DEFINING A US DEFENSE DIPLOMACY FOR BRAZIL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CENTURY*

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ABSTRACT

At the beginning of the 1990s, the US military was apparently considered to be a significant threat by the Brazilian Armed Forces. Other military establishments in the Hemisphere likewise expressed a lack of confidence, and even a sense of fear, regarding the North Americans. After an ‘opening’ in military relations between Brazil and the United States, directed by General Barry McAfree, commander-in-chief of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in the mid 1990s, Brazilian military sentiment regarding the US marginally improved. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s and the beginning of this Century, the Brazilian Armed Forces again felt threatened by the unilateralism of the US military.

This work examines the the concept of ‘defense diplomacy’ and the process by which the Clinton Administration initiated an experiment in conjunction with the National Defense University (Fort Leslie McNair, Washington, DC), at the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, that established between 1999 and 2001 a broader understanding of possible US defense diplomacy for the subsequent seven years. I was an invited participant in this experiment, along with more than two dozen North American and Latin American academics, including Brazilians, the aim of which was to complete a proposal under contract with the Defense Department. Although it was ended soon after the Bush Administration began, this experiment, and the broader concept of ‘defense diplomacy,’ may well have represented an important option for future hemispheric military relations.

KEY-WORDS: Diplomacy, International Relations, Brazil.

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“All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means.”
Chou En-Lai

“The great nations have always acted like gangsters, and the small nations like prostitutes.”
Stanley Kubrick

“Walters, you may be good soldier, but diplomat you are not.”
Soviet Ambassador to Brazil Andrei Fromin, 1964

What is meant by the term, defense diplomacy? Absent any obvious definition, and in view of the cynical observation of Chou En-Lai, one is left with the immediate impression that defense diplomacy is merely an overt manifestation of the failure of diplomacy, an edging ever closer to active warfare. However, if filmmaker Stanley Kubrick’s comment is considered seriously, perhaps defense diplomacy is the only avenue left to a less powerful country when the formal political machinations of a big power, a hegemonic power, have not included it in the grand political design. Brazil is, of course, a powerful, if less powerful, country, although it has been difficult to identify a cogent and consistent US foreign policy strategy for Brazil over the past three decades. In many respects, the traditionally close fraternal ties between the US and Brazilian armed forces have created a natural bridge between those two institutions, and hence an important possibility for meaningful and creative diplomacy. In an important sense, the United States has defined one of its two concepts of “Defense Diplomacy” in its historical relations with Brazil, viz., close brother-officer relations, effective consultation and collaboration, and overt expressions of mutual respect. The other pattern of US defense diplomacy, considerably more common in the Twentieth Century, involved propping up sympathetic authoritarian regimes through military and other financial assistance.

The following study represents an historical account of a promising, if brief, attempt to initiate a **third way** in US-Brazilian defense diplomacy with a new and promising model between 2000 and 2001 in which I played a small part. My central focus is as a minor participant and observer of this attempt, led by US Army Colonel John Cope and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, of the US National Defense University. Its purpose

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2 As reported by Walters. Fromin had just criticized Vernon Walters (and all Americans) for speaking only English, and Walters had sharply rebuked him in Russian and then challenged him to have that discussion in Portuguese. Walters, 1978: 384.
3 John A. Cope, Colonel (retired) of the US Army, has the following cv listed on the INSS web page: “Mr. Cope is a specialist in Western Hemisphere security affairs (including North American issues), U.S. policy for Latin America and the Caribbean, civil-military relations, and defense education. Before retiring from the Army, Colonel Cope served in the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Army South, U.S. Army War College, and the 101st Airborne
was to provide a balanced proposal within the broader definition of US defense diplomacy in Latin America, including a special focus on Brazil, under contract to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs (DASD/IAA) in the latter part of the Clinton Administration, Pedro Pablo Permuy. The focus was upon structuring a reasoned analysis of existing conditions as a basis for collaborative and person-to-person US defense diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere during the period 2001 to 2008, and was itself based upon direct civilian, and civilian-to-military contacts, as opposed to military-to-military contacts that typified the two previous models of defense diplomacy employed by the US.

A number of Latin American scholars of civil-military relations, and a similar but varying number of North American scholars and political practitioners were invited to a series of seminars at Fort Leslie McNair in Washington, DC, over the one-year period. In the course of several seminars, an outline of possible US Defense Department areas of possible concern and engagement were mapped out (see: Appendices I and II). Their efforts resulted in a submission that outlined the security challenges in Latin America, appropriate US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) responses, and hence proposed a strategy for US defense diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere, 2001-2008. I was an invited participant in this effort. The effective suspension of this proposal, and hence its failure to have a significant impact on US government policy during the proposed period, can be clearly, if unsatisfactorily, explained in a historical and political context. It is the central thesis of this study that this failed proposal nonetheless pointed the way to an updating and possible improvement of US defense diplomacy vis-à-vis one of the countries involved, Brazil, and is reflective of a potential direction that could be initiated at any moment in the future.

It is necessary to qualify this study with the little-known observation that US federal...
government relies heavily on commissions, committees and organizations of concerned participants, to formulate much of its policy. In foreign affairs, for example, the Council on Foreign Relations, a private organization with semi-official status, is a crucial formulator of proposals for US foreign policy. Membership is by invitation, and carries with it the burden of public service. Indeed, this pattern of private policy proposals, followed by public recognition and adoption or rejection in the formal political processes, is widely practiced in US government. Earlier manifestations of US defense diplomacy have been highly individualized and centered usually on single charismatic actors, as will be described below. The central focus of this paper involves a commission, under contract to the Defense Department, and focused on Latin America. The Brazilian component of that commission, two mid-career, highly educated and promising individuals with close military ties, both of whom remain in important inter-American defense educational positions, points to its continuing impact despite the failure of the George W. Bush Administration to adopt it as a framework for hemispheric policy.

Among the most puzzling phenomena of Latin American politics are the wavelike and surprisingly uniform natures of historical periods of authoritarianism and democracy across the region, given the great disparity between the character and development levels of the very different Latin American societies. Exogenous and endogenous variables have been proposed to explain this conundrum, usually as single-causal explanations, and with relatively little explanatory power. Chief among the exogenous variables in the last wave of authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s were the direct influence of US foreign policy, and phobic military responses to putative threats of communism. Primary endogenous explanations have revolved around military establishments qua institutions, usually the direct instruments of authoritarianism, and have included deep social phenomena (e.g., inequality, alienation, isolation), social irritants (e.g., crime, corruption), and the sense of a breakdown in fundamental institutions, including the organizational integrity of the military, and even military representation of the unfelt needs (breakdown?) of an incipient middle class (Nun, 1967; Zirker, 1998). The post-Cold War period, however, has been a dramatic period of democratization in Latin America, with a deepening of grass-roots voluntary associations as well as the establishment of national-level representative democracy, delaying, at the very least, any possible new “wave” of military interventions.

In an important sense, almost all US diplomacy in Brazil has been “defense diplomacy,” and Brazilian aspirations to world power status have frequently run into US defense policy. Perhaps the most painful of these, given Brazil’s loyal and effective support of the US efforts
in WWII, was the decision to make Argentina, and not Brazil, a Major Non-NATO Military Ally in 1998, at the time only the eighth such ally, and following New Zealand, a country that had also fought with General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army in Italy (the New Zealand Corps took Monte Cassino from the Germans in 1944), in 1997. At the time, Brazil had been campaigning to fill one of the promised Permanent Security Council Seats in the UN, and Argentina’s competitive bid was seen in the context of this US appointment. This followed two decades US pressures to modify Brazil’s emerging nuclear policies, and hence Brazil’s drive to world power status, and undermined Brazil’s special bi-lateral military relationship with the United States. The death-knell of US Defense Diplomacy in Brazil had been heard sometime before 1998, although the decision to accord Argentia, and not Brazil, MNNA status reminded the FAB of its demise.

**VERNON WALTERS AND THE FORMATION OF US DEFENSE DIPLOMACY WITH BRAZIL**

Brazil has certainly felt the critical need for armed forces in the last century. Although the last overt cross-border military threat to Brazil may have been the War of the Triple Alliance in the Nineteenth Century, the São Paulo revolt in 1932, and numerous other military threats to Brazil’s well being, including a possible need to invade Argentina in 1940, have continually reminded the FAB of its fundamental role in Brazilian society. Hence, while the peaceful stabilization of Brazil’s borders through the Barão do Rio Branco’s diplomatic maneuverings in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries may have seemed to attenuate the need for a Brazilian military strike force, WWII, starting with German U-boat attacks on vital Brazilian shipping, quickly re-awakened national awareness of a need for military preparedness. It can be argued that this led both to and from US defense diplomacy.

The origins of modern US defense diplomacy in Brazil stem from an emotional request for help from Franklin Delano Roosevelt, following the bombing of Pearl Harbor and Brazil’s subsequent sympathetic expression of solidarity. Despite the latent German sympathies of many of the senior Brazilian military officers and government advisors, including General Góis Monteiro, President Roosevelt’s personal appeal persuaded Vargas

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6 The permanent seats have been disputed based largely upon regional jealousies, and have never been implemented.
7 Bandeira discusses this important moment (Bandeira, 2007: 406).
(with the help of a US$20 million credit for the new national steel mill in Volta Redonda) to provide for the US use of military bases in the Northeast, and Brazil’s formal diplomatic break with the Axis powers Bandeira, 20007: 392). Between February and August of 2002 German U-boats had sunk 20 Brazilian vessels, causing Vargas to announce that a state of belligerence existed between Brazil and Germany (Moniz Bandeira, 2003: 202-203), and eventually to declare war. The US had struggled with several Latin American countries to gain military commitments from them. Brazil was, by far, the most responsive to these military diplomatic maneuverings.8

The subsequent formation and training of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) of approximately 25,000 soldiers, which fought with General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army and was to make a major impact in the Allies’ Italian campaign, provided the basis for a new US defense diplomacy with Brazil. While an analysis of this important collaboration is beyond the scope of this paper, two elements of it are crucial. First, the central importance, once civilian authorities had committed Brazil to war, that Brazilian military personnel placed on the inclusiveness imbued by the collegial and respectful attitude toward them by senior US officers; and second, the introduction to the Brazilian Army of then-Major Vernon Walters, US Army, a linguist and intelligence officer who had quickly mastered Brazilian Portuguese, and became the liaison officer and brother-in-arms of the Brazilians in FEB. As regards the first concern, memoirs of the FEB abound with effusive praise for the respect and deference accorded them by the North Americans. For example, Joaquim Xavier da Silveira, noting the high regard held for the members of FEB by General Clark, goes on to emphasize the respect that specific senior US officers held for the FEB:

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8 Expressing a clear interpretation of US policy at the time, Walters wrote in his autobiography that “for political as well as military reasons it was important that the largest nation in South America take an active part in the war against Germany. Brazil itself was anxious to take its first step onto the world scene” (Walters, 1978: 71).
terminou sua brilhante carreira como President da Junta de Chefes de Estado Maior, em todos estes altos postos sempre demonstrou uma sólida amizade pelo Brasil e a firme convicção de que a FEB legou ao Brasil valores, crenças e tradições que o engrandecem. Recordava-se de ter acompanhado a atuação da FEB, tendo a honra de representar o V Exército na despedida do General Mascarenhas e comitiva no Aeroporto Capidichino, em Nápoles, no dia 6 de Julho de 1945. O General Jacob L. Devers, Subcomandante do Teatro Mediterrâneo de Operações, oficial que recebeu a FEB quando de sua chegada à Itália...sempre recebeu pessoalmente brasileiros em visita oficial ou em cursos de aperfeiçoamento...Oficiais norte-americanos que serviam com Devers tinham a certeza de sua sinceridade, pois falava com a mesma entusiasmo sobre os brasileiros quando entre seus colegas de farda...O General Don E. Carleton, Chefe do Estado-Maior do General Truscott durante toda a guerra, passou três anos no Brasil....Segundo Carleton, a conquista de Montese pelos brasileiros foi um prêmio que deu consistência e credibilidade à aclamação da FEB como um símbolo da pátria brasileira.

Os americanos sabiam das limitações da FEB, mas constataram o emorme esforço feito pelos oficiais e soldados brasileiros, e em suas declarações, durante e depois da guerra, souberam reconhecer o esforço e o valor do combatente brasileiro (Silveira, 1989: 224-225).

The use of language here is especially revealing. The US defense diplomacy that had been exercised vis-à-vis Brazil in Italy remained extraordinarily successful. It was inclusive, respectful, and built upon personal officer-to-officer ties. These very personal testimonies, representative of such close personal ties, created the basis for a new and highly effective US defense diplomacy in Brazil. At the center of this was Vernon Walters.

Walters, who died in 2002, has long been accused of having engaged in covert political activities, particularly, as regards Brazil, in supporting the 1964 military golpe in Brazil,9 which predated by a decade his role as Deputy Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His autobiography, while questionable regarding his repeated denials of involvement in covert US actions abroad,10 offers a very clear description of his interpretation of the new model of US defense diplomacy that he was practicing: his work in defining a US defense diplomacy based upon person-to-person contacts that stressed inclusion, consultation and inter-personal respect among the senior military personnel of the two countries. Walters’ language skills, especially his consummate Portuguese, his shared battle experiences with the senior members of FEB, and his position after the War as Assistant Military Attaché in Rio, where he introduced and translated for distinguished US military visitors, including General Eisenhower, Admiral Halsey and General Spaatz (Walters, 1978: 143),11 continued to

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9 In 1963-64, he claims to have turned to his FEB colleagues to put an end to a “whispering campaign” in Brazil (Walters, 1978: 381).

10 Perhaps his least credible assertion is that he was unaware of “Operation Brother Sam,” which took place in support of the military golpe of 1964 in Brazil while he was the US Military Attaché, until many years later (Walters, 1978: 384-385). Walters was in Iran in 1952, Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, and so on.

11 He continually stresses how important it was for Brazilians that these senior US military officers continued to visit Brazil and to affirm their respect and gratitude for the impressive Brazilian performance
reinforce this alternative model of US defense diplomacy after the war. When he arrived in Rio in 1962 as the new US Military Attaché, for example, he was met at the airport by 13 Brazilian general officers, all of whom he counted as friends (Walters, 1978: 374).

It is difficult to decipher the actual diplomatic impact that Walters’ approach had on policy outcomes, mostly because of their sensitive nature. At a time when anti-communism was the leading US policy, Walters’ influence in Brazil was likely enormous. He was certainly unequivocal regarding his own anti-communist views, despite his constant reference to his close relations with Brazilian officers on the left, colleagues such as General Argeemiro de Assis Brasil, and his “good relations” with President Goulart’s dispositivo (Walters, 1978: 381). According to Walters, it was his relentless partisanship that triggered the Soviet Ambassador’s comment that I have cited at the opening of this study. Walters remained “best friends” with General Humberto Castelo Branco after the latter assumed the Brazilian presidency, although, as Walters notes, they used great discretion so as not to add to suspicions regarding the golpe (Walters, 1978: 381-2).

It is undeniable that the US-Brazilian defense diplomacy of the 1960s was potentially, if not actually, effective because of Walters’ active presence. What should be added is that this model of defense diplomacy led directly to unprecedented interference by the United States in Brazil’s internal affairs. As Carlos Fico put it,

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*A atuação do embaixador Lincoln Gordon e do adido militar, Vernon Walters, iniciaria uma fase jamais vista de interferência dos Estados Unidos na política interna brasileira, que teria como contrapartida a atitude subserviente do Brasil de Castelo Branco em relação à superpotência, involução diplomática que discrepava da tradição brasileira que vinha se construindo, sobretudo desde o governo de Jânio Quadros: tanto os sucessores de Castelo quanto os de Gordon não deixaram de reconhecer ess momento como um retrocesso (Fico, 2008: 137).*

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It is important to note that many other US military officers had contacts with Brazilian military officers. Indeed, some of them, like Captain Edgard Bundy of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, participated in training Brazilian military officers in identifying and opposing so-called “communist” officers in the ranks of FEB (Bandeira, 2007: 467-8).

As Walters put it in his autobiography, “The communists and their friends see the need to denigrate those who have defeated them. So they spread the word that the Americans were really behind the Brazilian, Chilean or any other revolution they don’t like. Unfortunately many guilt-ridden Americans naively believe them” (Walters, 1978: 385).

Walters refers to one of Assis Brasil’s parties, to which he was invited, in which Assis Brasil declared that he had been incorrectly labeled a communist. Walters said that he replied that he had been incorrectly labeled a capitalist and “the long arm of American imperialism,” to which Assis Brasil was said to have replied, “Walters, if all Americans were like you, we would not have any trouble” (Walters, 1978: 380).
Walters’ return to Brazil and Argentina in early 1981, as President-Elect Ronald Reagan’s special emissary, ultimately, if weakly, reflected this interventionist side to Walters’ interpersonal model of defense diplomacy. Argentina’s invasion of the Malvinas the following year could easily have been encouraged by his reaffirmation of close fraternal ties, as per his previous model of US defense diplomacy. Both Argentina’s and Brazil’s shock at the subsequent US support of the UK’s military response represented a fundamental shift away from whatever remained of inter-personal defense diplomacy in the region, if not the end of Walters’ (and his closest Brazilian military colleagues’) political influence in Brazil.

**US DEFENSE STRATEGIES IN BRAZIL, 1968-1999: A BRIEF REVIEW**

The presidency of Costa e Silva marked the end of the central role of the Febianos in Brazilian politics, and the beginning of a long-term drifting apart of the two military establishments. Walters left Brazil for other assignments, eventually serving as Deputy Director of the CIA (1972-1976), the US Ambassador to the UN (1985-89), and the US Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (1989-91). The terms of engagement between the US and Brazilian military establishments had shifted, as had the relationship between the two countries. The defense diplomacy of Vernon Walters was now seen as little more than hollow actions geared to fit short-term US needs. As Carlos Fico has elegantly put it,

> Assim é que a longa expectativa brasileira quanto a um relacionamento especial, que tem raízes na Segunda Guerra Mundial, nunca se realizou, e não foram poucos os militares brasileiros que se sentiram frustrados com o tratamento recebido pelos Estados Unidos após o golpe de 64—sobretudo pela parcimônia na venda de armas. Sempre que foi necessária, Washington deu a impressão de levar um grande conta a opinião brasileira, seja quando precisou de suas bases aéreas, em 1942, seja quando decidiu eliminar of governo de Allende. Umas poucas cartas amáveis, algumas frases adulatórias, por vezes excessivas—como foi a de Nixon—, nada mais do que isso (Fico, 2008: 279).

The breakdown of the US-Brazilian bilateral military relationship in the late 1970s contributed directly to the growth of suspicion with the Brazilian military establishment regarding the long term US designs on Brazil. Hélio Jaguaribe noted in 1986 that “De 1974
aos nossos dias vem se manifestando um crescente desentendimento político, no plano internacional, entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos” (1986: 290). Part of this was due, as Abraham Lowenthal noted in a recent CHDS publication, to a decline in the diplomatic importance to the US of Latin America in general.\textsuperscript{15}

US defense diplomacy shifted in the 1980s to demands to support drug interdiction in South America, a police function, and to the passing fancies of US politics. The Panama Canal came and went as a fundamental concern, as did Brazil’s waxing and waning nuclear program. US demands that Brazil break all relations with Iraq, a country with which Brazil had had a long-term and close military relationship, during the first US-Iraq war were formally, if not fully, honored by Brazil.\textsuperscript{16} In the meanwhile, the FAB became increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations with the UN. A central concern of the FAB remained that of national sovereignty, however, particularly as embodied in the vast Amazon region.

AMAZÔNIA: GROWING MISTRUST IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

Amazônia requires a special mention in the post-1968 policy review. Historically, Marshall Rondon and other prominent Brazilian military figures had focused on the Amazon as a fundamental—and intrinsically threatened—national patrimony. By the 1980s the region was possibly the most clear and orthodox military mission for the FAB. Some observers suggested that the surveillance and protection of the vast Amazon region implied direct military opposition to NGOs, land occupiers, Colombian guerrillas, and virtually any other group that might have sought to inhibit the broad spectrum settlement and development model envisioned by the Armed Forces of Brazil. The greatest threat to these rights had been characterized by military officers as the “internationalization” of region.

Brazilian military resistance to the “internationalization” of Amazônia has a long history, a comprehensive discussion of which is well beyond the scope of this paper (See: Zirker and Henberg, 1994; Martins Filho and Zirker, 2000). Briefly summarized, the Brazilian army has had an integral role—framed in the context of nationalism—from the beginning of the Twentieth Century, in internal security, border policy and Indian policy in the region. A counter guerrilla action in the Araguaia region in the 1970s, aimed at a communist

\textsuperscript{15} As Lowenthal put it, “The traditional diplomatic importance of Latin America…declined in the late 1970s and the 1980s as many Latin American countries expressed their solidarity with the Third World rather than with the United States.

\textsuperscript{16} The US military alleged that Brazil maintained a missile servicing team in Iraq as per a military contract.
insurgency, subsequently became a cause célèbre for the military and, decades later, a central focus regarding allegations of human rights violations by the Army.

By the late 1980s, senior military officers, including the Minister of the Army, General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves, frequently expressed their hostility toward “internationalists” in the Amazon region, particularly environmentalists, Brazilian and foreign.¹⁷ NGOs were drawn into the focus.¹⁸ At the beginning of the presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello, in 1989, strident military criticism was reserved for Minister of the Environment José Lutzenberger, although following his creation of a Yanomami Indian reserve on the Venezuelan border,¹⁹ which directly threatened the Army’s Calha Norte project, an attempt to create a “settled” buffer zone on the Amazon borders, President Fernando Collor de Mello became a central focus of military hostility. What had been a highly classified army program, Calha Norte, or “Northern Channel” (or “Trench”), was described in 1989 as “a project of a strategic nature” designed “to promote the occupation of the frontier strip along Brazil’s northern borders” (Santilli, 1989: 42). The establishment of large, productive landholdings in the region was its central goal.

Army Commandant General Glauber Vieira noted in 2000 a renewed emphasis on the plan, particularly to bring in the state governments of the Amazon region to help to create a “strategic” settlement in the areas involved, adding disparagingly that “there are interests that want to see [this area] as a huge botanical garden for international pleasure.”²⁰ Calha Norte clearly continued to represent an important element of army planning for the region, and military officers continued to express their concern over the role of NGOs over the past decade (Monteiro, 2000; Zirker and Henberg, 1994).

The 1990s represented a significant hardening of the military position vis-à-vis the Brazilian Amazon region. Five important events stand out in this regard: first, the 1991 US invasion of Iraq, which put the Brazilian military in a particularly awkward position because of its close military relationship with Iraq; second, the death of several Brazilian conscripts in a cross-border raid by the Colombian FARC guerrillas in 1991; third, US military maneuvers in Guyana in 1993, which provoked a significant Brazilian

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¹⁷ He was quoted in the media describing his hatred for Environment Minister José Lutzenberger as being similar to the hatred he had long felt for Luis Carlos Prestes, a famous tenente and leader of the communist intentona of 1935 (O Estado de S. Paulo, 11 October 1991).

¹⁸ A March 1990 paper of the National War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, or ESG), identified collusion between international NGOs and Indian groups with developed countries “to use Indian areas as bridgeheads to internationalize strategic parts of Amazônia” (Wood and Schmink, 1993: 101). The ESG paper reportedly called for drastic actions, including war, against smugglers, drug traffickers, and environmental organizations.

¹⁹ The announcement of the new reserve came just before the UN conference in Rio.
military mobilization in Brazilian Amazônia near the Guyanese border (Zirker and Henberg, 1994), fourth, huge Amazonian forest fires in 1998, regarding which international firefighting aid was pointedly rejected, apparently on nationalistic grounds, by the Commander of the First Forest Infantry Brigade, General Luiz Edmundo Carvalho; and fifth, a reported statement (later denied by the US Defense and State Departments) by U.S. General Patrick Hughes, Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, in which he was said to have commented in a speech at MIT in 1998 that “in case that Brazil decides to make use of the Amazon such that it places at risk the environment of the United States, we have to be ready to interrupt this process immediately”.

Even today, the struggle over property rights in the Raposa/Serra do Sol Indian Reserve in Roraima has triggered open criticism of the Lula Government by the military commander of the Amazon region, General Augusto Heleno, who flew to Rio in April, 2008, to speak at the Clube Militar, and publicly opposed the ratification of the R/SS reserve, labeling government policies as “lamentable, not to mention chaotic,” and thereby ignoring Disciplinary Regulations (which forbid active officers from making political statements). General Heleno’s comments were almost immediately followed by civilian opposition statements from Congress, from the state government of Roraima, especially from the rice-growing settlers, as well as from other military officers, including the retired President of the Military Club, General Gilberto de Figueiredo, who likened the creation of the R/SS reserve to the political situations in Kosovo and Tibet, and hinted at the compromise of Brazilian national sovereignty.

21 And afforded a brief glimpse of a return of Walters-style defense diplomacy when General Barry McAffrey, commander of SOUTHCOM, diffused Brazilian military concerns with a series of officer-to-officer meetings.
23 I am referring here to the Regulamento Disciplinar do Exército, the Regulamento Disciplinar da Aeronáutica, and the Regulamento Disciplinar da Marinha, which expressly forbid most active duty officers from commenting publicly on political matters.
24 The national presidents of the opposition PSDB and DEM parties, Sérgio Guerra (PE) and Rodrigo Maia (RJ) immediately opened fire on Lula’s Indian policies. Guerra proclaimed to the national news media that “O risco é que se está chegando a um nível insustentável, a um ponto insuportável,” and Maia that “O conceito de nação está sendo desrespeitado. O processo [como ocorre] acaba por provocar uma insegurança imensa a todos,” concluding that “A preocupação exposta pelo general vem crescendo. Ele expressou não só a opinião dele, mas o ponto de vista de outras pessoas também.” Giraldi, 2008c.
posed by “international organisations.”: “É a criação de um novo Kosovo, um novo Tibete. Deixar só os índios lá e proibir a entrada de outros pode caminhar para isso. Pode haver pressão de organismos internacionais como há hoje no Tibete” (quoted in Belchior, 2008b). Retired Lieutenant Brigadier Ivan Frota, President of the Air Force Club, immediately announced that General Heleno’s remarks “represented a synthesis of current military thinking,” and warned Lula:

Que o presidente não se atreva a tentar negar-lhe [ao general Heleno] o sagrado dever de defender a soberania e a integridade do Estado brasileiro [...]. Caso se realize tal coação, o país conhecerá o maior movimento de solidariedade, partindo de todos os recantos deste imenso país, jamais ocorridos nos tempos modernos de nossa História (quoted in Belchior, 2008c).

Brazilian military fears of the implicit threat to national sovereignty were inflamed by the suggestion that the Indian demands in Raposa/Serra do Sol were based upon the incorrect assumption of a US Indian reservation model, where a limited degree of national sovereignty is accorded the reservations.

While all of these events are discussed at some length in other sources, they each appear to have had a major, even formative, impact upon contemporary military thought, and hence underscore a persistent and stridently nationalistic military fear of the “internationalization” of the Amazon region’s development model. Ironically, foreign corporate and individual landholding for purposes of economic development and exploitation are welcomed by the military. Migration and settlement are equated with property holdings, particularly in the border regions. Unlimited property rights in Amazônia are seen by the Brazilian armed forces as aiding in the establishment of absolute national sovereignty over this “disputed” region.

A NEW ATTEMPT TO CREATE A COLLABORATIVE US DEFENSE DIPLOMACY WITH BRAZIL: 1999-2001

By the end of the Clinton Administration, at the request of a young Latino, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs (DASD), Pedro Pablo Permuy, Colonel John Cope, of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the US National Defense University applied for and received a grant from the Department of Defense in 2000 to
produce a broadly collaborative, commission-based study. The focus was to recommend a path for US Defense Diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere over the period 2001-2008. Col. Cope, an academic and retired US Army officer, was responding to a realistic but generally unstated vision of US defense policy in Latin America, particularly evident in past (but not present) US-Brazilian military relations, that close personal contacts and clear, open and honest intentions had represented the best formula for mutually positive outcomes in the past. The project was closely linked to the new Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, also sited at Fort Leslie McNair in Washington, DC. The important sub-text to this view required close contacts between bright and promising individuals early in their careers, people perhaps somewhat like the Vernon Walters and Humberto Castelo Branco of 1942.

Of course, much of US-Latin American military relations had been far from this in the previous decade, as noted above. Indeed, even the major documents emerging from the US Defense Department, like the “US Security Strategy for the Americas, October 2000, seemed almost hopelessly tied to myths, as evident in its opening paragraphs:

The United States has long defined its security interests in the Western Hemisphere in terms of peace, stability, and prosperity. From the early nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War, the United States considered activity by rival extrahemispheric actors and the challenge of competing political ideologies, most recently Communism, as sources of destabilization and threats to national security. A strategic framework took shape under the Monroe Doctrine, which dictated U.S. military activity for over 100 years and focused U.S. defense policy on preventing hostile penetration of the hemisphere. With the end of the Cold War, the United States adjusted its diplomatic and military posture to the new realities in the hemisphere. The focus of U.S. policy shifted to achieving increased interoperability for purposes of international peacekeeping and to better respond to humanitarian crises in the hemisphere, encouraging the institutionalization of democratic norms within defense establishments and engaging in cooperative security initiatives to include combating transnational crime (US Department of Defense, 2000: 7).

The use of terms like “interoperability” and “institutionalization of democratic norms” suggested that the very real challenges of meaningful defense diplomacy continued to be unrecognized at the highest levels of US defense strategy in the US. Even more intrusive was the pledge to achieve a number of “goals” by 2005, including: “A system of civil-military relations in the hemisphere that insures accountability of defense policymakers to the public, respect for human rights, rational and transparent budgets and security concepts, and increased democratic civilian expertise on defense
issues” (US Department of Defense, 2000: 9). While there was nothing particularly objectionable to Latin Americans these goals, per se, their declaration in the absence of close collegial (military) ties, and hence mutual trust, in countries like Brazil flew in the face of past successes, and may have seemed somewhat arrogant in context.

The Security Strategy document of 2000 proclaimed a “five-pronged strategy,” with the first four parts pledging that the DoD would “remain engaged in the hemisphere... support efforts to ensure democratic control of defense and law enforcement institutions... support efforts to strengthen effectiveness, legitimacy, and transparency of regional and subregional security structures and regimes...[and] support cooperative approaches to the peaceful resolution of border disputes and response to transnational threats and humanitarian crises.” The fifth strategy, however, opened the door for Col. Cope’s initiative:

> Finally, the Department of Defense will seek to build mutual confidence on security issues and develop long-term bilateral and multilateral cooperation among defense ministries and security forces. In this context, the Department of Defense seeks to advance the region’s understanding of the security concerns facing it, develop mechanisms for addressing these concerns, and obtain consensus on common principles and concepts of security to address emerging threats. The Department of Defense wants to foster expanded dialogue and cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual respect for sovereignty and understanding of diverse points of view (US Department of Defense, 2000: 10-11; emphasis in the original).

Col. Cope applied for and received a contract from the DASD, Inter-American Affairs, in 1999, and immediately contacted and contracted academics and “political practitioners” from the US, Canada, and Latin America. In mid-2000 I was contacted in Montana by Col. Cope with an invitation to play a part in the contract/commission, with periodic travel to Washington, DC to participate in seminars and presentations as part of the proposal (see: appendices I and II).

While most of the topics remained constant, it is interesting to note the evolution of one key topic and focus between the December 2000 meeting of the group, and the April 2001 meeting. Joseph Tulchin, the distinguished US scholar and then head of the Wilson Center, moved from a general topic, "The Future of the Inter-American Security System," in December, to "Advancing U.S. Interests in a New Hemispheric Reality," in April of 2001. The impact of the 2000 election appeared to have had a role in influencing the project, if ever
so slightly.

The central focus of the project was to build and extend an analysis of the Hemisphere for the period 2001-2008. Participants worked together to produce a document that reflected US concerns, including concerns for the well-being of Latin Americans, in the context of a military diplomacy. The selection of the two Brazilian participants, Luis Bitencourt and Thomaz Guedes da Costa, was, in my view, crucial not only to the project but to the definition of a third way in US-Brazilian defense diplomacy. Both had manifest ties to the military, both were civilians, and both represented strong bridges to a new generation of Brazilian military officers. Moreover, although occupying quasi-military status today as staff at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC, both at the time could be seen clearly as civilians with a great deal of understanding of military affairs. For example, in 1995 Dr. Guedes da Costa had invited me to a seminar at the Secretariat for Strategic Subjects (SAE—this had only recently replaced the military-dominated National Intelligence Service, or SNI), where he worked in addition to his position in the Social Sciences division at the University of Brasilia. His manifest contacts with key military officers in the Brazilian armed forces were evident to me at that time. Moreover, he completed a doctorate at that time at Columbia University, and his ties with both military and civilian experts in the US were also impressive. As a well-known and respected government functionary in the strategic planning and security areas, Luis Bitencort, had also established himself as an academic and University administrator. By 2001 he was a senior fellow at the prestigious Wilson Center of the Smithsonian in Washington, DC, was likewise closely connected to both US and Brazilian military decision makers.

The topics covered by Guedes da Costa and Bitencort suggest the importance that the project accorded to the re-establishment of an inter-personal defense diplomacy for Brazil. Guedes da Costa’s topic, “Brazilian Leadership in South America: Possibilities and Limits,” clearly fit the earlier Walters’ approach of inter-personal respect tempered with US requirements. Bitencort’s project, “The Influence of Globalization on Regional Security Calculations,” reinforced Brazilian leadership as a central concern in a Hemisphere in which Brazil had become an economic global leader.

25 See: Appendix III. Interestingly, the Center seems to be focused upon precisely this form of defense diplomacy. The Director, Richard Downes, notes in his welcome, that “the Center also provides an opportunity not only to understand the official vision of the U.S. government regarding security and defense within an academic, participative and inter-active environment, but also to compare, contrast and coordinate their own visions with it.”

In August, 2001, the project was concluded with the writing of final draft of the policy proposal. At about that time, a new DASD/IAA, Rogelio "Roger" Pardo-Maurer, a former aid to the Nicaraguan “contras,” was appointed by the new Bush Administration. Although Permuy had by no means been a “liberal,” his credentials were largely academic, and his focus in commissioning the study rational. The replacement of Permuy in mid-2001 with this far more “conservative” Latino, who, besides his work with the “contras” had been a speechwriter for the head of the Cuban American Foundation and was at that time an active officer in the US Army Special Forces, represented a major sea change. US concerns in Latin America would once again turn to drug interdiction and Plan Colombia, and away from building a broad-based inter-personal network as part of a comprehensive defense diplomacy in the region.

Perhaps most important in the shelving of the defense diplomacy project, however, were the unfolding events of September, 2001. Within days of the project’s completion, 9-11 occurred. The attention of the Bush administration shifted finally and irrevocably away from Latin America, and defense diplomacy, and the opportunity for a “third way” in US-Brazilian defense diplomacy seemed lost. It is interesting that in the last year of the Bush Administration, in mid-July, 2008, the Administration has suddenly discovered, with the re-introduction of the US Fourth Fleet in the Southern Atlantic, that the concept of defense diplomacy was once again necessary. However, it appeared to outside observers that the moment had passed.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States has tended to use very blunt instruments in its military contacts with Latin American countries over the past century. The principal defense diplomacy model, if it could sensibly be called diplomacy at all, involved the withdrawal of US occupying forces (as in Nicaragua in the 1930s), and their replacement with military figures and organizations that were trained and later supported with US dollars. US defense diplomacy may have reached a peak in a second model, one that was largely constructed and orchestrated by General Vernon

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26 As it was reported in Folha de São Paulo, “Diante de reação negativa ao relançamento da Quarta Frota, Washington destacou uma força diplomática-militar para acalmar os ânimos....O contra-almirante James Stavridis visitou países dan região e passou a ressaltar a prioridade munáritaria da frota e o fato de ela não contar com embarcações próprias. Foi seguido pelo número um do Departamento de Estado para o hemisfério, Thomas Shannon (Dávila, 2008: A18). It is interesting that Pardo-Maurer was not mentioned in this campaign.
Walters, whose language skills and position as a brother officer in WWII put him in a unique position as regarded the Brazilian military.

The drifting apart of the US and Brazilian military establishments in the 1970s, 80s and 90s cannot be over-emphasized. What had been a close and trusting relationship, though perhaps not always in Brazil’s best interests, had degenerated into open hostility and even fear by the late 1990s. A new generation of military leaders in Brazil saw the United States’ agenda for the hemisphere as a national agenda, and as the proposed hemispheric partners of the US as junior partners. The attempt by the INSS and Colonel John Cope to restart a consultative, interpersonal and respectful US defense diplomacy in the Hemisphere, within the framework of a commission and a grant with the Clinton Defense Department, represented a bold, if short-lived attempt with significant ramifications for US-Brazilian defense diplomacy.

There is a concluding question to this study: why would or should Brazil or the US consider implementing and/or improving defense diplomacy? There are two answers that might serve to close this discussion. The first is that, short of open military hostilities, there will be some form of defense diplomacy exercised by both of these professional armed forces. The recent US defense diplomacy campaign surrounding the re-introduction of the Fourth Fleet is a case in point. Given the nature of military professionalism, one can expect that there would be motivation on both sides, then, to optimize their respective defense diplomacy. There lurks a better military answer, however, that was best articulated in a personal comment made to me recently at a conference in Santiago, Chile, by the distinguished Latin Americanist, Martin C. Needler. Neatly, if perhaps inadvertently, summarizing a central concern of this study of defense diplomacy, Needler remarked simply that “diplomacy is an important substitute for military capacity.”

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27 Martin C. Needler, in a brief comment made verbally to the author at the 2008 Conference of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society, RC #24, of the International Political Science Association, Crowne Plaza and Convention Center, Santiago, Chile, June 27, 2008. Cited with the permission of Professor Needler.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX I
INSS Study for Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs
INSS, 21 December 2000
"Future U.S. Defense Relations in the Western Hemisphere:
The Challenges of Change"
(Study Outline)

I – Introduction

Forward, Senior Official from Cohen Defense Department
Preface, INSS Team

Executive Summary, INSS Team

1. “The Scope of This Study,” John A. Cope, Colonel (retired), Institute for National Strategic Studies

II – Strategic Trends That Could Affect Defense Relations


Implications for the Defense Department

III – Understanding the Region: Strategic Perspectives on Security Affairs

8. “Toward Re-Establishing Hemisphere Security,” Andrés Fontana, Ph.D., Universidad de Belgrano and Fundacion Gobierno y Sociedad, Argentina
10. “Brazilian Leadership in South America: Possibilities and Limits,” Thomaz Guedes da Costa, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Implications for the Defense Department

IV – Understanding the Region: Security Challenges
12. “The Future of Interstate Conflict in Latin America,” Daniel Zirker, Ph.D., Montana State University - Billings

13. “State Weakness and Insecurity in the Andes,” Cynthia A. Watson, Ph.D., National War College


Implications for the Defense Department

V – Understanding the Region: Civilian Governments and Armed Forces


17. “Defense Modernization and Latin American Geopolitics,” Patrice Franko, Ph.D., Colby College


Implications for the Defense Department

VI – Strengthening the Defense Framework


20. “U.S.-Mexican Military-to-Military Relations: Navigating the Labyrinth of Asymmetry,” Craig Deare, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Raul Benitez, Ph.D., National Autonomous University of Mexico and Arturo Sarukhan, Mexican Foreign Ministry


24. "Addressing the Civil-Military Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Margaret Daly Hayes, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies


Implications for the Defense Department

VII – Looking Ahead: Future Defense Relations in the Hemisphere, INSS Team
APPENDIX II
April 2001 Working Conference Agenda
Room 107, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Lesley J. McNair
INSS Study For Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs
"U.S. Defense Relations: Facing a New Reality in the Western Hemisphere"

Monday, 2 April

8:00-8:30 Continental breakfast, Room 107, Eisenhower Hall

8:30-9:45 Welcome, overview of INSS study, discussion of introductory essays

- "Scope of The Study,” John A. Cope, Colonel (retired), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
- "Decision Making Structure for Defense Diplomacy,” Gabriel Marcella, Ph.D., U.S. Army War College

9:45-10:15 Break

10:15-12:00 Discussion: Strategic Trends that Affect U.S. Defense Policy

- "Transnational Ethnicity: U.S. Diaspora Latino Communities and Implications for Regional Security," Gilbert G. Gutierrez, Ph.D., New World Structures, Inc.
- "U.S. Economic Behavior in the Americas: Prospects and Problems," Myles Frechette, Ambassador (retired), Hills and Company
- "International Involvement in the Americas: Latin American and Caribbean Engagement with Extra-Hemispheric Actors," Frank O. Mora, Ph.D., Rhodes College

12:00-1:30 Lunch

1:30-3:15 Discussion: Understanding the Region: Strategic Perspectives

- "The Influence of Globalization on Regional Security Calculations," Luis Bitencourt, Brazil at the Wilson Center, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
- "Toward Re-Establishing Hemisphere Security,” Andrés Fontana, Ph.D., Universidad de Belgrano and Fundacion Gobierno y Sociedad, Argentina
- "Latin American and U.S. Relations in Matters of Defense and International Security,” Francisco Rojas Aravenas, FLACSO - Chile
- "Brazilian Leadership in South America: Possibilities and Limits,” Thomaz Guedes da Costa, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University

3:15-3:45 Break

3:45-5:15 Discussion: Understanding the Region: Security Challenges

- "The Future of Interstate Conflict in Latin America,” Daniel Zirker, Ph.D., Montana State University - Billings
- "State Weakness and Insecurity in the Andes,” Cynthia A. Watson, Ph.D., National War College, National Defense University
- "International Threats to National Security in the 21st Century: The Role of the Latin American Military,” Richard L. Millett, Ph.D., North-South Center, University of Miami

5:15-6:45 INSS Reception
Tuesday, 3 April

7:30-8:00    Continental breakfast, Room 107, Eisenhower Hall

8:00-8:15    Administrative remarks

8:15-10:00   Discussion: Understanding the Region: Civilian Governments and Armed Forces

- "Defense Reform in Young Latin Democracies," Rut C. Diamint, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina
- "Military Institutions in Transition," Frederick M. Nunn, Ph.D., Portland State University
- "Defense Modernization and Latin American Geopolitics," Patrice Franko, Ph.D., Colby College

10:00-10:20  Break

10:20-12:45  Discussion: Strengthening the Defense Department's Framework

- "Understanding U.S. Defense Relations: Lessons and Lessons Learned from 40 Years of Engagement," Caesar D. Sereseres, Ph.D., University of California - Irvine
- "U.S.-Mexican Military-to-Military Relations: Navigating the Labyrinth of Asymmetry," Craig Deare, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University and Raul Benítez, Ph.D., National Autonomous University of Mexico
- "Addressing the Civil-Military Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean," Margaret Daly Hayes, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University
- "Canada and Security Cooperation in the Americas: Past Realities and Future Prospects," Hal Klepak, Ph.D., Royal Military College of Canada

12:45-1:00   Conclude the working conference

Separate agenda for INSS Study team members

1:20-5:30    Lunch followed by a review of conference results and discussion of INSS report to OSD,
"Looking Ahead: The Challenge of Defense Relations in the Western Hemisphere"

Wednesday, 4 April

Individual meetings and research related to project.
Dr. Luis Bitencourt
Professor of National Security Affairs

Dr. Luis Bitencourt was appointed to CHDS in July 2005. Prior to joining NDU, Dr. Bitencourt was the Director of the Brazil Project (2000-2005) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Visiting Professor at the Georgetown University.

For most of his professional life, Dr. Bitencourt simultaneously pursued two careers. In the Brazilian federal administration, he performed several functions related to research and training in strategic planning, international security, public administration, and intelligence (1974-1999). At the Catholic University of Brasilia, Dr. Bitencourt was a professor and dean (1987-2000).

Dr. Bitencourt also worked for the United Nations as a Regional Coordinator in East Timor, as a member of the Team of Electoral Experts in Tajikistan, and as a rapporteur for the U.N. Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty. He has a doctorate and an M.A. in World Politics from the Catholic University of America, and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Brasilia. His Bachelor’s Degree is in Mathematics. His research interests include hemispheric security, terrorism, trade, and democracy.

Dr. Thomaz Guedes Da Costa
Professor Acting Dean of Academic Affairs
of National Security Affairs

Dr. Costa’s academic career includes experience teaching international relations theory, strategy, defense issues, and international political economy for the Department of International Relations Department at the University of Brasilia.

He worked as a career analyst with Brazil’s National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, as international market analyst of military aircraft at EMBRAER, and served as a researcher and advisor in international security, national defense, strategic planning, and foreign intelligence training in the Center for Strategic Studies and the Office of the Brazilian Presidency.

Dr. Costa has a degree in international affairs from Indiana University of Pennsylvania and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Among his current research interests are international collaboration in interagency coordination, United States-Brazil defense relations, and curriculum development for security studies.
APPENDIX IV

Pedro Pablo Permuy
Pedro Pablo Permuy is Director of Governmental Affairs at Greenberg Traurig’s Washington office. He joined the firm from the Office of the Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus of the United States House of Representatives, Rep. Robert Menendez of New Jersey (now United States Senator from New Jersey), where he at once served as foreign policy, national security and international trade advisor, as Minority Staff Director of the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, and as Staff Director of the House Democratic Homeland Security Task Force. In those positions, he drafted key provisions of foreign relations authorization legislation and of the bill that established the new Homeland Security department. Previously, Pedro Pablo served in the Clinton Administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs where he led senior military and civilian staff in the formulation and implementation of US national security policy for the Western Hemisphere. In the political arena, he has worked in the Clinton-Gore, Gore-Lieberman, and Kerry-Edwards campaigns, and as a legislative staff member for Democratic Presidential candidate U.S. Senator Robert Graham of Florida amongst other notable positions.

Awards & Recognition
Golden Hammer Award, Vice President Al Gore's National Partnership for Reinventing Government, 1999 • Department of State Superior Honor Award, Office of the Secretary of State • "Servicios Distinguidos" medal from Colombian President Andres Pastrana • "Outstanding Public Service" medal from Secretary Cohen

Education
M.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1990
B.A., University of Miami, 1986

Rogelio "Roger" Pardo-Maurer (at the time of his appointment as DASD/IAA in 2001)

Work
• Emerging Market Access, Washington, DC, 1992-
  President Consulting/publishing on Latin America and US Hispanic markets.
• Access NAFTA Project Management, Mexico City/Washington DC 1994-
  Consulting partnership with former chief of Mexico’s NAFTA office.
  President Leading US provider of environmental remediation business news/price data.
• AEI American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1990
  Latin America and US Hispanic issues specialist
  • CSIS-Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, 1989
    Research project on the wars in Central America.
  • UNO/Resistencia Nicaraguense, Central America/Washington, DC, 1986-1989
    Liaison, Southern Front/UNO. Chief-of-staff for the US representative of the Resistance.

Academic
• King's College, Cambridge University, UK, 1984-1986. Dipl. (with Distinction) in Development Studies. (Economic/polities of development). First in class.
• Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1981: BA, History.

• **Languages**
  Fluent English, Spanish, German, French, Italian. Some Russian.

• **Publications**
  Books and articles on Latin American trade, finance, tabor, politics, security. Forthcoming: *Solidarity and social Ethic of Worker Microarocapitalism*. Have also ghostwritten volumes on competitiveness, sustainable development, and the role of cultural values in economic development in Latin America. Co-founder, the *Cambridge Review* of International Affairs, the graduate and faculty journal of international relations of Cambridge University.

**Civic Service (pro bono)**

- **Former Chairman**, ACRC Republican Business Council
- **Former Chairman**, ACRC Republican Hispanic Caucus
- **Committee Member**, Arlington County Republican Committee (ACRC) (1992-1999)
- **Delegate/organizer**, various Virginia Republican conventions
- **Speechwriter/advisor** to the late Jorge Mas Canosa, Cuban-American National Foundation
- **Advocate** representing small business interests on the USA-NAFTA coalition (1993)
- **Electoral Tribune**, Costa Rica: officer charged with verifying integrity of electoral process (1990)

**Military/Reserve Service (USA)**

Currently serving with B13 20 Special Forces Group (Airborne)