality of Life

#### 501 Environmental Protection

Preservation of countryside, forests, etc; general preservation of natural resources against selfish interests; proper use of national parks; soil banks, etc; environmental improvement.

#### 502 Culture

Need to provide cultural and leisure facilities, including arts and sport; need to spend money on museums, etc; need to encourage worthwhile leisure facilities and cultural mass media.

#### 503 Social Justice

Concept of equality; need for fair treatment of all people; special protection for underprivileged; need for fair distribution of resources; removal of class barriers; end of discrimination such as racial, sexual, etc.

\*503M Social Justice: Maori

References to equality and fair treatment for Maori.

\*503W Social Justice: Women

References to equality and fair treatment for women.

\*503D Social Justice: Disabled

References to equality and fair treatment for handicapped, mentally ill, and disabled.

\*503NP Social Justice: New Politics

All other new politics references to equality, including general references to racial equality.

\*503SE Social Justice: Socio-Economic

References to equality between social classes.

504 Welfare State Expansion

Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service or social welfare scheme; support for social services such as health service and social housing.

\*504C Welfare Childcare

All childcare references.

\*5041 Welfare Housing

All state housing references.

\*5043 Welfare State: Health

All state health services.

#### 505 Welfare State Limitation

Limiting expenditure on social services or social security; otherwise as 504, but negative.

#### 506 Education Expansion

Need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all levels. This excludes technical education which is coded under 411.

#### 507 Education Limitation

Limiting expenditure on education; otherwise as 506, but negative.

### Domain 6. Fabric of Society

#### 601 National Way of Life: Positive

Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas.

#### \*601L National Way of Life Positive: Left Emphasis

Positive National Way of Life references which primarily referred to left-wing goals, such as promises to build on New Zealand's humanitarian welfare tradition, or to ensure that control of the economy remained in New Zealand.

#### 602 National Way of Life: Negative

Against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the existing national state; otherwise as 601, but negative.

#### 603 Traditional Morality: Positive

Favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of family; religion.

**604 Traditional Morality: Negative**

Opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, abortion etc.; otherwise as 603, but negative.

**605 Law and Order**

Enforcement of all laws; actions against crime; support and resources for police; tougher actions in courts.

**606 Social Harmony**

Appeal for national effort and solidarity; need for society to see itself as united; appeal for public spiritedness; decrying anti-social attitudes in times of crisis; support for the public interest.

**607 Multiculturalism: Positive**

Cultural diversity, communalism, cultural plurality and pillarisation; preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country, including specialist educational provisions.

**608 Multiculturalism: Negative**

Enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration; otherwise as 607, but negative.

**\*609 Postmaterialism**

References to postmaterialism, or to postmaterialist goals such as self-actualisation, individual personal development, or the fulfilment of higher order needs.

**Domain 7. Social Groups****701 Labour Groups**

Favourable references to labour groups, working class, unemployed; support for trade unions; good treatment of manual and other employees.

### 702 Labour Groups: Negative

Abuse of power of trade unions; otherwise as 701, but negative.

### 703 Agriculture and Farmers

Support for agriculture and farmers; and policy aimed specifically at benefiting them.

#### \*7033 Agriculture: Fishing

Support for those involved in catching or farming fish.

#### \*7034 Agriculture: Forestry

Support for forestry.

#### \*7037 Agriculture: New Farmers

Support for new farmers.

### 704 Middle Class and Professional Groups

Favourable references to middle class, professional groups.

#### \*7041 Middle Class: Civil Servants

Favourable references to civil servants.

### 705 Underprivileged Minority Groups

Favourable references to underprivileged minorities who are defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms, e.g. the handicapped, homosexuals, etc.

#### \*7051 Returned Servicemen

Favourable mentions to returned servicemen and rehabilitation programmes for soldiers; higher benefits and special privileges for civilians and soldiers involved in wars.

## 706 Non-economic Demographic Groups

Favourable mentions of, or need for, assistance to women, old people, young people, linguistic groups, etc; special interest groups of all kinds.

\*7061 Youth

\*7062 Women

\*7063 Maori

\*7064 Elderly

\*7067 Migrants

\*7068 Maori and Pacific Islanders

\*7069 Pacific Islanders

## Domain 8. Monetary Reform (new domain)

\*801 Expand Money Supply

References to the need to expand the money supply to ensure adequate demand; statements about the desirability or need for cheap loans. The statements about expanding the money supply differed from Keynesian Demand Management because they argued that there is nearly always inadequate demand, whereas Keynesian economists argue that this is only sometimes the case. The 801 sentences also advocated increasing economic output by a monetary policy of cheap loans to various sectors of the economy rather than by the Keynesian strategy of central government spending.

\*802 Monetary theory/philosophy

Statements associated with social credit monetary theory or philosophy, such as discussion of theories of money and credit formation.

\*804 Government Control Credit

Promises to restrict the issuing of money and new credit to government banks.

\*805 Change Monetary System

Promises to generally reform the monetary and international trade systems.

## A.2 Aggregating Categories for Chapter Four

Considerable aggregation was necessary to determine the proportion of sentences in manifestos about each type of issue. The categories used in each aggregation are shown in Table A.1. Because categories such as traditional morality and national way of life also contain references to economic issues, while categories such as productivity and technology and infrastructure have a strong new politics element, the results are much less precise than for later categories.

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Table A.1: Measuring the main types of issues

<u>Main types of issues</u>	<u>Old categories</u>
Economic issues	All categories from the economy domain except anti-growth economy, all monetary reform domain categories, government efficiency, the welfare state and labour groups categories, agriculture, middle class and professional groups, returned servicemen.
Foreign affairs issues	All categories from the external relations domain.
Ethnic issues	Maori: positive, the multiculturalism categories, Pacific Islanders: positive.
Social conservatism issues and support for change	The constitutionalism, traditional morality, and national way of life categories, political authority, law and order, social harmony, political corruption.
New politics issues	Freedom and human rights: non-economic, democracy, decentralisation: positive, postmaterialist values, environment, culture, anti-growth economy, underprivileged minority groups, women.
Other Issues	Decentralisation: negative, general references to non-economic demographic groups, the youth, elderly, and migrants subcodes.

### A.3 Aggregating Categories for Chapters Five, Six and Seven

Overseas content analysis studies have frequently found it desirable to merge many of the codes that measure very similar concepts. This makes the data easier to interpret and helps avoid the possibility that coding variations could generate a false appearance of differences in policies.<sup>1</sup> The aggregated categories in Table A.2 were used in chapters five six and seven. Many of these aggregated categories are based on the aggregations used in texts that have used the MRG coding scheme,<sup>2</sup> although sometimes these have been revised to fit New Zealand conditions.

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<sup>1</sup>M.J. Laver and Ian Budge, 'Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation', in Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J Laver and Ian Budge (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), p. 24; Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organization, Ideology and Electoral Competition (London: Frances Pinter, 1987), p. 155.

<sup>2</sup> M.J. Laver and Ian Budge, 'Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation', p. 24; Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System, p. 155.

Table A.2: New categories and old categories

<u>New aggregated categories</u>	<u>Old categories</u>
Market economy	Economic freedom, free enterprise, incentives, protectionism: negative. Before the factor analysis welfare state limitation was also added to this category.
State intervention	Market regulation, economic planning, protectionism: positive, controlled economy, nationalisation, Marxist analysis.
Economic constraint	Government efficiency and economic orthodoxy.
Productivity and technology	Productivity, technology and infrastructure.
Monetary reform	All categories from the monetary reform domain.
Peace and cooperation	Anti-imperialism, military: negative, peace, internationalism: positive.
Maori: positive	Maori, equality for Maori
Maori: positive and multiculturalism	Maori: positive, multiculturalism: positive.
Social conservatism	Constitutionalism: positive, traditional morality: positive, national way of life: positive, law and order, social harmony.
Anti-establishment views	Constitutionalism: negative, political corruption, national way of life: negative, traditional morality negative, postmaterialism.
Freedom and democracy	Freedom and human rights: non-economic, democracy, decentralisation: positive.
Minority groups	Equality for new politics groups, underprivileged minority groups.
Women's issues	Equality for women, demographic groups: women.

#### A.4 Pairing Expenditure Data and Manifesto Emphases in Chapter Nine

The matchups between expenditure data and manifesto emphases used in chapter nine are shown in Table A.3. As political scientists have often found for other countries, aggregation of related manifesto categories often slightly increased the proportion of variance explained, and produced regression

coefficients which made greater theoretical sense.<sup>3</sup> The reason for this increase in the proportion of variance explained is that the manifesto coding categories are an imperfect fit with expenditure areas. For instance, because references to education spending could often be coded as either education or social justice, it was not surprising that an aggregation of these two categories explained the most variance in education spending.<sup>4</sup>

Most of the pairings are fairly intuitive. The internationalism: positive category was the best matchup for foreign affairs. This is because it measures support for international organisations, expanding diplomatic links, and foreign aid. In contrast, the anti-imperialism, military: negative and peace categories were not such a good match, because in New Zealand they mainly measured support for demilitarisation, and theoretical support for ending conflicts in other countries. Matching up expenditure on health with the results for the health subcode was not possible because at some elections parties only made very general references to social welfare expenditure.

Table A.3: Expenditure areas and manifesto emphases matchups

<u>Expenditure Area</u>	<u>Manifesto Emphases</u>
Law and Order	Law and Order
Land Use	Agriculture
Health	Welfare State+ and Social Justice
Education	Education Expansion and Social Justice
Defence	Internationalism: Positive
Transport and Communications	Productivity and Technology
Foreign Affairs	Internationalism: Positive
Transfers	Welfare State+ and Social Justice
Total Social Services	Welfare, Education and Social Justice

<sup>3</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, (Boulder: Westview, 1994), pp. 103, 106.

<sup>4</sup> However, Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, pp. 204-205 note that in Germany recoding the manifestos so that the coding categories matched up better with the expenditure data did not result in an overall improvement in the results.

## Appendix B: Factor Analysis of the Content Analysis Results

### B.1 Introduction

This appendix outlines the factor analysis techniques used to help construct the indexes for party movement used in chapter seven. Factor analysis is a technique for condensing variables into a smaller number of factors. Variables group or load together on a factor when references to them covary. From the factor analysis it should be possible to see which variables are positively and negatively correlated to each other. This will indicate which issues divide different types of parties. Because of Budge and Robertson's concern about the possible effects on factor analysis results of changes over time in the saliency of issues,<sup>1</sup> this is further investigated.

In this appendix the factor analysis methodology is first outlined. The factor analysis results over the 1911-1931 and 1935-1996 periods are then described, and then the results from both time periods are further analysed.

### B.2 Factor Analysis Methodology

Because many of the categories measure very similar concepts, collapsed categories were used in the factor analyses in this study.<sup>2</sup> Variables that on average made up less than one percent of the content of the programmes being analysed were also excluded.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ian Budge and David Robertson, 'Comparative Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 414.

<sup>2</sup> This is also done by M.J. Laver and Ian Budge, 'Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation', in Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J Laver and Ian Budge (London: MacMillan, 1992), p. 23; Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Party Positions and Voter Orientations', in Citizens and the State, edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 188.

<sup>3</sup> For other studies which have done this see, for example, Ian Budge, 'The internal analysis of election programmes', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 31; Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organization, Ideology and Electoral Competition (London: Frances Pinter, 1987), p. 171.

Previous studies of election programmes have sometimes only used rotated<sup>4</sup> and unrotated orthogonal factor analysis, in which the dimensions are always at right angles to each other. This has been justified on the grounds that it made the results easier to graph.<sup>5</sup> This study also used oblique promax rotations, in which the dimensions are allowed to correlate with each other, because it seemed likely that if more than one main cleavage was generated the cleavages could be correlated.

The number of factors initially used in the factor analyses was decided by using the 'scree' method of only retaining factors which occurred before the eigenvalues began to level off.<sup>6</sup> This ensured that all the factors generated had a reasonable explanatory power. Because studies of New Zealand politics have usually only identified class, urban-rural and new politics cleavages between New Zealand political parties it was often necessary to further reduce the number of factors extracted.<sup>7</sup>

Chapters five and six showed a high level of consistency in the types of issues that had divided the main parties. However, there were enough differences to justify initially running separate factor analyses for the 1911-1931 and 1935-1996 periods.

### B.3 Factor Analysis Results

#### B.3.1 Factor Analysis Results: 1911-1931

Although the number of factors extracted was varied, the theoretically best results for the 1911-1931 period were produced when only two factors were

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<sup>4</sup> Rotating factors is a method of simplifying factor analysis results so that each variable tends to load on only one factor. See, John Hedderson, SPSS Made Simple (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1987), p. 163 for further details.

<sup>5</sup> David Robertson, 'Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 1946-1981, an initial comparative analysis', in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 71 notes that all the factor analyses in this text are orthogonal.

<sup>6</sup> Jae-On Kim and Charles W. Mueller, Factor Analysis: Statistical Methods and Practical Issues (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), pp. 44-45.

<sup>7</sup> Jack Vowles, et al, Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 16, 100.

extracted.<sup>8</sup> The unrotated results for this factor analysis are shown in Table B.1. The numbers alongside each variable are factor loadings that show the association between a variable and each of the factors. For instance, Table B.1 shows that state intervention has a loading of .86 on the first factor, which indicates a very strong relationship. However, state intervention has a loading of only .06 on the second factor, showing a very weak correlation. All the categories above the solid black line in Table B.1 load best on the first factor, while the three categories below the black line load best on the second factor.

Factor 1	Factor 2	
0.86	0.06	State Intervention
0.82	0.06	Labour Groups: Positive
0.79	-0.12	Freedom and democracy
0.68	0.27	Peace and Cooperation
0.67	-0.12	Education Expansion
0.41	-0.28	Welfare State Expansion
-0.43	0.15	Military: Positive
-0.52	0.44	Political Authority
-0.54	0.05	Foreign Special Relations:+ve
-0.57	0.18	Social Conservatism
-0.67	0.44	Productivity and Technology
<u>-0.72</u>	<u>-0.28</u>	Economic Constraint
0.09	0.61	Social Justice: economic
-0.50	-0.55	Agriculture and Farmers
-0.30	-0.67	Market Economy
Proportion of variance explained		
Factor 1	Factor 2	
36.67	12.17	

The first factor in Table B.1 is a left-right dimension. On this dimension state intervention, labour groups: positive, freedom and democracy, peace and cooperation, education expansion, and welfare state expansion load positively at

<sup>8</sup> The 16 categories used in the first factor analysis were foreign special relations: positive, military: positive, peace and cooperation, freedom and democracy, political authority, market economy, state intervention, economic constraint, productivity and technology, social justice: economic, welfare state expansion, education, social conservatism, labour groups: positive, agriculture and farmers, and anti-establishment views. The anti-establishment category was quickly dropped because since it had been emphasised most at the 1911 election it could be expected to load badly. It was also poorly theoretically related to the other variables.

.4 or better, forming the left end of the dimension. In contrast, military: positive, political authority, foreign special relations, social conservatism, productivity and technology, and economic constraint load at .4 or better on the right end of this dimension. The second factor includes elements of both left-right and urban-rural dimensions because it contrasts a high emphasis on social justice against support for a market economy and agriculture.<sup>9</sup> The proportion of variance explained indicates how much of the variation in the data is explained by each factor. In Table B.1 the two factors extracted together explain almost half the variance.

While the results in Table B.1 largely conform to expectations they are not very useful for calculating party positions. This is because the market economy and social justice: economic categories fail to load strongly on the main left-right dimension, even though left and right-wing parties have consistently taken different positions on them. Probably an important reason for this is that both categories have considerably varied in saliency over time.

### B.3.2 Factor analysis results: 1935-1996

The factor analysis results for the 1935-1996 period were even more heavily influenced by time effects that prevented the optimal dimensions from being generated. For instance, when just Labour and National manifestos were included in the factor analysis the results in Table B.2 were produced.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Other factor analyses for this period using a greater number of factors produced relatively similar dimensions. Sometimes other categories such as economic constraint loaded with agriculture on the second dimension, while occasionally labour groups: positive or welfare state expansion loaded with social justice: economic on the second dimension.

<sup>10</sup> When undertaking factor analysis of just Labour and National manifestos over the 1935-1996 period the exclusion rules left only 19 categories. These were military: positive, peace and cooperation, freedom and democracy, political authority, market economy, economic constraint, state intervention, productivity and technology, environmental protection, culture, social justice: economic, welfare state expansion, education expansion, social conservatism, multiculturalism: positive, labour groups, agriculture and farmers, Maori: positive, and women's issues. When all parties' manifestos were included in the factor analysis the only additional category to meet the exclusion rules was monetary reform. In some factor analyses freedom: non-economic and democracy were used as separate categories instead of being combined together with decentralisation in the freedom and democracy aggregation. This was because the content analysis chapter showed that the freedom: non-economic category tended to be emphasised most by right-wing parties, while the democracy category tended to be emphasised most by left-wing parties.

Figure B.2: Factor loadings for Labour and National Party manifestos, 1935-1996

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Categories
0.85	0.09	-0.22	-0.09	0.24	Environmental Protection
0.84	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.00	Multiculturalism: Positive
0.57	0.21	0.16	-0.23	-0.46	Freedom and democracy
<u>0.56</u>	<u>0.55</u>	0.13	0.01	-0.25	Women's issues
-0.20	0.75	0.00	0.25	0.40	Welfare State Expansion
-0.23	0.74	0.38	-0.16	0.21	Labour Groups: Positive
0.14	0.72	-0.15	0.06	-0.06	Social Justice: economic
-0.26	-0.31	0.12	0.16	-0.30	Military: Positive
-0.10	-0.53	-0.48	0.00	-0.37	Market Economy
-0.20	<u>-0.77</u>	<u>0.17</u>	0.05	0.07	Productivity and Technology
-0.31	-0.02	0.79	-0.04	-0.08	State Intervention
0.18	-0.10	0.75	0.06	0.19	Peace and Cooperation
0.54	-0.06	0.60	0.14	-0.27	Culture
0.57	0.01	<u>-0.58</u>	<u>-0.11</u>	0.04	Social Conservatism
-0.37	-0.18	0.01	0.76	-0.17	Agriculture and Farmers
-0.15	0.07	-0.23	0.74	0.09	Maori: Positive
-0.06	-0.18	-0.37	-0.66	-0.25	Economic Constraint
-0.41	0.04	-0.22	<u>-0.78</u>	<u>-0.08</u>	Political Authority
0.03	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.87	Education Expansion

Proportion of variance explained

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
17.68	16.13	14.04	12.62	9.18

The Table B.2 results show that the first factor was a new politics dimension, which the environment, multiculturalism, freedom and democracy, and women's issues categories loaded best on. Because of the recent increase in references to social conservatism, this category also loads well on the first factor. This creates a theoretically ambiguous dimension that mixes categories from different cleavages. In contrast, other old politics categories, including political authority and military: positive, load negatively on this dimension. The second factor mainly included left-right issues. However, other left-wing categories, such as state intervention, loaded poorly on this dimension.

When all parties' manifestos were placed in the factor analysis many dimensions continued to measure changes in the saliency of issues over time. As a result when the first order factors were used as variables in the second order

factor analysis the results tended to explain only slightly more variance than the first order factors, while making considerably less sense.

To improve the clarity of the results categories poorly theoretically related to left-right differences were dropped from the factor analysis. The best results were then obtained when only two factors were extracted. The unrotated results for this factor analysis are shown in Table B.3.

Table B.3: Factor loadings for factor analysis of all parties' manifestos, 1935-1996

Factor 1	Factor 2	
0.73	0.11	Labour Groups: Positive
0.58	-0.38	State Intervention
0.56	0.39	Welfare State Expansion
0.54	-0.50	Peace and Cooperation
0.50	0.48	Social Justice: economic
0.28	0.02	Education Expansion
-0.42	0.36	Political Authority
-0.66	-0.20	Market Economy
<u>-0.71</u>	<u>0.24</u>	Economic Constraint
0.28	0.44	Democracy
-0.19	0.31	Social Conservatism
-0.11	-0.64	Military Positive
Proportion of variance explained		
Factor 1	Factor 2	
23.39	13.22	

On the first dimension labour groups, state intervention, welfare state expansion, peace and cooperation, and social justice loaded well at one end. Political authority, market economy, and economic constraint loaded well at the other end. This is a clear left-right dimension encompassing both economic and foreign policy categories. In comparison, the second dimension, which contrasts social conservatism and democracy against military: positive, makes no theoretical sense.

Even though this is the best factor analysis result generated for the 1935-1996 period it is still far from satisfactory. The biggest problem is that social conservatism loads badly on the first dimension, even though the content analysis results showed that conservative themes were almost always emphasised more by right-wing than left-wing parties. This probably occurs because growing

concern about crime has resulted in a sharp increase over time in social conservatism references. Despite usually being emphasised more by right-wing than left-wing parties military: positive has an even worse loading on dimension one. Because these categories have weak loadings, references to them in parties' manifestos will have a relatively low influence on the factor scores that measure parties' positions over time. As a result parties' positions will be less accurate than they could be. These results strongly confirm Budge and Robertson's belief that time effects could distort factor analysis results.<sup>11</sup>

#### B.4 Analysing the results

Further factor analyses over the entire time period, which are not shown here, tended to be even more distorted by time effects. Because time effects clearly influenced the factor analysis results it was necessary to use the findings from the content analysis and factor analysis results together with theoretical knowledge of politics to construct variables for left-right and new politics-old politics dimensions. These cover the entire 1911-1996 period, and are outlined in section 7.2 of chapter seven. An urban-rural dimension was not constructed because, except for the greater concern about agriculture and farmers, urban-rural issues have been very similar to left-right differences. No other theoretically valid dimensions emerged from factor analysis.

Naturally there have been variations in the structure of party competition over different time periods, and even from election to election. For instance, Reform's and Labour's welfare state expansion references were at the same level at elections between 1911 and 1928. Similarly, National's and Labour's positions on welfare state expansion also converged during the 1960s and 1970s. Other issues such as peace and cooperation have become less divisive over time. This indicates that the ideological cleavages dividing parties change, but usually at only a very slow rate over time. However, even when parties' positions on theoretically divisive issues are relatively similar it is still necessary to include

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<sup>11</sup> Budge and Robertson, 'Comparative Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes', p. 414.

these categories in the variables for measuring party movement. This is so that convergence by parties can be properly measured.

### B.5 Conclusion

Factor analysis techniques were used to help find the main dimensions of competition. Although recognisable left-right and new politics-old politics dimensions emerged, time effects heavily influenced the results. This tended to result in dimensions being generated that were suboptimal, because theoretically important issues loaded badly. As a result it was necessary to construct indexes of party movement on the basis of the content and factor analysis results, and on theoretical grounds. These results have important repercussions for other manifesto studies as they show that time effects can distort factor analysis results.

### Appendix C: The New Zealand Expenditure Data

The main sources of expenditure data available are the government financial reports, including the budget, in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR), the Yearbook figures, and series in the New Zealand Planning Council publication Public Expenditure and its Financing: 1950-1979, which improves the no longer collected 'National Income and Expenditure Account' statistics.<sup>1</sup> Other sources just reprint data from these series.<sup>2</sup>

Initial attempts to follow series back to the 1950s through the Yearbook were generally unsuccessful, while only gross expenditure figures could be found for before 1973. Careful checking of the AJHR and Yearbooks showed that a ten year functional summary of government expenditure in the AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61 matched up with a Yearbook expenditure series which extended up to 1994. Unfortunately, attempts to persuade either Statistics New Zealand or the Treasury to extend either the functional classification, or any other series, proved unsuccessful,<sup>3</sup> although Statistics New Zealand has done some retrofitting in the past.<sup>4</sup> Both organizations were also unable to provide any information on who had constructed the ten year functional summary of government expenditure, or where any notes they might have made would be archived.

After considerable experimentation it was found that by adding together individual items from AJHR, B-1 [Pt-1], 'The Public Account' and AJHR, B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand', that net expenditure for six areas in the functional classification could be correctly

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<sup>1</sup> New Zealand Planning Council, Public Expenditure and its Financing (Wellington: New Zealand Planning Council, 1979), p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, David Thorns and Charles Sedgwick, Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand: Historical Statistics (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), pp. 103-118; G.T. Bloomfield, New Zealand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G.K. Hall and Co, 1984); John Martin, State Papers (Palmerston North: Department of Sociology, [1981]).

<sup>3</sup> Email from Grant Baldwin, Information Analyst at Statistics New Zealand, 30 June 1997; emails from Paul Waterhouse, Statistics New Zealand, 7 August, 1 September, and 10 September 1998; email from Ruta Faiga, Treasury, 25 September 1998.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, in The New Zealand System of National Accounts, 1997 (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand, 1997), p. 25 it is noted that with the assistance of the Reserve Bank the national income and expenditure accounts were backdated from the late 1970s to the early 1960s.

calculated. These series were then retrofitted by collecting expenditure statistics for these areas for earlier years. Unfortunately it was not possible to extend back expenditure in every policy area. For instance, for transport and land use there were unexplained changes in the names of categories in the early 1970s that made it impossible to see how the figures in the functional classification had been calculated. This suggests that the ten year functional classification in the 1973 budget involved substantial reworking of existing expenditure figures in these areas. Although total government expenditure could also not be retrofitted, total expenditure in the functional classification matched up very closely with total expenditure in the Public Expenditure series, once local government expenditure had been subtracted from the latter.<sup>5</sup>

It had been hoped to create a separate expenditure dataset for the period up to 1944 when there is a substantial change in the public accounts.<sup>6</sup> Expenditure from the Consolidated Fund, the First and Second World War expense accounts, and the Public Works Account was successfully combined, although data could only be collected for five expenditure areas. There were also troubling differences between expenditure figures in different sources.<sup>7</sup>

Unfortunately government expenditure in individual areas, and total government expenditure, was very heavily influenced by New Zealand's involvement in the First and Second World Wars. This distorted the results when the data was used in policy implementation models. When the 1914-1919 and 1939-1944 periods, which included the years where expenditure was most affected by wars, were deleted from the policy implementation models, there were too few years left to get accurate results. This was particularly a problem

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<sup>5</sup> Over the ten year period between 1963 and 1972 period total Public Expenditure was on average 1.3% lower than in the functional classification, while the standard deviation was 1.7%. This divergence is smaller than many of the unexplained variations between functional expenditure for particular years in Yearbooks during the 1970s.

<sup>6</sup> New Zealand Official Yearbook (Wellington: Statistics Department, 1946), p. 388 notes that from 1944 the public accounts change from net to gross figures, with payments that had previously been ranked as credits now being treated as receipts.

<sup>7</sup> For instance, to get the pensions figure the same in AJHR, B-1 [Pt-1] as in the Yearbook, the credit of 30% of the national endowment had to be added on to the AJHR figure between 1914 and 1921. The only discrepancy in pensions expenditure was then for 1913, when the national endowment figure appears to have been excluded from the Yearbook figure. Although details like this have a very important effect on total pensions expenditure, they are usually not explained clearly.

because Reform was in government for most of the remaining years, while its references to some categories covaried with those of opposition parties.

Julia Crouch, a retired member of Statistics New Zealand, has spent a number of years backdating government expenditure into standard National Accounts categories developed by the International Monetary Fund. This sequence currently runs from 1972 to the present. When contacted, she said that she had almost completed the expenditure figures for the 1935-1945 period, but that it would be a considerable time before she finished the entire series.<sup>8</sup> Because all the raw data before the 1960s is paper based and archived, it is a very large task.

The retrofitted expenditure figures, and an explanation of how each series was constructed, are printed over the following pages. Although the calculated expenditure figures are usually exactly the same as those in the 1973 budget, for several categories there is a divergence for 1964. This occurred because the format of the Works and Trading Account in 1964 differed from that in other years, making some statistics incomparable. Fortunately this problem was not repeated, while because actual expenditure for 1964 had been printed in the 1973 budget there was no need to try and find a way around this problem.

#### Explanation of retrofit of law and order expenditure in Table C.1

(1). Law and order expenditure. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Consolidated Fund in B-7 [Pt-1], in the 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.

(2). Security intelligence service expenditure. This is taken from the AJHR, Consolidated Revenue Account in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

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<sup>8</sup> Julia Crouch, telephone conversation with author, 16 October 1998.

- (3). Expenditure on Judges salaries. This combines three items from the AJHR, Permanent Legislative Authority, B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'. For 1971 these are the 'Judicature Amendment Act 1964 (section 2)', the 'Magistrates' Court Act 1947 (section 6)', and the 'Superannuation Act 1956 (section 81)'. It is carefully signposted in the section on the Permanent Legislative Authority when these supersede earlier payments.
- (4). Crown law receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.
- (5). Justice receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.
- (6). Police receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.
- (7). Courts expenditure. This is taken from the AJHR, Public Works Account in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.
- (8). Prison buildings expenditure. This is taken from the AJHR, Public Works Account in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.
- (9). Police stations and buildings expenditure. This is taken from the AJHR, Public Works Account in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.
- (10). Calculated total net law and order expenditure in pounds and dollars.
- (11). Calculated total net law and order expenditure in millions of dollars.

(12). Total net law and order expenditure in millions of dollars as printed in the functional classification in AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61.

Explanation of retrofit of defence expenditure in Table C.2

(1). Defence expenditure. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Consolidated Fund in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.

(2). Defence receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(3). Airforce receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(4). Army receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(5). Navy receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(6). Defence construction receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(7). Calculated total net defence expenditure in pounds and dollars.

(8). Calculated total net defence expenditure in millions of dollars.

(9). Total net education expenditure in millions of dollars as printed in the functional classification in AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61.

Explanation of retrofit of foreign affairs expenditure in Table C.3

- (1). External/foreign affairs expenditure. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Consolidated Fund in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.
- (2). External/foreign affairs receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.
- (3). Calculated total net foreign affairs expenditure in pounds and dollars.
- (4). Calculated total net foreign affairs expenditure in millions of dollars.
- (5). Total net foreign affairs expenditure in millions of dollars as printed in the functional classification in AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61.

Explanation of retrofit of health expenditure in Table C.4

- (1). Health payments. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Consolidated Fund in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.
- (2). Medical and hospital, then health benefits. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], 'The Public Account', thereafter from the AJHR, Consolidated Revenue Account in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.
- (3). Subsidies to hospital boards. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Consolidated Fund in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government

of New Zealand', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.

(4). Health and mental hospitals payments. This is taken from the AJHR, Works and Trading Account in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(5). Health and hospitals expenditure. This is taken from the AJHR, Public Works Account in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(6). Mental hospitals. This is taken from the AJHR, Public Works Account in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(7). Health receipts. This is taken from AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(8). Calculated total net health expenditure in pounds and dollars.

(9). Calculated total net health expenditure in millions of dollars.

(10). Total net health expenditure in millions of dollars as printed in the functional classification in AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61.

#### Explanation of retrofit of education expenditure in Table C.5

(1). Education payments. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Consolidated Fund in B-7 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.

(2). Education receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-1 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(3). University and technical institutions payments. This is taken from the AJHR, Works and Trading Account, B-1 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(4). University and technical institutions receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Public Works Account in B-1 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(5). Education buildings payments. This is taken from the AJHR, Public Works Account in B-1 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(6). Education buildings receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Public Works Account in B-1 [Pt-1], 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(7). Calculated total net education expenditure in pounds and dollars.

(8). Calculated total net education expenditure in millions of dollars.

(9). Total net education expenditure in millions of dollars as printed in the functional classification in AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61.

#### Explanation of retrofit of transfers expenditure in Table C.6

(1). Social security expenditure. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.

(2). War pensions payments. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Consolidated Fund in B-7 [Pt-1], in the 'Estimates of Expenditure of the

Government of New Zealand', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.

(3). Social security expenses and emergency benefits payments. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.

(4). Family benefits, reciprocal agreement with Britain, payments. This is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account'.

(5). Family benefit capitalisation payments. Up to 1965 this is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account', thereafter from the Consolidated Revenue Account in the same source.

(6). Agency payments/ reciprocal benefits. This is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account'.

(7). Maintenance payments. This is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account'.

(8). Social security receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Departmental Receipts in B-7 [Pt-1], in the 'Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand'.

(9). Family benefit repayments. This is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account'.

(10). Deserted wives repayments. This is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account'.

(11). Receipts from social security arrangements with Australia. This is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account'.

(12). Miscellaneous receipts. This is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account'.

(13). Interest earned. This is taken from the AJHR, Social Security Fund in B-1 [Pt-1], in 'The Public Account'.

(14). Calculation of total social security expenditure in pounds and dollars.

(15). Calculation of total social security expenditure in millions of dollars.

(16). Total social security expenditure in millions of dollars as printed in the functional classification in AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61.

#### Explanation of total government expenditure figures in Table C.7

(1). Central government expenditure. This was calculated from New Zealand Planning Council, Public Expenditure and its Financing: 1950-1979 (Wellington: New Zealand Planning Council, 1979), pp. 27-31, by subtracting the 'Local Authorities' totals from 'Total Public Expenditure'.

(2). Functional classification of central government expenditure. The source for the data up to 1972 is the functional classification in AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury.

(3). This shows the functional classification in column two as a proportion of column one. The increased divergence in the late 1970s may be due to an increase in miscellaneous financing transactions in the functional classification.

Summary of postwar expenditure in Table C.8

(1). Law and order expenditure in millions of dollars. Before 1963 the figures are from the retrofit in Table C.1. Between 1963 and 1972 they are from AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury.

(2). Defence expenditure in millions of dollars. Before 1963 the figures are from the retrofit in Table C.2. Between 1963 and 1972 they are from AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury.

(3). Foreign affairs expenditure in millions of dollars. Before 1963 the figures are from the retrofit in Table C.3. Between 1963 and 1972 they are from AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury.

(4). Land use expenditure in millions of dollars. Between 1963 and 1972 the figures are from AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury. Expenditure before 1963 could not be calculated.

(5). Education expenditure in millions of dollars. Before 1963 the figures are from the retrofit in Table C.4. Between 1963 and 1972 they are from AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury.

(6). Transfers expenditure in millions of dollars. Before 1963 the figures are from the retrofit in Table C.5. Between 1963 and 1972 they are from AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury.

(7). Health expenditure in millions of dollars. Before 1963 the figures are from the retrofit in Table C.6. Between 1963 and 1972 they are from AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury.

(8). Transport and communications expenditure in millions of dollars. Between 1963 and 1972 the figures are from AJHR, 1973, B-6 [Pt-1], 'The Budget', pp. 60-61. Thereafter the source is total net expenditure (1) in a summary table provided by the Treasury. Expenditure before 1963 could not be calculated.

(9). Total government expenditure in millions of dollars. Up to 1963 this includes the Public Expenditure figures from (1) in Table C.7. Thereafter the functional expenditure statistics in (2) in Table C.7 are used.

Percent of government expenditure on different areas in Table C.9

- (1). The percentage of government expenditure on law and order.
- (2). The percentage of government expenditure on defence.
- (3). The percentage of government expenditure on foreign affairs.
- (4). The percentage of government expenditure on land use.
- (5). The percentage of government expenditure on education.
- (6). The percentage of government expenditure on transfers.
- (7). The percentage of government expenditure on health.
- (8). The percentage of government expenditure on transport.

(9). The percentage more government expenditure on left-wing than right-wing expenditure priorities. This is calculated by adding together the percentage of government expenditure on transfers and health expenditure and subtracting the percentage of government expenditure on law and order and defence.

(10). The proportion of government expenditure on total social services. This adds together expenditure on education, transfers and health.

Table C.1: The categories used in the law and order retrofit

Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1950	2329573	0	69137	221	524186	20917	4160	14546	13068	1885160	3.8
1951	2142319	0	68520	102	573981	17723	2496	8538	33446	1663513	3.3
1952	2636345	0	78895	325	856524	24451	4	29892	34633	1898469	3.8
1953	2670793	0	78627	127	1175443	29829	60	24001	55440	1623522	3.2
1954	3003856	0	81159	210	1300977	24762	7710	29715	68730	1865221	3.7
1955	3360367	0	93150	287	1349678	31253	7609	31983	88014	2199905	4.4
1956	3498632	0	92714	296	1479541	32953	29271	60793	338527	2507147	5.0
1957	4257583	0	117448	168	1506360	106595	75685	79364	549688	3466645	6.9
1958	5020622	0	123454	714	1671845	130537	108798	155915	447876	4053569	8.1
1959	5036198	0	127233	694	1737788	148194	54613	174013	451151	3956532	7.9
1960	5561746	0	132454	1335	1879109	161062	27696	178307	306935	4165632	8.3
1961	6199579	0	172567	1992	2029085	169873	89217	316913	424022	5001348	10.0
1962	6244191	0	183629	3088	2170097	178436	43125	530344	402478	5052146	10.1
1963	6913805	0	188920	983	2225246	179003	86564	558709	326568	5669334	11.3
1964	7590912	0	187637	1349	2659414	189161	40933	67815	115407	5152780	10.3
1965	8356631	0	228562	1986	2831279	192396	66204	411654	708764	6746154	13.5
1966	8825696	0	233622	1310	3103609	218169	99758	565864	758738	7160590	14.3
1967	10197246	0	240479	1427	3324959	233318	243218	1146520	629176	8896935	17.8
1968	21775875	0	551061	3475	7595607	507743	185584	3278452	1594795	19278942	19.3
1969	23042825	0	581085	2680	9061237	536262	139482	2715788	1067962	17946963	17.9
1970	26953247	0	632702	4914	9505888	557602	282111	1101717	1023918	19925291	19.9
1971	32343582	373674	743832	4749	10748449	542640	796270	673300	1381003	25015823	25.0

Table C.2: The categories used in the defence retrofit

Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1950	9822128	0	138632	152489	206975	0	9324032	18.6	
1951	15250733	0	209593	119740	336265	11521	14573614	29.1	
1952	24639657	0	201214	141443	287818	16098	23993084	48.0	
1953	26481106	0	254356	205949	181164	19018	25820619	51.6	
1954	29012489	0	290458	323424	183985	55629	28158993	56.3	
1955	24098566	0	267345	341258	285090	19757	23185116	46.4	
1956	24393136	0	270175	355745	161918	17772	23587526	47.2	
1957	26221269	0	295180	307583	217531	16466	25384509	50.8	
1958	23440719	0	286233	299616	239622	21819	22593429	45.2	
1959	17792624	0	292975	306755	289891	18249	16884754	33.8	
1960	19222388	0	320428	266301	430829	22652	18182178	36.4	
1961	20337105	913409				32235	19391461	38.8	
1962	22180436	1121824				21068	21037544	42.1	
1963	28084963	954515				16471	27113977	54.2	54.2
1964	29102344	970006					28132338	56.3	56.5
1965	36972966	869774					36103192	72.2	72.2
1966	40597074	881161					39715913	79.4	79.4
1967	44294400	963553					43330847	86.7	86.7
1968	87111174	2764832					84346342	84.3	84.3
1969	85335993	2352469					82983524	83.0	83
1970	89721298	3264159					86457139	86.5	86.5
1971	109075098	4661344					104413754	104.4	104.4
1972	121168803	2380139					118788664	118.8	118.8

Table C.3: The categories used in the foreign affairs retrofit

Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1950	733009	54156	678853	1.4	
1951	736637	61886	674751	1.3	
1952	1604363	58836	1545527	3.1	
1953	1800164	64309	1735855	3.5	
1954	1811860	66401	1745459	3.5	
1955	2070450	73599	1996851	4.0	
1956	2153892	70241	2083651	4.2	
1957	2191975	67172	2124803	4.2	
1958	1983469	53396	1930073	3.9	
1959	2292733	106793	2185940	4.4	
1960	2665125	73021	2592104	5.2	
1961	2764823	83994	2680829	5.4	
1962	3723927	83614	3640313	7.3	
1963	3556234	115886	3440348	6.9	6.8
1964	3775550	194214	3581336	7.2	7.2
1965	4076016	211571	3864445	7.7	7.8
1966	4784554	176859	4607695	9.2	9.2
1967	4932813	228954	4703859	9.4	9.5
1968	9911058	377332	9533726	9.5	9.5
1969	11525567	449095	11076472	11.1	11.1
1970	14694848	490766	14204082	14.2	14.2

Table C.4: The categories used in the health retrofit

Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1950	8565147	8461109	0		85171	171443	435593	16847277	33.7	
1951	10247294	8723383	0		108950	235526	312928	19002225	38.0	
1952	4482104	9368027	8293729		114579	259289	286956	22230772	44.5	
1953	4806181	10428596	9618373		161100	382647	193273	25203624	50.4	
1954	5010226	10607045	10270079		129866	560275	207762	26369729	52.7	
1955	5195853	12588924	10726676		58997	374615	209202	28735863	57.5	
1956	5797315	15547154	10704314		111490	393732	212395	32341610	64.7	
1957	6346558	16772712	12895674		52513	708828	223920	36552365	73.1	
1958	7108820	17058307	15390252		51711	841609	251487	40199212	80.4	
1959	7585523	18655374	15774324		57303	783548	261236	42594836	85.2	
1960	8334893	19891627	17204751		69231	697298	266558	45931242	91.9	
1961	8709014	21148431	19561085		78871	835561	234489	50098473	100.2	
1962	9627394	22970936	20285565		165968	736417	452712	53333568	106.7	
1963	10955186	23758225	22767767		306924	505897	481231	57812768	115.6	115.6
1964	12000780	24191975	25478958			102506	496285	61277934	122.6	124.7
1965	5789609	16428987	45802183		501954	812364	568144	68766953	137.5	137.5
1966	5772031	17686159	51909335		338509	904791	577757	76033068	152.1	152.1
1967	6102383	18734975	57504894		228377	826267	582746	82814150	165.6	165.6
1968	12582026	39314566	119140884		335698	2136799	962443	172547530	172.6	172.6
1969	13197041	41936999	126545616		116089	2429564	965611	183259698	183.3	183.3
1970	14671430	46914226	141105111	2847965			980312	204558420	204.6	204.6
1971	241950555			3311757			1103238	244159074	244.2	244.2
1972	288799857			4056354			1099039	291757172	291.8	291.8

Table C.5: The categories used in the education retrofit

Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1950	11613630	165226	0	0	2336512	39955	13744961	27.5	
1951	13345564	136490	0	0	2527435	706307	15030202	30.1	
1952	15904424	140985	0	0	2667634	782601	17648472	35.3	
1953	18123697	174480	0	0	4811575	23350	22737442	45.5	
1954	20782208	164007	0	0	5853607	25051	26446757	52.9	
1955	22886086	148306	0	0	5089916	18549	27809147	55.6	
1956	27455708	171343	0	0	6065358	30649	33319074	66.6	
1957	31826068	189803	0	0	0		31636265	63.3	
1958	34257051	221039	0	0	0		34036012	68.1	
1959	36145183	216647	0	0	0		35928536	71.9	
1960	39444547	276916	0	0	0		39167631	78.3	
1961	43825123	1271776	0	0	0		42553347	85.1	
1962	47183245	354574	0	0	0		46828671	93.7	
1963	51803142	387598	0	0	0		51415544	102.8	102.8
1964	57213920	426552	0	0	0		56787368	113.6	113.6
1965	61460382	489673	3523537	836			64493410	129.0	129
1966	66386486	508765	4376633	366			70253988	140.5	140.5
1967	73179650	614311	6038970	872			78603437	157.2	157.2
1968	159775681	1514721	14778063	453			173038570	173.0	173.1
1969	175918757	1937835	12035818	3900			186012840	186.0	186
1970	196332699	1722798	12731825	2112			207339614	207.3	207.3
1971	251917012	2061839	15698831	8827			265545177	265.6	265.5
1972	319249893	2741765	18543354	4325			335047157	335.0	335

Table C.6: The categories used in the transfers retrofit

Year	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
1950	36826720	5368228	1063977	0	0	1715	262	5549	0	65273	0	52905	17698	43119477	86.2	
1951	39553623	5597335	1140555	0	0	3083	117	42573	0	66900	1860	40311	7082	46135987	92.3	
1952	43490634	6443238	1317777	40	0	3730	33	53717	0	73555	3428	86868	4945	51032939	102.1	
1953	46306271	6639726	2086585	23	0	4966	0	84082	0	78429	3413	18545	19908	54833194	109.7	
1954	48626204	7241673	3130952	0	0	6048	62	52820	0	77652	6378	21925	15638	58830526	117.7	
1955	52901483	8013050	1665997	90	0	7115	25	57084	0	80595	3213	20055	35093	62391720	124.8	
1956	55457933	8444521	1874216	186	0	4035	266	61827	0	92673	4332	25825	77432	65519068	131.0	
1957	56659935	8927659	2163126	-16	0	10244	114	97776	0	92233	11057	37265	80737	67441994	134.9	
1958	59396546	9805065	2435895	89	0	9976	300	79792	0	104195	7977	58230	83081	71314596	142.6	
1959	68331936	10962093	2466574	0	0	9190	291	102360	0	115558	7642	62080	109	81482335	163.0	
1960	82638750	11575742	2773255	0	3879888	10699	112	80194	0	131179	7890	73480	20879	100564824	201.1	
1961	86298999	13685815	2978704	0	6941089	12991	55	148766	63597	140981	14283	103049	50396	109396581	218.8	
1962	89923185	13766693	2871861		5761962	14198	309	171429	131148	148421	13403	111462	10440	111751905	223.5	
1963	90600864	14171249	2836816		5150829	10655	763	154659	162493	159055	13767	92852	6264	112182086	224.4	222.4
1964	95738895	14830684	3474189		4542543	18654	87	159774	240996	154073	14072	157007	0	117879130	235.8	235.7
1965	97829135	14959115	3648291		4420088			817968						120038661	240.1	240.1
1966	101967339	15227446	3812716		4298241			1008719						124297023	248.6	248.6
1967	106725576	15459263	4229981		3788052			1038129						129164743	258.3	258.3
1968	230187724	30707853	9584942		7236948			1870105						275847362	275.8	275.8
1969	236975398	30794311	10819994		7789505			1838658						284540550	284.5	284.5
1970	255762981	32442348	12243858		7485820			2188749						305746258	305.7	305.7
1971	305838159	33577216	0					2814452						336600923	336.6	336.6
1972	378210415	0	0					2638070						375572345	375.6	375.6

Table C.7: Total government expenditure figures

Years	(1)	(2)	(3)
1950	338.7		
1951	354.8		
1952	415.9		
1953	467.5		
1954	492.4		
1955	501.5		
1956	536.2		
1957	579.1		
1958	606.8		
1959	638.7		
1960	701.2		
1961	751.6		
1962	772.5		
1963	812	847.1	104.3
1964	884.2	896.6	101.4
1965	962	974.4	101.3
1966	1049.1	1074.8	102.4
1967	1138.5	1165.5	102.4
1968	1172.5	1181.1	100.7
1969	1229.6	1212.4	98.6
1970	1335.8	1317.1	98.6
1971	1568.8	1597.8	101.8
1972	1840.8	1862.3	101.2
1973	2239.3	2219.3	99.1
1974	2551.4	2547	99.8
1975	3089.3	3411	110.4
1976	3870.2	4385.9	113.3
1977	4317.5	4578.2	106.0
1978	5282	5668.7	107.3
1979	6361.1	6948.4	109.2
1980		7586.7	
1981		9133.4	
1982		11196.5	
1983		12672.5	
1984		14250	
1985		15317.5	
1986		17672.3	
1987		20945.1	
1988		23116.6	
1989		23741.2	
1990		25508	
1991		27252.4	
1992		28869	
1993		27634	
1994		28859	

Table C.8: Government expenditure in different areas in millions of dollars between 1950 and 1994

Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1950	3.8	18.6	1.4		27.5	86.2	33.7		338.7
1951	3.3	29.1	1.3		30.1	92.3	38.0		354.8
1952	3.8	48.0	3.1		35.3	102.1	44.5		415.9
1953	3.2	51.6	3.5		45.5	109.7	50.4		467.5
1954	3.7	56.3	3.5		52.9	117.7	52.7		492.4
1955	4.4	46.4	4.0		55.6	124.8	57.5		501.5
1956	5.0	47.2	4.2		66.6	131.0	64.7		536.2
1957	6.9	50.8	4.2		63.3	134.9	73.1		579.1
1958	8.1	45.2	3.9		68.1	142.6	80.4		606.8
1959	7.9	33.8	4.4		71.9	163.0	85.2		638.7
1960	8.3	36.4	5.2		78.3	201.1	91.9		701.2
1961	10.0	38.8	5.4		85.1	218.8	100.2		751.6
1962	10.1	42.1	7.3		93.7	223.5	106.7		772.5
1963	11.3	54.2	6.8	27.3	102.8	224.4	115.6	86.3	847.1
1964	11.6	56.5	7.2	25.3	113.6	235.7	124.7	88.8	896.6
1965	13.5	72.2	7.8	23.2	129	240.1	137.5	89.9	974.4
1966	14.3	79.4	9.2	33.1	140.5	248.6	152.1	102.3	1074.8
1967	17.8	86.7	9.5	36.5	157.2	258.3	165.6	105.7	1165.5
1968	19.3	84.3	9.5	37.1	173.1	275.8	172.6	100.7	1181.1
1969	17.9	83	11.1	34	186	284.5	183.3	94.9	1212.4
1970	19.9	86.5	14.2	40.7	207.3	305.7	204.6	106.7	1317.1
1971	25	104.4	14.5	68.4	265.5	336.6	244.2	162.9	1597.8
1972	32.2	118.8	15.4	102.9	335	375.6	291.8	144.4	1862.3
1973	39.8	128.1	27.3	100	376.8	506	343.1	183.1	2219.3
1974	46.3	138.7	37.7	74.7	440.2	616.2	401.1	168.7	2547
1975	61	163	51.2	151.4	526.6	703.4	492.3	211.2	3411
1976	77.8	188.4	82.6	286.1	627	876.1	605.7	274.8	4385.9
1977	79.6	210.7	78	211.7	699.4	1067.2	689.1	230.6	4578.2
1978	107.5	248.2	80.8	253.9	807.5	1479.2	808.5	247.6	5668.7
1979	139.3	293.2	91.5	371.9	929.3	1790.4	980.1	279.1	6948.4
1980	164.7	340.8	110.7	315.7	1009.3	2096	1136.2	265	7586.7
1981	208.8	446.4	131.5	362.4	1292	2524.3	1356.3	332.6	9133.4
1982	253.5	581.1	138.8	531.2	1493.2	2972.6	1601.2	460.6	11197
1983	266.3	644.1	164.1	687.7	1638.8	3673.3	1766.1	495.6	12673
1984	271.3	660.2	169.2	986.2	1674.3	3973.9	1804.9	537.1	14250
1985	292.1	745.1	196.8	838.7	1728.6	4352.7	1911.5	543.3	15318
1986	391.1	852.1	226.6	460.8	2010.3	5325.9	2309	865.7	17672
1987	520.6	1072.1	255	476.4	2595.2	6121.6	2957.3	1039.5	20945
1988	681.4	1257.6	256	343	3118.2	7142.4	3387.5	654.8	23117
1989	863.7	1366.9	244	355.7	3569.2	8177.2	3639	672	23741
1990	959	1352	327	289	4068	9351	3782	888	25509
1991	1004	1320	319	335	4401	9892	3986	826	27251
1992	1036	1238	389	269	4467	9993	3855	816	28869
1993	1281	1171	363	150	4504	10089	3874	718	27364
1994	1260	1163	385	114	4631	9996	4103	805	28859

Table C.9: Percent of government expenditure on different areas between 1950 and 1994

Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1950	1.11	5.51	0.40		8.12	25.46	9.95		28.79	43.53
1951	0.94	8.22	0.38		8.47	26.01	10.71		27.57	45.19
1952	0.91	11.54	0.74		8.49	24.54	10.69		22.78	43.72
1953	0.69	11.05	0.74		9.73	23.46	10.78		22.50	43.97
1954	0.76	11.44	0.71		10.74	23.90	10.71		22.41	45.35
1955	0.88	9.25	0.80		11.09	24.88	11.46		26.22	47.43
1956	0.94	8.80	0.78		12.43	24.44	12.06		26.77	48.93
1957	1.20	8.77	0.73		10.93	23.29	12.62		25.95	46.84
1958	1.34	7.45	0.64		11.22	23.51	13.25		27.97	47.97
1959	1.24	5.29	0.68		11.25	25.52	13.34		32.33	50.10
1960	1.19	5.19	0.74		11.17	28.68	13.10		35.41	52.96
1961	1.33	5.16	0.71		11.32	29.11	13.33		35.95	53.76
1962	1.31	5.45	0.94		12.12	28.93	13.81		35.99	54.86
1963	1.33	6.40	0.80	3.22	12.14	26.49	13.65	10.19	32.40	52.27
1964	1.29	6.30	0.80	2.82	12.67	26.29	13.91	9.90	32.60	52.87
1965	1.39	7.41	0.80	2.38	13.24	24.64	14.11	9.23	29.96	51.99
1966	1.33	7.39	0.86	3.08	13.07	23.13	14.15	9.52	28.56	50.35
1967	1.53	7.44	0.82	3.13	13.49	22.16	14.21	9.07	27.40	49.86
1968	1.63	7.14	0.80	3.14	14.66	23.35	14.61	8.53	29.19	52.62
1969	1.48	6.85	0.92	2.80	15.34	23.47	15.12	7.83	30.26	53.93
1970	1.51	6.57	1.08	3.09	15.74	23.21	15.53	8.10	30.67	54.48
1971	1.56	6.53	0.91	4.28	16.62	21.07	15.28	10.20	28.25	52.97
1972	1.73	6.38	0.83	5.53	17.99	20.17	15.67	7.75	27.73	53.83
1973	1.79	5.77	1.23	4.51	16.98	22.80	15.46	8.25	30.69	55.24
1974	1.82	5.45	1.48	2.93	17.28	24.19	15.75	6.62	32.68	57.22
1975	1.79	4.78	1.50	4.44	15.44	20.62	14.43	6.19	28.49	50.49
1976	1.77	4.30	1.88	6.52	14.30	19.98	13.81	6.27	27.72	48.08
1977	1.74	4.60	1.70	4.62	15.28	23.31	15.05	5.04	32.02	53.64
1978	1.90	4.38	1.43	4.48	14.24	26.09	14.26	4.37	34.08	54.60
1979	2.00	4.22	1.32	5.35	13.37	25.77	14.11	4.02	33.65	53.25
1980	2.17	4.49	1.46	4.16	13.30	27.63	14.98	3.49	35.94	55.91
1981	2.29	4.89	1.44	3.97	14.15	27.64	14.85	3.64	35.31	56.63
1982	2.26	5.19	1.24	4.74	13.34	26.55	14.30	4.11	33.40	54.19
1983	2.10	5.08	1.29	5.43	12.93	28.99	13.94	3.91	35.74	55.85
1984	1.90	4.63	1.19	6.92	11.75	27.89	12.67	3.77	34.02	52.30
1985	1.91	4.86	1.28	5.48	11.29	28.42	12.48	3.55	34.12	52.18
1986	2.21	4.82	1.28	2.61	11.38	30.14	13.07	4.90	36.17	54.58
1987	2.49	5.12	1.22	2.27	12.39	29.23	14.12	4.96	35.74	55.74
1988	2.95	5.44	1.11	1.48	13.49	30.90	14.65	2.83	37.16	59.04
1989	3.64	5.76	1.03	1.50	15.03	34.44	15.33	2.83	40.38	64.80
1990	3.76	5.30	1.28	1.13	15.95	36.66	14.83	3.48	42.42	67.43
1991	3.68	4.84	1.17	1.23	16.15	36.30	14.63	3.03	42.40	67.08
1992	3.59	4.29	1.35	0.93	15.47	34.61	13.35	2.83	40.09	63.44
1993	4.68	4.28	1.33	0.55	16.46	36.87	14.16	2.62	42.07	67.49
1994	4.37	4.03	1.33	0.40	16.05	34.64	14.22	2.79	40.46	64.90

## Appendix D: Policy Implementation in Britain

### D.1 The Expenditure Data for Britain

To try and resolve the uncertainty about whether Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge ran their mandate and ideology models in the way their equations are specified or how they usually analyse them the author asked for their original data. The expenditure data for Britain was the only data collected by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge that could be obtained, with Professor Hofferbert noting that most of the data had been stored on now obsolete disks.<sup>1</sup> The manifesto data was obtained from the Data Archive at Essex.<sup>2</sup> Further details on the British dataset are provided in a note at the end of this appendix. The equations for Britain are the same as those for New Zealand except that bCon, bConPM and ConG are respectively substituted in for bNat, bNatPM and NatG, while bLib replaces bSC.

### D.2 Summary of the Results for Britain

The best-fit policy implementation results for Britain using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's equations are shown in Table D.1, while the results using the revised version of the equations are shown in Table D.2. The full results for each model are shown at the end of this appendix. Although there were no problems with multicollinearity, contradictory ideology effects were excluded from the best-fit table. This resulted in the ideology effects for social services, health, education, defence and foreign affairs, and the left-right equations being dropped.

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<sup>1</sup> Professor Hofferbert, emails to the author, 24 November 1998 and 8 March 1999. The author's original request for all the expenditure data was therefore narrowed down to asking for the data for any country, but preferably the expenditure series for Britain. It made sense to use the British data to test the revised equations because the models for Britain were outlined in Parties, Policies, and Democracy in more detail than for any other country.

<sup>2</sup> The reference for the manifesto data is 'Andrea Volkens, et. al, Comparative Manifestos Project: Programmatic Profiles of Political Parties in Twenty Countries, 1945-1988 [computer file] Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 6 July 1995'.

Table D.1: Best fitting models for Britain using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's method, with programme data lagged by two years, 1945-1985

Expenditure and manifesto emphases										
Best fit agenda	a	bLab	bCon	bLib	R <sup>2</sup>					
Left-right (Left-right scale)	23.14		-.25		.31					
Best fit mandate	a	bLab	bLab	bCon	bCon	bLib	R <sup>2</sup>	M+		
			*Lab PM		*ConPM					
Social Services (Social Justice)	7.28	-.3			3.63		.65	.54		
Health (Social Justice)	28.11			.7	3.1	-.78	.30	.19		
Education (Education Expansion)	.79	.23	-0.10		-.15		.68	.10		
Transport (Technology and Infrastructure)	.66	.16		.11			.24	.04		
Defence and Foreign Affairs (Foreign Relations)	12.55		1.89		2.75	2.5	.66	.18		
Best fit ideology	a	bLab	bLab	bCon	bCon	bLib	Govt	R <sup>2</sup>	M+	I+
			*Lab PM		*ConPM					
Housing (Welfare State Expansion)	2.33		-.21	.43	-.43	-.17		.75	.57	.01
Agriculture (Agriculture and Farmers)	-1.82		1.64				4.19	.54	.03	.09
Administration of Justice (Law & Order)	.15			.08		-.11	.17	.70	.12	.05
Environment (Environmental Protection)	-.02		.15			.01	.29	.72	.13	.37

Table D.2: Best fitting models for Britain using revised method, with programme data lagged by two years, 1945-1985

Expenditure and manifesto emphases										
Best fit agenda	a	bLab	bCon	bLib	R <sup>2</sup>					
Left-right (Left-right scale)	23.14		-.25		.31					
Best fit mandate	a	bLab	bLab	bCon	bCon	bLib	R <sup>2</sup>	M+		
		*Con PM	*Lab PM	*Lab PM	*ConPM					
Social Services (Social Justice)	7.28	-0.3			3.89		.65	.54		
Health (Social Justice)	28.11			0.7	3.81	-.78	.30	.19		
Education (Education Expansion)	.79	.23	.13		-.12		.68	.10		
Transport (Technology and Infrastructure)	.66	.16		.11	.17		.24	.04		
Defence and Foreign Affairs (Foreign Relations)	12.55				3.18	2.49	.66	.18		
Best fit ideology	a	bLab	bLab	bCon	bCon	bLib	Govt	R <sup>2</sup>	M+	I+
		*Con PM	*Lab PM	*Lab PM	*ConPM					
Housing (Welfare State Expansion)	2.33		-.25	.43		-.17		.75	.57	.01
Agriculture (Agriculture and Farmers)	-1.82		1.67				4.19	.54	.03	.09
Administration of Justice (Law & Order)	.15			.08	.11	-.11	.17	.70	.12	.05
Environment (Environmental Protection)	-.02		.16			.01	.29	.72	.13	.37

As with the New Zealand data the change to the mandate and ideology equations only affects the value of the coefficients which measure the effects parties' manifestos have on government expenditure when they are in government. The other coefficients and the proportion of variance explained remain unchanged. In the revised model three out of 26 significant coefficients are contradictory. This compares well to the five out of 26 significant coefficients that are contradictory using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's equations.

While this comparison was meant to end the uncertainty about how Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge ran their models, the results leave this key question unresolved. This is because they show that when Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's equations and the revised equations were run different results were generated in every expenditure area to their results. Generally the new results are better, with the average  $R^2$ , after excluding transport where the  $R^2$  is 24%, being 59% compared to Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's average  $R^2$  of 49%. Although in Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's results transport reached an  $R^2$  of 25%, social security and health were both below 25% and were therefore excluded from their summary results.<sup>3</sup>

While in some cases, such as education, different pairings of variables than Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge used produced the best results, even using their pairings produced improved results. Whereas Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge found that over 60% of the significant coefficients for Britain were agenda effects, somewhat more in line with expectations this study found that only 50% were, with the other 50% being mandate or ideology effects.<sup>4</sup>

Theoretically the new results fit better than Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's with the widely held view that Britain is a country where parties have implemented their manifesto commitments.<sup>5</sup> This is because the author's results

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<sup>3</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 74, 77. Recalculating Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's average variance for Britain to allow for the dropping of contradictory ideology coefficients does not change the proportion of variance explained.

<sup>4</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, pp. 257-258.

<sup>5</sup> Dennis Kavanagh, 'The Politics of Manifestos', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 34 (1981), pp. 11-14, 24; Colin Rallings, 'The Influence of Election Programmes: Britain, and Canada 1956-1979', in *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in*

show stronger policy implementation across a wider range of expenditure areas than Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge found. Indeed, these results suggest that Britain had a slightly higher than average rate of policy implementation, rather than the second lowest in the countries surveyed.<sup>6</sup> However, the proportion of agenda coefficients is still surprisingly high. Together with the New Zealand results this suggests that governments in Westminster systems have sometimes acted in far more consensual ways than often believed.

### D.3 Why the Divergences Occurred

The most likely reason why these results differ from Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's is that a more recent version of the British data, rather than the original data set, was obtained. Before the British data was obtained Professor Budge had noted that there were now several different British data sets.<sup>7</sup> He subsequently pointed out that after the publication of Parties, Policies, and Democracy additional work to try and improve and extend the data set was carried out by Professor Hofferbert.<sup>8</sup> Further evidence that a later version of the British data set was provided is that the summarised data set provided by Professor Hofferbert contains different expenditure categories than those used by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge.

Professor Budge pointed out that many of the coefficients for Britain found by this study were broadly similar to their results. An earlier replication by King and Laver using the United States data used by Budge and Hofferbert in a 1990 article also reproduced their results exactly.<sup>9</sup> Although Professor Hofferbert has now retired the statistical sources he used to construct the datasets for each country are still held at the State University of New York at Binghamton. Professor Budge stated that the only way to reconstitute the data set for all

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<sup>19</sup> Democracies, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, pp. 257-258.

<sup>7</sup> Ian Budge, email to the author, 15 February, 1999.

<sup>8</sup> Ian Budge, letter to the author, 16 January 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Gary King and Michael Laver, 'Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending', American Political Science Review, Vol. 87 (1993), p. 744.

countries would be to go to Binghamton and work on Hofferbert's original materials.<sup>10</sup>

#### D.4 Conclusion

Data from Professor Hofferbert was used to rerun Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's policy implementation models for Britain both the way they algebraically specified them, and how they often interpret the results. As in New Zealand the revised versions of the equations had no effect on the number of significant coefficients, or on the proportion of variance explained. However, it did tend to increase the size of the mandate coefficients. The attempt to check which method Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge had used was unsuccessful, with differences between all the results suggesting that an improved version of their expenditure dataset had been provided.

#### D.5 Note on the Expenditure Data for Britain

Professor Hofferbert sent the author both a "consolidated" dataset, and a much more detailed set. The consolidated dataset included instructions on how it had been constructed from the detailed dataset. Surprisingly the consolidated dataset was lagged by two years compared to the graphs in Parties, Policies, and Democracy, although experiments showed that this did not account for divergences between the results in that text and the attempted replication. A new summary of expenditure was therefore constructed from the detailed dataset, mainly using the notes included with the consolidated dataset. The construction of the expenditure totals is shown in Table D.3. With the exception of administration of justice for 1953 and 1954, the new summarised expenditure statistics at most differed only fractionally from the expenditure statistics in Hofferbert's consolidated dataset put forward by two years. Except for the administration of justice figures for 1950, 1951 and 1952 the graphs of the new summary of expenditure statistics looked very similar to Klingemann, Hofferbert

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<sup>10</sup> Ian Budge, letter to the author, 16 January 2000.

and Budge's. These summarised expenditure figures were used in the results appearing in this study.

Table D.3: How the British expenditure categories were aggregated

Hofferbert's initial expenditure categories	Name of new expenditure categories
C62+c77+c78+c80+c84+c85+c99+c105	Social Security
C63+c67	Agriculture
C108	Environment
C69+c86+c87	Transport
C66+c100	Housing
C90	Administration of justice
C58+c59	Foreign affairs
C72+c74	Education

#### D.6 Pairing Expenditure Data and Manifesto Emphases in Britain

The pairings of expenditure data and manifesto categories were all fairly intuitive. As in New Zealand alternative pairings usually worked reasonably well. Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's left-right expenditure scale for Britain was successfully reconstructed by multiplying the factor score coefficients by the proportion of government expenditure on that area, and then summing the products. However, Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's expenditure factor analysis results were counter-intuitive because environmental protection loads on the left in the expenditure factor analysis, even though the environment is an expenditure area that has grown under Conservative governments.<sup>11</sup> A left-right expenditure scale that added together expenditure on health, social security, and housing and subtracted from this expenditure on foreign affairs, and administration of justice was therefore also created. This equation, which explained more variance than Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's, was used in the tables for Britain.

<sup>11</sup> Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy, p. 74.

Table D.4: Agenda model for Britain, with programme data lagged by two years, 1945-1985

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab	S.E.	b Con	S.E.	b Lib	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>
Social Services (Social Justice)	6.17	(.18)	.16	(0.19)	.23	(.28)	.33	.11
Health (Social Justice)	27.44	(.04)	.2	0.75	.30	(-.62)	.42	.11
Housing (Welfare State Expansion)	2.00	-.1	.03	(.02)	.03	(.02)	.03	.17
Education (Education)	.95	.17	.03	-.10	.02	(.01)	.03	.58
Agriculture (Agriculture and Farmers)	.02	.73	.24	.57	.22	(.24)	.16	.42
Transport (Technology and Infrastructure)	.69	.14	.07	.13	.04	(-.08)	.06	.20
Administration of Justice (Law & Order)	.26	(-.06)	.04	.09	.02	(-.02)	.01	.57
Defence and Foreign Affairs (Special Relations)	14.73	(0.08)	0.46	1.49	0.47	2.03	.62	.48
Environment (Environmental Protection)	.18	.03	.02	(.03)	.02	(.01)	.01	.22
Left-Right (Left-Right scale)	23.14	(-.29)	.19	-.25	.10	(.19)	.14	.31

Table D.5: Mandate model for Britain using Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge's equations, with programme data lagged by two years, 1945-1985

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab	S.E.	bLab *LabPM	S.E.	bCon	S.E.	bCon *ConPM	S.E.	bLib	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>	M+
Social Services (Social Justice)	7.28	-.30	.12	(.22)	.15	(.26)	.15	3.63	.52	(.10)	.21	.65	.54
Health (Social Justice)	28.11	(-.35)	.22	(.50)	.28	.70	.28	3.10	.96	-.78	.38	.30	.19
Housing (Welfare State Expansion)	2.17	-.05	.02	-.18	.04	.44	.06	-.45	.06	-.17	.03	.74	.57
Education (Education Expansion)	.79	.23	.03	-.10	.04	(.03)	.04	-.15	.04	(0)	.02	.68	.10
Agriculture (Agriculture and Farmers)	.35	(.43)	.30	(1.07)	.54	(-.10)	.41	(.72)	.41	(.22)	.15	.45	.03
Transport (Technology and Infrastructure)	.66	.16	.07	(-.07)	.07	.11	.05	(.06)	.05	(-.08)	.06	.24	.04
Administration of Justice (Law & Order)	.25	(.04)	.14	(-.07)	.17	.08	.02	.07	.04	-.10	.04	.66	.09
Defence and Foreign Affairs (Special Relations)	12.55	(-.18)	.37	1.89	.81	(.43)	.45	2.75	.62	2.50	.51	.66	.18
Environment (Environmental Protection)	.15	(.01)	.01	.09	.03	(0)	.02	(.05)	.03	(.01)	.01	.35	.13
Left-Right (Left-Right scale)	23.5	(-.27)	.21	(-.05)	.17	(-.18)	.37	(-.11)	.39	(.18)	.15	.27	-.04

Table D.6: Mandate model for Britain using revised equations, with programme data lagged by two years, 1945-1985

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab *ConPM	S.E.	bLab *LabPM	S.E.	bCon *LabPM	S.E.	bCon *ConPM	S.E.	bLib	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>	M+
Social Services (Social Justice)	7.28	-.30	.12	(-.08)	.17	(.26)	.15	3.89	.54	(.10)	.21	.65	.54
Health (Social Justice)	28.11	(-.35)	.22	(.15)	.31	.70	.28	3.81	1.00	-.78	.38	.30	.19
Housing (Welfare State Expansion)	2.17	-.05	.02	-.23	.03	.44	.06	(-.01)	.02	-.17	.03	.74	.57
Education (Education Expansion)	.79	.23	.03	.13	.03	(.03)	.04	-.12	.02	(0)	.02	.68	.10
Agriculture (Agriculture and Farmers)	.35	(.43)	.30	1.50	.46	(-.10)	.41	.62	.23	(.22)	.15	.45	.03
Transport (Technology and Infrastructure)	.66	.16	.07	(.09)	.09	.11	.05	.17	.05	(-.08)	.06	.24	.04
Administration of Justice (Law & Order)	.25	(.04)	.14	(-.03)	.05	.08	.02	.14	.03	-.09	.04	.66	.09
Defence and Foreign Affairs (Special Relations)	12.55	(-.18)	.37	(1.71)	.85	(.43)	.45	3.18	.54	2.49	.51	.66	.18
Environment (Environmental Protection)	.15	(.01)	.01	.10	.03	(0)	.01	(.05)	.03	(.01)	.01	.35	.13
Left-Right (Left-Right scale)	23.5	(-.27)	.21	(-.32)	.22	(-.18)	.37	-.28	.11	(.18)	.15	.27	-.04

Table D.7: Ideology model for Britain using Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge's equations, with programme data lagged by two years, 1945-1985

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab	S.E.	bLab	S.E.	bCon	S.E.	bCon	S.E.	bLib	S.E.	Govt	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>	I+
				*LabPM				*ConPM							
Social Services (Social Justice)	4.49	-.47	.12	.75	.21	.31	.13	3.44	.46	(.24)	.19	4.18	1.32	.73	.08
Health (Social Justice)	22.22	-.72	.20	1.62	.37	.81	.23	2.71	.80	(-.47)	.32	8.82	2.29	.52	.22
Housing (Welfare State Expansion)	2.33	(-.04)	.02	-.21	.04	.43	.06	-.43	.06	-.17	.03	(-.36)	.24	.75	.01
Education (Education Expansion)	.43	.22	(.03)	(-.05)	.06	(.11)	.08	-.24	.09	(0.01)	.02	(.40)	.35	.68	+
Agriculture (Agriculture and Farmers)	-1.82	(.03)	.31	1.64	.53	(.54)	.44	(-.13)	.49	(.02)	.16	4.19	1.57	.54	.09
Transport (Technology and Infrastructure)	.73	(.18)	.09	(-.10)	.13	(.10)	.05	(.08)	.09	(-.08)	.06	(-.15)	.53	.21	-.03
Administration of Justice (Law & Order)	.15	(.13)	.14	(-.12)	.16	.08	.02	(.03)	.04	-.11	.04	.17	.08	.70	.04
Defence and Foreign Affairs (Foreign Relations)	15.39	(.01)	.41	(.59)	1.48	(-.10)	.68	3.42	.89	2.89	.64	(-4.26)	4.07	.66	+
Environment (Environmental Protection)	-.02	(0.01)	.01	.15	.02	(.02)	.01	(-.05)	.02	.01	.00	.29	.05	.72	.37
Left-Right (Left-Right scale)	12.23	(-.45)	.25	(.46)	.40	(-.43)	.41	(.18)	.43	(.22)	.15	(16.52)	12.12	.29	+.02

Table D.8: Ideology model for Britain using revised equations, with programme data lagged by two years, 1945-1985

Expenditure and manifesto emphases	a	b Lab	S.E.	bLab	S.E.	bCon	S.E.	bCon	S.E.	bLib	S.E.	Govt	S.E.	R <sup>2</sup>	I+
		*ConPM		*LabPM		*LabPM		*ConPM							
Social Services (Social Justice)	4.49	-.47	.12	(.27)	.19	.31	.13	3.75	.48	(.24)	.19	4.18	1.32	0.73	.08
Health (Social Justice)	22.22	-.72	.20	.90	.32	.81	.23	3.51	.83	(-.47)	.32	8.82	2.29	.52	.22
Housing (Welfare State Expansion)	2.33	(-.04)	.02	-.25	.04	.43	.06	(0.00)	.02	-.17	.03	(-.36)	.24	.75	.01
Education (Education Expansion)	.43	.22	.03	.17	.05	(.11)	.08	-.12	.02	(0.01)	.02	(.40)	.35	.68	+
Agriculture (Agriculture and Farmers)	-1.82	(.03)	.31	1.67	.42	(.54)	.44	(.40)	.22	(.02)	.16	4.19	1.57	.54	.09
Transport (Technology and Infrastructure)	.73	(.18)	.09	(.08)	.10	(.10)	.05	.18	.07	(-.08)	.06	(-.15)	.53	.21	-.03
Administration of Justice (Law & Order)	.15	(.13)	.14	(.01)	.05	.08	.02	.11	.03	-.11	.04	.17	.08	.70	.04
Defence and Foreign Affairs (Foreign Relations)	15.39	(.01)	.41	(.60)	1.36	(-.10)	.68	3.32	.55	2.89	.64	(-4.26)	4.07	.66	+
Environment (Environmental Protection)	-.02	(.01)	.01	.16	.02	(.02)	.01	(-.02)	.02	.01	0	.29	.05	.72	.37
Left-Right (Left-Right scale)	12.23	(-.45)	.25	(0)	.32	(-.43)	.41	-.25	.12	(.22)	.15	(16.52)	12.12	.29	+.02

## Primary Sources Bibliography

This bibliography first lists the government documents used, and the newspapers consulted. This is followed by a very detailed section listing the election programmes used, and giving directions as to their location. Other political ephemera used is then listed.

### Government Documents

Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1911-1996.

New Zealand Official Yearbook (Wellington, Statistics Department/Statistics New Zealand, 1911-1999).

### Newspapers

Most of the newspapers below were used only occasionally. When a newspaper has been used extensively this has been noted.

Auckland Star (Auckland).

Dominion (Wellington. This newspaper was consulted extensively, with its coverage of nearly every election being read).

Evening Post (Wellington).

Grey River Argus (Greymouth).

Independent (Auckland).

Listener (Wellington, then Auckland).

Lyttelton Times (Christchurch).

Maoriland Worker/New Zealand Worker (Wellington).

National Business Review (Auckland).

New Zealand Herald (Auckland. This was the newspaper used most extensively, with its coverage of every election being read).

New Zealand Times (Wellington. This daily newspaper was extensively consulted for elections between 1911 and 1925. It was taken over by the Dominion in 1927).

New Zealand Times (Wellington. This weekly Sunday newspaper was consulted for some elections during the 1980s).

Sunday Star (Auckland).

Sunday Star Times (Auckland).

Waikato Times (Hamilton. This newspaper was checked for some elections during the 1980s and 1990s. As well as reprinting stories from larger newspapers in the same newspaper group the Times also contains many original articles).

### Election Programmes

The election programmes for each party are listed chronologically under headings of party names, which are arranged alphabetically. Where party names have changed the name that a party has usually been known by is used for the heading. Because of the extreme difficulties encountered in collecting pre-1970s election programmes the library finding aid used to locate each document, and/or the location of each programme has been given for manifestos issued before the late 1960s. When only the finding aid is noted this means that it lists which libraries hold original copies. All the post-1969 election programmes are widely held. Unless otherwise noted those listed in the bibliography were obtained from the University of Waikato Library's New Zealand Collection, either on the shelves or uncatalogued in the political ephemera boxes.

Permission to get access to manifestos in the National Party Papers at the Alexander Turnbull Library was gained by writing to the National Party and the head of the Turnbull Manuscripts and Archives Collection. When this bibliography was compiled only the Victoria University Library required written permission from political parties for copies to be made of election programmes. Usually libraries were unwilling to provide original copies through inter-library loan, but would supply copies.

When it was found that manifestos were printed in newspapers or secondary texts this has been noted to make them easier to collect. For the pre-1935 period it has also been noted when it was found that the text of original copies appears in newspapers checked, and also when no original copies are available, but the text of the manifesto is identical in different newspapers. This has been done to support the argument in the methodology chapter that until the late 1930s, when manifestos became much longer, newspapers usually printed the full versions of the manifestos of parties they were sympathetic to. When it is noted that the text of programmes has been printed in full in newspapers the subheadings may differ. Variations in the use of definite articles such as 'the', and indefinite articles such as 'a' have also not been counted as changes. Full details of titles and page number have been given for newspaper versions, because without this information it is virtually impossible to get them through inter-library loan.

Because this thesis concentrates on election programmes, long-term party platforms are not listed unless they also served as a party's main

election policy statement. Other platforms issued by Labour's predecessors, however, can be found in Appendix A of Bruce Brown's, thesis 'The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935'. Appendix C of Brown's thesis also reprints many of Labour's platforms issued up to 1923 and lists subsequent changes. Because election pamphlets were not collected they are also not listed in the bibliography. Some, however, are listed in the bibliographic aids listed in the search strategy section, while a high proportion are held uncatalogued in the New Zealand Collection vertical file at the Auckland University Library. The search strategy for election programmes is listed at the end of this section of the bibliography to help future researchers.

#### Abbreviations for library sources and finding aids

AP	Auckland Public Library
AU	Auckland University Library
DU:HO	Hocken Library, Dunedin
HU	Waikato University Library, Hamilton
NZBN	New Zealand Bibliographic Network
NZUC	Microfiche version of the New Zealand Union Catalogue
WGA	General Assembly Library, Wellington
WN	National Library, Wellington
WRB	Reserve Bank Library, Wellington
WTU	Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington
WU	Victoria University Library, Wellington

#### Election Manifestos By Party

##### ACT

ACT New Zealand, ACT New Zealand Campaign Manifesto: General Election 1996 (ACT New Zealand, 1996).

##### Alliance

Alliance, Alliance Manifesto 1993 (Alliance, 1996).

Alliance, 1996 Alliance Manifesto for all voters (Alliance, 1996).

##### Christian Coalition

Christian Coalition, Agreement With New Zealand: Christian Coalition Manifesto 1996 (1996).

##### The Coalition

'The Coalition: Leader's Manifesto: Free Hand Sought', Auckland Star, 13 November 1931, p. 5.

Also published under the headings ‘General Election: Appeal By Coalition’, New Zealand Herald, 13 November 1931, p. 11; and ‘Policy of the Coalition’, Dominion, 13 November 1931, p. 10.

This manifesto was collected because it is the one referred to by Michael Bassett in Coates of Kaipara (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), pp. 172, 298; and by Bruce Brown, ‘The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935’ (M.A. Thesis, Victoria, University of Wellington, 1955), p. 218. It would also seem to be the manifesto referred to by R.M. Burdon, The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand 1918-1939 (Wellington: Reed, 1965), p. 138 when he says that the Coalition’s manifesto was very short, and “merely asked for a free hand to meet new conditions as they arise”.

A second manifesto issued by the Coalition was published under the title ‘Coalition: Manifesto: Self-Reliant Policy’, Press, 17 November 1931, p. 9. Also published under the headings ‘Purpose of Coalition Sound Financial Basis’, New Zealand Herald, 17 November 1931, p. 11; and ‘Aims of the Coalition: A Mandate for Stability’, Dominion, 16 November 1931, p. 10. This is the manifesto referred to by Bruce Farland, in Coates’ Tale (Wellington: Bruce Farland, 1995), pp. 90, 187, where he notes that this is the draft manifesto prepared by the Reform Party in July 1931 before it agreed to contest the election in a coalition. Since Farland carried out his thesis research in the 1960s the Coates Papers have been shifted to another library and the inventory has been redone. Unfortunately the draft Reform manifesto was unable to be found by the author of this study. However, a letter from Farland stated that his notes clearly showed that he had matched up the draft of Reform’s manifesto with the later newspaper text.

On p. 298 of Coates of Kaipara Bassett argues that the second document was very similar to the first. However, closer analysis shows that it covers a much wider range of topics. The results for the two manifestos were added together because both documents are likely to have influenced voters’ perceptions of the Coalition’s policies. This decision was justified when it was discovered that the text of these two different newspaper versions had been printed in Keep in step with the Motherland, ([The Coalition, 1931]), New Zealand Labour Party Papers, MS 0270-042.

#### Democrat Party

‘Summary of Plans: “A Great Programme”’, New Zealand Herald, 2 October 1935, p. 16.

The same text was printed under the heading ‘What the Democrat Party will do if returned to power’, Dominion, 2 October 1935, p. 11.

C.G. Rollo, 'The Election of 1935 in New Zealand', (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Zealand (Wellington), 1950), p. vi notes that an extensive search for Democrat ephemera, including checking with printing firms and opposition parties, failed to turn up any material.

### Democratic Soldier Labour Party

Democratic Soldier Labour Party, The Manifesto of the Democratic Soldier Labour Party (Democratic Soldier Labour Party, 1943).

AP on-line catalogue.

### Green Party

Green Party, Policy Directions for the 1990 General Election (Green Party, 1990).

### Liberal Party and successors

'Speech By Sir Joseph Ward: Liberal Policy and Administration', New Zealand Times, 8 November 1911, p. 7.

A letter received from Dr. Michael Bassett noted that he had seen copies of Ward's 1911 and 1914 campaign speeches reprinted in pamphlet form by the New Zealand Times for distribution by the Liberals. Unfortunately the reprinted texts could not be tracked down despite an extensive search by the staff of WTU and WN, and enquiries at National Archives and WGA. An untitled item in 'Notes of the Day', Dominion, 8 November, 1911, p. 6 states that an advance version of this speech, complete with "applause" at regular intervals, was sent to all newspapers through the Press Association before it was delivered.

'Sir Joseph Ward At Winton: "Reform" Policy Criticised', New Zealand Times, 17 November 1914, pp. 7-8.

See 1911 note. A version of this speech was also received from the Southland Times, 17 November 1914, pp. 2-3. There were only minor differences between the texts.

'Sir Joseph Ward Has Crowded Meeting: Liberal Principles and Policy', Lyttelton Times, 11 November 1919, p. 7.

According to Michael Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Bibliography (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 247 this is the speech with which Ward opened his election campaign. It is therefore used as the Liberal's election programme. However, historians have often attributed greater significance to the Liberal Party manifesto published after it left its wartime coalition with Reform. This was published under the title

‘End of Party Truce’, New Zealand Times, 22 August 1919, pp. 5-6 and under the heading ‘Truce Ended’, Lyttelton Times, 22 August 1919, pp. 7-8. There are sound reasons for seeing the first document as most important. For instance, some newspapers such as the New Zealand Times only published very short versions of the November statement. The August manifesto was therefore also coded for comparative purposes.

‘Election Campaign: The Opposition Policy Outlined By Mr Wilford’, New Zealand Herald, 1 November 1922, p. 11.

The same text was published under the subheading ‘The Policy in Brief’, in article headed ‘The Liberal-Labour Party’, New Zealand Times, 1 November 1922, p. 7. Although both the New Zealand Herald and New Zealand Times printed sections of Wilford’s elaboration of policy points this was not coded because leader’s comments on the programme were only coded when they were clearly meant to have the same authority as the platform.

‘The Election Campaign: National Party’s Policy’, New Zealand Herald, 2 October 1925, p. 13.

The same text was published under the heading ‘National Party: Election Manifesto’, New Zealand Times, 2 October 1925, p. 11.

‘Election Campaign: United Party Policy: Sir J. Ward’s Outline’, New Zealand Herald, 17 October 1928, p. 15.

### New Zealand First

New Zealand First, Manifesto 1993 (New Zealand First, 1993)

New Zealand First, The Leadership, The Vision, The Policies, and The Kiwi Spirit (New Zealand First, 1996).

After consultation with party officials these two brochures were treated as the official manifesto.

New Zealand First, Policy Summary (New Zealand First, 1996).

This statement was downloaded from the New Zealand First web site the day before the election. Unfortunately no information could be gained about the authoritativeness of this statement, with letters to the head office of the party going unanswered, and phone calls unreturned.

New Zealand First, New Zealand First Policies: Executive Summaries (New Zealand First, 1996).

According to Winston Peters' Tauranga electorate secretary, Maureen Guy, this was only put together after the election. It was therefore not included in this study.

### NewLabour Party

NewLabour Party, Manifesto 1990 (NewLabour Party, 1990).

### New Zealand Labour Party and its predecessors

Because most of the manifestos collected for this study had the year, or even the exact day, of release typed on the manifesto there was little doubt of their validity. Some of the manifestos found in the Labour Party Parliamentary Research Unit Records, however, only had the date written on in ink. In order to ensure that the right document was being used the length, titles, and content of these manifestos was carefully matched up with newspaper reports of the manifesto. No cases of manifestos that had been wrongly dated were found.

Trade Councils' New Zealand Labour Party, 'Platform', in Report of Annual Conference, 1910, pp. 47-48, reprinted in Bruce Brown, 'The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935' (M.A. Thesis, Victoria, University of Wellington, 1955), pp. A2-A3.

In Speeches and Documents in New Zealand History, edited by W. David McIntyre and W.J. Gardner (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 220, objective A under 'Land Reform' is misprinted. According to p. A2 of Bruce Brown's thesis it should read "No further sale of Crown Lands".

Social Democratic Party, 'Fighting Platform', Constitution and Platform of the Social Democratic Party of New Zealand (July, 1913) reprinted in Bruce Brown, 'The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935' (M.A. Thesis, Victoria, University of Wellington, 1955), pp. A4-A5.

Also in Speeches and Documents in New Zealand History, edited by W. David McIntyre and W.J. Gardner (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 228-230.

New Zealand Labor Party, 'Platform', Constitution and Platform (As Amended at the Third Annual Conference, July 3, 4, 5, 1919)

NZUC. Also in The New Zealand Politics Source Book, edited by Paul Harris and Stephen Levine, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1994), pp. 138-139.

This document was used because Bruce Brown, 'The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1935' (M.A. Thesis, Victoria, University of Wellington,

1955), notes on p. 38 that “Labour went to the polls on the basis of its 1919 platform”. Barry Gustafson, Labour’s Path to Political Power (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1982), p. 180 notes that the Marlborough Express, 3 September 1919, p. [7], printed Labour’s manifesto. However, the text in the Express is only a shortened version of the platform.

The Henry Holland Papers, Micro MS 831, reel 6, P5/1/696 contains Labour’s Chief Planks Explained [1919]. This document explains some of Labour’s planks in detail, with its 1919 platform then being printed at the end in full. Although it notes that Labour’s candidates are pledged to support the platform, its tone and annotations by Holland on this pamphlet show that there were divisions over details of some of the policies outlined in the explanation of the planks. This provides further evidence that the platform is the best indicator of Labour’s policies.

‘Election Manifesto of the New Zealand Labour Party: Policy to Reduce Toilers’ Burdens and Secure an Abundant Life’, Maoriland Worker, 8 November 1922, pp. 8-9.

‘Election Manifesto of the New Zealand Labour Party: Labour’s Bold Effort for the Common People’, New Zealand Worker, 21 October 1925, pp. 8-10.

Labour’s Election Policy: Labour Party Manifesto-Cooperation and Service’, New Zealand Worker, 17 October 1928, p. 1.

The same text was published under the heading ‘Labour’s Policy: Closer Settlement, Safeguarding State Enterprise’, Grey River Argus, 20 October 1928, p. 6. At earlier elections the Argus had printed detailed, but still condensed, versions of Labour’s manifestos.

Barry Gustafson, From the Cradle to the Grave: A biography of Michael Joseph Savage (Auckland: Penguin, 1988), p. 320 states that Labour’s 1928 policy is in the New Zealand Labour Party Papers, MS 0270-351. Unfortunately this file, and other files from this period on annual conferences, only contain very summarised versions of Labour’s manifestos.

‘Halt Must Be Called To Forbes-Coates Drift; Labour’s Election Policy’, New Zealand Worker, 18 November 1931, p. 1.

The same text was published under the heading ‘Labour’s Policy: Expansion of Industry’, Grey River Argus, 18 November 1931, p. 6.

‘Labour’s Election Policy, 1935: Security And Prosperity For All’ (1935), in Appendix C of J.T. Paul, Humanism in Politics: New Zealand Labour Party Retrospect (Wellington: New Zealand Labour Party, 1946).

This is a perfect match with an original copy held at HU.

New Zealand Labour Party, Government's Election Manifesto: Security and Prosperity For All ([New Zealand Labour Party], 1938).

AU on-line catalogue.

New Zealand Labour Party, Labour Party's Policy ([New Zealand Labour Party, 1943]).

AU on-line catalogue.

New Zealand Labour Party, Labour's Election Manifesto - 1946 (New Zealand Labour Party, 1946).

National Archives Reference, NASH 2094, Description, General Election No. 1946, folio numbers 0001-0441.

New Zealand Labour Party, Election Manifesto - 1949 (New Zealand Labour Party, 1949).

New Zealand Labour Party Parliamentary Records, MS 82-180-1/17. This 15 page version was used because it contains the subheadings "Security for All" and "Opportunity for Everyone" which the New Zealand Herald reported on November 2 1949 in its p. 8 article 'Labour Party Election Manifesto' that the full manifesto contained. This folder also contains a shorter version of the manifesto, which is in the form of a speech, that is a good match with the content of the article 'The Prime Minister Opens Election Campaign', New Zealand Herald, October 26 1949, p. 8.

New Zealand Labour Party, Labour's Progressive Policy: 1951 Election (New Zealand Labour Party, 1951).

New Zealand Labour Party Parliamentary Records, MS 82-180-1/18. Also published in full after the 'Finance' subheading in the article 'Labour Party Makes Promises', New Zealand Herald, August 15 1951, p. 8.

New Zealand Labour Party, untitled ([New Zealand Labour Party], 1954).

New Zealand Labour Party Parliamentary Records, MS 82-180-1/18. Also published in full after the 'Public Works and Housing' subheading in the article 'Labour Party's Policy', New Zealand Herald, October 20 1954, p. 10.

New Zealand Labour Party, Election Manifesto 1957, (New Zealand Labour Party, 1957).

NZUC. Also New Zealand Labour Party Parliamentary Records, MS 82-180-1/18.

New Zealand Labour Party, New Zealand Labour Party Policy, (New Zealand Labour Party, [1960]).

New Zealand Labour Party Parliamentary Records, MS 82-180-1/14, and 1/15. Although both these copies are undated they are in boxes which only contain Labour Party material, such as election brochures and letters, relating to the 1960 election. They also contain the same policies and are the same length as the Labour manifesto referred to in articles on page 1 of the New Zealand Herald, November 1 1960.

New Zealand Labour Party, 1963 General Election Manifesto (New Zealand Labour Party, 1963).

NZUC.

New Zealand Labour Party, 1966 Election Manifesto (New Zealand Labour Party, 1966).

NZUC.

New Zealand Labour Party, Labour's Election Policy 1969: Towards Nationhood With The New Zealand Party (New Zealand Labour Party, 1969).

NZUC.

New Zealand Labour Party, 1972 Election Manifesto (New Zealand Labour Party, 1972).

New Zealand Labour Party, The Labour Party Manifesto 1975 (New Zealand Labour Party, 1975).

New Zealand Labour Party, New Zealand Labour Party Manifesto 1978 (New Zealand Labour Party, 1978).

This is the long official version of Labour's manifesto.

New Zealand Labour Party, 1978 Manifesto: To Rebuild The Nation (New Zealand Labour Party, 1978).

New Zealand Labour Party, Manifesto 1981 (New Zealand Labour Party, 1981).

This is the long official version of Labour's manifesto.

New Zealand Labour Party, Getting New Zealand Working Again: New Zealand Labour Party 1981 Manifesto (New Zealand Labour Party, 1981).

New Zealand Labour Party, 1984 Policy Document (New Zealand Labour Party, 1984).

New Zealand Labour Party, 1987 Policy Document (New Zealand Labour Party, 1987).

New Zealand Labour Party, The Next Three Years: Labour's Plan for the Future (New Zealand Labour Party, 1987).

According to Anthony Hubbard, 'Broken Promises', Listener, 16 April 1990, p. 20 this manifesto only had a very limited distribution before the election. The shorter Policy Document was therefore treated as Labour's manifesto.

New Zealand Labour Party, Our Policies for the 90s (New Zealand Labour Party, 1990).

New Zealand Labour Party, Jobs. Health. Growth: Labour's Manifesto for New Zealand (MMSC Ltd, 1993).

New Zealand Labour Party, Labour's Key Policies (New Zealand Labour Party, 1996).

'Labour: Delivering the Vision: Speech at the Opening of Labour's 1996 Election Campaign', by the Rt. Hon Helen Clark, Leader of the Opposition, Aotea Centre Auckland, Sunday 8 September, 1996.

This Official Press Release was used as a comparison with the manifesto Labour's Key Policies.

New Zealand Labour Party, Labour Manifesto 1996: New heart, new hope, New Zealand (New Zealand Labour Party, 1996).

According to Murdo MacMillan, who is Labour's Assistant Secretary General, this was released to targeted "movers and shakers". The NZBN entry shows that it was first catalogued by a library in 1997. Neither the Hamilton East or Hamilton West offices of the Labour Party had a copy the day before the election, providing further evidence that this manifesto was not generally available. This manifesto was therefore not coded.

New Zealand National Party

New Zealand National Party, 'National Government's Policy: Leaders Issue Manifesto to Electors', Dominion, October 29 1935, p. 12.

The NZUC notes that National reprinted this manifesto from the Dominion for circulation as a brochure. Also published in two columns under the headings 'National Policy; Record During Crisis' and 'Sound Progress: Future Measures', New Zealand Herald, October 29 1935, p. 10.

New Zealand National Party, Election Manifesto and Statement By the Hon. Adam Hamilton, M.P. (New Zealand National Party, 1938).

New Zealand National Party Papers, MS 89-075-108/3. Only the manifesto section was coded, with the three-page statement by Hamilton being ignored.

New Zealand National Party, 1943 General Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 1943).

New Zealand National Party Papers, MS 89-075-108/3.

New Zealand National Party, Policy General Election 1946 (New Zealand National Party, 1946).

NZUC.

New Zealand National Party, Policy General Election 1949 (New Zealand National Party, 1949).

NZUC.

'Broadcast Address By Mr. S.G. Holland, 13th August 1951 Theatre Royal, Christchurch'.

National Archives Reference, NASH 2091, folio numbers 0001-0441.

New Zealand National Party, A Record of Progress: Policy General Election 1954 (New Zealand National Party, 1954).

NZUC and AU New Zealand Collection vertical file.

New Zealand National Party, Policy General Election 1957 (New Zealand National Party, 1957).

New Zealand National Party Papers, MS 89-075-108/8.

New Zealand National Party, Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 1 November 1960).

NZUC. Also WN.

New Zealand National Party, 1963 Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 4 November 1963).

NZUC.

New Zealand National Party, 1966 General Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 31 October 1966).

NZUC, also New Zealand National Party Papers, MS 89-075-109/5.

New Zealand National Party, 1969 General Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 3 November 1969).

NZUC.

New Zealand National Party, 1972 General Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 30 October 1972).

New Zealand National Party, National Party General Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 1975).

This is the long official version of National's manifesto.

New Zealand National Party, 1975 National Party Manifesto: A Guide To What The Next National Government Will Do For New Zealand, (New Zealand National Party, 1975).

New Zealand National Party, National Party 1978 General Election Policy. (New Zealand National Party, 1978).

New Zealand National Party, This Is Your Future (New Zealand National Party, 1981).

New Zealand National Party, National's 84 Election Policy (New Zealand National Party, 1984).

'National', in "Policy", New Zealand Times, 1 July 1984, p. 16; and 'National', in "Policy", New Zealand Times, 8 July 1984, p. 25.

The results for these two New Zealand Times summaries of National's policies were combined as a check upon the policies in National's manifesto.

New Zealand National Party, Let's Get New Zealand Right: Manifesto '87 (New Zealand National Party, 1987).

New Zealand National Party, National Party Policies For The 1990s, (New Zealand National Party, 1990).

New Zealand National Party, Manifesto '93: Stepping Out On The Path To 2010 (New Zealand National Party, 1993).

New Zealand National Party, The Plan For Progress: The Best Is Yet To Come (New Zealand National Party, 1996).

### New Zealand Party

New Zealand Party, Freedom and Prosperity: The New Zealand Party Manifesto (New Zealand Party, 1984).

### Reform

'The Fight For Reform: Great Meeting At The Town Hall', Dominion, 7 July 1911, p.6.

The New Zealand National Bibliography To The Year 1960, vol. 3, edited by A.G. Bagnall (Wellington: Government Printer, 1972), p. 195, entry m1289, notes that Reform's manifesto was reprinted from that issue of the Dominion, for general distribution. Also published under the heading 'Opposition Policy', New Zealand Herald, 8 July 1911, p. 8. Also printed in full in Speeches and Documents in New Zealand History, edited by W. David McIntyre and W.J. Gardner (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 222-224.

'Safety and Progress: The Reform Policy Manifesto By The Prime Minister', Dominion, 7 November 1914, p. 8.

The NZUC notes that DU: HO has a copy reprinted from this issue of the Dominion for circulation as a brochure. Also published in full under the heading 'Government Manifesto: Policy of Progress', New Zealand Herald, 7 November 1914, p. 9.

Reform, The Man and the Policy: Sound, Progressive and Liberal (Reform, 11 October 1919).

WTU. Also published in full under the heading 'Government's Policy: Manifesto By Mr Massey', New Zealand Herald, 13 October 1919, p. 8; and under the heading 'The Government Policy: Reform Election Programme', Dominion, 13 October 1919, p. 6.

Reform, The Prime Minister's Manifesto; Reform Government's Policy and Programme, (Reform, 30 October 1922).

WTU. Except for one the omission of one sentence it was also printed under the heading 'Government's policy: Programme Outlined', New Zealand Herald, 31 October 1922, p. 9. Published in full under the heading 'Prime Minister's Manifesto', Dominion, 31 October 1922, p. 7.

'The Election Campaign: Reform Party's Policy', New Zealand Herald, 3 October 1925, p. 13.

The same text was also printed under the heading 'No Spectacular Programme: Prime Minister's Workmanlike Manifesto To Electors', New Zealand Times, 3 October 1925, p. 5; and under the heading 'Stability and Safety: Reform Party Manifesto', Dominion, 3 October 1925, p. 7.

Reform, General Election, 1928: Prime Minister's Manifesto, (Reform, 15 October 1928).

WTU. One or two additional sentences appear in the 'Liberal and Self-Reliant Policy', version, Dominion, 16 October 1928, p. 12. Probably because it had its own correspondent at the launch of the manifesto, the New Zealand Herald published two long articles on the manifesto rather than the text.

### Social Credit

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, Social Credit's Solution To The Problems Of Today And Tomorrow (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1954).

HU. Also NZUC.

14 of the 16 brochures issued to households by the New Zealand Social Credit Political League for the 1957 election were able to be collected from the New Zealand and Pacific Collection vertical file at AU and from the ephemera collection at WTU. The first brochure which is titled 'The Key to Better Government and Higher Living Standards' is the only one to be unnumbered. Some of the brochures in the Auckland University vertical file were in a 1960 folder. However, comments by J.E. Colechin in 'The Campaign of the Social Credit Political League', Political Science, Vol. 10 (1958), p. 48, indicate that Social Credit would have been unlikely to issue this type of brochures again. This means that it is very likely that all these brochures were issued before the 1957 election. Unfortunately it was impossible to find brochures 11 and 12, or determine what they were about.

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, Official Policy For 1960 Election. (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1960).

Held Beaglehole Room, WU.

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, Official Policy For 1963 Election (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1963).

NZUC, but WRB were unable to find their copy.

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, Official Policy 1966 (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1966).

NZUC.

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1969 Election Policy (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1969).

NZUC.

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, N.Z. for ALL N.Z.'ers: Election Policy 1972 (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1972).

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, The New Dimension: Social Credit Policy '75 (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1975).

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, Social Credit '78 Election Manifesto (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1978).

New Zealand Social Credit Political League, Social Credit Manifesto 1981 (New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1981).

Social Credit, Policy In Brief (Social Credit, 1984).

N.Z. Democratic Party, Manifesto (N.Z. Democratic Party, 1987).

N.Z. Democratic Party, Policy Briefs 1990 (N.Z. Democratic Party, 1990).

### Values

Values, Blueprint for New Zealand: An Alternative Future (Values Party, 1972).

Values, Beyond Tomorrow: 1975 Values Party Manifesto (Values Party, 1975).

### Manifesto Search Strategy

The election programmes used for this study were initially collected by using the resources of the New Zealand Collection at the University of Waikato. The electronic New Zealand Bibliographic Network, the microfiche version of the New Zealand Union Catalogue, and print bibliographic guides were used to locate catalogued copies of party manifestos.<sup>1</sup> From these sources most of the manifestos located by earlier studies, and some of the manifestos they had been unable to find, were located. Historians and political scientists including Michael Bassett, Bruce Brown, R.M. Chapman, Bruce Farland, Barry Gustafson, Peter Harris, Stephen Levine, P.J. O'Farrell, Nigel Roberts and Jack Vowles were also contacted and asked about the location of original copies of manifestos.

Election programmes were then collected by interloaning items, and by personally visiting libraries and archives. Visiting libraries was important because it was found that even at libraries which claim that all material in closed collections is electronically catalogued, staff were often able to find items that had not yet been catalogued.

At Auckland University Library the New Zealand and Pacific Collection vertical file was found to contain several manifestos, and election pamphlets. The Auckland History department library only holds secondary texts, while the Auckland Political Studies archive only goes back to the 1960s. The Auckland Public Library political ephemera and Lee collections were searched, while at the Auckland Museum Library the card catalogue and the manuscripts catalogues were checked.

Although the National Library is meant to collect a copy of every New Zealand publication, staff in Wellington explained that it only had a few election programmes because it does not usually collect items below a certain physical size. Similarly, despite its role as a research library for members of parliament the General Assembly Library has not systematically collected manifestos.<sup>2</sup>

However, a visit to the Beaglehole Room at Victoria, University of Wellington, where no old New Zealand material is electronically catalogued, was productive. The Special Collections librarian at Victoria advised that there was no point in checking their manuscripts collection. The vertical files and uncatalogued ephemera on the shelves at Wellington Public Library were also searched, while the Reserve Bank Library was visited to see what Social Credit material it held.

Because P.J. O'Farrell noted that copies of Labour's 1922, 1925 and 1928 manifestos were held at Labour Party headquarters enquiries were made there, even though Barry Gustafson has since found that the Labour Party

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<sup>1</sup> These included the New Zealand National Bibliography, edited by A.G. Bagnall, volumes 2-5 (Wellington: Government Printer, 1969-1985); M.D. Coleman, The New Zealand Labour Party 1916-1966 (Wellington: National Library of New Zealand, 1972); N.E Archer and Mary Langton, Tweedledum and Tweedledee: General Elections in New Zealand (A Bibliography), (Wellington: Library School, 1971).

<sup>2</sup> Discussions with reference librarians at these libraries, 29 July 1996.

destroyed many of its records during the early 1970s.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately these enquiries were unsuccessful with a Labour party staff member saying that Labour's remaining records were poorly organised, and that although he had been looking out for early election manifestos for a number of years he had not found any.<sup>4</sup> Because Labour's remaining records take up several hundred metres of office space it was not feasible to check them.

Although the Alexandra Turnbull Library holds some of the remaining New Zealand Labour Party records from the 1920s and 1930s, unfortunately no full copies of Labour's manifestos were found in these papers. However, a number of manifestos from the mid-1930s onwards were found at Turnbull in the New Zealand National Party Papers, which contains the National Party's old records, and in the New Zealand Labour Party Parliamentary Research Unit Records collection. At Turnbull the Coates, Cracknell, Hislop, Holland, O'Farrell, Marshall and other relevant collections were also checked, while some manifestos were found in the ephemera collection. It was found that at some elections political parties had been more diligent at collecting copies of opposition parties' manifestos than retaining copies of their own.

Although some copies of Labour and National party programmes were found in the Nash collection at National Archives, fewer were discovered than had been expected.<sup>5</sup> This reflected both gaps in the inventory for the collection, and the finding that this collection seems to contain few items from before 1935. At National Archives the much smaller Fraser Papers were also checked.

In the South Island enquiries were made at the specialist McMillan Brown Library at Canterbury University in Christchurch. The inventory for the archives held at the Canterbury University Library was checked, although this is still incomplete for relevant subject areas.

Interloan requests for the few cases where original copies of manifestos had not been found were sent to libraries that it was not feasible to visit, but which it was thought might hold uncatalogued copies of manifestos. In addition, an advertisement was placed at the 1996 Library and Information Association Conference, which resulted in several librarians checking uncatalogued material in their political ephemera collections. A search of the on-line catalogues at the National Library of Australia and the Australian National University Library was made through the internet.

The very high probability that the newspaper versions of the manifestos were the same as the originals meant that it was considered unnecessary to check further archives that might hold copies of the originals. If time and financial resources had been of no consideration the J.T. Paul Papers and the William Downie Stewart Papers at Otago University's Hocken Library, and the full version of the Henry Holland Papers at the Australian National University would also have been searched. Since citations to the missing

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<sup>3</sup> P. J. O'Farrell, *Harry Holland* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1964), p. 223; Barry Gustafson, *From the Cradle to the Grave: A biography of Michael Joseph Savage* (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 345.

<sup>4</sup> Discussion with Labour Party staff member, 29 July 1996.

<sup>5</sup> Keith Sinclair, in *Walter Nash* (Auckland: Auckland University Press and Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 259 claims that after he came to New Zealand in 1914 Nash suffered from an obsession which resulted in him collecting every piece of paper that passed through his hands.

original copies of the early Labour manifestos have been made in a thesis by an Auckland University student since Labour purged its archives,<sup>6</sup> further research in Auckland might also be profitable. Unfortunately attempts to contact the author of that thesis through the Auckland University alumni association were fruitless.

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<sup>6</sup>Robin Oliver, 'Ideology, The Slump, and the New Zealand Labour Party: A Study of the ideology of the New Zealand Labour Party in the 1930s', (M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1981), pp. 76-87, 437.

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