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IDEOLOGY AND THE ANZUS
DISPUTE: THE LEGACY OF THE
NEW LEFT AND THE
CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW
ZEALAND'S SECURITY POLICY

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ABSTRACT

IDEOLOGY AND THE ANZUS DISPUTE: THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ZEALAND'S SECURITY POLICY

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This study of the ANZUS dispute examines the influence of the New Left's ideology on NZ's security discourse, and how the development of this ideology contributed to the rift between NZ and the US over the question of visits by US nuclear-powered or nuclear weapons-capable warships. In a break from past scholarship on the ANZUS dispute, this thesis examines the nature and history of the NZ peace movement, and it argues that New Left ideology became the main driving force of the peace movement after the 1960s. The NZ peace movement's resulting desire to disengage NZ from military co-operation with the US was aided by the fact that, by 1984, the NZ Labour Party was also heavily influenced by the same ideology. Although the NZ public was supportive of ANZUS and collective security, its anti-nuclearism enabled the above organisations to impose a nuclear ship ban which resulted in an end to US military co-operation with NZ. This thesis uses a wide range of peace movement sources and other secondary sources to reveal the motivations lying behind the NZ ship ban, and to assess the consequences of the ban.

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INTRODUCTION

To exchange one orthodoxy for another is not necessarily an advance.

The enemy is the gramophone mind, whether or not one agrees with the record that is being played at the moment.

George Orwell.¹

In 1985 NZ and the US found themselves in a dispute over the nature and obligations of the ANZUS alliance, a tripartite security treaty between the US, Australia and NZ that had been signed in 1951. At issue was the desirability of visits to NZ ports by nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered US naval vessels.

NZ viewed a ban on such visits as one of the few effective measures of nuclear arms control that was available to a non-nuclear-armed small state. The 1984-1990 Labour Government also claimed that hosting such visits was not a legal obligation under ANZUS treaty provisions. However, the Reagan Administration disagreed, claiming that visits embodied the *spirit of the treaty*. That is, Washington believed that they demonstrated the common interests and willingness to co-operate on security matters which had led to the treaty in the first place. By banning visits by US Navy (USN) vessels that were nuclear-armed or nuclear powered, and by making its own decisions on the status of nuclear-capable warships (those which were conventionally powered yet carried weapons systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads), NZ was seen by Washington as not only excluding the nuclear component of the USN from her ports, but also as challenging the US naval doctrine of “Neither Confirm Nor Deny” (NCND) regarding the presence of nuclear weapons on nuclear-capable warships.

¹ From Orwell's proposed preface to *Animal Farm*. George Orwell, *Animal Farm*, London, 1995, p. 170.

As far as the Reagan Administration and the USN were concerned, NZ's nuclear-free policy had the potential, if it was imitated by other US allies, to undermine the US's ability to project naval power around the globe during the Cold War. It also seemed that NZ had defaulted on certain implicit obligations regarding military co-operation within ANZUS, thus negating the treaty's very purpose. In response to the ban, which had first manifested itself in NZ's rejection of a visit request in February 1985 for the nuclear-capable, conventionally-powered destroyer USS *Buchanan*, the US thus reduced its military co-operation with NZ, and in 1986 it ended its obligation to "guarantee" the security of New Zealand. This had the effect of placing NZ in a type of security "limbo". It had been symbolically disowned by the leading member of the Western Alliance, yet Wellington continued to profess NZ's allegiance to the Western world, continued military co-operation with Australia, and remained a party to some ad-hoc defence arrangements with the US, outside the formal framework of ANZUS.

The Labour Government was faced with the task of reassuring the West that NZ had not moved to "non-alignment" in the Cold War. This meant reassuring the NZ public that NZ had not been left defenceless; it also meant dealing with peace movement demands that the government follow up the ban with further moves towards non-alignment such as closing bases on NZ soil which contributed intelligence to the Western Allies and revoking all existing military co-operation agreements. For the peace movement this was seen as a logical progression in the attempt to disengage from the Cold War, and to help end the nuclear arms race, the nuclear ship ban being merely a first step. However, the NZ public at large, while supportive of the ban on anti-nuclear principles, did not share the wider goals of radicals in the peace movement, as the public was quite attached to ANZUS. The Labour Government, therefore, contented itself with the nuclear ship ban, much to the chagrin of radicals, but the Government then found itself in the awkward position of having to explain to interested observers what the actual point of the ban was if it wasn't intended to

disengage NZ totally from the Cold War as some in the peace movement maintained. Overlaps between the peace movement and some Labour Members of Parliament regarding aims didn't exactly make this task easier.

Previous scholarship on the dispute and its consequences has tended to focus on the general anti-nuclearism present in NZ and its contribution to the ship ban, the rise of a more "independent" South Pacific orientated NZ foreign policy, or the process of negotiation which went on between NZ and the US prior to the formal parting-of-ways in 1986, especially Prime Minister David Lange's impact on these and the practical consequences of the dispute. This ground has been well covered, and it shall be thoroughly addressed in this work. However, the main concern of this study lies in the ideological dimension, that is, the impact of New Left ideology on NZ thinking, particularly within the NZ peace movement and the Labour Party. Forged in the turbulent 1960s, the New Left was based on a negative view of the US, in particular its capitalist economic system and its foreign policy.

Mirroring the development of a New Left in the US, NZ's own New Left grew out of an existing Old Left. Although the term "New Left" has generally been used to refer to the social movement which arose in the US in the 1960s, and which died in the early 1970s, the NZ Left was also transformed during the 1960s, and the term New Left is thus used in a NZ context to acknowledge that transformation. The term is also apt because both New Lefts were influenced by European ideas, and in each country the Vietnam War played a crucial role in their development. Both New Lefts adopted a post-materialist emphasis, and both romanticised Third World Communist regimes and vilified US imperialism. To a certain extent the NZ New Left drew inspiration from its US counterpart, but it also had domestic antecedents.

The impact of New Left ideology in NZ has significance if we seek to explain how the dispute between NZ and the US arose. Although ideology was not a significant factor in the anti-nuclearism of the general public, it played a

major role in the peace movement, and it was the NZ peace movement which ensured that a nuclear ship ban occurred. The NZ public's dislike of things nuclear (either on moral principle or the more conservative impulse of "Not In My Back Yard", or NIMBY), was focused on US warship visits by a peace movement influenced by New Left ideology; at the same time the peace movement's success in achieving the ban was made possible by the wider public's anti-nuclearism. However, while there was a convenient convergence of concerns between the peace movement and the wider public on the nuclear ships ban, the peace movement was unable to get public support for further measures in pursuit of radicals' objectives, i.e., total disengagement from the "Imperialistic US War Machine" and the Western Alliance.

In this work the term "peace movement" is not used to refer to those who work to avoid war via inter-governmental channels, bi-lateral or multi-lateral negotiations, or the maintenance of military deterrence. Instead, it focuses on those who try to bypass such channels through direct action, protests, and lobbying for unilateral disarmament measures on the part of their own country or the West per se. I also differentiate between the peace movement as it existed prior to and during the 1960s, and the post-1960s peace movement, the latter being my main concern. The general belief of the peace movement, especially its constituent anti-nuclear movement, during the latter stages of the Cold War seemed to be that, if left to their own devices, the contesting governments would be incapable of ending the nuclear arms race before the world was destroyed by nuclear holocaust. The notion that one side or the other might actually win the Cold War before this happened was not taken seriously by peace activists (or "Peace People" as some prefer to be called).

The peace movement usually responded to claims it was sponsored and run by Moscow by pointing to the "diversity" of the movement. If various components disagreed (often heatedly) over emphasis and means, this would tend to indicate an absence of centralised control by the KGB, for example. In truth,

this is most probably correct: the highly decentralised NZ peace movement was not made up of agents labouring under foreign direction. Instead, a general direction was provided by radical ideology, absorbed to varying degrees by most peace activists, perhaps excluding a small minority of non-politically-partisan religious pacifists. Thus, while the peace movement could claim “diversity” amongst its members, this applied mainly to preferred method of action, choice of targets for protest, and degree of commitment.² Emphasising these types of differences, however, obscures the underlying influence of a New Left world-view, which was shared by most peace activists in one form or another. Thus, while critics of the peace movement were wrong to see a clear-cut conspiracy, peace movement claims of “diversity” should not be taken too seriously either. The truth seems to be much more subtle, and it will be dealt with in later chapters.

One other point which should be noted here is that, for later purposes of explaining motivation, I have divided the peace movement into two categories: core and periphery. I see the core as consisting of long-term, committed activists, a radical minority whose ideology requires them to keep “working for peace” by condemning US foreign policy even when there is no major issue to rally greater numbers to the cause. This core, in both the anti-nuclear movement and the wider peace movement, has been heavily influenced by radical ideology, whereas the periphery, (i.e., those concerned citizens who join peace groups for a short period and who make up the numbers at protest rallies when the situation seems to demand it), is generally motivated by a single issue rather than any particular dislike of capitalism or US foreign policy per se. For example, opposition to Compulsory Military Training (CMT) or a fear of nuclear war. In general, the peace movement’s core does not represent as many people as it likes to claim, and it only attracts a large periphery when there is an available issue to translate the

² The peace movement lacked diversity in the categories of age, race, and educational background. For in-depth studies of the peace movement’s composition, see Fiona McMahon, *A Sample of Attitudes in the new Zealand Peace Movement 1993*, Auckland, 1993, or Michelle Young, *The Auckland Peace Movement: Attitudes and Characteristics, 1988*, Auckland, 1988.

public's fear or hope into a foreign policy choice.³ It may then be possible to mobilise the public for short periods, over limited objectives, with the media playing a key role.

On the topic of radicalism, it needs to be remembered that left-wing radicals existed in NZ before the 1960s and the New Left. What happened in the late 1960s-early 1970s was that the *focus* of NZ radicalism shifted, and a greater emphasis was put on post-materialist issues such as feminism and multiculturalism. Although some activists continued the old emphasis on pacifism and economic justice for the workers, many younger radicals concentrated on post-materialist issues. At the same time, radical ideas also gained a wider currency amongst the “chattering classes”.

The periphery of the modern peace movement is also likely to have been influenced by New Left ideology, but usually to a lesser extent than core activists. Hence, most could be called liberal rather than radical. The difference between radicals and liberals of the New Left is that, although they might agree on the need to prevent sexism, racism and war, liberals often disagree with radicals over the latter's proposed solutions to their common concerns. Regarding the peace movement, external events occasionally drive liberals towards the solutions forwarded by radicals, and so the size of the peace movement periphery tends to expand and contract at various times, depending on the current issues and level of international tension. The multitude of small, neighbourhood anti-nuclear groups which sprang up in the early 1980s, and which faded after 1985, could be described as part of the peace movement's periphery, whereas a longer-lived organisation such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) could be described as a core organisation.

In analysing the ideological dimension of the ANZUS rift, my first chapter will outline NZ's traditional approach to collective security, and will present a

³ Charles Chatfield, *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism*, New York, 1991, p.171.

brief summary of the background to the signing of the ANZUS treaty, focusing on the motivations of the various parties. It will then examine the contents of the treaty itself, and the events and trends which marked the period from 1951 to 1984, including the Vietnam War and NZ's shift in security focus from "forward defence" in South East Asia to "regional defence" in the South Pacific.

In chapters two and three I will look at the history of NZ peace groups prior to the 1960s, the impact of the New Left in the US and NZ during the 1960s, and its effect on the modern peace movements in the US and NZ. The connections made between peace issues, feminism and indigenous rights, will also be touched on, as each has drawn inspiration from New Left ideology, and has in turn influenced the other main strands or causes. These can be lumped into five main categories, all of them included in a "peace and justice" basket of beliefs: socialism and economic justice; anti-imperialism and anti-militarism; radical feminism and sexuality issues; multiculturalism and anti-colonialism; and environmentalism.

While each of the above causes has its merits, the most radical followers of New Left ideology demonstrated a preference for adopting the more extreme perspectives in each field, and for raising their dogma to the level of an unquestionable orthodoxy. Adherents of one or more of these causes are often courted by adherents of the others, with recruiters attempting to demonstrate linkages between the respective issues. For example, feminists in the peace movement might try to persuade other feminists to join by pointing out a relationship between sexism and war. Additionally, the role of religion in the modern peace movement will be examined, keeping in mind that New Left ideology was successful in making inroads into religious groups via the useful conduit of "Liberation Theology".

The fourth and fifth chapters will concentrate on the actual arguments made against nuclear deterrence and ANZUS by the peace movement. It must be realised that, due to the decentralised nature of the NZ peace movement, certain

arguments forwarded by some parts of the peace movement were not used by others. If a particular argument did not go down well with the public, other peace groups could always disown the statement as being a product of a fringe group or individual. If the argument worked, however, it could be adopted more widely and could be counted as a victory for the peace movement as a whole. Thus, arguments made by individual peace activists will occasionally be referred to as “peace movement” arguments, even when they were not an orthodoxy within the whole movement.

Chapter six addresses the influence of New Left ideology within the Labour Party, the change in Labour Party demographics which occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, and the new concerns which moved both the grassroots Labour Party membership and the Parliamentary Labour Party. This shift to the “post-materialist” politics of middle class Labour supporters may help to explain both the ship ban and ironically also the rise of the New Right and its impact on Labour’s economic reforms of 1984-1990. After detailing the 1984 election and its immediate results, the chapter will conclude with the a summary of the events leading to refusal of a visit by the USS *Buchanan*.

In chapter seven I deal with the “fallout” from the ban. After explaining the rationale for the US Cold War strategy in the early 1980s and why Washington perceived NZ’s policy as undermining this strategy, I will assess the Labour Government’s attempts to explain the ban, and its efforts at damage control. Finally, I will deal with the impact of the ban on NZ defence policy, and efforts by the National Party to mend the ANZUS rift.

Before proceeding any further, I should elaborate on my own assumptions. I consider myself to be cast in the mould of a pre-1960s liberal. I support the modification of capitalism rather than its abolition. I also believe in freedom of expression, tolerance toward different views and lifestyles, and equality of opportunity based on merit rather than on race or gender. Unfortunately, post-1960s liberalism seems to have departed from the above principles, becoming

sympathetic to the separatism, “positive” discrimination, and censorship promoted by radicals. My own particular brand of liberalism is also comfortable with the notion of military defence and does not bear any particular resentment towards the US. I believe that there are nations which would threaten their neighbours if they could get away with it and that such behaviour may need to be deterred by military means. When the opponent is nuclear armed, this may require nuclear deterrence as well as conventional deterrence.

There seem to be two basic human reactions to a perceived threat-resistance or appeasement. The peace movement seems to prefer the latter option. While it is acceptable for an individual to chose not to fight, for moral or pragmatic reasons, it is less acceptable for a peace movement to attempt to undermine the integrity of a nation or an alliance when the majority of the population would much rather prefer to be defended. It is even less acceptable when a nation’s peace movement is sympathetic to the ideology of its nation’s avowed rival. For a peace movement to protest on the grounds of principled pacifism is one thing; for it to do so because it despises the nature of its own society and tends to excuse the violence and repression of left-wing movements and governments around the globe is something else.

It is this double standard, inherent in the NZ peace movement since the 1960s, which most concerns me. The aim of peace is a noble one, and it is always helpful to have an honest and sincere peace movement to remind us of this. Unfortunately, the modern peace movement’s ideology and its strategies for achieving peace were not practical. However, those who criticise the modern peace movement are often labelled as being pro-war, i.e., being opposed to the goals of the peace movement. I here distinguish between my agreement with the professed goals of the peace movement and my sharp disagreement with the dubious methods that it advances to realise those honourable goals.

The scope of this work will, of necessity, be quite broad. The assumptions of the peace movement have taken such root within NZ that, rather than trying

to paint a detailed picture of one tree in the forest, I'll be attempting to portray the whole forest, as it were. The peace movement has put out such a wide array of arguments in support of its cause that to attempt to answer any one claim in great depth is to merely divert the energy of the critic into minutiae. For example, in my Master's Thesis⁴ I spent a considerable amount of time researching one peace activist's claim that the US media's reaction to NZ's ban was basically knee-jerk hostility.⁵ After a survey of mainstream US journals and two major US newspapers, I discovered that he was wrong: basically the articles were evenly split between pro, anti, and balanced caution. However, establishing this did nothing to actually challenge the larger orthodoxy existing in NZ, one which assumes that the ship ban actually achieved something beyond a mere national ego-boost. The impact of New Left ideology on the NZ intelligentsia has also meant that ideology's influence on the ANZUS crisis has barely been addressed in scholarship. When individuals are immersed in a particular way of thinking, they may not even realise the extent to which that way of thinking, or ideology, has influenced the events occurring around them. Alternatively, if they do realise it, they may not be too keen to draw attention to the fact.

New Left scholarship, or the work of what could be called the Academic Left, itself seems to delight in dry, intricate jargon, making the simple complex in the process, and complicating the task of any critic, who has to first *decipher* the work under examination before detecting basic flaws in its logic. To try and respond in kind can merely submerge the critic in a paper war on ground of the opponent's choosing. Rather than do this, I prefer to aim for the big picture. I have therefore adopted a narrative style which some may see as being insufficiently "scientific". Hopefully it will reach the general public, those outside the bastions of the Academic Left.

⁴ Brian Sinclair, *The ANZUS Debate :The Course of Events and the Reaction in US Periodicals, 1984-1993*, Unpublished Thesis, University of Maryland at Baltimore County, 1994.

⁵ Jason Salzman, "NZ Nuclear Reality", *Peacelink*, February 1987, pp. 4-5.

If the main thesis of this work is that ideology played a significant role in the ANZUS dispute, it would also appear that the effect of ideology on the NZ peace movement was part of a wider alienation of the Western intelligentsia from its own side during the Cold War. Morally questionable Western actions, particularly US ones, were emphasised in a vacuum, where possible ignoring the intentions, nature and tactics of the adversary. By playing down the crimes committed by Communist regimes at the same time,* radicals attempted a form of moral equivalence between the two superpowers, thus fostering moral indignation towards US foreign policy.

Unlike the Communist Party component of the Old Left, however, the followers of New Left ideology had no central control as such; they merely adopted a number of similar beliefs. Once having adopted an ideology which, like its parent, was essentially anti-capitalist and therefore anti-American in essence, radicals and liberals in the peace movement did not need central direction; the logic of their belief system inclined them towards taking direct action against what they saw as “evil”, namely, the military forces of the US and its allies.

While the personalised nature of New Left ideology led to constant division, fragmentation and inter-organisational conflict, it also allowed much wider dispersal of the ideology than had been possible via formal communist organisations. Whereas Communist Party members had great difficulty in penetrating and controlling institutions, New Left ideology was able to influence institutions merely because it had been adopted in various forms (usually at university) by many liberals in the educated middle classes who found employment in such institutions. Liberals who protested against various Western military strategies and actions were not consciously working against the interests of the West in the Cold War, and most would have denied having any sympathy

A traditional concern of liberals has been with human rights, but New Left ideology's fondness for Third World Communist regimes has often led it to make excuses for human rights abuses by such regimes. “Cultural differences” are sometimes cited as a reason why the West should not preach about human rights to Communist dictatorships. However, no such tolerance is shown by radicals towards human rights abuses by Western-leaning dictatorships.

with the Soviet Government. However, their protests could work in the Soviet's favour.

This may have been a co-incidence, as there are often good reasons for criticising a particular military strategy or action, but the ideology of liberal peace activists also made it easier for them to be manipulated. Having accepted certain assumptions contained in New Left ideology, regarding the motivations and nature of the US and USSR, liberals were susceptible to certain suggestions from pro-Communist radicals about what they could do to remedy situations that concerned them. For liberals worried about the possibility of nuclear war, the course advocated may have been to join a peace group and push for unilateral measures of disarmament by the West, as this was the only side in the Cold War they could actually influence. Unfortunately, degrading the defences of only one side can act as a temptation to the other. Radicals' methods of achieving peace thus risked increasing the chances of war, or at least of a Soviet ideological victory in the Cold War. In fact, the NZ peace movement's intention was that the NZ ship ban would act as just such a measure of unilateral disarmament. The wider NZ public probably supported the nuclear ship ban due to a mixture of fear, a perceived lack of alternatives (bi-lateral arms control efforts had stalled in the early 1980s), national pride, and a belief, encouraged by the Labour Party leadership, that ANZUS would not be harmed by the ban. As ANZUS had become an ideological alliance^{*} by 1984, in that it demonstrated NZ's commitment to Western-style democracy, the ideological shift that occurred within NZ after the Vietnam War had significant consequences for NZ's security policy.

^{*} An ideological alliance is as much based on the defence of common values or principles as it is based on the pursuit of self-interest and self-preservation.

CHAPTER ONE: NZ SECURITY POLICY PRIOR TO 1984.

A Question of Character

Were this land ever forced to Hobson's choice, if it followed the dictates of reason and chose Washington it might die of a broken heart. But if it followed the dictates of emotion and chose London, it might die of a broken spine. (US Journalist C.L. Sulzberger, 1959, on NZ's bonds with Britain.)⁶

Traditionally, NZ had seen itself as a remote outpost of the British Empire, socially superior to the Mother Country perhaps, yet still in need of protection; and as the fate of the Empire was also seen as irrevocably linked to the fate of NZ, it also made sense to “do one’s bit” when called upon to help in the defence of the Empire abroad. NZ was in fact heavily dependent on Britain with regards to trade, and also to an extent “culturally dependent”, even more so than Australia, which found the transition to reliance on the US a much less traumatic experience than did NZ. The NZ colony had been declared a Dominion by Britain in 1907. Given that the Statute of Westminster granted the Empire’s Dominions complete autonomy in 1931, from that date forward NZ’s loyalties could be described most accurately as pro-Commonwealth rather than as pro-Empire. However, NZ was slow in expanding its diplomatic contacts outside the Commonwealth context, and did not even possess a Department of External Affairs until 1943.⁷ NZ’s reluctance to “go it alone” can also be seen in the fact that it waited until 1947 before adopting the Statute of Westminster.

⁶ Trevor R. Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, London, 1969, P. 146.

⁷ Dora Alves, *The ANZUS Partners*, Washington, DC, 1984, p. 4.

Pakeha NZ's feeling of being an oasis of Anglo-Saxon culture to the South of a large and intimidating Asia contributed not only to concerns about protecting NZ's security, but also its way of life. Small size, remoteness, and economic dependence on Britain led to projectionist tendencies in most spheres. Regarding defence, NZ was eager to maintain a British presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Economically, NZ was initially suspicious of the US free market approach of Bretton Woods, fearing US penetration of NZ markets without reciprocity for NZ farm products gaining access to the US. NZ was also wary of any US political encroachment in Asia-Pacific which could be seen as coming at the expense of British interests. NZ took its role as the region's "Imperial Agent" quite seriously. For example, it opposed the US annexation of Hawaii in the 1890s despite the fact that the British had actually agreed to it.⁸

Protectionism also extended into the cultural sphere, with NZ intellectuals and pro-British conservatives being particularly concerned about the impact of US "popular culture" via films, magazines, comics, and, during World War II, direct contact with US troops. This concern about "low" culture (i.e., things American) led to such responses as the banning of 20 US magazines in 1933 under the Indecent Publications Act of 1910.⁹ Later concerned liberals would use the term "cultural imperialism" in an attempt to "protect" NZ from US influences.

Despite its desire to insulate itself from external influences, NZ also had an idealistic streak drawn from British traditions of non-conformity in religious and political thought¹⁰ along with a desire to improve people's well-being. This wish to "be different" and to stand out as a shining example to the world was later to contribute to NZ's efforts at disarmament, a mix of idealistic and nationalistic yearnings to "lead the way" and be noticed for it.

⁸ David Campbell, *The Social Basis of Australian And New Zealand Security Policy*, Canberra, 1989, p. 27.

⁹ Roger Openshaw and Roy Shuker, "Silent Movies and Comics", in Malcolm McKinnon (ed.) *The American Connection: Essays From the Stout Centre Conference*, Wellington, 1988, p. 60.

Regarding perceptions of direct military threat, however, NZ was perhaps more complacent than Australia, being further away from the Asian mainland, not having experienced the Japanese air-raids on Darwin during World War II, and later receiving far fewer immigrants from Continental Europe with experiences of conquest and occupation. The lower threat perception of NZers regarding physical invasion was to make the option of “non-alignment” in the Cold War seem more feasible to the NZ Left, and it is probably one of the main reasons why the NZ peace movement was able to achieve a nuclear ship ban while its Australian counterpart could not. In other words, Australia was less inclined to risk ANZUS over an anti-nuclear gesture due to greater feelings of physical insecurity.¹¹ However, at the same time NZ had traditionally felt the need to support the principle of collective security even if no immediate physical threat seemed to exist.

Traditional Support for Collective Security

As a small power NZ realised that it would be unable to deal with a major (or high level) threat by itself, and it had thus followed the natural instinct of banding together with others to deal with such a contingency. While NZ was part of the British Empire, the question of with whom to work was easily answered. However, small powers also suffer from the suspicion that they might be expendable in the eyes of larger friends, especially if the cost of aiding them proves to be great. NZ’s approach to this dilemma has been to insure that aid will be forthcoming even if the interests of allies tends to militate against such action. NZ sought to achieve this end by offering aid to allies when they needed it in the hope that this would be remembered if the situation was reversed. In other words, a resulting sense of obligation to a small, faithful ally would overcome more cold-blooded, pragmatic considerations on the part of NZ’s friends. In this way NZ would in fact pay insurance premiums in blood to help ensure a favourable response to any NZ supplications in time of need.

¹⁰ Denis McLean *New Zealand: Isolation and Foreign Policy*, Sydney, 1990, pp.2-3.

Hence, NZ became involved in a relatively large number of wars (from the Boer War 1899-1902 to the Gulf War in 1991) for a country of its size and location.¹² Given the absence of any need to cash in the insurance policy, the cost of the premiums led many people to question such commitments with growing frequency. In the absence of any large earthquakes, earthquake insurance tends to be viewed by some as an unnecessary burden, and this tendency was to later influence disillusionment with ANZUS, especially within liberal and radical circles.

NZ has also been a great supporter of collective security* through the United Nations, but the effective paralysis of that organisation during the Cold War meant that NZ preferred to rely on more traditional forms of co-operation for defence, such as military alliances. NZ's armed forces were structured around the assumption that they would most likely fight in conjunction with larger allied forces fighting overseas rather than fighting by themselves in defence of NZ territory. The basic idea behind "forward defence", a concept followed by NZ until the 1970s, was to do any fighting as part of a larger effort, preferably as far removed from NZ as possible. Hopefully such an effort would neutralise any threat before it actually reached NZ's shores. The Vietnam War was to lead to increased criticism of this approach, and was to provide ammunition for the modern peace movement's campaign against collective security.

During this period the NZ notion of independence in foreign policy which dominated official circles meant independence of national interest, and loyal dissent rather than the notion of secessionist nationalism whence one cuts away and follows one's own path. Thus, while critics of NZ's alliances claimed

¹¹ Campbell, *The Social Basis of Australian And New Zealand Security Policy*, p. 24.

¹² John Henderson, "The Foreign Policy of a Small State", in John Henderson, Keith Jackson and Richard Kennaway (eds.), *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State*, Auckland, 1980, pp3-4.

* Collective security in its pure form involves all nations being prepared to act against any aggressor. However, such a system requires that the great powers co-operate with each other. As this was not the case in the Cold War, "collective security" came to mean the alliance system formed by the strongest power in the UN - the US.

independence in foreign policy was conspicuous by its absence, leading to a kind of fawning dependence and willingness to follow allies blindly into disaster, independence of a sort already existed. Although NZ had chosen to sacrifice some of its national sovereignty in pursuing group aims, this was not seen by the government as constituting subservience. Given the tradition of loyal dissent, and the notion of consensus rather than conflict defining relations within the Commonwealth,¹³ NZ was able to pursue its independent interests within a wider grouping, dissenting when it was felt necessary and often getting away with it. If NZ went along with the plans of its larger allies despite its own misgivings, it did so not because of coercion or blind subservience but because of the conviction that upsetting major trading partners and military allies might not be in NZ's national interest. That is, upsetting major trading partners and military allies might jeopardise the security insurance policy in which NZ had placed its faith. From the 1930s to the 1960s most of those calling for a more independent foreign policy actually sought *increased* international involvement outside the Commonwealth context rather than going it alone. New Left ideology would change this, however, as independence became a euphemism for non-alignment in the Cold War.

Alliances and Balancing Behaviour

NZ's traditional approach to foreign policy should not have come as a surprise. A small power is one that is not only weak, but knows that it is weak; and hence it relies on outside help. "The small power is not defined by specific qualities...but rather by a position it occupies in its own and other eyes."¹⁴ Although their military power may be insignificant, small powers can exercise a form of power by influencing the actions of great powers. A period of great power rivalry also raises the status of small powers, as the latter's allegiance becomes sought after. This applied especially during the Cold War, as the

¹³ Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy : New Zealand in the World since 1935*, Auckland, 1993, p.8.

¹⁴ Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, Ithaca (New York), 1968, p. 29.

allegiance of small powers became a symbol of US or Soviet success in the ideological struggle.¹⁵

A small power that feels threatened by a great power has four options: it can “bandwagon” with the threatening great power and attempt to be on the winning side; it may attempt to “balance” the threatening power by allying with less threatening great powers; it can try to avoid the threat by trying to appear too insignificant as to warrant attention (neutrality); or it can support international law and promote universal disarmament. A small power that does not feel threatened by either side in a bipolar struggle may also become non-aligned. Defence policies are in turn designed to suit one of these options. Balancing behaviour usually requires structuring your military forces to work with the military forces of your allies.

Historically balancing behaviour has been more common than bandwagoning, although non-alignment became particularly attractive for some small powers during the Cold War. Usually, these small powers were countries recently independent from Western powers, and non-alignment was a way of showing their displeasure at the Western international system.¹⁶ Radical NZ supporters of non-alignment were likely to believe that NZ was a post-colonial nation that should reject Western values. Cold War competition for allies also made non-alignment more desirable, as a small power could maximise foreign aid by playing rival great power suitors against each other.

Regarding the decision to balance against a threat, it should be remembered that nations do not simply balance against the largest power; the intentions of powers also come into play. Pure balancing behaviour would involve small powers aligning against the strongest state, yet the US still found allies in the Cold War. Balance of threat theory may be a more apt concept to apply to alliance

¹⁵ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 249.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 249-253.

formation, than balance of power theory.¹⁷ A weaker power may be seen as more of a threat than a stronger power which exhibits more peaceful behaviour. In the Cold War, most Western states viewed the USSR and its ideology as the threat. However, the US still feared that its small allies might succumb to either bandwagoning behaviour, and defect to the Soviets, or that they might opt for neutrality as a safer course of action, should the US appear to be weak or losing the political struggle. “Credibility” became the US watchword with respect to its alliance system, as it believed that some of its allies would only continue to balance against the USSR if they remained confident of the US’s ability to support them when necessary. One problem with this approach was that the US went out of its way act firmly, thereby running the risk that the US might appear, to some small powers, to be a greater threat than the Soviets.

The decision to ally with a great power may also be based on either expedience or ideology, the later being a rarer phenomenon. For NZ, the ANZUS alliance was initially an alliance of expedience, with a US security guarantee being sought due to NZ’s fear of Japan. When this fear receded, ANZUS took on more of a ideological aspect; it came to illustrate NZ’s determination to stand with its fellow democracies against the threat of Soviet totalitarianism. However, pragmatism was still a factor in ANZUS, and pragmatism can override ideology. The problem with pragmatic alliances is that a change of circumstances can lead to tensions within the alliance, especially when the costs of the alliance are perceived to outweigh its benefits. In the early 1980s, the NZ peace movement was able to use the fear of nuclear war to achieve just such a reassessment of respective costs and benefits. The dangers of having nuclear weapons in NZ’s ports were cast as outweighing the benefits of defence co-operation with the US.

Ideology had increased significance regarding alliance formation in the Cold War. “The tendency for states with similar domestic systems to form alliances is

¹⁷ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, New York, 1987, p. viii.

greatest when they are fairly secure, when the ideology does not require that sovereignty be sacrificed, and when a rival ideological movement creates a powerful threat to legitimacy.”¹⁸ Nonetheless, ideological alliances are also a form of balancing behaviour, and they can be subsumed under balance of threat theory. As has been mentioned, the ANZUS alliance became largely ideological. NZ chose to balance with the Western powers against the USSR based on its own values and principles, rather than taking the alternative paths of bandwagoning, neutrality or non-alignment.

With regard to alliance longevity, a number of factors come into play, including shared interests, benefit-risk equity, similar values, leadership, power shifts outside alliance, and perspective. Contrary to some people’s beliefs only some interests need to stay the same. If allies share many interests, while other interests diverge, this does not mean that the alliance is finished. It is quite possible to become allies when only one interest is shared. In World War II, the US and USSR had systems which were diametrically opposed, yet their shared interest in defeating Germany made them allies.¹⁹

Another problem for alliances is that small powers often demand the right to be consulted, regardless of the size of their contribution, whereas great powers tend to link contribution to consultation. To make a credible military commitment, small powers may also have to put most of their limited resources into the alliance, and as a result they expect the alliance to cover all contingencies. Conversely, great powers may have other commitments, and a small ally’s regional concerns may be ignored in preference to the great power’s more global perspective. In addition, involvement in collective security can lead to dissent within a state, when the threat is ideological and some citizens are sympathetic to that ideology.²⁰

¹⁸ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, pp. 215-216.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 38.

²⁰ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 43-44.

With the above theories in mind it can be argued that, for most of the Cold War, NZ was allied to a great power (with an emphasis first on Britain and then on the US) to balance what it saw as an ideological threat posed by the USSR. NZ's security was seen as linked to Western security, and NZ's armed forces were structured around working with Western great power allies. In line with the other tactics used by small powers, NZ also promoted international law through the UN, and worked for mutual, verifiable disarmament.²¹ As NZ was largely satisfied with the international system as designed by the West, and the outcome of the Cold War mattered more to NZ than it did to many non-aligned small powers, it had no interest in becoming non-aligned. However, the ANZUS dispute was to mark a partial shift in this approach, as alternatives to alliance balancing behaviour were offered by the peace movement.

From the late 1960s there was increased pressure from the Left for NZ to change its behaviour. This pressure was due to a combination of ideology and fear. The world-view of the modern Left provided a counterpoint to NZ's traditional approach. NZ had shared the US world view to a large extent, but part of the NZ population was more inclined to accept the Soviet world view. In short, this view could be summarised as follows: US democracy was a misnomer, and was based on a "false consciousness" implanted in the American masses through the ruling elite's control of the media and education. The Soviet threat was a myth created by the US military-industrial complex for its own ends, and the Cold War was a product of the resulting US aggression. The US was also economically imperialist and responsible for the poverty of the Third World.²²

In 1984 a government that shared, to some extent, the ideology of the dissenters came to power. When this was combined with the general public's fear

²¹ Steve Hoadley, "New Zealand's Regional Security Policies", in Richard W. Baker (Ed.) *The ANZUS States and their Region: Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, Westport, Connecticut, 1994, p. 34.

²² For a more detailed summary of the Soviet world-view, see Walter S. Jones, *The Logic of International Relations*, New York, 1991, pp. 3-48.

of nuclear war, which was at a peak in the early 1980s, the ANZUS Alliance was in trouble. Those who were not content with the Western system saw no need for NZ to be allied with those attempting to uphold it, and they supported non-alignment. Those who feared the consequences of nuclear war, viewing this as more of a threat than the Soviets could ever be, also sought either non-alignment or neutrality. The growth of a distinctive NZ identity also led to questions about just how closely NZ should co-operate with great powers. As a result of the ANZUS dispute, NZ effectively abandoned the tactic of balancing with a great power, although it continued to work through the UN, and pursued collective security with a middle power, Australia.

As the Cold War was winding down by the time of the ANZUS dispute, NZ suffered few ill effects from the departure from its traditional behaviour. However, in the post Cold-War world, collective security through acting in concert with great powers remains a valid option for addressing ongoing disorder within the international system. At present, due to a lack of military co-operation with the US (a primary legacy of the ANZUS dispute), and despite its continued support for collective security, NZ is ill prepared to give military assistance to such efforts. The lingering anti-Western mentality of the modern Left also limits NZ's options. Pursuing renewed military co-operation with the US is desirable, although this does not necessarily require a formal alliance.

The Experience of World War II

During World War II, the alternatives to allying with great powers, mentioned in the previous section, held little appeal for NZ. After Pearl Harbour and Japan's lightning expansion throughout the Asia-Pacific region, Australia and NZ felt extremely vulnerable. Most of their fighting forces were in the Middle East and after the fall of Singapore, Britain was simply unable to provide the help that was needed. However, in early 1942 the US considered coming to the aid of the ANZACs. US Admiral Ernest King said to President Roosevelt,

We cannot, in honour, let Australia and New Zealand down. They are our brothers...²³

The US also had practical reasons for aiding the two smaller nations. The extent of the Japanese advance and the threat to lines of communication across the Pacific ocean meant that Australia and NZ needed to be secured as rear bases from which to launch the US counter-offensive whenever that became feasible.

The Japanese Combined Order No. 1 of November 1941 planned to occupy Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, Samoa, then the Aleutian and Midway areas, and lastly the Adaman Islands and Port Moresby. In January 1942, the intention was to secure Lae, Salamaua, Port Moresby and Tulagi in order to form an air-base chain that would protect the southern perimeter of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. From there a second phase would involve the seizure of Fiji and Samoa, allowing the “neutralisation” of Australia by cutting its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).²⁴ However, allied raids on the Marshalls and Gilberts in February led to some Japanese caution. The plan was to establish a defence perimeter, then wear the allies down by aggressive action at points of contact; but the US’s superior production capacity allowed early counter attacks that upset these plans.

With diminishing confidence the Japanese Army and Navy were at odds over what to do next. The Army wished to proceed against Port Moresby, Fiji and Samoa, yet the Navy preferred first to engage the US Pacific fleet in battle near Midway and to eliminate it. Altogether, in April 1942 it was the Japanese Navy’s plan which won out. Once the US fleet had been destroyed, the Army would then be empowered to take Fiji and Samoa, and later Hawaii and Australia.²⁵ An attempt on Port Moresby went ahead, on a reduced scale. However, the limited

²³ Denys Bevan, *United States Forces in New Zealand, 1942-45*, Alexandra, 1992, p.22.

²⁴ Bevan, *United States Forces in New Zealand*, pp. 33-35.

²⁵ Bevan, *United States Forces in New Zealand*, pp. 36-38

Allied success in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May and the great Allied victory in the Battle of Midway in June crippled the Japanese Navy. From this point Japan was on the defensive, and its plans for further expansion were shelved. Thus, while it could be argued that the US never actually “saved” Australia and NZ, as the Japanese never had concrete plans to invade either of them,²⁶ it can also be assumed that, without the Japanese setbacks in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, Japan would have been in a position to make such plans.

During the course of the war NZ played host at various times to three US Marine divisions, and three US Army divisions. The Port of Auckland handled 1,572,305 tons of cargo destined for US forces, with 850 war-related ship visits between June 1942 and September 1945; and from 1943 to 1946, NZ supplied 440,000 tons of food to US forces. Along with efforts at supplying pre-fabricated huts, hospitals, clothing, ship repairs and such, NZ ended up providing \$230 million worth of assistance to the US in return for \$275 million in Lend-Lease aid. This was the best performance (proportionately) of any US ally, with the US writing off the difference in 1946.²⁷ This effort stands in stark contrast to the furore over a few peacetime ship visits per annum during the 1980s.

At a political level, however, Australia and NZ were concerned with what they saw as a large-power monopoly on decision making. In April 1942, Australia was placed in the South West Pacific Area Command under General Douglas Mac Arthur while NZ was included in the South Pacific under Admiral Chester Nimitz. NZ complained, claiming that the two countries constituted a single strategic entity which should not be divided. Both countries were also concerned that the Pacific War Councils in London and Washington, of which Australia and NZ were members, had only an advisory function. NZ was also unhappy with having to communicate with the US via London, so in 1942 it established a

²⁶ Ray Galvin, *A Nuclear Free New Zealand...Now! A Practical Handbook for New Zealand Peace Makers*, Devonport, 1984, p. 39.

²⁷ Bevan, *United States Forces in New Zealand*, pp. 252-277

diplomatic mission in Washington, its first foreign diplomatic post.²⁸ In this way NZ made a major gesture of independence from Britain.

In 1942 Australia brought its 6th and 7th Divisions back from the Middle East, refusing US and British requests to divert the 7th to help save Rangoon. NZ, while aware of the political advantages of having NZ troops active in the Pacific, reluctantly agreed to retain its forces in Egypt, leaving only the under-strength 3rd Division for Pacific operations, where it worked with the US in the Solomons. Both Australia and NZ realised that their contribution to important campaigns in the Pacific would increase their leverage in post-war political settlements. But the US preferred to allocate the ANZACs to minor “mop-up” roles, most of which were unglamorous, costly and largely forgotten campaigns. NZ gave up on the effort to win political influence, and it disbanded the 3rd Division in September 1944, freeing up manpower for agricultural production.²⁹ ANZAC attempts to influence the US and to keep its attention focused on the Asia-Pacific region were tempered by a determination that this should not mean a loss of ties to Britain nor the emergence of an overbearing US presence in the region after the war. With the latter particularly in mind, the ANZACs produced the Canberra Agreement of 1944.

During World War II, Australia and NZ, while seeing US power as a handy surrogate for Britain at a time of dire need, were still suspicious of US post-war territorial intentions and any threat that Washington might pose to Commonwealth interests in the Asia-Pacific. Along with annoyance at the lack of consultation over the conduct of the war, this inspired the ANZACs to produce a declaration of mutual interests. This angered the US, and even the Australian Opposition saw it as pretentious.³⁰ It was, however, another demonstration that

²⁸Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, p. 13.

²⁹Ibid., pp23-26.

³⁰Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, pp. 39-42.

Australia and NZ were capable of independent thought within a collective endeavour and were not afraid to express it.

Essentially the agreement noted that Australia and NZ could have more influence if they presented a united front on issues, and it sought high level ANZAC representation on all armistice planning bodies. It also called for a regional defence zone for the South West Pacific based on Australia and NZ, and it claimed that the US use of island bases in wartime should not necessarily be grounds for post-war territorial claims, ANZAC input being required before any change of sovereignty.³¹ There was also a section, included at the insistence of NZ, with an emphasis on promoting the welfare of Pacific Islanders, to which the US was amenable, and a section advocating post-war international control of international civil airlines, a provision with which the US was not so happy. The US was also rather annoyed at what it saw as an attempt to exclude it from the ANZAC's "patch". The Canberra Agreement had little lasting effect, yet it did indicate both ANZAC annoyance at the great powers and a belief in the need for a regional security arrangement. What's more, the ANZACs had spoken out on an international issue that previously would have been dealt with by London.

Moves Towards ANZUS

The negotiation and signing of the ANZUS treaty with the US was also an act of independence by Australia and NZ, marking their first major diplomatic endeavour outside the Commonwealth context. ANZUS had also occurred on the initiative of Australia and NZ. The process of negotiating for ANZUS was led by civilians rather than by military men, and as the foreign policy of NZ and Australia was formulated by a handful of individuals, in contrast to the more complex US system,³² those individuals were faced with the task of convincing a large US bureaucracy to deliver a security guarantee.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 32-40

³² W.D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55*, Christchurch, 1995, p. 2.

The main aim of the two countries had long been to ensure the presence of a friendly great power in the Asia-Pacific; and after World War II it was clear that this power would have to be the US, for Britain could no longer play a major role in the region. Australia was also eager to have a voice in any Western military planning in the South West Pacific, due to its experiences in World War II. Even before World War II, however, the ANZACs had entertained notions of some sort of Pacific pact involving various nations in a collective security effort. In 1937 Australia had suggested to the Imperial Conference a Non-Aggression Pact among Pacific countries. In August 1941, NZ's Labour Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, suggested an Anglo-US agreement to protect Australia and NZ; Fraser preferred a universal security system, in the tradition of Labour internationalism, rather than a regional pact formed in the absence of such a system. However, he later became more flexible about the idea, suggesting a Pacific Pact in January 1949.³³

During his time as Australia's Minister of External Affairs, 1941-1949, Dr Herbert Vere Evatt also promoted the idea of a Pacific Pact.³⁴ From 1943 Evatt pushed the idea of a regional system, established within the framework of the UN Charter and with the ANZACs to play a leading role. In 1945 he took part in drafting that part of the UN Charter which dealt with regional arrangements, but the Labour governments of both Australia and NZ were to be disappointed with the ability of the UN to guarantee peace, and thus they turned elsewhere for protection. While they wanted to continue Commonwealth defence co-operation, the ANZACs also sought a US role, but they were faced with the problem that the South Pacific did not play a major part in post-war US planning.

However, a potential means to ensure a US presence was seen in a 1945 USN recommendation that Manus Island, 200 miles North East of New Guinea, be retained as a major US base. From February 1946 the US negotiated with

³³ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, p. 245.

³⁴ J.G. Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, Carlton, 1965, pp. 7-9.

Australia for exclusive joint use of Manus, proposing Australian authority over the US installations there (unless the US decided to assume control if necessary) and Australian funding of the base's maintenance. Australia, however, had its own proposals: the US could use Manus in return for reciprocal Australian rights to use nearby US bases and a regional defence arrangement.³⁵

Unfortunately, Australia had over-estimated the US's interest in Manus; the US Administration had little interest in committing itself to a South Pacific arrangement in 1946. In 1943 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had compiled a lengthy list of desirable bases for the post-war era, but by 1946 this list had shrunk considerably. By then the US was focusing on the Northern Pacific, and earlier ideas about a chain of bases in the South West Pacific had dropped out of fashion. Regardless of this change in circumstances, the Manus negotiations were pursued at the behest of the US State Department, which sought to develop a precedent for future base negotiations in more critical regions. When Australia made too many demands, attempting to link the issue of base rights with a security framework for the Pacific,³⁶ the US decided to drop its request. As a result, there was bitter press and Opposition criticism of the Australian Government for overplaying its hand.

The quest for US involvement in the region continued. At the 1946 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, Australia suggested a British-Australian-NZ security agreement for the Pacific, with provision for the US to join later. This marked an end to the old concept of Commonwealth defence; it had been replaced by the notion of regional associations which could involve non-Commonwealth countries.³⁷ Despite the misgivings of left-wing minorities in Australia and NZ, some form of defence collaboration with the US was now being sought.

³⁵ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, p. 54.

³⁶ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, p.75

³⁷ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, p. 63.

Meanwhile, defence co-operation with Britain also continued. Britain, preoccupied with planning for Western Europe and the Middle East, sought to delegate some of its Asia-Pacific responsibilities to Commonwealth members. The 1946 Prime Minister's Meeting was used to float this idea to the ANZACs. In 1949 the ANZAM area (Australia, New Zealand and Malaya) was defined, and in 1950 an agreement was reached that Australia would assume responsibility for peacetime military planning in the area. Despite assuming this responsibility, the ANZACs were reluctant to commit troops to Malaya. When a Communist uprising had occurred in Malaya in 1948, Britain's request for troops was refused by Australia. NZ's military contribution to ANZAM prior to 1954 was also limited.³⁸

Although the ANZAC's responsibilities in South East Asia were largely symbolic at this stage, more concrete commitments had been requested by Britain with respect to another region, the Middle East. Since World War II, it had been assumed that any NZ and Australian military commitment in the event of World War III would be in this region. As well as Western Europe, the Middle East was of particular concern to Britain. As the Cold War developed in the late 1940s, both Britain and the US developed contingency plans to deal with possible Soviet aggression.³⁹ The Pacific was considered to be a secondary theatre, where the West would fight on the defensive. The issue would be decided in Europe and the Middle East. Although the US and Britain agreed over the strategic importance of the Middle East, there were differences over exact strategy. The US was prepared to lose the Middle East in the first year of a war, and then retake it from a base area in North Africa. Morocco would provide a backstop, should Continental Western Europe or the Middle East have to be temporarily abandoned under the weight of a Soviet initial thrust.

³⁸ Mark Pearson, *Paper Tiger: New Zealand's Part in SEATO 1954-1977*, Wellington, 1989, p. 9.

³⁹ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, pp. 96-118.

The British took exception to the US “Center strategy”, preferring to establish a base area around Cairo.⁴⁰ This difference of opinion affected the ANZACs and eventually provided part of the impetus for ANZUS. By the end of 1948 the US was reluctant to support British plans for the Middle East, and Britain had to look to the Commonwealth for possible military support in the region. In 1950, British planning assumed that the Commonwealth would have to defend the Middle East without direct US help, for at least the first two years of a war. US air-power had been allocated to NATO and Morocco.⁴¹

Britain made its appeal for help from the ANZACs at the 1948 Prime Minister’s Meeting. NZ Labour Prime Minister Peter Fraser immediately (without consulting Cabinet), promised Britain a division within three months of war breaking out.⁴² Australia took longer to convince. At the January 1950 Commonwealth Foreign Minister’s Conference in Columbo, Australia finally promised a troop commitment to the Middle East in wartime, as well as agreeing to send some troops to Malaya immediately. The ANZACs had accepted their allocated role in the Middle East as part of their Commonwealth obligations. Perversely, this loyalty to Britain contributed to the ANZAC’s desire to obtain a US presence in the Pacific. A US guarantee of Australian and NZ security allowed the two countries to focus on their Commonwealth responsibilities in the Middle East. This aspect was especially important to NZ, and the concept of “bolting the back door” remained a theme in ANZAC negotiations with the US.

Independent initiative in national defence was also seen as necessary, given the existing lack of a regional arrangement and the Soviet Union’s use of its veto in the UN Security Council. However, the ANZACs stressed research and development rather than force build-ups, something that was contrary to US

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 110.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 160.

⁴² It was as a result of this commitment that, in 1949, NZ decided on peacetime conscription.

wishes.⁴² This approach was founded on the assumption that the US would maintain large forces in the Central Pacific, thus negating the need for a major defence effort by the ANZACs. This assumption was later shaken by the formation of NATO and the concomitant fear that the US would focus exclusively on Europe. Such a result was not desirable from the ANZAC point of view because both Australia and NZ had continued fears about Japan.

Evatt originally sought a Pacific Pact independently of a peace treaty with Japan, yet as prospects for a pact dimmed in the late 1940s, he began to press for a peace treaty, hoping that a pact could be extracted during the peace negotiations. The US objected to regional pacts on the grounds that they would merely replicate UN machinery. However, the paralysis of the Security Council by Cold War tensions led to a change of heart. In June 1948 the Vandenberg Resolution passed by the US Senate sanctioned regional collective security.⁴³ This opened the way for the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949, which set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

NATO encouraged Evatt in his efforts for a Pacific Pact. The US had not been receptive to the idea of a Pacific Pact immediately after World War II, but the emerging Cold War slowly changed its attitude. In March 1947 President Harry Truman asked Congress for aid for Greece and Turkey, and formulated the Truman Doctrine. The US would aid any country that was threatened by communism. In 1949 the “loss of China” and the advent of the Soviet atom bomb also led to reviews of US defence policy. Gradually, the US was “thinking globally” and adopting the concept of alliance formation as a major tool in the Cold War.

Despite such developments the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, rejected the idea of a Pacific Pact in May 1949, claiming that the Pacific was not

⁴² Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, pp. 65-67.

⁴³ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p. 21.

ready for a NATO-type arrangement because existing disputes between the region's nations made it impractical. Australia continued to promote the 1946 proposal of a US-Commonwealth pact, even though the US had never warmed to the idea. ANZAC conservatives, like their counterparts in the two nations' Labour parties, saw a need to cultivate relations with emerging nations in the region, yet their pro-European stance led them to also desire a continued Western presence for security reasons. While Australia and NZ had Labour governments, both nations were inclined to seek Asian involvement in a pact. After 1949, however, voters returned conservative governments in both countries, and there was less enthusiasm regarding Asian nationalism, and more interest concerning linkage to US policies.⁴⁴

In 1949 the ANZACs still favoured a pact with wide membership rather than a tripartite ANZUS pact, but it wasn't until 1950 that the US began to be receptive to the idea of a Pacific Pact. In 1949 Robert Menzies' Liberal Government replaced Ben Chifley's Labour Government in Australia, bringing in P.C. Spender as Minister for External affairs. That same year the NZ National Party returned to power with Sid Holland as Prime Minister. With the support of Holland's Minister of External Affairs, Frederick Doidge, Spender was to emerge as the prime mover in obtaining the ANZUS treaty. Whereas Menzies was a royalist, Spender was enthusiastic about the idea of co-operation with the US. As Menzies put it, ANZUS was "Spender's baby".⁴⁵

Like Evatt, Spender initially advocated a broad pact, but he was also willing to exclude other nations in order to secure US involvement. When a May 1950 Conference of Asian Nations in Baguio, the Philippines, would not commit itself in the Cold War power struggle, this confirmed for Spender that the NATO model was ill-suited to the Asia-Pacific region. At Baguio, the Filipino conception of a Pacific Pact dominated. The Romulo Plan called for an anti-colonialist union

⁴⁴ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, pp. 114-115.

⁴⁵ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, p. 21.

of non-Communist countries, including NZ and Australia, but excluding the US and Britain. This did not appeal to Spender, who was thinking of a pact involving Britain and Commonwealth countries as its nucleus, with US involvement.⁴⁶ Likewise, NZ did not like the idea of a pact which excluded the US and Britain.

The June 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea was to provide a golden opportunity for Spender, for the US suddenly appreciated the necessity for some form of collective security in the Asia-Pacific. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff dropped their objections to a Japanese peace treaty, allowing the State Department to proceed. The State Department's desire to get Commonwealth approval for a "soft" peace treaty in turn gave the ANZACs increased leverage in their search for a US guarantee. Although Doidge felt that the outbreak of war had *lessened* the need for a pact,⁴⁷ since US attention was now clearly focused on Asian security, Spender visited Washington in September, where he spoke to President Truman before being referred to Acheson. This contact was to prove crucial in forwarding Spender's agenda.

Spender suggested to Truman a broad Pacific Pact which included Britain, and he stressed Australia's desire for consultation over important security issues. By October, the US State Department was considering this request, along with additional provisions mentioned by Spender on October 12. Spender sought a pact with an article similar to that of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, where an attack on one member was viewed as an attack on all, and he also asked for a council to discuss planning.⁴⁸ One of the options mooted behind the scenes at the State Department during October 1950, originating from the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, was for a tripartite pact between the US, NZ and Australia. However, this was not one of the three options that were being considered by the US at this point. These options were a

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 260.

⁴⁷ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, p. 119

⁴⁸ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, p. 286.

Presidential declaration of a security guarantee for the ANZACs, some sort of formal military machinery for co-operation, or an Australian political liaison with NATO. By the end of 1950, the US had accepted the need for some sort of formula to appease the ANZACs, but it wanted to allay their fears about Japan without making too formal a commitment.

Although Washington appreciated the rapid dispatch of Australian troops to South Korea after the Security Council's request for military assistance, and the goodwill generated may have helped Spender to achieve the ANZUS treaty, this was not the main reason behind NZ's dispatch of forces to the Korean Peninsula. ANZUS was not the main factor behind NZ's entry into the Korean war. Although certain individuals probably realised the possible benefits regarding a US security guarantee, the NZ Department of External Affairs was more concerned about the possible effects on the credibility of the UN, should North Korea's actions go unchallenged.⁴⁹ Commonwealth ties were also a factor, and NZ opted to send warships because Britain had decided to do so. The National Government did not want to be accused by the Labour Opposition of failing to support Britain and the UN. Two frigates were dispatched on July 3, 1950, but NZ waited to see what Britain would do next before it announced a ground force contribution.⁵⁰ Thus, rather than scampering to ingratiate itself with the US, it appears that NZ was more concerned about its old Commonwealth ties and the future of the UN.

In the meantime, various ideas about a security pact involving the US, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand circulated around the State Department in late 1950. The options included: a five nation pact including the US, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and NZ; a bilateral pact with Japan accompanied by a quadrilateral one with the ANZACs and the Philippines; or bilateral pacts with Japan and the Philippines, and a trilateral pact with Australia

⁴⁹ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, p. 273.

⁵⁰ Ian McGibbon, "The Origins of the Alliance", in *New Zealand International Review*, May-June 1988, Wellington, p. 11.

and NZ.⁵¹ In January 1951 John Foster Dulles was appointed as US representative for the Japanese peace settlement and any negotiations with concerned nations regarding its provisions. Dulles was also instructed to explore the possibility of either a general security pact or separate pacts in his missions to Tokyo, Manila and Canberra. Dulles, a Republican, had been appointed as Consultant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson in April 1950. In January 1951 he proposed an “offshore island chain” pact involving the US, Australia, NZ, Japan and the Philippines.

Dulles’ trip to Canberra was announced by the State Department on January 11. When he arrived in Canberra in February 1951, Dulles “played dumb”; this meant he would encourage his hosts to make proposals without revealing beforehand what price the US was prepared to pay in order to win approval for the peace settlement with Japan. Thus, the initiative for a tripartite ANZUS treaty appears to have been taken by Spender and Doidge at Canberra.⁵² NZ, in particular, preferred the tripartite form to the idea of a pact which included Japan.

However, although the ANZACs were the first to raise the tripartite idea at Canberra, the US was more receptive to the idea than it let on. Just prior to the Canberra talks, on February 6 NZ’s Prime Minister Holland had met with Acheson to express NZ’s concerns. Holland stressed NZ’s desire to bolt the back door for its Middle Eastern commitments, and he noted that NZ’s efforts in that theatre would make NZ worthy of US protection in the Pacific. During these meetings the US asked whether a tripartite arrangement would suit NZ, getting a positive response.⁵³

When Dulles agreed to the idea of a tripartite pact at Canberra, it actually came as a surprise to most of the NZ government and military. By February 6

⁵¹ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p. 35.

⁵² Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p.40.

⁵³ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, p. 305.

1951 the NZ Chiefs of Staff and the NZ Cabinet were both prepared to settle for a Presidential declaration, believing that anything stronger was unlikely to eventuate. Holland's cable about the February 6 meeting with Acheson was not received until February 10. Britain was also left a step behind Holland and Spender. Britain was uncomfortable with Dulles' island chain proposal, as it excluded Britain and her interests on the Asian mainland. A US Presidential guarantee of Pacific sea routes to Australia and NZ was preferred, as this would leave the ANZACs free to concentrate on the Middle East.⁵⁴

In any event, Britain was concerned about an obsolete proposal. At the Canberra meetings, February 15-18, the island chain proposal was dropped, and Dulles, Spender and Doidge drafted the ANZUS treaty. The British Chiefs of Staff later accepted ANZUS, but there was some conflict in the British Cabinet over its implications. Some feared that the exclusion of Britain would send a signal that Britain was a declining power, or worried that the US was "poaching" members of the Commonwealth. For their part, the ANZACs accepted Britain's exclusion as they realised that the US, with its anti-colonial stance, was reluctant to appear as a security guarantor for British colonies in Asia. After ANZUS was operational, NZ advocated Britain's admission, but at Canberra it was more concerned with the immediate objective of getting the US on board.⁵⁵

Questions have been asked as to whether the ANZACs only received ANZUS as a quid pro quo for not opposing proposed Japanese rearmament. But, as they could not have prevented the US from achieving this objective anyway, and as Spender continued to push for a tougher peace treaty after Canberra, this seems unlikely. It must also be kept in mind that Spender had been seeking a pact long before the US had decided on the defensive rearmament of Japan.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 303.

⁵⁵ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, pp. 131-132.

⁵⁶ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, pp. 63-65.

Nor is it likely that the ANZACs *formally agreed* not to recognise Communist China as part of the “price” for ANZUS. In all probability they *may have refused* to recognise China for their own reasons, such as China’s bellicose attitude toward the West at the time. Britain’s decision to recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not result in any improvement in the PRC’s behaviour; and the ANZACs, while inclined to follow Britain’s lead, decided it was unwise to upset the US. However, this decision to follow the US’s example was most likely based on the ANZACs’ own judgement rather than any prior agreement with Washington. As early as March 1950 they were backing the US line that recognition should depend on China’s respect for international law. The ANZACs were also supportive of US policy regarding peace talks in Korea prior to US Senate ratification of ANZUS, but again this “price” was most likely paid voluntarily rather than as a precondition for ANZUS.⁵⁷

When Dulles returned to Washington, he made non-committal noises about what had occurred in Canberra. Australia and NZ were also cautious, perhaps waiting for a US response to Australian proposals to limit the nature of Japanese rearmament. On March 31, 1951, Dulles rejected controls on rearmament, and Spender then felt the need to appease Australian public opinion by acknowledging the progress made at Canberra.⁵⁸ ANZAC fears were to eventually prove unfounded, as the US limited Japanese rearmament to the building of self-defence forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had yet to be convinced of the desirability of ANZUS, as they did not want any new defence obligations other than Japan. Dulles worked hard to overcome their objections, and on April 18 Truman announced the near-conclusion of negotiations with the ANZACs. That same month, Britain gave its formal though grudging blessing to ANZUS, noting that it was confident that the ANZACs would represent Commonwealth interests

⁵⁷ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, pp. 50-51.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 54.

within it. Britain, however, expected to be included if ANZUS was later expanded, as was provided for in the treaty.⁵⁹ Despite this development, in June the parties were still trying to finalise a wording for the ANZUS Treaty that would satisfy the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of special concern to the Joint Chiefs were Articles VII and VIII. Article VII was re-written to make the ANZUS council a political forum rather than a military planning forum, and in Article VIII, consultation between the partners was limited to the Pacific area.⁶⁰ It would appear that the US military was not about to grant Australia the level of influence over Western military planning that the latter desired.

Negotiations on ANZUS ended in July, and the text was publicly released before the ANZUS Treaty was signed at the Presidio in San Francisco, September 1, 1951, several days before the Japanese Peace Treaty conference was to begin. All three governments duly ratified the ANZUS Treaty, and it came into force on April 29, 1952, one day after the Japanese Peace Treaty had come into force.

For the Australians and NZers who negotiated ANZUS, a formal treaty containing a US security guarantee had been the supreme aim. A verbal assurance was seen as insufficient, as it was felt that US commitments elsewhere could lead to a neglect of the Asia-Pacific.⁶¹ A return to US isolationism of the pre-World War II period was also viewed as a frightening prospect, one that should be avoided at all costs. The formation of NATO had also raised fears that ANZAC concerns in the Asia-Pacific would be overshadowed. NATO was both a model and a threat to Australia and NZ; they had originally wanted a similar arrangement in the Pacific but settled in the end for a tripartite pact with Washington.

⁵⁹ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968* pp.124-125.

⁶⁰ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, p. 342.

⁶¹ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, pp. 109-111.

Their motives appear to have been mixed, and included a fear of Japan, a desire to bolt the back door for their Middle East commitment, obtaining a voice in Western strategy, and a fear of communism. Australia was slightly more concerned about Japan than NZ, and NZ was slightly more concerned about the Middle East than Australia.⁶² The fear of Japan also outweighed the fear of communism at the time the treaty was negotiated. The Communist threat did not figure as large in ANZAC calculations as was publicly suggested by ANZAC leaders. At the time they were trying to explain to their respective publics why Japan's partial rearmament was necessary, and the Communist threat was used. As fears about a Japanese threat faded, leaders merely continued to stress that ANZUS was a bulwark against communism. However, the earlier emphasis on communism led some to conclude that this had always been the main impetus behind the ANZACs' desire for ANZUS, rather than a fear of Japan.

Spender's own motives were to gain an Asia-Pacific organisation in which Australia could raise issues, present its concerns to the US at the highest level, and perhaps even have a voice in NATO by association. Once again the "lessons" of World War II were involved, for the ANZACs wanted to have a voice in decision making. Spender was also aware of the need to counter communism in South East Asia, and for that objective he needed US assistance, as Britain focused almost exclusively on NATO and European security issues. Spender still would have wanted ANZUS even if the peace treaty with Japan had forbidden any form of Japanese rearmament.⁶³ A three-way pact with the US was also preferable to a wider pact in that it avoided putting the ANZACs in the position of having to support any right-wing Asian dictatorships.

As for the US, ANZUS was not just a formalising of the existing relationship. The treaty imposed some new military obligations, something with

⁶² McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, pp. 346-347.

⁶³ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p. 66.

which the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were not particularly thrilled.⁶⁴ The reason the US accepted these obligations was the fact that, after 1950 the notion of a pact fitted in with Dulles's vision of a set of interdependent treaties to secure the offshore island chain from Communism. With the Korean War and the February 1950 Sino-Soviet "Treaty of Friendship", Japan's security became paramount. ANZUS and a bilateral US- Philippines treaty would complement the US-Japan security arrangement. An important line of defence would be established in exchange for limited US air and sea power commitments. As a "backstop" for South East Asia, ANZUS could also act as insurance for the US if Japan was lost. US security was seen as being dependent on the security of other nations, and this required the deployment of American and allied forces along the edge of the Communist sphere of influence, the allied component allowing the US to economise on its own force deployment. President Richard Nixon's Guam Doctrine of 1969, which called for increased allied efforts at "self help", could thus be seen as merely an updating of this strategy rather than an abandonment of NZ, as some critics of the alliance later suggested.⁶⁵

US Cold War strategy may have led Washington to seek a formal alliance with Australia and NZ in any event, but pursuing it during negotiations for the Japanese Peace Treaty at least enabled the US to claim it was merely responding to the ANZACs' request. It should also be noted here that, if ANZUS was only one part of US Cold War strategy, it was not merely "defensive"; if necessary, it could be adapted, like NATO, to serve extended nuclear deterrence. Other gains for the US included reassuring the ANZACs, gaining consultative machinery for emergencies (a lesson from Korea), and the propaganda value of an anti-Communist "front" in the South Pacific.⁶⁶ In exchange, the US merely had to give a guarantee of military aid to two countries unlikely to be attacked outside a

⁶⁴ David McIntyre, "The Background to ANZUS", in McKinnon, (ed.)*The American Connection*, p. 139

⁶⁵ Peace and Justice Forum, Wellington Labour Regional Council, *Alternatives to ANZUS: A Paper For Discussion*, 1983, p. 12.

⁶⁶ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, pp. 71-74.

global war; and if there was one, the US would most likely have decided to aid them anyway. Moreover, the treaty also had a powerful symbolic value. In a Cold War between opposing ideologies, symbolism can be very important, and ANZUS certainly symbolised how democracies could join forces against a common undemocratic foe even when they lived at opposite ends of the world. This helps to explain the harsh US reaction to the NZ ship ban in 1985: the US feared the split might signal to the Soviets that their policy of working for disunity within the Western Alliance was bearing fruit.

Provisions of the ANZUS Treaty

The ANZUS treaty was largely based on the North Atlantic Treaty in format, yet it differs in certain crucial areas, probably at the insistence of Dulles during negotiation of the Canberra draft. Like NATO's founding treaty, ANZUS refers to the UN Charter, the need to maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, and the requirement to consult in the event of a threat. However, ANZUS, unlike its model, limited the area within which a threat would lead to consultation, and it did not contain the provision that an armed attack upon one would be seen as an armed attack upon all. Instead, Article IV of ANZUS committed each party only to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes". Dulles may have preferred the latter wording due to the 1949 controversy over NATO regarding the Congress's power to declare war. Adding the "constitutional processes" clause in ANZUS thus avoided a repeat performance.⁶⁷

Also omitted were Articles II and XII of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the former the parties agreed to strengthen free institutions and to reduce conflict in economic policies, and in the latter provision was made for review of the treaty. Review of ANZUS was probably not anticipated due to the general language of the important articles, phrased more in a political manner than a legal one, and the fact that ANZUS was based on an existing relationship which was expected to

⁶⁷ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p.45

continue. In this respect ANZUS was a declaration of common purpose, the preamble noting a “sense of unity”.

The influence of New Left ideology within the Labour Party, its particular notion of NZ independence, and the resulting divergence from a world view previously shared with the US had undermined this sense of unity by 1985. The US was therefore most likely correct when it saw the ship ban as undercutting the perceived purpose of ANZUS, namely, a declaration of the parties’ ideological unity against communism. Thus, given that that radicals were strongly opposed to Capitalist democracy, any evidence that their logic was influencing NZ’s foreign policy was probably viewed by the US as a sign that NZ had rejected the spirit of ANZUS.

At Canberra it was the US that almost certainly insisted on clauses such as the one in Article IV which provided for a response to armed attacks in the Pacific area and in Article V which defined an armed attack on one of the parties as including an attack on its forces in the Pacific. In the former case the ambiguity over what might be considered the Pacific area was probably designed to avoid a repeat of the signal sent to North Korea when Secretary of State Acheson left South Korea out of the US’s “defence perimeter” in a speech in January 1950. A potential aggressor could therefore not be sure where the geographical “line” was drawn when it came to provoking ANZUS.

In determining what ANZUS actually signified, it is instructive to look closely at the main articles:

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

This article resembles Article III of NATO and Article II of the 1954 Manila Treaty, which formed the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). In it the parties basically agreed to maintain and develop their own defences and to help the others to do the same. No party was bound to make any specific contribution to another party's defence capability, yet according to the principle of good faith, each had to make an honest judgement of what it could or should do to fulfil the terms. Mutual aid could include equipment standardisation, base rights and visiting; in 1985 the US claimed that NZ's ship ban violated Article II. Although it could be argued that US reprisals and their termination of military co-operation following the ban also violated Article II, NZ had in fact started the cycle.

ARTICLE III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article III corresponds to Article IV of NATO and Article IV of SEATO, by making consultation obligatory in the circumstances outlined. The article contains no description of the type of action following consultation, however, and the "threat" is not limited to armed attack, leaving room for subjective interpretation.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The first paragraph of the above can be contrasted with the first paragraph of Article V of NATO:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognised by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

While it is similar to Article V of NATO, Article IV of ANZUS does not include the declaration that an attack upon one is an attack upon all, nor does it require any immediate action. While critics of ANZUS have claimed that this makes ANZUS weaker than NATO regarding a “guarantee”, Article IV does not include the NATO escape clause that allows a Party to act “as it deems necessary”. It could therefore be argued that Article V of NATO is actually no

stronger than Article IV of ANZUS in practical effect.⁶⁸ In both cases the US is not automatically committed to war, although ANZUS spells this out more clearly.

It has also been noted that the word “act” is not a commitment to use force. Concerns that the US’s “constitutional processes” would weaken the chances of aid ignore the fact that keeping faith with one’s allies must also be respected by Congress and that the credibility of other US alliances would be threatened if the US decided not to help Australia and NZ. The US President also has the authority to commence hostilities before seeking Congressional approval; in June 1950 President Harry Truman ordered US troops to intervene in the Korean War and Congress went along with his decision with minimal dissent. It should also be noted that Australia and NZ had the option of using the “constitutional processes” clause to avoid automatic commitment of troops. It thus seems ironic for some critics of ANZUS to argue that ANZUS does not guarantee US aid, whilst also claiming that ANZUS could drag NZ into other peoples’ wars.⁶⁹

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

If taken literally, this would appear to activate ANZUS in the event a US ship was attacked while loitering in the Gulf of Tonkin. Yet it is doubtful whether the parties intended to assume such wide obligations without regard to the purpose being served by the forces attacked. If they were in position as part of a

⁶⁸ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p.118.

⁶⁹ Defence Alternatives Study Group, *Old Myths or New Options?*, Christchurch, 1987, pp. 15-23.

unanimous pre-agreed arrangement between the parties, then ANZUS would be activated. If, however, the US was pursuing its own objectives or the ANZACs were deployed somewhere as part of a Commonwealth operation, the parties were not obliged to act if the others got in trouble. In other words, if one party unilaterally stationed its forces in pursuit of goals other than those activating ANZUS obligations, an attack on those forces would not automatically invoke the obligations of Article IV.⁷⁰

Once again critics' claims that Article V could entangle NZ in a "US war" ignored the fact that, if this were true, the US could just as easily have been entangled in a "NZ war". The latter case in which "the tail wags the dog" has plenty of historical precedents; this is a risk which great powers take when they ally themselves with smaller powers.

Article VII established a Council for the purposes of consultation which was to consist of Foreign Ministers or their deputies. The Council could meet at any time necessary, but in general it proved to be an annual affair, a chance for high level talks between the three nations on a regular basis. Article X provided for the treaty to remain in force indefinitely; any party could withdraw as a member of the council with a years notice, although there were no provisions for ending the treaty itself.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the treaty had provision for later expansion to a wider pact, something mentioned in the preamble and Article VIII. However, it seems unlikely that the US was keen to widen its commitments, and while the ANZACs, especially NZ, may have had some reservations about Britain's exclusion, once ANZUS was achieved, previous notions of expansion lost their urgency.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, pp.146-149.

⁷¹ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, p.127.

Early Co-operation and events prior to Vietnam

During the early years of ANZUS, the Eisenhower Administration seemed content merely to use the treaty's mechanisms as a means of exchanging views and information rather than as a means of tying the ANZACs militarily to the US. For their part Australia and NZ rested on their laurels. Having achieved a security relationship with the US, a certain amount of complacency crept in regarding defence. This was not so much an inherent fault in ANZUS; with US aid seemingly assured, the ANZACs felt freer to neglect military spending, a common impulse of democracies during peacetime. In foreign policy there also seemed to be less need to court non-Western nations, because of the US link. However, uneasiness in both Australia and NZ about supporting US policies that were at odds with Britain's policies persisted. This concern about dual loyalties was partially salved by the notion that the ANZACs could act as a liaison between the US and Britain; a smooth-running Anglo-American partnership was seen as vital to the future of the "Free World".⁷²

During the remainder of the Korean War, the ANZACs worked to limit the extent of the conflict, fearing that if it was expanded by General MacArthur a US-British rift might occur. There were also concerns about US policy regarding Formosa (Taiwan), namely, that a Chinese attack on the US fleet between the Chinese mainland and Formosa might activate ANZUS.

The Korean War Armistice negotiations in 1953 revived the question of recognition of the PRC, and while Australia still supported the US position, NZ's more flexible views had to be suppressed at the 1953 ANZUS Council meeting. NZ also deviated from Australian policy in 1954 when it publicly criticised the US's non-recognition policy.⁷³ This came as a surprise to Australia, since the 1944 Canberra agreement had called for pre-consultation and unity between the two nations on major issues. However, despite its reservations, NZ was not to

⁷² Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, p. 148.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 165.

recognise China until 1972. More tension arose within ANZUS in 1955 regarding the US stance over the Nationalist-held offshore Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The US had declared its intention to defend them and Formosa against the PRC in January 1955; thus a question arose: if US forces were attacked while defending Quemoy and Matsu, would ANZUS be activated? The ANZACs were unambiguous in answering this question: no, it would not, at least as far as they were concerned. Clearly, ANZUS had not made the ANZACs into the mindless drones of the US that some in the peace movement later made them out to be.

Meanwhile, with the French losing in Indo-China in 1954, the US had proposed a new anti-Communist collective security arrangement for South East Asia rather than expanding the membership of ANZUS. Britain was receptive to the idea, given its position in Hong Kong and Malaya, but did it not want to take any military action to bail out France until the results of settlement talks in Geneva were known. The ANZACs wished to contain communism as far north as possible, but they did not want to alienate Asian nations by going to war to rescue the French.

The ANZUS Council met three times in 1954, as the US was considering intervening in Indo-China with force to avert the impending French defeat. On this occasion the ANZACs acted as a restraining influence on the US, for, like Britain, they feared that Western action would not receive the backing of the UN, would upset Asian nations, and would not arrive in time to save the French position at Dien Bien Phu.⁷⁴ NZ waited for the British reaction to the idea of aiding the French in Indo-China, and then echoed the negative response. Eisenhower had made allied support a condition of US entry into the war, and in the absence of Commonwealth support the US decided against helping the French. The 1954 ANZUS meetings, however, agreed on the need for some sort of collective arrangement, although the ANZACs wanted it to be directed at any

⁷⁴ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p. 177.

form of aggression, as opposed to the exclusive US emphasis on Communist aggression.

Although it opposed military action on the Asian mainland, in 1954 NZ was prepared to join an anti-Communist collective security arrangement which included Asian members. NZ also wanted to help to commit the US to the defence of mainland South East Asia.⁷⁵ The idea of a collective security arrangement in South East Asia had been developed in talks between the US, France and Britain in 1951 and 1952, with NZ and Australia being invited as observers, and later becoming members. The first official meeting of the "Five Powers" occurred in October 1952, and a Five Power Staff Agency was formed in September 1953.⁷⁶ The Staff Agency provided the ANZACs with two things that were absent from ANZUS: access to military planning for South East Asia, and the involvement of Britain. The Five Power arrangements were also a step closer to the wider security system that Australia and NZ had hoped would evolve out of ANZUS.

A settlement between the French and the Viet Minh was reached in Geneva in July 1954. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia became independent from France, but Vietnam was to be partitioned for two years pending free elections.* Although the US and Britain had disagreed in Geneva over the issue of military intervention, both were amenable to the idea of a collective security alliance for the region. The South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty (SEACDT) was signed in Manila in September 1954, with Australia, NZ, the US, Britain, France, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines as members. The South East Asian Treaty Organisation was created under Article V of SEACDT (otherwise known as the

⁷⁵ McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, p. 383.

⁷⁶ Pearson, *Paper Tiger*, p. 12.

* The elections, scheduled for 1956, were never held.

Manila Pact), and it was designed to facilitate military and political co-operation between members, along similar lines to the ANZUS Treaty.⁷⁷

One particular difficulty marred the Manila Pact: the US wanted it to be directed against Communist aggression, whereas the other signatories wished it to apply to any form of aggression. As a compromise, the treaty was said to be directed against aggression in general for most of the parties, and aimed solely at Communist aggression regarding the US commitment. A separate “Understanding” was appended to the treaty to this effect. Nevertheless, consultation would occur whatever the nature of the threat. The first SEATO Council Meeting occurred in Bangkok in February 1955.

SEATO was not seen as making ANZUS obsolete; rather, it was intended to complement it, filling in gaps outside ANZUS territory. The ANZUS powers could hold informal meetings during SEATO discussions, and they could discuss South East Asian issues during ANZUS meetings. Still, the ANZACs saw ANZUS as providing reassurances that SEATO did not because it opposed any form of aggression. The ANZACs had not been forced to join SEATO; they had their own reasons such as the wider membership, the increased chance for consultation with the US, and their concern for stability in South East Asia.⁷⁸ For NZ SEATO represented its first treaty with Asian powers, and it also had the virtue of including Britain.

Despite realising, by the end of 1952, that Britain was unlikely to ever join ANZUS, NZ still felt the old urge to support Britain. In 1953 Britain proposed that the ANZACs station forces in Malaya. NZ hesitated, because of its Middle Eastern commitment, but this commitment had been under review, and NZ was now prepared to redirect its Commonwealth effort to South East Asia.⁷⁹ In 1955 NZ and Australia both agreed to assume joint responsibility for the defence of

⁷⁷ See Pearson, *Paper Tiger*, pp.1-3.

⁷⁸ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p. 222.

⁷⁹ Pearson, *Paper Tiger*, p. 41.

Manila Pact), and it was designed to facilitate military and political co-operation between members, along similar lines to the ANZUS Treaty.⁷⁷

One particular difficulty marred the Manila Pact: the US wanted it to be directed against Communist aggression, whereas the other signatories wished it to apply to any form of aggression. As a compromise, the treaty was said to be directed against aggression in general for most of the parties, and aimed solely at Communist aggression regarding the US commitment. A separate “Understanding” was appended to the treaty to this effect. Nevertheless, consultation would occur whatever the nature of the threat. The first SEATO Council Meeting occurred in Bangkok in February 1955.

SEATO was not seen as making ANZUS obsolete; rather, it was intended to complement it, filling in gaps outside ANZUS territory. The ANZUS powers could hold informal meetings during SEATO discussions, and they could discuss South East Asian issues during ANZUS meetings. Still, the ANZACs saw ANZUS as providing reassurances that SEATO did not because it opposed any form of aggression. The ANZACs had not been forced to join SEATO; they had their own reasons such as the wider membership, the increased chance for consultation with the US, and their concern for stability in South East Asia.⁷⁸ For NZ SEATO represented its first treaty with Asian powers, and it also had the virtue of including Britain.

Despite realising, by the end of 1952, that Britain was unlikely to ever join ANZUS, NZ still felt the old urge to support Britain. In 1953 Britain proposed that the ANZACs station forces in Malaya. NZ hesitated, because of its Middle Eastern commitment, but this commitment had been under review, and NZ was now prepared to redirect its Commonwealth effort to South East Asia.⁷⁹ In 1955 NZ and Australia both agreed to assume joint responsibility for the defence of

⁷⁷ See Pearson, *Paper Tiger*, pp.1-3.

⁷⁸ Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, p. 222.

⁷⁹ Pearson, *Paper Tiger*, p. 41.

Malaya, and the Far East Commonwealth Strategic Reserve was established that same year. The Reserve, situated in Malaya (now Malaysia), was not formally under SEATO. Nor was it free to act in SEATO operations, due to Malayan reservations, although defence planning for the North of Malaya was linked to SEATO planning. Malaya became independent in 1957, and ANZAM linked the ANZACs to the resulting Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), which they joined in 1959. NZ was becoming increasingly involved in South East Asia due to its commitments to both SEATO and the Commonwealth.

NZ was also in a period of “dual dependency” at this time, a state of affairs that lasted into the 1970s.⁸⁰ NZ was simultaneously dependent for its security planning on both Britain and the US. A clash of loyalties was to occur in 1956 with the Suez crisis. The ANZACs (alone within the Commonwealth) voted with Britain, France and Israel against UN resolutions, which were backed by the US, that condemned the military intervention of Britain and France in Egypt. The US and virtually the entire Western world feared that the Anglo-French action would jeopardise Western influence in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Australia and NZ backed the Mother Country’s actions in line with domestic public opinion. The 1956 ANZUS Council Meeting was rather frosty. Although the ANZACs had sided with Britain this time, Suez did mark the end of an era. The US was increasingly becoming the primary protector of Australia and NZ, and a declining economic relationship with Britain continued to loosen the apron strings of the Commonwealth.⁸¹ After Suez, any ANZAC aid to Britain was based on obtaining US assurances of support beforehand. The ANZACs wanted to help preserve the Anglo-American relationship as best they could; good Anglo-American relations and co-operation would hopefully avoid situations where the ANZACs had to risk alienating one or the other of their traditional allies by taking sides in a dispute.

⁸⁰ See McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, pp. 390-402.

⁸¹ Paul Landais-Stamp and Paul Rogers, *Rocking the Boat:: New Zealand, the United States and the Nuclear-Free Zone Controversy in the 1980's*, Oxford, 1989, pp. 10-11.

The ANZUS relationship was also tested with regard to Australia's concerns about Indonesia's claims in the 1950s to West New Guinea. Australia wanted to keep the Dutch territory as a buffer against Indonesia; but the US did not want to provoke Indonesia into seeking Soviet support, nor did it want to appear as backing colonialism. By 1960 Australia had stopped complaining about US arms sales to Indonesia, trusting that Washington was aware of Australian interests and would not jeopardise them. By 1962 the US had made it clear that it did not perceive Indonesian control of West New Guinea as a threat to Australia; however, at the 1962 ANZUS meeting Washington confirmed that ANZUS did apply to East New Guinea, an island territory of Australia. Indonesia was thus given possession of West New Guinea in 1963 via the UN.⁸²

The whole issue had led to some doubts about ANZUS's usefulness to Australia and NZ in the event that wider US interests overrode more local ANZAC concerns. What Australia had seen as a vital national interest the US had seen as prejudicial to Western Cold War interests in South East Asia. It would appear that the US approach was more far-sighted, as it enabled constructive Western engagement with Indonesia; and it seems odd that parts of the peace movement were later to use the Indonesian example as a means to attack the worth of ANZUS on the grounds that wider and peripheral US interests were given higher priority than ANZAC vital interests.⁸³ Given the peace movement's tendency to support Third World nations against Western imperialism, this brings to mind double standards of political morality. In this particular case the US could be seen as acting in support of decolonisation while peace activists support old-fashioned colonialism.

As a result of these differences, Australia decided to increase its own defence spending to enable it to deal with contingencies that might not trigger US aid. In 1963 Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo joined Malaya to form the

⁸² Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, p. 215.

⁸³ Peace and Justice Forum, Wellington Labour Regional Council, *Alternatives to ANZUS: A Paper for Discussion*, Wellington, 1983, p. 6.

Federation of Malaysia, an entity which Indonesia refused to recognise, thereby leading to the deployment of Commonwealth troops in North Borneo. The US was unwilling to risk having ANZUS activated by an attack on ANZAC forces operating under Commonwealth aegis in North Borneo, but it also felt the need to privately reassure Australia that ANZUS would apply if Australian troops were attacked, provided Australia consulted the US before deploying. It was, however, felt best to be vague about this publicly, leaving diplomatic channels open. The US believed that the implicit threat of ANZUS would be enough to deter Indonesia; Washington dreaded openly taking sides, pushing Indonesia into a corner and perhaps getting dragged into a Commonwealth operation. Australia, less belligerent than it was over West New Guinea, agreed to consult the US before taking any action; and the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia ended in 1966 without ANZUS being tested. The ANZACs were able to use ANZUS only as a bluff in this case, but it seemed to suffice.

The US's behaviour over Indonesia spurred increased Australian defence spending in the 1960s, as it was realised that ANZUS wasn't a panacea for all ills. ANZAC frugality in defence spending during the 1950s had been due more to ANZAC complacency about ANZUS rather than its concern regarding any flaws in the treaty. The US had always expected its allies to carry their own weight. The fact that the ANZACs, especially Australia, now realised that they needed to be able to deal with low level contingencies by themselves did not lessen the worth of ANZUS. Self reliance up to a certain level is fully compatible with the notion of collective security. The British attempt to join the European Community, post-1964 indications of a looming British pull-out East of Suez, and the worsening situation in South Vietnam also goaded the Australian and NZ governments into increasing their defence efforts. The ANZACs were forced to address defence problems which the presence of British forces in the Asia-Pacific had enabled them to defer.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1941-1968*, pp. 297-298.

During the early 1960s, the Kennedy Administration increased ANZUS co-operation, for example, with the 1961 exchange of notes with Canberra on a satellite tracking station. The US's new interest in "flexible response" Cold War strategy, as opposed to the reliance on nuclear "massive retaliation" that had marked the Eisenhower years also led to an increased interest in ANZUS. In May 1963, the Naval Communication Station Agreement was signed between Australia and the US; the North West Cape station in Australia would be able to send signals to US Polaris ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean and South West Pacific.

Such co-operation was not required by ANZUS, but it was undertaken within the provisions for co-operation in Article II. In this de-facto manner ANZUS had moved from a regional and defensive role to become part of global nuclear deterrence. While NZ had signed ANZUS with an awareness and acceptance of the implicit nuclear element, by the early 1960s it was starting to become less supportive of the notion of nuclear deterrence than it had been in the previous decade. In 1963 the National Prime Minister Keith Holyoake declared that NZ would not have nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.⁸⁵ The peace movement was later correct in claiming that ANZUS was nuclear. However, this only applied to NZ in the sense that the US was nuclear armed and was using nuclear deterrence to help protect its allies. Although nuclear-capable ships visited NZ, no nuclear weapons were based on NZ soil, nor were NZ's forces ever trained in the use of nuclear weapons.

Vietnam

In the early 1960s NZ's idea of an independent foreign policy involved a belief in the Commonwealth framework for action, support for the UN, and loyalty to the Western Alliance.⁸⁶ Independence was thus seen as articulating certain principles while pursuing interests within a wider framework of co-

⁸⁵ Kennedy Graham, *National Security Concepts of States : New Zealand*, New York, 1989, pp. 19-21.

⁸⁶ McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, pp. 146-148.

operation, an internationalist approach rather than that of a lone-wolf. The decision to enter the war in Vietnam was a product of the above approach, one that sought to promote NZ's interests by ensuring the engagement of friendly major powers in the region. While reluctant to get involved in Vietnam, NZ decided that its interests required a response to US calls for help; still, it tried to get away with as small a military contribution as possible in the pursuit of these interests. NZ was also already involved in South East Asia due to Commonwealth and SEATO commitments. The slide into Vietnam evolved from these commitments.

In August 1962, in response to the US request at the May ANZUS Council Meeting for a show of flags in Vietnam, NZ decided to send a civilian surgical team. NZ officials shared US concerns about the regional consequences of losing South Vietnam to communism, yet they doubted whether military intervention could save the unpopular Southern regime. However, the US insisted on a military contribution, and the NZ Cabinet agreed in principle to a small non-combatant military team in May 1963. An engineering team was announced in 1964 even while NZ was voicing its doubts to the US about the value of escalation. In the face of continued US urging, and despite government reservations, Prime Minister Holyoake announced on May 27, 1965, the decision to send an artillery battery. 161 Battery, Royal NZ Artillery, arrived in South Vietnam in July and was placed under the command of the US Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade, before being reassigned to the 1st Australia Task Force in June 1966.⁸⁷

This was the first time NZ had deployed troops without British involvement. This was in itself an independent act, and it was also against NZ's better judgement. However, given the existing view that keeping US power engaged in the region was crucial to NZ's security, such concerns were temporarily put aside. It could be said that NZ also maintained its independence

⁸⁷ Bryce Fraser (ed.), *The New Zealand Book of Events*, Christchurch, 1985, p.303.

by constantly stonewalling US requests for more troops. The idea was to try and appease the US with the minimum contribution thought necessary to achieve this goal. The decision to send the battery was taken in the interest of maintaining a healthy alliance relationship with the US lest a refusal alter Washington's attitude to problems of more immediate concern to NZ. Good relations with the US were also seen as helpful in the trading sphere. These views were widely shared by NZ officials, and thus the NZ decision, it can be argued,

*...sprang from an independently-conceived assessment of its national interests within the alliance framework on which it had chosen to base its long-term national security.*⁸⁸

These concerns were not conveyed to the public. Instead, Holyoake mentioned increased North Vietnamese aggression, the US's escalation in response, the Australian decision to send an infantry battalion, and a formal request for help from the government of South Vietnam.⁸⁹ Holyoake also spoke of the notion of collective security and NZ's obligations under SEATO. In fact, while the Manila Pact provided the formal basis for action, it was NZ's concern for the health of ANZUS that led it to respond positively to US entreaties through SEATO. The US may have used ANZUS to squeeze troops out of NZ via SEATO, yet it was still up to NZ to decide whether ANZUS's value warranted responding. The ANZUS Treaty itself did not force NZ into Vietnam; it was NZ's desire for security through ANZUS that did so. The ANZACs were determined to keep the US in Asia, and they feared that a defeat or setback in Vietnam might lead to a US return to isolationism. In order to help keep Britain in Asia in some capacity the ANZACs signed up to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) of 1971 which included Britain, Australia, NZ, Malaysia and Singapore and which replaced the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement.

⁸⁸ Roberto Rabel, "The Quagmire of Vietnam", *New Zealand Defence Quarterly*, Summer 1995, Wellington, p. 19.

⁸⁹ Roberto Rabel, "The Vietnam Decision Twenty-Five Years On", in *New Zealand International Review*, May-June 1990, Wellington, p. 8.

Australia's enthusiasm regarding Vietnam posed a problem for NZ, as Australian behaviour tended to provide the yardstick by which the US judged NZ's capacity to act. Australia was less concerned about its commitments in Malaysia than was NZ, and it was far more ready to put its SEATO obligations ahead of Commonwealth ones. This in turn produced a much quicker response to US requests for troops. NZ, on the other hand, felt that it could more usefully combat communism from Malaysia. Throughout the war Australia was to be the more determined of the two in demonstrating its loyalty to the spirit of ANZUS. Thus, while Australia tended to support US policies in the war enthusiastically, NZ merely tried not to disagree openly with such policies. In other words, NZ was far less "subservient" to the US than the peace movement has suggested.

The NZ government was reluctant to expand NZ's role any further, but in 1967 it agreed to send two infantry companies from Malaysia, the first arriving in South Vietnam in May and the second in December 1967. The first RNZAF helicopter pilots to serve in Vietnam also arrived in 1967. At the peak in 1968, NZ forces in South Vietnam totalled 550.⁹⁰ After 1968 US pressure for additional troops declined, and most NZ forces were withdrawn from South Vietnam by the National Government before mid-1972. The decision to withdraw the remaining two small training teams in December 1972 was taken by the 1972-1975 Norman Kirk/Bill Rowling Labour Government, which promptly took the credit for getting NZ out of South Vietnam.

By the time of the pullout, NZ's reluctant efforts had failed to satisfy the US that NZ was an appropriately enthusiastic ally. However, its actions had still been sufficient to encourage the Left to claim that NZ was a US satellite. It also appeared that the ANZAC's contributions had not increased their influence in Washington, as they were still merely informed about US decisions. Additionally, the policy of encouraging a US presence in South East Asia had backfired; the Vietnam experience actually discouraged the US from further involvement in the

⁹⁰ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, p. 306.

region. NZ had entered the war because of its assumptions regarding collective security, yet the unfavourable outcome of the conflict led an increasing number of NZers, especially those who came of age during the war, to question and even reject those assumptions.

The growth of the New Left during the Vietnam War and the protest culture which accompanied it changed the meaning of an independent foreign policy. This found partial expression during the Kirk and Rowling governments, and it made bi-partisanship in foreign policy another casualty of Vietnam. The Third Labour Government became the champion of those calling for an independent foreign policy, although Wellington did not go so far as to repudiate ANZUS. Prior to Vietnam, independence had been defined in terms of interest, and it was perceived that interest at the time required co-operation with the US, something which the public had supported due to its own belief in the need for US protection. However, dissent arose during the war, especially among anti-militarist and anti-imperialist sources. While Labour was in opposition, it insisted both on being anti-war and also anti-Communist; it was thus reluctant to label the war as an example of “US Imperialism”, a charge levelled by the peace movement. Instead Labour contented itself with calling for a NZ withdrawal from 1966 onwards.⁹¹

After the US made its opening to China in 1972, the Labour Government felt free to recognise the PRC, and it went on to establish diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1973, re-establish an embassy in Moscow, and in 1974 recognise the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR. The French were taken to the World Court over their nuclear testing at Mururoa; sporting contacts with South Africa were broken off in 1973 when the Labour Government prevented a proposed Springbok tour of NZ; and the heightened profile of the Third World was greeted with increased rhetoric about anti-militarism and anti-imperialism. The 1971 National Government ban on US nuclear-powered

⁹¹ McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, pp. 163-167.

warships over the issue of accident liability was continued by Labour even after the US had agreed to accept legal liability in 1974.⁹² In 1975, Labour took the idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) to the General Assembly of the United Nations, where the concept was endorsed.

Most of these were actions which National would have avoided given its more traditional view of the meaning of independence. Labour, on the other hand, along with the Values Party established in 1972, was to encourage new notions of independence. These notions incorporated an unfavourable view of the US and demanded a more neutral stance in the Cold War. In the 1950s unease at US policies had been expressed in terms of pro-British sentiment; but by the late 1960s, nationalistic arguments articulated by the NZ Left had found a home in Labour, a fact that was reflected in party conferences. In the past the Department of External Affairs had fended off charges of being “disloyal” to Britain in its pursuit of independent foreign policy. Now it was criticised for not being independent from the US.⁹³

The Labour Government’s actions were thus seen by some as implementing a truly independent and moral foreign policy. Throughout the 1970s the new and older notions of independence co-existed, ANZUS was still popular, and detente between the two superpowers limited the impact of Labour’s initiatives on the US. A form of qualified alignment was thus practised by Labour; this involved increased dissent while maintaining ties with traditional allies, much to the annoyance of the more radical elements within the Labour Party.

The Condition of the Alliance by 1984

The victory of National in 1975 led to a return to the more traditional notion of independence, with Prime Minister Robert Muldoon welcoming

⁹² Kevin Clements, *Back from the Brink: the Creation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand*, Wellington, 1988, p. 84.

⁹³ McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, p. 183.

renewed visits by US nuclear-powered ships. However, despite its vocal support of ANZUS, the National Government allowed NZ's defence spending to drop as a percentage of GDP. Also, despite the end of superpower detente in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, pressure for a moral foreign policy continued to manifest itself within the Labour Party, manifested above all in a growing opposition to things nuclear. For some radicals, embracing anti-nuclearism may have been a cynical cover for their anti-US tendencies, but the anti-nuclearism of many Labour Party members occurred at a gut level,⁹⁴ which reflected the NIMBY tendencies of the wider public. This gut reaction later proved useful to radicals in the peace movement. The security debate had been polarised along political lines, and Muldoon made the most of it, claiming that a Labour victory would spell the end of ANZUS.

Pressures from the Left will be addressed in later chapters; but it needs to be noted here that, despite its continued adherence to ANZUS after Vietnam, NZ's sense of identity was changing. The notion of forward defence in South East Asia was gradually replaced in official circles by an increased focus on the South Pacific, hastened by the fall of Saigon in 1975, and the final British withdrawal from East of Suez in 1976. By themselves, these factors were not sufficient to cause the ANZUS split. Rather, they did provide a pretext for peace movement actions against ANZUS on the basis that NZ was a South Pacific entity not well served by an alliance with America⁹⁵ and that, in any event, the US's Guam Doctrine of 1969 meant that the ANZACs would have to fend for themselves anyway.

The Guam Doctrine had in fact signalled to US allies that they must pull their own weight if they expected US help when they could no longer defend themselves. Both Australia and NZ believed that they should focus on defending their own patch. However, the Guam Doctrine was probably directed at US allies

⁹⁴ Michael Bassett, telephone interview with author, April 19, 1999.

⁹⁵ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, pp. 11-12.

on the front lines of the Cold War where an increased local effort would help ease the US's burden. For NZ to take Guam as a sign that it should focus exclusively on the South Pacific and opt out of ANZUS co-operation, as the peace movement had suggested, would undoubtedly have been contrary to Washington's purpose in proclaiming the Doctrine. Moreover, while NZ could use Guam as a justification for its regional focus, it had not fulfilled the other requirement of the Doctrine, namely, an increased defence effort.

From 1975 to 1984 NZ had a South Pacific focus, yet the abandonment of forward defence in South East Asia was accompanied by an acknowledgement that NZ and its allies might still have to get involved outside the South Pacific if necessary. In this respect, the shift in focus had not yet led to an abandonment of the notion of collective security. The 1978 Defence Review under National noted the existing detente between the superpowers, the loss of a British presence in the region, and the lack of an obvious threat to NZ's security. At the same time it stressed that this was not the time to dismantle the military given unpredictability in world affairs, and it pointed to the continued need for NZ's forces to be able to operate with the forces of the nation's allies. Given that the US had scaled down its presence in South East Asia, the Review argued that, as a member of the Western Alliance, NZ must now concentrate its efforts in the South Pacific. The Review thus stated:

In present circumstances New Zealand can best contribute to the strength of the Western world by helping preserve peace and security in our own part of the world...⁹⁶

While there was no longer a strategic requirement to base forces in South East Asia, this did not preclude NZ's military co-operation with members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Co-operation with Australia was also seen as vital, since Australia and NZ were considered a single strategic

⁹⁶ 1978 *Defence Review*, Wellington, 1978, p. 11.

entity. The Review saw ANZUS as the ultimate guarantee of security in the region, and it urged continued demonstrations of commitment to the alliance by NZ. It also advocated the maintenance of reasonable defence capabilities so as to encourage allied support of NZ in times of crisis. Finally, the Review recommended that the NZ military create mobile, self-sufficient forces capable of dealing with low-level contingencies in the South Pacific; these same forces would train with ASEAN nations, help in international peace keeping, and serve as a base for expansion in larger conflicts.

The 1983 Defence Review in turn noted the post-1979 breakdown of detente, the Soviet naval build-up in the North West Pacific, and the value of nuclear deterrence. NZ's isolation was perceived both as an asset and a liability given the length of NZ's SLOCs and its dependence on trade. Collective security, still centred on America, was again promoted as the means to deal with threats to NZ's global interests. That is, ANZUS was still seen as fundamental to NZ's defence interests, although it might not apply in all circumstances. The Review also endeavoured to counter left-wing demands for alternative defence strategies by claiming that limiting NZ's defence to its 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) would signal a disinterest in outside events that could cost allied support for NZ and that armed neutrality was too costly.

Once again co-operation with Australia, dealing with low-level emergencies in the South Pacific, aiding ASEAN nations, and nurturing the ANZUS relationship were stressed as objectives. Regarding force structure, an increased emphasis was given to maritime capabilities, the protection of SLOCs in concert with allies, and the need for a three-service Ready Reaction Force (RRF). It was noted that in modern wars it was generally a case of "come as you are" given the time required to build modern forces and the necessity of having them ready in advance. The Airforce's surveillance and range capabilities also needed to be enhanced because of strengthened Soviet naval capabilities.

The Fourth Labour Government later claimed in its 1987 Defence Review that its own focus on the South Pacific, while foreshadowed by earlier reviews, differed from the past. Labour promised that it would actually allocate the resources required for self-sufficient operations in the region, whereas National had used ANZUS as an excuse not to do so. Future events would prove that Labour's commitment to defence funding between 1984-1990 was as erratic as National's commitment had been prior to 1984. In short, the presence or absence of ANZUS made no difference to the level of military spending under Labour or National governments; parsimony was a bi-partisan trend.

During the period of NZ's involvement in ANZUS, a large number of agreements were signed to help facilitate interoperability between the forces of the three partners. Actual defence co-operation was mostly carried out at the working level, with minimal involvement by bureaucrats. Consequently, in 1985 the US government was actually surprised by its full extent when it audited co-operation with NZ prior to reducing it in retaliation for the refusal to receive the USS *Buchanan*. Left largely to their own devices, the militaries of the three ANZUS partners had steadily built up both formal and informal co-operation in logistics, training, exercises, areas of surveillance responsibility, and the exchange of information that exceeded the level of co-operation between the US and some of its NATO allies. The aim was not so much to prepare for specific threats to the ANZACs as it was to develop the capacity for collective defence mentioned in Article II of the Treaty and to provide for efficient Western Alliance coverage of the Southwest Pacific.⁹⁷ Although the ANZUS Treaty had been designed by civilians for reasons since made obsolescent (such as the fear of Japan, and the desire to bolt the back door for NZ's Middle East commitment), and it had originally been viewed sceptically by the armed forces of all three partners, it had now become very precious to those same organisations.

⁹⁷ Alan Burnett, Thomas-Durell Young, Christine Wilson, *The ANZUS Documents*, Canberra, 1991, p. 2.

Many ties were bilateral, and they reflected the interests of the signatories rather than specific treaty obligations, producing considerable flexibility in the process. For example, intelligence sharing was not expressly mentioned in the Treaty, but it became in effect an important component of the relationship.⁹⁸ US facilities in Australia such as the one at North West Cape were also not specific requirements of ANZUS; rather, they reflected Australia's own judgement of what was strategically desirable. Additionally, the US and Australia decided to extend their co-operation into the Indian Ocean; this was technically outside the ANZUS area and NZ was not involved, but the US and Australia considered it strategically important for their own interests.

The open language in the Treaty's text allowed such developments, yet it was also to later allow the NZ Labour Government to deny that nuclear ship visits were an obligation and to claim that the US expected too much of its small ally. Ironically the fact that ANZUS didn't have NATO's formal machinery for military co-operation actually meant that the US applied less pressure on the ANZACs than it did on its European allies. This may have enabled Australia, and particularly NZ, to downgrade their forces somewhat. Labour claimed that this was a negative impact of ANZUS, but this seems to be something of a contradiction. Either ANZUS was over-demanding, or it was such a free ride that it had led to ANZAC laziness in defence planning; it could not be both at the same time.

A selective list of ANZUS formal agreements would include:

- Trilateral consultative fora: ANZUS Council
- Bilateral fora: Australian-NZ Joint Exercise Committee

⁹⁸ F.A Mediansky, "ANZUS: An Alliance Beyond the Treaty", *Australian Outlook*, Canberra, p. 178.

- Ties to NATO and other Western Allies: employment of NATO logistic codification system; Australian-NZ Army personnel exchanges with the British Army of the Rhine
- Multilateral agreements: Australian, British, Canadian and American armies (ABCA) Program (standardisation- NZ associated in 1965)
- Multilateral agreements, texts not released: UKUSA, 1947 (intelligence co-operation. NZ join 1977?); Radford Collins, 1951 (co-ordination and protection of allied shipping in war. NZ joined in 1978); MARSAR, 1977 (co-ordination of maritime surveillance)
- Bilateral US-NZ treaties: exchange of notes concerning establishment of an astronomical observatory in the Black Birch Range (NZ), 1982
- Bilateral memoranda of understanding, and agreements: MOU on logistic support between the US and NZ governments, 1982; arrangement between the USN and RNZN, 1965 (logistics)
- Bilateral agreements, texts not released: agreement for co-operative airlift support between USAF Military Airlift Command (MAC) and RNZAF, 1971.⁹⁹

The extent of co-operation with the US caused some to regard NZ's forces as merely an extension of the US military; it also reinforced peace movement charges of dependence on the US. But NZ had freely chosen to rely on the collective security approach rather than try to maintain self-sufficient forces capable of defending NZ's interests without help. Of course this was an impossible task for a very small country with wide trading interests. Nor did force interoperability inevitably result in diplomatic dependency. The ANZUS relationship continued despite differences of opinion on global issues until

⁹⁹ For a much more comprehensive listing, see Burnett, Young and Wilson, *The ANZUS Documents*.

Labour rejected previously shared threat perceptions and tacit agreements on obligations.

From the ANZUS relationship NZ gained experience in training with larger forces and in using advanced weapons systems, guaranteed (and cheaper) logistical support, and access to the Western intelligence network. From the US perspective the ANZACs were valuable partners who could act as intermediaries with countries who might be hesitant to deal with the US directly, who were familiar with the South Pacific environment, and who had small yet professional militaries with excellent anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surveillance capabilities.¹⁰⁰ In short, the ANZUS Alliance served to enhance the military effectiveness of the three members of the Western Alliance.

Finally, it is interesting to note that some of the multilateral agreements facilitated through ANZUS co-operation may still be operative despite the reduction of US-NZ ties. This has bothered peace activists, and some of them have called for nullification of all such agreements. Their insistence on doing so indicates that anti-nuclearism was not their sole concern; rather, the real aim was to cut NZ off from *any* form of military co-operation with its Western allies. By 1984 NZ had shifted to a South Pacific focus and had become a strong advocate of nuclear arms control. However, these developments had not detracted from the practical defence benefits gained under ANZUS. What had changed since the 1960s was that a new generation, starting to reach positions of influence within NZ society, adhered to an ideology that was alien to the older assumptions, values, and commitments that undergirded the ANZUS Alliance.

¹⁰⁰ Henry S. Albinski, *ANZUS, the United States and Pacific Security*, New York, 1987, pp. 19-20

CHAPTER TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The ideology of the New Left was a product of the turbulent 1960s, and later events would demonstrate that it profoundly influenced some NZers, especially those who attended university in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This generation's rebellion against the past, similar to the New Left's rebellion in the US, would lead to a transformation in the nature and tactics of the peace movement. Eventually the ideology of the so-called "baby boom" generation contributed to the nuclear ship ban and the ANZUS crisis. In order to understand the significance of the changes which occurred in the 1960s and their effect on the peace movement, it is necessary to examine the nature of the NZ peace movement prior to that crucial decade.

When Pacifists were Pacifist

The first NZ pacifists of real significance were the Quakers, a religious sect which played a major role in the peace movement until the 1960s. The Quakers believed that passive resistance was the only moral response to aggression, and thus they were to become a model for conscientious objectors, namely, those people who refused to be conscripted into the military. A similar belief in passive resistance had inspired the actions of the Maori leader, Te Whiti-o-Rongomai, at Parihaka in 1881.¹⁰¹ His decision not to use violence when British soldiers occupied his experimental Maori community later provided inspiration for those post-1960s peace movement activists who used the incident to establish a link between pacifism and Maori sovereignty issues.

Another strand in the early NZ peace movement was socialism, introduced by Unionist immigrants. Socialists tended to gravitate toward the peace

¹⁰¹ Elsie Locke, *Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand*, Christchurch, 1992, pp.19-21.

movement because their ideology incorporated the Marxist view that war is an inevitable product of the capitalist system. The NZ Young Socialist Party, standing in the 1905 and 1911 elections, saw war as a Capitalist plot which resulted in the working classes of warring nations killing their oppressed brethren in other states. An Australian organiser for the American-based Knights of Labour visited NZ in 1888, and books such as Henry George's Progress and Poverty came into local circulation, as did other US and British socialist texts.¹⁰²

Along with religious and Socialist influences on the early Peace Movement there were women's organisations with peace concerns on their agenda. For example, in the 1890s the NZ National Council of Women (NCW) sought the simultaneous and gradual disarmament of all countries, and during the Boer War of 1899-1902 it called for arbitration of the conflict. However, within the NCW there was a division between those who opposed the war on pacifist grounds (religious or non-religious) and those who were opposed for Socialist or political reasons. The latter tended to see the Boer War as an example of British economic imperialism rather than just as an affront to pacifism.¹⁰³ Over time the differences between pacifists and Socialists were blurred by attempts to get the two working together within a single organisation. While some Socialists were also pacifists, the basic division between pacifists and Socialists within individual organisations and within the peace movement as a whole remained a factor in the peace movement.

When the Defence Act of 1910 led to the introduction of Compulsory Military Training (CMT), it resulted in a proliferation of organisations opposed to NZ's defence policy, with Christchurch acting as the main hub of dissent. The Anti Militarist League (AML, est. 1910) had a socialist flavour, while the National Peace Council (NPC, est. 1911) tried to incorporate both religious and socialist perspectives. In addition, the Church Socialist League (est. 1913) attempted to prove that socialism and Christianity were compatible. While some radical church

¹⁰² Locke, *Peace People*, pp. 23-26.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 27-30.

members were receptive to this message, the mainstream churches kept their distance. Within the anti-militarist movement there were also those who were neither pacifist nor Socialist, yet who saw conscription as a breach of their personal freedom. The core of resistance to CMT was to come from the Passive Resisters' Union (PRU), which was made up of those actually eligible for military training.

The peace movement's campaign against CMT appeared to bear some fruit, as minor victories were won against government attempts to punish those who refused to register.¹⁰⁴ However, the outbreak of World War I was to present new problems. The sudden rise in patriotic fervour made life far more difficult for pacifists and anti-war Socialists. Many members of the PRU decided to volunteer for service, since their complaint had been with CMT rather than with war as such. The PRU and AML dissolved, but other organisations took their place. Religious opposition to the war was typified by the establishment in 1916 of an Auckland branch of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. In 1915 female activists established a NZ branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and in 1917 an Auckland branch of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP). The NPC also continued to function, albeit at a lower level of activity.¹⁰⁵

The National Registration Bill of 1915 spurred further dissent, as it acted to smooth the way toward conscription by requiring that all men between the ages of 17 and 60 register and provide personal details. Conscription was then introduced in 1916 and was opposed by the NZ Labour Party (est. 1916) and the Federation of Labour (FOL). The Military Services Bill of 1916 exempted only those who had belonged to pacifist religious sects in August 1914, and other resisters soon found themselves suffering harsh treatment.

¹⁰⁴ Locke, *Peace People*, pp. 44-46.

¹⁰⁵ Clements, *Back from the Brink*, pp. 90-91.

After World War I the NZ League of Nations Union (LNU) attempted to educate people against the notion of war as a means of settling international disputes, while the Socialist Sunday Schools organisation attempted to do the same in its own fashion. The LNU tended to attract “just war” advocates, people who preferred to avoid war if possible but were prepared to fight if they believed the cause to be just, as well as pacifists, people who refused to accept war in any circumstances.¹⁰⁶ Given that most Socialists were amenable to war in the defence of socialism, they could best be described as just war advocates. Thus, pacifists in the Labour Party, including a minority of Socialist pacifists, found themselves at odds with fellow members over defence policy. If the just war advocates were Socialist, they believed that having a military was necessary for the defence of socialism, at least until capitalism was defeated. However, both pacifists and just war advocates were opposed to CMT and restraints on freedom of speech in wartime. In the 1920s a NZ version of the pacifist British No More War Movement (NMWM) entered the fight against CMT, and the NPC promoted International Peace Days. These were supported by groups as diverse as the LNU, the Labour Representation Committee, and the Quaker organisation, The Society of Friends.

The 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference was supported by peace groups, yet militant socialists, who were sceptical about the value of any agreement by Capitalist nations to disarm themselves, refused to lend their support, thus creating a rift with the pacifists. The Communist Party was also displaying a distinctly non-pacifist attitude toward Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s when it called for a “popular front” for action against fascism. This raised the question of exactly how fascism would be checked. While Communists worked with pacifists when it suited them, they were quite capable of dropping their peaceful demeanour whenever the USSR appeared threatened. However, in an attempt to keep in touch with pacifist elements of the peace movement, Communists formed local Councils Against War, which then formed the NZ

¹⁰⁶ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 8.

Movement Against War and Fascism (MAWF) at their 1934 National Congress. Whilst proclaiming an opposition to war, the Communist Party dismissed pacifism as the solution, claiming that fascism and capitalism would have to be defeated before peace could break out. However, those few activists who were both Socialist and pacifist were wary of the Communist Party's rhetoric, and some preferred to avoid any organisation in which Communists played a significant role.¹⁰⁷ At this point the USSR was promoting collective security against fascism, and the NZ Communist Party tried to convince pacifists that this was necessary. In the meantime pacifists had also been active, with the formation of the Christian Pacifist Society (CPS) in 1936 and a NZ branch of the British Peace Pledge Union (PPU) in 1938. The former was made up of Christian pacifists, mainly Methodists, and the latter was dominated by humanist pacifists.

With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, the NZ Communist Party suddenly rediscovered pacifism, and initially Communists labelled World War II as a contest between the Capitalist powers. This enabled them to realign with firm pacifists via the Peace and Anti-Conscription Council (PACC, est. 1940). With Hitler's invasion of the USSR in June 1941, the Communist Party once again changed tack, much to the chagrin of pacifists. As the Communist homeland came under attack, the Communist Party rediscovered the value of self-defence and collective security, and thus it supported the war effort. This conversion was even more blatant than the one which appeared to have occurred within the Labour Party after World War I. Labour Cabinet Members who had opposed World War I were now coming down hard on dissenters during World War II. Bob Semple argued that, while the working man had had nothing to gain from World War I, it was now appropriate to fight to defend the gains which had been made by NZ workers under the Labour Government.¹⁰⁸ This made sense to Socialist and non-Socialist just war advocates, if not to pacifists, and it caused the former to be far less sympathetic to conscientious objectors.

¹⁰⁷ Locke, *Peace People*, pp. 85-88.

With the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, a new concern arose among peace activists- the atomic bomb. The PPU was replaced by the Peace Union (PU) in 1946, and its humanist pacifist members co-operated with the CPS to promote Hiroshima Day marches each year from 1947 onwards. The Berlin Blockade of June 1948 to May 1949 led the Labour government to suggest National Service, which was in effect peace-time conscription. This had the result of drawing the pacifists, Socialists and militant trade unions together, and the NZ Peace and Anti-Conscription Federation (PACF) was set up in 1949. However, that same year a referendum on National Service produced a “yes” vote, and CMT was to be a reality until 1958.

Meanwhile, Socialist youth organisations that had been established to pass the faith onto the next generation had come into their own. Socialist Young People’s Clubs were formed during World War II and later became linked to the World Federation of Democratic Youth, which held conferences in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. In 1949 the Young People’s Clubs became the Progressive Youth League (PYL). Student Socialist and Labour clubs also became involved in the NZ Peace Council (NZPC), an outgrowth of the PACF which was viewed with suspicion by some activists due to its links to the Communist-backed World Peace Council (WPC). The NZPC helped to unite the various strands of the peace movement, and it encouraged “peaceful co-existence” with the USSR. The PYL sent delegates to the Sydney Youth Peace Festival in 1952, but a pronounced increase in Communist influence within the organisation resulted in a fall in membership and the collapse of the PYL in 1955. This was only one indication that, prior to the late 1960s, many peace activists tried to avoid being associated with Communist influenced organisations. This helped to preserve the integrity of NZ’s pacifists, but such a situation was not to survive past the 1960s.

¹⁰⁸ Locke, *Peace People*, p. 117.

The peace movement was quick to label the Korean War a civil war rather than an act of Communist aggression. The Communist Party, the unions and the pacifist PU opposed NZ's dispatch of troops to South Korea, and the NZPC called for a cease-fire to end the "civil war". When China entered the war, the NZPC changed its approach from "Korea for the Koreans" to calling for a "just" peace and Chinese admission to the UN.¹⁰⁹ The peace movement continued to press the NZ Government to copy Britain and recognise the PRC, despite the PRC's hostile attitude to the West. In 1956 the NZPC had little problem in expressing opposition to NZ's pro-British stance during the Suez crisis, yet it faced internal division over the Soviet invasion of Hungary that same year. As Communists had played a large part in the NZPC, their refusal to support condemnation of the USSR's actions led to a loss in NZPC membership, as many pacifist members left in disgust.

Because of the 1954 Bikini test of a US hydrogen bomb and the resulting fallout incident involving the crew of a Japanese fishing boat, public concerns about atmospheric testing were spurred. In general, pre-1960s anti-nuclear groups were fairly sincere. The dangers of nuclear war also helped to reconcile pacifists and Socialists, given that a nuclear war was hard to justify as being necessary for the defence of socialism. Heightened public concern provided the peace movement with an audience more receptive to its campaign against nuclear weapons, and in 1958 the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed in Britain with church support. The fact that the public was now focusing on the *weapons* of the Cold War rather than on its underlying *cause* also gave Communists in the peace movement an opportunity to recruit members of the public into Communist-influenced peace organisations.

Religious pacifists had more principled motives for opposing nuclear weapons. In 1956 the Society of Friends presented the NZ Parliament with a petition opposing nuclear tests and calling for general disarmament. This

¹⁰⁹ Locke, *Peace People*, p.147.

admission that disarmament should be co-ordinated and mutual was at odds with the view of Socialists and Communists, who demanded immediate unilateral acts of disarmament by the West, citing the urgency of avoiding nuclear war. Not surprisingly, this approach held a number of risks for the West. For example, it assumed that Western disarmament would be reciprocated by the Soviets rather than allowing for the possibility that the USSR might use the resulting opportunity to deal with capitalism once and for all. For anti-Capitalists in the peace movement, this would not have been a disagreeable prospect. In the end it was the unilateralist approach to disarmament which would dominate the modern peace movement's position on arms control. Thus, later claims that the anti-nuclearism of the modern peace movement was not ideological¹¹⁰ are only partly true. The *form* that anti-nuclearism took, with its pursuit of unilateral disarmament, was influenced by ideology.

The protest actions of the British CND provided inspiration for the NZ peace movement, and a NZ version of the CND was soon formed. Information was collected from British and Australian branches of the CND and from the US organisation Scientists Against Nuclear Energy (SANE). The British CND sought unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain, while SANE sought a “no first use” declaration from the US regarding nuclear weapons, the Soviets having already made such a declaration. However, the problem was that nuclear first use was an attractive option for someone wishing to deter a massive conventional attack. Any such declaration from the West, whose forces were incapable of taking the offensive and whose task was strictly defensive, merely undercut the defence of West. For the Soviets, their own declaration came at no cost. Such distinctions were lost on those parts of the peace movement which preferred to overlook the differences between the two sides in the Cold War. The public's fear of nuclear weapons was proving to be a windfall for peace movement Socialists, and the “Ban the Bomb” movement gathered momentum. In effect, the peace

¹¹⁰ Nicky Hager, telephone conversation with author, October 22, 1998.

movement's core had found an issue with which to build up a wide periphery amongst the public.

The NZ CND's policy in 1961 demanded that NZ not acquire nuclear weapons; that NZ not be defended by nuclear weapons; and that NZ should not enter any alliances which could make us a party to nuclear war. Given the Western Alliance's nuclear component, this appeared to rule out NZ's involvement in any form of collective security with the West. Collective security had also gone out of favour with the Communist Party after the Allies had won World War II, and this saw the Communist Party once again in step with pacifists in the CND and in the wider peace movement. However, pacifists remained concerned about the tendency of Communist-dominated organisations such as the NZPC to refuse to criticise Soviet or Chinese nuclear weapons.¹¹¹

The CND had hoped to win over the public through education, and thereby increase its "grass roots" support. The fact that NZ, unlike Britain, did not actually have nuclear weapons took some of the impact out of those NZ CND protests which imitated the British Aldermaston marches. Nonetheless, the direct action tactics of the CND and its simple message gave it an appeal and glamour to middle class young people, resulting in the CND's eclipsing of the older peace organisations.¹¹² From 1965 the Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (YCND) held camps at Nelson to educate the young on the dangers of nuclear war. In 1962 the Australian Labour Party proposed extending the 1959 Antarctica Nuclear-Free Zone, and the NZ CND took up the cause, presenting a petition to Parliament in 1963. New issues were also to arise that year: the French announced that they would be shifting their nuclear tests to Mururoa, and Australia agreed to the construction by the US of a naval communications facility at North West Cape. Moreover, in a stroke of luck for the peace movement, the

¹¹¹ Locke, *Peace People*, p. 176.

¹¹² Clements, *Back from the Brink*, p. 101

Canadian peace activist Larry Ross had moved to NZ about a year earlier, bringing a network of international connections with him.

Church groups had increased their presence in the peace movement in response to the nuclear issue, although they were more concerned with the single issue of nuclear weapons than with the overthrow of capitalism advocated by the Socialists. In the early 1960s the single-issue motivation of the periphery of the peace movement was thus still distinct from that of the core's religious pacifists, Socialist pacifists and Socialists; but with the rise of New Left ideology and its wide dispersal throughout NZ society, this was to change by the end of the decade. Educated baby boomers who were influenced by New Left ideology shared many of the assumptions of the Socialists, and this reduced the ideological difference between the core and periphery.

When the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) ended US and Soviet atmospheric nuclear tests, public fears about fallout from such tests quickly faded. Subsequently the CND went into rapid decline,¹¹³ and the peace movement lost most of its periphery. However, this trend was to be reversed by the Vietnam War which revived the peace movement and resulted in its adoption of New Left ideology. In the past, Socialist and Communist views about the US had been balanced by pacifist influence in the peace movement, and the Communist Party had been kept at arm's length. However, the widespread adoption of the Socialist or Communist view of US foreign policy which occurred within the peace movement during the Vietnam War was to see this balance shattered.

Before the peace movement's energies were distracted by the Vietnam War, it had managed to achieve some movement in the NZ Government's position on the nuclear issue. In the 1950s NZ had supported the British nuclear testing program in Australia and on Christmas Island, and in 1957 the National Government argued that it would be dangerous for the West to stop testing

¹¹³ Locke, *Peace People*, p. 186.

before a verifiable agreement on disarmament had been reached. Nevertheless, National instituted monitoring of NZ's air, soil and water to reassure the public. Despite this the public remained worried about atmospheric nuclear tests, and supported peace movement petitions on the issue in 1956. The National Government responded in 1957 by renouncing any possession of nuclear weapons by NZ. The Second Labour Government of 1957-1960 continued to provide monitoring support for British nuclear tests despite its anti-test pre-election rhetoric.¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, Labour did vote in the UN against French testing in the Sahara, marking the start of a NZ divergence from its allies over the nuclear test issue. National was to follow Labour's lead upon its victory in 1960, as it saw the fallout hazard as an issue which could be dealt with separately from disarmament issues and without threatening Western security.

The red glow in the sky from the July 1962 US atmospheric test at Johnston Island disturbed the NZ public even further, and this effect lasted at least until the 1963 LTBT. However, the fact that France was not a signatory to the atmospheric test ban and was eyeing a South Pacific location for testing prompted the National Government to commence diplomatic protests from 1963 onwards. Labour in turn wanted more forceful action, either in the UN or in the form of a boycott of French goods.¹¹⁵ Labour's habit of outbidding National regarding possible action against the French was to continue until 1995. The Labour Party also took on board a 1963 petition calling for a southern hemispheric nuclear-free zone. The French connection looked like a political winner for the NZ CND; but the Vietnam War, an even bigger winner, was to shift the peace movement's focus away from the French and concentrate it almost exclusively on the Americans.

¹¹⁴ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, pp. 41-44.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 53-57.

The Vietnam War and The New Left

The Vietnam War was to have a profound effect on the baby boom generation in the US and NZ. American “boomers” turned against what they regarded as an immoral war initiated by their own country, and the New Left became their vehicle of protest. Although young NZers’ reasons for opposing the war varied somewhat from those of their American counterparts, given that NZ was playing a minor role in the conflict and NZ students were not in danger of being drafted, a New Left ideology also developed in NZ. Although there was a time delay and NZ demonstrations did not have the fire of those seen in the US, New Left attitudes and beliefs indeed had arrived. In order to understand how the New Left arose on the NZ political scene, it may be helpful to examine the ideology’s development in the US.

It can be argued that the Left is a generational experience, with each successive generation of Leftists having its own emphasis, based on common experiences and key events. A radical nucleus of intellectuals and students may be formed in response to a common experience and the need to defend their values in a hostile society. A broad definition of the Left might include: anti-Capitalist tendencies; opposition to the Right’s emphasis on family, religion, authority and property; and the practice of negation. Essentially, negation involves a denial of the validity of the existing understanding of reality. This idealism, and a belief in transformation, rather than the reform promoted by liberals, results in the radical Left’s constant struggle to bridge the gap between how the world is and how radicals would like it to be.¹¹⁶

Prior to the development of the New Left, there was an Old Left in the US, which was based on the experiences of an earlier generation. The US Old Left was based in native radicalism, but its ideals were imported. Marxist dogma seemed appealing during the Great Depression, and the rise of fascism also appeared to have discredited Western capitalism. As a result, the Old Left of the

¹¹⁶ John P. Diggins, *The Rise and Fall of the American Left*, New York, 1992, pp. 40-41.

1930s was enamoured with the idea of revolution, but many of its members became disillusioned with Stalinism as the 1930s progressed. The Moscow show trials of Bolshevik heroes shocked non-Stalinist members. The prospect of revolution in the US also dimmed when the USSR ordered US Communists to work within the US system, rather than overthrowing it, in order to form a United Front against fascism. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 was the last straw for many. Old Left radicals could not explain Stalinism away in terms of capitalism, and many gave up on all Left causes, leaving only a small rump of Stalinists. The de-radicalisation of the Old Left thus occurred well before McCarthyism.¹¹⁷ Having reconciled themselves with the existing reality, a number of former Old Leftists went on to become pro-US Cold Warriors.

By 1960, US liberals were best represented by the East Coast intellectuals, a group of disillusioned Old Leftists who were disgusted by their past embrace of Marxism. Concerned that the masses could be too easily led into totalitarian movements, the East Coast liberals preferred to save democracy from the people through pluralism. Politics would involve healthy competition between interest groups. Although liberals stressed the common good over individual materialism,¹¹⁸ they were reformist rather than radical critics of capitalism. In the 1960s, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson carried liberals' hopes with regard to Keynesian economics, civil rights, and the strengthening of the welfare state.

The New Left marked a departure from the Old Left in a number of ways. For one, the early New Left avoided Marxism and its historical determinism. Initially, the New Left rejected the dogma of the remaining Stalinist Old Left. It also rejected the reform efforts of the East Coast liberals. In effect, the New Left had rejected the reality which most Old Leftists had accepted. Negation was once more coming into play as a new generation of radicals reacted to their personal

¹¹⁷ Diggins, *The Rise and Fall of the American Left*, p. 191.

¹¹⁸ Allen J. Matusow, *The Unravelling of America: A history of Liberalism in the 1960s*, New York, 1984, p. 9.

alienation and guilt in an affluent society. Unlike previous Lefts, the New Left was also a largely student phenomenon.

The New Left's philosophies were drawn from intellectuals such as William Appleman Williams, who believed that US imperialism had caused the Cold War, and C. Wright Mills, with his theories on the power elite, and how change could be introduced from the top-down. The idea that intellectuals, not the working class, would lead the revolution held a special appeal to middle class students. Action for a moral society would be based on the direct action of the Black Civil rights movement rather than the work within the political system conducted by liberals. Although the early New Left was innocent of ideology, the Vietnam War eventually changed this. Moderation escalated to a call for revolution, the reverse of what had happened within the Old Left.¹¹⁹ Whereas the USSR had provided the model for the Old Left, Cuba became the model for the 1960s generation.

The American author Todd Gitlin chronicled his personal journey from being a student moderate to a student radical, and the concurrent transformation of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) organisation, in his book The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage.¹²⁰ The effect that the Vietnam War had on this New Leftist organisation was to be repeated within most US peace movement organisations. The late 1960s saw many educated US boomers move from shock at the killing in Vietnam to hostility toward their own government and society. This radicalisation of early New Leftists played into the hands of existing Socialists and Communists in the peace movement's core. Socialists and Communists suddenly found that a generation of young, educated Americans had become receptive to their anti-Capitalist message. A similar process occurred in NZ and other Western countries.

¹¹⁹ Diggins, *The Rise and Fall of the American Left*, p. 219.

¹²⁰ Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*, New York, 1987.

According to Gitlin, the American boomers had been affected by the conflicting forces of affluence and insecurity that existed side by side in the 1950s. Middle class children growing up in the 1950s took affluence for granted, yet the ever-present spectre of “the bomb” also had an effect. Unlike their parents the boomers did not associate atomic weapons with a welcome end to World War II. For American Jewish youth, who were to form a significant part of the early student movement, there was also the sense that their parents had failed to prevent the Holocaust due to a passivity that their children were determined to avoid. Affluence and insecurity thus had an effect on students from the white urban middle class, above all on Jewish students, who were concentrated in US universities by the 1960s.

The liberals’ failure to condemn the Vietnam War disillusioned many boomers, who then abandoned the liberalism of their parents for the radicalism of the New Left. Liberalism seemed incapable of containing the idealism and anti-Cold War sentiments of the new generation of middle class students. The New Left tried to create its own style in concert with the rebellious youth culture that had emerged in the 1950s.¹²¹ The voice of this culture was the new Rock and Roll music, with its sense of alienation from past generations and its desire for self-gratification. However, the New Left was also influenced by the remnants of previous subcultures. Older “rebels” served as role models for a generation that felt alienated from its parents. One such model for youth was the Beatnik (or Beat) subculture of the 1950s. The Beats’ embrace of working class dress, voluntary poverty, sex, drugs, Buddhism and their own “hip” language was to provide the groundwork for the 1960s “counter-culture”, a protest against the affluence and conformity of America in the 1950s.

As the Beats were essentially apolitical, some ideas for the 1960s political rebellion which ran parallel to the counter-culture’s lifestyle emphasis were drawn from the Old Left. Gitlin claims that, while the majority of early New Leftists

¹²¹ Gitlin, *The Sixties*, p.23.

were the children of liberal parents, many of them had been influenced in their adolescence by “Red Diaper Babies”, the children of Communist or Socialist parents.¹²² Whilst the US Communist Party was only a hollow shell in 1950s America, its children were to have a great impact on a larger number of students who were looking for models of rebellion. The early New Left soon adopted the “Us-Them” fortress mentality of the Red Diaper Babies, along with their attitudes against Western imperialism and their cynicism about US democracy. This shift from liberalism to radical activism occurred while many students sought a way out stifling career options and yearned for time to enjoy themselves. This attitude was possible only because affluence was taken for granted by this new generation.

The 1960s student movement thus did not appear in a vacuum, and it only took certain events to transform a generational mentality into a political movement.¹²³ For example, the February 1960 Greensboro sit-in by black Civil Rights protesters provided a model for activism. The Civil Rights Movement in general was to serve as a catalyst for moving white middle class youth from a position of alienation to one of opposition. The New Left therefore appeared first in the guise of single-issue causes such as Civil Rights, campus reform and pacifism, and it was seen as an end in itself, an affirmation of the right to take action.

The ideals of the early New Left were expressed in the SDS’s 1962 Port Huron Statement in an attempt to form an ideology. The Statement criticised anti-communism, and accused the US of acting too aggressively in the Cold War. It was also argued that an elite had perverted US democracy, causing spiritual misery for Americans. Action and participatory democracy, or the decentralisation of power, would overcome powerlessness, and action in the universities would

¹²² Gitlin, *The Sixties*, p. 67.

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 70-100.

be the means to social change. As education was used by the elite to maintain its power, students had to gain control of the universities.¹²⁴

Even though it was influenced by Communist thought regarding US foreign policy, the New Left initially tried to avoid formal association with the Communist Party, as it intended to maintain its own sense of identity. The SDS reflected this approach, and the Port Huron statement of goals was moderate in tone despite the presence of Red Diaper Babies at the conference. The SDS's parent organisation, the anti-Communist League for Industrial Democracy (LID), was concerned about the presence of Communists at the conference, but the SDS founders had dismissed the Communist Party as a threat and considered their liberal elders to be paranoid. The SDS had also developed a romantic view of Third World Communist revolutions, believing that they represented an alternative to Soviet-style communism; this in turn led them to reject or spurn the blanket anti-communism of the LID. This breach with old-style liberals was later to make the SDS vulnerable to Marxist doctrines, but in 1963 it was not yet condemning "US imperialism", and action was limited to university campuses, and Civil Rights work.¹²⁵

A brief attempt to act off campus was made through the Economic Research and Action Project in the Summer of 1964. SDS members went into the ghettos in an attempt to organise the poor, but they quickly became disillusioned. Frustrated, they retreated back into the universities and blamed liberals for the failure of the program.¹²⁶ Returning to the Port Huron concept of acting on campus, the SDS turned to crusading for free speech against conservative university administrations. In the late 1960s the New Left was still involved in confrontations within universities over curricula, faculty appointments, readings, and minority studies programmes. Intimidation by radical students was not

¹²⁴ Matusow, *The Unravelling of America*, p. 313.

¹²⁵ Diggins, *The Rise and Fall of the American Left*, pp. 224-233.

¹²⁶ Matusow, *The Unravelling of America*, p. 316.

unheard of. Even the Marxist historian Eugene Genovese was worried about the threat to academic freedom posed by those whom he called “pseudo-revolutionary middle class totalitarians”.¹²⁷

The SDS also paid attention to Civil Rights issues, but inaction on this issue by government liberals caused black activists to lose respect for their white allies. The Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC) saw the 1964 Democratic party convention in Atlantic City as a betrayal of the black cause and moved to form a movement without white help. The New Left, still forming its identity, saw SNCC workers as models for direct action, and it tended to romanticise black separatists and to absorb their attitudes. However, after SNCC purged its white staff members in 1965-1966, white activists had to find new causes.

New Leftists became increasingly angry with liberal support of the Vietnam War, and by 1965 they were being pulled further toward the views of Old Left Socialists and Communists. Later in the war, liberal opposition to government policy would increase, but liberal dissent still differed from the radicals' approach. For liberals, the war was the problem, and they sought to work within the US system to end it. For radicals, the US system was the problem. When it organised an April 1965 national demonstration against the war, the SDS allowed Communist groups to endorse the rally in Washington DC, and some speakers noted that a Communist victory in South Vietnam would be preferable to continued US subjugation. By now the New Left was starting to identify with the Vietnamese revolutionaries, assuming that they were simply a more victimised and better organised version of themselves.¹²⁸ Both were seen as fighting against the same oppressor, the US. While some liberals were sympathetic with the anti-war movement, they feared that such militancy would result in a loss of support

¹²⁷ Diggins, *The Rise and Fall of the American Left*, p. 252.

¹²⁸ Gitlin, *The Sixties*, p. 185.

from mainstream America. LID thus publicly rebuked the SDS and warned of potential totalitarian influences within the peace movement.

Many of those who joined SDS after the April 1965 demonstration helped to radicalise the organisation. At the 1965 SDS conference the “old guard” SDS leadership was able to prevent an open condemnation of the Vietnam War, but Marxist-Leninist cadres were already appearing as active participants. Passages in the Port Huron Statement which were critical of Communist authoritarianism were removed from the constitution. The Old Left was reasserting itself. However, the SDS leadership was slow to recognise the threat, having forgotten the lessons of the 1930s and 1940s. This attitude was reflected in Gitlin’s own belief at the time that, “We were the New Left, vigorously anti-authoritarian, purely American, no suckers for a bunch of tight-assed Stalinists.”¹²⁹

By 1966 an increased fear of the draft had made the youth culture a fertile recruiting ground for both the political New Left and the “new age” counter-cultural gurus. SDS was shifting toward active resistance to the Vietnam War as radical splinter groups replaced the old guard. The Diggers, anarchists with theatrical flair, were able to disrupt the 1967 SDS conference with calls for violent revolution. The New Left had built itself an identity by accusing liberals of being “sell-outs”. It was now vulnerable to similar charges from groups such as the Diggers.¹³⁰ The tactic of discrediting rivals through accusations of ideological impurity was inherent in Soviet communism and had led to countless bloody purges under Stalin. While its presence in the US New Left did not lead to executions, it did lead to fragmentation and increased radicalism as the most fanatical individuals and groups browbeat pragmatists out of positions of leadership. A related concept was the idea of a “hierarchy of suffering” whereby those who were the most oppressed were the only people fit to claim moral leadership of the New Left.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 191.

¹³⁰ Gitlin, *The Sixties*, p. 230.

During 1966 and 1967 New Left intellectuals tried to keep the focus on psychological freedom for students, grounding their radicalism in their own grievances, on the theory that they were the new working class, being trained for corporate slavery. However, during 1967 and 1968 the “New Working Class” theory was junked, and the New Left concentrated on fighting for the liberation of the Third World.¹³¹ Carl Oglesby was the prophet for this direction, which brought the New Left back into the Marxist fold. Che Guevara became a hero, the Black “guerrilla tactics” of the summer 1967 ghetto riots provided inspiration, and violent factions increased in anti-war demonstrations. The idea of participatory democracy also gave way to Leninism and a drive to centralise power. The New Left descended into its own form of totalitarianism, increasingly resembling Old Left Stalinists.

Meanwhile, the NZ peace movement was watching with interest events in the US. The NZ peace movement copied the tactics of the US peace movement, as direct action also seemed to appeal to NZ boomers. In imitation of SDS “teach-ins”, the first NZ teach-in was held in July 1965 at Victoria University. The multi-group “mobilisations” utilised by the US peace movement were also copied in NZ. Specific direct actions were co-ordinated by local Committees on Vietnam (COV), although the usual tensions accompanied efforts to get various groups to work together. Early in the war there was still much disagreement over precisely what peace movement demands should be.

A key organisation proved to be the Wellington COV, which in 1965 was demanding that NZ troops not be sent to South Vietnam and that the war be ended through negotiations.¹³² Whereas US protesters were in rebellion against their own nation’s conduct of the war in Vietnam, NZ opponents of the war focused instead on the claim that Vietnam was not NZ’s war. The main peace movement aim was to bring NZ troops home from “America’s war”. In this

¹³¹ Matusow, *The Unravelling of America*, p. 326.

¹³² Locke, *Peace People*, p. 201.

sense NZ opposition was based to some extent on nationalism¹³³ whereas US dissidents took a distinctly non-patriotic tone. It is also interesting to speculate to what extent a New Left would have developed in NZ, if no NZ troops had been sent to South Vietnam.¹³⁴ At the very least, NZ's involvement in the Vietnam War hastened the development of an ideology which both altered the nature of NZ radicalism and widened its appeal.

Although less well off than their US counterparts, NZ boomers were from an unusually affluent background. Unlike their parents, NZ university students had experienced neither war nor economic depression and were as ripe for rebellion as their American contemporaries. American popular culture had permeated NZ in the 1950s despite conservatives' best efforts at censorship; and NZ boomers had also felt the touch of Rock and Roll and had developed a sense of alienation from their parents. Although the original New Left was actually forged in the US, young NZers, both middle class and working class, readily embraced a similar ideology.

While the theories of the New Left were absorbed by many NZers at university, the economic dimension of the ideology tended to lose its appeal for many of those who went on to become part of the affluent middle class. Such people later provided support for New Right economics, yet in varying degrees, liberal to radical, they still held on to the social tenets of the New Left. For example, they espoused the feminist, multi-culturalist, environmental and peace tenets. The degree of adoption of New Left theories also varied among individuals. Those who were "true believers", namely radicals who took their Marxism and anti-Americanism more seriously, tended to congregate in the peace movement's core. Those liberal NZers who were more lukewarm in their adherence to the anti-Americanism of the New Left tended, when stirred by a specific issue, to make up the numbers in the peace movement's periphery.

¹³³ Basset, telephone interview, April 10, 1999.

¹³⁴ Owen Wilkes, interview with author, Hamilton, August 10, 1998.

Ideas found their way into NZ by various means, including new sources of information such as the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, launched in NZ by Canadian immigrant Larry Ross, and Freda Cook writing from Hanoi.¹³⁵ A 1966 visit to NZ by US Vice President Hubert Humphrey was greeted in Wellington by a demonstration led by a US teacher visiting NZ on a US scholarship.¹³⁶ US visitors also provided subscriptions to overseas magazines.¹³⁷ Meanwhile, NZers picked up ideas while travelling and studying overseas. NZ Hiroshima Day Marches were quickly adapted to include the slogan “No Troops for Vietnam”, as the peace movement shifted its focus. The CND and its youth wing thereby proved to be a useful source of protesters against Vietnam, illustrating the flexibility of the peace movement’s core in moving to take advantage of whatever issue could best be used to rally wider support.

Back in the US the year 1967 witnessed SDS shift its opposition to the seemingly endless war to a policy of violent resistance, even as the organisation itself was being torn apart by internal conflicts due to the “politics of identity”. Guilt-ridden whites in the New Left were increasingly deferring to the demands of black separatists, and trying to emulate their militancy. Feminists also moved away from SDS in 1967, claiming that SDS’s revolutionary agenda did not extend to women’s liberation.¹³⁸ Feminism was in turn divided by differences in doctrine between heterosexual and lesbian feminists, and so the process of schism continued. Feminist influence within the New Left, along with that of black separatists, resulted in the New Left adopting the view that white males were the cause of all the world’s woes. Women, blacks and the Third World were all in a colonial relationship to white-male dominated Capitalist America.

¹³⁵ Locke, *Peace People*, p.191-193.

¹³⁶ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, p. 324.

¹³⁷ Wilkes interview, August 10, 1998.

¹³⁸ Gitlin, *The Sixties*, p. 373.

The SDS also experienced division between those who wanted to build a wider base of support against the Vietnam War and those who wanted an immediate revolution in the US. White activists used direct action tactics in “Stop the Draft Week” in October 1967, imitating black tactics in ghetto riots. The assassinations of both Senator Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jnr., in 1968 signalled to some activists that peaceful reformers were simply killed; violence appeared to be the only alternative. Therefore, SDS used confrontational tactics at the August 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, clashing with Mayor Daley’s police. However, SDS was not to survive much longer as an organisation. The New Left’s opposition to authority and its impatience with working within the system ensured its fragmentation into competing interest groups, each with its own form of injustice to combat.

The shift towards militancy was aided by the rising influence of the Progressive Labour party (PL) in SDS from 1966 onwards. The PL was a pro-Maoist Marxist-Leninist organisation that did not like the NLF or Castro, and which wanted the SDS to focus on the US working class rather than on the Third World. Within the SDS, the main ideological buffer against the PL was the Weatherman organisation, which wanted white working class youth to provide the troops to help non-whites at home and abroad to overthrow the US empire. Charles Manson was a Weatherman hero.¹³⁹ Weatherman allied with the Black Panthers against the PL, with the result that the SDS split in two at its 1969 convention.

Despite the dissolution of SDS, the New Left briefly persisted as a movement. Liberalism had come into disrepute, and disillusionment with US institutions had fostered a desire to “smash the machine”, to stop the war by shutting down the US. The New Left had gone beyond attacking US foreign policy and was now romanticising the US’s military opponents. However, this identification with the Viet Cong isolated the New Left from the rest of the anti-

¹³⁹ Matusow, *The Unravelling of America*, p. 341.

war movement. As the Vietnam War dragged on, an increasing number of Americans became appalled at the cost of the war in terms of US lives and treasure. Unlike the New Left, however, they didn't actively support Third World Communist revolutions. Liberals were turning against the war by 1968, but New Left militants were impatient at liberals' efforts to end the war from within the system. By going beyond saying "no" to the war, and saying "yes" to revolution, the New Left had made itself vulnerable to Communist influence. This was the very thing that the leaders of the early New Left had resolved to avoid.

In effect, American New Leftists of the late 1960s had transferred their hopes and dreams from the US to any Third World nation where a suitably romantic revolution was taking place. It was also much easier for white American activists to feel appreciated when they visited North Vietnam or Cuba than when they tried to help in black ghettos in the US. The New Left had been so influenced by black nationalism by this stage that only "coloured" revolutions were deemed worthy of support. The New Left was now interested in North-South issues, rather than those of East-West, seeing Cuba and North Vietnam as better models than the USSR. The "Prague Spring", which occurred before the Soviets' 1968 repression of the Czechoslovakian velvet revolution was neither sufficiently exotic, nor sufficiently charged with "white-skin advanced-nation guilt", to obtain US New Leftist support.¹⁴⁰ Gitlin's own sympathy for the Czechoslovakian students led to his being labelled "Politically Unreliable" (PU) by the SDS leadership.

In NZ the romance with Third World Communist revolutions and the accompanying condemnation of the US was also well under way. A "Peace, Power and Politics" conference in 1968 called for the support of "independence struggles", condemned racism as harmful to world peace, supported NZ non-alignment in the Cold War and demanded that NZ leave SEATO. About the same time the NZ University Students Association (NZUSA) adopted the New

¹⁴⁰ Gitlin, *The Sixties*, p. 281.

Left perspective on the Vietnam War, and the NZUSA has been dominated by radical ideology ever since. In addition, the new Progressive Youth Movement (PYM) mirrored the ideas, rhetoric and tactics of the US New Left, often to the exasperation of those peace groups which preferred to act more moderately so as not to antagonise the wider NZ public. Old-guard pacifists in Christchurch were shocked by the PYM's style.¹⁴¹ As US protests became more violent in the late 1960s, it was the PYM which aped this trend, developing a taste for publicity-raising clashes with the NZ police.

Direct action against US activities in NZ also featured in student-led protests against a proposed US Omega naval communications transmitter in 1968. The anti-Omega campaign was to prove a vital catalyst in the evolution of opposition to the US military presence in NZ. Unwarranted fears that NZ would become a nuclear target were played on in this case, in an attempt to use NZ's latent anti-nuclearism to promote questioning of US foreign policy in general. In a similar vein, NZ peace activist Owen Wilkes noted in 1968 that visiting US warships might have nuclear weapons on board.¹⁴² Wilkes, who was later to become a key researcher and activist against nuclear ships and ANZUS, was also a co-founder of the Citizens Vietnam Action Committee. The NZ peace movement's campaign against ANZUS thus had direct roots in the Vietnam War.

Arguments about violations of NZ's sovereignty were also used as the peace movement tried to find a specific NZ recipe for opposition to the US military. While the US peace movement was attempting to get the US military out of Vietnam, the NZ peace movement was trying to get the US military out of New Zealand. Peace activists have denied that this was "anti-American", claiming that they were merely disagreeing with the US government's foreign policy and that they did not hate Americans per se.¹⁴³ However, in trying to limit the

¹⁴¹ Wilkes interview, August 10, 1998.

¹⁴² Locke, *Peace People*, p. 220.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 213.

definition of anti-Americanism to a dislike of American citizens, they conveniently side-step the reality that the New Left's attacks on the US system, including US capitalism and its brand of democracy, could be considered to be anti-American in the same sense that opposing the Communist system could be considered anti-Soviet. Even though American New Leftists were also opposed to their own system, it required a stretch of the imagination to believe that the NZ peace movement's attacks on US policy were not influenced by anti-Americanism in its broader sense. The August 1969 visit of US Secretary of State William P. Rogers was greeted by PYM chants of "Hey, hey, hey, let's defeat the USA!"¹⁴⁴

Despite the presence of such feelings, anti-Americanism in NZ was generally limited to radicals and the Communist Party. Later campaigns against those US facilities in NZ which could not be painted as potential nuclear targets failed to gain the type of public support evident over Omega. This suggests that, unlike peace movement radicals, the NZ public was more concerned about specific nuclear threats than the presence of the American military per se.

The early New Left had been Socialist, but it had sought to avoid the dogmatism of Soviet-style communism. Unfortunately, the passions raised by the Vietnam War saw the New Left emerge from the 1960s with a "new" dogma. The New Left blamed the US for the presence of evil in the world; it was militantly anti-Capitalist, pro-Third World and contemptuous of white males. The Marxist view that capitalism was the cause of war had also been adopted. No longer concerned with reforming the US system, the New Left had embraced Third World Communist tyrannies and had closed its mind. Marxist-style cant and dogmatism were the order of the day.¹⁴⁵ These views were set in stone as New Left orthodoxy, thereby ending the notion of the New Left as a force for tolerance and freedom of expression. Having marched for the right to disagree

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁴⁵ Gitlin, *The Sixties*, p. 347.

with their elders, US New Leftists now began to deny that right to their own critics.

While many young Americans had adopted the New Left out of anger at the actions of their own country, and a fear of getting drafted, young NZers' adoption of the New Left was partly inspired by extant NZ suspicions about the US and the wisdom of its foreign policy. It could also be argued that New Left ideology became so "trendy" that to hold to its radical theories was to demonstrate that one had "arrived" in the intelligentsia. A person could prove to their contemporaries that he or she was a member of the educated elite simply by holding views which were at odds with those held by the mass of NZers. The New Left's beliefs eventually became "politically correct", something to which university students were expected to subscribe in order to demonstrate their independence and critical intelligence. The boomers' desire for instant gratification and enjoyment of the "here and now" also helped to make them more receptive to New Left and peace movement logic. The West's conventional military forces and nuclear weapons were an unpleasant reality which didn't fit in with boomer romanticism. The potential longer-term consequences of unilateral disarmament by the West did not concern those whose sole focus was the enjoyment of the present.

Despite its impact on students and intellectuals, the New Left was never to become the ideology of a majority of NZers. Nevertheless, its beliefs were readily implemented by an educated minority of baby boomers, liberal and radical, once they reached positions of influence in government and education. Like the New Right economic reforms of the Labour Government of 1984-1990, the New Left's ideology was to be imposed "from the top down". Both campaigns were carried forward by the 1984-1990 Labour Government. New Right boomers wanted a change from the tight economic controls practised by the Muldoon Government, whilst radical left-wing boomers sought a break from the social conservatism of the old order.

In its anti-Capitalist aspect the New Left represented a conversion of some Westerners to Soviet ideology, although the extent of the conversion varied tremendously. It needs to be remembered that the Cold War was as much a struggle for “hearts and minds” as it was a military contest. The West eventually won the contest when the citizens of Communist countries decided that they preferred Western democratic freedoms and consumerism to the unfulfilled promises of Communist-style socialism. The rise of New Left ideology in turn represented a considerable Soviet success in promoting the reverse phenomenon in the West. Still, this was not sufficient to ensure a Soviet victory in the Cold War, although the presence of radical leftists within the West did sometimes hamstring Western governments as they sought to counter Soviet moves in the Cold War. The fact that radicals had never experienced the reality of life under Communist regimes also meant that their faith was resilient enough to last beyond the end of the Cold War. Thus, there is the irony that, while most of the citizens of ex-Communist countries have readily abandoned their Communist ideology, a similar ideology is still embraced by some present-day Westerners.

In the 1960s the New Left’s ideological opposition to the US system was openly displayed on the streets. In the 1970s and beyond it reverted to more Stalinist techniques, using organisations operating within the democratic system to work against US interests.¹⁴⁶ While Communist theory had only held currency in a fraction of the pre-1960s peace movement, by the 1970s the legacy of the New Left had created an anti-Capitalist and anti-Western peace movement core. However, Socialist goals were downplayed in favour of professed concerns about human rights and nuclear weapons. Radicals in the peace movement realised that open displays of anti-Americanism might merely alienate the general public. Hence, it was better to focus attention on a single issue with which the public was concerned rather than to try to and sell the public the whole radical agenda.

¹⁴⁶ Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts about the Sixties*, New York, 1989, p. 161.

Such deception was actually aided by the excesses that had occurred during US Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-Communist crusade from 1950 to 1954. His tendency to label anyone who disagreed with him as a Communist was so unjust that it eventually made it socially unacceptable for people to accuse Communists and Socialists of actually being Communist or Socialist. To do so merely resulted in cries of "McCarthyism" from left-wing radicals. Ironically radicals adopted their own form of McCarthyism by labelling anyone who disagreed with their theories as being "sexist" or "racist".

As a result of factionalism, the government reaction to its militancy, the winding-down of the Vietnam War, and the lack of off-campus allies, the US New Left had ceased to exist as an identifiable movement by the early 1970s. Confrontation had only paid dividends on campus, and the US working class proved indifferent or hostile to the New Left's message, leaving it as a revolutionary vanguard without a proletariat. When revolution failed to occur, the New Left faded away. Although the movement was dead, it had fostered particularly radical brands of feminism, multiculturalism, environmentalism and peace activism. Each of these causes was influenced by the Marxist and anti-US bent of the late New Left, and each continued to follow its own particular grievance. Ex-New Leftists, in both the US and NZ, moved on into careers in universities and politics. Liberalism also moved further to the Left (at least regarding Third World Communists and domestic social issues) as a result of New Left ideology. Post-1960s liberals adopted much of the thinking of the New Left, if not to the same extent as radicals.¹⁴⁷ (From this point onward, references to "liberals" or "radicals" in the text will refer to leftists influenced by New Left ideology. Right-wing radicals will be differentiated as such.)

In particular, the New Left lived on in the post-1960s Academic Left, which applied European post-structuralist theories about power to explain, mainly

¹⁴⁷ Liberalism's shift to the Left has been addressed by such writers as Adam Garfinkle, *Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement*, New York, 1997; and Joseph G. Morgan, *The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975*, Chapel Hill, 1997.

to itself, the New Left's failure on the streets. Post-structuralism argued that power was systematically omnipresent, rather than simply being exercised by government agencies. People could be controlled without an obvious oppressor, due to their perceptions and subconscious compliance with the dominant values.¹⁴⁸ Antonio Gramsci maintained that the “hegemony” exercised by the ruling class was more cultural and ideological than it was economic or political, and that it relied on the consent of the ruled, or a psychological deference toward the elite's attitudes.¹⁴⁹ The dominant cultural authority could be undermined from the top down, by intellectuals rather than workers.

Modernism, based on the values of the European Enlightenment, put its faith in rationality, science and universal values. However, American post-modernists believed that this approach was sexist, racist and Eurocentric, and preferred the idea of value relativity. Multi-culturalism, drawing on post-modernism, attempted to put more emphasis on non-Western cultures and values. In its extreme form, it also involved vitriolic attacks on Western culture and history. Ironically many traditional liberal ideas, such as the concepts of free speech, democracy and human rights, had been derived from the European Enlightenment. In addition, the New Left's cry of “value relativity” does not seem to apply to its own beliefs, which are often defended as absolute truths.

In the 1970s post-modernism became intimately linked to post-structuralism, initially through the theories of Jacques Derrida, who claimed that language could be used to oppress, and who advocated the “deconstruction” of texts to find examples of racist and sexist language which could shape the way people thought and acted.¹⁵⁰ In the 1980s more emphasis was given to Michel

¹⁴⁸ Diggins, *The Rise and Fall of the American Left*, p. 352.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 345.

Theories on the oppressive role of language eventually resulted in campus speech codes, under broadly worded anti-harassment regulations. In a far cry from the New Left's early campaigns for free speech on campus, the Academic Left had adopted its own form of censorship.

Foucault's theories on the nature of power.¹⁵⁰ Foucault maintained that truth itself was a product of power, and that there was a constant struggle between truth regimes (the dominant truth, backed by the elite in control of education and the media), and truth systems (alternative truths advocated by social movements). In a similar vein, Alain Touraine argued that all social relations were relations of power; Historicity, or a society's capacity to produce the models by which it functioned,¹⁵¹ could be controlled by an elite. Those groups which lacked access to production of historicity would have their values ignored. In this light, some peace activists view the efforts of the modern peace movement as part of a struggle for control of historicity,¹⁵² with nuclearism being the truth regime, and anti-nuclearism as the rival truth system.

The above theories suited the Academic Left quite well, as they served to explain why the masses had not risen behind the New Left in the 1960s. The New Left's failure had been due to the "false consciousness" of the masses. The Academic Left thus became preoccupied with searching for hidden means of power and control used by the elite, even as it became an elite in its own right. Radicals, now employed by the educational institutions they had once accused of acting on behalf of a power elite, sought to impose their own truths and values on society through the universities. As a Marxist world view lay at the base of the above theories, Marxism gained hegemony among 1960s generation scholars, and the attack on Western culture has persisted in US (and NZ) universities to this day. "At present New Left veterans are tenured professors within the system and now have the means of expounding their ideas to a captive college audience. The New Left is an idea whose time has passed and whose power has come".¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Hans Bertens, *The Idea of the Postmodern: A History*, New York, 1995, pp. 6-8.

¹⁵¹ Eleanor N. Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace: Case studies of 'Nuclearism', 'Nuclear Allergy' and 'the Kiwi Disease'*, Ann Arbor, 1990, p. 32.

¹⁵² Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 33.

¹⁵³ Diggins, *The Rise and Fall of the American Left*, p. 298.

Pacifists become Radicals

While it professed pacifist leanings, the New Left was actually dominated by anti-imperialism. While opposed to the war machine of the West, New Leftists also demonstrated a tendency to overlook Communist violence. The latter was seen as being unavoidable in the face of extreme Capitalist oppression. The rise of radical activists in the peace movement's core upset the old balance between pacifists and anti-imperialists. By weight of numbers and fanaticism, anti-imperialists pushed pacifists into the background. Even the older pacifist peace organisations were not immune to the trend, and they too were transformed during the 1960s. However, despite the marginalisation of pacifists, their beliefs were still paraded as the supposed ideals of the peace movement. Some examples of the changes in US peace organisations are included here, as they may help to explain changes within the NZ peace movement.

In the 1930s and 1940s pacifists were sceptical about co-operating with Communist-backed peace organisations, but the anti-war demonstrations of the 1960s resulted in the formation of a "United Front" against the Vietnam War. The principle of "non-exclusion", which allowed any anti-war organisation to take part in combined demonstrations, enabled Communist organisations to influence the direction and rhetoric of protests and to mute criticism of Marxist-Leninist regimes. One of the Communist Party's favourite subversion tactics involved the influencing of peace groups with which it co-operated. The introduction by the anti-war movement of the non-exclusion principle in the second half of the 1960s proved helpful to this end. While unsuccessful in their attempt to bring the peace movement under direct Communist Party control, the Communists were able to get much of their philosophy accepted by the peace movement through the medium of the New Left. The New Left initially may have been wary of Stalinism, but this did not prevent its adoption of the Soviet view of US foreign policy.

Pacifist organisations such as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) had established long-standing and honourable records of humanitarian concerns and principled pacifism. However, by the early 1970s all three were acting as apologists for Communist repression.¹⁵⁴ Before the 1960s pacifists had already adopted some of the views of Socialists, maintaining that economic and social justice was a necessary prerequisite for peace. Nonetheless, most pacifists were still opposed to all forms of violence, whether it was carried out by oppressive regimes or their victims. The conflict between the pacifists' desire to liberate the oppressed and their commitment to non-violent forms of resistance was to come to a head in the 1960s. It can be argued that it was the latter principle which was compromised.

In the 1920s and 1930s the FOR, founded in 1914 by socialist-inclined Christian pacifists and anti-militaristic Socialists, was already struggling with the dilemma of how to overthrow the Capitalist system without using physical violence. In 1933 the FOR experienced a schism over the role of violence in class conflict. Pacifists who had embraced socialism were finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile the aims of the two philosophies. The Protestant Minister J.B Matthews believed that coercion might be necessary for social change; and after he became chairman of the Communist-front American League against War and Fascism (ALAWF) in 1933, he was fired from the FOR, which had voted that same year to avoid co-operation with the Communist Party and to promote non-violence in the class-war.¹⁵⁵ In 1946 the FOR warned against the United Front tactics of the Communists, claiming that pacifists should avoid working with those whose pacifism ebbed and flowed with the tide of world events. Pacifists were courted by the Communist Party whenever its leaders felt anti-war sentiment in the US might advance the aims of Soviet foreign policy, but the former soon

¹⁵⁴ Guenter Lewy, *Peace and Revolution: The Moral Crisis of American Pacifism*, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988, pp. vii-ix.

¹⁵⁵ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p. 6.

learnt that working in organisations which contained Communists was an exercise in futility. If the Communist Party successfully “captured” a peace organisation, and this in turn became public knowledge, recruitment for the organisation became impossible.¹⁵⁶ In the 1940s the FOR was also sceptical of the Communist argument that any criticism of the Soviet Union and its allies only helped to fuel the Cold War.

In the 1950s the FOR was suspicious of the World Peace Council, which since its formation in 1950 had promoted the foreign policy of the USSR. The WPC sought links with the US peace movement, but the FOR replied that a true peace movement spoke to its government rather than for it. In 1963 Alfred Hassler, editor of the FOR’s newspaper Fellowship, successfully opposed the suggested inclusion of WPC observers in the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace. According to Hassler, McCarthyism had so revolted some Americans that they had overreacted by believing everything the Communists said. As a result a form of anti-anti-communism had emerged in the US peace movement, making it susceptible to Communist influence. Since the US Government was excessively anti-Communist, many peace activists had decided that Communists should therefore be included in peace movement activities.¹⁵⁷

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom had also rejected compromising its principles of non-violence prior to the 1960s. Formed in 1915 from the International Congress of Women, the WILPF, with its headquarters in Geneva, had long supported social and economic justice. For example, the NZ section of WILPF had promoted international disarmament, child welfare and opposition to CMT. In the 1930s it also took stands against the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and the Japanese invasion of China, and in 1939 it demanded that NZ stop exporting scrap metal to Japan.¹⁵⁸ The NZ

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁵⁷ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p.13.

¹⁵⁸ Betty Holt, *Women for Peace and Freedom: A History of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in New Zealand*, Wellington, 1985, p. 15-18.

WILPF had its share of Socialist just war advocates who were willing to fight fascism; accordingly, WILPF membership shrank dramatically during World War II, not reviving until after 1955.

In the US section of the WILPF, as in the FOR, there were divisions over the use of non-violence in the pursuit of social justice. In 1934 the French and German sections of WILPF tried to change the organisation's constitution, resulting in a compromise statement of aims which survived until 1959. This supported universal disarmament, an end to violence as a method of conflict resolution, and the use of non-violent methods to hasten social change. However, the US section of WILPF worked with the ALAWF until 1937, when it withdrew in disgust at the way the Communists conducted meetings. The WILPF protested against the formation of NATO and the Korean War, even though it was still opposed to totalitarianism and did not co-operate with the WPC.¹⁵⁹

The AFSC was an organisation founded by the Quakers in 1917 to help conscientious objectors. In 1933 it ruled out co-operation with the Communist Party, as the latter promoted the violent overthrow of capitalism. Like the FOR and the WILPF, AFSC pacifists opposed any American involvement in World War II, claiming that war only spread totalitarianism. However, while they did not back the war effort, US pacifists did not try to stop it or cause an American defeat, for they regarded such action as an undemocratic obstruction of the war efforts of other citizens.

In the late 1950s some pacifists began to deride the US notion of democracy, increasingly seeing the US as a "status quo" power which was ignoring the revolutionary forces of anti-colonialism which were sweeping the Third World. The views of such writers like Sidney Lens, who actually blamed the US for human rights abuses perpetrated by Communists, started to spread throughout the pacifist community with the emergence of the New Left in the

¹⁵⁹ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, pp. 16-17.

early 1960s.¹⁶⁰ Socialist just war advocacy was starting to make headway amongst pacifists. Radical pacifists were also to find that boomers, who had experienced McCarthyism but not the Machiavellian tactics of American Communists during the 1930s, were anti-anti-Communist and thus ripe for recruitment.

In 1965 the AFSC called for a cease-fire in Vietnam, but some of its members also sought a critical stand against US foreign policy. Russell Johnson admitted that pacifists should encourage non-violent solutions, but he claimed that the “violence of the status quo” should also be considered. Russell thus drew a distinction between the violence of the Viet Cong and the violence of the US Government, and he sanctioned the ends of the former. This raised the interesting question of how pacifists could show support for a revolution which was using violent means to attain its ends. The AFSC’s compromise was to help the revolutionaries non-violently by working for a US withdrawal from South Vietnam.

The AFSC adopted this position after prodding from several of its regional offices and the Peace Education staff at the national office in Philadelphia. By the early 1960s most of the AFSC’s bureaucracy was non-Quaker, and many of the staff were pro-NLF radicals. The AFSC’s leadership actually lagged behind their thinking, and in 1966 it was still calling for a negotiated settlement and the withdrawal of all outside forces. In contrast, radical staff wanted an unconditional US withdrawal, the course of action which would be most helpful to the NLF’s cause. The AFSC officially adopted the radicals’ position in 1970.¹⁶¹ Supporters of the NLF believed it was a genuine Southern nationalist movement rather than just a convenient front for the Northern Communists. Many Viet Cong may have been nationalists, but the North Vietnamese Government was also prepared to dispense with the NLF once it had outlived its usefulness. The Viet Cong were decimated during their Tet offensive in 1968, and it is probable that they were

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.23.

¹⁶¹ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p. 45

ordered to their deaths by Hanoi, as a means to aid the NLF's rapid dissolution after North Vietnam had won the war. After the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) captured Saigon in 1975, the NLF ceased to exist.

Whereas the peace movement had respected the democratic process in World War II, some 1960s peace activists were actively out to stop the Vietnam War by any means possible. On the whole, protest marches could be seen as part of the democratic process. Unfortunately, when such marches resulted in a militant minority turning to more violent forms of "direct action", such as obstruction, vandalism and rock-throwing, democracy suffered. In the search for anti-war allies, pacifists co-operated with Communist-influenced organisations supportive of revolutionary violence; hence in 1966 the AFSC adopted the principle of non-exclusion. Some members of the AFSC were uneasy about marching alongside people waving Viet Cong flags. However, once non-exclusion was accepted, pacifists found that they could not control the behaviour of violent elements within the multi-organisational demonstrations.¹⁶²

As the anti-war movement became more violence prone, and as hatred of US-style democracy became more pronounced, radical peace movement meetings began to resemble old-style Communist Party meetings. In theory this involved reaching decisions by consensus, but in practice "natural leaders" and the more strident elements at the meetings tended to steamroll opposition.¹⁶³ Emotionalism, invective, contempt for rational discussion and the howling-down of nay-sayers soon saw pacifists overridden. In 1968 the AFSC itself adopted Sid Lens' view that, as the US system was not responding to peace movement demands, it was time to talk about a revolution. Such a position was to strain relations between the AFSC and the Society of Friends, as the latter held more firmly to Quaker beliefs.

¹⁶² Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, pp. 31-35.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 35.

Radicals in the peace movement had decided that, if they were unable to get their way democratically, they were justified in challenging the state by direct action. Such an attitude is in essence a direct challenge to the pluralistic notion of democracy whereby competing interests accept the results of the democratic process, or lobby for change within it. Some radicals in effect espoused the Marxist-Leninist view that Western democracy was actually inferior to the “participatory democracy” of the Communist world and was therefore not worthy of respect.¹⁶⁴

In organising the 1969 New Mobilisation to End the War (New Mobe), the AFSC was ready to co-operate actively with the Communist Party, although some members were worried about the New Mobe’s slogans. They saw the war as a mistake rather than as a capitalist conspiracy to dominate Asia economically. After the New Mobe dissolved in the spring of 1970, new umbrella groups arose which tried to link the war to other New Left issues such as the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice. “Peace and justice”, which was to become a radical catch-cry, was a code phrase for the view that peace and justice were intimately related and that white, patriarchal capitalism was an obstacle to both. While some in the AFSC believed that the NLF deserved to win in South Vietnam, others believed that pacifists should not rank justice ahead of peace, as radicals were prepared to do.

When the NVA offensive of 1972 was met by renewed US bombing, the AFSC condemned only the latter, claiming that it couldn’t condemn the violence of those who had suffered injustice. It also pointed out that Americans were not qualified to preach non-violence to people who were suffering from violence perpetrated by the US. The AFSC sought to deny US aid to governments faced with revolutionary violence. Consequently, from 1973 to 1975 it attempted to cut off US aid to South Vietnam, which was fighting the war by itself after all US forces withdrew in January of 1973. In 1973 the new Coalition to Stop Funding

¹⁶⁴ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, pp. 202-203.

the War, which included SANE, the FOR, the AFSC and the WILPF, focused on the crimes of the Southern regime while playing down those of the North. The Indochina and Vietnam Resource Centres were essentially propaganda agencies for Hanoi, because they regarded their function as one of placating Americans' fears about what would happen if the North won.¹⁶⁵ Their logic was that decreasing US aid to the South would reduce the need for violence by the North.

By the 1970s the AFSC was no longer pacifist in the traditional sense. It had radicalised, and it saw the US as the root of the world's problems, US foreign policy being based on the "myth" of the Soviet threat and a hunger for profit. Third World Communist revolutions and regimes were idealised, and their human rights abuses were either denied or defended as being a consequence of US hostility. This process was repeated in both the FOR and the WILPF.

In 1964 the FOR was cautious regarding US involvement in South Vietnam, having grave reservations about an unconditional US pullout. Alfred Hassler, editor of the FOR's Fellowship newspaper, warned the SDS in 1965 against becoming pro-Communist, but his advice went unheeded. In 1968 Hassler claimed to see two strands in the peace movement. The first was the "Apocalyptic", Old and New Left militant pacifists who saw the Vietnam War as an inevitable product of US capitalism. The second was the "evolutionists", liberals who saw the Vietnam War as a mistake, yet did not attribute it to any flaw in US Capitalist democracy. Hassler feared that the Apocalyptic had rejected obsessive anti-communism only to replace it with obsessive anti-Americanism. Unlike previous conscientious objectors, they went beyond protest action to sabotage the Vietnam War effort, assuming that their moral superiority gave them the right to impose their minority will on the majority.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, pp. 51-55.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 59-60.

Those supportive of an immediate US pullout decided that direct action was required against a government which had refused to accede to their demands. Despite the peace movement's broad definition of state violence, it maintained that peace movement direct action, such as burning draft cards or the 1971 attempt by the May Day Tribe to shut down Washington DC, could still be classified as "non-violent". However, direct action which involved the obstruction of the activity of others, whatever the level of moral self-righteousness involved, could actually be considered a form of violence. This notion was never accepted by some radicals, who still believe that such protests represent true democracy in action.

However, others in the FOR were not as critical of the New Left as Hassler. The FOR eventually shifted to demanding an unconditional US withdrawal, joined the New Mobe, accepted active resistance to the US government and tried to stop aid to South Vietnam. Hassler was demoted from his position as Executive Secretary of the FOR in 1971. In 1972 the FOR adopted shrill New Left rhetoric in its National Council statement. Those who postulated that the origins of war lay within the US system believed that war would continue to exist in the world until the US system had been overthrown. They supported an unconditional US withdrawal from South Vietnam in the hope that such an obvious defeat would provide a fatal blow to the US system.

Having advocated negotiations in 1965, the US section of the WILPF, like the FOR and AFSC, also moved toward radicalism. On the last day of the 1965 annual meeting, after many delegates had left, a motion was put to enable WILPF participation in all peace conferences, including those backed by the Communist Party. In 1966 this view prevailed despite the reservations of some members. The rise of New Left ideology within the WILPF was accompanied by the resignation of executive director Jo Graham, who in 1967 warned that a small, vocal clique had pushed for WILPF co-operation with Communists in order to further their own extremist aims. Graham added that, since the WILPF was now controlled by

such radicals, “To promote the WILPF on the basis of its *unimpeachable* past record was to mislead innocent and sincere people.”¹⁶⁷

In other words, to fend off criticism of WILPF positions on the Vietnam War by pointing to its pre-1960s record of pacifism was simple deceit. In 1968 the WILPF discussed Graham’s charges and denied that WILPF was acting contrary to its founding principles. By 1969 the WILPF was openly supporting “non-violent” civil disobedience, and by 1970 it had adopted the full radical critique of the US, along with excuses for the violence of the oppressed. Many self-professed “pacifists” were now more concerned with ensuring a US defeat than they were with ending the killing.¹⁶⁸ At the 1970 annual meeting there were panels on US imperialism, racism, and women’s liberation; and the Caucus for Radical Economic Change urged that the WILPF work against the Capitalist system. In 1975 the WILPF and other peace movement organisations celebrated North Vietnam’s victory. The US peace movement had adopted the “just war” view.

The NZ peace movement was going through a similar transformation. In 1966 the Auckland branch of the NZ WILPF adopted as its theme for the year “The US and its Foreign Policy”, and its analysis was not favourable. In 1968 two visiting members of the Soviet Women’s Committee were welcomed in NZ. The first NZ “Mobe” occurred in 1970, with the new organisation, the Socialist Action League, helping to pass on direct action techniques learnt in the US. In 1971 an anti-war conference was held to organise the next Mobe, and it invited two visiting Americans to help instruct NZers on the best ways to protest against US policy. That same year the NZ WILPF participated in a “fact-finding” mission to North and South Vietnam, and assistance was sent to the Hanoi Maternal and Child Health Care Centre. The last Mobe in July 1972, demanded the unconditional withdrawal of US and allied forces from South Vietnam.¹⁶⁹ After

¹⁶⁷ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p.82.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 82-85.

¹⁶⁹ Locke, *Peace People*, p. 244.

NZ withdrew its troops in late 1972, the NZ peace movement emulated its American counterpart by supporting the NLF's peace proposals and highlighting human rights abuses by the South Vietnamese Government.¹⁷⁰

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 247-249.

CHAPTER THREE: THE MODERN PEACE MOVEMENT

They seek to raise fear and alarm, to play on honest doubts and ignorance; to induce emotional, irrational responses. Their real purpose is to have this country cut its defence links with the United States and Australia.

Robert Muldoon on peace activists, 1976.¹⁷¹

After the North Vietnamese victory of 1975, the US peace movement turned its attention to protecting the new Vietnamese state from Western criticism of its human rights abuses. In 1976 the AFSC backed a petition for sending aid to Vietnam, and opposed an appeal to the Vietnamese government, penned by Richard Neuhaus and Jim Forest, to stop its mistreatment of dissenters. The AFSC labelled any criticism of the record of the new Communist regime as CIA-inspired, and despite its traditional commitment to the defence of political prisoners, it made excuses for the need of the Vietnamese regime to suppress “pro-US” elements. The Quaker Kenneth E. Boulding was concerned that the AFSC was no longer politically impartial regarding the issue of human suffering, and in 1977 he conducted his own silent vigil outside the AFSC’s Philadelphia office. John P. Powelson also charged that the AFSC had adopted a secular ideology that excused Communist human rights abuses.¹⁷²

Peace activists were eager for further defeats of US imperialism, as they believed that the demise of capitalism was the main prerequisite for world peace. To this end it was considered desirable to support Communist regimes elsewhere in the Third World. Since 1975 the AFSC had taken a positive view of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, dismissing refugees’ reports of massacres as US

¹⁷¹ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 86.

¹⁷² Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p. 127.

propaganda. It was only after Vietnam had invaded Cambodia in December 1978 that the AFSC formally acknowledged the atrocities of Pol Pot, although it tempered this admission by blaming the killing on the US's isolation of the Khmer Rouge.

US pacifist organisations also shared the New Left's romantic attachment to Cuba. By the late 1960s the AFSC, WILPF and FOR were full of praise for the Cuban revolution. Any reservations they might have held about the militaristic bent of Cuba's "new society" were assuaged by blaming US sanctions and hostility. The US peace movement also supported the Nicaraguan Sandanistas, the Marxist-Leninist rebels in El Salvador, and opposed the 1983 US invasion of Grenada which toppled a newly imposed communist regime. Overall, the peace movement attempted to block US aid to the opponents of Communist regimes and guerrillas while at the same time denying or playing down the existence of Soviet aid to the Communist factions. Preventing US aid to Third World opponents of communism was seen as a path to peace and justice.¹⁷³

The peace movement's defence of communism was accompanied by attempts to play down the extent of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the Western world, and by claims that Western hostility toward the Soviets was responsible for the totalitarian nature of the Soviet system. Supporting this perspective was the naïve assumption that the USSR shared the West's values and goals, and that it would therefore respond to Western disarmament measures in good faith. Claiming that the USSR's actions were merely defensive also enabled the peace movement to push for unilateral Western nuclear disarmament measures, on the basis that these could be carried out at little risk to the West. This supposition was based on the usual left-wing denial of the real nature of Soviet totalitarianism and of its offensive military doctrine. But Soviet military doctrine suggested that the Kremlin perceived the situation quite differently. *Mir*, the Russian word for peace, means "triumph of socialism", rather than "an

¹⁷³ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, pp. 146-151.

absence of conflict".¹⁷⁴ While they stalled over verification issues in multi-lateral arms control talks, the Soviets had only to wait for Western peace movements to pressure their respective governments into making unilateral concessions. Every Western concession in turn would help to alter the correlation of forces in communism's favour.

Of the main US pacifist organisations, the WILPF was to become the most pro-Soviet. While both the Old and the New Left admired Communist revolutions and saw the US as the main threat to world peace, the New Left tended to be less enthusiastic about Soviet-style communism than its Old Left counterpart. New Leftists were convinced that Third World Communist governments were "different" from the Soviet Union. However, by the late 1970s the WILPF had gone beyond this position. It praised the USSR's "participatory democracy", worked closely with the WPC, and even made excuses for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.¹⁷⁵ The US WILPF denied its pro-Soviet bias, and claimed that its organisation represented a wide diversity of viewpoints. Unfortunately, actual diversity tended to decrease over time as critics of the prevailing orthodoxy left the WILPF.

A New Cause.

By late 1979, the issue of nuclear weapons deployment became a major peace movement focus. The US had previously relied on conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons based in Western Europe to deter a Soviet invasion of its NATO allies. As a result, any Soviet conventional invasion risked first use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO forces to counter the Warsaw Pact's conventional numerical superiority. It was assumed that the Soviets would then respond in kind. Once both sides were using tactical weapons in Europe, the risk of escalation to a strategic nuclear weapon exchange between the US and USSR

¹⁷⁴ Werner Kaltefleiter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States*, Kent, 1985, p. 182.

¹⁷⁵ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p. 212; plus see Kaltefleiter and Pfaltzgraff, *The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States*, p. 175.

was much higher. The presence of 300,000 US troops on the ground and thousands of tactical nuclear weapons raised the prospect of escalation to the strategic level and a horrendous thermonuclear world war.

If there had been no tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe, there would have been no clear path of escalation from NATO's conventional forces to the US strategic arsenal. Extended deterrence was designed to avoid a situation in which the Soviets could deploy their superior conventional forces without risking a thermonuclear world war.¹⁷⁶ The Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate range missiles in Eastern Europe, beginning in 1977, threatened to undermine extended deterrence,¹⁷⁷ and it also gave the Soviets additional psychological leverage over the US's NATO allies. The SS-20 was a weapon that could eliminate Western European targets in a matter of a few minutes, allowing the Soviets to rapidly destroy their NATO opposition. This put the US back in the position of consciously having to decide whether or not to escalate to the strategic level.

The US also feared that the very existence of the SS-20s hanging over Western Europe's head would encourage its NATO allies to make their separate peace with the USSR on the assumption that, if the US was incapable either of deterring a conventional Soviet attack or responding to a nuclear attack on Western Europe, it was better to opt out of NATO altogether. The 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) between the superpowers and negotiations for SALT II also reinforced Western European concerns that the US was reaching its own accommodation with the Soviets.¹⁷⁸ Given strategic parity between the US and USSR, the US might be inclined to abandon Western Europe in a crisis. West Germany, fearing that public pressure to leave NATO would result from the SS-

¹⁷⁶ Ramesh Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand; Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age*, Wellington, 1984, pp. 19-21.

¹⁷⁷ Lewis Fretz, "The INF Treaty: Reagan's Triumph", in *New Zealand International Review*, March/April 1988, pp. 20-23.

¹⁷⁸ Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*, New York, 1986, p. 217.

20 deployment, asked the US to balance or neutralise the SS-20s with its Cruise and Pershing II intermediate-range missiles and thereby counter the psychological impact of the Soviet missiles. Unfortunately, such a deployment would only fuel the arms race at a time when the US was seeking arms control agreements to counter peace movement pressure in the West.

As a result, in December 1979 the US and its NATO partners decided to follow a “dual track” course. The first track was to plan for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in 1983. The second track was to seek an arms control agreement before that date. If the Soviets removed their SS-20s from Eastern Europe before 1983, the US would not deploy its Cruise and Pershing II missiles.¹⁷⁹ This was called the Double Zero Option. If the SS-20s were removed, NATO could be preserved without an escalation in the arms race. The Soviets, on the other hand, realised that, if they could prevent the Cruise and Pershing II deployment, the West would have no bargaining chips with which to demand the removal of the SS-20s.¹⁸⁰ The unmatched SS-20s would also allow for continued Soviet intimidation of the NATO countries.

The one force in the West which had the power to block the US deployment was the peace movement. The Nuclear Freeze movement started immediately after the 1979 Dual-track decision.¹⁸¹ Terry Provance of the AFSC promoted a unilateral US freeze on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Instead, in 1980 the AFSC endorsed Randall Forsberg’s idea of a bilateral US-Soviet freeze. Either option would have left the Soviets with a monopoly on intermediate range missiles in Europe. The freeze concept proved attractive to many people because it seemed to offer a simple solution to the arms race. However, the support of the US Communist Party for the Nuclear Freeze

¹⁷⁹ Ralph B. Levering, *The Cold War, 1945-1987*, Arlington Heights, Illinois, 1988, p. 164.

¹⁸⁰ Fretz, “The INF Treaty”, p. 22.

¹⁸¹ Chatfield, *The American Peace Movement*, p. 150.

campaign, when added radicals' dismissals of the need for any immediate Soviet reciprocity, helped to limit public support for a freeze.

From 1979 to 1983 the peace movements in Britain and much of Western Europe also carried out a powerful campaign against the proposed 1983 deployment. By exploiting the public's legitimate fear of nuclear war and by demonising the actual weapons systems the US intended to deploy, the peace movement was able to mobilise massive demonstrations (hundreds of thousands strong) in some Western European cities, particularly in Britain and West Germany. One of the smaller but most famous of these protests was the women's camp outside the Greenham Common US military base, a destination for Cruise missile deployment in Britain. Vigils had taken place outside the base before a permanent camp was established in March 1982.

Despite peace movement efforts, NATO governments held firm, and the 1983 deployment went ahead as planned. The Nuclear Freeze campaign petered out soon after.¹⁸² Four years later the Soviets agreed to the destruction of all short range and intermediate range missiles in the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The SS-20s, the US Cruise and Pershing II missiles, and other missiles were actually destroyed; and both sides agreed to on-site verification of the missiles' destruction. This would not have been possible if the peace movement had succeeded in its anti-“Euromissile” campaign. Without the presence of Cruise and Pershing II missiles, the Soviets would have had no incentive to remove their SS-20s, and it is possible that NATO might have collapsed as a result. The Cold War might have been extended, or might even have ended in a stalemate which favoured the Soviets. In the early 1980s the West may have come close to losing the Cold War, largely thanks to the efforts of the Western peace movement. Ironically, the peace movement in Western Europe provided inspiration for the NZ peace movement. In particular, the example of

¹⁸² Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p. 189-191.

the “Women of Greenham Common” encouraged many NZ women to join their local anti-nuclear group.

The Modern NZ Peace Movement

The NZ peace movement reflected what was occurring in its US and Western European counterparts, from supporting Latin American “independence struggles”¹⁸³ to calling for Western unilateral nuclear disarmament; but it also had its own specific NZ causes. Whereas the main priorities of the US peace movement were to hamstring US attempts at military intervention around the globe and to push for US nuclear disarmament, NZ’s peace activists were more concerned with the actual US military presence in and around NZ, and the French nuclear presence in the South Pacific. Radicals’ attacks on ANZUS co-operation gained momentum with the formation in 1972 of the Values Party, which itself was an indication that the New Left’s post-materialist values were filtering into the NZ political mainstream.

Nicky Hager has maintained that the anti-nuclear movement’s opposition to ANZUS was not ideological, and that many activists were anti-nuclear before they turned against ANZUS.¹⁸⁴ He also argued that they only opposed ANZUS because it was seen as preventing independent action on nuclear disarmament by NZ. However, ideology had played a part in activists’ insistence on unilateral disarmament measures, and it is likely that ideology was also behind the belief that it was ANZUS, and not the NZ Government’s own reservations about the wisdom of unilateralism, that prevented NZ from following the advice of anti-nuclear activists.

NZ’s long-running objection to foreign intrusion into its South Pacific neighbourhood continued to give the peace movement a tool with which to stoke

¹⁸³ For examples of such views see Keith Leonard, “The US in Latin America”, *Peacelink*, November-December 1983; Viv Nelson and David Jackson, “Central America- Peace and Justice”, *Peacelink*, June 1985; Janet Bruin, “US Support For Terrorists”, *Peacelink*, September 1986.

¹⁸⁴ Hager, telephone conversation, October 22, 1998.

anti-nuclearism amongst the NZ public. The public's anti-nuclearism, which resulted from both nationalism and fears about fallout, could be utilised by those in the peace movement who were pursuing their own ideological goals. From 1972 to 1975 the peace movement's efforts against French nuclear testing at Mururoa were aided by the presence of a Labour Government more receptive than the previous National Government to the idea of direct action protest. The anti-nuclear efforts of the Third Labour Government will be addressed in chapter six.

Anger at the impudence of the French in exploding nuclear weapons in NZ's "back-yard" later helped peace movement efforts against American nuclear warships visits, which resumed under the 1975-1984 National Government. In the meantime, other forms of American military presence received peace movement attention. Targets for action included any US facilities in NZ which might have a military application. The first campaign against such facilities was the 1968 protest over the proposed US Omega low frequency naval transmitter in the Southern Alps. The protesters argued that NZers did not have any say about the desirability of such bases before the government agreed to them, that Omega might become a nuclear target, and that NZ had an "international obligation not to harbour any portion of the American military machine."¹⁸⁵

After the USN's Omega plans were announced in June 1968, a movement started at Canterbury University, centred around the student newspaper Canta and encouraged by several academics. Moderate students wrote to the Prime Minister and planned a "respectable" demonstration, while radicals pushed for more militant direct action. The government tried to fudge the issue of Omega's military applications, but it was standing on shaky ground. Omega's military applications were obvious. However, despite the protesters' success in pointing out Omega's military role, they did not answer convincingly the question of how

¹⁸⁵ Owen Wilkes, *Protest : Demonstrations Against the American Military Presence in New Zealand. Omega 1968, Woodbourne 1970, Mount John 1972, Harewood/Weedons 1973*, Wellington, 1973, p. 6.

the disruption of US naval communications would foster world peace. The reason for the peace movement's aversion to US Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence facilities in NZ seems to have been that these aided the US in its Cold War efforts, although the secrecy surrounding such installations was also seen as a cause for protest.¹⁸⁶

The uproar forced the US to change its plans in 1969 and to decide on an Australian site, although this decision was not immediately made public. In May 1973 the Australian peace movement asked Owen Wilkes for advice on how to protest against Omega in Australia, and eleven members of the Campaign Against Foreign Military Activities in NZ (CAFMANZ), formed as a result of the NZ anti-Omega campaign, also took part in demonstrations against the North West Cape facility in Australia.¹⁸⁷ CAFMANZ later became the Campaign Against Foreign Control in NZ (CAFCINZ), and eventually the Campaign against Foreign Control in Aotearoa (CAFCA).

The debate over Omega helped to spur the anti-Vietnam War movement and anti-nuclearism. Owen Wilkes claimed that the Omega upheaval had occurred because "this was the first time New Zealanders were faced with a direct, immediate, unpleasant consequence of alliance with America."¹⁸⁸ In other words, when faced with the possibility of becoming a target, NZers had second thoughts about sharing the risks of collective security. Thus, the issue of "national safety" was the focus of the general public, rather than a drive for global disarmament per se.¹⁸⁹

Another focus for protest was the US presence at the RNZAF base at Woodbourne near Blenheim. Secrecy about the nature of the US presence inspired NZ student activists to investigate. In 1967 students claimed that it might

¹⁸⁶ Wilkes interview, August 10, 1998.

¹⁸⁷ Locke, *Peace People*, p. 281-283.

¹⁸⁸ Wilkes, *Protest*, p.16.

¹⁸⁹ Locke, *Peace People*, p. 264-266.

be related to military satellites and could make the base a nuclear target, once again appealing to the notion of self preservation. In January 1970 the PYM planned a demonstration against the secrecy surrounding the base only to have it pre-empted by an offer of a guided tour. From their observations activists such as Owen Wilkes determined that the base was being used to monitor atmospheric nuclear testing. This was designed to ensure that the Soviets did not break the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, a bilateral US/Soviet agreement to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in the water, and in outer space, but the protesters also alleged that the US was spying on Chinese and French atmospheric tests, in order to gain test data which the US could not obtain for itself due to the LTBT.¹⁹⁰ This notion probably allowed activists to protest against the US's "Longbank" project at Woodbourne, something that aided arms control verification, without feeling guilty about it. The Americans eventually departed when Longbank's surveillance technology became obsolete.

Since 1963 the University of Canterbury had run an observatory on Mt. John. In 1967 the NZ Government asked the University to sub-lease part of Mt. John to the USAF Aerospace Defence Command, which then installed a Baker Nunn satellite-tracking telescope. In 1970 this became another target of left-wing NZ students. Owen Wilkes and Canta editor David Young saw it as their duty to investigate. Despite US claims that the Baker Nunn telescope was merely tracking space-junk in order to aid the space program, the students claimed that Mt. John was being used as part of a network designed to track enemy satellites for possible destruction in wartime.

Apparently, that Mt. John could be used to help the US in wartime was sufficient reason for people to oppose it. As Wilkes put it, "We had now learnt enough about Mount John to know that we didn't want it in New Zealand."¹⁹¹ In March 1972 the PYM held a demonstration which demanded that the University

¹⁹⁰ Wilkes, *Protest*, p.29.

¹⁹¹ Wilkes, *Protest*, p.36.

revoke the lease and displayed placards calling for an end to NZ involvement in the US war machine. Activists clashed with police guarding the facility when they decided to harass the Americans with a night sortie on March 11. The following day activists attempted to block the access road by scattering rocks over a large section of it. It appeared as though a group of about 300 NZers had taken it upon themselves to undermine part of the US defence system, regardless of whether or not the wider NZ public approved. The University of Canterbury revoked the lease; but the land reverted to government hands, and the Americans stayed on under civilian direction until the facility closed in 1983.

Other targets for CAFMANZ activists included the US facilities at the RNZAF base at Weedons and those at Harewood in Christchurch. Since the 1958 US-NZ agreement to co-operate in supplying their bases in Antarctica, the US had developed a military base at Harewood for the logistical support of its Antarctic Research Programme. This logistical effort was known as Operation Deep Freeze. The peace movement suspected that the military was involved for purposes beyond those of supporting civilian research, such as polar warfare training.¹⁹² This was supposedly a breach of the Antarctic Treaty, which prohibited purely military activity on the continent. However, even if the flight crews involved were getting cold-climate experience when they re-supplied the research stations in Antarctica, it is doubtful whether this constituted a breach of the treaty. As the flights were in support of a civilian operation, they could not be classed as "purely military".

The real problem that the peace movement had with such activity was that it required the presence of the US military in NZ; this was repugnant to those radicals who now saw themselves as champions of Third World Communist movements threatened by US military activity. NZ had come a long way since the co-operative atmosphere of World War II. Elsie Locke admitted that the campaign against the US military presence in NZ won support "based largely on

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 50.

an anti-war, anti-American, nationalism platform".¹⁹³ However, anti-Americanism was still defined by the peace movement as meaning resistance to the policies of the US ruling elite, rather than a dislike of American citizens. This conveniently overlooked the fact that the US was a democracy and that opposition to US policy was therefore also a slap in the face to the majority of American citizens.

Harewood was also the support base for the other US activities in NZ which the peace movement opposed, and as a result it contributed to what activists viewed as the US's domination of the Pacific. In addition, Operation Deep Freeze supported USAF MAC flights en-route to Australia which were not related to Antarctic operations, and a Naval Communications Unit with radio receivers at Harewood and transmitters at Weedons. In March 1973 CAFMANZ protested against such activities. In the 1980s, other US and NZ-run facilities came under scrutiny as part of the efforts against ANZUS, campaigns which will be covered in later chapters.

It must be kept in mind that the US facilities in NZ were actually less important, and therefore less likely targets, than those in Australia. Despite this fact, they aroused a higher level of anxiety than did the US bases in Australia because the NZ peace movement kept the NZ public informed about the potential hazards of hosting such facilities. One organisation which helped to maintain public awareness was the NZ Foundation for Peace Studies (NZFPS, est. 1974). The NZFPS was designed to promote public education on peace issues, or, in other words, to help combat the false consciousness of the public. This avowedly non-partisan organisation sponsored radical speakers from overseas, promoted Peace Studies, organised seminars, published books and endorsed the Labour Party's stand on nuclear issues.¹⁹⁴ Any anti-Americanism inherent in radical thought was concealed by NZFPS claims of a non-biased concern for promoting "analytical thinking" about the causes of war. The

¹⁹³ Locke, *Peace People*, p.281.

¹⁹⁴ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 108.

problem was that, for radicals, these causes focused almost exclusively on Western capitalism and the US military establishment.

The peace movement also turned its attention to the environment during the tenure of the Third Labour Government of 1972-1975. With Labour finishing the withdrawal from Vietnam and protesting more vigorously against French nuclear testing at Mururoa, activists searched for new causes. Environmentalism and peace could be linked by pointing out the environmental damage caused by war, or war preparations such as nuclear testing. The “Save Lake Manapouri” campaign of 1969-1970 provided a model for environmentally-based direct action, and the very name of the Canadian “Greenpeace” organisation illustrated the linkage radicals made between the causes of peace and environmentalism.

The environmental strand of the radical Left seemed to have the widest appeal to the general public, as it was apparently politically non-partisan. Nonetheless, radicals also hoped that, if they could raise NZ's environmental consciousness sufficiently, they might also be able to persuade NZers that the best way to keep NZ unspoilt was to opt out of Western capitalism and militarism.¹⁹⁵ In order to gain public support, the NZ peace movement found it more useful to stress the environmental impact of French nuclear testing than to focus purely on anti-militarist arguments. If the public could be won over initially with environmental arguments, there was always time to re-educate them later on the political evils of America's nuclear and conventional arsenals. “Although many peace activists were more concerned about New Zealand's involvement in a nuclear alliance than in the risks of a radiation-related accident, environmental concerns offered a way of engendering public support.”¹⁹⁶

Along with nuclear testing, nuclear-powered warships were the most obvious environmental threat to NZ in peacetime. As a result, in the early 1970s

¹⁹⁵ Michael C. Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence*, Cambridge, 1989, p. 88.

¹⁹⁶ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 345.

the peace movement used environmentalism and the nuclear power issue against US warship visits. As public concern at the time was focused on the possibility of reactor accidents rather than on the presence of nuclear weapons on the ships,¹⁹⁷ this was a necessary tactic. The Labour Government reflected such concerns, and it was considering keeping the nuclear-power ban in place if it won the 1975 election. However, although the public's concern was still focused on nuclear power, the peace movement was already seeking to widen the focus to nuclear weapons. In 1975 the CND and the WILPF asked Bill Rowling to extend the ban to include nuclear weapons-capable warships.¹⁹⁸

Regarding the relationship between ideology and the nuclear ship ban, it has been argued that a moral distaste for the events of the Cold War lay behind most people's efforts for a ban, and not a desire to end ANZUS. It is also claimed that, as the peace movement did not expect the ban to lead to the sudden collapse of ANZUS, an anti-ANZUS ideology could not have been motivating most anti-nuclear activists, nor were they being manipulated by ideologues.¹⁹⁹ However, along with the author's previous statements about the ideological dimension of anti-nuclearism, it is contended here that, even if liberal anti-nuclear activists did not expect the ban to end ANZUS, radicals viewed the ban as the first step in a gradual process of undermining ANZUS co-operation. If radicals were also anti-nuclear, due to the cross-fertilisation process within the peace movement, this did not negate the influence of ideology on their approach to a ship ban.

When Labour lost the 1975 election, the opportunity to widen the existing ban on nuclear powered ships was lost. In February 1976 Muldoon lifted the nuclear-powered ship ban that had existed since 1971, and the National Government also dropped the plans for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) which Labour had taken to the UN in 1975. The advent of the

¹⁹⁷ McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, p. 191.

¹⁹⁸ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, p. 79.

¹⁹⁹ Hager, telephone conversation, October 22, 1998.

Muldoon National Government, with its hearty embrace of the ANZUS Alliance and US nuclear-powered ship visits, merely reactivated peace movement efforts against co-operation with the US military. Ship visits provided a useful focus for direct action protests. Kevin Clements claimed that, by encouraging such visits, National deliberately provoked the peace movement and the Labour Party, thus killing any chance of a bi-partisan defence policy with its “politics of confrontation”.²⁰⁰

However, although the resumption of nuclear ship visits played into the hands of radicals by allowing them to associate ANZUS with nuclear weapons, it is hard to see what else National could have done to try to counter radicals’ efforts to extract NZ from the Western Alliance. To continue the nuclear ship ban might have appeased anti-nuclear activists, yet it would also have intensified NZ’s growing estrangement from its allies. The National Government could have tried harder to defend the rationales behind nuclear deterrence and collective security, yet NZ’s distance from any conventional military threat hampered this task.²⁰¹

The 1980s debate over NZ’s security was not helped by simplistic dismissals of the role of nuclear strategy in the Cold War. For example, David Lange labelled positive attitudes towards nuclear deterrence as “snuggling up to the bomb”.²⁰² Global problems involving Soviet expansion and the need for Western collective security were downplayed, with the emphasis placed on perceived shortcomings in NZ’s foreign policy such as the supposed lack of independence resulting from NZ’s membership in ANZUS. “Calculations of shared interest, of the give and take inherent in the conduct of international relations, were from the beginning largely set aside.”²⁰³ The absence of a co-

²⁰⁰ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 88.

²⁰¹ Wade Lee Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword: Security and Democracy in the Liberal State*, Ann Arbor, 1997, pp. 353-357.

²⁰² McLean, *New Zealand: Isolation and Foreign Policy*, p. 10.

²⁰³ Ibid., p.10.

ordinated response to radicals' attack on collective security and ANZUS may also have been due to the lack of interest in defence studies that has been displayed by the modern NZ academic community.²⁰⁴

From 1976 onwards the peace movement shifted its main emphasis from protesting against US facilities in NZ and French nuclear testing at Mururoa to protesting against US nuclear ship visits to NZ. Existing peace movement arguments against the ANZUS alliance were given fresh impetus by the argument that ANZUS resulted not only in the possibility of nuclear power accidents but also in nuclear weapons being brought into the country. NZ was now a potential nuclear target, and not just a potential site for a nuclear accident. The peace movement's use of environmentalism as a way of courting public support was now being complemented by an appeal to people's instinctive aversion to nuclear weapons. As the most visible form of ANZUS co-operation happened to be visits by US warships which might be carrying nuclear weapons, radicals could now use anti-nuclear public sentiment to undermine ANZUS co-operation. The issue of nuclear weapons became even more salient during the anti-“Euromissile” campaign in Western Europe, and it was exacerbated by global fears in the early 1980s that Ronald Reagan's military build-up might lead to nuclear war. Nuclear winter scenarios boosted the memberships of peace movements everywhere.

As a result of overseas developments, fear, and the legacy of the Vietnam War, the NZ peace movement had developed a particular character by the time of the ANZUS dispute. The peace movement core contained pacifists, anti-nuclear activists, liberals, and radicals, drawn from both the working class and the middle class. The older generation of pacifists was by now a small part of the peace movement, having been overshadowed by the new generation.²⁰⁵ Whereas anti-nuclear activists concentrated on that issue, radicals viewed sexism and racism as central concerns in the pursuit of “positive peace”, or a transformation of the

²⁰⁴ McKinley, *The ANZUS Alliance and New Zealand Labour*, p. 23.

²⁰⁵ Wilkes interview, August 10, 1998.

social order.²⁰⁶ Peace education and consciousness raising were seen as necessary to deal with the false consciousness of the majority of NZers, and to enable them to see the value of the peace movement's alternative truth.

New recruits to the peace movement's periphery tended to be middle class, and female. One researcher of the NZ peace movement argued that feminists, lesbians, young mothers, radical Christians, pacifists, career activists, teachers, social workers, environmentalists, academics, liberal-internationalists and Left-labour supporters were most likely to protest with the peace movement.²⁰⁷ However, many were more concerned with nuclear weapons than they were with the various causes espoused by radical feminists and multi-culturalists in the peace movement's core. Although they probably supported feminism and multi-culturalism to some extent, they were not militant in their approach to those issues, and in this sense they could be called liberal rather than radical.

In effect, the peace movement itself could be described as two movements in one: a liberal anti-nuclear movement with a narrow agenda, and a radical peace movement with a wider agenda, embracing a variety of non-nuclear causes. From this point onward, this text will use the term "peace movement" to include both movements, unless specific reference is being made to the anti-nuclear movement's single-issue focus. Obviously, there were overlaps between the two movements due to a similar world-view, and both agreed on the issues of nuclear testing and nuclear ships, but tensions between them continued to exist as radicals attempted to convince anti-nuclear recruits to adopt various other causes in the name of peace. Core activists also disagreed over the wisdom of a multi-issue agenda. Owen Wilkes preferred to focus on military issues, and he did not want to see the peace movement fragment into different causes, whereas Nicky Hager believed that such diversification would help expand membership.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 308.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 268-269.

²⁰⁸ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 278.

In any event, the anti-nuclear movement attracted the greatest number of recruits. Their concern was with nuclear accidents and the possible nuclear targeting of NZ; concepts of what “nuclear-free” entailed ranged from having no nuclear weapons stationed in NZ to getting out of ANZUS. Despite the radicals’ failure to convince them to continue to work with the peace movement after the nuclear threat had waned, the temporary presence of large numbers of anti-nuclear liberals did provide radicals with a convenient cover in the pursuit of their own agenda, which included opposing “American imperialism”. When they were accused of anti-Americanism, they could simply point to the members of the anti-nuclear movement as evidence that opposition to ANZUS and nuclear ship visits was based on anti-nuclearism. In addition, although fear was a prime motivation for the public’s anti-nuclearism, peace movement activists later insisted that the anti-nuclear movement had acted due to its moral outrage over nuclear weapons,²⁰⁹ which was probably a reflection of activists’ own beliefs more than it was a reflection of the public’s beliefs.

Protest on the Water

One problem for radicals opposed to ANZUS was how to focus the public’s general anti-nuclearism against the ANZUS Alliance. As most of the public did not share radicals’ views of the US, a way was needed to attack ANZUS on nuclear grounds. The resumption of US nuclear ship visits in 1976 provided the answer. If public opinion could be turned against nuclear ships, and if the banning of those ships helped to end defence co-operation with the US, the radicals would have achieved one of their cherished aims. In this respect, the US played into radicals’ hands. The US and Muldoon may have hoped that renewed nuclear ship visits would eventually cure NZers of their “allergy” to things nuclear. However, the reverse effect occurred.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ Nicky Hager, *Defending the Peace Movement’s Anti-Nuclear Stand*, Waikato Times, September 14, 1995, p. 4.

²¹⁰ Wilkes interview, August 10, 1998.

The cornerstone of the anti-nuclear movement's efforts in the 1976-1984 period proved to be the idea of "Peace Squadrons", or water-borne protests against US nuclear powered or nuclear weapons-capable warships. The concept of small boats taking direct action to blockade warships had its inspiration in a Quaker campaign to block a shipment of arms from the US to Pakistan in 1971. The Direct Action Committee of the Friends of East Bengal had tried to prevent the loading of the Pakistani freighter *Padma*. Copying such tactics proved to be a useful public relations tool for the NZ peace movement. The sight of a flotilla of small boats trying to hinder the progress of a hulking grey warship evoked images of David versus Goliath, and made for a great television spectacle. The Peace Squadron could also usefully tap into NZ nationalism by projecting an image of its small boats opposing a foreign "invasion" of NZ waters.

The Reverend Dr George Armstrong of the St John's Theological College in Auckland formed a Peace Squadron in NZ in 1975, as he feared that the Labour Government might lift the nuclear-powered ship ban under US pressure. Armstrong claimed to be motivated by his religious principles to oppose the nuclear "evil" embodied by US nuclear ship visits. However, Armstrong was also a proponent of Liberation Theology, a doctrine which manages to combine the two principles of Communist revolution and Christianity. Armstrong had returned to NZ from Princeton Theological Seminary in 1973, having been radicalised by the Vietnam War. As a result of war, "Armstrong's disillusionment with the Church spread to include all of Western society".²¹¹ The Peace Squadron began in a religious setting, but it was not church based. The NZ Peace Squadron was not, therefore, simply a product of traditional religious pacifism. The Anglican hierarchy was uneasy about the Peace Squadron's association with St John's, and its meetings were switched to secular venues.²¹² Although some

²¹¹ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 149.

²¹² Ibid., p. 256.

members were radical, most of the organisation was liberal, and the organisation was less ideological than the Wellington-based peace movement.²¹³

The Peace Squadron was launched in October 1975 for the Waitemata Peace Day, and it made use of religious symbolism as well environmentalism. George Armstrong insisted on making use of the environmental link, for tactical reasons.²¹⁴ Avoiding the radical sentiments held by Armstrong, the Peace Squadron pitched a pro-life, pro-environment message that struck a chord with many NZers. However, the Royal NZ Yacht Squadron declined to support any such efforts against nuclear visitors, claiming that Peace Squadron letters to newspapers or politicians were basically “statements from people who are [at] best uninformed if not downright ignorant of the subject”.²¹⁵ When the nuclear-powered cruiser USS *Truxton* visited Wellington in August 1976, it was met by a small water-borne protest, and the Wellington Harbour Employees Union supported the protesters by declining to help in the *Truxton*’s berthing.

Before the nuclear-powered cruiser USS *Long Beach* visited Auckland on October 1, 1976, Armstrong cabled its Captain, claiming that an “attempt to bring [a] death ship and nuclear weapons to Auckland will violate New Zealand hospitality”.²¹⁶ Small craft assembled at a point in the Rangitoto Channel to try to block the *Long Beach*’s entry into Waitemata Harbour. This was done within the international sea rules applicable outside the harbour. Larger boats would present their sterns to the US ship, forcing it to give way and slow down before it reached the small boats waiting in the channel. In the usual manner of the modern peace movement, this obstruction of the *Long Beach*’s freedom of movement was labelled as a “non-violent” protest. On two occasions the *Long Beach* was brought

²¹³ Wilkes Interview, August 10, 1998

²¹⁴ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 345.

²¹⁵ Tom Newnham, *Peace Squadron: The Sharp End of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand*, Auckland, 1986, p. 10.

²¹⁶ Newnham, *Peace Squadron*, p. 12.

to a halt before police boats started acting as an escort and boarding any protest vessels in reach.

The Peace Squadron's policy statement for December 1976 claimed that being "nuclear-free" was an essential part of a moral defence policy, and that it would avoid the nuclear targeting of NZ and help world peace. It advocated non-alignment in the Cold War and opposed the idea of NZ's armed forces acting as a supporting component of a nuclear power's armed forces. It claimed that NZ's destiny lay in co-operation with other South Pacific nations rather than with the US, and that naval nuclear reactors were a threat to the NZ environment. The policy statement represented various liberal and radical causes, and traditional Christian pacifist arguments were nowhere to be found.

In 1977 the conventionally-powered French frigate *Enseigne de Vaisseau Henry* was the target of a minor protest, as was the nuclear weapons-capable destroyer USS *Richard S. Edwards*. In 1978 the impending visit of the nuclear-armed and powered attack submarine USS *Pintado* resulted in several meetings of the Peace Squadron. Members decided to attempt to block entry into the Waitemata Harbour, with action taking place in waters lying just out of the reach of the Harbourmaster's powers. They hoped that the image of a US ship forcing its way into a NZ harbour would arouse nationalist sensitivities. However, this raised the question of whether or not a few protesters had a mandate to prevent entry of a ship granted access by a democratically elected government. If they did not, then would a breach of their protest lines actually constitute a breach of NZ sovereignty? Rather than answer this awkward question, the Peace Squadron focused on creating images, the more dramatic the better.

Dramatic images were soon delivered, and the protest made world headlines. The *Pintado* was escorted by the HMNZS *Waikato* and NZ helicopters, the latter using their down-draft against protest yachts. One small craft carrying a couple and their baby rammed the bow of the moving *Pintado*, thereby producing the image of a woman and an infant child being menaced by a sinister vessel of

war. As Dr Ranginui Walker put it, “For some people the submarine’s visit triggered a powerful human response akin to the territorial imperative in the animal kingdom”.²¹⁷ However, another interpretation was that the child had been intentionally placed in a dangerous position to maximise the dramatic effect.

The announcement in 1978 of an impending visit by the nuclear submarine USS *Haddo* led Labour Party leader Bill Rowling to accuse Muldoon of making NZ a doormat for nuclear powers. Support against the *Haddo* visit came from overseas peace movements, with domestic support coming from organisations such as the NZFPS, Greenpeace, and the CND. By this time public opposition to such visits was easily aroused.

In an effort to utilise NZ law against nuclear ship visits, Armstrong and a delegation complained to the Police Area Commander in December 1978 that the manner of the *Pintado*’s entry had breached NZ law, and they insisted that the *Haddo* be towed into the harbour, under the NZ Code for Nuclear Shipping, 4.1.b, which required surface escorts for nuclear submarines, preferably a tug boat. The Peace Squadron maintained that this meant that towing, although not specifically mentioned, was required. It was then argued that the civil disobedience of the Peace Squadron was justified because the law had been flouted by the *Pintado*’s NZ escort. In other words, as the law was serving “a politically powerful and ruthless segment of the population”²¹⁸ against the wishes of the less powerful “majority”, peace activists had a right to break the law themselves. The Peace Squadron’s claim that it represented the majority of NZers was based on the fact that 60% of voters had voted for anti-nuclear parties in the 1978 elections. “The Peace movement was able to stretch the degree of opposition upward by assuming that all those voting for [parties other than National] agreed with their anti-nuclear policies.”²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Newnham, *Peace Squadron*, p.32.

²¹⁸ Newnham, *Peace Squadron*, p. 36.

²¹⁹ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 185.

When the harbour limits were extended in December, a January meeting of the Peace Squadron decided to protest inside the harbour. This had the benefit of making sure that any protest action and police response would be visible to the public. Activists maintained that if the *Haddo* was not towed, and if it drifted and beached itself when stopped by the protesters, this would be the fault of the authorities, not of the protesters.

The January 1979 visit of the *Haddo* provided the spectacle activists sought. Police efforts to break up the protest fleet resulted in collisions; the submarine was hit with paint bombs thrown from kayaks; some boats were capsized by the *Haddo*'s bow wave; and one man managed to board the submarine and posture defiantly. This last act proved a media bonus for the Peace Squadron, as it again emphasised the romantic image of human against the machine, and the patriotic image of Kiwi against invader. There would be no more nuclear-powered visits to Auckland until 1983.

The USS *Truxton* visited Wellington in 1980 and 1982. The May 1982 Labour Party Conference passed a resolution against alliances with nuclear powers, despite cautions from Rowling and Lange. ANZUS was seen as "a nuclear magnet that would attract a devastating nuclear hail".²²⁰ With this unpleasant prospect in mind, the Peace Squadron mobilised for the August 1983 visit of the nuclear-powered cruiser USS *Texas* to Auckland. By coincidence, the *Texas* was in port on Hiroshima day. As a result, the peace movement's annual commemoration attracted 40,000 demonstrators, as opposed to 250 the previous year. After the *Texas*, there was an increased emphasis on land actions, with middle class women providing most of the leadership.²²¹

Meanwhile, the protest fleet of over 100 boats was allegedly disrupted by decoy police vessels which tried to split the fleet by heading toward the start of

²²⁰ Newnham, *Peace Squadron*, p. 48.

²²¹ Hedges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 210.

the Rangitoto Channel, the site of earlier protests, rather than toward the actual protest site at the narrowest part of the harbour entrance. The *Texas* still received a paint-bomb welcome off North Head. In November 1983 the nuclear attack submarine USS *Phoenix* received a smaller protest greeting in the inner harbour on its Auckland visit.

The planned March 1984 Auckland visit of the nuclear attack submarine USS *Queenfish* inspired Jim Keogh, the spokesman for the Peace Squadron in Armstrong's absence, to warn police that boarding vessels with intent to harass or damage was an act of piracy under the Crimes Act. One must assume that his point was directed at the boarding of protest vessels by police rather than at the boarding and paint-bombing of US ships by protesters. The *Queenfish* met with a protest in the inner harbour, and a "prestige" crew of Labour politicians was on hand, apparently to keep the police in check and to demonstrate the broad base of support behind the protests.

Anti-Nuclear Groups

The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a rise in the number of anti-nuclear groups, inspired by the Peace Squadrans, CND, the NZFPS, the European anti-nuclear campaign, and the US Nuclear Freeze movement. Most groups used a "consensus" decision-making style, emphasising anti-hierarchical techniques such as sitting in a circle to emphasis the supposedly equal status of each person present.²²²

Peace activists met in Christchurch in 1981 to discuss forming an umbrella support group for the growing number of local groups, most of which were anti-nuclear rather than pacifist.²²³ As a result, the Peace Movement NZ (PMNZ) organisation (later renamed Peace Movement Aotearoa) came into being in 1982. PMNZ aimed to work for disarmament and peace by networking between

²²² Clements, *Back From the Brink*, pp. 117-118.

²²³ Ibid., p.114.

domestic and overseas peace groups, by co-ordinating peace campaigns in NZ, keeping a record of available peace movement propaganda resources, and by educating NZers on peace issues.

The new organisation had a multi-issue focus, even though most member groups were only anti-nuclear. Many single issue anti-nuclear groups, and declarations of local nuclear-free zones, had been stimulated by the efforts of the Canadian Larry Ross and his organisation, the NZ Nuclear Free Zone Committee (NZNFZC), formed in Dec 1981. Although Ross was a radical, he chose to focus solely on the nuclear issue.²²⁴ “Ross’s organising technique was simple; he generated anxiety and alarm about nuclear catastrophe and then told his audience that they could reduce the risk by forming an anti-nuclear group”²²⁵

In the early 1980s there were over 300 NZ groups, many of them tiny, whose objectives were similar to those of the NZNFZC. Recruitment was helped by the radicalisation of NZ political culture which had occurred before, during, and after the 1981 Springbok Tour. The increased emphasis on racism which had emerged from the New Left contributed to protests about the tour, and the controversy surrounding the tour then introduced many people in the middle class to the thrills of direct action. The ritual of protesting proved addictive.²²⁶ This new-found passion for protest was later directed against nuclear issues, aided by the NZFPS-sponsored visit of Helen Caldicott in April 1983. The emotive style of the Australian-born Caldicott, founder of US Physicians for Social Responsibility and considered the “mother” of the US Nuclear Freeze campaign, helped to stoke women’s fears about their children’s future, thereby enlarging the peace movement’s periphery. The ensuing antagonism against the arms race was then directed at its nearest manifestation, US nuclear ship visits.

²²⁴ Wilkes interview, August 10, 1998.

²²⁵ Clements, *Back from the Brink*, p. 115.

²²⁶ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 201.

Groups of women also decided to declare their homes “nuclear free” in response to peace movement urging. This was seen as an act of personal “empowerment”. People were expected to take personal responsibility for decreasing the nuclear threat by taking individual action against the West’s nuclear arsenal rather than waiting for Western governments to act. This was an extension of the radical attitude, developed during the Vietnam War, that, if the government was unresponsive to peace movement lobbying, then direct action was justified. The NZNFZC encouraged local groups to lobby local governments to declare Nuclear Free Zones (NFZs). Local peace groups surveyed candidates on their position, and published lists of those who signed a nuclear-free pledge before local elections.²²⁷ This implicit threat from organised pressure groups caused many candidates to jump onto the NFZ bandwagon. By 1984, 65% of NZers lived in such NFZs. The figure rose to 72% by 1986. The efforts of Larry Ross, his volunteers, and people on Labour Department-funded work schemes helped to achieve this.²²⁸

PMNZ held forums and workshops to try to co-ordinate the different groups whose tactics ranged from peace education to direct action. While membership varied according to occupation and motivation, the peace groups were disproportionately white, middle class and female in their membership. Some peace groups also had an overlap in membership, as some activists often participated in more than one group. The Wellington branch of the CND was established in 1982 by members of the Coalition Against Nuclear Warships (CANWAR), established in 1976, and some members were also active in the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) coalition, the Wellington Peace

²²⁷ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 218.

²²⁸ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 115-116.

Forum, Women for Peace, Corso, or PMNZ.²²⁹ In particular, Nicky Hager played a key role in creating a number of small organisations in the Wellington area.²³⁰

At the 1982 NZ Peace Workshop 100 people gathered south of Hamilton to discuss a variety of peace and justice issues. Workshop topics included the value of performance art as an emotive propaganda tool for the peace movement, yoga as a means to “inner peace”, non-violent civil disobedience, alternative defence structures, and Maori sovereignty issues.²³¹ This was many activists’ first introduction to indigenous people’s issues and the concepts of alternative defence and NFZs.²³² The 1983 National Peace Workshop near Motueka drew 120 activists. Pakeha racism in the peace movement received attention, although efforts to have Maori issues taken into consideration by the peace movement met with some resistance. Other topics included the militarisation of the Pacific, the efforts of the European peace movement, ANZUS, women and peace, and organising local peace groups and NFZs. A workshop on the church in NZ concluded that many clergy did not have a commitment to peace. Resolutions from the workshops were passed on the last afternoon after many delegates had left. The most important resolution called for ANZUS to be the peace movement’s top priority for 1984.²³³

The proliferation of anti-nuclear groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s reflected the loss of consensus over NZ’s security policy which had occurred since the Vietnam War. This loss was in turn reflected in party differences over the nuclear issue. A 1978 postal poll¹ by the NZFPS found that 38.7% of the sample was opposed to nuclear-powered ship visits to NZ ports, but the

²²⁹ “CND Wellington”, *Peacelink*, June 1986, p. 18.

²³⁰ Wilkes interview, August 10, 1998.

²³¹ “Report on the 1982 New Zealand Peace Workshop”, *Peace Movement New Zealand: Newsletter*, March 1983, p. 11.

²³² Wayne Hennessy, “National Peace Workshops: A Brief history”, *Peacelink*, September 1986, p. 4.

²³³ Tim Jones, “The 1983 National Peace Workshop”, *Peacelink*, November-December 1983, p. 11.

¹ The poll had a mere 25% return rate, which casts some doubt on its accuracy.

difference by party was considerable. 61.4% of Labour supporters polled were opposed to such visits, compared to only 17.4% of National supporters. Regarding the presence of nuclear-armed ships in NZ's territorial waters, 31.5% of the sample was opposed: 45.8% of Labour supporters and 12.4% of National supporters.²³⁴ At this time, nuclear power was still the main concern of most of these persons.

The fear of nuclear attack was accompanied by suggestions that ANZUS was irrelevant to NZ's security needs. No obvious direct conventional threat to NZ existed, and enthusiasm for fighting overseas with allies, in any circumstances, had been severely dampened by the unfavourable outcome of the Vietnam War. The impact on ANZUS of an anti-nuclear ban by NZ was overlooked, not because a majority of NZers had suddenly become pacifists or radical but because collective security had, to some extent, fallen out of fashion. The Vietnam War was primarily responsible for this change; but the rise of the New Right, with its emphasis on self-fulfilment rather than group sacrifice, may also have had an effect.

Moreover, the public was impatient with the lack of progress in superpower arms control negotiations, which made peace movement calls for unilateral Western actions such as a nuclear ship ban seem attractive. When this was added to the notion that there was no threat to NZ other than the possibility of NZ becoming a nuclear target, the peace movement was in a prime position to destroy NZ's role in ANZUS, the long-held aim of radicals. The collective security rationale behind ANZUS was unable to neutralise the nuclear fears so adroitly manipulated by radicals. Pressure for a nuclear ship ban was able to overwhelm any concerns about the consequences for ANZUS co-operation and collective security simply because, in the early 1980s, nuclear weapons seemed a

²³⁴ Lawrence Jones, "Cracks in the Consensus: Shifting Attitudes to New Zealand Defence", in Roderic Alley (ed.), *Alternatives To ANZUS: Volume Two*, Auckland, 1984, p. 36.

more pressing threat to NZ than anything collective security had been designed to counter.

The success of the NZ peace movement may also have been due to factors such as the small size of NZ society, the existence of a Labour Party which shared its ideology (to a much greater extent than occurred in Australia), and the presence of relatively few nuclear issues on which to focus. The environmental fears of a rural economy would also have helped, along with the strength of radical feminism in NZ and the middle class's annoyance with Muldoon.²³⁵

In addition, although NZ had looked to the US for security reassurance since the ANZUS Treaty, its continued defence association with Britain into the 1970s meant that there had been little transference of positive sentiment to the US. While the Government viewed defence co-operation with the US as important, the public was less convinced.²³⁶ Such trends in public opinion were complemented by the recent shift in NZ foreign policy from the notion of loyal dissent toward a more belligerent, nationalistic outlook. NZ was discovering that small vocal states tended to get more attention than compliant ones.²³⁷ The squeaky wheel was getting the oil. The anti-nuclear ban sought by the peace movement provided just such an opportunity for NZ to gain international attention. However, whether a small vocal state could actually influence nuclear disarmament was debatable.

Apart from the formation of anti-nuclear groups, nuclear ship visits also inspired peace movement conferences, such as the 1978 Conference for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific in Suva. The conference had been preceded in 1975 by a Conference for a Nuclear Free Pacific which was backed by such organisations as CND, Greenpeace, and CAFCINZ. The 1975

²³⁵ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, pp. 423-424.

²³⁶ Report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*, Wellington, 1986, p. 11.

²³⁷ Henderson, Jackson and Kennaway, *Beyond New Zealand*, p. 7.

conference had discussed colonialism and foreign bases in the Pacific, and it had linked the presence of nuclear weapons with colonialism. The effort to include indigenous people's concerns in the peace movement's agenda led subsequently to the inclusion of the "I" in NFIP in 1978. Similar conferences followed in 1981 and 1983.

The NFIP movement sought an end to alliances between the US and Pacific nations, an end to the passage of nuclear ships through the Pacific, and an end to the presence of foreign command, control and communication facilities. Uranium mining, missile tests, nuclear weapons tests, and the building of nuclear power stations were also opposed. Policies such as these drove most of the Pacific peace movement's anti-nuclear efforts in the 1980s.²³⁸ The religious motivation behind this agenda was minimal, with a radical view of the US being predominant. The 1983 NFIP conference in Vanuatu urged the NZ peace movement to increase its efforts against ANZUS.

The Beyond ANZUS Conference in Wellington, June 1984, was inspired when Owen Wilkes returned from Vanuatu with the suggestion of a NZ conference on alternatives to ANZUS.²³⁹ The Beyond ANZUS Conference was intended to set the peace movement's agenda for the future, and it attracted 600 participants. The usual radical themes were present. The "nuclear colonialism" of the US and France was an issue, along with feminist and Maori perspectives, concern about US bases, and the operations of the intelligence agencies of the US, Australia and NZ. A call was made for the abolition of secret agencies such as the NZ Security Intelligence Service (SIS), whose alleged function was to spy on people such as those attending the conference. The apparent lack of a Soviet military threat to the region was also stressed.

²³⁸ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 111.

²³⁹ Barbara Harford, *Beyond ANZUS: Alternatives for Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*, Wellington, 1985, p. 3.

Other issues discussed in Wellington included Australasian overseas aid levels and aid recipients, heterosexism, and peace education. Calls were made for NZ to embrace non-alignment and to support the independence struggles of the Pacific and Latin America. It was claimed that membership in ANZUS linked NZ to the American imperialist policies against the Nicaraguan Sandanistas and El Salvador's rebels. ANZUS was also attacked on an anti-Capitalist basis, with charges that militarisation was a direct result of the Capitalist world order. "We therefore support all attempts towards a Socialist alternative and call for active support of the peoples of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Chile."²⁴⁰

Amster Reedy of Mana Motuhake added that ANZUS was another form of oppression for Maori, and pakeha peace activists such as Margaret Nolan played on feelings of pakeha guilt to urge that the peace movement support Maori activists' anti-colonial endeavours.

We are the colonials. We do not belong. It is not our home. If we are to have Pacific roots here, it will be because we've struggled for them in co-operation with and in support of the struggles of indigenous people of the area...²⁴¹

A women's group from Auckland presented a theatre performance condemning patriarchy and male violence, and some women challenged the plans for an afternoon of speeches by white male academics. Not only did the planned afternoon schedule allegedly negate the input of women and indigenous people, it was also claimed that lecturing from a podium was oppressive. The speeches were curtailed, and discussion circles were used to examine the structure of the conference. Some people decided to leave at this point.²⁴²

²⁴⁰ Harford, *Beyond ANZUS*, p. 174.

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 177.

²⁴² Tim Jones, "The Beyond ANZUS Conference", *Peacelink*, August 1984, p. 9.

Response to the Eastern Peace Movement

While the NZ peace movement argued about conference and lecturing styles, it was also divided over how to treat the USSR's official peace movement organisations. Three members of the NZ WPC visited the USSR in October 1982 as guests of the Soviet Peace Committee, and they were taken on a scheduled tour to meet members of the Soviet peace movement. The NZ visitors were most impressed by the fact that the Soviet Peace Committee had 70 million members, a level of mass involvement unprecedented in the West, and that it was so well funded. Apparently, members voluntarily "donated" a day's wages to their local committee, which usually owned buildings and facilities to an extent well beyond the reach of any NZ peace organisation.²⁴³ That the official Soviet peace movement was allowed to exist, was well funded, and appeared to be unusually popular should have provided the WPC visitors with a warning about the extent of its political independence.

Other members of the NZ peace movement were impressed by the reception accorded delegates to the WPC-organised 1983 World Assembly for Peace and Life and Against Nuclear War. Held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, the assembly addressed a wide range of radical causes, including nuclear disarmament, peace education, non-alignment, and liberation movements. Delegates flew to Moscow, then took a train into Czechoslovakia, and were received in Prague by local citizens and children bearing flowers.²⁴⁴ Delegates were pleased that opinions were freely expressed in group dialogues, and they were told that many workers had given their time to raise funds for the assembly. All nuclear weapons were condemned, but the Pershing II and Cruise missile deployments in Western Europe came in for particular attention.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ "Trip to Russia" *Peace Movement New Zealand: Newsletter*, February 1983, p. 10.

²⁴⁴ Wayne Hennessy, "Impressions of the Prague Peace Assembly", *Peacelink*, September 1983, p. 14.

²⁴⁵ Alan A. Brash, "NZFPS Fact Sheet", *Peacelink*, September 1983, p. 15.

There is no doubt that the World Assembly was a useful public relations ploy of the Soviet Bloc. However, despite the freedom of opinion that existed within the actual assembly and the desires for peace expressed by the Czechoslovakian citizens with whom the delegates mixed, it is unlikely that the Assembly had any prospect of altering the USSR's nuclear policy.* Most likely, the intent was to spur renewed efforts by the Western peace movement against the Cruise and Pershing II deployments. It must be remembered that the citizens of Warsaw Pact countries, regardless of their desire for peace, actually had no influence over their governments' military and nuclear policies.

While some peace activists enthused about the "peace-loving" nature of the people of the Soviet bloc, others in the peace movement were not so sure. Allan Cumming acknowledged that official Soviet peace groups had a very high membership, and that they could produce millions of signatures for their campaigns; but he also mentioned that they were more critical of US nuclear missiles than they were of the USSR's arsenal. In addition, the members of unofficial Soviet peace groups tended to be persecuted by their government. That they had not been entirely "removed" may have been because the Soviet Government did not wish to alienate the Western peace movement.²⁴⁶

Cumming's concerns met with a blunt response from an anonymous author in the next issue of Peacelink. The responding article warned that some parts of the peace movement, to the benefit of militarism, were trying to divert attention away from anti-nuclearism toward human rights issues. The author claimed that Cumming had used information from the European Disarmament Campaign (END), a British group that had proposed that "minuscule dissident groups" from Socialist countries should be given higher status at peace movement conferences than official Socialist peace groups. By trying to make the Soviets' human rights record an issue for the peace movement, groups such as END were

* This freedom of opinion may have been of little importance, since most of the delegates shared the same ideology, and would have had similar opinions anyway, at least with regard to US behaviour.

²⁴⁶ Allan Cumming, "Peace Movement's Around the World: An Overview", *Peacelink*, April 1983, p. 12.

in fact hurting the disarmament cause. Rather than encouraging contact with unofficial Socialist peace groups, Peacelink should publish much more news of the activities of the official Soviet peace movement.²⁴⁷ If the anonymous author was a Communist, his/her dislike of END may have stemmed from the fact that END excluded Communists, did not want Britain to leave NATO, and sought a Nuclear Free Zone in Europe which also covered the Soviet bloc.²⁴⁸

To its credit, Peacelink did not follow the author's advice. Most Western radicals were still unwilling to buy the WPC's sanitised version of life in the Soviet Union. Radicals embraced a wide variety of causes, which probably proved annoying to those activists who wanted the peace movement to concentrate solely on degrading the West's nuclear deterrent, chiefly for the benefit of the USSR.

Feminist Influence in the Peace Movement

To fully understand the ideological aspects of the modern NZ peace movement, it is necessary to examine certain influences which originated outside the Socialist and anti-militarist strands of the New Left but which have been affected by them. At the same time, these influences have added to radicals' own basket of beliefs, and they have certainly impacted on the NZ peace movement. These include feminism, Maori sovereignty, and religious issues.

Feminism, of course, existed long before the New Left, and women had been involved in the peace movement prior to the 1960s. However, the interaction between the New Left and feminism which occurred during the late 1960s was to alter the nature of the New Left, the nature of feminism, and eventually the dynamics of the peace movement. In the early peace movement, women's involvement was based mainly on either pacifism or socialism, with the former having more to do with the Victorian concept of women's moral

²⁴⁷ Anon, "The International Peace Movement", *Peacelink*, May 1983, p. 12.

²⁴⁸ Kaltefleiter and Pfaltzgraff, *The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States*, p. 74.

superiority and their concern for their loved ones than it had to do with feminist thought. This situation has altered since the 1960s.

The nature of the New Left, with its condemnation of the Western Capitalist system as exploitative, warlike and repressive, appealed to the more radical feminists. For such feminists, frustrated at the perceived lack of progress in women's rights, the New Left's portrayal of a repressive Western attitude toward Third World revolutionary movements was mirrored by the West's repression of women. Radical feminists, especially those who were Socialists, could readily identify with the New Left's critique of the West, and they added their own caveats. The American and Western systems were not merely Capitalist, warlike and hostile to the aspirations of oppressed people in the Third World; they were also patriarchal and oppressive of women. While the New Left helped to turn the anger of radical feminists at male patriarchy into a wider opposition to the whole Western system and its military forces, radical feminism in turn influenced the ideology of the New Left and became an integral part of it. This was to change the nature of women's involvement in the peace movement.

Despite the influence of the New Left, there still existed moderate feminists who found themselves at odds with radical feminists involved in the peace movement. For example, feminists calling for equal female access to the armed services, including combat roles, were criticised by peace movement feminists for supporting the very system which radical feminists sought to overturn.²⁴⁹ There were also women in the peace movement who were not radical feminists, but they were more likely to be found in the periphery of the peace movement than in the radical-dominated core. However, our main concern is with radical feminists in the peace movement, and these could be placed in two broad categories.

The first main category of radical feminists in the peace movement could be called the doctrinaire feminists. Doctrinaire feminists blamed war on the

²⁴⁹ Kathleen Ryan, "Should Women Fight?", in *Women on Peace*, May 1985, pp. 33-35.

structure of the existing patriarchal system. Those doctrinaire feminists who were Socialist added that the competition and hierarchy of the Capitalist system reinforced this patriarchy; therefore, this system was also responsible for both sexism and war.

The second category could be called supremacist feminists. While, like doctrinaire feminists, they blamed the existing Western system for sexism and war, they also tended in varying degrees to dismiss male nature as inherently violent and to view women's superior attributes as providing the means for achieving peace. They also promoted certain values as being more attractive to women. For example, women were supposed to have a preference for non-hierarchical organisation and consensus decision making, and to have a greater concern for the future. One of the advocates of such views was Katie Boanas, who had set up the Christchurch Peace Collective in 1979 after returning from attending Peace Studies at Bradford University in Britain. Boanas criticised the "alienating" language of male Peace Studies academics, and she called for more of a "woman's perspective" in Peace Education.²⁵⁰

Marion Hancock, who had returned from Britain in 1982 to set up a North Shore, Auckland peace group, seemed to agree. She believed that, as they brought life into the world, women had a stake in the future, and that they were used to working outside structures in a non-hierarchical manner.²⁵¹ Some male peace activists, such as Kevin Clements, agreed with the claims of supremacist feminists. Hierarchy, coercive power, and institutionalised violence were male notions which could be countered by having more women in decision-making positions.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Vivienne Shakespear, "Waging Peace", *Broadsheet*, December 1987, p. 19. For a similar view of men's responsibility for sexism, war, colonialism, capitalism and pollution, see Tamsin Harney, "A Woman's Perspective of ANZUS", in Barbara Harford (Ed.), *Beyond ANZUS: Alternatives for Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*, Wellington, 1985, pp. 10-11.

²⁵¹ "Peace Profile", *Broadsheet*, September 1989, p.10.

²⁵² Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 194. For a similar male view, see Richard Falk, *Nuclearism and National Interest: The Situation of a Non-Nuclear Ally*, 1986, p. 20.

The above authors clearly believed that the radical notion of Socialist democracy, which is to say consensus decision-making and a lack of formal authority, was naturally suited to women, but this belief could be seen as a departure from pure feminism by some feminists. Such beliefs, for example, caused conflict with doctrinaire feminists who maintained that pure feminism allowed for changing men along with the system. Feminist theory held that the potential for aggressive behaviour and for peaceful behaviour was present in both sexes. Violence was not inherently male; it was simply used by those with power. Pure feminism aimed to eradicate the categorisation of any particular behaviour as “masculine” or “feminine”, thereby ending pressure for men to act masculine and for women to act feminine.

As doctrinaire feminists believed that it was the masculine outlook which society required of men that led to both militarism and war, they believed that war could be ended by the application of pure feminist thought.²⁵³ Therefore, doctrinaire feminists criticised those women who blamed male nature for war, or who claimed that women provided a unique perspective on security issues. Supremacist feminists were accused of reinforcing gender stereotyping, or of being sexist, in their efforts to highlight the differences between male and female behaviour.

Christine Dann argued that those women who blamed men for war and claimed that women were less aggressive were merely reinforcing conservative views about gender differences.²⁵⁴ After changing the system and removing sexism, both men and women could learn peaceful behaviour and peace would follow. Sandra Coney added that, to achieve this, the peace movement needed to emphasise feminism rather than just peace. Coney’s concern was that, in order to recruit women in large numbers, the male-led peace movement was

²⁵³ For an in-depth presentation of this approach, see Betty A. Reardon, *Sexism and the War System*, New York, 1985.

²⁵⁴ In “May 24: Can 20,000 Women Be Wrong?”, *Broadsheet*, July-August 1983, p. 15.

“maternalising” peace. That is, by appealing to women’s sensibilities as mothers, they were reinforcing gender roles and hurting feminism.²⁵⁵

Another example of such thinking was that of Rachel Bloomfield, who had lived with peace activists in Philadelphia and had trained as a full time activist before returning to NZ in 1978 to pass on non-violent direct action skills and ideas on consensus decision making and non-hierarchical groups. For Bloomfield also, sexism and militarism were linked, and she urged that women not be co-opted by male views in the peace movement.²⁵⁶ Another like-minded feminist was Cate Ansdattir, who had travelled to Canada and Britain, made contact with Greenpeace and then returned to NZ in 1978 to protest against US nuclear ship visits. While she noticed that most peace activists were women, the peace movement had yet to endorse the “feminist belief” that assaults on women were part of militarism’s assault on humanity.²⁵⁷

Many women, attracted to the peace movement by the language of the supremacists and their own fears of nuclear war, were not radical feminists. This third group will be called the romanticists. The supremacists and romanticists were hard to distinguish at times, given the similarities in their rhetoric about male flaws; but the romanticists were less likely to adopt the radical feminist structural critique of the West, and consequently they were criticised by radicals for simply opposing nuclear weapons as a single issue. Rather than applying radical feminist thought, the romanticists appeared to apply the Victorian concept of women as morally superior mothers and nurturers, with an greater inherent aversion to war than men. In this respect, the romanticists resembled the traditional, pre-New Left attitude of women in the peace movement, and they also appeared to have provided many of the recruits to the peace movement’s periphery, especially

²⁵⁵ “May 24”, *Broadsheet*, July-August 1983, p. 20.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 25.

²⁵⁷ Christine Dann, “Make Peace Not War”, *Broadsheet*, April 1981, p. 22. For similar views see also Gabrielle Panckhurst “Beyond Babies and Bombs”, *Peacelink*, May 1984, p. 9; and Sabine Erika “Militarism and Masculinity: A Research Note”, *Peacelink*, October 1987, pp 4-5.

during the tense nuclear atmosphere of the early 1980s when many women feared for the lives of their families.

Helen Caldicott appealed to supremacists and romanticists with her rhetoric, and her April 1983 visit inspired many women to join a peace group. According to Caldicott, women were “the civilizers” whose intuition had helped early humanity to survive, and it was up to them to save the world, as the men were too busy boosting their self-image by building bombs. As women understood the genesis of life, she argued, it was up to women to take the lead in the anti-nuclear movement.²⁵⁸

The Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp, another inspiration for women in the NZ peace movement, was most likely led by supremacists. Their distrust of men had led to the exclusion of men from decision making, but their rhetoric would also have appealed to the romanticists by stressing the innate peacefulness of women. In solidarity with the women of Greenham Common, over 15,000 NZ women marched in Auckland on the May 24, 1983, “International Women’s Day of Action for Disarmament”. The new organisation, Women Acting for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND), was itself an indication of the increased emphasis on women as a separate force for peace.

An attempt to emulate Greenham Common’s separatist approach to peace was made in a 1983 Women’s Peace Camp outside the Pine Gap facility in Australia. However, tension arose between Aboriginal and white female activists when the former insisted on bringing Aboriginal men with them. The Aboriginal insistence on the need for male help offended most feminists at the camp, but the white activists’ commitment to indigenous rights led to a capitulation to the Aboriginal approach.²⁵⁹ Another supremacist effort occurred in December 1984

²⁵⁸ “Nuclear Madness: An Interview with Helen Caldicott”, *Broadsheet*, October 1980, p. 25.

²⁵⁹ Alison Terry-Evans, “Closing the Gap”, *Broadsheet*, March 1984, p.6.

at the “Womyns Peace Camp” outside the Stirling naval base in Western Australia.

On both occasions the women claimed their sex had a special role to play in overcoming militarism since they could better understand, through personal experience, the critical nexus between militarism and sexism.²⁶⁰

Combined, the supremacists and the romanticists made up what could be called the “Women = Peace” school in the peace movement, and even radical feminists outside the peace movement were concerned that the efforts of this school of thought were hurting the feminist cause. For example, claims that women had a special interest in preventing nuclear war based on their ability to give birth was in effect defining women by their reproductive capacity, something doctrinaire feminists opposed. By claiming that “feminine” attitudes were superior, and that women were inherently more peaceful, supremacists and romanticists were also failing to address the structural aspects of male supremacy and the resulting system which led to wars and the oppression of women. Feminists outside the peace movement pointed out that it was possible to be a feminist without being pacifist, and that women served willingly in the armed forces of some nations. Women’s non-participation in wars was not due to their “peace loving” nature, but due to the dictates of the patriarchal system.

The arguments of the main categories of radical feminists in the peace movement, both supremacist and doctrinaire, had strengths and weaknesses. In the argument over whether gender behaviour is due to inherent characteristics or learned through socialisation, each group went too far in one or the other direction. The supremacists may have had a point regarding instinctive male aggression; yet they overlooked the ability of socialisation to alter some aspects of male behaviour, and they overlooked women’s own capacity for aggression. Doctrinaire feminists were correct in noting social factors behind behaviour, but

²⁶⁰ Saunders and Summy, *The Australian Peace Movement*, p. 49.

they neglected the possibility that some differences in gender behaviour are not due to socialisation, and that a capacity for violence also exists in non-Capitalist systems. Both groups, in short, drew faulty conclusions.

Overall, women were attracted to the peace movement in significant numbers in the 1980s, especially after the visit of Helen Caldicott. Polls on defence issues consistently found that women had a disproportionate concern about nuclear ship visits.²⁶¹ However, women in the peace movement's periphery provided only a temporary boosting of the periphery's numbers, around 1983 to 1985. Despite the efforts of radical feminists in the core, most romanticists did not adopt the wider critique of Western society that their radical sisters were promoting. For most romanticists, nuclear weapons were simply an immediate threat to survival rather than a by-product of a bankrupt Western system. Therefore, many romanticists left the peace movement after the immediate nuclear threat seemed to have evaporated with the implementation of the nuclear ship ban. Doctrinaire feminists also failed to prevent the peace movement from continuing to appeal to romanticists with its emphasis on women's special role within its ranks. The need to attract as many recruits as possible has tended to override concerns about maintaining feminist ideological purity.

The Radical Maori Perspective

The debate within the peace movement over whether to play down the radicals' multi-issue stance in favour of pushing single issues with a broader public appeal was also evident in the case of Maori sovereignty issues. The radicals' attack on the Western system seemed to appeal to some Maori activists as much as it did to some feminists. In particular, white radicals' anti-colonialism and their portrayal of the US and the West as being insensitive to the independence aspirations of non-European peoples appealed to those Maori who sought increased Maori sovereignty within NZ. To some Maori, Socialist economic ideals

²⁶¹ For a break down of attitudes to security issues, by social grouping, see Alan C. Webster, *Who Supports New Zealand's ANZUS Policy? A Special Report of the New Zealand Study of Values*, Massey University, 1985.

also seemed to reflect traditional Maori society much more closely than the Capitalist system introduced by the British. The New Left's attraction to those who had experienced colonisation was also related to long-standing efforts by Communist parties around the world to use existing indigenous grievances to encourage Communist revolutions. Once the indigenous peoples had overthrown their Western colonial governments, it was hoped that their new revolutionary regimes could be coaxed into the Soviet sphere of influence.

While few Maori were prepared to embrace Soviet-style communism, the radical socialism and anti-colonialism of the New Left's ideology proved irresistible to a growing number of Maori radicals, from the early 1970s onward. The fact that the same ideology had been embraced by so many whites also provided a useful opportunity for Maori activists to seek pakeha allies. If such whites accepted the radical view of the West as a malevolent force, then perhaps they could also be convinced to support the cause of Maori sovereignty. One likely source of converts was to be found in the NZ peace movement. A small number of Maori radicals attempted to persuade the predominantly white, middle class peace movement that, if they really wanted peace, they should support "justice" for Maori. Radicals' habit of building bridges between its five main strands of their ideology- anti-militarism, feminism, socialism, anti-colonialism and environmentalism- aided such an endeavour.

One proponent of the radical Maori perspective was Hilda Halkyard-Harawira. In her eyes, pre-European Maori society had been a golden era of purpose, hope, respect for nature, communalism, healthy people, the rule of natural religion and no police. However, the arrival of colonialism had brought with it capitalism and the theft of land, by means of disease, force, and Christianity. The Treaty of Waitangi, as an "agreement between two nations", was never honoured, and NZ became dependent on the large Western powers. While the Maori were internally colonised by pakeha technology, which was seen as worthless by Halkyard-Harawira, NZ and Australia made the South Pacific their

Third World dominion. Eventually the old traditional ways were lost; Maori were urbanised, and the pakeha education system failed them.²⁶² To Halkyard-Harawira, Western society had offered nothing to Maori. This belief meshed well with white radicals' own unfavourable view of the West.

For Halkyard-Harawira, nuclear testing in the Pacific was merely a second wave of colonialism for Maori and Pacific Islanders, albeit one which had suddenly concerned whites. She claimed that the assumption of pakeha peace activists that the anti-nuclear movement had brought Maori and pakeha together was naïve, as indigenous people had been fighting colonialism for a long time, and were not overawed by its latest nuclear manifestation. In this manner, she appeared to paint pakeha peace activists as amateurs in opposing oppression, thereby adding ammunition to the Maori claim to a leadership role in the peace movement.

The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement was also at pains to stress that the indigenous peoples of the South Pacific²⁶³ had been suffering from the immediate effects of nuclear testing long before the 1980s witnessed an increase in white concern about the arms race and potential nuclear war. The NFIP movement emphasised that the indigenous peoples of the world had a special interest in resisting environmental exploitation, militarism and colonial oppression. It claimed that indigenous people, unlike most white peace activists, saw nuclear testing as being a colonial issue as much as it was a nuclear one; their land had been expropriated by the Western nuclear powers for nuclear testing.

The preamble to the 1983 People's Charter for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific, based on the 1983 NFIP conference in Vanuatu, claimed that, while indigenous peoples had inherited the administrative systems imposed

²⁶² Hilda Halkyard-Harawira, "Towards a Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific- From a Maori Perspective", in Gil Hanley (Ed.), *Peace is More Than the Absence of War*, Auckland, 1986, p. 27-37.

²⁶³ "Indigenous" in this sense applies to those who moved into the South Pacific before the Europeans arrived. However, exactly how long one must live in an area to be considered "indigenous" is an interesting question.

by alien, imperialistic and colonial policies, this did not imply that they would perpetuate them after independence. An “evil cancer” still existed in places like Australia and NZ, and it was declared that indigenous peoples “reaffirm our intention to extract only those elements of Western civilisation that will be of permanent benefit to us”.²⁶³ The language of the People’s Charter seemed to indicate that, at least among a vocal minority, Communist and Socialist efforts to encourage colonised peoples to abandon capitalism and Western-style democracy were having some effect. The 1984 NFIP conference in Vanuatu consisted of 160 delegates from 33 countries, and it supported the right of self-determination for Aborigines, Maori, Hawaiians, and North American Indians. The conference also opposed ANZUS as an aggressive pact, designed to increase Western influence in the Pacific., and supported Latin American “liberation struggles” in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

The 1987 NFIP Conference in Manila attracted 100 participants from 20 countries, with a predominantly Maori delegation arriving from NZ. Indigenous delegates met separately before the main conference, and they made it clear to the white support groups which turned up later that indigenous groups would be calling the shots. Many support group delegates responded by admitting that they were not indigenous to the countries they represented, and that they were trying to come to terms with the basic anti-racism ground rules of the NFIP movement. The conference went on to discuss Belau, Tahiti, Kanaky and Fiji, but some disagreement occurred over the appropriate reaction to the 1987 Fiji coup. At issue was whether it should be viewed as a pro-nuclear, CIA-inspired plot (the overthrown government of Dr Timoci Bavadra had been anti-nuclear), or as a victory for indigenous rights. Those who valued democracy found themselves in contention with those for whom ethno-nationalism outweighed anti-nuclearism

²⁶³ Hilda Halkyard-Harawira, “Pacific Alternatives”, in *Women on Peace*, p. 5.

and the democratic process. The NZ and Hawaiian delegations declined to condemn Colonel Rambuka's coup.²⁶⁴

While the NFIP focused on de-colonisation in the Pacific, other organisations looked specifically at the NZ situation. The Auckland District Maori Council, in its 1986 submission to the Defence Review Committee, recommended that the committee also consider the issue of internal peace and the necessary social changes to facilitate it. This required ending the pakeha monopoly of power and transforming capitalism. It was stated that Maori should not be used to fight overseas in the Cold War, as this usually meant fighting other indigenous peoples. Non-alignment was preferable.²⁶⁵ The Council viewed pakeha disregard for Maori aspirations as the primary threat to NZ, far ahead of any external threat in the Cold War.

Some Maori also called for more Maori influence in formulating New Zealand's foreign policy, claiming both an historical right and a unique perspective.²⁶⁶ They argued that Maori people should have a role in defining NZ's interests regarding disarmament, defence, peace education and NZ's UN voting, and that they should demand separate membership in the UN and the South Pacific Forum. NZ should also reject alignment with the West in the Cold War. Exactly how many Maori sought such things remained open to question, and it seems to have been assumed that only those Maori who shared the radicals' ideological assumptions would be taking up such opportunities.

The task for those Maori activists who were trying to influence the peace movement was to show that the Maori perspective had something to offer the peace movement. Failing that, white guilt could always be played on. Pakeha liberals and radicals were admonished that, unless they gave Maori more influence

²⁶⁴ Celine Kearney, "NFIP Conference", *Broadsheet*, March 1988, p.32.

²⁶⁵ Rangi Walker, "The Maori and New Zealand Peace Policy", *Peacelink*, September 1986, pp. 7-8.

²⁶⁶ Robert Mahuta and Manuka Henare, "The Basis For a Maori Foreign Policy", in Kennaway and Henderson *Beyond New Zealand II*, pp. 58-62.

in the peace movement, then they would be acting as part of the same oppressive Western system they were meant to be opposing. The 1981 Springbok Tour protests helped to bring domestic racism into the consciousness of white NZers. While eager to protest apartheid in South Africa, many pakeha activists had yet to consider the Maori situation. In particular, white female peace activists were harangued by female Maori activists committed to the NFIP movement. Pakeha women converts in turn started anti-racism workshops in the peace movement to re-educate other pakeha on cultural sensitivity.

One advantage for the Maori radicals' case was that pakeha radicals were receptive to their claim that the US presence in the Pacific was an example of the very same external, white, Capitalist, eco-unfriendly and war-mongering influence that Maori sovereignty advocates opposed. The peace-loving nature of Maori was also emphasised, and the example of Te Whiti's pacifism at Parihaka was used to support the case that Maori had a special contribution to make to the peace movement. To make Maori sovereignty even more palatable to whites in the peace movement, it was also linked to environmentalism. Indigenous people were portrayed as the "custodians of the earth", while white colonisers were the rapists²⁶⁷ and destroyers of the earth.²⁶⁸ White scholars such as Richard Falk concurred, and he claimed that the wisdom and world-views of pre-industrial indigenous peoples could help Europeans learn how to live with each other and the environment.²⁶⁸

Clearly, radicals were gathering support for their particular causes by forming tenuous links with other activists to maximise the potential pool of protesters. While some pakeha accepted the connections between Maori sovereignty, environmentalism and peace just as others had accepted the link between feminism and peace, a connection between Maori sovereignty and feminism was made by writers such as Joan Cook. Whilst supporting Maori

²⁶⁷ The portrayal of environmental exploitation as the "rape" of "Mother Earth", is itself a result of attempts to link the feminist and environmental strands of the New Left.

²⁶⁸ Ngaire Te Hira, in *Women on Peace*, p. 11.

²⁶⁸ Richard Falk, *Nuclearism and the National Interest: The Situation of a Non-Nuclear Ally*, 1986, p. 20.

sovereignty, Cook also claimed that women's roles were a result of white women buying into pakeha myths. White women were responsible for giving power to white men, who then oppressed both women and Maori. Pakeha women should, therefore, work to change the pakeha system and support Maori sovereignty. However, to support Maori sovereignty apparently did not require trying to work out what it actually meant. According to Cook, the main thing was to get rid of the existing system instead of worrying about what shape the alternative would take; then Maori sovereignty could take its "rightful place in Aotearoa".²⁶⁹

The Maori effort to bring the white peace movement into line was visible at the annual workshops of the peace movement. At the 1982 NZ Peace Workshops Eva Rickard claimed that Maori had much to offer Europeans regarding environmentalism and working for people rather than power and money. There could also be no peace without justice. When delegates were being selected for the 1983 NFIP conference, Hilda Halkyard-Harawira, a member of the Pacific Peoples Anti-Nuclear Action Committee (PPANAC, est. 1981), moved that half of the delegates from the NZ peace movement be Maori, with all Maori delegates to be approved by the PPANAC, and that all delegates should actively support the Maori struggle.²⁷⁰ The 1983 National Peace workshop identified racism in the peace movement as well as a lack of consultation with Maori by the peace movement; moreover, it criticised the anti-nuclear movement's single issue focus and the failure to use the Maori language.

Efforts to raise the consciousness of the white peace movement met with success in some quarters. For example, Katie Boanas claimed that NZ was in an identity-perception dilemma, and that any fondness for ANZUS was the result of a white view that negated Maori sovereignty.²⁷¹ In effect, radicals tried to claim that NZ's membership in ANZUS, a white Western alliance, had been a result of

²⁶⁹ Joan Cook, "Maori Sovereignty: A Pakeha Woman's Response", in *Women on Peace*, 1985, p. 10.

²⁷⁰ "Report on the 1982 NZ Peace Workshop", *Peace Movement New Zealand Newsletter*, March 1983, p. 11.

²⁷¹ Katie Boanas, "Towards a Truly Nuclear-Free and Independent Aotearoa", in Kennaway and Henderson, *Beyond New Zealand II*, p. 95.

racism. Moreover, this view seemed to assume that all Maori were opposed to the concept of collective security ties with the US, rather than just a radical minority.

After the 1984 Peace Workshop at Motueka, another pakeha convert responded positively to Maori charges. Bruce Meder acknowledged that peace and justice were linked, and that the NZ peace movement should look to Maori examples of pacifism such as Te Whiti. The peace movement talked about “getting the message” across to Maori, yet it had not looked at what “peace” meant to Maori. There could be no peace without independence for indigenous peoples. Meder was concerned that, while few white members of the Christchurch peace movement had turned up to a hui on the NFIP movement, many had gone to see the film *The Day After*, which portrayed a possible future nuclear attack on the US. According to Meder, this was insensitive. Nuclear danger was a “here and now” issue for people suffering from nuclear colonialism. Meder urged that the pakeha peace movement not make decisions for Maori, that it respect the separatist wishes of Maori in the peace movement, and that it be active in Maori sovereignty issues and acknowledge that Aotearoa was Maori land.²⁷²

Another convert, Lyn Crossley, noted that few peace groups had drawn the link between nuclear disarmament and colonialism.²⁷³ Australia and NZ were still under colonial control, yet PPANAC speeches still met with negative reactions from pakeha in the peace movement. Crossley accused the NZ peace movement of being just another “white import” from overseas. In her doctrinaire feminist capacity, Crossley also attacked the notion of women making quilts to stop the arms race, and noted that the “mushy” message of nurturing women saving the world was sexist.

²⁷² Bruce Meder, “The Pakeha Response to the Position of Maori”, *Peacelink*, March 1984, pp. 5-7.

²⁷³ In “May 24: Can 20,000 Women be Wrong?”, in *Broadsheet*, July-August 1983, p. 18.

Jane Severn noted that diversity in the peace movement was a strength, but that it could also be a problem. For example, peoples' understanding of what "peace" meant often differed. It was time that the white peace movement took heed of the Maori view of peace. In the past, the peace movement had made token gestures toward the NFIP movement, but now pakeha must decide what peace really meant in the NZ context. This meant listening to the NFIP, contemplating a separate role for pakeha, and accepting that a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific included Maori sovereignty. As the oppressing culture, pakeha should let Maori lead, and they should work alongside the NFIP rather than within it. "Observer status...seems entirely appropriate for whites at an NFIP conference."²⁷⁴ According to Severn, even with good intentions, the white peace movement's methods and priorities might contain elements of oppression. For whites to select the priorities of the peace movement was an example of colonial domination. Rather than focus solely on the nuclear issue, the peace movement had to adopt the decolonisation agenda.

However, in contrast to people like Boanas, Meder, Crossley, and Severn, Larry Ross of the NZNFZC preferred to keep a single-issue focus. Ross claimed that, while the NZNFZC supported independence movements, it could not let the threat of nuclear war be obscured by other considerations. No race was exempt from the effects of nuclear war, and the peace movement's traditional focus had been on preventing war. While he viewed Maori and feminist issues as legitimate, Ross doubted whether they should be a concern of the peace movement. In his opinion, the diversion of peace movement resources into other causes would hurt the anti-nuclear struggle and alienate potential supporters rather than strengthen the peace movement's case.²⁷⁵ The diverse response of pakeha peace activists to Maori pressure illustrated the peace movement's ongoing internal struggle over priorities, and it also mirrored the debate among

²⁷⁴ Jane Severn, "The NFIP Movement: How Seriously Does the White Peace Movement Take It, Here in Aotearoa?", *Peacelink*, December 1986, p.5.

²⁷⁵ Larry Ross, "NZNFZ View of NFIP", *Peacelink*, December 1986, pp. 14-15.

peace movement feminists over the wisdom of bringing the whole basket of radical beliefs into the peace movement.

At Hunua in 1989 the PMA Annual Workshop witnessed a successful Maori bid to change the official attitude of the peace movement core. This was perhaps possible only because the core itself had been shrinking, and there was no real periphery left to speak of by this time. NZ's expulsion from ANZUS, the passing of the anti-nuclear hysteria of the early 1980s, and the winding-down of the Cold War, had each played a part in rendering the peace movement increasingly irrelevant. Past concerns about alienating the public with a multi-issue peace movement orthodoxy which embraced Maori sovereignty were now moot. Radical Maori and their white allies now had the opportunity to overcome their opposition within the peace movement. To this end, Maori radicals challenged the pakeha participants to share power, and two members of the PPANAC, including Titewhai Harawira, were included in the Peace Movement Aotearoa Working Group for 1990. Nonetheless, a spirited rearguard action was fought by those pakeha peace activists who preferred to keep things simple and anti-nuclear. As the peace movement's meeting system, based on the radical idea of consensual decision making, precluded voting over Harawira, the workshop had to seek consensus in a six-hour hui.

Eventually the small number of people who opposed the proposal...took the very peaceful and co-operative step of withdrawing their blocking of consensus so that a decision in favour of the proposal could be taken.²⁷⁶

No doubt, the consensual style ensured that opponents were gradually worn down by attrition over those six hours. It is also interesting that the act of submitting to Maori demands was promoted as the peaceful thing to do. This

²⁷⁶ Jim Chapple, "Hunua '89: A Report of the PMA Annual Labour Weekend Workshop", *Peacelink*, December 1989, p. 19.

historic meeting was lauded by Jim Chapple, who claimed that the decision to share power with Maori activists, while leading to tears and anger from some, was the only way to keep the peace movement's principles intact.

Although Maori radicals succeeded in 1989 in browbeating the remnants of the white core of the peace movement, this victory was to have limited significance. The end of the Cold War was to cause the peace movement's membership to wither away further, and any chance of Maori radicals using the peace movement as their own vehicle was therefore severely curtailed. Harawira gave up on trying to co-opt the peace movement after Hunua, turning her attention to other left-wing organisations.²⁷⁷ Tension between a single or a multi-issue approach still arose, however, on those few occasions in the 1990s when there was a potential periphery to woo, as could be seen during one 1995 protest against French nuclear testing. Maori radicals attempted to take over an anti-nuclear rally, yet they faced resistance from pakeha activists who sought to keep the focus on nuclear testing rather than risk losing public support by allowing the rally to become a platform for Maori sovereignty.

Religion and the Modern Peace Movement

“A number of priests and clergy, most of them involved in urban or specialised ministries, were radicalised during the Vietnam War, and this group, along with a network of liberal-left bureaucrats in the Protestant mainstream churches, was able to maintain clergy- though not laity- support from motions within synods and conferences relating to nuclear free zone issues.”²⁷⁸

In the early peace movement, religious pacifists played a leading role in the peace movement's core, but it has been argued that this was no longer the case.

²⁷⁷ Wilkes Interview, August 10, 1998.

²⁷⁸ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 142.

While some religious pacifists remained in the peace movement, and the church played a role in the anti-nuclear movement, the radical peace movement was not guided by religious values. This could be seen in the topics and issues debated at peace movement annual workshops. What guided the NZ peace movement's core at its peak of influence in the early 1980s appeared to be a mixture of Socialist, anti-American, feminist, and radical Maori perspectives. The anti-nuclearism of radicals in the core was, therefore, derived more from a desire to disengage from the US war machine than from any religious principles.

Despite the dominance of radicals in the modern peace movement's core, religion was still employed by parts of the peace movement to justify their actions. At times this was no more than a moral cloak to conceal the secular ideology which actually led the peace movement. A. C. Webster of Massey University, for example, claimed that NZ had created the nuclear ship ban out of Christian values, yet his supporting arguments were replete with the political values of radicals. To be precise, he stressed environmentalism, a dismissal of nuclear deterrence and military alliances, fear of NZ's becoming a nuclear target, concerns about US subversion, and dismissal of the Soviet threat as motivations for NZ's actions.²⁷⁹ Moreover, Webster insisted that NZ's decision to diverge from US Cold War strategy was not politically based.

While they may have rejected certain Christian teachings, radicals were not above trying to convert churchgoers to their own secular "religion". Radicals made inroads into the churches, as individual members adopted the "peace and justice" perspective, and they also made allies of convenience out of those Christians who rejected nuclear weapons as immoral. However, any claims that radicals regarded the absolute "immorality" of nuclear weapons as a reason for NZ's leaving ANZUS were incongruous, given that one of the main characteristics of the far left was its *rejection* of Christian moral absolutism. Radicals

²⁷⁹ A. C. Webster, "NZ's Anti-Nuclear Policy- Why?", *Peacelink*, December 1988, p. 13.

and the churches were usually on opposite sides of the fence on such moral issues as extra-marital sex, abortion, divorce, and homosexuality.

The heightened emphasis of some Christians on peace and justice was seen as an improvement by Peter Matheson, who claimed that previous moral pronouncements by the church dealt almost exclusively with individual morality.²⁸⁰ However, Matheson was concerned that many church people, while pro-peace, had yet to adopt radicals' multi-issue prescription for peace. Despite their use of Church members, radicals were willing to tolerate Christian morality only so long as it was aimed at the nuclear arsenal of the West. It seems that the closest religion came to influencing the peace movement core's direction was when individual church members opposed nuclear weapons on moral grounds, or when they embraced Liberation Theology, a convenient mix of Christianity and socialism. Liberation Theology was a religious doctrine acceptable to radicals, as it could be used to help justify Communist revolutions in the Third World. Like the New Left, Liberation Theology was more anti-imperialist than pacifist, and the use of force was often condoned if it would lead to "liberation". Liberation Theology forms the last type of peace movement linkage to be addressed in this chapter, namely, the linkage between socialism and Christianity.

Barry Jones, a Catholic priest, claimed that Liberation Theology began in the 1960s when poor people in Latin America formed groups to reflect on the Bible and the nature of their oppression. Jones claimed that Liberation Theology was an attempt to justify the desire for change by the oppressed, using Christianity as a guide. Marxist concepts were used by Liberation Theology merely to "illuminate".²⁸¹ It would seem that, when faced with the problem of trying to encourage a revolution based on atheistic Marxism-Leninism, the solution in the face of the religious faith of Latin American peasants was to teach

²⁸⁰ Peter Matheson, "The Churches and I.Y.P", *Peacelink*, February 1986, p. 5.

²⁸¹ Barry Jones, "Liberation Theology: An Introduction", *Peacelink*, November 1986, p. 3.

the peasants that a Communist revolution was consistent with their religious beliefs.

Bernard Dennehy argued that Liberation Theology had an even earlier genesis in NZ, starting when nineteenth-century Maori prophets adopted the liberation themes of the Old Testament. While Liberation Theology in Latin America focused on economic justice, and in Africa on cultural imperialism, Dennehy believed that racism and sexism should be the focus of Liberation Theology in NZ.²⁸² Another liberation theologian concerned with NZ's situation was Terry Wall, who was sent by the NZ National Council of Churches (NZNCC) to Budapest in 1987 to attend a seminar "Towards a Theology of Peace", organised by the Reformed Church of Hungary. That such an international religious gathering was permitted in a Soviet-Bloc nation was an indication of the USSR's support for Liberation Theology. Wall returned from Budapest convinced that liberation theologians had to help reduce the "enemy image" Westerners had of the Communist bloc in order to foster peace.²⁸³

Jocelyn Armstrong, as General Secretary of the NZNCC in 1985, saw peace and justice as the primary issues for the NZNCC. As a feminist, Armstrong also accepted the connection between the oppression of women and the oppression of indigenous people, and she believed that a women's perspective would help solve the world's problems. In 1985 the NZNCC contained representatives from various churches, but it appears to have been dominated by Liberation Theology and would not have been representative of the majority of NZ's Christians. The 1981 meeting of the NZNCC had discussed issues important to radicals such as nuclear testing, the Springbok tour, peace education, nuclear alliances, Nuclear-Free Zones, and Treaty of Waitangi issues.²⁸⁴ Both the NZ and US National Council of Churches were affiliated to the World Council of

²⁸² Bernard Dennehy, "Liberation Theology in Aotearoa", *Peacelink*, November 1986, p. 4.

²⁸³ Terry Wall, "Enemy Images Challenged", *Peacelink*, December 1988, p. 5.

²⁸⁴ Marjorie Pierce, "Working for Peace With Justice- The National Council of Churches", *Peacelink*, October 1985, p. 4.

Churches, (WCC) and many of the leadership positions in both national organisations were filled by those who ignored or just misread Soviet behaviour in the Cold War. A delegation from the USNCC visited the USSR in 1984, and it returned praising the state of religion in the Soviet Union and condemning the US role in the nuclear arms race.²⁸⁵ Not surprisingly, the NZNCC backed the nuclear ship ban in 1985.

The NZNCC also set up a Christian Peace Network (CPN), which was concerned with justice issues in NZ. In particular, it focused on the issue of Maori land claims. The CPN believed that owning land was not conducive to peace, and it claimed Biblical support for this notion in Old Testament references to tensions over land. Apparently, many of the Israelites' problems had arisen when they had moved from sharing land to privatising it. The CPN believed that the Bible supported the Maori or Communist system of land ownership; therefore, it threw its weight behind Maori land claims. In 1990 land issues were its primary focus.²⁸⁶

Concomitant with efforts to spread Liberation Theology in NZ was the ecumenical movement. The ecumenical movement involved a search for co-operation and unity between Christian denominations, and as such it had the potential to be a useful tool for radicals. They could maximise their efforts to spread Liberation Theology by controlling an ecumenical organisation. Members from various churches could be imbued with "correct" thinking, and these converts could then spread the new gospel in their respective churches. In support of ecumenism, liberation theologian Jocelyn Armstrong claimed that the unity of God was broken by racism, sexism, class warfare, and environmental exploitation, and that the essence of God was community. In essence, radical ideology was seen as Christianity in action. The Conference of Churches in Aotearoa/NZ (CCANZ) launched an ecumenical initiative in 1987 that was intended to support bi-culturalism, power-sharing with Maori, and full

²⁸⁵ James Finn, "The Peace Movement in the US", in Kaltefleiter and Pfaltzgraff, *The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States*, p. 168.

²⁸⁶ Dan-Mark Gibson, "Where There is Landlessness There Can Be No Peace", *Peacelink*, March 1990, p. 11.

participation of women in decision making. The CCANZ had a Peace and Justice unit, and it was claimed that, with regard to opposing war, “For us it is just as important to seek to counter the attitudes and economic and political forces that under-gird the spirit of militarism”.²⁸⁷

While Liberation Theology was the only form of religion with any real influence in the peace movement’s core, primarily because it was almost indistinguishable from radical orthodoxy, the role of mainstream religion was more noticeable in the peace movement’s periphery. This was especially true when a significant proportion of the public became fearful of the prospect of a nuclear war in the early 1980s. However, most church members were concerned about nuclear weapons as a single issue, and they did not share the multi-issue radical agenda of liberation theologians. Whereas the peace movement core was dominated by those universally opposed to military alliances, polls found that NZ churchgoers were one of the social groups most likely to support ANZUS. Those groups least likely to support ANZUS included Labour Party voters, left-wing radicals, young urbanites, students, and those without any religion.²⁸⁸

The presence of mainstream Christians in anti-nuclear marches provided a convenient cover and some measure of respectability for peace movement radicals, but it did not change the political nature of the core. In addition, while most churches were morally opposed to nuclear weapons, there was still division within these churches over the morality of nuclear deterrence. To dislike nuclear weapons was one thing. To be prepared to end the West’s policy of nuclear deterrence, at the risk of losing the Cold War, was something else. Some Christians were prepared to take that risk and call for an end to nuclear deterrence, but others were not. To claim that NZ’s stand against nuclear weapons was religiously motivated is, therefore, too simplistic.

²⁸⁷ “Ecumenism and Peacemaking”, *Peacelink*, December 1989, p. 5.

²⁸⁸ Webster, “Who Supports New Zealand’s ANZUS Policy?”, pp. 2-3.

For example, church support for the Peace Squadron came from radical priests and some laity, not from the churches themselves. Indeed, peace groups were usually marginal in churches, often forming house-based ecumenical groups. It could thus be argued that Protestant and Catholic peace activists had more in common with each other than with members of their own church.²⁸⁹ Nor did the Catholic Church speak with one voice. Pax Christi was a Catholic peace group which tried to “educate” Catholics on Liberation Theology and direct action; whereas, after 1978 John Paul II warned Catholic liberation theologians of the dangers of Marxism, and the Brazilian theologian, Leonardo Boff, was censured by Rome. However, in 1986 the Pope also admitted, in a letter to Brazilian bishops, that Liberation Theology could be useful.²⁹⁰ In 1983 the Catholic Bishops of America had condemned the nuclear targeting of civilians as immoral, and supported the US Nuclear Freeze campaign. Unfortunately, the two actions were contradictory. If the Nuclear Freeze had actually occurred, it would have prevented US weapons modernisation, thereby locking-in the old Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) nuclear strategy of the US.

MAD was designed to deter war by holding the opponent’s civilian population hostage. The older, less accurate US nuclear weapons were suited to this purpose, as it was much easier for them to hit a city than it was to hit a Soviet missile silo. As the US updated its nuclear weapons, the ability to target military installations improved, which allowed for a “flexible response” or “counter-force” strategy which did not target cities. By supporting the Freeze campaign, the US Bishops were actually helping to keep in place the MAD strategy, the very thing they saw as immoral. The US Bishops also failed to acknowledge that nuclear deterrence had prevented the “immoral” use of nuclear weapons ever since World War II. In contrast, Pope John Paul II refused to condemn nuclear deterrence, so long as it was temporary and a step towards disarmament, and he worked with Ronald Reagan to undermine communism.

²⁸⁹ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 257.

The divisions within the Catholic Church were resented by those church members who had decided to work against nuclear weapons and the West's military, and who were unhappy that so few of the faithful had joined them. Doggedly they sought to get their church leadership to direct resources toward seeking peace and justice, as defined by Liberation Theology. Jon Curnow bemoaned the fact that, while the Catholic Church was anti-war, it had not adopted direct action against the military machine. Curnow praised the tradition of Catholic "resistance" which had been born during the Vietnam War, but he complained that "peace action and education are not in the mainstream of church concern in this country [NZ]."²⁹¹ The division between peace and justice advocates and conservative Catholics continues to this day. In April 1997, the NZ Catholic Churches Office for Justice, Peace and Development was critical of the stance of visiting Chicago nun Sister Connie Driscoll, who arrived for the Beyond Dependency Conference. As her views on welfare dependency did not meet with the approval of the Office for Justice, Peace and Development, it was claimed that she was not a real nun.²⁹²

The level of opprobrium which existed between radical and conservative Christians was yet another indication of the divisions existing within churches. Those who had adopted Liberation Theology and radical ideology found themselves at odds with those Christians who still supported nuclear deterrence and the West's efforts in the Cold War. One response of the former was to condemn the latter as "Christian Fundamentalists" or as rabid right-wingers who were prepared to risk a nuclear Armageddon for their beliefs. For example, Lloyd Geering claimed that "Armageddon Theology", supposedly followed by those American Christians who saw the Cold War in terms of good versus evil, was more of a threat than the Soviet Union's revolutionary ideology. He claimed that

²⁹⁰ Dennehy, "Liberation Theology in Aotearoa", p. 13.

²⁹¹ John Curnow, "Catholic Churches and Peace", *Peacelink*, October 1985, p. 3.

²⁹² *Dominion*, April 2, 1997, p. 6.

such Christians would rather die in a nuclear Armageddon than lose the Cold War, and they might even relish the possibility of their heavenly reward.²⁹³

The division over nuclear issues threatened to split Christianity asunder. The issue of the morality of nuclear deterrence was the subject of fierce debate amongst two schools of Christians, referred to here as Realists and Idealists. Christian Realists argued that Christian ethics could not be applied to the actions of states without considering the political realities. In other words, applying moral absolutes regardless of the possible political consequences was seen as unwise by Christian Realists, as it risked far greater evils. Geoffry Goodwin maintained that the leaders of nations had a responsibility for the security of their states, and that the uncritical application of Christian ideals could compromise that security. Principles might conflict where conscience and power met.²⁹⁴ It was necessary to acknowledge the character of the environment, even while holding to a vision of the ideal situation. For Realists, while nuclear deterrence wasn't morally perfect, there was no alternative to it when one was confronted with a hostile, suspicious, and nuclear-armed totalitarian regime. For Christian Realists such as G. R. Dunstan, the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers had no ideal "Christian" solution. There was only a choice among evils.²⁹⁵

Christian Idealists held an absolutist view of nuclear deterrence, claiming that nuclear weapons use could never be justified, regardless of the circumstances. Christians such as Barrie Paskins viewed even the *conditional* intention to use nuclear weapons, such as warning an opponent that a nuclear attack might result in a like response, as immoral.²⁹⁶ As nuclear weapons were immoral because of their inability to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants in war,

²⁹³ Lloyd Geering, "The Armageddon Myth", *Peacelink*, May 1987, p. 11.

²⁹⁴ Geoffry Goodwin (Ed.), *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, London, 1982, p. 36.

²⁹⁵ G. R. Dunstan "Theological Method in the Deterrence Debate", in Goodwin (Ed.), *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 50.

²⁹⁶ Barrie Paskins, "Deep Cuts Are Morally Imperative", in Goodwin, (Ed.), *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, pp. 45-115.

planning to use them, even only on the condition that they had been used first by the opponent, was also immoral. Hence, the nuclear deterrent strategy of the West was immoral and needed to be replaced.

Christian Realists responded that the aim of nuclear deterrence was to *prevent* the use of immoral nuclear weapons. Deterring an immoral act (a nuclear attack) by threatening to commit an immoral act (nuclear retaliation) was, according to them, morally justified. An absence of nuclear deterrence might actually *increase* the chances of opponents using nuclear weapons. Christian Idealists, however, refused to accept this as a valid defence of nuclear deterrence.

Despite their differences, both Christian Idealists and Christian Realists realised that nuclear weapons themselves were immoral, and both desired a world where nuclear deterrence did not exist. The distinction was that the former insisted on ending nuclear deterrence as soon as possible, regardless of the impact on Western security, while the latter believed that the dynamics of the Cold War needed to be taken into consideration. In dismissing the consequences for the West, Christian Idealists shared the view of radicals. Because of their moral impatience, they were also more likely to be attracted to unilateral forms of disarmament favoured by the peace movement. The slow progress of arms control talks, designed to facilitate multi-lateral or bi-lateral disarmament, meant that unilateralism appealed to those Christian Idealists who could not wait for mutual, verifiable, and stable reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Regardless of which side's arguments seemed the more convincing, Christian Realist or Christian Idealist, the main point is that within Christianity "the jury is still out" over nuclear deterrence. The NZ nuclear ship ban was NZ's own form of unilateral disarmament, based on a rejection of nuclear deterrence; but any claim to religious support for the ban must be tempered by the fact that there were strong religious arguments against such acts of unilateral disarmament. The peace movement utilised the views of only one segment of the Christian

population, namely, Christian Idealists who were moral absolutists on the nuclear question.

Along with Christian Idealists, Liberation Theology Christians were also adamant that the West's nuclear deterrence was immoral. Whether this was due to religious conviction or Cold War politics is open to question. Other Christians, who did not fit into either of the above categories, appeared to have supported the NZ nuclear ship ban for more pragmatic reasons, such as the fear that the presence of nuclear-armed ships in NZ ports made NZ a nuclear target or because they accepted the arguments of those supporting unilateral disarmament. However, the presence of such people in the ranks of the peace movement's periphery did not mean that the main motivation of the peace movement was religious. Nor did it mean that the churches had rejected collective security. The modern peace movement was, and still is, driven by radical ideology, which is often at odds with Christianity and which tries to co-opt church support by means of Liberation Theology.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

Security without idealism in foreign policy is like a boat without a rudder, but idealism without security is like a rudder without a boat.

Henry Kissinger²⁹⁷

Although the ideology of radicals in the peace movement's core lay behind many of its arguments against ANZUS, the majority of the NZ public did not share that ideology. As a result, the peace movement had to find arguments which could successfully play on existing public concerns. The most potent tactic was to focus on nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence and nuclear power, thereby increasing the size of the anti-nuclear component of the peace movement. Due to existing fears and suspicions about things nuclear, the international peace movement could undermine what it saw as the Capitalist, sexist, racist and militaristic West by utilising the Western public's instinct for self-preservation. As it was stated by Erich Geiringer, self preservation was the main aim of the anti-nuclear movement.²⁹⁸

Stressing the dangers inherent in the West's reliance on nuclear deterrence was the most effective way to tap into people's instinctive aversion to nuclear weapons, and the nuclear ship visits which occurred under ANZUS were a convenient way to direct that aversion against ANZUS. Therefore, claiming that such visits and ANZUS were part of US preparations for nuclear war-fighting helped to create an anti-nuclear movement against an alliance which radicals despised for ideological reasons. Although most anti-nuclear activists denied that ideology lay behind their anti-nuclearism, and instead claimed to be driven by

²⁹⁷ Quoted in the speech by US Ambassador to NZ Paul Cleveland, "The Benefits of Collective Security", in *New Zealand International Review*, July/August 1986, p. 24.

²⁹⁸ Erich Geiringer, *Malice in Blunderland: An Anti-Nuclear Primer*, Auckland, 1985, p. 49.

“moral” imperatives,²⁹⁹ many of the arguments used to convince the public to embrace unilateral nuclear disarmament did have an ideological dimension.

It could also be argued that both nuclearism and anti-nuclearism were competing ideologies,³⁰⁰ but the aim of radicals was to discredit nuclear deterrence and ANZUS without making it obvious to the NZ public that Socialist and anti-American ideologies were driving the peace movement core. Radicals could achieve their aim of hamstringing US efforts against Communist regimes and revolutions around the world whilst appearing to be expressing the public’s anti-nuclear fears. One way to extract NZ from the Western Alliance was to persuade NZers that membership in ANZUS was too dangerous for NZ due to the nuclear arsenal of the dominant partner in the alliance. Various other methods of criticising ANZUS will be covered in the next chapter, but the anti-nuclear critique is the most important and shall be addressed first.

Nuclear Deterrence

The very notion of deterrence, nuclear or otherwise, is generally dismissed by the peace movement. This may be attributable to radicals’ belief that US-style democracy was not worth defending. Whereas Western democracy was unable to meet their utopian standards, radicals gave Communist regimes, despite their far worse record of human rights abuses, the benefit of doubt.³⁰¹ Indeed, some radicals expressed a preference for the “participatory democracy” of Communist countries in which election turn-outs could run as high as 100%. While there was usually only one party for which to vote, and any opposition groups usually faced violent repression, this was unimportant; the salient factor was that everyone got to participate in the voting process, thus making it more “democratic”. However, one of the greatest ironies of the modern peace movement was that it could never

²⁹⁹ Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword*, p.237.

³⁰⁰ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, pp. 11-17.

³⁰¹ Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p. 243.

have existed as an independent organisation which opposed government policy within the Communist countries it so idealised.

In addition to the assumption that Western democracy was not worth defending, the peace movement also maintained that deterrence had a tendency to result in an opponent's feeling threatened, thereby resulting in a strengthening in the opponent's defences. An arms race would than ensue, one which could lead to war despite the defensive intentions of the two parties involved. Deterrence could also create enemies where none had existed before. The solution, according to the peace movement, was for the West to reduce its defences or to opt out of the arms race.

The notion that aggression can be deterred by increasing the cost of aggression for the attacker has always played a key role in human history, and it appears to work in many cases, from the individual to the international level. The idea that a bully is less likely to intimidate someone who will offer strong resistance is a fundamental everyday example of deterrence in action. In the Cold War Western liberal democracy was threatened by a totalitarian power in possession of awesome conventional and nuclear military forces. The only way to deter an attack by this power was to build defences sufficient to persuade it that any attack on the West would be so costly as to be suicidal.

Nevertheless, radicals appeared to rule out any form of violence to deter aggression, at least regarding the defence of Western democracy. Some peace activists argued that there was little historical evidence that aggression had ever been deterred by armed force.³⁰² However, if war breaks out despite deterrence, then it is likely that the deterrent was not considered credible by the aggressor. It was a search for maximum credibility which lay behind the US's nuclear strategy. Having pointed out that nuclear deterrence could fail, the anti-nuclear movement

³⁰² DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 41.

then proceeded to attack the very measures designed to boost its chances of success.

To sell the idea of unilateral Western nuclear disarmament to the public, it was necessary to dismiss the validity of deterrence theory and to highlight the risks of nuclear deterrence, while simultaneously downplaying the potential consequences for Western democracy. Once the public's fear of nuclear weapons outweighed its fear of Soviet totalitarianism, enough people would join in the anti-nuclear movement's promotion of unilateral nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from the Western Alliance to allow communism to triumph in the Cold War. At least, this was the aim of the few in the peace movement who were pro-Soviet members of the Communist Party. Most radicals were probably not consciously pursuing such an agenda. Nevertheless, their dissatisfaction with Western society made them receptive to those Communist arguments which were presented in terms of morality and self-preservation. Radicals tried to convince the public of the validity of such arguments, not necessarily because they supported the USSR, but because they genuinely believed these arguments.

As the Cold War progressed and the nuclear arsenals of both sides expanded, the public grew increasingly concerned about the potential consequences of nuclear war. This gave radicals in the peace movement an opportunity to undermine the West's deterrence strategy. The post-World War II success of nuclear deterrence was countered by dire warnings that its catastrophic failure was imminent.³⁰³ It was asserted that, if nuclear deterrence failed, it would result in the extinction of the human race. This was probably true, but peace movement advocates ignored that the West's nuclear strategy was designed to prevent such an occurrence while also preserving the West's way of life. In contrast, these advocates decided that it was better to end nuclear deterrence and

³⁰³ For example, see Robert Mann, "Environmental Threats from Nuclear Weapons", in *The Bomb and You*, Auckland, 1975, p. 8.

avoid the risk of nuclear war, even if it meant that the Western system was endangered.

The peace movement also questioned the benefits of successful nuclear deterrence. While it had almost certainly prevented war between the superpowers, it had not prevented wars in the Third World, nor had it brought justice to most of the world's population.³⁰⁴ While this is correct, justice for the Third World was not what nuclear deterrence was designed to achieve. It was designed to preserve Western democracy and avert a nuclear holocaust. The US's nuclear policy had seven main goals: to deter any Soviet nuclear attack on the US or its allies; to decrease any incentives for the Soviets to attempt a first strike; to provide the ability to fight a nuclear war, if deterrence failed, at a minimal cost to the US; to terminate a war; to prevent nuclear blackmail by the Soviets; and to act as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations.³⁰⁵ Fabricating non-existent goals for Western nuclear strategy and then claiming that it had failed to achieve these "goals" was an unusual form of logic, but it was one which was used by some peace activists.

The peace movement's claim that nuclear deterrence was unnecessary and dangerous was bolstered by its portrayal of the nuclear arms race as the result of a self-perpetuating attitude in the US that was inherent in the Military-Industrial Complex. Professor Richard Falk claimed that the Nuclear National Security (NNS) perspective, or "nuclearism", had been ingrained in the US governmental process. He maintained that the NNS perspective prevented peace within societies, as it required peacetime mobilisation of the society in a constant state of emergency preparedness.³⁰⁶ Secrecy, covert operations ("Western state terrorism") and surveillance of dissenters resulted from this mentality. Accordingly, non-nuclear states allied to nuclear states surrendered part of their

³⁰⁴ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 7.

³⁰⁵ Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, pp. 18-19.

³⁰⁶ Falk, *Nuclearism and the National Interest*, p. 9.

national sovereignty, as they were unlikely to be consulted on any decision to use nuclear weapons. As a result, according to Falk, the NNS perspective eroded both civil liberties and democracy. The answer was to allow participatory democracy and increased “public” (read “peace movement”) influence on national defence policy. Falk hailed the NZ anti-nuclear ships ban as an important symbolic gesture by a non-nuclear state, one which could help end the reliance on NNS which existed elsewhere.

While a NNS perspective may have resulted in the partial militarisation of Western society, it is hard to see how this could have been avoided if the West hoped to survive, let alone prevail, during the Cold War. Falk demonstrated no sympathy for the Western system, which probably explains his readiness to dispense with NNS and his support for the NZ ship ban. He held to the radical definition of peace and justice, equating “peacemindedness” with socialism, multiculturalism and feminism, and he claimed that liberation from the nuclear threat was only possible through the struggle, concerted direct action and political participation of the oppressed. People couldn’t rely on the wisdom of their governments to see them through.³⁰⁷

In attacking Western nuclear deterrence, various other tactics were employed. One was to attack the Western MAD nuclear strategy as immoral since it threatened nuclear attack on Soviet cities and civilians if the US were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was incongruous for peace movement radicals to use arguments based on strict moral principles, due to their belief in moral relativism, but this approach occurred nonetheless. Radical organisations such as the Peace and Justice Forum of the Wellington Labour Regional Council (WLRC) happily used religious concepts of good and evil. “Anyone who squarely faces [the reality of nuclear war] must cease to support the use or possession of nuclear weapons, or stand condemned of condoning an appalling potential evil.”³⁰⁸ Similar

³⁰⁷ Falk, *Nuclearism and the National Interest*, pp. 6-7

³⁰⁸ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 8.

statements by Christian liberation theologians within the peace movement could be viewed with less scepticism, even if they had chosen unusual bedfellows.³⁰⁹

In judging the morality of nuclear deterrence, it must also be remembered that its aim was to prevent war and to prevent a Soviet victory. In this sense, the issue was not one of “better dead than Red” or vice versa. The aim of nuclear deterrence was to be neither Red nor dead.³¹⁰ The above objectives met the moral test of *Jus ad bellum* (just cause and righteous intention). It can also be argued that, although it threatened nuclear reprisals, nuclear deterrence was primarily designed to prevent the evil of nuclear war from occurring and was therefore morally justified. It might not have been the ideal thing to do, but it was the necessary and right thing to do. While the actual use of such weapons might not meet the requirements of *Jus in bello* (use of discrimination and proportionate force in war), it could be argued that the US counter-force strategy attempted to overcome such a moral dilemma by not targeting civilian population centres. However, this did not prevent the peace movement, with all its talk about morality, from strongly opposing counter-force strategy.

Some in the peace movement argued that, in addition to being immoral, nuclear weapons were also illegal, or at least should be declared illegal, under international law. The drive to declare nuclear weapons illegal was intended to provide another weapon against Western nuclear deterrence. If the use of nuclear weapons was illegal, it could be argued that the threat of their use was also illegal, and this would have enabled the peace movement to urge Western unilateral disarmament on legal grounds. One radical scholar contended that the Nuremberg Principles, regarding the punishment of war criminals, could be applied to Western leaders because their threatened use of nuclear weapons constituted a crime against peace.³¹¹ On the other hand, it could be argued that

³⁰⁹ For example, see Ray Galvin’s radical Christian viewpoint in *Living Without ANZUS*, Auckland, 1984.

³¹⁰ Arthur Hockaday, “In Defence of Deterrence”, in Geoffrey Goodwin, *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 80.

³¹¹ Richard Falk, *Nuclearism and National Interest*, pp. 21-23.

nuclear deterrence *upheld* the Nuremberg Principles by deterring war and the use of nuclear weapons. The question of whether the Soviets would have eliminated their own nuclear weapons in the absence of an independent Soviet peace movement to apply internal pressure on the Kremlin was also conveniently overlooked.

Part of this legal campaign was the search for an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons from the World Court at the Hague. The case was supported by NZ and was ruled on by the World Court in July 1996. The Court declared that the use of nuclear weapons was illegal *unless* it was in self defence. This did not rule out nuclear deterrence, much to the annoyance of the peace movement, although it still attempted to claim the ruling as a victory. In any event, the very notion of outlawing nuclear weapons was beset by great difficulties, the main one being enforcement. Even if every nuclear-armed country abolished its nuclear arsenal, the knowledge to build such weapons would still exist, and it was readily transferable. To ensure that no country secretly broke the ban would require an unprecedented level of inspection and verification which would be extremely hard to achieve, especially within non-democratic countries. If a conventional war broke out, the temptation for the losing side to build nuclear weapons would also be enormous. If one warring state rebuilt its nuclear arsenal before its opponent, it was hard to see how it could be prevented by non nuclear-armed states from using that arsenal. The only possible solution would have been to allow the existence of small nuclear arsenals, held by responsible key states, to discourage anyone from the use of such weapons. Arguments over who was sufficiently "responsible" would probably have resulted.

A similar recourse to law was employed by the NZ United Nations Association when it requested in 1980 that the Human Rights Commission consider whether the government could overrule Auckland Harbour Board by-laws to permit the berthing of US nuclear warships at civilian wharves. The UNA pointed to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which stated

that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person".³¹² The Human Rights Commission dismissed the UNA argument, pointing out that the meaning of Article 3 was explained in articles 6, 7 and 9 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which carried more legal force than the Universal Declaration. Apparently, Article 3 of the latter was meant to provide protection against arbitrary abuses of power by governments, not to protect large groups of people from potential danger. If the latter interpretation was valid, then it could be taken to mean that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights could be used to oppose the construction of oil refineries and airports in urban areas, just to cite two examples.

Another peace movement tactic was to denounce the US's counter-force strategy, which was gradually phased in to replace MAD. Nuclear Utilisation Theories (NUTS) were designed to counter a dilemma raised by the MAD strategy. MAD was designed to deter a nuclear attack on the US with the threat of a full-scale nuclear response against the cities of the USSR. In effect, MAD threatened mutual suicide. However, this left the problem of how to deter a Soviet conventional attack against a US ally. The USSR could reasonably assume that the US would not risk global destruction to protect, for example, a country like West Germany; thus, MAD would not act as a deterrent in such a case. NUTS tried to solve this problem by threatening limited nuclear strikes designed to counter a specific situation without resorting to a full-scale nuclear exchange. This would involve fighting a controlled or limited nuclear war, with accurate missiles designed to hit military targets rather than wiping out whole cities. This threat was designed to prevent a Soviet miscalculation that they could safely attack a US ally.³¹³

The actual likelihood of managing a controlled or limited nuclear war, without its escalating due to a loss of command and control facilities, was very

³¹² Human Rights Commission, *Nuclear Warships: Report on Presentations by the United Nations Association on Nuclear Warships*, Wellington, 1980, p. 1.

³¹³ Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, pp. 19-23.

small, and the peace movement was quick to point this out. However, whether NUTs were practical was beside the point. Their main aim was to convince the Soviets that the US believed they were possible. The Soviets could not be certain that the US would not apply NUTs in a given situation. This uncertainty clearly helped to deter any Soviet conventional or nuclear attacks against US allies. Unfortunately, for this strategy to work it required the US to act as if it believed it was possible to “win” a limited nuclear war.³¹⁴

While this act was aimed at the Soviets, an unavoidable by-product was that it also scared the Western public and gave the peace movement a powerful propaganda tool. The peace movement argued that the US was in the grip of a dangerous delusion and that consequently the world was on the brink of nuclear war. Any US attempts at Civil Defence preparations for nuclear war were also seen as evidence that the US government was misleading its citizens about the survivability of a nuclear war. The peace movement warned that the search for a credible nuclear deterrent had led to an increased offensive capability in the West which had made the Soviet's insecure and had led to increased tensions and an escalating arms race.

The peace movement also attacked any US nuclear weapons developments that were designed to make NUTS credible, such as the development of faster and more accurate nuclear weapons, on the grounds that they made a “first strike” by the US all too possible. The Pershing II and Cruise deployments in Western Europe were criticised for this reason.³¹⁵ That US strategy now seemed to be offensive rather than defensive appeared sinister to many peace activists. While it was true that the growing technical advantage of the US increased its chances of hitting the USSR first, with the (slim) hope of destroying all Soviet ICBMs before they could be launched, this argument assumes that the US had either the motivation or the desire to initiate a nuclear war. Such an assumption

³¹⁴ Ibid., p. 23.

³¹⁵ Maire Leadbeater, *A New Zealand Guide to the Nuclear Arms Race*, Auckland, 1984, p. 20.

came easily to both liberals and radicals. The Vietnam War had entrenched malevolent images of the US government and military in their consciousness, and these images became increasingly negative with the advent of the Reagan administration and the heightened tensions of the early 1980s.

According to such images, US generals were bloodthirsty warmongers who were divorced from reality and certain that they could win a nuclear war. Even if all generals were not insane, it was feared that it would take only the overreaction of one madman to cause the extinction of humanity. Peace movement cartoons tended to press home this point, generating images of US generals as insane, bloodthirsty, incompetent or in love with nuclear technology. In the 1980s the portrayal of the US military as malevolent and bungling was accompanied by a campaign of vilification against President Ronald Reagan, which painted him as senile, inordinately aggressive, and lost in a cowboy-movie dream world.

In attacking the US's growing nuclear arsenal and the character of the US's Chief Executive, the peace movement also made much use of the fact that the US was the only country ever to have used nuclear weapons in warfare. Anniversaries of the Hiroshima bombing provided a useful platform to condemn US nuclear policy. However, in order to cast the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as examples of a US pre-disposition to use nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening peace movement arguments against US first-strike nuclear weapons development, it was first necessary to revise history. The actual situation facing the Allies toward the end of World War II was distorted by claims that Japan was prepared to surrender before the atomic bombings, and that the US used atomic weapons unnecessarily, with the aim of intimidating the Soviets.³¹⁶

The situation was far more complex than the peace movement led people to believe. Those politicians in Japan who wanted to surrender prior to the atomic bombings were not actually running Japan's war effort, and the US had also

³¹⁶ See W.J. Foote, *Disarmed and Defended*, Nelson, 1986, pp. 20-21.

planned conventional invasions of Japan for late 1945 and early 1946. If these invasions had gone ahead, they would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, both Japanese and Allied, as Japan's military junta would have ordered the Japanese people to fight to the end.³¹⁷ However, rather than addressing this reality, the peace movement preferred to portray the atomic bombings as being politically motivated, aimed primarily at the USSR rather than Japan.

As radical ideology was contemptuous of the US as a whole, it could easily accept Communist arguments which insinuated that US weapons developments were not purely for defensive purposes. After all, was not the US responsible for the economic and political repression of millions of Third World citizens around the globe?³¹⁸ Unfortunately, the fact that the NUTS bluff required the US to build weapons which could carry out a first strike gave increased credibility to such reasoning. In actuality, no Western nuclear strategy met with the approval of peace movement radicals, whose aim was that the West should have no nuclear strategy at all. This led to some contradictions. MAD was attacked as "immoral", but its successor, NUTS, which tried to avoid MAD's indiscriminate targeting of civilians, was decried as destabilising. The insinuation was that MAD, although immoral, was at least "stable" in the sense that it was less likely than NUTS to lead to an accidental nuclear war or to tempt the US to strike first. While it is true that the increased delivery speed of nuclear weapons could heighten the chances of an accidental nuclear war due to shorter warning times and reduced opportunities to check computer errors, it also enabled the US to abandon the MAD strategy.

The peace movement not only condemned MAD as immoral, and NUTS as dangerous, but it also opposed defensive US measures such as Anti-Ballistic

³¹⁷ Saburo Ienaga, *Japan's Last War*, Canberra, 1979, pp. 229-233.

³¹⁸ That many Americans viewed the US as responsible for all the world's ills may have been due to a certain amount of cultural arrogance. Both the traditional view of the US as the world's only hope, and the New Left's view of the US as an all-pervasive Satan, attributed more power and influence to the US than it actually had.

Missile (ABM) defences and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars” programme. Peace activists attacked Star Wars as potentially destabilising on the grounds that it might encourage the US to launch a first strike against the USSR because the SDI would enable America to survive a greatly weakened second strike by the Soviets. Peace activists also claimed that the Soviets might decide to attack the US before the SDI was operational and the security of the USSR was hopelessly compromised. In addition, the peace movement maintained that Star Wars was not financially or scientifically viable. Furthermore, it argued that a US pursuit of Star Wars would undermine arms control.³¹⁸

That each of the above developments worried the USSR as well as the peace movement radicals was no mere coincidence. If the US made advances in a particular field of weapons technology, it put the USSR at a disadvantage. In response, Western Communists, in their role as supporters of the USSR’s foreign policy, condemned the advances as “destabilising”. Radicals accepted many such arguments at face value rather than questioning the underlying motives of those who made them, and thus they became part of the peace movement’s rhetorical arsenal. One area of focus for the NZ peace movement was the deployment of Cruise missiles on US naval vessels in the Pacific.³¹⁹ Not only were they labelled as destabilising; they also provided a handy link between the peace movement’s critique of the arms race and its opposition to ANZUS.

US missile testing in the Pacific, US Trident submarines, and US military facilities in Australia were also attacked as “first strike” or “nuclear war-fighting” preparations that were occurring in NZ’s Pacific patch, thereby linking any distaste the public had for the nuclear arms race to feelings of territoriality. French nuclear testing was also mentioned in conjunction with descriptions of the US nuclear presence in the Pacific to help transfer public feeling against the French presence onto US warship visits. Australia’s command, control, communications

³¹⁸ Colin Burrows, “Star Wars is a Dangerous Red Herring”, *Peacelink*, April 1987, p. 5.

³¹⁹ See Galvin, *A Nuclear Free New Zealand...Now!* p. 17, and Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, pp. 12-13.

and intelligence facilities were identified as potential nuclear targets. Pine Gap gathered signals intelligence (SIGINT); Nurrungar was part of the system providing early warning of Soviet ICBM launches; and North West Cape provided communication with US nuclear submarines. While each of these facilities could theoretically be used to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike, they also had a stabilising effect on the Cold War by allowing for increased warning times and less chance of accidental war through communication errors. Peace movement opposition to them contradicted its professed concern about the perils of nuclear instability.

Nuclear ANZUS?

Some activists linked the undesirability of nuclear weapons to the undesirability of ANZUS by claiming that ANZUS offered NZ useless nuclear protection.³²⁰ That is, it was useless in the sense that, once nuclear weapons were used, everyone lost. The value of US nuclear protection was, therefore, minimal. If ANZUS dragged NZ into a nuclear conflict and nuclear war meant human extinction, then what was the point of being in ANZUS? This line of reasoning, however, totally ignored the purpose of the US nuclear deterrent as it applied to NZ. It was not designed to “save” NZ if nuclear war broke out, as the peace movement tried to suggest. Extended nuclear deterrence in the NZ context was actually designed to ensure that a conventional or nuclear attack on NZ never occurred.

By conveniently ignoring the real purpose of nuclear deterrence in the NZ context, peace activists were able to scoff at the likelihood of anyone being saved during a nuclear war. For example, Ray Galvin stated that the supposed “nuclear umbrella” provided by ANZUS could not stop a nuclear attack once it had started. However, he did concede that politicians were probably referring to extended nuclear deterrence when they promoted the umbrella, but he then

³²⁰ For example, see Marilyn Waring, as quoted in Roderic Alley “Alternatives to ANZUS: A Commentary”, in Alley, *Alternatives To ANZUS, Volume II*, p. 11.

dismissed as incredible the US guarantee to regard a nuclear attack against NZ in the same light as one against itself.³²¹ Oddly enough, NUTS, which people like Galvin decried, was designed to increase the credibility of such a guarantee. In any event, the chances of someone ever attacking NZ with nuclear weapons was nil.

Some peace activists argued that the presence of nuclear-armed US warships in the South Pacific merely drew Soviet nuclear attention to the area. If NZ invoked ANZUS against a nuclear-armed opponent, the presence of US nuclear ships could lead to the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. In other words, for NZ to accept US nuclear-ship visits was to accept that the US might use nuclear weapons to “protect” NZ, thereby making NZ a nuclear target. In effect, the ship visits provided proof that the NZ government had agreed that NZ would be a party to a future nuclear war.³²² In this manner the peace movement’s broadside against nuclear deterrence had allowed it to portray ANZUS as the embodiment of nuclear deterrence. A 1983 survey of the opinions of peace groups by the National Consultative Committee on Disarmament found that most believed that membership in ANZUS enhanced the risk that NZ would become a nuclear target.³²³

The chances of a US warship being targeted while it was in a NZ port were extremely remote. In any scenario other than that of a Soviet first strike, the ships would put to sea in the earliest phases of a crisis to assume their respective battle stations.³²⁴ Soviet missile doctrine also designated as prime targets ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines (which never visited allied ports), and command, control and communications facilities rather than individual US warships.³²⁵

³²¹ Ray Galvin, *Living Without ANZUS*, p. 23.

³²² Maire Leadbeater, *A New Zealand Guide to the Nuclear Arms Race*, p. 9.

³²³ Roderic Alley “The Alternatives to ANZUS, A Commentary”, in Alley, *Alternatives to ANZUS, Volume II*, p. 20.

³²⁴ James Bacon, *ANZUS, Yes or No? Preventing War, Providing Peace and Preserving Freedom*, Christchurch, 1989, p. 7.

³²⁵ Ramesh Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, pp. 51-52.

Moreover, the likelihood of the Soviets attempting a surprise first strike was negated by US nuclear strategy, which effectively deterred such a foolhardy attack. US nuclear deterrence, to the extent that it applied to NZ, was simply concerned with sending a message to any potential attackers, conventional or nuclear, that NZ had a large and nuclear armed friend. The occasional presence of US nuclear-armed warships in NZ was designed to help send this signal.

The notion of the immorality of nuclear weapons had definite implications for ANZUS. The peace movement maintained that the US no longer viewed ANZUS as a regional security arrangement but as an integral part of a global nuclear deterrence regime and that the US expected its allies to back its innovations in nuclear technology. If possessing nuclear weapons was immoral, then for NZ to be allied with a nation that possessed nuclear weapons was also immoral, as it meant condoning the possible use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, some peace activists believed that it was immoral for NZ to conduct conventional exercises with a nuclear armed power.³²⁶ Others went even further, viewing military association with Australia, which happened to be an ally of a nuclear power, as morally contaminating. In truth, the morality argument dovetailed nicely with the radicals' goal of ending NZ's military co-operation with the Western Alliance. Communist aims were also well served by the argument that it was immoral to be allied with the US.

Another moral case for leaving ANZUS was that it meant handing over some of NZ's sovereignty on foreign policy. The US would be making the decisions that might involve NZ in a nuclear war. However, this argument clashed with claims that ANZUS was a "nuclear alliance". If NZ had no influence on the nuclear strategy of the US, ANZUS was only "nuclear" in the sense that the US was nuclear armed. The peace movement's case against ANZUS on nuclear grounds thus basically came down to "guilt by association". However,

³²⁶ Peter Winsley and Jan Gould, *An Alternative Defence Policy*, Peace and Justice Forum, Wellington Labour Regional Council, 1985, p. 1.

regarding the topic of morals, one thing must be pointed out. If association with a nuclear-armed US was immoral, then what were the moral implications of the peace movement's preference for unilateral disarmament? A peace activist had to consider the morality of any oppression and injustice other people might suffer as a result of the policies he or she advocated.³²⁷ However, peace activists were not too concerned about such questions. According to Geiringer, the US would just have to find a non-nuclear way to deter the Soviets.³²⁸ Unfortunately, radicals believed that the injustices extant in the Western system were of more concern than the potential injustices which could stem from a Western defeat in the Cold War.

Apart from the occasional visit of US nuclear warships, NZ in ANZUS was already "nuclear free" to a large extent. No nuclear weapons were stationed, manufactured or tested in NZ. In 1957 the National government had refused to store British nuclear weapons in NZ, and in 1977 a Royal Commission on Nuclear Energy found in favour of hydro-electric power.³²⁹ That the peace movement had a broader definition of nuclear-free was a result of radicals' desire, dressed in a cloak of moral dogmatism, to use any means to disengage NZ from co-operation with the US. The National Party was condemned as "pro-nuclear", and the Labour Party was touted as "anti-nuclear" simply on the basis that the latter went one step further along a continuum of what "nuclear free" might mean.³³⁰ More recently, one activist has even argued that Holyoake's 1957 "no storage" pledge was broken, on the grounds that "Nuclear weapons were stored in NZ ports on visiting US Navy warships."³³⁰

³²⁷ Arthur Hockaday, "In Defence of Deterrence", in Geoffry Goodwin, *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 87.

³²⁸ Geiringer, *Malice in Blunderland*, pp. 98-104.

³²⁹ James Bacon, *ANZUS, Yes or No?*, p. 21.

³³⁰ Further discussion on this particular topic can be found in the article by Ramesh Thakur, "Creation of the Nuclear free New Zealand Myth: Brinksmanship Without a Brink", *Asian Survey*, October 1989, pp. 919-939.

³³⁰ Robert E. White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1984- New Zealand Becomes Nuclear Free*, Auckland, 1997, p. 11.

Another difference between National and Labour policy over nuclear ships was also minor in degree, but significant in its consequences. In 1970 National introduced a system whereby annual blanket clearances were given for US conventionally powered ships, with individual clearance required for nuclear powered ships. In 1984, Labour changed the policy to require individual clearance for all visiting warships.³³¹

Unilateralism As an Alternative

The peace movement claimed that the arms race had led to a situation of “overkill” whereby the world’s nuclear arsenals could destroy the world many times over. While this is true, it did not follow that the peace movement’s solution to the problem, namely, unilateral Western disarmament, was the best way to address that problem.³³² For several decades the Communist world had been trying to use the Western peace movements to promote unilateral nuclear disarmament by the West. In 1950 the NZ political cartoonist David Low addressed such efforts in a particularly astute political cartoon. Focusing on the Soviet-backed World Peace Committee’s conference in Prague of that same year, the cartoon, which was entitled “Peace, Imperfect Peace”, drew delegates as sheep, with the conference podium being staffed by a mixture of sheep and grinning wolves. Each sheep wore a small atomic bomb around its throat. A sheep speaking from the podium stated:

*The motion is that we sheep and wolves promise never to attack each another, and to show we mean it we sheep will unconditionally stop wearing these dangerous bombs which might go off if anyone tried to bite us.*³³³

³³¹ White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand*, p. 7.

³³² However, many activists viewed unilateralism as necessary. See Bruce Gooding’s interview of two visiting German Green Party members, “Greens’ Peace”, *NZ Listener*, July 21, 1984, pp. 22-23.

³³³ Colin Seymour-Ure and Jim Schoff, *David Low*, London, 1985, p. 111.

The nuclear arms race was decried by the peace movement as a self-perpetuating game that would inevitably lead to war. This wisdom was based on the experience of the great powers immediately prior to World War I. As an arms race between European states had preceded that conflict, the peace movement concluded that the arms race itself had caused World War I and that the same phenomenon in the Cold War would lead to World War III. In point of fact, this line of thought conveniently ignored the national aims and rivalries which lay behind the pre-World War I arms build-up, and the fact that *nuclear* deterrence was not being practised prior to 1914. The nations involved had no idea of the horrors which would unfold during World War I, whereas both sides in the Cold War were perfectly aware of what would happen in a nuclear war, largely because of Japan's experience in 1945.

Some radical feminists in the peace movement had their own spin on the arms race and nuclear weapons. Not only did the apparently "male" preference for competition and hierarchy lead to sexism and war; masculine values also lay behind the nuclear arms race. In particular, supremacist feminists blamed the nuclear arms race on men. "Men seem to have an in-built and ongoing death wish."³³⁴ Some feminists also suggested that nuclear weapons design was a result of phallicism, with men worshipping nuclear weapons as a result.³³⁵

One morality argument used against the nuclear and conventional arms races was that the money spent on arms could have been used to feed starving children around the world or could have been spent on domestic social programmes.³³⁶ The peace movement was very fond of using statistics which purported to show how much was spent on arms each year, and how this could be used to provide everybody in the world with adequate food, shelter, education

³³⁴ Romi Curl, "The Nuclear Threat: A Lesbian Perspective", in *Women on Peace*, p. 36.

³³⁵ Betty Reardon, *Sexism and The War System*, pp. 34-36.

³³⁶ For example, see Maire Leadbeater, *A New Zealand Guide to the Nuclear Arms Race*, p. 13.

and medical care.³³⁷ However, as any form of military spending in the face of a security threat diverts resources from social spending, this line of thought led to the conclusion that any form of defence spending was immoral. While a pacifist might believe this, most people do not. In addition, while poverty might be one factor contributing to war, the ambition and ruthlessness of despots was surely another. Any attempt to address poverty by reducing military spending had to be correctly timed. If the West were to disarm unilaterally before economic equity between most nations prevailed, and while much of the world was still under the rule of dictatorships, it would have been an extremely dangerous gesture that might even have contributed to future wars rather than preventing them.

While the nuclear arms race might have spiralled beyond the number of weapons required even for NUTS-style deterrence, this was due as much to the Soviet's failure to negotiate arms control in good faith as it was to an American pre-disposition, especially under President Reagan, to divert excessive funds into nuclear arms. In addition, although American defence spending theoretically could have been better spent elsewhere, US national security required the absence of any armed, totalitarian threat. This situation did not exist during the Cold War, despite peace movement claims to the contrary. Moreover, if unilateral American disarmament had occurred, and if it had encouraged a Soviet nuclear attack, then disarmament itself would have had immoral results.³³⁷

In effect, the Western peace movement's interpretation of the nuclear arms race implied that it was the primary *cause* of US-Soviet hostility rather than a *symptom* of the ideological contest in the Cold War.³³⁸ The peace movement was able to make this claim so long as the Cold War continued, but it was easily proven wrong when the Cold War ended. The United States and Russia still

However, this assumes that the savings made would then be automatically sent overseas, and distributed exactly where the money was most needed, regardless of national borders. This could not be guaranteed.

³³⁷ Ramesh Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand* 1984, p. 9.

³³⁸ Nuclear ban supporters also argued that nuclear weapons and nuclear war were the main threat to NZ. See Ron Locker, "After the Nukes", *NZ Listener*, July 6, 1985, pp. 22-23, and Helen Clark, "What Price Security?", *NZ Listener*, September 20, 1986, pp. 34-35.

possessed large numbers of nuclear weapons when the USSR collapsed in 1991. If nuclear weapons had caused the Cold War, it is unlikely that it would have ended while nuclear weapons still existed in such large numbers. The Cold War drew to a close when the Soviet system could no longer support an aggressive military stance. In the absence of Soviet hostility, the Cold War ended sometime between 1987 and 1991, even though both superpowers still possessed thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

By predicting that the high numbers of nuclear weapons in existence would lead to war, the peace movement also ignored the fact that war does not break out in a vacuum. Indeed, it is often the result of misconceptions about relative strengths and weaknesses. Efforts must be made to slow and reverse an arms race, but these require negotiations and mutual concessions which will preserve the security of both sides through stable reductions. Wars start when aggressors believe that they can fight and win. One of the greatest ironies of the Cold War is that the anti-nuclear movement, with its emphasis on unilateral disarmament, was encouraging such a situation. Ensuring that an opponent does not reach a position of real or imagined superiority was the key to preventing war and the use of nuclear weapons. As pointed out by the peace movement, the US was the only power to have used nuclear weapons in war. Nonetheless, the peace movement failed to appreciate that the US had enjoyed a nuclear monopoly in 1945 and that nuclear deterrence had played no part in the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan.

Meanwhile, as the peace movement pressured the West to disarm unilaterally, the Soviets rejected any proposal requiring the nuclear disarmament of the USSR. Unilateral Soviet disarmament was dismissed on the grounds that the USSR "has no right to do so, as it is responsible to the peoples of the world for peace and progress... [to disarm] would mean disarming in the face of the

forces of war and reaction".³³⁹ Any negotiations to limit the numbers of offensive nuclear deployments were, until the dying stages of the Cold War, merely used to extract political concessions from the US.³⁴⁰

In order to make the prospect of Western unilateral disarmament less frightening, the peace movement went to considerable lengths to dismiss the Soviet threat. While the peace movement was not supportive of Soviet-style totalitarianism, its unfavourable view of the US and its increased contact with Communist organisations from the 1960s onwards helped make it receptive to Communist propaganda about the motivations of the USSR. Moreover, while most radicals were uneasy about the human rights abuses that existed in the USSR, some still repeated Communist propaganda about the health of the Soviet system. It was argued that, as the USSR was so strong, influential and prosperous, and was so occupied holding together its existing empire, it had no reason to attack the West.³⁴¹ Any hostile Soviet behaviour was also explainable in terms of Russia's insecure history, the bloody experience of World War II, and a feeling of being encircled by a hostile West.³⁴² According to some peace activists, Russia's fears were real, whereas the West's fears were only figments of its collective imagination. The only way to build a lasting peace was for the West to help make the Soviet empire feel safe from external attack.³⁴³

The peace movement's reading of Soviet behaviour flew in the face of history. During the last months of World War II, and from 1945 to 1947, the West gave the Soviet Union every opportunity to co-exist peacefully. Soviet behaviour under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, especially his brutal

³³⁹ Roy Dean, "The Case for Negotiated Disarmament", in Geoffrey Goodwin, *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 121.

³⁴⁰ Jacquelyn K. Davis, "The US Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Facts and Fallacies", in Kaltefleiter and Pfaltzgraff, *The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States*, p. 179.

³⁴¹ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS: A Paper for Discussion*, p. 7.

³⁴² Ray Galvin, *Living Without ANZUS*, p. 18.

³⁴³ Brian Lilburn, "Sunk in Psychopathic Defence", *Peacelink*, December 1985, p. 3.

communisation of the nations of Eastern Europe, left the West no alternative but to resist any further Soviet inroads on the European continent. US re-armament was also spurred by the Korean War. The West's nuclear build-up was, therefore, part of the West's response to Soviet hostility, not the cause of Soviet hostility. This has always been studiously ignored by the modern peace movement, which has also preferred to blame Third World instability and poverty on the Western economic system while denying any Soviet role in aggravating North-South conflicts. The peace movement took Soviet claims of being a "peace-loving" nation at face value, but as Carl Von Clausewitz put it, "The aggressor is always peace loving...; he would prefer to take over a country unopposed".³⁴⁴

Another argument which downplayed the Soviet threat was one that pointed to the USSR's inability to expand its influence and keep its Third World clients under control.³⁴⁵ A related argument stressed that the US had a greater military presence in the South Pacific than the Soviets.³⁴⁶ Owen Wilkes, in particular, was fond of pointing out that US bases in the Pacific far outnumbered Soviet bases.³⁴⁷ A similar argument was applied to Europe, with the peace movement claiming that the Soviets had neither the will nor the capacity to invade Western Europe.³⁴⁸ However, peace advocates failed to appreciate that the frustration of Soviet expansion in the Third World, the limited Soviet naval presence in the South Pacific, and the non-occurrence of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, were largely attributable to the successful application of the containment policy during the Reagan Administration. The peace movement's arguments implied that the success of containment had meant that containment had never been necessary. It overlooked that power loves a vacuum and that the

³⁴⁴ Quoted in Lewy, *Peace and Revolution*, p. 245.

³⁴⁵ Ray Galvin, *Living Without ANZUS*, p. 19.

³⁴⁶ This was noted in an article by Peter Wills, "Few Soviet Naval Deployments in South Pacific", *New Zealand Herald*, February 7, 1985, p. 6, Section 1.

³⁴⁷ Maire Leadbeater, *Non-Alignment and a New National Security*, CND, 1976, p. 2.

³⁴⁸ Defence Alternatives Study Group, *Old Myths or New Options?*, Christchurch, 1987, p. 37.

USSR's opportunistic foreign policy would have ensured that the Kremlin exploited any such vacuum, including any that existed in the South Pacific.

Playing down the Soviet threat also involved statements by some peace activists that NZ wasn't threatened by Soviet nuclear weapons, as the USSR had nothing to gain from destroying NZ. This seemed to conflict with the "we're a target" claims made by other segments (or even by the same segments) of the peace movement. One explanation for this contradiction was that, even though NZ wasn't threatened by Soviet nuclear weapons, the fact that NZ was a US ally, with US nuclear ships sitting in its ports, increased NZ's chances of becoming a nuclear target.³⁴⁹ In any case, whether or not NZ was a target because of its membership in the Western Alliance was beside the point. Peace activists were appealing blatantly to the public's fears of self destruction in order to persuade NZers to opt out of the Western Alliance; in other words, opposing the Soviets might harm NZ and its people.

While NZ was not faced with a direct Soviet conventional military threat, it did not follow that Soviet expansion elsewhere in the world did not constitute an indirect threat to NZ's democratic system. If the Western Alliance had failed to contain communism further afield, the NZ way of life would have been jeopardised in many ways- politically, economically, and ultimately perhaps even in terms of its security. The Cold War was, above all, a struggle between ideologies, and the peace movement was guilty of a profound error in ignoring this salient fact. Some activists argued that the superpowers' rivalry was due to Soviet and US imperialism, not ideology, and that they would prepare for war regardless of their systems.³⁵⁰

Once radicals in the peace movement had accepted the claims of Communist peace activists that the USSR was a misunderstood and largely

³⁴⁹ Maire Leadbeater, *Non-Alignment and a New National Security*, p. 4.

³⁵⁰ Geiringer, *Malice in Blunderland*, p. 92.

harmless power, the next step was for them to posit that unilateral acts of Western disarmament would be reciprocated by the Soviets. The peace movement was attempting to influence Western foreign policy based on peace activists' wishful thinking about Soviet behaviour rather than on rational calculations about the likely consequences of certain actions. Whereas the peace movement regularly accused the US of having the worst of intentions, the Soviets were given the benefit of the doubt. The radicals' rejection of the rational in favour of the emotional lay behind their failure to acknowledge the possibility that the Soviets might take advantage of any Western disarmament measures. If one side disarms faster than the other, instability or war may result from the fact that the stronger side may seek to exploit its temporary advantage to compromise the security of the weaker side. The unilateral US nuclear cuts urged by the peace movement would also have forced a US return to the very MAD strategy the peace movement considered to be immoral, as the US would no longer have had the number of nuclear weapons required for NUTS. This, in turn, could have increased the chances of an all-out nuclear war.

To promote unilateral disarmament by the US, the peace movement dismissed ongoing bi-lateral US-Soviet arms control negotiations. Activists argued that US arms control proposals which were one-sided and designed to degrade the Soviet nuclear arsenal, thus hindering real disarmament. See, for example, Sonya Perrott's condemnation of the US's proposals in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in 1983.³⁵¹ Peace activists also warned that US deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in late 1983 was counter-productive to the arms control effort. Considerable mileage was made from pointing out that the Soviets suspended START talks as a result.³⁵² In the end, of course, the peace movement was wrong about the consequences. The Soviets

³⁵¹ Sonya Perrott, "The START Negotiations", *Peacelink*, August 1983, p. 17.

³⁵² Jem Bates, "Arms Control Today", *Peacelink*, April 1984, p. 16.

returned to the negotiating table in early 1985,³⁵³ and the US had the bargaining chips it needed to obtain Soviet agreement to the abolition of all short and intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of December 1987.

The main sticking point in arms control negotiations was the verification of agreements and the form of inspection required to ensure that neither side was cheating. The superpower with the most qualms about verification methods was the USSR. Totalitarian regimes do not appreciate foreigners wandering around, lest they have unauthorised contact with citizens or discover aspects about the society that the regime would prefer to remain secret for reasons of its international image. The Soviets considered international inspection to be a form of “legalised espionage” which they had been rejecting since the 1932-1934 World Disarmament Conference.³⁵³

As NZ did not possess any nuclear weapons nor have any nuclear weapons stationed on its soil, peace movement pressure for disarmament in NZ had to be directed against the nuclear dimension of ANZUS co-operation. The environmental hazards of accidents involving the visits of nuclear powered ships were used as an argument against being in ANZUS, although some activists claimed that the nuclear power issue was secondary to the issue of the nuclear arms race.³⁵⁴ The safety of nuclear powered ships was challenged by the peace movement, which produced an array of data to support its claims. These arguments were countered in the 1992 report of a Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, entitled The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships. The findings of this report and the peace movement’s response to it will be covered in chapter seven.

³⁵³ The Soviets may have walked away from arms control talks in the hope that continued Western Peace Movement pressure might be able to remove the Cruise and Pershing II missiles without the USSR having to make its own cuts.

³⁵⁴ Roy Dean, “The Case for Negotiated Disarmament”, in Goodwin, *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 137.

³⁵⁴ Galvin, *A Nuclear Free New Zealand...Now!* p. 14.

While the NZ Government was already promoting sensible multi-lateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, the peace movement argued that continued membership in ANZUS was inconsistent with NZ's disarmament efforts and that the former should be terminated. However, it was quite possible for NZ to remain in ANZUS and to support ongoing multi-lateral negotiations for nuclear arms control. The US accepted this, as it had in the case of the Australian Government. What the US could not accept was the unilateral approach favoured by the peace movement. This US refusal to pursue unilateral disarmament was one reason for the peace movement's campaign to withdraw NZ from ANZUS.

A NZ Act of Disarmament

A proposed act of unilateral disarmament was to create a NZ Nuclear Free Zone within a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The peace movement, and in particular its constituent anti-nuclear movement, wanted NFZs that would ban the manufacture, possession, storage, basing, testing, use, and transit of nuclear weapons within the respective zones. Early warning systems and other command, control, and communications facilities were also ruled out. The aims of NFZs were to escape the effects of nuclear war, to decrease the risk of nuclear war, and to reduce the cost of the arms race. The basic goal was to enhance security by decreasing instability.

Some peace activists argued that a precedent for a SPNFZ existed in the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had created a NFZ in South America. However, while Tlatelolco was designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not all countries within the zone had signed it, and two important countries within the zone had declared that they would not be bound by it until all the signatories had ratified it. In addition, the treaty allowed for "peaceful nuclear explosions", its inspection procedures were shoddy, and the issue of the transit of

nuclear weapons was left to individual nations.³⁵⁵ As such, Tlatelolco was not a model for the type of NFZ the peace movement had in mind.

The hope was that a SPNFZ eventually would be extended to Micronesia and the rest of the Pacific basin. Conveniently, for both the peace movement and the Soviets, a SPNFZ which forbade the transit of nuclear weapons would have crippled the freedom of movement of the superpower with the largest naval presence in the area, namely, the US. While the Soviets had the advantage on land, with their enormous conventional forces, the US could at least try to offset this with its naval superiority. Any NFZ covering the Pacific Ocean would impact far more on the US than it would on the Soviets, who, while they supported a SPNFZ which included transit restrictions, spurned the idea of a NFZ in Europe that might restrict the transit of the Soviet navy in the Baltic.³⁵⁶

The United Nations' own definition of what a NFZ should attempt to achieve was instructive. The 1975 UN definition of a NFZ stated that it should not disrupt existing treaty relationships within the zone, and that international law should be respected with regard to freedom of the high seas.³⁵⁷ Under this type of NFZ, NZ could allow nuclear ships to visit its ports, as was National Government policy from 1976 to 1984. Far from being "pro-nuclear", National's stance from 1976 to 1984 was compatible with the UN's definition of a NFZ.

The SPNFZ, which was incorporated in the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985, did not ban the transit of nuclear armed or powered ships, and it left the decision of whether to ban nuclear ship port visits to individual member countries. As such, the final version of the SPNFZ was a moderate and reasonable attempt to remove one part of the world from nuclear confrontation. Australia had attempted to make the SPNFZ as acceptable to the US as possible in order to encourage the US to support it. Although the provisions of the Australian-

³⁵⁵ Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, pp. 119-120.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 117.

³⁵⁷ Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, p. 122.

sponsored SPNFZ were too “weak” in the eyes of radicals, the US still refused to sign the treaty. The Americans were probably concerned that their approval of a moderate SPNFZ might encourage peace movement efforts for a stricter nuclear free regime. In any event the US did not sign the SPNFZ Treaty until 1996, five years after the end of the Cold War.

The peace movement was not entirely satisfied with the Treaty of Rarotonga and it insisted on a transit ban which covered international waters, even though this was contrary to the system of international law which the peace movement revered. It also claimed that US nuclear ship visits were incompatible with NFZs. The NZ ban on nuclear ships in its ports was compatible with the form of SPNFZ adopted in 1985, but was not required by it. The Neither Confirm Nor Deny policy of the US Navy was an obstacle to a strict NZ port ban, as it would be hard to prevent the entry of nuclear weapons if the US did not admit which of its ships were actually carrying nuclear weapons. As such, the NCND policy was attacked by the peace movement on the grounds that it interfered with a host nation’s sovereignty. However, NCND was intended to confuse any Soviet targeting strategy and thereby to increase the deterrent effect of the ANZUS Alliance, an alliance designed to foster the collective security of NZ, Australia and the US.

Despite the peace movement’s opposition to ANZUS, a few peace activists used legalistic arguments to claim that, since the ANZUS treaty did not require NZ to receive nuclear ship visits, it should theoretically be possible to have the ban *and* remain within ANZUS.³⁵⁸ Claims were also made about precedents for such action, with other US allies having placed restrictions on US nuclear weapons in the past. Nevertheless, NZ’s ban went further than the action of any other US ally. While the US usually accepted its allies’ wishes with regard to the stationing of US nuclear weapons on their territory and even accepted declared

³⁵⁸ See Ray Galvin, *A Nuclear Free New Zealand... Now!*, p. 18, and Owen Wilkes “Access Denied”, in *Peacelink*, November 1984, p. 3.

nuclear-armed ship bans, it would not accept a ban which attempted to determine the nuclear weapons status of visiting naval vessels. In contrast to other US allies, NZ demonstrated that it would not trust the US to honour the ban. This posture had no precedent within the Western Alliance.³⁵⁹

The claim that NZ could have both the ban and ANZUS seems to have been a red herring. The peace movement should have perfectly aware that the US would not accept a strict ban and that a crisis within ANZUS would result.³⁶⁰ Nonetheless, despite a significant overlap between the peace movement and Labour Party membership, the Labour Government later claimed that it did not anticipate the US reaction; it maintained that the ban was anti-nuclear rather than anti-ANZUS and that it should have been possible for NZ to have the ban and stay in ANZUS.

In contrast to the idea that the ban was compatible with ANZUS, other peace activists later argued that the US's NCND policy made compromise impossible, and added that, even if a trust formula was in place, and if the US honoured that trust, the US would still be breaching NCND whenever its ships visited.³⁶¹ However, compromises had been reached with all of the US's other allies. What prevented a compromise in NZ's case was not US policy, but the insistence of the peace movement and some Labour Party members and MPs that the ban seek 100% certainty about the nuclear status of each ship.

Some scholars also claimed that NZ's ban would not undermine Western nuclear strategy, although these claims were probably due to genuine belief rather than duplicity. This argument viewed deterrence as "divisible", that is, it was capable of being reduced selectively without damaging the overall structure of

³⁵⁹ See Robert E. White's study, *Nuclear Ship Visits: Policies and Data for 55 Countries*, Dunedin, 1989.

³⁶⁰ See Roderick Alley, "Alternatives to ANZUS", in *Alternatives to ANZUS Volume II*, p. 13.

³⁶¹ Robert E. White, *The New Zealand Nuclear Ship Ban: Is Compromise Possible?*, Canberra, 1988, p. 7.

deterrence.³⁶² In contrast, the US viewed deterrence as indivisible: an action against nuclear deterrence in NZ would have ramifications for the Western Alliance's entire strategy. In the specific context of the global Cold War, NZ's actions had potential political repercussions for other Western countries. As the Cold War was as much about perceptions as it was about actual military power, any perception that the West's unity was faltering could have serious consequences. Even if the central nuclear balance between the two superpowers was robust and stable, extended deterrence was much more fragile. Any perception that the US was prepared to abandon its allies, or vice versa, could lead to an attack on these allies by the Soviets or a Soviet proxy. Any doubts about US commitments to its allies could have led to the gradual fragmentation of the Western Alliance.

Nevertheless, the peace movement was eager to spread anti-nuclearism, and it worked hard to ensure that successful disarmament efforts in one part of the West were imitated elsewhere. In effect, the peace movement, like the US, realised that nuclear deterrence *was* indivisible and that NZ's actions could have repercussions elsewhere. This was one of the main reasons the NZ peace movement sought a nuclear ship ban. The peace movement defended the ban against charges that it was an isolationist gesture, merely designed to remove NZ from a list of nuclear targets, by claiming that it was an act of internationalism and engagement in world affairs. It was hoped that NZ's moral example would provide both a precedent and encouragement for other peace movements in the West, movements with which the NZ peace movement was networking.

While the NZ public was concerned about the immediate threat of nuclear attack on NZ, radicals in the peace movement core were more concerned with combating the US globally. That the NZ example was not emulated overseas, much to the chagrin of the peace movement, was due in part to the firm US

³⁶² Michael Pugh, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Spectre at the Feast", *New Zealand International Review*, May/June 1987, pp. 10-13.

response to the NZ ship ban and also to the fact that the Cold War was moving into its final stage by 1985. Therefore, the ban did not advance the cause of international disarmament. Real arms control and disarmament progress only became possible when the Cold War was winding down, as the Soviet system started to collapse and the Kremlin found it impossible to match the US arms build-up of the 1980s. NZ's anti-nuclear policy had absolutely no effect on the ending of the Cold War. The NZ nuclear ship ban was merely sufficient to assuage public fears that NZ would be a nuclear target and to "relieve many New Zealanders of a sense of moral culpability because of intimate links with global US strategic policies".³⁶³

³⁶³ Ramesh Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, p. 126.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE CASE AGAINST COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

Delight in smooth sounding platitudes, refusal to face unpleasant facts...genuine love of peace and pathetic belief that love can be its sole foundation...played a definite part in the unleashing upon the world of horrors and miseries which are already beyond comparison in human experience.

Winston Churchill, on the causes of World War II.³⁶⁴

The most successful of the peace movement's arguments against ANZUS was certainly the anti-nuclear one, and it is still employed today by members of the Labour and Alliance parties to oppose the prospect of NZ and US armed forces exercising together. But it is significant that there were other arguments against ANZUS which were not based on anti-nuclearism and which appealed far less to the NZ public. Some arguments were used against ANZUS long before the nuclear scare of the early 1980s, and they were quite revealing about the motivation of radicals in the peace movement's core. The peace movement did not begin a systematic presentation of alternatives to ANZUS until after the nuclear ship ban, and it thus appeared that the peace movement had shifted its goals,³⁶⁵ from a nuclear-free NZ to an ANZUS-free NZ. But this did not mean that opposition to ANZUS was an afterthought. Ending ANZUS had simply

³⁶⁴ Quoted in Bacon, *ANZUS, Yes or No?*, p. 45.

³⁶⁵ Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword*, pp. 264-276.

been a more distant goal than making NZ nuclear free.³⁶⁶ Once the ship ban had been accomplished, the peace movement felt free to address its other concerns.

According to the Defence Alternatives Study Group (DASG) in Christchurch, whose book Old Myths or New Options? benefited from the input of such activists as Owen Wilkes, Nicky Hager and Bob Leonard, “Much of the case against New Zealand’s involvement in alliances stems from the behaviour... of the United States.”³⁶⁷ In a similar manner, it was claimed that NZ’s fondness for ANZUS was based on an ignorance of the imperialist world role played by the US and a narrow Eurocentric Western perspective as opposed to a broader Pacific nation perspective.³⁶⁸ Helen Clark echoed this viewpoint in 1986 when she supported NZ’s detachment from Europe in favour of a South Pacific orientation. According to Clark, the nuclear ship ban was a logical progression in this development, as it “ identified with local concerns and not the East-West conflict, which is really the preserve of the Northern Hemisphere”.³⁶⁹

The Costs of Collective Security

While the peace movement claimed to support “internationalism”, it did not support the armed internationalism of collective security, as will be demonstrated shortly. The strong Socialist component in the peace movement’s core provided a reason for opposing collective security: in the Cold War context, it involved an alliance of Western nations under US leadership. It could be assumed that, if no Cold War had existed, or if the US had been Socialist, peace movement radicals would have been quite content with the notion of collective security. However, their ideological opposition to the US and its Western allies led them to attack any mechanisms designed to enhance the Western democratic Capitalist system.

³⁶⁶ For example, in 1983 the Peace and Justice Forum of the Wellington Labour Regional Council was already considering alternatives to ANZUS.

³⁶⁷ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 17.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 48.

In order to undermine the West's collective security mechanisms, the peace movement emphasised any differences in the national policies of Western nations while simultaneously playing down their common interests. It is true that some countries in the Western Alliance pursued different policies; however, they still had the same end-goals. For example, although NZ was opposed to French nuclear testing, both countries were Capitalist democracies, and any disagreements between them did not alter the basic fact that both wanted the West to prevail in the Cold War.

NZ was a Western nation, but many in the peace movement's core wished that it was not part of the Western camp. In the eyes of radicals, NZ was fighting for the wrong side in defence of a system which oppressed the Third World. If it was not possible to achieve a complete transfer of NZ's loyalties, then neutrality in the Cold War would have to suffice. To encourage such a move, some peace activists argued that collective security in the nuclear age involved far too many risks for NZ, and that the US was an immoral ally. While it was possible to be anti-nuclear and still support conventional collective security, the moral absolutism of peace movement radicals led them to argue that it was immoral to exercise with a nuclear power such as the US. For radicals the immorality of capitalism and US foreign policy was just as important as the immorality of nuclear weapons. Nuclear immorality was used with far greater effect with public audiences, but the anti-Capitalist approach was also hauled out when it was felt the audience might be receptive. Both forms of argument were utilised whenever the occasion required it, with the aim of detaching NZ from Western collective security.

Another approach was to stress the dangers inherent in NZ's involvement in a military alliance like ANZUS. It was argued that preparing for war could lead to war, and alliances were dismissed as conservative fear-based responses to perceived threats which could result in countries being dragged into wars against

³⁶⁹ Richard Long, "Abandoning the Settler Mentality", *The Dominion*, January 13, 1986, p. 2.

their will. They were also considered destabilising rather than confidence building. The dangers associated with membership in ANZUS were in turn magnified by the foreign policies of the US, it was argued, which were more likely to provoke war than perpetuate peace.

According to some peace activists, NZ's reliance on such hazardous devices as alliances was the result of dated assumptions, inertia, and pre-nuclear mythology. The DASG attempted to educate the NZ public in such matters, and it claimed that multi-lateral agreements had always resulted in arms build-ups.³⁷⁰ In effect, the DASG argued that alliances caused arms races, hoping to direct public annoyance at the arms race against ANZUS. The DASG also stated that NZ's ship-ban correctly recognised that the spread of nuclear weapons heightened the tensions between adversarial alliances.³⁷¹

The DASG used World War I as the prime example of the dangers of alliances, and it also asserted that Poland's alliance with Britain and France had failed to deter Hitler in World War II.³⁷² However, deterrence probably failed in this case because the Anglo-French guarantee was not taken seriously by Hitler. Britain and France had failed to oppose earlier German expansionism, and because Stalin had chosen to sign a non-aggression pact with Hitler rather than align the USSR with Britain and France, their belated alliance with Poland was not credible. In the same fashion, the Western Alliance in the Cold War would have lost its credibility if the US had not tried to contain Soviet expansionism after World War II. If anything, the Polish example in World War II is more a vindication than an indictment of collective security.

Some peace movement arguments had a boomerang effect. The peace movement scoffed at conservatives' use of the "lessons of World War II" to promote deterrence and collective security, with peace activists claiming that "The

³⁷⁰ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 17.

³⁷¹ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁷² Ibid., p. 16.

arguments for alliance-building are anchored on a simplistic analysis that World War II could have been prevented by proper preparations.”³⁷³ However, this approach is hypocritical, because the peace movement showed a distinct preference for using the “lessons of World War I” to bolster its own claim that alliances led to war.

According to peace activists, alliances had also been made obsolete by nuclear weapons. How the latter claim could be true, when the peace movement also claimed that nuclear weapons were unusable in war, is an interesting question. As the peace movement itself had pointed out, wars were still occurring in the world despite nuclear deterrence. If nuclear weapons were of no use in such conflicts, then alliances were still a valid defence alternative. Collective security carries risks, but so does any form of resistance to tyranny. However, these risks are accepted by most nations because their citizens hope to share in the benefits (e.g., freedom and prosperity) that successful collective security can bring. Radicals were not prepared to accept these risks because they perceived the Western democratic Capitalist system as a greater evil than the Eastern Communist system headed by the USSR.

Despite the position of the peace movement, the Labour Government’s Defence Committee of Enquiry discovered in 1986 that the NZ public was quite happy to support both anti-nuclearism and collective security. Nonetheless, the NZ peace movement was determined to end alliance co-operation because radicals’ primary goal had long been to destroy ANZUS. Although the Labour Government only went part of the way with the nuclear ship ban, radical peace activists probably supported the ban in the hope that it would spur a collapse of US-NZ military co-operation and finally kill ANZUS itself. However, this

³⁷³ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 16.

motivation is denied by activists such as Nicky Hager,³⁷⁴ and only the activists themselves will ever really know what their real motives were.

Radicals were able to oppose collective security without acknowledging that its absence could lead to war because they believed that war was caused by inequity and injustice, and that it was fought for economic reasons. Rather than worry about East-West issues, the world should have addressed the North-South economic imbalance. Peace could be obtained through the pursuit of economic justice for the poor and the liberation of the oppressed. As a result, the peace movement maintained that NZ foreign policy should be aimed at eliminating these causes rather than relying on collective security through ANZUS.³⁷⁵

In order to encourage NZers to abandon collective security, the peace movement dismissed the Soviet military threat. Peace activists argued that the Soviets did not have the amphibious capacity to invade NZ; moreover, they were too preoccupied with NATO to even bother. The British effort to retake the Falkland islands was used as an example of the difficulty of sea-borne assault. It was also stated that any invasion would be signalled well in advance and that this would enable NZ to rally the international community to its support.

The peace movement declared that the “Soviet threat” was an invention of the US’s Military Industrial Complex, which needed an “enemy” to justify its arms expenditures. According to some peace activists, global stability was threatened by the nuclear arms race far more than it was threatened by Soviet expansionism. They argued that the Soviets were pragmatic and opportunistic, not inexorably imperialist, the Kremlin having no intention of exporting its revolution to the rest of the world. As for Soviet human rights abuses, they were the West’s fault. Human rights in the USSR would improve if only the Soviets were not threatened

³⁷⁴ Hager, telephone conversation, October 22, 1998.

³⁷⁵ Winsley and Gould, *An Alternative Defence Policy*, p. 3.

by Western containment.³⁷⁶ Some writers added that the US could not bomb the ideology out of the minds of Communists, so therefore containment was futile.³⁷⁷

Though it is true that there was never any direct Soviet military threat to NZ, this was the case because other countries were tying down Soviet forces across the military divides of the Cold War in areas far away from NZ. If the Soviets had been victorious in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, there would have been no need for them to invade NZ, which would have been forced to fall into line if it wished to continue trading within the new world order. Therefore, the real threat to NZ in the Cold War was not an invasion of NZ, but the defeat of Western-style Capitalist democracy, and the triumph of Soviet totalitarianism with all its social and economic consequences.

By focusing exclusively on the military dimension of the Cold War and then claiming that it did threaten NZ, the peace movement ignored actual Soviet tactics in the Cold war, which were less about invasions than they were about the arming of radical groups in the Third World which were trying to overthrow pro-Western regimes, the aiding of radical governments in the Third World that threatened Western allies or Western interests, and the supporting of some Third World movements that actually fought the US and its allies, as in Korea and Vietnam. To deny the US the support of NZ in this East-West power struggle occurring in the Third World, peace movement radicals sought to detach NZ from ANZUS; and this effort involved pointing out that ANZUS resulted in NZ involvement in overseas conflicts.

The peace movement argued that NZ's old policy of forward defence in South East Asia merely entailed the propping up of right-wing dictatorships in the name of "stability". Peace activists claimed that many Third World recipients of Western military aid had a habit of using that aid to subjugate their own people.

³⁷⁶ Foote, *Disarmed and Defended*, p. 20.

³⁷⁷ Jack Hunn, "The Nuclear Delusion", in Alley, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, Volume II, p. 57.

ANZUS was condemned for involving NZ in such immoral behaviour; for example, the Five Power Defence Arrangements were opposed on the grounds that the governments of Malaysia and Singapore violated their peoples' human rights.³⁷⁸

Whereas many Western allies in the Third World were not democratic, they were on the whole less oppressive than most pro-Soviet dictatorships.³⁷⁹ It was also possible to push a right-wing dictatorship toward democracy even during the Cold war, something which occurred in countries such as Spain, Argentina, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is significant that no pro-Soviet dictatorships embraced democracy and human rights until the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe crumbled in the second half of 1989 and the Brezhnev Doctrine was consigned to the ash heap of history by Mikhail Gorbachev himself.

Peace activists also argued that it was immoral for NZ to fight wars in other peoples' countries. "If such a mercenary policy of fighting wars on other countries land was directed against us, we would consider it flagrant aggression."³⁸⁰ This claim was accompanied by an assertion that NZ had a tradition of fighting in distant conflicts alongside its allies regardless of the issues involved.³⁸¹ Both of the above arguments were made by the Peace and Justice Forum of the WLRC. The first argument assumed that the countries of the Asia-Pacific had no interest in the outcome of the conflict between the US and the USSR, and it would also appear to rule out NZ's efforts in World War II. The second suggested that NZ never understood the causes for which it had fought, entering wars regardless of its interests.

³⁷⁸ Maire Leadbeater, "New Zealand: Ready To React in the Pacific and South East Asia", *Peacelink*, April 1988, p. 27.

³⁷⁹ However, this depends on the type of oppression people have in mind. A right-wing regime might be economically oppressive, while a communist regime might excel at the control of information and ideas.

³⁸⁰ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 11.

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 11.

The crucial example of collective security in action that coloured the thinking of radicals in the peace movement was the Vietnam War. Whereas the World War II generation had developed an appreciation for what a combined effort could achieve, the Vietnam War convinced many in the 1960s generation that collective security was harmful. To take advantage of this sentiment, peace movement radicals used NZ's involvement in South Vietnam as a major argument against ANZUS. The peace movement cast the Vietnam War as an example of the type of evil and pointless venture into which NZ would be drawn unless it left ANZUS.³⁸²

The Costs of ANZUS

As well as using the Vietnam war to denigrate collective security in general, peace movement radicals criticised ANZUS in particular, highlighting what they saw as the "costs" associated with NZ's membership in the alliance. One of those costs was the presence of US scientific facilities and US naval vessels in NZ. One such facility was the Black Birch observatory near Blenheim, which from 1982 onwards mapped the position of stars. Peace activists such as Owen Wilkes argued that the data collected could be used to help SDI or the accuracy of US Trident missiles. While this was true, the data also had civilian uses, and it seemed odd to object to the collection of information on the basis that it might have military applications. For example, to have argued that the internal combustion engine should not have been developed lest it be used for military purposes would have been absurd.

The existence of Tangimoana, a SIGINT gathering facility in the Manawatu, was also roundly criticised. The Tangimoana facility fed intelligence data into the Western Alliance's network, from which NZ received information in return. Parts of the peace movement viewed Tangimoana as a potential threat, since any information gathered could be used by the US for its own purposes, or

³⁸² DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, pp. 18-22.

even against NZ.³⁸³ Data from Tangimoana could also be used to find targets for Cruise missiles in wartime and even to fight wars of which NZers did not approve. The peace movement argued that NZ had little control over the use of Tangimoana's data, and that the station served allied interests rather than NZ's own interests.³⁸⁴ Peace activists also charged that, through its interception of Soviet naval radio communications, Tangimoana might make NZ a nuclear target in wartime.³⁸⁵

It could be argued that helping the Western allies was in NZ's defence interests, as Western strength in the Cold War would reduce any need for NZ to defend itself. However, radicals were rarely prepared to acknowledge that Western interests in the Cold War were similar to NZ's interests. The NZ Government perceived Tangimoana's monitoring of naval activity in the South Pacific as beneficial to NZ's own defence, but radicals preferred to "blind" NZ rather than to allow it to share information with the US. This was but one more indication of the peace movement's strong dislike of the US and everything it represented.

The arguments against a US military presence in NZ were closely related to those arguments made against collective security per se. That is, peace activists argued that any NZ involvement with the US made it a target. Even if NZ ended nuclear ship visits it would still be a target due to its continued membership in ANZUS. In the Cold War struggle between the Capitalist democracies of the West and the Communist tyrannies of the East, radicals wanted NZ to opt out because it was too dangerous to take sides. What the peace movement would not admit was that, even if NZ left ANZUS and turned its back on the West, it would still be a potential target, because NZ was a democracy. Communist regimes

³⁸³ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 29-32.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 32.

³⁸⁵ Jim Chapple, "No Place To Hide", *Peacelink*, April 1989, p. 15.

viewed the mere existence of democratic Capitalist societies as a threat, and the only way (perhaps) to avoid their hostility would have been to adopt communism.

Nonetheless, the peace movement saw no reason for anyone to threaten NZ, and so peace activists claimed that being in ANZUS provided the only likely scenario for an attack.³⁸⁶ NZ for them was a small, non-threatening South Pacific state which was threatened only by the effects of a nuclear war,³⁸⁷ and ANZUS had the effect of increasing NZ's chances of becoming involved in such a war. The 1982 Memorandum of Understanding between the US and NZ also required NZ to open its ports to the US in pre-conflict conditions. As usual, peace movement arguments chose to dismiss the idea that unity in collective security enhanced deterrence and decreased the chances of nuclear war, and peace activists warned that the MOU would result in NZ becoming a target in wartime due the presence of US military forces.

Military co-operation agreements, agreements which existed apart from ANZUS, but which were pursued under its aegis, were also targeted by the peace movement, which claimed that they needed to be terminated in order for NZ to regain its independence. For many in the peace movement's core independence meant that NZ would completely divorce itself from the Western Alliance and then offer its moral and political support to Third World revolutionaries fighting against Western imperialism. The ANZUS MARSAR agreement to divide areas of responsibility for tracking enemy vessels, which built on the 1951 Radford Collins agreement on convoy protection and patrol duties, was one agreement that radicals despised. ANZUS MARSAR was believed responsible for the formation of the NZ Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) in

³⁸⁶ For examples of such claims, see Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 6; DASG, *ANZUS: Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 21; or Kathleen Ryan "What's Wrong with ANZUS?", in *Women on Peace*, p. 19.

³⁸⁷ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 79.

1977³⁸⁸ and the construction of Tangimoana station in 1982, two developments which radicals opposed. NZ's Mutual Assistance Programmes (MAPs), offered to pro-Western states in the South Pacific and South East Asia since 1973, were also opposed on the grounds that they led to NZ's helping to train the forces of human rights abusers.

A further cost of collective security was that ANZUS required NZ to "pay its dues" in order to ensure US aid in time of need. It was argued that NZ's involvement in the Vietnam War stemmed from its ANZUS obligations. Because NZ was in ANZUS, it was obligated to enter a war which was not in NZ's interests. However, the idea that NZ intervened in South Vietnam solely because of ANZUS is incorrect; for it was NZ's own values and judgements about its own security which caused it both to join ANZUS and to get involved in the Vietnam War.

In another tactic against ANZUS, peace activists argued that the alliance had led NZ to neglect its self defence.³⁸⁹ However, this approach tended to contradict accompanying claims that there was no Soviet conventional military threat to NZ.³⁹⁰ If there was no Soviet threat, then why increase our self defence capability? The situation was further confused by claims that ANZUS made NZ a target.

In sum, peace activists argued that ANZUS had reduced NZ's sovereignty in defence planning and that it was better for NZ to pursue self reliance in defence. It was declared that NZ's core security must be based on the defence of its own territory and that ANZUS had paid little attention to the development of local defence forces.³⁹¹ In actuality, ANZUS policy had stressed the development

³⁸⁸ Desmond Ball, "The ANZUS Connection: The Security Relationship Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America", in T.J. Hearn (Ed.), *Arms Disarmament and New Zealand*, Dunedin, 1983, p. 77.

³⁸⁹ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, pp. 15-20.

³⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 7-17.

³⁹¹ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*

of balanced forces, ones capable of national defence and co-ordination with one's allies. Article II advocated "self help and mutual aid" to develop the "individual and collective capacity" to resist armed attack. The fact that this was not carried out by NZ was due to its own approach to defence spending, not to the demands of ANZUS.

Some peace activists pointed out that Australia had realised it could not count on US help; accordingly, it had developed a regional self-defence capability.³⁹² What Australia actually did was to increase its self defence capability while staying within ANZUS, and the US was quite happy to support this move at the 1983 ANZUS Council Meeting. It was also possible for NZ to take the same path, maintaining military forces which were self-reliant at a lower level but which could still take part in collective security with allies if necessary. On the one hand, forces trained to operate with allies can also be self-reliant. On the other hand, forces designed purely for self-reliance find it extremely difficult to operate in an alliance, as a lack of inter-operability and contact with outside militaries severely hampers co-ordination of effort.

Peace activists also complained that ANZUS had skewed NZ's force structure in an undesirable fashion. According to some activists, NZ's Orion aircraft were far too high-tech for fisheries protection, and other weapons systems also appeared to be more suited to allied operations than to NZ's self-defence. It was argued that, although NZ had no Surface to Air Missile (SAM) air defence capacity or Anti-Tank missile capacity, it possessed armour that was best suited to foreign deserts, Skyhawk jet aircraft that were best suited for anti-guerrilla ground attack, and frigates that were too expensive for coastal defence. In particular, Owen Wilkes complained that NZ's armed forces were designed for long range, offensive warfare outside the South Pacific; in particular, he pointed to ASW in co-operation with the US.³⁹³ It was also maintained that NZ was practising for

³⁹² Alley, "The Alternatives to ANZUS", in Ally (Ed.) *Alternatives to ANZUS: Volume II*, p. 20.

³⁹³ Lawrence Jones, "Cracks in the Consensus: Shifting Attitudes to New Zealand Defence", in Alley (ed.) *Alternatives to ANZUS: Volume II*, p. 43.

fighting in US wars, exemplified by the annual “Team Spirit” excises for the defence of South Korea, rather than training for the defence of NZ.

The Peace and Justice Forum of the WLRC argued that ASW research by NZ, like that conducted by the *Tui* in 1970 and 1972 was helping the US to locate Soviet ballistic missile submarines. If the US could destroy the USSR’s second-strike capability, it would enable the US to conduct a nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union.³⁹⁴ US hunter-killer nuclear submarines, like the ones that had visited NZ in the past, also threatened the USSR’s second-strike capability and were therefore highly destabilising.³⁹⁵ In addition, because NZ’s Orion aircraft and their ASW capability were suited to US purposes, they had to be scrapped.

Owen Wilkes and other activists were particularly concerned that NZ’s Orion aircraft and naval frigates were designed for integration with allied naval ASW forces. They overlooked the fact that Orions are useful for the defence of NZ, the surveillance of local threats, and maritime rescue, so one must ask why peace activists were so opposed to such aircraft. Submarines could threaten even a non-aligned NZ, and for the peace movement to oppose NZ’s having an ASW capacity did not mesh with its professed concern for NZ’s security. Once again NZ’s security was subordinated to radicals’ goal of ending co-operation with the US.

A different tack was for peace activists to argue that a lack of self-confidence in NZ’s identity and uniqueness had led the nation to cling to the Western Alliance.³⁹⁶ As a result, NZ had been swamped by the culture and moral values of its Western allies. By remaining in the Western Alliance, NZ was acting to support its allies’ “Eurocentric” concerns, but these ties would be tested if NZ sought increased “independence” and a redefinition of its identity in the world. The DASG saw this process as a necessary and desirable part of NZ’s national

³⁹⁴ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 10.

³⁹⁵ Peter Jones, “Defence, a Radical View”, in Henderson et al, *Beyond New Zealand*, pp. 63-65.

³⁹⁶ Galvin, *Living Without ANZUS*, p. 15.

development.³⁹⁷ Obstacles to such a healthy development included NZ's emotional ties to the West, its loyalty to its Anglo-Saxon allies, its military tradition, cultural inertia, and the conformist nature of NZ society. This view of ANZUS as a "white" alliance is still held by some today.³⁹⁸ Supposedly, fear and prejudice were preventing NZ from pursuing the path mapped out for it by the peace movement. Apparently, NZ's fondness for ANZUS was a projection of white guilt. Pakehas had colonised the Maoris, and now they feared that the Asians might do the same to them. Therefore, both the "Yellow Peril" and the "Red Menace" threats had derived from suppressed Pakeha guilt, and the so-called Soviet threat in the Cold War was nothing but a figment of whites' imagination.³⁹⁹ As a result, New Zealanders clung to ANZUS for psychological reasons, and it was necessary to re-educate them.

Another indictment of ANZUS was to claim that US and NZ objectives were not the same and that ANZUS had compelled NZ to accept the predominance of US interests.⁴⁰⁰ For example, the two countries had disagreed over World War II military strategy, non-recognition of China, the imposition of sanctions against dictatorships with which NZ wanted to continue trading, and the US military interventions in Grenada and South Vietnam. In addition, there had been arguments over nuclear testing, Japanese rearmament, and agricultural protectionism. However, peace activists omitted to mention that these were only *policy* differences. The broader *interests* of the NZ and US remained the same- the victory of the Western democratic Capitalist system in the Cold War and the avoidance of nuclear war with the USSR, namely, the original aims of the containment policy. Nevertheless, radicals preferred to obscure such common interests; instead they focused on points of difference in order to drive a wedge between the US and NZ. The peace movement insinuated that its own values

³⁹⁷ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 10.

³⁹⁸ Helen Clark, interview with author, Mt. Albert, October 12, 1998.

³⁹⁹ Lawrence Jones, "Civilian Defence: An Alternative to Collective security", in Roderick Phillips (Ed.) *Alternatives to ANZUS*, Auckland, 1977, pp. 23-25.

⁴⁰⁰ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 21-22.

were the values of NZ while arguing simultaneously that these values were incompatible with US values. In truth, NZ was only “out of step” to the extent that New Left ideology was able to influence NZ foreign policy.

Related to arguments about divergence of interest were contentions that ANZUS had made NZ lazy and insular to the point where it had allowed the US to judge what constituted NZ’s interests.⁴⁰¹ Supposedly, it was this laziness which had prevented NZ from conducting an “independent” foreign policy.⁴⁰² To be sure, the peace movement was correct that ANZUS placed some restraint on NZ foreign policy; the alliance required that NZ not act like a non-aligned nation. Second, NZ had a habit of voicing its disagreements with the US in private, which gave a false impression that it followed the US lead blindly.⁴⁰³ Finally, this view of NZ’s subservience contradicted other claims made by the peace movement that the ANZUS Treaty did not oblige the signatories to do anything in particular. If ANZUS did not oblige the signatories to do anything, how could it force NZ’s subservience?

One example of NZ’s “subservience” to US policy was NZ’s contribution to the Sinai Peace Keeping Force instituted in 1982. It was alleged that the UN mission was merely a US plot to secure Israel’s southern border, thus enabling the Israelis to invade Lebanon.⁴⁰⁴ In the Middle East radicals backed opponents of the US and its allies, opponents like the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), whilst condemning US allies like Israel. That radical peace activists could be strongly supportive of organisations which used terrorism as a weapon was but one more example of how the modern peace movement had moved away from strict pacifism. The NZ peace movement worked hard to edge NZ away from

⁴⁰¹ Rod Alley, “The Alternatives to ANZUS”, in Ally (Ed.) *Alternatives to ANZUS Volume II*, p. 12.

⁴⁰² Galvin, *Living Without ANZUS*, p. 9.

⁴⁰³ Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, p. 68.

⁴⁰⁴ Kathleen Ryan, “What’s Wrong With ANZUS?”, in *Women on Peace*, p. 20.

sympathy with Israel, and it was aided in this endeavour by a succession of NZ governments which had an eye on trading opportunities with Arab states.

The peace movement also maintained that, as a “morally independent country”, NZ could freely pursue peace and justice once it withdrew from ANZUS.⁴⁰⁵ Peace activists failed to acknowledge that the pursuit of morality (however defined) as a sole guiding principle in foreign policy can be dangerous. Political leaders are required to act according to political realities;⁴⁰⁶ if they ignore these realities, they can endanger the very existence of the nations they are sworn to protect. In addition, nations guided primarily by moral absolutism do not necessarily do good in the world. Self righteousness and a crusading mentality can lead to immoral acts being committed in the name of a Jihad or holy war. In any event, the morals of peace activists were closely tied to their political beliefs.

Peace activists also claimed that ANZUS associated NZ with an immoral US foreign policy. To radicals ANZUS was an “aggressive” alliance which supported US nuclear-war fighting strategy and counter-revolutionary US interventions in the Third World. Not only did ANZUS hamper NZ’s search for a Pacific identity,⁴⁰⁷ but it also made NZ morally culpable for any US actions against indigenous peoples. The Peace and Justice Forum of the WLRC warned that ANZUS involvement meant that NZ was condoning “current evils” like right-wing dictatorships in South East Asia.⁴⁰⁸ Radicals were particularly angry that NZ forces were supposedly training to assist US forces in combating Communist liberation movements in the Third World. Apparently, training and exercises with the US had the effect “of helping to deter people from using political or military means to shake off the yoke of US backed economic

⁴⁰⁵ Hammington and Jones, “ANZUS and the Politics of Insecurity”, *Peacelink*, August 1983, p. 11.

⁴⁰⁶ Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, p. 8.

⁴⁰⁷ Hammington and Jones, “ANZUS and the Politics of Insecurity”, *Peacelink*, August 1983, p. 11.

⁴⁰⁸ Winsley and Gould, *An Alternative Defence Policy*, p. 1.

oppression".⁴⁰⁹ According to one peace activist "ANZUS cannot be viewed in isolation from Capitalist and imperialist drive and ambition around the globe...[ANZUS] was not a response to Soviet aggression but, like all aspects of the Cold War and arms race, part of a strategy of Capitalist encirclement of the Communist countries".⁴¹⁰ Similar views of the US were expressed in peace movement submissions to the Labour Government's Defence Committee of Enquiry in 1986. One in particular argued that "New Zealand should not have any military alliance with such a despicable country [the US]...in simple words they are liars, exploiters, killers".⁴¹¹

Conspiracy theorists added that NATO and ANZUS were allowing the US and France to establish their colonial hegemonies in the Pacific and that NZ was in danger from its own foreign-directed police and military. ANZUS brought only insecurity, they insisted. It made NZ a target, created enemies where none had existed, prevented the redistribution of wealth, and controlled how we thought, spoke and acted.⁴¹² Other peace activists complained that NZ's RRF could be used to intervene against independence struggles in the Asia-Pacific region,⁴¹³ thereby transforming NZ into a junior counter-revolutionary partner of the US in the struggle between the exploiters and the exploited.

A similar political predisposition may have been behind complaints that NZ's voting record in the UN was suspect. In 1985 Owen Wilkes urged that NZ stop supporting the US when resolutions on disarmament were voted on in the UN General Assembly. In 1984 the US and NZ had voted with the majority on

⁴⁰⁹ Galvin, *Living Without ANZUS*, p. 31. For a similar view see Kathleen Ryan, "What's Wrong with ANZUS?", in *Women on Peace*, p. 21.

⁴¹⁰ Simione Durutalo, "ANZUS- Camouflage for Yankee Nuclear Imperialism in the Pacific", in Harford, *Beyond ANZUS*, p. 20.

⁴¹¹ Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*, p. 26.

⁴¹² Brian Lilburn, "Sunk in Psychopathic Defence", *Peacelink*, December 1985, p. 6.

⁴¹³ Ross Stevens "New Zealand Foreign Policy: Choices, Challenges and Opportunities. Aid and Development in the Pacific," in Harford, *Beyond ANZUS*, p. 157-160.

only seven arms control resolutions. According to Wilkes, membership in ANZUS had transformed NZ into a US lackey.

However, Wilkes's own statistics did not seem to support his contention of NZ subservience. In 1984 the US voted against 27 arms control and disarmament resolutions, abstained on 13, and voted for 7. NZ's record was 8, 19, and 20, respectively. This was not very similar to the US record. In contrast, the record of the USSR was 4, 2, and 40.⁴¹⁴ In addition, Wilkes's proposal that NZ should vote with the majority was questionable. In the mid 1980s democracies made up a voting minority in the UN General Assembly. The voting majority included a large number of Communist and non-aligned dictatorships, many which supported arms control resolutions either because this made them look like peace-loving nations or because they did not possess the weapons in question.

The UN resolutions which NZ was supposed to be supporting included resolutions advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament measures and nuclear arms freezes, resolutions calling for an end to the nuclear arms race, and resolutions calling for the banning of nuclear weapons. There was no means to enforce them, so the nations most likely to honour such resolutions, the Western democracies, could have found themselves at a considerable disadvantage respecting the nations least likely to honour the resolutions, the dictatorships of the Soviet bloc.

In 1986 Wilkes continued to complain that NZ had still not improved its UN disarmament voting record. Once again his statistics did not show that NZ shadowed US voting. NZ's 1985 record stood at 43 "yes", 41 "abstain", and 16 "no", compared to 16, 27, 57 for the US.⁴¹⁵ In examining a sample of resolutions, Wilkes lamented that NZ had voted affirmatively for only one of ten resolutions which had originated in the Soviet bloc, and for only six of fourteen resolutions

⁴¹⁴ Owen Wilkes, "New Zealand Supports US Nuclear War Policies in the UN", *Peacelink*, November 1985, p. 14

⁴¹⁵ Owen Wilkes, Lyn Richards, "NZ Voting at the UN", *Peacelink*, August 1986, p. 5.

emanating from non-aligned countries. Meanwhile, NZ had supported eight of the twelve resolutions originating in the West.

It is worth mentioning that NZ had long supported negotiated multi-lateral arms reductions. The Fourth Labour Government realised that nuclear disarmament was desirable, but it was unwilling to support resolutions requiring the immediate banning of nuclear weapons because they were deemed unrealistic and impractical. The fact that it acted in this manner was interpreted by some as a sign that NZ remained a US stooge.

One final cost of ANZUS membership, according to peace activists, was that it prevented the diversification of NZ's trade and hurt its political prestige.⁴¹⁶ Apparently, the peace movement was referring to the prospect of increased trade with the Communist and non-aligned worlds. "Military alliances make us enemies with countries, which, even if they may not be our friends, can at least be lucrative markets."⁴¹⁷ However, such claims were hard to accept. NZ's trade links had already diversified while the country remained in ANZUS, and there is no evidence that NZ had ever been denied access to certain markets because of its membership in ANZUS. Even the USSR had traded with NZ while the latter was a member of ANZUS. In addition, if it was true that the non-alignment of NZ might lead to increased NZ trade with other non-aligned countries, then it was equally true that non-alignment might also result in decreased trade with the West.

Regarding the question of political prestige, it must be asked exactly which nations radicals wanted NZ to impress. Any country which wouldn't deal with NZ because it was allied to the US would have to be fanatically anti-US, and probably anti-Western as well, to impose such conditions on its potential trading partners. The desirability of NZ's trying to appease such a country was questionable. For all radicals' talk about morality in foreign policy, they were quite

⁴¹⁶ Dianne Davis "Armed Neutrality: An Alternative defence Policy for New Zealand", in Alley, *Alternatives to ANZUS: Volume II*, p. 51.

⁴¹⁷ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 11.

happy for NZ to trade with Communist or non-aligned dictatorships while calling for trade boycotts of pro-Western dictatorships.

The Dismissal of ANZUS's Benefits

While they were busy pointing out the costs of ANZUS, peace activists were also at pains to dismiss any apparent benefits associated with ANZUS. The peace movement scoffed at the beliefs of pro-ANZUS "conservatives" that the international environment was dangerous and unpredictable and that ANZUS's benefits outweighed its costs. The view that any weakening of the Western alliance would undermine the global balance and thereby jeopardise Western security was also dismissed. Similarly, peace activists rejected the "lessons" from the rise of Hitler and World War II, especially the "Munich" analogy. In the end peace activists found no valid historical reasons to justify containment itself, for they discerned no parallel between Hitler's expansion of the 1930s and Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia during the 1940s and early 1950s.

One benefit of ANZUS, as claimed by its defenders, was the US "guarantee" of NZ's security. Peace activists argued that NZ had received informal protection from the US between 1945 and 1951 without the existence of a formal alliance. As the ANZUS Treaty required the signatories to do little that they would not have done anyway, the formal treaty was meaningless. In other words, the relationship to which ANZUS gave formal expression would have existed without ANZUS,⁴¹⁸ and would presumably continue in its absence. This was ironic indeed. For activists to argue that ANZUS was unnecessary because NZ was already co-operating with the US undermined other peace movement arguments that ANZUS membership carried heavy costs for NZ.

Related to the above argument were claims that the US acted only in its self interest, and that it would ignore paper guarantees to its allies if it were so

⁴¹⁸ Stephen Levine, "New Zealand-United States Relations- a Political Appraisal", in Roderick Phillips (ed.) *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p.10.

inclined. It would also help NZ so long as it was in the US's interest to do so whether or not ANZUS existed. It was noted, for instance, that in World War II the US had not entered the war until it was attacked⁴¹⁹ and that it had then aided NZ despite the lack of a formal treaty at the time. The Guam Doctrine of 1969 was also interpreted as meaning that, short of major conflicts, US allies must rely on their own efforts. The US did not have any permanent friends, only permanent interests. Here the Falklands War was cited. The US had not automatically backed its British NATO ally, because Argentina was also a US ally, and this was a lesson for NZ.⁴²⁰

This line of reasoning is flawed in a number of respects. The Guam Doctrine demonstrated that, due to the Vietnam War and its tremendous drain on US resources, the US wanted its allies to increase their self reliance in order to enhance the overall credibility of the Western Alliance. As for the US's acting in its own interests, alliance credibility was a vital US interest in the Cold War. To aid an ally like NZ was very much in the US's interests because it demonstrated US reliability as a guarantor and thereby helped to preserve the unity of the Western Alliance. Indeed, alliance unity was considered such an important interest by the US that it excluded NZ from ANZUS when NZ's nuclear ship ban appeared to threaten the wider unity of the Western Alliance.

Other vital US interests included the rule of law, the spread of democracy, and the defence of the US's democratic allies. As an alliance between three of the world's oldest democracies, ANZUS bolstered these interests. Nor did the case of the Falklands War undermine the ANZUS guarantee. Britain was not in mortal danger, and the US first attempted to promote negotiations, an option usually preferred by the peace movement. When negotiations failed, the US gave Britain the political and military intelligence support it needed.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁹ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 5.

⁴²⁰ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 15.

⁴²¹ See Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, New York, 1984, pp. 141-142.

In addition to claiming that US interests might preclude Washington from helping NZ, peace activists also argued that the wording of the ANZUS Treaty weakened any guarantee.⁴²² For example, Article IV included the proviso that parties would act in accordance with their “constitutional processes”. In other words, the US Congress would have to approve US aid to NZ, and the experience of the Vietnam War probably militated against this occurring. However, the US Congress was also aware that the maintenance of the US’s alliance system was a vital interest. In actuality, those peace activists who took a legalistic approach overlooked the heart of the matter. As Ramesh Thakur noted, “ANZUS is not significant because of the technical excellence of its provisions but because it expresses a strategic community of interests.”⁴²³ The true value of ANZUS to its members consisted in what it symbolised rather than what it said.⁴²⁴ It was the US military facilities on NZ soil and US-NZ military co-operation that angered radicals. They recognised that above all ANZUS demonstrated NZ’s commitment to the chief goal of the Western Alliance- the survival and hopefully the triumph of Capitalist democracy. This was a goal which radicals did not share.

Other peripheral arguments were employed against the value of the US guarantee. First, it was argued that US protection was not even credible. After all, did the US not let down South Vietnam?⁴²⁵ US public support for a long war was clearly difficult to maintain.⁴²⁶ A second argument was that, if a crisis was serious enough to warrant US intervention, the US might be too preoccupied elsewhere in a war to come to our aid. There was, therefore, no military value to ANZUS in

⁴²² For example, see Alex Carey, “US Foreign Policy Subject to tides of Public Opinion”, *New Zealand Herald*, September 28, 1984, p. 6, Section 1.

⁴²³ Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, p. 44.

⁴²⁴ Roderic Alley, “Alternatives to ANZUS”, in *Alternatives to ANZUS: Volume II*, p. 14-15.

⁴²⁵ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 15.

⁴²⁶ Andrew Mack, “The Pros and Cons of ANZUS: An Australian Perspective”, in Gold, *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, p. 73.

the conventional sense, and NZ was simply trying to derive a sense of importance by consorting with larger powers.

While some peace activists denied that the US could be of any military value to NZ whatsoever, others in the peace movement tried to demonstrate how ANZUS was of political benefit to the US. According to peace activists, ANZUS had come about because of the Korean War, which had spurred the US to form an alliance in the Pacific for Cold War propaganda purposes. In this sense, ANZUS was an ideological and political alliance,⁴²⁷ designed to provide ANZAC support for US policy around the globe.

The contention that ANZUS was a political and ideological alliance serving the interests of the democratic, Capitalist West was the bedrock motivation for radicals' vehement opposition to the alliance. For many peace activists a main problem with ANZUS was that it helped to bolster Western political unity in the Cold War, although few of them mentioned this particular gripe in public. Doing so would have undermined simultaneous efforts by other peace activists to dismiss ANZUS as a military alliance that was failing to deliver any military benefits; moreover, it would have revealed their own political agenda to the public. Some activists, however, were not so cautious. As Ray Galvin said, "If we are in ANZUS simply as a pawn to help bolster the West's shaky ego it is time we found something more constructive to do."⁴²⁸ Others added that any subversion was more likely to come from NZ's Western allies (e.g., the French bombing of the Rainbow Warrior) and if NZ wished to avoid Soviet-US confrontation in the Pacific, it was better to help to "rid Asia and the Pacific of the American menace".⁴²⁹

To demonstrate that ANZUS benefited the US more than NZ, the peace movement had to dismiss specific arguments in favour of ANZUS. For example,

⁴²⁷ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 5.

⁴²⁸ Galvin, *Living without ANZUS*, p. 22.

⁴²⁹ Christine Gillespie, "A Worker's Perspective", in *Beyond ANZUS*, p. 13.

ANZUS defenders claimed that the alliance benefited NZ in the form of joint military exercises, weapons supply, defence overheads, trade, influence in Washington and the sharing of intelligence data. ANZUS exercises in particular aided the NZ military, because they provided experience in working with large formations and in using high-tech weapons systems. They also allowed for familiarisation with allied tactics, communications, and control structures, which helped to keep NZ's forces inter-operable with the forces of its allies. NZ's ability to exercise with US forces was the most practical manifestation of ANZUS, even though such co-operation derived from related agreements rather than from ANZUS itself. However, peace activists objected that, since most exercises appeared to be training the NZ military for service overseas, including counter-insurgency operations in the pursuit of "US interests," these exercises were more of a cost than a benefit. In short, they maintained that NZ's armed forces were training alongside its ANZUS allies' forces to suppress the forces of liberation in the Third World. As for NZ gaining access to high-tech weaponry, it was argued that NZ could buy sufficiently advanced weapons on the international market. In addition, it was said that sophisticated technology was only relevant to the Cold War's major combatants, and NZ would not need the latest military technology if it were non-aligned.⁴³⁰

Those who touted trade benefits from ANZUS were also attacked by the peace movement. It pointed out that ANZUS did not help trade with US due to the strong US agricultural lobby and that ANZUS merely served to get NZ's views heard at a high level. It also pointed out that other "nuclear free" countries had not suffered trade losses as a result of their status. To further bolster their case, some peace activists added that US influence on the NZ economy was not necessarily positive for NZ's workers and that trade dependence on the West only meant that NZ could be forced to back Western foreign policies. Arguments from ANZUS defenders that the USN was necessary to protect NZ's trade in wartime met with the glib response that, if war broke out, NZ trade would be

⁴³⁰ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, pp. 15-17.

hurt whether we had US convoy protection or not. As any global war would be nuclear, convoys would be irrelevant.⁴³¹ The possibility that NZ might face a conventional submarine threat from a regional adversary appears to have been ruled out.

Regarding the issue of access to Washington for NZ trade, it could be argued that obtaining a hearing for NZ was better than nothing. Occasionally, NZ's status as an ally did work in its favour. In 1977 Australia asked the US to pressure NZ into denying the Soviets fishing rights in NZ waters. The US refused on the grounds that NZ needed to redress its trade surplus.⁴³² Despite such bonuses, the peace movement was correct in this case. The non-existence of ANZUS would not make a significant difference to the level of NZ trade with the US. The flip side of this coin was that the existence of a NZ nuclear ship ban would not affect NZ trade either. There was only one way in which NZ's trading interests could be linked to the ANZUS dispute, and it was not something that the peace movement wanted to acknowledge: NZ's trade was helped by global stability. If collective security aided global stability, which it certainly appeared to do, then the maintenance of collective security and ANZUS was in NZ's trading interests.

The issue of NZ's influence in Washington on matters other than trade was also a peace movement target. In response to declarations that ANZUS allowed NZ to influence US foreign policy, activists asserted that the US was more likely to influence NZ than the other way around. They added that NZ would gain more influence with the US if it were nuclear free.⁴³³ Peace activists believed that it was more difficult for NZ to promote nuclear disarmament from within ANZUS, as it would be accused of jeopardising the "vital interests" of the US. Of course, ANZUS was not an alliance among equals, as some NZers might have

⁴³¹ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 38.

⁴³² Henry Albinski, "New Zealand and ANZUS: a United States' Perspective", in Henderson et al, *Beyond New Zealand*, p. 50.

⁴³³ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, pp. 17-23.

wished. The US was a superpower, NZ was a minor power, and this was the main reason NZ had sought US protection in the first place. It is unreasonable to expect the demands of the smaller partner to overrule automatically the policy of the larger. ANZUS was never an exception to this fact of life.

As for promoting nuclear disarmament, this was much easier as an ally. As a small ally sharing common values and goals, NZ could urge restraint on the US. For reasons of face, powerful nations like the US do not want to be seen yielding to pressure from small, non-aligned countries, especially ones spouting anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Capitalist revolutionary rhetoric. But, as a small country with access to the US's inner sanctums through ANZUS, NZ would have been useful as a conduit for the concerns of other small states. Obviously, this would not apply if it were relegated to the crowd standing outside the gates.

A final apparent benefit of ANZUS, one which parts of the peace movement enjoyed disputing, was that NZ profited from its access to allied intelligence networks. Various means were used by peace activists to counter this assertion. Some have been mentioned previously, in regard to the peace movement's claims about the costs of ANZUS. In order to dismiss intelligence as a benefit, peace activists contended that dependence on US intelligence laid NZ open to receiving distorted data. For example, they claimed that there was misleading US intelligence about the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, which was not as bad as the US liked to make out.⁴³⁴ The US would also withhold any information it didn't want NZ to have; moreover, the reception of US data might lead to NZ complicity in immoral US covert operations. Finally, US intelligence was faulty, intelligence failures having occurred regarding the onset of the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

⁴³⁴ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 23.

Peace activists seemed to be saying that it was better to be blind and deaf than risk NZ's being polluted by US intelligence. They did not understand that intelligence can help to avoid wars by allowing for pre-emptive action to prevent the occurrence of a war. The occasional intelligence failure is also far preferable to having no intelligence at all. Intelligence links build up channels of communication which can be used to co-ordinate a collective response to a crisis. Intelligence sharing, in brief, can help preserve world peace, but radicals opposed it nevertheless because the US was the primary intelligence gatherer and beneficiary.

The peace movement's fears about NZ's intelligence links with the US was one reason for its seeking an end to ANZUS, as it believed that such links helped the US to manipulate NZ foreign policy. Therefore, the nuclear ship ban produced an added bonus for the peace movement when the US virtually removed NZ from the West's intelligence "loop". Intelligence co-operation with the US also furnished the peace movement with a useful tool for generating public support. Intelligence matters are, with good reason, usually kept secret. The NZ peace movement was able to take advantage of this secrecy by concocting conspiracy theories to fill the vacuum created by the lack of information emanating from the NZ Government.⁴³⁵ The Australian Government attempted to deny its own peace movement this advantage in 1983 when it released information on US bases on Australia. This satisfied most of the Australian public and lessened the appeal of the Australian peace movement. If the NZ Government had followed the lead of the Australian Government regarding intelligence disclosures, it is likely that NZers would have taken even less notice of anti-base campaigners than they did.

Alternatives to ANZUS

Each one of them hopes that if he feeds the crocodile long enough, the crocodile will eat him last.

*Winston Churchill on neutral nations.*⁴³⁶

The peace movement's dismissal of the Soviet threat went hand in hand with the promotion of alternative foreign policies for NZ. Once the nuclear ship ban went into effect, peace movement radicals urged that the Labour Government take further steps to detach NZ from the Western Alliance; in particular, they criticised the government for not going beyond the ban to redefine NZ's defence requirements in a way that was radically different from the past.

One peace movement organisation that lobbied for such a redefinition was the Defence Alternatives Study Group (DASG), including activists like Nicky Hager, Owen Wilkes and Bob Leonard, which believed that alternative defence policies were not getting enough attention in the defence debate. The DASG published a booklet which was intended to inform the public of these alternatives and which proceeded from the assumption that nuclear war was increasingly likely and that security via nuclear deterrence was no security at all.⁴³⁷ It argued that public thinking was being limited by biased information, a lack of education about alternatives, and reliance on buzzwords like "ANZUS" and "alliance", all of which triggered Pavlovian responses in the NZ public. The DASG was particularly worried that traditional thinking might swing the defence debate back in the direction of healing the breach with the US unless peace re-education took place.

The members of the DASG were also upset that Prime Minister David Lange had rejected non alignment and neutrality as options for NZ, even though the DASG viewed them as "logically sequential" to the ban and in line with sentiments expressed at Labour Party conferences. Continued defence links with Australia and the Government's non-nuclear and pro-Western position hampered

⁴³⁵ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, pp. 25-32.

⁴³⁶ Quoted in Bacon, *ANZUS, Yes or No?*, p. 26.

⁴³⁷ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 1.

the search for alternatives. The DASG sought an “independent” world role for NZ and this would require the establishment of a non-governmental agency in NZ to develop alternative defence strategies based on regular public input. It was also proposed that NZ create a National Peace Research Institute, that the Ministry of Defence treat arms control as an integral part of security planning, and that NZ recognise the Treaty of Waitangi.⁴³⁸ In addition, NZ would rule out any multi-lateral defence arrangements with other countries. The DASG also advocated the formation of a bi-partisan group of MPs to oversee all defence and intelligence operations in NZ.

According to the DASG, the defence of NZ was not a military function, but something that could be achieved by economic, social and political means. The best defence was a foreign policy that shunned militarism, and that supported democratic and independent Pacific states. However, even if it was true that NZ focused excessively on the military aspects of security, as suggested by Kevin Clements,⁴³⁹ logic did not require that NZ terminate ANZUS and all military efforts. If the South Pacific was prosperous and democratic, this alone would not save it from military attack.

While the DASG tried to push NZ further away from the West, it denied that the peace movement had hijacked NZ’s foreign policy, and it pointed out that the public had supported the nuclear ship ban. Though it was true that the NZ public supported the nuclear ship ban, this did not mean that it supported the entire foreign policy agenda of radical groups like the DASG. For the NZ public NZ’s anti-nuclear stance and the proposed alternative foreign and defence policies were two separate issues;⁴⁴⁰ for radicals they were integral parts of the same programme that aimed to create a revolution in NZ foreign affairs and defence policy.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p. 81-82.

⁴³⁹ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, pp. 3-6.

⁴⁴⁰ Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword*, pp. 354-355.

The four main defence or foreign policy options promoted by radicals were: armed non-alignment, armed neutrality, armed positive neutrality, and unarmed neutrality or Civilian Based Defence (CBD). Each of these alternatives aimed to divorce NZ from the Western Alliance and to remove it from “the list” of possible nuclear targets. All but CBD accepted the existence of defensive NZ armed forces. This created problems for some of those who considered themselves pacifist, but they resolved them by condoning armed alternatives in the short to medium term in order to achieve total disarmament in the long run.⁴⁴¹ Owen Wilkes, for one, saw armed neutrality or armed non-alignment as potential preludes to CBD.⁴⁴² Thus, for tactical reasons parts of the peace movement subordinated the goal of a completely disarmed NZ to the goal of a NZ completely isolated from its Western allies.

Armed Non-Alignment

Some proponents of this armed non-alignment claimed that NZ was already in a situation of de-facto non-alignment under the Fourth Labour Government, simply requiring a final political break with the Western Alliance.⁴⁴³ In essence, non-alignment was a foreign policy rather than a defence policy. The peace movement’s overriding objective was that NZ should cease to be a US ally. Once NZ had become non-aligned, it could decide whether to have defence forces (and what type of force structure) or whether to disarm itself.

Non-alignment in the Cold War was generally an option pursued by those countries which believed that they had little interest in the outcome of the Cold War and which believed that non-alignment best served their national interests. For many Third World countries such interests included maximising foreign aid. By staying out of Cold War alliance systems, they could tap into both the East

⁴⁴¹ For example, in Winsley and Gould, *An Alternative Defence Policy*, pp. 2, 12.

⁴⁴² Foote, *Disarmed and Defended*, p. 19.

⁴⁴³ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 59.

and the West for aid, allowing each side to court them without ever fully committing themselves to either.

As for the desirability and likelihood of NZ's joining the non-aligned bloc, there were various obstacles. For one, NZ did not share the ideology of the non-aligned movement to the same extent that the peace movement did. The non-aligned bloc in the Cold War placed a strong emphasis on Third World issues of decolonisation, economic development, the UN and global financial institutions, issues that were near and dear to both liberals and radicals. Non-aligned conferences also spent considerable time attacking the West over its colonialism, racism and economic imperialism, and at times appeared to mimic the rhetoric of the Communist bloc. The idea of NZ's joining the non-aligned bloc and fulminating against the West alongside Cuba and Libya was therefore appealing to the modern peace movement. As one proponent of non-alignment put it, "Westernism boils down to pro-American anti-Communist white racism that aims to maintain economic affluence through neo-colonialism over the non-West peoples of the world".⁴⁴⁴

Non-aligned members were inclined to scoff at NZ's pretensions to join their ranks. As an Iraqi diplomat pointed out to NZ's Foreign Minister in 1976, "You [i.e., NZ] don't look non-aligned to me".⁴⁴⁵ Nevertheless, some peace activists believed that NZ's national debt and reliance on primary exports meant that its national interests coincided with those of Third World nations.⁴⁴⁶ Activists argued that NZ would benefit if it established itself as a free and independent trading nation which encouraged cultural and trade ties with all but the most repressive regimes. "Military alliances make us enemies with countries, which, even if they may not be our friends, can at least be lucrative markets."⁴⁴⁷ For

⁴⁴⁴ M. V. Naidu, quoted in "What Does Westernism Mean?", *Peace Digest*, April 1986, p. 22.

⁴⁴⁵ Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, p. 91.

⁴⁴⁶ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 59.

⁴⁴⁷ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 11.

example, NZ's commitment to the US-sponsored Sinai peace keeping force might hurt NZ's trade with Arab nations. Rather than remaining involved in the Cold War, NZ should focus on trade and diplomacy. If non-aligned, NZ could also act as an intermediary in peace-making negotiations, providing communication facilities and a neutral meeting ground. As a result, NZ would obtain a higher international profile and more careful consideration of its interests.

To complement a non-aligned foreign policy, its advocates also urged a new NZ defence policy, one which would take advantage of NZ's geographical isolation and the stability of the South Pacific. They argued that, if NZ was non-aligned, it would be moving within the more affordable world of conventional weapons, weapons which were not under the sole control of the large powers. Supposedly this would allow greater freedom of action in defence.⁴⁴⁸ However, despite this greater freedom, non-alignment advocates also noted that non-aligned defence policies were usually anti-nuclear and pro-UN peace-keeping, that they often involved conscription in some form, and that they required a domestic arms industry or the purchase of weapons from diverse sources. A non-aligned NZ, they maintained, could still get involved in wars, but these wars would be fought for clear ethical reasons rather than just for the sake of an alliance. How NZ would defend itself against a major conventional military power that could bomb or blockade the country with impunity in the absence of US military assistance was of no concern to the non-alignment school of thought.

Armed Neutrality and “Just Defence”

Armed neutrality was another combination of foreign and defence policies, one which also emphasised self-reliance in defence. Activists cited certain neutral nations as models, and then they listed the advantages of being one of them. For example, advocates argued that the blockade of NZ's sea-borne trade was unlikely to occur if NZ became neutral and that neutrality would also improve NZ's credibility in the Third World and help expand NZ trade. As one of its models, it

⁴⁴⁸ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 15.

pointed to Finland, a country with credible defence forces that threatened no-one. Activists failed to mention that, despite all this, the Soviet Union had invaded Finland in 1940 and had threatened to invade it again in 1948 unless Helsinki submitted to Moscow's blackmail.

Regarding defence policy, activists argued that NZ's geography was well suited to armed neutrality and that self defence would be cheaper in the long run. If a local defence industry existed in NZ, then the allocations in the defence budget could be spent in NZ, although some in the peace movement were uncomfortable with the ethics of a NZ arms industry. One group advocating a NZ defence policy of armed neutrality was the Just Defence group, formed in 1985 to develop the ideas raised in 1983 and 1985 by the Peace and Justice Forum of the WLRC. Just Defence focused on NZ's force structure, and it lobbied for a purely resource-protection navy, a larger and cheaper airforce (armed with anti-ship missiles), and the scrapping of NZ's armoured land forces and its Ready Reaction Force.⁴⁴⁹ Just Defence insisted that a neutral NZ withdraw from ANZUS and curtail its military co-operation with Australia.

While many of Just Defence's recommendations for NZ's force structure had value, it did not follow that they were best pursued through a foreign policy of neutrality. After all, NZ could upgrade its airborne anti-ship capabilities and still retain forces inter-operable with its Western allies. It was also possible for NZ to increase its "brown water" or local defence naval capabilities and still maintain the capability to assist allied naval efforts wider afield. The issue need not have been a case of "either-or"; however, groups like Just Defence were not interested in defence policy alone. What they wanted was a defence policy which would render NZ incapable of operating alongside the Western Alliance.

However, the armed neutrality option carried its own set of problems. For example, activists never considered what would happen if a belligerent nation

⁴⁴⁹ Similar views were expressed in Pauline Swain's article "Who Defends New Zealand?", *NZ Listener*, November 16, 1985, pp. 32-34.

attempted to cut off NZ's trade with its enemies. If NZ was trading with one or more belligerents, there was no guarantee that its neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent or belligerents. If NZ was confronted with a trade embargo, it would be unable to break this embargo with the naval forces advocated by Just Defence. If NZ possessed no powerful allies, no one was likely to rush to NZ's rescue. The peace movement dismissed the possibility of NZ's being cut off during wartime with the assurance that NZ could feed itself.⁴⁵⁰ This might have offered some comfort to NZers in the nineteenth century but it could offer very little to those living in the industrialised, urbanised NZ of the late twentieth century.

Respect for neutrality depends on the existence of international law, and international law in turn requires military force to enforce it. If international law and order were to break down, the only way that a neutral or non-aligned NZ, with its purely self-defence armed forces, could feel secure would depend on the willingness of other more powerful nations to uphold international law and order on its behalf.

Positive Armed Neutrality

Positive armed neutrality was similar to armed neutrality, but it tried to avoid the charges of “isolationism” which could be levelled at armed neutrality by specifically advocating a politically activist foreign policy. This appealed to those in the peace movement like Larry Ross who wanted NZ out of the Western Alliance but who viewed the Swiss model of neutrality, which ruled out involvement in UN efforts, as too extreme. Because positive neutrality spelled out a peace-keeping role for NZ as a conciliator and honest broker, it therefore did not constitute isolationism or a “Fortress NZ” mentality, as NZ would be practising “internationalism in the best and most positive sense of sovereign and self-reliant states working together for peace and justice”.⁴⁵¹ Under positive armed

⁴⁵⁰ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 19.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., p. 27.

neutrality NZ would also oppose the nuclear arms race, withdraw from all alliances and intelligence arrangements, and support the SPNFZ. NZ could then make “treaties of friendship” with any number of countries.

It was stated that the best defence for NZ was to ensure “social justice” in the region and that peace education was required to put NZers in the correct frame of mind for such a policy. In response to accusations that neutrality amounted to “free-loading” off the military efforts of others and that NZ would receive no help if it was invaded, peace activists replied that political and economic activism underpinned global stability and that any other nation would be ashamed to attack NZ.⁴⁵²

The alternative defence policy recommended by positive armed neutrality advocates also had foreign policy implications. NZ would have self-defence forces, but provision was to be made for possible military intervention in the South Pacific. Possible scenarios for the use of NZ’s new-look armed forces were offered by the Peace and Justice Forum of the WLRC. One scenario was set in Vanuatu, in a situation “where the Phoenix Corporation tried to impose their big-business empire on the democratically elected government”⁴⁵³ Another scenario involved an attempt by right-wing American or French extremists “to overthrow the government of a newly independent South Pacific State against the clear wishes of the local population”.⁴⁵⁴ Thus, for some proponents of positive armed neutrality it was acceptable for NZ forces to fight overseas for ideological reasons.

Unarmed Neutrality/Civilian Based Defence

Unarmed neutrality/Civilian Based Defence was advocated by those few activists in the peace movement who were genuine pacifists and who were not afraid of being publicly identified as such. As a defence alternative it had the

⁴⁵² DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 61.

⁴⁵³ Peace and Justice Forum, WLRC, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 18.

political result of removing NZ from the Western Alliance, something which appealed to many non-pacifists, although much of the peace movement was wary of implementing CBD in the short term. For example, the DASG disagreed and denied that passive resistance could really work against a ruthless invader,⁴⁵⁵ noting that CBD had never been totally successful.

A number of CBD or “social defence” proponents quoted the writings of Gene Sharp, a writer in vogue during the 1960s. He argued that non-violent deterrence could be practised, but it first required its practitioners to find inner peace. According to the followers of Sharp, the best way to deal with conflict was through persuasion and conciliation, followed if necessary by defensive, non-violent coercion. The term “Transarmament” was used to describe the gradual process of phasing out the armed forces. In order to implement CBD as a national defence policy, preparations had to be made in advance for resistance by means of non co-operation, the “winning over” of occupying troops, non-violent sabotage, an underground media, and a government in exile. Symbolic actions would include public statements, leaflets, marches and sit-ins; and concrete forms of non co-operation might include boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience.⁴⁵⁶ Specially trained non-military personnel would assume responsibility for Civil Defence functions, and NZ would inform the world of its decision never to threaten anyone.

According to its advocates, CBD would rule out imperialist or interventionist actions by NZ, and it would prevent internal coups or government oppression of the public. NZ would never face a nuclear attack, nor would anyone be likely to blockade it. It was claimed that Japan had only acted against NZ’s SLOCs in World War II because NZ was supplying the US’s Pacific forces

⁴⁵⁴ Winsley and Gould, *An Alternative Defence Policy*, p. 11.

⁴⁵⁵ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 71.

⁴⁵⁶ W. J. Foote, *Disarmed and Defended*, p. 5.

at the time.⁴⁵⁷ It was maintained that CBD was not isolationist, “because it [would] set an example” for the rest of the world.

The main proponent of CBD was the Association for Transarmament (Aotearoa), an organisation which saw six main threats to NZ. In the order of their likelihood, they were EEZ violations, terrorism, trade interference, raids against military targets, invasion, and global war. The threat of a coup, backed by a foreign power, was also noted. It was argued that NZ could break blockades non-violently, as happened during the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift.⁴⁵⁸ It was also claimed that there would be no raids against NZ military targets, because there would be none in NZ. The Association’s ignorance of Cold War history (the US nuclear monopoly enabling the non-violent Berlin Airlift to succeed) and the history of World War II (the countless bombings of civilian targets from Warsaw through Dresden) was nothing less than astonishing.

NZ, it was maintained, was an ideal place to implement CBD because it had no military industrial complex, no empire, and no major US bases. There was only a moderate level of trade with the US; there were no overwhelming common interests with Australia and the US, and the “RSA generation” was being replaced by younger NZers who were supposedly “less paranoid” about security. Successful examples of CBD were Norway and Denmark in World War II,* Mahatma Gandhi and Te Whiti against the British, the US Civil Rights Movement, and the Czechoslovakian resistance campaign of 1968.

Such examples of successful passive resistance in history were misleading, to say the least. For one, Norway and Denmark may have resisted Nazi rule in limited ways, but they were not liberated until the Allies had crushed the Third Reich by force. Moreover, the fact that Germany did not take more severe

⁴⁵⁷ Lawrence Jones, “Civilian Defence”, in Phillips, *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 23.

⁴⁵⁸ Quoted in DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 68.

* For example, Norway had refused to implement Nazi-style education in its schools, and Denmark refused to co-operate in handing over Danish Jews to the Germans.

measures to crush Norwegian and Danish resistance was probably due to the over-extension of the Wehrmacht, primarily in the USSR after June 1941. In any event, the Gestapo was preparing to act against leaders of the Danish resistance in 1944, and it required British air-strikes on Gestapo archives in Denmark to avert this.⁴⁵⁹ At best, CBD could only be used by occupied nations to harass an invader as they waited for liberation by other combatants. Significantly, Norway and Denmark could not have placed too much faith in CBD, for both joined NATO after World War II.⁴⁶⁰ The experiences of Gandhi, US blacks, and Te Whiti in NZ were also not very useful models in the Cold War context because each had used passive resistance against a democracy that had some respect for the sanctity of human life and the rule of law.

CBD advocates claimed that passive resistance would render any invasion of NZ pointless. If the invader coveted food, crops would wither for lack of co-operation in their harvesting; if the invader sought a pool of slave labour, NZers would resort to strikes and sabotage; if the invader wanted to force his ideology on NZ, then NZers would repudiate his ideology. CBD advocates did not contemplate what would happen if the invader's goal was genocide and "living space". CBD advocates also ignored how passive resistance might fare against the awesome power and control of Communist totalitarianism. If Joseph Stalin could murder twenty million of his own people in the USSR and if Pol Pot in Cambodia could execute the entire intelligentsia of his nation, CBD would not have created many problems for the killing machines of the Communist bloc.

An analysis of its non-nuclear case against ANZUS reveals that radicals in the peace movement were as much opposed to US foreign policy as they were opposed to things nuclear. The value to the peace movement of the NZ nuclear ship ban was that the public's anti-nuclear sentiment could be harnessed to achieve radicals' primary goal, namely, the military detachment of NZ from the

⁴⁵⁹ John Toland, *The Last 100 Days*, St Albans, 1973, pp. 273-279.

⁴⁶⁰ Bacon, *ANZUS, Yes or No?*, p. 25.

democratic Capitalist West. As the termination of such co-operation was the primary aim of radicals, the nuclear ship ban was probably supported in the hope that it would help to spur the US to cease such co-operation. Recently, Owen Wilkes admitted that the DASG's alternatives to ANZUS had not been well researched, and that its ideological opposition to any force structure that could be used for collective security co-operation with the West was "stupid". There might be a need to co-operate with other countries- including the US- in certain circumstances.⁴⁶¹

The peace movement's tactics to end co-operation with the US proved partially successful, even though NZ never adopted the alternative defence and foreign policies prescribed for it by the peace movement. However, in order to obtain the ship ban, peace activists needed a government which was sympathetic to the radical ideology dominating the peace movement. The Fourth Labour Government proved to be the government they were seeking.

⁴⁶¹ Wilkes Interview, August 10, 1998.

CHAPTER SIX: LABOUR AND THE NEW LEFT

'Many New Zealanders preoccupied with peace have tolerated and tacitly or overtly endorsed the course of Rogernomics because its material consequences have been unappreciated or ignored.'

Jack Vowles, Political Analyst. ⁴⁶²

Pressures For Change Prior to 1972.

As the traditional home of the Old Left in NZ politics, the NZ Labour Party (NZLP) was the obvious organisation for radicals to join and influence on behalf of their own political agenda. Labour's roots lay in the militant unions of NZ's mining towns, and the NZ FOL worked hard to heighten the class consciousness of its membership consisting primarily of unskilled urban workers and rural manual labourers. After the NZLP was formed in 1916, the NZ working class was increasingly exposed to Christian socialism, Marxism, Fabianism, and New Unionism.

Despite the Labour Party's close links with socialism, it moderated its stance once it gained a foothold in Parliament. Rather than aiming to destroy capitalism, the NZLP set out to humanise it by rectifying worker's grievances and by creating a welfare state. Christian morality and secular humanitarianism rather than Marxism motivated the NZLP at this stage.⁴⁶³ Although Labour contained some forerunners of the New Left, most members of the party belonged to downtrodden groups which were overwhelmingly concerned with alleviating

⁴⁶² Jack Vowles, "Nuclear Free New Zealand and Rogernomics: The Survival of A Labour Government", in *Politics*, May 1990, p. 89.

⁴⁶³ Barry Gustafson, "Coming Home? The Labour Party in 1916 and 1991 Compared", in Margaret Clark (Ed.) *The Labour Party after 75 Years*, Wellington, 1992, p. 3.

poverty and unemployment. Their focus was on “materialist” politics, or dealing with bread and butter issues for the poor, as opposed to the post-materialist emphasis which motivated the 1960s generation.

Although Labour was the party of the Left, having transformed NZ into a model welfare state between 1935 and 1949, there were no fundamental differences between Labour and National in the economic sphere during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. When the First Labour Government established a regulated and protected economy, created a welfare state and decreased business freedom of action, business interests consented in exchange for Labour’s willingness to moderate its socialism.⁴⁶⁴ Farmers and businessmen may have felt more restricted, but they gained financially from protectionism, subsidies and guaranteed prices. Some have called this arrangement the “historic compromise” of the 1930s.

National governments, which held power from 1949 to 1957, from 1960 to 1972, and from 1975 to 1984, honoured the historic compromise. National maintained the welfare state but was much tougher with the trade unions. Despite the futile challenges of some militant unions, the FOL and the moderate unions opted to work with National in order to keep the historic compromise alive. The business world was also content with the compromise, provided enough wealth was generated to keep both employers and workers happy. NZ’s tradition of state paternalism was also acceptable to the right-wing because conservative people benefited from free health and education as well as everyone else.⁴⁶⁵ Unfortunately, the loss of NZ’s British markets and the oil shocks of the 1970s undermined the export-related prosperity that was vital to the functioning of the historic compromise. The New Right, with its staunch commitment to conservative monetary and fiscal economic policies, and those influenced by the

⁴⁶⁴ Bruce Jesson, *Fragments of Labour: The Story Behind the Labour Government*, Auckland, 1989, p. 9.

⁴⁶⁵ Colin James, *The Quiet Revolution: Turbulence and Transition in Contemporary New Zealand*, Wellington, 1986, pp. 11-17.

New Left, with their equally staunch commitment to a radical anti-Western foreign policy, were now ready to fill the political vacuum.

Labour was the only practical vehicle for both right-wingers and left-wingers opposed to the old order that was represented by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon's National Government of 1975-1984. A series of gradual changes within the NZLP had laid it open to conquest by the generation which acted as a carrier for two ideologies: New Right economics and New Left social theories. These changes included a post-World War II decline in working class Labour Party members, the loss of Labour's reformist zeal, with television providing an alternative to the party's social events, and the loss of the working class's sense of community and solidarity through consumerism and suburbanisation. The historic compromise had been so successful in "sharing out the cake" that Labour's original constituency had become complacent. Most Labour stalwarts of the 1930s had either dropped out of politics, or they had died off, reducing the NZLP, once a mass-based party, to a hollow organisational shell by the 1960s. In 1938 one in 13 Labour voters was a party member, but by 1969 this had dropped to less than one in 50.⁴⁶⁶ Branch meetings waned in frequency and significance, and the few remaining members concentrated more exclusively on election campaigning.

This state of affairs provided a timely opportunity for the 1960s generation to re-make the Labour Party in its own image. The ideology of the New Left was gaining a hold on the minds of baby boomers at the same time that the NZLP's old membership was dropping out of the picture. The world views of the peace movement and the New Left, described in previous chapters, gained ascendancy in the Labour Party, although the old guard continued to resist the new trends. Radicals initially viewed Labour as tired and gray, and initially focused on street

⁴⁶⁶ Barry Gustafson, *Social change and Party Reorganisation: The New Zealand Labour Party Since 1945*, London, 1976, p. 10.

activism. However, Labour's small party membership made it ripe for a take-over carried out by small groups of young, dedicated political activists.⁴⁶⁷

Old Labour had espoused a strong state, government regulation of the economy, and the maintenance of a comprehensive, generous welfare system. It had also stood for traditional family values, conventional morality, and the collective good as opposed to untrammeled individualism. The liberal and radical reformers of a new generation, professing to "identify" with the working class, were more interested in self expression and a "moral" foreign policy than in economic issues.

The children and grandchildren of original Labour Party members were more affluent than their parents and grandparents, thanks in large part to the educational system introduced by Labour, and most were liberal rather than Socialist. Though they sympathised with Third World revolutionary regimes, most middle class liberals were not enthusiastic about promoting socialism in NZ; rather, they tended to feel strongly about traditional social and moral codes and authority structures rather than economic injustice in NZ. Since affluent boomers took material things for granted and found the security and conformism of 1950s and 1960s NZ boring, they focused on their emotional needs and political causes like the Vietnam War, feminism, homosexual law reform, anti-nuclearism, environmentalism, and race relations.⁴⁶⁸

In the early 1970s one in three white collar Labour Party activists belonged to left-wing pressure groups outside the NZLP.⁴⁶⁹ The "politics of difference" also meant that each minority group pursued its own agenda, in contrast to the Old Left groups that concentrated, almost exclusively, on worker's rights and social welfare measures. Margaret Wilson, who in 1984 became the Labour Party's

⁴⁶⁷ Jesson, *Fragments of Labour*, pp. 24-26.

⁴⁶⁸ On the shift to a post-materialist focus, see James, *The Quiet Revolution*, pp. 29-51, and Jesson, *Fragments of Labour*, pp. 28-34.

⁴⁶⁹ Gustafson, *Social Change and Party Reorganisation*, p. 35.

first female President, was typical of the new generation, which she characterised as privileged and confident. After a brief stint practising law, Wilson went on to lecture in law, seeking to change a legal system which, she believed, served the interests of men with power. The aim was to replace traditional lawyers "with people who were sympathetic and understanding of a different world view".⁴⁷⁰

After the Vietnam War, more young people were also interested in foreign policy issues, but they viewed government organisations such as the Ministry of External Relations and Trade as too conservative. To get across their alternative world view, young activists sought influence through Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and political parties.⁴⁷¹ The lack of response to their world view focused radicals' attentions on ANZUS, and they came to see it as an obstacle to new thinking. According to post-structuralist theory, the very existence of ANZUS could be construed as helping to lock the NZ public into a false consciousness.

In sum, many new NZLP members joined for non-economic reasons, especially to voice their disapproval of National's rule. For example, Helen Clark joined the NZLP because she opposed the Vietnam War and South African apartheid.⁴⁷² Labour was an attractive vehicle for the peace movement because of its anti-war, internationalist tradition. However, Labour had always refused to glamorise Communist regimes, and it had fought willingly in World War II. Labour's traditional internationalism had included participation in alliances, the military manifestation of collective security, as well as participation in international organisations like the League of Nations and the UN, the legal manifestation of collective security. The old guard would hold sway over Labour's foreign policy throughout the 1970s.

⁴⁷⁰ Margaret Wilson, *Labour in Government 1984-1987*, Wellington, 1989, p. 6.

⁴⁷¹ Kevin Clements, "The Influence of Individuals and Non-Governmental Organisations on New Zealand's Foreign Policy Making, 1943-1993", in Ann Trotter (Ed.), *Fifty Years of New Zealand Foreign Policy Making*, Dunedin, 1993, pp. 113-114.

⁴⁷² Gustafson, *Social change and Party Reorganisation*, p. 35.

As young political activists poured into stagnant Labour Party branches and made their presence felt at Labour Party conferences, their ideological views began to influence Labour Party debates, remits, and position papers. These activists sent a disproportionate number of delegates and resolutions to conferences, and these resolutions reflected the politics of young, university educated members. By 1988 only 11% of Labour Party conference delegates were working class whereas 40% had a university degree.⁴⁷³ Resolutions from the educated middle class reflected their post-materialist concerns, not the economic security and social welfare concerns of traditional Labour supporters.

NZLP conference resolutions against SEATO and later against ANZUS were symptomatic of the new mood sweeping the Labour Party. In 1968 the annual conference endorsed a remit against SEATO, but the same conference rejected calls for non-alignment. The Labour Party leadership, drawn from the previous generation, was still reluctant to abandon collective security. Initially the Labour leadership had been cautious about opposing the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, while the old guard was not as eager to embrace non-alignment as the new generation of party activists, Labour eventually demanded the immediate withdrawal of NZ troops from South Vietnam; and in November 1972 Prime Minister Norman Kirk promised that NZ troops would be home by Christmas.

In the 1970s the young left-wing reformers made their ideological beliefs felt at Labour Party Youth conferences. At this time there were customary references to socialism, but the greatest emphasis was placed on new post-materialist concerns like apartheid in South Africa, Maori grievances, and an independent foreign policy.⁴⁷⁴ Non-alignment was also a theme. David Caygill, speaking at the 1971 Youth Conference, criticised forward defence. He argued that events in South East Asia posed no military threat to NZ and that NZ and its

⁴⁷³ Jack Vowles, "Who Joins the Labour Party and What Do They Think?", in Clark, *The Labour Party After 75 Years*, pp. 73-79.

⁴⁷⁴ See D. Butcher (ed.), *Labour Party Young Socialist Positions*, Labour Party Youth Advisory Council, 1973.

allies were fighting in South Vietnam merely to impose Western values on an Asian culture.⁴⁷⁵

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Labour Party leadership began to cater to the reformers' concerns. It included non-economic planks during the 1972 election and the new members that it attracted accelerated the NZLP's transformation. Young careerists and middle class educated liberals, many from Auckland, clashed with the old guard, but eventually the former won the ideological struggle within the NZLP.

The long term rise of the educated middle class eventually showed up in the composition of the parliamentary Labour Party. Increasingly this elite group, which did not share the values of many, perhaps most, conservative Labour voters, gained control of the Labour Party selection process for candidates for Parliament. From 1935 to 1949 about 15% of Labour Cabinet Ministers were middle class, but this had risen to 45% by 1972.⁴⁷⁶ This trend was accompanied by a rise in the power of the parliamentary party as the grass-roots party declined.

Other structural changes accompanied the emergence of the young reformers. They sought to minimise the power of trade unions and party branches in favour of elite groups (the parliamentary party) and regional associations (the Auckland party organisation). The Auckland "cabal" which was to dominate the first term of the Fourth Labour Government emerged in the 1970s. Roger Douglas, Michael Bassett, Richard Prebble, Mike Moore, Jonathan Hunt, Phil Goff and David Lange worked and socialised together. The reformers did not get their way at the 1967 conference; but they maintained the pressure for change, and the NZLP was restructured along regional lines in 1974.⁴⁷⁷ A former mass membership party whose members rose to power "from the ranks" was being

⁴⁷⁵ David Caygill, 'Non Alignment or Military Involvement', in D. Butcher, *Labour Party Young Socialist Positions*, pp. 11-13.

⁴⁷⁶ Gustafson, *Social change and Party Reorganisation*, p. 29.

⁴⁷⁷ Gustafson, *Social change and Party Reorganisation*, p. 46.

replaced by a party run by professionalized cadres, educated organisers and administrators, and paid officials with little prior NZLP experience.

The Third Labour Government (1972-1975)

During the term of the Third Labour Government, reformers played a minor role within the parliamentary party. The younger activists had not gained a position of dominance, and the older generation was still firmly in control, in both domestic affairs and foreign policy. The old guard wanted to preserve good relations with the US; it also believed that armed neutrality would be too expensive and that unarmed neutrality would make NZ too vulnerable. Prime Minister Norman Kirk and his successor Bill Rowling studiously ignored remits to end ANZUS. This proved frustrating to radicals, who had to wait until the Fourth Labour Government before they could successfully attack ANZUS. However, activists won some concessions in foreign affairs, notably regarding the Vietnam War, South African apartheid, and French nuclear testing at Mururoa.

The Third Labour Government continued NZ's diplomatic protests, initiated under National in 1966, against French atmospheric nuclear testing at Mururoa. But Labour protested more strenuously, seeking to outdo National. The peace movement's emotional and confrontational tactics were impacting on Labour through the party membership. Radicals advocated direct action, and Labour saw such action as a way of increasing its appeal to young people. Prior to the 1972 election, the National Government "was severely criticised by the Labour opposition for not making more forceful, public and dramatic gestures".⁴⁷⁸ During the 1972 election Labour claimed that NZ's diplomatic protests in the UN were too cautious. National responded that Labour's approach was immature and counter-productive and that NZ had economic interests with France that should not be sacrificed.

⁴⁷⁸ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 64.

Despite National's reservations, Labour's approach better suited the public's mood, and not just that of the young and radical. The public's fears about radioactive fallout from French atmospheric nuclear tests gave Labour the electoral support it needed to take the direct action that was advocated by young peace activists. NZ's CND had revived earlier ideas of sending boats to Mururoa, and in 1972 it dispatched the yacht *Vega* (renamed *Greenpeace III*) to the test zone.⁴⁷⁹ The Labour Government considered sending a naval vessel to Mururoa to make its own protest.

Other avenues of protest were also pursued. In January 1973 Australia announced that it would use the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to oppose the French tests. NZ Prime Minister Norman Kirk wanted NZ to act alone rather than in concert with Australia, and he waited until April before announcing that NZ would go to the ICJ to conduct a separate (but co-ordinated) effort with the Australians. Both the Australian Labour Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and NZ's Norman Kirk were reluctant to act in concert with each other, as both wanted to maximise domestic credit for any results.⁴⁸⁰ Moreover, NZ sought to go one step further than the ICJ by sending a frigate to Mururoa, but the Australian Labour Government was reluctant to support such an effort with its naval refuelling capabilities. In the end, however, the Australians eventually agreed to assist.

At the ICJ the Australian's case adopted a scientific approach which emphasised the deleterious effects of radioactive fallout. In contrast, the NZ case dwelt on the political rights of the people exposed to fallout from the French tests. The ICJ's interim injunction of June 1973 stated that France should avoid tests which caused fallout, and on June 28 HMNZS *Otago* sailed for Mururoa to join small peace movement flotilla in the area. The *Otago* was later relieved by HMNZS *Canterbury*. However, the NZ Government forbade the two frigates

⁴⁷⁹ Locke, *Peace People*, p. 291.

⁴⁸⁰ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 74.

from acting as “mother ships” to the peace movement vessels; therefore, they stayed outside the French twelve mile exclusion zone. This first example of a direct action protest by one nation against another nation’s nuclear testing captured the world’s attention. To show its impartiality, NZ also voiced its opposition to all Chinese, Soviet and US nuclear testing. NZ continued to pursue its ICJ case in 1974, but when the French halted their atmospheric nuclear testing at Mururoa that same year, the ICJ dismissed NZ’s case as being moot.⁴⁸¹

Meanwhile, the peace movement believed that Labour did not go far enough on the nuclear ships issue. Although Labour perpetuated National’s nuclear-power ban, US nuclear weapons-capable ships still visited NZ. Rowling also announced in 1975 that the cabinet was re-examining the nuclear-power ban. In December 1974 President Ford had signed into law US Public Law 93-513, which accepted US liability in case of a nuclear accident during a visit. The peace movement’s reaction to the prospect of Labour’s lifting the ban was predictable, and the reaction within the NZLP was also negative. The 1975 Labour Party election manifesto made no mention of the issue, and it stated that Labour would continue collective security and ANZUS, and also maintain NZ’s armed forces.⁴⁸² The Values Party was the only avenue for the more radical anti-ANZUS factions in 1975. In a NZFPS survey in 1975, 84.6% of Values Party candidates favoured ending ANZUS, as opposed to only 19% of Labour Party candidates.⁴⁸³

A New Generation Takes Power, 1975-1984.

Labour’s 1975 election loss embittered young Labourites, as the electorate appeared to have rejected Labour’s more progressive foreign policy and to have accepted National’s anti-Communist scare tactics. Anger at voter rejection also served to increase the elitist tendencies of educated Labour members, who sought the power to implement their political programmes and to take their revenge on

⁴⁸¹ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 82.

⁴⁸² *The Labour Party Manifesto*, 1975, Wellington.

⁴⁸³ Roderick Phillips (ed.), *Alternatives to ANZUS*, p. 6.

the new Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon. Between 1975 and 1984 the National Prime Minister was to become the number-one enemy of urban, middle class liberals and radicals.

The latter's foreign policy agenda had gained considerable recognition when Labour was in power, but women's and Maori issues were also dear to liberal and radical hearts. Feminism had become an orthodoxy by end of 1970s, although it had experienced a schism between lesbian and heterosexual feminists, and in 1979 the Maori cause was spurred by the formation of the Mana Motuhake Party. Liberal preoccupation with these two causes resulted in their neglect of economic policies, leaving the field open to the New Right to alter the direction of NZLP economic policy. Many feminists focused on personal issues and new lifestyles, and the Maori resurgence fostered in some activists a propensity toward Maori separatism. Both movements further undermined Labour Party attention to working class grievances and economic policies.

The new generation's hierarchy of oppression featured women, gays, non-whites, and Third World victims of Capitalist exploitation. (NZ workers came last if at all.) Because Muldoon rejected liberal and radical social and foreign policy approaches, he became the quintessential enemy,⁴⁸⁴ loathed by urban liberals despite his commitment to the NZ worker. Middle class liberals and radicals flocked to the Labour Party to fight Muldoon over post-materialist issues, and the Values Party disappeared in the process, having outlived its usefulness. Loyalty to the Labour Party was now based less on class issues than it was on social and foreign policy issues. National became the home of defence traditionalists while Labour sheltered those seeking non-alignment. NZ had lost its bi-partisanship in foreign policy.

Although the parliamentary Labour Party may have appeared to be more sympathetic to reformers than the Old Left grass-roots Labour Party, it was still

⁴⁸⁴ James, *The Quiet Revolution*, p. 110.

not sufficiently responsive to their remits.⁴⁸⁵ A Policy Council was created in 1975, elected from party conferences, to break the hold of the parliamentary wing and to allow reformers more influence on policy. Attempts were made to influence the make-up of the parliamentary Labour Party, which was still led by the previous generation. The reformers needed sympathetic people on the Labour Party's executive and council, which would influence the selection of MPs, and they achieved this by 1979.⁴⁸⁶ However, the Labour Party was still unable to influence the economic direction of the Fourth Labour Government.

Although liberals and radicals had entered the Labour Party to overthrow Muldoon and to pursue a “moral” foreign policy, in 1983 the New Right also positioned itself within Labour, becoming highly influential within the parliamentary party. In the 1970s free market economic policies had been a fringe phenomenon, with ideas percolating into NZ from US and Britain and becoming ensconced within National’s right-wing and in the financial sector. Muldoon’s Socialist-style regulation of the NZ economy drove many right-wing businessmen and Treasury/Reserve Bank bureaucrats to support New Rightists in the NZLP. The New Right believed in individual economic freedom and the “hand of the market”, having imported most of its ideas from the Chicago School of Economics, which had revived the 19th century’s version of economics as an ideology, mixing science and political passion.⁴⁸⁷

The New Right harboured a fanatical dogmatism which was comparable in its level of self-righteousness to the intellectual arrogance displayed by left-wing radicals. Increased consumerism in NZ had fostered the rise of the Libertarian Right/New Right just as higher living standards had given birth to the New Left’s post-materialist politics. By the early 1980s the financial sector was flourishing due to inflation and the sizeable tax avoidance sector. The loss of British markets had

⁴⁸⁵ Clark interview, October 12, 1998.

⁴⁸⁶ Wilson, *Labour in Government*, p. 23.

⁴⁸⁷ Jesson, *Fragments of Labour*, pp. 36-37.

led a greater awareness of marketing problems and to more sophisticated businesses, most of which now sought less state intervention. The New Right's passionate espousal of individual economic freedom and free market policies was echoed by the NZ Treasury, the NZ Reserve Bank and the NZ Trade and Industry Department. By the early 1980s Treasury was busy purging its Keynesian theorists. Its Research Development Unit had become the Economic Division, which was split into "internal" and "external" sections (Economics I and II) and staffed by university graduates. The Treasury had gone beyond its old "book keeping" and management functions to become the carrier of an ideology. It lectured Labour on the primacy of individual and market freedom, and it stressed the undesirability of a "large state", or high levels of government regulation and intervention in the marketplace.⁴⁸⁸

Treasury's advice was well timed, as Labour had no firm economic policy in the early 1980s. Roger Douglas became a convert to the Treasury's plans, and he designed a free market policy for Labour which was innovative, reformist, and passionate. In other words, it was in tune with the general mood of the 1960s generation. Douglas's plan won out, largely due to liberal and radical pre-occupation with non-economic issues, although there was some resistance from the Old Left and radical Socialists. Douglas's "Economic Policy Package" was blocked in the NZLP's Policy Council, but it was not replaced by the Left's "Alternative Economic Strategy". Instead, Geoffrey Palmer drafted a mixed bag of policies that was "bland enough to win the election".⁴⁸⁹

This vague compromise united all party factions, but Douglas's plan eventually would win by default. Treasury was in the process of preparing Labour's future economic policy. Briefing papers drafted in advance for the Fourth Labour Government urged the application of New Right economic

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 41-43.

⁴⁸⁹ Jesson, *Fragments of Labour*, p. 62.

theory, and the volume, Economic Management, was produced for the new government's approval. Treasury knew that it had allies within Labour.⁴⁹⁰

There were three main reasons why left-wing radicals and New Right radicals co-existed within the NZLP. The first was that both were opposed to Muldoon's style of government, and Labour was the most logical vehicle for challenging and replacing him. The second was that middle class liberals initially tolerated Rogernomics because they were achieving their own aims in the post-materialist sphere. The third reason was that the reformers in Labour were individualistic and hungry for change, and they were able to work alongside other reformers despite differences in their agendas. Both the New Right and the left-wing reformers emphasised individualism, even though both were intolerant of dissent with their prescribed brands of individualism. Many middle class liberals had discarded the Socialist aspects of their ideology, and therefore they could tolerate a certain amount of free market economics whilst many New Rightists were happy to support the anti-nuclearism and environmentalism of the liberals and radicals. As a result, a New Right elite was able to capture economic policy and impose it "from the top-down", while a left-wing elite imposed its social and foreign policy views on the nation in a similar manner.

It could be argued that the new generation's migration to Labour was part of a cycle. The status quo in a society will hold until tensions within that society require a big change to occur, and major changes are often two generations apart,^{*} with a particular generation having its biggest political impact when its members are in their late 30s and 40s.⁴⁹¹ The left-wing radicals of the 1960s generation wanted big social change, and the New Right wanted big economic change. In

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 43.

A generation's reaction against the status quo may create instability, with the result that the next generation will be more moderate than its predecessor and seek a return to stability. The following generation may then pursue change once more, and so on.

⁴⁹¹ James, *The Quiet Revolution*, p. 9.

their mutual desire for change, both the left-wing radicals and the New Right could be called “radical” rather than conservative.

Radicals need the support of liberals before they can effect change. In the 1980s liberals were open both to radical left-wing and New Right ideologies. However, they were not as committed to these ideologies as were the ideologues of the New Right and radical Left. The Third Labour Government had been a liberal-conservative alliance rather than a liberal-radical alliance, and it had not delivered the big changes demanded by radicals, only the small changes favoured by liberals. By 1984 Labour’s liberals, imbued with a watered-down version of radical ideology, were ready to give their support to those radicals who wanted big foreign policy changes. Labour’s liberals were also ready to support radical New Rightists who wanted big economic changes. The radicals now possessed the numbers to begin their respective revolutions.⁴⁹²

History has demonstrated that common people do not precipitate revolutions. Revolutions occur when an educated elite feels deprived and it is able to convince enough people to follow it. The people will support the government unless it proves incapable of solving their problems. Robert Muldoon had attempted, through regulations and subsidies, to protect NZers from the economic downturn, but he could not counter the twin shock of rising oil prices and vanishing overseas markets. With the elite hostile to Muldoon and favouring Labour,⁴⁹³ and with the people now open to the elite’s solutions, the Muldoon Government was doomed.

The Labour Party of the mid 1980s differed significantly from the Labour Party of the post-war years. The terms “Left”, “Centre”, and “Right” are useful in each of two categories, the first representing economic attitudes and the second

⁴⁹² James, *The Quiet Revolution*, p. 27.

⁴⁹³ The NZ Party also helped to drain the support of the wealthy away from National with its free-market policies.

⁴⁹³ James, *The Quiet Revolution*, p. 196.

representing social attitudes. On the first (economic) continuum, “Left” represents a preference for socialism, state intervention in the marketplace and welfare provision, and “Right” represents a preference for “small government”, low taxes and privatisation. On the second (social) continuum, “Left” represents a liberal or radical approach to the post-materialist issues of gender, race, peace and environmentalism, whereas “Right” represents more conservative, traditional attitudes.

Bearing in mind that this classification system is fairly simple and cannot explain all shades of opinion, the five main groups in the NZLP of 1984 could be described in the following manner:

1) Labour Conservatives. (Economic left-wingers, centre to right-wing on social issues.) Older Labourites who were usually working class, this group lost control of the party machine to the 1960s generation, and after Labour embraced Rogernomics, any survivors probably defected to National, New Labour, or NZ First.

2) Left Radicals. (Economic left-wingers, left-wing on social and foreign policy.) More likely to be working class, many defected to New Labour in 1989 and later to the Alliance party.

3) Social Liberals. (Economic centrists, willing to accept a mix of Socialist and free-market economics, centre to left-wing on social and foreign policy.) The largest group in Labour by this time, and generally middle class, the Social Liberals put more emphasis on freedom from social restraints than on the economic freedom of all (stemming from a fair income) to obtain self fulfilment⁴⁹⁴ This group remained in control of the party machinery after Labour’s devastating defeat in the 1990 election.

⁴⁹⁴ Jack Vowles, “The Fourth Labour Government: Ends, Means and For Whom?”, In Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland, (Eds.) *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand*, Auckland, 1987, pp. 16-21.

4) Market Radicals. (Economic right-wingers, social centrists.) Supportive of New Right economics, these people paid lip service to New Left social policy. They could be called “Market Radicals”, many of whom might now be involved within the ACT party or National.

5) Technocrats. (Economic and social centrists.) With no firm ideology of their own, this group went with the flow. Holding onto political power was their main aim.⁴⁹⁵

Clearly, in 1984 groups 1 and 2 were overpowered in the economic sphere by a combination of groups 3, 4 and 5. Labour Conservatives and Left Radicals tried to oppose Rogernomics, but they initially received little support from the Social Liberals. The New Right’s economic revolution proceeded unhindered until the second term of the Fourth Labour Government. But, it was some consolation to the Left Radicals that they were able to carry out their own revolution in foreign policy during this same period.

Pre-Election Conflict Over Labour’s Priorities.

In the 1978 election Labour presented a nuclear-free platform which opposed visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships, but it also assured the public that ANZUS would remain intact. Such an assurance was a political necessity, but it also reflected the fact that a number of Labour Party moderates were not opposed to ANZUS per se.⁴⁹⁶ Radicals found this position wanting because it was at best a partial measure. The ban was only part of their agenda; they wanted independence from being a “client state” of the US or Britain, whereas the parliamentary party feared the public’s reaction to a move to leave ANZUS.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁵ A similar system is used in James, *The Quiet Revolution*, p. 76, although only four groups are identified.

⁴⁹⁶ Bassett interview, April 19, 1999.

⁴⁹⁷ Wilson, *Labour in Government*, pp. 57-60.

By 1980 the Social Liberals and Left Radicals had gained control of the Labour Party machine, but they still faced opposition from Labour leader Bill Rowling regarding their plans for ending ANZUS. At the 1980 NZLP Conference a majority voted to end ANZUS, but the Labour leadership was aware of the political damage that such a policy could cause Labour. The 1981 NZLP manifesto refused to condemn ANZUS, although it played to radicals' concerns about a moral foreign policy by claiming that a Labour Government would restore NZ's international reputation, supposedly damaged by National's policy over South Africa. Once again the public was assured that a nuclear ban and ANZUS were not incompatible.

At the 1983 NZLP Conference Rowling was able to engineer a compromise with anti-ANZUS activists. The Policy Council agreed that a Labour Government would "review ANZUS" rather than end it. By "review" the Policy Council meant that NZ would re-negotiate ANZUS so that NZ could have a nuclear-ship ban and it could support a SPNFZ from within ANZUS. Labour would also expect an "equal partnership" in ANZUS, and a greater economic emphasis in the alliance. In effect, this would have meant a form of "qualified alignment", and it served to placate the non-alignment advocates for the time being, although they continued to push at conferences for an end to ANZUS after the ship ban had become a reality. It has been argued that the Labour Party's decision to seek a ban within ANZUS meant that an anti-ANZUS ideology could not have lain behind the ban.⁴⁹⁸ However, the compromise of re-negotiating ANZUS was only reluctantly accepted by radical conference delegates, and then for political appearances only. The compromise was "intended to be useful to the Labour Government in explaining that this was an anti-nuclear policy and not an anti-United States policy".⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁸ Hager, telephone conversation, October 22, 1998.

⁴⁹⁹ Wilson, *Labour in Government*, p. 62.

In 1983 Rowling resigned as leader of the parliamentary party, and David Lange was chosen to succeed him. Lange's debating skills and wit made him a formidable opponent for Prime Minister Muldoon. They also made him an ideal front man for Left Radicals and Market Radicals. Although Lange was not particularly committed to any ideology, he was a consummate performer who could be expected to distract the NZ public while radical reforms were enacted. He was not expected to develop his own policies, and when he attempted to moderate the nuclear ship ban in 1983 by exempting the ban on nuclear power, the NZLP rebuffed him sharply. The peace movement did not want Lange to separate the issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear power, as environmental fears about nuclear power had been helpful in raising public support for a nuclear weapons ban.

Left Radicals also hated Lange for not being sufficiently anti-American, and they had tried to block his appointment to leadership.⁵⁰⁰ Like Rowling, Lange was aware of the public's fondness for ANZUS, and he wanted the US to accept a nuclear-free NZ within ANZUS. The moral argument against nuclear weapons did not encompass a ban on nuclear power, which was a safety issue, and Lange believed that including the latter in an anti-nuclear policy would make it harder to persuade Washington that the policy was not anti-American.⁵⁰¹

Lange also knew that Labour could not hope to win the 1984 election if it acknowledged that the ban would put ANZUS at risk.⁵⁰² Labour had reassured the public that ANZUS was safe, and it did not want the US to challenge this view. On June 25 1984 Paul Wolfowitz, US Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs, delivered a speech on the importance of port access to ANZUS, and the US Ambassador to NZ, H. Monroe Browne, released a copy of the speech in Wellington. Lange complained about this US interference in NZ

⁵⁰⁰ David Lange, Interview with Author, Mangere Bridge, July 18, 1998.

⁵⁰¹ David Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, Auckland, 1990, pp. 31-33.

⁵⁰² Ibid., p. 34.

politics,⁵⁰³ and other efforts by the United States Information Agency (USIA), to inform New Zealanders about US concerns were decried by Labour, the NZ media, and the peace movement.⁵⁰⁴

To what extent did the 1984 election give Labour a mandate to implement the ship ban? While the public was anti-nuclear, it did not seek a nuclear ban for the same reasons as radicals in the NZLP, who probably viewed it as a necessary step in the process of destroying ANZUS. The public almost certainly would have opposed the ban if Labour had revealed in 1984 that the ban would cause a major rift with the US. That this was not done may have partially been due to Lange's belief, at the time, that he could save ANZUS.⁵⁰⁵ As it turned out, this was not to be. It could be argued, therefore, that Labour's "mandate" between the election and the refusal of the *Buchanan* visit, to keep both the ban and ANZUS, was based on naiveté at best, or misinformation at worst. However, a different mandate was later created after the US's reaction to the refusal generated a nationalistic wave of approval for the Labour Government.

While liberals and radicals supported the ban for their own reasons, some New Right MPs also supported anti-nuclearism. Richard Prebble had introduced nuclear-free bills in 1976, 1982 and in 1984. On the last occasion he claimed that the collapse of the Geneva arms control negotiations between the US and USSR in November 1983 required small nations to take unilateral action. In 1984 National had a parliamentary majority of one. Two National MPs, Marilyn Waring and Michael Minogue, voted for the June 1984 bill; but two ex-Labour independents voted with National, and the bill was narrowly defeated. Waring would no longer support National on the nuclear ships issue,* and a meeting with Muldoon on June 14 failed to dissuade her from withdrawing from caucus. That

⁵⁰³ Landais-Stamp and Rogers, *Rocking the Boat*, p. 61.

⁵⁰⁴ For examples, see Landais-Stamp and Rogers, *Rocking the Boat*.

⁵⁰⁵ Lange Interview, July 18, 1998.

Waring had voted against the anti-nuclear bill of 1982, but only on the condition that the National Government establish a Select Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control, which it did.

same day Muldoon called a snap election for July 14.⁵⁰⁶ Muldoon's reason for his decision was that, due to Waring's defection, National could no longer be confident of a majority in Parliament, but it is possible that he had other reasons for calling an early election. Nevertheless, Waring was hailed in some left-circles for having precipitated the election which resulted in National's defeat.

Labour's 1984 election campaign was media-savvy. It targeted "floating" (uncommitted) voters, and it was heavily poll-issue driven. Labour adopted the slogan "Politics of Embrace" to appeal to floaters, semi-skilled boomer females in particular.⁵⁰⁷ Although it had a nuclear-free platform, Labour chose to focus on domestic issues rather than on ANZUS, as it did not wish to enter a public debate over the possible consequences of a nuclear ship ban. The 1984 NZLP Policy Document claimed that there was no military threat to NZ, but it stated that Labour would still maintain the armed forces. In addition, Labour would ban nuclear armed or nuclear powered ships and aircraft from NZ, seek a SPNFZ, support the UN, and "once again place New Zealand among those nations most concerned with international peace and justice".⁵⁰⁸ Labour also promised to focus on the South Pacific, to close the South African Consulate in NZ, and to increase NZ's independent stance within ANZUS and re-negotiate its terms.

The 1984 Official Policy Release had even less to say about ANZUS. With regard to economics, the Release was also vague. Words like "democracy", "fair", and "growth" were bandied about, but no specifics were provided.⁵⁰⁹ Both Left Radicals and Market Radicals preferred to surprise the public. However, in the social sphere the intended creation of a Ministry of Women's Affairs, a Ministry of Maori affairs, and a Bill of Rights was trumpeted. As Lange admitted, "The nuclear free policy wasn't decisive. For reasons of domestic policy and good taste

⁵⁰⁶ Stuart McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute Between New Zealand and the United States*, Wellington, 1987, p. 11.

⁵⁰⁷ Jesson, *Fragments of Labour*, p. 53.

⁵⁰⁸ *New Zealand Labour Party: 1984 Policy Document*, Wellington, 1984, p. 51.

⁵⁰⁹ *Election 1984: Official Policy Release*, NZLP, 1984.

the National party lost the [1984] election.”⁵¹⁰ At the polls, anti-nuclear parties gained 63.4% of the vote, and this statistic was often quoted in defence of the ship ban. Conversely, parties supporting the continuation of ANZUS (which included Labour) received 80% of the vote,⁵¹¹ raising serious doubts as to whether Labour possessed a mandate for what was about to happen.

The Refusal of the Buchanan

Immediately after the 1984 election the ANZUS Council Meeting of July 16/17 1984 was held in Wellington, with the lame duck National Government representing NZ. On July 17 The three countries issued a joint communiqué which affirmed that ship visits were an “essential” part of the ANZUS alliance. The US was signalling its position to the incoming Labour Government, but the new Prime Minister David Lange claimed this was a calculated attempt to embarrass Labour and to appeal over its head to the NZ public.⁵¹² On July 16 Lange had met with US Secretary of State George Shultz, and both had told the media that a dialogue between the US and Labour would continue. US Ambassador Monroe Browne later claimed that during the meeting Lange had requested a six month breathing space before a visit request so that he would have time to convince the NZLP of the need for ship visits. Lange, however, denied this.⁵¹³ On July 26 the new Labour Government was sworn in, and the nuclear ban automatically went into effect. International law held that no military visits could occur without a government’s permission.

The US expected that NZ Labour, like Labour in Australia, would modify its anti-nuclear policy once it gained power. The Australian Labour Party (ALP) had been anti-nuclear before its accession to power in 1983, but it had been convinced by the US that such a ban was incompatible with ANZUS. At the 1983

⁵¹⁰ Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 54.

⁵¹¹ Richard Kennaway, “Changing Views of ANZUS”, in *New Zealand International Review*, November-December 1984, p. 5.

⁵¹² Lange, *Nuclear Free-The New Zealand Way*, p. 56.

⁵¹³ See Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 130, and Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 105.

ANZUS Council Meeting, Prime Minister Bob Hawke's government had affirmed that ship visits were important. One reason for the Australian turnaround was the fact that the Australian peace movement did not have the same influence on the ALP as the NZ peace movement had on the NZLP. Peace politics had reached centre stage in NZ via the party system, whereas the Australian peace movement had to set up its own single-issue party, The Nuclear Disarmament Party.⁵¹⁴ The Australian peace movement had failed to shape the ALP's foreign policy because the pro-collective security and anti-Communist right-wing of the ALP had been able to align with ALP moderates against the party's left-wing. Although Australia continued to oppose nuclear testing and to advocate nuclear disarmament, it refused to pursue a nuclear ships ban that would endanger ANZUS.

In September 1984 Lange met Shultz in New York, and he presented Labour's case: NZ did not wish to be "defended" by nuclear weapons; the nuclear ships ban was a method of arms control; and NZ was still a Western ally. Shultz argued that the US could not divide its forces into "nuclear" and "non-nuclear" elements to suit NZ. According to Lange, both agreed to test the issue rather than let it drift; the US had the exercise "Sea Eagle I-85" scheduled for March 1985 off the east coast of Australia, and it wanted permission for one of the ships from that exercise to visit NZ. Accordingly, the US would submit its annual request for visits in December. Lange claimed that Shultz did not say that ANZUS would expire if the ban was enforced, nor did he ask Lange to change the anti-nuclear policy.⁵¹⁵ This was true in the sense that neither side directly asked the other to alter its policy, but both sides had stated their positions, and spelled out their minimum expectations. Lange should have been aware by this time that ANZUS was threatened.⁵¹⁶ If he was optimistic, the New Zealand Herald was not. Editorials immediately before and after the *Buchanan* was rejected

⁵¹⁴ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, p. 123.

⁵¹⁵ Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 62.

⁵¹⁶ White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand*, pp. 25-26.

worried that Labour's policy, and US reprisals, would hurt ANZUS.⁵¹⁷ In February 1985 Labour's Defence Minister, Frank O'Flynn, confirmed that defence advisers "had left the Government in no doubt that its anti-nuclear stance would almost certainly result in the United States' curtailing present activities under the ANZUS Treaty".⁵¹⁸

There has been some speculation that at this meeting Lange gave Shultz an assurance that he would engineer a compromise solution, and that this assurance added to the US sense of betrayal when the *Buchanan* request was refused. However, there is little evidence that this occurred, although Lange did claim that he told Shultz that he would *try* to persuade the NZLP to drop the nuclear-power aspect of the ban.⁵¹⁹ In any event, the question of whether Lange made a commitment to Shultz was a moot point, since it was highly unlikely that he would have been able to deliver on such a promise. By this time the grip of radical ideology on the Labour Party was too strong to allow for a compromise, even if Lange had been strongly committed to preserving ANZUS, which is doubtful in any case. His main concern was to limit the political damage to Labour that might eventuate from a termination of ANZUS, so he was eager to have a US vessel that met all of NZ's criteria visit NZ. Such a visit would have vindicated Labour's election claim that NZ could have both the anti-nuclear ship ban and ANZUS membership.

As Lange wrote in 1990, he had campaigned on keeping NZ in ANZUS, and he could not give up on ANZUS without a struggle. If the dispute was to cause any unpleasantness, the US had to be seen to start it. If the US did not accept Labour's putative willingness to continue defence co-operation, which significant parts of the party actually opposed, it would at least appear to NZers

⁵¹⁷ See editorials in the New Zealand Herald, December 6, 1984; December 26, 1984; January 24, 1985; February 14, 1985; February 28, 1985; March 9, 1985.

⁵¹⁸ "New Zealand Prepared to Pay Price of Ban", *New Zealand Herald*, February 6, 1985, p. 1, Section 1.

⁵¹⁹ Lange, *Nuclear free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 62.

that Labour had tried to be reasonable.⁵²⁰ If the US became vindictive, Labour would not be blamed by pro-ANZUS voters because they would perceive the US, not NZ, as the party that actually destroyed the alliance.

Whilst the Lange Government was endeavouring to appear moderate and accommodating, its own party membership had other ideas. By 1983, delegates to Labour Party conferences had made it clear that they wanted US assurances on the nuclear status of visiting warships, and that they would not accept a trust formula. The September 1984 NZLP Conference also demanded that NZ end its involvement in ANZUS, that NZ cease participating in military exercises with nuclear powers, that NZ reduce defence spending, and that NZ not deploy its military forces outside the South Pacific unless they were deployed under UN auspices. It also called for NZ to close the Harewood base and to end military co-operation with Indonesia and the Philippines.

As the NZ public did not share these sentiments, the Labour Government needed to avoid making the ship ban an explicit move against the US. Therefore, Lange claimed that the ban was merely an anti-nuclear move and that ANZUS was not the target. Lange later stated that at the time he had believed that it *was* possible for the US to accept the ban, as the visits did not serve any military purpose.⁵²¹ When the US did not accept the ban, he became convinced that the US was too inflexible and that NZ could *not* have both the ban and ANZUS. However, by then it was too late to inform the public of this fact.

Although the Labour Party was in no mood for compromise, the Labour Government had to make some attempt to reconcile the ban, the US's NCND policy, and the public's desire to stay in ANZUS. Lange wanted the US to send a warship that was not nuclear powered, and if nuclear capable, a warship that was unlikely to be nuclear armed. Negotiations between NZ and US officials thus

⁵²⁰Ibid., p. 60.

⁵²¹Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 47.

occurred between September and December 1984. In October 1984 the ANZUS airforce exercise TRIAD84 went ahead as planned, with little controversy over NCND as it applied to aircraft. The US may have been confident at this time that a compromise could be reached over the nuclear ships issue. In the hope of saving ANZUS, Lange sent Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson, NZ Chief of Defence Staff, to Hawaii to help the US to choose a ship that would be acceptable to NZ.

As a result of negotiations in 1984, a formula for granting clearance was created. The US, however, did not agree to a NZ government suggestion that the US provide a list of potential naval visitors, and then allow NZ secretly to pick one that it thought could safely be requested and accepted.⁵²² The agreed formula determined that, instead of NZ's seeking a US assurance on the non-nuclear status of a ship, something which would breach the US's NCND policy, NZ would assess for itself whether or not a particular ship was nuclear armed. With this formula in mind, the *Buchanan*, a nuclear-capable⁵²³ but conventionally-powered destroyer, was selected for a visit request.

The formula that NZ would decide on the nuclear status of individual warships was formally presented to the US embassy on December 20, 1984, after the US had submitted its annual blanket clearance request on December 13. As a result, in December the US also gave notice of its intention to apply for an individual ship visit, and it privately named the *Buchanan*. In the past the *Buchanan* had visited NZ without protest, and because the *Buchanan* was ambiguous in the nuclear weapons department, it made a suitable test case for the US's purposes. If NZ had chosen to assume that the US would honour the ban on nuclear weapons by not arming the *Buchanan* with nuclear weapons at the time of its visit, a compromise on the nuclear weapons question could have been reached on the basis of mutual trust, or the "trust" formula. The US had honoured nuclear-

⁵²² Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 131.

⁵²³ Its Anti-Submarine Rocket system (ASROC) could fire both nuclear and conventional warheads.

power bans in Europe, and it could have accepted a NZ nuclear-weapons ban on the trust formula, whereby the US was expected by the host country to honour the nuclear weapons ban without official confirmation of the ship's actual nuclear status. If NZ refused the *Buchanan*, it would demonstrate that it intended to maintain a stricter form of nuclear weapons ban than any other US ally.

Due to the above events, although the official US request for clearance for the *Buchanan* was not made until January 1985, the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs already knew about the ship in December 1984.⁵²³ Robert White has argued that US and NZ officials had colluded in an attempt to undermine the NZ ship ban, by misleading the Labour Government about the viability of the "NZ assess" formula.⁵²⁴ In a similar vein Helen Clark believed that Lange had not given the green light to "weaken" the ban.⁵²⁵ However, Lange was attempting reconcile the public's desire both to have the ban and to stay in ANZUS. Jamieson maintains that he was not acting against the Government; he was acting on instructions from Lange to try to satisfy both NCND and the ban, and he was not told before he went to Hawaii that the Labour Government wanted 100% certainty regarding the visit of any US warship. As a result he agreed on the *Buchanan*, and reported back to Lange on the ship-type chosen, why it was chosen, and why NZ could be reasonably (but not 100%) sure that it was not nuclear armed.⁵²⁶

The formula designed at Hawaii could have achieved a compromise between NCND and a nuclear ship ban, yet the intervention of the Labour Party and the peace movement effectively sunk any hope of compromise. When White claims that NZ officials tried to undermine the ban, he is referring to the strict ban advocated by radicals in Labour and the peace movement. As Lange had authorised officials to find a way to save ANZUS, officials were working against

⁵²³ White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand*, p. 30.

⁵²⁴ White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand*, p. 30.

⁵²⁵ Clark interview, October 12, 1998.

⁵²⁶ Sir Ewan Jamieson, interview with author, Taupo, September 26, 1998.

the type of ban favoured by radicals. It is quite possible that the general public would have been satisfied with a trust formula, were it not for the sequence of events that soon followed.

Lange took a trip to the Tokelaus in January 1985, assuming that on his return he could deal with any request that arrived while he was away. On January 17 the US officially requested that the *Buchanan* visit NZ. However, the news that the impending visit was a test of NZ's policy had been leaked to the Australian media. On January 21 an article in the Sydney Morning Herald suggested that acceptance of the visit would constitute a US victory. In addition, Bob Hawke's letter of January 10, 1985, to Lange, urging that NZ drop the ban, was also leaked to the Australian media. This had the result of inflaming NZ nationalism; both the US and Australia were now telling NZ what to do.

Further complications arose. On January 22 NZ's Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, acting in Lange's absence, claimed that the NZ Government might accept a nuclear-capable, conventionally-powered ship if it was satisfied that it was not carrying nuclear weapons at the time. This statement hinted at the formula that NZ and US officials had agreed on, but it had the effect of mobilising the NZ peace movement. Sympathetic people in Labour, such as Helen Clark, Jim Anderton, Fran Wilde, and Margaret Wilson also encouraged the peace movement to act to prevent the government from accepting a trust formula.⁵²⁷ CANWAR spokesman, Nicky Hager, warned the Government that it would have a fight on its hands if it tried to claim that a nuclear-capable ship was not nuclear-armed when it visited NZ.⁵²⁸ The peace movement argued that the Government could not be sure that a nuclear-capable ship would be nuclear-free.

The peace movement also arranged for a communications blitz to pressure the Labour cabinet into rejecting any nuclear-capable ship visits. Thousands of

⁵²⁷ White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand*, pp. 40-41.

⁵²⁸ Landais-Stamp and Rogers, *Rocking the Boat*, p. 74.

telegrams awaited Lange on his return from Tokelaus. Anti-ANZUS pressure within the Labour Party overwhelmed moderates such as Palmer and Mike Moore, who wanted to preserve the alliance if possible. The Labour Party's Executive wanted a rigid enforcement of the ban, or a US declaration, and this sentiment was expressed in a January 25 letter from General Secretary John Wybrow to Palmer.⁵²⁹ As a result of such pressure, Palmer had to reverse his position. He recommended that NZ not accept the visit.

A ban on nuclear-capable ships ruled out most of the US navy, as many of its weapons systems were dual-purpose. By insisting that NZ must satisfy itself that nuclear-capable ships were not carrying nuclear weapons, the NZLP had ruled out the trust formula. The difference between a nuclear-armed ship ban and what was, in practical effect, a nuclear-capable ship ban might have seemed like a minor distinction, but it was a clear indication that the NZLP was not concerned about the losing military co-operation with the US. The US reacted not only to the practical implications of the nuclear-capable ship ban, but also to what it symbolised: NZ was departing from the spirit of the Western Alliance. Although Lange had attempted to compromise with the US, a significant number of Labour Party members and Labour MPs were opposed to compromise on the nuclear issue. Some MP's also had an axe to grind with Lange, regarding their omission from his cabinet, and they sought to make his life as difficult as possible.⁵³⁰ The Party's refusal to allow Lange to base the nuclear weapons ban on the trust formula was a conscious decision by the Labour Party to sacrifice ANZUS, if necessary, in order to implement a measure of unilateral disarmament.

Lange returned from his visit to the Tokelaus and attended a Cabinet meeting on January 28. Apparently Lange had accepted Palmer's new stance on the issue, and he recommended that the visit be rejected. Although Lange had decided to reject the *Buchanan* in order to avoid future furores over visiting

⁵²⁹ White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand*, p. 38.

⁵³⁰ Bassett, telephone interview, April 19, 1999.

ships,⁵³¹ it is possible that he would have settled for a modified version of the trust formula, with the NZ Government judging a ship's status to "near certainty", provided of course that the media and the peace movement had acceded to this compromise. The possibility of reducing the level of certainty regarding a visiting warship's nuclear status was ruled out by the media glare; anything less than 100% certainty would have been seen as a Labour sell-out. As there was no way to be certain about the *Buchanan* without asking the US to breach NCND, which it would not do, the Government could not accept the visit for fear of a backlash from the radical left.

As Robert White put it, "The combined actions of Labour MPs, the Labour Party and the peace movement proved decisive in destroying any remaining hope for the *Buchanan*."⁵³² As previously mentioned, the peace movement's reasons for wanting a strict nuclear ship ban were as much a product of the anti-American ideology of radicals (and, to a lesser extent, of liberals) as they were a product of anti-nuclearism. Hence, it is undeniable that radical ideology played a significant role in the refusal of the *Buchanan* and the resulting expulsion of NZ from ANZUS.

The Labour Government informed Ambassador Browne on January 29 that the visit could not proceed. Lange suggested that the US send a non-nuclear capable ship, perhaps one of the Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG7) frigates. Unfortunately, Lange had told journalists after the cabinet meeting that a decision had not yet been reached but that there were some obviously non-nuclear capable US warships that would meet NZ's requirements. This announcement led to immediate press speculation about a possible US compromise. However, because Lange had gone public, the US refused to play ball, and on January 30 Ambassador Browne stated that the US was still waiting for a response to its visit request. That same day the peace movement mobilised a 15,000 strong march in

⁵³¹ Basset, telephone interview, April 19, 1999.

⁵³² White, *Nuclear free New Zealand*, p. 41.

Auckland to head off any Labour attempt to permit a nuclear-capable visit. “If in Doubt, Keep it Out” ran the catchy slogan of the day.⁵³³

The caucus meeting of January 31 urged that the *Buchanan* visit be rejected. The frantic lobbying efforts of the peace movement had paid off. Peace activists discovered that face-to-face pressure on politicians could be even more effective than street protest.⁵³⁴ While Lange had no problem with accepting a visit by a nuclear-capable ship which he could reasonably assume was not nuclear armed, he realised that there was no point in arguing with the party. To a standing ovation he told caucus that the ban would be upheld. The Labour caucus had feared that the *Buchanan* visit was only the thin end of a wedge, for the US would eventually overturn the ban and Labour would lose its most active campaign workers because many of them were opposed to nuclear-capable ships regardless of whether they were carrying nuclear weapons at the time. The US was formally invited to send a non-nuclear capable vessel, but on February 3 Ambassador Browne wrote that it was the “*Buchanan* or nothing”. The Cabinet discussed the letter, and the official NZ refusal of request was delivered on February 4 1985.

The US felt that initially it had been misled and later it had been betrayed. It had expected a compromise, and negotiated one with NZ officials, but the Labour Party’s strict interpretation of the ban had effectively barred all US nuclear-capable warships. Moreover, it seemed that the Labour leadership had transformed the issue into one of NZ nationalism versus US hegemony in order to gain domestic political support. To retain the support of its left-wing radical activists during the implementation of Rogernomics, Labour needed to implement a strict ship ban. To retain the loyalty of the general public, Labour had to exploit NZ nationalism by picking a fight with the US. In other words, the new government of an allied state had humiliated the US primarily for domestic political reasons.

⁵³³ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 135.

⁵³⁴ See Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword*, pp. 262-272.

As for the role of public opinion, it would seem that public anti-nuclearism, used to justify the ban, had been carefully cultivated by the peace movement over time. Without the efforts of the peace movement, including its last-minute intervention over the *Buchanan*, it is unlikely that the public's general distaste for things nuclear would have been focused on nuclear ships to such an extent. Ideology had played a crucial role in turning a general aversion against nuclear weapons, and a fear of nuclear war, into a call for an act of unilateral disarmament. It is also highly likely that a *Buchanan* visit under the trust formula would have been acceptable to a majority of the public. Evidence for this contention may be found in the rapid change in poll results on the nuclear ship question.

In 1978, after the water-theatre against the *Pintado* provided by the Peace Squadron, public opinion on nuclear-powered visits stood at 51.7% in favour of such visits, with 38.8% against. Conversely, on the issue of nuclear-armed ship visits, 61.5% were in favour of visits, with only 31.5% against.⁵³⁵ At this point, nuclear power was still the public's main concern. However, this situation had reversed itself by 1984, when nuclear armed ships were the main concern. The change was probably due to Reagan's rhetoric, the US's military build-up, the stalling of arms control talks, and a resulting fear of nuclear war. The latter was cultivated by the peace movement's educational efforts, and guest speakers such as Helen Caldicott. Opposition to nuclear-armed ship visits would also have been encouraged by Labour's claims that a ban on such ships would not mean the end of ANZUS. By April 1983, polls found only 46.1% in support of nuclear-armed visits, and 40.2% against.⁵³⁶ An August 1983 Heylen Poll found that 40% disapproved of visits by the nuclear-armed ships of NZ's allies.⁵³⁷ It appeared that the public's fear of nuclear war had paid even bigger dividends for the peace movement than the public's fear of nuclear accidents.

⁵³⁵ Hodges, *David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace*, p. 178.

⁵³⁶ Ibid., p. 208.

⁵³⁷ McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, p. 34.

Public opposition to nuclear-armed visitors also increased dramatically after the Fourth Labour Government was elected. An August 1984 Heylen poll found that opposition to nuclear power visitors had risen to 76%, which was quite a leap from the 40% result of August 1983. In contrast, opposition to nuclear power only increased from 34% to 52% between 1980 and 1985.⁵³⁸ It has been suggested that the sudden increase in support for a nuclear weapons ban, immediately after Labour was elected and the US had begun to apply public pressure on the new government, reflected the tendency of citizens of small countries to rally behind their government during a confrontation with a foreign power.⁵³⁹ This nationalistic tendency even affected National Party voters, although ideological differences soon reasserted themselves. In August 1983 23% of National voters supported the nuclear weapons ban. This rose to 63% in August 1984, before falling back to 55% in March 1985. Labour voters presented 53%, 83% and 92% results respectively, over the same period.⁵⁴⁰

Although nationalism might account for the increase in support for a nuclear-weapons ban, it should be noted that this phenomenon was not replicated over the nuclear power issue, which would indicate that a fear of nuclear weapons had a major effect on public opinion. The interaction of world events, the peace movement, the Labour Government, and public opinion thus gave the ANZUS crisis a peculiar dynamic. The nuclear arms race made the public uneasy, and their fears were played on by the peace movement. Once the peace movement's educational efforts⁵⁴¹ had raised public opposition to nuclear weapons to a certain level it then appeared politic for the Labour Party's leadership to act on the demands coming from the grassroots Labour Party, which shared a common

⁵³⁸ Keith Jackson and Jim Lamare, "Politics, Public Opinion and International Crisis: The ANZUS issue in New Zealand Politics", in Bercovitch, *ANZUS in Crisis*, pp. 180-181.

⁵³⁹ Jackson and Lamare, "Politics, Public Opinion and International Crisis", p. 180. A similar phenomenon occurred in Serbia during the 1999 confrontation with NATO over Kosovo.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 183-186.

⁵⁴¹ See Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword*, p. 257. Huntley also credits the change in public opinion to the peace movement's educational efforts.

ideology with the peace movement. Once the ban became government policy in 1984 the US's reaction led to a nationalistic surge behind the nuclear weapons ban, and the Labour Government then appeared to have its "mandate" for the strict form of ban which was applied in 1985 at the insistence of the Labour Party and the peace movement. This mandate was also based on Labour Government assurances that ANZUS was not under threat.

That the NZ public was not as keen as the Labour Party to sacrifice ANZUS could be seen in a poll conducted for The Dominion. Support for the Government's overall policy on nuclear ships stood at 48%, with 42% against. However, when asked if they would still support Government policy if ANZUS co-operation suffered, only 67% of the 48% reaffirmed their support.⁵⁴² (This result foreshadowed similar findings in 1986, in the poll conducted by a Defence Committee of Inquiry.) The Dominion's poll also found that 83% wanted a referendum on the ANZUS issue. It appeared that many people became hesitant about the ship ban once it became clear that the ban might threaten collective security through ANZUS. Despite the public's reservations, the Labour Government was determined to stay the course, and it insisted that it accurately reflected public opinion. No referendum took place, probably because Labour feared that the results might undermine its claim to a mandate. The Government's unwillingness to have its position challenged was also apparent in Parliament. On a number of occasions the National Party was prevented from forcing snap debates on the ANZUS issue, usually by the Speaker of the House.⁵⁴³

Inasmuch as public opinion was reflected in the media, some clues can be garnered from a survey of publications such as the New Zealand Herald, The Dominion, and the NZ Listener, from mid-1984 to late 1986. Letters to the New

⁵⁴² Richard Long, "Poll Calls for Vote On Ship Rejection", *The Dominion*, February 18, 1985, p. 1.

⁵⁴³ "Opposition Bid to Force Debate on ANZUS Fails", *New Zealand Herald*, September 22, 1984, p.5, Section 1; "MPs Storm Out Over Snap Debate Refusal", *New Zealand Herald*, February 28, 1985, p. 5, Section 1; "ANZUS Debate Refused", *New Zealand Herald*, July 2, 1986, p.5, Section 1.

Zealand Herald were evenly divided: they included, on the one hand, letters hailing the ban as a blow against the arms race, those questioning the value of the ANZUS Alliance, and those complaining about US bullying, and, on the other hand, those supporting nuclear deterrence, those supporting collective security through ANZUS, and those questioning whether the Government possessed a mandate for the ban. The Dominion published even more letters on the subject, and a majority were in favour of the nuclear ban. However, a large number of pro-ban letters arrived from Australia, the US, Britain and Germany.⁵⁴⁴ The New Zealand Herald appeared more reluctant to publish such letters, which could have been encouraged by the NZ peace movement through its overseas contacts. More correspondence from peace activists was also noticeable in The Dominion, perhaps due to the strength of the Wellington peace movement. In addition, an anti-ANZUS and anti-American viewpoint was repeatedly expressed by correspondents like R.O. Hare, A.P. Quinn, A. Reddish, and A. St. John Wood.⁵⁴⁵

In the NZ Listener letters tended to favour a pro-ban and anti-ANZUS position. The main areas of contention lay between the opposing advocates of unilateral disarmament and non-alignment in the Cold war, on one side, and the proponents of the “peace through strength” approach to arms control and collective security, on the other side.⁵⁴⁶

Regarding editorials, those in the New Zealand Herald were consistently critical of the Labour Government. They lambasted Lange’s complaints about US “interference”, and questioned the value of unilateral disarmament measures. It was argued that the ban would not save NZ in a nuclear war.⁵⁴⁷ Editorials in The Dominion were more neutral, and they noted that Lange would face a tough

⁵⁴⁴ For some examples see The Dominion’s letters page on March 21, 25, 28, 29 and 30, 1985.

⁵⁴⁵ For examples see The Dominion’s letters on March 15, September 23, November 29, 1985.

⁵⁴⁶ For examples of the latter, see letters in the NZ Listener on March 23, September 21, November 16, 1985.

⁵⁴⁷ For examples of the above, see the New Zealand Herald’s editorials for May 13, 1986; October 11, 1986; and December 12, 1985.

task in reconciling the public's anti-nuclearism with its desire for ANZUS, and in reconciling the position of the Labour Left with the US position on NCND. The Dominion noted that NZers' support for the Government's policy had been predicated on the assumption that the ban would not hurt ANZUS.⁵⁴⁸ However, after the US initiated reprisals, The Dominion criticised the US for making things worse.⁵⁴⁹ It had long warned that the US needed to avoid inciting NZ nationalism.⁵⁵⁰ The NZ Listener only published a few editorials on the subject, and these were fairly neutral, apart from those written by the assistant editor.⁵⁵¹

The range of opinion articles in the New Zealand Herald was balanced, ranging from anti-ANZUS articles⁵⁵² to articles supportive of ANZUS and those critical of unilateral disarmament.⁵⁵³ The Dominion also contained a selection of articles from various perspectives, pieces from those of Rev. Selwyn Dawson, who viewed alliances as responsible for NZ's involvement in the Vietnam War, to Douglas Graham's warning that the NZ ban might jeopardise bi-lateral arms control negotiations in Geneva.⁵⁵⁴ Conversely, articles in the NZ Listener displayed a tendency toward pro-ban and anti-ANZUS perspectives. Writers like Dalton West, H. Monroe Browne, and Warren Cooper, who supported ANZUS, were outnumbered by nuclear-ship ban supporters such as David Lange, Ron

⁵⁴⁸ Editorial, "ANZUS in the Balance", *The Dominion*, February 6, 1985, p.10.

⁵⁴⁹ Editorial, "Patching It Up With Shultz", *The Dominion*, May 24, 1985, p.12.

⁵⁵⁰ See The Dominion's editorials on July 3, 1984; July 23, 1984; September 21, 1984; September 29, 1984; December 3, 1984.

⁵⁵¹ These were more supportive of the NZ position. See the editorials in the NZ Listener for April 24, 1985, and October 12, 1985.

⁵⁵² See Alex Carey, "US Foreign Policy Subject to Tides of Public Opinion", *New Zealand Herald*, September 28, 1984, p. 6, Section 1; and John Galvin, "Traditional Alliances in a Nuclear Age", *New Zealand Herald*, January 20, 1986, p. 6, Section 1.

⁵⁵³ See Sir Richard Bolt, "Conscientious Objector Role Out of Character for New Zealand", *New Zealand Herald*, February 22, 1985, p. 6, Section 1; and Jim McLay, "New Zealand Left Without Voice in Arms Reduction Effort", *New Zealand Herald*, January 8, 1986, p. 6, Section 1.

⁵⁵⁴ Reverend Selwyn Dawson, "The Alliance- Then and Now", *The Dominion*, March 25, 1985, p. 10; Douglas Graham, "Progress Towards Peace", *The Dominion*, March 12, 1985, p. 8.

Locker, Helen Clark, and anti-ANZUS commentators such as Pauline Swain and Jim Falk.⁵⁵⁵

Although support for the ban was prominent in the publications mentioned above, and although it appeared to outweigh opposition to the ban, this does not weaken the argument that the public's fear of nuclear war was directed against nuclear ships by those with an ideological axe to grind. The widespread fear that the Government's mandate for altering the guidelines of ANZUS would endanger the alliance itself, which was quite evident in the media debate, also reinforces the argument that the Government misled the public about the practicality of having both a nuclear-free NZ and a secure place in the ANZUS Alliance.

In the end, the fact that the ANZUS crisis finally erupted over a conventionally-powered ship that, in all probability, would not have been carrying nuclear weapons demonstrated that Labour's stand was not simply based on an opposition to nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The US faced an allied government that was heavily influenced by an ideology hostile to the goals, strategy, and tactics of the West in the Cold War. Ironically, the strength of the US reaction was to heighten nationalistic support for Labour, as the Labour Government may have anticipated. The US response to the ban will feature in the next chapter, but the consequences of other Labour policies must be addressed beforehand.

Rogernomics and Nuclear Ships

The New Right was willing to accept the loss of ANZUS because the ship ban was an act of "individualism" which was in sync with its own anti-collective temperament, but, more importantly, this action also had the benefit of distracting

⁵⁵⁵ Dalton West, "The Case For ANZUS", *NZ Listener*, June 23, 1984, pp. 62-63; H. Monroe Browne, "Unreliable Ally", *NZ Listener*, March 30, 1985, pp. 20-22; Warren Cooper, "On the Strength of ANZUS", *NZ Listener*, July 26, 1986, pp. 20-21; David Lange, "ANZUS: The New Zealand View", *NZ Listener*, April 13, 1985, pp. 13-14; Ron Locker, "After the Nukes", *NZ Listener*, July 6, 1985, pp. 22-23; Helen Clark, "What Price Security?", *NZ Listener*, September 20, 1986, pp. 35-35; Pauline Swain, "Who defends New Zealand?", *NZ Listener*, November 16, 1985, pp. 32-34; Gordon Campbell (interview with Jim Falk), "Defence Around Our Own Pool", *NZ Listener*, May 31, 1986, pp. 18-19.

the NZLP Left as New Right economic reforms were being enacted. The support of Social Liberals for the radicals' social and foreign policy agendas encouraged them not to resist Rogernomics for fear that they might split the party and jeopardise what they had gained in the non-economic sphere. "The expression of post materialist values through anti-nuclear politics may have perversely allowed a new materialism to conquer New Zealand politics".⁵⁵⁶

In short, the New Right's economic revolution proceeded hand in hand with a liberal and radical foreign policy revolution. The support of Social Liberals had enabled Left Radicals to achieve the ship ban, but the reluctance of Social Liberals to support efforts by Left Radicals to thwart Rogernomics enabled the New Right's economic reforms to carry the day during Labour's first term (1984-1987). By 1987 the historic compromise was dead: collective security through ANZUS and state intervention in the NZ economy had been superseded by the political agendas of radicals and the New Right respectively.

Social Liberals had other reasons for supporting Rogernomics between 1984 and 1987. The economic crisis had convinced them that some measure of economic change was necessary. Social Liberals still believed in an economic role for the state, and they hoped that New Right economic policies would succeed in reviving the economy, thus making it easier to achieve social justice and traditional Labour goals.⁵⁵⁷ In the end, however, Rogernomics proved to be more incompatible with traditional Labour goals than they had expected, especially after National took up Rogernomics on its return to power in 1990.

The Fourth Labour Government, adhering to action plans formulated in Treasury, deregulated the financial sector, eliminating foreign exchange and interest rate controls and floating the NZ dollar. It abolished price controls and subsidies and reduced tariffs. It also radically altered the steeply progressive tax

⁵⁵⁶ Vowles, "Nuclear Free New Zealand and Rogernomics", *Politics*, p. 81.

⁵⁵⁷ Colin James, "The Rise and Fall of the Market Liberals in the Labour Party", in Margaret Clark (Ed.), *The Labour Party After 75 Years*, pp. 15-18.

system, introduced GST, and privatised state assets with vigour. Labour focused on decreasing inflation even if this entailed a rise in unemployment.

The Labour Government did effect changes in the social arena that appealed to the post-materialist sensibilities of liberals and radicals in the NZLP. For example, in the racial sphere Labour expanded the brief of the Waitangi Tribunal and severed diplomatic ties with South Africa. In the gender and sexuality sphere it established the Ministry of Women's Affairs and enacted the Homosexual Law Reform Act. Environmentalists received the Resource Management Act, and the peace movement got its nuclear ship ban. To address radicals' fears about "Big Brother", the government introduced parliamentary reforms and a Bill of Rights to increase checks on the power of the executive branch. The Government also introduced radical perspectives into the NZ educational curriculum to help combat the false consciousness that radicals believed was responsible for NZ's conservatism. There were also some Old Labour reforms. The government reintroduced compulsory unionism, abolished during the Muldoon years, to try to keep the trade unions within the NZLP.

Each of these non-economic reforms had the benefit of stifling opposition to economic policy, at least for a while. Although this may have contented many Social Liberals, there was little joy for the Left Radicals. For them the Labour Government had jettisoned socialism and had failed to embrace non-alignment in the Cold War. In response to such grievances, New Labour was formed in 1989.

The commitment of many liberals to maintaining the ship ban caused them to vote for Labour again in 1987 despite their unhappiness with Rogernomics. The defence issue loomed larger than economics in the voting for Labour in 1987, although social policy issues ranked ahead of both.⁵⁵⁸ If Labour had rescinded the ban, it would have lost more of its 1984 voters than it could have replaced with new pro-Rogernomics Labour supporters. In addition, Social

⁵⁵⁸ Vowles, "Nuclear Free New Zealand and Rogernomics", *Politics*, pp. 85-87.

Liberals were not overly concerned about Rogernomics in 1987: in one 1987 survey only 5% of Labour voters agreed that Rogernomics represented the “wrong direction” in which the country should move.⁵⁵⁹

Labour’s 1987 Policy Document went to great lengths to keep liberals happy, stressing Labour’s reforms in foreign policy and defence. It stated that Labour had increased NZ’s emphasis on self reliance, had excluded nuclear weapons and nuclear powered ships from NZ, and was planning to withdraw the Singapore battalion by 1989, although NZ would honour the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Labour boasted that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy, that it had created a disarmament division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that it supported the SPNFZ, and that it funded peace education and research. Opposition to French nuclear testing and French colonialism in the South Pacific, trade sanctions against South Africa, and the promise that “The Labour Government will continue to oppose outside military intervention in the affairs of Latin America”,⁵⁶⁰ confirmed Labour’s liberal credentials.

Despite voting for Labour during the 1987 election, Social Liberals were alarmed when Douglas prepared to extend his reforms to the social sector. They had given Rogernomics the benefit of the doubt during the 1987 election, agreeing with Lange that that economic changes were necessary to make social welfare affordable.⁵⁶¹ After the election, when it became clear that social welfare was next on the reform agenda, Labour’s unity disintegrated. The 1987 “Government Management” Treasury paper on social policy was the last straw. Liberals were also perturbed that Rogernomics had not addressed such issues as social diversity and minority victimisation.⁵⁶² With the Social Liberals now mobilising against Douglas, Lange, who had become concerned about the pace of

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 83.

⁵⁶⁰ New Zealand Labour Party: 1987 Policy Document, 1987, p. 55.

⁵⁶¹ David Lange, ‘Foreword’, in Boston and Holland, *The Fourth Labour Government*, p. ix.

⁵⁶² Jesson, *Fragments of Labour*, pp. 97-104.

economic reform and wanted to pause for a period of recovery, now possessed the numbers to halt Douglas, who was determined to complete his economic reforms as quickly as possible.⁵⁶³ After losing the power struggle against Lange, Douglas resigned from the cabinet in December 1988.

After its election victory in 1990, National completed the health and social welfare reforms which Douglas had intended to carry out. That this development occurred on the back of a Labour Government's own reform programme revealed how far NZ's two major parties and the nation had travelled since the Labour Government of Norman Kirk and Bill Rowling and the National Government of Robert Muldoon. It was ironic indeed that the great majority of the changes that destroyed the historic compromise, and which qualified NZ's alignment with the West, were the work of the NZLP, the party that had forged the modern welfare state and that had fought World War II as a dedicated member of the Western family of nations.

⁵⁶³ John Henderson, "Labour's Modern Prime Ministers and the Party: A study of Contrasting Political Styles", in Clark, *The Labour Party After 75 Years*, pp. 104-107.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CONSEQUENCES.

Mr Lange and New Zealand have had a measure of heroism thrust upon them from some quarters; both have risen like a moon on the gas of a subtly tickled ego.

*Michael McKinley.*⁵⁶⁴

The Response of the United States.

NZ's decision to implement a strict nuclear ship ban occurred during a period when the US Administration of President Ronald Reagan had adopted an offensive diplomatic and military strategy in the superpower rivalry with the Soviet Union. Reagan's assertive and proactive approach contrasted sharply with the passive and reactive policies pursued by President Jimmy Carter from 1977 until late 1979 when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan transformed Carter from a classic dove into a born-again hawk, though his conversion came too late to save his presidency.⁵⁶⁵ Reflecting the influence of radical ideology amongst the US's educated elite, Carter had offered a new-look US foreign policy. In the face of criticism of US aggression and imperialism, and particularly because of the US experience in Vietnam, Carter restrained US military spending and arms sales to the Third World, and he also attempted to address the human rights abuses of US allies, especially right-wing dictatorships in the Third World. The North-South focus of liberals and radicals also replaced the East-West focus of earlier US

⁵⁶⁴ McKinley, *The ANZUS Alliance and NZ Labour*, p. 77.

⁵⁶⁵ Levering, *The Cold War*, pp. 164-168.

administrations. “Evil” was defined primarily in terms of poverty, racism, and social injustice rather than in terms of communist totalitarianism. In line with peace movement pressure for unilateral arms control, Carter dropped the US policy of linking US arms control concessions to improvements in Soviet behaviour around the world; indeed, he even pursued unilateral US nuclear restraint regardless of Soviet actions.⁵⁶⁶

The USSR’s response to Carter’s initiatives was not reciprocal. Wherever the US limited its arms sales, the USSR stepped in and filled the vacuum. As the US preached to its allies about human rights, the Soviets used the Brezhnev Doctrine, first announced in 1968 to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, to prop up new Communist dictatorships in the Third World. As the US pursued arms control with a new vigour, the USSR expanded its navy, its arsenal of ICBM’s, and deployed a new, highly accurate IRBM, the SS-20, in Eastern Europe. Carter finally realised that his new approach had been exploited by the Soviets when they invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. After his transformation into an anti-Soviet hard-liner, Carter re-linked arms control to Soviet behaviour, and in January 1980 he abandoned efforts to gain Senate ratification of the SALT II Treaty. That same month Carter asked Congress to increase defence spending, and he announced that the US would project its military power into the Middle East, drawing a line in the sand with the Carter Doctrine. The US Navy, he declared, would extend forward defence into the Indian Ocean, and this meant that the US would increase its presence in Australia as a result.⁵⁶⁷

President Reagan continued along the path marked out by Carter, aiming for a 600 ship navy and introducing dual-capable Cruise missiles to the USN. This increased emphasis on naval weapons was designed to increase US force

⁵⁶⁶ Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power*, pp.241-247.

⁵⁶⁷ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, p. 54.

projection and extended deterrence under the new Maritime Strategy.⁵⁶⁸ Reagan's foreign policy was based on reviving the military-style containment of the late 1940s and 1950s, with its emphasis on force and military alliances. Reagan also demonstrated a renewed willingness to intervene in Third World against Soviet-backed forces. Moreover, he intended to negotiate arms control from a position of strength. For Washington the epitome of evil was now the Soviet Empire, and human rights rhetoric was once more directed at the USSR rather than at US allies. In this manner the old East-West focus returned with a vengeance.

These tactics would help win the Cold War for the West, and it was no surprise that Reagan became the public enemy number-one of radicals. His foreign policy was destined to clash with NZ's ship-ban, which was ideologically in step with the policies pursued and later abandoned by Carter. Whereas the US had returned to a confrontational mode, NZ under Labour had just begun to operate in an appeasement mode. ANZUS had become more important to the US in the 1980s, and the ANZUS dispute came at a time when the US and the USSR were about to start up arms control talks in Geneva, negotiations that were suspended in November 1983 and rescheduled to resume in early 1985. The last thing the US wanted was a display of Western dissent over nuclear policy, lest this weaken the US bargaining position in Geneva and at any Reagan-Gorbachev summit later in the year.⁵⁶⁹ With regard to the concerns of the US, Lange has commented that the successful conclusion of the US missile deployment in Europe came as a relief. The US then had less reason to punish an "expendable" NZ for its anti-nuclear stand.⁵⁷⁰

The NZ ban also challenged the NCND policy of the USN, which was critical to the new emphasis on naval force projection, especially due to the deployment of dual-purpose Cruise missiles. Naval force-projection overseas

⁵⁶⁸ Landais-Stamp and Rogers, *Rocking the Boat*, pp. 35-40.

⁵⁶⁹ Henry Albinski, "The ANZUS Crisis: US Policy Implications and Responses", in Jacob Bercovitch (Ed.), *ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management in International Affairs*, London, 1988, p. 93.

⁵⁷⁰ Lange Interview, July 18, 1998.

required port visits, specifically for crew morale purposes, re-supply, and shows of solidarity. Of course, a USN which was armed with dual Cruise missiles was a handy target for peace movement protests. The US officially defended NCND as a means of complicating Soviet targeting strategy, and thereby of enhancing the credibility of deterrence; but it also served a political purpose: it enabled allied or friendly countries to accommodate domestic anti-nuclear sentiments by allowing nuclear weapons bans to be based on the trust formula. In other words, NCND allowed host governments to defuse peace movement efforts to pry their nations out of the Western Alliance without lying to their people or restricting the operations of the USN. This was especially pertinent for Japan, which played an important part in US Cold War strategy, but which had to respect its public's understandable anti-nuclear sensitivities. Some have questioned the morality of this type of finesse,⁵⁷¹ but, due to the existence of radicals who were determined to undermine Western military co-operation, the US and its allies viewed the trust formula as an unavoidable necessity in the Cold War.

One reason for the strong US response to NZ's ban was a concern that, if the NZ ban was copied by other US friends and allies, the US's Maritime Strategy would be undermined. If the US had not responded to NZ's ban and had continued military co-operation with NZ in conventional areas, other US allies may have decided, under pressure from their own peace movements, to follow suit. A perception may have arisen that the balance of power was shifting in the Soviet Union's favour, and a "band-wagon" effect could have produced additional peace movement victories, with each one building on prior successes. In order to prevent the spread of the "Kiwi Disease", the US was forced to curtail military co-operation with its small alliance partner. NCND was far more important to the US than having NZ as an equivocal ally.⁵⁷²

⁵⁷¹ For example, Michael Goldsmith, in his paper *Neither Confirm Nor Deny: Language, Logic and Morality in Foreign Policy*, Auckland, 1993.

⁵⁷² Ramesh Thakur, "ANZUS and the Nuclear Ships Ban: The American Reaction", in Gold, *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, p. 53.

However, on Australia's advice the US kept the actual ANZUS framework intact in order to allow the possible re-inclusion of NZ at a later date. The US had probably hoped that military sanctions would result in pressure on the Labour Government from the NZ armed forces. This was wishful thinking, as the NZ military did not have the political clout of its US counterpart, and very few Labour politicians cared about its degradation.⁵⁷³ In October 1985 sixteen retired senior officers of the NZ armed forces released a statement arguing that nuclear deterrence had prevented nuclear war, and that the ban would not have occurred if the NZ public had been better informed about the value of nuclear deterrence. The Labour Party attacked their concerns as "military meddling", and Lange dismissed the individuals as "geriatric Generals".

In late February 1985 Lange visited Los Angeles, where he was informed of initial US reprisals by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, William Brown. Visits to NZ by senior US military staff would cease, the US would halt most of its intelligence flow to NZ, and US military forces would no longer exercise with NZ forces.⁵⁷⁵ As 1985 progressed, other US sanctions were imposed. The Reagan Administration ordered an audit of the extent of the military relationship with NZ, and it was shocked to learn of the intimacy and breadth of co-operation and exchange between the services that had quietly occurred under ANZUS. NZ service personnel on secondment to the US military would not be replaced when their terms expired, and there would be restrictions on the training courses that NZ military personnel could attend in the US. The loss of the exchange programme hurt the RNZAF, for one, as its pilots lost the opportunity to fly certain types of aircraft.⁵⁷⁶ However, the USAF's use of Harewood would continue, as NCND was not a concern in that particular case.

⁵⁷³ Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 101.

⁵⁷⁵ 22 exercises for 1985 were either scrapped, or reorganised to exclude NZ.

⁵⁷⁴ Jamieson interview, September 26, 1998.

In contrast to the reprisals meted out to NZ, the US adopted a different stance towards the February 1985 MX dispute with Australia. Prime Minister Bob Hawke was unable to honour an earlier Australian commitment to provide support facilities for US monitoring of an MX missile test landing in the Tasman Sea due to pressure from the ALP's left-wing. The US let the incident pass so that Bob Hawke could appease the ALP left, and also to avert a political confrontation that might have enabled the Australian peace movement to emulate the successes of its NZ counterpart.

Although the loss of military co-operation adversely affected the NZ armed forces, the main blow proved to be the US's diplomatic isolation of NZ. Both Australia and NZ had sought the ANZUS Treaty in order to gain access to US decision making, but the NZ ship ban resulted in NZ's being banished to the outer circle of countries for State Department briefings and to a cessation of high-level political visits to NZ. As a result, considerable "diplomacy" took place in the press. Australia became the bearer of more bad news when on March 5, 1985, Hawke postponed the annual Council meeting set for July: NZ was effectively barred from ANZUS Council meetings and the consultations they engendered.

The loss of diplomatic access was serious enough, but sanctions also produced serious repercussions in the intelligence field. Britain, Australia and Canada were instructed not to share US-sourced intelligence with NZ. Although CIA and FBI material would continue, along with any information absolutely vital to NZ's security, military intelligence was cut by at least 80%,⁵⁷⁵ which meant that much sensitive material relating to world events was lost to NZ. This tended to further isolate an already geographically isolated country.

Another possible form of US reprisal was trade sanctions. The Reagan Administration ruled out such measures, but it warned NZ that it would be more difficult for the Executive Branch to defend NZ's economic interests against

⁵⁷⁵ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, p. 132.

protectionist lobbies in Congress. Indeed, congressional protectionists did try to exploit the crisis to limit NZ's agricultural exports. In particular, representatives of mutton, wool and casein constituencies argued that a strong reaction to the NZ ban was justified.⁵⁷⁶ Despite their efforts, NZ's trade with the US did not suffer. The annual value of NZ exports to the US increased by 49.1% between June 1984 and June 1985,⁵⁷⁷ something which was in line with long-term trends, and by 1992 the US was still NZ's chief market for beef, veal and casein.⁵⁷⁸

The question can be raised here as to whether the US's response to the ban exacerbated the situation, and whether it waged the radicals' battle for them, as maintained by Lange.⁵⁷⁹ The New Zealand Herald was also worried that the US reaction was counter-productive. The dispute inflamed NZ nationalism, and the editor worried that "even some pro-ANZUS New Zealanders are wondering whether their vote for the alliance has become a vote against their own country."⁵⁸⁰ The Labour Government was not above labelling opponents as pro-US "collaborators". In March 1985 Dr Michael Cullen, a Labour MP, accused the Opposition leader, Jim McLay, of working with the US to destabilise NZ, and in September 1985 David Lange accused McLay of making speeches against NZ's interests.⁵⁸¹

Despite the problems caused by the US reaction, there was little else it could do after the Labour Government had implemented a strict ban. Ending military co-operation with NZ might discourage the US's NATO or Asian allies from following suit. This meant giving the NZ peace movement what they

⁵⁷⁶ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, p. 137.

⁵⁷⁷ Landais-Stamp and Rogers, *Rocking the Boat*, p. 109.

⁵⁷⁸ Frank Holmes, "A New Zealand View", in Richard Baker and Gary Hawke, (Eds.), *ANZUS Economics: Economic Trends and Relations Among Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, Westport (Connecticut), 1992, p. 177.

⁵⁷⁹ Lange Interview, July 18, 1998.

⁵⁸⁰ Editorial, "Time to Cool Off", *New Zealand Herald*, February 21, 1985, p.6.

⁵⁸¹ "McLay Hits Back at Smear", *New Zealand Herald*, March 8, 1985, p. 3, Section 1; "PM: US Speeches by Mr McLay Are A Disgrace", *New Zealand Herald*, September 11, 1985, p. 5, Section 1.

wanted. At best, the US could have postponed a test of the ban until after the 1985 ANZUS Council meeting in the hope that a private compromise might be reached at that meeting,⁵⁸² but by mid 1985 it was too late.

Alongside sanctions in the areas of military co-operation, intelligence sharing and diplomatic contact, the US tried to put across its own case. On July 17, 1985, a speech by Secretary of State George Shultz in Honolulu accused NZ of opting out of its Western Alliance responsibilities. In general, the US argued that NZ had failed to uphold its obligations under Article II of the ANZUS Treaty, and that NZ had opted out of collective security. The Labour Government was not comfortable with the latter claim, as it had been reassuring the NZ public that it was still committed to ANZUS.

The US embassy served as an information channel for the Reagan Administration⁵⁸³ and as a means of influencing NZ's opinion makers, while the United States Information Agency arranged visits to the US by key NZers and visits to NZ by US officials. Worldnet "inter-active" interviews, in which foreign journalists interviewed US officials by satellite link, were another information channel. As a result, in October 1985 the US Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger, appeared on NZ TV and criticised the NZ Government's efforts to resolve the ANZUS dispute. In response, Geoffrey Palmer accused the US of going over the head of the NZ Government to reach the NZ public. David Lange also protested about US interference whenever possible, but he actually loved it. As he noted, every US lecture helped to heighten NZ's nationalism.⁵⁸³ The peace movement, itself an expert at arranging visits by overseas peace

⁵⁸² Editorial, "ANZUS Fate in Balance", *New Zealand Herald*, March 6, 1985, p.6.

In January 1986 the professional diplomat, Paul Cleveland, was appointed as Ambassador to NZ to help present the US's case.

⁵⁸³ Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 156.

activists, also attacked US-sponsored visits as “interference” in NZ’s internal affairs.⁵⁸⁴

The complaints of the NZ Government and peace movement about interference smacked of hypocrisy. Although they challenged the US’s right to present its side of the debate to New Zealanders, members of both organisations were attempting to reach the US public. Lange defended NZ’s position on US television, and during the November 1984 US elections Labour MPs Helen Clark and Fran Wilde put their names to a Washington Post advertisement which asked Americans to prevent the Reagan Administration from pressuring NZ over Labour’s anti-nuclear policy.⁵⁸⁵ Clark also voiced her approval of a pro-ship ban letter from US peace activists which was later published in NZ newspapers.⁵⁸⁶

Labour Defends the Ban

In response to US claims that NZ had opted out of the Western Alliance, Lange and the Labour Government insisted that NZ was still pro-Western and that it continued to support collective security under ANZUS. In Los Angeles Lange told William Brown that NZ was ready to continue conventional military co-operation.

According to Lange, the ship ban was an act of anti-nuclearism, not anti-Americanism, and that NZ would like to continue its military relationship with the US. This was accurate in the sense that the majority of the NZ public supported the ban due to their anti-nuclearism rather than their opposition to ANZUS. However, the Labour Government’s position was disingenuous, as Labour Party support for the ban was also based on an aversion to ANZUS, and on Labour’s ideologically-grounded anti-nuclearism. This led to a paradox: an anti-ANZUS Labour Party had implemented a ship ban that was supported by a

⁵⁸⁴ Warren Thomson, “Nuclear free Kiwis”, *Peacelink*, July 1986, p. 9.

⁵⁸⁵ McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, p. 108.

⁵⁸⁶ Helen Clark, “A Politician’s view”, in Hanley, *Peace is More than an Absence of War*, p.66.

pro-ANZUS public. The Labour Government's professions of loyalty to the US were merely a political necessity.

Labour's professed willingness to continue military co-operation with the US also ran into trouble regarding its policy on defence exercises with US forces. Elements of the Labour Party believed that the ban should prevent NZ military forces from exercising with nuclear-capable US warships. The Labour Government's position was uncertain, and its members made conflicting statements. In September 1984 Helen Clark claimed that it was government policy to forbid such exercises, whereas David Lange said three weeks later that it was policy to allow them. Five months later Labour's Defence Minister, Frank O'Flynn, said it was not.⁵⁸⁷ In any event, the policy was unlikely to be tested. The New Zealand Herald noted that the US, by cancelling exercises, had allowed Labour to evade the matter of joint exercises with US nuclear warships, thereby sparing Labour from appearing hypocritical if it agreed to exercises despite the ban on port visits.⁵⁸⁸

Lange wanted to reassure the public that ANZUS was safe, at least until the public was accustomed to the idea that co-operation had effectively ceased. Thus, he continued to claim that ANZUS was intact and operative, even though the US had ceased its military co-operation with NZ. As it became more obvious that NZ's involvement in ANZUS had ended, Lange switched to downplaying the importance of ANZUS by dismissing the worth of the US guarantee. In December 1985, in order to prepare the public for the reality of life without ANZUS, Lange claimed that ANZUS contained only an obligation to consult (as under Article III). In June 1986 Palmer noted that no automatic military action was specified in Article IV and that the type of action taken would be dictated by national interests. As a result of such claims, the 1986 Defence Committee of

⁵⁸⁷ McKinley, *The ANZUS Alliance and New Zealand Labour*, p. 48.

⁵⁸⁸ Editorial, "War Gamesmanship", *New Zealand Herald*, March 1, 1985, p.6.

Enquiry later accused government officials of misrepresenting the subject of military guarantees in ANZUS.⁵⁸⁹

Although Labour claimed to support ANZUS, it had a radically different interpretation of the alliance from that of the US. Whereas Labour viewed ANZUS as a regional security pact, the US saw ANZUS as part of a global network of alliances. In addition, Lange initially claimed that ANZUS was a conventional military alliance, even though the US Government, the NZ peace movement, and most of the Labour Party viewed it as being part of a global alliance backed up by the US nuclear deterrent. Eventually Lange admitted what his party had been saying all along: ANZUS was undesirable because it involved visits by nuclear capable US warships. Speaking to the Canterbury Labour Regional Council in September 1985, Lange noted that NZ's action was important to the US because, he declared, "New Zealand has to some extent in the past been part of the global projection of American nuclear power which underpins the deterrence strategy".⁵⁹⁰

The Labour Government also maintained that ANZUS did not oblige NZ to accept nuclear ship visits. Taking a narrow and legalistic approach, NZ argued that ship visits were not specifically mentioned in the treaty text. This angle was used to counter the US's claims that NZ had violated the spirit of Article II of the treaty, which called for the parties to implement "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" and to "develop and maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". The US believed that ship visits were an essential ingredient in fulfilling these obligations, but the NZ Government demurred.

Although he maintained repeatedly that ANZUS was a conventional alliance, Lange went to great lengths to attack the idea of a nuclear defence of NZ. This raised an interesting question: if ANZUS was conventional, why was

⁵⁸⁹ Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security*, p. 88.

⁵⁹⁰ David Lange, "Relations With the US", in *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, Wellington, July-September 1985, p. 32.

the ship ban a blow against nuclearism? The US had been a nuclear power for six years when the ANZUS Treaty was signed, and nuclear ships had been visiting NZ for many years. In this sense, ANZUS had been a nuclear alliance. When the Labour Government claimed that ANZUS was merely conventional, this was a statement characterised by wishful thinking rather than a reflection of reality.

In a speech in February 1985, Lange stressed that NZ did not want to be defended by nuclear weapons, that such weapons were irrelevant to the defence of NZ and the South Pacific, and that nuclear weapons were the main threat to NZ's security. According to the Labour Government, "The destruction of the planet cannot be a defence for New Zealand".⁵⁹¹ As the NZ Government defined national security in its broadest sense, nuclear war was seen as the main threat. The ship ban was designed to counter this threat,⁵⁹² and some even viewed it as a realistic approach to security.⁵⁹³ However, even if a unilateral act of disarmament could be painted as a realistic strategy for NZ, on the basis that a symbolic ban could have an international effect,⁵⁹⁴ it did not necessarily follow that the strategy was the right one. The ban could also have had the effect of helping the West to lose the Cold War. Although NZ was in agreement with other Western nations that nuclear war must be avoided, it had chosen to embrace the peace movement's approach to the arms race, namely, unilateral measures of arms control by the West. Labour argued that trying to pursue arms control from a position of strength only led to escalation,⁵⁹⁵ a view with which the National Party disagreed. According to the National Party's leader, Jim McLay, trying to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of weakness was unlikely to prove

⁵⁹¹ NZ Labour Government, *Nuclear Free New Zealand*, Wellington, 1986, p. 7.

⁵⁹² David Lange, "A South Pacific Identity", in *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, 1988 #1, p. 10.

⁵⁹³ Wade Huntley, *Security or Spectacle? Foreign Policy Realism and Nuclear-Free New Zealand*, Canberra, 1993, p. 13.

⁵⁹⁴ Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword*, pp. 309-313.

⁵⁹⁵ David Lange, "Disarmament and Security: The Government's Perspective", in *The New Zealand International Review*, May-June 1985, pp. 13-15.

productive.⁵⁹⁶ On February 12, 1985, McLay argued that the ban would not foster disarmament nor would it make NZ any safer from the effects of nuclear war.

In March 1985 Lange participated in the Oxford Union Debate against the Reverend Jerry Falwell, the leader of the Christian fundamentalist “Moral Majority” in the US. Lange took the affirmative: “That Nuclear Weapons Are Morally Indefensible”. By making this speech Lange effectively undermined his radical critics in the Labour Party, and he became “the king” of nuclear disarmament in the process.⁵⁹⁷ The British Government was concerned that Lange would take the opportunity to attack the British independent nuclear deterrent, but Lange reassured them that he would not. He limited himself to attacking the nuclear arms race and the morality of nuclear deterrence in general. He also suggested that US opposition to the ban represented bullying. “To compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against its wishes is to take the moral position of totalitarianism, which allows for no self-determination”.⁵⁹⁸

The bullying line of defence proved useful to Labour, and it added that the US expected it to change a policy which was supported by a majority of NZers. On the other hand, it could be argued that the US was not forcing NZ to accept nuclear ships; it merely wanted the NZ Government to either accept that membership in ANZUS required nuclear ship visits or to acknowledge that NZ’s ANZUS involvement was finished.⁵⁹⁹ The Labour Government refused to make this decision because it had promised the NZ public that NZ could remain within ANZUS while banning nuclear ship visits. As NZ chose to walk in the middle, the US withdrew NZ’s alliance privileges. Labour’s contention that it was merely reflecting public opinion has been covered in the previous chapter.

⁵⁹⁶ Jim McLay, “Disarmament and Security: An Alternative Viewpoint”, in *The New Zealand International Review*, May-June 1985, p. 20.

⁵⁹⁷ Bassett, telephone interview, April 19, 1999.

⁵⁹⁸ Ewan Jamieson, *Friend or Ally: New Zealand at Odds With its Past*, Sydney, 1990, p. 32.

⁵⁹⁹ Ramesh Thakur, “Creation of the Nuclear Free New Zealand Myth”, in *Asian Survey*, October 1989, p. 927.

After the Oxford Union Debate Lange attended the Geneva Conference on Disarmament where he repeated the claim that NZ did not need to be defended by nuclear weapons and was not threatened by them. However, he insisted that NZ's ban was not meant to serve as a specific example of arms control for other countries to follow. "We do not say to any country...do as New Zealand does; all we say is that when the opportunity is given to any country to pursue a serious and balanced measure of arms control, then that country has a duty to all of us to undertake that measure."⁶⁰⁰

Lange's stance at Oxford and Geneva was mirrored in later Labour Government publications. NZ's security was at risk so long as the system of nuclear deterrence remained in place,⁶⁰¹ and if a country like NZ could safely stand aside from nuclear weapons, perhaps every country could do so eventually.⁶⁰² Therefore, the NZ ship ban was a display of the type of political will required to slow the arms race. However, both Lange's arguments and those of the Labour Government led to some contradictions. Both argued that nuclear weapons were irrelevant to NZ's situation, but neither attempted to call for immediate unilateral disarmament by NATO. Although nuclear deterrence was apparently not suited to NZ's situation, Labour did not engage in a discussion of the suitability of its application elsewhere in the world.

The reason for this abstention was that the Government did not want to aggravate its Western trading partners any further. Nonetheless, by avoiding debate Labour gave the impression that NZ's ban was only possible because NZ was not on the front lines of the Cold War, thereby undercutting Lange's Oxford argument that nuclear deterrence was immoral. As a result, it appeared that NZ had enacted the ban for selfish motives and that it was not intending to crusade against nuclear deterrence overseas. For example, NZ's voting patterns in the UN

⁶⁰⁰ Quoted in Landais-Stamp and Rogers, *Rocking the Boat*, p. 86.

⁶⁰¹ Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Brief For Mr C.R. Marshall, Minister of Foreign Affairs*, Wellington, 1987, p. 8.

⁶⁰² NZ Labour Government, *Nuclear Free New Zealand*, Wellington, 1986, p. 4.

did not match its supposed opposition to nuclear deterrence, as peace activists pointed out.⁶⁰³ By not urging an immediate end to nuclear deterrence in Europe, Labour appeared to be admitting that nuclear deterrence had been necessary to keep the peace between the superpowers.⁶⁰⁴ Labour's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russell Marshall, admitted as much in his speech to the Disarmament Meeting in Geneva in March 1988, but he also noted that such a strategy was dangerous.⁶⁰⁵

Although Labour advocated that the West eventually should abandon nuclear deterrence, it did not propose any real alternatives which were suited to the realities currently facing NATO, nor did it formulate a new theory of international security.⁶⁰⁶ Therefore, it would seem that the "not for export" line pursued by Lange was part of a fine political balancing act. The NZ ship ban was not for export, but Labour's general approach to the arms race was. However, the peace movement and many in the Labour Party did want to export NZ's ban, as they believed that this was the only way they could advance arms control. Helen Clark, for one, saw the ban as a potent symbol that should have been exported. The Australian peace movement was encouraged by the success of its NZ counterpart, and in 1985 Clark did address an anti-nuclear rally in Australia, much to Lange's displeasure.⁶⁰⁷

In any event, no Western country followed NZ's lead. The NZ peace movement basked in the praise flowing into NZ from overseas liberals and radicals and it claimed that NZ had made new "friends". However, although the NZ ban may have encouraged other Western peace movements, especially in Norway and Denmark, no Western allied or friendly governments copied the NZ ship ban. This may have been attributable to the US's reprisals against NZ, or it may have been the case because most Western nations had a higher threat

⁶⁰³ Alan Robson, *New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Cold War*, Suva, 1986, p.4.

⁶⁰⁴ Graham, *National Security Concepts of States*, p. 59.

⁶⁰⁵ Jamieson, *Friend or Ally*, p. 25.

⁶⁰⁶ Graham, *National Security Concepts of States*, p. 122.

⁶⁰⁷ Clark Interview, October 12, 1998.

perception than NZers and therefore were less easily swayed by their respective peace movements.

Labour Damage Control

The ship ban not only upset the US; it also worried NZ's other traditional allies. Britain condemned the NZ action, and several high-ranking British visitors were dispatched to NZ after the ANZUS rift to express the displeasure of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government. Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse visited NZ in February 1986, and he noted that the Royal Navy would not visit where it was unwelcome. This was an obvious attempt to pull on the old heartstrings of the British Commonwealth. True to form, Lange appealed to NZ nationalism to override the warnings of an ally. In April 1987 British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe played into Lange's hands when he linked the ban to access for NZ's butter in Europe⁶⁰⁸ and when he openly backed National in the 1987 election.

However, despite Lange's dismissal of US and British reprimands, the Labour Government was well aware that it had to limit the damage to NZ's international relations that might have occurred due to the ship ban. The Government also felt it had to address the public's fondness for military security. If NZ had adopted the alternative defence strategies advocated by the peace movement, real damage might have occurred to NZ's trading interests, and the public might have turned against Labour. Because of such considerations, Labour tried to demonstrate, both to the West and the NZ public, that it intended to maintain both NZ's armed forces and some ability to support collective security.

In order to formulate its new defence policy, Labour decided, in a nod to participatory democracy, to allow public input to a defence review for the first time. Consultation had the added benefit of pointing up the most desirable option from a political perspective. The first step in this process was the release in

⁶⁰⁸ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, pp. 141-142.

December 1985 of the government Green Paper, The Defence Question, which mapped out key questions for policy. Based on the issues raised in the Green Paper, the public was invited to make submissions to a Defence Committee of Enquiry. The four person committee, chaired by career diplomat Frank Corner, was empowered to hear the public's submissions, to question interested organisations, to poll the public, and then to report to the government. Currently serving military personnel were not allowed to make contributions.

Over 4000 Submissions arrived between during the first four months of 1986. The Labour Party's submission, presented by Helen Clark, Margaret Wilson and Tony Timms, contained a number of arguments against ANZUS, but David Lange quickly distanced himself from these opinions.⁶⁰⁹ Of the other submissions, 1,076 were newspaper coupons, printed by the pro-ANZUS Plains Club, coupons which were clipped out and sent in by readers. This displeased some peace activists, who claimed that coupons were not proper, well-thought-out submissions. In any event most submissions favoured the non-nuclear defence of NZ,⁶¹⁰ the peace movement having taken a considerable interest in the consultation process. Most shades of peace movement opinion and argument were represented, ranging from a nuclear-free NZ in ANZUS to a non-aligned NZ or Civilian Based Defence. Few people supporting disarmament appeared to understand the intricacies of arms control negotiations,⁶¹¹ and even fewer addressed the link between the ship ban and these same negotiations.

Because of the peace movement's interest in the submission process, the impression given by those submissions varied significantly from that given by the public poll, especially regarding defence alternatives. The polling was conducted by the NRB, and questions addressed issues such as perceived threats, preferred relationships with other countries, attitudes toward ANZUS and other defence

⁶⁰⁹ "Lange And Party Differ Over ANZUS", *The Dominion*, April 29, 1986, p. 2.

⁶¹⁰ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, pp. 154-155.

⁶¹¹ Ibid., p. 155.

options, views on nuclear ships, and the role of the NZ armed forces in peacetime. Most respondents were worried about nuclear war, although they designated the most likely threats as poaching in NZ's EEZ and terrorism. Countries which were viewed as posing the greatest threat were the USSR, the US, and France respectively. Women, those aged under 55, Labour Party supporters, and more highly educated people were most likely to perceive the US as a threat⁶¹² while older people held a stronger empathy for NZ's traditional allies.

Other findings were instructive. Regarding the best way for NZ to help prevent nuclear war, 76% preferred some form of involvement in the Western Alliance, with only 20% wanting to leave all alliances that involved nuclear powers.⁶¹³ The latter option was most strongly supported by those under 35 years of age and Labour Party supporters. There was also 71% support for ANZUS compared to 13% opposed to ANZUS. Once again, the young and tertiary educated were the most strongly opposed.⁶¹⁴ As to preferred allies, Australia ranked first with 68%, followed by the US (52%), and Britain (35%). Of those polled, 92% also viewed Australia as "important or very important" to NZ's security.⁶¹⁵ An overseas peace-keeping role for the NZ armed forces was favoured by 82%.

On the issue of NZ's ship ban, 3% favoured a ban on nuclear power, 28% favoured a ban on nuclear weapons, 38% wanted a ban on both, and 27% opposed any ban. This made for a total of 66% against nuclear arms and 41% against nuclear power. The main reasons that were given for banning both

⁶¹² National Research Bureau, *Public Opinion Poll on Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*, 1986, p. 18.

⁶¹³ NRB, *Public Opinion Poll on Defence and Security*, p. 21.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

included accidents (mentioned by 24%), unnecessary danger (24%), targeting risk (15%), opposition to nuclear arms (11%), and support for disarmament (11%).⁶¹⁶

As for future defence options, the break-down of preferences was as follows: membership in ANZUS, with nuclear visitors, 24%; ANZUS, without nuclear visitors, 42%; no ANZUS, with conventional co-operation continuing with the US and Australia, 13%; armed or unarmed neutrality, 12%; allied only to Australia, 4%; allied to other countries, 2%. As a result it appeared that, while 72% of those polled supported collective security, 73% also supported being nuclear free.

When asked whether NZ should remain in ANZUS with nuclear visits, pursue a nuclear free ANZUS, or leave ANZUS, the results were 37%, 44% and 16% respectively; in other words, 81% of those polled supported ANZUS in some form. Respondents were then asked how they would vote if the second option was not available. The result was that 52% supported keeping ANZUS, even if it meant having nuclear ship visits, with 44% preferring to leave ANZUS.⁶¹⁷ The Committee believed that this question was necessary, given political realities. However, Lange was not happy with the results. To learn that a majority of the public would not support the ban if a nuclear-free ANZUS was not possible was an unpalatable truth. Lange was annoyed at the Committee's emphasis on the 52%/44% result, and he accused the Committee of committing a methodological error by including the second question.

The Committee also defined eight different levels of non-nuclear status. Level 1 forbade any nuclear weapons or nuclear power generators from being stationed in NZ; level 2 barred from NZ any joint facilities with a direct role in nuclear strategy; and level 3 banned the transit of nuclear vessels in NZ territory. Level 4 prohibited NZ's armed forces from training or exercising with the armed

⁶¹⁶ Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security*, p. 42.

⁶¹⁷ NRB, *Public Opinion Poll on Defence and Security*, p. 76a

forces of a nuclear state, and level 5 ruled out the presence on NZ soil of any facilities connected with the military operations of a nuclear state. Level 6 forbade alliances with a nuclear state, level 7 prohibited alliances with an ally of a nuclear state, and level 8 prevented any NZ military forces from ever assisting a nuclear state. The Committee stated that, under Labour, NZ had moved from position 2 to position 3, which expressed the sentiments of a majority of NZers.⁶¹⁸ However, the peace movement continued to push for options 4 through 8.

In its report, released in August 1986, the Committee advised Labour to keep the door open to the US, to maintain professional armed forces and to increase their independent capability. NZ should also support UN peace-keeping and increase military co-operation with Australia. Although Lange welcomed these suggestions, he was unhappy with the historical commentary, something that was included in the report by Frank Corner, which Lange claimed was inappropriate and biased in favour of NZ's traditional approach to collective security. Lange was also annoyed with the report's comment that future defence enquiries should precede, not follow, major policy changes.⁶¹⁹ In addition, he asked why the total number of submissions in favour of each view was not given.⁶²⁰ The Committee replied that it was pointless to add up individual pieces of paper, as some groups had encouraged their members to write something in the hope that this would give the appearance of numbers.

The peace movement had its own complaints about what was called the Corner Report. First, some peace activists were unhappy that the poll results were given more weight than the submissions. Second, they believed that their own opinions were better informed and that the public had not been given the opportunity to make judicious assessments of the various options.⁶²¹ Finally,

⁶¹⁸ Clements, *Back From the Brink*, pp. 161-162.

⁶¹⁹ Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security*, p. 2.

⁶²⁰ Ibid., pp. 78-79.

⁶²¹ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options*, p. 91.

some were also distraught that submissions from foreign peace activists had not been accepted.⁶²²

On the basis of the Committee's recommendations, the Labour Government proceeded to produce the 1987 Defence Review. The review appeared to serve a heavy political function, being designed to gloss over and justify NZ's new defence situation after the loss of US co-operation. Making a virtue out of necessity, Labour presented its review as the most fundamental change in defence policy since WWII. The key concepts for Labour's defence policy were "regional defence" and "self reliance". However, despite the latter aim, increased co-operation with Australia was touted as assuming greater importance since the ANZUS rift, and joint purchases were even suggested. NZ's capital equipment was given some attention; upgrades were planned for the airforce's Skyhawks and Orions, and the purchase of a new logistics ship and tanker for the navy was considered. Regarding NZ's ageing frigates, Labour acknowledged the need for replacements of a more economical design that would be armed only with basic self-defence capabilities. An emphasis on low-level operations in the South Pacific was announced; and although this had been forecast in previous reviews, Labour stated that, in a new departure, NZ's armed forces would be able to act independently rather than simply as a component of larger allied forces.

It was maintained that NZ was prepared to meet its ANZUS obligations conventionally, but that it could best help the Western Alliance by concentrating on the South Pacific.⁶²³ However, the option of UN collective security operations beyond the South Pacific was kept open. The review also argued that ANZUS had merely acted as a screen for NZ's failure to provide adequate military resources for its security role in the South Pacific. Labour pledged to maintain NZ's FPDA involvement, but it announced the future withdrawal of the NZ

⁶²² Ibid., p. 4.

⁶²³ *Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987*, Wellington, 1987, p. 19.

battalion in Singapore. The review simply dismissed the defence alternatives promoted by the peace movement.

The 1987 Defence Review had attempted to show that Labour still supported collective security. However, there were several problems. First, Labour's rhetoric about self reliance was hollow. The old force structure, which was designed for use with allies, remained the same, and dependence on Australia replaced dependence on the US, both for exercises and intelligence. In addition, as Labour was left with only Australia as a defence partner, this gave Australia considerable leverage over the NZ Government, especially regarding the joint purchase of new frigates. Frigates were Australia's asking price for military co-operation, and Lange had no choice but to pay it, despite opposition from within his own party. He had to have Australian military co-operation in order to reassure the NZ public that NZ still had allies. In effect, NZ had entered a half-way house. It still had armed forces designed for use with the armed forces of larger allies, but it had lost most of these allies. The peace movement was also concerned that the review had not altered NZ's force structure,⁶²⁴ and some peace activists had reservations about co-operating with Australia, due to its ongoing close association with the US.⁶²⁵

Australia had completed its own defence review shortly before the NZ effort, and its review had also advocated closer ANZAC defence co-operation and joint purchases. Throughout the ANZUS crisis Australia had attempted to manage the dispute, preserving its ties with both the US and NZ. Australia was unwilling to renegotiate a new bi-lateral treaty with the US, as some of the close co-operation present under ANZUS might be lost if certain aspects of the treaty became the focus of a political debate in the US and Australia. Instead, Australia persuaded the US not to scrap ANZUS, and it attempted to maintain two separate bi-lateral arrangements. As the US refused to exercise with NZ, Australia,

⁶²⁴ Kevin Hackwell, "What Happened to the Defence Review?", *Peacelink*, July 1988, pp. 10-11.

⁶²⁵ DASG, *Old Myths or New Options?*, p. 8.

at greater cost to itself, organised separate bi-lateral exercises with NZ. The Australian Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, announced this decision in April 1985. Australia also incurred greater costs in passing intelligence along to NZ, as any US-sourced material had to be screened out beforehand. Australia realised that the NZ public was still pro-Western, and it did not want NZ's armed forces to deteriorate to the point of collapse. In late 1986 Australia and NZ reached an understanding on a Closer Defence Relationship (CDR). To test the NZ Government's commitment to CDR, Beazley visited NZ in March 1987 and urged a joint venture in frigate purchases.

Whilst the defence review process was in motion, the NZ Government went about the task of setting its nuclear ship ban into law. Although Lange believed that this was unnecessary, the peace movement sought legislation to ensure the survival of the ban if National should return to power. Lange decided to comply, as legislation had been promised in Labour's 1984 platform. However, he moved slowly, for he still hoped to gain US blessing of the ban. In September 1985 Geoffrey Palmer was dispatched to the US with a draft of the nuclear-free bill, with the aim of obtaining US approval for the NZ "compromise" contained within it. Essentially, this compromise was similar to the formula discussed with the US in late 1984. Rather than ask the US to breach NCND by disclosing the status of its ships, the NZ Prime Minister would decide whether a conventionally-powered but nuclear weapons-capable ship was likely to be nuclear armed. The US refused to be drawn into such a discussion, as this formula had failed in 1985, and it also rejected a NZ suggestion that the US request a visit by an obviously non-nuclear-capable vessel.

The ship-ban bill had its first reading in Parliament on December 10, 1985. A Foreign Affairs Select Committee reported back on the bill in October 1986, and the bill passed its second reading in February 1987. The NZ Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act became law on June 4, 1987.⁶²⁶

⁶²⁶ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, pp. 145-147.

During the long process in which the bill became law, the US formally ceased its military obligations to NZ under ANZUS. The US warned NZ that legislation would lead to a termination of US defence obligations. In April 1986 Britain warned NZ that legislation would also prevent Royal Navy visits.

Lange offered a final compromise that same month, a compromise based on the formula drawn up by the government of the People's Republic of China for accepting visits by US and British warships. The US could make a public declaration that it respected NZ's policy, and NZ would not challenge NCND. Lange even offered to amend Section 9 of the legislation (explained below) if necessary.⁶²⁷ However, the US was unreceptive.

At the June 1986 meeting of ASEAN in Manila, Shultz told Lange that countries accepting ship visits under NCND could expect that some of them would be nuclear armed. This later allowed Lange to claim that National's trust formula (whereby NZ would not try to determine the nuclear status of ships), floated during the 1987 election, would lead to a nuclear presence. Shultz also argued that, even if NZ made its own judgement, the US military system would probably leak which ships had been rejected, thereby compromising NCND. As Labour had continued with its efforts to enact the ship ban into law, Shultz announced that the US would withdraw its security guarantee to NZ. The two nations were now friends rather than allies.

At the August 1986 ANZUS Council Meeting in San Francisco, attended only by the US and Australia, the US formally announced the withdrawal of its security guarantee to NZ. Both the US and Australia agreed that access to allied ships and aircraft was essential to ANZUS, and that NZ had degraded Article II of the ANZUS Treaty. Both appealed to NZ to end the ship ban. ANZUS did not have provision for expelling a member, but under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the US could suspend operation of part of

⁶²⁷ Richard Long, 'PM Hints at Nuclear Ship Row Solution, *The Dominion*, April 29, 1986, p. 1.

ANZUS on the grounds of a “material breach”. In other words, the US believed that the violation of a provision (Article II) that was essential to accomplishing the purpose of a treaty had occurred.⁶²⁸

The anti-nuclear legislation thus became law after NZ had been expelled from ANZUS, leaving the US with few options in the way of reprisals. Section 5(2)(b) of the legislation stated that no NZ citizen could “aid, abet, incite, counsel or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device”.⁶²⁹ Section 9 empowered the NZ Prime Minister to grant approval of a port visit by a (conventionally powered) warship if he/she was satisfied that the ship was not nuclear armed, after taking into consideration all relevant information, advice, and NZ’s security interests. Section 10 (3) provided an escape clause for Harewood operations: the Prime Minister could grant blanket clearance for a class of ship/aircraft, as Lange did for US Starlifter aircraft enroute to Australia. Section 11 prohibited the entry of nuclear-powered ships into NZ’s internal waters.

Interestingly, it has been suggested that, if the Act had been in force at that time, the Buchanan could have been accepted in February 1985. ⁶³⁰ The Dominion also noted that the legislation, based on a “trust me” formula (Lange himself judging a ship’s status), was weaker than the ban implemented in February 1985.⁶³¹ At that time the approach had been “trust no-one”. This could explain why the peace movement, and not just the US, was dissatisfied with the legislation. Section 9 still left room for the NZ Prime Minister to accept a nuclear capable ship, and it was feared that a future National Government might do so without attempting to be 100% certain of the ship’s status. In effect, according to the peace movement, NZ might revert to a form of trust formula. There was also

⁶²⁸ McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, p. 53.

⁶²⁹ Quoted in Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, p. 208.

⁶³⁰ Andrew Mack, *Denuclearisation in Australia and New Zealand: Issues and Prospects*, Canberra, 1988, p. 3.

⁶³¹ Editorial, “Non-Nuclear But Naked”, *The Dominion*, December 12, 1985, p. 10.

discomfort with Section 12, which allowed innocent passage through NZ's territorial seas. The peace movement wanted the Act to ban the transit of nuclear ships within NZ's 12 mile territorial waters. Although a 12 mile ban was contrary to international law, peace activists defended their position by pointing to Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allowed for "innocent passage" (an act that did not prejudice the peace, good order or security of the state). According to peace activists, nuclear ships were not innocent.⁶³²

The only US reaction to the NZ law was the NZ Military Preference Elimination Bill, sponsored by Congressman William S Broomfield. As NZ was now a friend, no longer an ally, US offers of defence equipment to NZ would require an elapse of 30 days, rather than 15, after notification of Congress.⁶³³ The 1982 US-NZ MOU on Logistical Support had expired in June 1987, and it was not renewed. One result of this US reaction was an end to the money-saving practice of including the RNZAF's order for spares and ammunition within the USAF's annual order.⁶³⁴

During the 1987 election Labour initially focused on the economy, but as its lead was reduced during the campaign, it turned to playing the anti-nuclear card. In the last weeks of the campaign, Lange stressed that a Labour win was necessary to keep NZ nuclear free, and Labour's campaign advertisements included images of nuclear explosions. Labour dismissed National's claim that NZ could have ANZUS and remain nuclear free under National's trust formula. During the campaign Lange admitted that he no longer believed that NZ could retain the ban and remain in ANZUS, as ANZUS was underpinned by nuclear deterrence. In order to keep liberals and radicals on Labour's side, Lange

⁶³² Bob Leonard, "The Nuclear-Free Bill: An Update", *Peacelink*, August 1985, p. 14.

⁶³³ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis*, p. 148.

⁶³⁴ Jamieson interview, September 26, 1998.

promised to export the ban if he was re-elected,⁶³⁵ and the peace movement urged New Zealanders to “vote nuclear free”. When Labour won the election, peace movements in other nations hailed the result. Lange admitted that the ban had produced a unifying effect, and that it “won Labour support among members of the public who found the government’s economic policies hard to swallow”⁶³⁶.

At the same time that the Labour Government had been attempting to reassure Australia and the NZ public, it was faced with criticism from the NZ peace movement, despite the ship ban and other gestures toward peace activists. One such gesture to the peace movement was the formation of the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC), created in December 1987 under Section 16 of the Nuclear-Free Act. PACDAC’s function was to advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on aspects of disarmament and arms control, to advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of the Act, and to facilitate the flow of information between the public and the Government. PACDAC was heralded, by some people, as an example of participatory democracy, on the grounds that it could be used to transmit peace movement concerns to the government.⁶³⁷ As was stated in Peacelink magazine, “There are some very good peace activists appointed to the committee, and the Black Birch issue has become an important test of whether PACDAC can serve as a useful conduit for peace movement concerns”⁶³⁸ (The peace movement continued to argue that star-mapping data gathered by the observatory at Black Birch could be used to increase the accuracy of US Trident missiles.)

Another PACDAC function was to prepare studies on peace education initiatives in NZ’s educational institutions. Labour was interested in peace

⁶³⁵ Landais-Stamp and Rogers, *Rocking the Boat*, p.153.

⁶³⁶ Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 179.

⁶³⁷ See Katie Boanas-Dewes, *Participatory Democracy in Peace and Security Decision Making: The Aotearoa/New Zealand Experience*, Canberra, 1993, p.2.

⁶³⁸ “Aiding, Abetting or Procuring: Does Black Birch Violate the Nuclear -Free Act?”, *Peacelink*, April 1989, pp. 8-9.

education, as it had the potential to reduce the gap between the ideology of Labour and that of the NZ public at large. By injecting liberal ideology into the curriculum, Labour was attempting to ensure that future generations of voters were receptive to its notion of an independent foreign policy.⁶³⁹ The Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (PADET) was set up under PACDAC to provide funding for peace groups and peace education initiatives, based on PACDAC's recommendations. A sum of \$1.5 million dollars from the French compensatory pay-out for the Rainbow Warrior bombing was made available to such groups as Peace Movement Aotearoa, the NZFPS, CND, Just Defence, and the NZ Council for World Peace.⁶⁴⁰

PACDAC also supported a case before the World Court on the legality of nuclear weapons and questioned the legality under the Nuclear Free Act of Black Birch, the FPDA, NZ's continued involvement in UKUSA, and the US's continued use of Harewood. PACDAC challenged NZ's decisions to buy new frigates and to participate in the Gulf War, and it also criticised NZ's voting record on disarmament issues at the UN.⁶⁴¹ On most of these issues, PACDAC was simply ignored by the Labour Government. Those who claimed PACDAC was an example of participatory democracy must have been disappointed. However, in another Labour Government concession to the peace movement, peace activists were included in disarmament delegations to the UN.⁶⁴²

Lange professed to be annoyed with the peace movement's shift in aims. Once the ban was in place, radicals had sought new targets. To rise in the peace movement of the 1980s, claimed Lange, it was not enough to be anti-nuclear; one

⁶³⁹ An example of such efforts can be seen in the Department of Education document *Peace Studies: Draft Guidelines: A Discussion Document*, Wellington, 1986. For an explanation of the aims of peace education, see John Buckland, Audrey Jones and Yvonne Duncan (Eds.), *Peace Education: The Aotearoa/New Zealand Way*, Hamilton, 1990. For ideas on suggested activities and lessons, see STEP, *Peace Education the Aotearoa/New Zealand Way: Activities and Ideas. Resources for Teaching Book 3: Secondary Schools*, 1990.

⁶⁴⁰ Bacon, *ANZUS, Yes or No?*, pp. 52-53.

⁶⁴¹ Ministry of External Relations and Trade, *Disarmament and Arms Control*, Wellington, 1989, pp. 22-23.

⁶⁴² Clements, "The Influence of Individuals and Non Governmental Organisations", pp. 130-131.

also had to be pro-gay, pro-Maori and pro-environment as well.⁶⁴³ Radical ideology became more prevalent in the peace movement as nuclear concerns waned in the late 1980s.⁶⁴⁴ The Labour Government clashed with the peace movement over Tangimoana, defence policy, Harewood, Black Birch, the anti-nuclear legislation, CDR with Australia, and the decision to build the Waihopai base, which was capable of eavesdropping on the satellite communications of other countries. The peace movement conducted small demonstrations on the site of the base because it believed that the GCSB was still involved in UKUSA and that other countries would have access to the information gathered at Waihopai. It also believed that it was immoral to spy on anyone.⁶⁴⁵ In general, the peace movement was unhappy with the lack of progress in closing bases that could be of assistance to the US.⁶⁴⁶

Delegates at Labour Party conferences also sought further changes in NZ's foreign policy. Positive armed neutrality was endorsed by the Labour Party conferences of 1985 and 1986, and remits forwarded in 1988 called for ending NZ's MAP programs, for forming closer links with Nicaragua and Cuba, for condemnation of Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories, and for imposing a ban on any military relationships outside the South Pacific. There were also calls made for withdrawal from UKUSA, Radford Collins, and the FPDA.⁶⁴⁷

One of the main battlegrounds between radicals and the Labour Government was the latter's decision to action joint frigate purchases with Australia. The idea of ANZAC ships had emerged in 1986, and a NZ-Australian MOU of March 1987 formally established the concept. Australia wanted to maintain its own ship-building facility, and a NZ order would help to keep such a facility economically viable until repairs to the Australian fleet took up the

⁶⁴³ Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, p. 150.

⁶⁴⁴ Wilkes interview, August 10, 1998.

⁶⁴⁵ Anon, "Big Brother Will Be Listening From the Waihopai Valley", *Peacelink*, April 1988, pp. 6-8.

⁶⁴⁶ Maire Leadbeater, "Life After ANZUS", in *Broadsheet*, January/February 1986, p. 6.

⁶⁴⁷ *New Zealand Labour Party 1988 Annual Conference: Remit book*, 1988, pp. 35-38.

slack.⁶⁴⁸ Some peace activists speculated that Labour had to accept the ships in order to preserve Australian military co-operation. If this was lost, the NZ public's penchant for collective security might create widespread support to renew ANZUS, together with nuclear ship visits. Some argued that Labour needed both its nuclear-free stance and Australian defence co-operation to win the 1990 election.⁶⁴⁹ Whatever the reason, the Labour Government decided to proceed with the frigate purchase in 1989, despite peace movement and Labour Party objections.

Although many in the peace movement were opposed to militarism and military alliances, and were concerned that the frigates would bolster a force structure that was tailored to allied needs, it was felt that this argument would not suffice to win over the public. Instead, they focused primarily on cost. However, the peace movement's other objections to the frigates were well expressed by Nicky Hager. He argued that buying the frigates would help to perpetuate NZ's role as a junior alliance partner, and open the door to a possible return to ANZUS.⁶⁵⁰ According to Hager, the proposed frigates were too high-tech for fisheries protection; instead, they were designed for high-intensity warfare as part of the Western Alliance. He further argued that their ASW role was suited to protecting allied convoys and hence was irrelevant to the South Pacific.⁶⁵¹ He also maintained that the RNZN had hoodwinked the Government, stretching the definition of "basic self-defence capabilities" that was mentioned in the 1987 Defence Review in order to retain a NZ navy which was suited to US operations.⁶⁵² Hager believed that NZ did not need ships with anti-air missile defences, anti-ship missiles, and complex radar detection or radar jamming

⁶⁴⁸ Jamieson interview, September 26, 1998.

⁶⁴⁹ Llyn Richards, "Agonising Appraisal", *Peacelink*, November 1989, p. 10.

⁶⁵⁰ Nicky Hager, *The Case Against the Frigates: A Back-grounder on the Proposal to Buy ANZAC Frigates*, Wellington, 1988, p. 1.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid., p. 2.

⁶⁵² Ibid., p.4.

equipment;⁶⁵³ his alternative was to have NZ buy cheaper, low-tech ships solely to protect fisheries and to support relief efforts.

While lower-tech ships have their place performing peacetime functions, they are not capable of dealing with wartime scenarios. On the other hand, frigates can deal with a number of low-level and high-level contingencies, and this is crucial because flexibility is important for NZ's forces, given the limited resources available to them. ASW capabilities are important for the protection of NZ's SLOCs, especially with the increasing number of small, conventionally powered submarines in the Asia-Pacific area. A submarine does not need to fire a torpedo to disrupt trade; the mere knowledge of its presence is often enough to cause significant problems.⁶⁵⁴ Hager's objection to ships capable of collective security operations is hard to fathom. He claims that he wants NZ's defence policy to be based on NZ's own needs, and not on the needs of Washington or Canberra,⁶⁵⁵ but nationalism is a convenient cover for left-wingers who are attempting to extract their countries from defence co-operation with the US.

Even though the frigate purchase was a political necessity for the Labour government, there was considerable Labour Party opposition to it. For one, Sonja Davies argued that the frigate mentality was a relic of male, colonial thinking. NZ, she contended, should not maintain forces capable of imposing NZ's idea of security on Polynesians, of intervening in their political affairs, or for fighting battles on their territory.⁶⁵⁶ In September 1989 the Labour Party Policy Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security acknowledged that the ship ban had been merely a first step away from collective security with the US; in particular, it complained that the frigates gave NZ a capability to work alongside Australia, a

⁶⁵³ Ibid., p. 5. See also Kevin Hackwell, "The Case For Corvettes", in *The New Zealand International Review*, March-April 1989, where he argues for cheaper naval options.

⁶⁵⁴ See Denis McLean and Desmond Ball, *The ANZAC Ships*, Canberra, 1989.

⁶⁵⁵ Hager, telephone conversation, October 22, 1998.

⁶⁵⁶ Sonja Davies, "The ANZAC Ships: A Misguided Choice", *The New Zealand International Review*, March-April 1989, pp. 16-18.

development which could lead NZ back into ANZUS.⁶⁵⁷ Labour Party conferences voted against the frigates, but they were ignored by the Labour caucus.

During the same year that the frigate decision was made, Lange's tenure as Prime Minister came to an end. In 1989 he called for NZ's withdrawal from ANZUS, as NZ's membership was inconsistent with its disarmament efforts. Lange believed that NZ would have a more honest relationship with the US if it made a firm decision to withdraw from ANZUS, but the Labour cabinet was hesitant. Lange decided to float the idea in a speech at Yale in April 1989, where he called ANZUS a "dead letter". He also claimed that NZ was ahead of its time and that it had been proved correct; other countries were now pursuing disarmament.⁶⁵⁸ However, the news of his speech broke in NZ on ANZAC Day, and it was reported as if he had announced NZ's departure from ANZUS rather than just suggesting it. The public's continued fondness for collective security resulted in a backlash against Labour. This gave Lange's New Right political opponents in Labour the excuse to move against him on the grounds that he had acted without cabinet approval. Lange resigned in August 1989.⁶⁵⁹ Ironically, Lange had fallen when he tried to carry the ship ban to its logical conclusion, namely, NZ's withdrawal from ANZUS. Despite the warnings contained in the Corner Report, he had miscalculated public sentiment.

National Tries To Mend the Rift

The National Party decisively won the 1990 election, having embraced the nuclear ships ban and in the process having eliminated Labour's last trump card. The decision to emulate Labour may also have been affected by a thaw in the US diplomatic freeze against NZ. There had been no high level meetings between US and NZ Government officials since Manila in 1986, but in March 1990 US

⁶⁵⁷ Jamieson, *Friend or Ally*, pp. 27-28.

⁶⁵⁸ David Lange's Speech at Yale, *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, 1989 #3, pp. 42-43.

⁶⁵⁹ Lange, *Nuclear Free- The New Zealand Way*, pp. 201-207.

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Secretary of State James Baker met with Labour's Minister of External Relations, Mike Moore. With this Labour breakthrough, National had less reason to continue its opposition to the ban, for it could no longer argue that the ban was hurting NZ diplomatically. Indeed, Bolger was angry at Baker for undercutting National's argument. Baker had also acted without consulting State Department officials and the Pentagon. It appears that he acted for his own reasons, to counter accusations that he was harder on NZ than he was on Communist China.⁶⁶⁰

Owen Wilkes was also confident that National would not dare to repeal the nuclear free legislation. "We can confidently promise them protests that would combine the best (and maybe the worst!) of the 1989 anti-frigate, the 1983 anti-ship and the 1981 anti-Springbok actions".⁶⁶¹ However, National did take some action. It appointed a new PACDAC, much to the peace movement's dismay. Owen Wilkes claimed that the six new appointees all had right-wing or pro-US links. Nonetheless, he admitted that the peace movement's complaints might be inappropriate, since Labour's PACDAC had been heavily biased in the opposite direction.⁶⁶²

Although it did not directly challenge the ship ban, National worked to improve defence relations with the US. The National Government sent two Hercules aircraft and a medical team to aid the US-led coalition in the Gulf War, and it dispatched a company of infantry to Bosnia to help stop the civil war there. The former effort resulted in Bolger's meeting US President George Bush in February 1991, and later in an August 1991 visit to NZ by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Solomon, the highest ranking US State Department official to visit since George Shultz in 1984. Also in February 1991, Prime Minister Jim Bolger hinted that the Harewood escape clause (Section 10)

⁶⁶⁰ Jamieson interview, September 26, 1998.

⁶⁶¹ Owen Wilkes "Election Coverage", *Peacelink*, November 1990, p. 30.

⁶⁶² Owen Wilkes, "Will PACDAC Push For Real Disarmament?", *Peacelink*, August 1991, p. 21.

could lead to renewed US visits under Prime Ministerial blanket clearance. The suggestion, which could have enabled US warships to visit legally under the Nuclear-Free Act, without breaching NCND for individual vessels, worried peace activists,⁶⁶³ but the US insisted on the removal from the Act of the ban on nuclear power (Section 11).

National endeavoured to address the issue of nuclear power, and it was aided in this effort by the September 1991 announcement by US President George Bush that tactical nuclear weapons were being removed from the USN's surface fleet and attack submarines. The removal was completed and announced to the world in July 1992. Only the nuclear power issue now prevented USN visits to NZ. National appointed a Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion in December 1991, and it reported in 1992. The Special Committee's report used risk analysis to determine the safety of nuclear powered ships, safety being defined as a situation "when the likelihood of harm is so remote that it can occasion no rational apprehension."⁶⁶⁴ As most data on USN naval reactors was classified, the Special Committee examined the safety record of the USN and its quality assurance regimes, and it created a model reactor for determining the nature of accidents of various magnitudes. The Committee calculated a theoretical probability rate for various scales of reactor accident, and it used a Frequency Consequences Curve to illustrate that the most dangerous accidents had the least probability of occurring. The risk of a serious accident, meaning one with a significant radiation release, was calculated at one in a million per year; given these odds, the Committee considered that nuclear-powered ships were safe.

The report noted that all naval reactors were of the pressurised water type, which were self-regulating. Power output affected the water density, thereby regulating the reactivity level of the reactor, and this removed the need for control rods, thus making a Chernobyl-type accident impossible. Naval vessels also had

⁶⁶³ Owen Wilkes, "Nuclear Navy Visits in October?", *Peacelink*, April 1991, pp. 3-5.

⁶⁶⁴ Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships: Report of the Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion*, Wellington, 1992, p. i.

the advantage of rigorous safety procedures and a trained crew; moreover, they were designed for combat stresses. In addition, naval reactors did not run at a high capacity while in port. The Committee found that the USN safety record was impressive. There had never been a naval reactor accident involving an uncontained or significant release of radiation, and no damage from USN nuclear-powered visits around the globe had ever been documented. The two most serious accidents involving US nuclear vessels, the losses of the submarines *Thresher* and *Scorpius*, had not been caused by reactor accidents. Greenpeace statistics on accidents involving USN nuclear ships, the report claimed, had been padded by minor incidents of fire, collision, and equipment failures of the type that occurred with all ships; yet Greenpeace referred to them as "major accidents".

The Special Committee concluded that the leakage of radioactive coolant (excluding tritium) from USN operations outside the 12 mile limit was only about .4 Curie per year, or less than the natural radioactivity of 90 cubic meters of sea water.⁶⁶⁵ In fact, as the Committee noted, Auckland Hospital released more radioactivity into local waters each day than did the entire USN nuclear fleet around the globe annually.⁶⁶⁶

Regarding a possible accident in a NZ port, an accidental release with a probability of 1 in 10,000 years was used as a model.* Such an accident, occurring at the outer limits of probability for which the Committee considered it worth planning, posed minimal health hazards; it involved a contained release of radioactivity into the reactor's coolant, some of which then leaked into the ocean. The Committee believed that an update of NZ's AEC 500 safety regulations, addressing berthing, towing, and monitoring procedures, would be sufficient precaution for nuclear visits.

⁶⁶⁵ Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships*, p. 56.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 69.

* It was only one in 10,000 assuming that a USN vessel sat in port running its reactor for a whole year.

The report also stated that submissions to the Committee from the public and peace movement had revealed many misconceptions about nuclear power. For example, it cited the notion that a nuclear reactor could create a nuclear explosion of the type released by nuclear weapons. The Committee stated, ‘‘We now believe the public has been misinformed to a considerable extent, particularly by single-interest groups’’.⁶⁶⁷ For example, many peace movement submissions on the safety of nuclear power relied heavily on the work of ‘‘fringe’’ scientists which had been disseminated until it had become established myth. In addition, some peace activists were annoyed when the Committee asked for scientific proof for their statements, as these individuals expected the Committee to accept them at face value. The Committee learnt that anyone who disagreed with peace movement myths was considered biased,⁶⁶⁸ as was any information from US or NZ governmental sources which disagreed with the peace movement. Some activists refused to make submissions to the Committee because they believed there was no need to review the matter, and that it was a US initiative which did not deserve the participation of anti-nuclear experts.⁶⁶⁹

To counter the Special Committee set up by National, Peace Movement Aotearoa formed an Alternative Committee on Nuclear Ship Visits, which produced a critique of the Special Committee’s report. The critique involved quibbles over research methods and graph methodology, as well as accusations of political bias in the Special Committee.⁶⁷⁰ One contributor argued that the Committee had been wrong to use theory (in the absence of any actual accidents to study) to determine risk.⁶⁷¹ It was also argued that, if the peace movement’s

⁶⁶⁷ Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships*, p. 12.

⁶⁶⁸ Poletti, ‘‘The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships’’, in *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships: Critiques and Analyses of the 1992 Report*, Auckland, 1993, pp. 5-11.

⁶⁶⁹ Robert Mann, ‘‘An Old Anti-Nuke’s Perspective on the Polittee’’, in *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships: Critiques and Analysis of the 1992 Report*, p. 1.

⁶⁷⁰ Peter Wills, ‘‘The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships; Criticisms of the Report of the Special Committee’’, in *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships: Critiques and Analyses of the 1992 Report*, p. 1.

⁶⁷¹ R. E. White, ‘‘The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships Report- A Critique’’, in *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships: Critiques and Analyses of the 1992 Report*, p. 1.

arguments were “myths”, why were such beliefs to be found in Australia as well?⁶⁷²

A major peace movement complaint was that the Committee had not weighed the risks of nuclear visits against their benefits. In other words, the Committee had not addressed the issue of values (or ideology); its focus on safety was too narrow. The peace movement suggested that polls were a better means for the Committee to address the issue, as any decision on nuclear ships was a social one.⁶⁷³ In effect, peace activists could not perceive any benefits from US nuclear warship visits; therefore, they argued that, due to their anti-nuclear values, many in the NZ public did not want any nuclear ship visits, however small the risk. There were also other reasons not to be associated with US warships. As one activist wrote, “In the final analysis, I do not ever want my safety to depend on the actions of an institution whose priorities and values are as warped as those of the United States military.”⁶⁷⁴

It is understandable that the peace movement would have preferred the Committee to engage in political debate, as the peace movement could not win the scientific argument. Owen Wilkes admitted as much. He maintained that safety was not the primary issue and that the peace movement could not win by arguing on these grounds. Naval nuclear propulsion had proven to be safe in the past, and it was likely to be so in the future. Wilkes wanted the peace movement to redirect its efforts.⁶⁷⁵ In 1990 he warned, “If we want to keep foreign warships out of our ports regardless of whether or not they carry nukes, then we need to start preparing our arguments now.”⁶⁷⁶ In 1991 he urged that the peace

⁶⁷² Ibid., p. 35.

⁶⁷³ Charles Crothers, “Some Sociological Comments on the ‘Safety of Nuclear Ships’ Committee Report”, in *The Safety of Nuclear Ships: Critiques and Analyses of the 1992 Report*, p. 4.

⁶⁷⁴ Wills, “The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships”, in *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships: Critiques and Analyses of the 1992 Report*, p. 7.

⁶⁷⁵ Owen Wilkes, “Who Won? The Special Committee or the Anti-Nuclear Movement?”, in *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships: Critiques and Analyses of the 1992 Report*, p. 10.

⁶⁷⁶ Owen Wilkes, “Nuclear Ships, Gulf Wars and the Election”, *Peacelink*, October 1990, p. 3.

movement present its real values: “We are opposed to all that foreign warships stand for- a submissive ANZUS relationship, great-power bullying of smaller nations, ‘gunboat diplomacy’, [and] NZ participation in US aggression against the rest of the world...”⁶⁷⁷ Bush’s pledge to remove nuclear weapons from US surface warships had worried the peace movement, as there was now no real impediment to NZ’s re-entering ANZUS if the US allowed it.⁶⁷⁸ However, nothing happened. Aided by media disinterest, the report of the Special Committee disappeared into obscurity.

National also faced problems in dealing with the state of NZ’s armed forces. Despite the efforts of Australia and ad-hoc equipment upgrades, NZ’s armed forces continued to degrade. Despite Labour’s commitment to self-reliance, the NZ military’s capital equipment continued to be a working museum in many areas. The loss of access to large, high-tech exercises with US forces was not entirely made up by FPDA exercises. Australia was also unable to let NZers train on certain equipment. Logistics were not severely affected, and NZ could still purchase weapons, spares and ammunition from the US,⁶⁷⁹ but there was no longer the guarantee of US re-supply of NZ in wartime. NZ was also incapable of carrying out the South Pacific focus touted by the 1987 Defence Review, for it did not possess the necessary surveillance resources.⁶⁸⁰

National attempted to address the situation of the armed forces with its 1991 Defence White Paper. However, like its 1987 Labour predecessor, National’s defence plan contained more political statements of purpose than concrete planning. It noted that the ship ban had made full military co-operation with NZ’s closest friends unattainable, but it added that National would try to

⁶⁷⁷ Owen Wilkes, “US Warships in New Zealand”, *Peacelink*, November 1991, p. 5.

⁶⁷⁸ “The Bush Pledge”, *Peacelink*, October 1991, pp. 29-30.

⁶⁷⁹ Steve Hoadley, “New Zealand’s National Interests, Defence capabilities and ANZUS”, in Bercovitch, *ANZUS in Crisis*, p. 204.

⁶⁸⁰ Peter Jennings, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences*, Canberra, 1988, p. 38.

improve relations. NZ also needed to consider its broad overseas interests, which included shared values and international stability for trade, in the course of its defence planning. It stated that Labour's Regional Defence approach had not addressed such interests. Although there was no direct major threat to NZ, threats to its interests were likely to arise outside the South Pacific, and National thus sought a "Minimum Credible" defence force, which was inter-operable with allied forces, to assure NZ's friends that it took its obligations seriously. NZ would contribute forces to collective endeavours where NZ's interests were involved,⁶⁸¹ and it would support UN peace-making as well as peace-keeping.* As a result, NZ needed military units which could fulfil a self-defence role and have the ability to work with allies. This was called "Self Reliance in Partnership".

Despite these noble sentiments, however, National allowed defence spending to drop 33% in real terms between 1990 and 1996.⁶⁸² NZ's contribution to Bosnia was under-equipped, and it may have proved a liability to the British unit to which it was attached in the event that fighting had broken out. In 1997 a Defence Assessment Report noted that Minimum Credible forces would require at least 3 frigates, a 2 battalion army, 18 strike aircraft and urgent equipment upgrades and replacements. National has barely managed to fulfil these minimal requirements, and it remains to be seen whether the rhetoric of the 1991 Defence White Paper will be translated into actual defence force improvements.

⁶⁸¹ *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*, Wellington, 1991, p. 9.

* Peace-making, as opposed to peace-keeping, is more likely to involve the use of force.

⁶⁸² Simon Kilroy, "Maintaining a Credible Defence", *Dominion*, December 10, 1996, p. 11.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND IDEOLOGY.

There is more serious debate going on about New Zealand's security in Washington and Canberra than in Wellington.

Mike Moore⁶⁸³

By 1985 a number of events, trends and influences had combined to influence the course of the ANZUS dispute. Although NZ had actively sought a security guarantee from the US in 1951, NZ's threat perception had changed over time. The (perceived) primary threat shifted from Japan, to communism, to nuclear war. As pointed out in Chapter One, countries tend to join alliances in order to balance against threats, and by the 1980s there were growing doubts about ANZUS's ability to help diminish the nuclear threat. Meanwhile, NZ's security focus contracted from the Middle East, through South East Asia, towards the South Pacific. NZ's geographical isolation also contributed to a low sense of conventional military threat. When communism appeared to be less of a threat to NZ than nuclear weapons and nuclear war, this held implications for ANZUS. To a certain extent, low conventional threat perceptions meant that being nuclear-free was seen as a privilege that NZers could afford to indulge.⁶⁸⁴ However, the above factors alone do not explain the nuclear ship ban.

Another significant factor in the ANZUS dispute was the development of a new ideology during NZ's involvement in the Vietnam War. A New Left, with a post-materialist and pro-Third World agenda, was embraced by a generation of

⁶⁸³ Mike Moore, "Seeking Security Through Inter-Dependence", *New Zealand International Review*, January/February 1998, p. 19.

⁶⁸⁴ Bassett, telephone interview, April 19, 1999.

NZ radicals and liberals. This ideology played a significant role within the NZ peace movement, within its constituent anti-nuclear movement, and within the NZ Labour Party, and it was to have a direct impact on ANZUS. The fact that a New Left ideology was driving much of the peace movement was concealed by claims that “moral” concerns, or a desire for an “independent” NZ foreign policy, lay behind the actions of peace activists. Both terms could be used as a code for political motivations. For example, NZ support for Third World Communist regimes appeared to be viewed by some peace activists as an example of an independent and moral foreign policy.

The peace movement and its ideology capitalised on changing public threat perceptions, but it also encouraged such changes. Although the Reagan defence build-up and the collapse of arms control talks at Geneva had contributed to an increased fear of nuclear war in the early 1980s, this fear had also been stimulated by the educational efforts of the peace movement. It was also the peace movement that suggested a remedy to the public’s fears: a unilateral act of disarmament via a nuclear ship ban. External factors merely provided potential converts to the peace movement’s reasoning, and the latter proceeded to increase, then direct, the fears of the wider public. The peace movement, and the anti-nuclear movement within it, played down the need for collective security, taking advantage of NZ’s geographical isolation whilst emphasising the threat of nuclear war.

Ideology also played a role within the Labour Party, and this was to lead to a dilemma for the Fourth Labour Government. Although the Labour Party wanted a nuclear-free NZ, and it was prepared to sacrifice ANZUS to get it, the NZ public was still fond of ANZUS. Many NZers may have agreed with the peace movement that nuclear war was a threat, but they did not completely swallow the peace movement’s argument that US policy increased the threat, and that NZ should leave ANZUS.⁶⁸⁵ The Labour Government thus had to attempt

⁶⁸⁵ Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword*, pp. 352-355.

to implement a nuclear ship ban, and to satisfy the Labour Party, without destroying ANZUS and alienating the public. Part of this strategy involved reassuring the NZ public that it was possible to be nuclear free and to stay in ANZUS. Taking this line also helped to foster the illusion that anti-US sentiments within the Labour Party had nothing to do with the ban. Within most of the Western Alliance, support for collective security prevailed over the fear of nuclear war throughout the duration of the Cold War. However, as a result of the Labour Government's assurances, and the lack of an immediate conventional military threat, the NZ public came to believe that pursuing a higher level of nuclear freedom than NZ already possessed, and limiting access by nuclear powered or nuclear weapons-capable warships of a military ally, was still compatible with collective security.

Although changing threat perceptions and a shift in ideology represented two long term trends that militated against ANZUS, another factor was nationalism. Peace activists had long argued that ANZUS had reduced NZ's ability to pursue an "independent" foreign policy, but nationalism's strongest effect on the ANZUS dispute occurred immediately after the 1984 election. When the US voiced its concerns about the prospect of a ship ban, it had the result of rallying the NZ public behind its government. Nationalism also continues to block reconsideration of the nuclear ship ban, as being nuclear-free has entered the NZ popular imagination as a mark of NZ's independence as a nation.

A final factor also entered at the last minute. Despite all the influences and trends mentioned above, in January 1985 the Labour Government was still on the verge of adopting a trust formula for the NZ ship ban, a formula which could have preserved NZ's involvement in ANZUS. The efforts of the peace movement and its allies within the Labour Party ensured that no compromise occurred, and that the Labour Government rejected the *Buchanan*. In the final

analysis it was the determination of committed activists and ideologues that ensured a strict nuclear ship ban and an end to NZ's involvement in ANZUS.

The above interpretation of events is, of course, open to dispute, and there are still areas which require further study. For example, it is hard to quantify how an ideology travels between countries, or to what extent an ideology may be influencing an individual's actions. We can try to base our judgements on what people write, or say, but this may not necessarily represent exactly what those people really *think*; only the individual will ever know this. Sometimes people have a political incentive to not reveal the truth. In addition, although Chapter Two referred to changes within the US peace movement, and suggested that the NZ peace movement echoed such changes, further studies of the evolution of the NZ peace movement are required. To date, any in-depth studies of the NZ peace movement have been conducted either by peace activists, or by those sympathetic to the peace movement. As it is, whatever the complex combination of influences, ideological or otherwise, that lay behind the decision to refuse the *Buchanan*, the ban became a fact, and this had a number of concrete consequences for NZ's security policy.

As a result of the ban, NZ alienated its traditional allies. Due to the NZ public's fondness for collective security, NZ then found itself more militarily dependent than ever, this time on Australia. The ship ban did not further nuclear disarmament, nor would it have enabled NZ to escape the effects of a global nuclear war. Although the ban had the potential to cause a wave of similar moves in other Western nations, as intended by the peace movement, it was not copied. It served no purpose other than to make New Zealanders feel safer from the threat of nuclear weapons.

Traditionally NZ has identified with Western values, and it has been prepared to defend them in collective efforts. It has been argued that NZ did not shift from its traditional approach in many respects, as it is still pro-Western, and

still supports collective security.⁶⁸⁶ However, although mainstream NZ may still support collective security, the concerted effort of radicals to inject a new world-view into NZ foreign policy was sufficient to cripple military co-operation with US, and a radical world-view continues to restrict NZ's efforts at military collective security. Due to the influence of radical ideology, NZ finds itself in a security limbo: it is a Western nation with Western friends, and it has armed forces still structured for collective security with the West, yet it is often unwilling or unable to co-operate with the West. NZ should have quality armed forces, but it must also be prepared to use them when necessary, even if this entails co-operation with US military forces.

With the passing of the Cold War, there is little reason, other than nationalism, for NZ to maintain the nuclear ship ban. The only real benefit might have been the increased sales of NZ products to overseas liberals and radicals, a rather Capitalist benefit for a supposedly "moral" policy. In a 1985 article, Dr Walt Glazer stated that NZ's ship ban appealed to anti-nuclear Americans, resulting in a potential "substantial market of anti-nuclear activists and people committed to healthy, natural products. These people are, as a group, relatively affluent, well educated and interested in new products and tourism. Many of them make their purchase and travel decisions...as a statement of their personal beliefs."⁶⁸⁷

However, members of the peace movement still cling to the belief that NZ did the right thing, and that its ban helped arms control efforts, and David Lange appears to agree with them. In 1996 he criticised Australia's proclamation of an increased commitment to nuclear disarmament. He accused Australia of being hypocritical, as it had opposed NZ's anti-nuclear stance. Lange believed that NZ had been ahead of its time in the 1980s when Australia was still supporting the US nuclear deterrent. However, NZ's pursuit of nuclear disarmament while the Cold

⁶⁸⁶ Hoadley, "New Zealand's Regional Security Policies", p. 45.

⁶⁸⁷ Walt Glazer, *Nuclear free Identity may Carry a Special Cachet*, New Zealand Herald, March 8, 1985, p.6.

War was still in progress and Australia's pursuit of nuclear disarmament after the conclusion of the Cold War are as dissimilar as disarming during a war and demobilising after a war. In reality Lange's claim reflected peace activists' claims that post-Cold War disarmament efforts vindicated their pro-disarmament stance during the Cold War.⁶⁸⁸

Now that the threat of nuclear war has diminished, the steps taken by NZ to combat the threat of nuclear war, effective or not, have since hampered NZ's efforts to counter the new threats facing the world's democracies. The nuclear ship ban ended up hurting NZ's ability to participate in collective security efforts with the US and the West. Some peace activists claim that collective security is irrelevant now that the Cold War is over.⁶⁸⁹ However, military coalitions are more likely to be necessary for dealing with issues of ethno-nationalism, religion, and natural resources, now that the dampening effect of the bi-polar struggle is absent. Unilateral Western disarmament is still not feasible, and the pursuit of peace will be a gradual process, linked to the spread of democracy, tolerance, and prosperity.

If international law is to prevail in today's fractured and contentious world, force will have to be applied on occasion, and the use of force will probably involve collective efforts led by the US. If NZ seeks to play a part in these efforts, instead of letting other nations fight while NZ reaps the economic rewards of any resulting global stability, it must be prepared to fight alongside, or act in support of, the US when it is in NZ's interests to do so. The National Government has demonstrated the will to contribute, if not the will to adequately fund the forces, but it has been consistently opposed by the opposition parties.⁶⁹⁰ Some movement in relations with the US has occurred. In February 1994 the US announced the renewal of senior level contacts with NZ regarding political, strategic, and security

⁶⁸⁸ Owen Wilkes, "ANZUS, Arsenals and Activism", *New Zealand Defence Quarterly*, Autumn 1995, p. 16.

⁶⁸⁹ Robert White, "Alliance Era Over", *New Zealand Defence Quarterly*, Winter 1995, p. 25.

For example, in 1996 the frigate *Wellington* was sent to the Gulf to help police the blockade of Iraq. This was the first time that the NZ military had operated alongside the USN since the ANZUS dispute. National also dispatched an SAS unit and two Orion aircraft to the Gulf during the February 1998 show-down with Iraq, an action which both Labour and the Alliance party opposed.

matters, and the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, visited NZ in August 1998.

Partaking in collective efforts under US leadership also requires that NZ's armed forces be provided with the best equipment available, and that they be inter-operable with the forces of the US and its allies. This may not require the formal reactivation of ANZUS, but it does require the resumption of exercises with US forces. NZ needs only to seek a renewed ANZUS if it wants to regain the consultation benefits of the ANZUS Council,⁶⁹⁰ but such a move appears unlikely. Labour is still unwilling to entertain the idea of renewing NZ's ANZUS membership. Helen Clark, although she concedes the need for some form of collective security such as the FPDA, views ANZUS as an obsolete Cold War alliance. She also sees no need for NZ to re-join a "white" alliance for the purpose of exercising for a war against an undefined Asian threat.⁶⁹¹

However, NZ must have influence with the major players on the world stage, and for that it needs a credible military. Quality specialist forces which are capable of performing South Pacific duties and capable of co-operating with allied efforts in a supporting role are required. If NZ works collectively to help maintain global stability, it will need much more than self-defence forces. The woes of NZ's armed forces are largely due to funding deficiencies, and defence spending cuts were not a direct result of the ship ban. Unfortunately, the same attitude lying behind the ship ban also serves to prevent increased defence spending and a firm commitment to collective security. Money alone is not enough to solve the dilemma which dominates NZ's current security policy. If NZ is to help maintain international law and order, it must abandon the anti-US ideology which still simmers on the Left of NZ politics.

⁶⁹⁰ Jamieson interview, September 26, 1998.

⁶⁹¹ Clark interview, October 12, 1998.

Radicals tend to believe that it is wrong to use military force to defend Western interests and values, as they are not worth defending. During the Gulf War the NZ peace movement did not see the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, or the West's need for oil, as a valid cause.⁶⁹² Peace activists opposed the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, and some later complained about the morality of continued sanctions against Iraq after its defeat. This raises an interesting question: if neither force nor sanctions are appropriate for upholding UN resolutions, how will international law be upheld? The force of international moral disapproval is clearly not enough. Unfortunately, the ideology of peace movement radicals encourages them to criticise any US military action, whatever the merits of the case. The non-Stalinist Old Left supported free speech and it despised dictatorship, but modern radicals opposed action against Saddam Hussein despite the brutal nature of his regime. It appears to be a requirement of militant multi-culturalism that any non-Western regime should be defended against Western attack, regardless of its crimes.

The modern Left needs to abandon those radical theories which have made it increasingly irrelevant. By focusing too heavily on the identity politics of minority groups, the Left has alienated its wider base of working class support, and it has hampered efforts to form a coalition against the New Right.⁶⁹³ Radicals' attacks on free speech (based on post-structuralism's view of language as a tool of oppression) have also given the Right the high moral ground. The early Left would not have survived under the type of speech codes that the modern Left now imposes in the name of not "causing offence" to people. This loss of moral authority means that there is no inspiring opposition to rally people against the excesses of New Right economics.

⁶⁹² For a summary of the peace movement's position on the Gulf War, see Owen Wilkes, 'War in the Gulf', *Peacelink*, September 1990, pp. 3-8, and "Nation-wide Action on Gulf Crisis", *Peacelink* March 1991, pp. 11-15.

⁶⁹³ Michael Tomasky, *Left for Dead: The Life, Death and Possible Resurrection of Progressive Politics in America*, New York, 1996, pp. 21-22.

The ideology of the New Left continues to restrict NZ's involvement in collective security, as the Labour and Alliance parties vigorously oppose military co-operation with the US under the guise of supporting UN peace-keeping efforts exclusively.⁶⁹⁴ However, as it is the US which provides most of the military muscle for the UN, radicals have also opposed NZ's involvement in UN operations like the Gulf War and Bosnian peace-keeping. Radicals, and to a lesser extent, liberals, are still fighting the Cold War against the US,* but this is out of step with our time. Economic threats to NZ should also be considered. NZ relies on the rest of the world, but it has little influence over what goes on in the world. As the US is more committed to the defence of the rights of small nations and free trade than are Germany or Japan, it is also in NZ's economic interests to work with US.⁶⁹⁵

Despite the fact that it is in NZ's interests to work with the US, exercises with US forces are unlikely to occur until the issue of the ship ban is resolved. Even if NZ abandons the ideology of the New Left, an end to the nuclear-power ban seems unlikely as it has become part of NZ's national identity. The peace movement and its ideology may have played a crucial role in obtaining a strict nuclear ship ban, but once the ban was in place a new set of dynamics came into play, which was largely based on nationalism. For National to attempt to overturn the nuclear power ban might give the Labour Party a heaven-sent opportunity once again to utilise nationalism in the pursuit of its political agenda. In any case, the public appears to be content with National's approach of being nuclear free

⁶⁹⁴ Colin James, "Defence- Lost in the Babble?", *New Zealand Defence Quarterly*, Spring 1996, p.25.

For example, In 1994 the NZ branch of IPPNW was still railing against NZ's support of US foreign policy, NZ's force structure, and NZ's military co-operation with Australia. See Nicholas Wilson, *Pathways to Peace: Key Nuclear and Peace Issues on the 50th Anniversary of Hiroshima*, Wellington, 1994.

⁶⁹⁵ Bryce Harland, *On Our Own: New Zealand in the Emerging Tripolar World*, Wellington, 1992, pp. 100-101.

and friendly with the US, so much so that the Labour leadership may have to play down the anti-Americanism of the Labour Party.⁶⁹⁶

Nonetheless, the US still insists that NZ drop the ban on nuclear power contained in Section 11 of the Nuclear-Free Act. This may seem overly demanding, since the US has accepted implicit nuclear power bans in the past,^{**} but it appears to be the signal that the US requires before it will believe that NZ has abandoned the radicals' approach to foreign policy. However, for the US to insist on an end to the nuclear power ban may be counter-productive, as it keeps NZ security policy in limbo and represents a de-facto victory for the peace movement. For those radicals who sought an end to military co-operation with the US, the perpetuation of the present situation serves their purposes quite well. For the sake of helping NZ re-enter the camp of nations prepared to support collective military efforts, the US may have to live with the nuclear power ban.

As for the question of nuclear weapons, the situation has changed since 1985. With the Cold War over, and the threat of nuclear war having diminished considerably since 1985, the NZ public would probably accept the US's blanket claim about the removal of nuclear weapons from US surface warships. It is likely that peace movement or Labour Party attempts to demand individual reassurances on each nuclear-capable ship's status would appear to the wider NZ public as unreasonable and dogmatic, although this would depend on how the debate is cast at the time.

Although the issue of nuclear weapons need no longer bar US ships from NZ's ports, Section 9 of the legislation, whereby the NZ Prime Minister judges the nuclear weapons status of visiting ships, may need to be dropped, lest a future Labour Government use it to refuse a visit despite Bush's 1991 announcement of the USN's nuclear disarmament. Helen Clark has stated that Labour would still

⁶⁹⁶ Huntley, *The Citizen and the Sword*, p. 424.

^{**} Denmark has no nuclear-powered visits, but this is due to strict safety regulations, rather than a legislated ban.

try to assess each ship, and that the US must end its NCND policy.⁶⁹⁷ On the other hand, NCND is far less important now that the Cold War is over, so Section 9 need not be an issue.

If conventionally powered, nuclear-capable US warships were to visit, perhaps under the blanket-clearance provision in Section 10 of the legislation, exercises could be restored. Faced with a conventional ship visit, radicals would have little option but to voice their real reasons for their opposition to US warship visits, as were articulated in Chapter Five. These will not impress most of the NZ public, and the only option left to peace activists would be to claim the visits as a NZ victory over the US in an attempt to embarrass the US Government.⁶⁹⁸ On the contrary, such visits would represent a victory for common sense and a major peace movement defeat. Therefore, the issue of nuclear power must be put aside. The priority should be to end NZ's military estrangement from the US. The NZ Government could request a visit, but it is the responsibility of the US to respond in a manner that serves the common Western interest. With the end of the Cold War, it is no longer in the US's interest to isolate NZ militarily and diplomatically.

⁶⁹⁷ Clark interview, October 12, 1998.

⁶⁹⁸ Owen Wilkes, "Election Coverage", *Peacelink*, November 1990, p. 32.

GLOSSARY

ABCA: American, British, Canadian and American armies.

AFSC: American Friends Service Committee.

ALAWF: American league Against war and Fascism.

ALP: Australian Labour Party.

AMDA: Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement.

AML: Anti-Militarist League.

ANZAC: Australia and New Zealand Army Corps.

ANZAM: Australian, New Zealand and Malayan area.

ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand and the United States treaty.

ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations.

ASROC: Anti-Submarine Rocket.

ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare.

CAFMANZ: Campaign Against Foreign Military Activities in New Zealand.

CAFCINZ: Campaign Against Foreign Control in New Zealand.

CAFCA: Campaign Against Foreign Control in Aotearoa.

CANWAR: Campaign Against Nuclear Warships.

CBD: Civilian-Based Defence.

CCANZ: Conference of Churches in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

CDR: Closer Defence Relationships.

CMT: Compulsory Military Training.

CND: Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

COV: Committee on Vietnam.

CPN: Christian Peace Network.

CPS: Christian Pacifist Society.

DASG: Defence Alternatives Study Group.

EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone.

END: European Disarmament Campaign.

FOL: Federation of Labour.

FOR: Fellowship of Reconciliation.

FPDA: Five Power Defence Arrangements.

GCSB: Government Communications Security Bureau.

ICBM: Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile.

ICWPP: International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace.

ICJ: International Court of Justice.

INF: Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty.

IPPNW: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile.

LID: League for Industrial Democracy.

LNU: League of Nations Union.

LTBT: Limited Test Ban Treaty.

MAC: Military Airlift Command.

MAP: Mutual Assistance Programme.

MARSAR: Marine Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

MAWAF: Movement Against war and Fascism.

MOU: Memorandum of Understanding.

MP: Member of Parliament.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

NCND: Neither Confirm Nor Deny.

NCW: National Council of Women.

NFIP: Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific.

NFZ: Nuclear Free Zone.

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation.

NIMBY: Not In My Back Yard.

NLF: National Liberation Front.

NMWM: No More War Movement.

NNS: Nuclear National Security

NPC: National peace Council.

NRB: National Research Bureau.

NUTs: Nuclear Utilisation Theories.

NVA: North Vietnamese Army.

NZ: New Zealand.

NZFPS: New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies.

NZIIA: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.

NZLP: New Zealand Labour Party.

NZNCC. New Zealand National Council of Churches.

NZNFZC: New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee.

NZPC: New Zealand Peace Council.

PACC: Peace and Anti-Conscription Council.

PACDAC: Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control.

PACF: Peace and Anti-Conscription Federation.

PADET: Peace and Disarmament Education Trust.

PL: Progressive Labour Party

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

PMA: Peace Movement Aotearoa.

PMNZ: Peace Movement New Zealand.

PPANAC: Pacific Peoples Anti-Nuclear Action Committee.

PPU: Peace Pledge Union.

PRC: Peoples Republic of China.

PRU: Passive Resisters' Union.

PU: Peace Union/ Politically Unreliable.

PYL: Progressive Youth League.

PYM: Progressive Youth Movement.

RNZAF: Royal New Zealand Air Force.

RNZN: Royal New Zealand Navy.

RRF: Ready reaction

SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

SAM: Surface to Air Missile.

SANE: Scientists Against Nuclear Energy.

SDS: Students for a Democratic Society.

SEACDT: South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty.

SEATO: South East Asian Treaty Organisation.

SIGINT: Signals Intelligence

SIS: Security Intelligence Service.

SLOC: Sea Line of Communication.

SNCC: Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee.

SPNFZ: South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

UKUSA: United Kingdom and United States.

UN: United Nations.

UNA: United Nations Association.

US: United States.

USIA: United States Information Agency.

USN: United States Navy.

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

WAND: Women Acting for Nuclear Disarmament.

WCC: World Council of Churches.

WILPF: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

WLRC: Wellington Labour Regional Council.

WPC: World Peace Council.

YCND: Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

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