THE IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION & GEOPOLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIST MILITANT TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST & SOUTHEAST ASIA

A thesis
submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Arts in International Relations & Security Studies
at the
University of Waikato
by
SIMON REECE GRAY

University of Waikato
2012
Abstract

Since September 11th 2001 (9/11), substantial research has been conducted and published on the phenomenon of Islamist motivated militant terrorism; notably on the contemporary phenomenon of ‘global Jihadism’ and its growing threat to nations and the wider international community. However, little has analysed the different phases of ‘ideological evolution’ and ‘geopolitical transformation’ manifested within the wider phenomenon itself. As a result, Islamist militant terrorist organisations are often lumped together and defined, or identified, as belonging to a single ideological and geopolitical homogenous movement.

This study endeavours to highlight that not only is this notion incorrect, but that the phenomenon is threefold consisting of three fundamentally different ideological and geopolitical phases of Islamist militant terrorism and thus categories of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The three phases and categories of Islamist militant terrorist organisations are identified in the study as ‘National’, ‘Regional’ and ‘Global’. Each comprises and represents different ideological contours and geopolitical ambitions.

Collectively, these three phases and categories of organisations make up this study’s hypothesis that there have been three ideological and geopolitical sequential shifts in the phenomenon. The study’s sequential shift paradigm tracks the trajectory of the phenomenon beginning with the manifestation of National Islamist militant terrorist organisations, developing into Regional Islamist militant
terrorist organisations and, finally, into Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations.

The hypothesis is tested through an examination of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Here, the considered organisations are measured against the sequential shift paradigm, which provides key insight into their ideological and geopolitical contours. In turn, this helps to identify and categorise the National, Regional and Global phases and categories of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the two considered regions and, therefore, further advances support for the study’s hypothesis. The analysis presented in this thesis on the phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism finds that the study’s hypothesis applies and is analytically accurate in the context of the Middle East. In the context of Southeast Asia the analysis supports that there has been a shift from National to Regional Islamist militant terrorism but, however, that the third and hence Global phase of the phenomenon has thus far, although active in the region, failed to fully manifest. Therefore, the analysis presented in this thesis supports that the phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia has not undergone a decisive ideological evolution or geopolitical transformation into Global Islamist militant terrorism.
Dedicated to my Grandparents, Great Uncle, Uncle, &
Farther & Mother

Thomas (Tom) & Rosalie Edwards and Reginald (Mick) & Patience Gray

*  

Reginald Randall

*  

Reece Gray

*  

John & Geraldine Gray
Acknowledgments

This thesis was made possible with the supervision, guidance and support given by a collection of people and institutions. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge and thank both of my supervisors, Dr. Mark Rolls and Professor Dov Bing, for their advice, insight, professionalism and patience throughout the duration of the research process. I would also like to acknowledge the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism for the expertise and wide range of interdisciplinary materials on the research topic available to me during this endeavour. I would like to thank those academics, experts and government officials in the field that I met during this undertaking, notably at the 2010 World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, who provided additional insight and advice on my research and the wider topic. I am truly grateful and you have helped me gain a more informed understanding.

In addition, I would like thank the Gallagher Group Ltd for its generous sponsorship in support of my attendance at the 2010 World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, I am very grateful. Furthermore, I must say thank you to those University of Waikato Political Science and Religious Studies Ph.D candidates and visiting fellows who have provided additional insight and constructive feedback on my research topic through the many hours of invaluable group discussion. I must also thank my family for their love and support throughout this research endeavour.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................... ii
Acknowledgments ................................. v
Table of Contents ................................. vi
List of Diagrams .................................... viii
List of Abbreviations ............................. ix

**Chapter One: Introduction** ............... 1

**Chapter Two: Methodology & Theoretical Framework** ........... 8
  2.1. Introduction .................................... 8
  2.2. Methodology .................................... 8
  2.3. Theoretical Framework ....................... 10

**Chapter Three: Review of Literature** ........... 13
  3.1. Introduction .................................... 13
  3.2. The Expanse of Scholarly Literature Produced on Islamist Ideologies, Movements & Militant Terrorist Organisations .... 15
  3.3. The Three Key Scholarly Approaches Applied to the Literature Published on the Study of Islamist Ideologies, Movements & Militant Terrorist Organisations .... 18

**Chapter Four: Terminology & Definitions** .......... 23
  4.1. Introduction ................................... 23
  4.2. Terminologies ................................... 24
  4.3. Defining Militant Terrorism ................. 29
  4.4. Defining a Framework for the Geopolitical Categorisation of National, Regional and Global Islamist Militant Terrorist Organisations .... 42

**Chapter Five: Political-Islam, Islamism & the National, Regional & Global Ideological Evolution of Jihadism** .......... 45
  5.1. Introduction ................................... 45
  5.2. Liberal Political-Islamic Ideology .......... 48
| 5.3. Conservative Political-Islamic Ideology                      | 51 |
| 5.4. Islamist Political-Islamic Ideology                        | 53 |
| 5.4.1. Missionary Islamist Ideology                            | 62 |
| 5.4.2. Activist Islamist Ideology                             | 64 |
| 5.4.3. Jihadist Islamist Ideology                             | 66 |
| 5.5.1. National Jihadist Islamist Ideology                    | 70 |
| 5.5.2. Regional Jihadist Islamist Ideology                    | 76 |
| 5.5.3. Global Jihadist Islamist Ideology                      | 83 |

**Chapter Six: The National, Regional & Global Geopolitical Transformation of Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East**

6.1. Introduction                                              94

6.2. The Ascent of National Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East 95

6.3. The Ascent of Regional Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East 106

6.4. The Ascent of Global Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East 118

**Chapter Seven: The National, Regional & Global Geopolitical Transformation of Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia**

7.1. Introduction                                              134

7.2. The Ascent of National Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia 135

7.3. The Ascent of Regional Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia 149

7.4. The Ascent of Global Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia 161

**Chapter Eight: Conclusion**

**Bibliography**                                                190
List of Diagrams

**Figure 1:** Spectrum of the different levels of Asymmetric Warfare.

**Figure 2:** Spectrum of the different ideological levels of Political-Islam.

**Figure 3:** Spectrum of the different levels of Islamist Political-Islamic ideology.

**Figure 4:** Spectrum of the different levels of Jihadist Islamist ideology.

**Figure 5:** Diagram representing the quantified support base of Jihadist Islamist ideologies and organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia since the 1970s.
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQC</td>
<td>al-Qaeda Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRN</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNPT</td>
<td>National Counter-Terrorism Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIJ</td>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Philippine Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdekka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMIP</td>
<td>Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salifist Group for Call and Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMAS</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMRO</td>
<td>Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAT</td>
<td>Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMA</td>
<td>Jamaah Mujahidin Anshorullah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMM</td>
<td>Kumpulan Militant Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAK</td>
<td>Afghan Service Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMI</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUI</td>
<td>Ulamas Council of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PULO</td>
<td>Pattani United Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEARCCT</td>
<td>South-East Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TII</td>
<td>Tantra Islam Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One

Introduction

This study derives from the contemporary global phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism and its growing capacity to destabilise and threaten national, regional and global security. Although representing a clear minority within the wider pool of Islam, Islamist militant terrorist organisations and individuals are, nevertheless, responsible for some of the most deadly, destructive and prevalent attacks in modern times; indiscriminately targeting both Muslim and non-Muslim civilian populations and nations alike. The research topic, which focuses on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, does not, however, suggest that the phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism is exclusively confined to these two regions, nor that the phenomenon is exclusively the cause of instability in the contemporary international system. Rather, both geographic regions collectively have a long history of the direct effects associated with this study’s hypothesised ‘ideological evolution’ and ‘geopolitical transformation’ process of the ‘National’, ‘Regional’ and ‘Global’ phases of Islamist militant terrorism. The Middle East is identified in this study as the geographic region that incorporates the nation states that span from Morocco in the west to Iran in the east and from Northern Sudan and Yemen in the south to Turkey in the north and all those in between. Southeast Asia is identified as the geographic region that comprises the ten member states that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and include, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Moreover, both of the selected geographic regions act as case studies and provide important insights into identifying the hypothesised National, Regional and Global phases manifested within the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism which spans Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas. The first of these two case studies analyses the geopolitical transformation component of the phenomenon in the Middle East. It examines, in particular, the rise and transformation of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ - aka: Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest) which originated in Egypt as a National Islamist militant terrorist group and has evolved and spread throughout many regions of the Muslim and non-Muslim world; establishing a Regional Islamist militant terrorist network, Tanzim al-Jihad, based in Afghanistan which spans the Middle East and beyond. These two Islamist militant terrorist organisations then went on to directly influence the ascent of the first worldwide network of Islamist militant terrorist organisations and thus had tangible ties with the Global Islamist militant terrorist organisation al-Qaeda which they eventually merged with.\(^1\) The second case study analyses the geopolitical transformation component of the phenomenon in Southeast Asia and begins with an examination of the rise and transformation of Darul Islam (Realm of Islam) and Komando Jihad in Indonesia and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern

Philippines. These organisations emerged as National Islamist militant terrorist organisations and went on to spawn the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG/meaning ‘sword bearer’ in Arabic) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI/meaning Islamic communities/cells) which are both Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations with tangible ties to the Global Islamist militant terrorist network al-Qaeda.  

Collectively, the two geographic regions and groups of Islamist militant terrorist organisations have been selected for analysis as they provide the necessary historical background needed to successfully explore this study’s hypothesised paradigm and hence the National, Regional and Global phases of ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation of Islamist militant terrorism.

The research will first identify and analyse the major ideological contours of Political-Islam and the inception of Islamist political ideology and its subsequent evolution and manifestation as a platform employed by Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This section of the research seeks to establish that there are three primary groups of Islamist ideology that have evolved out of the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam including, ‘Missionary’, ‘Activist’ and ‘Jihadist’. This study’s primary focus is on

---


ayyaf, p.1; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V, op. cit., pp.6, 99.
the latter form of Islamist ideology – that is, Jihadist Islamist ideology. This is an extremist ideology that justifies the use of violence and, in particular, tactics and strategies of militant terrorism. Here the thesis will then examine the hypothesised notion that there has been, and exists, three distinct manifestations of Jihadist Islamist ideology – ‘National’, ‘Regional’ and ‘Global’ – and thus the ideological evolution of the phenomenon. The study seeks to establish that these three phases, individually and collectively, directly influenced the manifestation of, and underpin and connect, many of the historical and contemporary Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The three phases of Islamist ideological evolution collectively represent a spectrum that provides the additional sub-set of analysis which is needed to examine the hypothesised ideological evolution component of the research.

The spectrum, moreover, provides a way in which to gauge the geographic components of the considered Islamist militant terrorist organisations. This, in turn, helps to identify their geopolitical contours and ambitions and hence correlates to the hypothesised geopolitical transformation component of the research. Here, the spectrum will help gauge key political, social, economic, cultural, and religious phenomena and contexts which gave rise to each of the three phases of Jihadist Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations in the two regions. Collectively, the spectrum identifies key historical and contemporary phenomena and contexts that correlate to each of the three phases of ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation, helping to provide important insights into the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism and organisations. The ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation process, therefore,
ultimately seeks to identify the historical rise and evolution of Jihadist Islamist ideologies and militant terrorist organisations as well as the phenomenon’s geopolitical expansion and transformation via the three sub-sets of analysis – National, Regional and Global – and forms the cornerstone of the thesis’s hypothesis.

Following an analysis and categorisation of the ideological contours of Political-Islam and Islamism, the thesis begins by examining the geopolitical transformation process of the National, Regional and Global phases of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia respectively. The Middle East component of the thesis begins the analysis during the onset of the decline of the Ottoman Empire/Caliphate in the mid-1800s. Attention is given to the impact that European dominance and influence had on both Ottoman rule and the inception of Islamist ideology during this period. The study will then go on to examine key additional geopolitical and socio-cultural phenomena during the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century that directly affected both regions including World War 1 (WW1) and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 as well as the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate system in 1924, colonialism, the creation of nation-states, World War II (WWII), post-independence secular rule and the suppression of Political-Islam, the creation of Israel, and the 1967 Six Day War and 1973 Yom Yippur War. The analysis examines the impact that these events collectively had on the rise and spread of Islamist ideologies and, notably, militant terrorist organisations. The events during this period correlate to the manifestation of the National phase of the hypothesised geopolitical transformation process.
The study will then go on to consider the rise of Political-Islam as a political alternative in the 1970s; ongoing state suppression of Political-Islam; the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran; the Afghan-Soviet War and the arrival of Islamist fighters and militant terrorist organisations from the Middle East and Southeast Asia; the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the intensification of nationalist separatism in the Russian Caucasus; as well as the 1992-1995 Bosnian and 1998-1999 Kosovo Wars between pro-Serbian nationalists and non-Serbian peoples whom were mainly Muslim and sought independence in the former provinces of Yugoslavia. This period witnessed the migration and transfer of Jihadist Islamist ideologies, fighters, tactics and strategies, and technologies, and hence the rise of wider regional geopolitical grievances and objectives. This period correlates to the manifestation of the Regional phase of the hypothesised geopolitical transformation process.

Finally, analysis is given to the post-Afghan-Jihad period and the effects of Western-backed secular and Islamic regimes suppression of Islamism; the end of the Cold War and the additional spread and evolution of Jihadist operations and ideology; the 1991 Gulf War; al-Qaeda’s Declaration of War on America and Americans in 1996; the establishment of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders/Christians (World Islamic Front for Jihad) in 1998; the evolution and expansion of al-Qaeda in the Middle East and Southeast Asia during 1990s; and the post-9/11 War on Terror and the subsequent wars in
Afghanistan (2001-2011) and Iraq (2003-2013). It will conclude with an examination of the post-9/11 evolution of al-Qaeda and thus the organisation’s ‘second generation’ and ‘decentralisation and diversification’ in the wake of the War on Terror and the impact that this has had on the phenomenon. This period correlates to the manifestation of the Global phase of the studies hypothesised geopolitical transformation process.

---

Chapter Two

Methodology & Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

This chapter will first discuss the research methodology employed in this study, outlining the ‘three-part’ analytical approach adopted which combines ‘comparative’, ‘historical’ and ‘phenomenological’ analytical methods. It then goes on to outline the data collection methods employed by the researcher. Secondly, the chapter will provide a detailed account of the theoretical framework which consists of two stages of analysis. The chapter will discuss the first stage of the theoretical framework which examines the different contours of Political-Islam and the rise and evolution of Islamist ideology as a platform for militant terrorist organisations. This phase of the research correlates to the ‘ideological evolution’ paradigm of the hypothesis. The chapter will then outline and discuss the theoretical framework’s second stage which examines the study’s hypothesised ‘geopolitical transformation’ process of Islamist militant terrorist organisations.

2.2 Research Methodology

The research methodology of this study has adopted a three-part analytical approach which incorporates comparative, historical and phenomenological research methods. Although not exclusive, these three approaches collectively provide the researcher with the analytical tools needed to examine the matrix of historical, political, social, economic, and religious phenomena surrounding the
‘ideological evolution’ and ‘geopolitical transformation’ process of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This approach can be applied to analyse the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism or used to examine a particular organisation or individual. Collectively, these three analytical approaches combine to support the study’s hypothesis that there has been, and exists, three key phases of ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation manifested within the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism.

The methodology’s three primary analytical methods – comparative, historical and phenomenological - combines research methods and background knowledge deriving from both the Political Science and Religious Studies academic fields as well as from the wider analytical context of the Social Sciences. The methodology therefore allows for a diverse range of materials and data to be examined from a wide range of historical and contemporary contexts and perspectives. In turn, this provides the researcher with an interdisciplinary style approach which allows for greater insight and analytical accuracy. The study’s methodology entails an extensive review of primary and secondary materials and data relevant to the research topic and includes the examination of government and/or inter-government agency reports, publications and reports produced by research institutions and think-tanks, academic texts and research articles or reports, and the global media. Thus, the methodology employed in this study is qualitative in nature.
2.3. Theoretical Framework

The overarching three-part analytical framework adopted in this study is applied in two stages. This two-stage approach incorporates an additional sub-set of three analytical components – National, Regional and Global – which along with the three-part analytical framework combine to collectively examine this study’s hypothesised ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation process of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

The first stage of the theoretical framework’s analysis seeks to identify and examine the key ideological contours of Political-Islam and the phenomenon’s inception of Islamist ideology and its subsequent evolution as a platform for Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Key historical and contemporary contexts and phenomena will be explored including political, social, intellectual, and religious aspects which have influenced both Political-Islam and, in particular, the accent of Islamist ideologies and its evolution and manifestation of Islamist militant terrorist organisations and individuals. This stage of the research advocates the idea, and seeks to establish, that the three ideological phases (National, Regional and Global) underpinning Jihadist Islamism emerged out of the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam. These three phases collectively represent the ideological foundations manifested within the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The researcher has developed a typology/spectrum of Political-Islam in order to explore this notion and provide key insights into the ‘ideological
evolution’ process and the nature of the intended geopolitical ambitions that are sought by Islamist militant terrorist organisations in both regions.

The second stage of the theoretical framework’s analysis will examine the hypothesised ‘geopolitical transformation’ process and seeks to identify the geopolitical contours of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia via the additional three analytical sub-sets: National, Regional, and Global. The proposed hypothesis is that there has been a three-stage sequential shift in Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This begins at the National level; develops into a Regional level; and, finally, arrives at the Global phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorist organisations. Collectively, these three sub-sets of analysis are employed to examine this study’s twofold notion that there has been, and exists, three key phases and manifestations of Jihadist Islamist ideology which have subsequently manifested and spawned the geopolitical transformation of National, Regional and Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations in both regions.

The theoretical framework also introduces a spectrum to identify, categorise and analyse the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam which has three key bands: (1) ‘Liberal’, (2) ‘Conservative’ and (3) ‘Islamist’. Collectively, the three bands of the spectrum represent the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam and Islamist militant terrorist organisations which are a particular Islamist sub-phenomenon; and have been developed and derived from the adopted scholarly terminologies. Moreover, the adopted terms used to describe the bands on the spectrum correlate to a particular ideological orientation that represents and
measures sequential increases/levels in the hardening of Islamic political ideology as well as the tactics (non-violent or violent) employed by governments, organisations or individuals within the wider pool of Political-Islam. The spectrum thus acts as a sequential paradigm which is used in this study to identify the different levels of Islamic political ideology and the hypothesised National, Regional and Global evolution and transformation process of Islamist militant terrorist organisations. It is argued that at the moderate end of the spectrum there is a Liberal manifestation of Political-Islam, which develops into Conservative Political-Islam and, finally, at the extreme end of the spectrum develops into a radical Islamist manifestation of Political-Islam which consists of ‘Missionary’ and ‘Activist’ levels as well as a ‘Jihadist’ sub-group which, as noted, comprises National, Regional and Global levels of militant terrorist ideology and organisations.⁴

All chapters, excluding the introductory, theoretical framework, review of literature and concluding one, have been arranged chronologically. This allows for greater comparative analytical advantages as each chapter represents a sequential time period that builds on the previous one. Organising the ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation process into time periods helps to demonstrate a transparent sequential shift of the phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism, helping identify the phase(s) of a particular organisation and its tactics and motives as well as the different levels of violence perpetrated.

⁴ See page 47 for a diagram of Political-Islam.
Chapter Three

Review of Literature

3.1. Introduction

This chapter will provide an analysis of the scholarly literature that has been published on the phenomenon of Islamist ideologies, movements and militant terrorist organisations. It will identify and discuss the expanse of different scholarly works associated with the topic and examine the different analytical approaches and/or methodologies developed and employed within this field of literature. This study identifies that there are three major analytical approaches used, mainly within the Social Sciences, to analyse the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam and Islamist ideologies, movements or organisations and individuals. The three analytical approaches identified which will be examined in this chapter include: (1) the ‘essentialist’ approach; (2) the ‘contextualised’ (contextualist) approach; and (3) the ‘discourse’ analysis approach.5

The essentialist and contextualist analytical approaches are identified by, Hakan Yavuz, in his work Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: A Study in

Vernacular Politics.⁶ The contextualist approach is also identified and employed in Greg Barton’s Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah And The Soul Of Islam.⁷ The discourse analysis approach, which focuses on the discussion of discourses, is used and examined by such scholars as Richard Jackson in his work Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse, and by Mansoor Moaddel in his work Islamic Modernism, Nationalism And Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse.⁸

Collectively, these three analytical approaches have contributed significantly to the development of scholarly literature and debate on the growth of Political-Islam and Islamism as scholarly subjects within mainstream Western academia. Both have become increasingly important subjects, notably in the Social Sciences, particularly in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran.⁹

It was during that revolution that the term ‘Political-Islam’ was coined and was first used to refer to the rise of ‘revolutionary’ and/or ‘Islamic activism’ that was sweeping the Shiite Muslim world and ultimately led to the establishment of the

---

⁶ Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 18-20.

⁷ Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p. 25.


Islamic Republic of Iran. The term has subsequently been used to identify a much broader spectrum of Islamic political ideologies and will be discussed in chapter five.

3.2. The Expanse of Scholarly Literature Produced on Islamist Ideologies, Movements & Militant Terrorist Organisations

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran there have been an increasing number of works published on the subject of Political-Islam and, though the term was developed later, Islamism, within the field of Social Science, notably Political Science, by mainly Western scholars. Moreover, in the wake of 9/11, there has been a flood of literature produced on the topic within the wider field of the Social Sciences. However, in some instances these works have misrepresented or misunderstood the concepts and complexities underpinning the phenomenon that is Political-Islam and Islamism and the subsequent manifestation of Islamist militant terrorist organisations and individuals alike.

The expanse of scholarly literature published, particularly in more recent years, within the wider field of the Social Sciences on the phenomenon of radical

---


Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations and individuals is wide and diverse. While some prominent scholars take a broad approach to the analysis of Islamist ideologies and militant terrorism, focusing on geopolitical, social and economic trends within particular historical contexts and across a wide geographic region, and in particular the Middle East and wider Muslim world in general; other scholars analyse these trends within a particular region/s or state/s which has or is experiencing a particular manifestation of radical Islamist ideology and militant terrorism. Other scholars have produced works that focus on specific Islamist militant terrorist organisations and individuals within these geopolitical, social, economic and historical contexts. Moreover, most of these works have been arranged chronologically and are generally thematic in content with a noticeable reference to both Political-Islam’s and Islamism’s implications for the Christian and wider Western world.

Examples of works that analyse Islamism within a broad geopolitical, social, economic, and historical framework across a wide geographic context include: John Espostito’s *The Future Of Islam*; Fawaz Gergers’s *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*; Jarret M. Brachman’s *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*; and Bernard Lewis’s *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War And Unholy Terror*. Examples of works that focus on Islamism in a particular region/s within the wider Muslim world includes Bernard Lewis’s *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*; Kumar Ramakrishna’s *Delegitimizing

---

Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia and Christopher Deliso’s *The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West*. Examples of works that analyse a particular state/s in the wider Muslim world include Greg Barton’s *Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah And The Soul Of Islam*; Zachary Abuza’s *Political Islam And Violence In Indonesia*; Mohammad Ayoob’s *The Many Faces of Political-Islam: Religion And Politics In The Muslim World*; Dilip Hiro’s *War Without End: The Rise Of Islamist Terrorism And Global Response*; and the book edited by Said Amir Arjomand; *From Nationalism To Revolutionary Islam*. Examples of works that analyse a particular organisation/s or individual/s include: Khaled Hroub’s *HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice*; Rohan Gunaratna’s *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network Of Terror*; the work edited by Walter Laqueur; *Voices Of Terror: Manifestos, Writings, And Manuals Of Al Qaeda, HAMAS, And Other Terrorists From Around The World And Throughout The Ages*; Adnan Musallam’s *From Secularism To Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*; and the work edited by Abert Bergesen; *The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society*.

---


17 See, for example, Gunaratna, Rohan, 2002, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network Of Terror*, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, Australia, pp.1-15; *The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on*
3.3. The Three Key Scholarly Approaches Applied to the Literature
Published on the Study of Islamist Ideologies, Movements & Militant
Terrorist Organisations

As noted earlier, this study identifies three key analytical approaches or methodologies that have been developed and applied in the scholarly literature on the wider subject of Islamist ideologies, movements and militant terrorist organisations. The first of these approaches is the essentialist, also referred to by some as the ‘orientalist’ approach. This approach analyses the characteristics, values and ideas manifested in Islamist ideologies, movements and militant terrorist organisations and establishes the notion that these phenomena are the product of a ‘fixed’ set of principles inherent within the wider tradition of Islam.\(^\text{18}\)

Although this approach has some useful insights, critics such as Mohammad Ayoob argue that the essentialist approach fails to identify and examine the diversity of Political-Islam and Islamism and, ultimately, lumps them together into a monolithic phenomenon that is simply part of a wider singular Islamic ‘civilisation’ and which is inherently at odds with Christian and Jewish traditions and wider Western civilisation.\(^\text{19}\) It thus does not analyse Islam, and the

---

\(^{18}\) See, for example, Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., pp.25-26; Yavuz, Hakan, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, op. cit., pp.16-17.

\(^{19}\) Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: op. cit., p.23.
phenomenon of Islamism, “…as [a] religion and [a] code of ethics that affects and is, in turn, affected by multiple cultural and geographic milieus.”

Agreeing with this notion is Barton, who notes that: “Traditionally, the study of ideas in the Muslim world has been left to orientalists, or ‘text-oriented’ experts, [with no] …consideration of social and political engagement and the real-world application of the documents they are studying.”

Barton further notes, however, that: “At the same time, comparatively, few political scientists and commentators have a deep knowledge of the religious thought associated with the groups they are observing, and frequently all political parties and groups with an Islamic connection are lumped together.”

Lewis, who employs a combination of both the essentialist and contextualist analytical approaches, notes in his work *The Crisis Of Islam: Holy War And Unholy Terror*, that “…Islamism, …is not a single homogeneous movement. There are many types of Islamic fundamentalism [Islamism] in different countries and even sometimes within a single country.”

The second scholarly approach applied to the study of Islamist ideologies, movements and militant terrorist organisations is contextualist analysis which examines the subject from an objective interdisciplinary approach. It gives equal attention to both the characteristics, ideas and values, as well as actions and

20 Ibid.


22 Ibid.

context. Barton contends that the contextualist approach consists of three key analytical mechanisms and that: “Any sound understanding of the current [Islamist] reality must rest evenly on each of these three legs: [1] the seminal ideas, [2] the pattern of history; and [3] contemporary context.” M. Hakan Yavuz states that the contextualist approach examines key political, social and economic factors and conditions in particular geographic and historical contexts. Barton also argues that if the contextualist approach is amalgamated with the essentialist approach, such as in Lewis’s work, and hence a religious-text (Quran and Hadiths) oriented analysis, it collectively provides the required multidimensional approach needed to best engage the subject objectively.

Therefore, the contextualist analysis approach identifies Islamist ideologies and militant terrorist organisations and individuals as a product and collection of diverse, political, social, economic, historical, and religious phenomena.

The third scholarly approach applied to the study of Islamist ideologies, movements and militant terrorist organisations is discourse analysis. Developed and primarily used by scholars deriving from the ‘Post-Modernist’ field of academia, the discourse analysis approach focuses on the examination of the different and influential discourses manifested within the wider phenomenon of Islamism that derive from and span a wide range of geopolitical contexts. One

---

24 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p. 25.


central theme deriving from the discourse analysis approach to Islamism is the examination of how Islamist ideologies have been harnessed for popular culture and social symbolism and identity by a wide and diverse range of social, political and extremist movements and organisations throughout the wider Muslim world. This theme and approach is identified by Jenny B. White in *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*.  

The discourse analysis approach has also been employed in such works as *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, edited by Ken Booth and Tim Dunne. Therein, a number of chapters, such as Bhikhu Parekh’s *Terrorism or Intellectual Dialogue* and Chris Brown’s *Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity*, analyse their respective topics through the discussion of discourses. John Esposito, in *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, discusses the influence of classical Islamic thought and jurisprudence regarding warfare (al-Jihad), and the implications of contemporary geopolitics on Islamic and Islamist movements. Aspects of this approach are also employed by Gerges in his work, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, and by Brachman in *Global

---


Jihadism: Theory and Practice. Both of these books present and discuss the
different influential discourses manifested in different Islamist ideologies,
organisations and individuals regarding their justification for, or definition of,
warfare and the use of militant terrorism.31

Collectively, these three analytical approaches represent and form, though
not exclusively, the primary analytical mechanisms employed by scholars within
the wider field of Social Sciences to examine the phenomenon of Islamism. A
number of prominent scholars have argued that in order to gain a deeper and
clearer understanding of Islamism and its wider manifestations, it is useful to
employ all three analytical approaches. Therefore, this study has adopted, first and
foremost, the contextualist approach and, secondly, an essentialist approach.
Additional consideration will also be given to major social and political
discourses manifested in Islamist ideologies, organisations and individuals.

31 See, for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp. 1-2, 3-9; Brachman, M. Jarret, 2009,
26-41, 41-51, 54-61, 61-78.
Chapter Four

Terminology & Definitions

4.1. Introduction

This chapter will present and examine relevant scholarly terminologies and their analytical value and application to the study of Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations. This study employs various terminologies which have been developed within the Social Sciences and associated academic fields. These terms collectively form a key component of this study’s categorisation of Islamist ideologies and militant terrorist organisations. Although these terms are limited, and not exclusive in definition, they nevertheless provide by far the most accurate way of identifying the different concepts and phenomena directly associated with Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations as well as the wider political Islamic movement. The terms adopted in this study include: “Political-Islam”, “Islamist/Islamism”, and “Jihadist/Jihadism”.

After discussing these terms, this chapter will consider the definitions of ‘militant’ and ‘terrorism’ which are applied in this study, and which have been amalgamated to coin the term “militant terrorism”. Analysis is conducted on each of the concepts, individually assessing their legitimacy and the ethics of the tactics employed by militants and terrorists as well as their evolution and transformation as ‘asymmetric-warfare’ (irregular armed combat/low intensity conflict) groups in order to assess each concept’s definitional compatibility with this study’s coined term: militant terrorism. The concept is applied and interpreted in this study to
identify illegitimate Islamist organisations, networks or individuals which perpetrate various tactics and strategies associated with asymmetric-warfare.

Following this analysis, the chapter will then outline the definitional framework which has been developed and is employed in this study to analyse, identify and categorise the different ideological and geopolitical contours and phases of National, Regional and Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations.

4.2. Terminologies

The terms adopted in this study include “Political-Islam”, “Islamist”, and “Jihadist”. As noted, these adopted terms allow this study to identify and categorise the various levels and orientations of Islamic political ideology and thus their associated geographic ambitions. Collectively, these terms represent a spectrum that explores and identifies the different levels of Islamic political ideology. Each of these adopted terms correlates with, and represents, a particular orientation within the wider context of Islamic political ideology. The term “Political-Islam” was coined in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran32 and, in a general context, means that “Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.”33 However, it is more accurately defined as being “… a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by

32 See for example, International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., p. i.

individuals, groups and organisations that pursue political objectives.”\textsuperscript{34} This study uses the second definition and further develops the term to represent and encompass a range of different ideological orientations manifested within the wider spectrum of Islamic political ideology all of which advocate the establishment of Islamic political frameworks or governments that are pivoted on a particular, and often selective, interpretation of both Sharia Law (Islamic Law) and the fundamental scriptural texts of Islam (Quran, Sunna and Hadiths).\textsuperscript{35} As noted, this study identifies these different levels of Islamic political ideological orientation to include Liberal, Conservative, Islamist and Jihadist manifestations of Political-Islam. This study’s focus is centred on the latter form of Political-Islam – that is, the Islamist sub-phenomenon of Jihadist ideology and militant terrorist organisations.

The term “Islamist”, or “Islamism”, which has emerged in the last decade, refers to those ideologies, movements, organisations or individuals which derive their interpretation and teachings from the Islam of the 7\textsuperscript{th} Century CE. This period is identified by Islamists as representing a time when Muslims adhered to ‘true/pure’ Islam. Islamists seek to emulate this period and refer to it as ‘salaf al-saih’ or ‘salafiyya’ (Salaf/Salafist) which literally means ‘righteous ancestors/pious forefathers’ during the time of the Islamic Prophet, Mohammad ibn Abdulla (571-632) and the first Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (Abbasid Caliphate) and their close companions (the first three generations of the Muslim

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
‘Umma’/community). The term represents a radical shift away from ‘mainstream/classical’ Islam – a phenomenon identified in this study as primarily based on a selection of ‘cultural’, ‘spiritual’, and ‘political’ phenomena and identities derived from ‘conservative’ and, to a lesser degree, ‘liberal’ forms of Islamic teachings and traditions. These emerged following the codification and establishment of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Islamic philosophy and law) between the 8th and 11th centuries CE; a process that began some 150 years after the death of Mohammad.

Greg Barton notes that “Islamism is a response to modernity that has transformed the religion of Islam into a political ideology. Islamism is therefore, pre-eminently concerned with changing society and political institutions in order to bring both the state and society into confirming with an understanding of Islam. Among other things, this involves formalising the state’s constitutional and legislative recognition of Islam and, for radical Islamist, introducing the Shariah or Islamic Law.” While this definition has value and shows important insights into understanding and defining the phenomenon of Islamism, it has been refined here into a narrower framework.

This study adopts the following definitional framework: Islamism as a phenomenon is inherently radical – that is, it has broken from the tradition of

36 Ibid, pp.2-3.


38 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit, p.29.
mainstream Islam, and is fixated with the idea of emulating the traditions of the salaf al-saih in an effort to bring all aspects of the state (notably political and legal) and society (public and private) into a particular geopolitical framework (national, regional or global) which must submit to an Islamist interpretation of Shariah Law. It is thus unlike Liberal or Conservative forms of Political-Islam.39

Moreover, Islamists seek to revive and implement the traditions of the Islamic pious forefathers in an attempt to bring about the ‘golden age of Islam; a period when Islamic civilisation was at its greatest strength and when Muslims adhered to a literal interpretation of Mohammad’s teachings and a strictly puritanical legal and severe penal code: The period witnessed ‘defensive’ and, following Mohammad’s death, ‘offensive’ military campaigns – which were fundamentally expansionist, imperialist and colonialist in nature – and internal chaos under the leadership of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs which endures to today.40 Additional analyses of Islamism will be provided in chapter five.

The term “Jihadist”, or “Jihadism”, which has also become widely used by academics over the past decade and was invented by Islamist militant terrorists to refer to themselves, in this study refers to those ideologies, movements, organisations or individuals that adhere to a sub-category of Islamism which justifies and promotes acts of extremism, notably tactics and strategies of militant terrorism.41 This also includes suicide-attacks as well as other forms of political attacks.

39 See for example, Ibid, pp.28-29.

40 See for example, Hiro, War Without End, op. cit., pp.5-7, 9-14, 16-23.

violence, as their primary means to obtain a particular national, regional or global Islamist geopolitical objective. Unlike mainstream Islam, or mainstream Islamism (Missionary and Activist), Jihadist Islamists are committed to a campaign of indiscriminate warfare which they consider to be a legitimate act of ‘holy war/fighting’ against what they perceive to be the ‘enemies/aggressors of Islam’. They justify this campaign via a distorted interpretation of the Islamic concept of ‘al-jihad’ (holy war/fighting in a ‘collective/communal’ armed struggle in the ‘defence’ of Islam) which can be referred to as ‘jihad by the sword’ and ‘leaser jihad’ or ‘external jihad’.

The Jihadist Islamist interpretation of ‘al-jihad’ is derived from a number of key influential works by Islamist intellectuals. These include, Sayyid Qutb’s Ma’alim (Milestones) published in 1966, and the work, Zad al-Ma’ad (Provisions of the Hereafter), compiled by the medieval Islamists, Ibn Qayyim Jawziyyah’s and his teacher Ibn Tymiyyah (1263-1328). Ibn Tymiyyah is considered to be the

42 Hence the application and meaning of the term “Islamist militant terrorism” in this study is synonymous with the term Jihadist/Jihadism.

43 See for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.I, 4-5.

44 See, for example, Musallam, From Secularism To Jihad, op. cit., pp.180-183; Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.3-4; Footnote [1] of Verse 190 in Surah/chapter 2. Al-Baqarah on page 39, of the Quran identifies al-Jihad as ‘holy fighting’ in Allah’s/God’s Cause: “By Jihad Islam is established, Allah’s Word is made superior, and His Religion is propagated. By abandoning Jihad (may Allah protect us from that) Islam is destroyed and Muslims fall into an inferior position; their honour is lost, their lands are stolen, their rule and authority vanish. Jihad is an obligatory duty in Islam on every Muslim, and he who tries to escape from this duty, dies with one of the qualities of a hypocrite.”. It is important to note here that this verse is the original one in connection with the concept of al-jihad, but was later supplemented by verse 36 in chapter 9 (At-Taubah) of the Quran.
historical ideologue of the Jihadist Islamist doctrine.\textsuperscript{45} The Jihadist Islamist
document and its adherents seek to elevate ‘al-jihad’ alongside the principal ‘five
pillars of Islam’ and, therefore, to reinvent the concept as not only being
‘defensive’ (jihad al-dafa’a) and a ‘collective duty’ (fard kifayah) of the ‘Umma’
(Islamic community) which is compulsory for all capable Muslims – the
traditional understanding of the concept – but, rather, as an ‘offensive’ and
‘individual obligation’ (fard ‘Ayn) for all Muslims.\textsuperscript{46} It is thus unlike the classical
view under which ‘al-jihad’ can only be authorised by a legitimate Islamic ruler
(Caliph) or leader (Imam/Sheik/Ayatollah) of the entire Umma and must adhere to
strict ‘rules of engagement’ similar to the Christian doctrine of ‘just war theory’.\textsuperscript{47}
The term Jihadist will be discussed further in the following Chapter.

4.3. Defining Militant Terrorism

In order to define the conjoined term militant terrorism, employed in this
study, the two terms must first be separated for individual consideration and
analysis. The term militant derives from the Latin word ‘\textit{militare}’ and refers to
any individual or organisation that is engaged in aggressive or vigorous support of

\textsuperscript{45} Transnational Terrorism: The Threat To Australia”, 2004, Foreword by Alexander Downer,
\textit{Australian Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs}, National Capital Printing, Canberra, Australia,
p.23.


\textsuperscript{47} See, for example, \textit{From Secularism To Jihad}, op. cit., pp.180-183; Gerges, \textit{The Far Enemy}, op.
cit., pp.3-4; Gunaratna, \textit{Inside Al Qaeda}, op. cit., p.85.
a particular cause involving warfare, often to the point of extremism (including terrorism).48

The term militant/militancy is often loosely, and incorrectly, used as being synonymous with the terms ‘insurgent/insurgency’ or ‘guerrilla/guerrilla warfare’ to refer to non-state irregular armed combatants or organisations that employ asymmetric-warfare tactics and strategies against a particular state’s regular armed forces.49 Historically, guerrilla groups were originally employed alongside a particular state’s regular armed forces as an irregular sub-group in order to perpetrate covert military operations.50 This study refers to ‘guerrilla warfare’ as – as well as insurgents and militants – as non-state irregular combatant groups which may (or may not) be used as a covert proxy by states. Guerrilla, insurgent and militant groups alike not only employ various types of asymmetric-warfare tactics and strategies, they also represent a major phase in the ‘evolution’ and ‘transformation’ of the phenomenon of asymmetric-warfare.51 This study suggests that these three evolutionary phases of asymmetric-warfare are fundamentally rooted in the ethical shift of tactics and the legal and political moral legitimacy of guerrilla, insurgent and militant organisations respectively. Each of these three asymmetric-warfare groups can be identified and categorised as participating in


51 Ibid.
forms of ‘low intensity conflict’ incorporated within the wider Non-Traditional Security framework of Security Studies.\textsuperscript{52}

Each of the above three asymmetric-warfare groups, or phases, can be further categorised and identified through a number of key facets based on their “…motivation, strength of opposition, environment [urban or rural], leadership, organisation, recruitment, tactics and international reach [domestic, regional or global].”\textsuperscript{53} However, in the last 100 years, and in particular since the end of the Cold War, there has been a fundamental shift in targeting – away from combatants to civilians – which has influenced the evolution and transformation of asymmetric-warfare groups.\textsuperscript{54} Civilian populations have been attacked with greater intensity and lethality; some of which derives from an increase in fanatical motivation and outlook by these groups.\textsuperscript{55} Some of the common asymmetric-warfare tactics used by guerrilla, insurgent and militant groups include kidnapping, political assassination, murder, sabotage, sustained sporadic armed attacks, bombings, and – depending on definition – terrorism.\textsuperscript{56} Experts in the field are

\textsuperscript{52} Nester, International Relations, op. cit., pp.276-283.


increasingly advocating that the escalation of the intensity and lethality of the tactics employed by groups and individuals, and their increasingly premeditated targeting of civilians for a range of political ends (ideological, national, social, religious etc), is primarily a tactic that militant and, depending on the definition of terrorism, insurgent groups employ rather than guerrilla warfare groups.\textsuperscript{57}

There are over 109 cited definitions of terrorism that have been used or are currently in use. However, to date, there is no universally accepted legal or political definition of the term. A ‘quantitative perspective’ study conducted by Terrorism Studies expert Alex Schmid, revealed that a large number of these definitions all had three common identifying elements. The first and most consistent element, which featured in 80\% of the definitions, was that terrorism featured some form of violence. The second most common element, which featured in 65\% of the definitions, was that terrorism was political in nature. Thirdly, fear of terror was common in 51\% of the definitions examined. Schmid’s study further highlighted how contentious the term terrorism is analytically and, hence, legally and politically.\textsuperscript{58}

Ehud Sprinzak notes that, contrary to terrorism, “Guerrilla war is a small war – subject to the same rules that apply to big wars, and on this it differs to terrorism.”\textsuperscript{59} David Rapaport has also noted that the “… traditional distinguishing characteristic of the terrorist was his explicit refusal to accept the conventional

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, pp.1-5.


\textsuperscript{59} Ganor, “Defining Terrorism”, op. cit., pp.1-5.
moral limits which defined military and guerrilla action”. 60 Paul Wilkinson identifies a key ethical difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. He argues that Guerrillas “… can and often do fight according to conventions of war, taking and exchanging prisoners and respecting the rights of non-combatants. [However] Terrorists place no limits on means employed and frequently resort to widespread assassination, [and] …‘general terror’ upon the indigenous civilian population.” 61 James and Brenda Lutz contend that: “Guerrilla groups are more likely to target the police or military, setting them apart from their terrorist counterparts. Insurgent attacks on military personnel in Iraq [and Afghanistan], for example, are not normally considered terrorist attacks.” 62 It is only when groups begin to deliberately target civilians that it is considered terrorism. 63

Having considered the various definitions, this study employs the definition of terrorism which was developed by Terrorism Studies expert, Christopher Harmon: “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent [civilians64] to inspire fear for political ends.” 65

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.


63 Ibid.

64 The term ‘civilian’ in this study refers to all persons outside of the armed forces and who are not official government personal.

Considered to be one of the most influential pioneers of ‘modern’ insurgent/militant terrorism was the German Social Democrat, Johannes Most. He argued in his 1884 work, *Revolutionary War Science*, that ‘small groups’ would greatly benefit by utilising the systematic use of terror tactics if combined with the most modern technology available.\(^{66}\) Most identified this as a key aspect in the pursuit of what he termed the ‘propaganda of the dead’; and signalled the beginnings of a shift away from traditional guerrilla warfare tactics towards the somewhat more modern development of insurgent and militant terrorist organisations.\(^{67}\) Hence, prior to the twentieth century, guerrilla warfare was almost exclusively understood as a defensive ‘hit and run’ tactic which was primarily employed by a militarily weaker indigenous population under siege from foreign powers and was used to target a foreign power’s military forces through covert and/or irregular armed combat tactics (asymmetric-warfare).\(^{68}\)

Guerrilla warfare tactics were extensively employed by regular military forces during the American War of Independence in 1775-1783.\(^{69}\) However, and particularly from the post-1945 period onwards, guerrilla warfare tactics become employed by groups as a strategic means to political or ideological ends, unlike their predecessors which employed and understood guerrilla tactics primarily as a military means within itself. Guerrilla warfare groups historically operated in rural

---


\(^{67}\) Ibid.

\(^{68}\) Ibid, p.vii.

\(^{69}\) Ibid, p.3.
environments, unlike modern-day urban insurgent and militant terrorist organisations and individuals.  

The first sign of this evolved form of guerrilla warfare tactic/strategy, best described as ‘revolutionary guerrilla warfare’, was employed by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) in the 1880s and early 1890s. The IMRO attempted to build an integrated political and military organisation that employed guerrilla warfare tactics against the Ottoman Turks, and sought to undermine their dominance in the Balkans. Although the IMRO was fundamentally a Macedonian organisation, it was also based in Bulgaria where it would operate and carry out attacks against the Ottoman Turks. It ultimately failed following an attempted uprising in 1903. 

By the 1930’s and 1940’s, it has been argued, “…guerrilla warfare had become revolutionary in both intent and practice, with social, economic, psychological and, especially, political elements grafted on to traditional irregular military tactics in order to radically alter the structure of a state by force.” Following WWII, particularly from the late-1960s onwards, the evolution of revolutionary guerrilla warfare had evolved into urban ‘insurgent/militant’ groups which were primarily motivated by political ideologies and would often employ the tactic/strategy of terrorism. It was the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the

70 Ibid, p.15.

71 Ibid, pp.15-16.


73 Ibid, pp.vii-viii.
mid-20th Century that first effectively harnessed this new revolutionary style of guerrilla warfare as a strategy to overtly political ends.74 However, the use of terrorism by many of these groups was often limited, targeting government and domestic law enforcement personal and/or police rather than the civilian population and, therefore, equated to insurgent or militant tactics instead and the use of terrorism during the 1960s and 1970s was often state sponsored.75 By the 1980s though, those insurgent/militant groups increasingly motivated by radical Islamic ideology had begun to deliberately target civilians and thus terrorism. Therefore, the next point in the evolutionary phase of asymmetric-warfare can best be identified and termed as ‘terrorism’ and has manifested both groups and individuals that purely employ the tactic/strategy of terrorism as a means to political ends.76

Insurgent/militant groups that employ terror tactics/strategies have the common denominator of intentionally engaging in a prolonged, violent, and cold-blooded political struggle, employing terrorism directly alongside other forms of asymmetric-warfare. This type of combined tactic, which mainly targets civilians, is often employed by contemporary insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.77 These

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 See, for example, Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, op. cit., p.15; “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.8.

groups ultimately seek to create a ‘psychological’ state of terror within both the immediate targeted audience (the public) and, especially, the primary target (the government) in an attempt to destabilise society and force political change that would otherwise not happen. These insurgent/militant terrorist groups are ethically outside the legal conventions of regular warfare due to their intentional targeting of civilians. In this regard, they are unlike guerrilla groups which do not resort to terrorism and have legitimate nationalist grievances.

Insurgent/militant terrorist groups and individuals, therefore, fall outside the United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s resolutions and legal framework that legitimises the ‘right to self-determination’. The adoption of the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (UN Doc A/Res/49/60) makes clear that the ‘right to self-determination’ does not in any way legitimise the use of terrorism. The use and justification of acts that fundamentally resemble terrorism, and the limited and often absent nationalist identity and hence legitimacy, along with the general lack of popular political support from within their own population which they claim to represent morally,

---


legally and politically, discredit insurgent/militant terrorist groups and their motivations and goals.\textsuperscript{81}

Guerrilla groups, or ‘national liberation’ movements, are dependent on considerable public support for operational cover, logistics and ultimately political legitimacy; often representing a struggle for greater political autonomy/freedom or equality and hence a moral greater good.\textsuperscript{82} Insurgent/militant terrorist groups which have evolved out of, and are modelled on, early-to-mid 20\textsuperscript{th} Century guerrilla warfare revolutionary style organisations, however, are primarily rejected and viewed by the vast majority of a population which is being subjected to their campaign as representing an illegitimate political struggle.\textsuperscript{83} Based primarily on the ethical and legal framework laid out by the UN, guerrilla warfare groups which manifest and represent legitimate claims of self-determination, and which do not engage in terrorist attacks, can be identified as a distinct form of asymmetric-warfare group from that of insurgent and militant groups.\textsuperscript{84}

Unlike guerrilla groups, insurgent groups and, in particular, militant groups, engage in the tactic and strategy of terrorism and ultimately fall outside the ethical framework of what is considered legitimate armed combat.\textsuperscript{85} However,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, pp.10-14.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, p.7.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, p.6.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, pp.7-14.
\end{flushleft}
this is not to say that all insurgent groups do not have legitimate grievances, rather, it is the ethics of the tactics employed by a particular insurgent group that also determines their legitimacy. An important distinction which needs to be made here between insurgent and militant groups is that insurgent groups fundamentally derive from a situation that involves a foreign military’s occupation and political take over of a particular country or territory indigenous to the insurgent forces.\textsuperscript{86} Historical examples in the last 100 years include insurgencies by indigenous forces or populations against Imperialism, Colonialism, Fascism/Nazism, and Communism. The current Islamist insurgent and militant groups operating in both Afghanistan and Iraq are explicit users of the tactic of terrorism. Hence, insurgent and militant groups have targeted not only the military and indigenous government officials, but also reconstruction teams as well as civilians following the invasions of both countries in 2001 and 2003 respectively.\textsuperscript{87}

Unlike insurgent and guerrilla groups who are typically fighting a foreign invading and occupying power, militant groups, are fundamentally at odds with the indigenous political status quo which is otherwise viewed by the vast majority of the state’s domestic population and international community as both legitimate and sovereign.\textsuperscript{88} Hence militant groups often resort to the use of terrorism as it is the only real weapon in which they can successfully influence political outcomes.

\textsuperscript{86} Beckett, \textit{Modern Insurgencies And Counter-Insurgencies}, op. cit., p.vii.


\textsuperscript{88} Lutz & Lutz, \textit{Global Terrorism}, op. cit., pp.7-14.
due to their often extremist ambitions. Martial groups may also derive from indigenous geopolitical grievances such as occupation, civil war, the creation of nation states or separatist factions from within a particular population or demographic. Moreover, religion can also act as a motivating factor for some militant groups, notably in the context of Islamism. Hence, Islamist militant organisations and individuals, the majority of which are Sunni, have increasingly targeted Jews worldwide and Christians in countries such as Indonesia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Nigeria as well as non-Islamist Muslims and minority Shiite and Sufi Muslim sects in Iraq, Pakistan and Malaysia. Examples of Islamist militant


90 Ibid.

groups which use terrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia alone include the Jihad Group and EIJ in Egypt; Fatah al Islam in Lebanon; Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP – Pattani Islamic Mujahidin Movement) in southern Thailand; the ASG in the southern Philippines, and the Laskar Jihad (considered to have disbanded in 2002) and Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah organisations in Indonesia among others.

By identifying key ethical differences in the tactics employed by guerrilla, insurgent and militant groups such as targeting (civilians or combatants) as well as legitimate grievances and political credibility, a limited, but neutral and objective, definitional framework begins to emerge. This can then be used to categorise and identify militant terrorism groups which intrinsically manifest terrorist tactics and strategies. This study employs the term ‘militant terrorism’ which refers to militant asymmetric-warfare organisations or individuals illegitimately operating outside the UN’s resolution on the right to self-determination and which perpetrate the tactic/strategy of terrorism as a means to political ends, irrespective of whether the situation is one of conflict or peace.

Figure 1 represents a spectrum of the different levels of political-violence that collectively form the wider phenomenon of asymmetric-warfare. As noted, this study focuses on the final level (militant) and its sub-level (terrorism) and


93 See, for example, Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, op. cit., pp.67-71.

thus on militant terrorism. Each band on the spectrum represents an escalation of the ethics manifested in the tactics or strategies and thus an increase in the intensity of political-violence employed and justified by practitioners of asymmetric-warfare.

**Figure 1:** Spectrum of Asymmetric Warfare

![Spectrum of Asymmetric Warfare](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asymmetric Warfare</th>
<th>Guerrilla Warfare</th>
<th>Insurgency</th>
<th>Militant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4. Defining a Framework for the Geopolitical Categorisation of National, Regional and Global Islamist Militant Terrorist Organisations

Before discussing the National, Regional and Global manifestations of Jihadist ideology and organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, it is important to note that there are two primary contexts in which these three phenomena are viewed and defined; both of which are centred on the geographic contours and contexts of a particular militant terrorist organisation. The first key geographic component that needs to be considered is whether or not the organisation exclusively perpetrates attacks against targets within the geographic sphere that it seeks to control and, secondly, does the organisation also perpetrate attacks outside this geographic sphere and thus transcend these geopolitical boundaries.
A particular organisation that is motivated exclusively by a National Jihadist ideology might only attack domestic targets inside the pre-existing nation-state it seeks to control or territories considered to be under occupation and hence part of the existing or perceived future nation-state. An example of this would be the Islamic Resentence Movement (HAMAS) which is based in the Gaza Strip Palestinian territory and ultimately seeks to destroy the state of Israel and annex the West Bank territories into an Islamist-run Palestinian state and the MILF that seeks to annex most of the southern Philippians into an Islamist state.95 Another organisation motivated by National Jihadist ideology may attack both domestic as well as ‘out-of-state’ targets in one or more bordering states or in states further afield. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic Group (al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya) and the EIJ in Egypt, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, the Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan), are examples of organisations which have done so.96

Nevertheless, the latter example does not change the fact that the organisation’s goal is based on, and hence motivated by, National Jihadist


ideology. The same can also be said in regard to Regional and Global militant terrorist organisations which leads to a debate over how an organisation’s geopolitical ‘component’ can or should be categorised. Should it be either by its geopolitical ambitions, or its operational area and targeting capacity. For analytical proposes, this study will adopt the former concept which is based on the geopolitical motivations and thus ideology, rather than solely the operational area of a particular organisation. Therefore, National, Regional and Global Jihadist motivated organisations represent three distinct ideological and geopolitical phases and manifestations of Islamist militant terrorism.

Hence, National Jihadist ideology and organisations are identified in this study as exclusively pursuing the establishment of Islamist governments and polices and thus laws within the framework of a pre-existing or future nation-state. Regional Jihadist ideology and organisations are identified as pursuing the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and thus governments, polices and laws across the entirety of those regions once historically part of, or controlled by, the Islamic Caliphate. Global Jihadist ideology and organisations are identified as pursuing the implementation of Islamic Law and thus political dominance in the wider Islamic world and, ultimately, entire world via the creation of a ‘global Caliphate’.

---

Chapter Five

Political-Islam, Islamism & the National, Regional & Global

Evolution of Jihadist Ideologies

5.1. Introduction

As has been noted, the concept of Political-Islam in this study represents a collection of different orientations of political ideology motivated by, and premised on, a wide and diverse range of Islamic teachings and interpretations. The different interpretations of Islamic teachings are widespread within both the political and non-political manifestations of Islam, including both democratic and non-democratic principles and values. Political-Islam, like other political systems such as Democracy or Communism etc, manifests a wide and competitive range of ideological viewpoints that are collectively represented within an overarching political framework (i.e, Political-Islam). Each viewpoint offers its own insight into how Islamic, and in some cases non-Islamic, societies should be structured or reformed: Political-Islam is thus not monolithic in nature.\(^98\)

This chapter will outline and examine the different contours of Islamic political ideology, a phenomenon identified in this study as encompassing three primary levels/orientations: (1) Liberal, (2) Conservative, and (3) Islamist – which is made up from three additional sub-categories that includes ‘Missionary’, ‘Activist’ and ‘Jihadist’ Islamist ideologies. Collectively, these orientations of

---

Islamic political ideology are interpreted in this study as the primary manifestations associated with the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam. Each of these ideological levels builds on the previous one and represents a hardening of political and legal Islamic codes. Here analysis will focus on the degree to which a puritanical emphasis is adhered to or enforced within the different levels of Islamic political and legal codes, and each of these level’s justifications for the application of violence as well as the intensity of the levels of violence that are justified and employed.

This chapter also examines the ascent of Islamist ideology articulating that Islamism as a political phenomenon emerged out of the wider sphere of Political-Islam. Analysis will also focus on the hypothesis that the phenomenon has undergone a series of sequential ideological evolutions. Here, an examination of the wider ideological levels of Islamism will take place followed by an examination of the three Jihadist Islamist ideological phases (National, Regional and Global), analysing historical and contemporary contexts and phenomena which gave rise to the wider pool of Islamist ideologies and phases. The three evolutionary phases of Jihadist ideology collectively form the basis underpinning this study’s hypothesised ‘ideological evolution’ process of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of Jihadist ideology and militant terrorist organisations, as well as the phenomenon’s manifestation, it is important that all levels of Islamic political ideology associated with this study’s spectrum of Political-Islam be given some consideration. Figure 2 depicts a spectrum
developed with the adopted terminologies that represents what this study contends are the three primary levels of Political-Islamic ideology – Liberal, Conservative, and Islamist – and provides it with a workable analytical framework. The spectrum helps to identify and categorise the different levels of Political-Islam and also acts as a mechanism to gauge the different intensity of the levels of violence justified by different Islamist ideologies and organisations. Moreover, the spectrum provides a key insight into this study’s ability to analyse the ideological and geopolitical contours and ambitions of a particular Jihadist organisation. By identifying a particular organisation’s ideological contours, an insight into their geopolitical ambitions is gained thus helping to categorise them into National, Regional or Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations.99

Figure 2: Spectrum of Political-Islam

---

99 See, for example, Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.28: “A good starting point in our effort to analyse and categorise Islamic movements and political parties is to examine the beliefs, ideas and ideologies by which these groups define themselves.”
5.2. Liberal Political-Islamic Ideology

Although not the focus of this study, Liberal Political-Islam, also referred to as ‘moderate-Islam’ or ‘leftist-Islam’ or ‘secular-Islam’, is interpreted as representing those Islamic governments, organisations and individuals that adhere to and advocate a liberal and moderate interpretation of Islam. Liberal Political-Islam is primarily concerned with, on the one hand, preserving Islamic cultural identity and, on the other, revitalising Islam in a purely modernist context.100 Advocating and adopting many concepts and norms practiced in Western societies such as pluralism, emancipation, tolerance, social-justice and equality, and other human rights issues.101 It advocates Islamic piety to be an ‘individual/private’ obligation for all Muslims, rather than being a ‘social/public’ mandatory obligation for all members of society – both Muslim and non-Muslims – to submit to Islamic political and legal requirements.102 Liberal Political-Islam, therefore, coexists with both secular and pluralistic values within Islamic majority or minority societies and nations alike and is primarily democratic in nature,


101 Ibid.

promoting free elections and a macro liberal market economy.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, and akin to some Western democratic nations, Liberal Political-Islam seeks to establish ‘social-welfare’ systems based on the central Islamic concept of ‘sadaqa’ (bearing one another’s burdens) and is derived from both the Quran and ‘Hadiths’ (reports/biography containing the life teachings of what Prophet Mohammad did, said and approved of).\textsuperscript{104} It also emphasises that socio-economic equality is a mandatory obligation and a fundamental component of the Islamic Umma and thus any ‘Islamic state’ (dawla islamiyya).\textsuperscript{105}

It is important to note here that as well as promoting a modern, moderate and, in some ways, secular interpretation of Islam, Liberal Political-Islam is fundamentally based on socio-economic development and thus the concept of sadaqa rather than on Conservative fundamentalism or, in the context of Islamism, extreme puritanical Islamic Law that is otherwise considered by adherents of non-Liberal Political-Islam to be a mandatory component of any Islamic society or state.\textsuperscript{106} Hence, Liberal Political-Islam fundamentally rejects the harsh Islamic penal code of ‘hadd’ which justifies the use of violent punishment, inducing extreme violence and death in some cases, across a range of issues which are

\textsuperscript{103} Esposito, The Future Of Islam, op. cit., p. 64; Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, p.54; Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, op. cit., p.4.

\textsuperscript{104} Hewer, Understanding Islam, op. cit., p.151.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.

considered by those Muslims adhering to Conservative or Islamist orientations of Political-Islam to be extreme moral and thus legal misconduct (for example, theft, adultery, blasphemy etc), opting instead for more humane punishments which are similar to the Western world.\(^{107}\)

Liberal Political-Islam, therefore, represents not only the modern face of Political-Islam and Islamic society, but in many ways is fundamentally akin to some Western democratic values and principles and provides an invaluable and committed ally in the fight against Islamist militant terrorism.\(^{108}\) Contemporary examples of governments that adhere to forms of Liberal Political-Islam are best represented by the current Turkish government’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and, though facing many challengers, the Islamic Dawa Party of Iraq. The AKP and the Islamic Dawa Party of Iraq both support the deeper human-rights values fundamental to Western style democracy such as, liberty, equality and justice.\(^{109}\)

\(^{107}\) See, for example, Hewer, *Understanding Islam*, op. cit., pp.151-152, 28-29; Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.28.


5.3. Conservative Political-Islamic Ideology

The second ideological level on the spectrum, and again not the primary focus of this study, is Conservative Political-Islamic ideology. This is interpreted here as Islamic governments, organisations and individuals that adhere to or advocate a conservative interpretation of Islamic teachings deriving from a particular school of Islamic jurisprudence (philosophy and law) and are referred to as ‘madhahib/path or way to go’. These Islamic schools of jurisprudence were established following the death of the Prophet Mohammad. They focus primarily on defining and interpreting Islamic Law based on the Qur’an’s 6,616 verses and the ‘Sunna’ (a collection of ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’ of the Prophet) which consisted of some 2,700 sayings and doings and were later codified into six canonical bibliographic collections known as the Hadiths.  

The Hadiths were collected and codified over a period of nearly 150 years between the early 8th and mid 9th centuries CE, by the founders and students of the different schools who were considered to be ‘Islamic scholars’ (alim/ulama) and which, alongside the Quran and Sunna, collectively form the cornerstone of Islamic jurisprudence. These schools include ‘Hanifa’, ‘Maliki’, ‘Shafi’i’, and ‘Hanbali’, as well as an independent school known as ‘Ibadi’; all but the latter are classical Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence.  

---

110 Hewer, Understanding Islam, op. cit., pp.147-150.


112 Hewer, Understanding Islam, op. cit., pp.147-150.

113 Ibid.
legally codified between 932-1055CE, and include ‘Ja’fari’ as well as those schools established by the Shiite sub-groups, ‘Zaydi’, ‘Ismali’, ‘Bohras’, and ‘Nizari (a sub-Ismail sect) and thus collectively form the Shiite traditions basis of Islamic jurisprudence.114

The adherents and promoters of Conservative Political-Islam can, in some cases, exercise and justify the use of violence, inducing extreme forms of exsiccation (hanging/beheading/stoning), for crimes such as theft, blasphemy, adultery and murder.115 However, this is not to say that all governments, organisations or individuals that are adherents of Conservative Political-Islam exercise or justify violence regularly, or, as the only means to enforce and maintain Islamic Law. Conservative Political-Islam is identified in this study as representing the vast majority of the global Muslim population which adheres to the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam and advocates an amalgamation of political, legal and religious institutional frameworks (Islamic theocracy).116 Conservative Political-Islam, therefore, constitutes what is widely considered, in both the Muslim and non-Muslim world, as ‘mainstream’ Islamic ideology and hence political and legal Islamic norms. Thus, Islam and the vast majority of Muslims throughout history are not apolitical or traditionally politically Liberal,

114 Ibid.


Islamist or Jihadist in nature.\textsuperscript{117} Neither is Islam traditionally a religion of ‘peace’ but, rather, a religion of ‘law’ which is inherently focused on the governance, and thus politics, of private and public and state affairs.\textsuperscript{118}

Conservative Political-Islam has fundamentally amalgamated itself with the concept of the nation-state rather than advocating a return to an Islamic Caliphate system (Islamic empire). This notion is confirmed by the following Islamic governments and judicial systems which this study identifies as currently adhering to Conservative Political-Islam; Brunei, Kuwait, Malaysia, the thirteen autonomist provinces in northern Nigeria (though there is increasing concerns there over the rise of Islamism and Jihadist organisations such as Boko Haram/Western Education is Sacrilegious), Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (though somewhat more moderate), and, although there is strong support for Islamism within some pockets of society and the government, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

5.4. Islamist Political-Islamic Ideology

The third level of ideological intensification on the Political-Islamic spectrum, and this study’s primary focus, is referred to and interpreted in this study as Islamist political ideology. The term correlates to those governments, organisations and individuals that adhere to or advocate a particular form of Sunni or Shiite Islamist ideology that derives from an ultra-puritanical and literalist

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.

model of legal, political and religious Islamic teachings practised by the original Islamic community during the 7th Century. These teachings were established by the Prophet Mohammad and his close companions prior to the establishment and codifying of the different Islamic schools of jurisprudence. Islamists seek to impose a theocratic framework over all aspects of society, both private and public, ultimately endeavouring to install a particular theocratic framework in all existing and, in some instances, pre-existing Islamic lands (i.e. those areas formally under Islamic control such as Spain and parts of the Balkans), states and societies as well as globally in the most extreme cases.

As noted, the extremely hard-line Islamist interpretation of Islamic teachings and traditions is based on Salafist Islam which, in this study is synonymous with the term Islamist, attempts to imitate the ‘pious forefathers’ of the original Muslim community which included the first three generations of Muslims who lived alongside Prophet Mohammad. These first three generations of pious Muslims were the close companions associated with the Prophet’s life, teachings and first Islamic community, considered by Salafists/Islamists to be the only pure and true manifestation of Islam. Hence,

120 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
Islamists are inspired by, and attempt to replicate, the first three generations of pious Muslims that lived during, and after, the Prophet Muhammad by invoking the Islamic concept of ‘taqleed’ (emulating tradition).\textsuperscript{124} At the same time Islamists, ironically, considering they advocate a strictly literalist interpretation of Islam, are engaged in ‘ijithad’ (the intellectual effort of interpretation of the Islamic texts – Quran, Sunna and Hadiths); rejecting the classical schools of Islamic teachings (post-Hadith period) and reinterpreting the ideological foundations of Islam and thus Islamic law in order to justify their Islamist agenda’s.\textsuperscript{125}

The original Muslim community and the first three pious generations of Muslims included, and were led by, the first four Islamic rulers and successors (Caliphs) following the death of the Prophet Muhammad.\textsuperscript{126} These Islamic Caliphs included Abu Bakr (632-634), Omar ibn Khattab (634-644), Uthman ibn Affan (644-656), and Ali ibn Abu Talib (656-661), who are collectively referred to as the four Rightly Guided Caliphs of Islam.\textsuperscript{127} According to Islamists, all additional teachings and variations of Islam that emerged following the first three generations of pious Muslims and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs are contaminated and ultimately un-Islamic.


\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} Horst, “Salafist Jihadism in Germany”, op. cit., p.1.

\textsuperscript{127} Hiro, \textit{War Without End}, op. cit., pp.10-14.
Although Salafist ideology is rooted in 7th century Islam, the movement was not formally established until the 1880s. The original ideological foundations of the Salafist movement, however, represented an Islamic ‘reformist’ movement that embarked on a journey of modernisation, unlike many of today’s prominent Salafist/Islamist movements, in an effort to accommodate aspects of Western civilisation such as technology and science.\textsuperscript{128} The reformist project first emerged during the decline of the Ottoman Empire/Caliphate in the mid-to-late 1800s, following centuries of economic, technological, cultural, military, and geopolitical stagnation.\textsuperscript{129} Moreover, the rise of modern European Christian powers had begun to significantly weaken and influence the economic, military and political ‘balance or power’ held by the Ottoman Empire from the 17th Century onwards as a result of a series of military defeats at the hands of the post-renaissance European Christian powers.\textsuperscript{130}

This period also witnessed the ‘modernisation’ of the Ottoman Empire with sweeping reforms known as the ‘Tanzimat’ (reorganisation), implementing secular and liberal polices and laws that gave educational, employment, legal, and political equality to both Muslims and non-Muslims – primarily Christians and


\textsuperscript{129} See, for example, Cape, Jonathan, 1977, The Ottoman Centuries, The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, Lord Kings, Landon, Great Britain, pp.279-281, 319, 363.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, pp.361-364, 497-498: Beginning in the 1853-56 Crimean War the Ottoman Empire became dependent on European alliances (British and French and later Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) for its protection and climaxed in WWI (in some ways this has endured until today in the context of its NATO membership).
Jews.\textsuperscript{131} However, the reforms met strong resistance from the conservative Muslim elite and the wider Muslim population which had long resented Western influences, Christianity, Jews, and infidels, and who were seen as inferior and, ironically, a threat to Islam’s absolute superiority. Collectively, these events sparked widespread hostilities which thus sowed the seeds for the rise of the Salafist reformist project.\textsuperscript{132}

By the early 1920s, however, the Salafist reformist movement, following an explicit rapprochement with the Arabian (Saudi Arabia) based ultra-orthodox ‘Wahhabi’ sect of Sunni Islam, founded by and named after the Hanbali theologian, Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792CE), began to take on a much more political dynamic and was becoming increasingly anti-modernist and anti-Western in its outlook.\textsuperscript{133} Following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, which marked the end of nearly 1300 years of the Islamic Caliphate, the Salafist movement, now under the influence of Muhammad Rashid Rida (a native of Greater Syria who had become president of the Syrian National Congress in 1920), began to transform into a ‘revivalist’ movement that sought to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate and strict Islamic Law modelled on 7th Century Islam and became further politicised.\textsuperscript{134} By the 1960s, the Salafist movement had manifested pockets of radical and extremist (Jihadist) variants of Islamist ideology which had

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid, p.473-475.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid, pp.329- 330, 475- 476, 480.
  \item \textsuperscript{133} International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., pp.9-10: The Wahhabi doctrine can best be understood as a form of neo-Hanbali Sunni Islamic jurisprudence.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} See, for example, Hiro, Dilip, War Without End, op. cit., pp.52, 54.
\end{itemize}
both National and Regional agendas and, following the financial and spiritual backing from both the Saudi government and radical Wahhabi Imams (spiritual leaders) during the 1970s and 1980s, spawned the rise of global extremists (Global-Jihadists).\textsuperscript{135}

The Wahhabi-Saudi ‘takeover’ of the reformist/modernist project set out to achieve two objectives. First, to establish Wahhabi dominance over the Salafist reformist project in order to launch what has become a global Wahhabi-led ‘revivalist’ project, rather than a reformist/modernist project, that is actively exporting and establishing its hard-line puritanical and literalist teachings reminiscent to that of 7\textsuperscript{th} Century Islam throughout the wider Sunni and, if possible, entire Muslim world. Secondly, from the late 1970s onwards, to counter the influence of Shiite Islamist ideology which had gained significant influence in both Shiite and Sunni Islamist circles; notably following the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran.\textsuperscript{136}

It should be noted here that Salafist Islam is best understood in two contexts. First, as a methodology (manhaj) that can be used by any Muslim to consult the foundational texts – the Quran and Sunna – and to interpret Islam. Secondly, “…it is a movement, or a collection of like-minded believers who are held together by a common puritanical [or violent] understanding of Islam, all of whom apply the Salafist methodology to their religion.”\textsuperscript{137} Salafist Islam,

\textsuperscript{135} International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., pp.9-10.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{137} Brachman, Global Jihadism, op. cit., p.25.
therefore, is not exclusively a Sunni based phenomenon.\textsuperscript{138} Hence, this study advocates that there are two main forms of Islamist ideology: Sunni and Shiite.

Sunni and Shiite Muslims and Islamists alike regard Ali, who was the first male adult convert to Islam and the founder and first Imam of Shiite Islam, as a pious forefather and one of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs.\textsuperscript{139} Therefore, it is logical to conclude that because Shiite Islamist ideology, like that of Sunni Islamism, is premised on both the Quran and Sunna, and that Ali was a pious forefather of the first Muslim community, Ali’s teachings and interpretations of Islam are also representative of a true and pure version of Islam and are thus part of the wider Salafist tradition.\textsuperscript{140} Based on this logic, Shiite rooted Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations alike can best be identified as deriving from ‘Shiite Salafist’ ideology.

It is from this early point in Islam, post-Ali Caliphate, that both Sunni and Shiite Islamists see as being the period when Muslims and Islamic teachings and practices began to deviate from the pure Islamic tradition; claiming that they have become corrupted by other pre-existing non-Islamic influences (Greek-Hellenistic, Jewish, Christian, mysticism etc).\textsuperscript{141} Hence, Islamist political ideology advocates a return to Salafist tradition which all Muslims must adhere to based on the true


\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{140} See, for example, International Crisis Group, “\textit{Understanding Islamism}”, op. cit., pp.18-23.

and pure interpretation of Islam revealed to the Prophet Mohammad by ‘Allah’ (God). Thus, Islamists consider themselves to be the only true practitioners of Islam and, therefore, the only true Muslims.\textsuperscript{142}

Islamist political ideology acts as a platform to, on the one hand, aggressively oppose secular governments or reforms as well as Islamic governments or reforms that are not based on Salafist teachings. On the other hand, Islamists use Salafist teachings to promote political, legal and social reform throughout the Islamic world in order to replace what they see as un-Islamic and corrupt secular regimes and societies; as well as those Islamic regimes that are liberal or considered too moderate by Islamist standards. Islamists, in the short to mid-term, seek to establish in their place theocracies via what is described as an “Islamo-nationalist” (Islamist nationalism) political framework. This nationalist approach has been adopted by Islamist groups and militant terrorist organisations such as the Islamic Action Front in Jordan; most branches of the Muslim Brotherhood; HAMAS in the Gaza Strip; the MILF in the Southern Philippines, and Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{143}

It is clear, however, that not all Islamists support the idea of nationalism and the nation-state. These concepts are rejected by Islamists with regional or global ambitions, but not by those Islamists who are focused exclusively on establishing Islamist governments at the nation-state level. Advocates of Islamist

\textsuperscript{142} Brachman, \textit{Global Jihadism}, op. cit., p.25.

nationalism derive the concept from their interpretation that the Quran and Sunna or Hadiths do not fundamentally define an exclusive concept of what represents the ‘Islamic State’.

Although considered highly utopian, in the long-term some Islamists ultimately seek to unify these states under a single regional pan-Islamist theocracy. This study advocates that Islamists seek to establish policies, laws and hence theocracies throughout the wider Islamic world, including in those nations which were once historically part of the Islamic Caliphate or now have a majority or a significant minority Muslim population (including, for example, the regions of sub-Saharan and East Africa, Southern Thailand, the Southern Philippines, Bosnia and other parts of the Balkans); using national and regional geopolitical frameworks, strategies and tactics and, in the context of Global Jihadism, ultimately extending to global ones.

Islamists employ both non-violent and violent tactics to support their theocratic ambitions. As noted, this study employs the following three terms: Missionary (al-da’wa); Activist (al-harakat al-islamiyya al-siyassiyya); and Jihadist (al-jihad/al-mujahid) to represent the three distinctive manifestations of Islamist ideology and their associated strategies and tactics which need to be


\[145\] Laqueur, Z., No End to War, op. cit., p.30;

examined. The first two terms represent those Islamist organisations and individuals that refrain from using, propagating or justifying extreme acts of political-violence, while the term Jihadist represents those that use and justify systematic acts of political-violence and, in particular, militant terrorism.

Figure 3 represents a sub-spectrum of the Figure 2 and has been developed to provide this study with the additional analytical insights needed to further explore and gauge the different ideological levels associated with both non-violent and violent forms of Islamist ideology. This study contends that Islamist ideology can be best understood in three distinctive forms and is thus not monolithic in nature. This study’s primary focus is concerned with the third and final manifestation of Islamist ideology – Jihadist ideology.

**Figure 3: Spectrum of Islamist Political Islamic Ideology**

![Diagram of Spectrum of Islamist Political Islamic Ideology](image)

**5.4.1. Missionary Islamist Ideology**

Missionary Islamist ideology represents the least politically active form of Islamist ideology and is primarily focused on ‘al-da’wa’ (preaching and proselytising), seeking to ‘convert’, in particular, non-Islamist Muslims (Liberal

---


148 Ibid.
and Conservative Muslims) and attracting new Islamist converts from outside of the Islamic religion as well as from within the wider pool of Islam itself.\(^{149}\) Missionary Islamism fundamentally rejects the concept of the nation-state as an alternative to the Islamic Caliphate and advocates that all political systems not deriving from Islamic Law are ultimately un-Islamic and that there should be strict obedience to the sovereignty of God.\(^{150}\) Further, Missionary Islamism overtly propagates non-violence at the political level, focusing primarily on the “…preservation of Muslim identity and the Islamic faith and moral order against the forces of unbelief, [and] …the corruption of Islamic values (al-qiyam al-islamiyya) and the weakening of [Islamic] faith (al-iman)”\(^{151}\).

However, Missionary Islamism is a fundamental promoter of Islamist ideology and provides a fertile environment for political activism, radicalisation and the development of Islamist militant terrorists (Jihadists).\(^{152}\) Moreover, Missionary Islamist ideology and/or organisations are considered by experts to often be exploited or used covertly by Islamist militant terrorist organisations and their supporters to prepare or precondition non-Islamist Muslim communities to accept and convert to an Islamist interpretation of Islam; a process referred to as

\(^{149}\) Ibid, p.8.

\(^{150}\) Ibid, pp.9-14.

\(^{151}\) Ibid.

the “Islamisation” of mainstream Islam. Although there are few governments that can be identified as exclusively deriving from Missionary Islamist ideology there are, however, some major politically motivated non-government organisations (NGO’s) that ‘export’ Missionary Islamist ideology that are funded by Islamist states. These include the Saudi funded Muslim World League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the Saudi Fund for Development.

There is also the ‘Jama’at al-Da’wa wa’l-Tabligh’ (Group for Preaching and Propagation) in India, the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, and the Society for Islamic Reform and Darul Arqam in Malaysia, as well as the forty-five branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir – an Islamist organisation that amalgamates both Missionary and, to some extent, Activist ideologies in its efforts to establish an Islamic Caliphate – which are based throughout the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and have been growing steadily in Europe.

5.4.2. Activist Islamist Ideology

Activist Islamist ideology, unlike Missionary Islamism, is highly political in nature and often employs non-violent political tactics and strategies as the main form of ‘political communication’. Activist Islamists seek power via political


154 Ibid.

means, using a variety of political-systems along with rhetoric deriving from different forms of Socialism or Communism, Nationalism, and, more recently, Democracy, to sell their puritanical hard-line Islamist agenda.\(^{156}\) Hence, Activist Islamism represents a political framework that has amalgamated European developed political-systems with Islamist ideology; exposing the extent to which Activist Islamist ideology employs Islam for purely political means rather than relying exclusively on the ‘religious’ (al-da’wa) component of Islam like that of Missionary Islamist ideology.\(^{157}\) Activist Islamist ideology fundamentally rejects extremism, but supports the use of al-jihad during times of foreign occupation or attack, as a means to gain political power and has generally come to accept the concept of the nation-state unlike Missionary or some Jihadist based Islamist ideologies.\(^{158}\)

Examples of Islamist governments and major political organisations that currently correlate to Activist Islamist political ideology include Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Trans Federal Government in Somalia, the autonomous province of Aceh in Indonesia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt/Jordan, Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan, the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia, the Islamic Representative Council in Malaysia, and branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Malaysia and Indonesia.\(^{159}\) Although

\(^{156}\) International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., p.4.

\(^{157}\) Ibid. pp.4-6.

\(^{158}\) Ibid.

adhering to a more extreme Islamist ideological orientation, and hence pro-Jihadist in nature, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan), and the Afghan Taliban, all employ and justify both non-political and politically motivated forms of violence such as political assassination, torture, and terrorism, and have strong underpinnings to Activist Islamist ideology in the context of Islamist nationalism and their acceptance of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{160} Islamist nationalism and the nation-state have become the primary frameworks in which the majority of Islamist movements and militant terrorist organisations seek to gain and control political power through in order to impose their particular Islamist ideologies.\textsuperscript{161}

5.5.0. Jihadist Islamist Political-Islamic Ideology

As noted above, Islamist ideology also represents the ideological level associated with the phenomenon of politically motivated violence and hence militant terrorist organisations. There are a vast number of Islamist militant terrorist organisations throughout the Muslim world which have directly spawned from, though doctrinally and grossly misguided, the Islamic concept of ‘al-jihad’ which literally refers to an Islamic ‘defensive’ armed struggle/holy fighting/war, rather than the non-violent concept of ‘greater-jihad’ (al-jihad al-akbar).\textsuperscript{162} The concept of al-jihad which this third level of Islamist ideology derives from has both a ‘licit’ (based on the classical definition of al-jihad which rejects militant

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, p.6.


\textsuperscript{162} Hewer, “\textit{Understanding Islam}”, op. cit., p.153.
terrorist tactics and is adhered to by mainstream Islam) and an ‘illicit’ manifestation (it rejects the classical definition in favour of a new extremist doctrinal innovation of al-jihad which justifies militant terrorist tactics and is adhered to by a minority of Islamists). This study focuses on the latter, illicit, manifestation of al-jihad and is referred to as ‘Jihadist ideology’.164

Jihadist ideology is best identified as an Islamist sub-set that, like Missionary and Activist Islamism, has its ideological roots firmly embedded deep within the Salafist Islamic tradition. It can best understood as a tactic or strategy that is employed by Islamists who have abandoned the non-violent method of ‘da’wah’ (preaching/issuing of summons) used by Missionary Islamists and political methods used by Activist Islamists, and who justify extreme political-violence in the name of Islam.165 As this study will argue, Jihadist ideology, although representing a minority ideology within the wider Islamist movement, has witnessed a steady growth of support since its inception and, in particular, from the late 1970s onwards.166

The Jihadist movement, although not doctrinally or tactically monolithic, seeks to install, a puritanical, absolutist and violent Islamist interpretation of Islamic Law over all aspects of Islamic society and, in a particular context (Global


165 Ibid, p.4: Missionary and Activist Islamists rarely engage in politically motivated violence especially not acts of militant terrorism.

Jihadism), non-Islamic societies. Justified via an illicit interpretation, and supporting an ‘offensive’ al-jihad which fundamentally constitutes extreme and open-ended violence, it is, therefore, distinctive from both mainstream Islamism (Missionary/Activist) and the wider Islamic held interpretation that al-jihad is a ‘defensive’ concept.\(^{167}\) This study advocates that Jihadists are Islamist fanatics that have grossly distorted the concept of al-jihad and the wider religion of Islam in order to invoke what is an illicit religio-political armed conflict which Jihadists claim is in the defence of Islam and thus Allah/God.\(^{168}\)

Jihadist Islamist ideology also invokes, like that of Missionary and Activist Islamism, additional non-violent tactics including propaganda, missionaries, indoctrination, recruitment, and charity and fundraising activities, as well as supporting various forms of political-activism.\(^{169}\) Jihadists, therefore, often employ two strategies simultaneously, using both violent and non-violent tactics to promote and sustain their Islamist ideology. It remains the case, however, that the justification and use of militant terrorism and other forms of political violence represents the primary tactics and strategies adhered to by Jihadists as well as the most immediate threat.\(^{170}\) Nevertheless, non-violent tactics do play an important role within the Jihadist and wider Islamist circles, aiding their abilities to inspire

---

\(^{167}\) Ibid.


\(^{170}\) Brachman, Global Jihadism, op. cit., pp.81-103.
and recruit new members and thus providing a mechanism to amplify their Islamist agendas.\(^{171}\)

The overwhelming majority of Islamic theologians and academics contend that the concept of al-jihad has three distinctive interpretations. These include ‘internal’ (waging al-jihad against corrupt and impious Muslim rulers/governments); ‘irredentist’ (waging al-jihad to redeem Muslim land from non-Muslim rulers/forces); and ‘global’ (a new interpretation introduced by al-Qaeda in 1998 that advocates/justifies a worldwide campaign of open-ended and indiscriminate militant terrorism against, in particular, the West and its allies, Jews, Christians and other religions as well as those around the world who oppose their Islamist agendas).\(^{172}\) They only consider the first two to be legitimate and only if the prevailing status quo justifies the use of al-jihad (such as in case of foreign or apostate rule and/or military occupation). This must be the last resort and there are strict ethical codes such as ‘proportionality’ and ‘discriminate’ targeting which must be upheld.\(^{173}\)

Figure 4 is a sub-spectrum of Figures 3 and 2 and represents the different levels of Jihadist Islamist ideology identified in this study and hence collectively form the final and most extreme levels manifested within the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam.

---


\(^{173}\) Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op. cit., p.85.
5.5.1. National Jihadist Islamist Ideology

National Jihadist Islamist Ideology represents the original phase in the evolution and transformation phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism. This ideology propagates the concept of the Islamic state. Islamists prior to the 1970s were opposed to the concept of the nation-state (and it is still rejected by Missionary Islamists and Regional and Global Jihadists) which was considered a Western replacement of the Islamic Caliphate and thus deemed to be un-Islamic.\textsuperscript{174} However, as outlined above, the Quran, Sunna and Hadiths do not outline an exclusive definition or concept of the Islamic state. National Jihadist ideology, therefore, accepts the concept of the nation-state and thus represents an amalgamation of nationalism and/or Activist Islamist and Jihadist ideologies.\textsuperscript{175}

The Muslim Brotherhood, established in Egypt in 1928, by Hassan Al-Banna, had a doctrine that was deeply anti-Western, illiberal and anti-democratic and represents the earliest manifestation of Islamist nationalist ideology. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Islamist political party, primarily sought to reform the institutional framework of the Egyptian state, and hence society in

\textsuperscript{174} International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., pp.6-7.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid, p.6.
general, in accordance with Islamic Law. In its early days it advocated for the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate. Following the assassination of Al-Banna by Egyptian government agents in 1949, the Muslim Brotherhood was actively seeking to overthrow the highly secular Western backed autocratic government led by Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Nokrashi Pasha. By July 1952, and endorsed by the Muslim Brotherhood which had organised popular anti-government and anti-monarchy riots against King Farouq, the Egyptian armed forces staged a military coup and in 1953, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser was inaugurated Egyptian President. During this time, the Muslim Brotherhood received arms and clandestine military training from sympathisers within the Egyptian army and had developed close connections with members of the newly empowered Revolutionary Command Council which included the future President, Muhammad Anwar Sadat.

Following the military coup, the Muslim Brotherhood had expected Nasser to establish an Islamic government and institute Islamic Law and thus transform Egypt into an Islamic state. However, Nasser and his secular pan-Arab nationalist regime almost immediately returned to a policy of political suppression of the Islamist establishment in Egypt. This led to a failed assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954 by an extremist Muslim Brotherhood member, Mahmoud Abd

---

176 Hiro, War Without End, op. cit., p.63.

177 Ibid.

178 Ibid, pp.64-65.

179 Ibid.
al-Latif. Nasser then adopted a hard line and violent approach towards the organisation and wider Islamist movement; executing those directly responsible and arresting hundreds more.\textsuperscript{180} It was during this period that pockets of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership had begun to shift towards violent tendencies, providing an environment which would help influence and crystallise the manifestation and rise of National Jihadist ideology within the organisation and beyond.\textsuperscript{181} The adoption of Jihadist doctrine and thus campaigns of political-violence through strategies and tactics of militant terrorism by some leaders, ultimately lead to a major ethical division within the Muslim Brotherhood (and by 1970, the wider Salaifist movement) between, on the one hand, those Islamists who supported the Jihadist doctrine and, on the other, those that opposed it.\textsuperscript{182}

A central figure within the Muslim Brotherhood, one who is considered to be the founding ideologue behind the modern National Jihadist doctrine and the wider Jihadist movement, was the Egyptian born Islamic theologian and intellectual Sayyid Qutb. Ironically, Qutb was once secular and had spent three years (1949-1951) of his university study in the United States of America (U.S.) had concluded that the U.S. and the wider Western secular system and its principles were inherently immoral, corrupt, un-Godly (i.e. un-Islamic), and ultimately posed a direct threat to Islamic traditions and civilisation.\textsuperscript{183} On his

\begin{footnotes}
\item[180] Brachman, Global Jihadism, op. cit., p.24.
\item[181] Hiro, War Without End, op. cit., pp.64-65.
\item[182] Brachman, Global Jihadism, op. cit., pp.24-25.
\end{footnotes}
return to Egypt, Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood and immediately set out to institutionalise a more hard line anti-secular and anti-Western, in particular anti-American, doctrine within the organisation alongside increasing the Brotherhood’s efforts to denounce the Egyptian regime.184

By the late 1960s following Qutb’s imprisonment between 1954-1965, for his indirect involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempted assassination of Nasser, Qutb wrote the Islamist manifestos *In the Shade of the Quran* and *Milestones* – both of which provided, and remain, the most influential theological and/or intellectual innovation that justifies National Jihadist ideology and would later help influence/justify both Regional and Global Jihadist ideologies.185 Subsequently, Nasser and the Egyptian government accused and convicted Qutb of conspiracy and he was executed in 1966.186 In the wake of Qutb’s execution his Islamist doctrine began to resonate within the Muslim Brotherhood coinciding with the ongoing socio-economic and geopolitical failures of the Arab regimes and, in particular, their inability to militarily defeat Israel. This ultimately transformed the Muslim Brotherhood into two ideologically different Islamist camps.187 On the one hand, an Activist Islamist ideology based on Al-Banna’s doctrine that fundamentally rejected politically motivated violence and, on the other, a Jihadist Islamist ideology deriving directly from Outb’s manifestos. The

---


186 Ibid.

187 Ibid.
doctrine can be seen as a new or reinterpretation of al-jihad which justifies the most extreme forms of political-violence including militant terrorism.\(^{188}\)

Qutb remains, arguably, the most influential Islamist who nearly singlehandedly carved out what has evolved into the central ideological pillar underpinning Islamist militant-terrorist organisations and individuals alike.\(^{189}\) Qutb’s work was also highly instrumental in the rise of ‘Red Shiism’ (Revolutionary/Activist Shiite Islamist Political-Islamic ideology), which went on to establish the first modern Islamist orientated government following the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. This further crystallised Qutb’s pro-Jihadist doctrine as a template within both Sunni and Shiite Jihadist circles.\(^{190}\)

There are very few governments or regimes that are manifestations of this particular Islamist phenomenon. Saudi Arabia represents the oldest and closest example of an Islamist nation-state that has directly derived from the phenomenon of National Jihadist ideology.\(^{191}\) Emerging following a campaign of ‘internal’ al-jihad in pursuit of the nation-state (i.e Saudi Arabia) led by the House of Saud, and in particular, Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman al Saud (aka Ibn Saud). However, this was more a campaign of guerrilla warfare and insurgent style attacks - although large pockets of Ibn Saud’s Wahhabi Islamist fighters did

\(^{188}\) Ibid, p.7.


\(^{190}\) Ibid, p.67.

\(^{191}\) See, for example, Hiro, War Without End, op. cit., pp.117-121.
engage in militant terrorist attacks against Shiite civilians in 1929. \(^{192}\) Therefore, it is unlike the contemporary adherents of National Jihadist ideology who have adopted indiscriminate acts of militant terrorism as their primary means. \(^{193}\)

Other than the limited case of Saudi Arabia, there are no other nation-states that directly derive from National Jihadist Islamist ideology. There are, however, a growing number of ‘sub-state actors/organisations’ which are adherents of and propagate National Jihadist ideology. The following examples can be seen as major political-stakeholders that derive from or represent National Jihadist Islamist ideology: HAMAS which governs the Gaza Strip Palestinian Territory; Hezbollah which is represented in the Lebanese Government and controls the country’s southern districts south of Beirut; and the Afghan-Taliban which is the second largest political group in Afghanistan. \(^{194}\) Moreover, there are a growing number of ‘non-state actors/organisations’ which are or have been engaged in militant terrorist campaigns in the pursuit of political autonomy or power which are motivated by National Jihadist ideology. Examples of sub-state actors/organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia alone include among others: the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Palestine, the GIA in Algeria, the Asbat al-Ansar (The Partisan’s League) in Lebanon, the EIJ and Islamic Group in Egypt, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group,

\(^{192}\) Ibid.

\(^{193}\) Ibid.

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation in Iran, Palestinian Islamic Jihad which is active in the Gaza Strip and West Bank Palestinian Territories, the MILF in the Southern Philippines, and the GMIP in Southern Thailand.¹⁹⁵

5.5.2. Regional Jihadist Islamist Ideology

The second phase in the ideological evolution of Islamist militant terrorism is identified in this study as Regional Jihadist Islamist ideology which propagates and derives from the concepts of both ‘internal’ and, notably, ‘irredentist’ al-jihad.¹⁹⁶ This particular Islamist manifestation ultimately seeks, like National Jihadist ideology, to establish and impose Islamist control and law over all contemporary Islamic states and regions. However, contrary to National Jihadist ideology, it seeks also to achieve this in all geographic regions that were once, but are no longer, part of a former Islamic Caliphate or under Islamic control and thus, according to most Muslims, belong to ‘Dar al-Islam’(House of Islam).¹⁹⁷ Examples include Bosnia and the wider Balkans, Southern Spain, the Russian Caucasus, Maritime Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa as well as large regions of sub-Saharan Africa, and most of South and Central Asia as well as regions of western China.¹⁹⁸ Regional Jihadist ideology can be viewed as a form of ‘regional separatism’. Islamist militant terrorist organisations that adhere to this particular Jihadist ideology sometimes work together or are


sometimes in rivalry and which are driven by the common denominator of needing to liberate and recapture what they term to be sacred Islamic lands.\textsuperscript{199} Attempting to annex states or territory from within a particular state, that were once under Islamic control or law in their effort to restore and replicate the Islamic Caliphate which Regional Jihadists claim did, and will again, stretch from Senegal to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{200}

A key point needing to be added here is the rivalry between National and Regional – as well as Global – Jihadists. Although both seek Islamist rule and law, Regional Jihadist’s ultimately seek the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate based on, and justified by, the concept of both ‘internal’ and ‘irredentist’ forms of ‘al-jihad’ and reject the modern nation-state.\textsuperscript{201} They are thus unlike National Jihadists who seek to establish this within the framework of the modern nation-state via an exclusively ‘internal al-jihad’ against states otherwise already considered to be Islamic, but not under an Islamist interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{202} This religo-political and, hence, ideological difference is at the root of rivalry between National, Regional and Global Jihadists and is often played out on the ground in those nations and geographic regions which have a majority or a minority Muslim population that are experiencing socio-political conflict deriving from ‘inter’ or


\textsuperscript{200} Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, op. cit., p.112.

\textsuperscript{201} International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., p.14

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
‘intra’ state ethno-religious tensions.\textsuperscript{203} These types of conflicts are the primary context and hence entry-point for Jihadist’s to establish a foothold as has been the case, for example, in Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Aceh and Maluku as well as Sulawesi in Indonesia, Iraq, Kashmir, Libya, Mauritania, Pakistan, Palestine, Mindanao and the Sulu region of the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, Sudan, Somalia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and to some extent in the Xinjiang province in China; as well as a growing number of sub-Saharan African states such as Chad, Kenya, Mail, Niger, Nigeria, and Tanzania.\textsuperscript{204}

It’s worth noting that a number of the above states and regions within these states sit on the geographic periphery, and in the case of sub-Saharan Africa (and some parts of Central, South and Southeast Asia), beyond what is considered to be historically lands belonging to Islam.\textsuperscript{205} That is, these regions were never part of the Islamic Caliphate but, however, they have large Muslim populations and since the 1970’s, and in particular since the mid-1990s, have witnessed the rise of Islamist ideology and political movements as well as Jihadist organisations.\textsuperscript{206}

The rise of Islamist ideology has witnessed the geographic acquisition and subsequent institutional autonomy – most recently in northern Nigeria, Aceh in Indonesia, and southern Chad – in local political, legal and judicial matters as

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{206} Ibid, pp. 2-5.
well as the implementation by Islamists of harsh Islamic penal-code punishments in criminal courts. Moreover, large amounts of unregulated money and socio-economic aid is provided by Islamist and Jihadist’s networks alike, often originating from Arab (oil) states or sub-or non-state entities that support Islamist ideology and who seek to facilitate the Islamisation of mainstream Islamic society from the bottom up. A recent example of this type of activity occurred in Aceh, Indonesia following the 2004 Asian Tsunami were Islamists and Jihadists worked to successfully distribute money and aid which was supplied by both non-state Islamist entities and Indonesia authorities. Aceh is now effectively an autonomous region under the control of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM – the Acehnese separatist movement) and Islamists as well as Jihadists forces. Collectively, this two-pronged strategy is intended to coerce and condition non-Islamist Muslim communities for the introduction of Islamist ideology and thus progressively towards adopting and implementing an Islamist interpretation of both Islamic law and political control over society.


208 See, for example, Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., pp.351-352;

209 Abuza, Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia, op. cit., p.67.

210 See, for example, Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.423.

Most of these states and regions which are now experiencing religious based conflict originated out of conflicts based on non-religious issues such as nationalism and ethnicity but have now become radicalised in the wake of the rise of Islamist ideologies since the 1970s. This highlights the geographic expansion of both Islamism and, in particular, Jihadist ideologies in what National and Regional – as well as Global – Jihadist organisations now consider to be Islamic lands.

The desire by Regional Jihadist organisations to restore the geographic regions which were once under Islamic law or control derives primarily from Sayyid Qutb’s pro-Jihadist manifesto. This rejects the concept of the modern nation-state, unlike National Jihadist and Activist Islamist ideologies which have now come to accept it. Moreover, Qutb’s manifesto promotes the re-establishment of an Islamic Caliphate modelled from the first three generations of Islam (i.e. Salafist Islam), through a campaign of open-ended and indiscriminate armed conflict and thus militant terrorism. The campaign would first target the ‘near enemy’ (Muslim rulers deemed to be ‘kafir’ (unbelievers/apostate/impious)) which Qutb, and hence, Regional Jihadist’s derive from the concept of ‘internal’ and, to some extent, ‘irredentist’ al-jihad.


213 See, for example, “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.9.

By the late 1990s, a new targeting strategy was employed, especially by Global Jihadists, against what had come to be seen as the ‘far enemy’ (governments from the non-Muslim world, notably the U.S. and Western governments, that actively support those Islamic rulers and regimes deemed to be kafir according to Regional Jihadist ideology). Regional Jihadists would thus seek to incorporate and amalgamate all nation-states and territories that were once under Islamic control, as well as those that are not historically part of the Islamic Caliphate but now have a significant Muslim population, into what would technically represent an Islamic ‘super-state’ which would be controlled and united by a network of pan-Islamist organisations and regimes reminiscent of the Taliban in pre-9/11 Afghanistan, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the emerging Islamist sub-states in Northern Nigeria, and Aceh in Indonesia.

This study does not identify that there are any contemporary governments or states representative of, or that overtly adhere to, a pan-Islamist super-state based on Regional Jihadist Islamist ideology. However, Islamist elements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the winners of the June 2012 presidential elections in that country, recently made clear at a Muslim Brotherhood rally in Cairo in May 2012, their support for and ultimate goal is a pan-Islamist super-state. At the rally Islamist preacher, Safwat Higazi who is a

215 Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.10-14


supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and the idea of a pan-Islamist super-state and Regional Jihadist ideology, addressed thousands of Muslim Brotherhood supporters. In his speech Higazi stated that “The capital of the caliphate – the capital of the United States of the Arabs – will be Jerusalem, God willing.” 218 Moreover, Higazi went on to state “Come on, you lovers of martyrdom, you are all Hamas… Forget about the whole world, forget about conferences. Brandish your weapons … Yes, Jerusalem is our goal. We shall pray in Jerusalem, or die as martyrs on its threshold.” 219 Hence, Higazi and his statements indicate that there is still at least some support for the creation of an Islamist supper-state within some factions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and, in some pockets, Regional Jihadist ideology as well as, in the context of support for HAMAS, National Jihadist ideology. In addition to the limited case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood there are, however, many sub-state variants of this particular Jihadist phenomenon. The following is a list of Regional Jihadist organisations that have been identified by the U.S. Department of State from 2001-2010 that are or have been engaged in the pursuit of a pan-Islamist super-state modelled on the Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. 220 These include the ASG in the

---


219 Ibid

220 Hellman, Christopher, 2010, “Individuals and Entities Designated by the State Department Under E.O.13224” United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of
Southern Philippines, JI in Indonesia, Tanzim al-Jihad in Egypt (which evolved out of the EIJ, the Jihad Group, Islamic Group, Islamic Jihad, and Vanguards of Conquest and was established in Egypt and merged with al-Qaeda in 2001), and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria (which amalgamated with other elements in the region to form al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007). Moreover, these organisations have evolved to become ‘affiliated’, often for financial and their desire to obtain new technological knowhow and other strategic reasons, with al-Qaeda in their particular state or region but, however, organisations such as the ASG and JI retain complete operational independence.

5.5.3. Global Jihadist Islamist Ideology

The third, and final, phase in the ideological evolution of Islamist militant terrorism is that of Global Jihadist Islamist ideology. Unlike Regional and National Jihadist ideologies, and contrary to classical or mainstream Islam, this propagates a ‘global’ interpretation of ‘al-jihad’ which, as noted, is one that is an offensive, individual and perpetual duty for all Muslims throughout the world. As the former leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden put it “…jihad is part of our religion and no Muslim may say that he does not want to do jihad in the cause of


222 Ibid.

God…These are the tenets of our religion.”  Bin Laden further noted that: “No other priority, except faith, could be considered before [jihad].” Global Jihadist ideologists, therefore, elevate their interpretation and status of ‘al-jihad’ to be equal with the ‘five pillars’ of Islam’s central teachings, claiming it to be second only to the obedience of faith which is contrary to classical and hence mainstream Islamic teachings and is thus considered to be an illicit interpretation of ‘al-Jihad’.  

Global Jihadist ideology represents the most radical manifestation within the wider Jihadist movement and, like Regional – though rejecting the concept of the nation-state – and National Jihadist ideologies, is extensively influenced by Qutb’s Jihadist doctrine. This ideology seeks to establish and implement the most radical Islamist interpretation of Islamic law throughout, first and foremost, the Islamic world – that is, those nations and regions that belonged to the Caliphate – through a global campaign of militant terrorism that targets both the near-enemy and far-enemy simultaneously. Secondly, and contrary to both Regional and National Jihadist ideologies, Global Jihadists ultimately seek to

\---

224 Ibid, p.3.

225 Ibid.

226 Ibid.

227 Ibid, p.4.

impose their interpretation of Islamic law throughout the entire world in an effort to establish a global Islamic Caliphate and thus Allah’s kingdom/rule on earth.  

Although this study does not consider there to be any current Islamic governments or states that overtly propagate or adhere to Global Jihadist ideology, there is some evidence that there has been state-actors closely linked to the phenomenon. Examples include senior Saudi government officials such as, Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abdul Aziz who was the former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Ahmed, Prince Sultan bin Faisal bin Turki al-Saud, and Prince Fahd bin Turki bin Saud al-Kabirand, as well as a high-ranking Pakistani Air Force officer, Mushaf Ali Mir who was closely connected to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). All were identified by high-level al-Qaeda operative, Abu Zubaydah as key associates and financers of bin Laden and al-Qaeda as well as the Afghan Taliban prior to 9/11. This information was obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which had captured Zubaydah in Pakistan in 2002, and was confirmed by the CIA to be genuine. Moreover, within weeks of Zubaydah’s testimony, a copy of which was passed on to both the Saudi and Pakistani governments, the Saudi’s named by Zubaydah excluding Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, all dead within days of each other under suspicious circumstances.

---

229 See, for example, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, “Islamic Radicalisation Index”, op. cit., p. 1; Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p. 356.

followed by Mushaf Ali Mir seven months later in Pakistan. Further, the Saudi government, notably the Saudi Ministry of Education and the Cultural Department attached to Saudi Embassies, has been directly involved and cited on numerous occasions for providing ‘hate-publications’ and hence a platform for Jihadists. The latest example was in 2003 when it was cited for providing and influencing Mosques and Muslim communities around the world with radical Wahhabi publications and Imams who were promoting intolerant and pro-violent teachings towards, in particular, Jews and Christians as well as moderate Muslims and ‘infidels’ (non-Muslims who are not Christian or Jewish); and why/how Muslims should resist integrating into other society’s culture and values.

The post-Cold War period has seen an increasing number of organisations and individuals that have adopted the Global Jihadist doctrine. From the 1970s onwards there has been a steady increase in the growth of Jihadist based ideologies and militant terrorist organisations which from the 1980’s onwards, as a direct result of the Afghan-Jihad during the Afghan-Soviet War in 1979-1989, began to spawn the contemporary phenomenon of Global Jihadist ideology and militant terrorist organisations. Global Jihadists are attempting to ignite a worldwide ‘clash of civilisations’ between, on the one hand, Jews, Christians and the

231 Ibid.


wider Western world and ultimately all non-Muslims, against, on the other, the entire Islamic world. They employ and propagate both non-violent tactics (propaganda, missionaries and activism) and the most extreme forms of political-violence (militant terrorism – as well as other forms of sadistic violence) available to them as a means to implement their radical global Islamist agenda.235

Organisations and individuals that correlate to Global Jihadist ideology can be divided into three primary groups. First and foremost, is ‘al-Qaeda Central’ (AQC) which is the original and premier organisation at the forefront of today’s Global Jihadist movement. AQC is made up of a ‘core’ membership of Jihadists loyal to the organisation’s ‘central command’ which is now under the direct control of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri following the assassination of Osama bin Laden.236 AQC’s ranks are estimated to number about three hundred highly trained Jihadists who are hiding and operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as well as increasingly out of Pakistani ‘controlled’ towns and cities.237


Although militarily on the defensive in the FATA border region, forcing the ‘decentralisation and diversification’ of al-Qaeda at the operational and leadership levels and hence dispersed the network across a wider geographic sphere, AQC remains, however, the key driving force behind the wider al-Qaeda franchise. AQC’s post-2001 role has been to implement the decentralisation and diversification strategy in an effort to spread the organisation’s Jihadist ideology via its propaganda and media operations in an effort to increase its worldwide indoctrination and thus recruitment, notably inside the West. It has also worked closer with ‘local’ Jihadist organisations in an effort to infiltrate, regroup and strengthen the organisation’s ideological and geographic influence.\(^\text{238}\)

The second ideological evolution in the Global Jihadist camp, which also emerged as a direct result of AQC’s decentralisation and diversification strategy, has been the establishment of a global franchise of ‘affiliated’ Jihadist organisations that have pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda brand and Global Jihadist doctrine and represent al-Qaeda in that particular country or region. These franchises have provided AQC with a network of pre-established organisations and infrastructure which they now control and first began to establish and infiltrate during the 1990s.\(^\text{239}\) The destruction of al-Qaeda’s base in Afghanistan following the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001, as well as increased efforts globally


\(^{239}\) Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op. cit., p.95.
to disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, has furthered this development.\textsuperscript{240} Counter-terrorism efforts in the last decade by the international community have significantly weakened AQC’s ability to carry out large-scale attacks and have created significant operational set-backs thus forcing al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification.\textsuperscript{241}

However, in the wake of these developments, al-Qaeda has evolved into a multifaceted organisation with branches operating across a wider geographic region, independently from AQC, with the ability to conduct low to medium scale militant terrorist attacks frequently.\textsuperscript{242} Examples of al-Qaeda affiliated organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia alone include al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI/al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers) – which is made up from three local Jihadist groups which included Ansar al-Islam, Tawhid wa al-Jihad and elements of Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah –, AQIM (formally the GSPC), AQAP, and Harakat ul-Mujahedin; as well as JI, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) and, to some extent, the ASG in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{243}

\textsuperscript{240}“Towards Global Jihadism”, op. cit., pp.40-43.
\textsuperscript{241}Ibid, p.36.
\textsuperscript{242}Ibid, pp.38-43.
The third and most recent evolution in the Global Jihadist phenomenon to emerge in the wake of AQC’s decentralisation and diversification strategy is identified by experts as ‘inspired’ Global Jihadists. Since 2005, AQC has actively sought to export its Global Jihadist ideology - notably via propaganda on the Internet especially via its Inspire magazine/website - beyond the organisation’s traditional Islamist sphere. A strategy that seeks to connect with a wider Muslim populace, notably in Western countries, as well as seeking to resonate with those anti-American and anti-Western audiences around the world; thus manifesting and crystallising the phenomenon of inspired Global Jihadists.

Inspired Global Jihadists can be viewed as a type of ‘do-it-yourself’ group or individual. The phenomenon has been steadily on the rise throughout the wider Muslim world and, although not the focus of this study, in some Western democratic countries and has, particularly in the context of the West, manifested into two primary forms; the ‘home-grown’ and ‘lone wolf’ inspired Global Jihadists. These two forms collectively represent the latest development to manifest within the wider Global Jihadist theatre. The phenomenon has emerged, in the context of the West, out of minority Muslim migrant communities such as in the U.K, the U.S., most European Union (EU) states, Canada, and Australia. It is argued here that home-grown inspired Global Jihadists may or may not be directly connected with the al-Qaeda network or any other Jihadist organisation


245 Ibid.

and that the lone-wolf inspired Global Jihadists have no affiliation whatsoever with al-Qaeda or any Islamist militant terrorist organisation but, nevertheless, have adopted the Global Jihadist doctrine.\textsuperscript{247} Both manifestations of inspired Global Jihadists will be discussed further in the following chapter.

Examples of inspired Global Jihadist in the West include, among others, Khalid al-Dawsari, a lone-wolf inspired operative who was an international student studying in the U.S. from Saud Arabia who, in March 2011, manufactured explosives which he had planed to use in an attack inside the U.S. In 2010, a first generation Somali-American citizen – and hence a home-grown Jihadist –, Mohamed Osman Mohamud, attempted to explode a device at the Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Organ in the U.S. In November 2010, at Fort Hood Army base in Texas, Nidal Malik Hasan, a Palestinian Muslim who immigrated to the U.S. and became a Major in the U.S. Army, shot dead thirteen and lamed some thirty more. Hasan was not a member of any Jihadist group and was hence a lone-wolf.\textsuperscript{248} In Australia three male Somali Muslim migrants were charged for their role in a foiled suicide attack on an Army base in Australia and were inspired by the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab in Somalia; one of six home-grown and lone-wolf Jihadist plots uncovered in that country since 9/11.\textsuperscript{249}


\textsuperscript{248} Braniff, & Moghadam, “Towards Global Jihadism”, op. cit., p.38.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
In the context of Europe, although Jihadist ideologies and organisations were already established and had attacked some countries, notably Britain and France (which has the largest Muslim population in Europe and was targeted by the Algerian GIA Jihadist organisation from the 1980s onwards), well before 9/11, it was not until the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq that home-grown and lone-wolf inspired Global Jihadist attacks began to target and occur in the U.K and France and in other European nations.\textsuperscript{250} The threat posed to Britain by inspired Global Jihadists was clear following the July 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, when four British Muslims – three of Pakistani and one of Jamaican descent – detonated suicide bombs on the underground and on a commuter bus killing more than fifty and wounding over seven hundred.\textsuperscript{251} Along with the 7/7 attacks there have been scores of Global Jihadist plots uncovered and arrests made in the U.K such as in December 2011 when four Muslim males who are first and second generation immigrants plotted to bomb the Landon Stock Exchange.\textsuperscript{252} Attacks and attempted plots by inspired Global Jihadists in Europe in the post-9/11 era have also occurred in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Russia.\textsuperscript{253}


\textsuperscript{251} Gerges, \textit{Journey of the Jihadist}, op. cit., pp.231, 266.


Collectively, the three evolutions in Global Jihadist ideology can be seen as a direct result of al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification strategy in response to the launch of the U.S.-led global War on Terror following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s post 9/11 strategy, alongside the invasions of Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, are identified by experts as the key events that gave rise to the three ideological evolutionary phases of the Global Jihadist doctrine; which are collectively referred to as al-Qaeda’s ‘second generation’ and will be discussed further in the following chapter.

The following diagram indicates the studies findings of the quantified support base of Jihadist Islamist ideologies and organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia since the 1970s.

Figure 5:

Chapter Six

The National, Regional & Global Geopolitical Transformation of

Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East

6.1. Introduction

This chapter will examine the study’s hypothesised ‘geopolitical
transformation’ process in the context of the Middle East, and seeks to establish
that there has been three distinctly different phases of Islamist militant terrorism
and thus categories and manifestations of Islamist militant terrorist organisations.
The study advocates that the three phases and categories of organisations, which
have emerged out of the phenomenon of Islamist ideology, can best be identified
as National, Regional and Global. Collectively they make up the wider
geopolitical phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East.

The study articulates the idea that by identifying an organisation’s
d geographic contours and ambitions, first revealed through their ideological
d contours, it can provide a way of illuminating a particular organisation’s, or
individual’s, geopolitical motivations allowing their categorisation into either
National, Regional or Global orientated Islamist militant terrorist organisations.
Here, this chapter will examine the key historical, political, social and economic
phenomena and contexts directly associated with each of the three hypothesised
phases, as well as the categories of organisations, in respect of the Middle East
and represents the first case study of the research.
6.2. The Ascent of National Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East

In order to gain a clear understanding of the ascent of National Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and the phenomenon’s expanse since the 1970s, consideration must first be given to a number of key historical phenomena and contexts. These include the impact of WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate; colonial rule and the creation of nation states; the expansion of Jewish settlement in Palestine; WWII; the creation of Israel; the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War; and the failure of pan-Arab nationalism.

With the exception of the guerrilla warfare campaigns against the Ottoman and then British forces in Arabia by the Saud tribe, notably by Ibn Saud, and the Wahhabi terror camping against the minority Shiite Muslim community in Arabia, there have only been a handful of National inspired Islamist militant terrorist actors and organisations prior to the 1970s. Nevertheless, it is during the pre-1970s period, notably following WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman-led Caliphate and during WWII following the transfer of Nazi ideology, that the roots of National Islamist militant terrorism can be traced in the Middle East.

Three examples of National Islamist militant terrorism can be identified in the pre-1970’s period. First, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, a Palestinian and former Ottoman Army officer who became the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the Syrian

---

Islamist cleric, Izz al-Din al-Qassam who was a former student of Rashid Rida who was a student of Muhammad Abduh and who were both members of the original Islamist movement founded by Sayyid Jamal Din Afghani in the late 19th Century. Al-Husseini and, in particular, al-Qassam were instrumental in organising and developing the Palestinian “al-Qassam” group which was inspired by a mainly National Islamist ideology and perpetrated militant terrorist attacks against non-Muslim citizens, notably Jews, and assassinated British and French military targets in post-WWI Palestine. Al-Husseini and al-Qassam thus harnessed rising Islamic resentment towards the occupying British forces and Jewish immigration, successfully galvanising an Islamist-led anti-colonial and anti-Jewish movement that emerged following the Balfour Declaration by Britain in 1917, which signalled British support for the creation of a Jewish homeland alongside a Palestine one. Secondly, following the outbreak of WWII al-Husseini began collaborated with the Nazis in an effort to exterminate the Jewish people in Palestine and Europe and, ultimately, throughout the entire world. In turn, al-Husseini established close working relations with the Nazi high-command


257 See, for example, Laqueur, & Rubin, *The Israeli-Arab Reader*, op. cit., p.16.

following a meeting with Adolf Hitler in 1943, and agreed to commission al-Husseini the task to create and command the Muslim Handzar Division of the Nazi Waffen SS (the official armed wing of the Nazi Party which fought alongside regular Nazi controlled German Armed Forces) in occupied Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{259}

The third example is provided by the Muslim Brotherhood (which was found in Egypt in 1928) and its branches throughout the Middle East which, during this period, rejected the concept of the nation-state but, nevertheless, sought to implement Islamic policies and laws via the nation-state framework. The Muslim Brotherhood became involved in militant terrorist activities aimed at establishing national and, ultimately, pan-national Islamist regimes in the wake of colonial (Britain and France) rule, the creation of nation-states, Arab nationalism, Jewish settlement, and – throughout the 1950s and 1960s – as a response to pan-Arab nationalism in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{260} The Muslim Brotherhood’s political ideology throughout this period ran counter to the idea of secular rule which had emerged as the main political force throughout the Middle East following WWI.\textsuperscript{261} Over the next two decades, which witnessed the abolishment of the

\textsuperscript{259} See, for example, Deliso, \textit{The Coming Balkan Caliphate}, op. cit., p.5: Yugoslavia had a large Muslim minority region (modern day Bosnia) and the Muslim Handzar Division was the only SS division commanded and composed of non-Germanic peoples.


\textsuperscript{261} See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., pp.7-9.
Ottoman-led Caliphate in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Muslim Brotherhood began to send members from Egypt to Palestine to join what was considered to be an ‘al-jihad’ against colonial forces and Jews.\(^{262}\) The ‘al-jihad’ was led by al-Qassam and his newly established al-Qassam mujahedeen which employed an assortment of asymmetric-warfare tactics and strategies including insurgency and militant terrorism.\(^{263}\) Tensions continued to build climaxing in the Great Palestinian Revolt in 1936-1939, trigging the rise of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood which was officially established in 1946. The establishment of this branch turned the Arab Palestinian grievance from one that was fundamentally secular (Arab nationalism) in nature into one that has progressively become defined – primarily due to Islamist propaganda – as a religious one (i.e. Muslims against Jews and their Western Christian allies).\(^{264}\)

In the wake of WWII, tensions between Palestinian Muslims and Jews escalated in 1947, as the Jewish people fought for independence and in 1948 the state of Israel was created along with the Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. These events became referred to by the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots as the ‘al-Nakba’ (great catastrophe).\(^{265}\) Throughout this period the


\(^{263}\) Hroub, HAMAS, op. cit., pp.13-14.

\(^{264}\) Hroub, HAMAS, op. cit., pp.14-15; O’Brien, “*The Middle East in Context*”, op. cit., p.3; Ramakrishna, “*Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia*” op. cit., p.357.

Muslim Brotherhood increased its collaboration with the al-Qassam mujahedeen in Palestine and in Egypt, and actively engaging in insurgent and militant terrorist activities against Jewish military and civilian targets as well as Egyptians and foreign journalists. This represented one of the most prominent commitments to the use of political violence, including militant terrorism, in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁶⁶

Following Sayyid Qutb’s reinterpretation of ‘al-jihad’, manifested in his ‘near enemy’ Jihadist doctrine, from the mid-1950s and during the 1960s as an offensive concept (rather than a defensive one) justifying the use of extremism, the Muslim Brotherhood gravitated towards Jihadist ideology and the explicit justification of militant terrorism.²⁶⁷ Qutb’s radicalisation began during the Egyptian revolution that swiftly ousted King Faruq in 1952. Qutb’s gravitation towards Jihadist ideology was furthered following the failure by the secular orientated Free Officers and Revolutionary Command Council to implement Islamic Law which, as mentioned, had been promised to the Muslim Brotherhood by the pro-revolutionary Egyptian armed forces and was seen by Qutb and Islamists alike as a betray.²⁶⁸

In January 1954, following the Muslim Brotherhood’s call for Jihad against the British and vocal attacks against the Egyptian government’s negotiations with the British over the Sudan and Suez Canal which resulted in

---
²⁶⁶ Hroub, HAMAS, op. cit., p. 14; Laqueur, No End To War, op. cit., p.32.
²⁶⁷ Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad, op. cit., pp.137-142.
²⁶⁸ Ibid, pp.137-142, 142-146.
violent clashes, the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed and its leadership, including Qutb, arrested. The Muslim Brotherhood responded with the attempted assassination of the Egyptian President, Nasser, and, in its wake, resulted in the complete suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamism and all forms of Political-Islam in Egypt.\textsuperscript{269} It was from this point on that Qutb, who had become a central figure in the Muslim Brotherhood following his decision to defect from the pro-nationalist revolutionary sphere in 1953, and his supporters within the Muslim Brotherhood, thus increasingly sought to use militant terrorism to counter both Western influence and the emerging pan-Arab nationalism in their pursuit of national and pan-national Islamist objectives.\textsuperscript{270}

Collectively, the above three examples of pre-1970s nationalist inspired Islamist movements and their use of insurgency and, to a lesser degree, militant terrorism, provide important insights into the historical underpinnings of the ascent of this phenomenon in the Middle East. However, there were a number of additional key developments and events during the 1950s and 1960s including pan-Arab nationalism; the Six Day War in 1967; and the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Collectively, these events helped to further the growth of Islamism and proliferate the explicit rise of the Jihadist doctrine and thus National Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the region from the late 1970’s onwards.\textsuperscript{271}

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid, pp.143-145.

\textsuperscript{270} See, for example, Musallam, \textit{From Secularism to Jihad}, op. cit., pp.145-153, 180-182; International Crisis Group, \textit{“Understanding Islamism”}, op. cit., pp.7. 4.

\textsuperscript{271} See, for example, Laqueur, \textit{No End To War}, op. cit., pp.19-22.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Jihadist doctrine continued to gain support within extremist pockets of the Muslim Brotherhood and the wider Islamist movement. However, the post-WWII geopolitical environment in the Middle East also witnessed the rise of pan-Arab nationalism – heavily influenced by Nazi fascist ideology – which sought to replace the British and French propagated Arab nationalism following WWI, and quickly overshadowed the Islamist movement becoming the dominant political force in the Middle East.\(^{272}\) Coinciding with the rise of pan-Arab nationalism was the rise of Marxist inspired nationalist revolutionary political movements as well as insurgent and militant terrorist organisations such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Al Fatah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which were primarily established to fight Israel.\(^{273}\) However, by the late 1960s these groups had begun to ‘internationalise’ their targets shifting from what was primarily a rural-based and localised insurgency against Israel to perpetrating urban militant terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle East against Israeli targets. They are


influenced and, in some cases, trained by radical left-wing terrorist groups from Latin America and Europe.\textsuperscript{274}

During the 1950s and 1960s several attempts to bring about a pan-Arab state ultimately ended in failure and humiliation. The first of these failures was the ‘Arab Federation’ of Iraq and Jordan in 1958 which was implemented by King Faisal II of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan. The federation collapsed following a coup d’état by the Iraqi Army. The same year witnessed the establishment of the ‘United Arab Republic’, spearheaded by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, between Egypt and Syria. The Union lasted until 1961 when a coup in Syria led to Syria’s withdrawal. The Union can be identified as the highpoint of pan-Arab nationalism and was termed as “Nasserism” political ideology.\textsuperscript{275} Once Nasserism and the Ba’th Party had taken hold in Egypt and Syria, the Islamist movement considered pan-Arab nationalism to be an enemy of Islam. In response, President Nasser and President Hafez al-Assad in Syria, violently suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood and the wider Islamist movement whilst taking care to display respect for Islam in public.\textsuperscript{276} From the perspective of the wider Islamist movement, pan-Arab nationalism fundamentally rejected the ordained rule of Islam and its role in society and politics as well as the restoration of the Caliphate, while adopting secular pro-Western values and political ideology. Furthermore, pan-Arab nationalism was at odds with the Islamic concept of the Umma as it

\textsuperscript{274} See, for example, Moore, “\textit{The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism}”, op. cit., p.1; Carr, \textit{The Infernal Machine}, op. cit., p. 197; Laqueur, \textit{No End To War}, op. cit., p.49.

\textsuperscript{275} See, for example, Laqueur, & Rubin, \textit{The Israeli-Arab Reader}, op. cit., p.91-93.

\textsuperscript{276} Milson, “\textit{Reform vs. Islamism in the Arab World Today}”, op. cit., p.1.
excluded all non-Arab Muslim nations, but included Arab Christians as citizens/equals and no longer as ‘dhimmi’ (‘people of the book/protected people’: Christians and Jews). ²⁷⁷

In addition to pan-Arab nationalism, the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967 helped to crystallise and underpin the ascent of National Islamist militant terrorist organisations from the late 1970’s onwards. The Six-Day War was a cataclysmic event for the Arabs. It resulted in the utter defeat of the Arab armies at the hands of Israel and, ultimately, had regional geopolitical consequences bringing with it the collapse of Nasser’s vision of pan-Arab nationalism. For the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, the collapse of the Arab armies was understandable and even justified in accordance with their Islamic beliefs; they interpreted the defeat of the Arab armies as a punishment for having abandoned Islam. ²⁷⁸ Moreover, the political fallout following the Six-Day War within the Arab and Muslim world offered the Islamist movement the opportunity it needed to denounce pan-Arab nationalism as a failure because it was un-Islamic and thus must be rejected in the name of Allah. ²⁷⁹

It is from this point on that the Islamist movement, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood, began to increase their efforts to promote the overthrow of secular Arab nationalist regimes in their endeavour to restructure the political and social


²⁷⁸ See, for example, Milson, “Reform vs. Islamism in the Arab World Today”, op. cit., p.1.

landscape, so it was based on Islamist ideology. For the Islamist movement, the 1967 military disaster laid bare the worthlessness of secular pan-Arab nationalism and its collective failure to defeat Israel (which was now a firm reality following independence in 1948) and to unify the Arab Islamic world and generate economic growth. Thus the maxim ‘Islam is the solution’ was proclaimed with much greater force by Islamists within the Arab and wider Islamic world. Moreover, the humiliation and anger that swept the Arab and Muslim world following the failure of the Arab states to defeat Israel further intensified when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat officially declared peace with Israel in 1977. The peace treaty led to the follow-up signings of the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978 and 1979 and was the direct result of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 in which Egypt and Syria again attacked Israel and were defeated for a second time. The peace agreement meant Egypt now formally recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist and, though reluctantly, became the first Arab and majority Islamic nation to make peace and recognise Israel’s legitimacy.

By the late 1970s, in the wake of the failures of pan-Arab nationalism and the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars and the subsequent peace treaty with Israel, a power vacuum had emerged bringing with it the dawn of a new geopolitical era in the Middle East which was now directly challenged by Islamist movements and, moreover, National Islamist militant terrorist organisations that were explicitly

---


281 See, for example, Laqueur, No End To War, op. cit., p. 99; Laqueur & Rubin, The Israeli-Arab Reader, op. cit., pp.222-228.
premised on the “Qutbist” Jihadist doctrine. Emerging in Egypt as offshoots and/or close affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood was the EIJ and the Islamic Group; both of which sought to overthrow the Egyptian government and implement strict Islamic Law as well as attack Israeli and American targets or interests. The EIJ and the Islamic Group unleashed a protracted campaign of militant terrorism in Egypt which began in the late 1970s, and led to the assassination of President Sadat in Cairo, on the 6th of October 1981 for declaring peace with Israel. Both groups would continue their campaigns of militant terrorism in Egypt throughout the 1980s and 1990s during the rule of President Hosni Mubarak; during this time National Islamist militant terrorist organisations had rapidly spread to rival those of Marxist or other non-Islamic inspired militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East. This trend witnessed the rise of major National Islamist militant terrorist organisations such as the Armed Islamic Group and the GSPC in Algeria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS in the Gaza Strip and, to a lesser extent, West Bank Palestinian Territories.


283 See, for example, Musallam, From Secularism To Jihad, op. cit., pp.182-187; International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., p.4; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.43.

284 Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.23.

285 See, for example, Musallam, From Secularism To Jihad, op. cit., pp.185-187; Moore, The “Evolution of Islamic Terrorism”, op. cit., p.1

286 Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., pp.10, 89, 31, 63, 25
The ascent of National Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and the widespread, though not monolithic, support for Political-Islam and, to a lesser degree, Islamist political ideologies from the late 1970s, can best be seen as a phenomenon that derives from historical grievances. These include the decline of Islamic geopolitical power, law and values from the latter decades of the Ottoman Empire onwards; WWI and Colonialism and the creation of nation states; Palestine and the creation of Israel; and decades of Arab nationalisms that failed to deliver social and economic development as well as the Arab states collective failure to defeat Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel wars. Collectively, these events galvanised the rise and spread of National Islamist ideology and militant terrorist organisations in the region and thus represent the National phase of the geopolitical transformation of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East. Over time, these organisations have become the single largest group within the wider pool of Jihadist organisations.287

6.3. The Ascent of Regional Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East

In addition to the geopolitical events that unfolded in the Middle East between the 1950s and early 1970s, there were two key events that further crystallised the support for Islamist ideology and led to the ascent of Regional (pan-national and/or transnational) Islamist militant terrorism during the late 1970s and 1980s. It will be argued here that the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the 1979-1989 Afghan-Soviet War directly influenced the radicalisation of

287 See, for example, Mohammed, The Many Faces of Political Islam, op. cit., p.9.
Islamists and, ultimately, galvanised the ascent of Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and beyond. Moreover, the 1990s witnessed the collapse of the USSR in 1991 which brought with it the independence of many nations and the intensification of nationalist separatism in regions such as the Russian Caucasus. Separatism followed in the Balkans triggering the 1992-1995 Bosnian War between pro-Serbian nationalists and the non-Serbian populations who were mainly Muslim and sought independence. The Bosnian War plunged the region into conflict and set the stage for reprisal attacks by both sides throughout the 1990s. In some cases, these attacks escalated into ethnic cleansing and other war crimes including the massacre of some 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys by Serbian forces. In turn, the conflict increasingly became defined as a religious one between, on the one hand, Serbian Orthodox Christians and, on the other, Bosnian Muslims. Climaxing in the Kosovo-Serbian War in 1998-1999 which was also fought between pro-Serbian forces and a mainly Muslim force that sought independence in that former province of Yugoslavia. These two wars provided Jihadists and, especially, Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations with additional arenas to Afghanistan, allowing them to establish footholds there and to thus further expand their Regional Islamist geopolitical operations which were now established in the

---

Middle East and South Asia. Collectively, these events are identified in this study as being fundamental to the rise and spread of Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations as well as state-backed transnational Wahhabi militant groups throughout the wider Middle East and beyond.

Although the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East from the 1950s to the 1980s was dominated by pan-Arab nationalism and various manifestations of Ba’ath and Communist political regimes support for regional Islamist ideology amongst the Jihadist circles continued to grow and compete with nationalist inspired Islamist ideology. The rise of Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations, the ideological roots of which derive from the beginning of the Islamist movement (advocated by Al-Afgani in the late 1800s and, notably, Rashid Rida following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th Century and, therefore, predates national inspired Islamist ideology which is pivoted on the concept of the sovereign nation state created during the mid twentieth-century); emerged in the Middle East as a result of an ideological disagreement within the National Jihadist movement during the late 1970s. This group of Jihadists, as noted earlier, seeks to replicate the Islamic Caliphate and redeem Islamic lands that once belonged to it: It is identified in this study as representing the second largest group within the wider poll of Jihadist organisations today.

---


290 See, for example, Mohammed, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, op. cit., pp.7, 134; International Crisis Group, “*Understanding Islamism*”, op. cit., p.4

Similar to the rise of Sunni Islamism in Arab states, the ascent of Shiite Islamism was trigged by decades of socio-economic and civil unrest throughout the late 1960s and during the 1970s, and climaxed in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the establishment of the first Shiite Islamist government led by Ayatollah Khomeini. The revolution, and subsequent establishment of an ‘Islamic state’, provided Khomeini with a platform to project pan-Shiite Islamist ideology throughout the wider region in his quest to bring about an Iranian-led Shiite hegemony and represented the first successful Islamist take-over of a nation state. It thus was a watershed moment for the wider Islamist movement.292

The Khomeini instigated revolution was primarily driven by what was seen as the lack of ‘Muslim rights’ and the mistreatment of the Shiite clergy in Iran (particularly regarding land reform which threatened the clergy’s financial autonomy). This, according to Khomeini, was the result of Western influence under the rule of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.293 Khomeini accused Reza Pahlavi of ‘Westernising’ Iran and thus rejecting Islamic Law and limiting the Shiite clergy’s political involvement which had been established under the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906.294 The revolution can be seen as a turning point that provided the inspiration that triggered the expanse of Islamist ideologies and movements which had previously received little support from


294 See, for example, Mohammed, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, op. cit., p.51.
Muslims. The expanding ideology and ascending Islamist movement was now a serious contender to secular based political systems throughout the Muslim world and became a vehicle for anti-Westernisation and, in most cases, anti-democratisation.\textsuperscript{295}

In the immediate wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Khomeini began to engage in unprecedented collaboration between Shiite and Sunni Islamists and directly supported the Sunni National Islamist militant terrorist organisation the MILF in the southern Philippines. Khomeini provided direct political support to the MILF for the establishment of an independent Islamic state, stating that “…the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran would not be complete until the oppressed Bangsamoro Muslims in the southern Philippines won their victory.”\textsuperscript{296} In addition to political support, Khomeini provided financial aid, and possibly weapons, for their cause and, in November 1979, following accusations that the Philippine government had failed to successfully implement the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, imposed an oil embargo on the Philippines: Iran thus became the first Muslim nation to engage in an Islamic international intervention.\textsuperscript{297} A major strategic collaboration between Shiite and Sunni Islamist groups would not be seen again until the Iranian regime moved to back HAMAS following the


\textsuperscript{296} Lacovou, “\textit{From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf}”, op. cit., p.1.

\textsuperscript{297} Ibid.
unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in September 2005.\(^{298}\)

The Islamic Revolution in Iran sent shockwaves throughout the Sunni Muslim states, especially the Arab states which interpreted Khomeini’s revolution and the rise of Shiite Islamism as a direct threat to their national security and a challenge to their geopolitical spheres of influence throughout the Islamic world.\(^{299}\) However, between the late 1970s and the early 1980s following the global oil price shocks caused by some Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, witnessed the emergence of state-backed/funded Sunni Islamist militant forces to counter this threat. The new state-backed Wahhabi orientated Islamist militants sought to counter the expanse and influence of, on the one hand, pan-Arab nationalism and, on the other, the rise of Shiite Islamism throughout the region and wider Islamic world: with particular emphasis being given to the latter.\(^{300}\)

Coinciding with the rise of Shiite Islamism was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This quickly turned into a sub-state transnational conflict which saw thousands of Islamist fighters, notably Sunni’s from the Arab states, mobilised to join the “Afghan Jihad” and/or “Afghan-Mujahedeen” (aka Afghan-Arabs) to fight what became a protracted decade-long insurgency against the


\(^{300}\) Ibid, pp.2, 10
Soviets.\textsuperscript{301} The Wahhabi-led state-backed Islamist insurgent forces in Afghanistan soon became known as the “Afghan-Arabs”. It was during the 1979-1989 Afghan-Soviet War that these state-recruited Islamist insurgents began to interact and collaborate with members of independent Jihadist organisations from around the world who had also came to fight the Soviets in what they believed was the defence of Islam and to escape their domestic homelands where they were being hunted down by state security services.\textsuperscript{302} The EIJ, led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri who would later became the lieutenant of al-Qaeda, moved its operations to Afghanistan in 1986 and began to promote their “Qutbist” inspired Jihadist doctrine to many of the Afghan-Arab insurgent forces which they sought to recruit. This doctrine was an even more extreme interpretation than the purely Wahhabi concept of ‘al-jihad’ which was adhered to by the vast majority of fighters during the conflict.\textsuperscript{303}

The Afghan-Soviet War provided the U.S. with an opportunity to conduct a covert war in Afghanistan against the USSR in which they sought to create a Vietnam-like situation for the Soviets, establishing a ‘united Islamic front’ against the occupying Soviet forces to contain Soviet ideology and to induce fragmentation within the wider communist bloc during the Cold War. In order for the U.S to achieve this goal, the CIA, with direct support from their Saudi and

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid, p.15.


\textsuperscript{303} See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, op. cit., p.16; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.43.
Arab state allies, recruited and supported Muslim armed volunteers from across the wider Middle East and within Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{304} The CIA strategy recruited volunteers from Wahhabi Islamist movements as well as, though not intentionally, Islamists who adhered to a Qutbist inspired interpretation of Islam (such as the EIJ from Egypt) into their insurgent training programs. It was during this period in bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the Afghan Service Bureau (Maktab al-Khadamat/MAK) emerged in 1984. The MAK was an international pan-Islamic mujahedeen service recruitment organisation dedicated to fighting the Soviet forces in the 1980’s. The MAK was headed by a Palestinian member of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, and a wealthy Saudi Islamist, Osama bin Laden, who was recruited by Azzam to Afghanistan in 1979 to join the state-backed insurgency against the Soviet ‘crusaders’.\textsuperscript{305}

The strategic role of the MAK was to recruit Muslims to join the Afghan-Jihad and to channel funds from a variety of sources including donations from both government and non-government organisations from across the Middle East (notably Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states) and the wider Muslim world – as well as to distribute equipment, training and additional funds supplied by the CIA and Pakistan – to the Afghan-Mujahedeen insurgent forces.\textsuperscript{306} Towards the end of the Soviet occupation, many of the Afghan-Mujahedeen forces sought to expand


\textsuperscript{305} Gunaratna, \textit{Inside Al Qaeda}, op. cit., p.18.

their operations to other regions of the Islamic world which was in direct conflict with the U.S., and many of its allies, strategic policy and interests.\(^{307}\) While the state-backed Afghan-Mujahedeen insurgent forces were directed primarily via the CIA in conjunction with its Arab state collaborators, the MAK developed an ‘independent’ but overlapping and interconnected network of organisations. This network was built out of Islamist fighters that had originally flocked to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets but over time had defected into the orbit of Regional Jihadist ideology and thus sought to expand their operations into other regions of the Islamic world; which they saw as being ‘under attack’ from both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ anti-Islamic forces, for example, Chechnya, Palestine, Kashmir, and the Philippines.\(^{308}\)

The MAK, with its headquarters and operations firmly based in Afghanistan, and its newly developed transnational infrastructure of networks that spanned the wider Middle East and beyond began to fragment, however, along ideological and tactical lines.\(^{309}\) Many members of the MAK-led network which were loyal to bin Laden had adopted a hybrid of Wahhabi-Qutbist Jihadist ideology introduced by Zawahiri and the EIJ, and was increasingly violent and apocalyptic in outlook. Justifying terrorism and suicide-terrorism against both non-Muslims and Muslims alike in favour of the somewhat less radical Wahhabi variant adhered to by Azzam and his pocket of loyalists; thus fundamentally

\(^{307}\) See, for example, Ibid, p.95.

\(^{308}\) Ibid, pp.93, 95, 94.

splitting the MAK into two separate ideological and ethical camps.\textsuperscript{310} It was during the Afghan-Jihad that Zawahiri met and befriended bin Laden. They were united by the same objective: that is, the ‘liberation’ of all Islamic lands, first and foremost Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Palestine, from foreign occupation (both military and cultural) and secular ruler as well as the ousting of corrupt/fake Muslim rulers and regimes in order to re-establish ‘pure’ Islamic governments and laws in their stead.\textsuperscript{311}

In 1988, bin Laden, influenced by Zawahiri, established an offshoot of the MAK, which he named “al-Qaeda” (the base), in an effort to achieve their goals. They sought to implement their strategy throughout the entire geopolitical region that was once part of the Islamic Caliphate as well as in those regions that have Muslim majority populations such as Bosnia and parts of Southeast Asia via a campaign of Regional Islamist militant terrorism.\textsuperscript{312} Though the Azzam-led pocket of the MAK disagreed with al-Qaeda at an ideological level, and over the ethics of tactics employed, throughout this period, the two organisations nevertheless worked closely together alongside Zawahiri’s EIJ and the Tanzim al-Jihad network in their efforts to intensify recruitment, funding and asymmetric-

\textsuperscript{310} See, for example, Gerges, \textit{The Far Enemy}, op. cit., pp. 82-83; Gunaratna, \textit{Inside Al Qaeda}, op. cit., pp.22-23, 93.

\textsuperscript{311} See, for example, Gerges, \textit{The Far Enemy}, op. cit., p.94.

\textsuperscript{312} See, for example, Nassar, \textit{Globalization and Terrorism}, op. cit., p.94; Gunaratna, \textit{Inside Al Qaeda}, op. cit., p.89.
warfare activities across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world. They thus operated as Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations.  

Directly following the establishment of al-Qaeda in 1988, Azzam was assassinated – some believe at the hands of Zawahiri – in 1989 and the MAK split with a significant number of Afghan-Mujahedeen forces joining bin Laden’s newly found al-Qaeda organisation which was now allied with Zawahiri’s EIJ and his newly established Tanzim al-Jihad network.  

Disagreements between bin Laden and Azzam prior to his assassination saw bin Laden become closer to Zawahiri and the EIJ and Tanzim al-Jihad militant terrorist organisations. It was from this point on that Zawahiri’s Qutbist inspired Jihadist doctrine gained a major foothold within al-Qaeda and began to eclipse the Wahhabi inspired interpretation of Islam and hence ‘al-jihad’ – which is some what less radical than the Qutbist doctrine – and soon became the ideological foundation of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was thus cemented as a Jihadist organisation alongside EIJ and the Tanzim al-Jihad Regional Islamist militant terrorist network.  

Bin Laden’s ideological shift and move into the orbit of Zawahiri witnessed al-Qaeda adopt what would become the organisation’s trade-mark tactic – large scale militant terrorist attacks that sought to inflict maxim damage and casualties against both ‘hard’ (military and government) and ‘soft’ (civilian) targets through gun-fights,

---

313 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op. cit., p.70.


315 See, for example, Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op. cit., p.78.
shooting rampages and suicide bombings. Following the collapse of the USSR, these three Jihadist organisations (EIJ, Tanzim al-Jihad and al-Qaeda) worked closely together to further expand their infrastructures and operations during the late 1980s and 1990s in the Middle East, Africa – notably Sudan –, Chechnya, Bosnia, and South, Central, and Southeast Asia.

The Afghan-Jihad experience therefore represented the second major turning-point in the history of Islamist militant terrorism and organisations in the Middle East following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. It further galvanised the phenomenon throughout the wider Islamic world and is identified in this study as the primary catalyst underpinning the geopolitical transformation from National to Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations. By the end of the Afghan-Jihad thousands of state-backed Islamist insurgent forces, which had descended on Afghanistan from more then forty nations from across the Middle East and wider Muslim world, had joined a number of different independent Jihadist organisations that had established themselves and/or relocated their command structure to Afghanistan. Many of these insurgents and independent Jihadist groups – which included Zawahiri’s EIJ and Tanzim al-Jihad organisations – merged under the leadership and operational command of the

316 Ibid, p.70.

317See, for example, Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op. cit., pp. 136, 30, 134, 131, 174; Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate, op. cit., pp.vi-ix.

318 See, for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., p.80.
MAK and formed a network of organisations which would ultimately become the blueprint of al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{319}

The Afghan-Jihad provided both state-backed foreign Islamist insurgent volunteers, and Islamist militant terrorist organisations with an experience through which they came to believe that they had defeated the Soviet forces single handed; thus strengthening their resolve to join and expand the Jihadist war against the ‘near enemy’ – that is, within the wider geopolitical sphere of the Islamic world.\textsuperscript{320} The Afghan-Jihad, and those Islamist militant terrorist organisations and networks that were developed during the conflict in Afghanistan, represent the ascent of Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the Middle East and beyond and thus the Regional geopolitical transformation phase of the phenomenon.

6.4. The Ascent of Global Islamist Militant Terrorism in the Middle East

It will be argued here that the third and final phase of the geopolitical transformation of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East emerged out of the post-Afghan-Jihad era and crystallised throughout the post-Cold War period. During this period, the international community witnessed the realignment of global powers, shifting from a bipolar international order to a unipolar system dominated by a Western power bloc led by the U.S., and saw governments in the

\textsuperscript{319} See, for example, Nassar, Globalization and Terrorism, op. cit., p.93; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

\textsuperscript{320} See, for example, Laqueur, No End To War, op. cit., p.51; Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp. 1-4, 56, 81-84.
Middle East and wider Muslim world begin to crack down on domestic Islamist forces and veterans from the Afghan-Jihad campaign. Alongside the ever hardening Jihadist tactics and ideology (which had began to incorporate a distorted version of the Islamic concept of ‘takfeeri’ – the practice of excommunicating Muslims – who did not adhere to their Jihadist doctrine), it was the geopolitical reshaping of the international system and ultimately the strengthening of Western influence, mainly U.S. but also European, in the Islamic world and support for secular and Islamic regimes which had set about suppressing the wider Islamist movement following the end of the Afghan-Jihad that ignited the phenomenon of Global Jihadism. Moreover, the Gulf War in 1991, which saw the Saudi Royal family reject bin Laden’s offer to protect the Kingdom in favour of U.S. forces which became permanently stationed in Saudi Arabia; the U.S. and the West’s support for Israel; the Balkan Wars in the early and late-1990s; and the Chechnya conflict, all further influenced bin Laden and Zawahiri to defect from an exclusively Regional Islamist militant terrorist operation that solely targeted the ‘near enemy’ to an open-ended campaign of Global Islamist militant terrorism that primarily targets the ‘far enemy’.

Throughout the 1990s, the EIJ – Tanzim al-Jihad – al Qaeda alliance developed into a sophisticated network that spanned the Middle East, Asia, Africa,

321 See, for example, Nassar, Globalization and Terrorism, op. cit., p.93; Laqueur, No End To War, op. cit., p.57.

322 See, for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., p.96; Nassar, Globalization and Terrorism, op. cit., p.95.

323 Ibid, pp. 96-98, 145-146; p.95.
Europe, and North America. Bin Laden and Zawahiri relocated the core of al-Qaeda’s operations to Sudan where they developed additional training camps to the ones in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 1991 and 1996.\textsuperscript{324} They thus expanded al-Qaeda’s operations into sub-Saharan and the Horn of Africa where it collaborated with, and facilitated the development of, local Islamist groups based in Somalia, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Eritrea.\textsuperscript{325} During this period the three Jihadist organisations – EIJ, Tanzim al-Jihad and al-Qaeda – remained committed primarily to perpetrating militant terrorist attacks against ‘near enemy’ targets within the wider Islamic world, in Egypt and Algeria as well as in the Horn of Africa (primarily in Somalia but also Kenya and Tanzania), Bosnia, and Chechnya with operations outside Muslim countries being confined primarily to recruitment and fundraising activities.\textsuperscript{326} In 1993, however, an independent Egyptian based Jihadist organisation, the Islamic Group, which would later merge with al-Qaeda and was closely related to Zawahiri’s EIJ and Tanzim al-jihad organisations, perpetrated the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City.\textsuperscript{327}

By the late 1990s, following their return to Afghanistan from Sudan the two leaders, bin Laden and Zawahiri, of the three organisations began to shift

\textsuperscript{324} Ibid, p.122.

\textsuperscript{325} See, for example, Gunaratna, \textit{Inside Al Qaeda}, op. cit., pp.156, 151-156; Laqueur, \textit{No End To War}, op. cit, p.55.

\textsuperscript{326} See, for example, Gunaratna, \textit{Inside Al Qaeda}, op. cit., p.70; Gerges, \textit{The Far Enemy}, op. cit., pp.94-95.

\textsuperscript{327} Laqueur, \textit{No End To War}, op. cit., p.55.
their focus and strategy towards fighting a ‘holy war’ against the West (far enemy), notably the U.S., and its allies. This entailed, first and foremost, those Arab Islamic regimes allied with the West (near enemy); notably, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Pakistan.\footnote{328} Hence, in 1996, bin Laden announced al-Qaeda’s Declaration of War on America and Americans and thus shifted away from primarily targeting the ‘near enemy’ to a strategy that now targeted the ‘far enemy’.\footnote{329} Moreover, in 1998, bin Laden and Zawahiri, along with a number of other Jihadist organisations, further synergised their operations closer together following Zawahiri’s decision to commit EIJ and the Tanzim al-Jihad militant terrorist organisations to bin Laden’s World Islamic Front for Jihad. Other Islamist militant terrorist organisations which joined the al-Qaeda-led Jihadist network included the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamiat ul Ulema e Pakistan and the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.\footnote{330} Collectively, this network of Jihadist organisations was responsible for the synchronised terrorist bombings on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in 1998 which killed more than 230 people and was the largest terrorist attack in Kenya and Tanzania to date as well as on the U.S. since the April 1983 Beirut embassy bombing in Lebanon which killed 63, and is widely thought to have been carried.

\footnote{328} See, for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., p.56.

\footnote{329} Ibid, p.137.

out by the local Lebanese branch of the EIJ or the Shiite Islamist militant terrorist group Hezbollah.\footnote{See, for example, Laqueur, No End To War, op. cit., p.58; Hiro, War Without End, op. cit., pp. 267-269.}

From 1998 onwards, the newly formed al-Qaeda-led network set about infiltrating the wider Jihadist movement throughout the Muslim world in an effort to realign and hence amalgamate them together under the one cause and thus the World Islamic Front for Jihad.\footnote{See, for example, Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op. cit., p.221.} Moreover, the al-Qaeda network became committed to ‘short’, ‘mid’ and ‘long’ term goals which it still actively pursues today. The al-Qaeda network’s short-term goal is the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops and non-Muslim armies from the ‘dar al-islam’ (House of Islam/Islamic lands), in particularly from Saudi Arabia – home to Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina – which has had U.S. military personal permanently stationed there in agreement with the Saudi Royal family since the 1950s and peaked during the 1991 Gulf War until 2003; when they were dramatically degreased to a small number of airforce training personnel.\footnote{See, for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.56, 144-145; Otterman, Sharon, May 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2003, “Saudi Arabia: Withdraw of U.S. Forces” in Council on Foreign Relations, Retrieved, 24/01/2012, From, www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia-withdrawl-us-forces/p7739, p.1.} The al-Qaeda network’s mid-term goal has been to remove all ‘false’ Muslim regimes from the wider Islamic world, notably secular and non-Islamist Muslim regimes and those which collaborate with the U.S. and its Western allies (identified by Jihadists as the ‘near enemy’) as well as the destruction of Israel. In their stead
they seek to establish Islamist ones that adhere to a strict interpretation of Islamic Law in an effort to revive the Islamic Caliphate, encompassing Islamic states free of Western and non-Islamic influences and capable of waging nuclear war (Pakistan) on the U.S. and its allies in an effort to bring about a Third World War.\textsuperscript{334} The long-term goal of the al-Qaeda network and ‘inspired’ Global Jihadist organisations and individuals has evolved from solely targeting the ‘near enemy’ during the 1980s and early 1990s, into one that primarily targets the ‘far enemy’\textsuperscript{335}

The past decade, following the U.S.-led War on Terror in response to the 9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the U.S., has witnessed the al-Qaeda network and its followers (along with Activist and Missionary Islamist organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a worldwide movement), time and time again reveal that their long-term aspirations are to bring the entire world under the control of Islam.\textsuperscript{336} In the context of al-Qaeda, this was first officially made clear in June 2002 by Suleiman Abu Gaith, an official spokesman of the Jihadist network. He wrote in a manifesto that al-Qaeda and its allies end goal is “…to subject the whole earth to the rule of Islam.”\textsuperscript{337} This is a development, as noted,\n

\textsuperscript{335} See, for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.120-121.


\textsuperscript{337} See, for example, Laqueur, No End To War, op. cit., p.55.
which has evolved out of what has been identified by experts as al-Qaeda’s ‘second generation’ and is the direct result of successful propaganda and recruitment campaigns spun after the invasions of Afghanistan and, notably, Iraq. The phenomenon has, therefore, further evolved into one which promotes and adheres to a doctrine that calls on all Muslims to advance the worldwide expansion of Islamist ideology via any means necessary, notably Jihadist extremism, in an effort to achieve their ultimate goal of creating a global Caliphate system and thus the world’s submission to Islam.

As noted earlier, the post-9/11 years, particularly after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, has seen al-Qaeda’s second generation extremist ideology spawn a new twofold phenomenon in the contemporary Jihadist arena. First, the rise of ‘home-grown’ Jihadists cells and collaborators which are agents of, or inspired by, the al-Qaeda network or a particular Global Jihadist organisation and which the members are citizens of Western democratic nations in which they attack; and have emerged throughout Europe and North America as well as Australia. The home-grown Jihadists phenomenon has emerged out of these countries minority Muslim populace/communities which are made up of mainly first, second and, in some cases, third generation Muslim migrants. Second, and directly related to


339 See, for example, Laqueur, No End To War, op. cit., pp.55-56.

340 See, for example, Gerges, The Far Enemy, op. cit., pp.251-253.

341 See, for example, The Telegraph, 26, 12, 2010, Gardham, Duncan, “US home-grown terrorists ‘a global threat’, warns congresswoman”, Retrieved, 04/01/2012, From,
the first point, the Global Jihadist phenomenon has further manifested self-indoctrinated individuals referred to as ‘lone-wolves’, who have no ties to al-Qaeda, or a particular Jihadist organisation or cell, but, nevertheless, have come to believe in al-Qaeda’s apocalyptic Islamist ideology and global outlook. Such individuals represent what could be the greatest challenge to counter-terrorism efforts, particularly in the context of Islamist militant terrorism.\(^{342}\) These latest two trends in the Global Jihadist phenomenon have led to a steady increase in militant terrorist attacks worldwide, notably in the West, and are the direct result of the al-Qaeda network’s ability to adapt to the post-9/11 international security environment. Al-Qaeda has thus adopted a strategy of ‘decentralisation and diversification’ at the operational, leadership and membership (now has a much more ethnically diverse membership base) levels of the organisation which, in turn, spans across a much wider geopolitical theatre.\(^{343}\) Examples of home-grown and lone-wolf inspired second generation Global Jihadists are given in the previous chapter.

Al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification strategy has, in effect, allowed the organisation to evolve by dissolving and re-manifesting itself into a

---

\(^{342}\) Braniff, & Moghadam, “Towards Global Jihadism”, op. cit., p.36

\(^{343}\) See, for example, Ibid, pp.38-43.
much more elusive and ‘localised’ organisation that has spawned a collection of regional al-Qaeda ‘affiliate’ branches including, as noted, AQAP, AQIM, and AQI. It has also gained allegiance from independent, but inspired, groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria; JI in Indonesia; and the ASG in the Southern Philippines. The new, localised, al-Qaeda network is focused on infiltrating and influencing domestic affairs, notably political, via its local affiliates and sympathisers throughout the wider Muslim world.344 These developments have provided the al-Qaeda network with a wider geographic operational theatre in which to further spread its Global Jihadist doctrine and has increased the networks indoctrination, recruitment and targeting capabilities while, nevertheless, ultimately remaining committed to attacking ‘far enemy’ targets – civilian, military, government, and economic – via its local affiliated franchises while keeping its core leadership and command structure intact and thus ‘acting local’ but ‘thinking global’.345 Moreover, the most recent figures identifying support for al-Qaeda in the Middle East, produced by Pew Research Center surveys in 2010, 2011 and 2012, indicates that in Egypt alone, a country that is a major hub for Islamist and Jihadists activities and organisations in the region, an average of 20% of the Muslim population had a favourable view of al-Qaeda and hence the Global Jihadist doctrine.346


345 Ibid, pp.36-43.

The al-Qaeda network was identified at the 2011 World Summit on Counter-Terrorism by al-Qaeda expert and security analysts Professor Rohan Gunaratna of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore as pursuing its ‘infiltration strategy’ in local affairs in the wake of the geopolitical unrest and revolutions that have and continue to engulf the Arab world (referred to as the Arab Spring). Gunaratna noted that “Al-Qaeda has participated extensively in the Libyan uprising”. Hence, al-Qaeda actively sought with the support of local allies and sympathizers to infiltrate the uprising in Libya in an effort to further its support base and, in turn, foothold in that country and surrounding region. This has raised fears that the Arab Spring, which began suddenly in Tunisia in late December 2010, and quickly spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, and Syria throughout 2011; could potentially provide the al-Qaeda network and other Jihadist and Islamist organisations with an environment of political turmoil and instability which they could infiltrate and benefit from.

---


349 See, for example, The World Summit on Counter-Terrorism 2011, “Tectonic Geopolitical Shifts” in The 11th Annual International Conference of The International Institute of Counter-Terrorism, Retrieved, 1/1/2012, From, [www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=NzhlOdaVII%3d&tabid=68], p.68; The News
sudden demise, Osama bin Laden commented on the “Arab Spring” calling for an al-Qaeda strategy to infiltrate the rebellions.”

In addition to Libya, there is growing fears that al-Qaeda along with a handful of independent National and Regional Jihadist organisations, have been attempting to establish footholds in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Jihadist organisations which have had members arrested in the Sinai since 2010 include al-Qaeda, HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Dughmush clan’s Army of Islam, and Hezbollah. The Hosni Mubarak regime confirmed prior to the 2011 revolution the presence of a number of these organisations but denied, in particularly regarding al-Qaeda, that they had established an operational capacity in the Sinai. However, in the wake of the Egyptian revolution, which has seen an increase in Islamist militant terrorist activities and attacks against Israel from the Sinai, experts such as Ehud Yaari from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have noted that: “In August 2011, a proclamation announcing the alleged establishment of an al-Qaeda “Emirate of the Sinai Peninsula” appeared on the [al-Qaeda’s] terrorist network’s official websites but was quickly removed.” In June 2012, however, a Jihadist group calling itself the Lajnat Al-Shura fi Aknaf Beit Al-Mukadess (The Shura Council of the Mujahideen in the Environs of Jerusalem) emerged in the


350 “Tales From the Front”, op. cit p.71.

Sinai and is considered by experts to be linked to al-Qaeda. It carried out its first attack in the Negev Desert, Israel on the 18th of June killing one citizen and wounding one other. It is a supporter of the implementation of strict Islamic Law in Egypt, the distraction of Israel and the establishment of an international caliphate and, ultimately, the al-Qaeda-led Global Jihadist doctrine.\(^{352}\) This was followed by a much more sophisticated attack by Jihadists in the Sinai on the 5th of August which killed 16 Egyptian border police at an Egyptian check-point into Israel. The Jihadists opened fire on them while ramming the border check-point in a stolen Egyptian Army armed vehicle before driving into Israel in an attempt to carry out a large scale suicide bomb attack in that country but were killed by the IDF before reaching their targets. The IDF and experts believe that the Jihadists ultimate goal, in addition to killing as many Israelis, and Egyptians in this case, as possible, is to ignite an armed conflict between Israel and Egypt.\(^{353}\)

There is evidence that al-Qaeda is also attempting to influence developments in Syria following confirmation by the Director of the U.S. National Intelligence Agency, James R. Clapper who stated that “Al-Qaeda extremists “have infiltrated” …[and] …that its operatives may have slipped into


groups of fighters opposed to the government of President Bashar al-Assad.”

Clapper made these comments in the wake of the deadly suicide bombings in Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, on the 18th of March 2012; killing 27. Clapper also identified that AQI was responsible for the suicide bombings in the city of Damascus on 6th January 2012; killing 25 and which came just two weeks after two suicide bombers killed 44 people in Damascus. These attacks have been confirmed to have been carried out by AQI’s Syrian front organisation and/or proxy, Jabhat al-Nusra (Front for the Protection of the Syrian People), however, many of the protesters believe that the suicide bombings were organised by the Syrian regime. Moreover, on the 18th of May the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon confirmed that al-Qaeda and its Syrian proxy Jabhat al-Nusra were responsible for the deadly wave of suicide terrorist attacks on the 27th and 30th of April 2012 in Damascus and Idlib respectively; collectively killing 20 people and


355 See, for example, Ibid.

wounding more than 50. These attacks came just one day after the arrival of Gen. Robert Mood, the head of the UN’s military observer mission in Syria. In addition twin suicide bomb attacks on the 10th of May in Damascus, the largest and most deadly to date, killed 55 and wounded 327 people. The increase in Jihadist tactics and activities in Syria signals a shift in the uprisings turned conflict, a phenomenon that suggests Syria may quickly become the next major theatre for Jihadists to exploit in the Middle East.

Moreover, recent al-Qaeda activity of this nature is also evident in the periphery Middle Eastern state of Somalia where al-Shabaab has been collaborating at an unprecedented level with the Yemen based AQAP branch of the al-Qaeda network. This latest collaboration has seen the two organisations working much closer together and has included the distribution of aid while blocking access to international aid agencies such as the UN in the famine stricken country. Seeking to harness the crisis in an effort to manufacture


360 “Syrian uprising shifts toward suicide bombings. Al-Qaeda’s handiwork?”, op. cit., p.1;

support from within the domestic Somali population by intensifying the already desperate situation in that country thus to create an incubator for the Global Jihadist cause. Therefore, the crisis, further compounded by the effects of long running political instability, lawlessness and clan conflicts in Somalia, has provided al-Qaeda, notably AQAP, with the necessary mix of events and hence environment needed to infiltrate and/or develop strategic and operational ties with al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{362} In turn, this has allowed al-Qaeda to proliferate its Global Jihadist doctrine into the Somalia theatre while it works towards establishing a long-term operational foothold/base in that country via al-Shabaab which pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda prior to the assassination of bin Laden.\textsuperscript{363} This allegiance was reconfirmed when al-Shabaab’s leader, Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane publicly announced that organisations continuing loyalty to al-Qaeda’s new leader, Zawahiri on the 9\textsuperscript{th} of February 2012: declaring al-Shabaab as an official affiliate and representative of the al-Qaeda family in the Horn of Africa.\textsuperscript{364} Also in Africa, fears are growing over the northern Nigeria Jihadist organisation Boko Haram and its links with al-Qaeda, and in particularly AQIM, and the ramifications to Nigeria and the wider regions security.\textsuperscript{365}


\textsuperscript{363} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{365} Hahim, S. Ahmed, Patte, Gregoire, and Cohen, Nathan, “‘Western Ways Are Evil’: The Emergence and Evolution of Boko Haram”, in Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4,
The al-Qaeda network, its affiliates and inspired Global Jihadists, therefore, seek through a global campaign of militant terrorism, along with non-violent tactics and strategies, the geopolitical and religious restoration of the Islam that existed during the time of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs and first Islamic community; in an effort to bring about a world dominated by Islamism. Collectively, the events and phenomena identified since the late 1980s, therefore, represent the catalysts underpinning the ascent of the Global Jihadist phenomenon in the Middle East. Thus corresponding to this study’s hypothesised Global geopolitical transformation phase of Islamist militant terrorism and organisations which emanate from, and span, the wider Middle East and beyond and endure to this day.
Chapter Seven

The National, Regional & Global Geopolitical Transformation of Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia

7.1. Introduction

This chapter will examine the study’s hypothesised ‘geopolitical transformation’ process of Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia. It seeks to establish that there have been three distinctly different phases of Islamist militant terrorism and thus categories and manifestations of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia. These have emerged out of the phenomenon of Jihadist Islamist ideology and can best be identified as National, Regional and Global.

This stage of the research will analyse each of the three phases analysing key historical, political, and social phenomena and contexts directly associated with each of them and thus examining the National, Regional and Global geopolitical transformation of Islamist militant terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia. The chapter examines colonial and imperial rule; ideological influences and connections with Middle East Islamist organisations; post-independence secular rule and state suppression of Political-Islam (in particular, Islamism); extra-regional geopolitical events (especially the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Afghan-Jihad); al-Qaeda’s entry into, and influence in, the region; democratisation and the subsequent rise of Political-Islam (especially in Indonesia); and al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 strategy. It will be argued here that
collectively these events and phenomena are the primary catalysts for the rise and proliferation of Islamist militant terrorist ideologies and organisations in Southeast Asia.²⁶⁶ Like the Middle East component of the research, this chapter argues that the three phases and categories of organisations collectively make up the wider geopolitical phenomenon that is Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia and it represents the second case study.

7.2. The Ascent of National Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Armed Islamic groups have been active in Southeast Asia since as early as the 17th century, following the Spanish conquest of the Philippines and the arrival of additional imperial powers throughout the region who sought to control valuable trade routes and local commerce.²⁶⁷ These armed groups originally emerged as ‘rejectionist’ or ‘separatist’ movements that harnessed what can best be defined as asymmetric warfare strategies and tactics and resembled guerrilla warfare and insurgency rather than militant terrorism.²⁶⁸ Although not monolithic, these early armed Islamic groups were fundamentally driven by ‘local/national’ geopolitical and religious grievances as a response to the arrival of colonialism and Christianity and they continued to operate until independence in the 20th


²⁶⁷ See, for example, Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p. 98.

²⁶⁸ See, for example, “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.39; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p. 98.
Century, notably in the U.S.-ruled Philippines and the Dutch controlled East Indies (Indonesia) and, to a lesser extent, in British Malaya.369

This trend continued and further intensified in the late and immediate post-colonial period following independence in those regions of Southeast Asia that had a majority and/or minority Muslim population, with the newly established secular indigenous governments being targeted.370 This was particularly the case in Indonesia, the southern Philippines (from the 1970s onwards), southern Thailand (from the mid-1990s onwards), Malaysia, and, in the post-9/11 era, Cambodia.371 However, unlike their predecessors throughout the previous centuries they did not employ protracted campaigns of militant terrorism as their


370 See, for example, Barton, Indonesia's Struggle, op. cit., p. 47; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.98.

key tactic or strategy. While Islamist militant terrorist organisations did not emerge until the immediate post-WWII period, Islamist ideologies had been active in the region since the 1800s. The first Islamist organisation to emerge in the region and to advocate a primitive form of national motivated Jihadist ideology in Southeast Asia was the so-called Padri movement in the Dutch East Indies in the late 19th Century.

It was not until the years 1942 to 1945, however, during the Japanese occupation of the region, notably in the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, that the roots of Islamist militant terrorism can be traced in Southeast Asia. It was during the Japanese occupation that National Jihadist ideology in Southeast Asia began to emerge. During this period the Japanese worked to further intensify anti-colonial sentiment amongst its occupied Muslim populations, a feeling that had existed amongst the local Muslim populace since the arrival of colonialism to the region. This was particularly the case in Indonesia, with the largest Muslim population in the region and one of the largest in the world, where the Japanese established the Kantor Urusan Agama (Office of Religious Affairs). In 1943,

---


373 See, for example, Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.46: The Padri movement emphasised a return to the traditions of the Salafi and sought to politically reform society and were willing to use violence as a means to achieve their objective.


375 See, for example, Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.98; Abuza, *Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia*, op. cit., p.15.

the Japanese merged this office and forced all Muslim organisations, which included Islamist groups, to merge under the pre-existing umbrella organisation Majlis Syuro Muslim in Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council, or Masyumi). This umbrella organisation was controlled by the Japanese and enabled them to effectively co-opt Muslim leaders and control all major Muslim organisations and, in turn, the majority of the Muslim populace in Indonesia. The Japanese then used Masyumi as a tool to promote anti-Dutch and anti-Western propaganda and hate-ideology which was quickly absorbed by both nationalist and Islamists alike including Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo who formed Hizbullah (not to be confused with the Iranian-backed Hezbollah Jihadist organisation in Lebanon) in West Java in 1943.

Hezbullah represents the earliest manifestation of a modern armed National Islamist organisation in Southeast Asia and saw Japanese imperialism as just as much of a threat as Dutch colonial rule. Founded by Kartosuwirjo, who had defected from the secular orientated nationalist movement in favour of an Islamist outlook, Hizbullah was the armed wing of the Masyumi which was primarily an Islamist leaning organisation during this period and went on to become a major political party at the end of WWII in Indonesia. Hizbullah was, however, by no means a ‘true’ militant terrorist organisation by this study’s definition of the term,

377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.47.
380 Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.47.
but, rather, an insurgency movement committed to resisting Japanese occupation and, following WWII, the return of Dutch colonial rule.\textsuperscript{381} Although Japan did not win over the Islamist minority in Indonesia or throughout the region it did, however, somewhat successfully harness Muslim anti-colonial and anti-Christian sentiment in an effort to generate anti-Western sentiment which it hoped would soften the local Muslim populaces view towards the occupying Japanese forces.\textsuperscript{382} Moreover, Japan ultimately sought to promote itself as a ‘liberator’ rather than an ‘aggressor’, advocating that the West was the true enemy in an effort to win over support from the local Muslim populace vis-à-vis the Dutch.\textsuperscript{383}

This trend continued in the immediate post-WWII years following the defeat of Japan by the allied forces in 1945 and was furthered by the return of some colonial powers which sought to re-govern the territories that they had lost to the Japanese during the war; notably the Dutch to Indonesia and the U.S. to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{384} In turn, Islamist ideologies and organisations acted as a locus for anti-Western sentiment and had become infused with pre-existing nationalist and pro-independence elements.\textsuperscript{385} In the immediate post-independence years – which began in the mid-to late-1940s – the rise of national inspired Jihadist ideology

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{382} Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., p.15.

\textsuperscript{383} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{384} See, for example, Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., p.47; Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., pp.14-16; “\textit{Transnational Terrorism}”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.39.

\textsuperscript{385} Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., p.15.
continued to evolve in some majority Muslim populated states and regions of Southeast Asia, notably Indonesia and the southern Philippines. This was triggered primarily by the rise of secular leaning nationalist movements and governments that emerged during the late 1940s and 1950s throughout the region.\(^{386}\) This was particularly the case in Indonesia where all forms of Political-Islam had become suppressed by the secular leaning government. In the Philippines too there were increased efforts to continue the centuries long struggle for independence which was intensified following the state’s policy of induced migration of Filipino Christians into the predominantly Muslim populated south in the wake of independence in 1946.\(^ {387}\)

It was not until 1948, however, that the first National Islamist militant terrorist organisation emerged in Southeast Asia following the establishment of the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII) – aka the Indonesian Islamic Army – which was also founded by Kartosuwirjo in West Java as a result of Hizbullah’s and Masyumi’s increasingly moderate outlook.\(^ {388}\) The TII was the armed wing of the Indonesian nationalist Islamist organisation, Darul Islam, which had been

---


\(^{387}\) See, for example, Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., pp.98-99; Iacovou, “From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf”, op. cit., p.1.

\(^{388}\) Abuza, Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia, op. cit., pp.14-16.
established one year earlier in 1947. The establishment of TII was further influenced by the armed conflict between the Dutch and the indigenous nationalist forces in Indonesia. The three movements fought each other during this period in what became known as the ‘triangular war’.

Although often working in strategic partnership with Dural Islam and the TII against the Dutch, the nationalists favoured a much more secular outlook to the Islamist vision of statehood which had begun to gain rapid support throughout the country in the post-WWII period. On the 7th of August 1949, ten days before the end of Dutch rule, Kartosuwirjo declared the establishment of the ‘Negara Islam Indonesia’ (Islamic State of Indonesia) in West Java with the region to be put under the control of the TII and the authority of Darul Islam. However, the idea of Indonesia becoming an exclusively Islamic state governed by an Islamist interpretation of Islamic Law did not gain the support of the nationalist forces which had become increasingly concerned about the TII and Darul Islam’s Islamist intentions and lead to a direct armed conflict between the two ideological movements which would endure for decades to come.

Directly following independence, the TII and Darul Islam quickly declared the newly appointed Indonesian President, Kusno Sukarno and his nationalist

---

389 Ibid.
390 Ibid, p.16.
391 Ibid, pp.15-16.
392 Ibid, op. cit., p.16
393 Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.47.
government to be ‘enemies of Islam’ – like the Dutch – following the implementation of the secular orientated ‘Pancasila’ doctrine in 1949.\textsuperscript{394} Pancasila, which outlines the five principles of the independent Indonesian state and collectively forms the basis of the country’s constitution, fell well short of Darul Islam’s and TII’s Islamist outlook and agenda for an Indonesian Islamic State.\textsuperscript{395} Pancasila represented a fundamental change, and a betrayal, in the eyes of the Islamists, from the 1945 draft constitution known as the ‘Jakarta Charter’. The Jakarta Charter was ultimately rejected by Sukarno and the nationalists in favour of a more secular orientated constitution and Pancasila, which did not include the 1945 declaration that in Indonesia it was a legal “obligation to follow Islamic Sharia for its adherents [Muslims].”\textsuperscript{396}

In the wake of the adoption of Pancasila, Darul Islam and the TII began to intensify their attacks against the Indonesian nationalist forces and their civilian supporters in the population while expanding their foothold across the Indonesian archipelago (in particular in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh) until Kartosuwirjo was arrested and executed in 1962.\textsuperscript{397} This was followed by the capture and execution of Kahar Muzakkar, the Sulawesi leader of Darul Islam and TII in 1965 and Ibnu Hadjar in the same year.\textsuperscript{398} These proved to be decisive

\textsuperscript{394} Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., pp.15-16.

\textsuperscript{395} Ibid, p.15.

\textsuperscript{396} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{397} Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., p.47; Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.348.

\textsuperscript{398} Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., p.47.
blows by the Indonesian government that had been fighting the National Jihadist forces for well over a decade during which an estimated 20,000 people were killed. These blows all but signalled the defeat of Darul Islam and its TII militant terrorist organisation: it was forced underground and would not reappear until the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{399} Although Darul Islam’s armed wing, the TII, is identified in this study as representing the ascent of National Islamist militant terrorism in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, it is important to note that the choice of asymmetric warfare tactics and strategies can best be defined as being a mixture of insurgency (in the context of Dutch occupation) and militant terrorism (in the context of indigenous nationalist authorities and supporters).\textsuperscript{400}

Nevertheless, following almost twenty years of the state suppression of Political-Islam and, in particular, Islamism, the phenomenon of National Jihadist ideology remerged and spawned a number of additional Islamist militant terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia including, among others, Komando Jihad in Indonesia in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{401} Komando Jihad was modelled on, and made up from former members of, the TII and Dural Islam and included Abdllah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who became members of the organisation’s core

\textsuperscript{399} Abuza, Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia, op. cit., p.16.


\textsuperscript{401} See, for example, Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.47; Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.349.
Moreover, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were also the leaders of Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah (JMA) – a network of Islamist cells throughout Indonesia – which merged with Komando Jihad in 1977. JMA, mainly comprised of former students recruited from the Islamist orientated Pesantren al-Mukmin boarding school (better known as Pondok Ngruki) founded by Sungkar and Ba’asyir in Ngruki, Solo in central Java between 1971 and 1973, is identified by experts to be the precursor organisation to the JI Regional Jihadist organisation.

Coinciding with its establishment, and prior to the Indonesian general elections in 1977, the Suharto regime arrested 185 Komando Jihad members. However, experts are not clear whether Komando Jihad emerged as the result of the regime’s effort to flush out any clandestine Darul Islam and TII members and supporters prior to the election or if Komando Jihad was a completely new National Jihadist organisation emanating from an explicitly new grassroots Islamist revival movement in Indonesia.

---


403 See, for example, ibid, op. cit., p.349.

404 See, for example, Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., pp.348-349; Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.49.

405 Ibid.

406 The regime sold the idea that Indonesia’s sovereignty was directly threatened by foreign communist revolutionary forces which had taken control of other states throughout the region invoking an unprecedented threat to national security unprecedented since colonialism and which thus required unprecedented cooperation from the Islamist forces and supporters.

407 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.47.
The late 1970s also witnessed the ascent of National Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the southern Philippines following the emergence of the MILF which had split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1978.\footnote{Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., pp.98-99.} This was primarily the result of the former strongly rejecting the MNLF’s peace negotiations with the Philippine government regarding the establishment of an autonomous Muslim region rather than the independent state which it had originally sought in the south. The MILF considered the MNLF’s peace talks with the Philippine government and their national integration policy – which supported an influx of Filipino Catholics to the southern Island of Mindanao and the Sulu region following independence in 1946 – as a direct threat to the Muslim majority demographic there and thus any future Islamic state.\footnote{Ibid.} Moreover, the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 helped to lay the foundations towards a peace agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government which was achieved in 1996.\footnote{Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., pp.98-99.} The pace agreement allowed for the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and ultimately lead to the disbandment of the MNLF.\footnote{Malaya Business Insight, 09 July 2012, ED LINGAO, “Who governs Muslim Mindanao is as important as the system”, Retrieved, 26/07/2012, From, www.malaya.com.ph/index.php/news/nation/8051-who-governs-muslim-mindanao-is-as-important-as-the-system, p.1; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.99.} However, the MILF saw this as a betrayal
favouring instead an independent Islamic state based on the principles of puritanical Islamist ideology.\textsuperscript{412}

Although the MILF had adopted an Islamist nationalist doctrine it was, however, not until its members joined the Afghan-Jihad campaign in Afghanistan against the Soviets that it truly embraced the National Jihadist doctrine and thus the tactics and strategies of militant terrorism. This resulted from the ideological cross-fertilisation from Middle Eastern Jihadist organisations that had descended on Afghanistan in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{413} The MNLF, in contrast, was more of a mix between ‘quasi-Marxist’ and ‘local’ Conservative Political-Islamic ideologies and adhered to methods of guerrilla warfare and insurgency rather than those of militant terrorism.\textsuperscript{414}

In addition to Indonesia and the southern Philippines, the phenomenon of National Islamist militant terrorism has most recently emerged in Thailand, the only state in the region not to have been colonised.\textsuperscript{415} Although predominantly Buddhist, Thailand has a large minority Muslim demographic which represents the majority of the country’s southern population and is spread across the four

\textsuperscript{412} See, for example, Lacovou, “From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf”, op. cit., p.1; Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., pp.98-99.

\textsuperscript{413} See, for example, Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.99; Lacovou, “From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf”, op. cit., p.1; Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.421.

\textsuperscript{414} See, for example, Lacovou, “From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf”, op. cit., p.1; Sheridan, “Jihad Archipelago”, op. cit., p.171.

\textsuperscript{415} Houben, “Southeast Asia and Islam”, op. cit., pp.160-161.
provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Sarun, and Patani. These provinces have been at the epicentre of a separatist struggle by Muslim armed groups since the 1970s and include, among others, the GMIP, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), and the National Revolutionary Front (BRN). The conflict in the south between the Muslim separatists and the Thai government has its roots in the country’s politics of the early 20th Century. This conflict has intensified over time due to ongoing socio-economic underdevelopment and Buddhist-Islamic tensions. It is important to note, however, that prior to the 2000s, the Muslim separatist movement and organisations in southern Thailand were driven by nationalism rather than Islamist ideology.

However, since 2001, southern Thailand has witnessed an increase in violent unrest and the unprecedented rise of National Islamist ideology and militant terrorist attacks by organisations such as, or splinter groups from, the GMIP, the PULO, and the BRN. The violent unrest and attacks climaxed in 2004 following a raid on an armoury by Islamist separatist forces which left one hundred and seven dead. This trend continued throughout the late-2000s and into 2012, during which there have been a number of attacks including a roadside bombing and a grenade attack carried out against a former politician by Islamist

416 Ibid.

417 See, for example, “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.59.


separatists in the Narathiwat province on the 30 March 2012. Two days later, two simultaneous coordinated bomb attacks were carried out by Islamist militant terrorists in Yala and Songkhla followed by a third bomb which was detonated once rescue personnel had arrived. This type of bombing tactic is often used by Jihadist organisations such as JI and al-Qaeda and is intended to kill as many people and cause as much damage as possible. Collectively the attacks killed sixteen and injured some four hundred and twenty seven people.421

Experts see these attacks, and many since 2001, as directly targeting civilians and thus signalling a shift in the modus operandi of Islamic separatists in Thailand which had previously primarily targeted security forces via armed fighting, towards the explicit use of militant terrorism as their key tactic and strategy.422 Although there is as yet no conclusive evidence, following the arrest of a number of JI members in Thailand for plotting to bomb targets in Bangkok in June 2003, experts are concerned that JI is actively seeking to infiltrate separatist organisations in southern Thailand.423 This is reminiscent of JI’s infiltration of the MILF and the ASG in the southern Philippines and can be seen as a strategic effort by JI to regenerate and further expand their operational sphere and ideological influence throughout the region.424 Moreover, there are concerns that


422 See, for example, Ibid.


424 See, for example, Ibid.
the conflict in southern Thailand could ultimately attract, and be exploited by, Global Jihadists, particularly al-Qaeda.425

Collectively the above examples represent the ascent of National Jihadist ideology and organisations in Southeast Asia: a phenomenon that is identified here as being shaped and influenced by historical and contemporary as well as local and extra-regional events and ideological forces, and which has proliferated throughout the region since its inception in the 1940s and, in particular, since the late-1970s and which endures to this day. National Jihadist ideology and organisations set the stage for the second phase of the ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation process, thus spawning the phenomenon of Regional Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia.

7.3. The Ascent of Regional Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia

By the early 1980s, in the wake of renewed ties between old members of Darul Islam and the TII and extra-regional geopolitics in the Islamic world in the late 1970s (particularly the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), Komando Jihad reignited the National Jihadist phenomenon in Indonesia.426 However, since its establishment in 1977, Komando Jihad and its


426 See, for example, Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.48; Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.420.
leadership had become increasingly influenced by the emerging Regional Jihadist doctrine emanating from Middle Eastern Islamist ideologues and organisations.\(^{427}\)

By the mid-1980s, following a reduced nine year jail term to three years for their roles in numerous Islamist and Jihadist organisations, especially Komando Jihad, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, who had become further radicalised during prison, returned to their Islamist orientated Pondok Ngruki boarding school as teachers.\(^{428}\) However, to avoid a pending prosecution appeal lodged by the Indonesian Supreme Court challenging their early release from jail following their involvement in the Tanjong Priok riots in 1985, Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled to Malaysia from where they continued to build the Komando Jihad network until 1998.\(^{429}\)

During their exile in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba’asyir began to send Komando Jihad and Pondok Ngruki members, along with volunteers from throughout Southeast Asia, to Afghanistan to join the Afghan-Jihad against the Soviets and to the Middle East for ideological/spiritual training.\(^{430}\) This collection of Jihadists became known as Group 272 and referred to the number of Komando Jihad facilitated fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia who fought in the Afghan-Jihad. It is estimated that more than 1000 Islamists travelled to Afghanistan during this

\(^{427}\) Ibid, p.49; p.416.


\(^{429}\) Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.50.

period to receive militant terrorist training and Jihadist indoctrination. During this period the Komando Jihad-led Group 272 became further radicalised and forged alliances with Middle Eastern Jihadist organisations and, following Sungkar’s trip to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s, bin Laden. These events and, in particular, contact with bin Laden and other Middle Eastern Jihadists and organisations inspired Sungkar and Ba’asyir to begin shifting Komando Jihad away from an exclusively National Jihadist organisation to a Regional one. Thus, unlike their predecessors in Southeast Asia, Sungkar and Ba’asyir advocated the creation of a pan-Islamic super state that would incorporate all the regions of Southeast Asia that have a predominantly Muslim population and would include Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines.

From this point on Sungkar and Ba’asyir were committed to the Regional Jihadist doctrine and, following the Afghan-Jihad, began increasing their ties with Middle Eastern based Islamist militant terrorist organisations from the mid-1990s

---


onwards, primarily with the Islamic Group, EIJ and al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{435} This, in turn, directly influenced Sungkar and Ba’asyir to further develop Komando Jihad’s militant terrorist cells beyond Indonesia and, with the help of an Indonesian senior al-Qaeda operative, Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali), began to establish additional cells in Malaysia and Singapore.\textsuperscript{436} This led to the establishment of JI in 1993 and thus the first Regional Jihadist organisation in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{437} Moreover, from the mid- to -late-1990s, Sungak, Ba’asyir and Hambali began developing links with Islamist militant terrorist organisations, notably the MILF and the ASG, in the southern Philippines.\textsuperscript{438} Their aim was to unite them under one wider Regional Jihadist ideological and geopolitical agenda in an effort to ultimately create a pan-Islamic super state in Southeast Asia that would form part of a wider international Islamic Caliphate.\textsuperscript{439}

Although originally emerging as a National Jihadist organisation, Komando Jihad represents a watershed in the history of Jihadist organisations in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Komando Jihad signalled a hardening of Jihadist ideology and was the result of years of state suppression of both Political-Islam and, in

\textsuperscript{435} See, for example, Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., p. 51; Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., p.38.

\textsuperscript{436} Desker, \textit{“Islam in Southeast Asia”}, op. cit., pp.421-423.

\textsuperscript{437} Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., p.38.


\textsuperscript{439} Ibid.
particular, Islamism, underpinned by the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Afghan-Jihad experience. Following the establishment of its cells across Indonesia in the mid-1980s it became a more sophisticatedly structured organisation. \(^{440}\) These two aspects ultimately influenced Komando Jihad to move away from being an exclusively National Islamist militant terrorist organisation towards a Regional one. \(^{441}\) Komando Jihad represented the dawn of a new era in the ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation of the Jihadist phenomenon in Indonesia and the ascent of Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia. \(^{442}\)

By the beginning of the 1990s, following increased collaboration between Sungkar and Ba’asyir with al-Qaeda and other Middle East Jihadist organisations, the JI network began to directly influence and collaborate with Jihadist forces in the southern Philippines, particularly the MILF. \(^{443}\) During this period Sungkar and Ba’asyir were coordinating JI’s activities from their safe-haven in Malaysia where they collaborated extensively with the Malaysian based pro-Regional Jihadist organisation Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM). \(^{444}\)

---

\(^{440}\) See, for example, Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., pp.48-49; Desker, “*Islam in Southeast Asia*”, op. cit., p.420.

\(^{441}\) Ibid. p.49; p.421

\(^{442}\) Desker, “*Islam in Southeast Asia*”, op. cit., p.421.

\(^{443}\) See, for example, Abuza, *Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia*, op. cit., p.38; Ramakrishna, “*Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia*”, op. cit., p.350; “*Transnational Terrorism*”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., pp.57, 60.

\(^{444}\) See, for example, Ramakrishna, “*Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia*”, op. cit., p.358-359.
and the MILF was directly influenced, and facilitated, by a number of key Southeast Asian al-Qaeda affiliates. These included Hambali, Omar al-Faruq (who was the al-Qaeda financial liaison to JI and a future leader of the Indonesian based Laskar Mujahidin – a Jihadist organisation established in 1999 committed to a campaign of violence against the Christian population on the island of Maluku) and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef (who was a member of the Islamic Group – Tanzim al-jihad – al-Qaeda alliance and the mastermind of the 1993 bomb attack on the World Trade Centre and the bombing of a Philippine Airlines flight in 1994).  

This collaboration and influence ultimately led to internal ideological fragmentation within the MILF which saw some members defect and merge with other Filipino fighters who had fought in the Afghan-Jihad and, under the leadership of Jihadist ideologue, Abubakar Janjalani (who became affiliated with bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s), establish the ASG in 1990.  

Janjalani, who had studied and was radicalised in Saudi Arabia and Libya, received funding from both Saudi Arabian and Pakistani Islamic charities and/or organisations as well as from Islamic schools and Mosques throughout the Middle East in support of the ASG and its National

---


Jihadist objective in the southern Philippines. The ASG originally emerged as a National Islamist militant terrorist organisation with an estimated 600 members and sought to regenerate and intensify the struggle against the Philippines government in its quest to establish an Islamic state that would encompass the southern Islands of Mindanao and Basilan as well as the wider Sulu archipelago in the southern Philippines.

By the mid 1990s, following ongoing ideological cross-fertilisation and operational collaboration with JI, the Islamic Group and, in particular, al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian operatives, the ASG, began to shift towards a Regional Jihadist doctrine. For the most part, however, the ASG’s relationship with al-Qaeda and JI, and its support of pan-Islamist ideology in Southeast Asia was driven primarily by its need to procure sophisticated bomb making techniques to supplement less effective methods of kidnapping and sporadic armed attacks which were its primary modus operandi. This development allowed the ASG to undertake sophisticated militant terrorist training at a MILF–JI run camp in the southern Philippines from 1994 which was funded by al-Qaeda and further facilitated by its

---

447 *Foreign Terrorist Organisations*, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.99.

448 See, for example, “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.58.


450 See, for example, *Foreign Terrorist Organisations*, Edited by Linden, V. Edward, op. cit., p.99;
operatives in Southeast Asia who provided much of the ‘know-how’.\(^{451}\) Moreover, it provided the ASG with a strategic opportunity to increase its legitimacy/status amongst the Filipino Islamist and wider Muslim population where it was competing with the MILF.\(^{452}\) However, following the assassination of Janjalani by the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) in 1998, the ASG – which is now under the leadership of his younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani – went back to being a Nationalist Jihadist organisation that used what can best be described as ‘kidnap-for-ransom’ tactics.\(^{453}\)

Nevertheless, by 2004, the ASG had redeveloped strategic and operational ties with the MILF which was primarily the result of a renewed effort by JI to form a strategic alliance with the ASG in an effort to transfer skills and increase training activities in order to ultimately create a trilateral Jihadist network that spanned Southeast Asia.\(^{454}\) During this period the ASG mounted numerous attacks against the AFP and increased attacks against the civilian population (for example the bombing and sinking of the Superferry off the coast of Manila which killed 118

---

\(^{451}\) See, for example, Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.421; Jones, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On”, p.13.

\(^{452}\) See, for example, “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.57-59; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, op., cit., pp.58, 174-175.


\(^{454}\) See, for example, Ibid, pp.57-59; p.58
people on February 27th, 2004) and on Westerners, in particular Americans, living in and visiting the country as well as tourists as far away as Malaysia.455

Since 2004, it has become evident that the ASG has gravitated back into the sphere of JI and, in turn, al-Qaeda which has been followed by an escalation in both the willingness to intensify the lethality of its attacks and a hardening of ideology.456 This was confirmed following the arrest of an ASG financier for transferring funds from al-Qaeda which was to be used by the ASG to finance a number of militant terror attacks throughout the Philippines.457 Further evidence of this renewed alliance was evident following an AFP military raid on a Jihadist stronghold which killed two senior JI leaders and one ASG leader on the island of Jolo in the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines on the 2nd of February 2012 who were responsible for a series of bomb attacks in the region since 2006.458 These events have led many experts to believe that the ASG, while remaining committed to the domestic struggle, has once again become an organisation directly influenced by Regional Jihadist ideology in the context of JI and, therefore, a strategic affiliate of al-Qaeda and its Global Jihadist doctrine in the Philippines. 459 The ASG’s ideological evolution and geopolitical


456 See, for example, Ibid, pp.57-58; p.58.


transformation from a National to a Regional Jihadist organisation is identified by experts as the direct result of ongoing collaboration with the MILF and, in particular, JI and al-Qaeda who have both sought to regenerate themselves by infiltrating localised geopolitical and religious grievances or conflicts as part of their decentralisation and diversification strategies in the post-9/11 era.\footnote{See, for example, “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., pp.32, 57-59; Abuza, Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia, op. cit., pp.58-59; "Indonesia’s evolving terror networks ", op. cit., pp.1-4.}

JI’s post-9/11 effort to regenerate itself resulted in the establishment of JAT in 2008 which was founded by Ba’asyir and Malaysian national and JI operative, Norodin Mohammed Top.\footnote{“Indonesia’s evolving terror networks “, op. cit., p.2.} JAT is an Islamist militant terrorist organisation that has evolved out of JI (and hence adheres to and advocates JI’s Regional Jihadist doctrine) in the wake of the global War on Terror and increased counter-terrorism efforts by ASEAN member states and has confirmed fears about JI’s ability to ‘self-regenerate’.\footnote{Ibid.} JAT amalgamates both non-violent Missionary and Activist Islamist tactics with Jihadist ones and is considered by experts to be the new face of JI and the most dangerous Jihadist organisation in Indonesia and possibly Southeast Asia and is seen as an al-Qaeda proxy.\footnote{“Indonesia’s evolving terror networks “, op. cit., pp.2-4; Jones, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On”, p.15.} This fear is shared by the chief of Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Ansyaad
Mbai, who stated on the 29th of March 2012 that “JAT is the new camouflage of JI. It has the same leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and most of the key figures of JAT are also JI. So I call this the new jacket of JI.” 464 JAT was responsible for the simultaneous bombings of the J W Marriott Hotel and the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Jakarta in July 2009, and in February 2010 BNPT officials uncovered a JAT training camp in Aceh and foiled a terror plot in Bali in March 2012 which left five JAT–JI operatives dead following a shootout with security forces in Bali. 465

Finally, although not considered an epicentre of Jihadist activity, Cambodia is the latest region in Southeast Asia to have been infiltrated by Regional Jihadist organisations in the post-9/11 years. 466 With only 1% of the population being Muslim from a total population of 14 million who are overwhelmingly Buddhist, Cambodia has experienced unprecedented Jihadist activity emanating from Southeast Asia, South Asia and Middle Eastern sources. 467 In 2003, Cambodian authorities arrested four people who included one Cambodian citizen and two Thai nationals who were JI members and an Egyptian who was an al-Qaeda operative thus providing evidence of JI-al-Qaeda collaboration. 468 Moreover, Cambodian authorities have noted that there is an “…increasing influence of

464 “Indonesia’s evolving terror networks”, op. cit., p.2.


Wahhabi doctrines among their [Cambodian Muslim] Cham minority, resulting from Middle Eastern financial support and the use of Arab and Pakistani teachers in their madrassahs [Islamic schools].” Following hundreds of millions of dollars of investment and ‘soft-loans’ from Arab Gulf states to Cambodia in 2008, the Cambodian Prime Minister, Samdech Hun Sen believed it was possible “…that the money could open the door to private individuals and foundations who seek to influence the Muslim community in the country.” Furthermore, in 2008 the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Joseph Mussomeli, warned that: “There are some organisations here [Cambodia] from the Middle East that are very radical and are very intolerant, and they are trying very hard to change the attitude and atmosphere of the Muslim population here.”

Collectively, the above countries and organisations represent the ascent and expanse of the ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation of Regional Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia. This phenomenon is identified in this study as being shaped and influenced by historical and contemporary as well as local and extra-regional events and ideological forces, and has proliferated throughout the region since its inception in the late-1970s and, in particular, since the mid-to-late-1990s and endures to this day. Regional Jihadist ideology and organisations set the stage for the third phase of the ideological evolution and

---


471 Ibid, p.45.
geopolitical transformation process – the emergence of Global Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia.

**7.4. The Ascent of Global Islamist Militant Terrorism in Southeast Asia**

The ascent of Global Islamist militant terrorism in Southeast Asia can be traced to the late-1990s. It emerged in Indonesia in the immediate post-Suharto era during which the country descended into widespread inter-communal and Islamist instigated Muslim-Christian violence between 1999 and 2000. It will be argued here that events during Suharto’s New Order era, especially in the early-1970s, as well as extra-regional ones (mainly the Afghan-Jihad), led to an overall increase in Islamist and Jihadist ideologies. These events, along with the establishment of JI and the advance of al-Qaeda and its infiltration into the region via JI during the 1990s, and the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, as well as an overall increase in the support for both Islamist and Jihadist ideologies, acted as major catalysts underpinning the ascent of Global Jihadism in both Indonesia and wider Southeast Asia.

---

472 See, for example, Abuza, *Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia*, op. cit., pp.3-6; “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.56; Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.421: The origins of the violence was rooted in the 1980s as the direct result of Suharto’s ‘transmigration policy’ which saw a massive influx of Muslims into majority Christian regions and many Christians relocated in an effort to annul fears of Christian separatism (p.3); Jones, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On”, p.13.

As was the case in the previous chapter, it is argued here that the phenomenon of Global Jihadism in Southeast Asia is supported and/or adhered to by only a small minority of the region’s wider pool of Islamist and Jihadist elements and has been significantly weakened by the global War on Terror and, in particular, by ASEAN member state’s counter-terrorism efforts which have successfully reduced both the overall number and scale of militant terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, despite these successes, the phenomenon of Global Jihadism in Southeast Asia endures via its ability to strategically readapt to and exploit the post-9/11 security and political environments throughout the region.

The collapse of Suharto’s regime in 1998 signalled the end of the New Order era and Indonesia’s transition towards decentralisation and democracy. However, these developments also triggered an unprecedented rise in Political-Islamic organisations in Indonesia. During this period the state began lifting


477 See, for example, Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., pp.45-46; Houben, J.H. Vincent, “Southeast Asia and Islam”, op. cit., p.159; Abuza, Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia, op. cit., pp.7-11, 13-14, 20; The democratisation of Indonesia was led by Soeharto’s successor, President B.J. Habibie who removed the Anti-Subversion Law in 1999, and was followed by the
political constraints on Political-Islamic organisations and parties, allowing them new found freedoms such as use of the press and the legitimacy to campaign and compete independently in Indonesian politics.\textsuperscript{478} Prior to this, all Political-Islamic organisations in Indonesia were incorporated and strictly regulated and controlled by Suharto’s state-run and secular-leaning umbrella organisation, the United Development Party, established in 1973: the only Political-Islamic organisation to exist during the New Order era.\textsuperscript{479} Moreover, the introduction of a policy by Suharto in the mid-1980s, forcing all political and large organisations to adopt the pro-secular Pancasila manifesto as their sole ideological cornerstone (“asas tunggal”), followed by the introduction of the bill on ‘Political Parties and Golkar’ in 1985, led to restrictions on opposition political activities and parties themselves; especially Political-Islamic ones and Islamist activities and parties.\textsuperscript{480}

As a result of the emasculation of all forms of Political-Islam and the overall intensification of Suharto’s political authoritarianism during the New Order era, the identity of the different manifestations of Political-Islam in Indonesia became increasingly blurred and consequently came to be viewed as a

\textsuperscript{478} Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., p.20; Febrica, \textit{“Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia”}, pp.584-585.

\textsuperscript{479} Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., p.21; Febrica, \textit{“Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia”}, pp.584-585; Houben, \textit{“Southeast Asia and Islam”}, op. cit., p.158.

\textsuperscript{480} Desker, \textit{“Islam in Southeast Asia”}, op. cit., p.418.
monolithic phenomenon.\textsuperscript{481} The transition to democracy, and hence the legitimisation of Political-Islam, in the wake of the New Order era in Indonesia signalled not only the incorporation of Liberal and Conservative Political Islamic parties and organisations into the political mainstream, but Missionary and Activist Islamist ones as well.\textsuperscript{482} Some of these Islamist organisations, or elements within them, had links to the former Indonesian National Jihadist organisation DI and its TII militant terrorist wing.\textsuperscript{483} Moreover, members of the DI and TII had close links to JI’s leaders, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, who had retuned to Indonesia in October 1998 from Malaysia in the wake of Suharto’s resignation in May.\textsuperscript{484}

The legitimisation and growth of Political-Islam and, as a direct consequence, Islamism in Indonesia, was by default partly facilitated by Suharto himself as well as by successive Indonesian presidents prior to the country’s first free democratic elections in 2004 following the New Order era which saw Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono elected president.\textsuperscript{485} Realising the increasing support for

\textsuperscript{481} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{482} See, for example, Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., pp.44-46; Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., pp. 3-4, 7-11; Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., pp.418-419.


\textsuperscript{484} Jones, “\textit{Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On}”, p.12; “\textit{Transnational Terrorism}”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., pp.43-45.

\textsuperscript{485} See, for example, Desker, “\textit{Islam in Southeast Asia}”, op. cit., pp.418-419; Febrica, “\textit{Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia}”, p.585; Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., p.13: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was also democratically re-elected in 2009.
Political-Islam in Indonesia, throughout the 1990s Suharto attempted to court support from across the Political-Islamic spectrum in an effort to, on the one hand, consolidate his power bases while, on the other, attempting to contain the forces of Political-Islam and, in particular, the forces of Islamism. As a direct result of Suharto’s political consolidation and containment strategy the otherwise persecuted Islamist elements began to entrench themselves within the apparatus of the state, particularly in the military, and set about eroding the secular components of the state. The disintegration of the state was furthered by the cascading effects of the Asian Financial Crisis that broke out in 1997, leading to an escalation in tensions between the secular and Islamist elements within the government. Collectively, the economic and political crisis along with the consolidation of Political-Islam and the inclusion of Islamists into the establishment, combined with the breakdown of civil society, ultimately triggered widespread inter-communal violence which was largely instigated by Islamists.

By late-1999, the violence, fanned by Islamists and Jihadists alike, escalated into a Muslim-Christian conflict that was widespread throughout Indonesia and was particularly apparent on the islands of Maluku and Sulawesi.

486 See, for example, Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., pp.45-46; Houben, “*Southeast Asia and Islam*”, op. cit., p.158.

487 See, for example, Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, op. cit., p.46.

488 Ibid.

where it climaxed in 2000 with an estimated 9,000 people killed.\textsuperscript{490} It was during this period of intensified inter-religious violence in Indonesia that JI successfully infiltrated and/or collaborated with National Jihadist organisations particularly Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah (both of which have JI members in their leadership) and, though to a lesser extent, Lasker Jihad. These groups were formed to fight Indonesia’s indigenous Christian population.\textsuperscript{491} The post-Suharto political turmoil and intensified Muslim-Christian violence provided Sungkar and Ba’asyir with an unprecedented opportunity to exploit the violence and political unrest via their newfound civil and political freedoms to further expand their influence and hence JI’s Regional Jihadist Ideology in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{492} Moreover, JI and al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asia operative, Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambail – who is also a member of JI) created Rabitatul Mujahidin (Mujahidin Association) in Malaysia between 1999 and 2000; an incorporated alliance of Southeast Asian

\textsuperscript{490} See, for example, Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., p.46; Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., pp.3-4; Desker, \textit{“Islam in Southeast Asia”}, op. cit., p.423; \textit{“Transnational Terrorism”}, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., p.56.

\textsuperscript{491} Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., pp.3-4, 8-9, 80, 70; Desker, \textit{“Islam in Southeast Asia”}, op. cit., pp.419, 423; Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, op. cit., p.46; By 2000, it had become clear that some of these Missionary and, in particular, Activist Islamist organisations had begun to directly collaborate with, or were fronts for, Jihadist organisations in Indonesia. These include, among others, the Ulamas Council of Indonesia (MUI) – an Activist Islamist organisation which issued a fatwa (Islamic religious ruling) that called for Muslims to take up arms against Christians in Maluku and led to the establishment of the National Jihadist organisation Laskar Jihad in January 2000 – and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) – an Activist Islamist organisation that incites violence and was founded by the JI leader Ba’asyir in Yogyakarta in 2000, and is considered by experts to be a civic front for JI in Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{492} See, for example, Abuza, \textit{Political Islam And Violence in Indonesia}, op. cit., p.5; Desker, \textit{“Islam in Southeast Asia”}, op. cit., p.419; Jones, \textit{“Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On”}, p.13.
Jihadist organisations. Jihadist organisations and representatives that attended the series of meetings in Malaysia that resulted in the establishment of the Mujahidin Association, in addition to JI and al-Qaeda, included the MILF, Laskar Jundullah, Rohingya Muslims of Burma/Myanmar, Jihadists from southern Thailand, and GAM in Aceh, Indonesia.

Although al-Qaeda had already established close operational ties with Sungkar and Ba’asyir and their JI network in Malaysia and Singapore in the mid-1990s as well as with the ASG and the MILF during the same period, it was not until Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia in 1998 that the Global Jihadist doctrine first began to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia. Prior to 1998, al-Qaeda was a Regional Jihadist organisation. The fall of Suharto and the subsequent rise of Political-Islam and, in particular, Islamism and the widespread communal and inter-religious violence and economic crisis ultimately provided the required mix of political, social and economic factors necessary for the establishment of JI cells in Indonesia. In turn, the establishment of JI cells provided al-Qaeda with an ally/proxy through which it could gain a foothold to expand its Global Jihadist doctrine and operations into Indonesia. This was made clear by Ba’asyir in 1999 when he publicly declared his support for


494 Ibid.

495 See, for example, Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.423.

496 Ibid, p.419.

497 See, for example, Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.358; “Indonesia’s evolving terror networks”, op. cit., p.2.
“…Osama bin Laden’s struggle because his is the true struggle to uphold Islam”.498 This development directly followed the arrival of Omar al-Faruq in Indonesia in 1998 who had been despatched from the southern Philippines and was al-Qaeda’s first top operative to be stationed in Indonesia.499

During this period, in which al-Qaeda began to plan attacks against targets in Singapore via JI’s cells there, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were influencing and/or infiltrating some Indonesian based Missionary and Activist Islamist organisations advocating both JI’s and al-Qaeda’s ideology in an effort to increase recruitment and support.500 Hence, in 2000, following the death of Sungkar the pervious year, Ba’asyir organised a three-day Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta, Java. The conference drew delegates from across Indonesia’s Political-Islamic spectrum including Jihadists (with Australian members of the Jordanian based international Islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir also attending) and resulted in the establishment of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI – Mujahidin Council of Indonesia).501 The MMI is an Islamist umbrella organisation that seeks, firstly, the implementation of Islamic law and hence an Islamist state in Indonesia; secondly, a new Regional caliphate encompassing all states with a majority Muslim population and/or lands considered to be historically Islamic and, ultimately, to


499 See, for example, Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., pp.421-423.

500 See, for example, Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., pp.419-421; Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p.356.

501 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, op. cit., p.52.
establish a Global caliphate.\textsuperscript{502} The MMI, although comprising Missionary and Activist Islamist organisations, is considered by many experts to be a major front organisation for JI and other Indonesian Jihadist organisation’s non-violent activities in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{503}

Ba’asyir’s endeavours throughout this period aimed to recruit and bring as many Islamist organisations and individuals throughout Southeast Asia into line and/or under the influence of JI’s Regional Jihadist ideology and, in turn, provide the Global Jihadist movement with a wider recruitment pool in the region: Malaysian and Indonesian operatives attempted to establish an official Southeast Asia branch of al-Qaeda in 2008.\textsuperscript{504} They sought also to infiltrate and operate out of southern Thailand exploiting the political and security conditions in that country.\textsuperscript{505}

Moreover, in the post-9/11 period, and particularly since 2005, al-Qaeda has sought to renew its operational ties with the both the MILF and the ASG in the southern Philippines following increased efforts by governments in the region, notably the Indonesian government in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombing, to resolve long-standing communal and inter-religious domestic conflicts which has affected al-Qaeda’s and JI’s operational theatre in the region and forced them to

\textsuperscript{502} Ibid


\textsuperscript{504} See, for example, Jones, \textit{“Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On”}, p.15.

\textsuperscript{505} Ibid.
Furthermore, unlike the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, ASEAN member states in the post-9/11 period have not engaged in any major inter-state conflicts, though tensions and mistrust remain a real problem, or facilitated or encouraged Jihadist attacks against other neighbouring states. This has further reduced incentives and limited the ‘operating space’ for Global Jihadists in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{507}

These developments have limited al-Qaeda’s and its regional affiliates, especially JI, abilities to exploit local grievances which they seek to harness in an effort to manufacture pro-Global Jihadist sentiment and, ultimately, new recruits.\textsuperscript{508} However, al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 activities in Southeast Asia and globally also confirms its ability to adapt and expand geographically which, in turn, has ultimately allowed al-Qaeda to regenerate and evolve its ideological and operational theatre in Southeast Asia and beyond.\textsuperscript{509} Intelligence gained by Indonesian and Thai authorities, and arrests in Malaysia, in 2008 confirmed that despite intense counter-terrorism operations in Southeast Asia, al-Qaeda (especially AQI) had began to restore its links with JI which had been disrupted in 2003. Rohan Gunaratna noted that "Al-Qaeda’s’ re-linking with JI suggests an increase in the pace of transfer of ideology, finance and technology from the

\textsuperscript{506} Ibid, pp.13-14.

\textsuperscript{507} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{508} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{509} See, for example, Gunaratna, “Links between Asian and Middle Eastern Terrorism” op. cit., p.15; Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., pp.363-365.
Middle East to Asia.”\(^{510}\) Evidence of this can be seen in a second short lived attempt by al-Qaeda to establish an official Southeast Asia branch in Aceh, Sumatra but was quickly broken up and its members arrested by Indonesian authorities in February 2010. This attempt brought together a collection of some six Jihadist groups to form what was al-Qaeda for the Veranda of Mekkah.\(^{511}\)

Al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 evolution, as noted in the previous two chapters, has been further underpinned by the ascent of al-Qaeda’s ‘second generation’ Jihadist ideology that has spawned the phenomenon of ‘home-grown’ and ‘lone-wolf’ inspired Global Jihadists following the invasions of Afghanistan and, in particular, Iraq.\(^{512}\) In Indonesia alone, which is the epicentre of the Global Jihadist phenomenon in Southeast Asia, a July 2005 Pew Research Center survey identified that 62 percent of Muslims had an unfavourable view of the U.S. This directly increased the acceptance amongst Indonesian Muslims of the use of violence against the perceived ‘enemies’ of Islam, providing JI and al-Qaeda with a much wider recruitment pool.\(^{513}\) Support for al-Qaeda in Indonesia was highlighted in Pew Research Center surveys in 2010 and 2011 which indicated an average 21% of the Muslim population had a favourable view towards al-Qaeda in that country alone.\(^{514}\) Gunaratna identifies these two theatres of conflict as

\(^{510}\) Gunaratna, “Links between Asian and Middle Eastern Terrorism” op. cit., p.15.

\(^{511}\) See, for example, Jones, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On”, p.16.


\(^{514}\) “Key Indicators Database: Al Qaeda Favourability” op. cit., p.1.
ultimately a new Afghan-Jihad stating that: “The partnership [between AQI and JI] creates opportunities for fighting in Iraq, the most dangerous combat zone in the world, and transfer of expertise and skills to Asian conflict zones such as southern Thailand, eastern Indonesia and the southern Philippines.”515 Therefore, in the post-9/11 period al-Qaeda’s foothold in the region, like in all its other geographic theatres of operation, has dispersed to spawn new ‘affiliated’ and ‘inspired’ Global Jihadist organisations and individuals across Southeast Asia; since 2008 this phenomenon has shown signs of a revival which endures to this day.516

Therefore, as in its other theatres of operation throughout the world, al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 evolution in Southeast Asia can be seen in two key areas. First, in the total number of organisations and individuals which have adopted the Global Jihadist doctrine as well as attacks carried out by them since 9/11. This increase can be compared with the 2002-2010 listings of Jihadist groups by the U.S. Department of State. Secondly, the geographic sphere in which Global Jihadists now operate.517 The increase, also identified in the previous two chapters,

515 Gunaratna, “Links between Asian and Middle Eastern Terrorism” op. cit., p.15

516 See, for example, ibid.

is the direct result of al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification strategy, implemented in response to the international community’s and, in the context of Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s commitment to the War on Terror.\textsuperscript{518}

Although this study presents evidence supporting the growing phenomenon of Global Jihadism in Southeast Asia it should be noted that, unlike the Middle East and some other regions of the Muslim world, it has been to a much lesser degree. Hence, al-Qaeda has not yet been able to infiltrate and/or exploit particular religious, social, economic, or political conditions in Southeast Asia to their full advantage. This was evident following the failure of al-Qaeda to establish an official regional branch of the organisation in southern Thailand in 2008 and in Aceh, Indonesia in 2010 despite its post-9/11 decentralisation and diversification strategy.\textsuperscript{519} Moreover, Jihadist organisations in the region which have had direct operational and strategic links to al-Qaeda, and thus direct exposure to Global Jihadist ideology such as JAT, JI, MILF, and the ASG, have to date not evolved into comprehensive affiliates of either al-Qaeda or the Global Jihadist doctrine.\textsuperscript{520} Thus, the MILF remains a National Jihadist organisation: the ASG remains affectively a National and Regional hybrid Jihadist organisation: and JI and JAT remain essentially Regional Jihadist organisations with international operational and strategic links with al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda and its Southeast Asia operatives remain a primary threat to the region and are

\textsuperscript{518} See, for example, Gunaratna, “Links between Asian and Middle Eastern Terrorism” op. cit., p.15.

\textsuperscript{519} See, for example, Jones, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On”, pp.15-16.

\textsuperscript{520} Ibid, p.15.
actively seeking to infiltrate and expand the organisations operations and Global Jihadist doctrine throughout the region.

Evidence of this can also be found in the types of counter-terrorism responses and cooperation by ASEAN member states in the post-9/11 period which include domestic, regional and global efforts to combat Islamist militant terrorist organisations in the region. These three geographic levels of counter-terrorism response adopted by most Southeast Asia countries further reflect the three geopolitical and ideological phases and categories of the Jihadist phenomenon in Southeast Asia and hence the extent to which National, Regional and Global Islamist militant terrorist organisations are operating in the region.

At the domestic level, most ASEAN member states affected by Islamist militant terrorism have in place a twofold counter-terrorism approach that includes a combination of military and police and/or law enforcement responses and counter-radicalisation initiatives. However, approaches vary significantly between ASEAN members according to a particular state’s domestic political and religious environment as well as the preserved security threat to the state. On the domestic front in Singapore, a key ally and supporter of the U.S.-led War on Terror, and Malaysia, for example, the governments there have implemented

\[521\] See, for example, “Transnational Terrorism”, Foreword by Alexander Downer, op. cit., pp.61-63.

\[522\] Ibid.

\[523\] See, for example, Febrica, “Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia”, pp. 569-573.
counter-radicalisation programs which have had some success. In Indonesia and the Philippines (which has established an inter-agency counter-terrorism task force), to date counter-radicalisation efforts have had far less success even if they have been attempted. These two countries have, however, implemented military (especially the Philippines) and extensive law enforcement (particularly Indonesia) responses and initiatives which have had significant successes in combating the Jihadist threat in those two countries in the post 9/11 period. The choice to use military and heavy policing and/or law enforcement tactics and strategies to combat Jihadists provides further evidence of how significant the immediate threat is in those two countries. In addition, most countries in Southeast Asia have made considerable efforts to combat the fundraising efforts of Jihadists and have introduced significant changes to counter-terrorism laws and arrested many Jihadists and those aiding them in the post-9/11 period (especially in the wake of the first Bali bombing in 2002) signalling that most countries in Southeast Asia have a domestic Jihadist threat to some degree or another.

---

524 See, for example, Jones, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On”, p.17.


At the regional level countries in Southeast Asia work together through different inter-state counter-terrorism initiatives. These include bilateral and multilateral efforts and/or strategic partnerships between particular countries in Southeast Asia as well as at an official ASEAN level. Malaysia, for example, established the South-East Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCCT) in July 2003, an initiative that brings together counter-terrorism officials and those working in the field in the region for counter-terrorism training and capacity-building. The Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia have worked closely together to improve law enforcement and intelligence sharing efforts to counter Jihadists. These efforts have helped disrupt Jihadist organisations operating in and across these three countries borders and, for example, led to the detection of a Jihadist cell operating in Cambodia and the arrests of its three JI members and one al-Qaeda operative who were planning an attack in that country in 2003. Moreover, at the official regional level ASEAN has established more than a dozen institutional bodies to increase cooperation amongst its ten member states in an effort to combat Islamist militant terrorism throughout the region. A major intra-ASEAN counter-terrorism initiative emerged in October 2003 at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali where all ten member states signed the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II. The declaration states that the ASEAN Security Community will use ASEAN’s existing institutions and mechanisms to combat Jihadist organisations and transnational crime. The declaration further complemented

528 Ibid, p.62.
530 Ibid, p.63.
ASEAN’s commitment to counter-terrorism initiatives being implemented through other regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Collectively these inter-state and ASEAN counter-terrorism efforts provide additional insight into the imminent reality and threat posed by Jihadists to the wider region, especially Regional Islamist militant terrorist organisations.

At the global level, ASEAN contributes via regional initiatives which make up an essential part of the wider international community’s counter-terrorism efforts, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to this, individual countries in Southeast Asia have independently pursued bilateral initiatives in the post-9/11 period. These have included forging and renewing strategic and military ties with international powers such as the U.S. and its Western allies (especially Australia), and supporting the U.S.-led global War on Terror in an effort to fight Jihadists – as well as other forms of militant terrorism – worldwide: especially al-Qaeda and its global network of affiliates and their Global Jihadist doctrine. Examples of global bilateral counter-terrorism arrangements include the Philippines support of the U.S.-led global War on Terror, which has seen increased intelligence and military relations between those two countries, and its ratifying of all 12 UN counter-terrorism instruments. The

---

531 Ibid.

532 Ibid, pp. 61-63, 87, 90,

Philippine government also signed the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation to combat international terrorism with Australia on the 4th of March 2004. On the 5th of February 2004, Indonesia and Australia announced a joint counter-terrorism initiative to establish the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation in the wake of the first Bali and J W Marriott Hotel bombings. In February that year Indonesia and Australia also hosted a Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism which addressed critical areas of law enforcement, intelligence sharing and legal frameworks and was attended by Foreign Ministers and law enforcement officials from 25 countries. Moreover, Australia and the U.S. are key supporters of the SEARCCCT counter-terrorism initiative set up by Malaysia. The Singapore government has increased security, intelligence and defence relations with the U.S. and is a key supporter of the U.S.-led War on Terror, explicitly asking for U.S. engagement to combat Jihadist forces in the region, and has enhanced intelligence sharing through its Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre and the U.S. Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Centre. It has also ensured that its ports are inline with U.S. cargo and transportation requirements. Singapore has also increased these areas of counter-terrorism with Australia.

534 Ibid, p.87.
536 Ibid.
537 Ibid.
539 Ibid.
These global commitments to counter-terrorism by individual ASEAN member states, although varying from country to country and not foolproof as Jihadist groups operating in the region continue to readapt to counter-terrorism efforts, have, nevertheless, further strengthened the overall intelligence and readiness of both individual countries in Southeast Asia and the wider international community and the ability to detect, prevent or respond to Islamist militant terrorist threats or attacks. However, if states in the region provide the ‘political space’ and hence operational conditions/environment, resulting from, in particular, political instability and inter-religious or inter-communal violence, al-Qaeda would certainly capitalise and, in turn, increase the potential of that organisation and thus the Global Jihadist phenomenon becoming established in the Southeast Asia; regardless of the heightened counter-terrorism measures taken by ASEAN member states.
Chapter Eight

Conclusion

The study has examined key political, historical, economic, social, and religious phenomena and contexts directly associated with the phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism, and hence Jihadism, in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. It has presented qualified support for the claim that there have been three key sequential phases in the ‘ideological evolution’ and ‘geopolitical transformation’ of the phenomenon in the Middle East and thus the National, Regional and Global phases of Jihadism. The study has presented qualified evidence that the Jihadist phenomenon in Southeast Asia has undergone the first two phases and thus the National and Regional ideological and geopolitical transformation of Islamist militant terrorism. However, unlike the Middle East, the Jihadist phenomenon in Southeast Asia has thus far not undergone an explicit shift towards Global Jihadism despite efforts to establish itself in the region. Therefore, the study concludes that the phenomenon of Global Islamist militant terrorism to date has not been able to successfully gain a foothold in Southeast Asia.

The vast majority of the literature and data produced on Jihadism and examined in this study provide significant evidence that the phenomenon has undergone three sequential phases of ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation. The materials examined support the claim that the three phases of Jihadism emerged, and are manifested, in the context of National, Regional and
Global ideological and geopolitical frameworks. This, in turn, underpins support for the study’s claim that there exist three primary categories of organisations and individuals within the wide phenomenon of Jihadism. In the Middle East all three exist: National, Regional and Global. In Southeast Asia only the first two exist: National and Regional.

The thesis has provided adequate evidence supporting the study’s hypothesis gained through its comparative, historical and phenomenological analysis of key data directly associated with the ideological and geopolitical contours of Jihadist organisations and individuals since the phenomenon’s inception in the early 20th Century. The collected materials and data have been analysed against the spectrum which has set out the ideological and geopolitical contours of a number of key Jihadist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The spectrum explains the ideological and geopolitical trajectory of the Jihadist organisations and individuals examined in this study from their inspection to their current manifestations. Mapping their evolution and transformation which provides key insights into the ambitions and grievances of a particular Jihadist organisation or individual as well as evidence for the three phases and categories of Jihadism and the sequential shift that some Middle Eastern and Southeast Asia based Jihadist organisations and individuals have undergone. The spectrum presents analysis that provides significant evidence supporting the claim that the phenomenon of Jihadism is a sub-category of Islamism which emerged from, and is part of, the wider phenomenon of Political-Islam. The findings highlight that the phenomenon is not monolithic but, rather, that it is threefold consisting of fundamentally different ideological contours and
geopolitical grievances and ambitions. These are identified in this study as National, Regional and Global manifestations of Jihadism and thus collectively represent the wider phenomenon of Islamist militant terrorism in the Middle East while the first two represent the phenomenon in Southeast Asia.

While the evidence collected in this study supports the view that there are three primary categories of Jihadist organisations and individuals, not all have undergone any sequential shift in ideological evolution or geopolitical transformation since their inspection. Examples here include, among others, HAMAS in the Gaza strip and the MILF in the southern Philippines. However, the study has presented significant evidence that some organisations and individuals have undergone one or more of the phases of Jihadism. These include, among others, JI in Southeast Asia and the GSPC (also a core AQIM member) in the Middle East which have undergone at least two phases and, moreover, have emerged as al-Qaeda affiliates in their respected regions and therefore have further evolved into independent and semi-autonomous representatives respectively of the Global Jihadist doctrine. Others, such as the EIJ, Tanzim al-jihad and the collection of Jihadist organisations that make up AQIM, AQI and AQAP have undergone all three phases of Jihadism. Moreover, operatives and organisations such as JI and JAT in Southeast Asia, while not explicit adherents of the Global Jihadist doctrine, nevertheless, collaborate with and represent al-Qaeda in the region. Collectively, these groups form the cornerstone underpinning the wider al-Qaeda network and Global Jihadist phenomenon in the two regions.
Although sometimes having strategic links, it is argued that the three forms of Jihadism are fundamentally separate entities driven by different ideological and geopolitical grievances and ambitions that, over time, have come to manifest National, Regional and Global phenomena and phases of Islamist militant terrorism. The evidence presented indicates that, in the context of the two geographic regions examined, this process began in the Middle East in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century and thereafter emerged in Southeast Asia in the mid- to late- 1940s. Although the study identifies and confirms that all three phases and hence categories of Jihadist organisations and individuals exist and are active in the Middle East, evidence indicates that only the National and Regional phases and categories of the Jihadist phenomenon have successfully emerged in Southeast Asia.

It has been found that Jihadist organisations or individuals that have undergone one or more of the phases of ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation primarily results from ongoing direct ‘contact’ and/or strategic collaboration rather than an exclusively ‘natural’ evolutionary processes. Identifying the ideological evolution of a particular organisation or individual is often preceded by, and transferred through, increased interactions or strategic forms of collaboration such as the transfer of tactics, technologies and finances between the different categories of Jihadists. The thesis has presented evidence that political instability, authoritarian regimes and failing and/or failed states have all exacerbated the Jihadist phenomenon since its inception in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century.
The proliferation of Jihadism has been particularly energised by conflicts, especially anti-colonialist violence in the post-WWI period and during and after WWII in both regions; Muslim-Jewish violence in Palestine; the 1967 Six Day and 1973 Yom Yippur Wars; the Afghan-Soviet War; the 1991 Gulf War; Muslim-Christian violence in post-Suharto Indonesia; the long running separatist conflicts in both the southern Philippines and southern Thailand; the post-9/11 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; and post-Arab Spring Syria. Collectively, these conflicts can be seen as ‘melting-pots’ for Jihadist strategic collaboration. They have attracted and provided organisations and individuals from across the Jihadist spectrum theatres in which to strengthen their tactics, strategies and relations and thus have acted as Jihadists incubators which have significantly catalysed the proliferation of the wider Jihadist phenomenon in the Middle East and Southeast Asia and beyond.

The analysis has also identified that ongoing direct contact and strategic collaboration between National and Regional Jihadist organisations and individuals with Global Jihadists has had major implications in the post-9/11 period, especially in the context of al-Qaeda’s decentralisation and diversification. It is argued that during the post-9/11 period, al-Qaeda has successfully dispersed into a multidimensional organisation that has amalgamated and infiltrated both Regional and National Jihadist theatres of operation as well as organisations. This development is primarily the result of al-Qaeda’s ability to harness strategic collaboration as a tool to gain footholds into National and Regional Jihadist organisations and their theatres of operation in an effort to influence, recruit, regenerate, and thus endure.
Most literature and reports examined in this study provide evidence that Jihadist organisations have experienced significant setbacks following increased global counter-terrorism and security measures in the wake of 9/11. There is, however, a gulf between that evidence and that which supports a decline in the overall Global Jihadist phenomenon, especially in the context of al-Qaeda ‘affiliated’ and ‘inspired’ Global Jihadists, or a decline in Regional and National Jihadist organisations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia and beyond. The study has considered, and acknowledges, evidence supporting that idea that there have been significant successes in combating Jihadist organisations in both of the considered regions and worldwide since 9/11. These have, however, primarily targeted al-Qaeda, especially the organisations central command structure and fighters that form AQC, and its network of Global Jihadist ‘affiliates’ operations, activities and, in particular, their ability to carry out large scale militant terrorist attacks. The argument here is that while the successes made have, on the one hand, significantly reduced both AQC and AQC-affiliated Jihadist organisations capabilities, on the other hand, they have not led to a stemming of the overall geographic expanse and number of Global Jihadist organisations or Regional or National Jihadist organisations in the two considered regions.

The thesis has presented analysis supporting the claim that there has been an overall increase in the wider Jihadist phenomenon since its inception in the early 20th Century and, especially, since the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, followed by additional spikes in the phenomenon throughout the 1990s and 2000s, particularly in the post-2003 period. Although armed Islamic groups pre-date the beginning of the 20th Century in both of the considered regions, the phenomenon
and ascent of Jihadist organisations do not; they first emerged in the early 1900s during which there was only a small number of National Jihadist organisations. In the Middle East these included the al-Qassam group in Palestine, al-Husseini’s Nazi facilitated campaign of terror against Jews in Palestine and Eastern Europe during WWII, and the Muslim Brotherhood (although it no longer employs militant terrorism). In the context of Southeast Asia, these included Darul Islam and TII in Indonesia. By the late 1970s, National Jihadist organisations in the Middle East increased to include, among others, the EIJ, the Islamic Group in Algeria, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In Southeast Asia, the MILF in the southern Philippines and Komando Jihad and JMA in Indonesia emerged as National Jihadist organisations during this period. National Jihadism has represented the primary manifestation within the wider phenomenon and has spawned many more organisations throughout the post-1970s in both regions and beyond.

From the late 1970s onwards, and in particular throughout the 1980s, the phenomenon underwent the ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation away from an exclusively National Jihadist phenomenon to a Regional one as well. The development spawned a new generation of organisations and, in the context of Iran, and to some extent, Saudi Arabia, state sponsors. The analysis identified that those Middle East based organisations that emerged, or underwent ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation from a National to Regional Jihadist organisation during this period included, among others, the EIJ, the Tanzim al-Jihad network, MAK, and al-Qaeda. In Southeast Asia they primarily included Komando Jihad and Group 272. Regional Jihadist organisations increased
significantly throughout the post-1980s period and represent the second largest pool within the wider phenomenon of Jihadism in both of the regions and elsewhere.

A third overall increase in the Jihadist phenomenon was identified as emerging in the late 1990s. During this period the Regional Jihadist organisation al-Qaeda spawned the ascent of Global Jihadism which it signalled with the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad in 1998. Al-Qaeda can be seen as the first Global Jihadist organisation and thus it represents the third phase of ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation of Jihadism in the Middle East and has been attempting to establish itself in Southeast Asia. Throughout the post-1998 period, and especially in the 2000s, al-Qaeda and its Global Jihadist doctrine experienced considerable growth in both regions and beyond. The analysis identified the following Jihadist organisations, among others, in the two regions as joining or being linked to the al-Qaeda network or adopting its ideology throughout the post-1990s: the EIJ, the Tanzim al-Jihad network, the Islamic Group, the GSPC, Ansar al-Islam, Tawhid wa al-Jihad, and Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah. In Southeast Asia these have included, among others, Group 272, JI, ASG, and JAT.

Although representing a minority within the wider pool of Jihadism, and significantly weakened militarily, the al-Qaeda-led Global Jihadist movement and doctrine and their operations endure. They have evolved throughout the post-9/11 period following the U.S.-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan and, in particular, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. These two conflicts, along with increased global
counter-terrorism efforts, have forced the decentralisation and diversification of al-Qaeda resulting in a far more clandestine organisation and directly facilitating an increase in al-Qaeda ‘affiliated’ organisations in the two considered regions as well as the unprecedented ascent of al-Qaeda ‘inspired’ Global Jihadist organisations, cells and individuals in the Middle East and beyond. The conclusion can be drawn that the global post-9/11 political and security environment and, in particular, the military responses in Afghanistan and Iraq to the Global Jihadist threat have been, although far from counter-productive, ‘double-edged’. They provided al-Qaeda with the opportunity to disperse, readapt and regenerate and hence the ability to infiltrate and work alongside what are otherwise essentially Regional or National Jihadist organisations and theatres. Ultimately, this has allowed al-Qaeda additional exposure to further expand its ideological influence, techniques and recruitment potential across a wider geographic sphere and thus has increased the overall number of al-Qaeda ‘affiliated’ and ‘inspired’ Global Jihadist organisations since 9/11.

Whist al-Qaeda has been unsuccessful in surpassing or matching the scale of destruction and lethality of the 9/11 attacks the overall increases in al-Qaeda ‘affiliated’ and ‘inspired’ organisations, cells and individuals have, in turn, converted to an overall increase in Global Jihadist militant terror attacks as well as in the overall Jihadist phenomenon in the Middle East and beyond. This development has had a significantly impact in Southeast Asia where al-Qaeda has been actively seeking to infiltrate and establish itself since the late-1990s, and especially throughout the 2000s. Al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 decentralisation and diversification into Southeast Asia has accelerated the transfer of militant terrorist
capabilities and technologies and the Global Jihadist doctrine to the region and intensified the overall phenomenon which has thus resulted in the proliferation of attacks carried out by Jihadist organisations in the region in the post-9/11 period.

Collectively, the analysis presented provides qualified support for the idea that the three phases of sequential ideological evolution and geopolitical transformation have ultimately produced an overall increase in the wider phenomenon of Jihadism in both regions. Increases have been identified in the overall number of organisations and individuals which adhere to National, Regional or Global Jihadist doctrines, as well as increases in the overall geographic expanse of the phenomenon since its inception in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. The thesis reaches the conclusion that National Jihadists represent the largest group, followed by Regional Jihadists as the second largest group, and Global Jihadists as the third largest group within the wider Jihadist phenomenon.
Bibliography

Primary sources

Official documents and reports:


Articles in periodicals:


**Journals:**


Reports, surveys and articles produced by think-tanks and institutions:


194


Secondary sources

Books, chapters within books and theses:


Cape, Jonathan, 1977, *The Ottoman Centuries, The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, Lord Kings, Landon, Great Britain.


196


Newspapers and news services:

ABC News [Electronic], available: www.abcnews.go.com

ABS-CBN News [Electronic], available: www.abs-cbnnews.com

Agence France Presse [Electronic], available: www.afp.com/en/home

BBC News [Electronic], available: www.bbc.com/news

CNN News [Electronic], available: www.cnn.com

Free Malaysia Today [Electronic], available: www.freemalaysiatody.com

Frontline [Electronic], available: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline

Gulf Daily News [Electronic], available: www.gulf-daily-news.com
Malaya Business Insight [Electronic], available: www.malaya.com

The Christian Science Monitor [Electronic], available: www.csmonitor.com

The Express Tribune [Electronic], available: www.tribune.com.pk

The Guardian [Electronic], available: www.guardian.co.uk

The Jerusalem Post [Electronic], available: www.jpost.com

The News International [Electronic], available: www.thenews.com.pk

The New Republic [Electronic], available: www.tnr.com


The Telegraph [Electronic], available: www.telegraph.co.uk

The Washington Post [Electronic], available: www.washingtonpost.com