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How is teacher evaluation policy enacted?
— The workings of performativity and micro-politics in Japanese schools —

A thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Education
at
The University of Waikato
by
Masaaki Katsuno

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Statement of Intellectual Ownership

This thesis is my own original work. The thesis does not exceed 100,000 words.

Publication deriving from the Thesis

Part of the thesis has been published in the form of:

This thesis is concerned with the extent to which new teacher evaluation policies and practices in Japan are about controlling teachers or represent opportunities for authentic professional development. It seeks to examine how the new teacher evaluation policies are embedded within the wider policy formation, what perspectives teachers have on the new policies and what their experiences are, and how the new teacher evaluation policies are actually being enacted in schools.

The thesis uses a range of methods to explore these concerns. For the purpose of macro analysis of the new teacher evaluation policies, it examines both primary and secondary documentation around policy development. For studying the impact of the policy in schools, it draws on data from a national survey and in-depth interviews with a sample of teachers and head teachers. In this way, it employs a mixed methods approach in which quantitative data is used to provide a general picture of how teachers experience and perceive the new teacher evaluation policies and practices and qualitative data is used to provide the depth of analysis required to look at the nature of performativity in schools.

The concept of performativity has been central to the overall investigation. The study argues for a particular reading of performativity — a work through, as opposed to work upon, perspective. This analytical lens illustrates how the new teacher evaluation policies have played a role in producing or reinforcing the mutually policing relations that lead to destabilisation of teacher’s identities.

This thesis concludes that the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies has had significant indirect impacts on teachers and teachers’ work by affecting modes of school management and teachers’ relationships. By illustrating the usefulness of the work through perspective of performativity, it has enabled theorizing of performativity to advance. It also illuminates both congruence and
variance between teacher evaluation policies as enacted in Japan and other countries. Japan’s teacher evaluation is no less effective as a measure of political control than its counterparts in other countries, but it can work in a more subtle way: teacher evaluation affects, repositions, and reconstructs teachers’ work and identities through affected relationships as mentioned above. This implies that teachers as well as policymakers should develop a more broad, macro-political and critical perspective on teacher evaluation.
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The year of 2011 witnessed great sorrow caused by earthquakes in both New Zealand and Japan. I would like to offer my deep condolences to the sufferers and their families. Immediately in the wake of the nuclear plant accidents in Fukushima, Martin, Marcia and many other people in New Zealand contacted me to inquire after my family and me. Martin even wanted us to come to New Zealand for a while. Of course, my responsibilities in Japan continued, but I have a heartfelt gratitude for such warmth and friendship.

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Last, but not least, I would like to thank those teachers and head teachers that generously spared their time for participating in the present study.
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Glossary of Japanese Terms

*Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai* Central Council on Education

gakko  school

gakko hyoka  school evaluation

*hyoka*  evaluation

*Jinji In*  National Personnel Authority

ejinjikoka  personnel evaluation

*Keizaizaisei Shimonkaigi*  Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy

*kinmu hyotei*  efficiency rating

*kisoku*  regulations

*komuin*  public employees

*Koseirodosho*  Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare

*kyoiku*  education

*kyoiku iinkal*  local board of education

*Kyoiku Kihon Ho*  Fundamental Law of Education

*kyoin*  teacher

*kyoin hyoka*  teacher evaluation

*Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai*  Study Group on Personnel Evaluation of Teachers (Tokyo-to)

*kyoshokuin*  teacher and school staff

*Monbukagakusho*  Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)

*Naganoken Kyoin Hyoka ni kansuru Kento Iinkai*  Inquiry Committee on Teacher Evaluation (Nagano Prefecture)

*Naikaku*  Cabinet

*Nihon Kyoiku Gakkai*  Japan Educational Research Association

*Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai (Nikkyoso)*  Japan Teachers Union
Nippon Keidanren  Japan Business Federation

Osaka-fu Kyoiku Inikai  Osaka-fu Borad of Educaiton

Osaka-fu Kyoshokuin no Shishitsu Kajo ni kansuru Kento Inikai  Inquiry Committee into the Development of Teachers and School Staff (Osaka-fu)

seikashugi  performance-based personnel system

Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai  Tokyo Metropolitan High School Teachers and Staff Union

Tokyo-to Kyoiku Inikai  Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education

Zennihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai  All Japan Teachers and Staff Union
Chapter One: Introduction

In recent years almost all of the local boards of education (*Kyoiku linkai*) across Japan have begun putting in place redesigned schemes for teacher evaluation (Monbukagakusho, 2010a). Previous schemes that involved only unilateral efficiency rating of teachers by head teachers were widely considered to be ineffective for the development of teachers. Furthermore, teacher unions had denounced these older schemes as a control measure over teachers (Aspinall, 2001; Duke, 1973; Schoppa, 1991). On the other hand, the new schemes feature apparently development-orientated and collaborative elements, such as goal-setting and assessment meetings with head teachers, lesson observations and feedback, and self-reviews of performance and competence (Kariya & Kaneko, 2010). This means that Japanese teachers have to account for their performance and competence in new ways. The nature and impact of these new *accountabilities* are the main concerns of this thesis.

Teacher evaluation has been a continuing issue in Japanese schools. In the late 1950s, a heated confrontation arose between the government and the Japan Teachers Union (*Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai: Nikkyoso*), the then-powerful teachers union, over the “efficiency rating plan of teachers (*Kyoin Kinmu Hyotei*)” (Aspinall, 2001, p. 42). Originally, the government planned to directly link an efficiency rating to the teachers’ pay. This led to fierce resistance from the union, including teachers going on mass leave¹. This undermined the schemes that had been introduced across the nation and the link between rating and pay was abandoned. Around the turn of the millennium, the government’s interest in

---

¹ Under the Local Public Service Law, strikes by government employees (including teachers working for public schools) were banned and are still illegal today. To circumvent the prohibition, the teachers union directed its members to all go on leave at the same time.
teacher evaluation resurfaced (Monbukagakusho, 2001). This coincided with the “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education (Gimukyoiku no kozokaikaku).”\(^2\) The policy looked to new ways of controlling teachers as well as new forms of school organisation (Fujita, 2010). The same policy put particular emphasis on the enhancement of teachers’ abilities and competence, leading to school improvement, by means of a “professional developmental model” of teacher evaluation (Kariya & Kaneko, 2010; Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999; Yaosaka, 2005).

Nevertheless, there is evidence that the redesigned model of teacher evaluation has failed to gain teachers’ confidence. It has been the subject of member surveys conducted by the Tokyo High School Teachers Union (Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 2002, 2004, 2006) as well as investigations by local boards of education and educational researchers (Osaka-fu Kyoiku inkai Jimukyoku, 2004; Urano, 2002). Overall, the results have shown that in spite of the remodelling, teachers have perceived the policies and practices rather negatively. Some teachers have doubted the proclaimed effectiveness of the new schemes, while others have suggested that the earlier, highly contested policies were

\(^2\) In its public document of the same title, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Technology declared that the compulsory education system was in need of structural reform to assure its quality through the following cycling steps: the central government is to assume the responsibility for setting national goals and assuring the infrastructure to achieve these goals, more power and responsibilities are to be delegated to municipal governments and schools, and then the central government is to check up on the achievement (Monbukagakusho, 2005a). In summary, the “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education” has given the state more strategic and stronger power, with local education boards, schools, and teachers being given some autonomy in how they should work while dealing with severely constraints on the scope of their work. See Chapter 2 for more details.
strategies for the government to control teachers and that the redesigned model of
teacher evaluation is more of the same.

The broad concern guiding this thesis then has been the extent to which the
new teacher evaluation policies and practices in Japan are about controlling
teachers or represent opportunities for authentic professional development. It
centres on the following three research questions:

(1) How are the new teacher evaluation policies embedded within the wider policy
formation, namely the “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education”?
(2) What are teachers’ perspectives on and experiences of the new teacher
evaluation policies?
(3) How are the new teacher evaluation policies actually being enacted in schools?

Whilst the first question is concerned with macro analysis, the others look at what
is happening within the social interactions between teachers.

Additionally, here, I use the term “enact” with reference to Ball’s work on
policy sociology (Ball, 1990, 1994). Ball wrote about the rationale of adopting the
term of policy “enactment” rather than “implementation” as follows: “policies do
not normally tell you what to do, they create circumstances in which the range of
options available in deciding what to do are narrowed or changed, or particular
goals or outcomes are set” (Ball 1994, p. 19, cited in Braun, Maguire, & Ball,
2010, p. 549). This approach to exploration into policy processes gives attention
to the ways teachers make sense of their circumstances, including the policies
concerned. In other words, it gives attention to their agency (cf. Weick, 1995).
Drawing on the findings from the case studies in four secondary schools in
England, Ball, Maguire, Braun, and Hoskins argue that “actors in schools are
positioned differently and take up different positions in relation to policy” (Ball,
Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011a, p. 625). At the same time, however, the
authors distinguish between “coercive” and “emancipatory” policies, and later in a similar vein “imperative/disciplinary” and “exhortative/developmental” policies (Ball, Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011b, pp. 612-615). The former type of policy greatly constrains teacher’s agency, setting them in passive, delivery roles. On the other hand, the latter type of policy allows teachers to make judgments and thus have a sense of professional efficacy. My assumption is that teacher evaluation policy closes down rather than opens up possibilities of reflexive responses and exemplifies an “imperative/disciplinary” policy. It is heavily implicated in performativity.

The concept of performativity is highly relevant and will be central to the overall investigation. Performativity is defined by Ball (2003) as:

>a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgments, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change — based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic). The performances (of individual subjects or organisations) serve as measures of productivity or output, or displays of “quality” or “moments” of promotion and inspection. As such they stand for, encapsulate or represent the worth, quality or value of an individual or organisation within a field of judgement. (p. 216)

Thus, performativity “plays up the importance of measurable performance goals” (Chua, 2009, p. 159) and therefore “influences the identities of both individuals and organisations that become committed to improvement in outputs measured against competing peers and institutions” (Jeffrey & Troman, 2011, p. 485).

While performativity as an analytic concept has been seldom used in analysing education policies and practices in Japan (Katsuno (2008b) and Katsuno (2009b) are some exceptions), it clearly applies to teacher evaluation. It also provides a
theoretical framework that can allow us to bridge macro analysis of policy formation and micro analysis of what is happening within the social interactions between teachers. For Ball (1998), performativity is one of the interrelated technologies of reform, alongside the introduction of market mechanism and managerialism. These technologies have led to the education services being privatised and commoditised. As stated above, the renewed interest in teacher evaluation in Japan coincided with the development of the “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education” and it can be assumed that teacher evaluation in Japan is also an integral part of the new form of regulation of schooling. When using performativity as an analytical concept, it will be possible to understand how the new teacher evaluation policies are embedded in the wider policy formation and its enactment in schools.

A theory of performativity also enables us to investigate how, if at all, professional and personal identities of teachers are shifting in the process of teacher evaluation. This is made possible because performativity is defined not just as a technology of regulation but of production. Ball (2003) has stated this as follows:

> Within each of the new policy technologies of reform there are embedded and required new identities, new forms of interaction and new values. What it means to teach and what it means to be a teacher (a researcher, an academic) are subtly but decisively changed in the processes of reform [...] New roles and subjectivities are produced as teachers are re-worked as producers/providers, educational entrepreneurs and managers and are subject to regular appraisal and review and performance comparison. (p. 218)

Thus, performativity engenders new roles and subjectivities of teachers. Ball has
called this “the struggle over the teachers’ soul” (Ball, 2003, p. 217). As implied in the quote above, teacher evaluation could present a good illustration of how performativity works in this way.

For all of the above reasons, a theoretical concept of performativity is highly relevant to the present study. Yet because it has not been used very often in the Japanese national context, I will draw on related educational literature from England (Hall & Noyes, 2009; Jeffrey, 2002; Jeffrey & Troman, 2011; Moore, Edwards, Halpin, & George, 2002; Perryman, 2006, 2007, 2009; Troman, 2008; Troman, Jeffrey, & Raggl, 2007; Woods & Jeffrey, 2002) and other countries such as Scotland (Doherty & McMahon, 2007), the US (Lipman, 2004; Wills & Sandholtz, 2009), Hong Kong (Choi, 2005), Australia (Burnard & White, 2008; Day & Sachs, 2004; Keddie, Mills, & Pendergast, 2011; Sachs, 2001; Lingard, 2009) and New Zealand (Duhn, 2010).

I also argue for a particular reading of performativity being most relevant to how teacher evaluation policies are being enacted in Japanese schools. A feature of the literature on performativity and “identity work,” defined as “the range of activities individuals engage in to create, and sustain personal identities that are congruent with and supportive of the self-concept” (Snow & Anderson, 1987, pp. 1348, cited in Woods & Jeffrey, 2002, p.98), is that it tends to focus on the impact of performativity policies or discourse as outside forces on teachers (Moore, et al., 2002; Perryman, 2006; Woods & Jeffrey, 2002). This shared feature may stem from the fact that these authors conducted research in schools where teachers’ relations were relatively consistent in terms of values and aspirations. Consequently, it was possible that there was less possibility for micro-politics (Ball, 1987; Blasé & Anderson, 1995) to emerge. However, as Blasé and Anderson (1995) point out, this cannot always be assumed.

Although there are, perhaps, some general professional cultural norms that
most teachers would subscribe to, there are so many differences among teachers with regard to teaching philosophies, personal goals and values and political interests. This creates in most schools a complex set of micro political interactions among teachers. (p. 64)

I have argued previously that school organisation is becoming increasingly hierarchical in Japan (Katsuno, 2008a). Furthermore, there is evidence that while teachers in Japan used to share a sense of vocation, their values and aspirations have become more fragmented in recent years (Inagaki & Kudomi, 1994; Kudomi, 2008). These features of Japanese schooling make it necessary to locate the identity work of teachers in the micro-politics of the school. In this study, I assume that while performativity policies initiate performativity in schools, performativity becomes enacted through the interactions of teachers. In short, performativity is not always forced upon teachers: teachers themselves produce performativity in some ways.

In examining what is happening in the process of teacher evaluation, I shall introduce the work through perspective of performativity. Whereas a work upon perspective of performativity sees the culture of a certain school as being rather monolithic and the impact of performativity policies or discourse coming from the outside, the work through perspective pays attention to the way performativity capitalises on the value divisions already present (or being produced) and different positions within the school organisation. Accordingly, it locates the identity work of teachers in the micro-politics of the school.

The work through perspective of performativity is required due to different assumptions about the nature of school organisation. As has been suggested above and discussed further later, school organisation is likely to be more hierarchical and involve (both explicitly and tacitly) more use of power in Japan than in England and other countries where the concept of performativity has been
discussed. This leads me to concentrate on the details of the meetings between the evaluating head teacher and the evaluated teachers. These meetings are likely to be the point in the process of teacher evaluation, where “identity securing strategies in the production of power relations” (Knights & Willmott, 1985, p. 22) will become most tangible. A theoretical framework, which views performativity from a relational or micro-political standpoint, would allow us to make a more thorough analysis.

In recent years, a variety of performativity policies has been introduced into schools in Japan (Katsuno, 2007a; Katsuno & Takei, 2008). Many schools set targets on students’ performance under the growing pressure of testing and assessment. In some areas, local boards of education also publish the test results of the pupils by school. The test results can be linked to teacher evaluation in some ways or others. Firstly, head teachers as school managers, and then teachers are required to advocate such performativity, putting more emphasis on the measurable aspects of teaching and learning. However, some of them may feel alienated from such policies and practices because of pedagogical reasons. There is some reason to expect that the evaluation process provides those who are already advocates of performativity (presumably in more senior positions) with opportunities to win others over to their side.

In summary, the existing literature tends to assume that the performativity policies, such as target-setting, school evaluations, and school league tables constructed from pupil test scores, have a direct impact on teachers’ work and identities. However, the work through perspective of performativity, which pays more attention to micro-politics and micro power relations, will allow us to draw not only a more subtle picture of the way teacher evaluation policies are enacted in schools against a background of performativity but also of how performativity itself is enacted in schools.

However, it is worth noting that the work upon and the work through
perspectives of performativity are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are complementary to each other. When I began to conceive the idea of conducting research into new teacher evaluation, I only had it in mind to address research questions (1) regarding policy formation and (2) regarding teachers’ and head teachers’ reactions to policy. Arguably, the work upon perspective could do this work well. However, I gradually came to realise that more in-depth exploration is needed into the way teachers interact with each other to understand their different positions on the new teacher evaluation policies. Consequently, I decided that the research question (3) regarding the “enactment” of the policies in schools should be also addressed from the work through perspective.

Thus, this study uses a range of methods to address the research questions. For the purpose of macro analysis of the new teacher evaluation policies, I examine both the primary and secondary documents regarding the policy development. For the study of schools and teachers, I employ a mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) in which quantitative data has been used to provide a general picture of how teachers experience and perceive the new teacher evaluation policies and practices and qualitative data has been used to provide the depth of analysis required to examine the nature of performativity in schools. More specifically, I draw on the data from a national survey and in-depth interviews with a sample of teachers and head teachers.

The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 deals with the policy development of new teacher evaluation in Japan. In this chapter, I discuss the way the new teacher evaluation policies are embedded within the wider policy formation — the “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education.” Some critics have focused on the government’s intention to control teachers. This chapter more fully explores the thesis of new teacher evaluation as a means of government control.

Chapter 3 examines some surveys that have investigated how teachers and head teachers have experienced and perceived the policies and practices of the
new teacher evaluation in Japan. The findings from these surveys are early and local in nature, but despite these limitations, provide us with significant insights into the views of teachers and head teachers. Additionally, I review survey research on teachers’ and head teachers’ perspectives on performance management in the UK. I pay particular attention to the work of Marsden and Belfield (2005, 2006) which suggested that performance management of teachers could cause better articulation of goals between individual teachers and the school as an organisation, and thus lead to improvement of teaching and learning in the end. This is a proposition to be examined in the Japanese context.

Chapter 4 provides details about the theoretical framework. I review the literature of the policies and practices of teacher evaluation, with particular focuses on economic theory applied to teacher evaluation and the professional development model of teacher evaluation developed in the UK and Japan. I also review the literature on performativity and its impact on teacher identities as debated in the UK and elsewhere. This literature review leads me to discuss in more detail how the work through perspective on performativity is likely to be most relevant to teacher evaluation policies as enacted in Japan.

Chapter 5 describes research design and methodology employed by the present study. In light of the discussion regarding the theoretical framework in the previous chapters, I explain the rationales of using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to address different research questions regarding the new teacher evaluation in Japan.

Chapter 6 introduces the results of my national survey of teachers’ experiences and perceptions of the new teacher evaluation. I examine the differences in their views according to their types of school, gender and age. I also discuss how the findings from the national, more recent survey correspond with those from the earlier and local surveys discussed in Chapter 3. However, my main aim here is to provide a national context for the more in-depth research which follows.
Chapter 7 considers qualitative data from interviews that I conducted in three senior high schools and one special school. Apart from some local variations, a number of common themes from the stories of the four schools are identified. These themes are concerned with the impacts of teacher evaluation on the social interactions of teachers in schools. In particular, I explore the way micro-politics or performativity is fostered by the new teacher evaluation. I also illustrate social justice concerns raised by the process of teacher evaluation.

Chapter 8 focuses on the impacts of teacher evaluation on teachers’ work and selves. Again using the interview data from the teachers and head teachers, in this chapter I examine how the promises of professional development model for teacher evaluation have, or have not been fulfilled, and also how the teachers negotiate their professional identities under the pressure of performativity. In particular, I point out that the success of the teachers’ negotiating strategies depends on a variety of micro-political factors.

The final chapter (Chapter 9) further discusses significant themes arising from the micro-political analysis of the new teacher evaluation policies as enacted in schools. In doing so, I consider the range of findings and present conclusion. In particular, I conclude that the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies has had significant impacts on teachers and teachers’ work indirectly by affecting modes of school management and teachers’ relationships. I also discuss the limitations of the present study and some directions for future research.

Overall the thesis illuminates the impact of the new teacher evaluation in Japan and makes three related contributions. The first is concerned with the theoretical advancement of research on performativity. My introduction of the *work through* perspective on performativity enables the research in this area to take a step forward. The present research also advances the comparative analysis of education reform. Elsewhere I have described the characteristics of the Japanese version of the Evaluative State (Katsuno & Takei, 2008). As Whitty,
Power, and Halpin (1998) noted, we have to consider variance as well as congruence in the cross-national examination of education reform. The present work illuminates what is distinctive about teacher evaluation in Japan and what it shares with other countries. The thesis makes a third contribution in the area of policy and practice alternatives. My approach to the research problem and methodology is led by a social justice and transformative orientation (Mertens, 2007). We need to understand how teacher evaluation policies are enacted to be able to develop more progressive approaches in order to have any chance of serving the needs of those who have been excluded from positions of power.
Chapter Two: Japan’s New Teacher Evaluation Policy

In this chapter, I present a brief description of the development of Japan’s new teacher evaluation policy and then discuss how the new teacher evaluation policies are embedded within wider policy formation.

The Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education (Tokyo-to Kyoiku Iinkai) introduced a new teacher evaluation scheme in April 2000. Other prefecture boards of education followed suit and today almost all teachers nationwide go through an annual cycle of evaluation: setting annual goals, meeting with head teachers to discuss the appropriateness and attainment of the goals, conducting self-review on competence and performance, and being evaluated by head teachers (Monbukagakusho, 2010a). The government has promoted this as a “professional development model” of teacher evaluation and local boards of education and some educationalists endorsed this (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Linkai Jimukyoku, 2004; Yaosaka, 2005). Nevertheless, I argue that this justification is not plausible. By discussing the degree to which the evaluation policies are integral to wider policies, I suggest instead that this new teacher evaluation model is likely to be a form of political control.

2.1 How the New Teacher Evaluation Policies Developed

In July 1998, the Chief Education Officer of the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education convened the Study Group on Personnel Evaluation of Teachers (Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai). The Study Group was composed of nine members: educationalists, business managers, and mass media players. Professor Otohiko Hasumi of Wayo Women’s University and former president of Tokyo University of Education (Tokyo Gakugei Daigaku) was the designated chairperson of the group. At that time, he was also the chairperson of the National Council for
the Education of Teaching Personnel (*Kyoiku Shokuin Yosei Shingikai*), which was integrated into the Central Council on Education (*Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai*) later in 2001.

The mission for the Study Group was to examine and report on the issues of teacher personnel evaluation as an integral part of personnel management and human resource development (*Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999*, p. 1). Underpinning the mission was the idea that the old teacher personnel evaluation, “efficiency rating plan of teachers” (*Aspinall, 2001*, p. 42), was ineffective in enhancing morale and performance of teachers, not the least because the result was not communicated to the teacher evaluated, nor linked to pay and other personnel treatments (*Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999*, p. 7). Another rationale stated was the increased need for professional development of teachers who work in the era of education reform, facing up to many problems such as bullying, school non-attendance, drop out and *gakkyu hokai* (which means literally a collapsed classroom, the classroom where a teacher cannot have control over the students, and thus teaching and learning are seriously paralysed).

The Study Group delivered an interim report in December 1998, and in March 1999, after consultations with relevant organisations (see the next section for dispute, involving an international organisation, over this point), submitted their final report entitled “Future directions for personnel evaluation and human resource development of teachers: A conversion to teacher evaluation for professional development” (*Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999*).

The Study Group’s report explicated the idea and methodology of the professional developmental model or bilateral model of teacher evaluation (*Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999*, Chapter 3; *Tokyo-to Kyoiku Iinkai, 1999*). The bilateral model specifically meant the introduction of goal-setting and assessment meetings with head teachers, and self-review of the process and results of working towards the set goals. It recommended that teachers be assessed by the
deputy head in the first instance and the head teacher for the final evaluation. The teachers were supposed to be assessed annually and ranked in terms of three aspects: competence (noryoku), dispositions (joi, iyoku and taido), and performance (gyoseki). For fairness and objectivity, the report stated, evaluation items and criteria should be clearly defined, and such measures as lesson observation and asking teachers’ colleagues for comments should be adopted. It also recommended the introduction of training for the evaluator and disclosure of assessment results. The report also made specific statements on “the ways of utilising teacher evaluation” and “future directions for the human resource development of teachers” (Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999, Chapters 4 & 5). As such, it emphasised a professional development model, not a summative or judgmental model, but it did not abandon the principle of “appropriate personnel treatment based on evaluation results” (p. 21). The Board had been applying parallel evaluation schemes with particular aims, such as promotion to managerial posts (head teacher or deputy head teacher) and special pay increases for outstanding performers. The report argued that selection, placement, promotion, and reward should all reflect more rigorously evaluation results. Thus, it recommended a combined system of professional development and judgmental models, with the latter being based on the former.

In April 2000, the Board adopted the new system recommended by the report. Although the recommendations were only intended for teachers working in Tokyo, the concept soon spread beyond the board’s jurisdiction. In 2001, new teacher evaluation systems were introduced in Mie and Kagawa prefectures, then followed by Osaka in 2002, and Kanagawa and Hiroshima prefectures in 2003. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Monbukagakusho) committed studies of the new teacher evaluation to all prefecture boards of education from 2003 to 2006. It is a prefecture and
designated city\textsuperscript{3} board of education that has the legal authority to enact evaluation schemes for teachers who work in its jurisdiction (Local Public Service Law, Article 40; Local Educational Administration Law, Article 46). Thus, the Ministry could not order the adoption of new systems, but it endorsed them. Meanwhile, the Central Council on Education, an advisory body accountable to the Minister, recommended the introduction of new teacher evaluation systems by prefecture boards of education on many occasions. For example, in its report mainly dealing with teacher licensure, the council stated:

The success of schooling depends, first and foremost, on teachers. For teachers to professionally develop and bring their ability into full play, their competence and performance needs to be properly assessed and linked to placement, promotion, remuneration and other conditions, and training needs. Hence, we recommend that every prefecture board of education consider the introduction of new teacher evaluation systems, with reference to the present reform of the public service working force. (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 2002, ii4(3))

As this quote implies, the policy developments of new teacher evaluation were affected by wider reform of the public service. In December 2001, the Cabinet (Naikaku) approved and published a document entitled “Fundamental principles of the reform concerning public employees (Komuin Seido Kaikaku Taiko).” This document advocated “the renewal of the public employees’ values and attitudes in order to establish ‘the truly people-centred,’ as well as more efficient and effective, public service” (Naikaku, 2001, p. 1). Through the various measures

\textsuperscript{3} Japan's Local Autonomy Law grants 19 larger cities designated by the ordinance with more legal authorities, including those concerned with educational provision and service.
recommended, the Cabinet was determined to establish new public employees’ remuneration systems that were more closely than ever before linked to job competency, responsibility, and performance, instead of the current incremental systems. They understood that such remuneration systems needed new evaluation methods of competence and performance (pp. 10-13).

Similar recommendations appeared frequently in subsequent reports by the Central Council on Education (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 2003, 2004). In particular, the Central Council on Education (2004) discussed the issue of teacher evaluation, regarding it as an essential part of school organisation and management. The report confirmed the need to reform teacher evaluation systems for the purposes of maintaining public trust in schooling and enhancing teachers’ morale through linking the results to pay and other conditions. It then continued and stated that there should be two basic viewpoints — development of human resource (*jinzai ikusei*) and improvement of school work (*gyomu kaizen*).

In schools, for the most part, staff work collectively. Thus, it is needed to evaluate how they perform as a team. Furthermore, because the performance of a school and its teachers are closely interrelated, evaluations of a school and its teachers should go hand in hand. This, if properly done, will lead to better articulation of endeavour by a school and its teachers, development of both organisational strengths and individual teachers’ abilities. (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 2004, (3))

This statement signalled that the professional development of teachers was increasingly becoming viewed within the parameters of a school’s organisational development. There was a focus on better articulation between the efforts of individual teachers and the school’s work.

In 2010, ten years after the introduction of the new teacher evaluation system
in Tokyo, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology conducted a nation-wide survey to take stock of the policy developments for this period. The Ministry asked all prefectoral and designated city boards of education to report how they were conducting teacher evaluation systems as of April 2010. The main findings of this study were as follows (Monbukagakusho, 2010a):

- Almost all 66 prefectoral and designated city boards of education across the country introduced teacher evaluation systems, involving all teachers in all schools. Only one board had introduced a system that involved only a part of its teaching force.
- While 56 boards assessed teachers’ competence (noryoku) and 60 boards assessed performance (gyoseki), most of the boards assessed both. Twenty boards assessed teacher’s dispositions (joi, iyoku and taido), in addition to competence and performance.
- Most boards arranged for deputy head teachers to evaluate in the first instance, with head teachers undertaking the final evaluation. Only about 10 boards designated only the head teacher as evaluator.
- While 48 boards normally communicated evaluation results to the relevant teacher, 16 did so only on request. Furthermore, eight boards made it a rule not to disclose such information.
- Fifty-nine boards published their evaluation criteria but six did not (although one of these was planning to publish).
- Thirty-eight boards had established some system of complaint or appeal. Four were considering introducing a system but 15 replied that they had no plan to introduce such a system.
- Boards used the evaluation results of competence and performance for a range of purposes, including training, promotion, placement and remuneration.
- Twenty-four boards, including those from the largest three prefectures of
Tokyo, Kanagawa and Osaka, decided on annual rises in teacher salaries based on the results. Meanwhile, 10 boards reported that they did not use the evaluation results for any particular purposes.

Overall, local boards of education had some discretion over the detailed design of the schemes. One of the main differences occurred in the area of linking performance to pay\(^4\). However, in spite of the decentralised nature of education system in Japan (the Ministry is not able to order the adoption by individual boards of education), it was apparent from the survey that during the preceding decade the new model of teacher evaluation had extended across the nation.

Two main assumptions underpinned the new policy on teacher evaluation. One was that teachers could attain required competence and performance (however poorly defined) by means of the professional development model of teacher evaluation, which involves elements such as goal setting, feedback meetings with head teachers, and self review of competence and performance, in addition to being formally evaluated by the head teacher. The other is that a new teacher evaluation system was needed to create a more efficient and effective, performance-based personnel system and that this in turn would cause favourable changes in the values and attitudes of public employees. It was on the latter assumption that performance-related pay was forcefully advocated by some of those promoting the new teacher evaluation.

\(^4\) As will be explained later in Chapter 5, those local boards of education that oversee the sample schools operate performance pay system, and arguably, for this reason, they strongly demand that teachers set numerical goals.
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2.2 A Historical Perspective on Teacher Evaluation in Japan

Teacher evaluation is a resurgent policy issue. Japan had a serious national confrontation in the late 1950s between the government and Japan Teachers Union (Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai: Nikkyoso), the then-powerful teachers union, over the “efficiency rating plan of teachers” (Aspinall, 2001; Duke, 1973; Schoppa, 1991). Originally, the government planned to directly link efficiency ratings to teachers’ pay. However, the conflict that followed rendered the schemes ineffective, even as they were introduced across the nation. The link between rating and pay was abandoned.

The teachers union regarded the teachers’ efficiency rating plan as being another form of control over teachers. They denounced the plan as “the next stage in the government’s plan to extend its power and control into the schools themselves, while making a direct attack on the union” (Aspinall, 2001, p. 43). In the preceding years, the government had successfully established national curriculum standards and an official textbook approval (censorship) system, which had whipped up strong dissent. Increasing state control over education was criticised for undermining academic freedom, teachers’ professional autonomy, and the democratic control of education. The government’s moves were called a “reverse course” — a proclaimed intention to offset the “excess” of democracy and egalitarianism of post-war education reform under the Occupation authority (Horio, 1994; Schoppa, 1991, pp. 38-39).

The most recent efficiency rating plans (new teacher evaluation schemes) have been achieved more smoothly than those in the 1950s. One reason for this is that Japanese teacher unionism dramatically declined during the last half of the previous century. Indeed, the rate of teacher union membership declined for 34 straight years: from 86.3% in 1958 to 27.1% in 2009 (Monbukagakusho, 2010b). Thrupp (2002) observes that in various countries, teacher evaluation or
performance management has been used to erode teachers’ collective strength. Teachers in Japan had already noticed this 50 years ago. However, when responding to the government’s latest attempt to introduce new teacher evaluation systems, teacher unions could no longer resort to direct action as they did in the late 1950s.

Second, the performance-based personnel system (seikashugi) has become more widely accepted in Japanese society and, therefore, with teachers as well. In a survey that will be discussed in Chapter 6, a majority of the teachers agreed to the principle of performance-related pay. It has often been said that government employees, including teachers, should not be exceptions to the performance-based compensation of employees that the private sector practices. Indeed, many private sector firms now have a performance-based personnel system in place (Koseirodosho, 2008; Nakamura, 2006). These changes in Japanese employment approaches have helped the new schemes of teacher evaluation to be introduced.

Third, the new schemes of teacher evaluation that prefectural boards of education planned to install were not the same as the old rating plans. As stated earlier, the new rationale for evaluation underscored the professional development of the teacher. This shift in orientation contributed to the acceptance of the policy, as educationalists do not object to all types of teacher evaluation. Even during the era of confrontation over the efficiency rating, “A General Opinion on the Issue of Teachers’ Efficiency Rating (Kinmu Hyotei ni kansuru Zenpanteki Kenkai)”

5 Drawing on the statistics collected by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Keisuke Nakamura, a labour relations expert of the University of Tokyo, estimated that nearly a third of private firms had introduced performance-based personnel systems by 2004 (Nakamura, 2006). However, the proportion varied as to the size of the firms. Thus, 72.4% of the firms with over 1,000 employees and 61.0% of those with 300 to 1,000 employees had such personnel systems in operation.
provided by the Japan Educational Research Association (Nihon Kyoiku Gakkai) affirmed the significance of teacher evaluation when conducted to identify the needs of professional development. They argued that what should be negated was an efficiency rating that is intended to control teachers and education; teacher evaluation of a “completely different nature” was possible but had yet to be studied (Nihon Kyoiku Gakkai, 1958).

Some boards of education were more conscious of the difficulty of putting the two objectives — performance-related pay and professional development — into a single teacher evaluation scheme. Since they understood that to insist on performance-related pay would invite fierce objection from the teachers (albeit much less than in the 1950s), these boards behaved strategically. They refrained from making clear pronouncements on the possible (or intended) link of evaluation results to pay, saying instead that it would depend on the future development of general pay reform, a move that is categorically different from the introduction of the new teacher evaluation schemes.

Although the introduction of new systems of teacher evaluation did not cause as large a confrontation as in the 1950s, the teachers unions were able to draw international attention to their concerns. In 2002, the All Japan Teachers and Staff Union (Zennihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai), the second largest national teachers union, made an allegation to ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel (CEART)⁶. The union

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⁶The ILO/UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers was adopted on 5 October 1966. CEART was set up with the mission of examining reports on the application of the Recommendation by member-state governments, and national and international relevant organisations. In addition, CEART receives and examines allegations from national and international teachers’ organisations on the non-observance of the Recommendations’ provisions. See for more details CEART's website.
asserted that Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education had refused to undertake proper consultation with relevant teachers unions concerning the development of new teacher personnel evaluation scheme on the grounds that it related to a management matter that required no consultation. In addition to this, the allegation raised the following criticisms.

- It [the new system of teacher personnel evaluation] involves an “absolute” (i.e., criterion referenced) assessment by deputy principals and principals, coupled with a “relative” (i.e., norm referenced) assessment by a superintendent, who may have the overview of as many as 15,000 teachers. There is, accordingly, a substantial subjective component involved by reason of the latter assessment.
- The process begins with mandatory “self-assessment” by the teacher, which the principal or deputy can require to be “re-done.”
- The competitive nature of assessment is such that, in practice, it tends to be antithetical to the existence of collaborative collegiality among teachers and may well operate to pervert individual professionalism in order to secure a grading based on student results.
- [The system] is not truly transparent because the disclosure of assessment results is discretionary and has recently been suspended. A system of appeals against assessments has yet to be established.
- [The system] does not attract the confidence of teachers generally. It has, in practice, had a deleterious effect on morale and motivation. It has given rise to an undesirable breakdown in trust between principal and teachers. (Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel, 2003, pp. 43-44):

The Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology refuted the union’s allegations and sent their counter arguments to the Committee. Based on the parties’ submissions, the Joint Committee concluded that the new system of teacher evaluation had been developed in a manner inconsistent with the Recommendation in that:

- There has been no adequate process of consultation with teachers’ organisations, as contemplated by the Recommendation.
- It plainly involves the making of significant subjective evaluations.
- Teachers are not entitled to access the precise evaluation made and its basis.
- There is certainly a lack of openness and transparency in the process and a total absence of specific rights of review or appeal in relation to the evaluation itself. (Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel, 2003, p. 45)

Although ILO/UNESCO’s recommendations were not legally binding, CEART’s findings certainly exerted some pressure on boards of education to reconsider their systems in regard to the points raised. Thus, as stated above, 38 boards of education (including Tokyo) have now established some systems of complaint or appeal, and a majority of boards disclosed the results of evaluation to the relevant teacher. In other words, the allegation helped boards of education to be more conscious of issues of transparency and objectivity in evaluation, and procedures that would safeguard teachers against arbitrary assessments and personnel decisions that could follow, albeit not yet adequate. However, the main assumptions underlying the policy development of new teacher evaluation remained intact.
2.3 The New Teacher Evaluation within Wider Policy Formation

*Structural Reform of Education*

Since the introduction of a new teacher evaluation scheme by Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education in 2000, some local teachers’ unions have conducted surveys to probe their members’ attitudes and opinions toward the new system (see Chapter 3 for more details). These surveys found that the teachers have perceived the policy and practices rather negatively, in spite of the remodelling, possibly fuelled by the memory of the fierce confrontation over the efficiency rating plan of teachers in the late 1950s (Aspinall, 2001; Duke, 1973; Schoppa, 1991) and the more recent debates on the substitution of new teacher evaluation schemes for the old plans (Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel, 2003; Katsuno, 2002a). The new schemes — as well as their predecessors — have been blamed for the divisiveness in the collaborative relationships and activities of teachers. It seems that promotion of a “professional development” model of teacher evaluation has failed to win the confidence of the teachers. Some teachers doubt the proclaimed effectiveness of the new schemes, while others suspect them to be a control strategy of the government, as was the case with the old plans. I argue that this suspicion may be underpinned by recognition of a post-industrial and “post-welfarist” (Gewirtz, 2002, pp. 2-6) type of economic and education reform in Japan — “Structural Reform of Education (Gimukyoiku-no kozokaikaku).”

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (in office from April 2001 to September 2006) pursued a comprehensive societal restructuring agenda called “Structural Reform” to revitalise the country’s economy and industry in the aftermath of the collapsed “bubble economy.” Similar to reforms grounded in neo-liberalism ideology in Anglo-American and some European countries (Clarke & Newman,
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1997; Pollitt, 1990), the Japanese Structural Reform targeted the expanding public sector expenditures and challenged the bureaucratic system. The public education sector, alongside healthcare, insurance, and pension, has been deregulated, economised, and decentralised. Thus, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, the self-styled guardian of public education, was forced to undertake survival measures. According to Professor Tetsuhiko Nakajima of the University of Nagoya, a specialist on education policy and administration, the Ministry was desperate to include compulsory schooling in the national strategy to make Japan a frontrunner, leading the world in industry, and exploiting globalisation to realise economic growth (Keizai Zaisei Shimonkaigi, 2006; Nakajima, 2006).

The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (Keizai Zaisei Shimonkaigi), the most country’s powerful policy maker, was led by the Prime Minister and comprised relevant members of the Cabinet, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, and business leaders. To achieve the above-mentioned goal, the Council emphasised the importance of concentrating domestic resources on areas in which Japan has an advantage and utilising overseas resources to compensate for any insufficiencies in other aspects. There was some concern that Japan was unable to cope with the realities of globalisation and would find itself overwhelmed by nations that enjoyed rapid growth, such as BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Thus, it declared the need to strengthen international competitiveness in human resources.

Human resources who are well qualified to engage in international activities and who are also going to be the main players in the future labour market must be secured in terms of both quality and quantity. For this purpose, we will aim to achieve world top-level performance in international academic ability tests by 2010. (Keizai Zaisei Shimonkaigi,
To restructure education so that excellent human resources can be efficiently introduced in the economy would necessitate a new form of organisation and control of schooling. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, reacting to the report of the Central Council on Education (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 2005), began to refer to its own reform agenda as the “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education [Gimukyoiku no kozokaikaku].” In a leaflet bearing the same title, the Ministry declared that the compulsory schooling system needed structural reform to assure its quality — by establishing a new relationship between the state and the education system. The central government’s role would be to set objectives, secure input (national course of study, fully prepared teachers, and adequate funding), and audit outcome through a regime of national testing of academic achievement and school evaluation. The responsibility for the process would fall on the shoulders of local governments and schools (Monbukagakusho, 2005a, p. 1).

Centralised micro-management of education

The imperative of the Structural Reform was undergirded by the introduction of market forces into all aspects of public education. In January 2005 the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), a powerful representative of the business world, published the recommendations on the future direction of education (Nippon Keidanren, 2005). It began by stating, “Education is the foundation for national prosperity. Particularly for us, as a nation with scarce national resources and energy, the top priority should be placed squarely on developing the human resources which will and can perform well in various fields not only home but abroad” (p. 1). It continued by declaring that this project would be realised by means of more competition among teachers as well as schools.
Particular recommendations were made on the principles of *diversity, competition,* and *evaluation,* one of which was the introduction of an educational voucher system. Here lay the basic assumption that public sector services, in contrast to those of the private sector, are bureaucratic, self-serving, and inefficient. In response, quasi-market reforms based on private business systems were introduced to enable the centralised micro-management of education. This involved sharply focused interventions, in which accountability, developments, and outcomes would be subjected to management scrutiny at both the macro and micro educational levels (Gleeson & Gunter, 2001).

At the macro-educational level, the state would prescribe the operating environments for schools. As mentioned earlier, the “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education” sought to reallocate the responsibility and authority in finance and public education among the stakeholders, with the state setting nationwide objectives for education and introducing national testing to ensure that these objectives were achieved.

At the micro-educational level, the government has exhibited growing interest in efficiency, effectiveness, and development — within the national objectives (Nakajima, 2006). The new teacher evaluation systems in Japan employ procedures that are almost identical to those of the performance management for English and Welsh teachers that were developed during the 1990s (Department for Education and Employment, 1998, 2000). According to Gleeson and Husbands (2001), the performance management of teachers in the UK acts as a policy device that binds the micro and macro forms of intervention; the measured levels of teacher, pupil, and school performance are connected to external inspection, funding, pay, staffing, and resources. In the process of simultaneous devolution and control, teachers are being micro-managed to the point that their productivity can be measured locally against national standards in terms of the test results and the examination performances of their students.
The idea and procedures of management by objectives (MBO), which came to constitute an integral part of the evaluation of teachers and schools in Japan, are supposed to work in a similar way. For example, the School Evaluation Guidelines published by the Chiba Prefecture Board of Education required teachers to firmly base their individual goals on organizational objectives. MBO was regarded as a management method through which an individual staff member could attain goals and bring her/his autonomy and self-control into full play (Chibaken Kyoiku Iinkai, 2003). The board also claimed that MBO is different from the practice wherein a superior forces work quotas on the subordinate. However, following Lyotard, we can call it a device that “makes individuals ‘want’ what the system needs in order to perform well” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 62, cited in Ball, 2008, p. 46). Thus, MBO could more effectively make the staff realise required goals.

In the context of the management cycle, MBO strongly demands linkages between the school’s mission, the head teacher’s management policy, and the goals of middle-level groups such as subject groups, year tutor groups, administrative committees on the one hand, and those of individual staff on the other. Indeed, in recent years, head teachers have been strongly exhorted to formulate their own management policies or the “mission” of their schools so that teachers can follow the lead (Kioka, 2003). This process could be viewed as the workings of an “internal market, where the management ‘sells’ and the teacher ‘buys into’ the vision and mission” (Gleeson & Gunter, 2001, p. 150). However, there is no guarantee that the negotiations and trading are carried out on a level playing field. A subordinate teacher who refuses to accept the head teacher’s management policy may be meted a negative evaluation rating, the label of incompetent teacher, and disadvantages in remuneration or redeployment (Katsuno, 2002b). In the labour process literature there are also critics who describe MBO — and Total Quality Management in general — as a device to
accomplish the traditional Taylorist principle of separation between conception and execution, disguised by so-called benign theories and practices of human resource management (Boje & Winsor, 1993; Knights & McCabe, 1998).

After the announcement of the “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education,” the following policies were developed. In 2006, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology launched a new initiative called “Quality Assurance of Compulsory Education” (Gimukyoiku no Shitsutekihosyo) (Monbukagakusho, 2005a). The policy package included the promotion of self-evaluation of the school, once again in line with the “Guidelines for School Evaluation at the Compulsory Education Stage” published by the Ministry, and the commencement of pilot studies on school evaluation carried out by a third party, using as a model the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) of England (Katsuno & Takei, 2008; Monbukagakusho, 2006). In December of the same year, the Fundamental Law of Education (Kyoiku Kihon Ho) was revised. Under the new legal framework, economic demands can be more easily translated into national objectives of education (Katsuno, 2007a). The revised Fundamental Law of Education demands that local boards of education set their targets for education and outcome measures in the form of the Basic Plan for Educational Promotion, in accordance with the national objectives. Research shows that a large proportion of the local plans include targets for student achievement as measured by both national and local examinations (Arai, 2010; Taniguchi, 2009).

In 2007, National Testing began for 6th grade elementary school students and 3rd grade junior high school students although in 2010 the newly elected Democratic government scaled down its sampling to 30% for the tests. Many schools now set targets for students’ performance under the growing pressure of testing and assessment. More pressure is placed on the schools that have to attract
students in the areas in which school choice policies are in place. Such schools publish school development plans that elaborate on how they are attaining the targets. In these schools, teachers are required to make lesson development plans, which typically include more frequent use of drills and materials specially prepared for the tests, to ensure the attainment of the targets. The teachers appear to share the same goals, but their relationships are characterised by indifference to each other’s practices per se apart from attainment of the goals. This has also intensified teachers’ workloads and left them with less professional autonomy concerning their teaching content and pedagogy. I discussed elsewhere the apparently concerted efforts of teachers, in terms of “contrived collegiality” (Hargreaves, 1995; Katsuno, 2009a). Hargreaves (1995) considered that the characteristics of this type of collaborative relationship are “administratively regulated,” “compulsory,” “implementation-oriented,” “fixed in time and space,” and “predictable” (p. 195). In the circumstances of contrived collegiality, “teachers are required to or ‘persuaded’ to work together to implement the mandates of others” (p. 195).

In 2008, new managerial posts such as vice-head teacher (fuku kocho) and chief teacher (shukan kyouyu) were introduced with the responsibility of serving the head teacher. Prior to the creation of these posts, in 2000, the role of staff meetings was also legally defined for the first time as that of a sounding board for the head teacher rather than a decision-making body (School Education Laws, 2009).

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7 According to the Ministry of Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, by 2008, 14.2% of local boards of education had school choice systems for elementary schools, while 13.9% had them for junior high schools (Monbukagakusho, 2008b). The rates vary across the nation, depending on the local boards’ policies, the stage of schooling, and the degree of urbanisation. Out of 23 wards in Tokyo, 19 allow parents of students to choose among junior high schools and 13 allow choice of elementary schools.
Enforcement Regulations, Article 23-3). The government explained that this legislation was needed because teachers’ views could contradict those of the head teacher and, thus, staff meetings could hinder a head teacher from managing the school (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 1998). Meanwhile, in April 2004, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology began to develop training materials on organisational management for schools. Furthermore, the ministry then distributed a model curriculum to local education boards across the nation. This model curriculum distinguishes between goals of schools and those of private firms. Nevertheless, it seeks to introduce various generic private sector management skills into schools with the express purpose of strengthening head teachers’ leadership (Monbukagakusho, 2005b). Consequently, local boards of education have been conducting training courses for school leaders using the model curriculum. Thus, head teachers’ leadership and the hierarchical structure of management have been strengthened within schools (Sako, 2005).

Thus, with the legitimisation of the state’s power to develop comprehensive educational objectives and programs, the establishment of an audit regime of national testing and evaluations, and the enhancement of managerial power at the institutional level, all within the parameters of market-orientated reform, the “quality cycle” (Gleeson & Gunter, 2001, p. 148) will be completed by controlling individual teachers’ performance and competencies. The new teacher evaluation and performance-related pay will likely work not merely as an integral mechanism in the micro-management of education, but also as a bridge between the macro and micro-level interventions of the government. The proposition of new teacher evaluation as a device of government control — centralised micro-management of education — is plausible, although it still needs to be explored empirically.
2.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have sketched the policy developments of new teacher evaluation in Japan, to illustrate the two main assumptions that underpinned the policy developments. One was concerned with the claimed advantages of the professional development model of teacher evaluation. The other was that a new teacher evaluation, and a link of the results to salary, would cause favourable changes in the values and attitudes of teachers — micro-economic theory applied to teacher evaluation. (In Chapter 4, I will examine these assumptions in turn, critiquing the lack of perspectives on power and micro-politics on the part of the professional development model, and the improper treatment of the nature of teachers’ work on the part of the micro-economic theory.) I also introduced a historical perspective on teacher evaluation in Japan, suggesting reasons for why the new teacher evaluation schemes have been achieved more smoothly than with their teacher counterparts in the 1950s.

I also situated the teacher evaluation policy developments within a wider policy context by raising the prospect of new teacher evaluation as a device of government control — centralised micro-management of education. The recent policy formations led to a variety of performativity measures introduced into schools in Japan. These measures have caused changes in behaviour on the part of local boards of education and schools. In some areas, local education boards also publish the test results of the pupils by school and many schools now set targets for students’ performance. Moreover, some teachers may feel alienated from such policies and practices because of pedagogical reasons. How the new teacher evaluation policies are being enacted in these contexts is the main question that I address in the chapters that follow.
Chapter Three: Views on Teacher Evaluation

In this chapter, I revisit earlier surveys that sought to investigate how teachers and head teachers experienced and perceived the policies and practices of new teacher evaluation in Japan. These surveys addressed union member teachers in Tokyo (Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 2002, 2004, 2006), teachers and head teachers in Tokyo (Urano, 2002), and teachers and head teachers in Osaka (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004). As stated in Chapter 2, Tokyo initiated the development of the new teacher evaluation processes and Osaka followed shortly after. As also noted, they are early and local findings, but they still provide us with some initial insights into the views of teachers and head teachers in Japan regarding the new teacher evaluation policies and practices.

This chapter also reviews survey research from England on the way teachers and head teachers there responded to the idea of linking pay to evaluation results, and the introduction of performance management. The concept and procedures of the new teacher evaluation in Japan have much common with the professional development model that was developed in England and the performance management for English and Welsh teachers (Department for Education and Employment, 1998, 2000; Richardson, 1999). Yet reference to the English literature is unusual in the Japanese context despite the comparative insights it provides. I focus particularly on the work of Marsden and Belfield, labour relations specialists at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences. Their research suggests that performance management of teachers could cause better articulation of goals between individual teachers and the school as an organisation and thus lead to improvement of teaching and learning (Marsden & Belfield, 2005, 2006). In chapters 6, 7 and 8, I examine this proposition within the Japanese context, using data from both my national survey and interviews with teachers and head teachers.
3.1 Views of Teachers and Head Teachers in Tokyo

In April 2000, new regulations (*Tokyo-toritsu Gakko Kyoshokuin no Jinjikoka nikansuru Kisoku*) came into effect, which stipulated that teachers in Tokyo must go through “authentic personnel assessment” for the purposes of “developing their abilities and competence, and also reinvigorating school organisations” (Regulations [*Kisoku*], Sec. 1). The assessment processes have been divided into two parts: self-report (*jiko shinkoku*) and performance review (*gyoseki hyoka*). For the self-report, teachers are required to set goals “in accordance with school management policies formulated by the head teacher” (Sec. 2), and then, at the end of the year, self-review the degree to which they have attained these goals. The goals are supposed to be set in terms of teaching and learning (*gakushu shido*), personal and career guidance (*seito shido and shinro shido*), contribution to school management (*gakko unei*), and other activities (*tokubetsu katsudo and others*). For the performance review, a “criterion-referenced” evaluation of a teacher’s competence and performance is conducted by the deputy head teacher in the first instance and then by the head teacher (Sec. 10). In addition to these steps, under the new arrangement, a teacher's performance is assessed in a comparative way (i.e., a norm-referenced assessment is conducted) at the Board of Education level and the results may affect her/his pay advancement and promotion (Sec. 11).

The Tokyo Metropolitan High School Teachers and Staff Union (*Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai*) has intermittently conducted questionnaire surveys to investigate member teachers’ views on the new teacher evaluation (*Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 2002, 2004, 2006*). Although we should note that respondents are almost exclusively union members, the reliability of the results is high given the sample size (as shown below, between 1,960 and 3,532 teachers participated in the surveys).

Asked about the impact of the new teacher evaluation scheme on their work
and school management, union members have, in successive surveys, given clearly negative responses. In July 2001, 75.5% of the 3,532 respondents felt that the new schemes had “unfavourable impacts.” The percentage increased to 83.0% in April 2003 (n = 2743) and further to 86.5% in December 2005 (n = 1960). Union members were also asked to indicate what the impact has been in more concrete terms. As Table 3.1 shows, the unfavourable impacts noted most frequently included “less relaxed and animated atmosphere at the school,” “lower morale among the staff,” “worse relationships between the manager and teachers,” and “worse teamwork among the staff.” More specifically, in response to the question, “Did the performance review carried out by the head teacher and its link to remuneration help in enhancing your own morale?” only 0.3% answered positively while 56.1% answered negatively. Roughly a quarter of those responding felt that the performance review and performance-related pay had no particular impact on their motivation or morale (Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 2006, pp. 10-11).

Table 3.1 Views held by union member teachers in Tokyo regarding “unfavourable” impacts of the new teacher evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>2001 n = 3,532</th>
<th>2003 n = 2,743</th>
<th>2005 n = 1,960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worse teamwork among the staff.</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse relationships between the manager and teachers.</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower morale among the staff.</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable impact on pedagogy due to teachers’ awareness of being evaluated.</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less relaxed and animated atmosphere at school.</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given these results, the intended effects of improving morale and motivation were far from confirmed. On the contrary, it seems the experiences of being evaluated and receiving performance-related pay demoralised many teachers. Furthermore, there was concern about the divisive nature of the teacher evaluation. Thus, on the whole, it seems the new teacher evaluation scheme has failed to secure the confidence of teachers’ union members in Tokyo.

It goes without saying that head teachers play an important role in the new teacher evaluation processes and that it is necessary to seek their views, especially since their school management policies are supposed to establish parameters within which teachers set their goals and self-review their performance. In Tokyo, head teachers themselves had also been evaluated by the Chief Education Officer of the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education for five years before the new scheme for teacher evaluation was put in place in April 2000 (Katsuno, 1995). Thus, they had experienced being both the evaluator and the evaluated.

In early 2001, Toyokazu Urano, a professor at the University of Tokyo, carried out a survey to investigate how head teachers, as well as regular teachers, in Tokyo perceived the rapidly changing national and local education policies, including the new teacher evaluation system that had just commenced. For this survey, Urano randomly selected one teacher from each school and one out of every two head teachers from elementary, junior high, and special schools. For senior high schools, all the head teachers were included. In total, 3,527 questionnaires were sent to potential respondents. In the end, questionnaires were collected from 793 head teachers and 1,325 teachers — a total of 2,118, with a response rate of 60.1%. For a mailed survey, this response rate is very high.

The results clearly showed some differences between the views of teachers and head teachers in regard to the effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation (Urano, 2002). As Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show, most teachers’ views were in line with the teacher union survey already discussed. Teachers felt that they had not
observed any of the favourable projected impacts of the new processes; they did not perceive higher morale, better professional development, or improved school management. In contrast, the head teachers were more likely to view the processes favourably and to recognise some of these projected impacts although many of them still answered ambiguously. In response to another question, 45.2% of the head teachers indicated that they did not feel that being evaluated had heightened their morale.

Table 3.2 Views held by teachers in Tokyo regarding claimed advantages of the new teacher evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Ambiguous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher morale.</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>74.8%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better professional development.</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved school management.</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More specifically, in assessing the claimed advantages of the new teacher evaluation, head teachers were more likely to confirm the improvement of school management than higher morale or better professional development. This suggests that many head teachers are willing to make use of the new teacher evaluation as a management tool. From this finding, it is not possible to infer the ways in which they are actually using the tool. However, given the policy development
elucidated in Chapter 2, the management tool likely provides head teachers with the power to win over non-committal or even critical teachers.

### 3.2 Views of Teachers and Head Teachers in Osaka

Another key survey was conducted in Osaka. In 2003, the Osaka-fu Board of Education developed a large-scale trial of the new teacher evaluation scheme, called “Evaluation and Development System for Teachers and School Staff (Kyoshokuin no Hyoka/Ikusei System).” The Board claimed that the new system placed greater emphasis on the development of individual teachers and school organisation than its counterpart in Tokyo did (Osaka-fu Kyoshokuin no Shishitsu Kojo ni kansuru Kento Iinkai, 2002). Indeed, at that time, the system did not link evaluation results to the treatment of personnel, although this changed soon after. The head teacher was designated as an evaluator/trainer (hyoka/ikusei sha) (i.e., a person who does not simply evaluate but also develops teachers’ abilities and competence levels) and the deputy head teacher as supporter (shien sha) (i.e., a person who helps teachers develop their abilities and competence levels). In addition, the system advocated the active involvement of teachers in the process of school development. Teachers could express their views in regard to school management by means of opinion sheets (teigen sheet). Despite all of this, however, the system underscored “management by objectives,” just as the systems in Tokyo and other prefectures had. According to the Inquiry Committee into the Development of Teachers and School Staff, which reported to the Chief Education Officer of the Osaka Board of Education:

If teachers and other school staff voluntarily and actively set their own objectives, in line with those applied to the school as a whole or groups within the school, and seriously consider their roles and obligations, they
ought to be motivated and helped to attain their targets with the aid of the managerial staff. (Osaka-fu Kyoshokuin no Shishitsu Kojo ni kansuru Kento Iinkai, 2002, p. 8)

The committee regarded this as a “strategy for reinvigoration of schools.” All through the final report prepared by the committee, it was assumed that individual teachers’ goals accorded with organisational objectives. Head teachers were expected to clearly present their vision or goals for school development so that the teachers could fully understand them. In turn, the teachers were expected to present and explain their goals to the head teacher so that the head teacher could “finalise” these goals (Osaka-fu Kyoshokuin no Shishitsu Kojo ni kansuru Kento Iinkai, 2002, p. 10). The problem here is that the committee did not take into account power dynamics and possible conflicts over pedagogical goals that affect relationships between individual teachers and an organisation, teachers and managers, and even individual teachers and their peers.

In February 2004, for the purpose of collecting views about the trial, the Osaka-fu Board of Education sent questionnaires to 36,825 teachers and 179 head teachers. While all teachers working in Osaka were contacted, the head teachers were specifically drawn from the schools established and directly administered by the Osaka-fu Board of Education. In the end, the Board collected 17,731

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8 The Board also sent questionnaires to 43 municipal boards of education in the Osaka Prefecture. However, the results collected from the boards shall not be considered in the present thesis.

9 Generally, in the Japanese education system, while elementary (primary) and junior high (lower secondary) schools are established and administered by municipal boards of education, senior high (upper secondary) schools are the responsibility of prefectural boards of education.
questionnaires from teachers, with a return rate of 48.1%, and 179 questionnaires from head teachers, with a return rate of 100%. The Board analysed the results and published a report entitled “The summary of the trial of the Evaluation and Development System for Teachers and School Staff (Kyoshokuin Hyoka Ikusei System Shiko Jissh no Matome).” The report confirmed the rationale behind the new system as follows:

The results of the survey show that with regard to the aims of the system — the development of teachers’ and school staff’s morale, ability, and competence, the improvement of teaching and learning, and the reinvigoration of schools — the trial proved to be “useful.” Furthermore, the processes of the trial improved communication between teachers and the head teacher by means of meetings. They also led to discussion about the school goals in relation to individual teachers’ goals. Hence, better sharing of goals is needed.

In addition, in the schools administered by the Osaka-fu Board of Education, the trial promoted lesson observations by head teachers which had been seldom conducted. This led to the reinvigoration of the schools. Thus, we think that the aims of the trial were mostly achieved. (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004, p. 50)

Nevertheless, there are some points made by the Board, which are difficult to accept. First, it is unlikely that the results confirmed the effectiveness of particular parts of the processes as the Board would have us believe. The Board stated: “out of the teachers and school staff that participated in the scheme, those who said that the major parts of the procedures were ‘useful’ outnumbered those who said ‘useless’” (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004, pp. 48-49). In fact, the percentage of the teachers who chose “useless” was 35.0% for the self-report of
Chapter Three

goals, 24.3% for the meetings with the head teacher, 21.9% for the developer and supporter system, and 21.3% for the opinion sheet. However, it should be noted that there were sceptical teachers who answered neither positively nor negatively. For example, as Table 3.4 shows, in regard to the self-report of goals, 12.0% were anxious about its formalities, 9.3% about head teachers’ lack of understanding, 6.8% about the way in which the head teachers present their policies, and 15.3% about the way in which individual teachers’ goals are supposed to be articulated in relation to organisational goals.

Choices that might suggest no more than conditional acceptance (i.e., “Good, but . . .”) are misleading. The Board, nonetheless, chose to consider these choices as positive answers.

Table 3.4 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on the self-report of goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Teacher n = 17,731</th>
<th>Head Teacher n = 179</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Useful for understanding individual and organisational goals.</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful for sharing issues and objectives.</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about its formalities.</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about whether the head teachers appropriately understand teachers’ goals.</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about whether the head teachers appropriately present their policies.</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about whether goals are appropriately shared.</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useless.</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Certainly, 25.7% and 21.8% of all teachers answered that the self-report was “useful” for the purposes of “understanding individual and organisational goals” and “sharing goals,” respectively. Here, however, it should be noted that teachers could choose both of these positive answers, as the questionnaire followed a
multiple-choice style. On the other hand, logically, teachers who declared the self-report “useless” would not have chosen any conditional answers. Considering these factors, it is not possible to say that a majority of the teachers confirmed the effectiveness of the procedures. Rather, as opposed to the point made by the Board, it is possible that those who viewed parts of the procedures positively were in the minority. This is applicable to the other parts of the procedures. I reproduce Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 below which provide illustrations, though I will not duplicate the reasons here.

Table 3.5 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on meetings with the head teacher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Teacher ( n = 17,731 )</th>
<th>Head Teacher ( n = 179 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Useful for understanding individual and organisational goals.</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful for sharing issues and goals.</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about the way they are conducted.</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about whether the head teacher appropriately understands teachers’ goals.</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useless.</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on the trainer and supporter system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Teachers n = 17,731</th>
<th>Head Teachers n = 179</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Useful for the head teacher to understand teachers’ work.</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful for receiving advice.</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but the deputy head is not suitable for the role of supporter.</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about whether the head teacher appropriately understands teachers’ goals.</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about whether advice is relevant.</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useless.</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.7 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka regarding the opinion sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Teachers n = 17,731</th>
<th>Head Teachers n = 179</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Useful for raising teachers’ awareness of participation in school management.</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about its formalities.</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about the practicality for reflecting views on school management.</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about whether the head teachers appropriately present their policies.</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but it should to be handed in to the Board instead of the head teacher.</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useless.</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Meanwhile, the head teachers confirmed the effectiveness of the procedures, which contrasts with the teachers, as was the case in Tokyo. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that a significant minority of the head teachers raised serious concerns regarding aspects of the procedures. Indeed, the head teachers were
likely to be anxious about the practicality of the procedures, even when compared to the teachers. While a majority of the head teachers approved of the rationale behind the new system, they likely felt that the system was in need of reform.

Also problematic is the Board’s concluding statement: “With regard to the performance assessment, although issues were raised concerning how to deal with the work on which goals are not set, or the different degrees of difficulty of goals, we still think that it was accepted as being practical” (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004, p. 49). The Board also made the same statement in regard to the competence assessment. In reality, however, 47.9% of the teachers answered that the performance assessment could not or should not be conducted; only 8.1% viewed it as practical as seen in Table 3.8. Similarly, 43.2% answered that the competence assessment could not or should not be conducted; only 11.2% answered that it was practical as seen in Table 3.9. Even among the head teachers, no more than 27.4% and 39.1%, respectively, regarded the performance and competence assessment as practical. Given these results, the Board’s above-mentioned statement hardly makes sense.

Table 3.8 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka regarding the performance assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Teacher n = 17,731</th>
<th>Head Teacher n = 179</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical.</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but the work on which goals are not set ought to be assessed.</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but the different degrees of difficulty of goals should be taken into account.</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot or should not be conducted.</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter Three

Table 3.9 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on the competence assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Teacher n = 17,731</th>
<th>Head Teacher n = 179</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical.</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but the teacher’s role and obligations should be taken into account.</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but only the positive sides should be noted in the ‘special remarks’ column.</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but professional behaviour should be assessed independently.</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot or should not be conducted.</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Board reinforced these statements by noting that 40.6% were satisfied with their own performance assessment results and that 25.6% were satisfied with their own competence assessment results (i.e., they said that their self-evaluation concurred with the head teacher’s assessment). However, it is more important here to note that a significant minority of the teachers distinguished their general views on the system from those on their own individual assessment results. Individual assessment results depend on the circumstances — for instance, who the head teacher (i.e., evaluator/trainer) is, what the head teacher’s policies are, and what the relationships between teachers and the head teacher are like. The teachers may have made their judgements regarding the practicality of the system as a whole independently of whether they were content with the evaluation results that they received. Furthermore, there was a notable difference between the rates of concurrence of teachers’ self-review with head teachers’ evaluations reported by teachers and head teachers. While 82.1% of the head teachers confirmed the concurrences, only 55.9% of the teachers did so. This suggests that the reports on this concurrence were not as reliable as they first appeared.

As Table 3.10 shows, a minority of teachers confirmed the effectiveness of the
new system as a whole. Only 13.3% chose the answer, “The system is useful for professional development of teachers, improvement of teaching and learning, and reinvigoration of schools.” Meanwhile, 47.4% answered the system is “useless.” Thus, on the whole, it is safe to say that views teachers held on the effectiveness of the new system were largely negative in opposition to the conclusions drawn by the Board. The head teachers responded to the questionnaire more positively than the teachers did. However, their attitudes towards the new system were still often ambiguous or conditional.

Table 3.10 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on the effectiveness of the new system as a whole

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Teacher n = 17,731</th>
<th>Head Teacher n = 179</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Useful for professional development of teachers, improvement of teaching and learning, and reinvigoration of schools.</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but the system should be implemented all throughout the year¹¹.</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about the evaluator/trainer and supporter system.</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, but concerned about the lack of understanding on the part of teachers and school staff.</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useless.</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Board’s analysis was arbitrary in some regards. For example, the Board assumed choices reflecting conditional acceptance indicated affirmation in order to claim that the positive answers outnumbered the negative. Furthermore, the Board emphasised that those who participated in the scheme were much more

¹¹ The trial ran from July through January, as preparation took time.
favourable than those who did not, which is misleading. Rather, attention should be paid to the fact that 17.8% of the teachers and school staff did not submit their goals, and that 24.9% did not have any meetings with their head teachers as a part of the procedure (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004, p. 7). The Board presented an interpretation, which suggested that teachers did not participate because they did not properly understand the new system. However, it is possible that they did not participate because they disagreed with the system on principle. The teachers and school staff were not obliged to participate in the trial, but the fact that a significant minority actually chose not to participate suggests a lack of confidence in the new system.

3.3 Views of Teachers and Head Teachers in England and Wales

In the UK, there is ample evidence that both head teachers and teachers were skeptical of, if not hostile to, the idea of linking pay to performance and its claimed advantages (Farrell & Morris, 2004; Marsden, 2000; Marsden & French, 1998; Neill, 2001). For example, a questionnaire survey completed in 1997 showed that 63.1% of the respondents from National Association of Head Teachers, which mainly consists of nursery and primary head teachers, and 50.2% of the respondents from Secondary Head Association disagreed with the principle of performance-related pay (Marsden & French, 1998, p. 113). Marsden and French (1998) indicated that head teachers were less in favour of performance-related pay than employees of other public service sectors, such as Inland Revenue, employment service, and National Health Service trust hospitals.

Teachers shared their disfavor of performance-related pay with head teachers: “teachers stand apart from most other groups of public servants, but alongside doctors and nurses, in their opposition to performance-related pay in principle” (Marsden, 2000, p. 3). Indeed, only 23% of 760 teachers in England agreed that
“The principle of relating teachers’ pay to performance is a good one” (Marsden, 2000). Additionally, Farrell and Morris (2004) reported that 65.4% of 330 teachers in Wales disagreed with relating pay to performance in principle, with 31.5% disagreeing strongly (Farrell & Morris, 2004).

This skepticism on the part of teachers was associated with their understanding of the nature of their work. Indeed, no less than 93% of the respondents agreed with “Performance-related pay will be problematic because it is hard to link the work done in schools to individual performance.” In addition, 92.1% felt that performance-related pay would cause resentment among teachers. Thus, a great majority of teachers perceived unfairness in the operation of performance-related pay schemes, and they were deeply concerned about its deteriorating effects on relationships and collaborative work (Farrell & Morris, 2004, p. 91).

Farrell and Morris (2004) also showed that the respondents were generally suspicious of the advantages that the government promised would derive from the introduction of performance-related pay. Specifically, 80.6% of the respondents were suspicious of the positive effects on motivation of teachers; likewise, 83.0% on teacher recruitment and 83.9% on teacher retention (Farrell & Morris, 2004, p. 89). Meanwhile, Neill (2001) analysed the returns of questionnaire from 2,722 teachers in England. The results showed among other findings that: (1) 80.6% disagreed with “Performance review will help improve teacher morale and motivation in the school”; (2) 65.3% disagreed with “The performance management arrangements will help me improve my teaching”; and (3) 56.3% disagreed with “The performance management process will provide me a valuable opportunity to identify my achievements, skills and competence.” On the whole, these questionnaire-based studies came to almost the same conclusion that the new performance-related pay and performance management in England and Wales would “do little to increase teachers’ motivation, to improve teacher recruitment
“and retention,” which were, after all, “core to the rationale for the scheme’s introduction” (Farrell & Morris, 2004, p. 101). They suggested that the scheme would not improve the quality of teaching either. What is worse, the introduction of performance-related pay and performance management brought anxiety about undesirable side-effects to a majority of teachers.

A more recent survey noted the changes in teachers’ and head teachers’ views of performance-related pay and performance management (Marsden & Belfield, 2005, 2006). Marsden and his colleagues had been conducting panel survey research since just before the introduction of performance management in the autumn of 2000. In the first wave of the survey in 2000, no more than 23% out of 760 teachers on the panel agreed with the principle of performance-related pay. With the same item in the questionnaire, 37% out of 105 head teachers on the panel agreed. These results mostly accorded with those of some other attitudinal surveys conducted at almost the same time, as has been shown above (Farrell & Morris, 2004; Neill, 2001). However, the results of the latest survey conducted in 2004 showed that 39% of the same teachers agreed with the principle of performance-related pay, an increase from 23% in 2000. Furthermore, the percentage of the head teachers who agreed with it dramatically increased to 62% in 2004, from 37% in 2000 (Marsden & Belfield, 2006, pp. 9-10). These results suggest that, within the intervening years, many head teachers’ and teachers’ opinions of performance-related pay shifted from the unfavourable to the favourable.

Marsden and Belfield did not explain these shifts by the effectiveness of performance-related pay as an economic incentive. Indeed, they found that performance-related pay increases neither morale nor motivation for a great majority of teachers. What they thought to be the most significant factor causing the changes, among others such as dispelled concerns with favoritism and unfairness, was improvements in target setting — better articulation between
individual teachers’ and the school’s goals and, as a consequence, the improvement of school management (Marsden & Belfield, 2005).

In a later paper, Marsden and Belfield referred to this as the “joined-up” goal setting or “integrative bargaining” approach to performance management. The integrative, as opposed to the distributive, bargaining approach focuses on adapting the contents and priorities of work performance on the part of the “agent” to the changing needs of the “principal,” and on the need to advance on the basis of give and take by both parties (Marsden & Belfield, 2006, p. 6).

Marsden and Belfield (2005) further considered the concurrence of the judgments of improved school management between head teachers and teachers, which they argued implies that the improvements were actually happening. Their analysis showed that such concurrence could be observed in roughly 15% to 20% of the sample schools, where “joined up” goal setting is assumed to be functioning effectively (Marsden & Belfield, 2005, p. 16). They also suggested that academic records from those schools might well be better than other schools.

The proposition of “joined up” goal setting is also significant for the purpose of the present research, precisely because the new teacher evaluation in Japan is intended to cause the articulation of individual and organisational goals. Hence, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 consider the proposition within the Japanese context, but I will briefly comment on Marsden and Belfield studies here.

Although there was apparently a beneficial effect of performance management on school improvement (it was observed in a small proportion of schools), this does not represent a radical change. Their methodology was also overly reliant on their survey findings. They only hinted at some other reasons that might have explained the teachers’ and head teachers’ attitudinal shifts, but they could have more fully explored the other reasons by means of qualitative investigations.

Furthermore, what seems more important to me is that the nature of these goals, or the nature of school improvement in the end, was not explored. The head
teachers and teachers in Marsden and Belfield’s study reported that they were able to set better school goals than they had been before. However, it is not clear whether the school goals were good ones in an educational sense. In the English context where schools are compared with each other based on their examination results, every measure is likely to be used to raise the position of schools in the league tables. Given that, what the study presupposes is school improvement may be problematic. Indeed, many commentators do not simply believe that raising examination results means improvement of teaching and learning in any authentic sense, besides recording harmful side-effects of performativity deriving from target or objective based education reform (Ball, 2001; Gillborn & Youdell, 2000; Thrupp & Hursh, 2006). Better goal setting may lead to better test scores. However, here “are real dangers that distorting the importance of clarity within a strongly instrumental process like target setting runs the risk of severely weakening its essential links with the larger undertakings which it is designed to serve” (Fielding, 2001, p. 145, cited in Thrupp & Willmott, 2003, p. 122). As Fielding argues, we should ask how those test score are raised (for example, through an increasing incidence of “teaching to the test,” greater competition and substantial individual and group pressures) and whose scores are raised (for example, those on the borderline at the expense of those whose attainment is seen to be significantly lower). In other words, whether adopting a particular approach of goal setting is morally, as opposed to pragmatically, justifiable is most important.

3.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have looked at the previous surveys that have addressed teachers and head teachers in Tokyo, Osaka, England, and Wales. In this section, I summarise the findings to raise points that I need to explore more fully.
In Japan, teachers did not confirm the advantages of the new teacher evaluation which had been claimed by the two largest boards of education. Nearly 70% of the teachers in Tokyo doubted that the processes would lead to higher morale, better professional development, and improvement of school management. On the contrary, a majority of union member teachers in Tokyo claimed that the new teacher evaluation processes had unfavourable impacts, namely, they contributed to a less relaxed and animated atmosphere at school and poorer relationships between managers and teachers and among the staff. The experience of participating in evaluation processes demoralised many teachers. In Osaka, nearly half of the teachers answered that the new procedure was “useless” for its original purposes, and many others showed concern regarding its practicality, despite the reorientation towards the professional development model. On the whole, a majority of teachers in both Tokyo and Osaka, whether union members or not, did not have confidence in the new teacher evaluation policies and practices.

There were marked differences in viewpoints between teachers and head teachers on the effectiveness and practicality of the procedures. In Tokyo, fewer than a quarter of the head teachers had an unfavourable opinion of the claimed advantages of the processes. In Osaka, the percentage of head teachers who thought of the procedures as “useless” was only 1.7%. These results indicated that head teachers’ views were more favourable than teachers’ were. Looking more specifically at how head teachers felt, they were more likely to confirm the effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation for school management than for teachers’ morale and professional development. Indeed, 62.3% of the head teachers in Tokyo confirmed the favourable effects on school management, while no more than 16.1% of teachers did so.

The surveys that have addressed teachers and head teachers in England and Wales allow an interesting comparison, although the meanings and implications
of the questionnaire items are not exactly interchangeable. The opinions of the ineffectiveness of teacher evaluation held by teachers in Tokyo and Osaka mostly concurred with those held by teachers and head teachers in England and Wales. At the same time, however, it was found that Japanese head teachers were more amenable to the idea of teacher evaluation than their counterparts in England and Wales, as well as Japanese teachers. This can be explained by the policy developments that have been continually identifying head teachers as management who are expected to explain, advocate or simply “implement” government initiatives, as stated in Chapter 2. Both these findings and the Marsden and Belfield’s studies draw our particular attention to the way teachers and head teachers in Japan respond to the requirement of goal setting. The professional development model for teacher evaluation, based on the idea of management by objectives, assumes that individual teachers’ goals accord with the head teacher’s management policies. The results of previous surveys conducted in Tokyo and Osaka seem to suggest that head teachers are willing to use the processes to help teachers understand their management policies. This use made of new teacher evaluation by head teachers can mean changes in the way of managing school as well as teachers. Thus, a significant question to be addressed by means of using a national survey and interview data is “How is this particular process of goal setting by individual teachers actually enacted?”
Chapter Four: Review of Literature and Theories

In this chapter, I review two types of literature. One is concerned with the policies and practices of teacher evaluation (the subject of the present thesis) and the other with performativity (the theory of the present thesis). In conducting this literature review, I discuss how a particular perspective of performativity (i.e., the work through, as opposed to work upon, perspective) is most relevant to the examination of teacher evaluation policies as enacted in Japan.

4.1 Micro-economic Theory Applied to Teacher Evaluation

In Chapter 2, I described the two main assumptions underlying the policies and practices of new teacher evaluation in Japan: the micro-economic theory applied to teacher evaluation and the professional development model of teacher evaluation. In this and the next sections, I critically examine these assumptions in turn.

Micro-economic theory claims that a well-conceived compensation system linking evaluation results and pay motivates employees to work for the attainment of organisational goals (Lazear, 1995; Lazear & Gibbs, 2009). In Japan, performance-based personnel management (seikashugi) for workers in general, and teachers in particular, has been proposed as a result of these ideas (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 2002, 2004; Jinji In, 2005; Koseirodosho, 2008; Naikaku, 2001; Nakamura, 2006). However, the argument does not pay adequate attention to the particular nature of teachers’ work. This makes the application of micro-economic theory to teacher evaluation particularly difficult.

In the controversial teachers’ efficiency rating plan in the late 1950s, the ideological and political goals of government were at stake. This caused “violent internecine conflict” (Duke, 1973, p. 138). But this could not entirely account for
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the failure of almost all the prefecture boards of education to put performance-related pay into force. Duke argued that it was both opposition by teachers and problems with the policy itself that made teachers’ efficiency rating plans ineffective.

The relative impotence of the rating plan stemmed from the school boards’ concern that the majority of teachers, both non-union and union members, did not approve the plan. Hence, to enforce the results of the evaluation would invite total opposition by the teaching corps; the results of the evaluation that could be obtained from the ratings did not seem worth the trouble that was sure to come. Moreover, many school board members themselves were not convinced of the validity of the evaluation forms used as the basis in determining teachers’ pay increases. Hence, because of Nikkyoso’s efforts to undermine the plan, in addition to the inherent difficulties of evaluating teaching, the rating plan quickly turned ineffective. (Duke, 1973, p. 153)

About a half century later, many teachers’ unions again alleged that the new teacher evaluation schemes would be divisive and impair teachers’ collaborative activities and relationships, especially when pay links were threatened. Indeed, as stated earlier, the proposed introduction of new teacher evaluation schemes went hand in hand with the reform of public employees’ salary system. In 2005, the recommendations of the National Personnel Authority (Jinji In), the state agency which determines yearly pay increases and reforms in the salary system of public employees, finally included a proposal of performance-related pay (Jinji In, 2005). The proposal came after the prolonged debate over a performance-based personnel system for public servants. Reliable evaluation was the prerequisite for the introduction of performance-related pay.
Critics cited the inherent difficulty of properly evaluating the complex and collaborative nature of teachers’ work and the failure of performance-related pay for teachers — and government employees in general — in other countries (Katsuno, 2002a, 2004; Nakata, 2000; Ogawa, 1996). For example, Katsuno (2004) referred to Murnane and Cohen (1986) who drew on contract literature, to examine why most merit pay plans had failed in the USA. They illustrated that supervisors needed to convincingly answer the following questions, which workers might pose:

- Why does worker X get merit pay and I don’t?
- What can I do to get merit pay?

As an example, Murnane and Cohen (1986) picked the supervisor of workers who are unloading boxes from a truck. In this case, should a dissatisfied worker ask either or both questions, the supervisor can simply say, “Worker X carried two boxes at a time, while you carried only one. If you carry two boxes at a time, you will get merit pay, too” (p. 7). However, due to the “imprecise nature of the activity of teaching” or the fact that “effective teaching cannot be characterized as the consistent use of particular well-defined techniques” (p. 7), a head teacher cannot provide concrete answers to the questions. Thus, the problems plaguing merit pay are not just about careless “implementation” or the inadequate training of evaluators; the very nature of the teaching activity is a more fundamental problem.

Another requirement for the effective operation of performance-related pay as a means for measuring, at relatively low cost, is the actual contribution of the individual worker to the firm’s output (Murnane & Cohen, 1986, p. 4). Again, this is not feasible with teacher’s work and thus merit pay did not work well and was often a reason for complaint. As a result, teachers have been demoralised instead
of inspired.

The same evaluation problem applies to government employees in general. After reviewing the experience of many countries, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report entitled “Performance-related Pay Policies for Government Employees” concluded that the economic incentive effects of performance-related pay were overestimated (OECD, 2005). In the 1990s, the OECD had already indicated that performance-related pay for government employees in managerial posts did not meet the requirements for the system to work as an effective incentive mechanism. The OECD, as well as Murnane and Cohen (1986), blamed this failure on the difficulty of judging performance, not on system design and operation problems. The public sector borrowed the concept of performance-related pay from the private sector to enhance the motivation and accountability of public employees. The OECD report, however, has put the effectiveness of performance-related pay in doubt.

Apart from Murnane and Cohen (1986) and the OECD (2005), many scholars have discussed problems of introducing performance-related pay owing to the nature of work that employees conduct. For example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) argued that incentive pay systems could have undesirable effects on overall performance when the evaluated work was multidimensional (see also Burgess & Ratto, 2003; Dolton, McIntosh, & Chevalier, 2003). Because of the measurement problem mentioned above, the incentive pay systems are likely to reward the attainment of easily defined tasks or goals. Hence, employees are encouraged to divert effort away from other, but possibly important, tasks. Teachers possess multiple goals for their practices and their work is characterised as being multidimensional (Lortie, 2002). Given this, the misallocation of effort caused by thoughtlessly designed performance-related pay systems would have significant consequences. Indeed, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) referred to the distortions caused by the use of incentive pay for teachers based on their students’ test result
as an illustration of such consequences (p. 25).

Considering the literature, and also teachers’ perceptions that have been reviewed in Chapter 3 and will be discussed later in Chapter 6, the micro-economic assumption of teacher evaluation cannot be validated. Some teachers agree with the idea of performance-related pay in principle, but disagree with its application because of the difficulty of individually evaluating their performance. They also observe that enforced performance pay might cause undesirable competitiveness among teachers, leading to the deterioration of teaching and learning.

4.2 The Professional Development Model of Teacher Evaluation

The new teacher evaluation schemes in Japan invariably adopt the professional development model, in a particular form of “management by objectives” (Kariya & Kaneko, 2010). Prefecture boards of education claimed that management by objectives ought to contribute to the professional development of teachers (see Chapter 2).

For example, the Nagano Prefecture Board of Education was keener than others on the idea of teacher development by means of a new teacher evaluation scheme. The board declared that evaluation results should not be linked to pay, but it adopted management by objectives as a way of teacher development. Thus, the new scheme should help individual teachers perform educational activities pro-actively by self-management and develop themselves further by analysing their attainments. The final report of the Inquiry Committee on Teacher Evaluation (Naganoken Kyoin Hyoka ni kannsuru Kento linkai) gave the following rationale:

- Teachers should enhance their awareness of, motivation for, and involvement in their tasks by setting their goals, taking into consideration the congruence
between their own goals and the aims of whole school, subject areas, or departments, and having in mind their professional development.

- Through the processes of initial setting of goals, and interim and year-end reporting of attainments, teachers and head teachers should have meetings and improve their mutual understanding and communication. Also, teachers should be encouraged to regularly consult with deputy head teachers and colleagues.
- Teachers should be encouraged to improve themselves by understanding their own dispositions and abilities.
- Head teachers should be able to extend more appropriate help to teachers and improve school management by understanding the teachers’ dispositions and abilities. (Naganoken Kyoin Hyoka ni kansuru Kento Iinkai, 2005)

The report demanded that teachers be encouraged to improve their dispositions and abilities by self-reviewing and reflecting on their work and to understand themselves more objectively through meetings with the evaluator. Here, we can see the theory of intrinsic motivation, as opposed to the micro-economic motivation theory, being adopted. It argues that teachers will be better motivated to work and gain a better sense of self-efficacy if they are given autonomy in goal setting. In the USA, Odden and Kelly (1997) summarised how the theory of intrinsic motivation could be applied to a new form of teacher evaluation:

Overall, motivation theories suggest that employees are more likely to be intrinsically motivated when they have control over the quality of their work and are given ample opportunities to create a sense of professional efficacy through goal-setting, professional development, job enlargement, job involvement, and goal attainment. (p. 63)
This is also what the goal-setting theory of motivation includes (Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1997; Lock & Latham, 1990). In Japan, advocates of the professional development model of teacher evaluation affirmed the plausibility of the theory of intrinsic motivation and promoted the concept and procedures of management by objectives (Sato & Sakamoto, 1996; Yaosaka, 2005).

However, this way of conceiving a professional development model (i.e., composed of setting goals, meetings with the head and deputy head teachers and self-review of performance and competence, with the result of enhanced teachers’ intrinsic motivation and professional development) is still problematic. I will expand on this idea in reference to relevant literature from the UK. The rationale of the professional development models developed in the UK and Japan and elements involved in their processes were mostly identical (Katsuno, 1992, 2004; Urano, 1993). Any clear evidence of policy borrowing regarding teacher evaluation policies cannot be presented, but considering that both countries shared the same political needs for enhancing teachers’ accountability and performance (see Chapter 2), it seems likely that the preceding developments of policy and research in the UK had affected those in Japan.

**An outline of the professional development model**

In the UK, much of the teacher evaluation literature that appeared around 1990 advocated the professional development model, explicitly or implicitly criticising the accountability model. This literature and research influenced the introduction of teacher appraisals, the predecessor of performance management in the UK (National Steering Group on the School Teacher Appraisal Pilot Study, 1989). For example, Evans and Tomlinson (1989) summarised the background and development that led to the introduction of teacher appraisals, using a dichotomy of the increasing demand for accountability of schools and teachers on the one
hand and the school improvement movement on the other. The authors understood
that the school improvement movement comprised the combined efforts of
teachers, local education authorities, and educationists at broad and relevant
curricula, and more relevant pedagogy and evaluations (Evans & Tomlinson,
1989).

The professional development model of teacher evaluation is intended to
clarify individual teachers’ needs for professional development and thereby direct
training and in-service education to meet the needs. The model presumes that,
based on the attainment of objectives agreed to by an evaluator (manager) and
teacher at appraisal meetings, the teacher should engage in formal developmental
tasks. This function of teacher evaluation in diagnosing professional
developmental needs is called “appraisal for professional development” (Evans &
Tomlinson, 1989, p. 27). However, the professional development model assumes
another function — “appraisal as professional development.” Its rationale is that
by participating in teacher evaluation, teachers have an opportunity for
professional development, reflecting on and better understanding their own
teaching activities. The professional development model emphasises self-review
by teachers, which is thought to be useful for enhancing the validity of evaluation
by the evaluator.

Teachers are also supposed to reflect on their own teaching activities through
self-review, obtain a clearer understanding of their strong and weak points, and
then improve their practices and themselves even without formal training or in-
service courses. Thus, self-review is not simply the measure of appraisal
information collected but is, in itself, a “developmental focus” (Bollington,
Hopkins, & West, 1990, p. 56).

In the professional development model, lesson observation is assumed to play
an important role. If, after observation, the observer’s opinion is made known to
the teacher without delay, and discussion ensues based on that opinion, teachers
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should be encouraged to reflect on the practices. For lesson observation to be such a collaboration, mutual understanding and trust between the observer and the observed is imperative. That same trust should apply to meetings. Meanwhile, a lesson observer and evaluator must have a thorough grasp of the complex and contingent nature of teaching and improve her/his clinical capabilities. The “clinical supervisor” cited by Bollington, Hopkins, and West (1990, p. 40) should respect the judgment made by a teacher in a concrete pedagogical situation, provide an objective and constructive opinion, and help the teacher gain a deeper understanding of her/his own teaching practices.

The professional development model of teacher evaluation tends to relate individual teachers’ practices to the activities of the school and professional development to organisational development. Indeed, a professional development model firmly locates a teacher’s self-review within the parameters of whole-school review (Hopkins, Howard, Johnston, Glover, & Woodburn, 1991). It is claimed that the appraisal of individual teachers ought to be more substantive within an organisational context. Communication among teachers could thus improve, and effective strategies could also be found for improving overall school educational activities.

**Tensions between the accountability and professional development models**

Evans and Tomlinson (1989) understood that the two teacher appraisal models, professional development and accountability, were distinct and “mutually exclusive and impossible to integrate” (Evans & Tomlinson, 1989, p. 15). For the professional model to thrive, there should be an open relationship based on mutual trust and understanding that enables educational discussion between the evaluator and the evaluated. It is hardly possible to obtain such a relationship, though, if summative judgments for personnel decisions are to be made. Most of the teacher evaluation literature in Japan shares this tension (Kiyohara, 2005; Yaosaka, 2005),
and the professional development model is rarely criticised. Presumably, one of the exceptions is a sociological study into the development of local teacher evaluation schemes in a particular prefecture (Kaneko, 2010). This study illustrates the variance between the model of teacher development held by policymakers and the ideas of teacher development conceived by teachers. This variance led to abandonment of an originally conceived plan. However, for the most part, the teacher evaluation literature tends to adopt a problem solving approach (Thrupp & Willmott, 2003, pp. 54-55) and focuses on operational problems.

Here my main objection concerns the lack of perspective on micro-politics or power relations in the professional development model. It seems that advocates of this model base their arguments on the humane or subjective understanding of organisation while paying attention to teachers’ intrinsic motivation, beliefs, and values. If we accept this perspective, individual and organisational development should be considered political and would be laden with conflicts. On the contrary, the professional development model takes for granted the concurrence between personal, organisational, and systemic objectives. I would argue that the process of teacher evaluation is a crucible of social and political negotiation even if it is intended to promote individual and organisational development.

The professional development model puts weight on teachers’ participation in the process of evaluation, claiming that it will enhance their intrinsic motivation and commitment to organisational objectives. This is called a “commitment strategy” (as opposed to a “control strategy”) — the way by which teachers can be persuaded to contribute to their individual and organisational development (Skyes, 1990, p. 192) — and it is based on a notion of collaboration. However, if we pay enough attention to how power works in the process of participation, motivation, commitment, and collaboration, the professional development model would be no less constrictive than the accountability model. I agree with Hoyle (1989) when he
noted that:

It could be argued that participative appraisal — and indeed, the whole of the collaborative approach to professionalisation referred to above — could be seen as a greater threat to autonomy than the managerial form, since the intrusiveness of the latter is likely to be limited by the fact that schools are characterized by a structural looseness, allowing heads and teachers to collude in the ritualisation of appraisal, observing the form but not the substance. (p. 65)

Seen in this light, the dichotomy of the accountability and professional development models would be misleading. The professional model of teacher evaluation, as well as the accountability model, may be considered a control strategy or “disciplinary power” (Rose, 1999, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, at the macro level, the professional development model of teacher evaluation will enable the state to “steer at a distance” teachers’ work (Whitty, et al., 1998, p. 35).

Since the professional development model of teacher evaluation lacks perspectives on power and micro-politics, it cannot seriously deal with the effects on teachers’ subjectivity of self-reviewing and being evaluated, which has been discussed in the literature of performativity and teachers’ identity (see the next section). The professional development model deals with the effects almost exclusively in terms of individual and organisational developments. In this regard, Power (1997) explored what we may call the productive power of evaluation, in his critical review of the audit regime emerging in public administration and corporate governance. According to Power, the values and practices which evaluation entails will penetrate deeply into the core of organisational operations, not just in terms of requiring energy and resources to conform to evaluation demands but in the creation of new mentalities, new incentives, and perceptions of
significance. In other words, the evaluation regime may contribute to the construction of a new organisational actor (Power, 1997, p. 97). I argue that Power’s insight is also highly relevant to the professional development model of teacher evaluation in Japan.

4.3 Theories of Performativity

As stated in Chapter 1, a particular reading of performativity is relevant to the present study of how teacher evaluation polices are being enacted in Japanese schools. Thus, I will introduce the work through perspective of performativity, which allows us to analyse the impact of teacher evaluation from a micro-political or relational viewpoint. The need for this viewpoint has been partly shown by the examination of the problematic rationale of the professional development model in the previous section, and discussion of the literature on performativity illustrates it further.

Beginning with the meaning of performativity, the post-modernist theorist Lyotard stated: “knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?” (Lyotard, 1984, pp. 8-9) For Lyotard, all of the “grand narratives” such as “the dialects of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of the wealth” (p. xxiii) have been losing their legitimating function since the late 1950s. This modern mode of legitimation has been replaced by performativity, defined as the maximisation of a system’s output and the minimisation of its input.

In defining performativity as such, Lyotard used the idea of Wittgenstein’s language games (i.e., modes of legitimation) and applied it to “a general field of social agonistics” (Mckenzie, 2001, p. 162). Then he observed:
Decision makers attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. They allocate our lives for growth of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on the system’s performance — efficiency. (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv)

Under this principle of performativity, other language games are allowed only if they are calculable in terms of system optimisation. As a result, “the application of this criterion to all of our language games necessarily implies a certain level of terror, whether soft or hard: be operational (that is commensurable) or disappear” (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv).

Here Lyotard conceptualised performativity explicitly as a mode of power, regulation and control. In this thinking, the most important question is who knows, decides and controls. The following question posed by Ball (2003) echoes this:

Who is it that determines what is to count as a valuable, effective or satisfactory performance and what measures and indicators are considered valid? (p. 216)

Elliott’s formulation of “indirect regulation of performance by central government” (Elliott, 2001, p. 192) or “steering at distance” (Whitty, et al., 1998, p. 35) answers Ball’s question. Meanwhile, it is possible that these formulations of questions and answers, despite their significance, distract us from a different view of the way performativity is enacted in schools.

Related to this, Youdell (2010) summarised the way performativity is adopted in policy sociology as follows:
In policy sociology performativity is regularly interrogated for the ways that it remakes education by reducing both education and those who populate it to what is measurable, manageable, knowable. It is an account of the performative production of constraint. (p. 226)

As will be discussed later in this chapter, my reading of the literature on performativity in schools is that this constraint comes from elsewhere (at least from outside schools) as mandates, and it is the thing which teachers are required to individually face. I challenge this. My assumption is that performativity policies initiate performativity in schools but that performativity is enacted through the social interactions of teachers. In other words, performativity, as a “disciplinary system” (Ball, 1998, p. 190) or “disciplinary power” (Rose, 1999, pp. 22-23), does not simply work upon individual teachers’ selves and practices. As discussed below, it also works through the social interactions of teachers.

**Performativity and control over teachers’ work**

Concepts of performativity are useful in examining the impacts of recent education policies that are preoccupied with performance of teachers, students and schools — performativity policies such as target-setting, evaluation of a school’s and teacher’s performance, league tables constructed from pupil test scores, and performance-related pay for teachers. These policies most likely result in “the refocusing of school management on the attainment of narrow and partial, albeit important, short term outcome measure” (Husbands, 2001, p. 15). However, the performativity culture that these policies introduce to schools at the same time has a serious limitation. Elliot (2001) stated:

> Paradoxically, making performance visible by measuring it against indicators depends on making evidence about its real impact invisible,
since such evidence would reveal the dependence of outcomes on time and context, and limits on their predictability. (p. 197)

While quality of teaching and learning is essentially time-dependent, the performativity culture is based on the assumption that the relationship between cause and effect can be captured in a time-less form, in the here-and-now (i.e., the audit language). “If quality cannot be measured against timeless, fixed and immutable standards or targets, it does not exist” (p. 194).

A problem with this culture is that schools and teachers find it difficult to provide flexible responses to their students’ needs. Elliott (2001) illustrated this:

The more pervasive the gaze of performance audit on the activities of teachers, the less it becomes possible for them to balance learning requirements against the need of their students for non-formal space and time in which to pursue their own “learning agendas.” (p. 195)

Chua (2009) framed this difficulty from a somewhat different point of view. Citing Simon (1996), Chua (2009) regards teachers as designers whose activities aim to transform the present state of affairs into a preferred one — a student who is more knowledgeable, more skilled, and more enlightened. However, to the extent that performativity privileges visible, measurable outcomes, it diminishes teachers’ cognitive ability to conceive of a variety of other intrinsically valuable goals and thus “lowers the professional standards of educators just as it cultivates unscientific designerly ways of knowing” (p. 160). A teacher’s “cognitive soul” (p. 162) has been occupied by the performativity discourse and consequently the teacher is obsessed with those particular goals measured by performance indicators. Hence, Chua (2009) argued for the necessity of broadening this “irrationally muted design cognition” and developing “designerly ways of
knowing” (p. 162).

Certainly, this situation has much to do with the teachers’ dilemma and compliance, and identity work. With regard to performance management, an equivalent of teacher evaluation in Japan, Gleeson and Gunter (2001) stated that it was not simply concerned with teacher pay and recruitment, and that it had further implications which connect managerial procedures with desired outcomes and behaviour which may have little to do with learning or professional development. These outcomes and behaviours, with a primary focus on pupil achievement, are presented as targets to teachers. This has the following effects:

From “playing the game” to strategic compliance, professionals have become adept at distancing themselves from the values they believe in to those which require manipulation in order to get through the wide range of internally and externally imposed targets. (p. 149)

In a similar vein, Ball (2001, pp. 216-218) wrote about “fabrications” that are selections among possible representation of the organisations or individuals who are required to account for their performance.

There is a further problematic assumption on which the culture of performativity is based; perfect information about the workings of individuals or organisations can be provided by means of measurement, audit, assessment and evaluation. According to Elliot (2001), this assumption reflects “an interest in making individuals or organisations objects of social engineering” (p. 194). In as much as the culture of performativity is underpinned by this assumption, it will strengthen “indirect regulation of performance by central government” (p. 192).

While control over teachers’ work has been in existence for a considerable time, its meaning has been changing. Gleeson and Gunter (2001) depicted how the modes of regulation has shifted from “relative autonomy” (since 1960s through
mid-1980s), through “controlled autonomy” (since 1980s through 1990s), to “productive autonomy” (since 2000 through onwards) (pp. 142-143). The latest mode of the performance control of teacher and their work (i.e., performativity) is characterised as follows:

- Teachers must be internally accountable to themselves and their organisations through formal audit of students learning and outcomes. Head teachers and senior managers take control of the process.
- Teacher and organisational targets are assimilated into the national curriculum and performance framework. Performance-related pay is integrated into audit, appraisal and target procedure.
- Head teachers and senior managers are middle managers between the government and teachers, and are publicly accountable for performance outcomes.
- Formalised quantitative evidence based on pupil outcomes, and qualitative evidence based on personal statements and classroom evaluation are utilised.
- Performance is measured through transparent, statistical calculations about the value added by the teacher to pupil outcomes.
- Children are commoditised as objects and targets to be assessed and counted.

Thus, performativity is concerned with regulation or control by means of targets, outcomes, appraisal, assessment, audit, measurement and transparent and statistical calculations. This idea of performativity follows that of Lyotard (1984) as already discussed (Ball, 1998, 2001, 2003; Elliott, 2001).

**Teachers’ experiences of performativity policies**

These kinds of performance control are causing problems for teachers, not only in England but also in other countries, including Japan.
In England, the performativity measures have been in tension with parallel developments that place creativity at the heart of education policy (Craft & Jeffrey, 2008). Thus, teachers are “encouraged on the one hand to innovate, take risks and foster creativity, and on the other, are subject to heavy duty accountability” (p. 579). According to Doherty and McMahon (2007), despite its distinctive “social democratic virtues of policy-making,” the Scottish education system has not been immune to a policy paradigm constructed around “the desirability of national economic competitiveness in a global market and the repositioning of knowledge as the fundamental resource in wealth creation” (pp. 251-252). The professional context of Scotland’s teachers has been reconstructed by Scotland’s own particular performativity regime consisting of a range of measures, such as the use of development planning, statistical monitoring, and self-evaluation of schools.

Troman, Jeffrey, and Raggl (2007) also investigated the complex policy context in which the maximisation of test scores is imperative whilst some creativity initiatives or “nurturing programmes” (p. 560) have to be adopted in order to maintain the motivation and commitment of staff and pupils. The authors found some variance in approaches to creativity programmes between English primary schools that they studied. Contrary to their expectations, on the whole, high SES (Socio-economic Status) schools were more cautious than low SES schools. This was not least because in the high SES schools, middle-class parents demanded the basics and better test scores. In addition, the authors argued that performativity as well as creativity initiatives had a positive impact: “they both provided two of the most important sources of professional work satisfaction in teaching,” namely, “curriculum coverage and task completion,” and “the psychic rewards of teaching” (p. 564). According to the authors, while “the theoretical and analytical single-policy focused writing in the area of performativity has been almost negative,” that in the area of creativity has been almost positive (p. 568). Their argument was that these forms of analysis have not paid enough attention to
the complexity involved when teachers are enacting a range of distinct but not entirely oppositional policies. Thus, they argued:

If the policy context is complex then we can expect teachers’ interpretations, reactions and responses to it to be as well. In the schools of our research the drive to raise test scores involved both performative and creative strategies, and this critical mediation went beyond amelioration towards a more complex view of professional practices. (p. 568)

Sachs (2001), and Day and Sachs (2004) formulated the tensions teachers faced, not only in the UK but also in Australia, in terms of competing discourses of managerial and democratic professionalism. Following Brennan (1996), the authors considered that managerial professionalism exhorts teachers to meet efficiently and effectively the standardised criteria for the achievement of both students and teachers, and thereby to contribute to the school’s formal accountability processes. In essence, managerial professionalism is closely associated with performativity. On the other hand, democratic professionalism is concerned with collaborative and cooperative endeavours between teachers and other educational stakeholders. Both these forms of teacher professionalism share the desire to improve the performance of teachers and ultimately to enhance student learning outcomes. However, how they accomplish this (by means of external regulation or professional regulation and collaboration) and who has control of the process (external authority or teachers and other local stakeholders) distinguishes between them. The author observed that while both kinds of discourse were apparently evident in the UK and Australia, the managerial professionalism was clearly mandated by the states and informed their policies. In this context, “teachers move between the two, negotiating the contradictions and multiple demands that are placed on them in their busy and complex workplaces”
Burnard and White (2008) explored the way that teachers in both the UK and Australia must deal with tensions residing in the education policies that simultaneously advocate performativity and creativity. In both countries, emphasis is put on teaching creativity, which can enhance learners’ flexibility and initiative that a knowledge-based economy demands. At the same time, teachers are required to meet benchmarks and improve standards. The authors argued for a “rebalancing pedagogy” rather than a dichotomised way of developing pedagogy based either on performativity or creativity (pp. 676-677). Drawing on research conducted in schools in Queensland, Australia, Lingard (2009) also argued that pedagogies should be reinforced as an element of teacher identities in the context of some forms of accountability (for example, standardised testing, national league tables of school performance, and international league tables of performance) threatening to “thin out pedagogies and reduce the intellectual demand and reach of pedagogies” (p. 91).

However, balancing the conflicting discourses and policies, whether of creativity and performativity or managerial and democratic professionalism, is not an easy task. Keddie, Mills, and Pendergast (2011) found “a clear sense of disenfranchisement and dissatisfaction from teachers” at an Australian school where the administration placed emphasis on the school being “number one” — a high performing school of first choice (p. 79). This construction of school identity around academic excellence involved continuous comparison of student performance outcomes, sanctioning the teachers deemed to be under-performing, and adherence of teachers’ practices to a prescribed and standardised curriculum and pedagogy. The teachers, however, felt dissatisfied with these disciplinary processes, which were excessively demanding, producing undue pressure, generating a sense of anxiety and fear, narrowing pedagogy and curriculum, and ignoring the social aspects of schooling. In these processes, the authors argued,
the teachers’ confidence and trust in their own capacities were undermined, with their “coherent narratives of professional identity” being destabilised (p. 89).

Lipman (2004) described similar contradictions and dilemmas that teachers faced within the context of standards and accountability in the United States of America. They included teaching to the test, a narrowed curriculum, less intellectually demanding work, and intense regulation and deskilling of teachers with devastating consequences for their morale, confidence, and commitment (pp. 42-48). A compromise needs to be found between teacher professionalism and standardisation (Wills & Sandholtz, 2009). However, finding an acceptable compromise is not always easy for some teachers. Santoro (2011) suggested a new way of examining teacher attrition, introducing a category of “principled leavers” (pp. 2680-2681) who leave the profession on grounds that they are being asked to engage in practices that they believe contradict their beliefs about good teaching. The author analyses the “moral situation” in which teachers experience “incompatibility of ends” (Dewey & Tufts, 1926, p. 207, quoted in Santoro 2011 p. 2680) in terms of their responsibilities to the profession, the institution, students, and the self. A dilemma between teacher professionalism and standardisation that standards and accountability movement causes is potentially concerned with this moral situation.

The impact of performativity policies on teachers’ work and subjectivities has been investigated also in Hong Kong. Choi (2005) described Hong Kong’s education reform since the transition of sovereignty in 1997 as part and parcel of economic globalisation, mainly in terms of privatisation and managerialism. The author then continued by pointing out goal displacement: “Massive paperwork demanded of schools and teachers leads to a high level of work intensification for teachers, who are now left with little time for their core duties of teaching and helping students” (p. 247). This goal displacement required under the regime of performativity causes emotional and existential disturbances such as alienation,
self-doubt, and guilt. All of this can “displace the core values and self-identity that teachers have originally brought to their work” (p. 247).

In Japan, as stated in Chapter 2, schooling has become increasingly focused on the nation’s economic need for human resources in an era of globalised economies. With the aims of enabling intervention in which accountability, developments, and outcomes are subjected to scrutiny, a range of policies have been developed, such as National Testing, school evaluation, and teacher evaluation. Professional and public perceptions that academic standards in Japanese schools had declined were a catalyst for the neo-liberal education reform (Thrupp & Katsuno, 2010). Consequently, many schools now set targets for students’ performance and publish school development plans that elaborate on how the school is reaching those targets. One of the consequences of these policy developments is the intensification of work for teachers. Teachers now need to complete massive amounts of paperwork, such as goal-setting and self-review documents, which leave them with little time for lesson preparation and communication with students. This goal displacement can cause teachers to suffer emotional and existential disturbances, such as guilt, self-doubt, and alienation, exactly as teachers suffer in Hong Kong. A teacher working in an urban school stated this:

My days begin with making calls to some pupils to ask, “Have you had

12 Many traced this back to 2002, when textbook content was reduced 30% and the school week was shortened from six days to five. This policy change, called yutori kyoiku (relaxed education), was launched in response to many problems, such as bullying, physical attacks on peers and school staff, school phobia, and apathy and suicides among children and youths, which were attributed to the competitive and stressful nature of Japanese schooling. However, this change was soon retracted amidst public concerns about declining academic standards.
breakfast?” or “Are you fit enough to come to school today?” I come to school at seven, and making these calls is the first thing to do. It’s really hard work, but I don’t care because this is the work I have chosen. What I can’t put up with is the work imposed from above — a lot of paperwork and various tasks dictated by the administration. These things make me feel sorry. I should have done more for my children. (quoted in Katsuno, 2007b, p. 4)

Many commentators have noted that Japan’s teachers have a self-image as humane professionals who are responsible for and committed to the whole development of the children in their charge (for example, Inagaki & Kudomi, 1994). The teachers believe that their personal and emotional relationships with children play an important role in enacting effective teaching and learning (Rohlen & LeTendre, 1996). In the current situation of work intensification, however, these self-images and professional beliefs are likely to be a cause of teachers becoming “crippled by conscience” (Hargreaves & Evans, 1997, p. 2).

If this line of reasoning is true, more recent comments illustrating a shift in teachers’ self-images away from a fully committed professional seem plausible (Kudomi, 2003, 2008). Yamada (2003) asked why the burnout rate of Japan’s teachers had been declining since 2000 despite the continued intensification of work, suggesting that teachers were retreating from the troublesome concerns of their professional work to their private lives. In a similar vein, Hasegawa (2008) stated that teachers were delimiting their professional responsibilities in order to maintain their professional identities. The author calls this “a strategy of dualism,” which is “the way teachers try to avoid the overall collapse of their professional identities by seeing a part of the conditions and consequences of their work as being beyond their control” (Hasegawa, 2008, p. 118).

specifically explored the impact of performativity on schools, focusing on how teachers experienced the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) inspections.

Woods and Jeffrey (2002) explored how English primary teachers were negotiating new identities within the experience of school inspection by the OFSTED. Their experiences were sometimes “traumatic” (p. 99), not least because the social identity assigned by the requirements of the inspections ran counter to their personal identities. The authors called this collision the “challenge to the Plowden self-identity” (p. 93). For them, the Plowden self-identity consisted of humanism and vocationalism (in other words, a missionary commitment to teaching), and provided teachers with the basis for an integrated self. However, school inspection, as an essential part of the National Curriculum and Testing regime, pressured teachers to abandon or, at least, modify these value systems in many ways. For example, “the process of an OFSTED inspection reduced the complex, multiple qualities of Plowden teaching to a series of measurable criteria, assessed in 20-30 minutes as to how well children had ‘received’ specific factual knowledge” (p. 94). This was a serious assault on the child-centred philosophy that was a main constituent of humanism. Furthermore, the ever-tightening control over and detailed recording of practices connoted a diminution in the trust that had previously been extended to teachers.

Overall, the newly assigned roles and social identities created serious dilemmas for the teachers. Drawing on the Giddens’ formulation of four major dilemmas that the self in late modernity typically confronts (Giddens, 1991), the authors explained this situation in terms of the fragmented self with the old values becoming difficult to retain, an assault on teacher autonomy, a heightened sense of uncertainty about one’s abilities, aims, relationships and commitment to teaching, and commoditisation of personal relationships. While some teachers could simply embrace the newly assigned social identity, others found it difficult to negotiate some consistency between self-concept and social-identity. The authors found two
major responses among the latter type of teachers: self-positioning (refusal and self-assertion) and separation of the self from the new social identity. Self-positioning was concerned with “a strong resolve to maintain the Plowden self-identity, rejecting the new assigned social identity” (p. 99).

On the other hand, separation of the self from the new social identity was a strategy by which teachers developed “new personal identity to meet the ostensible requirements (although not the spirit) of the new social identity, while reserving and cultivating what to them were more important aspects of the self for their private life outside the teacher role” (p. 100). This act of detaching oneself from work involved acting (game-playing) in inspection situations. However, as the authors pointed out, this identity strategy could not keep the teachers’ self intact: “Game-playing can leave teachers ambivalent about their self-identity. In face of authority and loss of trust, uncertainty occurs and creates yet another dilemma for teachers” (pp. 102-103). Furthermore, for some teachers, their commitment to teaching was now underpinned by instrumentalism rather than by vocationalism — thus the Plowden-identity was undermined.

Perryman (2006) also examined the nature of OFSTED inspection, particularly the impact of being under special measures, as a disciplinary mechanism. Perryman uses the conceptual metaphor of “panoptic performativity” (pp. 156-158) derived from the work of Foucault (1977) to describe the experience of teachers under the inspection regime. In this regime, the “frequency of inspection and sense of being perpetually under surveillance lead to teachers performing in ways dictated by the discourse of inspection in order to escape the regime” (p. 148). Drawing on the case study of a secondary school called Northgate, which had been under special measures for nearly two years, she argued that the teachers could not help adhering to rigid and predetermined criteria for “the normal” (p. 155), in terms of policy and pedagogy. Perryman found that Northgate “increasingly seemed like an organisation existing purely for
the purposes of ‘passing’ an inspection” (p. 155). Here, the condition of being continuously observed ushered in performativity as well as normalisation. Such performativity could cause the teachers to have “a sense of de-professionalisation” (p. 158) as they felt that they were performing in order to demonstrate their competence.

The OFSTED inspection system has spurred the development of elaborate self-evaluation systems in some schools. Hall and Noyes (2009) explored the ways that teachers were re-positioned in these newly engendered conditions, “the regimes of truth,” from a Foucauldian perspective. In a large rural secondary school called Greenbank, the leadership team energetically observed lessons, gave feedback, verified departmental standards, and assigned grades to each subject area, using OFSTED inspection criteria and schedules. The authors found that members of leadership team often used, in everyday discourse, the grading terminology stipulated in the criteria to describe standards of teaching and teachers. They then suggested that a disciplinary regime of normalisation, as depicted by Perryman (2006) in relation to the national inspection regime, was reproducing itself within schools. They also observed, “Greenbank’s SLT established their system with a display of power” (p. 852). The senior leadership team (SLT) assumed formal power to conduct unannounced formal observations, audits, and grade teachers and their teaching. The authors also reported that the senior leadership team was planning to devolve this power to subject leaders.

In Foucauldian terms, disciplinary power in Greenbank was, by these means, becoming more anonymous and more functional, being exercised through surveillance and observation rather than through higher profile “ceremonial” events or post hoc accounts of practice. (Hall & Noyes, p. 852)
Importantly, however, this “more anonymous and more functional” internal quality assurance system was all the same as the OFSTED in that it “created its own kinds of pressures” (p. 853) and consequently upset many teachers.

**Need for the work through perspective of performativity**

These works illustrate how teachers experienced particular performativity policies in varied national contexts. Significantly to me, most of them seem to share another feature — what I call the work upon perspective of performativity. In other words, they are likely to have us believe that the performativity policy simply impacts upon teachers as outside forces. However, there are some reasons for believing that this cannot always be apposite.

Theoretically, the work upon perspective would lead to the reification of performativity; performativity derives from elsewhere as mandates and it is the thing to which teachers could manage to adapt, comply with, appropriate, or resist. If we see performativity as such, we can become trapped in the dualism of structure and agency. My assumption is that performativity is being enacted through the social interactions of teachers and is not always forced on them.

The work upon perspective may reinforce analytical individualism as well. Jeffrey and Woods (2002) explored the identity work of teachers confronting performativity policies. The teachers, faced with a dilemma between personal identity and social identity, employed varied strategies, including refusal, self-assertion, separation of the self from the new social identity, and game-playing. I have no objection to this observation per se, but I had the impression that the identity work is being done individualistically.

Another typical example of this sort of analysis is that of Moore, Edwards, Halpin, and George (2002), which explored the issue of the reconstruction of teacher identity in the general context of rapid socio-economic change and educational reform. Although their work did not specifically address
performativity, its historical, societal, and policy background is almost the same as that of Woods and Jeffrey (2002) and Perryman (2006).

One of the main arguments of Moore et al. (2002) is that English teachers talked about their professional outlooks and practices eclectically and pragmatically. Thus, the authors abandon the conceptual dichotomy of compliance and resistance, which have been thought feasible in examining teachers’ responses to public policy. Instead, they elaborate upon the analytical concept of pragmatism. They differentiate between two types of pragmatism — principled and contingent — with full reference to their interview data. They use principled pragmatism as a signifier “to describe the identification of teachers who, regardless of the extent to which their choices may be unconsciously guided by ‘external’ constrains, self-present as decision-making individuals with a clear professional plan and purpose that guide those decisions” (p. 554). On the other hand, the authors find a different signifier of contingent pragmatism “when teachers illustrate very visibly, and often quite uncomfortably in their narratives, a sense of compromise and uncertainty in their eclecticism” (p. 554) even if most the respondents drew on a range of educational traditions and discourse (in other words, they were invariably eclectics). What distinguishes a “principled pragmatist” from “contingent pragmatist”, therefore, was the sense of making one’s own choice — pro-activism as opposed to re-activism.

Having presented these elaborations, Moore et al. (2002) were careful to not overly reify the teachers’ identity, which is the reason they stressed the importance of eclecticism and pragmatism as signifiers. They were interested in “why teachers use particular signifiers of identification at different moments in educational history, and in particular, why pragmatism and eclecticism are such popular and powerful signifiers of identification in the present conjuncture” (p. 561). This is an interesting point both theoretically and analytically. However, it is more to the interest of the present research that Moore and his colleagues dealt
with the shift in teachers’ identification (more correctly, their signifiers), mostly as regards their individual inner conflicts and adaptation.

The authors hint at a relational influence. For example, Edward, a principled pragmatist, was aware of the potential conflicts with his colleagues over an issue of academic rigor. Meanwhile, for Graeme, a contingent pragmatist, increased pressure from management changed his pedagogy and outlook on teaching. However, these micro-political issues seem to have attracted only transient interest from the authors.

The professional identification of both Edward and Graeme might have been more a result of social interactions and negotiations with their colleagues, not to mention management, than what the authors would have us believe. The accounts seem to tell us that the two teachers responded, whether comfortably or not, to socio-economic change and educational reform by themselves, within their own minds. I would like to challenge this individualism. I believe that teachers’ identity work is enacted in local politics within the school.

This line of analysis of the literature leads me to adopt a different perspective of performativity in the present study — what I call the *work through* perspective of performativity. As opposed to the *work upon* perspective of performativity, which will see the culture of a certain school as being rather monolithic and the impact of performativity policies or discourse coming from the outside, the *work through* perspective will pay attention to the way performativity capitalises on the value divisions already present (or being produced) within the school organisation. Accordingly, it will locate the identity work of teachers in the micro-politics of the school. Here, my concern echoes that of Hall and Noyes (2009), which paid attention to the micro-power relations that the new self-evaluation systems were cultivating within schools. Following both Foucault (1977) and Ball (2001), the authors suggested that the workings of performativity have “a powerful social and interpersonal, as well as personal, dimension” (p. 854). They particularly referred
to fabrication going on in a school where an elaborate system of internal evaluation has been established. However, the identity work employed by teachers under the pressures of performativity can be more wide-ranging and more complex, as the other works mentioned above have suggested. Therefore, in this study, I explore in more detail the way performativity, in the form of teacher evaluation policies and practices, influences and shapes teachers’ identities as well as their work.

The work through perspective of performativity enables this study. However, as a newly conceived analytic lens, this perspective is difficult to delineate more clearly at the moment. Rather, the meaning of the perspective will articulate itself as analysis proceeds. For me, it is a heuristic device. Additionally, it should be noted that the need for the work through perspective does not deny that for the work upon perspective of performativity. On the contrary, both the perspectives are complementary in understanding the ways teachers’ work are being reconstructed and their selves are repositioned in relation to new teacher evaluation. In some schools, head teachers demand that teachers set numerical goals in terms of their students’ academic achievement. From a teachers’ point of views, this represents a work upon type of performativity, which in turn gives rise to work through types of performativity between teachers.

Cultural context of school leadership

As stated in Chapter 2, any analysis of the enactment of teacher evaluation policies needs to consider the wider policies. For the purpose of the present research, the most relevant are concerned with school leadership. As the Japanese government is determined to respond effectively to a globalising economy, it increasingly regards the role of head teachers as a guarantee of national goals that are set mainly in economic terms. The goals are ultimately concerned with producing a workforce with the appropriate skills and attitudes.
required by changing capitalism. What Bottery (2002) elucidates with regard to English institutional leadership can also be applied to Japanese head teachers: “educational leaders increasingly use the terms of economists (such as customers, clients, markets, stakeholders, etc.), and are therefore led down to a road where the validity and dubious morality of commercial oxymoron like customer intimacy are accepted” (p. 161). Here, the author is concerned about the downgrading of primary educational values, such as respect, trust, and care that “can be practiced only if they achieve the aims of the marketplace” (p. 161).

These kinds of changes with regard to function and value are required not only of educational leaders but of regular teachers. Yet, as literature on shifting headship towards the “new manager” in the English context has shown (Ball, 1994; Gewirtz, 2002; Grace, 1995; Whitty, et al., 1998), head teachers are more vulnerable to the pressures for new professional values and identities than are teachers.

Bottery (2002) illustrates an apparent contradiction in education policies that the UK government has adopted. On the one hand, as business developments predict, greater responsibility and implementation have been devolved to the school, and the need for flattening the management structure is recognised. These changes are supposed to encourage more effective use of the local knowledge and skills that practicing teachers possess. On the other hand, in order to achieve the same goal of developing economic and human capital, the government has strived for a tightly controlled and directed education system. The author suggests that the latter model is largely borrowed from the Far East in the belief that such directive approaches underpinned their economic success in the 1980s and 1990s (p. 163).

As a member of the Far East, Japan’s societal and cultural characteristics have attracted the attention of many commentators and have been variously discussed. For example, Ouchi (1981) searched for the secret of Japan’s
economic success and argued that a unique management style contributed to the improvement of employees’ loyalty to the company and thereby to high productivity. It has also been argued that this management style is undergirded by the paternalistic culture of Japanese society or “tateshakai [vertical society],” which makes it possible for organisational leaders to forcefully direct subordinate members without harming their commitment (Nakane, 1967). Thus, this particular culture is assumed to underlie “a hierarchical organisation of a group, with a paternalistic leader at the apex, who is the source of satisfying both affective and instrumental needs of subordinate members” (Befu, 1980, p. 170).

Until recently, Japan had developed a highly centralised and prescriptive education system, with little room for teachers to decide what they would teach and how they would teach it (Horio, 1994, 2002). To ensure the fulfillment of its directives, the government demanded that head teachers be authoritative figures in relation to teachers. More recently, as described in Chapter 2, decentralisation and market focus have become current trends in education policies. Within the resulting education market, every school must develop its distinctive character to compete with other schools. For this purpose, schools are given a mandate to develop not only students’ scholarly skills but also teachers’ professionalism (the new teacher evaluation is clearly a case in point). At the same time, a hierarchical management structure and an authoritative decision-making style are strengthened through national and local policy enforcement (Sako, 2005). For example, in April 2006, the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education circulated letters to all schools in its jurisdiction, saying that voting by a show of hands as a method of confirming the intentions of school staff at meetings should be strictly forbidden to ensure strong headship and “proper” school management.

Japan’s head teachers have been coping with the task of not only instrumentally but also normatively controlling teachers on behalf of the state for
a longer period than have school leaders in any other country. Arguably, this complex task has been fulfilled owing to the above-mentioned paternalistic culture of Japanese society. However, school leadership is becoming more difficult to exercise because of the increasing volume of demanding directives that are imposed on teachers. These strictures have had demoralising effects, as mentioned. In response to this situation, the government has been providing head teachers with various measures to help them perform their leadership responsibilities, such as new subordinate managerial posts to support them. Although head teachers continue to rely on the paternalistic culture, they can supplement, if not replace, it through these new measures, one of which is the new teacher evaluation.

Thus, the present study is concerned with the reorientation of school leadership culture, with a particular focus on the role that the new teacher evaluation plays in this process. However, this cultural viewpoint does not exclude a political viewpoint. On the contrary, the workings of culture always involve power. Hence, it is necessary to study how the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies influence the transformation of the cultural base of school leadership into a more performative culture, focusing on power-relationships within schools. In this regard, it should be noted that Befu (1980) has critically examined, if not totally disputed, the “tateshakai [vertical society]” model of Japanese society, which is predicated on hierarchical relationships and psychological interdependence. She assumed that in reality, society is rife with different forms of conflict and competition and blamed the model for lacking a political perspective. In a sense, the present study’s criticism of the consensual assumption of the professional development model of teacher evaluation follows suit.

In summary, I argue that the work through perspective of performativity, which pays close attention to micro-politics and micro power relations will
allow us to draw not only a more subtle picture of the way teacher evaluation is being done in schools against a background of performativity but also performativity itself is enacted in schools. Performativity is certainly affecting students. Jeffrey and Troman (2011) examined the way primary school students’ performative identities are being constructed as they complete Key Stage examinations. The harmful side effects of numerical goals or target setting, which do not fully consider the nature of educational processes have been well documented in various countries (Ball, 2001; Lipman, 2004; Thrupp & Hursh, 2006). Although the present study into the workings of performativity with a particular focus on teachers is limited in scope, this limitation should be justified when considering the significance of teachers’ work and identities for the learning and well-being of students.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have critically examined literature on teacher evaluation (micro-economic theory to teacher evaluation and the professional development model) and theories of performativity. By reviewing the literature of the latter type, I found that most of it heavily relied on what I call the work upon perspective of performativity and I argued that this particular perspective should be complemented by what I call the work through perspective. By adopting this perspective as a heuristic device, the present study can pay more attention to the micro-politics occurring around the processes of teacher evaluation.
Chapter Five: Research Design and Methods

In this chapter, I discuss the research design, methods of data collection and analysis, and ethics of research. Those research design and methods that I adopted in the present study are guided by not only the nature of the research subject (teacher evaluation as performativity policies and practices) but by that theoretical perspective that I have discussed in Chapter 4. A particular theoretical perspective is related to a research orientation. I state my transformative, as opposed to problem solving, orientation.

5.1 Research Design

Focusing on the micro-politics associated with teacher evaluation processes demands a detailed understanding not only of what is actually happening, but what sense teachers and head teachers are making of their experiences. A problem with this inquiry is that significant events, such as goal-setting and review meetings, are not accessible to researchers on account of privacy requirements associated with personnel procedures. I therefore chose to conduct a survey and interviews rather than direct observations to collect the relevant data. The study has employed a “concurrent mixed methods procedure” in which “the researcher converges or merges quantitative and qualitative data in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem” (Creswell, 2009, p. 14; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). More specifically, quantitative data from a survey has been used to provide a general picture of how teachers experience and perceive the new teacher evaluation policies and practices, and qualitative data from interviews has been used to provide the depth of analysis required to examine the nature of performativity in schools.

The research design is guided by my use of a specific theoretical perspective,
the work through perspective of performativity. As stated in Chapter 4, most previous research on the new teacher evaluation by Japanese scholars has adopted problem-solving approaches associated with professional development models. Such approaches are characterised by their blindness to conflicts and domination, and further marginalisation of individuals in disadvantaged positions. Previous survey research has shown that there are problems with both the development and effectiveness of teacher evaluation (see Chapter 3). However, the results cannot be of much help in explaining how the teachers’ and head teachers’ views have been formed. More significantly, against the overall trend from the quantitative research, it is likely that views and experiences of a minority are not seriously considered. What is needed is an approach that is able to consider the particular as well as overall trends, and then probe further into the particular.

Attention to the views and experiences of individuals who suffer from the processes of teacher evaluation in some ways and others, even if they are not a majority, is demanded by the theoretical perspective. Creswell (2009) discusses the use of theory in qualitative method and mixed methods approaches as “an overall orienting lens for the study of questions of gender, class, and race” (p. 62). My own theoretical perspective of performativity is not particularly associated with gender, class, or race, but with dominated and marginalised voices in general. Here I assume that the domination and marginalisation occurring around the processes of teacher evaluation have undesirable consequences for teachers’ work and selves, and that the situation should be changed as a result. Here, I concur with Mertens (2007) when she argues for transformative mixed methods research:

The transformative mixed methods approach is needed because research does not necessarily serve the needs of those who have traditionally been excluded from positions of power in the research world, and therefore the potential to further human rights through a research agenda has not been
fully realized. The transformative paradigm provides such a framework for examining assumptions that explicitly address power issues, social justice, and cultural complexity throughout the research process. (pp. 212-213)

Mertens (2007) examined transformative ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions in turn, and then stated:

Methodologically, mixed methods are preferred for working toward increased social justice because they allow for the qualitative dialogue needed throughout the research cycle, as well as the collection of qualitative data as appropriate. (p. 224)

I understand that research with a transformative orientation should provide not only the researcher but also the researched with a basis for change based on better understanding of their reality; participative action research shares the same orientation (Kemmis & Wilkinson, 1998). The mixed methods approach has an advantage in promoting this research agenda.

5.2 Methods of Data Collection

As stated in the previous section, I conducted a nation-wide survey and in-depth interviews with twelve teachers and four head teachers in four focus schools – three senior high schools and one special school. These research methods address different kinds of research question; while the survey is concerned with teachers’ and head teachers’ perspectives on new teacher evaluation, the interviews are concerned with the actual enactment of the policies (see Chapter 1 for the full statement of research questions). In the following, I provide more detail about the data collection.
A nation-wide survey

Questionnaires were sent to 3787 head teachers of public primary, secondary, and special schools across Japan in February 2008. For this purpose, I randomly selected every 10th school, by prefecture and school type, from the School Registry. The head teachers were asked whether, besides filling in their own questionnaires, they would distribute questionnaires to the teachers in their schools. In total, 1368 questionnaires were received, with the return rate being 36%. Of the 1368 head teachers who responded, 146 agreed to distribute questionnaires to the teachers in their schools.

I sent the questionnaire packages to the cooperating schools and each package included sufficient copies for all the teachers in the school. The teachers were also provided with stamped envelopes so that they could return their questionnaires on their own, rather than via their head teachers. I adopted this procedure with the intentions not only of raising the response rate, but of also reducing such a bias as may accrue from a culture of conformity in which teachers may find themselves pressurised to answer in a particular way (this is one of the themes to be discussed in the present thesis. See Chapter 4 for Japan’s societal and cultural characteristics as a context of school management). In my study, it turned out that differences in the views of the head teachers and teachers were large as will be shown in Chapter 6. This fact suggests that teachers felt free to answer the questions.

The head teachers and teachers were asked three categories of questions: (1) views on teachers’ pay, (2) views on the “implementation” and effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation, and (3) views on the current state of their schools (see Appendices 1 and 2 for translated questionnaires for head teachers and teachers respectively). In designing the questions, I tried to avoid inadequate wording and poorly defined terms: a key strategy to increase the reliability of answers (Fowler, 2002, pp. 78-88). However, as I did not conduct a preliminary pilot survey, the
The questionnaires included some items specifically designed for head teachers and teachers. For example, the head teachers were asked whether they thought that the new teacher evaluation practices had been helpful in identifying particularly incompetent teachers, whereas the teachers were asked whether they consulted colleagues when setting their own goals. The rest of the questionnaire items were mostly identical so that comparisons could be made between head teachers and teachers.

In the end, responses from 567 teachers were collected – an average of 3.9 teachers per cooperating school. However, I am not sure whether all the teachers in the cooperating schools actually received the questionnaires. I am also not sure whether all respondents were volunteers or if they were told to complete the questionnaire. If the head teachers had chosen only like-minded teachers, the sample would be biased. However, it seems reasonable to believe that this did not occur because the differences in the views of the head teachers and teachers were large as already mentioned above.

Overall, considering the related literature (Cohen & Manion, 1989, p. 114; Fowler, 2002, pp.40-41), the response rate can be considered to be modestly good. However, more importantly, the sample is highly representative of the national population in terms of school type and size, and the teachers’ and head teachers’ attributes, except for gender (see Chapter 6 for more detail).

The sample of schools for in-depth interviews

Alongside the questionnaire survey, I conducted in-depth interviews to obtain a more nuanced picture of what is happening in the process of teacher evaluation. I had planned to select a few focus schools from the 146 cooperating schools, but all of the schools that I approached declined to cooperate further. I had chosen three head teachers whose views on new teacher evaluation policies ranged from
extremely favourable to rather sceptical and had asked them for permission to interview staff in their schools. However, none of these head teachers granted permission. One of them, who thought that their teachers in his school had poor opinions of the new teacher evaluation procedures, referred to the repercussions that the interviews could have. The others made excuses, referring to the extra burden that their staff would have to bear. However, in communications with these two head teachers, I realised that the real reason for not allowing their teachers to be interviewed was the same as the one provided by the first head teacher. These developments revealed the serious sensitivities of the issue, which made me realise that approaching the others in the group of 146 schools was unlikely to be successful.

I therefore took a “convenience-sampling approach” (Cohen & Manion, 1989, p. 103) and conducted interviews only in schools where I had some previous contacts, such as a school governor or as a friend of a member of the school staff. The four schools where I conducted interviews were overseen by two particular prefectoral boards of education, both of which had been implementing rather stringent teacher evaluation schemes. Both linked the result of teacher evaluation to remuneration to some extent. In addition, one of these boards of education strongly promoted numerical goals. This meant that I had an advantage in observing the micro-politics that performativity could cause.

It should be also noted that none of the schools were elementary or junior high schools. Generally speaking, senior high schools are under stronger pressure for performativity than elementary and junior high schools, not the least because their performance, as typically represented by university entrance examination results and drop-out rates, is more visible and subject to numerical goals.

Overall the sample of schools was one in which the impact of performativity was probably stronger than would be seen in a more broadly representative sample. Nevertheless by exploring theoretical issues concerned with the manner
in which performativity is being enacted in schools, I have been able to “generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory” (Yin, 2009, p. 43). What I have attempted to do is an “analytical” generalisation, if not a “statistical” generalisation.

The interviews

I conducted the interviews of four head teachers and 12 teachers over the period from May 2008 to July 2009. Each of the interviews lasted about an hour after school and occurred when and where the participants felt most convenient and safe (predominantly in her/his office). The interviews were semi-structured around the following key questions:

- What do you think are the beneficial and harmful effects of teacher evaluation?
- What is your view of the evaluation meetings between the head teacher and the teachers?
- Do you think your management/teaching approach has somehow changed as a result of this teacher evaluation?
- Are there elements in the process of teacher evaluation that particularly impressed/dismayed you? If so, why?

All of the interviewees except one head teacher agreed that their interviews could be audio recorded and then transcribed for analysis.

Some teachers appeared uneasy at the beginning of their interview, but they gained confidence as the interview progressed. Although the interviews were semi-structured, the interviewees were permitted to express their opinions openly. One young teacher began to talk about her own experience of breakdown, which at first she only vaguely associated with the teacher evaluation. Some other
teachers also used the interview time to reflect on their experiences, making or re-making sense of them in context.

5.3 Methods of Data Analysis

The purpose of conducting the survey was not to confirm or refute any hypothesis, but to obtain a recent, national picture of views held by teachers and head teachers. As such, the survey was not able to recognise such local differences in the new teacher evaluation policies as I discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, I present the overall trends and interpreted features I believed were worth mentioning. As stated above, the differences in the views of the head teachers and teachers were large. I also paid particular attention to differences of teachers’ views on and experiences of the new teacher evaluation policies and practices by type of school, gender, and age. The results are also compared to those from previous surveys.

Here, it should be noted that there are some items that are not reported upon in this thesis. These are mainly the results of the judgement regarding the relevance of individual items in light of the themes to be discussed. A different reason applies to many items in the category (3). Originally, I intended to select sample schools for in-depth interviews from those participating in the survey, and then to match the data from case studies to those from this particular section of the survey. However, as will be stated below, I could not obtain permission to conduct in-depth interviews from the schools that I approached. Consequently, I had no choice but to give up utilising that part of the survey data as originally planned.

With regard to the qualitative analysis, I employed “thematic analysis” strategy (Mutch, 2005, p. 176; Creswell, 2009). Specifically, I repeatedly read through the transcriptions to develop codes and then to generate themes for analysis. As stated earlier, the sample consisted of four head teachers and 12 teachers in four schools. I paid particular attention to the divergence as well as
congruence of the ways they are making sense of their circumstances and they are positioning themselves (Ball, Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011; Weick, 1995). For the purposes of improving the validity of analysis, I adopted the method called “peer debriefing” (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 221). Specifically, on several occasions, I invited knowledgeable researchers, including Professor Toyokazu Urano of the University of Teikyo (my ex-supervisor), to double-check my data and interpretations. They mostly supported my analysis, but drew attention to some points that I had missed.

5.4 Ethical Issues

In Japan, ethical issues of research, particularly in social sciences and humanities, have only recently come to be debated. Most universities have established research ethics committees, but their review processes tend to be slack when the proposed research involves surveys or interviews. However, over the course of the present research, the Human Research Ethics Regulations of the University of Waikato were observed. In the introductory letters (see Appendices 3 and 4 for head teachers and teachers respectively) and prior to each interview, I explained to the possible participants the purpose, methodology, and likely use made of the research. The participants were advised that they could decline to participate, decline to answer any of the interview questions, or withdraw completely from the research before completion of data collection. They were also informed that they had the right to read the transcripts of the interview and withdraw or change any points before completion of data collection. I asked for informed consent in writing from all the interviewees (see Appendix 5) but many of them did not bother to complete the consent form. This is because against the background mentioned above, research participants as well as researchers tend to feel it too formal to complete consent forms and prefer relying on the mutual
In this thesis, pseudonyms have been used for all the participants and schools so that they will not be identifiable.

5.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have presented a rationale for the mixed methods approach with a transformative orientation that I have employed in the present study. Specifically, I have used quantitative survey data to provide a general picture of how teachers experience and perceive the new teacher evaluation practices and qualitative data from interviews to provide the depth of analysis required to probe the nature of performativity in schools. The theoretical perspective has been a guide for collecting and analysing data. I have then discussed in more detail the methods of collecting and analysing data and also ethical issues.

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13 Some academic associations in the fields of social sciences and humanities have published ethical guidelines for research, but normally they do not make the completion of consent forms mandatory. For example, the Japan Sociological Society’s research guidelines published in 2006 make it a requirement for researchers to explain to possible participants the purpose, methodology and likely use made of the research, and to receive their consent. However, with regard to consent forms, it simply states, “in some cases, you might consider asking participants to sign consent forms” (Japan Sociological Society, 2006, p. 2).
Chapter Six: Results of a National Survey

In this chapter, I introduce results of a national survey that I conducted to investigate teachers’ and head teachers’ views on the new teacher evaluation policies and practices. The previous surveys, which I described in Chapter 3, provided us with significant but local and early findings. Considering that almost all of the prefectural boards of education have introduced new schemes of teacher evaluation, it is possible to produce a national and more current picture. Thus, I conducted the national survey to examine how these national and more recent findings correspond with the local and earlier ones. I will also use these findings as background for the qualitative research discussed in subsequent chapters.

6.1 Outline of the National Survey

Over the period from February to April 2008, I conducted a national survey of teachers’ and head teachers’ views on the new teacher evaluation policies and practices and the related organisational conditions of schools. Questionnaires were sent to 3,787 head teachers at both primary and secondary schools, with the exclusion of private schools, across the country. I asked the head teachers if they would distribute questionnaires to teachers in their schools in addition to completing the questionnaires themselves. Questionnaires were collected from 1,368 head teachers, out of which 146 head teachers agreed to cooperate further. Packages of questionnaires were then sent to the cooperating schools with each containing sufficient copies for all the teachers at the school. A total of 567 returns

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14 In Japan’s national education system, primary sector consists of elementary schools (age 6-12) and secondary sector of junior high (age 12-15) and senior high schools (age 15-18).
were collected from the teachers, which meant that, on average, 3.9 teachers from every cooperating school took part in the survey (see Chapter 5 for more details on the survey method).

Only returns from the cooperating schools will be reported in this thesis, which means that the sample consists of 146 head teachers and 567 teachers. This decision was made in order to ensure that comparisons between the replies of head teachers and teachers would be plausible (although in fact the returns from the larger sample of 1,368 head teachers did not statistically differ from those analysed here). In addition, 63 teachers and 15 head teachers reported that they had not yet taken part in the new teacher evaluation processes, all of whom I excluded when examining the views based on experience.

Table 6.1 presents a breakdown of cooperating schools by type and Table 6.2 by size (according to the number of full-time teachers). No type of school is either under- or over-represented (Monbukagakusho, 2008a). The most common range for the number of full-time teachers is 11-20, which accounts for 34.9% of the schools. The number of full-time teachers largely depends on the type of school. Among the 29 cooperating schools with a maximum of ten full-time teachers, 23 are elementary and six are junior high schools. Among the nine cooperating schools with no fewer than 51 full-time teachers, two are junior high, six senior high, and one is a special school.
Table 6.1 Breakdown of the cooperating schools by type, compared to the national population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperating Schools</th>
<th>National Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>82 (56.2%)</td>
<td>22,270 (60.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School</td>
<td>42 (28.8%)</td>
<td>10,180 (27.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High School</td>
<td>18 (12.3%)</td>
<td>3,922 (10.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special School</td>
<td>4 (2.7%)</td>
<td>506 (1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>146 (100%)</td>
<td>36,878 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The national data is drawn from *Gakko Kihon Chosa* (Monbukagakusho, 2008a).

Table 6.2 Breakdown of the cooperating schools by size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of full-time teachers</th>
<th>Cooperating Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 and below</td>
<td>29 (19.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>51 (34.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>28 (19.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>17 (11.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>12 (8.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and over</td>
<td>9 (6.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>146 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The breakdown of teachers and head teachers for the cooperating schools are shown in terms of gender (Table 6.3) and age (Table 6.4). Table 6.3 indicates that female teachers and head teachers are under-represented among the teachers and head teachers in the cooperating schools. The most frequent age range for teachers in the cooperating schools is 46-50 while 64.4% of the head teachers are over 55 years of age. These age profiles of teachers and head teachers in the cooperating schools are consistent with the national profile. In 2007, the average ages of teachers across the nation were 43.2 in elementary, 42.8 in junior high, 44.8 in senior high, and 43.1 in special schools. In the same year, the average ages of head teachers across the nation were 56.7 in elementary, 56.7 in junior high, 57.7 in senior high, and 57.4 in special schools (Monbukagakusho, 2007).

Having described the attributes of teachers and schools in the present sample, I
then move on to examine the findings of the survey: views on teacher’s pay and the implementation and effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation. Here it should be noted that throughout the present thesis I report the results in terms of three scales (i.e., “agree”, “disagree”, and “do not know”), instead of original, five point scales (see Appendix 2 for reproduced questionnaires). This is because the respondents were likely to choose less straightforward scales. In Japan, this approach to handling survey data is common.

Table 6.3 Breakdown of teachers and head teachers in the cooperating schools by gender, compared to the national population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Head Teacher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperating Schools</td>
<td>National Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 567</td>
<td>n = 708,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>241 (42.5%)</td>
<td>352,334 (50.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>321 (56.6%)</td>
<td>356,183 (49.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>5 (0.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The national data is drawn from *Gakko Kyoin Kihon Chosa* (*Monbukagakusho*, 2007).

Table 6.4 Breakdown of teachers and head teachers in the cooperating schools by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Head Teacher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 567</td>
<td>n = 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 and below</td>
<td>13 (2.3%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>48 (8.5%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>54 (9.5%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>85 (15.0%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>111 (19.6%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>122 (21.5%)</td>
<td>5 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55</td>
<td>82 (14.5%)</td>
<td>47 (32.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 and over</td>
<td>51 (9.0%)</td>
<td>94 (64.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>1 (0.2%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2 Views on Teachers’ Pay

In this section, I present a general picture of teachers’ views related to pay issues and then probe further into the findings. Differences in the views by type of school, gender, and age are reported.

Overview

Table 6.5 summarises agreement and disagreement with various propositions on teachers’ pay, collected from both teachers and head teachers across Japan. As stated in Chapter 2, the policies for the new teacher evaluation developed at the same time as the reform of the public employees’ salary system, particularly the introduction of performance-related pay.

A high percentage of agreement with the principle of performance-related pay became apparent. More specifically, 63.9% of all head teachers and 51.5% of teachers agreed that “Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way for rewarding hardworking and competent teachers,” a statement often used during the government’s recent reform of teachers’ pay. However, their views on performance-related pay might not be as straightforward as they initially appear. In fact, they are ambiguous or contradictory in various ways.

First, compared to the degree of agreement with linking pay to the evaluation, survey respondents are less confident that this link will lead to substantial benefits, such as improvement of quality or standards in education or teachers’ motivation. Consider their responses to the following two propositions in Table 6.5:

- Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to improvement of quality or standards in education.
- Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally.
Those who disagreed outnumbered those who agreed, with the exception of head teachers who responded to the second proposition.

Table 6.5 Views on teachers’ pay held by teachers and head teachers across the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Teacher n = 567</th>
<th>Head Teacher n = 146</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way of rewarding hardworking or competent teachers.</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education.</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally.</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should reflect the demands of posts such as head of a department or “lead teacher.”</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should reflect differences in workloads, including, for instance, supervision of club activities.</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to reward the hard work of teachers, salary levels for all, rather than only some, teachers should be raised.</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because it is difficult to attribute students’ attainment to individual teachers.</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers.</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this table, figures for “do not know” are omitted. Consequently, the sum of the percentages for “agree” and “disagree” does not always equal 100%.
Second, while teachers agreed with the idea of performance-related pay, they were concerned about its practicality once their attention was drawn to potential difficulties or problems. It appears contradictory that, out of the 93 head teachers who agreed with the idea of performance-related pay, 40 agreed that “Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence because it is difficult to attribute students’ attainment to individual teachers.” Thus, they switched their opinion on the performance-related pay from the affirmative to the negative on account of the collaborative nature of teaching. Similarly, 31 of the same head teachers agreed that “Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence because it will cause competition and jealousy among teachers.” Similar changes in opinion have occurred among teachers, too. Furthermore, a majority of both head teachers (83.3%) and teachers (84.7%) felt that teachers’ pay should be raised on the whole.

These findings prompt us to consider the reasons teachers and head teachers in Japan seemed to support, perhaps without much thought, the government’s logic for pay reform. One possible reason concerns the existent variation in the demands of teachers’ duties and workloads. Of the head teachers, 76.2% thought that teachers’ pay should reflect the different demands and obligations of their posts such as are associated with managerial or supervisory roles. At the same time, 67.9% of teachers agreed that teachers’ pay should reflect different workloads. It seems that they were not satisfied with the present pay system which, in their view, failed to properly consider such variation. For that reason, they were predisposed to endorse the new proposal.

Thus, teachers may have misconceived the principles behind and operation of performance-related pay. As indicated in Chapters 1 and 2, performance-related pay (apart from new teacher evaluation itself) has not yet come into full force, and it should be noted that the general results shown here were obtained in advance of
the across-the-board introduction of performance-related pay. If the government does not dispense a large enough fund for performance-related pay and if a quota system is applied (which is likely given the precedents in Tokyo and some other prefectures), teachers’ support for performance-related pay could plummet.

**Differences in views on teachers’ pay by type of school, gender, and age**

A closer examination of the views on teachers’ pay held by teachers and head teachers across the nation indicates certain differences due to the type of school (Table 6.6), gender (Table 6.7), and age (Table 6.8) of teachers. To confirm the differences statistically, I conducted $\chi^2$-squared tests. The results are shown in the tables, along with their significant levels.

First, in regard to type of school, junior high school teachers were more likely to believe that their pay should reflect the demands of their posts and differences in their workloads. In other words, 63.6% of them agreed that “Teachers’ pay should reflect the demands of posts, such as head of a department or lead teacher,”\(^{15}\) while 73.8% agreed that “Teachers’ pay should reflect differences in workloads, including, for instance, supervision of club activities.” Compared with teachers in other types of school, junior high school teachers seemed to be more aware of their varied demands and workloads. As stated above, this may cause them to feel dissatisfied with the present pay system. Indeed, junior high school teachers were the least likely to agree that “Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because it is difficult to attribute students’ attainment to individual teachers” (57.9%). Additionally, on the whole, junior high school teachers were more supportive of the idea of performance-related pay with

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\(^{15}\) A lead teacher is supposed to help her/his colleagues at her/his school improve their teaching, besides fulfilling her/his own teaching duties. Local boards of education have been choosing and appointing this category of teachers since 2008.
45.9% agreeing that “Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education.” The average response across all types of schools was 38.2%. Similarly, 44.3% of junior high school teachers agreed that “Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally,” with the average across all types of school being 37.1%.

By comparison, elementary school teachers were the least likely to confirm the effectiveness of performance-related pay. Indeed, 74.1% of elementary school teachers agreed that “Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers,” while the average rate across all types of schools was 68.6%. In addition, head teachers in elementary schools were more likely to approve across-the-board pay raises for teachers. These results suggest that elementary school teachers, including head teachers, tend to value collective, as opposed to individual, professionalism.

Second, gender affects teachers’ views on pay. 55.9% of male teachers agreed that “Linkingpay to performance and competence is a good way of rewarding hardworking or competent teachers,” while only 45.2% of female teachers agreed. Likewise, 41.4% of male, compared to 33.3% of female, teachers agreed with the statement “Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education.” In general, male teachers are more sympathetic to performance principles than female teachers. However, men still strongly approved of an across-the-board pay raise for teachers. In fact, male teachers were more likely to agree with an across-the-board pay raise than female teachers, as 87.5% agreed as opposed to 81.5% of the women.
Chapter Six

Table 6.6 Views on teachers’ pay held by teachers across the country according to type of school (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element-ary School n = 216</th>
<th>Junior high school n = 185</th>
<th>Senior high school n = 140</th>
<th>Special school n = 22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way of rewarding hardworking or competent teachers.</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education. **</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally. *</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should reflect the demands of posts such as head of a department or “lead teacher.” *</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should reflect differences in workloads, including, for instance, supervision of club activities. *</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to reward the hard work of teachers, salary levels for all, rather than only some, teachers should be raised.</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because it is difficult to attribute students’ attainment to individual teachers. *</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers. *</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.

Third, age is shown to be a significant source of differences in views on teachers’ pay. The younger the teachers are, the more supportive they are of the
rationale and claimed advantages of performance-related pay. Furthermore, young teachers are more likely to approve of the idea of pay differentiation based on positions and workloads. However, teachers in their 40s and 50s were more likely to be aware of the difficulty of attributing students’ attainment to individual teachers. In addition, 71.9% and 83.5% of teachers in their 40s and 50s respectively agreed that “Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers.”

The head teachers’ views according to gender and age are not reported as the sample is not diverse enough in these areas.

In summary, these results indicate that there are considerable differences in views on teachers’ pay based on gender and age exist, including differences between the views of teachers and head teachers.

Table 6.7 Views on teachers’ pay held by teachers according to gender (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female n = 240</th>
<th>Male n = 319</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way of rewarding hardworking or competent teachers. **</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education. *</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally.</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should reflect the demands of posts such as head of a department or “lead teacher.”</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should reflect differences in workloads, including, for instance, supervision of club activities.</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to reward the hard work of teachers, salary levels for all, rather than only some, teachers should be raised. *</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because it is difficult to attribute students’ attainment to individual teachers.</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers. **</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.
Table 6.8 Views on teachers’ pay held by teachers according to age group (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study of teachers’ pay</th>
<th>20s n = 60</th>
<th>30s n = 139</th>
<th>40s n = 230</th>
<th>Over 50 n = 133</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way of rewarding hardworking or competent teachers, ***</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education, **</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally, ***</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should reflect the demands of posts such as head of a department or “lead teacher,” *</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should reflect differences in workloads, including, for instance, supervision of club activities, ***</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to reward the hard work of teachers, salary levels for all, rather than only some, teachers should be raised, ***</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because it is difficult to attribute students’ attainment to individual teachers, **</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers, ***</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.

6.3 Views on the “Implementation” of New Teacher Evaluation

In this section, I examine the views on the “implementation” of the new teacher evaluation. First, a general picture of the views is presented and then differences by type of school, gender, and age are examined.
Overview

Table 6.9 describes how teachers and head teachers reflected on the approach taken to the new teacher evaluation. This consists of such processes as goal setting, lesson observations and feedback, self-reviews of performance and competence, and evaluations conducted by the head teacher.

First, in regard to goal setting, a great majority of head teachers were keen to give instructions to teachers. Specifically, 85.6% of head teachers reported that they had instructed teachers to set goals in line with their school management policies; likewise, 90.2% in line with the goals of school and its sub-units. In addition, 76.5% of head teachers reported that they had repeatedly required teachers to set “concrete and objective” goals such as numerical goals. On the other hand, a majority of teachers confirmed these head teachers’ reflections, but there was still a significant minority of teachers who denied that they were given these instructions. This gap was also observed in relation to the experiences of rewriting goals. In other words, while 34.8% of head teachers reported that they had repeatedly required teachers to rewrite, only 13.2% of teachers remembered that they had been asked to do so. Given that the head teachers and teachers were from the same schools, these discrepancies suggest that head teachers behaved differently with different teachers. Additionally, it was found that a proportion of teachers (34.1%) used the goal setting meetings as opportunities to express their opinions regarding the head teacher’s school management policies.

Another characteristic found in regard to goal setting was that the process was predominantly confined to the teacher concerned and the head teacher. No more than 17.2% of teachers consulted their colleagues about what goals they should set.
Table 6.9 Views on the “implementation” of new teacher evaluation held by teachers and head teachers across the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal setting</th>
<th>Teacher n = 504</th>
<th>Head teacher n = 131</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with her/his school management policies.</td>
<td>49.8% 45.8%</td>
<td>85.6% 12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with school goals, and goals of year or subject groups.</td>
<td>54.1% 42.5%</td>
<td>90.2% 8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set “concrete and objective” goals such as numerical goals.</td>
<td>64.7% 32.3%</td>
<td>76.5% 21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teacher repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals.</td>
<td>13.2% 85.0%</td>
<td>34.8% 63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers consulted colleagues when setting goals.</td>
<td>17.2% 81.0%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers know each other’s goals.</td>
<td>5.0% 87.3%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers expressed opinions regarding head teacher’s management policies.</td>
<td>34.1% 62.2%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson observation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers had enough pre-observation discussion with the evaluator.</td>
<td>15.6% 78.9%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received enough feedback from the evaluator after lesson observations.</td>
<td>34.3% 60.2%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers felt that evaluation results were subjective or arbitrary.</td>
<td>30.6% 54.0%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received enough feedback from head teacher regarding evaluation results.</td>
<td>34.2% 60.1%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers were mostly satisfied with evaluation results.</td>
<td>50.6% 26.9%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ self-evaluations mostly accorded with evaluation results.</td>
<td>51.5% 26.0%</td>
<td>N.A. N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this table, figures for “do not know” are omitted. Consequently, the sum of the percentages for “agree” and “disagree” does not always equal 100%.

Second, in regard to lesson observations, it was found that despite the importance attached to the process by the professional development model of teacher evaluation (see Chapter 4), they had not been taken seriously. Indeed, only
15.6% of teachers reported that they had received sufficient pre-observation consultation, and no more than 34.3% had had adequate feedback from the evaluator (in most cases, head teacher) after lesson observations.

Third, in regard to the evaluation of performance and competence, a majority of teachers were satisfied with the evaluation results, which also concurred with self-evaluations. However, it should be also noted that about 30% of teachers felt that the evaluation results were subjective or arbitrary, or differed from their self-evaluations, while a minority of teachers were not satisfied with the evaluations.

*Differences in views on the “implementation” of new teacher evaluation by type of school, gender, age*

Some of the views on the new teacher evaluation were found to be different due to the type of school (Table 6.10), gender (Table 6.11) and age (Table 6.12) of teachers. To confirm the differences statistically, I conducted χ²-squared tests. The results are shown in the tables, along with their significant levels.

First, types of school for which teachers are working affect their experiences. Specifically, elementary school teachers were more likely to believe that they had enough pre-observation discussion with the evaluator (22.2%), and that they had received enough feedback after observation (44.3%). These results can be attributable to little specialisation in primary teaching (most primary teachers are supposed to teach all subjects and therefore head teachers have some expertise in any subject). Possibly, in other types of schools, head teachers do not have confidence in conducting observations to give instructions about lessons that are different from their own specialisation.

On the other hand, senior high school teachers were more likely to feel free to talk when meeting with the head teacher. Specifically, 43.8% of the teachers felt that they had expressed their opinions regarding the head teacher’s school management policies, with the average percentage across all types of school being
34.1%. Additionally, senior high school teachers were less satisfied with their evaluation results; 37.0% of the teachers, as opposed to 51.4% of elementary and 61.2% of junior high school teachers, reported that they were mostly satisfied with their evaluation results. This result corresponds to the other finding that senior high school teachers were most likely to feel that evaluation results were arbitrary or subjective (44.5%).

Second, the gender of teachers was found to be related to differences in their experiences of teacher evaluation. The salient differences between female and male teachers were concerned with goal setting. Specifically, 40.1% of male, as opposed to 26.9% of female teachers expressed their opinions regarding their head teacher’s management policies, in addition to setting goals. Furthermore, male teachers were more likely to feel that evaluation results were subjective or arbitrary, while female teachers were more likely to feel that they had been repeatedly required to rewrite their goals.

Third, the age of teachers affects their reflections on the new teacher evaluation. Compared to their elder colleagues, teachers in their 20s were more passive at the meetings with the head teacher; only 12.7% of the teachers expressed their opinions regarding the head teacher’s school management policies, with the average percentage across the all age ranges being 34.1%. In addition, younger teachers were more likely to believe they received adequate feedback from the evaluator after lesson observations. On the other hand, teachers in their 50s were least likely to interact with the evaluator (head teacher) in relation to lesson observations and evaluation results. It can be assumed that the lack of communication has something to do with their distrust of the evaluation results.
Table 6.10 Views on the “implementation” of new teacher evaluation held by teachers according to type of school (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element-ary school n = 190</th>
<th>Junior high school n = 172</th>
<th>Senior high school n = 122</th>
<th>Special school n = 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal setting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with her/his school management policies.</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with school goals, and goals of year or subject groups.</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set “concrete and objective” goals such as numerical goals.</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teacher repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals.</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers consulted colleagues when setting goals.</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers know each other’s goals. **</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers expressed opinions regarding head teacher’s management policies. **</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson observation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers had enough pre-observation discussion with the evaluator. ***</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received enough feedback from the evaluator after lesson observations. ***</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers felt that evaluation results were subjective or arbitrary. **</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received enough feedback from head teacher regarding evaluation results.</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers were mostly satisfied with evaluation results. ***</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ self-evaluations mostlyaccorded with evaluation results.</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.
Table 6.11 Views on the “implementation” of new teacher evaluation held by teachers according to gender (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female n = 214</th>
<th>Male n = 284</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal setting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with her/his school management policies.</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with school goals, and goals of year or subject groups.</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set “concrete and objective” goals such as numerical goals.</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teacher repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals. **</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers consulted colleagues when setting goals.</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers know each other’s goals. **</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers expressed opinions regarding head teacher’s management policies. **</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson observation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers had enough pre-observation discussion with the evaluator.</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received enough feedback from the evaluator after lesson observations.</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers felt that evaluation results were subjective or arbitrary. **</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received enough feedback from head teacher regarding evaluation results.</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers were mostly satisfied with evaluation results.</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ self-evaluations mostly accorded with evaluation results.</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.
Table 6.12 Views on the “implementation” of new teacher evaluation held by teachers according to age group (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal setting</th>
<th>20s n = 55</th>
<th>30s n = 125</th>
<th>40s n = 205</th>
<th>Over 50 n = 116</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with her/his school management policies.</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with school goals, and goals of year or subject groups.</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teachers instructed teachers to set “concrete and objective” goals such as numerical goals.</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teacher repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals.</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers consulted colleagues when setting goals.</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers know each other’s goals.</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers expressed opinions regarding head teacher’s management policies. ***</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson observation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers had enough pre-observation discussion with the evaluator. **</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received enough feedback from the evaluator after lesson observations. ***</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers felt that evaluation results were subjective or arbitrary.</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received enough feedback from head teacher regarding evaluation results.</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers were mostly satisfied with evaluation results. **</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ self-evaluations mostly accorded with evaluation results.</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.

Examining head teachers’ views on the “implementation” of the new teacher evaluation did not confirm any differences due to type of school. Again, as the sample is not diverse enough in these areas, findings will not be reported.
6.4 Views on the Effectiveness of New Teacher Evaluation

In this section, the views on the effectiveness of new teacher evaluation are in focus. First, a general picture of the views is presented and then differences in the views by type of school, gender, and age are examined.

Overview

When it comes to views on the effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation, as Table 6.13 shows, differences between head teachers and teachers were remarkable, as was applicable to the results of previous surveys. It can be easily assumed that the evaluator tends to have a more favourable outlook on the effectiveness of the evaluation than the evaluated. In regard to almost all the possible effects, the percentages of head teachers who affirmed the evaluation’s effectiveness were almost twice as high as the percentages of teachers who did so. For instance, 76.5% of all head teachers agreed that the evaluation would have an effect on the improvement of communication and mutual understanding between teachers and themselves, while only 31.7% of teachers agreed. Indeed, a majority (60.1%) of teachers disagreed with this expected advantage.

Compared with the effectiveness of improving communication, understanding school management policies and goals, and better prioritising work-related duties, head teachers were less confident of the effects of the new teacher evaluation on teachers’ morale, and teaching and learning, although a majority of them retained favourable perspectives. Again, this suggests that head teachers regard the new practices as management tools — more specifically, a measure to convey their policies more effectively to teachers. At the same time, nearly 70% of all teachers did not believe that the evaluation would have favourable impacts on their morale and quality of teaching. Compared to the rather hostile replies of union member teachers in Tokyo (see Table 3.1), the attitudes of the teachers, including both
union and non-union members, appear relatively benign, particularly in light of the extent to which teachers associated the evaluation with divisiveness and unfavourable effects on relationships. However, teachers were far from neutral, indeed they were skeptical of the claimed advantages of the new teacher evaluation. Specifically,

- 72.5% disagreed with “New teacher evaluation improved quality or standards of teaching and learning.”
- 70.8% disagreed with “New teacher evaluation helped to better identify teachers’ needs for professional development.”

Table 6.13 Views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation held by teachers and head teachers across the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Teacher n = 504</th>
<th>Head teacher n = 131</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved communication and mutual understanding between head teacher and teachers.</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ understanding of head teacher’s school management policy.</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ understanding of school goals.</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers came to think about work priorities more effectively.</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better identified teachers’ needs for professional development.</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ overall morale.</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved quality and standards of teaching and learning.</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships between head teacher and teachers.</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused some kinds of attrition in relationships among teachers.</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this table, figures for “do not know” are omitted. Consequently, the sum of the percentages for “agree” and “disagree” does not always equal 100%.  

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Differences in views on the effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation by type of school, gender, age

A closer examination of the views that teachers and head teachers across the nation held on the effectiveness of new teacher evaluation confirmed differences due to types of school (Table 6.14), gender (Table 6.15), and age (Table 6.16) of teachers. To confirm the differences statistically, I conducted $\chi^2$-squared tests. The results are shown in the tables, along with their significant levels.

First, concerning types of school, senior high school teachers were more likely to report that the processes had unfavourable impacts on their relationships. Specifically, 36.1% of them agreed that the evaluation “Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships between head teacher and teachers.” In addition, 33.1% of senior high school teachers agreed that the evaluation “Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships among teachers.” On the other hand, compared to the other types of schools, elementary school teachers (34.2%) were more likely to agree that “Teachers came to think about work priorities more effectively.”

Second, gender affects the teachers’ views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation on relationships. For instance, 15.8% of female teachers agreed that the evaluation “Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships among teachers,” while 23.6% of male teachers agreed. In addition, 17.7% of female teachers agreed that the evaluation “Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships between head teacher and teachers,” while 28.4% of male teachers agreed. Thus, female teachers were less likely to report unfavourable impacts of the new teacher evaluation on relationships.
Table 6.14 Views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation held by teachers according to type of school (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element-ary school n = 190</th>
<th>Junior high school n = 172</th>
<th>Senior high school n = 122</th>
<th>Special school n = 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved communication and mutual understanding between head teacher and teachers.</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ understanding of head teacher’s school management policy.</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ understanding of school goals.</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers came to think about work priorities more effectively. ***</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better identified teachers’ needs for professional development.</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ overall morale.</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved quality and standards of teaching and learning.</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships between head teacher and teachers. ***</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused some kinds of attrition in relationships among teachers. ***</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.
Table 6.15 Views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation held by teachers according to gender (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Female n = 214</th>
<th>Male n = 284</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved communication and mutual understanding between head teacher and teachers.</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ understanding of head teacher’s school management policy.</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ understanding of school goals.</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers came to think about work priorities more effectively.</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better identified teachers’ needs for professional development.</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ overall morale.</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved quality and standards of teaching and learning.</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships between head teacher and teachers.</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused some kinds of attrition in relationships among teachers.</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.

Third, age greatly affects how teachers view the teacher evaluation processes, as well as teachers’ pay. All of their views, with the exception of the idea that the evaluation “Better identified teachers’ needs for professional development,” differed according to age. Teachers in their 30s and 40s were more likely to affirm the effectiveness of the teacher evaluation, while teachers in their 20s and over 50 were less likely to do so. Furthermore, there was a another difference between the views held by teachers in 20s and those over 50; younger teachers were less likely to perceive unfavourable effects on relationships, while older teachers were more likely to notice them.

Thus, there are differences in views on the effectiveness of new teacher evaluations due to the type of school, gender, and age. However, we must remember that the majority of teachers reported a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the teacher evaluation.

Examining head teachers’ views on the effectiveness of new teacher
evaluation did not confirm any differences due to type of school. Again, as the sample is not diverse enough in these areas, results will not be reported.

Table 6.16 Views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation held by teachers according to age group (percentages of agreement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>20s n = 55</th>
<th>30s n = 125</th>
<th>40s n = 205</th>
<th>Over 50 n = 116</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved communication and mutual understanding between head teacher and teachers. ***</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ understanding of head teacher’s school management policy. **</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ understanding of school goals. **</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers came to think about work priorities more effectively. **</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better identified teachers’ needs for professional development.</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved teachers’ overall morale. *</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved quality and standards of teaching and learning. *</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships between head teacher and teachers. ***</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caused some kinds of attrition in relationships among teachers. **</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01.

6.5 Discussion of the Survey Results

From the results of the national survey, I can add to the earlier findings. In this research, approximately 60% of teachers in the national sample were doubtful about the possible effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation practices. These results indicate that most teachers across the nation see little value in the policies and practices of the new teacher evaluation.

At the same time, differences between the views of teachers and head teachers
have been reconfirmed. A majority of head teachers in the national sample approved the claimed advantages of the new teacher evaluation. Compared with the head teachers in Tokyo and Osaka, surveyed just after the development of the new systems, head teachers in the national sample tend to respond less ambiguously regarding effects, particularly in regard to communication and mutual understanding between head teachers and teachers, and teachers’ understanding of head teacher’s school management policies and goals. The professional development model of teacher evaluation commonly demands that individual teachers’ goals accord with the head teacher’s management policies. The national survey, like the local ones, suggests that head teachers are willing to use the evaluation processes to ensure this accordance. However, it is impossible to assume that this always happens without conflict. Indeed, a proportion of teachers reported unfavourable impacts on their relationships within their schools. Affected relationships not only include those between teachers and head teachers, but also those among teachers.

In Chapter 3, I noted that the way teachers and head teachers judge the effects of the new teacher evaluation on goal setting in schools is a significant point to be explored given the previous survey results and the Marsden and Belfield’s studies. As Table 6.13 showed, no more than 30% of teachers in my survey agreed with the questionnaire items that implied beneficial impacts on goal setting — a majority of the teachers disagreed. However, a great majority of the head teachers confirmed the impacts. There is a large gap between the judgements of teachers and head teachers in relation to what Marsden and Belfield called joined-up goal setting or integrative bargaining.

How then is goal setting for individual teachers actually done? I also asked the teachers and head teachers specifically about how teachers’ annual goals were decided over the processes of new teacher evaluation. As Table 6.9 showed, a great majority of the head teachers felt that they had instructed the teachers to set
goals consistent with their own school management policies (85.6%) and also the goals of the school and its sub-units (i.e., year or subject groups) (90.2%). On the other hand, while a majority of teachers confirmed the head teachers’ views, there was still a significant minority who differed from their head teachers in their reflections on the experience of goal setting. This discrepancy may suggest that head teachers behave differently toward different teachers; they require some teachers to set goals in line with their management policies or school goals, but they do not require other teachers to do so. The seniority (age) and gender of teachers (among other factors) are likely to define their social position in relation to their head teachers, which in turn shapes how the head teachers’ behave toward them. I will revisit this social justice issue later with interview data in Chapter 7.

On the whole, based on a combined analysis of these survey results, it seems to suggest that through the processes of new teacher evaluation a majority of teachers are required to pay close attention to their head teachers’ management policies or school goals, but that many teachers still feel that this has been done in vain; these practices improve neither their understanding of the policies and goals, nor objective setting. This suggestion will be corroborated by qualitative analysis.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that about 30% of teachers supported the effects of new teacher evaluation on their understanding of their head teachers’ management policies or school goals and their practices of goal setting. Using the criterion that Marsden and Belfield adopted, there are some schools in Japan where joined-up goal setting or integrative bargaining approach to teacher evaluation is functioning. However, as I already noted in Chapter 3, a more significant issue is whether this joined-up goal setting or an integrative bargaining approach to teacher evaluation leads to improvement of teaching and learning, and if it does, then what are the features of the improvement.

My questionnaire included some broad questions concerning the current conditions of schools. The results showed that 52.0% of teachers felt that their
Chapter Six

colleagues were always conscious of the head teacher’s management policies. Not surprisingly, these teachers were more likely to feel that the practices of teacher evaluation improved their understanding of the head teacher’s management policies. In other words, 42.7% of them agreed to the item, with the average of 30.0% on the whole (Table 6.17). Furthermore, 26.7% of teachers felt that their colleagues gave the highest priority to raising the measurable academic and physical attainments of students, and these teachers were more likely to attest to the effects of teacher evaluation on their understanding of the head teacher’s management policies. That is to say, 39.8% of them agreed to the item, again, with the average of 30.0% on the whole (Table 6.18). \( \chi \)-squared tests confirmed that both the differences were statistically significant.

These results suggest that when the head teacher’s school management policies focus on measurable achievement of students, the processes of teacher evaluation are likely to promote the articulation of individual and organisational goals in these terms. As Table 6.9 showed, 76.5% of head teachers believed that they had repeatedly instructed teachers to set “concrete and objective” goals such as measurable goals and 64.7% of teachers felt that they were required to do so. These percentages were both high, and the gap between them was smaller, compared to the gaps in the other views on the way goal setting was done. Considering these, it is likely that teacher evaluation can help introduce measurable achievement into both school and individual teachers’ objectives and goals.
Table 6.17 Consciousness of the head teacher’s management policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colleagues are always conscious of the head teacher’s management policies. ***</td>
<td>111 (42.7%)</td>
<td>134 (51.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35 (17.2%)</td>
<td>132 (65.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>150 (30.0%)</td>
<td>310 (62.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this table, figures for “do not know” are omitted. Consequently, the sum of the percentages for “agree” and “disagree” does not equal 100%. *** p < .01

Table 6.18 Priority to raising the measurable academic and physical attainments of students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colleagues give the highest priority to raising the measurable academic and physical attainments of students. ***</td>
<td>53 (39.8%)</td>
<td>76 (57.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>94 (27.6%)</td>
<td>221 (70.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>150 (30.0%)</td>
<td>309 (62.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this table, figures for “do not know” are omitted. Consequently, the sum of the percentages for “agree” and “disagree” does not equal 100%. *** p < .01

Unlike the study conducted by Marsden and Belfield, it was not possible to collect the academic records of the sample schools. Thus, I cannot confirm whether the articulation of individual and organisational objectives in this way contributes to raising student achievement levels. However, it should be noted that Marsden and Belfield might have missed some other reasons that could explain the improvements to academic achievement, such as changes in the classroom composition of students. More significantly, even if student achievement is raised, it is difficult to determine whether this achievement is as it seems. Better
examination results do not always mean improvement of teaching and learning in any authentic sense. Further, as stated in Chapter 4, in many countries, performativity deriving from target or objective based education reform policies provides teachers with difficult dilemmas between what they want to do and to be, and what they are required to do and to be.

Having thus discussed the results of the national survey, there remains a need to probe further into the ways new teacher evaluation policies affected social interactions between teachers. Attention needs to be given particularly to the impact of teacher evaluation on school management and teacher’s work and selves. The enactment of new teacher evaluation policies may well involve changes in modes of managing school as an organisation as well as teachers. While a majority of teachers felt neither favourable nor unfavourable impacts of teacher evaluation (Table 6.13), it is not clear whether teachers were actually affected and in what ways. Teachers have different ideas about what teaching is like and how they should behave professionally, and teacher evaluation, as a performativity policy, supports particular ideas of these kinds and negate others. Considering these, the enactment of the new teacher evaluation is likely to have impacts on teachers’ work and identity. Qualitative analysis can help to draw a more nuanced picture of these impacts.
Chapter Seven: The Enactment of New Teacher Evaluation Policies

In the last chapter, I described the views held by a national sample of teachers and head teachers about the new teacher evaluation policies and the related pay reform. Their views mostly concurred with those already found in previous studies (see Chapter 3). Teachers held unfavourable views of the claimed advantages of teacher evaluation while in contrast, head teachers were much more in favour of the new policy. Among the advantages expected by head teachers were improved communication and mutual understanding between teachers and the head teacher, followed by improved teachers’ understanding of the head teacher’s school management policies and school goals.

In this chapter, against the background of these survey results, I probe further into the enactment of the new teacher evaluation policies in schools. For this purpose, I conducted interviews at three senior high schools and one special school (see Chapter 5 for how these schools were selected). The local education boards administering the four schools have all been enforcing rather stringent teacher evaluation policies and, to a certain extent, they all link the results of teacher evaluation to remuneration. Consequently, despite the predominantly consensual perceptions presented by head teachers, most teachers I interviewed had become involved in what I call the micro-politics of numerical goals. The idea of micro-politics that I follow is articulated by Ball as “the process which links these two basic facets of organisational life — conflict and domination” (Ball, 1987, p. 278). Certainly, the enactment of the new teacher evaluation policies involved conflicts and domination. The main aim in this chapter is to describe the micro-politics of numerical goals by school, drawing on qualitative data from the interviews.
Chapter Seven

7.1 Local Boards of Education and Schools

I conducted interviews at East Senior High School, West Senior High School, South Special School, and North Senior High School (all the school names are pseudonyms). The first three schools are administered by a local board of education that played a pioneering role in introducing new teacher evaluation schemes. The scheme adopted by this particular local board of education is characterised by a strong managerial emphasis and a performance-related pay element. It demands that individual teachers set a number of numerical goals in line with head teachers’ management policies. The teachers’ evaluation results are linked to both a bonus called a “diligence allowance” and their annual pay raise.

East Senior High School is located in one of Japan’s most populated prefectures. However, because it is in a suburban area, the students enjoy spacious grounds and facilities. Since it was first established about 50 years ago, this school has been regarded as a “community school,” which means that students are mixed in terms of their academic records and future career paths. After graduating, about half of the students attend higher education, a third attend vocational training institutions, and the remainder immediately enter the workforce. This is typical of academic senior high schools. However, the head teacher at East Senior High School was not satisfied with the mediocre image of “community school” and sought to increase the number of students advancing to higher education, especially “brand” universities.

West Senior High School is located in the same prefecture as East Senior High School, but it is much nearer to the centre. Like East Senior High School, this school is generally regarded as having a middle status in terms of prestige. However, students are less diverse in terms of future orientation of careers; almost all of them aspire to attend universities or colleges. The local board of education
classifies West Senior High School as “a school of middle standing.” However, this status does not mean stability in terms of the working environment for teachers. The local board demands that the school make every effort to better meet the demands of students and their parents. Consequently, the teachers were acutely concerned with students’ test results.

At South Special School, students with both mental and physical special needs learn and receive training. It is located in a suburban area of the same prefecture as East Senior High School and West Senior High School. The school includes elementary, junior high, and senior high divisions, serving students aged 6 through 18. As a special school, it has, first and foremost, the goal of meeting the individual needs of students. To this end, the present head teacher recently added a new objective regarding specific future careers of students. South Special School employs about a hundred teaching and training staff members, almost twice that of other schools in the study. This staff size as well as the specialised nature of special needs education further complicated the school’s approach to teacher evaluation.

North Senior High School is located in a northern prefecture of Japan. The prefectural board of education introduced a teacher evaluation scheme a few years later than the other board mentioned above. Compared with the scheme covering the other three schools, the scheme adopted by this prefectural board places less emphasis on managerialism. Instead, it focuses on the collaborative nature of planning and working in schools. However, even in a region far from the centre of Japan, senior high schools are highly stratified and function within competitive relationships with each other, each striving for a better profile. As a result, the development of a new teacher evaluation system at this school site involved strong pressure for setting numerical goals regarding students’ academic achievement. With regard to performance-related pay, the scheme links results to bonuses, but not yet to annual pay raises. North Senior High School is generally
regarded as having a middle status in the hierarchy of local senior high schools. Located in the politically and industrially central city in this prefecture, it competes with neighbouring schools for students. Consequently, the head teacher and some teachers strongly felt the need to develop merits that would distinguish their school from others.

The three senior high schools are all academic rather than vocational in orientation. Yet, schools of this type vary greatly in terms of previous academic records and future careers of students, as 73.9% (Monbukagakusho, 2008a) of senior high schools are classified as “academic.”

For my research, I interviewed the head teacher of each school and a total of twelve other teachers across the four schools. After obtaining permission from the head teachers, I asked all the teachers whether they would agree to participate in the research. In response to my request, some teachers volunteered. I also directly contacted a number of teachers whom I had already known or to whom I had been introduced by other teachers. To all these teachers and the head teachers, I explained the purpose of the research, possible use of the interview data, and their rights. Having understood the ethical implications of being involved in the research, they agreed to participate although the head teacher of North Senior High School did not permit his interview data to be used in this thesis. I made an effort to ensure that the teachers I interviewed varied in terms of gender, age, and the subject they taught. Appendix 6 lists details of the teacher characteristics.

The following sections describe how new teacher evaluation policies were being enacted in each school, based on the head teachers’ and teachers’ interviews.

7.2 East Senior High School

Motivating teachers to raise students’ academic achievements

The head teachers I interviewed unanimously welcomed the opportunities
facilitated by the introduction of the new teacher evaluation system. They regarded the new practices as having positive effects on the motivation of many, if not all, teachers. For example, the head teacher of East Senior High School regarded the new teacher evaluation system as an opportunity to motivate the teachers to work towards higher academic achievement of students.

We must gain higher attainments, yet not all the teachers are fully motivated for this aim. I have been thinking a lot about doing something to break the impasse. I believe this [new teacher evaluation system] is it [...] Some teachers came to me saying, “It [new teacher evaluation system] is a good challenge for me.” They highly regard setting annual goals, saying that the practice inspires them to be forward-looking. (Head Teacher, East Senior High School)

Recently, the head teacher had been articulating school management policies that have a clear focus on raising student achievement. He appreciated the newly introduced processes of teacher evaluation, particularly meetings with individual teachers, believing that in these meetings, he could communicate his own policies to the teachers more effectively.

[Author: Do you often talk about your management policies at the meetings with individual teachers?] Yes, I do. I believe this is the most beneficial part of the new system. I talk about my policies at the all-staff meetings, but I often find it difficult to get the teachers to understand what I mean. This is frustrating. This year, we have started to move for higher achievement. So, I have asked all the teachers what they can do for this goal of improving students’ performance, and also what, if anything, they are already doing for the goal. (Head Teacher, East Senior
At the same time, however, the head teacher noted some teachers’ “rather fierce resistance” to the new scheme. The resistance, as he perceived it, was of two broad types: resistance to being assessed for the purpose of ranking and principled and practical objections to setting “concrete and objective” goals. The first type of resistance was concerned with teachers being annually assessed in terms of competence (noryoku), dispositions (joi, iyoku, and taido), and performance (gyoseki) with the results linked to pay.

According to the national survey, while about a half of the teachers (51.5%) agreed with the idea of performance-related pay, a significant minority (44.9%) disagreed (Table 6.5). The views of the respondents are mostly split. At East Senior High School, teachers’ union members, joined by a number of non-union members, raised a public objection to this aspect of the new scheme and called its validity into question at staff meetings. Although performance-related pay has not been introduced nationally, the local board of education administering this school demanded that head teachers rank all the teachers not only in categories (A, B, C, D) but also in order (No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, ...) for the purpose of performance-related pay. The objecting teachers pointed out the impracticality, unfairness, and divisiveness of assessing teachers in this way, and the head teacher himself admitted the impracticality of “ranking all the teachers”:

The board tells me to differentiate all the teachers. This is for the board to treat them differently for remuneration. Yet, it is a very difficult task, you know. I can easily name incompetent teachers. But the idea of ranking all the teachers, about fifty teachers in this school, is impractical. (Head Teacher, East Senior High School)
However, to the objecting teachers, he reiterated that “Although I personally understand your points, we must go through the official procedures, anyway. Then, we should make good use of it.” In this way, he apparently succeeded in suppressing their objections.

For the head teacher of East Senior High School, it was most important for teachers to have specific goals and criterion for judging the degree to which the goals had been attained. However, this was where he encountered other difficulties.

The first goal-setting meeting matters very much. Without specific goals, we cannot evaluate properly. Therefore, I ask the teachers to make their goals as specific as possible. You need also a proper criterion for judging the degree to which your goals have been attained, so that you can say you have achieved 90%, 70%, or 30% of the goals. But this is the most difficult part of the processes. Numerical goals and quantitative criterion are most apposite. In my school, almost half of the teachers have agreed to set such goals and criteria. Yet, there are some teachers who cannot set such goals and still a few others who refuse to do so. (Head Teacher, East Senior High School)

Raising the academic profile of the school was the most important part of his management policies. He demanded that individual teachers’ goals be set in accordance with his policies. However, some teachers did not like “seeing things only from a rational point of view.”

In the event, our work is wide-ranging, concerned with the holistic development of students. Thus, it is understandable that they find it
difficult to pick up and define only a few aspects of their work as goals. Yet, we should work hard to produce results. Sometimes, we must see things from a rational point of view and this [new teacher evaluation system] should serve the purpose. I have been reiterating this at the meetings with teachers. (Head Teacher, East Senior High School)

As shown in Table 6.9, the majority of head teachers (85.6%) across the nation instructed teachers to set goals in line with their school management policies. Fewer head teachers, but still a majority (76.5%), also instructed teachers to set “concrete and objective” goals such as measurable goals. Thus, it seems that the demands of the head teacher of East Senior High School well represented what was happening nationally.

Teachers’ varied reactions to numerical goals

The story told above by the head teacher of East Senior High School corresponded with those of the teachers there. Some teachers were happy with the introduction of a new teacher evaluation system, particularly with numerical goals. For senior high school teachers, measurable goals are typically concerned with examination performance, completion of various assignments, and student promotion (or drop out). Ms. Yamamoto, a mathematics teacher in her 30s, stated the following:

A numerical goal such as the students’ completion of assignments makes things clearer. For me, working mindful of the goals makes a difference. Actually, I got better results this year. (Ms. Yamamoto, East Senior High School)

Ms. Yamamoto accepted the goal that was suggested by her head teacher at the
goal-setting meeting, instead of what Ms. Yamamoto described as an “obscure goal” that she herself had been pondering over before the meeting. She was not concerned so much about the “more concrete and assessable” goal, but felt uneasy about the assessment of her achievements.

One of my goals was that 90% of my students should complete and hand in their math assignments. This year I accomplished it. But if I was not successful and at the review meeting my head teacher had told me, “You achieved ‘only’ 70%,” I certainly should have felt that I achieved “no less than” 70%. (Ms. Yamamoto, East Senior High School)

However, for other teachers, to the extent the task of setting “concrete and assessable” goals involves seeing things from a limited viewpoint, this requirement of teacher evaluation conflicted with the more holistic educational values that they held. For example, Mr. Shimura, an English teacher in his 50s, thought of numerical goals as contradictory to his original aims of teaching, although he eventually accepted them because of his head teacher’s strong persuasion. He reflected on his embarrassing experiences of setting goals as follows:

Under this system, we are required to set specific, measurable goals. For instance, you have to set goals such as, “I shall have more than 80 students pass the third level of the Eiken [Test in Practical English Proficiency].” I personally feel I have to write down objectives that may be a little distanced from the nature of education. Here I see some contradictions. (Mr. Shimura, East Senior High School)

At first, he intended to set “I shall have many students interested in English” as
one of his annual goals, but he rewrote the original goals in the end because “Our head teacher pointed out specifically how they should be reworked.” According to the results of my survey, 34.8% of head teachers in the national sample had repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals (Table 6.9). My interview data shows that not only at East Senior High School but also in the other schools, this occurred predominantly because the head teachers believed that original goals were too ambiguous and should be replaced by numerical goals.

**A sense of comparison and rivalry**

Mr. Kitano, a chemistry teacher in his 30s, also felt distressed with the school management policies that had a strong emphasis on higher examination results of students. Like Mr. Shimura, he was unhappy with the numerical goals that he was required to set. However, he made another point in his interview. For him, it was not so much numerical work *per se* as the strained relationships with his colleagues that caused his suffering:

> Examination results of my chemistry classes were worse than any other subject. No one explicitly blamed me for the results, but I felt as if everyone looked at me reproachfully. (Mr. Kitano, East Senior High School)

At East Senior High School, individual teachers were required to attain their own goals that were derived logically from the all-school targets. Thus, if a teacher failed to achieve her/his goals, the whole school would fail to achieve its objectives too. This caused the teachers to be more aware of each other’s attainment rather than teaching practices. As he described it, although the teachers did not explicitly blame each other, their relations became awkward. He
explained this further.

Since the teacher evaluation began, I have certainly become more aware of the test results of my classes, although I have understood that the processes of evaluation are rather complex, the test results do not simply determine my own evaluation results. I suppose that most of my colleagues here feel the same way. For me, the sense of rivalry is particularly acute with my colleagues. (Mr. Kitano, East Senior High School)

This provides us with an important insight into how the micro-politics of numerical goals have been enacted; the new teacher evaluation systems can cause teachers to internalise a sense of comparison and rivalry. It is worth investigating whether this was observed in the other schools as well as East Senior High School.

7.3 West Senior High School

*Individualised modes of decision making and working*

Like the head teacher of East Senior High School, the head teacher of West Senior High School appreciated the new teacher evaluation system. For him it was a useful tool for effective communication with the teachers but seemingly only in a one-way manner.

I like this new system [of teacher evaluation] because now I have more opportunities to communicate to my teachers what I am thinking, what I want them to do. (Head Teacher, West Senior High School)
Chapter Seven

As this statement implies, the teachers of West Senior High School often felt that the head teacher forcefully imposed goals that they did not like. In addition, it should be noted that the teachers did not know each other’s goals, as Ms. Miyakawa, an English teacher in her 40s, commented.

I wondered why he [one of the colleagues teaching the same subject] had been taken up with collecting and checking students’ notebooks and I realised that that was the goal that he had set at the beginning of the year. (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High School)

The results of my national survey corroborated this; 81.0% of teachers across the nation did not consult their colleagues when setting goals, and 87.3% did not know each other’s goals (see Table 6.9).

If a majority of teachers are pursuing goals that their colleagues do not know, it is possible to say that the new teacher evaluation system is promoting an individualised, as opposed to collective, way of working in schools. During the interviews, some teachers were willing to refer to the changes in how the school was managed. As stated in Chapter 2, recent government policies have been championing head teacher’s managerial powers, while blaming collective modes of decision making for the lack of agility and accountability of school management. The policy proponents argue that enhancing head teachers’ managerial powers will lead to a school management that can respond more promptly to, and consequently meet more fully, the needs of students and parents as consumers in the educational market. In this context, the introduction of the new teacher evaluation system helps to institutionalise an individualised method of decision-making and working in which a head teacher can ask or require teachers on an individual basis, as opposed to a collective basis, to undertake tasks derived from their management policies.
At the same time head teachers themselves may feel constrained in formulating their own goals for school management, despite the rhetoric of government policies. The head teacher of West Senior High School flatly denied having such decision-making power, saying:

In reality, the local board of education dictates school management policies. They have established a comprehensive plan of restructuring schools, and every single school is a part of the whole picture consisting of various types of school, such as elite school, vocational training school, and school especially for students having difficulties adapting themselves to school life. The assigned types of school determine the way schools should be managed, with little room for maneuvering left to the site. The board wants me to implement such management policies exactly as it wants. (Head Teacher, West Senior High School)

It should also be noted that head teachers are subject to the requirements of goal-setting and evaluation conducted by local boards of education. While head teachers’ power to persuade teachers to work within their management policies has been enhanced, in a broader perspective, their power in relation to the local board of education is constrained. Thus, the politics of numerical goals stretches over the whole system of local educational governance. This observation of head teachers’ power being constrained in relation to the local board of education does not diminish the previous observation that their power is fortified in relation to other teachers.

*Dilemmas between professional beliefs and performativity*

Also at West Senior High School numerical goals conflicted with teachers’ educational values. Again, some of the teachers were persuaded to set numerical
goals, albeit unwillingly, as the head teacher demanded, but others declined to do so. Ms. Kawabata, a physics teacher in her 40s, was one who successfully declined to comply.

I was instructed to set numerical goals by my head teacher. But I found them unsuitable. So I said to my head, “Excuse me [from the requirement].” (Ms. Kawabata, West Senior High School)

Ms. Kawabata did not approve of placing too much emphasis on measurable aspects of student achievement although she did not articulate well the reason for her noncompliance.

As with the case of Mr. Kitano of East Senior High School, Ms. Kawabata’s successful refusal suggests that there is still some room left for teachers to decline to set numerical goals against the head teacher’s strong exhortations. However, such resistance scarcely left the teachers’ values and identities intact. The following statement by Ms. Kawabata illustrates this point:

I feel increasingly powerless in the face of this new teacher evaluation system. I am tolerating it. But sometimes I feel as if my professional beliefs are completely outdated [...] I did not set numerical goals, but goals that I set instead are still about academic standards. Recently, I have become more conscious of test results, although I refused to set goals about them. (Ms. Kawabata, West Senior High School)

Even for Ms. Kawabata, the micro-politics presented a dilemma between her own educational beliefs and performativity. This happened to her by way of the power relations in which the head teacher increasingly came to dominate over teachers.
There is also some evidence that the micro-politics induced by the new teacher evaluation systems was affecting collegial relations, as a sense of comparison and rivalry was being internalised among the teachers of East Senior High School. Ms. Miyakawa felt restrained from doing more or initiating anything new.

I was thinking about proposing new pedagogy to my colleagues in the same subject group. I really believed in the effectiveness of the new method of teaching English. But I gave up in the end, because I was nervous about being seen by them as trying to “get points.” It was a shame. (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High School)

This statement implies that some teachers may be afraid that their colleagues could view them as trying to stand out for better evaluation results. Thus, in West Senior High School, the micro-politics seemed to contribute to a less relaxed and animated atmosphere.

7.4 South Special School

A decline of collegial relations

Recently, the head teacher of South Special School had been proposing a new policy concerning future careers of the students. He insisted that the school should provide all the students with proper vocational training so that they would be able to gain employment immediately after graduation. Although he did not specifically refer to this policy in his interview, he welcomed the new teacher evaluation system on the ground that he “sees it an effective tool to integrate the entire work of teachers for school goals” (Head Teacher, South Special School). However, Ms. Miyazaki, a special education specialist in her
50s, objected to this proposal.

Recently, the board of education emphasised that every student in special high schools should be trained for employment. Therefore, our head teacher suggested that our school prospectus include an aim of a “100% success rate for employment.” I objected to this because I did not think that all of our students are both competent and suited for employment. So I asked the head teacher which students he was thinking about. Then, he replied, “I do not know the actual state of the students. However, the board of education insists on thorough training for employment. Therefore, we should do so.” (Ms. Miyazaki, South Special School)

Ms. Miyazaki had asked the question at a meeting with the head teacher when she was asked to set her own goals in line with the new school aim. Naturally, she could not accept the head teacher’s answer. However, under pressure to set those goals that would contribute to the fulfillment of the school goal, she conceded in the end.

As at the other schools, for the interviewed teachers of South Special School, meetings with the head teacher were attached special importance over the whole process of teacher evaluation. The meeting was the place where the micropolitics laden with conflicts and domination became most tangible. Furthermore, it is not just the head teachers but also some teachers who were willing to make use of the meeting. Ms. Miyazaki gave an example.

Last year, a dormitory tutor [attached to the special school] was rated C [i.e., below the average], and we wondered why. It so happened that one of her senior colleagues had told the head teacher that the tutor was quite incompetent. I myself cannot justify that. She is far from incompetent,
although her tactic is a bit unique. Sometimes, she does things her way. I suppose that the senior colleague was not happy with that, and hence, called the tutor names in the meeting with the head teacher. (Ms. Miyazaki, South Special School)

Thus, the new teacher evaluation system drove a wedge between colleagues. On the other hand, it is possible that the meetings provide some teachers with opportunities to pledge loyalty to their head teacher. Consequently, horizontal communication among colleagues was sacrificed for vertical communication between individual teachers and the head teacher.

**Harassment and discrimination**

At South Special School, the closed nature of meetings seemed to facilitate differing treatment of teachers, depending on their age and experience.

At my school, teachers with less experience, for example, novice teachers, are persistently instructed to rewrite their goals. I have heard that the head teacher assumed an overbearing attitude towards young teachers. But he never does this towards experienced teachers like me. (Mr. Kagawa, South Special School)

Mr. Kagawa himself was an experienced, male teacher in his 50s who felt “free to talk to, sometimes even criticise” the head teacher. However, he was concerned that less experienced teachers and female teachers were being harassed by the head teacher at the meetings.

Given that the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies is closely related to a shift in power relations within the school, harassment and discrimination can occur over these processes. Indeed, not only at South Special
School but also at East Senior High School, discrimination in relation to the evaluation results was reported. The head teachers may feel that younger teachers are easier to deal with than experienced, older teachers, even when the young teachers are unhappy with their own evaluation results.

These examples echoed the results of the national survey. While 26.9% of female teachers stated that at the goal-setting meetings they expressed their opinions regarding the head teacher’s management policies, 40.1% of male teachers reported doing so. Further, it was found that it was more likely that female teachers would be required to rewrite annual goals. In regard to age, young teachers were less likely to have such an active attitude as mentioned above, although they seemed to be happier than their older colleagues with the processes and results of teacher evaluation (see Tables 6.11 and 6.12).

In addition, Mr. Kagawa raised concerns about the disadvantages that (again, in many cases, female) teachers with heavy home responsibilities would suffer. He referred to his colleague who was taking care of her toddler.

On the ground that she assumes only a minimal amount of duties at school, she might have been judged as being poorly motivated and accordingly evaluated. Suspicious of this possibility, she came to talk to me. I strongly recommended that she ask the head teacher the precise

16 Mr. Shimura of East Senior High School reported the case: “One of my young colleagues self-evaluated his own performance of the year as ‘A.’ As a criterion-referenced judgment, I believe, this self-evaluation is right. Yet, the head teacher rejected it, saying, ‘Young teachers cannot get “A” because they are inexperienced.’ We have been told that evaluations are made criterion-referenced, rather than norm-referenced. The reality is totally different. Many young teachers feel that they are discriminated against simply because they are young.”
reasons for her evaluation results, but she hesitated. I am afraid that she was not confident enough to do so. (Mr. Kagawa, South Special School)

Thus, the introduction of new teacher evaluation policies can reinforce, if not produce, social injustice. In such cases, relevant appeal actions should be taken, but disadvantaged teachers are often afraid that taking any action would put them in a more disadvantaged position. In any case, not all the boards of education have established systems for complaint or appeal (see Chapter 2). Further investigation of social justice issues involved in the new teacher evaluation policies is warranted.

7.5 North Senior High School

*Excessively narrow goals*

Just as at East Senior High School and West Senior High School, the head teacher of North Senior High School insisted that teachers set numerical goals. He clearly endorsed this in his interview although he did not allow me to directly use his interview data in the present thesis (his refusal may be related to the incident of a teacher’s breakdown which I describe below). Again, however, not the all teachers were persuaded to do so. Ms. Minamisawa, a chemistry teacher in her 50s and an active union member, declined to set numerical goals concerning the attendance rate of her students. This was despite repeated exhortations by the head teacher. She did not object to the idea of setting annual goals, but could not accept being forced to set numerical ones. She explained the reason:

I do not want to make concessions when I set my goals. I do not disagree with the idea of setting goals at all. But students will never develop
exactly as I expect. I cannot set numerical, too specific goals because they will constrain the level of flexibility in work. For example, regarding absent students, I suppose that some of them have good reasons. So, I cannot simply say that I aim for 100% attendance. Rather, I think that what I should do is make every effort to understand my students better. (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High School)

The reason Ms. Minamisawa cited for her refusal to set numerical goals was similar to that cited by Mr. Shimura of East Senior High School for his embarrassment. For these teachers, numerical goals seemed to be too narrow and too specific. The idea of setting such goals contradicted with their beliefs in the wholeness and flexibility of pedagogical processes.

*Pressure and emotional stress*

At North Senior High School, all the meetings occurred face to face in the head teachers’ offices. Naturally, some teachers felt anxious about how the meeting would proceed. They were embarrassed or upset when the head teacher imposed numerical goals with which they disagreed. Others felt that they could ask their head teachers for advice or recognition of their efforts and achievements. This expectation on the part of teachers was related to the communication gaps and rivalry between colleagues. As Ms. Minamisawa stated, the more the teachers feel too busy to talk to each other or the more they feel that a sense of rivalry hinders communication with colleagues, the more they think of meetings with their head teacher as “helpful and reassuring” (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High School). Here, it is important to note that relationships in schools are being affected by, and at the same time are affecting, the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies.

At North Senior High School, the micro-politics of numerical goals certainly
stretched beyond the relationships between the head teacher and the teachers to
the relationships with colleagues. Ms. Hatakeyama, an English teacher in her
20s, had developed a mental illness and could not work for more than six
months. At the meeting with the head teacher, she set numerical goals concerned
with the examination results of her students. She exerted great effort to achieve
the goals, giving her students many assignments and grading the assignments
collected every day. She would often end up grading until 1:00 am and wake up
at 5:00 am to prepare for the day’s lessons. At first, she noticed that her students
were exhausted. It was not long before an increasing number of them failed to
complete and hand in their assignments. Then, she felt that she could not
motivate them to work harder because she herself had become less confident in
her method.

Ms. Hatakeyama had been a good practitioner of communicative English
teaching. She studied pedagogy at the university and believed in it. However,
she decided to ignore her beliefs, hoping that “teaching to the test” would work
better for her students who intended to attend higher education. However,
eventually, it turned out that “teaching to the test” was not simply unsuccessful
but also a source of emotional stress for both herself and her students:

It was when the summer term nearly came to an end that I found myself
completely stuck on my chair in the staff room. I could not move at all
although the time had already come for a class. I was asking myself,
“Why did I, such an incompetent woman, become a teacher? I should not
have become a teacher at all.” (Ms. Hatakeyama, North Senior High
School)

For some time before this breakdown happened, she had been suffering from
a dilemma between “teaching to the test,” which numerical goals required, and
using a communicative approach to English teaching, which she had been practicing since she entered the profession. She was wondering whether she had made the right choice. However, when the breakdown occurred, the dilemma had almost disappeared. She blamed herself and kept repeating to herself, “I should not have become a teacher.”

It seems that the power relations with her head teacher, who insisted that she set numerical goals, contributed to her dilemma and her self-blaming mentality, which eventually led to the breakdown. At the same time she said, “I remember that I was not particularly aware of the numerical goals, but rather, I was always feeling beholden to my colleagues, particularly to my year group colleagues.” Thus, it is important to look at micro-politics, not only in terms of relations between the teacher and her head teacher (i.e., vertical relations), but relations among teachers (i.e., horizontal relations). Ms. Hatakeyama felt strong pressure from her colleagues, particularly from her year group leader. She told me that this senior teacher “stirred up rivalry between us in the same year group.” She supposed that the year group leader himself had set a goal of a significant increase in tests results for the year group students.

“Doubts beget doubts” atmosphere among teachers

At North Senior High School, most, if not all, teachers were involved in the micro-politics of numerical goals, but some teachers were not as affected as others. The case of Ms. Hatakeyama shows that teachers who are more willing to adapt to numerical goals (like the year group leader in this case) can cause other teachers to suffer by promoting performativity and stirring rivalry among colleagues.

The less relaxed and animated atmosphere observed at both East Senior High School and West Senior High School was more clearly felt at North Senior High School. The following comments by Ms. Minamisawa are good
Our relations have become much tenser. I am most worried about the spread of the “doubts beget doubts” atmosphere among us. For example, if someone is working hard, perhaps he is sincerely devoting himself, going the extra mile, for the sake of students, but people will cast a suspicious glance at him, feeling that maybe he wants to get points. (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High School)

I feel that teachers here are more conservative than before. They do what they must do anyway, or they do what they are instructed to do by the head teacher, but they are not willing to do more. It seems to me that they are careful not to be noticeable. (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High School)

At the same time, the teachers of North Senior High School came to work in more isolation than before.

It sometimes happens that something new had already been undertaken when I noticed it. For example, some teachers abruptly began to examine students’ clothes at the school gate every morning to ensure the observance of dress code. We had received many complaints from neighbours about the untidy ways some students dress themselves. We understood that we should deal with this problem, but we had never discussed this particular measure at staff meetings. As far as I remember, things like this never happened before. (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High School)
At North Senior High School, proposals of changes in relation to instruction and guidance of some students used to be discussed at staff meetings so that teachers could express their opinions. Recently, however, Ms. Minamisawa felt that the discussion was becoming a mere formality because many decisions had already been made by the head teacher and senior management team and then were simply announced. She explained, “Still, some teachers stand up to present their opinions at staff meetings. But they often begin by saying, ‘I know that conclusions will not change, even though I state my view.’ A mood of resignation has been spreading among us” (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High School). This change means that when teachers feel uncomfortable with specific initiatives that their head teacher proposes, they have fewer opportunities to discuss them with colleagues. At North Senior High School, questions about the particular policy issue of teacher evaluation were not raised in public (although I noted that at East Senior High School such questions were raised at the staff meetings). Thus, individualised modes of decision making and working can help the top-down style of school management to operate.

**Broader backgrounds of changes in modes of decision making and working**

Ms. Minamisawa, who had been learning about policies as a union activist, attributed the causes for the “more conservative” attitudes, individualised way of working, and top-down style of decision-making, not simply to the introduction of new teacher evaluation policies, but to other recent changes. These changes included downgrading of democratic decision making within schools, further stratification of school organisational structure with the introduction of new administrative positions, and sanctions against the dissident teachers with regard to the local government’s policies of the national anthem and flag. In this particular prefecture, teacher unions still maintain higher rates of membership than in other prefectures. Occasionally, they have had fierce confrontations with
the local board of education over these issues.

All these changes originated from national or local education policies. However, not many teachers I interviewed had such a macro-political point of view as this particular teacher had. Indeed, many teachers felt strained relations among themselves, sometimes rather acutely, but they did not relate the affected relations to particular policy mandates. There were fewer opportunities for them to address and redress the problems.

Remembering the statistical findings (see Chapter 6), teachers in senior high schools were more likely than their colleagues in other types of schools to report the unfavorable effects of teacher evaluation on their relationships. I have already suggested a reason for this (stronger pressure for performativity), which corresponds to the qualitative analysis. With regard to another significant differentiator of the views, the age of teachers, I could not find any significant correspondence between the findings from the questionnaire survey and those from the interviews. The survey showed that older teachers were more likely to report unfavourable effects while amongst the interviewees, the teacher that suffered most from the affected relations was young and female. This fact drew my attention to the problems of social injustice.

From the above descriptions of the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies in the schools, a number of common themes regarding the micro-politics have appeared. I will discuss the themes further, linking them to the broader theory and literature, in the concluding chapter.
Chapter Eight: The Failure of the New Teacher Evaluation Policies

In Chapter 7, I explored how the new teacher evaluation policies were enacted in schools. It was found that the new teacher evaluation systems were inducing the micro-politics of numerical goals or performativity that was laden with conflicts and domination. While the last chapter focused on the aspects of management and social relations of schools, in this chapter I look at whether and how the new practices of teacher evaluation were affecting teachers’ work and teachers themselves. Although I could have organized the discussion by school, the positions of different “policy actors” (Ball, et al., 2011a) within the schools were often so different that it has been easier to organize the discussion according to themes that cut across the schools.

The new teacher evaluation policies — in particular, their professional development model — are intended to promote teacher development and contribute to better teaching quality. According to the national survey I conducted, however, a majority of teachers (over 70%; see Table 6.13) denied these effects. The results prompt me to explore further why most teachers had such poor perceptions of the claimed advantages. Furthermore, the analyses in Chapter 7 suggested that the micro-politics induced by the new teacher evaluation policies can cause some teachers a serious dilemma between their educational beliefs and performativity, and thus destabilise their professional identities.

Considering these, this chapter explores three questions. First, why do the new teacher evaluation policies fail to fulfill their claimed advantages? Second, given this failure were there any impacts of the new teacher evaluation systems on teachers’ work and identities? Third, if there were such impacts, how can we make sense of them? As in Chapter 7, I draw on first-hand experiences of teachers as
described in the interviews.

8.1 Why Did Teacher Evaluation Fail?

Distrust

An annual cycle of teacher evaluation leads to the head teacher’s assessments of individual teachers’ abilities and performance. In the national survey, almost half of teachers (50.6%; see Table 6.9) reported that they were predominantly satisfied with their evaluation results. Interestingly, however, most teachers I interviewed distrusted their own evaluation results. Indeed, not a single teacher fully relied on the head teachers’ judgments.

I suppose that no one believes in the evaluation results. If I knew other teachers’ evaluation results, I would be more confident in saying so [evaluation results are not valid]. A good teacher is really hard to define and evaluate. If you spend many hours listening to a student who often gets into trouble, I am sure that you are a good teacher. However, under the present teacher evaluation system, you will never get good results. Sometimes we hear that a teacher who did not seem very dedicated to students’ well-being got an “A,” and then we say, “Why did this teacher get an ‘A’ and that teacher get a ‘C’?” (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High School)

Even a teacher who confirmed the beneficial effects of teacher evaluation on her work motivation expressed concerns about the validity of the teaching assessment given to her by her head teacher.

After lesson observations, we had time to talk about the lessons. But he
[the head teacher] would not pick up on what I myself thought I had not done well, and thus we had to discuss. He did not encourage me by praising what I thought I had done well, either. It was regrettable that he gave me none of those comments, advice, or commendations that I had sought. (Ms. Yamamoto, East Senior High School)

Ms. Yamamoto received feedback from her head teacher but was not satisfied with it. As this suggests, in a number of cases, distrust of teacher evaluation resulted from a dissatisfying experience of lesson observation and its feedback. Without exception, official procedures of teacher evaluation demand that head teachers observe lessons and provide appropriate feedback. However, I found that not all of the head teachers gave feedback after lesson observations.

Last year, my head teacher came to see my classes three times, once per one semester, each time for one period of class, but I had received no feedback. I do not believe that my head teacher is exceptional. I hear that not a single lesson observation has been conducted elsewhere. (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High School)

This teacher suggested that there are schools where no lesson observations take place. Indeed, at North Senior High School, Mr. Tada reported that his lessons had never been observed.

My head teacher has never seen my classes, but I got a “B” for my teaching. I do not understand how he was able to make this judgment. (Mr. Tada, North Senior High School)
Different specialisations

As the reasons for this superficial observance, and even breach, of the procedural requirements, the teachers often referred to specialised knowledge and skills, which hinder head teachers with different specialisation from having confidence in conducting lesson observations to give proper feedback. These difficulties occurred not only in the senior high schools but in the special school. The following quote illustrates the latter case:

I am a specialist of autonomic training for physically handicapped children. Our head teacher has been working only in schools for mentally handicapped children and therefore he cannot understand what we are doing with our [physically handicapped] students in rehabilitation classes. He told me, “I may not say this, but, to be honest, I do not have any knowledge about what you are doing.” For this reason, he could not but confirm my own self-evaluation. (Mr. Kagawa, South Special School)

The national survey showed that 51.5% of teachers (see Table 5.9) confirmed a concurrence between their self-evaluation and the evaluation by the head teacher. However, situations such as the one described by Mr. Kagawa may be true for other teachers and if so, the concurrence does not help the teachers to trust the head teachers’ judgments.

Staff size and time

Another reason teachers cited for the difficulties of conducting lesson observations and giving feedback was the size of a school’s teaching staff.

On average, elementary and junior high schools have 20 to 30 teachers, a typical senior high school, 40 to 50, and some special schools no less than
100 teachers. You must remember all the teachers first. Knowing what they are doing is really hard work. Assessing them one by one is far from realistic. (Ms. Miyazaki, South Special School)

Related to this, one head teacher complained that lesson observation was time-consuming:

I have about 57 teachers here. If I spent two hours observing a lesson and discussing it afterward, the total would amount to 114 hours. That would mean that almost three weeks should be consumed exclusively on the evaluation tasks. Given other commitments of mine, I do not think that it is possible. (Head Teacher, West Senior High School)

The new teacher evaluation policies were introduced into schools without consideration of these practical conditions.

The nature of work

In addition, teachers expressed more substantial reasons for their distrust of teacher evaluation. For example, Mr. Aoyama of East Senior High School, a physical education teacher in his 50s stated:

I do not see any point [in the new teacher evaluation system]. We are supposed to set goals and self-monitor what we are doing, seeing that we are always on the track for the accomplishment of the goals all through the year, in addition to being evaluated in the end. But we must be flexible enough to respond to unfolding events and student needs. I had completed both the goal-setting and self-evaluation forms, but they are just paper work, making no sense […] it is often said that teachers’ work
is invisible. The evaluation is supposed to make visible what is invisible, but it is not possible with regard to our work. (Mr. Aoyama, East Senior High School)

By “visible,” Mr. Aoyama seemed to mean “quantifiable.” He distrusted the evaluation in principle, because of the incompatibility between his own beliefs in the nature of work, which demand a great deal of flexibility, and the requirements of teacher evaluation, which encourage conformity.

While Mr. Aoyama set some numerical goals as a mere formality, Ms. Kawabata and Ms. Minamisawa refused to set numerical goals because of the nature of the work as they perceived it, despite exhortation to do so by their head teachers. The following explanation by Ms. Minamisawa echoed the reason Mr. Aoyama disagreed with the idea of teacher evaluation; both teachers believed in the flexibility of teaching.

[...] Students will never develop exactly as I expect. I cannot set numerical, too specific goals because they can constrain the level of flexibility of my work [...] Regarding absent students, I suppose that some of them have good reasons. So, I cannot say that I aim for 100% attendance. (Ms. Minamisawa, East Senior High School)

These teachers declared themselves against the rationale of the new teacher evaluation policy for the same reasons that they opposed the old efficiency rating plan (see Chapter 2) despite the policy claims that the new teacher evaluation system, with its professional development focus, was different.

Mr. Aoyama also referred to the issue of performance related pay. For him, linking results to pay aggravates further the dysfunction of the new teacher evaluation system.
To be honest, we are making ourselves look better. Now that evaluation results are linked to pay, we cannot say, “I am weak here. I have not done well enough there.” We cannot help each other when we need help. Anyway, being always aware of such a thing [being evaluated], we cannot do our work properly […] if you want to get good evaluation results, you will naturally delimit the scope of your work so that you can surely complete the work. If you take a risk, you may be seriously penalised for failure. As a result, there are parts of work that we must do as a school but no one is willing to do. (Mr. Aoyama, East Senior High School)

With regard to performance-related pay, the national survey showed that about half (51.5%) of teachers agreed with the performance-based personnel system (seikashugi) in principle, but that many of them disagreed with its application due to the complex and collaborative nature of teachers’ work (see Table 6.5). This also applies to Mr. Aoyama quoted above. He suggested that teachers were trying to make themselves look good and evading difficult but necessary work.

Although almost all the teachers I interviewed had a distrust of the evaluation processes and results, one suggested that some teachers welcomed the new policy.

I have an impression that young teachers see it [the new teacher evaluation system] much more favorably than I. They complain that they are doing more, working longer but that they are less paid than their elder colleagues. They want to be treated fairly, so they support the idea of teacher evaluation. (Ms. Minamisawa, East Senior High School)
As already suggested in Chapter 6, differences in duties and workloads can be linked to the endorsement of performance-related pay by those teachers who perceive the imbalances. However, it is also speculated that this support for linking pay to evaluation can plummet once the new pay system has been fully developed. Ms. Minamisawa understood her colleagues’ complaints but thought of their endorsement as “indiscreet” because given the way the teacher evaluation policies were being introduced, performance-related pay would not do justice to the imbalances. She came to think in this way partly because she was a union activist and learning about the relevant policies in detail.

**Unfulfilled promises of professional development**

Given the general level of distrust of teacher evaluation due to the practical and substantial difficulties mentioned above, it is not surprising that most teachers I interviewed categorically denied its beneficial impacts on their teaching. For example, Ms. Miyakawa commented on the ineffectiveness of teacher evaluation in terms of professional development, with reference to her own experiences of continuing professional development. A few years ago, she had an opportunity to take leave from school and study pedagogy at a graduate school of education.

While I learned about “lesson study” at the graduate school, I came to realise that I need to learn much from other teachers’ lessons to improve my own teaching. I need to see other teachers teach and have them see me teaching, much more. For teachers to develop professionally, I believe, these practices need to be firmly rooted within school. Culture of mutual learning needs to be developed. Some may say that teacher evaluation should make this change. Yet, I totally disagree. As it stands, it has nothing to do with our professional development. We have not
come to see each other teach any more. We have not come to talk about teaching any more. Worse, the situation is the opposite. (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High School)

As already mentioned in Chapter 7, Ms. Miyakawa was thinking about proposing new pedagogical approaches to her colleagues after she returned to school from university. In the end, she gave up because she “was nervous about being seen as trying to ‘get points’ from them [colleagues].” She felt that collegial relations had become strained after the new teacher evaluation system started, which would hinder teachers’ professional development. Ms. Miyakawa agreed with the idea of professional development, but felt that the new teacher evaluation system had failed her.

Apparently, Ms. Yamamoto was an exception in that she admitted the beneficial effects of teacher evaluation on her work. She stated the following:

I came to think about my goals more clearly. I had been thinking about my goals, but just thinking. A numerical goal such as the students’ completion of assignments makes things clearer. For me, working mindful of the goals makes a difference. Actually, I got better results this year. (Ms. Yamamoto, East Senior High School)

At the same time, it should be remembered that Ms. Yamamoto was not satisfied with the quality of feedback she had received from her head teacher. Even for this teacher, the beneficial effects of teacher evaluation were rather limited.

The professional development model of teacher evaluation is intended to contribute to the professional development of teachers in two related ways (see Chapter 4). One is by encouraging teachers’ reflection on work, aided by professional dialogue with the head teacher. The other is by clarifying individual
Chapter Eight

teachers’ needs for professional development and thereby directing training and in-service education to meet these needs. However, I did not find any evidence of organisational (at the school level) or systemic (at the local board of education level) efforts to ensure that in-service education and training catered to the needs of professional development as part of the processes of teacher evaluation. For the teachers I interviewed, the promises of professional development had hardly been fulfilled. Consequently, they distrusted the teacher evaluation processes and results.

8.2 How Did the New Teacher Evaluation Policies Affect Teachers’ Work and Professional Identities?

In Section 8.1, I documented reasons for the failure of the new teacher evaluation policies. However, stating that the teacher evaluation systems failed to fulfill their claimed advantages is not the same as contending that they had no impact on teachers’ work and selves. On the contrary, as mentioned in Chapter 7, the new teacher evaluation policies seemed to be significantly affecting some teachers’ work and identities.

In this regard, the most salient case was Ms. Hatakeyama of North Senior High School, who changed her way of teaching. Numerical goals regarding the attainment of her students forced her to adopt a “teaching to the test” practice, which was contrary to the way she practiced previously. As a result, she faced a serious dilemma between her own pedagogical beliefs and performativity. This dilemma became too acute for her to endure, and eventually she suffered a breakdown. She felt strong pressure not only from her head teacher but from colleagues. She said, “I was always feeling beholden to my colleagues, particularly to my year group colleagues.” At the same school, however, Ms. Minamisawa refused to set any numerical goals, claiming that such goals were
incompatible with her educational beliefs and practices. As this suggests, the ways individual teachers reacted to the new teacher evaluation policies varied even in the same school.

At East Senior High School, Mr. Shimura suffered from a contradiction between his original aims of teaching and the numerical goals that he was required to set. He felt that the goals were “distanced from the nature of education.” Mr. Kitano also talked about his sufferings. He was afflicted by the strained and accusatory relationships with his colleagues, as well as the numerical goals that he himself had set. For him, the teachers seemed to be more aware of each other’s attainment than teaching practices per se. When his students did not perform well on tests, he felt “as if everyone looked at me reproachfully.” On the other hand, Mr. Aoyama disagreed with the method of evaluation because it was supposed to make “visible” (quantifiable) what is “invisible” (not quantifiable) in his work. He declared his deep distrust of the new teacher evaluation system, saying “I do not see any point.” He completed the formal requirements but disregarded them from the beginning to end.

I put bland goals in the evaluation sheet and handed it over to the head teacher. He had insisted on numerical goals, and we had a rather long talk at the meeting, but he conceded in the end. For me, teacher evaluation is simply a waste of time. I simply do not remember the goals I set. (Mr. Aoyama, East Senior High School)

At the same school, Ms. Yamamoto appeared to have little difficulty adapting to the requirements of teacher evaluation. She confirmed the beneficial effect of numerical goals on her work motivation.

Then, at West Senior High School, Ms. Kawabata did not like the emphasis on measurable aspects of student achievement and successfully declined to set
numerical goals. Ms. Miyakawa also disregarded the new teacher evaluation system. However, she took a practical approach to setting annual goals. Specifically, she set some numerical goals but regarded setting annual goals as a mere formality.

I said to myself, “OK. I will set goals that sound plausible, sound satisfying to the head teacher.” And then I forgot. (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High School)

During the interviews, I found that Ms. Miyakawa was highly regarded not only by her colleagues but also by the head teacher for her expertise and enthusiasm for teaching. This advantage of social position may be why she was able to take this practical approach. At the same time, it should be noted that she mentioned considerable anxiety about being seen by her colleagues as trying to “get points.”

At South Special School, the head teacher had recently decided on a new school goal of a “100% success rate for employment.” Ms. Miyazaki disagreed with this goal because she believed “not all of our students are both competent and suited for employment.” However, under pressure from the head teacher, she eventually did set her own annual goals, consistent with the new school goal. She recounted the painful experience as follows.

In the end, my goal was “I will make an effort to have all the students prepared for employment.” But I did not think that all of them were suited for employment. This experience greatly discouraged me. Of course, to those students who are suited for employment, I have been making every effort to provide proper preparation. (Ms. Miyazaki, South Special School)
Just like Mr. Shimura, she suffered from being forced to set goals against her professional beliefs.

As mentioned several times, a number of teachers were persuaded by their head teachers to set numerical goals. Literature on shifting headship towards the “new manager” in the English context (e.g., Ball, 1994; Gewirtz, 2002; Grace, 1995; Whitty, et al., 1998) also describes what Japan has witnessed — head teachers are more vulnerable to the pressures for new professional values and identities than teachers. For those head teachers who either advocate or cannot but advocate performativity, teacher evaluation is a helpful measure for winning teachers over to their side. However, it was not confined to the power accruing to the head teachers that helped performativity to gain full force. Both Ms. Hatakeyama and Mr. Kitano felt strong pressure from their colleagues. Ms. Hatakeyama mentioned that her year group leader “stirred up rivalry” between colleagues in the same year group. Thus, performativity worked through horizontal (collegial) relationships as well as vertical (managerial) relationships.

Furthermore, even in the same schools, individual teachers behaved differently in the face of the micro-politics of numerical goals or performativity. The teachers’ reactions can be classified into four broad types: accommodating, suffering, separating, and resisting. A typical example of accommodation was provided by Ms. Yamamoto. She willingly accommodated to the requirements of new teacher evaluation and rewrote her original goals when the head teacher insisted that they be replaced by numerical ones. Ms. Hatakeyama, and to a lesser degree, Mr. Shimura, Ms. Miyazaki, and Mr. Kitano, represented the suffering reaction. Ms. Hatakeyama tried to accommodate to performativity but ended up having a breakdown. Mr. Shimura and Ms. Miyazaki also felt a dilemma between their original beliefs and the numerical goals they were required to set. Mr. Kitano suffered from strained and accusatory relations with
his co-workers. Ms. Miyakawa also represents this reaction type, as she felt uneasy about the declining collegial relationships caused by the introduction of the new teacher evaluation system. At the same time, however, her reaction can be classified as detachment, as she disregarded the processes and results of teacher evaluation. Separation is about keeping one’s professional work and values intact by dealing with the requirements of teacher evaluation as “a mere formality.” Certainly, Mr. Aoyama did this; he did not remember his own annual goals. Ms. Miyakawa could not remember hers either. Lastly, Ms. Kawabata and Ms. Minamisawa resisted the new teacher evaluation system by refusing to set any numerical goals.

Of these types, it is obvious that teachers who suffered had their professional identities destabilised by performativity. As Mr. Kitano suggested, since they had been aware of test results, a dilemma between their beliefs and the requirements of the new teacher evaluation policies had been growing. On the face of things, the other types of reaction appear not to have particular impacts on teachers. For example, for Ms. Miyakawa, the processes of teacher evaluation were usually inconspicuous, surfacing only occasionally such as during meetings with the head teacher and lesson observations. However, things could be more complicated than they first appeared. She abandoned proposing a new pedagogical idea because she felt uneasy about being seen by her colleagues as trying “to earn points.” When she conceded in this way, she must have experienced some sort of dilemma.

This may also be the case with the reaction of resisting. Indeed, Ms. Kawabata, who declined to set any numerical goals, saying “Excuse me [from the requirement of setting numerical goals]” to her head teacher, acknowledged her vulnerability to performativity.

I feel increasingly powerless in the face of this new teacher evaluation
system. I am tolerating it. But sometimes I feel as if my professional beliefs are completely outdated […] I did not set numerical goals, but my goals are still about test academic standards. Recently, I have become more conscious of test results. (Ms. Kawabata, West Senior High School)

She successfully refused the requirement of the new teacher evaluation system to set numerical goals. Nonetheless, she felt that her professional values were being undermined by the pressure of performativity. Thus, the process of resistance did not guarantee that this teacher’s values and professional identity were kept intact.

In summary these examples suggest that even the teachers who apparently retained their values and original ways of working were at risk. To a greater or lesser degree, they have had their professional identities destabilised. While the new teacher evaluation system failed to fulfill its claimed advantages, it did have impacts on teachers’ work — adopting “teaching to the test,” becoming more aware of test results, internalising a sense of rivalry and comparison, and refraining from proposing a new idea. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of micro-politics, it appears that its apparent successes depended on a variety of factors, such as age, expertise, social position, and relationships in schools. Here, I can describe the precarious nature of successful resistance and detachment. In the concluding chapter, with reference to relevant literature, I will further explore how the new teacher evaluation system is affecting teacher identities.
Chapter Nine: Discussion and Conclusions

In earlier chapters, I addressed the research questions introduced in Chapter 1. In this concluding chapter, I summarise my findings and discuss further the significant themes for analysis. In particular, I have reserved detailed discussion of qualitative findings about the enactment of the new teacher evaluation policies (presented in Chapters 7 and 8) for this chapter. I also note the contributions and limitations of the present research and conclude with suggestions for further research.

9.1 New Teacher Evaluation Policies Embedded within Wider Policy Formation

Following the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education’s (Tokyo-to Kyoiku linkai) introduction of a new teacher evaluation system in 2000, the concept has been gaining ground across the country with the support of the national government. Two rationales governed the development of the new teacher evaluation policies. The first was that teachers could attain required competence and performance by means of a professional development model of teacher evaluation. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (Monbukagakusho), local education boards, and some educationalists have endorsed this model, which involves goal setting, lesson observation and feedback, and self-review of competence and performance, in addition to formal evaluation by the head teacher. Advocates distinguish between this development-orientated model and the old efficiency-rating plan, which they regard as being solely for accountability. At the same time, however, new teacher evaluation schemes were sought so that performance-based personnel systems could be put in place. Thus, the second rationale is that the results of
teacher evaluation could be used as an objective basis for personnel disbursements, including providing performance-related pay.

I critiqued these two rationales. The professional development model of teacher evaluation assumes that individual teachers’ goals align with organisational and systemic goals. It ignores likely tensions between these goals, adopting instead a “problem solving” approach (Thrupp & Willmott, 2003, pp. 54-55). In reality, however, such conflicts may well occur. Therefore, practices based on this model, if enforced, could control teachers and their work just like the accountability model. The nature of teachers’ work hampers the reliability of teacher evaluation when applied for the purpose of personnel disbursements. These lines of reasoning led me to adopt both macro- and micro-political points of view and to use an analytic concept of performativity.

A macro-political examination has revealed that developments in new teacher evaluation policies have formed an integral part of the wider policy formation. The “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education” aims for changes in the relations between the national government, local education boards, schools, and teachers. More specifically, the national government seeks to play a more strategic role in directing the education system to meet the imperatives of economy and global competition, while other actors assume greater responsibilities, but less autonomy, for carrying out national directives (i.e., the need to strengthen international competitiveness of human resources).

Within this changed system of educational governance and accountability, a more effective quality assurance system is needed. Thus, a variety of measures, such as national and local examinations, school evaluation, and teacher evaluation, have been introduced. I have argued that the new teacher evaluation is supposed to develop teachers’ competence and performance, but does so within the parameters set by governmental priorities. Indeed, the professional development model of teacher evaluation demands that teachers set their own
goals in line with school goals that are supposed to conform to local and national government objectives. Further, by linking pay to evaluation results, an individual teacher’s success or failure in attaining his or her own goals will be rewarded or punished. Thus, the new teacher evaluation might be expected to work as a mechanism of political control.

Having analysed the nature of new teacher evaluation policies embedded within wider policy developments, I considered a micro-political question: How are the new teacher evaluation policies being enacted? In the following sections, I discussed other significant themes arising from the qualitative findings presented in Chapters 7 and 8 against the background of the quantitative findings in Chapters 3 and 6. The discussion supports the thesis that new teacher evaluation will work as a performativity mechanism. However, it provides us with a particular view of how performativity works. At first glance, the new teacher evaluation policies seem to have failed. Few teachers took the new practices seriously, and most teachers were apparently immune from political control and performativity. Neither did the professional development model exhibit its acclaimed advantages. However, these findings suggest that the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies influenced teachers and their work indirectly by affecting modes of school management and teachers’ relationships. Thus, my central argument is that performativity works not simply upon but also through teachers.

9.2 Impact of the New Teacher Evaluation Policies

In Chapter 7, I stated that the new teacher evaluation procedures provided head teachers with opportunities for individualised face-to-face communication with teachers. Head teachers can use this opportunity for listening, recognising, reassuring, proposing, persuading, and directing teachers. In other words, head
teachers now have a new means of control over what teachers think and do. The head teachers in my sample often asked teachers to replace their original, “ambiguous” objectives with “specific and measurable” goals, typically regarding the academic performance of students. In addition, head teachers proposed to teachers individually that new teaching- and management-related initiatives should be undertaken; earlier, such proposals had been made collectively at staff meetings. As a result, it became more likely that teachers did not know what their colleagues were doing. Thus, teacher evaluation promoted individualised modes of decision-making and working in schools, while endangering collective modes.

This change facilitated the top-down style of management within schools; even when individual teachers felt uncomfortable with head teachers’ policies and specific initiatives, they had fewer opportunities to form a collective voice. Thus, teacher evaluation has eroded teachers’ collective strength in Japan as witnessed in various other countries (Thrupp, 2002). Of course, the introduction of new teacher evaluation is not solely responsible for the top-down style of management in schools. In recent years, Japan’s education has witnessed both coercive and managerial policies, such as sanctions against teachers defying the national anthem and flag, downgrading of democratic decision-making, and the creation of a more hierarchical management structure in schools. For the most part, teacher unions have been critical of these policies, which they fear will diminish democracy within schools. However, teacher unionism has drastically declined with teacher union membership standing at only 27.1% as of 2009 (Monbukagakusho, 2010b). Informed objections to these policies have less appeal to non-union members than before. At East Senior High School, union members, joined by non-union members, publicly objected to performance-related pay. However, this may not occur elsewhere very often.

Work intensification for teachers is another factor. Some teachers appear to
have been reassured by the dubious judgements produced in the teacher evaluation. As Ms. Minamisawa of North Senior High School suggested, the more occupied teachers are with the evaluation procedure, in addition to their core job of teaching, the more difficult it is for them to develop “extended professionality” — a concept originally coined by Hoyle (1974). It implies “a [much] wide[r] vision of what education involves, values the theory underpinning pedagogy and generally adopts a much more intellectual approach to the job” (Evans, 1997, p. 61).

Here, the work on policy enactment by Ball, Maguire, Braun, and Hoskins (2011) is relevant. The authors presented different types of “policy actors or policy positions” (Ball, et al., 2011a, p. 625), based on their case studies in four schools in England. In an era of heightened accountability, reporting on the “implementation” of various policies demands “increasing amount of time and effort away from that which is reported on” (Ball, et al., 2011a, p. 629). This is particularly, but not exclusively, true of senior teachers. Teacher evaluation, a focus of the present study, is a case in point, as it requires all teachers to self-review their competence and performance and complete related paper work. However, for junior teachers, and perhaps some experienced teachers as well, day-to-day survival predominantly dominates and “the bigger picture is mostly blurred and distant” (Ball, et al., 2011a, p. 632). Even when the policy “receivers” as Ball, Maguire, Braun, and Hoskins call them, consider policies enforced and oppressive, they normally choose to comply. Where these “transactors” and “receivers” consist of the majority of staff in schools, the voice of policy “critics,” such as active unionists, is likely to become muted. Thus, Ms. Minamisawa of North Senior High School warned that a “resigning mood” was spreading and resistance was getting harder in Japanese schools.

As the survey results clearly showed (see Chapters 3 and 6), Japanese head teachers were more in favour of the concept of the new teacher evaluation than
teachers, and more so than their English counterparts. Although no evidence can be provided at present, Japanese head teachers seem more likely to accept not just the teacher evaluation policies, but also the current raft of Japanese education reforms, despite their neo-liberal flavour. In Japan, the government has always been keen to win head teachers over to its side so that policies can be enacted smoothly. In particular, during the national confrontation over the old “efficiency rating plan of teachers,” the government moved to define head teachers as an “authoritative boss” over teachers (Duke, 1973; Ojima, 2007, pp. 20-25). Since then, it has been enforcing a series of policies aimed at driving a wedge between head teachers and teachers: for example, head teachers were formally prohibited from joining the same unions as teachers in 1968. In addition to this political maneuvering, perhaps the paternalistic culture of Japanese society discussed in Chapter 4 is responsible for teachers and head teachers embracing the top-down style of school management. This particular culture is assumed to underlie “a hierarchical organisation of a group, with a paternalistic leader at the apex, who is the source of satisfying both affective and instrumental needs of subordinate members” (Befu, 1980, p. 170). The individualised methods of decision-making and working, induced by the new teacher evaluation policies, are the most recent factors resulting in this style of school management. In this regard, the enactment of the new teacher evaluation policies is playing a critical role in reinforcing the cultural base of Japanese leadership.

However, it should be noted that head teachers are also subject to the requirements of goal setting and evaluation conducted by local education boards. Thus, while head teachers’ power to persuade teachers to work in line with their management policies has been enhanced, their power in relation to local education boards is constrained.

The goals and policies of local education boards are, in turn, supposed to be
set within the parameters defined by the state. All of these power relations, between teachers and head teachers and head teachers and local education boards, are aligned to enable the state’s national educational goals to permeate to individual teachers. If the entire system functions properly, goals or objectives can be articulated not only at the school level but at all levels of the education system. My study suggests that this has already occurred in a proportion of schools. Japan’s recent policies, scholarly discourses emphasising teacher evaluation as an integral part of school management, and Marsden and Belfield’s formulation of joined-up goal setting or integrative bargaining approach to performance management, lack this broader, macro-political perspective.

The new teacher evaluation affected not only vertical power relations between head teachers and teachers but also lateral relations among teachers. Some of the teachers I interviewed complained of strong pressure from their colleagues and rivalry among colleagues. Understanding that a teacher’s failure to attain her/his goal would amount to the failure of the entire school, teachers became more aware of each other’s performance. Consequently, even if teachers did not explicitly blame each other, their relationships became mutually accusatory and strained. Thus, teacher evaluation caused teachers to internalise a sense of comparison and rivalry. We saw that within these contexts, one teacher (Ms. Hatakeyama) became overly self-critical and needed to take extended leave.

In the English context, the concept of “panoptic performativity” was used to explore the experiences of teachers living in the stringent school inspection regime (Perryman, 2006). It was discussed that the sense of being under surveillance led to the teachers performing in ways dictated by rigid and pre-determined criteria for their work. The metaphor of a panopticon (an institution in which everyone is easily seen from an observation point but nobody can see the observer) was useful for explaining how teachers internalised performativity.

The following anecdote provided by one of my interviewees illustrates this
I pair up with a young teacher. She sometimes complains to me that she cannot be outspoken with the senior management. She feels that they are always watching with accusatory eyes rather than looking after her. They are ready to assess her rather than to lend her a helping hand. However, she is resigned to that as she is in her first year of teaching (during which her employment is conditional) anyway. (Mr. Kagawa, South Special School)

Here the senior management represented the agency of surveillance. However, in other cases that I presented in Chapter 7, the salient observation point (the state, local education board, or head teacher) had receded into the background and was instead replaced by tacitly accusatory colleagues. The teachers were observed by each other rather than by an external authority such as the state or local education boards or an internal authority such as the head teacher. The authority may have initiated performativity, but it was being enacted through the strained and mutually accusatory relations of the teachers in the school — *implicitly* in some cases, but perhaps more *explicitly* in others.

This seems to be echoed in Jeffrey’s (2002) analysis of the replacement of the democratic relations of teachers with a “team culture.” According to Jeffrey, “a performative discourse refocuses teachers’ attention from the issues of how to interpret curriculum policy to ensuring that delivery of its basic tenets and reproduction of them illustrate the success of the school in the educational market place” (Jeffrey, 2002, p. 537). Thus, this changed priority functions as a disciplinary force for teachers. Furthermore, the performativity reconstitutes teachers’ relations in terms of teams with the team, as Jeffrey quoted a teacher saying, “being only as good as the weakest link and I keep thinking, ‘I’m the
weak link here, I’m going to let them down’” (Jeffrey, 2002, p. 537). Mr. Kitano of East Senior High School, who felt “as if everyone looked at me reproachfully” under the circumstances in which a teacher’s failure to attain targets would equal the failure of the school, echoed the sentiments of the English teacher quoted by Jeffrey.

“Panoptic performativity” (Perryman, 2006, 2009) is about self-policing, to which my interviewees, senior high school teachers, attested. Their colleagues were inquisitive about each other’s attainment of goals, since it would affect the success of their school as a whole. They lived in fear of being looked upon as “standing in my colleagues’ ways” (Mr. Kitano, East Senior High School) and grew self-critical. Not only vertical (with head teachers) but also lateral (with colleagues) relations became more tense, with increased pressure on teachers to perform better. My observation is that teachers did not simply police themselves but also each other.

9.3 Exploring the Nature of Teachers’ Identity Work

In Chapter 8, I hinted that the identity work teachers undertook in the process of teacher evaluation was more precarious than it first appeared. The results of surveys showed that the professional development model of teacher evaluation did not work and failed to gain teachers’ confidence. A more in-depth analysis of the enactment of teacher evaluation policies confirmed this although suggesting that it still affected many teachers and their work.

The teacher who suffered a breakdown was a case in point. She suffered from a serious dilemma between her own professional beliefs and performativity. Other teachers, whose identity work ranged from accommodating at one end by looking at the process “as a mere formality,” to resisting at the other, appeared to succeed in keeping their professional identities intact. However, I observed that
less strain in their relationships at school was also responsible for their successes. In particular, the success of separating and resisting strategies depends on how many teachers, willingly or unwillingly, conform to the rationale and procedures of performativity policies, such as teacher evaluation. Performativity works through teachers as it is internalised by them. Performativity, as represented by numerical goals, causes emotional disturbance and conflicts through engendered relations. However, these conflicts can be pre-empted or solved again through these relations, which provides head teachers with the power to “achieve and maintain particular definitions of school” (Ball, 1987, p. 278) — the power to dominate.

It is not my intention to argue that all head teachers are advocates of numerical goals or performativity. However, as the English literature on shifting headship towards “new managers” has shown, (Ball, 1994; Bottery, 2002; Gewirtz, 2002; Grace, 1995; Whitty, et al., 1998), head teachers are more vulnerable to the pressures of new professional values and identities than teachers. As Gewirtz stated, new managerialism “provides a means by which school practices can be realigned to performance criteria set by the state” (Gewirtz, 2002, p. 47). For head teachers who either advocate or cannot help but advocate performativity, teacher evaluation is a helpful management tool for winning teachers over to their side.

Drawing on Giddens’ (1991) formulation of four major dilemmas that the self typically confronts in late modernity, Woods and Jeffrey (2002) elaborated on the situation of teachers in England in four areas: (1) the creation of a fragmented self, as it became difficult to retain old values; (2) an assault on teacher autonomy; (3) a heightened sense of uncertainty about one’s abilities, aims, relationships, and commitment to teaching; and (4) commoditisation of personal relationships. While some teachers could simply embrace the dilemmas, others negotiated the inconsistencies between their self-concepts and the newly
assigned identities.

Woods and Jeffrey (2002) found that the latter type of teachers responded in one of two ways: self-positioning (refusal and self-assertion) or separation of the self from what they were required to do and be. Self-positioning was concerned with “a strong resolve to maintain the Plowden self-identity, rejecting the new assigned social identity” (p. 99). Here, the authors defined the Plowden identity as consisting of humanism and vocationalism (in other words, a missionary commitment to teaching), providing teachers with the basis for an integrated self. In the separation of self strategy, teachers developed a “new personal identity to meet the ostensible requirements (although not the spirit) of the new social identity, while reserving and cultivating what were to them more important aspects of the self for their private life outside the teacher role” (Woods & Jeffrey, 2002, p. 100).

These analyses seem applicable to the teachers I interviewed who responded differently to the new teacher evaluation. Specifically, Ms. Kawabata, Ms. Minamisawa, and Mr. Aoyama, who criticised the rationale of teacher evaluation, resisted the pressure of performativity. Some other teachers, for example Ms. Miyakawa, seemed to employ a separation of self-strategy or “game playing” (putting on an act to meet expectations) which enabled ritualisation of teacher evaluation. Yet, these analyses are somewhat ambiguous with regard to the trajectories and consequences of the identity work. For one thing, it is not certain how long and under what conditions these strategies can be successful.

Woods and Jeffrey (2002) noted that these strategies cannot always solve the dilemmas: “Game-playing can leave teachers ambivalent about their self-identity. In the face of authority and loss of trust, uncertainty occurs and creates yet another dilemma for teachers” (pp. 102-103). Woods and Jeffrey (2002) suggested that these strategies could only be stop-gap measures. Although they did not expand on this idea, the strategies could intensify, rather than relieve,
teachers’ professional and existential anxieties. Indeed, as noted earlier, Ms. Kawabata acknowledged that her professional beliefs were being destabilised, although she refused to set numerical goals and apparently succeeded in sustaining her professional identity.

In the present thesis, I introduced a work through, as opposed to work upon, perspective of performativity. My main objection to what I call a work upon perspective is that it makes us believe that teachers adapt to, comply with, appropriate, or resist performativity policies on their own (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed critique). Thus, analyses based on this perspective can fail to pay adequate attention to the impact of performativity on teachers, mediated by relations with their colleagues. I assume instead that performativity policies, in this particular case teacher evaluation, are being enacted through the social interactions of teachers. As I repeatedly noted, it is the strained and mutually accusatory relations among colleagues that seriously afflicted Ms. Hatakeyama and Mr. Kitano.

This line of reasoning leads me to suggest that success in sustaining one’s professional identity, at least partially depends on the degree to which relations with colleagues are strained. To put it in another rather blunt way, success was contingent on how many teachers, willingly or unwillingly, conformed to the rationale and procedures of performativity policies in each school. Apparently, the new teacher evaluation did not have a significant impact on Ms. Miyakawa’s professional identity. Her own personal factors, such as disposition, professional and personal career, and strength of educational beliefs, contributed to the success of “game-playing.” At the same time, however, it is possible that the less strained relations in West Senior High School allowed her to ritualise the processes of teacher evaluation. Thus, success is not guaranteed.

Besides Ms. Miyakawa, some other teachers I interviewed set their own numerical goals as “a mere formality,” believing that thereby they could
preserve their professional beliefs and identities. However, this may not be as easy as it first appears if evaluation is linked to pay. The penalty for failure to attain goals will put stronger pressure on teachers to be conscious of the goals. Furthermore, I would argue that “game playing” involves a kind of instrumentalism that assumes it is possible, if not easy, to keep one’s interior self intact by detaching it from one’s exterior self. However, in reality, the exterior can affect, modify, and even decay the interior. Taylor (1994), an American philosopher, criticised instrumentalism when he warned that our inner nature is “in danger of being lost, partly through the pressures toward outward conformity, but also because in taking an instrumental stance toward [ourselves, we] may have lost the capacity to listen to [our] inner voice” (p. 30). This is what performativity, the currently dominant policy technology, means.

Performativity is one of the “mechanisms for reforming teachers (scholars and researchers) and for changing what it means to be a teacher, the technologies of reform produce new kinds of teacher subjects” (Ball, 2003, p. 217, quoted in Youdell, 2010, p. 226). This may well happen to teachers, possibly including Mr. Aoyama who categorically criticised the rationale of new teacher evaluation.

Describing the “as a mere formality” strategy deployed by teachers as a method to successfully preserve their professional identities is also problematic. In this case, adequate attention is not paid to the consequences of the identity work and overall, this identity work can reinforce performativity, not the least because an increasing number of teachers will set numerical goals. Even if individual teachers feel they can preserve their professional identities for the present, other teachers could feel that circumstances are becoming more constrained. Here, again, performativity works through the working relationships — it does not simply impact upon teachers as an outside force. Thus, for individual teachers to disregard and set numerical goals “as a mere formality” does not halt, but rather assists the enactment of performativity.
With regard to the consequences for individual teachers, undoubtedly, Ms. Hatakeyama was most severely affected. She faced a dilemma between her professional sense of dedication to students and her pedagogical beliefs on one hand and the changes in her teaching and strained relations with her colleagues on the other. This dilemma disturbed her professional and personal identities and eventually led to her breakdown. However, when the breakdown occurred, the dilemma had almost disappeared. She just blamed herself saying, “I should never have become a teacher.” She came to consider herself “incompetent and responsible for all the collapse.”

In this identity work, the mechanism of “responsibilisation” (Kelly, 2001, pp. 29-31) played its full part. Responsibilisation was successful because Ms. Hatakeyama could not but “conduct themselves [herself] in accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of actions” (Beck & Ritter, 1992, p. 29, quoted in Kelly, 2001, p. 30). For Ms. Hatakeyama, the appropriate or approved action was to commit herself to “teaching to the test,” which meant to produce higher test scores. Yet, responsibilisation does not always demand commitment and can happen to other teachers. Teachers responding to the new teacher evaluation by deploying the “as a mere formality” strategy will still behave in accordance with the appropriate and approved model of action, and they will in turn be asked to accept responsibility for the results of their behaviours. Responsibilisation works more imperceptibly and more widely than many previous studies have assumed, just as performativity does.

9.4 Implications for Research, Policies, and Practices

Advantages of work through perspective of performativity

In the present study, I have deployed the work through perspective of performativity as a theoretical concept. Through this analytical lens, I have been
able to observe how the new teacher evaluation policies played a role in producing or reinforcing mutually policing relations and the destabilisation of teachers’ identities in schools. This observation illustrates the usefulness of the work through perspective of performativity and enables theorizing of performativity and research into related policies to become better informed.

The work through perspective is constructed on a core assumption: performativity is being advanced through the social interactions of teachers. Thus, this particular perspective is closely connected to the micro-political or relational viewpoint I have adopted in Chapters 7 and 8. In Chapter 4, I argued that previous literature on performativity tended to focus on the impact of performativity policies or discourse on teachers as if they were simply outside forces. I called this work upon, as opposed to the work through perspective of performativity. It is not my intention to deny the work upon perspective, but rather I would argue that while policies initiate performativity in schools, performativity is fully enacted through the social interactions of teachers.

Using the work through rather than the work upon perspective of performativity allows us a more fine-grained understanding of the impact of new teacher evaluation and, perhaps, other policies. Specifically, it is possible to analyse the indirect impact of performativity policies on teachers, mediated by affected relationships, as I have documented in the present study. The perspective also made it possible to pay attention to the composite effects of policies. A number of teachers suffered due to the strained and mutually accusatory relationships produced not only by the new teacher evaluation but also due to other changes in the policies and structures of managing teachers and schools.

In contrast, a problem with the work upon perspective would be the individualistic nature of the analysis. From this perspective, performativity comes from elsewhere as a mandate, and it is what teachers respond to in some
way. They adapt to, comply with, appropriate, or resist performativity requirements, but ultimately in an isolated manner. For example, Jeffrey and Woods (2002) explored the identity work of teachers confronting performativity policies. Faced with a dilemma between self-identity and social identity, the teachers employed varied strategies, including refusal, self-assertion, separation of the self from the new social identity, and game-playing. This analysis gives the impression that identity work is being done individualistically. In reality, however, the nature of teachers’ relations could significantly influence how policies affect identity work, as the present analyses of the impact of teacher evaluation have suggested.

In addition, although it sounds contradictory to analytical individualism, the work upon perspective of performativity is based on an assumption of ontological collectivism. It is a model of school organisation that would help performativity to be reified (in other words, considered to be an outside thing) rather than a micro-political analysis. The literature on performativity often assumes that teachers’ social relations are monolithic in value and orientation. However, I believe such strong value sharing among teachers is not common enough to be generalised. My own analysis in the present study suggests that the new teacher evaluation helps performativity to work by capitalising on the “differences among teachers with regard to teaching philosophies, personal goals and values, and political interests divisions” (Blasé & Anderson, 1995, p. 64), both already present and newly produced, within school organisations.

Ball, et al. illustrates that studies on “policy implementation,” as opposed to “policy enactment,” pay little attention to different positions taken by school actors in relation to policies. This obscures the differentiated nature of their responses to policy (Ball, et al., 2011a, p. 625). With the exceptions of school leaders, teachers are likely to be regarded as “receivers,” just coping and defending. On the other hand, the present research provides a more nuanced
picture than such “implementation studies” of how teachers responded to new teacher evaluation policies.

A comparison of teacher evaluation policies

Japan’s new teacher evaluation policies are meant to work in almost the same way as in other countries, such as performance management for teachers in the UK. In other words, teacher evaluation may promote teachers’ professional development but within the parameters of State policies. The “Structural Reform of Compulsory Education” has given the State additional strategic and stronger powers, with local education boards, schools, and teachers being given some autonomy in how they should work while dealing with severe constraints on the scope of their work. On the other hand, the present research documents some variance in how policies are enacted. In Japan, strict accountability measures, such as linking evaluation to pay, have been only introduced in some prefectures. This may be partly because local education boards are reluctant to develop harsh, confrontational relationships with teachers. However, as the present research suggests, this does not necessarily mean that Japan’s teacher evaluation is less effective as a measure of political control than its counterparts in other countries; teacher evaluation works in a more indirect, subtle way, by means of changed modes of school management and altered relations among colleagues. As noted in Chapter 4, in Japanese culture, conflicts tend to be avoided, but control and domination are completed through relationships (Nakane, 1967). The enactment of new teacher evaluation policies, as the present study has explored, seems a newly added illustration of such control and domination.

In addition, compared with head teachers in the UK, head teachers in Japan are more in favour of new teacher evaluation policies and, possibly, of the current education reform as a whole. This difference also highlights the inadequacy of researching teacher evaluation policies as simply enforced upon
Chapter Nine

teachers, telling teachers how they should teach students, develop professionally, and manage themselves. A micro-political study, with a particular focus on how head teachers or what are called “enthusiasts” and “translators” (Ball, et al., 2011a) interpret and translate teacher evaluation policies in schools, is highly relevant in Japan.

**Alternatives to teacher evaluation policies and practices**

The present study is also concerned with alternatives to teacher evaluation policies and practices. A number of teachers I interviewed were concerned about or even critical of performance-related pay. Linking pay to evaluation results is a powerful constraint on teachers’ professionalism and professional collaboration. Many studies on teachers’ professional learning have confirmed that a professional learning community has positive effects on student learning outcomes (McLaughlin & Talbert, 2001; Vescio, Ross, & Adams, 2008). They also indicate that managerialism and testing accountability, which aims to increase student learning outcomes, have detrimental effects on teachers’ emotions, sense of efficacy, conditions of work, and relationships, which can be debilitating for the professional learning community. If teachers’ professional development is a serious consideration in an era where teaching is increasingly complex and demanding, such a strong accountability or managerial element should be abolished.

However, the present study clearly indicates that abolishing performance-related pay is not sufficient; without the salient element of accountability and control, performativity impacts, repositions, and reconstructs teachers’ work and identities. This implies the need for alternative policies and practices.

First, at the level of policy-making, in addition to teacher evaluation polices, a range of accountability and managerial policies should be reconsidered. As stated earlier, the new teacher evaluation policies are part of the policy ensemble
intended to more effectively control what and how teachers perform and produce. Policymakers and scholars should be more critically engaged in the idea of professional development by means of teacher evaluation. They should consider carefully the practical conditions for and substantial difficulties involved in this model of teacher evaluation. They should also develop a broader, macro-political perspective.

Second, at the level of practice, teachers need a more critical view of the professional development model and a broader, macro-political perspective on teacher evaluation and performance-related pay. A number of teachers have chosen to respond to the requirements of the policies “as a mere formality.” However, this kind of response does not help them escape performativity. On the contrary, it reinforces performativity with increasing number of teachers still setting numerical goals, thus straining relations among peers. In addition, teachers and head teachers should be more conscious of issues of social injustice occurring during teacher evaluation.

This also has implications for future directions for teacher professionalism. The present research stresses the need to develop “extended professionalism” (Hoyle, 1974) so that teachers and head teachers can more fully understand education policies and can intellectually and morally respond to the performativity issues that the policies endorse. Given that education policies are influenced and shaped by a variety of intersecting globalising forces and are mediated nationally and locally, teachers and head teachers must enhance their awareness of these wider, complex forces. They need to develop what Bottery (2006, p. 108) calls “ecological awareness.”

As I stated in Chapter 4, the present study has a transformative orientation (Mertens, 2007). The domination and marginalisation that it has thus far discovered through a mixed method research approach and the theoretical lens of performativity, needs to be shared not only with other researchers but with the
researched. Better understanding of existing reality can empower the dominated and marginalised to seek improvements.

9.5 Limitations of the Research

As I stated in Chapter 5, I had planned to select a few focus schools from the 146 schools where not only head teachers but also teachers participated in the national survey, but I had to abandon this plan. I adopted what is called a “convenience-sampling approach” (Cohen & Manion, 1989, p. 103), which resulted in limitations on the representativeness of the schools and the teachers involved in the research.

Originally, I intended to choose schools such that head teachers’ views on new teacher evaluation policies could represent the national sample, from favourable to skeptical. In the event, all the head teachers I interviewed were in favour of the policies. Given the importance of head teachers’ interpretations and translations of policies, if I had conducted the research according to the original design, I might have found some differences in the way the policies were being enacted.

It should also be noted that neither elementary nor junior high schools were included in the study. As repeatedly stated, senior high schools are under stronger pressure with regard to performativity than elementary and junior high schools. In addition, as the results of the national survey suggested, senior high school teachers may have different views on the new teacher evaluation policies and practices than teachers in other types of school (see Chapter 6). Specifically, they are more likely to report unfavourable impacts on their relationships, and they are more likely to feel that their evaluation results are arbitrary and subjective. On balance, senior high school teachers have less confidence in the new teacher evaluation. These variances in views may reflect variances in the
way the policies are being enacted in different types of school. Therefore, I cannot claim that the present findings can be generalised to other types of school. However, this delimitation is an advantage in a sense as I was able to observe explicitly how performativity functions. The theoretical themes arising from the analyses can be explored in other cases.

Another limitation was that I could not match interview data with survey data by school. If I had been able to do this, a greater variety of approaches to analysis would have been possible. For example, better use could have been made of teachers’ responses to survey items that queried the current state of their schools. On the other hand, I did have the advantage of being able to collect contextual information about the schools, such as the subtle feel of teachers’ relations and neighbours’ views on the schools.

9.6 Future Directions for Research

Studying the enactment of teacher evaluation policies is necessary for us to be able to develop more “educative approaches” (Gitlin & Smyth, 1989, pp. 3-7). We need to have a more adequate understanding of how the present state of performativity has become established in schools.

I conceive two future directions for research. One is to investigate further the manner in which the new teacher evaluation policies are enacted but in different contexts. As stated above, the present research has limitations in terms of generalisability. The theoretical themes arising from the present research need to be explored with a wider sample, which should include elementary schools and junior high schools. In addition, schools in geographical areas other than the two prefectures in which I have conducted my research should be included in research. Variances in the new teacher evaluation schemes introduced by local education boards can affect the different ways in which the schemes are enacted.
in those schools.

The other direction is to widen the scope of the policies to be studied. For example, target-setting, evaluation of a school’s performance, league tables constructed from pupil test scores, and a variety of learning policies for students are all concerned with performativity. This research has found that a policy ensemble, of which the new teacher evaluation policies are part, is inducing performativity in schools. This suggests that studying the new teacher evaluation policies in isolation is not sufficient. At the moment, myriad polices are being enacted in schools and they interact with, and frequently contradict each other. While some policies are explicitly concerned with performativity, others are not. Therefore, to address the myriad of problems associated with performativity, we need to understand the complexity in policy processes. This understanding could help us grasp “how it [performativity] might be unmade” (Youdell, 2006, p. 512).
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Appendices

Appendix 1 Questionnaire for head teachers (translated into English):
Views on new teacher evaluation and performance-based personnel system:

Thank you very much for your participation in this research. Your answers will be statistically analysed and thus both you and your school will not be identified. Your candid answers will be very much appreciated.

February 2008

Associate Professor Masaaki Katsuno
Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo

First of all, I would like to ask you about your school and yourself. Please choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate.

**Question 1.** What type of school is yours?
1. Elementary school  2. Junior high school  3. Senior high school
4 Special school

**Question 2.** What is the number of students at your school?
1. No more than 50  2. 51~100  3. 101~200  4. 201~300  5. 301~400
6. 401~500  7. 501~600  8. 601~700  9. 701~800  10. 801~900
11. 901~1000  12. no less than 1001

**Question 3.** What is the number of staff at your school?
1. no more than 10  2. 11~20  3. 21~30  4. 31~40  5. 41~50  6. 51~60
7. 61~70  8. 71~80  9. 81~90  10. 91~100  11. No less than 1001

**Question 4.** How many years have you been working at the present school?
1. 1 year  2. 2 years  3. 3 years  4. 4 years  5. 5 years  6. Over 6 years

**Question 5.** What is your age?
1. Under 46  2. 46~50  3. 51~55  4. 56~60  5. Over 60

**Question 6.** Which is your sex?
1. Female  2. Male

Secondly, I would like to know about your views on teachers’ pay and performance-based personnel system teacher.

**Question 7.** For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard the most appropriate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Do not know.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Generally speaking, linking pay to performance and competence is a matter of course.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Teachers' pay should reflect the demands of posts such as head of a department or “lead teacher”.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>3. Teachers’ pay should reflect differences in workloads, including, for instance, supervision of club activities.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Linking teachers’ pay to students’ academic achievement is a good idea.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>5. In order to reward the hard work of teachers, salary levels for all, rather than only some, teachers should be raised.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Linking pay to performance and competence is intended to cut off teachers’ pay budget.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way of rewarding hardworking or competent teachers.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Most teachers could not work harder even if their pay was linked to performance and competence, because they are already working up to their full limit.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. It is better to reward schools’ performance in terms of staffing and finance better than to reward individual teachers’ performance.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Linking teachers’ pay to performance and competence is a fair way of distributing financial resource.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Linking pay to performance and competence would contradict evaluating teachers for their professional development.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because it is difficult to attribute students’ attainment to individual teachers.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers.</td>
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<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Thirdly, I would like to know about your experience of and views on new teacher evaluation.
**Question 8.** For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate. If you have not been involved in the process of new teacher evaluation, please skip this question and go straight to Question 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>On overall effects of new teacher evaluation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Strongly agree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Agree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Disagree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Strongly disagree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Do not know</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Helped me to deal with particularly incompetent teachers.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Helped me to deal with teachers having particularly heavy work load or health issues.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Improved communication and mutual understanding between teachers and me.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Helped me to have teachers understand my own school management policies.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Improved the teachers’ understanding of school goals.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Helped me to deal with particularly poorly motivated teachers.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Helped me to have teachers think about work priorities more effectively.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Helped me to better identify teachers’ needs for professional development.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Improved teachers’ overall morale.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Improved the quality or standards of teaching and learning in the school.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships with teachers.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>On goal setting</strong></th>
<th><strong>Strongly agree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Agree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Disagree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Strongly disagree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Do not know</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. I instructed teachers to set “concrete and objective” goals such as numerical goals.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. I instructed teachers to set goals in line with my own school management policies.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. I instructed teachers to set goals in line with school goals, and goals of year or subject groups.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. I repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. I instructed teachers to be aware of their annual goals over the course of a year.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>On meetings with teachers</strong></th>
<th><strong>Strongly agree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Agree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Disagree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Strongly disagree</strong></th>
<th><strong>Do not know</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their concerns about teaching and guidance.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their concerns about relations with parents or guardians of their students.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

19. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their concerns about their work load or health issues.  
20. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their concerns about relations with their colleagues.  
21. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their opinions regarding my school management policies.  

On lesson observation and feedback
22. I had enough pre-observation discussion with teachers.  
23. I gave enough feedback to teachers after lesson observations.  
24. I felt the difficulties of objectively judging teachers’ performance, competence, and motivation.  

On self review and evaluation results
25. I often felt that teachers’ self-reviews were subjective or arbitrary.  
26. I gave enough feedback to teachers regarding my judgment of their performance and competence.  
27. Teachers were mostly satisfied with my judgment of their performance and competence.  

Fourthly, I would like to know about your views on differences in performance of different teachers.

Question 9. On the whole, do you agree with the proposition that differences in performance of different teachers can be attributable to the teachers themselves? Please, choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate.


If you chose 1 or 2, please go to Question 10.
If you chose 3 or 4, please go to Question 11.
If you chose 5, please skip both Question 10 and 11 and go straight to Question 12.

Question 10. What do you think differences in performance of different teachers are specifically attributable to? Please choose up to three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.


Question 11. Except for teachers’ personal matters, what do you think differences in performance of different teachers are specifically attributable to? Please choose up to three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.

1. relationships with students  2. Relationships with colleagues  3. Relationships with school managers  4. Load and intensification of work
5. School management policies  6. The current education reform
7. Others (Please specify  )

**Question 12.** When evaluating teachers’ performance and competence, whose views do you think should be most seriously considered? Please choose up to three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.
1. Head teacher  2. Deputy head  3. Chief teacher or Head of sub-groups
4. Colleague teachers  5. Colleagues of the same subject
6. School councilors or governors  7. Students
8. Parents or guardians of students  9 Local board of education
10. The third party
11 Others (Please specify  )

Lastly, I would like to ask you about the current state of your school.

**Question 13.** For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
students, whether academic or physical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. Not a few of staff complains about the heavy workload.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Not a few of staff complains about school manager’s policies.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Our staff often talks about how students are doing and developing.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Even if individual teachers disagree with whole-school or sub-group policies, they are consistently put in force.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Our staff is proud of being a member of this school.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 14.** If permitted, I would also like to know the views held by teachers in your school. If you cooperate further and grant this permission to me, please specify the name of your school below. I will send a package of questionnaire for teachers to you (For your reference, a sample of questionnaire for teachers is enclosed.)

The name of your school

( )

You have answered all the questions. Thank you again for your participation in this research.

If you have any concerns or questions about the research, please do not hesitate to make enquiries to the following address, phone/fax, or email.

Address: Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033 Japan Phone/Fax: 03-5841-3967 Email: mkatsuno@p.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Appendix 2 Questionnaire for teachers (translated into English): Views on new teacher evaluation and performance-based personnel system

Thank you very much for your participation in this research. Your answers will be statistically analysed and thus both you and your school will not be identified. Your candid answers shall be very much appreciated.

February 2008

Associate Professor Masaaki Katsuno
Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo

First of all, I would like to ask you about your school and yourself. Please choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate.

Question 1. What type of school is yours?

Question 2. What is the number of students at your school?
1. no more than 50  2. 51～100  3. 101～200  4. 201～300  5. 301～400  6. 401～500  7. 50～600  8. 601～700  9. 701～800  10. 801～900  11. 901～1000  12. no less than 1001

Question 3. What is the number of staff at your school?
1. No more than 10  2. 11～20  3. 21～30  4. 31～40  5. 41～50  6. 51～60  7. 61～70  8. 71～80  9. 81～90  10. 91～100  11. No less than 101～

Question 4. How many years have you been working at the present school?
1. 1 year  2. 2 years  3. 3 years  4. 4 years  5. 5 years  6. 6 years  7. 7 years  8. 8 years  9. 9 years  10. 10 years  11. Over 11 years

Question 5. What is your current post or responsibility?
1. Deputy head  2. Chief teacher  3. Head of sub-groups such as instruction division, guidance division, and year group  4. Lead teacher  5. Regular teacher

Question 6. What is your age?
1. Under 26  2. 26～30  3. 31～35  4. 36～40  5. 41～45  6. 46～50  7. 51～55  8. 56～60  9. Over 60

Question 7. Which is your sex?
1. Female  2. Male

Secondly, I would like to know about your views on teachers’ pay and performance-based personnel system teacher.

Question 8. For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate.
### Questionnaire Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Generally speaking, linking pay to performance and competence is a matter of course.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Teachers' pay should reflect the demands of posts such head of a department or “lead teacher”.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Teachers’ pay should reflect differences in workloads, including, for instance, supervision of club activities.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Linking teachers’ pay to students’ academic achievement is a good idea.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. In order to reward the hard work of teachers, salary levels for all, rather than only some, teachers should be raised.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Linking pay to performance and competence is intended to cut off teachers’ pay budget.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way of rewarding hardworking or competent teachers.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Most teachers could not work harder even if their pay was linked to performance and competence, because they are already working up to their full limit.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. It is better to reward schools’ performance in terms of staffing and finance better than to reward individual teachers’ performance.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Linking teachers’ pay to performance and competence is a fair way of distributing financial resource.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Linking pay to performance and competence would contradict evaluating teachers for their professional development.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because it is difficult to attribute students’ attainment to individual teachers.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Teachers’ pay should not be linked to performance and competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Thirdly, I would like to know about your experience of and views on new teacher evaluation.

**Question 9.** For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard
as the most appropriate. If you have not been involved in the process of new teacher evaluation, please skip this question and go straight to Question 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On overall effects of new teacher evaluation</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Improved communication and mutual understanding between my head teacher and me.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Improved my understanding of head teacher's school management policies.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Improved my understanding of school goals.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Improved my overall morale.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Helped me to think about work priorities more effectively.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Helped me to better identify my needs for professional development.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Improved quality and standards of teaching and learning in my classes.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships with my head teacher.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships with my colleagues.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On goal setting.</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. My head teacher instructed me to set “concrete and objective” goals such as numerical goals.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. My head teacher instructed me to set goals in line with her/his school management policies.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. My head teacher instructed me to set goals in line with school goals, and goals of year or subject groups.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. I consulted my colleagues when setting my own goals.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. My head teacher repeatedly required me to rewrite goals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Most of my colleagues know my goals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. I have been always aware of my annual goals over the course of a year.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On meetings with the evaluation</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. At the meeting with the evaluator, I voiced concerns about teaching and guidance.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>18. At the meeting with the evaluator, I voiced concerns about relations with parents or guardians of my students.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. At the meeting with the evaluator, I voiced concerns about my workload or health issues.

20. At the meeting with the evaluator, I voiced concerns about relations with my colleagues.

21. I expressed opinions regarding my head teacher’s management policies.

On lesson observation and feedback

22. I had enough pre-observation discussion with the evaluator.

23. I received enough feedback from the evaluator after lesson observations.

On self review and evaluation results

24. I consulted my colleagues when self-reviewing performance and competence.

25. I felt that my evaluation results were subjective or arbitrary.

26. I received enough feedback from my head teacher regarding my evaluation results.

27. I was mostly satisfied with my evaluation results.


Fourthly, I would like to know about your views on differences in performance of different teachers.

**Question 10.** On the whole, do you agree with the proposition that differences in performance of different teachers can be attributable to the teachers themselves? Please, choose the alternative that you regard the most appropriate.


   If you chose 1 or 2, please go to Question 11.
   If you chose 3 or 4, please go to Question 12.
   If you chose 5, please skip both Question 11 and 12 and go straight to Question 13.

**Question 11.** What do you think differences in performance of different teachers are specifically attributable to? Please choose up to three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.

1. Knowledge about subject matters  2. Teaching skills
7. Others (Please specify)

**Question 12.** Except for teachers’ personal matters, what do you think differences in performance of different teachers are specifically attributable to? Please choose up to three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.

1. Relationships with students  2. Relationships with colleagues
3. Relationships with school managers  4. Load and intensification of work
5. School management policies  6. The current education reform
7. Others (Please specify)
**Question 13.** When evaluating teachers’ performance and competence, whose views do you think should be most seriously considered? Please choose up to three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.
1. Head teacher  
2. Deputy head  
3. Chief teacher or Head of sub-groups  
4. Colleague teachers  
5. Colleagues of the same subject  
6. School councilors or governors  
7. Students  
8. Parents or guardians of students  
9. Local board of education  
10. The third party  
11. Others (Please specify)  

Lastly, I would like to ask you about the current state of your school.

**Question 14.** For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Our staff shares the same goals regarding teaching and guidance of students.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Even when a certain teacher has serious difficulties in her/his teaching or class management, other teachers are not willing to give a helping hand to her/him.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Our staff always talks about the way we should attain the current school goals.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. At the subject or year group meetings, little time remains for talking about classes and learning and of development of students, because agendas are occupied with administrative matters.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Most of our staff does not know how other teachers are teaching or they do not know each other’s goals.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Despite difficulties in day-to-day running of school, our staff is always forward-looking.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Our staff feels free to talk about teaching and guidance of students.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Our staff gives the top priority to students’ learning and development.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Our staff is always conscious of school managers’ policies.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Our staff gives the top priority to raising “visible” achievement of students, whether academic or physical.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Not a few of staff are critical of giving the top priority to raising “visible” achievement of students, whether academic or physical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. Not a few of staff complains about the heavy workload.

13. Not a few of staff complains about school manager’s policies.

14. Our staff often talks about how students are doing and developing.

15. Even if individual teachers disagree with whole-school or sub-group policies, they are consistently put in force.

16. Our staff is proud of being a member of this school.

You have answered all the questions. Thank you again for your participation in this research.

If you have any concerns or questions about the research, please do not hesitate to make enquiries to the following address, phone/fax, or email.

Address: Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033 Japan  Phone/Fax: 03-5841-3967  Email: mkatsuno@p.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Appendix 3 Letter of invitation to head teachers for interview (translated into English)

Dear

As you know, over the last few years almost all of the local boards of education across Japan have put re-designed schemes of teacher evaluation into operation. In this letter, I would like to request for your kind cooperation with my research into the way the new teacher evaluation policies are enacted in schools, and how head teachers and teachers experience and make sense of the practices.

I would like you, as head teacher, to consider your own participation in this research and also conveying this invitation to teachers at your school. Participation in this research is totally voluntary. If you decline to cooperate altogether, you don’t have to distribute invitation letters for teacher on my behalf.

Participation in this research will involve an interview of approximately one hour in length. The interview will take place when and where you feel most convenient and comfortable. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you wish. You may decide to withdraw from this research at any time before completion of data collection (July/2009). With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded for the accuracy of information, and later transcribed for analysis. All information you provide will be kept completely confidential. You have rights to see the transcripts of interview and any other information you have provided and withdraw any part of the information before completion of data collection (July/2009). Whenever I use the information in my PhD thesis or any other papers resulting from this study, your school and identity will be kept strictly anonymous.

For your reference, I have attached a list of likely interview questions to this letter. If you would like additional information to assist you in reaching a
Appendices

decision about participation or you have any questions regarding this study, please contact me by means of postal address, phone/ fax, or email that appears below.

I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your cooperation with this research.

With best wishes.

Masaaki KATSUNO
Graduate School of Education,
The University of Tokyo,
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo,
113-0033 Japan
Phone & Fax 03-5841-3967
Email mkatsuno@p.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Interview questions for head teachers

These are the key interview questions, however you may wish to make other comments where you think they are relevant.

1. What do you think are the beneficial or harmful effects of teacher evaluation? For example how about its effects on
   - communication between you and teachers?
   - communication among teachers?
   - teachers’ understanding of school goals or your management policies?
   - teachers’ morale?
   - teachers’ professional development?
   - quality or standards of teaching and learning in your school?

2. What is your view of evaluation meetings with teachers? More specifically,
   - What instruction did you give with regard to goal setting?
   - Were you happy with teachers’ self-review of performance and competences?

3. Do you think your management approach has somehow changed as a result of teacher evaluation?

4. Are there elements in the process of teacher evaluation that particularly impressed/dismayed you? Why?

5. Do you think if there is any better way to evaluate teachers?
Appendix 4 Letter of invitation to teachers for interview (translated into English)

Dear

As you know, over the last few years almost all of the local boards of education across Japan have put re-designed schemes of teacher evaluation into operation. In this letter, I would like to request for your kind cooperation with my research into the way the new teacher evaluation policies are enacted in schools, and how head teachers and teachers experience and make sense of the practices.

With you head teacher’s permission; I distribute this invitation letters to you. Participation in this research is totally voluntary. Participation in this research will involve an interview of approximately one hour in length. The interview will take place when and where you feel most convenient and comfortable. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you wish. You may decide to withdraw from this research at any time before completion of data collection (July/2009). With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded for the accuracy of information, and later transcribed for analysis. All information you provide will be kept completely confidential. You have rights to see the transcripts of interview and any other information you have provided and withdraw any part of the information before completion of data collection (July/2009). Whenever I use the information in my PhD thesis or any other papers resulting from this study, your school and identity will be kept strictly anonymous.

For your reference, I have attached a list of likely interview questions to this letter. If you would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation or you have any questions regarding this study,
please contact me by means of either postal address, phone/ fax, or email that appears below.

I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your cooperation with this research.

With best wishes.

Masaaki KATSUNO
Graduate School of Education,
The University of Tokyo,
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo,
113-0033 Japan
Phone & Fax 03-5841-3967
Email mkatsuno@p.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Interview questions for teachers

These are the key interview questions, however you may wish to make other comments where you think they are relevant

1. What do you think are the beneficial or harmful effects of teacher evaluation? For example how about its effects on
   - communication with head teacher?
   - communication among teachers?
   - your understanding of school goals or head teacher’s management policies?
   - your morale?
   - your professional development?
   - quality or standards of teaching and learning in your class?

2. What is your view of evaluation meetings with head teacher? More specifically,
   - what instruction were you given with regard to goal setting?
   - what were your goals like?
   - were you happy with head teacher’s evaluation of your performance and competences?

3. Do you think your teaching approach has somehow changed as a result of teacher evaluation?

4. Are there elements in the process of teacher evaluation that particularly impressed/dismayed you? Why?

5. Do you think if there is any better way to evaluate teachers?
Appendices

Appendix 5 Consent Form

Having read the letter of invitation and list of key interview questions, I understand the purpose of the research and the nature of my participation in it. I was informed that I have rights to;

1) decline to participate in the research,
2) decline to answer particular questions,
3) withdraw completely from the research at any time and
4) see the transcripts of interview and any other information I have provided and withdraw any part of the information before completion of data collection (July/2009).

I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded to ensure the accuracy of information and the information will be kept confidential, with the understanding that any quotations in the thesis or paper will be anonymous.

With full knowledge of all of the above, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this research.

Signature: ______________________________

Date: ______________________________
### Appendix 6 List of teacher interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Senior High School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Yamamoto</td>
<td>mathematics</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>Apparently had little difficulty in adapting herself to the requirements of teacher evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Aoyama</td>
<td>physical education</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Categorically criticised the rationale of new teacher evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Kitano</td>
<td>chemistry</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>Suffered from the strained relationships with his colleagues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Shimura</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Thought of numerical goals as contradictory to his original aims of teaching.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Senior High School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Miyakawa</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Disregarded the new teacher evaluation system, believing in its ineffectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Kawabata</td>
<td>physics</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Declined to set any numerical goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ota</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Was doubtful about the effectiveness of new teacher evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Special School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kagawa</td>
<td>autonomic training</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Raised issues concerning harassment and discrimination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Miyazaki</td>
<td>special education needs</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Suffered from the experience of exhorted to set her goals in line with school goals that she disagreed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Senior High School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Hatakaeyama</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>Suffered from performativity and developed a mental illness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Minimisawa</td>
<td>chemistry</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>An active union member and declined to set numerical goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Tada</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>His lessons had never been observed by the head teacher.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>