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THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHTS-BASED
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND

FOR SOME HAURAKI GULF FISHERMEN AND
THEIR COMMUNITIES

A thesis submitted in fulfilment for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Waikato

by

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the social implications of a neoliberal ‘rights-based’, fisheries management system introduced in New Zealand on 1 October 1986 in the form of the Quota Management System (QMS) using Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). Ongoing biological and economic monitoring has endeavoured to ensure the status of fish and the well-being of the industry but relatively little social research on the fishermen and their communities. This thesis begins to address this discrepancy.

It considers four “components”, The Fishing, now Seafood, Industry (corporates), Fisheries Management (MAF/MFish), which have more market and national perspectives respectively, often influenced by international considerations, while social implications impinge more particularly on Fishermen and their Communities, both generally having more local perspectives.

Communities, mainly Waiheke Island (my own community) but with reference to Coromandel, and Leigh, that had been active in the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery before the QMS, were selected, initially as case studies but later as less distinctive variants.

The dissertation argues that permitting the ‘Big Boats’ on the coast constructed a crisis which was aggravated by loan schemes. The exclusion of the part-timers and aggregation of quota to the corporates has deprived coastal communities. Once they had access to fish through rights of propinquity and usufruct for livelihood and food. Now access to fish is commodified and controlled by corporates supplying an international market. Some fishermen retained their own quota, are passionate and debt free: others are contractors and financially marginal so that what was once an expressive vocation is now a more instrumental and in many cases marginal job. For social justice the QMS must provide better livelihoods for fishermen and better access to fresh locally caught fish at a fair affordable price for local consumers, especially in coastal communities.

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¹ Fisheries Social Science Network, an internet discussion list for fishermen, managers, scientists, academic and those interested:
<http://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/fishfolk>

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter will set out the objectives of this research, indicate the style of presentation, discuss the nuances of the essential terminology used, describe the ‘components’ of the study – fishermen, communities, corporate and management (MAF / Mfish). It will concentrate on the first two, before reviewing literature on rights-based fisheries and its manifestation in New Zealand in the form of the Quota management System (QMS). It will then describe the Hauraki Gulf fishery. The introduction will conclude by outlining the structure of this dissertation.

Before the 1980s neo-liberal fervour of Rogernomics, New Zealand had a relatively high level of government involvement in a welfare state ideology. The fishing industry was numerically dominated by owner-operators (See e.g. Boyce et al. 1986), and these supported and were in turn supported by their communities. Following the election in 1984 the Labour Government implemented a rights-based policy system characterised by privatisation, market forces and deregulation and introduced the QMS. Power shifted so fisheries are now predominantly in the hands of a few vertically integrated private and Māori corporations and the industry re-branded itself as the Seafood Industry.

AIMS AND GOALS OF THIS RESEARCH

This dissertation is primarily concerned with the social implications of the QMS for fishermen and their communities in the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery. It therefore seeks to show the change in the ethos of fishermen and the identity of their communities before and after the introduction and give them “voice” that has generally been disregarded in the literature. This focus will be contextualised by re-examining the causes of the coastal crisis and the social implications of the 1983 Fisheries Act and 1986 Fisheries Amendment Act that led to the QMS.

Since this dissertation is concerned with changes over 30 years, with Think Big and Neo-liberal ideologies, before and after the QMS with a methodology that varied over time it utilises a mosaic rather than a linear progression of data. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) / Ministry of Fisheries (Mfish) policy toward large-scale companies (the corporates) contrasted with that for small-scale coastal fishermen or smaller yet, part-timers, and their communities,

that can be used to establish change before and after the introduction of rights-based fishing with the QMS and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). The main focus then is on the fishermen and communities in one fishery, snapper in the Hauraki Gulf. The dissertation is situated, in the debates over the consequences of ideological shifts in approaches to resource management.

Much of the literature on the QMS is by those responsible for its introduction and ongoing management (See: Chapter 2 Dominant Ideology: Neo-liberal), assumes the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, and presents the perspectives of the big companies (corporates) and/or the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF)/ Ministry of Fisheries (Mfish). This literature is not ideologically neutral and generally is weighted towards the biological and economic aspects of fisheries, externalising social aspects, and advocates in favour of the QMS². This dissertation is unashamedly more critical of neo-liberalism, aims to redress this ideological bias and address the paucity of social literature on the social implications of the QMS for fishermen and their communities.

I am more concerned with the expressive, the emotional, the subjective that denotes the unique character of fishermen and commercial fishing; what makes it different, what makes it special, rather than more objective, statistical and instrumental aspects. So will elucidate the ethos of commercial fishing before the QMS for both commercial fishermen and their communities and seek to evaluate those changes and give “voice” to the fishermen and their communities.

Most of the empirical data on the fishery before the QMS is from my previous research and from experience on Waiheke Island. Since, however, the majority of Waiheke fishermen sold their quota Waiheke was no longer involved in commercial fishing. To get more comprehensive coverage of the social implications for the Gulf data from Coromandel and Leigh has been used (*Figures 1, 2*).

² Some, mainly by academics and conservationists is, critical e.g. Rees (2004, 2006) but then as a Senior Strategic Projects Analyst for the Office of the Chief Executive with the Ministry of Fisheries/Te Tautiaki i nga tini a Tangaroa is highly laudatory (Winder and Rees 2010).



Figure 1. New Zealand: main place names in the text. (Source: Max Oulton)



Figure 2: The Hauraki Gulf. Note: Locations of the three communities Waiheke, Coromandel and Leigh. (Source: Max Oulton)

UNTANGLING TERMINOLOGY

Understandings of the social changes are hindered by conceptual and methodological tensions and ambiguities so it is useful to clarify some of the key concepts employed in this research.

Fisheries occur at the intersection between the human social system and the marine ecosystem. They are one of the mediators and expressions of the people/sea relationship. Both systems are complex, dynamic, chaotic and open; seemingly fragmented and contradictory. While both systems contain an empirical reality, the way in which they are perceived depends on ideological and/or

theoretical perspectives (van Ginkel³ 1999 19 22). Two disciplines - biology and economics, often conflated as bio-economics - have dominated later 20th century fisheries' management. The broader ecological and social sciences have been less significant, but have grown in importance in the last decade.

Ecologically, from a biological perspective, the marine ecosystem is a vast complex network of food chains: species in predator or prey relationships in diverse interrelated communities undergoing processes of reproduction, maturity, and mortality, in diurnal, seasonal, climatic and other cycles. However, from the simpler perspective of the fisheries science used by MAF / Mfish, the status of single species populations can be determined by a variety of surveys, complex statistics, mathematical equations, computational analyses, and computer modelling.

From an economic perspective the marine ecosystem represents a source of supply, with marine protein and product harvested under rights-based fishing by venture capitalists (Massey 2003). The social system provides the market which creates demand for marine product with an emphasis on economic efficiency.

The terms 'social', 'economic' and 'political' each include dimensions of the others. Davis and Bailey state, for example, that, "for humans property is as much an expression of social and political, as it is economic, relationships" (Davis and Bailey 1996 253). To ensure conceptual clarity, so that social does not just conflate to, or subsume the other terms, it will be defined following the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: "(5a) Of or pertaining to society or its organisations as a natural or ordinary condition of human life. (5b) ... Of or pertaining to the mutual relationships of human beings or a class of human beings connected with the functions and structures necessary to membership of a group or society" (O.E.D. 1973, 1993). In practical terms this dissertation emphasises the social while recognising there may be economic and/or political implications.

³ Although I have long been aware of the interrelationship between the social system and ecosystem and the social context of the fishing grounds, Van Ginkel's work, especially this paper, not only resonates with my perspective but extends and expresses it with exceptional cogency.

The term ‘social implications’ is used for this research instead of the more usual terms, ‘social impacts’, and ‘social consequences’ in the social impact literature (e.g., Burge 2004) to avoid the assumption of negative connotations associated with change. My concern is that the subjects of this research are recognised as people, often with conflicting attributes, aspirations and emotions. They are not the abstract entities of neo-classical economics. My approach lies firmly within the tradition of social anthropology with its emphasis on social interrelationships and human geography, aspiring to “the development of critical thinking about issues involving the interrelationships among people and nature, in places” (Johnson et al. 2000).

In most countries, fisheries management involves consideration of fisheries biology, industry economics and management of fishermen (Miller and van Maanen 1979). Internationally, Copes presented a system for comparing “major fisheries management systems in industrialized countries” arguing that, “[t]he value of any management system lies in meeting society's policy objectives for fisheries management, consisting of acknowledged goals in three areas, widely accepted by political consensus. These are resource conservation, economic efficiency, and social considerations” (Copes 2002 1). Social consideration is essential (Crean and Symes 1996 197; NMFS 2001) and has been explicitly incorporated into the USA’s Magnuson Fisheries Management Act (Nielander and Sullivan 2000). This can however, underplay the lived experience of fishing or even the perspectives of communities where poetic, folkloric or anthropologically informed views record, nostalgically salt etched seafarers, pursuing the occupation of their forebears, operating small grimed workboats and contending with lines or nets in a hostile environment to feed the local community (See for example Boeri and Gibson 1976 11-22). Romanticised or not, the lived experience, the ethos, of fishing plays an important part in the cultural sense; the identity, of being a community or society.

Yet, traditionally in New Zealand fisheries management considerable attention has been given to biology, in the form of ongoing fisheries science research⁴ and

⁴ See for example MAF FARDs or MAF / Mfish scientist’s papers and reports published in NZ Journal of Fresh and Saltwater Research, <http://www.rsnz.org/publish/nzjmf/2008/> (Accessed 11 August 2008).

annual single species stock assessments (e.g. Annala et al. 1999⁵), and to economics (e.g. the bi-annual NZFIB / SeaFIC Economic Reviews e.g. Peacey 1996) but with relatively little attention given to social science. The need for a changed management regime arose from the belief that the stocks were being over-fished. In consequence fisheries scientists increased their biological research to determine the status of the stocks and the level of fishing they could sustain. The Fishing Industry Board monitored and facilitated economic development for the industry. The third disciplinary perspective, the social implications for fishermen and their communities was considered only briefly, at least during the lead up to the introduction of ITQs and it was recognised by some that the change would bring significant social pain (See: Fairgray 1985; Hawkey 1994; Holmes 1998 below).

With the fervour of New Zealand State Sector Reform, the policy makers implemented a 'pure' economic system rather than ensuring social justice for fishermen⁶ and their communities. Social aspects were considered externalities (Helgason and Palsson 1997), and, neo-liberal bio-economic NZ fisheries managers expressing the zeitgeist of the time argued for, "the sanctity of the policy and let the chips fall where they may" (Clark and Duncan 1986 128⁷). They ignored the social consequences. The social implications for fishermen, their

⁵ The Ministry of Fisheries and MAF before it produced annual Reports from Fishery Assessment Plenaries: stock assessments and yield estimates. Similar information is now available <http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/SOF/default.htm> (Accessed 4 September 2008).

⁶ "Fishers" is the politically correct, gender neutral and academic terminology. The term "fishermen" will, however, be used throughout this research. Both men and women who fish commercially seem to prefer to be called fishermen. It is their identity and this dissertation is concerned with identity and changes in it. Nadel-Klein and Davis quoted a female informant, "I am a fisherman and mean fisherman [emphasis ours]. I'm not a fish person or a fisherette or any of those strange words. The word says what I do, I fish. The word has been around a long time and it deserves respect" (Nadel-Klien and Davis 1988 29). This view is reinforced by Allison (1988) and by Davis (Davis 1996). It was also the consensus reached when debated on an Internet email list Fishfolk (fishfolk@mit.edu). While fisher is the academic terminology I will adhere to the expressed wishes of those I write about unless quoting or the context requires otherwise.

⁷ Alex Duncan, no relation to me.

families and communities have had little attention. This dissertation partly addresses that gap.

Initially it seemed that the social implications would become apparent from a relatively straightforward social impact assessment (SIA) but it became evident that the issues were more complex and the direction evolved. Informants asserted that the social implications of changes made before the QMS, such as the exclusion of the part-timers were greater than those of the QMS and made establishing a baseline considerably more difficult, if not impossible.

In addition, relationships, similarities and differences, and entanglements among the communities meant that rather than separate cases I was really studying just one: the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery. I did not set out to do a discourse analysis but the significance of different perspectives on the part-timer issue became strikingly apparent, so elucidating just how this ‘problem’ had been discursively constructed required analysis.

I take bureaucracy to mean formal institutional structures and mechanisms of the departmental organisation and staff members involved in monitoring and management of the fisheries, the degree of regulation and the amount of paperwork required of fishermen and others reporting the catch.

COMPONENTS

Van Ginkel’s seminal overview of the issues of fisheries management advocates understanding the multiplicity of forces working upon on ecosystems and cultures noting that “[i]n a globalising world, ecological, economic, social and political interdependencies have but reinforced the impact of external factors on socio-cultural entities defined as geographically bounded wholes” (van Ginkel 1999 20). The real world is not clear-cut entities but rather conglomerates of blurred boundaries. Heuristically, however, four collectivities, or ‘components’ will be considered here: the larger companies - ‘corporates’ which process, distribute and market the fish; the government administration; ‘management’ which manages the fisheries and fishermen and their communities (See Figure 3 for an overview of the basic context).




Figure 3: The main components considered in this research.

From my perspective, fishermen cast off from communities to fish on the fishing grounds to make a livelihood by catching fish for food for subsistence and for sale. Fishing corporates, however, can be seen as somewhat impersonal organisations, rather than individuals, extracting resources for processing and arguably value-adding, distribution and marketing globally. They contend with independent fishermen, owner-operators, for access to the fishing grounds. Given the pejorative perspective the media have portrayed of the fishing industry (as opportunistic hunters and rapists pillaging the ecosystem (Minnegal et al 2003 65)) the corporates have rebranded the seafood industry and fishermen as farmers or ranchers (Talley, 1999) who ‘harvest’ the stocks. The administrative agency monitors stock levels, establishes policy and ensures compliance.

Since the social implications for fishermen and their communities are the focus of this dissertation and the social concepts are both ambiguous and contested, fishermen and communities as used in this research require elaboration.

Fishermen

In the literature fishermen have been classified or typologised in a variety of ways: subsistence (Akroyd Walshe et al. 2002), part-time or pluriactive (Symes 2001 7), family (Christensen and Raakjær 2006 263 264; Minnegal et al. 2003

53), traditional (See for example Firth 1966; Cordell 1989; Miller and van Maanen 1979 31 32), rapacious maximisers⁸ (van Ginkel 1999 19), hunters (Talley 1999), rugged individualists/entrepreneurs (Jentoft and Davis 1993 1; Stella 1996 191), innovative (Symes 2001 7, 8), businessmen utilitarians (Christensen and Raakjær 2006 266; Hamilton 54; Davis 1991 13; St Martin 2006 172) and charter fishermen⁹ (Rennie, 2000; Rennie and Thompson 2004, 2007). For the present research some of these terms may relevantly describe fishermen throughout the period while others may be more applicable either before or after the QMS was introduced.

Commercial fishermen¹⁰ traditionally catch and transfer fish (through sales) from the marine ecosystem into the social (and political-economic) system. The communities in which they live and which facilitate their enterprise are the prime focus of social concern. Fishermen were seen as having all the skills, knowledge and wiles identified in the international literature as being “pitched against the unpredictable and physically challenging” ocean (Davis and Bailey 1996 255). Such a shared perception gives fishermen a sense of social and emotional identity and status, a community of occupation, and influences their relationships both at sea and with kith and kin and community members. Academic research substantiates this perception. Courtland Smith, for example, “found that fishermen optimize such occupational objectives as independence, challenge, lack of regimentation, and being outdoors” (Smith 1981:181).

Administratively in New Zealand after the QMS, commercial fishermen fall into three categories:

⁸ None of the fishermen I knew, worked with or interviewed fit this category or even came near. Indeed many knew and practiced the conservation issues to the extent they were able and were as concerned as I, even as a Greenpeace Fisheries consultant.

⁹ Charter fishermen here is used in the sense of fishermen skippering their vessels for parties of recreational fishermen, not skippers of overseas vessels chartered by the bigger fishing companies to catch their deepwater quota.

¹⁰ Unless otherwise stated the term fishermen means ‘commercial fishermen’ where the intention is to sell or exchange fish as opposed to ‘recreational fishers’ who fish for recreation, sport and/or food for themselves, their families and their friends.

- owner-operators who run their own boats and own sufficient quota¹¹ to be able to operate their enterprise relatively independently
- Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE)-dependent fishermen who frequently own their own boats, but have to lease ACE from other fishermen, quota brokers or fishing companies, and
- share fishermen who are employed by the companies to operate company boats and fish company-owned quota.

Communities

The Dictionary of Human Geography defines ‘community’ as “a social network of interacting individuals, usually concentrated into a defined territory” (Johnson et al. 2000). The literature on communities is extensive, but the concept remains difficult to define (Jacob and Jepson 2000 211). There are tensions between those who focus on agglomerations or aggregations of people (Ramsey and Smit 2002 369) or collectivities (Frazer 2000 178) and those with concern for the emotional and expressive. Here, communities are “fundamentally important to the human experience, representing the personally meaningful physical, social and psychologically – emotional territories within which people are born, encultured, marry and establish families, and perform the role of producers and consumers and finally elders and ancestors” (Davis and Bailey 1966 267). There is tension between those who see geographically bounded communities of place like Sharp et al. (2000 25) and those who emphasise more dispersed communities of interest or occupation, or who see the concept as an integrated whole where “a community could be understood in entirely non-spatially specific terms, such as a physiological state of ‘togetherness’ or identification. Therefore members of the ‘community’ could be widely geographically dispersed” (Brookfield, et al. 2005 57).

¹¹ In order to fish, the fisherman must have Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) to cover all the species caught. ACE is derived from quota. If the fisherman does not own quota he must buy ACE, colloquially this is referred to as ‘leasing’. For technical details see: <http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/ace/> (Accessed 11 July 2006).

This perspective supports Johnson's premise (1996) that "community is not a fixed entity. It reflects and is composed of its context: social, cultural, political, and economic. ... community is socially constructed: that which humans identify as community is not a fixed universal. By the same token, the social representation that is community changes because its core is never completely unambiguous. In some situations the ties that bind cannot even be articulated" (Johnson 1996 http://www.uoguelph.ca/~rsphd/qualifying_exams/djohnson.htm. (Accessed 5 August 2003)). Thus within a community of place there may be a myriad of other communities: of interest, of occupation, of status, overlapping with blurred indeterminate boundaries. Just which are pertinent depends on the context of enquiry.

The focus here is on the emotional and the expressive, consequently community means people who interact and relate to each other, people involved in gender roles and relationships of power (politics) - in individual, group, organisational and institutional power - people who have a 'sense of place' and shared identity. This includes people who self identify as belonging to certain communities or who are identifiable by someone else based on their expressions. The communities here are not clearly bounded collectives, but in a state of flux as a result of external (for example, unsympathetic local governance, developers or a fluctuating housing market) and internal (for example, changing generational values) pressures and opportunities. Communities are taken as dynamic, not static, agglomerations. My concern is that while the core is easily self-identified and identified by others, certainty dissipates toward and beyond the periphery¹². One of my themes of concern is that neo-liberalism has increasingly individualised social relations, weakening the community bonding but community resistance may produce a countervailing trend¹³.

¹² Essentially this is the same definitional issue as "Who are the Maori?" The definition has become those with any or all of certain genetic inheritance, social or cultural identity, particular tribal or land affiliations with or without self-identity as such.

¹³ On Waiheke Island, for example, the efforts to counter the Proposed District Plan (e.g. *Gulf News* 8 May 2008 1, 11; Editorial: Who we want to be. *Gulf News* 20 August 2009 3), the granting of the contract for rubbish collection not to Cleanstream, the community-owned waste management trust operating a leading recycling scheme but to the Australian corporate TPI despite questionable economy, recycling and sustainability

Likewise, nationally, Kiwi heritage and culture stands in contradistinction to the trends of globalisation and the western world generally. Beliefs such as, that all New Zealanders own the fish, not just those who fish them commercially (e.g. Mills 1978 99), the values of self-sufficiency and sustainability, innovation, DIY (“do it yourself”), “man alone” (Mulgan, 1949), and the quiriness of popular culture (See Wolf and Barnett 2007) contribute to the distinctiveness of New Zealand communities.

Before the changes in fisheries management systems in the 1980s, New Zealand's coastal communities were more than ‘just’ where fishermen lived¹⁴. They provided the emotional and social support of and for their families, their crew, and, generally, a large proportion of the equipment and skill required for provisioning, maintenance and repair. Communities were also a large part of their fishermen's market while fishermen provided fresh healthy basic food. The issue now is to what, if any, extent communities and community identity has changed in response to rights-based fishing.

The sense of community is one that can be ascribed by the observer and claimed by members. This enables and encompasses the self-expression, the interest, the ascribable, the geographical and the claimed. Thus the consequences and implications of the rights-based fisheries management can be seen in their multifarious forms, rather than constrained to possibly over-simplistic categories, abstract from the realities of those who live with and through them.

Corporates

The dominant commercial players in the fishing industry, particularly the larger vertically integrated companies, are referred to in this dissertation as ‘corporates’ including Leigh Fisheries, the only remaining fishing company in the three specific communities studied. Only one corporate, Sanford, is listed on the stock

(e.g. *Gulf News* 2 April 2009 1, 2 July 2009 1, 10, 9 July 2009 13) [another example of corporate takeover of community resources], or the governance proposals for the Auckland Super City (e.g. *Gulf News* 2 April 1).

¹⁴ Jentoft (2000) argues that there is an interrelationship between communities and the fisheries resource of mutual benefit. Likewise there is between fishermen and their communities.

exchange so the others are private companies. With the introduction of the quota management system, these companies gained considerable control of quota and thereby much greater access to fish (Stewart and Callagher 2002) and marketing (Coriolis 2005 25). The new system allowed companies to buy up or, in New Zealand parlance, ‘aggregate’ the quota. Since the QMS there has been considerable consolidation¹⁵ through take-overs and mergers. The industry is represented by the Seafood Industry Council Ltd. (SeaFIC), a company owned by about 2500 New Zealand seafood industry enterprises¹⁶.

Before the Quota Management System both Waiheke and Leigh had Co-operatives. After its introduction, however, Waiheke Fishing Co-op collapsed whereas Leigh Fisheries expanded.

Management (MAF / MFish)

Since the mid-nineteenth century New Zealand fisheries were managed by various committees and bureaux representing several government departments under a variety of Acts, until the Marine Department became responsible in the mid 1940s (Johnson and Haworth 2004 55 156 resp.). In the early 1970s, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) (Haworth 2008 125) was established and in 1995 the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) became a standalone entity¹⁷ with a brief “to ensure that fisheries are used in a sustainable way and that we (New Zealand) have a healthy aquatic ecosystem. That way, all New Zealanders can get the best value from this resource” (Mfish 2008¹⁸).

Both the corporates and MAF/MFish are part of the wider complex social system of the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery and are entangled within it, but fishermen and their communities are the prime focus of this dissertation. These ‘components’ are

¹⁵ For the situation before the QMS see Boyce et al. 1986 especially chapters 1-3.

¹⁶ See: <http://www.seafood.co.nz/sc-about> (accessed 12 November 2008).

¹⁷ See Rennie, 2002 and Johnston and Haworth, 2008 for a fuller description of the nature of the changes in administration of New Zealand’s fisheries over the latter half of the 20th century.

¹⁸ See: <http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/default.htm> (Accessed 18 July 2008).

driven to a greater or lesser extent by different ideologies shaping their objectives and orientations and therefore tend to have different perspectives

RIGHTS-BASED FISHERIES

The term 'rights-based fisheries management' came to my attention with the FishRights99 Conference in Fremantle, organised by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 1999 (See Shotton 2000; 2001). From an anthropological perspective, although in keeping with the concept of property rights, the term seemed a euphemism for the negation of traditional human and community rights explicit in the literature on common property (See for example, Ostrom 1990).

In this dissertation, 'rights-based' fisheries management stands for formal, de jure rights and is exemplified by New Zealand's QMS using Individual Transferable Quotas¹⁹. New Zealand's approach is used as a model and flagship in international forums for promoters of rights-based fishing (Hersoug 2002; Newell et al. 2005 437; Thompson 1992 25; SeaFIC n.d.).

However, as Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2004 1415), argue, it seems that: "the label 'rights-based approach' has become the latest designer item to be seen to be wearing," and it needs to be seen in a broader more diverse context of World Bank and other agencies' development practices. The introduction of rights-based fishing management could make way for particular industry sectors or communities to gain access to or dominance of a nation's fisheries to the detriment of the subsistence, artisan and small-scale fishermen who feed the bulk of the world's coastal populations.

In fisheries management, Iceland first introduced privatised fishing rights in the herring fishery and Canada used a similar approach in the form of Enterprise Allowances for its offshore fisheries. New Zealand, however, was the first country to make comprehensive use of ITQs in commercial fisheries with the introduction of the QMS on 1 October 1986.

¹⁹ ITQs, are defined on page 41.

Since then the 'missionaries' (Herzog 2002 62), primarily the New Zealand fisheries managers who had been responsible for introducing the QMS, have convinced other countries that ITQs offer the solution to the global fisheries crisis (FAO 2006 29). Since their introduction, proponents regard ITQs as *the* solution, often *the only* solution to the problems of fisheries (e.g. Davis, 1996, 97; Ostrom, 1999 493; Apostle, McCay and Mikalson, 2002, 11; Rees, 2004, 1; St Martin 2004 533; St. Martin 2007 528; Copes 1986; Mansfield 2004 32).

Some, though, who favour property rights approaches, do see their limitations (Mansfield 2004 32). Others are critical of the property rights approaches stemming from Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons', on both theoretical and practical grounds, (See, for instance, Palsson and Helgason 1996; Symes 1998 6; Brookfield et al. 2005). Brookfield et al. (p59), in particular, argue that if this policy [by implication policy rights] creates political constraints on fisheries-dependent communities then "certain features of fisheries management policies 'wittingly or unwittingly' buttress the competitive advantage of large-scale fishing enterprises operating on a full-time basis, over small-scale," often owner-operator operations. They claim that licensing and quota allocations often "discriminate against part-time and, therefore, small-scale fishing," and that "policies on fleet reduction, licences and quotas, have all, 'intentionally or otherwise, tended to favour the more specialised, large-scale and industrialised sectors of the fishing fleets at the expense of the small-scale inshore fleets'". Indeed, Symes (2001 3), has argued that EU regulators (in this case) have virtually written off the inshore sector. Only those fisheries-dependent communities capable of accommodating large vessels will succeed in attracting the custom of these 'corporate' fishers. Communities that rely upon smaller independent fishers may face a terminal decline (Brookfield et al. 2005 59).

Rights-based fishing has now been introduced in part or full in Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Namibia, the Netherlands, Mozambique, Greenland, Portugal, Mexico, and the United States while Peru, Argentina and Morocco were in the process of introducing them (Arnason, n.d.). Understanding the social consequences of rights-based fisheries management for fishermen and their communities is therefore overdue and is important for making informed decisions

on the utility, appropriateness of adopting and responding to using individualised property rights as the foundation for fisheries management.

The international literature on the social implications of ITQ is sparse and either speculative or presents relatively early information (e.g. Palsson and Petursdottir 1997, Jentoft 1993). Apostle et al.'s (2002) study is one of the few works by social scientists dealing with a mature ITQ fishery. The literature that has emerged suggests that the introduction of ITQ systems may lead to:

- quota aggregated to corporates (Stewart and Callagher, 2002)
- major reduction in the numbers of owner-operators (Stevens 1999a, 1999b)
- corporate ownership taking wealth out of the community (Yandle 2001 29)
- crew being disadvantaged (Yandle 2001 30)
- unemployment (Palsson and Petursdottir, 1997 53)
- exacerbated equity problems within the community (Helgason and Palsson, 1997, Apostle et al. 2002)
- changed fishing behaviour (Apostle et al. 2002 121; Boyd and Dewees 1992 187)
- changed and additional pressures on family relationships (Davis 1996 110)
- loss of fishermen from commercial fishing (Stevens 1999b; Holmes 1998) and
- loss of coastal fishing community authenticity (Jentoft, 1993).

Unfortunately, despite its flagship status, there has been relatively little social research on the impacts of ITQ on New Zealand fishermen or their communities and almost no peer reviewed literature on the social consequences of rights-based fishing in New Zealand. A substantive, empirically-based analysis of the social implications of this form of management in New Zealand will have significance for both New Zealand and the international community.

Indeed, with the notable exceptions of Dewees (e.g. 1989, 1998, 1997, 2007), Holmes (1988), Rennie and Holmes (1998), Knight (2007), Yandle and Dewees (2000) and more institutionally Harworth (2008) the literature on the New Zealand experience has barely touched on the impact on fishermen and communities from the introduction of ITQs.

However, the requisite reference indicators and regular measurements that would enable changes to be comprehensively assessed either did not exist then or are beyond the logistics of encompassing within a single doctorate dissertation. Although the QMS is an exemplar of neo-liberal theory its effects in a real world context where neo-liberalism has been adopted across the society cannot be evaluated because its impacts are intertwined with other aspects of societal change (See for example Symes 2000 3). The theoretical impacts of the QMS dominate the literature. However, during this research it emerged that the impacts of an earlier re-regulation of the industry, the removal of part-timers, may have had significant consequences, leaving an indelible imprint on the subsequent reforms, so that the apparent social changes actually reflect a combination of both policies. Accordingly, the approach adopted was to explore the discursive development of social changes in fisheries based on a diversity of available sources (as discussed in Chapter 3 Methodology).

DESCRIPTION OF QMS

There are many descriptions of the operation of the QMS system using ITQs (See, for example, Clark, et al. 1988b; Clark and Duncan 1986; Crothers 1988; Falloon 1993; Hersoug 2002; Sharp 1997; Shotton 1999 2001) and, despite the paucity of social research, it is perhaps the most described fisheries management system in the world (Hersoug 2002 53).

Rennie (pers com) explains: ITQ in New Zealand is a right to harvest a particular proportion of the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) of a particular species from a particular area (QMA). The actual amount that can be taken on an annual basis is referred to as the Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE). Thus the quota might not change, but if the TACC is changed, then the amount of the species able to be caught in the specific year also changes, but remains the same proportion of the TACC.

Put simply, quota applies to an amount of a particular species of fish that an individual may harvest from a particular Quota Management Area (QMA) (See Figures 4 & 5). The ITQ owned “has legal standing as a title in perpetuity and is divisible, transferable, leasable, and bankable. Commercial landings must be matched in direct one to one proportion with a holding of quota. Two quota

markets operate; ownership (perpetuity) and lease (annual) title" (Batstone and Sharp 2003 497).

The QMS was introduced 1 October 1986 for 26 species. By 1994 Annala (1996 44) noted 30 species in 179 different fishstocks and now there are 97 species in 629 stocks in the QMS (Walker²⁰ pers com., 14 October 2008).

Unlike fisheries management using input controls the QMS sets the output, the weight of fish caught. This is determined by fisheries scientists in consultation with industry scientists and representatives of other stakeholder groups²¹. After consultation with the stakeholders, the Minister of Fisheries sets a total allowable catch (TAC) which is then allocated to Maori and recreational fisheries with the remainder to the commercial fishery as the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) for each fish stock²² in each quota management area (QMA) (See Annala 1996 51 for the Stock Assessment process).

The TACC was then divided into quota²³. To fish commercially a fisherman required a fishing permit and a licensed fishing boat and individual transferable quota (ITQ) or ACE for each stock in each QMA likely to be caught. The initial allocation of quota was made on the basis of fishing history reduced where necessary by two tender rounds to buy back quota to match the sustainable TACC

²⁰ Scott Walker, Socio-economic analyst, Ministry of Fisheries.

²¹ In the mid 1990s there were a number of working groups some for one of the high value prime stocks (e.g. orange roughy or snapper), others for collections of stocks, (e.g. the inshore group or deepwater). Maori were entitled to attend, but did not for good reason. The fishing industry was represented by FIB and later SeaFIC scientific consultants with international consultants for the big stocks such as orange roughy and hoki. Recreational fishers were represented by the Recreational Fishing Council and conservationists by the Royal Forest and Bird Society (Barry Weeber) and me from Greenpeace. The working groups reported to an annual plenary which confirmed recommendations of the TACs, allocations and TACCs for the Minister.

²² A fish stock was believed to be the proportion of a given species that bred in a particular area. The 10 QHAs were amalgamated or divided into an area that contained one stock. See Figure 3 of NZ FMAs / QHAs and Figure12 snapper QHAs.

²³ See Fishserve (<http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/quota/index.aspx>) for the derivation of quota shares from TACC.

estimated by MAF scientists. An individual's quota could be owned or transferred, that is leased or sold, in whole or part. After 1996, to simplify the transfer process, Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) was derived annually from quota. Fishermen who didn't own quota for all the fish they intended catching had to buy or, in colloquial terms, 'lease' ACE for the shortfall. ACE-dependent fishermen are those who have to buy ACE for virtually all the fish they intend catching.

All fish caught have to be landed and, in the event a fisherman catches fish covered by the QMS for which he does not have quota, there are mechanisms to balance catch against quota such as: to 'lease' or purchase more ACE or Quota, using CAAQs and FAAQs (Catching or Fishing Against Another's Quota), Overs and Unders (an allowance to catch or carry-over to the next fishing year up to 10 percent of the next year's quota) and deemed values, the penalty set low enough to provide incentive to land the fish but high enough to prevent fishermen targeting that species (See: Sanchirico et al. 2005). This made quota balancing complex and after 1996 some of the provisions to balance ACE were changed and in 2001 a new system of catch balancing was introduced.

Fishermen had to land all the fish they caught to Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs). A wharf seller's license allowed direct sales to the public during the hours for which the fisherman was licensed. Sales were further restricted to no more than 10kg per person per day. Both the fishermen and the LFRs (independently) had to comply with a stringent²⁴ reporting regime thus generating the two 'paper trails' which were compared for monitoring and compliance purposes.

²⁴ I am sure that if the technology was available, every fish would have to be bar coded as it came out of the water.




Figure 4: New Zealand General Fishery Management Area (FMA's²⁵)
(Map reprinted courtesy Mfish: www.fish.govt.nz)

²⁵ FMA's are the basis of Quota Management Areas (QMA's).

THE HAURAKI GULF

This section is mainly concerned with the Hauraki Gulf fishery in the lead up to the introduction of ITQs. The three case study communities, Waiheke, Coromandel and Leigh are all in the Hauraki Gulf where traditionally snapper was the predominant commercial and recreational, target species.

The Hauraki Gulf (See Figure 2) is a semi-enclosed sea on the north east coast of New Zealand's North Island between the Coromandel Peninsula and the islands to the north. For administrative purposes the actual boundaries have been delineated in various ways at various times. In his history of the Gulf's predominant fishery, snapper, Larry Paul notes:

If its seaward limit is taken as the 100m contour line (the continental shelf edge is at 150m), the Hauraki Gulf covers about 9000km² (about 2700 square miles), of which about one-third comprises shallow harbours and bays less than 25m deep. For various reasons not all this area is productive fishing ground (Paul 1977 15).

In their 1972 review of New Zealand fisheries Watkinson and Smith state “the New Zealand snapper (*Chrysophrys auratus*) is the most important marine fish in New Zealand's commercial fisheries landings” and essentially the Hauraki Gulf, “covers the major snapper fishery, providing one-third to one-half of New Zealand's total landings” (Watkinson and Smith 1972 10). Snapper has remained both a primary target and valuable coastal species but its proportion of the total New Zealand catch has declined since the 1970s.

The major port for the fishing industry has been the Viaduct Basin in Auckland's Waitemata Harbour. Leigh should be added to Paul's designation of Thames and Coromandel as secondary ports (Paul 1977 15). Historically the bays and estuaries have also been bases for the fishermen from the numerous coastal towns and villages around the coasts of the Hauraki Gulf.

Hauraki Gulf Geomorphology

Harris (1993) provides a detailed description of the formation of the Gulf some 20 million years ago from the Waitemata inland sea. Volcanic activity, sediments from the land mass, emergence, distortions and sea level rise were all involved in producing the present physical and faunal characteristics. In addition the physical

setting of climate, sealevel, tidal regime, coastal currents and wind waves all influenced the fisheries in the present Hauraki Gulf (Harris 1993).

More poetically Mitcalfe describes the physical Gulf as “(a) sunken rift valley, with the scarp of the Moehau and Coromandel Ranges along the Eastern fault and the ... Ranges along the Western, the Gulf shallows imperceptibly into the Firth of Thames” and indicates its social significance; "Sea and land intertwined, a thousand miles of coastline, offering all that a people could desire, from sea to forest, from fishing camp to pa” (Mitcalfe 1980 8 10).

Snapper Biology

Biologically, snapper, the dominant commercial species in the Hauraki Gulf is scientifically named *Chrysophrys auratus*, belonging to the ubiquitous family Sparidae or Porgies (sea breams) and the Order of perch-like Perciformes (Froese and Pauly) but in New Zealand has been renamed *Pagrus auratus* (Froese and Pauly 2007; Annala et al 1999 408)

The Fishing Industry Board's Guide Book to New Zealand commercial fish species presents the “basic facts” on snapper as:

Snapper *Chrysophrys auratus* ... occurs around New Zealand and Australia with a very similar species in Japan. ... [It is the] [o]nly species of sea bream family found in New Zealand. Very important commercially. ... A moderate resource capable of an annual yield of about 8,000 tonnes. A very popular food fish. Flesh white, medium texture. Suitable for most cooking methods, including smoking. In season, October - December, has excellent roes; very suitable for smoking” (FIB 1990 107).

"Snapper are demersal fish found down to 200m but are most abundant in 15-60m. They are the dominant fish in northern inshore communities and occupy a wide range of habitats, including rock reefs, areas of sand and mud bottom. They are widely distributed in the warmer areas of NZ, being most abundant in the Hauraki Gulf. Snapper are serial spawners... over an extended season during spring and summer" (Annala et al. 1999). Figure 5 shows the Mfish division of snapper stocks into QMAs.

“Snapper is slow growing and long lived [r]ecruitment of young fish into the catch occurs at about age 4-6 years” (Paul and Elder 1979 77) and

varies with the average temperature and climatic conditions of the spawning season (November-December (Annala et al 1999 411-412)).

Paul and Elder refute Hauraki Gulf fishermen's belief that there is a resident population boosted by a migratory stock in the schooling season (Paul and Elder 1979 77).

During my Viaduct research (See Box 1) most fishermen believed they should not be allowed to fish during the snapper spawning season (school or schooling season) and used the analogy of a farmer culling his breeding stock. Scientists on the other hand indicated that climatic and ecosystem factors had more influence on size of the snapper stocks than fishing mortality (SeaFIC 1997 12). Some snapper could be caught year round but the big schools and catches would start at the entrance to the Gulf and then circulate through it. During the present research it became clear that environmental factors, particularly type of seabed and food type affected the appearance of snapper.

Greg Bishop, Leigh Fisheries CEO said,

The best caught and quality fish was out there in the (Gulf). Snapper is coloured and conditioned on its habitat. Fish caught right up north will be dark because they feed on kelp. Fish in Auckland will be what we call golden because they live around sand. Fish caught down in Thames will be a grayish colour because they live in either the mangroves and feed on crabs. (Greg Bishop pers. com. 8 February 2007).

History

Dr Larry Paul (1977)²⁶ reviewed the history of the fleet and landings of the commercial fishery for snapper in the Hauraki Gulf. Prior to colonisation, the fishery had provided important food supplies for Māori. Commercial fishing, “developed slowly in the late nineteenth century, the principal fishing methods for snapper being hand-lining, set netting, and beach seining from small sailing and rowing boats in the sheltered south-western Gulf close to Auckland” (Paul 1977 18).

Right at the end of the nineteenth century, the steam trawlers, the first of the ‘big boats’, entered the fishery and were almost immediately accused of overfishing the Gulf. Smaller commercial fishers and amateurs petitioned Parliament

²⁶ Snapper scientist, Fisheries Research Division (FRD), MAF.

and trawling was excluded from the Gulf until “in a new attempt to encourage trawling and strengthen the local industry the trawl limit was moved closer to shore in the Kawau Island and Colville Bay areas in 1907” (Paul 1977 19). For details of this small-boat / “big boat” conflict and Albert Sanford’s²⁷ efforts to dominate the domestic market see the Ayson Reports (1901, 1904), the Hefford Reports (1928 1929 1930) and Godfrey (1929)²⁸.

Danish seining was introduced in late 1923 as an alternative method for smaller uneconomic steam trawlers but just a year later the Firth of Thames was closed to Danish seining. Even so it was adopted quickly by many “oil engaged”10-12m launches and numbers increased to 30 by the end of the 1920s. Claims they were depleting snapper and flounder stock meant such seining was excluded from the Firth, and the inner and the central Gulf (Paul 1977 21).

The Depression, the Second World War, the opening of the Australian market, and the alleged disorganization and fragmentation of the fishing and fish-exporting industry meant that returns on fishing fluctuated through the years. With varying costs and changing economic factors, fishing methods also varied and Danish seiners converted to trawling. Landings fell to the low of 1942, peaked in 1946-47 then dropped again until 1953-56 before rising steadily until the 1970s (Paul 1977 20-32).

Management Before the QMS

Paul (1977) distinguished three periods in the development of regulations in the Gulf and noted two forms of restrictions, mesh sizes and closures of the inshore fishing areas: “A large portion of the harbours, bays, and trawlable in-shore grounds around northern New Zealand were closed to trawlers, either seasonally or permanently by 1971. Essentially the same grounds were also closed to Danish seiners, with complex seasonal variations for different sizes of vessel in Hauraki

²⁷ Founder of Sanford Ltd. now one of New Zealand’s largest companies (Titchener 1981).

²⁸ One of the surprises of my Viaduct research project was reading the Annual reports of the early Marine Department Fisheries Inspectors, Ayson and Hefford, outlining the same “Big Boat” small boat conflict that was then prevalent.

Gulf. Both forms of regulation are aimed at protecting snapper on known spawning and nursery grounds and at preventing serious competition between different groups of fishermen” (Paul 1977 34). See Figure 6 for exclusion zones as of 1982 and 1991.



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Figure 5: Snapper Quota Management Areas (QMAs)

(Source: Mfish, reprinted with permission. www.fish.govt.nz).

Rick Boyd, a Fisheries Management Division (FMD) scientist at MAF, Auckland, also refers to three phases in his review of resource management in the Hauraki

Gulf at the Fin Fish conference in 1983. The first was closed areas between 1902-1977, the second beginning in 1977 with the introduction of a catch quota, an upper limit on total catches and the third when the Gulf became a Controlled Fishery 1 March 1983 (See also Director-General, MAF, 29). Boyd noted that each new measure was met with opposition and debate giving an indication of social concern. Indeed he refers to the two aspects which seemed to dominate MAF policy during the time of my Viaduct research: concern for fishermen but also maintaining the existing pattern of exploitation with the mass fishing and power methods of trawling and seining despite the better returns and conservation especially of iki jimi long-lining (See: Duncan, L. 1983). Putting forward MAF's perspective Boyd stated "obviously the process of management requires difficult decisions, because the livelihood of individual fishermen is at stake. In the Hauraki Gulf, where there is a diversity of fishermen using different methods, there has been the additional problem of trying to ensure that management decisions do not unduly upset the allocation of the resource" (Boyd 1983 63).

Boyd argued that decisions had not been taken until they were unavoidable. The second phase, for example, "was the result of a failure by managers and the fishing industry to accept the difficult decision at that time -- that effort controls were needed" and, as the industry expanded following removal of controls in 1963, little thought given to "the time when our fisheries would be fully exploited, and a new forms of control would be needed" (Boyd 1983 63 64). Thus suggesting management was ad hoc for short-term benefits.

Howard presented the perspective of a small (family) fisherman when he noted that management in practice and on "paper" was different. His fishing had never been stopped because the quota had been reached. It had not been enforced and had done nothing to save the fish. In addition, he alleged, like fishermen reported in the *Gulf News*, "a significant proportion of the fleet disregarded the boundaries for types of fishing" (Boyd 1983 66). Donohue implied that "the concept of minimum sustainable whinge had applied" to which Boyd answered that "his philosophy was ... to make decisions and recommendations that upset people the least and still achieved sustainable catches or similar goals" (Boyd 1983 66).

Paul concludes that "[m]ost of the fluctuations in snapper landings are due to recorded changes in the industry" (Paul 1977 50), but there were two significant

events. The first of these in the 1950s could have been the result of environmental changes and the second event particularly in 1960, 1962 and 1968 “resulting from spawning seasons when the air temperatures were warmer than average”. Fluctuation in the catch and fishing effort was, he felt, inevitable but “a sudden and permanent decline in catches is ... unlikely” (Paul 1977 50).




Figure 6: Hauraki Gulf method exclusion zones (lines) 1981, 1992. (Source: Max Oulton)

Status of the Hauraki Gulf Fishery

The Director-General MAF reported in 1983 that "[t]he Hauraki Gulf is one of the most important inshore fisheries in New Zealand and had been the subject of management measures and controls over the last 60 years" (Director-General MAF 29). While Paul and Elder (1979 76) concur they argue "it had a long history of problems. Some but not all of these have resulted from overfishing".

In the early 1970s, the heyday of the Gulf fishery, Paul writes, "snapper contributed about one-third by weight of total wetfish landings: 277 397 cwt (14 092 tonnes) at a landed value of \$2 157 286. It has nearly always ranked first in marine fish landings. In 1971, 139 334 cwt (7078 tonnes), almost exactly half of the New Zealand snapper landings, was taken from the Hauraki Gulf and landed at Auckland, Thames and Coromandel. Boats from these ports, however, also worked fishing grounds beyond the Hauraki Gulf, and in 1971 they landed a total of 165 433 cwt (8405 tonnes) of snapper from the Gulf and other grounds" (Paul 1977 11).

By the end of the decade (1970s), though, the issue was: "how to reduce fishing effort to that which will allow the stock to recover to a level capable of sustaining the allowed quota. It is a socio-economic problem. ... too many fishermen for the available fish and a conflict between methods" (Paul and Elder 1979 76). The Hauraki Gulf Advisory Committee had been set up and the Fisheries Management Division of MAF was "preparing a paper ... which set out the pros and cons of declaring the Auckland snapper fishery and its associated fisheries, fully controlled (Paul and Elder 1979 77).

Certainly management in the Gulf was complex and particular choices, of where, for example to draw the lines, were driven by the "political and social pressure put on the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries by various interest groups" (Elder and Taylor 79), such as those for commercial fishermen using the different methods (primarily pair trawling, single trawling, Danish seining, long-lining, set netting) or amateur fishermen.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

To clarify; this dissertation attempts a multilevel (large scale to small scale), interdisciplinary (anthropological, sociological and geographic), symbolic

(ideology, identity) versus power relations (politics) using a mosaic of data sources but the difficulties of presentation have been compounded by the linear nature of theses.

To reiterate, three disciplines, biology, economics and social science are associated with fisheries management. In New Zealand the first two get significant attention so are not detailed here so focus is on the third which has been generally neglected. This dissertation, therefore, attempts to redress the balance from the ideologies (perspectives) of four components, MAF / MFish the administration, the corporates, certain Hauraki Gulf fishermen and their communities before, during the transition and after the introduction of the QMS. The dissertation concentrates particularly on the fishermen who are embedded in their families and, to an extent relate to the communities through them.

This Introduction has outlined the issue and approach taken by the research to this mosaic of data, ideologies and components, to fishermen's ethos and their communities' identity before and after the QMS raising issues relating to the social implications of this policy. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical approach of the research arguing that ideology shapes perspective and behaviour at both the large scale and the small, and is experienced as ethos and expressed as identity. The globally dominant ideology, neo-liberalism, under which rights-based fishing as implemented by the Quota Management System using Individual Transferable Quotas was introduced, is examined. Chapter 2 also encompasses a general literature review and a more specific account of fisheries and the QMS/ITQs in New Zealand. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in this research for studying the Hauraki Gulf fishermen and their communities. Chapter 4 discusses background issues providing a critique of the usual explanation for the need to restructure New Zealand's coastal fishery. It contends that the introduction of the 'big boats' and Rural Bank loans under the 'Think Big' policy were responsible for the crisis and contrasts this attitude with MAF's perspective toward the exclusion of part-time fishermen and rural communities. Data from the submissions to the Waitangi Tribunal hearing at Te Hapua are used here since I was unable to find and interview local part-time fishermen²⁹. Chapters 5, 6, and 7,

²⁹ The last, indeed only Waiheke part-time fisherman I could find (See background photo Figure 24) died several years previously.

present empirical material to show the distinctiveness of commercial fishing for the period before the QMS, the transition period when QMS was implemented, and the contemporary situation, respectively. They draw primarily on my experience on Waiheke with supplementary material from Coromandel and Leigh to show the experience of Hauraki Gulf fishermen and communities more comprehensively under the QMS. Chapter 8 discusses the findings and draws conclusions on the social implications of rights-based fisheries management in New Zealand.

Chapter 2: Community Ichthyology: The Science of Community Fish

“Don't say in the years to come you would have lived your life differently

if only you'd heard this story - you've heard it now” King 2003.

"Seafood is among the most traded food commodity world wide" Børresen, 2006
1.

This dissertation contends that ideology, in this case rights-based or neo-liberal, shapes social perception and awareness of the larger environment and impels regular activity within it. Thus the manner in which fisheries managers perceive and utilize the ecosystem, its resources and features is shaped by ideology. Therefore the crux of assessing the social implications of rights-based fisheries management in New Zealand involves determining the changes, particularly for fishermen and their communities, from the introduction of the neo-liberal rights-based ideology (Rogernomics) to fisheries management.

This chapter will outline the nature of ideology and, how it is experienced by fishermen as ethos and expressed as identity by their communities. It will delineate the major features of neo-liberalism, the globally dominant political-economic ideology, and its expression in the fishing industry in general. This theoretical framework will enable analysis of the empirical data set out in subsequent chapters (5, 6, 7) that will expand on the social implications of the local rights-based manifestation of neo-liberalisation in the QMS. The dissertation is concerned with the social implications brought about by the change to neo-liberalism so this ideology, its effects for the fishing industry and the four components , the corporates, fisheries management, fishermen and their communities will be discussed before reviewing the literature on social aspects of New Zealand fisheries and the QMS.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Fisheries occur as complex interactions between marine ecosystems and social systems³⁰. When a fisheries management system is changed, ideally attention is given to three disciplines: biology/ecology to look after the fish stocks, economics to facilitate the industry and social science to ensure the well-being of fishermen and their communities (Gilden 1999; Degnbol et al. 2006, Jentoft 2006 673,674).

The ecosystem, its utilization and activities are perceived through the “rules”, the belief in how things are as shaped by the ideology. For fishermen this will be the “laws of nature” of the marine ecosystem and their species (snapper) as experienced first hand and filtered by the discipline of biology, the legal regime and its regulations promulgated by MAF/Mfish, the market and its economics as expressed by primarily the corporates and the more local social influences of their families, friends and community. Empirical data will therefore be analysed by delineating fishermen’s ethos from the ways they experience these “rules”, the identity as expressed by the community and the implications of changes following the introduction of the neo-liberalism and rights-based QMS.

IDEOLOGY

Ideology is a key social attribute that shapes the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of individuals and groups, organisations and institutions. Ideologies may be chaotic, fragmentary and contradictory, and expressed in beliefs and values³¹ (See: van Ginkel 1999 22). The notion of ideology as belief system or worldview (Olsen et al. 1992) has been grounded by Gramsci's analysis of ideology and the politics of hegemony (Simon 1991) and has been developed by more recent writers and critics (e.g. Howarth 2000; Finlayson et al. 2005; Gill 2003). Significant among these have been Clegg's (1979; 1989) analyses of the

³⁰ See Barrett (2001 7, 8) for discussion of this relationship but more specifically applied to terrestrial ecosystems.

³¹ I have been strongly influenced by the assumption that there is some truth in the claim in the film “What the Bleep...” that our eyes take in some 5000 bits of information per second but our brains are aware of only about 2000. The filtered involved is, I contend, indicative of the cogency of ideology.

development of power and the more coherent and contemporary perspective of theorists such as Dubbink (2003) and van Dijk (1998).

Individuals, groups and organisations construct their notion of society, their places within it, and their interactions with, and behaviour toward, other groups through ideology. Thus the nature of governance, compliance and response are influenced by ideology. Individuals and social systems are driven by ideologies (van Ginkel 1999 22). An ideology is important, therefore, because it

provides people with rules of practical conduct and moral behaviour, and is equivalent to a religion understood in the secular sense of a unity of faith between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct (Simon 1991 59).

These are not abstract concepts, but “are very specific basic frameworks of social cognition, with specific internal structures, and specific cognitive and social functions” (van Dijk nd 4). The ideology of being an individual (e.g. fisherman) influences the group (fishermen, community) and shapes, even controls their shared evaluations and distinctive group opinions as well as the individual’s attitudes, knowledge and self-expression. Hence, for example, New Zealand fishermen may share a similar attitude toward the regulators of the fishery, MAF/MFish, or may share a consensus as to the state of their fishery. While their individual models or mental representations of ‘reality’ “are unique and personal and controlled by the biographical experiences of social actors” (van Dijk nd 3) their ideology as a whole influences those of the group and community and are in turn shaped by the dominant ideology. Thus the influence of ideology is two-way: the ideologies of governments and institutions, the top levels, influence groups and industries and in turn communities, families and individuals. And vice versa, personal experience influences perception and this to a lesser extent, influences the ‘higher levels’. The extent to which a particular ideology can become hegemonic, permeating, dominating and becoming Gramsci’s (1971) ‘organising principle’ for every day life, the ‘common sense’ of a society, can determine the structuring of power in that society.

Ethos and Identity

The concept of ideology is, however, frequently conflated with either or both ethos and identity. Dictionary.com, for example, defining ethos refers to “the

underlying sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a group or society; dominant assumptions of a people or period” (Dictionary.com) or AlphaDictionary, “the characteristic set of beliefs and attitudes that guides the behaviour of individuals, groups, institutions, and nations”. Both these definitions are, for the present purpose, more in keeping with ideology. Closer to fisheries Zulaika, guided by Bateson, defines the pivotal concept of his work on the ethos of deep-sea fishermen, as "The expression of culturally standardised system of organization of the instincts and emotions of individuals” (Zulaika 1981 34). Again this definition may be confused with that of ideology.

Likewise there is confusion with the definition of identity; Castells, for example stressing the organisation of felt experience, notes “Identity is people's source of meaning and experience” (Castells 1997 6). MacInnes recognises both personal cognition and membership: Identity means “a personal sense of coherence over time” and “membership of a social category” (MacInnes 1994 533). He states further that “[u]nderstanding Identity starts out from the recognition that 'identity offers a way of thinking about the links between the personal and the social'. It is 'relational', about 'marking difference', 'locating and transgressing boundaries', it is fluid and historically specific, but '[u]ncertainty about identity may lead people to lay claim to essential truths in their search for security and stability” (MacInnes 2004 533). More actively as Jamieson et al. note, “fishing is an identity performed by doing” (Jamieson et al. 2009) or heuristically more useful for community members, Hazlehurst (1994) defines identity as

A description of an individual's organization of experience. ... individuals come to have a sense of who they are which is constructed through embodied experiences in real situations. These situations are themselves structured by the practices in which the individuals participate. Identity, in this sense, is about reflection upon—and action taken in accordance with—learned and perceived order in the world and one's place (both perceived and desired) in it. It entails construing past experiences and organizing ongoing behavior in order to evaluate—and demonstrate—who one is and where, in the world, one fits. (Hazlehurst1994).

While these definitions provide empirically recognizable signifiers they may again be confused with the concepts of ideology or ethos. For the present work, therefore, identity will be taken as the expression of ideology.

DOMINANT IDEOLOGY: NEO-LIBERAL

Since the 1970s, neo-liberalism has become the globally dominant ideology, implemented in New Zealand as Rogernomics and the ideological underpinning of the QMS. Harvey's (2005) *Brief History of Neoliberalism* attributes the re-establishing of the conditions for capital accumulation, to neo-liberalism and the restoration of the power of a narrowly defined capitalist class, resulting in a severe increase in social inequality (Harvey 2005 19 159).

Perspectives on neo-liberalism range from Shaik's (2004) supportive assessments, while others are more neutral and academic such as Sholt (2005) Who examines the sources and processes of neo-liberal globalization, or Dicken's analyses of global economic processes (Dicken 1997; Dicken et al 1997) or Whatmores studies of neo-liberalism's application to the agro-food business (Whatmore 1995; Whatmore and Thoren 1997; Phillips 2006) and, more specifically, Barret's (2001) investigation of the dialectic between globalization and communities. More polemical opponents of neo-liberalism and globalisation such as Bello (2001), Korten (e.g. 1995), Klein (1999; 2007), Kingsnorth (2003) and Napoleoni (2008) are yet more critical.

Privatisation, market forces and government deregulation

The key features in neo-liberalism are privatisation, market forces and government deregulation, contending that

[H]uman well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices (Harvey 2005 2).

The crux of neo-liberalism is that eventually the sum total of all individual economic choices, the 'invisible hand', will reward those who focus on the market to the greater or lesser exclusion of social life and the community, with economic rationality for higher profits and penalises those who don't. "The effect of this selection process on the economy is an increase in productive efficiency and a corresponding increase in gross economic rents" (Helgason and Palsson 1997 460).

As Ben-Yami (2003) suggests, the “implied outcome of such ‘free play’ is that any financial profit derived from a common, fully, partly, or quasi-privatized resource, would somehow trickle down and redistribute itself all over the society”. Thus “the messy political environment can be avoided and all distribution questions solved by market forces as soon as the private rights to fish become a commodity” (Wiber 2000 272).

While the state has the role of establishing and guaranteeing the necessary institutions, the monetary system, security of property rights and markets, neo-liberalism requires that it also minimise its interference in the market. Proponents of neo-liberalism claim that private enterprise is more efficient than the bureaucratization of the public service and therefore delivers goods and services at lower cost to the public. Thus if the state withdraws or the public service is deregulated better use is made of resources and all members of society benefit. Some, though, regard neo-liberalism as economist-driven “tunnel vision” (Degnbol et al. 541 2006), and claim its proponents “garner their power and popularity via the elimination of any alternative” (St Martin 2007 528). In addition there is a discrepancy between the theory and practice and benefits are skewed (e.g. Mansfield 2004b 565; Harvey 2005 19; Monbiot 2007).

Consequences of Neo-liberalism

For companies, profit maximisation generally means increasing profits by lowering costs and increasing efficiency and productivity. Consequently if profit can be made then whatever is necessary to achieve it is applied. For example:

Economists refer to the externalization of costs as the tendency to make third parties bear the burden of negative outcomes and consequences of business decisions ... Hence capital's ability to make communities bear the burden of the costs of its operations (Barrett 2001 12 fniii3).

The role of the state therefore includes the removal of hidden community subsidies and ensuring that companies bear the full cost of their activities; that they internalise their externalities. The market will then ensure more efficient allocation and use of those resources. To a significant degree this means that formerly ‘free’ goods (e.g. water, fish) must be brought within the market economy, and commodified (Harvey 2005, Agrawal and Gibson 1999), a concept

which Mansfield (2004) terms enclosure by privatising environmental services and goods.

Accompanying the increased scale of companies and the push for liberalisation has been a move to corporatisation that “entails separation of management from the owners while transforming an entity into a body with limited liability having perpetual succession”. It allows “significant benefits to the entity as well as to the economy as a whole. Primarily, it extends the rights, duties and privileges of a natural person to a legal entity”. Essentially corporatisation provides a structure for financial dealings and operating in the market. Thus, it has been argued that corporatisation “is quintessential for economic progress” (Hassan 2003).

Companies therefore diversify the supply chain and maximise profits from the increased prices offered by improved access to international markets. The multinational agro-food industry, for example, has increasingly gained control of the harvesting, processing, distribution and marketing of world's food supply including fish products. This has led to conflict between the corporates, traditional fishermen and fishing communities.

Brookfield et al (2005 58) argue:

Corporatisation is turning a once strong link between a fisheries-dependent community and the local fishing fleet into a more diluted one. Within North Shields, for example, only 10 per cent of the total catch landed at the port is attributable to the local fleet. The community's real link seems to be with the whole fish catching sector rather than with the local fleet in particular. In the future, given the fishing industry's growing spatial detachment, fisheries dependent-communities will have to become engaged in a process of inter-community competition if they are to attract visiting vessels to land their catches and sell their fish in the local fish market.

This tension is further explained by Copes (1999 99):

Since the beginning of civilization fisherfolk of coastal communities have commonly laid claim to adjacent coastal fish stocks. ... Their perceived rights to these resources are justified by the sustained use they have made of them. At the same time, deepening economic dependence of coastal people on their fishery resources has intensified their need to maintain and defend these rights, which are now being challenged in many parts of the world by a combination of two developments. One is the growth in power and ambition of industrial corporations in the fisheries sector. Necessarily, these corporations have dominated offshore and distant water fishing operations - drawing on their ability to mobilize the required technology

and to finance the large scale of operations involved. However, in their drive for greater market share and enhanced security of raw material supplies, corporations increasingly are seeking to extend their dominance also over resource-rich coastal fisheries.

The commodification and privatisation of natural resources (e.g. fish) is also one of the logical outcomes of a neo-liberal agenda (Harvey 2004 e.g. 160; 2003). In the process the value of these 'goods' is seen only in terms of their exchange value. With increased exchange opportunities and increased demand comes an increased need for standardisation of products (Stutz 2004), thus reducing the individuality of mass commodities. Whether demand or processors has driven standardisation remains a subject of debate (cf for instance, Stutz 2004; Jaffe and Gertler 2006). Consequently, "the globalized fisheries commodity market has replaced the give and take reciprocity of the informal community economy" (Appadurai 1986 12-13 in Anderson 1979 14).

Following Appadurai, Bestor notes that from a structural view the complex network of commodity chains forms a world trade in seafood products (Bestor 2002 80). Fish, however, have had more than just economic significance for society and communities.

For the purposes of this dissertation neo-liberalism is regarded as an ideology and globalisation as the outcome. Globalization refers to the global economic transformation through the interaction of trans-national corporations (Dicken 1997 xiv) and states on the basis of market forces for profit without, I believe, apparent concern for communities or the environment. Globalisation is closely supported by increased and unrestricted financial flows maximising differential advantages ostensibly for the "greatest good for the greatest number" (Dicken 1997 xiv; Gudeman 2001 22)³².

Some (e.g. Dicken, Peck and Tickell 1997) suggest the terms neo-liberalism and globalization are interchangeable and conclude: "Corporations are free to act solely on the basis of profitability without regard to national or legal consequences. Relationships, both individual and corporate, are defined entirely

³² While concern for neo-liberalism and globalization in this dissertation tends to be on the economic such features as the Internet and communication must be acknowledged.

by the market. There are no loyalties to place and community" (Dicken, Peck and Tickel 1997 160).

Within the globalisation literature, the agri-food industry is seen as a major sector. Most of the literature on the agro-food industry is concerned with agriculture and terrestrial food products but just as the industry has shifted from the numerical domination of family farms to agri-business enterprises, so too have the processes of catching fish, processing, distributing and marketing seafood followed similar trends under neo-liberalism. The corporatization of fisheries is just one segment of the corporate control of food in the sense of control of access to the raw material or, especially with respect to aquaculture, also the control of production, commoditization, distribution and marketing.

Similarly, as a result of the corporate control of the distribution of seafood, there has been considerable reduction in the availability of fresh, especially locally caught fish, and greatly reduced ability of consumers to clean fillet and cook it, a deskilling of the population. Arguably this is a consequence of processing efficiency rather than consumer demand (Jaffe and Gertler 2006).

NEO-LIBERALISM IN FISHERIES

Traditionally fisheries were exploited according to rules and practices that were appropriate locally and culturally for the fishermen concerned. Refuting claims that rights-based methods such as ITQs are the only means of ensuring sustainable fisheries (St Martin 2006 182), social scientists and maritime anthropologists in particular have been at pains to show that there are many indigenous and traditional forms of both formal and informal fisheries management that have maintained sustainable fish stocks. These tend to be relatively localised and may be based on extended families, clans, tribes and/or communities. They indicate a wide variety of circumstances and mechanisms, often based on kinship or status considerations with fishing grounds owned, named and marked in various ways (See for example Cordell 1990; Johannes and MacFarlane 1991; Ruddle 1994; Bavinck 2001 112; or in more familiar Western fisheries: Andersen 1979, St Martin 2001). In such fisheries the problems such as open access, over capitalisation which neoliberalism addresses have arisen as a result of

development or as a consequence of encroaching industrialised or developing fisheries.

Implications of Neoliberalism (& ITQs) for the components

Increasingly as neo-liberalism has become the dominant ideology, its effects are being felt off shore. The introduction of market forces, property rights and state withdrawal from fisheries has had different implications and has been differently implemented by the four components of particular relevance for this dissertation.

Fisheries Management

Mansfield (2006 29) argues that the confluence of features of fisheries, particularly “open access, intractable problems, and ineffective regulation” has provided the basis for property rights to be presented as the solution by neo-liberals. Accounts of the introduction of neo-liberal approaches to fisheries, in particular property rights, typically note, “[e]verybody's property is nobody's property” (Gordon 1954 135). Scott's argument is that “the solution to the commons problem is "sole ownership" of fisheries (Scott, 1955)”, reflecting Hardin's mantra of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968) (Mansfield 2004 315). In refutation, Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop assert “Hardin conflates "common property with everybody's property. Rather, common property should be seen as 'property in common'” (Jentoft 2004 97 98) as opposed to there being no property rights at all.

To counter the growing hegemony of property rights proponents, common property researchers demonstrated that traditional and indigenous fisheries were generally well managed and, at least until the intrusion of offshore corporate fishing, distant-water fishing vessels or government development, were not open access (e.g. Ostrom (1999) or more comprehensively the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IACS n.d.).

Impacts of Property-rights-based: ITQs

Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), are the right to take a certain quantity of a certain species of fish from a certain area. Ownership of ITQs is not ownership of the fish, before they are caught, but the ownership (the privatisation), of the catching rights. As such they are a form of property rights developed from, and are an expression of, neo-liberal ideology. More related to the perspectives of

corporates than to those of communities, the reported and theoretical impacts of implementation are:

highly dependent on gross simplifications... impose a variety of costs on society ... [create] social inequalities...between large and small operators, between licence holders and crew, and between generations of fishermen ... tend to become geographically concentrated, removing a key condition for the survival of many coastal communities. ... [create] a 'new fisherman', less rooted in community, and a community where social relations are structured according to the principles of the market and not those of civil society (Jentoft 2004 99).

And further

Inequity and socially perverse distributional effects ...simplistically presented.... risk to employment and living standards in the fishing dependent regions lead to job losses, changing social relations of production and changing social structures within the community To sell the fishing vessel and its quota is to deprive future generations of their economic, social and cultural patrimony (Symes 1998 6).

Brookfield et al. (2005 59) have also found that privileging corporate enterprise over small-scale and part-time fishermen meant less inshore investment and resulted in the "gradual erosion of the economic vitality of many Scottish coastal and rural communities with a dependence upon the fishing sector". Neo-liberalism through the introduction of [property] rights-based fishing [ITQs] has also changed the ethos and attitude of fishermen. Fishermen who were once cooperative are now competitive and seen as capitalists (St Martin 2007).

Corporates

ITQs derive from the neo-liberal economic theory that also drives corporatization. They are therefore grist to the mill of corporate lawyers and accountants, especially, by comparison with the fishermen, many of whom struggled with paper work and just wanted to fish.

Under neo-liberalism corporates focus on competitive profitability, "growth dynamic: revenue-seeking strategies and ... cost-driven strategies" (Barrett 2001 6) while smaller fishermen's attentions tend to be on fish as elusive quarry. Their communities dealt with the day-to-day exigencies of existence. In a transition to a new neo-liberal ideology favouring privatisation and market-forces, the big companies, already vertically integrated, corporatised and market-oriented, were

poised to compete in the quota market and an increasingly neo-liberally globalised arena.

Researchers (e.g. Belgrave et al 2000 8; Mansfield 2001; Rees 2004; Rees 2008 172; Townsend 1998 205; Winder 1997) confirm that the larger, especially vertically integrated corporations have financial and marketing advantage and are generally in a better position than fishermen or communities to understand the implications, take up and control the property rights involved. They have more flexible structures and processes than government and greater access to capital (human and financial) than local communities.³³ By being driven to maximize profit, fisheries corporates are typically involved in international markets and thus have closer relationships than fishermen or their communities with the agri-food industry (See e.g. van Vleit 2000). Their size and professional staff often means corporates are better able than fishermen or communities to access and lobby higher levels of fisheries policy and management agencies and to leverage finance to achieve their desired outcomes.

Rights-based fishing has allowed quota to be bought, from skippers and fishermen by outsiders, or aggregated in corporates or enabled passing “control over all aspects of the fishing enterprise to land-based 'speculators' and 'profiteers'. Thus, the resistance of the former may partly be viewed as a reaction to the symbolic and financial devaluation of their labour and a diminished sense of agency” (Helgason and Palsson 1997 467). Often quota owners have no loyalty to the community and its resource base so that they may withdraw fishery assets such as boats or processing plants from the community. Consequently community security, indeed, viability, may be seriously eroded.

Fishermen

Commercial fishing is more than the knowledge and skill required to hunt and harvest a mobile quarry in the marine ecosystem; obtaining and utilising neo-liberal ITQs necessitates a certain business acumen which in turn changes the regime from an artisanal vocation to a more structured and professionalised career.

³³ See Battett (2001) for a comparison of community and capital's role in market competition, restructuring, attitude [corporate] and mileux.

Since economic rights are critical in a neo-liberal system, following Deetz (1994), it would be expected that ideological change in fishermen's work would occur to express new economic and employment arrangements. The fishing ethos would change from a dominant freedom, hunting 'out there', to a more structured and accountable, supplying seafood commodity to meet corporate interests. Quota allocation would shift from the fisherman and crew with best fishing expertise, to those acquiring most quota through the market.

Where initial allocation of quota went to the fishermen with biggest catch history, subsequent commercial activity in the quota market would alter that significantly. Consequently the competitive basis of relations between boats would also change from fishing skill to commercial skill and show notably between quota owners and those who are ACE-dependent. This would reinforce skipper / crew hierarchies and shift emphasis from a primary focus on fishing skills to quota acquisition ability in a more dominantly commercial market.

Two of the many typologies of fishermen in the literature, particularly representative of the changed regime and related to the implications of neo-liberalism, indeed mark the "polar extremes" of a continuum of fishermen types. Part-time (or pluri-active) rural community fishermen or rugged individualist owner-operators epitomise community fisheries while corporatized utilitarian, rights-based fishermen represent the neo-liberal order.

Part-time or Pluri-active

In many rural coastal areas, inshore fishing may seasonally provide an essential economic component making up the shortfall from farming or other rural activities. Such part-time or pluri-active fisheries may be part of a wider household economy (Johnson et al. 2005 85) and provide a buffer economy available to augment the lows in other regional economic sectors for the benefit of coastal economies (Symes 2001 7). They may be flexibly exploring new methods or products, opening market niches and supplying local markets (Symes 2001 7 8).

Rugged Individualists or Utilitarians

Frequently researchers have noted that fisheries globalisation has changed fishermen from being rugged individualists operating flexibly in a traditional, family or community setting to more utilitarian, self-interested business oriented

maximisers (See e.g. Davis 1991 13; Jentoft and Davis 1993 1; St Martin 2006 172; 2007 542; Stella 1996 191).

Johnson et al. (2005 73) are critical of classifications such as small-scale versus industrial and argue that three characteristics, “the social organisation of production, the technological intensity of fishing, and the closely related attributes of space and time”, provide scales that take more appropriate account of differences in fisheries than mere dichotomies. While small-scale fisheries may be increasing their technology and integrating with global markets, researchers suggest they still retain resilience, adaptability, and continued distinctiveness from the industrial sector so given their continued “non-capitalist relations of production” they would be better termed semi-industrial (Johnson et al. 2005 75).

Recent research shows that for fishermen, leasing quota has more severe consequences on incentives than previously considered. Pinkerton and Edwards (2009) seminal paper notes that the fishermen who lease quota, [in New Zealand ACE-dependent fishermen] do not have the alleged conservation incentives. Rather the incentives for conservation, increased efficiency and economic security apply only to quota owning fishermen. Indeed, lessees are squeezed “between what [they] must pay to lease the quota and what [they are] paid for [their] catch. Therefore, the assumption that ‘the market value of the ITQs reflects the market’s perception of the net present value of the future stream of net economic returns from the fishery’ applies only to the value of the fishery to quota owners and not to vessel operators who lease quota” and confirm the marginality of lessee, [or ACE-dependent], fishermen (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009 2). While written for New England the principles, if not the details, apply to the QMS.

Communities

Neoliberal implications vary since “[c]ommunities should not be treated as unchangeable. Communities are maintained, constructed and changed as part of continuous processes of social change. At present globalisation interferes with local development through worldwide processes of integration” (Floysand and Lindkvist 2000 2).

By contrast:

The ideal of community as a pure copresence of subjects to one another receives political expression in a vision of political life that privileges local face-to-face direct democracy. Critics of welfare capitalist society repeatedly invoke such a model of small group relations as a political ideal. The anarchist tradition expresses these values most systematically, but they retain their form in other political soils as well. This model of [community] politics as founded in face-to-face relations poses as the alternative to the impersonality, alienation, commodification, and bureaucratization of governance in existing mass societies (Young 1990 232).

In many cases, as corporates increasingly exploited coastal and even inshore fisheries neo-liberalism meant that fishing communities previously dependent on these commercial fisheries were progressively excluded and had to find or increase other economic enterprises such as charter fishing and the visitor industry. So where before the community members took themselves and community for granted now they had to self-consciously seek 'identity' or brand the community, like Akaroa's³⁴ emphasis on French historicism, to attract outside clients (See Lien 2003 111).

Under conditions of capital-intensive accumulation, followed by increased top-down regulation of the fishing industry in the 1970s and 1980s, van Vliet noted that:

European fishermen have become deskilled.... Lack of future prospects fostered an atmosphere of frustration, despair and alienation in what was an increasingly marginalised sector. Certainly in those regions where fishing is a cornerstone of the economy and a determinant of its cultural identity, the danger from the current development is a vicious circle in which the economic basis for communities and regions is placed in doubt, the people dependent on fishing see no future in the industry and investments to secure a future do not take place (van Vliet 2000 161).

Thus communities once unselfconsciously active in the fisheries for a significant proportion of their socio-economic wellbeing now have to overcome frustrations and despair and attract alternative sources of income. Small-scale coastal fleets are downsizing and corporates have much of the quota but many are not running

³⁴

A harbour community on Bank's Peninsular in the South Island.

rurally based fleets so rural maritime jobs are decreasing³⁵. Where alternative resources such as forestry or farming are not available, or under pressure, increasing involvement in tourism may be a solution. For those who had been involved in fisheries, marine tourism such as chartering or seafood tourism offer basic possibilities. Since tourists and clients must be attracted, community identity becomes an issue as rival towns brand themselves to gain necessary market share. Where communities lose access to the fishery, the fishermen, as accountable economic actors, become displaced from the give and take of reciprocity within their community (See St. Martin 2006).

Dependent Fishing Communities

Copes (1997b) observes that the traditional rights of coastal communities to the fisheries in adjacent waters were established through propinquity and usufruct which in turn increased economic dependence on coastal stocks and the need to maintain and defend their rights. Social scientists are very aware that access to fisheries is important for social justice and equity of community members, (See for example, Davis 1996; Davis and Bailey 1996; Copes 1997). They also know of the diversity of social organisation, structure and relationships both among and within communities and while economists and ITQ proponents may not “deny the existence of social relations ... per se, they minimize the role of such factors in economic affairs by assigning them to the category of 'externalities' - mere economic noise” (Helgason and Palsson 1997 460).

The extent to which communities are or have been economically and social dependent on the fisheries has been debated, especially for the US fisheries where as Jodice and Norman (n.d. 2) note, “The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) defines ‘fishing community’ as a community that is “substantially dependent on or substantially engaged in the harvest or processing of fishery resources to meet social and economic needs, and includes fishing vessel owners, operators, and crew and United States fish processors that are based in such community’ (MSFCMA 16 U.S.C. 1802 §3(17))”.

³⁵ Fishing boats still need to be repaired and maintained and this could occur wherever they are based but, as will be shown, the fleet is declining and decaying as many fishermen become more marginalised.

Van Vliet found that in previously dependent communities, when fishing becomes economically and socially marginalised, the people become alienated resulting in a vicious circle and those who were involved previously now see no future (van Vleit 2000 157). Communities have different histories, environments, and degrees and types of access to resources so differ in their dependence on the fisheries and their response to exclusion. Jodice and Norman (n.d.3) cite Brookfield et al's analysis of the concept of fisheries dependence in their comparison of four UK communities and found they now "existed on a continuum between 'real' and 'virtual' dependence, where the fishing industry is part of the waterfront destination to varying degrees". They note that the introduction of tourism may raise the issue of the authenticity of what is promoted (Jentoft 1993) and therefore the reality of the community identity (Brookfield et al 2005). This is in addition to the increased inter-community competition" (Brookfield et al. 2005 58).

Jodice and Norman indicate that the alternatives such as tourism can have detrimental effects on the community and the marine environment, such as competition for waterfront access and harbour congestion, but these might be mitigated by coastal tourism to enhance the economic sustainability of the local fishing industry (Jodice and Norman n.d. 2).

Social Implications

McCay and Jentoft reach the crux of this research focus on social implications of ITQs when they, quoting Polanyi and Habermas, argue that the market "penetrates and redefines social relations, which become basically instrumental and utilitarian. Social interaction is strategic and ego-centered. As community life evolves according to the logic of the market place, it assumes a character pointed out by Polanyi: 'Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system.' Thus Jurgen Habermas' (1984) argument that 'the daily lives of human beings are increasingly being dominated by money transactions and bureaucratic control'" (McCay and Jentoft 1998 26).

So the expressive aspects in fishermen's ethos, their identity, independence and freedom 'out there' contending with the big marine environment, hunting elusive prey becomes (closer to being) just instrumental operators, micro-managed at the

beginning of the commodity chain. As fish have become products for an international market, fishermen are no longer providing food for their communities and their livelihoods have become mere employment.

Thus the beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of people, communities and groups are strongly influenced by their ideologies. The dominant ideology in the global market is neo-liberalism and its variants, stressing privatisation, market forces and deregulation. In fisheries, emphasis on property rights has facilitated the access to fish by corporates - their commodification, processing and distribution in the international market. It has been suggested that fishermen become increasingly utilitarian maximisers in attitude and concomitantly, detached from meaningful interaction with their communities.

FISHERIES IN NEW ZEALAND

This section reviews the literature on New Zealand fisheries, first in terms of an overview then indicates social and the historical context prior to the introduction of the QMS, reviews the literature on fishing communities generally then more particularly in the Northland region before considering the literature on ITQs.

The social literature on fisheries is sparse and New Zealand is no exception. Until relatively recently there have not been good general overviews of New Zealand fisheries. Bulletins such as Slack (1969) or Watkinson and Smith (1972) provided an introduction by outlining the production and economics of each coastal fishery and the general structure of the industry overall. Boyce et al. (1986) outlined a geographical perspective on the industry as it was just before the introduction of ITQs. These studies, backed by the overview statistics such as those in the annual New Zealand Official Yearbooks (e.g. Department of Statistics 1979, 1985-86, 1987-88), amount to the only early, substantive, broad picture analyses.

For an outsider, appreciation of fisheries in New Zealand is scattered through an extensive literature. The dearth is now relieved by three recent publications.

Johnson and Haworth's (2004) *Hooked* giving an historical overview of the New Zealand Fishing industry, Hersoug's (2002) *Unfinished Business* evaluating the last 15 years of New Zealand fisheries management and Haworth's (2008) *Tides of Change*, outlining the history of the New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen.

Makarios (1996; 1997; 1999) presents episodes on fishermen, their families and communities, fishing vessels and companies, to provide snapshots of the history of New Zealand commercial fishing and show independent coastal fishers tend to be individualists at best. Paul Titchener (1981) provides a hagiography of the first hundred years of New Zealand's second largest and now only publicly listed company, Sanford Limited. Paul Powell (1976) captures the efforts and ethos of mainly rock lobster fishermen in Fiordland while Kirk Hargreaves (1998) presents portraits of some 20 of the most quirky coastal fishermen he has observed. Peter Stevens, more than any other author has outlined the contemporary (1999) ethos and issues for commercial fishing and fishermen of New Zealand's regional and secondary ports such as the Far North, Gisborne and Timaru (Stevens 1999c-i).

The only significant ethnographic research is that of Hal and Marlene Levine, reporting participant observation research into, mainly rock lobster, fishing on Stewart Island (Levine and Levine 1987). A smattering of novels provides some flavour, but it is difficult to identify where reality ends and fiction begins (e.g., Billington 2000; Hawes 2000; Hansen 1997).

New Zealand Fishing Communities

Traditionally communities had rights to coastal fisheries and consequently fisheries have influenced the social fabric of these communities. Communities have changed over time and in some communities the QMS has been one of the drivers of that change. This section indicates the situation in some rural coastal communities, explores the literature on New Zealand fishing communities in more detail and the social implications, ascribed to the QMS for fishermen and for their geographic communities, as a result of the introduction of rights-based management and particularly the aggregation of quota to the bigger companies.

Prior to the 1984 Labour government and the imposition of neo-liberalism, ideology in New Zealand was an uneven blend of colonialism and the welfare state epitomised by the interventionist stance of the Muldoon led National government (1975-1984). As Berg and Roche (1997 147) state, New Zealand was an "expansive welfare state and a heavily regulated export-orientated economy". Le Heron and Pawley (1996 2) termed the lead up period of the 1950s and '60s the "long-boom" – "usually characterised as one of relative social and economic

stability and optimism.... grounded within the myth of an egalitarian and harmonious society" which they iconised with the ubiquity of the Edmonds Cook Book.

For rural and coastal New Zealand, however, the period was not as universally benign. Parkes (1979 95), for instance, found that, most coastal communities (such as rural Hokianga, Rawene, Leigh and Omapere) were "poverty pockets" of people "who depend on shellfish, fish, wild pig and farm animals for their protein source supplemented from home gardens. ...Rural communities get by on incredibly small incomes. ...including family benefit³⁶. ... (T)hey managed by finding most of their own food and having rent-free shelter" (Parkes 1997 95). School fees and family exigencies meant a dependence on plural activities including part-time fishing and an informal economy of community exchange. Commercial fishing, fishing for sale and exchange in the community was therefore extremely important buffer against poverty in small rural coastal communities. Yet despite this importance under neoliberalism the interests of the corporates dominated.

Idealised perceptions of communities, such as the image of the community of rugged individualist fishermen, may mask injustice and inequity. In their ethnography of a Stewart Island fishing village the Levines found such a contradiction between community solidarity and competitive fishing that this seemed to be the case (Levine and Levine 1987). With the possible exception of Halfmoon Bay, Stewart Island (Levine and Levine 1987) few, if any, communities in New Zealand were totally dependent on fisheries. Fisheries did however contribute significantly to their community economy and in some cases continue to do so.

Generally traditional fishing rights have been seen as stretching back into distant history. Minnegal et al (2003), however, show that fisheries in Victoria have relatively shallow time depth. The fisheries of Māori Iwi considerably pre-date those of New Zealand Pakeha communities that, like those of Australia, are

³⁶ A social welfare payment for each child which in the 1970s could be 'capitalised' with the New Zealand Housing Corporation as the deposit on the first family home.

comparatively brief. Nevertheless, the importance of these community rights of access and usufruct before the introduction of ITQs, can be gleaned from spasmodic references in histories such as those by Makarios (Makarios 1996; Makarios 1997; Makarios 1999), Cormack and Orwin (1997) and Johnson and Haworth's (2004) more comprehensive history.

Fishermen in the communities on the New Zealand coast often came from different cultural backgrounds and, in different communities, used different methods, with different styles of vessels often more particularly suited to local waters, concentrating on different species (Johnson and Haworth 2004 163-171; Makarios 1996; 1997; 1999).

Māori fishing and communities have been well-documented elsewhere (e.g., Waitangi Tribunal reports. See Waitangi Tribunal Reports Wai 22; Wai 27). Pakeha-dominated identifiable communities in the literature include: Italians from Island Bay lining groper in Cook Strait, Dalmations on the Kaipara dory netting mullet in the inlets, and Waiheke fishermen using converted launches to longline snapper in the Hauraki Gulf. In addition to those built in New Zealand fishing boats sailed or were freighted from all round the world. Boats have been run solo, or with a skipper and a permanent or casual crew member(s), who may be self taught, apprenticed to kin or ticketed through the Ministry, the fisheries schools or the Polytechs. Overseas there may be considerable diversity in fisheries. Sharp indicates, for example, in one particular fishery, on just one boat there might be as many as “five distinctly different language-cultures” (Sharp, *Fishfolk*, 20 Jan 2005) or eight different ethnicities (Sharp, *Fishfolk*, 22 Mar 2002). So too in New Zealand there seems to have always been considerable diversity in the fisheries, the fishermen, the vessels, the methods and the communities involved with the New Zealand fishing industry.

Northland

Perhaps because Fairgray's (1985, 1986) survey of Northland provided the only baseline social information for the QMS much of the subsequent social research on New Zealand fisheries has been done has tended to be for this region.

In a research essay Hawkey (1994) appraised fishery culture and conflict for the Northland region, finding that many small communities are dependent on fishing

for revenue, as a major food source and that indeed fishing has strong multiplier effects (Hawkey 1994 21). He notes that despite the Quota Appeal Authority (See: Peter Stevens: QAA) increasing quota over and above the Total Allowable Commercial Catch TACC (Hawkey 1994 24), fishers had difficulties with quota that led to high grading and dumping, poaching and a black market and consequently increased enforcement (Hawkey 1994 25 26). He also found that commercial and recreational fishers reciprocated the views that the other was taking more fish than they were entitled to (Hawkey 1994 26). He attributed the difficulties to the attempt to meet the QMS goals of sustainability and efficiency simultaneously (Hawkey 1994 26). The social and economic consequences, were he felt, “probably more acute for Northland because ... fishing has historically been an important source of livelihood, employment and income in Northland. A factor that exacerbated the impact of the QMS implementation in Northland was the lack of alternative employment” (Hawkey 1994 27). Indeed, Hawkey feels that the “implementation of the QMS for Northland was nothing short of disaster” (Hawkey 1994 28). Hersoug (2002 57) acknowledges Hawkey’s perception but concurs more with the proponents’ perspective, noting that equity issues were strongly raised in the general ITQ literature but did not feature strongly in New Zealand (Hersoug 2002 58). He does, however, consider that the most important socio-economic effect has been the creation of employment (Hersoug 2002 58). It is not clear to me, though, whether this is the result of new opportunities in the deepwater and aquaculture replacing major losses in the coastal fisheries. Subsequently there seems to have been a shift of employment as processing went offshore firstly onto deepwater factory vessels the majority of which were foreign chartered with foreign crews and then for processing in foreign countries.

Nicola Holmes, picked the three most fishery dependent communities from Fairgray’s studies, Totara North, Houhora and Mangonui, for her research (Holmes 1998 4). She argued that essentially the privatisation of state assets (fisheries) would result in “extensive reconstruction of relationships between the economic, cultural and political factors...” (Holmes 1998 7). The most important factor she identified was changes in employment of both skippers and crew and she found that with loss of quota many small fishers lost their livelihood. Consequently she expected many of the small processing plants in rural communities would disappear (Holmes 1998).

Holmes (1998) also reports that wives of fishermen often took over the paperwork involved. That seems to be a typical pattern. Certainly the wife of the skipper whose boat I worked on in 1982 (and others I was familiar with) before ITQs were introduced, was both a partner in the firm and provided shore liaison. Holmes notes, however, that the increase in, and complexity of, paperwork, was such that it became too burdensome and many sold out for that reason.

Owner-operators used to pride themselves as hunters and frequently asserted, despite constrictions of weather, uncertainties of catch and often extreme work hours, that they preferred the “freedom” of being at sea to the restrictions of bills and expectations ashore (See, for example, Smith 1981). With ITQs, however, Yandle notes, “We're more efficient at running businesses - made us better businessmen, but less efficient fishermen (Yandle 2001 89 Auckland Survey #24).

As well as Yandle's informants who could cope better with paperwork and stayed in the industry, others found the new regime burdensome. In addition to the hassles with paperwork, independent fishermen also had to contend with cost recovery, and lighthouse and conservation levies. As one said in 1995, “There is not a big future for the small guy, with 60 percent of the fish going as taxes, lighthouse fees, MAF fees, you name it. And now DOC³⁷ ... comes in for a piece too. The guy that has got to lease snapper, he is not going to stay in” (Duncan L. 1995 17).

It seems that the change from “hunters” to “farmers” with the burden from increased costs and changing job descriptions resulted in more owner-operators selling their quota than might have been anticipated. Certainly Talley expressed surprise at the rapidity with which owner-operators exited:

I, like many others in the industry, never envisaged that fishermen would sell their quota-rights in the way they did immediately after the QMS was introduced and catch-history rights became tradable. This massive 'sell-down' of quota caught many operators by surprise and contributed to a major and rapid restructuring of the NZ industry (Talley 1999, 2).

Loss of quota by an owner-operator can mean his/her becoming ACE-dependent, or even loss of employment (Hawkey 1994).

³⁷ The Department of Conservation

MANAGEMENT

The major architects of the QMS system appeared to be theoreticians and proponents more concerned with implementing a “pure” system than ensuring social justice for fishermen and their communities (See for instance Clark and Duncan 1986). Surprisingly, later McClurg (1997 100) was to state, "I am not aware of any community impact studies carried out either prior to, or subsequent to, the establishment of the QMS. Rather than an oversight, I believe this reflected the youth of the New Zealand fishing industry and the fact that, by and large there were not long standing communities solely dependent on fishing for their existence". Boyd and Dewees (1992 195) went further claiming that, they are “not aware of any significant negative social and economic impacts on small fishery dependent communities as a consequence of ITQs”, but in the absence of official follow up admit this is conjecture.

Contrasting the rights-based QMS with the greater level of community consultation under the Resource Management Act (RMA), Rennie notes that the 1983 fisheries management plan (FMPs) provisions would have allowed public participation in fisheries management and potentially greater consideration of social implications. He suggests that once these were abandoned in favour of the QMS the public was progressively excluded from fishery decisions (Rennie and Holmes 1998; Rennie 1998). Subsequently, the 2005 amendments to the RMA advantaged quota holders significantly relative to the aquaculture industry but further reduced the ability of communities to determine the uses of local marine areas (Rennie 2006).

Introduction of ITQs

Hersoug, an outside observer could argue in 2002 that the literature on fisheries management in New Zealand with ITQs has been patchy (Hersoug 2002). Indeed overseas practitioners could claim “that for 2 decades New Zealand has been very busy implementing the QMS but that there has been very few qualitative assessments and very little data” (Anderson 2002b).

Affiliation of Authors

The literature on fisheries in New Zealand reflects particular perspectives that appear to have shaped the outcomes of their analyses: Generally administrators

and industry representatives are proponents, for example, Crothers (1988, 2000), Alex Duncan (1983), Clark, Major, (e.g. Clark, Major and Mollet 1988), Falloon (1993), Harte (2000) McClurg(1997), indeed 'missionaries' (according to Hersoug, 2002 62) with "proselytising zeal" (Symes 2000 1) for ITQs. Critical evaluation has been left to academic grey literature, (e.g. Wallace 1998, nd (1997?), Gaffney 1997, Hawkey 1994, Duncan L. 1993) which has raised environmental and social concerns. Non-exploitative stakeholders and environmental advocates (e.g. Monk and Hewison³⁸ 1994) are opponents on ideological (against property rights) and environmental grounds; Wallace³⁹ and Weeber⁴⁰ (2003) provide both ideological and practical recognition that ITQs are not a panacea for the real issues of fishery management. Weeber particularly, was concerned that ITQs create barriers to protection of maritime areas due to lack of protection of habitat and other species such as marine mammals and seabirds that come with the industry arguing on the basis of property rights for continued fishing at high Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACCs) levels. Weeber is also an advocate of conservation of fish stocks. Those with backgrounds in the Department of Conservation, Rennie⁴¹, for example, are arguably skewed in favour of advocating conservation and inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders in decisionmaking (e.g.in planning). It should be noted that while personal ideology or perspectives may not be reflected by their employment, most probably they have been drawn to employment in particular careers in which they feel ideologically comfortable and that this in turn may reinforce the orientation of those institutions and of the people⁴². As with the other "categories" in this dissertation the strength of such affiliations may vary with time and issue.

Peter Pearce (1991), a Canadian economist, whose paper with Maloney (Maloney and Pearce 1979) was instrumental in the system's inception, has also been a

³⁸ Then in Greenpeace.

³⁹ Chairperson of ECO, an environmental umbrella organisation and School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington.

⁴⁰ Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society.

⁴¹ Rennie worked in four government departments, primarily the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Conservation between 1982 and 1994.

⁴² Though with a tighter employment situation now, perhaps less than in the past.

repeat consultant to MAF and therefore likely to have had continued influence. He was keynote speaker at the IIFET2002 Conference in Wellington. Annala (1996) was a fisheries scientist and manager of fisheries research with MAF and the Ministry of Fisheries where he was responsible for the fish stock sustainability assessment process. Sullivan and Hore (Annala, Sullivan & Hore, 1999) were with MAF and are now with NIWA⁴³. Fisheries scientist Boyd (Boyd & Dewees, 1992) was a fisheries manager with MAF at the inception of the system and later a consultant with Ika Fisheries Consultants. Dewees, however, is a US academic biologist with a continuing interest in the effects of ITQ on skipper fishing behaviour. Clark (1993) was with MAF and then NZFIB, and Alex Duncan (Clark & Duncan, 1986) was with NZFIB, and later part of the Fisheries Legislation Task Force (Wheeler, Bradford et al. 1991). Crothers (1988) was with MAF at the inception of ITQ and remains with MFish⁴⁴. Davies (1992) was a South African academic then a manager with MAF Auckland that is a similar trajectory for Townsend (Townsend 1998) an American academic and proponent of rights-based management who joined MFish in 2007. Cullen (Cullen and Memon 1990) is an economist and Memon a geographer and planner variously at Otago and now Lincoln Universities. Bess (1999 2005) was at the School of Business, Nelson Polytechnic and now MFish. Harte (1999 2000) was with SeaFIC. I (Duncan, L. 1995) was an anthropologist, formerly fishing crew, Greenpeace observer and conservationist. Feldman (1998) was a recreational fisher whereas Major (Clark, Major & Mollet, 1988) was with FIB prior to the system's beginning and with MAF Policy to start the ITQ system. Clark and Major effectively "swapped" positions. Falloon (1993) was seconded from Treasury to MAF Policy, Mace (Sissenwine & Mace, 1992) was a New Zealand fisheries scientist (MAF) and subsequently worked for NOAA/NMFS⁴⁵ in the US but is now senior scientist with MFish and Sissenwine was a US fisheries scientist NOAA/NMFS who has

⁴³ National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA): Clark, I., P. Major and N. Mollet, 1988 (Accessed 17 July 2010).

⁴⁴ Until his retirement during the course of this research.

⁴⁵ The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a US federal agency focused on the condition of the oceans and the atmosphere. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is the section of NOAA responsible for offshore living marine resources and their habitat.

had stock assessment contracts with MAF. McClurg (1997) managed MAF Policy in the early 1990s and had studied at Lincoln University in a programme where Sharp (1997 1998) (now at Auckland University) was an economist. Rennie (1989 2000) was with DOC then did a masters thesis on fisheries development at Memorial University, Newfoundland, was on staff and did an aquacultural PhD at University of Waikato and moved to Lincoln University in 2007, Wallace (1997) is a Victoria University of Wellington political economist and award-winning conservationist. Le Heron (Le Heron and Pawson 1996) and Winder (1997) a Canadian, are Auckland University economic geographers involved with Auckland University PhD students, Massey and Rees (2004) who are both now with MFish.

The affiliations of most of the authors as staff or former staff of the then Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), the fishing industry associations (the Fishing Industry Board (FIB), now SeaFIC), Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) or University⁴⁶, are such that they present mainly the top down perspectives of government, the seafood industry, conservationists and the universities. The bottom up perspectives of fishers and their communities, have not been well addressed in the research literature. Clement (2000) does discuss the perceptions held by the Orange Roughy Company of orange roughy quota holders, but this is a deepwater fishery so most⁴⁷ stakeholders are corporates, and Arbuckle (MAF, Challenger, and then back to MAF) and Drummond (2000) do similarly for the Challenger Scallop Enhancement Company⁴⁸. To find richer views and perspectives of fishers it seems necessary to move away from the academic literature to the popular press (e.g. newspapers and magazines such as Seafood New Zealand and related books (e.g. Hargreaves, 1998). Indeed, the success or otherwise of the QMS appears to reflect as much the organisational views and orientation of the authors as it does any objective measurements (See Appendix 2).

⁴⁶ See Appendix 2

⁴⁷ Crew, for example, are not considered stakeholders.

⁴⁸ An inshore fishery, so a mix of corporate and individual members.

ITQs: Neoliberalism: Property rights

Ownership of the fish stocks within the EEZ was not clear at the outset of the QMS implementation. Clark (1993 341) believed that whether owned or not they were “in the stewardship of the government ... (with) a responsibility to conserve and above all, manage the resource ... the creation of property rights and their allocation is the most appropriate way of discharging the responsibility”. Allen⁴⁹ (1983 23), perhaps the only commentator to express community disquiet over the potential of ITQs, asserted “valuable rights which have been regarded as something belonging to the community as a whole, are alienated to individuals. ... a transferable system will lead to monopolies obtaining control over large parts of the resource”. Essential elements were, however, “the creation of property rights (ITQs); their tradability; a reduction of governmental intervention, with any such intervention being accomplished through market forces rather than through regulatory interference; and the matching of effort to the resource in such a way as to allow the industry to develop with inbuilt economic efficiency while maximizing returns to the nation” (Clark and Duncan 1986 109). Crothers noted that under the Law of the Sea and a Westminster style government, “[f]rom a constitutional and legal standpoint, it is important to understand that the transferable right is a harvesting right, not a property right” (Crothers 1988 10), which reassured non-exploitative sectors of the public but disconcerted the industry.

The advantages of using a property rights approach were that “owners are confronted with the economic consequences of their behaviour. ... And management decisions ... are reflected immediately in the market value of the property right. Rights owners face incentives to maximize the present and future values of their harvesting rights” (McClurg n.d. 1996 91-92). Scott’s (in Shotton 2000 6) features of property such as duration, security, exclusivity, and transferability increase the value of the right, provide incentives toward husbandry and investment to improve returns and compliance with obligations so as to

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“increase economic and social benefits by allowing for industry rationalisation, while providing returns, increase economic efficiency” (Edwards 2001 1).

However, the QMS did not initially clearly resolve the issue of property rights, especially with the first version of ITQ. Doug Kidd, the Minister of Fisheries (1990 – 1995), felt “[t]he great failing of the system was in the definition of the property right - it was not clearly defined. Perhaps more importantly it was not proportional”. The system was, he felt, “a classic case of a property rights-based fishery providing the right incentives to take a long term view of fish stocks and providing the confidence to invest enormously in the catching, processing and marketing sectors” (Kidd 2000 5). The solution, achieved with “the Accord” in 1989 (See Appendix 3) was changing ITQ from fixed tonnages, to clearly specified rights (enacted in legislation) to harvest proportional amounts to TACC. ACEs were created to define the actual annual tonnage available to be caught.

Objectives of ITQs

Social goals were included among long-term biological and economic objectives expressed in the consultation meetings leading up to the introduction of ITQs. Namely that “[t]here should be maximum freedom for fishermen to decide when, where and how to fish and there should be stable fishing communities” (Duncan, A. 1983 1). Subsequent decisions, commentaries and reflections appear, however, to have ignored these. Generally, two, sometimes three, objectives have been given for the introduction of the QMS. Conservation and economic objectives are most frequently cited (e.g. Clark 1993; Clark, et al. 1988b; Annala 1996; Hersoug 2002; Connor 2001b). Alex Duncan (1983), writing at the time, adds objectives from the usually ignored, social dimension while Sissenwine and Mace (2002) give three.

However, even within the apparent agreement there are significant variations. Clark and Duncan, for instance, note that “even though economic objectives were cited as a reason for introducing controls.... For fin fisheries, it was gradually realized that economic as well as biological objectives were necessary for effective management, and that the management program had to be improved in order to achieve these objectives” (Clark and Duncan 1986 108). Clearly, in their view economic objectives emerged after the biological. Fishermen realised stock depletion meant their operations were becoming economically unviable, and

lobbied through the Federation⁵⁰ for industry restructuring that would let the stocks rebuild.

Sissenwine and Mace (2002 29) argue that, “ITQ management was implemented to address overfishing, overcapitalization, and excess government regulation”, and Hersoug (2002 29) emphasised that, “QMS was introduced to reach two major goals: economic efficiency and biological sustainability”. Sinner and Fennemor analysed statements of policy to determine why market based instruments were adopted (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 14). It appears therefore that, with the intention also of simplifying government regulation and intervention (i.e., improving the efficacy of fisheries management or reducing bureaucratic interference in the market place, depending on perspective), biological sustainability and, subsequently, economic efficiency were the primary reasons for introducing ITQs in New Zealand.

Corporate Perspective (SeaFIC)

From the practical experience of running Talleys Fisheries⁵¹, Peter Talley argues that, like other industry CEOs he was initially suspicious of ITQ’s apparent restriction on purchasing of fish to supply their processing plants and also concerned at the government revenue gathering potential of resource rentals. He had, however, not anticipated fishermen’s “massive 'sell-down' of quota”. From his perspective it was the direct interaction between fish and fishermen that creates the property right so they should receive free access. Following their eventually successful fisheries claim in 1992 Māori argued they should not have to pay resource rentals for access to their own resources and supported the industry’s case for cost recovery replacing resource rentals (Talley 1999/2000).

For the industry the government’s reluctance to pay compensation when settling claims by other resource users, such as recreational fishers and conservationists, meant the industry’s property rights were “being gradually eroded by 'environmental creep” (Talley 1999). ITQs, not having the same recognition and

⁵⁰ The New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen.

⁵¹ Talleys Fisheries operated on the coasts of mainly the South Island. Peter Talley was also CEO of Amaltal in the deepwater one of New Zealand’s “Big Three” companies. In addition he was on the executive and at times President of the Fishing Industry Association.

security as terrestrial property, were felt detrimental to industry. Having property rights meant fishermen (quota owners) worked more collectively to enhance sustainability, but to ensure fishing was as economical as possible they also wanted the right to manage their assets. The contestability of science was a step in this direction. Talley was, though, critical of the biological orientation of science and wanted “focus on improving profitability and market-acceptability of the products we produce” (Talley 2000).

Combining the insights of the Business School⁵² and SeaFIC, Bess and Harte (2000) regarded property rights as bundles of rights for transferring resources. The advantage of the QMS was that market mechanisms led to “a more efficient fit between fishing capacity and available fish stocks” but the risk was that “failure to further develop the property rights-based management system would incline most harvesters to adopt short-term perspectives towards fisheries management” (Bess and Harte 2000 332). The seafood industry wanted these property rights developed further but had confidence for the future since “at every major crisis point the property rights-based fisheries management system has emerged stronger and better specified” (Bess and Harte 2000 332). Indeed Bess attributed the success of the New Zealand fishing industry in international markets to secure property rights that also “provided individual firms with opportunities to enhance their competitiveness by reconfiguring value chain activities from harvesting to marketing” (Bess in Shotton 2000).

Recent Academic Commentators

In terms of diachronic social science, only Dewees offers a long term, socially focused analysis of fishermen’s attitudes toward their commercial and economic operations. Dewees visited New Zealand in 1986, 1995 and in 2005-6 during which he interviewed a sample of 62 Auckland region commercial fishermen and company personnel and 14 MAF staff in 1986, then re-interviewed 55 fishermen in 1995 and 31 from the same group in 2005-6 (University of Waikato seminar⁵³; Dewees 1989 131). In the latter survey he was able to determine “what had happened to 21 others who were part of the original sample ...[but] he was unable

⁵² School of Business, Nelson Polytechnic Te Whare Wananga o Te Tau Ihu

⁵³ Chris Dewees, Seminar at University of Waikato, 1 May 2006.

to determine the current status of 10 of ... [his] original sample” (Deweese 2007 1). In addition, his then PhD student, Tracey Yandle administered his questionnaire in interviews with the same set of industry informants in 1999 (Yandle 2001 iv). Both also had discussions with MAF/MFish, FIB/SeaFIC and other key informants.

MAF/MFish considers the resulting corpus of research (Deweese 1987, 1989, 1997, 2007, 2008⁵⁴; Boyd and Dewees 1992; Yandle and Dewees 2000; Yandle 2001) as social monitoring that contributes to understanding some of the impacts of fisheries policies on some impacted groups, but that it does not give a complete picture of the impacts (Jonathan Peacey, pers com 2006). It does not cover the implications of ITQs for communities, nor, like this present work, for crew members.

Deweese’s, and Yandle’s, purpose was to evaluate both the positive and the negative claims made for the QMS. They found that market-based regulation was neither the panacea nor the curse some claimed but rather a policy tool with mixed “strengths and weaknesses that create important and long-lasting changes on the fishing industry, fishing community, and regulatory community associated with it” (Yandle and Dewees 2000). The survey research emphasis was instrumentalist, as Dewees had previously been a Fisheries Extension Officer (Deweese, University of Waikato Seminar 1 May 2006).

Deweese found that of his informants, after six months operation of the QMS, 100 per cent MAF staff but only 56 per cent fishermen felt the system would be successful (Deweese 1989 131). After 20 years QMS operation “about one-third of them are still in the fishing industry. Twelve of the 17 who own fish quota still fish their quota. Five lease out their quota rather than fishing, while four sold their quota and only fish quota leased from other quota owners” (Deweese 2007 1). The remainder had left the industry for other jobs, retired, were deceased or overseas (Deweese 2007 2). Of those still in the industry six of his 13 fishermen were reducing their commitment or exiting, seven were maintaining their level while the two corporates were expanding (Deweese 2007 3).

⁵⁴ References Dewees 1987 and 2008 have not been sighted.

All appeared pessimistic about the current and future fisheries economic situation although they ranked conditions better than those pre-QMS (Deweese 2007 4): “Interviewees were relatively evenly split on their own economic situation and retirement security. A slight majority felt that QMS was compatible with their beliefs about fisheries management and that New Zealand is better off under QMS. Three-quarters feel that QMS conserves fish stocks and makes it more difficult for young to enter. A majority disagrees that QMS fishing is safer”. Among the benefits that informants claimed of the QMS, were conservation, improved business planning and that quota was an asset. Some of the detriments cited were “Draconian regulations and enforcement, QMS complexity, insecurity of quota asset, company control, loss of community infrastructure and various bureaucratic issues” (Deweese 2007 7).

For Massey and Rees (2004) the QMS is the result of contradictory trends, ideologically driven neoliberal reforms on the one hand and sustained social opposition to the appropriation of natural resources on the other. They further note that the Fisheries Act 1996 resonates with the free market environmentalism of the RMA (Massey and Rees 2004 31, 27) and that property rights to single species are preventing moves to ecosystem management (Massey 2003). Rees reviews the neo-classical [concatenated here with neo-liberal] basis for the QMS, outlining the theory, rationale, assumptions, incentives and contradictions in the implementation of the system, concluding that the:

QMS has achieved positive resource outcomes including the preservation of commercial species. It has sent signals to firms concerning the status of species. These signals are such that companies appear to be acting responsibly and fishing within the TACC. QMS has resulted in companies fishing beyond New Zealand's waters or investing beyond the quota system. These moves may have reduced pressure on over extended wild stocks but they also place more of the seafood industry beyond the domain of QMS and into other regulatory frameworks. The challenge for fisheries management and the seafood industry in the future will be to unite the demands of multiple stakeholders and maintain stocks and sustain performance and productivity gains (Rees 2004 87).

To determine whether ITQs are harvesting rights or property rights, Connor compared the discourses in the US where ITQs are legally characterised as revocable privileges, in Australia as Statutory Fishing Rights and New Zealand where full blown property rights language is used. He argued normatively that

"ITQs should be defined as full and unattenuated (as far as possible) property rights - permanent, transferable, divisible, subject to registration of third party interests, etc. They should be subject to compensation when appropriate but not for changes in TACs or other sustainability management actions. ITQs are rights in fishing, rather than in the fish themselves and ownership of fish stocks is vested in the state (e.g. the current model in New Zealand". He concluded "There is no doubt that pressure is mounting for rights systems for fisheries management to evolve" (Connor 2001a 2 15). Yandle similarly sees a strong bundle of property rights, ITQs, for example, as being "the foundation" and "necessary" for the development of a co-management regime" (Yandle 2002 61).

However, early claims that the QMS could achieve a balance between competing objectives of conservation and property right security have been contested (Page 1994 2) with Winder (1997 327) commenting. "Neither the Canadian nor the New Zealand fisheries policies recognise that it is new technology in the hands of corporations that places pressure on the fisheries". This tension remains. Quota became a bigger asset than either boats or plant for individual fishermen or fishing companies, but the allocation of other spatial rights, such as for aquaculture or marine reserves reduced the security of the ITQ right (Gibbs 2007 113, 116). Knight, an Otago academic notes that "Conservation-minded fishermen play an important role in the fishery viewed as a socio-ecological system" but questions the contention "that private property rights encourage conservation through the self-interest of owners ... (since) establishing those property rights has meant the exclusion of the conservation-minded fishermen" (Knight 2007). Thus ITQs fit the neoliberal mould of (privatized) property rights and in being transferable, subject to market forces.

Outcome of the Introduction of ITQs

Three forms of outcome will be considered, biological, economic and social.

Biologically, Sissenwine and Mace argued that in 1992 "there is little evidence of improvement in the condition of the fisheries resources" (Sissenwine and Mace 1992 147) and note that, "[t]he scientific basis for assessing fish stocks, setting TACs, and evaluating the overall performance of the ITQ system is generally inadequate" (Sissenwine and Mace 1991 155). In 1994 Annala, however, argued

that ITQs had resulted in “improved biological status of the resource” (Annala 1996 46). Industry attributes the alleged sustainability of New Zealand fish stocks to the QMS (e.g. SeaFIC n.d.; Vela n.d.). Massey, however, argues the embedded property rights prevent management moving from single species to ecosystem based management, “the only viable tool for preserving biodiversity in the marine environment” (Massey 2003 107 108).

Biologically, Sissenwine and Mace (1991) were critical of the basis of stock assessment, questioned the efficacy of the buyback⁵⁵ and queried the linkage between stock assessments and TAC setting noting the increased risk of stock collapse. Indeed, the data is just not present to evaluate the biological, economic and administrative efficiency objectives of the QMS (Hersoug 2002 49-64). Consequently, Annala's (1996) declaration of its success may have been more a judgment based on his personal experience as manager of the research division rather than a robust empirical analysis. More than a decade since its introduction there was still considerable uncertainty over the stock status of all but the major commercial coastal species (Wallace 1997 19; Hersoug 2002 57 214)

The economic effects of the QMS on the New Zealand fishing industry have been described as an enormous increase in the export of seafood, rationalisation of fishing effort, and a reduction in vessel numbers (but not in the mid-range fleet) (Rees 2005 143). Rees (2004) ascribes these outcomes to increased competitiveness and the enabling of a New Zealandisation of the offshore fishery.

Certainly the perception of MAF and the industry is that the QMS has improved economic outcomes, but Annala admits hard information is lacking (Annala 1996 46). Hersoug also notes that “little has been done by New Zealanders themselves in terms of more academic research into the working (and the success) of the QMS system” and indeed could assert “there is a paradox that a management system so bent on empirical evidence and the use of rationality in shaping and implementing management measures has so little in terms of systematic evidence to prove the outcomes of the QMS” (Hersoug 2002 4, 61). Rees could, however,

⁵⁵ MAF held two rounds of “Buybacks” the Tender Rounds to buyback nominal quota in order to match the desired TACC (See: Clark et al 1989 129; Johnson and Haworth 2004 364; Haworth 2008 224).

conclude that results have been mixed. Sanford, his example, “expanded sales tenfold.... Both profits and earnings before tax increased significantly. ... The QMS promoted the development of new species and products. ... [but] Productivity and profitability have not increased steadily as there have been periods of uncertainty and fluctuating fortunes as competitiveness varies” (Rees 2004 86). An overview of New Zealand’s food industry was more pessimistic finding that “The export value per kilo of New Zealand’s seafood is down or flat” (Coriolis 2005 34).

Although the ITQ system is based on qualitative measures to supposedly ensure accountability, Hersoug finds that to assess economic performance, “there are no reliable statistics covering the most essential indicators” (Hersoug 2002 50). Although there are numerous possible economic indicators, few are covered by time series and others are not available through “commercial sensitivity” (Hersoug 2002 50). After careful analysis of those that are available, including, profitability, quota prices, competitiveness, aggregation, fleet structure, “capacity creep”, he found that “overcapitalisation is still a problem in New Zealand fisheries” (Hersoug 2002 54). He summed up by saying "most fisheries economists are uncritical about the improved economic performance of the QMS ... there is little evidence to support the widely held assumption that the efficiency, competitiveness and profitability of the industry has increased" under the QMS (Hersoug 2002 54).

With the possible exception of Akroyd, et al. (1999) no analysis has been done as to the efficiency of fisheries management. As indicated by the level of litigation, the industry still expresses dissatisfaction with excessive bureaucratic interference and inability to achieve full compliance leading to fudge factors in TACC setting to allow for poaching. I clearly remember the CEO of one of the corporates asserting, during one of the 1990s stock assessment plenaries I attended on behalf of Greenpeace, that the QMS had not taken account of the number of court cases involved as the industry asserted its rights.

Prior to the “Sealord settlement” (Māori Fisheries Act 1989 and the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992)⁵⁶, addressing Māori concerns

⁵⁶ See, for example, Russell and Campbell 1999.

and court cases over setting TACCs, inquiries into possible corruption, and still unresolved competing uses for marine space⁵⁷ and fish were very costly.

Certainly major cases in the High Court, such as *Orange Roughy (Greenpeace v Minister of Fisheries CP 492/93)*, *snapper 1 [SNA1] (NZ Federation of Commercial Fishermen v Minister of Fisheries, decision 24 April 1995)* or *kahawai (NZ Recreational Fishing Council versus the Minister of Fisheries 2007 CIV-2005-404-4495)* are indicative of the litigation. The *Mfish (2004) Briefing to the Minister* states “[t]he fisheries sector is characterised by conflict between various participants who have competing values and objectives. The contentious nature of the issues is demonstrated by the level of litigation with over 20 cases, mostly by way of judicial reviews, currently on the books” (MFish 2004 3).

Hersoug (2002) notes that while most see economics as having been the prime factor in the ITQs introduction, in practice economic measures and economists are entirely absent from the stock assessment process which is instead dominated by biologists and lawyers (Hersoug 2002 55). He is referring to lawyers’ involvement in litigation when industry is dissatisfied with the stock assessment outcomes.

Aside from a few comments, the literature makes little reference to the social implications of the QMS. Alex Duncan did note one criterion: “There Should Be Stable Fishing Communities” (Duncan, A. 1983 1). Crothers (1988) states that it was clear ITQs

would have significant social implications for the fishing industry, its down-stream operations, and in some cases, whole communities.... [and] concluded that an effort reduction strategy, which sought to maintain the inshore fisheries in areas where fishing was important to the local community, would lessen the negative consequences of change. The downside to this conclusion was, of course, that the industry restructuring pain would be shifted elsewhere, either geographically or economically. ... The social pain caused by the restructuring would have occurred irrespective of which management regime was implemented to reduce fishing effort, and indeed, if the government had done nothing (Crothers 1988 12).

As noted previously, the “purist” market decision took precedence over the social awareness (Clark and Duncan 1986 129). Crothers and Harte (1999) in examining

⁵⁷ Marine reserves, for example.

compliance did consider social and psychological aspects but Boyd and Dewees (1992), and McClurg (1997), indicate that they know of no adverse social implications for fishing communities.

Rennie, from his background in Newfoundland where community impacts were a key feature in fishery decisions, recalls being told by MFish in the early 1990s (when he orally raised the issue of communities with them) that the Department of Conservation (Doc) had “no mandate to raise arguments on behalf of fishing communities”. Subsequently DOC arguments used communities (like charter boat tourism) only as a means to get other Ministries involved in debates with MFish when DOC had concerns over the impacts of the QMS or measures for fisheries regulation (Rennie pers com 8 September 2008).

Stan Crothers, one of the architects of the QMS, was one of just a few commentators to raise social issues. He noted that the social dimension has often been ignored in the development of fisheries policy and, in 1999, warned that, “[w]ithout an understanding of the social dimension of fisheries management, government is unlikely to structure policy to promote fisheries management in a way that is ecologically sound, socially acceptable and politically supported. ... [and] an attempt to remedy one aspect of a fisheries issue may, if it ignores the social context of the issue, reduce the likelihood of achieving its desired outcome” (Crothers 2000). This appears to demonstrate the benefits of hindsight. However, social impact assessment was well established, and indeed required as part of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures adopted by a cabinet minute in 1974 and although without legal force, was required by government departments. Consequently, such an oversight is hardly excusable (Wallace 1995). The possibility of social consequences were largely ignored in the introduction of the QMS.

Some social objectives for the QMS seem, therefore, to have been included in the early deliberations but these have been dropped or subsumed within the economic objectives. Despite claims to the contrary, there are still unresolved tensions between economics and biological/ecosystem considerations and their historical alignments on one side or the other still taint commentators.

This chapter has developed a theoretical framework linking ideology with ethos and identity for the analysis of empirical data, delineated the salient features of neo-liberalism as an ideology and their implications for the components of fisheries considered here and reviewed the literature on social aspects of New Zealand fisheries and the QMS. The following chapter will outline methodological issues for this purpose.

Chapter 3: Baiting Fish Hooks: Methodology

This project covers a time span of approximately thirty years coinciding roughly with my return to New Zealand in 1978 with an urge to begin small-scale fishing and the present 2010. So at a personal level it covers the period of my observation and interest. Fortuitously this also happens to coincide with a growing perception of stock depletion in the coastal fishery resulting in the QMS and the subsequent social outcomes.

POSITIONALITY

All research reflects a degree of the researchers' personality and either implicitly or explicitly a position from which the research is undertaken. I considered becoming a commercial fisherman in the late 1970s (See Boxes 1 & 4 pages 73 & 139 resp.) and had a stint as a deckhand in the early 1980s but then more publicly, I had conservation oriented contracts in the late 1980s and early 1990s from Greenpeace and later facilitated a Waiheke Island marine reserve application (Te Matuku) for the Royal New Zealand Forest and Bird Society. Consequently, I assumed that I had a reputation with the fishing industry as biased and this would be a serious impediment to interviewing fishermen and other industry people. My bottom line is concern for conservation, but also for fishermen, especially small-scale and local fishing cultures. Simplistically - no fish means no fishermen; serious losses to both the environment and to the community. It cuts both ways. For many fishermen and industry personnel I am probably too pro-conservation, and for many conservationists too pro-fishermen and pro-fishing culture.

Inevitably this research reflects my personal interests and concerns so is deliberately reflexive. A conscious attempt has been made to recognise and present the different perspectives of informants and the different components (Corporates, MAF / Mfish, Fishermen and their Communities). In consequence informants have been quoted at length, to tell their own story in a way that conveys their lived experience, perspectives and nuances of the issues, ethos and identity. It is hoped that this will redress the comparatively little "voice" fishermen and community people have had in the politics of fish to date.

On Waiheke, I might also be judged biased. I have been aligned with the pro-conservation, pro-“leftie” group -- that loose conglomerate we used to call “the Alternatives” in contrast to the more pro-development “Capitalists” -- so to establish a more “objective” or academic stance and counter any garbled accounts that would be generated by an enthusiastic “rumour-mill”, I published an article in the local weekly, the *Gulf News*.

I felt an article outlining the research proposal would allow potential informants to contact me or, at least, would introduce the research letting them know what was intended. In addition it would reach those I didn't know about and so otherwise wouldn't contact but instead of being inundated only two people contacted me. Both were, however, extremely important sources of information.

In addition there were still friends and informants on the Island from my Viaduct study and other names and contacts were obtained from *Gulf News* articles. As friends and acquaintances heard of my research, a number expressed views or experiences about fish or commercial fishing on the Island which often led to more formal interviews or to other contacts in Coromandel, Leigh and a few elsewhere.

At Coromandel a former colleague and long time friend, Wendy Pond, provided local knowledge and assisted with contacts, helping arrange interviews with community representatives. While at Leigh, Professor Bill Ballantine, of Auckland University's Marine Laboratory, did likewise. I purchased a mini van to provide transport, accommodation and also study space for field work on the ‘mainland’ but both these people provided access to power and water; basic living essentials that gentrified such camping.

As well as fishermen and people associated with the communities, I interviewed key informants, most of whom were involved when the QMS was introduced, representing the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) now the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish)⁵⁸, the New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen and the fishing industry. With just one exception (“it was too long ago”) none of the people I approached refused my request for an interview and generally appeared

⁵⁸ The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF became a standalone department the Ministry of Fisheries (Mfish) in 1995.

to be unconcerned over my past activities in relation to the fisheries.

Consequently I believe that the previous experience was much more of an aid than a hindrance for the research.

Box 1: My main experiences on Commercial Fishing boats.

During the Viaduct research trips were made with fishermen in the Hauraki Gulf on their boats using each of the different methods for snapper: set netting, longlining, Danish seining, single and pair trawling. I then joined Aksel Larsen on his Danish seiner *Diana* trolling for albacore out of Westport and Greymouth on the West Coast of the South Island (WCSI), dhan lining for hapuka (groper) off the Hokianga, handlining for bluefin tuna under the trawl wires of hoki trawlers and longlining for ling and shark before returning to the Hauraki Gulf for snapper.

While with Greenpeace I led the seals observer group and did trips on Amaltal's *Voyager* for hoki in Cook Strait and Sealord's *Will Watch* for hoki off the WCSI, the east coast Stewart Island (then the first (NZ) commercial exploration for orange roughy in what became the Puysegur fishery) before returning to Nelson.

IDEAL METHODOLOGY

Ideally, participant observation of inshore and coastal commercial fishing might be conducted in such a way that local and national perspectives throughout that time could be observed and analysed. That hasn't happened, though, as outlined later in this chapter. I have been involved and observed commercial fishing from a variety of perspectives through the period and draw on that for the present study (Box 1).

Given the constraints of family responsibilities and resources, the case study method, using interviews in accessible and affordable communities, was most appropriate. The alternative, and more familiar, participant observation - staying in a fishing community, hanging around the wharves and landing places, observing the fishermen their crews and boats, getting to know them, their boats, their interactions with the industry, and the community and those around, was not an option. One of the strengths of interviews with a researcher located outside of the powerful groups involved with fisheries, by comparison with participant observation, is that informants, as individuals, have the courage to express in an interview what they feel and are able to resist persuasion by nearby peers at the

time. Whereas even in a one to one situation, with a fisheries officer for example, they do not want to disagree with a person in power or may be more flexible. This dissertation is based, therefore on interviews and sufficient observation on the wharves and in the communities to "place" the present situation within more detailed experience of the past.

In addition there are often constraints on, unavailability of, and uncertainty regarding fishing industry data allegedly for reasons of commercial secrecy, privacy or cost. Rees reports (Rees 2003 113), for example, an under-stated level of the concentration of rights ownership due to the formation of shell and proxy companies to evade legislative restrictions on quota aggregation. Thus, when looking at the implications of rights-based fishing on communities, I could not know who in a community might have a partnership or be otherwise involved as an investor in a corporate, or the degree of power a quota owner might have over a community.

METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter contends that the introduction of the neoliberal Quota Management System has had profound social implications for fishermen and their communities. By exploring the changes in fisheries communities over the period since the introduction of the QMS it was intended to shed light on the processes, mechanisms and social implications of implementing a neoliberal agenda and adopting a rights-based approach to broader resource management. Initially the research was conceived as comprising a straight forward Social Impact Assessment (SIA) using case studies of three accessible fishery communities.

SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (S.I.A): METHODS OF ASSESSING COMMUNITY SOCIAL IMPACTS

Social impact assessment requires a relevant, clear baseline or set of reference indicators and ongoing effective, robust monitoring of these indicators. In the United States the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) "holds that social impact assessment (SIA) is an essential part of the fishery management process and improves fishery conservation and management decision-making.... [where] SIAs focus on the human environment of the fisheries" (NMFS 2001). They call

for “quantitative probabilities” in preference to qualitative data and provide operational guidelines for the purpose. NMFS with specific reference to fisheries calls for:

First, the size and demographic characteristics of the fishery-related work force residing in the area; these determine demographic, income, and employment effects in relation to the work force as a whole, by community and region. Second, the cultural issues of attitudes, beliefs and values of fishermen, fishery-related workers, other stakeholders and their communities. Third, the effects of proposed actions on social structure and organization; that is, on the ability to provide necessary social support and services to families and communities. Fourth, the non-economic social aspects of the proposed action or policy; these include life-style issues, health and safety issues, and the non-consumptive and recreational uses of living marine resources and their habitats. In addition to these four variables, one other variable is related to MSA actions. This social factor is the historical dependence on and participation in the fishery by fishermen and communities, reflected in the structure of fishing practices, income distribution and rights (NMFS 2001 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/OperationalGuidelines/OGsocial_impact_assess.htm).

Likewise the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation and Commonwealth of Australia handbook for Fisheries SIAs (Schirmer and Casey 2005 24) suggests using common indicators including:

- total population, population change over time
- labour force participation
- unemployment
- key types of employment (by industry, sector or other category)
- dependency ratios
- median age
- income
- education
- proportion of population employed in fishing-related activities
- economic diversity of local economy
- household expenditure
- other indicators such as home-ownership levels

The general literature on community impact assessment, a variant on SIA, also suggests [instrumental] indicators in terms of changes in population, demographic structure, occupations, and community social structure, and adds infrastructural resources (e.g. Burdge 2004; Taylor et al. 1999; Baines and McClintock 2000).

The outcomes of SIAs are a major advance on the neglect of social science when the QMS was introduced and implemented. Indeed they are critical for understanding the impacts of fisheries management policies on fishermen and their communities. But in using such indicators SIAs give major emphasis to an instrumental approach and the neglect of the emotional and aspirational, the more expressive aspects of interest to this dissertation.

While both instrumental and expressive approaches are necessary others have employed statistical analysis on aspects of the NZ fishery (e.g. Connor 2000, 2001ab; Dewees 1987, 1989, 1997, 2007; Cullen and Memon 1990; Memon and Cullen 1992). The expressive, on the other hand has, to a greater extent, been neglected but is, I believe, necessary for an understanding of social change and its implications. These include concepts such as community resistance (Mittleman and Chin 2000), community resilience (Blount 2007; Berkes and Folk 1998), entanglements of power (Sharp et al. 2000) or social capital (Bodin and Crona 2007; Wiber et al. 2008), which do not show up in the suggested SIA indicators but require more empathy and closer communication.

Sensitised during my Masters research (Duncan 1970) to the difficulties of defining and specifying indeterminate expressive categories by Sellin and Wolfgang's (1964) seminal work on the measurement of delinquency I have avoided statistical research. Expressive concepts require a close and detailed understanding of the relevant community/ies as it/they change over time perhaps best gained by diachronic participant observation such as Firth's classic research of Tikopia (Firth 1936; 1959) and Malay fishermen (Firth 1946; 1966).

In addition, by comparison with other fishing community studies (See for example, Hall-Arber et al. 2001) the number of fishermen and boats remaining are probably too small for statistical validity. More generally social change or social impacts on the community of fishermen will in this research be assessed in terms of changing attitudes and ethos by evaluating typologies which in many cases

arose from larger scale, sometimes interdisciplinary, research projects like those of Davis and others in St Georges Bay (See, for example Davis and Jentoft n.d.) or in Chedabucto Bay (Davis and Wagner 2006). On a smaller scale, fieldwork studies have assessed related variables such as “deep identity”(Minnegal et al 2003), or gender relationships (Stella 1996).

In New Zealand possible categorical typologies of fishermen include human (e.g. part-timers/full timers, gear type, male/female, vertically integrated or not, ethnicity, big boat/small boat, skipper/crew/shore processor) or spatial emphases (ecosystem, inshore, coastal and deepwater). Before the QMS, administratively MAF used primarily the categories of part-time or full time fishermen, and owner-operators (where the fisherman ran his own boat) versus share fishermen (who ran company owned boats). After the introduction of the QMS the categories became quota owners and ACE-dependent fishermen where the former owned sufficient quota to operate their own enterprise and the latter had to buy (colloquially – lease) ACE in order to fish.

In the Hauraki Gulf the distinction between inshore/coastal does not seem useful for the present purpose so the relevant categories for Hauraki Gulf fishermen, used are part-time or full-time, owner-operators, family, traditional, and lifestyle fishermen. Part-timers fished either for only part of the year (e.g. the snapper schooling season or not in the winter) or were primarily employed in another occupation compared with those who were kept fully occupied by fishing. Owner-operators, who could be further classified as family fishermen (where two or more generations of sons follow their father into fishing), ‘traditional’ fishermen (who followed the common career path of crewing soon after leaving school and worked their way until they owned and operated their own boat) and lifestyle fishermen (where those in another job change and become full time fishermen for lifestyle reasons). These may then be further categorised as conservationist fishermen (whose prime concern is the environment and the ethos of small boats where fishing is a means of working at sea) versus more utilitarian fishermen (whose prime interest is in earning income). Such categories are not mutually exclusive. For gear types the main distinction would be between ‘passive methods’ (e.g. longlining and set-netting) versus the ‘power methods’ (e.g. Danish seining or trawling). Most of the boat-owning fishing companies are urban based

so the category of share fishermen may not be relevant to this community based research. Focus was therefore on owner-operators before the QMS and similar or different changes in ethos and identity between quota owning and ACE-dependent fishermen.

The work of two main researchers is relevant for New Zealand. Connor's work on the changes in boat numbers and their fishing capacity as a result of the QMS (Connor 2000) and Dewees (See: Recent Academic Commentators) work on skipper behaviour (Dewees 1987; 1989; 1997; 2007). Connor's work is primarily an economic analysis of changes in the fishing fleet and quota ownership not the social issues of concern here. Likewise Dewees attention is based more closely on an instrumental analysis than the expressive issues being addressed in this dissertation.

Retrospective Ethnography

Since returning to New Zealand in 1977, I have been interested and involved in the fisheries so have used the available opportunities to observe and accumulate information. Consequently my methodology drew on some of that material and the methodologies used in gathering it. I still have my field notes from the Viaduct Research, notes and vivid memories of the time on the Danish seiner *Diana*, working with Greenpeace which included observer trips and participation in MAF stock assessments, and a collection of trade journals and newspaper clippings. These have been drawn on to supplement data gathered more specifically for this research and are specifically identified as such where this occurs.

The constraints on such data are that while a deckhand I was observing and participating as an aspiring fisherman with mixed feelings toward MAF edicts. As a Greenpeace contractor while empathising in many aspects with fishermen my brief was for conservation. Consequently my notes reflect these differences in perspective and purpose. Clearly my knowledge of and subjective engagement with Waiheke was considerably greater than for the other two communities. Consequently my time, contacts and access to information was much greater but constrained by alliances with conservationists and those who oppose larger-scale

development. Though my time in the other two communities was considerably briefer it was not burdened by the baggage of community involvement.

In the past I studied as an ethnographic researcher and consequently much of my note taking reflected those skills and experience and are therefore arguably more robust as a data source than would be those of someone unfamiliar with such methods, even if not taken for the purposes of this dissertation.

While ideologically I have supported small-scale fishing culture and conservation persistently, the shifting purpose and varying perspective means there are significant implications of the use of such data. When collected it was not connected with specific reference to this current research objective and therefore has significant gaps. It does, however, provide a valuable source of information and has been drawn on in a similar manner to participant observation data. In effect, therefore, I have used a retrospective participant observation of the fishing industry, my experience living in Waiheke, sharpened by a concern for case studies and more formal interview techniques.

The alternative, and more formal participant observation, was not an option due to family commitments. It could have been done in Waiheke except that there have been no commercial fishing boats based on the Island since the earliest stages of the QMS.

CASE STUDY

Although case studies are widely used in social science research (Ragin and Becker 1992), there are assumptions and controversy as to just what a case is; whether theoretical or empirical (Ragin 1992 3), whether pre-existing or determined (constructed) in the course of the study, selected randomly or for their unique qualities (Ragin and Becker 1992 Front Note). Ragin (1992 2) suggests that “[a]t a minimum, most social scientists believe that their methods are powerful enough to overwhelm the uniqueness inherent in objects and events in the social world. The idea of comparable cases is implicit in the boundary between dominant forms of social science and other types of discourse about social life”. He notes that social science conventionally defines cases by emphasising boundaries and time periods.

The roughly thirty-year time period covered by my research is applicable for my choice of communities. To an extent these are also recognizably bounded communities but, as my research found, strictly speaking boundaries are generally not sharp. Since Waiheke is an island there is a clearcut land/sea demarcation but in practice such a definite boundary does not apply to Coromandel where for administrative, practical and even emotional purposes the Coromandel Peninsula is often not distinguished from the town. One informant whose residence was in Colville referred to Coromandel as part of her community, while Coromandel, as a port on the peninsula, is often linked for fisheries purposes with Thames.

Whitianga on the opposite coast of the Peninsula is very much part of Coromandel commercial fishing since that is where the 'local' company OPColumbia (OPC)⁵⁹ is situated. OPC is not the only company involved, but does provide some of the ACE for the Coromandel fishermen, and most of the locally caught fresh fish sold in the town. Leigh is also a port and a town, but the Leigh Fisheries Ltd factory services boats from the Hauraki Gulf (including Coromandel) and the NE coast of the North Island. So the three do constitute communities of place with recognizable boundaries for some purposes, but there are also other links and relationships, very significant for this research, which, as will be shown, blur the distinctiveness.

Choice of Communities

Initially a number of communities throughout New Zealand were considered for study, but the only likely funding source, the Ministry of Fisheries, was not pursued because of likely compromise with informants, especially fishermen. I have, however, lived on Waiheke since 1978 and completed a six month research project based on Auckland City's Viaduct Basin fishing community over the summer of 1981-82 (See: Duncan L. 1982) and therefore considered Waiheke and the Viaduct as case studies due to the advantages of that longterm knowledge.

⁵⁹ Johnson and Haworth (2004 376) note that in 'Think Big' days there were three fish processing companies in Whitianga, Fletcher, Ocean Products and Columbia Seafoods but they became two and after the introduction of the QMS just one, OPColumbia (OPC).

During the Viaduct study I had hung out on the wharf and gone on trips on boats using each of the different methods and, since roughly one third of the Auckland longline fleet was based on Waiheke, I met many of the Waiheke fishermen and subsequently followed the establishment of The Waiheke Fishing Co-operative. Later, although not as actively involved, living on Waiheke I followed the changes in the fishing industry on the Island and also watched those in the Viaduct with interest. With this background and contacts these places seemed obvious choices.

As research progressed, however, it was apparent that the Viaduct and Waiheke were closely linked. Before the Co-op and its ice plant, many Waiheke fishermen unloaded, sold their catch, bought ice, gear and fuel and reprovisioned at the Viaduct. Although Waiheke and the Viaduct allowed comparison between urban and semi-rural and big industry versus small-scale industry this interrelationship meant they were not really separate cases. Additionally, the influence of the America's Cup which resulted in considerable restructuring of the Viaduct area and associated relocation of the fishing fleet was considered likely to have overly-distorted the picture (See: Figures 7 and 8).



Figure 7: The Viaduct Basin then (Summer 1982).

(Note the steelwork for the lifting bridge [The Viaduct] in the top right-hand corner.)



Figure 8: The Viaduct Harbour Now (July 2009)

Note: Taken from same viewpoint as Figure 7.

An early informant had pointed out that following the introduction of the QMS, virtually all fishermen on Waiheke had sold their quota, those on Coromandel had leased it out and were set up for life, while I was aware that at Leigh some had kept theirs and were still operating at least until recently. In addition, the fishing co-op at Leigh had become a company in 1982 and now (2009) Leigh Fisheries, is part of The Lee Fish Group and had bought up quota so there were both quota owning and ACE-dependent fishermen based at Leigh. It seemed then that each of these communities had responded differently to the QMS and that comparison of these responses would show a range of social implications of the QMS.

These three communities are all within the Hauraki Gulf. Leigh, in the west, is a narrow inlet sheltered from all but strong southeasterly winds and, by comparison with Coromandel, a deep harbour except in its upper reaches. Coromandel Harbour in the shelter of the Coromandel Peninsula is in a broad shallow bay enclosed by islands, exposed to some extent to the southwest and, even at the wharf, many of the boats bottom on the low tides. This factor restricts the time they can enter or leave their berths. Some smaller or more shoal-draught vessels can use the even more tidal reaches of the river. Waiheke on the other hand is an

island with its major port, Matiatia an inlet like Leigh but sheltered to the east and open to the west, sufficiently deep for all the fishing vessels in its fleet⁶⁰.

The population of the communities has varied over the years. Prior to the QMS it was about 303 in Leigh, 948 in Coromandel and 3181 in Waiheke⁶¹ (See Table 1).

| COMMUNITY | CENSUS | | | |
|------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1981 | 1996 | 2001 | 2006 |
| Waiheke | 3,181 | 6,288 | 7,137 | 7,689 |
| Coromandel | 948 | 1,498 | 1,437 | 1,473 |
| Leigh | 303 | 423 | 423 | 390 |

Table 1. Community Population

Source: Census 1981: Population by Territorial Local Authorities, 1981 Census, Department of Statistics, Wellington 1981. Remainder: Statistics New Zealand <http://www.stats.govt.nz/> (Accessed 26 August 2010)

The populations of the communities have grown between 1981, prior to the QMS, and the most recent census in 2006 as indicated in Table 1. However, as the table shows there is considerable variation with Waiheke growing at a much faster rate. Indeed, Leigh and Coromandel both peaked in 1996 with populations of 423 and 1,498 respectively in 1996.

All communities share a similar history of Māori occupation and initial dependence in European times on the extraction of timber. Gold was found in Coromandel in 1852 (Coromandel Town History Research Group Incorporated 2002 10) and by that stage Waiheke was being mined for manganese, sand and gravel (Monin 1992 160-167) and as the bush was cleared the land in both communities was being broken for farming. In the mid 1850s at both Waiheke

⁶⁰ For informal navigational local knowledge of these ports see Royal Akarana Yacht Club *Cruising Handbook* (1972)

⁶¹ Population by Territorial Local Authorities, 1981 Census, Department of Statistics, Wellington 1981.

(Monin 1992 131) and Leigh (Frost 1991 4) the “40 acre system”⁶² was used by the Auckland Provincial Government to encourage settlers. Farming, especially sheep farming, was important for all three until more recently the farms were subdivided for life-style blocks and more intensive developments. On Waiheke this began in the late 1980s. Tourism has become a feature of all three communities, with Leigh benefiting from its proximity to a marine reserve, Waiheke from its closeness to Auckland, and Coromandel being on the tourist route of the popular Coromandel Peninsula.

Administratively all were originally under the Auckland Provincial Government until the formation of the Waiheke County Council in 1970 and amalgamation with Auckland City in 1989⁶³. Subsequently, Coromandel was amalgamated with the Thames District Council in 1979 fell under Waikato Regional Council in 1989 so Leigh and Coromandel have been communities within Rodney and Thames-Coromandel Districts respectively.

All three communities have strong fishing histories evident in local and national histories (*Gulf News*; Coromandel Town History Research Group Incorporated 2002; Frost 1991), but the numbers of fishermen, boats involved or relative social importance are not as readily identifiable. Currently there is a fish processing plant at Leigh, and shellfish processing at Coromandel. Both these communities and Waiheke have shops selling limited amounts of fresh filleted fish. Each community has been the base for fishing operations in the past and only Waiheke does not currently have a fishing fleet. In all three there were families where two or more generations were prominent in commercial fishing and well recognized by the community. In Coromandel it was the Strongmans, in Leigh the Torkingtons and Davies, and on Waiheke the Gordons and the Scotts were prominent and undoubtedly there were other fishing families who got on with the occupation but were not so publicly active or easily identified.

⁶² Whereby free land (40 acres per adult, 20 per child – roughly the costs of steerage passage from Britain to New Zealand) rather than free passage was offered to attract immigrants to Auckland (Monin 1992 129 130).

⁶³ See: Auckland City Libraries: Auckland Region Archives: <http://www.aucklandcitylibraries.com/populartopics/resourcepages/localhistory/Auckland-region-archives.aspx>. (Accessed 15 August 2009).

Sources of Community Information

For Waiheke the main sources of information were my own observations, Paul Monin's history (1992), my Viaduct research, the *Gulf News*, local histories or overviews for visitors such as (Picard and Picard 1993) and interviews with informants. For Coromandel historical data was from Coromandel Town History Research Group Incorporated (2002), Mitcalfe (1980) and informants. For Leigh history, I depended primarily on Frost (1991), previous visits while with Greenpeace and a Northland trip (Duncan L. 1995) and informants. In addition Internet pages including census data and the company register were searched for each of the three communities.

Timelines of changes in fisheries management in New Zealand were extracted from Hersoug (2002) and from the *Gulf News* for Waiheke (Appendices 3 & 4 respectively).

Late in my research MFish supplied McCormack and Crothers' (2008) report on "Leigh: A Community of fishers?" Despite its main focus on the relationships between the Marine Reserve and the fisheries it records fishermen's attitude toward the QMS. Indeed this is the only fisheries research on the present communities and, shows the strength of SIA methodology by dealing comprehensively with issues of fishermen's identity apparent in my present research: "fishers believe themselves to be natural environmentalists and promoters of sustainable management techniques. This perception may be somewhat idealised, however, it is a firmly held belief" (McCormick and Crothers 2008 35). It also reveals attitudes about quota ownership (p33), landlubbers and quota ownership – a major source of unease (p36), paperwork (p40), income, costs and crew relations, relationship with Leigh Fisheries (p43), social cohesion and factions among commercial fishermen (p45) and other issues. In addition, while not denying that some have done well financially from the QMS, it confirmed that the vehemence of feeling some express toward the system is not just a product of my own partiality.

Leigh Fisheries, on an Internet web page to promote the company and their product to European consumers, provides a good description of the town. Leigh is "a small village at Cape Rodney on the North Island of New Zealand. It has a

population of about 450 people - a typical fishing village”, with “[a]pproximately 20 per cent of the working population ... employed by "Lee Fish". The company is the largest employer in the village. About 30 people work operationally at "Lee Fish". They fillet, sort and pack. 60 employees fish on the 30 boats, two people on each boat”.

Constraints

Such indicators for community change can, however, founder on the rocky shores of the concept of community (discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). Moreover, a clear baseline or set of reference indicators, such as census numbers of community fishermen and occupational data, and ongoing effective, robust monitoring of these indicators did not exist. Without such baselines there has not been an ongoing coordinated data collection programme measuring changes in those key indicators over time. Consequently, distinguishing social implications, due to rights-based fisheries management, as opposed to, general social change resulting from decades of neo-liberal policy, particularly for communities, is much more problematic when conducted as a hindsight investigation. For example, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the availability of fish in the supermarket has been influenced by trends in the agri-food industry as opposed to consequences of rights-based fisheries management using ITQs. There are also problems in obtaining occupational and other statistical data for communities that are not recognised as such for statistical data collection purposes, and this is exacerbated when the data collection methods used by Statistics New Zealand do not differentiate fishing and fish processing as an occupation from other sectors of food processing and production. It is unlikely that there is any community in New Zealand for which reliable ongoing data on relevant social indicators for the purposes of this dissertation exists, with the possible exception of the Chatham Islands. The Chatham Islands, however, are in fact anomalously managed under a community quota system (Marshall 2000) and therefore not an appropriate case study.

Consequently this research used a mixed-method methodology that evolved as the research developed to take advantage of data sources and opportunities that arose. The primary data sources comprise interviews and documents, and methods were chosen that reflected these data source limitations. Logistical constraints meant

also a focus on the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery and predominantly Waiheke Island, only supplemented by Coromandel and Leigh communities. In retrospect I would liked to have spent much greater time in both Coromandel and Leigh interviewing and getting to know more fishermen and community members. Unfortunately circumstances didn't allow so data collected is heavily weighted to my home base, Waiheke. These three communities were, however, clearly distinct communities that historically had significant involvement in fisheries and were believed to be likely to show the effects of the implementation of the QMS in contrasting ways.

It became apparent during the research, however, that these seemingly geographically separate and distinguishable communities had more links and interactions with respect to fisheries and among the communities than originally perceived. Likewise fishermen from these communities of place had preferred or habitual fishing grounds and landing places (e.g. the Viaduct) but overlapping communities of occupation. Therefore, rather than being three separate case studies, they were theoretically and practically just one case reinforced by the research focus on snapper.

The exclusion of the part-time fishermen, an event ostensibly independent of rights-based fishing but one that highlighted the very question of rights, emerged as significant when some informants asserted that social impacts of the exclusion were probably more pronounced than those of the QMS. This further blurred what might have been a fairly clear before/after QMS distinction. Difficulties in locating informants and accessing official records also imposed some constraints on distinguishing between the effects of the QMS and the exclusion of part-timers. The potential impact was however sufficiently significant that it has been incorporated into the dissertation.

Known Links Among the Communities

Fishing in the Gulf was not static and while fishermen from one community may have had their favourite patches they were not confined to just those fishing grounds. Depending on season and other climatic conditions, fishermen periodically moved away from their local areas and indeed at different times, many fished throughout the Gulf. At various times, often for commercial convenience or access to a wider choice of buyers, gear or maintenance facilities,

the fishermen from all three communities have landed their catch or worked out of the Viaduct. Similar links, interactions and relationships probably apply to other ports around and in the vicinity of the Gulf. In part a result of the seasonal and life cycle movements of snapper, the dominant commercial species, the Hauraki Gulf, can therefore be considered as one fishery that has been exploited by fishermen based in its various communities.

Points of Compatibility

While there are considerable similarities and differences in these communities they are not necessarily typical of all coastal fisheries or fishing communities in New Zealand. All three are smallish, semi-rural, coastal communities in the Hauraki Gulf, within reasonable proximity of a major urban conglomerate (Auckland) and, more particularly, an international airport with links to major overseas markets. In the past snapper has been the main target species and historically contributed to subsistence in all these communities and a significant component of the local economy.

Perhaps the biggest similarity among all three communities is the presence of the agriculture industry giving way to lifestyle blocks, increasing pressure for coastal development and developing tourist industries. Leigh, adjacent to the marine reserve, Waiheke, as an island setting and Coromandel with gold mining history and aquaculture industry have developed tourism and associated businesses.

Other similarities are more closely apparent between two rather than three places. Waiheke and Coromandel share a history of the depletion of the kauri forests (*Agathis Australis*, an iconic New Zealand tree), longterm visitor industries, increasing coastal subdivision, and generally development pressure. In Leigh and Coromandel there are significant marine industries. At Leigh, Leigh Fisheries claims to be New Zealand's biggest exporter of chilled fish while at Coromandel, Sanford, New Zealand's second largest fishing company, maintains a processing plant for oysters and mussels from the marine farms in the vicinity.

Points of Uniqueness

Each of the communities has its particular distinctive attributes. Waiheke is an island and, with the exception of charter fishing and a very recent Wharf Seller's Licence has virtually no fishing industry. It has, however, become a major commuter community contributor of labour to Auckland, and has developed an

international recognition for its wine and figs. Coromandel was the centre of a gold rush and has deliberately retained at least the shop facades and claims identity from that time. At Leigh the fishing fleet and factory operations provide a more obvious dynamic.

Waiheke Island is semi-rural (See Figure 9) with a deeply indented coastline, located in the Inner Hauraki Gulf in the middle of snapper spawn grounds. Matiatia, its main "port" is 19kms or 35 minutes fast ferry ride from Downtown Auckland near the Viaduct Basin. The island's northern side is more exposed while the southern, more sheltered and the mainland is just a few kilometres across Tamaki Straits. The island is 19.5km long and extremely variable in width, being 0.75 km across the villages of Oneroa and Blackpool but 12km at the eastern end colloquially known as the 'Bottom End'.

Waiheke can be seen as one community of place with various communities of occupation such as the fishermen or the commuters or as numerous overlapping communities based in the villages. In the early days these were separated by greenbelts and were more visually distinct. The advent of the supermarket, centrally positioned at Ostend, undercut the economics of the food and general stores, increased traffic island-wide and eroded a greater sense of village identities.

The residential population was about 2000 in the 1970s but with the island being a visitor and holiday destination it catered to between 20,000 and 30,000 tourists over the summer. Economically this created a summer boom and a winter bust for local businesses. About that time many who were seeking to escape the modern urban 'rat race' and live an alternative lifestyle, settled on the island. Accordingly, the permanent residents could be loosely divided into two broad categories, 'the capitalists' and 'the alternatives' with concomitant ideologies and identities. There were fishermen in both categories.

The alternatives strove for a community ethos by establishing networks for an informal economy of cooperation and exchange and such institutions as the Food Co-op, Playcentre, and alternative health services, while avoiding consumerism. Many supported their ideals by gardening, pottery and crafts, repairing boats, creating artwork, or as social welfare beneficiaries, stretching meager incomes supplemented by part-time work, a conscious reciprocity for labour, services and

the exchange of surplus produce with those in the network of an informal economy.



Figure 9: Waiheke Island showing the main places named in the text (Source: Max Oulton)

Critics had a different evaluation and referred to:

Self-consciously trendy areas like ... Waiheke Island where the inhabitants are preoccupied with the pseudo-problems of personal and spiritual growth. The particular manifestations sometimes have their logic - alternative medicine for instance - but the total effect is quite bizarre: tarot cards, astrology, naturopathy, self-actualisation, men's groups, group living and loving, Reichian massage, neuro-linguistic programming, 'organic' foods. Running through these otherwise unrelated fads is a common purpose: establishing the identity of the individual both through an external system of superstition or spirituality, and through collective activity with other individuals. (Jesson in Sharp 2005 150)

The external pressures of governance, population increase and a globalised economy have shaped community dynamics on Waiheke. Prior to changes introduced by the 1984 Labour government, Waiheke was locally autonomous under the Waiheke County Council. Following an amendment to the Local

Government Act (1974) the Island was amalgamated with Auckland City in 1989 and administered as part of the Hauraki Gulf.

Globalisation had increasing effects on the community and, indeed, the fishermen. For much of the 20th century Waiheke had been a locality for baches and a holiday destination catering for travellers, tourists and casual visitors. With the growth of the tourist industry nationally and on the island, vineyards producing internationally acclaimed wines, more gourmet restaurants, and expanding accommodation including resort and conference centres, the island's tourist and visitor industry became more formalized to attract increasing overseas custom.

OTHER COMMUNITIES

The literature, my past experience and more recent opportunities to visit them, provide some information about commercial fishing in other New Zealand communities. Those in the literature have been covered in my literature survey and are drawn on as relevant in subsequent chapters. During the course of this research visits were made to Ngawi (exposed coast), Thames (inshore), and Helensville (harbour, estuarine), Lyttelton, Akaroa and Whangarei (all harbours). Information obtained while visiting these communities will be drawn on where appropriate in the following chapters as points of comparison, but were not part of the detailed study.

CRITERIA: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ITQS

An objective of this research is to determine to what extent, if at all, the introduction of ITQs has changed the ideology and ethos of owner-operators, quota owning, and ACE-dependent fishermen and their crews. It is to see whether or not the ethos and identity of fishermen, the work and social relations between skippers and crew and their relationships with non-fishing members of the community within which they live, have been altered as a result of ITQs and commoditised fishing rights.

ACE-dependent fishermen have to lease quota from quota owners who may be corporates, quota brokers or owner-operators. The cost of leasing adds to their operational costs and therefore may marginalise them still further than previously. It may also mean that control of their operation shifts from the wheelhouse to the

corporate boardroom (Apostle, McCay et al. 2002). Indeed fishermen have complained of being micro-managed by cell-phone from ashore (Apostle, McCay et al. 2002 121). Thus ACE-dependent fishermen may no longer enjoy the cache of independent owner-operators and are simply contractors to the corporates.

Loss of quota can result in change of community focus from active participation in the seafood industry to servicing the tourist industry with charter operations for example, which may also involve resource extraction but are, in addition, dependent on the whims of outsiders. Jentoft notes that, “Many feel that it would ruin the special cultural characteristics; that the authenticity would be lost. It is even claimed that the tourism industry would reduce the coastal culture to a caricature of itself. There is a danger of devaluation through commercialization” (Jentoft 1993 93).

While as Davis and Bailey (1996 253) say, “[t]he logic and dynamics of such management policies give little recognition to the fact that for many in small-boat community settings fishing and ocean resources are as much expressions of social relations between kin and familiars as they are about economics and property”. But in terms of comparative perspectives, if a social approach shows that at the community level (bottom) there is social injustice and inequity, this is, at least potentially on a face to face basis within a community structure where formal and informal mechanisms may be available to help resolution. The economic perspective of right-based fishing, however, allows, maybe even promotes, social injustice and inequity to a higher level (top) resolvable only through more formal means. Thus, just what ownership of quota means for such fishermen and their communities has to be identified.

Fishermen

There is a question as to whether social change follows or precedes fishery changes. Hamilton et al (2004 196) suggest that “[a]s a fishery transforms its resource base, the fishery itself must change too, and along with it the fishery society”. However, Helgason and Palsson (1997 120) emphasise that as quota is “quantifiable, divisible and commensurable”, fishing rights have been commoditized to a particular sector (in their case, boat owners) “in a privileging of capital over labour, shifting power from sea to land and widening the economic

rift between boat owners and their employees". Thus the change in management instrument resulted in social change.

For individual quota owners this may bring more certain income and returns and result in increased status whereas those who have to lease are deprived with concomitant changes in community relationships (Apostle, McCay et al. 2002) and social status. In some more extreme cases owners have been referred to as "quota kings", "Lords of the sea" (Helgason and Palsson 1997 57) or "quota barons",

This probably means a change in relationships from more co-operative and sharing on the basis of reciprocity and community solidarity to more formal with mutual assistance giving way to utilitarian commercial transactions.

Concomitantly it may increase the social distance between fishermen and families of those who own quota and those who do not. Seeking information on such matters formed a key part of the research.

Communities

The loss of quota owning fishermen from communities may result in a change of ideology of communities from resourceful, self-sufficient collectivities to company towns or dependent dormitories for corporate employees. Ashore, therefore there may be changes in social justice, and equity, the social fabric, livelihoods and social relations, which have affected the identity, ethos and outlook at levels of the community from fisher families through to the community as a whole.

Research at the community level (Holmes 1998 105) has shown a much more varied response among communities and indicates that to understand the implications of a change in ideology, such as that experienced in New Zealand, its impact on fishermen needs to be explored at a scale that enables the diversity and the variety of responses to the new regime to be expressed. Again, information was sought on such matters.

PRACTICALITIES: FIELDWORK

Having lived on Waiheke since October 1978 and participated in various aspects of the community through out that time but, I unfortunately did not regard this as

fieldwork and haven't "anthropologised" the community in the sense of keeping detailed notes and records. I have also maintained interest in the Viaduct, visited it periodically and, particularly since owning a digital camera over the last few years, photographed the fishing vessels and general activities whenever opportunity offered.

Fieldwork in the Coromandel and Leigh has required more intentional arrangements. Early in my research the (Waiheke) Ferry Users Group (FUG) annual social trip by ferry to Coromandel allowed a preliminary visit (5 March 2005). On that Saturday afternoon a couple of hours were spent on the wharf looking at the boats and talking with the two owner-operators who were doing maintenance at the time.

The recommissioning of a friend's trimaran (*Kliss*) enabled visits by sea to both Coromandel (30 Sept - 2 October 2006) and Leigh (13-15 December 2006). It was hoped that arriving by small boat would facilitate contact with fishermen in a way that arriving by vehicle and standing on the wharf would not. They were short visits but provided an introduction to these communities and an entree to deeper discussions with some of the fishermen.

These trips also showed that to interview informants in Coromandel and Leigh required either a much longer time or better shorebased mobility. Subsequently I purchased the Daihatsu HiJet mini-van to provide transport, accommodation and sufficient certainty to make appointments for interviews with informants. I used it for trips to Thames and Coromandel (8-11 Jan 2007) as well as Whangarei and Leigh (5-10 Feb 2007). It also enabled visits to places I couldn't have seen otherwise (Ngawi 18,19 Dec 2006 and Helensville, 5 February 2007) and the flexibility to travel on for two interviews in Parua Bay (Whangarei, 6 February 2007) when a strong easterly wind and a public holiday (Waitangi Day) meant fishermen were absent from Leigh.

DATA SOURCES

Interviews with fishermen, their wives or families, participants and leaders in the fisheries, in the communities and the industry, provide the primary data used to determine the social implications of changes in the flow of rights. Supplementary information was gathered from archival sources such as census data, local

periodicals (e.g. *The Gulf News*) and local histories from the Auckland Public Library Archives, items in the news media, observation and also more casual conversations. Informants were found from past contacts in the fishing industry from the Viaduct research and Greenpeace contracts, by telephoning quota or ACE owners in Leigh or Coromandel who were identified from the quota register, by the snowball technique and through opportunistic encounters.

PRACTICALITIES / METHODS: INTERVIEW PROCESS

My interests are in the expressive, the more emotional feelings and subjective responses to fish, fishing, the community and the politics of the fishery, rather than the instrumental and more objective aspects of the subject. I sought to make the interrelations between people variables and factors transparent in an attempt to highlight the role neo-liberal rights-based policies play in shaping communities. For this reason interviews have been quoted at length to ensure the informants' perspectives are apparent and have not been distorted by my possible bias.

Census and statistical data, and other material normally grist to a formalist mill, hasn't been given a great deal of prominence. Nor has the role economics plays in altering fishermen's behaviour as they describe or rationalise it because these have been addressed for the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery by Dewees (1987; 1989; 1997; 2007).

My interviews were generally arranged by phone and conducted at a time and place as convenient for informants as possible, most typically at their dining room table. Often we had had a brief chat about the topic, which I deliberately didn't prolong because often what had been said once would not be repeated in interviews and although I made notes after such conversations, they were never as rich as the recorded information. At the interviews the topic and the Consent Form were explained and permission to record on a digital voice recorder (DVR) was almost always given. Later these recordings were downloaded to my laptop and transcribed.

The working title for my dissertation was "The social implications of rights-based fisheries management in New Zealand". For a few informants no further

explanation was required. They had observed or participated in the development and introduction of the QMS. For others, though, such insider terminology was meaningless so I either explained the terms or, more usually, glossed the title as, "Social change as a result of our fisheries management system" explaining that this involved the privatisation of catching rights.

The interests, concerns and perspectives of each informant were different so each interview was different and often covered different aspects. Aside from fishermen or former fishermen who could be regarded as similar, at least in terms of occupation, most informants were in different situations and could provide insight into different aspects of the research. I did not, therefore, start with a list of standard questions but rather on the basis of previous contact or knowledge of the person's situation often conveyed when I outlined why I was doing the research. Typically this was my assertion that ideally when a fisheries management system was being changed they looked at biology to look after the fish, economics to look after industry matters and social science to look after fishermen and their communities. That from the literature in NZ there had been little concern with the social and the classic phrase was "[l]et the chips lie where they fall" (Clark & Duncan 1986 129). Frequently, without further prompting, my informants told me of their experiences or how they were involved in their specific area of relevance.

Alternatively, or possibly later, I asked what attracted them to fishing and how they got in. I was interested in what motivated them, what they did and what it meant for them. This was a familiar and entirely non-threatening approach and informants seemed very willing to share.

My objective was to facilitate a guided conversation, to follow their enthusiasm and the results, generally, provided good coverage of the information I was seeking. Where necessary I asked questions raising relevant areas not already covered (how, for example, the family was affected by the absences or uncertainties of fishing trips?). At times I would use stories of my own experience to empathise and elicit clarification or get more detail on relevant issues. My objective was to get an account of recruitment, objectives, satisfaction, fishing ethos, relationships with family, with the industry, with community, future prospects, and attitude to ITQs.

The QMS was introduced in 1986, so investigation of the ensuing social change has meant comparison of fishing before and after, involving experience over some 30 or more years. The research was therefore vulnerable to the normal difficulties associated with oral history, including the potential to valorise or rationalise past roles and actions as well as oversights, recollection distortions, selective memory⁶⁴, reliability of memory (Perkes and Thompson 2006 3), the issues of subjectivity/objectivity and “the effects of the interviewing process on the interviewer” (Yow 2006 58 63).

Some informants had, in fact, been actively involved over all that period, whereas others had not. There is potential that those who remained throughout or were still actively fishing were not fully representative of the overall participants’ experiences. Moreover, I suspect, their recollections were probably more influenced by direct experience and emotional commitments, their lived experience and their memorable moments, than by matters that might more objectively be the facts and figures of official history. It is through this experience and meaning that I sought to understand the implications of rights-based fishing (See K’Meyer 1997; Perkes and Thompson 2006 3).

Fishermen are not restricted to participation in only one community. One fisherman, for example, who I first met unloading in Leigh, keeps his boat at Whangarei Basin and lives elsewhere. Another vessel, one of the only purpose built longliners first launched during my Viaduct study in the early 1980s, was seen unloading in Leigh then later moored at Sand Spit, just south of Leigh. Coromandel fishermen, while generally unloading at Coromandel, sometimes did so at the Viaduct or even occasionally at Leigh. A Coromandel informant told me about boats, normally based there targeting snapper, which as a result of the QMS, periodically moved to deeper water, even to the Far North to target gurnard.

I knew from copies of the *Gulf News* and cuttings in my records that this community weekly newspaper contained a rich dataset, essentially a local history of Waiheke commercial fishing from before the QMS at least until the demise of the Co-op. Written as news or accounts from those involved or occasionally by

⁶⁴ For the politics of memory and the interplay of collective, personal memory and counter-memory see K’Meyer (1997).

outside observers this material made up for the lack of current fishermen on Waiheke and also helped assuage concerns that my own recollections might be overly biased and provided a needed counter to my lived experience of Waiheke with a more neutral contemporary source. The current local news media I saw during my times in Coromandel and Leigh did not suggest a comparable source in either community and local Council staff confirmed this. Due to time constraints these sources were not investigated further and instead I have relied on the local histories referred to by council officers, found in the Auckland City Library Reference Collection or the local libraries at Coromandel and Warkworth (See: Coromandel Town History Research Group 2002; Mitcalfe 1980; Frost 1991).

I also analysed *Commercial Fishing, Professional Fisherman* and the earlier copies of *Seafood New Zealand* but didn't find significant articles about these places. Logistic constraints worked against having sufficient time in these communities, or at SeaFIC archives in Wellington, to work through local association records. The perspectives and memories of fishermen and community members who had been or were involved in commercial fishing were of more direct relevance and interest than archival records.

I accessed information on fishermen, quota, and ACE for SNA1 (snapper in Quota Management Area 1 which is between North Cape and Cape Runaway, bounded by the EEZ) and fishing vessels. As far as I could tell Census records did not contain breakdowns or categories that would be particularly useful for this research. So I relied on those records that had been informative which I had collected in the past.

Before this research, based on casual observation, the news media and the trade journal, I had assumptions about the social implications of the QMS, such as: a reduction in the coastal fleet, a declining number of independent owner-operators (e.g. Stevens 1999b 43), more work for less return, and less fresh and local fish for higher prices. In the past when I thought I knew what was going on suddenly new information came to hand refuting, or seriously complicating my perceptions. For this project, therefore, the approach and questions were directed at allowing informants to express their views and their perceptions of social implications to emerge in the analysis. I hoped that interviews would be guided conversations that would:

Take us into the mental world of the individual, to glimpse the categories and logic by which he or she sees the world. It can also take us into the lifeworld of the individual, to see the content and pattern of daily experience. The long interview gives us the opportunity to step into the mind of another person, to see and experience the world as they do themselves (McCracken 1988 9).

On a surprising number of occasions when I mentioned the subject of this research in casual conversation, there were vehement responses about the lack of fresh locally caught commercial fish, particularly from those not connected with fishing. Some then agreed to an interview, but for others I noted their statements and checked them against interviews with community people who had been involved with fish.

The guidelines for qualitative research or collecting oral histories advise asking open questions, either attributing or not attributing meaning (e.g. Emmerson et al. 1995; Becker 1998 14) or the implications of ideology on the interviewer/interviewee relationship (cf Yow 2006).

Informants

Table 2 outlines some of the characteristics of the informants who participated in the study. The fishermen I interviewed were firstly those on Waiheke I had known from the Viaduct Research who lived and moored their boats on the Island. Soon after the introduction of the QMS virtually all quota was sold so these people were no longer fishing commercially⁶⁵ and in several cases had moved off the island to Auckland or Northland. The Coromandel and Leigh fishermen interviewed were those I met on those wharves and others I'd been able to contact through one of the FishServe databases⁶⁶ or those suggested by other informants. In all these cases the fishermen lived in the community and, when operating, had generally based their boats nearby. In addition there were two fishermen, key informants, one in Auckland who had put his fish through the Waiheke Fish Co-op and one in Leigh, both of whom had been enthusiastic fishermen and active with the Federation who I had first met while with Greenpeace. I had met Peter Stevens and Bob Martin earlier following my time as deckhand, when they had

⁶⁵ One is now a charter fisherman.

⁶⁶ See Appendix 1: Abbreviations and Glossary.

been on the Federation Executive and seen subsequently when they were part of the NAFMAC Roadshow and again later when I was with Greenpeace. While for some fishermen it was clear from the FishServe databases that they did or didn't own quota and were ACE-dependent, others clarified their position in the interviews.

| Informants | Fishermen | | Community | | Other | | Totals |
|------------|-----------|---------|-----------|-------|-----------|------------|--------|
| | Former | Current | Seafood | Other | MAF/MFish | Federation | |
| Waiheke | 10 | | 6 | 9 | 2 | | 27 |
| Coromandel | 2 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 1 | | 15 |
| Leigh | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | | | 10 |
| Other | 4 | | 2 | | 3 | 2 | 11 |
| Totals | 17 | 10 | 13 | 15 | 6 | 2 | 63 |

Table 2. Informants

Notes: Of the 63 interviews with these informants 9 were informal i.e. on the phone and not recorded, or they either didn't sign the consent form or didn't explicitly give consent on the recording. Informants here are in one category only but could arguably be in several ('Former fishermen', for example could also be in 'Community').

Some of the fisheries officers who had operated in the Hauraki Gulf before and in the early stages of the QMS were resident on Waiheke or at Coromandel. One of these had been a share fisherman before running boats for MAF, is almost a neighbour, and now runs a dive charter boat often moored in "my" bay.

The key community people interviewed in the communities of place at Coromandel and Leigh were either contacted through longterm colleagues and residents Wendy Pond or Bill Ballantine (respectively) or were obviously connected with the fishing industry such as the local fish shops. The major exception was the licensed fish receiver at Thames who managed his shop on the wharf.

Some informants from the Ministry had been with MAF Head Office or the Auckland Regional Office and involved with the design, introduction and development of the QMS and were still with MFish or were consulting. Others were fisheries officers who initially crewed then skippered the MAF patrol boats. All three had worked extensively in the Hauraki Gulf but also in the Bay of Plenty and up the Northland coast. Consequently, they, particularly by comparison with Head Office staff, were in close contact with fishermen to enforce the regulations. All operated boats of similar size and in the same conditions and marine environment so had greater understanding, indeed empathy, with the fishermen than officers from Head Office.

MAORI

I have deliberately avoided the complexities and sensitivities of Māori fisheries issues. They are very significant for New Zealand fisheries and Māori now have some 50 per cent of the quota which is being devolved to Iwi with significant social implications for Māori communities, whanau and individuals and also for those companies and fishermen who currently lease this quota. This is a fascinating but complex matter on which I have little background, knowledge or entrée. Consequently the dissertation makes only passing reference to what would otherwise be very important Māori issues. Where I make comments in relation to the impacts on Māori of the rights-based fishing they are based on information that arose naturally as part of the interview or document analysis process, rather than something that was specifically sought or explored. A specific detailed exploration and analysis of the implications of rights-based fishing for Māori and Māori communities was beyond the scope of this research.

ANALYSIS

Since the interviews were transcribed and often keyworded I tried the demonstration packages for many Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) programs before deciding on MaxQDA because it contained a graphics program and operated as I anticipated. Unfortunately it will not analyse audio, video or pdf files. I recognized the utility of working directly with audio toward the end of my interviewing. Pdf files are now becoming “industry standard” making ability to work with this format essential. Other programs were used to assist the research project principally Word, Text Analyst and the database program Zoot as a repository for significant quotes and information. I also experimented with many other programs⁶⁷ to facilitate data handling, understanding and writing.

While using the computer for archiving and analysis, works on Computer Aided Qualitative Analysis (CAQDAS) (e.g. Barry 1988; Bong 2002; Coffey, et al. 1996; Lee and Fielding 1996; Peace 1998) and software for Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) (Kelle 1995ab, 2007; Koenig n.d., 2004; Bourdon 2006), were among references that guided analysis by, for example, assisting coding interview transcriptions and considering, open or axial coding (Urquhart 2000) and their subsequent interpretation.

MaxQDA was the particular software program used for analysing the transcripts of my interviews. These were firstly imported into the program and a coding scheme set up to identify the required information. Each transcript was then read and relevant information, in a sentence or paragraph, marked with a code or codes. Alternative Boolean searches would locate a key word or combination of keywords and those relevant could be coded. Once the corpus was coded, information could be retrieved from all or selected transcripts using Boolean searches on the codes.

⁶⁷ X1, DTSearch for searching, MindManager to enable visualising chapters and the whole document and Tinderbox since I would have preferred to work with software that made networks, interconnected levels, multi-dimensional webs of information visual.

SUMMARY

In summary, the dissertation methodology has involved a mix of methods and data sources attempting to cover a period of about thirty years including participant observation on the wharves and the boats, reviewing the different incarnations of the trade journals Commercial Fishing, Professional Fisherman and Seafood New Zealand, collecting newspaper cuttings, noting TV coverage, Internet searches and general interest observation. It has involved some fifty formal interviews, supplemented by documentary analysis. The data derived has been analysed using qualitative data techniques with MaxQDA.

The lack of a clear baseline and an ongoing monitoring programme before and after meant the QMS cannot be robustly evaluated in the sense of objectively measuring its achievements and failures against its original objectives. It also became apparent that rather than separate case studies the communities were in fact one regional fishery that impacted differently on different terrestrial bounded communities of place. Additional matters arose in relation to the impacts of the exclusion of part-timers and the impact of QMS associated regulatory matters such as Licensed Fish Receiver (LFRs) processes. The methodology employed therefore sought to shed light on the lived experience of the QMS and associated or contemporary fishery management decisions and their implications for the 'communities' and fishermen rather than an evaluation of the QMS as originally intended.

This chapter has presented the methodologies used in this research; my background in relation to commercial fishing, my preferred methodology, SIA and why it was not appropriate, the necessity of using "grey literature", past research and interviewing - essentially "retrospective ethnography", the choice of communities, their similarities and differences with the reason for focus on primarily one, and the practicalities / methods of interviewing and analysis. The research assumes that the ideology of each of the components (corporates, management, fishermen and communities) will be experienced as ethos and expressed as identity. Dynamic interrelations between the components, result concomitantly in interactions between the ideologies and hence their ethos and identities. The 1984 Labour government and Rogernomics meant, however, that neo-liberalism became the dominant ideology. Hence the dissertation will assess

the social implications of the QMS by examining the changes that resulted in ethos and identity, for local fishermen and their communities.

Chapter 4: A Critique of the Received View of the Introduction of ITQs

The focus of this dissertation is on the changes that arose from the introduction of rights-based fisheries management. This chapter will, therefore, provide a critical evaluation of the usual explanation for the fisheries crisis and the introduction of the QMS to resolve it. It will examine MAF's ideology and its relations with a), the corporates that created open access and the crisis of overfishing and over capitalisation in the coastal fishery as exemplified by the introduction of 'big boats', with b), coastal fishermen and their Federation with grants and loan schemes and with c), inshore part-timers (pluriactive fishermen) and their rural coastal communities.

As my research developed it became increasingly clear that despite the critical comments of various commentators (e.g. Cullen and Memon 1990; Wallace 1995 1997; Hersoug 2004) the dominant view of the QMS did not stand closer scrutiny. Following a critical review, this dissertation argues, therefore, that it was the advent of the 'big boats' for the deep water fishery and Rural Bank loans for the development of the coastal fisheries which led to the open access which was blamed for stock depletion which, in turn led to rights-based management with ITQs. The exclusion of the part-timers shows the government's lack of concern for social implications. Indeed some informants suggested that the social implications for fishermen and their communities of this exclusion were more profound than those of the QMS (early informal interviews, Informant 14). The significance of these features of the history of New Zealand fisheries has had little more than passing reference in the academic literature⁶⁸.

It was commonly believed New Zealand's coastal fishery was overfished but the National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (NAFMAC) discussion document indicated "the problem is spread disproportionately among the various regions, among the various fishing methods, among the various sizes of vessels

⁶⁸ Haworth's "Tides of Change" recently published (2008) does track the Federation's concern for both the increasing fleet of 'big boats' on the coast and the part-timers.

operating in the trawl fishery, and among the various species which are considered important” (Struik in Boyce et al 1986 117).

ITQs were purportedly introduced to resolve the problems of over-fishing and overcapitalization in New Zealand's coastal fishery. Commentators (Newell et al. 2005 1; Boyd and Dewees 1992 184; Sissenwine and Mace 1992 148) generally believe that these problems were the result of open access. This dissertation instead argues that it was a consequence of Government policy following the declaration of the EEZ in response to the fishing industry and public's perception of foreign fishing around New Zealand. The Government's 'think big' development orientation facilitated the fishing industry's expansion of the fishing fleet with imported duty-free 30 metre boats for the deepwater on the one hand and loans for coastal boats on the other. It was government policy, therefore that created open access although as Cullen and Memon (1990 52) argue “[c]ontinued inshore fishing effort is likely to have achieved this result unaided but the process was accelerated by the use of larger, more effective boats originally purchased by New Zealand companies for deepwater fishing. While there were a relatively large number of part-time fishermen, the New Zealand industry had come to be dominated by a number of large operators. Thus, 90 percent of the vessels caught less than 20 percent of the fish”. The depletion of coastal stocks was a consequence of Government facilitated over-development creating the open access that led to the crisis.

The big boat issue dealing with the development and corporatising of the fisheries involved the bigger NZ companies such as Sealord, Fletchers, Sanford, Skeggs and others, the government and the international market; and a high level or institutional perspective. The exclusion of the part-timers shows the lack concern for a grassroots perspective.

FOREIGN FISHING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW ZEALAND FISHING INDUSTRY

Cozens (2001 1) argues that despite the presence of Japanese vessels fishing around New Zealand from the late 1950s, the advice of experts, the slowly developing domestic fishing industry and official reports, New Zealand was slow to develop an industry to take advantage of these resources. Foreign fishing

started with Japanese targetting tuna, then snapper longliners that provisioned and bunkered in New Zealand ports. While most of the fishing was not in competition with New Zealand vessels, longlining for snapper was. In addition, the foreign fishing indicated the extent of the resources was larger than realized. The New Zealand fleet had been catching only about one quarter of the total catch available in local waters (Eggleston 1977 15).

Rees (2005 83), citing Le Heron (1996), and Sharp (1997) noted that “[t]hrough 'think-big' policies, the Government made large scale access to fisheries possible, at the expense of overseas fishing companies, in return for large scale investment in processing and labour. Between 1978 and 1982 the industry invested \$47 million in vessels and \$25-30 million in onshore processing facilities”.

Brian Kenton⁶⁹, well placed to convey the industry's perspective, indicated the fishing industry was aware of the foreign fishing, but became alarmed at the extent revealed by New Zealand Defence Department information showing that 393 foreign fishing vessels had been identified working in waters surrounding New Zealand. He questioned “why this large build up was never brought to the notice of the Government earlier” (Kenton 1977 11)?

By 1976 the government responded to the fishing industry and public concern at the foreign fishing by following Iceland's lead and entered negotiations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for enlarging NZ waters from the 12-mile limit to the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (See Figure 10). Fishing industry leaders were skeptical of the form of access agreements. Peter Stevens, for example, then President of the Wellington Trawlermen's Association, was concerned, that “many politicians will see unilateral agreement as a legal basis to trade access rights in return for sales of our agricultural products” to the detriment of the local fishing industry. He believed that attention to “foreign expertise” was misplaced since their catching methods were not “as new, better or even as efficient as ours”. The essential difference was, he felt, “(t)he large foreign fishing nations have massive markets of traditional fish consumers to provide a continuing incentive while our efforts have

⁶⁹ Trawlerman, Managing Director of Kenton Trawling Company Ltd of Timaru and President of the Federation of Commercial fishermen.

been inspired by individual pride, a worthy motive perhaps, but hardly the formula for economic growth and survival in today's world" (*Commercial Fishing*, August 1976 5)




Figure 10: New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Source: Max Oulton).

BACKGROUND: “THINK BIG”

Although it gained wider currency in public debate Wilson claims the term “think big” essentially arose from “a range of large-scale, capital intensive energy related projects undertaken in the late 1970s by the (then) National⁷⁰ New Zealand government ... to reduce the escalating foreign exchange burden being imposed on New Zealand by the rising oil prices as a consequence of the Iranian revolution of 1979” (Wilson 2006 162).

Wallace points out that “[f]ishing was one of the first of the infamous Muldoonist “think big” policies of paying a resource rental and argued the proceeds should be put into a revolving fund to pay for fisheries research and management” (Wallace 1997 10). Although the formal “think big” policy may not have included such fisheries development, the “think big” ideology, certainly did. Arguably, from a more general perspective, “[a]s time passed the term came to embrace almost any new factory or industrial development which Government MPs wanted to use to illustrate the success of their ‘National Development Strategy’” (Douglas and Callan 1987 151).

Certainly within some sectors of the fishing industry, particularly among the representatives of smaller fishermen and companies, and the Labour opposition of the time, the loans and importing of the ‘big boats’ epitomised the “think big” policy. Sir Basil Arthur, then Labour Party shadow minister for primary industries, believed that the first victims of the “think big” policy were the inshore fishermen and, in no uncertain terms, at the Federation's annual conference asserted “the Government policies which allowed the importation of big fishing boats and let them fish inshore waters had caused problems. The livelihoods of many small fishermen had been threatened and others had been put out of work” (NZ Herald, 1981).

Bruce Jesson, a critic of the “think big” policy, contended that a result was “a shift in the balance of social forces: towards groups such as the finance sector; and against groups such as the trade union movement ... [and had] been evident since the late seventies” (Sharp 2005 139).

⁷⁰ A “Right wing” party as opposed to the “Left wing” Labour party.

As Taylor et al (1999 4), argue “the economic benefits from developments are centralised, while the negative impacts of changes and the social costs arising from the developments are substantially borne by the regions and communities in which the resource development activities are located”. Of relevance for the fishing industry were the:

key influences of, and close alliance between, the interests of multinational capital and the State in resource development, the role of technological change (and imported technology) and its influence on work and its organisation, and the power of the corporates to restructure local society. These interacting, extra-local influences, when focussed on resource exploitation, bring changes to regional and local communities and their physical environments which are not anticipated or always welcomed. Conflicts result (Taylor et al 1999 4).

The formal “think big” policy discredited Muldoon's National Government and resulted in significant detriments to the communities directly affected by the projects and added further indebtedness to New Zealand. In addition, by less formal extension, the “think big” philosophy that led to the importation of the ‘big boats,’ increased corporatisation of the industry and also impacted severely on the inshore fishermen and their coastal communities.

A result of the “think big” policy was, Wilson argues, that “[t]he debt incurred by the ‘think big’ projects also bolstered the neoliberal rationale for the selling of other state assets – such as banks, railways and airlines. Where privatization was not feasible, other sectors of the economy were restructured through corporatisation and deregulation” (Wilson 2006 162) and in turn led to the introduction of the QMS.

BIG BOATS

A key plank in the argument for introducing neoliberal ITQ systems is that they will enable industry rationalization and this is often interpreted as meaning investment in bigger boats of greater capacity and the removal of smaller vessels (Aslin et al, 2001 23). It is important to note that that this was not a consequence of anticipating the introduction of the ITQ system.

Connor observed significantly that, “[b]oth the number of 24-33m vessels and their total capacity increased by nearly 500 per cent in the decade leading up to implementation of the quota system in 1986, while the number of vessels over

33m in length increased by an order of magnitude. Some of these large vessels, imported under duty concessions to increase domestic participation in the deep-water species, had also been fishing inshore, increasing pressure on stocks” (Connor 2000).

Even before the declaration of the EEZ, New Zealand companies, ostensibly gearing up to supplant the foreign fishing fleet were evaluating and importing ‘big boats’ in the 100 foot/30 metre size range under the duty-free scheme. Fletcher Fishing had imported two British Distant Water trawlers (86.06 m length overall (l.o.a.)) (Lovie 1988 168, 169). These were of compatible size to the foreign factory trawlers already fishing in New Zealand waters. Other companies, however, focused on a smaller class. "Skeggs ... commissioned two 100ft stern-trawlers ... at a total cost of \$2 million” (Avery 1007 13) while Wrightsons NMA sent a team overseas to examine “fishing vessels of the [same] 30 metre class in Denmark, Spain and Korea and called for quotations from shipyards in those countries” (Avery 1977 13). Sealord’s two new 196-ton (199.15 tonne) trawlers began pair trawling in mid September and, “put the New Zealand industry on a technical footing with the world's big league fishing countries” (*Commercial Fishing*, November 1977, 31).

By late 1977 some coastal fishermen were concerned at the prospect of the ‘big boats’ competing with the more traditional vessels on the coast. The Moeraki Fishermen's Association, for example, had made submissions to the Federation: “The inshore fishery has already been ruined by foreign boats and there is not enough for the small inshore fleet. What will happen if big New Zealand owned trawlers choose to fish inshore?” Then, tellingly in terms of the part-timers and the issues concerned to be addressed in this dissertation, “As I see it, the smaller boats are going to be hammered by part-timers from the shore side and the big trawlers from the sea side” (*Commercial Fishing* November 1977 15). Kenton confirmed the perspective: “I think the big New Zealand trawlers are going to be more of a problem to the established New Zealand fishermen than the foreign boats. There is no way the ‘big boats’ are going to be able to fish out of the

developed area⁷¹ all of the time. They are not big enough to be in the hunt, like the Japanese and the Russian boats” (*Commercial Fishing* November 1977 15).

Cliff Skeggs, managing director of Skeggs Fisheries Ltd⁷², took the opposite view, essentially implying that the companies should be able to expand regardless of the consequences for the coastal fishery “We've got to grow up to the fact that we are all New Zealanders and that they are all New Zealand fishing grounds. There must be no discrimination between small trawlers and large trawlers. The grounds must be fished to their capacity. Large trawlers have to be serviced just like the smaller ones.” He did concede that the inshore grounds had been overfished and the main potential for the ‘big boats’ was “out on the continental shelf” (*Commercial Fishing* November 1977 15).

PAIR TRAWLERS

In the light of Skeggs’ comments, it is significant that many of these ‘big boats’ were built or bought in pairs and set up for pair trawling⁷³. Mills (1978 64,65) in discussing 30 metre vessels, refers to rejecting designs not suitable for pair trawling and states explicitly, “The vessels were laid out so they can pair trawl as well as single trawl if required”. Titchener's account of Sanford’s search for vessels in the 95-foot class (30 metre) and then the trialling of the first pair, the *Albert Sanford* and *San Rakino*, confirms that not only were they set up for pair trawling but that they immediately entered the coastal North Island West Coast fishery (for snapper) using that method. They were so successful that Sanford’s ordered a second pair, *San Hauraki* (See Figure11 and Figure12 for size comparison) and *San Manukau*. The naming ceremony and their trials pair trawling in the Hauraki Gulf were attended by both, Hon. Duncan McIntyre, Minister of Fisheries and Hon. Jim Bolger, former Minister of Fisheries but then

⁷¹ By the “developed area” he was referring to the traditional coastal fishery.

⁷² One of the large fishing companies.

⁷³ Pair trawling involves two matched boats towing a net between them. Fishermen who used this method argued it is more power and fuel efficient and catches more than the combined catches from single trawling. Before the QMS Fishermen using other, particularly passive methods, argue pair trawling takes too great a share of the catch (Viaduct Research).

Minister of Labour, immediately before they left for fishing on the West Coast (Titchener 1982 112 113). So the Government was fully cognizant they were operating in the inshore fishery⁷⁴.



Figure 11: San Hauraki, one of the 'Big Boats' that pair trawled for snapper in the coastal fishery



Figure 12: Cotapaxi, primarily a snapper Danish seiner but multi-purpose fishing vessel here handling for bluefin tuna. She is a sister of Diana the vessel I crewed on.

⁷⁴ This would not have been unreasonable had the 'big boats' remained in the more exposed fisheries of the West Coast but many also encroached on already crowded inshore fisheries.

Likewise Skeggs 'big boats', *Hawea* and *Waipouri*, Sealord Products *Fifeshire* and *Whitby* and Jaybelle-Nichemo's *Recovery II* and *Resolution* all pair trawled and this method was a prime consideration in their design. Pair trawling is most closely associated with the snapper fishery and I have not found evidence of its use in other New Zealand fisheries. Johnson's only references to the method are all in relation to vessels targeting snapper (Johnson and Haworth 2004 302-306) so that it seems that far from being bought primarily for the deepwater the "pairs" were bought for and first used on the coast for snapper. While their use in the exposed conditions in the West Coast snapper fishery may have been justified since they were not generally in conflict with smaller boats, the 'Big Boat' 'pairs' were also used in the already congested east coast snapper fishery (Haworth 2008 240, 242). Certainly it appears that high value coastal species were essential for their economic viability. So instead of deepwater usage in practice, from Johnson's account there are hints that the investments in the 'big boats' were directed at demonstrating fishing commitment in a bid for deepwater quota (Johnson and Haworth 2004 297). This raises the very significant issue of whether these vessels were bought in anticipation of the QMS, or as I have assumed, by "quota"⁷⁵ Johnson meant share (Enterprise Allowances (EAs)) of the deepwater resources.

When, in 1978, at the Demersal Fisheries Conference, conservationists questioned bringing more fishing vessels into the coastal zone (Elder and Taylor 1978 70). Mr MacKay⁷⁶, answered they "were exploiting coastal species in order to obtain overseas earnings" (Elder and Taylor 1978 71). Others were also skeptical. Dr Elder⁷⁷, felt that the imported 30 metre vessels "were not really being aimed at deepwater species, but at the already exploited coastal stocks" (Elder and Taylor 1978 71) while Mr Waugh⁷⁸, expressed his belief that these vessels "would not be able to fish the deepwater resources" but felt they should replace smaller less

⁷⁵ Prior to the QMS fisheries were managed with a competitive quota for the species in the FMA so the term was in general use but its meaning here is unresolved.

⁷⁶ President N.Z. Seafood Processors Association and Managing Director Nelson Fisheries Ltd.

⁷⁷ A scientist with the Fisheries Research Division (FRD) of MAF

⁷⁸ Also from FRD.

efficient vessels on the coast (Elder and Taylor 1978 71). Elder and Taylor concluded that those present felt those vessels were adding to the fleet rather than replacing other vessels (Elder and Taylor 1978 71).

From the perspective of Hauraki Gulf owner-operators, Catton (1978 111) suggested that whereas the small vessels using passive fishing methods ensured the quality of each fish, the bigger company boats using power methods landed lower quality fish and had lower rates of financial efficiency since they require a higher proportion of their profits to pay for the bigger boats. Indeed he felt the situation was “scandalous”. The ‘big boats’ showed the incongruity of the situation since it appeared that one part of the Government was saying the stocks were fully fished or, like his own species, snapper, possibly overexploited, while another part “appears to be providing duty concessions, and presumably loan monies, to enable an increase in catching effort in that fishery” (Catton 1978 111, 113).

By 1980 the consequences of the “think big” policy were becoming very apparent. Mel Courtney, MP for Nelson and convenor of the Opposition fisheries' sub-committee on production and marketing, in asserting “the policy is falling apart”, expressed the view of many. “The industry ... expanded so rapidly it was overcapitalized with too many boats ... [t]he inshore fleet expanded and joint venture and duty-free boats exerted further pressure” (*Commercial Fishing* June 1980 5).

Some fishermen were in deep financial trouble and in 1980 felt “the last few months ... (had) been one of the worst 'lows' for years. The industry wanted subsidies but there were equitability problems since what would benefit larger operations would do little to help the smaller fishermen” (*Commercial Fishing* June 1980 5). The big companies were also facing serious problems. Skeggs, for example, just three years after the euphoria of buying their ‘big boats’, reportedly lost \$418,000 in eight months from their Nelson operation with the ‘big boats’, *Hawea* and *Waipouri* losing \$11,201 on just one trip, and, consequently they were tied up (*Commercial Fishing* June 1980 7). Doubts were being raised about the longterm viability of prime species such as snapper from the traditional fishing grounds of the coastal fleet as a result of “increased fishing pressure applied by larger more sophisticated vessels” (Riley 1982 380).

By 1983 coastal fishermen were very concerned about the status of their stocks. In the run up to the industry restructuring that resulted in the introduction of ITQs, NAFMAC (consisting of top level representatives of the big fishing companies, MAF divisions, the Fishing Industry Board, The Federation of Commercial Fishermen and the Fishing Industry Association) published a discussion document providing an overview of New Zealand Fisheries and then conducted “The Roadshow”, a series of meetings in all the main fishing ports to consult with fishermen. The belief at the time was that to ensure sustainability of the coastal stocks, fishing effort had to be reduced by 40 per cent. While the document had been circulated to some prior to the meetings, in general it was handed to fishermen as they entered. It noted “trawlers over 18 metres operating in the inshore fishery comprise 40 per cent of the trawl fleet, land 42 per cent of the total catch and 72 per cent of the trawl catch and may incur significant losses” (NAFMAC 1983 4).

Box 2: ‘Big Boats’ and Part-timers’ catch compared

Arguments that part-timers contributed to overfishing are difficult to sustain. From the NAFMAC Report (1983), boats are listed in descending / ascending order of landings (NAFMAC 100) the top 50 boats which would have included the newly imported ‘big boats’ caught 43,139 tonnes making the average catch per vessel 862.78 tonnes. Just 2.2 average ‘big boat’ catches were therefore equivalent to the tonnage landed by the bottom 2,000 boats. It took only 88 per cent of the average “Big Boat” catch to equate to the catch of the bottom 1,500 vessels and merely 22 per cent to be equivalent to the catch from the bottom 1000 vessels. So the catch of the excluded 2260 fishermen had been approximately that of 2.4 ‘big boats’ while that of the estimated 1500-1800 part-timers excluded had approximated the catch of between only one or two such average ‘big boats’.

The most significant finding of the document was that “in 1981 the top 50 boats accounted for 45 per cent of the total landings while the bottom 3,500 boats accounted for only 20 per cent of the total,” (NAFMAC 1983 100) and further, the bottom 2000 of the latter, landed only 4.1 per cent of the total landings (See Box 2). The top boats were clearly the big company boats and included those ‘big boats’ imported duty free or built with suspensory loans. It seemed that if MAF's prime motive had been to save the coastal fishery these vessels could have been traded-up into vessels suitable for the deepwater. The Government and the

companies did have the financial expertise and contacts to achieve this. Mistakes had been made with the size of these boats and there were calls for the “New Zealandisation” of the industry that should have encouraged such a move. Indeed it was not long before companies working in the deepwater began buying much larger factory trawlers. Instead, in order to save four per cent of landings the Government excluded the part-timers. The only explanation appears to be the Government’s concern at the potential loss the trawlers would make on the inshore fishery. Robin Allen⁷⁹ presenting MAF’s perspective on this conflict within the fishing industry noted that the “[m]edium sized trawlers, who must make their living from the prime inshore species such as snapper and tarakihi, are concerned that larger trawlers which have been purchased to fish in deeper waters offshore are also attracted to the prime inshore species” (Allen 1983 23) but justifies leaving such ‘big boats’ in the inshore fisheries since “there may be low valued resources in the inshore areas which are not attractive for small and medium sized fishing boats, but which could be effectively used by larger fishing boats were they not excluded from the area” (Allen 1983 24). Which begs the question as to why the ‘big boats’ were still allowed to fish prime inshore species.

It may well be that the companies’ choice of vessel size was unduly swayed by the advice of their local skippers and familiarity with the domestic market. But since Government Ministers were hosted aboard during pair trawling trials just the day before departure for snapper fishing grounds it is hard to believe that the Government did not know the ‘big boats’ would in fact be adding pressure in already fully fished coastal fisheries. It is hardly plausible that this extra pressure could be applied without not just Government awareness, but also Government approval. Rather it seems part of a *defacto* policy, to corporatise the coastal fisheries.

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MAF / Assistant Director Fisheries Research Division

RURAL BANKING AND FINANCE CORPORATION

LOANS

As noted above, even while companies were importing ‘big boats’ and forming joint ventures to supplant foreign fishing the Government was offering suspensory loans to build bigger coastal vessels and MAF was already warning that coastal fisheries were fully fished.

Ironically the same issue of *Commercial Fishing* (September 1977) reported both Duncan Waugh’s⁸⁰, warning to the annual conference of the Federation of Commercial Fishermen that the “Inshore demersally [bottom fish] caught stocks were fully fished.” (*Commercial Fishing* September 1977 17) and the Minister of Fishing, Mr. Bolger's, Budget announcement of suspensory loans for building larger, at least 21 metre, fishing vessels in New Zealand and "the special fishing boat scheme ... designed to assist suitably qualified fishermen who had demonstrated thrift and initiative but who had relatively little capital to purchase and operate their own fishing vessels, both from the Rural Banking and Finance Corporation (*Commercial Fishing*, September 1977 41; see also Information services 1977).

In outlining the proposals for the EEZ the Minister of Fisheries assured the conference, that the government was “committed to the expansion of your industry as rapidly as our investment resources will allow”. Addressing concern at direct foreign competition with New Zealand coastal fishermen he noted that “These 'prime fish' will ... be wholly reserved for the New Zealand industry so that our local fleet will be entitled to catch the lot.” (*Commercial Fishing* July 1977 8, 9). The 1976 budget had made provision for “fishermen or companies to import larger fishing vessels duty free. To date, eight vessels worth \$9 million have been approved and further applications are under consideration” (*Commercial Fishing* July 1977 8, 9). By contrast, the minister pointed out that in “1975 there were only nine fishing vessels on the New Zealand coast longer than 24 metres” (*Commercial Fishing* July 1977 8, 9). So the government was prepared to double ‘big boat’ capacity despite concerns that the stocks were fully fished.

⁸⁰ Research Director of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.

The EEZ was declared on 1 April 1978 and later that year the Government confirmed its development policy by extending the “deadline for the duty-free importation of larger fishing vessels” because “[s]imply, it is that we still need larger, more versatile vessels in our fleet” (Bolger 1978 3). He also noted a second suspensory loan scheme contributing to the construction of 15-21 metre coastal vessels while the previous scheme for smaller vessels now had a rider attached “for larger vessels than last year” though these vessels were to “concentrate on the less preferred species” (Bolger 1978 3).

With sectors of the public and industry already facing conflict with the 30 metre ‘big boats’, Neil Mills, Sanford’s General Manager felt it necessary to assure the demersal fisheries conference that “the planning of these (30 metre) vessels involved a large number of people from each section of our business, especially fishermen, engineers, factory executives, marketers and accountants were especially involved” and the company had considered all the relevant facts. He felt Sanford’s decision to buy such vessels had been confirmed when both Sealord Products and Skeggs Fisheries reached the same decision quite independently (Mills 1978 64). Indeed, I recall that some years later when attending a MAF Stock Assessment meeting, a CEO with one of the companies operating ‘big boats’ told me that they had done their homework, sought the best information and followed the best advice available, but despite this the 30 metre boats were clearly too small to work the Chatham Rise and other deep water grounds so had to fish the traditional coastal fisheries.

Ostensibly at least, the goal, from the Government's “think big” perspective, was to develop an internationally competitive New Zealand fishing industry. The big companies wanted to demonstrate commitment to the deepwater with bigger boats but of a size still within their experience and the expertise of New Zealand crews. In order to maintain economic viability they stuck with the methods and species they were familiar with. From the perspective of the Federation of Commercial Fishermen, the smaller companies and more traditional owner-operators, the coastal fisheries were under severe pressure and to save their livelihood desperately needed restructuring.

The prime inshore species were being depleted initially as a result of foreign fishing. The rapid, Government facilitated, expansion of the fleet especially with

the imported duty-free 30 metre 'big boats' and other loans for boats bigger than those in the traditional coastal fleet, then created the problems of overcapitalization and overfishing. Since the 'big boats' being bought for the deep water were neither restricted to the deep water nor being replaced by more appropriate deepwater boats, deliberately or otherwise, the coastal fishery was being corporatised for the benefit of the larger companies to the eventual detriment of the smaller and individual fishermen and their communities.

Rightly or wrongly there was a steady progression developing the corporate fleet, creating open access and taking over the coastal fishery from the traditional fishermen and the communities that they supported and which supported them.

Part-Timers

If the issue of the 'big boats' provides perspectives on the discourse frameworks of the "top" then an analysis of the discourse surrounding the exclusion of the part-timers shows the perspectives from the "bottom" of the fishing industry.

It has been argued that the exclusion of the part-timers happened in the context of MAF's growing recognition, in the late 1970s early 1980s, that existing management methods including a moratorium on issuing new licences, and the declaration of controlled fisheries were not working (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 3). McManus, reported the sequence of regulation "... the government ordered a moratorium on commercial fishing permits in the Hauraki Gulf in 1980 and on fishing permits generally in 1982, these were revoked by the Fisheries Act of 1983", but was critical of official "wrong doing" in the implementation of these policies showing why many fishermen felt disaffected (McManus 1994 1, 2; see Other Perspectives, p139).

PLURIACTIVE FISHERY NEW ZEALAND

Prior to the early 1980s there appears to have been a significant level of pluriactivity in New Zealand although little research was done on its importance, especially in the fisheries. Russell and Campbell (1999 122) claimed that "[a]t the start of the 1970s, the fishing industry was characterized by a large number of small-scale and often pluriactive fishers engaged in commercial fishing, with

another large group also engaged in fishing on a recreational basis. There were few large companies involved and little exporting”.

Compulsory licensing of fishermen first came into effect in January 1940 and Johnson and Haworth found that “there were 362 full-time and 1341 part-time fishermen in the industry. Another 319 full-time and 119 part-timers were classed as 'other than fishermen' but licensed all the same. Others worked in the fishing industry but not on boats. A year later there were 972 full-time fishermen and 761 part-time” (Johnson and Haworth 2004 134,135). In the late seventies the *Gulf News* reported that in the Hauraki Gulf, “An increasing number of part-time fishermen are also engaged in the fishery. In 1978, out of 680 registered commercial vessels in Auckland, 545 earned under \$4000 gross from fish landings” (*Gulf News* 7 November 1980 16).

Part-time fishing was part of a thriving informal economy in the 1970s-1980s involving sharing and exchange of food and produce in small communities (Johnson and Haworth 2004 358). Many of the part-time fishermen were at or near the level of subsistence fishing and some may in fact have been subsistence fishermen. In their survey of subsistence fishers Ackroyd Walshe et al. (2002) distinguished between economic and social/cultural fishers where the former “harvests for him/herself and or immediate dependants and uses the surplus for small-scale commerce” (Akroyd Walshe et al 2002 1), and the “social/cultural subsistence fisher gifts fish for reciprocity and mutual purposes. The definition does not include reciprocity for immediate or near term material benefit, such as swapping fish or other commodities or benefits at the time of the transaction” and would be illegal under the QMS (Akroyd Walshe Ltd. et al. 2002 2). Māori customary fishing exemplifies the latter category. Now though, Pita Rikys, one of my few Māori informants stated strongly, from first hand experience, that both the recreational and customary fishing limits are quite inadequate for Māori subsistence purposes.

Akroyd Walshe Ltd. et al (2002 24) also note that the informal economy has different referents for different researchers:

Work activities other than regular formal employment that are remunerated either in cash or in kind' ... the term has also been applied very broadly to include non-economic aspects such as an individual's sense

of place in a larger community as well as overall community integration. Under the informal economy non-wage activities 'are ultimately geared toward economic ends even if they are maintained or practiced through overt social relationships which may exhibit positive social and cultural benefits for their participants'.

Unexpectedly my research found that this informal economy, though not as extensive as it was then, nor as apparent, still continues. Scott sketches the contemporary context. "In addition to paid work ... there are informal means largely outside the realms of the state and the market by which households can supplement their incomes, based on self-provisioning, unpaid domestic and community work and reciprocal exchange within localities" (Scott 2000 39). Before the exclusion, fish in the informal economy networks would often have been from the part-timer catch. Now the fish is from the recreational catch but judging from a New Zealand television series on coastal surveillance and court prosecutions, it may also be from illegal catch. Fish were certainly among the resources that contribute to such family and household self-provisioning, subsistence and the reciprocity that strengthens community networks.

WHO WERE THE PART-TIMERS?

Not all the part-timers were, like Walter Murray (See Box 3), based in relatively isolated rural communities and dependent on seasonal work. Part-timers were a diverse group. For some, fishing provided an essential part of their livelihood and for others it was a supplement for other incomes, for tax rebates or other perks. Many of the former were seasonal workers in other primary sectors such as farming, forestry, or the meat processing (the freezing) works (Rennie 1998), while many of the latter were professionals taking time out from other occupations or using part-time fishing to get sales tax off their recreational boats, berthing space in the Viaduct or to cover their holiday expenses (Viaduct Research notes).

Seasonal fishermen

Numerically part-timers dominated the New Zealand domestic fishery and in some regions their livelihood activities included in addition to seasonal fishing, farming, forestry or work in the meat processing industry (the freezing works).

Taylor et al. (1999 6), in surveying New Zealand resource communities, found that [in contrast to commercial fishing] in the period 1986-96, “across most primary sectors, full-time employment gave way to part-time employment”. While the Taylor Baines consultants show the significance of part-time fishermen they do not refer specifically to the exclusion of part-timers in 1983 and just indicate “small operators withdrew from the fishery” (McClintock 2000 7). Their study of Riverton exemplified the dependence of communities before the exclusion of part-timers, especially in the period 1950-1970, “on the fishing, agriculture and meat processing industries” and indicated that “many part-time fishers were also employed as seasonal workers on farms or at nearby freezing works” (McClintock 2000 4) while many others were transient fishers “attracted by the rock lobster and paua [abalone] booms” (McClintock 2000 6). In addition there were “a lot of seasonal fishers catching rock lobster during the boom years” and many of these “according to one of our informants ... were 'instinctive fishermen' and 'the best conservators', with a comprehensive knowledge of their fishing territory” (McClintock 2000 10).

Box 3: Part-timers dependent on commercial fish excluded

The following exemplifies the situation of rural (seasonal, isolated) part-time fishermen dependent on fishing who were excluded by the definition of full-time fishermen 1 October 1983.

Walter Murray

Walter Murray moved back to Te Hapua initially to become a fisherman setnetting for mullet, a non-endangered species (Murray 18 September 1984). He was granted a permit under the Fisheries Act 1908 in 1978 (Watson 29 August 1985) and was dependent on fishing to supplement the \$6500 he earned as a casual driver of the school bus especially since he did “not get any income during the three months School Vacations” (Murray, 31 October 1983). It took him six years to accumulate his fishing gear, a boat and finally a freezer after Hikurangi Fisheries “reclaimed this equipment in March 1982” (Murray, 31 October 1983). His “motor was damaged in February '83 & parts were not available immediately. I only received the motor back in January 1984” (Murray 25 May 1984).

Consequently he did not meet the criteria defining a fisherman under Section 2 Fisheries Act 1983 (in force 1 October 1983) and, like 2260 others around New Zealand (McClurg 1997 102; Sharp 1997 510), his fisheries permit was not renewed.

MAF stated, and then in the process of appeal reiterated, the “criteria defining commercial fishermen include persons who: have earned at least \$10,000 from fishing; or at least 80% of their total gross income is derived from fishing; or

annually catch a minimum of 5,000kg of fish; or are on less than a subsistence income (which is \$4,400pa)". And explained: "The inshore fishery is facing major problems and a substantial reduction in fishing effort will need to be made in order to ensure a continuing industry. The definition of a 'commercial fisherman' is designed to exclude those persons who have another occupation or source of income". They conclude: "After careful consideration of the information you have supplied, as well as of records of fishing returns held by the Ministry, it has been decided that you do not qualify as a commercial fisherman in terms of the Act and therefore no fishing permit can be issued to you" (Dobson 2 March 1984).

Walter Murray appealed and in the process some 22 letters were exchanged variously between Murray, MAF, Hon. Bruce Gregory, his local MP and Colin Moyle, Minister of Fisheries and J.W. Watson of the law firm John Hooper.

He "commenced fishing again in February (1984) on the assumption that I would obtain the permit and to date I find that I meet your minimum catch requirement of 5000kg & only in 4 months". "Receival Dockets for the period February, May '84 show(ed) a total in excess of 6000kg" (Murray 25 May 1984) but he was still excluded.

So despite the isolation of Te Hapua, Murray's financial commitment to commercial fishing, lack of employment opportunities in the area, the exigencies of his situation and the leniency in allowing the 'big boats' to remain fishing on the coast, MAF was intransigent and Walter Murray was excluded from the fishery (Murray 1987).

Small-scale Fishermen

The exclusion didn't only affect part-time commercial fishermen. Soon after the Fisheries Act 1983 came into force, but before fishing permits had been declined, the New Zealand Herald ran a story about three fishermen, which I take as being typical of the many who expected to be excluded by the policy. Mr Roy Morey, based in Taipa, had started fishing with a dinghy and oars before graduating to a five metre boat and had been a commercial fisherman for 28 years. Mr Colin Pugh operated from Houhora in the Far North and Mr Ough had been fishing in Northland for seven years after part-time fishing the Hauraki Gulf. Like many other small commercial fishermen around the coast they expected to be excluded. They, like Walter Murray, had the right to appeal. They did agree on the necessity for conservation but wondered why the Ministry did not exclude the big trawlers. Landing and reporting \$10,000 of fish, the previous year were the criteria to be

considered. Mr Pugh, had “caught only \$8,000 worth of fish and that was enough for him to live on” he said. His commitment to fishing had involved an estimated \$100,000 moving to the North and the anticipation of fishing until he was 80. He was, he felt ‘a classic example of how to turn a small amount of fish into a reasonable income. We get by all right’”. They blamed the depletion on the big trawlers and believed that if only two pair trawlers were removed forty local longliners, compared with the five crew on the trawlers, would have jobs for life. They could not understand why, “[i]f the ministry wants to reduce the strain on fish stocks ... it is making life difficult for the small owner-operators who make the least impact on the resource” (*NZ Herald* 7 November 1983).

So unlike the corporates wanting allocation of the deepwater resource, neither financial commitment to fishing nor dependence on this occupation was considered sufficient for part-timers wanting to remain in the industry.

Urban part-timers

During my 1982-83 research, Viaduct informants, said of part-timers: “[t]hey're doctors and dentists and just in it to take the cream ... Part-timers are public servants, school teachers who have annual leave; all of them are in it for a fast buck. Summer, what's better to do?” (Viaduct Research). “As a result of the ready granting of licences ‘fly-by-night’ fishermen have taken advantage of the good money to be made in the schooling season – often dumping cheap fish on the market at a time of the year when year-round fishermen are starting to recoup winter losses. Several local fishermen mentioned the North Shore company directors who take two months off to reap the benefits of the lucrative summer season” (*Gulf News* 30 July 1982 30).

Heuristically there were two broad categories of part-timers; rural fishermen dependent on the fishery for a yearly income with little if any alternative employment and urban-based part-timers with more options. Rural part-timers and other excluded fishermen were diverse, often from very different backgrounds and with very different emotional or financial dependence on commercial fishing for their annual livelihoods or lifestyles. They and their fishing were, however, a significant part of both formal and informal economies of rural communities right around the coast.

THE EXCLUSION OF THE PART-TIMERS

The mechanism to exclude the part-timers was the Fisheries Act 1983. Very significantly Martin asserted “when the exclusion of part-timers was undertaken in October 1983 ITQs in the form we now have them had not yet been seriously considered. In hindsight we clearly must acknowledge that if we had been able to introduce the ITQ policy in 1983 the removal of part-timers would not have been necessary” (Martin 1987 Appendix p1).

Stan Crothers⁸¹, to clarify the Ministry perspective, said:

Because of poor policy settings there was a burgeoning of actual and latent fishing effort in the inshore fishery. This excess effort was leading to the overfishing of many of our high value inshore fish stocks. Part timers were seen as part of this increasing problem. Many fishers had permits for many fishing methods across many different fisheries that could be used at any time. i.e. there was no real control on fishing effort.

Like the Federation:

MAF analysis showed there were two distinct groups of part time fishers. The first group consisted of *lifestylers*, working part of the year fishing and the rest on such activities as possum trapping, shearing, fencing, forestry etc. This group largely lived in regional/rural areas. Many were Māori. The second group of part timers were largely urban dwellers in full time employment who held fishing permits to get around sales tax, offset income tax, enable them to sell their excess recreational catch etc. The policy to remove part timers did not distinguish between these two groups.

The policy was a complete failure. It did not reduce or control fishing effort and probably had a much greater adverse social impact than any fishery policy before or after it, including the implementation of ITQs. It certainly provoked Māori into thinking about the nature and extent of their customary fishing rights protected by both the Treaty of Waitangi and the Fisheries Act (Stan Crothers 4 June 2009).

The MAF perspective was not uniform across the department. While Head Office personnel were instrumental in developing the policy, operational staff such as MAF fisheries officers, working face to face with fishermen on a day to day basis and others based in the rural centres, were very aware of the personal and community hardship it would involve, especially in rural areas.

Regional fisheries officers wrestled with the problems of playing God to many families who relied on fishing for part of their income. At the same

⁸¹ When interviewed he was Assistant Director of MAF but retired soon after.

time they also relished the opportunity to clean out some of the more destructive and difficult people in the industry: those who poached, sold for cash, filed misleading or false returns could be excluded by the 'under \$10,000 provision (Johnson and Haworth 2004 359).

WAS EXCLUSION THE FIRST-CUT FOR ITQS?

MAF sources reviewed are adamant that when the part-timers were excluded ITQs were not envisaged and the exclusion policy was not related to the introduction of the QMS. McClurg (1997 102), for example, states explicitly that “[it] is a mistake to view ... [exclusion of the part-timers] as a planned or necessary precursor to the introduction of ITQs three years later. ITQs were not under consideration at that time and analysis focused on the possible application of boat buy-back schemes, though some feared that buying vessels from part-timer fishers would prove expensive and remove little effort” (McClurg 1997 102).

Kim Walshe, who was MAF Regional Manager (Auckland) when ITQs were introduced also refuted my suggestion that the exclusion of the part-timers was part of the lead up to the introduction of ITQs.

ITQs were not decided on – the Minister at the time, who was McIntyre, was not prepared to go with ITQs so it was not until Moyle came in with them. [Within] a week of Moyle coming in with the new Labour government, he called the Ministry together and said: “Right we’re going to move on ITQs – I’ve decided that’s the way to go.” But prior to that it was technically correct to say that it was not the precursor to ITQs because even though I was heavily involved with people like Ray Dobson in the process, the Director of Fisheries Management at the time which is Brian Cunningham, all the time he was there, he was adamantly opposed to ITQs. So there was a lot of scepticism from the Ministry about ITQs (Kim Walshe, pers com 4 April 2007).

Neil Martin (1987 1), a MAF officer, in an appendix to his presentation to the Waitangi Tribunal Hearing of “The Muriwhenua Claim” at Te Hapua, states that: “the first point which must be stressed is the policy which excluded part-timers was quite separate from the ITQ policy. The exclusion of part-timers was a management measure introduced to cope with the growing policy of overfishing”. Likewise Ministry informants (Stan Crothers⁸² and Jonathan Peacey⁸³, pers com

⁸² Deputy Chief Executive, Mfish.

⁸³ National Manager Fisheries Operations, Mfish.

21 November 2006) and MFish personnel at Chris Deewes' seminar (5 May 2006), all made the same assertion. In strict policy terms that may be correct, but there are wider issues in terms of social process.

Indeed Crothers emphasised:

There is an urban myth that the policy to remove part timers was part of the government's strategy to implement ITQs. At the time in question, as the Chief Fishery Officer, I was involved in the fisheries policy and operational areas of MAF at a senior level. I am unaware of any factual foundation for this notion. Indeed many officials have sworn on oath that there was no connection between the two policies. In my view this is just another conspiracy that seems to thrive in this sector (Stan Crothers 4 June 2009).

Kim Walshe⁸⁴, pointed out that the exclusion of the part-timers was his first job when he had been promoted to Head Office (pers com 4 April 2007). Johnson and Haworth confirm, stating

Newly appointed assistant director Kim Walshe made the first public announcement on reducing effort. Part-timers were seen as a threat, able to increase effort if they became full time. 'They must be removed from the inshore fishery now,' said Walshe. While the timing of his comment could have been seen as a reaction to Stevens' [effort reduction] paper, it was merely stating the official attitude which had now gained added strength from the new Act's definition of a commercial fisherman (Johnson and Haworth 2004 357).

Walshe, contradicting Crother's emphasis, asserts that

The exclusion of part-timers was driven almost exclusively not by the Ministry but by the Federation of Commercial Fishermen, in particular Peter Stevens. Their concern was that ... part-timer fishers were the nub or one of the major ways in which they could reduce effort because by that stage everybody had got concerned there was too much effort in the fishery. And it was seen that by getting rid of the part-timers they would be able to get rid of a substantial amount of effort. A second reason was that even at that stage they were talking about the potential of an ITQ system and flowing from that the need for a buy back scheme and they knew that if they had to pay out a lot of part-timers then a lot of money would, they believed, be dissipated in the wrong courses and that given the amount involved the Government would balk, part-timers would make it more expensive (Walshe 4 April 1007).

⁸⁴ Former Director of MAF Auckland and now consultant to the recreational fisheries sector.

Speaking of the criteria used for the exclusion, Walshe said they had to be objective and simple since there were about 4000 applications to deal with (pers com 4 April 2007).

Connor, who worked for MAF in the 1990s and subsequently wrote his PhD using MAF records (pers com), takes a more neutral line. “The uncompensated exclusion of part-time fishers in 1983, although not strictly part of the QMS strategy, is difficult to view as equitable in light of the subsequent adoption of ITQs. Although it would have incurred greater transaction costs, these fishers could have been included in the quota allocation process, without substantively affecting the achievement of its objectives, producing a more equitable outcome” (Connor 2001).

From my observations and interviews, for many fishermen, commercial fishing was a passion while clearly for others it was the employment of last resort but for both, severity of the full-time/part-time conflict was certainly aggravated by the depletion of the coastal fisheries and the shortage of full-time work ashore. It might be claimed, at least in theory, that following the introduction of the QMS part-timers could buy quota and re-enter the fishery. In practice, for those dependent on the fishery, exclusion meant their very livelihoods were at stake to the extent of some believing Social Welfare assistance, “the dole”, was virtually their only option (e.g. Peter Waapu in Waitangi Tribunal 1988 40; Walter Murray 1987 Letter 31 October 1983). Their very ability to support themselves and their families was jeopardised to the extent that buying quota would have been impossible.

It is not clear just when the notion of ITQs received widespread consideration. It is, however, relevant to note that the concept was in circulation prior to the exclusion of the part-timers. Yandle, for example, found “ownership”, the core element of ITQs, being discussed in Fishing Industry Board Annual Reports at least as early as 1974 (Yandle 2001 113). Sinner and Fenemor state that in his 1980 report, Peter Riley in the MAF's Economics Department evaluated limited entry policies and recommended the setting of total allowable catches and transferable quota (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 3) and reported that a “small group of officials within MAF and the Fishing Industry Board began to promote the concept of transferable catch entitlements in 1980 and sponsored a visit to New

Zealand by Professor Lee Anderson⁸⁵, of the University of Delaware, in early 1982. During this and subsequent visits in 1983 and 1984, Anderson gave presentations to fishing industry leaders and government officials about the advantages of ITQ as interest in the concept grew (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 4).

In the NAFMAC (1983) discussion paper used for the “Roadshow” ITQs was the sixth of seven solutions suggested for discussion (NAFMAC 1983 13). At one of the NAFMAC meetings I attended one fisherman asserted that in fact ITQs were the only new management tool being offered and that all the other suggestions had been tried and proved inadequate (Personal research notes, 1983). Sharp noted (1997 512), “[m]ost fishers ... attending the public meetings supported the exclusion of part-timers (full-time attendees 59-91 per cent – part-time two per cent)”. So “there was a clear consensus that part-timers should go, with special arrangements for some areas. Part-timers had no say in this. Very few of them belonged to their local fishermen's associations” (Johnson and Haworth 2004 363). The final report to government stated “it is NAFMAC's view that some policy such as ITQ's in the long term, but within the FMP [Fisheries Management Plan] framework, should be further examined with the view to devising a workable policy based on this principle” (Belgrave 1983 14).

In his analysis of the conflict within the fishing industry, Robin Allen⁸⁶, foreshadows a shift from fisheries as a common property resource to some form of privatization and ownership like land: “Future management to obtain the optimum use of fisheries is likely to entail a move from using them as a common property resource, to some form of ownership and control, analogous to the change from common property use to individual ownership which occurred long ago in most land use” (Allen 1983 23). His terminology became familiar as that of the advocates for property rights and ITQs and his discussion provides a preliminary outline of the QMS. It clearly indicates that there was serious consideration of ITQs by sections of three of the four fisheries components, the Federation for coastal fishermen, NAFMAC representing all but part-timers and the

⁸⁵ An international advocate for ITQs.

⁸⁶ Then Assistant Director, Fisheries Research Division of MAF.

communities, and within MAF, at the very time the part-timers were being excluded.

Moreover, presumably about 1982,

The New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen (NZFCF) had sought a share of deepwater quota to distribute to inshore fishers, demonstrating that its leaders, at least, were already beginning to see the flexibility that quota offered. The Government rejected this proposal; its main concern was to stop the race to fish without disrupting existing deepwater operations (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 5; see also Haworth 2008 204).

Technically the two policies, ITQs and the exclusion of part-timers, were different and involved different factors such as administrative convenience, a narrow economic efficiency and detailed development. They may well have been separate but clearly ITQs were actively being considered before the part-timers were excluded. With the privatisation of fishing rights being discussed in the Federation it also advocated exclusion of part-timers to ensure compensation if it should come to the exclusion of 'bona fide' fishermen. It seems hardly credible, then, that in MAF the importance of one policy to the other was not considered.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONSIDERING THIS EXCLUSION HERE

While MAF officers state that the exclusion was not part of the introduction of ITQs, a number of informants assert that the exclusion of part-timers probably had greater social implications, for fishermen and the coastal communities they operated from, than the QMS, and so is therefore socially more significant than the introduction of ITQs. This exclusion is also delineated in the academic reviews of policy that preceded the QMS. Sharp (1997 510), for example, observes that "part-timers fishers were not seen as a major cause of the decline in stocks, nor were part-time fishers catching a significant share of the total fish landed. Part-timers were, however, seen as the necessary first cut in the effort-reduction process to enable a clear focus on the later stages of effort reduction. In part, the removal of part-timers was also justified by the high transaction cost of accommodating the interests of a large heterogeneous group of fishers".

Although outside the focus of this dissertation, the impact of the exclusion of part-timers on Māori and their communities, led to the fisheries claims before the Waitangi Tribunal and the 1992 Sealord Settlement -- arguably the greatest social implication to result from the fisheries restructuring and so adding weight to the importance of the exclusion.

Despite the serious impact of the exclusion of part-timers and the obvious issues for them, their families and communities, there is a lack of research on, or comprehensive reviews of, part-time fishing in New Zealand. The next section will examine the role of pluriactivity or part-time fishing in New Zealand to the extent that it sheds light on the implications of implementing rights-based management with the QMS.

PERSPECTIVES

Some informants suggested that the social implications for fishermen and their communities of the exclusion of part-timers were greater than those of the QMS. Separating the social implications of the exclusion of the part-timers from those of the QMS or indeed from subsequent social change as a result of neoliberalism generally is beyond this research. Nevertheless understanding of the process is assisted by awareness of the different perspectives involved in the exclusion.

Different views were expressed as to whether or not part-timers were beneficial or detrimental to the coastal fisheries and, even within particular groups; the perspectives were not always identical. The views of commercial fishermen especially as expressed by the Federation and those of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries appear to have been the most influential in the decision to exclude part-time fishermen from the fisheries so they are the perspectives presented here.

Full-time Fishermen

Many full-time fishers regarded part-timers as a significant threat to their own livelihood. The *Gulf News* quoted a fisherman's assertion that "[m]any of these [part-time] fishermen fish only during the peak of the season and their catch reduces the potential catch of full-time fishermen. While the fishing may be economic for individuals with other sources of income it is having a damaging effect on the already uneconomic position of many full time fishermen" (*Gulf*

News 7 November 1980 16). It was a competitive situation. Resources were already fully exploited.

Informants, during my research at the Viaduct, (summer of 1982-83) and again in 2007, with a few exceptions were strongly against the part-timers. Several of the longliners, for example, stated “the part-timers follow and just see where you're fishing and set on top”, they are “licenced so [they] could use the Viaduct for mooring”. They also complained that since they were relatively inexperienced, part-timers ignored the usual protocols on the fishing grounds, “parasiting” on [full-time fishermen’s] knowledge, encroaching on their gear and depressing their market. One of the exceptions was the skipper of the Danish seiner I worked on later who, from strong involvement with the Federation and experience working round the coast, was well aware that the part-timers were not catching a huge quantity of fish. Also, as a seiner he was working outside the Danish Seine Line (See Figure 6) so was less in general conflict with them (Viaduct Research).

The trade journal, *Commercial Fishing*, about that time reported the anger some full-time fishermen felt toward the part-timers. A meeting of the Taranaki and Wanganui Commercial Fishermen's Association, for example, suggested that “unless the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries took some positive action to police their activities, direct action might be taken”. They were concerned that part-timers often left gillnets set for so long “they became polluted with dead fish which ... spoilt the fishing grounds. They set too close to other fishermen. They sometimes sold their fish ‘under the counter’ and endangered the stability of the local fish market and the livelihood of fulltime fishermen – at the same time failed to file fishing returns and evading taxation responsibility.” Since many of the part-timers were also waterside workers and policemen, the Association hoped that mutual job exclusion could be arranged with the Watersiders Union and the local MAF fisheries officer could assist police the part-timers. That only 30 of the 200 fishing boats registered in New Plymouth worked full-time indicates the extent of their difficulties and they felt the part-timers were forcing the full-time fishermen to travel further afield to avoid the problems (*Commercial Fishing*, December 1977 17).

The Federation of Commercial Fishermen

An influential lobbyist for many years, Peter Stevens, Secretary of the Federation of Commercial Fishermen had been campaigning for an Effort Reduction System (ERS). Johnson reports “Stevens’ campaign for ERS was being met in part by the reduction in part-timers” (Johnson and Haworth 2004 359). The thrust of his argument was that,

... removing the catching power of part-timers would only go a small way to solving the problem of overfishing. Departure by attrition – failing to catch fish, losing money, not being able to afford repairs or to feed a family, then leaving the industry – had become increasingly common since the mid-1970s. Full-time fishermen had been given a means of leaving while keeping at least part of their financial skin intact” (Johnson and Haworth 2004 359).

Bob Martin, then President of the New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen (the Federation) told me that when travelling with NAFMAC he was very conscious that fishermen throughout New Zealand were, like himself, agitating for more effective management. They “asked for something to be drawn up to show what the situation was,” insistent that “[y]ou can't carry on like this”. The part-time issue was, he felt, complex. “Commercial fishermen all over the country said basically 'Hey no way – you've got guys in the freezing works [getting] big money and they duck off in the closed season and that's fine but if you expect us to take cuts then ‘No way José’” (Bob Martin pers com 6 February 2007). He did imply that they did not realise at the time how many would be excluded.

When asked if the difference between urban and rural or part-timers dependent on fishing was considered Bob Martin stated their job was not “to regulate people's lifestyle. I might want \$100,000 and another guy might want \$20,000, he might want to live in a caravan”. The issue was that “there were people holding part-time licenses... just for sales tax off motors and things like that. There were all sorts of part-time licenses out there. How you would ever pick a distinction between them legally would be a hell of a job. Every one of those licenses had the potential to become full time licenses, if somebody else got their hands on them”.

Charged with managing the fisheries, part of MAF's stock monitoring was provided by collating mandatory catch returns from commercial fishermen. Johnson and Haworth indicate, however, that fishermen's compliance was often inadequate and the difficulties were aggravated by part-timers but this didn't only apply to them:

... the vast majority of fishermen just wrote down their total landed weight of each species on the MAF form (although some under-reported that as well). Little of the fish dumped at sea was recorded. Most of them left the catch-effort information panel blank. Many were months behind with their paperwork, and some didn't send returns in at all, and got away with it. The system was also bogged down by increasing numbers of part-timers who might fish only one or two months of the year and failed to submit 'nil returns' for the other months (Johnson and Haworth 2004 309).

Also, “[m]ost commercial fishermen to some degree or other – over the years they fished – sold for cash money – it was one of the sidelines like you have tradesmen working over weekends now, you know, for cash” (Bob Martin pers com 6 February 2007). From observation, fishermen’s cash sales, “home freight,” were part of the culture, but I am not aware that MAF collected any data to verify the extent of the practice.

Peter Stevens, encapsulated the Federation perspective:

You see as the law was then, anybody who was a New Zealander or a naturalized New Zealander had to be given a fishing permit. It cost next to nothing. Because of the sales tax exemption people were registering as fishermen who weren't fishermen merely they might have wanted to build a yacht or run a launch or all of that and they got all the sales tax exemptions for the sake of about a \$5 fishing permit. Right. There were people that went to do that who wanted to make some money out of their fishing to cover their pleasure fishing costs were told by the Ministry, ‘Well you'd be legal if they take out a permit’. There was this massive growth of numbers and numbers and numbers and it was quite obvious that there was no way for both those reasons and for the fact that that we didn't have a lot of fish in New Zealand – we have a very small fisheries – inshore fisheries – long lived fish – not a great deal of fecundity ... and it was all going to collapse. Then I kept hammering away at this idea that we needed to take a proper look at what we've got. We were then being invaded by foreigners who were eroding things. We had companies getting bigger boats that were putting more and more pressure on. We ourselves were becoming super efficient at fishing – we were the best in the world. We started with next to nothing in 1965, 66 and by 1975 we had just about stuffed it (Stevens, pers com 19 November 2006).

To “balance the book socially” NAFMAC, in apparent contradiction to Martin's claim of not regulating lifestyle, decided on the criterion that 80 per cent of income was to be earned from fishing, but it opposed the cancelling of unutilised licenses⁸⁷. The government, however, accepted both criteria.

It was to balance the books socially, as it were, but they [part-timers] were fishing about 12 different permits, 12 different methods and only used one. So that was all potential later on – to create big problems. The government was right to do that. I agreed with them from day one because you've got to clear the books. You can't have all this latent slip hanging round because otherwise it all comes back to bite you and your whole system falls apart (Stevens pers com 19 November 2006).

So the Federation was concerned about numbers and the position of their members. They saw a huge potential from unutilised licenses, many held by part-timers, who could be utilised or become full-time with an explosion of fishing effort. Few part-timers either belonged to the Federation, or had attended the meetings so if, in the course of the effort reduction, the Federation's own members would have to exit the fishery, it wanted them to get compensation so they could leave with dignity. The same consideration was not extended to the part-timers.

Consequently:

The Federation of Commercial Fishermen convinced MAF and the Minister of Fisheries that part-timers were at the heart of the excess effort problem and that they needed to be removed to ensure sustainable fishing and to “professionalise the commercial sector” (Stan Crothers 4 June 2009).

National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee

Perspective

NAFMAC was a “high level committee of MAF and industry representatives, chaired by M.J. Belgrave, Deputy Director-General of MAF [which] conducted the “Roadshow” around New Zealand to consult with the industry on effort reduction.

⁸⁷ Licenses related to the method used so fishermen often needed more than one license as they changed methods to target different species through seasonal and/or availability changes. “Diana” for example was principally a Danish seiner but handlined for bluefin tuna, trolled for albacore, longlined for ling and shark and dhanlined for hapuka (grouper). They needed this flexibility.

An indication of MAF and the industry's perspective on the exclusion of part-timers is given by the NAFMAC discussion paper: "Future policy for the Inshore Fishery" (cited here as NAFMAC 1983) was circulated before and during the round of consultation meetings and the committee's subsequent report to Government (Belgrave 1983b)⁸⁸. The actual exclusion was the result of the Fisheries Act 1983 but, while the legislation was under consideration, *NAFMAC, The Report, a discussion paper* was issued to facilitate the consultation. Given the report was put out under the signatures of Duncan McIntyre the Minister of Fisheries (Forward) and M.J. Belgrave (Preface) it provides a plausible indication of MAF's thinking at the time, as well as also indicating the influence of those fisheries sectors represented.

The main aim of the discussion paper was to find policy options to solve the immediate overfishing problem, allow stock recovery and then "ensure the longer term biological and economic well being of the inshore fishery" (NAFMAC 1983 5). The ultimate objective was to ensure that effort did not increase above sustainable yields. The discussion document set the first phase of effort reduction as "Administrative removal of Fishing Units not Wholly or Substantially Involved in the Fishery" (NAFMAC 1983 5), but the document stated that to meet the Fisheries Bill's requirements a person "must show they are wholly or substantially reliant [not just involved] on fishing for their income".

Interestingly, MAF's Robin Allen commented, "conflict exists at all levels in local fisheries where fishermen who use small open boats ... are threatened by trawlers which might be based a considerable distance away". In relation to part-timers he reports "there is widespread agreement that part-time commercial fishermen should not be encouraged, and this could be extended to mean that there is no need to protect the local industries which use small boats confined to a restricted local area" (Allen 1983 24). MAF therefore accepted the removal of part-timers as essentially the first phase of the necessary effort reduction, fully aware of the likely spatial and industry effects.

⁸⁸ "National Fisheries Management Committee Report to the Minister of Fisheries on Future Policy for the Inshore Fishery" (cited as Belgrave 1983b).

There is a significant difference between substantial involvement and substantial reliance. The NAFMAC paper indicates that the latter meant financial dependence on fishing. “The new Fisheries Bill provides that to obtain a permit to fish a person must show that they are wholly or substantially reliant on fishing for their income” (NAFMAC 1983 5). Belgrave then suggested some 14 criteria that could be used to determine who is a “commercial fisherman”, also known as a “bona fide” fisherman or a “full-timer” or “full-time” fisherman who could be licensed.

The objective of NAFMAC's policy was “to reduce effort and progressively ensure the economic position of those remaining in the fishery” (Belgrave 1983 6) although it was admitted that while there “are a large number of 'part-time' fishermen they do not catch a large volume of fish. Indeed, it can be generalized that 90 per cent of vessels catch less than 20 per cent of the fish” (Belgrave 1983 7). The policy allegedly stressed effort reduction and conservation but the removal of the part-timers made little difference to either. Supposedly it also allowed for financial dependence but, if the Walter Murray case is an indication (See Box 3), ignored financial dependence and commitment; significant criteria in other MAF policies. The policy allowed the returns from only 1983 not as was the case later when ITQs were introduced and catch history was derived from the best three years. There is no indication in the NAFMAC paper that social aspects would be considered.

MAF Perspective

Many part-timers had licences for gear they weren't using or for other species to allow for seasonal and natural variation so one of the reasons given for exclusion the part-timers was MAF's concern that dormant licenses could be activated. MAF officers at the time explained, said: “[t]here was burgeoning effort and part timers were seen as part of it. Many fishermen had permits for many methods and could use them at any time. ... [and] the Federation persuaded MAF that part-timers were the problem. The government did their homework and with the 1983 Fisheries Act they were removed” (Stan Crothers pers Com 2006). According to McClurg 1997, “the 1983 Fisheries Act allowed for the cancellation of unused licences or licences held by ‘part time’ fishers”.

Neil Martin (1987) justifying the exclusion of the part-timers from the Northland fishery argued that most part-timers who were registered in Whangarei seemed to be Pakeha, registered for other reasons than fishing, or were also gainfully employed but holding permits so they could retire from white collar jobs. The threat to the fishery was, that those who held the permits could gear up and fish harder, or fathers could transfer their permits to their sons, or at retirement could sell the vessel and transfer the permit to a younger entrant with the result that the catch might increase. The concern was, therefore, for “potential effort” (confirmed by Herzog 2004 25) not actual effort like that of the ‘big boats’. Perhaps most tellingly, Martin stated that he had checked the catch of 12 new hard working (presumably full-time) owner-operator longliners and found that in some years they had caught over 150 tonnes of fish which, from the NAFMAC paper represented 1/6th of the sustainable yield on the northeast coast (Martin 1987). What he didn't say was that that catch could have been caught by just one or two trips of the average ‘big boat’ but he did claim that those excluded could appeal (Martin 1987 Appendix p1). He is, however contradicted by Russell and Campbell (1999 123) who noted that 85 percent of those excluded were Maori and (subsequently) few Maori were allocated ITQs.

Those Pakeha part-timers who were dependent on the fisheries may have had very similar moral and community rights, but they were unorganised individuals with no legally recognised collective rights and have therefore disappeared into the population. In many cases the impact on Pakeha individuals, families and communities may have been similar to those on Māori. Research and information on the latter is therefore used here as being possibly illustrative of the social consequences for part-time fishermen.

Johnson asserts that MAF did allow for some flexibility stating: "In many parts of the country fishing was mixed with farming or subsistence activities. In these circumstances MAF conceded 'room for some manoeuvring'. It would listen, it would consider, but it held the power to make the final decision” (Johnson and Haworth 2004 357). But in the end, as well demonstrated by the response to Walter Murray's application, MAF let the economic advocates override other social issues.

Box 4: My perspective

My perspective may not be strictly objective. In the course of this research I realised that had I chosen differently I could well have been one of the excluded part-timers. In 1978 in Matawhi Bay, in the Bay of Islands a small-scale landowner who longlined snapper from a converted mulletty knew of my interest and took me on a several day trip setting the lines off the Cavalli Island and mooring in Whangaroa Harbour and offered to sell me the mulletty. After discovering New Zealand inshore fisheries were seriously over-capitalized and that scientists and managers already believed they were depleted. I could not as a conservationist, become a fisherman. The real clincher though, was lack of capital but had I decided otherwise and persisted, my aspirations toward a subsistence lifestyle would have meant that I would have been among those excluded.

Other Perspectives

An investigative reporter, McManus⁸⁹ (1994), has a different perspective (See Boxes 5 & 6), reporting that in their concern for effort reduction and professionalisation of the industry MAF's tardy treatment of license applications was of uncertain legality and, from their enthusiasm for some fishermen's interests, information from certain Federation officers was of questionable accuracy.

Box 5: McManus: Fishermen stripped of livelihood

After it became clear fisheries officials had been abusing their powers to victimise small-time fishermen Fisheries Minister Doug Kidd rushed through retrospective legislation ensuring justice would never be done for those deprived of their livelihoods. ... the government ordered a moratorium on commercial fishing permits in the Hauraki Gulf in 1980 and on fishing permits generally in 1982, these were revoked by the Fisheries Act of 1983. In spite of this change in the law, MAF officials, then Fisheries Minister Colin Moyle, and then president of the Federation of Commercial Fishermen Bob (Taffy) Martin, continued to tell fishermen the moratorium was still in place. In this way newcomers, unless they had money and/or political clout, were deliberately excluded from the industry. ... [H]undreds of fishermen were fobbed off with the moratorium ruse and refused permits on this basis, Thus when the ...(QMS) was introduced in October 1986, hundreds of small-time fishermen could not demonstrate a catch history - on the basis of which quota were allocated. Thus the bureaucrats stripped them of their livelihood (McManus 1994 1, 2).

⁸⁹ An Investigative journalist with the *The Independent* (monthly newspaper).

The retrospective nature of the legislation and the speed at which it was introduced were condemned by the Law Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Keith, who said it also negated section 27 of the Bill of Rights Act, the section giving people disagreeing with bureaucratic and government decision the right of appeal to the courts (McManus 1994 1 2).

It must be stressed that the issue of questionable legality was by no means one sided; miss- and under-reporting, and undeclared wharf sales, for example, were not uncommon. Several informants referred to scams, especially in relation to the claiming of quota at the Quota Appeal Authority hearings and McManus cites a fisherman buying a boat and, she believed, the quota, only to find the seller had kept the boat registration and quota and sold the latter back to MAF for \$40,000 (McManus 1994 1 2).

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT

The Fisheries Act 1983 excluded part-time fishermen by defining commercial fishing to mean: “In the case of an individual, a person who is engaged or intending to engage in fishing for sale throughout the year, or a specified part of the season of each year, and who can satisfy the Director-General that during such time as he engages in fishing for sale he relies *wholly or substantially* on his fishing activities for his income” (Fisheries Act 1983, Section 2 Interpretation (1) 81) [my emphasis].

Because of the Fisheries Act 1983 definition of “a commercial fisherman” many fishermen, but especially those who fished part-time did not meet MAF's criteria, were refused fishing permits and excluded from the fisheries. This is widely referred to as the exclusion of the part-timers.

The Fisheries Act 1983 had certain consequences. It excluded licensed fishermen, without any compensation, from the New Zealand coastal fishery who did not meet MAF's criteria of “commercial fishermen”. Not all were fully dependent on the fishery for their livelihoods but there were many who lost a vital part of their annual means of income and subsistence support and there were major consequences for their families and communities. It is not clear just how many were excluded and there is less knowledge about how many of those were dependent on the fishery.

Since the definition of “commercial fishermen” in the Fisheries Act 1983, and MAF's criteria also applied to full time fishermen, it is unclear just how many part-timers were excluded and how many were Māori. Cullen and Memon do note that many were Māori, and stress the critical issue and the results for the industry: “These operators were numerous but their catches very small” and “[w]hile there was a relatively large number of part-time fishermen, the New Zealand industry had come to be dominated by a number of large operators” (Cullen and Memon 1990 52 59).

CONSEQUENCES FOR PART-TIME FISHERMEN

The Law Commission states that the “result was to approximately halve the numbers of commercial operators, something like 1500 to 1800 going out of business” (Law Commission 1989 17) and this estimate is taken as the number of exclusions by subsequent authors (e.g. Wallace 1998, Rennie 1998 Connor 2001). However, McClurg, with access to MAF statistics, states that “a blanket moratorium was placed on the issue of new licenses in 1982 and as a further step in halting and reversing the expansion of effort, the 1983 Fisheries Act allowed for the cancellation of unused licences or licences held by “part time” fishers. As a consequence, 2260 licences were cancelled” (McClurg 1997). This appears to be the more reliable figure although it does not account for the number of successful appeals that may have been allowed from the Law Commission report. Johnson and Haworth, also with access to Ministry records, notes “In 1984 NAFMAC estimated that 2260 fishermen, 46 percent of the total would be removed from the fishery” (Johnson and Haworth 2004 359) and Sharp also uses this figure observing that “those not meeting the criteria were excluded. It was estimated that 46 per cent (about 2260) of the existing license holders would be excluded” (Sharp 1997 512). Straker and Kerr continue the confusion stating “as at October 1 1983, 46 per cent (2260) of licence holders did not meet the stated criteria and were labelled “part-time” fishers. Part-timers did not have their permits renewed, therefore were excluded from the commercial fisheries, partly for administrative convenience but mainly because they had the greatest potential to increase their fishing effort” (Straker and Kerr 2002 42).

It would seem, then, that a total of 2260 licences were cancelled (although whether this was an estimate or the actual number is unclear). Some were full-time but an estimated 1500-1800 were part-time, and of these maybe 85 percent were Māori. All would have had boats, gear and other equipment representing a significant financial, to say nothing of their social and emotional commitment to the fishery, lost without compensation.

As Rennie points out the biggest and most critical impact was in Northland, especially among Māori (See also Fairgray 1986 45; Habib 1985 15; Johnson and Haworth 2004 388). Basically the new regulation made it simpler to introduce the ITQ system. No compensation was considered for the former part-time fishers. With consequent high unemployment rate and a preference for growing marijuana, “[i]t is not surprising that the successful Maaori challenges to the legality of the Crown's claims to be able to allocate rights of access were initiated in the North” (Rennie 1998 7).

CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHER FISHERMEN

Whereas the Federation and Fishermen's associations had been strongly against part-time fishermen before the exclusion, after its affects started to bite, the trade journal *Commercial Fishing* expressed significant concerns. In Wellington, for example, an estimated 120 out of 170 commercial fishermen would be excluded, 80 of who reportedly appealed. The Wellington Regional Fisheries Association labelled the exclusion “an affront to any kind of human rights fishermen have as Kiwis. ‘Everyone has a right to go broke if he wants to’ ... No allowance has been made for the financial commitment – between \$10,000 and \$60,000 – these men have made to the industry. They will be left with a totally unsaleable vessel” (Don Ritchie in *Commercial Fishing* 1984 January 15). Experienced skippers in Canterbury found the new requirement to have a skippers ticket was used to prevent them qualifying as “committed” and one of these was selling his trawler as a pleasure boat after 45 years fishing.

Commercial Fishing (March 1984 23) noted that further south:

“Big financial losses are being suffered by Canterbury fishermen forced to sell trawlers as pleasure boats” while Dick Brown, President of the Lyttleton Commercial Fishermen's Association said “[i]t goes against the grain to see hard workers put out of business when big companies, like

Fletcher Challenge, are 'chartering' foreign vessels and crews to catch their deep-sea allocations". One fisherman, "Glenn Parrat, a watersider, had his application for a commercial fishing licence accepted last September ...two weeks later he received his receipt and a letter saying his licence could not be granted until he obtained a skippers ticket. "I was", he said "really angry at the way they treated the case and changed their minds. After I had been licenced for two years they suddenly decided that I have to have a ticket" and, since there was no compensation for loss of livelihood or money on gear, he "decided to sell his \$20,000 trawler as a pleasure boat for \$12,000, leaving him with all the fishing nets and equipment". Another, "Mr Ken Smith who has been fishing commercially in his spare time for 45 years was told that he had to get his skippers ticket to retain his commercial licence. As he is 57, Mr Smith did not want to go to 'school' to obtain his ticket so he could fish for just another three years⁹⁰". He said "Commercial fishing has been my only source of income since I lost my other job. ... The fishing plus my wife's salary gave us a comfortable living." He was "selling his \$15,000 boat, *Wainoni*, for \$8,000 as a pleasure boat" (*Commercial Fishing* March 1984 23).

However, of my informants, only a few had been affected by the exclusion and only one directly. He had gone with his partner to the Coromandel Peninsula to "escape" unemployment in Auckland. Then because other work was not available in the district he had been crewing on a boat that was then excluded. As a result he was forced onto the dole and into a struggle for subsistence. More generally many of the part-timers were not just excluded from the fishery they were also excluded, around the same time, from other part-time employment in the district as work opportunities in the Coromandel forestry, or in the freezing works, elsewhere, were closing (See le Heron et al 1989 397).

Box 6: McManus: Process used to strip fishermen of livelihood

During last year's hearing before the Quota Appeal Authority (QAA), a former MAF officer, giving evidence for Main [a fisherman] described to the court the various ruses he and his colleagues employed to give permit applications the run around and illegally shut prospective fishermen out of the industry (McManus 1994 1 2).

Rick Boyd (A fisheries scientist with the Fisheries Management Division of MAF) said as a matter of course, prospective commercial fishermen were told a moratorium was in place even though MAF was aware this was not the case. "It was a matter of general knowledge and cynical humour that all such permit applications... were stored in a cardboard box in Ray Dobson's [another MAF official] ... office. This box was a bottomless pit... By not making a decision, even when there was no legal basis for refusal, no permit was issued. Boyd and

⁹⁰ Retirement age and eligibility for the old age pension was then 60.

his colleagues justified this by saying they believed the fishery was at risk. They eventually concluded the government had scrapped the moratorium by 'mistake' or 'oversight'. "Although the 1993 Act revoked the two moratorium notices, the Director General felt that he needed more controls of the issue of fishing permits than were apparent on the face of the fisheries Act 1983," Boyd said. ... During the so-called moratorium, some of the big guns, including Fletcher Fishing, managed to obtain large and valuable permits from MAF. Recounts Boyd: "... (Successful) applicants sought legal advice, and generally made a trip to Wellington with their solicitor to personally confront the Assistant director who was responsible for the decision to issue new permits. When confronted on this basis, the Assistant Director issued the permits in question promptly." ... Aware that MAF's past blunders, accidental or otherwise, might be about to cost the government hundreds of millions of dollars, Fisheries Minister Doug Kidd sneaked retrospective legislation into the House just before Christmas 1992, preventing aggrieved fishermen from going to court to appeal quota and permitting decisions. At least 27 appeals involving \$87 million worth of quota were already in the pipeline, and Kidd and his officials feared a flood of cases ... triggered by two 1992 High Court decisions in favour of fishermen (McManus 1994 1 2).

CONCLUSION

Just as the designation of the EEZ excluded foreign fishing vessels from surrounding New Zealand the exclusion of part-timers removed some two thirds of the New Zealand fleet, and almost 50 per cent of New Zealand fishermen from their livelihood and many coastal communities from a significant portion of economic support.

To summarize, the reasons given for the exclusion of the part-timers were diverse. For MAF it was to reduce the pressure on the fishery by removing the threat of unutilized licences and part-timers becoming full-time, for administrative convenience, to reduce the "illegality" of under-the-counter sales, less than reliable reporting and to "professionalise" the fishery and possibly to ensure cooperation from the Federation. For NAFMAC the exclusion was part of effort reduction by ensuring only those wholly or substantially dependent on the fishery remained. For full-time fishermen, but especially for those most in contact with part-timers (longliners and setnetters), it was to remove the chaos and inconvenience of "newbies" unfamiliar with the etiquette of fishing and the economic threat to their already marginalised livelihoods. For the Federation it was part of effort reduction to ensure sustainability of the stocks and, if "bona

“fide” fishermen (Federation members) were to be removed they would get fair compensation rather than it being dissipated to all the part-timers as well.

Few of those excluded were particularly powerful or visible in the consultations and the impacts on them were not considered until after the event. Many part-timers had caused congestion and difficulties for Federation members on the fishing grounds and threatened their income by adding fish to an already glutted market. MAF appears to have been partly appeasing the Federation that found the part-timers relatively vulnerable and easy to marginalise, demonise and ultimately exclude.

McManus’s (1994) report on both MAF and the Federation's treatment of licence applications and the severity in denying applications to remote rural fishermen dependent on the fishery, such as Walter Murray, suggests possible illegality. The total catch of those excluded represented the annual catch of only a few average “big boat” catches. Those boats had been imported for the deepwater but were allowed to fish on the coast. Effort reduction may have been the primary rationale, but if so it was not well considered or the potential expansion of effort from unused licences could have been dealt with using other policy instruments. Rather, it seems that top-level concern, consciously or not, was to corporatise the fishery and in the process denied communities access to commercial fisheries.

At the time the dominant justification for the exclusion was to address overfishing. The more professional fishermen had the ear of government that was particularly concerned about developing an industry. The part-timers offered an easily marginalised group that could be blamed for the woes, in a more objective, equitable discourse might well have attributed as the consequences of “think big” and the ‘big boats’. Subsequently economic impacts on communities might attribute the desire to introduce ITQs as the reason for the exclusion, however, MAF and later authors have defended that change suggesting it was administratively driven. While the introduction of ITQs may have been facilitated by the exclusion, that introduction does not appear to have been the key driver for it. The part-timers were undoubtedly the weakest players and most easily demonised.

The consequences for communities have never been fully assessed but did give momentum to Treaty claims. In the context of this dissertation it appears those impacts may have been greater and been conflated with the social implications of rights-based fisheries management.

In retrospect this overall process exemplifies Naomi Klein's *Shock Doctrine* (2007), the creation of a crisis to allow the takeover of existing rights by governments and corporates. The government deliberately developed the coastal fishery, facilitating development of the larger companies (corporates) but whether it was intended to shift control of access to the fishery from local fishermen to the corporates is outside the scope of this research.

This chapter has argued that the crisis in the coastal fishery was a consequence of the think big ideology with Rural Bank development loans under which MAF tolerated the corporates' 'big boats' imported for the deepwater fishing to fish on prime coastal species in contrast to their lack of concern for the consequences of the exclusion of part-time fishermen and their coastal communities.

Chapter 5: BEFORE the QMS

To establish the baseline for change this chapter delineates the commercial fishing vocation and ethos as it was before the introduction of the QMS for coastal fishermen and their communities. Drawing primarily on data from Waiheke Island and notes from Coromandel and Leigh it will indicate the variety of fishermen, their recruitment, their methods, the ethos "out there", and the political, economic and community context. The significance for the fishermen of their vocation will be shown by the features that distinguished their families from friends and neighbours, their work from the regular and periodic services provided by others and the contribution of commercial fishing to the community in terms of employment, nutrition and identity.

The perspective of fishermen and the communities on the QMS is largely absent from the literature. It is their story and generally not mine and is quoted here in their words so that inferences I was not aware of still remain.

COMMUNITY FISHERMEN

Since communities are formed by regular and periodic interactions among people and may be on the basis of either a blend of emotional feelings and shared interests or of needs and services, Hauraki Gulf snapper fishermen were part of their communities of place but also their community(ies) of occupation. This section will describe the ethos and perspective of Hauraki Gulf fishermen and their communities as it was before the introduction of the QMS.

In the late 1970s the 36 fishing boats based on Waiheke Island were roughly a third of the Auckland registered longline fleet. Before the advent of the Co-op and ice plant a typical trip might begin by leaving their Waiheke community of place, 'steaming' the 19km to Auckland for ice, bait and possibly fuel. Then out to the Gulf fishing grounds for several days before returning to the Viaduct to off-load, sell the catch and replenish. During the intensive periods of the school season fishermen were lucky to snatch only an overnight on the island before heading for the grounds again.

There was, therefore a symbiotic relationship between, the semi-rural or fringe community of Waiheke and the urban port, the Viaduct Basin: servicing their

enterprise brought fishermen, into regular contacts for fuel, ice and provisioning and to sell their catch to fish shops, buyers or fishing companies and, less regularly, with mechanics, engineers and boat repairers. Fishermen were, therefore, part of a community of occupation. From fairly early, as independent owner-operators, Waiheke fishermen were not limited to service providers on the island. They used the Viaduct particularly to sell their catch for the iki jimi market and for purchasing ice⁹¹ and thus were in contact with other fishermen based there and other industry personal seasonally, and irregularly, as careers and opportunities evolved.

The position of crew is more ambivalent than the skippers or owner-operators. While working on the boats crew members were part of the community of fishermen but many worked in other occupations, especially over the winter. Thus commitment to this community came and went. Likewise the families of fishermen shared the involvements and exigencies so had shared interests and interacted with each other to a greater or lesser degree.

Seasonally, and as their careers developed, Waiheke fishermen worked around the Gulf. In summer they tended to work the waters around the island but moved further afield to the outer Gulf or even beyond as local fish became scarce. The community of place centred on Waiheke but at different times other fishermen from elsewhere moved into Waiheke waters and the community of occupation expanded and contracted merging and blending with those other communities based on the Viaduct and around the Gulf.

FISHERMEN'S ETHOS

For this research ethos is regarded as the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishermen's experience of ideology. Consequently this section describes the experience of fishing and reveals the ethos and thence the prevailing ideology before the introduction of the QMS. The experience of fishing will be considered in terms of a variety of aspects, including their recruitment into fishing, their career trajectories, the experience of being "out there", the politics and economics of

⁹¹ Especially before Waiheke Sea Products (the Co-op) was established on the island.

fishing, and fishermen's relationships with each other, their families and their community(ies).

As contended above ideology is experienced as ethos and, following Bartleby (1995 2000) ethos is used here to convey what the fishing occupation meant, both in terms of the physical activity and emotionally; what the experience was like (good and bad), what made it different for one fisherman as opposed to another, what kept these people fishing commercially and what made the occupation special to them.

The ideological perspectives of fishermen were as diverse as their personalities. Davis (1991 19) suggested that community fishermen were constrained by collective interest so implied they were conservative and looked after the stocks. My informants ranged from consciously conservationist (Informant 21 for example had always been interested in fishing and the marine environment, was passionate and caught only what he needed) through to one entrepreneurial fisherman who got into it because he needed the money – fishing as employment of last resort – so caught all he could and even expanded his operation (Informant 13).

Recruitment / Career Trajectory

Before the QMS there was a variety of career trajectories in commercial fishing and often a fisherman began in one category and, as his interest and skills developed his career moved through other categories. One person began, for example, fishing recreationally as a child and youth. Then, after a stint off the island, came back to the rural part of Waiheke to live off the land and fish for subsistence before moving back into the community. This meant easier access to the local fish shops and opened commercial opportunities so he began fishing for the local retail market. As the iki jimi trade developed he was both a local retail fisherman and an iki jimi fisherman first sending prime snapper to Auckland on the ferry and then through the Waiheke Co-op (Informant 6a).

Those I've termed family fishermen grew up in fishing families and followed their fathers or uncles. Fishing was 'in their blood,' they grew up with it, fished with their fathers first for recreation, then as crew before they started on their own account (Informants 7, 10, 31, 41). Others chose fishing as their career early so

after leaving school joined as deckhands on boats, (most typically using one of the active fishing methods, Danish seining or trawling) or, less directly, took jobs in the fishing industry before becoming crew (Viaduct Research, Informant 3). The other major career path was by men moving into fishing from another job. Among my informants many had been tradesmen and particularly the opening of the iki jimi market made the move possible (Belcher *Gulf News* 9 May 1980 26; Informants 26, 44).

Although the process of becoming a fisherman was as idiosyncratic as my informants, there are a number of types with similarities and differences. The main categories considered here are subsistence, family, local retail and iki jimi fishermen. Just as the process is different so to are fishermen's ideologies with the polar extremes being conservation oriented and entrepreneurial. The former is an expression of alternative ideals with the latter more compatible with neo-liberalism.

Subsistence Fishing on Waiheke

Before the QMS subsistence fishing, particularly for snapper and kahawai, was prevalent among some of my commercial fishermen informants and although subsistence fishing remains important for the island and indeed elsewhere, commercial fishermen are no longer involved.

Despite the 1970s being the era of hippies and alternative lifestyles and Waiheke was notorious for its hippies and alternatives, only one of my informants and his partner had begun intentionally as a subsistence fisherman. He started coming for holidays and fishing the local bay with his grandfather. Then, in his early twenties came back with his partner and children to create an alternative lifestyle, an ethos of rural self-sufficiency, with bags of wheat, flour, chickens, shellfish, a drag net and a rifle, living in one of the original farmhouses on an isolated southern beach. After living off the land and the sea, subsistence fishing they moved back to the more developed part of the island and eased into a more commercial operation (Informant 6).

For another (Informant 12), fishing was a more attractive adjunct to farming.

I inherited the farm when I was a teenager. ... still over at school and had to come home and run the farm ... I decided I'd rather fish than milk cows by hand. ... So you run dry stock on the farm and like that and put time

into fishing so I never got into fishing in a big way ... just fishing for a living. But it subsidized my life so I didn't have to draw out of the farm. So in fact, if anything, I probably made enough out of it to put a little bit into the farm. (Colin Gordon).

Family Fishermen

On Waiheke, two informants (Informants 5, 12) had sons who followed them into commercial fishing. The first had one son (Informant 7) who remained on the island while three of the four sons of the second informant became commercial fishermen. Only one (Informant 10) remained on the island while a grandson continues the family tradition and fishes out of Thames.

Informant 7, the son of the first, when asked what attracted him to fishing and how he got in, told me:

Yes – basically born into it with Dad being a commercial fisherman down on the farm and he was farming and fishing and I just got into it. Just ended up being involved helping Dad with the fishing when he was fishing and got through to the teenage stage and Dad suggested I get myself a fishing license and it was easy enough to do and away you go. I just flopped into it. I got myself a boat a few nets and longlines and bits and pieces and away I went (Informant 7).

Informant 10 fished for 20 years and was known as “the setnetter” although by no means was he the only one using set nets. Of the twenty local fishermen he was the only one to target dogfish “There were a lot of grizzles about me being a netter in the days. Like people hated nets and they hate them even more today”. Overall though, “it was great then but 20-odd years at it for myself – commercial end of it”. Commercial fishing had been “really wonderful”. When the quota system came in the fishery was declining. “It was a struggle ... to make a living at it. I'm glad I'm not doing it now. It was the lifestyle really a beautiful lifestyle that I've been lucky to participate in really ... Now I'm at the other end -- the recreational sector and that's awesome just being a recreational fisherman out there – you know,” (Informant 10).

So unlike other commercial fishermen who started recreationally this informant was involved in commercial fishing from the start, at first with his father, then on his own and now he fishes for enjoyment and “the pan” (food). He'd started fishing for “predominantly snapper with licenses for setnetting, drag netting, plonking, handlining, longlining” and these gave “the freedom to catch those fish

all year round. So I had everything and I didn't go very far to catch the fish either. So it was quite good”.

At the time, aside from he and his father, there were only a few fishermen working in or near the bay so it wasn't congested because new fishermen didn't know what they were doing so didn't last and it was the extra knowledge, skill and motivation he had from growing up in a fishing family that made the difference. He started fishing from a “little tin boat” – no cabin and liked fishing in the rough. “Yeah. I mean when it's really rough I get quite excited. I can't sleep at night. ... The fish will be banging. That's part of the local identity isn't it? When you get conditions like that you know the fish are going to be around (Informant 7).

On Waiheke, during this period, the 1960s and '70s, commercial fishing tended to develop from subsistence fishing or fishing as a means of supplementing other activities (part-time or pluriactive) with family relations becoming increasingly important in the recruitment of new fishermen.

Commercial fishing in Coromandel and Leigh followed a similar pattern. In Coromandel the Strongmans are recognised as one of the prominent fishing families. Ian Strongman was a second-generation fisherman.

When I was a little fellow I was mucking around in boats and what not. Then Dad went deckhand for ... (his brother) and I was always down there when they came in, helping unload and it just interested me and I did a cabinet making course when I left school and at that time Dad bought his own boat. I came back to Coromandel from Auckland as quick as I could and I was deckhand for him for about ten years I guess. When Dad retired, my brother, worked with me and he became a quota broker (Ian Strongman).

Ian bought his father's boat but when the quota management system came in his father sold his quota, so Ian had to lease quota (i.e. buy ACE).

At Leigh Barry Torkington and his brother were third generation fishermen. Their grandfather started catching crayfish and put them on the steamer for Auckland but ... he didn't get paid for many. Their father started commercial fishing just after World War Two with a dinghy rowing just outside the Leigh harbour to catch plentiful crayfish with a few pots. These were transported to Auckland by steamer and mail truck and sold on the Auckland waterfront through a contact there. Then he persuaded his brother, a local quarry worker, to join him in the

business that they continued for the rest of their lives. During that time they expanded their operation by building some boats and adding snapper to their target catch. This was rugged work:

When they were going out to Little Barrier you'd never see a boat and they were going out there for a couple of days, go and sleep a night and ... pull the pots twice and never see a boat. But no winches or anything, all pulled by hand. All pulled by hand. The pair of them had hands like ... bears' claws ... you know (Barry Torkington).

Fishing had an ethos of freedom, of independence of working for oneself. Indeed Barry Torkington describes his motivation to become a fisherman as:

Freedom from an 8-5 job...you could make your own living, at your own pace, being your own boss. This was a huge plus for me and I shot across to Aussie as a young guy with the idea of saving some money, enough to buy a boat, a bit of land and that was it, very low tech, very easy. Just a way of, just make enough money to avoid having to get a job (Barry Torkington)⁹².

Although circumstances and aspirations were different, family fishermen eased into the occupation by participating in the household livelihood, using their father's gear, learning his skills and sharing his vision. They experienced an ethos of kinship and freedom where the main restrictions were imposed by the marine environment and the life cycle of their quarry.

Local Retail Fishermen

Perhaps starting as subsistence fishermen, many moved into fishing more deliberately for the fish shops and became retail fishermen. After subsistence fishing for the family, informant 6 eased into commercial fishing using his grandfather's gear setting nets around the Bay he knew so well from early recreational fishing. As he expanded operations he got a loan from the family to buy his own 14-foot aluminium dinghy and outboard motor, then he went into partnership with a now invalided fishermen, "good at doing deals and conning the young guy". He used his partner's nets and the partner smoked the catch and they were selling to the fish shops on the Island. After leaving the partnership he began getting his own nets but longlining was becoming popular. It was only about then that he realised that he had to be registered.

⁹²

See also: <http://torkington.com/history/>

Fishing in the late 1970s and early 1980s was flexible. He was using three different methods, set nets, drag net and longlines and depending on seasonal availability, caught a variety of species: snapper, kahawai (sometimes there were huge schools in the Bay and periodically the dolphins chased them right up to the beach), trevally and the occasional kingfish, smoking some and selling some fresh (Informant 6).

Largely self-taught this fisherman learnt the basics from his grandfather, became first a subsistence fisherman, then with family assistance and increasing commercial arrangements, he became more commercial and picked up other knowledge in both co-operation and competition from senior fishermen. Most of his knowledge and skill, however, came from the trial and error of setting his gear in the local bay and adjacent coast during a decade of commercial fishing (Informant 6).



Figure 13: A small Waiheke (retail) fishing boat circa 1983.

Two of the senior fishermen (Informants 5, 12) on the Island through the 1980s and 1990s had both grown up on farms at the bottom end of the island. One, had fished commercially well into his seventies but when interviewed he was retired and only occasionally putting out a small flounder net for recreational or subsistence purposes. Most of his fishing was for flounder or mullet netting with a 14 foot [4m] dinghy (c.f. Figure 13) and old outboard motor, the largest boat he'd used, working only on the south and east coasts of Waiheke and usually close

to home. But he sometimes used a long line, with maybe no more than 25 hooks, for gurnard and a drag net for snapper. Most drag net fishermen in the Hauraki Gulf had bigger boats and used a winch, which wasn't legal, but he always hand pulled his net, occasionally using the outboard.

It was hard – bloody hard work, even with using the outboard because I hand did it all. So I'd always leave home before daylight. I'd pull it at daylight sort of thing and I'd be home – well it depends on the time of the year sort of, but a couple of hours after daylight I was home with the fish I'd caught. So that's how it sort of worked. Well my floundering that was done tidal really. Wintertime – setting over night (Informant 12).

Fishing was not his main occupation.

The less running the better because I've always had a lot of work to do on the farm ... I supplied a shop for years and years and years ... but there's not really any decent fresh fish outlets on the island. I mean there's fresh fish in the supermarket and different things but not fresh fresh fish. Fish that I supplied to the shop was FRESH fish, top high quality! It was caught and probably sold the same day or within two or three days at the most ... I did fish to the Co- op for a few years and I made quite a bit of money at that time, iki-ing them and they were sending them to Japan ... It was very good at one stage but then it faded out (Informant 12).

Before the QMS, fishermen could take advantage of new opportunities as they arose. This informant, for example, would gill, gut and string the flounder on flax and land it to another fisherman on the other side of Tamaki Straits who would sell it in Otara (a suburb in South Auckland) from his van. "He used to catch his own but then he actually preferred me to catch them and he'd just sell them, which worked all right". There were various patterns depending on species targeted and season. "Yeah there are changing patterns. Everything is changing all the time. The quota system sort of changed that" (Informant 12). So local fishermen could supply local shops, regional outlets and, by landing to buyers in Auckland, even the international market.

The other senior fisherman on Waiheke (Informant 5) grew up on a Waiheke farm, attended a one teacher school at Man-O-War Bay, spent a couple of years away, and then returned and remained on the island. He had always loved fishing but never sold any while on the farm. Then he married the sister of another fisherman, moved up to a bach⁹³ on the end of Onetangi almost next to the hotel

⁹³ A simple, usually coastal, holiday home.

and fished more commercially selling to the locals in Onetangi. He too just used a small boat launched off the beach. Other informants told me how he and his wife had a bench set up by the bank and cleaned or filleted the catch then took fish to regular customers (Informant 5).

Some time after he started fish disappeared from the Gulf and he had to revert to shearing sheep for a while. By the time of our interview he had been retired for some years and told me:

When I was doing it commercially I used nets and longlines and handlining and all that type of fishing because I actually supplied only the [Onetangi] hotel along here. I had to. I used to go out every day, sometimes all night, sometimes to get the fish for the guests. ... The guesthouse was running in those days. That's what I fished for. I had about 22 years of it. I supplied them with fish. But I didn't rape the Gulf or anything in those days but I used to see a lot of wastage – you know with the seine boats and the trawlers. Longliners don't do that much damage. Not really because they only catch live fish and what they don't need they put back” (Informant 5).

Others, working in full time but low paid jobs caught fish to feed their families before becoming retail fishermen. One (Informant 21) who grew up on the Island, for example “just grew up walking around the rocks and fed my family and when I got married I decided that I was still going to live on the Island so I was labouring and I was working in a timber yard and I was earning \$90 a week (mid 1970s) driving trucks” (Informant 21).

Iki Jimi Fishermen

The biggest group of informants was those who, for convenience, I've called “iki jimi” fishermen although many had been part of the influx into the fisheries in the 1970s before the introduction of that method (See Box 7, page 157). Typically they had been introduced by friends, come into commercial fishing from other careers, and targeted snapper for the lucrative Japanese iki jimi market using old launches converted for longlining (See Figure 14).

The iki jimi method, also known as iki jime” and “iki jume” was introduced to New Zealand fishermen by Barry Torkington after he and his brother returned from a trip to Japan to investigate the snapper market. In 1980, after an attempt that failed in 1979, fishermen received a 10cent/kg premium but fishermen spiked

them on the way out of the icebox. In 1981 after showing Leigh fishermen the correct method, Barry Torkington introduced it to Auckland.

He “went down and got a few Auckland boats doing it and we used to get the fish packed in a shed in Auckland, a fish processing place, and market it ourselves under our own brand which was great and the returns were huge. We doubled the price for the fish in no time” (Barry Torkington).

Another informant put it in context, showing how fishermen had scope for innovation before the QMS and the possibility of cooperative relationships with fishermen from other communities:

Barry and his brother are amongst the early ones who were aware of what Japanese fishermen were doing and went over to Japan to have a look at the market for themselves, came back and taught themselves how to do it and hence Leigh Fisheries who were always the most innovative of all the little fishing companies and they were the first ones into that ... Those are the guys who really started it. ... [W]hen the Waiheke Co-op ... was set up ... one of the first things that we did at Waiheke Island was to get some experts to lecture us on iki jimi fishing and that's what the Waiheke Co-op was aiming to do ... So I think probably Leigh (was) first and perhaps some people up in Northland ... and then there was Waiheke Co-op and then really last of all the Auckland Viaduct and then later on down the track seine boats and trawler fishermen started sticking holes in their heads too. And I must say, probably improving their fish quality (Informant 14).

Box 7: Iki Jimi Fishing

The method involved killing each live snapper quickly as it came aboard the longliner by putting a spike into the brain. Then immersing it in slurry of seawater and ice to drop the temperature and chill, not freeze it. Since the fish did not flap around the muscles were relaxed and the flesh stayed together and also maintained quality, appearance and taste. Quick chilling in the slurry prevented the release of enzymes that would change or discolour the flesh or affect the taste and tests done at Massey for the NZFIB showed that even inexperienced tasters could identify “iki” fish since the flesh quality and texture differ markedly between iki and non- iki (Baigent 1987 41). The snapper were then packed on a layer of ice on their bellies into iki bins with some ice over the top so they didn't get ice burn. They would be regraded by size, colour and condition after landing to the packing shed. Although it normally took only three days for the fish to travel by air to Japan the method allowed up to a week. The fish are also handled carefully throughout the process to ensure all scales were intact and appearance perfect. Japanese reputedly eat with their eyes and red coloured snapper were especially prized for ceremonial purposes such as weddings (Baigent 1987 41, 43; Viaduct informants; Martyn 1991 38). Fishermen now use cotton gloves to prevent sweat and oils getting on the snapper (Leigh Fisheries).

One informant who became an iki jimi fisherman entered fishing in what seems the 'classic' manner: “I just loved ... (fishing) as a kid ... just going down the wharf there as young kids do... Like I wasn't doing that great at school. When it came to it I decided whether I wanted to go fishing or be a chef”. He was too young to take an apprenticeship with either the Navy to be a chef or on a trawler in Onehunga⁹⁴. “So then I looked in the papers and there was a long line boat looking for a deckhand which you didn't need an apprenticeship for so I started out of Kawakawa Bay” (Informant 42).

After a year there he followed his parents to the fishing village at Leigh, “but no one was looking for deckhands so I just went around to a lot of the boats and said I'd work for free on various boats and it started from there. So three or four years on one boat and ... I studied hard for my skipper's ticket. At the age of 21 got my skipper's ticket and started running boats from there”. The QMS was introduced while he was crewing on others' boats so he missed out on quota (Informant 42).

Other fishermen had come from diverse careers such as labouring (Informant 26), mechanic (Informant 44), panel beater (See: Gulf News 4 August 1978 5), real estate agent (Informant 13), teacher (Informant 14). Often they had experience with boats and friends who were already fishing which also accounts for cliques; groups of three or four fishermen the boats rafted up at the pontoon between the ferry times. For the locals waiting for the ferry it was "the boys and their boats" as they baited up or did maintenance together then fished separately but met up to anchor over night in the same bay.

Some were attracted by the lifestyle, others by the money. Some were entrepreneurial fishermen constantly seeking to improve the method and get a product for a better market (e.g. Barry Torkington and iki jimi), another had the first colour sounder in the Viaduct (Informant 14), or setting more and more gear, another had to get a better boat, then bought a second, an old Danish seiner to also get into tuna fishing (Informant 13). Others who may have initially been attracted by the money persisted because they appreciated the lifestyle and were content to fish at a reasonable level (Informant 26; Chris Dunn, longliner).

⁹⁴ On the Manukau Harbour in South Auckland.

The difference in attitude and ideology was not just to the occupation but also in the manner they fished. Showing the diversity within just one clique one informant described his colleagues. Referring to one he said:

I can remember fishing alongside him a few times but he wasn't the gun fishermen that some of those other guys were. He was life styling he wasn't out there to catch as much fish as he could catch, that's for sure. He was really doing it for enjoyment rather than anything else. Another was smart, he could catch fish, that's for sure and he was out to catch fish. He wasn't out for fun. He was out for money. Yes, he was a good hard hungry fisherman and once or twice he had some outstanding strokes of luck too. He was consistently good and he targeted good fish and he used technology a lot.

[A third] used to talk about finesse rather than mega hooks and I certainly subscribed to that way of thinking as well and the three of us used to talk to each other and respected each other quite a lot I think. [The fourth and fifth] were gun fishermen from the old school really in terms of they could catch a hell of a lot. [The fourth, especially] was always volume rather than quality, I think and his little boat wasn't ... wasn't, the ideal boat for it although he got a, he built a, ... [another] and put big fish bins in it and probably improved his quality a lot later on. I don't know but he's a guy that could catch fish.

[The sixth] was probably the most born and bred, most natural fisherman, of anyone on the island. He was kind of the genuine Waiheke local who knew every little nook and cranny and he fished very consistently and very regularly. He never caught too much and he never caught too little and he fished all through the year, in a way, in some ways the most professional fisherman of all. After the QMS came in he was one of the first to sell out. I know because I bought his boat and his quota. He was one of those fishermen who didn't go for colour sounders and all that sort of stuff but he observed the birds and the tides and weather and he was kind of a natural fisherman (Informant 14).

Some built their own boat (Gulf News 9 May 1980 26). Others bought an old launch. Some had persisted with the boat they started with (Chris Dunn, longliner, for example), while others changed boats and indeed three of the informants owned the same boat (*Lotus*) sequentially.

The Coromandel was similar. People fished for subsistence then as other employment dried up began fishing commercially:

In the mid 70s you'd just throw your line out and you got heaps of fish just like that. You didn't need to make any effort. You hardly needed to even

bait the line. There were just heaps of fish there in the mid 70s. But then after the economics started to get tight and the fishing (expanded), there were lots of young fishermen out with their boats. Man that made a real impact because they fished close in and they had the smaller boats and they fished all along the coast and it got much harder then. It was the job of last resort for young men trying to support their families ... Just got up or borrowed from their families \$3 or 4,000 for an old fishing boat and set out to support themselves. So that was mainly what it was and there were heaps of them. There just got to be more and more and more of them until there were no fish basically. And you saw the big [Japanese] longliners. They would fish along the line and they would send the little boats in. We were right on the edge of the restrictions for coming into the Gulf at that stage when they were beginning to bring in restrictions. Boy they went over that line every night (Informant 2).

These informants didn't fit the typologies of fishermen presented in the literature and, while it is useful to consider them in the categories used here, the situation is more dynamic since an operation that began one way, in one category, developed another and ends in a different category. One fisherman, for example, started recreationally, then for subsistence, retailed a bit, then deliberately moved into both iki jimi fishing and retail.

The profitability of the iki jimi market had seemed responsible for the considerable influx of fishermen into the snapper fishery in the early 1980s but this perception was refuted by one informant from both his own and wider experience.

People came in because they just wanted to fish. There was always a market for fish. The iki jimi market was already in the process of being established when I started fishing. I just went straight into that form of fishing. Most other fishermen around me were converting their attitudes, more than anything else, towards higher quality type of fish and they were learning what they should do and I was learning as well ... Most of my fellow fishermen had been fishing before the iki jimi market opened up. ... It was certainly the factor that made longlining profitable and exciting in the early 80s. It was a golden time and had it not been the controlled fishery I'm sure many more people would have come in because of the iki jimi market. Because of the controlled fishery they couldn't and the controlled fishery was more or less in place before most people were aware of the iki jimi market, I think (Informant 14).

The technology they used, the boats and type of gear, particularly whether active (trawling and Danish seining) or passive (longlining and set netting) contributed

to the occupational identity of my commercial fishing informants. The boats most iki jimi fishermen used had been designed and built locally, for recreational use, most of them, especially the older, specifically for the Hauraki Gulf (See Figure 14).



Figure 14: Waiheke longliners at the Matiatia pontoon gearing up for an iki jimi trip.

Fishermen were innovative, always watching each other, checking out the boats and gear to see how they resolved the hassles. The problem of catching seabirds is an example and also represents the range of conservation ideologies among fishermen, from the more conservation minded who were there to experience the marine environment to the more entrepreneurial for whom monetary return was more paramount;

Birds! I've seen fishermen that pissed me off a bit. I used to call them truck drivers because they weren't actually out there because of the environment or anything they were there to make a quid. I used to see them shooting birds and also laying the gear that quick they weren't using weights and they'd have three or four, five, six, ten birds pull their gear down and personally myself, if a bird did get hooked you'd chip back up and try and get it off because it didn't do your gear any good for a start. Birds that used to get us were sooty shearwaters, they were the worst (Informant 2).

Longliner Chris Dunn explained how the work and gear changed during the years he was fishing:

Yeah well we progressively moved. When we first went there ... we were hand hauling the bloody kuralon. We used to pull the bloody gear in, even in the summer time and you'd just drop the fish on the bloody floors inside a covered cockpit but just drop the fish on the bloody floor. Then you'd pick up all your gear before you'd turn round ... dig the ice out then with ... (an ice) pick you'd throw the things in ... At the end of it (after the advent of iki jimi) we were holding the little darlings and you'd have your gloves on – we weren't allowed to touch them because the Japanese alleged you leached the colour out of them. You had a spike so you'd take the hook out of the mouth and then you'd spike it in the brain then you'd drop it in a slurry bin. I built in [bins for] slurries of seawater and ice and then even after awhile you'd break off half way down a line. If the fish were in a slurry bin for longer than about an hour and a half the eyes used to freeze so for appearances sake, if you were getting good catch you'd just cut the line under a buoy and a little anchor and drift away from it and put the fish away. We used to stack them on their little tummies. Pick them up with little gloves, stack them all up and you'd have ice underneath them. You'd have only one layer of fish, all on their tummies, then you used to put ice on top of that. We used to put boards in so it would take care, if you were falling off seas and things, there was no crushing and then you'd put down some more ice and then put the fish down, you know? The fish were beautiful (Chris Dunn, longliner).

By comparison with trawling, or to a lesser extent with Danish seining, with time off during tows or sets, longlining was constant labour intensive work.

I didn't like seining much. [My skipper] didn't have a drum. It was all coilers, stamping the bloody rope down. Hard work, utter boredom sitting round waiting waiting waiting to do the shot and then it's all action when it was on and then ... No, with longlining it's constant working all the time there are very few spare minutes. When you do get them it's idling back to pick up the gear, putting fish away, baiting up for the next set cleaning up, hauling gear, it's all on (Informant 13).

For those who wanted to work in the inshore environment, iki jimi fishing while labour intensive, with early starts and constant physical effort, had relatively low capital demands with comparatively cheap boats, gear and easily obtainable.

Fishing as a Last Resort

Much of the commercial enterprise and employment on the island is sensitive to wider economic trends such as the housing market and, being dependant on visitors and seasonal fluctuations. As with many other coastal communities access

to commercial fisheries could make the difference for some between tiding over or even succeeding well and bankruptcy. An informant explained:

I'm a real estate agent but before that I was a photo engraver. No I came home to help my Dad in his real estate business. We had a boom in '72, '73 and at the end of '73 we had a crash. Had a young family, made lots of money in real estate. The taxman was all over me wanting provisional tax for the next year assessed on the income in previous years. I started with Dad in '69 incidentally. There was no money coming in, you'd sit around all day, no appointments. Nothing would happen, no money. So I had to do something so my mate and I went out and, as I say, we put out a hundred metres of net and caught a heap of fish. This was pretty good so we got started on fish. Got a license, bought more net supplied the local fish shops – catching too much (Informant 13).

The fisheries also helped resolve the perennial problem of lack of employment because “any young bloke around the island that wanted a job. You could go and see one of the skippers and he'd be tried out and he'd get a job fishing” (Informant 1). Fishing then required practical seagoing and boating skills so provided an option for those youth who would hadn't done well at school. One now very successful fisherman explained the situation and his experience.

Those people might not have been any good at school. They might have dropped school days and gone fishing instead of going to school but they were the 'bone fide' people in the fishing industry. They are the ones that should have been helped – [instead of] these university delinquents – take away the electronic equipment and they're stuffed. That's what they are. I'm no good at school. Good thing I went fishing in the early days I suppose. But everybody's got something good about them and the fishing in the old days was one of those things. You could pick it up and catch fish, you could do alright (Informant 7).

He got into the fishing by choice but the fisheries also provided the community a means of dealing with some of those youth at a loose end and getting into trouble with alcohol. The novel, *Royce, Royce the people's choice* (Hawes 2002) provides realistic detail of this option.

ETHOS "OUT THERE"

On the assumption that the highlights, positive and negative, would indicate both the physical experience and major motivations, the questions: “What was the best of it, out there?” and “What was the worst of it”, were asked.

During my Viaduct research, seiners and trawlermen tended to regard their boats, not like recreational boaties as expressive objects but, like a farmer's old utility vehicle, merely a tool and the Gulf just the 'factory floor' for the routine grind of an arduous activity. The marine environment of the Hauraki Gulf was the arena for fishing activity and their boats the means of access. Kenyon and most of my present longline informants also suggest otherwise. In his seminal paper, "Making a Living from the Sea", Graeme Kenyon, epitomized what longlining meant to him before the introduction of the QMS:

Ten years ago, small-time commercial fishing was a way of life which gave independence, opportunity and the excitement of a gambler's optimism, a source of pride to each individual that he could use wit, skill and energy to provide for his family in the most primitive way, hunting in the wild, becoming in tune with the environment, the weather patterns, the changing sea conditions, falling in love with the Hauraki Gulf and its coastline, its islands and its havens of safety and calm in times of exhaustion and despair, rejoicing in the good times the sheer joy of surging back from the Cape in a rising north easterly, a following sea building behind and a reasonable freight carefully iced away as a reward for two twenty hour days single-handed, followed by a straight twenty four, three hours out from the Mercuries⁹⁵ or behind the Barrier, and then setting the autopilot for home. The occasional brief comment over the VHF being the only contact with the others, but through that link a sense of community, a few laconic words, but so full of meaning if you are a part of that community, all of us just two good trips away from being rich but never quite making it. My fraternity: the longliners, we never took too much, rarely had the luck or the stamina to do it, limited by a labour-intensive method which held unlimited hope but never quite delivered. But prices were good, and we could afford to be generous and bloody-minded at times, and to do well you had to be always optimistic and opportunistic (Kenyon 1992 1).

Fishermen learnt the seasonal variability of fish and the methods and gear setups required to catch them:

[Y]ou could split where the fish were and the effort into quite clearly four seasons and we used to work the spring and autumn. In the early stages we used to work in the channels when the fish were coming in out of the deeper water with the tides coming up onto the shellfish beds in the shallower waters and then they'd go back out ... You know the channels used to drop off when the tides got too big and you'd get only juvenile fish.

⁹⁵ A cluster of islands just to the east of the Coromandel Peninsular.

You know the bigger fish are smart enough and they'd stay out because there was a lot of [fishing] effort and so it was hard fishing when the tides got over about 3.2, 3.3 metres⁹⁶. ... Then in the winter we used to be hard in on the foul. What I mean hard in on the foul we had the early Furuno sounders ... and they were hard to [calibrate] – we didn't have colour sounders ... but you could pick up the bottom profile and you could see fish marks and I would just start. I would drop the gear when the bottom profile went like that [gesture], if there was a flat area and you didn't cut the gear and get the anchor on – generally there'd be couple of hooks outside and just on flat profile ground and you'd get – at the start of the line no fish and then where it was all jagged there'd be often bloody near a fish on every hook and then the last couple of hooks out on the ground on the flat ground outside you'd get nothing. ... Then in the school season I had them [the snoods – traces] about 4 yards apart so the play in the school season was in the early period I used to pick up fish (Chris Dunn, longliner).

The demands of the livelihood were ongoing:

We used to fish for three nights, four days, and then we'd have to steam up to Auckland and unload the catch and get the ice and bait and any replacement gear and then we'd sail back down again and wait until the start of the next week generally. So it was one trip a week. We fished year round ... We were originally hand hauling monofilament backbone line ... just trying the backbone was difficult. But we ... had your snoods tied onto the backbone and we used to cut up inner tubes from bicycles ... to get some bloody grip but of course things got bloody exciting when you, if you, got one of those bloody big stingrays on, sharks, you didn't tend to land sharks much bigger than 6 feet. But if you got one of those bloody big carpet things, the danger was, if you let go, the gear started going through and you'd get hooked up!" (Chris Dunn, longliner).

Best Times

In contrast to many of my Viaduct research informants for whom the Gulf was just work space, for a surprising number of the present informants, the best was being “out there”, at sea in the marine environment, in the Gulf and, perhaps secondarily, boating.

Oh I enjoyed, I just really enjoyed the ocean. The fishing for me was never the important part. Being on the ocean was the important part and still is. I still, I think that whole growing up on the coast and spending a youth mucking around in boats and a lot of time at sea, it's definitely the ocean that's the attraction (Greg Hayes).

⁹⁶ Locally very high

Well I love catching fish. There's the joy of catching fish, just to be out there. It is something. I love the old boat I have you know. If you love the boat then you love being out there in it and you'll do well with it. ... You love to see the birds. You love to see the fish life, the whales, the dolphins, the sharks. You like to see the bag, the fish coming up. The whole thing is, I suppose you can say it's like an addiction; everything's changing all the time. You're hunting. Man is basically a hunter, you're always hunting for things waiting for that, it's a gambler's paradise. Where do you get a job like that? You never know what you're going to earn and a lot of it is up to your own ability. It's not just a straight-out gamble. It's an intelligent gamble (Greg Hayes).

I say to people 'If you love the sea and you love fishing then all right go fishing. Don't go fishing for the money, go for the passion. If you go because it's your passion then you might make money but if you go for the money you'll never do it'. And that is the secret. If it is your passion and you just love the sea. I mean I've been on the boat and I belong out there. If you gave me some square arsed steel boat and it's like a truck, alright. That's what I call them, they're just truck boats ... I go out there in my old dunga sort of thing which is a lovely ship, you know (Greg Hayes).

When I asked Ian Strongman what he most liked about being out there he said:

Freedom! I'd wake up in the morning look out the window and if it was blowing or rough, not go. Or if I did go I'd tell the wife I'd be back tomorrow but then get enough fish and be back that night.

Despite the 4.00am starts and the fisherman's hands⁹⁷ others agreed with him:

The attraction for me was freedom; freedom from an 8-5 job. Which I've had a few ... This was a way you could make your own living, at your own pace; being your own boss. This was a huge plus for me. I remember my uncle saying to my old man [father] when he was fishing he'd say "Anybody who'd go fishing for a living would go to hell for a picnic." He thought it was just the craziest, the hardest, the most uncomfortable and hard lifestyle to choose. But definitely to us, when we were just starting it did represent freedom. Even though, sure it took you to the edge a few times it was, that's what it was about (Barry Torkington).

Appreciation of the environment, or working the boats, were not the only factors. Often lifestyle, the challenge of hunting, a good catch, and freedom merged. "Just the sheer solidarity like just the beauty of the whole thing and not having to worry

⁹⁷ One of the occupational hazards is that with some methods, hand hauling gear and the saltwater aggravating sores, some fishermen's hands often become swollen and cramped.

about anything basically. You were just in the environment. You were with the birds; the wind and the water and you could make some money out of it” (Informant 26). Their friendships and camaraderie might not always have seemed most important at the time but it is what fishermen remembered later. Kevin Martin, for example:

The best of it, mate, exactly what's happening right now, talking to you. Meeting the people. I love the people ... the main thing ... is the comradeship with the people. That's what I liked. I liked that and I still like it ... I used to enjoy sitting down and having a beer and talking bullshit. I like it. I just liked all the bullshit about it. All the rah rahing around and the story got big and the waves got bigger and the ship got smaller and that's what I liked (Kevin Martin).

When asked about the best of it, the fisherman who was perhaps the most entrepreneurial (Informant 13) said:

It was a lifestyle. It was hard physical work. Long hours we'd work 30 hours straight. We'd leave here (Matiatia). You'd go down pick up your ice after the 9.00 o'clock boat (ferry) so you were down there just after 8.00. You'd get your ice and bait then start idling your way out wherever you were going and cutting up bait, making up gear from the last trip, replacing traces and stuff so. You'd get out and you'd see something on the sounder so you'd put a little shot down just to see what it was and see whether the fish are biting or what the hell and we'd mainly target the evening set. That would be the big one and whack in a couple of thousand, 1,500 to 2,000 hooks and pick it up then start doing short shots 300s all through the night because you could not leave, put a lot of gear in the water over, there's patches of lice out there that would just strip you as soon as it hits the bottom so any fish on there, if there are any fish on there too long, gone. If you can see them on the sounder and if they're on the bottom, you've got them on the hook, there's nothing surer so you put in a short shot so you've got the fish and that was beautiful fish. They're only in the water less than an hour, you'd whack in 300 hooks and turn around and pick them straight up. So we'd carry on doing this all night. Come in and unload, sometimes you'd need to take it to town (the Viaduct) and by the time you'd got your ice and loaded and everything and got back to the island it would be one or two o'clock and by the time you did all the things you had to do, well I had to do because I was running another business as well and I'd crawl into bed about four or five o'clock in the afternoon. They'd wake me up for tea but the sleeps were incredible (Informant 13).

Sometimes it wasn't just the appreciation of the environment but also the contrast with shore based occupations and the uncertainty of the results:

Well sometimes it was quite miserable. At other times it was very enjoyable. I suppose on the enjoyable times, you'd be coming out of a little bay on Great Barrier Island thinking to yourself most people are working all year and looking forward to going out to the Barrier for one week and here I'm doing it all of the time so I virtually own the Hauraki Gulf. It's my place. I'm here all the time. That kind of feeling but I think the compelling thing about fishing, apart from all of those things, I think there's a kind of addiction to it and it's a little bit similar to the addiction of gambling, I think, and people who are prone to those addictions take very readily to fishing.

The reason why it's so addictive is that it is so unpredictable. The rewards can be very great but they occur randomly, you can convince yourself that you are a good fisherman, I'm not a good fisherman, but there's still a randomness to it. You never quite know, the best guy never quite knows, what's going to happen and there's always the thought that the next one's going to be even better and sometimes it's not so. You get this intermittent reinforcement.

These failures and the occasional great successes and all of this drives a kind of addictive process and if fishermen become in any way sort of slaves it's a slave to that. It's the thought that the next trip's going to be a good one and that drives you to go out and do it again so there's the excitement that a gambler experiences when he thinks he's about to strike it lucky and I think that's probably the thing (Informant 14).

Several fishermen referred to the gamble and the excitement engendered by the uncertainty of the catch:

The best out there was the unknown. You could never put money on what would turn up. What was today's problem? On any day there were so many variables you could never stop trying to learn. The unknown. One day you'd get eight baskets off one shot. The next day in the same place just one then a week later there's more again. You just don't know. But experience helps (Informant 18).

Worst Times

I had anticipated that bad weather would be the worst of it but this was not the case. Fishermen certainly experienced bad weather, even those who used small open boats right inshore.

Informant 12, for example said:

It was lovely at times but bloody awful at other times because when you were supplying a shop you were trying to get the fish and sometimes you had to go out and stuff them. I'd never go off shore these days. Yeah, I've

been out there in all sorts ... I suppose being out there in a little boat. One time ... when I was longlining with an outboard running in reverse to hold me into the wind and pulling the bloody longline and working it in and it was so bloody rough I had planes circling over me to see if I was alright. I looked like I was in trouble. Yeah, I don't miss those crook times and cold winters, have a bloody string of nets out and by the time you'd been over the first net you were totally numb. You couldn't feel a thing with your hands. You had to do all the rest by eye and make your hands, tell your hands what to do and hope they did it. I don't miss any of that (Informant 12).

So many fishermen felt a sense of obligation, often a financial necessity, to retrieve the gear, but also to their customers. For some, the gamble contributed to the best, for others it was the worst, part of the experience out there: “Just the uncertainty. It was like playing cards. It was the uncertainty or the stress of not earning any money and that happened quite a lot” (Informant 26).

It's a whole lot of things. Getting boarded by the MAF. That's a hell of a thing; it always stuffs your day up. Getting the net round the propeller. Hooking the net up on a rock or a roll or something and ripping the arse out of it ... Yeah expensive. Those are probably the worst things. The other, sometimes you get days out there when the fish, you don't catch anything; for various reasons, like there might be an earthquake in the Bay of Plenty and that spooks the fish so you don't catch anything. So you tow your gear round all day and you burn a lot of fuel up and stuff and you don't catch anything, maybe a bit of, half a box, that sort of thing. There's that, that's not much fun (Informant 20).

In addition there was the contradiction between camaraderie and dependence on the one hand and ruthless competition on the other:

Yeah it was a very cutthroat business but I think the basis was fishermen, you know, when you were out there you used to rely on other people. Especially before we had radios because none of us had radios to start off with in our boats. So I guess that sort of come through in the industry. But boy they would cut each others' throats (Informant 44).

The lack of fish was often a big factor. “The worst was having a mortgage when the fish were not biting. When you'd get the southwesters that blow for a week. We don't get them now” (Informant 18).

For another, the worst was what it meant in terms of his relationship with his the family:

No. I neglected my family. I missed out on the best times of my kids growing up and in the end sort of distanced myself from my family despite the fact that I didn't want to do that but it happened because each day seemed more important than one's sort of family goals which could be shoved off for another day or so, which always happens. The Quota Management System didn't cause that, fishing itself did (Informant 14).

Perceptions change with age so that with nostalgia the best might outweigh the drudgery and the worst of it. So for these mainly small longline fishermen the occupational ethos was hard physical work for uncertain returns but at sea in the beauty of the Gulf. They worked down among the waves in small old boats with the reality of caulked timbers and steamed ribs, cranky diesels, oil in the bilge and fumes. There was a sense of freedom, the gamble of the hunt, the intellectual challenge of elusive quarry but not the regularity and authoritarian regime endured by shore-based work forces.

Fishermen: Politics

Heuristically, taking politics as meaning action to do with power and authority within social involving relationships from an expressive perspective, the politics of fishing involved interactions and interrelations among different components of the industry and community constituents: the process of becoming and remaining fishermen and engaging with other local fishermen, fishermen using different methods, fishermen from elsewhere, complying and contending with the rules and regulation of MAF's management and enforcement regime, negotiating with the market (See Economics, below), and relating with their families and the community.

More formally Gulf fishermen had their own Association, the Combined Fisherman's Association which was a combination of four small associations, Auckland, Waiheke, East Coast Bays and Rodney. They were all small fishermen and had representatives on the port Liaison Committees with MAF, Ministry of Transport (MOT) and provided a better inter-sector understanding from a fisherman's point of view and vice versa. The Association was trying to maintain the quality of catch and the industry. The members were one-man businesses, not industrial enterprises, and earned an average income, adequate for a fisherman's personal needs and to support his boat. The return to the country was staggering. It was all private capital investment and didn't require Rural Bank Loans and they

remained viable because of the ability of the men to make it so. Their income fluctuated. Some were young and single, young married with a family and house. An older man is an asset to the industry since he had knowledge but also had his boat and land freehold so he didn't need the income of a man starting out (pers com, Ken Browne, President Combined Fisherman's Association, Viaduct Research 8 October 1981).

The process of becoming fishermen, for family fishermen for example, involved negotiating the family fishing traditions and attitudes, participating or not with father or other relative, learning the skills, deciding to become a fisherman then committing to the choice, with or against the support of the family, friends and community. Learning to fish meant not just becoming competent with the boat, the gear and accumulating fishermen's seasonal and ecological knowledge. It also meant contending in the political arena. It was a time when there were increasing numbers of fishermen. Consequently many fishermen began to experience reductions in their catches and there was a growing belief that fish in the Gulf were being depleted. They also had to contend with the politics of increasingly intense negotiation with other varieties of fishermen, groups and institutions such as MAF. Even the choice of where to fish involved a political dimension. This was especially true for the longliners and setnetters in relation to the part-timers before the Gulf became a Controlled Fishery (See Appendix 3) but also in relation to MAF.

Chris Dunn (longliner) for example, felt that he was contending with part-timers "parasiting" and aggravating the alleged overfishing.

Every school season you got all these bloody pricks [part-timers] turning up who you'd never seen before and they'd just gone and got out and got a bloody license, put a bloody boat in and they'd come out and follow you, ... What happened was with all these new entrant guys, the cheeky pricks, they'd be hanging off the wharf in Matiatia. You'd often four or five new boats, you'd never seen them before, you'd row out to your boat and get your gear ready ... Steam out of the harbour and a couple of these guys would drop off the thing and they'd follow you out and no acknowledgement. No hello or anything like that. ... They'd see where you dropped your gear and they'd do a parallel set and they'd drift their gear over you. There were bloody fights and arguments. It was just ridiculous. Anyway that was the legacy of the Ministry. That's why I hate bloody government servants I must admit (Chris Dunn, Longliner).

He was also critical of MAF's response to the issue. "When MAF decided that the Gulf was under pressure they didn't just say: 'There's a moratorium, everybody's whose earning ... (so much)', if they'd just done the simplest thing it would be to say: 'It's now a fishery for those who can prove they derive their income full-time out of it.'"

I always thought that was just an absolute mismanagement and the Ministry just couldn't give a stuff about it. Then when they decided that there was a whole lot of discussion about how the Gulf was going to be managed and for three years prior to actually putting the controls into place they actively opened up the licenses and encouraged people, new entrants, to come in. So for about the last year and a half we used to have these bloody strangers. I used to think they just about tripled the small boat pressure on the fish (Chris Dunn, longliner).

There was also conflict with other gear users. For the longliners it was set netters on the one hand, and Danish Seiners on the other:

Of course if you were gill netting fish, of course the fish are all dead and, you know, they are sitting around in there and a lot of them are getting eaten out. It was just a waste of a resource ... But ... [two other Waiheke fishermen] got into netting big time they had power haulers and they had little fast boats and they'd put the bloody nets all over the 'foul' all round the Noisies [islands] and they'd ghost fish for bloody years. They'd lose gear and that was a c*** of a thing and the Ministry had no interest in bloody limiting that (Chris Dunn, longliner).

When I worked on *Diana*⁹⁸, for one part of the school season the longliners working inside the seine line had been getting fish. The seiners outside, however, had been "starving". As the fish moved out, the liners, as they were legally entitled, moved with them and their longline sets often meant the Danish seiners could not do their seine sets, as and where they wanted, without towing-up the longlines. It was, therefore, frustrating for the seiners waiting until the longline had been retrieved or galling for the longliners when their gear was entangled in the seines. On the other hand some set net and long line fishermen suggested that the bulk catching methods, Danish seining and trawling, also had implications for the fish inshore.

⁹⁸ A 45 foot Danish seiner / multi purpose fishing vessel fishing vessel sister of *Cotapaxi* (Figure 11).

While some individual fishermen did annotate their sounder tapes with position and conditions and did keep their shot books with similar information for fishing spots, tows or sets, for obvious reasons fishermen neither published nor broadcast their knowledge. It was their intellectual capital built up incrementally through the course of their fishing careers. As one fisherman said:

Nobody will write it down and tell you very easily. I mean you can't pick up a book. I'm not going to write the book on how to do it. Nor am I going to tell the next guy who goes out there or he'll clear out the areas where I know where and when to fish; what size fish I'll get. You know I can target into the right place at the right time. That is everything really in fishing plus the way in which I execute my method. So, yeah, it is very hard now to get well-qualified fishermen. There's new guys coming on, I mean there's been a lot of guys over the years, fly-by-nighter. You see they come in, young guys, burn themselves out, there's one guy sick, and now either in prison, dead or in nut houses (Informant 37).

Fishermen: Economics

Economics concerned the relationship with the market, initially with clients in the community, local fish shops and/or buyers at the Viaduct. The best indicator of the economic situation of my informants was the market for which they fished. Initially one of the older family fishermen (Informant 13) had his own clients in the local village before he started supplying the hotel. As another fisherman told me:

[He] wasn't commercial fishing in those days, virtual, [he'd] go out and catch a few fish and ... (his wife) would fillet them and he had his set clients. I suppose you could say it was commercial fishing but he wasn't unloading in the city or anything like that. No bulk fishing (Informant 13)

He knew his clients and what they wanted so could match his expenses and effort to their needs.

The local retail fishermen kept the shops supplied so their relationship with consumers wasn't quite so direct and they were reliant on shop owners or managers knowledge of their clientele. Meanwhile "bait" sales through several fish shops, takeaway outlets and corner stores selling "bait", ensured a flexible market.

The son of one of the older fishermen said:

All my fish was sold on the island. ... I was supplying three at that stage, or more, because there were part-time ones that only took a little bit. Three or four fish shops; they were dealing in fish and chips. Yeah it was a lot of work but it was pretty rewarding and pretty good money for back then. You know, for a small venture with not much capital input and it was all effort, whatever effort you put in. In those days, like when I first got married, and that I was virtually working seven days a week (Informant 10).

Twenty to thirty years ago, local fishermen were directly, or perhaps only one remove from supplying fresh locally caught fish to a relatively small community. Waiheke was much closer to self-sufficiency than is the case now. But it was not perfect. Meager catches in winter as a result of natural variability and the seasonal cycles of fish numbers had a flow-on effect for fishermen and their families. This made it “very hard when there was no fish caught because you still had all the expenses of running the boat, buying ice, buying bait and getting no return for it. So you could go backwards very quickly financially. The winter was hard to get through at times” (Informant 8).

Before the Co-op was established, with the exception of the few that kept their operation strictly local, most of the fishermen took their catch to the mainland on occasion, if not regularly. As noted, one of the senior fisherman supplied a market stall at Otara⁹⁹ (Informant 12), another fisherman supplied his brother-in-law's fish shop in Auckland and sometimes also his in-law's friend who also had a fish shop. “I'd be out at five [am] and the day was over by eight in the morning” (Informant 6) and the fish would be on the ferry.

Buyers

With increasing numbers of fishermen more sold fish at the Viaduct. Many of the buyers at the Viaduct were Dalmatian and the Waiheke fishermen had mixed feelings about them. In winter when the fish and indeed the fishermen were scarce, the buyers cultivated the fishermen to get the fish but in the spawning season it was different.

I suppose we got a reward in a way because if there was, and there were periods, when there was an absolute glut but because we looked after ... [his buyers], you know, you could go out ... but if you got onto a patch of

⁹⁹ A South Auckland suburb.

fish you could bloody come in and drop it off and turn around and go straight back out, fill up and come back in and ... [his buyer] would be ... saying, "Jesus. Not more fish". But because we looked after him through the winter season he would somehow lay off that fish and I'm sure he even took a loss on some of the fish (Chris Dunn, longliner).

Some of the fish sold on the wharf at the Viaduct went to fishshops but another fisherman said his Dalmation buyer "had a truck up on the Viaduct and he used to buy my fish and take it all through the North Island and sell" (Informant 26).

Other fishermen sold to one of the relatively smaller companies and, seemingly as a last resort, to the much larger vertically integrated "corporates" such as Sanford or Jaybel Nichimo. Even then they had a personal relationship with a known buyer or buyers. My skipper, for example, had three buyers, all Dalmations. It seemed most of the buyers, at this 'intermediate' level were Dalmations, who got first choice of the fish. In the event that they did not want it or there was more than they needed then it was offered to Jaybels or Sanford (cf. Johnson and Haworth 2004 110-117).

It was similar for most of the Waiheke fleet before the Co-op was established. Chris Dunn said:

Although you were fishing say for four days you'd come back in on the fourth night. Go home and have a decent bloody sleep, have a shower and wash because I didn't have a shower on the boat and I was a vegetarian in those days so I used to go away with these vegetarian bloody pizzas. I didn't even have a stove for the first three or four years so I'd just eat cold food and you'd come home, have a good feed, have a sleep. You'd still be up again at five o'clock next morning because you had to be up in town¹⁰⁰ -- it's an hour and a half run if the boat had a clean bottom. You'd steam back up to see ... [his buyer who] used to come down and bloody plonk a 40ounce bottle of rum on the back of the boat, particularly in the wintertime when we were keeping his business going.

So you'd do all your business and then often ... start drinking about half past nine or ten o'clock but by then you'd done five or six hours work. So you'd all have a few snorts with all the guys would sit around and tell a few jokes and things (Chris Dunn, Longliner).

Chris Dunn also said that with the effects of the camaraderie and the rum the fishermen "used to play chicken all the way back down [to Waiheke]".

¹⁰⁰ The Viaduct Basin, Auckland.

Export

Increasingly the globalizing export, and particularly the iki jimi, market had more influence, offered better returns than local retail and attracted Waiheke fishermen. As a consequence the community didn't get fish, at least:

Not as much as it should have, it could have benefited more and probably as a result of that they [commercial fishermen] had more disposable income. But the community didn't have the range of fish it had before or direct access to the fish like we did before. That's true the local fish shops at that time started to not be able to get fish ... That is when it started to be exported ... Yeah they were the export prices but also it was all tied up. I mean, if you brought fish in it was exported. Nobody [none of the fishermen] was interested in giving a couple of fish to the local shop. It was mostly ... [shop owner's] at that time, although there were other people, and he would just try and get a bit of second grade fish off whomever he could, like shark fillets or stingray. In the end he was reduced to selling his chips and snapper that had been in the net too long and that kind of thing. And he'd also learnt to sell lower qualities of fish too. So it was really the end of the easy access to fish for the whole community (Informants 6a, 6b -- husband and wife).

So it was not only the corporates who were influenced by the export market to the detriment of the local community. Initially fishermen on Waiheke had supplied the island, then, when they caught more fish than locals could take they started landing the excess at the Viaduct on a small scale for the fish shops and the Auckland domestic market, then to companies who were also exporting internationally for a higher price. As the Japanese iki jimi market developed, Waiheke fishermen increasingly focused on this higher priced, premium market and it also opened opportunities for new fishermen.

Waiheke was not self-consciously a 'fishing community' and ironically it was not the local market, or even the wider Auckland domestic market but the export, particularly iki jimi, market that supported the establishment of a more identifiable fishing industry and the Co-op on the island.

Fishermen: Social Relationships

Fishermen were by no means socially homogenous. One informant was running two boats and a lot of gear, fishing mainly at night while also trying to keep another business running. In consequence he had little or no energy to socialise (Informant 13). Others worked more closely with a "mate" running another boat

while still others formed cliques, groups of three or four who baited-up and got their boats ready together at the wharf on almost a daily basis. The shared experience, running a boat, fishing and confronting the challenge “out there”, or MAF, developed a sense of camaraderie and trust. While generally they did not fish in the same place, often they'd rendezvous and raft up in the same bay overnight. Ashore, they and their families often socialised together.

Perhaps the most dramatic expression of the relationship, the camaraderie between fishermen, was the lengths to which they'd go to assist each other or other 'boaties' in difficulty. Using old boats, sometimes with makeshift arrangements, in an uncertain marine environment, not surprisingly there were exigencies. Even in the semi-enclosed Gulf, situations could be extreme and Chris Dunn told me:

I remember once my drive ditched on me ... [I was] in the "shit" down in the Firth and big seas. Some nuts came loose and it affected essentially the timing of the diesel. It was dark and it was blowing bloody hard and the guys had been fishing for three or four days they were f***** and I bloody, I just, I was f***** (Chris Dunn longliner).

He called up on the radio, got two of his mates and both got out of bed and they steamed out to assist.

There were other cases where boats were caught in weather much rougher than anticipated with planks opening up, with pumps or motors failing, being sheltered in the lee of their mates or being towed. One story I heard in the Coromandel pub was of Search and Rescue (SAR) asking a fisherman to check a Mayday call from another fisherman 130km northeast of Barrier Island in 70 km/hr southwesterly and tow him in. Unfortunately, before getting to the wharf, his boat started taking water from a broken engine cooling fitting and in turn needed assistance. He then faced a long wait for reimbursement.

As a result of the camaraderie that developed through fishing and involvement in such emergencies, even now several decades later one can call up for assistance and the others drop everything even for several days to offer the needed expertise. The bonds forged fishing run deep.

ESTABLISHING THE CO-OP

Establishing the Co-op is indicative of community fisheries before the QMS. It involved the needs, motivations and relationships among the fishermen, with the

authorities (e.g., the Health Department and the County Council) and with the community.

For the fishermen part of the motivation for starting the Co-op was to get essentials like bait and ice and eliminate the travel time having to go over to the city. It also avoided the hassles of filling too much time in the pub. One of the fishermen pivotal in starting the Co-op said,

We used to take it (fish) over to Auckland. And it's the usual old thing. When the fish started running you'd go over and been out for a couple of days and finally had a boatful of fish and thought it was great and go over there and all of a sudden the price had halved. So that was, *****? Of course when fishing was good it was hard to get ice over in Auckland ... It was attractive to be able to do your fishing on the island and return home to the island. To cut out at least a day and extra miles and so on ... It seemed silly to me that you'd come home 'knackered' and then you had to go over to Auckland. It was as simple as that and sea conditions of course. It could be quite awkward getting over there at times in a small boat (Informant 44).

“Of course you've got to have a certain critical mass to have a local industry. I was one of the ones involved in actually starting up the Waiheke Co-op and it was possible to start that Co-op up because there was about 18 or 20 local fishermen and by banding together they had enough critical mass to actually set up their own little chiller plant and ice making plant and run a truck back to the mainland” (Informant 14) (See Figure 15).

Establishing the Co-op was very much a team effort. Right from the time when one of the senior fishermen, who would not himself benefit from the Co-op, first put his hand in his pocket and put a substantial cheque, or bank roll (accounts differ) on the table, setting the example that others followed, a handful of fishermen contributed significant expertise and others their labour.

[E]verything was done on the cheap. I went to Westfield [freezing works] when they were closing up and bought a couple of pallets of electrical goods and brought them all back and ... [one fisherman, formally an electrician] knitted them all together and did all the electrics ... One of my fortes is ferreting out things. I've never bought anything new in my life. I've always go to auctions to buy things. ... But yeah it was the only way could set it up with the funds that we had. I think that if we had asked members for more it would have folded because it was just beyond [them]. I can't remember what it was but the – you know all that

machinery – the only thing new that we bought was the ice head, itself. The big compressors, 20 horse power compressor I bought that second hand from McNeal's out at Tuakau and bought the chiller and the freezer, all those motors etc. bought at auctions and what have you. I think it had a pretty hard life, that machine. It run day and night for years and yeah what was it 3 tonne a day, 5 tonne a day [ice plant] (Informant 44).

While a few fishermen did the skilled work, others did the labouring. “We all put our back, our sweat into it. We all had a share holding ... we built the damn thing!” (Informant 13). “[W]e did a huge amount of work in building the Co-op ... [W]e didn't need to get ice from town which was a major. All the fish was traded through the Co-op and it was taken out to a crowd in Onehunga ... was the exporter or it was the pack house and somebody else was the exporter” (Informant 6). “We got involved with Reijio Sea Products exporting the island fish” (Informant 13).

Like much community enterprise, as the Co-op developed, personal factors and networking, not just commercial convenience, were involved. Getting on well with those one was dealing with was significant. The Co-op contracted with one of the Japanese fish exporting companies in Auckland to process and export their snapper to Japan. It so happened, about the same time, that an informant, a would-be fisherman had joined one of their boats as deckhand for several months before moving into the office¹⁰¹. When one of the Japanese people that he got on well with, also a key liaison with the Co-op, decided to leave, he felt it was time he moved on also. Both the managers had also got on well with another Japanese man who had good relations with the buyers in Japan so asked him to continue exporting their snapper and invited my informant to participate. They formed Reijio Holdings in 1984 and through to 1990 exported chilled (iki jimi) snapper to Japan and pioneered the Taiwanese market (Informant 3).

Despite the ideology of harmonious community relations, the internal reality is often conflicting. Fishermen had joined for different reasons. Some, including two who were Auckland based always put their fish through the Co-op books to support cooperative community enterprise and generate work on the island, “I wanted to see the fisheries stay on the island” (Informant 5) but for others

¹⁰¹ Coincidentally about the same time as I was doing the Viaduct Research.

economic benefit was more important. Lots of different things were going on within the Co-op:

They built the depot and the ice tower and they had the truck and would come over on the barge to town. But even back then everything was open as to what was going through with the prices [transparency] and so on. Even back then some of the fishermen would be happy to steam to town to unload if the competitor was paying 10cents a kilo more. They were doing that and losing dates fishing (Informant 3).

So despite the benefits many found, and their ideological support, the Co-op didn't work out for all the members. One found "it was like layers of middlemen so magical figures, like \$10 a kilo from Japan; well fishermen didn't see that or twenty dollars a kilo. We didn't see that. We struggled, we struggled to try and get \$2 out of him. He [the manager] was supposed to be getting these big sums of money" (Informant 6).

An additional motivation was to provide employment in the community, especially for people on the island. One of those responsible had been on Waiheke for a long time and his wife had grown up on the island. As he explained her perspective of the employment situation she:

... had seen most of her friends, you know, teenagers didn't have any employment on the island at all. Going back, what 40 years, 30-40 years and it wasn't the thing done then for teenagers going out flatting by themselves so families used to leave the island, as teenagers were growing up, and go to the mainland and find employment for the kids etc. A lot of those kids come back to Waiheke when they got on their feet. The only industry really on the island over my period was the clothing factory and of course it had closed down so there wasn't anything at all in that way and one of my biggest buzz was getting [fishing] licenses for a couple of young people on the island. ... You know I went down to Wellington and lobbied for them and went through all the clip clap that went on in those days. It was a buzz. It was very hard to get a license over the period that we were fishing before quota came in. So yeah it was good (Informant 44).

The Downside: Regulations

Regulations created major difficulties and were indicative of relationships with the authorities. The fisherman mostly responsible for negotiating explained:

That depot we built ... [on Waiheke] turned out to be ... the only export depot in New Zealand and we come under all those rules and regulations

and that thing was set up as a whole fish factory. It was ridiculous what we had to do and so on what we went through. Later on an export receiving depot was a bloody 20 feet container sitting in the middle of nowhere and trucks coming in and piling stuff in taking a bit of ice out and we ... [had to have] bloody hard hats and all sorts of things. That was built by the members. It was mostly voluntarily built. We just missed out on all the handouts, like Leigh and Coromandel that ...[were] all built with government loans which, if you made a viable go of it, those loans were wiped out. But we never got any of that. It was a real struggle but yeah, it was good ... When we started off I went up to Leigh. They were very good. They showed us right through the whole lot, gave us a lot of advice about ice plants and that. Went over to Coromandel, they were the same (Informant 44).

Community Support

Some people in the community had mixed views on facilitating commercial fishing by supporting Co-op infrastructure. Indeed, the island's senior statesman, a former Chairman of the Waiheke County Council, Planning Committee and subsequently Hauraki Gulf Councilor on the Auckland City Council when asked about the economic importance of the Co-op said

They had quite a significant role to the extent that the Community Board at the time was considering to meet their needs in relation to the expansion of the wharves, if there needed to be a cool store on the wharf and arrangements ... They made an economic contribution [to Waiheke] and four or five were engaged in the storage (Informant 44).

It went both ways. Indeed the *Gulf News* reporter (Simon Johnson pers com) responsible for most of the fishing news articles, recognising its importance stated that the Co-op then was probably the biggest business on the island putting more than a million dollars into the community annually for the years they operated.

The question is, though, did fishermen feel, on balance, support or opposition? The Co-op manager felt:

Looking back probably very supportive. Thinking about things, you know, different things come to memory. One, for instance, was the first meeting we had. They said 'well the Council won't let you put up a plant because of the waste from it', because we were talking about putting up a processing plant not only a receiving, an export receiving plant and ice plant. I went to the Council ... and they were very supportive. Another thing that was at a later stage after we'd formed the Co-op I was told in no uncertain terms that there was no way we could get a diesel pump down at the wharf. [Named person] had tried for many years to get one and the

Council supported us on that and as you know we put up a diesel pump there. Yeah, yes, we did get support. I can't really remember anyone being against it as far as the public went.

The general thing in those days, everyone was against outside boats coming into the community – trawlers – it was a big No no, wasn't it? In the Gulf I think longlining was seen to be a much better way of fishing and even set netting ... [One fisherman] got it in the neck a bit when he got into monofilament nets. People didn't like that but on the whole I think it was good. Bit of feedback from putting bins of fish on top of the old Iris [Ferry] and water come in. Stuff on the way over on a bad trip and the Baroona [Ferry] and so on. Yeah it was crazy days (Informant 44).

So before the QMS individual fishermen could determine arrangements and, through interaction, negotiation and teamwork between themselves, with cooperation from the community, establish an enterprise to meet their collective needs. Physically it may have utilised an eclectic assemblage of redundant equipment and relationships may not always have been harmonious but for the years of its operation it was one of the biggest industries on the island contributing both social and monetary value to the fishermen and to the community.

LEIGH

Fisheries were very significant for Leigh:

Oh definitely and this place was born by the ancestors who came here, the mill, owned by the Wyatts. They're shareholders in Leigh. Mathiessen's Bay, Mathiessens, they're here, they're shareholders so and then generations down from them. It's a very localized company. Part of Leigh is where we are and what we do. I suppose if you were brutal the best place for us would be at the airport" (Informant 3).

Neil Macdonald, a former fisheries officer from Coromandel recalled that in the early days, perhaps in the 1950s, when Leigh Fisheries "started up they had longline boats only, fishing out of there and they used to come over this side when the weather was right". He remembered that Leigh fishermen:

... came down and they headed and gutted (snapper). That's how all the fish went back – iced down, headed and gutted. Just cut through the back and shoot through ... I was up there once. I used to go up and see them about once a month and have a chatter. The thing that intrigued me, they were smoking fish and there's a roll of bacon and a leg of ham. My word, what a choice – profound (Neil Macdonald)!

Later when he visited periodically between 1970 and 1986 generally whole fish were landed and other methods, including Danish seining, were also in use. Even before the QMS Leigh fishermen had a reputation for good fish. A Waiheke fisherman, who at the time was doing three or four day trips, reported that his Auckland buyer used to say that:

... the second best fish used to come off Waiheke. The best fish used to come out of Leigh and the only thing they had us better on is the fish had a bit more colour. The fish in the Gulf were often a little bit pale. But also, the guys from Leigh often used to do overnight trips then they'd come in after overnights daily. Then of course when we set up Waiheke Sea Products [the Co-op] we organised that so we unloaded at Waiheke” (Informant 19).

Leigh was smaller and a much greater proportion of the population was involved with the fisheries than on Waiheke. An informant who fished with fishermen from both communities suggested:

But they were never the same. The Leigh boys were always different and generally they didn't mix well with the Auckland fishermen and weren't liked but I had a lot to do with Leigh because I went up and worked for them afterwards and so I sort of knew both sides quite well. Totally different bunch of guys altogether (Informant 14).

From the perspective of the Waiheke fisheries officer who knew both communities, if anything, it was better at Leigh since, “there was not much else, at the time, except fishing. Sure there's a bit of farming. But the whole township is based on fishing out there. It's one of those few places in NZ that were fishing villages. I'm sure there were others down south and up north” (Informant 1). So at the local level there were differences among the fishermen based in the three communities but on a larger scale these were not great.

COMMUNITIES

This section will set out the community side of coastal commercial fishing as it was before the QMS; traditionally informal through to more regulated. It will outline aspects of fishermen's families and their communities. Fishermen were and are individualistic and, likewise, their families, children, aspirations and interactions within the community varied. Fishing was not a nine to five occupation and its demands varied. In some cases the differences from the more regular patterns of community life meant personal, relational and occupational

strains took their toll. The fishing supported the community by supplying fresh locally caught fish initially to locals and, in some cases the informal economy, then to the fish shops. Fishermen also needed community support from boatbuilders, repairers, engineers, mechanics or other relevant trades. Commercial fishermen were part of the community and in earlier parts of their lives many members through selling directly had been more involved in community life. The community was still fascinated by fishing so fishermen and their boats were topic of great interest, were reported in the local press and frequently featured conversation¹⁰². Fishing was, therefore, a significant part of the community and contributed to its identity.

Community Subsistence

Traditionally for rural coastal communities, including those in the Hauraki Gulf, fish from locals were an essential part of subsistence. Many coastal people in communities just about depended on fish as a source of protein. In sheltered areas households even had jetties, nets, lines, scoop nets and all the gear needed to fish. In one particular community a pluriactive farmer/fisherman had what was known as the “fish boat” and would barter a good catch. Licenses weren't considered (Faye Giles).

Everybody ate fish and they ate all the fish they caught. I can't think of any kind of fish that was caught there that was not eaten. And the Māori rules held ... where you have a sort of moratorium on shell fishing at one end [of the bed] for say three years or whatever, let them breed up, make sure there was always plenty there (Faye Giles).

So not only did fish provide an important part of diet for the community, community rules ensured conservation. There was no external motivation that threatened fish supply while an informal economy ensured all shared.

On the Coromandel there were many subsistence fishers. Sandra Watson, for example, was born and raised the tip of the Coromandel Peninsular.

There were six in our family and we lived mainly off the sea and the bush. Our mother would go fishing catch us fish for dinner. In those days you could just walk down in front of the house and throw a hand line out and

¹⁰² This is still the case and, as I write in a local cafe, two couples at an adjacent table are recounting earlier careers and a local fishing boat.

catch a bait off the rocks which would be crabs or some of the little kelp fish and we were always guaranteed to have fish for our tea. [It was] mainly snapper, they were good sized snapper too, not just legal size, the ones that you catch a lot of these days. ... Over the years I've found it's got harder and harder to catch fish off the rocks. Basically now you've got to get a boat and go out and go out (Sandra Watson).

Fishing Families

Family is used here in the loose sense of a husband, a wife and their children but there were variations including partners with their children from former relationships. Like other concepts in this research it is dynamic with considerable variation between the families and changes through time in the course of the fishing careers of my informants.

Fishing families differed from others in the surrounding community in that one of the partners, usually the 'husband', and this was certainly the case for all my informants, was a commercial fisherman. In some cases the 'wife' was also heavily involved in the enterprise by doing the bookwork, liaising with buyers, the mechanics and assisting with general shore-based support. In others, the demands of young children, schooling, normal household and community affairs meant she was not directly involved in activities that could be related specifically to commercial fishing. There were, of course, variations between these two fishing family situations with time, life cycle and circumstances. Families were not static entities. The irregularities and uncertainties of the commercial fishing occupation were probably greater for fishing families than for families with other occupations in the community. To a greater or lesser extent fishermen's relationship with the community, as opposed to those businesses that contributed to their enterprise, was through their families.

The regular and irregular absences due to seasonal, weather, market and the exigencies of fishing meant that many routines, satisfactions and stresses on the family tended to be different from those of other families. This may even have been taken for granted by a wife or partner who had grown up in a fishing family, as was the case for a small number of the wives of my informants. For others it was an accepted, tolerated or resisted part of the relationship and probably differed for every couple and varied throughout the family 'cycle'.

The time spans covered by this research and the fishing careers of informants meant that the families moved through different parts or stages of the cycle from the formation of the couple, with or without children who grew up went to school and maybe college or university or got jobs and moved on, through to retired fishermen with their lifelong partner or, for a number of informants, maybe a new one.

For my informants then, fishermen supported and were supported by their families. Many were in relationships or at the young family stage of their life cycle. An informant explains:

But after awhile I did the young Kiwi thing and did the big OE in seventy-four – came back and didn't really know what the hell to do. I got involved with a girl whom I'm still married to and so I ended up saying, "Shit I'd better settle down" I meandered around for a while – came back into Auckland (in due course got a boat and) just got started. We went across to Waiheke and got a mooring and just rented a house over there initially (Informant 19).

Indeed, for one, it was the necessity to provide for the family that was the incentive to start commercial fishing.

My first child was born in seventy-two so yeah I had a young family. That's when I started fishing. That's why I had to start fishing because of young family. Built a house. Lots of money for two or three years prior, then suddenly nothing and what can you do" (Informant 13)?

Some of the wives were actively involved in the enterprise, making up lines, baiting hooks, keeping the books, liaising with shore facilities, looking after the children and running the household. Others were not so actively part of the fishing itself but never the less maintained the "home base". For younger members of the family, it would have been a diverse and uncertain occupation, with Dad's comings and goings at sometimes unpredictable times but also trips on the boat or family holidays on the boat, something different.

A Waiheke fisheries officer when asked if the community was helpful to the fishing, responded:

There's whole families that were relying on the fishing and there were people getting work on fishing boats as deck hands and later, if they saved enough money and they were good they finally become fishermen. They build their own boats and went fishing so it was just like a turnover. It (the

community) was very reliant on fishing and they went through the system and there are still a few people out there – the fishermen. It could have gone that way if people hadn't sold their quota (Informant 1).

For some fishermen and families, at earlier stages of the family cycle, when the fisheries were not yet the constant grind of a challenging occupation, they provided a romantic element. Then, as the novelty wore off fishing families provided a support system or for those not too busy to socialise, interaction with those in a similar situation:

Often it would be the blokes drinking themselves but yeah it felt like quite a nice network of the fisher families in the island. You know we felt like we had this thing in common and could just stop and chat about this and that (Informant 8).

Children

Children growing up in fishing families, both traditional and non-traditional, “learnt the business”. They went out (usually) with Dad on the boat from an early age, learnt the language and terminology of the sea, boats and fishing gear. One former fisherman's wife told me:

I've three sons and they are all excellent in boats and that's because they grew up with a fisherman and were in boats from when they were a baby and they've all got a really good sense of the sea and handling boats and catching fish and, yeah and, they're teaching their children that and that's come from their father being a fisherman really. So it's had an effect, quite a big effect in the family actually. I've got these little grandchildren who are learning to handle a boat and they're quite small and they're quite capable (Informant 8).

Wives and children not only have opportunity to experience the fishing ethos at sea they may also learn the joys and disappointments of Dad's presence and absence, the excitements and dissatisfactions of good and bad catches. For those whose children were interested, fishing could provide jobs for the family and, vice versa, the family could provide crew that would otherwise be notoriously difficult to find:

The two biggest boys, especially the eldest one was a real keen fisherperson and he used to go and help out, if he wanted to, especially if he was saving up to buy a [commodity] and get the deckhand money and learn about boats. He's a very good boat person now (Informant 8).

Strains / Divorce

Unlike many other jobs, commercial fishing, especially from small coastal communities is not a nine to five job so the hours when the fisherman would be away from his family, were uncertain and irregular and some fishermen in particular were “night owls” (Informant 14).

It was long hours, incredible hours. You'd get two, three or four hours of sleep a night, if you were lucky and you were up crack of dawn, before dawn, for the next day ... During the winter, well I'd be working all night. The local guys would be working in here [near Waiheke]. I'd be working down the Firth or way up off Tiri or up off Kawau or and then we'd do a lot of trips out to Curvier, Merc's [Mercury Islands], Mokohinaus, Arid Island, back of the Barrier and around there. Then I'd be away on the *Podgora* (another vessel) doing trips so it became full time (Informant 13).

In response to a question about her former husband's leaving for a trip in the early hours or returning late at night one informant indicated how irregular it could be:

... just strange hours ... if it felt right, if the wind was doing what it should be. Yeah, three or four in the morning, might be more like five and depending on how the fishing went, whether he came back or not. If it was no good he'd come back probably and start again fresh or if it was going quite well stay there and make the most of it (Informant 8).

Sometimes, though, trips were regular. In a couple of cases the fishermen generally worked in sight of home but in other situations the fishermen could be very distant. For them the advent of bad weather could mean being caught out and seeking shelter in a remote bay or getting a good catch, or maybe bad catches and staying on. But, it meant considerable uncertainty for those at home. With the fisherman at sea families found some form of communication desirable.

Some Waiheke fishing families communicated through Auckland Maritime Radio but then Citizen Band (CB) radios or VHF radios enabled them to maintain ship to shore contact. “Yes he could hear from home, what was going on and ... it was good” (Informant 9).

Perhaps more than more regular occupations fishing put strains on the family. The father or husband would be away often but even when they were home: “Guys were working so hard that when you came ashore you were so exhausted, all you wanted to do was flop. I was just so busy personally” (Informant 13).

Some had grown up in fishing families so could cope and others were able to adjust the times and demands of the fishing or the family or both so that relationships worked and families remained together. Others didn't manage. Fishing could be hard on the family. Indeed, only a few of my informants had not been divorced and while it was not uncommon among my non-commercial fishing peers to split or divorce, the strains on fishing families mean it seemed even higher among fishermen. As an indication, one informant commenting about those who generally made the eight-or-ten-day trips that were typical for the trawlers and Danish seiners based in the Viaduct, when asked about the stability of relationships said: "Well no, those guys, most of them are divorced" (Informant 6).

Another remarked:

But we [the fishermen] spent a lot [of time together] – we used to drink a lot which wouldn't have been good for the relationships. I think, I've read that even now fishing's still one of the, it's got one of the highest rates of divorce, the fishing industry (Informant 26).

Another, speaking of his personal experience noted:

... it was very bad for the family ... It's not a good job for a family man unless you're located in a place like Waiheke Island where you can go day fishing and be back home each night and restrict your fishing to sensible hours. There's no reason why fishing has to be damaging to families but there's a great tendency for it to be so because of the unpredictableness that comes with it. As I explained, and because of the geography of trying to fish out of a place like Auckland city because it doesn't lend itself and therefore necessitates several days each week away from home, and quite a long way from home, so therefore I found it very damaging on my family. But I believe it is possible to do it without being damaging on the family but it wasn't possible for me to do it.

I think there will be plenty of other Auckland fishermen who can say that it was not good for their family. I don't think there would be very many who couldn't. A place like Waiheke or Leigh is really the place to be if you want to be a fisherman and especially if you want to be a small time fisherman and fish locally and stay at home. That's the way to go. But that's not the way to make a lot of money. The problem with fishing is, because you can lose a lot of money and you can be poor, when the opportunity presents itself to make a lot of money, you've got to take it. Otherwise you won't be a fisherman for very long, unless you happen to be quite good at it. If you're not too confident and there's a chance there

you've got to take it and that can mean fishing comes first and family comes second, which is not good in the long term.

FISHERIES SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY

Bob McDonald, wrote on *Fishfolk* outlining the extent fisheries contributed to communities “There is a mighty list of those who live off the sea, invisible to most on the (*Fishfolk*) list:

Those that rent rooms and caravans to recreational anglers, the charter boat operators but also the tackle shop proprietors, the bait sellers, the tackle making factories of which even little Australia manages to import nearly a billion dollars worth. Then there are the boat builders, the outboard makers, the local government boat ramp fee collectors and the boat ramp builders. All of this eclectic collection of business, small and multinational, rely on fish. The processors of fish, the supermarkets and fish shops, the restaurants, dapper and cheap, and of course the commercial fishing industry with nets, bigger boats, gear, wharves, slips etc. as all on the list know. Then there is the scores of scientists and 'user pays' academics and government workers that live of the proceeds of dead commercial fish, increasing the costs of fishing and amount the fish caught to pay them, all the while making a living out of shifting the fishing rights around to reduce the catch. And finally ... there is us, the eaters of fish and the watchers of fish (McDonald, *Fishfolk*, 25, July, 2002).

C Phipps likewise outlined on *Fishfolk*, how commercial fishing contributed significantly to local communities.

Fishing – recreational as well as commercial – is "the backbone of coastal economies" – at least those not overwhelmed by the form of prostitution called "tourism" [or more euphemistically “Visitor Industry” on Waiheke] – because the money flow in the communities revolves around fishing. Fishing causes money to flow to bait shops, boatyards, chandlers, fishing charters & guides, fish markets, fuel docks, harbors (sic), marinas, mechanics, restaurants, tackle shops, and other categories that just didn't come to mind quickly enough. That that's not the same as saying that the people involved have a whole lot of money to spare. One season's more-or-less cyclic trough in fishing catch can flatten the previous season's peak in catch and whatever profits were derived from them. This holds true not just for commercial fishers, but also for charters & guides for recreational fishers, and all the people who depend on their catch and business. Salt water being so wonderful for mechanical devices, equipment maintenance is a continual issue and money sink. As with nonfishers, there are long-term uses for extra cash that may make it unavailable for other nonfishing

use, such as sending the kids to college, so that the kids have career options beyond being dependent on fisheries for their future (C. Phipps, *Fishfolk*, 19 April 2003).

The same is true, to a greater or lesser extent, of these Hauraki Gulf communities, and certainly applies even more strongly if the Viaduct and other communities surrounding the Hauraki Gulf are included.

Community Economy: Retail

As communities formalised from clusters of cooperating households to villages or towns with shops and businesses, traders and shops increasingly retailed fish. Indeed, growing up in Auckland in the 1950s, fish stalls were one of the features of a family Sunday drive along the Tamaki Drive.

On Waiheke, one of the first articles on the fisheries in the *Gulf News* (6 February 1976 11) was of the application to Council by the Lindegren's father and son team to sell fish caught from their boat from a mobile stall several days a week. The results of the application were not recorded but the senior Lindegren had done similar from Auckland. Fish was a basic staple for the population and supplying it provided livelihood for fishermen. "In those days you made a very good living buying fish, sell it on the side of the road [Street stalls] and providing it for fish shops" (Informant 44).

There have been various fish shops on Waiheke. One informant who grew up on Waiheke said that in the 1960s there used to be a fish shop in Ostend, that used to sell a few fish although her family caught fish recreationally so wouldn't have bought fish very often. "Then there was just the fish Co-op shop that I remember and they were in two places in Tahiri Rd and in where the Post Office used to be" (Informant 4).

When I came to Waiheke the public could buy fresh locally caught commercial fish from the fish shop in Oneroa run by Norma and Malcolm Shepherd who had bought it from Murray Bromily in March 1978 and from the butcher in Onetangi (*Gulf News* 1978). At different times there have been mobile fish stalls such as the Lindegrens' (*Gulf News* 1976). Indeed the summer before this research began (2003, 2004) there was a regular fish stall, at the Ostend Saturday Market, selling fresh fish that had to be imported from as far away as the Chatham Islands.

Similarly, in Coromandel the fishermen and the fisheries generally supported and were supported by the community of place. Commercial fishing provided fresh locally caught fish. In the butcher's shop, for example:

... back then we also had a license for fish – to be able to sell fish over the counter. I used to get it off ... [a local fisherman]. It was always hit and miss, depended on the weather but ... about half the year ... 20 weeks or 25 weeks – we would have fresh fish to sell in the butchers shop. I'd get it off him on the Thursday and people would always come in and see if you had any. It wasn't the most clever thing to do in the butchers shop because if they could buy fish they didn't buy meat. (Keith Stephenson).

Also, before the Coromandel Fisheries factory was sold to Sanford, locals were sometimes able to buy fresh locally caught fish that was not required for other orders. After Sanford bought the Company supply for locals was not as regular.

[When parents] were no longer catching their own fish so we expected that at Sanford we would be able to buy fresh fish from the local fish factory. But it wasn't like that. There were certain times when I suppose word got around that if you went to Sanford you could buy a whole fish and I think you had to clean it yourself and ... scale it yourself. I can remember once going there and Sanford saying, “No we've got no fresh fish for the public. Go to the fish and chip shop” and that was unbelievable to us. Anyway the situation has now reached a level plateau where the fish and chip shop regularly, reliably sells fresh fish to the public. So isn't this an interesting change, ... first we caught our own fish then we tried and scrounged it from the local fish factory, sometimes unsuccessfully, and now we go to the fish chip shop where we buy fresh fish at \$19.00 /kg for gurnard and terakihi. \$19 /kg for fresh fish (Informant 22a)!

But more than that, they had tangible economic and social benefit by supporting, the community. As he experienced

... most of the boats ran accounts at the butcher's shop in those days under the name of the boat. I wouldn't have all that (detail) now but that was interesting ... [even] the seasonal guys that would come round this way into the Coromandel into the Hauraki Gulf in the scallop season and would be fishing out of Coromandel or they'd use Coromandel as their base for part of the season and those guys would have stocked up when they come ashore to take them out for however many days”. In those days the boats “probably a crew of 2 or 3 and they all had families here. They would all have been part of a community where they belong to a committee. Their children would have gone to school (Keith Stephenson).

Community Employment

Fishermen regularly called on island and community services as an essential part of the occupation. Transport, for example, where the passenger and vehicular ferries and SeaBee Air, linked Waiheke Island and the “mainland”. Before the Co-op was established, fishermen could order supplies that would be sent over on the ferry or the amphibian run by SeaBee Air, depending on the urgency of the requirement. “Things like crates and lines and hooks and ice and anything like that was all from Auckland until [THE Co-op] came and ice came and we got bait here too. When we were able to buy our own bait here. That was good. It was certainly better bait that we got through the Co-op” (Informant 6).

Although it was a regular practice for fish to be sent over to Auckland iced in bins on the cabin top of the ferry, the “Iris Moana” or on the “Baroona”, there were times when other passengers found it inconvenient and offered a “[b]it of feedback from putting bins of fish on top of the old Iris [ferry] and water come in. Stuff on the way over on a bad trip and the Baroona and so on, – yeah it was crazy days” (Informant 44).

Indeed some of the stories convey the informality of island life. One fisherman said:

I had these half size crates with lids and little plastic strapping system and I had to have them down at Surfdale for SeaBee Air by 7.30 in the morning so I would go out at 4.30 or 5.00, pull the nets, get them back, put them in these crates. There was no ice then and send them over by air to ... [his partner's brother] and in fact, one morning, they were that fresh they were still kicking on the [filleting] bench in Auckland and people were stunned. Like guys that were buying off trawlers had no idea what a fresh fish actually looked like and there were fish actually flapping on the bench. There was one time I went down to the aeroplane and the pilot said, 'you gave me a hell of a fright yesterday!' I said, 'what was that?' and he said, 'I got half way to Auckland and there was this big [thump thump thump] and I didn't know what it was. I was totally panicked. I thought the rivets were coming out of the wings, you know!' And he really, they were those little amphibian aircraft, thought it was coming apart and he dropped down low and he was sending out mayday calls and the whole bit, you know! And it was this bloody big trevally in the box and it was thumping. He wasn't at all amused (Informant 6).

Once the Co-op was established the boats were unloaded into the Co-op truck, taken to the premises in Tahi Road, sorted, repackaged for export and freighted to Auckland by truck on the vehicular ferry from Kennedy Point.

So as their markets expanded from supplying just island residents and fish shops the fishermen contributed the costs of freight increasingly to the transport operators.

Fishermen also utilised other essential services in the community periodically. They were running old boats, for example, so would call on the services of my neighbour, a highly experienced, sailor, designer and boat builder, one of the few on the island with the necessary traditional woodworking skills. It was an ethos of assisting community members with the skills and materials they required often with the "Kiwi cando" or "No.8 wire" attitude so they could surmount a marginal situation and "stay afloat". It was not commercially transaction but part of community cooperation and "helping out". He explained:

They were nearly all old pleasure launches converted, boats built in the thirties and forties with much bigger engines in than they were designed for and the aft ends closed in for shelter. When the snapper were running of course they worked like stink. These boats were generally carvel built with caulked seams. There were some more modern ones as well. They basically drove the hell out of them. When they got a full load they were flat stick for Auckland whatever the weather and they would plough into sou'westerly 20kt, 30kt winds full steam and it gave these boats a lot of hard work. I would frequently, or from time to time, be called out for an urgent repair job and find a boat lying on its side on the shingle at Matiatia dried out at low tide with the caulking hanging out around the stem and the garboard. 'Can we get going for the next tide, please?' And, so getting it dry enough to take the putty was the big challenge. I used to use a blowlamp to try and dry the seams out as best I could. Ram the caulking cotton into it and putty it up then [nail] copper tingles over the top, sort of thing, and get them going again (Informant 28).

When metal work was required, Peter Franken¹⁰³, an engineer, for example, made up a stainless steel gunnel and "the ratchet gadget which I used for winding the tyres" (Informant 6).

¹⁰³ See, for example Ingenious Machine. *Gulf News* 31 December 1980 5-7.

At times such expertise led to innovations that not only helped local fishermen but also had wider commercial spin offs. The haulers and clips developed by a mechanic and an engineer respectively are a case in point. As I knew from experience pulling longlines by hand was a hard and painful business at least for the newcomers. But, although there is a knack and practice eases the chore, probably also for more experienced fishermen. Because fishermen's hands never really dried out during a trip, they remained soft and puffy and cuts and abrasions, from hauling lines or ropes, never really healed while at sea. It was one of those occupational hazards so they sought solutions. Some of the fishermen were more experimental than others and some had a mechanical “bent” and came up with ideas and perhaps individual solutions but it took the expertise of others in the community to realize more universal, more commercial innovations. Line haulers and snood clips are a case in point.

While the ratchet “thingie” worked for one fisherman (Informant 6) others tried line pullers. One fisherman had been a mechanic and his mentor “had a line puller on his boat which was probably some ten years before anybody had them on Waiheke, I made one straight away” (Informant 44). But the line hauler made from recycled starter motors from demolished trucks became the more general equipment.

Initially lines would be made up, typically with 100 snoods and hooks and be wound into half a car tyre or a tray with a rubber (perhaps inner tube) edging slotted for each hook. Then “hockey clips” and haulers were introduced. It meant the backbone could be hauled mechanically while snoods were kept separate. Knots or metal slugs crimped on the backbone in pairs spaced often an arm's span (1 fathom) apart meant that as the line ran out the snood and hook could be clipped to it. Likewise as it came in each fish, hook and snood could be unclipped more easily.

The innovations also eased the tedious job, when making up new or replacement gear, of tying knots to fasten nylon snoods to the backbone was eased somewhat by using the commercially available “hockey clips”. As the *Gulf News* reported:

Waiheke fisherman Jerry van Iersel¹⁰⁴ was having trouble with the "hockey clips" on his long lines – the clips were prone to slip from the line, were hard on cold, wet hands, and had the potential of tangling the traces when the line was wound in. ... a brainstorm and three months work from an island engineer Peter Franken, and some finance from a Waiheke businessman, the new clip is being manufactured (with an 'ingenious machine') in a totally island enterprise (*Gulf News* 31 December 1980 5-7).

This was a community enterprise. The fishermen had a problem and an idea to resolve it, took it to the relevant expert in the community, who, with additional financial assistance to cover some of the costs, solved it. Having helped local fishermen they then patented and marketed the clip in Auckland and more widely.

As well as its contribution to the challenge, the cash flow and livelihoods of other trades and occupations on the island, commercial fishing supported the community lifestyle in other ways. The experience of the Women's Group is a case in point (See Box 8).

Box 8: Community Fishing Lifestyle

Women's Group

The experience of the women's group exemplifies the benefits access to commercial fishing made to the community before the QMS. In the early 1980s my partner was in a women's group which drag netted on Onetangi beach because the partner of one member was a commercial fisherman and they could use his gear and license. It was probably borderline between subsistence fishing, informal economy and commercial fishing.

Mainly we needed some extra money. The women... all had small children. We were all looking for some way of getting a little extra bit of money but that could involve the children. ... (Her partner) would get these big drags on Onetangi Beach. That was legitimate at that time. He was registered for dragging but it also meant that he had this huge volume of fish for a couple of days which he had to process so it was something that we could do with the children on the beach and round about the bach (Informant 6b).

As they learnt the methods the women helped with the drag, then rowing the net out, clearing it, processing and marketing the catch. As the result of an accident preventing the fisherman retrieving the nets his partner had picked them up in rough conditions so knew

¹⁰⁴ Informants named at least one other fisherman as being involved (e.g. Informant 6).]

the operation and took the lead.

So that's how we started. We (the women) did quite a lot at the times of the year when there would be large schools of kahawai and that was something that we could do because we had freezers and we could process all the fillets into bags and it was frozen and then there was quite a market on the island at that time. ... We'd sell some smoked and some bagged as cat food (Informant 6b).

My own memory was of times when my partner came back and we had a copper full of kahawai – beautiful looking fish. If there was a lot I'd give a hand otherwise she filleted or sometimes steaked, them. Then she'd bag them up and take them round the food shops while our potato patch benefited from a prime fertiliser of frames and scraps.

It was “a good job too then when all the women were involved ... because it meant that a lot of families got some good food at quite a reasonable price, quite cheaply,” (Informant 6b). So it certainly had benefits for the community since unemployed or under-employed mothers with young children had a social and economic activity their kids could share in, that contributed to both the larder and the wallet.

Community: Informal Economy

In addition to their contribution to the regular and periodic formal economy fishermen were part of the informal economy as well. In the early days they gave fish away, exchanged, raffled or sold it around the local community.

What my father and mother used to do was catch it – smoke it and sell it to the Four Square [grocery store] in exchange for groceries and stuff like that. Take it along to the pub and have a few raffles and make a living. That's how they made a living (Informant 7).

During my Viaduct research, at the end of most trips the skippers and crew took what was referred to as “home freight”, a couple of fish each, “a feed”. My impression was that most of this fish either went home or to neighbours or friends. Some was, however, sold especially by casual crew to restaurants. My skipper expressed concern that one crewman was taking more than a reasonable amount and selling it “on the side” to make extra.

Among community fishermen home freight was customary.

For a lot of the guys who were fishing then if there were old folks, you know, they'd take fish around to them. Some of the Māori guys on the island could do fish heads. There was all this sort of spin-off then. Fishermen were always good at giving things, always. If someone was a little bit old or a little bit fragile. They'd just take a little bit of fish around every week or two, you know, and give them. A great deal of that went on

throughout the community. You know, for fishermen to give some fish to someone and think nothing of it and next day there'd be eggs there or something like that (Informant 1).

In many ways this was merely a continuation of customary practice in the community. One informant spoke of fishing recreationally, in his younger days, with his grandfather when they habitually giving their large catches away making a considerable contribution to local nutrition:

In those days there were no amateur limits or anything ... He used to gut and scale the fish ... [but] didn't ever sell them. He was really strict about that. He refused to take even petrol money. People'd say, "You've got to have something for your petrol". No, no, no – I'll get my boat seized. And he would cut pieces of flax and we would string them together and my job was to run over the hillsides and take them to widows and people with big families and he would be there cutting and scaling. I don't remember him ever doing fish fillets. I mean he did at home for himself but the fillets were always ... scaled and skin on. ... And you'd think – how the hell did people eat all the fish he distributed? I don't know. Maybe they had friends they gave some to. ... We'd make a string out of flax and feed it up through the gills and the mouth, poke it up the gill and out the mouth. He'd say take these to Mrs. Fisher and take these to Mrs so-and-so-else. He kept most of that end of Onetangi in fish (Informant 6a).

On Waiheke even fish that was not in prime condition or was otherwise unsalable was used by the informal economy. Speaking of his partner a fisherman said:

She used to trim up ... anything that was substandard, we never wasted any food and she would trim up these licey fish and take them along to the Playcentre mums and things like that for a couple of dollars for a little bag of fillets. All the chewed out bits would be cut away. We had a tractor then and she went off on the tractor with a trailer and this big pile of smoked fish and she came back at the end of the day with a couple of hundred bucks and said there you are. I was stunned. I was stunned. I didn't think she would sell more than one or two fish but she did (Informants 6a, 6b).

Whether the fish was bought retail or came through the informal economy, local people were able to get good health promoting fresh food at prices affordable even to those on fixed and limited incomes and especially to those who most needed it.

A fisherman's spouse said:

I think they [their clients] had ready access to good food and it was good food and it was at a price that wasn't expensive and it was very easily available. The benefits for us who were involved in it, [her husband] and

them, me and other people who helped, it was a good life you know. It was a lovely lifestyle by the beach. It wasn't too demanding all the time. Yeah, it was really I think a healthy and relaxed lifestyle. The benefits to the community were the access to the fish and not just for them but also for the cats and bait". While the fisherman noted, "It was inexpensive. I'm not sure what the price was then but a few years earlier than that when I wasn't fishing I used to buy flounder because it was cheaper than sausages. I think flounder was two and six [two shillings and six pence, equivalent to 25 cents] a pound and sausages were three shillings [30 cents] a pound (Informant 6b).

The community then had easy access to fresh locally caught fish, good nutrition at prices affordable even for those such as unemployed, drop-outs, beneficiaries or new families who had minimal means of support. Fish was one of the currencies of community cooperation.

IDENTITY: WHAT DID THE FLEET MEAN FOR THE COMMUNITY?

Islands, Waiheke in particular but also New Zealand in general are embedded in the marine environment. Before the QMS the local seas were a direct source of food, livelihood and recreation that made island, and fishing community lifestyles distinctive from urban or inland farming or forestry communities. This section explicates the contribution of the fishermen and the fisheries to community identity. The boats and the fishermen who worked them were part of the community's identity. At Coromandel:

I come up the Peninsular in about 1961. Back a little bit later, it appears, I can remember even going down to Thames and there was something like about 14 boats tied up at the wharf down there. There was more than that tied up here, I can't honestly remember but they were a bigger commercial identity up here than what they were down in Thames. We had boats tied up both sides of the wharf (Keith Stephenson).

In general the fishermen and the fleet were just taken for granted, an intrinsic part of the community. For some people they were a source of work, often difficult and often rushed, trying to get boats repaired on the beach between the tides (Informant 28), for example, or of fish to sell or buy. But they were seen to be contributing members of the community workforce.

More than that, the fishermen and their boats provided maritime interest at the wharf. For me personally, and it is true of others, I recall, many times when waiting to catch the ferry watching 'the boys' and their boats. Often, between the

ferries, there would be three or four rafted up or anchored just off the wharf pontoon, often stern-to so that cockpits were together or close so fishermen could chat as they scrubbed down, baited up or stacked trays. While it might not have been a tourist attraction to the extent of Fishermen's Wharf in San Francisco, these were recognized members of our community, adding diversity, making a living from the sea thereby giving substance to the maritime nature of our island culture. It meant that boating and fishing on the island was not just a recreational activity. It was also a way of life and (then) an essential support for the island and the rest of us. It meant that island life had a basis in real maritime tradition. It wasn't just an optional life style totally dependent on Auckland or the transient contributions of tourists and the visitor industry.

Members of the community saw the lights of the fishermen working off the northern side of the island. There was a sense of familiarity and reassurance. The 'boys' were working. For their part, if anything went wrong there were people who would be aware of it ashore so hope of assistance. Now there is a sense of loss, a significant part of the character of the island has gone. "Remember when the longliners used to work here – you'd see the lights out at night and you knew who it was and where they were and you know? You don't see them. You don't see the buoyed lights on the longlines. So who's fucking fishing it" (Informant 46)? "... at night you could look out and see something like 20 something lights from the fishing boats off the northern coast" (Informant 13).

SUMMARY

The fisheries were not in a "traditional state", nor indeed was the community, before the QMS but both had been driven by and managed for "development" and the 'big boats' so the administrative ethos had not been community sustainability but economic expansion – "Think Big"! Even so fishermen supported, and were supported by, their communities of place; embedded in the webs of community reciprocity with locals, trades people, boat repairers, engineers, mechanics, grocers, and they provided fresh locally caught fish directly to family and friends, to the local wider and even international markets. Their ethos had the informality of "Kiwi culture" with relatively cheap boats converted from other uses and locally made and maintained gear. "Out there" there was a sense of freedom, of self- or mutual- reliance; of self- dependence and of working for

themselves and family, a sense of identity and rugged independence but also strong camaraderie with other fishermen. For their communities they contributed to island and community identity and provided additional livelihood in the snapper school season and opportunities for diversion for potentially delinquent youth. On Waiheke, for example, the Co-op was one of the biggest industries on the island. Fishermen were of both formal and informal economies both the fishermen and the communities benefitted.

In occupational terms ethos "out there" for the fishermen before the QMS involved their experience gearing up perhaps with the help of their families. Then in small old wooden "much loved" launches, leaving in the early hours, out into the impressive beauty of the Hauraki Gulf or threatening marine conditions, recalling all they'd learnt or recorded from past seasons and the previous trips, depending on the season, weather and tides, heading for the chosen fishing grounds. The boats always in motion, the fishermen reveled or contended with the conditions located fish, set gear later retrieved, spiked, and slurried and iced the fish. They exchanged cryptic information of chat with their friends and colleagues on the radio or within hailing distance, contended with other fishermen, some friends and part of the clique, some known and or more distant, some using the same, others using different methods, or with MAF regulations and inspections always a hassle but hopefully by known fisheries officers in similar small boats. Depending on the fishing they'd anchor overnight, maybe rafted up with a friend in a calm enclosed bay or just in joggly¹⁰⁵ shelter, before motoring out again in the early hours but finally steaming to Auckland with the catch to berth or raft up in the Viaduct and off load, trusting or suspicious or with curdling apprehension, to a buyer or buyers, auctioning or directly to a ute or truck. Squaring the sale with the buyer then cleaning the boat, maybe getting the ice truck and filling the bins with flake ice from the nylon chute or refueling from the petrol company tanker or, alternatively heading back to the wharf at Matiatia, tying alongside and offloading to the Co-op truck, getting cleaned up, putting the boat on the mooring before rowing in, catching sleep at home. Then back to moor alongside the pontoon between ferry times, rafting with the boats of friends and cleaning or baiting ready for the next trip.

¹⁰⁵ The irregular motion of small waves in only partially sheltered anchorages.

For the fishermen commercial fishing then meant an ethos of freedom, the independence of self employment, a livelihood out there in the marine environment, "messaging about in boats", free of the urban "rat race" and the tyranny of nine to five work for the boss, instead integrated, comfortably or uncomfortably to the dictates of snapper life cycle, seasonal and climatic variation. It meant the solitude of working solo from very early morning until very late or the boredom, the challenge of hunting an elusive quarry offset by the uncertainty of no catch, the adrenalin from contending with rough weather or the excitement of bonanza and frustration when it never came interspersed with close companionship with colleagues or the brief respite of family.

For the community, the fishermen and commercial fishing expressed the island identity of Waiheke was a community of place, with often conflicting communities of interest (e.g. capitalists and alternatives), an island embedded in the Hauraki Gulf with fishermen and the Co-op an ethos of the marine environment. More than many New Zealand coastal communities, Waiheke was self-consciously an alternative to Auckland's urban conglomerate; a community where cooperation and interaction aspired toward low energy lifestyle, living with nature and community reliance. Before the QMS commercial fishermen and the Co-op expressed an identity, if not of dependence on the sea and fish, then need for, and commitment to, the sea, with marine livelihoods supplying basic affordable nutrition, fresh fish caught by known or almost known fishermen.

This chapter delineated commercial fishing for Hauraki Gulf community fishermen before the introduction of the QMS. It drew primarily on information from Waiheke Island and briefly from Coromandel and Leigh. It presented fishermen's account of their recruitment, their methods, experience and ethos "out there", in the political, economic and community context. Their significance and the contribution of the community was shown by the features that distinguished their families from friends and neighbours, the services provided by others and the contribution of commercial fishing to the community with employment, nutrition and identity.

Chapter 6: Transition to the QMS

The introduction of the QMS resulted in a transition from a management regime termed by neo-liberal proponents as 'command and control' that focused on input controls, to one based on property rights focusing on outputs. Social impact literature emphasises the need to consider the planning for change, the implementation and the subsequent operational phase. The preceding chapter addressed the previous situation. The next chapter will address the changes for Hauraki Gulf community fishermen and their communities following the new regime. This chapter focuses on the immediate impact of the transition to the QMS. There is some integration of pre- and post-implementation phases since it is not possible to put this period in tidy timeframes.

This chapter is, therefore, concerned with the perspectives of the significant components but primarily fishermen's responses in the final run-up to the QMS and its introduction. It initially deals with general issues of getting quota, then the more specific perspectives of local fishermen and their response. Inevitably in any change of regime there is an element of transition impinging on different attitudes and attributes that results in advantages and disadvantages for different components and people. The decisions made and rhetoric used, reveal the underlying rationales and structures.

This chapter sets out:

- The MFish perspective on social considerations at the introduction of the QMS.
- The Federation's perspective as presented by Bob Martin, (president) and Peter Stevens (secretary).
- The perspective of informants on the transition of the QMS for Hauraki Gulf fishermen and communities.
- The implications for companies and their response.

MAF(/MFISH) PERSPECTIVE

Since much of the literature on the QMS was written by those who introduced it, the broad MAF/MFish perspective has been well canvassed so this section will present the MFish view in hindsight (2006) in addition to the views of those who oversaw the implementation in the Hauraki Gulf.

In the response to the suggestion that the introduction of the QMS, neglected social aspects, Jonathan Peacey argued that the two buybacks of quota were an indication of social concern but he “liked to say, there were three: 1. Variable price and 2. Fixed price by MAF and 3. by industry with those who decided they were in the business of fishing buying up quota. Some observers felt from the prices they were offering that they'd had a power surge through their calculating machines ”.

Emphasis on the buybacks indicates there was now acknowledgement of the rights of full-time fishermen, which they decided to ignore for part-timers, especially before the right was changed again from absolute to proportional quota. Kim Walshe then the MAF Regional Manager, Auckland, noted that there was opposition to the QMS within the Ministry but this was:

[A]lmost exclusively due to those who had to implement the ITQ system and so they looked at the practicalities of administering it and they said that it was too difficult... It would not be able to be done, for example, if Fred Beard hadn't turned up with his optimization programme of how to develop an economically efficient buy back programme and also just as important was that computer technology was finally coming on stream¹⁰⁶. Prior to that it would have been impractical to do it (Kim Walshe).

Fisheries Officer Perspective

Fisheries officers, like traditional village policemen or school prefects were loved and hated¹⁰⁷, respected or despised depending on context. Those on the boats generally lived in the communities and interacted at sea with fishermen on a face-to-face basis inspecting and enforcing the input controls such as the method lines, mesh sizes, seasonal and area closures.

Like fishermen they operated small boats and worked at sea, they regarded or disregarded the beauty of the Gulf, they were concerned for the marine ecosystem and certain fish species, especially snapper, they were part of the interrelationships and interactions within the community of occupation but unlike

¹⁰⁶ See: Haworth 2008 247

¹⁰⁷ Jimmy Ngapo, for example, had legendary status within the Waiheke community when I arrived.

fishermen their objective was not catching fish and, if they could have their way, fishermen would comply with requirements so would not require catching either.

They were intermediaries, MAF personnel and answerable to Head Office but living in and accountable to the communities, with a history of face to face interaction with the fishermen and most responsible for monitoring the QMS in the Hauraki Gulf. Some supported the introduction of the QMS but others, including front line staff were opposed to it.

Bill Dumpleton started on the patrol boats, spent time in the Tauranga office before becoming a Regional Fisheries Officer. He felt that because Bay of Plenty fishermen already had a management committee, facilitated by fisheries officers, with all sectors including part-timers, amateurs and Maori, they were more receptive to the QMS and communities like Coromandel had already come to terms with the controlled fishery in the Hauraki Gulf so more readily accepted the QMS: "it was just another step for them. They adapted very well".

Refuting my impression from attendance at the Auckland consultation and concluding meeting in Wellington was that fishermen in general opposed the ITQ system he stated:

In a group they would say they don't want it because they're adverse to change. But you go and talk to them as fishermen and say "Well this could do this and that". And they'd say "Yeah but we didn't want to say that in front of everybody." I found that in heaps of cases (Bill Dumpleton).

There were issues such as reporting catches. In the old regime there were considerable irregularities with under reporting and misreporting.

There was a lot of jiggery pokery on the older days. ... A lot of ... black market fish and that sort of thing. You know they'd sell it off here and there'd be – there has always been fish returns as long as I can remember and a lot of ... those fish returns were never sent in and that's where the ... quota system came in. 'Where's your bloody fish returns?' and of course they'd buy at the local market and then of course you've got the pseudo amateur who's always been there that used to catch more than the commercial fisherman and supplied the neighbourhood with fish (Bill Dumpleton).

He felt, however, the system wasn't strict enough and fishermen should only get quota for landed and reported catch. In addition the new paperwork systems demanded so much additional information on everything from net length to

weather that a former fisheries officer estimated filing it out required at least 10 years learning. The recruitment of police as fisheries officers meant a significant improvement in enforcement and overall formality. He concluded that if MAF had "known how complicated it was they wouldn't have backed the ITQ system as much as they did. But now, by far the majority of fishermen can see the benefits of the QMS now" (Bill Dumbleton).

Dave Collins, skipper of the patrol boat "Tokatea", then based on Waiheke was, however, vehemently against the QMS and indicated there were others within MAF who felt similarly. He and his crewman had been share fishermen and, since they weren't going to get anything out of it were also opposed to the proposed change. It had all happened overseas and they could see jobs "going down the drain".

They (MAF) wouldn't let us go to the (Consultation) meetings. ... the skippers were made redundant; got rid of all of us ... and got rid of all the fisheries officers up there as well. ... They drove a wedge between us and the Fisheries Officers ashore (Dave Collins).

Eventually they lost their jobs. MAF got new boats and canvassed office staff to crew them, rather than the seagoing staff. This drove a wedge between fisheries officers and the fishermen, significantly changing the relationship. Previously field staff lived in these fishing communities and so were accountable to them, had previous boating and sometimes fishing experience in the Gulf and therefore empathy with fishermen and the communities. In the new QMS regime the new fisheries officers with more formal police and compliance background were implementing more rigid compliance and enforcement. To both fishermen and their communities they were outsiders.

Neil Macdonald, who was based in Coromandel for 17 years and then in Auckland for 16, also reported opposition in MAF toward the QMS. As training and induction in preparation for the new regime there were conferences for all the fisheries officers of the region, conducted by the Chief Fisheries Officer, Assistant Chief Fisheries Officer and Training Officer. In a simulation exercise, however, that went through the whole supply line process participants found faults and most doubted the QMS would work (Neil Macdonald).

Unlike the stated objectives of the National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee NAFMAC, from further consultation meetings with fishermen throughout his North Auckland Region Neil Macdonald believed the purpose was "to explain how the new regime would work under the Fisheries Act. The main idea that was to bring all the commercial fishermen up to play with what was intended. To get all their gripes and bitches and things before they [MAF] really implemented things. Give them an idea that way the government was moving. ... [To] explain to the guys as best we could from our side – what was coming in, how it was going to be policed and all that sort of thing. That was the main gist of our Fisheries Division (Neil Macdonald).

The fisheries officers, to a greater extent than the QMS advocates of Head Office, especially those with a fishing history and empathy with fishermen and the communities, saw the complexity of the regime, the difficulties of reporting and the imposition of a more rigid compliance regime enforced by outsiders. Their perspective was, therefore, from the ethos of small boat operation and face-to-face relationships, concern for the illegalities and enforcement of the regulations but within knowledge of individual fishermen's economic, family and social circumstances.

FEDERATION PERSPECTIVE

Bob Martin was a fisherman and President of the New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen through the critical years, 1983-87 and again 1988-99 (Haworth 2008 212) and so had experience of the original regime and provides critical insight from a fisherman's perspective on the design, introduction and transition to the QMS. Peter Stevens had been trawlerman fishing out of Napier and Wellington and quickly became Secretary of the Federation. The men were a team. If Martin was the public figure Stevens was the strategist. The following sections present the social implications involved in the introduction of rights-based fishing as seen by each man.

Bob Martin

When Bob Martin started fishing, the opportunity was there for everybody, "[y]ou could walk in and get a permit and go fishing". But in the context of the coastal fishery:

Trouble is – it doesn't matter when it happens or how it happens, once the catch has to be controlled those days are gone. It doesn't matter how you control it. ... There is no easy way – once you control the catch to stop people making money out of it people are going to get hurt. ... What's the alternative – to keep it open? Now I used to go to meetings and commercial fishermen used to say at meetings they would like to see only commercial fishing – only fishermen and their families – their sons and all that would be able to buy in. That's from a socio-economic view – that's fine but the trouble is why should somebody who's possibly unborn have more right to go fishing than somebody who's here now (Bob Martin).

Quota entitlement for owner-operators was ostensibly straightforward. Most of my informants did own their own boats so were owner-operators but balancing the amount of paper work from MAF, understanding their options and the small print, the reporting issues and ensuring enough quota to maintain a viable operation was confusing. From his personal perspective and as President of the Federation, Bob Martin saw other social and legal complexities;

The quotas were meant to come in, in 85 but MAF just couldn't do it in time – they just fell apart. They just couldn't do it. And I fully expected not to have any quota at all (Bob Martin).

Fishermen needed quota but, for example, the issue of whether the catch history was attached to the boat owner or the boat, or the skipper or, possibly, the crew, was not clear. Subsequently, a common criticism of the ITQ system has been that established crew were not compensated in any way for loss of their livelihood.

Bob Martin elucidated: “What happened was – if you had a fishing permit on the day the quota system came in you were entitled to your catch history. It was never specified that it was the catch history of the vessel that you owned.”

There were both politics and individual rights involved. Bob Martin believed more fishermen should have followed the precedent of an Auckland share fisherman who saw a lawyer who wrote to MAF and asked for a permit. MAF had all the quota in Wellington locked up because:

They couldn't risk the Districts giving out things that would cost more quota – you see. They sent him back a letter saying, “No he wasn't entitled to a permit because he didn't own the boat,” but after it came in, the Act said “Anybody on a fishing vessel should have a fishing permit – anybody on a fishing vessel” (Bob Martin).

Most fishermen hadn't realised that so hadn't applied. One share fisherman did and was refused but:

It turned out they had to give him quota. He was the only one in New Zealand that I know of who actually did that – went to a lawyer... Now I don't know if that guy leased boats at that time so it's questionable if he had a fishing history if he wasn't, you know what I mean. If you leased the vessel you were in the business of fishing and all – you paid the bills – you did all that sort of thing so there was no doubt that it was your catch history and that sort of thing (Bob Martin).

MAF was trying to reduce the quota, fishermen were trying to ensure their rights and complexities made it difficult:

Under the terms of the Act ... at the time – you could buy a licensed fishing vessel. They [MAF] couldn't stop you but of course in some ways they did. They locked it up. People would apply for the transfer [of catch history] and it would never happen. You can actually understand the reasoning behind it. You didn't have to like it, but they [MAF] were actually in some ways acting illegally. They weren't refusing anybody anything. ... One guy decided to lengthen his boat – he made a commitment that he wouldn't increase his request for quota but of course when the quotas came in he did. ... 'Look, I've lengthened my boat so I need more'. ... Commitment and dependence were the big thing. Like guys who bought (trawl) wire to ostensibly to go out orange roughy fishing. Maybe they never would have gone but still but they showed commitment and dependence. So they had all these things in the mix going on but I suppose to some degree it's inevitable. You have to open an Appeals Authority or to some degree it is unjust (Bob Martin).

On the other hand some fishermen also exploited the situation. Bob Martin said he was in the pub and (a fisherman) said to him “You know I went to that Appeal Authority and I lied and I cheated and all I got was a lousy extra three tonne”. “He's the most honest rogue I've ever met said Bob Martin.

Such a complex and comprehensive quota management system had not been introduced elsewhere. While theoretically simple, in practice:

It was such a huge thing happening [that] there were gaps all over the place, if people knew how to exploit them ... although we were at the top of the tree in the Federation we didn't actually realise these things ourselves. We were taking MAF at their word or (what) we were told. The fishermen knew MAF wanted to cut snapper 40 per cent so believed that if they tendered 40 per cent of their quota that was their cut.

When John Belgrave (Director General of Fisheries) addressed the Federation Conference (about 1985) they learnt the worst:

You could offer your 40 per cent and then whatever they were short, averaged over all users, you could lose again. ... I know a lot of fishermen here (Whangarei) it seemed. So instead of 40 per cent they lost 60 per cent or whatever the extra cut was (Bob Martin).

There was compensation for the forty per cent but not the twenty that they'd never see again.

But we didn't ourselves understand that until at that conference and John Belgrave was talking ... I'm not saying anybody was deliberately deceitful it's how misunderstandings occur – you assume – you hand in your 40 per cent and that's it – you know” (Bob Martin).

Peter Stevens

Peter Stevens, trawlerman and then Secretary of the Federation grasped the scope of the changes from the big perspective of large-scale business and the national fishery. He knew the history and issues of the coastal fishery and was one of the architects of the QMS. From his experience and position, as a fisherman and accountable to fishermen, therefore, Peter Stevens represents the coastal fishermen's perspective. While fishermen might understand their own fishery few understood the coastal resource, biomass and national fishery but he was one of the few who did. It was an issue of numbers; too many fishermen. He explained, outlining the lead up, context and background of the QMS:

The history of numbers in fishing, like owner-operators and fishing in New Zealand is very very short. Most of the people ... came in after '65 in a great rush in a rash – weren't traditional fishing people. They were people like me who had a whole lot of varied skills – there were people who worked in trades and all sorts of things, came into fishing attracted by it for a whole lot of reasons ... Some people liked the lifestyle, other liked being able to work for themselves, others just saw it – “well I've got to do something, I'll go fishing.” All of this sort of thing and there's a little bit of attraction – the hunting, shooting, fishing sort of thing and there's a lot of people might have wanted to go farming but couldn't afford a farm but could get into fishing for five dollars [for a fishing permit]. With all that mix of people there's a great deal of innovation – development ... so we were capable of wiping ... [the coastal fishery] out. Most fishermen, most people for instance, don't realise how close we came to that. There were many species that were almost going to have to be zero TACs put on them and we were very close to having to close down a lot of fisheries. So what do you do? (Peter Stevens).

By the late 1970s he could see the number of fishermen expanding with incentives to get in, sales tax exemptions and the belief of administrators, politicians and fishermen that there were so much fish in the sea there was no need to worry about management. From his experience as a big roofing contractor Peter said: “(I) knew business and systems and all ...how to organise things ... but, I've got to give Bob Martin a certain amount of credit. I was a voice in the wilderness for ages and it was getting harder and harder. The Federation was bloody pathetic”. He didn't join until the Wellington Trawlerman's Association organised a big protest in 1979. “There were going to be 400 boats illegally fishing in Wellington Harbour – that's when I joined the Federation”.

About that time Peter Stevens was talking to Brian Cunningham (then Director General of Fisheries) on the Napier Wharves. Stevens had just seen the number of fishing permits issued: “and, in Auckland alone that year, 1978, they'd written out 2,200 fishing permits – new ones.... Every time a freezing works closed 800 workers went and got a fishing permit”. He told Cunningham, that it couldn't continue. But Cunningham, putting the MAF perspective, replied they couldn't do anything about that since the Act said, if you're a Kiwi you've got to have a fishing permit. Stevens told him to change it and his condition for the fishermen's co-operation was a new Fisheries Act.

He insisted that Duncan McIntyre, the Minister of Fisheries at the time, chair a national meeting in the Legislative Chamber with people from all round New Zealand. The fishermen had had a “guts full” and insisted that the Fisheries Act was rewritten. “That meeting was the beginning of the 1983 Fisheries Act,” said Peter Stevens. He was feeling the Federation was “bloody hopeless”, then at the annual conference Stevens saw Bob Martin advocating for Northland fishermen so persuaded him to stand for the Executive Committee. So there was a bit more weight and we got other people thinking and all through this process, what was happening. Well I kicked it all off I've kept it going because I was the strategist and Bob delivered the work (Peter Stevens).

From the NAFMAC consultations I had felt that MAF did not consider alternatives that had not already been tried. Peter Stevens stated, however, that “[t]he government sent officials to see other fisheries management systems. Dobson went to West Australia, for example. Stevens argued:

The government was right. You couldn't muck around. Look honestly, all these other alternatives were looked at and all found wanting because they'd take us right back to where we were because other countries because in other countries that had tried to change anything slipped straight back and it never did any good. Things were getting more and more desperate with our fisheries. Remember all the numbers were still in the air. The technology is growing and growing, the size of boats and all that sort of thing and more and more people were getting into fishing, exercising their permits (Peter Stevens).

Very significantly, Peter Stevens asserted:

You've got to put fishermen out of your mind and look at the resource. The biology and that. If you don't state that – no hope – you've lost the fishery AND the fishermen. Also the number that were licensed to fish had grown to such an extent that, ... If it was all divided up equally no one would have got enough to survive on. Not enough to even put food on the table let alone put profits and pay for everything. Initially there was a point; when I first started we could have, I believe, shifted effort. Stopped it – stopped everything – and shifted effort and take [effort] where there was too much ... [to an] area where it could take a bit more. Moved Aucklanders to the West Coast and things like that. But we rapidly got beyond that being effective. And so I was pushing for a buyback and a new management regime but not necessarily ITQs because that came later and the idea was to save fisheries and then take it from there (Peter Stevens).

Stevens claims to have convinced the conservation lobby to support ITQs: “It represents government control over the amount of fishing and takes away this fish till you drop sort of thing,” and they thought that this was good ... So they agreed. They came in behind ... because they were concerned about the corporates keeping expanding in terms of how much fish they took” (Peter Stevens).

At the same time:

Increasingly there's a critical mass required for economic viability. Once a 30 footer [10m] catching X fish could provide a living but now with the costs of OSH [Occupational Health and Safety Service] requirements and Maritime Transport and so forth and all “the administration of quota system – it all adds up. All of a sudden that 30 footer that could do quite well – it [now] needs to be a 60 footer catching 5 or 6 times more fish” (Peter Stevens).

In other words, he sees the ‘big boats’ as the future for fisheries.

Nevertheless the Buybacks and then the Quota Appeal Authority (QAA) were set up to protect the rights of individual fishermen.

The idea of the buyback was: to do anything effective it was obvious that we had to reduce the number of people fishing – that fence-line effort reduction scheme. But you can't just kick people out so I didn't want that to happen. So we had to get a buyback so there was compensation ... so that people could get out with something rather than knocked out and so forth (Peter Stevens).

MAF's acceptance of the Federation's lobbying for quota buy-backs indicates that there was at least an implicit recognition of equity issues and a de-facto fishing right for coastal fishermen that hadn't been there for the (small-scale) part-timers. Even so the QAA wasn't all the Federation hoped for:

There were some shocking things done in regard to the appeals and that. The big problem with the appeals is that there was no refereeing. It was covert not overt. Now I insisted and ... well most of us insisted, that they be overt and that peers were brought in to peer judge and they [MAF] wouldn't do it. So people (the appellants) could tell lies and get away with it and there was a lot of that (Peter Stevens).

[Consequently] with some fishermen applying for more quota than perhaps they deserved and others unable to meet MAF requirements Peter Steven's believes he did what he could to make fair adjustments. As Federation secretary he said: "I had a lot of control and I had a lot of quota taken away from people or ... [denied] people who had no right to it whatsoever and I had quota given to people who had every right and were shoddily treated and I'm quite proud of that really."

Society moves on. "My point being that all of these communities were never going to survive on fishing because there wasn't enough fish in the sea – period! Everyone of those people – a large percentage of those fishermen on Waiheke were all going to go bankrupt if nothing was done" (Peter Stevens). However, it may also be claimed that if the fishery had been less corporatised there would still have been community fishermen and the Waiheke fishery would probably have persisted at least until the collapse of the Japanese Iki Jimi market.

According to Stevens (interview) the government was not going to put red cod, flat fish and one or two other fish that breed quickly on quota. He considered this "a matter of social justice".

The Morris's¹⁰⁸ of the world were unaffected. There was no capital involved and so forth and they had their fish. They got their flats [flounder].

¹⁰⁸ A well known small inshore setnetter formerly a president of an inshore fishermen's association.

For example, in Napier there were about 30 trawlers, 15 or 18 in the deepwater and catch tarakihi, trevalli, snapper, groper, gurnard and some flats. The remainder fished for flats predominantly because they were too small to do anything else. I said, “Those boats aren't going to get anything [quota] – all the other boats are. You can't do that to people. Red cod – most of the people down in Canterbury have been on red cod. They're going to get nothing and [only] one or two amongst them are going to get quota”. So I said, “How can you do that? You've got to put the long quota system – You've got to treat everybody in terms of their share in perpetuity”. So they agreed (Peter Stevens).

Initially leaving the few species targeted primarily by small-scale inshore fishermen outside the QMS may be viewed as mitigation of the equity issues. It also indicates the agency of key people in the development of the system.

While he has qualms about the number of people who mourn the loss of the owner-operators Peter Stevens notes that now New Zealand has depleted its native timber numerous jobs were lost similarly.

Now in fishing, if we've run out of fish – the same thing has happened. We would have run out of fish. We simply can't accommodate everybody. The fact that it's corporatized doesn't take away from the fact that fisheries are protected by TACCs that the government can affect and change. That was the name of the game. So I'm quite confident that our fisheries, from a human point of view and exploitation point of view are very very safe – for all time. All time say 1000 years. How long is forever...they're safe (Peter Stevens).

Clearly, rather than correct MAF's mistake of allowing the ‘big boats’ to fish the coastal fishery from his background he accepted their legitimacy. The focus was on symptoms not on causes.

HG FISHERMEN PERSPECTIVE: INTRODUCTION OF THE QMS

Although the QMS was introduced 1 October 1986, transition to the new management regime did not happen overnight. Initially fishermen had to get tickets (skipper's licence) and secure licences to remain commercial fishermen during the Controlled Fishery. Then to remain fishing commercially under the QMS fishermen had to establish their 'catch history', the annual average reported catch between 1981 and 1983 (Johnson and Haworth 2004 364) in order to be offered nominal quota. Waiheke fishermen were generally on low incomes so for

some, especially in the context of the island's informal economy, minimizing their tax could mean the difference between a reasonable year financially and little more than breaking even. Consequently some had patchy catch histories.

Fishermen: Exit before the QMS

There were tensions in the run-up to the QMS. Industry people in the early 1990s complained of commercial uncertainty due to constant restructuring. More recent interviews with fishermen, indicated that it had been ongoing and personal. They had faced the uncertainty of keeping their licences when the controlled fishery came in and further upheaval was in the offing. Some were ready to get out. Some were increasingly disillusioned with the fisheries regime, others felt 'ripped off', exploited by buyers and being too restricted by bureaucratic requirements, by 'the System'. Others were exhausted by the work, the tensions and were ready to leave and some exited before the system came in.

Two informants, for example, had been passionate for the work but left during the run-up to the QMS. One was offered a more financially attractive opportunity (Informant 19), while the other would have received what he felt was a good amount of quota but gave up fishing before the system was introduced. He said he'd done everything right – reporting "by the book" and was offered the correct amount of quota but didn't uplift it. The new regime was looking more restrictive than he wanted to work in so, with his wife, decided to exit commercial fishing. He also felt that small operations like theirs were being exploited by the Waiheke Co-op, which he felt wasn't democratic and his fish was considered of less importance than that from bigger enterprises.

Getting Quota

Before they could fish under the QMS commercially fishermen had to get quota by firstly establishing a catch history, the average of the best two years reported catch for the period 1981-83. On the basis of the catch history owner-operators then received offers from MAF of nominal quota. This was not the final amount since MAF wanted to reduce the Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) in each area. Two buyback rounds enabled fishermen to sell back quota at a sufficient price to compensate them for leaving that fishery. The remaining quota was still more than the desired TACC so individual entitlements were reduced by

'pro rata' cuts. Many fishermen felt that they had insufficient quota to be economically viable and so appealed to the QAA.

It was complicated. Fishermen often didn't understand the logic of MAF's process and felt they were cheated. One, for example, had been offered 24 tonnes of snapper quota but recalled that he had to sell back a percentage at MAF's price, initially \$5 /kg then later \$7 /kg. If the percentage MAF wanted was not offered:

[T]hey took it off you anyhow. I lost four tonne because I was incorrect. I think I had to get rid of 15 tonne out of that and I only offered 11 or something through no fault of mine because none of us were lawyers ... They railroaded us so I offered 11 and I was four tonnes short – I didn't get paid for that. They just took that off and said in 1986 ... it would be reallocated when the fishing stocks built up. That's bullshit. Nobody's ever mentioned anything about that anymore. And evidently you've still got to be registered as a fisherman to even contemplate how to get it so they robbed us like that somehow. Then of course you could keep the rest that became yours in perpetuity which you could lease, sell. I hung on for about a year. ... The initial thing was the government took it off us for \$5 a kilo and \$7 – there were two trades there ... when it become mine ... [the price] just continued to climb. But a lot of people, when they saw \$10 a kilo they grabbed it [sold]. It actually went over \$50 a kilo but even now, I think today you'd still have to pay \$40 a kilo to buy quota (Informant 26).

He then sold his quota to another fisherman for \$12.00 /kg who later sold it for \$52.00 /kg. He sold his boat to the same fisherman. Like their Waiheke counterparts some of the Leigh fishermen, even those who got quota successfully, still feel resentful at the way the QMS was introduced (Informant 26). The twenty years since this happened puts such vehemence in perspective.

Quota Appeal Authority (QAA)

Fishermen's and industry circumstances differed widely so the Quota Appeal Authority (QAA) was established. In his review in 1992 Peter Stevens explained that while drafting the preparatory legislation industry leaders and government officials considered an appeal process. They knew many catch histories were incomplete. The MAF database contained challengeable errors, widespread developments meant the industry had numerous commitments so a formal appeal process was necessary to ensure natural justice (Stevens 1992 7).

As a result of inaccuracies in the MAF catch database, miss- or under- reporting, fishermen's career exigencies such as illness or changing boats, the appeal process was legally and morally necessary, indeed essential for the individual fishermen who got quota as a result of their appeals. The process itself was excessively delayed for some and caused considerable hardship and those responsible – MAF, industry leaders, and (truth be told) conservationists – had considerable misgivings about the process in general and its implementation.

Industry leaders had developed tight rules but were then virtually excluded from the process as government legal advisors “established the criteria according to the dictates of our legal system” (Stevens 1992 5). Industry was concerned that too much quota could be given out. Stevens is adamant that:

Collectively the industry didn't want appeals at all because it didn't want to see TACs increased by what some saw as a handout factor ... (but) agreed out of recognition of the judicial and *moral* rights of those individuals who might have been denied equality and/or natural justice” (Stevens 1992 5, emphasis added).

Since no experienced fishermen were involved on the QAA panel there was no peer pressure, on the one hand, and appellants' lawyers found loopholes that gave some more than a fair share although others “received a lot less than their entitlement¹⁰⁹. There were many who stood to gain but didn't appeal at all, or if they did, were poorly prepared and so lost out” (Stevens 1992 5). On the other, the process was complicated and drawn out over more than two years in some cases. In 1990, the editor of *The New Zealand Professional Fisherman* (1990 11) published a letter to the QAA from one such fisherman, John Blake, who stated that the delay he faced meant: “The strain financially and emotionally on my family at the moment is tremendous and you (Secretary of the QAA) are our last hope to stay in the industry”.

There were often legitimate reasons for appeals to the QAA but some claims whose legitimacy has always been questioned (See Box 9) and nationwide “by the end of the process 900 fishermen out of 1300 potential objectors carried their objections to a hearing” (Johnson and Haworth 2004 377). Even so

¹⁰⁹ Stevens noted, that since fishermen representatives were involved in a similar process in Canada, it was considerably more effective (Stevens)

It was a nightmare because the quota actually blew out by a massive amount and I thought: “What's the point of having a quota system?” ... It just got so complicated. If they hadn't recorded – that's it – you don't get a quota. It's as simple as that but of course I sort of call it the hardship clause – there was, you know, the poor little fisherman [in isolated places] ... Because I was fighting their cause I couldn't very well ignore what they were saying. At that stage the minimum quota was I think 5 tonne before they qualify. A lot of them were only 2 ½, 3 tonne – which was 'big bickies' to them (Bill Dumbleton).

Box 9: QAA claims

- Fishermen had been absent from the fishery due to illness or their boat had been wrecked or was out of service or they were building a new vessel
- Fishermen had been fishing for someone else between owning boats and had forgotten to transfer licences.
- Mistakes had been made reporting catches.
- Some fishermen lied and cheated to get more quota.

Fisheries Officer, Neil Macdonald outlined some of the rorts some fishermen had resorted to in claiming catch history to get quota.

There ... (were) all sorts of ways they get in there and mess around originally to generate quotas. I heard of a guy, after I left the fisheries, up North Auckland who used to kill a couple of cattle beasts and ... half of each one for himself and flick [sell] the rest off and the money he got for it went down on his fish quota that he caught ... as an invisible species of fish. He paid all his dues and that and recorded everything like that and he thought that quite a good quota of flounder and mullet and that in the set net and it was never ever picked up and he got quota. He got quota on that (Neil Macdonald).

Another fisherman longlining in the Hauraki Gulf started recording baracouta in his returns. When MAF queried the catch he explained it was bycatch which he'd used as bait on his thousand hooks, which was partially true but: "he built up a considerable amount of quota for something he never ever caught. ... So there's a couple of avenues where a couple of guys have got in and fiddled the system" (Neil Macdonald).

Consequently the TACC for snapper in QMA1 was set at 4,710 tonnes in 1986-87 a reduction from reported landings of between 6,000 and 7,000 tonnes in the years

just prior to the ITQ system but by 1990-91 QAA decisions had increased the TAC by 1,222.446 tonnes (around 26%) about 110 tonnes more than the previous reduction” (Duncan L. 1993 27,28). This was of concern for MAF field staff caught between enforcement against tax avoiders and concern over the situation of individual small fisheries in isolated situations (e.g. see Box 10).

Stevens concluded it “as a traumatic and necessary exercise that had to be carried out in order to make the transition (Stevens 1992 7). That the QAA was established indicates that MAF did recognise the existing rights of pre-QMS fishermen and natural justice to an extent limited by the complexity, duration and uncertainty of the system. In the communities a few fishermen and their families took what quota they got and carried on as before. For most though there was the stress of the complicated, long running appeal process with considerable uncertainty whether they could remain solvent and maintain their livelihood.

Waiheke

On Waiheke, fishermen felt that the way MAF brought the QMS in was “sneaky” as they did not know in advance which years were to be used for catch history¹¹⁰. Reporting on which catch histories were based was mandatory but there were discrepancies on both sides with databases incomplete and in some cases, miss- or under-reporting. This is a moral issue with responsibilities on both sides. In order for MAF to manage the fishery, they needed the information but to maintain a reasonable operation, fishermen needed a reasonable income and some had to resort to contributing to the community practice of supporting the informal economy.

There were many reasons for lax or under-reporting catch returns: the complexity of the forms, the difficulty and inconvenience of filling them out at sea, in small boats that were too wet, with too much motion, under uncertain lighting by fishermen who were often practical manual workers and not generally clerks or bureaucrats, when they were exhausted from long hours of uncertain work (See Box 10). The fact the returns asked for a position and fishermen didn't want to give away their 'hot spots', the ethos of 'under the counter' wharf sales where buyers would offer cash which was far more convenient rather than cheques

¹¹⁰ Of course knowing in advance could have lead to 'fishing for quota'.

which meant an extra trip to the bank cutting into time at home'. Their involvement in the informal economy and concern to minimise tax, led to fear that their fisheries returns could be matched with income tax returns so compromise tax avoidance. Many fishermen resented the bureaucracy and accountability: they resented MAF and just wanted to 'get on with it'. On Waiheke, they also wanted to continue keeping a feed for the family and giving a few to friends or neighbours and those who needed them. That's what fishermen did traditionally. Consequently some Waiheke fishermen struggled to get a quota package sufficiently adequate for them to continue fishing at a reasonable level and, with the assistance of the Co-op, some went to the QAA.

Box 10: Problems with compliance

A fisherman explained:

We were supposed to report our catches every day. Nobody ever did. What you'd do is, you'd get your report book out and you'd sit down in the evening and you'd say "Right, how many hooks have we done? We've done 500 or we've done 800. Right we'll call 150 kilos – there like that". You might forget about that for three or four days. But I think it averaged out the same and then – well I used to just ditto it – you see – and if I had the time and I was dry and I wasn't hungry I'd fill it out again, you know? But a lot of them didn't fill them out at all and they'd just put in nil catch returns and consequently when it come up, when you got your quota, they didn't have a fishing history ... I was basically bang on with what I used to catch ... 24 tonnes of snapper quota, and I had 1½ tonnes of bycatch that was gurnard and that. ... If you average it out over a year that's basically what it was and we used to take cash – sometimes you'd go into the Viaduct and your Dalmation buyer would say: "You want the cash or you want the cheques?" Well if you had any brains you used to take a bit of cash and a cheque next time or half and half but none of us got rich out of fishing (Informant 26).

They went off the catch landing logs and knew no one was putting the right amount in. Also there were guys who had been fishing for years but who couldn't read and write so didn't sit tickets. They lost – didn't get quota (Informant 18).

Licensed Fish Receivers

In the transition to the QMS, the new requirement (For social complications see Leigh, page 280) that commercial fishermen land all fish to Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs) was to have very profound social implications for Waiheke not

just for the Onetangi Hotel (See Box 11) but also in removing fresh locally caught fish from the community¹¹¹.

Box 11: Onetangi Hotel

Back in the good old days, Farley Scott, lived on the beach front, virtually next door to the Onetangi Hotel, launched his boat across the beach and supplied the hotel for 22 years. “Oh I used to go every day. I was out there every day. Usually I'd go out about 9.00 or half past 8, 8 o'clock and come in at five and deliver the fish around the island. If I didn't get enough I'd go out after tea and come back at 3 or 4 o'clock in the middle of the night just to supply the hotel. Because they had all the guests there then. A lot of people'd ... take 20 pounds or 20 kilos of fish every day. ... so I'd fillet it and take it along there for breakfast. It was quite exciting” (Farley Scott).

Shortly before the QMS was introduced, Peter Rowland, the chef entered one of Farley's snapper in the NZ Fishing Industry-Auckland Star Restaurant Competition 1983 and won “first prize for his seafood speciality dish. Peter's winning entry “Gannet Rock Snapper”, was sampled by a panel of judges who visited the hotel last month. Apparently the quality of the fresh fish was everything the judges expected it to be – they were delighted when the waitress told them it had been caught that afternoon, Peter reported. 'I don't think there's any other restaurant around that can collect their fish supply directly from a fisherman just a 50 metre walk away down the beach,' he comments. Their 'private' fisherman, local resident Farley Scott, has been fishing Gulf waters for many years and, says Peter, brings back just what the hotel orders. 'If we want so many kingfish or terakihihi, he just goes out and gets it' (*Gulf News* 22 July 1983 14, 15.).

After the introduction of the QMS, the hotel applied to be a Licenced Fish Receiver but while the application was still in the pipeline were raided and threatened with prosecution for receiving fish. Neville Buckley, Regional Fisheries Officer, wrote “that their application had been declined. 'He said the Ministry did not agree that the applicants' business was "sufficiently unique" to justify granting a licence, and was not satisfied the applicant would "conduct fish receiving operations in a proper manner” (*Gulf News* 20 March 1987 25, 27).

Co-op Involvement

In getting quota Waiheke fishermen were disadvantaged. The Co-op had been formed particularly to service the iki jimi fishery. During my Viaduct research, informants stressed that the Co-op was concerned to get the best return for local fishermen by niche marketing iki jimi snapper. In the process of becoming established, the product was being labelled as from Waiheke Sea Products (the

¹¹¹ The implications of the LFR requirement are examined in Chapter 7.

Co-op) but in the longer term they were hoping to "personalise" it by labelling it from individual fishermen. For the strategy to be effective quality had to be consistently perfect and that meant each fish had to be handled, processed and packed with extreme care. Consequently, during the critical years for getting catch history fishermen were catching and landing far fewer fish than they had been, perhaps up to half of their previous catch tonnage. Their entitlements to nominal quota were far less because they were already adding value (Informants 3, 44). Danish seiners and trawlers, were beginning to do shorter tows and ice their catches more carefully, but were not going to the lengths of the iki jimi fishermen, so the companies running such boats would get 'full' quota, then have the additional option to add value. The longline fishermen, most of the Co-op fishermen were therefore at a disadvantage in gaining nominal quota, effectively penalised for being innovators.

As a result the Co-op Manager directly lobbied Wellington and consequently the Co-op obtained quota of one species (recalled as probably hoki) that they sold immediately for 25 tonne of snapper quota and eventually "after a big bun fight – handed out to members" (Informant 44). In the critical years for catch history, instead of fishing, the Co-op manager had been establishing, building and administering the Co-op so hadn't received quota in his own right.

In addition to trying to offset the iki jimi discrepancy the Co-op tried to help individual fishermen with their reporting issues. As the manager said:

We tried to go back through records and put a case that they should get some higher amount of quota than what was on paper on the day, and were successful with quite a few of them (Informant 44).

There were different perceptions of the amount of quota Waiheke fishermen received. One, then fisherman, told me he didn't feel that individually he had been adversely affected by the QMS and that collectively the Waiheke fishermen all did "OK".

The 30 boat owners all ended up with enough quota. [Subsequently] it spoilt the industry when the companies aggregated the quota. That spoilt it. It was not as good environment as it was (Informant 18).

But others felt they hadn't received enough and some remained embittered. The concessions made to the Co-op in granting some quota seem to indicate that MAF did have some awareness of social justice and equity issues.

Fishermen: Sale of quota

Some Waiheke fishermen were offered quota they didn't take up. Others received fair entitlements but some, with assistance from the Co-op appealed, went through the process before eventually getting quota. Ultimately most Waiheke fishermen sold their quota. The one who didn't see sufficient benefit stated:

I could have sold it because I didn't have that big a return but some of the guys got \$200,000 or something for their quotas. ... They're big quotas but I didn't have a big quota because I just fished locally – used to smoke them and cart them around twice a week to everybody (Informant 5).

An Informant close to the fisheries said:

To start with the quotas here, a lot of people sold because – there was a novelty factor as well. It's like you're being paid and it was money for jam and possibly a lot of fishermen here fell into that category. It was easy money. They could sell a tonne or two. I think with snapper it was \$6 or \$7,000 dollars a tonne was the original starting point with the government – when the government bought quota back (Informant 3).

Another had a friend who sold his quota so he could set up a motel business on Great Barrier. “Cashing in the quota was quite handy for some people at that particular stage because they were quite tired of fishing” (Informant 4). Another suggested “Probably the reason that they sold on Waiheke is that they were all downhearted by what happened with the fishing Co-op. They weren't actually getting the money out of it anyway. ... I heard that ... (another fisherman) got \$250,000 for his quota. Some of them set themselves up quite nicely” (Informants 6 6b).

The wife of another fisherman said:

Yes, well I think some people heard about somebody else selling and all the money they got and thought oh well – I could do this and I could do that and it probably had a bit of a spin off and then some people bought some land with it – set themselves up doing something different. Yeah really, I think the companies ended up with far too much quota. I think what a shame more people didn't keep it. Never have to work again – just lease your quota out and do what you like instead. ... We bought a section, which was good. ... but I think the very sad thing is that you've got an island surrounded by ocean and people cannot buy fish caught around here (Informant 8).

Commercial fishing always had high rates of tension and divorce but the options opened by quota created additional tensions between some couples. A fisherman,

for example, was tired had had 'a guts full' and wanted to get out but his wife wanted to be prudent and retain the possibility of his getting back in by keeping the five tonnes of quota needed and leasing it out in the interim. Some invested and were hurt badly by the 1986 stock market crash. Consequently some couples split and others weathered the storm.

Many of the fishermen sold to pay off their mortgages or build their houses.

Eventually as the quota system came in I ended up with these quotas as we were coming to the farm here and we built this earth home – dug a hole in the top of the hill and built the earth home and moved here and did the alternate power thing and all that and I sold most of the quotas – got out of it. Sold it all and that provided money to build my house here so then I was forced to look at the private end of it more – the private end – you know the recreational end of it (Informant 10).

Another sold his snapper quota;

to a guy from Coromandel – he flew over and signed it up and I paid off a \$36,000 mortgage on the farm. ... So – you know – fishing was good to me in some ways”. But “its not economic in these outer-lying areas – the quantities and stuff that you sell – for someone to hold quota and do all the work of fishing it – it becomes such a big job for a little return that nobody wants to do it anymore. ... It was hard work and ended up being work without any real reward in the end – when you are down to a small amount (of quota). ... I was going to hang onto mine but at the time I couldn't lease it and I thought 'bugger this'. The government keeps sending you these bills for – I don't want it any more. I felt like I was on string there – on a hook. I was a fish now. So I sold it for what I could get for it and got out of it. ... When I got out actually there must have been miles of fishermen like me in a small way that all got out the same year – all decided that this was too much. Because up until then I'd had no trouble leasing out quota that I wasn't going to use towards the end of the year and that sort of thing. ... So I ended up – I sold it eventually. It was back in the nineties – late nineties (Informant 12).

Another sold small amounts in an effort to continue fishing:

There was just attrition, 'Oh, I'll sell a tonne we've got to put this bloody engine in and I've had a mean winter and the fish prices are way down so to sustain themselves they (fishermen) had to keep nibbling away at their quota and sell half a tonne and sell (more). ... I held onto some quota for a while but the paper nightmare of leasing it – I just sold it out. The boat's still there, I thought I might go back one day – I kept it but I don't think. I don't think there's ... (an opportunity). Well you look out to sea there now and you never see a seine boat working whereas the horizon used to be lit

up at night – seine boats doing their shots – tow outs on the incoming tide (Informant 13).

Informant 18 and his family were mortgage free when the QMS came in. He'd fish 40 weeks per year, and spend three nights per week on the boat so 120 nights a year for 15 years. Then he left in 1991. He had hung on for five years but the remuneration got worse and worse. He'd thought it would be good and the money would be as good as they'd had, but it got worse. He sold his quota and basically cashed up and got out. There was money they wouldn't have had if not for the QMS. It was about the same time other workers were getting redundancy that “put them on their feet”. They bought a business and did well then sold that and have all they want so he doesn't have a yearning to get out there. Friends invite him out to fish but he doesn't. He's done that. So overall they achieved their desired economic level (Informant 18).

Another didn't do quite so well and felt they didn't get the best advice:

I'm sure that if we'd been given the real assistance. ... Somebody should have understood that these guys [fishermen] are not the sharpest knives in the drawer at the figures. I think I might have been persuaded to actually keep my quota. It was just like – 'There's some money there – do you want it?' Yeah, I want it – I'll take it. Because it set me up. I paid for my home. I bought a property and all that and all of a sudden I've got no business and I thought, “What am I doing here? I want to go fishing but I can't now.” So it's a bit dumb. My children. My children want to go fishing. They could have taken my business over. So it's a lesson now. A lesson – people who had foresight have actually stayed in it. I actually ended up getting out because the money was so huge – I know two or three people who I still see fishing – they're in their 60s and that and they're doing it for – money doesn't mean anything – they're just doing it. I made that fatal mistake where I took the money. I didn't want a cent. I was quite happy before that, you know (Informant 26)?

Most of the Waiheke fishermen sold for reasons more immediately related to their domestic and community situation. One fisherman, however, was involved with Federation politics and while working for them leased out his quota. Initially leasing out was reasonable:

The idea of leasing was just really so someone else could have the use of it and there could be something back ... like renting out your house or something. But it began to be leased at figures that were in excess of what even the fisherman could make catching the bloody stuff simply because of its scarcity and the kind of mania that surrounded it. Just like the share

market crash. Everybody suddenly wanted it and the price just went ridiculous and I feel that probably some of the bigger companies sat back and fed that fire because it really had very little impact on them (Informant 14).

From his interest and this experience he had a wider view of the industry and New Zealand fisheries than most fishermen. Aware of trends and ethical concerns:

I sold my quota because I began to think of it as a bubble in terms of its value. I guess I was influenced by the stock market crash and I felt that – for the first time in my life I realised that commodities could rise above their true value because of all kinds of artificial forces and that you could be left holding nothing. In my last year of owning quota I made ... perhaps ... as much by leasing out my quota as I had made in previous years by going out and catching it myself and that seemed to me to be a strange slightly unwholesome and not quite right sort of spin off that the QMS should never have given rise to. Certainly the economic theorists never predicted that (Informant 14).

He was in a quandary. On the one hand leasing his quota out meant he had the time and resources to do things he couldn't otherwise but on the other hand, since many were selling their quota soon the market would be saturated and his asset would be valueless. "There's one school of thought that says, "Never sell it. Never ever sell it." There's another school of thought that says, "Hey this is hugely overvalued." I knew that at the time it was being sold for far in excess of what its economic worth would be in the hands of somebody buying it". He was persuaded by what seemed an excessive increase of user-pays costs such as those for research and " I didn't think I was going to go fishing again. The excitement had kind of gone, the lifestyle had gone and [significantly] it had become just a business and I thought, I should try and think like a businessman and sell out while the going was good. I felt a bit sick doing it because it had never been my intention when I went fishing and I loved fishing and it seemed like the end of something and I was sad but it felt that I had no choice" (Informant 14).

A lot of other people had sold out and I'd held onto my quota for a long time – ... because I became involved in the politics of fishing. ... I thought I was quite an important person representing the small owner-operator and I felt that as long as I was going to be voicing opinions and saying this and saying that then I should be a quota owner. I didn't feel that it was very ethical to be telling other people what they should do when I wasn't going to be taking the consequences of it myself so I held onto my quota because if I wanted to be a spokesman I had to be willing

to take the consequences of whatever might happen but it all turned a bit sour in the end and I got a bit sick of it all and at that point I realised I should sell my quota and get right out of it and get out of the politics as well because it was a soul destroying activity. ... We all got the jitters after the stock market crash – you know. I thought quota would go the same way so I got rid of it. I wish I still had it. In fact if I still had my quota I'd be back out there fishing again there now. I'd be out there like a shot but I wouldn't even think about going fishing now – leasing in someone else's quota – it wouldn't be worth it (Informant 14).

Some fishermen were convinced the major companies were manipulating prices to extremely low levels through high grading. Local fishermen expected the Co-op would prevent similar happening to them but that was not always their experience.

I think it was when we were getting prices from Japan, with what we were getting paid and the grading – the way they were grading our fish was diabolical. We would be out there catching fish that would look like they had just come out of a machine they were all the same size – perfect iki fish and we'd get a reject rate of 70%. It was ridiculous, absolutely ridiculous because they'd been caught within – sometimes within 2 or 3 hours of being unloaded. They were still in the slurry and they'd say, “Oh no – they're too old.”

They had every excuse in the world so we were being hi-graded by the companies –ripped off. There's no doubt at all. The companies were manipulating the prices to their advantage. That way they funded the purchase of the quota because the companies were buying the quota off the fishermen was with the fishermen's money that they were ripping them off. ... When you compare us [Waiheke] to Leigh and comparing Leigh's prices to ours they were getting a far better price than we were. The impact was just devastating. It was the end of it all. We got out of it in the end because it was just too much of a hassle (Informant 13).

For many the decision to retain it or sell it involved husbands and wives and, to a greater or lesser extent their family. For some it was not an easy matter. Their relationship had not previously had to contend with the amounts of money involved. It varied with personality and depended on the extent to which long term aspirations were shared and in some cases became contentious to the extent that some couples split. Those fishermen who sold tended to be younger, in their 20s or 30s. Many thought they could have the cash and stay fishing. It was a LOTTO¹¹² mentality. Those who retained their quota tended to be older more

¹¹² The national weekly lottery.

established fishermen later in their career cycle with boats and houses paid off; perhaps more committed to fishing, possibly because they were later generations of fishing families so had greater experience to call on. It seems significant that those on Waiheke who retained their quota went chartering.

For some fishermen and their partners selling was a short-term decision to meet immediate needs but others were hoping for an alternative. Some were glad to leave the fishing, because what had been a lifestyle ethos had become a business, but others had regrets, feeling the information they'd acted on had been inadequate. Commercial fishing always had high rates of tension and divorce but the options opened by quota created additional tensions between some couples. A fisherman, for example, was tired had had 'a guts full' and wanted to get out but his wife wanted to be prudent and retain the possibility of his getting back in by keeping the 5 tonnes of quota needed and leasing it out in the interim. Some invested and were hurt badly by the stock market crash. Consequently some couples split and others weathered the storm with eventually, all but one fisherman on Waiheke, selling their quota.

Demise of the Co-op

The QMS led to the demise of the Co-op. The Co-op was, of necessity, a Licensed Fish Receiver (LFR) with concomitantly increased administrative requirements. For fishermen quota ownership added monetary enticement. In the ethos of Waiheke both factors compounded. Those who ran the Co-op were there to support and cooperate with fishermen not to run a business. The additional demands of the QMS were, therefore, debilitating rather than challenging. The struggle with paperwork was an example:

It was just a god damn paper nightmare – you know – every kilo of fish has to be accounted for and buying in fish and trying to sell your rejects through the Co-op shop and that – too much of a hassle – who needs it? ... Everybody just got pissed off with us [the Co-op] and found easier jobs because it's hard physical work. You don't mind doing it if you're making a buck but when you're working like a bloody maniac and not even covering the costs some weeks (Informant 13).

The QMS changed people's perspectives, attitudes and aspirations. On the one hand fishermen needed quota and had to account for it but on the other quota was an asset representing options they hadn't considered previously.

There were 21 shareholders in the Co-op ... The Co-op just got started really and then the quota system came into effect. It effectively killed the Co-op! Basically, there was a dollar on the snapper head ... Slowly and surely fishermen would sell their quota and get out of the industry. It was a way of getting out and getting paid for it. They decided to sell out. I think some of them had had enough of fishing but that certainly was 'the icing on the cake' (Informant 13).

One of the fishermen who had first facilitated the Co-op said:

I think everything went quite smoothly for a while but when quota came in, of course, I think people got greedy then ... All of a sudden people could sell off a bit of quota and get rid of their mortgage. That was the demise of it. It ended up a bit of a bun fight in the end because the sections ... bought [for the Co-op] ... in Ostend, for £500 pound, all of a sudden were worth quite a lot of money so a little group tried to take things over in the end ... [One fisherman] and I went into battle for everyone else. Yeah it was a lot of 'fun'. That was basically what it was. Yeah. I'd got out of it for personal reasons, I suppose but most of the fishermen got out because ... all of a sudden you could get money for what you'd been doing (Informant 44).

A lot of fishermen dropped out so that eventually the Co-op had

to start a fish and chip shop to keep it going ... [but it] didn't have the quota to service it properly ... You've got to have the quota. You must have it in your own right, to serve the community and if you haven't got it you can't do it. You'll always hear stories of people coming to the island and saying, "Jeeze, you should be able to buy fresh fish on Waiheke Island." Well they'll be saying that for a frigging long time because I don't think it's going to happen (Informant 13).

Eventually dwindling numbers meant it was uneconomic to keep the Co-op going (Informant 13) and the Co-op was sold to a partnership of two couples who had been members (*Gulf News* 9 October 1992 37) (Box 14). They kept it running:

There was a lot of [community] support but ... [with the] black market ... [you] could keep yourself in fish from right next door to [the fish shop]. Ten dollars a packet of snapper – can't compare with that. So [it] only got the people who don't know about the black market fish, who were prepared to come to the fish shop and pay legit ... It all boils down to the quota. The black market fish at the time was – probably still as high now. I don't think you'll ever get away from that (Informant 7).

Reduced catches from improving quality and the pro-rate cuts in quota meant that even with the additional 25 tonnes of snapper quota many of the fishermen felt they were not economically viable. Some then sold their quota, whereas others tried to keep going but attrition, lack of cash flow, meant an exigency such as an

engine failure would lead to selling of small amounts of quota until they had to leave the fishery. Eventually the Co-op disbanded and in the mid nineties the fish shop closed so now locals virtually can't get fresh locally caught fish.



Figure 15: The buildings that were the Waiheke Co-op (September 2009).

Coromandel

Getting quota was also difficult for some Coromandel fishermen. One of my Coromandel informants found that the fishing experience was attached to the boat rather than the fisherman, or the owner. In the run-up to the QMS he bought one of the oldest Danish seiners in the Viaduct. Its owner, who had been one of the top fishermen, also owned a fish and chip shop in Mangere, had ill health and couldn't fish any more so had been trying to sell the boat for three or four years.

In general, catch history went with the fisherman but in this case he said:

Several years that history went with the boat ... but he was told that he couldn't transfer it – which was not true ... [because] it turned out that similar transactions had taken place all over the country and when I came to look at the situation it seemed to me that, what I was being told was preposterous and that the boat was worth what he wanted for it anyway ... The boat was the oldest fishing boat in the Auckland fishing industry, just

a year or so older than the *Dorothy* so if there was any boat ... [that] had a right to a catch history it was that one... (Informant 35)

What was being said to people was unreasonable and unjust and I decided ... that if I can't get any quota I'll set it up and buy longlines for big tuna and set up a big surface longline and I was able to fish it under his permit for a few months after I bought the boat ... I went off and did my surface longlining which was totally experimental for a New Zealand boat.

They (MAF) changed it. So then I was advised that I could appeal because I should have had some quota and there should have been some applied to the boat ... I did follow it up and was lucky to finish up ... with some quota. That was difficult such a tenuous operation getting [quota] (Informant 35).

Another Coromandel informant felt that the fishermen with families were fine and younger single fishermen who could live on a small income while they bought extra quota were also able to stay in. In comparison, older fishermen already in their fifties didn't get enough quota and had to drop out. "So there was that whole generational difference; a bit sad for the old ones" (Informant 2).

The consequences at Coromandel were more mixed than for Waiheke perhaps because more fishermen had been operating bigger boats (e.g. Danish seiners) and larger businesses for longer. Some individuals who, from a common sense perspective, appeared to have a good case for getting quota, had to really struggle whereas others, who contrived a case, got it easily.

Bill Dumpleton's perspective of the introduction of ITQs to Coromandel was:

We never got as many squeals from Coromandel as a community. Most of them were satisfied. Most of them knew what they were going to do and they've always been quite an intelligent lot in Coro. They are savvy to do things, a bit like those in Whitianga too, with the three factories. ... [Also] they actually had a controlled fishery a long time before they had an ITQ system. They had – you know it was just another step for them. They adapted very well – Coro (Bill Dumpleton).

The social impact on Coromandel from the introduction of the QMS was dramatic: "many fishermen made a substantial amount of money and gained an impressive asset by selling or leasing out their quota" (Bill Dumpleton). Indeed, one informant suggested the QMS had created 46 millionaires overnight, but twenty years later wasn't sure of the exact figures: "It might have been 16 in town

or 46 on Coromandel Peninsular”. That does not alter the fact that some gained an impressive asset by selling or leasing out their quota.

Contrary to early information however, not everybody was leasing their quota out. Some fishermen retained part of their quota for their own use (e.g. Informant 33). Others didn't get enough quota of their own so had to lease more but there were also others who wanted to fish who had to lease the entire quota needed to cover their catch. Bill Dumbleton felt that many people were making a lot out of leasing out quota and that created a problem for those who had to lease it in order to fish.

A Danish Seiner said:

It's a lot of water under the bridge since the Quota system came in. In a nutshell when I traded I traded down and sold the big boat because I didn't think the quota system would be enough to support it (Informant 21).

The problem was compounded:

[T]hey were going to cut us back but they had us on a bit, because they kept saying 'if there's not enough cuts' [they would cut more – pro rata across all the snapper fishermen]. It's a 64 dollar question if there wasn't enough people cut out of the industry then they'd cut us back even more. That's where the catch – where the quota's all out a bit. So I decided bugger this, I'll sell the boat and just sell off. The mistake I made is I should have kept a little bit but even if I kept a little bit back that could have been cut back. It was never going to end ... they cut the snapper down a lot. That was the biggest issue (Informant 21).

Informant 21 sold.

I got \$6.40 or \$6.70, I think it was across the species. ... I got a payout and sold the boat separately and then I bought back in to the industry – enough for my entitlement back into the fishery – five tonne. Well I actually bought seven tonne. Then I found out I didn't need to do that in the first place because I was already a registered fisherman and when they bought me out they left me with 100 kg plus of baracouta. So they left me with ... still good fish [quota] even though it was useless – baracouta (Informant 21).

He started longlining but even so his operation was marginal. He had to spin out the small amount of quota he had but when the price for snapper landed dropped he didn't have sufficient. He needed a deckhand but:

[N]obody would stay with you for say less than twenty grand (\$20,000) in a year deckhand. Prior to that I had this good hand and everything was normal. We got quite used to one another but he had to move on to the forestry because we cut the bloody quota out by January and February –

my quota and a third schedule quota. So I caught more fish than what I'm catching now and ended up with less in my hand because I had to give it to him ... I had to make dollars (Informant 21).

So he decided to go solo but Danish seining again:

I'll give it a go and I'll spin [the quota] out. If I don't catch it I'll lease out what's left. In the first year – I got used to it quick but there were just certain things. Sometimes you can't get more snapper or ... (its) not worth [sufficient], or you don't get as much leasing it as you would catching it, that sort of thing. Well that would change your mind ... So I'll lease the lot (out) instead. Sometimes the factory will have a bit of extra snapper so I'll not catch a lot of snapper into here – just [higher priced] dory while there's [some around] – they cover me for other species anyway. So I'm still reliant on them. That's the only sad part about it. This game here – you sell – you're self employed but you're still working for the MAN – you know what I mean (Informant 21)?

He had lost the sense of freedom.

On Coromandel some did sell their quota. I was told:

[B]asically the greed got the better of them. They saw the instant gain and forgot about the future. One chap ... well he sold that quota [10 tonne snapper] back to the company because they gave him a guarantee that he wouldn't need quota. He could just lease it back off them rather than have all his money tied up. (Then) he spent the whole bloody lot in a pub in six bloody months. Then he came back to work and there was no job for him and he realised then he'd made a huge mistake but it was too late. He also sold it really cheaply. I don't know the exact figure but it would have been less than \$10,000 a tonne ... He's not fishing now but he comes down (to the wharf) quite a bit (Informant 20).

Ian Strongman explained the situation for family fishermen:

[W]hen quotas were introduced I was deckhand for my father as was my brother. Initially the first thing we noticed was that with the quota reduction was that if we were all getting paid from the government – but with the quota you had left – you were only landing half as much as you were before. So you had a fishing boat set up to catch 60, 70 tonne of fish in a year... [but] your quota was only 35 tonne. To make your boat viable you had to go and lease somebody else's quota that had decided not to fish it. So that worked OK for a while – while I was on a boat that had a reasonable amount of quota provided – as my father's boat. Dad provided the quota.

Ian Strongman leased his father's quota but when he retired a further quota reduction made him wonder, "Where is this going to end? How many cuts are they going to take?" and decide to sell the quota leaving Ian to lease quota

privately. Others were also competing for this quota and against the factories, which could pay more. So “by the time you landed your fish with your crew and your ice and diesel and expenses and the quota cost – the cost of leasing it – it just wasn't worth it” (Ian Strongman). As a result he now has a \$120,000 boat that he hasn't used for six years, although a buyer is offering about \$10,000 for the boat and some of the gear was sold to other fishermen its still a huge loss. Some of his peers have got bigger boats, diversified or they've got out.

The QMS left no love for the government. One fisherman, a descendant of a European fishing family so perhaps more traditional than many others in Coromandel, was working his quota but had also started a mussel farm, yet felt betrayed. Colin Moyle, then Minister of Fisheries had said

'This [quota] is bankable your kids can inherit it' but then they cut it. The second time they cut about nine per cent and no compensation there were a lot of promises that weren't kept. There have been reductions since (Informant 33).

[He] doesn't trust any government but “Labour wants total control” and the paperwork is “over the top”. Because he didn't trust the government he sold three quarters of his quota and leases the remainder out. His brother, however, has kept all his but was not available to interview.

Just as Waiheke lost the Co-op, Coromandel also lost its wet-fish factory that was adjacent to the wharf. Neil Macdonald explained that before the factory was sold to Sanford, the CEO of the company, [called] Coromandel Fisheries or Coromandel Exporters, was the biggest single owner of quota. During my first visit, fishermen on the wharf told me informally that when Sanford bought the fish factory they were assured arrangements to buy snapper and other wet fish would continue as before but just a month or so later, the factory converted to a mussel packing shed no longer buying fish. The QMS was rationalising the industry.

COMPANY PERSPECTIVE

While the QMS was supposed to smooth out fishing by eliminating the race for fish and since they had quota and prices were market driven, moderate the competition between fishermen. As a result with seasonal variation, snapper lifecycles, and other exigencies, fishermen's catches and their supply to their

market, the viability of the companies fluctuated. The companies' domestic or international markets did also though not necessarily in relation to seasonal availability. Their financial returns were still variable. Thus the return to the fisherman was less than predictable and with ethnic factors affecting cultural styles, not surprisingly, fishermen's feeling toward the companies were mixed. After the introduction of the QMS, leasing quota was an option:

But then after the first year the leases steadily went up and up and the prices [for fish] came down and the costs went up so it all turned around – quite rapidly. That's why I think the companies are responsible because they saw that they had the power and there was nothing we could do about it so they seized on that. And they basically tell us: “If you don't like it you can f---- off!” That's their attitude (Informant 20).

With the factory in Leigh, and a community that was significantly more dependent on commercial fishing than either Waiheke or Coromandel, fishermen had more support and remained more viable. They got quota, held it and leased more as needed so that a bubble in prices in Japan meant they sold at top price. “500-1000 Yen more than any other company in New Zealand because of the quality aspect” (Greg Bishop).

Johnson and Haworth (2004) considered that companies aggregated (bought up) the quota so quickly to secure access to fish. As a result of the loan schemes, fishermen had become financially independent of the companies so when the chance to buy up the quota came companies were far more aware of the financial implications than fishermen and bought it as fast as possible.

Fletcher Fishing was first off the mark. It was not the only quota buyer, but it was quick, aggressive, and paid cash on the spot. When one snapper fisherman called at Fletcher's Auckland plant to pick up a cheque for his catch the buyer laid out a cheque book in front of him and offered to buy his entire quota on the spot. That fisherman did not sell – or not until later – but many did. ... The tenders submitted to the government in the first round effectively set a price per species. If fishermen were offering fish back to the government at, say \$5000 a tonne, Fletcher would happily pay \$7000 or \$8000 ... Some fishermen acted as though they had won the Golden Kiwi lottery. None of this was reflected in the government's statistics (Johnson and Haworth 2004 375, 376).

Such aggressive corporate aggregation of quota also had implications for the smaller local companies that resulted in amalgamations and closures in the small ports thus changing the options fishermen had in selling their catch. Coromandel

fishermen, for example, were affected by what happened at Whitianga. Johnson and Haworth (2004) report:

Quota buying at small ports caused substantial shifts in the way local processors worked. At Whitianga ... Fletcher bought most of the local quota – mostly snapper – within 24 hours of its allocation, at a price the local processor thought was close to what it was worth. The fishermen then had boats but no quota. Those who wanted to fish had to lease from someone who owned it. Fletcher moved the processing factory to Auckland. Whitianga had already gone through considerable upheaval. ... In the Think Big days it had about 15 trawlers, 44 scallop boats and three processing plants. Then as things became tougher in the early 1980s with falling catches and closed areas, three plants became two, Ocean Products and Columbia Seafoods. By quota time there was one. Jim Williscroft was running OPColumbia [OPC]. He had moved to 'iki fishing', small premium snapper for the Japanese market. Now he watched most of his fish supply go to Auckland in Fletcher Fishing's trucks (Johnson and Haworth 2004 376, 377).

Generally smaller processors owned no boats so depended on independent fishermen. In the past they had kept them by guaranteeing bank overdrafts or making loans but later Rural Bank loans and development incentives enabled owner-operators to buy their own boats. Consequently they too had to buy sufficient quota to “generate enough fish to keep his [the CEO] plant busy. It was no use controlling boats it had to be quota. Somehow he had to get quota. It need not be enough for his total requirements but there needed to be some sort of base” (Johnson and Haworth 2004 378).

During my Northland Tour in 1995, a Leigh Fisheries spokesperson stated that most Leigh fishermen had their own quota. It had been the basis of Leigh for 40 years. “Aggregation? It's a product of market mechanisms. If the market controls fisheries access it will go to those who control capital. That process hasn't finished yet”. So aggregation of quota by big companies had little effect on smaller companies such as Leigh Fisheries. He said:

If you've got quota and are fishing you've got quota and are fishing! If you sell out it doesn't matter who you sell to. The existing operators are not affected [by aggregation]. That's the way it's always been here; ding dong carry on (Leigh Fisheries spokesman).

To maintain this position Leigh Fisheries:

[B]elieved that the company should purchase quota to help subsidise the fishermen with their quota so there was a regime of borrowing money and going out there and purchasing quota. In the early middle 90s one of our share holders – he owned Coromandel Fisheries – which he sold to Sanford and that quota came to Leigh Fisheries so what Leigh Fisheries has [now in 2007] is 450 tonne in its own name in snapper and a 105 tonne from Coromandel which is a 50/50 partnership (Barry Torkington).

On Waiheke, one of those who saw the demise of the Co-op commented to the effect that the younger fishermen started selling quota to Fletchers to get cash and within 18 months the Co-op died. The young people and deckies needed money to do up the boats – they were just old wooden planked boats. The companies, Fletchers and Moana, offered big money and promised locals they would lease back at a reasonable price. He felt they even lied. But then, when the fishermen leased, locals got so little that quite a few left. During the good times they got double \$13 or \$14 /kg for snapper but most of the time only \$5 /kg and paid \$2 /kg to lease. The Co-op was fine but because it had to be self sustaining it had to charge for bait and ice leaving just \$1 /kg so it “was down” from there. “A big shame” (Informant 11). The Co-op did what it could but: “the big worry at that time was of the big companies being able to get all of the quota and the little fellow being pushed out” (Informant 44).

Another Waiheke fisherman drew attention to the different attitudes between companies:

Fletchers bought all those companies. Then the QMS came in suddenly. They seemed to have inside information. Took over JBL and the company in Gisborne and others around the coast and all got quota. Then they weren't in for long. Can't get over it. They had the inside word this was going to happen. No one else knew about it they bought the companies. ... [They didn't] see the guys who'd work hard – they should have. [They] were burglars [poachers but] Sanford, deserved everything they got – they had a history of fishing [120 years] and deserved [the quota]... There should have been an enquiry (Informant 18).

I had believed that since the QMS arose out of the same neo-liberal perspective that underpinned the corporates and corporatisation and consequently matched corporate styles of operation it facilitated their gaining control of access to the fisheries. They had scientists, accountants, and lawyers familiar with and oriented to the complexities of finance, commerce and regulation. The fishermen, on the

other hand, did not generally have that interest or expertise. I felt the QMS had been designed for the corporates not the fishermen.

Peter Stevens, previously a fisherman, President of the Federation and significant architect of the QMS, refuted this vehemently: “No there were never these intentions but what I'm trying to say here – there's these human nature factors that create the inevitability. It was never done by intention. ... [Aggregation] was always going to happen.” It was accelerated by an oversight. Fishermen were told quota was equity for borrowing but the banks disagreed. One of the penalties [for fishing offenses] was confiscating quota that then reverted to the Crown so banks would not lend on something they had no legal hold over. [He] wanted penalties to be fines commensurate with the offence or gear or boat confiscations but wasn't listened to and the industry wasn't supportive (Peter Stevens).

The communities were preoccupied with other restructuring including the Local Government Act and so in all probability most didn't even consider purchasing quota. Consequently they failed to ensure the availability of livelihoods for their fishermen and fresh locally caught commercial fish for their members.

CONCLUSION

During the transition and the early years there were mixed perceptions of the QMS both within and between the different components. While the ideologues in MAF were fully supportive, many of the operational, particularly front-line staff closer to fishermen and their communities had serious reservations. The companies saw the opportunity to secure their access to the fish by buying quota and thereby having more control in supplying the market.

For local fishermen the transition meant the complexity of another bureaucratic change from the controlled fishery to the QMS and uncertainty from new rules, regulations and processes. It meant that the ethos changed from fishing as a lifestyle, or vocation; a change from the flexibility and relationship, supporting their community and Co-op to business transactions where they fed product into a supply chain over which they had no control. Their response varied. Reporting requirements and other restrictions compounded paperwork and for some increased the incentive to lease or sell their quota and “get out” with a “nest egg” and do other things. Others remained fishing and either sold their quota but leased

it back on the promise fishing would continue as before or, particularly the more business minded, came to grips with the system, retained ownership of their quota or bought more and continued fishing. Those leasing quota, especially from the companies, were obligated to sell them their catch so lost the previous flexibility to sell in the community. With the reduction in the number of quota owners, fishing, communities that weren't the base for fishing companies lost livelihoods for their members and the basic food and nutrition that had been provided by fresh locally caught fish.

Chapter 7: QMS Now

The preceding Chapter demonstrated, the 'immediate' or transitional impact of the QMS implementation resulted in the aggregation of quota to larger companies, primarily through their realising quota ownership gave control over access to fish and fishermen taking the wind-fall gains by selling the newly acquired paper right. This was augmented by attrition of those who did not sell immediately. Significantly, both the Waiheke co-op and the Waiheke fishing fleet disappeared leaving lingering social implications and residual feelings of anger and distrust. At Leigh the fleet and Leigh Fisheries, now a company expanded into an international conglomerate and survived. Coromandel was somewhere in between, having lost its fish processing plant and many of its fishermen. The focus in this chapter is on the present and more recent past - approximately twenty years after the introduction of the QMS and twenty- six after the exclusion regulations. This chapter shows the ethos of Coromandel fishermen facing the new regime and difficulties servicing distant factories, of Leigh and implications of the QMS for a community company and the community, particularly the fish shops. This Chapter, therefore, indicates the change in ethos and social implications from before the QMS where fishermen dealt primarily with the fishing occupation, their buyers on a relatively personal level and the community to the more stringent and bureaucratic under the QMS.

FISHERMEN

Waiheke



Figure 16: Remnants of the Waiheke longline fleet (2009)

Commercial fishing continued on Waiheke for a while after the introduction of the QMS but reporting and paperwork involved had profound implications. The need

for certificates and bureaucratic requirements selected for people with a different ideology. The livelihood was no longer available to those just interested and capable in boat handling and fishing but meant additional ability to cope with clerical and bureaucratic standards was also needed.

One of those affected said:

I disagree with the paper work, myself. To a certain extent the paper work's good but I disagree with the certificates that you need to be on the water to catch fish because in my opinion ... Some of the best fishermen; that's all they want to do. They don't need a piece of paper to say: "I got a ticket to catch fish." They are some of the best fishermen around and that's gone! It's taken away from them - completely. Those people might not have been any good at school. They might have dropped school days and gone fishing instead of going to school but they were the 'bone fide' people in the fishing industry. They are the ones that should have been helped - [instead of] these university delinquents - take away the electronic equipment and they're stuffed. That's what they are. I'm no good at school. Good thing I went fishing in the early days I suppose. But everybody's got something good about them and the fishing in the old days was one of those things. You could pick it up and catch fish - you could do all right (Informant 7).

Fortunately for some their wife's role could expand to cope with the new requirements.

Me - I hate the bookwork. I don't like pens and I don't like paper. I'm lucky because I come home every night and catch landing log's an easy thing to fill out. My wife does all that - does the whole lot. ... We've never been in trouble with that because my wife's kept up with the new regime and all that. ... It is a very small operation. So there wasn't a lot of paper work but you still needed someone. My wife's worked as a secretary when she first left school so she cottoned on to this sort of stuff pretty quickly so it was pretty easy. ... People who had bigger boats and can catch by-catch - you get stung if you bring back your by-catch. It could become very very complicated. Yep - you need to be a full time secretary and probably it has taken its toll on marriages as well (Informant 7).

The need for quota and bureaucracy meant loss of the old ethos whereby a fishermen could meet local needs such as the classic case with the Onetangi Hotel on Waiheke where:

[T]he 'old man' used to supply all the fish down there. He supplied ... [the hotel] from day dot until it ended. You could sell fish to anyone - you liked! And in effect there wasn't as much black marketing going on either - in those days you could go around and make a living off fishing by

selling to the community. But all that's been denied now. The fisheries quota system has stopped that and very successfully too. They've done 110%. They've killed it (Informant 7).

On Waiheke the QMS also altered family dynamics. Where previously fishing had been

from father to son. And that's probably the most important thing in the fisheries. And probably the last most important thing - there are no more father and sons which has destroyed the fishing rights of individuals. (T)he fishing is good, the resource is good but the social part of it - with families like myself there's no one else to follow up because there's been too many restrictions put on the fishing. So there are no more fathers and sons to come any more. Basically that's what the system has done - it's destroyed community (Informant 7).

This certainly applies to ACE dependent fishermen although children or relations of the few who keep their quota may still have the option of following the family tradition and becoming fishermen (e.g. Wharf fisherman, *Surf and Turf*, Country Calendar, TV1, 27 August 2006).

Coromandel

Unlike Waiheke, some fishermen and boats are still working from Coromandel (e.g. The *Gay Dolphin*, the *Vampire* and the *Nadgee* (See Figure 17) all Danish seiners. A few others go out occasionally but it was a striking comparison with before the QMS:

It's not far off a dead port really as compared with what it used to be say in the 70s and 80s. There's really only two longliners working. One of them's got this boat ... and it's just a bloody rust bucket. Like it's because he can't afford to maintain it and is probably slowly going bust. There's that other chap - he's a single guy and he's got no fixed abode so he lives on his boat so he gets by like that because his outgoings aren't all that big. He's got no family to keep or anything. Those are the only two longliners. There's three seiners here at the wharf that haven't moved for years, one of them *Boy Roel* for about 15 years. ... The *Kia Toa* here it's been here for about 5 years for sale. He (the owner-operator) even tried to give it away at one part of it and nobody wanted it. It's down to about \$10,000. There's the *Sea Reaper* down there. I don't know whether that will ever go again. ... Sometimes the *Eight Dollars* works out of here and sometimes he works out of Mangonui (Informant 20).



Figure 17: Nadgee, Danish seiner, one of a handful of Coromandel boats still operating.

One of the fishermen told me that the companies paid the fishermen a pittance so he was not earning enough and is finding it difficult to keep up the maintenance on the boat. The fleet is aging. It is heart breaking because he feels it is deliberate. He doesn't get enough return to maintain his boat and since the introduction of the QMS a lot of good fishermen have gone. More positively, the “cowboys,” those just in it for the money or with a liberal disregard for regulations, were weeded out or have changed but it will probably also put him out in a few years. He will have to tie up but he likes the lifestyle. He commented that there were no new boats coming in and no significant “young guns” (ambitious new entrants). He is one of the younger skippers and it had always been his dream to have a boat - but now his family doesn't make a living out of it. In fact the only reason he can keep it running is because his wife works and so subsidises the operation (Informant 21b) so essentially they kept fishing for the lifestyle.

These boats used jetties attached to the Coromandel wharf but there was at least one fishing boat, a longliner, *Tamure* that uses a mud berth in the river that reportedly (Informant 20) hardly ever goes out.

While commercial fishing from Coromandel might be only marginal now, the industry is still hanging on but the boats were increasing in size (See Box 12).

Box 12: Increasing size of fishing vessels

There's always a big turnover of fishermen but there always seem to be people who want to have a go. That's what I've noticed. I've also noticed that in the last couple of years boats are getting bigger. ... This is a small boat now [about 40 feet, 12.2 metres] - at one time this was an average sized boat. They're getting like 60 footers [18.3 metres] now to do the same method of fishing (Danish seining) we do. That's a bit of a worry for people like me. Because it's all pressure (Informant 20).

Because the quota was such an asset they've done quite nicely out of it so it's only really been the few deckhands that have tried to carry on in the system afterwards - like a young farmer. Now try and get onto a farm with the huge cost of the farm - it's just about impossible. And that's really what it did (Informant 31).

Implications of Quota

Many fishermen in Coromandel kept their quota but some leased some or all of it out and developed other occupations such as mussel or oyster farms, building or timber operations. Even here ACE dependent fishermen often found getting it difficult to get the ACE they needed. One stated that getting the first tonne was difficult when he wanted to land fish to some factories, like the Auckland Fish Market, which leased snapper quota on a tonne for tonne basis.

When there's hardly any in private hands. You know you ring around people to try and get some but it's already gone. Not many people ... because most of them have sold it. So to get any reciprocal you go to a factory - well it's difficult" (Informant 20).

[Snapper] quota is very nearly all held by fishing companies and they lease nearly all the quota that is leased around the place and they ...control ... the fishermen. They allocate what they feel like. Tell the fishermen what they are going to catch ... then they get it or they may not - tie the boat up - for a couple of months (Informant 35).

Sometimes the factory will have a bit of extra snapper ... they cover me for other [bycatch] species anyway. So I'm still reliant on them. That's the only sad part about it. This game here - you sell - you're self employed but you're still working for the MAN - you know what I mean? They're still there and you're at the mercy of all of them. It's certainly not what it used to be. They don't sort of hassle me that much because the boat's mine. ... I've seen ... [new fishermen] come and go into the street now and they got packages [of ACE for target and bycatch species] - all the packages off these big companies. Probably for the first year and it

sounds good - looks good and everything. Then the reality sets in - everything changes - legislation and everything else (Informant 21).

Yet from the perspective of those fishermen who still have quota to lease out it provided as good a return as fishing without the costs. This also meant they were reluctant to return to fishing even if they wanted to for emotional reasons.

Yes I lease it. I've still got the boat as well. The quotas worth just about as much to lease as the fish is to catch that means ... [it's] a 50 per cent cost. Catching fish is just occupational therapy - it's just meager living. You find that if you are leasing in quota for fishing all you can pay for is monthly [expenses]. ... I'm not getting any money for what I am doing - it's just occupational therapy too. I'd go back to [fishing] it, but the balance changed (Informant 35).

Since another fisherman's boat was mortgaged he couldn't give his quota to his son, or indeed to any other new entrant. The cost of leasing was high and since the companies own virtually all the quota he believed that soon there would only be about five [working fishermen] there was no future for the small fisherman (Informal Discussion Coromandel Pub 30 September 2006).

Fishermen had become contractors and, like many others are working on a subsistence level; “on the very bare minimum where it is possible to operate ... and most of them will go bankrupt in the process. Most ... will finish up putting about 20 or 30 years of life in and being bankrupt at the end of it as the millions of dollars worth of [boat and] gear that they have had to buy [become obsolete]” (Informant 35). So on retirement fishermen are unable to retrieve much, if any, of the capital they have sunk into their operation and only what little savings they've managed from a financially marginal occupation.

The need for quota [ACE], more rigid accountability and being unable to supply food means the occupational ethos is considerably more restrictive, individualising and straining social ties with the family and community.

Crew

When quota was sold crew missed out. For casual crew, particularly those still young and single or those who moved from boat and job to job, losing a particular berth was possibly no big deal. Generally, fewer boats meant berths became fewer so jobs afloat and entree to commercial fishing harder to find. Fisheries were not the only industry being restructured, so it also meant outdoor employment was

harder and harder to find and demanded a change in work lifestyle. It certainly made getting into commercial fishing considerably more expensive and more difficult. For those who were loyal to a boat or skipper and those who aspired to become skippers, the loss was severe.

Crew lost out. “Well they did eh. It wasn't their quota. I guess the lucky ones had a captain who said: 'Well we'll keep our quota and we'll catch it'. But there weren't too many of those” (Informant 34).

The loss of boats and quota put additional pressure on those married or with young families and the impact on the community was significant:

... these boats had a crew. They had ... had probably a crew of 2 or 3 and they all had families here. They would all have been part of a community where they belong to a committee. Their children would have gone to school and to say that it wouldn't have affected Coromandel wouldn't have been very accurate. I would say that it would have ... [though] I don't think you would say it would be a profound effect. Economically and socially we did see that ... a lot of good people left and with that in your small communities is never a good thing because ... at that point in time there was nothing to replace what was happening [especially for crew]. We had the forestry but that was in its infancy and of course once that's planted and the trees are growing and the prunings done you just got to wait for another 30 years for something to happen. ... In all honesty it would have socially and economically... it would have been a dent in Coromandel's economy - for sure (Informant 34).

It was not easy even with good loyal crew. One fisherman had his wife crew for him and kept additional expenses to a minimum but it was difficult and less profitable than 8-5 jobs on shore but “it's a lifestyle thing. I guess it's something you adapt to. It's probably not good. You've got to have an understanding wife. ... You're not away from home so much. I had little kids with me. Their grandmother looked after them a lot as well” (Informant 20).

Despite lower financial returns working the boat together at that stage of the relationship was fulfilling but he considered that now it is even tougher on families and relationships with more stress on maintaining economic viability. At least one informant could provide work for his son on his boat, but urged him to look for another, better income position.

Well I pay my guys 15 per cent. ... [of] what I get paid for the fish value - without the lease. I don't take out any fuel or ice or stores or anything - I

pay him straight off the top 15 per cent. He probably makes about twelve grand a year gross. No, it's terrible. ... it's still bloody poor money eh (Informant 20)!

Crew was hard to find so I assumed those available would be those really keen on making a career of fishing but: "No basically you get all the 'down and outers', the drunks and druggies - those who don't want a proper job; some of them on the dole kind of thing". It meant there would be lot of turnover which didn't help running an efficient happy vessel.

He was pessimistic about the future and arguably the rigidity of the QMS added to the difficulty. Often crew needed to be fishing part-time and also working part-time at something else.

Sandra Watson having crewed on a Danish seiner, a scallop boat and mussel barges attested to the crew perspective:

They work hard. People need to get away from this attitude "Wow it's the lifestyle - let them enjoy doing it". But that's not how it should be - people should get paid for a decent day's work and those guys work really hard. ... We worked hard all right and you've got to put up with the weather - the rough seas and the pounding coming in. It is quite a good life for people that like the sea and I'm one that does like it. But why should you be penalised for doing a job you enjoy and get very little for it? (Sandra Watson).

Relationships Government Departments (MFish / MOT)

As shown by reporting requirements, under the QMS fishermen have a much more stringent relationship with MFish and other government agencies such as the Ministry of Transport (MOT) than they had previously. Reporting requirements are strict and MFish compliance is severe. One fisherman, for example, said he

was hammered for \$400". [He'd] always been legal and had only ever had a parking ticket but just after [he'd] bought the boat he was fined for taking three fish home for his family to eat. There was no warning. They ruled by fear. They had too much power - and "behaved like storm troopers. ... So everyone is playing by the rules. If there is a black market around ... [he] doesn't know about it. No one is saying anything so if there is then they are keeping it very close (Informant 21b).

The QMS had brought a change in fishing culture that affected not only the fishermen but also their families and food availability. Loss of 'home freight', a regular supply of fresh fish for a healthy diet, meant money was the only tangible

compensation for the job's demands on the family and this was generally marginal for ACE-dependent fishermen. The QMS had eliminated such non-economic 'perks' and this was reinforced by stories of what happened in other communities. A Coromandel Community Board member told, for example, how at Kawhia (an isolated west coast North Island fishing community) a fisherman was heavily penalised for eating three dog fish (by catch) when the compliance officer saw the frames. Such complexity and accountability fueled animosity toward MFish (Boxes: 13,16).

It was a common refrain in the industry: fishermen, particularly coastal and small-scale just want to fish. They're not businessmen, they don't want to be filling out returns and doing paperwork. Fishermen agreed that there should be rules: "There have to be rules but they don't have to be over the top" (Informant 33).

Ministry officials do not consider the reporting "a big deal, but recognise that fishermen do not share their view and may make the mistake of relying on their recollection the following day if they come in tired from fishing" (Neil McDonald)

Box 13: MFish Compliance Requirements

[The QMS was] probably good for fishermen who understand finance and business and can do that ... (but) there's other fishermen too. All he wanted to do was fish and the paper work trail for some of them was a real stumbling block. They've come in and they've had MAF sitting on the wharf when they come in: "Oh you haven't filled in your book tonight."

"Well it was blowing 30kts and my hands were wet and the paperwork got wet, you know."

"Oh not good enough!"

The MAF crowd created a lot of animosity with those sort of tactics (Ian Strongman).

For some fishermen reporting and paperwork were more routine:

I can handle it easy enough. ... Yeah, I do the monthly returns on the internet. Only because I know they get there and there's a \$400 or \$500 fine if you don't get it in by the 15th of the month. Then after, if you don't get it in ... it's an \$800 fine. ... I know heaps of guys that have been fined. They don't show any mercy. I think it's just a revenue gathering exercise. If they basically don't keep on top of you ... I get it [inspected] once a year - basically once a year (Informant 20).

In addition to MFish the MOT was also much more involved since the introduction of the QMS. Fishing vessels had to pass annual surveys. While these

were to ensure safety, fishermen found them onerous both in terms of costs which could amount to \$30-\$40,000 to get a small local boat up to standard and in terms of the 'agro' and compulsion involved. Fishermen's perspective was "nobody pays you for painting your own boat. If you're not pulling fish out - no pay. Then there is ACE, levies for [he listed several] and payments. ... People are too greedy and want too much for ACE. They have forgotten what it's like to be a fisherman (Informal). Consequently there was considerable animosity toward the Ministry of Transport surveyor

[The surveyor] knows that if we see him first ...[all the fishermen] just drive off so he's left here on his own. So he generally hides over there by the fish factory and waits until the fisherman stops then he drives down. He's usually got a raincoat on. Or he walks down and suddenly he'll peel his raincoat off and there he is large as life in his white overalls. He's got you then (Informant 20).

The fishermen's resistance, whether from either or both marginal economic circumstance or from resentment at being controlled adds to the compliance cost, further aggravates the situation.

Relationships with the Companies

As the companies had the quota and exported most of their fish there was little available for the community and no Coromandel fresh fish shop to sell them (although a smoke shop had recently opened, due perhaps to the tourism industry and brought most of its fish in from outside the town. The "*Vampire* and the *Gay Dolphin* fish for OPC in Whitianga so some of your fish go to Whitianga and then get distributed up from OPC" (Informant 20).

The fishermen were prepared to do what was necessary but say: "the companies have got too much monopoly and too much control. It's not a partnership". The QMS was empowering the companies, not the fishermen and has flow on effects for the environment since decisions were driven by short-term economics not long-term awareness of marine ecology. With OPC and Moana, for example, fishermen felt they had to be careful not to "rock the boat" and keep them happy or they'll say: "OK you can fish elsewhere". The fishermen don't have a contract so if there's a problem or the fisherman 'sounds off' it's "good bye" and there's no quota. He can't fish so had to get quota from another company but the implication

was that there was virtually none available elsewhere. (Coromandel Field Trip 2006)

Since virtually all the quota for lease is in the hands of the corporates, they dictate where to fish and what type of fish the fishermen are allowed to catch driving some to consider getting out of the fishery altogether (Informant 35 and Informal). One fisherman with 30 years as a skipper and an engineer, estimated when downtime was considered he gets \$5 an hour longlining despite working sometimes from 5am to 11pm (Informal).

Others commented that they were now just getting \$1.50 / kg whereas they know the companies sell fish for up to \$30/kg retail locally and won't say how much they get overseas but presumably it was a lot more (Informal). Unlike the more openly managed Co-ops of the past, the companies “keep us pretty much in the dark over what they get for fish overseas” (Informant 20). Landed price for snapper varied. Some fishermen said they got maybe \$4.00 (/kg), others \$3.50 or only \$3.00 but they didn't know what the company gets because there was no disclosure. They saw the retail price (maybe as much as \$30 / kg for snapper) and felt the discrepancy was too high. Company profits and the extra costs of the commodity chain meant the cost to the consumer could be ten or more times what the fisherman received (Coromandel Field Trip 2006).

[We] really feel hurt when they see the price of fish in the supermarkets. When we see the gurnard for \$8 or 9 or 10 a kilo and we're getting like 0.20 or 0.30 or 0.40 cents for it. Really it hurts - eh. Because we know we're getting blatantly robbed and nothing we can do about it. What they're basically doing is they are [basically] saying that if you don't give us the gurnard - for nothing - then we're not going to give you snapper quota. ... It's blackmail really. So there's not much money in the snapper and there's nothing in the gurnard and flounder. It's only the John dory that really pays anything and I suspect that they - even - they're most probably robbing us big time on that as well. ... all the other blokes that I talk to about it they all feel the same way I do. Powerless” (Informant 20)!

Local environmental issues also influenced the options. The tidal nature of the Coromandel wharf meant that fishermen had to time berthing and departing right. The QMS had perpetuated if not exacerbated the dependence of fishermen on the companies (See: Stuster 1980).

Box 14: Under the Thumb

When I steam back from Auckland - you know an hour or two hours after the tide and I can't get back to the wharf so I've got to sit out there all day until the next tide. That kind of thing. ... It's an extra day basically on top of your trip. ... That's the reason why I changed - why I wanted to fish for OPC - because I could park right here and unload my bins straight onto the jetty and slide them across and straight into the truck and it was all good but at the end of the day - they were a bit cunning. They took me on when the ... other boat had broken down but when those other people came back suddenly they said, "Oh we don't need any fish off you this week." Then the next week would come, "Oh we've got two seiners already unloading this week. We don't really need any fish off you." Then after the third week I told them to get f_____d because I couldn't operate that way. So I got on the phone. Actually I got on the phone first to make sure that I could still have a placement at Leigh. Here's the other thing that makes it more difficult is that the factories don't like you fishing for other people, whether they can accommodate you or not. Basically they think they own you. If you start giving fish elsewhere they'll threaten to sack you and there's nothing you can really do. You've got to toe the line otherwise you've got no quota. ... They've got us under the thumb basically (Informant 20).

In response to my suggestion that fishermen were tied to companies because they had their capital in their boats and had to keep earning, one fisherman responded

[Quota owning companies] control how much we pay for the lease. How much lease they'll give us. How much they'll pay us for the fish once it's caught. When to go out. ... [At the height of summer] ... Sometimes they even try to tell us what size fish to catch and what colour. ... Sometimes they'll even tell you not to go because the market's flooded. Through the rest of the year it's not so bad but it's probably about three months where they dictate the terms 'big time' (Informant 20).

LEIGH

Leigh Fisheries with the fish factory and being by far the biggest employer in the town, ensures that Leigh was both a community of place and still very much location for a vibrant fisheries community of occupation (See Figures 18, 19, 20). Originally, the factory was established and owned by share holder longliners (Informant 20). Before the QMS, Leigh Fisheries had been a co-operative. Some of the directors were fishermen then and although retired now, still lived locally so there were still vestiges of fish tradition and community commitment in an otherwise capitalistic enterprise. An informant who had lived on Waiheke and

been involved with the Co-op, but now was involved in fishing in Leigh so knew both communities suggested: “The people up at Leigh Fish might be worth while talking to because they look at things as a real community up at Leigh it's very tight in that area” (Informant 3).



Figure 18: Leigh now (December 2006). Commercial FV converted for charter alongside *Happy 1*, a trawler converted to a longliner.

Leigh Fishing Fleet: Fishermen’s perspective

In the mid 90s “25 boats work out of Leigh,”(Leigh Fisheries spokesperson.) In the mid-90s I saw 21 in port including *Reward* and *Southwind*¹¹³, mostly longliners but one trawler, one Danish seiner and *Beverly S* gearing up with a big monofil reel for surface longlining (Northland Fish Tour). Fishermen then were moving into better longliners - purpose built launches *Tungsten*, for example (See Figure 19) and the Torkington brothers each built new fishing boats. The more economically successful fishermen were modernising. Probably none of the old wooden launches such as used from Waiheke survive commercially. Most fishing vessels are purpose built and except for a few vintage enthusiasts (e.g. FV *Margaret* etc) most are steel or fiberglass.

¹¹³ Boats that were in the Viaduct during my Viaduct research.



Figure 19: Tungsten, one of the first purpose built, then new, longliners in the Viaduct (1982) now fishing into Leigh.



Figure 20: Purpose built longliner (middle vessel) in Leigh (1992)

Unlike Waiheke some fishermen still owned quota and their boats and were expanding their operations. One such fisherman, one of the directors of the company, fished both his and also company quota as well (Informant 3). Other, particularly younger, fishermen were not so fortunate and one had sold his quota

to build a new larger vessel so now leases ACE. With quota he had access.

Without his own quota, access is controlled by the company.

But this is not the full story and there are also tensions and conflicts in Leigh.

Now some of the fishermen were more marginal so the fleet operating out of Leigh has declined and Leigh Fisheries has to source fish from much further afield (e.g. Coromandel). One boat had been “up north” for 5 weeks and was just back in Leigh. The skipper felt there was good fishing up north and a sense of community - cooperation and assistance not obvious in Leigh. “There is a tall poppy syndrome in Leigh so no one likes to get too big. The fishing is not so good here at present” (Leigh Kliss trip 13-15 December 2006).

Yet from elsewhere, fishermen from Coromandel, for example, felt that some companies, Leigh Fisheries particularly, gave them a better deal, while other companies didn't have the capacity to handle all the fish they could land. Despite the extra distance involved, at least one Coromandel fisherman was happy to supply Leigh Fisheries. The company had been good - paid a good price and talked to the fishermen. All the fishermen had wanted to work for them. Leigh Fisheries did well, but he thought they expanded too fast and were now the same as the other companies. They didn't pay as well and didn't talk to the fishermen, unless they wanted fish on Christmas day; “They'd ring you up then alright” (Coromandel Field Trip).

In Leigh, Greg Hayes said:

[T]he fishing for Leigh Fisheries has made a difference. Despite the unreliability like - I've fished for Sanford's - cut me quota just like that - no morality within the industry there - Moana [Moana Pacific] who I've fished for - they weren't too bad but I was still very limited [in terms of getting quota] on the snapper and the other species. I wasn't getting a good price... but I was fortunate to get into Leigh Fisheries... I enjoy it more. Leigh keep the other guys fairly honest. They're a good company. I really appreciate them. Best company I've ever fished for by a long shot and they say, “Man that was good fish. Man that was really good. Bring me in more like that” - you know? They'd tell me it was gorgeous.

All I've been used to over the years has been abuse [by] fishing companies. Now you're telling me the fish is good. Man that delights me to hear that. That's wonderful. I'll go out and get you even better fish, you know. To be told and encouraged like that and told you've done a good

job. That's Leigh - you know - quite personal. You know they ring us up every day (Greg Hayes).

The relationship with the company may be friendlier and the financial return better than from other companies but it is still marginal. In casual conversation a fisherman told me:

Last winter there were only 3 or 4 longliners operating from Leigh - few owned quota. The trawlers and seiners get the same as the longliners - they iki jimi if they are still alive and slurry their fish. So longliners no longer get a premium. There are theories about longlining. Sanford, for example, set 9000 hooks per day from their 'big boats' - but they are only doing a few days per week now since the fish aren't there. He on the other hand sets only 2,000 /day" (Leigh Kliss trip 13-15 December 2006).

Even so as a result of the QMS the costs of fishing had increased considerably and the financial returns decreased

Trawlers and seiners are improving quality, but still not to that of good longline caught snapper. However, the iki jimi market has suffered from competition by Japanese cultured snapper and the market no longer has the same high value return. One longliner at least "couldn't even get crews to run his boats. In the wintertime anyway they were tied up because nobody would run them for him. There was so little in it" (Informant 20). Leigh's markets include chilled fish flown to Australia, Europe and the USA.

Even before the QMS there were gear conflicts (See Duncan, L 1982). Under the QMS, they were to be resolved by market forces rather than it being the responsibility of MAF. When the QMS was introduced the official attitude seemed to be to leave the mix as previously, leaving it to market forces to resolve. In the Gulf, the issue was between the more capital and fuel intensive trawlers providing fewer jobs and catching considerably more, but lower quality fish, versus the labour intensive longliners catching higher quality fish, with the Danish seiners occupying an intermediate position. Now, even with the QMS there are, however, still gear conflicts, especially between trawlers and longliners (See Box 15).

Box 15: Conflicts Between Trawlers and Longliners

The wife of a fisherman and café owner, Sarah Davies said:

It's hard, I think, particularly with the quota holders and the way fisheries are being run now. I think they're just trying to push out the smaller boats and get the 'big boats' back in there basically ... the trawlers and things which are wiping out everything. We sit and watch them and they'd be right in Mathieson's Bay [just south of Leigh]. They're right in close - they shouldn't be allowed in there. And then you can go out on your longliner and set a line one day get 15 or 20 bins - go there the next day and get 2 bins because you see that the seine boats go there.

They shouldn't be allowed in that close but I think that's what the Fisheries want now because they hold more of the quota than anybody else. For us to buy quota it's just ridiculous - unless you've got a spare \$100,000 or whatever it is - who has these days? (Sarah Davis).

Crew

In contrast to the generally depressing situation at Coromandel, fishermen in Leigh were more optimistic about the future. One young deckie, not long out of school, told me that he had been working on a dairy farm and earned in 14 days what he gets for four days fishing and the fishing was much more interesting. Even so finding good crew was an ongoing problem. "Of course and keeping them. It's an art in what they're doing," (Greg Bishop). Girlfriends or wives certainly helped as relationships developed or larger economic opportunities beckoned.

It meant that there were opportunities for youth who were keen but even then often it didn't work out since sea conditions, the routines and the reality of commercial fishing were not always what aspirants from non-fishing families imagined. While the economics worked for some, the uncertainties and reduced share meant fewer were attracted.

Peter Stevens, former secretary of the Federation, from a national perspective in referring to the issue of companies wanting to use foreign crew provided the context:

They [companies] just can't get Kiwis. They are scared to advertise in the papers because someone comes along and they won't take him because they're lazy, drunk, doped out or just bloody mindless - they end up in trouble because they won't employ them. So they won't take that risk.

Anyone that WINZ¹¹⁴ sends is useless. They only go for the job because if they don't go they don't get the dole. They don't want you to employ them. They want you to sign: "Sorry I can't employ you" They want that to happen so they can go back to WINZ and say, "Sorry I can't get a job" so they could stay on the dole. No one's interested - that's a fact (Peter Stevens).

Leigh: Reporting

Like elsewhere the paperwork generated by the QMS is an issue. Every step in the production chain, every transaction has its paper work and opportunities for control. At Leigh, for example, when boats unload they exchange dockets with the truck driver. The usual procedure seemed to be that the truck driver would lower a stack of empty bins and lids onto the deck, then hoist the full bins and the exchange dockets. A former fisherman now driving for Leigh Fisheries said, "we give them 30 [bins for fish] - that's what the bin limit [the amount the company will let them land] is at the moment. We give them 30 empty and whatever bait and pass the docket" (Informant 42). It was the same for the fishermen.

MFish hold everyone in fear ... I cover everything all the time - crossing the 'T's' and dot my 'I's' sort of thing so I don't have a hassle but ... there's so many things to remember and when you're tired! You know - it's hard to remember everything ... It's not just MAF, it's the Maritime Safety and all the safe things you've got to do and compliance everywhere - it's ridiculous. So you know you have to be fairly astute to cover all those things and still be a fisherman. ... So ... you've got to be fairly professional sort of person these days to remain in the industry (Greg Hayes).

Other fishermen I have spoken with from around the country have expressed the same view with the same vehemence (See also: Box 16).

Box 16: Reporting

As reported by Anne Beston, Chris Matich, a 48 year old Kaipara fisherman from Ruawai was so frustrated by new MFish reporting requirements that he was intending to get out of fishing. "Generations of his family have fished from Ruawai at the river mouth. ... By the time he was eight he was running nets out from his father's boat, and by 14 he was fishing down as far as Port Albert. Today he was up at 4am. His brother's going out again

¹¹⁴ Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ), the government social welfare department.

tonight but he stayed home to mow the lawns and think about moving to Australia. He wants to pack it in. Bureaucratic red tape is killing the business for independent operators like him.

“You can't just be a fisherman any more, you have to be an accountant, a lawyer, everything. My wife would leave tomorrow but it's hard to get out, I'll get almost nothing for the money I've invested.” Once he would have missed the family too much, his parents, brothers and cousins scattered throughout the town. “But in the last year or two I've started to get bitter. Three weeks ago we got new books to fill in, you have to say what time you put the first anchor out, what time you put the last one in and what the weather was like at the time. Every single thing.” The average age of a fisherman now is 50, he says. “I haven't heard of anyone taking it on” (Beston 2007).

FLEET

Although not pursued in detail, many informants spoke of their own boat, or particular vessels in the fleet, with considerable affection. It was like my own experience with recreational boaties where there was almost a familial relationship. These particular boats were not just tools of the trade or means of production. They had, valued design features and histories; seemed to have their own personalities and idiosyncrasies so were a source of aesthetic appreciation and even emotional satisfaction. This was by no means universal as, particularly during the Viaduct Research, many informants regarded their boats, like a farmer's ute¹¹⁵, just means to facilitate their occupation. Indeed, I even heard fishermen use terms of approbium for their boat. For many, such as the “new part-timers”, the QMS will not have altered the relationship. For other, more marginal fishermen, like the additional strain on a marriage, the additional expenses make the relationship with the boat tougher.

The cost of ACE has squeezed fishermen's finances and this impacts, often severely on their ability to lavish attention, or even keep up the maintenance on their boats. As Ingram¹¹⁶ states, “unless you own quota it's hard to make a buck”. He noted that in January (2008) “the wharf price for bulk green snapper in Auckland was around [NZ]\$4 to \$4.20 per kilo. The ACE price was \$2 to \$2.20

¹¹⁵ Utility vehicle

¹¹⁶ Editor of *Professional Skipper*, industry observer and recreational fishing advocate.

per kilo, effectively giving the fisherman \$2, out of which he had to go and catch the fish, pay fuel at \$1.26 per kilo, and repair and maintain his boat. ... And yet the housewife was paying nearly \$30 a kilo for skinned and boned snapper in the shops". By mid-April the wharf price had increased to \$7.50 per kilo but the ACE price also increased to \$5.50 per kilo (Ingram 2008 19). Consequently ACE-dependent fishermen are struggling to maintain their boats. They are having to seek alternative livelihoods.

Since the QMS there has been a considerable reduction in the coastal fleet and concomitantly the number of fishermen. Consultants Coriolis note that in the period 1985-2004 "the number of fishing boats declined by 1,191" (Coriolis 2005 12). This has happened partly by attrition. At least one of my informants saw his boat's failing Maritime Safety Survey as inevitable since his operation wasn't paying sufficient to maintain it at the mandatory standard. As fishermen sold their quota the effect has been fewer boats in the coastal fleet and few new additions. As Peter Stevens said "No boats have been built in the last 10-15 years. The only ones that have been built are being built by boat yards because they've got nothing for the staff to do so they are building boats hoping to sell it" (Peter Stevens). Ingram (2004 4-9) however, reviewed one new build and the trade journals note a few others but the fleet is generally aging.

Ingram expanded:

When we look around the current fleet we see tired and inefficient ships by modern standards. ... With this fleet approaching some 30 years comes the cost of increased maintenance, higher fuel consumption and compliance costs. Most of these vessels suffer from decreased engine horse-power, cramped and often damp uncomfortable crew working conditions, tired deck machinery and dated fish handling and storage facilities. While we recognise the dilemma associated with these aged vessels, we have seen very few modern trawlers specifically built for inshore fishing within the last 10 to 15 years" (Ingram 2004 4).

Certainly the old converted launches that were the bulk of the longline fleet in the Hauraki Gulf have gone. Even the boats based at (or near) Leigh are newer purpose-built launches and at least one was launched quite recently. One of the few new purpose-designed and built longliners I saw during my Viaduct research *Tungsten* is now operating into Leigh. The state of some of the boats at

Coromandel, however, support Ingram's views (See Table 3. for trends in vessel numbers in the ports studied).

| | 1980 | Pre-QMS* | Early 1990s* | Now (2006-7) |
|------------|------|----------|--------------|--------------|
| Waiheke | 36 | | 17 | 0 |
| Coromandel | | 49 | 18 | 8 |
| Leigh | | 18 | 20 | 18 |

Table 3. Estimates of Vessel Numbers in Case Study Ports

Notes: Source: 1980 and Now from research notes and informants. “Pre-QMS” and “Early 1990s” from undated databases.

As the boats become unseaworthy and the fishermen go bankrupt, the question is: how will the companies catch their fish? One suggestion is that the big companies are increasingly focusing on the deepwater on the one hand and aquaculture on the other. This might create “space” biophysically and socio-politically for recreational fishers. Alternatively, as may be happening, New Zealand Companies may also use bigger vessels built, bought or chartered for the deepwater fisheries on the coast (See Dixon 2009 9 and Letters to the Editor same issue, 30).

Inevitably, there will be increased gear conflicts as trawlers come inshore at the expense of recreational fishers and longliners, or they will have to fish further afield around the coast.

CHARTER FISHING

After World War when the fairmilies¹¹⁷ and large charter boats operated, “You used to get the bigger boats taking people out and there might be 50 people on it. ... They were charter boats and big ones from Auckland and they used to go out and they used to get off and sell them from the wharf when they got in and so on and all that sort of thing. But it’s all changed now. ... the fishing is getting better. It can’t help but get better. I’m glad they pushed the ‘big boats’ out because that was ruining fish. ...” (Informant 5).

¹¹⁷ A class of ex-naval patrol vessels many of which were converted after World War 2 for civilian use.

Even before the introduction of the QMS there were clashes between charter¹¹⁸ and commercial fishermen. The *Gulf News* (24 October 1980 31, 32) reported that Mr John Appleton, an Auckland charter boat operator asserted: “Commercial fishermen are 'raping' the Hauraki Gulf and slowly destroying an area that has the potential of becoming New Zealand's top tourist attraction.” He claimed: “a fish caught by a tourist from a boat is worth hundreds of dollars more to New Zealand than a fish commercially caught and sold through the export markets in Japan”. Commercial fishermen, however, believed charter fishermen should have to comply with the regulations and reporting regime they did rather than the recreational requirements since they were a commercial operation and also adding pressure on the fish stocks in the Hauraki Gulf.

By the mid 1990s virtually all the quota on Waiheke had been sold. The last few quota owners became charter fishermen (Cox 2001) mainly taking clients around the coast inshore. Charter fishing was one of the few livelihoods available that enabled them to utilise their ecological knowledge, understanding of the species, skills and experience of boat handling, the marine environment in general and the Hauraki Gulf in particular. It was the only livelihood available that offered the satisfactions of 'freedom' and working in the marine environment that had attracted many into commercial fishing in the first place. The only other occupation that didn't involve significant absences from family and community was aquaculture.

Some, including many commercial fishermen, argue that charter fishing operations should have quota since they are utilising the same fish species and commercial fishermen. Their opposition contend that the clients are recreational fishers exercising their entitlements and the charter operation is not fishing but providing a service, the boat, gear and expertise (Rennie et al 2007 467)

A random sample of charter boat companies gives an indication of the number in the Hauraki Gulf. The September 2007 edition of the popular fishing magazine *New Zealand Fishing News* has 57 classified advertisements for Charter fishing

¹¹⁸ Charter fishermen are those who use their boats and possibly gear to take individuals or parties recreational fishing.

companies operating from ports within the Hauraki Gulf, most with only one boat but a few had two. None of the boats shown were the old style of longliners used by the Waiheke fishermen. Only one still carried a commercial fishing registration number, a couple appeared to be conversions from the older Danish seine or trawlers although a few were the same style as the newer aluminium, planing deepwater longliners.

The two of the three charter operators from Waiheke were not listed and there were none from Thames so this number is at best only an indication of the popularity of charter fishing and the number of boats involved¹¹⁹.

In contrast to the earlier experience of Waiheke fishermen, the QMS is credited as resulting in more fish for charter fishers (Cox 2001 5). Like many of the previous commercial fishing operations charter fishing provides work for the skippers' wives. With the possible exception of Doolittle Charters, the fishermen's wives run the "on shore part of the operation" (Cox 2001 6), taking bookings and organising web pages.

One of those commercial fishermen who took up chartering provided perspective:

The fishing in between before the quota system was introduced and the fishing today is that it only benefits one person - one ... [industry] - really and that's the growth of tourism. It's a hot tourism thing for catching fish. The commercial fishing sector's gone by the board. Probably more money's being made out of doing tourism than doing fishing - than is in the catching power of fish commercially, maybe.

I only need to catch nine fish per person per day (Recreational fish limits) instead of 100 a night sort of thing, you know. So that's better. As far as my business goes those nine fish can be selected per person. So we have a standard length of fish to take on board the boat if the fishing's hard. Apart from that they're all pretty good-sized fish. So we can select and put them back in the water quickly so there's less fish coming out of the water. ... I'm actually catching more fish on my charters than I am commercial fishing because I'm allowed to. I'm allowed to - that's the silly thing (Informant 7).

He advertised locally and most of his clientele were New Zealanders, some of them regulars whose emphasis is on getting together with the 'boys' (Informant 7).

¹¹⁹ See also Rennie et al 2007 on problems of gathering data for the charter fleet

Another charter fisherman spoke of the satisfactions of still working on the water and facilitating necessary nutrition:

It's endlessly fascinating, you know, to me anyway, yeah. And I get a satisfaction out of ... getting a few fish for people, taking people out. When I was fishing I used to think it was providing fish, providing food for people. It's a good thing to do. Yes. I still think (that) when I take people out because they are mostly [Pacific] Islanders. Their main diet is fish so I still think it's good when they eat fish because they've got food to take home and put on the table for their families, you know ... they're ... mostly from South Auckland, they're on fairly low wages and, ah, the Islanders' diet's totally different from ours. We eat a lot of meat. You've just got to scrub the meat from their diet and substitute fish because that's what they like. They'll eat fish all the time (Informant 1).

By comparison with the very early days when the fairmilies and large charter boats operated, he felt “the fishing is getting better. It can't help but get better. I'm glad they pushed the big boats out because that was ruining fish. ... You used to get the bigger boats taking people out and there might be 50 people on it. ... They were charter boats and big ones from Auckland and they used to go out and they used to get off and sell them from the wharf when they got in and so on and all that sort of thing. But it's all changed now” (Informant 5). Chartering now?

Everybody goes out and when they are chartering like my son. There's two of them on the island doing chartering work. And they are limited. They are only allowed so many fish per person ... they can't go out and flog the (resource) - which is good. I reckon that recreation fishing is ... good for that, so it must be getting better! There's more people coming. More boats certainly (Informant 5).

A retired Fisheries Officer summed up the big picture for Waiheke:

Like it's created a little mini industry -chartering - taking people out fishing, to get their own fresh fish, to do the whole experience so to speak. ... Of course that's one of the attractions of coming to Waiheke - surely - is just to see if you can go out fishing. You just need to look at the boat ramps now and there's certainly quite a few (recreational boats) going out and these hire boats out of Matiatia and other places. They're always chocka and they always seem to be bringing fish in. The amateur situation right throughout fisheries has been quite dramatic. I think when we actually got down to the nitty gritty in the Bay of Plenty it was found that with the quota system in place that in the Bay of Plenty alone there was 800 tonne of snapper caught by amateurs. Now that's a lot of fish (Bill Dumpleton).

RECREATIONAL FISHING

A former Federation fisherman viewing recreational fishing on a national basis, felt that many people became avid supporters of recreational fishermen because they felt they were denied some sort of right by the QMS. As a result they've become a force to be reckoned with and the drivers¹²⁰ of that movement are as commercial as any commercial fisherman" (Informant 14). While some consider the QMS has improved the availability of fish for recreational fishing (Todd Silvester, MFish, pers com May 2006, Informant 8), the commercial fishermen argue that recreational should also be paying for their utilization of marine resources.

Likewise commercial fishermen also argue that recreational fishers should be paying for their utilization of marine resources. Recreational fishing allows those passionate fishermen who sold their quota to still have access to fishing (Informants 10, 26) and they consider this could be a considerable amount of fish. Very roughly to estimate his household's fishing one recreational fisher argued:

4X9s are 36 (fish caught) plus in between. If we know that this house has fished 36-40 fish in the last 2 months that's say in 80 days it's fished it's taken a fish every second day. This household - one household in one street - what the hell's the island fishing? So that's let's say - at that rate this household is pulling 180 fish say 180Kg per household (Informant 46).

The feeling is that with the commercial boats no longer round the island there is more and easier fish for recreational fishers (Informant 15). It is not

too much trouble catching fish - like if I want to catch fish for myself I can usually go out and catch a couple of fish and not come home empty handed although there are times when obviously ... you come home with nothing (Informant 15).

The harbour and marine farms in Coromandel provide alternative opportunities for charter fishermen. The increase in aquaculture since the QMS was introduced, offers 'mussel farm fishing' a form not as readily available from Waiheke. In addition to the typical charter boats barges similar to those that service the mussel farms take larger parties fishing around these marine farms.

¹²⁰ He was referring to manufacturers and suppliers of a considerable variety of gear and support.

Long time residents claim that holiday fishers have given the northern parts of the Peninsula a particularly high level of fishing pressure, resulting in waste as they cannot even give fish away.

At Wyuna Bay, Coromandel Harbour, there have been significant changes in recreational fishing moving from rowing boats in each household to the current (2006) situation of “at least two huge enormous launch fizzaboats ... rigged with great trolling rods” with a significant increase in fishing power in the holiday community (Informant 22a). Another informant familiar with the Colville area commented “The fishing competitions are just devastating. I think they are a lovely concept but we might have to breed fish for those” (Informant 2).

One former Coromandel commercial fisherman sold most of his quota because of his constant uncertainty of further quota cuts and established a mussel farm where fish were easy to catch from the charter boats. When they are working the (mussel) ropes the sea is red with snapper after the little black mussels. That is a problem for him but good for the recreational fishers on the (charter) fishing barges. He likes to see that because they keep the snapper population down - if each take their allowance of nine snapper with 10 - 15 fishers per barge - that helps him (Informant 33). But others are concerned about the effects of local fishing (See Box 17).

Box 17: Recreational Fishing

I am now 50+ and most of my life I've spent sitting on the rocks fishing - well (in) spare time and fishing for food - for fish to eat. Over the years I've found it's got harder and harder to catch fish off the rocks. Basically now you've got to get a boat and go out. Coromandel has the mussel farms that have brought a fair few snapper around but then you get the barges that take out lots of fishing groups – back-to-back groups - who also get a lot of fish. There's about - I don't know how many people go on the barge - maybe 15 - 20 and when they are all bringing in 9 fish each it's quite a large amount of fish. It's quite patchy in Coromandel where I now live. We go out sometimes [by boat] and you've really got to search around the farms to find fish. You know - you can't just guarantee you can go out there and fish - catch a fish now. The chances on a boat are greater than off the rocks but you've got to move round a lot to go from farm to farm (Sandra Watson).

Well the very [Fisheries] Act itself ... [where] the Minister decides basically how much to allocate and then divides it up so straight away there's competition between traditional fishing, recreational fishing and commercial fishing. Commercial fishing you've got

property rights. Māori fishing seem to have traditional rights and recreational fishing just have a bloody strong argument and probably it will be translated into some form of [legislated] rights. ... To protect themselves they simply talk down the TAC. Talk it down, just talk it down while the fishing industry tries to talk it up. ... Nothing to do with looking after fish, I might say (Informant 14).

So under the QMS there is less recreational fish for local people and catching what there is requires a more expensive, more mechanised operation. Fish for subsistence is not so readily available.

A mix of charter fishing boats operate from Leigh, Sandspit and Mangawhai, ports in the vicinity, offering overnight or longer trips out to the islands, Little and Great Barrier, Cuvier, Mercury, Mokuhinaus or the 'Hen and Chicks' or even further afield to the Three Kings with parties ranging from three or four to as many as ten. These were not explored in this research, since the commercial fleet was still of considerable scale compared with the other two communities studied. They probably offer a similar experience to that from Waiheke and Coromandel with the additional opportunity of deeper water fishing.

COMPANIES: LEIGH FISHERIES

Of the three, Leigh is the community studied here where there is still a fishing company operating (See Figure 21). Leigh Fisheries would be the “largest private company left ... involved in the snapper fishery if you take out Moana and Sanford though, the quota they own and control would probably be more than those two companies” (Informant 3)

Market New Zealand’s (n.d.) Company Overview states Leigh Fisheries, under the brand name Lee Fish airfreights premium NZ seafood species daily to overseas markets serviced through subsidiaries in America (Lee Fish USA) and Europe (Lee Fish Europe).

Leigh Fisheries does not own its own boats. Instead it has around 87 contract boats, primarily long-line day boats that fish on its behalf. The livelihood of these independent fishermen depends upon the quality of their product - that is, they don't get paid unless the catch is top quality. ... caught to order so there's no waste and juvenile and older fish are avoided. [The company relies] on excellent relationships and communication between ... the fishers, factory workers, truck drivers, freight forwarders, airlines, importers, customs agents and clients (Market New Zealand).

Even so fleet numbers have declined rapidly compared with 71¹²¹ contract boats supplying the company in 2005 (Seafood NZ 2005 17), they were “down to about 18 out there [Leigh] ... (but) I’ve got 100 boats out there fishing around New Zealand.” (Greg Bishop Leigh Fisheries CEO). Northcote (2005) indicates even with a company as concerned for their fishermen and their employees as Leigh Fisheries, it is difficult for the fisherman:

The challenges faced by fishers that contract to Leigh will mean that many of them will have to decide whether they want in or out of the business. If they stay, Greg [Bishop] says, they'll need to get bigger. ‘In 1986 they could quite comfortably catch 20 tonne a year and live the life of Riley, today they have to catch 100 tonne a year.’ Dave Moore has been working with Leigh for almost 25 years, as a longline fisher and more recently coordinating ... [three] boats, mainly targeting snapper and a mix of other inshore species. He thinks it's as tough in the industry now as it's ever been. ‘My fishers and I have seen drops in income. It's a bit of a catch 22, you can try to increase volumes to maintain your income but you've got to put in more effort for the same money at the end. We have lost relativity’ (Northcote 2005 15).

The company started about 1957¹²² with 90 per cent of the fish caught by Leigh fishermen. It got into the chilled fish around about 1980 exporting predominantly iki snapper to Japan but when the QMS was introduced in 1986 because Leigh Fisheries was a pack house it didn't received quota. Like other New Zealand fishing companies it realised that to ensure access to fish it needed quota and therefore acquired all it could and tendered for orange roughy quota that was then exchanged with Sanford for snapper quota. Subsequently Leigh Fisheries acquired 450 tonne of snapper quota. In addition to quota Leigh Fisheries is approximately worth about \$50 million dollars (Greg Bishop Leigh Fisheries CEO).

¹²¹ Estimates of boat numbers fluctuate widely.

¹²² Leigh Fisheries was incorporated 06 Feb 1958, now has 3 CEOs including Greg Bishop and many but not all shareholders live in the vicinity of Leigh or have names with long association in the district. New Zealand Companies Register, <http://www.business.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/56407> (Accessed 19 September 2010). Company composition and structure is generally outside this research but see Titchener (1981) and Rees (2004; 2006) for details of Sanford, the largest Hauraki Gulf fishing company.



Figure 21: Leigh Fisheries

In 1995, most Leigh fishermen owned their own quota (Northland Tour). Leigh Fisheries is still the major employer in the town and most households were connected directly or indirectly to the company so it means Leigh is a company town. Yarwood (2000) asserted “one in five of the fishing village's population” were employed by Leigh Fisheries about 30 people filleting, sorting and packing (Lee Fish Europe AG). In turn the Leigh Fisheries acknowledges its role in the community. “We are the work force of Leigh. ... for Leigh itself, I have about 33 staff. On top of that there's contracted 10 truck drivers... all the fishermen and all their skippers and all their crews [about 60 fishermen on 30 boats]” (Greg Bishop).

It meant that since the companies, and especially the corporates, bought up virtually all the quota fishermen became dependent on and obligated to quota owners. The companies had to match quota ownership to their markets and therefore market requirements rather than seasonal availability had strong influence on fishing. They therefore said they "farmed" the Gulf by imposing such restrictions as bin limits fish when appropriate for export market, and, sometimes notoriously, told fishermen where to fish and what sizes the market required. Thus

under the QMS fishing became driven by international market requirements than by seasonal, species, marine and climatic conditions.

As a smaller "community company" with limited quota Leigh Fisheries had to maximise returns by maintaining top quality, niche marketing through relationships with key companies in the international market; hence the evolution of the Lee Group. 'Branding'; getting an identity for the product was part of that. The Waiheke Co-op had used the same strategy aiming to become recognised to the extent they could personalize the transaction by putting the name of the fisherman and the boat from which it was caught on the packaging. Leigh Fisheries strategy was to get more quota when possible and leverage the local pride in the product and company:

'Wild fish and natural' - is our catch phrase and we've trademarked the name. We're very proud but.... Leigh's Archiles heel is quota. ... I wish Sanford, Aotearoa or these guys would buy Leigh Fisheries but leave it like it is to give it access to their quota which they waste. If we had ... [their] quota base ...just for the inshore, the company would make more money, the fishermen would make more money, the shareholders would make more money. Sanford ...got the quota because they were using their own boats and stuff. So really there's no real reason why Leigh [Fisheries] should be here ... but no one can touch us.

I tried to put Leigh out of business when I was with Fletchers. I came up here with trucks and took some boats. I was down at the wharf and the manager here back in the 80s said: "I'll shoot you if I see you again." Why? Now that I'm here I understand. No one can touch Leigh because of the pride, the passion to do the job (Greg Bishop).

He attributed this to an egalitarian ethos where the CEO could work and process with the staff until both recognised the expertise of the other.

I always believe I must earn ... [their] respect first and to get the support. ... so my door's always open. ... If I had the door closed they wouldn't ask - it's not that they can't do the job but it's fantastic to know that if they see something wrong with the quality, if they're putting fish somewhere else that they'll ask. ... It's important the people here are 'family' with the boats - some of them.

If we get a new boat that boat must unload and all its crew and owner must walk through with the fish. Not so that we can show them the quality but all my staff, instead of identifying with a boat number say, "Ah that's ... [name] from the ... [vessel]. ... I had a beer with him. He's a good guy.

It's not about putting fish in a box and sending it. ... We work with people. We find the right people. ... we're at the arse end of the world ... so find and recruited enthusiastic and passionate local managers in the countries where they are marketing (Greg Bishop).

The company's promotion told the personal story of the commodity chain since [Snapper is] everywhere. Snapper is the wrong name. It's not even a snapper. So to market the fish overseas you have to be competitive. You have to be consistent and you have to have quality and so we were going into new markets and competing with other people's product and nine times out of ten you're competing with price so what we've done is - we've set up our own companies in Europe and in the States where we have direct access to markets.

To gain and maintain their market Leigh Fisheries has diversified their supply and now get fish from Nelson in the south to Houhora in the north. Under the restrictions of the QMS and with the opportunities of globalization Leigh Fisheries has expanded from one local company to the internationalised Lee Fish Group with companies both in New Zealand, Leigh Fisheries at Leigh, Lee Lobster and Associates, at Auckland International Airport and Priority Fresh, an International Freight company specialising in temperature sensitive perishables. Overseas, the product is distributed by Lee Fish Europe Ag in Switzerland to Europe and UK supermarkets, by Lee Fish USA in Los Angeles and there are new operations in the Manila, Jakarta and now Ho Chi Min (Viet Nam) and also the Maldives. (Market New Zealand; Lee Fish Group DVD: Lee Fish Group Ag).

Under the tighter Quota restrictions on catch volume, fishermen and companies are no longer able to earn more by catching more. They therefore have to improve quality and add value through branding and niche marketing. Leigh Fisheries strategy has been to ensure supply by imposing bin limits to optimise their use of quota to fit the market, improve quality through better handling and efficient processing by utilising local feeling and relationships by fostering an ethos of community participation both with factory staff and fishermen. By branding what would otherwise be a ubiquitous product (snapper) then having it marketed by companies run by personally picked enthusiasts the Lee fish group claims to maintain the feeling of personal community relations while gaining the greater profits of the international market.

With its international structure and contemporary business practices as a result of globalisation and the QMS, Leigh Fisheries is a corporate, as considered in this dissertation. It is also, however, concerned for employment and its role in the local community. The priorities of the export market and LFR obligations, however, militate against its meeting the nutritional requirements of local residents and visitors and therefore it's being a "full" community company.

FAMILIES

Although fishing families now are probably much as they were, under the QMS the internal dynamics must fit a tighter regulatory regime and the costs of more expensive levies, more controlled catch and landing schedules, more stringent vessel survey requirements and, if the wife keeps the books much more demanding accounting.

For Greg Hayes, who is still fishing and his wife Michaela, herself a daughter of an extensive fishing family, their three sons and their sons' friends are often crew. While the oldest is now crewing different boats, the younger two are "not too bad. They're all good really. I mean I'm really happy to take those two out there - runs really well - know exactly what they're doing. They're quite smart" (Greg Hayes).

Despite being in the same family each of the members had different attitudes and abilities to the sea and the job. As Michaela said:

You [Greg] miss the sea and ... [Oldest son][- when he's on land he misses the sea. He heads out there all the time. He just needs to go to sea. It's like a drug and they need to go and do it. It's not as though they're great in the water. I mean I love being in the water. Greg can't stand being in the water - he's got to be on top of the water and likewise ... [oldest son], he's the same. Whereas ... [the other two] who are not the fishermen, love being in the water.

For youth dreaming of becoming commercial fishermen being part of a fishing family could assist. Although:

If you're encumbered with too much debt - it will be difficult for anyone coming into the game. Whereas with (oldest son), he's quite blessed in that he can - if he proves to us that he can take over the boat - then one day it will happen so he will walk into an established business. They can still do it with their boats (Michaela).

Given the interest and aptitude it is still possible for sons and, more so now than previously, for daughters, to succeed to their father's occupation. Skippers (especially younger) who fished before the QMS could now have children reaching 'skipper' age but the additional need for funds to buy quota or ACE means it is that much harder for children to take over the family operation.

Just as before there were strains on relationships. Indeed the QMS provided new opportunities and new difficulties. Some informants gave the impression that being a family fisherman was easier before the QMS.

Well it was easier because you could make more money quicker and so you could still spend time at home. I mean, I was in that position then and I ... paid off a boat in a year. The first steel boat I had. I paid that off because I got stuck in, worked hard, catch as much fish as you wanted and now with the return - unless you are in a freehold position. If you have kids and stuff it would be terrible (now) because when the weather's right you'd have to go for a week at a time and that's not fair on them. You may as well not be married. As I say you may as well sell your family before you go to sea because you won't have one when you get back, same as the tuna. It can be a very selfish thing, fishing, if you're not careful (Greg Hayes).

Aware of this situation Greg Hayes was doing trips of two or three days rather than seven or eight. Essentially he had become a new part-timer (See: New Part-timers page 307) because:

I've engineered it like that you see. I look at it intelligently and say, "What can the family handle? And what will leave me not too worn out that can't give them time." So as I say to the company "I'm only really a part-time fisherman. ... I do this because I see it's important to spend that time with the family so - yeah I go on a Sunday so I have the weekend here. I mean that's a luxury that a lot of fishermen who are trying to pay off a boat and a house and stuff couldn't afford. Otherwise [it's] very strenuous on the family" (Greg Hayes).

Otherwise a lot of relationships break up because of the strains of the fishing occupation, with absences from home, the demands of boat maintenance.

Oh heck yeah. The love affair with the boat becomes greater than with the family and with the wife and that is something ... I've seen that and I work around it. All of these things are part of the whole equation and that's why I could have gone tuna longlining years ago (but didn't) when there was money in it (Greg Hayes).

Quite apart from the changes in the fishing regime the QMS had implications for families. The prospect of large sums of money from selling quota opened opportunities that they hadn't had to consider previously and in some cases led to marriage dissolution. Quota then became part of the property settlement as Greg Hayes explains in relation to an earlier relationship

Oh well I had to sell out (quota), half anyway, because of what I was allocated. What I was left didn't seem like enough. My wife back then left, that virtually took the half that I had allocated to me then in paying her out. So what I had then didn't seem enough to survive on - not knowing how things were going (Greg Hayes).

If quota had not been available for the settlement and the couple could not reach agreement between themselves, then some 50 per cent of assets under the provisions of the Matrimonial Settlement Act would have applied.

COMMUNITIES

Under the QMS and globalization the international market seems most compelling for the corporates and therefore most of the catch is exported. Consequently fresh and especially locally caught commercial fish has been diverted from all these Hauraki Gulf communities.

Fresh fish can be regarded from alternative perspectives; the length of time out of the water before it reaches the customer, secondly the distance and number of steps, the ease and consistency, in the commodity chain and thirdly the implications for community identity. Retailers appreciate the second. One informant felt the system worked well from a retailer's perspective as he only had to deal with his purchasing agents rather than several irregular fishermen. Island residents have a different perspective.

Waiheke

Virtually all the quota on Waiheke had been sold and generally fish sold through restaurants, island wholesale or retail outlets is bought from a range of Auckland suppliers, purchasing agents and the Auckland fish market and shipped over on the ferries (Nat Upchurch, Informant 23, Gulf Island Foods). Informants were in complete agreement on the demand for fresh fish and the belief that there would be a bigger local market, especially for tourists, if the product was caught and

landed by Waiheke fishermen direct to the Island. Snapper currently sells at relatively high price due to the costs of transportation and middlemen.

Waiheke Sentiments

There is considerable concern on the island that the QMS has meant that fresh locally caught fish is not available. Fish had been intrinsic to Waiheke's identity as an island and part of basic nutrition. One senior fisherman: "I don't know why they can't - why they can't let us have fish on the island and everybody fishing. They had to send it to Auckland and they get it back second hand" (Informant 5).

A former fisherman, food Co-op organiser and fruit and vegetable seller observed that:

[T]he result of ... [the QMS] is - that a community like this - surrounded by sea can't even get fresh fish. ... The community just does not have that good quality food. ... What is so popular now ... is the local produce. Where ever you go in New Zealand or overseas, ... people want the local produce, whether it be vegetable or whatever. It is so much promoted! Isn't it? - local produce (Informants 6).

The very sad thing is that you've got an island surrounded by ocean and people cannot buy fish caught around here. ... I ... work[ed] in a shop after the Co-op disbanded that bought fish from Seamart. It came over from the fish market in town on the boat and some people actually bought it and took it back to town thinking it was local Waiheke fish. It was just bizarre. And it was really sad but the other side is that it gave the fish a rest (Informant 8).

Angry at the change from before the QMS, one informant asserted: "We used to be able to buy fresh fish that had been caught that morning. We used to be able to buy all sorts of fish, piper, creamfish, butterfish... and cheap. Now we can't!" (Anne Elder). Another stated, "It's disgusting - we're an island and the fish in the supermarket is just not fresh" (Informant)!

"We certainly used to eat quite a bit of fish.... and the family came over from town and like eating fish. It's all part of the whole thing" (Informant 8). Fresh locally caught fish was part of Waiheke's identity; part of the experience of being on Waiheke.

Mike Cotterill, former commercial fisherman in a letter to the *Gulf News* was concerned:

Waiheke is a rundown little island with little to offer but wine and olives which your average tourist can buy anywhere in the world. ... When an

island doesn't even have a fishing fleet with local fare available to all on the island you know we are in the crap (*Gulf News* 9 September 2007).

There were and indeed still are takeaway shops selling fish, typically hoki, but also depending on availability snapper, trevali and tarakihi. In addition there have occasionally been other outlets for fresh fish sourced from the Auckland Fish Market or Auckland wholesalers. For a while one of the butchers, for example, tried to sell fish but reached the point of frustration because when it was available his customers didn't want it, but when they wanted it he couldn't get it. "It's a pain ... the fact you can't buy it from those who go out. ... The customers say 'But you're surrounded by fish - why can't we buy it? Have to go through a wholesaler don't you'" (Informal interview). The situation now is that "There is never enough ... [fish] from the point of view of a customer, you have to pay export prices for top grade fish which is why snapper consistently sells at \$29.95 a kilo" (Informant 23).

After the introduction of the QMS the main sources of retail fresh fish were the Co-op fish shop which continued after the demise of the Co-op, and now Oneroa Fish and Chips (OFC), the Tahiri Rd Butcher which is now Te Matuku Bay Oysters Ltd. and Woolworths Supermarket. Speaking from his experience of both catching and selling Informant 7 noted that the

The fish that you get from the shop now can be anything up to three days old before it gets to the shop. It could be even longer ... [and] probably is. You'll never get it as fresh as what the community can provide it itself. ... Basically that's what the system has done - it's destroyed community. We can't buy fish here anymore. We have to buy it from Auckland. It's too expensive to actually set up a fish shop or anything like that without going through the red tape to actually look after your own little tiny community. To be able to supply a community like Waiheke Island you'd need a million dollars worth of quota and then you've got to go through all the portfolio you know of licences, hygiene regulations, hawker's licence if you like, staff, MAF all those things - you know.

All that's red tape. It's cost cost cost. The quota system's been in here now for 20 odd years, right? The costs of fishing have gone up in that time 20 years. The price of fish has not gone up. And just to add insult to the whole thing now we see a huge increase in price of fuel coming our way. That's just going to be the top - the icing on the cake. Icing on the cake - fishermen can't really afford to go out there and catch fish like they used to. In fact I think they have to catch twice as much fish as they used to make a living today as they did yesterday. That's no good ... So you get

small communities like Waiheke Island who could well do with a good fish shop and supply of fresh fish to the restaurants on the island. It's just not going to happen (Informant 7).

A shortcoming of the system is that fish has to be landed to Licensed Fish Receivers [LFRs] and since there are none on Waiheke, fish caught in the Gulf have to go to Auckland to be processed, then purchased and shipped to Waiheke to be sold. The complication is:

the distribution chain. We're at the end of a very long link. ... The bill with Fullers [ferry company] is \$300 per month [2007] and most of it is fresh fish and that's off my bottom line. If I could land it here! ... it's a very very clumsy system. [He] ordered fish through the Ngai Tahu¹²³ company Pacific Catch in Auckland and it came over on the ferry daily. Most of their fish came from Ngai Tahu's own boats but some from the Auckland Fish Market auction when they are in short supply. "So they are the wholesaler, the middlemen in some instances, and in some instances they are the direct source" (Informant 17).

Fish sold locally by one outlet comprises snapper (twice as many sales as the other species), Tarakihi, gurnard and hapuku with hoki for fish and chips. Tarakihi came from Hawkes Bay or Christchurch the bluenose [administratively classified as hapuku] from boats operating out of Whangarei while hoki was caught by Sanford offshore in deep water. All the fish was frozen skinned and boned fillets in 10 kilo boxes ready for sale and that eliminated processing waste problems. Through the winter the fish and chip shop sold 50-60 kilos of 'fresh' fish a week and 50-80 kilos of frozen hoki and two or three times that amount in summer.

A seafood café was opened in 2007 (*Waiheke Marketplace* 9 May 2007) reflecting the view that Waiheke "is a holiday destination. When people come over here they want to eat fish" (Informant 17). The Woolworths supermarket offers "280 items for 'fish' across different shelves" including six species fresh fish "seafood bar fish fillets" most skinned and boned ranging from red cod at \$14.65/kg to snapper at \$33.99/kg. The website does advise that "the product range and pricing you see may differ to what is available in your area" (Woolworths website date 5 December 2007).

¹²³ This is a Maori tribe based in the South Island.

Comparison of fish prices (NZ\$/Kg)

Te Matuku Bay Oysters on Waiheke (1July 2009)

| | Trevali | Gunard | Tarakihi | Snapper |
|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| Fillets | \$18.99 | \$27.99 | \$27.99 | \$38.99 |

OceanZ, Botany Downs Shopping Centre, Auckland (June 2009)

| | Trevali | Gurnard | Tarakihi | Snapper |
|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| Green | \$9.95 | \$9.95 | | \$15.95 |
| Fillets | | \$27.95 | \$24.95 | \$36.95 |

Meat:

Pak 'n Save Supermarket, Botany Downs Shopping Centre, Auckland
NZ\$/Kg (June 2009)

From memory, before the QMS meat was (cut for cut) generally twice the price of fish.

| Beef | Mince(Special) | Rump | Scotch Fillet | Eye Fillet |
|----------|----------------|---------|---------------|------------|
| Packed | \$5.99 | \$11.99 | | \$24.99 |
| unPacked | | \$11.99 | \$25.99 | \$39.99 |
| | | | | |

Table 4: Comparison of fish prices (NZ\$/Kg)

Retail

The retail market is not static (See Table 4). Te Matuku Bay Oysters Ltd needed processing space in 2008 for oysters from their aquaculture operation so bought the butcher's shop in Tahiri Rd¹²⁴ for its factory and “inherited” the shop. They had the oysters to sell to the public and knew the dissatisfaction with the supermarket

¹²⁴ The main (light) industrial area of Waiheke.

“fresh” fish so kept the shop going with complimentary “specialty & essential products”, smoked seafood and the then small, fresh fish operation. The 7 May 2009 issue of *Gulf News* had a full page advertisement for “Fresh Fish Daily”. They too buy their fish from the Auckland market by ringing their purchasing agents each night with their order. The fish is bought about 2.00am filleted and delivered on the 9.00am ferry (Nat Upchurch, Director).

Most of the finfish comes from the Hauraki Gulf, tuna from the South Pacific and mussels from the Marlborough Sounds. Upchurch claims there is:

great demand. It's being an island too, people have grown an affinity for the sea and sea food is a real part of the diet ... During the week we get a lot of retired people coming in but in the weekend it's - so everybody. The wealthy are probably a large section because we cater for the gourmet end. Like we're not a cut price warehouse. I think just the quality - the people who are prepared to pay just that little bit extra for the fish then treat themselves every now and then. You do [get] ... a cross section of the island (Nat Upchurch).

Te Matuku considered becoming Licenced Fish Receivers but space was limited and processing fresh fish carried the risk of contamination with their core business of oysters. Besides,

For me as a fish purchaser ... a retailer... instead of dealing with 4 or 5 local fishermen supplying their product irregularly, it's a case of me making a phone call once a night and getting fish just as fresh over on the first boat at pretty much the same price - or cheaper and processed already. So the whole rationalisation of the industry has really aided that side of it. ... We probably go through ... maybe 150-200kgs wet fish a week.” (Nat Upchurch).

The complexity of becoming a LFR, having sufficient quota in terms of amount and species to cater efficiently for the Waiheke market, the reporting and health and safety requirements are such that none of the outlets for fresh fish on the island have been able to comply.

Restaurants

Waiheke was always a holiday and visitor destination, but now instead of a scattering of visitor, tourist and hospitality establishments, a formalised visitor industry has been developed since the mid 1990s. Fish is still a significant component at Waiheke restaurants.

One chef asserted:

[Fresh locally caught fish is] really important. People come to the island and they want - because it's an island - the seafoods are a major draw card so that and you have to have that. Every restaurant has to have fish on the menu somehow or other. ... It's sometimes a bit of a struggle to get fish and keep it fresh because it all has to be brought in from Auckland so its all got to be packaged up in styrofoam boxes and ice and freezer packs and shipped over and with freight costs and things like that - you've got to watch how many packages you bring over. ... At the moment we get it through New Zealand Wholesale Seafood and we have someone who goes to the markets early on Thursday morning. ... Well, he buys the whole fish and gets it cleaned and everything - filleted for us and sends it over. ... but usually when we buy through Wholesale Seafoods it's all fillet and stuff anyway and we pay for cleaned price while he's paying ... green - they call it? Green and then get it filleted and sent over. ... All the restaurants use fish and they probably all have their gripes and things about supply and having to get it shipped over and everything (Informant 15).

Front of house staff told him that clients ask every day for locally caught fish.

There is considerable demand and he felt:

Locally caught... [fish] would be a major draw card ... if you could have it on your menu like 'Locally Waiheke caught', 'Waiheke Fresh'. ... You could possibly even charge a bit more for it or something (Informant 15).

Community Resistance

In summing up the fresh fish issue it is important to bear in mind the broader socio-cultural expressive context of the changes happening for Waiheke as it moved from a somewhat rural self-governing island to a commuter suburb and tourist playground of Auckland. Politics has always been hard fought and loss of access to fish for livelihood or nutrition was one issue among many that engendered resistance. This was epitomised in a public meeting over a planning issue Dick Hubbard, the Auckland City mayor, put a positive spin on Islanders' complaints and dissatisfaction, by branding them "feisty" (Dick Hubbard, Public Meeting Ostend Hall Monday 26 September 2005). The term feisty has subsequently been added to island discourse signifying the struggle for resilience in the contest to assert and retain the community's distinctiveness and identity. The threat from neoliberal governance such as being imposed on Waiheke on a number of fronts and the change to its lifestyle epitomised what was at stake for communities. It wasn't just fish.

Coromandel

Like Waiheke by comparison with the situation before the QMS relatively little fresh locally caught fish is available now. Most of that little is sold at the takeaway fish shop and sourced from OPC in Whitianga where Coromandel boats land much of their product. On rare occasions rather than having fish trucked from Whitianga, the shop can get fish directly from a boat at the Coromandel wharf but the transaction will have been arranged through OPC or another company. They have little choice in what fresh fish is supplied or when. At the takeaway shop selling fresh fish, I was told that:

[U]sually there is no choice they just take what we're given. In June/July 2004, for example, there was no snapper. We get the seconds - the rest is exported. Sometimes we do pick it up direct from the local fishermen but it's been arranged through the factory. Otherwise we have to get it from the Fish Mart in Auckland.

In the cool display cabinet on the counter there were two plates, one of fillets and the other labelled "Boneless snapper \$28/kg (Coromandel Kliss Trip 30 September - 2 October 2006).

Coromandel with a much smaller population is also on the tourist and domestic holiday route and emphasised local product through tourist oriented stores, including a specialty smoked fish store. The presence of many aquaculture farmers operating in the area may have provided synergies that facilitated this and reports on a Waiheke community social trip (*Gulf News* 17 March 2005) indicated a degree of envy from the islanders at the range of fresh fish product.

The locals are disenchanted and resent having to pay tourist prices, in a town where wages are low, so have to go without or catch their own (See Box 18).

Box 18: Coromandel attitudes

Sandra Watson, for example, said:

You feel like it's your right, like you know - you've worked in the area, you've lived in the area, you've kept the area, you've kept the place going in the winter months when it's quiet and next minute away it goes - boom - everything in town jumps up in price and that included. We have to pay the same price put up for the tourist. All those nice [fish] on the menus - all those nice scallops and crayfish and snapper we just can't really afford to go out and have a meal of them. If you do it's not very often.

Like also living in a small town the wages here are not very good. We don't pay good wages in small towns. ... People of course aren't able to go out and treat themselves to snapper and they've got to go and sit on the rocks all day and the next day for a week to try and catch a fish (Sandra Watson).

Leigh

Despite the reasonable expectations of visitors and tourists to such a fishing village, even in Leigh where the fish factory still operates in the town local shops are unable to sell fresh locally caught commercial fish. Though, as with Coromandel, sometimes, the fish itself may come from the factory or even the boats.

Sarah Davies, Proprietor of Leigh Café wanted to get fish from her husband, Nick Torkington, who was running a longliner. It would have made good sense to keep both catching and marketing in the family, in the same way her parents, a well known fishing family had by getting fish more directly. To do that under the QMS they would have had to own quota and be Licensed Fish Receivers that made it “impossible”. As with the other two communities there is a lot of demand for fresh locally caught fish among the public. She explained the situation they have to operate:

I buy my fish, for the shop, from Auckland but I pick it up direct from the [Leigh] Fisheries. But I actually buy it through South City Seafoods in Auckland because they're not able to sell us wholesale. It's to do with the Quota Holders. ... My parents [who owned another shop ten years earlier] used to buy it direct from [Leigh] Fisheries and we didn't have a problem getting fish but now I can only get fish when it's available. Yeah - when they've got the excess basically. ... Yeah we just get all their crap fish basically. ... If they've got a bin limit on and they've got too many bins then we get it.

It's a bit ridiculous.... It comes from all over the place. We get fish - when I pick my fish up from there we get fish from up north. We get fish from down south. Whatever fish they've got left over we get. So it's not necessarily off the boats in Leigh or - yeah from anywhere (Sarah Davies)

We get people coming in constantly wanting to buy wet fish off us but we can't just sell it to them because we don't get enough of it to supply that and for our own cooking needs, ... you send them to New World [the supermarket in Warkworth] to buy wet fish because we just can't get it. But it's the same - people come out here and say: “Leigh's a fishing town - must

be able to get all sorts of sea food". They expect scallops and everything else. ... we buy in frozen scallops because we can't get them fresh - you know? ... It's funny: "Yeah the harbour and all the boats - your fish must be so fresh get it every day." No we've got to buy it from Auckland (Sarah Davies).

Jennifer Cockayne, the present proprietor of Leigh Fish-N-Chips, had investigated becoming LFR but the costs were prohibitive to become a Licensed Fish Receiver would cost her "nearly \$1,800, a one off, and then [a minimum of] \$280 / month to fill in the forms. So for a place like me it's really not worth it. Which is a shame" (Jennifer Cockayne). She had worked for the Council for 16 years so was not unfamiliar with bureaucracy but still found the reporting requirements onerous.

[To be a LFR]: I would have to buy under a basic company name and then sell it to Leigh Fish-N-Chips otherwise I'd have to get peoples' names and addresses of where it's going. So and you have to break down any guts and frames you have to sell and have it all weighed and then each month you have to put in the quotas - ... the amount brought in - in kilos, the amount you've sold as fillets, the amount you've sold as frames, the amount you've sold as this - as cat fish or whatever. ... It's very complicated. If you put it in ... by mail it costs you \$300 and something per month and if you put it in over the Internet it costs you so much but you have to put it in. But even if you get a nil return, you don't buy any that month, you have to put it in and it still costs you \$280 (Jennifer Cockayne).

Jennifer Cockayne said that there would be significant advantage in being able to sell fish straight off the boats:

You can just hold up two bits of fish [fillets] and you can just see... the fresh one is luminous. ... You can really see the difference and the difference between line caught and seine caught too because most of the ones out here are line caught. You can see the difference between really fresh fish - caught the same time and the difference between line and seine. Yes, I've learnt a lot since I've been here. You can really pick it just from the luminosity of the fish (Jennifer Cockayne).

Since the fish has to come through the product chain:

It's at least a week old before you get it... I have a standing order [with Leigh Fisheries] for 20 Kg of gurnard, 20 kg of snapper per week. Last week I got the 20 kg of snapper and 7 kg of gurnard. This week so far I haven't had anything because of the storms. They've got to fill their other orders. ... The first couple of months of the new quota while people are

settling down - the prices are sky high and in the last months you might not get any fish at all. Because - yeah - they've used up their quota and they can't go out and fish - and it's frustrating because this place is based on the export fish and the fresh fish and the hassles I have sourcing. ... And of course they keep their quotas [orders] up in Auckland first instead of supplying locals. But they're doing their best for me. If there's any fish to be had I do get it. ... Yes - they are great in that way. If they can get it for me, they do but their hands are tied with the quota in Auckland (Jennifer Cockayne).

Sales of Locally Caught Fish

When this research was carried out there were no LFRs in any of the communities studied so there were no regular outlets for the direct sale of locally caught fish in these communities. There were, however, limited wharf sales in Coromandel and Leigh but none (until October 2009 see Worthy 2009) in Waiheke. In 2007/2008 428.52 kg of snapper were sold in wharf sales around the Hauraki Gulf out of a total of 60,818.566 kg for all fish sold this way in New Zealand (MFish) and these appear to be declining (see Table 5).




Table 5: Annual wharf sales of snapper in Hauraki Gulf areas 2001-2008)

(Source: MFish data)

The MFish database of wharf sales in the Hauraki Gulf includes 113 landings around New Zealand of which I identified 39, including misspellings, as being in

the Hauraki Gulf. Since the amounts of fish sold at some of these landings was such that the annual income of some fishermen could be identified¹²⁵, this information would breach confidentiality these landing places were therefore clustered into the east coast (the west coast of the Coromandel peninsular, including Whitianga on the east coast), the south coast (including the Viaduct Basin) and the west coast (East Coast Bays, Hibiscus Coast etc.) of the Hauraki Gulf. By comparison with Gulf Island Foods orders of 400kg/month frozen hoki the volume of snapper sold in Hauraki Gulf wharf sales is infinitesimal.

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Access to information is the flip side to reporting. Previously outside observers had ready access to overviews of the fishing industry performance through such annual publications as the FIB Economic Review. User pays now means that services that used to be covered by general taxation are now charged specifically. A change of formats that has occurred which makes a real appreciation more difficult. Before the QMS, for example, the interested public had reasonable access to overview information and often more particular data was readily available. The NZ FIB Economic Overviews were available bi-yearly then intermittently and are now replaced by less comprehensive (no vessel data for example) information seemingly for public relations or maybe school projects.

Comprehensive information, subject to confidentiality is still obtainable but often at considerable cost, essentially restricting it to the industry and those with research contracts. For this research, for example Fishserve willingly provided a list of all LFRs (named businesses) but no indication of locality or data on export or domestic disposal. MFish estimated 50 of those 229 were the big export companies and helpfully, at the other end of the scale, willingly extracted the number of boat sales by landing place in the Hauraki Gulf but, to ensure confidentiality, had to cluster thirty nine into just three or four regions¹²⁶. It seems

¹²⁵ I suspect this accounts for the much higher values in East Hauraki Gulf.

¹²⁶ These clusterings were the East coast to which I added Whitianga, the South coast including Auckland and the West coast of the Hauraki Gulf. Unfortunately I misidentified one west coast landing spot as south coast. These clusterings were identified

increased data reporting requirements may enable better control but public benefit remains uncertain and the fishery, the industry and management are less transparent and accountable than before the QMS.

SUMMARY

For the communities the QMS has meant a general loss of access to the fisheries, and therefore to a source of livelihood, nutrition and in consequence of a significant aspect of community identity¹²⁷. Fishermen and crew, those in the community of occupation miss out directly but others such as the engineers, mechanics, boat repairers, fish shop retailers and consumers do also indirectly. Despite the changes, and the emphasis on the export market, the fishery seems as or even more marginal for small operators and community members than it was before the introduction of the QMS and economies of scale and ownership of quota are increasingly important.

from a list of landing places involving misspellings and local names. Without further information it is at best an estimation.

¹²⁷ This is a global issue. See, for example, the World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP), International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) intervention on small-scale fishermen's and community rights to the FAO Committee on Fisheries, 2009. http://icsf.net/icsf2006/uploads/resources/statements/pdf/english/statements_other/1236235734085***Intervention_on_Small-scale_Fisheries_COFI_FAO.doc (Accessed 10 March 2009)

Chapter 8: Discussion

*"The law doth punish man or woman that steals the goose from off the common,
but lets the greater felon loose who steals the common from the goose.*

-- Anonymous

This dissertation is concerned with the social implications of government policies for fishermen and their communities; a change foreshadowed by "think big" attitudes to rights based fisheries management in New Zealand. Chapters 5 to 7 (pre-QMS, QMS implementation/transition, QMS now) reported the empirical findings in the context of the original objectives and expectations of the QMS (Chapter 2) and findings elsewhere in the literature (Chapter 4). This chapter refutes the usual perspective on the "crisis in coastal fisheries" then discusses social implications of the neo-liberalism QMS, privatization, market forces and deregulation for the various industry components but particularly for Hauraki Gulf fishermen, then for their communities. Some issues are dealt with from more than one perspective.

CONTEXT

Before humans New Zealand had fish. Then Māori came, settled round the coast and utilised the kaimoana (seafood) for sustenance and, later as communities evolved and the population increased, for trade and ceremonies. Legend asserts New Zealand was born from fishing (Waitangi Tribunal 1988 31-56). Certainly with a paucity of animals and indifferent soils, fish were an essential part of community diet. Pakeha came, likewise established around the coasts and utilised the fish resources. Included in the influx were "imports" of fishermen and their families from countries with long fishing traditions who set up or merged their own fishing communities around the coast: Shetlanders, Greeks and Italians in Island Bay, and Makara (both near Wellington) for example, Dalmations on the Kaipara Harbour and in Auckland (See: Johnson and Haworth 2004 163-171; Makarios 1996; 1997; 1999) and provided for their communities and for a growing urban population.

As the country changed socially and culturally fishermen established co-operatives beginning the fishing industry and some of these generationally deep

fishing families established companies¹²⁸. Indeed as Rees suggested (pers com June 2005) the New Zealand fishing industry is based on families setting up companies, the Talleys for example establishing Talley's Fisheries & Amaltal, the Velas Velas' Fisheries now Watties and, though slightly different, Albert Sanford from a sailing rather than fishing background set up Sandford and there were others.

With a neoliberal ideology and the advent of the EEZ enclosing the deepwater fishery, the New Zealand fishing industry globalised to meet the increasing international market. These companies became increasingly corporatised and bought the 'big boats'. Though inadequate for the deepwater they did establish fishing history on the coast that later translated to quota, and, with the loan schemes, facilitated the inshore crisis that justified the QMS.

Crisis

The introduction of the QMS was a change of regime in response to a manufactured crisis. The government had already allowed the corporate 'big boats', bought for the deepwater, to fish on the coast not only adding to the pressure that depleted the stocks but also gaining catch history and later quota. Government policy had, therefore, compounded the impacts on a depleting coastal fishery and, in effect, facilitated corporate access over coastal fishermen and the rights of the communities they supported. As demonstrated in Chapter 4 the government was aware of this.

The additional catch of the 'big boats' threatened the livelihoods and economics of the coastal fleet. To protect the interests of 'bona fide' fishermen and the hope of adequate compensation, part-timers were demonized as the Federation persuaded the Government to exclude them. By allowing the 'big boats' to fish prime species in the coastal fishery the government facilitated Hardin's 'open access', in effect constructing the crisis, and then aggravated it by making grants and easy loans available for fishing vessels and processing plants, increasing capitalization of the fishery. The degree to which this was initially accidental or deliberate is not clear. Concern to "professionalise" the fishery was explicit and

¹²⁸ While outside the focus of this research, I suspect the process in New Zealand would have been similar to that reported by Palsson (1991 105-110) for Iceland.

some of the components were jockeying for position to take advantage. Consequently when the neo-liberal oriented Labour government came to power in 1984 there was already a crisis in the coastal fishery and, as Yandle (2001 113) found, as early as 1974 elements of ITQs were being considered. Thus MAF, in accord with Treasury advice and in an exemplar of the strictures of Friedman (“only a crisis - actual or perceived - produces real change” (Klein 2007 6)) and his Chicago School, implemented the Shock Doctrine (See Klein 2007) with the neo-liberal QMS using ITQs.

Given that New Zealand's coastal fisheries were to be managed by quota, three alternatives were available: boat based quota, community-based quota and individual quota. With the notable exception of the Chatham Islands (Marshall 2000), communities lacked 'voice' so appear not to be considered as a general approach. By identifying the boat owner rather than the skipper or the boat for quota allocation, neo-liberal rights-based management reinforced the trend toward transactional (market- forces) relations and facilitated quota aggregation to the corporates. The choice of quota owner is indicative of valuing the mortgagable, capital asset over the human and social capital of skippers' knowledge, skills and community relationships.

The outcome is increased corporatisation and corporate control of the fisheries, “absentee” (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009 6) (distanced) or investor ownership of quota, bureaucracy and, as this research confirms, considerably increased controls over the fishermen. An unforeseen consequence, perhaps, has been the reduction in availability of fresh locally caught fish in the coastal communities and the impact of the rise of tourism. Communities such as Waiheke with tourist industries may be able to sustain a niche market for the higher prices of fish available but it is at the expense of more basic local food supply. Rights-based fisheries management in New Zealand has meant the loss of many rights for coastal and inshore fishermen and their communities.

An overview of the formal relations between the components discussed in this research are sketched in Figure 22. Of particular note, fishermen are no longer as closely linked occupationally within their communities. The Waiheke community is now divorced from the fishing industry.


Relationships

Text

THEMES

- Globalization of NZ Fishing Industry
- Corporatizing NZ Fisheries
- Commoditizing fish
- Professionalizing NZ fishermen

TOP DOWN



BOTTOM UP

THEMES

- Fishermen career trajectories (ethos)
- Loss of community resources (locally caught fresh fish & livelihood)
- Shift to service industry & dormitory suburb
- Fishing community identity

Figure 22: Overview of relationships between the components

GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS

Since from the early 1900s the amount and complexity of regulation and the bureaucracy to support fisheries management increased but from 1986 neo-liberalism's third plank, deregulation, became relevant. One of the objectives of the introduction of rights-based management was the reduction of government involvement but, Sissenwine and Mace (1992 147), for example, assert "Government regulation has not been reduced". The Fisheries Act 1996, supposedly simplified the QMS, but the increase from 82 pages and 108 sections in the 1983 Act, to 386 pages and 370 sections in the 1996 Act indicates the reality (See: Figures 23, 24, 25). Instead the QMS initiated a raft of legislation with constant amendments compounding an increasingly complex regime. No longer

can fishermen just get a boat, obtain a licence, meet basic requirements of area, gear and reporting; now they have to comply with a greatly increased bureaucracy, levies, quota, and a reporting and compliance regime. Yet the Ministry feels they are now getting the system right and the continued amendments are “tweaking rather than lurching” (Russell Burnard, pers com, 15 October 2008).

In the meantime, the confusion of regulations has criminalised fishermen and local people for exercising what used to be their community rights of propinquity and usufruct. Penalties can be draconian by comparison with those in other sections of the economy, with loss of the means of production, quota, boats, vehicles and/or fines. This is exemplified by informants' “stories” such as that of a Licensed Fish Receiver allegedly being fined for eating three dead 'doggies' (dogfish bycatch) for which he didn't have quota.




Figure 23: Bureaucracy: Traditional. Pre-1983.




Figure 24: Bureaucracy before the introduction of the QMS.




Figure 25: Bureaucracy now.

Change of Regime

Ideologically, "think big" was a forerunner of neo-liberalism catering for the (BIG) market and its players (corporates) externalising detriments to the "bottom" - part-timers. Restructuring of the fisheries with the QMS went further with a change from fisheries management using input controls to a neo-liberal, property rights-based management system with ITQs. MAF knew the significance of the rural /urban spit in part-timers and now know the exclusion was a failed and unnecessary policy (Crothers, pers com, 21 November 2006). Coastal fishermen through the Federation were struggling for their share also and sacrificed the part-timers so they could get buybacks. This exclusion, charged against those least responsible for the crisis was neither morally nor in practice the cost of bringing in the new system. Had the 'big boats' been restricted to the deepwater or 'translated' into vessels more appropriate for the deepwater there may have been no need to restructure the coastal fleet so radically! Part-timers may have been numerically difficult to administer but the amount of fish they caught, although crucial for their communities, was comparatively infinitesimal. They could have been excluded from the QMS - like Recreational and Maori fishermen or overseas precedents such as Chile where artisanal or inshore fishermen are managed separately from industrial. Given the increase in number of Mfish staff required to administer the QMS¹²⁹, part-timers could have had their own QMS if necessary! Restricting the 'big boats' more tightly to the deepwater or less-preferred species might have been a compromise!

The QMS left the Hauraki Gulf regime of exclusion lines, input controls and regulations in place but while aggregation of quota has virtually resolved the allocation issue between the companies and the communities it has meant serious though varying social implications for the those in this study. As such, my research tends to support arguments that changes resulting from the QMS, in economic, political, social and cultural and other factors, impinge on "localised systems of common pool resource use and the adaptive responses of the users"

¹²⁹ Allegedly with the highest staff/catch ratio required to administer any fisheries management system (c.f. Australian administration costs (McDonald *Fishfolk* 31 October 2007)). .

(van Ginkel 1999 24). My research also supports other New Zealand research (Holmes 1998, Baines 1999) that in New Zealand, response to crisis reconstructs the economic, cultural and political relationships between and within communities and varies between communities.

Despite the QMS having been developed and promoted largely by the Federation of Commercial Fishermen, the corporates were early recognisers of the implications of the new approach. They deliberately and aggressively sought to quickly secure the new property right to harvest fish (the Individual Transferable Quota) that was fundamental to control of the fishery. In the communities studied, only Leigh with Leigh Fisheries, integrated into a relatively fishing-dependent community, was able to resist the larger corporates, but to survive it too has had to take on many of the trappings of those corporates, becoming a vertically integrated, globalised company with fishing operations expanded throughout the country and prioritising export fish contracts. Despite these changes, it has managed to retain its connections with the community and remains the company of first choice for independent fishermen in the Gulf.

The QMS advantaged the vertically integrated companies as Rees (2004) and Taylor et al (1999) have noted, though the bottom line benefits seem not as great as claimed (Rees 2004 4). My research also supports the view of Taylor et al (1999 4) that changes such as the QMS centralised economic development with benefits accruing to the administration (here MAF/MFish) and the vertically integrated companies, but the impacts were borne by the regions and communities.

The result of the change of regime has been that for a comparatively brief time fishers owned most of the coastal quota and had the ability to maintain parity with buyers. They had an asset that gave them negotiating power in first sale of fish but, since many were not accountants, economists or lawyers, already struggling with paper work and just wanting to fish, were not aware of their strengthened position. On the other hand ITQs, economic instruments arising from neo-liberal economic theory, in keeping therefore with the drivers of corporates were grist to the mill of corporate lawyers and accountants. The corporates, increasingly embedded in the global market and therefore influencing and influenced by globalization, were quite aware of the asset and therefore responded by buying the

quota from fishermen and smaller companies. In consequence, rather than fishermen being empowered through ownership or even gaining parity, the corporates reinforced their traditional dominance as the “Mr. Bigs” of the fishing industry (See: Stuster 1980). In addition, quota is regarded as an investment and so accumulated by “Queen St Fishermen¹³⁰” and quota brokers, “absentee” owners creating an additional layer of profit for themselves and costs for the fishermen.

For MFish although the system is not perfect they believe it has been considerably improved and deserves its global reputation. Russell Burnard stated:

Have we got a perfect system? No! Is it a better system than most jurisdictions in the world? I think so. Do New Zealanders still have access to fish? Generally yes! Is it completely fresh? It depends where you are in terms of location and that's a factor of our quite massive coastline in relation to our population. From the government's point of view we don't make those choices. We provide a framework that allows people to make those choices and we think we've reduced the cost of entry for most people to allow them to undertake their activities reasonably” (Russell Burnard pers com 15 October 2008).

Many fishermen have a different perspective. McCormack and Crothers (2008) found:

The ownership of quota by non-fishers and the consolidation of quota is described by a fisher as 'morally obscene'. Further, the privatisation of fishing rights is believed to have 'pushed the market price right through the floor'. The main problem that we have difficulties with the quota system was when they put a value on the quota everyone wanted it, even though they didn't want to fish it, they just wanted to own the quota. (Commercial fisher)” (McCormack and Crothers 2008 38).

Consequently, as Holmes (1998 34) noted, fishermen's participation in the fisheries was reduced. These regimes are underpinned by different social

¹³⁰ Queen St is the core of Auckland’s Central Business District (CBD) so symbolically the location of investors, brokers and bankers.

constructs appropriate for different people. The older system emphasised the individual fit with ecosystems and the face-to-face relations of cooperative or conflicting social reciprocity. The QMS puts emphasis on more generic units in the production machine analogous to the factory floor. Now to become independent fishermen skippering their own boat, they need not just the boat but business or financial skills and also quota. Alternatively they must be content working for the few companies still running a fleet or become ACE dependent contractors struggling to stay afloat and with little hope of a nest egg for retirement.

Quota

To ensure supply the companies operating in the Hauraki Gulf have largely aggregated the quota and therefore have significant control over the harvesting of the fish. Under the growth imperative of neoliberalism, because the QMS capped the volume of fish with the TACC, the companies had to increase their profits by maintaining quality and adding value to maximise the return on the resource. Neo-liberal ideology promoted the best price and globalization of the market meant that invariably the international market could offer more than the local domestic market. Companies, such as Leigh Fisheries, sought the best profits available by promoting increased quality and niche marketing in an apparently insatiable international market. The quality of fish declines from the time it is caught, cannot be increased and at best only maintained. Cultural requirements of international markets, such as the Japanese attitude to *iki jimi* for quality that New Zealanders might otherwise have considered excessively exacting, provided incentives but along with the other inspections for food and safety, also added costs. Consequently considerable attention, in technology, marketing, scholarly research and industry education, was given to what was variously known as the “cool chain”, the “quality chain”, the “commodity chain” (e.g. *Seafood NZ* 1994 66-74).

The QMS demands accountability and depends on the paper trail of catch landing logs (fishermen's) matched with LFR (buyers', corporates') returns (See: Clark et al. 1988b). Since the paperwork and reporting requirements for fishermen and LFRs are comprehensive and strict larger fishing companies have accountants and clerical staff with abilities and qualifications to deal with them effectively. But,

for fishermen reporting has been an issue since the QMS was introduced. Indeed, MAF officers contended that this was incentive for many fishermen to sell their quota to companies. The distress I saw, however, when a fisherman did not get “quota” he believed he had been promised, when conditions were ideal for fishing, seemed to contradict the claim that fishermen would in fact assign control of their operation to the companies over paperwork (Duncan, L. 1993 21, 22). The reality is, whether they fish their own ACE or company ACE, fishermen are still responsible for reporting their catch (Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 Section 189); filling out catch landing returns before midnight of the day of the catch. These requirements have meant more onerous form filling, greater surveillance and stress.

A comparison of the pre QMS and current (2008) reporting areas for the Hauraki Gulf (See Figures 26 and 27) indicates the increase in complexity. Contemporary electronic technology such as GIS, chart plotters and chart overlays on sounders might well simplify this chore but the extent to which these administrative boundaries relate to fishermen's conceptual mapping of the Gulf and fishing spots (e.g. the Ahahas, The Blocks (Viaduct Research)) is open to question.




Figure 26: Auckland Fishery Management Areas (Hauraki Gulf) showing 005, 006, 007 for reporting before the QMS. (Source: Paul n.d.).




Figure 27: Hauraki Gulf reporting areas 2008. (Source: MFish, reprinted with permission, www.fish.govt.nz).

Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs)

Under the QMS fish must be landed to Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs), a low profile but intrinsic part of the QMS, as a cross check on fishermen's returns for compliance purposes and for control over the resource. Most LFRs were larger companies and with company closures and consolidations and increasing vertical integration there are fewer fish buyers. Increasingly, the majority are exporting overseas or value-adding for supermarkets.

Compared with fishermen's perhaps more personal relationships with their buyers before the QMS, control over fishermen is now greater since many are dependent on the company for ACE and therefore tied more formally by contractual relationships. The company sets both the price for ACE and the landed price for fish. Fishermen are no longer free to shop around, select their buyer and have become price takers all year round. They tend not to have alternative buyers so the companies have more control over price and conditions and can pick and choose among would-be fishermen and even those already well established.

Local LFRs selling to the public seem few and far between so fresh locally caught commercial fish is generally not available in communities directly from fishermen. LFRs add another level of bureaucracy between the fishermen and the consumers. The more stringent policing by compliance staff takes up whatever slack or flexibility that may have been in the system so allowing for personal circumstances, and has created a tension and change in the relationship between fisheries officers and the fishermen.

Before the QMS most coastal towns had one or more fish shops selling fresh locally caught commercial fish and fish was also easily available in virtually every other town in New Zealand. Now, emphasis was on the export market, LFRs making fresh locally caught commercial fish available to the public seem scarce.

Before the QMS there were many more outlets selling locally caught fish directly to the public¹³¹. After the QMS Fishserve stated there were 229 LFRs in New Zealand in 2008 but determining the current distribution of fresh locally caught fish was hindered by their refusal to disclose location. Russel Burnard of MFish, estimated that of these 229 LFRs about 50 were the big export companies. Many of the remainder (179) might sell their fish direct to the public but there is no evidence of this in the communities covered by this research. In addition the 10Kg wharf sales allowed do make limited amounts of fish available in those ports still servicing the dwindling number of independent fishing vessels. These sales also appear to be decreasing.

¹³¹ Boyce, Martin and Stringer (1987) do not indicate the number of fish shops or outlets selling fish from local fishermen to the public before the QMS. They do show three ports for landing in the Hauraki Gulf, Auckland, Thames and Coromandel (Boyce et al. 1986 32) with a total of 23 licensed fish packing houses (Boyce et al. 1986 10) but this includes Whitianga and omits Waiheke and Leigh.

CORPORATES

The neo-liberal QMS by privatising catching rights with quota ownership and user-pays ethos has impacted the structure, the costs and relationships of fishing enterprises in the Gulf. Where previously fishermen ostensibly controlled the catch now quota ownership means corporates have the control, inverting the previous structure. In addition the extra cost of harvesting has been externalised to fishermen through levies, more detailed surveys, and the need to buy ACE.

Other researchers (e.g. Belgrave et al 2000 8; Mansfield 2001; Rees 2004; Rees 2008 172; Townsend 1998 205; Winder 1997) imply the larger, especially vertically integrated corporations have financial and marketing advantage. Larger companies, already with specialist staff dealing in law, accounting and international marketing, were better aware of financial markets, quota ownership and market opportunities. Smaller more localised companies working face to face in domestic markets or owner-operators whose prime speciality was as top fishermen were mainly concerned about boat handling and fishing to maintain catch rates. While corporates focus on competitive profitability, “growth dynamic: revenue-seeking strategies and ... cost-driven strategies” (Barrett 2001 6), smaller fishermen's attentions tend to be on fish as elusive quarry. Their communities dealt with the day-to-day exigencies of existence. In a transition to a new neo-liberal ideology favouring privatisation and market-forces, the big companies, already vertically integrated, corporatised and market-oriented, were poised to compete in the quota market and an increasingly neo-liberally globalised arena.

In facilitating corporate aggregation of quota the QMS has arguably resolved the “race for fish” but replaced it with the 'race for companies' and the 'race for ACE'. With the quota market, investors, quota brokers, non-fishing quota owners, (together the so-called 'Queen St Fishermen'), the system has added a level of bureaucracy to maintain the quota market and greatly expanded the work required for compliance purposes. To get the best from their quota, companies have restricted the fishermen, and manage them tightly to ensure they get just the needed product. The concomitant emphasis on economies of scale, efficiency and quality has lengthened the local distribution chain and greatly increased costs to the local consumer.

FISHERMEN

Fishermen who sold their quota had opportunity to set-up an alternative livelihood and some did. Some of them regret the loss of the lifestyle and the opportunity to pass that fishing enterprise on to their children. Those who were crewing and those who were supporting the operation with goods or services have little to show for the change. Some former fishermen who leased out their quota found the market uncertain and the reporting onerous so sold. Others found dependable clients and maintain a satisfying lifestyle. ACE-dependent fishermen tend to be marginalised. The comparative few “new part-timers”, debt free, with passion for their work, with detailed ecological knowledge of their species and fishing grounds, can easily catch the fish their market requires, meet increasingly stringent company requirements and still enjoy their boats and the marine environment.

Before the QMS aspiring fishermen had the option of becoming ‘deckies’ for experienced fishermen, likely to be a relative or neighbour and from the same community of place. There were opportunities for those, the rebellious or idiosyncratic, whose skills weren't oriented toward the strictures of school or the authorities. Thus they learnt the necessary skills in a familiar context by example, virtually by osmosis rather than formal teaching. They fitted the community of occupation and learnt the intricacies and quirks of the local ecosystem and fishery. Now, in the more formalised regime of the QMS there are fewer opportunities for deckhands. There is less certainty of on-going careers so although some who aspire to the vocation can start as deckies others are recruited through centralised maritime colleges. To advance they need to do their tickets so again are shaped not by local practice, which includes specific ecosystem and community requirements but by industry and head office curricula in a regime of formalised schooling and trade training for a generic fisheries occupation; the New Zealand coastal or deepwater fishery rather than the local Hauraki Gulf or the Bay of Plenty or the bays and islands of the North East coast. Participation in the QMS demands an increased management component and costs which require new skills of the fishers, met through generic technologically based training with the expectation the skills are generic.

For fishermen the QMS has meant a change of ethos, a tighter regime and more “micromanagement” through, for example, phone calls each day, welcomed by some since they implied company concern and communication but deplored by others since they implied surveillance, interference and control. For many it has meant more economic marginalisation and reduction in their sense of freedom ‘out there’. Indeed the QMS has not resolved the fishermen's perennial suspicion that they are being exploited by the companies. Nor has it resolved some safety issues, since quota owners driven by the market dictate conditions, not fishermen deciding when and where to fish, including that they go out in bad weather, so the QMS does not necessarily mean that fishing is safer or more flexible for the fishermen.

In consequence commercial fishermen have moved from being community-based to selling to the fishing companies, which process, distribute and market both domestically and internationally. The findings support those of St Martin's (2006) for New England (USA) that fishermen were removed from the give and take reciprocity of community relations. The community loses and the role of social relations per se is minimised (Helgason and Palsson 1997 460). In some of the Hauraki Gulf communities, fishermen's direct involvement and the communities' commercial linkage with the sea was lost by selling or leasing their quota. In addition community relations became transactional rather than social and reciprocal.

As Pinkerton and Edwards (2009) demonstrate, the leasing of quota has profound implications for one of the fundamental assumptions of the ITQ system namely that the ownership (rights-based) aspect is an incentive for conservation. It doesn't. The decisions relevant for conservation of for example, where and how to fish, how much to catch or over-catch, are made by fishermen. The owners of most of the quota, corporates, are removed from direct influence on such decisions that are generally outside their expertise and interest. Also, generally, the companies are of commercial necessity more focused on meeting market demand and the ‘bottom line’. Quota (ACE) is bought (colloquially ‘leased’) for the duration of a year. The costs involved ensure that the major incentive for ACE-dependent fishermen is to cover their expenses and maximise their return. For non-quota owning fishermen economic necessities ensure that concerns for

longer term consequences for conservation, while not necessarily absent are of lesser immediate concern.

Arguably the QMS may have reduced the "Race for fish," but since getting ACE can be uncertain, fishermen now have to race for companies, and for ACE. As noted above, this may negate the claim that ITQs improve fishermen's safety, since generally international markets not climatic or social conditions (e.g. Christmas) determine company requirements and can override fishermen's seafaring prudence. In the present research the race was for the more sympathetic company, Leigh Fisheries. Many of the directors or board members had been fishermen or still have kin ties to fishermen or own fishing vessels and so tend to have closer personal relationships and empathy with fishermen. Indeed, this company has a reputation for treating their fishermen better than the bigger Auckland corporates. Yet, under the QMS regime restrictions such as bin limits still had to be imposed to ensure catch was both within quota and matched their markets effectively.

Despite the added costs of levies and surveys fishermen are now paid little, if any, more for their catch than they did before the QMS. Reporting and commercial requirements mean less literate, but often expert, and conservational fishermen have been excluded. Discussions with fishermen and observations of the state of the boats at other wharves around the country confirmed that the coastal fleet is in decline and particularly ACE-dependent fishermen are generally marginalized (See: Ingram 2010 2,3). Recruitment now is even more difficult for aspiring fishermen. Where previously cost of the boat and gear was the biggest hurdle, now, in addition they incur training costs to get the necessary tickets and quota or ACE. For many remaining fishermen, their ethos has changed from being enterprising owner-operators with relatively egalitarian relationships with buyers, to being ACE-dependent fishermen. They have, in effect, become contractors, with all the costs and responsibilities but none of the privileges and little hope of realising on their investment in boat and gear, either now or at retirement. They have lost their sense of independence and freedom. "Fishing was one of the least regulated [industries] now it's going 'over the top'" (Anonymous informant).

Typology: Identity / idiosyncratic

Even before the QMS neither the fishermen nor the local community controlled the fisheries. Fishermen were ideologically diverse. Some were conservationist, while others were more content to “get as much as possible” and driven by their own needs at the time and these varied according to lifecycle (pay off the house, and/or debts, retirement needs), seasons (winter / schooling season), the natural variability of snapper and other alternative commercial stocks (e.g. gurnard, john dory, rig), year, class variability and market demand. Needs and opportunities varied. Fishermen were driven variously by an idiosyncratic mix of passion, on the one extreme, and economic exigencies on the other. Fishermen shared and influenced community ideologies. Perhaps, if communities were relative isolates from the pressures of national and international economies, local Hauraki Gulf fishermen would have been more conservative but even in the relatively insular 1970s - 1980s these communities could not be described as predominantly conservative.

Many of the typologies in the literature imply clear or distinct boundaries that may be borne out in the everyday life of fishermen. A typology can be conceived for New Zealand's fishermen based on the degree to which they are relatively independent. This research suggests that current key distinguishing variables are ownership of tangible assets (e.g. boats) or rights (e.g. Annual Catch Entitlement or ITQs). This enables a typology that is a distinctive consequence of a rights-based fishery (See Table 6). In developing this typology it must be recognised that fishermen may never neatly fit one or other of the categories and that personal characteristics may override or subvert any levels of empowerment that might be thought attributable to fishermen who outwardly appear to fit a particular category.

An important crosscutting change has occurred in the construction of the meaning of “fish”. Whether this is due to the introduction of the QMS as a mechanism of change and meaning or as an outcome is unclear. Once, for the fishermen, those elusive living quarry 'fish' meant a livelihood, a challenge, risk and drudgery, the means of supporting a family, or at least one's self. They meant work outdoors in the big marine environment; at times overwhelming, at others uplifting. They meant skill; those special abilities of boat and gear handling in small moving

spaces at unusual unrelenting hours. They meant exhilaration and frustration; a sense of identity. Not everyone could survive the job and not all of those who could, made good fishermen.


| Fishermen | Security | |
|---------------------------|--|------|
| Fishing knowledge / skill | <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> | |
| Debts paid off | | |
| LFR | | |
| Own boat | | |
| Own quota | | |
| Lease some ACE | | |
| ACE-dependent | | |
| Lease boat | | |
| New Entrant | | |
| | | High |
| | | Low |

Table 6: A continuum of Fishermen security under QMS

Certainly, individual informants were rugged individualists, some with more business acumen or more innovativeness or more concern for conservation than others. ACE-dependent fishermen, however, had less room for individual choice so were of necessity more utilitarian than they might otherwise have been, but these are tendencies that are contextual and vary from one individual to another and from season to season. Fishermen now are generally no longer hunters, catching an elusive quarry whenever they could. The QMS selected for different individuals - business oriented and financially competent and often eliminated conservationists, the less literate, and the un-academic. While cuts were ostensibly to ensure sustainability those eliminated were sometimes the more environmentally concerned leaving the more financially ambitious with perhaps less personal commitment to the conservation objective even when economic exigencies allow. This appears to run contrary to standard Hardinian theories of vested interests in quota-ownership leading to long-term sustainability.

Although remaining fishermen manage the stocks in the sense of not deliberately damaging the habitat or taking too much at any one time they didn't "fertilize" or "dag"¹³², or whatever the equivalent task would be in the marine ecosystem, so they also were not farmers. Nor are they employees of 'the company', but since they own and operate their own boats they are contractors at the beck and call of the companies to catch a particular amount, at a particular time, of the right species, the right size and colour and still had to fill out increasingly detailed catch landing returns. More than ever they are in debt (if not financially, in terms of operability) to the company and with a more stringent compliance regime, under the thrall of MFish. No longer rugged individualists they are now serfs (cf Pálsson and Helgason 1995 140).

Commercial fishing was now a lifestyle with passion, traditions, a desire to work in a marine environment and appreciation of being out there, not a viable job! The system was not paying proper wages and depended on people being willing to work for lifestyle, what Courtland Smith (1981 182) termed, 'satisfaction bonus', was being exploited.

Reasons for Selling

Rights-based fishing brought opportunities and problems. It changed commercial fishing from strategising how best to catch and benefit from selling the fish to having to deal with far more bureaucracy, surveillance and compliance. Some fishermen sold their quota, willing sellers to willing buyers and got a "windfall". Others sold to simplify the expanding paper work, believing they could lease quota or buy ACE and fish as before. Maybe they did, for a while, but then buyers' requirements were different or the price they were offered for fish was lower or the conditions tighter or ACE was less available. Fishermen hadn't seen the implications and therefore lost or at least reduced their control over their operation. Others sold, paid off their house mortgage and other debts, tried to continue fishing for a year or two but found such difficulties too great and now regret the loss of their chosen occupation both for themselves and for their children. Some, on the other hand were getting near to retirement or tired of fishing, tried to retain their quota but found it difficult to lease out and reporting

¹³² Routine farming chores.

requirements such as monthly nil returns too taxing so sold. For others capitalising on their efforts was a good way to get out but as Dawson noted a few who sold “pissed their asset away against pub walls¹³³” (*Fishfolk* 15 May 1999). For some fishermen the devaluing of the previous freedoms and satisfactions was something they had to put up with. For others it was a handing over of irksome responsibilities. For some members of Waiheke and Coromandel communities it meant the loss of a vibrant industry that had contributed to their economic and social wellbeing. Some got rid of a grotty often smelly occupation and allowed the gentrification and upmarketing of desirable marine infrastructure for recreational or tourist purposes. Generally, then, those who sold their quota fit Stewart et al.'s profile of exiting fishermen (2006 7). In hindsight, however, a significantly higher number of my informants, than Stewart et al. imply, regretted selling and feel bitterness and a sense of betrayal that they expressed explicitly in several interviews.

Certainly it can be said that in capitalizing on the value of the asset, Waiheke fishermen were at least partially complicit in the dispossession of the community's historical fishing rights. For many fishermen the increased complexity and bureaucratic change of the QMS created a situation of uncertainty that changed the ethos and character of the occupation. In a situation fraught with misunderstandings and misconceptions some sold because they wanted the money, some to get what they could before the possibility they lost out more seriously, some because the job was no longer what they wanted or since others had sold the clique would no longer function and some because they didn't trust the regime. The social implications were not apparent and the Waiheke community was not part of the decisionmaking.

Even if those who sold and then invested in new businesses, such as arborist, or landscaper, the tourist or visitor industries, or waste disposal and are now employing as many crew and provide other support to the community, lost the cogent values of relating to the sea. From being primary producers at least potentially, contributing to community food security, these people moved to secondary or service industries.

¹³³ Squandered it in the pub or on other consumer products.

Under the Thumb

Stuster's seminal paper "Under the Thumb," explains the dynamics of the relationship that resulted between fishermen and their buyers or in the present case, corporates:

In relationships with fish buyers, fishermen incur along the way a host of incidental debts both financial and intangible. Sometimes 'loans' are solicited by fishermen and sometimes they are extended by buyers, as if altruistically. These include borrowing a vehicle, prompt payment for fish, accepting a difficult-to-sell species or a fish in marginal condition, a "break" on price (higher than the going rate), or an actual loan of money or fishing gear. Even when extended in "friendship" both parties recognize the nature of these transactions and the degree of indebtedness incurred. ... The general condition of fishermen in the traditional relationship with buyers is referred to as "being under the thumb" of the markets (Stuster 1980 6).

Daryl Sykes, former fisherman, Federation Field Officer and now CEO of the New Zealand Rock Lobster Industry Council, suggested to me that before the QMS, buyers and companies maintained their access to fish through such covert ties to fishermen. Now since they own the quota and therefore supply the necessary ACE, the relationship is more transparent but the Fishermen are no less tied (Daryl Sykes pers com June 2005). ACE means that Fishermen are contractually tied to the ACE provider which can then be utilised to ensure catching is more in accord with market requirements.

The need for quota and ACE is also part of a managerial bureaucracy that overrides the New Zealand "do it yourself" attitude, and reified "Kiwi identity". Big companies can have specialised staff to handle it whereas the hassle it creates rules out smaller companies and communities. For NZ fishermen, the costs of leasing quota (buying ACE) takes finance that might otherwise be used to maintain their boats and upgrade their gear.

Many of the remaining fishermen complain that the price they receive for their fish now is no more than they were getting twenty years ago. They are aware that the cost of fish to the consumer has risen considerably and for many is priced off their menu. This mark-up from the landed value they receive and the cost to the consumer includes company profits and the cost of the commodity chain but seems exorbitant especially as all fishermen's costs: running a boat and making a

trip, the cost of ACE, NZFIB levies, DOC levies, Maritime Safety levies, safety gear requirements, fuel, ice, groceries are considerably more now than they were before the QMS. Most of the levies are paid by quota owners but fishermen say these are passed on in the ACE prices and are additional to ACE and the costs of vessel safety requirements. Many fishermen are, therefore financially marginal. As most own their own boats they are in effect contractors, struggling to keep up the maintenance and meet the standards of the annual survey. As contractors, fishermen bear the costs and risks. For ACE dependent fishermen quota owners have externalised most of the costs involved in harvesting. So, concurring with Holmes (1998 65, 80), extra benefits go to the authorities, the administration, the companies and their shareholders benefit¹³⁴ but the small-scale fishermen are increasingly marginalised.

Further, for ACE-dependent fishermen Pinkerton and Edwards (2009 5) note that “While processors characterize these skipper lessees as "desperate", the situation of crew or deckhands is equally or more precarious.... [In addition] skippers who are desperate will take greater risks and fish earlier in the season when prices are often higher and weather less predictable”. My research supports that view, although it is not necessarily early-season fishing, but fishing at the direction of the quota owners and their market needs that may place local ACE-dependent fishers at risk. Although the QMS might be expected to have modernised and empowered fishermen and moved them away from the traditional buyer-fishermen power structure, this research indicates that, if anything, they have become more under the thumb.

New Part-timers

Some fishermen among my informants have benefited from the QMS and generally they straddle both systems. They tend to have learnt the skills, accumulated the essential ecological knowledge and fished before the introduction of quota. Perhaps most importantly they have a passion for the sea, for their boats and the vocation. Some sold quota and paid off debt and set up alternative businesses but have been able to get back into fishing with their own boats. Now

¹³⁴ It could be argued that retailers also benefit but since some 90 percent of fish is exported and there are fewer retailers selling a more expensive product directly to the public than before the QMS the issue is not clear.

with well developed knowledge and skills they can reliably catch the fish the companies require so have some security in getting ACE if needed. Since they are debt free they no longer have to work long and hard so can pick their trips to suit themselves and their families. They retain the “freedom” and ethos enjoyed before the QMS so are in effect the new part-timers.

Greg and Michaela Hayes exemplify the attitudes of the new part-timers

If you love the sea and you love fishing then all right, go fishing. Don't go fishing for the money. Go for the passion. If you go because it's your passion then you might make money but if you go for the money you'll never do it. And that is the secret. If it is your passion and you just love the sea. I mean, I've been on the boat and I belong out there.

They enumerated those of their colleagues who were financially comfortable and all were enthusiastic; fishing was more than a job “They've got a passion. They've got a passion for the sea and they are very good. They're bright. They are really bright men. It's interesting. But people would look at them and think 'Oh you're just commercial fishermen’”. These new part-timers, are passionate for the sea and their job, have cleared their debts, own their boats, have skills and are knowledgeable and, unlike many have been able to work the QMS to their advantage so retain some of the pre-QMS freedom.

COMMUNITIES

By privatising catch rights (quota) the QMS, in effect, changed the concept from fish being a community resource to being primarily an internationally tradeable commodity that has then been aggregated to the corporates. For the communities in this study this reallocation of their rights of propinquity and usufruct impacted in terms of nutrition, livelihood and identity. Where once fish was a staple diet and provider of food security, supplied by local community members, it is now scarce and expensive. The fish that is available has traversed a considerably lengthened supply chain. Fish caught off Waiheke, for example, that once supplied the community directly, is now exported or, at best goes through the Auckland Fish Mart and could be bought there, fresh, by those privileged consumers able to get there. Fish otherwise comes from the Mart or another company through a wholesaler, filleters and a distributor. At Coromandel, during my research, the only fresh locally caught fish available to the public was fish that

had been rejected from export orders. While at Leigh, the fish may have been caught by a local fisherman but at least in terms of paperwork it has been through an Auckland retailer.

The commodity chain for mussels from Waiheke is also indirect. Farmed on the island they go across the Gulf by boat to Coromandel then by truck to Auckland before coming back for sale on the island. Some New Zealand communities with LFRs who sell to the public may still have access to fresh locally caught fish at affordable prices but this is virtually not the case for those communities where the fish on offer is expensive, often of questionable quality, compared with what was previously available, and so has generally been priced off the average menu. The community now no longer has ready access to what once was a healthy dietary staple. The supermarket commodities that replace fresh fish may be more convenient but whether they are as nutritious is beyond my expertise.

Compared with some New Zealand fishing communities, the fishing families in Waiheke, Coromandel and Leigh, have less generational depth and dynastic outlook, but perhaps stronger local aspirations since their fishing traditions and ideologies started in those localities, not in the “old countries” (Greece, the Shetlands, Italy, England or others). Their concerns were supplying their local community and making a living, not establishing an industry or “an empire”. For those wives who dealt with the paper work, the increased requirements of the QMS have either enlarged the job considerably or excluded them from this aspect of the enterprise as professional, or alternative, help is required. For their children entering the workforce, doubtful future prospects, pessimism and uncertainty can mean a shortage of aspiring crew and therefore better chance for those who do wish to fish. For those who do not it adds to the pressure to help out struggling family enterprises in an occupation they would rather avoid. Generally though, the livelihoods that fishing once offered are no longer available. As an informant pointed out, the previous ability to divert obstreperous teens is no longer available to mitigate drug, alcohol or vandalism or such teen problems.

For Waiheke and, to a lesser extent Coromandel, the QMS has meant community costs - lack of a system to pick up youth, lack of ability to buy fresh fish (with associated costs to image and health) unless an LFR is obtained, lack of connection with the biophysical environment, loss/change of identity, loss of

community power (to distant communities/corporations), change in boat types leading to loss of vessels from the community with related employment and diversity of readily accessible food alternatives (types of fish). These have had to be offset by further costs to the environment, landscape and community from expanding tourism and land development.

Lien (2003 113) suggests that community identity is a response to outside pressure and the need to 'brand' oneself in contrast to similar others. This is certainly the case in response to the QMS. On Waiheke prior to restructuring¹³⁵, people pursued their lifestyles apparently with little concern for establishing an externally recognizable identity since the ideological contention between 'capitalists' and alternatives' was an internal community issue. Sustenance was available from local resources that included commercial fishing. Before the QMS commercial fishing was part of this identity. There was reassurance in seeing the lights of local fishermen working off the northern coast, knowing they were actively part of the symbiotic relationship between the social and marine ecosystems. With virtually no quota owned on Waiheke Island, except for the wharf sales vessel, no operating commercial fishing boats are based on the island so this sign of a commercial relationship with the sea has gone and with it a significant component economy and identity. So for Waiheke from baches and bed-stays being an expression of a down-to-earth visitor and holiday island, now resorts and lodges backed by wineries and restaurants express a neo-liberal up-market identity without the substantiation of locally caught fresh fish. Waiheke is missing an essential element of its former island life and for the island, the Gulf has moved from a productive fishing ground to a seascape for holiday snaps and postcards.

Neo-liberalism has brought interrelated changes with globalisation, rights-based management and Auckland City governance supporting urban and resort development. In particular, after the QMS, the ethos and symbols of commercial fishing and fresh locally caught fish, fundamental features of islands, are no longer available for community identity. There has, therefore, been increasing

¹³⁵ That occurred generally as a result of the change of government in 1984, Rogernomics and particularly the Local Government Act 1989.

pressure on the communities to identify those 'unique' aspects of the island and its lifestyle that were economically, socially and emotionally significant to Waihekeans and defend them from developers and exploiters. Community economics increasingly meant attracting revenue to the communities from outsiders. With a thriving fishing industry in the Hauraki Gulf, visitors and tourists still expect fresh locally caught fish. The difficulty of sourcing such seafood has, however, meant that commercial fishing and seafood are not generally promoted as part of community identity. Instead even as an island in the middle of what was once the biggest coastal fishery by value and volume in New Zealand, fresh fish caught by locals is not commercially available. Because these local resources for subsistence and livelihood have been increasingly restricted there has been the need to construct an identity and 'sell' Waiheke Island's other attractions and services.

Coromandel, however, with a strong marine aquaculture industry and gold mining history has recently seen the transition to a tourist oriented 'fishing town' image through the shops, while the 'wild' commercial fishery has dwindled to marginality. Leigh, with marginally better infrastructure and arguably fewer resource and livelihood alternatives appears to be significantly different with its processing plant, prominent local fishing company (Leigh Fisheries) and fleet. However the fleet and number of people involved in the fishing has been severely depleted compared with those in the not too distant past. Leigh still identifies itself and is identified as a fishing community. Since Waiheke, Coromandel and now Leigh could expand their restaurant, wine, visitor and tourism industries they are still viable. It remains to be seen to what extent they will remain so under tighter financial and possible fuel restrictions following peak-oil. .

These three communities have good access to local fishing grounds, but access to infrastructure and transport is more difficult for Waiheke (as an island), Coromandel (with winding roads on a long peninsular) than for Leigh. Leigh has highways and a location that enabled servicing vessels in communities on the North East coast and to urban supply centres (Whangarei and Auckland) with Auckland international airport giving ready access to international markets. With the QMS quota aggregation, the corporates have centralised so the fleet previously based at Waiheke is now virtually non-existent and those at Coromandel and

Leigh severely reduced. Consequently Waiheke is no longer involved in the fishing industry and Coromandel is marginal though Leigh is still a fishing village. The strategic location for the remnant fleet and both domestic urban and international markets explains Leigh's continued and indeed expanding involvement in the fishing industry under the QMS.

Waiheke has survived at the cost of greater dependence on commuting to Auckland for employment, expansion of other aspects of the tourist and visitor industry, the fortuitously expanded productivity of viticulture and the demand for coastal lifestyle blocks; features which facilitate a viable neo-liberal economy, but to the detriment of self-sufficiency. On Coromandel the profits from leasing out quota have contributed to the development of aquaculture and other enterprises including the tourism and visitor industry so the capture fishery persists, but is marginal. Conditions for aquaculture have provided a replacement marine industry with a local product that contributes to identity and nutrition. At Leigh, a greater number of fishing families with longer traditions of fishing, its location on main road transport and fewer alternative resources have resulted in a different outcome. Leigh Fisheries survived as a Co-op and found a niche in the international fresh chilled fish market to increase its strength as a company, although still threatened with takeover by larger corporates. There has been a reduction of the local fleet and availability of fresh fish to the community but with Leigh Fisheries the community has met the challenge through its company. Leigh is still a base for fishing operations and is a 'fishing community' but even here the LFR requirements and the demands of the international market mean fresh locally caught fish is scarcer for local residents and visitors than the locality and activity would suggest.

In all three communities charter fishing and boat chartering have provided a few jobs in the recreational sector for former fishermen which meant some could still use their boats and skills working in the marine environment and revel in the different relationships with their clients. For others chartering meant a loss of the solitude and familiar work adjustments to known or casual crew and a form of sociability outside their comfort zone such that it wasn't a viable alternative in an already well catered market.

Politically and economically Coromandel has been marginalised and Waiheke generally excluded from the fishing sector's contribution to employment, fresh food, income and related mechanisms that reinforce community and social capital. Now they are much more dependent on secondary industries and highly vulnerable in the present global financial crisis and unpredictable fuel prices. Communities are stakeholders, in the marine environment and fisheries, and should be recognised as such. Individuals may submit to FMPs but communities are not represented in consultations. Instead the issue is left to market forces.

The resources and processes of community cohesion have been reduced as the basis of them has been socially captured by the corporates. Relations in the community are now more transactional than previously and consequently the community is now less expressive, more instrumental and utilitarian which substantiates Symes (2000 3) claim that the more centralised concentration of fishing (rights-based fishing) creates, “virtually unsurmountable obstacles to new entrants. ... the implied threats to the survival of the small boat sector which generates considerable employment, and the unique socio-cultural characteristics of the artisanal fishermen. ... the development of capitalistic relations within the fishing industry” (Symes 2000 3).

This research therefore confirms the findings reported by others:

- Quota aggregated to corporates (Stewart and Callagher, 2002). The QMS provided corporates opportunity to break their dependence on fishermen by aggregating the quota and thus catch rights over commercial fishing. As a result there was a major reduction in the numbers of owner-operators and fishermen (Stevens 1999a, 1999b; Holmes 1998)

Some fishermen, those who retained quota have done OK and now depending on their personal ideology own several boats or become ‘New Part-timers’.

- Corporate ownership took wealth out of the community (Yandle 2001 29). Since corporates controlled the fishing through corporate ownership of quota and hence ACE meant fishermen had to land to them not through the community. The international market was more profitable hence fish that would have been utilised by the community was either exported or greatly increased in price thus taking wealth out of the community.
- Crew being disadvantaged (Yandle 2001 30). The reduced fleet meant crew had fewer berths while the costs of training, tickets and quota or ACE greatly increased the difficulties of entering the industry.
- Unemployment (Palsson and Petursdottir, 1997 53). Greater unemployment was mitigated by payments received from selling quota enabling recipients to establish other businesses offering self employment

and in these communities development or expansion of the aquaculture, viticulture and tourism industries

- Exacerbated equity problems within the community (Helgason and Palsson, 1997; Apostle et al. 2002). The buybacks and the sale of quota meant previous fishermen had capital not available to their peers in the community meant.
- Changed fishing behaviour (Apostle et al. 2002 121; Boyd and Dewees 1992 187). The corporates control of quota meant they could adjust fishing to suit international market requirements not necessarily the seasonal availability of fish thus rationing fishing effort.
- Changed and additional pressures on family relationships (Davis 1996 110). Money from buy-backs or quota sale on the one hand offered unanticipated alternatives the additional funds required for ACE, levies, surveys and increased costs in addition to more stringent reporting requirements add strains to family finances.
- Loss of coastal fishing community authenticity (Jentoft, 1993). Without fishermen, fishing boats and fresh locally caught fish the island identity of Waiheke and the fishing community identities of Coromandel and Leigh have been badly depleted.

THEORISING THE QMS

The three features stressed by neo-liberal ideology, privatisation, market forces, and deregulation impact differentially on the components discussed in this dissertation. Neo-liberal ideology is embedded more explicitly in MAF/Mfish and given expression through the QMS therefore influencing fishermen and their communities. This is so-called rights-based since the core element, privatisation creates the property right with ownership overriding the human rights of communities and their fishermen on the basis of propinquity and usufruct. Mfish's brief is "to ensure that fisheries are used in a sustainable way and that we have a healthy aquatic ecosystem. That way, all New Zealanders can get the best value from this resource" (Mfish¹³⁶). MAF/Mfish ideology, 'think big' then neo-liberalism seems to interpret "best value" as the maximisation of industry and export returns which are then captured mainly by corporates and their shareholders with the costs externalised to part-timers and their communities.

For the corporates, market forces facilitated corporatisation and the globalisation of international trade on the one hand and, through the QMS access to fish shifted

¹³⁶

See: <http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/default.htm> (Accessed 18 July 2008).

from owner-operators to the corporates and quota owners, enabling most to maximise benefit without concern for the well-being of communities, even those which had been significantly dependent on fish previously. The neo-liberal imperative for growth means that once the availability of fish is capped by the TACC, in order to "grow" profits harvesting costs must be reduced, processing added for value-added products and the resulting commodities distributed and sold to the highest paying market.

Yandle's (2001 113) claim that privatisation was being discussed in Federation in the 1970s was at a time when 'think big' policies were developing the crisis. The issue, therefore, is more complex than just benefits for MAF /MFish and the corporates as fishermen through the Federation lobbied for the exclusion of the part-timers to the detriment of inshore fishermen and coastal communities. There are profound consequences from privatisation and deregulation for the fishermen under the rights-based QMS. Ownership of quota or ACE meant both considerable cost and restriction while, under deregulation, the imposition of levies, more stringent survey requirements, reporting and selling restrictions tightened the fishing regime. Even so some fishermen have benefitted from quota ownership (e.g. Dave Moore, TV1 Country Calendar 7 June 12.00AM) or service his own operation and provide quota for others (e.g. Tony Meulo, TV1 Country Calendar 113 February 2010 22:30) or alternative occupations but many others have become marginal or been forced out of the industry.

Right-based fishing meant a change of ideological perspective from an ethos of flexibility, community relationship, cooperation and informal economy, an ethos of freedom where fishermen were self-employed, hunting, rugged individualists, with a "number eight wire Kiwi can do" attitude keeping the boats together, out there self- and clique-reliant, not part of the urban rat-race. To operate within the QMS fishermen became neo-liberal businessmen in a regime of privatised catching rights (quota), market forces and "de-regulation" that in reality increased regulation in an ethos of business / commercial, regulation and inflexible accountability. Just as the exclusion of the part-timers removed many legitimate, particularly rural pluriactive fishermen dependent on fishing for their livelihood so the QMS removed not just the ratbags but also many environmentally and socially responsible community fishermen.

At the level of personal ideology some fishermen were not "the sharpest knives" and just wanted to fish. Fishermen and those in the Co-op, for example, were oriented to fishing not business and therefore the added difficulties (reporting, paperwork, bureaucracy) were a problem not a challenge. Even before the QMS globalisation was having influence and Waiheke fishermen had begun to service the more lucrative Japanese Iki Jimi market in addition to the local market.

Exports were beginning to take precedence over local subsistence. Fishermen are now embedded in a tighter bureaucratic regime. They can still enjoy the marine ecosystem, boats, camaraderie, cliques - out there - but quota restrictions mean corporate control and marginality for many.

Some of the remaining fishermen who owned quota, may have become the new part-timers or others with the business acumen and such aspirations could leverage it to a small fleet operation. ACE dependent fishermen, however, became contractors, serfs for the companies, with many marginalised by the externalised costs of the system, levies, ACE lease, increased survey fees, to the extent they were lucky to keep their boats afloat for the duration of their careers; their boats and gear barely saleable on their retirement. In such a regime they lack the ownership and any incentive toward conservation. Instead their incentive is of necessity to squeeze the most money they can, by catching the product the market requires as quickly and cheaply as possible and maintain their operation and livelihood. While non-fishing quota owners have incentive to conserve the value of their financial asset they have only indirect effect on fish stocks and habitat destruction.

The consequences of ideology in general and neo-liberalism in particular affect the community (e.g. See Palsson 1990 1991 54) with significant social implications. The rights of fishing communities are a global issue and New Zealand is no exception. In the Hauraki Gulf and, by extension, in other coastal communities, rights of propinquity and usufruct were overridden. Locally caught commercial fish is not readily available so fresh 'fresh' fish and an intrinsic part of Kiwi heritage has been lost to a combination of corporate export profits¹³⁷ and

¹³⁷ On Waiheke Te Matuku Bay Oysters' expanding sales of fresh fish sales from the Hauraki Gulf goes some way to address this issue. These filets are however, at gourmet prices and not the basic, cheap and nutritional fresh fish supply the island once enjoyed. Some urban locations are better served (See: Table 2)

tighter, more costly more punitive administration that appears geared to both protect the sustainability of the fishery and the rights of those who hold harvesting rights. Such implications might not be as severe as for the communities of developing nations dependent on the fisheries for survival, they were, nevertheless, seriously deprived of a major resource that contributed to livelihood, nutrition, community identity and well-being.

Symbolically and meaningfully fish have become commodities. Once sacred in some areas and some cultures, fish which were part of the exchange, for money or barter, between fishermen or fish shop keepers and community members, facilitating community relationships and the interrelationships which reinforced community solidarity and resilience are now mere commodities passed along an anonymous commodity chain. Where once community members knew, or could know just by asking, who caught the fish or which boat, now takeaway shopkeepers often know only the last company to have handled the product. Instead of eating natural foods distinguishable by appearance and taste consumers now depend on advertising, branding and labelling of an anonymous commodity. Consumer relationships with the fishermen, fish workers and the marine ecosystem have been lost to an increasingly globalised, corporate food industry.

Before the QMS the livelihoods of fishermen operating from the community were dependent on community resources for services and contributed to community welfare. Now, since fishermen are more dependent on the corporates they are less embedded in the community. Fish had meant jobs supporting families directly and indirectly through repair work or other services to keep the boats running. For a few short years commercial fishing was the biggest industry on Waiheke Island. With the exception, for example, of one wharf fisherman selling at most only one night's catch per week, Waiheke, has lost its fishermen. Fish once meant good fresh healthy food a chore and inconvenience to gut and cook, maybe, but caught by the neighbour or the guy down the road. For Waiheke now and to a lesser extent Coromandel, if not bought at the Fish Mart in Auckland, or gourmet items at limited outlets, fish are 'products' expensive fillets or boxed frozen commodities, sourced through long uncertain chains. Sometimes of questionable quality, generally 'fresh' is priced off the ordinary budget.

At Coromandel the few fishermen that remain are oriented to selling to Leigh or OPC at Whitianga. While even in a fishing community such as Leigh, conceptually landing to *your* mate driving *your* co-op truck is different to landing to the company truck though in practice it may be little different. In consequence loss the "perks" such as "home freight" and the criminalisation of the informal economy has meant the loss of ability to ensure those who need nutrition, such as the ill and struggling (young mothers), get the occasional feed of fish. The communities have been excluded from resource, from livelihoods, from the nutrition of cheap locally caught basic food. Instead of an ethos of cooperation and sharing has been replaced by greatly individualised cash transactions. Now, generally, kids have lost the inheritance moving into a family run business. Community resentment and resistance contributes to Waiheke's identity as a feisty community.

For the recreational fisher the fishing may have been improved with less commercial fishing around the island and more "recreational" fish. The supply seems generally better but is still subject to yearly and seasonal variation, and there are opportunities for local and tourist charter fishing.

Before the QMS community identity was not an issue. Now under neo-liberalism the incentive is not for a sustainable community from local resources. Consequently loss of direct access to fishery resources has meant loss of essential features of Island identity and the necessity to rebrand, to maximise wealth through coastal subdivision and business "growth". It has meant catering for a changing demographic with the influx of wealth expressed in mansions, lifestyle blocks, vineyards, fig plantations, investments and profits. In contradiction to a tourist publicity identity of "picturesque vineyards, beaches and laid back seaside villages" the remnants of the Alternatives struggle against being rated off the island and retain features of ecology, landscape and community.

MFish were focused on the symptoms and ideological solution, not the causes of the decline in coastal fish stocks or social justice for the communities. The corporates were then and are now focused on profits from globalization and the global food industry so the remaining fishermen and their communities bore the brunt. If the rights of fishing communities are important as determinants of community entities, they have not been considered in the QMS and its

implementation. The social implications of rights-based fishery management has meant fishermen's and community rights to community resources have been transferred to the corporates with consequences for livelihood, nutrition and food security. In the Hauraki Gulf, and by extension in other similar coastal communities, rights of propinquity and usufruct were overridden. Individual fishermen, with the exception of the 'new part-timers' and 'fishing communities' such as Leigh have been marginalised economically and politically from the fishing industry.

Future Research

To what extent the findings for Hauraki Gulf fishermen and their communities are representative of other New Zealand fisheries needs investigation. The present research did not set out to study the exclusion of the part-timers and I was unable to locate any in the communities studied. The exclusion of Māori led to the fisheries claims to the Waitangi Tribunal and partially addressed. The real consequences for pakeha fishermen who had been dependent on the fisheries have, however, been largely ignored by other researchers. A more comprehensive assessment would research the files in MFish and SeaFIC to provide information on just who the part-timers were and go to the more remote, particularly Far North, ports to determine the social implications of their exclusion. This was a significant event in New Zealand history with long term consequences for social justice and warrants full investigation.

Just how representative this research is other coastal communities in New Zealand needs investigating. Many, if not most fishing communities will have faced the same trends from social and reciprocal relations toward transactional, with marginalisation of fishermen, fleet depletion¹³⁸ and loss of locally caught fish similar to those studied here.

Māori and the Māori Fisheries Settlements were not included in this research despite profound social implications, both positive and negative of the QMS. This is a major field for further research.

¹³⁸ During a brief visit to Lyttleton Harbour , for example, in May 2008 one fisherman expressed similar concerns to my informants and about a third of local fishing boats at the wharf seemed to be for sale.

The present focus has been more heavily weighted toward fishermen and consumers in the community rather than the supply chain and the commercial implications. Determining whether or not coastal communities now get a more nutritional, healthier food from commodities through the contemporary supply chain as they did previously from their local fishermen requires different expertise from mine. Like fisheries, the food industry has also been corporatised with profound implications for communities and their members and warrants a more comprehensive investigation than has been attempted here. Research is needed into the costs at each step of the supply chain between catching and the final consumer to determine whether or not factory jobs and benefits to corporates and their shareholders are of greater benefit to the nation than those for owner-operators and direct consumption in communities.

Fisheries were not the only resource privatised in a way that excluded many from their preferred livelihoods. A real accounting of the benefits should be balanced by evaluating the cost of externalising the loss of jobs, clients, unemployment, family strain, depressions and the contribution to such symptoms as drug use, graffiti and other symptoms of social resentment.

With the benefit of hindsight, I would have explored the process and implications of “leasing quota” for ACE-dependent fishermen in more detail. This is a critical issue on which the social success or failure of the QMS depends.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Fish, living marine species, once sacred in some cultures and societies, then community livelihood and food, are now mainly just value-added commodities in the frozen product sections of global food industry supermarkets.

Through the extensive introduction in 1986 of the QMS, New Zealand has established a reputation as a leader in implementing rights-based fisheries management. This dissertation has explored some of the social implications at the fishermen's and community level and this concluding chapter draws the main threads of the dissertation together.

Since the early 1900s there has been conflict between small locally based fishermen generally supplying their local community and the big company boats serving the mass local and export markets. There has been a trend to increasing legislation and bureaucracy imposing more reporting, monitoring and control on fishermen. The change with rights-based management has not been a simplification but an exponential expansion of bureaucracy, costs and corporatisation that has shifted allocation of fish from community and coastal fishermen to the corporates. From having fish and importing fishermen to supply a local market, New Zealand now deprives much of the local market of fresh locally caught prime fish species and instead exports it to service a predominantly international market mitigating the loss to communities with convenience commodities.

Following the declaration of the EEZ MAF's allowing the 'big boats' imported under "Think Big" to fish prime coastal species aggravated consequences of Rural Bank and Financial Corporation loans and created the crisis that the QMS addressed. In its implementation MAF did show some recognition of pre-existing rights and social justice but the social implications of the quota buyback schemes and the QAA process in the transition to the QMS for fishermen their families were stress, frustration and uncertainty. In due course for some it meant financial benefits as the companies bought up their quota but for other fishermen and families, there remained only the stress and uncertainty of a tortuous process and the uncertainty of being able to continue their chosen livelihood. Consequently

the number of fishermen has been reduced considerably. Fewer fishermen based in the community with different boat types and methods changed the scope of fishermen politics so there is now less scope for cliques, the rivalries and cooperation. Fishermen may remain rugged individualists at sea but are now more formally contracted to companies and of necessity utilitarian.

MFish now implements a more stringent compliance system policing the quota requirements, while registration, boat survey requirements and inflating costs all add occupational restrictions. For the companies, marketing opportunities but more restricted quota has meant a tighter, even micro management regime for the fishermen from ACE distribution, bin limits and daily phone calls. From the flexible “give and take” of an occupation embedded in the coastal communities and local industry, with the QMS the fisheries became much more regimented, the ethos of freedom has been curtailed and of necessity fishermen are now far more utilitarian than before.

Aggregation of quota has meant the corporates now have direct control over access to their product. Fishermen are more beholden to the companies from which they obtain ACE. With little increase in the landed price for fish over the past 20 years, deduction of the price of ACE, increased costs for goods, services and levies, more of the remaining fishermen are economically marginalized in a new system that demands rigorous accountability and primarily services the export market.

Commercial fishing is now no longer an occupation of either last resort nor does it offer an optimistic career path for the capital strapped new entrant. Where before the QMS those who aspired to the becoming commercial fishermen with the freedom of working in the marine environment chasing an elusive quarry needed to develop boating and hunting expertise now, in addition, they must have technological and business skills, a much different skill set and aspirations. Fishermen now, aware of the occupational uncertainties; tighter management regime and increasing costs, tend to discourage their children into more certain career directions. For their children who do have the skill set and commitment, those of the new part-timers for example, the opposite may be true so they may be inducted into the family enterprise.

The requirement to land to LFRs and the bureaucracy involved for local retail outlets in becoming and being a LFR meant fishermen were generally no longer

able to land distribute fish to community outlets and thus residents in most coastal communities were deprived of fresh locally caught fish an issue, at best, only redressed by Wharf Sellers Licences. Communities were, therefore, deprived of fresh fish.

Under the neoliberal ideology, rights-based fisheries management in New Zealand, aggregation of quota by the companies generally transferred control over access to fish from the fishermen to the companies, especially the corporates. In keeping with corporate minimization of costs the landed price of fish to the fishermen remained at pre QMS levels and ACE-dependent fishermen were increasingly marginalized. Corporate control of quota also transferred the food and nutrition of fresh locally caught fish from the community to international markets. The financial benefit went to corporates and their shareholders. In return communities lost livelihoods and got expensive processed commodities.

The main social implications for Hauraki Gulf Fishermen are a tightened regime with greatly increased bureaucratic requirements. With the exception of the few new part-timers there is a reduced ethos of 'freedom'. Many fishermen are ACE-dependent contractors under tight company control. As anticipated allocating economic rights is critical in a neo-liberal system. Following Deetz (1994), I expected to find hegemony and hegemonic change in fishermen's work expressed the new economic and employment arrangements; change in fishing ethos from a dominant freedom hunting 'out there' to a more structured and accountable supplying seafood commodity to meet corporate interests. Consequently the basis of competitive relations between boats changed from fishing skill to commercial skills between quota owners and also between ACE-dependent. Quota ownership reinforces the hierarchical relationship between skipper and crew shifting emphasis from prime focus on fishing skills to quota acquisition ability in a more dominantly commercial market. Rights-based fishing meant the loss of the community rights to fish through usufruct and propinquity. The property rights-based management system, has taken fisheries in New Zealand from an expressive system in which fishermen experienced an ethos of "freedom" and serviced local communities, the domestic and the export markets to a far more instrumental and utilitarian system.

The social costs of the QMS were, therefore externalized to the fishermen, especially ACE-Dependent, their families through increased uncertainty and stress and financial pressure and to their communities through the loss of fresh locally caught fish. Although Waiheke has essentially been excluded and Coromandel marginalized from the fishing industry the development of alternative resources, tourism, coastal development, wine and figs has meant both have shifted to dependence on external markets but have survived. Other more fishery dependent communities may not have been so lucky. Perhaps when Peak Oil bites or international markets collapse from the financial crisis or concern for “oil miles” and sustainability, the trend will reverse. Then if the traditional, ecological or fundamental knowledge of fishermen is still extant, local youth and coastal communities can face the challenge of the marine ecosystem and again provide fresh fish caught by locals.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Abbreviations and Glossary

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------|--|
| ARA | Auckland Regional Authority |
| ARC | Auckland Regional Council |
| Federation | New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen |
| FIA | New Zealand Fishing Industry Association |
| FIB | New Zealand Fishing Industry Board |
| FishServe | Fisheries Registration Service |
| FMA | Fisheries Management Area |
| FMP | Fisheries Management Plan |
| GPS | Geographical Positioning System |
| ITQs | Individual Transferable Quota |
| LFR | Licensed Fish Receiver |
| MAF | Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries |
| MFish | Ministry of Fisheries |
| NAFMAC | National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee |
| QAA | Quota Appeal Authority |
| QHA | Quota Holders' Association |
| QMA | Quota Management Area |
| QMS | Quota Management System |
| Rights-based | Property rights-based |
| SeaFIC | Seafood Industry Council |
| SNA | Snapper stock species code |
| SNA1 | Stock code for snapper in QMA1 |
| TAC | Total Allowable Catch |
| TACC | Total Allowable Commercial Catch |

MAORI WORDS USED

| | |
|----------|-------------------------|
| Hapuu | sub-Tribe |
| Iwi | Tribe |
| Kaimoana | Seafood |
| Manuka | Ti Tree |
| Pakeha | non-Maori New Zealander |
| Whanau | Family |

GLOSSARY

ACE Annual Catch Entitlement

“ACE is a property right, which gives the holder the right to take a certain weight of a fishstock during a fishing year. Quota shares generate an amount of ACE at the beginning of each fishing year. This means that each person who owns quota shares will be allocated an amount of ACE at the beginning of each fishing year. The amount of ACE that is allocated for a fishstock will be determined by the TACC (Total Allowable Commercial Catch) for that Fishstock. There are 100 million quota shares for each quota stock, and ACE is allocated as a proportion of that”. <http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/ace/index.aspx> (Accessed 3 August 2008)

Fishing Permit

“Any person or company wishing to fish commercially in New Zealand waters must hold a fishing permit. If you are not already a client of FishServe you should submit your client application form with your permit application. On the permit application you need to state whether you are applying for a permit to take quota and non-quota stocks, and or Schedule 4C stocks, where you are intending to land your catch and the stock code and fishing methods for any Schedule 4C stocks that you are applying for. Please note that only a handful of fishers have a moratorium exemption to catch Schedule 4C stocks”. <http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/permits/index.aspx> (Accessed 3 August 2008).

LFR Licensed Fish Receiver

“Only those persons licensed as Fish Receivers are permitted to receive fish for the purpose of sale from commercial fishermen. Section 191 of the Fisheries Act 1996 restricts the disposal of commercially taken fish, aquatic life, and seaweed

by commercial fishermen”. <http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/lfr/index.aspx>
(Accessed 3 August 2008)

ITQs

Individual Transferable Quotas

Quota Shares

“Quota shares are a property right that represents the quota owner’s share of a fishery. There are 100 million shares allocated for each fishstock. Please note: There are restrictions in the Fisheries Act 1996 which controls the ownership of New Zealand quota by overseas persons or companies”.

“Owning quota shares does not allow you to take fish. The amount of quota shares owned determines the amount of Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) that is generated each year. ACE is allocated at the start of each fishing year”.
<http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/quota/index.aspx> (Accessed 3 August 2008).

FISH SPECIES MENTIONED

| | | | |
|--------------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------------|
| Albacore | | | <i>Thunnus alalunga</i> |
| Baracouta | | | <i>Thyrsites atun</i> |
| Bluefin (Southern) | | | <i>Thunnus caccoyii</i> |
| Crayfish | Rock lobster | | <i>Jasus edwardesii</i> |
| Creamfish | Leatherjacket | | <i>Paruka scaber</i> |
| Dogfish | | | <i>Squalus acanthias</i> |
| Gurnard | | | <i>Chelidonichthys kumu</i> |
| John dory | | | <i>Zeus faber</i> |
| Hapuku | Gropers: | Bass, | <i>Polyprion americanus</i> |
| | | Groper, | <i>Polyprion oxygeneios</i> |
| | | Bluenose | <i>Hyperoglyphe antarctica</i> |
| Hoki | | | <i>Macruonus novaezelandae</i> |
| Kahawai | | | <i>Arripis trutta</i> |
| Kina | Sea egg | | <i>Evechinus chloroticus</i> |
| Kingi | Kingfish | | <i>Seriola lalandi</i> |
| Ling | | | <i>Genypterus blacodes</i> |

| | | |
|-----------|---------------|---------------------------------|
| Mackerel | Jack mackerel | <i>Trachurus declivis</i> |
| Snapper | | <i>Chrysophrys auratus</i> |
| Swordfish | | |
| Tarakihi | | <i>Nemadactylus macropterus</i> |
| Trevaly | | <i>Pseudocaranx dentex</i> |
| Warehou | | <i>Seriolella brama</i> |

Appendix 2. ITQs Author Affiliations

| NAME | AFFILIATION | Discipline / Status | DOMINANT OCCUPATIONAL PERSPECTIVE | EVIDENCE: PUBLICATION |
|------------------|---|----------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Allen, Robin | MAF / Assistant Director Fisheries Research Division | | Fisheries Research | Allen 1983 |
| Annala, John | Biologist / MAF / NIWA / Chief Scientist at the Ministry of Fisheries | | Fisheries Science | Annala 1996; Lead author annual Stock Assessment Reports. |
| Arbuckle, M. | MAF / Challenger Scallop Enhancement Company | | Industry | Arbuckle and Drummond 1999 |
| Batstone, C.J. | Faculty of Business, Auckland University of Technology (AUT) | Biology | Academic Economist | Batstone and Sharp 2003 |
| Belgrave, M.J. | NAFMAC | Public servant | Public Servant | Belgrave 1983; Belgrave et al. 2000 |
| Bess, Randal | School of Business Nelson Polytech / Mfish | Fisheries / Business | Academic / Mfish | Bess 1999; 2005 |
| Billington, Greg | F.I.B. Gear consultant | | Industry? | Billington 2000 |
| Boyd, Rick | MAF Auckland Manager | | MAF Management | Boyd 1983; Boyd and Dewees 1992 |
| Clark, Ian | MAF then FIB | | Economics | Clark and Duncan 1986; Clark, et al. 1988b |
| Clement, George | MAF / Consultant / CEO Orange Roughy Company | | MAF / Industry | Clement 1999; 2000 |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|--|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Connor, Robin | Bureau of Rural Sciences and Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, The Australian National University / Mfish | Resource management student / MAF Policy analyst | Academic / Mfish | Connor 2001abc; Aslin et al. 2001 |
| Crothers, Stan; | MAF / Mfish | | MAF / Mfish | Crothers 1988; 1999 |
| Cullen, R | Economist | | Academic economist | Cullen and Memon 1990 |
| Davies, N.M. | South Africa / MAF Auckland | | Mfish | Davies 1992 |
| Deweese, Christopher | Marine Fisheries Specialist Sea Grant | Anthropology / Geography | Social research | Deweese 1987; 1989; 2007 |
| Drummond, K. | Biologist / MAF / Challenger Scallop Enhancement Company | | Industry | Arbuckle and Drummond 1999 |
| Duncan, Alex | FIB then MAF | Economic Geographer | Economist | Duncan 1983; Clark and Duncan 1986, later a key player in the unsuccessful attempt to establish FMPs |
| Duncan, Leith | Sociology Dept U of Auckland / Deckhand / Greenpeace / PhD student U of Waikato | Anthropology / Geography | Anthropologist / Environmentalist | Duncan 1982; n.d. (1993); ; |
| Edwards, Mark | MAF | Biologist / Fisheries scientist / Manager Stock Assessment | MAF / Mfish Administration | Edwards 1999 |
| Fairgray, J.D.M. | McDermott Associates Ltd | Social scientist | Socio-econ Consultants | Fairgray 1985;1986 |
| Falloon | Treasury / MAF | Economics | Economics | Falloon 1993? dateFAO?? |
| Feldman, Mark | Recreational Fisher / Trauma Doctor | | Recreational Fisher | Feldman 1993 |
| Fenemor, A, | Integrated Catchment Management, Landcare | | Planning | Sinner and Fenemor 2005 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|--|---------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| | Research, Nelson | | | |
| Gaffney, K.R. | Economics Department University of Auckland | Economics student | | Gaffney 1997 |
| Gallagher, Peter D. | UNITEC Institute of Technology | | Analyst | Stewart and Gallagher 2002 |
| Hansen, Derek | Novelist | | Community / fishermen's | Hansen 1997 |
| Hargreaves, Kirk | Oral Historian | | Fishermen's | Hargreaves 1998 |
| Harte, M. | SeaFIC | Economic Geographer | Industry | Harte 1999 |
| Haworth, Jenny | SeafoodNZ Journalist / Writer | | Fisherman's | Haworth 2008 |
| Hawes, Peter | Novelist | | Community / fishermen's | Hawes 2002 |
| Hawkey, David | Economics Department, University of Auckland | Economics student | Social Research | Hawkey 1994 |
| Heberley, H. | Wife of Fisherman, Farm owner | | Fishermen's / Family | Heberley 1996; 2005 |
| Hersoug, Bjorn | Norwegian College of Fisheries Science, Tromso / Mfish | Fisheries science | Fisheries Scientists | Hersoug 2002 |
| Hewison, Grant | Greenpeace | Lawyer | Conservation | Monk and Hewison 1994 |
| Holmes, Nicola Jane | Geography Department, University of Waikato | Geography student | Community | Holmes 1998; Rennie and Holmes 1998 |
| Hore, A.J. | MAF / NIWA | Fisheries Science | Fisheries Scientists | |
| Hufflet, J | NZFIB | Economist | Industry | Parker and Hufflet 1993 |
| Johnson, David | Management Studies, University of Auckland | Historian | Industry | Johnson and Haworth 2004 |
| Kerr, K. | Motu Economic and Public Policy Research | | Economic and Public Policy Consultants | Straker and Kerr 2002 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|--|--|----------------------|---|
| Le Heron, Richard | Geography Department, University of Auckland | Economic geographer | Research | |
| Mace, Pamela M. | MAF / National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). NOAA. / NIWA | Fisheries science | Fisheries Scientists | Sissenwine and Mace 1992 |
| Major, Philip, | FIB then MAF | Management | MAF / Neoliberal | Clark, et al. 1988b |
| Marshall, S.J. | Geography Department, University of Waikato | Geography student | | Marshall 2000 |
| Martin, Bob (Taffy) | President, Federation | Fisherman | Fishermen's | |
| Massey, Edwin | Geography Department, University of Auckland / Mfish | Geography student / MAF Policy analyst | Geographer / Planner | Massey 2003; 2005; Massey and Rees 2003; 2004 |
| McClurg | MAF / Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission | Biology? / Management | Neoliberal | McClurg 1997 |
| Memon, Ali | Otago / Lincoln University | Geography | Geography / Planning | Cullen and Memon 1990 |
| Monk, Grant | Greenpeace | Lawyer | Conservation | Monk and Hewison 1994 |
| Neilander, W.J. | University of Tulane / Fisheries Management Consultancy International, Ltd | | Lawyer | Neilander and Sullivan 1999 |
| Newell, Richard | Resources for the Future, Washington | | Economist | Newell et al. 2005 |
| Page, P. | Law Department, University of Otago | Law student | | Page 1994 |
| Parker, G. | NZFIB | Economist | Industry? | Parker and Hufflet 1993 |
| Peacey, Jonathan | F.I.B. / Mfish | | Economist | Peacey 1996; Peacey and Connor 2007 |
| Pearce, Peter | Emeritus Professor University of British Columbia | Economics | Academic economics | Maloney & Pearce 1979; Pearce 1991 |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|---|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Rees, Eugene | Geography Department, University of Auckland / MFish | Economic geography student / MAF Policy analyst | Geographer / Planner | Rees 2004; 2006 |
| Rennie, Hamish | D.O.C./ University of Waikato / Lincoln University | Geography | Geographer / Planner | Rennie 1993 |
| Sanchirico, James N | Resources for the Future, Washington | | | |
| Sharp, Basil M. | Economics Department, University of Auckland | Economics | | Sharp 1997; 1998 |
| Sinner, J. | Ecologic Foundation | | | Sinner and Fenemor 2005 |
| Sissenwine, M.P. | NMFS / MAF consultant / NMFS | Fisheries science | | Sissenwine and Mace 1992 |
| Stevens, Peter | Trawlerman / Federation Sec. | Fisherman | Fishermen's | Stevens 1992; 1999;.. |
| Stewart, James M.. | UNITEC Institute of Technology | | | Stewart and Gallagher 2002 |
| Straker, G. | Motu | | Economic & Public Policy Research | Straker and Kerr 2002 |
| Sullivan, Kevin | MAF / NIWA | Fisheries Science | Fisheries Scientists | Annala, Sullivan and Hore 1991 |
| Sullivan, Michael S. | University of Washington / Fisheries Management Consultancy International, Ltd | | | Neilander and Sullivan 1999 |
| Talley, Peter | GEO Talleys/ Amatal | | Corporates | Talley 1999 |
| Thompson, Andrea | Law Department, Victoria University | Law Student | | Thompson 1992 |
| Townsend, Ralph E. | Department of Economics, University of Maine / now Mfish | Economics | | Townsend 1998 |
| Wallace, Catherine | School of Business and Public Management, Victoria University of Wellington / ECO | | Academic Economist / Conservationist | Wallace 1997; 1998 |

| | | | | |
|----------------|--|--------------------|--|---|
| Walshe, Kim | MAF Auckland / Ackroyd Walshe Ltd./ Academic | Fisheries manager | Administration | Akroyd Walshe Ltd. 2002; Stewart, Walshe & Moodie 2005 |
| Weeber, Barry | Biologist / Forest & Bird | Environmentalist | Conservationist | Wallace and Weeber 2003 |
| Wheeler, Brent | Public servant / Director | Economic Geography | Geography / Corporate Finance, Law, Economics, Governance | Wheeler et al. 1991 |
| Winder, Gordon | Canadian University / University of Auckland | Economic geography | Geographer / Planner | Winder 1997 |
| Wyatt, N. | Mfish | | | Wyatt 2000 |
| Yandle, Tracy | Indiana University / Emory University | Political Science | | Yandle 2001; 2002; Yandle and Dewees 2000 |

Appendix 3. NZ Legislation and Management

Timeline

NEW ZEALAND FISHERIES LEGISLATION AND MANAGEMENT TIMELINE

Maori [1000 AD]

Maori started fishing¹³⁹ (p15)

1769 Captain Cook

Was impressed by Maori fishing – 120 different species with nets, hooks, lines, rods, traps.

1790 on

Maori supplied whalers traders and new settlers

1860s

First colonial regulations.

1866 Oyster Fisheries Act 1866

First government move to control fisheries. There were more Acts over the next 2 decades.

1877

Fisheries Protection Act. Provided for fish reserves, seasons, gear restrictions (P17)

1885 Fisheries Encouragement Act.

Provided land for fisheries townships and bonuses for fish canned and cured for export. (P16)

¹³⁹ Unless otherwise stated page references refer to Hersoug 2002 which is the main source for this timeline.

1886

Fisheries Auction Act. Fishers could sell fish at any hour of the day or night. (P17)

1894 Sea-Fisheries Act and Licensing

1892, 1897, 1903

Amendment Acts (P17)

1903 Amendment Act. Fishing Vessel Licensing & Reporting

All fishing vessels to be licensed & statistical returns

1908

Fisheries Act 1908. Consolidated all previous and passed responsibility to Marine Department and the Minister of Marine.

1911

First signs of local over-fishing. The Chief Inspector of Fisheries started questioning the effects of trawling on near-shore local fishing grounds.

1914

Canadian Commissioner of Fisheries, Professor Prince visited NZ and reported. His recommendations (included) territorial borders and cold storage.

Despite discouragement Auckland City Corporation started trawling with 5 steam trawlers. Dunedin and Wellington established public fish markets.

1919

Government set up a Fisheries Commission – groundwork for the Fisheries Promotion Act. Provided \$NZ 25,000 per annum for fishing boats, processing plants and cold storage. Implementation of Act delayed so little of the money was invested in fisheries but the fleet consisted of steam trawlers and smaller net and line boats (P18).

1926

Inspector: “The principle object of scientific administration is to regulate exploitation so that it doesn’t cut too deeply into the reserve that must be maintained to ensure adequate stocks for the future” (P18).

1930s

Depression. Then exports to Australia boomed and there was concern about over-fishing. (P18)

1937

House of Representatives Commission of Enquiry to investigate the state of fisheries. Sea Fisheries Investigation Committee visited 38 harbours, interviewed 500 operators, produced 3102 pages of written evidence and 200 recommendations. The mood was conservative and cautious. Suggested dispense with fish trade.

1937 April

Licensing to limit participation in catching, wholesaling and retailing. During the war there was more conservation concern.

1945

Amendment Act 1845, regulations. Licensed fishing vessels could only operate out of and land their catches in specific ports, prescribed in the licenses. Number of vessels down to 1000, 1413 men employed at sea, 16,600 tonnes catch. Fish exports tiny – 0.24% NZ total exports. By 1945 government regulated all aspects of fishing.

1950

Fisheries (General) Regulations. 114 separate regulations.

1957

Fishing Industry Advisory Council with representatives of fishers, wholesalers, retailers but a government nominated chairman. Conservationist views prevailed. Canadian expert, Professor Richardson at University of Victoria who led doubt in the regime (P19). Fisheries Inspector: “Conservation of our fisheries resources through restrictive licensing is no longer effective” (Slack 1969 14). Richardson claimed there was scope for expansion. Hersoug implies New Zealand disregarded his advice (Hersoug 2002 19). Japanese fished to within 3 NM limit. There was pressure on politicians.

1961

Select Committee to inquire and report on the fishing industry of New Zealand.

1961

Fisheries Amendment Act 1961 opened entry into catching sector to any individual resident of NZ and companies with more than 50% NZ ownership. Set standards and

requirements and established the Fisheries Research Division of the Marine Department. New technology from Norway demonstrated (trawling and Danish seining).

1965

Supplementary Loans and Mortgage Guarantee Scheme ... to provide finance for independent fishermen to buy new fishing vessels.

During the next 20 years the government provided harvesting industry with \$NZ 50.9 mil in loans, processing sector with \$15 mil, export subsidies \$1.5 mil.

Fleet increased from 1727 vessels in 1963 to 5178 vessels in 1973. Landings increased 6-7% per year from 1963 – 1983. Fishing Zone [the Territorial Sea] expanded from 3 NM to 12 NM (P19). New Zealand's total catch was 58,000 tons compared with South Africa's 470,000 tons, Iceland's 1,240,000 tons and Norway's 2,850,000 tons (P20).

1972

Responsibility for fisheries administration transferred from the Marine Department to MAF (P19).

1975

NZ catch 90,000 tons. Clear signs that the inshore resources were depleted. "Vessels acquired to fish offshore waters were used to fish prime inshore species, competing with steadily increasing coastal fleet of full-timers as well as part-timers". In waters outside New Zealand catches by Japan, Korea, Soviet Union and other Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) increased. By 1977 (year before 200NM EEZ declared) it was estimated foreign vessels were responsible for 90% of the demersal catch of 475,600 tonnes (Sharp 1997 508).

1977

Amendment Act 1977 Controlled Fisheries

granted Minister and ministry discretionary power to declare "controlled fisheries" (Hersoug 2002 24; Sharp 1997 507)

1978 The 200NM New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) declared.

It was fourth largest in the world, more than 5 million square kilometres, twenty times the New Zealand landmass, but not as productive as others with 75% of the EEZ deeper than 1000m (>500 fathoms).

1982 Moratorium on inshore fisheries

(Hersoug 2002 24; Sharp, 1997, 507)

1983

Formation of National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (NAFMAC)

August 1983

NAFMAC report laid out the inshore problems in detail

1983 Fisheries Act

(Hersoug 2002 26)

1982-83 season

The declared catch of 2000 fishers was less than 750tons. MAF concerned about potential capacity in these 2000 licenses (Hersoug 2002 25).

1983 August

National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (NAFMAC) Report laid out the inshore problems in detail (Hersoug 2002 26).

1983 Exclusion of the part-timers.

1984

Government's Inshore Fisheries Management Discussion Paper (The Blue Book cited as MAF 1984) offered three alternatives:

Business as usual

Attrition with competitive TACs

ITQs

End 1984

Consultation with fishermen begins industry to gain info and feedback on ITQs (Hersoug 2002 30)

1984

Moratorium on new lending for inshore fishery projects (Sharp 1986 512)

Unused permits were removed from the fishery (Sharp 1986 512).

1985 May Decision on ITQs

1985

1800 fishers received initial allocation based on best two of three years. But under reporting so 1400 reviewed. 6 objection committees heard most cases by mid 1996. But there was still possibility of appeal to QAA (Hersoug 202 31)

1986 QMS introduced 1 October.

1987 Quota Appeal Authority

1989 “The Accord”

Absolute quota in perpetuity changed to proportional quota.

1991

The Government invited Dr Peter Pearse, Canadian Fisheries Economist, to review whole of QMS. “Not surprisingly, Pearse (1991:25) concluded that the “quota system is a better way of managing fisheries and should be retained.” But he had a number of critical remarks...”

Deficiencies:

“environmental concerns are not well handled

“users are given too little responsibility for management of the resources, and

the need for a thorough reform of the whole legislative framework (Hersoug 2002 39).

1991 August

New minister. “In August 1991 the Minister appointed a Fisheries Task Force, headed by Dr. B. Wheeler to review all fisheries legislation and to develop a coherent, practical and integrated management regime”. The Taskforce produced a comprehensive review of the QMS which showed how the new Fisheries Act could be constructed with “sound environmental management” by giving environmental concerns a greater role using market incentives and a rights-based regime. Some environmental groups argued “strongly for a revival of state interference (sic) and government regulations to curb the commercial fishing industry” (Hersoug 2002 40 – 42).

1996 Fisheries Act

After 10 years of QMS operation and 5 years of reviews and debate. The Fisheries Act 1996 brought significant changes:

ecosystem based approach

provides for input and participation from Maori (Treaty of Waitangi and Settlement Act (Fisheries Claims))

Recognises NZ's international obligations – more enabling allowing administrators more flexibility to achieve outcomes.

1996 Act provides for *utilisation* of resources while protection is explicitly taken care of by other acts and agencies. Increased stakeholder participation and involvement in decision-making process, purchase of services and devolution of services. Consultation mandatory. Possibility of Fisheries Plans. Commercial stakeholders got concessions on participation and devolution and Minister more discretionary power obtaining different outcomes (Hersoug 2002 45).

1997

An Mfish discussion paper proposed reforms (Mfish 1997). An independent review of the Fisheries Act 1996 was started by Wheeler, former leader of Task Force, then by PricewaterhouseCoopers and reported to the Minister July 1998 (Hersoug 2002 45).

Fisheries Amendment Acts 1998, 1999

These “reforms aimed at better definition of roles and rights, a simplification of the present regime, improving flexibility and participation in decision-making.

Introducing Fisheries Plans

Devolution (especially registry services)

More efficient cost recovery scheme, based on principles more acceptable to industry

More flexible balancing regime (ACE)

Alternative ways to set TAC especially taking bycatch into consideration

Simplified offenses and penalties regime

Technical amendments to simplify original Act (Hersoug 2002 46).

But the fishing industry felt that “in spite of certain simplifications, the overall QMS has become more and more complex over the years, and this applies even more so if we include the complete management system, to the extent that the industry now talks about the “Maximum Sustainable Frustration Level” (Talley 2000 250)

2001

With 105 species still under non-ITQ management the Minister promised 50 new would be added to the QMS. “Within industry views are mixed, where many would prefer certain species permanently kept out of the QMS” (Hersoug 2002 39).

Appendix 4: *Gulf News*: Waiheke Based Commercial Fishing

The *Gulf News*, Waiheke Island's now prize winning local weekly news media has, since its inception in the mid 1970s, consistently provided detailed accounts of local events and significant issues of interest or relevance for the Waiheke community. Since Waiheke is an island, maritime matters in particular get good coverage. Not only those of general interest, such as the periodic finding of rare beaked whales or dolphins washed up on Onetangi Beach or the presence of seahorses in Enclosure Bay but also commercial, and recreational fishing and events.

From a smattering of articles in the mid 1970s until 1992, when virtually all commercial fishing from the island ceased, *Gulf News*, provided good coverage to the local industry particularly of the nature of fishing in the period before the QMS and issues in the lead up to the introduction of ITQs.

MID 1970S

Those early issues dealt with the Marine Department research vessel *Ikatere*'s snapper survey in the Hauraki Gulf (*Gulf News* 31 July 1975), an application to sell fish from a refrigerated van by father and son fishermen who had done similar successfully in Auckland some years previous (*Gulf News* 6 February 1976), concern at trends in fisheries exports and foreign fishing (*Gulf News* 1 January 1977), a councilor taking over the Oneroa fish shop (*Gulf News* 10 June 1977) and stirrings at over-fishing with fishermen calling for better surveillance in the Hauraki Gulf (*Gulf News* 16 December 1977).

As commercial fishing based on Waiheke expanded in 1978 news coverage increased reporting the sale of the fish shop so the owner could devote more time to council work and assess the support for a fish plant on the island (*Gulf News* 3 March 1978 9), fishermen hit by thefts of gear from their boats (*Gulf News* 2 June 1978), a Danish seine skipper in court for poaching too close to the island (*Gulf News* 2 June 1978).


Formation of the Association

The *Gulf News* devoted several articles to the formation of the Waiheke Commercial Fishermen's Association with reports of the intention to meet (*Gulf News* 23 June 1978 4), coverage of the meeting of 33 fishermen (*Gulf News* 30 June 1978 5) and their application to council to establish a fuel tank on the wharf at Matiatia (*Gulf News* 7 July 1978 10,11). Murray Bromiley, fisherman, County councilor and recent fish shop owner was reported as saying he had been asked to call a meeting to initiate an association or

co-operative. "There's about \$140,000 worth of fishing boats at Matiatia," he said, "and many of them have been put into the water within the last three months -- so we're dealing with a fairly big industry and one that brings a lot of money onto the Island". With "37 registered fishing boats on the island", some though part-timers, with a co-operative working, "they could get supplies cheaper and they'd also have more bargaining power in selling their catches," they wanted an ice locker on the wharf and there was a security aspect (*Gulf News* 23 June 1978 4). The meeting elected a steering committee, decided on the name, Waiheke Commercial Fishermen's Association and determined that the a condition of membership was holding a current commercial fishing license but allowed for the possibility for associate membership (*Gulf News* 30 June 1978 5). It was soon realized that having both ice and fuel available on the wharf was important but were angered by Council's list of conditions in response the application was withdrawn (*Gulf News* 1 September 1978 3).

The not untypical recruitment of one fishermen was reported. "Ken Thompson ha(d) been a panel beater at Ostend for six years - and "working in fibre glass dust and paint fumes" was beginning to affect his health so, after trips with friends who were fishing commercially, he had bought and was fitting it out as a long-liner" (*Gulf News* 4 August 1978 5).

By the end of the year, spokesmen for the association, Chris Dunne, the secretary and Murray Bromiley were expressing the association's concern at the peril to the Gulf from trawlers and seiners poaching in the 007 area (See: figure 27) – that part of the inner Gulf designated for long-liners and gill netters. Dunn noted that Hauraki Gulf Snapper Advisory Committee Government was wrongly blaming the depletion of fish in the Hauraki Gulf on recreational fishers when it wasn't doing enough to prevent poachers. Instead, expressing the fishermen's perspective, the Government seemed "interested only in increasing exports and at present fish is a big export earner". Further, he felt "The Government brings in these enormous boats used by Sanford and Jaybell ['big boats' See Chapter 4.] which are 12 times more efficient than normal boats and they fish the old grounds around Barrier, often in pairs or even threes dragging huge nets; they're taking 36 times the fish a normal boat would take. When they're a third full, the catch is put into one boat which shoots off back to town and the other pair carries on. They work them non-stop" (*Gulf News*, 1 December 1978 13-15).



Map: Hauraki Gulf Reporting Areas before QMS. (From, Supplement to Catch '80, MAF, October 1980.

Since there were fewer articles the following year the fishing seems to have proceeded more routinely. The plans of Mr. Tomczyk, a relatively newcomer to the Island, to establish a fish processing plant did make the news. "There were 49 registered fishermen on the island and it was a state of idiocy that at present they were required to take their catch to town', he said". "Stringent town planning and health requirements" intervened, however, "since a conditional use on an industrial property does not allow either processing, cleaning, gutting or disposal of wet fish on site". "The Waiheke County Council... agreed 'in principle'". Despite obvious benefits to the island from employment

since “fish processing is a labour intensive industry, with a lot of work (gilling, gutting, filleting, etc) done by hand” and “The fish manure process required machinery for processing the gut, but otherwise plant machinery costs were negligible” (*Gulf News* 17 August 1979 cover story), but the health regulations proved too much and the project lapsed.

An alternative application from the Association for a chiller on the vehicular ferry wharf at Kennedy Point aroused considerable concern from nearby residents. The closest objected because there was “no notification, effluent, melting ice, no septic tank or drainage” and there would be an increase in heavy traffic from the wharf. Again the project was stymied by planning regulations (*Gulf News* 16 November 1979 13).

While the Island community was generally supportive of the fishermen residents did not want the detriments of the occupation like, refrigerator or truck noise intruding on their backyards or lifestyles. Though later my informants remembered the support, but there were also conflicts at all levels; with Council over regulations, with residents over noise and locality of the infrastructure with inconsiderate part-time and new fishermen from elsewhere.

The year ended with the obituary for “Jimmy” Ngapo who had come to Waiheke with his family in the mid 1950s after “long and distinguished war service with the Maori Battalion” and in the Marine Department in Coromandel, and Tauranga as District Inspector of Fisheries. As Inspector of Fisheries for Waiheke and a fisheries officer with MAF he was one of the island identities and held in very high regard by many including a number of my informants (*Gulf News* 21 December 1979; & pers com).

1980

Problems of disposal of food scraps and waste were being discussed early in 1980 with the food shops concerned they were being blamed “for the appearance of decaying food scraps in Council rubbish bins.” In a letter to the editor, Malcolm Sheppard, owner of one of the fish shops asserted “We can only speak for ourselves, but all our organic wastes, fish offal, potato peelings, etc, are composted in line with the County Chairman’s recommendation, and the cardboard fish cartons returned to our fishermen for recycling.” (*Gulf News* 25 January 1980).

For her May column, Aileen Belcher, one of the many local artists sketched the fishing boat *Pip-Kim*¹⁴⁰ and outlined how it had taken Bruce Prattley, its owner-operator, a

¹⁴⁰ For significance of fishing vessel names see Dwyer, Just and Minnegal who argue:

the initial private acts but public conventions of naming, fishers recreate on the water, through the personalisation of boats, the on-shore attachments and connections entailed

former builder four years to build before launching it three and a half years previously. Naming it for his two daughters symbolized the family attachment. His then three years of fishing were far more satisfying than building. The article gave the essence of his fishing ethos: his love of fishing, shifting the boat from the local bay even at midnight to the shelter of Matiatia when a northerly came in, the seasonal variation in fishing and maintaining contact with his family. "Bruce says he will never go back to building. He loves fishing and is sometimes away for a whole week or longer if the weather is contrary. He keeps in touch with his family with a C.B. radio, his wife having a base set" (*Gulf News* 9 May 1980 26).

All sectors were beginning to feel the lack fish. Local fishermen had a lot of support in the community but there was strengthening opposition to commercial fishing in favour of tourism. A charter skipper claimed "Commercial fishermen are "raping" the Hauraki Gulf and slowly destroying an area that has the potential of becoming New Zealand's top tourist attraction" and argued that "that a fish caught by a tourist from a boat is worth hundreds of dollars more to New Zealand than a fish commercially caught and sold through the export markets in Japan" (*Gulf News* 24 October 1980 31, 32).

Moratorium

MAF was also concerned and in October the *Gulf News* announced the moratorium on new commercial fishing licenses, various gear restrictions such as increased mesh size and a quota of 3,500 tonnes on the snapper catch. The Regional Fisheries Officer felt "The moratorium would have a "dampening down" effect on the pressure on the Hauraki Gulf fishery reserves: in the last 25 years there had been a substantial erosion of the amount of water available for commercial units¹⁴¹ and the number of boats had tripled, he

in the names carried by those boats. What each person who names a boat may achieve for himself is ultimately an accomplishment for all others in the community of fishers to which he belongs. Second, named and personalised boats mediate relationships among all who have been and are associated with those boats. Each boat, in its own right, is secured through its name to the relationships embodied in that name; an umbilical connection to home and hearth. All of those boats, collectively, through the individuals who have been and are linked through the names, socialise the sea; they give it dimensions it would not otherwise have, and establish the sense of both time and place (Dwyer, Just and Minnegal 2003 19)

¹⁴¹ The Fisheries Act 1983 defines "Fishing unit" in relation to a controlled fishery license, means the vessel or vessels used by the, license holder in carrying out the business of fishing together with all gear and equipment used in association with that business; and includes any employee of the license holder engaged in that business (Fisheries Act 1983, 5)

said. "There are more units and more work and that must throw the pressure on." A few of the commercial fishermen on the island were not catching snapper but once the quota for the Gulf was caught the "bulk of the 36 registered fishermen on Waiheke -- will have to fish outside the boundaries of 005, 006 and 007" (*Gulf News* 10 October 1980 8, 9).

In November an article spread across two issues of *Gulf News* informed the community that the Moratorium was a prelude to the Hauraki Gulf becoming a controlled fishery before 1982 with further restrictions and detailed the reasons and anticipated restrictions (*Gulf News* 7 November 1980 15,16; 14 November 1980 15-17).

The final issue for December gave an inkling of community involvement in commercial fishing and also of how innovation arises in the fishery. One fisherman was have gear difficulties "the "hockey clips" on his long lines -- the clips were prone to slip from the line, were hard on cold, wet hands, and had the potential of tangling the traces when the line was wound in. ... a brainstorm and three months work from an island engineer...and some finance from a Waiheke businessman, the new clip is being manufactured in a totally island enterprise" resulted in an ingenious mechanical device patented on Waiheke and marketed further afield (*Gulf News* 31 December 1980 5-7).

1981

By 1981 the increasing numbers of Waiheke fishermen and their growing sense of their industry was reflected in an increased number of articles.

In anticipation of a controlled fishery the local fisheries officer warned that there would be increased enforcement of fisheries controls. "There is a lot of flounder fishing going on at the moment and, as seems to happen every year, fishermen are using illegal nets and are often letting them go dry. People should be aware of the regulations because if the nets are set wrong, are too long or are not marked correctly, they are almost certain to be picked up by fisheries officers" (*Gulf News* 16 January 1981 19).

Fishermen were part of the community, were aware of community support and in turn by organizing a fishing contest for children both contributed to community life and raised their profile. The *Gulf News* reported on "The Waiheke Fishermen's Association fishing contest for children at Matiatia was held for the second time last Sunday with 125 entries." The contest was supported by "predominantly Waiheke businesses" which was indicative of community support and, at the wharf, arranged to fit between ferry times (*Gulf News* 30 January 1981 11).

The moratorium was controlling the number of fishermen but not the increase in fishing effort in response to depleted stocks. With more public interest and awareness a Gulf News reporter took a trip with the fisheries patrol launch to hear official concerns first hand. "From time to time the public read of another trawler arrested at sea and charged with a breach of the fishing regulations ... what many may not realise is that each arrest is backed up with an extensive exercise run to near military precision by teams of Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries officers." Both the patrol boat and some fishing vessels were painted a naval grey, the reporter saw the efforts made to avoid detection. When a fisherman was apprehended "it was all 'Hail fellow, well met' with both the officers and the fishermen being reasonably cordial. ... (though that) was not always the case, but most of the time the fishermen were very gentlemanly about a "fair cop". That is not to say they are not past trying every trick in the book to wriggle off the hook if it is at all possible" (*Gulf News* 27 February 1981 29-31).

The new controls came into force on 1 March with a snapper quota of 3800 tonnes, new minimum gear sizes and area prohibitions on larger vessels. They also banned pair trawling by smaller boats but significantly in terms of the issue in relation to the 'big boats', not from boats over 19 metres. Vessels of this length were, however, pushed into the deeper water of the outer Gulf and, once the quota was reached the Director of Fisheries could ban all commercial fishing. If it was not reached the remainder could be carried over to the following year (*Gulf News* 6 March 1981)

The *Gulf News* noted increasing concerns for energy use by all sectors of the fishing industry, "Concern is expressed for the industry's, and in particular the fish catching sector's, heavy and increasing reliance on diesel fuel which comprises 62 percent of the total energy used. The rapid expansion of the domestic catching industry which is forecast to occur up to the mid-80's will increase its diesel requirement from 2 percent (1978) of the total supplied to all New Zealand industries to over 15 percent by 1983" (*Gulf News* 10 April 1981 26).

Formation of the Co-op

At a meeting over the weekend, sixteen full-time commercial fishermen put "forward equal cash contributions", ordered an ice plant and appointed the initiator and one of their number, Doug Hamilton as manager of a cooperative. Details of the enterprise; "the finer points of just how the co-operative would form - whether as a company or what - were still being discussed with legal and accountancy advisers. Essentially the group had decided in principle to go ahead at the weekend meeting. 'We have 16 fulltime commercial fishermen who have all fronted up with the cash to get this off the ground and that's the main thing. They will all be equal shareholders in the company and will fish in to the company facilities on the island'" instead of having to steam to the Viaduct (*Gulf News* 14 August 1981, Cover & 4). Since Waiheke was in the middle of the long-

line fishing grounds, servicing the fleet on the island saved extra fuel, time and running costs.

By December Mr. D.W. Hamilton, the managing director of “The Co-op”, officially Waiheke Sea Products Co-op Ltd, outlined their plans to the Waiheke County Council. In doing so he also presented the salient features of Waiheke commercial fishermen’s role in the fishing industry. “The company set up by 23 Waiheke commercial fishermen ... wants to use Matiatia wharf to offload catches bound for the company's proposed cool store at Ostend” The first stage of the operation was .”an ice plant, chilled holding facilities and trucking facilities” ... (employing) “two people”. Second stage was developing “a licensed whole fish packing house which would provide work for six to twelve people”. They aimed to “service the Waiheke fishing fleet at Waiheke instead of in Auckland. He predicted a saving of \$60,000 a year to shareholders from the reduced unloading costs” (*Gulf News* 18 December 1981 17-19).

With the Gulf becoming a controlled fishery most (local) fishermen applauded the restrictions. Mr. Hamilton said co-op members “contribute roughly 40% per cent of Auckland's 'Jap Pack' export snapper, we collectively have a reasonable say in the gulf's management.” And “the 'Jap Pack' trade was worth about \$1.5 million annually. The fish handled were top quality, long-line caught, and were exported air freight, whole and chilled. The shareholders' boats were in the 26 foot to 35 foot range and were set up with semi- automatic longline gear and icing down facilities.” Time in getting the snapper to the market was critical their “aim is to have the fish on the auction floor in Japan within two to four days of being caught. ”Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and Fishing Industry Board studies have shown that this type of fishing returns the highest price per kilogram of fish for each unit of energy (fuel and labour) used. So, while a lot of larger companies with trawlers and seine boats are in difficulties over rising costs, the longline fishing is booming” and “Because of this type of catching method, conservation is guaranteed as small fish are returned to the sea alive and feeding grounds are not damaged” (*Gulf News* 18 December 1981 17-19).

They wanted moral support from the council. Use of the Matiatia wharf between ferry operations, to use a suitable truck and hoped to discuss the siting a diesel pump on the wharf with Council, in return for paying reasonable wharfage and their cooperation (*Gulf News* 18 December 1981 17-19).

1982

With even greater coverage the major issues addressed by the *Gulf News* were the demand for marine farms in prime commercial fishing and recreational areas around the island, the depleted fishery, Co-op operations and growing uncertainty over licensing.

The New Zealand Companies Register reports that Waiheke Sea Products Co-op Ltd. Was registered 19th January 1982 with six directors (all of whom I know to be fishermen) and Nominal Capital \$62,400.00. The Co-op was struck off the register 10 February 1994.

Marine Farming

All the sites in the Waitemata Harbour and Inner Hauraki Gulf that would support marine farming had been identified and disseminated for public consultation. The extensiveness of such possible aquaculture alarmed many including a large proportion of Waiheke residents and their opposition was widely reported in the *Gulf News*.

The Waiheke Commercial Fishermen's Association's submission as reported indicates that the fishermen's concern was not just for their economics or their operation but was much wider and included community issues. Mr. Chris Dunn, the secretary wrote to the Ministry, "saying that on the basis of being residents some 24 families are represented and they would "strenuously object" to any use of Oneroa, Mawhitipana or Onetangi Bays" which were three of the major and the most publicly used beaches on the island, "for marine farming on aesthetic grounds as these are recreational areas whose beauty "adds greatly to the charm of the island". Also "As commercial fishermen they would actively oppose many of the areas indicated, including closure of: Man O'War Bay and Waiti Bay as these are necessary anchorages that provide good shelter in winds from the west through north to northeast. There is also good winter fishing in these areas and they provide somewhere to work in northerly conditions when the Firth of Thames is too rough. The area from Kauri Point south to Waiti Point, an "invaluable shot" in northwest conditions during winter. From Te Whau Point to Pie Mellon Bay, a rich area of scallops and snapper in winter and easily worked in easterly or southerly conditions" (*Gulf News* 15 January 1982 17). Public outcry was such that the future applications were dealt with on an individual basis but the process did alert residents to other demands to use the Gulf.

Snapper depletion

The decline of fish, mainly snapper in the Gulf was a major concern, that arose from MAF's study for marine farming in the area, and even led "Waiheke County Council to find out what action they can take halting this trend". The Council and indeed many fishermen were worried that in the schooling season there were "fishermen galore taking out fish that are full of roe. They are destroying their own future¹⁴²." Some councilors

¹⁴² Fishermen's and scientific views were different. Fishermen used the analogy of a farmer killing his breeding stock opposed fishing during the spawning season. They did because they couldn't afford not to and if they didn't fish, everybody else did anyway (Viaduct research). Scientists on the other hand argued at since each female snapper ejected hundreds of thousands of

suggested closure for the period and another referred to marine reserves (*Gulf News* December 1982 10 19). The fishermen responded with their perceptions of MAF, power fishing part-timers and the issue: MAF "who purportedly spend hundreds of thousands on researching the Gulf, are totally ignorant of the complex ecosystems out there. We fishermen, who also study the Gulf full time, love further information, so if Waiheke ratepayers have a quarter of a million for further research we would welcome the findings".

"The problems of the Gulf are:

- (i) Re-introduction of pair trawling in the Gulf during the breeding season.
- (ii) Blatant (often daylight) poaching by Seiners (one good catch would equal the total catch of the Waiheke fleet for seven working days).
- (iii) Trebling of fishing effort by part-timers when the fish are trying to school.

"Against this formidable array of horsepower, the local fleet plugging away at nighttime to make up for winter losses is but a 'drop in the ocean'" (*Gulf News* 17 December 1982)

Leith Duncan noted that "The problem of declining fish catches is complex. There are no obvious or easy solutions. Indeed there are almost as many views as there are fishermen. Perhaps the only consensus among them ... is that the Gulf should be closed to all fishing, including recreational fishing during the spawning season" (*Gulf News* 24 December 1982 19-21).

Co-op development

"(T)he purpose of the plant was to safeguard the livelihoods of the fishermen on the island" (The number involved seemed to fluctuate but) "There were 19 in the co-operative and about 25 full time committed fishermen on the island". The co-op manager "didn't think the restriction on licenses would adversely affect the operation of the plant. "Most of the guys here are established fishermen," he said. "They all have a commitment to fishing. It is not like in town where you can go and get other work - it's a full time commitment". By contrast "In the Western Viaduct in Auckland half of the boats are tied up in the winter time and they¹⁴³ only go out in the school fish season and rape the gulf. 'I think any committed fisherman would be fully behind what they are trying to do'. 'They

eggs, the number of snapper recruiting to the fishery 4 or 5 years did not depend on the number of fish spawning but on predators and other environmental factors.

¹⁴³ Part-timers and those who registered their pleasure craft so they could berth there and sell "recreationally" caught fish.

are looking after the resource and it is in the interests of the co-operative that we have this protection” (*Gulf News* 18 June 1982 28).

Early in December the *Gulf News* reported that "After one year of negotiation, organisation and hard work, Waiheke's fishing co-operative has received official sanction for an operation that could prove to be one of the island's biggest industries. "So far the co-operative has 19 shareholders, and is looking at an optimum membership of 25. For the 17 boats now operating from the island, the sound of ice from their Ostend plant sliding down the chutes at Matiatia wharf is a particularly welcome sound” They calculated “it was costing our members about \$75,000 a year just in the physical expenses of going up to town to unload, ... "without counting the cost of wasted fishing time." By operating from centre of Gulf so fresher, quicker turnaround, better price, particular Japanese market, improved quality, better bargaining position. (N)ineteen shareholders put in capital for their \$90,000 Ostend ice plant, which was built with the help of the Rural Bank and Development Finance loans”. Since ""There's a lot of varied expertise in the group and that has cut a few corners.’ It also saved a bit of money - market buyers were surprised they had done it for under \$130,000”. Their spokesman, Chris Dunn, noted "Much of the organising, financial knowledge and diplomacy (fishermen being an individualistic lot) was provided by Doug Hamilton Other members of the co-operative spent long hours working on the plant, as well as keeping up with their fishing” (*Gulf News* 3 December 1982 19).

With the ice plant working the co-op was anxious to start the next stage and open a packing shed. It was hoped that the Rural Bank, which had helped with finance for the ice plant would assist. "At the moment the co-op's fish is contract packed in Auckland, an operation that loses both time and money, according to (spokesman) Chris. At peak times the Auckland sheds are unable to cope with the volume of fish from co-operative members. With the Waiheke Co-op now providing about a third of the good fish coming into Auckland, he thinks that the Auckland sheds will not be enthusiastic about this proposed venture. 'But it's essential for our viability to have the fish packed here on the island. It's the only way to realise the full quality and value for the fish - and I believe we are committed to going ahead with the proposal" (*Gulf News* February 18 1983 1,4) .

Commercial Fishing Licenses

Rick Boyd, of MAF anticipated that less than half of the 1000 fishermen who might apply to continue fishing in the Gulf would get licenses. A licensing board was being established to review applications and conduct hearings. "Those who were informed that the authority intended to decline a license also had the right to attend a hearing and state their case”. Those still not satisfied could appeal to the High Court. "He said that the main grounds for the granting of a license would be a history of fishing in the Gulf and a reliance on it. The criteria “usually meant that at least 80 per cent of income was derived

from fishing". "In a fishery like the Hauraki Gulf where there are too many fishermen, part timers are likely to get the short end of the stick," he said. "But there will be some people who do rely on fishing on a seasonal basis and the licensing authority has plenty of options open to it to allow these people permits but they will be second best to the full timers" (*Gulf News* 11 June 1982 5).

The prospect of licensing¹⁴⁴ created considerably uncertainty for Waiheke fishermen. Newcomers were worried because they needed a fishing history and an economic reliance on the fishery. This was a big issue for Waiheke fishermen "At the moment there are upwards of 1000 licenses in the Gulf, but according to Waiheke co-op fisherman, Doug Hamilton, only about 150 of these are full-time fishermen, while perhaps only 70 fish all year in the Gulf. "A recent survey carried out by the Combined Fishermen Association show that of this 150, 30 are seiners, 30 trawlers and 90 are small boat fishers. These operate in an area from Leigh down to Thames, including the Coromandel, Waiheke and Great Barrier Island" (*Gulf News* 30 July 1982 30).

The issue was that "In the past licenses have been granted readily, with the result that 'fly-by-night' fishermen have taken advantage of the good money to be made in the schooling season - often dumping cheap fish on the market at a time of the year when year-round fishermen are starting to recoup winter losses. Several local fishermen mentioned the North Shore company directors who take two months off to reap the benefits of the lucrative summer season". Chris Dunn had fished from Waiheke for six years was critical of the way MAF had handled the situation "They gave 2 1/2 years advance warning, and have invited applications from practically everyone. Even people as far North as Whitianga who don't normally fish in the Gulf." As a result many part-timers were becoming full-time "and the numbers of boats fishing in the Gulf has increased three-fold". "In spite of a national moratorium of licenses he has heard that they are still being issued" (*Gulf News* 30 July 1982 30).

If the concern was for conservation he felt long-lining would be the preferred method since it was more selective, caught only feeding fish and did not cause the habitat damage like trawling. Long-lining also caught higher quality fish for the Japanese market. "They

¹⁴⁴ There is confusion between "licences" and "permits". Fishermen talked about licences but Walter Murray was told by his lawyer "We have also noted in your correspondence and your discussions with us that you have referred to the issue of "a licence" when what you seek is a "permit". A licence relates to "controlled fisheries" where permits are issued as a necessary prerequisite for carrying on a commercial fisheries operation under the Act. We observe section 49 of the Fisheries Act makes provision for appeals in relation to "licences" but we can find no corresponding provision under the Act for appeals in respect of "permits". (See: J.W. WATSON letter, 11 Sept 1985 From Watson to Murray, Re: Fishing Permit Application In Murray 1986).

pay good money for top quality, but they won't pay anything for substandard produce. 'It's better to have 100 small guys getting a high quality product, and good export receipts from the Gulf, than trawlers getting a lower grade product which the companies cannot always find a market for.'" While MAF's stated reasons for the policy were conservation fishermen were concerned the real reasons were political and in favour of the big companies. That by not policing what long-line fishermen saw as rampant poaching, by seiners and trawlers, more aggressively and allowing the "repugnant" pair trawlers into the Gulf at all, local fishermen felt MAF's policy was the "sort of approach as favouring the entrepreneurial fisherman rather than those who were working steadily throughout the year maintaining a market stability for the fishing industry. Indeed "One reason behind the formation of the fishing co-operative is that 'individuals have no say'" (*Gulf News* 30 July 1982 30). Small-scale fishermen had felt powerless and that by forming the Co-op they would have more "voice".

Controlling the number of boats was a start but poaching by trawlers and seiners was rife and policing that was harder. The major worry was "for the snapper stock in the warm and shallow waters of the Gulf. "They're prolific breeders - and if the pressure was taken off now they'd bounce back within five years" (*Gulf News* 30 July 1982 30).

The proposed policy was having an effect on fishermen's attitudes and the fishing ethos. Chris Dunn noted "'When I came here (Matiatia) six years ago, I was welcomed into the harbour. There were only about three boats here then. Information on the best fishing areas is still exchanged among those who have fished alongside each other for years, and helped out when things were difficult. But now they do not chat openly on the radio. Competition is too keen and the information is eagerly swallowed by those who would never dream of returning the favour". Cooperation and fellowship was giving way to competition and mistrust. "Now its just survival out there" (*Gulf News* 30 July 1982 30). The established fishermen were feeling threatened by increasing numbers chasing a depleted stock.

Part-timers

Hoping the Waiheke County Council would support them, Councilor Delamore put the case for the part-timers. "Part-time fishing on Waiheke is an important income supplement for people who can't get full employment here.... (F)ishing from Waiheke was more capital and fuel efficient than from Auckland, and that fishermen here were mainly long-liners and more conservationist. "The emphasis is on local fishermen, ... part-time fishermen in Auckland have more employment opportunities." Others didn't share the view. Their main concern was full-timers. Councilor Hillman felt "encouraging part-timers here would probably have the effect of bringing people from Auckland to fish part-time here." While for Councilor Murray "'The idea of legislation is to cut out

seasonal fishers who threaten the livelihood of the full-timers." Consequently the motion was lost (*Gulf News* 3 September 1982).

1983

Early in 1983 the *Gulf News* reported that the feasibility study for the co-op packing shed was still proceeding (*Gulf News* 18 February 1983 1,4) and since a co-op spokesman had suggested there should be more research on the current issues in the Gulf, Duncan outlined his research (*Gulf News* 4 February 1983 38,39,41) and also expressed concern at the damage to wetlands would have consequence for the food chains of commercial fish species (*Gulf News* 11 March 1983 32-33).

Marine Farms

The really big issue in 1983, with six articles, was the prospect of numerous marine farms around the island (*Gulf News* 11 March 1983 17; 18 March 1983 1,13,14; 29 April 1983 1. 14,15; 8 April 1983 19; 27 May 1983 25-27; 9 September 1983).

Gulf Protection

In April *Gulf News* reported the Regional Fisheries Officer, Neil Macdonald's response to a letter from the Waiheke Council to MAF about "the possibility of a closed fishing season to protect snapper stocks". The Ministry had taken a number of steps which they believed ensured the future of the fishery. These included a snapper minimum size and quota and "a reduction in the number of boats licensed to fish in the Gulf, from 1100 in 1982 to the 320 granted permits as from March 1 of this year. The Gulf fishery was important to New Zealand's export earnings, so that "any closure of the Gulf would, ...be unacceptable to the 17 members of Waiheke's fishing co-operative, who were authorised to fish in the Gulf" (*Gulf News* 22 April 1983 27).

FIB – Auckland Star Prize

Epitomising the significance of commercial fishing for the island and the visitor industry the 22 July issue trumpeted "Waiheke's Onetangi Hotel reeled in the prizes during last weekend's presentations for the NZ Fishing Industry-Auckland Star Restaurant Competition 1983". Recipient, Chef Peter Rowland, informed the community that "Apparently the quality of the fresh fish was everything the judges expected it to be - they were delighted when the waitress told them it had been caught that afternoon... 'I don't think there's any other restaurant around that can collect their fish supply directly from a fisherman just a 50 metre walk away down the beach,' ... Their 'private' fisherman, local resident Farley Scott, has been fishing Gulf waters for many years and,

says Peter, brings back just what the hotel orders. "If we want so many kingfish or terakihi, he just goes out and gets it' (*Gulf News* 22 July 1983 14,15) .

Thefts

By contrast a November issue reported serious theft from fishing vessels moored in Matiatia. Fishermen were tightening security since "thieves from the mainland were disturbed while loading stolen property into a boat at Matiatia". The risk was serious since high premiums meant the boats were not insured. One 33 foot, \$45,000 fishing launch had even been hijacked and was found the following morning drifting off "Wash Rock, Rakino Island" missing fish, gear, tools and electronics. The skipper informed just as he was leaving home at 3.00am to go fishing, notified the police. He was told two hours later his boat had been spotted by a Waiheke fisherman and it was towed back by a third (*Gulf News* 4 November 1983 5). The issues were indicative of the tensions in the fishery as a result of the depleted stocks on the one hand and exclusions on the other.

1984

The marine farm issue was still 'hot' and the cover of the first issue for the year reported "Parts of the Hauraki Gulf deemed suitable for marine farming have been reduced to a total of about 140 hectares, of which nearly a third lies off the coast of Waiheke Island" (*Gulf News* 6 January 1984 1).

Tagging Surveys

In February MAF asked Waiheke Islanders to report any tags from their Bay of Plenty tagging program to determine snapper movement in any of the fish they caught (*Gulf News* 6 January 1984 20). Then later in September *Gulf News* reported "Thousands of snapper in local fishing grounds will soon become the subjects of a scientific survey to find out more about their living habits" and there would be prizes for the return of tags (*Gulf News* 21 September 1984 46,47).

Also in September an irate letter to the editor complained about delays to the ferry which the editor explained had been caused by an "unexpectedly large consignment of 46 cartons of fish on the Iris Moana had to be unloaded, keeping her at the wharf until 4.55pm and delaying the arrival of the Baroona off the Devonport service" (*Gulf News* 9 November 1984 10).

Schooling Season

To celebrate the return of fish for the schooling season after the winter "starve", the *Gulf News* reported on the year for the fishermen and for the co-op. The local fleet had worked hard for the past fortnight as the Gulf was "teeming with snapper as the fish

"return" for the start of the annual spring schooling season. The fishermen wished they knew where the snapper went to in Winter, because they were "as rare as a wealthy fisherman in August". "That is the Waiheke fleet's worst month. The boats might bring in a total of three and a half tons during the whole month. Over the past couple of weeks, they have been landing about two tons a day. ... In the last financial year, snapper caught by Waiheke boats earned \$2 million, of which a quarter was injected into the island's economy. Most of the Waiheke catch goes to Japan. After the boats unload at Matiatia the fish are packed on ice and sent to the city, either in the fishing co-op's truck on Subritzky's barge or atop the Iris Moana. In Auckland, it is prepared for export by Kia Ora Seafoods Ltd and taken to the airport for flight to Tokyo. Oversized snapper remains at home for sale in city markets (*Gulf News* 2 November 1994 36-38).

Despite the scarcity of winter fish the "Waiheke fishing Co-op has become one of the island's most successful businesses and is believed to be the only viable co-operative in the country". The co-op had opened in October the previous year, currently had 19 members, with 16 boats which was three more than previously and a \$90,000 ice plant. "Over the past fortnight the boats have been almost constantly at sea as the fishermen take advantage of the schooling season's abundance to make enough money to carry them through the lean times" (*Gulf News* 2 November 1994 36-38).

Co-op Manager Retires

In December, after three years planning, setting up and operating the co-op, Doug Hamilton retired. He had "helped to turn what was no more than a dream into a successful export business expected to turn over \$1 million this year". The co-op was "going extremely well. Because of devaluation, it is in a very good financial situation." Membership had fluctuated. The co-op had started with 19 members but dropped to 14 with the shortage of fish over winter but with increased catches membership had risen to 22. "95% of its catch to markets in Japan, Australia and America". To put the export business on a more substantial footing Rijyo Sea Products, a company in which the co-op has a 20% shareholding, opened ... in Auckland last May. 'We are now assured of a market in Japan and in the last fortnight we also started exporting to Australia and America'.

The season was now exceptionally good "Our catch for this October was equal to the total amount caught in the previous six months. In August we exported 3.7 tonnes of fish - it was a terrible month. During October we were unloading the same amount in one day." With globalization and bureaucratization, the task in the last three years had "become increasingly administrative" so the "new manager will probably have less contact with those who work the fishing boats." Much of Doug Hamilton's job had been "to educate the guys to think as a co-operative and not just to do their independent thing. I think that's been achieved. 'This year the Co-op will turn over in excess of \$1 million'"

(*Gulf News* 21 December 1984 23, 24). The same issue of *Gulf News* advertised for a General Manager

1985

The proposed introduction of the quota system (QMS) was the big news for 1985.

ITQs proposed

The *Gulf News* reported that "A quota system is being proposed...to reduce the size of the fishing industry and increase the number of fish in New Zealand waters.... "limits will be placed on the total catch from each fisheries area with individual fishermen contributing a share under a quota system." The Minister of Fisheries, Colin Moyle was quoted as saying the prime species had been over fished.

For example, "national commercial landings of snapper which dropped from 17,660 tonnes in 1978 to 8,729 tonnes in 1983. 'There is widespread agreement that the consequences of continuing along the present course will be that some fisheries will suffer economic collapse and the recreational fishery will continue to decline,' ... (to) at least the levels of "commercial extinction", according to a report from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. "For example, the TAC for snapper in the Auckland Fishery Management Area (including the Hauraki Gulf Controlled Fishery) is 5,300 tonnes - 2,480 (32%) less than the 1983 catch.... The TACs for each species in each area will then be allocated among owners of fishing vessels. Their allocations will be based on catches for each vessel in past years - probably an average from 1981-83." Fishermen were, however, promised "financial assistance to fishermen who voluntarily decided to leave" but further discussions would be held before the system was implemented (*Gulf News* 3 May 1985 16-?).

Also in May, Ian Toddun's appointment as the new co-op manager was announced (*Gulf News* 10 May 1985 23) and inviting the community to be involved, a competition opened to the community to design a logo for the co-op (*Gulf News* 31 May 1985 29)

Fishermen response to ITQs

By June fishermen were uniting to oppose the ITQ system. Ian Toddun, the new co-op manager "described the meeting of forty long-line fishermen from Waiheke, Great Barrier, Leigh and Kawakawa Bay as a group of 'fragmented, rugged individualists coming together for united action to express their concern at a change in the proposals for the introduction of the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system.'" They had learnt that ITQs were proposed without the additional controls they regarded as crucial to

save the fishery, that had been included in the Fisheries Management Plans and the controlled fishery restrictions for the Hauraki Gulf would also be removed. "Speaking early in the meeting, Ian Todden expressed shock that the ITQs were to be introduced in isolation, with neither the controls nor the management plan which had been proposed in the discussion document of 18 February. 'We have cabled the Minister of Agriculture of Fisheries, the Hon. Colin Moyle And Ray Dobson¹⁴⁵ the architect of the scheme, to say we are not interested in ITQs unless the management plan of 18 February is introduced,' Mr. Toddun said, speaking on behalf of the Waiheke fishing co-operative. Fishermen saw

"The lack of plans for the gulf and coastline means our livelihood and way of life is affected." Quite wrongly in the event "The president of the Combined Fishermen's Association, Ken Brown, said that the ITQs were just an administrative measure" but did admit, "We have not got a lot of confidence as to its effectiveness. ... 'The individual fisherman, because of his limited range, is most at risk. I cannot really see the ITQs will be the measure which will save the fisheries. 'We cannot afford to see overall management removed. There is no way that the small fisherman can compete with pair trawling.' Ken added that the management plan was a necessary protection for the gulf.

The representative at the meeting from one of the big companies, David Belton from Fletcher Fisheries had a different perspective and spoke in favour of ITQs alone." We do not agree with extra management measures which will make catches by trawl fishermen any more difficult,' he said. 'Nothing should change, apart from ITQs.'" But he did add "If the gulf remained a closed fishery,... this would enable the more effective assessment of the values of ITQs." "The feeling of all other speakers was strongly against the MAF proposal. "The main concern was that there would be increased fishing effort within the gulf. One fisherman was concerned that the proposal was general and ignored local issues. "We're sick and tired of seeing the resource ruined willy-nilly. 'We're out there every day of the week, and we see what happens.... "Fishermen will come into the gulf, long-liners, set nets, pair trawlers ...' "The management plans seemed exceptionally good and now we don't know what to believe and who to believe. We have commitments, and we want proper measures,' he said. Ken Brown summed up "the gulf is presently being fished co-operatively by all sorts of methods under proper management and that people were able to earn good livelihoods. 'The gulf is being made a scapegoat for the Bay of Plenty.' he said" (*Gulf News* 28 June 1985 pp29,30) . What he didn't know at that stage was that the quota many of these fishermen would receive would be sold to the companies and while they had cash, they'd no longer have a fishing livelihood.

¹⁴⁵ Ray Dobson, Deputy Director of MAF Fisheries Management Division in early-mid 1980s. (Skinner and Fenemor 2005 6).

Local Fishermen

In a lighter vein one of the Gulf News reporters, Vicki Jayne wrote a human interest account of one of the two prominent fishing families on the island, father and son fishermen Farley and Phil Scott. Farley had always loved fishing and when they'd moved from a farm at the "bottom end" to Onetangi he had fished full-time for ten years. Then the fish disappeared so he went shearing for ten years before going back to the fishing and supplied the neighbouring hotel and the local community. His son Phil (and indeed another brother but not on the island) followed in his footsteps. In a side bar it was reported that the Quota system had been delayed, the Co-op was making submissions and assisting individual fishermen make their own but "Reaction to the ITQ system so far seemed to be one of 'tacit acceptance'" (*Gulf News* 20 September 1985 24-29)

The final item on the fisheries for the year announced that "This season's fishing has been the best yet for Waiheke Sea Products Co-op, according to Co-op manager Ian Toddun" (*Gulf News* 20 December 1985 10,11).

1986

In 1986 the Gulf News published several general interest stories related to commercial fishing. Scott Gordon, son of the second prominent fishing family caught a large bronze whaler shark which resulted in the loss of several hundred dollars for the net and catch (*Gulf News* 14 November 1986 p19). Debate over the name for a new road on nearby Rakino Island occasioned an account of Albert Sanford's fishing from Rakino, rowing the catch to Auckland and the beginnings of Sanford Ltd. One of New Zealand's oldest and biggest fishing companies (*Gulf News* 28 February 1989 45).

The same issue of Gulf News devoted a long article to Waiheke Personality Mavis Scott who had been born into the Gordons, the other prominent fishing family and the only family of original landowners still farming on the island, before marrying Farley Scott from an adjacent farm. It also told how one son, Phil, had been born on the deck of the naval supply launch Philomel in a storm just before I reached the Ferry Buildings. Such was the nature of life on an Inner Gulf island in those days (*Gulf News* 9 May 1986 24-30).

Run up to ITQs

In the run up to the introduction of ITQs, the cover of the *Gulf News* indicated the vehemence with which local fishermen regarded the new management system "'Incomes Threatened' 'Privacy Invaded' New Rules Anger Local Fishermen". Fishermen saw the new regulations as a threat to their livelihood and would be "a "gross invasion of their

civil liberties". In a letter to government they described "the new controls on their industry... as "unfair" and "heavy handed". The *Gulf News* outlined the ITQ system noting that quotas would be allocated on catch history between 1982 - 1984, that "An ITQ represents "ownership" of a certain amount of fish [as popularly conceived of not as a catching right], and it can be traded through a tender system with the Fishing Industries [Sic] Board acting as broker. Fishermen were concerned that ostensibly a conservation measure they saw it as "a way for the Government to gain more control over their industry, charge them extra taxes, invade their privacy and destroy their lifestyles". "Fishing is a lifestyle, not just a job, and as individuals we feel we are being squeezed out by this legislation in favour of larger and more efficient companies". They blamed "the previous government for exploiting the country's fisheries with cheap loans which, they say, led to over capitalisation, more boats, increased competition and a diminished resource. Despite using long-lining, the least exploitative method, Waiheke fishermen felt they were being penalized and were "sick of being blamed by this present Government and other for the 'pillage of the seas'" (*Gulf News* 18 April 1986 1,16-18).

More specifically to Waiheke, Ian Toddun the co-op manager believed "The formula for setting individual quota also worked against Waiheke fishermen. Basing quotas on the 1982-84 period caught island fishermen at a time when they were concentrating on establishing their co-operative and building it into the million dollar a year business it is now. As a result, some fishermen had been allocated quotas below their current potential". The fishermen themselves had taken time out in order to construct the buildings and install the ice plant. In addition there would be extra levies FIB and "a "resource rental" tax of \$3 per tonne - a levy on ownership of fish stock" together with the cost in time and money for the extra paperwork involved in Catch Measurement Logs and Quota Management Report books required to monitor the new system (*Gulf News* 18 April 1986 P1,16-18). This raises the question of whether this was increased bureaucratization, acknowledgement of the public ownership of the resource or good ecosystem accounting. Which ever it was it resulted in more pressure on the fishermen.

The fishermen were concerned that they already provide statistics so "This extra amount of paperwork, combined with GST, will take considerable time and we are wondering if the Government is considering paying us compensation. 'Also, failing to satisfy the MAF requirements will mean an immediate loss of quota.'" There was also concern that MAF's existing right to search boats would be extended to homes setting a dangerous precedent for other government departments. Likewise they feared "that rigid policing will interfere with a skipper's ability to give away a few fish to family, friends and crew. 'To add insult to injury, it has always been the traditional prerogative of fishermen to give some part of their catch away without the interference of government busybodies. 'With such stringent legislation surrounding this tradition we feel it can only lead to breaking the law'". Concerned about "the future of their industry, Waiheke fishermen fear the effective de-

regulation of the Hauraki Gulf fishery will follow the introduction of ITQs. Anyone with an ITQ will be able to enter gulf waters to fish. Also, the sale by tender of ITQs will open up the fishing industry to anyone who can afford to buy in.' This causes us a great deal of concern because not only does it set fishermen against fishermen in the competition for limited quota to maintain or improve our livelihood, but also it introduces the "Queen Street fishermen" element,' they say. They were not the only fishermen to oppose the system; "In Napier, a Fisheries Officer was thrown off a wharf by angry fishermen and a recent visit to Waiheke by a Fisheries Officer from Auckland aggravated, rather than allayed, local concerns" (*Gulf News* 18 April 1986 P1, 16-18). On the one hand fishermen saw the threat of again facing open-access as quota owning "outsiders" pulse fished their "patch" and on the other non-fishing quota owners controlling the fishing without understanding either the ecology of the fishery nor the social and political dynamics of the industry.

The co-op, quite rightly as it turned out, was pessimistic about the effects of the new system on both its members and the Waiheke community. Indeed "Waiheke could lose up to three quarters of a million dollars per year as a result of the government's new policy.... For the 15 members of the Waiheke Fishing Cooperative, the policy could mean a substantial reduction in income. What has provided them with a full income in the past, may have to become a part time job. Some boat owners have already had to cut back on their crew with a policy of non-replacement" and in turn would have consequences for the island economy. "The bulk of the money earned goes back into the community. Our members are people with homes and families. They support our school and local businesses. Their boats are maintained here. (T)here was the possibility of some members pulling out of the co-op because they expected commercial fishing to become uneconomic." (*Gulf News* Sun 4-Sep-2005). In effect this might reverse the policy that led to the exclusion of the part-timers although MAF's expectation which was correct in the event was that uneconomic packages of quota would be sold to companies or "more efficient" fishermen who valued them more highly.

Co-op fish shop

To diversify operation the co-op wanted to change the "'no retail" condition from their original planning consent" and "sell locally-caught fish from its Tahi Road ice plant has run into opposition from three other fish retailers on Waiheke". While the planner saw no reason not to grant the application the three other retail fish outlets on the island were opposed (*Gulf News* 26 September 1986 9). In the event the application was granted.

Hotel Raided

In a sequel to the Onetangi Hotel's prize in the FIB Auckland Star Fish Dish competition the *Gulf News* reported that two fisheries officers had "confiscated 58 kilograms of fish from the Onetangi Meat and Sausage Mart and 14 kilograms from the Onetangi Hotel. Auckland regional Fishery Officer, Neville Buckley, told *Gulf News* that prosecutions are 'likely'" since they were alleged to be contravening the ITQ system. The immediate effect of the system had been "dramatic reduction in the amount of fresh fish on the local market as fishermen, especially long-liners with quotas restricting their annual income, concentrate on the more lucrative export market." Indeed "(a)ccording to recent reports, some Auckland fish and chip shops are buying New Zealand fish from Japan to stay open and the price of once-common species of fish had reached \$20 or more a kilogram". "On Waiheke, as elsewhere, a regime designed to achieve conservation has not only affected local consumers but also the type of fisherman who poses the least threat." Both "(t)he butcher and hotel at Onetangi have traditionally bought from local fishermen. Now they need a license. The hotel applied for a fish receiver's license last December; butcher Peter Rowland, says he asked for application papers only days before the fisheries officers arrived on his doorstep. Hotel licensee, Heather Riley, says her application has been before the Ministry since Friday 12 December. Both she and Peter Rowland were surprised to hear that they might be prosecuted" (*Gulf News* 20 February 20 1987 5-7).

Subsequently "An application by Onetangi Hotel proprietors, Ian and Heather Riley for a fish receiver's license for their restaurant has been declined, and they still face possible prosecution for receiving fish without a license". They were informed that "the Ministry did not agree that the applicants' business was "sufficiently unique" to justify granting a license, and was not satisfied the applicant would "conduct fish receiving operations in a proper manner." (*Gulf News* 20 March 1987 pp25,27). If being on the beach, almost adjacent to their fisherman's home and gaining a national prize was not "sufficiently unique", then clearly MAF was not concerned with local communities nor local fishermen. MAF administered the Fisheries Act. The operative act at the time was the Fisheries Act 1983 which was to consolidate and reform the law relating to the management and conservation of fisheries and fishery resources within New Zealand and New Zealand fisheries waters. The 1996 Act tasks MAF more clearly: the purpose was "to provide for the utilization of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability". "Ensuring sustainability" meant (a) "Maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet reasonable foreseeable needs of future generations; and (b) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects on the aquatic environment" while "Utilisation" meant "conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fisheries resources to enable people to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being" (Section 8, Fisheries Act

1996). The present case seemed contrary to both natural justice and the definition of "Utilisation" here.

Call for ban on Gulf Fishing

Allan Brewster, parks' chairman of the Auckland Regional Authority,

Asserted that "commercial fishing trawlers operating in the Hauraki Gulf were "Piranhas disguised as goldfish" and called for a ban on commercial fishing in the Gulf. He was "seeking the support of local authorities in the Auckland region to lobby Government for legislation banning all trawl fisheries in the area of the Hauraki Gulf behind an imaginary line drawn from Orere Point, in the Firth of Thames, across to Takatu Point, north of Kawau Island". While the Waiheke Council had mixed feelings and the planning committee was prepared to support the call in principle (*Gulf News* March 20 1987) some councilors recognized that it would be the final nail in their coffin for Waiheke fishermen. Trawlers were already banned in that area although Brewster claimed many were still poaching, and the co-op had already taken a 43% cut so Council was divided. On the one hand it was concerned about the conservation of the Gulf but on the other "it must also protect the livelihood of local fishermen and the fishing rights of Maori people included in the Treaty of Waitangi" (*Gulf News* 24 April 1987 p22,23). "Waiheke Fishing Co-op manager, Ian Toddun, (felt) ... the local fishing industry had already been hit by legislation limiting fish catches. 'The quota system has worked but its left a lot of disgruntled fishermen, our through-put has dropped by 76% ... now we're looking at further management controls being brought in by another body. It seems a bit ridiculous." (*Gulf News* 25 September 1989 27).

By September Allan Brewster's call for a ban had been changed to a concept for a Hauraki Gulf marine park "which would take in Waiheke's northern shores, Rakino, The Noises, and Tiritiri Matangi". "He said the concept would not affect Waiheke residents, and that the proposed designation was that of a marine park - not a reserve. It would help control any commercial exploitation of the area. While he claimed "a lot of support within the Auckland regional Authority" it was not endorsed (*Gulf News* 25 September 1989 27) though it had gained support from about half of the regions local authorities (*Gulf News* 24 April 1987 22,23).

In April The Gulf News noted that the old Anzac Bay Jetty would be removed. A makeshift jetty of manuka poles and timber. "The jetty has had a number of owners and until recently was being used by the local Fishing Co-op for servicing their boats." but this use stopped about two years ago and the jetty has fallen into disrepair" (*Gulf News* 10 April 1987 33).

Co-op and Fishing reviewed

At the end of 1987 the well known boating journalist Gary Baigent reviewed the status of the fishing and the co-op in a two part article. The business of fishing was erratic, “dependent on the wind, weather, tides and the migratory habits of fish. However it is an adventurous life and although fishermen can become despondent at times when catches are low, when the fish move in and the lines are tight, living is good.” The quota system meant that (just a year after its introduction) “the boom time was over. Now of the original 20, only five fishermen remain and Ian said that the co-op, which handled over a million dollars in fish sales before ITQ, suddenly dropped 50%.” [So essentially, from my perspective, commercial fishing on Waiheke had been decimated.] Despite the difficulties and the threat of ‘big boats’ setting large amounts of line gear, the signs were good and “the co-operative is looking to the future and wants to see islanders enjoy buying fish from the retail shop in Tahiri Road”. The co-op hoped the council approved the application, “they are not after handouts, just a [P43] fairer assessment of what the co-op is trying to do in the community. They export by themselves and purchase fish from all registered fishermen on the island, regardless of whether or not they are members the co-op. With this attitude he hopes the co-op will acquire more fishermen as the island community expands. The iki jimi method allows up to a week’s travelling time to Japan although usually it takes only three days; the fish are never frozen but chilled and they keep better this way.” So he felt the “island’s fishing potential is very good” (*Gulf News* 24 December 1987 41-44).

For the second part of his article Gary Baigent went out with one of the fishermen and wrote about the ethos and process of the job, "Squid, octopus and kahawai are used as bait, sliced with thin ... then deftly hooked onto the 700 odd traces which are stacked away. But once the long line has begun to be laid, the traces are then clipped onto this large spooled nylon length..... (and set). "Whether solo or double handed, fishermen have a number of tasks to accomplish once they begin lifting their lines and the snapper are coming over the transom. To accommodate this the boats are ingeniously set up and (the skipper) can steer, engage and disengage gear, guide the incoming line, remove fish and traces, plus perform a number of other operations, all from the same working area on the port side of the cockpit.

The Waiheke Fleet

Most of the fleet are “old designed wooden planked, traditional launches that have been fitted out for fishing and which operate from Matiatia. *Ronomor, Tuatea, Galatea, Tawhara* and *Manakura*, along with the newer alloy boats, all carry ice boxes.” In the past fish were tossed into the bilges to die but iki jimi snapper “are killed by spiking and

placed into a ... a slurry that immediately chills the fish to zero degrees Celsius.” “When everything is rolling - and there are rarely hitches - the whole process is rhythmic to watch. (The skipper) says it is like getting a factory underway Although both he and (his crew) make the task look easy, I know from experience that it isn't. Skills and alertness are required and one can see by the lack of scratches or spike marks in their hands that their competence and efficiency has come from many hours of sea work....The sea can be a depressing and cold place at times and when the catches are few, it can seem an unrewarding occupation.” Fishermen often face prejudice but “really they are just making a living and are ordinary people. The difference is they do extraordinary things” (*Gulf News* 31 December 1987 29-33).

1988

Despite the reduction in the number of members, the catch handled and amount it contributed to the community the co-op was still optimistic but *Gulf News* coverage of commercial fishing was beginning to taper off.

Others were beginning to look at other uses for the Gulf so beginning to reduce the favourable perception of local fishermen.

While the ARA Regional Parks Committee Chairman, Allan Brewster's call for a ban had not been heeded mooting a marine park was under consideration. An initial report by Henry van Roon, the ARA's senior planning officer, Henry van Roon stated that "Establishing a recreational park in the Hauraki Gulf would not necessarily mean banning commercial fishing in the area" (*Gulf News* 16 September 1988 11). Fishermen and the co-op were skeptical.

1989

Other changes and technologies were in the offing. Accountant Tim Hubbard took over from Ian Toddun as co-op manager and the Japanese live fish market offered "Enormous Implications For Waiheke". Polar Products, one of the Auckland companies Waiheke fishermen had fished to especially before the co-op had bought the technology for exporting live snapper from the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research (DSIR). It involved packing four fish to a box in separate compartments of a polystyrene crate with circulating water and a proprietary component producing oxygen and allowed sufficient time for the 27 hour flight and exigencies such as an air controller's strike. Waiheke's location in the middle of the fishing grounds and fast transport to Auckland on the Quickcat's meant local fishermen were well placed to participate. "Polar Products is offering fishermen \$20 a kilo for live snapper - double the return they get on the current top of the market product iki jime. Like iki jime, live fish need to be caught on long lines and handled with care. Damage to scales or scars made in a net can mean a big drop in

market value. It is particularly important to avoid contact with the fish's eyes. Even a slight brush can damage the eye membrane causing it to cloud over and Japanese apparently don't like eating blind fish" (*Gulf News* 4 August 1989, pp22-24). It was a niche market involving very high quality and specific Japanese cultural values and although promising the market did not take off like the iki jimi method to the extent that it saved the co-op (*Gulf News* 4 August 1989 22-24).

Co-op fish shop

By November the co-op was sufficiently confident its application to sell fresh fish locally was at a stage where they could place the following advertisement in the *Gulf News*:
"Waiheke Sea Products Co-op Ltd. ... Fresh Whole Snapper only \$6.00 KG

Flounder, Gurnard, Trevalli, Hoki fillets, Squid bait, pet food. Specialty seafoods now available; Scampi, Whitebait, Crabsticks, Smoked Fish, Oysters. Hours: Thurs & Fri 9.30-5pm Sat 9-12.30" (*Gulf News* 17 November 1989)

The following month the *Gulf News* announced that that the co-op had finally "won permission from the Waiheke Planning Committee to sell scaled and filleted fish at its Tahiri Rd packing centre and shop." It was becoming clear that changes as a result of the ITQ system and the Japanese market meant the co-op was not as economically viable as previously. "Fishing co-operative member Greg Hayes told the committee that processing some of the local catch to sell on Waiheke was both a matter of economic necessity and public demand. He said Waiheke's long line fishermen were now competing on the Japanese market with trawler and seine boat operators. The Japanese market had been over-supplied this season and prices were low. The Tahiri Rd shop opened three days a week and already sold whole fish caught by island fishermen and frozen sea food from Auckland. Mr. Hayes said customers repeatedly asked to buy fresh fillets or smoked fish". While final approval had required a specified departure from the district scheme there was also competition within the island's commercial sector. "Malcolm Shepherd, owner of Waiheke Fisheries in Oneroa... (said) he didn't mind the competition from the co-op, but said it was inappropriate to fillet and smoke fish alongside the smells and smoke of other industries and dust from the unsealed road" (*Gulf News* 22 December 1989 15).

As final fishing news for the year MAF a fisheries plan suggesting further restrictions on recreational fishing in the Auckland region and opened it for public submissions (*Gulf News* 29 December 1989 11).

1990

1990 was a thin year for commercial fishing news coverage.

The island's voluntary fishing officer resigned. He said "(H)e had been 'given to understand there would be an honorarium of up to \$1000 per year to cover expenses'. But after spending many hours checking fishing spots, giving warnings and issuing information, he had received only \$100". But, from MAF's perspective, it was a voluntary job and "(s)ome of them have been with us for 30 years and they put in many hours of voluntary work without regard for payment" (*Gulf News* 16 March 1990 28).

The following month MAF officers seized half a tonne of fish and a net from one of the commercial fishing vessels moored in Matiatia and were likely to prosecute since "nets used commercially in the Hauraki Gulf must not have a mesh of less than 125 mm square" (*Gulf News* 12 April 1990 18).

The 3 August issue reported that just after the crew had checked the boat, a storm had swept the 11 metre fishing vessels *Santa Maria* onto rocks near the entrance of Matiatia Bay. Apparently an anchor fluke had broken. "A local fisherman said the vessel had an Auckland owner but was being fished by 'four Waiheke men who did not wish to be identified. They have families and it was their livelihoods,' he said" (*Gulf News* 3 August 1990). Interestingly the *Santa Maria* is currently up on the Boat Club hard at the Causeway for major maintenance.

1991, '92

Late in the year a new honorary fisheries officer was appointed so that Waiheke now had two (*Gulf News* 9 August 1991 31) and the Waiheke Rod and Line Club was not fazed by MAF's intention of lowering the recreational bag limit for snapper to 30 fish per day (11 October 1991 35) – which is, by comparison, 3 times the present limit (Ministry of Fisheries 10). Early in 1992 when MAF suggested the limit should be 3-4 fish per day the reaction was different. Club members were so angry some were suggesting protest demonstrations and "a delegate to the NZ Recreational Fishing Council, said a nationwide campaign was underway to mobilise recreational fishers" (*Gulf News* 14 February 1992 30-31).

The same issue also reported that with the suggested appointment of Waiheke beach wardens, as honorary fisheries officers, the island would soon have a full compliment (*Gulf News* 14 February 1991 33).

Fishing boats often worked close to rocks and rocky shores so accidents were always a possibility but when they occurred, regardless of their fisheries sector, boaties cooperated. The *Gulf News* reported that the old vessel *Taranui II* being fished, not by the owner but two locals, was holed when it hit rocks and towed back to Matiatia escorted by the local fisheries patrol vessel (*Gulf News* 19 February 1992 16).

Co-op demise

In terms of commercial fishing the big news of the year was the change co-op ownership.

According to the New Zealand companies register of the Ministry of Economic Development, Waiheke Sea Products (1992) Ltd. on 24th September 1992 and operated it until, twelve years later, on 14th December 2004 it was struck off the register (<http://www.companies.govt.nz>). Its directors were the two remaining fishermen active in the Co-op and their wives. While, from the register, the Co-op itself was not struck off until 10 February 1994. The *Gulf News*, however, reports that Waiheke Sea Products Co-op Ltd., the co-op became Waiheke Sea Products (1992) Ltd, a private company.

In an interview with Mr. O'Grady, one of the two active fishermen remaining, the *Gulf News* reported that "The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries reduce(ed) the total allowable catch of 1100 tonnes for Snapper Area One, an area from Cape Rienga to East Cape." As a result four of the six remaining members were no longer fishing and the co-op became a family business owned by two fishermen and their wives". Although the export market was depressed the local fish shop was not affected. The two fishermen had their own quota but others had to lease quota from Auckland companies. Mr. O'Grady, one of the owners in effect encapsulated the fisheries system at the time by saying, "Polar Products ... have really looked after us and do their best for Waiheke fishermen'.... "But they are having to deal with an 18.1 per cent reduction and it's the small non-quota holders who are the first to be hit. The cuts come on top of an unusually cold winter in which fish 'weren't biting'. ... (T)here was a lot of resentment in the industry toward the amateur fishing association which had lobbied hard to get the commercial quota reduced". Indicating, in essence, the relationships between stock status and seasonal variation, the nature of fishermen company relations as a result of quota ownership, the competition between recreational and commercial fishermen, and MAF's response. He summed up "Especially for long-liners there's a feeling that with half a million amateur fishermen in the Auckland region who are not really accountable, the impact they are having on the fish stocks is being underestimated.... it was the hardest time for Waiheke fishermen in 15 years. 'Low prices in summer and bad weather in winter'" (*Gulf News* 9 October 1992 37).

1993,'94

The Hauraki Gulf was not immune from detrimental events that had occurred on other parts of the coast and in August of 1993 an algal bloom decimated the scallop beds in the Hauraki Gulf to the extent that official had difficulty finding sufficient shellfish for testing purposes (*Gulf News* 20 August 1993).

Likewise exigencies ashore impacted on the community and a fisherman, on his way to check his nets, at 5.45 am on a Sunday morning rescued a sleeping man from a burning house after suspected arson (*Gulf News* 1 October 1993, 13,15-17).

The last two articles in *Gulf News* before Waiheke fishermen ceased being involved, concerned MAF's seizure of a small boat and "outboard motor, a commercial sized net, 500 metres of rope and a hydraulic winch with a total value of \$8,000.... (T)he ministry believed some, fish had been sold locally and also as far away as south Auckland. It is believed fish were being taken which were not accounted for. (The MAF officer) said the vessel was a properly registered fishing boat which had not been registered for the current year" (*Gulf News* 11 February 1994 15). From an outside perspective it seemed small fishermen were having to resort to illegal activity to remain economically viable.

A follow up article indicated that two small boats had been seized after a year's investigation following tip-off by local residents but the decision to prosecute still hadn't been made (*Gulf News* 18 March 1993). Fishing activity that had been perfectly legal before the introduction of ITQs, had become an offense serious enough a year's surveillance. The community's access to commercial fishing, was by this time, marginal.