The nature of disagreement: matters of taste and environs

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Over the past fifteen years, *predicates of personal taste (PPT)* have been at, or near, the forefront of the minds of many philosophers and linguists. Paradigmatic PPT include words such as 'tasty,' 'fun,' 'cool,' 'boring,' and 'disgusting.' Upon examining the behavior of PPT in natural language, philosophers and linguists have developed a range of sophisticated approaches to the meaning of PPT, the most prominent of which are relativist, contextualist, and absolutist approaches. Relativists, contextualists, and absolutists have, in turn, devised competing models of *faultless disagreement* about matters of personal taste.

My plan for the paper is as follows. I'll begin by laying out the relativist, contextualist, and absolutist approaches to the meaning of PPT and the corresponding models of faultless disagreement that have been associated with them.   I'll then develop a concern for the relativist and absolutist models of faultless disagreement. In essence, the concern is that these models are empirically inadequate.

In light of this critical discussion, I'll sketch an alternative, preferential model of faultless disagreement that emerges from a kind of model put forward by certain contextualists. However, as I'll take pains to explain, this model is in no way hostage to a contextualist semantics for PPT. As a matter of fact, it is compatible with every major analysis of the meaning of PPT. This result, I think, delivers an important methodological lesson: considerations related to faultless disagreement do have a dialectical role in debates about PPT, but not the role that they are standardly taken to have. In the final section, I will examine four objections against my preferential model, showing that despite their failure to fully undermine that model, they prompt us to think much more carefully about the nature of disagreement.

1. PPT and faultless disagreement: a snapshot

1.1. Approaches to PPT

We'll need to begin by tracing the outlines of the debates about PPT and faultless disagreement. Debates about PPT have largely centered on three approaches to the meaning of PPT—*relativism*, *contextualism*, and *absolutism*.[1] Relativists, contextualists, and absolutists diverge with respect to two main questions about PPT:

(Q1) What is the semantic content of sentences containing PPT?

(Q2) What sort of truth-values do utterances of such sentences receive, and what sort of truth-values do their semantic contents receive?

Consider, for instance:

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[1] In recent years, *expressivist* analyses of PPT have also gained traction, and in § 4, we'll see that they indeed deserve a great deal of attention. For discussion of expressivist accounts, see Barker (2010); Buekens (2009a, 2009b, 2011); Clapp (2015); Eriksson (2016); Gutzmann (2016); Kölbel (2002, ch. 4; 2004a, § V); Lasersohn (2005, §4.3); MacFarlane (2014 §§ 1.3, 7.3); Richard (2008, ch. 5); and Zouhar (2019). See also Hirvonen, et. al. (2019) and Huvenes (2012, 2014).

(1) Sauerkraut is tasty.

Suppose that (1) is assertively uttered by Sarah at a time t. A basic sort of contextualism will then have it that:[2]

(C₁) The semantic content of (1) is the *relativized proposition* ⟨sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Sarah's tastes at t⟩

(C₂) Sarah's utterance is true iff ⟨sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Sarah's tastes at t⟩ is true iff sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Sarah's tastes at t.

The contextualist, then, holds that the semantic content of (1) is relativized, whereas the truth-value that Sarah's utterance and this content receive is absolute. By contrast, the relativist will analyze (1) along the following lines:[3]

(R₁) The semantic content of (1) is the *absolute (unrelativized) proposition* ⟨sauerkraut is tasty⟩

(R₂) Sarah's utterance is true, relative to (e.g.) Sarah's tastes at t iff ⟨sauerkraut is tasty⟩ is true, relative to Sarah's tastes at t iff sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Sarah's tastes at t.

The relativist's outlook on (1), then, is the converse of the contextualist's, insofar as the relativist holds that (1)'s semantic content is absolute and that the truth-value that this content, as well as Sarah's utterance, receive is relativized.

We can think of the absolutist as being, in essence, half relativist and half contextualist. The absolutist follows the relativist in taking (1)'s semantic content to be absolute, yet they follow the contextualist in taking the truth-value of this content and of Sarah's utterance to be absolute as well:[4]

(A₁) The semantic content of (1) is ⟨sauerkraut is tasty⟩

(A₂) Sarah's utterance is true iff ⟨sauerkraut is tasty⟩ is true iff sauerkraut is tasty.

1.2. Models of faultless taste disagreement

In the intricate debates over the meaning of PPT, one issue has arguably loomed above all of the rest: which of these views can best account for the possibility of *faultless disagreement* about

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[2] Proponents of contextualism about PPT include Barker (2013); Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, ch. 4); Capraru (2016); Glanzberg (2007); Hîncu (2015); Huvenes (2012); López de Sa (2008, 2015); Marques (2015); Marques and García-Carpintero (2014); Pearson (2013); Schaffer (2011); Silk (2016); Snyder (2013); Sundell (2011); and Zouhar (2018). See also Recanati (2007, 91–94) and Moltmann (2010).

  Strictly speaking, contextualists can take (1)'s semantic content to be a temporally neutral proposition; however, we can safely set aside issues related to tense for present purposes.

  In what follows, I'll use angle brackets to denote propositions.

[3] I here categorize both *non-indexical contextualism* (defended by Kölbel (2004a; 2009, § 2.1) and *assessment-sensitivism* (defended by Lasersohn (2005, 2013, 2017) and MacFarlane (2014)) as species of relativism. Dan Zeman (2013, 2015) has also offered notable defenses of relativism, and see also the allied proposal by Diaz-Legaspe (2013).

[4] Defenders of absolutism include Belleri (2010); Hirvonen (2016); and Schafer (2011). Cp. Anthony (2016); Davies (2017); and Wyatt (2018).

matters of personal taste (henceforth, *faultless taste disagreement*). To illustrate what faultless taste disagreement is meant to be, consider the following case, which we can call the *sauerkraut case*:

> *[Context: Jill and Paul are friends who feel comfortable sharing their views with one another. They are eating at a German restaurant where both are trying sauerkraut for the first time. Both brushed their teeth about thirty minutes ago and neither has tasted anything in the interim, so their palates are clean. Each has tried two pieces of sauerkraut.]*

(2) Jill [licking her lips and smiling contentedly]: Mmm, sauerkraut is tasty! (How have I never tried it before?)

(3) Paul [grimacing]: Nah, sauerkraut isn't tasty. (It's way too sour.)

A natural and prominent reaction to this sort of case is that Jill and Paul disagree, yet neither is in error in virtue of behaving as they do. In this sense, Jill and Paul seem to *faultlessly disagree*, the result being that it is possible for speakers to stand in faultless taste disagreement.[5]

How, then, should we understand the nature of faultless taste disagreement? Thus far, three main models of this phenomenon have emerged, corresponding to the three dominant analyses of the meaning of PPT.[6]

There is, first of all, the *relativist model*.[7] According to this model, Jill and Paul disagree because they respectively assert and believe inconsistent propositions. Specifically, this model has it that Jill sincerely asserts—and thus believes—⟨sauerkraut is tasty⟩, while Paul sincerely asserts—and thus believes—⟨sauerkraut isn't tasty⟩. As for faultlessness, the relativist suggestion is that Jill is faultless because ⟨sauerkraut is tasty⟩ is true, relative to her tastes at the time t of her assertion. Similarly, Paul is meant to be faultless because ⟨sauerkraut isn't tasty⟩ is true, relative to his tastes at the time t' of his assertion. It thus seems that relativists can neatly account for the possibility of faultless taste disagreement.

In response to this motivation for relativism, absolutists and contextualists have crafted models of their own. The *absolutist model* converges with the relativist model when it comes to the question of why Jill and Paul disagree.[8] The idea is again that they disagree because Jill sincerely asserts—and thus believes—⟨sauerkraut is tasty⟩, whereas Paul sincerely asserts—and thus believes—⟨sauerkraut isn't tasty⟩. The absolutist and relativist models diverge, however, regarding the explanation for Jill and Paul's faultlessness. According to the absolutist model, Jill is faultless because it is rational for her to assert and believe ⟨sauerkraut is tasty⟩, given that sauerkraut's flavor is in fact pleasing to her tastes at t. Similarly, Paul is faultless because it is rational for him to assert

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[5] For data which corroborate the hypothesis that ordinary speakers would take Jill and Paul to faultlessly disagree, see Beebe (2014, Figure 1, pp. 172-6); Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, and Endara (2015, Table 3, Figure 2); Beebe and Sackris (2016, Figure 1); Cova and Pain (2012); Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figure 2, pp. 383-4); Goodwin and Darley (2008, Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1]; 2012, p. 252); Kaiser and Rudin (2020); Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000, p. 318, Table 4); and Solt (2018, Figure 1). Regarding young children, cf. Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figures 4 and 5).

[6] Of course, some theorists have argued that faultless disagreement is impossible; see the references in Wyatt (2018, n. 17). Rather than directly rebutting their arguments, our strategy will be to construct a novel model of faultless taste disagreement and to then show how it withstands a variety of objections. It should be profitable for future studies to reassess their arguments in connection with this model.

[7] Kölbel (2004a, pp. 53-4, § VII). Cp. Beall (2006, § 6); Egan (2014); Kinzel and Kusch (2018); Lasersohn (2005); MacFarlane (2014, pp. 134-5); and Smith (2010).

[8] Schafer (2011). Cp. Baker and Robson (2017); Beall (2006, § 4.3); Belleri (2010); Davis (2015); Hills (2013); and Hu (2020). Cf. Hirvonen (2016).

and believe ⟨sauerkraut isn't tasty⟩, given that sauerkraut's flavor is in fact not pleasing to his tastes at t'. The point of divergence, then, is that the absolutist account of faultlessness, unlike the relativist account, makes no use of relativized truth-values.

Thirdly, there is the *contextualist model*.[9] This model delivers an account of Jill and Paul's disagreement that diverges from both the relativist and the absolutist model. A simple version of the contextualist model has it that Jill asserts and believes ⟨sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Jill's tastes at t⟩, whereas Paul asserts and believes ⟨sauerkraut's flavor isn't pleasing to Paul's tastes at t⟩. These propositions are, of course, consistent, so on the contextualist model, Jill and Paul don't disagree in virtue of asserting or believing them. Rather, they disagree in virtue of something else, e.g. holding inconsistent beliefs about what their standards of taste should be or about how 'tasty' should be used, or having incompatible non-doxastic attitudes. For the contextualist, Jill and Paul are faultless (at least) because the propositions that they respectively assert and believe are true. Figure 1 summarizes the basic components of these three models of faultless taste disagreement.

Model	Disagreement	Faultlessness
Relativist	Inconsistent beliefs about asserted propositions	Truth of speakers' assertions and beliefs, relative to their respective tastes
Absolutist	Inconsistent beliefs about asserted propositions	Rationality of speakers' assertions and beliefs
Contextualist	Inconsistent beliefs about unasserted propositions; non-doxastic incompatibility	Truth of speakers' assertions and beliefs

Figure 1: Models of faultless taste disagreement

2. A concern for the relativist and absolutist models

With the stage now set, we can move to consider our primary question: which model of faultless taste disagreement is the most attractive, and how does this model inform debates about the meaning of PPT?

To start, I want to develop what I regard as a pressing concern for both the relativist and absolutist models.[10] The concern proceeds in two parts. First of all, we have strong empirical evidence that we tend to lack beliefs in absolute propositions about matters of personal taste such as

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[9] See Barker (2013); Huvenes (2012, 2014); Marques (2015); Marques and García-Carpintero (2014); Parsons (2013); Plunkett and Sundell (2013); Schaffer (2009, p. 219; cf. pp. 218-19, 219-20); Sundell (2011, 2016, 2017); Zakkou (2019 a, b); and Zouhar (2018). The model developed by López de Sa (2007; 2008; 2010; 2015, §§ 2-3) contains some additional subtleties that won't be pertinent to what follows. Cp. Moltmann (2010, § 5.3); Pearson (2013, § 4.1); and Silk (2016, ch. 7).

Some versions of the contextualist model integrate non-doxastic attitudes and, in that respect, resemble *expressivist* models of faultless taste disagreement. For additional discussion of expressivist models, see Barker (2010); Beddor (2019, § 4); Buekens (2009a, 2009b, 2011); Clapp (2015); Eriksson (2016); Gutzmann (2016); Kölbel (2002, ch. 4; 2004a, § 5); Lasersohn (2005, § 4.3, 2017); MacFarlane (2014, §§ 1.3, 7.3); Richard (2008, ch. 5); Smith (2010, pp. 199-200, §§ 5-6); and Wyatt (2018). Cp. the model proposed by Diaz-Legaspe (2015, 2016). In § 3, we'll say more about the possibility of appealing to non-doxastic attitudes in thinking about faultless taste disagreement.

[10] Of course, many additional concerns have been discussed in the literature (see e.g. Francén (2010) on the relativist model and Wyatt (2018) on the absolutist model), but the present concern is independent of them.

⟨sauerkraut is (isn't) tasty⟩. Thus insofar as the relativist and absolutist models presuppose that we tend to believe such propositions, these models are empirically inadequate.

In an inventive study, Florian Cova and Nicolas Pain (2012) aimed to determine the extent to which ordinary subjects are *normativists* about familiar aesthetic matters and to thereby assess a standard argument for aesthetic realism. They also examined the extent to which ordinary subjects are normativists about *matters of personal taste (MPT)*, e.g. whether pasta with ketchup is delicious.[11]

As Cova and Pain use the term, one is a normativist about MPT to the extent that one believes that if one disagrees with another taster about MPT *m*, then the judgment about *m* that the other taster makes is mistaken. Using a 0-3 scale, Cova and Pain assigned a 'normativism score' to their subjects. They found (ibid.: Figures 2 and 3) that the average normativism score with regard to MPT was well below 0.5 (and hence well below 1.5). Accordingly, their findings indicate that when it comes to MPT, ordinary subjects don't tend to be normativists.

Taken by themselves, Cova and Pain's findings regarding MPT don't present a special problem for the relativist and absolutist models. The problem emerges when we connect their findings with a particular platitude about disagreement. Mark Richard formulates this platitude in the following penetrating remarks:[12]

"[W]hen one is willing to ascribe truth or falsity to a particular claim p, one treats p and the claim that p is true as equivalent…Suppose I think that Beaufort is a better cheese than Tome, and you think the reverse…Then not only can I…say that Beaufort is better than Tome, I can…say that it's true that Beaufort is better than Tome. And of course if you think Tome is better than Beaufort and not vice versa I can also…say that you think that it's not the case that Beaufort is better than Tome. So I can…say that it's true that Beaufort is better than Tome though you think Beaufort isn't better than Tome. From which it surely follows that you're mistaken—after all, if you have a false belief, you are mistaken about something. *This line of reasoning is sound no matter what the object of dispute.*" (2008, p. 132, italics added)

We can codify this Richardian platitude about disagreement— which, as he intimates, applies not only to disagreements about MPT, but to disagreements about any subject matter—as follows:[13]

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[11] Cova and Pain's findings are corroborated in numerous additional studies. These include Beebe (2014, Figure 1, pp. 172-6); Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, and Endara (2015, Table 3, Figure 2); Beebe and Sackris (2016, Figure 1); Cohen and Nichols (2010, Figures 1 and 2); Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figure 2, pp. 383-4); Goodwin and Darley (2008, Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1; 2012, p. 252); Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000, p. 318, Table 4); and Solt (2018, Figure 1). See also Cova, Garcia, and Liao (2015, p. 930); Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000, p. 323) and Nichols and Folds-Bennett (2003, Table 1, p. B28 and Table 2, p. B30). Regarding young children, cf. Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figures 4 and 5). For some suggestive remarks to the contrary, see Hirvonen (2016, § 3.1). I also discuss Cova and Pain's findings in Wyatt (2018), though here, I use these findings to assess both the relativist and the absolutist models.

In what follows, we'll make use of a rather *minimal* notion of an MPT that preserves neutrality as to the metaphysics of MPT (e.g. whether their nature is purely subjective or is, to some extent, objective). In the minimal sense, an MPT is simply a subject matter, or topic, about which one speaks when using unembedded PPT, as in (1) above. It's natural to say that someone who assertively utters (1) speaks about a topic such as whether sauerkraut is tasty, or whether sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to their tastes. Whether sauerkraut is tasty and whether sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to a given person's tastes will then count as examples of MPT.

[12] Cp. Boghossian (2011, p. 62) and MacFarlane (2014, p. 134).

[13] Note that (D) should be read synchronically, rather than diachronically. Note also that strictly speaking, we need only assume that (D) holds in most cases; an irrational or confused person, for instance, might fail to behave in accordance with (D).

(D) If person A_1 believes $\langle p \rangle$, then if A_1 also believes that they disagree with person A_2 as to whether p, then A_1 believes that A_2's judgement as to whether p is mistaken.

With (D) in view, we can now appreciate why Cova and Pain's findings constitute a stumbling block for the relativist and absolutist models. From (D), it follows that if ordinary subjects tended to believe absolute propositions about MPT, then they would tend to be normativists about MPT. However, Cova and Pain's findings indicate that ordinary subjects *don't* tend to be normativists about MPT. Via an application of *modus tollens*, their findings thus also indicate that ordinary subjects don't tend to believe absolute propositions about MPT. However, both the relativist and absolutist models presuppose that ordinary subjects do tend to believe absolute propositions about MPT. For this reason, Cova and Pain's findings, when combined with (D), present a pressing empirical challenge for the relativist and absolutist models.[14]

3. An alternative model: type-noncotenability

3.1. Preferences regarding MPT

Given Cova and Pain's findings, it seems that we lack recourse to beliefs in absolute propositions about MPT when attempting to explain why speakers like Jill and Paul disagree. It also won't do (§ 1.2) to appeal to Jill and Paul's beliefs in the relativized propositions $\langle$sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Jill's tastes at $t\rangle$ and $\langle$sauerkraut's flavor isn't pleasing to Paul's tastes at $t\rangle$, as these propositions are consistent. It thus seems wise to ask whether we can construct an attractive *non-doxastic* model of faultless taste disagreement.[15]

There are a number of ways in which one could attempt to develop a non-doxastic model of faultless taste disagreement, corresponding to the kinds of non-doxastic attitude that we have

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[14] I would emphasize that Cova and Pain's findings don't indicate that we tend to lack beliefs of *any* sort about MPT. It's compatible with their findings, taken together with (D), that we do tend to believe relativized propositions about MPT, e.g. $\langle$sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Jill's tastes at $t\rangle$. What their findings indicate, rather, is that if we do tend to have beliefs about MPT, then they aren't beliefs in absolute propositions, but beliefs in propositions of some other sort(s).

[15] Note that despite the ingenuity of his analysis of PPT, it won't help relativists or absolutists to bring in Kindermann (2019, § 6)'s notion of '*n*-belief,' insofar as doing so would be tantamount to appealing to beliefs in relativized propositions.

Admittedly, though, it may be possible in the face of the above considerations to craft an appealing doxastic model of faultless taste disagreement. Andy Egan, for instance, has developed an explicitly *de se* version of the relativist model that may be compatible with Cova and Pain's findings. I would point out, though, that in developing this model, Egan (2014, pp. 95-6) suggests that the best account of how we can disagree in thought about MPT will invoke our non-doxastic attitudes regarding MPT. Accordingly, Egan should find value in the theoretical resources that I detail below.

Bob Beddor (2019) has also recently put forward a highly original view of faultless taste disagreement. A signature claim of this view (ibid. § 5) is that there are no objective facts about whether speakers stand in taste disagreement. Rather, Beddor proposes that in theorizing about such disagreement, we should, in essence, shift from the material to the formal mode and provide truth-conditions for various sorts of *disagreement ascriptions*. Some of these ascriptions are true and some aren't, and which ones come out as true, Beddor argues, depends on facts about the syntax of English—as well as, presumably, facts about the syntax of other natural languages that we might study. Beddor contends, then, that we should give up on trying to understand the nature of taste disagreement and opt instead for the syntax-driven, language-relative analysis that he develops. Beddor's arguments are subtle, and I lack the space to evaluate them in detail here (though in §§ 3.1 and 5.2, we'll discuss two concerns that are based on his work). I should say, however, that I take the plausibility of the model that I'll detail in §§ 3.3 and 5 to constitute evidence that we can in fact construct a satisfactory account of the nature of taste disagreement which doesn't advert to syntactic facts.

towards MPT. Rather than trying to definitively adjudicate between these options, I'd like to develop in some detail a non-doxastic model that strikes me as being quite promising.

Speakers who use PPT tend to have distinctive sorts of *preferences* regarding MPT. Let 'E' be a noun phrase (e.g. 'sauerkraut,' 'sushi,' or 'pasta with ketchup') that stands for a (kind of) entity. The following generalizations then look very plausible:[16]

(4) Typically, if A assertively utters 'E is tasty,' then A prefers that they experience E's flavor, rather than not experiencing E's flavor, other things being equal

(5) Typically, if A assertively utters 'E not is tasty,' then A prefers that they not experience E's flavor, rather than experiencing E's flavor, other things being equal.

Given that one's usage of PPT is typically correlated with one's possession of distinctive sorts of preference regarding MPT, preferential models of faultless taste disagreement should pique our interest.[17]

3.2. Noncotenability

The question that then arises is how, exactly, to describe the preferential *incompatibility* that grounds taste disagreement. One prominent construal of such incompatibility involves the relation of *noncotenability*. Say that A's preference p_A is noncotenable with B's preference p_B iff A could not coherently adopt p_B while retaining p_A (and *mutatis mutandis* for B).[18] We can then attempt to explain taste disagreement along the following lines:[19]

The *noncotenability (NC) model*: A and B are in taste disagreement about MPT *m* iff A and B respectively have preferences about *m* that are noncotenable.

The intended application of the NC model to the sauerkraut case runs as follows. Jill, the thought goes, couldn't coherently adopt Paul's preference about tasting sauerkraut while retaining her own preference about tasting sauerkraut, and *mutatis mutandis* for Paul. Their preferences are thus noncotenable, and they *ipso facto* disagree.

The NC model certainly exerts some initial pull. However, upon further scrutiny, it looks as though it *undergenerates* cases of taste disagreement. To see this, think further about the sauerkraut case.

How, exactly, should we describe Jill and Paul's preferences about tasting sauerkraut? We know that Jill enjoys sauerkraut's flavor, so it seems correct to say that Jill prefers that she experience its flavor, rather than not experiencing its flavor, other things being equal. Call her preference p_{Jill}. Similarly, we know that Paul doesn't enjoy sauerkraut's flavor. It thus seems correct to say that Paul prefers that he not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor, other things being equal. Call Paul's preference p_{Paul}.[20]

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[16] Cp. Bordonaba Plou (2015, n. 1); Diaz-Legaspe (2015, p. 57); MacFarlane (2014, p. 3); Sundell (2017, p. 83); Wyatt (2018, § 8.2); and Zouhar (2018, § 5.2). See also Furey (2017, pp. 485-6, 492-3).

[17] Cp. Huvenes (2012, § 7).

[18] Cp. Kölbel (2004b); MacFarlane (2014, p. 121); and Plunkett and Sundell (2013, p. 11). For some illuminating suggestions regarding the notion of coherence at work here, see Worsnip (2018) as well as Wyatt (forthcoming).

[19] Cp. Dreier (2009, p. 106) and Zouhar (2018, § 4). See also Worsnip (2019), who argues that a wide variety of disagreements can be explained using a tweaked version of the NC model.

[20] Henceforth, we'll mostly omit the 'other things being equal' qualifier, though it should still be mentally inserted.

The problem with the NC model is then that while Jill and Paul do seem to disagree, their preferences are actually cotenable. This is because Jill could coherently adopt p_{Paul} while retaining p_{Jill}, and likewise for Paul. For Jill to adopt p_{Paul} while retaining p_{Jill} would be for her to prefer the following two things:

(6) That she experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not

(7) That Paul not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor.

It seems entirely coherent for Jill to prefer both (6) and (7). That she experiences sauerkraut's flavor doesn't compel Paul to follow suit, and that Paul refrains from experiencing its flavor doesn't compel Jill to follow suit. They are free to experience sauerkraut's flavor, or not, independently of one another. The more general lesson here is that for persons A and B to disagree about an MPT m, it's not necessary that A and B have noncotenable preferences regarding m.[21]

One possible response to this concern would be to follow Teresa Marques and Manuel García-Carpintero (2014, pp. 717-21) in suggesting that Jill and Paul actually have *de nobis* preferences. This response might seem attractive, given that Jill and Paul are sharing a meal together. We would then interpret p_{Jill} as the preference that both Jill and Paul experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not and p_{Paul} as the preference that Jill and Paul not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. On this rendering, p_{Jill} and p_{Paul} are indeed noncotenable.

A cost of this response, though, is that it is much more natural to interpret p_{Jill} and p_{Paul} as being *de se* (or 'autocentric,' as we'll put the idea in § 5.4), rather than *de nobis* preferences. This is because in (2) and (3), Jill and Paul are thinking only about themselves (their own gustatory reactions and whether they are respectively inclined to consume more sauerkraut). By contrast, they aren't thinking about how they should coordinate their tasting of sauerkraut. Jill knows that she can go on tasting sauerkraut while Paul refrains from doing so, and likewise for Paul. In other sorts of case (e.g. the case from Stevenson discussed in § 5.2 below), the *de nobis* interpretation does look to be the most reasonable. However, we ultimately want an account of faultless taste disagreement that can handle both *de se* and *de nobis* cases (on the latter, see n. 44).

Another possible response would be to interpret Jill and Paul as having *de se* preferences and to adapt the work of Lewis (1979) in modeling the contents of these preferences as *centered propositions*.[22] The basic ideas would be (i) that p_{Jill} is the preference to experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not, and p_{Paul} is the preference to not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor; (ii) that these preferences can be satisfied, or not, relative to a particular center i, depending upon whether i does or doesn't experience sauerkraut's flavor; and (iii) that it would be incoherent for Jill to adopt p_{Paul} while retaining p_{Jill}, and *mutatis mutandis* for Paul. These ideas would suffice to secure the noncotenability of p_{Jill} and p_{Paul}.

A concern for this response, though, is that it rests on a questionable account of preference adoption. As mentioned above, it seems clear that Jill's preference is about herself and that Paul's preference is about himself. Accordingly, an analysis of p_{Jill} and p_{Paul} should predict that if Jill were to adopt p_{Paul}, she would thereby adopt a preference that is *about Paul*, rather than an additional preference about herself, and the same goes for Paul, were he to adopt p_{Jill}. However, the envisioned Lewisian account of p_{Jill} and p_{Paul} clearly fails to predict this. Indeed, its ability to secure

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[21] This concern is structurally similar to a concern that is offered by both Bob Beddor (2019, p. 5) and Teresa Marques (2015, p. 6; 2016, p. 310) against another sort of non-doxastic model.
[22] See Egan (2014) for a doxastic account of taste disagreement that proceeds along similar lines.

noncotenability between p_{Jill} and p_{Paul} hinges on this predictive failure. To this extent, the Lewisian account of p_{Jill} and p_{Paul} looks dubious. In the next section, though, we'll see that this account is not entirely on the wrong track.

3.3. Type-noncotenability

The NC model is clearly an unsatisfactory account of taste disagreement. However, all is not lost, as it is fairly straightforward to devise a successor that is more satisfactory. We've observed that Jill and Paul have preferences that are cotenable in the usual sense. However, we should also take care to observe that Jill and Paul's preferences are of noncotenable *types*. Jill has a preference to experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not. By contrast, Paul has a preference to not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. Moreover, if a single person, thinking only about themselves, had preferences of both of these types, then their preferences about tasting sauerkraut would be incoherent. In this way, the types of preference at issue are noncotenable, even as an arbitrary pair of token preferences that exemplify these types might be cotenable.

We can fix ideas more precisely by introducing a novel notion, which we'll call the *anonymized variant* of a preference. Let p_A be A's preference that A does act a_1, rather than act a_2 (other things being equal). Then the anonymized variant p_A^N of p_A is the preference for doing a_1, rather than a_2 (other things being equal). To obtain the anonymized variant of p_A, we simply remove from p_A's content any information about who will be doing a_1.[23]

We can say, moreover, that an arbitrary person C *has* p_A^N *with respect to themselves* iff C prefers that they do a_1, rather than a_2 (other things being equal). By way of illustration, if Nadia has the preference p_{Nadia} that she go to the movies rather than jogging (other things being equal), then we can say that Nadia has the anonymized variant p_{Nadia}^N of p_{Nadia} with respect to herself. By contrast, if Nadia merely preferred that Jamal go to the movies, rather than jogging, then we wouldn't say that Nadia has p_{Nadia}^N with respect to herself. Rather, we would say that Nadia has p_{Nadia}^N with respect to Jamal.

With these notions in hand, we're now in a position to identify a relation between preferences that is similar to, yet importantly distinct from, noncotenability. Say that p_A and p_B are *type-noncotenable* iff an arbitrary person C couldn't coherently have both p_A^N and p_B^N with respect to themselves. Our successor to the NC model will then run as follows:

The *type-noncotenability (TNC) model*: A and B are in taste disagreement about MPT *m* iff A and B respectively have preferences about *m* that are type-noncotenable.

The first thing to notice about the TNC model is that it, in contrast to the NC model, entails that Jill and Paul disagree. The anonymized variant p_{Jill}^N of p_{Jill} is the preference to experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not. Likewise, the anonymized variant p_{Paul}^N of p_{Paul} is the preference to not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. Suppose that an arbitrary

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[23] In effect, then, the content of p_A^N is the sort of content that the Lewisian account considered just above would assign to p_{Jill} and p_{Paul}. It would also be suitable to describe p_A^N as having the *generic content* that one do a_1, rather than a_2. López de Sa (2015, p. 159) floats a similar notion, but the details are sketchy.

It should be carefully observed, especially in connection with the Lewisian account mentioned above, that we are using anonymized variants to fulfill a specific theoretical goal—namely, generating an account of the nature of taste disagreement. In so fulfilling this goal, we need not assume that anonymized variants feature in human *psychology*. Rather, it may be that the best description of human psychology appeals to non-anonymized preferences such as (6) and (7).

person Jamal has both $p_{Jill}{}^N$ and $p_{Paul}{}^N$ with respect to himself. It would then follow that Jamal prefers both of the following:

(8) That he experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not

(9) That he not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor.

If Jamal preferred both (8) and (9), then it would seem accurate to say that his preferences about tasting sauerkraut are incoherent. As a result, p_{Jill} and p_{Paul} are type-noncotenable, which means that the TNC model entails that Jill and Paul do indeed disagree.

Moreover, the TNC model offers resources for explaining why taste disagreements such as that between Jill and Paul can be *faultless*. The explanation hews somewhat closely to the absolutist treatment of faultlessness that we detailed in § 1.2. The main difference is that the absolutist account invokes our (alleged) beliefs about MPT, whereas the present explanation invokes our preferences regarding MPT.

First, we know that as a matter of fact, sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Jill's tastes at the time t of her utterance in the sauerkraut case. In light of this, it seems entirely rational for Jill to prefer at t that she experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not. Similarly, we know that as a matter of fact, sauerkraut's flavor isn't pleasing to Paul's tastes at the time t' of his utterance. Accordingly, it seems entirely rational for Paul to prefer at t' that he not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. In short, given the respective ways in which Jill and Paul evaluate sauerkraut's flavor, it is rational for them to have the preferences about tasting sauerkraut that they do. This serves to explain, at least in part, why Jill and Paul are indeed faultless.[24]

4. Whither PPT?

Let's take stock. Thus far, we've identified a significant empirical shortcoming in the relativist and absolutist models. We've also seen that the TNC model provides an attractive, preferential account of the nature of faultless taste disagreement that improves upon the NC model. Given that faultless taste disagreement has been at the heart of debates about PPT, it is now worthwhile to ask what light the TNC model can shed on those debates.[25]

In § 1.2, we saw that non-doxastic models of faultless taste disagreement, including preferential models, are standardly associated with contextualist (and expressivist) semantics for PPT. It is certainly clear why a contextualist would be attracted to these models. They promise to generate powerful explanations of the nature of faultless taste disagreement that are fully compatible

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[24] The reason for the qualification is that there may be other reasons why they are faultless. For instance, if contextualism about PPT is correct, then they may also be faultless insofar as they both assert and believe true (relativized) propositions.
Given that speakers like Jill and Paul tend to appreciate that it is rational for them to hold their respective preferences, the TNC model also looks to deliver an account of what is often called *parity* in connection with taste disagreement. For a recent discussion of some important subtleties related to parity, see Ferrari (2016).

[25] The conclusions that I advance in this section extend the complementary conclusions that have been drawn by Beddor (2019, § 6); Belleri and Palmira (2013, § 4); Furey (2017, esp. p. 525); Huvenes (2012, p. 179); Lopes (2017, § 3.3); López de Sa (2015, § 3; 2017, § 2.2.1); Palmira (2015, § 6.3; 2017, pp. 311-12); Plunkett and Sundell (2013, p. 18); and Stojanovic (2017, § 1). See also the suggestive remarks by Dreier (2009, pp. 106-7). My conclusions are also similar to, though more concessive than, those forwarded by Anthony (2016, § 3).

with contextualism. However, this shouldn't lead us to overlook the fact that preferential models are also available to relativists and absolutists.

Suppose, for instance, that a relativist about PPT went in for the TNC model. The basic components of the resulting view, as it concerns 'tasty,' would be:

(10) The semantic content of a sentence of the form 'E is (not) tasty' is ⟨E is (not) tasty⟩

(11) An utterance of 'E is (not) tasty' is true relative to A's tastes at t iff ⟨E is (not) tasty⟩ is true, relative to A's tastes at t iff E's flavor is (not) pleasing to A's tastes at t

(12) A and B are in taste disagreement about MPT m iff A and B respectively have preferences about m that are type-noncotenable

(13) A and B are in faultless taste disagreement about m iff (i) A and B are in taste disagreement about m; (ii) the propositions asserted and believed by A and B in the course of their disagreement are true, relative to their respective tastes; and (iii) it is rational for A and B to have the preferences about m that they do.

(10)-(13) are mutually consistent, which means that a relativist about PPT is free to adopt the TNC model. Moreover, a relativist could justify their adoption of this model on grounds that are entirely independent of issues pertaining to the meaning of PPT. Cova and Pain's findings (§ 2) indicate that we don't tend to believe absolute propositions about MPT, and in light of this, the relativist could justifiably refrain from assuming that we tend to believe such propositions. Moreover, they could point out that the TNC model is attractive insofar as it preserves the spirit of the NC model while avoiding a major concern for the latter. So, despite the fact that contextualists have been the major defenders of preferential models, relativists have reasons to endorse such models—and in particular, the TNC model. It's straightforward to show that absolutists can also adopt the TNC model and that they have the same reasons to do so.

The TNC model is thus available to *all* participants in the debates about the meaning of PPT. This means that every such theorist can account for the possibility of faultless taste disagreement, which is a significant result. Does this mean, however, that considerations related to faultless disagreement are a red herring in debates about PPT? Not at all; it just means that we need to reevaluate how such considerations come into the picture.

It is standardly thought that faultless taste disagreement raises an important question concerning *compatibility*: which analysis of PPT is compatible with the possibility of this sort of disagreement? However, we now see that this question has a straightforward answer: all of them. The truly significant question in this vicinity, rather, is a question about *theoretical economy*: which analysis of PPT provides us with theoretical resources that can do the most explanatory work, including work in explaining the nature of faultless taste disagreement?

I've argued that we can convincingly explain faultless taste disagreement in terms of our preferences regarding MPT. With an eye towards theoretical economy, then, we would do well to seriously consider analyses of PPT which appeal to such preferences in other explanatory contexts. It seems particularly worthwhile to inquire into the potential of an *expressivist* analysis of PPT which takes one of the central roles—and perhaps the central role—of the use of PPT to be the expression of the speaker's preferences regarding MPT. Such an expressivist analysis—in contrast to standard contextualist, relativist, and absolutist analyses—frontloads preferences into its account of PPT,

enabling the expressivist to economically draw on them when explaining the nature of faultless taste disagreement.

5. Objections: four flavors of overgeneration

5.1. Grades of taste disagreement

I want now to examine four objections that can be leveled against the TNC model.[26] All of these objections emanate from a single thought: that the TNC model seems to *overgenerate* cases of disagreement. In other words, the central thought that motivates each of these objections is that when we shift from the NC to the TNC model, we trade undergeneration for overgeneration, so that the shift isn't really worth the trouble. While none of these objections fully undermines the TNC model, we'll see that each of them opens up an avenue of inquiry that promises to be fruitful for those working on the nature of disagreement.

The first objection concerns cases such as the following. Suppose that Latisha has a *weak* preference $p_{Latisha}$ that she experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not and that Sean has a *strong* preference p_{Sean} that he experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not. The anonymized variant $p_{Latisha}^N$ of Latisha's preference is the weak preference to experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not. The anonymized variant p_{Sean}^N of Sean's preference is the strong preference to experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not. It seems incoherent for the same person to have both a weak and a strong preference that they experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not, which means that $p_{Latisha}$ and p_{Sean} are type-noncotenable. The TNC model predicts, then, that Latisha and Sean are in disagreement. However, it seems counterintuitive to say that they are in disagreement, insofar as they both prefer, to some degree, to experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not.[27]

It should be admitted that at first glance, Latisha and Sean may not seem to be in disagreement. However, when we think more deeply about this case, categorizing it as a case of disagreement should come to seem appropriate. In reflecting on the case, we also come to appreciate a general fact about taste disagreement—that such disagreement is *graded*.

Consider first how Latisha and Sean might communicate with one another. They might be speaking about sauerkraut, and Latisha might say, 'I like sauerkraut, but I don't love it.' Sean might reply, 'Oh, not me—I *love* sauerkraut. In fact, it's one of my favorite foods.' That Latisha and Sean might naturally speak in this way serves to underscore the fact that even though they both prefer to experience sauerkraut's flavor, their preferences are nevertheless *divergent*, insofar as Latisha merely has a weak preference, whereas Sean has a strong preference to experience sauerkraut's flavor. In light of this divergence in their preferences, it's reasonable to classify them as being in disagreement.

Moreover, we can do justice to the intuition that Latisha and Sean fail to disagree by noting that even though they do disagree, it may be that Sean, for instance, disagrees *more strongly* with other tasters than he does with Latisha. For instance, if Nadia has either a weak or a strong preference p_{Nadia} that she *not* experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor, then it's fair to say that Sean disagrees more strongly with Nadia than he does with Latisha. This is because the distance, so to speak, between the anonymized variant p_{Nadia}^N of Nadia's preference and p_{Sean}^N is greater than that between p_{Sean}^N and $p_{Latisha}^N$. To put the idea a bit differently, the distance between someone who strongly or weakly prefers to not experience sauerkraut's flavor and someone who strongly prefers to experience its flavor is greater than the distance between the latter person and

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[26] MacFarlane (2014, p. 131) offers an important objection against a similar model. As I've responded to this objection elsewhere, in Wyatt (2018, § 9.1), I will set it aside here.

[27] Thanks to J. Adam Carter and Hwan Ryu for discussion of this objection.

someone who weakly prefers to experience its flavor. In this way, even if all of the preferences in a given set are type-noncotenable, we can draw distinctions between the strength of the disagreement that exists between those who have them.

The more nuanced picture of taste disagreement that we obtain from these observations reflects the fact that it is graded in this way and consists of three basic components. The first is a *threshold* for taste disagreement, which is that A and B's respective preferences about the MPT at issue are type-noncotenable. The second is a *distance measure d* over the anonymized variants of a set of preferences which delivers the result that, for instance, $d(p_{Nadia}^N, p_{Sean}^N) > d(p_{Sean}^N, p_{Latisha}^N)$. The third is the idea that the strength of disagreement between the possessors of preferences p_A and p_B can be determined by reference to *d*. We can illustrate these three features as in Figure 2.[28]


Figure 2: Graded taste disagreement

5.2. Disagreement vs. conflict

It's natural to assume (though we'll see in § 5.4 that this assumption needs to be refined) that we ultimately want a unified, general account of preferential disagreement which treats all such disagreements as consisting in the same relation. However, A and B's having type-noncotenable preferences regarding matters *other than MPT* looks to be insufficient for them to disagree about those matters. It will then follow that we should actually take type-noncotenability to be insufficient for taste disagreement as well, contrary to the TNC model.

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[28] In thinking about *d*, we've considered only a basic case that serves to motivate its introduction. Erich Rast (2018) has compellingly argued that precisely articulating *d* will require more mathematical subtlety, given the possibility of what he calls 'perspectival disagreement.' Also, I've assumed in Figure 2 that *d* is symmetric. If this assumption proves to be questionable, then we can easily insert more boxes on the far right. Additionally, note that given our reflections in § 5.4 below, we'll need to amend the threshold described here when considering exocentric preferences.

It is presumably the case that disagreement involving credences is similarly graded, as e.g. Palmira (2017, p. 302) argues. See also Rowbottom (2018, § 3).

To see how this problem arises, let's consider a pair of cases that are respectively offered by Bob Beddor (2019, p. 9) and Teresa Marques (2016, p. 310):[29]

The *taxi case:* Ava and Bert are standing on a street corner trying to hail a taxi, which they intend to share. Ava prefers that she sit in the front of the taxi, rather than the back, whereas Bert prefers that he sit in the back, rather than the front.

The *leisure case:* Stephen and Lucinda are considering how to spend their respective weekends. Stephen prefers that he spend the weekend hiking in the Alps, rather than sunbathing in Gran Canaria. Lucinda prefers that she spend the weekend sunbathing in Gran Canaria, rather than hiking in the Alps.

The anonymized variant p_{Ava}^N of Ava's preference is the preference for sitting in the front of the taxi, rather than the back. The anonymized variant p_{Bert}^N of Bert's preference is the preference for sitting in the back of the taxi, rather than the front. It would clearly be incoherent for an arbitrary person C to have both p_{Ava}^N and p_{Bert}^N with respect to themselves, which means that p_{Ava} and p_{Bert} are type-noncotenable. The TNC model thus entails that Ava and Bert are in disagreement. However, this will probably strike many of us as a counterintuitive verdict about the taxi case. Similar reasoning shows that $p_{Stephen}$ and $p_{Lucinda}$ are type-noncotenable, which generates the same problem.

This concern for the TNC model is undoubtedly significant. Nevertheless, it doesn't destabilize the model. Rather, its significance is borne out by the fact that it prompts us to recognize a significant distinction. This is the distinction between disagreement and *preferential conflict* (or *conflict*, for short). Once we are mindful of this distinction, we'll be able to see that the subjects in the taxi and leisure cases are in disagreement, even as they don't experience conflict.

In essence, we can say that two persons experience conflict when they believe that they can't both do what they prefer and each of them prefers to do what they prefer, rather than what the other person prefers. To put the idea more precisely, let's first say that that A's preference p_A that A does act a_1, rather than act a_2 is *satisfied* iff A in fact does a_1, rather than a_2. We can then define conflict as follows:[30]

Conflict: A and B experience conflict over matter *m* iff (i) A and B believe that their respective preferences p_A and p_B pertaining to *m* can't be jointly satisfied; (ii) A prefers that p_A, rather than p_B, be satisfied; and (iii) B prefers that p_B, rather than p_A, be satisfied.

In a classic paper, Charles Stevenson (1963, p. 2) offers a case that nicely illustrates how conflict might arise:[31]

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[29] Cp. Beddor (2020, p. 536) and Marques (2014, n. 13), and see also Lewis (1989, p. 119) and Worsnip (2019, pp. 260-1). I've added names for the subjects in the leisure case.

[30] Cp. the germinal ideas in López de Sa (2015, p. 159); MacFarlane (2014, p. 123); Marques (2015, pp. 6-7; 2016); Rovane (2012, p. 246); and Schaffer (2009, p. 212). Note that this definition allows that we can experience conflict over matters other than MPT.

Also, note that conflict is distinct from the relation that Belleri (2014) calls 'dispute' and from the activity of disagreeing, as characterized by e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, pp. 60-1); Kinzel and Kusch (2018); and MacFarlane (2014, § 6.1). On the latter, cp. also Rowbottom (2018, § 5).

[31] Note that Stevenson's use of 'divergent' diverges a bit from ours.

"Two men are planning to have dinner together. One wants to eat at a restaurant that the other doesn't like. Temporarily, then, the men cannot "agree" on where to dine…The men have divergent preferences and each is trying to redirect the preference of the other—though normally, of course, each is willing to revise his own preference in the light of what the other may say."

Call the men in this case A and B. A has the preference p_A that A and B eat (on that evening) at restaurant r_1, rather than restaurant r_2. By contrast, B has the preference p_B that A and B eat (on that evening) at r_2, rather than r_1. Since it's obvious that p_A and p_B can't be jointly satisfied, it's reasonable to attribute to A and B the belief that their respective preferences can't be jointly satisfied. Moreover, as Stevenson points out, A prefers that p_A, rather than p_B, be satisfied, whereas B prefers that p_B, rather than p_A, be satisfied. Accordingly, the men in this case experience conflict.

With the notion of conflict in hand, we can now take a second look at the taxi and leisure cases. We noted that in the taxi case, Ava has the preference p_{Ava} that she sit in the front of the taxi, rather than in the back. Similarly, Bert has the preference p_{Bert} that he sit in the back of the taxi, rather than the front. Given that both the front and the back of the taxi are available to prospective passengers, it should be obvious to both Ava and Bert that their respective preferences *can* be jointly satisfied. Accordingly, we can reasonably refrain from attributing to either of them the belief that their preferences can't be jointly satisfied. It follows that Ava and Bert don't experience conflict, and parallel reasoning shows that the same goes for Stephen and Lucinda.

What about the challenge to the TNC model? The first thing to say is that the taxi and leisure cases do look to teach us something important—that A and B's having type-noncotenable preferences is insufficient for them to experience conflict. The second is that once we distinguish conflict from disagreement, we come to recognize that we can plausibly describe the subjects in these cases as being in states of disagreement.

About Ava and Bert, for instance, we can plausibly say that they are in disagreement about where to sit in the taxi insofar as Ava prefers to sit in the front, whereas Bert prefers to sit in the back. Putting the point succinctly, we can say that Ava and Bert have *divergent* seating preferences, even though they are not in a state of preferential conflict. Their preferences diverge insofar as Ava and Bert respectively prefer to take courses of action both of which it would be incoherent for a single person to prefer that they take. This is just to say, of course, that Ava and Bert have type-noncotenable preferences. It's easy to see that we can think along similar lines about Stephen and Lucinda.

We learn from the taxi and leisure cases, then, that the relation of taste disagreement is distinct from that of preferential conflict. Disagreement and conflict can occur together, as in Stevenson's dining case, but they can also come apart, as they do in the taxi and leisure cases. We also see, as we did in § 5.1, that we can appropriately characterize taste disagreement as a kind of preferential divergence—namely, type-noncotenability.[32]

5.3. Disagreement pluralism, v. 1

To close, we'll turn to two objections which prompt us to think more deeply not just about taste disagreement, but about disagreement in general. Suppose that Hsiangyun has the belief $b_{Hsiangyun}$ that she is in Taipei and that Charles has the belief $b_{Charles}$ that he is not in Taipei. It seems correct to say that Hsiangyun and Charles aren't in disagreement. However, the anonymized variants $b_{Hsiangyun}^N$ and $b_{Charles}^N$ of their beliefs are respectively the belief that one is in Taipei and the belief that one isn't in Taipei. $b_{Hsiangyun}$ and $b_{Charles}$ are thus type-noncotenable, insofar as it would be incoherent for a

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[32] We'll refine the latter claim just below, in § 5.4.

single person to believe both that they are in Taipei and that they aren't.[33] This means that if we extended the TNC model to full beliefs by taking doxastic type-noncotenability to be necessary and sufficient for *doxastic disagreement*, then we would seem to overgenerate cases of doxastic disagreement. This result puts pressure on the advocate of the TNC model to say something about the relationship between taste disagreement and doxastic disagreement.[34]

I'm inclined to agree that in the Taipei case, Hsiangyun and Charles fail to disagree even though they have type-noncotenable beliefs. How to square this, though, with the TNC model? For the Taipei case to have bite against the TNC model, we must assume that if type-noncotenability suffices for taste disagreement, then it also suffices for doxastic disagreement. In other words, we have to assume a kind of *monism* about taste and doxastic disagreement. However, it doesn't seem that we are antecedently mandated to accept this monist outlook. Moreover, if our intuitions suggest that the conditions for taste and doxastic disagreement differ, then this looks to be a strong reason to seriously consider an alternative, *pluralist* account of disagreement.[35]

There are many questions that can be raised about disagreement pluralism, but let us focus on one of the most fundamental questions. In the present context, disagreement pluralism involves the suggestions that type-noncotenability is necessary and sufficient for taste disagreement, whereas it is insufficient for doxastic disagreement. In light of this, we are compelled to say that the relation R in which doxastic disagreement consists is stronger than type-noncotenability.[36] The following question then arises: what do these two relations have in common such that it is appropriate to describe both of them as 'disagreement?' We might call this the *unity challenge* for disagreement pluralism.[37]

A straightforward way of addressing the unity challenge is to articulate a generic notion of disagreement that covers type-noncotenability while also plausibly covering the relation in which doxastic disagreement consists. While I won't venture to fully defend such a generic notion of disagreement here, the following seems to be a good start:[38]

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[33] We're assuming, of course, that Hsiangyun believes that she is *fully* located within Taipei and that Charles believes that he is not even partially located within Taipei.

[34] Thanks to Neil Sinhababu for stimulating discussion of this objection. Similar objections can be raised in connection with beliefs in modally or temporally neutral propositions. See MacFarlane (2014, p. 128) and Drier (2009, p. 98), and cp. Marques (2014, § 4.1).

[35] Disagreement pluralism has a strong foothold in contemporary discussions; my aim here is to offer a sharpened formulation of the view, as it pertains to doxastic and taste disagreement. For relevant discussion, see Baker (2014); Diaz-Legaspe (2015, 2016); Egan (2012, pp. 575-6; 2014, pp. 95-7); Eriksson (2016, § 8); Huvenes (2012, § 7); López de Sa (2015, § 2); MacFarlane (2014, ch. 6); Marques (2014); Marques and García-Carpintero (2014); Moruzzi (ms); Osorio and Villanueva (2019); Palmira (2017); Ridge (2013); and Sundell (2011, §§ 2 and 3). See also Davis (2015, n. 6) and Stojanovic (2019, § 5), as well as Baker and Woods (2015, § III)'s helpful remarks on 'A-type' and 'B-type discordance.'

[36] It may be, for instance, that R is stronger than type-noncotenability insofar as it requires that A and B's beliefs *concern* the same circumstance of evaluation c, i.e. that the truth-conditions of their beliefs involve the same parameters (world, time, location, etc.). This condition isn't met the Taipei case, and this may suffice to explain why Charles and Hsiangyun fail to stand in doxastic disagreement. Alternatively, it may be that doxastic disagreement involves an incompatibility relation that differs in *kind* from type-noncotenability, as e.g. Belleri and Palmira (2013); Marques (2014); and Palmira (2017) have argued.

[37] This is familiar territory for veterans of other pluralism debates, e.g. those concerning truth, logical consequence, or epistemic justification. For instance, on the unity challenge for truth pluralism, see Pedersen and Lynch (2018, § 20.3.2). For additional articulations of the unity challenge for disagreement pluralism, see Palmira (2017, p. 297); Ridge (2013; 2014: ch. 6); and Zeman (2020a, § 5).

Of course, it may be that doxastic disagreement comes in a plurality of forms, as Palmira (2017) has recently argued. In this case, the unity challenge becomes even more pressing, as we have more relations to consider.

[38] Cp. Baker (2014, p. 41); Dugas (2018, pp. 138, 146); Huvenes (2012, p. 178); Ridge (2013, pp. 55-6, 59-60; 2014, pp. 187, 189-190); and Wright (2001, p. 53; 2006, p. 38). Zeman (2020b) has recently advanced what he calls a 'minimal' notion of disagreement, which is meant to play essentially the same role as (GD). While I lack the space to discuss this

(GD) A and B disagree over matter *m* at time *t* iff at *t*, A has a (doxastic or non-doxastic) attitude α of kind K about *m* and B has a (doxastic or non-doxastic) attitude β of kind K about *m*, and α and β are incompatible$_K$ with one another.

The basic idea behind (GD) is that for attitudes α and β to generate disagreement between A and B, α and β must stand in an incompatibility relation that is indexed to attitudes of that kind. By referencing such kind-specific incompatibility relations, (GD) leaves open the possibility (though it doesn't entail) that the incompatibility relation *R* in which doxastic disagreement consists is distinct from type-noncotenability, in which taste disagreement consists.[39]

By way of motivating (GD), I would note two details in particular. The first is that (GD) makes reference to both doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes. This is an important desideratum, provided that we want our generic notion of disagreement to cover all, or at least most, of the fine-grained accounts of disagreement that have been proposed in e.g. aesthetics, metaethics, epistemology, metaontology, argumentation theory, and the philosophies of logic and language.[40]

Secondly, the generic notion of disagreement articulated in (GD) centers solely on the (doxastic or non-doxastic) *attitudes* that A and B have. In particular, then, (GD) doesn't advert to any *utterances* that A and B make. This also seems desirable, given that if A and B make utterances and we're inclined to describe them as disagreeing, we presumably take this disagreement to be ultimately grounded in their attitudes, rather than their utterances. Jackson and Pettit (1998, p. 251) put this point crisply, noting that "[t]he production of sentences makes public our disagreements; it does not create them."

To illustrate, consider the following case:

(15)

A [to B]: There is a table in front of me.

B [to A]: No, there is no table in front of you.

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notion in detail, I would note that it comes with the requirement (ibid. § 3) that attitudes α and β have the same *content*. Insofar as it is free from this requirement, (GD) is even more minimal than Zeman's notion. Given the discussion in his § 2, I take it that he would regard this as a virtue.

[39] We should mention a few caveats regarding (GD). First, it may be that there are 'mixed' instances of disagreement, in which α and β are attitudes of different kinds (this wouldn't be so surprising, insofar as pluralist theories and 'mixing cases' seem to go hand in hand). If there are, then we'll need to amend (GD) accordingly. Secondly, it may be that A and B can be in disagreement in virtue of one of them having, while the other *lacks*, an attitude of a certain kind; see e.g. Worsnip (2019, § 3.2). If so, then we can easily amend (GD) to accommodate this possibility. Thirdly, it may be that we ultimately want a generic notion of disagreement that applies not only to individuals, but also to *groups* (on group disagreement, see e.g. Carter (2016)). (GD) can be generalized to cover group disagreement, given a plausible account of the conditions under which a group counts as having (or lacking) a particular attitude α. Fourthly, note that (GD) is meant to deliver a generic notion of *synchronic*, rather than diachronic, disagreement (for helpful remarks on diachronic agreement, see Rowbottom (2018, § 4)).

Lastly, I would note that Palmira (2017, pp. 312-13) suggests that if we treat doxastic and conative (e.g. preferential) disagreement as exemplifying a generic notion of disagreement, then since doxastic disagreement is importantly "normative," conative disagreement should be as well. This suggestion is plausible, yet I suspect that the norms governing conative disagreement are fairly complex, insofar as they presumably depend upon facts about the context in which such disagreement occurs. Accordingly, I'll defer investigation of these norms for the time being.

[40] In this respect, (GD) improves upon certain recent attempts to offer a 'minimal' or 'basic' notion of disagreement, which cover only truth-evaluable attitudes such as beliefs. For discussion, see Baker (2014, pp. 41-2); Belleri and Palmira (2013); Coliva and Moruzzi (2014); Palmira (2015, p. 5; 2017, pp. 286, 304-5); Sundell (2011, § 2); and Zeman (2020a, b).

If we know of this case that A and B's utterances are sincere, i.e. that they believe the propositions that are expressed by the sentences that they utter, then we will infer that A and B are in disagreement. However, if we know that either of their utterances is insincere, then we'll infer that while the sentences that A and B utter express contradictory propositions, *A and B* aren't actually in disagreement, insofar as it is not the case that both of them believe those propositions. Similar cases involving non-doxastic attitudes are easy to construct, which suggests that the root of disagreement is the respective attitudes of the disputants, rather than any utterances that they make. (GD) is perspicuous insofar as it directs our attention to such attitudes straight away.[41]

Figure 3 offers a summary representation of the response to the unity challenge that (GD) affords. In the next subsection, we'll wrap up by refining this representation in light of an additional wrinkle concerning taste disagreement.[42]

Generic disagreement

| *Preferences about MPT:* Type-noncotenability | *Full beliefs:* Relation R that is stronger than type-noncotenability |

Figure 3: Disagreement pluralism, v. 1

5.4. Refined disagreement pluralism

A final overgeneration concern pertains to *exocentric* preferences. Peter Lasersohn (2005, pp. 670-74) has drawn an influential distinction between *autocentric* and exocentric uses of PPT.[43] In the sauerkraut case, Jill and Paul use 'tasty' autocentrically, insofar as they only have their respective tastes in mind when they use this PPT. By contrast, Sebastian uses 'tasty' exocentrically in (16), insofar as he has his cat Lulu's tastes in mind when he uses this PPT:

[Context: Sebastian has just fed Lulu a new brand of cat food and notices that she is eagerly consuming the food.]

(16) Sebastian: Oh, the new food must be tasty! I guess I should buy some more.

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[41] There are also cases of what Beddor (2019, pp. 824 *ff.*; 2020, p. 536) calls 'speechless disagreement,' in which subjects disagree although the disagreement is never voiced. The most natural way of accounting for such disagreements is in terms of the incompatible (doxastic or non-doxastic) attitudes of the subjects.

[42] We can of course amend Figure 3 if we determine that disagreement involving some other kind of attitude—e.g. credences or desires—consists in a further relation R´. Also, in fully developing disagreement pluralism, we will need to determine which relation is represented by the arrows in Figure 3. As truth pluralists have investigated a number of relevant relations, that literature should be particularly helpful here. For an instructive overview, see Edwards (2018, ch. 7). See also Kim and Pedersen (2018); Newhard (2014); and Wyatt (2014, § 5.5).

[43] See also Egan (2010, pp. 251-2).

We can draw a similar distinction between autocentric and exocentric preferences. Say that A's preference p_A is autocentric iff p_A's satisfaction only involves the properties of A. By contrast, say that p_A is exocentric iff p_A's satisfaction involves the properties of another person B (in addition, perhaps, to those of A).[44] The trouble for the TNC model, even in light of the subtleties that we've introduced, is that it looks to overgenerate taste disagreement in certain cases involving exocentric preferences.

Suppose, for instance, that Latisha has the preference $p_{Latisha}$ that Jamal experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not and that Sean has the preference p_{Sean} that Nadia not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. Suppose further that whether Jamal experiences sauerkraut's flavor won't affect whether Nadia does, and vice versa. It then seems correct to say that Latisha and Sean aren't in disagreement with one another. However, it's easy to see that $p_{Latisha}$ and p_{Sean} are type-noncotenable. The anonymized variant $p_{Latisha}^N$ of $p_{Latisha}$ is the preference to experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not. The anonymized variant p_{Sean}^N of p_{Sean} is the preference to not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. It would clearly be incoherent for an arbitrary person C to have both $p_{Latisha}^N$ and p_{Sean}^N with respect to themselves. This means that according to the TNC model, Latisha and Sean are in fact in disagreement.

A way to preserve the idea behind the TNC model while avoiding this concern is to refine the model and in turn, the pluralist picture of disagreement that we adumbrated in § 5.3. In particular, we should recognize a distinction between two kinds of taste disagreement. Say that A and B are in *autocentric taste disagreement* about MPT m iff A and B disagree about m because they have certain autocentric preferences regarding m. By contrast, say that A and B are in *exocentric taste disagreement* about m iff A and B disagree about m because they have certain preferences regarding m, at least one of which is exocentric.

The lesson of the above case is that while autocentric taste disagreement consists in type-noncotenability, exocentric taste disagreement is a bit more complex. We can differentiate the conditions for these two types of taste disagreement by refining the TNC model as follows:

The refined TNC model:

(TNC_{Auto}) A and B are in autocentric taste disagreement about MPT m iff they respectively have autocentric preferences about m that are type-noncotenable

(TNC_{Exo}) A and B are in exocentric taste disagreement about MPT m iff (i) they both have preferences about m, at least one of which is exocentric; (ii) these preferences are type-noncotenable; and (iii) these preferences are about the same tasters.

The refined TNC model enjoys two notable virtues. The first is that it rightly entails that Latisha and Sean don't disagree in the case above, given that their respective exocentric preferences are about different tasters. The second is that it nicely handles cases in which A and B have type-

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[44] Note, then, that we treat *de nobis* preferences as exocentric.

    Note also that whereas it is plausible that autocentric uses of PPT, such as Jill and Paul's respective uses in (2) and (3), express the speaker's autocentric preference regarding an MPT, exocentric uses of PPT and exocentric preferences regarding MPT don't seem to be similarly aligned. For instance, when he uses 'tasty' exocentrically in (16), Sebastian doesn't seem to express his preference that Lulu experience the new food's flavor, rather than not (perhaps he doesn't care what flavors Lulu experiences as long as she's content). Rather, he seems to attribute to Lulu the *autocentric* preference that Lulu experience the new food's flavor, rather than not. This asymmetry between autocentric and exocentric uses of PPT is striking and will need to be explained by an adequate account of PPT.

noncotenable, exocentric preferences about the same taster C. Suppose, for instance, that Latisha prefers that Jamal experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not and that Sean prefers that Jamal not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. The refined model entails that Latisha and Sean are in exocentric taste disagreement about whether Jamal should experience sauerkraut's flavor, which looks to be the correct assessment.[45]

In so refining the TNC model, we in turn refine disagreement pluralism, as depicted in Figure 4:

Figure 4: Refined disagreement pluralism

This refined pluralist account of disagreement delivers the result that the relations in which exocentric taste disagreement and doxastic disagreement consist are both stronger than the relation in which autocentric taste disagreement consists.[46] It's no wonder, then, that the original TNC model, which was designed with autocentric preferences in mind, is beset by overgeneration objections. Going forward, it should be profitable to investigate whether autocentric taste disagreement is in fact the *weakest* variety of disagreement, or whether there are other varieties of disagreement that are even weaker.

6. Conclusions

We've covered quite a bit of ground in this discussion. We first saw that the relativist and absolutist models of faultless taste disagreement are empirically problematic, insofar as they presuppose that speakers tend to believe absolute propositions about MPT. This encouraged us to

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[45] Note that the refined model also handles cases in which A has the autocentric preference that they experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than not and B has the exocentric preference that A not experience sauerkraut's flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. A and B are classified as being in exocentric taste disagreement about A experiencing sauerkraut's flavor, which is precisely what we want.

[46] This confirms MacFarlane (2014, p. 123)'s sense that if (autocentric) taste disagreement involves incompatible non-doxastic attitudes such as preferences, then such disagreement is "rather thin." Of course, MacFarlane takes the resulting 'thinness' to be problematic. However, once we are careful to order different varieties of disagreement according to their strength, we can happily allow that some such varieties are in fact 'thinner' (that is, weaker) than others.

sketch a non-doxastic, preferential model of such disagreement: the TNC model. The TNC model prompts us to rethink the dialectical role of faultless taste disagreement in debates about PPT and points to a potential advantage enjoyed by expressivist accounts of PPT. We investigated four overgeneration objections that can be raised against the TNC model and found that while each of them motivates additional subtlety in our overall account of disagreement, we can preserve the spirit of the TNC model in the face of each of them. In light of these results, we can conclude that the TNC model, once suitably refined, looks to be a resilient and compelling account of the nature of faultless taste disagreement.[47]

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