The ‘National Security Strategy of the USA’ and Brazilian Military Thought: Imagining the Near Future

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people. National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006 (p. 6)\(^1\)

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002

O inimigo...é os Estados Unidos. Brigadier General Sérgio Ferolla\(^2\)
It is extraordinarily difficult to analyse the political thought of a military establishment as diverse and carefully regulated as that of the Forças Armadas Brasileiras. Several problems immediately intrude: 1) typically, the opinions of senior military officers cannot be expressed legally because of regulations; \(^3\) 2) such views are part of a dynamic process, constantly changing and adapting; and 3) there are always at least several major political camps within a national officer corps, complicating even the presumption that there might be a single Brazilian military position on most topics. Nonetheless, we can identify broad military themes over the past three decades, including an emphasis upon nationalism, \(^4\) and the defence of Brazilian national sovereignty. Moreover, the military establishment has been able to identify spokesmen, be they retired officers or members of the Military Supreme Court. Hence, the following study will seek to “imagine,” based upon a very few public statements by such spokespeople and commentators, and the implications of US policy that directly suggests specific US treatment of the all-important concepts of national sovereignty and world order.

As the US presidential administration of George W. Bush begins to fade and metamorphose at the end of its second four-year term, its possible impact upon Brazilian military thought, given the emergence over the past two decades of profound distrust and concern with US security policy in the Hemisphere, should be of major interest to both policy analysts and observers of regional politics. Specifically, the emphases of the National Security Strategies of the United States of America of 2002 and 2006, the “Bush Doctrine,” upon just war and preemptive military attack, \(^5\) on unilateralism, on limiting possession of at least some middle-range powers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and upon qualified democracy/freedom and national security appear at first glance to put the Brazilian military in a quandary. In their emphasis upon US national se-
curity and external military intervention these policies could be regarded as posing a threat to the autonomy, if not the national sovereignty, of middle-range powers (including Brazil), and of avoiding enough references to international law sufficient to put military minds at ease. In stressing the importance of democracy and freedom as natural antidotes to terrorism, they might be accused of interfering in the internal political affairs of sovereign nations, even if they are thought to be in a good cause. Nonetheless, observers are increasingly speaking of the end of a single US strategy for Latin America, arguing, rather, that “US-Latin American relations today are simply the sum of many different bilateral relationships.”

The attack on New York’s Twin Towers and the Pentagon, on September 11, 2001, created a new argument for unilateral US actions in support of “world order,” a term that had been pioneered by George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s under the nomenclature of the “New World Order.” By most accounts, the September 11 attacks should not have been a transforming development, except perhaps in their scope. Terrorist attacks, particularly in Europe, had become commonplace decades ago. This was, however, a defining event as regards the number of deaths, the extent of the destruction, the iconic structures targeted, and the central and growing concern of the administration of George W. Bush that US military hegemony was threatened, and yet was vital to worldwide economic and political goals. As a result, two declarations of US national strategy, incorporated into numerous policies and policy justifications, have emerged to explain and support the subsequent invasions and overthrow of the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq and the worldwide US war on terror, the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002” (NSS02), and the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006” (NSS06). While the NSSs, by most accounts, have had little direct impact on US-Brazilian relations, the following study
will examine some of the possible impacts of these broad-reaching strategies, the so-called “Bush Doctrine,” on Brazilian military thought in the Twenty-First Century, imagining, as it were the responses of senior military opinion leaders who are forbidden by regulation from speaking their minds.

**NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES, 2002 AND 2006**

The hypnotic power of ideologies, which, as Karl Mannheim put it so well, function more like busses than taxis—they take their adherents along a prescribed route, often ill suited to their (or their country’s) needs. The NSSs of 2002 and 2006, increasingly regarded as the heart of the “Bush Doctrine,” and published on the White House web page, have been seemingly captured by an ideological tenor, if not clearly identifiable ideological content, and hence have transported US foreign policy to an apparently new paradigm, if not new territory. Meanwhile, Brazilian military thought over the past two decades has been adjusting to a new international configuration, a new domestic political arena, and a decidedly new approach to its dealings with the United States. The need to clarify and situate the NSSs, then, is underscored. The following pages will undertake this task in the unique and significant Brazilian military context.

Writing in the *Revista Marítima Brasileira* in 2004 about the first US NSS and subsequent invasion and overthrow of governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr noted that:

Dentre vários outros a NSS chama a atenção para quatro importantes tópicos; As ações militares preventivas, a construção de um poder militar forte o bastante para não ser desafiado, um compromisso multilateral deixando claro a unilateralidade se assim a nação achar necessário e o objetivo de espalhar a democracia e os direitos humanos por todo o mundo.
As will become clear shortly, each of these concerns, particularly the justification of preemptive military attack, unilateralism, and the maintenance of a military establishment that is beyond challenge, are regarded as officious in contemporary Brazilian military thought, and would be amplified and broadened in NSS ‘06. The concept of “rogue states,” likewise expressed in the NSSs, seems to lack conceptual precision, and hence is susceptible to broad application. As Christine Gray, Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge, noted in 2006 in the *Chinese Journal of International Law*, there is one other important concern: unlike the *EU 2003 Security Strategy*, the 2006 NSS strangely made no reference to international law. We will now briefly examine each of these considerations in turn in an effort to understand their possible impact, through the influence of the NSSs, on Brazilian military thought.

**Growing Emphasis upon Pre-emptive Military Actions and Unilateralism**

The presumption of “just war doctrine” and the right of pre-emptive military attack have long been argued by philosophers of international relations. The NSSs tackle these delicate questions rather awkwardly. In the 2006 document, President Bush asserts in an opening letter that:

This Administration has chosen the path of confidence. We choose leadership over isolation, and the pursuit of free and fair trade and open markets over protectionism. We choose to deal with challenges now rather than leaving them for future generations. We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in this country. We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy (italics added).
The 2002 document was very direct in raising unilateral rights to pre-emptive attacks, implied threats to national sovereignty of other countries, a special status accorded to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and the use of “terrorism” as a separate and almost unassailable category:

We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:

• Direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist of state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;

• Defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and

• Denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.15

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, the United States argued that military pre-emption fell far short of the criteria of “just war,” and thereby opened that ancient and difficult concept. A (US) Brookings Institution policy study notes that the NSS concept of pre-emption “is not limited to the traditional definition...—striking an enemy as it prepares to attack—but also includes prevention—striking an enemy in the absence of specific evidence of a coming attack.”16 Moreover, it is clear that pre-emptive military strikes virtually always violate international law, and in this regard NSS 2002 “fails to distinguish between eliminating dangerous capabilities and overthrowing dangerous regimes,”17 a rather serious omission
for military establishments considering the international legal implications as regards their own national sovereignty, as will be seen below. Moreover, the assumption that other states cannot adopt a policy of pre-emption underscores the US rejection of international law as it might be said to apply equally to all countries.\textsuperscript{18} Additionally, the Bush Doctrine, expressed as a response to a perceived threat by “rogue states” with “weapons of mass destruction” (WMDs), deliberately avoids precise definitions in each of these difficult concepts. As Gray notes for example, while the definition of the pre-emptive “use of force in the 2006 Strategy is no more detailed than it had been in 2002,”\textsuperscript{19} the definition of “rogue states” seems to have changed from Iraq (now occupied) and North Korea to Iran and Syria.\textsuperscript{20} They are clearly capable of changing again in subsequent iterations.

The implications of these changes for Brazilian military thought are relatively straightforward. The Bush Administration documents assume that the United States must be called upon to act unilaterally in defence of world order, although some care is made in the documents to deny this.\textsuperscript{21} In fact, the presumption of NSS 2002 and 2006 that the US must combat terrorism worldwide is fundamentally posited as primarily a unilateral duty, to be shared only if possible. In fact, as Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr notes,

\begin{quote}
A busca por um multilateralismo que dissimulasse a dominação norte-americana, facilitando intercâmbios e prevenindo coalizões anti-hegemônicas, foi encarada pelos republicanos como uma fraqueza democrata.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Any rationale in support of US intervention in the affairs/territory of middle-range powers be they currently defined “rogue states” or not, has immediate resonance as regards the Amazon region. For example, references in the NSSs to stabili-
ty in Colombia are readily associated with previous cross-border incidents in the Amazon as well as a major attempt to foment a Brazilian PT/FARC scandal as late as 2005. As Vice-Almirante Vidigal notes, “O grande problema associado com a doutrina específica da ação preemptiva está no fato de que outros países podem querer seguir o exemplo do Estados Unidos.” The actual US proposal of pre-emption, moreover, has been argued as better described as prevention. This would be no better from an international legal standpoint, however, and perhaps even more threatening to a Brazilian military establishment, for as Lawrence Freedman has noted,

Prevention is cold blooded: it intends to deal with a problem before it becomes a crisis. Prevention can be seen as pre-emption in slow motion, more anticipatory or forward thinking, perhaps even looking beyond the targets’s current intentions to those that might develop along with greatly enhanced capabilities.

As defenders of a middle-range power reportedly with nuclear weapons technology, the Brazilian armed forces would justifiably see a proximate threat in this surgical notion of prevention.

**Terrorism as an iconic threat — and islam**

The opening lines of a section in NSS 2006 entitled “The Way Ahead,” insists that:

The struggle against militant Islamic radicalism is the great ideological conflict of the early years of the 21st century and finds the great powers all on the same side—opposing the terrorists. This circumstance differs profoundly from the ideological struggles of the 20th century, which saw the great powers divided by ideology as well as by national interest.
The central focus of NSS 2006 is combating terrorism, with Section III devoted almost exclusively to the subject. Key policy points include:

- Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur.
- Deny WMD to rogues states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation.
- Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states.
- Deny terrorists control over any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.
- America will lead this fight and we will continue to partner with allies and recruit new friends to join the battle.\(^{26}\)

The nature of the international threat of terrorism has been characterised by association with specific and related groups, primarily Islamic Fundamentalists, although there are abundant references to other groups (and states) that might also fit this category.\(^ {27}\) The case of Iraq, and the US invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein, is particularly sensitive to Brazilian military thinkers. Writing in the *Brazilian Navy Journal*, Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr summarised the conflicting possible motivations for the Iraqi invasion, and concluded that after that invasion:

\[\text{Aqueles que antes apoiavam os Estados Unidos no combate contra o terrorismo e os responsáveis pelos atentados de 11 de setembro passaram a se mostrar contrários aos discursos e opções norte-americanas.}^{28}\]

The Brazilian military's close traditional relationship with Iraq, and the manner in which that government was overthrown, cannot but have had a major impact on Brazilian military thought. Moreover, Brazilian military strategists will not have failed to note that the terms used in the NSSs are sufficiently broad to capture a changeable range of groups
and activities that might otherwise have been regarded in a very different light.

**US pressures for democracy**

Plato observed in *The Republic* that “democracy pass into despotism.” His views on democracy are well known. For Plato, democracy, and the liberty that it implicitly entails, entail represented the triumph of libertine and demagogic excesses. Nonetheless, his observation went well beyond his philosophical preferences: democracy, he correctly observed, was and is most vulnerable to its own political dynamics. Polarization, scandals, the gradual erosion of the middle ground, disillusionment with its outcomes, the corrosive nature of barter politics, crises of succession, in short, the primary “stuff” of politics, have an erosive effect on inherently fragile democratic systems. The NSS 2006 states unequivocally that “the advance of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational terrorism of today.”

Others have pointed to the tenuous empirical link between autocracy and terrorism, however, suggesting that this is not necessarily a fully candid expression of policy.

By most standards scrutinize by US policy makers, democracy in Brazil and, indeed, in Latin America, is “deepening,” but NSS 2006 is adamant that there are three countries in Latin America that deserve special attention in this regard: Colombia, where “a democratic ally is fighting the persistent assaults of Marxist terrorists and drug-traffickers,” Venezuela, where “a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region,” and Cuba, where “an anti-American [sic.] dictator continues to oppress his people and seeks to subvert freedom in the region.”

Given the emphasis in NSS 2002 and 2006 upon democracy and freedom as ma-
rkers, along with prevention of drug trafficking and (apparently, in the Hemisphere, at least) terrorism, and growing US emphases upon use of Latin American military establishments as police forces in this regard,\textsuperscript{32} it is seen as odd, as Suzeley Kalil Mathias notes, that in the meetings of the Committee on Hemispheric Security, relatively little support has been shown for US insistence on the assignment of police duties to Hemispheric military establishments. Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr echoes these concerns when he notes from a military perspective that

a nova situação trazia, de uma vez por todas, a questão da Guerra Assimétrica com suas ameaças de difícil identificação e a necessidade de, cada vez mais, um trabalho conjunto entre organismos militares e civis. O enorme aparato e prontidão militar de nada serviram para impedir os ataques terroristas.\textsuperscript{33}

As regards the Santiago meetings in 2002, which should have been vitally influenced by 9-11, Mathias notes that:

O tema central continuou a ser o Terrorismo e o Narcotráfico. Entretanto, por não existir uma visão comum sobre a percepção e definição destas ameaças, não se atingiu o consenso buscado pelos EUA no intuito de promover a militarização dos mesmos, o que redundaria na utilização das Forças Armadas em seu combate. A inclusão do Terrorismo e Narcotráfico como temas prioritários, mas para os quais as respostas são múltiplas, pode ser creditada ao governo argentino, cujo Chanceler defendeu justamente a multifacetabilidade destes dois temas.\textsuperscript{34}

The recent definitive UNDP report on Democracy\textsuperscript{35} in Latin America seems to reinforce the NSSs oblique characterisation that democracy has only ambivalent majority support, that economic opportunities are far more central to popular thought and prevailing political culture, and that there is a variety
of factors working simultaneously in Brazil and in wider Latin America to promote drug trafficking and terrorism and hence to undermine the democratic swell. According to recent UNDP studies, such disenchantment may now characterise a significant minority of Latin Americans, and a majority of the Brazilian electorate. Moreover, economic development is seen as lagging dangerously behind popular expectations, so much so, in fact, that a recent book on the global economic crisis by a prominent New Zealand economist is called *The Democracy Sham*. As summarised in a UNDP report:

In 2002, 57 percent of the citizens of Latin America said that they preferred democracy to any other system. Of these people, however, 48.1 ranked economic development over democracy and 44.9 percent said that they would be prepared to support an authoritarian regime if it was able to resolve the country’s economic problems (UNDP, Survey, elaboration on the basis of *Latinbarómetro 2002*).

Hence, although both of the US NSSs, stress the crucial importance of democracy and democratisation abroad, including in Latin America, as ideological markers as to whether or not a country is a friend or enemy in this worldwide war on terror, and stress active combat against drug trafficking and terrorism, active Hemispheric resistance to this police role, ostensibly shared by military establishments such as Brazil’s, remains central. Aside from the implied US unilateral action to encourage democracies in Latin America, which would be largely acceptable from the standpoint of the UN and international law (although, again, there is little mention of international law in the first Plan, and virtually no mention of it in the 2006 version), there are implications of this external “encouragement” of democracy as regards the broader issue of national sovereignty. As Jervis has emphasised, in his examination of NSS (2006),
Although Bush and his colleagues may have cynically exaggerated the ties between Saddam and Al Qaeda, they do appear to believe that only nondemocratic regimes, if not all nondemocratic democratic regimes, will sponsor terrorism and that without state backing, terrorism will disappear.\textsuperscript{41}

The predominant alternative to democracy in Brazil, and in Latin America, has been dictatorship. Generally speaking, dictatorships have involved the military at some stage, even when they are not military dictatorships. Brazil’s experience with a 21-year corporate military dictatorship (1964-85), its “bureaucratic authoritarian\textsuperscript{42}” phase, however, looms large as a possible alternative Brazilian model of governance.\textsuperscript{43} It is not an exaggeration to say that senior Brazilian military officers would be well aware of this, and are cognizant of the Brazilian military’s reputation as well of having nuclear weapons technology, if not nuclear weapons, and hence of possibly (at some near-future point) fitting the potential category (according to NSS 2002 and 2006) of a future target of pre-emption, as ironic as this may seem in historical perspective.\textsuperscript{44}

The NSS emphasis on spreading democracy abroad, although it has been revitalised and underscored, developed in fact out of a long-term US foreign policy emphasis, and hence has a historical entrenchment. Beginning in the 1980s, for example, the US Agency for International Development, USAID, a chief foreign assistance coordinator, commissioned a study on democracy; the US State Department shifted its Cold War emphases from anti-communism to pro-democracy, and used this to pressure the collapsing East Block regimes. Old Testament-form foreign policy associated with the Cold War (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”) rapidly gave way to a rather technical insistence by the US on democratic practices in a number of countries: the creation of competitive multiparty systems, free and fair elections, guarantees of basic human rights, and the rule of law.
With the collapse of the East Block in 1989-90, US policymakers quickly withdrew their support for long-term dictatorial allies. In some cases, like that of Kenya, US foreign policy quickly shifted in favour of democracy, leading to withdrawal of US foreign assistance and sudden and unexpected political reversals. Limited US commitment to democracy in Latin America and Africa was developing ad hoc with the end of the Cold war, and hence was specifically qualified and conditioned by a series of often unrelated political events. Increasing credence was given to the axiom in international relations that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. Then, with September 11 and the NSS documents, a new and far stronger rationale for US insistence upon democratic governance emerged.

US pressures in support of democracy in Latin America seem to have been determinate in some cases, although the message is by no means unambiguous, particularly following the publication of the US National Security Strategy of 2002. In that same year the US appeared to support an undemocratic military coup attempt against an elected president (and former military coup conspirator, himself), Hugo Chavez of Venezuela that “demagogue awash in oil money [who] is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region,” as he is described in NSS 2006. During this coup attempt, Chavez was arrested, and a civilian was sworn in as president; Chavez was returned to power after 47 hours when his supporters were able to retake the capital. Significantly, the US moved with unseemly haste to recognise the short lived government, and then did not condemn the coup until well after it had failed. Clearly, the events associated with 9-11 had elevated US national security and “anti-terrorist” priorities to a primary level, and even reinforced a new criterion for allocating US support and recognition to Latin American governments. In this sense, the “US Factor” showed signs of having changed significantly, appa-
rently no longer representing an absolute barrier to authoritarian (“irregular executive”) transition when democratic mandates are regarded as having been abused.

The more threatening image of the US in Latin America is less ambiguous. The US role posited by the NSSs, and its often confusing activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, have undermined its claim to a more peaceful and benevolent fiduciary role. A number of “middle-range” powers have been imbued with an antagonistic set of interests *vis-à-vis* the United States. From Brazil to Iran, the United States has come to be seen as a potential or real “enemy,” and this may be another propel to democracy, at least insofar as the US has sporadically served as its defender. At the very least, and following the haphazard coup attempt in Venezuela, it is clear that the Bush Administration is decidedly ambivalent in its support of democracy in Latin America, at least as a first-order priority.

**National sovereignty, nationalism and middle range powers**

Beginning in the mid-1980s, tremendous energy was expended by political analysts on studies of “transitions” to democracy, reflecting in some cases an almost Nineteenth Century concept of unilinear “progress” in their conceptualizations. “Transitologists,” as Philippe Schmitter referred to many of them, tended to neglect one important factor in his view: as Alexis de Tocqueville had observed one hundred and fifty years earlier, “armies (in democracies) always exert a very great influence over the fate (of these polities).”

Recent studies have reflected a far more cautious and circumspect view, given the broad spectrum of nationalist and ethnic conflicts that have occurred over the past decade. Many observers, in fact, have dusted off their old texts on nationalism as the levels of nationalist rhetoric, and outbursts of nationalistic and ethnic vio-
lence continue to occur. The Brazilian military establishment is, by dint of its fundamental role in Brazilian society, a nationalistic organisation.

What is Nationalism? Broadly defined, it is an assemblage of ideologies, a family of ideologies, rather than a single, discrete ideological adaptation, although it is always recognizable as nationalism *per se*; it is constructed around a national ideal, “that all those who [share] a common history and culture should be autonomous, united and distinct in their recognized homelands.”

The concept of sovereignty, particular crucial this case, is thought to derive directly from “the neoclassical, secular ideal of assimilation,” a conviction that is said to “take much of its inspiration from the political passion and activist fervor of the *polis* tradition.”

A decade-old extreme right-wing analysis of US threats to Brazilian (and wider Latin American) national sovereignty by an American extremist organization, thought to have been very popular reading on Latin American military bases over the last 13 years in its Portuguese and Spanish translations, makes the argument against democracy, and apparently for something very much like national socialism (fascism), in a way that is seen to feed very effectively on Latin American military fears regarding US (and hence international banking conspiracy) limitations on Brazilian national sovereignty.

*Sovereignty* would appear to base its claims primarily upon history, upon the record of a national population *living in* a territory. Hence another dilemma of the Brazilian nationalists is that sovereignty over Amazônia, given its historical record as a “hollow frontier” (much of it has always been virtually unpopulated) is particularly dependent upon international agreements and international law; nonetheless, the nationalist *gritos* of most strident nationalists over the past five years, and certainly of senior military officers such as Brigadier Sérgio Ferolla, consistently deny the validity of international consensus as it ap-
plies to Amazônia. The US NSSs, moreover, seem to support this principal of national sovereignty, but only as regards the United States.

In the post-Cold War era, the most effective use of nationalist appeals has seemed to involve middle-level powers. With the unchallenged military and economic primacy of the United States, and the rapid decline, or continuing slow development, of other potential “superpowers” (e.g., Russia and China), a potentially new era of “sorting out” has apparently begun. Countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Yugoslavia (greater Serbia) have been characterized as “rogue-state” nations. Other middle-level powers, Indonesia and Yugoslavia, for example, have struggled with nationalist appeals to maintain their national form and integrity in the face of separatist claims.

Brazilian military thought, as the reigning justification of the defenders of a middle-level power, has been impacted by these developments in at least two ways: first, for a variety of reasons Brazil has occasionally maintained close ties, including close military ties, with some of the so-called “rogue states.” An interesting example of this is the case of its close military ties to Iraq during the Gulf War of the early 1990s. Second, as an aspiring middle level power, Brazil has become directly involved in international competitions for political inclusion. Competition for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is one example of this. In both of these categories, the experiences of the Brazilian military establishment point to frustrations, and, often, open dissatisfaction with the international order.

The vulnerability of the Brazilian military officer corps to nationalistic arguments can be summarized briefly as follows: first, the relative paucity over the past century of what might be termed as “orthodox” military missions has meant that, from mission and budgetary standpoints, the Brazilian armed forces have frequently felt threatened. Second, as one of the most sta-
ble and professional national institutions historically, the military has often evinced broad popular support, particularly when it has been seen as standing for the national interests. Third, and not unrelated to the second, repeated pressures from civilians on the military to intervene in the political processes have, on a number of historical occasions, put the military in a precarious and politically vulnerable position, and ultimately led to the 21-year military intervention, 1964-1985. The response of Brazilian military officers is clearly conditioned by Brazil’s status as an aspiring middle-level power, or what Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst have called a “middle ground international role.” The military has been directly involved in heavy industry, in international peacekeeping, and in exercising control over the vast Amazon region. Moreover, officers reflect the national frustration with the post-Cold War worldwide economy, in which some countries appear to be relegated to a semi-permanent “have-not” status.

Particularly interesting is the military establishment’s dilemma involving property rights. As the guarantor of sovereignty in Amazônia (and the largest “landholder” in Brazil), and as a frequent police force opposing the land occupations of the Landless Movement (MST), the Brazilian military has long been arrayed with the most uncompromising advocates of unrestricted property ownership. On the other hand, senior military officers have supported calls for the broad-scale occupation of Amazônia, the full implications of which would ultimately involve compromising huge tracts of private, or privately controlled land. Moreover, in the case of some stridently nationalistic officers, the lesson that unrestricted property ownership tends to perpetuate extreme inequality, and hence underdevelopment, is not lost. This dilemma played itself out in the 1960s and 1970s, when a number of authoritarian nationalist officers in the Brazilian military gravitated eventually toward much more liberal and populist positions.
FURTHER BACKGROUND TO POSSIBLE BRAZILIAN MILITARY THOUGHT: GROWING FEAR AND SUSPICION OF US INTENTIONS IN THE 1990S

The increasing emphasis in the George H.W. Bush administration upon the “New World Order” appears to have intensified deep suspicion in the Brazilian military establishment. Within a short period, an open military dialogue on the post-Cold War international situation led to the adoption of a position that has been characterized as one of “pure realism,” as opposed to the modified and more “global” realism of the late Cold War period. The words of Admiral Vidigal perhaps best express this interpretation in a context that relates directly to the 2002 and 2006 US documents:

The basic principles that governed international relations up to the Gulf War—non-intervention and self-determination—are, in the contemporary world, ignored by the great powers that preach intervention, provided that, in their exclusive estimate, there is a risk to democracy, a grave violation of human rights, the possibility of an ecological tragedy, a threat to peace, or any other noble reason that the idealists of the planet can find at the opportune moment.

In the face of these new perceived threats, strategic analyses, which previously (and invariably) began with a reaffirmation of the Soviet threat, have now come to emphasize the risks to the independence, self-determination, autonomy and territorial integrity of the middle-range powers. Typical of this shift in concerns, General Leonel presented the following topics in the opening class of the Superior War College in Rio de Janeiro in early 1996: “1) Change in the 21st Century: Repercussions in the Military Sphere; 2) Sovereignty; 3) The New Threats to the Sovereignty of States; 4) The Phenomenon of War.” Significantly, these topics were covered in the course before turning to
the Brazilian national situation. In the same summary of the course, General Leonel referred to the “notable” personalities outside of Brazil who “have come to qualify sovereignty, in accordance with their interests, as ‘limited sovereignty,’ ‘restricted,’ [and] ‘shared,’ and have accepted the ‘right of interference,’ [and] ‘humanitarian intervention,’ expressions that have become common, and that bring with them effects that are undesirable for some countries in the absence of the right of tutelary power.”

In a lecture delivered at the Second Meeting on Strategic Studies, held at the University of São Paulo in 1995, Leonel was already referring to “the asymmetry of economic power” as a generator of regional disparities and poverty, which ultimately resulted in insecurity. In the face of such threats, he stressed that “Brazil possesses assets essential to watch over – its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and its national unity.” He concluded that “sovereignty is characterized by being one, indivisible, inalienable and non-prescriptive.” It is significant that such public and official declarations by high-ranking officers are typically restrained, cautious and characterized by implicit, rather than explicit, comments. As noted below, informal statements by Brazilian military officers, both active and in the reserves, on this theme tend to express these same views, although far more explicitly.

The insistence upon the threats and risks imposed upon Brazilian national sovereignty by the asymmetry in North-South relations has become a common concern in military analyses after 1991. In the economic sphere, commercial marginalization and technological isolation have been mentioned frequently. In the political sphere, the North American anti-drug strategy, which has opened a path for the principle of extraterritoriality (supported by the US Supreme Court), likewise figures prominently. The recent rise of environmental questions to a level of key concern on the part of wealthy nations is
seen as threatening Brazil’s eventual development policies with a debate over ecology, which may curb economic activities that the most industrialized countries regard as destructive to the environment.  

Concern with US disregard for Brazilian national sovereignty was expressed clearly by Brigadier General Sérgio Xavier Ferolla in an interview in 1998. According to the former head of the Brazilian Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff and the founder of Embraer, who was able, as a Military Supreme Court Justice to speak on political issues (in other words, not bound by the RDA), the ‘enemy’ of Brazil was “the Northern Hemisphere, principally the United States.” Moreover, in his opinion, the support of the UN could not legitimise multinational intervention such as occurred in the First Gulf War, because the Security Council was “dominated by five countries which determine what others should do.”

The potential threat to the Amazon may loom as a central concern of Brazilian military thought as regards the US NSSs. The Brazilian military has long insisted that its authority in the vast Brazilian Amazon region must be unqualified. By the 1950s, the region’s geopolitical implications, and particularly its “natural permeability,” were employed by General Golbery do Couto e Silva to argue in favor of its extensive colonization and national integration. Since the end of the Cold War, such concerns have tangibly intensified, and been directed outwards towards, for example, NGOs and foreign powers. Ecological catastrophe in the Amazon region is a commonly painted scenario regarding such intervention. Madeline Albright was quoted in the Brazilian press in 2001 as having remarked that “As to the question of the environment, there are no frontiers.” As Admiral Vidigal put it,

It is not absurd to imagine that, in a future that is not distant, international forces under the aegis of the United Nations, would be used
to “avoid an ecological catastrophe,” such as, for example, the ‘devastation’ of the Amazon forest.\textsuperscript{73}

In probing the anthropological implications of the term “nation,” Brazilian military officers have decided that an eventual “ecological” conflict, such as between an indigenous nation and the Brazilian nation, would open a space for such a possible international intervention in Brazil.\textsuperscript{74} It would now appear that “terrorism” and threats of terrorism could do so as well. US concerns with the Colombian guerrilla group, FARC, have directly impacted Brazilian military operations over the past decade, for example. In March, 1998, during a crisis stemming from huge forest fires in Roraima, the Commander of the First Forest Infantry Brigade, General Luiz Edmundo Carvalho, declared to the press that he rejected any possibility of foreign assistance in combating the fires.\textsuperscript{75} This position created difficulties for the federal government, which was preoccupied at the time with limiting the negative foreign repercussions from the destruction of the forest.\textsuperscript{76} Interestingly, the presidential spokesman limited himself to commenting that General Carvalho had been the victim of a misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{77} The Brazilian press attacked senior officers for their inopportune insistence upon this nationalistic gesture, however.\textsuperscript{78}

The intensity of military thought in this regard was evident in its adoption by a civilian president, one of Brazil’s most noted intellectuals. In a speech commemorating promoted generals in 1999, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso responded openly and defensively to putative threats of foreign military intervention in Amazônia, implying that he was responding to statements by US authorities. The tenor of the speech clearly countered the general feeling of cooperation between the Cardoso and Clinton administrations, which had included new military contacts. Cardoso had decided that the armed forces would give support to the Federal Police operations against
narcotics trafficking in Amazônia, a response, according to news reports at the time, to a personal appeal from Clinton. Later Cardoso referred specifically to a speech given at MIT by General Patrick Hughes, Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, where he was said to have commented that “in the case that Brazil decides to make use of the Amazon [in a way] that puts the environment of the United States at risk, we have to be ready to interrupt this process immediately.” While subsequent official notes denied that this statement had ever been made, it is interesting that the president of Brazil risked provoking a diplomatic incident in order to respond to this nationalist Brazilian military concern, especially coming so soon after the Roraima fire.

**Additional possible areas of concern as the brazilian military imagines the future**

Brazilian diplomatic policy has long involved paying careful attention to US policy. Part of this stems from the growing national aspirations to major middle-range power status, including at some point in the future acquisition of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. US watching, however, goes far beyond this. As Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst have noted, “Brazil keeps a permanent watch on the United States and what it does in world politics, and its foreign policy decisions consistently involve an assessment of the costs and benefits of convergence with or divergence from the US.” Brazilian military focus upon US policy is clearly conditioned by such concerns as weapons acquisitions. It was recently observed, for example, that Brazil’s largest diplomatic corps in Washington is in the Air Force mission, which reportedly has three times the staff of that of the Brazilian Embassy.
THE DEMOCRACY QUESTION (AGAIN)

There are disquieting signals, however, that US pressures putatively in support of democracy, particularly in the National Security Strategies, may actually be working directly against support for democracy in the military thought of countries like Brazil. It must be stressed that the NSSs in no way suggest that force should be used to implement democracy.83 However, by stressing the importance of the National Security State, for example, a term that is very familiar to Brazilians, the NSSs appear to be sending a mixed message as regards democratisation. As Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr, of the Brazilian Navy, put it in 2004:

É com esse pensamento que a nação norte-americana apoia-se numa retórica de disseminar os ideais de democracia e da liberdade vai, ao longo da toda sua história, justificar iniciativas expansionistas, imperialistas e intervencionistas não somente como um dever, mas também um direito divino.84

Pressures for democratisation, in this lens, represent direct challenges to the national sovereignty of Brazil. This obviously complicates military thought regarding the near future. The military established the NS State in Brazil, the central artefact of political concepts of national sovereignty in Brazil, and did have limited societal support for it during specific junctures, although there is abundant evidence of its early loss of popular support after 1964. Hence, while it is true that some parts of the Brazilian middle class, for example, supported the military intervention in 1964, it is also true that the collective middle classes rapidly turned against dictatorship, and in favour of democracy.85

Brazil’s transition to Democracy after 1985 was painfully slow and deliberate. Because of the untimely death of Presi-
dent-Elect Tancredo Neves in 1985, the first civilian president after the dictatorship, José Sarney, was a conservative who had been closely associated with the military government. Little was done to redress the excesses of military dictatorship.\(^8\) The first decade of the new democracy was dominated by crippling inflation. Moreover, the new constitution that was drafted in 1988 enshrined some of the “military prerogatives” that had represented the persistence of authoritarianism in Brazil, including half a dozen military places in the presidential cabinet.\(^9\) The first direct election brought to power a president, Fernando Collor de Mello, who had been closely associated with the military government, and who, despite his clear break with the military, was quickly impeached\(^8\) and removed from office because of corruption. His successor, Vice-President Itamar Franco, was likewise dominated by civilian and military elite demands, although by the end of his presidential term, his Finance Minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, managed to introduce a new currency and stabilise the economy, and inflation was effectively eliminated.

Cardoso, previously a famous leftist sociologist, was subsequently elected president and directed a stabilising (conservative) administration that emphasised economic growth while only very gradually and carefully reducing the power and influence of the military. In particular, the creation of a civilian-directed intelligence agency, Abin, and a civilian-directed Ministry of Defense, both near the end of his second administration, represented major democratising accomplishments. Nonetheless, major high-level political scandals, a significant breakdown in personal security (widespread urban crime, primarily) and open conflict with the Landless Movement (and other groups) lowered the popularity of his government, and of democracy in general, as revealed at the time by major sample surveys.

With the election of Luís Inácio (Lula) da Silva, leader of the
Workers’ Party (PT) in 2002, the stage was set for direct confrontation with economic elites over fundamental questions of economic democracy. Instead, Lula has also pursued stabilisation policies and has been beset by high-level political/economic scandals. The economy continues to grow, and hence his popularity has remained relatively high, but as the UNDP report on democracy demonstrated, popular support for democracy may be waning significantly in Brazil. Brazil has long had a dramatic and growing disparity between its rich and poor. Its democratic processes are now struggling to deal with a crisis in property ownership, a direct result of this. The Landless Movement (MST) and Homeless Movement (MTST) have increasingly moved to expropriate property holdings, making their case in terms of justice and fairness, so much so that the Workers’ Party Government, headed by President Lula, is at odds with them after working closely with them for nearly two decades. However, the “problems from below” for Lula’s government go well beyond the MST. His much heralded “Fome Zero” (Zero Hunger) programme, a commitment in 2002 to rid Brazil of hunger within four years, has encountered serious political and economic obstacles despite continuing economic growth and relatively positive tax receipts. The military is invariably drawn into this kind of conflict and it will be direct a concern in the formulation of Brazilian military thought over the next several years.

The 2004 UNDP report, *Democracy in Latin America; Towards a Citizens’ Democracy*, a comprehensive and multifaceted survey research exploring citizens’ attitudes toward democracy and democratic process, revealed that the “Democratic Wave” of democracy in Latin America has crested, at least as regards popular support for, and commitment to, continuation of democratic processes. Brazil has been especially noteworthy in this regard, with strikingly non-democratic percentages indicated by the random surveys. Voting behaviour
also emphasises this point. Voting is compulsory in Brazil, and 92.4% of those with the right to vote register; 75.9% of those with the right to vote actually vote, still a very high percentage, but clearly dictated by the legal requirement to vote. However, only 54.6 percent of those qualified to vote cast valid votes, with many voters either turning in a blank ballot, or ruining their ballot in some way.

Coupled with democratic disenchantment is romanticism regarding the past. Military officers have once again become the most admired professional category in Brazil, and nostalgic feelings for the military presidency of Ernesto Geisel (1972-79) were apparently evident as early as 1989.

Social insecurity

The profound and growing personal insecurity in Brazil is part of a region-wide pattern that has followed collapsing economies and infrastructures, desperate attempts by economic elites to retain their privileges, the rapid growth of drug trafficking, and pervasive corruption. Social insecurity is most stridently felt among the middle classes, and typically revolves around security of private property. As José Nun observed in the mid-1960s, it is the interests of the middle classes that are best represented by, and hence seem to trigger, military coups. The military is increasingly called upon to engage in police actions in Rio de Janeiro and other major Brazilian cities. This inevitable confusion of identities invariably corrupts the mission, if not the personnel, of the military establishment.

Social capital, popularising democracy

The findings of Robert Putnam’s path breaking work, *Bowling Alone*, can be interpolated to cast the Brazilian Political system in a very favourable light. While, as Putnam de-
monstrates, voluntary organisation in the form of “social capital,” the basis of democratic governance, is in dramatic decline in the US, since the early 1970s there has been an unprecedented growth of grass-roots voluntary associations in Brazil, many of which have directly democratic aims. This accelerated growth of “social capital” clearly represents a barrier to authoritarian designs. As Huntington observed in The Third Wave,

Over the course of a decade, from 1974 to 1984, the Brazilian government regularly revised its laws on elections, parties, and campaigning in hopes of stopping the steady growth of opposition power. It did not succeed. Again the evidence is fragmentary, but what there is does suggest that, unless they were carried to an extreme, rigging tactics were unlikely to ensure government victory.

Putnam is perhaps more clear in his argument that “the health of our public institutions depends, at least in part, on widespread participation in private voluntary groups—those networks of civic engagement that embody social capital.”

Implications of the breakdown of absolute property rights

There may be a connection between the progressive breakdown of unlimited property rights and a greater tendency toward military intervention in Brazil. MST and MTST, for example, directly challenge not only the political order that has underwritten military structure, but threaten Brazil’s largest landowner, the Brazilian Armed Forces. For many Brazilians, the prospect of political democracy in 1985 had represented economic democracy, and continuing economic deprivation spells disillusionment with the electoral system. Occupation of lands and buildings is often described by the wealthy as “terrorism,” a message that is not lost on North American authors of the NSSs. Lula, now an international socialist leader, finds himself in the
difficult position of having to defend bourgeois representative (and global) democracy, private property ownership and the rule of oligarchic law against ever more strident demands from within his coalition for economic democracy as a primary goal. And US concern with the “terrorist” implications of limited property rights will inevitably be seen as a threatening development by military elite.

**Political popularity of the military**

In many Latin American countries, according to the recent UNDP survey data, democracy is losing popular support, mostly because of its failure thus far to deliver economic prosperity to most of the population, but also because of other factors, including social insecurity, growing ideological polarization, high level corruption, and so on. In many of the same countries, the military has once again become the most respected national institution, almost irrespective of an individual’s ideological persuasion, soaring above legislatures, presidencies, courts, other bureaucratic entities, private corporations, etc. in survey responses.¹⁰²

The military is pressed for a variety of reasons to encourage a narrow brand of nationalism, and to adopt special causes, such as “saving” the Amazon region from putative foreign threats.¹⁰³ In practice, this has led to a more authoritarian presence of the military in that region,¹⁰⁴ and ultimately to the preservation of interventionist tendencies based upon claims of “national security.” However, it also reinserts the military in the role of national political mediator, a role that has been reflected in the sharp growth of the Brazilian military as political actors. Moreover, the Brazilian Armed Forces are increasingly seen as pitted directly against the implied political intervention in Brazilian affairs, if not national sovereignty, represented by the NSSs.
Brazilian borders and national security

Brazilian concern with its borders, and particularly with Colombia’s inability to resolve its civil war (and the implications for the entire Amazon region that this poses), is unfortunately highlighted in the NSSs. Hence, although

...for over 100 years Brazil has considered itself a ‘geographically satisfied’ country and, in marked contrast to other states in the region, its state-building process has been the result of successful diplomatic negotiation rather than engagement in military disputes,\textsuperscript{105}

it can also be affirmed that “Brazil understands the problems of regional security very differently from the Uribe government and fears the consequences of Colombia’s clear alignment with the United States.”\textsuperscript{106} A multiplicity of specific border concerns have arisen over the past two decades, including Brazilian military mobilisation in response to US-Guyana war games in the early 1990s and rumours of US designs on Amazônia. The relative failure of SIVAM and Calha Norte, incursions by FARC, indeed, US drug patrols and anti-drug operations, have all conspired to produce a climate that can only be interpreted by future Brazilian military thought as threatening to national sovereignty.

Nationalism

Brazilian nationalism has soared to new heights in the last decade, initially designed in the 1970s by the military dictatorship, fuelled by subsequent soccer and sports victories and dramatic economic growth, and focused in recent years, as just noted, by paranoia involving putative sovereignty threats to the Amazon region. “A Amazônia é nossa,” (The Amazon is ours),
The ‘National Security Strategy of the USA’ and Brazilian Military Thought: Imagining the Near Future

has assumed international proportions at times, and has periodically reinforced election campaigns. Recent declarations by senior military officers that the US has designs on the Amazon region, and that it is the likely future “enemy” of Brazil, give a particular shade to this nationalistic fervour. Brazilian nationalism will inevitably run counter to the US intervention that is part and parcel of the War on Terror. An interesting example involves US concerns with the putative presence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Foz de Iguaçu area, and the implications that this may have for foreign incursions on Brazilian soil.

**Anti-“americanism”**

As noted above, a growing level of anti-Americanism in Brazil may represent an interesting influence on future Brazilian military thought as regards the preservation of democracy in Brazil, with similar implications in the rest of Latin America. When the US is portrayed, accurately or not, as an anti-democratic actor, this might actually fuel a level of enthusiasm for democracy, although not necessarily the global economic model of democracy that has been central to the “Bush Doctrine.” While the NSSs devote a good deal of space in pressing for global democracy, the “Bush Doctrine” that they have spawned is generally regarded as anti-democratic, from the “rendition” and torture of prisoners, and the use of Guantanamo Bay, to the struggles with external implementation of democratic regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, there is growing evidence in the NSSs of striking disagreement as to the characterisation of regimes as “democratic” and non-democratic” (viz., Hugo Chávez). Brazilian military concern with US responses to “anti-Yankee” sentiment in these regards may well condition military thought regarding Brazilian politics into the next decade.
CONCLUSION

It would be facile and inaccurate to assume a major impact of the NSSs on Brazilian politics in the near future. Brazil has remained largely untouched by these policy declarations. Indeed, analysts are increasingly concluding that US-Latin American relations, with the possible exceptions of relations with Venezuela, Cuba and Colombia, are unlikely to be transformative. As Abraham Lowenthal recently concluded,

Neither strong US-Latin American partnership nor profound US-Latin American hostility is likely to prevail. Relations between the United States and Latin America during the next few years are likely to remain complex, multifaceted and contradictory.

Nonetheless, the NSSs represent a growing US trend as regards the national sovereignty of other countries, and national sovereignty remains the fundamental raison d’être of national armed forces. As Vice-Admiral Vidigal remarked in 2003,

O que é específico da Doutrina Bush é o nível atual do poder nacional dos Estados Unidos, sem contraponto moderador, o que dá a ela acentuado conteúdo de realpolitik, apenas disfarçado com um discurso messiânico. No fundo, a Doutrina Bush reflete um profundo desprezo pelos interesses e receios dos demais países—ou eles se aliam incondicionalmente com a América ou são considerados inimigos e são tratados como tal. Esta é a forma mais perversa de isolacionismo.

Hence, it is clear that the NSSs will continue to exert some influence on the development of Brazilian military thought, if only in a strident objection to the untenable choices that it imposes upon all middle-range powers.

Imagining Brazilian military thought in the near future ultimately yields a melange of perceptions deeply influenced by
Brazil’s pretensions to major regional power status, growing world status, socio-economic struggles at home, and persistent threats to its national sovereignty. The Brazilian military has simply not been concerned in the past with terrorism.110 Now their thought may be conditioned as never before to examine such categories, and possible US responses to them, in the context of world and regional politics. As Soares de Lima and Hirst have concluded, “Brazil faces major challenges ahead. Never before have internal and international developments been as closely intertwined as they are at present.”111

Brazilian military thought will continue to interpret the “Bush Doctrine” and the National Security Strategies from the standpoint of a middle-range power, and through the dual lenses of national sovereignty and international law. On both scores, the Strategies are sorely lacking. As Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr, of the Brazilian Escola Naval, wrote in 2004 regarding the first National Security Strategy,

A Estratégia de Segurança Nacional implementada por George Bush não passa, então, de mais uma tentativa dos Estados Unidos de manter sua hegemonia mundial. Seu caráter unilateral vem so mente reafirmar o que mais de um século de relações internacio nais mostrou: Os Estados Unidos agirão onde quiserem e quando for interessante para suas ambições políticas e econômicas.112

In the face of such open suspicion, and in the complete paucity of consultation, it is difficult to see how the full goals of the US National Security Strategies can ever be regarded by the Brazilian Armed Forces as an acceptable basis for a cordial alliance. In the end, Brazilian military thought will continue (and must continue) to reflect the fundamental concerns of Brazilian national sovereignty, the space for which seems wholly lacking in the National Security Strategies (2002, 2006) of the United States of America.
We are referring here to the Regulamento Disciplinar do Exército, the Regulamento Disciplinar da Aeronáutica, and the Regulamento Disciplinar da Marinha, which expressly forbid most active duty officers from commenting publicly on political matters.

Even during the early years of the 1964-85 dictatorship, the “internationalists associated with General Golbery do Couto e Silva manifested a strident form of Brazilian manifest destiny, seeing Brazil as a future world power.

Many observers have argued that the actual strategy that is being proposed is one of prevention rather than the more desperate strategy of pre-emption. See, for example: Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention, Not Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly, 26:2 (Spring 2003), pp. 105-114.


Gray, p. 559: “Thus, the 2002 Strategy did refer expressly, but very briefly—and controversially—to international law, in claiming that, for centuries, international law had recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they could lawfully take action to defend themselves.”

Some analysts have argued that the Bush Administration is not proposing pre-emption, but rather “prevention” and “preventive war.” See, for example, Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly, 29:3 (Summer 2006), p. 9.


17 O’Hanlon, et al., p. 5.

18 Jervis suggests that this demonstrates the Bush Administrations view that “only the hegemon can nip problems, including others’ problems, in the bud, and the very fact that it acts prevenitively means that others need not and must not do so.” Jervis, p. 14

19 Gray, p. 561.

20 Gray, p. 564.

21 NSS 06, p. 37: “...we must be prepared to act alone, if necessary, while recognizing that there is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of our allies and partners.”

22 Cruz de Andrade Flôr, p. 154.


25 NSS2006, p. 36.

26 NSS 2006, p. 12.

27 References to Venezuela, Cuba, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, and “Marxist terrorists and drug-traffickers” in Colombia as “challenges” represent cases in point. NSS 2006, p. 15.

28 Cruz de Andrade Flôr, p. 161.

29 NSS 2006, p. 11.

30 See, for example, F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs 84, No. 5 (September/October 2005), pp. 62-76.

31 NSS 2006, p. 15.

32 Suzeley Kalil Mathias notes, in this regard, that the US quickly withdrew its troops from police functions after the fall of Baghdad, and that “a grande potência define que esta é missão castrense para os países periféricos, embora não o seja quando se trata de lugares por ela controlados.” “Defesa e Segurança Hemisférica: Um Tema Controverso. Notas à Declaração sobre Segurança nas Américas,” Boletín de RESDAL No. 13, Special Edition (December 2003), http://www.resdal.org/campo/art-news-kalil.html .

33 Cruz de Andrade Flôr, p. 155.

34 Mathias, http://www.resdal.org/campo/art-news-kalil.html. Mathias quotes the final declaration of the 2002 meetings, a summary of which is missing from the official web site: “Reafirmamos que, no âmbito da paz, da cooperação e da estabilidade alcançadas no
Hemisfério, cada Estado americano é livre para determinar seus próprios instrumentos para a defesa, incluindo a missão, o pessoal e as forças armadas e de segurança pública necessárias para a garantia de sua soberania, bem como aderir aos instrumentos jurídicos correspondentes no âmbito das Carta das Nações Unidas e da Organização dos Estados Americanos”.


36 In a 2004 survey of most of the countries in Latin America, 1000 randomly selected Brazilians were surveyed. Of that sample, 30.6 percent regarded themselves as “democrats,” 42.4 percent as “ambivalents,” and 27 percent as “non-democrats.” UNDP, Democracy in Latin America; Towards a Citizens’ Democracy. Statistical Compendium (New York: UNDP, 2004), p. 220.


39 Beginning, emphatically, in NSS, 2006, p. 2, for example.

40 E.g., “We must also solidify strategic relationships with regional leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean who are deepening their commitment to democratic values.” NSS, 2006, p. 37.

41 Jervis, p. 10.


43 And, interestingly, was justified in its day as the immediate requisite of “National Security”—in fact, it was defined as a national security state.

44 It is worth noting here that the military coup that overthrew the elected government of Brazil in 1964 was provided with backup support (which it never used) from the US in the form of “Operation Brother Sam,” the stationing of US Navy vessels offshore, loaded with petroleum should the coup conspirators have needed it.

In Latin America, in particular, that process signalled definitively the end of tacit US support of military dictatorships, and was conditioned by the US invasion and overthrow of Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1989. The legitimacy of that action was reinforced when the US swore in Guillermo Endara, widely acknowledged as the candidate who would have been the likely victor of the presidential election that had been cancelled earlier in the year by Noreiga.

In 1996, 1998 and 2000 the US diplomatic mission in Paraguay played a key role in stifling coup attempts stemming from a Colorado Party faction that supported General Lino Oviedo, a military officer and politician instrumental in the overthrow of long-term anti-communist dictator (and sporadic US ally) General Alfredo Stroessner. In 1998, in particular, US pressures were central in defeating an explicitly anti-democratic coup that had, for all intents and purposes, already succeeded. The message to all Latin American military establishments was clear, and in direct contrast to the US policies pursued in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, when the US sometimes covertly supported the overthrow of elected governments by military officers. Nonetheless, 22.9 percent of Latin American political leaders polled by the UNDP survey in 2004 believed that, of all branches of government and major domestic and international political actors, it is the United States that exercises determinate power in Latin America. UNDP Report, p. 64.


Smith, Nationalism, p. 2.

Smith, Nationalism, p. 40.

Executive Intelligence Review, The Plot to Annihilate the Armed Forces and the Nations of Latin America (Washington, DC: EIR News Service, 1994). Published by Lyndon LaRouche’s organization, this work is based upon expressly pro-authoritarian and crypto-fascism.


It argues, for example, that the movement toward democracy in Latin America is directed at the destruction of the military and the nations of the region: “It is the military institution as a whole that is the target, and therefore all military officers, whether they choose to fight, be ‘neutral,’ or even join the enemy side, are targeted for destruction” (Italics in the original). The Plot, p. 6.


“Interview with Brigadier General Sérgio Ferolla, Caros Amigos (Brazil), 20 (November) 1998, pp. 22-27.

General cum President Castello Branco’s reported response to a congratulatory comment after the golpe of 1964 comes to mind: intervention in the political process was relatively easy….it was the military’s withdrawal, he warned, that posed the real difficulties.

Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State and


See, in this regard: Martins Filho, João  and Daniel Zirker, “Nationalism, National Security and Amazônia: Military Perceptions and Attitudes in Contemporary Brazil,” Armed Forces and Society, 27, No. 1 (Fall, 2000), pp. 105-129; Martins Filho, João  and Daniel Zirker, “The Brazilian Military under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42, No. 3 (Fall, 2000), pp. 143-170. In response to predictions of an era of international peace, Brazilian military analysts began to explore concepts of contemporary war in this new setting. Responding to utopian descriptions of a “New World Order,” they increasingly defended a view of international relations as unpredictable and anarchistic. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz and even Freud were cited in support of this contrasting interpretation of the new international setting. There are many examples of this. For example, Admiral Vidigal cited Clausewitz in recalling that relations between states are relations of power (59); the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Brazilian armed forces, General Bezerra Leonel, cited Freud to explain the profound psychological causes of war, and concluded, following from Hobbes, that it has never been possible to eliminate it from human affairs; Rear Admiral Luiz Sérgio Silveira Costa turns to Machiavelli in describing the actions of world powers: “in the world of sovereign states, each one does the best possible in defending its interests and is only judged for its weaknesses, never for its crimes.” Silveira Costa, “A complexa nova orden mundial,” Revista da Escola Superior de Guerra, X, No. 29 (December, 1994), 38.


Leonel, “Segurança e Defesa no Brasil,” Revista da Escola Superior de Guerra, XII, No. 32 (July, 1996), 7-26. There are numerous passages in the text that are directly quoted from his other article (cited above).


Leonel, “Perspectivas,” 54.

Native populations, and to the demarcation of native reserves, have been seen by the
Brazilian military to have transformed Amazônia into an area of intense world concern, enhancing its special vulnerability to foreign intervention.

68 His position as a justice in the Military Supreme Court gives Ferolla the opportunity to express himself freely on political subjects. The text of the interview was published in Caros Amigos, 20 (November, 1998), 22–27.

69 Ferolla interview, Caros Amigos, 26. In the case of the recent bombing of Yugoslavia, the Brazilian government initially condemned the NATO action because it did not secure UN approval; later, Brazil voted against the request of China, Russia and Namibia to condemn the aerial attacks. According to our evidence, this position clearly left a sense of dissatisfaction in military circles. Nevertheless, there were no open military reactions regarding this policy.


73 Vidigal, “Estratégia,” 56.

74 It is plausible that, in a not very distant future, a Yanomami ‘nation’—and the generalized use that has already been made of the term ‘nation’ is absolutely tendentious—at the instigation of another country and counting on the approval of the UN, will exercise its ‘right’ to autonomy. The repression that, without a doubt, would follow could bring about an international intervention.” Vidigal, “Estratégia,” 58. This explains to some extent the unusually open criticism by the head of the Secretariat for Strategic Studies (SAE, the immediate successor to the SNI), Admiral Flores, and the Minister of the Army, General Zenildo de Lucena, in August of 1993 (during the Itamar Franco presidency), of the demarcation of Indian reserves. At the time, investigations were underway of the massacre of 19 Yanomami Indians, allegedly by prospectors (garimpeiros) on Brazil’s border with Venezuela. An even more direct response was given by the Commander of the First Forest Infantry Brigade, Col. Saboya Burnier, who suggested that the NGOs that pursued this investigation were little more than lightly disguised instruments of the countries of the Northern Hemisphere, “a way to get around the sovereignty of a country without damaging international rights.” Similarly, the brigadier general charged at that same time with directing “Operation Presence in Amazônia” affirmed that “Brazil and Amazônia are coveted [by others], instinctively,” and, referring to the US in decidedly pre-Cold War terms, said that “nations do not have friends, or enemies. They have interests.” “Para admirante, reservas são ‘discutíveis,’” “Garimpeiro também é vítima, diz ministro,” “Comandante diz que reserva é ameaça ao país,” “Para brigadeiro, presença militar inibe cobiça,” Folha de S. Paulo (August 19, 1993); “Garimpeiro também é vítima, diz ministro,” “Comandante diz que reserva é ameaça ao país,” “Para brigadeiro, presença militar inibe cobiça,” Folha de S. Paulo (August 20, 1993).

75 “Ajuda da ONU contra o incêndio divide o governo,” O Estado de S. Paulo, March 26, 1998.

76 See, for example, “Brazilian Wildfires Threaten Indians,” and “Amazon Going Up in Flames,” The Washington Post (March 20, 1998; March 27, 1998).
Information had been given to the national press, citing diplomatic sources, that noted that “most of the countries interested in offering [firefighting] aid are acting with great caution in this matter, [because] they are aware that Amazônia is a sensitive subject for the Brazilian government—especially for the military, who fear foreign interference in the territory.” “Bird oferece US$5 milhões para combate ao fogo,” O Estado de S. Paulo, March 27, 1998.

“Nacionalismo despropositado,” editorial in O Estado de S. Paulo (March 27, 1998); and “Fogo, omissão e bravatas,” Veja (April 1, 1998).

According to the magazine Época, a conversation between Clinton and Cardoso, during his visit to Washington in April, 1995, led to a presidential directive that ordered the armed forces to provide logistical support to the police operations against Amazonian narcotrafficking. “Guerra na Amazônia,” Época (August 24, 1998). Nonetheless, news reports insist that “whenever they have been consulted, the military have opposed using combat troops in combatting narcotrafficking, offering, rather, technical and logistical support. The creation of the National Anti-Drug Secretariat, tasked with restricting the traffic, was the key reason for the misunderstanding between the Chief of the Military Household, General Alberto Cardoso, and the Minister of Justice, Renan Calheiros…..” Isabel Braga and Tânia Monteiro, “Ministério da Defesa prega atuação de militares no combate ao narcotráfico; Álvares diz que Armas não ficarão ausentes ‘de maneira nenhuma’ se chamadas a atuar,” O Estado de S. Paulo, June 11, 1999.

As far as we can determine, the first mention of these comments occurred on an early morning news broadcast on TV Globo, in which journalist Ricardo Boechat referred to the lecture. The citation (above) appeared in Veja the following week (April 22, 1998). In an official note, the US Department of State maintained that in the April 8th lecture, “at no time did General Hughes advocate US or any military action in the Amazon,” although it recognizes that “among the concerns he addressed were potential environmental catastrophes to include massive depletions of the world’s rain forest reserves.” The US Embassy in Brasília also released a note on April 15th affirming that General Hughes “categorically and finally denies the words and insinuations attributed to him by the foreign press.” Both of these notes were sent to one of the authors of this paper, by email, from the political office of the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, and by the press office of the US Embassy in Brazil.

Soares de Lima and Hirst, 33.

“O brigadeiro José Carlos Pereira, ex-presidente da Infraero, foi convidado pelo amigo comandante Juniti Saito para chefiar o escritório da Aeronáutica em Washington, como esta coluna antecipou. Ele ainda não respondeu. Trata-se de uma sinecura cujo objetivo é fazer compras para a FAB nos EUA. As compras podem ser feitas de qualquer repartição no Brasil com telefone, fax e internet, mas a Aeronáutica se recusa a extinguir a boquinha. Em Washington, há três vezes mais funcionários no escritório da FAB do que na embaixada, a mais importante representação diplomática do Brasil,” “Sinecura americana da FAB,” Jornal do Commercio, 13 August 2007.

Gray, p. 569.

Cruz de Andrade Flôr, p. 152.

The ‘National Security Strategy of the USA’ and Brazilian Military Thought: Imagining the Near Future


88 A number of works have been published on this topic, including my own: Daniel Zirker, “The Political Dynamics of Presidential Impeachment in Brazil,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Vol. 21, No. 41 (December 1996), pp. 9-29.

89 Perhaps because no member of the Brazilian Congress has ever been convicted by the Supreme Court (the reigning judicial body in such cases) of corruption (Latin American Brazil and Southern Cone Reports, July, 2006, p. 3), practices associated with “fundraising” are among the many that have led to high-level political scandals in Brazil.


91 The Human Development Report for Brazil—1996, by the UNDP and IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada) noted in 1996 that “The richest 20% of the [Brazilian] population retains 65% of the total income and the poorest 50% with 12%. (In 1960 this relationship was 54% against 18%). The average income of the richest 10% is nearly 30 times greater than that of the average income of the poorest 40%, as against 10 times in Argentina, 5 times in France and Germany, 4 times in Holland, 25 times in Peru and 13 in Costa Rica (see Graph 2.1 attached). The fraction of the income of the richest 20% grew by 11 points between 1960 and 1990, while that of the poorest 50% fell 6 points and that of the intermediate classes remained almost without change….5% of the poor are in the North, 45% in the Northeast, 34% in the Southeast, 10% in the South, and 6% in the Centre-West. In the North, the poor are 43% of the total population; in the Northeast, 46%; in the Southeast, 23%; in the South, 20%; and in the Centre-West, 25. In the metropolitan regions, the poor comprise 29% of the population, in the non-metropolitan urban areas, 27%; in the rural areas, 39%. In São Paulo the poor correspond to 22% of the metropolitan population. A tendency has been noted of the metropolization of poverty, as during 1981 there were 26% of the poor in these areas, as against 29% in 1990. In proportionate terms, São Paulo is one of the States with less poor (17% of its population), and also of Santa Catarina (14%). The greatest proportion is in Piauí (59%) and in Ceará (52%).” http://www.undp.org.br/HDR/Hdr96/hrd1-1.htm


93 UNDP Report.

94 These figures are from the UNDP Report, p. 84.

95 Huntington mentions this in Third Wave, p. 257.


Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 183-184.

Putnam, p. 336, italics in the original.


Indeed, within Latin America this is nearly a majority. A 1999 transnational survey demonstrated that the armed forces had once again become the most trusted institution in Latin America, with about 49% of the public expressing trust for their national militaries. Cited in: Marta Lagos, “Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 2001), p. 143.


Soares de Lima and Hirst, p. 22.

Soares de Lima and Hirst, p. 35.

Which are all singled out in NSS 2006.

Lowenthal.

Vidigal, 2003, p. 95.


Soares de Lima and Hirst, p. 40.

Cruz de Andrade Flôr, 2005, p. 164.