

Regional Security Complex Theory: Southeast Asia and the South Pacific

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Abstract

The changing shape of the international system in the post-Cold War era has demanded that theorists and practitioners re-evaluate the nature of security in the analysis of International Relations in the modern world. While realist conceptions of security are still pivotal in determining the actions of states, the increasing prevalence of transnational threats and security interdependence has facilitated the rise of regionally coherent subsystems within which the pursuit of security cannot be achieved in the absence of cooperation. Despite modern advancements in technology and transportation, the reality remains that security threats have a higher capability to travel over short distances rather than long, and the capacity of most states to project power beyond their own regional sphere is relatively limited. Consequently, the interplay between geography and anarchy in the current international system has facilitated the rise of regional security complexes (RSCs), whereby geographically proximate states are bound within a distinct regional dynamic; be it conflict or cooperation. The regionalist perspective has sought to emphasize that security at the regional level is autonomous and distinguishable from the dynamics of the global and domestic levels and that, whilst each regional space is unique, particular variables are comparable and highlight interactions that would not occur were it not for the existence of a RSC.

The purpose of this thesis is to utilise the theoretical framework of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) in order to cross-compare two different regions; Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Southeast Asia has been widely accepted as an autonomous regional construct and experiences a web of security interdependence which ensures that the security concerns of its units cannot be analysed or resolved apart from one another. The South Pacific, by contrast, has been largely ignored in the literature on regional security and has otherwise been categorized as being unstructured and too weak in its dynamic to constitute a security complex in its own right. The objective of this thesis is to outline the variables of the essential structure of a RSC so as to ascertain whether the characterization of the South Pacific as being unstructured holds true. The additional objective of this thesis is to map and cross-compare the regional security architecture of the South Pacific to that of Southeast Asia in order to highlight and pinpoint what differences exist, what they say about the region itself, and how they may be explained.

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List of Abbreviations

- ACP** - African, Caribbean and Pacific Island countries
- AICHR** - ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights
- AFTA** - ASEAN Free Trade Area
- AMMTC** - ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime.
- ANZUS** - Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
- ASA** - Association of Southeast Asia
- ASEAN** - Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- ARF** - ASEAN Regional Forum
- APEC** -Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
- APT** - ASEAN Plus Three
- APC** - Asia Pacific Community
- ADMM** - ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
- ADMM –Plus** - ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight
- CROP** - Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific
- CSCAP** - Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
- EAS** - East Asian Summit
- ESCS** - European Coal and Steel Community
- EEZ** - Exclusive Economic Zone
- EU** - European Union
- FFA** - Forum Fisheries Agency
- FRSC** - Forum Regional Security Committee
- FPDA** - Five Power Defence Arrangement
- ICJ** - International Court of Justice
- IMF** - International Monetary Fund
- MAPHILINDO** - Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia
- MRC** - Mekong River Commission

MSG - Melanesian Spearhead Group

MSP - Malacca Straits Patrol

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PACER - Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations

PIC – Pacific Island Countries

PNG - Papua New Guinea

RAMSI - Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands

RSC - Regional Security Complex

RSCT - Regional Security Complex Theory

SEATO - Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation

SIS - Small Island States

SPC - South Pacific Commission

SPREP - Secretariat of Pacific Regional Environmental Programme

TAC - Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

UN - United Nations

UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNCTAD - United Nation Conference on Trade and Development

US - United States

Chapter One - Introduction, Purpose and Chapter Breakdown

1.1 Introduction

In the post-Cold War era security interdependence has become a reality, “security issues today cannot, by and large, be solved by states acting alone.”¹ The idea of security cooperation in the international system is nothing new and that tracing back to the Westphalian system, and beyond, we can see that throughout history many states have sought to strategically cooperate with other sovereign units, where necessary, in order to achieve similar gains. Collective defence and collective security policies have been central in the past and, through both World Wars, alliance systems based on these notions have aligned states through mutual obligation and have sought to balance the over-arching and anarchical structure of the international system. However, in the wake of the Cold War, the international security environment has experienced a significant transformation, whereby the state, while still a dominant unit, is not as overwhelmingly so and where peace and stability are derived from more than just a balance-of-power in the pursuit of protecting national sovereignty.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequential dissolution of overarching bipolarity, the pursuit of stability and security for a majority of the world’s states has taken on a new form. In the contemporary international security environment major concerns have spread beyond the traditional military and political sectors, and the additional perspective has emerged such that rules, rather than power, can determine the limits of action.² As a result, scholars and practitioners have expanded their scope outside of the state and the global level of analysis and have acknowledged that, given the density of security interactions that occur within concentrated regional groupings, the regional level represents a viable area of security analysis and an autonomous subsystem in its own right.

The regionalist perspective has surfaced as one of the key theoretical approaches for analysing the structure of international security in the post-Cold War era. This perspective argues that regions, as groupings³ of proximate states embedded within a historical and geographical context, represent areas where security interdependence is particularly intense. The degree of interconnectedness “stems from the simple mechanism... by which threats, particularly political and military ones, are

¹ Jim Rolfe, ‘Regional Security for the Asia-Pacific: Ends and Means’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 30, no. 1 (2008), p. 101.

² Rolfe, 2008; 100.

³ The conceptualisation of the term ‘region’ as both a social and geographical construct will be discussed in more depth in a following chapter.

most strongly felt when they are at close range.”⁴ It is on this central assumption that Barry Buzan offers Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as a means of helping to explain the unique dynamics that take place at the regional level.

In their simplest form “regions have been typically defined as geographically proximate and independent states and regionalism as attempts at formal cooperation between such states.”⁵ However, it has been the acknowledgement of ‘security complexes’ that has emphasised the need for more depth in the conceptualisation of these notions. The interlinked nature of security complexes ensures that in order to successfully combat threats experienced across a wider region, durable stability and security is only achievable through cooperation and coordination by all actors – insofar that threats cannot be wholly mitigated unless all actors agree to approach the issue in a harmonized manner. In the post-Cold War period regionalism has emerged as one of the more favourable means of confronting transnational security threats and generally describes the projects developed to facilitate peace and security in certain issue areas within a regional context. The rise of regionalism, as a result, has given way to a budding phase of multilateral institution building in a variety of areas around the world, albeit with varied success.

Founded in the post-World War Two period, and as a means of re-building the embittered relationships within Europe, the European Union represents the most common and notable multilateral institution developed on a regional level. Since inception, and its humble beginnings as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Union remains the prototypical illustration of how a regional bloc can manage its dynamics in a cooperative way. By the late 1990s the European Community had flourished into a supranational institution that managed issues transcending all sectors of society and politics. In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon announced the community’s transformation to the European Union – a formal regional organisation with a common market and a distinct infrastructure of institutions managing a range of issue areas – governance, law and justice, environment, foreign affairs and security, education, development and economy. In many regards the ‘legal personality’ of the European Union has enabled it to move beyond a distinct regional focus and is now regarded as a viable actor within the international system itself.

Nonetheless, the evolution of the European Union has been a unique transformation. The underlying conditions that have facilitated the progression from economic integration to the development of a ‘mature security community’ are conditions that do not exist, and are unlikely to ever exist, elsewhere in the world. It is for this reason that, when considering other regional blocs and the

⁴ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. (Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited, 1991), p. 188.

⁵ Joseph Nye (ed.), *International Regionalism* (Boston, United States: Little Brown and Co, 1968), p. xii.

relative success of the multilateral organisations developed within them, it is important to avoid the temptation to gauge the evolution of these institutions on the basis of the European Union's success. Two such regional institutions that have developed in a context that is a strong contrast to that of Europe have been the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). Both organisations have been regarded as the 'drivers' of regionalism in their respective regions and have, incrementally over the past several decades,⁶ sought to establish a framework of norms and rules upon which to coherently combat the shared security concerns within their particular regions.

1.2 Purpose of this thesis

In the process of conceptualising the region as a subset of the international system, Buzan argues that regional structures can exist in one of three distinct ways. Firstly, overlay describes those spaces where the presence of great powers is so intense within the region that it suppresses all local security dynamics. Secondly, a Regional Security Complex (RSC) exemplifies a space in which a set of units within a distinct geographical boundary experience security interdependencies that are so intense and intertwined that the processes of (de)securitisation for these units cannot be considered or resolved apart from one another.⁷ Thirdly, unstructured regions comprise the leftover space and combine proximate local states that are so weak that their focus is largely internal and thus "generate insufficient security interdependence"⁸ to satisfy the essential structure of a regional security complex.

Despite Buzan's critical assessment that the South Pacific region exemplifies a prototypical example of an unstructured region, since decolonisation and largely in the post-Cold War era, the islands within the South Pacific have recognised that the fate of their security is interlinked with each other and cannot be resolved in the absence of a collective approach to threat mitigation. Security cooperation as a means of combating trans-boundary crime is a fundamental focus within the region and has emerged as one of the four modern pillars of the region's organisational body, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF).

The first objective of this thesis is to utilise Buzan's conceptual framework of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to analyse the extent to which a Regional Security Complex (RSC) is present

⁶ Whilst the organisations themselves may only date back 43 years and 39 years respectively, the roots of these organisations do date back slightly further in their antecedents.

⁷ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security* (New York, United States: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 44. Defined in full as being a situation where "local states have such low capability that their own power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries; and second, where geographical insulation makes interaction difficult." (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 62).

⁸ Buzan & Waever, 2003; 492.

within the South Pacific - even if this is only in its most nascent stage. The second objective is to analyse how the evolution of the security architecture within this regional space may compare to that of the region's nearest neighbour, Southeast Asia. This cross-comparison is significant in that Southeast Asia represents a relatively intense RSC that shares several key characteristics with the South Pacific; namely, they are comprised of traditionally non-western nation-states that have suffered strongly at the hands of both colonisation and Cold War overlay. As a result, the states within both regions have sought to initiate cooperative security projects through regional institutions amidst post-World War Two state-making and share the same underlying desire to minimise the assistance required from extra-regional powers and solve their own problems, on their own terms, from within.

1.3 Propositions

1. First, I propose that the South Pacific does possess the necessary characteristics to be defined as a Regional Security Complex. I propose that this may be illustrated by translating the four features of the essential structure of a RSC to the dynamics of the South Pacific.

2. Second, in the short modern history of independent states within the South Pacific, regionalism has been a consistent feature, even if the relative effectiveness of these regional initiatives have been highly criticised. I propose that, while a complex exists, it is still loose and developing, thus the nature of this complex reflects the region's inefficient attempts to coordinate its mutual security concerns. I propose that the shortcomings of the South Pacific, and its preeminent regional institution the Pacific Island Forum, can be highlighted by cross-comparing the evolution of its regional security architecture to that of its nearest neighbour, Southeast Asia.

1.4 Chapter Breakdown

This thesis is comprised of seven chapters including this introductory chapter and a conclusion. Chapter one includes an introduction, the purpose of this thesis, its propositions and a breakdown of its chapter structure. Chapter two outlines a brief history of post-Cold War security and maps the emergence of the regionalist perspective. Chapter three outlines the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis. As conceptualised by Barry Buzan 'Regional Security Complex Theory' takes a systematic approach to understanding the relationship between security and the regional level. RSCT highlights four key variables that determine the existence and dynamics of a RSC: boundary, anarchic structure, polarity and, social construction. By mapping these features within regions RSCT allows for a methodical cross-comparison to take place. Chapter four is an application of RSCT to the

dynamics of Southeast Asia and is an outline of the four variables within the Southeast Asian context. Chapter five is an application of RSCT to the dynamics of the South Pacific and is an outline of the four variables within the South Pacific context. Chapter six is a cross-comparative analysis of the previous two chapters and discusses the nature of both RSCs, as well as their attempts at regionalism and securitization as a means of dealing with the dynamics of a RSC. Chapter seven utilises the knowledge gained from the cross-comparative analysis to outline the major findings of this thesis and to suggest what future areas for development may exist.

1.5 Methodology

The methodological approach of this thesis is a qualitative and research-based approach utilising primary and secondary sources of information. It's theoretical framework is been largely derived from the works of Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the Copenhagen School of security studies, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. Buzan's individual and collaborative work, as outlined in *Regions and Powers, People, States and Fear*, and *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, have all been critical to the application and understanding of this framework. Sources of information also include press releases and official statements from both ASEAN and the PIF, reports by academic observers, journal articles, newspaper articles, government documents, web pages and conference/working papers. Whilst a wealth of literature exists in regards to RSCT and Southeast Asia, literature on the South Pacific has been harder to come by. I have sought to accumulate a range of sources in order to encapsulate the opinions of regionalist advocates and critics.

Chapter Two - Post-Cold War Security and the International Relations of Regions

Few would object to the statement that, in the wake of the Cold War, the international system has experienced a dynamic shift. The over-arching bipolar structure of the international security environment collapsed with the demise of the Soviet Union and many international relations scholars have sought to explain the dynamics of this transformation, its principal features and what it means for the future of security affairs in the international system. The end of the Cold War “brought about devolution to strategic affairs”⁹ and created a new international security environment that was “a marked shift away from global-level security concerns and towards local and regional ones.”¹⁰ Amidst the emergence of various perspectives, a focus on regions in the international system has attracted renewed interest and “has been foregrounded in the analysis of international politics, has emerged as the locus of international economic activity, and for organizing security and resolving conflict.”¹¹

Prior to this devolution, and with its pinnacle at the height of the Cold War, international relations has been strongly embedded in the very premise that “the state is and should be about security, with emphasis on military and political security.”¹² Traditionally this saw the state as the central focus and national sovereignty as the ultimate goal. The contemporary doctrine of state sovereignty¹³ may be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 with the emergence of the nation-state¹⁴ and its predominance as the key unit within the international system. It was from here that the concept of a state developed and was used to describe an autonomous political unit that was geographically bound within a certain territory. Stability and order was then maintained by a “centralized government with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree and enforce laws”¹⁵ and ultimately was, in the traditional Weberian sense, “an institution claiming to exercise monopoly of legitimate force within a particular territory.”¹⁶

⁹ Hans Maull, ‘Security Cooperation in Europe and Pacific Asia: A Comparative Analysis’, *Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 19, no. 2 (2005), p. 68.

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London, England: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 61.

¹¹ Deepak Nair, ‘Regionalism in Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 3, no. 1 (2009), p. 110.

¹² Buzan et al, 1998; 37.

¹³ Robert Patman, *Globalisation, Sovereignty, and the Transformation of New Zealand Foreign Policy* (Wellington, New Zealand: Centre of Strategic Studies, 2005). [online] <<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/working-papers/WP21/pdf>> [accessed 10 September 2010].

¹⁴ The traditional notion of the state is predominantly attributed to Max Weber, in which the state is necessitated upon its monopoly use of and/or licensing of violence within a given territory.

¹⁵ Robert Carneiro, ‘A Theory of the Origin of the State’, *Science, New Series*. 169, no. 3947 (1970), p. 733.

¹⁶ Patman, 2005; 5.

It is from this realist perspective and in the Westphalian world of strong states¹⁷ that the state represents the referent objective of security and the aim is to maintain its sovereignty and thereby protect the integrity of the state. The management of threats is largely outward looking as this state-centric view of security rests on the assumption that, by default, if the state is secure then that security transfers to those that occupy the state. Internal conflict in a strong state is less of a danger and thus security concerns are derived from between states and not from within. Military strategy through deterrence and balance-of power have been fundamental to understanding the role of states as independent units and their interactions within the 'anarchical international system'.

The 1990s marked a re-conceptualisation of security and saw the scope of traditional security analysis expand beyond the state and beyond the military and political sphere. In the new and emerging security environment, scholars and practitioners were forced to broaden the levels and sectors in which they viewed security relations, as the end of the Cold War coincided with not only a structural shift but an ideational one - "the latter essentially being the replacement of traditional polarized security views by the principles of cooperative security."¹⁸ It has been in this new environment and through a multitude of multilateral organisations that war has become increasingly regarded as an unthinkable action and it has been rules and norms, rather than power, which has been argued as a means of determining the limits of action.¹⁹ However, this is still only one such perspective and it is important to note that there are many that still adhere to the realist ideal that, despite their membership within rule and/or norm based organisations, states still act on an individual and nationalistic basis and that these organisations are used as another means of hedging bets and pursuing national aspirations.

The disbandment of the Soviet Union essentially meant that nature and scope of the international system was no longer at the mercy of a "system-level pattern of great power relationships."²⁰ Local dynamics, more so than ever before, became free to take on their own shape - while this meant heightened conflict and insecurity in some areas; it meant diminishing conflict and heightened cooperation in others. The extent to which the rivalry of the Cold War impacted on local and regional internal dynamics was not altogether felt until the overlay, that had stagnated its development, was removed in the 1990s. Overlay is essentially a process in which "the interests of external great powers transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that

¹⁷ Strong states being at far less risk of internal conflict.

¹⁸ Brian L. Job, *Alliances' and Regional Security Developments: The Role of Regional Arrangements in the UN's Promotion of Peace and Stability* (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University, 2003), p. 12. [online] <<http://unu.edu/millennium/job.pdf>> [accessed 24 August 2010].

¹⁹ Rolfe, 2008; 100.

²⁰ Buzan et al, 1998; 61.

the local security dynamics of security interdependence virtually cease to exist.”²¹ During the Cold War - and in the wake of decolonisation - many distinct regions of the world, such as East Asia and Africa, became more diverse with postcolonial independence and the emergence of many new nation-states. These regions were simultaneously struggling with the pressure of developing their own societal, political, military and economic personalities as well as combating the pressure of extra-regional involvement and the proxy wars that developed as a result.

During the Cold War “international relations came to be rigidly defined by a small number of regional arrangements”²² and various defence alliance groupings, namely NATO, SEATO, ANZUS and the Warsaw Pact, typically characterised regional level security interactions and functioned under the shared auspices of collective defence. The post-Cold War period, by contrast, has seen the pursuit of state security evolve beyond these mechanisms and it has now sought to embrace the concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security. Subsequently the international system has experienced a growth in multilateral institution building in which new governmental, military and non-governmental mechanisms have emerged as a means of facilitating security dialogue. The significance of this shifting paradigm is that security coordination between states is no longer considered an act of defence but involves cooperation to securitize threats via mechanisms that do not involve force. This idea embodies the Deutschian concept of a security community, whereby armed conflict between states is accepted to be completely unthinkable and where social problems can (and must) be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change.’²³

As already noted, another distinct feature of the emerging international system²⁴ is that the region, as a basis for group organisation, has become highly significant: “to a substantial extent, all regions in the post-Cold War period have moved towards inclusive regional arrangements.”²⁵ Actors within their respective regions have become acutely aware of the fact that their security is intertwined within their own historical and geographical context and that the pursuit of national security cannot be achieved in the absence of considering the wider security environment. Security interdependence and the transnational nature of contemporary security threats has ensured that regions and their

²¹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 490.

²² Job, 2003; 1.

²³ Andrej Tusiciny, ‘Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously’, *International Political Science Review*, 28, no. 4 (2007), p. 426.

²⁴ The shape of this polarity is not widely agreed upon. Arguments exist between whether the international system is characterised by a uni-polar tier with the United States at the top and a multi-polar distribution of the rest; or, if in fact, China represents a great power and is positioned somewhere between the top tier and the rest.

²⁵ Job, 2003; 16.

preeminent regional organisations now have sought, in their own context and on their own terms, to manage their security affairs more closely with their neighbours .

Arguably the end of the Cold War has marked one of the most significant shifts in the analysis of security in the international system and represents a “remarkable turning point in the international relations of regions and the role of regional security arrangements.”²⁶ This period has seen two key changes that have facilitated the rise of regional cooperation as a means of coping with the reality of security interdependence. Firstly, the importance of the individual as a referent object of security has increased and the security agenda has broadened to include non-traditional security concerns such as human rights issues, international crime, economic security and poverty, environmental degradation, and demographic challenges. Secondly, there has been a shift away from the belief that dealing with security challenges can be met in a unilateral manner. Instead, there is a significant focus on security processes that seek to increase cooperation and reduce competition and conflict between neighbours by promoting trust building and transparency at the regional level. The task of ensuring that a secure and stable environment exists for all is no longer a preoccupation reserved just for governments, nor is it one that can be successfully achieved by a state alone. In the post-Cold War era the regional level has emerged as the best possible means of organising multilateral cooperation and, arguably, regional peace and stability can only be attained on the basis of inclusion and engagement.²⁷

²⁶ Job, 2003; 10.

²⁷ Job, 2003; 16.

Chapter Three – Regional Security Complex Theory

Traditional International Relations theory holds that the global system is comprised of individual units that all possess the same power to affect systemic dynamics – it is for this reason that anarchy defines the relation among the units and that war is an ever present reality. However this is no longer strictly the case and, since World War Two, an array of multilateral institutions have emerged and sought to reject the Clausewitzian notion that war is a continuation of politics. The underlying aim of these organisations has been the collaborative pursuit of rendering war an unappealing mechanism for action within the international system. Furthermore, a significant trend in the development of multilateral and intergovernmental groupings over the past five decades is that they have been initiated and conceptualised at a regional level.

Security interdependence is more intense on a regional scale than it is on a global scale. This is grounded in the fact that the majority of the world's 193 sovereign states²⁸ generally lack the ability to project power much beyond their own regional sphere. It is for this reason that the regional level, as a distinct level of analysis between the national and international level, has become progressively significant and has emerged as one of the key perspectives through which to view the post-Cold War security environment. The importance of theorising about the regional level "is made necessary by the argument that regions are not just micro-versions of the global system"²⁹ but that these two levels are innately different and incorporate their own dynamics. Regions are not strictly "natural, objective and ontologically given spaces... Instead, regions are spatial and temporal constructs contingent on a variety of interests and agendas."³⁰ The regional level is bound within a historical and geographical context and thus the elements of proximity and familiarity intensify the nature of interactions between actors within regional groupings. While the materialist elements of defining regional parameters are crucial, this does not mean that the region is necessarily fixed as a permanent subsystem. It is important to note that regions are not impermeable and, unlike the global-level system which is inherently closed, the regional system can change as "even regions that seem most natural and inalterable are products of political reconstruction and subject to reconstruction attempts."³¹

²⁸ The accuracy of this figure is derived from state representation within the United Nations (as such that acceptance as a sovereign state is a prerequisite for membership).

²⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 79.

³⁰ Deepak Nair, 'Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 31, no. 1 (2009), p. 112.

³¹ Peter Katzenstein and Christopher Hemmer, 'Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism', *International Organisation*, 56, no. 3 (2002), p. 575.

3.1 The Relevance of the Regional Level

The regional level of security has become increasingly autonomous based on two foundational assumptions; first, that territoriality is still a "central feature of international security dynamics"³² and, second, that in the post-Cold War era the regional level is a necessary feature of any coherent analysis of international security. The latter may be illustrated by the rise of multilateral institutions in regional settings - as regionalism has become an increasingly popular means of organising comprehensive security mechanisms for many actors. As noted previously, and as the logic that links the previous two assumptions, "most types of threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones."³³ Consequently, regionally coherent security subsystems "stem from the simple mechanism... by which threats, particularly political and military ones, are most strongly felt when they are at close range."³⁴ As a result, certain security threats tend to be regionally localized and become so intertwined that they cannot, for the most part, be wholly resolved or analysed in the absence of considering the other units that exist within the dynamic of the complex. It is for this reason that "the central idea remains that substantial parts of the securitisation and desecuritisation processes in the international system will manifest themselves in regional clusters"³⁵ and that these clusters are both durable and distinct from global level processes. This reality has facilitated the acknowledgement of security interdependence for many governments and has been the key driving force behind regional projects.

3.2 Regional Security Complex Theory

Over the past 50 years, and particularly during the Cold War, interest in regions as distinct features within international relations theory has fluctuated and has predominantly been focused on regionalism and the conceptualisation of regions as imagined communities. Regionalism has emerged as a focal point for constructivists in the development of a 'new world order' and has dominated regional analysis with its belief in regional groupings being bound together by shared identities, values and cultures.

While a commonality of values and ideals may facilitate regional cooperation and the formation of multilateral organisations in their later stages, they are not adequate enough to fully explain the emergence of mutually exclusive regions and the intensity of dynamics within them. Mutual

³² Buzan and Waever, 2003; 461.

³³ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 461.

³⁴ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited, 1991), p. 188.

³⁵ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 44.

interests exist irrespective of whether a sense of identity is shared by all. Materialist and rationalist features with territorial boundaries and power must also be acknowledged in order to wholly conceptualise regional formations in that, given the density of interactions and limited projection of power, regions are still territorially bounded and embedded within power distributions. Arguably, “all the states in the system are to some extent enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. But because insecurity is often associated with proximity, this interdependence is far from uniform. Anarchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally-based clusters where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside the complex and those outside it.”³⁶

Over the past decade, and based on his belief that regions are central to world politics, Barry Buzan has developed a conceptual framework for analysing the regional level as a standalone subsystem, one which incorporates characteristics that are distinct, durable and independent from global level phenomenon. Buzan offers what he has termed Regional Security Complex Theory and suggests that, in a world of mutually exclusive Regional Security Complexes, regional security complex theory (RSCT) can sharply distinguish between the regional and global levels.³⁷ Regional Security Complexes exist throughout the international system and “are defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.”³⁸ Through RSCT Buzan suggests that the separation of the global and regional levels can be derived from something more realist and materialist than the constructivist idea of imagined political communities bound together by shared ideals and identities.

First and foremost, the conceptualisation of Regional Security Complex Theory requires the clarification of several key definitions; namely, what is meant by the term ‘region’ and term ‘security’. Here, the former represents a more problematic area than the latter, for the reasons above – i.e the conflict between constructivist and identification definitions of regions and realist and materialistic definitions.

3.3 Defining Security

As noted earlier, the concept of security has evolved and moved beyond its traditional roots of being strictly a value of the military or political sphere. To pursue the development of a strong and secure state, the state alone can no longer be treated as the sole referent object of security . In order to

³⁶ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 46.

³⁷ Amitav Acharya, ‘The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics’, *World Politics*, 59, no. 4 (2007), p. 635.

³⁸ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 45.

highlight this evolution, Buzan offers a reconceptualised definition of security. He argues that a security threat is an issue that "is posited (by a securitising actors) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal internal economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave the issue to normal politics."³⁹

This reconceptualised definition of security highlights the element of perception, whereby security threats must be perceived as such in order to facilitate whether it is necessary to act or not to act and thus, from this point two further definitions are offered; securitisation and desecuritisation.

1. Securitisation is defined as "the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat."⁴⁰ Essentially the idea of securitisation highlights the process by which a threat is treated equally by all involved as being a mutual and imminent concern that requires action. In regards to regional securitisation this requires that all actors view the issue, to the same extent, to be harmful to the referent object being threatened. This may be contrasted to the previous concept of security in which the actors who decided which threats were most dire were solely from within the state – as the state was acting as one unit within the international system and one unit alone.
2. Desecuritisation is defined as "the discursive process by which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as a threat."⁴¹ By contrast, desecuritisation is the process by which those involved acknowledge that the threat is no longer an imminent reality and that it is an issue that can be dealt with within the ordinary framework of day to day politics.

3.4 Defining 'Region'

Defining a region is not a simple task and consequently no such definition exists that is going to satisfy all perspectives and theoretical needs. In order to understand how Buzan uses the term within his framework and in reference to RSCT it is important to offer his concept of the term.⁴² A region, in security terms, "means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists

³⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 71.

⁴⁰ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 491

⁴¹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 491.

⁴² In a later chapter (pertaining to the development of political communities and regionalism) I will discuss the conceptualisation of the term more thoroughly. At this point, and as a matter of consistency in the application of Buzan's framework, it is important to adhere to Buzan's definition.

among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”⁴³

As argued by Buzan not only is geography a concrete situation for each state, “but, because its influence on processes of (de)securitisation, that it also cuts the world into distinct chunks so that the actors in a given region share the properties of their region as a structural context.” Combating piracy, for example, provides a case in point. Securitizing the freedom of movement within shipping lanes is an imminent concern for various regions, but, a non-existent one for others. Geography in this instance is a crucial factor and cannot be removed from this equation.

3.5 Defining ‘Regional Security Complex’

A Regional Security Complex (as coined and conceptualised by Buzan) may be defined as a “set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved from one another.”⁴⁴

Buzan argues that within the framework of RSCT, “regions are not given by geography or culture or patterns of current events, or the whims of analysts, local discourses about regionalism. RSCs are socially constructed by their members, whether consciously or unconsciously by the ways in which their processes of (de)securitisation interlock with each other.”⁴⁵ And thus, while RSCs may be durable, they are not permanent – “they can therefore be changed by changes in those processes though the scope for change may well be conditioned by the relative depth or shallowness of the way in which the social structure of security is internalised by the actors involved.”⁴⁶

3.5.1 The Conceptualisation of a Regional Security Complex

Region building has been a slow and steady process in the works since World War Two. However, the impact of Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union had an intense impact of this process. The ability of these to states to project power and interfere in the dynamics of other states essentially froze regional developments in various areas as it temporarily suspended the emergence of many local dynamics. It was not until the 1990s that the structural configuration of the world began to emerge along regional lines and further facilitated by the acceleration of regionalisation, regionalism and the “advent of non-military actors.”⁴⁷ In short, regional dynamics

⁴³ Buzan, 1991; 188.

⁴⁴ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 491.

⁴⁵ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 481.

⁴⁶ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 481.

⁴⁷ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 17.

began to characterise the relations of states in the international system more so than global dynamics.

Regional security complexes are “ultimately defined by the interaction among their units... the pattern formed by these acts defines the RSC. If it were purely a product of global processes, it would obviously not be a regional level phenomenon.”⁴⁸ It is for this reason that it is important to analyse the regional level as a distinct level and not just a micro-level of global dynamics.

While the concept of RSCs represent a fresh perspective within international relations, the concept has already evolved to better match the evolution of the contemporary security environment itself, whereby “traditionally, RSCs were usually generated by bottom-up (or inside out) processes which the fears and concerns generated within the region produced RSC.”⁴⁹ However, given the realities of ‘new’ and emerging security threats⁵⁰ “regions can be created as patterns within system level processes”⁵¹ The example offered here is that “a group of countries find themselves sharing the local effects of a climate change is a case of collective responses to shared fates arising from outside systemic pressures.”⁵² While the systemic nature of the threat may make it appear as a global system threat, “the RSC is still constituted by the regional actors because they are the ones defining the problem in such terms and interacting to produce a regional formation over the issue.”⁵³ As will be focused on in the next chapter, this feature is particularly important when considering the South Pacific complex – previously the region did represent an unstructured one in that the sparse geographical nature, the economic underdevelopment and socio-political instability of the region’s nation-states rendered the concerns of most to be strongly internal. It has been the introduction of ‘new’ security threats that has drawn the states of the Pacific region together in a cooperative pursuit of regional security – climate change, resource exploitation and transnational crime, for example, represent some of the security objectives that Pacific Island countries have sought to securitize and have recognised as mutually concerning threats.

3.6 The Essential Structure

The essential structure of a RSC consists of four elements; boundary, anarchic structure, polarity and social construction. It is the combination of these four elements that differentiates the lines of the complex and may be characterised as follows:

⁴⁸ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 72.

⁴⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 72.

⁵⁰ Buzan is referring to threats originating from sectors that were not typically featured on the traditional security agenda. Namely, those emerging from the economic or environmental sector.

⁵¹ Buzan et al, 1998; 198-200.

⁵² Buzan and Waever, 2003; 72.

⁵³ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 72.

3.6.1 BOUNDARY - *Is there a clear boundary that may differentiate the members of one complex from another?*

As argued by Buzan and Waever, a RSC encapsulates a distinct dynamic between a particular set of states within a geopolitical context. The existence of a RSC is highlighted by a clear distinction between those units within the complex and those outside of it. As a result, the relationship between the states within the complex is intensified by elements of familiarity and proximity. Thus, it is important that a clear boundary exists and “that the local factors are given their proper weight in security analysis.”⁵⁴

3.6.2 ANARCHIC STRUCTURE - *Are there two or more autonomous units within the complex?*

The structural variable of anarchy is clear and straightforward. In order for a regional subsystem with a clear boundary to emerge it is imperative that the majority of its units are autonomous. In the absence of such autonomy a distinct regional dynamic fails to emerge as the region is easily penetrated and influenced by outside powers.

3.6.3 POLARITY - *Is there a distribution of power among units?*

As posited by Buzan and Waever, “the structure of anarchy, the essential structure and character of RSCs are defined by two kinds of relations, power relations and patterns of amity and enmity.”⁵⁵ A RSC represents a substructure of the international system, and in a similar fashion, incorporates a distinct dynamic whose security can be either facilitated or hindered by the distribution of power within in. The regional level “can be analysed in terms of polarity, ranging from unipolar, through bi – and tripolar, to multipolar”⁵⁶ and it is important that it is distinguished from global level polarity. The historical interactions between states is important and “it is thus not enough to look at the distribution of power in order to predict patterns of conflict...Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as specific issues trigger conflict or cooperation, and take part in the formation of an overall security constellation of fears, threats, and friendships that define a RSC.”⁵⁷

According to Buzan, “the basic premise that security interdependence tends to be regionally focused is strongly mediated by the power of the units concerned,”⁵⁸ whereby, the most imminent and critical security concerns have a tendency to be clustered on a regional scale. It is important to note that the role of great powers within this logic represents an abnormality as these powers have the

⁵⁴ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 46 -7.

⁵⁵ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 49.

⁵⁶ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 49.

⁵⁷ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 50.

⁵⁸ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 46

capacity to “largely transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security relationships, [whereas] at the other end of the power spectrum are those states whose limited capabilities largely confine their security interests and activities to their near neighbours.”⁵⁹

3.6.5 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION - *Are there patterns of amity and enmity?*

Patterns of amity and enmity are much less a part of traditional IR theory than power, but rather represent an element that has emerged as a product of the density of regional interactions. These patterns highlight the interactions between states within the specified regional context and place the nature of these interactions on a spectrum between amity and enmity. These patterns tend to show what sort of relations has largely dominated the system – be it friend, rival or enemy – and are “influenced by various background factors such as history, culture, religion, geography, but to a large extent they are both path dependent and this become their own best explanation.”⁶⁰ Power, while still necessary, is not sufficient as an indication of a regionally coherent subsystem. Whilst the distribution of power within a security complex does contribute to shaping the possibilities for alignment; it does not, however, shape the entire character of the region.⁶¹

3.7 Summary

RSCT argues that the essential structure of a RSC can be derived from four key variables; boundary, anarchy, polarity and social construction. Furthermore, that characterising the parameters of a RSC allows one to identify where the complex sits on the spectrum from conflict formation, through to security regime or security community and what this may explain about the regional dynamic itself. The merit of RSCT, as Buzan suggests, is that it “stays more narrowly with security and security-defined activities, and uses RSCT as a general instrument for telling a structured version of world history, past, present and future.”⁶² The strength of RSCT rests the fact that it is “allowed to define the possible orders on the outcome side and to select the relevant parameters on the input side,”⁶³ which, in turn, rids the analysis of loose, ad hoc variables and, thereby, show both its virtues and its limitations.

⁵⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 46.

⁶⁰ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 50.

⁶¹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 213.

⁶² Buzan and Waever, 2003; 79.

⁶³ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 79.

Chapter Four - Southeast Asia and Regional Security Complex Theory

4.1 The History and Conceptualisation of Southeast Asia

As the largest continent in the world, Asia can be further divided into three sub-regions: “*Northeast Asia* (the People’s Republic of China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and the Russian Far East), *Southeast Asia* (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), and *South Asia* (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka).”⁶⁴ Having undergone a substantial transformation since the end of World War Two, the parameters of Southeast Asia as a geopolitical region are commonly derived from the ten member states that comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN was founded in 1967 upon the signing of the Bangkok Declaration and sought to establish a regional partnership between its five founding members; Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. ASEAN welcomed the addition of Brunei Darussalam upon full independence from the United Kingdom in 1984⁶⁵ and further continued to expand its membership base during the 1990s. With the accession of Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and finally Cambodia in 1999, the membership base of ASEAN, as an institution, managed to fully encapsulate Southeast Asia as a geopolitical region. ASEAN represents the heart of Southeast Asia and Southeast Asian regionalism where all, with the exception of the region’s newest nation state Timor-Leste,⁶⁶ enjoy full and active participation in the region’s core multilateral organisation.

Southeast Asia itself is comprised of two distinct subregions; the Malay Archipelago represents maritime Southeast Asia and landlocked Indochina represents the region’s mainland core. Each sub-region is distinctive in that different patterns of interstate relations dominate the security dynamic. Indochina includes Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the northern peninsular of Malaysia. Interstate conflict within Indochina has been particularly problematic and the “Thai-Vietnamese struggle for domination over Laos and Cambodia”⁶⁷ has been one of its most defining characteristics. The Malay Archipelago includes the remainder of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines and Timor-Leste. Rivalry and competition between Malaysia-Singapore-

⁶⁴ Sheldon Simon, ‘ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to Community’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 30, no. 2 (2008), p. 265.

⁶⁵ Donald E. Weatherbee, ‘Brunei: the ASEAN Connection’, *Asian Survey*, 23, no. 6 (1983), p. 723.

⁶⁶ Whilst Timor-Leste is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, it is yet to attain full membership within ASEAN itself. It has been stated by ASEAN that they are preparing to support Timor-Leste’s full membership. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Bulletin: discussing preparations for Timor-Leste membership to ASEAN*, 22 July 2010 [online] <<http://www.aseansec.org/24842.htm#Article-17>> [accessed 17 May 2011].

⁶⁷ Alan Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2003), p. 21.

Indonesia is the core of the sub-regional dynamic and the desire to stabilise ties between the three states was a significant driving force behind the creation of ASEAN.⁶⁸ Since the end of the Cold War interstate conflict in Southeast Asia has steadily declined. Historical grievances have been pushed aside and a fresh, geographically coherent form of regionalism has emerged. Southeast Asia's regional security architecture has expanded significantly since 1967 and the region's extensive institutional framework has come to define Southeast Asia as a region. Nonetheless, and despite shifting dynamics in the international security environment and the region itself, it is important to note that "old-fashioned concerns about power still dominate the security agendas of most regional powers, and war remains a distinct, if constrained, reality."⁶⁹

Southeast Asia is an eclectic region with a wealth of cultural, social and political diversity. Extra-regional interactions date back to the sixteenth century and the vibrancy and diversity of Southeast Asia is a direct reflection of the region's geographical position in the heart of the trading route between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Southeast Asia is highly syncretic and "noted more for its ethnic, religious and political heterogeneity than its homogeneity."⁷⁰ Each country within the region displays a variegated mixture of religious influences including Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and animism. Religion plays a critical role in the culture of the region, yet the incorporation of religion into the identity of the region's post-colonial nation-states has taken on different forms and has been a source of both stability and instability. With a population of 242,968,342 million, 86 per cent⁷¹ of which are Muslim, Indonesia represents the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, yet Indonesia is not an Islamic state and has sought to define itself as both secular and democratic. Conversely, despite having a smaller Muslim percentage of 60.4 per cent,⁷² Malaysia is defined as a Muslim state and Islam remains its official religion.

From the mid-nineteenth century East Asia became dominated by foreign presence and Southeast Asia in particular suffered from the effects of colonization followed by the impact of World War Two. Post-colonial Southeast Asia "emerged in a protracted and often conflictual process of decolonisation."⁷³ The beginning of post-colonialism and the emergence of the region's new nation-states began when "the Philippines gained independence in 1946, Burma in 1948, Indonesia in 1949,

⁶⁸ Collins, 2003; 18.

⁶⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 93.

⁷⁰ Dominic McGoldrick, 'Current Developments in Public International Law: The ASEAN Charter', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 58 (2009), p. 199.

⁷¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA - The World Factbook Indonesia* [online]. Updated 2011, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>> [accessed 18 January 2011].

⁷² Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA - The World Factbook Malaysia* [online]. Updated 2011, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html>> [accessed 18 January 2011].

⁷³ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 133.

Cambodia in 1953, Laos and Vietnam (in two parts) in 1954, Malaya in 1957 (wider Malaysia in 1963) and Singapore in 1965.”⁷⁴ However, these events cannot be truly seen as the beginning of an independent and autonomous region. Within years of independence, “the Cold War divided the area into antagonistic communist and anti-communist alliance systems centred on the Soviet Union and the United States.”⁷⁵ It was amidst the external pressure of the Cold War environment that the conflictual process of state formation began and the new, emerging Asian nation-states of Southeast Asia sought to develop a sense of individual autonomy and a sense of self within regional and international affairs.

The effects of overlay and the pressure embedded within the Cold War context were especially harsh on Southeast Asia. For the length of the Cold War the region was at the mercy of the bipolar alignment of the international system and the balance-of-power politics of the Soviet Union and the United States. Consequently when the Cold War came to a close, and the region lost its strategic relevance, the units within the region were forced to confront their local security dynamics in a way that had not been experienced before. The reality of a weakened superpower presence left “more room for local security dynamics to take their own shape and to operate more on the basis of local resources, issues, and perceptions.”⁷⁶ Relationships and rivalries within the regional context took a central position and the significance of proximity and familiarity in the perception of security threats emerged to define much of the security environment.

The end of the Cold War culminated in the release of Southeast Asia from the effects of overlay. Although the beginnings of a regional security regime had already begun to take shape, the end of the Cold War meant that both anti-colonialism and non-aligned neutrality no longer maintained their central significance and thus took a back seat to the region’s own locally driven security environment. Post-overlay, the region took on a desecuritized form and continued to develop patterns of dialogue and mutual trust building that were already embedded with the foundation of ASEAN. Desecuritization in Third World regions was not a globally uniform response to the end of the Cold War and Southeast Asia was a unique case. The geopolitical context and historical legacy embedded within the regional level security environment became paramount and during this period each region took on a vastly different shape. In Southeast Asia, desecuritization took place as the regional structure started to slowly build an organisational framework as a means of coping with previously conflictual interstate relations and the fundamentals of a security regime began to

⁷⁴ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 133.

⁷⁵ John Miller, *The Roots and Implications of East Asian Regionalism* (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 4.

⁷⁶ Buzan et al, 1998; 66.

develop. By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa was also facing a decolonisation process and suffered significantly from high levels of local insecurity. Unlike Southeast Asia, the leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa did not have the capacity to form the cooperative mechanisms required to deal with their disputes and armed conflict became the *status quo*.⁷⁷ Southeast Asia's capacity to internally transform rests with the fact that economic prosperity ostensibly offered an incentive for states to cooperate. In sum, "rapid economic development helped sustain remarkable strategic stability on the surface"⁷⁸ and resulted in the rapprochement of ties between previously hostile neighbours.

4.2 The Southeast Asian Regional Security Complex

The first traces of a Southeast Asian regional security complex manifested amidst the Cold War environment. However, its presence was subdued and heavily shaped around Cold War allegiances. During this time a sub-regionally coherent dynamic did emerge and "although Southeast Asia, like the other new third world RSCs, contained a wealth of interstate conflicts and rivalries, these dominated neither its operation nor its formation."⁷⁹ Progress towards interstate cooperation during ASEAN's formative years was steady but incremental. So as to ensure that the ASEAN survived, ASEAN members found themselves preoccupied with the need to consolidate the new Association and overcome "the mutual suspicions and animosities that had bedevilled relations among its members."⁸⁰ In effect, ASEAN member states "managed to shelve the disputes among themselves, effectively forming a weak subregional security regime whose members agreed not to pursue their disagreements by force."⁸¹ The intertwined nature of the regional security environment became an increasing reality and member states were forced to acknowledge that these interdependencies could not be managed in the absence of coordinated action. Despite historic patterns of conflict and rivalry, the ASEAN states found that as a collective they could provide their own "legitimacy, local knowledge and experience, and some resources"⁸² to the pursuit of stability and security within the region and, furthermore, could do so without the overbearing influence of extra-regional powers.

The regional bipolarisation of conflict in Southeast Asia was largely shaped by the international system. However, "woven through this were substantial elements of still active regional level securitisation"⁸³ and the beginnings of a web of security interdependence which would go on to

⁷⁷ Buzan, et al, 1998; 66-67.

⁷⁸ Maull, 2005; 69.

⁷⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 133.

⁸⁰ Rodolfo Severino, 'ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 29, no. 3 (2007), p. 409.

⁸¹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 135.

⁸² Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security: a Framework for Analysis', *Third World Quarterly*, 18, no. 3 (1997), p. 421.

⁸³ Buzan and Waver, 2003; 134.

define the Southeast Asian security complex. The RSC of Southeast Asia has developed its own pattern of security relations and its own coping mechanisms. It is territorially bounded with an element of social construction and contains its own distinct distribution of power and regionally driven patterns of amity and enmity. As a result, Southeast Asia has steadily developed a regional security architecture in which the facilitation of stability and security at the regional level has been the ultimate goal. The pursuit of security in the post-colonial history of the region, however, has not been without its obstacles, which have both come to define and disrupt the Southeast Asian security complex and its coping strategies.

The Essential Structure of the Southeast Asian RSC

4.3 BOUNDARY - *Is there something differentiating a RSC from its neighbours?*

The boundary of Southeast Asia's regional security complex is commonly associated with the parameters of ASEAN membership which significantly since its expansion in the 1990s and with the exception of Timor-Leste's lack of full membership, has regarded itself as an accurate reflection of geographical Southeast Asia.⁸⁴ East Asia itself has three distinct sub-regions with separate dynamics that drive their own regional security complexes but also play into the wider regional dynamic. Varied historical relationships and distributions in power have resulted in individual complexes that function autonomously and independently from those experienced in other parts of Asia. *Northeast Asia* comprises two great powers (China and Japan), both of which receive either positive or negative attention from the United States. *South Asia* contains India, an important and aspiring state that is seeking to compete with China and is South Asia's "leading aspirant to elevation from regional to great power standing."⁸⁵ Southeast Asia by contrast is the only Asian sub-region that "contains no Great Powers with global reach."⁸⁶ While it may incorporate regional powers, such as Indonesia, no state has the capacity to project power beyond its regional sphere. As a result the boundary of the Southeast Asian complex has become important in driving the terms and the means by which the region copes with, and socialises, the larger powers within the wider regional context.

The view of Southeast Asia as a stand alone region became popularized during the Cold War "albeit one with only shadowy unity and indistinct borders."⁸⁷ The formation of ASEAN has played a strong role in conceptualising the existence of Southeast Asia as an autonomous region and as a result

⁸⁴ The recent ASEAN Charter acknowledges the extent to which member states of ASEAN are bound by geography, common objectives and a shared destiny. ASEAN Secretariat, *The ASEAN Charter*, 8 January 2008 [online] <<http://www.asean.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>> [accessed 10 June 2011].

⁸⁵ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 93.

⁸⁶ Simon, 2008; 265.

⁸⁷ Miller, 2004; 3.

geographical coherency has always remained critical.⁸⁸ The engagement of outside powers has always been achieved via offshoot forums and by socialising extra-regional states in such a manner that ASEAN has managed to maintain its geographical integrity while allowing for Southeast Asian preferences to determine the terms and conditions upon which outside powers engage.⁸⁹ In spite of their economic and political weaknesses, the expansion of ASEAN's membership base to incorporate Vietnam in 1995,⁹⁰ Laos and Myanmar in 1997,⁹¹ and Cambodia in 1999⁹² highlighted the desire for ASEAN to fully reflect the geographic region as a whole. The idea of geographic coherency was further reiterated in the introduction to the ASEAN Charter in 2007 in which explicit reference was made to ASEAN membership being derived from "location in the recognised geographic region of Southeast Asia."⁹³ On this basis, and irrespective of concerns over internal political stability, states such as Myanmar cannot be expelled from the Association for failing to comply with political norms.⁹⁴

The territorial boundary between the individual security complexes of Southeast Asia, South Asia and Northeast Asia, have developed organically and within their own historical context each complex has become defined by its own unique structure, polarity and patterns of interaction. Standing back to back between complexes, Myanmar has been typically regarded as the insulator state between the three. Particularly during the Cold War, and as a result of the military regime's post-colonial isolationist policy, Myanmar emerged as a zone of indifference "between the self-contained dynamics on either side,"⁹⁵ yet, did not have the strength to unify them into one. It has been the vast geographical space to the south of Southeast Asia that has left the conceptualisation of the region with a few points of contention. Southeast Asia rests at the centre of the loosely conceptualised Asia-Pacific area, a term generally used to refer to the wider East Asian region in

⁸⁸ Weatherbee, 1983; 723. Both Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea campaigned for membership early on. However, both were held off in concern of their place within the geopolitical region.

⁸⁹ For example, with the emergence of ASEAN +3, the ARF, and EAS, for example, ASEAN has managed to socialize certain powers into certain forums. ASEAN +3 is a forum that enables open dialogue between ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea, which by definition, excludes the United States. As a result, the U.S has sought to engage and influence regional forums such as the ARF and EAS.

⁹⁰ ASEAN Secretariat, *Bangkok Summit Declaration of 1995*, 14-15 December 1995 [online] <<http://www.aseansec.org/2081.htm>> [accessed 22 February 2011].

⁹¹ At the summit following the acceptance of Laos and Myanmar, ASEAN expressed the hope that Cambodia would soon join as a full member and that the realisation of ASEAN comprising all Southeast Asian countries would be met. ASEAN Secretariat, *Press Statement of 2nd ASEAN Informal Meeting*, 17 December 1997, [online] <<http://www.aseansec.org/1816.htm>> [accessed 22 February 2011].

⁹² ASEAN's Hanoi Declaration of 1998 explicitly states the decision to admit the Kingdom of Cambodia into ASEAN. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Hanoi Declaration 1998*, 16 December 1998, [online] <<http://www.aseansec.org/686.htm>> [accessed 22 February 2011].

⁹³ McGoldrick, 2009: 206.

⁹⁴ McGoldrick, 2009; 206.

⁹⁵ Buzan, 1991; 196.

addition to portions of Oceania; namely New Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea. The security of the additional Oceanic states does experience elements of interdependency with the Southeast Asian security environment: Papua New Guinea suffers from the unrest in Indonesia's southern provinces; Australia has had significant trouble managing the illegal flow of immigrants and the trafficking of drugs from its northern neighbours; and the major political unrest in the former Indonesian province of Timor-Leste has resulted in New Zealand and Australia's largest contribution to international security and peacekeeping since the Korean War.⁹⁶ In spite of overlapping security concerns, "it was notable in defining the regional boundary between Southeast Asia and the South Pacific that neither Australia and New Zealand nor Papua New Guinea (which gained independence in 1975) joined ASEAN."⁹⁷ The Asia-Pacific is still a loosely constructed region and while Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea have all sought strongly to engage in the security framework of the Southeast Asian complex they have done so through regional offshoots such as the ARF and EAS.

4.4 ANARCHIC STRUCTURE – *Are there one or more units?*

The anarchic structure of the international system has been one of its most enduring features throughout history. It is the existence of such anarchy, in combination with the limitations of geography, which is responsible for the creation of regionally driven security complexes. Furthermore, it is the presence of regionalism that highlights the existence of anarchy and the need to mitigate its effects in the pursuit of regional prosperity. In essence, the political structure of anarchy "confronts all states with the security dilemma, but the otherwise seamless web of security interdependence is powerfully mediated by the effects of geography."⁹⁸ The interdependent, but anarchical, structure of the units that comprise Southeast Asia is a case in point. The Southeast Asian dynamic exhibits a strong and conflictual push-and-pull between the individuality of its units and their own desire for self-preservation, and the extent to which self-preservation cannot be achieved in the absence of collective action as an economic and political regional bloc.

The anarchic structure of the units that comprise Southeast Asia has consistently been one of its definitive features; both in conflict and cooperation. Interstate conflict in the region reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s as the remnants of pre-colonial political structures took hold and historical securitizations between neighbours reignited interstate disputes.⁹⁹ The pursuit of nationalistic self-

⁹⁶ The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was an Australian/New Zealand led mission under the auspices of the United Nations launched in September 1999 to facilitate peace and stability between East and West Timor. New Zealand Defence Force, *Deployments: East-Timor* [online]. Updated 2010, <<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/east-timor/update.htm>> [accessed 15 February 2011].

⁹⁷ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 136.

⁹⁸ Buzan, 1999; 191.

⁹⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 134.

preservation dominated conflict between neighbours and insecurity across the region became widespread: “Thailand and (North) Vietnam drifted into rivalry in Cambodia and Laos, and Cambodia resisted Vietnamese hegemonism. Between 1963 and 1966 Indonesia threatened to extinguish the new Malaysian federation, and had frictions with Singapore. There was also a territorial dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over claims to Sabah.”¹⁰⁰ It was not until 1965 when a change of government took place in Indonesia¹⁰¹ that the dissolution of the region’s conflict formation began to take shape in the maritime core of Southeast Asia and the rapprochement of ties between Malaysia-Indonesia-Singapore paved the way for a weak security regime. The growing consciousness of security interdependence ensured that the anarchical regional structure did not continue to descend into a typical post-colonial conflict formation and that “rather than sharpening their national identities against each other, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand... began to construct a subregional security regime.”¹⁰² However, institution building after 1967 remained concentrated within maritime Southeast Asia and the structure of mainland Southeast Asia continued to be dominated by Vietnam’s hegemonic aspirations and the ongoing effects of the Cold War. The ideological division of the region into communist and non-communist allegiances further ensured that the Indochinese subregion remained alienated from the emerging security regime. It was not until 1989, when Vietnam’s decade long occupation of neighbouring Cambodia came to an end, that the anarchic structure of the region began to encapsulate all of geographic Southeast Asia and became characterised by a burgeoning security regime comprised of autonomous and nationalistic individual units.

4.5 POLARITY - *Is there a distinct distribution of power amongst the units?*

The dynamics of power and balance-of-power theory have largely been used to explain the actions of autonomous states and their pursuit of security within the international system. As a contested notion, balance-of-power refers roughly to the “equal distribution of power existing between two or more states”¹⁰³ and may be viewed in one of two ways. Balance-of-power can describe a state of equilibrium as a condition of the environment in and of itself or, alternatively, can refer to the action of creating policy in the aim of attaining a state of balance.¹⁰⁴ The history of Southeast Asia, prior to the beginning of decolonisation in the mid-1940s, reveals little about the power dynamics of the regional level as all, with the exception of Thailand, suffered from the impact of colonial control. By

¹⁰⁰ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 134.

¹⁰¹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 134.

¹⁰² Buzan and Waever, 2003; 134.

¹⁰³ David Capie and Paul Evans. *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*. 2nd ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p. 28.

¹⁰⁴ Capie and Evans, 2007; 28.

1975 the process of post-colonial state-formation had well and truly ensued in a majority of the region¹⁰⁵ and many new nation-states had begun to take shape. The formation of ASEAN facilitated in rebuilding the relationship between Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia and paved the way for regionally specific balancing behaviour to emerge that was not antagonistic and driven by military acquisitions. Indochina continued to contribute little to the regional level balance-of-power and was heavily overwhelmed by the system level power dynamics. By 1975, communist victories in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam had occurred,¹⁰⁶ although this did not immediately alter the overall regional balance as no counteracting balance-of-power military structures materialized as a reaction from non-communist Southeast Asia. However, and at the subregional level, Vietnam's unification did instigate balance-of-power behaviour from Cambodia and Thailand in reaction to Vietnam's burgeoning hegemonic aspirations. The system level continued to subdue the contribution of Indochina to overall regional level polarity and balancing relations between both communist and non-communist Southeast Asian states, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China remained the ultimate focus.

During the Cold War, local level conflict in Southeast Asia remained bipolarised and was organised on the basis of communist and anti-communist alliance systems. The end of the Cold War "opened the way for ASEAN to unite the sub-region in a security regime based on Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-intervention"¹⁰⁷ and rejected the idea that regional security and balance could only be attained via a military alliance system. For the first time in the post-colonial era the regional level defined the balancing behaviour of its units and Southeast Asian polarity drew from local perceptions, resources and issues from within its own geopolitical context. Nonetheless, and whilst multilateralism in Southeast Asia may have diluted the overt balancing behaviour of its units, "ASEAN has not completely rejected balance of power behaviour. Some developments – for example, patterns of arms modernization, Myanmar's membership in ASEAN, and [the then] suspended Australia-Indonesia security agreement – could also be view as balance of power policies."¹⁰⁸

The 1990s marked a critical and testing time for the regional framework as ASEAN endeavoured to both deepen and broaden its scope politically and economically. The expansion of ASEAN to include

¹⁰⁵ Brunei did not gain full independence from the United Kingdom until 1984 and significant conflict in South Vietnam and East-Timor hindered their pursuit of autonomy.

¹⁰⁶ Donald E. Weatherbee, with Ralf Emmers, Mari Pangestu and Leonard C. Sebastian, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: the Struggle for Autonomy* (Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005), p. 71.

¹⁰⁷ Buzan and Waeber, 2003; 155.

¹⁰⁸ Capie and Evans, 2007; 34-5. The suspended Australia-Indonesia agreement has since been replaced with an alternative agreement, albeit in a different form.

the region's mainland and former communist states demanded a readjustment of regional balance. The end of the great power struggle in Indochina altered the previously acute division between the ASEAN group and Vietnam. Regional unification had to look beyond ASEAN's uncharacteristically open condemnation of Vietnam's decade long occupation of Cambodia and reconciliation sought to synchronise Vietnam's regional aspirations more coherently with those of ASEAN.¹⁰⁹ Economically driven regionalism also flourished during this period as APEC¹¹⁰ began to gain momentum and with the introduction of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)¹¹¹ in 1992. However, concerns over the distribution of wealth did weigh heavily on the region's emerging economic institutions and the integration of new, but economically weaker, ASEAN members added further complexity to the pursuit of economic prosperity and regional stability.

Throughout the history of post-colonial Southeast Asia Indonesia has long endeavoured to be the dominant power within the region. During the initial conflict formation of Southeast Asia Indonesia's power aspirations were readily apparent. Between 1963 and 1966 open confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia became characterised by the Sukarno regime's *Konfrontasi* policy,¹¹² in which Indonesia's desire to dominate the region and to break up the new federation amounted to both political and armed opposition.¹¹³ The collapse of the Sukarno regime in 1965 altered Indonesia's traditionally antagonistic and power driven role within the region to one of open engagement and pragmatic cooperation. As a positive force Indonesia's engagement became instrumental in the formation of ASEAN as well as providing APEC with a vehement supporter in the 1980s. However, concerns of Indonesia's domestic insecurity have also represented a destabilizing feature in the regional balance as Jakarta's focus on internal affairs has not necessarily been congruent with those outlined at the regional level. The impact of internal disputes in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor have permeated the international level and have raised questions over ASEAN's functionality and commitment to international values and on human rights.¹¹⁴ Indonesia

¹⁰⁹ An ASEAN-Vietnam study group was set up in 1992 and commissioned to produce a '*Shared Destiny Report*' outlining the important issues involved in harmonizing ASEAN-Vietnam relations.

¹¹⁰ Established in 1989, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a forum devoted to economic cooperation and is a project independent of ASEAN. APEC currently has a membership base of 21 'economies' spanning from North America to the South Pacific.

¹¹¹ ASEAN Secretariat, *Trade: Overview*, [online] <<http://www.aseansec.org/12021.htm>> [accessed 12 June 2011].

¹¹² The *Konfrontasi* policy was regarded as an undeclared war on the creation of Malaysia which sought to amalgamate the Federation of Malay with British Borneo.

¹¹³ Justus M. Van der Kroef, 'Indonesia, Malaya, and the North Borneo Crisis', *Asian Survey*, 3, no. 4 (1963), p. 175.

¹¹⁴ Hao Duy Phan. 'Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights in Southeast Asia: A Survey Report', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 31, no. 3 (2009), pp. 468-501. Notably, it was not until the 2007 ASEAN Charter that ASEAN outlined the need for a regional human rights body. In 2009 the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was created and designed to serve as a consultative

represents a large portion of the region – both in terms of geography and population. Comprising of over 17,000 islands the Indonesian archipelago is vast and fragmented and, as a result, cultural and religious influences throughout Indonesia’s provinces are not uniform and particular influences have been typically concentrated more so in some provincial areas than others.¹¹⁵ Volatile relations between provincial guerrillas and the Indonesian government in Jakarta¹¹⁶ have been a significant obstacle to the socio-political cohesion of the country and the balance that Indonesia provides as a leader at the regional level.

4.5.1 Polarity and Extra-Regional Powers

The security dynamic of Southeast Asia has been transformed dramatically in the post-colonial era. The intensity with which the fate of the region’s units have become heavily intertwined is reflected in the presence of ASEAN and the extent to which ASEAN represents a platform for broad based coordination between individual, albeit interdependent, units. The relative autonomy of the regional level has been one of Southeast Asia’s defining post-Cold War features and regional order has functioned on the simple notion that, more so than ever before, the solution to regional problems can be found at the regional level. This is not to say, however, that the international system is neither influential nor factored into the security dynamic. As the shape of the international system has transformed, so has ASEAN’s approach to the integration of extra-regional powers into the regional structure. Given the reality of varied bilateral and historical relationships between major extra-regional powers and individual Southeast Asian states, the process of engaging outside powers has not been easy and an ASEAN-wide consensus on the role of differing major powers has been difficult to achieve.

One of the key features of ASEAN’s initial development was its determination to pull away from the region’s dependence on the United States and to neutralise its place within the global dynamic.¹¹⁷ In

intergovernmental body. However, the efficacy of such a body is questionable as it wields no power, is not an independent body and is obstructed by the ASEAN right of non-interference.

¹¹⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York, United States: Random House Publishing, 2010), p. 247. The northern provinces of Indonesia have a tendency to be more influenced by Islam due to their proximity to former trading routes of Middle Eastern travellers; whereas the Papuan provinces in the South Pacific have a more Christian and animist influences.

¹¹⁶ Kaplan, 2010; 247. With Timor-Leste aside, the province of Aceh at the northern tip of the island of Sumatra marks one of Indonesia’s greatest internal struggles and successes. Acehese guerrillas, known as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), the Aceh Freedom Movement, fought for independence for nearly three decades. In 2005 the GAM and the central Indonesian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding which signified a ceasefire and joint commitment to the peaceful introduction of a democratic provincial Acehese government.

¹¹⁷ Non-aligned neutrality was achieved in maritime Southeast Asia, albeit Singapore continued to maintain strong ties with the United States. In mainland Southeast Asia American troops were still actively engaged in

the past the structure of Southeast Asia's security environment reflected less of what its units represented to each other and more so what they represented as strategic pawns on the Cold War chessboard. From its inception ASEAN sought to facilitate a Southeast Asian region that was responsible for the polarity of its structure and through mutual trust and dialogue could build an autonomous and resilient region by accommodating modernizing changes without fear of sparking a security dilemma. Lastly, and by limiting the impact to the international system, the new world of emerging Asian states proposed that "a new geography free of colonial and Eurocentric biases and an objective understanding of non-Western people"¹¹⁸ could create a distinctly Asian form of regionalism that would be the most valuable tool in the pursuit of regional stability and security.

4.6 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION - *Are there patterns of amity and enmity?*

The early history of post-colonial Southeast Asia is marked by nationalistic rivalry and competition with significant conflict between several of the region's major units. Conflict between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore was particularly problematic during the decolonisation period. The disparity in size between the three, in addition to Jakarta's desire to achieve regional dominance, resulted in significant patterns of enmity in the early formative stages of post-colonial maritime Southeast Asia. Interstate conflict in Indochina has also been pervasive and historically the sub-region has been dominated more by patterns of enmity than amity. Border disputes between Thailand and its neighbouring states,¹¹⁹ in addition to Vietnamese hegemony over Laos and Cambodia, have been the dominant features of the sub-regional dynamic and, in some cases, these disputes have eased but never dissolved completely. In the early post-colonial years, conflict in Southeast Asia was much akin to that of the security environment of the Middle East and had the potential to descend into a similar and fully fledged conflict formation. However, the impact of the "devastation wrought by Indonesia's *konfrontasi* campaign against Malaysia (1963 – 1966) exposed the dangers of territorial revisionism and the need for common affirmation of postcolonial frontiers."¹²⁰ The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 and the commitment to a territorial status quo that became "enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) concluded during the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976"¹²¹ assisted the region in taking on a desecuritized form and reducing the viability of military confrontation between individual states. The role of ASEAN became to socially construct an economic, political and social grouping that was both accommodating to individual differences but also reflected the

conflict in Vietnam until 1973 and it wasn't until 1991 that all U.S operational bases in the Philippines were closed.

¹¹⁸ Miller, 2004; 3.

¹¹⁹ Collins, 2003; 17.

¹²⁰ Leszek Buszynski, 'Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security', *Asian Survey*, 32, no. 9 (1992), p. 830.

¹²¹ Buszynski, 1992; 830.

region's shared security environment. Rather than seeking to overtly reduce conflict via a military alliance, the establishment of ASEAN aimed to construct a forum for cooperation and coordination that in turn would have the secondary effect of alleviating interstate conflict. The emerging reality of security interdependence ensured that it would be more costly for one unit to compromise overall regional stability in the pursuit of self-interest and that coordination could actually strengthen their nationalistic goals and, simultaneously, keep both their sovereignty and autonomy intact. With ASEAN as the organisational hub of the Southeast Asian security complex, Southeast Asia has been hailed as one of the most successful regional transformations from conflict formation to security regime. Yet, the existence of a security regime does not completely rule out conflict, "rather, conflict exists, but the actors agree to cooperate to deal with it."¹²² The reality of interstate conflict is still very much real but restrained.¹²³

Changing patterns of enmity to amity between the units of Southeast Asia predates ASEAN's Bangkok Declaration in 1967 and "the desire to avoid confrontation and acrimony in international relations and the importance of low-key, consensus-based diplomacy can be traced back to ASEAN's predecessor, the short-lived Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)."¹²⁴ Further organisational attempts in the form of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO)¹²⁵ and MAPHILINDO (which combined Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) also predate ASEAN and emerged as representations of the region's desire to strengthen the cooperation between its neighbouring units, albeit each with a different objective and membership base. Whilst both ASA and MAPHILINDO failed to create a sustainable basis for regional order, in some respect, they did sow the seeds for regional coordination. Although, and in order to achieve success, it was essential that ASEAN withheld from the rhetoric of the ASA and MAPHILINDO. The comparative survival and evolution of ASEAN largely rests with the fact that it was internally devised and was based upon a series of values and ideals that distinctly reflected the history, proximity and familiarity of the units within Southeast Asia. ASEAN was defined fully from within the region and on terms that resonated with how regional leaders believed they could function and cooperate successfully with each other in the pursuit of regional stability. Furthermore, the desire was for regional order to be attained and to function

¹²² Buzan, 2003; 165.

¹²³ "Thai, Cambodian Clashes Resume at Disputed Border", *The New Zealand Herald*, 7 February 2011. [online] http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10704736 [accessed 7 February 2011].

¹²⁴ Capie and Evans, 2007; 10.

¹²⁵ ASEAN wanted to completely avoid any accusations that it sought to replace the redundant Western-inspired military alliance that SEATO represented.

independent of major power influence. ASEAN remains the region's "first and still the most successful venture"¹²⁶ and has embodied a uniquely Asian form of regionalism.

The need for cooperation and coordination in the mitigation of both traditional and non-traditional security threats, which cannot be achieved independently, is the definitive variable underpinning amicable relations in Southeast Asia. It is the indivisible nature of security which has seen cooperative mechanisms emerge and it has been self-preservation, not altruism, that has become the key factor ensuring patterns of amity continue to dominate the regional dynamic. Security cooperation has predominantly involved bilateral exchanges in logistics, equipment, and intelligence in reaction to existential threats such as terrorism and piracy, but successful coordination has been mixed and has often failed to receive full commitment from all sides.

The development of the 'ASEAN way' has played a fundamental role in facilitating amicable relations between neighbours and, as a style of diplomacy, has been used to dictate intra-ASEAN behaviour and habits of dialogue. It is the central principle of non-interference that "links together the concepts of comprehensive, cooperative, and common security"¹²⁷ which, combined with consultation and consensus based decision-making, "creates the perception of public unity by not shaming another member."¹²⁸ Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity is enshrined in the 'ASEAN way' and aims to place confidence in the capability of individual governments to maintain domestic control over the physical base, idea and institutions of the state.¹²⁹ Non-interference in domestic affairs, however, "does not mean that ASEAN members are indifferent to one another, nor does it mean they never become involved in each other's domestic affairs. It simply means that one elite supports another by not publicly criticizing the other and by providing support, both tangible and nontangible, if an elite is threatened by internal rebellion."¹³⁰ ASEAN's respect for non-interference and silent support of its member states has been a complicated element within the regional style of diplomacy and has inhibited the mitigation of regional threats such as terrorism and been the cause of frustration in the international community.¹³¹ Shared beliefs on non-interference and territorial integrity, nonetheless, have remained critical elements in the rapprochement of ties between previously hostile neighbours and the maintenance of amicable relations.

¹²⁶ Miller, 2004; 4.

¹²⁷ Collins, 2003; 139.

¹²⁸ Collins, 2003; 139.

¹²⁹ Buzan et al, 1997; 150.

¹³⁰ Collins, 2003; 141.

¹³¹ The internal politics of Myanmar, in particular, has received significant attention from the international community. The United Nations, NGO's such as Amnesty International, as well as the European Union and individual countries such as the United States have all been vocal about human rights violations taking place within the country. As a result, in various cases, ASEAN has received significant pressure to take a firmer stance on the internal political situations of its member states.

4.6.1 Non-Interference and Internal Security

Internal insecurity is a pervasive feature of the Southeast Asian security environment and a high degree of vulnerability to political internal threats is prominent throughout the region. Sources of individual political weakness include: an ethnic-religious insurgency in the South of Thailand; weak democratic practices in the Philippines; secessionist violence in the outer provinces of Indonesia and concerns about ruling parties in both Malaysia and Singapore. Internal conflict rarely remains internal and the reality of porous borders can contribute to flow of refugees into neighbouring countries which, in turn, can strain relations between states.¹³² In addition, the spill over effect can exacerbate the focus on the dispute and have an internationalizing impact. As the impact of internal conflict spreads, either physically by spilling over borders or by highlighting the inability of the regional framework to restrain conflict within and between its states, the potential for strained relations heightens, both at the regional and international level.¹³³

The complexity of dealing with internal conflict in the former Indonesian province of East Timor and integrating the internally weak state of Myanmar into the ASEAN fold represent two of the most testing incidents in the social construction of ASEAN: First, by highlighting the limits of ASEAN in coping with internal security concerns whose effects permeate both the regional and international level and, second, by signifying a social and spatial caveat in the conceptualisation of Southeast Asia.¹³⁴ Historically, the cherished value of non-interference has benefited the ASEAN style of diplomacy by means of facilitating coordination without challenging claims of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of any of its members. However ongoing internal issues in Myanmar and violence in Timor-Leste¹³⁵ received an international audience and placed external pressure on ASEAN to take a firmer stance on the unstable domestic politics of its member states. In both cases, ASEAN could not avoid taking an official stand on particular domestic security issues and faced criticism over its capacity to maintain regional order.

¹³² For example, as conflict ensued in the province of West Papua a mass exodus of refugees into Papua New Guinea took place. Inevitably, this strained relations between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Ian Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley, 'The West Papuan Challenge to Indonesian Authority in Irian Jaya: Old Problems, New Possibilities', *Asian Survey*, 26, no. 5 (May, 1986), pp. 539-556.

¹³³ Coping with the effects of internal conflict is a source of tension between individual ASEAN members as well as between ASEAN and the international community. The United Nations, for example, has previously questioned ASEAN over its capacity to ensure its member states adhere to universal principles regarding human rights.

¹³⁴ Donald K. Emmerson, 'Challenging ASEAN: A "Topological" View', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 29, no. 3 (2007), p. 428.

¹³⁵ International attention was particularly prominent in 1999 and thus led to the introduction of an Australian-led UN peace keeping force in order to end the violence and to ease East Timor's transition to independence. Subsequently, Timor-Leste made international headlines again following riots in both 2002 and 2006. "Residents flee East Timor capital", *BBC News*, 5 May 2006, [online] <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4975722.stm> [accessed 17 October 2011].

Since independence in 2002, Timor-Leste has slowly gained momentum towards establishing itself as a functioning and autonomous state, although, and at the Timorese government's request, "around 550 Australian and New Zealand military personnel remain on the ground... to help maintain security."¹³⁶ Although factional fighting reignited in 2006, killing dozens and leaving 150,000 people homeless,¹³⁷ the country has steadily re-stabilised and, like all new nation-states, Timor-Leste continues to face a myriad of developmental challenges as it lays the foundations for building a legitimate and viable state - politically, socially and economically. In spite of Timor-Leste's historical, cultural and geographical relationship with Southeast Asia, the new-nation state represents a caveat in the conceptualisation of ASEAN encapsulating all of geographic Southeast Asia. The independence of Timor-Leste has raised complicated questions about the state's integration into the regional security architecture of Southeast Asia and also the extent to which ASEAN has the capacity to cope with the implications of another membership expansion. Timor-Leste is currently regarded as an ASEAN special observer and whilst full membership has been applied for, and despite the vast cost of establishing and maintaining full embassies throughout the region, Timor-Leste will need to meet all pre-requisites in order for full membership to be granted.

The evolution of Southeast Asia and its expanding regional security architecture has seen the region transform from a conflict formation of new nation-states, to a small and nascent security regime and, in its current form, a geographically coherent security regime with relative autonomy over the regional security environment. However, and whilst a successful transformation has taken place, this is not to say regional patterns of amity are fixed and non-reversible. Military conflict remains a possible, if not subdued, reality. In spite of the idea gaining momentum from both within Southeast Asia¹³⁸ and outside,¹³⁹ the establishment of an ASEAN security community has not been achieved. ASEAN's capacity to establish one cohesive and integrated regional community is still heavily debated and is a transformation process that could alter the essence of the institution itself, not only in terms of the integration of outside powers, but also the rules of engagement within the

¹³⁶ Wainwright, 2010; 8.

¹³⁷ "Timor-Leste on its own: Young and Growing", *The Economist*, 9 March, 2011. [online] <http://www.economist.com/blogs/asiaview/2011/03/timorleste_its_own?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/bl/youngandgrowing> [accessed 9 March 2011].

¹³⁸ Both the 2007 ASEAN Charter and the 2009 Roadmap to an ASEAN Community 2009-2015 highlight the consciousness of the current ASEAN framework and the progress required so as to evolve into an 'ASEAN Community.'

¹³⁹ In 2008 the then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd received a mixed reception when he proposed the establishment of an Asia-Pacific Community (APC). Rudd argued the need for a community which would use its existing foundation but, with a wider expanse and a more comprehensive agenda. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Secretary-General's Welcoming Speech on the Occasion of the Visit of the Hon. Kevin Michael Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia, to ASEAN Secretariat*, 13 June 2008 [online] <<http://www.asean.org/21642.htm>> [accessed 16 May 2011].

institution. Instead of strictly non-binding values such as mutual respect and understanding governing the regional dynamics, this would see the introduction of legally binding laws and norms that would not only restrict the limits of power, but would also oblige member states to collectively act against a member state if they were to breach the framework of legal terms and conditions. Significantly, the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in December 2007 represents a fundamental and unprecedented step towards “a legal and institutional framework for the association,”¹⁴⁰ the relative success of which, however, remains to be seen.

4.6.2 Social Construction and Extra-Regional Powers.

The strategic interaction and integration of major world powers into the regional security architecture is important to the social construction of the region and the extent to which extra-regional engagement may be achieved without compromising the exclusive nature of ASEAN itself as the central regional institution. Extra-regional powers are essentially managed through their involvement in various offshoot initiatives, which are instigated by ASEAN and in which ASEAN centrality remains the driving organisational force. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) established in 1994 and ASEAN+3 (APT) established in 1997¹⁴¹ in particular have been devised as a means of engaging particular powers, but on the terms and conditions outlined by ASEAN. Furthermore, the region’s security architecture has continued to grow in order to cope with shifting patterns in major power relations which are taking shape within Southeast Asia. In essence “ASEAN, for its part, sees the significance of its connection to the United States declining and is aware of the need to create a more coherent regional regime to deal with expanding Chinese power.”¹⁴²

The shape of the East Asia and what kind of relationships China develops with its neighbours is both politically and economically critical to the security dynamic of Southeast Asia. The roles of China and Japan as regional powers, and the United States as a world power, may underpin patterns of interaction in East Asia itself but, as is highlighted by China’s naval posturing and pursuit of territorial claims in the South China Sea,¹⁴³ the potential for East Asian balancing behaviour to impinge on the security dynamic of Southeast Asia is a constant reality. Furthermore, “how China relates to its East Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which

¹⁴⁰ McGoldrick, 2009; 198.

¹⁴¹ The APT is a forum that brings together ASEAN plus China, South Korea and Japan and whilst the APT forum emerged in 1997 it was not fully institutionalised until 1999 after it received a boost due to the effects of the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation*. Updated 2011 [online] <<http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm>> [accessed 14 September 2011].

¹⁴² Buzan et al, 1998; 67.

¹⁴³ With Chinese authorities issuing maps “which show China effectively claims the whole of the South China Sea, and there is evidence that the People’s Liberation Army continues to militarize China’s claims.” Paul Dibb, ‘Indonesia: The Key to South-East Asia’s Security’, *International Affairs*, 77, no. 4 (2001), p. 832.

centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security”¹⁴⁴ and the likelihood of Southeast Asia being the first to experience the effects of a global standoff are high and significant. Regionalism in Asia has been typically inward looking and “driven by historical patterns of cooperation, the common challenge of the west, the century-long quest for an Asian identity, and growing economic interdependence and integration.”¹⁴⁵ However, the changing shape of the wider East Asian region has seen a series of dramatic shifts occur that are influencing regional power dynamics and creating new uncertainties.¹⁴⁶ During the Cold War era American military strength and its network of bilateral alliances largely underpinned Southeast Asian regional stability.¹⁴⁷ However, as the United States withdrew militarily from mainland Southeast Asia in 1973 and the strategic relevance of the region eventually dissolved with the collapse of the Cold War in 1989, American engagement in the region reached an all time low and the potential end of American predominance became signalled by the rise of China and India.¹⁴⁸ Southeast Asia’s interregional relations with neighbouring complexes, as well as with the global powers, are becoming increasingly crucial and ASEAN itself is a part of a “bigger security picture, no longer confined just to Southeast Asia.”¹⁴⁹

4.6.3 Economic Security and the Asian Financial Crisis

The economic dimension of regional security in Southeast Asia has been a facilitating factor in the rapprochement between states and positive patterns of interaction. The need for coordination in the pursuit of self-interest is imperative in regards to economic security and is a factor that has inadvertently ensured amicable relations among ASEAN member states. In spite of the massive economic impact of the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997¹⁵⁰ and the following ‘Asian crisis’, the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia received a renewed boost as a result. Whilst the crisis began as a financial one it did not remain strictly economic for very long. The financial crisis became an economic issue; the economic instability penetrated the societal sector, which in turn then spilled over to the political realm.¹⁵¹ Essentially, “the economic and social fabrics of their societies were torn as bad loans, shaky financial system, corporate bankruptcies, rising unemployment and

¹⁴⁴ Barry Buzan, ‘Security architecture in Asia: The interplay of regional and global levels’, *The Pacific Review*, 16, no. 2 (2003), p. 143.

¹⁴⁵ Miller, 2004; 2.

¹⁴⁶ Elsin Wainwright, *Conflict prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific* (New York, United States: Center on International Cooperation, 2010), p. 6.

¹⁴⁷ Wainwright, 2010; 6.

¹⁴⁸ Wainwright, 2010; 6.

¹⁴⁹ Buzan, 2003; 155.

¹⁵⁰ Maull, 2005; 78.

¹⁵¹ Eric Teo Chu Cheow, ‘The Forms of Transition: Globalization, the Asian Crisis & Change’, in *Asia-Pacific: a Region in Transition*, ed. Jim Rolfe, (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 13.

plunging currencies suddenly engulfed them.”¹⁵² The advancement of regionalism in Asia remained relatively stagnant prior to the Asian financial crisis and the need to cohesively develop ASEAN’s regional framework was overshadowed by the dramatic rise of its emerging individual economies. The economic sector in this period took on a life of its own and “ASEAN came into international prominence primarily as a consequence of the high performance of its ‘tiger economies’ from 1987 to 1997.”¹⁵³ Consequently, the 1997 crisis had a dual effect on the dynamic of the region. The impact of the crisis permeated all sectors and spread throughout much of the wider region and whilst this created mass unrest and uncertainty throughout the Asia-Pacific, it also had the surprising impact of bolstering regional cooperation. It was the catalytic force of the Asian financial crisis that highlighted “the perceived heavy handedness of the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)”¹⁵⁴ and produced a deep and powerful “politics of resentment.”¹⁵⁵ It was this deep resentment that facilitated the establishment of a more inwardly looking view of regionalism in Asia.

The Asian financial crisis highlighted the inadequacy of the region’s economic framework and also the fact that neither the IMF nor the United States could support the region’s recovery to the extent that they had anticipated. The crisis reiterated ASEAN’s underpinning ethos that regional solutions needed to be found at the regional level and, as a result, “the idea of creating an institutional mechanism to promote East Asian cooperation consequently made a comeback.”¹⁵⁶ Established in 1993, ASEAN + 3 (APT) was an institution which sought to increase economic relations between ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea. Whilst the APT gained some momentum in its formative years, it was not until the crisis hit that the importance of wider Asian cooperation really took effect. This new arrangement aimed to “work out currency swaps and other arrangements designed to forestall another economic meltdown and dilute the influence of the IMF.”¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, and as a direct result of the crisis, “ASEAN has paid sedulous attention to promoting intra- and interregional growth, extending its economic processes into an East Asia Community.”¹⁵⁸ The idea of extending the regional framework to that of wider, but still exclusive, “East Asian” regionalism has received strong Chinese support and has been “premised on the viability and normative preference for an Asia by and for “Asians” that is excluding the United States and Pacific Asia.”¹⁵⁹ Beijing in particular

¹⁵² Cheow, 2004; 13.

¹⁵³ Hiro Katsumata and David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, ‘Correspondence: ASEAN, Regional Integration, and State Sovereignty’, *International Security*, 33, no. 2 (2008), p. 186.

¹⁵⁴ Nair, 2008; 117.

¹⁵⁵ Nair, 2008; 117.

¹⁵⁶ Miller, 2004; 7.

¹⁵⁷ Miller, 2004; 7.

¹⁵⁸ Jones and Smith, 2008; 186.

¹⁵⁹ Nair, 2008; 112.

has strongly pushed for the “Asianization”¹⁶⁰ of international relations in the region as this strategic move could potentially and gradually ease America and its influence out of the region.¹⁶¹

In 2005, the construction of an East Asia regional framework began to gain momentum and the newly conceptualised “East Asian Community” became a popularized idea. The East Asian Community concept took a significant lean towards a community which was less exclusive than previous initiatives and “with the stroke of a summit, the conception of East Asia was suddenly stretched... as it stood, the EAS represented a remarkable qualification, a baffling revision, of the exclusive Asia principle that had been pursued since the Asian financial crisis.”¹⁶² The East Asian Summit (EAS) came into existence in 2005 and “included not only the APT members but also a set of three more states – India, Australia and New Zealand.”¹⁶³ The EAS sought to encapsulate not only East Asia, but the more expansive Asia-Pacific area. The summit represented a hybrid of the ARF and APT and, it was hoped, would play a coordinating role in both economic and security regionalism. In 2010, and of notable significance, the EAS formally expanded its membership base to include both the United States and Russia.¹⁶⁴ On the one hand this move has been regarded as a positive step towards the re-engagement of the United States in Asia’s multilateral framework yet, on the other, it has also raised serious questions about the extent to which the membership of numerous and competing world powers will impact on, and potentially dilute, the institution’s functional capacity.

Lastly, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an annual forum held to promote economic cooperation between the ‘economies’ of the Asia-Pacific. Unlike the majority of regional projects that have emerged from Southeast Asia’s regional framework, APEC is not an ASEAN initiative but, in part, still reflects an important element in the social construction of the region. Founded in 1989 APEC aimed “ostensibly to stimulate economic cooperation across the Pacific rim, but again not without an oblique security agenda.”¹⁶⁵ APEC was established to facilitate sustainable regional autonomy and ensure that regional economic stability could be derived from within the region and was not contingent upon outside influences. It is important to note that whilst the existence of APEC (as a regional project independent of ASEAN) has been useful to ASEAN, in the sense that it has

¹⁶⁰ John Lee, ‘The Stakes at the East Asian Summit; Beijing Wants to Ease America Out of the Region, but Other Nations Want to Entrench the U.S. Role,’ *Wall Street Journal*, 26 October 2010 [online] <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303467004575575171836507884.html>> [accessed 18 January 2011].

¹⁶¹ Lee, 2010; 1.

¹⁶² Nair, 2008; 120.

¹⁶³ Nair, 2008; 120.

¹⁶⁴ Having fulfilled the precondition that all parties sign the ASEAN founded ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation’ established in 1976. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation*, 24 February 1976 [online] <<http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>> [accessed 16 March 2011].

¹⁶⁵ Maull, 2005; 77.

successfully served as an extensive forum for economic discussion across the Asia-Pacific that does not hold ASEAN necessarily accountable for its progress. It does, however, have the potential to undermine ASEAN at the same time. Unlike ASEAN's direct organisational offshoots, ASEAN control over APEC is limited. However, in spite of this, what occurs within APEC impacts on ASEAN's own wider regional framework, whereby "ASEAN had to struggle hard to maintain its leadership with an ARF containing several large powers, Japan and the United States wanted more influence for themselves, and could threaten to use APEC as an alternative forum."¹⁶⁶

The development of the APT and the emergence of the EAS both represent beneficial steps towards the strengthening and potential expansion of the wider East Asian social construct. Whilst the idea of East Asia constituting a 'community' in the true Deutschian sense is far from being achieved, the Asia-Pacific area has begun to take steps towards establishing "a comprehensive scope for regional cooperation which would include political-security and transnational issues."¹⁶⁷ In spite of this, however, it is important to note that the idea that "ASEAN remains an essentially state-sovereignty reinforcing organization becomes more evident when we explore the lack of intraregional economic integration, which is neither a peripheral nor recent focus of ASEAN concern or ASEAN commentary"¹⁶⁸ and "ASEAN states continue to trade more with the rest of the world than they do with each other."¹⁶⁹

4.7 Summary

Regional security complex theory offers valuable insight into the understanding of Southeast Asia's regional security environment and the evolution of its regional security architecture. The creation and survival of ASEAN has been instrumental to the transformation of the region's essential structure and has been responsible for incrementally changing the face of post-colonial Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia's structural transformation, from conflict formation to security regime, has seen the region move on from its shadowy past and create a distinct and autonomous region with relative control over its own boundary, polarity and social construction. The enlargement of ASEAN, the impact of the 1997 economic crisis and its widespread political consequences, the environmental effects of the forest fires and trans-boundary haze, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the emergence of China as a possible hegemon, and the transnational impact of terrorism have all linked the states' security concerns sufficiently closely together and have highlighted the extent to

¹⁶⁶ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 159.

¹⁶⁷ Nair, 2008; 119.

¹⁶⁸ Jones and Smith, 2008; 186.

¹⁶⁹ Jones and Smith, 2008; 186.

which stability and security cannot be achieved in the absence of coordination.¹⁷⁰ The increasing threat posed by non-traditional and transnational security issues has ensured that the intensity of Southeast Asia's RSC continues to deepen and regional level cooperation remains an imperative feature of the regional security environment.

Intraregional relations and patterns of amity within Southeast Asia are historically at their most peaceful. Nevertheless, the region is still only the sum of its parts and is comprised of individual and self-interested states who have accepted the need for economic and security cooperation in the pursuit of their own survival. As a result, ASEAN continues to face criticism over its functional capacity and ability to cope with sensitive and deeply ingrained issues which threaten the individual autonomy of its units. The ASEAN style of diplomacy and the pace with which the "ASEAN way" achieves proposed initiatives has also been the source of criticism and has raised questions about ASEAN reliance on unbinding consensus-based decision making and has led outsiders "to dismiss these meetings as simply talk shows for underemployed bureaucrats."¹⁷¹ However, and as regional security complex theory highlights, the web of security interdependence and the strategies devised to cope with it are much more complicated than they may appear. Proximity and familiarity can push states together, but historical and cultural baggage can pull them apart. In essence, "there are no instant press-buttons solutions to building distinct regional identities and approaches among countries that were mostly at logger-heads less than two generations ago."¹⁷² Regionalism in Asia has taken on a distinctly Asian form and the regional security framework of Southeast Asia, as established and facilitated by ASEAN, does not emulate any other and nor has it aspired to do so.

¹⁷⁰ Collins, 2003; 18.

¹⁷¹ Hal Hill, 'Whose Idea Matters?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism,' review of *Whose Idea Matters?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, by Amitav Acharya, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 172, no. 8 (2009), p. 70.

¹⁷² Hill, 2009; 70.

Chapter Five – Regional Security Complex Theory and the South Pacific

5.1 Introduction

One of the fundamental propositions of this thesis is that, despite Buzan's critical remark, the South Pacific does satisfy the essential structure of a regional security complex. While acknowledging that the regional security dynamics may be weaker than most, and may not share the same lengthy history of interregional amity and enmity as experienced by other regional constructs, the security and interests of the islands within the region do overlap and regionalism has emerged as a means of facing this reality. My objective is to outline the four elements of the essential structure of a regional security complex in order to highlight how, even if in its most basic form, the South Pacific as a regional space constitutes more than an unstructured region within the international security environment.

In his early work, Buzan posits a distinction between lower level and higher level complexes in which the Pacific Islands fit within the definition of the former. He argues that "a lower level complex is composed of local states whose power does not extend much, if at all, beyond the range of their immediate neighbours. This constraint on power is a key element in the existence of relatively self-contained local security dynamics among sets of neighbouring states."¹⁷³ The higher level complex, by contrast, contains states whose power projects far beyond the immediacy of their own regional sphere. These complexes involve great power dynamics and are the concern of the global level of analysis, whereas lower level complexes are concentrated at the regional level where the interactions are most intense.

Security complexes are, in essence, a natural product of the anarchic structure of the international systems¹⁷⁴ and thus, with all things being equal,¹⁷⁵ we should be able to find complexes that not only expand across the entirety of the international system but are also geographically clustered and mutually exclusive in their dynamic structure. While some are easily located because the lines of security interdependence are markedly distinguished, others are not as straightforward. The South Pacific, Buzan notes, represents one such example. The weakness of the states within the region limits their capacity to project power beyond their own local and domestic environment and their preoccupation with internal instability means that the security interactions between them do not

¹⁷³ Buzan, 1991; 195.

¹⁷⁴ Buzan, 1991; 196.

¹⁷⁵ Buzan (2003) argues that a RSC is expected to emerge "whenever anarchy and diverse geography are combined unless low interaction capacity or overlay offsets this." (p. 84)

generate a sufficient level of interdependency to warrant a local complex.¹⁷⁶ When considering the South Pacific, the question becomes - are the islands of the Pacific all equally too weak for a pattern to emerge at all, or can this still occur but on a much smaller scale?

5.2 Conceptualising the South Pacific

As mentioned previously, defining the parameters of what constitutes a 'region' is a complicated task and the 'South Pacific', or 'Pacific Islands', is a strong case in point. Geography plays a major role in the conceptualisation of a distinct and mutually exclusive regional complex. Geographical elements such as landscape, natural resources and neighbouring states are confined within a physical space and are relatively fixed.¹⁷⁷ However, the social construction of a region or the 'idea' of a region is not and the 'idea' of what constitutes the region can vary depending on who defines it and how they stand to gain.¹⁷⁸ Reconciling the discrepancy between the (artificial) social construct of the region and its geography can be problematic and can hinder tangible progress towards organising a sense of the region.

Conceptualising the South Pacific is unusually complicated as various labels are often used when discussing the region and there is generally a lack of consistency in the application of each label. Across the literature, the terms 'Pacific Islands' or 'South Pacific'¹⁷⁹ emerges as the most appropriate. The term "Pacific Islands" is consistently used to refer to the "22 island polities that fall within the scope of the Pacific Community. The term Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) is synonymous with this usage and is distinguished from the smaller group of 14 island countries that are members of the Pacific Islands Forum."¹⁸⁰ Notably, the term 'Pacific Islands' includes the region's semi-autonomous territories in addition to the fully autonomous PICs that comprise the Pacific Islands Forum.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) argues that the term 'Pacific Island Countries' (PICs) is a term that successfully encapsulates the Pacific's "two OECD-member

¹⁷⁶ Buzan, 1991; 197.

¹⁷⁷ Territorial disputes aside and riding on the assumption that empire building and the annexation of entire countries no longer takes place in the international system.

¹⁷⁸ Jim Rolfe, 'A Region of Change: A Region in Transition', In *Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition*, ed. by Jim Rolfe (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Centre for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 1.

¹⁷⁹ Insofar that it is sufficiently qualified as to whether this constitutes New Zealand and Australia or not.

¹⁸⁰ Richard Herr, 'Aspects of Security Challenges and Pacific Island Regionalism', Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, [online] <http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/FADI_CTTE/swpacific/submission/sub39a.pdf> [accessed 18 September 2010].

countries (Australia and New Zealand), 14 developing and 5 least developed countries.”¹⁸¹ Here the parameters of the region are not derived strictly from full membership within the Forum, but also incorporate the geographical region’s semi-autonomous territories and explicitly conceptualises Australia and New Zealand as ‘Pacific Island Countries’. On this basis, Demography literature also defines the region not by the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum, but more so the South Pacific Community (SPC) based in Noumea, New Caledonia.¹⁸²

Since both the PIF and SPC are so important in terms of the definition of the region, a short outline of the history and function of both organizations is essential. Formerly known as the Pacific Islands Commission, the SPC is a regional inter-governmental body that was founded in 1947 by the region’s former colonial powers¹⁸³ and was initially devised to restore stability in the wake of World War Two and as a means to cope with the process of decolonisation. Presently, the SPC has an overarching vision to provide “a secure and prosperous Pacific community” and believes that this can be achieved by managing economic, environmental and social resources in a sustainable way. One of the key differences between the PIF and the SPC is that by 1983 the SPC expanded dramatically to incorporate all 22 self-governing islands and territories of the South Pacific – all of which share full and equal voting rights within the organisation irrespective of their overall autonomy. The SPC is purely a social construct whose existence and scope has been arbitrarily defined. The organisation was devised to facilitate the decolonisation process for the region’s colonial powers, and not due to the need for cooperation to cope with intense and overlapping security concerns. As a result, the SPC does not carry the same burden as the Pacific Islands Forum, whose purpose now largely embraces such security concerns and is perceived as being the protector of the region. Consequently, the SPC does not experience the kind of international pressure experienced by the Forum in that the latter is expected to facilitate a safer and more secure environment and to push towards establishing stronger mechanisms for coping with threats to regional stability.

The history of the Pacific Island Forum begins when the South Pacific Forum was created in 1971, with a strong colonial power influence. After a gradual transformation and evolution process that saw stronger ownership being taken by its island state members, the South Pacific Forum eventually

¹⁸¹ Proceedings from the Regional Workshop *Constraints, challenges & prospects for commodity based development in the Pacific island countries* organised by the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, (Nadi, Fiji: UNCTAD, 2001) [online] <<http://www.unctad.org/infocomm/diversification/nadi/brief.pdf>> [accessed 16 September 2010].

¹⁸² Helen Ware, ‘Demography, Migration and Conflict in the Pacific’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 42, no. 4 (2005), p. 437.

¹⁸³ This organisation is the product of the Canberra Agreement signed in 1947 by Australia, New Zealand, France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. South Pacific Community Secretariat, *About SPC: History*, [online]. <<http://www.spc.int/en/about-spc/history.html>> [accessed 18 February 2011].

made its name change to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000. This name change was made on the basis that it would provide a better depiction of the region and thus would “better reflect the geographic location of its members in the north and south Pacific.”¹⁸⁴ While the boundaries of the region should not be considered to be determined by membership in the Forum alone, the Forum has emerged as the key representation of the PICs as a regional grouping. Furthermore, and given that only self-governing states are granted full membership, membership within the Forum is indicative of each island’s independence and autonomy.

In looking at the history of the PIF and SPC, and of the region in general, it is important to note that in the modern history of the South Pacific interstate conflict has not been a prominent feature. The security structure of the region has taken shape not from the interplay between the individual states on the basis of their power and the threat they may represent, but rather on the basis of their collective weakness and the impediment this weakness poses to regional prosperity. In the absence of a dynamic driven by nationalistic tension, regionalism within the South Pacific has emerged not as a means of preventing war from being a viable tool of regional politics, but as a means of counteracting the increasingly non-traditional nature of security threats that the region faces. This process has taken form predominantly under the auspices of the PIF, whereby the Forum is regarded as the ‘driver’ of Pacific regionalism and facilitator of “peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity.”¹⁸⁵ In this context it is those countries that comprise the Pacific Islands Forum that are responsible for binding the region as more of a politically cohesive bloc of autonomous states.

The history and current role of Australia and New Zealand in relation to the Pacific Islands is significant and cannot be left aside in discussing how the region is defined since, despite the central role these two play within the Forum, the extent to which Australia or New Zealand would classify themselves as ‘Pacific Island’ states is greatly debatable. The term the ‘South Pacific’ has been relatively workable, particularly in the sense that unlike the ‘Pacific Islands’ it is slightly more ambiguous and does not suggest the same unspoken implication of membership within the ‘extended Island community’. The term ‘South Pacific’ encapsulates the membership of both Australia and New Zealand as being important to the structure of the region, but allows them to maintain their own individuality within the international system. Both Australia and New Zealand are inextricably linked to the Pacific Islands but, to a degree, have the capacity to disengage and

¹⁸⁴ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Updated 2011 [online] <<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/>> [accessed 18 February 2011]. This particular piece of information is highlighted as a key fact on the opening page.

¹⁸⁵ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Leaders Vision: The Pacific Plan*, 2005 [online] <<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/pacific-plan/>> [accessed 25 November 2010].

define the terms of their membership. It is for this reason that I am reluctant to place them fully within the parameters of the region and perhaps would prefer to put them on the cusp as insulator states: these states, as defined by Buzan, “are standing between regional security complexes and defining a location where larger regional security dynamics stand back to back.”¹⁸⁶ New Zealand and Australia are wedged between involvement within the South Pacific complex and also the wider Asia-Pacific region. Yet their involvement in the latter is perhaps less the product of their historical ties or their geographical positioning and more so the product of the socially constructed looser Asia-Pacific complex, which New Zealand and Australia have actively sought to engage in.

The term ‘Oceania’ is also common and is used in a similar vein to the South Pacific, notwithstanding its stronger implications of Australian and New Zealand centrality.¹⁸⁷ Lastly, the term ‘Asia-Pacific’, as introduced above, is frequently used when discussing the links between New Zealand, Australia, Southeast and East Asia. It has been very important to note that, despite the use of the word Pacific, the Pacific Islands are not implied within this grouping. While the parameters of the Asia-Pacific are not fully defined, it is regarded as being the loose and extended community that spans from East and South Asia, through Southeast Asia to Australia and New Zealand. The grouping exists wholly as a socially driven construct and it lacks the distinctly intertwined security environment that essentially underpins security complexes. The ‘Asia-Pacific’ is not a complete and functioning complex in and of itself, but is utilised as a useful regional concept.

Lastly, it is important to recognise that the South Pacific and its states is largely an imposed construct. In the lead up to decolonisation it was the colonial powers that arbitrarily defined the political borders of the region and, as was the case in much of Africa (albeit to a lesser degree¹⁸⁸), these borders were not congruent with how Pacific Islanders associate their identity with family and tribe before their national territory and state. This has heavily influenced domestic instability in the sense that these existing cultural or ethnic boundaries are not necessarily consistent with the construction of the new nation-states that were devised to encapsulate them. While these states may physically exist as one bloc, there is little cohesion on a socio-political level. These states “either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic

¹⁸⁶ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 490.

¹⁸⁷ In fact, Demographic literature describes Oceania as being comprised of 17 independent countries and 6 territories that may be broken down into four sub-regions – Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia and New Zealand-Australia. Not surprisingly, 73% of Oceania’s population lives in New Zealand and Australia.

¹⁸⁸ Given that the archipelagic nature of region ensured some form of cultural continuity was maintained as water acted as a significant border defining feature that was not interchangeable.

political life of the nation.”¹⁸⁹ Conflict over land between cultural and ethnic groups has been one of the key destabilising domestic forces in many Pacific Islands countries.

These similarities notwithstanding, and as a result of varied colonial ties, the experiences of each of the individual Pacific Island’s has been complex and diverse and each has experienced a different road towards self-governance and autonomy. Whilst some sought to embrace Westernised democratic ideals almost instantaneously, other islands, such as the kingdom of Tonga, sought to maintain their traditional regime for as long as it was palatable for the masses.¹⁹⁰

5.2.1 Geographic South Pacific

Since Geography plays such a key role the modern history of the Pacific Islands as independent nation-states traces back to the post-World War Two period in which “decolonisation established this area as the world’s largest concentration of microstates.”¹⁹¹ In terms of geography, “the Pacific is conventionally divided into Micronesian, Polynesian, and Melanesian sub-regions, reflecting the ethnic character of those islands north, southeast, and southwest of the equator, respectively.”¹⁹²

The sub-region of Micronesia incorporates the North-central Pacific area and is characterised by the key islands of Nauru, Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and the United States flag territories of Guam and Northern Marianas.

Polynesia constitutes the Southeast Pacific triangle whose corners are defined by New Zealand, Hawaii and Easter Island. The independent states within this sub-region include Kiribati, Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. Polynesia also contains several semi-autonomous French colonies, such as French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, and diplomatically maintains strong links to New Zealand in particular. Tokelau, Nuie and the Cook Islands are regarded as self-

¹⁸⁹ Buzan, 1991; 99.

¹⁹⁰ This positive nature of such an ‘archaic’ regime has been the source of some controversy over the years and has been the source of some political instability within Tonga itself. In 2010, Tonga held its first democratic election – albeit 9 key seats were reserved for King appointed members within the 27 seat parliament. “Democracy’s day one step closer in Tonga”, *The New Zealand Herald*, 4 January 2011 [online] <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10697747> [accessed 4 January 2011].

¹⁹¹ No clear definition for what constitutes a microstate exists. However, states with a population less than 500,000 are typically referred to as microstates. This is slightly problematic in that both the populations of Fiji and Papua New Guinea surpass this number.

¹⁹² Stephen Hoadley, *Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a new paradigm*, (Wellington, New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 1. [online] <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Working_Papers/WP20.pdf> [accessed 25 September 2010].

governing but in free association with New Zealand and as a result its people are granted New Zealand citizenship but the island government is permitted to administer its own affairs.¹⁹³

Melanesia comprises those states in the Southwest Pacific area and contains the highest density of population within the region: Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are its defining states. With Papua New Guinea bordering Indonesia, Melanesia is the only sub-region to share a physical border with another country and with another regional construct. Given Australia's proximity, Melanesia remains an area in which Australia is most consciously aware of its security significance and thus maintains its strongest involvement.

5.2.2 The History of the South Pacific

In the 19th century, and earlier, the South Pacific was not immune to the attention of the world's 'imperialistic giants' who sought to colonize the Islands "in a mad rush to extend their influence to what seemed at the time as the 'outer fringes' of the world."¹⁹⁴ Nonetheless, as the dominance of these powers diminished, and their empires began to collapse, so did their interest in their Pacific colonies. The comparative isolation and lack of exploitable resources within these colonies ensured that maintenance of ties was more trouble than they were worth. It was in this period that New Zealand and Australia "assumed a new, more active role in the Pacific"¹⁹⁵ as a means of mitigating the effects of colonial disengagement. Renewed interest in the Pacific as a theatre of global relations emerged in the form of World War Two – this saw the engagement of the United States with the establishment of various military outposts throughout the region. This served to strengthen the United States previously non-existent interest in the region. Yet, and in terms of the Pacific's Cold War strategic relevance, interest in the region was very minimal in comparison to Southeast Asia.

In the 1960s and 1970s, as was the case throughout many regions of the world, a decolonization process took place to relieve the former colonial powers "of their bureaucratic responsibilities, and to give the Pacific Islands political and economic sovereignty."¹⁹⁶ Independence and self-sufficiency via the introduction of transnational corporatism, multilateral and international deregulation¹⁹⁷ was sought to push the Pacific Islands towards economic prosperity. Ideally, economic prosperity would facilitate transforming the islands political environment from its traditional and tribal hierarchy to

¹⁹³ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Cook Islands* [online]. Updated 2010 <<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Cook-Islands.php>> [accessed 18 November 2010].

¹⁹⁴ Holiday Powell, *The Road to Sovereignty in the Pacific; A Framework for Pacific Island Development Policy*, (Wellington, New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 1. [online] <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Discussion_Papers/DP04.pdf> [accessed 25 September 2010].

¹⁹⁵ Powell, 2003; 1.

¹⁹⁶ Powell, 2003; 1.

¹⁹⁷ Powell, 2003; 1.

one of a transparent and viable democracy. However, in the absence of legitimate governmental infrastructures this instead “caused a breakdown of distinct national societies, cultural and state boundaries and created political disenfranchisement.”¹⁹⁸ From their inception, the modern nation-states of the Pacific Islands have generally “been directed by an inadequate notion of state building”¹⁹⁹ and thus “have arguably lacked legitimate governance... [and] failed to construct viable states.”²⁰⁰

Despite the hope and promise enshrined within the ideals of independence, the majority of island states did not flourish in the wake of their new found freedom. By contrast, “inept guidance, policy, and leadership unfortunately left many of the islands without proper tools or motivation to build viable and independent states”²⁰¹ and thus left behind a mass of politically unstable island states that lacked both the capacity and resources to cope with their disintegrating internal dynamics. Both politically and economically, and on the most fundamental level, the majority of the autonomous islands within the South Pacific still fail to meet their key obligations as a state. Fiji, for example, fails to meet all three of its key obligations. Firstly, it cannot secure the physical base of the state against destabilising ethnic and cultural groups; secondly, it lacks a united and cohesive idea of the state; thirdly, and when considering the numerous incidents of nepotism and bribery that have occurred within the government, it is apparent that it also falls short in maintaining a hold on the transparent and fair institutional expressions of the state.²⁰²

The Pacific Islands have arguably lacked the capacity to fully embrace the key tenets of western democratisation in the form that was imposed upon them in the post-colonial phase. This has been due to the fact that these democratic values have not necessarily been compatible with longstanding island political traditions. Essentially, it has been suggested that “democracy as a form of government is difficult to achieve and implement in the islands because it reflects Western conceptions of governance and modernisation” and these notions clash with island history, tradition and custom. Furthermore, it has been these traditional beliefs that have stifled economic progress in that “communal land ownership, clan loyalty and limited working hours”²⁰³ give workers a sense of economic security in the absence of actual prosperity. Clan loyalty has been responsible for attaching prosperity to nepotism and creates a welfare state with a lack of investment and saving.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁸ Powell, 2003; 1.

¹⁹⁹ Powell, 2003; 4.

²⁰⁰ Powell, 2003; 4.

²⁰¹ Powell, 2003; 1.

²⁰² Buzan, 1991; 64.

²⁰³ Powell, 2003; 7.

²⁰⁴ Powell, 2003; 7.

In short, clan loyalty is favoured over individual entrepreneurship and as a consequence economic growth is minimal and stagnant.

In the twenty-first century, “the hope and promise that accompanied Pacific Island states emergence from colonialism have dissipated. Corrosive external influences and domestic mismanagement have combined to produce weak states, faltering economies, and fractured societies”²⁰⁵. The concern is that “the ramifications, though felt mostly by island inhabitants, are relevant to their geographic neighbours and past colonists”²⁰⁶ and thereby the impact on stability is felt not only at a local level, but also at a regional and international one. In essence, the weakness of individual states can either directly or indirectly impact on those in close geographical proximity and it is for this reason that the units within the region have sought to bind together as a cohesive bloc in order to pursue security, stability and prosperity.

Regional Security Complex Theory: The Essential Structure

5.3 BOUNDARY - *Is there something differentiating a RSC from its neighbours?*

The archipelagic nature of the South Pacific has ensured that, sinking islands aside, each unit’s physical boundary has remained unchanged throughout history.²⁰⁷ The geographical outline of the Pacific region is distinct insofar as its parameters are derived not from the strength of the region itself as a mutually exclusive regional space, but rather are defined by a lack of inclusion or strategic relevance in any other regional construct. As a result, and when attempting to differentiate the boundary of the Pacific as a mutually exclusive region, minor areas come into contention.

Firstly, one must consider the region’s six semi-autonomous islands, such as American Samoa and French Polynesia, which irrespective of their physical and geographical presence within the region are still colonial territories that are neither self-governing nor fully independent.²⁰⁸ The presence of existing colonial allegiances alters the role of these islands and it is for this reason that these islands are seen as a mere extension of their paternal powers and thus do not share the same equal level of interdependence that is experienced by the region’s wholly autonomous units. The South Pacific

²⁰⁵ Hoadley, 2005; III.

²⁰⁶ Powell, 2003; 1.

²⁰⁷ While the islands within in the Pacific have little threat of encroachment and land annexation from each other or outside powers, some islands are suffering intensely from the effects of climate change and the islands are essentially shrinking as they sink below the sea. Kiribati and Tokelau, for example, are two such islands at risk.

²⁰⁸ Questions have been raised about the extent to which these territories are allowed representation within international and regional organisation where they have a vested interest. United States Department of Interior, *U.S. Territories’ Participation in International Meetings*, 2010 [online].

<[http://www.doi.gov/oia/Firstpginfo/2010Session/4 Appropriate Representation of Insular Areas in Regional organizations.pdf](http://www.doi.gov/oia/Firstpginfo/2010Session/4_Appropriate_Representation_of_Insular_Areas_in_Regional_organizations.pdf)> (accessed 24 September 2010).

complex is largely aligned by membership of the Forum in the sense that the Forum reflects the socially constructed sphere in which interdependence is acknowledged and securitization is pursued. These territories are granted only Associate Membership or Observer status within the Forum and thus do not have the same equal capacity to impact on initiatives put forth by the group. These islands are not granted the same decision making capabilities as full members, but do have an opportunity to offer insight in an ad hoc manner and on terms allocated by the Forum.

Secondly, there are those states that exist on the cusp of inclusion within the region, but are not traditionally regarded as being a part of the South Pacific dynamic. Arguably, these islands share some cultural links with their Pacific island counterparts but they have been historically more affiliated with their Southeast Asian neighbours than their South Pacific ones. The former Indonesian province of East Timor enjoys special observer status within the Forum, much akin to its membership within ASEAN, but given its history with Indonesia is unequivocally conceptualised to be more a part of the Southeast Asia complex. The Indonesian province of Papua occupies the same landmass as the Pacific island of Papua New Guinea and represents the only physical border between the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. While conflict over this boundary has been comparatively minimal it has not been without tension. Papua New Guinea (PNG) has suffered from the spill-over effect in that domestic instability in Papua has seen many flee across the border to avoid the outbreak of violence between Papuan natives and the Indonesian military. It has been a difficult balance for PNG; although they are sympathetic towards the plight of the Papuans they are in no position to defend them.²⁰⁹ While the risk of Indonesian occupation would be unlikely, armed conflict of some description would undoubtedly ensue. The most that PNG can realistically do, and has continued to do, is maintain the border agreement between the two countries. Significantly, PNG is the only PIC to hold official observer status with ASEAN, and be an active member of APEC and the ARF. Furthermore, it is notable that, with all complicating variables aside, PNG is lobbying to become a full member of ASEAN.²¹⁰ Whether this hope will become a reality is questionable but nonetheless it would add an interesting dynamic to what PNG represented within both RSCs.

Recently, and despite being technically a province of Indonesia, West Papua has actively sought to engage within the regional framework of the South Pacific. Since being rendered a separate province from Papua in 2003, West Papua has further pushed for independence and recently reached out to align closer with the regional bodies within the South Pacific. Vanuatu, one of West Papua's closest Pacific neighbours, has supported this manoeuvre and has been vying for West Papua's inclusion as

²⁰⁹ Papua New Guinea has fewer than 4,000 armed forces. Indonesia, by contrast, has almost 300,000 personnel.

²¹⁰ Since 2009 Papua New Guinea's leader has been increasingly pushing for ASEAN membership.

an observer at the PIF leader's annual summit meeting. In addition, there has also been an expression of interest in engaging in the sub-regional organisation known as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG).²¹¹ This move is perhaps based on the realisation that any attempt to gain representation within Southeast Asia's regional architecture would be regarded as a personal and domestic issue for Indonesia and is a manoeuvre which would surely be blocked and cast aside by ASEAN on the basis of non-interference.

The autonomous units within the Pacific Islands are quite distinct in that they barely share physical borders with each other. Yet, naturally, there have been minor disputes over ocean territorial boundaries between neighbouring islands such as Tonga and Fiji.²¹² Those that do have overlapping physical borders are uniquely placed and additional circumstances have ensured border stability and maintenance of the status quo. Papua New Guinea and Papua represent an interesting situation in that Papua is still a province of Indonesia and despite Melanesia ties is a part of Southeast Asia. Papua New Guinea by contrast has been autonomous since 1975 and is embedded heavily within the framework of the extended Pacific Islands community, but does enjoy some political engagement within the regional architecture of Southeast Asia.²¹³ In addition, Samoa and American Samoa represent the only other countries to share a physical boundary. Notably, whilst Samoa (formerly Western Samoa) achieved autonomy in 1962; American Samoa by contrast remains a semi-autonomous American territory.

5.4 ANARCHIC STRUCTURE - *Are there two or more autonomous units?*

Arguably, the anarchical structure of the regional system is much akin to that of the international system, just densely concentrated and embedded more heavily within an historical pattern of relations. The lack of a ruling authority ensures that each unit within the system must protect themselves and their interests from each other. A distinct focus on the survival of the state ensures that the state remains the referent object and national security is the central focus. Given that there is a limited amount of exploitable resources available to guarantee the survival of the state, security is then pursued in a distinctly competitive and nationalistic manner. This traditional dynamic is

²¹¹ "Vanuatu to seek observer status for West Papua at MSG and PIF leaders summits", *Pacific Scoop*, 22 June 2010, [online] <<http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2010/06/vanuatu-to-seek-observer-status-for-west-papua-at-msg-and-pif-leaders-summits/>> [accessed 18 October 2010].

²¹² In 1972 the Minerva Reefs were laid claim to by Tonga. Tonga's claim was subsequently followed by an occupation of the reef in the wake of a private groups venture to establish an independent Republic of Minerva on the reef. It was not until 2005 that Fiji laid a complaint against Tonga's claim of ownership, in which an official complaint was lodged with the International Seabed Authority. This dispute currently stands unresolved.

²¹³ PNG do not have the capacity to compete and/or stand up to the strength of the Indonesia military. Maintenance of the current status quo is the only option and, as a result, PNG refuses to play any role in Papua's plight for independence.

distorted when its units are so politically and economically weak that they struggle to manage their own internal affairs, but nevertheless competitively pursue external ones. The majority of the states within the South Pacific are politically and economically underdeveloped microstates and barely have the capacity to look beyond their own immediate security environment. Consequently, their capacity to focus on the additional and competitive pursuit of territory or resources that are readily up for grabs is heavily constrained.

The anarchical structure of the South Pacific is present, albeit not in a traditional military sense. None of the units within the region pose a military threat to each other. The threat that these states may pose to each other arises not from their strength, but more so their weakness as a state. Subsequently, their desire to survive is derived not from securitising themselves against each other, but from securitising themselves against the existential threats that are created by their weakness and cannot be mitigated in the absence of cooperation.

5.5 POLARITY - *Is there a distinct distribution of power amongst the units?*

The overall distribution of capabilities among the units of the South Pacific is rather minimal in comparison to other regional groupings throughout the world, although a distinct distribution of power has emerged and continues to affect the dynamic of the South Pacific complex. Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, for example, represent the largest and most populous islands within the South Pacific. As a sub-region, and unlike Polynesia and Micronesia, “Melanesia comprises large, mountainous and mainly volcanic island countries, endowed with natural resources, rich soil and an abundant marine life.”²¹⁴ These Melanesian islands are in a better position to capitalise on the regional initiatives proposed by the Forum because they can bring more resources and clout to the table. Furthermore, they have a higher capacity to attract foreign enterprises that are looking to invest in harnessing the region’s resources.²¹⁵ Micronesia and Polynesia, by contrast, “are made up of much smaller island landmasses, and their natural resources are limited to small areas of land and the expansive ocean; they mostly contain small atolls with poor soils, with elevations usually between one and two meters (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu).”²¹⁶

This distribution of power is best highlighted by the capacity of some states to ‘highjack’ regional initiatives for their own benefit and thus use regionalism as a means of pursuing their own

²¹⁴ Gerald Haberkorn, ‘Pacific Islands’ Population and Development: Facts, Fictions and Follies’, *New Zealand Population Review*, 33, no. 34 (2008), pp. 97-8.

²¹⁵ Fiji has successfully benefited from increasing Chinese investment, particularly in the wake of the military coup and ‘smart sanctions’ imposed by both New Zealand and Australia. “Fiji’s dictator praises China,” *The Australian*, 12 August 2010, [online] <<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/fijis-dictator-praises-china/story-fn59niix-1225904123193>> [accessed 14th Feb 2011].

²¹⁶ Haberkorn, 2008; 98.

nationalist ideals. The establishment of Air Pacific and the University of the South Pacific (USP) both provide valuable examples, whereby both were regional initiatives designed to represent the region as a whole, yet due to the logistical advantages of having them based in Fiji, were manoeuvred by Fiji in such a way to monopolise their benefits. Air Pacific is now regarded as the national airline of Fiji and the location of the USP in Suva has ensured that Fiji benefit more highly from the appointment of staff and as the academic hub of the islands.²¹⁷

In order to securitize a threat at the regional level it is imperative that the majority of the region's members are convinced that a particular security threat is of equal concern to all. Consequently, those with fewer resources to convey their concerns are going to be more heavily disadvantaged in the pursuit of securitization. The regional distribution of power, therefore, can distort the security agenda and the Small Island States (SIS) within the Forum experience a reduced capacity to securitize threats. Significantly, the inhibiting nature of the region's distribution of power has not gone uncompensated and, in 2005 with the implementation of the Pacific Plan, the Forum acknowledged the discrepancy between the capabilities of the Forum's smaller island members and its more developed ones. This was formally recognised in 2006 with the establishment of the Smaller Island States Unit which proposed the need "to advocate the special and peculiar needs of Smaller Island States; provide special assistance for the implementation of the Pacific Plan, and ensure that they derive the fullest possible benefit from the Plan, particularly given their limited capacity and fragile and vulnerable environment."²¹⁸ The aim of this unit has been to provide a collective voice for the SIS and to help counteract the lack of resources they may experience. Furthermore, assist in highlighting the fact that the establishment of a framework of initiatives to provide a safe and secure environment may be one thing, but having the capacity and resources to implement them is another.

Lastly, whilst economic integration was viewed as an excellent starting point to balance out the power structure of Europe, this is not the case for the South Pacific. In the European context economic integration represented a low risk area of political conflict and was a viable basis upon which to fabricate the beginnings of a framework for regional cooperation. However, the wide gap in economic potential between the varying South Pacific islands has seen this issue become highly politically charged. Economic integration has been slow and stagnant as previous attempts to coordinate regional initiatives have seen the distribution of power come into play as individual states

²¹⁷ Eric Shibuya, 'The Problems and Potential of the Pacific Island Forum', in *The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition*, ed. by Jim Rolfe (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 102-115.

²¹⁸ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Smaller Island States*, [online] <<http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/smaller-island-states/>> [accessed 14 February 2011].

have used their power to pursue their own national interests. This is not to say there has been no progress; cooperation in regards to transportation, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) and education have been met with relative success. Some of the more ambitious regional projects, however, have been met with great controversy and conflict over larger Island states monopolising the direction of the projects and thus contributing to the poor distribution of its generated wealth. As previously mentioned, Fiji has used its central position within the region to capitalise on the success of various projects. Inevitably, this has left a sour taste in the mouth of those states that felt their interests were being railroaded by those with larger economies and larger populations.

5.6 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION - *Are there patterns of amity and enmity?*

RSCT observes that patterns of amity/enmity are more intensive on a regional level due to the fact that “the specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported to the system level, but generally internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions.”²¹⁹ These patterns intensify regional dynamics as ordinary assessments of power distribution are distorted by the additional elements of proximity and familiarity. RSCT suggests that “within this approach, and along with power relations, durable conflicts and long term historical rivalries, the security dynamics in a RSC also depend on the way actors, mostly but not exclusively states, construct their identity.”²²⁰ The social construction of the region is just as crucial as the existential threats that the units within the region collectively face, thus, “the complication is that it is really the relationships (the moves) that tie together, not the particular referent objects.”²²¹

The geographically sparse and economically underdeveloped nature of the Pacific archipelago has facilitated a strong and region-wide preoccupation with internal stability. Historically, interstate conflict has been minimal with various minor territorial and diplomatic quarrels between island states. These conflicts, however, pale in comparison to the many armed conflicts experienced in other regions of the world and it would be difficult to argue that the interstate relations in the South Pacific have ever been intense enough to be described as one of conflict formation. Within the South Pacific patterns of amity and enmity do exist, just predominantly in the postcolonial world and generally more amity than enmity. Yet, while these patterns do not fall within the parameters of a conflict formation they are by no means strong enough to warrant a security regime either.

²¹⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 47.

²²⁰ Khatchik der Ghokassian, ‘Instability in the New Imperial Periphery: A Conceptual Perspective of the ‘Turbulent Frontiers’ in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 2, no. 3 (2008), p. 152.

²²¹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 73.

The socially constructed identity of the South Pacific dates back to 1947 with the creation of the SPC, but unlike the regional initiatives of Southeast Asia with ASEAN or Africa with the OAU (now the AU) this collective identity was fabricated not by the member states themselves but by the former colonial powers. The SPC was, by and large, imposed regionalism to lift post-colonial burdens and thus was less about binding the regional states together as a community at the grass-roots level than it was about pragmatically managing extra-regional obligations in the process of post-colonial transformation. Regional collaboration in the South Pacific was superficial and rested more heavily on the basis that “the well-being of Pacific Island states is defined more in terms of their relationships (individual and collective) with major international aid donors than by their intra-regional neighbours.”²²²

It has been the evolution of regionalism in the South Pacific and the transformation of the Pacific Islands Forum as the region’s preeminent driving force that has been pivotal to the history of interstate amity and enmity in the Pacific Islands. The social construction of a common identity has drawn the units within the region closer together and this has facilitated a stronger power distribution and pattern of relations. In the past it has been bilateral ties and colonial links with outside powers that constituted the source of key support and resources for PICs. Now, however, under the auspice of the Forum, the region’s island states must manage their extra-regional relations in a collective manner as a regional grouping and not as individual units. Needless to say, this has altered the regional dynamic and has heightened the patterns of amity and enmity in the region. The grouping as a whole is only as cohesive as its least cooperative member and internal disagreements amongst member states reflect poorly upon the group as a whole. The overwhelming reliance on outside financial and political support ensures that the lack of group cohesion has the capacity to impinge on their relations with international donors and furthermore, particular pressure is enforced by those external donors whose support is conditioned on the maintenance of Westphalian democratic values. In addition, a failure to cooperate with each other also compromises support from non-state actors such as the European Union or the Commonwealth as it highlights the ineffectiveness of the PIF to adequately manage its internal dynamics.²²³

Although armed conflict between neighbouring states has been rare in the South Pacific, security has emerged as a significant focus in the modern framework of Pacific regionalism. Arguably this is not

²²² Ian Campbell, ‘Tongan Development and Pacific Island Security Issues.’ In *The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition*, ed. by Jim Rolfe (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Centre for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 136.

²²³ Fiji was suspended from the Commonwealth on the basis that the country’s interim government was responsible for persistently violating the fundamental political principles of the Commonwealth. “Fiji suspended from Commonwealth”, *BBC News*, 1 September 2009 [online] <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/8231717.stm>> [accessed 11 June 2011]. Relations with the EU are still favourable as the PIF continues to negotiate free trade agreements.

the product of a typical balance-of-power dynamic or the presence of a security dilemma, but rather of the extent to which there is a distinct link between internal domestic stability and the social and economic prosperity that the region strives to attain. As noted previously, the region is only as strong as its weakest member and given that “the Pacific regional security environment has become increasingly complex and diverse”²²⁴ this has demanded a stronger framework for regional security cooperation. A safer and more secure overarching security environment cannot be achieved in the absence of a viable and sustainable environment for economic and social development. Consistent with global trends in security, the increasingly transnational nature of security threats has ensured that the islands of the Pacific have had many mutual threats to contend with, including: “increasing transnational organised criminal activity in various forms; internal conflicts and crises threatening the stability of Member and their neighbouring States; the ever present global threat of terrorism; governance challenged to Government Agencies as well as limited legal and law enforcement and capacity.”²²⁵ Consistent with this growing reality, and over the past two decades, the PICs as a regional group²²⁶ have implemented several key agreements that have had a substantially significant security focus. In 1992, the Honiara Declaration proposed increased law enforcement coordination. Later on, this initiative was further expanded with the establishment of guiding principles in the 1997 Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation. In the wake of unrest in both Fiji and the Solomon Islands the Biketawa Declaration (2000) represented a definitive measure in the Forum’s history and outlined not only the guiding principles pertaining to regional security, but also proposed a course of action in the event of a domestic crisis threatening regional stability. The Biketawa Declaration marked a groundbreaking step in the social construction of the region as it recognised that there were limits to the highly regarded values of individual sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs and acknowledged that in certain instances the Forum should (and would) take action as a matter of region-wide safety and security. Lastly, the most recent and comprehensive security initiative emerged in the form of the Pacific Plan in 2005. This long-term plan proposed a “new and innovated approach to the unique challenges that Pacific Island Countries face through a framework of greater regional cooperation and integration.”²²⁷ Four key pillars underpin the Pacific Plan and are regarded as being fundamental challenges to the region and the

²²⁴ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Security*. [online] <<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/security/>> (accessed 10 December 2010).

²²⁵ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Security*. [online] <<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/security/>> (accessed 10 December 2010).

²²⁶ Projects initiated before 1999 were under the auspice of the South Pacific Forum. Two key initiatives, namely the Biketawa Declaration and the Pacific Plan, took place after the regional groupings transition to the Pacific Islands Forum.

²²⁷ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. *The Pacific Plan*, endorsed October 2005 [online] <<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/pacific-plan/>> [accessed 25 November 2010].

well-being of its people. These pillars are economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and, lastly, security.

Domestic instability has become increasingly relevant to the functionality of the Pacific Islands Forum. The scathing reactions from fellow Island states to the political upheavals in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji in particular, illustrate the extent to which neighbouring states are conscious of internal instability and how it may impact the regional dynamic.²²⁸ Whilst many island states have openly avoided 'choosing sides' in these situations, apparent fluctuations in patterns of amity and enmity have taken place. Relations between Fiji and Papua New Guinea have been particularly strained when Fiji's domestic crisis started to negatively impact on Papua New Guinea's own internal struggle. In 2005 it was revealed that Fijian mercenaries had been illegally arming and training private militia in the autonomous province of Bougainville and actively facilitating unrest.²²⁹ This was viewed by the Autonomous Bougainville Government as a breach in Papua New Guinea's agreement to take responsibility for "defence, foreign policy and the broader security of the island"²³⁰ and raised questions about the extent to which the Papua New Guinean government was aware of the Fijian's activities. However, ostensibly, tensions seem to have subsided and Papua New Guinean Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare expressed his support for the Fijian government with a lengthy speech at the island's 40 year celebration of independence in 2010.

Despite its theoretical progress towards taking a tougher stance on the internal stability of member states, the Forum has still failed to step up in a practical sense. A lack of consensus on the suspension of Fiji from the Forum has been apparent despite Fiji's failure to meet the prerequisites outlined by the Forum itself. A clear divide within the PIF exists; members of the sub-regional Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) were openly reluctant to suspend Fiji, yet states such as Australia and New Zealand were determined to maintain their tough stance towards Fiji's interim government throughout.²³¹ As a result, PNG, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have sought a subtle, conciliatory approach to their relations with Fiji, and have reportedly made private proposals.²³² This is a reflection of the vast differences between New Zealand and Australia, and the island countries within the region and it is this dynamic that represents the most distinct pattern of amity/enmity.

²²⁸ Nadkarni, Dev, "PNG lifeline for Bainimarama", *The New Zealand Herald*, 4 September 2008 [online] <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10530447> [accessed 20 September 2010].

²²⁹ There are plenty of journalistic reports regarding this incident (both western and island media). However, no academic analyses of the incident appear to exist.

²³⁰ "Fijian Mercenaries in Bougainville", *The World Today*, 18 November 2005 [online] <<http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2005/s1509837.htm>> [accessed 17 January 2011].

²³¹ Wainwright, 2010; 19.

²³² Wainwright, 2010; 19.

One of the biggest functional obstacles faced by the Forum to date has been conflict over Fiji and its place in the regional institution in the wake of the 2006 military coup. It is important to note that, despite regional agreements in place allowing for Forum-led intervention, all major regional interventions that have taken place have not done so under the auspices of the Forum. Whilst the Forum has given its blessing for the proposed course of action, both major projects in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)²³³ and Papua New Guinea have been actively spearheaded by New Zealand, Australia or the United Nations respectively. Needless to say, the inclusion of New Zealand and Australia as equal members within the regional framework of the South Pacific has significantly impacted on regional dynamics. It is interesting to consider how, in the absence of pressure from the Forum's two largest financial patrons, intervention in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea may have taken on a completely different shape (if it were even to take place) and also raises the question as to whether Fiji would have been suspended from the Forum at all if the positioning of New Zealand and Australia were different.

The involvement of New Zealand and Australia is complicated but necessary and is a careful balance between their contributing to the region and their imposing themselves on the region. RSCT suggests that "in defining the shape and structure of security complexes, cultural and racial patterns may well be an important contributing factor, though they come second to the patterns of security perception which are the principal defining factors."²³⁴ Thus, while cultural and racial ties are important in the later stages of organising regional constructs and perhaps their progression towards building a regional security community, they are not central in their initial development. Buzan notes, however, that "the question of whether cultural and racial ties should be a factor in identifying security complexes is an interesting one. It seems not unlikely that shared cultural and racial characteristics among a group of states would cause them both to pay more attention to each other in general, and to legitimize mutual interventions in each other's security affairs."²³⁵ The Pacific Islands Forum has used the notion of an 'extended Pacific family' in the 2000 Biketawa Declaration as a means of justifying the need to facilitate in improving the internal stability of its member states. The 'extended Pacific family' notion is regarded as an extension of the 'Pacific Way' and is a mantra that embodies the extent to which the region's history, proximity and familiarity may bind its members together with a sense of 'region-ness.' In essence, regional norms and initiatives are grounded not by law and obligation, but by mutual respect and trust.

²³³ Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands.

²³⁴ Buzan, 1991; 393.

²³⁵ Buzan, 1991; 393.

5.7 Summary

Finally, as Buzan and Waever argue, in an unstructured region the security dynamic is essentially inward-looking and dominated by internal interactions and, thereby “no regional RSC exists because the units do not become each other’s main security concern.”²³⁶ In a traditional sense, the units within the South Pacific do not see each other as being a military threat or direct risk to their survival and domestic stability is the most imminent concern. They do, however, view each other’s weakness or domestic instability as being a threat to the overall functionality of the region: whereby, the threat posed by neighbouring units is not derived from their strength as a power, but from their weakness as a state. While governance issues are problematic and do have transnational implications, they do not, however, have a regionalizing effect in quite the same way that intense and overlapping security threats do. The existence of a RSC and the emergence of regionalism as a coping mechanism have a tendency to go hand in hand, in that the web of interdependence that underpins the complex perpetuates the need for regionalism and, reciprocally, habits of regionalism can lead to a deeper web of interdependence.

The development of South Pacific regionalism has not emerged in a way that is congruent with the dynamics of RSCs and RSCT. South Pacific regionalism initially emerged as an initiative of colonial and neo-colonial states in the pursuit of managing the transition of the Pacific Islands to independence. As such, the history of regionalism and the region as an autonomous construct is not as lengthy as it may appear. In effect, the transformation of the SPC into the PIF in 1999 represents the decolonisation of South Pacific regionalism and the self-determination of the Pacific Islands as an ‘extended Pacific family.’ Nonetheless, the dynamics of the security environment itself are not responsible for the autonomy of the regional level and the extent to which outside factors have impinged on regional security dynamics is inconsistent with the existence of a complex. In sum, the South Pacific is not entirely unstructured in terms of its security environment, yet it is hardly organised either. A lack of interstate conflict and competition ensures that as a regional space it constitutes more than a conflict formation, yet its incapacity to manage its own security affairs, both financially and logistically, ensures that it is not a security regime either. The South Pacific constitutes some form of nascent and weak complex, but exists in an uncategorized league of its own.

²³⁶ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 64.

Chapter Six - Cross-Comparative Analysis: Southeast Asia and the South Pacific

6.1 Introduction

The key distinguishing feature of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is that it recognises the enduring and dynamic structure of the regional level and seeks not to predict, but to identify the means by which the context and the personality of the units within the region can produce particular patterns of security or insecurity. Historical and cultural circumstances drive individual complexes in different directions and thus the job of understanding each mutually exclusive complex on its own terms, whilst still maintaining common themes in order to allow for cross-comparison, is becoming increasingly difficult.²³⁷ The regions of the world cannot be compared without formulating theoretical concepts that establish a common basis of comparison.²³⁸ RSCT offers the concept of securitisation as its definitive theoretical tool for recognising regional variation and proposes that “a securitisation based theory will accept that the security agenda is about different things in different regions: the actors differ, as does the relative importance of different sectors.”²³⁹ Because it allows regions to be driven by their own conditions and context, securitisation removes prejudices on how people ‘should’ react given a certain set of circumstances and regional security becomes “not a question of state versus other units, but of what kind of relations these units – states and/or others – form among themselves.”²⁴⁰

The framework of RSCT relies on the specification of four interrelated levels of analysis: (a) domestic order in which fears are derived from instability and vulnerabilities; (b) state-to-state relations; (c) inter-regional interactions with neighbouring regions;²⁴¹ and (d) the impact of global powers in the region. The interplay between these levels defines the essential structure of an RSC. As discussed in previous chapters, the four variables that characterise the essential structure are: (a) boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours; (b) anarchic structure, in which the complex requires two or more autonomous units; (c) polarity, or the distribution of power among the region’s units; and (d) social construction, or the definition of patterns of amity and enmity among units.

²³⁷ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 85.

²³⁸ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 85.

²³⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 85.

²⁴⁰ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 476.

²⁴¹ Buzan argues that this level is relatively limited except when major changes of security interdependence are gaining momentum.

6.1.1 Regions of Cross-Comparison

The transformation of Southeast Asia and the development of ASEAN have provided regionalist specialists with “an important and rich area of investigation into the study of security communities. Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has lived through a major shift in the regional security and stability of Southeast Asia.”²⁴² Now, more so than ever before, the Southeast Asian RSC is being defined from within the region and on non-western terms, and thus has the capacity to provide an insight into the establishment of security mechanisms that do not necessarily adhere to the values underpinning those of their Western counterparts. The South Pacific, by contrast, is a fresh area of interest and, given the size and economic capacity of the units that comprise the region, the islands of the Pacific have been neglected as a stand alone regional construct in the sphere of international relations. As previously mentioned, in Buzan and Waever’s most recent conceptualisation of RSCT they noted that there were a variety of regional spaces that characterised different areas of the world; ranging from unstructured, to pre- and proto-complexes, to a full-fledged security complex. Theoretically, and on the basis that increased trade, technological innovation, and advancements in transportation have made the world a much smaller place, even the most remote areas of the world are now interlinked with their neighbours and need to manage their relations accordingly. These links, of varying degrees, now span the world and whilst “parts of Africa and possibly central Asia are pre- and proto-complexes”²⁴³ an unstructured region is a regional space that is in retreat and in its pure form no longer exists. Yet, the South Pacific is defined by Buzan and Waever as the last ‘unstructured’ regional space in the world; whereby the units within the region possess an insufficient level of interdependence in order to have what would be constituted as a viable dynamic. Thus, despite the region’s history of regionalism, the South Pacific has gone relatively unnoticed in terms of its security architecture and what it represents as a regional construct.

Despite their close proximity to each other, therefore, the South Pacific and Southeast Asia represent two very distinct regional complexes. The essential structure of Southeast Asia has transformed dramatically and an extensive regional security architecture has emerged and contributed to the stability of its regional order. The essential structure of the South Pacific has been weaker and less dynamic. Despite similarities between the two regions and, the South Pacific’s emulation of Southeast Asia’s regional structures, the South Pacific has lacked equal evolution and failed to manage its structure and security concerns with any efficacy. The purpose of this cross-comparison is to ascertain: 1) what are the key differences between the regional security complexes

²⁴² Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London/New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 5.

²⁴³ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 472-3.

of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and, 2) how have these differences led to a variation in development?

There are certain elements of similarity between the two regions, both in terms of historical elements and the perspectives held on regional cooperation. However, regionalism in Southeast Asia has taken on a life of its own and in the South Pacific it has been slow to develop and achieve results. Why has Southeast Asia developed an intense security complex and the South Pacific hasn't? What is it about the South Pacific that prevents the intensity of overlapping security needs and why, despite its regional framework, do its units not experience the same interdependence that inextricably links their security to that of their neighbours?

It is important to acknowledge that no two regions are the same and, as Buzan and Waever note, there is an obvious dichotomy between uniqueness and generalisation that makes a cross-comparison difficult. There are particular general elements (the essential structure) that do transcend the immediate context and "whatever their differences, regions are fundamentally comparable in terms of the elements of basic structure."²⁴⁴ This cross-comparison will consider the basic structure of these two regions, as established in the previous chapters, and why or how these structures have facilitated the strength (or weakness) of the development of a regional security complex.

FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-COMPARISON

For any given comparison of RSCs, the following variables must be addressed:

6.2 Positioning on spectrum from conflict formation (balance-of-power system) through security regime to security community.

A region's position on the spectrum from conflict formation through security regime to a mature security community is determined not only by the type of interstate interaction, but also the genuine cohesiveness and internalisation of values underpinning its overall regional order. So as to best understand interstate relationships, Buzan and Waever draw on Alex Wendt's constructivist scheme for characterising social structures and argue that, whilst it is not entirely fitting, the fundamentals of this scheme do help to typify aspects of regional level interstate interaction and where the dynamics of their relationship may best fit on this spectrum.²⁴⁵ Wendt proposes that there are two critical features of a social structure that must be acknowledged: "first, that all anarchies fall into one of three types of social structure (Hobbesian = enemy relations; Lockean =

²⁴⁴ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 468.

²⁴⁵ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 471.

rivalry within some rules; Kantian = friendly relations and strong restraints on war); and second, that these social structures can vary in their depth and mode of internalisation from shallow (coerced) through middling (calculations of self-interest) to deep (ideas accepted as legitimate).”²⁴⁶ On this basis, it is not only the nature of the historical relations between the units that determines the complex’s place on the spectrum, but the genuine internalisation of the ideas that are jointly established as a result of these interactions.

The characteristics of the three categories on the spectrum are as follows:

6.2.1 Conflict Formation

A conflict formation is unambiguous and describes units in a close formation whose interactions are characterised by fear and rivalry. It is a dynamic in which traditional security agendas prevail and, whilst some organisational framework may extend across the region, traditional state-versus-state conflict is the primary type of interaction. The units within this dynamic are typically weak states that are inward looking and plagued by internal instability. However, and in spite of their preoccupation with domestic issues, the security environment of these states are intertwined and it is an interdependence that persists irrespective of whether it is acknowledged or not. Instability in one state can easily disrupt the balance in a neighbouring one; be it through the example of a revolution (leading to the suggestion that it is a viable solution for the current political situation) or through the effect it has on refugees illegally crossing borders and seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. The extent to which these states lack the capacity to manage their own affairs can often permeate the regional level and cause tensions between neighbours.

6.2.2 Security Regime

A security regime is a structure in which member states have established a cooperative framework and have agreed upon conditions that best suit their needs (both as individual units and as a collective grouping), but do not regard armed conflict between neighbours as being inconceivable. As mentioned previously, “security regimes are more akin to what Deutsch called a ‘no-war community,’ ... [it] is a first step towards a full-fledged security community, but unlike a security community a no-war community is one in which ‘the possibility of war is still expected and to some extent preparations are made for it.”²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 471.

²⁴⁷ Acharya, 2001; 18.

6.2.3 Mature Security Community

Lastly, a mature security community is regarded as the holistic embodiment of regionalism and regionalisation whereby the framework of the regional level is entirely paramount and the initiatives established at this level go above and beyond the national agenda of its member-states.

Furthermore, the key aim of a security community “is to develop the common interests of actors in peace and stability, rather than to deter or balance a common threat.”²⁴⁸ Thus, the use force between members as a means of dealing with conflict becomes completely unthinkable. The aim is to meet persistent calls for ‘peace, security, prosperity and progress’ and to establish a regional community which is invested in a shared identity and aspiration among its people and governments.²⁴⁹ A mature security community represents the most evolved regional social structure and requires mutual interest and genuine trust between elites as well as at the grassroots level amongst the masses. Intergroup trust at the local level is crucial as “regional communities can surely be imagined by elites, but to be meaningful and sustainable they would also have to be anchored in the domain of popular approval and participation.”²⁵⁰

6.2.4 Spectrum Characterisation of Southeast Asia

Immediate post-WWII Southeast Asia was an environment characterised by intense conflict formation. Consistent with Wendt’s scheme, and as the painful process of state-formation took place, fear and rivalry dominated much of the regional dynamic with particular patterns emerging within the two Southeast Asian sub-complexes; mainland Indochina and the maritime Malay Archipelago. After the onset of the Cold War, and previous lacklustre attempts at cooperation, the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 marked the first successful step away from conflict formation and towards an institutional framework of peaceful resolution. With the creation of ASEAN its founding member-states agreed to “a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation”²⁵¹ and sought to establish a framework whereby they could incrementally reduce fear and rivalry via mutual and trust building interactions. In its formative years, ASEAN did not have the strength to form the basis of a regional security regime, nor was security an explicit aim on the organisation’s agenda. ASEAN’s inception did, however, symbolise a critical stage in Southeast Asia’s transition from conflict formation to security regime. Both Southeast Asia as a region, and ASEAN as an institutional body, have evolved significantly in the past four decades. ASEAN is now the driving

²⁴⁸ Acharya, 2001; 19.

²⁴⁹ Nair, 2008; 113.

²⁵⁰ Nair, 2008; 114.

²⁵¹ ASEAN Secretariat, *The ASEAN Declaration 1967*, 8 August 1967 [online] <<http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm>> [accessed 17 September 2010].

force behind Southeast Asian regionalism and represents the core of Southeast Asia's security regime. Lastly, and with the expansion of its membership base in the 1990s, ASEAN now completely rests at the centre of Southeast Asia's regional security regime and, Timor-Leste aside, attempts to encapsulate the total sum of geopolitical Southeast Asia.²⁵²

Having experienced 44 years of interstate peace, Southeast Asia represents the most successful structural transition from conflict formation to security regime in the Third World. Nonetheless, traditional realist concerns about power still contribute to the regional dynamic and, despite the lengthy history of regional cooperation; the states within Southeast Asia's RSC are still not willing to entirely rule out military means in the resolution of disputes between neighbours. Potential flashpoints for military confrontation continue to highlight that tension between member states still exists and that national agendas still trump regional ones. The Indochina sub-complex has been particularly problematic as bitter historical disputes persist and Southeast Asia's security regime has not managed to diplomatically alleviate interstate tension. This has been exemplified by recent and intermittent armed clashes over the area surrounding a Buddhist temple bordering Thailand and Cambodia in which both parties claim territorial ownership.²⁵³ Furthermore, the South China Sea has continued to remain a regional hotspot for conflict as fundamental conflicts over islands, maritime space and resources have not been resolved.²⁵⁴ Overlapping territorial claims between several Southeast Asian states including Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as China, have led to quarrels over UNCLOS regulations and EEZ zones.²⁵⁵ In both these instances, diplomacy has failed to deliver results. Given that peaceful resolution via diplomatic means is a definitive element of a security community, Southeast Asia's security environment invariably remains characterised as a security regime.

²⁵² Where all, with the exception of Timor-Leste, enjoy full and active participation in ASEAN.

²⁵³ "Loose Stalks Posing as a Sheaf". *The Economist*, 10 February 2011 [online] <<http://www.economist.com/node/18114235?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/ar/stalksposingasasheaf>> [accessed 20 February 2011]

²⁵⁴ Proceedings from the International Workshop organised by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, ed. by Tran Truong Thuy. *The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development*, (Hanoi, Vietnam: Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, 2009).

²⁵⁵ Lodged on the basis that some states are not complying with the regulations regarding Exclusive Economic Zones as outlined in Article 48 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations: Oceans and Law of the Sea, *UNCLOS Agreement of December 1982* [online] <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf> [accessed 2nd May 2011]; "A Sea of Disputes". *The Economist*, 21 February 2011 [online] <http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/02/south_china_sea?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/bl/seaofdisputes> [accessed 21 February]; and "Carps among the Spartlys". *The Economist*, 10 March 2011 [online] <http://www.economist.com/node/18332702?story_id=18332702> [accessed 11 March 2011].

The traditional concern of national security is “the use of and threat of using military force to secure the state.”²⁵⁶ The credibility of one’s force is directly proportionate to the capabilities of those surrounding it and “thus keeping a careful watch on those capabilities becomes an important nexus in the state’s security calculations.”²⁵⁷ During the formative years of Southeast Asia’s RSC, and its conflict formation phase, the presence of rivalry between states and an overt focus on military security were dominant features of the regional dynamic. As a result, concerns over the emergence of a security dilemma, military competition and even an arms race within the region have featured heavily in the literature on Asian security in the post-Cold War era. Even now, despite the region’s transformation to security regime and the development of an extensive regional security architecture, traditional military security concerns continue to be an area of focus.²⁵⁸ In the past two decades, arms expenditure for many Southeast Asian states has not decreased; in fact, it has progressively risen. Regional observers have been left trying to explain how this trend fits into the “regional security calculus”²⁵⁹ and what potential impact it may have on the regional security dynamic.

Prior to the Asian economic crisis in 1997, a substantial increase in arms expenditure occurred in much of the region. Currently, and as the region recovers from the effects of the Asian crisis and subsequent periods of global level financial insecurity, “there are signs that weapon procurement is rising again.”²⁶⁰ While this may be the case, and this trend may have an impact on the regional dynamic in the long run, it does not necessarily reflect a change in patterns of fear and rivalry at the regional level. It is more likely that this trend is a manifestation of the shifting power dynamic in the wider East Asia region; in which China’s growth and military manoeuvring have inevitably heightened focus on the military capabilities of individual Southeast Asian states. In addition, increased military expenditure may also be attributed to “the cyclic process of replacing old and worn out equipment.”²⁶¹ These concerns are a constant reality for many Southeast Asia states. Nonetheless, and irrespective of the abundance of regional initiatives and cooperative mechanisms established, the consciousness of each state about the power capabilities of their neighbours has never truly subsided and military action as a means of improving an individual state’s security has

²⁵⁶ Collins, 2003; 94.

²⁵⁷ Collins, 2003; 94.

²⁵⁸ Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘A New Arms Race?: Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 32, no. 1 (2010), pp. 50-69. Also see: Colin McInnes and Mark Rolls, *Post-Cold War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region* (England: Frank Cass & Co LTD, 1994). Mark Rolls, *The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in South-East Asia During the Second Cold War* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1998).

²⁵⁹ Bitzinger, 2010; 52.

²⁶⁰ Collins, 2003; 96.

²⁶¹ Bitzinger, 2010; 62.

not been rendered inconceivable.²⁶² As a result, it is difficult to argue that Southeast Asia is anything more than a security regime as the key Deutschian concept of the 'undesirability of war' has not been entirely achieved.

6.2.5 Spectrum Characterisation of the South Pacific

The South Pacific has never experienced the same degree of conflict as Southeast Asia, and thus the region has never realistically constituted a conflict formation. As a result, both the establishment of regional order and the significance of regionalism have been subtle and incremental. The fragmented nature of the units within the region, in combination with their economic underdevelopment, has ensured that prior to the last decade the region has remained relatively unstructured in its security dynamic. The underlying threats faced by the region are derived not from the power of the units, but from their weakness and thus the intensity of interaction between its units (be it cooperative or conflictual) has essentially been low. The South Pacific has slowly gained its regional security structure and the early basis for a security regime from the need to stabilize non-traditional security threats. Whilst such threats are less intense and less imminent than traditional military threats, they do require regional order and coordination to mitigate and this is something the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has recognised. In comparison to Southeast Asia, the depth of institutionalism in the South Pacific is shallow and the PIF's momentum relies heavily on Australia and New Zealand for funding and resources, in addition to the tenacity to make critical decisions. Nonetheless, a degree of structure and regional order has developed so as to cope with the region's security environment. The South Pacific, it can be argued, constitutes a limited security regime.

6.2.6 Cross-Comparison

Whilst the security regimes of the two regions vary in strength and depth there are several similarities between the two: there is a distinct absence of collective defence, security has developed as an implicit not explicit value; and sensitive security issues relating to internal stability are a constant test of regional values of non-interference and individual autonomy.

Collective defence, regarded as the most traditional security alliance, may have a long history in Europe, but in the Asia-Pacific "collective defence effectively has played no role."²⁶³ As argued by

²⁶² Collins, 2003; 96. This has been demonstrated (both in the past and as of late) when several of the mainland Southeast Asian states have clashed over border disputes. Thailand and Burma have had some skirmishes in the past and Thailand and Cambodia are currently in conflict over the area surrounding a temple bordering the two countries that is a UNESCO world heritage site. This dispute is still ongoing and remains unresolved. "Thailand, Cambodian Troops in Border Clash". *New Zealand Herald*, 22 April 2011 [online] http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10720937 [accessed 22 April 2011].

²⁶³ Maull, 2005: 81.

Maull, “the principal reason for a lack of collective defence in Pacific Asia, however, was distrust among the potential candidates and fear of entanglement with US policies.”²⁶⁴ Yet today, and despite the diminished role of the US and increased trust between neighbours, explicit and binding defence alliances do not exist. The ultimate focus within the security regimes of both regions has been the implementation of comprehensive or cooperative security, in which both like-minded and non-like minded states are engaged: the security agenda is inclusive and looks beyond military security, and continuous dialogue facilitates trust.²⁶⁵

In both the South Pacific and Southeast Asia contemporary concepts of security cooperation underpin their security regimes. Member-states acknowledge that security cannot be attained at the expense of one’s neighbour and that comprehensive security requires a framework that is both multidimensional and transcends sectors. In both regions, the similarity of this approach has led to shared experiences regarding a lack of explicit security cooperation and also the difficulty of integrating sensitive internal security concerns into the regional security agenda. Consequently, and whilst order exists and initiatives are proposed, in times of crisis tangible results have been difficult to achieve. Previous instances have highlighted how both regional frameworks have struggled to cope with domestic level security concerns that have a potentially destabilizing effect at the regional level. Sensitive security issues have been either ignored and passed off as strictly internal concerns, or conflict resolution has been “sanctioned” by the region’s institutional body but carried out by a third party. In the South Pacific, this was the case in PNG as well as in the Solomon Islands and in Southeast Asia this was the case in both Cambodia and East Timor. In each case it was agreed at the regional level that conflict could not be resolved domestically and that external intervention was necessary, albeit to be conducted under the auspices of a third party (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, or the United Nations) and not the regional institution itself.

In spite of criticism that ASEAN lacks ‘teeth’ in regards to sensitive security issues, Southeast Asia constitutes a more mature security regime than the South Pacific. In comparison to Southeast Asia, the South Pacific does possess a similar regional order, institutional security framework and a desire for peaceful resolution, but to a far lesser degree. Security interdependence in the South Pacific lacks the strength of Southeast Asia and thus the fates of its units are not bound together with the same sense of intensity. Lastly, and despite the presence of a security regime, Southeast Asian and

²⁶⁴ Maull, 2005; 81.

²⁶⁵ David Capie and Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), p. 99.

Pacific Island states “tend to prize their sovereignty highly and can be acutely sensitive to perceived intrusions thereon.”²⁶⁶

6.3 Type of region: overlaid, unstructured, pre- and proto- complexes, or RSCs. And if a RSC, then standard, centred, or great power?

Southeast Asia, formerly overlaid during the Cold War, is a standard regional security complex. The region has emerged as a fully-fledged and autonomous complex in its own right and is the only Asian sub-region comprised entirely of small to medium powers. As a result, Southeast Asia is a standard complex with a relatively even distribution of power. The South Pacific as a regional space has changed substantially since decolonisation took place, yet the region’s evolution pales in comparison to that of Southeast Asia. The South Pacific is, at best, a standard nascent RSC. However, it is extremely weak, porous and vulnerable to changing patterns of extra-regional engagement.

As a regional space, the South Pacific once represented a prototypical unstructured region. Steadily, and significantly in the past decade, regional level interactions have increased as the region has seen its units become more interlinked and cohesive as a regional bloc. The driving force behind this transformation, however, lacks the intensity and interdependency of the Southeast Asian security complex. The history of interstate conflict in the South Pacific is minimal compared to many regions and, as a result, the relationships between the region’s units are less volatile than the pre or proto-complexes that typically exist in areas such as Africa. With the development of the Pacific Islands Forum, and key regional initiatives such as the Biketawa Declaration and the 2005 Pacific Plan, the South Pacific has gained significant structure. Yet, the region continues to lack the interdependence needed to facilitate the intensity of the regional level such as to make it the crucial level at which security can be achieved.

The transformation of the South Pacific from unstructured region to security complex has been slow and is not yet complete. The region’s stagnated development may be attributed to several factors; namely, the extent to which the South Pacific is fragmented, geographically sparse, and relies heavily on economic aid. Unlike Southeast Asia, the regional level is not fully autonomous and a committed focus on regional level concerns has been hard to develop and sustain. The capacity of the region to function self-sufficiently in the absence of economic aid is questionable and, whilst it may be speculated that by restructuring inefficient and ineffective bureaucracies key regional players could have the capacity to engage in the international market in a functional and productive way, it has been remarked that the region’s geographical nature is its central impediment and that this drives a

²⁶⁶ Wainwright, 2010; 15.

range of logistical issues that are difficult to fix.²⁶⁷ Geography has created a context in which “ethnic cleavages and conflict, governmental corruption, natural resource depletion, and trade inequality”²⁶⁸ are typical characteristics, and the extent to which these elements are embedded in the core of the state are “just a few of the variables that keep the islands from gaining such an idealistic status”²⁶⁹ of economic independence. Furthermore, the South Pacific is geographically disadvantaged in ways far beyond the states’ control as natural disasters and the impact of rising water levels threatens to destroy and displace entire islands themselves.²⁷⁰

Whilst the South Pacific and Southeast Asia share similar security concerns in regards to the internal instability of individual countries, the dynamics of their complexes vary significantly in this respect. Southeast Asia is a distinct regional security complex. It is a region whose intense and tumultuous history of conflict and interaction has inextricably bound the fates of its constituent states together. Consequently, and irrespective of their diversity, these states have been driven together in the need to form a cohesive approach towards a common goal of peace, stability and prosperity. The need to gain control of the region’s security environment is derived from the type of threats that the region’s states face collectively as a group (both in terms of past threats and those predicted for the future). Southeast Asian interdependence is derived from the extent to which managing extra-regional involvement and also facilitating economic prosperity rely heavily on coordination, and cannot holistically be achieved by individual units.

In contrast, the South Pacific has struggled to develop the same kind of imperative for cooperation. This may be attributed to the fact that the region’s fundamental security concerns are neither immediate nor imminent – they feel little threat of attack from each other or major powers and their instability is derived internally from non-traditional threats such as the spread of disease, economic instability, climate change and elements of human security stemming from state weakness. Ultimately, the crucial issues facing the people of the Pacific are welfare issues and despite being concerns of the societal sector, the problems and solutions are not contained strictly within this sector. It is the lack of socio-political cohesion and the underdeveloped ‘idea’ of the state in these nation-states that is the source of much unrest. It has been the lack of socio-political cohesiveness that has seen ethnic cleavages transfer from the societal sector to the political. Fiji, for example, is a case in point. Tension between native Fijians and Indo-Fijians over the Fijian identity has become

²⁶⁷ Powell, 2010; 13.

²⁶⁸ Powell, 2010; 13.

²⁶⁹ Powell, 2010; 13.

²⁷⁰ Namely Kiribati and Tokelau.

inextricably linked to tension over political leadership.²⁷¹ Welfare issues can cause a significant level of tension at both the domestic and regional level but, because welfare concerns manifest incrementally and internally within society, they are harder to securitize as they lack the clear breaking point required of existential threats.²⁷² In addition, it is difficult to push welfare issues as an imminent concern on a regional level irrespective of the extent to which they affect the stability of the unit and its place within the complex.

6.4 Dominant unit(s) among which the dynamics of securitisation occur

In the case of both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific individual states are still the most central units. However, the nature of interdependence determines that strength and autonomy as individual units is directly linked to the dynamics of securitization at the regional level and the ability to act as a regionally cohesive unit. ASEAN and the PIF represent a single voice for the units that comprise their respective regions; yet all individual states still strongly maintain their national sovereignty and the right to individual autonomy. Unlike the European Union, neither region has (nor have they expressed a desire to create) an overarching supranational body in which sovereignty would be pooled and control would be ceded. This shared feature of both complexes is apparent in the similarity between the 'ASEAN Way' and the 'Pacific Way' and the extent to which both organisations have moulded their frameworks around the ideals of non-intervention in domestic issues; maintenance of individual sovereignty; and agreement through non-binding, trust-based consensus. On the one hand, it has been argued that a lack of legality and formality in the ethos of both institutional frameworks has hindered progress towards tangible progress, whilst the ASEAN style of diplomacy, on the other hand, has been hailed by others for its ability to develop genuine bonds based on trust and honesty between governments despite historical grievances. Arguably, the belief is that enabling cooperation by fostering genuine relationships that will stand the test of time is more important than obligations bound to legal documentation. As such, the state firmly remains the unit that drives the process of securitization in both regions.

6.5 Dominant sectors driving the dynamics of securitisation

By mapping sectors of securitization, RSCT aims to capture how local dynamics impact on the pursuit of security at the regional level, in particular the kinds of issues that are moved onto the securitization agenda and what that suggests about the nature of the RSC itself. Buzan and Waever highlight the idea that "there is a correlation between sector of securitisation and position on

²⁷¹ Political leaders in Fiji have used the country's ethnic cleavage to their advantage and used threats to identity and ethnic issues to justify their actions and gain support.

²⁷² Buzan and Waever, 2003; 359.

spectrum from conflict formation to security community. Military and political and/or societal security dominate in most of the conflict formations, whereas economic and societal is usually prominent in the security communities.²⁷³ Arguably “the causal arrow here points in both directions: political-military securitisation causes conflict and, when you have conflict, you turn to the strongest instruments which often include the military one.”²⁷⁴ As previously acknowledged, the concept of security in both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is strongly state-centric and nationalistic, albeit with a regional focus on comprehensive security via self-asserting and autonomous regional frameworks. Theoretically, and by mapping the dominant sectors of securitization within each of the regions, securitization theory should provide a platform for recognising key differences that may exist between the RSCs of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

In the post-Cold War era the broadening and deepening of the security discourse has seen a clear change in both the sources of insecurity within different sectors and also, the divisibility between them. Securitization theory suggests that security is the outcome of a particular social process in which a threat, irrespective of its origin, is deemed potentially destabilizing and thus, security is not an objective condition in and of itself. As a result, the military sector and traditional security threats are no longer the central focus and potential sources of insecurity are perceived as being not only non-military, but also transnational in scope. In essence, traditional and non-traditional threats interact with and reinforce each other and, in order to manage the effects of a widening security agenda, securitization needs to take place across sectors and be coordinated on multiple levels. The broadening of security, however, has made the process of distinguishing securitization within individual sectors increasingly problematic. The interplay between the origins of a threat, its impact, and the sector in which it needs to be securitized have a tendency to overlap and that this thesis suggests that it would be more comprehensive to focus on regional patterns of securitization across traditional and non-traditional threats as opposed to across the individual sectors themselves.

6.5.1 Traditional Security in Southeast Asia

The securitization of traditional threats has been a minimal feature of regional level cooperation throughout the history of Southeast Asia. The intention of ASEAN as a multilateral institution is not, and never has been, the creation of a military alliance. Increasing demands for cooperation have ensured the durability of regional patterns of amity and have enabled ASEAN to adopt clear norms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.²⁷⁵ In the post-Cold War era the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ has been used to underpin regionalism in Southeast Asia whereby, both military and non-

²⁷³ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 477.

²⁷⁴ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 477.

²⁷⁵ Severino, 2007; 410.

military threats are recognized as an impediment to the overall well-being of its member states.²⁷⁶ As a result, regional cooperation has moved beyond its initial focus of facilitating positive intra-ASEAN relations and has acknowledged the necessity of counteracting security threats that originate from within all sectors and equally contribute to insecurity and instability. Significantly, and to date, “the only strong multilateral security organization in South-East Asia is the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) among Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain.”²⁷⁷ The FPDA, forty years since its inception, is still active and continues to organise joint defence exercises within the region. Nonetheless, the FPDA’s most valuable contribution still remains facilitating increased cooperation between Singapore and Malaysia during the formative years of the region’s security regime. Additionally, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, was devised as a further mechanism for security cooperation. However, and despite emerging “with much fanfare and with the aim of progressing steadily from military confidence-building measures to preventative diplomacy and, eventually, to conflict resolution,”²⁷⁸ the ARF has not provided any basis for military cooperation and traditional security concerns still continue to be dealt with predominantly on a unilateral or bilateral basis.

6.5.2 Non-Traditional Security in Southeast Asia

Notwithstanding the ARF’s shortcomings in regards to traditional security concerns, it has contributed to highlighting the need to securitize non-traditional security threats at the regional level. Crime, piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal immigration have all been listed by the ARF as being among the top threats facing the region. The origin of such threats may be located in particular sectors: however, the implications of individual threats interact with and facilitate instability across various sectors. The securitization of the following non-traditional security threats have featured prominently within the regional level dynamic:

6.5.3 Maritime Security

Maritime security, be it common piracy, politically motivated piracy or maritime terrorism, has been one of the most significant areas of security cooperation in the region and has highlighted the need for comprehensive securitization. However, the securitization of piracy highlights the difficulty faced in separating security threats and the sectors in which they are targeted. The Straits of Malacca, which flow through and overlap the territorial seas of several ASEAN member states, is defined as being the waterway “between the west coast of Thailand and Malaysia in the northeast, and the

²⁷⁶ Capie and Evans, 2007; 70.

²⁷⁷ Dibb, 2001; 835.

²⁷⁸ Dibb, 2001; 835.

coast of Sumatra in the southwest.”²⁷⁹ The Straits represent the key link between the Indian Ocean and Northeast Asia in the Pacific and is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. The importance of the Straits ensures that its security has an overlapping impact in virtually all sectors and the immediacy of its effects is felt by all, both directly via the political-military sector and indirectly via the economic sector.

In essence, the threat posed by insecurity within the Straits of Malacca is that it has the potential to disrupt shipping routes and the flow of trade, and whilst this reality may be considered an economic security concern, its securitization requires the deployment of military resources, institutional reform to criminalize transnational crime, and synchronized political responses regarding border control and the rights of law enforcers in the maritime jurisdictions of neighbouring countries.²⁸⁰ In 2001 the securitization of piracy and other maritime threats received notable attention at the ARF where maritime security was outlined as being “an indispensable and fundamental pillar for the construct of economic welfare and security in the ASEAN region.”²⁸¹ Upon the inception of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 maritime security also featured prominently on the ADMM agenda and the need for increased cooperation garnered further attention. The securitization of maritime security has facilitated the development of cooperative mechanisms in the form of information sharing networks and joint shore exercises. Notably, the most significant capacity-building effort to come from regional level securitization has been the introduction of the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP). The MSP, consisting of an air-surveillance component, an Intelligence Exchange Group, plus Joint Coordination Committee,²⁸² has made significant progress in improving practical cooperation in patrolling the Straits and represents an instance of regional level securitization which has produced tangible results.

6.5.4 International Terrorism

Southeast Asia’s geostrategic position has exacerbated the role of political threats challenging the ‘idea’ of the state and its organizational stability. Terrorism, for example, is a political threat that targets national identities and organising ideologies in the pursuit of change to the current order. It is an issue that has taken on a regionalising dynamic: as the ARF duly notes, “terrorism, irrespective of its origins, motivations or objectives continues to pose serious threats to regional and

²⁷⁹ Nazery Khalid, ‘With a Little Help from My Friends: Maritime Capacity-building Measures in the Straits of Malacca,’ *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 31, no. 3 (2009), p. 425.

²⁸⁰ Sam Bateman, ‘Solving the “Wicked Problems” of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 33, no. 1 (2011), p. 15.

²⁸¹ Khalid, 2009; 436.

²⁸² Khalid, 2009; 436.

international peace and stability.”²⁸³ Terrorism currently features highly on the region’s securitization agenda yet, despite having a lengthy history in Southeast Asia, it was not until the events of September 11 2001 that ASEAN articulated a common stand against terrorism.²⁸⁴ In November 2001, ASEAN members endorsed the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism²⁸⁵ and asked its signatories “to improve intelligence sharing and collaboration among their law enforcement agencies, to provide assistance on border surveillance, immigration and financial issues to comply with UN resolutions on terrorism.”²⁸⁶ However, and whilst the speech act of securitization took place, “the divergent domestic interests between Indonesia on one hand and Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines on the other hand undermined the attainment of a regional agreement and the formulation of more concrete measures.”²⁸⁷ Indonesia’s initial reluctance to acknowledge the American initiated “war on terror” resulted in a distinct disconnect between policy and practice. It was not until 2002, when the Bali nightclub bombings took place, which were then followed by several further incidents,²⁸⁸ that Indonesia’s policy began to change and acknowledged the need to fully engage in the securitization of terrorism at the regional level.²⁸⁹ Since 2002, the securitization of terrorism has had some success and has increased the capacity of law enforcement groups to detain key figures within terrorist organisations.²⁹⁰ However, disagreements over “threat perceptions and how far ASEAN members should go in discussing domestic aspects of terrorism’s origins and impacts”²⁹¹ has exacerbated the prevalence of ASEAN members acting unilaterally or bilaterally with extra-regional powers, such as the United States.²⁹²

²⁸³ ASEAN Regional Forum, *ARF Annual Security Report 2006* [online] <<http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=egcnD8%3d&tabid=291&mid=929>> [accessed 8 May 2011].

²⁸⁴ Prior to 9/11 several ASEAN member states already had internal security initiatives in place. Collins (2003) notes that “in Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma, the ability to hold a suspect without trial was already possible before 9/11. In these states the Internal Security Act enables the ruling elite to bypass the due process of the law.” (p. 209)

²⁸⁵ As stated in the ASEAN Declaration ‘Joint Action to Counter Terrorism’, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 5 November, 2001.

²⁸⁶ Emmers, 2002; 15.

²⁸⁷ Emmers, 2002; 14.

²⁸⁸ As outlined by Febrica (2010), the following incidents include “a bomb attack against the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003; a car bomb outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004; and, most recently, simultaneous bomb attacks at the Marriott and the Ritz Carlton Hotels in 2009.” (p. 581)

²⁸⁹ The impact of the Bali bombings enabled the Indonesian elite to securitize terrorism on the domestic level by passing two presidential decrees allowing the arrest and detention of suspected terrorists in the absence of a trial or police warrant. This, in turn, enabled Indonesia to engage in the emerging regional level securitization of terrorism. (Collins, 2003; 209-10)

²⁹⁰ “Terror Suspect Killed in Java” *BBC News*, 8 August 2009 [online] <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8190071.stm>> [accessed 12 July 2011].

²⁹¹ Jonathan Chow, ‘ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation since 9/11’, *Asian Survey*, 45, no. 2 (2005), p. 302.

²⁹² Chow, 2005; 302.

6.5.5 Environmental Degradation

In the past decade environmental security has taken on a supplementary role in the regionalizing dynamic of Southeast Asian securitization. The relevance of the environmental sector is driven by the nexus of civilisation and environment in which “a dynamic, interdependent relationship exists between [the] environment and politics: Civilization is held responsible for part of its own structural environmental conditions, which limit or enlarge its development options and influence incentives for cooperation and conflict.”²⁹³ Global environmental issues such as climate change and the sustainability of food and energy resources, as well as regionally specific issues such as trans-boundary haze, water scarcity in Singapore and the utilisation of the Mekong Delta River in Indochina, have begun to take prominence on the regional agenda and the need to consider the securitization of environmental issues to avoid future conflict has become a reality. The growing significance of environmental security concerns has been addressed in some of ASEAN’s most comprehensive documents, such as the ‘Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009 – 2015,’²⁹⁴ which have referenced the need to cooperate and highlighted the role that environmental threats play in the pursuit of sustainable development or, rather, the hindering of. Nonetheless, the pursuit of environmental security is multifaceted and securitizing moves need to take place at all levels in order to be effective. Furthermore, regionally specific issues have the added difficulty of moving on to a political agenda that is already driven by the dynamics of the regional security environment.

6.5.6 Traditional and Non-Traditional Security in the South Pacific

In Third World states, domestic political concerns are the “typical lens through which threats are judged.”²⁹⁵ This is not to say that external threats do not exist within the regional security environment, but more so that such threats “often attain prominence largely because of the conflicts that abound within Third World states.”²⁹⁶ The South Pacific is comprised of weak and underdeveloped states with extensive internal security concerns resulting largely from ethnic differences, land disputes, economic disparities and a lack of confidence in government resolution capabilities.²⁹⁷ The political instability of individual countries has previously been left off the agenda at the regional level for fear that Forum intervention would be considered a breach of sovereignty.

²⁹³ Buzan et al, 1998; 76-77.

²⁹⁴ ASEAN Secretariat, *Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015*, April 2009 [online] <<http://www.asean.org/publications/RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf>> [accessed 7 May 2011].

²⁹⁵ Buzan et al, 1998; 173.

²⁹⁶ Buzan et al, 1998; 173. In reference to the works of Mohammed Ayoob (1995; 7).

²⁹⁷ Stewart Firth, ‘A Reflection on South Pacific Regional Security, mid-2000 to mid-2001’, *The Journal of Pacific History*, 36, no. 3 (2001), p. 278.

However, and as a result of violent instability in three of the region's largest countries,²⁹⁸ the 2000 Biketawa Declaration²⁹⁹ marked a fundamental change and acknowledged the link between domestic level stability and regional security. The Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC),³⁰⁰ which meets annually and combines "regional law enforcement secretariats, stakeholders and development partners to discuss various law enforcement and security related issues,"³⁰¹ has identified internal threats to be of equal importance to external ones.

Regionalism in the South Pacific has been functioning for forty years, yet explicit dialogue regarding security and regional level securitization has been slow to develop. The military sector has played a very minimal role in the security dynamic at the regional level. Interstate relations have been largely amicable and a lack of conflict between both neighbouring Islands and external powers has ensured that military cooperation has not developed as a feature of regional interaction. Traditionally the security focus of the Forum was to address threats that were "anti-colonial in nature such as French nuclear testing and New Caledonian decolonisation, or second-order matters such as natural disasters and environmental damage."³⁰² The broadening of the security agenda and the increasing realities of security interdependence has had an influential impact on the South Pacific and, more so than ever before, has demanded a regionally cohesive approach to potential sources of insecurity; namely, transnational crime and environmental degradation.

6.5.7 Transnational Crime

The South Pacific is plagued by weak and underdeveloped states whose economic infrastructures have continually struggled to cope with the creation of new global markets. Transnational business opportunities, both legal and illegal, have prospered as a result of globalization. It has been the combination of reduced national border restrictions with an increase in the mobility of goods, people, and services³⁰³ which has facilitated the expansion of business interactions throughout the

²⁹⁸ During 2000 the violence and civil unrest was particularly problematic in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji.

²⁹⁹ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Biketawa Declaration 2000*, 28 October 2000 [online] <<http://forum.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/biketawa-declaration/>> [accessed 21 September 2010].

³⁰⁰ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Forum Regional Security Committee*, [online] <<http://forum.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/forum-regional-security-committee-frsc/>> [accessed 25 July 2011].

³⁰¹ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Political Governance and Security*, [online] <<http://forum.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/security/>> [accessed 25 September 2011].

³⁰² Firth, 2001; 278.

³⁰³ Andreas Schloenhardt, 'Transnational Crime and Island State Security in the South Pacific.' In *Security in Oceania : in the 21st Century*, ed. Eric Shibuya and Jim Rolfe, (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2003), p. 171.

region and the world. However, the political and economic weakness of the Pacific islands has made the region particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of increased interactions and transnational crime has become a growing security concern. Resource and infrastructural limitations have ensured that individual states cannot cope with transnational crime in the absence of regional securitization. Consequently, the role of the PIF Secretariat has been paramount: the PIF has actively sought to formulate “best practice legislation, immigration and policing models for circulation and consideration,”³⁰⁴ as well as looking for ways to reduce aid and development funds being spent on unnecessary and overlapping programmes. The need for cooperative measures has been duly recognised at the regional level. The problem is, however, that border control has “often been hampered by a lack of high-technology equipment and accompanying infrastructure”³⁰⁵ and the endemic nature of corruption³⁰⁶ within the South Pacific has also served to inhibit and undermine the success of crime targeting regional initiatives.

6.5.8 Environmental Degradation

The securitization of threats from within the environmental sector has also featured prominently within the regional level security dynamic. The negative consequences of environmental degradation have the potential to have both an economic and societal effect which, in turn, becomes politicised. Furthermore, the threat that climate change poses to the South Pacific has become increasingly evident as rising sea levels threaten the destruction of complete islands and the potential displacement of entire island populations. The reality of rising sea levels will inevitably impact on the wider region and put pressure on both national governments and the PIF to facilitate the relocation of refugees and the mitigation of social and political issues that may ensue as a result. Regional level environmental action has been focused on via relevant Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP) agencies such as the intergovernmental organisation known as the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP).³⁰⁷ The focus has been on adaptive strategies, as opposed to counteractive strategies, and the implementation of regional level initiatives that assist island nations in best coping with the effects environmental security. Such initiatives have previously included “preparing roads for flooding in the Federated States of Micronesia; improving sea walls and drainage systems in the Cook Islands; and relocating gardens, planting salt-resistant crops and

³⁰⁴ Ralf Emmers, Beth Greener-Barcham, and Nicolas Thomas, ‘Institutional Arrangements to Counter Human Trafficking in the Asia Pacific’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 28, no. 3 (2006), p. 500.

³⁰⁵ Emmers et al, 2006: 493.

³⁰⁶ Elise Huffer, ‘Governance, Corruption, and Ethics in the Pacific’, *The Contemporary Pacific*, 17, no. 1 (2005), p. 118.

³⁰⁷ Secretariat of Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) [online] <<http://www.sprep.org/sprep/about.htm>> [accessed 21 September 2011].

reviving the fishing industry in Solomon Islands atolls.”³⁰⁸ Additionally, the PIF has repeatedly called on the international community to increasingly engage in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and to strengthen their commitment to the reduction of carbon emissions, the use of cleaner fuels, and the increased use of renewable energy resources.³⁰⁹ Nonetheless, and at both the regional and international level, the securitization of the environmental sector is highly politicised and a difficult area in which progress may be achieved.

6.5.9 Cross-comparison

The impact of decolonisation and state formation have seen Southeast Asia and the South Pacific share contextual commonalities that have resulted in similar patterns of securitization in regards to particular non-traditional threats and the avoidance of cooperation in regards to others. The political sector is typically perceived as the most dominant sector within the securitization dynamic at the regional level as, “in some sense, all security is political... politicization is political by definition, and, by extension, to securitize is a political act.”³¹⁰ It is the overspill quality of insecurity that is of critical relevance and the recognition of the fact that security threats in one sector inevitably impact on security in another. Consequently, and in combination with the political sector, additional sectors have been supplementary in the pursuit of regional securitization, but not necessarily in a distinguishable way. Arguably, the interplay between sectors has ensured that focusing on the threats themselves, as opposed to individual sectors, better highlights the role securitization plays in the dynamics of the RSC and what this may emphasize about the RSC itself. Both ASEAN and the PIF have followed similar processes of establishing a regional security architecture that is best suited to the securitization of particular types of threats: namely, those that can be focused on without compromising the territorial integrity and autonomy of its individual units. The evolution of which, perhaps, may be attributed more to the increasing depth of security interdependence within the RSC as opposed to an increased capacity of its member states to compromise national sovereignty in the pursuit of regional stability. However, the speech act, or “the process of staging something as an existential threat,”³¹¹ and the acknowledgement of a need for regional level securitization, in and of itself, is not enough. Similarities in the principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and the ‘Pacific Way’ have seen

³⁰⁸ “Rising Sea Levels Threaten Small Pacific Island Nations,” *The New York Times*, 3 May 2007, [online] <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/world/asia/03iht-pacific.2.5548184.html?pagewanted=all> [accessed 21 September 2011].

³⁰⁹ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Niue Declaration on Climate Change*, 19 August 2008 [online] <<http://forum.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/THE%20NIUE%20DECLARATION%20ON%20CLIMATE%20CHANGE.pdf>> [accessed 21 September 2011].

³¹⁰ Buzan et al, 1998; 141.

³¹¹ Senia Febrica, ‘Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the Various Responses of Singapore and Indonesia’, *Asian Survey*, 50, no. 3 (2010), p. 71.

securitization rhetoric occur, but with tangible results being stagnated and generally slow to develop.

Based on the premise that the 'virtuous cycle' of economic growth will lead to domestic stability and international security,³¹² both regions have placed economic cooperation high on the regional agenda. Economic cooperation, however, is a part of the process but not the subject of securitization itself. In Southeast Asia in particular, the 'economic-security nexus'³¹³ has provided an incentive for regional cooperation and, in the post-Cold War era, has contributed to the institutionalisation of formal regional arrangements.³¹⁴ A refreshed regional focus on economic security occurred as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, whereby region-wide economic collapse highlighted the need for a strengthened regional response to the repercussions of globalization and the increasing reality of economic interdependence. By the Seventh ARF meeting in July 2000, and with "the emergence of an Asia-only form of regional economic cooperation,"³¹⁵ the challenges and uncertainties posed by globalization became a prominent feature on the regional security agenda.³¹⁶ The relationship between non-traditional security threats affecting the region, such as terrorism and piracy, and their impact on the economic prosperity of its units has ensured that economic security is a significant feature of the security agenda, albeit its regional level relevance is mostly derived from the need to consolidate and expand the growth of ASEAN as a cohesive bloc so as to better enable the region to engage in the international system.

By contrast, economic security has played less of a successful and regionalizing role in the South Pacific, whereby economic regionalism has been highly politicised and vulnerable to the intractable security politics of the region. Regional economic pursuits have been hindered by a level of distrust stemming from a fear that larger states will highjack certain arrangements for their own nationalistic interest.³¹⁷ Furthermore, attempts to incorporate the South Pacific in the global free trade regime via initiatives such as the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries³¹⁸ and the

³¹² Nair, 2008; 121.

³¹³ The security-economic nexus as described by Nair is based on the logic that regional economic interdependence would render war implausible and would provide the benefits of stimulating domestic development and providing performance legitimacy for political regimes. (Nair, 2011; 250-1)

³¹⁴ Nair, 2011; 250-1.

³¹⁵ Hyun-Seok Yu, "Explaining the Emergence of New East Asian Regionalism: Beyond Power and Interest Based Approaches", *Asian Perspective*, 27, no. 1 (2003), p. 275. A renewed interest in interregional economic cooperation culminated in the formation of the Asian Monetary Fund.

³¹⁶ ASEAN Secretariat, *Politics and Security Overview*. Updated 2010, [online] <<http://www.asean.org/92.htm>> [accessed 10 November 2010].

³¹⁷ As previously mentioned, this has been the case in the Pacific with Fiji and its relationship to the USP and Air Pacific.

³¹⁸ ACP refers to the grouping of African, Caribbean and Pacific Island countries. 'The Cotonou Agreement' was produced by the Commission of European Communities in 2000. Negotiations and revisions about economic

Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) with Australia and New Zealand, have received a mixed reception and it has been argued that exposure to global competitiveness could potentially “undermine economies and exacerbate dependence on aid”³¹⁹ as well as have negative political implications.³²⁰

In both the South Pacific and Southeast Asia threats from within the societal sector have also failed to have a regionalizing effect and “no strong elements of interlocking societal fears are found at the scale of the region.”³²¹ Thus, and in comparison to other sectors, societal security issues have remained relevant more at the global or local-transnational level.³²² The global level element is derived from the extent to which ASEAN’s institutional framework is embedded in the ‘ASEAN Way’ and its own set of ‘Asia specific values’ and the way in which it provides an alternative ideological perspective to the typically “Western-dominated international agenda.”³²³ In a similar vein, the ‘Pacific Way’ has sought to reject traditional Western frameworks of institutionalism and to define itself on its own terms. With that said, the influence of Australia and New Zealand as central members of the PIF and significant regional aid donors has prevented an entirely non-western ideology taking hold.³²⁴ The relevance of the local-transnational level is derived from conflict between ethnic groups and minorities. This is particularly apparent with the Chinese population throughout Southeast Asia and the South Pacific in which the fear of the ‘Greater Chinese Empire’ has been the source of racially driven violence. Incidents of such conflict include the Sino-Malay race riots in Malaysia in 1969; the May 1998 riots in Indonesia;³²⁵ and anti-Chinese fuelled arson attacks in Mount Hagen, PNG.³²⁶ In addition, the ongoing and tumultuous relationship between native Fijians and Fijian-Indians has also highlighted the extent to which local-transnational conflict can be problematic within the societal sector.

cooperation have been ongoing since. European Commission, *EuropeAid: The Cotonou Agreement*. Updated 2011 [online] <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm [accessed 8 June 2011].

³¹⁹ Firth, 2001; 283.

³²⁰ Inevitably, initiatives would benefit larger members of the Forum, such as Fiji and Papua New Guinea, where regional initiatives have typically been based.

³²¹ Buzan et al, 1998; 134.

³²² Buzan et al, 1998; 134.

³²³ Buzan et al, 1998; 134.

³²⁴ Democratic values and good governance continue to maintain a central role in regional initiatives.

³²⁵ “Ethnic Chinese Tell of Mass Rape” *BBC News*, 23 June 1998, [online]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/indonesia/special_report/118576.stm [accessed 25 May 2011].

³²⁶ In Southeast Asia, anti-Chinese sentiments have been rife throughout the post-colonial history of both Indonesia and Malaysia. In the South Pacific anti-Chinese fuelled riots have occurred in Papua New Guinea, Tonga and the Solomon Islands in the past five years. “Chinese Targeted by PNG Rioters.” *BBC News*, 21 September 2007 [online] <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7006428.stm> [accessed 25 May 2011].

Regional level coordination is evident within both regions, albeit with particular types of threats eliciting more successful results than others. Mapping the types of threats that dominate the securitization agenda within each of the regions has highlighted the relationship between the complex and its securitization whereby the depth of interdependency within the RSC directly impacts on the securitization agenda. In the case of Southeast Asia, interdependency is the driving force behind security cooperation and securitization is motivated not by altruism, but by self-interest. National security needs, in regards to key non-traditional threats, cannot be met in the absence of regional cooperation and thus regional level securitization prevails predominantly out of necessity. The RSC of the South Pacific lacks the same intensity of interdependence that is present within the dynamic of its Southeast Asian counterpart. The threats facing the islands of the South Pacific may be shared by their neighbours but, notwithstanding growing concerns over transnational crime, they are not exacerbated directly by them. In some sense, the securitization agenda of the South Pacific is more socially constructed and thus slower to progress. The threats within the South Pacific lack the clear breaking point required to bridge the gap between policy and practice.

The interdependent security relationship between the units of the Southeast Asian RSC is far more distinct than that of the South Pacific. The extent to which both non-traditional and traditional security concerns threaten the region have a relatively direct impact, and a transnational effect, ensures that the consciousness of interdependence persists and facilitates regional coordination in the development of coping mechanisms. Nationalism and self-interest still prevail and will only be conceded when security cannot be attained at a national level. It is for this reason that maritime security, international terrorism and environmental degradation have been most successful, albeit success is relative and discrepancies between policy and practice will always exist. The South Pacific, by contrast, does not share the same depth of interdependency that has the capacity to generate its own necessity driven securitization agenda. The RSC of the South Pacific is not wholly autonomous and the regional dynamic is not derived entirely from within the region. The South Pacific is more susceptible to outside pressure and influence which, in turn, creates a securitization agenda that is not necessarily consistent with the needs perceived by those within the region itself. In sum, and as argued by Pacific expert Ron Crocombe, “more will be gained if Pacific Island countries decline current pressures for across-the-board closer integration among the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum and instead identify what degree of regional integration will provide the best solutions for their peoples for particular purposes and what region is the most appropriate for each purpose.”³²⁷

³²⁷ Ron Crocombe, ‘Regionalism Above and Below the Forum: The geographical/culture regions, Asia-Pacific and others’, In *Pacific Futures*, ed. Michael Powles (Canberra, Australia: Pandanus Books, 2006), pp. 195-196.

6.6 Dominant levels on which the dynamics of securitisation occur

Securitization can take place on one or more of four levels; global, interregional, regional, or domestic. The dominant level upon which securitization occurs is driven not by the origin of threat, but how the threat is targeted. In the process of securitization it is the actors, not the threat, that determine “who or what is defined as the (origin of) threats, and whom the actor targets in countermeasures.”³²⁸ In Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, the chains of interaction between actors is significantly higher on the regional level than the global, interregional or domestic and the regional level has been typically regarded as the best possible means through which securitization may be managed. The development of geographically coherent regional constructs and their attempt to mitigate security threats which are local, but transnational, are a direct reflection on the prominence of the regional level within the securitization dynamic.

6.6.1 The Securitization Dynamic of Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, the regional level enjoys a strong degree of autonomy and regional chains of interaction have emerged as being the core of the securitization dynamic. The prominence of the regional level within this dynamic is linked to the degree of security interdependence experienced by its units. In essence, distance matters and securitization within Southeast Asia targets threats that are more intensely felt within the complex than outside of it, and the region’s securitizing actors have maintained that the solutions to these problems can be achieved at the regional level. Consistent with this rationale, transnational crime represents a significant issue area “because it takes a network character, and much of its business is land-based, such as smuggling drugs, people, or arms across borders, and therefore distance matters – it is *ceteris paribus* easier over short than long distances.”³²⁹ Despite their global origin and impact, regional solutions have also been sought for security issues such as terrorism³³⁰ and piracy as regional level securitization in the form of law enforcement and border control coordination is regarded as the most manageable countermeasures approach.

Since its inception in 1994, the ARF has been the key forum for securitization based discussion. However, specific issue area meetings, such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on transnational crime (AMMTC), have also emerged. Created in 1997, the AMMTC meets every two years with an

³²⁸ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 462.

³²⁹ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 466.

³³⁰ Whilst terrorism has a long history in the region the securitization of terrorism has taken prominence since the incident known as the ‘2002 Bali Bombings’ in which three bombs were detonated outside several nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia. “Bali death toll set at 202”, *BBC News*. 19 February 2003, [online] <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2778923.stm>> [accessed 12 February 2011].

agenda of coordinating national authorities in an approach to target crimes such as terrorism, trafficking, money laundering and piracy.³³¹ Transnational crime is central to regional level securitization as in the absence of regional cooperation it is a security threat that cannot be counteracted.

Unequivocally, ASEAN centrality resides at the core of Southeast Asia's securitization dynamic. Who or what is defined as a threat, and the coping strategies that emerge as a result, are directly linked to the nature of the RSC and the web of security interdependence. Yet, and whilst the ongoing ethos of ASEAN has been 'regional solutions to regional problems', this is not to say that the global level plays no role. Major powers and international organisations are socialised into the framework under the terms and conditions determined by the specific issue area forums, but the impact of the international system on the decision making process has been intentionally minimalised by ASEAN itself. As a result, the United Nations, for example, has played a minimal role in the region's pursuits of securitization and suggested help has been quietly rejected. For example, in 2007 the United Nations Department of Political Affairs "proposed the establishment of a regional office in Singapore – this proposal would have given the DPA a regional platform from which to build states' mediation and dialogue capacity and promote collective responses to regional security challenges."³³² However, this initiative was rejected by regional actors and the UN's engagement continues to be restricted.³³³

The prominence of the regional level in the dynamics of securitization is paramount, albeit there has been a steady increase in securitization at the interregional level. The development of the EAS and the expansion of the ADMM to ADMM – Plus³³⁴ have substantially widened the partners with which ASEAN states are willing to talk about regional security issues. Whilst regionalism within the Asia-Pacific is looser and less intertwined than that of Southeast Asia itself, the ADMM-Plus is still gaining momentum as a platform for Asian and Pacific countries to discuss common transnational security issues. The establishment of the ADMM-Plus has received positive attention and highlighted

³³¹ ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime*, 20 December 1997 [online] <<http://www.asean.org/5640.htm>> [accessed 10 June 2011].

³³² Wainwright, 2010; 15.

³³³ Wainwright (2010) argues that "the UN's circumscribed role can be attributed in part to the importance in the region of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference... a posture influenced by still-potent memories of colonialism." (p. 15)

³³⁴ This refers to the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting plus an additional eight dialogue partners. Namely, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, India, South Korea, Russia and the United States. ASEAN Secretariat, *ADMM Plus Championing Peace, Stability and Understanding*, 11 October 2010. [online] <<http://www.asean.org/25303.htm>> [accessed 25 February 2011].

ASEAN's growing acknowledgement of the role that extra- regional powers can play in the mitigation of non-traditional security threats.³³⁵

6.6.2 The Securitization Dynamic of the South Pacific

The chains of interaction in regard to securitization are also at their most prominent at the regional level in the South Pacific. In a similar fashion to Southeast Asia, and as expressed by the Forum's Secretary General of the Secretariat, Tuiloma Neroni Slade, "a myriad of serious cross-border and trans-national crimes, compounded by devastating impacts of the global financial and economic crisis, including climate change and natural disasters, add to complications and challenges for our region."³³⁶ These concerns represent security threats that are best managed at the regional level. Since its transformation from the South Pacific Forum to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000, the PIF has fashioned itself as an arena for South Pacific securitization. As previously noted, Forum initiatives such as the 2000 Biketawa Declaration and, most recently, the 2005 Pacific Plan are a direct reflection of regional level securitization and highlight the prominence of regional approaches to threat management regardless of the threat's origin; be it governance at the domestic level or climate change at the international level.

The regional securitization dynamics of the South Pacific are not wholly autonomous and, unlike ASEAN, the PIF does not have the capacity to insulate the regional level from the effects of the global level. The South Pacific is extremely vulnerable to shifting dynamics in the international system and the reality of this has become increasingly apparent as the South Pacific has begun to emerge as a strategically relevant area in the current global level interplay between China and the United States. China and the US have been increasingly vying for closer alignment with states in the Asia-Pacific and over the past two decades China has progressively increased its ties throughout the Pacific establishing diplomatic relations with eight (of the fourteen) member-states of the Pacific Islands Forum.³³⁷ In a similar vein, the United States has more overtly sought to make its desire to re-engage in the Asia-Pacific region known. After officially announcing its renewed military ties with New Zealand late in 2010, the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, went on to announce that the US is

³³⁵ ASEAN Secretariat, *ADMM Plus Championing Peace, Stability and Understanding*, 11 October 2010, [online] <<http://www.asean.org/25303.htm>> [accessed 25 February 2011].

³³⁶ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) 20th meeting*, 5 May 2010, [online] <<http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/press-statements/2010/forum-regional-security-committee-20th-meeting.html?printerfriendly=true>> [accessed 16 May 2011].

³³⁷ "Beijing's embrace spreads irresistibly across the Pacific", *The New Zealand Herald*. 16 April 2011 [online] <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10719607> [accessed 16 April 2011].

to establish a USAID base in support of the Pacific islands located in Fiji.³³⁸ Given Fiji's current suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum this represented an extremely bold move on behalf of the US and reflects Fiji's centrality in the region despite its domestic political situation.

In the South Pacific, environmental security concerns mark an overlapping area of securitization integrating both the international and regional level. In the South Pacific, and whilst a majority of securitization is outlined on a regional level, economic incapacity ensures that some issues such as the effects of climate change are securitized at the international level. Climate change, for example, is an existential threat that can displace and destroy entire islands and this cannot be confronted strictly on a regional level. In fact, for the majority of the Asia-Pacific climate change is increasingly becoming an imminent concern and "is now expected to have major geostrategic implications, such as destabilization of state governments, the fuelling of terrorism, and the mass movement of refugees and internally displaced persons."³³⁹

6.7 The stability of the essential structure, potential sources of instability, patterns of interregional interaction and the probability of external transformation

Having celebrated over forty years of existence, ASEAN has emerged as the centralizing figure driving the stability of Southeast Asia's essential structure. All key variables of the essential structure have proven to be stable and have remained relatively unchanged over the previous two decades. In fact, and notwithstanding recent tension between Thailand and Cambodia over the area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple, Southeast Asia "has never been more stable and free of conflict."³⁴⁰ By contrast, the South Pacific's transformation from unstructured region to a nascent regional security complex is still too incomplete and weak to be considered stable. The dynamics that drive the RSC of the South Pacific are underdeveloped at the regional level and are vulnerable to internal and external influences. The PIF does represent a source of regional order but, unlike ASEAN, it does not have the capacity to control the variables determining the region's essential structure.

6.7.1 Stability of the Essential Structure – Cross-Comparison

Southeast Asia's essential structure emerged from the conflictual process of decolonisation and despite initially being characterised by conflict and rivalry, regional patterns of interaction are now largely amicable. Furthermore, the transnational nature of the region's security concerns has

³³⁸ "US Chooses Fiji for aid base in the Pacific despite dictatorship", *The New Zealand Herald*, 3 November 2010 [online] <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10684960> [accessed 10 November 2010].

³³⁹ Wainwright, 2010; 11.

³⁴⁰ Bitzinger, 2010; 61.

ensured that the transformation from conflict to cooperation is steady as individual state's security cannot be achieved in the absence of regional cooperation.

Regardless of ASEAN's progress since 1967, the capacity of Southeast Asia's regional framework to make measurable progress towards the mitigation of security threats at the regional level remains tentative. The essential structure of region is currently stable, albeit the variables underpinning regional stability are not fixed and patterns of amity are reversible. The overall dynamic of the region is stable, yet small ongoing issues within each element of the essential structure leave some ambiguity over how superficial this stability may be. ASEAN's inability to confront the ongoing structural issues and pursue actual policy outcomes is a significant functional flaw and is regarded as one of "too much redundancy, and too much architecture that does nothing at all."³⁴¹ Criticisms over functionality have given rise to two key questions regarding Asia's institutional architecture: why is there no regional multilateral security organisation and why do Asia's institutions remain 'soft'? The omission of these elements in its regional security architecture is a significant impediment to the stability of the structure and the biggest hindrance to further evolution.³⁴²

The stability of the South Pacific's essential structure is even more difficult to assure. In Southeast Asia the level of security interdependence is intense enough to ensure that certain variables will remain unchanged. The rising concern of transnational crime and the role of economic cooperation in the pursuit of regional security and stability guarantees that amicable relations will continue. The South Pacific, however, does not share this same intertwined intensity and as a result is more vulnerable to disruption and slower functionality.

6.7.2 Territorial disputes as a Source of Structural Instability

Ongoing territorial disputes within both regions highlight the weaknesses in relationships between neighbouring units and the extent to which traditional issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty still come into play and are a source of instability.

In the South Pacific, a diplomatic dispute between Tonga and Fiji over territorial ownership of the Minerva reefs has been an ongoing issue that resurfaced in 2009 and remains unresolved in 2011. Tonga's ownership dates back to its claim of the reefs in 1972, in which Tonga then established a lighthouse and began maintaining patrolling of the area. In late 2009, Fiji claimed the reefs as their own and as a sign of clout sent naval ships to destroy navigation lights and to chase away passing

³⁴¹ Evan Feigenbaum, 'America is being left behind in Asia,' *East Asia Forum*, 4 August 2010 [online] <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/04/america-is-being-left-behind-in-asia/>> [accessed 3 Dec 2010].

³⁴² Hill, 2009; 70.

yachts.³⁴³ The implications of such a dispute are yet to be ascertained, but what this incident highlights is that despite the South Pacific's history of amicable relations potential flashpoints do exist and have the capacity to compromise positive regional dynamics.³⁴⁴

In Southeast Asia, "bilateral geopolitical disputes exist almost across the entire spectrum of states in Southeast Asia, and include both territorial and resource disputes."³⁴⁵ Significantly, in the past decade, it has been Indochina that has been particularly problematic.³⁴⁶ The 2008 Thai-Cambodia border crisis³⁴⁷ marks a significant conflict "in which the UNESCO World Heritage listing of the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia rekindled Thai contestation of the Temple and its nearby border."³⁴⁸ Other significant and ongoing territorial disputes include "the islands and waters of the South China Sea which are contested by the Southeast Asian states of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as by China and Taiwan,"³⁴⁹ as well as conflict over "the energy-rich Gulf of Thailand, contested by Thailand and Vietnam; and the Ambalat maritime area, over which ongoing Indonesian-Malaysian tensions heightened [in 2009] with Indonesia accusing Malaysia of a naval incursion into its waters."³⁵⁰ Lastly, the utilisation of the Mekong River has been a source of tension between the mainland ASEAN member states. In order to better manage these tensions, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was established in 1995 and comprises Thailand, Cambodia, Laos PDR, and Vietnam.³⁵¹ However, in spite of an established forum for joint decisions, tensions continue to persist as Laotian officials propose the construction of a Hydro dam at Xayaburi without fellow MRC member support.³⁵²

³⁴³ 'PAC:Ownership feud over Pacific Minerva reefs.' *AAP General News Wire*, 31 March 2011 [online] from Academic Research Library: document ID: 2308260351. [accessed May 18, 2011].

³⁴⁴ 'Warships square off in Pacific Feud,' *Sunday Star Times*, 12 June 2011, [online] <<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/5132572/Warships-square-off-in-Pacific-feud>> [accessed 12 June 2011].

³⁴⁵ Bernard Fook Weng Loo, 'Transforming the Strategic Landscape of Southeast Asia,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 27, no. 3 (2005), p. 423.

³⁴⁶ Bilateral disputes within the maritime Southeast Asia sub-region have been resolved peacefully. In 2002 Indonesia and Malaysia decided to resolve their conflict over Pulau Sipadan and Ligitan peacefully. Also, in the pursuit of a lasting resolution, the 29-year territorial dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca was submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2003. In 2008 the dispute ended as full sovereignty of the islet was granted to Singapore. "Court Awards Islet to Singapore", *BBC News*, 23 May 2008 [online] <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7416473.stm>> [accessed 31 May 2011].

³⁴⁷ This dispute has persisted and peaked in 2011 with observers suggesting that this incident could break ASEAN's 44 year streak of being free from major inter-state conflict. Pou Sothirak, 'ASEAN Needs New Ways to Resolve Disputes,' *Institute of Southeast Asia Studies (ISEAS)*, 28 May 2011 [online] <<http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/?p=3770>> [accessed 28 May 2011].

³⁴⁸ "Thai-Cambodia clashes damage Preah Vihear Temple," *BBC News*, 6 February 2011 [online] <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12377626>> [accessed 21 April 2011].

³⁴⁹ Wainwright, 2010; 10.

³⁵⁰ Wainwright, 2010; 10.

³⁵¹ Mekong River Commission, [online] <<http://www.mrcmekong.org/>> [accessed 21 April 2011].

³⁵² "Laos defies neighbours to start dam work." *The New Zealand Herald*. 21 April 2011 [online] <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10720676> [accessed 21 April 2011];

6.7.3 The Potential for Internal Transformation

Both regions have similar potential for internal transformation. Although former sources of domestic instability, such as Timor-Leste and the provinces of Aceh in Indonesia and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea “are in the consolidating phase after their respective conflicts,”³⁵³ many internal and volatile conflicts within various countries continue to simmer and remain unresolved. Conflict within Myanmar, Fiji, Southern Thailand, Mindanao in the Philippines and Papua in Indonesia are all in a phase of questionable stability as separatist insurgencies, fuelled by the intensity of their enduring grievances, seek to change the political status quo in their respective countries. These grievances are deeply internalised, have an ethnic or religious dimension and span a variety of societal issues, namely: representation, access to resource-derived revenues, and employment opportunities.

These internal disputes mark flashpoints within each region and have the capacity to alter the dynamics of the RSC and lead to internal transformation. The way in which individual countries cope with their internal security concerns is relevant beyond the individual country itself as these actions reflect on the units of the RSC and the effectiveness of its institutional framework. Despite the ethos of non-intervention in both ASEAN and the PIF, human security concerns are playing an increasingly significant role in the relationship between the organisational body and its members. Fiji’s expulsion from the PIF in 2009 represents one such incident as human security took priority over Forum solidarity. Fiji’s expulsion has led to a minor internal transformation in the region in which polarity has become more balanced but patterns of enmity have increased. In a similar vein, ASEAN’s open condemnation of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 marked a minor internal transformation in ASEAN’s history as it represented progress towards acknowledging sensitive security issues that had previously been brushed aside.³⁵⁴

6.7.4 Interregional Interaction and the Probability of External Transformation

The evolution of Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture has been the most successful in the developing world and “attempts at regional cooperation elsewhere... notably Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, have not fared any better, and in most cases have lagged further behind.”³⁵⁵ ASEAN involvement in this process has been critical and ASEAN has established a level of credibility in East Asia as well as on the international level. As a result, ASEAN’s capacity to drive interregional

and “No decision on Mekong Xayaburi dam project”. *BBC News*, 20 April 2011
<<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/13125556>> [accessed 21 April 2011].

³⁵³ Wainwright, 2010; 8.

³⁵⁴ Albeit this differed to Fiji’s expulsion as neither Cambodia nor Vietnam were active members of ASEAN at the time of the incident and the situation thus did not constitute a breach of the ASEAN value of non-interference.

³⁵⁵ Hill, 2009; 70.

interaction has strengthened and continues to raise questions about the viability of an external transformation. Possible scenarios for external transformation of the region include: the Asia-Pacific region being more interdependently linked into the core of the complex;³⁵⁶ the merging of the three Asian sub-complexes into an Asian supercomplex; and also the potential for the Asia-Pacific, with the inclusion of the South Pacific, transforming into a complex in and of itself. Buzan argues that an external transformation, whilst rare and difficult, is possible and that “alterations in the processes of (de)securitisation”³⁵⁷ can lead to complex boundary changes and vice versa. The increasing strength of the Asia-Pacific multilateral security architecture, with ASEAN at the core, has shown signs of growth, stability and solidifying its hold on the region. In the past decade, with the ARF, EAS, ADMM-Plus, this stability has been evolving outwards³⁵⁸ and there is a distinct possibility that this will continue to develop and strengthen.

China’s expanding influence into the regional dynamics of both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is an important variable in the development of an Asia-Pacific complex. The economic and geostrategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region has accelerated in the past several decades and this has served to strengthen the interdependence between the wider region’s diverse and geographically fragmented units. In Southeast Asia this has led to significant cooperation between China and ASEAN in response to non-traditional security concerns.³⁵⁹ However, and if this trend were to lead to a tightly interlinked supercomplex, several variables must be considered, namely: the competitive or complementary actions of China and the United States and, to some degree, the role of India and Japan. There is now a significant focus on China and India as they “both compete for energy markets, diplomatic influence and naval access”³⁶⁰ within Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape is of central importance as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea are strategically vital and the former is the pathway through which an estimated 30 per cent of world trade travels every year.³⁶¹ Furthermore, maritime disputes between China and other Southeast Asian claimants in regards to the Spratly islands, in addition to disputes with Japan, have also impacted on the wider geopolitical landscape of the region. Needless to say, and although the scenarios for Asia’s transformation are relatively narrow, “it remains the case that the two crucial

³⁵⁶ Whilst ASEAN does actively engage with the Asia-Pacific the same level of interdependence does not exist. The development of an Asia-Pacific complex (as opposed to just a region) would see Australia and New Zealand become more interlinked within the security dynamic as necessary, not optional, features.

³⁵⁷ Buzan and Waeber, 2003; 478.

³⁵⁸ *Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), Regional Security Outlook: CRSO 2011*, [online] <<http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CRSO/CRSO%202011.pdf>> (accessed 27 April 2011).

³⁵⁹ David Arase, ‘Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation: The Institutionalization of Regional Security Cooperation and the Evolution of East Asian Regionalism’, *Asian Survey*, 50, no. 4 (2010), p. 810.

³⁶⁰ Wainwright, 2010; 6.

³⁶¹ Khalid, 2009; 425.

variables on which the future of Asian security depends – China and the USA – are fundamentally indeterminate.”³⁶²

6.8 Historical patterns of development: the influence of history and the legacy of state formation.

6.8.1 Influence of History and the Legacy of State Formation

There is no doubt that the legacy of history matters in the construction of RSCs and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific are two cases in point. In both regions the influence of history has had a twofold effect. First, on the domestic level, state formation amidst the climate of decolonisation has negatively impacted on the establishment of civil society and political structuring. This legacy has resulted in a significant number of internal conflicts in both regions on the basis that territorial boundaries were arbitrarily defined by former colonial powers and, furthermore, the impact of the Cold War saw both regions have little control over determining the initial structure of their regional order. Second, on a regional level, the historical context has resulted in an “inbuilt resistance to action and institutional reform.”³⁶³ National sovereignty has remained paramount on the agenda of states within both complexes and has severely hindered the successful mitigation of transnational security issues which require compromise over issues of autonomy and sovereignty.

A significant portion of states within Southeast Asia and the South Pacific are weak states. State formation within the historical context of both regions has seen that, whilst state structures in some cases may be strong and seemingly legitimate, much of the ‘idea’ of the state is lacking. In the process of state formation there has been a discrepancy between what the state and nation represent and as a result societies have been divided along ethnic or religious lines and civil/political unrest has ensued. Prominent examples include: religion driven violence in the outer provinces of Indonesia; separatist violence in Mindanao, Southern Philippines; ethnic separatist violence in Southern Thailand; ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea; and ethnically driven political conflict in Fiji which has resulted in three coups since the country’s independence. All of these instances exemplify internal groups fighting for self-determination and an alternative ‘idea’ of the state.

Southeast Asia and the South Pacific have both suffered from the legacy of their history. However, Southeast Asia, assisted by its vast economic growth, has managed to push beyond its historical baggage and formulate an institutional framework with ideals that help work around its conflictual history. By contrast, the South Pacific is still burdened by its legacy and history. The South Pacific is

³⁶² Buzan and Waever, 2003; 177.

³⁶³ Emmers, 2002; 1.

dominated entirely by weak states and this continues to influence the character and the weakness of its RSC.

6.8.2 Common Historical Patterns of Development

Both regions have had similar experiences in the history of their development, albeit Southeast Asia's experiences have been significantly more intense than the South Pacific's. Both regions emerged as clusters of fragile post-colonial states that had shared security needs and concerns, but also historical antagonistic relations which made their interdependent needs difficult to manage. Domestic constraints, as well as external ones relating to the impact of the Cold War, limited the ability of both to establish a locally driven regional order and sense of regional identity.

A significant commonality in the historical development of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is that they have had to simultaneously endure the formation of state structures as well as regional structures. Institutionalism, as a result, has been slow, has lacked a legal personality and has placed individual autonomy and sovereignty at the centre of its ethos. It is no accident that security communities have flourished in areas comprised of post-modern and industrially advanced states such as Europe where state structures were already well defined.

Whilst the pattern and variables for development have been similar between the two regions it has been the economic element that has seen Southeast Asia flourish and truly take hold of its regional security environment.

6.9 The interplay between the global and regional level dynamic and the end of the Cold War

6.9.1 The Relationship between Global and Regional Level Dynamic

The relationship between the global and the regional dynamic differs for both regions. ASEAN has a strong command on the dynamics of Southeast Asia and has the capacity to influence the engagement of outside actors. Consequently, the global level does not alter the inner dynamic of the region, the regional level maintains relative autonomy and the global level merely supplements its dynamic. A source of potential disruption is the rise of China and its encroaching claims on the South China Sea as this, coupled with the re-engagement of the United States in the region, could see ASEAN's control waver if the U.S-China dynamic becomes one of rivalry in Southeast Asia and ASEAN gets dragged into the competition. In order for ASEAN to retain control of the region the United States needs to be integrated into the region as an equalizer and not a balancer. All regional units will benefit from a cooperative global power dynamic and not a competitive one.

The South Pacific, by contrast, does not have the economic autonomy or the institutional strength to disaggregate the regional level dynamic from the global level: whereby the South Pacific relies heavily on outsider attention for aid packages, business investment and resources and is willing to welcome global level dynamics playing out within the region. Chinese influence in the region has steadily increased in the past two decades and China has become a valuable aid and loan donor for many Pacific Island nations. In particular, Chinese companies have taken a keen interest in investing in Pacific resources such as timber, fish and minerals.³⁶⁴

6.9.2 Lessons from the End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War has markedly changed the shape and scope of security studies; particularly in regards to security in the Third World. The widening and deepening of security has facilitated a broader analysis of what constitutes security and what is required to attain it. Both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific exemplify the need to look beyond traditional perspectives on security. Within both regions, non-military threats threaten both domestic and regional security regime survival more so than traditional threats.

The end of the Cold War has seen the role of economic prosperity become an important factor in the security equation. The more politically fragile the state the more it is limited in its capacities and depends on economic growth for legitimacy; thereby the relationship between economic and internal stability and political legitimacy is heightened. The crucial lesson learnt from this change is how binding economic security can be on a regional level. Cooperation-centred 'prosper-with-thy-neighbour' logic is driven by self-interest, not altruism, and this ensures compliance to institutional rules and norms more so than a common ideational philosophy. As Buzan argues, "economic factors do play a role in determining both the power of states within their local complex, and their domestic instability and cohesion as actors. They may also play an important role in motivating the patterns of external interest in the local complex... and they can affect the prospects for regional integration, which can influence how a given security complex evolves."³⁶⁵

³⁶⁴ "Beijing's embrace spreads irresistibly across the Pacific," *The New Zealand Herald*, 16 April 2011 [online] <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10719607> [accessed 24th April 2011].

³⁶⁵ Buzan, 1991; 201 – 2.

Chapter Seven - Conclusion

The end of the Cold War marks a significant turning point in the role of regionalism and regional security arrangements in the study of International Relations. Proponents of the regionalist perspective have sought to highlight the existence of regional subsystems which are not only autonomous from the global system, but are unique and embody the distinctive relationship between the geographical proximity of its units and the nature of their security. The regional level occupies a space between the level of the state and the international system and, on the basis of proximity and shared historical and geographical roots, regional subsystems encapsulate an exclusive regional dynamic derived from balance of power relations and patterns of amity and enmity of its units.³⁶⁶

So as to map the relationship between regional clusters of states and their pursuit of security, Buzan and Waever offer the idea that the security of states in close geographical proximity to each other has a tendency to be linked sufficiently close together that their security environment cannot be considered in isolation from one another. The term 'regional security complex' has been coined by Buzan and Waever and is used to describe "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one another."³⁶⁷ The purpose of RSCT is to offer a conceptual framework that accounts for the centrality of geographical variables. The analysis of RSCs as regional substructures helps to highlight how territorially based security dynamics can account for patterns of behaviour within a regional context and provide a more beneficial understanding of its origin; be it conflict or cooperation. RSCT stresses that, in spite of modern advancements in technology and transportation, the interplay between anarchy and geography remains paramount and a distinctive web of security interdependence facilitates the emergence of a regionally coherent subsystem.

The existence of a RSC is not arbitrarily defined, nor is its presence fixed, and depending on the configuration of its units it can take on many different forms. RSCT offers four variables which embody the essential structure of a RSC and determines its particular type: ranging from conflict formation, security regime to security community, and standard to centred. Whilst different forms of RSCs may exist, one factor remains consistent: overlapping security concerns are more intensely felt between those within the complex than those outside. Subsequently, and in order for states to successfully combat the threats experienced across a wider region, durable stability and security is

³⁶⁶ Khatchik der Ghoukassian, 'Instability in the New Imperial Periphery: A Conceptual Perspective of the "Turbulent Frontiers" in the Caucasus and Central Asia', *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 2, no. 3 (2008), p. 151.

³⁶⁷ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 44.

only achievable through some form of cooperation and coordination by all actors; insofar that threats cannot be wholly mitigated unless all securitizing actors approach the issue in an organised and harmonized manner. In the post-Cold War era, regionalism has emerged as a mechanism for coping with regional patterns of security. The broadening of the security agenda has also acknowledged the increasingly transnational nature of security threats, in which the facilitation of peace and security hinge on coordination within a regional context. The rise of regionalism has resulted in the prevalence of multilateral institution building at the regional level throughout the world, albeit in different forms and with varied success.

The purpose of RSCT is to provide a theoretical framework that highlights the distinct structural nature of individual regional spaces, thereby enabling the identification of mutually exclusive constructs and the processes responsible for altering the dynamics within its geopolitical context. Buzan and Waever suggest that the existence of RSCs rests on four particular variables: boundary, anarchic structure, polarity and social construction. Furthermore, in the absence of satisfying these variables, a regional space may be deemed unstructured, whereby the security interactions are so weak that no regional structure exists. Buzan and Waever suggest that the South Pacific represents a prototypical example of an unstructured region and, as a result, the goal of this thesis has been to explore the extent to which this statement holds true. The aim of this thesis has been twofold: first, to question and analyse the extent to which the dynamics of essential structure of the South Pacific are too weak to classify it as a RSC and, second to cross-compare the regional spaces of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and show what any differences may indicate about the complexes themselves.

The contrasting roles of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific in RSCT literature make this cross-comparison valuable. Southeast Asia has typically been regarded as a representation of a prototypical RSC and the evolution of ASEAN has been hailed as one of the most successful pursuits of non-western regionalism. The South Pacific, by comparison, is a relatively new interest area. Contextual commonalities across both regions has ensured that a strong basis for cross-comparison exists as both are comprised of traditionally non-western nation-states whom, due to decolonisation and Cold War overlay, have suffered from the effects of history and the legacy of state formation. As a result, regional level cooperation has emerged as a representation of regional self-determination and as a means of facilitating peace and security, and regionalism has flourished.

A significant finding that has challenged the researcher's pre-existing view has been that although the South Pacific has a lengthy history of regionalism, regionalism has not been established in a way that is fully compatible with the history and culture of the region and, as a result, has led to its

stagnated evolution. The South Pacific is a unique regional space. The majority of the units within region are now independent, with a strong sense of their own Pacific ideals and regionalizing beliefs about what it will take to develop the 'extended Pacific family.' The South Pacific, however, lacks the mutual exclusivity required of a RSC to develop the dynamics of a regional construct that is derived entirely from within the region. The perpetual political and economic weakness of its units ensures that the region is still very heavily indebted to New Zealand and Australia, as funding and infrastructural limitations ensure that regional needs cannot be met from within the region. The extent to which both New Zealand and Australia are a part of the region, but who have the capacity to disengage, distorts the conceptualisation of the region's current structure. The boundary of the region and its polarity remain ambiguous. Regionalism in the South Pacific, in many respects, has been forced and is not necessarily congruent with island practices and beliefs. Instead, it is more aligned with Western perceptions of how regional security and stability may be achieved. It is difficult to say what evolutionary path South Pacific regionalism, and the Pacific Islands Forum, may have taken in the complete absence of outside influence.

This, however, is not to detract from the contribution the PIF has made to developing a sense of regional cohesion. The evolution of the Forum from the SPC to the PIF has been a fundamental step in the transformation of the region and, in many regards, represents the decolonisation of South Pacific regionalism and an affirmation of Pacific Islands' sovereignty. The South Pacific is unique insofar that regionalism and the establishment of the PIF has grown to symbolise the independence and autonomy of South Pacific regionalism from colonial and neo-colonial influences. Conversely, regionalism typically represents a compromise between the units within a RSC. Regionalism has continued as a means of asserting the self-determination of the Pacific Islands, more so than as a means of counteracting regional interdependence. New Zealand and Australia continue to maintain an important role in the regional dynamic. They do not, however, maintain a definitive role.

Nonetheless, and as Greg Fry argues, "because the term 'regionalism' has become something of a mantra for solving problems beyond the national level, and the Pacific Islands Forum was the model and the paramount decision-making body, probably more reliance has been focused at that level than has been justified."³⁶⁸ As such, the latest PIF initiative, the Pacific Plan, is still experiencing significant challenges five years on, and whether it has been a success is still difficult to ascertain.

A further significant finding has been the extent to which the rhetoric and fanfare surrounding ASEAN initiatives has not necessarily been consistent with policy outcomes. The evolution of regionalism has significantly changed the shape of Southeast Asia, and conflict between states is

³⁶⁸ Crocombe, 2006; 202.

now minimal and reserved. In reality, however, the securitization of threats has been extremely slow and national self-interest still largely prevails. Only certain issues, namely those that have emerged as being increasingly imminent existential threats, have been successfully elevated to the level of regional securitization and other concerns, which are sensitive and/or interlinked more with internal domestic issues, have typically been avoided. The Southeast Asian RSC, however, is so intensely developed that the security cooperation between its units will continue to dominate the regional dynamic irrespective of its complications. The key obstacles facing Southeast Asian regionalism will be for ASEAN to sustain its centrality in spite of the expanding security architecture and the extent to which ASEAN can reconcile the geographical caveat in the conceptualisation of the region that is represented by the absence of Timor-Leste as a full member of ASEAN.

Both regions share a contextual commonality in that “since the end of the Cold War, low-level violence has been the prevailing type of conflict...[and] this has arguably contributed to the fragmented nature of conflict prevention in the region.”³⁶⁹ Regionalism, in spite its contribution to harmonizing relations, has not provided a framework for coping with internal conflicts that permeate the regional level. Internal sources of insecurity have been dealt with in an ad hoc fashion and on a case by case basis: typically because outside sources have demanded some form of action from their respective regional institution. The evolutionary stagnation of both regional institutions rests with the fact that nationalism and self-preservation are paramount. The implementation of securitization is only as valuable as the sum of its parts, and the extent to which not all members are committed to bridging the gap between policy and practice is a fundamental problem.

Lastly, this cross-comparison has highlighted that whilst both regions share similar commonalities and lengthy histories of regionalism, the underlying foundation of regional cooperation has varied significantly. This has resulted in Southeast Asia’s transformation being significantly more apparent than that of the South Pacific. In the case of Southeast Asia, the intensity of interdependence has ensured that regionalism has emerged as the by-product of a deep RSC. Thus, limiting competition and conflict has been a fundamental and functional necessity. By contrast, in the South Pacific competition and conflict at the regional level, and between states, has been far less problematic than internal conflict between tribes or ethnicities within states. South Pacific regionalism did not initially emerge as an indication of a distinct regional dynamic, and it was not until 1999 with the transformation of the SPC to the PIF that regionalism grew to symbolise regional self-determination. The process of regionalism has occurred out of necessity in some regards, but also out of desire. As a result, the regional level is not wholly autonomous like its Southeast Asian counterpart and the

³⁶⁹ Wainwright, 2010; 7.

regional dynamic is easily impinged on and subject to the imposition of outside beliefs and standards.³⁷⁰

It has become apparent that a main area for further development is the conceptualisation of the 'Asia-Pacific' as a region and an analysis of its growing role in international relations. Asian influences in the South Pacific have steadily risen over the last decade and the potential for an external transformation that will see a stronger and wider regional dynamic emerge is a possible, albeit distant, reality. Arguably, "the Asia Pacific region is fast becoming a core area, if not the core area, in the international system. A new regional architecture is required to help frame the cooperation with the Asia-Pacific core as well as shape regional strategies towards global issues."³⁷¹ The rise of China and its capacity to exacerbate "dramatic shifts in regional power dynamics"³⁷² will, inevitably, create new uncertainties. The impact of growing Chinese influence has already been felt throughout the South Pacific and Southeast Asia and, in the wake of renewed American engagement,³⁷³ the Asia-Pacific area may, once again, prove to be the theatre for global power rivalry.

In conclusion, and as has been posited in this thesis, the importance of the regional level in the post-Cold War era is unparalleled. Regionalism and multilateral institution building has become a significant feature of interstate patterns of interaction and have paved the way for highlighting both the prominence of regionally coherent security dynamics, and also the need for cooperation in the pursuit of stability and security. The South Pacific has made significant progress in asserting the self-determination of its regional construct. The kinship and cooperation present at the regional level through its preeminent institution, the PIF, is undeniable. However, the web of interdependence that links its units together in an intense and pragmatic way is lacking. The South Pacific is, at best, a very weak form of security complex.

The most significant contribution made by this thesis is it's the unique application of RSCT to the dynamics of the South Pacific. This has helped to highlight formative issues in the establishment of South Pacific regionalism and the extent to which the region's ambiguous positioning on the RSC spectrum has impinged on its ability to obtain regional stability and security. Arguably, a distinct regional security architecture does exist and elements of interdependence do bind the fate of its

³⁷⁰ The extent to which Fiji would have been suspended from the PIF in the absence of pressure from both New Zealand and Australia, and outside of the region, is debatable.

³⁷¹ Hadi Soesastro, 'Architectural Momentum in Asia and the Pacific', *East Asian Forum, CISI*, Jakarta, 14 June 2009 [online] <www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/14/architectural-momentum-in-asia-and-the-pacific/> [accessed 12 August 2010].

³⁷² Wainwright, 2010; 6.

³⁷³ In terms of the US countering growing Chinese influence by gaining admission into the EAS, and with the establishment of a US aid hub in Fiji.

units together. This is to say that the South Pacific is not entirely unstructured, and on a superficial level the region may sufficiently fulfil the requirements of the essential structure of a RSC. In reality, however, the regional level is not entirely responsible for its own security dynamic. The South Pacific fails to meet the most fundamental feature of a RSC: that the regional dynamic is “substantially self-contained not in the sense of being totally free-standing, but rather in possessing a security dynamic that would exist even if other actors did not impinge on it.”³⁷⁴

³⁷⁴ Buzan and Waever, 2003; 47.

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