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The New Zealand Wars Documentary Series: Discursive Struggle and Cultural Memory.

A thesis
Submitted in fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy in Screen & Media Studies
at
The University of Waikato
by
Lisa Perrott

The University of Waikato
2007
Thesis Abstract

The 1998 television broadcast of *The New Zealand Wars* documentary series was a significant public event, which had a major impact on a broad range of communities and individuals in Aotearoa New Zealand. This popular television history engaged with issues of historical veracity, race, culture and nationhood and challenged previously dominant discourses associated with these concepts. In doing so, it provoked heated debate, and a re-imagining of ‘nation’, and also opened up spaces for alternative ways of engaging with historical narrative.

Informed by post-colonialism, cultural studies and cultural memory, this thesis explores the discursive and affective role of *The New Zealand Wars*, as it has operated within the turbulent climate of 1990s New Zealand cultural relations. This catalytic function is described in this thesis as a phenomenon of a television series shaped by, whilst also intervening in, processes of cultural colonisation and decolonisation.

While both of these processes involve the transmission of discourse via cultural forms, the act of cultural *decolonisation* requires, in addition, the convergence of a number of agents (people and communities, discursive and memory resources) and circumstances, within particular contextual conditions. Such a convergence provided the conditions for the discursive synthesis, which shaped the production, construction and reception of this series.

The role of audio-visual media (and specifically television documentary) in transmitting cultural memory is significant as it enables the flow of memory through channels or forms (such as visual, oral and aural traditions) that can bring about new perspectives and critical reflections upon colonial discourse and dominant concepts of nation and culture. In addition to these social and intellectual processes of audience engagement, this thesis argues that experiential and affective dimensions of cultural memory can (in
these specific circumstances) open up radical spaces, offering the potential for generating awareness and sparking political action.

These issues are explored through a tripartite analysis of the production context, construction and reception of *The New Zealand Wars* series. The integration of these three phases of analysis has generated a number of insights into the potential of audio-visual forms, including their producers and audiences, to participate in the negotiation of, and resistance to, colonial discourse. Such insights serve to challenge taken-for-granted constructions of nation and history, and suggest the increasing relevance of alternative concepts such as community-building and cultural memory. Ultimately, this thesis argues that television documentary can serve as a prime site for the articulation of these concepts. *The New Zealand Wars* serves as a case study, which demonstrates both the potential of this site, and the significance of the social-historical and cultural context in framing this series.
Preface

1998 was a pivotal year for me. It was at this time, as an honours student at the University of Waikato, that I found myself drawn to the study of documentary, postcolonial theory, and to the seemingly under-represented use of audience research, as a particularly fruitful way of exploring these theoretical areas. These burgeoning interests heightened my sensitivity to the local public engagement with television documentary at this time.

This was also a very interesting year in Aotearoa New Zealand, when Television New Zealand audiences were expressing a passionate and public engagement with documentary, history and issues of national and cultural identity. Many of these audience members were still reeling after being duped by Peter Jackson’s (1996) Forgotten Silver, when in June 1998, the first episode of The New Zealand Wars was broadcast on TV One.

It was after watching the first three episodes of this series, and observing the volatility of the debate that followed, that the topic for this thesis was conceived. Initially, I was propelled by a sense of curiosity about the differing ways in which New Zealand audiences were engaging with this series. This curiosity gave way to a sense that there was a space somewhere ‘in-between’ the debate and the emotion, where new ways of engaging with New Zealand history were being generated. Since my PhD enrolment in 1999, the gestational period for this thesis has been longer than was anticipated. Now that the labour is over, it is possible to see how this extended time has enhanced the final thesis.
Acknowledgments

The process of researching and writing this thesis has been in many ways a very rewarding experience. It has been an enormous test of my intellectual capacity, my ability to juggle the necessities of family life with my career, and of my sheer determination to extend myself. However, completing this thesis has been a protracted and often taxing process, not only for myself, but also for the immediate members of my family, who have put up with my absent-mindedness beyond what is reasonable in any family.

My team of supervisors have also put up with what must have seemed like a never-ending story. Despite this, they have each been very supportive, in quite different ways. My chief supervisor, Craig Hight, deserves special acknowledgement for his ability to see through the aspects I had taken-for-granted, and to locate those assumptions I was oblivious to. He also needs to be thanked for whipping me into action during my most un-productive periods.

I also owe a lot to Sean Cubitt, who was chief supervisor before jumping ‘across the ditch’ to less green pastures. Sean has been a great inspiration to my academic career, and has constantly encouraged me to creatively explore new theoretical possibilities, even when they seemed uncharted or far-fetched. Sean’s emails, with his wonderfully creative spelling and bubbling enthusiasm for my work, always managed to lift my spirits during the most grueling writing marathons.

Geoff Lealand has been a constant supportive presence since the very beginning. Despite the lengthy period of my research, Geoff has been a patient and optimistic supervisor to the end. He has always shown a genuine interest in my research and has provided pragmatic suggestions and timely resources. I am grateful for his generosity and for his ability to understand the value of maintaining a life-work balance.
Peter Gibbons has in many ways been a model supervisor. He has consistently provided feedback of the highest quality (and quantity). Peter has generously offered to this project, his wealth of knowledge in the area of history and colonialism in Aotearoa New Zealand. Much of Peter’s brilliant thinking about these topics has found its way into this thesis. In particular, I would like to acknowledge him for introducing me to the notion of ‘cultural colonisation’. This concept has opened up new possibilities in terms of the later stages of my analysis.

I would also like to thank Jane Roscoe for giving me the inspiration to embark on a PhD, and for helping to lay the foundations of my theoretical and methodological framework. Unfortunately, Jane’s role as my first chief supervisor was short lived, as she too jumped ‘across the ditch’ after the first year of my enrolment. However, Jane can be credited for encouraging me to develop my interest in postcolonialism, documentary theory and audience research.

While I cannot name them individually, I would like to thank all of the people who participated in my focus group research. Each of these participants contributed significantly to the insights that have emerged from my research. In particular, I would like to thank the members of the Tainui Kaumatua group and the Te Ahurei Maori youth group. Not only did the participants of these groups travel some distance to take part in the research, they allowed me to document and discuss their cultural memories as well as their raw emotions.

I would also like to thank the production informants who made time in their busy lives to partake in interviews with me. James Belich, Tainui Stephens, Colin McRae and Roger Horrocks each enabled me to gain an insight into the distinctively collaborative nature of the production process for *TNZW*. There interviews also gave me a sense of the particular flux of historiographic and television broadcasting discourses with which they continued to negotiate long after the series initial broadcast.
My colleagues deserve an acknowledgement for understanding my need to take time out from departmental responsibilities in order to complete this thesis. So, a big thank-you to all of my colleagues at the Department of Screen and Media, the University of Waikato.

I also wish to thank; Paul Harris, Sonya Roussina, Tanya Perrott, Mark McGeady and Maia Wharawhara, for kindly providing very useful editorial and research assistance during the final stage of the project.

Last but not least, a huge thank-you to my family, and especially Maia, Katya and Mark. Without your understanding, emotional support, superb cooking and childcare, this thesis would not have made it this far.
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Transcription Conventions

The following transcription conventions are used for all extracts of transcribed interviews and focus groups, which appear in chapters; one, six and eight of this thesis:

... To signify a pause of more than one second.

(.) Indicates that some part of transcript has been deliberately omitted, most likely because it was inaudible.

( ) Any portion of text inside curved brackets may have been barely audible, and requires checking for accuracy.

[ ] Clarificatory or explanatory material is placed in square brackets.

// A double oblique marks the beginning of any overlap in talk.

____ Words or particles said with particular emphasis are underlined.

*The Governor* Titles of books, films etc are written in italics.

Italics also indicate specific phrases to which I have added my own emphasis.

Speech ‘errors’ and particles (e.g. er, umm, aah) which are not full words are included, and punctuation marks such as commas, full stops and question marks have been included in a manner designed to improve the readability of the extracts while conveying their sense, as heard, as effectively as possible.

For the purposes of all interview transcripts used in chapter six, I have indicated the identity of the speaker by their initials. However, in order to protect the anonymity of the participants of my audience research, I have coded each participant with letters and numbers that correspond to a key. This key provides a breakdown of the composition of each of the focus groups (see Appendix 1).
Glossary of Maori Terms and Names

Akaroa: Town situated on the Banks Peninsula in the South Island.

Aotearoa: Maori title for New Zealand, meaning ‘Land of the Long White Cloud’

Ariki: Area in Taranaki.

Haka: A physical and oral performance, expressed usually in the form of a song/chant and dance, and symbolizing a preparedness or intent for battle. (see Kaiwai & Zemke-White, 2004 for a discussion of the cultural meanings associated with the haka).

Hapu: A sub-tribe, or extended family

Harakeke: a specific type (and method) of flax weaving.

Hauhau: A term applied to the religious movement, Pai Marire in the 1860s.

Heni Pori: Distinguished female warrior who fought alongside men in the Waikato wars.

Hone Heke: Maori chief and war leader.

Hori Ngatai: Head of the Ngai-te-rangi tribe.

Iwi: Originally a term approximating the meaning of ‘nation’ or ‘people’, but more frequently used to describe a tribal entity.

Kaiapoi: The name of a Pa near Christchurch. (Check spelling)

Kaitiaki: Guardian and protector.

Kao: No

Kapa-Haka: A group who practice and perform the haka (see Kaiwai & Zemke-White, 2004 for a discussion of the cultural meanings associated with kapa haka).

Kapiti Island: Island situated west of Wellington.

Karakia: A charm or a prayer.

Karanga: To call, summon or welcome someone.

Kawiti: Prominent Maori chief who (with Hone Heke) successfully fought the British in the flagstaff war.
**Kaumatua:** An elderly man or woman with knowledge of lore, ritual/tikanga, and thus an elder as well as elderly.

**Kaupapa:** Underlying concepts or philosophies to which tikanga is based. Also used to refer to an agenda, philosophy or intentions.

**Kingitanga:** Also known as the **King Movement**. This was a collectivity of chiefs representing a number of disparate tribes. This unification was established around the time of the Treaty of Waitangi and continues to exist today.

**Kiwi:** Native New Zealand bird. Also a colloquial term for New Zealand people.

**Koauau:** Traditional Maori wind instrument played through the nose or mouth that produces a distinctly haunting sound.

**Korero:** To speak, discussion.

**Kotiate:** A flat weapon of hard wood or bone, with lobed blade.

**Kooti Whenua Maori:** The Maori Land Court

**Mana:** Authority, influence, prestige, power or psychic force

**Marae:** A sacred place of iwi and hapu identification for many Maori.

**Maunga Pohatu:** Kainga/village where Rua Kenana gathered his flock.

**Maori:** Name given to the indigenous inhabitants of New Zealand.

**Maori Tanga:** Maori protocols.

**Maungatawhiri:** Waikato stream.

**Mauri:** Life force.

**Meremere:** Rural community in the North Waikato.

**Mihi:** A form of greeting.

**Motu:** Island.

**Ngaruawahia:** Waikato town, home of the Maori King.

**Nga Puhi:** Northern tribe.

**Ngeri:** A fierce chant. Specific tribes have their own, historically specific version of the ngeri.
Noa: Free from restrictions.

Ohaeawai: Place north of the Bay of Islands, that was once home to many pa.

Orakau: South Waikato town where the now legendary battle of Orakau was fought.

Pa: A fortification

Pai Marire: The first independent movement of the Maori church in the 1860s.

Pakeha: Name for non-Maori New Zealanders.

Papatuanuku: Mythological god signifying the earth.

Parihaka: Small community north-west of Taranaki.

Paterangi: Small community outside of Te Awamutu.

Patu: a) To strike, beat, thrash or pound, b) A weapon.

Pokeno: Small town south of Auckland.

Rangiriri: North Waikato village.

Raupatu: An enduring sense of conquest related to colonial injustices, and specifically to the unjustified confiscation of land.

Rewi Maniapoto: Distinguished chief of the Ngati Maniapoto tribe, who supported the Kingitanga.

Ringatu: A syncretic religious movement. See Belich (1986) for more details.

Rohe Potae: (Pakeha equivalent is King Country). A geographic region spanning the mid – North Island of New Zealand, in which the King Movement was active.

Rua Kenana: Self-acclaimed prophet who wanted to remove the Tuhoe people completely from European influence.

Ruapekapeka: a Northland Pa, which was the sight of the last battle of the Northern War, fought in January 1846.

Ta-moko: Tatoo.

Taiaha: A weapon of hard wood, about 5 feet long, having one end carved in the shape of a tongue with a face on each side and adorned with a fillet of
hair or feathers. The other end is a flat smooth blade about 3 inches long.

**Tainui**: a) Waikato tribe, b) People of the Waikato tribe, c) Christian name of Tainui Stephens (director of *TNZW*).

**Taha Maori**: Maori customs/ culture

**Taha Pakeha**: Pakeha customs/ culture

**Tangata Whenua**: People of the land, original inhabitants of the land.

**Tangi**: a) to cry, b) funeral.

**Taonga**: Treasure, treasures or cultural forms with special value. For more details about the cultural significance of this term, see Tapsell (2006).

**Tapu**: Taboo. Forbidden and restricted.

**Tauranga**: A city on the East Coast of the North Island

**Tawhiao (or Kingi Tawhiao)**: King of the Kingitanga Movement, who played an important role in unifying tribes during the Waikato wars.

**Te Ao Marama**: A ‘world view’ based on “traditional concepts handed down through the generations” (Royal, 1998: 2). According to Royal (as cited in Mahuika, 2006: 5), ‘Te Ao Marama’ is a “paradigm of understanding that encapsulates a specific world view built around a spiritual relationship to the environment, and is a clearly separate body of knowledge from Western and non-Maori epistemologies”

**Teina**: Cousin, younger brother or younger sister.

**Te Kooti**: Famous chief of the southern North Island region.

**Tekoteko**: Carved figure on the front of a house, or a canoe.

**Te Mangai Paho**: A crown entity established to make funding available for the production of Maori television programmes.

**Te Pehi Kupe**: Ngati Toa leader and warrior.

**Te Puea**: Influential female Maori leader.

**Te Rauparaha**: Ngati Toa who built an empire at Kapiti Island.

**Te Reo**: Meaning language, but is often used to refer specifically to Maori language.

**Wherowhero**: Potatau te Wherowhero was from the Ngati Mahuta hapu of the Waikato tribe, and was the first appointed King of the Kingitanga.
**Tikanga:** Maori customs and traditions.

**Tino Rangatiratanga:** Maaka and Fleras define this term as “Maori self-determining autonomy” (2005: 22) and as “a multi-layered expression of Maori sovereignty over jurisdictions pertaining to land, identity, and political voice” (1997, 20).

**Tito Kowaru:** Maori warrior from the Taurangaika Pa, who was involved in the Taranaki War, in 1868.

**Tohunga:** Priest.

**Tuakana:** Elder, or senior in line of descent.

**Tuhoe:** Central North Island tribe.

**Tupuna:** An ancestor or grandparent.

**Urewera:** Mountainous area near Maungataniwha Mountain, in the central North Island.

**Utu:** Response or reply (in the sense of revenge).

**Waiata:** A song, or to sing.

**Waikato:** Regional area of the mid North Island. Also the name for a tribal entity of the Waikato region.

**Wairua:** Spirit

**Waitangi:** Northern site where the Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840.

**Wiremu Tamihana:** A chief who taught and preached in the Tauranga and Matamata areas.

**Whaikorero:** To make a formal speech.

**Whakapapa:** Oral or written genealogy

**Whakatauki:** Type of proverb or story fragment.

**Whanau:** Family

**Whatawhata:** A village in the North Island, west of Hamilton.

**Whenua:** Land
Introduction to Thesis

*The New Zealand Wars* series was a landmark cultural event that resonated with diverse New Zealand audiences. The broadcast of this series on primetime television in 1998 provoked vigorous debate and intense emotional response in the realms of national identity and race relations. This was a significant documentary series dealing with events from New Zealand’s past in an innovative and populist fashion. For example, the series adopted a unique aesthetic approach which extended expository documentary conventions. *TNZW* continues to inform as a widely used instructional historical text, especially as a key resource within secondary schools.

The subject matter of this series, in that it opened up issues of historiography, nationhood and race-relations, required the thesis to adopt a complex approach toward both theory and method. The research conducted in this thesis is positioned within the broad theoretical domains of cultural studies and New Zealand media studies. The complex theoretical approach taken in this thesis has necessitated a layered framework comprised of concepts such as nation-building, postcolonialism, and especially cultural memory. Key to this thesis is the concept of cultural memory, which has enabled the study of alternative approaches toward historical narrative, including the exploration of an emotional dimension of engagement with audio-visual forms.

My focus upon this emotional dimension of audience response has provided a key contribution to documentary theory, where existing research has tended to focus upon the rational and informative functions of documentary texts. Drawing from the field of reception studies, the audience research undertaken in this thesis provides a body of rich empirical data that opens up possibilities for further study, particularly with regard to the affective dimension of engagement with television documentary.
The structure followed in this thesis develops the theoretical framework in chapters one through five, and then focuses on the three phases of research informed by the tripartite approach: the production context; textual construction and reception. Each of these phases of research are explored in relation to the wider social-historical context that frames \textit{TNZW}. The key questions addressed by this research include the following:

- What is the relation between discourse, memory and affect? How have these three concepts played a part in the production, construction and audience engagement with \textit{TNZW}? 
- What is the role of audio-visual media (and specifically, \textit{TNZW}) in relation to the concepts of nation and the imagined community? 
- What is the role of cultural memory in relation to television documentary and nation-building? 
- What are the key functions, limitations and possibilities of television documentary in relation to the public sphere?

These research questions are developed in the following sequence of chapters:

Before outlining the methodological framework for this thesis, chapter one examines the relation between the concepts of discourse, memory and affect. While the section on discourse theory situates my approach toward the discursive negotiations with historical narrative, my discussion of memory and affect is guided by the need to explore an emotional engagement with historical narrative.

Chapter two explores the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, especially as they relate to the role of audio-visual media in relation to ‘nation-building’. The idea of community membership is discussed in relation to the concept of homeland, and to the landscape as a trigger for remembrance of the past.

In chapter three, theories of nation-building are explored specifically as they relate to historical narrative in Aotearoa New Zealand. This chapter maps out
the historical - discursive context that shaped the production, construction
and audience engagement with *TNZW*. This discursive overview surveys the
changing position (and character) of discourses of ‘race’, ‘nation’, and
colonisation, as they are manifested in a broad range of historical narratives
of the New Zealand Wars. Extracts of these narratives are discussed in
support of my argument that many of these texts take part in an ongoing
process of cultural colonisation. However I also discuss the possibility that
contemporary re-configurations of discourses may destabilise the position of
previously dominant discourses, thus contributing to a process of cultural
de-colonisation.

Having explored the concept of ‘nation’ as it has been theorised, and then
as it has been manifested through cultural formations of discursive struggle,
chapter four asks “what is there beyond ‘nation’?, and what theoretical
perspectives have been developed to unmask colonial discourse, as it
survives in the guise of nationhood?” This chapter discusses the relevance of
those postcolonial theories that have framed strategies of resistance to
colonialism in Aotearoa New Zealand. In doing so, it also marks out the
limitations of postcolonialism, specifically in terms of its application to
indigenous cultures, for whom resistance to colonial discourse may be more
effectively discussed via a dual framework of cultural hybridity and cultural
memory.

Chapter five links the theoretical and discursive framework established in
chapters one through four, with the following tripartite analysis of *TNZW*.
This chapter outlines the key functions, limitations and possibilities of
television documentary, in relation to the public sphere. A comparative
critique of Habermasian and Bakhtinian perspectives on the public sphere
points toward the plurality and emancipatory potential implied by the terms
‘counter-publics’, ‘social imaginary’, and ‘citizen-viewers’. The specific role
of television documentary within such processes is discussed in relation to
the televised ‘historical event’ and cultural memory.
Having established my theoretical orientation and outlined the distinctive historical and discursive context in which *TNZW* was produced, chapter six draws on interviews with key informants to outline significant aspects of the production of *TNZW*. Insights emerging from these interviews are discussed in relation to the discursive volatility and distinctive institutional context that framed the series. I argue that these contextual factors contribute to the highly collaborative shaping of a ‘national event’.

Chapter seven provides an analysis of the discursive and affective character of *TNZW*, as it has been constructed with the use of established documentary and narrative conventions. These analytical categories intersect with an analysis of the discursive and aesthetic construction of the series, all of which are discussed in relation to concepts of nation, postcolonialism and cultural memory. The textual prioritisation of visual and aural forms, is understood as a strategy for tapping into memory resources. All of these aspects of textual construction combine to shape the discursive parameters and affective possibilities for the audience engagement with the series.

Drawing on audience research, chapter eight discusses the complexity of audience engagement with *TNZW*, with a particular focus on the use of discursive and memory resources, in articulating verbal and affective responses. These resources are discussed in terms of discursive intertextuality, the collective negotiation of discourses and memory resources, as well as the manifestation of individual bodily affects. The insights emerging from this audience research provoke a re-examination of theories of nation-building and postcolonialism, and point toward cultural memory as an appropriate theory for studying resistance to colonial discourse.

Finally, chapter nine concludes this thesis by describing certain limitations of the research design, and outlining the key insights arising from an integration of each phase of the tripartite analysis. These insights support my argument
that television documentary can potentially serve as a prime site for the articulation of discursive and memory resources, thus opening spaces of resistance to colonial discourse.
CHAPTER 1: Theoretical and Methodological Framework

MY5: It was quite emotional for me…and I’m quite angry about it.

MY3: I was crying man

MY1: I just feel like getting the British Flag and burning it

MY3: Yeah, same here...I was blown away…I was crying and everything. I just honestly didn’t think that everything was like that, but it was...just how like, the great chiefs, how they were just killed off, like...like nothing.

(Extract from ‘Maori Youth’ focus group transcript)

1.1 Introduction

In the above focus group extract, three Maori teenagers discuss their experience of viewing The Invasion of Waikato - episode three of The New Zealand Wars (henceforth TNZW). As a linguistic expression of bodily responses that were both experienced and imagined as an impulse toward action, this audience response sets the scene for the key theoretical and methodological issues discussed in this opening chapter.

As illustrated by the above extract, the audience research conducted for this thesis has generated rich data and significant insights, which have played an important role in re-assessing, and modifying my initial theoretical approach. The most significant modification in this sense has resulted from unexpected outcomes of the audience research, which have demanded a theoretical approach toward, and methodological strategy for, analyzing affective dimensions of audience engagement. As a result, my initial theoretical and methodological approach has been adjusted, thus stretching the use of discourse analysis beyond its traditional linguistic focus, to include a methodological approach toward cultural memory, as both a signifying and a-signifying system of transmitting meaning.
This has resulted in a first chapter that ‘works through’ theoretical problems, reflects upon the inadequacies of the initial method, and adds a purpose-built extension to my initial theoretical and methodological framework. This is not an attempt to re-write theories of discourse or depth-hermeneutics, or to devise a new, ‘perfect’ model that would replace supposedly ‘imperfect’ models. Rather, this process demonstrates my response to insights emerging from the research, which was driven by a sense that an additional theoretical approach was needed in order to do justice to the richness and complexity of the transcript material from which I was learning.

This layered or modular approach to theory and method also reflects (and has contributed to) the extended period in which this PhD has taken shape. With the passing of time, my research interests have developed, thus shedding light on the inadequacies and limitations of my initial methodological approach. One objective of this chapter is to be explicit about how this process has unfolded, by situating myself in relation to various perspectives toward discourse and memory.

The reciprocity of theory and method that occurred during the research process is represented here via an integrated approach toward theory and method. So, although I begin the chapter by situating my theoretical approach toward discourse, and then memory, the following outline of methodology re-addresses the theoretical implications of extending upon the parameters of a conventional discourse analytic perspective.

Before embarking on a detailed discussion of theories of discourse, I will briefly situate my theoretical orientation in relation to those concepts that underpin discourse theory. My position in relation to the highly debated concepts of ideology and agency is closely aligned to the perspective theorised by Stuart Hall, which has been described as ‘post-Marxist’ and as negotiating the middle
ground between ‘culturalism’ and ‘(post)structuralism’ (Grossberg, 1996a: 155). Hall’s approach to these concepts has been effectively summarised as follows:

By identifying the possibilities of struggle within any field, Hall occupies the middle ground between those who emphasise the determination of human life by social structures and processes, and those who, emphasizing the freedom and creativity of human activity, fail to recognize its historical limits and conditions: a middle ground in which people constantly try to bend what they are given to their own needs and desires, to win a bit of space for themselves, a bit of power over their own lives and society’s future (Grossberg, 1996a: 154).

While following the cultural studies orientation of Hall (1996b), I also find myself similarly aligned to Hall’s theorisation of post-colonialism and identity (Hall, 1996a; Hall & du Gay, 1996), and his emphasis on the potential role of visual culture in relation to a “new politics of representation” (Hall, 1996c: 447). However, I depart from Hall by exploring these concepts in relation to affect, cultural memory and indigeneity – concepts that Hall has given minimal attention to (see chapter four).

1.2 Discourse

Although not utilised as a stand-alone analytical tool, discourse theory has played an important role in shaping the approach taken throughout this thesis. As was indicated in my survey of written responses to TNZW, respondents tended to diverge along the lines of specific discourses. This early insight became a rationale for establishing a map of those discourses expressed in written histories (see chapters three and four), by key production personnel (see chapter six), by TNZW text (see chapter seven) and by audience members participating in my focus group research (see chapter eight). Given that discourse has been a key concept running through the entire thesis, a substantial section of chapter one is devoted to positioning my approach toward discourse theory. In particular, Fairclough’s theory of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) takes centre stage during this discussion, primarily because of
the relevance of this theory in relation to hierarchies of discourse and the perpetual struggle of discourses, as they vie for positions of dominance and marginalization. These are key issues during each stage of the tripartite research discussed in later chapters of this thesis.

The theoretical and methodological framework for this thesis is significantly informed by Fairclough’s approach toward CDA, which was developed through the synthesis of linguistically oriented discourse analysis and insights emerging from social theory (Fairclough, 1992, 1995a, 2001). Before outlining the theoretical framework and key principles of CDA, it is necessary to define the term ‘discourse’ and position my approach in relation to a selection of other approaches toward discourse.

In this thesis, ‘discourse’ refers to formations of meaning that are either linguistic or semiotic. These discursive formations can be articulated verbally, in writing, through body language, and through visual, aural and kinetic forms. Discourses are socially and culturally constructed resources that people make use of in their daily lives. These resources can be used consciously during struggles over power relations, but they are often taken-for-granted and considered to be benign forms of expression. While discourses are constructed by and through social and cultural forms, they also play a part in constructing social and cultural life. Discourses are fluid, dynamic, malleable, transitory forms of meaning that circulate through time and space. They are often temporary, unstable, fragmentary and difficult to pin down. However they can also appear as relatively stable, resilient formations that survive for a long time, with apparently little change. Discourses are performative, “discontinuous practices, which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well exclude or be unaware of each other” (Foucault, 1984: 127). As with the metaphor of alchemy, discourses have the potential to change their structure. In certain catalytic conditions, discourses can compete, hybridise, metamorphose
and perform – but all of these articulations occur in relation to prevailing ideological conditions.

Throughout this thesis, the term ‘discourse’ is used in slightly different ways. Most often, it refers to specific categories of knowledge, for example: the discourse of ‘racial science’, the ‘noble-savage’ discourse, the ‘ratings’ discourse. However, at times ‘discourse’ is used in a different sense, to imply wider domains of discourses, such as ‘colonial discourse’ (which includes discourses such as ‘fatal necessity’ and ‘colonial paternalism’), ‘racial discourse’ (including ‘scientific racism’ and the ‘noble savage’ discourses) or ‘media discourse’ (including the ‘ratings’ discourse and discourses of ‘public service television’ and ‘neo-liberal commercialism’). This notion of overlapping discursive domains (sometimes referred to as arenas) suggests a sense of the connections between a collection of related discourses, and also alludes to the notion of an array of discursive practices that hold the domain together, working to maintain the position of specific discourses within a discursive hierarchy or ‘order of discourse’.

I use the term ‘order of discourse’ in the manner used by Fairclough (who borrowed this term from Foucault), to refer to:

...a social structuring of semiotic difference – a particular social ordering of relationships amongst different ways of making meaning, ie different discourses and genres and styles. One aspect of the ordering is dominance: some ways of making meaning are dominant or mainstream in a particular order of discourse, others are marginal or oppositional, or ‘alternative’...an order of discourse is not a closed or rigid system, but rather an open system, which is put at risk by what happens in actual interactions (Fairclough, 2001: 232).

In this sense an ‘order of discourse’ is constituted by a hierarchical positioning of a collection of related discourses, which may be apparent in any given moment or ‘discursive snapshot’. Foucault (1984) used the term ‘order of discourse’ to imply “a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and
institutionally constraining system” (Foucault, 1984: 112). He describes this system as:

...a kind of graduation among discourses: those which are said in the ordinary course of days and exchanges, and which vanish as soon as they have been pronounced; and those which give rise to a certain number of new speech-acts, which take them up, transform them, or speak of them, in short, those discourses which...are said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again...This differentiation is certainly never stable, nor constant, nor absolute...Plenty of major texts become blurred and disappear, and sometimes commentaries move into the primary position. But though its points of application may change, the function remains; and the principle of a differentiation is continuously put back in play (Foucault, 1984: 115)

In this sense, the term ‘order of discourse’ alludes to the instability of discursive relations - the potential of discourses to change position over time, perhaps moving from a position of dominance to marginalisation or visa-versa. This idea informs my approach toward the discursive transience of histories, which is demonstrated in chapters three and eight. Another important aspect of the ‘order of discourse’ (also demonstrated in chapter eight) is the sense in which this hierarchical organisation suggests inequitable access to discourse:

...not all the regions of discourse are equally open and penetrable: some of them are largely forbidden (they are differentiated and differentiating), while others seem to be almost open to all winds and put at the disposal of every speaking subject, without prior restrictions (Foucault, 1984: 120).

As discussed in chapter eight, this unequal access to discursive resources is understood in terms of the particular ‘interpretive frameworks’ that differently positioned audience members may (or may not) have access to (Corner et al, 1990: 50). This idea is also emphasised by Fairclough (2001: 232) who argues that “discourses are diverse representations of social life which are inherently positioned - differently positioned social actors ‘see’ and represent social life in different ways, different discourses” (Fairclough, 2001: 232). The term ‘interpretive repertoire’ has been used to imply a similar idea, although the performance metaphor “suggests that there is an available choreography of
interpretive moves – like the moves of an ice dancer, say – from which particular ones can be selected in a way that fits most effectively in the context” (Wetherell et al., 1992: 92).

My use of ‘discourse’ is further clarified by situating it in relation to a selection of different approaches to this term. While the many conflicting and overlapping uses of discourse render it an extremely difficult concept to define, these differences tend to indicate general theoretical assumptions about the nature of knowledge, power and communication.

1.2.1 Contrasting Approaches Toward Discourse

While discourse is widely understood to be manifested in language, there is a distinction between those definitions that apply a narrow concept of language use, and those that include “other forms of semiosis” within their notion of language use (Fairclough, 2001: 231). The narrow concept of language can be found in the work of Critical Linguistics and Conversation Analysis, both of which have been constrained by a linguistic view of discourse as a facet of written and verbal texts. The more open approach has been emphasised by Fairclough (2001), by Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) and by Blommaert (2005), who defines discourse as:

...a general mode of semiosis, i.e. meaningful symbolic behaviour. Discourse is language-in-action, and investigating it requires attention both to language and action...discourse...comprises all forms of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connections with social, cultural and historical patterns and developments of use...What is traditionally understood by language is but one manifestation of it; all kinds of semiotic ‘flagging’ performed by means of objects, attributes, or activities can and should also be included for they usually constitute the ‘action’ part of language-in-action (pp. 2-3).

This more open view of discourse enables researchers to apply discourse analysis to the non-verbal discursive expressions often found in media texts, as
well as to audience engagement. Despite the acknowledgement that discourse analysis must not be constrained within written and verbal forms, the linguistic origins of discourse analysis have shaped its methodological development, and this has limited its usefulness as a tool for researching some facets of audiovisual forms, as well as certain dimensions of audience engagement. The intention to address this issue, by developing more suitable methods of discourse analysis has been addressed by Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) and van Leeuwen (2000). But even the most ‘semiotic’ oriented models of discourse analysis fall short as methods for researching the communicative dimensions of affect and memory in relation to audiovisual media.

While some theorists imply a view of discourse as relatively fixed and static, I follow those who insist that discourse is fluid and dynamic. Fairclough (1992) argues that discourses undergo continual re-configuration and discursive flux, generated by a perpetual struggle for domination. The contrasting ‘static’ view of discourse is related to the following two points: a distinction can be observed between those who apply a cognitive or socio-cognitive approach toward discourse (van Dijk, 2005; Chilton, 2005; Wodak, 2005), and those who steer clear of cognitive theory, viewing discourse as social action (Edwards & Potter, 1992, 2005; Fairclough, 1992; Billig, 1996; Potter, 1996). The cognitivist approach implies that discourse is located within the brain, usually in ‘fixed’ forms such as “global patterns”, “stored images”, “frames” and cognitive “schemata” which are “exact patterns for the concrete realisation of a situation or a text” (Titscher et al, 2000: 155). I take issue with this view, aligning myself with those who argue that discourse cannot take the form of concrete or fixed entities, as it is constantly, and fluidly, transiting in-and-between social processes. However the limitations of this position have become clear during the process of conducting research for this thesis. The notion of discourse as social action (and in particular the focus upon linguistic or verbal expressions of discourse) prioritises social processes over those related to subjectivity and individual engagement with a media text. A similar point is made by Chilton
(2005: 36), who argues that CDA’s “lack of attention to mind” needs to be addressed by drawing on cognitive models of discourse. The problem with Chilton’s argument is that cognitive approaches to discourse tend to prioritise intellectual processes and fixed ‘mental schemas’, both of which are of limited use in the research of affective and emotional engagement with cultural forms.

Also related to the view of discourse as static, is the tendency of some analysts to treat discourse as though it is a product of a text, thereby determining social behavior in a simple, uncomplicated way. Addressing this propensity toward textual determinism, Fairclough (1992) and Thompson (1990) have developed multi-dimensional approaches, which draw attention to the ways in which discourse operates across processes of production, textual construction and different levels of interpretation.

Both textual determinism and social stasis are indicative of a top-down view of power, which leaves little scope for studying the agency of audience members, the fluidity of discourse, or the potential for transformative social change. Fairclough (1992) explains that this emphasis on social stasis is demonstrated in the Althusserian approach of the Pechaux group of discourse analysts. Possibly due to the Marxist orientation of CDA, many ‘critical discourse analysts’ have tended to focus on the role of discourse in maintaining social relations, rather than on resisting or transforming oppressive power relations. Fairclough’s version of CDA retains a critical, post-Marxist approach toward ideology and Gramscian hegemony, but his emphasis upon power in terms of perpetual struggle and shifting relations of domination enables discourse analysis to be utilised as a means of researching manifestations of resistance (Fairclough, 1992: 9).
1.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

According to Titscher et al (2000: 146-147, summarised from Wodak, 1996: 17-20), CDA is an interdisciplinary method of discourse analysis that is guided by the following key principles: CDA is concerned with the “linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures”. It conceptualises language as a form of social practice, and attempts to draw attention to the reciprocal influences of language and social structure, especially those that are taken for granted. He also notes that “CDA studies both power in discourse and power over discourse”. It is underpinned by concerns about the ideological production and maintenance of power relations, and seeks to expose the naturalisation of these power relations. Informed by a cultural studies perspective toward ideology, both discourse and power are understood to be shaped by cultural and social, rather than merely economic, dimensions. CDA proposes that “discourses are not only embedded in a particular culture, ideology or history, but are also connected intertextually to other discourses”. Here, the term intertextuality is derived from Bakhtin’s use of the term to indicate the dialogic properties and inextricable relationship between texts (Kristeva, 1986). For critical discourse analysts, the term ‘text’ refers to “the written or spoken language produced in a discursive event”, but Fairclough (1995b: 4, 2001) opens up this definition, by emphasising the “multi-semiotic character” of texts, which includes visual images and sound. According to Fairclough “CDA sees itself as politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement”. This last point sets CDA apart from non-critical forms of discourse analysis, but it has also been the source of criticism from those analysts who claim that such an approach produces biased interpretations (Widdowson, 1995; Schegloff, 1997).

Widdowson (1995: 158) argued that “CDA is an ideological interpretation and therefore not an analysis. The term critical discourse analysis is a contradiction in terms”. In reply to this criticism, Fairclough (1996) explains the value placed by critical discourse analysts upon interpretive, open-ended results and
emphasizes the importance of being explicit about the researcher’s position and commitment toward the research. Widowson’s criticism implies that it is possible and desirable, to conduct some kind of objective analysis that is free from the interpretation of the researcher. I would argue that this is not only impossible, it is not desirable, given the general commitment of CDA to political emancipation. Also, CDA does not aim to produce analyses that are totally conclusive and resolved. Analyses are open to further contestation, and research tends to be conducted and documented in a self-reflexive way.

1.2.3 What Makes CDA Critical?

According to Fairclough (1992: 9), “‘critical’ implies showing connections and causes that are hidden”. In his survey of various approaches to discourse analysis, he makes the following distinction:

Critical approaches differ from non-critical approaches in not just describing discursive practices but also showing how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to discourse participants (1992: 12).

Fairclough’s use of the term ‘critical’, and his labeling of some approaches (such as that of Wetherell & Potter, 1992) as non-critical, has been challenged. Billig (2003) questions the possibility of CDA continuing to maintain a critical edge, when it is riding a wave of ‘success’, and is inextricably caught up in a process of academic marketisation. Addressing this problem, Billig argues that there is a need for “continual intellectual revolution”, adding “perhaps critical discursive studies must be open to new forms of writing and to beware of its own linguistic orthodoxies” (p.44). While Billig’s call for intellectual revolution is beyond the scope of this thesis, he emphasises the need for researchers (like myself) to be self-reflexive and critical in their use of CDA – not to use it as an uncontestable paradigm, but as a model that is open to re-working and modifying where
necessary. Such an approach to CDA is required due to the affective quality of audience responses discussed in chapter eight.

1.2.4 Fairclough’s Version of CDA

A number of scholars have pointed out that CDA is not a homogenous method, and researchers should acknowledge whose version of CDA is being used (Titscher et al., 2000; Weiss & Wodak, 2003). As discussed, I take issue with the socio-cognitive slant of Wodak and van Dijk’s approach to CDA, preferring Fairclough’s (1992) more fluid, social approach toward discourse and social change. Fairclough’s attention to the multi-dimensionality of discourse, and the multidirectional aspects of power relations, has shaped a particular version of CDA that enables the study of discourse as a tool for ideological domination, as well as a resource that supports resistance to such domination. This became particularly important during my analysis of audience responses, where insights emerged about the ways in which discursive resources were drawn on as a means of resistance to colonial discourse (see chapter eight). Despite its suitability to these aspects of my research, Fairclough’s CDA has not been a perfect fit for this thesis. I will discuss the reasons for this, and how I have dealt with the shortcomings of this method later in this chapter.

According to Titscher et al. (2000), Fairclough’s version of CDA is primarily concerned with investigating “the tension between the two assumptions about language use: that language is both socially constitutive and socially determined”. This tension needs to be considered in relation to specific social-historical contexts, because “Whether language use has a reproductive or a transforming function depends on the prevailing social circumstances – for example on the degree of flexibility in the power relations” (pp.148-149).

But Fairclough’s view of language is more inclusive and open than other approaches to discourse analysis. For him, CDA “is based upon a view of
semiosis as an irreducible element of all material social processes” (Fairclough, 2001: 231).

In formulating his approach to CDA, Fairclough draws selectively from; Althusser’s approach to ideology, Bakhtinian concepts of genre and dialogics, a Gramscian notion of hegemony, theories of critical science developed by Habermas, Foucault’s contributions to the study of discourse and power, and Halliday’s (1978) ‘systemic functional linguistics’ (Fairclough, 1992). While Foucault’s ideas inflect CDA with elements of post-modernism and social constructionism, its overall theoretical orientation has been described as neo-Marxist (Titscher et al, 2000).

In relation to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Fairclough (2001) views the control over discursive practices as a struggle for dominance over orders of discourse, as they operate within political, ideological and cultural domains:

A particular social structuring of semiotic difference may become hegemonic, become part of the legitimising common-sense which sustains relations of domination, but hegemony will always be contested to a greater or lesser extent, in hegemonic struggle (p.232).

In this sense, orders of discourse are formations of potential cultural hegemony, a concept that is understood to be transitory and unstable.

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) use the concept of ‘articulation’, as developed from Althusser, by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) in two senses: to describe the shifting relations of social elements, as well as the way in which these elements are “transformed in the process of being brought into new combinations with each other” (p.21). Stuart Hall has developed this concept to include an important consideration of the empowerment that can (in certain circumstances) emerge from intersecting elements:
An articulation [which is] thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions...enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position (Hall, as cited in Grossberg, 1996b: 141-142).

This view of agency emerging from articulatory processes can be compared with that proposed by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999):

The concept of ‘subject’ is felicitously ambiguous between passivity (being subjected) and activity...the capacity of a person to be active and creative depends upon the resources (‘habitus’ in Bourdieu’s terms...) which he or she has, and people vary in their habitus according to social circumstances. We might say that people are active - agents – to the extent that they are capable of pursuing collective or individual strategies in their discourse. But whether articulatory shifts in discourse constitute substantive shifts in identity or resistance to domination depends...on how the moment of discourse is inserted within the social process overall – whether and how articulatory change in discourse maps onto articulatory change in other moments (p.14).

In addition to this conceptualisation of articulation, Fairclough’s insistence on viewing power as a fluid and dynamic process of struggle, rather than as a static and fixed structure determined from the top-down, orients his version of CDA as a post-structuralist approach toward discourse analysis, which is suited to my theoretical orientation. However, the last sentence of the above quotation points toward an important limitation of CDA: the articulatory change in other (non-discursive) moments falls outside of discourse analysis, and is therefore often overlooked in social research.

1.2.5 Limitations of CDA

While I have favoured Fairclough’s interpretation of discourse over the socio-cognitive models of other CDA practitioners, his version of CDA is inhibited by a bounded sense of agency (as occurring ‘in’ discourse), which does not account for the intersection of discursive and non-discursive aspects of individual
subjectivity. This limitation means that CDA lacks an effective strategy for analysing those moments of individual audience engagement that are experienced outside discursive or linguistic expression. This limitation has been especially apparent in this thesis, where some of the most complicated audience responses required the analysis of processes of memory, affective, imaginative and emotional dimensions of engagement. In his later work, Fairclough (2001) has attempted to engage with the relation between discourse, memory and bodily engagement, in his theory of the ‘dialectics of discourse’:

Discourses include representations of how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries – representations of how things might or could or should be...Discourses as imaginaries may also come to be inculcated as new ways of being, new identities...inculcation is a matter of...people coming to ‘own’ discourses, to position themselves inside them, to act and think and talk and see themselves in terms of new discourses...inculcation also has its material aspects: discourses are dialectically inculcate not only in styles, ways of using language, they are also materialized in bodies, postures, gestures, ways of moving, and so forth (pp.233-234, emphasis added).

In a theoretical sense, this notion of inculcation begins to negotiate the relation between discourse and embodiment. This relation was theorised in a more abstract way by Foucault (1977: 169), who used the terms “counter-memory” and “incorporeal materiality” to argue that an “expanding domain of intangible objects...the phantasm that cannot be reduced to a primordial fact” - as experienced by bodies - “must be integrated into our thought”. Despite their attempts to address the relation between discourse and embodiment, neither Foucault nor Fairclough have alleviated the methodological limitations of using CDA as a means of analysing affective engagement. Acknowledging that CDA has its limitations for the analysis of non-linguistic formations, Fairclough (2003) proposes combining CDA with other methods. He explains that his version of CDA:

...is based upon the assumption that language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research always has to take account of
language...this means that one productive way of doing research is through a focus on language, using some form of discourse analysis. This is not a matter of reducing social life to language, saying that everything is discourse – it isn’t. Rather, it’s one analytical strategy amongst many, and it often makes sense to use discourse analysis in conjunction with other forms of analysis... (p.2).

Steering clear of cognitive approaches to discourse, but continuing to see the merits of Fairclough’s approach, I have addressed the limitations of CDA by exploring theoretical perspectives toward memory and affect that can be used in conjunction with Fairclough’s CDA.

1.3. Memory

According to Radstone and Hodgkin, (2006: 2), there has been a “theoretical ‘expansion’ of memory from the individual to the social or collective”. While the early modernist ‘regimes’ of memory tended to approach memory as a fixed property of individuals, the contemporary study of memory demonstrates a shift away from this focus on individual and internalized processes, toward formations of memory as external, social, transient and mediated. In conjunction with this shift, Radstone and Hodgkin (2006) show that there are also strong threads of continuity between early modernist regimes of memory and a number of contemporary approaches.

The distinction between individual and social memory operates beyond the notion of a temporal or historical shift. Despite my orientation toward the latter position, neither of these positions is natural or ‘correct’. Radstone and Hodgkin (2006: 1) argue that such positions operate as ‘regimes of memory’ and there has been a tendency for academics to contribute to the naturalisation of these regimes. It is therefore important to recognise how these socially and culturally constructed regimes have been ideologically shaped, naturalised and bounded within academic disciplines.
1.3.1 Cognitive Versus Social Memory

Despite acknowledging a general shift toward social approaches to memory, Middleton and Edwards, (1990: 1) argue - from the perspective of social psychology - that there still “exists a certain ‘repression’ for recognising the social as a central topic of concern”. They note that “when social ‘factors’ are considered, they are invariably treated as a social ‘context’ enriching the physical ‘background’ against which people exercise an individual capacity to remember”. Just as there is a recent emphasis on cognitivist approaches toward discourse, the enduring dominance of cognitivism within the discipline of psychology has shaped many contemporary studies of memory, which view memory as a fixed property, located within the brains of individuals (See Davis, 2005, Gibbs, 2006, and a critique of this approach by te Molder & Potter, 2005).

In contrast to this legacy of cognitive psychology, a social approach toward memory is increasingly favoured within many other academic disciplines, for example it has fuelled an internal critique of cognitivism within psychology. In addition to te Molder and Potter’s (2005) critique of cognitive psychology, a number of other social psychologists, have been active critics of cognitivism, and have produced insightful studies of memory and emotion as social processes (Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 1994; Middleton & Brown, 2005).

1.3.2. Collective Memory

Drawing on the Durkheimian concept of ‘collective memory’ developed by Halbwachs (1992), Middleton and Edwards (1990) locate both discourse and memory as external to the minds of individuals, arguing that memory is a social process of ‘collective remembering’:

In cognitive psychology, the relationship between discourse and memory is generally seen as an issue of knowledge representation...[but for social
psychology] as far as memory is concerned, the aim is not to specify how putative mental models might represent knowledge and experience, but rather with how people represent their past, how they construct versions of events when talking about them (p.23).

Middleton and Edwards are amongst a small group of scholars who have conducted empirical research that engages with the relation between discourse and memory (see also Edwards & Potter, 1989; Billig, 1990; Middleton & Brown, 2005). Viewing memory as a form of discursive, communicative action, their work serves as a useful model for exploring the possibilities and limitations of utilising discourse analysis for the study of memory. According to Middleton and Edwards (1990: 37), a discourse analytic approach insists that “people’s accounts of past events, before they can be taken as data on the cognitive workings of memory, need to be examined as contextualised and variable productions that do pragmatic and rhetorical work, such that no one version can be taken as a person’s real memory”. One advantage then, of a discursive approach toward memory, is that it highlights the problematic tendency to describe memories as though they are authentic, pure or real (or more so than other forms of expression). However, there are also some problems with limiting the study of memory to a solely discursive approach.

One problem is the tendency to over-emphasise the rhetorical aspect of discourse and memory, so that every instance of remembering is viewed as a form of “representational instrumentality [in which] versions (of events...) are shown to be not only pragmatically occasioned, but also intrinsically structured...to accomplish particular sorts of pragmatic actions” (Middleton & Edwards, 1990: 36). Such an approach is useful as a means of identifying the more implicit discursive strategies that are used in order to support and defend participants involved in power struggles. However, this over-emphasis on ‘memory work’ as a conscious and strategic form of social interaction, lacks a consideration of individual memory processes that are experiential, embodied and perhaps even unconscious.
Another related problem is that the focus on linguistic processes of either verbal conversation or written text does not account for the significant role of material objects, audio-visual media, and body language, in transmitting and mediating memory. While I have already explained that discourse analysis does not need to be confined to written and verbal forms of language, uses of this method are often constrained by its linguistic origins. As social psychologists, Middleton and Edwards’ insistence on rejecting psychology’s disciplinary fixation with cognitive models of memory has led them to approach memory in an inversely one-dimensional way – as though it can only be studied as a form of social process. Like Fairclough’s approach, this intense focus on discourse as social process does not account for associational and affective dimensions of memory.

In psychology, while a social approach toward memory has had to compete with the scientific credibility that is ascribed to the cognitive model, the concept of ‘social memory’ has been viewed as more legitimate within some other disciplines. Anthropologist James Fentress and historian Chris Wickham use the term ‘social memory’ instead of ‘collective memory’; arguing that Halbwachs’ development of the latter concept put:

...excessive emphasis on the collective nature of social consciousness, relatively neglecting the question of how individual consciousnesses might relate to those of the collectivities those individuals actually made up...while doing full justice to the collective side of one’s conscious life [Halbwachs] does not render the individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying the interiorized collective will (Fentress & Wickham, 1992: viiii).

While retaining Halbwachs’ insights into the collective dimension of memory, Fentress and Wickham’s alteration of terminology was intended to imbue ‘social memory’ with a recognition of individual agency. This is an important reason for insisting on an approach toward memory that considers social dimensions as well as individual subjectivity and identity. However, in making a distinction between “memory as action and memory as representation”, Fentress and Wickham (1992: x) reductively describe memory as either “a type of behavior” or
“considered cognitively, as a network of ideas”. Despite insisting that memory is “social in origin” and “infinite”, Fenton and Wickham also imply the existence of fixed, cognitive schemas, which does little to support the notion of individual agency.

1.3.3 Cultural Memory

The concept of cultural memory forms an important part of my theoretical framework, and is utilised throughout this thesis, both as a means of bridging diverse theoretical ideas, and as a way of framing my interpretation of various kinds of memory figuration. In formulating a suitable definition of cultural memory, I have retained useful aspects from concepts of ‘collective’, ‘social’ and ‘popular’ memory, and stitched these together with insights from a variety of approaches to cultural memory. These include those offered by; Marita Sturken (1997), Laura Marks (2000), Jeanette Mageo (2001) and Myra MacDonald (2006).

Throughout this thesis, ‘cultural memory’ refers to a fluid and dynamic process by which memory is constructed, transmitted and experienced. While continually transiting the intersection of collective identification and individual subjectivity, cultural memory is both transmitted by, and involved in, the construction of, social and cultural forms. The term cultural memory implies that memories and their signifiers are shared and shaped via the social and communicative practices that come to define a particular cultural group. In this sense, remembering is often a social activity that is practiced and articulated during the communications of everyday life. However, these social activities also constitute sites for the manifestation of personal memory, which involves private recollections and associations that are so individual that they are unlikely to be shared with others.
It is important to distinguish cultural memory from those ‘collective’ and ‘social’ approaches that view memory as a fixed or essential entity, which can be equally accessed by all members of a community. In contrast, ‘cultural memory’ suggests a process of constant reconfiguration of memories in relation to changing social and cultural circumstances. As implied by Foucault’s theorisation of ‘popular memory’ (1977a: 22) and counter-memory’ (1977b), the unequal accessibility, instability and changeability of cultural memory distinguishes it from (and sometimes situates it in opposition to) official or dominant histories, laying it open to debate, but also charging it with an important political function:

Acknowledging the inevitability of a conflict over interpretations of the past, it [cultural memory] draws our attentions to the interactions between culture and subjectivity in the formation of a contest...In emphasizing contest over meaning, ‘cultural memory’ relates memory to structures of power. Recollections of the past become part of the struggle over identity and the claiming of voice (MacDonald, 2006: 329-330).

Thus, like discourse, memory is also involved in the struggle over power relations, but unlike discourse, there are dimensions of memory that cannot be publicly articulated, or consciously represented. As will be explained, these dimensions may potentially play an important role in unsettling power relations.

1.3.4. Memory Genres

With a specific focus on the significance of cultural memory for the communities of the ‘postcolonial Pacific’, Mageo (2001) distinguishes between two genres of cultural memory: “‘Inter-group memory’ takes place at the boundary between groups and is enlisted in the politicking that boundaries entail”; whereas “‘Intragroup memory’ takes place among group members and is enlisted in finding meanings in experience that make cultural sense” (Mageo, 2001: 11). While these genres are seen to represent the poles within which cultural memory can
be located, Mageo points out that in everyday life, memory genres are fluid, dynamic and continually negotiated:

The inter-textual nature of intra-group remembering means that it juxtaposes the echoes of collective memories with those of personal memories. Intra-group memory is continually transiting between the present and the perceived origins of meaning in the affective dimension of the past (Mageo, 2001: 15).

Mageo’s notion of a place of transit is understood here as an interstitial cultural space that embodies productive potential. It is a space where new memories are formed, and where the framework of an entire ‘memory corpus’ may be transformed. Within the context of decolonisation, this productive space can be understood as potentially emancipatory, in the sense that the ability to manipulate, and have a degree of control over one’s memory resources, enables the articulation of cultural identities in a way that resists totalising concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘history’.

While Mageo’s model of memory genres is useful to this thesis, it poses some theoretical dilemmas. Cultural borders are not clearly demarcated, and overlap in infinitely complex ways. As an extension of this problem, my understanding of cultural identity disputes any claim to authenticity in favour of a focus upon interwoven complexities of hybrid identities. At any given time, multiple fragments of cultural identities shape individual subjectivity, so that the notion of culture as located in the form of distinct groups is problematic. However, Mageo’s model of memory genres remains useful in the sense that it serves to highlight fluid processes of inclusion and exclusion in enabling and constraining differential access to memory resources.

1.3.5 Technologies of Memory

My use of the phrase ‘technologies of memory’ refers to the various cultural forms and media technologies that enable the transmission of cultural memory.
Mageo (2001: 3) explains how “the meaning-making processes inherent in remembering can be exploited through memory technologies. These are technologies of written and oral narrative...but...they are also technologies of embodiment and performance”. In this way, technologies of memory may include television broadcast, cinema and photography, but also those that cut across modes of embodied performance, such as; carving, tattoo, body piercing, dance and song. While some philosophies propose that memory is actually stored within such formations, or that objects possess their own memories,\(^3\) I reject the textual determinism of this view, preferring Sturken’s (1997) argument that:

...cultural memory is produced through objects, images and representations. These are technologies of memory, not vessels of memory in which memory passively resides so much as objects through which memories are shared, produced and given meaning” (p.9).

With the exception of Walter Benjamin’s pre-eminent theory of the ‘technologisation of memory and consciousness’,\(^4\) the role of audio-visual media has been somewhat overlooked in the study of memory. However, a number of scholars have recently argued that audio-visual media constitute prime technologies for the negotiation of cultural memory (Hansen, 1996; Marks, 2000; Anderson, 2001; Edgerton & Rollins, 2001; Kuhn, 2002; Healy, 2003; Cook, 2005; MacDonald, 2006). Not only are these technologies pertinent because of their inherent ability to re-shape historical narrative, the fabric of their construction provides fertile ground for the study of memory:

Film, memory and history...intertwine in various ways...like computer technology, film may provide a new metaphorical language that allows us to rethink memory processes...it appears also as a model of historical writing that allows full weight to the uncertainties and fractures of the past, rather than depending on the teleology of narrative structures (Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003: 14).

While ‘film’ is prioritised in this extract, Hodgkin and Radstone (2003) proceed to discuss these ideas in relation to other forms of media, adding:
“documentary film can subvert the problem of the ‘real event’, through a simultaneous insistence on irrevocable truth and refusal of realist mode” (p.14). The notion that audio-visual texts offer potentially rich sites for exploring and contesting memory can be equally applied to television documentary. However televisual media must be approached differently to that of cinema. According to Anderson (2001), “Memory, like history, is best understood as a site of discursive struggle...part of the power and significance of televisual historiography lies in its flexibility and intangibility in comparison with ‘official histories’” (p.22). However, while it is important to recognise this potential of television documentary, it is also necessary to acknowledge the ways in which its generic conventions can constrain the possibilities of popular memory. According to MacDonald (2006), the constraints of these conventions can be observed through an analysis of documentary texts:

In its love of ‘serial monoglossia’, its denying of opportunities for collective remembering, and its pretence that visualization of the past resides primarily in archives, not in people’s memories, television documentary focuses too exclusively on the often truncated outcome of memory rather than memory as process. By reifying memory into a means of presenting ‘colour’ or ‘instantiation’, television misses opportunities for a performance of a diversity of memories that might unsettle comfortable views of the past and suggest a radical enquiry into how the present and future might be otherwise (pp. 344-345).

While I agree that documentary conventions can operate to constrain the possibilities of memory, this is not (as MacDonald suggests) a constraint that occurs within the text. The extent to which a documentary text may constrain or spark radical enquiry depends on various factors, such as the particular viewing context, and audience members’ access to discursive and memory resources. The specific generic possibilities of television documentary, along with the potential of this site to support the contestation of ‘official histories’, must be considered in relation to the role of television documentary within specific social-historical contexts. It is also important to consider the ways in
which ‘popular memory’ has been articulated with cultural identity, individual subjectivity, and the social construction of knowledge.

1.3.6 Memory Resources

In the context of *TNZW*, the relation between discourse and memory is significant. My research demonstrates how a complex interweaving of these meaning systems enables audience members to draw on both discursive resources and memory resources as a means of engaging with this representation of the past (see chapter eight). Just as the interpretation of a text relies on access to discursive resources, the transmission of cultural memory requires access to memory resources, such as oral traditions, legends, myths and proverbs. According to Mageo (2001), memory resources are structured as narrative ‘schemas’, which are circulated and “constantly accreted” amongst community members by way of conversation, performance and various other cultural forms. The specific repertoire of memory resources that any individual may access can be described as a “memory corpus”, which “constitutes a meaning system that has language-like properties” (p.13). As is the case with discursive resources, the ability to draw on the resources of a particular memory corpus differentiates group members from non-members, thus helping to establish the criteria for belonging to a ‘community of memory’. According to Irwin-Zarecka (1994: 47-48), a community of memory is a community created by the shared memory of a significant experience or event. The notion of communities of memory has often been utilised in relation to the bonds formed out of the experience of traumatic events, however Irwin-Zarecka also acknowledges those communities of memory (such as families, teams of workers, people participating in class reunions), whose bonds are formed by shared memories of everyday, banal events, which are not necessarily traumatic. Most significantly though, communities of memory are “formed by individuals with not only common experience but a shared sense of its meaning and relevance” (p.54).
This definition draws attention to the way in which communities of memory may be tenuously held together and may undergo processes of fragmentation and transformation. These are communities that have constantly shifting boundaries. A community that is bonded by memory is not necessarily restricted to direct eye-witnesses or participants of an event. Such a community can grow to include empathetic eye-witnesses as well. In this case “the direct connection between experience and remembrance is now not severed, rather it is redrawn to capture the complexity of effects of that experience beyond individual memories” (p.48).

In this way, communities of memory can be bonded across ethnic divisions and generational boundaries. The ‘complexity of effects’ of an experience are transmitted across these boundaries through various means of both private and public communication. These range from the more private practice of passing on stories about people and events of the past, to the public transmission of the past via various forms of media. According to Irwin-Zarecka, the private realm of bonding experienced by communities of memory may also take the form of unspoken bonding, which has particular relevance for those communities bonded by memories of trauma. In this context, “it is through a transition from unspoken bonding to outspoken (and frequently institutionalized) activity that the community of memory acquires public resonance (1994: 51).

While Irwin-Zarecka discusses this idea in relation to traumatic memories associated with the holocaust and the “Soviet gulag”, the notion of a community undergoing transition from private bonding to public significance is relevant to the ways in which communities of memory in New Zealand have acquired public resonance. This can be observed in the ways in which televised public histories (such as TNZW) have prompted, not so much a transition, but an articulation between more private modes of bonding (such as families passing on stories across generations) and outspoken activity (such as those viewers who were prompted to write letters to local newspapers).
The relation between private and public modes of remembrance has particular relevance to the tripartite approach taken in this thesis. By examining the ways in which various communities engage with *TNZW* as a public history, communities of memory are understood here to function as crucial units that provide the resources from which individuals can negotiate between modes of remembrance that are unspoken, privately spoken, or publicly expressed. Communities of memory play a significant role in this process because:

...neither “the past” nor remembrance of it can be deduced from public discourse alone. The “realities of the past” as they pertain to individuals are not carbon copies of publicly available accounts. They are often worked out within smaller and larger communities of memory, their shape and texture reflecting a complex mixture of history and biography. In other words, how people attend to the past, if at all, and how they make sense of it is very much grounded in their experience. At the same time, and allowing for this, the public framing of remembrance does matter. Beyond providing resources to work with, public discourse may validate (or discourage) particular ways of seeing the past. It may also create an altogether new community of memory, where bonding extends well beyond individuals’ own experience (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994: 56).

The research undertaken in this thesis acknowledges the complex interplay between communities of memory and the public framing of remembrance. A particular strength of the tripartite approach taken in this thesis, is the way in which it allows for the possibility of examining the impact of the public framing of remembrance, in terms of validating or discouraging ways of interpreting the past. Another potential insight emergent from this approach, is the prospect that public discourse might create a new community of memory, bound together not only by memories of past events, but by memories of the public event (the television broadcast of *TNZW*) that re-constructed the past events.  

1.3.7 Affective Memory

Affect is a useful concept in terms of understanding how individuals engage with cultural forms in ways that are not necessarily intellectual or representational. It
allows us to consider the significance of experiential dimensions of engagement, especially in relation to memory and identity. While the concept of affect is valuable as a means of theorising emotional and bodily figurations of memory, its intangibility and ‘slipperiness’ makes it notoriously difficult to use in an analytical sense. Drawing on Silverman’s (1996) theory of subjectivity, Stupples (2003) proposes a psychoanalytic approach toward memory, arguing that affect, memory and subjectivity are intertwined, taking the form of an ‘associational visual matrix’:

…we all have a treasure house of remembered images, a mnemonic residue, an associational visual matrix, that serves as a repository of our individual subjectivity, as the core of that unstable and ever changing psychic entity we call ‘ourselves’…These visual memories lie alongside and amongst our memory fragments of sensations (pp. 132-133).

This notion that memory fragments are experienced as ‘sensations’ helps to explain why particular memories are not easily expressed in words. They operate beyond the realm of representation. While they are connected with physiological processes, memory sensations are often intensely personal experiences, called up by fragments of individual experience that may be buried deep within the unconscious. These highly subjective and elusive qualities of affective memory tend to slip through the grasp of analysis. Apart from the sheer difficulty of perceiving and communicating the memories of other subjects, methods of social and cultural analysis have tended to prioritise the analysis of discursive and linguistic expressions of meaning (Averill, cited in Harre & Gerrod, 1996, Tulloch, 2000). As a result, “there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to the affect. Our entire vocabulary has been derived from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure even across irreconcilable differences” (Massumi, 1996: 221).
1.3.8. The Relation Between Discourse, Memory and Affect

Inspired by Hall's (1996b) theorisation of ideology and agency, and his recognition of the need to theorise the “sensibility of mass culture”; Grossberg argues that such a sensibility depends “on the particular historical relations between ideological and affective struggles, between resistance and empowerment, that surround the mass media and contemporary social struggles” (1996a: 168). For Grossberg, affect refers to:

...a dimension or plane of our lives that involves the enabling distribution of energies...it is an articulated plane whose organisation defines its own relations of power and sites of struggle...like the ideological plane, it has its own principles which constrain the possibilities of struggle” (1996a: 167).

So to consider struggle and empowerment in relation to both ideology and affect requires a non-diametric approach toward these distinct, but intersecting planes of cultural meaning:

Theorising the concept of affect involves deconstructing the opposition between the rational and the irrational in order to undercut, not only the assumed irrationality of desire but also, the assumed rationality of signification and ideology. Current theories of ideology, rooted in structuralism, have too easily abandoned the insights embodied in notions of ‘the structure of feeling’ (Williams) and ‘the texture of lived experience’ (Hoggart) (Grossberg, 1996a; 171).

Despite the neglect of affect within cultural studies, there is currently a surge of academic energy devoted to developing a language with which to apply theories of affect to the study of the visual arts, cinema, television and documentary.” Marks provides a particularly compelling argument, and useful resource, for the study of affective memory in relation to audio-visual forms. In her exploration of the role of affect and embodiment in calling up memory, Marks (2000) argues that the ‘sensorium’ is especially important to those whose histories have been marginalised:
memories are especially crucial as repositories of knowledge for people whose experience is not represented in the dominant society. The memory of the senses, a nontransparent and differentially available body of information, is important to everybody as a source of individual knowledge. For cultural minorities, it is an especially important source of cultural knowledge (p.199).

In order to illustrate this idea, Marks discusses specific examples of ‘intercultural cinema’, which demonstrate the way in which processes of cultural memory occupy a ‘space in-between’ – a space of interstitial transit between cultures, and across time and space, where “both memory and media constitute intermediaries between individual and society, and between past and present” (van Dijck, 2004: 261). Marks reiterates this idea specifically in relation to the memory of images:

Intercultural cinema by definition operates at the intersections of two or more cultural regimes of knowledge. These films and videos must deal with the issue of where meaningful knowledge is located, in the awareness that it is between cultures and so can never be fully verified in the terms of one regime or the other. Yet the relationships between cultures are also mediated by power, so that the dominant regime…sets the terms of what counts as knowledge (Marks, 2000: 24, emphasis added).

Marks describes how specific examples of intercultural cinema are implicated in opening up moments that are “enormously suggestive and productive”. These texts “point to…moments where new kinds of knowledge may emerge” (2000: 26). Her discussion of affective memory as a site of knowledge production derives from Deleuze’s concept of the ‘encountered sign’. According to Deleuze, the ‘encountered sign’ must be differentiated from the ‘recognised object’ because it is not recognised as representation, but is felt or sensed as ‘sensation’. But as Bennett (2006) explains, Deleuze does not propose a diametric relation between thought and affect:

The kind of affect the sign incites, however, is not opposed to the thinking process in the sense of supplanting critical enquiry with a kind of
passive bodily experience; far from foreclosing on thought, it agitates, compelling and fuelling enquiry rather than simply placating the subject. In its capacity to stimulate thought, the encountered sign is – according to Deleuze – superior to the explicit statement, for it is engaging at every level: emotionally, psychologically, sensually. The importance of this conception of the sign lies in the way it links the affective actions of the image with a thinking process without asserting the primacy of either the affective experience (sense memory) or representation (common memory) (p.32).

This Deleuzean insight that affective engagement with media is not opposed to, but can agitate, thought, supports the crux of my thesis – that affective dimensions of memory can (in specific circumstances) open up radical spaces. In the case of audience engagement with TNZW, these spaces offer the potential for a resistance to colonial discourse. Deleuze’s concept of the ‘encountered sign’ also helps to explain my understanding of the relation between discourse, memory and affect.

Insights arising from my audience research have required the development of an analytical approach that operates beyond a diametric conception of thought versus emotion.11 A number of audience responses discussed in chapter eight suggest that these dimensions of audience engagement are discursively and dialogically linked, and that cultural memory provides a useful means of bridging the diversity of audience engagement with TNZW. The complex articulation of various dimensions of engagement has required the formulation of a multi-dimensional model, which distinguishes between three inter-related modes of memory: representational, associational and affective (see figure 1).12 When utilised co-extensively with CDA, this model has enabled a type of analysis that attends to the complexities of the rich transcript material at hand.
‘Elliptical modes of memory’ are used in this thesis to imply distinct, but interrelated, modes of memory engagement. While ‘representational memory’ is expressed publicly via discourse, semiosis or body language, ‘affective memory’ is non-representational. Rather than being publicly or socially expressed, ‘affective memory’ is embodied and experienced through ‘sensation’, which can result in bodily actions (such as crying or goose-bumps) – described as ‘categorical affects’ (Stern, 1985: 51-57). The attempt to represent or describe the experience of affective memory becomes ‘representational memory’ as soon as it is translated into words or images. For example, when a focus-group participant cried during the screening of TNZW, this is discussed in chapter eight as ‘affective memory’, but her later explanation “I was crying man…” is an example of how the affective memory became translated into representational memory. The space that opens up between the sensation and its representation is understood here as a generative space in which new ideas are sparked (Deleuze, 1988, 1987; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

Bridging these modes, ‘associational memory’ can be both publicly represented and affectively experienced. This mode is characterised by the discursive articulation of resonances and physiological associations with past experiences. ‘Associational memory’ is most often incited by aural and visual triggers that are non-linguistic (such as music or photographs), but it can also be triggered by...
an attempt is made to express the meaning of these sounds through language.

1.4. Methodology

Located within the wider field of cultural studies, a number of contributors have emphasised the need to consolidate theoretical and methodological approaches, and to view texts, recipients and contexts as interdependent elements within the process of meaning production (Moores, 1990: 26; Livingstone, 1998: 196). It has also been argued that analysis of the media should be situated in relation to the wider social–political context, and in particular, to the prevailing relations of power (Dahlgren, 1995: 44, 1997).

In order to locate both the text, and its analysis within such a broader context, one appropriate methodological approach for this project is the tripartite model developed by Thompson (1990). Informing this methodological framework is the “depth hermeneutical” approach to the study of symbolic forms, which views symbolic forms as socially constructed and therefore imbued with meaning that derives from their particular social-historical context. While positivists would advocate statistical and objective forms of analysis, Thompson argues that “the object of analysis is a meaningful symbolic construction which calls for interpretation” (1990: 272).

Thompson’s ‘tripartite approach’ requires an initial study of the ways in which the producers and recipients of symbolic messages are situated within specific social-historical contexts. This approach incorporates three phases of analysis, connecting the production and transmission of media messages, together with
the construction of these messages, and the ways in which they are received and interpreted by individuals. This enables an exploration of the complex ways in which meanings are constructed, represented, interpreted and contested, without excluding the social and historical context within which these processes operate (See figure 2). A final integration of each of the three phases of analyses is necessary because:

A comprehensive approach to the study of mass communication requires the capacity to relate the results of these differing analyses to one another, showing how the various aspects feed into and shed light on one another...the process of interpretation may seek to explicate the connections between particular media messages, which are produced in certain circumstances and constructed in certain ways, and the social relations within which these messages are received and understood by individuals in the course of their everyday lives. (Thompson, 1990: 304-306)

The final step in the tripartite framework requires the researcher to creatively synthesise each of the three phases of analysis, in order to interpret the ideological character of the messages and meanings associated with a particular media text. The interpretation of ideology is fundamental to Thompson’s approach, which is intended to show how “in specific circumstances, the meaning mobilised by symbolic forms serves to nourish and sustain the possession and exercise of power” (1990: 292). While this focus on power is a strength of the tripartite approach, Thompson’s over-emphasis on investigating the maintenance of relations of dominance, is limiting. Taking issue with the structural determinism of Thompson’s approach, I have utilised the tripartite model to explore the potential disruption of power relations.
Insights emerging from my research have fuelled a more substantial critique of Thompson’s tripartite model. The first issue I have is with the restricted sense in which this model seeks to interpret the ideological character of media messages, at each of the three phases of analysis. Thompson’s (1990: 307) use of the term ‘doxa’ implies that the generation of meaning takes the form of discourse or semiosis, and is expressed via intellectual and social processes. As I have argued, it is reductive to research media messages only in terms of their ideological character; following Grossberg (1996a: 167), the ‘ideological plane’ needs to be theorised in relation to its intersection with the ‘affective plane’.

The final stage of the model, in which all three phases of research point toward the ‘interpretation of the ideological character of media messages’, operates as a spatial contraction, squeezing the potential insights generated by the research into a singular ideological channel. If I were to re-draw this model to in some way illustrate the flow of research for this thesis, the final stage would take the form of multiple arrows pointing outward, thus implying the opening of spaces and the generation of insights.

Despite these problems, I am not advocating the complete abandonment of the tripartite model, as it has served as an effective structural basis for my
research design, where it has enabled a heightened sense of the ways in which cultural forms, along with their producers and audiences, are embedded within social-historical contexts.

The specific methods employed for this thesis, which relate to each of the three phases of Thompson’s tripartite approach, are outlined below.

1.4.1. PART 1: Social-historical Context and Production Context

This phase of the research explores the social-historical context for the production and transmission of TNZW. The purpose of this phase is to develop an understanding of the changing figuration of the ‘order of discourses’ that have influenced the production, construction and reception of the series. In order to develop a sketch of this discursive field, it is necessary to survey the range of discourses that have been articulated in written, oral and audio-visual narratives of the New Zealand Wars. These discourses are “mapped out into discursive domains, hierarchically organised into dominant or preferred meanings” (Hall, 1980: 134).

In line with Fairclough’s use of ‘rearticulation’ and ‘conjunctures’ as concepts for exploring social change, this social-historical analysis explores the changing character of conjunctures of the discursive terrain over time. These are organised via a ‘map of discourses’, in which various representations of the New Zealand Wars are historically situated and hierarchically organised, so as to indicate the fluidity of discourses within shifting patterns of domination and marginalisation (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

The exercise of situating historical narratives in relation to a discursive map illustrates how the producers of both written and audiovisual texts draw from changing fields of differentially accessible discourses in order to construct representations of a historical event (Hall, 1980: 129). In undertaking such a
discursive survey, it is necessary to restrict the focus to those domains of discourse that are most relevant to this thesis. For example, it is essential to develop an understanding of the changing character of discourses of race, culture, nationhood and history, and to view these within the context of New Zealand’s distinctive response to colonisation (Spoonley, 1995; Pearson, 1996; Williams, 1997).

A map of discourses is a valuable tool for conducting a preliminary review of the social-historical context in which a media text was produced. The ‘order of discourses’ represented in this map are understood to have played an important role in shaping audience engagement with the text, where meaning is generated partly through access to discursive resources, within specific contexts. In this respect, the discursive map serves as a useful framework, where it can be used as a template that informs the analysis of production context, text and audience engagement, so that it functions (alongside the model of ‘elliptical modes of memory’) as a tool for integrating each of the three phases of analysis.

While both the discursive map and the model of ‘elliptical modes of memory’ serve to establish an understanding of the social and cultural influences upon the construction and reception of this series, it is also important to examine the production process, and to place this within the broader political and economic context of New Zealand broadcasting in the 1990s. New Zealand has a specific broadcasting context, which is characterised by the co-existence of both a commercial and a residual public service model. This dual framework gives rise to a distinctive set of tensions, contradictions, opportunities and constraints, all of which ultimately help to shape the form, content and transmission of a media text (Roscoe, 1999; Spicer et al, 1996). Chapter six explores the way in which this institutional context has influenced the production of TNZW, which serves as an important link between the wider social historical context and my textual analysis of the series.
To examine the above issues, a series of interviews were conducted with key informants who were involved in funding, making and broadcasting the series. The intention here was to explore the range of objectives, motivations and influences upon the individuals and groups involved in the production of this series, to understand the delineation of roles and creative input of the participants, to investigate the dynamics of the production process, and to assess the degree of institutional mediation upon the production of the text. The analysis of interview transcripts relates the responses to these areas of enquiry to the map of discourses, and to theories of cultural memory, nation building and postcolonialism.

While it was expected that the producers and programme makers would draw from the wider pool of discourses that I have mapped out, it was also anticipated that they would reveal their privileged (or constraining) access to specific media discourses, such as the ‘ratings discourse’, which has been described as a one-dimensional (but very powerful) approach to the construction of television viewing, influencing many of the decisions regarding content and coverage (Ang, 1991: 50, 1996: 57, Lealand, 2001).

Chapters one through six provide a contextual basis for the subsequent analysis of the construction and reception of this series.

1.4.2. **PART 2: Construction of Text**

Informed by both the first and third phases of the tripartite model, the purpose of this second phase of research is to analyse the construction of *TNZW*. While some preliminary analysis of the text was conducted before phase three, the more in-depth analysis of this text took place after the audience research. This has resulted in a reflective approach toward textual analysis, which is shaped by my interpretation of the most significant insights arising from the analysis of
both the production context and the audience research. In order to examine the way in which meanings are mobilised by this series, it is necessary to undertake a range of different types of analysis, which provide a multi-faceted approach to the deconstruction of form and content. The relevance of each of these methods is outlined as follows:

1.4.2.1 Discursive Construction

Informed by the research outcomes of phase one and three, part of the emphasis of chapter seven is on the hierarchical organisation of those discourses that are most prominently negotiated in the survey of historical narratives (discussed in chapter three) and in the audience research (discussed in chapter eight).

Informed by Fairclough’s approach to CDA, discourse analysis of \textit{TNZW} explores the ways in which this text organises, privileges, challenges and re-contextualises those discourses specified in the discursive map. Through my analysis of the complex discursive and affective construction of \textit{TNZW}, I argue that this complexity militates against the notion of a ‘preferred reading’. Furthermore, the added complexity of audience engagement with this series problematises Thompson’s notion that an “ideological character of media messages” can be interpreted (in the form of a singular ideological channel) as a result of integrating the three stages or analysis. Rather than attempting to locate a singular preferred or dominant reading, I argue that the series prioritises particular hierarchies of discourse and ‘taps into’ particular dialects of memory. In doing so, the series constructs both parameters and possibilities for audience engagement.
1.4.2.2 Documentary Construction

Generic analysis explores the ways in which the codes and conventions of the documentary genre have been utilised in the construction of *TNZW*. Documentaries have played an important role in “animating the historical” (Corner, 2006b, 301) and in serving as a site for constructions of a New Zealand nation (Roscoe, 1999; Goldson, 2004). In this sense, it is important to consider how documentary codes and conventions serve to mobilise, legitimise, and challenge particular discourses of history and nationhood.

In chapter seven, the analysis of documentary construction is informed primarily by the work of Nichols (1991, 1994, 2001), whose study of the documentary genre provides a useful model that can be applied to a variety of different case studies, while also being compatible with Thompson’s tripartite model. Nichols’ (1991 & 2001) tripartite definition of documentary illustrates the fluid relationship between the documentary filmmaker, the documentary text, and the audience, which work together to carve out a niche for the documentary genre in relation to other moving image genres. As discussed in chapter five, Nichols distinguishes the generic features of six modes of documentary: poetic, expository, observational, interactive, reflexive and performative. While a distinction between the characteristics of each mode is worthwhile, Nichols points out that most documentaries employ the conventions of more than one mode. In chapter seven I argue that, in the case of *TNZW*, a synthesis of expository and performative characteristics helps to open up possibilities for complex intersections of discursive and affective modes of audience engagement.

1.4.2.3 Narrative Construction

Due to diametrically opposed, popular conceptions of ‘fiction’ and ‘non-fiction’, a sometimes taken-for-granted aspect of documentary is the creative role of
storytelling in mobilising meaning, legitimising versions of events and popularising history. These issues have been addressed by Nichols, who described documentary as “a fiction (un)like any other” (1994: 98), and by those scholars who have paid specific attention to the use of ‘narratological’ aspects in documentary, hybrid and ‘factual formats’ (Rabiger, 1992; Paget, 1998; Corner, 2005a). In light of the insights generated by such analyses, I have explored the more ‘fictionally associated’ aspects of narrative construction, through an analysis of narrative structure, character development and the use of literary conventions such as metaphor, hyperbole, suspense and revelation. The ‘narrative choreography’ of the text is analysed with particular emphasis on the rhetorical function of these narrative techniques, which is informed by the double edged view of rhetoric developed in the discourse analytic perspectives of Potter (1996), Wetherell and Potter (1992), Billig (1996), and by Bakhtin’s concept of dialogics (1981).

1.4.2.4 Aesthetic Construction

The concepts of cultural memory and affect are discussed in relation to my analysis of the aesthetic construction of 7NZW, which is informed by Corner’s (2005a, 2006b) close attention to the aesthetic construction of television and documentary texts:

Feeling and ideas become condensed upon objects, bodies and places, modified by the physical at the same time as the physical itself is perceived within the developing thematics. Such a dialectics, at once sensual and intellectual, referentially committed yet often possessed of a dreamlike potential for the indirectly suggestive and associative, is central to documentary as an aesthetic project (Corner, 2005a: 53).

Drawing together several of the issues I have discussed in relating discourse, memory and affect, Corner proposes the category of aesthetics as a means of practical analysis for exploring the intersection of these issues, specifically in relation to television documentary. My approach to aesthetic analysis is influenced by Corner’s discussion of “aural density” (2005a: 54, 2006b: 295)
and his use of the term “archival aesthetics” (2006b: 293). These concepts provide a language that enables a discussion of specific textual examples that invite an affective engagement with TNZW, and a means of analysis that enriches, and extends generic and discourse analysis.

The analysis of the construction of the text forms a valuable, yet partial contribution to understanding the process of meaning construction, and the types of meanings associated with this text. However, textual analysis becomes richer and more worthwhile when complemented by an exploration of social-historical contexts and a study of the ways in which audience members construct meaning.

1.4.3. PART 3: Reception of Text

According to Thompson’s tripartite approach and Fairclough’s CDA, the viewing experience is understood as a discursive encounter, involving a complex interaction between the construction of the text, the field of discourses accessed by viewers, and the constraints generated by the social-political context in which the text is viewed (Philo, 1990; Morley, 1992; Ang, 1996). Viewers not only take cues from the documentary text, they draw on a range of interpretive frameworks that are defined in part by the particular social spaces they occupy. Such frameworks provide access to discursive resources. Factors such as the age, ethnicity and gender of each audience member contribute to determining the social and cultural contexts within which they are immersed. These contexts are seen to shape an individual’s subjectivity and social experience, an experience that is assumed to be “constructed, defined and articulated” through discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 59).

But this conception of audience engagement must be stretched to accommodate my need to delve beyond the discursive, ‘representational mode’, to acknowledge its intersection with ‘associational’ and ‘affective’ modes
of engagement. So while another level of discourse analysis is used as a means of exploring the social articulation of meanings that are prompted by TNZW, audience engagement is also discussed in relation to the model of ‘elliptical modes of memory’.

1.4.3.1 Audience Activity

While much of the study undertaken within the ‘effects’ research tradition has conceived of the audience as passive, subsequent research traditions such as ‘reception analysis’ have conceptualised the audience as active (Bruhn Jensen & Rosengren, 1990). According to Roscoe et al (1995: 87), the notion of the active viewer has “acquired a ‘commonsense’ status in media studies”, where a somewhat diametric notion of the ‘active’ and the ‘passive’ viewer has been assumed. Wishing to address this problem, Roscoe et al’s schema of audience activity defines three different, yet potentially co-existent, modes of audience activity. These are ‘social’, ‘active’ and ‘critical’.17

The term ‘social’ refers to the notion that viewers gain access to discourses by way of their positioning within particular social spaces. In this sense, viewers are able to draw on their access to particular group memberships, in order to bring knowledge and experiences to the viewing situation. The term ‘active’ implies that viewers compare the messages presented by the text with their existing frameworks of understanding. Such negotiation enables the active viewer to contest or concur with screen messages, as part of a process of actively producing ‘meaningful interpretations’.

The notion of the ‘active viewer’ also places emphasis on the ways in which viewers make sense of representations, and is therefore associated with a shift away from the limitations of viewing audiences primarily in terms of the consumption of television. (Morley, 1992: 76; Moores, 1993; Livingstone and Lunt, 1994). While Roscoe et al’s definition of audience activity rejects the idea
of the all-powerful media as assumed within ‘effects’ research, neither do they advocate the concept of the all-powerful viewer either. Audience activity is defined by them, alongside the notion of the ‘agenda setting’ role of the media:

We take the term ‘setting the agenda’ to mean the way in which television presentations frame the events in such a way as to promote particular accounts as being the most legitimate and valid, while other accounts are excluded or marginalized. By doing so, the parameters within which the debate can be conducted are set out...the media can be seen as having the power to frame the debate by promoting the legitimacy of certain representations or accounts (Roscoe et al, 1995: 91).

This conception of the audience as active, yet constrained by the ‘parameters’ set by the text, is well suited to my position in relation to questions of power and agency (Hall, 1980 & 1996b, Morley, 1992: 75). Here, the construction of meaning is viewed as a dialogical process, which involves “a negotiation between what audiences bring to the text, and what the text brings to the viewer” (Roscoe, 1999: 29).

The term ‘active viewer’ has been used to imply a wide spectrum of types and degrees of ‘activity’. Such indiscriminate use of the term is problematic, because “active usage as such doesn’t guarantee any critical purchase, let alone resistance or subversion” (Ang, 1996: 14). It is therefore necessary to clarify this distinction between ‘critical’ and ‘active’. With the capacity to draw upon wider social and political debates, the critical viewer will go beyond the ‘agenda setting’ parameters outlined by the text, often producing ‘oppositional’ readings that may involve a rejection of the dominant or ‘preferred reading’ (Hall, 1980: 135). However such oppositional readings do not necessarily involve political action (Jensen, 1990, Schlesinger et al, 1992). Livingstone has suggested that a critical question now facing audience research is “when is activity resistance? (and how much resistance makes a difference...?)” (1998: 195). To this, I would add: what role does the affective dimension of audience engagement play in constituting resistance? And, given that theories of discourse do not deal
adequately with this affective dimension, what alternatives are there for exploring audience activity and resistance via both discourse and affect?

In order to engage with a text, it is understood that viewers will draw on a range of discursive resources that are accessed by way of social group membership, gender, ethnicity, age, class, education, experience and so on. In line with Foucault’s ‘order of discourse’, it is acknowledged that viewers are embedded in social, political and economic structures that produce asymmetrical power relations, thus rendering individual viewers with differing degrees of access to discursive resources. For instance, a minority of viewers will have privileged access to ‘specialist discourses’, which enable certain types of audience activity. (Corner et al, 1990; Roscoe, 1999: 29). Differential access to memory ‘corpuses’, ‘dialects’ and ‘idiolects’ may also equip viewers with resources that make possible particular kinds of audience activity (such as the expression of a mimetic impulse of resistance, which is illustrated in the quotation opening this chapter, and discussed in chapter eight). It follows that the manifestation of audience activity will vary considerably, so that while all viewers are assumed to be active, in the sense that they will actively negotiate the meanings of a text, not all of them will have access to resources that might spark a critical response or an active expression of resistance.

Roscoe et al’s three-part schema provides a useful theoretical framework from which to explore the social construction of meaning within specific discursive contexts. However, my discussion of audience engagement with TNZW supports an argument for extending this model of viewer engagement beyond the rational and intellectual, to include a means for analysing a separate, but related affective dimension. In doing so, I am not proposing a separate, or superior model, as it is not helpful to view these different types of engagement in a polarised way. While it is useful to distinguish between various dimensions of audience engagement, it is necessary to emphasise that they are often articulated in complex, dialogical ways. For instance, racism is a discourse that
is not solely rational. The expression of racism involves a rationalisation of a number of discursive resources about ‘race’, but these social, linguistic and intellectual processes are articulated alongside complex emotions. The ‘subjective’ component of racism is expressed through the social domain of discourse, where: “Subjectivity is organised discursively as a public act of self-presentation...In this sense discourse straddles the boundaries usually erected between the objects of internal worlds and the objects of external worlds” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 78).

Breaking with the propensity amongst some scholars toward a binary conceptualization of intellect versus emotion, I have argued that rational and emotional audience engagement might be better understood as discursively and dialogically linked (Perrott, 2002). The articulation of affect with intellect is a frequently overlooked, yet distinctive aspect of the ‘documentary mode of engagement’, whereby audience members are often invited to engage affectively with documentary, and to draw on psychological, physiological and social resources as a means of not only making sense of, but also experiencing a documentary text (Gaines, 1999, Nichols, 2001). This approach toward audience engagement underlies my use of both CDA and the model of ‘elliptical modes of memory’, which work alongside each other to form the framework for analysis of the reception of TNZW.

1.4.3.2. Viewing Context

In line with the principles of CDA, it is important that the researcher takes into account the role of the specific viewing context in shaping audience interpretations. In this respect, a range of temporal and spatial factors must be considered as influential. There is a need to acknowledge that significantly different audience responses would be observable over time, in different geographical locations, and in relation to the wider social-political context. During the research design for this thesis, it was anticipated that audience
responses would be influenced by the composition of the discussion group, and the presence and degree of involvement of the researcher. Just as the text can be understood as ‘setting the agenda’, the researcher must also be viewed as setting the parameters within which negotiation of the text can take place (Burgess et al, 1991: 503). The particular assumptions that the researcher brings to bear on the research need to be reflexively considered (along with other contextual factors) for their role in shaping audience negotiations. The act of conducting audience research, and the procedure of analysing audience interpretations, must also be understood as processes in which the researcher draws upon interpretive frameworks in order to reconstruct an interpretation of the text. The self-reflexive researcher should acknowledge that “scrutinizing media audiences is not an innocent practice. It does not take place in a social and institutional vacuum” (Ang, 1996: 45).

Although I have emphasised the importance of considering the influence of the researcher, this is not to say that audience responses would be more ‘natural’ or ‘authentic’ if they were observed in a setting devoid of the researcher’s influence, or perhaps in a one-to-one interview situation without the influence of other group members. This has been a criticism of the group discussion method, especially by those who favour the interview as a research method (Hoijer, 1990, Green, 1999). According to Hoijer, “the obvious and well documented effect of group pressure” distorts people’s responses, and thus “demonstrates...the invalidity of the method” (1990: 34). I agree with Lunt and Livingstone’s (1996) response to this criticism, that Hoijer:

...sets up the ideal of the uncontaminated interview in which social pressures do not distort the individual expression of opinion...it is untenable to suggest that groups interfere with the “clean” expression of individual opinion. Rather, under individual conditions, people can manage impressions solely for themselves and the interviewer. Under such circumstances, one set of pressures exist, whereas under group conditions, people manage impressions for the group and a different set of pressures exist (p.94)
It is not an aim of this research to seek ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ responses, as it is understood that there is no such thing as an ‘uncontaminated’ response. The audience research undertaken in this project is concerned with the social and affective processes involved in meaning construction, and therefore does not attempt to access ‘authentic’ responses or the cognitive reasoning of audience members, as is often the assumed objective of ‘cognitive psychology’.  

1.4.3.3. The Focus Group Method

Informed by a qualitative approach to the pursuit of knowledge, a key objective of this third stage of research is to provide insights into the ways in which viewers ‘socially’ construct meaning as part of the process of publicly negotiating a documentary. With this in mind, the focus group was the most pragmatic choice in comparison to individual interviews or quantitative methods such as surveys and opinion polls, as it satisfied the theoretical requirements that underpin the research. The focus group is an appropriate method for the exploration of the ‘dilemmatic’ process of negotiating meaning. Group discussions can illustrate the dialogic performance of discursive resources, whereby they are often transformed in the creative process of constructing new meanings (Billig, 1990, 1996; Puchta & Potter, 2004). The focus group also provides an opportunity to gain insights by way of participant observation, during both the discussion and the viewing of the programme, in which it is possible to observe individual emotional responses as they are expressed within the group context.

While there are pertinent reasons for using the focus group method for this phase of the research, it is acknowledged that the method does have some drawbacks, not least of which is the amount of time and effort involved in organising the participants of the group, transcribing the discussion, and analysing the vast quantity of data generated by this method.
Lunt and Livingstone (1996) have identified some common criticisms of the focus group method, which are “based upon the notion of a hierarchy of methods for making statistical and causal inferences” (p.89). Such critiques claim that the focus group cannot be a reliable ‘stand-alone’ method because there is no way of controlling or measuring the variables, and without the accompaniment of quantitative data, it is not possible to make cause-effect relations. It is also claimed that focus groups cannot be representative of the wider society, because the sample size is typically too small to be able to make statistical inferences and generalisations about populations (Merton, 1987, Morrison, 1998, Green, 1999).

These criticisms have been addressed by Lunt and Livinstone (1996) as well as Puchta and Potter (2004), who argue that it is not necessary to employ quantitative methods when the researcher does not aim to be representative of a wider audience, but to explore social processes of meaning construction. Issues of distribution, certainty and generalisation are central to the empiricist approach to knowledge, but they are of marginal concern to the researcher who wishes to explore the discursive construction of meaning, and to produce insights and contestable interpretations rather than concrete statistical findings. As Tolich and Davidson explain, “qualitative methods...provide an insight into social phenomena in a way that quantitative methods never can” (1999: 26).

1.4.3.4. Procedure

The audience research for this project involved six focus groups, which took place between March 2000 and October 2000 (roughly two years after the series was first screened on television). Five of the discussion groups took place in the Waikato region and one pilot group was held in Auckland. The sample was determined on the basis of already existing ‘interpretive communities’ - collectives of community members who share from a common pool of discourses (Radway, 1984). In retrospect, these communities also served as
‘communities of memory’, which was indicated by the use of ‘memory dialects’ within specific groups. As implied by my qualitative research orientation, the research sample is not intended to be representative of the wider population. Although the groups follow a ‘comparative’ design, discourse analysis not only focuses on discursive differences between the groups, but on the diversity of interpretation within each group.

Each group consisted of between four and ten participants of roughly equal gender proportions. In terms of the composition of the groups, an attempt was made to account for variation in ethnicity, age, and gender, as it was apparent from an earlier pilot project that initial responses to TNZW tended to diverge significantly along these lines (see Appendix 1, for details of group composition).

Each group involved an initial viewing of The Invasion of Waikato (episode three of TNZW), followed by a focused discussion lasting between ninety minutes and two hours. The discussion was audio-taped and later transcribed, thus yielding a huge body of data for analysis. The possibility of video-recording the group discussions was considered, but rejected as unnecessarily obtrusive, however linguistic, emotional and gestural responses of the participants were observed and noted throughout the screening.

Moderated by the researcher, the agenda for each group discussion was based on a semi-structured interview schedule, which included a basic list of themes around which the discussion was focused. While the themes remained constant for each group, the type and order of the questions, and the style of language used by the moderator was modified to account for cultural and educational differences. Such diversity also meant that different levels of ‘moderator involvement’ were necessary in order to stimulate and focus each group discussion (Morgan, 1997: 48-54). To some extent, the decision to opt for either ‘high’ or ‘low’ moderator involvement had to be made during the initial stages of each discussion.
Both academic and market research projects have been criticised for disempowering research participants. This has been the case especially when the researcher has endeavored to maintain tight control over the project, or when there are significant cultural differences or perceived ‘status’ imbalances between the researcher and the subjects of the research (Smith, 1999, Tolich & Davidson, 1999). With this in mind, an effort was made to empower the participants as much as possible. The focus group method provided research participants with the ‘power of numbers’, meaning that representatives from each community group were able to negotiate acceptable terms for the conduct of the research, such as conducting the discussion on their own territory and in a time frame suitable to them. In order to further address these issues of power, each group discussion was guided by a “funnel strategy” (Morgan, 1997: 41) that was “designed to allow groups initially to determine their own agendas as much as possible, before urging them to focus on specific issues” (Schlesinger et al, 1992: 28-29). This strategy ensures that the researcher acknowledges the value of participant interpretations.

1.5 Conclusion

By examining discourse, memory and affect in terms of distinct trajectories of scholarship, and then exploring the relation between these concepts, this first chapter has outlined the modular development of the theoretical and methodological framework for this thesis. By surveying a selection of themes flowing through these diverse fields of scholarship, these intersecting perspectives serve to situate my own theoretical orientation, and to introduce the following chapters.

In order to further clarify my orientation toward the key concepts underlying this thesis, a similar theoretical survey forms the basis of chapter two, where I explore the highly complex and extensively debated terrain established by theories of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, with a particular focus upon the role of
audio-visual media in relation to ‘nation-building’. Drawing on Anderson’s (1983) concept of the ‘imagined community’, the sense of ‘community membership’ is discussed in relation to the concept of homeland, and to the tangible presence of the landscape as a taken-for-granted, everyday construction of ‘nation’. I argue that mediation and re-contextualisation of the landscape can serve as a means of triggering memories that may spark the contestation of dominant configurations of ‘nation’.
I take issue with ‘textual determinism’ because it does not allow “space for a dialogical relationship between texts and subjects” (Ang, 1996: 38). See also, Thompson (1990: 291), who describes this issue as the ‘fallacy of internalism’.

See chapter four for a discussion of cultural hybridity, as theorised by Bhabha (1995: 34-35).

Walter Benjamin implied that memory is “held not just by humans, but by objects” – objects such as cameras and photographs (Leslie, 2006: 179).

Benjamin theorised the role of optical devices and the technologies of photography and cinema, in evoking memory traces. His theorisation of the ‘optical unconscious’ develops the notion of a ‘technologisation of memory and consciousness’, which emphasises the role of the camera in enabling a connection between rational and experiential modes of engagement. These ideas appear to precede much of the contemporary theorisation on affect in relation to screen media. A useful discussion of Benjamin’s theorisation of memory can be found in Leslie (2006).

The debate within historiography between presentism and objectivism is relevant to this discussion about public history. This debate appears across several volumes of The New Zealand Journal of History. In vol.40, no.2 of this journal, James McAloon engages with criticisms of the Waitangi Tribunal’s historiographical practice, made by Oliver (2001: 10), Belgrave (2001: 103) and Byrnes (2004). The general tone of these criticisms has been expressed by Howe (2003: 56-57) who argued that the Tribunal has projected “present moralities onto peoples of the past” (Howe, 2003: 56-57). Oliver (2007: 83) has replied to McAloon’s criticisms in vol.41, no. 1 of the same journal, reiterating his concern that particular Tribunal reports show “an instrumental presentism which is remarkably evidence free”. This debate between presentism and objectivism is relevant to the focus group extracts discussed in chapter eight, as it can be understood as influential upon the discussion that took place amongst the history academics.

Hall (1984), unpublished lecture, delivered at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee (as cited in Grossberg, 1996a: 168).

For example: Deleuze (1988); Silverman (1996); Gaines (1999); Campbell (1999); Marks (2000); Kennedy (2002); Massumi (2002); O’Connor (2002); Healy (2003); Stuppes (2003); Sobchack (2004); Bennett (2006).

While Marks (2000) has applied this theory to an analysis and discussion of a number of films that she defines as ‘intercultural’, I would argue that the very basis of her theorisation stresses the importance of applying these ideas to audience research. In this respect, my own audience research serves as a means of testing and potentially building upon Marks’ theory.

This idea of locating knowledge between cultures is compatible with Bhabha’s (1994, 1996) concept of “culture’s in-between” where he locates a hybrid space of cultural identity, (see chapter 4.8.2).

The theoretical implications of the ‘encountered sign’, especially as it relates to cinema, are developed in Deleuze (1988 & 1989) and Deleuze & Guattari (1987). For the purposes of this thesis, the most useful discussions of this concept were found in Kennedy (2002) and Stern (1985). These writers provide a more accessible discussion of Deleuze’s ‘encountered sign’, and usefully explore this concept in relation to aesthetics and sensation. While these concepts are relevant to the affective aspects of audience engagement discussed in chapter eight, there has not been space for their further development.
A diametric conceptualisation of intellect versus emotion has persisted in Western thought since the seventeenth century. The residue of this discourse is manifested in contemporary language use (Averill, cited in Harre & Gerrod, 1996: 24). Such ‘common-sense’ notions influence the field of audience research, where there has been a tendency to separate these two dimensions, as they are seen as operating within two distinct disciplines (Tulloch, 2000).

This model is a modified version of the model devised by Radstone and Hodgkin (2006), who propose a distinction between “three modes of memory: representation, affect and practice”, where practice equates to ‘performatve’ memory (p.12).

I use the term ‘memory triggers’ as discussed by Bennett (2006: 29) to describe the way in which sensory memories of past events can “trigger emotion in the present”. See also: van der Knaap (2006: 168) and Assman (2003: 2) for similar uses of this term.

Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s theorisation of social change in relation to CDA draws on the concept of ‘articulation’, developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), and also by Hall, (as cited in Grossberg, 1996b: 141-142) to describe social change as ‘rearticulation’ and ‘articulatory change’ (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 13). They also find the concept of ‘conjunctures’ to be especially useful in the analysis of social change. According to Chouliaraki and Fairclough, ‘Conjunctures’ are more or less “durable assemblies of ‘people, materials, technologies and practices”, which “cut across and bring together different institutions”. The benefit of focusing upon conjunctures is that it enables a tracing “through time the effect not just of individual events but of conjuncturally linked series of events in both sustaining and transforming (rearticulating) practices” (1999: 22).

There has been a degree of uncertainty and debate about the exact nature of the ‘preferred reading’ (Wren-Lewis, 1983: 184). I follow Hall’s (1980) explanation that “there is no necessary correspondence between encoding and decoding, the former can attempt to ‘pre-fer’ but cannot prescribe or guarantee the latter, which has its own conditions of existence” (p. 135). My understanding then, is that the preferred reading must actually be a plurality of readings, as it refers to the reading(s) that the author(s) of the programme would intend (or assume) to be taken by members of the audience.

Rhetorical analysis is especially important in the analysis of documentary, because “part of the job of the rhetorical analyst is to determine how constructions of ‘the real’ are made persuasive” (Simons, 1990: 11). The theoretical basis for rhetorical analysis is informed by Potter (1996: 107), whose double-edged view of rhetoric has also been mirrored by Billig (1996: 18) and has some parallels with Bakhtin’s (1981) theory of dialogics, which suggests that the rhetorical force of utterances must be assessed with regard to their dialogic context (p. 272).

Theories about audience reception have tended to emerge from two distinct disciplines. On one hand, the disciplinary conventions of social science have influenced the development of much of the quantitative and experimental types of analysis that characterise both the ‘effects’ and ‘uses and gratifications’ traditions. On the other hand, the disciplinary precepts of humanism have shaped the more qualitative approaches taken by literary criticism and cultural studies. Influenced by the methodological conventions of both the social scientific and the humanistic perspectives, reception analysis stresses the importance of conducting empirical research, while conceiving of the audience as active individuals who are capable of responding to a text in a variety of ways. (Bruhn Jensen & Rosengren, 1990: 222).

Such specialist discourses may become available to people by way of those institutions that require social or economic capital to ensure entry. For example, experience or knowledge of institutions such as academia, medicine, government or the media, may endow viewers with the resources that will allow them to make sense of, concur with, or criticise a television programme.
For examples of a diametric conception of thought versus intellect, see: Averill, (cited in Harre & Gerrod, 1996: 24), and Tulloch (2000).

This idea has been theorised by Nichols (1994: 93-106 & 2001: 130-137), where he discusses the performative mode in terms of its ability to invite an affective engagement with documentary.

For example, in van Dijk’s (1998) model of ‘cognitive structures’, and Hoijer’s (1990) audience research, which studies cognitive processes of constructing meaning.
CHAPTER 2: Theorising Nation-building

In attempting to construct a national, cultural unity, one part – one aspect of the cultural and linguistic mosaic – will become the dominant, metonymic representation of the whole...other ways of being national will be repressed, forgotten or relegated to the status of dialect (Billig, 1995: 87).

2.1 Introduction

Notions of ‘community’, ‘identity’ and ‘culture’ constitute a fluid domain, which is constantly being contested and re-constituted. Embedded in these three concepts is a debate that rages over the relevance of ‘nation’ as a concept. While the terms ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ continue to be utilised as part of common-sense discourse, globalisation theory has come to occupy one foreground within current academic debates over the media. Although globalisation is not a central concern of this thesis, it is necessary to explore the continued relevance of the term ‘nation’ within the context of local communities experiencing the effects of an accelerating process of globalisation.

While it is important to investigate the origin and purpose of the term nation, it is necessary to look at how the ‘national’ concept operates in practice, and what function it serves in the twenty-first century. Given my focus upon the construction and de-construction of historical narrative via audience engagement with TNZW, the central focus of this discussion involves an investigation of the role played by the media, and by audiences, in relation to the complex process of ‘nation-building’.

2.2 Defining the Nation

The term nation is notoriously difficult to define, and there is considerable debate about its origin and function. It is not within the scope of this chapter to conduct an exhaustive overview of the broad field in which definitions of the nation are debated. Rather, the intention is to map out the key areas of
debate deemed most relevant to this thesis, and to position myself in relation to various approaches towards defining the nation.

There are a number of debates that are central to definitions of the nation, and these overlap in complex ways. While the theoretical framework for this thesis draws on competing approaches to the nation, the definitions that are most aligned to my approach are those proposed by Anderson (1983), Billig (1995) and Price (1995). Each of these theorists provides a unique definition, which adds a new layer of significance to the concerns of this thesis.

Anderson’s definition of the nation as an ‘imagined political community’ is particularly useful as a means of articulating the way in which nations are socially and culturally constructed, while also addressing the active role of audience members in constructing the nation (1983: 6). His focus on the print media is useful as a means of understanding the role of the media in providing a tangible connectivity to an elusive concept such as national belonging. However, such a focus does not deal with the specificities of contemporary media, and the way in which these media operate in the context of processes of globalisation.

Price (1995) builds upon Anderson’s definition, to include a discussion of the nation-building role of screen media, with an emphasis on television and the public sphere. Price considers Anderson’s definition within the context of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, where globalisation needs to be considered as an important process, which is modifying the conceptualisation and relevance of debates about nation and nationalism (Price, 1995).

Billig’s (1995) term ‘banal nationalism’ is pertinent in terms of my focus on the role of the media in everyday constructions of the nation. His distinction between ‘hot nationalism’ and ‘banal nationalism’ is relevant to the New Zealand context, where everyday instances of nation-building are often taken for granted, while more salient expressions of national and cultural identity
take on labels such as ‘Maori nationalism’ (see sections 4.5. & 4.8.1). Billig’s argument that people forget the origins of the nation is also particularly relevant to this thesis, as it places emphasis on the apparent public amnesia of foundational historical events. In this case, **TNZW** can be understood as an ‘historical event’ (Sobchack, 1996: 4) – an event that has been both forgotten and remembered directly in relation to processes of legitimation and contestation and a changing public consciousness towards colonial authority, as it has been perpetuated and contested via historical narrative and cultural forms (see section 5.3.4.).

### 2.2.1 Key Debates

In the search for definitive criteria, some theorists have defined the nation on the basis of ‘objective’ criteria such as; language, ‘race’, ethnicity, geographical territory, religion, common history or common lineage. This ‘objective’ approach to defining national belonging has been challenged by those who favour subjective definitions of the nation (Renan, 1882, Anderson, 1983, Hobsbawm, 1990). Hobsbawm criticises the objective approach for “trying to fit historically novel, emerging, changing and far from universal entities into a framework of permanence and universality” (1990: 6).

In this sense, he is critiquing those who use objective criteria in order to rationalise their view of the nation as natural and primordial, and those who would separate subjectivity from history.

An alternative approach employs subjective criteria, defining the nation in terms of the collective, (as well as individual) sense of belonging. In his 1882 lecture ‘What is a Nation?’, Renan argued that the concept of the nation is neither tangible nor natural. Conversely, nationhood is determined by the *will* of a group of individuals to unite as a community:

> A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle...two things...constitute this soul or spiritual principle...one is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an individual form (Renan, cited in Bhabha, 1990: 19).
In contrast to those who describe the nation as a concrete and natural entity, Renan’s insistence on defining nation on the basis of ‘collective will’ suggests that national belonging is a dynamic and elusive phenomenon. Rather than being determined by tangible and measurable characteristics, Renan proposes that national belonging is entangled with the complexities of emotion, collective subjectivity and memory. This is the real strength of Renan’s argument, and it is this part of his lecture that has relevance for this thesis. However, there are some fundamental problems with a definition of the nation that rests on the notion of the ‘will’ to belong. Such a view would suggest that individuals possess the agency to choose whether or not they would like to belong to a nation, a view that tends to ignore the extent to which individuals and communities are shaped and constrained by ideological structures (Hobsbawm, 1990, Billig, 1995). According to Gellner (1997), the state plays a key role in determining inclusion and exclusion from ‘the nation’.

While both Renan and Gellner have offered much to debates about the nation, Renan’s definition suffers from the pitfalls of ‘liberal pluralism’, while Gellner’s definition is overly compliant to the ‘false consciousness’ approach toward ideology2. As discussed in chapter one, my position straddles, and adapts these two approaches. So while the state plays a key role in determining the boundaries of national inclusiveness, individual subjects are also active agents in processes of imagining their own sense of identification and relative position to culturally produced notions of ‘nation’.

The complex, fluid and overlapping relationship between definitions of the nation defy one dimensional, diametric representation. Despite the limitations of simplification, there is some value in representing a selection of key definitions of the nation along a continuum. The point of using a continuum is to emphasize the oppositional approaches, while acknowledging the ‘grey’ areas that are located in-between these poles. To select one debate as an example, primordialist definitions would be located at one end of a continuum. Proponents of this approach argue that nations are perennial
and natural, and that they are simply an outgrowth of their ethnic origins. On the other end would be the constructionists, who argue that nations are modern constructions (thus arising from the conditions of modernity), and that nationalism is 'instrumental' (that it serves the purpose of maintaining power and control by gaining the voluntary submission of citizens). A number of definitions can be located at various points between these two poles, representing positions relative to the extremes of primordialism and constructionism. While this is a highly simplistic representation of a complex and constantly changing theorisation of the nation, this ‘snapshot’ serves the purpose of illustrating the way in which all definitions of the nation are underpinned by a set of competing assumptions about nature, human behaviour, knowledge, power and the social world.

The primordialist approach favours the idea that nations arise from ethnic origins, which are understood to be natural and primordial. Stemming from this approach are the proponents of ‘ethnonational identity’ (Kellas, 1991; Ignatief, 1993; Connor, 1994). Primordialists argue that nations exist due to “‘primordial’ ties based on language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory” (Smith, 1986: 12). According to this argument, these are the elements that persist throughout time, tie a community together, and distinguish communities apart from each other. In this way, a direct link is made between the characteristics of ‘pre-modern’ ethnic communities and ‘modern’ nations. But some primordialists push this argument to its limits, by asserting that the terms ‘ethnic community’ and ‘national community’ are actually interchangeable, albeit with a significant difference in scale and capacity:

...the units we call ‘nations’ and the sentiments and ideals we call ‘nationalism’ can be found in all periods of history, even when we camouflage the fact by using other terms to describe analogous phenomena. This means that the units and sentiments found in the modern world are simply larger and more effective versions of similar units and sentiments traceable in much earlier periods of human history (Smith, 1986: 12).
The idea that nations are simply larger forms of ethnic communities appears to be an integral element in the viewpoint of those who ascribe to the primordial position. By using the term ‘ethnonationalism’, Connor (1994) not only equates nationalism with ethnic identity, he melds the two into a singular and inseparable term. Despite outlining a view that appears to express Connor’s notion of ‘ethnonationalism’, Smith (1986) claims to reject both the primordial and modernist positions. But while he points out some problems with the primordial view, it is this view that underpins his argument:

...one can concede the antiquity of collective cultural ties and sentiments without assimilating them, retrospectively, to nations or nationalism, or suggesting that ancient or medieval collective units and sentiments are simply small-scale, primitive forms of modern nations and nationalism. There may be connections between the two, but, if so, these have to be established empirically (p.13).

Although Smith argues that it may be problematic to equate ethnicity with nationalism, he reduces the problem to a lack of empirically established evidence, which would (presumably) verify the connections between these ‘units’ of community. While pre-modern ethnic communities and modern national communities may be linked by similar characteristics, it is overly simplistic to view one as an outgrowth of the other, because they are two distinct forms of community, situated within different socio-historical contexts, with their own historically specific functions. To ignore these specificities is to disregard significant changes in political and economic structure, industrialisation, mobility, communication, and globalisation. But in their search for universal behaviours, the primordialists have tended to overlook such specificities. Behavioural similarities serve to provide evidence in support of the claim that universal laws of nature determine communal behaviours.

The primordialists derive much of their argument from assumptions about human nature. Rather than making a clear distinction between the natural world and the social world, primordialists adhere to the view that all social behavior is determined by human nature (van den Berghe, 1978). Informed
by the doctrines of organic naturalism and scientific humanism, proponents of this position propose that both ethnic communities and nations are natural phenomena, and that:

...nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of history and integral elements of the human experience. The sociobiological version of this argument asserts that ethnicity is an extension of kinship, and that kinship is the normal vehicle for the pursuit of collective goals in the struggle for survival. Sociological versions of the same viewpoint regard language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory as the basic organizing principles and bonds of human association throughout history (Smith, 1986: 12).

While Smith has outlined a useful distinction between socio-biological and sociological views of community, it follows that if both nations and ethnic communities are thought to be natural units of human experience, then this also implies that they are eternal, or at least ‘perennial’. Smith (1986) suggests that primordialists make two separable claims; that nations are perennial, and that they are natural. He maintains that while the latter claim presupposes the former, the former does not necessarily presuppose the latter (p.12).

2.2.2 The Constructionist View

In contrast to the primordial position, the constructionist approach maintains that nations are constructed and continuously reproduced via narrative and cultural forms. This concept underpins those definitions that describe the nation as ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ by citizens (Anderson, 1983; Ringrose & Lerner, 1993; Billig, 1995; Price, 1995; Gellner, 1997). Proponents of the constructionist approach tend to support ‘instrumental’ definitions of the nation, arguing that the nation serves as a tool wielded by dominant groups, functioning to sustain and to reify hierarchical power relations (Hobsbawm, 1990; Gellner, 1997).

Closely aligned with the Marxist notion of ‘false consciousness’, Gellner (1997) argues that nations function to promote the success and
maintenance of the capitalist order. Rather than reducing the function of the nation to a one-way power relationship based solely on economic terms, I follow those ‘instrumentalists’ who focus on the ongoing struggle to construct and sustain nationhood, which is understood to be determined by one’s ability to control, define, or at least participate in the production of cultural forms (Price, 1995, Billig, 1995). Price and Billig tend to use the term ‘nation-building’ to describe such a process of struggle. While this term presupposes that nations are constructed, functional and dynamic, it also provides a useful metaphor for the way in which nations undergo continuous processes of construction and reconstruction. Just as a building requires construction, repair, renovation and protective treatment from the elements, a nation can be understood to require continual protective and reconstructive maintenance in order to survive. For example, New Zealand On Air (NZoA) and the New Zealand Film Commission, as state funded bodies, can be arguably understood as existing in order to maintain and reconstruct the concept of the nation, as it is manifest in cultural forms such as television documentary, music video and film.

According to Gellner (1964), “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (p.169). This is a useful definition, as it challenges the primordial view that nations are natural and eternal, and promotes the idea that nations are constructed. However, the problem with this idea of the nation as ‘invented’, is that it suggests a ‘false’ existence rather than an ‘imagined’ existence. As Anderson (1983) argues, Gellner “implies that true communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations” (p.6).

While defining the nation as ‘an imagined political community’, Anderson (1983: 6) argues that nations were partly developed due to the instability brought about by the industrial revolution. Like Gellner and Hobsbawm, Anderson views nations as arising out of the conditions of modernity. However his argument is primarily founded on the changes brought about by ‘print capitalism’ in providing “a new fixity to language” (1983: 44). He
explains that nations are “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p.6).

Anderson’s definition of the nation as an imagined community is more appropriate for this thesis than that proposed by Gellner. Not only does Anderson challenge the common-sense view that nations are natural and eternal, he moves beyond a one-way conceptualisation of power relations, thereby implying that individuals are active agents capable of imagining themselves at various locations in relation to the nation, and thereby allowing for different degrees of national belonging. This notion of imagined belonging tends toward the argument that nations are founded on the will to belong, however Anderson balances this vision of human agency by situating individuals as agents positioned within the political and economic structures of modernity.

2.3 Function of Nation, State and Nation-state.

In considering the function of a nation, it becomes necessary to interrogate the relationship between the terms ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nation-state’. These terms tend to be used in contemporary discourse in an interchangeable way, implying that they are one and the same thing, or that they are always co-existent. There seems to be very little agreement about the degree to which nations and states are connected to, or reliant upon each other.

According to Gellner (1983), a state is a “clearly identified, and well centralised, disciplined agency” which operates at a political and administrative level, towards a means of maintaining control and order in society. He argues that a state “possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence” (p.3), explaining how state authorities are permitted, and often required to enforce and modify behaviour through means of violence. The state is an agency, or network of agencies, that is supposedly representative
of the people who make up its community. Its function is to maintain its own authority and stability, in order to protect its members from physical harm, and perpetuate their collective values and norms.

A nation is a more elusive, and broader concept to define. The term nation goes beyond the political and administrative level of the state, to incorporate qualities such as emotional attachment and feelings or imaginings of community. While both the state and the nation can be described as constructs, the state is experienced in a tangible way in everyday life, while the nation can be described as an imaginary concept (Anderson, 1983). Following this view, it is not possible to speak of the nation as an actual, physical community or geographical place (despite being constructed this way in political and media discourse). It is only an imaginary (although, a potentially powerful) concept. Regardless of this intangibility, it is a concept that sometimes presents itself in tangible forms, such as via paintings, sporting events or televised images of the landscape.

Positing a useful distinction between state and nation, Held and McGrew (2000) argue that states are...

...complex webs of institutions, laws and practices, the spatial reach of which has been difficult to secure and stabilize over fixed territories. Nations involve cross-class collectivities, which share a sense of identity and collective political fate. Their basis in real and imagined cultural, linguistic and historical commonalities is highly malleable and fluid, often giving rise to diverse expressions and ambiguous relationships to states (p.15).

The point here is that a nation is not the same as a state, and while the two entities are related in complex ways, there is no simple overlap. Connor (1994) argues that such a conflation of terms has created major confusion:

The most fundamental error involved in scholarly approaches to nationalism has been a tendency to equate nationalism with a feeling of loyalty to the state rather than with loyalty to the nation. This confusion has led scholars to assume that the relationship of nationalism to state-integration is functional and supportive rather
than dysfunctional and defeatist (p.91).

In making this statement, Connor raises an important point about the problematic conflation of the terms nation and state. In doing so, he criticises those who have defined the nation in a functionalist sense. Such definitions have suggested that nations are not only constructions, but that they undergo constant re-construction, functioning to constrain, control and stabilise social change. (Hobsbawm, 1990; Billig, 1995; Gellner, 1997).

If a nation and a state are not the same, and if they do not always exist at the same time, why is the term nation-state so frequently used? The term nation-state can be used to signify the point at which a nation and a state overlap. It describes the synergistic relationship between the centrality and political authority of the ‘state’, and the elusive ‘boundary consciousness’ of the nation (Billig, 1995: 21). Using various methods of cultural signification, the state works to bolster the image of a unified and stable nation. Such an image must be projected (primarily through cultural signification) to other nations, but also to the members of its own community. In turn, a perception of national unity insures a degree of compliance to the state. However the relationship is not quite this simple. Individuals may have a sense of loyalty to a perceived nation, but it does not follow that they will extend this loyalty to the state. Conversely, they may exercise loyalty to the state, but their sense of national loyalty may be ambivalent, especially in the case where an individual’s national identity is split between two or more ‘nations’.

According to Billig (1995), there is a constant potential threat to the stability of the nation-state, by internal and external disruption. Therefore, the state must undergo a continuing struggle to maintain order, to nurture, and to project a sense of national identity that is resonant with, and subsuming of, an increasingly fragmented matrix of cultural identities. Billig (1995) emphasises this fluid and contestatory aspect of nationhood, arguing that:

The struggle to create the nation-state is a struggle for the monopoly of the means of violence. What is being created – a nation state – is
itself a means of violence. The triumph of a particular nationalism is seldom achieved without the defeat of alternative nationalisms and other ways of imagining peoplehood (p.28).

By describing state violence as a monopoly, both Gellner and Billig are referring to the legitimation of violence for different purposes. On the one hand, internal violence is deemed necessary to maintain compliance from dissenting groups within the nation. On the other hand, external violence is deemed necessary to maintain and protect national borders.

2.4 Nationalism

Billig argues that the term ‘nationalism’ occurs in everyday conversation and in the media as a means of explaining irrational and emotive behaviours exhibited by minority ethnic groups, terrorists, and extremists, striving towards independence or the ultimate rule of a territory. Describing this use of the term as ‘hot nationalism’, Billig points out that this understanding of nationalism is routinely transmitted via mass media depictions of national disunity (1995: 43). It would appear that ‘hot nationalism’ has been the dominant interpretation of nationalism in academic discourse throughout the twentieth century. Worsley (1984) notes that, after 1918 “nationalism was seen as a problem, even a catastrophe, a reason for pessimism, not hope. To intellectuals, it had now become supremely illogical and supremely irrational”. (p.272). This interpretation of nationalism has persisted in the writing of more contemporary academics. For example, Ignatieff (1993) uses the term nationalism as though it is of primary concern to minority ethnic groups who are driven to the use of violence in the name of self-determination:

... nationalism is centrally concerned to define the conditions under which force or violence is justified in a people’s defence, when their right of self-determination is threatened or denied. Self determination here may mean either democratic self-rule or the exercise of cultural autonomy, depending on whether the national group in question believes it can achieve its goals within the framework of an existing state or seeks a state of its own (p.3).
Although he proceeds to differentiate ‘ethnic nationalism’ from ‘civic nationalism’, Ignatieff’s use of the term ‘national group’ implies that this is a subordinate, _ethnic_ community, engaged in nationalist acts of violence in the struggle for self-determination. Similarly, Connor (1994) uses the term ‘ethnonationalism’ to embody a phenomena that applies (almost exclusively) to subordinate ethnic groups:

The still-revolutionary idea popularly termed national self-determination holds that any people, simply because it considers itself to be a separate people, has the right, if it so desires, to create its own state...The finding concerning popular sympathy for those who carry out violence in the name of the national group also has momentous implications for the political stability of states, for it explains how guerrilla struggles have been maintained for years in the face of overwhelming odds (pp.82-83).

Taking issue with this rather narrow use of the term nationalism, a number of theorists have drawn attention to what is described by them as a common-sense acceptance that nationalism is the ideology of ‘others’, and that this term is rarely used to describe ‘our’ ideological loyalty to the state and the nation (Brennan, 1990: 57; Chaterjee, 1993: 4; Billig, 1995: 15-16; Lazarus, 1999: 69). Lazarus observes that many of the contemporary studies of nationalism have continued to offer an “unambiguously First Worldist interpretation of nationalism” (1999: 68). As he explains:

In what Tim Brennan terms ‘a conveniently European lapse of memory’, ‘our’ nationalisms – to the extent that they become visible at all as objects of enquiry – are typically classed as finished projects and are taken to have had benign effects: modernizing, unifying, democratizing. ‘Their’ supposedly still unfolding nationalisms, on the other hand, are categorized under the rubrics of atavism, anarchy, irrationality, and power-mongering. Nationalism in the East or South is centrally on the research agenda today, in short, for the basically strategic reason that it is taken to pose a danger to the established social order of the West (p.69).

Rather than simply condemning those individual theorists of nationalism who have unreflexively studied the nationalism of the ‘Other’, Lazarus argues that this elision is a Western phenomenon. While the nationalism of the ‘Other’ is
constantly constructed via the mass media, the nationalism of the dominant social order has become so naturalised as to be rendered invisible, not only in the eyes of academics, but for a majority of individuals who live in the Western world. As Lazarus points out, those Western versions of nationalism that are recognised (such as colonialism) are often considered to be ‘finished projects’ with ‘benign effects’. Arguably, even the term ‘post-colonial’ implies that there is some end-point to colonisation, or some harmonious after-period, in which the effects of colonisation cease to be experienced as a problem. Chatterjee (1993) reiterates this argument that the term nationalism has come to be interpreted as a force emanating from the Third World, and threatening Western ‘civilisation’:

Nationalism is now viewed as a dark, elemental, unpredictable force of primordial nature threatening the orderly calm of civilized life. What had once been successfully relegated to the outer peripheries of the earth is now seen picking its way back toward Europe, through the long-forgotten provinces of the Habsburg, the czarist, and the Ottoman empires. Like drugs, terrorism, and illegal immigration, it is one more product of the Third World that the West dislikes but is powerless to prohibit (p.4).

Likening the use of the term nationalism to that of “drugs, terrorism and illegal immigration”, Chatterjee illustrates how this term has been utilised to reiterate common-sense understandings of nationalism as an ‘uncivilized’ force, which is disruptive and threatening. In everyday conversation, when people speak of nationalist movements, they are not usually referring to expressions of national pride, of which they may participate on a daily basis. If noticed at all, such sentiment is referred to as ‘patriotism’, and is commonly presumed to be a healthy requirement for the wellbeing of a nation. As Billig puts it, “‘our’ nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien. A new identity, a different label, is found for it. ‘Our’ nationalism appears as ‘patriotism’ – a beneficial, necessary and, often, American force” (1995: 55).

But the notion of ‘our patriotism’ and ‘their nationalism’ extends well beyond the borders of the USA. In New Zealand, the term nationalism is regularly
expressed by the (usually pejorative) label ‘Maori nationalism’. As this term is utilised most visibly in the media, and predominantly by non-Maori, it tends to be used to describe a marginal group of ‘activists’ who lobby for ‘Maori self determination’ in the form of separate sovereign rule over a Maori nation (see section 4.8.1.). In this local context, in which the struggle for decolonisation is often represented as a threat to national cohesion (Abel, 1997), nationalism is rarely considered to be something that non-Maori practice as a means of reproducing existing power relations.

Theorists such as Ignatief and Connor tend to be guided by ‘common-sense’ definitions, such as that proposed by Rogowski (1985), for whom nationalism is “the striving...for territorial autonomy, unity and independence” (pp.88-89). In a similar vein, discussions of New Zealand nationalisms tend to focus on those forms that are most prominent. Definitions resembling that of Rogowski’s have been used to describe ‘Maori nationalism’. Williams (1997) defines ‘Maori sovereignty’ as “signified (by) the desire among Maori for a return not only of their alienated land, but also of the cultural and political autonomy they had lost through 150 years of domination by the Pakeha” (p.32). He also defines the particular essence of Pakeha nationalism and bicultural nationalism, but acknowledges their existence only during the specific period in which they strive towards meeting their goals. At the point at which bicultural nationalism is noted to arise, “the period of Pakeha nationalism was at an end” (p.28). Although Williams provides an important illustration of the struggle for hegemony in New Zealand, he limits his discussion of ‘New Zealand Nationalisms’ by neglecting to consider the banal nationalism of New Zealand as an established nation-state. Both Rogowski and Williams (in Billig’s words), “in concentrating on the striving for autonomy, unity and independence, ignore how these things are maintained once they have been achieved” (Billig, 1995: 43). In contrast, Billig argues that nationalism is not a temporary mood expressed from the margins of a society, but a constant expression by established and often powerful nation-states.
While identifying ‘hot nationalism’ as a particularly salient phenomenon, Billig views ‘nationalism’ as a less visible ideological concept – one that functions to support the state and construct the nation. As Hobsbawm put it, “Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round” (1990: 10). In this sense, it is important to recognise the many ways in which the state actively participates in the process of nation-building. The problem is that nation-building activities have become so commonplace that they are taken-for-granted by those citizens who participate in them. Addressing this problem, Billig has broadened the concept of nationalism to emphasise the ways that “established nation-states are routinely reproduced” (1995: 16).

2.4.1 Banal Nationalism

By emphasising the commonplace ways in which nationhood is reinforced in everyday life, Billig illustrates how the concept of national belonging is taken for granted as being natural and eternal. His focus on banal signifiers of the nation serves as a powerful reminder of the way that ‘we’ participate in ‘our’ own nationalism. This is not just a phenomenon of daily behaviour, but a problem of the way in which nationalism has been theorised. “In using the term ‘nationalism’ in a limited way…theorists have often projected nationalism onto others and naturalised ‘our’ nationalism out of existence” (1995: 16).

While *TNZW* was by no means a banal moment in the construction of the nation, the concept of banal nationalism developed by Billig is relevant to the ways in which the series utilises banal and taken-for-granted phenomena (such as familiar imagery of the landscape, street signs and battle sites) in order to create connections between past and present, which in turn, operates as imagery for a newly imagined nation. The significance of such banal signifiers in terms of both textual construction and audience engagement with the series is discussed in sections 7.2.4, 8.4. and 8.4.1.
The notion of ‘banal nationalism’ challenges assumed distinctions between patriotism and nationalism. While patriotism tends to suggest a positive sentiment, nationalism connotes a negative, more aggressive sentiment. What may appear as patriotic to those partaking in such expressions may also be considered as nationalistic by outsiders and onlookers. For example, in the period following the 2001 attack on the New York Twin Towers, there was an outpouring of nationalist sentiment from United States citizens, some of which has been expressed in the form of digital artwork exhibited via the internet. Those participating in the creation and exhibition of these cultural forms considered themselves to be undertaking an exercise in patriotism, whereas, many non-U.S visitors to these websites might describe the images as nationalistic. The emotional dimension inherent in this type of cultural production serves to reinforce a specific image of the nation.

Although focusing primarily on print journalism, Billig’s concept of banal nationalism contributes an important dimension to my consideration of the role of the screen media in nation building. Television has come to occupy such a central position in social and cultural life that its nation-building and commercial functions have become taken-for-granted. This is evident in discourses that view ‘popular’ and new entertainment formats as hindering the public exploration of issues of ‘nation’ and ‘culture’ (see section 6.2.4.).

On New Zealand television, banal signifiers of nationhood are routinely communicated via new factual formats, news broadcast, advertising, music-video and various forms of documentary. According to Horrocks (1995), New Zealand television broadcasters have the following implicit agendas:

The emphasis is on national togetherness (for example, montage sequences in which Maori and Pakeha are singing together). This nationalism has a strong appeal for broadcasters whose aim is to attract the largest mainstream audiences they can find. It fits naturally with advertising and allows New Zealand to be marketed as a brand (p.95).

While few people would consider the example put forward by Horrocks as a form of nationalism, this extract demonstrates why television is a key
medium for perpetuating banal signifiers of national unity. But while television may be an ideal medium for the transmission of banal nationalism, it does not follow that audience engagement with such material should be devoid of critique. As outlined in section 1.4.3.1, audience members are active individuals, with access to a variety of resources that may enable critique. While Billig’s theorisation of banal nationalism provides a useful concept for studying the role of television as a nation-building medium, it must be considered in relation to empirical audience research. The fact that broadcasters believe such messages of nationalism are attracting large ‘mainstream audiences’ is not evidence of a tacit acceptance of this version of nationalism. Rather, this is indicative of broadcaster’s assumptions about audiences, and their compliance to the ‘ratings discourse’ (Lealand, 2001), (see section 6.3.8).

2.5 The Role of Historical Narratives in Nation-building

Several scholars have demonstrated how the concept of the nation is inextricably tied to narrative form. Anderson (1983) makes a connection between the nation and the temporal and spatial arrangement in the narrative forms of the realist novel. He argues that “the idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which is also conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) in history” (p.26). According to Anderson, the realist novel, as well as other forms of print media, “allowed people to imagine the special community that is the nation” (p.25).

While significantly influenced by the work of Anderson (1983), Bhabha (1990) extends his view of the narration of nation beyond that proposed by Anderson, explaining the value of interrogating the ‘narrative address’ of the nation:

To study the nation through its narrative address does not merely draw attention to its language and rhetoric; it also attempts to alter the conceptual object itself. If the problematic ‘closure’ of textuality
questions the ‘totalization’ of national culture, then its positive value lies in displacing the wide dissemination through which we construct the field of meanings and symbols associated with national life (p.3).

While the nation is understood here as constructed through narrative address, Bhabha does not constrain his interpretation of narrative within the domain of the written word. Instead, he stresses the need to problematise the fixity of meaning associated with textual determination, and to demystify the cultural production of a totalising concept of the nation, as it is reiterated via narrative address. In this sense, audiovisual media must be considered as prime sites through which versions of the nation are narrated and disseminated. But, as White (1996) argues, media technologies offer new possibilities for the representation of both history and nation, and these possibilities do not always involve the use of conventional narrative forms. According to White (1996), the notion of the story:

...has suffered tremendous fraying and at least potential dissolution as a result of both that revolution in representational practices known as cultural ‘modernism’ and the technologies of representation made possible by the electronics revolution...we can consider the power of the modern media to represent events in such a way as to render them, not only impervious to every effort to explain them but also resistant to any attempt to represent them in a story form (pp.22-23).

Instead of considering audiovisual media as particularly suited to the notion of narrative address, White views these media as potential sites for the use of non-narrative techniques. For White, the primary value of ‘modernist techniques’ for the representation of history and nation “resides in the sense of doubt and uncertainty toward historical knowledge that a modernist approach to the past permits” (Burgoyne, 1996: 118). Both White and Burgoyne refer here to the possibilities of narrative texture and fragmentation enabled by audiovisual media. It is the creative potential of audiovisual forms to move unexpectedly backwards and forwards through time, to juxtapose images of past with present, and to weave together various (sometimes contradictory) forms of representation, that opens a space for audience members to experience a sense of doubt toward historical knowledge. Bhabha (1990), Anderson (1983) and White (1996) offer insightful
perspectives on the role of narrative form in not only nation-building, but in theorising alternatives to the concepts of nation and history. These ideas are discussed in chapter seven, specifically in relation to the notion that TNZW functions as a ‘technology of cultural memory’ (see sections 7.6. and 8.5.1.).

As early as 1882, Renan observed the legitimising function of historical narrative, especially in the sense of promoting a sense of what Anderson (1983) refers to as ‘social unisonance’ - a singular or unified nation culture (p.145):

Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory…this is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea. To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more – these are the essential conditions for being a people (Renan, 1882, in Bhabha, 1990: 19)

Renan’s observations must be interpreted within the context of nineteenth century European conceptions of community. However, despite the new possibilities brought about by audiovisual media to de-stabilise the concept of nation, historical narratives continue to play a central role in the development and maintenance of nationhood. Encoded and mediated via linguistic and cultural forms, these narratives operate as ‘memory schemas’ or ‘residues of meaning’ that travel through time, circulate amongst communities, and assist individuals to imagine scenarios that play out the origins of a nation (Mageo, 2001: 2). Emphasising the significance of a common or shared narrative of the past, Renan recognised that such narratives relied upon heroism and glory as the founding principles of the national idea.13 When utilised for the purpose of nation-building, such origin stories are not only used as a means of justifying sovereign rule, they serve to mark the boundaries that determine who may belong, and who will be considered as alien to the nation.

Co-existing with a gradual process of de-colonisation, particular narratives have been utilised by dominant groups to construct a sense of a unified New
Zealand nation (see chapter 3). However, competing narratives have also served marginalised communities as a source of an alternative collective identity and a means of resistance (see chapter 4). According to Bhabha (1990), “counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalising boundaries – both actual and conceptual – disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities” (p.300). In this sense, TNZW can be interpreted as both a nation-building narrative and a counter-narrative of the nation (see chapters 7 and 9).

Narratives of war are often promoted as justification for colonial rule, and thus serve to sustain current hierarchies of power. A number of theorists have alluded to this power dynamic, suggesting that those narratives that become legitimated as official history are crafted and perpetuated by the victors of war. As Benjamin (1970) put it, “whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate” (p.258). While in agreement with this assessment, Billig (1995) argues that the writing of history is a dynamic process, which reveals the struggle for hegemony, and demonstrates how certain historical narratives maintain a place of dominance over time. “National histories are always being re-written, and the re-writing reflects current balances of hegemony” (p.71).

While many historical narratives appear to be ‘fixed’ by the written word, all histories have a dynamic and fluid potential, in the sense that they can move from positions of dominance through to marginalisation and visa versa. In New Zealand, various interpretations of the New Zealand Wars have played a fundamental role in the construction of ‘the nation’. Chapter three of this thesis maps the movement of a number of histories in relation to changing social and political circumstances over the past 150 years. This demonstrates that while marginalised histories have had to vie for public legitimacy, cultural and linguistic representations of New Zealand as a nation have undergone a process of metamorphosis which is representative of the
changing cultural and political climate.

Historical narratives are an important means of nation-building, not only by the way in which they are remembered, but also by the way they are forgotten. According to Belich (TNZW, Episode One, 1998) ‘collective amnesia’ supports the ‘myth of good race relations’ in New Zealand. But as a means of rationalising colonisation, both work in support of each other. Perpetuated by cultural forms, myths of cultural harmony help to legitimise the colonial narrative and ensure that the brutality and resounding impact of the New Zealand Wars\textsuperscript{14} is not remembered. To draw attention to such conflict would be to illuminate the violence from which the nation emerged, thus making connections between past injustices and present social and economic circumstances. Such connections are dangerous for nationalism because:

Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for (the principle of) nationality. Indeed historical inquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations…Unity is always effected by means of brutality (Renan, 1882, in Bhabha, 1990: 19).

Further, a perception of unity in the face of difference provides a sense that a community is bonded by what they share in common, rather than divided by irreconcilable grievances. Nationalist consciousness perpetuates itself by the banal and unremarkable ways in which the myth of national unity is delivered to citizens.

In New Zealand, myths of national unity have promoted the imagining of a singular, coherent national identity, recognisable in phrases such as ‘we’re all Kiwis’ – a common response to overt displays of cultural diversity or unrest (Abel, 1997). Although on the surface these expressions of unity may appear harmless, when considered within a historical context, such comments signify a deeply ingrained national consciousness, which imagines a level playing field, and an ‘identity of identities’ (Billig, 1995: 92).
This tendency of condensing identities occurs as part of the process of sustaining hegemony.

Given that narratives of national unity are implicated in this construction of ‘social unisonance’, it is not surprising that certain narratives of the New Zealand Wars (those which emphasise national dissolution) have (at least prior to 1970) been treated as relatively insignificant by state sanctions, such as the New Zealand school curriculum. According to Bell (1996) where the New Zealand Wars have been included: “they were taught to the society’s school children in a highly sanitised version” (p.151). Such elision was (in the context of the 1990s) notable not only within schools, but also within academia, where “historians creatively remember ideologically convenient facts of the past, while overlooking what is discomfiting” (Billig, 1995: 37).

Belich (1986) has argued that New Zealand history has been marked by significant periods of historical amnesia. Notwithstanding these arguments about elision and amnesia, it must be acknowledged that since the 1970s there has been a growing interest, both in the media, and in the education system, in remembering the less comfortable aspects of the past. Rosenzweig and Thelen (1998) explain this shift as they have observed it occurring in America:

In the late 1980s, much publicized jeremiads warned ominously of historical amnesia and historical illiteracy suffocating the nation...the historians gathered in Indianapolis thought that the real issue was not, as pundits were declaring, what Americans did not know about the past, but what they did know and think. Incredibly, since many commentators had surveyed American ignorance, no one had actually investigated how Americans understood and used the past (p.3).

Addressing this perceived omission in the study of the past, Rosenzweig and Thelen conducted empirical research, which enabled them to analyse the ways in which people are engaged with the past in everyday life. Interview extracts from this research are used in The Presence of the Past to demonstrate different types of engagement with the past - from ordinary
activities such as watching television and maintaining collections of cultural artifacts, to the more intimate connections that are made through oral histories, family photograph albums and the recall of experience.  

2.6 The Role of the Media in Nation-building

For Healy (2003), both remembering and forgetting history are characteristic of a ‘culture of memory’ in contemporary Western society, whereby the media plays a central role. According to Healy, Huyssen (2000):

...suggests that on the one hand contemporary culture is relentlessly cast as forgetful, its historical consciousness lost or anaesthetized. Yet on the other hand there is a seemingly endless proliferation of discourses of the historic, of commemorations, of memorialising, of genealogical and local historical enthusiasm, and an unceasing escalation in the desire to preserve, record and document ‘the past’. It seems that Western society’s memory culture suffers from a hypertrophy of both remembering and forgetting. The ‘great paradox’...is that ‘[T]he amnesia reproach is invariably couched in a critique of the media, while it is precisely these media...that make ever more memory available to use day by day’ (Healy, 2003: 221).

As suggested by Healy and Huyssen above, media play an increasingly important role in the activity of nation-building. Narratives of the nation are not only transmitted via print media, and their functions are not limited to that of nation-building. Audiovisual media technologies provide numerous possibilities for narrative and non-narrative methods of constructing, deconstructing and re-constructing the nation. However, in order to navigate this changing role of the media, it is important to explore Anderson’s theorisation of the role of the print media in laying the basis for the national idea. Here, Anderson illustrates the function of language in the construction of a unified national consciousness. In this sense, language can be understood as an instrument of both unity and differentiation. As vernacular languages were disseminated and legitimated in print form, they signified and projected the unity of a community, whilst simultaneously asserting it as distinctive from other communities (Anderson, 1983). As an extension of this idea, Anderson describes how certain languages came to occupy positions
Print-capitalism created languages-of-power...High German, the King’s English, and, later, Central Thai, were...elevated to a new politico-cultural eminence. (Hence the struggles in late-twentieth-century Europe by certain ‘sub’-nationalities to change their subordinate status by breaking firmly into print – and radio)...In their origins, the fixing of print languages, and the differentiation of status between them were largely unselfconscious processes resulting from the explosive processes of capitalism, technology and human linguistic diversity...once ‘there’, they could become formal models to be imitated and, where expedient, consciously exploited in a Machiavellian spirit (1983: 45).

In enabling the fixity of language, print media enhanced the status of certain languages. Once fixed in print, these languages were officially legitimised, and communally recognised as the national language. The consequent visibility, centrality and shared use of these ‘languages-of-power’ meant that the speakers of less visible (non-printed) languages were relegated to a position of subordination. This process is especially relevant to the historical and contemporary use of language in New Zealand, where colonisation has brought about the subordination of the Maori language and the domination of the English language (Maaka & Fleras, 2005). Maori versions of historical events (such as the New Zealand Wars) have survived predominantly as oral histories, while the dominant English versions of these events have been ‘fixed’ in print, and thus accorded the status of ‘official’ history. While this printed record of New Zealand history has occupied a position of dominance for many years, the authoritative status of the written word is now in a position of competition with the authority and popularity of television (Edgerton, 2001) This situation is exemplified by many of the audience responses to TNZW (discussed in chapter 8).

While emphasising the role of the media in nation building, Anderson also points towards the importance of language in defining the parameters of national belonging. The ability to communicate and participate in the shared meanings signified by a common language is a powerful reminder that an individual belongs to a particular community. Conversely, those who cannot
participate in this ‘common language’ are reminded of their alienation from that group. According to Anderson (1983), print languages created:

...unified fields of exchange and communication...Speakers of the huge varieties of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language field, and at the same time, that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community (p.44, emphasis in original).

Despite the significance of Anderson’s focus on the written word, his analysis of the role of the print media has some limitations, especially when we consider the importance of screen media within the process of globalisation. While the readers of print media may have formed the ‘embryo’ of the nationally imagined community, the audiences of screen media are now actively, and centrally involved in the ongoing process of nation building. Price (1995) describes how print media’s capacity to ‘fix’ language and define history has been challenged by television:

...the new fixity of language helped to contribute to defined accounts of history, and usually to national histories. New definitions of the past – often invented – paved the way to enhanced and specific ideas of national consciousness. Now television changes popular notions of time itself and hierarchy and, as a consequence, popular notions of history (p.53).

Extending upon Anderson’s discussion of the print media, Price argues that television has had an ‘intensified impact’, potentially serving as a means of disrupting or reinforcing dominant versions of national history. While Anderson focused on the construction of national communities, Price includes a consideration of the impact of technological advances such as satellite broadcast, where he argues that such ‘globalised’ forms of communication have helped to foster the imagining of communities that are not national.
If print made people aware, however dimly, that there were millions of others sharing the same experience and reading the same material, television has an intensified impact – and the scale of intensity means that television is different in kind. Now people become aware of the vast numbers, maybe billions, in their particular ‘language field’ who are assumed to be fellow viewers; to whom they are connected, in Anderson’s term, in ‘their particular, visible invisibility’. What they might imagine is a community that is nearly universal, not limited, encompassing, and not national. (Price, 1995: 52)

In contrast to Anderson, Price focuses on the role of contemporary media in ‘community-building’ as opposed to ‘nation-building’. He argues that these newer forms of media are capable of bypassing ‘national’ boundaries and therefore function to construct imagined communities that may be universal rather than national, and inclusive rather than exclusive.

In this context, many audience members participate in processes that undermine the continued relevance of the term ‘nation’. Under the auspices of globalisation, audiences of screen media constitute various forms of imagined community that go beyond what Anderson describes as ‘nationally imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983). For example, the internet may function as a virtual interface for the convergence of communities that defy the limitations of national boundaries. The formation of such communities may be based on aspects of identity that transcend national identity, for example, communities formed on the basis of gender, sexuality, political affiliation, religion, shared interest and even game-play. Many of these communities may operate within a transnational, virtual space that serves to unify citizens who may otherwise be marginalised in relation to dominant conceptions of nation (Rheingold, 1993). But while the internet provides new possibilities for the development of trans-national, imagined communities, Bhabha points out that it should not be assumed that ‘virtual communitarians’ operate in an emancipatory global world that is beyond the
Although cyberspace communities are not obviously ‘national’ in character, their deterritorialization must not lead us into believing that they are detached from national policies of technological innovation, education provision, science policy (Bhabha, in Naficy, 1999: viii).

It is worth mentioning that various media forms have explored the ambivalence that Bhabha has observed as emerging from the intersection of local, national, global, and trans-national identities. This is a complex process whereby media audiences may simultaneously gain a sense of belonging and exclusion from both national communities and transnational communities. In other words, the media can play a central role in nation building, but this goes hand in hand with the building of non-national communities. Cinema and television provide examples of media texts that occupy such a transnational space. For example, films such as *Illustrious Energy* (Narbey, 1987), *Bend it Like Beckham* (Chadha, 2002) and *Bahji on the Beach* (Chadha, 1993) transcend the unstable parameters presumed by the concept of a ‘national cinema’, by focusing on issues concerned with transnational systems of identification, such as diaspora, cultural hybridity, and ambivalence towards the negotiation of national and cultural identity.

While it is important to consider the impact of globalisation in generating transnational identification with media, of particular relevance to this thesis are the ways in which New Zealand television audiences constitute imagined communities. New Zealand television broadcasting has undergone various models of ownership, many of which have attempted to integrate state and private ownership (Spicer *et al.*, 1996). In this context, many viewers who watch *One Network News* do so with the recognition that large numbers of other New Zealand citizens are witness to the same news, at the same moment in time. Despite the fact that the viewing audience for *One Network News* may only be representative of a selective section of the New Zealand population, these viewers are addressed as the national audience. Using phrases such as ‘our people, tonight’, viewers are invited, by broadcasters, to imagine themselves as participants of the national audience.
Abel’s (1997) study *Shaping the News* examines the way in which unity is constructed by television news. Rather than focusing on a singular discourse, Abel locates “discourses of unity…four different ways of talking about unity, partnership and the Treaty [of Waitangi]” (Abel, 1997: 39), (this is discussed in chapter 3). Defining these discourses on the basis of textual analysis of television news reports, Abel’s study lacks a vital and potentially insightful component study of audience responses. Despite this omission, the discourses cited are easily recognisable as operating through both television news reports and wider social discourse. Abel points out that television news privileges one discourse over the others. This ‘unity discourse’, or the ‘one people – one nation’ position is characterised by the assumption that “unless we forget our differences and unite as a single grouping called New Zealanders or Kiwis, racial tension will continue to grow” (McCreanor, 1989: 92, quoted in Abel, 1997: 38). Abel argues that such thinking is indicative of the dominant discourse in the news coverage of Waitangi Day events, which was “treated as common-sense, while the oppositional discourse was scarcely heard” (Abel, 1997: 41). Rather than being a deliberate conspiracy on behalf of TVNZ, the ‘one-people’ discourse is taken for granted by TVNZ reporters because it has become “enhabited” in everyday language use. Such enhabitation means that constructing a news story is a matter of using ‘a syntax of hegemony’ (Billig, 1995: 88), which takes the form of ‘little words’ that have the appearance of being quite reasonable, yet through their ambiguity, carry considerable power:

“We’ can become an ambiguous term, indicating both the particularity of ‘we’ the nation, and the universality of ‘we’, the universally reasonable word. In this way, our interests – those of party, government, nation and world – can appear to coincide rhetorically, so long as ‘we’ do not specify what ‘we’ mean by ‘we’, but, instead allow the first person plural to suggest a harmony of interests and identities (Billig, 1995: 90).

While Abel and Billig are able to demonstrate the way in which this syntax of hegemony is enhabited in media institutions, neither have examined the way in which individual audience members respond to such language use, to
what extent such language is accepted or critiqued, why and by whom. These are important questions because it cannot be assumed that every audience member is unproblematically ‘interpellated’ into the national ‘we’, despite being routinely addressed in this way.

Anderson’s theorisation of the print-media suggests that audience members do not have to be in direct communication with one another to imagine that they are taking part in a communal activity of national proportions. However this is a process of inclusion as well as exclusion, and while audience members possess the agency to imagine a community within which they may or may not participate, the state, via public broadcasting, has the power to construct and promulgate a dominant version of the nation, thus setting the parameters which define who is included and who is excluded from the nation. In his discussion of the state’s role in the regulation of imagery, Price argues that:

The language of American commercial television is a language of power, but power first and primarily for a vision in which modernity and progress are defended against the ubiquitous forces of dissolution. Those who are the speakers and have substantial control over the forum naturally seek to fend off threats to their relative monopoly of imagery, as well as threats to their control over of the channels in which imagery, or language, is expressed (Price, 1995: 193).

Applying the term ‘languages-of-power’ to television, Price relates this idea to the way in which television can, in some contexts, serve as a vehicle for state control over the dissemination of imagery. However, in the contexts of the United States of America and New Zealand, this control over televised imagery is not only wielded by the state, but is also exerted by those who are able to determine the nature and frequency of image dissemination on the basis of economic power (Spicer et al, 1996: 36). Advocates of globalisation maintain that “it is global corporate capital, rather than states...that exercises decisive influence over the organisation, location and distribution of economic power and resources in the contemporary global economy” (Held & McGrew, 2000: 25). It is important to acknowledge that
multinational corporations use their economic power to exercise control over televised imagery, and that their choice of imagery is not always aligned with what the state determines to be in the best interests of its citizens. With regard to globalisation, this tension between the interests of multinational corporations and the interests of the state is currently redefining the role that broadcast media have played as a prime site for nation-building (Held & McGrew, 2000).

2.7 The Homeland

Given that nation is an intangible and imagined concept, the notion of the homeland provides a tangible point of connection with the idea of the nation. But while the term homeland suggests a concrete place of existence, like nation, it is also a concept that is charged with emotion and sentiment. Individuals form relationships of attachment, belonging, ownership and ambivalence towards their perceived homeland, and these relationships tend to defy rational explanation. While a homeland is not necessarily a place of habitation (or even birth), it is often considered to be a place of origin that possesses a spiritual pull or connectivity, and provides a special element of an individual’s identity.

The homeland people consider the entire state to be their historic homeland, although their ancestors may themselves have migrated to the region... Even if in a minority (e.g., the Fijians), a homeland people feel that as ‘sons of the soil’ they and their culture merit a privileged position relative to the interlopers (Connor, 1994: 78).

Connor uses the term ‘homeland’ in a restricted sense, implying that homeland people are Other in terms of ethnicity. The concept of homeland is not only important for the sub-altern and the diaspora, it is also significant to colonial settlers and their descendants, and any person who has migrated from one territory to another. However, Connor’s statement is also very relevant to the situation in New Zealand, where it has been argued that Maori, as ‘first-nation’ people, have a distinct (sometimes privileged) connection to the land. In fact, Maori are often described (and sometimes
describe themselves) as tangata whenua, or ‘the people of the land’ (Rika-Heke, 1997: 173). This term has been utilised to reinforce the notion of ownership over the land, but also to imply a sense of belonging, and a spiritual connection to the land. In terms of national and cultural identity, the homeland is not a straightforward concept.

According to Bhabha, ambivalence towards the homeland is further complicated by the process of globalisation, where the impact of “CMCs (computer mediated communications)” throws up dilemmas of communal identification. While on the one hand CMCs offer the potential to form communities that have little relevance to an individual’s sense of homeland, the communal identification derived from a sense of homeland and nation continues to be significant. Bhabha explains that ‘new media apparatuses’:

…enable us to ‘access’ a range of materials and material cultures with an ease never before imagined. What they disturb, therefore, is a sense of ontology, of the essentiality or inevitability of being – and – belonging by virtue of the nation, a mode of experience and existence that Derrida calls a national ontopology…this assumption is unsettled by the apparent ‘emancipation’ from homeland and nation that cyberspace seems to offer – yet, …that very freedom is severely limited by the authority and locality of the nation whose presence may have somewhat diminished, but whose power to determine the lives of its citizens through national economic policy and political regulation should not be underestimated. The event of historical culture or ethnic ‘affiliation’ must now be thought through a problematic break in the link between the ontological value of present being – subject or citizen – and its situation in a stable and presentable determination of a locality, ‘the topos of territory, native soil, city…” (Bhabha, in Naficy, 1999: ix, emphasis in original).

For Bhabha, the concept of the nation, though imaginary, remains a powerful means by which communal identification is shaped in the globalising age. In this sense, the concept of the homeland provides a metaphorical and tangible sense of being rooted to a land that can be visualised, heard, touched and physically experienced, all of which is increasingly important in a world where communication and identification is experienced more and more as a virtual phenomenon.
The notion of the homeland is also important from the perspective of settler nationalisms. For those undergoing processes of settlement, the notion of homeland is marked by ambivalence, remembrance and forgetting. According to Turner (1999: 22) “settlement is traumatic, a form of exile that over time comes to seem like being at home”. Turner observes that contemporary settler culture in New Zealand is marked by “a problem of living in the present”, a problem that goes hand in hand with a kind of historical amnesia, and a need to discover a new-country identity:

The new country is the site of contradictory demands: the need, ultimately, to forget the old country, and the need to ignore people who already inhabit the new country. To resist the indigenous presence the settler must retain some sense of the old-country self to be able to draw on a strong and authoritative identity. But in order to settle in the new country, to find oneself at home, the settler must forget the old country and become acclimatised, that is, discover a new-country identity…quite apart from the indigenous presence, the idea of a new country is built on the displacement or overflow of old-country passions (Turner, 1999: 21).

For Turner, settler culture in New Zealand is marked by the trauma of failed separation and an incomplete sense of belonging to a homeland. It is the overflow of old-country passions (literature, visual arts and sport) that provide the settler culture with a means of expressing a sense of nation - a nation that is on one hand distinctive, but on the other hand, still tied to the British motherland. Paradoxically, an unsettled experience of separation-trauma, combined with an admission of forgetfulness, has given rise to an enrichment of cultural expression that is evident in many forms of literary and visual art works. Characteristic features of the New Zealand landscape feature prominently amongst many of these works, and a survey of these works can reveal changing attitudes toward both land and national identity (see, for instance; Williams, 1997; Curnow, 1998, and Turner, 1999. See also, section 3.4 for a discussion on national identity in the post-settler period).

National identity is often forged on a sense of belonging or connection to the land, which is a far more tangible concept than the sense of common
ethnicity. Not only is the natural landscape tangible, memory of the landscape is constantly evoked through a variety of cultural forms. The landscape provides daily reminders of the persisting and distinctive character of a nation. Hayrynen (1994) argues that:

Where history and mythology have constituted an imaginary shared past, a ‘Great Story’ of the nation, landscape has pictured an imaginary shared space or scene. The natural landscape illustrates the alleged pact between the nation and Nature, which was one of the key themes in nationalist thought. It naturalises the nation-state, rendering it as indisputable and timeless despite its recent and controversial history (p. 22).

On one hand the natural landscape offers an illusion of the perennial existence of the nation, but on the other hand it has the potential to serve as a powerful reminder of the origins of the nation. The New Zealand landscape has served a nation building function in many of the colonial works of literary and visual culture, many of which were romantic and idealised depictions of the natural landscape. However in post-colonial visual culture, images of the landscape have provided a means of re-contextualising, challenging and subverting dominant conceptions of the nation (Williams, 1997).

Just as national history is constructed via the legitimisation of written narratives, visual imagery of the landscape constructs versions of the homeland that offer an ideal platform from which to imagine the nation. Mountains, valleys, trees, beaches, horizons and wildlife all become signifiers of the unique character of a nation. Helsinger (1997) explains the significance of landscape in the construction of a specifically English version of nation:

National territory is locating as well as located: it is a site for reproducing a nation and its culture. Etymology suggests the peculiar representative requirements of land in imagining a nation. In English language, ‘country’ refers to both rural place, and national entity. It is here that the suture between home and nation can be effected: when the rural scene signifies the nation, it constructs a homeland (p.15).

Helsinger discusses the significance of national territory in relation to England, explaining how, in this specific context, the rural countryside serves
as a signifier of the nation. Such a signifier is capable of being associated with a vast repertoire of visual imagery, much of which depicts the English countryside as beautiful, natural, open, tamed and economically productive. This ‘idealised’ image of Englishness has been carried from the English homeland, often in the guise of visual artwork, to settler colonies. While they appear to many as innocuous depictions of the countryside, these images continue to operate as part of the cultural capital of colonialism. Bell and Lyall (2002) explain how nature and the natural landscape plays an important part in the constructed mythology of colonised territories:

Nature stands for precolonial history, infusing it with historic attributes, uniquely local...Man against the elements, man conquering nature, and the transformation of a wilderness into productive nation were powerful settler mythologies. The territorializing of landscape became the official (gendered) story. In Australia, the United States and New Zealand, settler societies constructed a version of nature that was inextricably profused with ideas of rugged individualism, the spirit of capitalism, and the myth of the frontier. In each of these countries, wild nature was a source of national pride, its conquering forging evidence of the stalwart national character that created such nations. In each emerging nation these attributes were claimed as unique to its national character. Each promulgated a creation myth as its own, with the European settlers the creators (p.173).

The European settler’s conception of land as a utility was based on ideological constructions of the Victorian Age. For example, John Locke argued that “unless land is developed so it creates a product, it is waste land” (Ellis, 1994: 86-103). While the capitalist ethic proposed maximum use of both human and natural resources for the purpose of economic gain, colonists were also influenced by a ‘Lockean’ assumption about land. For many Maori, concepts such as ‘land’ and ‘property’ had (and continue to have) quite different meanings and values to that presumed by the colonists. According to Cadogan (2004), “Maori identify themselves as tangata whenua. In the Maori mind, this denotes belonging to whenua rather than whenua belonging to Maori” (p.30). Urlich Cloher (2004) explains why this bond between land and identity was at the heart of a value system, which was at odds with coloniser’s distinctions between ‘cultivated’ and ‘waste’ land:
Maori in pre-European New Zealand were deeply attached to their whenua. The relationship was both emotional and spiritual – land being a major facet of their value system…Maori appreciation of land because of its permanence has been interpreted as evidence of ‘deep ecology’ which imputes to land intrinsic worth, independent of its status as property or asset, namely, values put on it by human beings. This quality derives from its spiritual status connected with Papatuanuku, the Earth Mother, parent of the Maori gods – a key figure in Maori cosmology (p.47).

Such a value system was incomprehensible to colonists whose primary aim was to become established on their own plot, and to use the land in an economically productive way. The approach of Maori towards land use was explained to colonists (through the doctrine of scientific racism) as an indication of the primitive state of an inferior race - their capacity for civilisation was retarded (see section 3.3.1). From this standpoint, colonists adopted a paternal approach towards Maori, believing that they needed to be taught the correct way to make use of their land. This ‘Lockean’ assumption was invoked as a means of authorising colonisation and land confiscation, both in the initial stages in which the case was put forward for ‘systematic colonisation’, and in more contemporary accounts of New Zealand history.¹⁹

It has been assumed that the landscape constitutes a powerful, yet often taken-for-granted presence in the lives of citizens. In terms of national and cultural identity, the geographical landscape is often considered to be benign, however it plays an important role in reinforcing myths that construct the nation as natural and perennial. Duncan (1990) argues that “the landscape as a text is read and thus acts as a communicative device reproducing the social order”, whereby it serves “as a concrete, visual vehicle of subtle and gradual inculcation” (p.19). While Duncan’s view of ideology leaves little room for the agency of the viewer, his focus on the taken-for-granted engagement with the landscape is useful:

The tangibility and apparent transparency of landscape will tend to convince the local viewer of the landscape that the social, political,
and economic relations that are enabled by its organization are naturally or even divinely ordained...it is this forgetting, this cultural amnesia, which allows the landscape to act as such a powerful ideological tool. By becoming part of the everyday, the taken-for-granted, the objective, and the natural, the landscape masks the artifice and ideological nature of its form and content. Its history as a social construction is unexamined. It is therefore, as unwittingly read as it is unwittingly written (Duncan, 1990: 18-19).

According to Duncan, the landscape is a signifying system, and as such is constructed and interpreted by way of tropes which “encode and communicate information by which readers may, or may not be, entirely persuaded of the rightness, naturalness, or legitimacy of the hegemonic discourses” (1990: 19). Each of these tropes thus enable the landscape to have a rhetorical function. It is via tropes such as allegory, synecdoche, and metonymy, “that landscapes do much of their ideological work” (p. 22).

While Duncan introduces an important focus on the everyday familiarity of the landscape as a rhetorical signification system, his assertion that the landscape is a text, embodying a number of meanings that can be read, is at odds with the interpretive framework of this thesis. The way in which individuals engage with the landscape involves the intersection of culturally mediated texts, with discursive and memory resources, which may or may not be shared amongst other individuals, or community members. This process of engagement with the landscape also involves a high degree of alterity and contestation amongst, and between, community members. This approach towards the interpretation of landscape as a process of social and cultural negotiation is reiterated by Bender:

Landscapes are thus polysemic, and not so much artefact as in process of construction and reconstruction. The landscape is never inert, people engage with it, re-work it, appropriate it and contest it. It is part of the way in which identities are created and disputed, whether as individual, group or nation-state. Operating therefore at the juncture of history and politics, social relations and cultural perceptions, landscape has to be...‘a concept of high tension’ [Inglis, 1977] (Bender, 1993: 3).
For the theorists cited thus far, the physical presence of the geographical landscape is an important aspect of national identity. However this thesis is more sharply focused on the landscape as a social and cultural construction. In other words, I am interested in the ways in which the landscape is represented, constructed, transmitted, interpreted and negotiated in a mediated context. In this sense, imagery of the landscape can be understood as a means of ideological signification and reification as well as a cultural form, embodying and articulating associations with personal and shared memories of the past.

2.8 Cultural Memory and Audio-visual Media

Bell and Lyall (2002) point toward the significance of the landscape in evoking cultural memory:

There is a strong correlation of physical place and cultural meaning. The physical elements have connections with various events over time, some mythical, some still present, residing in the collective memory: ‘that place where...’ Those sharing the traditional knowledge of landscape also share cultural notions that steer experience, create cultural symbolism, and enable the continuance of shared cultural associations over time (p. 175).

This point is particularly relevant to Aotearoa New Zealand, where many Maori share memory resources pertaining to the concept of ‘Te Ao Marama’, which is a “paradigm of understanding that encapsulates a specific world view built around a spiritual relationship to the environment, and is a clearly separate body of knowledge from Western and non-Maori epistemologies” (Royal, 1998, as cited in Mahuika, 2006: 5).

The significance of cultural memory in relation to both audio-visual media and nation-building lies in the complex interplay of representations, the subjective construction of identity, and the highly fluid and contested nature of historical narratives. Cultural memory provides a useful framework for understanding the way in which individuals articulate processes of collective identification, such as national identity and cultural identity, with those
aspects of identity that tend to be confined to the realm of subjectivity. The study of the ways in which memory is negotiated illumines the process by which national identity is constructed and projected in ways that subsume subjective and cultural diversity within a dominant conception of the national community. In this sense, cultural memory is particularly relevant to the role of the media in the construction of national identity in New Zealand:

In a ‘new’ and colonized country like New Zealand ‘national identity’ is always under review. There is an ongoing, if often covert, debate about which memories may, or even should, be taken out of the matrix for re-examination, for re-assessment, to be replaced in the cluster in an ideologically refurbished form. What part of the precipitate is worthy of honouring with national naturalization? What images, say, can be brought forward in a television advertisement seeking to demonstrate, at least in one respect, what it is to be a New Zealander? Conversely, it may be collectively agreed, again often covertly, that certain images in the precipitate are to be calumniated with ‘shame’ and no longer free to be naturalized, but must be suppressed and labeled as deviant. The fantasmatic is thus rearranged by the constantly changing ideology of a group’s symbolic order marked by certain values as to what is legitimate and what is not for the naturalization of a cultural commonality (Stupples, 2003: 136-137).

Stupples’ use of the term ‘fantasmatic’ can be interpreted to refer to the collection of images and imaginary concepts of the nation, which may be understood as memory resources, with which individuals have varying degrees of access. Given that these resources are constantly re-arranged, legitimated or marginalised according to dominant value systems, the ‘cultural commonality’ that appears as natural, and is often assumed to determine collective memory, is at constant risk of being de-stabilised by the ongoing struggle to control the transmission of national signification. It follows that audio-visual media play a vital role in the construction, transmission and legitimation of cultural memory.

2.9 Conclusion

In order to clarify my own position in relation to a number of theoretical debates, I set out at the opening of this chapter to navigate my way through
a complex matrix of theorisation about the meaning and significance of the term nation. Following Anderson, Price and Billig, I have argued that the nation is an imagined community, which is constantly being re-defined due to the constant struggle over nationhood.

While deconstructing the common-sense view that nationalism is an irrational force possessed by ethnic Others, I have adopted Billig’s term banal nationalism as a means of emphasising the taken-for-granted existence of nationalism in established and powerful societies.

By discussing the role of historical narratives in legitimising and maintaining certain versions of the nation, it has become clear that the movement of histories from positions of dominance or marginalisation is linked to strategies of remembering and forgetting, whereby the mass media have become increasingly implicated. In exploring the central role of audio-visual media in processes of nation-building, I have also acknowledged that media technologies are increasingly involved in processes of trans-national community building that potentially undermine the continued relevance of the nation. After examining the specific function of print capitalism, I have focused specifically on television as a language of power, operating within the context of the tension between the interests of state control and the power exercised by multinational corporations.

After examining these broader issues of definition, functionality and power, it was necessary to narrow my focus, in order to explore the debate between rationality and emotion as motivators of nationalist behaviour at the level of the individual.

Emerging from the notion of emotional attachment to the nation, homeland becomes an important concept, one that offers a tangible sense of rootedness to the land. For similar reasons, the geographical landscape is also significant in the construction of national identity. While the landscape is understood to be a signifying system that is taken for granted because of its familiarity, it is through mediated representations of the landscape that
memories of the past are evoked. However the ability of mediated cultural forms to evoke such memories is dependant on viewers’ access to memory resources.

This chapter is brought to conclusion by way of a brief outline of the significance and relevance of the theory of cultural memory, where I argue that recent theorisation on the subject provides a key to the intersection of the multiple through-lines of this thesis. The theories of nation explored in this chapter build a theoretical framework, from which to explore the map of New Zealand discourses discussed in the following chapter. Together, these chapters begin to set the scene for the analysis of the specific case study of TNZW, which is discussed in chapters six through eight.
Endnotes

1 For example, Ignatieff (1993) and Connor (1994).

2 By the pitfalls of 'liberal pluralism', I mean that Renan’s view of national belonging (as a matter of individuals possessing ‘the will to belong’) does not give adequate attention to the role of ideology in shaping and constraining community membership. Conversely, Gellner views national belonging as almost entirely determined by the way in which individuals are ideologically positioned, which leaves little room for individual agency in respect of community formation.

3 For example, Ignatieff (1993) and Connor (1994).


5 New Zealand on Air (NZoA - initially titled The New Zealand Broadcasting Commission) was set up primarily to satisfy the demand for public service television, and as such it was initially responsible for collecting the yearly broadcasting fee from the public, and administering all aspects related to the funding of ‘public service’ oriented programming on television and radio (see section 6.2.4).

6 Both NZoA and the Film Commission are state funded entities with mandates to provide funding to those media initiatives that explore, promote or represent aspects of New Zealand national identity (see www.nzonair.govt.nz, www.nzfilmco.govt.nz).

7 As is often the case with ‘diasporic’ and ‘subaltern’ identities (See Bhabha, 1999 and Spivak, 1988).


9 It must be noted that Williams added the rider “or was it?” to this statement.

10 See http://911digitalarchive.org/.

11 See also Debrett (2004: 12)

12 For example, see: Bhabha (1990); Brennan (1990); Anderson (1983); Chaterjee (1993); Sobchack, 1996; Burgoyne (1996).

13 For those communities affected by the process of colonisation, narratives of war play a particularly important role. Colonial narratives of war have served to justify power relations, by rationalising the process of colonisation as natural, inevitable and necessary in order to ensure the ‘progressive advance’ of civilization.

14 Several different titles have been used to refer to the wars fought between Maori and Colonial militia in New Zealand between 1840 and 1900 (see chapter 3 for specific examples). However, I have used ‘the New Zealand Wars’ throughout this thesis, as this term is currently most widely used to describe these wars (and this is partly due to the popular use of Belich’s 1986 book, and TNZW documentary series).

15 While this research shows how the past is present in the day-to-day lives of US citizens, the research participants also indicated a degree of alienation from certain sources of history, expressing concerns about issues such as mediation, authority and pedagogy (Rosenzweig & Thelen, 1998: 89-114).
While the print media played a role in providing a national status for certain languages, this was not always the case. For instance, in Britain, some dialect languages were ‘fixed in print’ circa 1840, but this did not give all of these dialect languages the status of a national language.

One Network News is a daily news bulletin of TVNZ, which is a remnant of the earlier public service model. Until recently TVNZ has operated as a state owned enterprise (See sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3).


The ‘Lockean’ assumption about land use is evident in; Wakefield (1835-9) and Cowan (1922).
CHAPTER 3: 'Cultural Colonisation' in Aotearoa New Zealand.

National identity is just one of many masks colonists wear (Gibbons, 2002: 15).

3.1. Introduction

There is an insidiously mystifying connection between nation-building, historical narrative and ongoing processes of cultural colonisation. Wishing to demystify this process, Gibbons argues for the need to rework “New Zealand history from the perspective of colonization rather than confining it within the (en)closure of national identity” (2002: 15). Having interrogated the project of nation-building in the previous chapter, the job of this chapter is to explore the role of discourses associated with nation-building and cultural colonisation, specifically as they have been played out in Aotearoa New Zealand. This discursive survey tracks the changing position and character of discourses of ‘race’, ‘nation’, and colonisation, specifically as they have been manifested in a selection of historical narratives of the New Zealand Wars. Having constituted the ‘reality’ of colonial New Zealand, which TNZW interrogates, these discourses play an important role during each stage of the production, construction and reception of this series. In this respect, chapters three and four function (in conjunction) as a discursive map, thus setting the context for, and establishing through-lines that connect, each stage of the tripartite analysis.

By locating each narrative both discursively and historically, chapters three and four work together to illustrate how the predominant discourses of eight ‘arenas’ are utilised in a variety of historical narratives. Using this comparative overview of historical narratives as a discursive map, TNZW may then be positioned in relation to a range of discursive influences. This overview also plays an important role during the production research and the analysis of audience interpretations. A historical sketch of changing discourses, leading toward a map of the contemporary discursive field, provides a framework from which to locate the range of interpretative repertoires utilised by both producers and viewers of TNZW.
These eight arenas were established on the basis of an observed clustering of discourses within particular historical narratives and time periods. While this organisational framework has the drawback of appearing to tie discourses to particular time periods, it is not implied that these discourses are in any way fixed or overly schematic. To the contrary - they are fluid, dynamic, and flexible resources, which respond to the changing ideological climate, and tend to reappear in other time periods, although often in a mutated or remnant form. This strategy of marking out the changing terrain of ‘orders of discourse’ demonstrates how historical narratives move from a position of marginalisation through to being considered as dominant, and visa versa.

3.2. Historical Context

The New Zealand experience of de-colonisation has been distinctive for a number of reasons. One point of distinction is that New Zealand is often described as a ‘settler society’. While this term signifies a departure from a metropolitan experience of de-colonisation, it also distinguishes a similarity between New Zealand and other ‘settler societies’, which:

...share certain common features and challenges pertaining to the coexistence of diverse indigenous and migrant collectivities...these commonalities stem from the foundational claims made by European migrant groups intent on settlement and on the building of self-sustaining states independent of metropolitan centres. Further similarities pertain to the settlers’ political domination over the indigenous populations as well as other racialized minorities... (Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis, 1995: 1).

Despite these similarities with other countries often described as settler societies (such as Australia and Canada), one important differentiation is the political and state recognition of The Treaty of Waitangi, which has been described as “an unparalleled collective agreement with indigenous representatives” (Pearson, 2005: 24), and has played an important part in enabling a degree of ‘Maori agency’ (Byrnes, 2004: 111). The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 was instrumental in formalising colonial rule.
However, the Treaty has since played a central role in validating decolonisation (Orange, 1987). The Maori language version of the Treaty has served as the pivotal document against which financial and resource restitution has been leveraged (Byrnes, 2004). Fuelled by the Treaty, the process of decolonisation in New Zealand can be partly characterised by a persistent struggle for a share of power and resources, and by the quest for Maori self-determination with regard to land, identity and political voice (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999) While Treaty issues have become topical in the media since the 1970s, what has been absent is an explicit connection between nineteenth century colonising encounters and contemporary cultural relations. This absence has been entrenched through the reification of those narratives that have served to reinforce a New Zealand sense of national identity at the expense of alternative narratives and identities (Gibbons, 2002).

Underpinning such national narratives is a Victorian interpretation of race, established particularly during the late nineteenth century, which involved a belief in the existence of a hierarchy of ‘races’, that gave scientific legitimacy to the idea that colonisation was an inevitable and necessary part of a natural process. With the acceptance of these ideas as part of human nature, the New Zealand Wars were predominantly interpreted by historians, as the inevitable and necessary clash between the “forces of barbarism and those of civilization” (Buick, 1926: 23).

This interpretation has informed many of the popular New Zealand narratives of the colonial period, derived especially from their reliance on existing Victorian documentation (Turner, 2002). These narratives have been privileged over time, becoming naturalised, and appearing as common sense to many citizens. While largely accepted as factual and rather benign accounts of settler’s experiences, such accounts participated in a wider process of textual colonisation:

Such accounts purport to be more of less truthful accounts of what really happened…the circumstances under which settlers came to be
dominant and the indigenous peoples subordinate, and making this outcome seem natural, conclusive and definitive. All these histories share an essential characteristic...they propose the settler presence to be unproblematic, and they problematize the ‘Other’. In contriving to invert the world as it really is, by presenting the settlers as legitimate inheritors and rendering the indigenous peoples as marginal, these historical accounts, scholarly and ‘unscholarly’ alike, are not simply memorializations of what is supposed to have happened in the past, but are actual sites of (textual) colonisation (Gibbons, 2002: 14).

This notion of textual colonisation can be linked to important contributions to post colonial theory. In Orientalism (1978), Said proposed that the texts of Orientalism played a crucial role in a Western construction of the Orient, and in creating the justification for colonisation of the ‘Other’. Similarly, Bhabha (1985) argued that the ‘Emblem of the English Book’ is a signifier of the written text as an instrument of the coloniser’s control over colonised peoples. While both of these ideas are relevant to New Zealand examples of textual colonisation, Gibbons (2002) explains how the constructed concept of the nation has been utilised as a facade for the broader process of ‘cultural colonization’:

Those histories which propose national identity/ nationhood/ nationalism as the normative narrative, which consider national identity to be a natural, even organic growth rather than an ideological construction, and which conceal how national identity is fabricated within the broader processes of colonization, are themselves colonizing texts, not ‘representations’ of the past but practices with real and continuing consequences (p.14, emphasis in original).

Gibbons defines cultural colonisation as “a complex series of activities – not the colonisation of culture but colonisation through various cultural practices, particularly those involving writing and printing” adding that the study of cultural colonisation will involve the retrieval of items such as “verse, fiction, reminiscences, drawings, photographs...” (2002: 14). If these items are involved in a process of cultural colonisation, it follows that such cultural forms can also be re-contextualised, so that they participate in an inverse process of ‘cultural de-colonisation’. This issue will be discussed in chapter four, and specifically in relation to TNZW in chapter seven.
3.3. Arena 1: Victorian Interpretation

This arena is characterised by a Victorian interpretation of ‘race’ and a view of colonisation as an inevitable means toward social progress. While spanning the period of 1840-1945, the discursive remnants of this arena continue to be influential in the contemporary period. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth century, the Victorian arena may be considered as dominant, as the discursive characteristics of this arena have been foundational, not only for early settlers to New Zealand, but for subsequent generations. Variations of these discourses continue to circulate, and are therefore available to be drawn on via interpretive frameworks.\(^5\)

3.3.1. The Victorian Interpretation of ‘Race’, Civilisation and Colonisation

In mid nineteenth century Britain, the notion of the ‘hierarchy of race’ was beginning to gain legitimacy, largely due to the popular belief in the theory of scientific racism. This situation can only be understood in relation to the ideological forces that were operating at this time. Lorimer (1978) describes the climate in which scientific racism flourished:

> During the 1860s, scientists, in common with other gentlemen, experienced a change in social outlook which in turn resulted in a hardening of racial attitudes...The improvement of savages, it was now believed, could only be achieved to a limited extent, and under the paternal and perpetual governance of the civilised English (pp.149-160).

Emerging from the post enlightenment philosophies of romanticism and positivism, scientific racism dominated western thinking on race in the second half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century (Malik, 1996). Romanticism was characterised by a hostile reaction against the enlightenment quest for equality. The Romantics believed that permanent social distinctions were necessary as a means of maintaining order, and...
therefore argued for the return of an aristocratic elite. As an influential regime of thought during the Victorian age, positivism transformed racial theory from the anachronistic feudal aspirations of romanticism to a theory with a scientific basis, which was perceived to be progressive. Positivism “united order and progress by subsuming society to the laws of nature” (Malik, 1996: 86).

Scientific racism combined the Romantic hostility towards the concept of equality, and the perceived necessity of a social hierarchy, with the scientifically justified belief that these phenomena were part of the laws of human nature. Central to the ideological foundation of scientific racism was a teleological understanding of history, where “human development was seen as purposive, leading ever forward to the triumph of civilisation, which was defined as contemporary European society.” (Malik, 1996: 87).

For those who sought to colonise New Zealand during the mid nineteenth century, their impressions of Maori were constructed within an interpretive framework of which scientific racism was a dominant discourse. By explaining social inequality as the natural order, scientific racism legitimised the already widely accepted view that there existed a hierarchy of ‘races’. Racial science also established the notion of an ‘evolutionary ladder’, whereby “nature had evolved by gradual means from the most backward types to the highest forms”. The emerging discipline of anthropology added legitimacy to this idea with the view that “contemporary backward societies represented human beings arrested at an earlier stage of evolution” (Malik, 1996: 88).

With the acceptance of the ‘evolutionary ladder’ theory, physical differences such as skin colour and head shape became the distinguishing characteristics by which ‘races’ were classified on a hierarchical ladder, thus implying that some races had more potential for civilisation than others. The fairer races were believed to be more civilised and thus superior, while at the bottom of the ladder, those with black skin were deemed to be ‘barbaric’,
‘primitive’ and therefore unable to be civilised (Jahoda, 1999: 63-74).

The discourse of scientific racism was not only widely accepted - it flourished after Charles Darwin’s *The Origin of the Species* was published in 1859. Although there was already widespread acceptance for the notion that human nature determined the existence of a racial hierarchy, Darwin’s theory of evolution gave these ideas scientific legitimation. Arising out of the intellectual and political climate of Victorian England, Social Darwinists applied the theory of evolution to society. Darwin’s ideas of evolution were connected with those of scientific racism and positivism. Malik explains how racial discourse applied the scientific logic of Darwinism to become a pervasive ideological force in the second half of the nineteenth century:

In appropriating the concept of evolution by natural selection racial science married the idea of a fixed hierarchy with that of progress. - those at the top of the hierarchy arrived there on merit, because of their natural superiority in the struggle for existence. Racial scientists were now able to establish the idea of social hierarchy and explain it by scientific means (Malik, 1996: 91).

Social Darwinists took the theory of ‘the survival of the fittest’ and transformed it to support their belief that “struggle eliminated the impure specimens of the race and helped perpetuate the ideal type” (Malik, 1996: 90). It was in the context of the scientific legitimation of this idea that the New Zealand Wars were considered not only as justified, but inevitable and necessary. Drawing on this orthodox discourse of ‘race’, Governor Grey was able to convince the Colonial Office to provide substantial support for a systematic invasion of the Waikato, which was intended to crush the power of the Kingitanga Movement. The discourses of scientific racism and Social Darwinism are imbued in Grey’s correspondence of 1862, in which he wrote that Maori “[are] a semi-barbarous race, puffed up with the pride of an imagined equality” (Grey to Newcastle, 1862, as cited in Belich, 1986: 122). But Grey was not alone in this kind of thinking. These discourses were formative to a climate in which imported imperial troops and colonial troops (derived from the settler population) were given the impetus to take part in a
large scale invasion aimed at the ultimate subjugation of the Maori race.

3.3.2. De-constructing the Noble/savage Discourse

The term ‘noble/savage’ has been used in New Zealand, on many occasions to refer to a particular construction of Maori during the Victorian period (Blythe, 1994, McCreanor, 1997). Despite its local significance, a broader understanding of the discursive construction of the ‘noble savage’ may be gleaned from Said’s (1978) notion of Orientalism. Drawing on Foucault’s approach to the discursive conditions of knowledge, Said argued that the ‘Orient’ is constructed by European systems of knowledge, and that knowledge is intimately linked with power (Childs & Williams, 1997). “Orientalism demonstrates…the deep complicity of academic forms of knowledge with institutions of power” (Young, 1990: 127). For Said, Orientalism is a self-perpetuating discursive system that provides the “necessary knowledge for actual colonial conquest” (Young, 1990: 129). This idea is relevant to the New Zealand context of colonisation, where the discourse of scientific racism provided the justification for colonial conquest.

Said argued that the texts of Orientalism “can create not only knowledge, but also the very reality they appear to describe” (Said, as cited in Young, 1990: 129). In other words, the Orient was constructed by the West, taking the form of a complex array of representations, which not only determined a Western understanding of the Orient, but “provided the basis for its subsequent self-appointed rule” (Young, 1990: 126). In this sense the Orient can be understood as an abstract system of representations constructed by the West, which was also then adopted and ‘played out’ by those who viewed themselves as ‘Orientals’. This concept is sometimes discussed in relation to the discursive construction of the ‘exotic Other’, which is used as a means of establishing European identity as distinct from ‘other races’. These Others have been feminised, infantised and exoticised, via literary texts, cultural forms and performative practices, to the extent that such markers of identification become played out by those constructed as Other.
As Bell (1999) explains, “by imbuing the Orient with a radical Otherness based on a timeless and essentialised authenticity, Europeans allowed themselves a dynamic and modern history and identity” (p.130). Orientalism then, can be related to Butler’s (1990: 24) concept of the social construction of identity as a means of performativity (Yegenoglu, 1998: 16).

The historical narratives of the Victorian arena demonstrate how the noble/savage construction draws together two seemingly contradictory images. On the one hand Maori are described as barbaric, bestial and savage, while on the other hand they are depicted as noble, innocent and child-like:

One was the image of the bestial savage, sometimes gigantic and physically monstrous as well as brutally cruel, which derived from medieval bestiaries and theories about demons. The other was the ‘savage’ as an innocent, happy child of nature, free of the corruptions of ‘civilised’ society, the Utopian inheritor of the biblical Garden of Eden (Salmond, 1991: 95).

Although the majority of written histories produced during the Victorian period use the dual construction, some texts privilege either the ‘barbaric/savage’ or the ‘noble/savage’. Despite these variances, both sides of this construction rely on a conception of Maori as uncivilised, and therefore inferior to the European race. Written for the purpose of attracting colonists to New Zealand, *Information Relative to New Zealand* (Ward, 1839) reveals a dual construction of Maori as noble/savage, which is consistent with many of the prior descriptions to be found in the texts of visitors, missionaries and settlers in the early 1800s. Ward’s summary of the characteristics of the Maori people exemplifies the duality of the ‘noble/savage’ construction:

Their colour varies from black to an olive tinge. They are both physically and intellectually superior to the New Hollanders; but although their capabilities of cultivation are great they are yet an essentially savage people...with the physical powers and passions of men, they have at present the intellect of children, and in moral principle, are too often little above the level of the brute creation. Such are the unhappy characteristics of a thoroughly savage nation (pp.62-63).
Not only does this description typify the dual construction of Maori as noble, yet savage, it reveals other characteristics of racial discourse that were predominant around the middle of the nineteenth century. Ward has utilised the hierarchy of race as a means of categorising Maori on a colour scale, so that prospective colonists may construct an image of Maori as inferior to themselves, yet superior to the most ‘primitive races’. With “capabilities of cultivation”, Maori are not worthless to the elite races, as they display the potential to be civilised. For Ward, this civilising potential was a primary incentive for attracting middle-class British and ‘frustrated entrepreneurs’ to emigrate to New Zealand. If Maori are “yet an essentially savage people”, these frustrated Britons are assured the tempting prospect of becoming the ruling class in a country where there is a ‘naturally inferior’ subordinate class in a prime position for exploitation. The extent to which this kind of thinking was accepted as common sense at this time is illustrated by the way in which Ward unashamedly lays out his intentions:

We shall endeavor, briefly, in the first place, to describe some of his habits and character as a savage; and then to cite some facts which prove that his capacity, intelligence, and moral feelings are undoubtedly such, as afford the promising hopes, both of his own civilisation, and of his future usefulness as a member of British Colonial Society (p.61).

Although Ward stressed that Maori have the potential to be civilised, he implied that Maori were an inferior race by nature. This is an example of the way that scientific racism was utilised in order to justify the domination and exploitation of Maori, and to explain colonisation as ‘fatal necessity’. In this light, potential colonists were able to feel justified in their subjugation of an ‘inferior race’, while in a paternalistic sense, they were able to envision themselves as fulfilling the necessary role of bringing the gift of civilisation to a ‘backward and needy race’. According to Lorimer (1978: 159), “As superior men, they had a paternal duty, a sense of noblesse oblige, regarding the protection and governance of the childlike, savage races of man”. Positivism had prepared colonists with the notion that they were assisting the advancement of human progress.
Buick’s book, *New Zealand’s First War or The Rebellion of Hone Heke* (1926) was written in response to a request on the eve of the First World War to “collect facts...regarding the activities of the ninety-sixth Regiment during the time it was stationed in New Zealand”. In conducting a discursive analysis of this text, it is therefore important to acknowledge the context of its creation, and the author’s objectives to place the British Regiments “upon a pedestal” on the basis of their strength and heroism (preface).

Having previously outlined the development of scientific racism in the mid nineteenth century, including the subsequent impression of Social Darwinism, it is necessary to discuss the influence of the Eugenics Movement, which was most active in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s. Originated in 1883, the term ‘eugenics’ literally meant ‘well born’, but was later used to describe the science of improving humanity through selective breeding. While *positive eugenics* sought to encourage reproduction amongst the allegedly superior sections of society, *negative eugenics* aimed to prevent procreation by the ‘undesirable’ classes. Although the basic ideas of eugenics preceded the term, they did not become publicly legitimated until Darwin’s *Origin of Species* was used to substantiate the theories of racial science (Bullock & Stallybrass, 1988: 288-289). The scientific or genetic elements of eugenics were used to legitimate social prejudice, not only in terms of race, but also in terms of class. Consequently, social and cultural characteristics were interpreted as genetically inherited, so that people were assumed to be born into their social status and class, by which the necessary characteristics were thought to be genetically determined before birth (Malik, 1996).

Cowan and Buick’s interpretations of the New Zealand Wars have been influenced by different strands of the eugenicist ideology. Buick’s construction of Maori as a genetically inferior race reveals the influence of the genetic aspects of eugenicist thought. Throughout his text, Buick espouses judgements about the character and status of the participants, on the basis of their breeding. As an explanation for Heke’s shrewdness, Buick (1926)
proposes that:

In Heke’s veins there thus flowed the best blood of the Nga-Puhi people, and to this high birth he had again added the advantage of a second marriage with Hariata, the handsome and intelligent daughter of Hongi...By birth and training Heke was better qualified than most of his contemporaries to perceive the drift of national events (pp.28-29).

While Heke’s lineage allows his foresight to be explained as an exception to the norm, Buick maintains a view of the general deficiency in the intelligence of ‘the Natives’. This is revealed by his description of the response of the “majority of the Maori race” to economic change: “the reason for which the primitive mind of the Maori could but dimly comprehend” (p.24). By conceiving of cognitive ability as being determined by both racial hierarchy and genetics, Buick’s interpretation has been shaped by the discourses of scientific racism and eugenicism.

Buick’s narrative also draws from other discourses of the ‘Victorian’ arena, such as the view of civilisation as an inevitable part of human progress and the paternal attitude towards the ‘lower ranks’ of civilisation. Viewing the missionaries as constrained by their existence in a less progressive era, Buick reveals the way in which his own ideological constraints limit his interpretation to that of arrogant paternalism:

The missionaries, though intensely in earnest about the civilization of the natives, and always uncompromising towards their grosser practices, were yet men of the world enough to know that these children of barbarism could not be weaned from all their wild customs in a day (p.38).

Such paternalism is not necessarily a consequence of Buick’s personality, but a deeply ingrained characteristic of Victorian attitudes towards ‘primitive races’. As Malik (1996) explains: “The primitives of other cultures...were all represented as examples of incomplete realisation of human potential...Victorians considered that non-western peoples were like the children of European societies” (p.99).
Buick’s attempt to analyse the causes of the New Zealand Wars epitomises the Victorian tendency to escape an in-depth social-political analysis in favour of reducing the causes of ‘racial’ conflict to the inevitability of human nature. For Buick, the New Zealand Wars were:

...largely the outcome of that inherent conflict which must ever wage between the forces of barbarism and those of civilization: the inevitable fear and apprehension of the savage at the breaking down of his old customs by the introduction of civilized law. This fear, aggravated by the forces of envy, of national jealousy, and all uncharitableness inseparable from the founding of a colony such as New Zealand, if persisted in, could have but one result and but one remedy - an appeal to arms (p.23).

For the Victorians, civilisation and colonisation were part of the working out of human nature. As an extension of this idea, war between the colonised race and the colonising race was deemed to be inevitable. While these ideas were treated as common sense, they derived from the positivist belief that “...humanity is perfectible and it moves incessantly from less good to better, from ignorance to science, from barbarism to civilization.” (Malik, 1996: 84). In this sense, Buick’s understanding of ‘racial’ conflict was largely determined by the discourses of race that were dominant in the early twentieth century.

Cowan’s narrative also reveals the discursive limitations of his time. In the context of the 1920s, both Buick and Cowan were constrained by the dominance of racial science, limited access to alternative discourses and limited tools of social analysis. Despite this, Cowan’s approach toward the processes of civilisation and colonisation departs from the positivist basis of Buick’s assessment. Although Cowan views war as the inevitable outcome of the ‘fatal impact’ of two races, he does not view colonisation as a progressive process, at least for Maori. While Cowan (1922) perpetuates the construction of Maori as uncivilised, he maintained that the endeavour to civilise Maori was regressive, and would bring about the ultimate destruction of the Maori race: “Heke foresaw more clearly than most of his countrymen the fatal consequences to the Maori of white colonisation and the flooding of
the country of an alien population” (Vol.1, p.14). Although Cowan’s conception of civilisation diverges from Buick’s, both approaches derive from branches of Victorian thought. Salmond (1991) explains this anomaly:

Enlightenment thinkers were crafting these ideas into evolutionary schemes that described the transition from savagery to civilisation as deterioration (Rousseau) or progress (Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Buffon and De Pauw), depending on whether the idyllic or the bestial image of the savage was being used (pp.95-97).

Cowan’s interpretation was particularly influenced by the theory of fatal impact as well as eugenecist ideas proposing the maintenance of racial purity. For Cowan, the pre-European Maori was noble and dignified, and European contact had tainted these qualities. According to King (King, as cited in Cowan, Vol.1: viii), much of Cowan’s writing reveals the tendency to “equate Maori adaptation with pollution of a formerly pure stream of Maori culture.” The Victorian discourses of racial purity and fatal impact are expressed in his descriptions of “the last of the old type of better Maori”, such as the following portrait of an elderly war veteran:

[He] is a picturesque figure who, in my memories of the past, personifies much of the departed savage glory of the Maori race. He typified the splendid dying manhood of his people. Born in the New Zealander’s stone age, he survived to near the end of the miracle-working white man’s nineteenth century, flotsam of the primitive world stranded on the shores of modern progress...A Homeric personality was this old cannibal warrior, a savage but a gentleman...full of the hospitable generosity of the true Maori rangatiratanga... (Cowan, Vol. 1, 1922: viii).

Cowan’s representation of Maori draws on both the noble/savage construction and the romantic image of Maori as exotic Other. While the pure-blooded, pre-civilisation Maori was described as noble and worthy, Cowan would have us believe that the ‘fatal impact’ of the races has corrupted the essential character of the noble Maori, thus creating the ‘bad’ Maori. The noble/savage can be viewed as the precursor of the more contemporary binary discourse of ‘good Maori/bad Maori’.8
3.3.3. **British Military Superiority**

A characteristic of the narratives that draw from this arena is the assertion of British military superiority and the downplaying of Maori skill in tactical warfare. Drawing much of their information from government documents, as well as the journal entries of the militia, the narratives of the early twentieth century have tended to interpret the New Zealand Wars as an outright victory for the British. Buick displays a tendency to describe each battle in terms of the heroism and superiority of the British, such as in his account of the battle at Ruapekapeka:

...at 11 o’clock the attack began on a scale never before witnessed by the Maori, and of which in all probability his imagination had never conceived...With the fall of Ruapekapeka...there was nothing left now for the rebels but to sue for peace. In this they were unusually expeditious for Maoris, but the hopelessness of their case proved an irresistible incentive. For some days after their defeat they had wandered about the bush destitute of food and with the sorrows of forlorn men upon them (pp.251, 265).

Such an interpretation typifies the narratives of the Victorian arena. However, Cowan (1922) once again departs to some extent from this tendency, observing that “it is curious to discover in the early records how little the military commanders and officials realised the military quality of the Maori” (Vol.1: 4). Despite Cowan’s progressive efforts to better represent “the Maori side of the struggle”, his interpretation was ultimately guided by the predominant discourses of his time, from which he concluded that due to the fatal impact of the two races, war was inevitable, and British victory was necessary to establish peace:

The inevitable shock of battle between the tribesman of Aotearoa and the white man who coveted and needed his surplus lands...was in the last and unavoidable test...that the two races came to gauge each other’s manly calibre, and came, finally, to respect each other for the capital virtues that only trial of war can bring to mutual view...the shrewd Maori soon divested himself of his illusions of military superiority...The wars ended with a strong mutual respect, tinged with a real affection, which would never have existed but for this ordeal by battle (Vol.1: 2-3).
3.4. Arena 2: National Identity in the ‘Post Settler’ Period

Many of the narratives of the twentieth century display a desire to establish a distinct sense of New Zealand nationhood. While the earlier narratives (1840-1920s) tend to be focused on championing the British Empire and affirming a sense of ‘Britishness’ as the basis of a settler identity, the later narratives (1920s-1950s) reveal a gradual shift away from the British emphasis, towards the expression of a more autonomous New Zealand identity.

For many settlers, national identity was founded on an “imperial culture that continued largely unquestioned until the First World War” (Williams, 1997: 21). The colonial period was a time of establishment for the settlers and their descendants, who were undergoing a gradual process of ‘indigenisation’, in which subsequent generations of (post) settlers would eventually perceive themselves as New Zealanders, rather than as British settlers or immigrants. By the 1920s, both British roots and New Zealand indigeneity were important aspects of a post-settler identity (Williams, 1997: 21-22). A 1925 report entitled The Teaching of History in Primary and Secondary Schools is revealing in terms of what was identified as New Zealand history at this time. A section outlining the history syllabus proposes that history...

...stimulates an intelligent patriotism by familiarising young people with the history of their own country and its place in the world...The time that can be allotted to the subject, force the position that the study of our own national development must claim the whole of that time. ...During the third year the course should be extended to cover British history from 1815 to 1900. For those pupils who stay four years a more intensive course of British history from 1815 to 1914 should be taken...(Skinner, 1925: 3, 12-13).

For many New Zealanders of British descent, ‘our own national development’ meant the history of the British Empire, rather than events such as the Treaty of Waitangi or the New Zealand Wars. For the post-settler New Zealander of 1925, national identity was still very entangled with the British ‘Motherland’, although beginning to be marked by a desire for a sense of belonging to New Zealand, as a place embodying the attachments
of a homeland (Williams, 1997; Gibbons, 2002). In this light, Cowan’s preoccupation with creating a specifically New Zealand identity appears to have been at the forefront of a shift in the national zeitgeist. As Belich has pointed out, “Cowan was a product of an intensely Anglocentric, Empire-worshipping period in New Zealand’s development, and in this context his balance is quite impressive” (1986: 16). As a national myth-maker, Cowan was more concerned to establish an identity that was based less on Britishness and more on a model of an independent New Zealand. He was keen to reassure New Zealanders of the pioneering qualities of enterprise, ruggedness and bravery, and to popularise idealised imagery of white New Zealanders living in harmony with their beautiful landscape:

...the young generation would be better for a more systematic schooling in the facts of national pioneer life and achievements which are a necessary foundation for the larger patriotism. Yet the passionate affection with which the Maori clung to his tribal lands is a quality which undeniably tinges the mind and outlook of the farm-bred, country-loving, white New Zealander to-day...Not only the tribespeople...but the New Zealander of British descent, may feel the truth...this son of New Zealand cannot but come to love the landscape saliences of his native place with something of the Maori adoration for 'my parent the Mountain' (Vol.1, 1922: 3).

While exemplifying the felt necessity to become indigenised, Cowan’s inclination to promote a romantic image of New Zealanders ‘at one with their landscape’ derives from the philosophy of romantic organicism. Influential in Britain between the World Wars, this movement was based on the idea that “the national consciousness was a result of the organic response over time by a given people to a specific landscape” (Williams, 1997: 24).

3.5. Arena 3: Pakeha Nationalism

This arena is characterised by the expression of a specifically Pakeha nationalism (which is closely related to the notion of indigenisation). During this time, there was little discussion about race relations, which may have been associated with the more specifically British phenomenon noted by Malik. According to Malik (1996), the racially based atrocities associated with
WWII brought about the public disappearance of racial discourse after 1945. The focus for many writers and artists, was on the development of a specifically Pakeha sense of national identity. This expression of Pakeha nationalism emerged in the wake of World War One, and reached its peak in the 1930s and 1940s. Williams explains the character of this new form of nationalism:

At issue was the long struggle of a displaced British people to feel ‘at home’ in New Zealand and this required the evolution (or construction) of a single coherent Pakeha culture. This in turn required of the Pakeha New Zealanders that they disentangle their identities from Britain...By seeing themselves in relation to the Maori rather than in relation to Britain, the Pakeha were advancing their claims to authentic belonging in New Zealand (1997: 21).

Shadbolt has suggested that the separation from Britain came about as a result of the “Anzac soldiers’ sense of betrayal by British officers in the trenches of Gallipoli” (Shadbolt, as cited in Williams, 1997: 21-22). It may be just as likely that the collective act of New Zealand troops going away to fight in a World War helped to establish an atmosphere of patriotism and a sense of New Zealand as a separate entity to Britain. Whatever the reason, the British Empire remained influential in its construction of ‘official’ histories, which suggests that the umbilical chord leading from the ‘Motherland’ was still firmly intact. This is evident in the school history text *Our Nation’s Story* (Whitcombe & Tombs, 1940). Published in London, this text begins with a section on the New Zealand colonial period, which includes an outline of events pertaining to The Treaty of Waitangi and the New Zealand Wars. The preface introduces its objective to establish a sense of New Zealand patriotism, but reveals a continuing (although ambivalent) conception of Britain as ‘the nation’:

The pupil is first taught the story of his own country, a story which cannot fail to arouse his pride and patriotism. Having carried him thus far, ‘Our Nation’s Story’ seeks to interest him in the historical progress of the nation of which he is a citizen (Whitcombe & Tombs, 1940, preface).
Despite the new interest in establishing a distinct New Zealand nationalism, the period of 1927-1957 is devoid of any substantial historical accounts of the New Zealand Wars (Belich, 1986: 15). This can be attributed to the emphasis on a specifically Pakeha type of nationalism, as well as the disappearance of racial discourse from the public arena. Malik (1996) describes the post war period in the West as a “gap in history”, where the issue of race was removed from the political agenda. He also explains this as a response to the experience of Fascism and the racially based atrocities of the Holocaust:

> Whatever the changes in the public discussion and treatment of the issue of race, the centrality of racial themes to Western social discourse was left untouched...The result was to give rise to half a century of seeming racial harmony (p.10).

Following Malik, the apparent racial harmony during the New Zealand post war period can be interpreted as a response to the implications of racial discourse upon the atrocities of WWII, which transformed the racial discourse of the Victorian age from common-sense to taboo, and rendered the overt expression of racism as politically unacceptable. In this light, the lack of apparent interest in New Zealand race relations during this period can be viewed as part of the wider reaction of the West, to these extremes of racial discourse, as well as part of the local emphasis upon developing a stronger sense of Pakeha nationalism.

### 3.6. Arena 4: Monocultural Interpretation

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there emerged a new kind of interest in the New Zealand Wars. Due partly to changes in the discipline of historiography, the historians of this arena were more concerned with the analysis of social causes of racial conflict, and less interested in producing a comprehensive account of military maneuvers.¹¹

With the exception of Keith Sinclair (whose work stands out as an anomaly here), the historians publishing during the 1950s and 1960s display an
acceptance of, and reliance upon, the colonial interpretations of the New Zealand Wars. Apart from Sinclair, there is no attempt to critique the inadequacies of the Victorian interpretation, and in a less explicit way, these narratives re-cycle many of the discourses of the Victorian arena. Most obvious are the discourses of noble savage, fatal impact, colonisation as ‘fatal necessity’ and the Lockean assumption regarding the utility of land. Their analysis of the outcome and consequences of the wars appears unanimous: Maori suffered overwhelming military defeat, and the wars brought about perpetual peace.

It is not surprising that Holt titled his narrative *The Strangest War*, as he perceived Maori cultural differences as simply ‘peculiar’. Revealing the limitations of his analysis, Holt (1962) reinforces the still popular noble-savage dualism, which he describes as the “paradox of their character”:

> Yet for all their cannibalism and their delight in savage war the old-time Maoris had qualities which many white visitors to New Zealand found very attractive...The Maoris’ love for their land, even for land of which they were making no practical use...were at the root of the new wars (pp. 22-23).

Most of the historians writing during the fifties and sixties were willing to resurrect a range of myths for the prime purpose of supporting their analysis of the cause of the wars. Holt reveals an almost perverse pre-occupation with both cannibalism and Maori prostitution. He suggests that “Not all the Maori girls were shameless hussies like the ship-girls of Kororareka” (1962: 20).

Aided by his access to the ‘enlightening’ discourse of Christianity, including an extremely paternalistic view of the role of the missionaries, Miller (1966) interprets the Wars as a necessary step towards the joys of civilisation and Christianity:

> ...it was not simply to school that these wide-eyed [Maori] children came but to a new world - a world of well-dressed fields and waving crops of wheat and barley, a world of flower gardens and orchards, of
apples and pears, peaches and grapes, a world of ploughs and watermills and theodolites and clocks and printing presses, of solid and well built houses, a world of order and cleanliness and soft speech and gentle manners and new and large ideas; a world where every human being was thought of as precious in the eyes of a heavenly Father and where a grown man could go safely in the dark and reap where he had sown. To accomplish such things...called for ability and character of no common kind, and these things some of the missionaries had. They produced impressive results (pp. xiv-xv).

A distinctive aspect of this arena is the prevalence of the ‘one people’ discourse, where the myth of good race relations is employed to validate the idea that war brought about peace, allowing Maori and Pakeha to live together harmoniously as ‘one people’. Developing out of the Pakeha nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s, monoculturalism became a predominant ideology in New Zealand in the nineteen fifties and sixties, and continues to be a prominent (although extremely contentious) public discourse into the twenty-first century.

Williams (1997) suggests that a conservative, “inward looking” kind of nationalism grew out of the depression of the thirties and WWII. He argues that in the post war period a “lack of contiguity with Britain” gave rise to a:

...reluctant nationalism, given at times to mourning the distance of New Zealanders from Europe, insistent on maintaining European ‘standards’, and wishing to preserve the heritage of European, particularly British, culture while seeking to add something new and distinctive to that heritage (p.26).

Implied in this monocultural concept of nationalism are the ideas of assimilation and amalgamation. Preservation of the British culture was important, but Pakeha increasingly felt the need to establish a distinctive identity (Bell, 1996). According to Williams (1997), this distinctiveness was expressed in a New Zealand nationalism, based on the unification of Maori and Pakeha as one people (albeit Maori identity was subsumed within the dominant Pakeha identity). For McCreanor (2005), the one people discourse, is characterised by the assumption that “unless we drop our sectarian interests in favour of national unity as New Zealanders or Kiwis, racial tension
will continue to grow” (p.59). This continues to be a predominant discourse, which relies on the forgetting of historical injustices, and ignores the power dynamics within New Zealand society. The enduring use of this discourse is illustrated by the following written submission gathered by the Human Rights database in 1980: “How about recognizing that this country has one race, one culture, and one history shared by all – the race, culture and history of the New Zealand people” (McVeigh, as cited in McCreanor, 2005: 59). 

The expression of the one people discourse in the 1990s and early twenty-first century has been supported by a neo-liberal dialectic, which relies on the presumption of a ‘level playing field’ – a field in which both time and space are somehow synchronous. Bhabha (1996) explains how neo-liberalism:

…contains a non-differential concept of cultural time. At the point at which liberal discourse attempts to normalize cultural difference… it does not recognize the disjunctive, ‘borderline’ temporalities of partial, minority cultures. The sharing of equality is genuinely intended, but only so long as we start from a historically congruent space. The recognition of difference is genuinely felt, but on terms that do not represent the historical genealogies, often postcolonial, that constitute the partial cultures of the minority (p.56).

This neo-liberal dialectic supports the one-nation discourse, which is often invoked to assist the imagining of a singular, coherent national identity, recognisable in the phrases ‘we’re all kiwis’ and ‘we’re all New Zealanders’. Such comments signify a deeply ingrained national consciousness, which presumes a “condensation of identities”, and operates to eclipse diversity (Billig, 1995: 87-92).

Histories of the New Zealand Wars written in the 1950s and 1960s abound with examples of monoculturalism and the myth of ‘good race relations’. Describing Governor Grey as “the last of the three great men”, Holt (1962) concludes his story with adulation for the ‘great work’ of Wakefield, Selwyn and Grey:
...their work lived on...thanks to their efforts...the 60-year old colony was able to move confidently and independently into the twentieth century - a century which...would allow it to set the world an example of how two races, their old quarrels forgotten, may live together in one country in perfect harmony (p.263).

Although Holt was not a Pakeha New Zealander, the above extract suggests that he had access to some of the discourses of the Mononcultural arena. Similar discourses are expressed by Miller (1966), who praised “the splendid words of Captain Hobson at Waitangi - ‘We are now one People!’” (1966: xi). Miller further reinforces this monocultural concept of nationhood in his acknowledgement to his secretary, who he describes as “herself a happy example of that ‘amalgamation of races’ to which Sir George Grey looked forward” (p.v).

These examples typify the histories written in the 1950s and 1960s, which suggests the predominance of a monocultural view of nationhood as a key influence for historians of this period. Although public expression of racial discourse was unfashionable during this time, these histories reveal the continuing existence of a less explicit strain of racial discourse. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the conservatism of the post war period had exhausted itself, and those who clung on to entrenched prejudices had to contend with the growing momentum of a comparatively radical kind of consciousness.

3.7. Arena 5: Emergence of a Critical Consciousness

Nineteen sixties New Zealand was characterised by the arrival and increasing influence of television, and the emergence of a new social consciousness, which was initially a reaction against the conservatism of the previous decades. Anti-Vietnam War demonstrations initiated a vigorous protest spirit, which became a public outlet for the expression of a range of political views. The growth and unity of the various strands of political protest in New Zealand became increasingly influenced by international politics. The
American civil rights movement was a significant influence on a changing Maori consciousness, and Maori protest organisations began to “adopt and adapt its rhetoric and tactics” (King, 1988: 91).

The historical writing of Sinclair was strongly influenced by the emerging spirit of political consciousness. During the 1960s, Sinclair was a political activist who spoke publicly against the government’s decision to send troops to Vietnam. King (1988) suggests that Sinclair’s “nationalist focus, and the high value he placed on Maori history, were to influence a whole generation of historians who followed him” (p.102). Sinclair was partly responsible for injecting New Zealand history with a political edge that was to bring about an important transition in the future construction and interpretation of historical texts.

Although published at the height of post-war conservatism, Sinclair’s *The Origins of the Maori Wars* (1957) stands apart from other interpretations produced around this time. A distinctive aspect of Sinclair’s history is his critical analysis of Victorian attitudes towards race. Describing the limiting attitude of the colonial settlers, Sinclair wrote that “Too frequently...they were content to believe that roads and bridges, farming and roadwork would civilize the Maori...they tended to regard the Maoris as children rather than as adults of a different culture” (p.9). While Sinclair’s interpretation stands apart from other histories of this period, it must be viewed within the context of post-war liberalism, where “post-war social consciousness was shaped largely by the need not to be tainted by the political culture of prewar Europe” (Malik, 1996: 14). To some extent, Sinclair (1957) bypassed the monocultural tendency of his time, in favor of an early, although subtle, expression of biculturalism:

> It has been an interruption to the work of founding a new state, rather than as a formative struggle, that the colonists and their descendants have generally regarded the wars...Yet they formed what now seems a necessary prelude to the growth of a new nation which embraces two races (p.9).
Despite his vision of nation as ‘two races’ rather than ‘one people’, and although he stands out as one of few historians of this period to critique the Victorian construction of race, Sinclair tended to explain the Wars as a necessary step toward good race relations. While this history serves to illustrate the pervasiveness of this myth during the nineteen fifties, in *Kinds of Peace - Maori People After the Wars* (1991), Sinclair (somewhat less idealistically) describes the ‘aftermath’ of the Wars: “‘Aftermath’ used to mean the second mowing - of the crop of grass following the early summer mowing. In New Zealand the first mower was the Grim Reaper; the second was the Law: land courts, commissions and confiscations” (p.7).

### 3.8. Arena 6: Bi-cultural Interpretation

Influenced by a bicultural concept of nationhood, the histories of this arena proliferate during the period of the late 1970s and 1980s, and continue to be prevalent in the early twenty-first century. Belich’s work is also significantly influenced by the discourses of this arena. Characteristics of this arena include the tendency of historians to depart from previous interpretative constraints and the conformity of monocular written texts, moving towards a concept of a dual history. This new approach must be considered within the context of the intellectual climate of this period, in which theories of post-modernism, post-structuralism and postcolonialism have challenged earlier interpretations of history. These texts were written by an emerging group of historians for whom history was no longer viewed as a singular truth, and there is a greater appreciation of the validity of alternative versions.

#### 3.8.1 Definitions of Biculturalism

The preconditions for biculturalism were founded out of the political consciousness of the late 1960s. Williams (1997) describes the chief expression of biculturalism as “a concerted effort to remake New Zealand by eradicating the settler heritage, renouncing the ‘racist’ policy of assimilation, and overcoming the legacy of colonial guilt by making New Zealand into
Aotearoa...a truly bicultural country” (p.27). This definition does not acknowledge the ambiguity of the term ‘bicultural’. Nor does it explain the interpretation of biculturalism as a form of ‘power sharing’, which has become the basis from which to interrogate the hegemonic domination of Maori in many institutional settings (Spoonley, 1988: 104).

Discourses of biculturalism have also been expressed as part of a strategy to bring about a review of the Treaty of Waitangi in order to support the case for a transfer of resources and power to Maori. In 1984, the newly elected Labour government made an assurance to honor the Treaty of Waitangi, by investigating claims made to the Waitangi Tribunal on the basis of the loss of land and resources. In 1988 the government proclaimed the Treaty to be “part of the basic law of New Zealand”. This was the official expression of the “determination in much of the literary culture, in the educational establishment and in many areas of government and law to carry through a thoroughgoing program of biculturalism” (Williams, 1997: 51).

Biculturalism has become a highly ambiguous term. The range of positions about biculturalism can be represented on a continuum, where the most superficial level of bicultural discourse might take the form of a ‘token acknowledgement’. This position is similar to the monocultural view in that it often envisages two cultures living together in harmony, yet ignores the power dynamic and the question of who maintains dominance, and how. According to Pearson (1996: 262), this display of biculturalism became apparent in “a series of changes in organisational practice, personnel and emblematic expressions of a new national identity based around the Treaty and ‘partnership’ within the state.” Themes of biculturalism became linked to “neoliberal economic philosophies”, and “by the mid-1980s, images of cultural diversity were heavily laced with the symbols of economic management and efficiency” (Pearson, 1996: 259). This official expression of biculturalism has wide currency in both public and private discourse, where it is often elicited as an easy solution to the recognition of past injustice, and as a kind of confessional, thus serving to wipe the slate clean, removing the

Further along the continuum of biculturalisms is the proposition of ‘equal power sharing’ - a position which itself is open to a variety of interpretations. In 1985 Awatere described biculturalism as a society in which “taha Maori receives an equal consideration with, and equally determines the course of this country with taha Pakeha” (Awatere, as cited in Abel, 1997: 198). Power sharing may be perceived in terms of the adaptation of “Pakeha institutions to meet Maori requirements to bicultural distribution”, or conversely, as the need to develop “different and specifically Maori institutions to share the authority defined by the Treaty” (Abel, 1997: 199). The latter interpretation is situated in opposition to the official view of biculturalism, and actively works to undermine the one people construction of nationhood.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite these different interpretations of biculturalism, the histories of the bicultural arena differ from the monocultural arena in terms of their interpretation of nationhood, which is informed by a conception of the nation as two peoples rather than as one people.

Both the school curriculum and educational history texts serve as indicators of the changing interpretation of New Zealand history. The interpretative framework utilised in the construction of The Oxford History of New Zealand (1992, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition) confirms the prevalence of bicultural revisionism within official discourse. Some of the contributing historians have used Belich’s work as a source, some adopting aspects of Belich’s revisionist argument. Parsonson (1992) cites Belich as her source of information regarding the Maori development of “remarkable trench and bunker systems” (p.185). Sorrenson’s (1992) summary of the New Zealand Wars exemplifies the differences between the interpretations of the monocultural arena, and those of the bicultural arena. He concludes that:

...the most significant development in race relations in the second half of the nineteenth century was the survival of the Maori as a distinct ethnic group in New Zealand, co-existing with, but not rigidly
segregated from, the Europeans. Sometimes Maori and Pakeha lay in the same bed; more often they were in separate beds within the same house. But the Pakeha had got hold of the house (p.166).

This house-making metaphor sums up some of the key features of biculturalism. Maori and Pakeha are no longer described as a ‘happy amalgamation’ as they were in the 1950s and 1960s. They are now two peoples, and while they share a ‘home’, Pakeha are in control of allocating power and resources.

In *Two Worlds* (1991), Salmond expresses a bicultural concept of nationhood by juxtaposing two histories to become what she describes as a “shared history” (p.432). Acknowledging the differences of two peoples, Salmond states that her intention was to “respect the perspectives of both sides, while taking the narratives of neither side for granted” (p.12). Her narrative focuses on the early encounters between Maori and European explorers, aiming to show how both ‘sides’ interpreted each other on the basis of different world views. While *Two Worlds* suffers from the pitfalls of a binary view of culture, Salmond intended the juxtaposition of viewpoints to create new meaning, so that the reader may reach a new understanding of the background and causes of conflict between Maori and Pakeha.

Two other historians take a less orthodox approach toward the construction of a bicultural history. Acknowledging the diversity and validity of two different historical approaches, Binney and Sissons step outside the Western paradigm of history to explore oral and tribal histories. Sissons (1987) illustrates the bicultural tenets of respecting cultural diversity and sharing power. Using the techniques of juxtaposition and ‘counterpointing interpretations’, Sissons has brought together Maori tribal narratives and whakapapa charts with European accounts by visitors, missionaries, ethnographers, and documentation from the Maori Land Court. In his first book, Sissons’ intention was to bring these histories together “in a way that respects the integrity of Nga Puhi traditions while opening up possibilities for these and the European accounts to inform each other” (1987: 5). In order to do this, Sissons worked collaboratively with Wiremu Wi Hongi and Pat
Hohepa, to produce a work that reveals differences in the focus and selection of each interpretation. Binney (1987) has argued that the difference in form and purpose of the ‘Maori oral narrative’ must be respected, rather than integrated into a grand narrative:

The ‘Western’ historian, in order to respect the integrity of the oral narrative needed to keep it apart from the written: The contradictions in what constitutes history - oral and written - cannot be resolved. We cannot translate other histories into our own. We can merely juxtapose them. The structures and the events have been bonded culturally, in time and place (p.88)

In *Nga Morehu* (1986), Binney documents the oral histories of eight Maori women, who spoke of their ancestors’ involvement with the Ringatu religion, and recounted stories about Te Kooti that had been handed down to them. *Nga Morehu* stands out as a history that departs not only from the empiricist influence of Western written histories, but also from the patriarchal focus of many of the earlier narratives of the New Zealand Wars. As Binney explains, “The written accounts focus almost entirely on Te Kooti as the guerrilla leader and man of war, ‘the rebel’. We hoped that, by talking with some of those who followed him, we could cross such barriers” (1986: 1). By providing access to a more peripheral, personal dimension that acknowledges the value of Maori women’s interpretations of warfare, Binney demonstrates an awareness of the predominance of war narratives that focus on a masculine rebel image, at the exclusion of the experiences of women.

Binney’s approach to the writing of *Nga Morehu* can be related to Spivak’s, argument that “…both as object of colonialist historiography, and as subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender keeps the male dominant” (1988: 28). Closely related to this issue, Spivak posed an important question which can in turn be applied to the histories of both Binney and Belich. By asking “can the subaltern speak?”, Spivak questions the possibility of colonised peoples having a voice, when their histories have
been predominantly written for them, by those who adhere to the narrative
canventions of Western historiography (1988: 25). By focusing on the oral
histories of women, Binney has made a concerted effort to depart from
these conventions, and while she may not be considered as a colonised
subject in the way that Spivak has used the term, she was living and writing
in a context in which the distinction between colonised subjects and
colonisers had become (and continues to be) increasingly blurred. This point
is particularly relevant to the production of TNZW, in which Belich
collaborated with Maori director Stephens to create a history that is
bicultural, both in content and form (see chapters six and seven). In this
context a further question needs to be posed: can the subaltern speak -
when their voice is mediated or negotiated via a Pakeha historian? (This
issue is discussed further in chapters seven and eight).

While Nga Morehu serves an important function as an oral history that
enables subaltern women to speak, Binney’s (1987) article Maori Oral
Narratives, Pakeha Written Texts: Two Forms of Telling History makes a
reductive generalisation by proposing that “there have been two
remembered histories of New Zealand since 1840: that of the colonisers,
and that of the colonized” (p.16). Such a statement obscures the plurality
and diversity of interpretations of history that fall outside this binary
opposition of coloniser/colonised. The title of this article ascribes to the
polarity – ‘Maori oral narratives’ and ‘Pakeha written texts’. While this notion
derives from a traditional distinction between oral and written histories,20 the
narration of history is no longer a matter of one essentially Maori way and
one essentially Pakeha way (Mahuika, 2006). Processes of cultural
hybridisation have spawned a number of hybrid and collaborative methods
of researching history (Reilly, 1996: 94-95). Ironically, Binney’s work is a
good example of this.

The reliance on a binary concept of race, culture and history is a reoccurring
feature of many of the histories that draw from the discourses of the
bicultural arena. Influenced by the discourse of ‘one nation - two peoples’,
there is a tendency to reduce culture to binary oppositions, and to produce histories that rely on essentialist notions of what is considered to be authentically Maori, which in turn, is expected to help define Pakeha identity.

3.8.2. Competing Culturalisms

In contemporary New Zealand society, there is a prevailing sense of tension between discourses of monoculturalism, biculturalism and multiculturalism. Up until the 1970s, monoculturalism remained dominant. It was generally accepted as common sense that it was in the best interests of Maori to assimilate into the dominant Pakeha culture. For many years there was little competition to this view. However, with the new mood of revisionism emerging in the 1970s and 1980s, monocultural discourse had to compete with biculturalism in a way that has surpassed the experience of other settler societies undergoing processes of de-colonisation. In comparison to both Canada and Australia, “the strength of the ‘bicultural’ counterweight, at least in aboriginal terms, was much greater in Aotearoa/New Zealand” (Pearson, 1996: 260).

Throughout the 1990s, immigration changes of a more heterogenous, and therefore more visible character have altered the ‘culturalism’ dynamic, so that the last decade of the twentieth century is marked by considerable tension between bicultural and multicultural discourses. One argument is that multiculturalism has diverted attention away from the bicultural focus on historical injustices and the interrogation of hegemonic power structures, and thus reduced the power of Maori to claim reparation for the dispossession of land and taonga. Another concern is that, if (the neo-liberal interpretation of) multiculturalism proposes a notion of the nation as ‘many peoples’ (all surviving on that a-historical, ‘level playing field’), then the bicultural ideal of equal power sharing between two peoples may be perceived as somewhat redundant. Given the apparent resilience of the neo-liberal dialectic, and the willingness of many New Zealanders to turn a blind eye to the historical injustice associated with colonisation, this concern is
valid. Walker (1995) takes this concern to an almost xenophobic extreme in his argument that the “growing inflow of Asian immigrants” has put Maori at risk:

> The reduction of the Maori to a position of one of many minorities negates their status as the people of the land and enables the government to neutralise their claims for justice more effectively than it does now...the ideology of multiculturalism as a rationale for immigration must be rejected...the government’s immigration policy must be seen for what it is, a covert strategy to suppress the counter-hegemonic struggle of the Maori by swamping them with outsiders who are not obliged to them by the Treaty (p.292).

An opposing argument suggests that biculturalism is based on an essentialist concept of two distinct cultures, which, apart from ignoring the hybridisation and multiplicity of culture, operates to push immigrant groups to the margins of society, and erect boundaries around an exclusive and carefully protected centre. Pearson (1996) draws on the theories of cultural hybridity to question the value of continuing to focus on ‘culturalisms’:

> Bicultural discourses have the same inbuilt tensions, with the added potential difficulty of imposing a binary exclusivity on...the hybridity of everyday life experience. Both ‘culturalisms’...suffer from the limiting consequences of an objectifying and essentialising conception of culture...that is sociologically suspect and politically questionable. If the study and politics of ‘culture’ privileges the exotic over the familiar, the local over the global, the unique over the shared, the singular ‘insider’ voice over multiple ways of knowing, we all too readily end up with a vision of demarcated social worlds set within bounded historical traditions...these boundaries, ironically, often trace the shapes of old ‘races’ that the new culturalist perspectives were meant to replace (p.265).

In this sense, the problem with authenticity is that it ignores the plurality and diversity that are borne out of processes of cultural hybridity. Defining ‘culture’ as “a system of multiple exchanges and boundary crossings”, Pearson argues that “[a]ll human societies are hybrids, biologically and socially. Consequently, no one can be said to be without a culture and we are all ‘multicultural’” (1996: 248). Pearson could be criticised here for proposing a universalising position that assumes an equality of hybridity,
which negates the culturally specific experience of differently positioned hybrid identities. Acknowledgement of such specificity means identifying the complexities of different types of hybridity within specific contexts, as does Avril Bell (2004). These issues of authenticity and cultural hybridity are discussed in more depth in sections 4.8.1. and 4.8.2.

### 3.9 Conclusion

This overview of New Zealand historiography has been presented historically, thus tracking changes in the hierarchy and access of discourses over time. The most significant shifts in relation to six discursive arenas can be summarised as follows:

The discourse of scientific racism was predominant in the period of 1850-1945, but then became unfashionable after World War Two, and disappeared from public discourse for some time. While it is still not particularly fashionable to express ideas of racial hierarchy, the remnants of scientific racism are revealed less blatantly in everyday discussions and ‘letters to the editor’ sections of newspapers.\(^{22}\) The noble-savage construction is no longer expressed in the same way as it was during the Victorian age, but its descendant is alive in the form of the ‘good Maori/bad Maori’ discourse.

The ‘one people’ discourse was first mentioned during the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. As Governor Hobson shook hands with each chief who signed, he announced “We are now one people” (as cited in Orange, 1987: 55). Due to a preoccupation with establishing a ‘Pakeha’ national identity, the ‘one people’ discourse did not reach its peak until the 1950s and 1960s. This discourse continues to be perpetuated by way of ‘banal’ expressions of nationalism, and is often invoked as a reaction to (and provocation for) assertions of Maori self-determination and political protest.\(^{23}\)
Ushered on to the scene by the zeitgeist of political activism and the Maori renaissance of the 1970s, biculturalism reached its pinnacle of public and institutional declaration in the late 1980s. This coincided with a dramatic transformation of economic policy toward the de-regulation of the state and a neo-liberal ethos based on individual responsibility. In the current context, these discourses continue to be predominant, as they mingle, collide and produce hybrid variations.

Added to this entanglement of competing discourses, recent changes in immigration policy have fueled tension between discourses of biculturalism and multiculturalism. Appearing as a threat to localised identities, the process of globalisation has stimulated a sense of anxiety, a quest for authenticity and the desire to resurrect boundaries. Consequently, the de-colonising potential of cultural hybridity is rarely recognised.

The mapping of discourses within historical narratives has provided a framework from which to situate Belich’s approach in relation to discourses of race, culture and history. In this sense, Belich aims to challenge discourses of scientific racism, colonial military superiority, Pakeha nationalism, monoculturalism and the myth of good race relations. Belich’s histories are best situated in relation to bicultural discourses that advocate equal power sharing of ‘two peoples’, whilst also drawing attention to the injustices of colonisation. In terms of his role in the production of TNZW, and in particular, his collaboration with Stephens, Belich has also been influenced by the ‘anti-colonial’ and ‘tribal’ discourses discussed in the following chapter.

Having mapped out a number of discourses associated with cultural colonization (specifically in relation to Aotearoa New Zealand), chapter four discusses those discourses that operate to challenge the project of cultural colonization. Both of these chapters build toward a framework that lays the foundations for the subsequent analysis of TNZW.
Endnotes

1 Discursive arenas are used here as a means of representing overlapping discursive domains. One problem with this application of my own interpretive categorisation, is that it over-simplifies a complex discursive interplay that is fluid and dynamic. However these arenas help to illustrate the shifting, hierarchical relations between discourses (see section 1.2). Arenas one-six are discussed in relation to their discursive role within the broader process of cultural colonization, so they are outlined in chapter three. Arenas seven and eight are discussed in relation to their discursive role within the process of cultural de-colonisation, so these are outlined in chapter four. The eight arenas are labeled as follows:

Chapter Three:
Arena 1: Victorian Interpretation
Arena 2: National Identity in the ‘Post Settler’ Period
Arena 3: Pakeha Nationalism
Arena 4: Monocultural Interpretation
Arena 5: Emergence of a Critical Consciousness
Arena 6: Bi-cultural Interpretation

Chapter Four:
Arena 7: De-colonisation
Arena 8: Discourses of Maori and Tribal Identity

2 For examples of mutating and re-occurring discourses, see McCreanor (1997 & 2005).

3 The differences between a metropolitan experience of de-colonisation, and that experienced in settler societies, is discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.7.

3. ‘Maori agency’ is discussed in Byrnes (2004: 111-121).

5 The narratives surveyed here include; Government documents found in the Appendices to the House of Representatives, journal entries of the militia during the time of the New Zealand Wars, and historian’s accounts of the main events and protagonists of these Wars. In order to illustrate the discursive influence of this arena, examples are drawn mainly from; Ward (1839), Cowan (1922) and Buick (1926).

6 One objection to Orientalism, is that it does not provide an alternative to the very phenomenon that it criticizes (Young, 1990). In other words, Orientalism refers to a perpetual cycle of knowledge production that offers no way out – no means of breaking out of they cycle. Bhabha (1983) extends upon this issue, arguing that “there is always, in Said, the suggestion that colonial power is possessed entirely by the colonizer which is a historical and theoretical simplification” (p.200).

7 For examples of early constructions of Maori as ‘noble savage’ see; Beckham (1969), McKinlay (1939) and Yate (1835). For a discussion of the construction of these discourses during the eighteenth century, see Salmond (1991).

8 The good Maori/bad Maori discourse is still drawn on today, particularly as a means of explaining Maori protesters and criminals behavior (McCreanor, 1997, 2005).

9 According to Belich (1986: 200), this involved the embellishment of acts of heroism, even after British defeat. These were evident in documents of the Appendices to the House of Representatives, where Governor Grey quickly learnt the benefits of creating a “paper victory” out of a non-event.

10 Goldie (1989) used the term ‘indigenisation’ to refer to a process that “suggests the impossible necessity of [settler society people] becoming indigenous” (p.13).
Histories surveyed here for their expression of the discursive characteristics of this arena include; Sinclair (1957), Holt (1962), Miller (1966), Dalton (1967) and Wards (1968). While neither Holt nor Dalton can be viewed as Pakeha New Zealanders, they have been included in the Monocultural arena because their histories express the discourses of this arena.

For example, the historians mentioned in endnote 11.

The predominance of this ideology is implied in the Hunn report (1960).

The continuing prevalence of the one nation discourse is illustrated by leader of the National Party, Brash’s (2004) ‘State of the Nation’ address to the Rotary Club of Orewa.

For a more recent example of the public expression of the one nation discourse, see Brash (2004).

Sinclair’s (1991) expression of biculturalism has changed since the 1950s. His focus has shifted to the hybrid identities of influential Maori of the twentieth century, describing them as “equally at home with English and Maori people and languages, and well educated in the European system; moving comfortably in both worlds” (p.127).


Variously described as; Maori nationalism; separatism; the quest for Maori self determination; tino rangatiratanga or kawanatanga, this more ‘radical’ view of biculturalism overlaps with the ‘de-colonising’ arena, where it will be explored in more detail.

The Spring of Mana (1991) is one of many histories written during the twentieth century that demonstrate the limitations of relying too heavily on colonial archives, thus suggesting the value of collaborative research between Maori and Pakeha. It has been described as “an experimental history written during a decade of bicultural trial and error, in which New Zealand intellectuals trained within a Western tradition have searched for new cultural forms appropriate to a postcolonial society” (Reilly, 1996: 89)

In chapter six, interview extracts from key informants involved in the production of TNZW, demonstrate a sharp distinction between what the production personnel consider to be ‘Maori history’ and ‘Pakeha history’. However, in chapter four, I discuss the continued significance (for many Maori) of orality as a means of transmitting cultural memory. This is also demonstrated by Mahuika (2006).

For example, the 2005 census indicated that 10% of the New Zealand population identified themselves as Asian at the time in which the census data was collected.

Examples of remnants of racial discourse have been observed in my survey of letters to the editor, where viewers expressed various responses to TNZW. See, for examples; Peacock (1998) and Diamond, (1998). Both of these are included in Appendix 2.

Mahuika’s (2006) MA thesis also demonstrates, via oral history narratives, how discourses of Maori self-determination and political activism have been provoked in reaction to the public predominance of the one people discourse (p.90).

See chapter 4.10.1 for a full discussion of the concept of cultural authenticity, as well as Griffiths (1995).
CHAPTER 4: Postcolonialism and Cultural De-colonisation

What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. These ‘in-between’ spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular or communal – that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation…it is the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated (Bhabha, 1994: 1-2).

4.1 Introduction

Chapters three and four operate together to map out the manifestation of discourses associated with the New Zealand experience of colonisation. While many of the discourses discussed in chapter three can be related to the broader project of cultural colonisation, chapter four looks at the other side of the coin - by exploring those discourses and theoretical perspectives that offer an alternative to the concept of ‘nation’. In particular, this chapter focuses on theories that offer strategies for unmasking “the many masks that colonists wear” (Gibbons, 2002: 15).

As suggested by Bhabha’s quotation above, postcolonialism offers a key theoretical framework for the demystification of, and resistance to, colonial discourse. While adding a further two arenas to complete the map of key discourses introduced in the previous chapter, this chapter discusses those aspects of postcolonial theory that are most relevant to TNZW. Here, it is necessary to explore the particular postcolonial context that shaped the production, construction and reception of the series. Both Belich (writer/presenter) and Stephens (director/kaitiaki) were influenced by this postcolonial context. This influence is apparent in both the production interviews (discussed in chapter 6) and specific aspects of the construction of TNZW (see chapter 7). The audience responses (discussed in chapter 8 suggest conflicting and competing interpretations of this context, which demonstrates both the usefulness of postcolonial theory, and the need for its
conditional application.

While I explain how particular strands of postcolonial theory have been influential upon New Zealand expressions of resistance to colonialism, this chapter also marks out the limitations of postcolonial theory, especially in its application to New Zealand cultural relations, indigeneity, oral and aural cultural transmission and audiovisual media.

Having discussed important shortcomings of postcolonial theory, I then discuss the significance of postcolonialism to theories of cultural memory, and develop the most useful postcolonial positions into a workable framework for this thesis. This framework is comprised of a modified selection of postcolonial perspectives, which operate as intersecting threads of discussion throughout this thesis. These deal with issues of resistance, agency, power, representation, and cultural memory.

While postcolonialism is espoused here as a strategy for ‘unmasking’ colonial discourse and for moving beyond the concept of ‘nation’, there are a number of problems with the term, especially when attempting to apply postcolonial theory to the New Zealand situation. For this reason, the chapter begins by discussing a selection of critiques of the term postcolonial, which serves as a necessary precursor to marking out a definition that is useful, whilst also maintaining a critical awareness of the problems and limitations of the term.

4.2 Critiques of the Term ‘Postcolonial’

There are a number of problems with the term ‘postcolonial’, some of which are due to semantic interpretation. For example, the prefix ‘post’ is misleading as it suggests that the term relates to a time period that comes after colonisation – as though it is possible to define a moment when the process of colonisation finished, and a new period started. For some critics, the fact that many people continue to experience the effects of colonisation
means that ‘post-colonisation’ is not possible. This kind of literal interpretation of the term ‘postcolonial’ points to inevitable problems in the way that the term has been used. However, it is important to go beyond a semantic periodisation of the term in order to locate ways in which the postcolonial can be useful. In this sense, I follow Hall’s (1996a) critique of the term, which identifies a number of problems and uses of the term, while acknowledging that “…the colonial is not dead, since it lives on in its after-effects” (p.248).

Many of the critiques of postcolonialism challenge the theoretical legitimacy of the concept. Hall points out that one of the main problems with the term is its ambiguity:

When was ‘the postcolonial’? What should be included and excluded from its frame? Where is the invisible line between it and its ‘others’ (colonialism, neo-colonialism, Third World, imperialism), in relation to whose termination it ceaselessly, but without final suppression, marks itself? (1996a: 242).

Hall interrogates these questions through a discussion of specific critiques put forward by a selection of theorists. Shohat (1992) and McClintock (1992) argue that the term postcolonial is a ‘universalising category’ as it implies that everyone who has experienced the colonial process has done so in the same way, regardless of temporal, spatial and cultural specificities. As Hall (1996a) puts it, “like the other ‘posts’ with which it is aligned, it collapses different histories, temporalities and racial formations into the same universalizing category” (pp.242-243). This is a valid critique, as much postcolonial theory assumes direct relevance to all who have experienced the process of colonisation, often without adequate consideration of specific trajectories. The application of such theory to the New Zealand context highlights this problem, as there are a number of circumstances that make the New Zealand experience of colonisation distinctive (Byrnes, 2004). However, this does not mean that such theory cannot (or should not) be applied to the New Zealand context. In this case, it is useful as an abstract
Much postcolonial theorisation reveals a tension between universalism and specificity. While specificity and difference must be given adequate attention, there are commonalities between colonising and de-colonising societies “in terms of which those local differences can be articulated.” (Childs & Williams, 1997: 83). Byrnes (2004) emphasises this tension between the universal and the specific, especially as it relates to the application of postcolonial theory to her own study of The Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand History:

As a master narrative of crisis, postcolonialism has a tendency to universalize, to subsume difference rather than celebrate it, leaning toward a transcendent theorizer, assumed to be outside time, space and power relations. Postcolonialism also suggests an emancipatory ideology of precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods that homogenizes different societies and the differences within them…most importantly, the re-assessment of colonial discourses cannot be a matter of simply inverting the imperial dichotomy, depicting colonists as one-dimensional agents of imperialism and colonial peoples as victims, for to do so does not do justice to either party. Therefore the crisis of postcolonialism is that there are continuities, as well as discontinuities, between colonial and postcolonial narratives (p.189).

While it is important to consider the specific circumstances in which colonisation may be experienced, it is also useful to outline those characteristics of colonisation and de-colonisation that appear as ‘universal’ (Hall, 1996a). In this sense the term postcolonial must be understood as an abstract concept that allows a critical examination of power relations, as they are experienced in both global and local terms.

Despite the concerns about universalism, postcolonial theory has been predominantly utilised as a metropolitan theory, which has tended to focus on the after effects of colonialism in mass immigration to metropolitan territories. Loyd (1993) refers to this phenomenon as the “‘metropolitan circuits of theory’, which, ‘for better or worse’, shape much intellectual life within and without postcolonial debates” (as cited in Childs & Williams, 1997:
While this metropolitan backdrop may not have direct relevance to the New Zealand context, it has played an important part in helping to shape (and being shaped by) the writing of some of the key postcolonial theorists, such as Bhabha, Said and Spivak. While these ‘diasporic intellectuals’ may be more focused on issues of diasporan identity politics (Childs & Williams, 1997: 90), they offer particular insights to a study of New Zealand cultural relations.

The postcolonial has also been criticised for its “theoretical and political ambiguity” (Hall, 1996a: 242). According to Shohat, the postcolonial is politically ambivalent because it blurs the distinctions between colonisers and colonised. It negates the politics of resistance because it “posits no clear domination and calls for no clear opposition” (Shohat, 1992, as cited in Hall, 1996a: 242). This critique rests on Shohat’s use of the postcolonial as a concept that implies the final closure of a historical epoch (Hall, 1996a). If colonialism and its effects are ‘finished’, then one cannot speak of colonial domination as a contemporary condition, and there is no impetus for oppositional politics. While Shohat’s critique is dependant on a ‘periodised’ concept of the term postcolonial, it is relevant to the New Zealand situation, where there is currently a political and discursive thrust to define an end point to processes associated with colonisation and de-colonisation (such as the Waitangi Tribunal), thereby apparently leveling the ‘playing field’ (Byrnes, 2004; Brash, 2004; Pearson, 2005).

Dirlik (1994) critiques postcolonial theory for its post-structuralist orientation. He argues that postcolonialism “grossly underplays capitalism’s structuring of the modern world. Its notion of identity is discursive not structural” (p.347). According to Hall, some of these arguments (especially that posed by Dirlik) suggest a desire for a “return to a clear-cut politics of binary oppositions, where clear ‘lines can be drawn in the sand’ between goodies and baddies” (1996a: 244). Later in the same article, Hall adds “the differences, of course, between colonising and colonised cultures remain profound. But they have never operated in a purely binary way and they certainly do so no longer”
In this sense, Hall is aligned with Bhabha (1994: 112), whose notion of cultural hybridity serves to challenge binary conceptions of colonised and coloniser.

4.3 Defining ‘Postcolonial’: Responding to the Critiques.

Despite the problems outlined above, postcolonial theory provides a useful framework for the interpretation of a number of diverging responses to colonisation. Being primarily concerned with issues of power, agency, identity and representation, postcolonial theory constitutes a basis from which to interrogate discourses of race, ethnicity and culture from a critical standpoint. For Hall (1996a), the term postcolonial enables the identification of both universal and specific characteristics of a temporal shift in power relations: “What the concept may help us to do is to describe or characterise the shift in global relations which marks the (necessarily uneven) transition from the age of Empires to the post independence or post-decolonisation moment” (p.246). While Hall speaks of a ‘moment’, his notion of a shift or transition in global relations is not meant to imply an instant swing, reversal or leveling of power relations. Hall emphasises that such a transition is a continual process, which is experienced in different ways, at different times, within different conditions, and in uneven proportions. Following Hall, I find Hulme’s (1995) definition of the term postcolonial to be a fruitful point of reference:

If ‘postcolonial’ is a useful word, then it refers to a process of disengagement from the whole colonial syndrome which takes many forms and is probably inescapable for all those whose worlds have been marked by that set of phenomena: ‘postcolonial’ is (or should be) a descriptive not an evaluative term…[It is not] some kind of badge of merit (Hulme, 1995).

Hulme’s definition proposes a useful application for the term postcolonial, whilst also dealing with some of the major critiques of the term. The emphasis on process reinforces his intention to move beyond periodised interpretations of the term, whilst also acknowledging the ongoing reverberation of ‘after-effects’ that are symptomatic of the ‘colonial
syndrome’. Such a definition has application to the New Zealand context, where there is currently much debate concerning the ongoing significance of colonial ‘after-effects’ (Gibbons, 2002, Byrnes, 2004, Brash, 2004). According to Hall (1996a), Hulme’s definition:

...helps us to identify, not only the level at which careful distinctions have to be made, but also the level at which ‘postcolonial’ is properly universalizing (i.e. a concept which is referring to a high level of abstraction). It refers to a general process of decolonization which, like colonisation itself, has marked the colonising societies as powerfully as it has the colonised (of course, in different ways). Hence the subverting of the old colonising/colonised binary in the new conjuncture (p.246).

Hulme proposes an ongoing process of de-colonisation, which is experienced by both colonised and colonising societies. While this helps to define the way in which terms such as postcolonial and de-colonising are used throughout this thesis, it also enables me to orient myself in relation to some of the key contributors to postcolonial theory.

4.4 Key Debates

The historical development of postcolonial theory is far too complex to cover adequately in this chapter. Rather, the intention is to briefly outline the broad brush strokes of postcolonial theory, with a focus upon a selection of theoretical perspectives that are most relevant to the body of discourses discussed in this thesis.

Much early postcolonial theory has focused on demonstrating the authoritative power of colonial discourse, predominantly through a discussion of literary modes. As a number of theorists began to view colonised subjects as active agents rather than passive victims, they have tended to become more concerned with theorising strategies of resistance to colonialism. This tendency can be exemplified by the work of Fanon, who shifted from an initial concern with the negative impact of colonial authority, to an emphasis on strategies of violent anti-colonial resistance. Fanon expressed this latter idea through the idea of a ‘national literature’:

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Here there is, at the level of literary creation, the taking up and clarification of themes which are typically nationalist. This may be properly called a literature of combat, in the sense that it calls on the whole people to fight for their existence as a nation (Fanon, 1968, reprinted in Ashcroft & Tiffin, 1995: 155)

While Fanon made a significant contribution to the work of subsequent theorists, there are a number of reasons why his theoretical approach does not fit easily into the framework developed in this thesis. Despite being a key influence upon a number of anti-colonial activists in New Zealand, Fanon’s strategic use of essentialist identity politics and his insistence on theorising resistance in terms of violent nationalist struggle are at odds with my own perspective, which follows Bhabha (1994) and Hall (in Grossberg, 1996b) in viewing effective resistance as an outcome of processes of cultural hybridity and interstitial spaces of articulation and ambivalence.

Said (1978) also focused extensively on theorising the nature of colonial authority. Although criticised for not offering an effective strategy of resistance to that authority, his theories (such as orientalism and the performativity of colonial discourse) paved the way for subsequent theorists to do so in a more sophisticated way than was achieved by Fanon. Here I am referring to the work of Chatterjee (1993); Bhabha (1994 & 1996) and Parry (2004).

Anti-colonial struggles in New Zealand have been influenced by the contradictory ways in which nationalism has been theorised within postcolonial studies. While some theorists (eg; Chatterjee, 1986; Bhabha, 1990) provide strategies for deconstructing and resisting the use of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, others have utilised these concepts as a strategic means of resistance to colonialism. According to Ashcroft et al (1995), Anderson’s conception of nation as an imagined community “has enabled postcolonial societies to invent a self image through which they could act to liberate themselves from imperialist oppression” (p. 151). This sense of nationalism can be exemplified by the work of Fanon, who argued that:
The claim to a national culture in the past does not only rehabilitate that nation and serve as a justification for the hope of a future national culture…it is responsible for an important change in the native…the native intellectual who takes up arms to defend his nation’s legitimacy…is obliged to dissect the heart of his people (Fanon, 1968, reprinted in Ashcroft et al, 1995: 154)

Despite Fanon’s use of nationalism as a strategy for violent anti-colonial struggle, his theorisation of nationalism was far more complex than this idea suggests. Fanon warned against the ‘pitfalls of national consciousness’, stressing that the national bourgeoisie used nationalism as a coercive tool for asserting and maintaining power (Fanon, 1961). For Fanon, it was possible for nation-building (in the latter sense) to occur simultaneously with nationalist anti-colonial revolution.

The contradictory use of nation in postcolonial theory is partly due to the differing time and location in which theorists were writing. In the context of Algerian revolutionary politics in the 1950s, Fanon’s version of nationalism makes sense as a strategy for liberating colonised subjects against colonial oppression. This is a very different context to that in which Bhabha’s deconstructive approach to nationalism was shaped. Aschcroft et al (1995) explain that “While nationalism operated as a general force of resistance in earlier times in post colonial societies, a perception of its hegemonic and monologic status is growing” (p.152).

In terms of the theoretical and methodological framework underpinning this thesis, the most relevant argument posited by many postcolonial theorists (with the exception of Fanon), is that ‘nation’, ‘race’, and ‘history’ are all discursive formations. The deconstruction of these terms by postcolonial theorists has resulted in the frequent use of quotation marks to denote their constructedness. Contributing a theoretical framework for this process of deconstruction, Said (1978) argued that colonial discourse was not only constructed by the West, but has been integral to the construction of the Orient.
Another key point emphasised by Said relates to his notion of the ‘wordliness’ of texts (1983: 34). Said (1978) argued that those discourses associated with colonialism are not only embedded in texts, but are performative, meaning that they have a tangible impact upon people’s daily lives. Bhabha has also theorised this performative aspect of colonial discourse:

Stereotypical racial discourse is then a four-term strategy...one has then a repertoire of conflictual positions that constitute the subject in colonial discourse. The taking up of any one position, within a specific discursive form, in a particular historical conjuncture, is then always problematic – the site of both fixity and fantasy. It provides a colonial ‘identity’ that is played out...in the face and space of the disruptions and threat from the heterogeneity of other positions (Bhabha, 1983: 204).

This performativity of colonial discourse is relevant to the situation in New Zealand. The noble/savage discourse may have been expressed predominantly in texts written during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but as noted in chapter three, this discourse continues to be played out in modified ways by both Pakeha and Maori. (McCreanor, 1997, 2005). This playing-out of the noble/savage discourse via representations, stereotype and social activity, implies its continuing ‘life’ in relation to the performative aspect of identity (Butler, 2004).

In an inverted way, the deconstruction of colonial discourse is also a performative act, and as such, is capable of operating beyond theoretical abstraction, and actually making a difference in terms of identity and power relations. The act of deconstruction provides a form of empowerment that can incite activism, especially for those who have been affected by the oppressive weight of colonial discourse. Postcolonial deconstruction does this by providing colonised peoples with access to knowledge, networks of solidarity and practical strategies for resistance.

4.5. Dis-locations

While I have identified those principles of postcolonialism most useful to this
thesis, there are important dis-locations that take place when attempting to apply this theory to the New Zealand context, and more specifically to the particular body of discourses discussed throughout this thesis. These dislocations are also associated with broader gaps in postcolonial theory.

4.5.1 Indigeneity

One of the most significant dis-locations can be found in the argument that postcolonial theory has not sufficiently addressed issues of anti-colonial resistance from the perspective of indigenous peoples. According to Smith (1999):

There is...amongst indigenous academics, the sneaking suspicion that the fashion of postcolonialism has become a strategy for reinscribing or reauthorizing the privileges of non-indigenous academics because the field of ‘postcolonial’ discourse has been defined in ways which can still leave out indigenous peoples, our ways of knowing and our current concerns (p.24).

One reason for this suspicion of postcolonialism is that the most significant writers in this field have been shaped by, and concerned with, issues of metropolitan and diasporan significance. Key issues for the development of resistance strategies – specifically relating to localised indigenous contexts, have not been prioritised in postcolonial theory. Despite this situation, I argue that some postcolonial theories offer an important political perspective, which could potentially support an indigenous strategy for resistance to colonial discourse. Given the historical and cultural context that shaped TNZW, it is necessary to investigate some of the key issues associated with indigeneity, with the intention of working through the relation between an indigenous politics of resistance and that offered by postcolonialism.

According to Maaka and Fleras (2005), indigenous peoples are “fundamentally autonomous political communities, with claims to indigenous models of self-determining autonomy” (p.13). The notion of resistance to colonialism is understood by these writers as an internal process involving an important connection between differently situated indigenous populations: “Indigenous peoples justify their society bending claims on the grounds of
historical continuity, cultural autonomy, original occupancy, and territorial
grounding...Indigenous peoples around the world are casting for ways to
de-colonise “from within” (pp.10-11). While connections between
indigenous peoples are deemed to be valuable, indigenous Maori activists
express little optimism about the possibilities of non-indigenous peoples
participating in an indigenous politics of resistance (Smith, 1999). This is an
important distinction between postcolonialism and indigenous politics. It is
also a point that reveals an essentialist basis to the politics of indigeneity.
Despite an insistence that indigenous politics do not propose separatism, an
essentialist orientation toward culture and nation is evident in Maaka and
Fleras’ (2005) proposed alternative to community:

References to indigeneity do not necessarily mean secession or
separatism, any more than demands for self-determination preclude
the possibility of co-operative co-existence. Instead, a postcolonial
constitutional order is endorsed, one anchored around a new social
contract for living together differently in partnership with non-
indigenous populations. That is, indigenous peoples insist on
surviving as distinct nations while participating in society at large, but
on their own self-determining terms rather than conditions imposed
by authorities (pp.12-13, emphasis added).

While this proposed constitutional order serves as a strategy of anti-colonial
resistance, the notion of demarcating borders between indigenous
populations and non-indigenous populations is problematic, particularly
during a time when processes of globalisation and cultural hybridity are so
crucial to formations of identity and community. The notion that ‘indigenous
populations’ can operate within this contemporary context, as “autonomous
political communities, with claims to indigenous models of self-determining
autonomy”, and survive as ‘distinct nations’ is not only idealistic, but
proposes a form of community based on the nationalist principle – the very
concept that was imposed on indigenous peoples, thereby masking the
intent of colonialism. Identifying the irony of this situation, Niezen (2003) asks
“How then, can we expect indigenous nationalism to be any different from
other forms of nationalism, to be free of chauvinism and counter-hate, even if
it develops within existing nation-states and is entirely or largely without
secessionist ambitions?” (p.149). In this way, Maori indigenous strategies of
resistance during the 1970s and 1980s share similarities with (and may have been influenced by) the nationalist principles of Fanonism (Fanon, 1968).

For these reasons, indigenous theories of resistance conflict with the view of resistance as emerging from processes of cultural hybridity and ‘interstitial transit’ – a view that involves a deconstructive approach toward the concept of nation. Despite this incompatibility, I have explored a selection of issues of concern to indigenous activists, that postcolonial theorists have neglected. Selected on the basis of their observed prominence within the discursive construction and reception of TNZW, these issues include; the transmission of memory via the oral, aural and visual arts, alternative discourses of sovereignty and community, and the dispossession of land, language and resources (Smith, 1999; Mageo, 2001; Featherstone, 2005).

4.5.2. Orality and Aurality

While some postcolonial theorists have explored issues of colonialism via the written narrative form, much postcolonial theory has ignored the significance of orality to indigenous cultures. As Featherstone (2005) argues, this situation also relates to the marginalised position of orality and memory in relation to historiographic disciplinary conventions:

…the place of orality in postcolonial studies, not least in its complex relationships with literacy and memory, remains a significant, if under-represented one. Postcolonial studies is rooted in textual materials and textual criticism. Consideration of orality tends to be concentrated on its influence upon writing or limited to specialist disciplines within a broader field of ethnography such as ‘oral literatures’, a contradictory term that suggests some of the conceptual difficulties in addressing the topic…but orality, like memory itself, insists upon the possibility of a de-textualised, performative history that works on different principles from those of conventional historiography (p.186).

Ong (1982) has discussed the ideological struggle between oral and written forms of communication. As outlined by Featherstone (2005), Ong’s argument is that:

…the technology of writing is rapidly naturalized in a textual world [where] cultures come to write and read without thinking about the
actions as processes of transformation. However, in cultures where orality remains a powerful influence, this shift of consciousness is incomplete…the ‘psychodynamics of orality’…depend upon situated performances of meaning” (p.186).

Ong makes a comparison between the dialogical, social, performativity of orality and the ‘privatisation’ and closure of historical narrative. While the former is open to debate and challenge, the latter “accrues a power to itself as text, a silent code of knowing that is quite different from the inevitably social acts of the public speaker of memory…the processes of memory cultures are in many ways antipathetic to the values of ‘historical narrative’” (p.187). These ideas have application to the New Zealand situation where, for many Maori, orality continues to be an important means of transmitting memory. From a Maori indigenous perspective, orality is not only a prime means of transmitting memory across generations, it is also viewed as a form of empowerment and resistance - an alternative to the dominant written narratives that have been so closely entwined with nation-building (Mahuika, 2006: 94-95).

While orality is understood to be an important means of resistance to the historiographic written expression of discursive and cultural colonisation (as outlined in chapter three), the situation in New Zealand needs to be considered in relation to the dangers of a diametric conceptualisation of orality versus written text:

Nationalist movements, particularly those engaged in struggle against colonial powers, were able to appeal both to the endangeredness of oral traditions, threatened by colonial imports of literacy and education, and those traditions’ embodiment of pure cultural values. The collection, preservation and revival of those traditions…became a political process of anti-colonial resistance and nation-building…typically, this romanticizing of traditional cultural purity elides or distorts a long-standing and complex interplay of literacy and orality in so-called oral cultures. This has ironic results. Orality, rendered passive and endangered instead of active and hybrid, becomes in such circumstances a condition that requires record and rescue by the intervention of the textual forces of cultural nationalism (Featherstone, 2005: 188).
Featherston refers here to the ‘cult of authenticity’ (Brydon, 1995: 140), which is discussed later in this chapter in terms of its antithetical relation to cultural hybridity. The tendency toward a diametric conceptualisation of orality versus literacy, along with the romantic quest for oral cultural expression (as though it is possible to locate pure cultural forms, supposedly ‘untouched’ by the colonising process), draws attention away from the potential agency generated by the interplay of orality and literacy. This interplay was a significant means by which Maori kaumatua drew on an array of oral, aural, visual, bodily and written resources as a means of discussing their knowledge of historical events pertaining to TNZW (see chapter eight).

Orality has become a focal point in terms of critiquing the literary and textual obsession of historiography, and the dislocations of postcolonialism. However, as argued by Scheunemann (1996), attention must also be paid to aural and visual modes of transmitting memory, and to the role of audiovisual media in reconfiguring the combination and relation of these sense modalities.

Sound has been described as culturally ‘dis-located’. According to Seidler (2003), although sounds can be evocative reminders of places and events, their shifting and highly subjective associations mean that they are not easily located as belonging to specific cultures or territories. However, postcolonialism has been utilised as a means of theorising aural culture as a potential avenue of agency for subaltern and diasporic identities (Gilroy, 2003, Hall, 2003, Sharma, 2003). Gilroy (1993) has drawn on the postcolonial theory of hybridity in establishing “song and music as central components of subaltern cultural expression, and [has] developed a supple methodology for exploring these beyond their purely verbal expression” (Featherstone, 2005: 37). Gilroy’s methodology is compatible with the approach to affective memory taken in this thesis:

The dialogic forces of the changing same of black music depend upon three elements in creative motion: an urgent memory of slave history, in sound, body and speech; a tradition of resistance through
an articulation of those memories; and a continuing capacity for aesthetic reconfiguration (Featherstone, 2005: 37-38).

Gilroy’s methodology, along with his use of LeRoy Jones’ concept of the ‘changing same’ of black music, serves to challenge essentialist approaches that seek to locate and preserve ‘pure’ examples of indigenous oral and aural cultural forms.

In chapters seven and eight, my discussion of the aural dimension of TNZW, and the aural-affective dimension of audience engagement, is aligned with Gilroy’s “definition of music as migrant and hybrid performance rather than as an expression of stable identities, national or personal [and] the sense of its political agency as enacted through a complex dialogue of history, body, voice, material contexts and reception” (Featherstone, 2005: 39). Although the Maori focus-group participants in my research did not have a bodily experience of slave history (certainly not in terms of the black Atlantic), many of them were able to draw on sensory memories, in connection with aural associations, with the trauma and legacy of colonisation (see section 8.5.).

Having outlined the relevant applications and shortcomings of postcolonial theory, I will now turn to a discussion of selected discourses involved in the struggle toward decolonisation in New Zealand.

4.6. Arena 7: De-colonisation

Following on from the arenas outlined in chapter three, this arena maps out key discourses involved in the process of cultural de-colonisation, specifically as they have been expressed in historical narratives and anti-colonial cultural forms. While I have separated arenas seven and eight from those discussed in chapter three, there is a complex system of overlap between the ‘bicultural’, ‘de-colonising’, and ‘tribal’ arenas. Historians writing during the 1980s and 1990s had varying degrees of access to the discourses of each of these arenas. Despite the temperament of revisionism that accompanied biculturalism, discourses of all arenas continue to be used as resources
during public debate.

As has been the case with other arenas, authors tend to reveal their discursive influences by the name they choose to describe the Wars. Apart from *The New Zealand Wars*, the range of possibilities have included; *The Maori Wars, The Land Wars, The Origins of the Maori Wars, The Strangest War, The Shadow of the Land*, and *The Anglo-Maori Wars*. Two authors drawing from discourses of the de-colonisation arena opt for names that suggest an oppositional interpretation: Simpson’s (1979) *Te Riri Pakeha - The White Man’s Anger* and Walker’s (1987) *Years of Anger*. Here, Walker refers to the Wars as “The Pakeha Land Wars”. (p.38).

The narratives of the ‘de-colonisation’ arena utilise a range of discursive strategies as a means of challenging Victorian histories in favour of a more didactic interpretation highlighting the past alienation of land and resources. This arena is distinguished by a far more political interpretation of the Wars, emphasising issues of colonial domination and the struggle for sovereignty (Walker, in Melbourne, 1995: 28). Another strategy of the de-colonisation arena is the connection of past injustices with the present socio-economic position of Maori, and contemporary Maori-Pakeha relations. Simpson reminds readers that “Maori people have been deliberately, over the course of a hundred years, stripped of power or influence, as a prelude to the loss of their land…the treasured belief that New Zealand is the most successful multiracial society in the world is a delusion” (1979: 257).

Both Simpson and Walker subvert past constructions of Maori, replacing them with more empowering images, such as the emphasis on Maori tactical skill in warfare. Walker (1987) focuses on the battles that Belich describes as overwhelming victories for Maori (Ohaeawai and Gate Pa) and accentuates British weakness. Aligning himself with Belich (1986), Walker emphasises Maori tactical skill and argues that they were not defeated outright. Despite being part-time warriors fighting against a numerically stronger army, Maori fought:
...at least to an honorable draw...Belich makes the interesting observation that in post mortems of British defeats many rationalisations were advanced...They even postulated that some renegade white man had taught them [Maori] the engineering skills necessary to construct such marvelous fortifications...But the real weakness of the British, says Belich, was their reluctance to concede that they were dealing with an intelligent foe who was their intellectual equal (Walker, 1987: 40).

4.6.1. Discourses of Maori Sovereignty

Political activism associated with issues of Maori sovereignty and self-determination has occurred to varying degrees, and has taken many forms, since the protests of Hone Heke and the unifying power of the King Movement during the nineteenth century. Anti-colonial discourses have existed in a marginal way throughout much of the twentieth century, being active amongst some communities, but remaining almost invisible to others. In tandem with the ‘Maori renaissance’ of the nineteen seventies and eighties, expressions of ‘Maori self-determination’ began to gain visibility, especially within the public sphere (Abel, 1997; Maaka & Fleras, 2005: 37). Contemporary discourses of Maori sovereignty have been influenced by the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, and the growing prominence of postcolonialism – especially in the nationalist terms posed by Fanon. Both global and local influences have contributed to the unique development of anti-colonial politics in New Zealand:

...the interest in postcolonialism is largely a product of the evolving politics of iwi, especially as these politics have increasingly moved beyond the specific cultural and economic concerns of iwi and have offered a community-focused option in a deregulated, monetarist-influenced economic context (Spoonley, 1995: 52).

Having recognised the influence of both global and local politics, settling on a definition of ‘Maori sovereignty’ is more difficult, as there is much diversity regarding the meaning of the term. Maaka and Fleras acknowledge this diversity by defining ‘tino rangatiratanga’ as “Maori self-determining autonomy” (2005: 22) and as “a multi-layered expression of Maori sovereignty over jurisdictions pertaining to land, identity, and political voice”
Maaka and Fleras propose a model of ‘Sovereignty/Self determination’ in which they discern several layers “with respect to indigeneity-Crown relations, including its expression at the level of state, nation, community and institutions”:

...at one end of the continuum are appeals to absolute sovereignty (statehood) with formal independence and control over internal and external jurisdictions...in between are models of de facto sovereignty, including ‘nationhood’ and ‘municipality’. De facto sovereignties do not entail any explicit separation...At the opposite pole are sovereignties in name only (‘nominal sovereignties’)…a ‘soft’ sovereign option with residual powers of decision-making autonomy within existing institutional frameworks or parallel structures (1997: 22).

Such a continuum is an appropriate way of representing the range of diversity within the concepts of Maori sovereignty and ‘tino rangatiratanga’. There is not one ‘Maori’ position nor one ‘Pakeha’ position regarding sovereignty, but a variety of discourses, ranging from “assertion of Maori sovereignty over the entire country...to the creation of separate Maori institutions...with arguments for constitutional-based power-sharing arrangements in between” (Maaka & Fleras, 1997: 25). There is also considerable disagreement as to which level such control should be applied - either at a national, local, iwi, hapu or individual level. While these different approaches represent various interpretations of ‘tino rangatiratanga’, Maaka and Fleras argue that the key principle of this term is self determination: “The single unifying aspiration under tino rangatiratanga is that of autonomy, that is the right to take control of their (Maori) destiny and resources through control of the decision making policy process” (1997: 29).

While Awatere’s view of sovereignty represents an extreme position, her book *Maori Sovereignty* (1984), provides examples of discourses that continue to be expressed in the twenty-first century. Awatere maintains a binary opposition between Maori and ‘white’ people, and supports this by referring to ‘white hatred’ of Maori. According to Awatere, ‘Colonial Maori’ are problematic because “these are Maori with too much ‘white’ in their
lives. It could be a white parent, white partner, respectability in the white world” (1984: 83). After basing much of her argument on the genetic characteristic of ‘white skin’, Awatere attempts to deny the genetic basis of her argument: “white blood is not the problem. White culture is the problem” (p.86). This is a self-defeating argument, based on the essentialist presumption that culture can be reduced to intrinsic units, demarcated by skin colour. The irony is that while Awatere’s aim was to point out the evils of colonial ‘attitudes’ toward Maori, she applied Victorian discourses of eugenics and scientific racism to ‘white’ people. However this may have been more complex than a simple inversion of racial discourse. During the time in which Awatere was most aggressively seeking Maori sovereignty, her de-colonising strategy could be described as a localised form of ‘Fanonism’. In Black Skin, White Masks (1952), Fanon tactically emphasised ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ as physical markers with very real social consequences, while also suggesting their use as tools of resistance: “In the white world, the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity” (p.110).

Awatere has since become an advocate for neo-liberal politics. Her conceptualisation of Maori self-determination is now substantially based on the right of Maori to determine their financial destiny without the intervention of the State. Such a view “neatly dovetails with Douglas’ preference for unbridled individual responsibility” (Williams, 1997: 35).\(^8\) Reacting against monoculturalism and colonial paternalism, Awatere (1995) expresses a desire to assert Maori self-sufficiency: “Roger Douglas is one of those who believed that Maori could do it for themselves...we changed to that whole process of devolution because he believes that ordinary people hold within their hands the solutions to their own problems” (p.181). Here, the discourse of Maori self-determination is combined with neo-liberalism to create a new discourse, which remains influential within the political arena. This discourse is frequently elicited by politicians to gain support for the dismantling of the welfare system and to encourage a capitalist ethos of individual responsibility (Brash: 2004). Spoonley (1996) describes the unfortunate paradox of this
Major policy documents...in the late 1980s signalled the intention of continuing to reform the public service to encourage Maori economic independence...Significantly, the ambition of iwi and urban Maori, and to some extent the government, to see that Maori do gain a measure of economic independence has been contradicted by the loss of paid employment and the difficulty for Maori...of obtaining employment in a deregulated labour market that has suffered major losses in those sectors and industries which have been traditional employers of Maori (p.74).

These diverse positions of Maori sovereignty suggest that the reduction of this issue to a Maori/Pakeha binary is problematic, as it promotes the idea that there is only one Maori position and only one Pakeha position.

Arena seven is represented here as a collection of discourses that are expressed as a means of challenging colonialism and promoting Maori self determination. These discourses have often been strategically deployed in the form of anti-colonial histories, as a means of drawing attention to the injustices associated with colonialism, and promoting the struggle for Maori sovereignty. As noted, there is a complex overlap between the discourses of arena seven, and those of arena eight, so that anti-colonial histories and cultural forms often draw from the discourses of both arenas.

4.7. Arena 8: Discourses of Maori and Tribal Identity

In contrast to the discourses of other arenas, which have tended to predominate over a specific time period, tribal discourses have existed on the margins of New Zealand society. Despite their marginal status, tribal narratives continue to be a vital means of transmitting memory across generations, where they are often considered to be a way of continuing or preserving cultural tradition. But these narratives do not maintain a fixed, authentic structure over time. Rather, they are organic formations that bear ‘traces’ of the past. Pere (1991: 30) has outlined changes in method, form, access, and influence in tribal histories spanning the past 150 years. In the
contemporary period, tribal histories are fraught with several tensions, many of which involve issues of national and cultural identity, power and access.

Hall’s theorisation on global/local identity politics provides a backdrop for interpreting the multiplicity of identity formations that pull Maori subjectivities in many directions. Hall (1996d) argues that globalisation:

…makes it possible for us all to address those issues from within the local specificities of our own cultural situations. Here, too, we find not a rupture between the local and the global, but new local/global re-articulations…The destruction of centres, the dissemination of centres that is going on, opens a conversation between spaces…globalization must never be read as a simple process of homogenization; it is always an articulation of the local, of the specific and the global. Therefore, there will always be specificities of – voices, of positioning, of identity, of cultural traditions, of histories, and these are the conditions of enunciation which enable us to speak (p.407).

This global/local dichotomy can be seen as part of a contestatory ‘identity crisis’ in New Zealand, whereby some Maori express the importance of defining ‘Maoriness’ or a Maori identity, while others identify primarily with the entity of the iwi, hapu or whanau (Maaka & Fleras, 2005: 65-95). Many Maori identity themselves in relation to their status as ‘tangata whenua’, or people of the land, and all of these identifications are further complicated, and enriched, by various interpretations of a ‘hybrid’ Maori-Pakeha identity (Bell, 2004). Rangihau points out his preference for a localised ‘tribal’ identity over a national ‘Maori’ identity:

My being Maori is absolutely dependent on my history as a Tuhoe person as against being a Maori person. It seems to me there is no such thing as Maoritanga because Maoritanga is an all inclusive term that embraces all Maoris. And there are so many aspects about every tribal person. Each tribe has its own history. And it is not a history that can be shared among others (Rangihau, as quoted in Pere, 1991: 30-31).

Just as identity can be conceived of in terms of national, trans-national or local configurations, this also applies to conceptions of history. Western historians have been criticised for the tendency to interpret history through a
Euro-centric framework, which does not account for ethnic diversity. While there is increasing acceptance of indigenous approaches toward the past, there is also a tension between conceiving of indigenous history as ‘Maori’ history or ‘tribal’ history, which derives from the wider issue of Maori or tribal identity:

Much of the controversy revolves around the dichotomous situation of defining tino rangatiratanga in terms of Maori rights or in terms of tribal first nations rights...there are two ethnicities, namely, a tribal ethnicity and an all inclusive Maori ethnicity. What needs to be kept in mind when considering tino rangatiratanga...is that the two ethnicities co-exist symbiotically and in a state of tension with each other (Maaka & Fleras, 1997: 34).

This ‘ethnicity’ issue is further complicated by political tensions between iwi and ‘urban’ Maori, and the activism of pan-Maori organisations. One argument is that the unification of Maori tribal identities towards a collective ‘Maori’ identity creates a more powerful counter-hegemonic resistance. Pearson (1996) points out that “the Treaty often provoked a binary opposition between the Crown and Maori that fostered greater unity, but the [Waitangi] tribunal reinvigorated hapu and iwi competition” (p.262). With regard to Treaty settlements, the privileging of iwi identity over Maori identity has provoked divisions, competition and the fragmentation of collective power (Byrnes, 2004, Maaka & Fleras, 2005). According to Pere (1991), the dismantling of tribal identity is a Pakeha ploy to erode the power derived from traditional tribal structures:

Maoritanga is a term coined by the Pakeha to bring the tribes together. Because if you cannot divide and rule, then for tribal people all you can do is unite them and rule. Because then they lose everything by losing there own tribal histories and traditions that give them their identity...before 1970 many Maori did not view themselves as a separate nation...tribal organisation provided a stronger basis of loyalty and a rudimentary sense of nationhood than their identity as Maori...I suspect that Maori history is a nineteenth century concept instituted by ethnocentric Europeans to be used as a means of convenience and expediency totally ignoring the importance of tribal ancestry (p.31).
Although Pere is arguing here against the notion of an essentialised category that would reduce all Maori to one identity, this view also suggests the desire to retain traditional aspects of tribal identity, and as such it can be interpreted as part of a quest for authenticity. But tribal histories have both an authentic and a hybrid dimension. It is possible to define Maori tribal history on the basis of a set of traditions that continue to be upheld, but are now often used in an organic way, in conjunction with western methods of documentation.

Maori tribal histories (which may be better referred to as memory formations) have been transmitted primarily by oral, aural, bodily and visual-material modes. These memory formations, which take the form of; whakatauki, whakapapa, karanga, waiata, haka, ta-moko and tekoteko (refer to glossary), have been passed down from one generation to the next through “selected repositories of the whanau, hapu, or iwi” (Pere, 1991: 30).

4.7.1. Access to Tribal Histories

Soutar (1996) has devised a model to illustrate the factors that determine the degree of access a historian will have to historical source material. In Aotearoa New Zealand, according to Soutar’s model, the main determinants are; ‘race’, tribal membership, genealogical connections, cultural background, knowledge of the Maori language, age, gender and a “sincere interest and an attentive ear” (pp.44-47). Accordingly, young historians who are non-Maori, and with little knowledge of Maori language have a number of obstacles to overcome before gaining access to tribal histories. However, there are also many Maori who have limited access to tribal histories. Due to alienation from land and resources and migration from rural to urban areas, there are now many Maori who are geographically or socially removed from tribal affiliations and traditions, and who do not speak te reo. For these people, history is what they are taught from school textbooks, rather than told by family members. These diverse experiences complicate and enrich the constellation of discursive resources, memory dialects and idiolects that
can be associated with arena eight.

Public access to tribal histories is constrained by the above determinants, as well as the fact that while many tribal histories exist in the forms mentioned above, few have been documented in writing. However, in the decade prior to 1996 there was a significant increase in the publication of tribal histories, mostly written within an academic context (Soutar, 1996, 43). Despite this recent textualisation of tribal histories, there appears to be a tension between the desire to document tribal knowledges for public use, or to retain histories within oral forms so that they cannot be misused (either by other tribes or by Pakeha). According to Soutar, historical knowledge was often regarded as a form of power. As such, tribal histories needed to be closely protected so that they did not fall into the enemy’s hands. There was value placed in “retaining some knowledge for one’s personal reserve...This reservation of giving out too much information stems from the cultural belief that by so doing, one is giving away part of their own mauri or ‘life force’” (Soutar, 1996: 46). While this view of historical knowledge derives from tradition, it has continued to be an influential discourse, which helps to explain the marginal status of tribal histories.¹¹

Historians who document tribal histories are faced with the dilemma of either choosing the most authentic scholarly version, or presenting a multiplicity of contradictory stories (and thus following either postcolonial or postmodern approaches toward history). Few historians trained in the Western, empiricist tradition are willing to do this, as it is still deemed to be important to locate a singular truth, and present it as such (Megill, 1995). In 7NZW, Belich and Stephens have incorporated tribal histories, but public response to the series indicates that members of some tribes are unhappy that the stories of competing tribes have been privileged, while their own versions have not been included. This reaction has stimulated the public ‘surfacing’ of a variety of tribal histories that contest elements of Belich’s narrative.¹²
4.7.2. Predominant Discourses of Tribal Histories

Of the tribal histories that have been documented in New Zealand, many are genealogical histories, and there are few that provide detail about the New Zealand Wars. One story that does is the article *Heke’s War In The North* (1956), written by Tawai Kawiti, who for the first time documented a story that was passed down, initially by his ancestor, Kawiti (a chief featured in Episode One of *TNZW*) revealing a Ngapuhi interpretation of the Northern War. The history of the King Movement is also well documented in *Te Kingitanga* (1996), and *Kingitanga: the oral diaries of Potatau Te Wherowhero* (2001), by Mitaki Ra.

As mentioned, the predominant discourses of the ‘tribal’ arena tend to overlap with those of the ‘de-colonisation’ arena. However, while access to the discourses of the ‘de-colonisation’ arena tends to be limited by familiarity with political and postcolonial theory, access to the discourses of the tribal arena is restricted by the use of culturally specific concepts, (where there is often no adequate translation in the English language) and the emphasis on spiritual dimensions, that appear to defy simple explanation. Tawai Kawiti refers to the breaking of tapu on the battlefield. Because Hone Heke had removed an object from a dead soldier, he became ‘noa’ (Kawiti, 1956). Concepts such as ‘tapu’ and ‘noa’ are imbued with culturally specific meanings that cannot be easily explained or translated into another language. The frequent use of these concepts is a distinctive aspect of tribal discourse. Kawiti (1956) describes how during the war at Ruapekapeka:

...great reliance was again placed on the tohunga who needed to be of Ariki descent. His was the office of foretelling the future, of expounding the tapu laws and seeing that they were kept, breaking down enemy resistance by incantations, curing the sick and giving succour to the wounded. Before battle, he had to render fighting men immune to the evil effect of the opposite priest’s incantations (p.42).

Although this spiritual dimension (which can be discussed in relation to the concept ‘Te Ao Marama’)$^{13}$ may appear incomprehensible from a non-Maori perspective.
perspective, this is an influential discourse for many Maori, and appears to challenge, and become hybridised, due to the influence of Christianity.

Just as Victorian interpretations of the New Zealand Wars emphasise the bravery of the militia, many tribal histories tend to extol the courageous actions of their ancestors by focusing on the battles that were considered to be victories for their tribe. Kawiti (1956) documents a great deal of detail regarding the construction of the pa at Ruapekapeka (some of which Belich has used to support his ‘trench warfare’ argument – see chapter 7). His interpretation of the battle at Ohaeawai includes elements that were not mentioned in the Victorian interpretation:

It is said that the Maoris had managed to obtain a Union Jack by creeping through the bush and stealing it. The Officer seeing it in the pa, flying below the Maori flag, lost his head and ordered his men to charge. That was exactly what the Maoris in the pa wanted to happen. Pene Taui’s pa had withstood the heavy bombardment of the British artillery and the defenders had repelled the soldiers’ onslaughts, striking back with devastating result (p.41).

While describing this battle as a cunning and tactical victory for his ancestor’s faction of the Ngapuhi tribe, Kawiti also discredits the actions of the British militia. Although he does not discount the validity of the Victorian interpretation, Kawiti criticises the lack of detail and the incomplete nature of written accounts about this war, adding that stories which lack detail “cannot be relied upon” (Kawiti, 1956: 45). This is an interesting perspective, because within Western historiography, it is more often the oral forms of history that have been considered to be unreliable.

Arena eight incorporates discourses associated with Maori and tribal identity, including those discourses that express the tension between these different identities. In New Zealand, tribal histories have been marginalized in relation to academic and officially recognized histories, however they have transited through time and across generations via technologies of cultural memory. The discourses of arena eight (such as that of Te Ao Marama) are entangled with culturally specific meanings, memory dialects and idiolects, all of which
are of limited access to many Pakeha and Maori. As with arena seven, the
discursive and memory formations of arena eight have been influential to the
production, construction and reception of TNZW, where they have served as
resources for a resistance to colonial discourse.

4.8 Modes of Resistance to Colonial Discourse

Within some earlier strands of postcolonial theory, revolutionary violence is
endorsed as one of the few modes of resistance to colonial oppression. This
early metropolitan strand of postcolonial theory has influenced New Zealand
anti-colonial activists, perhaps more so than other postcolonial theories of
recent postcolonial theorists have formulated alternative strategies of
resistance, such as that of cultural hybridity (Bhabha, 1994, 1996). But in
New Zealand, resistance to the postcolonial concept of cultural hybridity has
been expressed by various Maori and Pakeha commentators (Rika-Heke,
1997: 177, Smith, 1999: 97). One reason for this is that the term ‘hybridity’
has strong associations with negative terms such as ‘assimilation’, ‘half-
caste’ and ‘miscegenation’. Bell (2004) argues that:

…the particularities of cultural identity politics in Aotearoa New
Zealand makes the wide acceptance of hybrid identities difficult. Two
factors in particular are noted. First, hybridity has a long association
with Pakeha desires for Maori to assimilate to Pakeha culture. Many
Maori, consequently treat its popularity with some suspicion. Second,
the rhetoric of biculturalism with its positing of two distinct cultures,
cannot easily accommodate hybrid, Maori and Pakeha, identities
(p.121).

In addition to these reasons, the term cultural hybridity tends to be utilised in
opposition to the idea of cultural authenticity. As already indicated, a number
of anti-colonial activists in New Zealand have been drawn to the ‘cult of
authenticity’ as a strategic means of resistance against colonial oppression.

4.8.1 Authenticity: ‘Mythic Imposition’, ‘Cult’ and ‘Strategy’.

In New Zealand, cultural authenticity has been adopted for different reasons
and has taken many forms. It has been imposed, mythologised, desired,
resurrected, reconstructed and resented. While early settlers to New Zealand described Maori as ‘natives’ and ‘savages’, the modern equivalent of such definitions has become the term ‘authentic’, which has been described as an act of “liberal, discursive violence” (Griffiths, 1995: 238).

Within postcolonial theory, the ‘myth of authenticity’ refers to that which has been imposed by the coloniser in order to define the colonised. The myth of authenticity has been constructed and perpetuated through colonial discourse and has commonly taken the form of cultural representations of the indigenous as authentic or exotic. Images of the exoticised are constructed by the layering of a series of cultural and racial characteristics that serve to differentiate the ‘Other’ from the coloniser (Blythe, 1994: 22). Such mythologisation reinforces binary differences, in turn functioning to promote an image of the European as that which the ‘indigene’ is not - enlightened, rational and civilised. Said (1978) describes this binary function of the ‘exoticised Other’: “…for nineteenth century Europe an imposing edifice of learning and culture was built, so to speak, in the face of actual outsiders (the colonies, the poor, the delinquent), whose role in the culture was to give definition to what they were constitutionally unsuited for.” (p.62).

The danger of these mythical representations lies in their naturalisation, and their consequent performative reification.

Another problem is that the ‘myth of authenticity’ denies the processes of history and disavows the injustices that have occurred due to colonisation. The myth presumes that what must be (or should be) important to Maori today has changed little from the traditional values which were important in pre-colonial times. Therefore it does not consider the possibility that Maori may undergo a simultaneous process of articulating the ‘postmodern’, the ‘modern’ and the ‘pre-modern’ (Morley, 1996: 327-328). The myth of authenticity ignores the potential agency generated from hybridity and ambivalence. Its reduction of differences to binary oppositions has the effect of “overwriting the actual complexity of difference” (Griffiths, 1995: 237).
Another form of authenticity is that of a quest to return to an authentic way of life, or to project an authentic sense of cultural identity. Hall (1996a) describes this quest for authenticity in relation to colonisation, as a process:

...whose negative effects provided the foundation of anti-colonial political mobilisation, and provoked the attempt to recover an alternative set of cultural origins not contaminated by the colonising experience...in terms of any absolute return to a pure set of uncontaminated origins, the long-term historical and cultural effects of the ‘transculturation’ which characterised the colonising experience proved, in my view, to be irreversible (pp.246-247).

While this approach may insure the preservation of oral traditions and self-control of representations of indigenous people, it runs the danger of becoming a self-contained view of cultural purity, thus denying access to the ‘non-indigenous’ and erecting barriers that might obstruct constructive dialogue.\textsuperscript{16} Brydon (1995) discusses the problems with this phenomenon, which she calls the ‘cult of authenticity’:

> Although I can sympathise with such arguments as tactical strategies in insisting on self definition and resisting appropriation, even tactically they prove self-defeating because they depend on a view of cultural authenticity that condemns them to a continued marginality and an eventual death. Whose interests are served by this retreat into preserving an untainted authenticity? Not the native groups seeking land rights and political power. Ironically, such tactics encourage native peoples to isolate themselves from contemporary life and full citizenship (p.141).

In an attempt to pin down the problematic nature of authenticity, it is important to consider the meaning of the term ‘indigeneity’ with regards to its diametric status to the terms ‘immigrant, settler or non-native’. In contrast to the latter terms, ‘indigeneity’ connotes ideas of ‘uncontaminated purity’, and when used in this context, this term can lead to a form of ‘incarceration’, that confines indigenous people to well-defined geographical boundaries (Mohanram, 1995). Increasing transience and global communication has precipitated a sense of anxiety around issues of authenticity. According to Appadurai (as cited in Mohanram, 1995), another problem with the ‘cult of authenticity’ is that it relies on the idealistic presumption that indigenous peoples represent themselves and their past, without distortion. This
premise gives rise to a discriminatory ‘rule’ about who has the authority to speak about or critique issues concerned with indigeneity. The term ‘tino rangatiratanga’ has been interpreted to imply that only Maori have such authority. Following this interpretation, it becomes very difficult for non-Maori to engage in public dialogue or debate about a range of issues.17 The discursive weight of this issue is discussed in chapter eight, in relation to Maori responses to Belich, as a Pakeha presenter of ‘Maori history’.

4.8.2 Cultural Hybridity

While it is possible to locate initial notions of hybridity as offshoots of colonial discourse, more contemporary conceptions of hybridity can be found in the discourse of anti-colonial theorists.18 The term ‘hybridity’ has been used as a way of describing the merging of; races (within the discourse of scientific racism), of languages and of cultural identities. However, this thesis is more concerned with the ‘cultural politics of hybridity’, especially as it has been developed by Bhabha (1994a, 1996).

Bakhtin’s theory of linguistic hybridity has provided the foundations for Bhabha’s reconceptualisation of hybridity as a strategy of anti-colonial resistance. Bhabha describes Bakhtin’s definition of the hybrid as “engendering a new speech act” (1996: 58). For Bakhtin (1981), the hybrid is:

…not only double-voiced and double-accented…but is also double-languaged; for in it there are not only (and not even so much) two individual consciousnesses, two voices, two accents, as there are (doublings of) socio-linguistic, consciousnesses, two epochs…that come together and consciously fight it out on the territory of the utterance…It is the collision between differing points of view on the world that are embedded in these forms (p.360).

For Bakhtin, the significance of the double-voiced hybrid is its contestatory nature. It is in the ‘unmasking’ of one voice by another that authoritative discourse becomes undone. While Bakhtin is concerned with the dialogising potential of language to undermine authority, Bhabha (1996) transfers the
basis of linguistic hibridity into cultural hybridity, thus describing the dialogic process of colonial authority:

Strategies of hybridisation reveal an estranging movement in the authoritative, even authoritarian inscription of the cultural sign. At the point at which the precept attempts to objectify itself as a generalized knowledge, or a normalizing, hegemonic practice, the hybrid space or discourse opens up a space of negotiation where power is unequal but its articulation may be equivocal. Such negotiation is neither assimilation nor collaboration. It makes possible the emergence of an ‘interstitial’ agency that refuses the binary representation of social antagonism (p.58).

Bhabha points to a process in which different cultural discourses are brought together, thus opening up a ‘space in-between’. This is an interstitial, creative space of alterity and struggle – in which differing world-views are negotiated. This space generates a hybridising process that results in the formation of new cultural identities. While it is possible to imagine such a process as a constant experience for any person negotiating difference through communication, Bhabha’s concern is with the particular hybridising process experienced by the subjects of colonisation, and by diasporic communities. For it is in the experience of being uprooted or de-centered from the homeland, that people are forced to negotiate often conflicting versions of identity. In New Zealand, this particular version of hybridity is relevant to the way in which Maori have been forced, through colonisation, to negotiate the intersection of opposing discourses (such as those associated with nation, sovereignty, land, orality, memory and history). In this sense, hybrid identities are formed through the articulation of diverging cultural perspectives.\textsuperscript{19} While hybridity is described as an outcome of colonisation, Bhabha (1994) posits an important outcome of hybridity as the deconstruction of colonial power. He notes that “hybridity is a problematic of colonial representation and individuation that reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other ‘denied’ knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority” (p.114). Young (1995) explains this process, whereby “hybridity becomes the moment in which the discourse of colonial authority loses its univocal grip on meaning
and finds itself open to the trace of the language of the other, enabling the
critic to trace complex movements of disarming alterity in the colonial text”
(p.22). This sense of hybridity as a strategy of unmasking and estranging the
authority of colonial discourse is applicable to the situation in New Zealand,
where the ongoing struggle toward de-colonisation can be observed in
terms of shifts and ebbs in the power dynamic between colonial authority
and anti-colonial resistance. For Bhabha, the resistance implied by the
concept of hybridity is brought about partly due to the presence of colonial
authority. Like Debord’s (1956) concept of ‘detournement’, mimicry
emphasises the creativity of expressions of resistance which turn the tools of
oppression back onto the oppressor: “Mimicry marks those moments of civil
disobedience within the discipline of civility: signs of spectacular resistance.
When the words of the master become the site of hybridity” (Bhabha, as
cited in Young, 1990: 149).

According to Bhabha (1996), hybrid identities utilise cultural resources as a
means of negotiating competing versions of history and memory:

Hybrid agencies…deploy the partial culture from which they emerge
to construct visions of community, and versions of historic memory,
that give narrative form to the minority positions they occupy; the
outside of the inside: the part in the whole (p.58).

As indicated here, cultural hybridity is related in important ways to the
concept of cultural memory, and the combined use of these concepts may
provide a complementary framework from which to explore strategies of
resistance to colonial discourse.

4.8.3 Cultural Memory

Postcolonial historiography has to develop methods of dealing with
memory performances and their textless histories (Featherstone,

If postcolonialism is to have pragmatic outcomes, it is necessary not only to
unmask the ideological construction of colonial discourse, but to reconstitute
alternative histories that play a performative role in building the discursive repertoires and memory corpuses with which sub-altern and indigenous peoples may access. However some of the more pessimistic theorists of postcolonialism have argued that, despite this ideal to reconstitute a postcolonialist take on histories, it is not possible to escape the “enmeshments of colonialist historiography and ‘narrativity’” (Featherstone, 2005: 168). For instance, Chakrabarty (1992) points out that:

So long as one operates within the discourse of ‘history’ produced at the institutional site of the university, it is not possible simply to walk out of the deep collusion between ‘history’ and the modernizing narrative(s) of citizenship, bourgeois public and private, and the nation state. ‘History’ as a knowledge system is firmly embedded in institutional practices that invoke the nation state at every step (p.19).

This is an important point, which alludes to the problematic concentration of postcolonialism in the discipline of literary studies and within the institutional paradigm of the academy. But this does not enclose the possibility of reconstituting histories that move beyond the institutional and theoretical parameters of nation, history, or the academy. And it is possible for participants of such an activity to do so either from within, or from outside the academy, especially via those liminal positionalities fuelled by processes of cultural hybridity and affective memory. Featherston (2005) argues that, “any attempt to reconstitute the history of the colonized requires not only a questioning of history’s subjects, but also a questioning of the methods and audiences of its narration” (pp.167-168).

Relating this idea to TNZW, this process of reconstituting history can be understood in terms of an approach toward television documentary as a “technology of memory”, and the intention to direct a revisionist history toward previously marginalised audience members. Rather than communicating this history as a written text (as was originally done by Belich), the choice of an audio-visual, ‘popular’ method of transmitting history has opened up a number of alternatives in terms of both textual construction and reception. These alternatives include the potential of audio-visual media to utilise creative and innovative techniques for the transmission
of memory. Through its creative use of memory technologies, TNZW can be interpreted as a catalyst for previously marginalised audiences, thus sparking their access to discursive and memory resources (see chapters seven and eight). In the following chapters, my tripartite analysis of TNZW illustrates how:

...memory and orality can and do work in dialogue with written evidence, expanding and challenging the materials and practices of conventional history, and acting as an alternative version of those critiques of colonialist discourse initiated by Edward Said and Homi Bhabha. The emphasis upon memory as a performative practice may include a range of material and oral resources that can broaden postcolonial studies’ textual emphasis to include other ways of framing historical narrative (Featherstone, 2005: 172).

4.9. Conclusion

One function of this chapter has been to complete the map of discourses that was established in chapter three, which form the basis of my interpretive framework for the following analysis of TNZW. Arenas seven and eight are more effectively outlined here, where they have been discussed in relation to theories that offer strategies of resistance to colonialism.

This chapter has demonstrated how the concept of postcolonialism has generated much debate. Many of the critics of postcolonialism have abandoned the possibility of retrieving any theoretical or pragmatic value in such an abstract, and apparently universal, concept. Its application to local indigenous communities does highlight important dis-locations, most relevantly in terms of the specificities of indigenous experiences, and in terms of the postcolonial emphasis on literary texts, at the expense of considering orality and aurality as significant modes of transmitting memory and articulating agency. The tribal histories discussed here illstrate the unsuitability of postcolonial theory as a means of studying the ‘textless’ nature of these histories. They also point toward cultural memory as a useful theory for exploring the significance of this textless transmission of memory.

Despite these shortcomings, postcolonialism offers useful theories that engage with issues of agency, identity and resistance. Those most useful to
this thesis are Said’s emphasis upon the discursive and performative construction of colonialism and Bhabha’s theories of cultural hybridity and mimicry. Within the context of New Zealand discourses of anti-colonialism and Maori self-determination, the term ‘hybridity’ has been regarded with much suspicion, and consequently has not been actively adopted as a strategy of anti-colonial resistance. However, I argue that Bhabha’s development of cultural hybridity, together with his concept of the ‘space in-between’ offer an abstract model with which to understand the opening-up of creative spaces of resistance.

Cultural hybridity and cultural memory are drawn together here, to form a framework from which to explore strategies of resistance to colonial discourse. Having established the complementary relation of these key theories, the next step is to navigate the possibilities of television documentary, in terms of its use as a technology of cultural memory, and to explore the potential of this site to transmit memory and spark resistance. These issues are discussed in the following chapter.
Endnotes

1 The Waitangi Tribunal was set up in 1975 as a means of gaining recognition for colonial injustices brought upon Maori. The Tribunal is responsible for settling claims for financial restitution, based on the dispossession of land, resources and culture (for a more detailed explanation, see Byrnes, 2004).

2 For instance; Awatere, (1984), Walker (1995), and the political protests of Dun Mihaka, such as baring his buttocks (‘Whakapohane’) at Queen Elizabeth II (1983) and the Bastion Point Occupation (1977-78).


4 In the context of Maori indigenous political strategy, Meredith (2001) argues that “‘Essentialist frameworks’ have been and will continue to be employed as a strategic movement in creating certain spaces of resistance against immutable colonial elements, and as an immediate and simplified solution to making sense of cultural representations and practices” (p.58).

5 This ‘cult of authenticity’ is understood as both performative (Butler, 2004), and as a mode or resistance – both of which relate to the ‘myth of authenticity’, as it has been imposed on colonised peoples as part of the broader process of cultural colonisation (see Griffiths, 1995: 238).

6 Scheuneman (1996) argues that while Ong’s theory of orality and literacy has been very useful, it “supports a conception of cultural progress that fails to transgress the alternative of orality and literacy...While initially it seemed to be apt to discuss oral culture in terms of aural experience, and written and print culture in terms of communication through visual signs, it appears that modern media productions cannot be described in terms of a one-dimensional quality or a single-sense experience” (p.81).

7 Examples of Maori activism range from Hone Heke cutting down the British Flag pole during the Northern War (Belich, 1986), an act that has been mimiced in the twentieth century, Maori protesters cutting down the tree at ‘One Tree Hill’, Dun Mihaka bearing his buttocks during a visit from Queen Elizabeth II, public burning of the New Zealand flag, examples of the detournement of public signifiers of colonialism.

8 Roger Douglas (finance minister of David Lange’s Labour government) was the chief architect of 1980s neo-liberalism. Douglas became so well known for his role in restructuring economic policy, that his particular (neo-liberal) version of economic policy became colloquially known as ‘Rogernomics’.

9 There has been considerable tension between those who represent ‘urban Maori’ and those who argue that claims and settlements of the Waitangi tribunal must be entirely based on tribal self-determination of their own assets in their own territory. Two urban authorities; Te Whanau O Waipareira and Manukau Urban Maori Authority (MUMA), are concerned for the welfare of Maori living in the city - “Maori who, because of their distance from their ancestral base, are unable to play an active part in their tribal community and fear that they will not share in the benefits of the Settlement because of that remoteness”. The friction between urban Maori and iwi Maori was a source of bitter debate during the Fisheries Settlement, and there continues to be fierce competition between these opposing discourses. (Maaka & Fleras, 1997: 33, 2005: 65-95).

10 For some tribes, the oldest male or female was responsible for passing on historical knowledge. However, members of the tribe could be specially selected for this purpose. In many areas, histories continue to be passed down in this manner. “Whakapapa (genealogical connections) determines which members of the tribe are privy to historical records...Descent from the families who have been the repositories of history within the tribe
increases one’s right to continue the role” (Soutar, 1996: 44).

11 Historians, such as Belich, may be criticised for relying too heavily on colonial sources, and not utilising tribal sources. However, there are a number of difficulties with doing so. Apart from issues of access and trust, there are competing versions between tribes, and tribal informants inevitably have their own agenda for passing on information (Soutar, 1996: 44).

12 For an example of such a public ‘surfacing’ of tribal histories, see the letter to The Daily News, written by Houston (1998) (see CD in appendix 2 for a collection of these public responses to TNZW).

13 The term ‘Te Ao Marama’ is a ‘world view’ based on “traditional concepts handed down through the generations” (Royal, 1998: 2). According to Royal (as cited in Mahuika, 2006: 5), ‘Te Ao Marama’ is a “paradigm of understanding that encapsulates a specific world view built around a spiritual relationship to the environment, and is a clearly separate body of knowledge from Western and non-Maori epistemologies”.

14 According to Tau (2001) “this uniquely Maori body of knowledge…can never be fully grasped of understood ‘without a firm understanding of the language’” (Tau, 2001: 68, as cited in Mahuika, 2006: 5).

15 A number of syncretic religious, and spiritual belief systems have been documented as hybrid formations of Maori and Pakeha spiritual beliefs. For example, ‘Pai Marire’ (also known as ‘Hauhauism’) and the ‘Ringatu’ (Belich, 1986). There have also been more contemporary forms of syncretism, such as that of Rastafarian and Maori philosophies.

16 For another critique of cultural authenticity, see Appiah (2006).

17 Spivak (1987) provides a logical counter-argument: “Can men theorize feminism, can whites theorize racism, can the bourgeois theorize revolution and so on. It is when only the former groups theorize that the situation is politically intolerable. Therefore, it is crucial that members of these groups are kept vigilant about their assigned subject positions…Whatever the advisability of attempting to ‘identify’ (with) the other as subject in order to know her, knowledge is made possible and is sustained by irreducible difference, not identity. What is known is always in excess of knowledge. Knowledge is never adequate to its object” (pp.253-254).

18 Hybridity was initially part of the domain of colonial racial discourse, signified by the concern of anthropologists to define human ‘races’ as species. Social Darwinism and eugenics adapted evolutionary theory to ideas of racial supremacy and the extinction of the races. There was much anxiety over the threat of the formation of hybrid ‘races’, which were described as perverse and degenerative. A comprehensive discussion of these aspects can be found in Young (1995:1-28).

19 It is not only Maori who have experienced this process of hybridisation. Immigrant populations, including those of the colonisers, have experienced hybridity in quite different ways. There is a constant process of negotiating cultural traditions of ‘the homeland’ with the national ‘we’ - as constructed by banal nationalism (Billig, 1995). This process results in ambivalence toward both homeland, and the possibility of New Zealand as ‘home’ (Roscoe, 1999).
CHAPTER 5: Television, Documentary and the Public Sphere

What I am calling political mimicry has to do with the production of affect in and through the conventionalized imagery of struggle: bloodied bodies, marching throngs, angry police. But clearly such imagery will have no resonance without politics, the politics that has been theorized as consciousness…(Gaines, 1999: 92).

5.1. Introduction

In the above quotation, Gaines explains her use of the phrase ‘political mimesis’ in relation to imagery that has become conventionalized through documentary representations of violent struggle. I have used this extract to introduce the prospect that the immediacy and visceral qualities of impassioned struggle can (within certain contexts) be mediated in such a way as to incite or revive embodied impulses toward political action.¹

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the possibilities and limitations of television documentary with regard to the distinctive characteristics of television as a medium of public address, and of documentary as a creative genre. This discussion supports my developing argument that these characteristics enable television documentary to function not only as a site of public debate, but also as a potentially innovative technology of cultural memory.

In order to situate television documentary as a site from which to provoke public debate, I begin by comparing two different approaches toward the public sphere, both of which can be seen to frame the emergence of concepts such as ‘counter-publics’, ‘citizen viewers’ and ‘social imaginaries’. These concepts allow room for exploring the multiplicity and agency of audiences, as active members of society.

This chapter serves as a necessary link between the earlier theoretical and discursive framework and the following tripartite analysis of TNZW. This series provides a case study that can shed light on the possibilities of
documentary in relation to nation-building, historical narrative and cultural memory. It is not the objective of this chapter to provide and exhaustive survey of debates about television, documentary or the public sphere. Rather, this chapter is intended as a platform of theoretical reference points associated with these areas of scholarship, which will help to support the following analysis of *TNZW*.

5.2. Theorising the Public Sphere

Drawing on Hegelian and Marxist social theory, Habermas argued that it was necessary to theorise a perspective that would extend upon the economic reductionist focus of Marx, allowing for a broader understanding of the public sphere that would include social and cultural perspectives. According to Calhoun (1992) the key aspects of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere lie in a “two-sided constitution of the category of the public sphere as simultaneously about the quality or form of rational-critical discourse and the quantity of, or openness to, popular participation” (p.4). Both sides of this constitution provide a theoretical context for discussions about the role of television documentary in provoking public debate.

Aiming to recover an apparently modernist, and utopian conviction in the beneficent capacity of reasoned argument, Habermas proposed that the power of reason would enable full participation in the public sphere, regardless of one’s social, cultural or economic position. Reasoned argument was considered to be necessary in order to bring about a form of rational consensus. However, Habermas has been criticised for proposing an overly idealistic scenario of equal access to the public sphere. According to Seidman (1994)

The logic of rational consciousness or a consensus shaped by the force of the reasons advanced is unthinkable without assuming a social condition in which discourse is open to all individuals who are not constrained by lack of resources or fear of repercussions in contesting validity claims and therefore power hierarchies....Rational consensus presupposes what Habermas called an ‘ideal speech
situation’, a social condition in which the parties to public discourse are in a situation of equality and autonomy (p.178).

Foucault’s (1984) concept of the ‘order of discourse’ clearly challenges Habermas’ view of the emancipatory potential of the public sphere, as based on an ‘ideal speech situation’ (see section 1.2.). Apart from this idealism, his theories appear outdated when considering them in the context of contemporary social and cultural relations, new media, and the economic structural dynamics of capitalist society. Eley (1992: 293-294) argues that the ideals of Habermas are unattainable in the context of contemporary capitalist society, which does little to promote the type of emancipatory potential of the public sphere that Habermas suggested. The concepts of rational discourse and public participation in civil society remain relevant, but are rarely treated as important within the institutions of mass media. While Garnham (1992) argues for the continuing and even increased relevance of aspects of Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, he also makes a number of critiques of Habermas, the most significant being a critique of his model of communicative action in relation to the role of mass media in contemporary democratic societies:

Habermas’s model of communicative action, developed as the norm for public discourse, neglects, when faced by distorted communication, all those other forms of communicative action not directed towards consensus...therefore he neglects both the rhetorical and playful aspects of communicative action, which leads to too sharp a distinction between information and entertainment and to a neglect of the link...between citizenship and theatricality (p.360).

This point has particular relevance when considering the role of public debate in relation to the new and often playful, hybrid forms of factual media that have come to predominate television coverage, but also in relation to the non-consensusal debate that was provoked by TNZW (see chapter 8). In these examples, consensus is not necessarily desirable or even possible. Garnham argues that Habermas’ “rationalist model of public discourse leaves him unable to theorize a pluralist public sphere and it leads him to neglect the continuing need for compromise between bitterly divisive and irreconcilable positions” (1992: 360). The argument for conceiving of a
pluralist rather than singular public sphere has been reiterated by a number of scholars, many of whom point to the problems associated with a taken-for-granted homogeneity in relation to the concepts of nation and public (eg; Robbins, 1993; Warner, 2002; Mardianou, 2005). Taking the idea of ‘pluralistic publics’ further, Gardiner (2004) argues that Habermasian-inspired notions of the public sphere should be interrogated in relation to a theory of ‘counterpublics’. Citing Asen (2000: 425), Gardiner adds that “Habermas’ stress on a relatively monolithic, overarching public sphere characterized by specific regulative mechanisms for rational debate and consensus-building...actively ‘supresses sociocultural diversity in constituting an arena inimical to difference’” (Gardiner, 2004: 29).

The audience research discussed in this thesis demonstrates the value of conceiving of the public sphere as pluralistic. The insights generated from discursive negotiation illustrate the productive value of non-consensual debate, as was proposed by Bakhtin’s (1981) theory of dialogics (Gardiner, 1992, 2004; Hirschkop, 2004) and Billig’s (1996) argument about the value of argumentation. Gardiner’s comparison of Habermasian and Bakhtinian theories of the public sphere usefully summarizes my own position in relation to these competing theories:

...whilst Habermas likes to think in terms of formal unities, Bakhtin prefers to meditate on the irreducible complexities that inhere in particular lived contexts, and to think with (and through) the implications of multiplicity and alterity vis-à-vis concrete phenomena...Habermas fails to grasp adequately the significance of the embodied, situational and dialogical elements of everyday human life (Gardiner, 2004: 30).

Related to Habermas’ one-way emphasis on the ideas of rationality, reason and consensus, is his omission of affective elements of public participation and political action (Scannell, 1989). Admonishing these omissions of Habermas, Gardiner (2004) argues that Bakhtin’s theorisation of the public sphere prioritises alterity and ‘radical difference’ in resistance to an ‘enforced homogeneity’ and “strives to grasp the experiential and affective qualities of human embodiment within diverse lived contexts, and is sensitive to a full
range of inter-human (and human-nature) relations that are not simply cognitive or narrowly ‘rational’” (p.45). Bakhtin’s conceptualisation of the public sphere is compatible with my approach toward the relation between discourse and affect (as outlined in chapter one). His concept of the public also supports my argument that audience activity needs to be conceived of beyond the singular dimension of a socio-cognitive critique of media.

5.2.1. **Publics, Nations, Cultures, Audiences.**

Arguably the most significant challenge to defining the term ‘public’ has been brought about by the constantly shifting relation between media, publics, citizens, and audiences. This situation is compounded by the increasingly complex relation between ‘publics’, ‘nations’, and ‘cultures’. Livingstone’s (2005) definition of ‘public’ draws together the notion of the public sphere as a place of consensus, collective interest and active participation, with an important emphasis on the increasing mediation of the public:

‘Public’ refers to a common understanding of the world, a shared identity, a claim to inclusiveness, a consensus regarding the collective interest. It also implies a visible and open forum of some kind in which the population participates in order that such understandings, identities, values and interests are recognised or contested…the understandings, values and identities of the public (or publics), together with the fora in which these are expressed, are increasingly mediated – technologically, materially, discursively (p.9).

A notable feature of Livingstone’s definition is that it shares some similarities with previously discussed definitions of nation. Parallels can be found in phrases such as; ‘common understanding’, ‘shared identity’, ‘claim to inclusiveness’, ‘consensus’ and ‘collective interest’. These similarities are also evident in a number of other definitions of ‘public’ (Habermas, 1989; Calhoun, 1992; Eley, 1992). While Gaonkar (2002) also distinguishes public from nation, the most relevant dimension upon which these terms share common ground is usefully expressed by the term ‘social imaginary’ – a term that has been utilized as a means of theorising the increasingly amorphous nature of the public sphere. Taylor’s (2002) use of this term follows
Anderson’s (1983) definition of the nation as an imagined community, arguing that “a public sphere can exist only if it is imagined as such…The public sphere was a mutation of the social imaginary, one crucial to the development of modern society” (p.113). Positing his own research as part of a “conceptual turn towards the social imaginary”, Gaonkar (2002) relates this concept to the idea of ‘stranger sociability’, where “modernity in its multiple forms seems to rely on a special form of social imaginary that is based in relations among strangers. The stranger sociability is made possible through mass mediation, yet it also creates and organizes spaces of circulation for mass media” (p.5).  

The idea of the social imaginary can be related to the notion of the phantom public (Lippmann, 1927, Robbins, 1993), which has been used in order to argue that the ideal of the public sphere is not only unrealistic and unattainable, but only exists in an imaginary realm. While Stanley Aronowitz referred to a “mythic town square in the sky”, Allan Bloom reiterated this idea with his term “the phantasmagoria: an agora (public forum, assembly) that is only a phantasm” (as cited in Robbins, 1993: ix). Each of these ideas supports the argument that, despite their differences, both nation and public sphere share a similar type of common space – an imaginary space. Gaonkar (2002) outlines the relations and distinctions between nation and public sphere:

A national people lives amid many other social imaginaries, penumbral to them. Other modern social imaginaries – such as the ethnos, the mainstream, the public, and humanity – differ from the national model in important ways. Some are not articulated as a ‘we’ but are third-person objectifications of society; these include the market, the mainstream, and ethnic and census categories. Some are experienced vicariously or through indirect mediation. Some are not collective agents like the people but are experienced through affects, such as mass sentiment or grief, rather than through will formation…Under some conditions, social imaginaries that are third-person objectifications can suddenly acquire agency; this is the case with at least some of the new social movements. And these movements, once agentialized, can under other conditions gravitate back to modes of passive belonging or vicarious agency (p.5).
According to Gaonkar, the social imaginary enables a movement from ‘passive belonging’ to the acquisition of agency and visa versa – but this may occur only under some conditions. This point has particular relevance for this thesis, which seeks to explore the conditions upon which agency may have been catalysed in relation to TNZW. Much like Anderson’s definition of nation as an ‘imagined community’, a conceptualization of the public sphere as a social imaginary (although differing from other social imaginaries), allows a degree of agency, and the possibility of imagining the public sphere differently. This is a point emphasized by Castoriadis (1987), who developed a theory of the social imaginary as a reaction “against the deterministic strands within Marxism”, seeking to “identify the creative force in the making of social-historical worlds” (Gaonkar, 2002: 1). Drawing on the work of Castoriadis, Gaonkar defines the idea of the social imaginary “as an enabling but not fully explicable symbolic matrix within which a people imagine and act as world-making collective agents” (p.1).

In addition to enabling a view of ‘public’ as a category imagined by active agents, the idea of the social imaginary intersects usefully with theories of discourse and cultural memory. While the public has been described as “a social space created by the reflexive circulation of discourse” (Warner, 2002: 62), the social imaginary is transmitted via discursive systems that are mobilized by social engagement with cultural forms (Gaonkar, 2002; Taylor, 2002). In this sense, the term social imaginary provides a useful strand of my overall theoretical framework, and informs later discussions about the nature of public debate in relation to TNZW.

5.2.2. The Relation Between ‘Public’ and ‘Audience’

According to Livingstone (2005), there is a:

…widely held view of public and audience as mutually opposed, one in which audiences are seen to undermine the effectiveness of publics…the changing media and communications environment – characterized by both the mediation of publics and the participation of audiences - problematises such an opposition (p.17).
While publics are often discussed as active, critically and politically engaged, participating collectives, audiences tend to be characterized as passive, individualised, non-participants of collective action, who are often confined to the private domain (Livingstone, 2005). Acknowledging that the study of ‘public’ and ‘audience’ draw on discrete theoretical domains, Livingstone believes it is necessary to maintain a degree of distinction between these terms. However she argues that no such opposition actually exists between publics and audiences. As she notes, “in a thoroughly mediated world, audiences, and publics, along with communities, nations, markets and crowds, are composed of the same people” (p.17). With increasing pressures of mediation and globalisation, the boundaries between these categories are becoming progressively blurred. Livingstone’s rationale for interrogating the relation between audiences and publics is supported by an “empirical observation that publics are increasingly mediated, moving ever closer to audiences, while audiences are increasingly diffused and diverse, no longer contained within the private sphere” (pp.9-10).

Seeking an alternative to the pitfalls of diametric terminology, Livingstone follows a number of scholars (eg: Corner, 1995; Bennett, 1998; Dahlgren, 2003) in suggesting that the term ‘civic’ might be usefully employed in order to describe an intermediary realm between public and audience. One rationale for using the term civic is to “reconceptualise audiences as ‘citizen-viewers’ (Corner, 1995) so as to recognize the civic significance of audience activities” (Livingstone, 2005: 32). Livingstone proposes the use of a mediating domain, which could be discussed using terms such as ‘civic culture’ or ‘civic society’ (p.17). Dahlgren (2003) discusses civic culture in terms of the cultural prerequisites for political engagement and action. He argues that dimensions such as subjectivity, identity and meaning are key to understanding how people become citizens, and how they participate in public life:

If the more familiar concept of the public sphere points to the politically relevant communicative spaces in daily life and in the media,
civic culture points to those features of the socio-cultural world – dispositions, practices, processes – that constitute pre-conditions for people’s actual participation in the public sphere, in civil and political society (p.154).

This idea provides a sense of how participation and political engagement cannot be taken for granted, but must be considered in relation to the specific circumstances involved with production and broadcast, media content and the wider viewing context. When assessing the role of the media in promoting (or constraining) political engagement, it is necessary to consider specific contextual factors. In the case of TNZW, these include; social and cultural relations, the status of alternative versions of history, discourses associated with colonisation and de-colonisation – all considered within the specific period in which the series was broadcast in 1998. In this sense, the notions of ‘citizen-viewers’ and ‘civic culture’ put forward by Corner, Livingstone and Dahlgren, serve as useful categories, if only as a reminder that the potential exists, within certain preconditions, for audience engagement to become part of a broader process of participation in civic life.

5.2.3. Mediation of the Public

Despite offering a very insightful reconfiguration of ‘civic culture’, in which he describes the media as one of the many ‘technologies of citizenship’, Dahlgren (2003: 154) has not always devoted such attention to discussing the possibilities of political action as a positive outcome of engagement with media. His earlier discussion on this topic suggested a pessimistic view of the idea of media influence, where he focused on patterns of disengagement with civic life, specifically in relation to the role of television and democratic society (Dahlgren, 1995). Even when discussing the possibilities of political engagement in relation to civic culture, Dahlgren (2003) balances this optimism with concern about the degree to which “media culture generally, with its emphasis on consumption and entertainment, has undercut the kind of public culture needed for a healthy democracy” (p.151). Discussions about the role of media in relation to publics have often been approached
with pessimism and suspicion, where the terms ‘civic disengagement’ and ‘civic cynicism’ have appeared. Emerging from the disciplinary precepts of political science and communication, those who view audiences and publics as opposed:

...tend to ascribe a clear meaning to the public in terms of political citizenship and then ask how the media support or – more commonly – undermine public understanding and public participation...the outcome, so the argument goes, is that the media undermine the public sphere, (Habermas, 1969/89), transform politics into political marketing (Scammell, 2001), bias the news agenda according to commercial imperatives (McChesney, 2000) and distract citizens from civic engagement (Putnam, 2000). (Livingstone, 2005: 18).

While Livingstone does not discard the notion that political citizenship is a characteristic of public life, her use of ‘civic culture’ insists that audience members also participate in activities of political citizenship. Rather than viewing the media as undermining public participation, Livingstone (2005) asks what the implications are of viewing ‘publics’ as either served by, or dependent upon the media. Such a question refers back to the rise and fall of competing traditions in the study of media audiences, which has moved through various stages, from media effects, to uses and gratifications, and reception analysis (Bruhn Jensen & Rosengren, 1990).²

5.3. Television, Public address and Public Debate

5.3.1. What Makes Television Distinctive?

Television has rarely been discussed in the positive light accorded to new digital media and the Internet, where the democratizing role of such media has been emphasized (Manovich, 2000; McCaughey, 2003). In contrast, television has been theorized predominantly from the perspective of mass media (Dahlgren, 1995), where the focus has tended to be on the power relations between mass audiences and hegemonic structures. There are a number of objections to discussing television as a mass medium. From the perspective of scholars interested in the social and cultural relations between individual audience members, the term ‘mass’ categorizes and homogenizes audience members, while also drawing attention away from the study of
individual subjectivity and human agency (Williams, 1958). Having acknowledged the validity of such objections, Corner (1995) argues that:

…the scale of production, distribution and reception of most broadcast television, as well as the form of its economic organisation, still justifies the descriptive use of the term ‘mass’ and that this usage can stop well short of slipping into unflattering and distortive ideas about ‘the masses’. For some critics of television, it is precisely the asymmetrical character of its ‘mass’ distribution (a small number of outlets to a large number of recipients) and the power relations this can imply which are the substantive points at issue in the politics of the medium (p.14).

While the term ‘mass media’ has been less frequently applied to the study of media in the twenty-first century, Corner’s defense of the term must be understood within the context of public engagement with television in 1995. Given that my discussion of the production and reception of TNZW is concerned with a similar time period, it is appropriate to apply some of the ideas put forward by those who described television as a mass medium, while refraining from conceptualizing audiences or publics as powerless ‘masses’. In this sense, Dahlgren’s (2005) notion of ‘television’s leaky hegemony’ is useful as a means of acknowledging both the constraints and possible gaps in the ‘mesh’ of television hegemony. According to Dahlgren, “‘working through’ does not deny the hegemonic character of television, but recognizes that such hegemony is loose, leaky and always at risk” (2005: 418).

It is important to consider the way in which TNZW attracted a ‘mass’ audience, in the sense of the widespread interest in the series. The notion of television as a mass medium also contributes to an understanding of the role of TNZW in the negotiation of national and cultural identity. However the audience research discussed in chapter eight demonstrates the importance of moving beyond the notion of mass media, in order to consider the social and cultural relations between individual audience members. In this sense, it is important to think about the specific mode of engagement brought about by the combination of television as a mass medium, whilst being frequently experienced by individuals in a domestic setting:
The ‘mass’ character of production and distribution is combined with the ‘domestic’ mode of reception...many of the distinctive speech forms, visual conventions and generic ‘rules’ of the medium are only comprehensible, let alone analyzable, when considered as part of this electronic bridging between the home and the various realms which television is able to access and/or construct...the imaginatively potent alignments of this world/home couplet have been judged by many researchers to be a central feature of television as a political agency... (Corner, 1995: 15).

Apart from this mass/domestic duality, there are a number of other characteristics that situate television as a distinct medium of public address. Corner (1995) emphasizes aspects such as; indexicality, ‘liveness’ and immediacy. The electronic and visual means by which television is produced, distributed and received, contribute to “the indexical quality of the television image, linking it with photography and distinguishing it from modes of representation...this provides the television image with a strongly evidential character” (p.12).

Another related characteristic of television is that it provides a directness of engagement with everyday life, which encourages a sense of being a participant in public events. This idea has been discussed in relation to the term “magical conveyance (television as bringing the world into your living room or, conversely, transporting you out ‘there’” (Corner, 1995: 15). Also related to this idea of direct engagement is “the memorable nature of images as sensory information” (Corner, 1995: 31). Stemming from the previous discussion of aurality as a dis-location of postcolonialism (see section 4.7.2), it should be reiterated that sound must be equally emphasized as a mode of sensory memory, and that the potential exists for the distinctive characteristics of television to promote a synaesthetic engagement with the people, places, objects and events depicted on screen. While these ideas have been discussed in relation to cinema, experimental media and ‘visual music’, their relevance to the study of television engagement remains largely untapped. There is scope to rethink theories of embodiment and materiality in relation to the specific type of engagement that television invites:
...television ‘seeing’ can have a resonance which elicits from its viewers certain kinds of investment of self which other media cannot so easily generate, if at all. This capacity is an important aspect of its ‘public’ character – to call viewers into empathy and understanding; to create a ‘virtual community’ of the commonly concerned, of vicarious witness; to cut through accommodating abstraction with the force and surprise of ‘things themselves’ (Corner, 1995: 31).

While this idea can be linked to Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ and Gaonkar’s ‘social imaginary’, it can also be discussed in relation to theories of embodiment (Marks, 2000; Sobchack, 2004). It is the indexicality of the television image, and the sense of immediacy that invites a certain kind of investment of self, thus promoting a sense of direct connectedness with events of the outside world. While this kind of engagement may be most intensely experienced during the live coverage of events, it is possible that a sense of ‘liveness’, of witnessing or even participating in an event, may be carried over into the coverage of other television genres, such as documentary. This has important implications when considering issues of emotional engagement and embodiment in relation to the reception of historical documentary. While audience members may be fully aware that they are not watching ‘live’ coverage, the contextual factors associated with non-fiction (and new factual formats of) television broadcast provide a sense of ‘liveness’, an experiential quality of engagement that plays an important part in the interpretation of historical events.

5.3.2. Television and Public History

The idea of television as a tool for nation-building (as discussed in section 2.6) is entangled with its role in the construction of histories. Just as the populist appeal of television potentiates a kind of egalitarian access to histories, the communicative characteristics specific to television have enabled the re-imagining of alternative versions of nation, community, and identity. This distinctive power of television to rouse the imagination of historical events, landscape and nation is expressed in Champion’s (2003) description of Simon Schama’s A History of Britain (BBC, 2000-2001):
EYE AND EAR; IMAGINATION AND MIND...History made for television can do this. It can take you to the familiar spot of land, into the castles and cathedrals, through the country houses and fields, into the bedrooms and private places. You can...hear the clash of swords and the thunder of horses' hooves. Portraits, tapestries, skulls, coins, statues, all speak of the dead who once were...Startling landscapes, brooding forests, stark ruins and tempestuous seas provide ample context for describing the development, evolution and confirmation of the geographic and imagined boundaries of tribal and national identities (p. 153).

By exchanging ‘castles and cathedrals’ and ‘horses’ hooves’ with more nationally specific elements of Aotearoa New Zealand, this extract could easily be mistaken for a description of TNZW, Ken Burns’s The Civil War (PBS, 1990), or Frontier (ABC-TV, 1997). Each of these televised documentary series share a number of similarities in terms of their construction, and all have provoked a significant degree of public debate and academic scrutiny (Toplin, 1996; Edgerton, 2001; Champion, 2003).

While acknowledging the persistent skepticism about the increasing use of television as a medium for communicating histories, Champion (2003) argues that television plays an important role in appealing to the imagination of vast numbers of audience members, and provoking an active and critical interest in the past. Such an approach is compatible with Anderson’s (1983) idea of the nation as an ‘imagined political community’, and with the idea of publics as ‘social imaginaries’ (Gaonkar, 2002). Using the term ‘public history’ to describe those histories that provoke public engagement with history, Champion discusses how distinctive characteristics of the television medium have been used to invite alternative ways of engaging with histories. Drawing on Schama’s keynote speech, The Burden of Television History (2001), Champion builds upon what Schama identifies as “four components central to making engaging and instructive public history. These qualities are ‘immediacy’, ‘empathy’, ‘moral engagement’ and ‘poetic connexion’” (Champion, 2003: 159). While Champion discusses these features in relation to an analysis of Schama’s A History of Britain, I have also identified similar characteristics during my analysis of TNZW (see chapter seven). In addition to the characteristics suggested by Champion, Corner (2006b)
demonstrates how documentary can play an important role in generating forms of “the historical imaginary” (p.294), and in enabling audience members to participate in historical narrative in the form of a “virtual journey” – “a kind of chair-based travel” that describes the configuration of past and present potentiated by televised histories (p.291).

5.3.3. Popularising and ‘Animating’ History

Television plays an important role in popularizing history, whereby it not only enables a greater access to histories, but has the potential, under certain circumstances, to provide an exhibition site for the expression of previously marginalised histories. The characteristics of indexicality, ‘liveness’ and immediacy enable televised history to be experienced by large numbers of people as entertaining, exciting and “alive” (Edgerton, 2005: 361). In chapter seven, I use Corner’s term “animating the historical” (2006b, 301) to emphasize the way in which documentary can ‘give life’ to histories that have previously existed in the more static form of a written text. In this sense, history ‘comes to life’ when engagement involves an experiential dimension. Rosenstone (1995) ponders this idea with a sense of nostalgia for the profession of ‘academic history’: “To think of the ever-growing power of the visual media is to raise the disturbing thought that perhaps history is dead in the way that God is dead. Or at the most alive only to believers – that is, to those of us who pursue it as a profession” (p.23). Here, Rosenstone reveals the tendency of some historians to feel threatened by television’s potential to enliven history. Interestingly, this anxiety toward televised history was also expressed by participants of my audience research (see HA3’s comment in section 8.2.5), and by public responses to TNZW (see appendix 2).

5.3.4 The Televised ‘Historical Event’

Television has the advantage over oral history of allowing us seemingly direct access to non-verbal and paralinguistic cues (MacDonald, 2006: 331).
While being addressed as vicarious witness of an historical event, the television viewer is invited (through aesthetic elements as well as generic and narrative conventions) to participate in a process of simultaneous interplay between discursive, affective and experiential engagement.

The reference to televised history as ‘public history’ can be discussed in relation to the impact of television upon the modernist ‘historical event’. According to White (1996: 22), the ‘historical’ event “has been dissolved as an object of a respectably scientific knowledge”. Initially, White attributes the dissolving of the historical event to the narrative tools of modernist literature and art, but then moves his discussion to the impact of electronic media:

…we can consider the power of the modern media to represent events in such a way as to render them not only impervious to every effort to explain them but also resistant to any attempt to represent them in a story form. The modern electronic media can manipulate recorded images so as literally to ‘explode’ events before the eyes of viewers (p.23).

Here White refers to the capacity of electronic media to manipulate recorded images so as to produce an infinite archive of equally plausible versions of an event, which has the impact of detracting from the established legitimacy of previously taken-for-granted written versions of events. White discusses this explosive capacity of television specifically in relation to events such as the beating of Rodney King, the shooting of JFK, and the Holocaust - all events that have been ‘exploded’, not only by the technology of electronic media, but by the hybrid forms of “postmodernist docu-drama or historical meta-fiction”. According to White, these forms enable:

…the placing in obeyance of the distinction between the real and the imaginary. Everything is presented as if it were of the same ontological order, both real and imaginary – realistically imaginary or imaginarily real, with the result that the referential function of the images of events is etiolated...Thus, the contract that originally mediated the relationship between the nineteenth century (bourgeois?) reader and the author of the historical novel has been dissolved. And what you get, as Gertrude Himmelfarb tells us, is ‘History as you like it’, representations of history in which ‘anything
Himmelfarb’s concern that audio-visual media provides the potential for any version of an event to appear factual or legitimate, has been expressed by many historians, by critics of ‘tele-history’ and by audience members (see section 8.2.5. and appendix 2). While there exists much anxiety about the role of audiovisual media in representing traumatic events, Sobchack (1996) perceives this as part of a process by which such media are contributing to new ways of engaging with history:

…the popular apprehension of the traumatic and grand ‘historical event’ as a potentiality in the trivial temporality of the everyday (common and extensible enough to ‘include one in’) can be seen as signaling not merely the ‘end’ of History as a distinct temporal category, but also (and alternatively) an emergent and novel form of historical consciousness – in sum, as a very real and consequential ‘readiness’ for history (p.5).

According to Sobchack, we are living “in a moment marked by a peculiarly novel ‘readiness’ for history among the general population” (p.4). This readiness is characterized by a new kind of historical consciousness, one in which notions of ‘the past’ are entangled with our experience of ‘the present’ and our imaginary vision of ‘the future’. Television documentary has played an important role in enabling an engagement with history based on what I refer to later in this thesis as ‘temporal collapse’ – a collapsing of past, present and future that has brought about this emergent historical consciousness:

…by virtue of their increasing representational immediacy, these new twentieth century technologies of representation and narration (most significantly, television) have increasingly collapsed the temporal distance between present, past and future that structured our preciously conceived notion of the temporal dimensions of what we call history (as the latter is differentiated from experience) (Sobchack, 1996: 4-5).

This phenomenon emerges as a reoccurring theme throughout each of the three phases of my research, suggesting that temporal collapse is an important outcome of televised history. Temporal collapse can also be
discussed in relation to the notions of popular memory and cultural memory. Both of these ideas involve the connection of past and present, as experienced by individuals who are socially and culturally “suppressed by dominant historiography” (McArthur, 1978: 56). In this sense, the role played by television in dissolving the modernist historical event, and in provoking a connection of past and present, can be understood as a potentially empowering process, whereby memory and experiential engagement begin to take the place of officially sanctioned ‘history’.

5.4 Defining Documentary

Referring to documentary as a ‘fuzzy concept’, Nichols (2001) stresses that any definition of documentary needs to be flexible enough to account for the extent to which documentary is a dynamic genre that constantly changes shape in relation to the specific context in which it is situated (p.21). According to Nichols, “documentary takes on meaning in relation to fiction film or experimental and avant-garde film” (2001: 20). While this is one way of marking out a definition for documentary, it omits the important ways in which documentary also takes on meaning in relation to television genres, such as news bulletins, serialised drama, and music video. Despite this omission, Nichols’ (1991 & 2001) approach to defining documentary is useful as a means of emphasizing the dynamism and complexity of documentary as a moving image genre. Updating his earlier (1991) four-part definition, Nichols (2001) outlines his definition of documentary according to; ‘an institutional framework’, ‘a community of practitioners’, ‘a corpus of texts’ and ‘a constituency of viewers’ (pp.20-41).

5.4.1. ‘An Institutional Framework’

Nichols’ ‘institutional framework’ emphasizes the importance of the institutional context in labeling and providing a status for documentaries. Important here, is the idea that any shift in the institutional context can significantly alter the way in which a documentary is received. For example, the (1997) broadcast of Peter Jackson’s Mock documentary Forgotten Silver
within a programming slot that has the status of high-brow artistic or educational programmes, had a significant impact upon the way in which New Zealand audience members engaged with this programme.\(^{14}\)

Another defining characteristic of the ‘institutional framework’ is that it "imposes an institutional way of seeing and speaking, which functions as a set of limits, or conventions, for the filmmaker and audience alike" (Nichols, 2001: 23). For Nichols, these conventions include the “almost omnipresent” voice-over commentary and the constructed appearance of reportorial balance. One outcome of this institutional framework is the commonsense assumption that "documentary filmmakers exercise less control over their subject than their fictional counterparts do" (1991: 13). Nichols (2001) views this situation in relation to a long-term institutional suppression of the highly creative potential of documentary.

### 5.4.2. ‘A Community of Practitioners’

In contrast to this institutional view of control, documentary practitioners have insisted that control must remain in the hands of the filmmaker, rather than the participants of the documentary. In an interview about the documentary series *An Immigrant Nation* (TVNZ, 1995), producer, Vincent Burke was questioned by Roscoe (1997) about the perception by some participants of a lack of control over how they were presented. Burke responded:

> We worked very closely with the communities, but, this is not an access programme where people have the chance to tell their story the way they’d like to. It was prime time television. It’s quite a different beast (Burke, as quoted in Roscoe, 1997).

In this sense, control is less that of the filmmaker and more an institutional form of control - "the economic power that institutions exert over what documentarists produce" (Kilborn & Izod 1997: 170). This power dynamic is one reason for differentiating between the institutional framework and documentarists as a 'community of practitioners'. According to Nichols,
members of this community "share a common, self-chosen mandate to
represent the historical world rather than to imaginatively invent alternative
This description depicts a “shared sense of purpose” within the domain of
documentary production (2001: 26). But it does not consider the extent to
which documentarists are divided by their different approaches, and by
production constraints that serve to marginalise independent documentary
makers, while privileging those that fit neatly into the dominant institutional
framework. In New Zealand, the relation between these two contexts of
documentary production has played out in an interesting way, where
recurrent restructuring of television and changes to the broadcasting system
have contributed to a volatile climate for both ‘in-house’ and independent
documentary production (Debrett, 2004: 8; see section 6.2.4).

Documentary derives institutional status not only from the presence of a
community of practitioners, but from a network of distributors, exhibition
sites, funding bodies and specialized production houses - all of which are
subject to, and contribute to, the restraints and directives of the dominant
institutional framework. Although Nichols acknowledges the way in which
these bodies constrain and regulate discursive potential, his statement that
documentarists are "largely self-defining" appears overly optimistic (1991:
15), especially when applied to the New Zealand broadcasting context (see
chapter six). For Nichols, such a definition:

...stresses how the field operates by allowing itself to be historically
conditioned, unfolding, variable, and perpetually provisional, based on
what documentarists themselves consider admissible, what they
regard as limits, boundaries and test cases, how boundaries come to
exert the force of a definition...and how the qualification, contestation, or subversion of these same boundaries moves from
inconsequential anomaly to transformative innovation to accepted

This type of definition usefully “confirms the historical variability of the form”,
showing how a specific documentary (or documentary mode) may function
quite differently in different historical and institutional contexts (Nichols, 2001:
26). It also illustrates the metamorphic potential of documentary as an
institutional practice, which is shaped, in part, by the innovations of documentarists that make up this practice. But Nichols does not emphasize the extent to which political and economic constraints play a part in shaping documentary form and content. As Kilborn and Izod point out "since the rules of sponsorship dictate that there shall always be a pay-off for the sponsoring agent, documentarists have found themselves - to a greater or lesser extent - involved in acts of compromise" (1997: 166). It is not only documentarists who decide what is admissible, set limits, boundaries and exert definitive force. To a large extent, politicians and broadcasters set the agenda, thus constraining (although sometimes enabling) the potential for documentary to move from transformative innovation to the status of 'accepted practice'.

Corner discusses the impact of political economy upon the changing character of television documentary in Britain. As does Nicholls, Corner highlights the growing emphasis upon entertainment in determining the quality and direction of documentary. However, Corner contributes a more complex view, incorporating the market ethos of de-regulation:

The threat of a 'narrowing' and 'thinning' of documentary as a result of economic changes in the funding of broadcasting remains a strong one...The older forms of 'unitary' public address...have all but disappeared...however, this has been achieved less by a re-appraisal of documentary's social function and social address in changed times than by the new market imperatives of the television industry (Corner, 1997: 19-20).

Although Corner is referring here to the British situation, a similar 'narrowing' and 'thinning' of documentary has been observed as a feature of New Zealand television since the mid 1990s, and this observation has been connected with the devotion of prime-time broadcasting slots to new factual formats and entertainment based programmes. Roscoe and Hight (1997) have noted that “Documentary as an institutional form is in a current state of flux...traditional boundaries between genres have been eroded and new styles and visual languages have surfaced” (pp.78-79). Given that this observation was made within the context of Aotearoa New Zealand, at a
moment in which *TNZW* was being produced, it helps to explain the climate of generic flux that has contributed to the production and construction of *TNZW*. Corner (2006c: 90) has made a similar observation, in his discussion of the ways “in which many aspects of the ‘art of the real’ continue to be refashioned as a viewing experience”. In this more contemporary context, Corner refers to the “‘dramatic turn’ in documentary crafting, one in the nature of a quiet but significant development rather than a sharp shift” (p.90). During the production and broadcast of *TNZW*, this ‘dramatic turn’ was (at least in the context of Aotearoa New Zealand) at the ‘budding’ stages of its development. In terms of the institutional influence upon *TNZW*, it is possible to see the significance of Corner’s observation of a “new ‘economy of intensity’…[which] has placed a new premium on material strong in kinetic or other forms of affective impact” (p.90). While some scholars have interpreted this ‘dramatic turn’ (including the predominance of new factual formats on television) with much pessimism, I would argue that the influence of the early stages of this ‘dramatic turn’ upon *TNZW* has been (for the most part) positive. The emergence of this ‘economy of intensity’ has encouraged a particularly innovative approach toward some aspects of the construction of *TNZW* (see chapter seven) and these innovations have helped to popularize a revisionist historical narrative, making this history accessible to a previously marginalised section of the audience.

The constant transformation and reconstruction discussed above renders any attempt to define documentary as problematic. Nichols’ multi-faceted definition helps to show how “documentary has never been only one thing…we can use this history of a changing sense of what counts as documentary as a sign of the variable, open-ended, dynamic quality of the form itself” (2001: 26).

5.4.3. ‘A Corpus of Texts’

Complementing the first two prongs of his definition, Nichols ‘corpus of texts’ focuses on documentary as a film genre (I prefer to use the more
inclusive term ‘moving image’ genre). In defining documentary as a genre, Nichols argues that there are particular characteristics and functions that give documentary the distinct status of a "a fiction (un)like any other" (1994: 98). According to Nichols, one of the most distinctive characteristics setting documentary apart from fictional film is that documentary has a:

…kinship with those other nonfictional systems that together make up what we may call the discourses of sobriety. Science, economics, politics, foreign policy, education, religion, welfare…Their discourse has an air of sobriety since it is seldom receptive to "make-believe" characters, events or entire worlds. Discourses of sobriety are sobering because they regard their relation to the real as direct, immediate, transparent (1991: 3).

While documentary may share a kinship with the ‘discourses of sobriety’, there is a danger of tying documentary too tightly to the notions of discourse, rational debate and education. The problem here is that such a restricted focus presupposes a dominant mode of engagement shared by viewers. This rests upon an artificial separation of fictional viewing practices as opposed to non-fictional practices. Furthermore, this ignores the ways in which the body itself produces its own forms of knowledge that exist alongside that produced by intellectual engagement. The co-existence of knowledges produced by both the body and the mind is addressed in this thesis, specifically in relation to audience engagement with documentary (see chapter eight).

Nichols’ attempts to differentiate documentary in terms of “the ring of sobriety that separates it from fiction” (Nichols, 1994: 54) have not always been fruitful, or open to the potential of new forms (Corner, 2006c: 94 & 96). However, his emphasis upon the blurred boundaries between genres and modes does have useful application as a productive way of approaching the complex and dynamic relation between these genres. In this respect, the potential of transformative innovation is suggested by the possibility of modal interplay implied by Nichols’ framework of documentary modes.
5.4.3.1. Documentary Modes

In the chapters that follow, I draw on the modal schemas developed by Nichols (1991, 2001) and Corner (1996). While Nichols’ schema follows a linear, generic sequence in which each mode appears to be historically and hierarchically situated, Corner’s typology of documentary modes is ‘provisional and heuristic’. Corner’s “principle depictive modes of documentary discourse” are divided according to four image modes and three speech modes (1996: 27). The image category includes; reactive observationalism, proactive observationalism, illustrative and associational modes, and the speech category includes; overheard exchange, testimony and an expositional mode.

In comparison to Nichols’ modes, Corner’s modes imply greater scope for the interplay between evidential and observational conventions, and there is a stronger sense of the transformative potential of the individual modes. While this model suggests an almost unlimited multiplicity of generic possibilities for documentary, I have found this schema to be less straightforward in terms of its application to T NZW. Accordingly, I have used Nichols’ schema of documentary modes as a basic analytical framework, in conjunction with some of the relevant insights of Corner’s typology. Of particular relevance is Corner’s emphasis on the possible co-existence of referential and associational uses of imagery, and his suggestion that the expositional mode may operate outside of an assumed authoritarian function (Corner, 1996: 28-30).

There have been a number of critiques of Nichols’ (1991) modal classification. According to Bruzzi (2000), the premise of Nichols’ ‘family tree’:

…is that documentary has evolved along Darwinian lines, that documentary has gone from being primitive in both form and argument to being sophisticated and complex…the fundamental problem with his survival-of-the-fittest ‘family tree’ is that it imposes a
false chronological development onto what is essentially a theoretical paradigm (pp.1-2).

Bruzzi has made an overly literal interpretation of Nichols’ intentionally abstract model. In his later publications, Nichols (1994, 2001) reinforces the idea of permeable and fluid boundaries existing between his original modes. However the linear ‘chain’ with which Nichols presents the modes can easily be interpreted as instituting a determinate and fixed set of boundaries, at the expense of exploring the hybrid and fluid relation between documentary and other genres. Despite these potential drawbacks, Nichols modes are useful as a means of charting textual differences in form and function, as well as illustrating transformations in the nature of audience engagement with various modes of documentary.

Extending upon his earlier (1991) modal classification, Nichols (2001) establishes generic variance across six documentary modes; poetic, expository, observational, interactive, reflexive and performative. Although it is useful to study the characteristics that distinguish each mode, most documentaries utilise the conventions of more than one mode. While Nichols (1991) argues that each mode advances a new attitude towards ‘representing reality’, by 2001, his explanation of how this modal framework is held together appears more fluid:

Modes come into prominence at a given time and place, but they persist and become more pervasive than movements. Each mode may arise partly as a response to perceived limitations in previous modes, partly as a response to technological possibilities, and partly as a response to a changing social context. Once established though, modes overlap and intermingle. Individual films can be characterized by the mode that seems most influential to their organization, but individual films can also ‘mix and match’ modes as the occasion demands (2001: 34).

For the purpose of providing a basic generic framework most relevant to TNZW, this section is limited to a brief outline of the main features of Nichols’ expository and performative modes. Specific features of these modes will be applied to my analysis of TNZW text in chapter seven.
According to Nichols (2001), the expository mode “addresses the viewer directly, with titles or voices that propose a perspective, advance an argument, or recount history” (p.105). This mode relies on a rhetorical voice of authority and evidentiary logic in order to legitimate an argument about the historical world. Although this argument is often highly subjective, documentary conventions are utilised to create an impression of objectivity and balance. Audience expectations of the expository mode include problem solving and the use of evidence in support of an argument. Based on an informing logic, the documentary structure relies upon evidentiary editing, which is a variation of the classical narrative method of continuity editing. With the aim of creating verisimilitude, continuity editing organises cuts in order to create a seamless sense of a unified time and space. Evidentiary editing, on the other hand, "organizes cuts within a scene to present the impression of a single, convincing argument in which we can locate a logic" (Nichols, 1991: 19). The conventions of the expository mode (such as ‘voice-of-God' commentary) can be exemplified by the newsreel films of the 1930s and 1940s, current affairs television programming, and independently produced political documentaries.18

Nichols (2001) adds that the expository mode “assembles fragments of the historical world into a more rhetorical or argumentative frame than an aesthetic or poetic one” (p.105). This statement does not account for the ways in which rhetorical and aesthetic frames operate simultaneously within many documentaries. As will be demonstrated by my analysis of TNZW in chapter seven, fragments of the historical world can be assembled in such a way as to support a rhetorical and argumentative frame, whilst simultaneously offering aesthetic layers of evocation and meaning.

The performative mode is posited as the most recently developed of Nichols modes, and deviates from the others in terms of the particular relationship of the viewer to the referent. The performative mode encourages viewers to experience not only an active, but also a creative mode of engagement.
Nichols (1994) argues that performative documentaries "present a distinct disturbance to ethnographic" films which are bound together by:

...a conception of realism and its apparent access to the historically real which performative documentaries devalue (but do not reject). Performative documentary suspends realist representation. Performative documentary puts the referential aspect of the message in brackets, under suspension. Realism finds itself deferred, dispersed, interrupted, and postponed. These films make the proposition that it is possible to know difference differently (Nichols, 1994: 96-97).

In terms of indexicality, the performative mode stands apart from all other documentary modes and can be seen as operating in opposition to the observational mode. While the observational mode is reliant on the maintenance of the indexical bond to sustain a sense of realism, the performative mode is significant for its absence or deflection of the referent. A continuum provides a tangible way of discussing the graduation between these two modes. On one end of the continuum, there exists a close relation to the 'real'. On the other, fictional films and performative texts require a metaphorical or imagined perception of the 'real'. However, as few documentaries can be described as primarily performative, this mode is more usefully understood as a collection of performative characteristics, which operate as secondary to the predominant mode in a documentary. *TNZW* is a good example of this (see chapter seven).

Bruzzi (2000) argues that Nichols' (1994) initial definition of the performative mode was confusing, partly due to the assumed familiarity of readers, with Butler's (1990) use of the term 'performative'. This is a valid point, and given that I have already used this term in the 'Butler' sense to help explain Said's notion of the performative 'playing-out' of colonial discourse (see section 4.6), it is necessary to reiterate that my use of Nichols' sense of 'performativity' is quite different from that implied by Said (1978), Bhabha (1983) and Butler (1990).

My use of this term can be contrasted to that of Bruzzi (2000), whose notion of a ‘performative mode’ of documentary, follows Butler’s (1990) use of the
term ‘performative’: “…the performative documentary uses performance within a non-fiction context to draw attention to the possibilities of authentic representation. The performative element within the framework of non-fiction is thereby an alienating, distancing device, not one which actively promotes identification…” (153). This definition proposes a Brechtian notion of performance, which is predicated on the provocation of an ‘alienation affect’ as a mode of audience disengagement (Willett, 1992). This type of definition is relevant to a number of overtly ‘performative’ documentaries, but it does not leave any room for the ways in which performativity is used as a means of affective and embodied engagement with documentary (which can occur simultaneously alongside a disengaging estrangement). Due to the overall framework of this thesis, I have utilized Nichols (2001) definition, which argues that the performative mode:

...sets out to demonstrate how embodied knowledge provides entry into an understanding of the more general processes at work in society...meaning is [treated as] a subjective, affect-laden phenomenon [concerned with]...experience and memory, emotional involvement, questions of value and belief...performative documentary underscores the complexity of our knowledge of the world by emphasizing its subjective and affective dimensions (131).

This use of performativity as a means of affective engagement and identification is not only more suited to my theoretical framework, but it is more relevant to the performative aspects of TNZW, which take the form of re-enactments, rhythmic editing and the visual and auditory evocation of memory (see chapter seven). These performative characteristics are relevant to considering the potential of television documentary to function as a technology of cultural memory.

5.4.4. ‘A Constituency of Viewers’

Nichols has labeled the final prong of his 4-part definition ‘a constituency of viewers’. This part of his definition interprets documentary from the perspective of the audience, where “the sense that a film is a documentary” depends upon assumptions and expectations of viewers, that “the text’s
sounds and images have their origin in the historical world we share" (2001: 35). Nichols reiterates that this *assumption* is encouraged by the ability of recording instruments to replicate or ‘bear the trace’ of the sounds and images of the historical world. From this standpoint, such an assumption about what constitutes documentary must constantly shift according to changing cultural and technological contexts. An audio-visual form that bears the trace of one person’s experience of the historical world, may not bear any resemblance to another person’s experience (or remembrance) of the past. This situation highlights a problem with Nichols use of the term ‘constituency’ of viewers, which implies that all viewers of documentary share a similar experience, knowledge or understanding about what documentary is, and how they might engage with it. While Nichols clarifies this phrase by noting that “documentary lies in the mind of the beholder” (2001: 35), he neglects to explain this situation in terms of individuals’ differential access to interpretive resources, which are partially determined by the specific trajectories of social, cultural and historical contexts. As demonstrated by my audience research, membership to a constituency of viewers does not prohibit individuals from employing vastly different interpretive resources when engaging with an audiovisual text (see chapter eight).

Related to the notion of a constituency of viewers, and one way in which Nichols distinguishes documentary from fictional film, is by the notion of a documentary ‘mode of engagement’, characterised by a direct engagement with the ‘real’ (1994: 98). According to Nichols, audiences enter into a unique way of engaging with documentary, which can be differentiated from fictional film in the following way:

We settle into a distinct mode of engagement in which the fictional game calling for the suspension of disbelief (“I know this is a fiction, but I will believe it all the same," a continual oscillation between "yes, this is true," and "no, it is not") transforms into the activation of belief (“this is how the world is but still it could be otherwise”). Our oscillation now swings between a recognition of historical reality and the recognition of an argument about it (1991: 28).
Nichols’ interpretation of a ‘documentary mode of engagement’ is useful as a means of pinpointing a particular set of characteristics that might accompany the experience of engaging with a documentary (such as a recognition of an argument about historical reality). However, Nichols interpretation appears to be constrained here by an underlying assumption that documentary engagement is an inherently sober, intellectual activity, in contrast to the more imaginative characteristics he associates with the process of engaging with fictional film. To explore the nature of a documentary mode of engagement, it is important to consider the full range of possibilities for which audiences may creatively engage with documentary, which means rejecting the assumption that viewers engage with documentary primarily in terms of an intellectual mode of reading.

I would argue that the capacity to oscillate between a sense of the ‘real’ and the fictional or imaginative world can occur during audience engagement with a vast array of cultural forms. Rather than focusing diametrically on the differences of engaging with documentary and fictional film, it may be more useful to think of audience engagement as a dynamic and layered process, whereby audiences can simultaneously engage with an audiovisual text via multiple modes of engagement. For instance, a documentary mode may accompany a fictional mode, an ‘animation’ mode or even a ‘music video’ mode. For the audience member, these modes may serve as concurrent layers of engagement, or they may oscillate between these modes, during their engagement with a single text. While there may be an element of individual choice in this process, an individual’s capacity to oscillate between multiple modes of engagement will be determined by their interpretive resources, which includes their prior experience of documentary, as well as a variety of other cultural forms.

As outlined here, Nichols’ multi-faceted definition of documentary offers a malleable framework that can be applied to each phase of the following tripartite analysis of TNZW. Of the four parts of his definition, his ‘constituency of viewers’ is the least developed. It is through textual analysis
that Nichols builds a concept of the audience, seemingly opposed to exploring this construct through direct audience research. While he recognises the role of the audience, he deals with this via the generic boundaries he has constructed for documentary, rather than through the ‘messy practicalities’ of audience research. However, this niche has been explored by other documentary theorists, such as Corner et al (1990), Roscoe (1999) and Hill (2005), and it is the intention of this thesis to add to this small, but vital body of research.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter begins by establishing a theoretical context for the related concepts of ‘public’, ‘audience’, ‘citizen-viewer’, and ‘civic culture’. It then outlines some of the ways in which these concepts have been used to explore the participation and political engagement of citizens, within an increasingly mediated society.

These concepts provide a theoretical frame for my discussion of the distinctive characteristics of television as a medium of public address. The characteristics of indexicality, ‘liveness’ and immediacy are considered here in relation to the complexities of television as a technological form of communication, with a dual mass/domestic character of production, distribution and reception. These aspects provide television with the potential to popularise and enliven historical narratives, and to invite a type of engagement with televised histories, which collapses the temporal conventions constructed by dominant historiography.

This outline of television’s distinctive role within the public sphere is intended to establish the significance of television, before marking out a definition of documentary as a complex and dynamic genre. Nichols four-part definition of documentary is useful to this thesis, but limited by his tendency to define documentary as a ‘film’ genre, predominantly in contrast to fictional film. While this approach omits to consider the development and potential
innovation of documentary in relation to television genres, I have discussed the four parts of Nichols definition in relation to the specific characteristics of television documentary.

Drawing on the modal frameworks established by Nichols (1991, 2001) and Corner (1996), my interpretation of Nichols’ expository and performative modes frames my analysis of TNZW (in chapter seven). Underlying the contrasting approaches of Nichols (1994) and Bruzzi (2000) toward documentary performativity, are different orientations toward the prospect of documentary as a vehicle for social change. These opposing orientations are analogous with debates about the possible role of television in relation to the public sphere. While there are those who claim that television documentary has the potential to provoke significant social changes, the more pessimistic view is that television is totally constrained by the structures of hegemony. Dahlgren’s (2005) use of the phrase ‘television’s leaky hegemony’ serves as a pragmatic compromise between these poles.

Gaines (1999) explores these perspectives in relation to the notions of political mimesis, affect and embodiment. Proposing that a “myth of sweeping social change” has been attached to documentary, Gaines argues that there is little, if any, historical basis for such a claim. Her research participants indicated that “it was only in connection with moments or movements that films could be expected to make a contribution to social change” (1999: 85). My research would also appear to support this notion. What is distinctive about TNZW, is that it was televised at a significant historical ‘moment’, whereby the de-colonisation ‘movement’ had reached a state of ripeness, laying the foundations for the documentary series to act as a catalyst, thus opening up spaces for affective resistance.

Having introduced my general orientation toward the potential of television documentary to catalyse resistance, the following chapter will explore the specific broadcast context of television documentary, as it was played out during the 1990s in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Endnotes

1 I interpret Gaines’ (1999) use of the term ‘political mimesis’ as similarly aligned to Bhabha’s term ‘mimicry’, as outlined in Section 4.10.2.

2 Such criticisms have been made by Fraser (1990); Calhoun (1992) and Eley (1992).

3 For discussions on the ‘playful’ and ‘performative’ aspects of recent shifts in factual formats, see Corner (2000, 2002 & 2006b).

4 Mardianou (2005) argues that engagement as a citizen is not only a matter of cognitive participation, but involves important emotional dimensions of participation, especially with regard to the mediation of public affairs.

5 This idea of stranger sociability fits neatly with Anderson’s (1983) notion of print capitalism bringing about a reading public (see section 2.6).


7 While maintaining a concern for issues of power, access and control, the turn toward cultural studies and reception studies has problematised many of the earlier assumptions about television undermining public participation and civic engagement (Livingstone & Lunt, 1994; Ouellette, 1999; Livingstone, 2005). A cultural studies perspective views power relations as dynamic and situated within specific social and cultural circumstances. Such an approach means that television is no longer viewed only as a tool of the powerful, and audience members are viewed as active agents, capable of critical and multi-dimensional engagement. These theoretical ideas inform empirical audience studies, many of which have sought to explore ways in which publics can make use of television in a participatory or politicized sense, while also acknowledging the constraints imposed by the media (Corner, 1990; Livingstone & Lunt, 1994; Corner et al., 1997; Roscoe, 1999; Curran & Morley, 2006).

8 It is also noted that both orality and aurality have been discussed as important defining characteristics of television and documentary. Ellis (1982) discusses the communicative function of sound in terms of sound/image relationships on television. Corner (1995: 62-63) has discussed television’s emphasis on the spoken word, as one defining characteristic of television. He has also provided a useful discussion about the use of music in documentary (2005b). Nichols (2001) has noted the importance of voice and oral narration, as defining characteristics of documentary modes.

9 See for example; Kandinsky (1911); Marks (2000; 213); Sobchack (2004; 53-84), and Brougher (2005).

10 I have explored the concept of synaesthesia in my paper ‘New Perspectives on Cultural Memory: Sub-cultural Engagement With Visual Music and Music Videos’ (a conference paper presented at the Particles & Pixels Symposium (dedicated to the life and work of Len Lye), Auckland, September, 2005).

11 See for example, Taylor’s comments about televised history, as quoted in Chapman (2001: 138).

12 See section 6.3.5 where (in an interview extract), Tainui Stephens refers to “the Maori view of history – of walking into your future backwards”, and explains that this was something he wanted to convey in TNZW.

13 For examples of documentaries and new hybrid formats that have been shaped by these television genres, see: the musical/performance documentary Feltham Sings (Hill, 2002), docu-soaps, such as Airline and Airport, and reality gameshows such as Big Brother (Endemol Productions, 1999), Popstars (Jonathan Dowling, 1999), and New Zealand Idol (South Pacific Pictures, 2004). For more examples, including a discussion of audience engagement with these formats, see Hill (2005).

14 Several audience members were not only duped by Forgotten Silver, they were extremely angry with TV One for having betrayed an assumed contract of trust between TVNZ and its audience. For a discussion of these audience responses, see Roscoe and Hight (1997 & 2001).

15 See, for instance Debrett (2004: 12) and Horrocks (2004c: 63).

With reference to the influence of Nichols’ *Blurred Boundaries* (1994), Corner (2006b) points out that documentary “has always been a dispersed genre, sometimes to the point of having its very categorical existence questioned, and a sharper exploration of its generic characteristics and its multiple points of overlap with other modes of portrayal has been a feature of much recent scholarship (p.291).

For examples of independently produced documentaries that utilise expository conventions for political means, see; John Pilger’s films; *The New Rulers of the World* (2001) and *Palestine is Still the Issue* (2002). For New Zealand examples, see Alistair Barry’s documentaries; *Someone Else’s Country* (1996) and *In a Land of Plenty* (2002).

See for example, Jan Svankmajer’s animated documentary, *The Death of Stalinism in Bohemia* (1990), and Peter Greenaway’s *The Falls* (1980).
CHAPTER 6: Production of Text

...the Maori view of history – of walking into your future backwards...was something that I wanted to try and bring into this... (Stephens, director of TNZW, interview extract, 1999).¹

6.1. Introduction

Chapters one through to five have established the various facets of my theoretical and methodological framework, and have surveyed the social-historical terrain in which TNZW is situated. I will pause here to reiterate the key arguments covered thus far.

I argue in chapter one, that my initial research design needed to be extended in order to deal with the insights emerging from my audience research. Accordingly, my development of the elliptical modes of memory is intended to operate co-extensively with both CDA and the tripartite approach, to provide a more nuanced approach to each phase of my analysis of TNZW.

The significance of cultural memory as a key theory is carried through into the following chapters. Demonstrating that ‘nation’ is a highly debated and problematic concept, I discuss the role of audio-visual media in relation to nation-building and community-building. I argue that the notion of an ‘imagined community’ can be usefully tied to the concept of homeland, where the landscape is a taken-for-granted, but nevertheless powerful, cultural signifier and trigger of cultural memory.

Chapters three and four work together to map out discourses associated with cultural colonization and de-colonisation, as they have been manifested in New Zealand historical narratives. As will become apparent in the following chapters, these discourses have significantly shaped the production, construction and audience engagement with TNZW.

The discursive arenas discussed in chapter four have been utilised as strategies of resistance to colonialism, and to the idea of a unitary ‘New
Zealand nation’. While not always viewing postcolonial theory as relevant to local indigenous issues, the proponents of discourses such as Maori sovereignty have been (somewhat indirectly) influenced by early postcolonial theory. While marking out important limitations of postcolonial theory, chapter four argues that the theories of cultural hybridity and cultural memory offer a useful dual framework for studying strategies of resistance to colonialism.

Chapter five explores the distinctive characteristics that make television documentary an important site of public debate, affective resistance and engagement with historical narrative. While the potential of television documentary has not been adequately recognised by some of the salient theorists within the study of documentary, I argue that Nichols’ definition and modal schema would benefit from an exploration through specific audience research. Having noted the debate about the potential of television documentary to play a role in activating resistance, I argue that this catalytic function can only occur in conjunction with an already established ‘readiness’ for social change.

Together, these arguments form a platform that supports the different types of analysis conducted in chapters six through to eight. The following three chapters draw on these arguments in order to discuss each phase of the tripartite research. The initial phase, forming the basis of this chapter, outlines the specific institutional context in which TNZW was produced.

Approximately fifteen to sixteen months after the initial TV One broadcast of TNZW, I conducted interviews with four of the key people involved in funding and producing the series. They were; Colin McRae (producer), Roger Horrocks (board member of New Zealand on Air – henceforth NZoA), James Belich (Historian/ writer and presenter) and Tainui Stephens (director and kaitiaki). A number of insights emerged from these interviews, which are discussed here in relation to the specific discursive volatility that framed the production of the series. The period between the initial broadcast of the
The distinctive institutional context meant that both possibilities and constraints influenced the production of this series. With many ‘stakeholders’ involved, there were also a number of competing agendas and diverse objectives for TNZW, and this collaborative production process has helped to shape the series as a multi-authorial and polysemic version of history.

6.2. New Zealand Broadcasting Context

6.2.1. Shifting Patterns of Documentary in New Zealand

In New Zealand, documentary has developed in a particular way. The small size and geographic isolation of the country, its postcolonial history, and the public service origins of both film and broadcasting have laid the path for documentary to take up a nation-building role. According to Goldson (2004), in New Zealand:

Documentary was introduced deliberately to represent the nation and in fact continues in this purpose. Its alignment to the national project is thus amplified; not only was it conceived at the moment of the emergence of national identity, it now shows almost exclusively on television, which has itself become the central cultural apparatus
through which, and from which the nation is broadly styled and understood (p.241).

Prior to the introduction of television broadcasting in the 1960s, documentary developed under the public service orientation of the National Film Unit. Within this context, Grierson’s vision of documentary as a means to foster national unity was adopted as a preferred model:

...providing an image of New Zealanders at work, at play, and at war. This was the prevailing image of public culture, an image that audiences found deeply satisfying; it was a vision that fulfilled a desire, a felt need to shore up the sense of collective unity and nationhood (Goldson, 2004: 243).

While this need to develop a sense of nationhood was most intense during the 1940s and 1950s (see section 3.5), it continued to play an important role in the production and reception of documentary in the 1990s.

The introduction of television in the 1960s brought about a shift from the screening of documentary newsreels in the cinemas to the ‘in-house’ production of documentaries by the documentary unit set up within the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (NZBC). During the early stages of television broadcasting, documentary remained strongly influenced by the Griersonian model, and many of the programs were generically similar to those made by the BBC (Goldson, 2004). Eventually this new site allowed documentary to gain a ‘national audience’, and at times, to function as a national forum for public debate (Horrocks, 2004b).

6.2.2. Public Service versus Commercialism

The history of television broadcasting in New Zealand is marked by a number of shifts in direction and changing strategies. There has been a long-standing tension between the ideal of television as a public service and the drive towards full commercialization (Boyd-Bell, 1985; Smith, 1996; Farnsworth, 2002). While proponents of public service followed the British approach, described as the ‘Reithian tradition’, those who pushed for
commercialisation upheld the American approach, which was guided by the ideological precepts of capitalism (Horrocks, 2004a: 11). As a means of summarising these shifts between the poles of public service and commercialism, Horrocks has outlined five phases of broadcasting that New Zealand television has passed through over a forty-year period:

a. Government broadcasting (1960-61)
b. Public service diluted by commercialism (1961-88)
c. TVNZ as a commercial broadcaster counter-balanced by NZoA (1989-95)
d. Dominant commercialism (1995-99)
e. Attempts to revive public service broadcasting (since 1999).

(Horrocks, 2004b: 26).

Although this periodisation demonstrates a shift away from public service towards commercialism, links to the Reithian tradition have never been completely lost, and these links have enabled a resurgent demand (and political support) for public service broadcasting since 1999. As *TNZW* was broadcast in 1998, discussion of the broadcasting context is focused predominantly on phase ‘d’. However, given that NZoA funding was approved in August 1993 (Horrocks, 1999), and the early stages of pre-production began around this time, it is necessary to consider how circumstances associated with the previous phase (‘c’) influenced the production of *TNZW*.

6.2.3 Regulation and De-regulation

Skepticism about public service broadcasting has emphasised concerns over the connection between some models of public service broadcasting and unacceptable levels of state control. However, the British public service model, “in its pure form, insists on keeping both commercialism and the government at a distance. The New Zealand version abandoned the first principle but embraced the second” (Horrocks, 2004b: 26). While the ideal of
minimising government interference in the broadcasting system may have been overtly stated during the initial stages, the recent history of television broadcasting portrays a series of government led strategies in re-orienting broadcasting in relation to the opposing approaches of public service and commercialism: “Whether regulating or de-regulating, the governments of New Zealand have been constantly tempted to leave their mark on broadcasting, often with a heavy-handed touch” (Horrocks, 2004b: 26). This ‘heavy-handedness’ had its most serious impact in 1989, when the neo-liberal ideology promoted by ‘Rogernomics’ led the Labour government to deregulate the broadcasting industry and restructure TVNZ as an SOE (State Owned Enterprise). The SOE Act established a “framework for a new organizational form for the commercial activities of Government enterprises” (Spicer et al, 1996: 59). Under the dictates of this framework, “TVNZ was required to make profits like any other commercial business and to return a dividend to its shareholder, the government” (Norris, 2005: 43). According to Horrocks:

Television was restructured by the 1989 Broadcasting Act, but over the course of the decade television had been getting ready, shifting each year further away from the public service model and closer to the commercial model. The shift was in line with the politics of the new government, which extolled the energies of global capitalism. The government proceeded at breakneck speed to privatise various areas of the public sector, selling them mostly to overseas buyers as part of what it saw as a necessary process of globalisation. It restructured other areas as SOEs (state owned enterprises, required to operate like commercial companies) (2004b: p.29).  

These changes were to have a significant impact on the way in which television broadcasters operated, and on the type of programming deemed to be ‘popular’ in order to meet the new requirement of delivering audiences to advertisers. In this new climate of commercialism, “the idea of ‘public service’ was redefined as ‘giving the public what it wants’, and high ratings and profits were seen as the only reliable proof” (Horrocks, 2004b: 29).

This new philosophy encouraged television executives to look upon the schedule as a scarce commodity. The key networks, including TV One
(which had been the channel most associated with public service), became fixated on methods of scrutinising the cost benefit of each ‘slot’ in the schedule. Ratings were closely monitored, and interpreted primarily in the context of the requirements of advertisers, which were viewed as paramount. When advertisers asserted the need to prioritise programming that attracted a ‘youth audience’, broadcasters responded by pulling many of the programmes with low ‘youth’ ratings from the schedule. According to Horrocks (2004b), many of these programs happened to be associated with the Reithian values of ‘public service’ broadcasting, which were to “inform, educate and entertain” (p.27). Some of those who maintained these values were alarmed to discover that television executives showed little interest in broadcasting programs of social and cultural value, minority interests (including Maori culture and language), ‘local content’ or in-depth explorations of social, historical or political issues – even when these programs were regarded as ‘quality’ and had been fully funded either by NZoA or independent means, and were handed to the network for free (Horrocks, 2004b, 2004c). This was a period of uncertainty and structural change in broadcasting institutions, which bought about a reduction of in-house production and a rise of commissioned work.

Ironically, the deregulation of the broadcasting industry and re-classification of TVNZ as an SOE brought about a positive outcome for Maori, as it enabled members of the Maori community to take legal action to the British Privy Council. Here, Maori “accused the national broadcasting system of failure to give adequate representation to Maori language and culture. Their campaign focused on the government’s obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi” (Horrocks, 2004b: 35). Although the government won the court battles, this was on the basis that it would make a serious commitment to support the development of Maori language, and this support has manifested in a number of ways. In 1993 the government established Te Mangai Paho (TMP), a funding body devoted to Maori broadcasting. While this body has supported a wide range of programs made by, for and about Maori, NZoA has also:
...continued its policy of requiring Maori culture to be represented – where appropriate – in any prime-time series it funds for the general audience. For Inside NZ and Documentary New Zealand, long running national documentary series, NZOA introduced an explicit quota to ensure that at least 15 per cent of the individual documentaries had Maori creative control and Maori-related subject-matter. Broadcasters at first resisted the idea of a quota but learned to live with it on the condition that the programs remained accessible to the general audience (Horrocks, 2004b: 36).10

Despite the extreme commercialism of TVNZ during phase ‘d’, it is possible that the aftermath of the Privy Council court case unleashed a degree of pressure (from the government, NZoA, Te Mangai Paho and the public) upon television executives to support those programs that were made by, for or about Maori, and which included Maori culture or language.11

6.2.4. NZoA and the Funding Situation

The New Zealand Broadcasting Commission (which became known as New Zealand On Air) was set up in 1989 by the Labour government. In this new era of commercial imperatives, NZoA was to play a residual role of satisfying the demand for public service television. The Commission was viewed as a means of providing a degree of balance during a time when TVNZ was focused almost entirely on commercial interests. According to the 1989 Broadcasting Act, its mandate was to “reflect and develop New Zealand identity and culture”, to promote Maori language and culture, and to support the requirements of minority audiences (Broadcasting Act, 1989: s36(a)).12 NZoA upheld this mandate, placing emphasis on increasing the quantity of ‘local content’ programming, and on attempting to secure prime time coverage of these programs (Horrocks, 2004b). Despite this, the contradiction between the social and cultural objectives of NZoA and the commercial focus of broadcasters led to productions that were funded by NZoA, later being assigned ‘low rating’ slots in the schedule (Roscoe, 1999: 50-58, Debrett, 2004: 6). Because of the problems involved in ensuring that the programmes they funded would actually be broadcast, NZoA insisted
that they would only fund those programs that were assured a placement in the broadcasting schedule (Debrett, 2004: 7). TVNZ and TV3 had to demonstrate their commitment by providing a small percentage of the total funding for any project funded by NZoA. These strategies were intended to put pressure on broadcasters to make a serious commitment to those programmes that they wanted to claim the rights for (Roscoe, 1999).

The new funding system was welcomed by the community of independent documentary filmmakers, where it was “widely hailed as a democratising move, freeing documentary from the bureaucratic constraints of public service broadcasting and what had come to be seen by many outsiders as an ‘elitist old boys’ network of in-house documentarists”. (Debrett, 2004: 6). While the new funding system provided many opportunities for independent documentarists, Debrett argues that this very system was responsible for an overlooking of the role of documentary as ‘public knowledge project’. Debrett is very critical of NZOA for insisting on prime-time slots for the documentaries they funded, viewing this strategy as a barrier to the production of certain types of documentary. According to Debrett, NZoA’s:

...interpretation of the Act and its subsequent relationship with broadcasters meant documentary as ‘national culture project’ was also curtailed. Making prime time the key criterion for funding, the Commission imposed considerable constraints on what could be achieved under the wholly commercial system, virtually precluding the more demanding sub-genres – the essay form, experimental documentary and ‘high-culture’ subjects. By prescribing a mimimal budget for documentary in order to maximise quantity, the commission excluded longer-form documentary, along with subjects requiring a longer time-frame, thereby imposing more creative constraints on documentarists (2004: 7).

Debrett places a significant amount of blame on NZoA for precipitating this situation, however she does not give adequate attention to the increasing popularity of factual entertainment formats as an international trend (Kilborn, 1994; Dovey, 2000; Corner, 2000, 2002; Hill, 2005). Debrett’s accusation that “under the new system documentary as ‘national culture project’ was
reinvented as a fusion of tabloid values, youth appeal and nationalism” (2004: 12) not only attributes this new trend towards entertainment formats significantly to NZoA, but neglects to consider the possibility that these new formats may also play a role in provoking public debate about nation and culture. While Horrocks also indicates a concern for the ‘thinning’ of television documentary, he does not attribute blame to NZoA, instead explaining the situation from the perspective of having been a NZoA board member:

...there was an increasing demand among broadcasters for what might be called the populist documentary with its emphasis on human interest over ideas, ordinary people over experts, familiar or ‘universal’ topics over unfamiliar or minority topics, emotion (or melodrama) over reason, and a once-over-lightly approach over a slower, in-depth investigation. NZOA opposed this trend as a narrowing of the possibilities of local culture (Horrocks, 2004c: 63).

In the above extracts, both Debrett and Horrocks express an overly simplistic discourse of pessimism about new factual formats, which prevents them from ‘entertaining’ the idea that formats prioritizing ‘human interest’, ‘the familiar’, ‘emotion’ and ‘light entertainment’ might also function as an important means of provoking public debate. The complex role of some of these newer factual formats has been the focus of recent scholarship, demonstrating that the ‘use-value’ of ‘popular factual entertainment’ “cannot be dismissed merely because it does not seem to conform to traditional knowledge criteria” (Corner, 2002: 262). As I have argued in section 5.3., the emergence of an ‘economy of intensity’ during the time in which TNZW was produced, is likely to have encouraged a directorial focus on ‘kinetic’ and ‘affective’ dimensions (Corner, 2006c: 90). In my view this is likely to have invited and engaged a section of the audience that may not have found the more traditional treatments of historical documentary to be particularly engaging.
6.3. Production Perspectives

6.3.1. An Anomaly?

TNZW was funded, produced and broadcast between 1993-1998. During this period television broadcasting had become increasingly commercial and programmers were favouring light entertainment formats and quick turn-around projects over ‘in-depth’, long-term productions with big budgets. Expressing a sense of nostalgia for the days of public service television, Horrocks (2004b) proclaims: “From a public service point of view, the fourth phase was (apart from some Maori initiatives) the most depressing chapter in New Zealand’s television history”. This was a period in which TVNZ was intensely concerned with “cranking up its profits to a record level” and “increasingly loath to take risks such as screening any programme that might be regarded as dry, highbrow or unfriendly” (pp.33-34). Against this context, TNZW appears as an anomaly. The fact that this documentary series fulfilled an important role in provoking public debate, was categorised as ‘local content’, was directed by a ‘minority’ Maori filmmaker, and presented the (often assumed to be dry) topic of history – all appear to sit paradoxically with TVNZ’s extreme commercialism and reluctance to take risks. Why was the series funded just over $1.2 million and broadcast in a prime-time slot? And why did it ‘rate’ so highly in these circumstances? (Horrocks, 1999).

6.3.2 Synergy

As Horrocks had been involved in the funding of TNZW as a NZoA board member, he was perhaps well placed to provide a clear and observant picture of why the series was funded and how each piece of the puzzle operated in synergy with others to produce (in his words) an “extraordinary occurrence”. He described the series as:

...an extremely rare achievement...it is not business as usual for television. It is really something out of the ordinary. And in some ways, the fact that it happened at all is more striking than the shape it
actually took...how does such a thing happen? I think you have to understand that as a kind of synergy...I don’t like using the word...but...it’s a case of the right people in the right place at the right time (Horrocks, 1999).

Horrocks attributed this synergetic occurrence to a timely alignment of “all the right ingredients” – the human elements of which included; Colin McRae (producer), James Belich (historian/presenter), Tainui Stephens (director/Maori facilitator), Whai Ngata (associate producer/Maori facilitator), Wira Gardiner (Consultant), Marcia Russell (script editor), Tom Finlayson (TVNZ Network Executive), Karen Bieleski (TV One programmer), and various people involved with NZoA. Viewing the series as a major achievement, Horrocks expressed gratitude towards each of these people for the role they played in enabling the series to be produced during such a commercially oriented broadcasting climate. According to Horrocks, each of them approached the series as something special. He added that none of them were involved simply for selfish reasons, there was no money to be made,\textsuperscript{16} and all were fully committed to the project. Horrocks (1999) also discussed this alignment of people in relation to the timing of the series, mentioning that “it’s unlikely this kind of project will happen again”.\textsuperscript{17} On one hand, the timing did not appear to be good. It is difficult to understand how such a series could have gained so much support during the mid-to-late nineties, when television broadcasting had an extreme commercial orientation. But this was also a particularly important moment in the postcolonial history of Aotearoa New Zealand. Stephens expressed the view that New Zealand viewers had reached a state of readiness for this kind of history:

I certainly felt the time was right for...New Zealanders are more sympathetic – more open to this sort of story now. That’s part of the big picture of the way our society is developing...the time is right...and I like to develop programs who’s time has come...and when you’ve worked in the...the Maori/Pakeha groove - there’s lots of things happening, and it’s not too hard to tell things that will be of import, based around race relations issues...it’s the major thing in New Zealand today...notions of Pakeha identity and what that is, [are] really important in New Zealand society today. The Wars is a project which actually went back to the basis of all that (Stephens, 1999).
6.3.3. Support from NZoA and TVNZ

From the perspective of NZoA, the decision to fund *TNZW* was not a difficult one. According to Horrocks, the proposal submitted in 1993 by Landmark Productions “perfectly fitted” the basic objectives defined by the Broadcasting Commission legislation (Horrocks, 1999). NZoA board members could see the enormous potential of such a series in terms of satisfying the requirements for public service, local content and promoting national and cultural identity. But they were nervous about sinking so much of their budget into this one project:

The average documentary in those days was about a hundred thousand dollars an hour, and this project was receiving close to three hundred thousand dollars an hour...for five programmes. So it wasn’t something you could do very often in money terms. But NZoA was prepared to give a large chunk of its documentary budget...Its understandable that we had to be nervous because...it was a huge chunk of our production budget that had to come out of something else...we’ve had many experiences of big budgets that go off the rails (Horrocks, 1999).

According to Horrocks, apart from worrying about the size of the investment, NZoA board members were also worried about the adequacy of historical complexity, its bicultural adequacy, and the ability of the production team to realise such a large, complex project. However, these worries were alleviated when it became evident that Belich was committed to the project and the revised proposal and script had been legitimated by Pakeha historians. After about a year of negotiations with McRae from Landmark Productions, and with TVNZ programmers, NZoA were satisfied that there would be adequate Maori input at each stage of the production process. *TNZW* was finally given the ‘green light’ in August 1994, roughly a year after the proposal was first submitted to NZoA (Horrocks, 1999).

Given the almost ‘perfect fit’ of the Landmark proposal with the mandates of NZoA, it is perhaps not difficult to understand why NZoA would agree to devote such a large portion of their budget to funding this series – especially
at this particular moment, when the need to build national and cultural identity was perceived by the 1989 Broadcasting Act to be paramount (Bell, 1995a). It is less clear why TVNZ committed to a prime time slot in the schedule for a month of weekly documentaries, and why they contributed $156,000 towards the production of the series, when they had no assurance that these programmes would attract viewers, or meet the requirements of advertisers. While it proved impossible to find a direct answer to this question from TVNZ, it is possible that their support for TNZW was initially fuelled by a ‘public relations strategy’ (including a strategy to ward off government interference), that has been linked to broadcaster’s support for the national branding of documentary strands, Inside New Zealand (TV3) and Documentary New Zealand (TVNZ) (Bell, 1993: 40). Both Horrocks (1999) and McRae (1999) speculated that this support from the broadcaster was partly due to the important role played by NZoA in negotiating with TVNZ. They also speculated about the significance of the highly competitive relationship between TVNZ and TV3 during the time in which funding and scheduling was negotiated between NZoA, TVNZ and Landmark Productions. Particular individuals within TVNZ were also mentioned for their ability to see beyond the commercial interests of the broadcaster, and recognise that the series constituted a ‘special event’:

…it [the series] had to work for prime time…but, the interesting thing about this…is that there was less broadcast pressure than usual…and the programme is less compromised than the average programme…if you look at Monday night documentaries…there’s much more broadcaster pressure to make them populist…why was there less pressure in this case? First of all, it was accepted as a special event…secondly…TVNZ links which the participants had…meant that there was some confidence in TVNZ that they would make a programme that was…suitable for TVNZ…thirdly…there was ongoing staff support from NZoA. NZoA was fanatically supportive…and while we have limited power over the broadcaster…there is a file with about five thousand pages of documents showing how much work NZoA put into making this programme happen (Horrocks, 1999).

There were a number of possible factors, each of which may have played a part in the decision to fund and broadcast TNZW. Although NZoA had no
control over scheduling, the extremely competitive relationship between TVNZ and TV3 fuelled TVNZ’s desire to get hold of programs funded by NZoA. This was apparently fortuitous for NZoA, who occasionally found themselves in a position where they were able to ‘manipulate’ the outcome in terms of the broadcaster’s commitment to prime-time scheduling (Horrocks, 1999). Just when NZoA was considering the possibility of funding the Landmark proposal for this series, they were also considering another application by David Baldock’s Wellington production company, Ninox. This was for a similar documentary series, although with the backing of TV3. According to both McRae (1999) and Horrocks (1999), this situation put pressure on TVNZ to commit to a prime-time slot for TNZW, particularly as this series would be granted a significant amount of NZoA funding, at a level that was unheard of for any other New Zealand documentary series at that time. It is also possible that TVNZ executives felt a degree of ownership over TNZW, due to the involvement of a number of TVNZ staff. For example, the role played by Stephens and Whai Ngata (who were both key members of TVNZ’s in-house Maori unit) in communicating with a wide range of Maori communities with utmost respect, is likely to have brought kudos to TVNZ. Both Stephens and Ngata had a proven track record. Having directed and produced a significant number of programmes that were deemed both ‘quality’ and ‘popular’, they had gained confidence and respect from certain TVNZ executives (Stephens, 1999, 2004). So even if the series were to rate poorly (in terms of the ‘youth’ audience statistics), TVNZ would benefit from gaining a reputation for being a culturally sensitive network, and this was deemed to be extremely important at this time. According to Horrocks, there was increased pressure to support Maori broadcasting during this time, due to the aftermath of the Privy Court Case (2004b: 35).

6.3.4. Influences: Belich and Stephens

While many of the public respondents to TNZW assumed that Belich was the sole author of the series,19 the authorship of the series is possibly best described as a bicultural collaboration between Belich as writer/presenter,
and Stephens as director/kaitiaki. Their approach to these roles was shaped by a number of specific influences. A seminal audio-visual influence for Belich was the local television series *The Governor* (1977). During his time as a student at Victoria Universtiy, Belich had worked as a labourer, digging trenches on this docu-drama series:

...it was...working on *The Governor* that engaged me with New Zealand history...so there was a sense of full circle for me in that. I believed, with many of my colleagues in the mid seventies, that New Zealand history was a bit of a second class citizen...that was in engagement with it through television ironically enough...as a lowly labourer, that helped convince me that there was a history here and that it was potentially exciting. So in that sense there’s a kind of personal full circle in *TNZW* television series (Belich, 1999).

Episode four of *The Governor* dealt with Governor George Grey’s involvement in *TNZW*, specifically in relation to the wars fought in Taranaki in 1860 and in Waikato in 1863. Working on *The Governor* gave Belich the opportunity to experience first hand the potential of television to make history exciting. This series is also likely to have been influential for many people involved in the funding, production, broadcast and reception of *TNZW*, because as Horrocks (1999) pointed out, *The Governor* was “such a national event...it coincided with a kind of new nationalist spirit in the 1970s...*The Governor* came at just the right time to be a catalyst for public discussion”.

Despite being broadcast two decades earlier, this series, and the ‘event’ surrounding it, contributed to an awareness amongst many people involved in the production of *TNZW*, that such a series could potentially function as a very controversial ‘national event’.

McRae (1999) and Stephens (1999) both talked about Ken Burns’ *The Civil War* (USA, PBS, 1990) having sparked their interest in the making of a similar series. For McRae, it was the TVNZ broadcast of *The Civil War* that led him to read Belich’s (1986) book (the genesis of the documentary series), and subsequently to approach Belich about the possibility of using his book as the basis for the making of a ‘Ken Burns’ style series. At the same time, there were at least three other people who had approached Belich with
similar intentions, and Belich suspected that this “little crop of people” showing an interest in televising his thesis were also sparked by the TVNZ broadcast of *The Civil War*.

Quite independently, Stephens had also been inspired by the same broadcast: “It blew me away…I thought it was just a fabulous film”. While he was impressed with the use of photography and the way in which *The Civil War* “broke the stereotypes”, Stephens (1999) spoke more about the influence of Terrence Malick’s direction of *The Thin Red Line* (1998):

…it’s a more emotionally true story of war…that to me is wonderful direction…and you can hear, see, feel Terence Malick’s voice. It just so happens that the way he directs…I’m very simpatico with it…it’s fantastic, it’s just fantastic…There’s two things here – there’s the craft…and then there’s the wairua that you bring to the craft (Stephens, 1999).

Stephens describes a kind of synaesthetic engagement with the fictional film *The Thin Red Line* (1998), and his feeling of affinity for Malick’s directing style suggests that he approaches directing not only as a craft, but also as a means of evoking an experiential engagement for audience members. Throughout the interview, Stephens spoke at length about his approach towards crafting the series, which was interwoven with his philosophical and spiritual outlook. For him, the role of directing a television series involved an intuitive response to situations, and an understanding of wairua, empathy and emotional engagement. To some extent, this ‘deep’ approach to directing may derive from Stephens’ deeply rooted identity as Maori, but he also spoke about a number of life experiences (such as working for the Race Relations Office, studying at University, traveling through Europe, working on a wide range of programs for TVNZ) which appear to have contributed to his distinctive approach to directing, in which he appears to have a sensitivity for the emotional impact of culturally specific aesthetic elements (see section 7.6.).
Stephens’ objectives for the series were numerous. He considered *TNZW* to be a rare and important opportunity for a Maori director to craft and communicate Maori stories and language to a wide audience. However as a TVNZ employee, he was to an extent complicit with broadcasting discourses associated with ratings and prime-time requirements. When asked if TVNZ or NZoA had conflicting objectives in relation to his own, Stephens responded:

no, because such was the importance of the series...all the objectives were the same...to make a high rating, quality programme that revealed something about us as a nation...I attempted to make a programme, which was attractive to people...and to attain a programme that had political and commercial appeal. And that was...ooh that was very lofty...the intent to make a high rating programme was always a part of it...absolutely. I felt in my bones that the content, alone...would achieve that...but it had to work on many, many levels...and critical in that for me, was to ensure that it worked for Maori – that in no way did Maori feel embarrassed that, yet again...a successful mainstream project was dealing with Maori kaupapa – that they had cause to be embarrassed by bad pronunciation, wrong facts...by disrespect (Stephens, 1999).

This extract reveals Stephens’ strong sense of responsibility to Maori - and to a lesser extent, to TVNZ. He appears to negotiate between two discrete discursive domains, aiming to meet the objectives of both. I was surprised that he did not express this process as a source of great conflict and frustration, but having worked as a TVNZ employee since 1984, Stephens was well accustomed to such discursive negotiations. Beyond achieving these ‘lofty’ responsibilities, Stephens aimed:

- to move people...to move people...to cause them to think about it.
- And, for the project to have integrity and validity for the academic, and the militia, for the Maori, for the Pakeha, for the young, for the old - we had to cover a lot of bases on this one...I guess we wanted it to heal as well I mean, in an intellectual sense. And to turn people on to our stories...from a broadcasting sense...and from a spiritual, kiwi sense, to awaken them, to good history, good stories...another thing, was to, not play with, but also treat history as now...like the past isn’t
really past because it’s still happening… and the Maori view of history – of walking into your future backwards… was something that I wanted to try and bring into this… so I wonder, with certain contemporisations stylistically, certain language things… to work with people’s feeling about ‘what is history?’ (Stephens, 1999, emphasis added).

Stephens realised that challenging preconceived notions of history could be achieved in many different ways. While Belich was the explicit narrator of his version of history, Stephens wanted to inject a Maori approach towards history into the aesthetic construction of the series. The notion of “walking into your future backwards” can be related to the idea of ‘temporal collapse’ (as discussed in section 5.3.4.), and to my discussion of the way in which the series provokes a connection between past and present (see section 7.5.4. and 8.4.1.). Here, my audience research suggests that Stephens’ use of stylistic ‘contemporisations’, such as contemporary video footage of the battle sites, and ‘language things’, such as alternative forms of Maori ‘oral’ and ‘aural’ histories, have been very successful in achieving this objective.

During our interview, Belich stated that his objectives for the series were different, but compatible with those of Stephens. The main point of difference was that Belich spoke in a far more critical, and even ambivalent way about ‘New Zealand television culture’. On one hand, he was highly cynical of the media, but on the other hand, he wanted his stories to make a difference. He wanted to reach a mass audience, and he knew that television could do this:

…try as I might, through published books… I could only get to a tiny percentage of the population… you had this knowledge which I thought was important to disseminate to New Zealanders… and which I was unable to do through certain channels and television offered an option of getting far more broad… So, this is the other side of the argument of… you know… should one sully one’s hands with the mass media, or should one be content to sit in an ivory tower having no affect on one’s own society at a time when it desperately needs to be affected by people who think about things (Belich, 1999).
This extract expresses Belich’s ambivalence about being involved in televised history. He articulates a number of competing discourses, many of which relate to his position as a well-respected historian, both within, and outside the academy. While Belich wanted his work to be accessible, he was wary of the potential judgement from his academic peers. Despite his egalitarian disdain for the ‘ivory tower’ academic, Belich cannot escape those discourses - so prominent within the discipline of history - that chastise television for ‘dumbing down’, distorting and trivialising academic work of social, political and historical value (see sections 5.3.4 and 8.2.5). For Belich, the desire to reach a mass audience was not entirely a means of promoting himself as a leading historian. Gaining a mass audience via television was a key facet of his aspiration for the series to contribute to a maturing sense of national identity:

If I had to choose the single most fundamental message of the series, it would be that New Zealand has a history...and that that history is as instructive, dynamic and significant, as the history of any other country...an awareness of one’s own history, good and bad...is an essential prerequisite of a healthy national identity...And I think that’s particularly important at the moment, because I believe that New Zealand culture is currently at a cusp, where, you know...we’ve only relatively recently culturally de-colonised from our relationship with Britain, which had many benefits, but who’s cost was prolonged adolescence...and that New Zealand is now engaging with the fascinating, but traumatic process of standing on it’s own cultural feet. And...that that series, and an engagement with New Zealand history can be a positive force in assisting that process (Belich, 1999).

Several members of the production team claimed to have shared similar aspirations, and they expressed the belief that they were involved in a special event of national significance. All of the interviewees expressed a tacit acceptance in the idea that the series had contributed to a ‘healthy’ national identity. This suggests that a nation-building role for the media is taken-for-granted as unproblematic within (and beyond) the New Zealand broadcasting culture. The role of TNZW in relation to nation-building has been speculated by some New Zealand commentators, but my research indicates that such an assessment may not account for the complexity of audience engagement with this series (see Goldson, 2004, and section 7.5.).
6.3.6 Collaboration

Having heard through the grapevine that the proposed project was “basically Pakeha run”, Stephens discussed with a friend the possibility of being involved in the series:

…we thought to ourselves, you know would we be a part of it…and be complicit in what could be another Pakeha um…distortion, perhaps, because there’d been enough precedent of that. Or, do you take the point of…becoming part of it, and exerting damage control, cos you know it’s going to happen anyway (Stephens, 1999).

This initial expression of skepticism is possibly representative of the way that many Maori would have felt upon hearing about such a project having been driven by Pakeha. As Stephens points out, there had been a precedent of projects dealing with similar topics which had had little involvement from Maori, and which had been perceived by Maori as Pakeha ‘distortions’. For Stephens, the choice between viewing his involvement as being “complicit” in a possible distortion, or “exerting damage control”, was a position he had learnt to negotiate during his long career with TVNZ. For two decades Stephens had constantly sought to empower Maori through his representations of history, culture and language. With his integrity to this aim staunchly asserted, he learnt to be a very strategic negotiator in order to succeed in making a difference for many Maori, from within an increasingly commercialised television network. Against this background, it is understandable that Stephens had doubts about the “integrity” and “sincerity” of the team prior to meeting them.

I harboured all the usual doubts about what something like this would mean…and whether I wanted to get involved and put my neck on the line with something like that. But any doubts that I happened to have…were diminished considerably when we had our first meeting at the marae down here…there was a lovely set of good mihi’s, and I was able to sense right away…a sense of humility on the part of these Pakeha people who were driving the project. Jamie, in any event, in my experience with his work…has always been thought of as a man of mana, and good on him for digging up the truth of these stories…But importantly, there was a good feeling…it was a lovely
meeting. I thought, well yes these people I could work with… I made the point that if I was to be involved I wanted some considerable creative say in the way the story was to be told (Stephens, 1999).

The fact that this first team meeting was held at a marae, where a mihi was expected from each person, helped to set the tone for what was to become a very effective collaborative relationship, and bicultural production environment, that (according to all interviewees) lasted throughout the production. Within such a context, humility and integrity are not only highly valued, but necessary pre-requisites for the job of standing before a community and expressing your own kaupapa. While Stephens already had respect for Belich, this meeting provided the opportunity for each member of the team to express their respect for the wider kaupapa of the project they were about to embark on. It also provided Stephens with the opportunity to assert his desire for significant creative input. Both Stephens and Belich reflected upon the series as a successful collaboration between Maori and Pakeha. For Belich:

…it was probably a lot more collaborative than the books. And from my point of view that was one of the great things about it. I had some trepidation about the Maori response, and working with Maori. And…by the end of the process I was very comfortable with it. And that’s largely down to Tainui…who did a brilliant job of kind of bridging that interface…the incident that sticks in my mind is making a speech on the marae at Mangapohatu…Rua Kenana’s marae in the Urewera mountains….miles from anywhere. And, I made my statement…and I sung a Dalmatian song for my waiata…my heritage being Dalmatian/Croatian…and found that quite moving. The other thing that I was immensely impressed by…I mean basically when I went onto a marae, what I would say was this: listen, I’m going to tell the story of the New Zealand Wars and your part in it as honestly as I can. I’ve got no interest in tapu information. I’ve only got interest in information that I can question. It so happens that most of what I am going to say, you will like…but there will be some that you don’t like. Can you handle that? And, without exception the answer was yes. But there was never any…I never had a sense of kind of Maori veto. I mean I suppose a few things were softened…there were elements where I might have spent more time on Pakeha tragedies and so on…but…you know, Tainui was there and he was Maori and the compromise I think was relatively effective (Belich, 1999).
The mention of a ‘Maori veto’ suggests that perhaps Belich was initially a little uneasy about what such collaboration would mean in relation to his usually singular authorial voice as a historian. When Belich spoke of compromise, he was alluding to a give-and-take relationship, whereby Stephens was able to guide him in the Maori world, opening doors, and assisting him to gain the trust of a number of Maori communities. For Belich, the trade-off meant focusing more on Maori tragedies than those of the colonists, but this was also part of the wider agenda for the series, where it was understood by most of the production team, including Belich, that the time had come to ‘redress the balance’. A number of critics, who were seemingly oblivious to the authorial collaboration between Belich and Stephens, claimed that Belich had “swung the pendulum too far in the other direction” (see section 8.3.1). For Stephens, the process was less about compromise, and more about working out autonomy and responsibility for their distinct roles and their different approaches toward history:

In time I realised that what I was trying to do was...give Jamie [Belich] the right to tell the thesis, or the facts of the story, and give the Maori people the right to give their emotional response to that story...that became the nature of the balance in time” (Stephens, 1999).

This kind of collaboration operated beyond the personal and professional relationship of Belich and Stephens. They both appeared to view this as a collaboration of distinct approaches toward history - the ‘European approach’, in which (according to Belich) ‘the facts of the story’ are important, and the ‘Maori approach’, which (according to Stephens) prioritises an emotional engagement with the past.

Drawing on bicultural discourse, Stephens described this balance in terms of an almost symbiotic partnership:

...what developed in very short order was...in terms of a Maori structural dynamic...a tuakana-teina kaupapa – younger and older sibling. In a partnership sense it’s wonderful. In the series, Jamie was my tuakana, because it’s his thesis, his neck on the line...in the Pakeha world. In the Maori world, I became his tuakana and he had
to defer to me. So – tuakana you look down to, and uplift the standard, the skills of your younger sibling. The teina’s role is to defer to look up and show evidence, respect, and then strive...And, with Jamie and I, I felt that, that tuakana-teina thing was a paradigm, and it was fluid...and for me it served in a micro way, a paradigm, what leading a partnership...could be... and all that became a dynamic of the series (Stephens, 1999).

For Stephens, *TNZW* did not only tell the ‘right’ story, but it was crafted in the ‘right’ way. He suggests that the ‘tuakana-teina paradigm’ can be viewed as a microcosm of an ideal bicultural partnership between Maori and Pakeha in wider society. The fluidity of this relationship seemed to give him a sense of how such a partnership could be achieved in a broader context. This strength of collaboration during the production of the series was not restricted to Belich and Stephens. There was a high degree of collaboration amongst the wider production team, and this was driven by the recognition that they were involved in a special event. For Belich, this collaborative team spirit was welcomed as an alternative approach to producing history:

I was very fortunate that such imaginative and able and committed, very committed...they each saw it, as did other members of the crew, as something just a bit special. They were not working for dollars alone on that, nobody was. And, you know that came through quite strongly. We all felt that it might be a bit of a break-through (Belich, 1999).

This emotional investment in the project, indicated by descriptions of the series as a “special event”, or a “break-through” was a re-occurring theme throughout the production interviews. On one hand this team commitment to the project can be attributed to the particular discursive context in which the series was produced. As discussed in chapters three and four, this context was marked by a volatile friction between discourses of neo-liberal individualism, extreme commercialism, anti-colonialism, biculturalism, monoculturalism and multiculturalism. All of the interviewees spoke of a kind of philosophical alignment amongst the production team, and an awareness of the timeliness of the series as a ‘national event’. On the other hand, the team’s emotional investment to the series was fostered on a daily basis by Stephens’ dual role as director and kaitiaki. Feeling the huge responsibility of
his role, Stephens shrouded the production in tikanga, thus reinforcing the unique qualities of the project to all involved:

I felt that I shouldered the Maori responsibility to this event...But it was...a chance to work on a good quality Kiwi kaupapa – and that’s fantastic, but we felt that weight...I felt the Maori weight in particular...ethically...and so I spent a year travelling around various tribes, speaking to various people, having lots of karakia, following my nose...going through zillions of cups of tea...to find the right Maori people, the representative spokes-people...I wanted to make the project in a very Maori way. For three months of the shoot, every day...we started with karakia, we’d have a hymn,...whenever we went to the marae...I had to make sure my crew wouldn’t embarrass me...so we learnt the stuff, we learnt what to do...we picked people who were sensitive...‘au fai’ (Stephens, 1999).

6.3.7 Tensions, Constraints and Compromise

According to Stephens, personal tensions and frustrations were minimised by the degree of consensual importance given to the project. Both Stephens and McRae said that the production process had been relatively free of constraints, apart from a few minor incidents. While McRae felt constrained in terms of how far the budget could be stretched to cover additional expenses, Stephens experienced time constraints when he was juggling his regular TVNZ work whilst editing \textit{TNZW}. I was surprised to hear Stephens say that he had almost “total creative control” over the series, and could only identify one exception to this situation - when TVNZ insisted on him re-shooting a scene, against his own opinion. This relatively ‘hands off’ approach by TVNZ can be partially attributed to the few individuals within the network (such as Tom Finlayson) who recognised the special-ness of the series, had respect and confidence in Stephens, and understood the necessity of giving creative autonomy to an appropriate member of the Maori community, especially at a time when sections of this community were becoming increasingly vocal about the desire for Maori self-determination. While Stephens was well situated in terms of gaining respect and autonomy within this discursive context, according to Horrocks (1999), Belich was more likely positioned as a ‘pointy-headed academic’ within the corporate
television culture, and consequently experienced a markedly different relationship with TVNZ. In the following extract, Belich appears to position himself both within and outside this description:

…it was difficult for an outfit with the corporate culture of Television New Zealand to cope with the notion of a bearded academic standing in a paddock, getting good ratings. And, I think that generates a certain amount of…I think there’s a sub-text of unease at that…because arguably it calls into question other elements of Television New Zealand programming. So there was that tension. I’m also very irritated by the way that Television New Zealand has handled the video, which has been completely non-consultative with me. But, on the other hand, there was a real breadth of support…amongst the actual workers in Television New Zealand. There was a real sense that people put in a little extra…There was a sense that although the corporate entity might be uneasy…its individual components saw this as something important, and were quite supportive about it (Belich, 1999).

Despite the support from a few individuals within TVNZ, tension arose from the discursive clash between the academic domain and the corporate television culture. There were contradictory responses to the idea that TNZW upheld the old public service values, and according to Horrocks (1999), television executives were confounded by the unexpectedly high ratings for the series. As he explained it, “all industry wisdom said people don’t like history. This will be too serious, too ‘pointy headed’…and it will bomb out. TVNZ was ready to run for the bomb shelters when the ratings came in…and they were absolutely astonished at the strength of the ratings”.

Adding to these tensions, Belich also had concerns about the process of adapting his thesis for television:

I always had concerns…and, you know…continue to do so to the present. So what I tried to do was…kind of take measures which would minimise the risks from my point of view…of the project escaping from me. So I negotiated with Colin and with TVNZ a veto over matters historical. So that was a sort of security blanket if you like, or comfort factor for me. It transpired that the…rigour of television puts pressure on the academic’s desire to qualify and footnote…and that’s nobody’s fault…but it is inherent in the discipline…and that is a problem for me, and was right through. But on the other hand it’s the nature of the medium rather than…a desire
amongst those involved in the project to kind of vulgarise or bawdralise (Belich, 1999).

Here, Belich expresses a common discourse of disdain for the simplicity of televised history. Numerous historians have expressed concerns about over-simplifying and not being able to footnote, with regard to televised history (Toplin, 1996; Champion, 2003). Belich appeared to understand that he was caught between the disciplinary requirements of two vastly different ‘cultures’. While acknowledging that his involvement in the series “opened my eyes” to the “nature of New Zealand media culture”, this apparent insight did not alleviate Belich’s concerns (1999). Within the discipline of history, footnoting, and other methods of providing evidence are not only prioritised as fundamental necessities, they are viewed as a means of defense for any historian who publishes a contentious or revisionist history. Belich expected the series to provoke debate over certain historical ‘facts’ (such as his claim that Maori were the first to use ‘trench warfare’). He was concerned that he might be attacked for making such claims, without providing adequate evidence (in the expected form of footnotes). However his collaboration with Stephens meant that the conventional historiographic notion of ‘what counts as evidence’ became challenged, and alternative forms of evidence (such as oral testimony from descendents of those who fought in the Wars) became effective, although highly debated, methods of providing evidence (see chapter seven and eight). When the series was broadcast in 1998, Belich was publicly attacked by a number of very upset audience members, including historians and military ‘experts’. While he was pleased that the series had provoked such debate, he had reason to be concerned about such attacks on his professional reputation. While he was frustrated by the limitations on complexity imposed by TVNZ, Belich also appeared to be caught between the poles of objectivity and subjectivity:

Objectivity, or the attempt at impartiality is very important to a historian and I think that I do try to be impartial. A couple of factors meant that the balance was pro-Maori, rather than pro-Pakeha. One is…I just didn’t have the space to explain what was driving Pakeha…it wasn’t individual greed. It was a kind of ethos of expansion. Now, no one can deny that that’s a major part not just of
This extract suggests that Belich was pulled in one direction by disciplinary discourses upholding balance and impartiality. But he was also pulled in another direction by his subjective and ethical view, that the time had come for the ‘Maori side’ of the story to be told, especially given that they were the people who had been invaded. While he talks of impartiality as though it is a professional obligation he tries to adhere to, he does not appear to be personally concerned about the balance of the series tipping in favor of Maori. However he is understandably concerned about the repercussions of not being able to include aspects of his original thesis that contextualised the Victorian interpretation of race. According to Belich, he tried to convince TVNZ to include some aspects of contextualisation, but “the reaction was, ‘listen its complicated enough telling us what happened…don’t let’s confuse it with what people thought happened’…that was perhaps the hardest compromise” (Belich, 1999). This omission may have provided the impetus for critics who described aspects of the series as “reverse racism” (see chapter eight and Appendix 2).

6.3.8. Audience Considerations

The lack of interest by the interviewees in discussing specific audience responses was one of the most surprising aspects of the production interviews. Many of the interviewees’ comments suggested that they were partially complicit with the ‘ratings discourse’. Even those who expressed skepticism about television ratings, talked enthusiastically about how well the series rated and only mentioned specific audience responses in relation to a
few of the most negative public criticisms. When asked what kind of audience the series was aimed at, Belich initially spoke of the audience in demographic terms: “I wanted to get...as low, in quotation marks, down the age profile, and the socio-economic profile as I could” (Belich, 1999). While Belich was reluctant to surmise any impact of the series without ‘evidence’, he expressed hope that the series had been a source of empowerment for Maori youth:

I’ve heard some evidence, particularly from Tainui, talking about the way in which Maori kids have been fascinated by this...and I feel really good about that, because, I mean...it’s not that they think oh violence is the way out, that’s obvious that that’s not the case. It’s obvious that those wars were then and now is now. But what it does demonstrate is that Maori can do things. Maori can engage with change, they can engage with technology, and do so in their own way while remaining Maori. And if that lesson gets conveyed to even a small number of people who would otherwise be locked in the notion of themselves as second-class citizens...then I think that’s a very good thing. And I’m hopeful, but not certain that that was one of the effects of the series (Belich, 1999).

When asked if he was interested in specific aspects of the audience response to the series, Stephens (1999) replied: “this might sound blithe...but its not meant to be...to an extent, I don’t care...because I know it’s achieved what I want it to”. This response appeared to contradict other comments, where Stephens’ portrayed a unique empathy and understanding of audience engagement as an emotional, bodily, experience. As he put it, if audience members “didn’t intellectually agree, they got the emotional point” (1999). The following extract illustrates how an intuitive understanding of affective engagement guided the directing process:

…the song at the end, was very much a waiata or whaikorero, which encapsulates what the speech has been about, and emotionally brings people back to square one – back in peace. If in a tangi, funeral oration raises all sort of emotions...the waiata tangi is specifically designed to be a catharsis, and in some ways even exorcise all those feelings...and so I wanted the waiata at the end to be a part of that... And you’ll notice that the song is different on the first four episodes and it’s different again on the fifth episode. Because there’s a different encapsulation, different words...which
goes straight to identity...visions of identity. It all ties in with the picture of Ruakenana turning up at the right time and his tribe being mentioned in the song...all these little clues to resonate with the Maori audience...but if those resonance’s go up there [holds his hand above his head] – they’re nice enough, pleasant enough to be enjoyed anyway. (Stephens, 1999).

At the forefront of Stephens’ approach to audience engagement was an empathy with a ‘Maori audience’. However he continued to question what such audience categories meant for him: “if you’re aiming at a Maori audience...what do you know about a Maori audience? How does that Maori audience interact with a mainstream Pakeha audience? What is it?....and you have to have empathy” (Stephens, 1999). This categorisation of audiences as either ‘Maori’ or ‘mainstream – Pakeha’ is perhaps indicative of the strength of the discourse of biculturalism during this time. While Stephens used these categories as though they were two clearly demarcated audiences with essentialist characteristics of engagement (such as Maori emotional engagement and Pakeha intellectual engagement), he also appeared to be questioning many of the assumptions that are implied by such categories. This suggests that Stephens did not actually view the audience in this demarcated and essentialist way, but perhaps found it useful to use these categories as a means of establishing different sets of codes that would resonate with different audience members.

6.3.9. Landscape and Memory

A number of audience responses discussed in chapter eight indicate that Stephens had the experience to know what audio-visual codes would resonate with many Maori audience members. As he had suspected, some of these resonances went ‘above the heads’ of non-Maori focus group participants. Stephens’ apparently intuitive sense of what would resonate with Maori can be explained in relation to cultural memory. He expressed a sensitivity for the way in which memory can be evoked via cultural forms, as well as the natural landscape:
One of the things I enjoy about Europe...you walk into the Notre Dame in Paris...and you think, oh shit this is where the [...] got married, that’s where the gargoyles are, that’s where Quasimodo was...the physicality of that history isn’t as evident in New Zealand. But you can see it, you can have it, for instance...pa sites, mountains. That’s another awakening I had...one of the things I enjoy about the country...you go into the country...you sit there...shit that mountain range is fantastic...that mountain range has seen thousands and thousands of life and generation’s stories. And you can't help, particularly because of what Maori thought is...as reflected particularly in the language – to have respect for that moment (Stephens, 1999).

This statement reveals Stephens’ heightened attentiveness to the evocative impact of the man-made and natural environment. He also expressed a belief in the ability of physical objects to embody stories of the past: “I take stories as vehicles of meaning....stories are everywhere. These chairs have particularly wonderful stories to tell, because of the beings that have sat [on them]” (Stephens, 1999). This philosophical or spiritual approach to mythology, memory and the landscape played a significant role in the process of ‘crafting’ the series. It appears that Stephens has approached television documentary as a technology of cultural memory, by weaving together a number of auditory and visual ‘memory technologies’ that evoked emotions and bodily responses from audience members (see section 8.5. and 8.5.1.).

6.4 Conclusion

Beginning with an outline of the distinctive institutional context in which TNZW was produced, this chapter discusses some of the key discourses operating within the specific production culture in which the series was created.

Against the climate of neo-liberal reform that marked 1990s broadcasting, TNZW stands out as a rare example of a ‘longer-form’ documentary series that fulfills public service requirements, was supported by both NZoA and TVNZ, and rated highly. However the series can also be interpreted as an
unusual example of harmonious collaboration, not only amongst the individual people involved, but also between Maori and Pakeha, and between divergent approaches toward history and memory.

These unexpected outcomes can be understood in relation to a particular moment of Aotearoa New Zealand history, when the movement toward decolonisation had contributed to a discursive volatility, and a ‘readiness’ for such an ‘event’ to occur. On a more personal level, the interviewees pointed towards an element of synergy, where an array of influences, discourses and people became aligned at a particular moment (within the wider process of decolonization). As Horrocks (1999) put it: “it’s a case of the right people, in the right place, at the right time”.

A significant insight emerging from these interviews was the expression that the series was an anomalous ‘national event’ with unique qualities. The frequent expression of this discourse suggests the tacit acceptance of the idea of the nation within (and outside of) the New Zealand broadcast culture. This insight exemplifies my earlier discussion about significance of the media in relation to nation-building, and also in relation to the quite different project of community building (see section 2.6). Also implied here is a common-sense assumption that television documentary fulfills a nation-building role, without considering this situation as unstable and context dependent (see chapter 9).

Many of the extracts discussed in this chapter provide a sense of the complexity involved in exploring what has been theorised as the ‘preferred reading’ (Hall, 1980). The collaborative nature of this project suggests that a singular ‘preferred reading’ cannot be located, and that any preferences in terms of meanings, readings, or audience engagement, must be understood in terms of the discursive entanglement that each of the interviewees attempted to weave their way through.
Endnotes

1 This memorable phrase of Stephen’s (which he explains in Stephens, 2004: 113-114) communicates a similar idea to that suggested by Benjamin (1969) in the following extract:

   His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward (p.257).

2 New Zealand on Air (NZoA - initially titled The New Zealand Broadcasting Commission) was set up primarily to satisfy the demand for public service television, and as such it was initially responsible for collecting the yearly broadcasting fee from the public, and administering all aspects related to the funding of public service oriented programming on television and radio (see section 6.2.4).

3 The public debate provoked by TNZW has reverberated since its initial broadcast in 1998. Apart from repeat television broadcasts of the series, the video/dvd release of TNZW, and its use (since 2000) as a curriculum resource in New Zealand state high-schools, has maintained a public awareness of the series, and the debates surrounding it.

4 My attempts to secure interviews with TVNZ executives were not successful. This was partly because many of the executives involved in the programming and production of TNZW were no longer employed at TVNZ as a result of restructuring.

5 I have explored a range of perspectives relating to this period of New Zealand’s broadcast history (Bell, 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Spicer et al, 1996; Smith, 1996; Roscoe, 1999; Farnsworth, 2002; Lealand, 2002; Perry, 2004; Debrett, 2004, 2005; Norris, 2005). However, I have discussed this period predominantly in relation to statements made by Horrocks (1995, 1996, 1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). This is because of the insight that he was able to provide about the specific funding context for this series, due to his role as NZoA board member during the period in which TNZW was funded and produced. Horrocks’ view of NZoA, has been contrasted here with the more critical, and pessimistic view of Debrett (2004, 2005).

6 Examples of such skepticism are well documented in Smith (1996).

7 ‘Rogernomics’ was named after the finance minister, Roger Douglas, who played a significant role in developing the strategic focus of the 1989 Broadcasting Act. (See also endnote 8, chapter 4, for further details).

8 Following the 1999 election of a new Labour-led government, in 2001 TVNZ’s status was changed from an SOE (State Owned Enterprise) to a CROC (Crown Owned Company), meaning that “while the broadcaster was still expected to pursue advertising revenue and make of profit, it needed to balance those aims with service to the community” (Horrocks, 2004b: 36)

9 In addition to TMP, there was also government support for the short lived Aotearoa Television Service, a precursor to Maori Television (see Stephens, 2004, for a discussion about Maori television).

10 The ‘branded’ documentary strands, Inside New Zealand (TV3) and Documentary New Zealand (TVNZ) were both established by Geoff Steven, who worked as a commissioning
editor and executive producer for TVNZ during part of the production of TNZW, before moving to TV3. According to Debrett, Stevens ensured that these strands were nationally branded and dedicated to local documentary. She added that, by setting this up, “Steven consistently delivered good audience ratings to advertisers and consolidated local documentary within prime time in the weekly schedule” (2004: 9). This consolidation of local documentary within prime time slots, is perhaps one factor that opened up the possibility of TVNZ providing support for TNZW. New Zealand Television’s branding of local content was initially identified by Bell (1993 & 1995b). Bell argued that, from the perspective of the Government, this type of national branding was a political strategy intended to sustain national identity, legitimate the state and manipulate public opinion. For the broadcasters, national branding was both a loss maker and a public relations strategy (1993: 40). These branded documentary strands can be interpreted as both positive and negative examples of this commercial era of television broadcasting.

11 See Stephens (2004) for a discussion of his experience of attempts to develop Maori culture and language, both within, and outside of, TVNZ. Stephens also discusses some of the debates about Maori TV.

12 For a discussion of the shifting focus of the 1989 Broadcasting Act, see Bell (1995a).

13 However, in practice, the insistence on a financial commitment by the broadcaster created a catch-22 situation for independent documentarists. In our interview, Colin McRae (1999) commented about the frustrations involved in working independently, saying that in this situation, a documentary maker could only get funding if they already had agreement from the broadcaster, while broadcasting executives were reluctant to commit to a prime-time slot without the assurance of NZoA funding. According to McRae, this situation fuelled a tension between the in-house (network) programme makers, and the independents.

14 It is acknowledged that, during the 1990s, televised history was becoming “in vogue” in the UK and the USA, which is suggested in the popularity of Shama’s A History of Britain (BBC, 2000-2001) and Burns’ The Civil War (PBS, 1990). However, an institutional enthusiasm for televised history did not become expressed by New Zealand television executives until TNZW was being produced and broadcast. According to McRae (1999), this enthusiasm was not expressed until these executives had been impressed by the ratings statistics for TNZW.

15 TNZW was funded: $1, 246, 891.00 from NZoA and $156,000 from TVNZ (information provided by Horrocks during the interview with the author).

16 While Horrocks assured me that none of the key people in the production team made money from the series, it is likely that some money would have been made through book and video spin-offs. However, producer Colin McRae pointed out that much of the money made through video spins-offs went to both TVNZ and his production company, as a means of repaying the amount that both parties contributed to the project (McRae, 1999, Interview with Author).

17 Despite this comment, similar projects have since been broadcast on New Zealand television. For example; Frontiers of Dreams (xxxx) and New Zealand at War (xxxx).

18 The ‘branded’ documentary strands, Inside New Zealand (TV3) and Documentary New Zealand (TVNZ) were both established by Geoff Steven, who worked as a commissioning editor and executive producer for TVNZ during part of the production of TNZW, before moving to TV3. According to Debrett, Stevens ensured that these strands were nationally branded and dedicated to local documentary. She added that, by setting this up, “Steven consistently delivered good audience ratings to advertisers and consolidated local documentary within prime time in the weekly schedule” (2004: 9). This consolidation of local documentary within prime time slots, is perhaps one factor that opened up the possibility of
TVNZ providing support for TNZW. New Zealand Television’s branding of local content was initially identified by Bell (1993 & 1995b). Bell argued that, from the perspective of the Government, this type of national branding was a political strategy intended to sustain national identity, legitimate the state and manipulate public opinion. For the broadcasters, national branding was both a loss maker and a public relations strategy (1993: 40). These branded documentary strands can be interpreted as both positive and negative examples of this commercial era of television broadcasting.

19 See Appendix 2.

20 *The Governor* is significant as a flagship series produced prior to the deregulation of New Zealand’s state run broadcasting system. This docu-drama series was particularly controversial when it went to air in 1977, with then prime-minister Robert Muldoon ordering an investigation questioning the extent of financial support given to the production.

21 For useful discussions on synaesthesia in relation to cinema and sensory memory, see: Kandinsky (1911); Marks (2000, 213) and Sobchack (2004, 53-84).

22 For a discussion of the ratings discourse, see Lealand (2001).

23 See Stephens (2004: 113-114) for an explanation of this phrase.

24 For examples of these discourses on televised history, see also Taylor’s comments about televised history, as quoted in Chapman (2001: 138) and Appendix 2.

25 This point has also been made by Bell (1995a) in relation to New Zealand Broadcasting.

26 Discourses of biculturalism are discussed in Section 3.8.1.

27 Horrocks used this term during our interview, to describe the stereotypical construction of academics, by television executives in particular.

28 These include attacks by; letters to the editor from Peacocke (Sunday Star Times, 21 June, 1998, articles written by military historian, Garry Clayton (see Appendix 2), and an article by historian, Chris Pugsley (1998).

29 The significance of the ratings discourse in shaping programming decisions in Aotearoa New Zealand, is discussed by Lealand (2001).

30 A similar belief in the ability of objects to possess memories was expressed by Walter Benjamin, who implied that memory is “held not just by humans, but by objects” – objects such as cameras and photographs (as cited in Leslie, 2006: 179):

31 Stephens’ spiritual approach (which he refers to as ‘Maori thought’) is best understood in relation the concept of ‘Te Ao Marama’ (for an explanation of this concept, see endnote 13, chapter 4, and section 4.9.2.).
CHAPTER 7: Construction of Text

The New Zealand landscape will never look the same – how many people realised that the Great South Road was built to spearhead Governor Grey’s campaign in the King Country? (Diamond, letter to editor, 1998)

7.1 Introduction

Chapter six explored the distinctive institutional context in which TNZW was produced, including the objectives and reflections of those who were involved in its production. An examination of the intentions of the production personnel must be understood as only one part of a tripartite analysis, and as such these perspectives need to be considered in relation to the map of discourses outlined in chapters three and four, and to the following two chapters.

The purpose of chapter seven is to discuss the ideological and affective character of media messages, specifically in relation to the construction of the series as an audio-visual text. The term ‘media messages’ is used here in the widest possible sense, including ‘messages’ that are not necessarily communicated via linguistic means, and which may evoke both representational and affective modes of engagement.

Within the wider tripartite framework, textual analysis is valuable as a means of examining the specific conventions, techniques and strategies utilised in the construction of a media text. This method is used here, in order to locate the expression of the discourses already outlined in the discursive map. As discussed in chapter one, my multi-faceted approach to textual analysis will show how these discourses (including their remnant forms) are expressed not only via linguistic means, but also through audio, visual and kinetic dimensions of aesthetic construction (see sections 1.2.1. & 1.4.2.). The different types of textual analysis employed in this chapter include; generic analysis (with the specific use of Nichols’ expository and performative modes), narrative analysis, discourse analysis and aesthetic analysis. While
these types of analysis focus on different sets of codes and conventions, particularly rich insights can emerge from exploring the interplay between each of these dimensions of a text’s construction. The different dimensions of the series’ construction are exemplified by extracts of Belich’s narration, together with a selection of stills derived from episodes three and four of *TNZW*. While many of the insights emerging from this chapter are applicable to each episode of the series, in-depth analysis focuses specifically on episode three of *TNZW: The Invasion of Waikato* (see my rationale for this later in this section).

The analysis discussed in this chapter will demonstrate how this series promotes a number of discourses associated with biculturalism, nation-building, and de-colonisation, while also operating to re-contextualise and challenge previously dominant discourses of ‘race’, history and nationhood. This privileging of some discourses over others is discussed both as a strategy and as a form of discursive synthesis, whereby the series operates to mark out the parameters, and set the agenda, for the subsequent public debate (as discussed in section 1.4.31).

### 7.1.1. From Book to Television Series

*TNZW* documentary series is based on Belich’s book *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (1986), which was the published result of his doctoral thesis. As discussed in chapters three and four, Belich’s histories have been influenced by a particular discursive and historiographic context. This chapter does not intend to include an analysis or assessment of Belich’s book. However, it is necessary to establish some basic differences between these two different forms of Belich’s version of the New Zealand Wars. While the narrative structure of the series generally follows the events as they are set out in the book, there are a number of differences.
The series places more emphasis upon techniques of dramatization and personalization than does the book, and these techniques derive from the narrative conventions and audience expectations of cinema and television rather than those of historiography and prose that were used to shape Belich’s book. The adaptation of the book for television involved a process of linguistic simplification, but the translation of words into modes of audio-visual storytelling resulted in a form of historical narrative that has a specific type of complexity. As discussed in chapter five, the specific characteristics of television documentary call on quite different dimensions of engagement, and these aspects mean that televised histories function in quite different ways to written histories.

While Belich was the sole author of the book, the television series was a highly collaborative exercise, where the authorial creation was shared with Stephens. Belich’s collaboration with Stephens, and the conventions associated with television documentary, provided a complex approach towards what counts as evidence. While footnotes provide Belich with historiographic security in his book, there is no place for footnotes in a television series. As will be discussed later in this chapter, in *TNZW*, evidence takes a different form, following (and in some places, adapting) the conventions of television documentary, rather than historiography.

One of the most significant differences between the two forms is the series’ omission of the book’s contextualization of the Wars in relation to the emergence and dominance of the discourse of race. This contextual omission, combined with the personification of characters, meant that the series appeared to some, to be implying that all British people were innately bigoted, selfish and foolish. While the British characters were predominantly represented in this way in the series, little room had been allowed for Belich to explain the origin of assumptions about British superiority and Maori inferiority. In some instances, Belich attempts to explain the attitudes of the time, but only some participants of my focus groups were able to draw on
the necessary discursive and educational resources to place these representations of racism within an ideological context.

Aimed for prime-time television, the series was viewed (within the television industry) as a ‘popular’ text, and while it was praised by some (including Horrocks, 1999) for upholding public service values, it was also loaded with the added objective of entertaining a broad audience. The book may be regarded as an educational and entertaining read by academics and history enthusiasts, but the documentary series arguably surmounts these functions, utilising audio-visual techniques to ensure that a large number of audience members experience history as exciting, emotive and ‘alive’.

For Belich, the transition from author of written history to presenter of popular history, meant that his role as ‘author’ was made visible. He became a ‘theatrical’, entertaining and identifiable historian. Belich’s performative presence in the series plays a significant role in legitimizing the series, where as his book helped to legitimize him as a historian.

Central to Belich’s argument throughout both the series, and his original book, is a reinterpretation of the causes, the course and the consequences of the New Zealand Wars, all of which are framed within a challenge to the Victorian interpretation of racial hierarchy. Belich argues that Maori were intelligent and tactical strategists, and actually won many of the individual battles, and would have won more battles if they had not been outnumbered by British militia who were brought in to invade specific territories. Perhaps his most contentious claim is that Maori were first in the world to develop trench warfare. Particular attention is given in the visual construction of TNZW, to support this claim via technologically sound ‘evidence’ (see section 7.2.4.).

The five episodes are demarcated according to temporal and geographic factors, which Belich uses to distinguish specific ‘wars’, each including a collection of related battles.
The Invasion of Waikato (episode three of the five-part series) has been used as the focal point for textual analysis and as the prompt for focus group discussions (see chapter 8). This episode was chosen because the Waikato region continues to hold particular significance as a location that evokes memories of the New Zealand Wars. The Waikato iwi are guardians of the Kingitanga, a movement that emerged during the Wars as a means of inter-iwi unity and resistance to colonialism. Waikato is also the area in which most of my research was conducted, and I was fortunate that several focus group participants were descendants of those who are represented in The Invasion of Waikato. Some participants were owners of land that had been confiscated from Maori as a consequence of the Waikato War, and most of the participants were living in the Waikato region at the time the focus groups were conducted.

While the third episode covers a distinct series of events, themes, geographic sites and characters, it is representative of the wider series in terms of narrative structure, documentary conventions, rhetorical strategies, discursive prioritization and audio-visual construction. For me, episode three was more emotionally engaging, and more successful than other episodes in evoking a connection between past and present, but this is possibly due to my own familiarity and sense of connection with the Waikato landscape.

7.2. Documentary Construction

TNZW draws on many of the established generic conventions of television documentary. However this conventional generic structure is complemented by an innovative approach towards a number of documentary conventions.

As noted in section 6.3.4, the initial inspiration for the series came from Ken Burns’ The Civil War (PBS, 1990), and the producers have utilized a number of similar strategies in terms of evidence, narrative structure and characterisation. There are also other historical documentaries that have attended to the constraints posed by the absence of archival evidence, by
using similar strategies to represent events of the past. While *The Civil War* is closest in terms of formal construction, other comparable series include; the Australian docu-drama series *Frontier* (ABC-TV, 1997), Simon Schama’s *A History of Britain* (BBC, 2000-2001), and the New Zealand docu-drama series *The Governor* (1977).

In relation to Nichols’ modes of documentary representation, *TNZW* is best described as drawing on the conventions of the expository and performative modes, with expository conventions being dominant. According to Nichols (2001), the expository mode:

> Assembles fragments of the historical world into a more rhetorical or argumentative frame than an aesthetic or poetic one. The Expository mode addresses the viewer directly, with titles or voices that propose a perspective, advance an argument, or recount history. Expository films adopt either a voice-of-God commentary…or utilize a voice of authority commentary (p.105).

While expository documentary is expected to provide knowledge of the social and historical world, performative documentary “underscores the complexity of our knowledge of the world by emphasizing its subjective and affective dimensions” (Nichols, 2001: 131). Although few documentaries can be classified as primarily performative, it is not uncommon for documentaries to use elements of performativity as secondary to another mode. According to Nichols, these films may “give added emphasis to the subjective qualities of experience and memory that depart from factual recounting” (2001: 131). The potential for audience members to experience an imaginative engagement is also enhanced by “the free combination of the actual and the imagined [which] is a common feature of the performative documentary” (Nichols, 2001: 131). While *TNZW* uses conventions of the expository mode as a dominant means of representing and structuring events, performativity serves as a powerful means of complicating representation and audience engagement.
7.2.1. Objectivity and Balance

According to Nichols (2001), documentaries of the expository mode tend to emphasize the impression of objectivity and well-supported argument. *TNZW* utilizes a number of expository conventions to achieve this, but this sense of objectivity competes with a performative subjectivity, whereby alternative ways of imagining the past are evoked rather than explicitly stated.

In order to support Belich’s revisionist argument, the series constructs the impression that his argument is objective and balanced. In episode three, the sequence of the Rangiriri battle exemplifies this construction of objectivity. Belich describes two different versions of the battle, and then proceeds to legitimise his own version, with the assistance of computer graphic re-enactments (see Figure 7.1), and eyewitness evidence.

Figure 7.1: CGI Re-enactment of Rangiriri Battle

By including a description of the competing version, the series creates the impression of fairness and honesty. By using evidence to arrive at a truth claim, the implication is that Belich’s argument is well substantiated and historiographically sound.

The parts of Belich’s narrative that are most revisionist are given special treatment, so as to construct the impression of historiographic objectivity underlying the argument. Belich discredits the ‘official version’ of the Rangiriri battle, saying “this Pakeha account is clear, concise and quite generous about Maori courage. The only little problem is…it is not true”. He then proceeds to assert his version as more sound:

They may have been out of ammunition, they may have been buying time in the hope of reinforcement. But, standing here in their trenches, I find it very hard to believe that they were trying to surrender unconditionally. And there is both Maori and Pakeha eyewitness evidence that counts against the unconditional surrender story (Extract from The Invasion of Waikato, Episode 3 of TNZW).

Belich narrates both versions of the battle, demonstrating a professional and objective ‘weighing up’ of accounts, and a consideration of the evidence, before arguing that his own version has more merit. The fact that he is standing inside the remnants of the trenches is emphasized in order to give credibility to his revisionist version of this battle. Belich’s conflation of ‘Pakeha account’ with ‘official version’ suggests a simplistic and binary conception of Pakeha history versus Maori history.

An impression of objectivity is constructed by a balance of formal elements that appear as distinctly Maori or distinctly Pakeha. The beginning of each episode introduces the series with a screen that is literally divided in half (see Figure 7.2). One half depicts an ornately carved musket, representing the Maori side of the battle, and the other half depicts a military rifle, representing the colonial militia side of the battle. The guns symbolically confront and move toward each other, merging in the middle of the screen. It is interesting that this merging of guns was discussed by focus group
participants, as symbolic of various conceptions of nationhood – ranging from interpretations of bicultural power sharing, and a merging of two cultures within one nation (see section 8.4.).

Figure 7.2: Split-screen Signifying Biculturalism

TNZW, Episode 3, The Invasion of Waikato, 1998, Colin McRae (Producer), Tainui Stephens (Director), Landmark Productions, 50 mins.

A similar sense of visual balance is suggested by the selection of referential ‘fragments’, where a Maori perspective is represented by; a carved taiaha planted at the site of each battle site (see Figure 7.13), carvings, portraits of chiefs (see Figure 7.3) and interviews with Maori descendants. A visual counterweight to these fragments is implied by; photos of government officials, the militia, their campsites and weaponry, archival artwork derived from the colonial period, and monuments to the dead soldiers.

This formal balance is also suggested by the soundtrack, which has been carefully crafted in order to maintain a balance between sounds that can be associated with distinct Maori and Pakeha cultural traditions. In episode three, associations of Maori traditions are evoked by the sounds of traditional Maori wind instruments such as the koauau, by waiata, haka,
ngeri, karakia, and mystical wailing vocals. These sounds are interspersed, and counter-balanced, with the sounds of military drum rolls, bugles, Irish flute and banjo music, organ music, sounds of gun and cannon fire and sword swipes – all of which are representative of the colonial militia. This formal construction suggests a set of binary characteristics that clearly differentiate Maori and Pakeha as two distinct cultures. This duality may be indicative of the dominance of the discourse of biculturalism, at the time in which the series was produced. However some elements reveal an implicit complexity to this binary dynamic. For instance, the Irish music suggests that Pakeha were not just English colonists, but were also comprised of people from places such as Ireland, Scotland, Australia and France, many of whom had been disenfranchised by colonialism. Just as Pakeha could not be represented simply as ‘one people’, neither could Maori. This cultural specificity is demonstrated by the meticulous attention to using appropriate tribal waiata, haka and karakia, which are distinct for each battle site.

7.2.2. Constructing Authority

The authority of Belich’s argument is enhanced by a number of expository conventions, such as the use of maps, computer generated diagrams, evidentiary editing, low camera angles and direct address. In episode three, there are a number of instances where Belich is filmed from a low camera angle, endowing him with an air of authority, particularly during the most revisionist points of his argument. A low camera angle is used for rhetorical effect when Belich stands on a grassy hill in Rangiriri, and while looking down at the camera, contests the ‘official version’ of the Rangiriri battle. Direct address is utilized, in the form of titles, re-enacted voices, oral testimonies from interviewees, and Belich’s voice of authoritative commentary.

Belich’s presence as on-screen presenter helps to legitimize the less conventional aspects of the series, as well as validating his own version of history as that of (in his own words) a ‘bearded academic’. Belich walks into
shot in stereotypical academic attire, stares directly into the camera with a serious facial expression, and speaks with passionate intonation and over-active gesticulations. These aspects of Belich’s on-screen presence convey authority and credibility. While legitimising this version of history, his theatrical presence reinforces it as one person’s perspective. Every gesticulation further demonstrates Belich’s passion for his argument, which gives it integrity, but lays it open for contestation, debate and parody.

The excessive gesticulation borders on comical performance, and it was unfortunate for Belich that this quickly became the talking point of the series during the initial broadcast period. While Belich received some public ridicule, and was even parodied by television presenters over-indulgently gesturing with their hands, this amusing idiosyncrasy had some positive spin-offs for the series. Some audience members complained that his gesturing was an annoying distraction, preventing a meaningful engagement with the content of his commentary. However, this expression of fallibility and eccentricity helped people to identify with Belich as a credible and distinctive personality, rather than a stuffy academic or disinterested professional presenter. There is an element of unconscious irony in the sight of a bearded, spectacled historian standing in a grassy paddock, waving his arms around emphatically. On one hand, these images invite ridicule, but on the other hand, they portray Belich as a ‘down-to-earth’, ‘hands-on’ historian. Rather than sitting in an ‘ivory tower’ writing about history from a comfortably detached distance, Belich appears as a historian who braves the elements to engage intimately with the physicality of history. Standing in the remnants of trenches, or bowing his head at the foot of graves, Belich communicates a sense of genuine empathy for those who lost their lives at these battle sites. This treatment of expository narration can be compared with Ken Burns’ use of the more traditional voice-of-God narrator in The Civil War, which arguably appears as a more detached voice of authority in comparison to Belich’s voice. Ken Burns’ off-screen narration may be more authoritative in a traditional or didactic sense, but in my view it is also less personally engaging and less lively than the on-screen voice-of-Belich.
7.2.3. Evidentiary Fragments

Figure 7.3: Portrait of King Tawhiao


Figure 7.4: Only Surviving Visual Representation of Chief Titikowaru.

Due to the limited availability of archival photographs, a particularly creative approach has been adopted during the construction of the series, where ‘fragments of the historical world’ take the form of paintings and etchings derived from the colonial period, carvings, contemporary footage of the remnants of the battlegrounds, and the repetitive use of portrait photos of significant characters (see Figure 7.3). A particularly innovative example of such a fragment occurs in episode four, where a photograph of a one-eyed carving is used repeatedly to signify the chief Titokowaru, because no other visual representations of this chief could be located (see Figure 7.4). In the absence of evidential materials such as archival footage of the battles, these ‘fragments’ are utilised for their referential qualities and their assemblage functions as a rhetorical backbone, supporting Belich’s revisionist argument. These fragments also operate as technologies of cultural memory, where they have a particularly powerful resonance for those audience members who have access to specific memory dialects (as discussed in section 1.3.6).

Evidence also takes the form of; Belich’s narration (whilst standing at the actual battle grounds), oral testimonies by Maori descendants, maps and diagrams, re-enactments in the form of diary entries by militia, and colonists - performed verbally by actors, and computer generated animations of the pa fortifications. Editing serves as an important means of organising auditory and visual fragments, so that they serve as evidence, in support of Belich’s argument.

According to Nichols, the expository convention of evidentiary editing “may sacrifice spatial and temporal continuity to rope in images from far-flung places if they help advance the argument” (2001: 107). Images and sounds originating from various places and times are assembled primarily as evidence. However, these ‘fragments’ are also choreographed on the basis of Stephens’ objectives; to bring history to life, to entertain a wide audience and to evoke a memorable connection between past and present (see section 6.3.5.). In this way, the editing style shifts between evidentiary editing and what would more accurately be termed ‘performative editing’, as
explained below. Evidentiary editing dominates during sequences where Belich builds his argument, and when evidence is required to provide substance to the story. In episode three, an array of photos, paintings, etchings, narrated diary entries and contemporary footage is assembled to provide evidence in support of Belich’s claim that the Great South Road was built as part of Governor Grey’s strategy to invade Waikato and crush the Kingitanga. Spatial continuity is maintained by black and white photographs of the road at different stages of development, and images depicting the backdrop of the Waikato river. However, temporal discontinuity results from the constant cross-cutting between the colonial origins of the road, and familiar images of traffic speeding past on this well-used motorway. Rather than detracting from the argument, this temporal collapse evokes an indelible association between the familiarity of the contemporary landscape and the ideology of colonial domination that brought this road into existence. This strategy of juxtaposing visual imagery of past and present has evoked powerful affective responses in other documentaries, and functions here to provoke a re-imagining of the present landscape, and by association, of current relations between Maori and Pakeha (see section 8.4.1.).

Performative editing takes over during many of the ‘re-constructed’ battle sequences, where choreographed cutting promotes a rhythmic interplay between image and soundtrack, an escalating sense of dramatic intensity and a connection between past and present. In episode four, archival paintings by Von Tempsky depicting his experience of the action and the spontaneity of the battle, are rapidly cross-cut with contemporary footage of the forest battle site (see Figures 7.5 & 7.6). The camera movements are jerky and ‘unnatural’, including fast zoom-ins and zoom-outs, whip-pans and jump-cuts. The interplay of Von Tempsky’s paintings, jarring footage of lush forest flora, Maori chants and discordant sounds, combine to evoke a sense of nervous excitement, anticipation and immediacy. In this performative context, temporal collapse invites audience members into an experiential and synaesthetic engagement, as eye-witness and virtual participant of the battle.
7.2.4. Re-constructions

In the absence of photographic archives, the series relies heavily on more conventional techniques of reconstruction and re-enactment, not only to provide evidence in support of Belich’s argument, but also as a means of engaging the audience with a sense of the immediacy and ‘live-ness’ of the warfare. Consistent with Stephens’ intentions for the series, these re-enactments help to bring history to life, and are effective strategies for collapsing time, thus imaginatively transporting historical events into the present moment. Nichols explains this function of the re-enactment:

Re-enactment lies anchored, indexically, to the present distinct from the past it re-presents. The very authenticity of the image testifies to the use of source material from the present moment, not the past. This presents the threat of disembodiment; the camera records those we see on screen with indexical fidelity, but these figures are also ghosts or simulacra of others who have already acted out their parts (1994: 4).

While Nichols refers here to the presence of actors performing as specters of past events, a similar function can be attributed to contemporary footage of the landscape, the battle sites, the remnants of trenches, monuments, carvings, and art-work from the colonial period. When crafted as a rhythmic
interplay with the soundtrack, these referential fragments become ‘figures’ that perform as ‘ghosts or simulacra’, evoking an affective presence of the past.

On one hand, the re-constructions provide an immediacy, intensity and experiential quality to the battle sequences. On the other hand, the explicitness of re-construction undercuts the referential function of the evidentiary fragments. For Nichols (1994), the performative nature of re-construction and re-enactment calls attention to the issue of proximity. Audience engagement with these strategies depends, in part, on how close they are to the ‘real’, actual events. For historical documentaries depicting relatively recent events, closeness can be maintained temporally (Ward, 2005: 51). This is not the case for *TNZW*, where the temporal distance from the actual events becomes collapsed with the assistance of spatial proximity. The reconstructed battles are partially comprised of contemporary footage filmed at the exact site in which the battle took place. While this serves an evidential function, it also inspires an imaginative engagement with the re-constructed battle. The familiarity of roads, street signs, mountains and rivers, enables a memorable connection between place and event, which provides the basis or ‘trigger’ for a contemporary re-imagining of the battle. The re-constructions of the Meremere and Rangiriri battles exemplify this function of spatial proximity. While the Meremere battle is re-constucted via a montage of paintings, sketches and sounds, the Rangiriri battle includes a computer-generated animation (see Figure 7.1). Both re-enactments are cross-cut with images of the contemporary landscape, and of Belich standing at the site, drawing attention to the fact that he is standing ‘in the trenches’ or at the side of the familiar Great South Road. This was an aspect that was appreciated by New Zealand audiences. The particular response of audience members to these aspects of the series’ construction suggests a connection between spatial proximity, temporal collapse, imaginative engagement and cultural memory (see section 8.4.1).
Figure 7.7: CGI - Gate Pa Trench and Bunker System


The series makes extensive use of three-dimensional, computer generated re-enactments of the battle scenes. These provide a sense of credible, scientific evidence, thus serving as an ideal legitimising tool for the revisionist historical narrative constructed by Belich. Their association with scientific rhetoric and technological efficiency means that they are easily accepted as being stable, objective and factual forms of evidence (Miller, 1998). They are used in strategic places to support the most revisionist aspects of Belich’s narrative. For example, Belich’s argument about the expertise and success of Maori trench warfare is given credibility by way of three-dimensional computer- graphic models of the trench and bunker systems and the modern pa.

These computer-generated demonstrations enable viewers to travel on a ‘virtual journey’ through the trench and bunker system. This journey can be likened to the simulated and interactive capacity of a three-dimensional computer game, where there is an experiential dimension that invites the viewer to become immersed in a sense of ‘being there’ - at the battle scene,
complete with the sounds of canon fire, discordant sound effects, and the urgency and excitement generated by camera movement and editing. This type of engagement appears to share similarities with the simulated capacity of computer game play, where:

The onscreen representation of reality is not indexically related to the social historical world, yet the computer generated imagery stands as the locus of critical mass that feeds an imaginative and productive collision between game and player (McGeady & Schott, forthcoming).

While this statement refers specifically to a type of engagement between game and player, it is possible to apply this scenario to the capacity of imaginative engagement between documentary and audience member. With regard to the Gate Pa re-enactment discussed above, the strength and impact of this ‘virtual journey’ makes it possible for the viewer to experience the trench and bunker system as plausible, and to appreciate the sophisticated construction of the modern pa in terms of tactical warfare.

In the construction of the Rangiriri battle, two different re-enactments are compared in order to discredit the previously accepted version, while legitimising Belich’s version. The sequence begins with Belich’s description of the established historical account of the battle, accompanied by a computer graphic model of the pa and a re-enactment constructed from a montage of drawings and sounds of cannon fire. After dismissing the validity of the ‘official version’, Belich proceeds to tell his version of the battle – this time with more detail, and accompanied by a computer-generated re-enactment, complete with thick red arrows that indicate the movement of the British aggressors. This type of re-enactment serves as a more detailed and persuasive historiographic alternative to the (two-dimensional, symbol-laden) maps that are also used throughout the series.

To complete this array of evidence, Belich refers to “Maori and Pakeha eyewitness evidence”, presented in the form of re-enacted voice-overs of the eyewitnesses. In these, the series follows a similar approach to the use of re-enacted voice-overs in Ken Burns’ The Civil War. While these re-enactments
serve as evidence, testimony and dramatization, their intrinsic performativity evokes a sense of ghosts being ‘called up’ to act as ‘eyewitnesses’ of the battles. While the content of the non-Maori voice-overs is derived from diary entries, letters and other ‘official’ documents, the Maori voice-overs are derived from less-official sources, such as various forms of oral history.\footnote{These 'eyewitness' elements of Belich’s presentation of evidence represent an innovative approach to the lack of surviving eyewitnesses of the New Zealand Wars on the part of the filmmakers. The Maori descendants of those who participated in the Wars provide ‘eyewitness’ accounts in the form of extracts from interviews. This approach is in keeping with a Maori perspective toward tribal histories, whereby history is passed down in an oral form from one family member to another, via ‘knowledge holders’ (Pere, 1991: 30). In a sense, the documentary allows the descendants the authority of an eyewitness, as they speak on behalf of their ancestors. (They are pictured on screen, being ‘interviewed’ by Belich or Stephens, in contrast to the disembodied voices presenting ‘non-Maori’ accounts.) The descendants are provided the status of valid representatives of eyewitness evidence, despite the fact that this tradition sits outside of Western historiography. At a more structural level, it is useful to consider the role of narrative, as an important schematic device for communicating academically sanctioned forms of forms of history and for transmitting memory.}

7.3. Narrative Construction

The narrative devices utilised by TNZW include a classical narrative structure, character development in the form of thumbnail sketches, and the use of exposition, suspense and surprise. These strategies help to make this a popular, memorable, exciting and plausible story. As Potter (1996) has pointed out, “narrative organization can be used to increase the plausibility of a particular description by embedding it in a sequence where what is described becomes expected or even necessary” (1996: 118). Having discussed the rhetorical construction of TNZW, the following section extends
upon this discussion by examining specific aspects of its narrative construction.

The classical narrative screenplay is often structured into three distinct ‘acts’ – sometimes known as the set-up, confrontation and resolution. (Field, 1994: 9) The intensity of the action can be represented on a dramatic curve, whereby the story or scene begins at the lowest level of action, with exposition. An event or moment incites rising action and resistance to this action until a climax is reached. This peak of action then falls towards a point of resolution (Rabiger, 1998: 53).

Rather than dividing TNZW, or even each episode, into three acts, the ‘dramatic curve’ to provide an overall episodic structure.11 Invariably, each battle scene begins with Belich addressing the camera directly, providing introductory information about the events leading up to the battle, introducing the main characters, and emphasizing the significance of the location. The purpose of this first ‘act’ is to set the time and place of the individual battle scene, in relation to the overall narrative. The second ‘act’ is initiated by the ‘inciting event’, or the first confrontational action, usually the advancement of British troops upon a Maori pa or fortification. This is followed by ‘rising action’ in the form of combat, in which the British troops edge closer and closer towards a climactic point in which one side is forced to defeat. The third act, or resolution takes the form of Belich’s post-mortem of the battle scene, in which he assesses the status of winners and losers.

### 7.3.1. Protagonist versus Antagonist

The protagonist versus antagonist convention of the classical narrative is a powerful means by which conflict drives the story forward towards imminent resolution. In this case, it is not individual characters, but groups of people, who are representative of protagonist and antagonist forces. Conventionally, the protagonist is the most active character, the character who incites action, and whose action is driven by a desire to achieve some goal. In the
Waikato episode, even more so than throughout the rest of the series, the British are represented as the aggressors and attackers. According to Belich, it was the British who planned the Waikato war, with the objective of asserting colonial dominance, dis-empowering the Maori King Movement and confiscating the fertile Waikato land. In most cases it was the British who are situated as instigating individual battles. Maori, on the other hand, are represented as defenders of their families and their land. Their defensive reaction to successive attacks by the British places antagonistic obstacles in the way of the British achieving their goal.

From the beginning of the Waikato episode, Belich tries to discredit the previously accepted story that the invasion of Waikato was a response to threats made by the Kingitanga Movement to attack Auckland. Consistent with Belich’s argument, the Waikato episode weaves together a narrative of British as the aggressors and Maori as defenders. In order to emphasize the extent to which this war was a strategic British invasion, Belich emphasizes the amount of planning and preparation involved in the invasion of Waikato. Amongst other detail, he describes how Colonial Governor Grey had:

...been preparing for his invasion since the beginning of 1862, with a massive military build up in Auckland. A supply organisation, forts and depots, a flotilla of armed and armored steamers and barges for the control of the Waikato river. He also installed one of the first telegraph lines in New Zealand for rapid communication. The centerpiece of his strategy was a road from Auckland to the Waikato (Extract from The Invasion of Waikato, Episode 3 of TNZW).

The construction of the British as aggressors is supported by the argument that the British had an unfair military advantage. Belich repeatedly expresses the enormity of this advantage in terms of access to the latest weaponry and the numbers of troops. While steam ships are described as “the latest technological advantage”, Belich draws a modern-day comparison to provide an idea of the size of the advantage: “It was as though an army of one million people had invaded the New Zealand of today”.

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British as brutal protagonists and Maori as defensive antagonists is a feature that is consistently asserted not only by the structure of the narrative, but also by the actions of the individual characters and by the embellishments of the soundtrack. Military drum-rolls, bugle calls and the sounds of cannon-fire evoke a sense of the aggressive advancement of the British troops, while sad wailing voices and defiant chants evoke the defensive resistance of the Maori. In conjunction with Belich’s narration, and montages of images of the militia and their weaponry, these sound effects provide the affective reinforcement to the construction of British as aggressors and Maori as noble defenders.

Just as in overtly fictional texts, characters serve an important function within the documentary form. Plausible, recognisable characters provide a human conduit that viewers may identify with, and thus engage with abstract themes of a documentary (Rabiger, 1998: 46). This metaphorical characterisation serves an important purpose in TNZW. Here, documented character traits of individuals are presented through personalised vignettes, representing selective characteristics of larger groups in society.

In the Waikato episode, the historical figures of Spencer Nichols and Heni Pori perform these roles in the build-up to the Gate Pa battle. Spencer Nichols can be seen as representing a number of negative characteristics attributed to the British militia; creating an image of the British soldiers as individualistic, greedy, arrogant and foolish. According to Belich, “Nichols’ life revolved around food and boredom. Army food had improved since the Crimean War, and the supply system in New Zealand was good. But it was not enough for Nichols”. The re-enacted voice of Nichols says “We hear there’s to be a good deal of fighting at Tauranga, so I suppose I shall see some fun after all”. The characterisation of Heni Pori is developed in stark contrast to that of Nichols. Pori is described as “the other soldier who missed the battles of Orakau and Rangiriri...Once an Auckland school teacher, she was now a woman warrior”. Belich also reveals that the legend of a Maori man bringing water to dying soldiers after the battle was actually
Heni Pori. Portrayed as an incredibly brave and noble participant, Pori appears as a woman of strength, intelligence and integrity who risked her life in support of her brother, her whanau, and the Kingite Movement. Presented in this binary way, the negative characteristics of the British soldiers appear even more pronounced, with their Maori counterparts constructed as strong, brave, intelligent, noble and altruistic. These opposing character traits form part of a classical narrative system of binary oppositions, whereby British and Maori are consistently represented as opposing forces. In TNZW, these binary oppositions operate at both an individual character level, as well as a general level of opposing forces.

During the presentation of the build up to the Gate Pa battle, the audience is primed to develop an expectation of imminent British victory and crushing Maori defeat, on the basis of an overwhelming British advantage in terms of numbers of troops and weaponry. As Belich describes it, the Maori of Gate Pa were preparing to head into battle against:

...General Cameron himself, seventeen hundred crack troops and seventeen big guns. The biggest of these guns was an ultra modern, breach loading Armstrong, throwing shells weighing 110 pounds each - that's 50 kilograms. It was said to be one of the biggest guns ever used anywhere in the 19th century (Extract from The Invasion of Waikato, Episode 3 of TNZW).

Details of the weight of the shells and the size and number of the guns serve to paint a picture of not only British advantage, but imminent British victory at Gate Pa. The re-enacted voice of Hori Ngatai expresses the Maori fearful response to the very sight of the Armstrong guns: “When we gazed at those sons of thunder striding forth, can you wonder that the cooked potato seemed to have lost their sweetness, and many a one of us seemed to forget his hunger”. The expectation of an easy and anticipated British victory is given further weight by the re-enacted voice of Spencer Nichols, as he articulates the British soldiers' arrogant and ignorant attitudes just prior to the battle: “I dare say the brutes will bolt in the night. We’re going to blow the pa to the devil. From the outside it looks the most insignificant place”.
Belich’s narration of the battle scene at Gate Pa is at first consistent with this theme of overwhelming British advantage, and this construction of imminent British victory is reinforced by the sounds of heavy cannon fire and a defiant military drum beat. Belich narrates “the Gate Pa took a heavier pounding than the trenches of the Western Front and the heaviest artillery bombardments of W.W.I.”. This further emphasises the degree of British military advantage, in order to exacerbate the moment of revelation - when it becomes clear that despite the enormity of their military advantage, the British suffered an overwhelming defeat. With the assistance of a computer generated ‘re-enactment’, firstly sweeping above Gate Pa and then moving quickly through the trenches and bunkers (see Figure 7.7), Belich describes the reason for the Maori victory:

Gate Pa was a masterpiece of trench and bunker warfare. Sophisticated anti-artillery bunkers enabled the [Maori] garrison to survive the heavy bombardment. But it was also a trap, a killing ground, into which the British were invited... this was a bitter defeat for the British (Extract from The Invasion of Waikato, Episode 3 of TNZW).

In the Gate Pa sequence, conventional narrative techniques of character development, exposition, suspense and revelation are utilised to build up audience expectations, and then undermine them. In this way, the series illustrates the manner in which the expectations of the British militia were left unfulfilled during the battle, and also effectively disrupts any preconceptions the viewer may have about Maori military inferiority.

The above discussion has dealt with rhetorical and narrative construction within separate sections. However these dimensions of textual construction work together, in an attempt to persuade New Zealand viewers, both intellectually and emotionally. As noted in chapter six, Stephens discusses these as distinct forms of address, aimed at distinct Maori and Pakeha audiences. Although, as suggested in chapter eight, differently situated audience members (within and across these ‘ethnic’ categories) engaged with some aspects more than others.
7.4. Discursive Implications

All of the constructions outlined above have a number of discursive implications. This section refers to the discursive overview of chapter three as a framework from which to identify the presence, within TNZW, of key discourses associated with race, nation, culture and colonization. While it is necessary to describe the often mutated or remnant character of the more contemporary articulation of these discourses, it is also important to position these discourses in terms of a hierarchy of dominance and marginalization, so that a comparison can be made between their position in TNZW, and previous versions of these wars.

7.4.1. ‘Race’

The producers of the series made a distinct attempt to discredit the ideas that emerged from the discourse of scientific racism. For example, the Victorian belief in racial hierarchy, white superiority and Maori inferiority is challenged by discourses of Maori military genius and tactical warfare. Maori are represented as a people of great spiritual depth, strategic intelligence, and military skill. To complete this binary construction, the British are frequently portrayed as suffering defeat due to disregard of Maori skill, and their assumed superiority over Maori. These discourses are evident, both in the narration and the formal construction of episode three.

At various points in this episode, Belich draws attention to discourses associated with the Victorian interpretation of race, and then proceeds to point out the inadequacy of such ideas. Belich describes Governor Grey’s interpretation of Maori:

Grey did not like sharing power, and he liked sharing it least of all with those he saw as misguided children - the Maori...But there was nothing childlike about these men. The second Maori King Tawhiao became a great spiritual leader of his people. His supporters, Wiremu Tamihana and Rewi Maniapoto were men who impressed even their enemies (Extract from The Invasion of Waikato, Episode 3 of TNZW).
While Belich sets out to expose Grey’s racially based understanding of Maori, he does so without explaining the wider context of this interpretation. For instance, that this tendency of English colonists to perceive of dark skinned people as childlike, and thus, at a lower level of development, was a common orthodoxy during the 1860s, and part of the wider discourse of racial science. Without such a social-historical context, audience members may assume that Grey was merely an exceptionally racist person, or that Belich was trying to discredit him his personality. Adding to this problem, Belich proceeds to portray Grey as cunning and deceptive, without providing any background to the accepted racial attitudes of the time.

However in some areas the series is quite successful at discrediting aspects of the Victorian interpretation, and revising these with (at times) convincing alternatives. Throughout the series, Maori are portrayed as a people blessed with military genius. This discourse serves to challenge the Victorian interpretation that perceived Maori as an inferior, and defeated race. Both in narration and formal elements, the series builds up an image of Maori military genius by emphasizing a range of attributes, ranging from intelligent strategy and tactical warfare, to military skill, physical strength, endurance, bravery, and the sophisticated construction of the modern pa system.

In episode three for example, Belich repeatedly points out the intelligent strategy of the Maori response to each stage of the invasion. After the initial battle at Koheroa, Belich describes a delay experienced by the British militia. He adds, “the settlers blamed Cameron…but the delay was really due to Maori strategy”. According to Belich, this strategy entailed an intensive raiding campaign by the Kingites, which forced a delay of three and a half months to the British invasion. He also describes the British reaction of surprise, as though they had been tricked at their own game. The implication is that the British repeatedly failed to realise Maori military strategy, as they went into battle believing that Maori were genetically inferior. For some viewers, however, this may also be interpreted simply as a portrayal of British foolishness.
One of the most publicly debated aspects of this series has been Belich’s assertion about the modern pa system. In his attempt to convince viewers of the clever construction of these pa, Belich risks weakening a vital aspect of his argument, as he draws comparisons with the fortifications of overseas wars, claiming that the Maori modern pa system came before other examples of trench warfare, and was superior. Belich describes the Paterangi Line as “Quite possibly the most sophisticated set of earthworks to have been built anywhere in the world up to that time. Even including the formidable entrenchments of the Crimean War and the American Civil War”. And of the British response to the Paterangi line, Belich says “General Cameron and his officers could scarcely believe that such a savage race without any education in military tactics could have designed such a complete system of defence”. While this emphasizes the assumptions held by the colonial militia, there is no explanation of the origin and naturalization of the noble-savage discourse (see sections 3.3.2. & 6.3.7.).

particularly prominent in episode three, is the construction of Maori as a people who defended themselves in battle with exceptional bravery, endurance and unification. This is consistent with Belich’s (1986) literary version of the Waikato war, where special emphasis is placed on the strength derived from the unification of the King Movement. Although Belich describes the battle of Orakau as “an exceptional Maori strategic blunder”, his description of this battle serves to extol Maori bravery and endurance:

...inside the pa things were getting grimmer and grimmer. Most of the ammunition had been fired away, there was no water, and the people were eating raw kumara to relieve their thirst. By the third day of the siege the plight of the Maori was obvious to all. Cameron offered them a chance to surrender. Their reply is engraved on New Zealand history... ‘We will fight onwards - forever!’...Cameron then offered to allow the women and children to leave. Ahumai te Paireta replied on their behalf: ...‘If the men are to die, the women and children must die also’ (Extract from The Invasion of Waikato, Episode 3 of TNZW).

Accompanying this description, are images of Maori carvings, superimposed through a montage of mystical ‘dawn’ shots (see Figure 7.8), as well as the
sounds of a defiant Maori chant and wailing. Narrative and formal aspects combine to tell a story of incredible bravery and endurance. But there are many possible interpretations of this sequence. For some viewers, the carvings may be representative of the spirits of those who died during the battle. Depending on the discursive and memory resources with which New Zealand audience members have access, the soundtrack may evoke emotions such as; defiance, pride, sadness, anger or pity.

Figure 7.8: Dawn Shot/Carving Overlay (Aftermath of Orakau Battle)


The idea that women and children must die in battle alongside the men may be interpreted in many ways. Apart from emphasizing the bravery of Maori women, it suggests that Maori have a strong communal bond that places the whanau or hapu before the interests of the individual. This is a discourse of Maori kinship, which Belich tends to draw on throughout the series, often corresponding this to the binary opposition of Pakeha as individualistic and self-serving during battle.
The binary construction of Maori military genius and bravery versus British foolishness, arrogance and selfishness, serves to revise many of the previously dominant interpretations of the New Zealand Wars, and in doing so, to challenge the idea that Maori were an inferior race, and that the British were brave and victorious. However, while the series works to undermine the discourses associated with racial science, and replace them with more ‘empowering’ constructions of Maori, the effectiveness of this reverse representational strategy is undercut by the omission of a discussion of the ideological context of racial science. Without such a contextual setting, the British may be interpreted as simply foolish and ignorant or Belich may be accused of constructing and reinforcing them as such.

7.4.2. ‘Noble/savage’, ‘Exotic/Other’ and ‘Child/like’

Although the series works to challenge the Victorian interpretation of Maori as inferior, primitive savages, some elements of the series re-work aspects of the noble-savage discourse. A central argument for Belich is the assertion of Maori military skill, both in the sense of strategy and in the development of the modern pa. While this construction projects a more positive image of Maori than the Victorian interpretation, it may also perpetuate the myth that Maori are an essentially violent or warring race. By constructing Maori as a fighting ‘race’, with innate qualities of warfare (as do the Colonial artworks that are re-contextualised to re-enact the Rangiriri battle – Figures 7.9 & 7.10), these visual constructions of savagery may provide legitimacy to contemporary discourses of Maori as ‘violent trouble makers’ (McCreanor, 1997, 2005). As for strength and bravery, these were characteristics often attributed to ‘savage races’ - as opposed to the characteristics of sensitivity, gentleness and thoughtfulness, which were considered to be the more refined attributes of ‘white’ people (Jahoda, 1999).

However, the series’ construction of Maori is not that of the primitive savage of inferior intellect that was typical of the Victorian interpretation of race. The series constructs Maori as sophisticated, intelligent fighters. There is a
strong sense that Maori possessed special qualities that enabled them to be superior to the British. In contrast to the British, Maori are represented as spiritually superior, possessing an innate and spiritual connection with the land that the British are unable to comprehend. It is this connection that gives them an edge over the British, despite the enormity of the British military advantage. It appears that these qualities are over-emphasized in order to challenge the previous interpretation of Maori as inferior. In its attempt to revise the Victorian Interpretation, the series exposes constructions of racial hierarchy, but retains a hierarchical framework, determined in part by essential characteristics of ‘race’.

A particularly interesting aspect of the formal construction of the series is the extensive use of artwork from the colonial period, where paintings and etchings by colonists and members of the colonial militia are assembled to form re-enactments of the battles (see Figures 7.9-7.12). Viewed in isolation, many of these art-works reveal the discursive dominance of colonial paternalism, Maori as noble-savage, child-like (Figure 7.11), exotic and feminised (Figure 7.12) and inferior. For example, the paintings and etchings used to re-enact the Rangiriri battle depict Maori warriors as savage and child-like, while the images of the Maori warrior delivering water to wounded British soldiers, portray the noble side of this construction. But these discourses are re-contextualised within the discursive orientation of the overall series, which serves to challenge colonial discourse. While this paradoxical use of colonial artwork was the result of the limited photographic archives of the period, the creative alternative provides further complexity to the performative nature of the re-enactments. In this sense, Said’s (1978) notion of performativity and Bhabha’s (1990) concept of mimicry helps to explain this apparently self-conscious playing-out of colonial discourse, used here in order to support a post-colonial discursive strategy (see sections 4.6 & 4.10.2.). When colonial discourse is visually performed within such an unexpected context, it becomes de-naturalised.
Figure 7.9: Re-contextualisation of Colonial Artwork I


Figure 7.10: Re-contextualisation of Colonial Artwork II

Figure 7.11: Re-contextualisation of Colonial Artwork III


Figure 7.12: Re-contextualisation of Colonial Artwork IV

Both the colonial artwork, and the re-enacted voice-overs draw attention to the ways in which Maori have been exoticised. In the opening sequence of episode three, photographs of ‘groomed’ Maori chiefs are inter-cut with a portrait photograph of Queen Victoria and her re-enacted voice-over, derived from a diary entry:

I went into the council room...there were the thirteen chiefs and the three women...all had fine eyes and beautiful, glossy black hair...I expressed my interest in their welfare, sorrow at war having broken out, and my satisfaction at seeing them...when asked if they had anything to say, one spoke of their lands being taken away and hoped I would promise that this should be done, which I said I would. (Extract from The Invasion of Waikato, Episode 3 of TNZW).

On the surface, it appears that the Queen treated her Maori visitors with respect, and that she had a genuine interest in ensuring that their land would not be confiscated. But this diary entry is used to contextualise the episode, by providing an example of the Imperial view of Maori as exotic, child-like and in need of paternal welfare. The re-enacted voice-overs of the colonial militia serve a similar function, however narrated with an arrogant tone and upper-class English accent, these voice-overs were most effective at enraging those audience members who complained that the series “swung the pendulum too far the other way” (see section 8.3.1).

7.4.3. Relation to Land

While the British colonists are represented as invaders who have an opportunistic and uneasy relation to the land, Maori are portrayed as having an intrinsic connection to the land. In this way, Maori are firmly constructed as the ‘homeland people’ (see chapter 2), also described by Connor (1994: 78) as ‘sons of the soil’. These discourses are prioritized by the formal construction of the series, as well as Belich’s narration: “For the imperial troops carving a highway through the scrub and swamp of South Auckland, it was back-breaking work. There were few home comforts, and they did not remember Pokeno fondly”. While colonial militia are seen to struggle and complain about the task of constructing the Great South Road, Maori are
portrayed as living in harmony with, and respect of the land, and their strong connection to the land enabled the construction of “a defensive line of trenches and parapets” made entirely of earth. The sense that Maori have a spiritual connection to the land is also evoked in more subtle ways by formal elements, such as the use of flowing water and misty landscape imagery as image layers, from which emerge ghost-like portraits of King Tawhiao, Wiremu Tamihana and Rewi Maniopoto. These aspects express Stephens’ understanding and value of the notion of Tangata Whenua (people of the land), his interest in indigenous political issues, and his belief that figures of the natural landscape embody ‘stories’ of the past. Stephens’ approach to landscape imagery is also consistent with the notion of ‘deep ecology’, especially as it is understood within Maori cosmology (Urlich Cloher, 2004: 47, see chapter 2).

7.4.4. Nation, Landscape, Memory and Metaphor

The ‘uncanniness of being at once the same and different, at once time and space’ characterizes the dual vividness of evocations of physical place with their dreamlike refusal to be contained within a particular time (MacDonald, 2006: 336).

Figure 7.13: Rangiriri Battle Site: Taiaha

Figure 7.14: Rangiriri Battle Site: Sign

TNZW, Episode 3, The Invasion of Waikato, 1998, Colin McRae (Producer), Tainui Stephens (Director), Landmark Productions, 50 mins.

The above quotation by MacDonald expresses how imagery of the geographical landscape plays a powerful role in constructing ‘the nation’ in a
tangible and memorable way. As discussed in section 2.8.2., the landscape can be understood as a taken-for-granted means of ideological signification and reification, whereby metaphor, allegory, synecdoche and metonymy allow images of the landscape to have a rhetorical function (Duncan, 1990). In a mediated context, the landscape can also be theorized as a daily signifier of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995), and as a process of social and cultural negotiation, “part of the way in which identities are created and disputed, whether as individual, group or nation-state” (Bender, 1993: 3).

TNZW makes use of the landscape to invoke a connection between past and present. The newly remembered nation is made tangible by a re-imagining of the landscape, so that previously taken-for-granted roads, towns, hills and valleys take on an eerie association with the violence of the past. The series works to etch the Great South Road into the popular memory of New Zealand’s national story, where it can function as a familiar signifier of the brutality of British colonization. The Waikato episode presents a montage of archival photographs as evidence of the road being built by British soldiers. Complementing this visual montage, are the sounds of military drum rolls, overlaid with Belich’s narration: “By early 1863, the road pointed like a giant sword at the heart of the King Movement”. Interpreted within the context of New Zealand decolonization, this statement serves as an extremely powerful metaphor for the colonial ‘rape’ of the landscape, and invasion of tangata whenua. Such a vivid metaphor also firmly constructs the colonial militia as the aggressors of this war. Belich also employs anthropomorphic metaphors to invoke imagery of colonial brutality. He says that the Taranaki War “had been an attempt to cripple Maori autonomy by local example, to cut off the hand of Maori independence...the (King) Movement and its Waikato heartland was the spine of Maori independence. It could only be broken by assault”.

This role of forging a connection between past and present through familiar imagery of the New Zealand landscape was a recurring theme in many of the public responses that flourished following the screening of each episode.
This is illustrated by the extract by Diamond (1998), which introduces this chapter (see Appendix 2). Even the title ‘King Country’ now takes on new meaning, as many will recall the importance of the King Movement from the Waikato episode of the series.12

While the re-imagining of the New Zealand landscape may appear an abstract notion, many viewers recognised immediately the social and political consequences of such a transformation. As one commentator suggested: ‘Belich’s deliberately iconoclastic series reveals the lack of knowledge we have about our past… his myth busting exercise helped put in context the present grievances of the Maori’. (Sunday Star Times editorial, p.10)

7.5. Biculturalism, Nation-building and Resistance

Given the prominence of the discourse of biculturalism throughout the 1990s, it is not surprising that a bicultural concept of nationhood is promoted by the formal construction of the series. This is evident in the repeated and attempted balance of binary characteristics that represent Maori and the British as two distinct groups, whose representative images and sounds literally share screen space. Arguing that “it is necessary to see beyond what might be understood as a progressive liberal vision of society”, Goldson (2004) interprets the series’ prioritization of biculturalism as perpetuating the ‘nation’ as cohesive rather than fragmentary:

But as vital as the restitution process is, biculturalism can be understood as potentially staving off Maori sovereignty (tino rangatiratanga), allowing the ‘nation’ to survive rather than to splinter. Hence, rather than being simply a liberal force, TNZW can be seen as part of the Griersonian tradition, as reformist, an attempt to contain and diminish Maori anger and, importantly, their claims for sovereignty. It also offers a view, produced, as Stephen Turner has pointed out, ‘through a triangle of discourses – the University, the media, and the state – all invested in the continuation of...a settler economy’ (246).
I agree with Goldson that biculturalism is not always a progressive strategy for decolonisation, and this is especially so when it is expressed in the form of binary categories based on essential characteristics of race and culture. I also agree that the series should not be simply understood as a liberal force. However it is just as simplistic to view this series as complicit with the superstructure’s investment in the continuation of a settler economy. This argument underplays the complexity of the series’ construction, and also overlooks the complex discursive entanglement forming the context of production and reception. Within this combustible discursive context, the series functions in a number of ways - while it may fulfill a nation-building role, it also simultaneously opens spaces, evokes memories and ‘stirs up’ emotions of passionate resistance to colonial discourse. The audience responses in chapter eight, together with the discussion of production intentions in chapter six, serve to challenge both Turner’s and Goldson’s arguments, including the claim that this series is part of “an attempt to contain and diminish Maori anger” (Goldson, 2004: 246).

As argued in section 1.3., theories of cultural memory offer a useful means of exploring the ways in which *TNZW* has been constructed so as to evoke, ‘stir up’ and even transform the memory corpus of audience members. The series ‘taps into’ intra-group memory resources in the form of oral traditions such as; legends, myths, proverbs, waiata, haka and instrumental sounds. Along with the ‘fabric’ and ‘craft’ of audio-visual media, the former, more traditional forms are used as technologies of cultural memory, thus opening up a space of transit whereby audience members are encouraged to experience a continual “transiting between the present and the perceived origins of meaning in the affective dimension of the past” (Mageo, 2001: 15). According to Hodgkin and Radstone (2003), various forms of audio-visual media have an inherent ability to re-shape historical narrative. By prioritizing less conventional oral, aural and visual forms of transmitting meaning, this audio-visual construction of memory resources carries the potential of legitimising previously marginalized ways of engaging with the past. The impact of this process was observed during the focus group discussions,
where some Maori participants expressed a sense of empowerment in relation to the use of culturally specific methods of transmitting memory (see section 8.5.1). In TNZW, cultural memory plays an important role in activating sites of resistance to colonial discourse. The series’ transmission of memory resources incites an enduring consciousness of injustice, which is experienced simultaneously as knowledge, emotion and bodily affect.

7.6. Conclusion

Influenced by a number of popular televised histories dealing with colonisation and war, the producers of TNZW have consciously positioned this series as a popular historical narrative. Faced with similar constraints to those that helped to shape The Civil War, an attempt has been made to emulate many of the documentary conventions utilised in this American series.

The creators of TNZW have utilised the conventions of Nichols’ expository and performative modes, adapting these in order to make the series both persuasive, and resonant with their assumed audiences. Conventions of the expository mode are used to construct the impression of objectivity, to legitimise Belich’s revisionist narrative, and to construct a rhetorical and evidential backbone for the series. While these are all well tested conventions of historical documentary, the series departs from convention by adopting a creative approach toward evidentiary fragments and oral testimony. Documentary performativity is also approached in a creative way, with the use of computer generated re-enactments and cross-cutting between colonial artwork and contemporary landscape images, both of which attempt to simulate the action of the battles. The re-contextualisation of colonial artwork exemplifies the postcolonial strategy of mimicry, and operates to de-naturalise the discourses associated with racial science.

These generic aspects of the series’ construction are also considered here in relation to the approach taken toward narrative and aesthetic construction.
Many of the evidentiary fragments used in support of Belich’s narrative also serve as technologies of cultural memory. Carvings, colonial artwork, and familiar landscape imagery operate simultaneously as evidence and as memory triggers, strategically directed here toward specific communities of memory within the New Zealand audience. The series’ soundtrack adds another layer of memory triggers, however the following chapter will demonstrate how the affective qualities of the Maori instrumental sounds resonated in quite different ways for differently positioned audience members.

In these ways, the different facets of Stephens’ agenda (as discussed in section 6.3.5), are especially evident in the aesthetic construction of the series. Belich’s agenda is perhaps more apparent in the rhetorical and evidentiary aspects of the series’ construction. However, the sense of legitimacy and status accorded to his particular version of history may have been partially damaged due to the series’ omission of a necessary contextualisation about the origins of discourses of race and colonialism.

While it has been argued that *TNZW* has fulfilled a nation-building role, it can also be described as a strategy of cultural de-colonisation, whereby the series’ challenge to colonial discourse is achieved via aesthetic, linguistic and narrative construction. It is perhaps more useful to describe this series as a complex polysemic text, which engages with a wide range of sometimes competing discourses and documentary conventions. The highly collaborative nature of its production has contributed to a complexity of formal construction, reiterating the impossibility of locating a singular ‘preferred reading’. Rather than attempting to do so, this chapter outlines how the series frames concepts such as ‘nation’, ‘culture’, ‘race’ and ‘history’, thus revealing the prioritization of a particular ‘hierarchy of discourse’. This discursive hierarchy is understood here as setting the parameters for the public debate that followed the series’ 1998 broadcast, including the focus group responses discussed in the following chapter.
Endnotes

1 This extract was derived from a letter to the editor by Diamond (1998). A full copy of this letter is included on the CD in Appendix 2.

2 While my analyses focused primarily on episode 3, I have also included some analysis of other episodes of TNZW.

3 The narrated script, which was reduced from the book’s 160,000 words, to 35,000 words for the series, has been described by Belich (1999), as overly simplified in comparison to the book.

4 See for instance, Peacock’s (1998) letter to the editor (an extract from this letter is used as the opening quotation for chapter 8. A full copy of this letter is included in Appendix 2).

5 See section 6.3.7., where Belich (1999) explains “I just didn’t have the space to explain what was driving Pakeha”.

6 Certain aspects of Belich’s attire (such as the stereotypical ‘formal but bland’ academic clothing) and theatrical performance have been molded on the basis of prominent academic presenters in documentary series. For example, David Attenborough and Simon Schama.

7 See Appendix 2 for examples of a variety of public responses to Belich’s over-active gesticulations.

8 See, for example Night and Fog (Resnais, 1955), and discussions about the international reception of this documentary in; van der Knaap (2006).

9 By ‘unnatural camera movements’, I am using moving image production terminology to distinguish between those camera movements and framing conventions (such as the pan, the tracking shot and the mid-shot) that tend to be used to mimic what the eye would ‘naturally’ see, and those (such as the zoom-in and the pull-focus) that appear ‘unnatural’ to the eye, and thus draw attention to the process of construction (these are explained in Vineyard, 2000).

10 Oral history is accorded more prominence in Nichols’ ‘interactive’ and ‘observational’ documentary modes of representation, where more weight is given to the authenticity of personal testimony (Nichols, 1991, 2001).

11 This is a common structuring device for television documentary, as it enables the episode to fit into fragmented broadcast slots, which are regularly interspersed with advertisements. This is also an example of the way in which the de-regulated broadcast context has impacted on creative decisions during the program making.

12 Refer to the glossary for an explanation of the significance of the King Country in relation to the King Movement.
CHAPTER 8: Reception Analysis

What further racist tripe is to be inflicted in the guise of true history?...The renegade Maori deserting their pa in a skirmish were not a ‘victorious and heroic’ people defending independence in the face of intruding cowardly and nincompoop English soldiery, despite what Professor Belich and Auckland University invent...The programme...increasingly makes this elderly fourth generation New Zealander – and I suspect a lot of others – want to puke. (Peacock, letter to editor, 1998)

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the complexity of audience response to *TNZW*, paying special attention to the role of discursive and memory resources, which are understood here as systems of meaning that shape, construct, constrain and spark certain types of intellectual and affective engagement with the series. This chapter aims to demonstrate how these meaning systems are utilised as primary modes of engagement with this series, and to explore their role in enabling, activating or shaping negotiation of (or resistance to) discourses associated with colonisation, nation, history, race and culture.

While cultural memory has been used as an abstract cultural theory (Mageo, 2001), and as a means of cinematic textual analysis (Marks, 2000), its appropriation as a tool for analysis of empirical audience data may strengthen theoretical claims about the significance of memory in terms of engagement with audiovisual media. As cultural memory operates at the intersection of collective and personal memory, its application to audience research enables a consideration of memory as a collective social and cultural resource, without losing sight of the personal, bodily, experiential, or more subjective dimensions of audience engagement.

By demonstrating the complexity of audience engagement with this series, this chapter argues that such complexity points toward the opening of new and dynamic spaces. These are ‘interstitial’, productive spaces that generate
processes such as public debate, discursive synthesis, affective engagement, temporal transit, re-imagining, and re-membering. These processes also operate at different levels and different discursive contexts for differently situated audiences.

The audience responses discussed in this chapter have been selected from a vast array of focus group extracts, for their propensity to provide insights about how these processes operate within this specific discursive context, and to demonstrate the articulation of discursive and memory resources.

One conclusion of this chapter is that these focus group participants have accessed the same domains of discourse that were located in earlier historical narratives of the New Zealand Wars. However, the actual discourses expressed by these audience members appear as remnants and mutations of their predecessors. The audience responses also show how certain discourses have changed position since the colonial period – moving from dominance to marginalisation and vise-versa. But possibly the most significant conclusion is the key role of memory resources in enabling a ‘stirring up’ of emotion and resistance to colonial discourse.

While the insights generated from this audience research have significant qualitative value, it is necessary to acknowledge the particular limitations and assumptions of this type of research, and of my research design. The focus group method of audience research is very sensitive to many aspects of the viewing context. As outlined in chapter one, a number of environmental, temporal and spatial factors influence the shape and nature of the group discussion. Other factors, such as group composition and dynamics, and the involvement of the researcher also play a role in shaping the research outcomes. However, it must be stressed that it was not my intention to reproduce, or represent, ‘natural’ or ‘authentic’ dialogue. It is understood that all dialogue, even that which occurs relatively spontaneously, is always constructed (and often performed) in relation to the prevailing social and cultural context.
Just as the producers of this series constructed their own assumed audience, I have also constructed assumed audiences as part of my research design, which included a total of thirty-four participants, spread across six focus groups (see Appendix 1 for an outline of focus group participants). With the value of hindsight, it is now possible to see that there are some obvious limitations in my initial choice of focus groups, and the participants that made up these groups. If the opportunity had arisen to revise these choices, I would include a group of participants who were recent immigrants to New Zealand. However, the ‘audiences’ that have been constructed on the basis of my initial choices reveal my assumptions about potential differences of interpretation based on demographic factors such as ethnicity, age, gender, education and community group membership. To an extent, these assumptions were guided by the findings of an earlier pilot audience response project. This survey of public responses to newspapers and magazines (which were written during the initial broadcast of *TNZW* in 1998) provided a sense of the types of debates that the series had provoked, and indicated that responses tended to differ predominantly along the lines of ethnicity, age and geographic homeland. Many of these responses took the form of letters to the editor, and this particular forum for public debate appeared to promote a full range of ‘gut reactions’ from many audience members (see for instance, the extract quoted at the beginning of this chapter. See also Appendix 2 for examples of these published responses). The letters to the editor also suggest the wider applicability of cultural memory and affective response to documentary.

Despite this relevance, my focus group study of the audience takes centre stage in this chapter. The focus group transcripts are utilised here as the primary resource for analysis for several reasons. The focus group is a useful forum for producing rich discursive data, especially in this case, where a key objective was to explore the social construction of meaning. The particular discursive negotiation within an existing community and observation of body language are facets of the focus group discussion that would not have been available through the analysis of letters to the editor. Finally, the focus group
method has enabled the participation of individuals who would not normally respond to a documentary series by writing a letter to the editor. In this sense, the focus group method has given voice to a less publicly represented section of the television audience. However, in the conclusion of this chapter, I will briefly discuss the quite different types of responses elicited by these different fora, which is an important outcome of my research.

The particular research context that I have set up in each focus group is significant in terms of the way in which the participants engaged with TNZW, and the type of discussion that resulted. Each focus group took place in an environment that the participants were familiar with (on their own ‘territory’, rather than on mine). A full episode of TNZW (*The Invasion of Waikato*) was watched by the group members, where I was able to observe their immediate responses, outbursts of emotion and body language. Directly following this fifty-minute screening, the group discussion was initiated by my initial questions, which sought an immediacy of response rather than providing time for contemplation.

While not entirely intentional, the design of the research context favours a particular way of engaging with the series. For instance, I deliberately composed each focus group on the basis of existing communities, so that individual group members already had a rapport or association with other members of the group. The point here was to ensure that they would feel comfortable enough to speak relatively spontaneously, and candidly, from the beginning of the discussion session. This selection of participants (partially based on the existence of group rapport) may have inadvertently helped to set the context for more emotional types of engagement, as many of the group members had little need to be guarded about expressing their emotions.

The groups were also devised in order to serve as discrete interpretive communities, and it was assumed that each of these communities would
have varying access to discursive resources. This particular research context favoured the articulation of certain discourses over others. While I had believed it was important to include both Maori and Pakeha, and various age groups and genders, I had not included participants from immigrant communities, politicians, children younger than fifteen, school teachers and many others. This meant that the research context was more bicultural in make-up than multicultural, and that many of the group participants had a vested interest in discussing particular aspects of the series. For example, the history academics group had a disciplinary interest in discussing the historical veracity of the series, while some members of this group had a vested interest in professionally discrediting Belich, or at least critiquing his conduct as a historian.

What follows in this chapter is not an exhaustive depiction of the focus group discussions, and I have not presented these group discussions individually. Key extracts from the focus group transcripts have been selected for their ability to demonstrate the discursive negotiation of concepts such as; history, memory, nation, colonisation, race, culture, and documentary construction (see the list of transcription conventions at the beginning of this thesis).

Due to the limitations of this research design, the multitude of factors influencing the viewing context, and the selective nature in which the discussions have been presented in this chapter, it is inevitable that any conclusions will be speculative rather than representative of wider social and cultural conditions. Despite this speculative aspect, the conclusions made in this chapter are valuable for their qualitative insight.

This chapter is structured according to four major themes, each of which serves as a frame for a number of sub-themes. These themes are; 8.2: ‘Negotiating Histories’, 8.3: ‘Negotiating Discourses of Race, Culture and Colonisation’, 8.4: ‘Re-imagining the Nation’ and 8.5: ‘Cultural Memory’. The rationale for selecting this particular range of themes is based partially on the
discourses identified in the ‘discursive map’ outlined in chapters three and four, which are understood to have shaped each stage of the production, construction and reception of this series. The structure of this chapter is intended to demonstrate the ways in which spaces have opened for the negotiation of history, nation, race and culture. While emphasizing the complexity of audience engagement with this series, each section of this chapter builds toward supporting my argument about the significance of television documentary in the transmission of cultural memory.

8.2 Negotiating Histories

‘Negotiating Histories’ was identified as a broad theme during my survey of published responses to _TNZW_. My focus group research shed further light on the range of key debates within this theme. These are discussed according to the following sub-sections; 8.2.1: ‘Historical Amnesia’, 8.2.2: ‘Historical Veracity’, 8.2.3: ‘Maori versus Pakeha History’, 8.2.4: ‘Balich as Presenter’, 8.2.5: ‘Revising History’, 8.2.6: ‘Critiquing Belich’, and 8.2.7: ‘Trench Warfare’.

8.2.1 Historical Amnesia

For many of the focus group participants, the screening of episode three of _TNZW_ prompted a heightened awareness of the limitations of their knowledge of New Zealand history. When discussing this issue, many of the participants described their school history education as ‘inadequate’ or ‘one sided’. Some commented that they had learnt far more about European or British history than New Zealand history. Across all of the focus groups, many of the participants commented about a lack of knowledge about New Zealand history, but there were different perceptions about who experiences this lack. For one kaumatua, historical amnesia was perceived as a specifically ‘European’ phenomenon:

TK3: …a lot of people don’t even realise…I think generally a lot of people, _European_ people don’t even know the history of this country
Implied in this comment is the notion that history is alive for Maori, where as for Pakeha it is generally overlooked. The suggestion here is that while ‘European people’ have an attitude of neglect or indifference towards New Zealand history, Maori have an acute awareness of history because of their access to traditional forms of oral story-telling. In the following extract, TK3 provides a more elaborate explanation for this difference, whereby he shifts from using the non-Maori term ‘European people’ to a more explicitly colonial ‘English people’:

TK3: … it basically illustrates that there is still a strong depth out there, of history to document. I think the things that have been taken, in terms of the confiscation of land, the history becomes a lot stronger (.). I’m quite intrigued when I meet English people, that because they have so much history around them in England, they don’t even know it. They take it all for granted. One of our advisers from England, if you ask point blank about oh, (Edward Nelson) or what ever happened in his home village (.). He’s quite right, he says it’s there, right around you. It’s in the parks and the buildings, the structures, the statues…but because they are there everyday, it doesn’t (register in). And for us, when we have seen the loss and invasion and the things that have been taken…then the history becomes more important.

A distinctive political context was brought to bear on this particular group discussion. According to TK3, Maori have a stronger awareness of history because they have been forced to deal with the injustices of colonization in a very direct and tangible way. None of these kaumatua actually experienced the New Zealand Wars first hand, but many of their direct predecessors did. Furthermore, there is an unspoken understanding that subsequent generations have not only inherited the socio-economic consequences of this dis-possession, but they share an emotional and spiritual connection with their ancestors.

In the above extract, TK3 describes a scenario where it seems natural for Maori and English cultural groups to view history differently. Within this
‘Tainui Kaumatua’ focus group, there is a common-sense acceptance that Maori have an intrinsic continuity with the past, where as ‘English’ culture is estranged from the very structures that are understood to keep history alive. This discourse, which I have labelled ‘intrinsic continuity’ was also a distinctive feature of the interview with Tainui Stephens, where he expressed the notion that history is alive everywhere around us, but that many people take it for granted (see chapter six). Given that Stephens directed the series with the intention of making the taken for granted aspects of New Zealand history more visibly tangible, the above extract is one example of the many audience responses that suggest a degree of success in achieving this objective.

8.2.2 Historical Veracity

As was anticipated, the issue of historical veracity was prioritised in some of the discussion groups, where a number of participants attempted to promote this as the key topic for debate. While some groups hotly debated the degree of accuracy of the series, others did not question this. There were also diverse notions of what constitutes ‘historical accuracy’. Although this outcome was not surprising, it provided insight about the range of discursive resources viewers were able to access as a means of constructing their own ‘yardstick’ from which to assess the veracity of this historical narrative. The term yardstick is used here because it implies a degree of comparative measurement between those histories that are already perceived as valid, and those that challenge them. This was a key part of the discussion of history academics.

In the following extract, two history lecturers speak from divergent positions as they debate the importance of historical accuracy. While HA3 speaks from an empiricist position, proposing the existence of a monocular and objective history, HA4 argues that it is important to acknowledge ‘other’ histories:
HA3: it’s [the series is] clear, concise, generous, but unfortunately not true. And his [Belich’s] real problem is he’s also Euro-centric...in terms of Maori warfare...he tries to impose European conceptualisation of it, and unfortunately he will choose the wrong conceptualisation. He talks of personal war...but he’s actually meaning delay in defence...not attritional, static warfare. Static warfare (.) warfare is not a Maori concept...he’s even chosen the wrong analogies, let alone misunderstanding what he’s talking about.

HA4: Even if he’s wrong, isn’t the important thing that he is trying to acknowledge another history that most people didn’t know. We’re all familiar with what he said because we’ve read his books and discussed it ten years before this documentary...but many New Zealanders hadn’t and he’s trying to acknowledge another side...but I’m very conscious hearing it for the second time...when you hear Maori speak, they speak poetry. Now, I wasn’t offended by this documentary at all but I know people of the older generation were because the British when they spoke, sounded like buffoons...they had accents that the older generation didn’t identify with...and they felt completely alienated by that.

As he does throughout this discussion, HA3 demonstrates his determination to critique Belich’s narrative, and to discredit him as a historian. By articulating an expert discourse that appears apolitical, he has attempted to portray his subjective interpretation as though it is an objective critique. HA3 also draws upon a variety of military discourses that serve to support the construction of himself as a ‘military expert’. When he says that “static warfare is not a Maori concept”, he positions himself as an expert on Maori culture. By claiming to have a superior understanding of Maori approaches to warfare, he reveals an element of professional competitiveness that appears to drive his critique of Belich.

In contrast to HA3’s view of history as a singular truth, HA4 argues that other histories need to be recognised. Although acknowledging the validity of multiple histories, HA4 also draws on the empiricist notion that historical narratives must be either right or wrong. She constructs herself as a person who is not only liberal minded, but friendly to Maori. In contrast to the older Pakeha viewers, some of whom were offended by the series, HA4 was able to make sense of the series within the wider context of New Zealand decolonization. In response to her colleague’s personal and loaded critique
of Belich, HA4 emphasizes the importance of the series as a political act. Despite their attempts to portray themselves as perceptive of Maori concerns, both HL3 and HL4 inadvertently construct Maori as ‘other’. Statements such as “warfare is not a Maori concept” or Maori “speak poetry” reveal an essentialist view of Maori culture, that has its origins in the ‘noble-savage’ discourse.

Within each of the focus groups a different notion of historical veracity appeared as ‘common sense’ within the parameters of the group. In the ‘History Academics’ group, historical veracity was discussed in relation to discourses of empiricism. However members of the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ group shared a quite different understanding about what was considered to be ‘correct’ history. This discussion was framed by already established critical attitudes toward the previously published histories, seeing them as limited and incorrect. In this group, the validity of history was determined by factors such as; the source of the information, the perceived ‘cultural suitability’ of the presenter, the familiarity of particular ‘stories’ in relation to Maori oral histories, and the degree to which participants were able to experience the history as tangible and alive. The following extract illustrates how these factors played a part in helping to establish that Belich was presenting the “correct history”:

TK1…at last we’ve got a historian in New Zealand…somebody has put this film together and is doing something correctly, doing a lot of good, bringing through the correct history...instead of what the books...different historians have written in books...very limited. But a documentary done like this is...to me it’s good because...not only do you get the resources, (all) that comes with it...and he’s been able to get it from the right source, and also portraying the whole thing on the actual sites, you know...the illustrations. That increases the um...makes you think now how did that sort of pass? (My emphasis).

In this extract, TK1 articulates the notion that history is alive and that it should be communicated in a tangible and dynamic way (rather than the static or abstract form of history that is presented in books). This was a salient theme expressed during the ‘kaumatua’ discussion. For many of
these participants, the fact that the actual sites were visited means that Belich was able to present a lived history in a way that is synonymous to 'being there'. The group consensus was that Belich was acknowledging the 'Maori' concept that history is alive in the residual structures of warfare that have 'scarred' the landscape. (This is more likely to be an outcome that can be attributed to Tainui Stephens, who spoke about this concept of history at length during the interview).

One notable outcome of the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ discussion was the complex array of discursive resources that were utilised as a means of determining historical veracity. While many of these participants emphasised the interpretive aspect of history, they were also happy to accept Belich’s version of events as ‘truth’, largely on the basis that they interpreted a strong sense of familiarity with the oral histories that had been passed down to them. This apparent contradiction is illustrated in the following extract, where TK4 negotiates a position somewhere between polysemy, singular truth, and a binary conceptualization of history:

TK4: You know…history…history told like that…It’s like a whakatauki or proverbs from Tawhiao. They’re interpreted in lots of different ways, but if you hear two, that sounds the same, then it must be true.

[group laughter]

TK4: It may be interpreted in different ways. // There’s two sides to every story.

TK1: Two sides…yeah.

TK4’s analogy, likening TNZW to a ‘whakatauki’ provides insight as to why the participants of this group had an affinity with the notion of history as interpretive and contestable. These elderly Maori had engaged with the past in many ways during their lifetime. These include (but are not limited to); oral story-telling, mihi and whakapapa (reciting genealogy), song, karanga, prayer, war-chants, dance, proverbs, carvings, moko (tattoo), weaving, tekoteko, visiting historical sites, books and school education. The notion of
passing on memories of the past through such organic, embodied and material modes of transmission has been marginalised in relation to Western historiography. However in the context of the postcolonial Pacific, these modes of transmitting memory through generations serve as powerful repositories of ‘intragroup memory’ (Mageo, 2001). This ability to access the past via various technologies of cultural memory as well as Western forms of written history, has provided the members of this group with an implicit understanding that such diverse methods of passing on history will inevitably produce many different versions, with varying degrees of validity. However the comment that there are “two sides to every story” suggests that this multiplicity of versions is often reduced (through linguistic communication) to the binary notion of a Maori version and a Pakeha version, possibly demonstrating the influence of discourses of bi-culturalism during the late 1990s.

8.2.3 Maori Versus Pakeha History

A reductionist binary distinction between ‘Maori history’ and ‘Pakeha history’ was made by many of the participants. This dualism appeared as common-sense within the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ group, to the extent that such terms did not require further explanation. However in a very different context, the only Maori participant (HA1) of the ‘History Academics’ group was asked by his colleagues to explain his position in relation to this distinction. In doing so, HA1 provided an insightful account of the life experiences that have shaped his approach toward history:

HA1: Um…I was brought up…with Rewi Maniapoto’s patu {weapon}…a white kotiate {flat weapon made of bone}...and the suspicion that was engendered in us as children...that the history that we were learning at school was not true...and having a fight when I was eleven years old with this big person I thought was a best friend, who said that the Treaty of Waitangi was nothing...and that the so called King...Maori King was just a drunkard...and so my experience of New Zealand history was very much painted by that, and I didn’t want anything to do with it when I was young...but when I came into this job...its sudden immersion...its wonderful.
HA2: Do you make the distinction between New Zealand history as applied to Pakeha...and tribal history that you grew up with?

HA1: Well New Zealand history was Pakeha...there was no Maori history. Maori history was just me. It was just part of our...the raupatu [conquest] was part of our being. Mum’s family owning no land...part of Dad’s family...being part of that also, but being part of the King Country and his land being taken by the Kooti Whenua Maori. It was just a...that’s the way it...it was a continuing suspicion when New Zealand history was ‘that stuff’ and the rest of us wasn’t important.

HA4: Would you say that you view that somewhat differently now that maybe there is a counter to those two point of views...that you (are now able) to tease it out?

HA1: I don’t know about a...counter...but there’s a...I have a wider understanding of what was affecting other people...Then...all I knew was what was affecting our people...as a child, right through secondary school.

According to HA1, a number of early life experiences shaped his understanding of the significance of historical events such as the Treaty of Waitangi. From an early age, he learnt to be suspicious of the history taught at school. As a boy, he was aware that ‘New Zealand history’ did not seem to apply to him, and that ‘tribal histories’ were not considered to be of any value to the education system.

When asked to make a distinction between New Zealand History and “tribal history”, HA1 suggests that history is not necessarily an objective account of events that can be labeled as either Pakeha or Maori, but that history can be viewed as a subjective aspect of a person’s identity. When he says that “the raupatu was part of our being”, HA1 expresses the view that history is inseparable from selfhood, and that his sense of an enduring conquest is complexly interwoven with his developing historical consciousness. The comment that “it was a continuing suspicion when New Zealand history was ‘that stuff’ and the rest of us wasn’t important” illustrates how his experience of marginalisation has been formative to a sense of identity that is alienated from dominant discourses about ‘New Zealand history’. HA1 describes the way in which his position has gradually changed as he has grown older and been exposed to alternative approaches to history. His initial suspicion,
which is expressed in terms of ‘them and us’ (Pakeha and Maori) shifts to a consideration of the context in which that suspicion was generated, and finally to a self reflective comment that he is now able to consider history with a “wider understanding of what was affecting other people”.

Although HA1 was significantly less (academically) qualified than the other members of this group, he was treated as the expert on ‘Maori knowledge’ on many occasions during this discussion. This was demonstrated by the fact that much of the group directed questions toward him, and listened intently to his responses. Given that HA1 was the only Maori participant of this group, expressing a position that was in many ways contrary to western empiricist historiography, it seemed ironic that he was treated as an expert by a number of extensively published, Pakeha historians. While this inverted social dynamic was a distinctive characteristic of this micro ‘academic’ interpretive community, it can be viewed as indicative of the ‘macro’ phenomenon whereby Maori histories have gained increasing legitimacy within the broader post-colonial context.

**8.2.4 Belich as Presenter**

The role of Belich as presenter of the series was a re-occurring point of discussion within all of the focus groups. Although in some instances this topic was prompted by questions posed by the researcher, many of the respondents discussed this issue vigorously without any provocation. There were two main strands to these discussions; the validity and significance of Belich as a *Pakeha* presenter, and the authority provided by Belich’s *academic status*.

Some of the participants of groups MY and TK were initially dubious about the idea of a Pakeha historian presenting the series, but they expressed a sense of satisfaction when they were informed by the researcher that prominent members of the Maori community had been consulted throughout the production of the series. There are strong similarities between this
audience response and Stephens' initial skepticism about the potential extent of Pakeha control when he was asked to co-direct the series (see chapter six). While several of the participants expressed disappointment that the presenter was not Maori, groups MY and TK quickly reached a consensus that a Pakeha presenter was a necessary strategy for gaining recognition from a wider (predominantly Pakeha) audience. The following extract from the Maori Youth Group transcript illustrates how this group negotiated their way from initial skepticism, through to a favourable view that acknowledged the role a Pakeha presenter was able to play in this series.

LP: How do you feel about the series being presented by a Pakeha presenter?

MY1: When I saw him I thought, how would you know? That was the first thing that came into my mind...but then in another way I thought...oh that’s pretty cool you know...coming from him.

MY5: I think it’s good that he did it in consultation or in partnership with Maori...um...and it would be good to see Maori historians or whatever come through and do their stuff as well. But...being Pakeha I think it would have, um...if it was Maori it wouldn't have got as much attention if it was done by a Maori person. It wouldn’t have got so much, I don't know...attention from the people that it got attention from aye?

MY2: Yeah...I don’t think so. It wouldn’t have got that recognition, not as much. But also, having James Belich do it...also um...like, he couldn’t really be emotionally attached to the Land Wars...if you were to have a Maori historian to present it...because it’s a documentary you have to be...you’re trying to portray a balance in the series, so you have to be quite um, detached from it, kind of like...if I was to do it I would be really emotional about it and go ‘oh the Maori suffered’ but, I mean they did, but then you know the Europeans lost lives too, so, but they wanted to (.) but that’s another story, but it was good to have him in the aspect like you were saying for the recognition and that he could...that truthfulness, there was that truthfulness about...I don’t think his status could play a role in...what is he, a professor or what? Yeah, to me he’s just the narrator.

MY5: But to other people it would have meant a lot probably.

MY2: Yeah. I think its good that he can’t...wasn’t too emotionally involved, so to speak
In the above extract, MY1 expressed initial skepticism about the source of Belich’s historical knowledge, but this was followed by a gesture of approval, that it was “pretty cool…coming from him”. For many of the Maori participants, such approval was withheld until they were satisfied that Belich had followed an appropriate process of consultation and collaboration with Maori. The participants of this discussion have accessed a number of competing discourses in the process of negotiating their views about Belich as presenter. As with some of the Maori participants in the other groups, the above discussion generated a degree of ambivalence about the series being presented by a Pakeha historian. While this was welcomed as a necessary strategy to gain recognition from a predominantly Pakeha audience, this view was expressed alongside a sense of regret that a Maori historian/presenter would not have been given the same kind of “attention”.

Such ambivalence is related to the specific discursive resources that members of this group were able to access. Due to factors such as upbringing, tribal affiliation, social group membership and alternative forms of education, the three participants involved in the above discussion had access to ‘specialist’ cultural and political discourses. For example, the concept of tino rangatiratanga can be understood here as a discourse which assisted these individuals in their assessment of Belich as a Pakeha presenter of history. For some members of this group, an acute awareness of the significance of tino rangatiratanga emphasised the importance of Maori self-determination in defining their own past, present and future. Consequently, these participants demonstrated a socially constructed skepticism toward representations of Maori, by Pakeha.

Despite expressing approval for the “recognition” that Belich has provided, MY5 suggests, “it would be good to see Maori historians come through and do their stuff too”. On one hand, MY5 expresses pleasure that at last someone is giving due recognition to Maori grievances. On the other hand, her comment suggests a sense of frustration, that Maori historians should be
telling their own histories, but are not yet able to achieve this kind of “attention” from a Pakeha audience.

Another interesting aspect about this extract is MY2’s perception that Belich was able to be more emotionally detached than a Maori presenter would have been. The ability of the presenter to maintain emotional distance is understood by MY2 as a vital means by which the series constructs a sense of ‘truthfulness’. In order to assess the success of this documentary series, MY2 draws on some common-sense audience expectations - that documentaries are supposed to be presented with a degree of impartiality, and that they should portray a balanced argument. While Belich’s position as an apparently non-partisan, Pakeha presenter is viewed here as a necessary ingredient for legitimating a previously marginalised history, his academic status is not considered by MY2 to be a significant factor in this legitimating process. This interpretation stands out as unique when compared with the other discussion groups, where there was more emphasis placed on Belich’s academic status as a legitimating tool, while the significance of his ethnicity was relatively overlooked.

Much like the ‘Maori Youth’ discussion, the following extract from the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ discussion also portrays a sense of ambivalence about the series being presented by a Pakeha historian. While TK1 expressed the ideal that “it should be one of our own talking it”, this group also reached a consensus that a Pakeha presenter was necessary in order for the series to be considered believable by a Pakeha audience:

TK1: It’s very ahhh…it’s quite unique to see a Pakeha talking our history, where it should be our own…should be one of our own talking it, but coming from him it’s really quite, quite unique.

TK2: I think it has a better impact if it is a Pakeha speaking about it...I think having a Pakeha speaking about, it has a better impact on the Pakeha than...

TK1: You must admit he’s done his homework.

LP: So do you think maybe it’s more believable to see a Pakeha...
TK2: Well…it’s the Pakeha mindset that if a Maori gets up to speak, oh it’s just another Maori.

TK1: Another Maori moaning.

TK2: But if it’s a Pakeha…they’ll say, oooh he’s a clever fella, he’s a well educated man, he knows how to investigate things and research things and all that...and so they’ll, they’ll listen...You know, it’s just the mindset that’s out there...that um...if it’s coming from a Maori, oh it’s only another moaning Maori, or something like that.

TK1: That’s right, another, once again...but you know like a Pakeha...you think a Pakeha would believe a Pakeha, but going by what she’s saying, some of those Pakeha’s don’t, not really

TK6: Only because it hit home.

TK1: Because it hit home, the truth? Is that what it is?

TK2’s use of the term ‘Pakeha mindset’ indicates an awareness of a discourse that is frequently reiterated in the media. This ‘just another Maori moaning’ discourse was especially prominent during 1990s news broadcasts which focused on Maori grievances about Treaty issues (Abel, 1997, McCreanor, 2005). However, TK2 expresses this as though it is a permanent mental image within the brains of all Pakeha, rather than as a fluid and mutating discourse with different levels of utility, but which is repeatedly expressed in the media.

An interesting aspect of the above extract is the notion of a Pakeha presenting what was perceived by some as a ‘Maori history’. While TK1 assumed that Belich was telling ‘Maori history’, participants of other groups provided alternative interpretations about the degree to which this history could be described as ‘Maori history’. As a Maori academic, the story that Belich presents is considered by HA1 to be a Pakeha history:

HA1: Ahh…I didn’t see any of my relations in it. [group laughs]. It’s just that...he was telling his story...but, we’ve got ours...it’s still...a Pakeha story...and a Pakeha telling his Pakeha story...even though there is some allowance...of the things that being Maori...the series is far and away more affirmative of Maori than anything to date.
A significant insight from this audience research was the extent of ambivalence that many of the Maori participants experienced, not only about the role of Belich as a Pakeha presenter, but about what constitutes ‘Maori’ history, and who should tell it. Maori self-determination in defining their own past, present and future, is an influential discourse that has played a part in each of the above extracts. However, even the participants who were most critical about the lack of Maori control over the historical content welcomed the series for its affirmation of Maori perspectives and grievances.

8.2.5 Revising History

Soon after the screening of the series, there was repeated discussion in the media about the idea that TNZW was responsible for ‘revising’ history. This idea had only been mooted in a superficial way, without the necessary context or detail about what the ‘revision of history’ might actually mean. Consequently people began to use this term, often to imply a simple replacement of one version by another. Many of the audience responses reiterated this simplistic understanding of historical revision, as they indicated little consideration of the complex process by which a version of history may shift from a position of marginalisation through to being considered dominant.

While many participants commented that the series promoted “healthy debate” (TK1), some were concerned that it had created a “new orthodoxy”. HA3 was so alarmed by this prospect that he organised a series of community lectures aimed at reviewing Belich’s version of the New Zealand Wars and “challenging the new orthodoxy” (see Appendix 2). Upon hearing that the series was to be used as an audiovisual resource by secondary schools throughout New Zealand, HA3 replied that:

HA3 …that’s very, very dangerous because its propaganda in all sorts of ways...if you put that video on...those students are just going to...relate to that. You don’t have anything which is equally dramatic
to come at it from another perspective...that’s going to so shape thinking...it’s actually quite dangerous

HA4: Others might say does that matter, because if the hegemony was way over here in the past, and that pushes it a little bit towards the middle for those people’s consciousnesses, is that going to be a problem?

HA3: I think so...is a lie better if it’s from one side or the other?

HA3’s comment that “you don’t have anything which is equally dramatic to come at it from another perspective” belies the fact that Victorian interpretations of the New Zealand Wars have held positions of dominance for many years, and continue to be utilised as resources within educational institutions. While placing emphasis on the dramatic qualities of television, he overlooks the ideological role of the numerous written accounts of the New Zealand Wars, which are not only dramatic, but have had a privileged status of legitimacy at many levels of the education system. Although describing Belich’s version as ideological, HA3’s inability to view these Victorian interpretations as ideologically reinforced, portrays the extent to which they have been naturalised and viewed as commonsense.

HA3’s response to the series demonstrates an element of ‘moral panic’, which rests on the assumption that the television audience is comprised of vulnerable dupes, who are unable to actively or critically negotiate media messages. His description of Belich’s history as “propaganda” and “a lie” not only portrays a rigidly empiricist approach to history, but implies that Belich has some kind of ulterior motive for misleading the public.

With HA3 tending to dominate the discussion with an consistent empiricist view, other members of this group responded by challenging this position, often by emphasising the fluid and dynamic aspect of historical interpretation. While HA4 argues from the perspective that shifting consciousness is an important step toward ‘redressing the imbalance’, she is also suggesting that the ideal outcome is when consciousness shifts away from positions of extremity, towards a ‘middle ground’. This notion of
‘redressing the imbalance’ is a prominent discourse that derives from the ideology of biculturalism, and argues for recognition and compensation for the historical power imbalance between Maori and Pakeha.

Although HA3 and HA4 were colleagues who had access to a common pool of discourses about history, in this discussion they appeared to be speaking different languages. HA3 talks about history as though it is either right or wrong - ‘the truth’ or ‘a lie’, where as for HA4, history is fluid and dynamic, and historical legitimacy is determined on the basis of morality, balance and fairness. At times, all five members of this group appeared to be speaking different languages. These ‘languages’ seemed to be representative of various theoretical approaches to history, and from the perspective of an outsider to the discipline, most of the HA participants appeared to be playing out ‘metaphorical roles’. For example; ‘the military historian’, ‘the social historian’, ‘the empiricist’, ‘the post-structuralist’, ‘the cultural theorist’, ‘the Maori historian’, ‘the bicultural Pakeha’, etc. Despite the complex interweaving of these divergent ‘languages’, the common thread of the discussion became a critique of Belich as a historian.

8.2.6 Critiquing Belich

While generally the same questions were posed to each focus group, a distinctive ‘re-shaping of the discussion agenda’ occurred in the ‘History Academics’ group. Despite my attempts to focus the discussion on issues relating to the series as a representation of history, the conversation kept returning to a critique of Belich. This was usually couched in terms of his professional performance as a historian, but at times became a personal attack of his character and integrity. HA3 was the participant who launched the most blatantly aggressive attack on Belich:

HA3: ...my problem with it...I actually don’t give him [Belich] the generosity that you [HA4] do. I’m actually quite cynical. I think he’s a marketer...and he’s chosen a topic which he knows is going to capture a future...and he’s gone about it in a very cold and calculated way to make a name for himself. He’s chosen a conclusion and then
he finds evidence which will fit it...and he warps or twists evidence which doesn’t support what he’s saying...and I think it’s actually quite a cynical approach...and I think he’s misused or used Maori in the same way that Michael King has.

HA4: [asking HA1] Would you say that he used and abused Maori in the episode that we saw just now?

HA1: Ahh...well I think he...all of us...I think he used them deliberately for his own purposes...and um...I don’t

Directly following HA3’s comment that Belich has “used Maori”, HA4 asks HA1 (the sole Maori participant of this group) if he thinks Belich has “used and abused Maori”. Not only is HA1 being treated as the resident expert on Maori history, he is being asked to reply on behalf of Maori (in a totalising sense). It is interesting that his reply begins with “all of us”, then abruptly switches to the more objective “he [Belich] used them”, as though he is now speaking as a detached academic, rather than on behalf of Maori. This syntactical adjustment suggests that, due to the inverted social dynamic within this group, a number of expectations were assumed about the role HA1 would play within this discussion. These expectations can be seen as influencing, and at times constraining HA1’s language use. This apparent ‘identity shift’ between responding as an academic or as a Maori can also be interpreted as a learnt behaviour – a coping mechanism for working, living, and communicating ‘appropriately’ in different ‘worlds’.

In the above extract HA3 treats Belich’s version as being motivated by self-interest. My initial interpretation was that his critique of Belich appeared to be motivated by professional jealousy. However, from a discourse analytic perspective, this instance of language use can be understood as an attempt to make his own account appear more objectively factual by discrediting alternative versions, as well as historians who are more publicly ‘successful’ than himself (including the prolific Michael King). It is interesting that HA3 does this while simultaneously attending to the “dilemma of ‘stake and interest’” (Horton-Salway, 2001: 155). The ‘dilemma’ for HA3 is that, in order to construct (and protect) his own credibility as an objective historian, he must not allow his own account to appear as motivated by self-interest.
Apart from the rhetorical strategy of discrediting alternative versions, HA3 uses a variety of ‘discursive devices’ to manage this dilemma. In many of HA3’s contributions to this discussion, it is possible to identify the use of devices such as; ‘fact-laden’ descriptions, the use of ‘expert’ military discourse, comparative analysis of evidentiary details, narrative, consensus and corroboration.

In the following extract, HA3 reiterates his view that Belich’s version is motivated by self-interest, but this time adding ‘evidence’ to support his accusation. By making a link between Belich’s “marketing exercise” and his father as a “well known P.R. person”, HA3 is insinuating that Belich has inherited some kind of genetic predisposition to becoming a ruthless marketer. Despite its purpose as a form of evidence, this comment is perceived by HA2 as ‘hitting below the belt’, and provokes a more carefully managed analysis of Belich’s character.

HA3:  …I still come back to my point, because I make the same commentary about the book [Belich’s 1986 book, which The New Zealand Wars series was based on]...it’s done as a marketing exercise...it’s purely calculated...and it’s not surprising that his father is a well known P.R person, so...

HA2:  Isn’t that a bit tough though [HA3]?

HA3:  Oh, very tough...

HA2:  I don’t want to be knocking the tall poppy...Jaimie’s got a reputation, in scholarly circles that he is a performer...he sees himself as a successor, there’s no doubt about any of these things...but I think it’s very easy to sound cynical about someone who has that kind of arrogant self confidence that most of us don’t necessarily have, and his giving provocations that did appear to justify in terms of the prizes that he’s won...I mean I don’t mind having a discussion about whether his actual approach as a historian has respect for evidence as such that it matches professional standards, I just...I don’t really like attributing this sort of cynicism and manipulative approaches [laughs], really.

The qualifier “I don’t want to be knocking the tall poppy” draws on a discourse that is specific to New Zealand identity. The ‘tall poppy syndrome’
refers to the notion that New Zealanders tend to respond to those who rise to a position of obvious success, by wanting to ‘cut them down to size’ (like a poppy that is taller than the others in a field). While this metaphor may be attributed to HA3’s prior attack of Belich, HA2 uses this statement as a ‘stake inoculator’, to ensure that her own criticisms are not interpreted as motivated out of self-interest or professional jealousy. (Potter, 1996: 125). Despite the disclaimer suggesting that HA2 does not want to cut Belich ‘down to size’, she proceeds to do this anyway, but in a carefully managed way. The implication is that she is critiquing Belich’s method of achieving fame, rather than the fame itself. In this sense, HA2 can be seen as attempting to distance herself from the personal attack levelled by HA3.

8.2.7 Trench Warfare

Possibly the most contentious issue discussed during the broadcast of the series was Belich’s claim that Maori were the first to develop ‘modern trench warfare’. By the time this audience research was conducted, the trench warfare debate had subsided in the public sphere, but continued to be a persistent ‘bug-bear’ for certain people. As a military historian, HA3 appeared to be particularly irritated by the fact that a ‘social historian’ had made this ‘trench warfare’ claim. The following extract exemplifies the way in which HA3 utilises discursive devices such as detail-laden accounts, narrative and ‘expert’ military discourse, as a means of discrediting Belich’s claim, and making himself appear more authoritative.

HA3: …but Maori strategy, which is not discussed there, I mean you sort of get this idea of a trench block…where as trench warfare is actually to fall back on your position…so he [Belich] doesn’t even understand basic military concepts.

HA2: Did he have a military advisor, just out of interest?

HA3: I noticed in the series, he attributes advice from Chris Pugsley, but I cannot believe that Chris did not point this out to him…because Chris wouldn’t keep it to himself, for his own work later…Just basic concepts he’s [Belich has] got wrong…He talks about the Europeans having no answer to trench warfare, Maori trench warfare. Pratt in
Taranaki had shown that Maori did not have an answer to the sap...at Orakau, Maori did not have an answer to Carey’s use of the sap. So to suggest they [the Europeans] don’t have an answer to the trench is wrong...a wrong position in fact. He doesn’t point out how the artillery is misused by Cameron. Artillery’s a linear weapon, and he puts it to the wrong side, and the only piece of artillery at Gate Pa, for example, he brings around to the flank, turns up the um small (pa position) easily...only one piece, and he had sixteen pieces...were out the front which were absolutely useless...and even then if you look at formal shot, he talks about, you know the greatest formal shot. Absolute rubbish.

HA2: It has to be suggested that although Belich’s work has actually been really important in terms of helping to explain the Victorian attitude and about the conflict and our approach to (race) in the nineteenth century, that he himself has not faced up to his lack of knowledge //

HA3: // he’s a social historian.

L.P: So do you think that, for you, that’s part of the problem, that he’s not a military historian?

HA3: That’s his great weakness.

HA2: That he hasn’t actually sought advice on that area?...Yes.

HA4: How much does his misunderstanding of that strategy weaken his argument about the way in which // (.) conflict, and the way in which it was subsequently (.) by Maori?

HA3 takes many opportunities during this discussion to present himself as knowledgeable and authoritative in comparison to Belich. In order to support his comment that Belich “doesn’t even understand basic military concepts" he weaves a barrage of military ‘facts’ into a complex narrative. Included in this account are meticulous details such as the specific numbers and names of soldiers and weapons, and even an account of the direction of artillery fire during the Gate Pa battle. There is an interesting parallel between HA3’s use of facts to construct his narrative, and Belich’s fact-laden narration in TNZW (see chapter seven).

One insight emerging from the ‘History Academics’ focus group, was the way in which different types of history were talked about, as confined within
specific territories. Not only was there a distinction between ‘Maori history’ and ‘Pakeha History’, there were also rigid boundaries constructed around the terms ‘military history’ and ‘social history’. This division is evident when HA2 comments that Belich “has not faced up to his lack of knowledge” and that he “hasn’t actually sought advice”, and when HA4 says that he has a “misunderstanding of that strategy”. While HA3 also refers to these types of history in a territorial sense, he appears to view military history as superior, inferring that Belich’s “great weakness” is that he is a social historian, rather than a military historian. HA3’s earlier comment “I can’t believe that Chris [Pugsley] didn’t point this out to him” also serves to reinforce the idea that a military historian is more knowledgeable than a social historian. When he adds that “but Chris wouldn’t keep it to himself...for his own work later” he suggests that Pugsley (who happens to be a military historian) has integrity, where as ‘other’ historians are likely to be motivated by self-interest. The assertion that a military historian and a social historian should keep to their own territory was not unique to the ‘History Academics’ focus group. This division was also a feature of the ‘Mature Pakeha’ discussion, where the idea was raised that Belich was “stepping outside” of professional boundaries.

MP2: The guy [Belich] seems to be trying to write a military history, but I don’t think he’s got a military background. In a way he’s stepping outside of his //

MP4: It seems as though he’s a social historian, and yet...he seemed to miss...the basic reason that they went from Paterangi to Rangiaowhia was because it was a good food source...and that’s where most of the food was being grown, and they wanted to cut off the food source, they felt if they cut off the food source from the Maoris they would...could perhaps halt the war...and he doesn’t seem to bring that side in, and that’s why Rangiaowhia was (sacked) because they wanted to cut off the food source, and I didn’t hear him mention that anywhere.

While MP2 suggests that historians should operate within separate categories, MP4 talks about history in a more holistic way. She points out that, during the Waikato War, military tactics were often strategised on the basis of probable social and economic consequences, such as to “cut off the food source”. This comment illustrates the point that military history is
always embedded in a social context. However, as demonstrated by the latter extract from the HA focus group, the integration of a social context is sometimes considered by military historians to be an unwelcome intrusion upon their professional territory. This compartmentalisation of history is perhaps indicative of the broader clash between empiricist and post-structuralist approaches toward history.\(^4\)

This section demonstrates the complexity of debates existing within the overall theme ‘Negotiating Histories’, which illustrates the dialogism that occurs due to constantly shifting discourses about history and memory.

### 8.3 Negotiating Discourses of Race, Culture and Colonisation

As discussed in chapter seven, *TNZW* emphasised a binary representation of Maori and British cultural groups. One of the objectives of the audience research was to explore the ways in which audience members responded to this binary construction. There were considerable differences in the way people talked about the notion of representation. It had not occurred to some people that this series was using narrative and generic conventions in order to articulate a number of representations of race and culture. Some of the participants interpreted the series as a simple presentation of the available evidence, while some argued that it was a ‘mis-representation’ of what ‘really’ happened, or a biased portrayal, which favoured either Maori or Pakeha.

#### 8.3.1 Representation of British

A distinctive aspect of the ‘Ngaruawahia High School’ focus group was the lack of critical negotiation about the way in which cultural groups were represented. The four students who took part in this discussion responded as though the point of the exercise was to learn the ‘facts’ as they were presented on the video. In a different context, it is possible that these students may have engaged with the documentary in a more critical way.
However in this ‘secondary school’ environment, along with the presence of an academic researcher, they may have assumed that such critique was inappropriate. For these participants, the notion of ‘representation’ was not part of their usual discursive repertoire. With this in mind, I tended to phrase questions such as “what do you think of the way that the British were portrayed in this episode?” In response to this question, a fifteen-year-old Pakeha high school student replied that:

NHS1: It affirmed my opinion that the British weren’t very intelligent at the time, and they just thought, they took them [Maori] as savages or natives, they didn’t think they had much education or anything, that they were very skilled, because they were. Maybe just because they couldn’t, like they didn’t understand the English language...didn’t mean they were stupid.

Although NHS1 was able to condemn the view that Maori were lacking intelligence, she had no trouble reversing this idea, not realising the racial significance of her comment that “the British weren’t very intelligent at the time”. As discussed in chapter seven, specific British characters (such as Ensign Nichols) were portrayed as behaving in an ignorant and foolish way. Rather than understanding this as a deliberate representational strategy during the construction of the documentary narrative, NHS1 simply applied these character traits to all British people during this time period. This particular statement is one of a number of audience responses, which support my argument (see section 7.6.) that an important aspect of Belich’s original thesis had been omitted during the construction of TNZW. While members of the NHS focus group appeared to accept these representations as unproblematic depictions of intrinsic characteristics, many audience members were extremely critical of the way in which the British were portrayed. Directly following the screening of the series, there were a number of public expressions of anger and offence, including accusations that the series was ‘biased’ or ‘unbalanced’.5 This sentiment was expressed in a more emotionally subdued way during the focus group discussions, as illustrated by this participant of the ‘Mature Pakeha’ focus group:
MP6: My general impression...is that...Belich has sort of *swung the pendulum too far the other way*...he sort of makes out that every Maori move was a brilliant bit of strategic thinking and the British were generally a bit thick on it...and they made a lot of big blunders, full frontal attacks and the like. But they were the military tactics of the day...and there was a different sort of um...value put on life then...full frontal attacks were done in those days (my emphasis).

The expression that Belich had “swung the pendulum too far the other way” is used here as a metaphor for the idea that ‘redressing the imbalance’ (of power) had been taken too far in the interests of Maori. This ‘pendulum’ metaphor was prominent in public discourse during the 1990s and beyond, expressed publicly by those who, apparently, harboured resentment about claims to the Waitangi Tribunal for financial and resource restitution (for example, see Brash, 2004). In the above extract, this metaphor constructs an image of Belich being in an extreme position of power, to the extent that his narrative could alter the ‘national’ balance of power. While this notion portrays a degree of anxiety about the possibility of Pakeha disempowerment, it does not account for the specific context of decolonisation from which the series emerged, and the fact that the very process of decolonisation involves an ongoing power struggle, of which *TNZW* plays only a small part.

Several members of the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ group and the ‘Maori Youth’ group appeared to be pleasantly surprised about the way in which the British militia was represented in the series. When it was explained that some of the descendants of the British militia had taken offence to the way in which their ancestors had been represented (and expressed their anger through the public forum of letters to the editor), TK1 responded with little sympathy:

L.P: Some of the Pakeha responses in the newspapers. Some of them were saying that they were angry about how their ancestors were being portrayed in the documentary. They felt that they were being portrayed as fools...

TK1: Well they were fools.

L.P: They were foolish for believing what they did?
TK1: They blamed that...was it that flag? That flag that went up? There was a misunderstanding there when they...where was it, at Orakau? Yeah, the white flag...they were fools...that was true. They thought the white flag was up for truce. [laughs]. (...) Oh, I think it’s lovely...it’s a good documentary, I’m quite happy with it.

Rather than critiquing these representations of the British militia, TK1 displays a sense of pleasure that it is the British who are portrayed as fools. In a sense, TK1 was interpreting these representations as retribution for the predominance of negative stereotypes of Maori. Her statement that “they were fools...that was true” suggests that she was content to interpret these representations as though they were unmediated reflections of historical reality, rather than discussing the role of such characterisations in constructing a dramatic narrative.

8.3.2 Representation of Maori

This expression of retribution (to make up for the predominance of negative Maori stereotypes) was a distinctive feature of both the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ and ‘Maori Youth’ groups, however it was also discussed in relation to the series’ positive representation of Maori.

MY2: ...I think that what he’s [Belich is] trying to depict is that there is more to Maori than just the savageness that has been depicted so much in the history books...that he was just trying to identify that they are um...that they were quite intelligent people for people of that...you know, they had their own warfare tactics and they were quite...you know...yeah I think they were depicting that Maori were being...not just cannibals...which they were in some cases, but that was survival.

Despite expressing her approval that Belich had moved beyond the ‘noble-savage’ discourse, MY2 does not disregard this discourse outright. Her comment that “there is more to Maori than just the savageness that has been depicted” implies that she is pleased about the more positive representation, yet her statement retains some residue of the common-sense construction of Maori as ‘savage’. Her statement that Maori were
“not just cannibals…which they were in some cases…but that was survival” demonstrates a degree of ambivalence about the discourse of cannibalism. Rather than focusing on the mythological construction of Maori as ‘savages’ and ‘cannibals’, MY2 utilises these discourses partly as an admission of shame - that her ancestors were tarred with these negative racial characteristics. Such ambivalence can possibly be attributed to the degree to which remnants of the ‘noble-savage’ discourse have been reified, even for young Maori living in a contemporary context (McCreanor, 1997, 2005).

8.3.3 Maori as Skillful

The participants of the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ focus group demonstrated an intense sense of empowerment when discussing the series’ representation of their ancestors. Having lived through a period in which the dominant historical narratives were underpinned by Victorian racial discourse, these kaumatua expressed surprise that Maori were not only portrayed here as skillful and intelligent, but as victors of many of the battles. This more positive representation was supported by Belich’s claim that Maori were first to develop modern trench warfare, and that the British militia was at times defeated because they underestimated the sophistication of Maori strategy. TK1 was particularly impressed with Belich’s description of the Gate Pa battle. Expressing pride for her ancestors, TK1 interpreted this incidence of Maori victory as a sign of the strength and unity of the Kingitanga.

TK1: …as many pas as they were able to build…not even Cameron could ahh, with all his cannons…all those cannons that he was firing…to actually abolish them all. (he)...still couldn’t destroy them (Cameron) wasn’t successful. The Kingitanga was too strong. The Kingitanga was too strong.

TK4: Gee you know they were really clever aye.

TK5: Yeah…yeah…the strategy…the strategic positions.

TK4: They never read books. They never read books, and yet in terms of um…strategic warfare...

TK5: Mmm…no books.
TK7: They were very clever all right, our tupunas {ancestors}.

TK1: They were clever.

TK4: Very clever

TK1: They were too clever for General Cameron. // I mean General Cameron had the biggest //

TK2: I think they were more than clever. You know…clever’s not a good enough word for it, I think. They had a genius for it. It wasn’t something that they did on the spur of the moment. If you have a look at the…some of those pas and that…and if you have a look…there’s been a lot of thought gone into where they actually put them. If you go down to the

TK7: At Orakau for instance…have you been there?

TK2: Kao. I know where it is…But…if you go over…If you drive from Tauranga down to Makatu…there’s a chain of pa…you can still see the (the remnants there) you know, and the thought that’s gone into just which particular peak that they put them on…it’s not just clever, it’s more than clever…that’s what I’m saying it’s actually genius. Ahh, when you take into account…right from Julius Caesar right down…they, they’ve had a history…they’ve had military academies and all this…and supposed to be highly educated people these Pakeha soldiers. But these, these Maoris are // (genius).

The above extract demonstrates a significant moment of satisfaction for these participants, which is evident by the emphasis placed on reiterating the series’ validation of their ancestor’s intelligence. When TK4 says “gee you know they were really clever aye?”, he appears to have reached a moment of realisation, as though the series has empowered him to activate the process of revising the racial stereotypes that once seemed ‘natural’. TK4’s exclamation that his ancestors “never read books” and yet they were “very clever” contests the common-sense discourse that people need to read books in order to be clever. Being able to read is one of the many markers of being ‘civilized’, yet this notion is further challenged by TK2, as he proceeds to argue that Maori “had a genius for” strategic warfare, and that the term ‘genius’ does not need to be interpreted in a Eurocentric academic sense.
8.3.4 Myth of the Maori Warrior

While this new representation of Maori as skillful in strategic warfare can be interpreted as empowering for some Maori viewers, it is possible that the media’s cumulative portrayal of Maori as being intrinsically ‘good at warfare’ may reinforce the double-edged discourse of the noble-savage. This ‘flexible’ discourse has its roots in the ancient Roman myth that “‘primitives’ could be at once noble – brave, strong, unequivocal in defence of home and hearth – and savage, uncivilised, defiant and violent” (McCreanor, 1997: 41). In the context of New Zealand screen and print media, this myth continues to be utilised as a racial explanation for Maori involvement in gang warfare and criminal behaviour (McCreanor, 1997, 2005).

As pointed out by a Pakeha participant of the AS focus group, “all of our ancestors were...we all were warriors once...we all knew how to beat certain types of shit out of other people” (AS2, p.19). The notion of Maori being portrayed as ‘good at warfare’ was raised in a cursory way on a number of occasions within the discussion groups, but it became necessary to provoke a more in-depth discussion about the significance of this idea as a mythic representation.

L.P: Can I just go back to something that [HA5] said earlier about...how people have this view of Maori as being particularly good at warfare...this was obviously something that Belich was emphasising...[HA1], do you think that that’s an empowering kind of representation?

HA1: It’s another generalisation...because we were farmers, and we were (ship-folk), we were hunters...as well as being warriors. And the warrior thing only happens when (there’s provocation)...and again I think that its um...it’s another Pakeha story...I mean its just another story...that’s my point of view...but I’ll confirm that a lot of my relations would say, oh it’s great. It’s really affirming, but that’s another story...in fact I’d be sure that a lot of my relations would be saying that that’s a great documentary.

Here, HA1 argues that the representation of Maori as skillful warriors tends to obscure the ways in which his ancestors utilised other valuable skills.
While interpreting this “generalisation” as another stereotypical “Pakeha story”, HA1 balances this criticism by adding that his relations would find the series “really affirming”. The duality of this response is indicative of the flexibility and ‘double edged’ character of the noble-savage discourse. It is not only double-edged in the sense that Pakeha have utilised this discourse to define Maori in both negative and positive ways, but also because Maori viewers have interpreted this ‘warfare’ representation as simultaneously stereotypical and empowering. This duality was also demonstrated in the ‘Maori Youth’ discussion, where one participant actually used the ‘noble-savage’ terminology on several occasions to describe his ancestors:

MY1:  Our people were savages and...yet they still had the mind power and stuff like that to fight back and stuff...but the British are still powerful, they had the weapons and everything. And our people just (couldn’t win).

By using the term “savages” in an apparently uncritical way, MY1 demonstrates a degree of compliance with the ‘negative edge’ of the ‘noble-savage’ discourse. However his following comment “yet they still had the mind power...to fight back” suggests that the series has provoked an internal negotiation of this dual perception. This negotiation process is continued in the following extract, where the Maori Youth participants discuss the series’ representation of their ancestors as skilled warriors:

MY3:  That’s true warrior, warrior kind of what I was thinking

MY1:  I was thinking when I was seeing them in their cloaks, that’s what I’ll wear at the Coronation, when I perform.

[group laughs]

MY5:  Um...I think it really showed that element of warriorship or what ever you want to call it...because most of the time they were outnumbered...and yet they fought you know...and that just shows a whole lot of guts...and a lot of mana {esteem or status}.

MY1:  I think with the warriors, they used their head cos they lost their weapons. They had more power with this [points to his head] than a weapon.
MY5: Yeah, true.

In this extract, MY1 exuded a sense of immense pride when he talked about wanting to perform at the ‘Coronation’ in a cloak like his ancestors wore in battle. At eighteen years of age, he may not have expressed the cynicism of HA1 about the generalising ‘warrior myth’, but he was particularly impressed by the series’ portrayal of his ancestors, not as brainless savages, but as skilled strategists. A distinctive aspect of this focus group was the expression via body language as well as talk, of a strong sense of empowerment. This was not only an affirmation of their ancestor’s intelligence, but of their own sense of cultural identity.

8.3.5 Remnants of the ‘Noble-Savage’ Discourse

In many instances, TNZW became a prompt for participants to discuss other periods of New Zealand history, and wider issues of ‘race-relations’. In the process, much of the discussion surrounding these issues demonstrated the persistence and polymorphous articulation of the ‘noble-savage’ discourse. In the ‘Mature Pakeha’ discussion particular emphasis was placed on the ‘savage’ side of this construction, expressed via a pre-occupation with the ‘colourful’ details of various accounts of Maori slavery and cannibalism. When Belich’s ‘trench warfare’ claim was raised, the discussion became centred on the practicalities of how Maori were able to dig the trenches. This implies an assumption that Maori did not possess the skill, intelligence or tools to dig trenches. When it was suggested that slaves were used for this purpose, the discussion descended from emphasising the ‘primitive’ existence of slavery to blood curdling accounts of cannibalism.

MP4: I was talking to a very elderly Maori...and he said they used their slaves to dig those [trenches]...He said they still had slaves in Waikato.

MP1: About 1840 they (still had) slaves

MP4: He said they still had slaves...he said they didn’t officially recognise that they had slaves.

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MP3: They’d need more than just // (slaves)

MP4: But they’d need more than slaves, but they...

MP5: It’s a wonder they didn’t eat them.

MP1: I don’t know if anyone here has read The Musket Wars...but that actually brings a lot of that into context if you read The Musket Wars. It’s probably one of the best books I’ve ever read...It’s a phenomenal book. We learnt about how savage the American Indians were...they were like (kids) compared to the Waikato wars. There were some horrendously savage things that went on.

L.P: Like what kind of thing?

MP1: Cannibalism was one of the main features. Just about every paragraph, or every chapter winds up with...like if they were besieging a pa...the pa fell to a slaughter...the victors feasted on the dead for a fortnight or whatever it was...there was one chapter in there that says they feasted on the slain...until the stench of putrification drove them out...they didn’t have fridges and freezers in those days so they had to eat pretty quick. But...Te Rauparaha...his right hand man (Te Pehe) Kupe...was killed at Kaiapoi pa at Christchurch. They were besieging the pa...and there was a visitor from (Akaroa) at the pa. (Te Pehe) Kupe had sort of made friends with him some time in the past...and while the pa was being besieged, he went to visit him...a bit of a dumb thing to do...go visit the pa you’re besieging...but he thought this guy would protect him...and he did twice. But the third time he went there...they did him and his party in. Later on, to extract utu for that...Te Rauparaha hired a ship and its captain...

MP4: Captain (Stewart) and the (Brig Elizabeth)

MP1: That’s the one. Went down to Akaroa...posed as a trading party...his warriors stayed below deck so they weren’t seen. They couldn’t get the chief...he was away somewhere...so they waited until he returned, on the context that they wanted to trade muskets, and they would only trade with the senior man. Once he was on the ship they (clapped him in irons), captured the party, stormed the pa and flattened that...and feasted on cooked and (un-cooked) flesh all the way back to Kapiti. Kapiti Island and Te Rauparaha, was a well established (.) at that stage. The captain of the ship was paid in dressed flax...and he refused to release the last of the hostages, which was his chief and his wife...until he had his cargo of flax...and when he had it, he handed them over. They were then handed over to (Te Pehe) Kupe’s wife...and I don’t know what happened to this guy’s wife, but the guy who was responsible for Kupe’s death...she had him hooked up by his heels...they split a vein in his neck...and just quietly drank his blood until he bled to death. And once you put
your thumb over till someone else got there...that’s mentioned several times in the book.

The above extract demonstrates the persistence of the noble-savage discourse, as it underpins these narratives of slavery and cannibalism. At the beginning of this conversation, the subject of cannibalism appeared to be treated as taboo, but when MP5 said, “it’s a wonder they didn’t eat them”, the taboo was broken, thus opening the way for other members of the group to tell some particularly gruesome tales of cannibalism.

By advocating The Musket Wars as “one of the best books I’ve ever read...it’s a phenomenal book”, MY1 declares his allegiance to Ron Crosby’s (1999) interpretation of Maori inter-tribal warfare. The Musket Wars draws upon the noble-savage discourse in a similar way to those narratives written during the Victorian age. This book’s graphic emphasis on slavery and cannibalism as essentialist characteristics of ‘uncivilised’ Maori, serves to reinforce the myth of Maori as inherently savage warriors. Given that The Musket Wars is utilised here as an influential discursive resource, the noble-savage discourse continues to be accessed, not only as a means of making sense of historical conflicts, but as a way of interpreting contemporary ‘race relations’ in New Zealand and making sense of the nation.8

As discussed in chapter three, cannibalism was a predominant discourse of the Victorian interpretation of the New Zealand Wars, but also of those histories written during the 1950s and 1960s.9 Against this backdrop, the responses of the ‘Mature Pakeha’ participants can be understood as partially shaped by their exposure to those historical narratives that expressed a certain fascination and legitimacy towards the notion that Maori were ‘uncivilised cannibals’. While such histories were key resources of the interpretive framework utilised by the ‘Mature Pakeha’ group, the participants of the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ group had access to a different array of discursive resources. For instance, both written and oral histories, and personal experiences, were accessed during this group’s discussion about cannibalism.
A distinctive aspect of the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ group was the way in which history appeared to be understood as contextual, fluid and malleable, to the extent that their discussion portrayed an acceptance of the way in which histories inevitably change as they are passed from one generation to the next, and are mediated in various ways. In the following extract, TK2 demonstrates a critical awareness of the role of the media in elaborating and transmitting histories, and in the construction of popular myths such as those of cannibalism.

TK2: …the Pakehas had control of the newspapers and all the media...in those days...and my father told me...that when...Te Puea was at Maungatawhiri...she prevented Tainui from joining the army at the First World War. Well...my dad told me that, when she did that...the propaganda machine ground into action against her and there was reports...that they were eating people at Maungatawhiri. And that was in...1914 or 15. But that was the story that was appearing throughout the motu...and...I couldn’t believe it when he told me that. He said not everybody believed it...but that’s what was going on, to try and denigrate her...They had that...um...being pushed back in their corner all the time...by these little things. Even now... you see little articles that appear in the paper. If they don’t appear again the next day you know they’re not really true, you know. About what some Maoris done here and...I remember when...I used to pick up the newspaper and look through the court notices...and it had ‘JAMES THOMPSON, A MAORI’, you know, it didn’t have ‘WILLIAM SMITH – A PAKEHA’. But it always had...if the fella had a Pakeha name and he was a Maori, they’d always specify that he was a Maori.

TK2 brings these oral stories ‘to the surface’ as a means of illustrating the way in which racial stereotypes have been constructed in part, by the media. His ability to adopt a critical interpretation of the media is demonstrated by his suggestion of continuity between the construction of racial stereotypes in 1914, and contemporary constructions in the print media. He places these constructions within the context of power relations in 1914, when “the Pakehas had control of the newspapers and all the media that was in those days". His connection between past constructions of ‘Maori cannibalism’ with present reportage of Maori involvement in criminal behaviour, suggests
that power and control of the media continues to be an issue of contention, especially with regard to the representation of Maori.

8.3.6 Inevitability of ‘Racial Conflict’

As discussed in chapter three, the ‘inevitability of racial conflict’ was a distinctive discourse of the histories of the Victorian arena (Buick, 1927: 23). This discourse, which is closely aligned to the terms ‘culture contact’ and ‘fatal impact’, rests on the assumption that people of different races cannot live together harmoniously, and that the initial contact between races will inevitably result in violent conflict. This notion serves to naturalise and justify colonisation, as it reduces coloniser-colonised power relations to the simplistic concept of ‘racial incompatibility’. Given that Belich aimed to deconstruct the myth of ‘racial-conflict’ as an inevitable outcome of culture-contact, it is interesting that the participants of the ‘Mature Pakeha’ focus group utilised this discourse as an unproblematic explanation for warfare (Belich, 1996: 173).

MP6: Well the thing is to me...that hasn’t really come through in the series...that to me was virtually, the inevitability of the conflict between Maori and Pakeha...armed conflict...because...you basically had Europeans pouring into the country and Maori sort of saying enough’s enough, particularly in certain areas (.)...and there’s only so much...it was going to happen.

MP5: It was the same here [the Waikato]. It was going to happen...one way or another

MP4: It was going to happen.

MP6: Just as Maori (had taken the land from) other Maori in the past.

MP7: That’s right

MP6:...as I said before there was an element of inevitability about it...either that or Pakehas either stop coming to New Zealand or...pack up shop and move to Australia or something.

MP3: Culture contact. Happened all over the place...culture contact’s happened all over the world hasn’t it?
While MP2 points out that the notion of culture contact has “caused considerable debate”, the members of this group appeared to take it for granted that ‘racial conflict’ was an inevitable aspect of inter-cultural contact. After expressing surprise that this inevitability was not portrayed in the series, MP6 draws a parallel between the Colonial confiscation of land following the New Zealand Wars, and the land that had been won and lost during earlier inter-tribal conflict. By describing both the New Zealand Wars and the land confiscation as inevitable, MP6 sidesteps a critique of the motivations and power relations that are integral to the process of colonisation.

Within the broad theme ‘Negotiating Discourses of Race, Culture and Colonisation’, I have explored the way in which differently situated audience members have been prompted, by me questions, to discuss the representation of Maori and British, as distinct cultural groups, or as distinct ‘races’. One particular insight emerging from these discussions, was the contrasting responses of some of the Maori participants, with those of some of the Pakeha participants. While Maori expressed delight and a sense of empowerment about the series’ positive representation of their ancestors, the ‘Mature Pakeha’ participants expressed anger about the series’ representational strategies, and anxiety about its corrosion of previously dominant concepts of nation and history. This anxiety was expressed by the way in which these participants drew on their available repertoire of discourses associated with colonial justification. These discourses, along with competing discourses of nation and culture, also play a part in the following section.

8.4 Re-imagining the Nation

One of the most prominent insights to emerge from the audience research (which has impacted upon the approach taken in previous chapters) was the suggestion that TNZW has prompted a re-imagining of ‘the nation’ (see
section 2.2.2). The complex intersection of theoretical perspectives discussed in chapter two has helped to shape my argument that *TNZW* has re-contextualised familiar imagery of the New Zealand landscape, so that a number of once taken-for-granted landmarks have adopted a new signification of the past (see sections 7.4.3 & 7.4.4.). Imbued with the images, sounds and rhythm of violent conflict, this re-signified imagery has resonated in powerful and enduring ways for a number of audience members. When asked about the series’ role in the construction of national identity, the ‘History Academics’ began a discussion that illustrates the collective process of negotiating national identity:

HA5: I think those images of contemporary towns...show that there is...() of the landscape...there is...there should be a memory, there should be an embracing of past conflict...in this case it’s conflict that we’re talking about...and, sometimes (you kind of get the feeling that it has been) completely erased...in the landscape, and...I’m just learning about it but, it’s still got, that’s part of the history through those messages. ()

HA2: I think that this particular documentary is bringing us face to face with the fact that we are diverse people...that we have got different histories...I mean the very fact that it could be screened, and met with such a wide audience, tells us something. I don’t think that could have been made or screened twenty years ago.

HA5: I think, yeah, // the timing is really important

HA4: // I think it was tremendous timing

HA2: // We need to travel down those roads again, quite metaphorically, and also on [HA3’s] buses [group laughs] and revisit those sites and rediscover the highland of our history. We need to go back to it.

HA3: In terms of the images, I think it does show that we are growing together as a people. I actually quite like the image of the two muskets disappearing, so what comes...there’s actually the stocks, side by side...um, just the use of language...it actually does show a partnership...the people are coming together...I think that’s, it’s actually quite a nice image that you get graphically, with no text, its just a graphic. And also at the same time if you think of that Great South Road shot...what struck me there was not the Great South Road, but it was the Mercedes franchise, who’ve been taken over by another group of colonial (interlopers)...you know we’ve now got
economic dominance from another group...it’s...there’s a lot of visual stuff there which is not actually spoken about, but it’s just there...and it’s only when you start thinking about it that you realise...yes we are, as a people coming together, and we’re now struggling in a much bigger world...and if we’re not careful, we’re going to be swamped by it.

HA1: I recognise that the words in the script were Jamie Belich’s…but I also think that the visuals...the audio-visual were Tainui Stephens...and knowing Tainui...well, he’s a very gentle man, and he has these visions of...like you said about muskets...so um...I think as an identifying element in the national consciousness...the audiovisuals that Tainui provided...reflect my understanding of Maoridom...and Jaimie’s stories reflect what I understand of Pakehadom.

HA4: And they work together.

On one hand, this discussion demonstrates a process of collectively imagining a ‘New Zealand nation’. But on the other, it demonstrates a diversity of interpretations of ‘the nation’. While HA2 describes the series as “bringing us face to face with” cultural diversity and emphasising the multiplicity of histories, HA3 interprets the iconography of the muskets as signifying Maori and Pakeha “growing together as a people”. So while HA2 upholds the ideal of diversity in a bi-cultural sense, HA3 posits the desirability of a mono-cultural concept of ‘the nation’. This interpretive difference can possibly be attributed to the contrasting interpretive frameworks established by the paradigms of ‘social history’ and ‘military history’ (Montgomerie, 2003). Although mentioning the term ‘partnership’ (which is characteristic of the language of bi-culturalism), HA3 repeats the idea that “we are, as a people coming together”, a statement which alludes to the ‘one nation – one people’ discourse. By adding “and we’re now struggling in a much bigger world...and if we’re not careful, we’re going to be swamped by it”, HA3 argues that New Zealand citizens need to identify themselves as ‘one people’, in order to fend off ‘Other’ peoples that apparently threaten the stability of an imagined ‘mono-cultural nation’. HA3’s earlier comment “we’ve now got economic dominance from another group”, serves to establish the grounds for caution with regard to these ‘Other’ peoples. Although the nationality of the “colonial interlopers” is not specified here, the
‘Mercedes franchise take-over’ suggests an oblique indication that HA3 is referring to non-English speaking immigrants.

Another aspect highlighted by this extract is the significance of the timing of the series’ broadcast. HA2 points out that the series could not “have been made or screened twenty years ago”. Here, HA2 was most likely referring to a specific zeitgeist of late twentieth century New Zealand, emergent discourses of de-colonisation had prepared the ground for a revision of history to take place. This also suggests that sections of the New Zealand television audience had also reached a state of readiness for the reception of such a documentary series. These comments about the timing of the series serve to support my argument that the series functioned as a catalyst, shaped by, and possibly re-invigorating, already established processes of cultural colonisation and decolonisation (as discussed in chapters three and six).

8.4.1 Landscape, Memory and Metaphor

The above discussion demonstrates the way in which national and cultural identity is partly negotiated in relation to familiar imagery of the landscape, as well as the counterpoint of culturally specific iconography (such as the musket, the taiaha, cannons and carvings). According to HA5, images of the landscape play a necessary role in the “embracing” of memories of past conflict, because many of the landmarks that were once reminders of the conflict associated with colonisation have been metaphorically “erased” from the landscape. This viewer’s response is one of many that reinforce my premise that imagery of the landscape serves, in this series, to articulate a process of temporal collapse, thereby provoking a tangible and indelible connection between past and present.

While Belich has demonstrated his flair for using landscape metaphor to evoke imagery of colonial brutality, this was also a feature of the ‘History Academics’ discussion. This demonstrates the conventional utility of
metaphor as a historiographic narrative tool. At one point in the ‘History Academics’ discussion, HA2 argued, “we need to...revisit those sites and rediscover the highland of our history”. In the context of this discussion, the word ‘highland’ evokes the idea of the Scottish highland, as an iconic vista embodying the scars of ancient battles. The suggestion here is that New Zealand also has a ‘highland’, but the potential iconic status of the New Zealand highland is comparatively untapped. This is a perspective that both Belich and Stephens aimed to emphasize in the series (see chapter six).

In addition to the textual extracts discussed in chapter seven, several focus group responses suggest that the series’ re-contextualisation of landscape imagery has aroused an indelible connection between past conflicts and the turbulence of contemporary New Zealand cultural relations (This is also suggested by many of the published letters to the editor. See, for example, the opening quotation in chapter 7, by Diamond, 1998. See Appendix 2 for more examples). In the following extract from the ‘Tainui kaumatua’ focus group, TK1 describes how this landscape imagery and metaphorical description of the Great South Road “pointing like a giant sword at the heart of the King Movement” (Belich’s narration), evoked memories and stirred resentment:

TK1: …but I like the way that he [Belich] took it out...he went out to those, you know...he went to those very places, starting from the top there, from Pokeno, then you know you could just about follow. You can follow it, you can visualise it, you could just about follow where he was taking it through on the film. Where the road, you know that Great South Road there...that Great South Road. [laughs] Well I’m going to say that’s history, just as well it’s history, but sometimes it can stir...it can just stir the emotion. It can stir the emotion. So you know, that’s how real the documentary was to me. It’s almost stirred the resentment...you know, the fact that the road there was built and was leading into the Waikato here, straight to our people...just sort of stirred up the emotion in me [laughs]. So...yeah, if a documentary can do things like that to me, well...it’s getting to my...

TK7: (.) I think in every day life...we talk now of, oh you know um...oh I come from Whatawhata and I go here and I go there and you use the names that are there today...and a lot of those things happened in places that we know, but they were called under a different name
at that time...and when you see it there, and you know, oh it’s that place and then, you sort of gloss over it in every day life...but when it’s like that, it brings it back pretty graphically.

TK1: I always used to think about that Great South Road...I think back to that Great South Road again (.) and I used to go with the old people up to Auckland and oh you know, why do they call this place The Great South Road? It’s just a road. However, that’s what it had, it had a historic significance to it. And then I didn’t realise what it meant until I saw that film. I mean that documentary actually showed me just why that jolly road was such a big thing. It was the only road to come into Waikato...to our people...so...yeah. So, thank goodness we’ve got a new road now. The old Great South Road is (.) We’ve got a new bypass, what is it, a new motorway now? [laughs].

In the above extract, TK1 expresses her satisfaction that Belich visited “those very places” where the battles were fought, suggesting that the series enabled a tangible and experiential engagement with a history that resonated in powerful ways with this particular community. For TK1, the series’ use of metaphor and landscape imagery provoked an imaginary mode of engagement, evoked memories and ‘stirred up’ an emotional and deep-seated resentment about the impact of colonisation. Although this is only one individual example of such a ‘stirring affect’, it provides a ‘micro’ level insight into the (possible) broader unsettling of public consciousness that was outside the scope of my empirical research.

The participants of the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ group alluded to the way in which banal nationalism is repeatedly flagged by common-sense mnemonics such as place names and street signs (Billig, 1995). As TK7 describes it, “you sort of gloss over it [a place name] in everyday life...but when it’s like that, it brings it back pretty graphically”. This comment suggests that the significance of place-names used in daily life is often taken-for-granted, but that the use of nomenclature that is graphically linked to violence has the potential to evoke associations with past conflicts. This notion is further reiterated by TK1’s comment that the Great South Road “had a historic significance to it...that documentary actually showed me just why that jolly road was such a big thing".
While the extracts discussed in this section reveal a discursive struggle between competing concepts of nation and community, they also illustrate the significance of the series’ creative use of familiar landscape imagery in promoting a connection between past and present. The landscape can be seen here to evoke memories of the past, and to stir resentment about colonial injustices. Examples of participants’ access to specific memory resources provide the focus for the following section.

8.5 Cultural Memory

A significant insight of the audience research was the variety of ways in which participants utilised memory as a means of engaging with, and discussing the episode. The focus group extracts discussed here demonstrate the articulation of different ‘modes’ of memory (as outlined in section 1.3.8). While some extracts exemplify memory as representational, some illustrate the associational dimension of memory, and some suggest the involvement of memory as non-representational, affective and embodied. Memory is sometimes articulated as a collective, social process, and at times, as a highly subjective, individual form of bodily or emotional engagement. In some extracts, all of these dimensions appear to operate simultaneously. These extracts show how memory is evoked by; words, metaphor and place-names, images of the landscape (as in the above extract), photographs of ancestors, sounds that are associated with past events, textures, colours, camera movement, the rhythm of editing, and discordant sound-effects. While these observations have required a complex, multi-dimensional approach to the role of memory (see section 1.3.8), a further layer of complexity must be added to this framework. Memory resources appear to provide, for some, a more comfortable (but not natural) means of engaging with the past. In this sense, memory can be seen as operating as an alternative (and potential form or resistance) to the dominant modes of engaging with history.¹⁰
The idea of engaging with the past through memories that are passed through generations has been discussed in relation to ‘Holocaust memory’, as a characteristic of audience responses to the documentary Night and Fog (Nuit et Brouillard, 1955). Here, van der Knaap (2006: 169) describes this ‘flow’ of memory as a ‘transgenerational act’. A similar type of transgenerational transit has also been emphasized as a characteristic of cultural memory in the post-colonial Pacific (Mageo, 2001), and as an indicator of memory as a form of social activity that can be passed on and discursively modified, amongst various communities (Edwards & Potter, 1992).

As argued in chapter one, the transmission of memory from one generation to another enables the flow through time of memory resources that operate as culturally specific systems of meaning. In the following extract, TK2 ‘remembers’ the sacrifice of her ancestor, King Tawhiao (whose portrait is repeatedly displayed in episode three – see image 3), to whom she attributes the prescience of a prophet. TK2’s expression of story fragments can be understood as an expression of memories that were passed through generations, and that have culturally specific currency, collectively shared by “all of us here in Tainui”:

TK2: Tawhiao foresaw all these things before it ever happened. This was the spirituality in our Maori King, King Tawhiao... He foretold of a lot of things. And this is where we, the people in Tainui were aware. I just sort of truly believed in it... and I thought that, well not thought, I must say that... he was truly a prophet... King Tawhiao was

TK3: He was

TK2: He foretold everything... even before the wars that started when they came across Maungatawhiri... where that was the boundary line, where the soldiers weren’t supposed to cross that creak. See and I think that, not only myself, but all of us here in Tainui... we still strongly believe in it... and there’s still some little unsettled business within our own hearts that... we cannot accept, I can’t...

L.P: Accept what happened?
TK2: Mmm...because it came right through there...we were the people that suffered in land confiscations...and it was through those brutal wars...they who still believe us will go with all those thoughts. And I honor my people, even though they used a natural (.) when they said...when the men wanted to take the Orakau wars...they wanted them to get out...Maniapoto told them to go and they refused to move...if the men died...told them to do with them. And even today, I guess I must say the same thing...that is still how I feel, that...you know I could, I feel that, I could go all over this again, and see it all over again. But my greatest honour of all is my Kingi Tawhiao, where he had already foreseen all these things...but we just didn't have the tactic of prevention. We were threatened from the beginning.

This passionate expression of story fragments was prompted by a complex intersection of memory triggers. While the particular flow of discussion during this focus group played a part in this process, specific formal aspects of TNZW triggered memories. Expressed as dialect, the collective access to this particular ‘memory corpus’ meant that this reflection upon fragments of oral histories did not require TK2 to elaborate beyond the skeletal communication of these story fragments. While the series projected a complex web of potential memory triggers, this particular response is likely to have been triggered by the repeated appearance of portrait photographs of King Tawhiao and Rewi Maniopoto. As discussed in chapter seven, these photographs of Maori chiefs were super-imposed against moving-image layers of flowing water and mystical dawn shots. These evocative images, in conjunction with wailing vocals, provide the visual and aural substance for imagining a ghostly presence of those who lost their lives during these wars.

Photographs have been theorised as repositories of cultural memory, where they have been discussed for their semiotic function, their material evocations and their social and cultural significance. Elizabeth Edwards argues that:

...it is not merely the image qua image that is the focus of contemplation, evocation and memory, but that its material forms, enhanced by its presentational forms, are central to its function as a socially salient object. These material forms exist in dialogue with the image itself, to make meaning and to create the focus for meaning and evocation. For photographs belong to that class of objects formed specifically to remember...photographs express a desire for
memory and the act of keeping a photograph is, like other souvenirs, an act of faith in the future (Edwards, 1999: 222).

Like the landscape, photographs function on several levels as both repositories of memory, and as memory triggers. Photographs of ancestors can serve as especially powerful memory triggers, whereby they can function as a material platform from which to construct memories (or the imagined existence) of a person, for whom the viewer may not have known during their lifetime. In order to ‘animate’ the person depicted in the photograph, the viewer must be able to access a variety of memory resources relevant to that person’s life, which can be woven into a complex, imaginary fabric. This ‘ancestral memory fabric’ can then be carried with a person (like a spirit or ghost), serving as protection, guidance or assurance. This idea may appear far-fetched, but it helps to explain the construction of memory by those focus group participants who had access to discourses of Maori spirituality. The following extract demonstrates the emotional response of HA4 to the way in which a Maori descendant of Rewi Maniapoto constructs the ghost-like presence of her ancestors, whilst holding a photograph of them (interviewed in episode three of the series). This photograph functions here as a material platform from which to construct a memory fabric – which serves for this Maori woman, as a means of ‘animating’ her ancestors, so that she hears them ‘speak’ to her.

HA4: The most moving moment in the whole episode…is…when this Maori woman…she said ‘I look at that photograph of my old people and I hear them say, what is past is past’…and I still go into tears every time I hear that because that’s such a generous response…and I remember the time that I saw that, that particular statement meant more to me, than anything…any of Belich or anything…it was just such an expression of hope for the future that despite all of that…

This extract contains several layers of ‘memory work’. For HA4, the screening of episode three of *TNZW* prior to the focus group discussion served as a trigger for her to remember her emotional response to this particular sequence of the series, at the time it was first broadcast on television in 1998. Within the context of this group’s discussion, HA4’s
response stands out as a rare moment of affective engagement with the series. As mentioned earlier in this chapter this ‘History Academics’ group tended to prioritise the discussion in terms of historical veracity, and a critique of Belich’s professional integrity. HA4 suggests here, that these aspects meant very little in contrast to the way in which this Maori woman was able to construct memories of her ancestors via a photograph. Such engagement with the past through visual, oral and spiritual technologies of memory has been marginalised within the history academy.

8.5.1 Sound, Association and Affect

The semantic and affective role of the soundtrack has received minimal (but much needed) attention within the realm of documentary theory (Corner, 2005, Gaines, 1999). However, there is growing interest in this role of sound, especially in relation to the study of cultural memory, synaesthesia, visual music and audio-visual culture (Kandinsky, 1911; Chion, 1994; Marks, 2000; Mageo, 2001; Brougher, 2005). This body of scholarship has informed my understanding of the complex ways in which audience members engaged with TNZW soundtrack, which appears to have been especially powerful for those whose ‘memory corpus’ includes culturally encoded aural associations. For example, some Maori have a strong spiritual association with the sounds of the koauau, and the ngeri. An eighty-four-year-old Maori woman illustrated this, when she described her response to specific aspects of the series’ soundtrack:

TK1: Yeah…it really brought back the spirit, the wairua of the korero. You know you could hear the koauau. Yeah the soundtrack…I think that’s the one that got me most…and the ngeri, when I heard the ngeri…Waikato’s famous ngeri being sung. Right away that’s showing their mana in who they stand for, the Kingitanga. Oh yes, that’s real Waikato…mana…when you hear it, it sends goose pimples up your back. When you feel that up your back, you know that documentary…the wairua’s there… See that’s where a lot of the history’s kept…it’s in the waiatas…it’s in those ngeris. That’s why I was glad when I heard the sound of the ngeri, in the background…because that’s where the actual korero was…in those ngeris (my emphasis).
This extract illustrates how, for some audience members, engagement with the auditory aspects of this series catalysed the ignition of associational and affective dimensions of memory. This may suggest that a number of the instrumental sounds used in the series are codified with culturally specific meanings or associations. While some participants were able to associate specific memories or strong emotions with the sounds of the koauau, the ngeri, the haka, and the military drum roll, it was evident that not all viewers had access to the same socially and culturally constructed memory resources.

TK4’s final comment alludes to the idea that the waiata and the ngeri are repositories of cultural memory, which hold onto memory resources in oral and aural forms, and are accreted over time, enabling the flow of memory across generations (Mageo, 2001: 11). On one hand, TK4 refers to these memory repositories as though they are representational forms of memory storage – that the Waikato ngeri represents the mana of the Kingitanga. On the other hand, her engagement with the sound of this ngeri demonstrates an affective dimension of memory. To experience “goose pimples” as a bodily response to music, does not necessarily involve processes of representation, thought, or access to discourse. But such a response may involve a sub-conscious process of accessing sensory memories (see Marks, 2000).

An affective engagement with *TNZW* soundtrack was demonstrated by a number of the audience responses, and it was interesting that many of these responses were accompanied by the expression of an impulse to ‘do something’ - to activate their bodies in various ways. While an elderly Pakeha respondent wrote in a letter to the local newspaper that the series made him “want to puke”, an eighteen-year-old participant of the Maori youth group commented, “…a lot of those hakas, I knew them…I just felt like standing up and doing a haka”. It is understandable that these differently situated audience members express such vastly different bodily impulses. But the
later response exemplifies a more general expression of an impulse of resistance to colonial discourse, which was exhibited by a number of Maori focus-group participants. These responses would appear to support Gaines’ (1999) argument - that the point of using “traditional solidarity ballads on documentary sound tracks is to reach audiences at the juncture of the physiological and the psychological and to use musical associations to “produce...not just affiliation but action” (p.92).

Likened here to a “traditional solidarity ballad”, the haka is a very expressive and physical form of chant and dance that was once used to express the intent to engage in battle, to scare opponents, to prepare warriors psychologically for battle, and to express tribal identity and solidarity. It has also been used as a psychological preparatory chant by Maori who fought as part of the Maori battalion during WW2 (where it was often whispered). The haka continues to be performed prior to international rugby tests (featuring the New Zealand national team, the ‘All Blacks’) as a signifier of national and cultural identity. Like other oral and aural forms of memory transmission (such as the waiata and the ngeri), the haka can be understood as a repository of cultural memory. But the bodily impulse and historical function that can be associated with the haka, charge it with the potential of functioning as an extremely potent and passionate expression of resistance to colonialism.

During the focus groups, a number of other bodily impulses of resistance to colonialism were observed. The most surprising of such responses is perhaps the following, where an eighteen-year-old woman (MY3), when asked to describe how she felt about the documentary, replied, “I was crying man”. In fact, I had observed earlier that she had been literally sobbing uncontrollably throughout the screening:

MY5: It was quite emotional for me...and I’m quite angry about it.
MY3: I was crying man
MY1: I just feel like getting the British Flag and burning it
MY3: Yeah, same here...I was blown away...I was crying and everything. I just honestly didn’t think that everything was like that, but it was...just how like, the great chiefs, how they were just killed off, like...like nothing.

In order to discuss the powerful emotional response exhibited by this group, it is necessary first to explain the particular context within which the screening and subsequent discussion took place. This was a close-knit, Maori youth group, most of whom had not seen this episode (The Invasion of Waikato) when it was first televised. As a group, they had limited prior knowledge of conventional ‘New Zealand history’ (in its dominant written forms), but most of them had strong emotional ties with their ancestors - some of whom were portrayed in the series as distinguished warriors who were eventually killed during the Waikato War. As descendants of various Waikato hapu, the participants of this focus group had inherited the socio-economic consequences of the massive dispossession that ensued the Waikato War. When interpreted against this context, the extent of sadness, resentment and anger that was expressed by these participants is hardly surprising.

As illustrated in the previous examples, many viewers used ‘emotion metaphors’ - phrases that expressed a ‘mimetic’ impulse to perform some kind of bodily action in response to the series. These ranged from wanting to “puke” to “getting the British Flag and burning it”. Such statements take the expression of emotion to a new level of passion, whereby the respondents articulate their desire to physically act upon strong feelings of disgust, pride, resentment and anger. Whether or not these responses were actually manifested in action is not known, but the frequency of this kind of passionate response suggests that the series may have functioned as a catalyst, thus sparking the emergence of an impulse toward an ‘active’ resistance to colonialism.

8.6 Conclusion
The focus-group extracts discussed in this chapter have demonstrated both the agenda-setting role of *TNZW*, and the diversity of responses, which have been shaped by the participants’ access to quite different discursive resources.

In terms of the choice of transcript material and themes for discussion in this chapter, it has not been an intention to provide either a fully representative examination of the content discussed in all focus groups, or a balanced representation of Maori and Pakeha responses to *TNZW*. Instead, this chapter has been structured on the basis of my selective choice of both transcript extracts and themes. The rationale for this selection is based on the relevance of the data at hand, to the key concepts and insights emergent from the research. This has resulted in a prioritization of focus group material that helped to shed light on concepts such as cultural memory and affective engagement. My identification of each of the themes discussed in this chapter has been useful as a means of structuring the many insights emerging from the focus group discussions. While this was a highly interpretive response to the transcript material, my identification of these themes was also informed by my earlier survey of the distinctive discursive field that shaped the reception of *TNZW*.

A number of rich insights have emerged from this audience research, the most unexpected of which were the highly emotional character of both the transcribed and observed responses, and the participants’ use of memory resources as a way of engaging with the past. Both of these insights turned out to be particularly significant outcomes of my research, which prompted my exploration of the relation between discourse, affect and cultural memory.

Other significant insights from this audience research suggest the potential of this particular television documentary to function as a technology of cultural memory, to evoke a re-imagining of the nation, to provoke public debate, and to stir up a sense of resistance to colonialism.
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the similarities and differences between the published audience responses and my focus group responses provide an important research outcome. While the themes identified in the focus group discussions are consistent with the key debates of the written responses, these more public negotiations (which occurred during the month in which the series was first broadcast) appear to have invited a more polemic type of ‘gut reaction’ to the series. Written at the moment when the discursive collision generated by the series was experienced (for some) as raw and corrosive, discourses of race and nation reveal themselves in many of the apparently more impulsive written reactions. In contrast, many of the discursive negotiations discussed in this chapter have been expressed after a period of contemplation and with the value of hindsight. Both of these methods of research have their own value, and their combined use suggests this as a useful approach toward audience research.

While my audience research has operated as a valuable part of the overall project, the outcomes must be considered in relation to the specific limitations of my research design, and of the focus group method. In this respect, all of the research outcomes discussed here are interpretive rather than conclusive, and the speculative aspects of these outcomes point toward the need for further research.

The focus group discussions have generated a complex discursive entanglement that has been difficult to marshall. However, the intersection of a number of insights point toward the catalytic potential of television documentary to open up productive spaces. Situated within these spaces, the audience responses discussed in this chapter illustrate the interstitial transit of discursive and memory resources, and show how they are involved in re-imagining ‘nation’ ‘landscape’ ‘colonisation’ and ‘history’. The major insight of this chapter however, is that it is through the associational and affective dimensions of cultural memory, that audience members derive the impulse to actively negotiate strategies of resistance to colonialism.
Endnotes

1 Letter to editor. The full letter is included in Appendix 2.

2 This pilot audience response project was conducted during July-October, 1998. It involved a survey of a extensive array of letters to local newspapers and magazines, which focused on TNZW. These responses were grouped according to discursive themes, and an observation was made, that certain discourses tended to be expressed along the lines of factors such as ethnicity, age and geographic homeland.

3 Both MY1 and MY2 were brought up in a family environment (in Nagaruawahia) where Maori activism was prominent, and history was often discussed in relation to the Kingitanga and contemporary issues of Maori self determination. MY5 did not have this influence of Maori oral history being passed down, but learnt a lot about history, the Treaty, biculturalism etc. at University.

4 For a recent discussion on the issue of military versus social history, see: Montgomerie, (2003).

5 These claims of bias were a prominent feature of the public response directly following the series’ broadcast. For example, one letter to a local newspaper commented that Belich must be “an anglophobe [who] has tried to ingratiate himself with Maori” (Coulson, 1998).

6 This double-edged character of the noble-savage discourse is discussed by McCreanor (1997) and Salmond (1991: 95).

7 The ‘Coronation’ is a yearly celebration held to commemorate the formation of the Maori King Movement, and the subsequent ‘crowning’ of the Maori Queen. In this instance, MY1 refers to performing at the Coronation, possibly inferring that he will be performing as part of a ‘kapa haka’ group.

8 It is interesting to note that the argument that underpins The Musket Wars (Crosby, 1999) has been utilised by some people as a rationale for arguing for the abolishment of the Treaty of Waitangi. This rationale rests on the notion that, at the time of the signing of the Treaty, Maori tribal dynamics were severely unbalanced due to the introduction of the musket, and consequent ‘genocide’ of poorer tribes who were not wealthy enough to be able to participate in the trade for muskets (Crosby, 1999; Hunt, 1999).

9 See, for instance Cowan (1922); Buick (1926) and Holt (1962: 22-23).

10 This use of memory as a form of resistance to the dominant modes of engaging with history has been discussed by; Radstone and Hodgkin (2006: 10), Foucault (1977: 22) and McArthur (1978: 55).

11 This response was expressed in a letter to the local newspaper, by Peacocke (1998) (See Appendix 2).

12 This use of the haka was discussed in a documentary made by a University of Waikato MA student, Kahurangi Waititi, in which she interviewed her father, who spoke about his experiences as a member of the Maori battalion during WW2.

13 For a discussion about the many cultural meanings associated with the haka, see Kaiwai and Zemke-White (2004).
CHAPTER 9: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

Audio-visual media can play a significant role in the processes of drawing upon, transmitting, reinforcing, and popularising cultural memory. Using TNZW as a key television event within New Zealand, resonating with a distinctive discursive context, this thesis has explored the role of television documentary in terms of its capacity to animate history and to function as a technology of cultural memory, within a specifically volatile context. The insights gained in this thesis have demonstrated that television documentary has the capacity to implicate a number of other technologies of cultural memory, and in doing so, to function as a complex trigger for audience members to experience both collective and personal memories of the past.

Thompson’s (1990) tripartite approach has provided a useful means with which to study the role of TNZW within this context, since it has enabled a multi-faceted approach to analysing the construction of meaning. The significance of conducting tripartite research can be seen in the integration of insights gained across the three levels of research. This thesis demonstrates that any meanings associated with a documentary text are not simply able to be read from the text in a textually determined manner, but that these meanings undergo a complex process of negotiation between producer, text and audience. One value of this approach has been its emphasis on the importance of the specific social-historical context in which this text was produced and interpreted. In this respect, chapters three and four demonstrate the importance of acknowledging the complex discursive terrain that shapes the wider resonance of a documentary text.

While both the tripartite model and CDA have certain shortcomings, these have been addressed in this thesis by my exploration of the elliptical modes of memory. This heuristic model has been utilised co-extensively with my original methodological framework, where CDA was initially situated as the
principal analytical method utilised across each phase of the tripartite model. This modular framework has served as a productive method for exploring the following specific research questions.

Initially, the objectives for this research derived from my curiosity about the specific nature of the public debate that followed the broadcast of *TNZW*. In particular, I was interested in exploring the complexity and reverberation of this debate, and investigating the origin and function of these discursive negotiations. This required an investigation into how these discursive expressions had emerged and developed within wider processes of discursive struggle, cultural colonization and de-colonisation. During the initial broadcast, and through my survey of public responses, it occurred to me that the series played an important role in ‘stirring up’ an already much-contested discursive situation. But this was a speculation that invited further investigation via empirical audience research. After this research had been conducted, analysis of the focus group transcripts generated a number of insights, which led to the identification of cultural memory as a crucial element of my theoretical and methodological framework. However, the inclusion of cultural memory posed another layer of research questions. It became necessary to explore the role of memory in relation to discourse and affect, and to understand the factors (such as community membership) that enable or constrain differently positioned audience members’ access to memory resources. It was also important to assess the capacity of *TNZW* to function as a technology of cultural memory. In order to discuss the specific use of memory resources by focus group participants, my conceptualisation of memory needed to be developed, enabling its practical application and differentiation between affective and discursive instances of memory.

This conclusion reflects upon the value and the limitations of each of the three phases of research, as separate parts, and as an integrated whole. While discussing the difficulties involved in attempting to arrive at a singular ideological character of media messages, this chapter outlines a selection of the insights that emerged from the integration of the three phases of
research. Having influenced my theoretical framework in a reciprocal way, many of these insights appear as recurring motifs that run through this thesis. An attempt is made here to identify when they significantly intersect. However, many of these insights point toward the need for further research rather than establishing neatly bounded conclusions. The most significant outcomes of this thesis are considered after reflecting upon the value of each part of these three phases of research.

9.2 Part 1: Social-historical Context and Production Context

Part one of this research addresses the need to position cultural forms within their context, and to identify how a specific media text draws from, inflects and contributes to discourses and cultural memory. At least three different types of ‘context’ are established within this first phase of research. These include: the social-historical context that is surveyed by way of a discursive map; the institutional context that is investigated through my study of broadcasting discourses in chapter six; and the production context that is outlined via the discourses articulated by key production personnel. Together, these different types of context build a platform that informs my analysis of TNZW and its reception.

The discursive arenas mapped out in chapters three and four provide a flexible framework allowing for a more nuanced understanding of how particular discourses have played out in historical narratives, and have reappeared in re-contextualised and remnant forms. This map of discourses has also been vital as a means of emphasising the distinctive context that has shaped TNZW as a media event. Chapters three and four underscore the significance of the volatile discursive context as a key element of the complex dialogical process catalysed by the series.

The production interviews played an important role in relation to the wider project. While enabling some insight into the institutional context in which the series was produced, the interviews also revealed the collaborative nature of
the production process. Selected comments from each of the interview transcripts illustrate the way in which production personnel negotiated various approaches toward popular history and the role of television documentary as a vehicle for the expression of discourses of biculturalism and de-colonisation. The discursive entanglement associated with this process of collaboration and compromise has complicated the notion of locating a singular ‘preferred reading’. Rather, chapter six illustrates a more complex situation, whereby multiple layers of meaning have been generated from the bi-cultural collaboration between individual personnel, and between different approaches toward historical narrative and memory.

The fifteen to sixteen month gap between the series’ broadcast and the time of the production interviews is significant. This enabled each of the informants to reflect upon the historical context in which the series was produced and broadcast, and to consider the implications of its reverberating impact since the initial broadcast. As discussed in chapter six, *TNZW* was described by Horrocks (1999) as a result of ‘the right people in the right place at the right time’. However, the discursive map outlined in chapters three and four suggests that what may appear as a coincidental alignment of people and places was considerably shaped by a highly volatile discursive and cultural context.

Placing phase one within the wider frame of the tripartite research highlights the way in which several of the objectives expressed by these interviewees can be observed in following chapters to have come to fruition. For instance, Stephen’s (1999) objectives were: “to move people”, “to awaken them, to good history” and “to treat history as now”. However, this tripartite framework also shows how the generation of meaning across three phases often escapes the intentions of the producers. In this sense, a focus on the production context is useful, but can only provide a partial understanding of how a media text is situated within its wider context.
9.3 Part 2: Construction of Text

The second phase of research has been valuable as a means of assessing how *TNZW* is positioned in relation to the New Zealand broadcasting context, and how this series makes use of the distinctive characteristics of television documentary. While I have drawn upon global templates as a means of defining the generic characteristics of television and documentary, these are adapted to enable a type of analysis that is sensitive to the specific New Zealand context within which this series was produced, broadcast and engaged by viewers.

In chapter seven, a multi-faceted approach toward textual analysis demonstrates the complex construction of *TNZW*. The value of focusing upon generic, narrative, aesthetic and discursive layers of analysis becomes evident when considering them in conjunction. For instance, *TNZW*'s innovative use of documentary conventions is enriched by the strategic use of aesthetic elements. Throughout the series, culturally specific visual and aural codes are used both as evidentiary fragments, and as technologies of cultural memory. In chapter seven, the aesthetic and narrative construction of *TNZW* are discussed separately, but these layers of construction are also considered in relation to the particular discursive constellation promoted by the series’ creative use of documentary conventions. By using the tools of dramatic narrative and appropriating the aesthetic archives of colonialism (in the form of art-work from the colonial period), discourses of race and colonization are re-contextualised via a process of ‘detournement’ (Debord, 1956). While this creative use of visual culture was adopted due to a lack of contemporary photographic evidence of these specific battles, the resulting de-naturalisation of colonial discourse illustrates Bhabha’s (1990) postcolonial strategy of mimicry.

This layered analysis of *TNZW* demonstrates how the interplay of expository and performative conventions generates possibilities for complex intersections of discursive and affective modes of engagement. A key insight
arising from this modal interplay is the temporal collapse that occurs as a result of re-enactments of the battle scenes. Here, the juxtaposition of artistic representations of the past with contemporary footage of the landscape and battle sites function as referential fragments as well as evoking an affective presence of the past.

Another key insight emerging from this phase of analysis is the way in which the soundtrack has been crafted in order to resonate with particular communities of the New Zealand audience. The specific repertoire of instrumental sounds that make up this soundtrack have the potential to ‘tap into’ the memory corpus of differently situated ‘communities of memory’. In addition to these instrumental sounds, the use of historically and culturally specific waiata, ngeri and haka, the sound effects of battle, and the re-enacted voice-overs that connote various British dialects, combine to create a complex aural texture that has the potential to evoke personal associations and bodily memories. Due to the discursive and associational qualities of these sounds and images, **TNZW** operates as a series of layered texts that are open to multiple interpretations, and a potentially rich type of engagement for New Zealand audience members.

**9.4 Part 3: Reception of Text**

In part three, both transcript analysis and the elliptical modes of memory work alongside each other to frame my analysis of the focus group participants’ discursive and affective engagement with **TNZW**. This analytical approach presupposes a conception of the audience as active, not only in the sense of individuals’ capacity to participate in intellectual critique and public debate, but also in the sense of their affective and experiential engagement with television documentary. My audience research suggests that this broader notion of audience activity is significant (especially in this specific case study) as a means of researching expressions of resistance to colonial discourse. While the discursive map outlined in chapters three and four is useful as a point of connection between all three phases of research,
discourse analysis has been particularly valuable as a means of studying audience negotiations with *TNZW*. Here, discourse analysis has enabled a detailed analysis of the ways in which audience members have drawn upon, articulated, and socially negotiated those discourses outlined in the discursive map. This type of analysis has generated many insights, some of which required the adaptation of my initial research design.

One expected insight arising from the audience research was the complexity and diversity of responses to *TNZW*. For instance, some Pakeha expressed their anxiety about the series’ corrosion of ‘the nation’, by subverting the justifications of colonialism. Particular members of the ‘HA’ focus group were influenced by (and to some extent constrained by) the ways in which they privileged their access to discourses of historical veracity and empiricism. In contrast to these examples, some Pakeha participants drew on discourses of biculturalism and postcolonialism, and were able to discuss the documentary series in terms of its audio-visual construction and strategic revision of a colonial historical narrative. While a similar degree of diversity was also evident in the responses of Maori participants, the insights emerging from the ‘Maori Youth’ and the ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ group highlighted the significance of their differential access to specific memory resources. One of the most portentous insights to arise from the audience research was the extent of emotion observed during the ‘Maori Youth’ and ‘Tainui Kaumatua’ focus groups, and the related expression of an impulse toward action. This is not exhaustive or representative of wider society. It is possible to assume that emotional responses were expressed by other groups in society. Certainly, the letters to the editor suggest that at least some Pakeha responded in a similar fashion.

Across all of the focus groups, possibly the most significant finding has been the way in which the series has opened up spaces which enable the interstitial transit of discursive and memory resources. Specific audience responses suggest that these spaces have generated a re-imagining of nation and landscape, and have spawned alternative ways of engaging with
the past. In aggregate, these insights demonstrate the complexity of audience engagement with this series, thus reiterating the value of a tripartite study and the limitations of focusing only on production research or textual analysis in accessing the generation of meanings associated with a specific text.

The model of elliptical modes of memory (chapter eight) has served as a useful means of differentiating between discursive expressions of memory and non-representational instances of affective engagement with the series. The focus group extracts demonstrate the articulation of these different modes of memory, and illustrate the Deleuzean notion that affective memory can agitate thought (Deleuze, 1988; Bennett, 2006: 32; also discussed in section 1.3.8). The complex results generated by this type of analysis emphasise the need for further research that integrates discursive and affective facets of audience engagement. This type of research is likely to be of particular value in a study of the interplay between various ‘modes of engagement’ (such as an ‘animation mode’, or a ‘music video’ mode) as a means of better understanding the complexity of engagement with other forms of television documentary.

9.5 Integrating the Three Phases

Thompson’s tripartite approach has served as a useful means of structuring my research, where it has enabled an integrated approach toward multiple dimensions of the mediated communication of meaning. This approach has been particularly valuable as a means of researching the social-historical context for the production, construction and reception of *TNZW*, whereby specific discourses can be seen to weave their way through each of the three phases of research. The changing position, character and context of these discourses across the three phases serves to illustrate both the catalytic role of the series, and the significance of the complex discursive flux in which it was embedded.
One of the benefits of integrating the three phases of research is that it enables a focus upon the intersection of themes, discourses and insights, which has occurred across each of the three stages of analysis. For example, one of the most significant insights occurring across all three phases is the role of memory resources such as Maori instrumental sounds, colonial artwork, and landscape imagery. The prominence of these resources during each stage of analysis required the expansion of my initial theoretical framework to include the theory of cultural memory.

Another benefit of integrating the three phases of research is that it brings into contrast particular points of difference and contradiction that arise across the phases. For instance, similar discursive arenas were accessed and negotiated in all three stages, but, as suggested above, they are drawn upon and expressed in quite different ways in each stage.

The processes of discursive struggle and discursive intertextuality cut across each of the three phases of research. My research illustrates how many of the discourses drawn upon in the construction of written narratives of the New Zealand Wars also figure in the production, construction and reception of TNZW. But it also shows how these discourses are always involved in an ongoing process of struggle, and that discourses change position (in terms of dominance and marginalisation), and mutate over time. More specifically, the tripartite structure of this research demonstrates how discourses have moved from positions of dominance to marginalization (and vice-versa), and that remnants of these discourses continue to be used in complex and apparently contradictory ways. For example, focus group extracts in chapter eight demonstrate how some Pakeha have drawn on remnants of racial discourse. However, these discursive remnants have also been utilised, quite differently (often by indigenous communities), as part of a Fanonist strategy of anti-colonial resistance. A different type of anti-colonial strategy is utilised in TNZW, where discourses of race are re-contextualised (as discussed in sections 4.10.2 & 7.4.2).
The process of integrating the results of these different types of research demonstrates the fluidity and dynamic nature of the discursive context in which the series was produced and constructed, and the diversity of public debate about and audience engagement with *TNZW*. As I have argued in chapter seven, such complexity demonstrates that any ‘reading’ of *TNZW*, in terms of a singular textual message or function within wider society, is untenable.

By integrating the insights emerging from the three levels of this tripartite study, what becomes apparent is that the negotiation of meaning occurs at the encounter between text and audience. Within this process of negotiation, some meaning appears to be closely tied to the preferred readings intended by the producers. Other meanings escape this frame and draw from alternative discursive resources and other frames of reference. For example, the bicultural collaboration between individual production personnel is expressed in the text’s privileging of bicultural discourse. However, the audience engagement with this series indicates a complexity and diversity of response that escapes the bounds of a bicultural frame. This reinforces much of the earlier audience research literature related to television (eg: Corner *et al.*, 1990; Morley, 1992; Philo, 1990).

To argue that *TNZW* serves a nation-building role or promotes a unified national identity, may be an appropriate partial assessment (see Goldson, 2004: 246). But this academic critique is best understood as part of a broader, more intricate situation. In its privileging of bicultural discourse and landscape imagery, the series can be viewed as celebrating biculturalism. One interpretation, then, is that such a national narrative may operate as a banal signifier of cultural colonisation, quashing anti-colonial anger by proposing a unified outcome. However, the complexity evident in all three phases of my research suggests that this would be an overly simplistic and textually determined assessment. A more adequate appraisal would be that *TNZW* intervened, and functioned as a catalyst, within a volatile discursive context. My research suggests that within this particular context, *TNZW* has
functioned on many levels, permitting the reimagining of nation, landscape and community, in many different ways.

While these conclusions serve as an important outcome of my research, they add to the difficulty of gauging the wider reverberations of *TNZW*. This series has resonated in many different ways with differently situated audiences. For example, the series has been interpreted as a step in the development of an orthodox historical narrative, and this view is supported by the use of *TNZW* as an educational resource within secondary schools.¹

While this ongoing use of *TNZW* text may be viewed as a means of establishing a new orthodoxy, it can also be understood as a means of generating resistance to literary historical narratives, or as a vehicle for encouraging an engagement with oral histories. On the basis of the integration of insights emerging from the three levels of research conducted in this thesis, my observation of the wider resonance of this television series has focused on the emotional re-imagining of landscape and the stirring of collective and personal remembrance. While these aspects were only hinted at in the focus group responses and letters to the editor, they are worthy of further study.

This research challenges some of the taken-for-granted assumptions about the supposed role of television documentary. The first is the assumption that television documentary should (or does) play the primary function of nation-building and maintaining hegemonic power relations. While there are many examples of New Zealand documentaries that can be argued to have played this role,² my research suggests that television documentary may potentially function in a far more socially and politically contextualised way. Even within an institutional climate of neo-liberal conservatism, where (during the 1990s) there was still a state mandate to maximise the use of television as a site for nation-building,³ this thesis has demonstrated that it is still possible for television documentary to open spaces for new (and even progressive) ways of re-imagining ‘nation’ and ‘community’.
My research adds to the small but vital body of documentary audience research.\textsuperscript{4} It extends existing research in this area by articulating the relation between discourse, memory and affect, and by challenging a common-sense (and scholarly) assumption that engagement with television documentary can be defined as fundamentally rational, intellectual or socio-cognitive.\textsuperscript{5} While intellectual processes do play an important role in engagement with television documentary, my research demonstrates that impassioned, emotional and bodily engagement are also inherent to viewing such texts, and that the distinctive characteristics of television documentary in fact make it a potentially powerful technology for inviting an affective and ‘popular’ engagement with the past.\textsuperscript{6} As noted in chapter one, the study of affect in relation to the media has focused predominantly on cinema.\textsuperscript{7} Even when affect has been theorised in relation to documentary, the distinctive capacity of television documentary to invite affective engagement has tended to take a back seat to a focus on examples of independent or avant-garde documentary films.\textsuperscript{8} However, in recent years significant contributions have been made to this neglected area of study.\textsuperscript{9} Adding to this body of scholarship, this thesis reiterates the need for further research aimed at exploring the potential of television documentary to provoke multi-dimensional types of engagement.

The issue of affective engagement is addressed in this thesis by treating television documentary as a potentially complex technology of cultural memory. As discussed in chapter seven, \textit{TNZW} weaves together a number of memory technologies (such as photography, colonial art-work, waiata, carvings and instrumental sounds). All of these cultural forms are woven into an audio-visual ‘fabric’, which operates as a complex, multi-dimensional technology of cultural memory, enabling the flow of memory through visual, oral and aural channels. My analysis of \textit{TNZW} suggests that when television documentary functions as a technology of cultural memory, it can potentially serve as a site for challenging previously dominant histories (see sections 1.3.5. and 8.5.).
My research provides a compelling example of the distinctive capacity of a television documentary to intervene in the process of cultural colonisation and to participate in an inverse process of cultural de-colonisation. The series’ creative interplay of expository and performative conventions has served as a strategy for ‘animating’ the past, and for establishing an indelible connection between past colonial injustices and contemporary experiences of the landscape. In particular, focus group extracts discussed in chapter eight demonstrate how the series’ juxtaposition of past and present imagery of the landscape has played an important role in a re-imagining of nation, for sections of the series’ New Zealand audience.

These potentiating functions of TNZW are selected aspects of a more complex process in which the wider social-historical context plays an important part. While it is impossible to locate a singular, conclusive function for TNZW, the audience research discussed in chapter eight suggests that this series has functioned to open up radical spaces for alternative ways of engaging with the past and new ways of imagining nation and community. These are spaces ‘in-between’ the dimensions of discursive and affective engagement, and it is within these spaces that affect can agitate thought, generate a reiteration of colonial narratives, and activate an impassioned resistance to colonial discourse. While demonstrating the richness and complexity of this space in-between, this thesis emphasizes the need for further research located at the intersection of television documentary, discourse, affect and cultural memory:

Memory … is not a means of closure – is not a strategy for closing or finishing the past – but on the contrary, memory emerges as a generative force, a force which propels us not backward but forwards (Landsberg, 1995: 176).
Endnotes

1 This resource was developed as an educational package by Learning Media in 1999. The VHS tapes and accompanying study guides were distributed to all state-funded secondary schools in New Zealand.

2 For examples, see Goldson (2004).

3 This state mandate is discussed in relation to the idea of ‘Mainstreaming the Margins’, in Bell (1995a). Here, Bell interrogates the ill-defined (but taken-for-granted) concept of ‘national and cultural identity’ that was intended in 1989 Broadcasting Act.

4 Here, I am referring to the audience research conducted by Corner et al (1990), Roscoe (1999), and Hill (2005).

5 Despite his useful discussion on the role of affect in terms of documentary performativity, Nichols has implied that (in contrast to fictional film) a ‘documentary mode of engagement’ can be defined on the basis of a fundamentally sober, rational or intellectual type of engagement (1991: 28). Nichols suggests this in his statement about documentary’s kinship with the “discourses of sobriety” (1991: 3). See my discussion about this in sections 5.4.3. and 5.4.4.

6 This role has been acknowledged by some documentarists. For example, Stephens (1999) appeared to be particularly aware of the potential of television documentary to invite an emotional engagement with the past. He expresses this in the interview extracts discussed in chapter six.

7 See, for instance Deleuze (1988), and Marks (2000).

8 See, for instance Nichols (1994, 2001), Gaines, (1999), and (Middleton, 2002).

9 See, for instance Corner, (2005a, 2005b, 2006b, 2006c), and MacDonald (2006).
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Appendix 1

The pilot project was conducted in October 1998, and involved a survey of audience responses derived from media articles and letters to the editor. On the basis of a wide range of such responses, it was apparent that age and ethnicity were significant factors in determining the types of responses to *TNZW*. The six groups were; Mixed pilot group (Auckland, mixed gender and ethnicity, age 27-35), Historians/history lecturers from The University of Waikato, ‘Te Ahurei’ Maori Youth Group (based in Hamilton), Tainui Kaumatua (representatives from different hapu of the Waikato region), Ngaruawahia High School students (mixed gender and ethnicity), Pakeha, aged 50+ (with an active interest in the history of the Waikato region). The recruitment of participants involved making contact with a range of people in specific community settings. Given that there was some difficulty in gaining access to (and the trust of) particular groups, people were chosen for their ability to act as a ‘gatekeeper’- a “person who can facilitate an outsider’s entry into a ‘restricted’ location” (Tolich & Davidson, 1999: 94). The ‘gatekeeper’ often became instrumental in the selection of participants, as well as initiating a dialogue between myself and the group members. The recruitment process was aided by “snowball sampling” (Tolich & Davidson, 1999: 35), whereby group participants would suggest the names of acquaintances who could form a subsequent group. In this way, it was possible to recruit people who were genuinely interested in the topic, and who wanted to contribute to the discussion. The snowballing process was also an effective way of making contact with people who had either specialised knowledge or a curious fascination for the topic.
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