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**Ranking Economics Departments in Terms of Residual Productivity:
New Zealand Economics Departments, 2000-2006**

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Abstract

This paper considers a new approach for ranking the research productivity of academic departments. Our approach provides rankings in terms of residual research output after controlling for the key characteristics of each department's academic staff. More specifically, we estimate residual research output rankings for all of New Zealand's economics departments based on their publication performance over the 2000 to 2006 period. We do so after taking into account the following characteristics of each department's academic staff: gender, experience, seniority, academic credentials, and academic rank. The paper concludes with a comparison of rankings generated by the residual research approach with those generated by traditional approaches to research rankings.

Keywords

economics departments
university rankings
research output
economics research

JEL Codes

A19, C81, J24

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I. Introduction

The literature on the research ranking of economics departments is extensive.¹ With early roots in the USA, economists have now undertaken rankings in many parts of the world. The majority of studies utilize journal rankings to weight the output of individual researchers, and then calculate a total or a per capita output measure for each department in their study. An alternative approach is to calculate citation counts per researcher, and then proceed to calculate departmental rankings—once again, either in total or on a per capita basis. Regardless of the approach used, the resulting per capita measures are often presented as proxy measures of departmental research productivity. However, such measures do not adjust for differences between institutions in the composition of their research staff. For example, some departments may have a higher proportion of researchers at the senior ranks of the professoriate. If so, one would expect such a department to exhibit better per capita research results than those generated by a department staffed largely by junior staff. Similar arguments can be advanced with respect to other academic staff attributes such as: years of experience, years at current institution, gender, and educational background.

In this paper we suggest an alternative approach in which measures of the research output of individual economists are modelled to determine rankings based on the residual research productivity of departments. In the simplest models, research output is viewed as a function of only the department in which the individual is located. Using New Zealand economics departments as a case study we show that for these models, as expected, estimates of research productivity are highly correlated to those based on traditional measures. We then consider more complex models that allow for the impact of a range of human resource variables. The resulting rankings can be interpreted as reflecting the underlying research productivity of each department, rather than its overall per capita output that may, for example, be based on having an above average number of Professors.

II. Data and Output Measurement Issues

The primary features of our database are as follows: a) relevant research is defined to be refereed papers published in journals included in the EconLit database as at 15 April 2007 (1217 journals); b) all countable publications, over the period 2000–2006, are assigned to each academic's home institution as at 15 April 2007 (a stock measure of output); and c) all academic staff holding the rank of Lecturer through Professor in a New Zealand university economics department, as at 15 April 2007, are included in the study.² In summary, 106 out of a total of 138 academic staff members

¹ For a general discussion of the evolution of the rankings exercise in the economics profession, see Macri and Sinha (2006). Additional background information can be found in Coupe (2003), Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003), Kodrzycki and Yu (2006), and Henrekson and Waldenstrom (2007).

² The primary database employed in this study is discussed in depth in Anderson and Tressler (2008a). It has been augmented by data from John Gibson on gender, years of experience, and name of PhD granting institution (if applicable) for all academic staff in our core database. It should be noted that New Zealand has only eight universities and all are included in this study. The institutions, in alphabetical order are: Auckland, Auckland University of Technology (AUT), Canterbury, Lincoln, Massey, Otago, Victoria, and Waikato.

authored or co-authored at least one paper over the seven year period of study. In total, 612 refereed papers were produced (in whole or in part) over the relevant time period.³

The second component of our database is the most contentious: the selection of a scalar measure of activity. It should initially be noted that our unit of output is the size adjusted page, and our selected output measure is the number of size adjusted pages per capita. In our study we have employed six different measures of output based on weighting schemes utilized in prior studies of research activity by economists. The most simplistic scheme employed is denoted as **EQUAL**; it assumes that all publications are of equal value and, as such, is primarily a measure of quantity rather than quality. We also adopt a weighting scheme based on a reputational survey of economics journals; this scheme was developed by Mason, Steagall & Fabritius (1997) and, hence, is denoted as **MFS**. Citation counts underlie three of our schemes, although each of these schemes is based on different time periods, covers a different set of journals (some overlap, but not total), and makes different adjustments to the underlying citation counts. These schemes are denoted as **KMS**, **COUPEIF** and **BAUWENS**, and are based on the work of Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas & Stengos (2003), Coupe (2003), and Bauwens (1998), respectively. The sixth and last weighting system is a hybrid scheme based in part on citation counts, arbitrary assignment to groups, and, most importantly, an ordered-logit analysis of academic rank regressed on journal publications and other control variables. A major advantage of this scheme, denoted as **GIBSON**, is that the weights reflect the implicit values placed by New Zealand-based promotions and hiring committees on their academic staff's research portfolios (see Gibson, 2000).

The different weighting schemes used to measure output differ significantly in terms of the journals covered and the degree of inequality of weights. For example, in the KMS scheme one page in the *American Economic Review* is equal to 34 pages in the *Economic Record*, whereas in the Bauwens scheme it equals 4 pages in the *Economic Record*. The Gini coefficients for the six measures based on the journals in which New Zealand economists published over the period are: Gibson 0.54, MSF 0.60, KMS 0.86, CoupeIF 0.67 and Bauwens 0.30.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and variable definitions of the data utilized in our subsequent empirical work. Note that 78% of all researchers are male. Although 90% of all researchers possess a PhD, only 36% of them hold a PhD from a "top-tier" programme.⁴ Furthermore, the average researcher has 14.1 years of experience, and has been at her/his current institution for 10.9 years. Approximately 20% of all academic staff are Professors; the relevant percentages for Associate Professor, Senior Lecturer and Lecturer are 20, 42 and 18, respectively. The database also yields other mean estimates that may be useful in interpreting our subsequent findings.⁵ For example, for all six measures of output, the higher the rank, the higher the average

³ It should also be noted that Peter Phillips, an internationally renowned economist, is not included in the Auckland data. We have restricted our dataset to academics holding "regular" appointments at New Zealand universities. By "regular" we mean an appointment akin to what would be called in a North American setting, a tenure or tenure track position. A regular appointment need not be a full-time appointment.

⁴ We have utilized Coupe's (2003) list of the top fifty economics departments based on citation counts.

⁵ Background information on the data presented in the remainder of this paragraph can be found in Anderson and Tressler (2008b).

Table 1: Variable Definitions and Means (Standard Deviations)

Variable		Description
<i>Dependent Variables</i>		
Quantity Equal	35.475	Unweighted share and size adjusted pages
Quantity Gibson	6.829	Share and size adjusted pages using Gibson weights
Quantity KMS	124.713	Share and size adjusted pages using KMS weights
Quantity MSF	35.820	Share and size adjusted pages using MSF weights
Quantity CoupelF	13.00	Share and size adjusted pages using CoupelF weights
Quantity Bauwens	68.173	Share and size adjusted pages using Bauwens weights
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>		
Gender	0.783 (0.414)	Male =1, Female =0
PhD	0.906 (0.293)	PhD = 1, otherwise =0
Ranked PhD	0.362 (0.482)	PhD from a Coupe top 50 department =1, otherwise =0
Experience	14.065 (9.628)	Years since receipt of highest degree (or publication of first article if earlier)
Seniority	10.899 (9.270)	Years of employment at current university
Auckland	0.188 (0.393)	Auckland staff member =1, otherwise =0
Canterbury	0.116 (0.321)	Canterbury staff member=1, otherwise=0
Lincoln	0.087 (0.283)	Lincoln staff member=1, otherwise =0
Massey	0.174 (0.380)	Massey staff member=1, otherwise=0
Otago	0.123 (0.330)	Otago staff member=1, otherwise=0
Victoria	0.159 (0.367)	Victoria staff member=1, otherwise =0
Waikato	0.109 (0.312)	Waikato staff member=1, otherwise=0
Senior Lecturer	0.420 (0.495)	Rank is Senior Lecturer=1, otherwise=1
Associate Professor	0.196 (0.398)	Rank is Associate Professor=1, otherwise=0
Professor	0.196 (0.398)	Rank is Professor=1, otherwise=0

15.2); they are generally to be found in the lower ranks of the profession⁶; and many of them were not in research-related positions for the full duration of this study (40% for females and 26% for males). Of the 138 economists in the sample, 32 did not publish in a journal included in the *EconLit* database over the period 2000-2006, and some of the remaining economists had zero weighted research output for some output measures.

III. A Simple Model of Research Productivity, Location and Weighted Pages per Capita

In a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) model in which research output is regressed against a set of dummy variables reflecting the departments in which the staff are located, the estimated coefficients represent the expected value of research output in each department, i.e. the estimated weighted average pages per capita. However, as noted above, a significant number of economists in the sample did not publish over the period 2000-2006. The censored nature of the sample means that OLS estimates would be biased; for this reason Tobit models are estimated.⁷ It should be noted that in a simple Tobit model the estimated coefficients are proportional to the expected value of research output in each department.⁸

The results of regressing each of the six measures of research output against a constant and location dummies only are shown in Table 2. Since research output is determined by much more than the location of each individual staff member, it is not surprising that these models perform poorly. Only for the KMS weighting scheme does the Wald test indicate possible rejection of the hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero. For Otago and Canterbury all location coefficients are significant regardless of the output measure used, while for Auckland four of six are significant.⁹ Despite the poor fit of the model, there is a very high level of correlation between the estimated coefficients and average weighted measures of research output per capita.¹⁰ As shown in Table 3, for all six models the correlation coefficients are 0.96 or higher.

⁶ Only two of 27 Professors and 3 of 27 Associate Professors are female, whereas 25 of 85 of junior positions (Lecturers and Senior Lecturers) are held by females.

⁷ Since Tobit Type One models may produce biased and inconsistent estimates if heteroscedasticity exists, we use Tobit Type 2 models.

⁸ For a discussion of the interpretation of estimated coefficients in Tobit models see McDonald and Moffitt (1980).

⁹ As indicated by the significance of Insignia, the use of a selection model such as Tobit rather than OLS is appropriate.

¹⁰ The weighted pages per capita (wpc) estimates are from Anderson and Tressler (2008a).

Table 2: Research Output and Location, New Zealand Economics Departments 2000-2006

	Research Output Measure					
	Equal	Gibson	KMS	MSF	CoupeIF	Bauwens
Auckland	22.914 (1.36)	8.796 (2.26)*	453.715 (2.24)*	101.126 (2.15)*	19.031 (1.51)	61.830 (1.99)*
Canterbury	35.943 (1.79)+	7.965 (1.94)+	317.296 (1.99)*	100.608 (2.09)*	24.193 (1.75)+	72.351 (2.07)*
Lincoln	24.786 (1.22)	3.697 (0.94)	165.781 (1.06)	67.284 (1.41)	9.400 (0.68)	43.822 (1.25)
Massey	20.594 (1.09)	3.203 (0.84)	119.837 (0.81)	53.722 (1.14)	4.564 (0.37)	35.501 (1.07)
Otago	50.398 (2.33)*	12.972 (2.24)*	382.638 (2.36)*	140.531 (2.50)*	29.464 (2.10)*	110.204 (2.49)*
Victoria	17.598 (0.93)	5.970 (1.27)	325.020 (1.89)+	87.479 (1.73)+	31.248 (1.50)	58.358 (1.48)
Waikato	56.454 (1.71)+	7.631 (1.59)	188.563 (1.22)	95.227 (1.78)+	18.722 (1.25)	103.583 (1.98)*
Constant	-2.969 (0.19)	-2.112 (0.66)	-260.130 (1.73)+	-87.974 (1.70)+	-15.881 (1.25)	-13.144 (0.48)
Insigma	4.061 (25.57)**	2.558 (15.52)**	5.895 (25.50)**	4.364 (24.93)**	3.622 (11.43)**	4.701 (35.20)**
Wald chi2(7)	7.44	9.69	12.33	11.66	9.29	9.42
Prob>chi2 (test for all coeffs=0)	0.3843	0.2071	0.0901	0.1122	0.2327	0.2241
Left-censored obs	32	32	49	55	47	32
Uncensored obs	106	106	89	83	91	106
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138

Note: Robust z statistics are shown in parentheses, with statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by +, *, **.

Table 3: Weighted Pages per Capita and Estimated Location Coefficients

	EQUAL		Gibson		KMS		MSF		CoupeIF		Bauwens	
	Est.	WPC	Est.	WPC	Est.	WPC	Est.	WPC	Est.	WPC	Est.	WPC
Auckland	22.9	26.6	8.8	8	453.7	254.4	101.1	39.8	19.0	11.6	61.8	60.2
Canterbury	35.9	39.8	8.0	7.4	317.3	141.5	100.6	39.1	24.2	16.8	72.4	72.2
Lincoln	24.8	31.6	3.7	4	165.8	41.8	67.3	16.3	9.4	7	43.8	50.1
Massey	20.6	29.4	3.2	4	119.8	33.2	53.7	17.2	4.6	4.4	35.5	45.7
Otago	50.4	51.3	13.0	11.7	382.6	151.9	140.5	67.9	29.5	16.6	110.2	104.3
Victoria	17.6	27.8	6.0	6.7	325.0	150	87.5	32.9	31.2	23.3	58.4	69
Waikato	56.5	59.8	7.6	7.2	188.6	55.4	95.2	39.1	18.7	14.4	103.6	102.8
Cor. Coef	0.99		0.99		0.97		0.98		0.96		0.99	

Note: the WPC estimates are from Anderson and Tressler (2008a).

IV. Empirical Models of Research Productivity

In the academic labour market literature, the characteristics of individual academics and their locations have been shown to be related to market outcomes, i.e., academic salaries or rank.¹¹ The characteristics of individuals considered in this literature include: experience (the time since obtaining a PhD or first publishing), seniority (number of years at the current institution), gender, education as indicated by holding a PhD, and the quality of the institution from which the PhD was obtained.

Correspondingly, it is reasonable to suggest that research productivity is influenced by the attributes of individual academics, and also the department in which the individual is located. The particular characteristics of other members in a department, the complementary nature of the group, the department's research culture, the efficiency of the teaching programme and administration, the level of staffing in the department, teaching loads, research funding of various kinds and the number and characteristics of doctoral students all impact on research output. It follows that the relative research productivity of departments, and thus research rankings, will also be determined by both the attributes of the individuals and the characteristics of the department.

In this section we present simple econometric models of research output using data on the characteristics of individual academics described above. By including a location variable we estimate the "residual research productivity" of departments after controlling for the general characteristics of individual researchers. As above, Tobit models are estimated given the censored sample.

Academic rank is influenced by research quantity and quality, and the other variables that represent individual characteristics.¹² In order to concentrate on the influence of gender, experience, seniority and location, we first present results that do not control for academic rank. Following the academic labour market literature we include experience and seniority squared. The excluded dummy category in these models is a female without a PhD at Auckland University of Technology (AUT). The results are presented in Table 4

The Wald test supports the hypothesis that "all coefficients are zero can be rejected" except for the KMS and CoupelF models. The results show that after controlling for experience, seniority and location, male economists publish more research than females for five of the six output measures.¹³ Having a PhD has a significantly positive influence on research production in only three of the six models, and the ranked PhD variable has an unclear impact on research output across the models. At low levels, experience has a significant positive impact on research output in all models, but the marginal impact declines as experience increases, with the maximum impact of experience on research output being reached at between 21 and 24 years.

¹¹ See, for example Hamermesh (1989), Ransom (1994), Moore et al 1998, Moore et al (2001, Bratesberg et al (2003), Moore et al (2007) and Gibson et al (2008).

¹² See, for example, Gibson et al (2008).

¹³ While the coefficient for gender is positive for the CoupelF model, it is not statistically significant.

Table 4: Research Output, Individual Characteristics and Location, New Zealand Economists 2000-2006

	Research Output Measure					
	Equal	Gibson	KMS	MSF	CoupeIF	Bauwens
Gender	17.625 (1.68)+	4.704 (2.40)*	135.234 (1.97)*	35.461 (2.55)*	9.120 (1.44)	35.158 (1.96)*
PhD	21.384 (1.27)	4.744 (1.59)	246.811 (2.09)*	46.155 (2.16)*	27.210 (1.81)+	42.817 (1.55)
Ranked PhD	-0.527 (0.04)	1.962 (0.57)	7.909 (0.11)	-9.801 (0.47)	-13.002 (0.94)	4.867 (0.18)
Experience	8.333 (3.85)**	1.451 (2.48)*	33.404 (2.04)*	9.319 (2.52)*	5.169 (2.00)*	16.753 (3.57)**
Experience ²	-0.197 (3.52)**	-0.032 (2.20)*	-0.743 (1.81)+	-0.196 (2.12)*	-0.116 (1.87)+	-0.398 (3.33)**
Seniority	-5.451 (2.42)*	-1.184 (2.21)*	-42.784 (2.24)*	-6.580 (1.94)+	-4.483 (2.26)*	-12.835 (2.99)**
Seniority ²	0.130 (2.20)*	0.028 (2.06)*	1.012 (2.01)*	0.153 (1.72)+	0.108 (2.18)*	0.310 (2.85)**
Auckland	29.611 (1.52)	9.484 (2.11)*	574.927 (2.55)*	116.550 (2.47)*	37.800 (2.12)*	79.425 (2.23)*
Canterbury	37.154 (1.87)+	7.630 (1.85)+	392.376 (2.41)*	103.175 (2.24)*	36.066 (2.29)*	78.623 (2.27)*
Lincoln	22.154 (1.01)	4.008 (0.89)	268.409 (1.52)	66.527 (1.42)	16.382 (1.14)	48.088 (1.17)
Massey	31.907 (1.68)+	5.290 (1.26)	256.794 (1.69)+	69.702 (1.53)	20.252 (1.48)	63.463 (1.81)+
Otago	34.296 (1.82)+	10.070 (1.98)*	377.987 (2.54)*	121.685 (2.35)*	27.386 (2.37)*	83.900 (2.19)*
Victoria	22.640 (1.13)	6.088 (1.05)	432.330 (2.24)*	97.570 (1.86)+	49.067 (1.73)+	73.938 (1.67)+
Waikato	56.848 (1.63)	7.569 (1.66)+	266.639 (1.78)+	97.205 (1.98)*	28.486 (2.08)*	110.247 (2.28)*
Constant	-65.029 (2.47)*	-14.683 (2.65)**	-676.308 (2.82)**	-184.817 (3.24)**	-67.725 (2.12)*	-133.553 (2.91)**
Insigma	3.981 (24.07)**	2.478 (15.59)**	5.807 (26.11)**	4.291 (25.29)**	3.557 (11.86)**	4.597 (36.33)**
Wald chi2(7)	26.11*	24.44*	19.71	24.82*	16.19	26.76*
Prob>chi2 (test for all coeffs=0)	0.0250	0.0406	0.1395	0.0363	0.3019	0.0207
left-censored obs	32	32	49	55	47	32
uncensored obs	106	106	89	83	91	106
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138

Note: Robust z statistics are shown in parentheses, with statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by +, *, **.

**Table 5: Research Output, Individual Characteristics and Rank
New Zealand Economics Departments 2000-2006**

	Research Output Measure					
	Equal	Gibson	KMS	MSF	CoupeIF	Bauwens
Gender	5.466 (0.65)	2.229 (1.23)	85.183 (1.35)	23.106 (1.89)+	3.317 (0.59)	12.085 (0.78)
PhD	-15.481 (0.92)	-2.362 (0.61)	179.943 (1.38)	4.605 (0.18)	8.551 (0.75)	-26.934 (0.86)
Ranked PhD	-0.702 (0.06)	1.944 (0.66)	0.363 (0.01)	-8.753 (0.50)	-13.096 (1.06)	4.883 (0.23)
Experience	0.070 (0.03)	-0.200 (0.45)	-9.000 (0.61)	-0.889 (0.31)	0.165 (0.11)	1.019 (0.27)
Experience ²	-0.058 (1.19)	-0.004 (0.37)	0.077 (0.21)	-0.027 (0.36)	-0.031 (0.72)	-0.133 (1.39)
Seniority	-0.382 (0.22)	-0.209 (0.50)	-29.136 (1.52)	-0.346 (0.12)	-1.612 (1.31)	-3.212 (0.95)
Seniority ²	0.003 (0.06)	0.003 (0.31)	0.677 (1.33)	0.005 (0.06)	0.039 (1.08)	0.069 (0.74)
Auckland	34.221 (1.74)+	10.735 (2.24)*	683.316 (2.63)**	115.949 (2.35)*	42.128 (2.10)*	90.230 (2.45)*
Canterbury	54.058 (2.64)**	11.210 (2.59)**	531.764 (2.90)**	114.648 (2.31)*	46.018 (2.41)*	111.781 (3.13)**
Lincoln	29.959 (1.46)	5.856 (1.26)	411.998 (2.03)*	69.133 (1.38)	22.573 (1.38)	64.388 (1.61)
Massey	32.300 (1.76)+	5.504 (1.30)	306.229 (1.89)+	59.403 (1.26)	20.059 (1.39)	64.273 (1.86)+
Otago	51.199 (2.47)*	13.848 (2.44)*	552.442 (2.98)**	134.972 (2.43)*	38.292 (2.43)*	117.490 (2.73)**
Victoria	45.470 (2.16)*	10.992 (1.86)+	642.211 (2.87)**	115.696 (2.13)*	63.177 (1.98)*	119.152 (2.71)**
Waikato	59.679 (1.96)*	8.384 (1.82)+	318.367 (1.91)+	87.054 (1.73)+	28.542 (1.95)+	116.304 (2.68)**
Senior Lecturer	47.515 (3.73)**	10.240 (3.22)**	453.820 (3.01)**	62.752 (3.00)**	31.168 (2.05)*	93.355 (3.91)**
Assoc. Professor	87.261 (4.65)**	17.956 (4.26)**	527.425 (3.86)**	92.942 (3.60)**	47.748 (2.57)*	164.175 (5.24)**
Professor	123.353 (3.97)**	24.681 (3.70)**	622.618 (3.47)**	151.411 (3.61)**	72.234 (2.25)*	236.432 (4.75)**
Constant	-46.129 (1.91)+	-11.744 (2.03)*	-836.910 (2.75)**	-157.418 (2.88)**	-60.747 (2.13)*	-100.094 (2.20)*
Insigma	3.838 (26.40)**	2.375 (16.40)**	5.732 (24.83)**	4.188 (28.18)**	3.479 (12.57)**	4.443 (40.61)**
Wald chi2(7)	54.11**	39.87**	37.53**	39.05**	29.69*	58.58**
Prob>chi2 (test for all coeffs=0)	0.0000	0.0014	0.0029	0.0018	0.0287	0.0000
left-censored obs	32	32	49	55	47	32
uncensored obs	106	106	89	83	91	106
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138

Note: Robust z statistics are shown in parentheses, with statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by +, *, **.

In contrast, seniority (number of years at current institution) initially has a negative impact that declines in absolute value¹⁴. In the academic labour market literature, Ransom (1994) argues that the negative impact of seniority on academic salaries may be explained by the monopsony power of universities in dealing with relatively immobile staff. Bratsberg et al (2003) suggest that it could also be the result of “raiding”- the bidding away of high-quality faculty. The results above suggest that, at least initially, research output declines with seniority, and thus lower salaries or rank may simply reflect lower productivity.

For Canterbury and Otago, residual research productivity, as indicated by the location dummy, is positive and significant for all models; for Auckland and Waikato it is significant for all but the **EQUAL** output measure, and for Victoria for four of the six models.¹⁵ Results for Lincoln and Massey are more mixed.

Table 5 shows the results for models in which academic rank is included as an explanatory variable. The excluded dummy category is now a female without a PhD who is a lecturer at AUT.¹⁶ After controlling for academic rank, the other characteristics of individual economists (gender, education, PhD and ranked PhD, experience and seniority) do not have a statistically significant impact on research output.¹⁷ The failure of seniority to have a statistically significant impact on research output after controlling for academic rank is noteworthy. As noted above, Ransom (1994) suggests that the negative impact of seniority may be explained by the monopsony power of universities who discriminate against immobile academic staff. If this were the case, after controlling for academic rank, we would expect research output to be positively associated with seniority. Our results suggest that there is no evidence to support this hypothesis for New Zealand economics departments.¹⁸

The academic rank dummy variables are positive and significant, with magnitudes that show the appropriate ordering across the ranks, i.e. in all models professors publish more than associate professors who publish more than senior lecturers who in turn publish more than lecturers. The location variable is now significant for Auckland, Canterbury, Otago, Victoria and Waikato for all models. For Massey and Lincoln the coefficients are positive, but often not significant. That is, the residual research productivity of these departments is not significantly better than AUT.

¹⁴ The models suggest that the impact of seniority would be positive after 21-22 years.

¹⁵ This indicates that for these departments, research output is higher than if staff with the same attributes were located at AUT.

¹⁶ The Wald test suggests that all models are significant at the 1% level, except the Coupelf which is significant at the 5% level.

¹⁷ An exception is the positive influence of gender for MSF weighted output.

¹⁸ Estimated coefficients for seniority are negative, but not statistically significant.

V. Ranking Departments in Terms of Residual Research Productivity

As noted above, the location variable captures the residual research productivity associated with a department after controlling for key attributes of the staff: gender, education, experience, seniority and rank. The coefficients can therefore be used to construct residual research productivity (RRP) rankings of departments. In Table 6 the resulting rankings are compared with those based on weighted pages per capita (WPC) from Anderson and Tressler (2008a).¹⁹ For both ranking methodologies an “overall rank” is provided by treating all six measures equally. For comparison purposes the ranking implied by New Zealand government’s Performance Based Research Funding (PBRF) scheme is also provided.²⁰ The most consistent changes in ranking, after taking account of residual research productivity, are those for Victoria and Waikato. Across all departments in New Zealand at the 15 April 2007 census date, Victoria had the highest percentage of lecturers (36%) and a relatively low proportion of staff at the rank of professor and associate professor. In contrast Waikato had the second to lowest percentage of lecturers (7%) and a relatively high percentage of staff in senior ranks.²¹ After controlling for staff variables, Victoria ties with Otago as the highest ranked department in terms of residual research productivity, while Waikato slips from 3rd to 5th in the rankings.

Table 6: Comparison of Rankings of New Zealand Economics Department by Weighted Pages per Capital and Residual Research Productivity

	Equal		Gibson		KMS		MSF		CoupelF		Bauwens		Overall		PBRF
	WPC	RRP	WPC	RRP	WPC	RRP	WPC	RRP	WPC	RRP	WPC	RRP	WPC	RRP	
Auckland	7	5	2	4	1	1	4	2	5	3	5	5	4	4	2
AUT	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Canterbury	3	2	3	2	4	4	2	4	2	2	3	4	2	3	4
Lincoln	4	7	6	6	6	5	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Massey	5	6	6	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Otago	2	3	1	1	2	3	1	1	3	4	1	2	1	1	1
Victoria	6	4	5	3	3	2	5	3	1	1	4	1	4	1	4
Waikato	1	1	4	5	5	6	3	5	4	5	2	3	3	5	3

¹⁹ Since none of the estimated coefficients are negative, AUT is ranked eighth (and last) for all measures.

²⁰ For a brief discussion of the PBRF programme, and its applicability to the economics profession, see Gibson, Tressler and Anderson (2008).

²¹ With the exception of AUT, there is relatively little variation between department in the experience, seniority or the percentage of staff with PhDs. AUT as a small and relatively new department has staff with relatively little experience.

VI. Conclusions

In this paper we have developed a methodology that enables the research productivity of academic departments to be ranked in a way that takes into account some of the key characteristics of each department's academic staff. We have illustrated this methodology by applying it to the research output of academic economists in New Zealand's university-based economics departments, as measured by six different journal weighting schemes. Our results show that Victoria, a department that was ranked 4th on weighted pages per capita in Anderson and Tressler (2008a) and 4th in the New Zealand government's PBRF exercise, ties with Otago as the nation's highest ranked department.

The characteristics of the staff resources available to departments are not the only relevant variables that may influence residual research productivity and ultimately research rankings. For example, this methodology could also be utilized to determine the impact of external research income and the characteristics of teaching programmes and teaching loads on research productivity.

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