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Reclaiming Mystery:
A Māori philosophy of Being, in light of Novalis’ ontology

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of the requirements for the degree
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by

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Abstract

In both the German Romantic and the Māori traditions, Sein/Being may be described as both finite and endless, and is not a separate phenomenon from things in the world but instead one that gives rise to them, providing them with Geheimnis/mystery. Forgetting about Being is an issue for the Māori self now as much as for the West, however, and it is moreover implicit in various modes of colonisation that things in the world should be approached as if they are geheimnislos/lacking mystery. To acknowledge Being in all its mystery is to bring to the fore, once again, the notion that the activity of Being is not separate from the consciousness of the self, or from other things in the world.

The frühromantische/early German Romantic poet and philosopher, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), had written in the late 18th century on the threat that Geheimnislosigkeit/the lack of mystery posed for the integrity of things in the world. His works are central to this thesis: I approach them with an ontological focus and use them as Stoßsätze/sentences that challenge and push, to examine how Māori, individually and collectively, are encouraged to forget Being and mystery in their everyday interactions with the philosophies of Western institutions. I then engage with the dominant usages of the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’, ‘whenua’, and ‘mātauranga’, to show that they are characterised by an overriding lack of mystery. Finally I use some of Novalis’ fragments to romanticise/revitalise those terms and the things to which they refer, in conjunction with some other Māori terms, thereby reclaiming aspects of their mystery in modern philosophical discourses. I also offer some romanticised early German Romantic terms from their positioning alongside Māori ones.

This thesis is innovative methodically and substantively, highlighting two main themes: the collaborative approach of referring to a seemingly disparate philosophical source to explain colonising influences on Māori metaphysics, ontology and epistemology, and the possibility for some substantive critique and resolution to those influences. The form of Symphilosophie/[unified philosophy] that is referred to here is both collaborative and productive. Novalis’ theories and fragments assist method and substance. My thesis brings to the fore the value of his sources when they are brought into dialogue with Māori philosophy to illuminate the issue of Geheimnis to things in the world.
Acknowledgements

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I acknowledge the influence of my father, Peter Lewis, and my uncle David, who both passed away in 2012. They were constantly inquiring into my progress on the thesis, and provided definite ‘sentences that push’ with their unique senses of humour.

Last but not least, I also acknowledge my aunt, Betty (Titari) Hill, of Ngāti Tūwharetoa, who passed away some years ago. She encouraged me to constantly think beyond the world of appearances. Moe mai i tō moenga roa, e kui.

Nga mihi nui ki a koutou.
# Table of contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iv
Table of contents ............................................................................................................... v
Style notes .......................................................................................................................... ix
  Technical formatting approach ................................................................. ix
  Linguistic approach ............................................................................................. x
  Subtextual approach ............................................................................................. xi
Chapter One: Introduction: ‘Geheimnis’/mystery/“Tērā te auahi” ............... 1
  The Māori writer in the realm of mystery: “Tērā te Auahi” ......................... 2
  “Tērā te Auahi” and the mystery of Heidegger’s ‘legein’/gathering disciplines ................................................................. 6
  The beginning of a discussion of Geheimnis ...................................................... 8
  Novalis’ and Māori elements of thought ......................................................... 10
  My Erkenntnisinteresse/motivation to inquire into the theme of Geheimnis ... 12
    The philosophical problem of Geheimnislosigkeit ...................................... 14
    Discordance between traditional utterance and usage ............................... 16
    The teachings of an aunt .............................................................................. 19
    The desire to engage with Symphilosophie ................................................. 20
    The substantive structure of this thesis .......................................................... 26
Chapter Two: The mystery of Stoßsätze/ [sentences that challenge and push],
and of thinking: Terms and method ................................................................. 29
  Kore/korekore: Das Absolute, Sein, das Unbedingte................................. 30
    Das Absolute/the absolute ........................................................................ 30
    ‘Sein’/Being .............................................................................................. 36
    Das Unbedingte/the unreified .................................................................. 38
    Oppositional states as part of a method ................................................... 39
  Method: Thinking after the sentence that pushes ........................................... 39
    ‘Stoßsätze’ – Novalis’ method involving sentences that challenge and push 42
    Stoßsätze: A dialogue between Novalis and aspects of Māori metaphysics. 48
    The method of Nachdenken: Thinking within Novalis’ Stoßsätzen .......... 62
    The form and effect of Stoßsätze in each chapter ..................................... 87
Chapter Three: Philosophising about Being and mystery ............................ 91

The purpose of this chapter ............................................................................. 91
Novalis, Fichte, and chapter structure............................................................. 92
Preliminary methodical remarks concerning this chapter .............................. 96
1. Novalis’ agreement/opposition method ....................................................... 97
   Novalis’ ambivalent reaction to the Enlightenment........................................... 97
2. Adopting Novalis’ methods and assertions for a process of active
   philosophising .............................................................................................. 114
   Novalis’ philosophising as the basis for my own ........................................... 114
   Te Maire Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains” .......................................................... 116
3. Philosophical fragments that propose a notion of Being for Māori readers 126
   Named and unnamed Being: Its ongoing activity ........................................... 130
   Being intuited in text and in silence .............................................................. 133
   Being, present in both solitary and combined words ...................................... 135
   Humanity as creative agency, within the domain of the Absolute ............... 136
   Language as a potential unifier of Being and beings ..................................... 139
Summary ............................................................................................................ 141

Chapter Four: Poesy as Stoßsatz: “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren”.
A critique of Geheimnislosigkeit ...................................................................... 143

The substantive importance of “Wenn nicht mehr” ..................................... 144
“Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” – manifestations of Geheimnislosigkeit
............................................................................................................................ 147
   Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren/Sind Schlüssel aller Kreaturen...... 149
   Wenn die, so singen oder küssen/Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen........... 156
   Wenn sich die Welt in’s freie Leben/Und in die Welt wird zurück begeben
   ........................................................................................................................ 162
   Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten/Zu echter Klarheit werden gatten
   ........................................................................................................................ 165
   Und man in Märchen und Gedichten/Erkennt die ewgen Weltgeschichten 167
   Dann fliegt vor Einem geheimen Wort/Das ganze verkehrte Wesen sofort 170
The dialectics of “Wenn nicht mehr” .............................................................. 171
Thinking affirmatively within the problem: Overcoming Geheimnislosigkeit
............................................................................................................................ 173
Chapter Five: The epistemological and ontological loss of Geheimnis as a colonising act on Māori

- Stoßsätze to be addressed
- The forgetting of everyday Being: “Das ganze verkehrte Wesen”
- Preventing the autonomous manifestation of things: Die Tiefgelehrten
- Overriding focus on highly visible presence: Zahlen und Figuren
- Health as an issue of physical presence: Licht und Schatten
- The drive of the self to express him- or herself with precision: Schlüssel aller Kreaturen
- Summary

Chapter Six: Nachdenken: The geheimnislose constraint of Being in some Māori terms

- Novalis’ views on language, continued
- Geheimnislose terms in focus
1. The positioning of ‘whakapapa’ as highly visible ‘genealogy’
2. The introduction of epistemic certainty through ‘mātauranga’
3. The self-focus of ‘ako’
4. A solid portrayal of phenomena through ‘whenua’
- Summary

Chapter Seven: The Geheimnis of Māori terms in light of Novalis’ Romantisieren

- Preliminary remarks
- Reclaiming the spontaneity of terms
- Some contemplative fragments for the reader of the early German Romantics
- The benefits of romanticising terms: Wellbeing
- Challenging the geheimnislose self: ‘Dasein’/‘ira’
- Reviewing Novalis’ interpretation of the ‘self’
- Dasein
- The Māori self: A general introduction
Romanticising the epistemic self: Ira and its geheimnisvolle nature ............ 275
Exkurs: A Māori romanticisation of the Dasein of the Ich .................................. 278
The groundlessness of the apparent ground .............................................................. 279
Ira’s judgement of its fragility: Whakawā ................................................................. 279
Exkurs: ‘Urteil’, romanticised by ‘whakawā’ ‘Urteil’ ............................................. 283
Being’s geheimnisvolle arrangement of things and ira ........................................... 284
The Absolute’s active layering and accrual: Whakapapa ........................................ 284
Exkurs: Actio in distans – whakapapa ..................................................................... 297
The concerning comportment of things for ira: Whakaaro ...................................... 298
Wonderment through the groundlessness of Being: Ako ....................................... 300
Disclosure and concealment for ira: Whenua ......................................................... 309
Exkurs: Tupuna/‘Vorfahr’ romanticised ................................................................. 313
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 314

**Chapter Eight: Conclusion** .................................................................................. 315
Uniqueness of the thesis .............................................................................................. 315
Specific arguments ................................................................................................... 316
Philosophical and cultural implications of the thesis as it relates to postcolonialism ............................................................................................................. 321
Everyday nature of ontological metaphysics .......................................................... 322
Challenges arising during thinking and writing ....................................................... 323
Retaining a Māori ‘voice’ .......................................................................................... 323
Complicating what is actually quite simple ................................................................ 325
Potential for future research ..................................................................................... 326
Summary: Reference back to “Tērā te Auahi” ......................................................... 327

**Glossary** ................................................................................................................. 329
German terms ............................................................................................................ 329
Māori terms .............................................................................................................. 333

**References** ............................................................................................................ 343
Style notes

The reader should keep in mind the following aspects of style:

Technical formatting approach

As much early German Romantic text is not available in English, or because I wished to place greater emphasis on aspects of Geheimnis/mystery than some translations offered, I have provided some translations into English myself. Some Māori text has also not been translated. Where I have translated German or Māori quotes myself, I give the German or Māori first in quotation marks, follow this with its reference in APA in text style, and then follow it with a solidus (/), and then my translation enclosed in square parentheses. In cases where the translation is not mine but another author’s, it is enclosed in quotation marks and then followed by its reference, as with the German version. However, where a German or Māori term is already very well known amongst those speakers, or has already been translated by several sources, I have provided the common definition without square parentheses.

The APA rule is that quotes that exceed the 40-word limit be indented beneath the paragraph. I have generally followed this rule but, because the quotes often combine both German and English and hence their combined word count, I have sometimes kept the quotes within the paragraph, particularly when the flow of the paragraph is retained by running the quotes on straight from the text.

To draw the reader’s attention to a use of a term that is key, or to highlight a term that is significant or idiosyncratic in a discrete piece of text, instead of using double quotation marks (which is the norm for APA referencing) I use single quotation marks to avoid confusion with direct quotations. Generally I do not use quotation marks again for the term thereafter, but will sometimes include them to make it clearer that it is the term itself that is being discussed. I also use single quotation marks with translations when there is some text between the German or
Māori term and the English translation. Italics are reserved for smaller works or for emphasis, double quotation marks for larger works when not used for direct quotations.

The table of contents shows headings of font size 16 and above.

**Linguistic approach**

To highlight the crucial importance and dignity of one of this thesis’ key terms, I have capitalised ‘being’ – therefore ‘Being’. This is to emphasise its importance as distinct from things in the world. The phrase ‘things in the world’ refers to ideas, feelings and concepts as well as physical matter.

For the non-German reader: German is a highly inflected language, and the form of nouns and adjectives can change depending on their context. I make the following notes about the incorporation of German terms and text into English:

- Where I have run German quotations immediately on within English text, I amend them at the start as if they were situated within German text overall. They are therefore declined, where appropriate, so that they fit with the English text, as if the immediately preceding English text were in fact German.
- There are some German terms that I use throughout. Where appropriate, I have declined these to fit with German linguistic conventions.
- At page 230, in a heading in chapter five, I use a German adjective (‘geheimnislos’) after the dative preposition ‘with’, in relation to the Māori term ‘whakapapa’/genealogy. Without either a definite or indefinite article, the German rule is that the adjective be declined in a particular way, to reflect the gender of the noun (in this case, ‘whakapapa’). German has three genders – neuter, masculine and feminine. I chose to decline ‘geheimnislos’ so that the activity of ‘whakapapa’ in relation to women is acknowledged – hence ‘geheimnisloser whakapapa’. This seems not only appropriate given the glaringly obvious fact that women are linked with whakapapa, but also
because of the deep metaphysical, and then etymological, associations that the term ‘whakapapa’ has with the phenomenon ‘Papatūānuku’/Earth Mother/Being. I also declined the adjective so that it reflects both masculine and neuter elements—‘geheimnislosem whakapapa’—to reflect the equally clear connection that men have with whakapapa.

As a noun carrying with it the expression of the neuter gender, ‘whakapapa’ could be seen as simultaneously independent of gender.

At the time that Novalis was writing, it was common to use a slightly different spelling for some of the terms I frequently refer to. These are ‘Sein’ (which he spelt ‘Seyn’), Dasein (‘Daseyn’), and Geheimnis (‘Geheimniß’). Where I am quoting him directly, and other writers of his era, I retain that original spelling; otherwise, I opt for the more contemporary spelling of those terms.

Not all Māori terms are macronised because often the sources they were quoted from did not use macrons. In accordance with The University of Waikato policy I have macronised Māori terms in all other instances, but I note that there is a risk of the language being standardised (and hence disciplined) at the expense of policy, as if speakers would only traditionally pronounce a term in one specific way. My contentious assertion here is beyond the scope of this thesis but its focus would itself be an interesting aspect of Geheimnislosigkeit.

**Subtextual approach**

My overall aim in chapters five, six and seven is to provide a response to the German Romantic philosopher and poet Novalis’ Stoßsätze/sentences that push. This response draws both on Māori theoretical writings and my own active process of thinking. The focus of these descriptions is on the ontology of things in the world, and therefore the mystery they either possess or lack for the Māori self. In a worldview in which the tendency is to encourage discussion about things as if they lack mystery, or as if there is no prior phenomenon that allows for their
emergence or concealment, references to their ontology can be subsumed by what are considered to be more fruitful, or valid, discourses.

The reader will observe that in these chapters I have frequently provided a considerable volume of information through the use of footnotes. They contain those valid discourses that tend to arrange the things being discussed as if they are to be interrogated thereafter in terms of their already apparent nature. In other words, these discussions order things according to what Heidegger (1993), throughout his *Sein und Zeit*, terms their “ontisch”/ontical character. This ordered approach to those things does not reflect on them as if there is that prior, pre-arranging phenomenon: Indeed, such a reflection is not its concern. A significant amount of information and discussion can be generated in that manner. Novalis himself did not have a single term to describe this penchant that dominant discourses have for the discussion of things in terms of their clarified properties, but in one of his works – *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* – he gave a cursory nod to that seemingly matter-of-fact, empirical mode of description when he stated that “[d]er Wind ist eine Luftbewegung” (1960e, p. 100)/”[t]he wind is a movement of air” (1988, p. 87). Thus the wind may indeed be talked about in terms of its overt, already-established characteristics. In a Māori context, a similar approach would restrict ‘hau’/wind, as an event of physics, to its evident and sensible characteristics. Immediately, however, Novalis follows this up with a strict, qualifying question: “[A]ber ist er dem einsamen, sehnsuchtsvollen Herzen nicht mehr, wenn er vorübersaust, von geliebten Gegenden herweht[?]/”[B]ut is it not more to the lonely, yearning heart when it comes murmuring, blowing from places beloved[?]” (my own emphasis). The disclaimer he gives here indicates the unnamed places that the wind originates from. Those places are mysterious but are incorporated with that acknowledged, felt fact of the wind as an entity that behaves in accordance with established laws. Novalis’ preference there is to place a fact about a thing in the world cautiously alongside a description of its mysterious origin. In Māori, to follow Novalis’ approach, the *ontological* nature of ‘hau’ could be considered in its unfathomable depth, in its association with its sense of a tempest that gales through things in the world, allowing them to dwell, or, as the tohunga/[specialist] Tikao told Beattie (1990), with “a wind or breath coming out of their [a person’s] inner being” (p. 76). ‘Hau’ is hence always
‘wind’ that appears to be governed by certain laws and displays certain tendencies, but this is always secondary to its mysterious, unknowable character.

This approach of Novalis’ is not an uncommon one in his *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais*. Here, Novalis finds it necessary to include the more ordered descriptions in the substantive part of his text. Generally he manages this in a considered way, but always on the way to a more mysterious discussion. Like Novalis, I therefore include some of those sorts of discourses in the text of the thesis where some context, particularly historical, is necessary. The reasons for this are evident, but in particular they offer a fuller explanation of the reasons for an ontological hiatus that I describe in chapter five. To that extent, historical facts are necessary to clarify to the reader what actually happened to bring about that forgetting of Being, and hence mystery.

At other parts of those chapters, I judge that it is necessary to place these sorts of ontical descriptions into footnotes. *One* of the roles in my footnotes in these chapters is to provide a subtext to the main discussion. The subtext consists of social, political, historical and traditional fragments related to Māori scholarship that, I argue, show my ontological argument in various forms of practice or manifestation, but which are not aimed at discussing Being, and would interrupt the flow of that argument if they were incorporated into the primary text. To be sure, these fragments comprise an important portion of the argument, because they show that the realm of Being is not disconnected from everyday living, as I go on to argue throughout the thesis. Yet I argue for the primacy of that ontological realm, and so the greater portion of space is claimed for that discussion.

On one level the subtextual footnote may be seen merely as support for my argument. It is true that this device does indeed support it, but the broader intention is that it should provide a glimpse into the social manifestation of Being. My other, quite closely related and rather more conventional use of footnotes is drawn on simply to give additional information for the reader on a related point in the text.
Chapter One: Introduction: ‘Geheimnis’/mystery/“Tērā te auahi”

This thesis explores the Geheimnis/mystery of things in the world for the Māori self, primarily informed and challenged through the writings of the Early German Romantic poet and philosopher Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis) as well as through various Māori strands of scholarship. First, I shall outline the problem of ‘Geheimnislosigkeit’/[lack of mystery] that threatens a respect for things in the world as geheimnisvoll/[replete with mystery]. I propose that, in both explicit and tacit ways, strands of Māori scholarship and thought argue for the Geheimnis of things in the world. Novalis’ writings (and those of other German speaking philosophers) provide specific ontological prompts for me to consider both an attribution of Geheimnis to things in the world through the lens of that Māori-related reflection, and the converse - the forgetting of the Geheimnis of those things. In discussing Geheimnislosigkeit and Geheimnis, I aim to do as Novalis had done: I shall constantly disrupt the idea that things in the world are self-evident and completely knowable, as if their Geheimnis were stripped from them. Alongside that discussion I inquire into the notion of Being/the Absolute and its relationship with Geheimnis.

As this work considers a theory of mystery (and its lack) and Being, I refer primarily to Novalis’ writings that highlight the ontological. Of particular significance here are his Fichte-Studien (which emphasises both the epistemological and ontological aspects of existence), “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” from Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Die Lehrlinge zu Sais, and some of Hymnen an die Nacht. In these works, a strong argument for the recognition of Being and mystery is discernible. Other works of his that I refer to are not recognised as especially ontologically focused, but I have detected that there is nevertheless an equally strong, if somewhat more silent, attention to Being in those works. These works include Das Allgemeine Brouillon, which is Novalis’ incomplete poeticising of the sciences, and Die Christenheit oder Europa, a fictionalised history of ideas set in an ontological context which argues against the
socio-political and philosophical tendencies of modernity that endanger a commons-oriented, spiritual outlook on human beings, society and the divine. In all these, in one form or another, Novalis describes how Being is commonly obstructed, and how it can be reclaimed. As a Māori writer who is concerned with both those processes, I approach Novalis’ writings in all cases so that his arguments for ontology, and hence Geheimnis, are brought to the surface.

Embedded within this thesis is the continuous presence of my own identity as Māori (from the Tūhourangi and Ngāti Whanaunga iwi/tribes). My engagement with mystery, with my disturbance of certainty that is held out as a priority to various processes of colonisation in relation to Māori, and with my own connection to the wider world, begins in the following lament that is often sung by my people of Tūhourangi. Even in my recitation of this lament, I introduce traditions external to Māori to help delve into its Geheimnis, and to critique the given Geheimnislosigkeit of its translation (and therefore its conception even in Māori).

### The Māori writer in the realm of mystery: “Tērā te Auahi”

*Tera te auahi ka patua i Tarawera kai raro iti iho
*Yonder is the volcanic haze that destroyed (those) at Tarawera, and just below

*Ko Ngati Taoi i moe ra i te whenua, haere ra e te iwi
*Lie Ngati Taoi entombed by ash and scoria, farewell to you all

*Ki te po-uriuri ki te po tangotango ki te iwi ki te po
*(Farewell) to the realm of death, to the darkness, where reside your ancestors

*Arohirohi ana taku nei titiro ki te puke i te Kumete
*I feel giddy as I look toward the hill Te Kumete
Kai raro iti iho ko te tini a te kura, i a Tuhourangi
*For just below are buried the myriad of precious ones of Tuhourangi*

Whakapukepuke ai nga ngaru o Tarawera, ko te rite i aku kamo
*The waves of Tarawera were tumultuous, likewise my eyes are a-flood with tears*

Ka whati mai te ngaru, ka oho ra te marino, ko te rite i te iwi
*The wave of volcanic debris broke, causing disharmony, likewise the people were in shock*

E hora noa mai ra te rae ki Moura, haere ra e te iwi
*(Ash and mud) are spread across the promontory at Moura, goodbye my people*

Ki wiwi ki wawa, ki raro ki te reinga – ko wai au ka kite?
*Who knows where you have gone, to the north to Te Reinga – will I ever see you again?*

Kai kinikini ai te mamae i taku kiri, ki te iwi ka wehe
*Pain pinches my body, for the people who were killed*

Whakarehurehu ana taku nei titiro ki Whakapoukorero
*The mountain Whakapoukorero fades from my sight*

Kai raro iti iho ko Ngati Rangitihi, toku hoa moenga
*Just below were Ngati Rangitihi, my companions and relations*

Na Ngatoroirangi i taki mai te mana o te atua ka hau kai te whenua
*T'was Ngatoroirangi who called upon the mana of his god (to imprison Tamahoi), whose fame spread throughout the land*

Hurahia (e) nga tohunga, ka maranga kai runga, ka ru ko te whenua
*(Later) priests uncovered and awoke the denizen who caused the quake*
It was thus the anger of the god who destroyed the people, and the land

(The people) lie scattered in the world of darkness, in the world of the dead

Leaving anguish and pain, to gnaw unceasingly within

And the tears drop copiously from my eyes, for those who have departed this life.

I begin my thesis with this lament for various reasons. Firstly, Māori writers may wish to acknowledge those who have gone before them but still remain in one form or another. Secondly, they frequently embark on an academic text with an introduction outlining their position, regardless of the discipline(s) in which they are working. This sort of preface acts as a signal to the audience that they are entitled to discuss elements of Māori existence. They may alert the reader by stating that they are Māori – and therefore have a degree of experience and expertise in the area of Māori Studies - or they may choose to allude to the fact by reciting a piece of text that originates from their tribal area. In this chapter and the next I discuss my position as a Māori researcher/writer, with a greater focus on the impact of the outside world on that position. I partially aim to clarify my own social membership with one of my tribal groups and to signal to the reader my personal capacity to deal with those disciplines that I listed earlier and that provide points of discussion in my thesis.

The lament also gives rise to an irony concerning the very method of this thesis. The irony consists in the situation that the Māori writer is forced to deal with the term ‘Māori’ as they write about aspects of Māori existence. Although full attention to this problem is beyond the scope of the thesis, and although it is a dilemma that would appear to be more sensibly dealt with in the method chapter, I propose it is helpful to address it from the outset, as my approach to it will assist...
the reader as they continue reading the thesis. The problem lies in the following: It could be stated that the lament relates to facets of Tūhourangi experience, and that I am therefore defined wholly by that experience. On extension, I would be unable to use the term ‘Māori’ because it is a general term (and indeed one that did not exist pre-colonially to refer to any group of people). My response is that I am also affected on a continual basis by the discourse of ‘Māori’ as a colonising notion. This effect is largely historical and political, but it also impacts on the very identity of the self. My use of the term ‘Māori’ throughout the thesis, then, acknowledges the need to talk from the position that this general label offers, to provide responses that a collective experience of colonisation gives rise to. Pihama (2001) acknowledges the difficulty and comments that “[t]he term ‘Māori’ is viewed by some as problematic…. The term Māori has … been challenged by many Māori people” (p. 1), but she adds that the term can be used politically. I agree with both her reservations with, and confidence in, the term, and argue that it can be used to reflect the reality of a colonised people who would formerly have referred to themselves in other ways.

However, throughout the thesis I also use the term cautiously, particularly where it might generalise. If the term generalises then it threatens to homogenise Māori people, as Pihama also identifies. Writing about a possible concept of Being and Geheimnis for Māori in this manner is especially fraught because it assumes that there is a solid, unchanging entity that is undifferentiated. It may become authoritative when it is preceded by the adjective ‘Māori’. Again, an irony arises, for I suspect that talk of ‘metaphysics’ and ‘Being’ is especially vulnerable to this form of discipline, whereas we may talk of ‘the Māori reader’ and ‘Māori people’ with relatively more freedom. This susceptibility that arises from representations of ‘metaphysics’ and ‘Being’ leads to my resistance to prescribing the nature of Being to one experience. The irony at this point is that in the act of asserting a Māori notion of Being, I threaten to be prescriptive.

The problems that I have posed here could be fleshed out in another thesis altogether but are important to allude to. I also need to make some decisions about them. The reader should note that what I discuss in the thesis are actually aspects of ontology, Geheimnis, and Geheimnislosigkeit that I propose could be of use to
Māori, and I draw on particular writers’ observations and theories that, of course, give their perspective on aspects of Māori philosophy. In other words my propositions about Being are in fact my limited expressions of what ontology might be held out to be, informed by both Novalis’ writings and those from the Māori tradition, but I draw back from definitively asserting a Māori ontology. Instead, I offer that my approach to the interplay between Novalis’ thought and elements of Māori scholarship, to theorise about Being and mystery for Maori, could be of interest to the Māori reader.

“Tērā te Auahi” and the mystery of Heidegger’s ‘legein’/gathering disciplines

As I engage with the ontological context of mystery, I draw on other cultural sources to clarify the mystery of my position as a Tūhourangi researcher. This engagement is similar in nature to what Heidegger means when he describes the Greek verb legein in terms of its depiction of ‘gathering’, which accords with his proposition that, when thinking “besinnlich”/[meditatively], “wir uns auf solches einlassen, was in sich dem ersten Anschein nach gar nicht zusammengeht” (2000, p. 526)/“we engage ourselves with what at first sight does not go together at all” (1966, p. 53), instead of solely using reasoning to produce a conventional outcome. Here I am concerned with bringing together a seemingly unrelated group of disciplines - German Studies, Māori Studies, philosophy, some law and education - without diminishing their distinctive integrity. ‘Thinking’ for this thesis is to draw on various strands of thought whilst acknowledging their distinctiveness in relation to each other. The lament describes the trauma that the Tūhourangi people experienced from the eruption of their mountain, Tarawera: This much may be obvious to the reader. But other elements reveal themselves too: mystery; life (as opposed, or in addition, to the death that is evident in the lament); other finite phenomena (mountains and hills) to name a few. The interpretation that I offer here signals my intention to draw on hitherto unrelated academic disciplines, whereby the lament requires that I not just stay within the usual gloss defaulted to in the English translation but that I step outside of it and
think about everything as if it is impinged on by other less obvious elements. This constant critique/affirmation process at every step also dictates the method of my research, as I discuss in the following chapter.

Again thinking of Heidegger’s interpretation of the verb legein: In ‘gathering’, the calling together of elements with a view to revealing an outcome is an aim of this thesis. The eruption that the lament refers to took place in 1886, and at this time the Tūhourangi were seasoned business people, especially in tourism. Indeed it is sometimes said that the reason for the eruption was that Tūhourangi had ventured too far from their traditional practices and opened themselves up to rampant capitalism. Meanwhile, the composer of the lament names a god (Tamahoi) who is decidedly pre-European in his or her origins. Historically and discursively this juxtaposition is important because, despite the continued oppression of Māori beliefs at the time this lament was composed, the lament calls to itself a number of elements, physical and other, to discuss an event, in much the same way that legein envisages. Factors of colonial resistance despite colonisation are gathered together, alongside purely traditional belief. Legein in a Māori sense would have to account for not only the aggregation of traditional events and discourse but colonised ones as well.

In turn, these elements are themselves unfathomable. In holistic Māori belief they connect to every other thing in the world, both perceptible and those, as “Tērā te Auahi” recounts, “in the world of darkness”. They bring with them all those elements with which they are connected, continuously and throughout what is now dominantly perceived as ‘time’. To this extent there is a degree of the unknown inherent to every word in the lament. Although they can be denotatively understood, the words themselves necessarily call forth and gather all elements in the world. While we may be focusing on one element of the lament, such as one word or concept, there is a much more mysterious interplay between all elements that cannot be identified. Some of these elements are not even specified in the lament, but I go on to argue that a sense of Geheimnis has innate to it a marked respect for the lack of presence of an object. It is here that one becomes aware of the fundamental mystery of things in the world and their interplay beyond one’s perception.
The dominant interpretation of the lament lends one to think that the terms and the things they signify are certain, and indeed there is a degree of determinacy to them. We may be fundamentally certain that an eruption did indeed occur from a mountain that is indeed named Tarawera. Yet even such terms, as certain as they appear, are surrounded by an aura of mystery. Science, that exemplar and advocate of certainty, still intersects with mystery on a regular basis, mainly at the theoretical level: Dawkins, an atheist and scientist, argues for what seems to be a mysterious effect of the gene phenotype on the environment as well as other organisms:

Causal influence [of gene on phenotype] radiates out from the replicator, but its power does not decay with distance…. Through a variety of physical and chemical media it radiates out beyond the individual body to touch objects in the world outside, inanimate artefacts and even other living organisms. (1982, pp. 237-238)

In the lament, darkness or “pō tangotango” is scientifically definable, yet within the Māori term itself an infinitude of phenomena, which may not be determinable, is pulled into the lament. The term ‘dark’ has been coined as the adjectival portion of the phrase “dark matter” to describe “the dominant component of the physical Universe” for which “there is no persuasive theoretical explanation” (Cahn, 2007, p. 2551). I propose some Māori would agree that the adjective ‘dark’ is more than the absence of light; it is also engaged with the active presence of invisibility. Pō tangotango, equated with ‘dark’ in the lament, takes on an active role of movement, as it is in the constant process of ‘taking’ – ‘tangotango’.

The beginning of a discussion of Geheimnis

I return to the idea that Geheimnis is derived from ‘Being’ in chapter three, but we can note at this stage that, even in terms that are scientifically defined, there is an equally mysterious and ontologically uncertain aspect. Moreover, it is not just
terms that call forth a holistic mysteriousness. Here one may draw on the various aspects of mystery that exist between humanity and nature. The works of Rudolf Otto, an early pioneer of reclaiming and analysing the mysterious and holy in ancient and modern philosophy, were influenced by his studies in theology and aimed to specifically identify types of mystery that were at work. He notes that ‘holy’ has taken on specifically religious overtones that coincide with “vollendet gut” (1997, p. 5)/“completely good” (1958, p. 5) but initially carried with it a “deutlichen Überschuß” (1997, p. 5)/“clear overplus of meaning” (1958, p. 5). His modes of revelation that herald the mysterious include ‘Mysterium tremendum’, which itself is broken down into the elements of “awefulness”, “overpoweringness”, and “energy”. The first of these is not characterised solely by the devastating but also the gentle. In the lament we can clearly see the destructive event but alongside some aspects that are treasured – the “precious ones of Tūhourangi”. In the second, the ‘majestas’, as a word containing still “eine leise letzte Spur des Numinosen” (Otto, 1997, p. 22)/“a last faint trace of the numinous” (Otto, 1958, p. 19), we get a sense of not just grandeur and overpowering but submergence – of being, as Otto phrases it, “Erde-, Asche- und Nichts-Seins” (1997, p. 23)/“dust and ashes’ and nothingness” (1958, p. 20), or, as the lament would have it, ash and scoria. There is a sense of being “entombed”, as the lament notes. The energetic form of mystery refers to that which “[ist] rastlos und restlos” (1997, p. 28)/“knows not stint nor stay” (1958, p. 24): The entire lament is punctuated with the acknowledgement of this aspect of the mysterious. It is the mysteriously active that gave rise to the eruption through the god Tamahoi.

What emerges from Otto’s analysis is a discussion of the well-worn, rational-based ideas of the world against various modes of mystery. He does not discount those rationalistic explanations but outlines how there were originally additional, more sublime attachments to various things in the world, leading to a kind of delight that resides in both solemnity and longing. While ‘fascination’ may seem like an overly detached description, in the past it was linked directly to the emotional state. “Whakarehurehu” does not just mean the fading from sight that is given in the text; it also incidentally carries with it the meaning of a premonition. As such, the eruption and all the elements called forth in the lament recur in a
longing for the future, in particular to see what will be the emotional reserve of the survivors.

Otto’s discussion draws our attention to the problem of mystery, with its corrosion by rationalism, and its capacity to be both benevolent and destructive. His implicit warning that one should not be satisfied with the current usage of a term is set against a backdrop of mystery. Ultimately it is the overall presence of mystery that renders a thing in the world unknowable in a complete sense. The noun ‘mystery’, which is the given equivalent of ‘Geheimnis’, does not do justice to its German counterpart. Again it is Heidegger who, with his emphasis on etymological semantics, provides us with some assistance by arguing against equating Geheimnis with inert mystery. Geheimnis is comprised partly of the word ‘Heim’, which equates with ‘home’ or place of origin (Massie, 2007). It is this home or point of origin that is concealed but still holds sway throughout humanity’s engagement with the world. Geheimnis is active in its concealment of itself, and it is from this mystery that one originates and unfolds in the world. However, given mystery’s self-concealment, Heidegger warns against trying to unveil the “light of truth that shines behind the veil of deceptive appearances” (Massie, 2007, p. 43) and instead supports the openness to the revelations that this concealment itself holds. For Otto and Heidegger, Geheimnis, or mystery, is therefore not an inert ‘thing’ but an active presence in the world.

Novalis’ and Māori elements of thought

The reader will have already concluded that I am referring to another cultural tradition alongside my own cultural reading. Some 12000 miles from New Zealand, and nearly one hundred years before the eruption that gave rise to the lament I have cited, an Early German Romantic poet and philosopher had acknowledged that there was a ubiquitous activity that was characteristic of mystery. For him, this Geheimnis was a constantly impinging activity, not a detached entity. He also argued that some things would likely come into sight of

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1 From this point on I use the term ‘Romantics’ to refer to the Early German Romantics.
the onlooker while others would hide, but that arrangement could change instantaneously. Interestingly, this poet and philosopher, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), penned a significant set of poems that also lamented death. In this case grieving for the loss of his fiancée, one of these poems titled Hymnen an die Nacht rhapsodically disturbs the reader from a solid, self-evident interpretation of his text, with components swerving into the view of the reader and then moving out, as Novalis intended. Novalis had tried to convey to the reader that something much greater than the reader’s own cognitive control was at play here, something which allowed a limited understanding to grasp the poems to begin with. This unknowable, primordial agent, he maintained, should prevent one from speaking about the world as if it were ‘geheimnislos’/[lacking mystery]:


Away I turn to the holy, the unspeakable, the secretive Night. Down over there, far, lies the world – sunken in a deep vault – its place wasted and lonely. In the heart’s strings, deep sadness blows. In dewdrops I’ll sink and mix with the ashes. - Memory’s distances, youth’s wishes, childhood’s dreams, the short joys of a whole long life and hopeless hopes come grey-clad, like evening mist after the sun has set. In other places Light’s pitched happy tents. Should It never come back to Its children, who are waiting for it with simple faith? (1988, p. 11)
There is a warning waiting to be expressed here that starts to argue more directly for a sense of mystery to be retained even as one is encountering the thing in the world as geheimnisslos. Novalis, as Heidegger would much later, expressed some of his philosophy in caveat form. Similarly Max Weber (1919) would state that, under a regime of rationalism and intellectualisation, the inevitable result is “Entzauberung” (p. 9)/[disenchantment], in which there would be no room for “prinzipiell … geheimnisvollen unberechenbaren Mächte” (p. 9)/[principally … mysterious, incalculable forces]. What becomes apparent with these writers is that one may not write wistfully from a point of traditional romanticism by, say, reciting past tradition as if that were enough: One must also account at the same time for a critical form of expression.

The outcome of gathering these different strains of thought and writing together is an uncertain one, but it is motivated by a desire to add to what Habermas (1968), throughout his Erkenntnis und Interesse, calls “persönliches Erkenntnisinteresse”/personal cognitive interests, which for him has both a critical and emancipatory aspect and one that retains the dignity of the ‘Erkannten’, the thing being thought about. In this thesis I intend to highlight Geheimnis alongside a necessary critique of Geheimnislosigkeit so that both the European and Māori reader may get a feel for a greater dimension to things in the world.

My Erkenntnisinteresse/motivation to inquire into the theme of Geheimnis

The lament “Tērā te Auahi” both sets down my position as a Māori writer and begins to alert the reader to the generally complex nature of Geheimnis. Specifically I aim to inquire into the following aspects of the issue of Geheimnis for the Māori self and, to a lesser extent, for the scholar of the ‘Frühromantik’/Early German Romantic tradition:

1. What is the creativity of thought that Novalis provides for a Māori consideration of Geheimnis/Geheimnislosigkeit of things in the world?
2. More specifically, how might a dialogue between the German speaking tradition and Māori academic tradition help us contemplate a contemporary and ontological approach to the mystery of objects that we talk of, including the Māori terms for these?

Other questions arise within those two main ones above:

1. What are some of the wider ideas and notions of Geheimnis that emerge from a discussion of Geheimnis in a colonised Māori context? How can ideas and notions of Geheimnis, of the ontological mystery and mysterious interrelationship of things, be conceived of in academic philosophical contexts? How can they be conceptualised and described, without Geheimnislosigkeit resulting?

2. What are the consequences of not considering the mysterious and holistic ideas for modern society and modern academia? That is, what happens when one approaches things in the world as if they were geheimnislos? I pay particular attention to the consequences for the Māori self, but also note that there are consequences for non-Māori traditions, such as the German speaking ones on which I draw.

3. How can a dialogue between those early discourses about the mysterious and the loss of the mysterious that arose in German Romanticism, in particular from Novalis’ works, help contemporary philosophers to reconstruct and better understand their contemporary situation, which is often characterised by the exclusion of the mysterious and Being from social discourses?

There are specific factors that have led me to want to inquire into the issue. They involve: the largely untraversed nature of philosophical colonisation that Māori have experienced; the lack of correspondence between utterances that are grandly spiritual on the one hand, and everyday, particularly institutional, activities on the other; the teachings of an aunt; and my somewhat unusual wish to place
seemingly disparate cultural philosophies in conversation with each other, in an expression of ‘Symphilosophie’/[collaborative philosophy].

The philosophical problem of Geheimnislosigkeit

For quite some time I have been aware that Māori would have been colonised philosophically as well as by loss of land, language and wellbeing. Indeed the discipline of philosophy itself appears to have been colonised, according to Millán-Zaibert (2007) who cites Rorty: “Logical positivists such as [Carnap] trained students to brush past romance and to spot nonsense. Philosophy in the English-speaking world became ‘analytic’ – antimetaphysical, unromantic, highly professional, and a cultural backwater” (p. 26). This admittedly harsh rebuke of Millán-Zaibert’s is tempered later when she states that “philosophy as a cultural backwater would still be preferable to philosophy as a sea of relativism” (p. 27). If the type of philosophy that she reproaches is the acceptable one, though, then it will more than likely be the one that was given over to Māori in order to make sense of the world. The huge amount of literature stating that Māori had a non-analytical, emotional/spiritual/mental/physical-at-once relationship with everything (Durie, 1994; Marsden, 2003; Pere, 1982; Royal, 2009b) would be influenced by the analytical presentation of objects in the world to produce some very unusual combinations, which are not traditional, may nevertheless still be sourced in Māori philosophy, but will need to be analysed and critiqued. My discussion of “Tērā te Auahi” has revealed that the given translation needs to be called into question, and the belief that analytical, rational and empirical philosophy and traditions need to be the assumed ones for Māori now is itself one that has emerged through colonisation: As Marsden (1985) warns in a step further on from Millán-Zaibert, “abstract rational thought and empirical methods cannot grasp the concrete act of existing [for Māori] which is fragmentary, paradoxical and incomplete” (p. 163). Marsden’s use of the word ‘abstract’ raises interesting issues for the Māori writer who is delving into a colonised, neo-traditional approach to the world. I would argue that the traditional view of the relationship between self and object was neither solely concrete nor abstract: It was both at the same time. In a colonised age, though, it may be necessary to think about these
relationships theoretically, without the overly rational and empirical approaches that Marsden suggests one avoids.

**Novalis and the resistance of the Frühromantiker**

Novalis himself was acutely aware of the effects of philosophical colonisation, even if their full impact had yet to be felt. A scientist, explorer, poet and philosopher - all achieved before he died at the age of 29 - he belonged to the prominent Early German Romantic movement. Alongside the rationalistic attitude toward nature during the eighteenth century, there was a parallel artistic and philosophical tradition in the West that saw the imposition of an overly correct view of the world as detrimental to its traditional life-styles, or more generally to more holistic forms of thinking and living. Having witnessed the stark contrast evidenced by the change from ‘myth’ to a scientific worldview\(^2\), proponents of the stance that ‘myth’ and ‘knowledge’ were on an equal footing, such as Novalis, questioned the loss of a belief in the holistic nature of language alongside the de-mythologisation of history and nature. In the Early German Romantic movement the critique of instrumental language became the mainstay of the critique of modernity, with particular concern directed to the linguistic ordering of nature, of traditional human societal and economic order, through modernist forms of speech. This critique was sustained through time, with the Romantics’ distinctive use of poetry reflected on and taken up into the 20\(^{th}\) century\(^3\).

In stark contrast to the preferred modern view of things in the world as explicable, Novalis drew on a number of terms to describe their inexplicability. In his *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, for instance, he uses what would normally be an adjective – ‘geheimnisvoll’/[state or quality of being replete with mystery] – and capitalises it to render it a noun at the same time. This unrestrictive approach to grammar is a tool of his, and in this case it has the effect of turning what would

\(^2\) The dramatic move from a holistic perception of the world to a scientific one was the result of a malaise that was named in different ways by the German Romantics. Beiser (2003) lists them as follows: alienation (Entfremdung), estrangement (Entäußerung), division (Entzweiung), separation (Trennung), and reflection (Reflexion) (p. 31).

\(^3\) Stefan George and Karl Wolfskehl are two writers who have developed their reception of the ideas of the Romantics in the twentieth century.
normally refer to the static properties of a thing into a thing that is simultaneously active and conceptually incomprehensible. He also uses the term against its opposite sense:


[The system of learning has been reformed, humanity has tried to give the old religion a new, rational, baser sense. At the same time, humanity has painstakingly expunged itself of wonder and mystery.]

Even in his use of the word ‘das Geheimnisvolle’ here, he manages to draw the reader’s attention to the need for a synchronised mode of thinking, in which I am not just describing a traditional Māori approach to mystery but also a consequence of not accounting for mystery. It is here that another motivating feature of my thesis emerges.

**Discordance between traditional utterance and usage**

A predicate of many rationalist and analytic methods of philosophy is a belief that a grounding proposition can be found, or that it should be strived for. Then it needs to be expressed in clear or systematic terms (Levy, 2003; Solomon, 2003). Such lucid certainty the Romantics take issue with. As we shall see in more detail in chapter three, Novalis disdained the idea that the individual self was the grounding aspect of awareness and philosophical certainty. Here, alongside Geheimnis and its negatives, Novalis refers also to ‘Being’, as well as ‘the Absolute’. The variety of words he utilises demonstrates that what is being discussed is largely unknowable and should not be isolated by one name. For Novalis and other Romantics, the Absolute, or Being, although related to the self, is prior to it and turns everything into the mysterious. Innate to an apparently
straightforward act such as an utterance there is an ontological given, influenced by both speaker (who is him- or herself influenced by Being) and the Absolute. Friedrich Schelling, a contemporary of Novalis’, noted that talking about the Absolute is thoroughly different from talking about the world of appearances. Echoing Novalis’ and Schelling’s view, Grant (2006) therefore stated that “[t]he philosophical exposition of the unconditioned, or Absolute, is not like the analysis of a concept or state of affairs, rather, the exposition of the Absolute occurs within the Absolute, as the medium of its own exposition” (p. 1).

**The disjuncture for Māori**

The extent to which we can have certainty about things as they still retain their mystery is an issue that arises for me as a Māori writer because on the one hand one commonly sees utterances printed such as “[e]verything has a mauri, including people, fish, animals” (Barlow, 1991, p. 83) and yet one will witness a discordance between such an utterance and the everyday practices and literature of Western institutions, such as law, medicine and education. These institutions would often commission research reports seeking to address the ‘Māori problem’ that existed between Māori communities and those particular institutions’ everyday workings. The reports might have a substantial portion set aside detailing what are taken to be Māori core values and beliefs (often overly traditional, not contemporary, in their voice), but would then revert to an empirical voice throughout the rest of that same report. It was as if the front piece of the research felt the need to get the more intangible, ‘spiritual’ and metaphysical aspects of Māori existence out of the way before moving on to more realistic, pragmatic solutions. Māori philosophy in these cases is attractive as a mythical proposition but holds very little credibility as a complete philosophical explanation in its own right.

In order to elucidate what is at issue here, we must think about these slip-ups in a cultural context. Despite appearances, they are not entirely innocent. In a Māori sense they may have very real consequences, but the nature and extent of those consequences have not yet been fathomed. Treacherously, the remainder of those
commissioned works would still invoke Māori terminology to refer to concrete Māori entities – one currently prolific example is ‘whānau’, which appears to be attached liberally and discursively cited – but, because of those terms’ new context and setting within empirical and objectifying language, they would now mean no more than their Western counterparts. Whānau in these texts threatens to mean no more or less than its given, ‘family’. Yet these terms were still held out as if they retained their original, authentic meaning. This aspect of language, its movement over into colonising agendas and realms, as if both the original and the colonising have an almost instinctive correspondence with each other, is one that remained unarticulated by me for many years, even though I saw it in action in the Waitangi Tribunal, where I represented Māori claimants as a lawyer. Here I noticed that Māori claimants were allowed to describe their traditional and ontological views of the world but unless these were packaged with epistemic and linguistic certainty, ultimately it would be the ‘technical’ evidence that would be most compelling for the Tribunal. Even though I had not recognised it then, those utterances were being constrained to fit the certainty that empirical, rational knowledge offered. Here it is as well to consider Schelling’s negative description of discussions about Being – namely, the idea that a particular sort of exposition, one that talks about an already apparently evident thing in the world (such as a concept or state of affairs), is posed as adequate for discussing all things in the world. Or as the phenomenologist Martin Heidegger (1993) argued, when he highlighted the tendency of modern Western humanity to avoid thinking about Being in the ways that the ancient Greeks had: “was als Verborgenes das antike Philosophieren in die Unruhe trieb und in ihr erhielt, zu einer sonnenklaren Selbstverständlichkeit geworden, so zwar, daß, wer darnach auch noch fragt, einer methodischen Verfehlung bezichtigt wird” (p. 2)/“that which the philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method” (1967, p. 21). This plainly evident attribution of characteristics to things in the world that both Heidegger and Schelling (and, as we shall see, Novalis) warn of probably also affects Māori.
The teachings of an aunt

My observations about these discordances, or of a philosophical and political denial of Geheimnis, have for some time been accompanied by a nebulous sense that things are not right. Largely this disquiet was cultivated in me by an aunt of mine, who was a wonderful inciter of mysterium tremendum! Titari Hill, or Aunty Betty as we called her, was an amazing ‘kuia’/older woman of Ngāti Tūwharetoa who lived her life for her iwi. A staunch Catholic, she was also highly aware of Being. We very rarely spoke Māori with each other, although we both could have if we had chosen to. I was 15 when I started having a lot to do with her. She was a philosopher in her own way and also highly political: She was quite opposed, for instance, to the wholesale commodification of kumarahou/Pomaderris, because she had memories of her grandmother collecting rongoa/traditional remedies from the forests and using them to treat various maladies. In the main, though, our discussions had very little to do with ‘ngā rā o mua’/[the days of old]; they were much more to do with the posing of questions to explore what lies beneath the surface. This was an active process that required a bringing together of old ways of thinking with current colonised settings. Some of these conversations were punctuated with great tracts of silence. What I learnt from her was the need to theorise the workings of other things – good or bad – beneath what appeared to be obvious. Implicitly I was advised to retain some tentativeness in my approach to things in the world.

My aunt’s teachings, which did not seem to be self-conscious attempts on her part to ‘teach’ me, were characterised by times of theorising and creativity. This is also a vital facet of Novalis’ method, which is to ‘romanticise’, and which is described in a pedagogical context in his Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. Here neither my aunt nor Novalis intend that one stay focused on the past. In many ways, then, this thesis is a commitment to her to carry on that task. She passed away some years ago now, but would have been amused and unsurprised, I imagine, to hear that I had decided to refer to a German Romantic poet and philosopher from the late 1700s to discuss issues that we Māori are facing here in New Zealand today.

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Kumarahou is highly valued by Māori for its blood cleansing and antiseptic properties.
The desire to engage with Symphilosophie

My motivation as a Māori writer, to specifically refer to a German philosopher to clarify and articulate philosophies that relate to Being and Geheimnis, arises for a number of reasons. First, I am familiar with German-speaking cultural traditions, and I can read and speak German, and although I had left the language behind me for quite some time I still find referring to other linguistic sources a fascinating exercise. This alone does not explain my approach, though. Easily the most frequent question in respect of my thesis is: “Why are you looking at a German philosopher for your topic?” This question frequently implies that we already have the answers among our own Māori resources, academy and community, and that any forays into Western disciplines in particular are not only puzzling but also unnecessary and even potentially dangerous. That there may already be resources to undertake similar critiques in our own communities could indeed be true, and I am not setting out to either prove or dispute that assertion, but my motivation comes from trying to bring a fresh perspective to the fraught topic of colonisation. However, I do note that there appears to be a hiatus in discussions about colonisation amongst Māori. Possible explorations into that murky area are overshadowed by debates in specific, solid sites where improvement is needed, such as Māori achievement in education, te reo Māori/Māori language proficiency, greater Māori access to resources, and so on. I speculate that it is as if the colonisation of one’s philosophies is too hard and unpleasant to talk about directly, or as if it has been conceived of as neatly dealt with in its root and scope.

Many Māori are not averse to invoking Western theorists to highlight a political dilemma, though. The 1990s saw an upsurge of Māori who referred to Foucault and Gramsci, for instance, but these theorists were drawn on to explain political oppression, not to theorise different Māori ways of perceiving and describing metaphysical phenomena, such as the relation of the self to things in the world. They were also not referred to in order to discuss intra-cultural colonising 

\footnote{Oliver (1998) notes that there is a general tendency to avoid philosophical discussions about education, and that those solid sites are focused on.}
practices. It has been especially important for Māori to identify the subtler, covert machinations of State power to examine oppression, but exactly how these less obvious practices affect views that Māori have of the world remains an underrepresented concern. Although it is not necessary to refer to Western writers to discuss indigenous metaphysics or self-colonising practices, the self-affirming nature of current views of language, often replicated by Māori themselves, means that some sort of outside help is desirable. The more obvious reaction is to default to other indigenous writers, and certainly this is a highly feasible option, given the apparent, common experiences shared by indigenous peoples. Collective indigenous forums, such as the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, allow for the exchange of ideas and for dialogue amongst indigenous peoples, thus providing opportunities for discussion on more conceptual topics. Even in these forums, indigenous peoples are still aware of their differences and avoid taking on the broad ‘indigenous’ name, together with its shared experiences, as a cultural reality.

**The place of Western philosophers in Māori metaphysics**

It is crucial, though, to understand that Western theorists can be useful in contributing to the process of theorising around colonisation. By identifying those sites of colonisation, they can encourage debate of a different type than that which indigenous peoples commonly engage in. These theorists do not have as their target audience indigenous peoples, they cannot describe the indigenous experience – and nor do they aim to - but their contribution is more tangential because it raises concerns that may not arise within indigenous forums. Many of these concerns are precisely so useful because they are starkly different to those that usually emerge from indigenous writings. Some examples may be proposed here: Heidegger, arguing that “[d]ie Zugangs- und Auslegungsart muß vielmehr dergestalt gewählt sein, daß dieses Seiende sich an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her zeigen kann” (1993, p. 16)/“[w]e must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself” (1967, p. 37), may attract Māori to a non-instrumentalist approach to a thing in the world. Foucault’s (1995) analysis of the Panopticon – that it “gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into men's behaviour” (p. 204) - could
assist Māori by challenging them to assess whether colonisation has affected them to the extent that they engage in disciplining behaviours amongst themselves. We can see here the embryonic beginnings, derived from those galvanic Western sources, for various Māori discussions that are relevant for their contexts.

I argue that Māori could, if they wanted, apply the philosophies of the Romantics in a similar vein. Undoubtedly more surprising than any lack of Māori engagement with the Romantics, though, is the general silence of Romantic philosophies in concrete and current areas of concern in the West. Bowie (1997) suggests that the German Romantics have still to be fully incorporated within “contemporary analytical philosophy” (p. 299). The exact degree to which Romantic and Goethean thought has left a legacy for modern German environmentalism is hotly debated (Ball, 2003). In both cases there is a call for German Romanticism to be made relevant and current, an appeal which was reiterated at the recent “Die Aktualität der Romantik”/[The Actuality of the Romantics] symposium of February 2011, at Monash University, Melbourne. It became apparent at the symposium that the Romantics needed to not only be discursively sketched in their isolated theories – this has already been in train for some time - but also applied to new territory. It was acknowledged that Romanticism was supposed to be a living, relevant set of theories that were yet to be more fruitfully applied in the social and political spheres, or even be made a ‘Lebenkunstwerk’/[living work of art], and it was highlighted that the Romantics offer numerous possibilities for the application of their philosophies to equally numerous but unrelated areas. One of these areas, postcolonialism, when viewed through the lens of Romanticism, has the potential to open onto an inquiry into the ‘Binnenkolonisation’/[inner colonisation] of European societies and philosophical thought. The Romantics posit that, philosophically, developed European thinkers did not always view things in the world in predominantly rationalistic and empiricist ways.

**The need for research into the self-colonisation of Europe**

Novalis and, for instance, philosophical and religious thinkers in central Europe (such as Paracelsus and Jacob Böhme) had not always viewed things in the world in rationalistic ways, signalling that the deeper, more metaphysical implications of
colonisation within Europe remain to be further explored. Both the deep metaphysical colonisation that confronts Europe, and even its automatic avoidance of that problem, are not frequently traversed areas of concern. That Europe has suffered philosophical colonisation through the imposition of dominant ideas could be daunting for those who have always considered – and indeed lauded – Europe as the coloniser, and as somehow invulnerable to the corrosion of its long-held traditional beliefs, especially to a deterioration that occurs outside of its control. Yet, to be sure, there has been trenchant critique along certain lines. The deep-seated hubris that appears to characterise Europe’s belief in its own inviolability is one that Heidegger’s method of Destruktion, for example, takes to task when he questions the elevation of reason, and the consequent neglect of an inquiry into Being, through Platonic metaphysics (Colebrook, 2006; Richardson, 2003), and then through a preference for the highly visible (Wolcher, 2008). Heidegger notes, though, that the ancient Greeks did not avoid the issue of Being. Novalis, as we shall see, had earlier witnessed the philosophical overthrow of a spiritual Europe by objectifying and instrumentalising practices. Capra (1982) highlights that before the 15th century Europe lived organically. Dorothy Brantz (Forum, 2009), talking specifically of Germany’s relationship with nature, indicates that there is now a reluctance on the part of German society to fully embrace the idea of nature as opposed to ‘landscape’ – a symptom of an historical and philosophical divergence from viewing the outer world as something not necessarily breachable by human interference. In that written “Forum” in which she expresses these concerns, other critics, who recognise only too readily the loss of an earlier relationship with things in the world, join her in similar critiques.

Where rationalism meets Māori

The conception of colonisation at issue here makes it necessary for the West to consider its largely unacknowledged, ironic domination over itself. Whilst some considerable intellectual graft has been brought to bear on the problem, the critical authors above call for more extensive inquiry. As a vulnerable entity, the coloniser’s tendency to rid both the self and the other of mystery remains to be explored in more depth. My own reference to the Romantics does not primarily aim at exposing this soft underbelly of Europe but instead seeks to highlight to the
reader, either Māori or non-Māori, that no particular culture is immune to that tendency. In other words, Māori are not somehow exempt from the possibility that they, too, might deprive things in the world of their mystery. The flaw of rationalism and philosophical materialism, according to the Romantics, is that, as it explains things in the world, so there is now nothing mysterious about it. For Māori this can inculcate itself subtly through Māori terminology, with such terms as ‘rangahau’/research, intertwining themselves heavily with Western traditions. In these contested spaces Māori are called to “define the term correctly” (L. Smith, 2000, p. 5). Yet, in thinking ‘correctly’ there may be an element of mystery: The appearance of the thing that is being thought of, the appearance of the perceiver in relation to that thing, the surrounding and distant things in relation to that thing and the perceiver, are all mysterious, and are given their mystery because of the primordial ‘force’ that Weber (1919) spoke of. Being, the Absolute, and perhaps ‘the thing in itself’: All may supply our reference points for thinking, but they may also disrupt the apparent certainty evolving from that thinking, and so even then one’s certainty is precarious.

The fresh approach that other schools of thought bring about – including Western ones – is a timely one. Recently the Waitangi Tribunal (2010) released a report into the state of the Māori language. The Tribunal had previously released another report into the reo/language in 1986, but this current document is part of a wider claim concerning Māori cultural and intellectual property. The Māori language – or more precisely its decline - constitutes a significant element of the claim and is described in the report as “approaching a crisis point” (p. x) in various ways throughout. On its heels, other sources echo this same grave sentiment (“Change needed to avert crisis for te reo Māori," 2010; TVNZ, 2010). Clearly something is not working; however, the root of the problem may lie not in whether enough money is plugged into the issue, or whether language is compulsory in schools, or whether there needs to be a tuakana/teina relationship between learner and teacher. It may instead lie, to a large extent, in different views of the interrelationship between language, self, and things in the world.

It is here that I see the Romantics as being especially valuable, because I argue we need to rethink our currently static views on things in the world, including
language. The Romantics promoted this constant reformulating of ideas and creativity, especially when an apparent impasse had been arrived at. The type of thinking here is meant to be abstract because it is not meant to dwell on solid, definable objects. We would not only conceive of language, for instance, in its usual sense; we would also have to think about the natural world, its possible effect on the speaker, the speaker’s effect on the natural world and the objects in it, the place of emotion in speech (and whenever I mention speech here I am describing everyday speech, not just ceremonial). The Romantics are drawn on here to challenge almost unassailable ideas about things in the world: that terms for them are an apparently self-evident tool for communication (preferably a precise one); that they are therefore totally created by human beings; and that the natural world only has an impact on a speaker insofar as the speaker is aware of that impact through their senses.

Even though this thinking that the Romantics encourage may indeed be described as ‘abstract’ in the strictly philosophical sense of the word, Novalis, for one, wants such thought to be useful. Underlying such assumptions about the nature of things in the world is an overall drive for theory to be concretely helpful. I speculate that the Romantics would prefer that an exchange take place in a dialectical exchange of discussion or ‘poesy’ rather than in a discursive form. Novalis (1960b) states that “[a]llles soll aus uns heraus und sichtbar werden – unsre Seele soll repraesentabel werden” (p. 252)/“[e]verything should be drawn out of us and rendered visible – our soul ought to become representable” (Wood, 2007, p. 11). Philosophy is not just a mental activity but needs to be translated into practice in a social and aesthetic sense. Consequently, Novalis’ ideas are meant to have implications for practical life. The empirical mode of revealing things in the world is just a step towards a greater mysterious encounter with those things, and this encounter is an everyday one. This thesis may also augment German scholarship on the area, as I provide a reading of Novalis’ emphasis on mystery through a relational indigenous lens whilst acknowledging that the

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6 In the broader context of Novalis’ philosophies, ‘visibility’ does not equate with ‘clarity’, or with the exposure of a thing to the Panopticism that Foucault warns against. ‘Made manifest’ may be a better translation of ‘sichtbar’, because although things are brought out into the domain of perception, they still retain their hidden aspects.
creativity of the individual ‘Ich’/I is important. I refer to this again in the final substantive chapter of the thesis.

Of course, other philosophers and poets besides the members of the Romantics may be referred to in order to illuminate aspects of Māori philosophy. I chose Novalis because he impressed me as articulating ontological and metaphysical philosophies that share similarities with those of some Māori. However, the general method that brings philosophical traditions into dialogue to see what academic and social benefits will emerge may be employed in other situations as well.

**The substantive structure of this thesis**

The thesis consists of an introduction, a chapter on terms and method, five substantive chapters, and a conclusion. The reader may unofficially approach the five substantive chapters as comprising three parts – the philosophising towards a Māori notion of Being, the focus on Geheimnislosigkeit, and the romanticising (and hence rendering mysterious) of key Māori terms – even though these parts are not explicitly stated elsewhere in the thesis. To begin with my method chapter (chapter two): It discusses in quite some depth the terminology that I refer to and the process I am using to inquire into the questions laid out above. Novalis inspired the method I am using which can at this stage be briefly thought of as involving ‘sentences that challenge or push’, which Novalis calls ‘Stoßsätze’. My aim is to use these sentences of his to push me to think about (he calls this ‘Nachdenken’) a possible Māori response to Geheimnis and Geheimnislosigkeit. This chapter is indeed long, but while this Stoßsatz method is relatively straightforward, I intend to discuss the method in its fullest context of Geheimnis. I also set the scene in this chapter for a view of the ‘geheimnisvolle’/[replete with mystery] self in relationship to other things in the world, particularly to thinking and writing. It is just as much related to the actual content of the thesis as to the method.
In chapter three, “Philosophising about aspects of Being and mystery for Māori”, I theorise about a notion of Being that may be relevant for Māori, and the immediate relationship that Being has with Geheimnis, through my own process of thinking and by drawing on Māori scholarship. To arrive at that point I firstly consider Novalis’ process of making those sorts of assertions. Novalis reacted to a contemporary philosopher’s (Fichte’s) theories about the place of the self in relation to other things in the world. He called this process ‘Fichtisierung’/Fichtesisning, and it is important to note that his reaction to Fichte included both admiration and opposition. From that point he then felt he could make some pronouncements of his own about the place of the self as a thing in the world in respect of other things. In that chapter I discuss the position of another Māori theorist that I similarly react to: I have chosen Te Maire Tau’s assertions about the place of the Māori self in relation to the world as a method of theorising about a Māori notion of Being and Geheimnis. The point of this chapter is to highlight the issue that simply making affirmations about Being and Geheimnis is not sufficient; one should also simultaneously engage in a process of philosophical critique. My resulting affirmations about Being and Geheimnis are therefore joined with an element of Geheimnislosigkeit - their opposite. I refer back to Novalis’ own assertions about Being that evolved from his method, in order to further supplement my own assertions about Being, and allude to some processes of thinking that my aunt encouraged me to engage with. This process I undertake understands ‘Geheimnis’ not so much as an object of thought but, among other things, as an infinitely critical approximation to thinking, as a continuous activity, about what Novalis envisages is a creatively unfolding Being.

The next three chapters deal with the forgetting of Being and mystery, a forgetfulness that is encouraged by various instruments of Geheimnislosigkeit. The first of these - chapter four - considers in some detail Novalis’ poem “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren”, from his novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen, through which Novalis lays out some of the general signposts of Geheimnislosigkeit. The aim of this chapter is to provide Stoßsätze to discuss chapters five and six. Chapter five draws on the impetus given by chapter four to discuss the factors that have encouraged Māori to forget Being and to think about things in the world as geheimnislos. Chapter six also draws on chapter four but
examines how things in the world are sometimes made to be complicit in the process of Geheimnislosigkeit through dominant definitions of Māori terms, particularly in Western institutional settings such as law, medicine and education. The terms I have chosen to examine here are ‘whakapapa’/genealogy, ‘ako’/teach/learn, ‘mātauranga’/knowledge, and ‘whenua’/land. Central to this critique is an investigation into the nature of the philosophical self, in an individual but relational sense, as the self relates to things in the world.

The final substantive chapter, chapter seven, is aimed at suggesting some resolutions to the Geheimnislosigkeit that threatens things in the world for Māori. It refers back to the terms that I argued in chapter six had become tools for viewing things in the world with certainty, and now I romanticise them, drawing on their denotative definitions as well as their first assumptions, with a view to representing them so that they reflect the Absolute. In chapter eight I identify some issues that arose throughout the thesis, and conclude by noting that there is considerable need for further research into this area.

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7 The reader will see in chapter six that I challenge those dominant definitions that I have provided here for convenience.
Chapter Two: The mystery of Stoßsätze/
[sentences that challenge and push], and of thinking: Terms and method

In the introduction chapter I brought to the reader’s attention the notion of Geheimnis and its opposite, Geheimnislosigkeit. That chapter was designed to raise these phenomena as nascent issues in my thesis. I expressly referred the reader to a lament that is sung by my iwi – “Tērā te Auahi” – and showed that the elements within that lament are mysterious, intrinsically and also because of their link with each other. Additionally, my position as a writer is somewhat mysterious because of my innate, ontological association with the elements of that lament.

In this chapter I bring to the fore Novalis’ works more explicitly, and continue with the complexities presented by Geheimnis and Geheimnislosigkeit, but now consider them in the context of the theorising self. To theorise for the rest of the thesis, and indeed to theorise about my position as thinker and writer in this chapter, I refer to Novalis’ process of Romantisieren with particular emphasis on his Stoßsatz method. This is my method chapter, but in that method I also start to consider a substantive problem that will continue throughout the thesis: How do things in the world impact on the self? In the context of the method specifically I can expand on that broader question in the following way: How do things in the world impact on the self as the self thinks and writes, and therefore how is thinking and writing in that sense an activity underpinned by Geheimnis? Thus, while this chapter does set out the method for the reader, it also continues in greater depth than chapter one the theme of mystery itself – now in relation to the thinking self. This constant thought given to things in the world as one undertakes what appears to be such an avowedly straightforward exercise as writing starts to alert the reader to the complexity of Geheimnis, as one is also forced to constantly consider it alongside its opposite - Geheimnislosigkeit.
In the German Romantic and phenomenological traditions, common reference is made to the terms ‘Sein’/‘Seyn’, ‘das Absolute’, ‘das Unbedingte’, and ‘Gott’. Occasionally, as the primordial activity underpinning all those terms organises all manifestations of nature, Novalis may also use the term ‘Natur’ as a holistic expression of the Absolute. The Romantics tend to use the terms Seyn/das Absolute/das Unbedingte interchangeably – more so Seyn/das Absolute – suggesting that they contain many more similarities than differences, although when using them they do wish to highlight different aspects to the term. As I am introducing the Māori labels for Being alongside those terms, I shall lay out for the reader the ontological similarities of each Romantic term alongside the Māori term korekore/thoroughgoing negativity/Being. The activities and manifestations that these terms refer to give rise to things in the world, including the self, and imbue them with unknowable, imperceptible elements. An analysis of these terms is therefore essential to any discussion about Geheimnis.

**Kore/korekore: Das Absolute, Sein, das Unbedingte**

**Das Absolute/the absolute**

According to German Romantic philosophy, things in the world, including human self-awareness and perception, are transformable by human beings but only because of human dependence on, and relationship with, the Absolute. Consider the relationship between finite things in the world and the Absolute in the primordial sense in Novalis’ (1960g) following fragment:

(Lebendige Kraft - abs[olute] Kraft - relative Kraft – wirksame Kraft.)


Der Ausdruck abs[olut] ist relativ wieder.
absolut | absolut | oder abs[olut]² ist das Höchste und Letzte. (p. 52)

(Living force – absolute force – relative force – effective force).

By means of control the body is forced out of its relations – into a free living state. Life in turn is also – physical life, specific life – absolute life – living life.

The expression ‘absolute’ is in turn relative. Absolute absolute or absolute² is the highest and the ultimate. (Wood, 2007, p. 195)

Novalis emphasises the dual nature of the Absolute – its finitude and infinitude – in this fragment. He calls the expression ‘absolute’ “relative”. It is qualifiedly linked to the noun ‘life’, and is posed as finite in that way. His point is that, by grouping it amongst ‘physical’, ‘specific’, ‘living’, it is no more or less in its qualification than those other adjectives because it is amongst the world of things.

Novalis then doubles the term for effect, but before we delve into his reasons for this approach, let us turn to a similar, and helpful, description from the Māori theologian and philosopher Maori Marsden. Marsden, a prolific writer on Māori philosophies around Being, uses various terms to refer to the infinite, including Io, Papatūānuku, kore and korekore. His works are highly innovative, as he reflects on the metaphysical significance of each traditional term within a contemporary ethics of nature, and theorises on their current importance, not just on their traditional use. Moreover, in his The woven universe: Selected writings of Rev. Māori Marsden (Marsden, 2003), he addresses the mismatch between the metaphysical concepts behind these terms and the approach offered by science, thereby questioning whether Māori and dominant Western philosophies can, or even should, be reconciled. In many ways, Marsden’s knowledge is an indispensable aspect of parts of this thesis, especially as he places concepts alongside what he posits to be their antitheses.

For Marsden (2003) the radical and necessary alternative to staying with the evident form of ‘kore’/negativity or voidness is to acknowledge its antithesis. The term is apparently the opposite of Novalis’ “absolute” in the above fragment, because in its singular ‘kore’ form, as a term indicating negativity, it refers to a
void. It is not yet a thing. Marsden then posits that the term korekore that succeeds kore, being the result of the doubling of the term kore, is so thoroughly negative or void that it takes on aspects of its opposite. It hence becomes positive, or “potential Being” (Marsden, 2003, p. 20), and assumes elements of the finite. Marsden believes that the potential Being can be likened to growth within the womb, or of a plant. The finite is not yet fully formed but is on its way. It is nevertheless a thing. The effect is to point to a paradox within the double term that is established to attempt to reflect that there is a dual, even oppositional, character within the term.

**Das Absolute/korekore, both finite and infinite**

Marsden is helpful as I interpret Novalis because he highlights the effect of doubling the term. Although the respective terms kore and absolute in their singular form point to diametrically opposite states, both conclude in the same place. There is a possible precedent in that discussion for an interpretation of Novalis’ term “[a]bsolute absolute”, which he comes to towards the end of that fragment. Recall that Novalis’ grouping of ‘absolute’ with other finite phenomena highlights that the absolute is similarly finite⁸. Its later doubling in the fragment, Heidegger’s somewhat confusing maxim that “[d]as Nichts nichtet” (1998, p. 39)/the nothing noths, offers some help with an alternative interpretation of the active nature of kore, and its immediate impact on the awareness of the self. His maxim is perplexing partly because he encourages the thinker to evade negativity in their thinking whilst contemplating the “nihilating power of the void” (Dorrien, 1997, p. 158). This nihilating in fact “shelters the best of Being” (Warminski, 1987, p. 63). Being is to be thought of not as an entity that is not a thing, yet that, as a non-entity, it noths. Thus it is a “certain occurrence (Ereignis) that is given to be thought” (Vallega, 2001, p. 51). As negativity it is simultaneously to be thought of as that which has to it positive and negative elements, yet ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are terms to be rejected.

It would be unusual to say ‘ka kore te kore’; indeed, in its grammatical peculiarity the statement roughly equates with that of Heidegger’s. However, kore can be a verb, and in the context of Heidegger’s assertion it also means ‘the nothing noths’. This Māori linguistic rendering – ka kore te kore - likewise construes that Being is nihilating that which is not a thing. This nihilation means that one is dealing with both negative and positive but that these term should at the same time be rejected because they threaten to reify that which is (and that is therefore such and such) and that which is a blank nothing. So in nihilating, there is simultaneously (‘einst’) a concealment of Being, and an appearance that is given to humanity to think about. I argue that this revelation is ‘te pō’, which is taken usually by most Māori metaphysicians to mean ‘the dark’ in the next stage of creation after te kore, but which may also be taken to mean concomitant ‘distress’, as in ‘pō-uri’.

Thus: Ka kore te kore is the sheltering (nihilation) of kore and at the same time the revelation of te pō (distress).

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⁸ Heidegger’s somewhat confusing maxim that “[d]as Nichts nichtet” (1998, p. 39)/the nothing noths, offers some help with an alternative interpretation of the active nature of kore, and its immediate impact on the awareness of the self. His maxim is perplexing partly because he encourages the thinker to evade negativity in their thinking whilst contemplating the “nihilating power of the void” (Dorrien, 1997, p. 158). This nihilating in fact “shelters the best of Being” (Warminski, 1987, p. 63). Being is to be thought of not as an entity that is not a thing, yet that, as a non-entity, it noths. Thus it is a “certain occurrence (Ereignis) that is given to be thought” (Vallega, 2001, p. 51). As negativity it is simultaneously to be thought of as that which has to it positive and negative elements, yet ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are terms to be rejected. It would be unusual to say ‘ka kore te kore’; indeed, in its grammatical peculiarity the statement roughly equates with that of Heidegger’s. However, kore can be a verb, and in the context of Heidegger’s assertion it also means ‘the nothing noths’. This Māori linguistic rendering – ka kore te kore - likewise construes that Being is nihilating that which is not a thing. This nihilation means that one is dealing with both negative and positive but that these term should at the same time be rejected because they threaten to reify that which is (and that is therefore such and such) and that which is a blank nothing. So in nihilating, there is simultaneously (‘einst’) a concealment of Being, and an appearance that is given to humanity to think about. I argue that this revelation is ‘te pō’, which is taken usually by most Māori metaphysicians to mean ‘the dark’ in the next stage of creation after te kore, but which may also be taken to mean concomitant ‘distress’, as in ‘pō-uri’.

Thus: Ka kore te kore is the sheltering (nihilation) of kore and at the same time the revelation of te pō (distress).
though, suggests an uptake not just of the opposite as an object of human thought ("relative") but as an ontological opposite. In being doubled, the term ‘absolute’ has become so thoroughly finite that the infinite is immediately emphasised. As much as korekore, “absolute absolute”, as Novalis puts it, is intrinsically both finite matter and mystery. We shall see in much greater depth that Novalis wanted Western humanity to recognise that the finite things before them are part of a much greater, organising activity, and to move away from viewing them as if they are total and as if they are independent of other things. On the other hand, he also encourages his readers to resist losing themselves within a morass of indeterminacy. The “absolute absolute” appears to be a mystical paradox but in the “[lebendiges Leben” the contradictions of finite and infinite, and of immanent and transcendent, seem to be resolved. His Das Allgemeine Brouillon, from which was sourced the above fragment, evidences the presence of both mystery and banality at the same time, as well as showing that one may proceed towards either mystery or banality through the process of romanticising, which takes scientific principles and expresses them in seemingly contradictory and mysterious ways. Nevertheless, the continuation of certain empirical and rationalistic aspects of things and activities is still to be acknowledged in that process.

In being pōuri, from te pō, one is similarly grappling with a thing but also its simultaneous loss. It has hence receded but its background has been brought into our awareness, and this ‘background’ cannot be defined. It is through this recession of the thing of concern that one is radically disengaged “from the whole space-time-matter world of das Seiende/the entity)” (Nieli, 1987, p. 25). Heidegger had argued that it was a feeling of ‘Angst’ or dread that brought this sudden, yet rare, awareness of the disengagement about.

The linguistic aspect of this phrase is utilised by Heidegger (and may be executed for similar effect in Māori) to emphasise the following:

- that there is a continuous active aspect to kore;
- that an unusual linguistic experiment is sometimes necessary to activate thinking about this activity;
- that there is a need to get ‘beyond’ the finite object to obtain a sense of that which is both finite and infinite, or positive and negative;
- that, in Māori linguistic convention, the dark (te pō) is a reference to a form of distress, and, when experienced, takes one beyond the confines of the finite world, as Heidegger had noted was the outcome of ‘dread’.

Novalis refers throughout his works to the activity of a thing in the world, including the activity of a thing’s properties because of the Absolute. In Fichte-Studien, for instance, he places activity in the “Entgegengesetzte” (1960j, p. 237)”opposed thing” (Kneller, 2003, p. 136). It is the thing that is opposed to the thing being focused on that holds the activity of the thing. In respect of korekore, it is kore that contains activity, and vice versa.
All this appears to be relatively straightforward as long as it accords with progressive and linear strains of thought, by which this leads to that. Yet could the original singular terms already contain within them elements of their double, even though the double form apparently follows the singular? My question suggests the possibility that those singular terms defy sequential time and simple binary logic and causality. Novalis tackles the temptation to think of the unlimited as deriving from the limited in his *Fichte-Studien* when he addresses the apparent causal link that suggests the move from feeling to reflection:


In *consciousness* it must *appear* as if it went from the limited to the unlimited, because consciousness must proceed from itself as limited – and this happens through *feeling* – without consideration of the fact that *feeling*, regarded abstractly, is a progression from unlimited to limited. (Kneller, 2003, p. 13)

His attention to the apparent move from one state (limited) to another (unlimited) is what is striking in this passage. More specific to this fragment, we could maintain that our depiction of the movement from finite to infinite – from absolute to absolute absolute – comes about because of the limitations on our consciousness. Because of this progressive interpretation we are caught in a linear stasis. But Novalis goes on to name the Absolute even in that same fragment:

Sobald das Absolute, wie ich das Ursprünglich Idealreale oder realideale nennen will, als Accident, oder halb erscheint, so muß es verkehrt erscheinen – das Unbeschränkte wird beschränkt et vice versa. (1960j, p. 114)
As soon as the absolute, as I want to call the original ideal-real or real-ideal, appears as accident or halfway, then it must appear inverted – the unlimited becomes limited and vice versa. (Kneller, 2003, p. 13)

**Implications for notions of time**

For Novalis the major issue now becomes how to avoid the consequences of thinking that either the limited leads to unlimited or vice versa. These consequences more than likely entail a continued limitation on the potential of the self, through the restriction of the activities of the Absolute by consciousness. In terms of the Absolute, Novalis is clear that it contains already the apparently successive infinity of absolute absolute. The Absolute in singular form is therefore already both finite and infinite. The complexity of the notion of time for Māori is also implicit linguistically, as particles such as ‘e … ana’, ‘ka’, ‘kei te’, and ‘kua’ that are normally used in conjunction with a verb are not time specific. The proper noun ‘Papatūānuku’ conceives of ‘Papa’: Marsden (2003) insists that “the earth is not simply Papa (rock foundation) but Papa-tua-nuku (rock foundation beyond expanse, the infinite)” (p. 22), but the name already shows manifestations of that finite manifestation, rock foundation. The interrelational causality also shows itself, again, in the phrase ‘i ngā rā o mua’ which refers both to days gone before as well as those ahead. The preferred belief of both Romantics and Māori, I argue, is for a “Gegenwart [die schwebt] – gleich einem Gefäße, das einen aufnehmenden und abführenden Gang hat” (Novalis, 1960b, p. 449)/“present [that] floats – like a vessel that has an ascending and descending course” (Wood, 2007, p. 167), where movements forwards and backwards occur simultaneously. Kore and Absolute thereby evade total solidification as much as their doubled forms and warn against a complete detachment from things in the world. With this interpretation, humanity is encouraged to remember the importance of their finite manifestations as disclosures of the Absolute.

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10 I diverge from some areas of Marsden’s belief, especially his tendency to stress the termination of metaphysical events at certain stages. It may appear to humanity’s perception that there are set stages to metaphysics, but I argue later that the event continues, despite that perception.
‘Sein’/Being

Seyn or Being is also a dual, simultaneous action that can be discussed phenomenologically. Korekore is comparable here, too. To start with Being: Phenomenologically it is linked with both activity and finite thing. It therefore contains within it the ability to act, but also present in it are things in the world. As an ontological indication it “is characterized by the dynamic of ‘becoming’; by its manifestation in ‘appearances’; and by the sense of authentic representation denoted by the ‘ideal’” (Pratt, 2002, p. 94). As an “ideal”, one strives after depicting it authentically. In these ways the word ‘Being’ already contains within it both the ability to organise itself as well as the things that it autonomously solidifies into. It is both product and activity. Korekore might be a ‘thing’ according to its positive attributes, but because of its creation from kore it contains within it strains of negativity, or ‘nothingness’ that appear not to be related to things. One is reminded here that ‘kore’ can be placed after the particle ‘kua’, suggesting that in its negativity it is less concerned with positive things; that is, it is concerned entirely with activity, not finite manifestation. Yet in forming korekore, kore even on its own already contains within it strains of positivity. Like Seyn/Being, both kore and korekore are things in the world as well as sheer activity at the same time.

There are hence some plausible correspondences between Seyn/Being and korekore, and the Absolute and korekore. In the case of the Absolute, Being, the infinite (das Unendliche) and the unconditioned, Stone (2011) sums up the relationship between the German terms and the Romantics’ reason for using a variety of terms for the same phenomenon:

The absolute is ‘the infinite’ (das Unendliche) because it is not a finite thing but the non-finite whole encompassing all finite things. The absolute is ‘being’ because all finite things contain negation in that they differ from and so are-not one another, whereas the absolute encompasses everything so that there is nothing outside it for it to not-be: it entirely is. The absolute is ‘the unconditioned’ (das Unbedingte)
because, as the whole, there is nothing outside it to causally condition it. (p. 502)

These similarities all highlight the terms’ reference to the same phenomenon. I note here, though, that there may be some difficulties with the English or German terms when discussing a Māori affirmation of korekore, especially with the term Being. ‘To be’ does not exist linguistically as an outright verb in Māori. A discussion of the implications of a linguistic ‘Being’, including its potentially negative connotations of its import into Māori, is beyond the scope of this thesis, but would be a worthy topic of research. Translations certainly (and, I suspect, unwittingly) impose a translation ‘to be’ on sentences with the Māori particle ‘he’, specifically when a thing in the sentence is pointed out as the equivalent of something else, or when it is necessary to indicate the attributes or quiddity of a thing. Hypothetically, what something is threatens to become self-evident for the Māori psyche as much as Heidegger – who took many of his cues from Idealist and Romantic philosophies - argues it has for the West. Some solace may be found in the fact that, according to Heidegger, Being as primordial activity is not solely manifested linguistically but more importantly is focused on the disclosure

11 As in ‘he whare tērā’ /[that is a house]. ‘He’ may not strictly equate with ‘is a’ in this example, as it is commonly given, but instead may draw one’s attention to the manifestation of a thing – [that house manifesting]. In that sense, the house is disclosed as that thing, together with the constant relationship of Being. With guidance from Novalis, Heidegger, and Māori belief, we would note that the house discloses itself as a coming together of the work of individuals, together with their ancestral and colonised histories, materials, attitudes, and land, as well as the constant activity of the ‘Gods’ (Heidegger, 1990), the Absolute/Seyn (Novalis), and the ‘tapa whā’ (Durie, 1994)/four walls of health. These latter entities all manifest themselves as equally in the thing disclosed as the house as the house itself.

Another example is ‘ko hea tērā maunga?’, which is commonly taken to mean ‘what is that mountain called?’, or ‘what is that mountain?’ It could be reinterpreted as ‘That phenomenon arising before us there gathers to it our attention. How does it draw us to relate to it?’

‘Ko wai koe’, instead of ‘who are you’, may be rendered as ‘in/towards (ko) your selfhood (koe), the waters (wai) that you draw on allow you (koe) to be present (ko) as a particularly-named entity (wai). How does that selfhood, to which those waters pertain, manifest?’

12 Some important precursors of Heidegger’s thinking are discernible in Novalis’ philosophies. Greaves (2010) observes that, despite being in the background, Novalis was an important factor in Heidegger’s theories, with Heidegger reading Novalis’ works “a number of times” (p. xiv). In her comparisons between Heidegger’s ‘Gestell’ and Novalis’ ‘Werkzeug’, Holland (2006) remarks that the relationship between the two scholars is more significant than has been previously recognised.
of things in the world. He states, for instance, that Being is as obvious to one in “jedem Verhalten … zu Seiendem als Seiendem” (1993, p. 4)/“comporting oneself towards entities as entities” (1967, p. 23) as when one uses the verb ‘to be’. He also emphasises that “[i]n jedem Gebrauch eines Verbum haben wir schon Sein gedacht und immer irgendwie verstanden” (2005, p. 18)/[in each use of a verb we have already thought, and somehow always understood, Being]. Being understood in this sense is beyond linguistic conventions: It is instead conceived of as drawing attention to a thing in the world in its autonomous totality within a primordial activity.

Das Unbedingte/the unreified

The other term, das Unbedingte/[unreified], is used by Novalis in a way to highlight our paradoxical focus on things in the face of Being. He adopts this term specifically to draw our attention to our pursuit of grasping a thing as knowable. In the background of this term, however, works Being/the Absolute itself, so that the thing-as-knowable ends up retaining its mystery and fluidity. It also shares some common characteristics with korekore; it is both a negative (‘Un-’) and positively represented thing (‘-bedingte’) and is therefore also mystery and transcendent thing. ‘The unconditioned’ shares likenesses with Being/the Absolute/korekore, but is used more to highlight the finite (yet very much mysterious) thing in the world. Although it does automatically include the sublime activity of Being when used, and is contingent on that activity, it tends to focus on what is directly before the perceiver, as an illustration of humanity’s futile engagement with trying to find a grounding principle. As I want to bring to the fore Novalis’ notion of mysteriousness, underpinned by Being, I shall use the more immediately mysterious terms of ‘Being’ and ‘the Absolute’. When specific terms are expressed by an author in the original text I stay with that usage, but otherwise move between terms. I also use them in relation to ontological theories that posit a Māori notion of Being, and so occasionally I shall revert to the Māori term korekore.
Oppositional states as part of a method

Korekore and das Absolute/Sein/das Unbedingte highlight the need to consider oppositional states as one moves towards making an assertion about the nature of a thing. The lament “Tērā te Auahi” that I cited in chapter one also asks the writer to think about oppositions when certain terms in the lament are brought to the fore and laid out in connection with each other. For Māori this signals more specifically that one should undertake a critique as much as make such an assertion. The dialogue that I have facilitated here between the terms indicates that I should engage in a critique as well as propose any outright resolution, and it forms the basis of how I approach this thesis.

Method: Thinking after the sentence that pushes

Recall that my overall method is to establish a dialogue between Novalis’ and Māori philosophies to reconnect Māori terms with their Geheimnis. Novalis’ love of Geheimnis led him to argue for a philosophical approach that would not only preserve the Absolute but would also have as its aim the consciously holistic depiction of the world. He proposes throughout his works that one disturb the dominating Geheimnislosigkeit by rethinking the relationship of things in the world with the Absolute. He terms this activity ‘Romantisieren’, and states the following:

[The world must be romanticised. In this way, one again finds the primordial sense…. In that I give the general a higher sense, the usual a mysterious look, the well-known the dignity of the unknown, the finite an infinite appearance, I am romanticising it – The converse operation is for the lofty, unknown, mystical, infinite – they are logarhythmised by this association.]

In this endeavour Novalis accords with other Romantics, such as the Schlegel brothers, who proposed that “[d]ie romantische Dichtart … allein ist unendlich, wie sie allein frei ist und das als ihr erstes Gesetz anerkennt” (1798, p. 30)/[the Romantic style of poetry … is on its own in being as unending as it is free, and, insofar as this is its fundamental law, it is to be acknowledged]. The “romantische Entgrenzung” (Strich, 1962, p. 358)/[Romantic removal of limitations] process was seen as a means of assigning Geheimnis to the Absolute that it deserved.

Thus there are both metaphysical and political aims to Romantisieren. Poetry and philosophy should not really be seen as separate components in this exercise as they are both “part of the same process” (Kneller, 2003, p. xxxiii) that calls on imagination and logic to transform things in the world. Both of these components of Romantisieren are responsible for either lifting or reducing. It is important to remember the latter of these two exercises, for the rendering of things to a more banal level is a sign of the workability of the exercise. The claim that one must be constantly raising the idea of things in the world to greater heights is only partially true: Novalis envisaged that romanticising assists us only to the extent that we desire, but that at times we must lower those aspects. Both operations are important and related and so must be carried out to the “gegenseitigen Vortheil beyder Operationen” (1960b, p. 362)/“mutual advantage of both operations” (Wood, 2007, p. 98). However, given Novalis’ disillusionment with the worldview of his epoch, most of his fragments are aimed at raising the degree of humanity’s construction of nature; hence such statements as:

The knowledge of raising the degree, and the means for the classification of the degree - as well as their usage - allow us to immediately proceed into the breadths and depths. (Wood, 2007, p. 98)

It is at this point that one romanticises, for to macrologise and micrologise one must look outside of a usual discipline that tends to describe things in the world in one particular, unchanging way. For Novalis, raising our view of things in the world to another level was an interdisciplinary activity, drawing on manifold sources – including empirical ones\textsuperscript{13} – to move outwards from geheimnislosen realms. There also remains a special place for what may be called ‘first’ or ‘lower’ degree explanations for things in the world, signalling Novalis’ positioning of the sciences and philosophy. One may rely on these lower explanations to begin the process of Romantisieren. Nature’s ‘Sprachlehre’ (Novalis, 1960e)/[grammar] illustrates the importance of given, initial signs. Assumed first principles, including philosophical ones, provide the first steps, and their imprint lingers throughout the Romantisieren process. They should be neither ignored, as a reaction to their current overriding importance, nor banished once they appear to have served their purpose.

My own method takes place within this expansive field of Romantisieren, as my most fundamental aim in this thesis is to give the banality of dominantly posed Māori terms the “dignity of the unknown”. This broad description of Romantisieren that I have just provided has therefore been necessary from the outset, as it informs the reader that this fundamental drive of mine underpins the entire thesis. But in order to achieve this grander aim I resort to a more specific operation that comprises a part of the Romantisieren project. In this express method I am pushed forward to consider a response that theorises about a notion of Being for Māori, from Novalis’ writings. Novalis’ writings here form ‘Stoßsätze’,

or ‘sentences that challenge and push’, and my responses form the ‘Nachdenken’, or ‘meditative thinking’. Whilst I primarily use the terms Stoßsätze and Nachdenken throughout this chapter, at crucial points I refer back to the broader project of Romantisieren.

‘Stoßsätze’ – Novalis’ method involving sentences that challenge and push

For Novalis, the Ich/I, including the Ich as a philosophical subject, is one manifestation in the world of many, admittedly with the ability to transform the world but not as the grounding principle of every activity. The Absolute or Being is no more absent from the Ich than it is from anything else. To acknowledge the Geheimnis that Being provides to things in the world, including to the Ich, Novalis identified that the reader needs to draw some creative conclusions of their own. This could happen both through provoking the reader and by grouping disparate elements together for an unknown outcome. Things in the world would then avoid being self-evident. He indicated on that note that:


The exposition [Darstellung] of philosophy consists, therefore, merely in themes, first sentences – certain sentences that push [Stoßsätze] – the exposition exists only for active lovers of the truth. The analytical elaboration of the theme is for slow or unskilled ones, those whom the mother first needs to teach how to fly, and how to maintain a certain direction. (Kleingeld, 2008, p. 278)
I wish to bring this method originating from Novalis’ idiosyncratic term ‘Stoßsätze’ to the fore as an important one for this thesis. Novalis’ approach is linked with his critique of ‘Systemphilosophie’/[foundationalist philosophy]. He used fragments and aphorisms instead of whole descriptions deliberately as he did not wish to solidify or petrify the world to which he was referring, and he desired to avoid the “analytische Ausführung” that required step by step assistance. To that extent he tried to use a method of writing that corresponds to the dynamics of his thinking. Before one mistakes him for being an arbitrary, non-committal character, though, it should be noted that there are strong and discernible arguments that are embedded in all of his philosophical fragments, poems and essays. He immersed himself readily within the philosophical systems of Fichte and Kant and understood them thoroughly, but, as a reaction to their foundational nature, and out of a desire to actively preserve Geheimnis throughout things in the world and in the process of thinking itself, he did not create a foundational system himself. Novalis wanted to preserve thoughts as “Bewegungen und Actionen” (1960f, p. 595)/[movements and actions] and believed that to create a final philosophical system was to rob thought of its continued creativity and action. His general way of thinking lends itself to being rearranged and recombined to prompt discussion, which in the case of this thesis focuses on the loss of mystery to things in the world for Māori and, finally, on Māori ontological relationships with the world through the romanticising of particular Māori terms.

Thinking for Novalis is largely a creative faculty, one that requires an impetus, a challenge or push from an external force. In his Das Allgemeine Brouillon he highlights the importance of some form of contacting force:


Sculptors or atomists require a thrust (mobile force.) – musicians a modifying body – an obstacle. Fichte belongs among the musicians….  

43
Both require an obstacle – a contact. The one to form – the other to move. (Wood, 2007, p. 115)

A first principle is less important to identify, because the push, while apparently determinable, is itself communicated to by a number of factors, some unidentifiable, leading Novalis to ask in that same fragment “[w]ozu überhaupt ein Anfang? Dieser unphilosophische – oder halbphilosophische Zweck führt zu allen Irrthümern” “[w]hy do we need a beginning at all? This unphilosophical – or semiphilosophical goal is the source of all error”. What is important for Novalis here is that there is a form of contact that can be either emotional or physical, or both. For the perceiver it may be thought of as an ‘Anfangssatz’/[starting proposition] but with its own autonomy it is the product of other interrelated elements and events.

As Novalis’ approach is linked to his suspicion of Systemphilosophie, I am permitted to draw on his ideas as provocations to consider a response that contains aspects of Māori metaphysics. This response takes into account the effects of colonisation, is affected by Geheimnislosigkeit, and in turn is suggested as an impetus for readers. This provocation is not necessarily one marked by an adverse opinion, however (although it may be): It can be stimulating because it draws together a number of seemingly unrelated elements to involve an outcome that an engager might suspect but cannot know with certainty. The Stoßsatz method, then, is characterised by its openness, creativity, and by its element of unexpectedness, and is linked with an equally unexpected outcome.

The validity of Novalis’ method lies in the following:

1. It secures the Geheimnis in the process of thinking and therefore evades Geheimnislosigkeit.
2. In its process, as much as its outcome, it reflects the Geheimnis of the Absolute/Being, which itself displays elements of the creative and contingent.
3. For both the coloniser and the colonised who are affected by a geheimnislosen view of the world, it is disruptive. The method interferes with a comfortable view of things in the world, and is likely to be liberating because it threatens to dismantle commonly held principles that over time have become entrenched and lacking in mystery. In its critique of and challenge to generally accepted worldviews it is a highly political method.

4. By this method, one engages with opposing viewpoints before one makes positive affirmations about a thing in the world. For a colonised people, this acknowledgement and articulation of the antithetic element is particularly important. As Novalis notes, one may not adequately describe things in the world anymore with affirmations of traditional certainty, as one also has the reality of present and future to account for.

5. It is theoretical, and involves the imagination.

6. It may be called ‘spiritual’ but in an everyday sense, not in a rarefied fashion. It involves the driving together of cognition, imagination, political astuteness, and the history and locality of the engager, as well as of Being/the Absolute.

7. For Māori, it may offer a way of bringing all these elements together in a theoretical explanation for a thing in the world. This theoretical exercise, though, is to be thought of as active, as the whole essence of the person and their relationships with things in the world, is actually involved.

8. It comes with responsibility attached. Stoßsätze may be quite powerful if they are original. They should be helpful. The poet Hermann Hesse, a great admirer of Novalis, stated that “jedem Anfang wohnt ein Zauber inne/Der uns beschützt und der uns hilft zu leben” (1961, p. 199) [at every beginning lives an enchantment within/That protects us and helps us to live], emphasising the creative and assisting force of every critique and inaugural proposition. Stoßsätze can begin the activity of theory but remain helpful in any outcome.

9. Importantly, it is not just reactive but constructively playful, as it groups elements in unforeseen combinations with each other, often resulting in outcomes characterised by Geheimnis.
In its most general sense, and reminiscent of Heidegger’s legein, this thesis draws heavily on the last aspect, as it brings together German and Māori traditions with an unknowable outcome. More specifically, I shall draw on Novalis’ method in the following way in this thesis:

Novalis’ Stoßsätze → My creative and instinctive reaction informed by Māori philosophy → My own articulated response to the Stoßsätzen.

In the context of this thesis it should perhaps be clear that ‘a Māori discussion about a thing in the world’ is in fact ‘my own articulated response to the Stoßsätzen’, but in my thesis I refer also to other Māori writers’ works so that I can provide some clarification of my response. The Stoßsatz method is thus meant to be rigorous, but it may not be systematic. The reader will also have already observed that, at the beginning of this chapter whilst starting a discussion about the oppositional nature of Being, I brought Māori Marsden into a dialogue with Novalis; this then opened up my response. This is a possible aspect of the ‘symphilosophischen’/[philosophically unified] nature of the Stoßsatz method. In certain other places there is an evident dialogue occurring between Novalis and elements of Māori scholarship and thought. An important facet of the Stoßsatz method, then, is its possibility to allow two different traditions to come into dialogue with each other. Novalis noted that the production of ideas comes about through the impacts of diverse substances:

Der Poët braucht die Dinge und Worte, wie Tasten und die ganze Poësie beruht auf thätiger Idéenassociation – auf selbstthätiger, absichtlicher, idealischer Zufallproduktion - (zufällige – freye Catenation). (1960b, p. 451)

The poet employs things and words like keys, since the whole of poesy is based on the active association of ideas – on the self-active, purposeful, and idealistic production of chance – (fortuitous – free concatenation). (Wood, 2007, p. 168)
The poet strikes the keys, and the sound acts as a Stoßsatz. But the keys are an impetus to begin with, and so is the poet him- or herself. The poetic sound that emerges shows the complex nature of the Stoßsatz method. It is a mixture of the key, the sound, the poet, and the impact of other unseen things in the world. The metaphor that I have interpreted here demonstrates that there is ongoing discussion between a variety of elements. Arranging fragments of thought next to each other, in the context of this thesis, brings them to speak with one another.

Chapter three draws heavily on Te Maire Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains” and to that extent is similarly symphilosophisch. Yet in that chapter it is Novalis who clearly has the igniting word and makes it possible for me to respond to Te Maire Tau in this thesis in the way that I do. In all cases involving Stoßsätze the view that this method appears tidy (in that it first refers to one tradition then another) should be revisited, as the engager may have to alternate between both traditions. However, Novalis’ influence is perceptible in my responses, and indeed is the beginning provocative sentence at each point.

**Similar Māori practices of challenge and provocation**

Novalis has directed my attention to this method, but it should be noted that there are also Māori precedents. The Māori equivalent terms are numerous. For instance, the term ‘kupu whakaaro’ incites the thinker to respond to a word or set of words. The term ‘aro’ can also be used in the sense of ‘kōaro’, referring to a regard of a thing so that it is inverted; thus ‘kupu whakakōaro’ could signify the regard to respond to the word with the result that a conventional approach is overturned. ‘Kupu whakakōkiri’ is the challenge that a word or set of words invokes, and ‘kupu ohorere’ the immediate provocative response that the words arouse in the reader or listener. In practical ways, the Stoßsatz method was utilised in traditional learning settings, with the learner being encouraged to respond imaginatively to a stimulus, with fresh, even unanticipated perspective the focus (Hemara, 2000) rather than correctness. Contemporary political and research activities in indigenous contexts reveal a call to imagination: Graham Smith (2003), speaking of the need for Māori to recapture their imagination as a liberating force, posits that colonisation tried to stifle creative Māori thought and
rob it of its ability to theorise; and Linda Smith (1999) offers that “indigenous elders can do wonderful things with an interview. They tell stories, tease, question, think, observe, tell riddles, test and give trick answers. Conversely, they can also expect that an indigenous researcher will do the same back to them” (p. 136). Carrying this into practice in the academic arena, Māori academic Hoskins (2010) refers to Levinas in her doctoral thesis in a ‘kanohi ki te kanohi’/[face to face] relationship with indigenous thought and ethics, but has not referred to this as a method of prompting, even though there may be elements of this in her approach. What I show here is that, even in potentially colonising practices, spectacular opportunities may offer themselves for the use of Stoßsätze to address those practices’ very nature. Māori have been sent on an entirely other direction by the overwhelmingly devastating impact of colonisation, but, far from dampening any Māori ability to respond, colonisation has ironically opened itself up to response by Māori.

Stoßsätze: A dialogue between Novalis and aspects of Māori metaphysics

At first glance, the term ‘Stoß’ seems to suggest setting something in motion, but Novalis intends for it to have the effect of a chain reaction. It contains a deeper aspect of continuity and continued creativity, but having a residual effect, with Novalis (1960j) stating:

Der Grund des Naturgesetzes, daß jedes Anstoßes Wirkung ohne Gegenwirkung ewig dauere – wo liegt der im Ich – er kann uns im Ich manches erklären. (p. 268)

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14 The full extent of cultural and political transformation is beyond the scope of this thesis, but for specific discussions and interpretations, see: Kaiwai & Zemke-White (2004); Anne Salmond (1994) for a brief discussion on the resilience yet adaptation of Māori protocol after contact; Royal (2006); Linda Smith (1999); Pihama (2001).
The ground of the law of nature that the action without reaction of every force continues eternally – where does [this principle] lie in the I – it can explain much about the I. (Kneller, 2003, p. 167)

There is a link between the Stoßsätze and the creative outcome, with the outcome one of deep personal embeddedness: “Eine überraschende Selbstheit ist zwischen einem wahrhaften Liede und einer edeln Handlung” (Novalis, 1960h, p. 332). “There is a surprising similarity between a genuine song and a noble deed” (Novalis, 1990, p. 167). As the self continues in its creative pursuit, so it is evidence of impetus and creative activity. The powerful effect that nature and poesy have on various characters in Novalis’ works, including Heinrich from Heinrich von Ofterdingen, and Rosenblüte from “Die Natur” in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais, stays with those participants, provoking them to consider nature in its fullest and continuously impacting extent.

I argue that both Novalis’ and traditional and contemporary Māori belief would resist any notion that Stoßsätze are merely stimulating functions and can thereafter be discarded from what ensues. To begin with, some Māori writers (Browne, 2005; Pere, 1982; Raerino, 2000) acknowledge the enduring nature of a word. Because of the overall embrace of the word that they talk about, one may move onward after encountering the word but with the expectation that the essence of the word remains. Pihama, Smith, Taki, & Lee (2004) draw on the function of ‘kupu’ as the “kakahu/[cloak] of sound” (p. 21). Admittedly about the spoken word, this ‘kakahu’ may cloak the speaker as much as any aspect of the word. As written Stoßsätze, it is not inconceivable that the kupu could have their own effect, perhaps providing a similar ‘cloak’. A metaphor, ‘cloak’ suggests that removal is possible. Certainly Māori believed that the effect of a word on the perceiver could be either enhanced or undone, further showing that the subject operates within the subtle influence of a word on contact with it. Located as a subject within the wider sphere of reo/language, one may be moved onward to new and imaginative grounds but always with the continuation of the old ground.

One may undertake an interpretation of certain Māori terms here to understand this admittedly unconventional idea that entities ‘stay’ with others. Here we are
discussing not the stimulating impact of those words (although indeed they do provide impetuses for much creative discussion) but the fact that things in the world remain under their influence. With the word whakapapa/genealogy, for instance, there exists a complex web of interrelated phenomena **within** which one operates. As an allusion to Papatūānuku/[Earth Mother] one is automatically reminded of the earth (hence ‘papa’). One is born of the earth – nourishing substance - as a manifestation of Papatūānuku, and is also becoming (‘whaka’) earth. An interpretation of this language suggests that the earth is inescapable. A term denoting noun and verb at once, whakapapa reveals that all finite things in the world might move forward into new terrains but always within the world’s primordial influence. In its draw back to Papatūānuku, whakapapa innervates and arouses finite things. In its way it acts as Stoß/[jolt] to them. Whenua, the Māori term for both land and placenta, completely embraces Māori. It therefore “sparked the Māori imagination” (Royal, 2011 n.p.)\(^{15}\), but never disappears as a jolt for that imagination.

Novalis (1960m) avowed that:

*Wir stehen in Verhältnissen mit allen Theilen des Universums, so wie mit Zukunft und Vorzeit. Es hängt nur von der Richtung und Dauer unserer Aufmerksamkeit ab, welches für uns vorzüglich wichtig, und wirksam werden soll.* (p. 455)

[We stand in relation to all elements of the universe, just as we do with future and past. It is the direction and endurance of our attention that determines which should become eminently important and effective for us.]

The interrelationship of past and present is a given, but where one takes one’s attention – here, to utilise Stoßsätze – is also important. The engager with Stoßsätze is therefore forgiven in thinking of Stoßsätze as a thoroughly

\(^{15}\) The saying “ka tu te ihihi/ka tu te wanawana/ki runga i te whenua e takoto nei, e takoto nei”/“so that the land surrounding us/proclaims its wonder” (Greenwood & Wilson, 2006, p. 89) shows the prompt that whenua can provide.
founding impetus, or that he or she stands outside of it, but still here the person operates as a part of the enduring nature of the impetus. Even here, from a linguistic perspective that draws on Māori thought, the kupu’s influence would remain. Apparently leaving the Stoßsätze for good, one is still operating from its sphere and cannot help but carry remnants of it. To continue this discussion, let us examine a sentence in Māori which carries with it dual senses:

Ka puta mai tērā whakaaro mō taku whare i taku kitenga i te moana.

[That thought about my house arose because I saw the lake/from the point of seeing the lake: That thought about my house arises because I see the lake/because I continuously see the lake.]

Here the crucial components of the sentence are ‘mai … i’. These two particles indicate a continuing flow of activity and influence that ‘from’ does not impart. Seeing the lake, I suggest, remains as the starting point for thinking about ‘my house’ – it does not automatically disappear. These particles together can also mean ‘since’, suggesting that the effect is as much about what brought the thought about as the continued time in which the thought and the sighting coexist.

Novalis for his part speaks much more directly about the unique and continuing nature of the fragments and aphorisms. He relates to the ongoing move towards completion, with the imperfect fragment as a constant backdrop:

Als Fragment erscheint das Unvollkommne noch am Erträglichsten – und also ist diese Form der Mittheilung dem zu empfehlen, der noch nicht im Ganzen fertig ist – und doch einzelne merkwürdige Ansichten zu geben hat. (1960o, p. 595)

[As fragment, that which is imperfect still seems to be most bearable - and so this form of disclosure has in its favour that it is not yet finished so as to be whole – and indeed, particularly, that it offers remarkable views.]
The fragment is a mode of expression that I do not replicate for this thesis, as my own writing style is characterised by a traditionally academic narrative in which I advocate various positions. Despite its adherence to academic conventions, though, my thesis should be viewed as serving a larger impetus for further thought, which may also lead to further dialogue between marginalised European and Māori trains of thought. Occasionally, within some of my greater arguments (which, taken as a whole, could serve as impetus for thought) there appear highly condensed arguments that are more discrete in nature. In that form they resemble fragments to some extent, but they generally emerge as the result of a greater argument. A similar surmise may be made about the role of whakataukī/proverbs in that they are not meant to be prescriptive but to be calls to action: Pihama (1993) notes this about the following whakataukī:

Hutia te rito o te harakere/Kei hea te komako e ko?/Ki mai ki au/He aha te mea nui o te ao/Maku e ki atu/He Tangata, He Tangata, he Tangata/Pluck the centre shoot from the flax bush/Where will the Bellbird sing?/Ask me/What is the most important thing in the world/I will say/It is people, it is people, it is people. (p. 4)

She argues that the philosophy behind the saying “demands the active critique of and challenging of discourses … that contribute to the imposition of hierarchical power relations by the dominant group” (pp. 4-5). A reading of such an assertion as the whakataukī embodies does not immediately disclose the need for a critical discourse analysis, but what Pihama demonstrates is that different fields of knowledge, perhaps normally compartmentalised, are arranged next to each other so that the reader can make evolving connections from their placement. This is also an approach that Novalis advocates.

**The continuous influence of the sentence that challenges and pushes**

Just as the Māori whakataukī does not disappear from any subsequent theorising, so the first fragment that Novalis provides continues to exert its influence, despite having apparently been left behind. In a letter to Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis stated
that “[e]s sind Bruchstücke des fortlaufenden Selbstgesprächs in mir – Senker…. Erst Poësie – dann Politik, dann Physik en Masse” (1960a, pp. 241-242)/“fragmentary pieces of the ongoing dialogue that is going on in me – shoots…. First poesy – then politics, then physics en masse” (Gelley, 1991, p. 379). “Shoots” suggests a genesis in a seed, with the ongoing influence of that seed evident, where the whole plant or tree is potentially present in the very beginning – in the inaugural thought, the fragmented or condensed idea. “Poesy”, although first, is responsible for the activities that follow it; poesy is not thought to have ceased, nor just to have given rise to its predecessors but to have continued in them (Gelley, 1991). Friedrich Schlegel himself had considered a similar role of the fragment, highlighting its clashing with other fragments in bringing forth a new perspective (Speight, 2011).

Through the fragment, both Schlegel and Novalis attempted to force the reader into new realms of thought and to avoid reifying philosophical systems. They recognised the need for some sort of philosophising together, or Symphilosophie, which would acknowledge the moving forward together into new poetic and philosophical realms (Cieślą-Korytowska, 2002). An aim of the Stoßsatz method is to ensure that my own outcomes are influenced by a deliberate encounter with the source of the thinking that occurs: that is, with Novalis’ compelling sentences, with a dialogue occurring as well. As I indicated in chapter one, Symphilosophie in this sense refers to the conjunction of thought between Novalis and me through this method. Some of these aphorisms reach over a distance of several hundred years, demonstrating that Stoßsätze work not only in a recent time frame but have enduring relevance.

16 Novalis also refers to seeds in his popular comment: “Freunde, der Boden ist arm, wir müssen reichlichen Samen ausstreun, daß uns doch nur mäßige Ernten gedeihn” (1960n, p. 402)/“[f]riends, the soil is poor, we must richly scatter/Seeds to produce even a modern harvest” (O’Brien, 1995, p. 320). Novalis clearly hopes for a useful outcome to his fragments here, as O’Brien notes, but also a barren soil is started with, meaning that some of the seeds may not take effectively. We may infer here, as O’Brien does, that not all fragments will have a fruitful outcome.

17 A similar trait is discernible with Māori whakataukī, which still act as jolts for thinking even though they, too, may be several centuries old.
If the first element remains throughout the imaginative process, as I maintain it does, then there are consequences for both any substantive discussions about Geheimnis and for my method. For the first part, Stoßsätze appear to cease but are intertwined with the imaginative process, even where that process leads to a much more expansive outcome than the original Stoßsätze seem to contain. Any outcome, then, will be mysterious because it always contains primordial, often opaque, vestiges of the first principles that the user refers to. The reader may have already apprehended that my argument rests on the premise there is an imperceptible element to a thing in the world that is given to it by Being and that continues to exert its influence. That there is correspondingly a component of the first principle that cannot be scribed out from the last product reflects that grander argument. As we shall see, quite apart from being indebted to Fichte for the substantive nature of Fichte’s proclamations about a grounding principle, Novalis benefited from these proclamations as a kind of Stoßsatz; he uses them in the sense of ‘Aufhebung’,18 by which he carries Fichte’s declarations with him, but he seeks to counter them through his own creative thought process. A process of critique is renewed in Novalis’ encounter with Fichte’s thoughts which does not do away with them, however. Additionally, yet linked to that Geheimnis-oriented force of the Stoßsätze, both Māori philosophical belief and Novalis bestow on words an actual force beyond denotative meaning. Recall that Māori writers such as Pere, Marsden, and Browne declare that kupu are imbued with divine forces. Aspects of their, and others’, writings will be discussed in the following chapters, but they may be summarised in a methodological context in the briefest way as follows: Language is not an inanimate entity but has a ‘reach’ that moves outwards and inwards simultaneously – to other things in the world and also into the speaker. Language therefore not only jolts the cognitive faculty of the listener or reader – although this is an important aspect of it – but it will also have a much subtler effect. The effect of Stoßsätze is moreover to reaffirm the mysterious realm that the writer or talker works in through responding to another’s words and imagining another scenario through language.

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18 Hegel’s dialectical term ‘aufheben’, in the sense of lifting a term along with another but where they are “aufgehoben”/sublated (Redding, 2010, section 3.2) within a third, is similar. Novalis’ own approach is less formally identified, but he does acknowledge the vestiges of Fichte’s thought in his term ‘Fichtesising’, for instance. I shall delve into this process in some depth in chapter three.
The new scenario is not a traditionally pure one, and Novalis indicated that there was no going back to traditional or original ways of naming and philosophising in their pure form. This shows itself also with Stoßsätze, which retain aspects of the original but do not render those aspects as objects that can be returned to or ‘owned’. As far as Novalis was concerned, modernism had arrived and life had to be dealt with on those terms. He bears some resemblance to Enlightenment philosophers here (Gjesdal, 2009), but he diverges from them in at least one important respect: One may, and indeed should, still think in a poetic way as one’s ancestors had done. This poetic mode of interpreting and revealing Being was certainly a traditional one, as far as the Romantics were concerned. Tradition in this account is never truly compromised as long as one is representing Being in its indeterminacy and its continual presence. The Stoßsatz method ensures the continuation of the original principle that compels thought, as I have argued. In terms of this thesis it could be said that it will not result in a ‘traditional’ or ‘authentic’ Māori idea as the idea automatically contains elements of Novalis’ prompts. Whether this rules out an authentic Māori idea, though, is up for some speculation. Currently there is much debate on what constitutes an authentic Māori voice. My argument in this thesis, from the outset, is that Novalis would be correct: Māori cannot return to an uncolonised world, nor should they devise one that is typified by “the mystical, misty-eyed discourse that is sometimes employed by indigenous people to describe our relationships with the land and the universe” (Smith, 1999, p. 12). The Stoßsatz method does not aim to expunge the hidden but real principle of the colonising force, but instead aims to clarify that it may exist at most times, in most if not all places. Yet the outcome is perhaps not as compromised as one might think: In this case it will contain a distinctly Māori voice with Novalis as a catalytic partner in dialogue and vice versa.

Another aspect of Romantic methodology is the placement and enduring nature of first antithetic signs. These may not be identified as empirical or rationalistic but

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19 I argue that a mystical assertion may nowadays be termed such because of an overwhelmingly current focus on practical, concrete conditions. Yet I take from Smith that a highly idealised description is undesirable, and agree with her here. My thesis aims to place what might otherwise be explanations about a ‘mystical’ relationship as both mystical and concrete.
could include these characteristics. An extremely important point of Novalis’ comes to light here, especially in view of his overall project of Romantisieren, which is a liberating one. The advancement towards higher goals is hindered by an unobtainable scientific pursuit of first principles. However, that humanity tends to resort to the idea of linear progression when it comes to Romantisieren is conceded by Novalis, who appears to moderate his need for an unadulterated, simultaneous, and interdisciplinary approach to raising and lowering degrees with the realities of the human tendency to need ‘to start somewhere’. He notes:

Definition und Klassification der Wissenschaften – nothwendiges und vollständiges Princip der Definition und der davon abhängenden besonderen Definitionen und Classificationen. (1960b, p. 362)

Definition and classification of the sciences - necessary and complete principle of a definition, and the particular definitions and classifications dependent on it. (Wood, 2007, p. 98)

and even applies that to the simple operations of philosophical arguments when compared with the poet:


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20 Note in particular the following fragments, all sourced from Novalis’ (1960b) Das Allgemeine Brouillon: “Jede W[issenschat]t hat ihren Gott, der zugleich ihr Ziel ist” (p. 296)/“Every science has its God, that is also its goal” (Wood, 2007, p. 46); “Die Phil[osophie] sucht ein erstes und einziges Princip. Der Mathem[atiker] die Quadratur des Zirkels und eine Principalgleichung. Der Mensch – Gott. Der Mediciner ein Lebenselixier … und vollkommener Gefühl und Handhabung d[es] Körpers. Der Politiker einen vollkommenen Staat” (p. 296)/“Philosophy seeks a first and single principle. The mathematician, the squaring of the circle and a principal equation. The human being – God. The physician, an elixir of life … and complete feeling and control of the body. The politician, a perfect State” (Wood, 2007, p. 46). Novalis concludes that those limits internal to modern philosophy prevent it from setting out to achieve these ends.
The more immeasurable and diverse the horizon (the sphere) of consciousness becomes – the more the individual quantity wanes, and the more noticeably and perceptibly - the spiritual and rational quantity of man increases….. The diversity of the methods increases - the thinker eventually knows how to make everything out of each thing – the philosopher becomes a poet. (Wood, 2007, p. 132)

He allows the progression from a temporal and conceptual beginning point to another, whilst acknowledging that, preferably, humanity will eventually learn the art of simultaneity:


That will be a Golden Age, when all words become - figurative words – myths - And all figures become – linguistic figures – hieroglyphs - When we learn to speak and write figures - and learn to perfectly sculpt and make music with words. Both arts belong together, are indivisibly connected and will become simultaneously perfected. (Wood, 2007, p. 206)

It appears that humanity’s pursuit of Geheimnislosigkeit, in relation to its simple temporal and conceptual operations, has a place in Romantisieren. For Novalis, this is an inevitability that will lead on to more creative enterprises, but staying with comfortable, set definitions of words, notions of chronology and causality, is what he resists. Using those set definitions from which to romanticise is what he advocates.
Thus there is retained in the process of Romantisieren (which is never really finally resolved – it is an eternal process) some first principles of precision. In the first instance those first principles guide the poet (whose role I discuss later in this chapter), who is a true interdisciplinarian. But the poet is never satisfied with just strengthening those lower principles so that they construe and build on the same forms of ontological knowledge: Instead, the thinker who is on the way to becoming a poet is able to construct everything from individual components. In a concrete way, alongside the Māori fiction writer the Māori artist is perhaps foremost of those able to achieve this. Artists seek to bring back tradition but raise it to another level. Jahnke and Ihimaera (1996b) note that:

This has not been easy. To achieve ascendancy Maori artists have had to break the mould of that other false face of Maori art imposed by and established by the pakeha in place of the true face. They have had to battle and dismantle the entire pakeha construction of Maori art and culture, that false face which has always insisted that it knows better than Maori what Maori art is and how it should be portrayed. (p. 17)

The existence of what Jahnke and Ihimaera term “the entire pakeha construction of Maori art” is undeniable but provides what might be thought of as unlikely forms of impetus from which to transform the current nature of Māori art.

**The ethics and responsibility of the Stoßsatz method**

In his *Blüthenstaub*, Novalis vividly highlights the role of the word. Asserted against the backdrop of the French Revolution, he notes that “[d]ie Sprachlehre ist die Dynamik des Geisterreichs. Ein Kommandowort bewegt Armeen; das Wort Freiheit Nazionen” (1960m, p. 413)/[grammar is the dynamic of the realm of spirit. A word of command moves armies: The word ‘freedom’, nations]21. The word is more than a denotative reference to a thing in the world; as a social and political speech act it has the power to impact on societies (or nation states, in

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21 Novalis has in mind here the social impact of the French Revolution and the commanding words of Napoleon in particular.
It has a performative and motivational dimension. If the word is thought of as a Stoßsatz then its use must be employed with care, precisely because of its impact. The responsibility attached to the Stoßsatz method compels collective welfare even though it is initially a highly individual pursuit. It can be challenging or provoking but it is not meant to be personally injurious.

For Novalis, the past guides the future – “Die Zukunftslehre gehört zur Geschichte” (Novalis, 1960b, p. 320)/“The theory of the future belongs to history” (Wood, 2007, p. 66) – but ultimately the user will never completely understand the interplay between elements resorted to. At the same time, the method calls for some responsibility, both personal and political. The thinking poet therefore takes on greater importance than just a composer of aesthetically pleasing verse; the person who turns to the Stoßsatz method is there to ensure that the mystery of things in the world is never extinguished. This is clearly a personal motivation of the poet but it also carries with it a much wider consequence of ensuring that humanity does not sink into complacency in their relationships with things in the world. In another sense the Stoßsatz method similarly renders personal relationships between individuals and communities mysterious, with the Other constantly remaining never quite determinable by the self. This concept is visible in Novalis’ ‘Magical Idealism’ by which the self is turned outwards to the world as a reflection of the self. Also, the Other is constantly in a state of ‘outwardness’ towards the world and may never be known, whilst the Other is related to the self in a way similar to Buber’s (1997) “Ich/Du” relationship: It is simultaneously one with the self but unknowable.

With these accounts we can see that care is needed when dealing with Stoßsätzen, as they may be used to make fantastic, outrageous constructions of the Other, such depictions having been recounted and critiqued by postcolonial writers including Hall (1997), Said (1978), and Sardar, Nandy & Davies (1993). While the mystery

22 Buber advocates that humanity should orient towards nature as a ‘you’ rather than an ‘it’. Like Novalis, this maxim was stated alongside a critique. For instance, Buber (1997) declared that “[d]ie Welt als Erfahrung gehört dem Grundwort Ich-Es zu. Das Grundwort Ich-Du stiftet die Welt der Beziehung” (p. 12)/“[t]he world as experience belongs to the basic word I-It. The basic word I-You establishes the world of relation” (1996, p. 56). To experience the world is to set the world apart from the I in Buber’s construction.
of the Other might be a prompt to try and get to know the Other, the user of Stoßsätze is always aware that the Other is ultimately beyond the grasp of the self. This account of the unknowable outcome that the Stoßsatz method foreshadows does not provide any immunity from misuse, however. I acknowledge that it may perversely have an opposite effect – of providing a challenge to the user to always *try* and get to know the Other. Alongside that drive there is a degree of risk to the Stoßsatz method, which the Lehrer appears to have recognised in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* when he opened up the discussion to his students on the link between humanity and nature. Encountering the sentence that pushes could well direct the subject into speaking of the Other, and indeed the self, in negative ways. When writing from a perspective in which the imagination is “reduced to a way of seeing and understanding the world” (Smith, 1999, p. 37) then what is taken to be imagination is merely a recasting of the banal. The Other is then seen as capable of being discussed or imagined in conceptually usual ways.

**The Stoßsatz method and ‘care’ through ‘manaakitanga’**

The Stoßsatz method may be as open to misuse as any other method, but the idea that it must be positively and carefully applied can be fleshed out by a broad understanding of certain Māori terms. ‘Kia hiwa rā’, a phrase best interpreted as ‘alert!’, can be thought of both as an introduction to a speech, but in its own right it bestows the right to think, from that point onward in a free manner. Additionally it relates that one must be critical for one’s community (Aranga, Mika, & Mlcek, 2008), in its close association with ‘manaakitanga’. ‘Manaakitanga’ is to protect, but the particle ‘akiaki’, related to ‘aki’ (‘mana’ – ‘aki’), means “to urge on” (Aranga et al., 2008, p. 2). Taken all together, Stoßsätze are sentences that push, or urge on, for the benefit of the greater group as a means of hospitality or care. The kind of imagination to be employed is not the sort that just satisfies an individual want, as it must also keep the care of one’s community at the forefront, even though it is an individual exercise. Imagination

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23 For instance, the apprentice states of the Lehrer that “[v]ielmehr will er, daß wir den eignen Weg verfolgen, weil jeder neue Weg durch neue Länder geht, und jeder endlich zu diesen Wohnungen, zu dieser heiligen Heimat wieder führet” (Novalis, 1960e, p. 82) “[h]e wants us … to go our own way, because every new road goes through new countries and each in the end leads anew to these dwellings, to this sacred home” (2005, p. 17). Each ‘way’ involves encountering unique points of impetus for the students.
in this vein, Smith (1999) notes, is a “way of sharing the world” (p. 37). It is a kind of thinking that is ethical and, as Haig-Brown & Archibald (1996) write, encourages that one is “to be in harmony with oneself, others, members of the animal kingdom, and other elements of nature … [so that] … First Nations people respect the gift of each entity and establish and maintain respectful, reciprocal relations with each” (p. 253).

I do not use Heidegger’s legein in the remaining chapters, but it is an important one to recall here to contemplate my motivation for drawing on these apparently unrelated cultural traditions – German Romanticism and Māori philosophy. I reiterate Heidegger’s focus that gathering must be of collective benefit, not just an exercise in my detached philosophical interest. Māori writers, such as Linda Smith (1999), Graham Smith (1997), and Pihama (2001), have written widely about the need for Māori academic pursuits to have benefits for Māori communities. My thesis has as its basis the desire to add to this growing body of emancipatory work for Māori, but through using a different method, more than likely involving another outcome. The method and outcome may be of particular use to Māori academics and may spark some discussion for Māori communities who want to inquire into the issues that a discussion about Being raises for them.

I do not wish to restrict my thesis to Māori academics, however. As I am drawing on the works of the German Romantic philosophers and poets with Novalis as central theorist, I imagine that my own Māori interpretation of those texts will be somewhat different to non-indigenous approaches. The hope here is that I can add to the expanding literature in the English-speaking world on the German Romantics. Here legein does not just set out to glean from one side, but it is instead reciprocated, and my approach to it may in turn provide a lens through which the non-indigenous academic philosopher can view the important area of mystery.
The method of Nachdenken: Thinking within Novalis’ Stoßsätzen

Stoßsätze, either for an individual or collective audience, are stimuli provided for the hearer, and then the hearer moves on with the sentence(s) to create new ideas. They are particularly addressed to the individual and the responses to them are similarly individualistic but may be discussed in communities. It is necessary to discuss this move within the Stoßsätze towards new ideas, particularly from a Māori viewpoint, as such a discussion aims to appraise the reader of my reasons for alighting on certain new ideas in the thesis and combining apparently disparate aspects. In the same passage that Novalis introduces the concept and method of Stoßsätze he relates the following:


Hemsterhuis has a wonderful passage on spirit and letter in philosophy…. According to him the letter is merely a help for philosophical communication - the true essence of which consists in after-thinking [Nachdenken]. The speaker merely leads the direction of thought in the hearer - and thereby it becomes after-thinking. He thinks and the other thinks after him. Words are an untrustworthy medium of fore-thinking [Vordenken]. The genuine truth must,
according to its nature, show the way. Therefore, the only thing that matters is sending someone onto the right road, or better, giving him a certain direction towards the truth. He will then get there automatically, if only he is active, desiring, to get to the truth\(^{24}\).

(Kleingeld, 2008, p. 278)

Nachdenken is creatively guided but not restrained by the Stoßsätze, and is equally a part of Novalis’ Romantisieren project. “Spirit and letter” are linked here, with Geheimnis guiding where one goes after having been propelled onward by the pushing sentence. The direction is provided in a nonprescriptive fashion: “Spirit” cannot be defined, and the hearer’s course of action may be as varied as the Stoßsätze are to begin with. Thinking after the guidance that Novalis proposes is “unaufhörlich” (1960f, p. 655)/[unceasing], “frey”/[free], in “verschiedenen Stimmungen”/[diverse moods]. It “enthält eine unerschöpfliche Quelle von Trost und Beruhigung”/[has innate to it an inexhaustible source of solace and reassurance]. The hearer has to be prepared for following the way thrown open by the Stoßsätze and hence has to be open to the sense of mystery that Novalis advocates. Solace and reassurance do not preclude anxiety, uncertainty and even fear, but for Novalis they are always present. I posit that Novalis wishes to highlight that moving in a direction with an unknown outcome can itself be a source of comfort, despite the Geheimnis that attends it.

The mystery of Nachdenken/contemplative thinking: ‘Thinking’ within things

An outcome of the Stoßsätze, Nachdenken is clearly to do with the reaction of the person. The response, however, must be thought of as the interplay of elements both inside of and discrete from the hearer. The thinking process is ‘free’ but is moved about by the stimulus of the original thought and the self-organising nature of the Absolute. Things in the world retain contingent as well as determined elements, along with the historical experience of the hearer and whatever the social and cultural context is in which the reader works, together with

\(^{24}\) The reader may like to consider Nachdenken as ‘to think in the wake of’ rather than simply ‘after-think’. ‘To think in the wake of’ suggests that there is a sphere of influence provided by an impetus.
imperceptible aspects, to create a process of thought that the Stoßsätze bring to the fore. As I have argued, Stoßsätze remain even imperceptibly influential over the outcome, but they work in conjunction with the elements of the Absolute that move onto the hearer. Despite this fact, though, there is a certain amount of freedom resulting from this whole activity: The Absolute develops and engages with the hearer but within its sphere the self acts with openness towards things in the world. Mentioning this interplay, I am reminded of Heidegger’s ‘Geviert’/Fourfold which finds some precedence in isolated parts of Novalis’ _Die Lehrlinge zu Sais_ as well as in that work’s totality. In his later work, Heidegger tried to articulate a mode of holism that arguably was already present in his earlier works (although, according to Harman (2009), his Fourfold would be largely ignored by Heideggerean scholars). The Fourfold, or Quadrat as it is otherwise called, refers not only to the earth, divinities, sky and mortals, but more importantly to their reflection of each other. Each contains within itself all aspects of the others. There is also evident in his description what I call a ‘driving together’ of the oneness of the Fourfold within a thing, ensuring the continued presence of each element, including their necessary interaction amongst and within each other. A thing is not just that thing but also the mirroring of all those elements of the Fourfold within and around it at the same time. Mortals for Heidegger ‘dwell’ as a result of all these elements, dwelling being preserved as the freeing of things into their own essence, without constraint by humanity:


But ‘on the Earth’ already means ‘under the sky’. Both of these _also_ mean ‘remaining under the divinities’ and include a ‘belonging to men’s being with one another’. By a _primal_ oneness, the four - earth and sky, divinities and mortals - belong together in one. (1971b, p. 147)
As all those elements are constantly manifested in things, time is manifest as a necessary issue of discussion, and the things are the confluence of the past, present and future: “Die Sterblichen wohnen in der Weise, daß sie das Geviert in sein Wesen schonen” (1990, p. 144)/“Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing” (1971b, p. 148).

Even though not furnishing these phenomena with an explicit rubric, Novalis is no less interested in his version of the Fourfold. He does not address the Fourfold through prosaic means as Heidegger does (he engages with it in a manner more consistent with poetic verse), but he is more concerned than Heidegger with addressing its direct effects on the self as the self comes to new ideas. Like Heidegger, the thinking that he proposes takes place as a mirroring of the Fourfold; one thereby ‘dwells’. Novalis – and Heidegger would quote him directly – stated that “[d]ie Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh – Trieß überall zu Hause zu seyn” (1960b, p. 434)/“[p]hilosophy is really homesickness – the desire to be everywhere at home” (Wood, 2007, p. 155). This drive to be at home refers to a process of thinking that constantly takes into account the Absolute, by which one dwells. The process of thinking that is central here is that of philosophising through poesy, which is not confined to lyrical poetry but is a form of being in the world. As Hölderlin (1961a) had hoped “dichterisch, wohnet der Mensch auf dieser Erde” (p. 372)/[poetically, humanity dwells on earth], meaning that dwelling poetically acknowledges the Fourfold. Opposed to this is alienation from one’s ‘Heimat’/[place of home], sensed as ‘Heimweh’/homesickness. Heimat, as an acknowledgement of poetic dwelling, thus also incorporates a critical analysis of estrangement that may itself be ‘dichterisch’.

One may discern recognisable aspects in foreign elements that one encounters, even though they may be unusually combined (and here they will have their uniqueness). In Die Lehrlinge zu Sais it is the combination of these elements that thereafter gives rise to new thoughts, emphasising dwelling or Heimat:

Wie er [der Lehrer] größer ward, strich er umher, besah sich andre Länder, andre Meere, neue Lüfte, fremde Sterne, unbekannte Pflanzen, Tiere, Menschen, stieg in Höhlen, sah wie in Bänken und in
bunten Schichten der Erde vollführt war, und drückte Ton in sonderbare Felsenbilder. Nun fand er überall Bekanntes wieder, nur wunderlich gemischt, gepaart, und also ordneten sich selbst in ihm oft seltsame Dinge. (Novalis, 1960e, p. 80)

When [the teacher] grew older, he roamed the earth, saw distant lands and seas, new skies, strange stars, unknown plants, beasts, men, went down into caverns, saw how the earth was built in shelves and multicoloured layers, and pressed clay into strange rock forms. Everywhere he found the familiar, only strangely mixed and coupled, and thus strange things often ordered themselves within him. (Novalis, 2005, p. 7)

For the Lehrer, to dwell is to be immersed within unfamiliar finite things in the world and yet still be at home. The travellers in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* are all affected by the environment and are then able to tell their stories:

As they [the thousandfold natures] spoke, the sun shone through the lofty windows, and the sound of their words was lost in a gentle murmur; an infinite surmise permeated every shape, a tender warmth spread over them all, and a wondrous song of nature rose from the deepest silence. Human voices were heard nearby, the great folding
doors leading in from the garden were opened, and a few travelers sat
down on the steps of the broad staircase, in the shadow of the
building. The charming landscape lay in a lovely radiance before
them, and in the background the eye lost itself in blue mountain
heights. (2005, p. 73)

Even though they are travellers, and are therefore passing through the temple of
Saïs, they are brought to think about nature because of the current interplay of
nature, sun, words, shapes, sensation, earth, light and distance. Here they are
responding to the stimuli provided, and with the surrounding, intertwining
elements of earth, divinity, mortals and sky, they are able to speak their
conclusions. The interplay of the light on the earth, the changing of the sky’s
colour, the presence of mortals – along with the conversations of manifold voices
of nature – and the travellers’ own immersion and mirroring of these elements,
ensure their staying within the equivalent of Heidegger’s Fourfold. Novalis’
mention of these elements while the travellers are talking, and even apart from the
travellers’ awareness at times, is not by accident: He intends to show the direct
relationship between all these elements, even their reliance on each other. Direct
attention to a matter, or to Stoßsätze, ensures that the self moves outwards and
carries all elements that it encounters with it. We can see here that ‘dwelling’ for
Novalis is to do with the expansion of the bodily self outwards and its travel to the
world, for as Novalis noted “Gedanken ... scheinen nichts als Strahlen und
Wirkung, die jenes Ich nach allen Seiten zu in jenem elastischen Medium erregt”
(Novalis, 1960e, p. 97) /“thoughts seem to be nothing other than emanations and
effects which the self induces all around it in that elastic medium” (2005, p. 75).

The Māori self’s thinking within things in the world

The self’s response in terms of thoughts is hence important. The travellers
propose theories based on the activities of the Absolute in the realm of nature;

25 The finite appearance of these elements is not meant to confine their significance in
either Novalis’ or Heidegger’s treatment of the Fourfold, I argue. Those elements in turn
have their ontological relationship with each other and are therefore as much about their
unseen effect on each other as their appearance to the perceiver. In Māori belief this may
best be described as an effect of mauri, which I discuss occasionally throughout this
thesis.
these propositions comprise a substantial portion of Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. Yet there are many voices involved, with some tentativeness retained in the tenor of each. I theorise that my own approach to this thesis, with particular regard to Nachdenken, reflects Novalis’ and Heidegger’s respective ideas about the interplay of elements as one, resulting in my progress towards certain ideas. Māori writers such as Smith (1999), Walker (1996), and Pihama (2001) either directly discuss the subjectivity of research and/or allow it as a given in their method. Similarly I argue that my response to Stoßsätze is just that – primarily my own – but in accordance with the driving together of all those influences alluded to above. In terms of theoretical fit, this proposition lines up well with an all-inclusive notion that Māori operate holistically (Marsden, 2003; Pere, 1997). It also corresponds with Māori verse, much of which is personal in nature. We additionally see a reflection of these elements in certain terms, and if we interpret them beyond their dominant meanings then we may get a glimpse of what the term is saying. To refer to the term ‘whakapapa’ again: In the previous section I discussed its innate reference to the earth with its retention of ‘Papa’ from ‘Papatūānuku’. Directed to think by Stoßsätze, I am engaging with moving towards an utterance as a grounding proposition – becoming earth – but never quite reaching it. Nevertheless, earth is present at all times in that thinking and talking. Besides being earth, though, it is also divinity because it always reaches up towards Ranginui/Sky Father, and outwards beyond one’s range of perception, in a sense ensuring that one is operating in a realm of Geheimnis. In becoming earth, the sky is simultaneously manifested as its mirror image; in becoming earth and sky, humanity is always seeking to return to the primordial, and is thus mortal in the way that Heidegger emphasised it – as tending towards death as death (Heidegger, 1990). Within this one term, then, we can see that one’s ‘dwelling’ is in fact a sort of ‘becoming’ within all those elements. One layers (‘whakapapa’) aspects of all those elements to oneself, as immersion within them all takes place.

**Thinking within the world of Tūhourangi**

Perhaps this explanation does not specifically lay out exactly how *I* build on Novalis’ Stoßsätze to arrive at my ideas – that is, I cannot say that exactly at *this* point I know that *that* element is working in a certain way – but I can broadly explain my responses to those sentences in the following, more concrete, ways.
These more concrete explanations reflect the Fourfold, Novalis’ *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais*, and whakapapa as a phenomenological term. One may begin thinking of an individual Māori response to Stoßsätze in terms of one’s history. As I am a member of the Tūhourangi iwi, my responses are in turn a synthesis of historical influences – all including earth, sky, divinities and mortals – that are related to Tūhourangi. Things in the world that have affected Tūhourangi have all been (and continue to be) affected by those elements in whakapapa. The eruption of Tarawera that I talked of in the introduction chapter through the lament is one example: As well as being the third generation down from that event, I also carry the history of that eruption – including the interrelationship of all elements within that event - alongside the tourist trade that cropped up around the tribal area, alongside the subsequent selling of the wharenui/meeting house to Clarendon Park in England, to cite some other instances. Being concrete historical events as well as arrangements of the Absolute, all these happened with a sense of Geheimnis, with the result that I am not even aware of their, and other historical events’, complete influence.

Other things in the world also drive together with each other, including the self within their activity. They in turn carry their history. These things – whether they are one’s ‘maunga’/mountain, ‘awa’/river – do not just exist as isolated phenomena: They *act* within the world. Thus my own tribal saying is of significance in Nachdenken, even though the phenomena that comprise it are not physically present. This saying is the following:

*Ko Tarawera te maunga
Ko Okataina me Tarawera ngā roto
Ko Te Arawa te waka
Ko Tamatekapua te tangata
Ko Ngātoroirangi te tohunga
Ko Ngāti Hinemihi te hapū
Ko Ngāti Tarawhai me Tūhourangi ngā iwi*

There are elements listed here that make up the Māori individual. They are names of specific ancestors, things in the world, and social structures. Maunga, or
mountains, roto, or lakes, are the things in the world that have special significance for me as a writer generally. In particular reference to this thesis, they are important because I dwell within them, even though I may not be physically near them. This dwelling occurs because they all themselves dwell within each other, reflecting each other. In turn, they are enabled and arranged by emanations of the Absolute, and link through their action to other things in the world. As I am placed within them, they have an impact on me: In this reading of their significance, they are not merely solid identities waiting for me to identify them through referring to them, but they are living entities. While I respond to Stoßsätze I am affected by these entities. The ancestors mentioned, although deceased, are still present in that they move throughout all these elements as well. They resemble the living in this respect, and are hence ‘dwellers’ as well. Part of the movement of the Absolute, they also impact on my responses. Social structures can be understood as manifestations of the bodies of water mentioned, the mountain, and the names of those ancestors. They are not separate from those other elements mentioned, and work together with those others to impact on my thinking.

*My discussions with my aunt*

One cannot account for every sort of impact on the thinking for Nachdenken – this is the extent of the Geheimnis of things in the world – but, naturally, relationships with others are important here. Discussions with my aunt were especially informative and come to mind immediately. These discussions took place on an almost daily basis from the age of 15 through to 18. They were not only about the transference of ideas but probably also involved a synthesis of those elements above, as well as many others. Responding to her Stoßsätze, she and I would have been mirroring those elements at once\textsuperscript{26}. Given the state of flux that all those elements are in – Novalis especially was at pains to point this out in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* - my aunt would discuss ideas, and provide Stoßsätze, to reflect the need of those elements to retain their fluidity. She would therefore never set out to answer a question directly; my impression was that she wanted to

\textsuperscript{26} The German adjectives and adverb ‘ineins’ and ‘einst’, which means ‘at once’, as in past, future and instantaneity together, are appropriate here. The English phrase ‘at the same time’ could suffice, but tends to stress a chronological dimension more than ‘at once’, which even then does not completely match the sense of ‘einst’.
both convey a larger and more thorough complexity to her answer, and did not want to cut through the hidden meaning or significance that lay behind and around the direct question. Often she would rely on poetic or metaphoric language to get her point across and would discuss whakapapa only at certain times and with certain people. At these times, it could be said, I was providing sentences that compelled her to think, and her response was her own but guided by my question.

**Nachdenken: The self’s creative response**

In relation to the grand project of Romantisieren, Beiser has written extensively on the apparent tension between self and nature. In his *German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism* he gives a succinct introduction to Novalis’ oft-maligned ‘Magical Idealism’. This term is meant to encompass Novalis’ working approach to Romantisieren. Its occult connotations have contributed to Novalis’ works being treated at times as if scrofulous, yet alongside the undeniable supernatural element there is a workable one. Novalis does not shelve human will; on the contrary, Beiser states that Magical Idealism involves refining the senses so that humans can be both active and passive. Where Fichte and Kant had argued too strongly in favour of the subject, Novalis brings to the fore an awareness of one’s duty to reflect Being through romanticising things in the world. If we reflect the mystery of Being through Romantisieren, we are to transform the world so that it regains its Geheimnis. Here a parallel may be noted with the ‘tohunga’/[specialist] Hohepa Kereopa who, in a discussion with Paul Moon about gardening, stated that one would not be disappointed with an outcome of a crop if one just listened to the will of the garden (Moon, 2005). Further, Novalis’ Magical Idealism takes on a similar hue in Kereopa’s discussion:

> The way we, as Maori, look at plants is that each species has total power. That is power over themselves, over their relationships with other plants, and everything. Now, each species is like a whole universe unto itself. So each species has mauri – which is that life force. And because each species has mauri, they are tapu. But there is a higher power – God – and all these universes of plants and people and whatever are all directed by God. So unless you relate with God,
you can’t relate honestly with the world which he created, so what are you left with? (Moon, 2005, p. 43)

We can see two sides to Kereopa’s argument here: human will (revealed in their relationship with what Kereopa refers to as ‘God’) and a “higher power – God.” Beiser (2002) believes, in accordance with Novalis, that the human subject has the responsibility of bringing into balance “activity and sensibility, inner and outer sense” (p. 424). Through this balance one reflects the activity of the Absolute. Thus it is with listening to what Beiser calls ‘the world’ that the self is brought into harmony. As echoed throughout the complete Das Allgemeine Brouillon, which focuses in a fundamental sense on various elements and their relationship with each other, Novalis advocates that the “inner and outer sense enjoy an interplay with one another…. This harmony means that they must each retain their specific characteristics when united with one another” (Beiser, 2002, p. 424). When thinking with Romantisieren as the aim, one is encouraged to reflect those aspects that Beiser raises as an ethical response to the self’s, and Being’s, creative impulses.

**The transformative ability of the self: Poesy**

Until this point I have been stressing the importance of things in the world and their impact on thought. This activity is one within which all other activity takes place, but I now need to address in more detail the place of subjectivity in relation to the world – namely, the self and its interplay with Being - whilst preserving the mystery of things in the world in that interaction. Novalis’ views are not necessarily straightforward but they are nonetheless comprehensible when read in the context of the activity of Being. He tempers the human will to act, including Nachdenken, whilst emphasising it. Even though humanity is sourced within primordial Being, it would be a mistake to think that humanity has no agency as far as Novalis is concerned. Das Allgemeine Brouillon in particular indicates that humanity is necessary for the unity of poetry and science. Alongside his Fichte-Studien, the Das Allgemeine Brouillon fragments perhaps highlight most the innate ability of the individual, and thereafter the collective, to impose their will on things in the world. That the “ächt synthetische” (1960b, p. 250)/[truly synthetic] person needs to be versatile is a clue to his overall thesis that, in the
absence of an organic way of interacting with the world, the world and the people in it will remain at the same level, without progress. As with Schiller, who, in speaking of the disjointed nature of disciplines, believed that “es [ist] die Dichtkunst beinahe allein, welche die getrennten Kräfte der Seele wieder in Vereinigung bringt” (1840a, p. 1231)[the art of poetry is almost on its own in being able to reunite the fragmented forces of the soul], Novalis believes that it is precisely the ability of the self to embody many different abilities that brings about ‘genius’. Throughout his works, Novalis alludes to the action of the self, whether it is the searching of Rosenblüte in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais, or the ‘love’ that people tend to have for the day in his Hymnen an die Nacht. What characterises all this subjectivity is the desire of the poet – reflecting Novalis’ wish also – to aspire ‘upwards’ towards the unknowable. Thus an artist seeks upward movement towards “höhere … Einheiten” (1960b, p. 258)/“higher … unities”, building on the “Einheiten der niederern Künstler”/unities of the lower artist]. Novalis wants the artist to continue on the track of change, even though the artist might have felt they have finally arrived at their zenith.

It is here that the vital concept of poesy enters our discussion as one of the most exciting and daring projects of the Romantics. Friedrich Schlegel, an avid proponent of Romantisieren, had explicitly subscribed to its importance with his statement that:

Wie die Novelle in jedem Punkt ihres Seins und ihres Werdens neu und frappant sein muß, so sollte vielleicht das poetische Märchen und vorzüglich die Romanze unendliche bizarr sein; denn sie will nicht bloß die Phantasie interessieren, sondern auch den Geist bezaubern und das Gemüt reizen. (1964a, pp. 83-84)

[Just as the novel must be new and striking in its being and becoming, so the poetic tale and eminently the romance should be infinitely bizarre. The romance does not set out to just interest fantasy, but instead to also enchant the spirit and to pique the temperament.]

Eichner (1956) notes that the use of ‘Roman’ in the 18th century embraced a number of
As Beiser explains, Schlegel had equated poesy with human creative power, not just the literary art of poetry. Both as a literary and non-literary art, poesy encompasses a wide and often interrelated range of moods and genres. Recall also that Novalis thought poesy had the ability to liberate from Geheimnislosigkeit, and, additionally, that the ironic situation of the colonised situation had to be placed alongside poesy at all points of its operation. Poesy for him never occurred in isolation from whatever was undesirable; instead the undesirable provided impetus for poesy to take place. On the strength of Schlegel’s conviction about the breadth of poesy, Beiser (2003) states that “the most essential feature of any Romantic work is ‘its becoming,’ the fact that it is never complete but that it destroys itself only to create itself forever anew” (p. 17). Novalis also wanted to view poesy as a means of assuming a greater degree of health: Poesy is a philosophical and artistic ‘work in progress,’ just as some emanations of the Absolute such as nature and history can be understood as ‘works in progress’. In poesy, the self and nature, as an emanation of Being, are accounted for as working together.

As an exercise in poesy, the never-ending nature of Nachdenken is reflected in its incremental process. At each point, the poet – who is the character responsible for Romantisieren, and who need not be a poet in the conventional sense but is capable of transforming things in the world – is him- or herself engaged with change, in all aspects of existence. Nachdenken, compelled by Stoßsätzen and poetically bringing together different things in the world, is therefore not a distancing exercise; the poet is, as it were, thoroughly involved in Nachdenken so that they are moved at each step by the unanticipated outcome. Additionally, the poet’s deep involvement with Being in this activity ensures that “[d]a sich das magische Poeten-Ich dem Absoluten nähern soll, dürfen Subjektivität und Objektivität in ihm einander nicht überbieten” (Fiebich, 2007, p. 69)[because the magically poetical I is meant to approach the Absolute, subjectivity and objectivity are not allowed to outdo each other], demonstrating that the world, as a fluid expression of Being, is meant to be thought about without the conventional binary oppositions. A thoughtfully critical method, nearing the Absolute in genres, not just the novel. Schlegel believes that it is linked to the creative spirit of poesy.
accordance with these contingencies, is step-by-step, without one ever actually arriving there. Novalis alludes to that ongoing journey when he rhetorically exclaims “[w]elche unerschöpfliche Menge von Materialien zu neuen individuellen Combinationen liegt nicht umher!” (1960, p. 534)/[which inexhaustible amount of materials for new individual combinations does not lie at hand!] The self as subject will never deal with all things or objects in the world, and so the subject is itself involved in the greater activity of the Absolute. Thus, according to Franke (2011):

Novalis beruft sich auf soziale und ökologische Begriffe, die ihren Sitz im Leben, in organischer Konkretheit erkennen lassen und doch auf eine mystische und spirituelle Dimension verweisen. (p. 79)

[Novalis appeals to social and ecological concepts which may be recognised by their place in life, and in organic concreteness, but which refer to a mystical and spiritual dimension.]

Nachdenken is hence a highly personal, yet Being-driven, exercise. One may at best describe how it works generally, but it is much more difficult to predict the specific actions of the Fourfold-oriented elements when one is involved in Nachdenken. The poetical practice of thinking, and grouping strange elements next to each other, does not expose the interplay of those elements but it does act in synchronicity with them. Novalis described this active philosophising thus:

Wenn man anfängt über Philosophie nachzudenken – so dünkt uns Philosophie, wie Gott, und Liebe, Alles zu seyn. Sie ist eine mystische, höchstwirksame, durchdringende Idee – die uns unaufhaltsam nach allen Richtungen hineintreibt. Der Entschluß zu philosophiren - ... der Stoß auf uns Selbst zu. (1960, p. 523)

[Whenever one starts to consider philosophy, it appears to us, like God and love, to be everything. It is a mystical, highly effective, pervading idea that pushes us unceasingly in all directions. The decision to philosophise is a jolt acting upon us.]
Reflecting on how we were both thinking was a concern of my aunt’s, and she would respond to my questions by moving into an apparently unrelated area, echoing what Novalis (1960a) calls “eine Bezeugung der innigsten Liebe zum Nachdenken” (p. 524)[attestation to the innermost desire to ponder] or “experimentiren mit dem Zufall” (1960f, p. 574)[experimenting with chance]. Schleiermacher (1969) concurs with Novalis when he states the impact of what he calls the ‘universe’ on humanity, reflecting the unreliability of this impact:

So die Religion [:] das Universum ist in einer ununterbrochenen Tätigkeit und offenbart sich uns jeden Augenblick. Jede Form, die es hervorbringt, jedes Wissen ... jede Begebenheit ... ist ein Handeln desselben auf uns; und so alles Einzelne als einen Teil des Ganzen, alles Beschränkte als eine Darstellung des Unendlichen hinnehmen, das ist Religion. (p. 39)

[As for religion [:] The universe is an uninterrupted activity and reveals itself to us at every moment. Every form that it brings forward to us, all knowledge … every occurrence … is an action in itself upon us; and so every individual accepts itself as a portion of the whole, every limitation as a representation of the infinite. That is religion.]

Royal (2008) reflects on the impact of the wairua from things in the world on his thoughts, positioning wairua as something to be remembered and noting that “[m]ā te Ao te tangata e tohu e oho ai tōna ngākau, tōna wairua e mārama ai ia ki ētahi mea” (p. 37)[the world represents itself to humanity, awakens humanity’s heart and spirit, and brings it to understand something]. Royal and Schleiermacher respectively indicate the impact of external things in the world on the self as an interrelated thing. Nachdenken hence becomes impossible to categorically analyse and can be either directly related to its compelling Stoßsätze in terms of its content or it can be simply moved in a direction so that the original sentence is tangentially addressed but elaborated on with what seems to be a completely unrelated outcome. In both instances, my process of Nachdenken involves grouping elements together, which at first glance are disparate, as they are not
connected by the dominant episteme. My overall method of placing aspects of Māori thought and response in relation to Novalis’ theories is the prime example: Their relationship is one that indeed has provoked some confusion in others, when the research has been explained, but it exemplifies Novalis’ – and my – love of drawing relationships between seemingly unrelated discourses. For Novalis’ part, much of Das Allgemeine Brouillon is concerned with placing poetic, scientific and philosophical discourses in conjunction with each other to see what emerges for the thinker. For instance, he postulates that “Zahlen Harmonieen – Zahlen acustik – gehört zur Comb[inatorischen] A[alysis]…. Der Dichter, Rhetor und Philosoph spielen und componiren grammatisch” (1960b, p. 360) /“[t]he harmonies of numbers – and the acoustics of numbers – are a part of combinatorial analysis…. The poet, rhetorician and philosopher play and compose grammatically” (Wood, 2007, p. 96). In direct relation to what he calls ‘Spiel’/play, he asks: “Spielt Gott und die Natur nicht auch? Theorie d[es] Spiels, Heilige Spiele, reine Spiellehre” (1960b, p. 320)/[Don’t God and nature play as well? Theory of play, holy play, pure teachings of play].

**Poesy and Spieltheorie: Nachdenken and Romantisieren**

Nachdenken after Stoßsätze may be governed by a desire to romanticise. If it is good enough for God and nature to play, as Novalis noted above, then - and here is a nuanced reading of that same fragment - it is good enough for humanity to engage with the process too. The job of the poet who, incidentally, may or may not be intent on producing verse, is to bring together the apparently disjointed elements into new relations with each other to create new outcomes, perhaps breaking taboos in the process. Poesy and play as a mode of being at home are significant theories that inform early German Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel and Schleiermacher as well as Novalis. ‘Spiel’ emphasises the creative, constructive aspect of thinking and safeguards against Systembildung/[the formation of systems]. The Schlegel brothers, Wilhelm and Friedrich (1798), emphasise the role of Romantic poeticising in the following passage:

> Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive Universalpoesie. Ihre Bestimmung ist nicht bloß, alle getrennte Gattungen der Poesie wieder
zu vereinigen, und die Poesie mit der Philosophie, und Rhetorik in Berührung zu setzen. Sie will, und soll auch Poesie und Prosa, Genialität und Kritik, Kunstpoesie, und Naturpoesie bald mischen, bald verschmelzen, die Poesie lebendig und gesellig und das Leben und die Gesellschaft poetisch machen, den Witz poetisieren und die Formen der Kunst mit gediegnem Bildungsstoff jeder Art anfüllen und sättigen, und durch die Schwingungen des Humors beseelen. Sie umfaßt alles, was nur poetisch ist, vom größten wieder mehrre Systeme in sich enthaltenden Systeme der Kunst, bis zu dem Seufzer, dem Kuß, den das dichtende Kind aushaucht in kunstlosen Gesang. (pp. 28-29)

Romantic poetry is a progressive universal poetry. Its destiny is not merely to reunite all the separate genres of poetry and to put poetry in touch with philosophy and rhetoric. Its aim and mission is now to mingle, now to fuse poetry and prose, genius and criticism, the poetry of the educated and the poetry of the people; to make poetry living and social, life and society poetic; to poeticize wit, fill and saturate the forms of art with matters of genuine cultural value, and quicken them with the vibrations of humour. It embraces everything that is poetic, from the most comprehensive system of art that contains in itself further systems to the sigh or kiss which the child who writes verses expresses in artless song. (Eichner, 1972, p. 112)

Poesy is the combination of aspects that at first glance may not be commensurate: As transcendental\(^{28}\) poesy it is “aus Philosophie und Poësie gemischt” (Novalis, 1960f, p. 536)/[a mixture of philosophy and poesy]. Designed to clash together the systematic with the contingent, this approach is otherwise known as ‘romantische Ironie’/Romantic irony, which is “a sort of play that reveals the limitations of a view of reality that presumed to have the last word. With the use of Romantic irony, Schlegel [and Novalis] showed that there was no last word”

\(^{28}\) ‘Transcendental’ for Novalis does not mean a mind that goes beyond all finite things but is situated within them (van Riet, 2009). It refers to the creative process of the mind within these finite elements.
Knowledge systems in this activity are broken down, bringing them together in a playful yet focused and engaged way. Conventions may be transcended in this process; however, their assertions also demonstrate that the Absolute transcends our awareness. It is an ambitious project, evident in Novalis’ distinctive grouping together of various disciplines of knowledge and art within one short space. Schleiermacher (1969) similarly would scorn the “Systemsucht”/[pursuit of a system] as it “stößt freilich das Fremde ab”/[pushes the unfamiliar away too easily] (p. 44), excluding and destroying alternatives, whereas the infinite potentially allows all finite things in the world to stand next to each other in interactive and interrelated ways. Schleiermacher, along with Novalis, wished to moderate the belief that there is a ‘proper’ and controllable association of things with each other that would lead to a magisterial, unempathetic system of thought. Novalis gave expression to this concern when he recounted the thousandfold natures’ complaint in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais: “[w]ie glücklich könnte er [der Mensch] sein, wenn er mit uns freundlich umginge” (1960e, p. 95)/“[h]ow happy he [humanity] could be if he treated us amiably” (2005, p. 71).

The ethics of Nachdenken

Evidently there is a responsibility on the self in poetic Nachdenken. My discussions with my aunt showed me that, as one thinks, one must have particular consideration for others who might be affected by that thinking. Just as one must be careful in how Stoßsätze are both approached and provided, responses to them require an equal amount of caution, and in a Māori discussion this takes on particular significance. Novalis emphasised in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais the caution of the Lehrer as he provided Stoßsätze that could be responded to in a way that was thoughtful of Being:

‘Wem regt sich nicht’, rief der Jüngling mit funkelndem Auge, ‘das Herz in hüpfender Lust, wenn ihm das innerste Leben der Natur in seiner ganzen Fülle in das Gemüt kommt! wenn dann jenes mächtige Gefühl, wofür die Sprache keine andere Namen als Liebe und Wollust hat, sich in ihm ausdehnt, wie ein gewaltiger, alles auflösender Dunst,
und er bebend in süßer Angst in den dunkeln lockenden Schoß der Natur versink’. (1960e, p. 104)

‘Whose heart does not leap with joy,’ cried the youth with glittering eye, ‘when the innermost life of nature invades him in all its fullness! When the overpowering emotion for which language has no other name than love, expands within him like an all-dissolving vapor and, trembling with sweet fear, he sinks into the dark’. (2005, p. 103)

These sorts of thoughtful reactions to the Stoßsätze provided by the Lehrer show that nature is a form of impetus from which the Lehrling works. Yet how one refers to nature, as well as how the proceeding thinking evolves, is additionally important in this Lehrling’s response. The Lehrer has provided a provocation, and the youth answers, affected by what he is discussing even in the Lehrer’s language, to make sure that humanity is responsibly sourced within Being. That same character then continues further with his belief that:

Sie, die den schöpferischen Sinn der Natur mit Macht erwecken, nur ein Geheimnis der Liebenden, Mysterien der höheren Menschheit sein sollten, werden mit Schamlosigkeit und sinnlos von rohen Geistern hervorgerufen, die nie wissen werden, welche Wunder ihre Gläser umschließen. Nur Dichter sollten mit dem Flüssigen umgehn, und von ihm der glühenden Jugend erzählen dürfen…. Wie glücklich würden die Städte sich wieder dünken, die das Meer oder ein großer Strom bespült. (1960e, p. 105)

These phenomena whose potency calls forth nature’s creation, phenomena which should be a secret of lovers, a mystery of higher mankind, are shamelessly and senselessly evoked by unfeeling minds, which will never know what miracles their retorts contain. Only poets should deal in the fluid element and be empowered to speak of it to ardent youth; then laboratories would be temples…. How fortunate would cities laved by the ocean or a great river once more call themselves. (2005, p. 107)
The youth was discussing here the problem of science when it dissects nature, and his assertion that poets have a specialised role in thinking about things in the world at another level speculates that not everyone may think in the way that Nachdenken foresees. Nachdenken is much more an active process of both thinking and feeling than of reciting knowledge in terms of facts. As a process it is potentially impactful, and, at a much more practical level, its outcome is probably novel and not completely foreseeable. The Lehrer, acting responsibly, ensures that discussion takes place within an open forum, collectively, even though the initial thought process is individual but within the wider aspect of the Absolute. Part of its ethical character lies in its ongoing nature, evident in the continual excavation behind the thinking of both the Lehrer and the Lehrlinge, leading to some affirmations about Geheimnis. It is therefore less about a grand statement than an activity that allows one to make some critical affirmations about things in the world, in the context of the Absolute.

Political and literary seriousness of Romantisieren

Its association with Spiel/play should not mislead the engager into thinking that Romantisieren as a grand project (and necessarily Nachdenken and Stoßsätze) is only capricious, sentimental or aesthetic, or even just literary. Indeed, the term ‘Romantic’ has long caused both literary and political debate: literary, because of the Romantics’ often uncertain use of the term; and political because of its unjustified arrogation by, and even attribution to, Nazism, and because of its threat, in its own right, to social convention. In terms of its uncertainty within literature, writers on Schlegel admit to confusion when trying to describe Schegel’s non-specific use of the term (Speight, 2011). Dilthey (1965), appearing to ponder both the literal and political effects of the term ‘Romanticism’, identifies in general that the term has accrued to it “Mißbrauch” (p. 188)/misuse, which, at the time Dilthey was writing, had already been heaped on the term for more than half a century. As for its political use, Kamenetsky (1972) echoes the problem of the abuse of the label ‘Romantic’ and the philosophies of Romanticism, with specific reference to its perversion by Nazism. She cites that the National Socialist Hans Dahmen had drawn similarities between the Romantic

29 Although Berlin (1999) noted that Fascism did inherit a value of unpredictability from the Romantics. This inheritance, however, was a warped uptake of Romanticism.
Movement and Nazism, with the result that Romantisieren could be easily disregarded because of its apparently fascist roots in the Romantics. But she points out that Dahmen had not acknowledged that “a distortion of values had taken place, and that what began as theory and philosophy culminated in a perverted ideology” (p. 198). The early Romantics cannot be held responsible for irrational ‘Nationalromantik’ or the cult of ‘Blut und Boden’/blood and earth, that developed later in the 19th century. Biological materialism, racism and Social Darwinism all represent ideologies that deny Novalis’ philosophical focus on the interrelated and mutually beneficial in natural and social relationships.

Socially, the term can vex those who uphold the grandiosity of “die europäische Zivilisation” (Strich, 1962, p. 359)/European civilisation, the specific conventions of which seem to be threatened by what Romanticism proposes. Furthermore, bringing together both literal and political issues, Löwy and Sayre (2001) quite categorically state that:

In reality, for a great many students of Romanticism, the problem of contradictions (political ones in particular) does not even come up, because they strip the phenomenon of all its political and philosophical dimensions and reduce it to a mere literary school whose most visible features they then describe in greater or lesser detail. (p. 3)

The wrongful but raucous usages of Romanticism and, equally unjustly, the frequent and total eclipse of Romanticism by the interpretation of it as a sub-category of literature, are perhaps testament to its seriousness. That is, both the reification and the avoidance of it proclaim themselves loudly. But these subsequent usages of, and attitudes towards, Romanticism, do no justice to the earnestness of the original German Romantics, who most definitely saw Romanticism as a coherent project, neither solely political nor literal, neither exclusively philosophical nor poetic. It is at least fair to speculate that the Early German Romantics considered Romantisieren to be a project of concerted effort. I reiterate even more specifically that the Romantics saw Romantisieren as both philosophically and politically transformative. The seriousness of the Romantic
enterprise is evident in its definitely emotional and passionate push for change that impacts at what I would call the ‘politically metaphysical’ level. By this I mean that the Romantics were very clear that a state of ontological balance was necessary in facets such as the everyday use of speech and comportment towards things in the world. What the poet sets out to do has effects on things in the world, including its political institutions and assumptions. This may involve a cloyingly sentimental or aesthetic (two adjectives which are nowadays equated with the common term ‘romantic’) approach, but not in isolation: An additional aim is to “dethrone” (Eichner, 1982, p. 17) instrumental reason and to elevate “the irrational faculties of the mind” – faculties that are commonly delineated out from each other but that, as Eichner argues, the “Romantics did not always clearly differentiate”.

*Not seeking to know a thing*

With reason as the dominant agent of experience to be deposed, a major challenge to the romanticising poet is to retain the belief that Being renders things in the world mysterious. This will not be a simple task, especially if the poet is trained in the academy. As one can never know the “eigentliche Ding an sich” (Novalis, 1960g, p. 56)/“actual thing-in-itself” (Wood, 2007, p. 196) while it is an isolated element, one must trust that its manifestation as finite objects, and their grouping with other things, renders them as “Bestimmmbares und Bestimmtes”/[definite and distinct]. This is different to *knowing* the thing: Its commune with other elements merely reveals what makes it different. One may reasonably suspect that the thing’s distinctiveness changes according to what is collectively associated with it. Varied facets of its nature will be disclosed due to the qualities of its surrounding elements. Such a view of the thing results from having firstly acknowledged its ‘Unbegrifflichkeit’/incomprehensibility, and then surrounding the thing with various elements (and applications) to view its distinctiveness without seeking to know it completely. The approach to a thing at this level involves a certain amount of emotional responsiveness – either reticence or confidence 30. Reflecting Goethe’s wish that a process of

30 We will remember that Rosenblüte revealed both responses to nature, and vice versa.
Steigerung/intensification take place through the combination of poetry and action (Gray, 1967), one approaches the world in a romanticising way, but may only romanticise if one acts in concert with that mysterious relationship between things, and between things and the Absolute.

As Beiser (2002) continues, it is not through the blithe recital of arcane spells or prayers that is at the basis of Magical Idealism and Romantisieren; it involves instead the transformation of the senses and of knowledge so that they can work in conjunction with the world, in turn changing the world in accordance with the activities of Being. Although one may not be able to achieve this in its entirety, one is instead encouraged to continue in that exercise, with the result that the process of poetical Nachdenken is never-ending. Yet if one were to utter such spells or prayers on the basis of a prompt from things in the world, then this provides a different outcome and indeed adheres to Novalis’ idea of poesy. This sort of utterance, I argue, is a sort of poetry that is intended to have a deeper effect than just aesthetic. A spiritual one joins the social imperative behind Novalis’ avowal that words themselves have power here. To that extent, prayers, chants, ‘spells’ and ‘fairy tales’ are forms of poesy that then have an effect on the hearer or reader. In the context of ‘Märchen’/[tales of magic], Novalis (1960b) notes about Romantisieren that:


In a true fairy tale everything must be marvelous – mysterious and unconnected – everything must be animated. Everything in a different fashion. The whole of Nature must be interwoven in a wondrous manner with the entire spirit world…. The world of fairy tales is the absolute opposite world to the world of truth (history) – and for this
reason is so remarkably similar to it – as chaos is to completed creation. (Wood, 2007, p. 34)

His “Geistliche Lieder”, hymns to the Christian triune deity, indicate that Novalis could also think of the Absolute as that which addresses humanity, and as an empathetic and unifying agent.

In all forms of transformative language – poetic, spiritual, even mathematical – there exists the potential to render a sense of the mysterious again. Using that terminology that reflects his dual mysticism and pragmatism, he states that “Magie ist = Kunst, die Sinnenwelt willkürlich zu gebrauchen” (1960a, p. 546)/[magic is the same as the art of using the sense world at will]. His attempt to unify the sciences and poesy in Das Allgemeine Brouillon represents a mammoth but incipient attempt at romanticising. The Das Allgemeine Brouillon would have an effect on the self that, Schiller also noted in his observation “[beschäftigt] Kopf und Herz, Scharfsinn und Witz, Vernunft und Einbildungskraft in harmonischem Bunde” (1840a, p. 1231)/[[concerns] head and heart, astuteness and wit, reason and imagination in harmonious association] and “[stellen] gleichsam den ganzen Menschen in uns wieder [her]”/[and yet again produces in us the whole person].

A ‘whakaaro’ response through Nachdenken

For Māori, the ethicality of thinking that follows on from Stoßsätze draws its relevance from one’s regard for the thing to be thought about, evident in the term ‘whakaaro’. I expand on this term more in chapter seven. Although it is often taken economically to mean ‘to think’, it can be broken down to reveal a deeper meaning of ‘to cause to have regard for’. The regard that is envisaged here is not solely cognitive but involves the senses also. Royal (2008) claims that “he whakamiharo ngā āhuatanga o te Ao – arā, te whitinga o Tamanuiterā, te ngungurutanga o te tai, te pōuritanga me te awatea – ēnei tū āhuatanga o te Ao, he whakamiharo ki te titiro atu” (p. 60)/[the forms of the world are amazing – the movement of the sun, the lapping of the tide, the darkness and the light – these
manifestations of the world are amazing to see]. He continues that it is on the basis of that sensorial perception of the world that we come to think\textsuperscript{31}.

Quite apart from that interpretation of the term whakaaro, one may see common reference to the cordonning off of \textit{knowledge} from the populace (R. Walker, 1996; Walker, 2004). Traditionally, according to these writers, only certain people were able or allowed to access specific forms of knowledge. These writers, however, tend to emphasise the protection of knowledge already formed, rather than describe whose active \textit{thinking} would be taken seriously. Thinking \textit{anew}, or innovatively, is well exemplified by the account of Māui Tikitiki a Taranga, who set out to change aspects of nature (unethically by current standards, it might be argued) after the long ‘apprenticeship’ inherent to being the youngest, and to being mistaken for stillborn. He changed the course of the sun, brought fire to the world, was eventually killed by Hinenuitepō through neglecting required ‘karakia’/prayers, but he revealed benefits for humanity, even as the elements that converged in his demise were highlighted by his misdeeds.

This common reading of Māui generally promotes an anthropocentric view of the self, where Māui self-determinedly reacted to Stoßsätze on the basis of his own thinking. I propose that this is an incomplete reading. An ethical undertaking with Nachdenken considers the creative process of the individual \textit{within} the realm of the Absolute. Maui did not just act alone: He acted against and with other family members, in reaction to the sun and his ancestor who held fire, in tandem with birds, and as a part of the interrelated and vast character, in turn, of all those elements that he may not have known about. Indeed, issues were brought to his attention through the external world and its unitary activity. In relation to the Fourfold mentioned previously, one thinks respectfully as part of a greater process that comes to bear on the self. With that in mind, one retains one’s personal approach but with an acceptance of the activity of Being.

The ‘Nachdenker’/[the person who thinks in the wake of the impetus] in the context of ‘whakaaro’ and the Fourfold is charged with the responsibility of

\textsuperscript{31} I argue in chapter seven that in Māori terminology there is room for an interpretation that what is not perceptible also comes to bear on the thinking process.
ensuring that the outcome – never complete though it is – does not impact negatively on the listener or reader. As a Māori writer, I respond to Novalis’ Stoßsätze in ways that incorporate the elements of the Absolute with Novalis’ concerns. It may appear as if I have placed greater emphasis on Being than I have on the creative potential of the self, but my aim instead is to highlight the often-neglected issue of the interrelationship of a number of finite things on each other. Novalis also advocated that one has creative energy and cognitive ability whilst residing amongst the Absolute (Stone, 2008): This critical creativity leads him to say that “[d]er Künstler ist durchaus transscendental” (1960o, p. 534)/[the artist is thoroughly transcendental] and that “Poësie ist die große Kunst der Construction der transscendentalen Gesundheit. Der Poët ist also der transscendentale Arzt” (1960o, p. 535)/[poesy is the great art of constructing transcendental health. In other words, the poet is the transcendental physician]. One may hence draw on the artist or the poet to prevail over “ideological atrophy” (Schulte-Sasse, 1987, p. xxii); the artist as well as the poet can “express what modern philosophy wants, yet is painfully aware that it cannot get” (Gjesdal, 2009, para. 6). Māori are similarly aware of the highly impacting nature of their creative responses. Killed by Hinenuitepō, Māui had perhaps gone where he should not have – to kill what is termed in English the Goddess of Death. His demise is well known amongst Māori, and its precedence for appropriate behaviour resonates when Māui is discussed in current times.

The form and effect of Stoßsätze in each chapter

As one who is referring to Novalis, I need to ensure that any outcome is beneficial to both the source of this method – Novalis’ theories – and to Māori communities. My use of these sentences that challenge and push takes different forms throughout the chapters. The reader should note that there are different kinds of Stoßsätze apart from provocative ones (although the other kinds could also be described as provocative in that they have an effect on the perceiver). There are indeed those Stoßsätze against which one reacts: This form occurs mainly in chapter three, in which I address, and react to, what for me is the relatively
inciteful text of Te Maire Tau. In chapter three I describe Novalis’ ‘philosophising’ to show that I may similarly ‘philosophise’ against a piece of work that I mostly disagree with – here, the impetus that Novalis provides me is in the form of an awareness of philosophising. Whilst philosophising I retain aspects of Novalis’ substantive affirmations about Being also. Even the method I emphasise is partly geheimnisvoll, in that it involves a placing together of apparently disparate theories. By the time I have arrived at the summary to this chapter, both Novalis and Te Maire Tau have compelled me to consider notions of Being that may be relevant for Māori. This chapter aims to bring to the reader’s attention the political as well as metaphysical issue that a denial of Geheimnis brings about, and highlights that Stoßsätze are as much to do with references to inimical or disagreeable sentences and tracts of writing as they are to do with amiable theories. As a process of manaaki the chapter emphasises that one must acknowledge contrary viewpoints in providing a critique for one’s community.

Additionally, though, there are those that subtly bring into one’s awareness, as a phenomenological activity in the sense of ‘whakaaro’/[becoming a concern], an entity which then encourages one to imaginatively explore. Chapter four, which outlines Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren”, provides this sort of impetus: It turns my attention, in a gentler way than Te Maire Tau’s text, towards my explanation, as a Māori writer, of Geheimnislosigkeit which I explore in chapters five and six. Although it is not an inflammatory text for me, it is no less powerful. Here Novalis encourages me to search out colonising events, practices and discourses. He highlights for me that colonisation occurs through particular incidents, but it is underpinned by a loss of mystery. Both explicitly and tacitly, Novalis brings me through his poem “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” to consider the greater phenomenon of philosophical colonisation, in conjunction with occasional dialogue between him and certain Māori writers. Clearly, the events that occur in New Zealand in respect of Māori, as discussed in chapters five and six, are different to the ones that took place in Novalis’ time, but Novalis has compelled me to become aware of some of the specific events that bring about the modes of colonisation that “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” exposes. In this process the reader is forced to engage with the disruptive patterns of Stoßsätze, which can liberate the reader and their communities from banal,
geheimnislose views of things in the world. The political and cultural aspects of care/manaakitanga are therefore stressed in these three chapters.

Finally, one should be aware of a specific use of Stoßsatz that aims to romanticise. This form of Stoßsätze is expressly meant to ‘lift’ the commonly held Māori concepts so that they regain some Geheimnis. These Stoßsätze may either be provocative or encouraging. Chapter seven draws on Novalis’ fragments explicitly as a means of lifting those core Māori terms, and some others as well, so that they take on aspects of the Absolute that I have discussed in chapter three.

Of course each chapter articulates either the loss or recapture of Geheimnis in a substantive sense – these discussions are the Nachdenken, and these also take place within the broader project of Romantisieren. This discussion, however, occurs because of the Stoßsätze provided by Novalis. After these affirmative descriptions of loss and recapture, then, I shall describe the resemblance of the Stoßsätze to the outcomes flowing from them. My discussion in this chapter should signal to the reader that, although this method and thesis generally is in written form, it has come about because of the thinking of my ancestors, my engagement with another theoretical and cultural tradition, with the view to reclaim some ontological aspects of things in the world and their inherent interrelationship. There is therefore a very important step that precedes the writing of this thesis, and this emphasises that Symphilosophie/[unified philosophy] happens in the exchange that occurs between me and various external elements as much as the written outcome. One could argue perhaps that a more authentic Symphilosophie occurs in the exchange because it is less inclined to be permanently etched out as a static and ‘knowledge-producing’ form. The written word can tend to objectify these sorts of discussion; it becomes more difficult to retain the idea of the unexpected and the Spiel that occurs behind the scenes. The method is not just what is in the text, or has produced an outcome, but it is what brought about the text to begin with. Yet there are concrete benefits to writing up the after-thinking of these exchanges, which is perhaps what Novalis had in mind when he reflected that “[b]ey den Alten war die Religion schon gewissermaßen das, was sie bey uns werden soll – practische Poësie” (1960o, p. 537)/[with the
old people, religion was, so to speak, that which it should become with us – practical poesy].

Chapter Three: Philosophising about Being and mystery

In the previous chapters I introduced the terms that name an activity that underpins all finite things in the world and that gives those things their Geheimnis. These terms – Seyn, das Absolute, korekore, das Unbedingte – are innately both finite and infinite and contain within them opposite phenomena. As a method, Stoßsätze inspire one to always consider those opposite phenomena as one engages in thinking. My discussion of Novalis’ and Māori philosophical aspects highlights the continual need to avoid making affirmations without first engaging in an oppositional position. In relation to writing, I think of this as undertaking a sustained critique. As an aspect of the Romantic method, the Stoßsatz method emphasises that those first instances of opposition are retained throughout one’s thinking so that, when one finally makes an assertion, the opposition is still present even in that utterance. The self is hence an important agent in thinking, although in a measured sense.

The purpose of this chapter

The aim of this chapter is to further delve into the concept and presence of Geheimnis by theorising about what gives rise to it: Being. Where I identified the terminology for it and gave a brief discussion of aspects of Being in chapter two, I now theorise about how Being acts in an everyday sense for the Māori self and how it provides things in the world with Geheimnis. I undertake this by making some affirmations that are a process of my Nachdenken and that draw on Māori scholarship that is oriented towards the ontological realm, as, according to Novalis, a thing in the world has its Geheimnis and incomprehensibility through the presence of Being (Stone, 2008).

But there is a process that I undertake to arrive at these theories about Being and its everyday activity, and this involves referring to Stoßsätze from two sources -
Novalis and Te Maire Tau. The Stoßsätze that Novalis provides act as a method for me to arrive at those theories and also offer some substantive assistance in those affirmations about Being. Alongside recounting Novalis’ assertions about the mystery of objects because of Being, I also wish to emphasise the paths that he followed to arrive there. Novalis not only had his own ideas about Being as mystery but he also referred to another very important writer – Johann Gottlieb Fichte – to clarify a notion of mystery that was current and, perhaps interestingly for the Māori reader, colonised. Novalis proposes here a form of dialectic, whereby one’s existing ideas of mystery are tested against an opposing view, with the full force of imagination, to create a fresh perspective. To this extent, Novalis provides a Stoßsatz by making me aware of a process of arriving at an affirmation.

Novalis sets an example here of reacting to the prompts of a stimulus that is antithetic to his own philosophies. In this chapter I follow his example, and react to the writings of Te Maire Tau. The Stoßsätze that Te Maire Tau offers are inspiring in the process, as in crucial parts I disagree with his argument and at the same time appreciate it for bringing the ‘knowing Māori self’ to the forefront as an issue. Thus, throughout this chapter I engage with both Novalis’ and Tau’s prompts to conclude with some affirmations about Being. What Novalis illustrates in his own process is that one should engage fully with a discordant stimulus in coming to an utterance about Being and Geheimnis. Indeed, Being itself, as we have seen, is involved with both positive and negative elements. Novalis’ method to that extent appears to reflect those antithetic characteristics.

Novalis, Fichte, and chapter structure

Novalis approached Geheimnis with some novelty, displaying similarities in this endeavour with other early Romantic writers. Geheimnis for him was preserved through the belief that Being is unknowable but at times able to be appreciated in its emanations or simply felt. This relationship of humanity to Being characterises one of the fundamental differences between Romanticism and Idealism. In the
Romantic camp, Being is seen to be unknowable through the intellect. The fact that different terms – the Absolute, Being, the thing-in-itself - were given to an unknowable activity that preordained the presence of all objects (concrete and abstract) should send an initial signal to the reader that any attempt to confine Being through final definitions is to be avoided. With this in mind, Novalis’ contemporary, Schelling, who is often considered to be an Idealist but who displays some very real Romantic philosophies, noted the negative approach to knowing the Absolute by highlighting how radically irreconcilable the word ‘Bedingt’ [limited, reified] is with its negative ‘Unbedingt’ [the Absolute, unlimited, unreified]:

[Bedingt]… [es ist] ein vortreffliches Wort, von dem man sagen kann, daß es beinahe den ganzen Schatz philosophischer Wahrheit enthalte. Bedingen heißt die Handlung, wodurch etwas zum Ding wird, bedingt, das was zum Ding gemacht ist, woraus zugleich erhellt, daß nichts durch sich selbst als Ding gesetzt seyn kann, d. h. daß ein unbedingtes Ding ein Widerspruch ist. Unbedingt nämlich ist das, was gar nicht zum Ding gemacht ist, gar nicht zum Ding werden kann.

Das Problem also, das wir zur Lösung aufstellten, verwandelt sich nun in das bestimmtere, etwas zu finden, das schlechterdings nicht als Ding gedacht werden kann. (1856, p. 166)

[[Reified] ... [it is] an admirable word. One may say of it that it comprises all that philosophical truth holds dear. To ‘en-thing’ means the process whereby something is made into a thing. Conditioned, that which is made a thing, by which light is shed at the same time on the fact that nothing through its own agency can be posited as a thing. Therefore, an unconditioned thing is a contradiction. Unconditioned is

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32 For a full treatment of the extent of this unknowability, see Stone’s (2008) “Being, Knowledge and Nature in Novalis”. She indicates that Novalis moved from thinking of Being as thoroughly unknowable to its conception as self-arranging.
in other words that which is not at all made into a thing, and cannot become a thing.

And the related problem that we tried to find a solution to transforms now into the determinate. We try to find something that simply cannot be thought of as a thing.]

Schelling’s concern is with the impossibility of finding the changing ground that is Being even though there is an incessant drive to keep trying. For the later Schelling, one cannot say that either the Unbedingt es or the Bedingt es is this or that. Nature as a manifestation of Being can only be conceived of as active (Schelling, 1858). The depiction of Being as a self-organising, pluriform organism (Stone, 2008) is one that Novalis agrees with when he refers to nature as an active Absolute:

Es wäre denkbarer, daß sie [die Natur] das Erzeugnis eines unbegreiflichen Einverständnisses unendlich verschiedner Wesen wäre, das wunderbare Band der Geisterwelt, der Vereinigungs- und Berührungspunkt unzähliger Welten. (1960e, p. 98)

More conceivably, it is the product of an incrutable harmony among infinitely various essences, a miraculous bond with the spirit world, the point at which innumerable worlds touch and are joined. (2005, p. 81)

One may glean from this quote of Novalis’ that the Absolute is not circumscribed by its finite elements. Although these elements, or things in the world, may be organised through the intellect, Being cannot be. Being is instead the sublime activity that brings these elements into existence to begin with. It may be contingent and chaotic, but it also displays aspects of structure, reliability, nurture and harmony (“Einverständnism”). However, Being is not just a ‘super being’ but it is comprised of all those finite elements so that, in totality, they are inseparable from Being (Stone, 2008). These discrete elements are just as important to a concept of Being as the idea that Being is an Absolute, and for Novalis they
merge, separate and interrelate because of Being. The activity of the thing in itself is what characterises it, and gives things in the world their presence. Being, however, may also be hinted at by the poeticising of scientific and mathematical terms, although this relates more to the visible activity of Being than Being itself. In this act of poeticising, one moves the orthodox symbols of science and mathematics to ever-new realms, and thus does not try to use tools to finally describe Being. Novalis, a scientist by training, was most eager to explain the activity of Being in this poetic manner. Because it is all-encompassing, Being impinges on all things in the world and is capable of acting in an almost rational way, in that it works by organising itself:

Die Natur addirt, subtrahirt, multiplicirt, potenzirt etc. unaufhörlich.
(Novalis, 1960g, p. 52)

Nature incessantly adds, substracts, multiplies, raises to a higher power etc. The applied mathematical sciences show us Nature as a mathematician. Physics is real mathematics. (Wood, 2007, p. 195)

Novalis’ fragment demonstrates two aspects of his belief about Being. Firstly, it is active; it moves things in the world so that they are never static. Secondly, an aspect of it can be described rationally, or scientifically, so that things in the world even act ‘scientifically’ (and in this respect they accord with a force – physics – that is organised mathematically – rationally). Both the spiritual and scientific are for the Romantics mysterious, at times affecting the self so that understanding occurs.

The relatively uncontroversial nature of this brief description of the Romantics’ position on Being does nothing, however, to sketch the Idealists’ position on this matter. Here we enter much more contentious terrain, for the Idealists are not completely lacking in Romantic thought. One commentator who argues for the Romantic strain within Idealism is Frederick Beiser, who rejects the strict distinctions between the Idealists and the Romantics, preferring instead to
problematise the labels themselves and indicate their often unexplored similarities. He reads Idealism as a sort of Romanticism to the extent that the Romantics possessed ‘objective’ Idealism. Beiser (2002) points to a belief adhered to by the Romantics that the “subjective is possible only within experience itself” (p. 12). He notes that the ‘forms’ within which the subject manifests is Being or “the realm of pure being itself” (p. 12).

**Preliminary methodical remarks concerning this chapter**

Nevertheless, despite any alleged similarities, it was Johann Fichte, an Idealist, whom Novalis reacted against most strenuously yet productively. Indeed, Novalis’ expressions about Being that I have cited above were not immediately forthcoming: Instead, Fichte called Novalis to action, providing a kind of Stoßsatz that would prove to be extremely galvanizing, so that Novalis could then describe Being and develop his expression about it in relation to the self on his own philosophical terms. In a similar fashion I shall use Novalis’ method of reacting, by referring to some of Te Maire Tau’s writings – specifically his “Ghosts on the Plains” article – but I shall also keep in mind Novalis’ express assertions about Geheimnis and Being through to my own constructions about Geheimnis and Being. There are various Stoßsätze involved here, and the structure goes as follows:

1. I describe the initial Stoßsätze that partially inspired Novalis to consider the issue of Being. These Stoßsätze are the philosophical ideas concerning Fichte’s ‘Ich’.

2. I then describe how Novalis reacted to these ideas while having some admiration for them. Novalis used this (mainly) opposing text to arrive at his own - although Fichte-informed - ideas about Being.

3. As Novalis had referred to an inspiring but antithetic text, I refer to Te Maire Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains” as a means of inspiring some ideas around Geheimnis and Being. While my method does not exactly match that of Novalis’, I shall show that it is desirable to have an oppositional viewpoint to respond to when proactively constructing these
philosophies. Throughout this exercise I retain Novalis’ express articulations about Geheimnis and Being.

4. These stages culminate in some of my own constructions of Geheimnis and Being. Combined with these ‘steps’ above, I also explain and draw on the teachings of an aunt, as well as take the important step of referring to other Māori writers on the subject.

There are three broader processes that those four above fit into and which determine the greater structural framework in this chapter. The first heading, “Novalis’ agreement/opposition method”, refers to (1) and (2) above. I then turn to the second heading, which is “Adopting Novalis’ method and assertions” and relates to all of (3) above. The third heading – “Philosophical fragments that propose a notion of Being for Māori readers” – relates to the final fourth stage above.

I have listed the process here for clarity, but it is important to note that an earlier step has as much of a part to play in the final outcome as a more recent one. Novalis believes that philosophising, as he calls it, retains traces of first elements. Stoßsätze are related to philosophising for Novalis, as they never entirely disappear from the outcome, although they push the thinker in a new direction. We will recall from chapter two that one is always ‘stuck’, as it were, with the original elements (and all subsequent ones as well), rendering both utterance and self geheimnisvoll.

1. Novalis’ agreement/opposition method

Novalis’ ambivalent reaction to the Enlightenment

Novalis’ reactions to Fichte can be described as responses within the context of the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment generally. By the 1770s, the threats posed by both scepticism and materialism – two irreconcilable outcomes of the concept of Enlightenment reason – had already been identified in Germany
Beiser, 2000), with the dissemination of the materialist works of de la Mettrie and Mauterpuis amongst others on the one hand, and of Hume’s scepticism on the other. Despite the inability of the Enlightenment to gain the foothold in Germany that it had in France and England, German Romantic and Idealist writers were nevertheless very familiar with the problems it offered. Novalis does not mention Julien Offray de la Mettrie by name but it seems quite likely that his critical reference to the world as “eine ungeheure Mühle” (1960d, p. 515) /[a monstrous mill] in Die Christenheit oder Europa directly concerns de la Mettrie’s highly radical vision of man and world as machine. Grappling also with Immanuel Kant’s division between art and critical reasoning, Novalis drew on the form of the fragment to encourage their unity (Gjesdal, 2009): The fragment for Novalis would operate within both art and reason, thereby mingling the two realms. The teachings of Locke he would call a “System der Materialisten” (Novalis, 1960m, p. 462) /[system of materialists], and he would draw comparisons between Leibniz’ and Newton’s conceptions of light. His acquaintance with their works meant that he could comment from a position of authority. As we shall soon see, he was particularly well versed in the philosophies of Fichte.

It was from this vantage point that he would both embrace and resist Enlightenment and Idealist philosophy. That early Romanticism links in no small part to the Enlightenment has for some time been an acknowledged focus of scholarship dealing with the Romantics (Mahoney, 1987), with Novalis, for one, being interested in the scientific description of aspects of nature and the radicalisation of the creative powers of the individual that the Enlightenment augured. Yet it is the poet who is responsible for divulging this inventive potential (Mahoney, 1987) and here we start to see a marked divergence from the Enlightenment project, which preferred rationalism and empiricism as modes of perceiving the world. Resisting the automatic default to solipsism that the Enlightenment encouraged, Novalis instead sought a sensual relationship with things in the world. In this he accords with the theologian and philosopher Schleiermacher who used the term ‘metaphysics’ to denote the tendency of modern philosophy to objectify things in the world:

Metaphysics [modern philosophy] proceeds outwards from the finite nature of the person, and strives to determine, through its most simple concepts and through the circumference of its strengths and its receptivity, what the universe can be for the person themselves and how the person must necessarily glimpse it. Religion also lives its whole life within nature, but in the infinite nature of the whole, of the one and all.]

Novalis, then, found it useful in a time of philosophical upheaval to consider what mystery might be in relation to its counterpoint, lack of mystery. Colonisation does not allow any spaces that are free from its influence: This peculiar nature of colonisation is also one that Friedrich Schleiermacher discusses in his Über die Religion:


[[The vulgar Enlightenment] is more and more the ruling party. You and we are inconsequential masses. Entire towns and countries are trained in its foundation principles, and whenever that training is overcome, one discovers it again in society, in the sciences and in philosophy…. Through its almighty influence on every worldly
interest and through its false appearance of philanthropy … this way of thinking always keeps religion on a leash.]

Novalis advocated scrutinising a philosophical stance against which he could explicate his own views. He affirms that we can critically consider opposing opinions to form other theories, and that in times when philosophical colonisation is evident this is a necessary step. The effect of Fichte on Novalis cannot be underestimated here, and moreover we shall see that Fichte’s philosophies do not delimit those of Novalis’.

The Fichtean prompt for Novalis’ thoughts on Geheimnis

In 1794 Idealist philosophy would take on a unique complexion with the arrival of the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte at the University of Jena. Quite apart from the revolutionary impact of Fichte on Kantian philosophy, his role in the development of Romanticism would prove to be vital (Bowie, 1997). It is not overreaching to claim that his philosophies provided prompts themselves for Novalis, even though Fichte, being foundationalist in his approach to philosophy, may not have envisaged such an inspirational outcome. Fichte in turn had been greatly influenced by the philosophies of Kant and had surfaced from an immersion in Kantian philosophy with a change in his own views (Breazeale, 2009), turning his thoughts now to countenancing a single underpinning principle; hence his foundationalist approach. Although remaining faithful to Kantian philosophy in many respects, Fichte would soon come to realise the shortcomings of that eminent philosopher’s notions of critical philosophy, including the possibility of the thing-in-itself (Breazeale, 2009) that Kant had continuously noted was “zwar als für sich wirklich, aber von uns unerkannt” (1828, p. xvii)/“as something actual for itself but unrecognized by us” (1998, p. 112).

Fichte’s six years at the University of Jena were intensely productive ones and it is at this time that he laid the foundations for his rejection of the thing-in-itself and the ascendancy of the “Ich”/I. He believed that Kant had failed to adequately preserve a notion of practical reason (Kneller, 2007). The thing-in-itself as a fundamental concept was impossible on critical grounds and a more secure anchor
was required. Drawing on the philosophies of Solomon Maimon and G. E. Schulze, Fichte articulated his discomfort at the notion of the thing in itself and set about proclaiming the place of the Ich as the single, overarching principle. When reading about Fichte’s preference for the Ich, one may also discern similarities with Descartes’ proposition that the thinking I is evidence of the I’s existence. Both philosophers propose a single principle from which all knowledge flows (Mandt, 1997). Mandt argues that Descartes influenced Fichte (and Kant) to a great extent, whilst acknowledging the novelty of, in our present case, Fichte’s own philosophies. Even so, according to Mandt, Fichte acted as if he were starting afresh in philosophising about the subjectivity of a grounding proposition.

I argue that Fichte extended on Descartes’ sceptical philosophy by annihilating other objects in the world – they are the not-I. It is the Ich that is the foundation of all knowledge, and other objects act as resistance to the Ich. Fichte progressed his foundationalist system by proclaiming that it was the I that was at the basis of experience: It is “demnach Erklärungsgrund aller Tatsachen des empirischen Bewußtseins, daß vor allem Setzen im Ich vorher das Ich selbst gesetzt sei” (Fichte, 1997, p. 15)/“the ground of explanation of all facts of empirical consciousness that before all positing the Ego ['I'] must be posited through itself” (1868, p. 68)33. Here Fichte draws a crucial distinction between representing the Ich to itself – that is, being conscious of the Ich as an object – and immediately completing an act in being conscious of the I. He advocates the latter explanation, in which the positing of the Ich is an immediate ‘Tathandlung’/deed. In this immediate and first self-positing act, the Ich as fact is not originally any ‘thing’ or ‘substance’ (Breazeale, 2009) but is at the same time what it “posits itself to be” (Breazeale, 2009, para 4.1). In other words the I is, after Fichte:

\[\text{[A]bsolutes Subjekt \ldots dessen Sein (Wesen) bloß darin besteht, daß es sich selbst als seiernd, setzt. So wie es sich setzt, ist es; und so wie es ist, setzt es sich.} \text{ (1997, p. 17)}\]

33 The English version was italicised.
[A]bsolute subject … that, the being (essence) whereof consists merely in positing itself as being. As soon as it posits itself, it is; and as soon as it is, it posits itself. (1868, p. 70)

This activity of the Ich is the “pure act of thinking as such” (Lindberg, 2007, p. 249). Fichte’s axiom ‘A = A’, with A = Ich-I, provides the starting point for this act, and because we are affirming this axiom we are also positing our selves, meaning that the axiom can then be expressed as ‘I is I’. The ‘I’ is therefore originally productive and is internally creative. However, in positing the Ich so actively the Ich also posits the nicht-Ich, because in the affirmation A = A there must arise something that is not of the Ich as well. Thus it posits the nicht-Ich as an object in opposition to itself, and the self and non-self impose limits on each other. This non-self as an object of reflection acts as a shock (‘Anstoß’) to the self because it is precisely that – an object of reflection. It is opposed to the self because the self, in positing itself, has not represented itself as an object of reflection. It is to be observed, though, that the self becomes limited through this action only insofar as the self posits its own limitation. The Anstoß that Fichte talks about provides a chain of abstractions, beginning with feeling, progressing to sensation and then to a concept (Breazeale, 2009). It is through this process that one is able to consciously experience the world of “spatio-temporal material objects” (Breazeale, 2009, para 4.1).

The task of philosophy for Fichte is therefore a “Reflexion über dasjenige, was man etwa nächst dafür halten könnte, und eine Abstraktion von allem, was nicht wirklich dazu gehört” (1997, p. 11)/“reflection on what may perhaps for the present be taken for that deed-act, and an abstraction from all that does not really belong to it” (1868, p. 63). Beiser (2002) sees Fichte’s idealism as “pragmatic” (p.

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34 Although not explicit in his demarcation of the terms, Fichte’s use of ‘Ich’ appears to refer to the very primordial act of positing, where ‘self’ or ‘Selbst’ may take place when the Ich becomes self-conscious, having become aware of the nicht-Ich. Many writers, however, use the terms interchangeably. In giving the summary of his philosophy of the Ich, I have tried to stay true to my interpretation of Fichte here with this specific use of the two terms which, it should be noted, apply only to his works and not to those of Novalis or Te Maire Tau. With his focus on the Absolute and its workings on everything, including the Ich, Novalis is much less concerned with strict use of terms to denote the self, and I similarly use them interchangeably throughout this thesis.

102
Given the finite nature of the self, he notes that the world can only be “diminish[ed]” (p. 218) but not completely constituted by us. As we come to know the non-self through the process of abstraction, we strive to make nature “conform to our own purposes”. The world becomes conceived of in negative terms (Nicht-Ich) as an object and in overly rational ways, as it is the cognitive state that is able to move things in the world around according to the will of the self.

**Fichte’s legacy to Novalis: ‘Philosophising’**

Novalis came to identify the need to engage with Fichte’s philosophies, evident from Niethammer’s diary notes of a meeting that Novalis had with Fichte and Hölderlin in Jena (Kneller, 2007). Because Novalis disagreed with Fichte at crucial points, it is tempting to read Novalis as entirely dismissive of Fichte; however, this is to rashly minimise Novalis’ admiration for his mentor. In a letter to Schlegel he wrote that “Fichten bin ich Aufmunterung schuldig - Er ists, der mich weckte und indirecte zuschürt” (1960a, p. 188)/“I am in Fichte’s debt for encouragement…. It is he who awakened and indirectly incited me” (O'Brien, 1995, p. 81). Fernández (2005) believes that both Fichte and Novalis shared an “admiration of man” (p. 91). We get a glimpse here of the creative potential of the individual: In its broadest sense, the ability of the individual to reach beyond the realms of the banal through their own efforts could be said to announce some common ground between the two.

Fichte was also vital as a theorist against whom Novalis could start to create certain of his own ideas. I have used the word ‘against’ here purposefully, because Fichte’s works created in Novalis an initial unease, or:

[A] call to self-activity – I cannot thoroughly explain something to someone else unless I refer him to himself, unless I bid him to perform the same action that clarified it for me. I can teach someone to philosophize when I teach him to do it as I do it – when he does what I do, he is what I am, is there, where I am. (Kneller, 2003)

Fichte certainly disturbed Novalis, but in his responses Novalis shows that it is the initial unease that provokes original thought. It is also important to remember that Novalis did not engage with Fichte on a merely superficial level, by either brushing aside Fichte’s ideas or critiquing it facilely. Instead, Novalis grappled with Fichte’s philosophies at a very deep and sophisticated level, involving some measured agreement with Fichte’s strong Ich. Novalis came to the conclusion that the Ich should render the world mysterious, in no small part due to Fichte’s influence (Kneller, 2003) if not because of Fichte’s substantive theories. His intense devotion to Fichte’s works shows itself in both his direct responses to Fichte and in the extent to which Fichte’s works stung him to respond with indirectly related observations. Novalis’ six groups within his Fichte Studies are related to Fichte’s philosophies but are sometimes tangential, reflecting what Novalis believed was a method of romanticising. Fichte therefore both provoked Novalis and allowed his theories to take a distinctive path by “subjecting the laws of thought to a critical examination” (Wood, 2007, p. xxi).

Novalis reacts and arrives at his own theories about Being

Novalis’ admittedly critical attitude to Fichte’s supreme Ich is tempered with his acquiescence to the creative power that Fichte’s Ich announces. Novalis does indeed see the merit of the creative self: In a later fragment in the Fichte-Studies, he notes that:

Unsre Kraft hat um soviel Spielraum gekriegt, als sie Welt unter sich hat. Da unsere Natur aber, oder die Fülle unsers Wesens unendlich ist, so können wir nicht in der Zeit dieses Ziel erreichen – Da wir auch in einer Sfäre außer der Zeit sind, so müssen wir es da in jedem Augenblick erreichen.... Hier ist Moralität und Beruhigung für den
Our [creative] power gets as much free play as it has world under it. But since our nature, or the fullness of our being, is unending, we can never reach this goal in time – But since we are also in a sphere outside time, we must reach it there in every moment…. Here is morality and peace of mind, because an endless striving after what hovers ever out of reach before us seems unbearable. (Kneller, 2003, pp. 186-187)

We are therefore thoroughly dependent on the world under us in our ability to act creatively. Humanity is at the whim of the world’s infinity and may never reach the end of its creative powers due to this endlessness. The world here becomes more than a not-I and takes on the role of caretaker of humanity’s creative powers. Its boundlessness dictates its impression on creativity. It is partially the world’s (and the ego’s) creative powers that compel Novalis to employ the use of the fragment as a means of propelling thought rather than a foundationalist system of philosophy, as the fragment pushes the reader forward into their own poetic realm. It is this free interplay between the world and the creative Ich that is important to Novalis. The Ich here makes artistically creative and, at times, scientific sense of the world, but it is a science that is melded with poetry that is of greatest consequence to Novalis, as this matches the infinity of the creative Ich and the world. Constituting a working with the world, the poetic mind has the ability to reconcile extremes, to allow their unity and to then take a place in the development of society. As a benefit to society, the creative potential of the Ich can romanticise and poeticise both aesthetically and politically. Acting in agency to kreative Einbildungskraft/[creative imagination] the Ich may work outside of current hegemonic constraints and theorise differently about social situations.

The Ich for Novalis is also a trustee for Being, as the Ich is entrusted with keeping Being together and protecting it from being scientifically dissected. His Poetisieren and Romantisieren are therefore not concerned with definitive assertions – his fragments, although at times assertive, are designed to compel the
reader to think, not to systematise things in the world – and it is through poetry that one my discern a ‘hovering’ that takes place when he does not fix arguments with a final truth. The responsible Ich may propose a theory but the extended argument is best created through poesy, or creative potential. With Novalis, form and content are harmonised here: The Ich is at once creative and subservient to Being. It is for the articulation of the creative power of the ego that Novalis is thankful to Fichte.

We can see here that Novalis’ aforementioned ‘debt’ to Fichte is both spiritual and political, and that Novalis’ obligation is due to a method of disagreement with Fichte. The true nature of this contestation provides the most profound ‘jolt’ for Novalis’ method and theoretical substance as far as the self is concerned, and it lies in its most fundamental form in Fichte’s positioning of man in relation to Being. For where Fichte believed that the ‘I’ was the ground of Being, Novalis placed Being as ultimately beyond the self (Nassar, 2006) and yet enabling the activity of the self. In his criticism of the belief that one can know Being through the self, he suggests almost laconically that one “[g]reift doch eine Handvoll Finsterniß” (1960j, p. 106)/[grasps a handful of darkness]. Knowing itself is secondary to, or dependent on, the primary essence of Being. Jacobi, another contemporary of the early Romantics, also unequivocally states as unsustainable the dilemma that Fichte posed, conceiving of the self as incapable of knowing Being with certainty:

The decisive difference of my way of thinking from the ways of thinking of the majority of my philosophical contemporaries lies in the fact that I am not a Cartesian. I begin like the Orientals (Morgenländer) in their conjugations with the third, not with the first person, and I believe that one simply should not put the Sum after the Cogito. I needed a truth which was not my creature, but whose creature I would be. (Bowie, 1997, p. 35, citing Scholz, 1916)

As Bowie follows, “we would not recognise when we have reached the end of our investigation” (p. 34) in regard to trying to “arrive at final certainty”. We would have to know with complete confidence what it is we are seeking in advance.
Novalis’ specific reaction

Novalis arrives at the same conclusion by both logical and poetic means. In his Fichte Studies – which, it should be noted, total some 400 pages, representing the galvanic impetus that Fichte had provided – he begins his critique by laying out the impossibility of Fichte’s ‘A = A’ proposition. To begin with, according to Novalis (1960j) “[w]ir verlassen das Identische um es darzustellen” (p. 104)/“[w]e abandon the identical in order to represent it” (Kneller, 2003, p. 3); this is because “[d]as Wesen der Identität läßt sich nur in einen Scheinsatz aufstellen” (1960j, p. 104)/“[t]he essence of identity can only be presented in an illusory proposition” (Kneller, 2003, p. 3). But how can we ever be sure that we have represented the identical? To identify something as the same means that the thing to be determined must be in some way different (Bowie, 1997; Nassar, 2006) - otherwise we would just be identifying the thing itself, resulting in a tautology – thus “A is A”. As Kneller (2003) elucidates, Novalis questions how we can ever really know that we have authentically reflected our true selves. The moment we state a feeling about ourselves as a certainty it is relegated (or consigned) to the realm of representation. Kneller cites Novalis at this point, and I shall also draw on this same fragment:


Philosophy cannot be self-observation, because it would not then be what we are after. It is perhaps a self-feeling.... What then is a feeling? It can only be observed in reflection – the spirit of feeling is then gone. (Kneller, 2003, pp. 12-13)

As such, the idea that a representation holds the ground of truth is implausible for Novalis (Bowie, 1997; von Molnár, 1970): After all, in order to state that an identity has been made, the things between which an identity is to be made must
necessarily be different from each other in order to be elements to be supposedly reflected. Assertions of truth require a movement away from the self; it is:

【T】he problem of how to gain the external perspective – which would allow one to assert that the universe is ‘really “x”’ (e.g. ‘law-bound matter’) – without leaving the place from which that assertion is made outside what is described as the grounding reality. (Bowie, 1997, p. 76)

The problem arises when we try to assert a physics-based truth about the universe. Bowie (1997) goes on to note that to think that the world could be explained absolutely in scientific laws is problematic, because then what he calls “consciousness”\(^{35}\) would have to be able to “explain itself” (p. 76) in the same way. Yet it cannot. In order to manage that task, the self would firstly have to be already completely familiar with what is to be explained; otherwise it would not know when it had arrived at the complete explanation of the thing.

Novalis’ argument that one may only dimly feel Being is based on his belief that:

All aspects of Being, Being above all is simply being free – hovering between extremes that are both necessarily unifying and divisive. From this point of light of hovering all reality flows – in it is contained everything – object and subject are there because of it, it is not there because of them.]

\(^{35}\) Although Bowie uses the term ‘consciousness’, Māori may have self-hood even without consciousness. However, as Bowie is addressing the realm of Fichtean self-consciousness and is using appropriate language for that process, the word ‘consciousness’ is a fitting one here.
The *hovering* describes the productive but dependent relationship with Being generally. In line with Novalis’ intention, it throws into doubt sounds the statement that professes to be once and for all definitive. Being is neither precisely in one state or another. Its quiddity defies rational explanation because of its movement between the extremes that are at once together and apart. Because Being gives rise to statements as much as things in the world apparently independent of the self, statements about Being are just as indefinite. All things are contained within hovering Being: It gives rise to the unpredictability of all things in the world, including statements and thoughts. In Novalis’ *Hymnen an die Nacht* one may see similar numerous reflections on the changing state of Being: At times the night is a hovering entity – it hovers around “des zarten Mädchens Busen und [macht] zum Himmel den Schoß” (1960i, p. 135)/“a tender girl’s breasts making her womb heaven” (1988, p. 15) - at others the night provides an uncertain gauze through which Novalis sees the changed features of his deceased love. When discussing the night in such a poetical way, Novalis is hinting at the active nature of Being. In *Hymnen an die Nacht* it is a productive, irrepressible movement that never alights on one element for long.

With Fichte, Geheimnis is inevitably lost to the certainty of the self. Fichte mentions ‘hovering’ himself but reduces it to an activity of the self’s imagination. Imagination acts between “subject and its projected object, action out of which arises, so far as thought can comprehend it, the experience of objectivity or thinghood” (Shell, 1992, p. 110). At times uncertain hovering is acceptable, even beneficial, between “authority and mere emptiness” (Simpson, 1988, p. 210), for instance, but only if it propels humanity towards a state of certain knowledge. Novalis addresses the Ich and imagination in his *Fichte-Studien*, acknowledging their validity, but crucially turning them over to ‘Being above all’, as we have seen. According to Stone (2008) “Novalis takes [B]eing, or unitary substance, to precondition not only the subject/object distinction, but also the subject’s consciousness of itself” (p. 145), and its “givenness” means that one may *approach* or *seek* productivity in the Fichtean sense (Kollias, 2000) but never achieve it. Hovering for Novalis can be understood as a moving outwards from the self – as a product of Being – towards the uncertainty of Being. Geheimnis is thereby retrieved from Fichtean subjectivity. This movement outwards is alluded
to by Hölderlin who, similar to Novalis, admired Schiller’s aesthetics, and like
Novalis tried to extend those aesthetics’ creative potential into the spheres of the
unknown:

[W]ir haben unsre Lust daran, uns in die Nacht des Unbekannten, in
die kalte Fremde irgend einer andern Welt zu stürzen, und wär es
möglich, wir verließen der Sonne Gebiet und stürmten über des
Irsterns Grenzen hinaus. (2011, p. 19)

[W]e delight in flinging ourselves into the night of the unknown, into
the cold strangeness of any other world, and, if we could, we would
leave the realm of the sun and rush headlong beyond the comet’s
track. (2002, p. 10)

Hölderlin’s theory of tones, in which one may only express poetry by the tension
between tones, and which points to an understanding that the Absolute lies out of
cognitive reach, chimes with Novalis’ *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais*. Humanity’s
vulnerability before Being’s manifestations – finite phenomena in nature - is most
clearly highlighted at a number of stages in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais*; it is
overwhelmingly about the autonomous (but interdependent with humanity)
ontological essence of nature, and the interaction of humanity with it. One of the
youths in this fragment of Novalis’ considers that:

Wer … einen richtigen und geübten Natursinn hat, der genießt die
Natur, indem er sie studiert, und freut sich ihrer unendlichen
Mannigfaltigkeit, ihrer Unerschöpflichkeit im Genusse, und bedarf
nicht, daß man ihn mit unnützen Worten in seinen Genüssen störe.
(1960e, pp. 105-106)

He who has a sound and practiced sense of nature enjoys nature by
studying it and takes delight in its infinite variety, its inexhaustible
joy, and has no need to be disturbed in his pleasures by useless words.
(2005, p. 109)
As far as that youth was concerned, nature is engaged with sensually, not in a way that emphasises precise cognition. The impossibility of a truly reflective explanation, such as ‘A=A’, is an abiding one that philosophers besides Novalis have taken up. Novalis’ friend Friedrich Schlegel believed that all truths had to be expressed with a sense of paradox to remind humanity that they cannot be confidently disclosed, and proposed that:

Alle höchsten Wahrheiten jeder Art sind durchaus trivial, und eben darum ist nichts notwendiger, als sie immer neu, und womöglich immer paradoxer auszudrücken, damit es nicht vergessen wird, daß sie noch da sind, und daß sie nie eigentlich ganz ausgesprochen werden können. (1964c, p. 534)

[All highest truths of every sort are through and through trivial, and just because of that nothing is more necessary than to express them in ever new and, where possible, paradoxical ways, so that it will not be forgotten that they exist and that they can never actually be expressed with totality.]

Hölderlin (1961b) argued in a similar fashion but in relation to the subject and object:

Wo Subjekt und Objekt schlechthin, nicht nur zum Theil vereiniget ist, mithin so vereiniget, daß gar keine Theilung vorgenommen werden kan, ohne das Wesen desjenigen, was getrennt werden soll, zu verlezen, da und sonst nirgends kann von einem Seyn schlechthin die Rede Seyn, wie es bei der intellectualen Anschauung der Fall ist. Aber dieses Seyn muß nicht mit der Identität verwechselt werden. (p. 216)

[Where Subject and Object are absolutely, not just partially, united, and with that so united that no division can take place, without destroying the essence of that which is to be sundered, there and in no other way can we talk of Being, as is the case in intellectual intuition.]
But this Being must not be interchanged with identity.]

Originally Being is the primordiality which unifies all judgements. Hölderlin’s proposition is that Being is not a proposition so much as an original given. Heidegger spoke also of the importance of contemplating the Being of beings, an activity that science in itself was incapable of carrying out, as its existence cannot be explained by its own essence (Glazebrook, 2000). For Heidegger, then, science could not explain its ontological existence by means of its own laws. More broadly, we may take from this that the thing attempting to explain itself does not know when it reaches the true reflection of itself in its pursuit of its own essence.

According to Stone (2008), though, whether the self can grasp Being cognitively involves an unresolved and enduring debate. One such dispute occurs between Manfred Frank and Frederick Beiser, two contemporary Novalis scholars, in which Frank on the one hand argues for the unknowability of Being, and Beiser on the other advocates that Being is knowable because “it is a self-realizing organic whole which develops in an intelligible way” (Stone, 2008, p. 141). Frank argued that:

Denn nur ein Grundsatz, dessen Existenz feststeht, böte sich an für Deduktionen, die nicht nur die Geltung von Sätzen, sondern auch die Sachhaltigkeit einiger unserer Gedanken über die Welt einsichtig machen. (1997, pp. 49-50)

[Because only a grounding proposition, whose existence holds fast, lends itself to those deductions that not only make the validity of propositions comprehensible but also the objective nature of our thoughts about the world.]

Of course Frank’s argument suggests that knowledge would only be possible through the generation of knowledge of a fundamental ground. Beiser (2002) places great emphasis on the “self-awareness of the knowing subject” (p. 13), stressing the knowable nature of Being as it organises itself and gives rise to the self. Although this discussion is unresolved, it is likely that Novalis argued for a
type of knowledge of Being that was not discursive. In *Das Allgemeine Brouillon*, he poses an apparent conundrum:

Das Universum ist das Absolute Subject oder der Inbegriff aller Prädicate. Hierinn liegt schon seine unermeßliche und zugleich meßliche *Gliederung*, weil nur dadurch der Inbegriff aller Prädicate möglich wird. Man muß nothwendig erschrecken, wenn man einen Blick in die Tiefe des Geistes wirft. (1960b, p. 381)

The universe is the absolute subject, or the totality of all predicates. Both its immeasurable and measurable *structure* are based on this fact, for only in this manner does the totality of all predicates become a possibility. We would indeed be shocked if we were to gaze into the depths of the spirit. (Wood, 2007, p. 113)

There is both a knowable and unknowable element to Being (Stone, 2008), but its knowability is emotional rather than cognitive. We find here a capacity for intuition that involves knowledge as feeling alongside ignorance, prompting Novalis (1960b) to add that:

So gut, wie alle Kenntnisse zusammenhängen, so gut hängen auch alle Nichtkenntnisse zusammen – Wer eine Wissenschaft machen kann – muß auch eine Nichtwissenschaft machen können – wer etwas begreiflich zu machen weis, muß es auch unbegreiflich zu machen wissen – Der Lehrer muß Wissenheit und Unwissenheit hervorzubringen vermögen. (pp. 375-376)

Just as all knowledge is connected, so all ignorance is also connected – Whoever is able to create a science – must also be able to create a nonscience – and whoever knows how to make something comprehensible, must also know how to make it incomprehensible – The teacher must be capable of bringing forth both knowledge and ignorance. (Wood, 2007, p. 109)
As he would later mention in his “Monolog”, Being for Novalis is that which propels the self into both knowledge and ignorance. In this he agrees with both Hölderlin and Heidegger who generally believe that it is Being, not the self, that “makes all experience possible” (Beiser, 2002, p. 357). Novalis (1960o) proposed therefore that “[a]ller wirklicher Anfang ist ein 2ter Moment” (p. 591)/[every true beginning is a secondary moment] because our assertions of truth are dependent on what precedes and follows them (Bowie, 1997). For the Romantics, making a definitive assertion about the world is the ‘trivia’ that Friedrich Schlegel speaks of precisely because even the signs used to formulate the utterance are dependent on the ontological given as well as other signs. This is not to say in post-modernist fashion, though, that all truth is relative; indeed, Bowie (1997) indicates that this sort of position is “undemonstrable” (p. 79). As we shall see later, Novalis believes the constant striving towards final and determinate truth is a human inevitability, but that it will never be arrived at.

2. Adopting Novalis’ methods and assertions for a process of active philosophising

Novalis’ philosophising as the basis for my own

Novalis highlights that an object’s Geheimnis is due to the activity of the Absolute. His method of arriving at that conclusion involved ‘Fichtesising’ - reacting to a different opinion (that of Fichte’s) and thinking self-consciously about his own process of philosophising. Fichtesising is a term he coined to convey a “deepened analysis of the activity of philosophizing itself” (Wood, 2007, p. xxii) or a “result of applying the Fichtean method to philosophy, of making philosophy itself ‘self-conscious’” (Kneller, 2003, p. xxxiv). It was made self-conscious by “ironic mimicry” (O’Brien, 1995, p. 82), through which he to some extent copied Fichte’s style whilst still diverging from it. His deviation would occur through rereading certain of Fichte’s terms and style so that it could provide an alternative philosophy (O’Brien, 1995). Novalis was therefore more concerned
with the method of arriving at certain philosophical assertions than he was with the substantive outcome. As Mahoney (2001) explains:

Die Fichte-Studien waren in ihrer erhaltenen Form nicht zur Veröffentlichung bestimmt, sondern stellen dar, was Friedrich von Hardenberg im Brief an seinen Bruder Erasmus vom 12. November 1795 ‘dringende Einleitungsstudien auf mein ganzes künftiges Leben, wesentliche Lücken meiner Erkenntniss und nothwendige Uebungen meiner Denkkräfte’ nennt. Gerade deswegen sind Hardenbergs Studienhefte alles andere als ein laufender Kommentar zu Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre. (p. 37)

[The Fichte Studies were not destined for publication in their conceived form, but instead are meant to represent what Friedrich von Hardenberg, in a letter dated 12 November 1795 to his brother Erasmus, names as ‘urgent introductory studies into the entirety of my artistic life, into the giant gaps in my knowledge and the necessary practice of my powers of thought’. Precisely because of that fact, Hardenberg’s notes on the Studies are far from a running commentary on Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.]

That this results in an uncertain outcome for Novalis should be obvious to the reader, simply because Novalis did not know what track his thoughts would follow; indeed, Fichte’s philosophy “not only offered Hardenberg a theoretical basis for his writing, but spurred this writing into new directions” (O’Brien, 1995, p. 82). The unpredictability of this method lies in acknowledging that any outcome is undefined from the outset – an adventure into the unknown.

Yet Geheimnis is to be linked much more with Novalis than with Fichte. Indeed, Fichte’s conception aimed to divest the world of mystery, even if the initial act of self-positing is itself mysterious. My own argument for a notion of Geheimnis that engages Māori philosophies of ontology proposes that Māori are likewise less Ich-focused than Fichte proposes. Despite the fact that the individual – the tohunga, for instance – could change the external world with the power of thought, I shall
ultimately explore that the individual was still reliant on the mystery of transformational processes and things to achieve this. Therefore, while Fichte brings the Ich into sharp relief, unlike either Novalis or Māori he does not place this Ich into subservience to any other being. I shall now turn to Te Maire Tau’s (2001) “The Death of Knowledge: Ghosts on the Plains” to continue the process of philosophising about mystery and Being. I shall argue that this is a relevant method of thinking about philosophy for Māori who are concerned with the ontological realm; it is necessarily creative, and it reminds the philosopher that colonisation is a constant presence (and that traditional, pre-contact discourse on its own is insufficient when discussing mystery and ontology in a contemporary context). One must in this setting respond to discourses that are partly or wholly discordant with Māori ones. In this endeavour, one can engage responses to texts that are jarring and are avowedly based on feeling and thinking about outcomes that are relevant for today. For this section I shall refer in detail to Te Maire Tau as a source of agitation for me, against which I advance a theory about mystery that is relevant for Māori. This process of philosophising is carried out together with Novalis’ romanticised theories about mystery and Being.

Te Maire Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains”

The value of Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains”
Little writing exists that is devoted solely to the intersection between Māori consciousness, colonisation and traditional views of the world, and I believe that such writing is undertaken bravely. One particularly controversial piece of scholarship for me was written by Te Maire Tau, Māori scholar and researcher, who aimed to point out the vulnerability of Māori knowledge in the face of Western colonisation. As Novalis had been to Fichte, I am grateful to Tau for introducing the less familiar terrain of Māori selfhood as an issue. I have generally observed that the topic of the Māori self is dealt with either by subsuming it within collectivist discourses, or by aligning it with traditional archetypes. Both of these approaches are valid but not exhaustively so. The theme of selfhood is central to Tau’s thesis - even though he may not have intended it to
be – because the place of the knowing self in relation to things in the world is of primary concern to him. Tau interrogates those dealings with the issue of the self by rigorously questioning traditional Māori epistemology. By bringing it into question, in “Ghosts on the Plains” he fearlessly disrupts the idea that traditional knowledge is somehow infallible. To that extent he accords with the romantic idea of Novalis’ that one cannot return to a bygone era, and that tortuous paths have always been trodden after colonisation as one comes to question how one knows things in the world. As we shall soon see, however, Tau places much more emphasis on what is epistemically certain than either Novalis or I do.

Although it is not my aim here to compare Tau’s writing to Fichte’s, one may broadly perceive a harmony between his and Fichte’s basic theory: that humanity seeks to engage with nature as if humanity is not governed by anything prior. That is, humanity is the ground of experience. Tau does not “fetishize” (Martin, forthcoming, p. 2) systems like Fichte does – after all, Tau’s concern is less with incrementally establishing a ground notion of consciousness than with providing a commentary on how Māori knowledge was overwhelmed. Nevertheless, he does make some basic assumptions about humanity’s place in relation to Being and its object manifestations to arrive at his point. After making these assumptions, he then attempts to provide an account of how this form of consciousness never could amount to ‘proper knowledge’ in a Western rational or empirical sense. According to him, Māori were exposed and vulnerable in the colonising relationship.

Briefly, Tau’s argument can be summed up as follows: Tau asserts that Māori, prior to colonisation, could only reflect themselves onto objects in the world. By this, he asserts, “all things are ultimately known through the connection to the self” (p. 136). A whakapapa/genealogy that he cites, giving the genesis of Pākehā, provides evidence of this knowledge base. Reciting the whakapapa itself is not important for my critique here, but what is central is his summation of the whakapapa. He contends that:

While one could use this whakapapa as an example of how Māori knowledge systems could expand to include the unknown, the reality
was that their knowledge system was exposed on two fronts. First was the inability to adapt quickly enough to alterations in the environment. Secondly, the framework was meant to represent a knowledge system but in real terms was an arrangement of beliefs underpinned by a paradigm of genealogy. (p. 136)

According to Tau, from this “a continuous self-validating loop is established” (p. 136). He provides a number of examples by which this ‘orthodoxy’ leads to a death of Māori knowledge. With this death, Māori knowledge is proven to be merely belief and is overwhelmed by the knowledge of the West. The social repercussions – discussion of which is beyond the scope of my thesis – include that there are benefits for Māori in accepting changes to knowledge systems, in the corrosion of “old traditions and beliefs, allowing for the growth in knowledge” (p. 141). Essentially, Tau’s work provides some very interesting and thought-provoking instances of all these factors.

The Ich-focus of “Ghosts on the Plains”
First, Tau’s basic assumption about humanity and nature is to be addressed. He places the genesis of human action – broadly similar to Fichte – in the self. Matching Fichte’s broad, overall intention of the self, Tau proposes that awareness of and relationships to objects in the world are grounded in the Ich. It is the Ich that reflects the Ich in the world. Unwittingly, Tau proposes that Māori engaged in a Fichtean awareness of the world: In line with Larmore’s observation that for Fichte “all knowledge is grounded upon the I and its relation to itself” (p. 146), Tau advocates that an explanation of the world “came from the observation of their [Māori] immediate experiences” (p. 138). He implies that it was the initial impression of the world that was important to Māori, again with the self as the origin of that impression. While Tau does not go far in his discussion about Māori consciousness, he does place a lot of emphasis on the act of positing the self as a first, initial activity. He states in his article, for instance, that:

This fact [how Māori perceived the past] meant that Māori acted and behaved in a way that was fundamentally different from Pākehā
because just as Māori imposed their past onto the landscape, the
landscape therefore set the boundaries for how the present could be
understood and, therefore, how the future would be written. (p. 139)

The landscape may set limits on human interaction but this is construed as useful
for the human understanding and writing of present and future. Its limitations are
directed at human activity. Again reminiscent of Fichte, nature is the resistant
nicht-Ich; it reminds the Ich of its unfulfilled state but also affirms it as ground.
The individual and collective self, or Ich, is brought here to awareness of itself by
being made aware of the landscape. The self then names it. While Tau asserts that
Māori saw themselves as the landscape, in fact by his depiction of Māori first
principles of consciousness the Māori self is not the landscape.

**Using Tau’s selfhood as Stoßsatz: Dialogue with “Astralis”**

The key point to be made here is that Tau either tacitly disagrees with the
proposition that the self is an ongoing element in the primordial activity of Being,
or at least he simply does not acknowledge it. In descriptions of Being that
Novalis provides we see that, because one cannot comprehend Being, there is a
mystery to all things in the world. This mystery is not one of our making but
exists because of the self-organisation of Being. Novalis’ poem “Astralis”,
referring to the birth of poesy, structurally bears a striking resemblance to a chant
given by Te Maire Tau.

Novalis’ (1960h) poem, lines 47-55, reads thus:

Es bricht die neue Welt herein
Und verdunkelt den hellsten Sonnenschein,
Man sieht nun aus bemoosten Trümmern
Eine wunderseltsame Zukunft schimmern,
Und was vordem alltäglich war,
Scheint jetzo fremd und wunderbar.
<Eins in allem und alles im Einen
Gottes Bild auf Kräutern und Steinen
Gottes Geist in Menschen und Thieren,
Dies muß man sich zu Gemüte führen.
Keine Ordnung mehr nach Raum und Zeit
Hier Zukunft in der Vergangenheit.> (p. 318)

[The new world begins
And darkens the brightest sunshine
One now looks out of overgrown ruins
At a wonderfully strange, shimmering future,
And what was previously banal,
Is now so strange and wondrous.
One in everything, and everything in one
God’s picture imprinted on leaves and stones
God’s spirit in man and animal,
One must take this to heart.
No order any more in space and time
Now, future in the past].

Tau refers to a Ngai Tahu chant explaining the creation of things in the world:

Na Te Po, Ko Te Ao
Na Te Ao, Ko Te Aomarama
Na Te Aomarama, Ko Te Aoturoa
Na Te Aoturoa, Ko Te Koreteiwihia
Na Te Koreteiwihia, Ko Te Koreteiwihia
Na Te Koreteiwihia, Ko Te Koreteiwihia
Na Te Koreteiwihia, ko Te Korematua
Na Te Korematua, Ko Te Maku
Na Te Maku, ka noho i a Mahoranuiatea, ka puta ki waho ko Raki
Na Raki, ka noho i a Pokoharuatepo

From the first glimmer of light,
emerged the long-standing light until light stood in all quarters,
Encompassing all was a womb of emptiness, an intangible void intense in its search for creation until it reached its ultimate boundaries and became a parentless void with the potential for life. Thus moisture emerged and coupled with Mahoranui a Tea, a cloud that grew from the dawn. From this union came the heavens, Who coupled with Pokoharuatepo… (p. 137)

Both items refer to creation, and express Being and the infinite in a sort of mythical and mystical primordial setting. Novalis is intent on making a point about the unknown; here, he is attempting to represent Being through a set of tensions, in which dark and light, strangeness and banality, future and past, physical and spiritual, are forced together to give birth to a spiritual being. A shimmering future awaits the beholder, but the horizon is not a definite, determined one; it lies behind the knowledge of the onlooker, changing between the two polar regions of light and dark and so on. As one who was sceptical about definitive, orthodox Biblical theologies of monotheism, but who thought that it could operate as a way of accessing pantheism (Barth, 1972), Novalis refers to the pantheistic emanations of ‘God’ as metaphorical for Being, and states that these are the source of a spiritual influence on the physical realm, suggesting that there is as much of a ‘shimmer’ within these objects as there is on the horizon for the onlooker. Long-held assumptions are hence discarded, as the light, in its infusion with darkness, comes to highlight this new poetic world. Time and space cease to be the sole defining factors: In the traditional Māori chant, it is a state of being that comes first, and, similarly, Novalis deals with the Judaeo-Christian God/Being. Both the chant and the poem are opposed to Fichte’s Ich because they propose that what is important is activity that is prior to, but decisive for, the Ich. Even Novalis’ merging of God and Being further cement the mystery of the poem: ‘God’ is neither just God nor just Being, but both are the same and are influential on all the elements in the poem.
Creation lying beyond incremental ‘knowledge’

Let us hold that ontological intention of Novalis’ for a reading of Tau’s recited chant, which he uses - along with other elements - as proof for the problem of Māori knowledge as against Western knowledge. Again, I speculate that this chant is about a set of interacting opposites, including light and darkness, boundary and void, moisture and dryness. The reference to these opposites seeks to highlight an unknowable movement that lies beyond, but also within, the words themselves and their arrangements with each other. Like Novalis, what comes to the fore here is that which precedes human consciousness, giving birth to a constantly present way of being and thinking as much as to the names which are given. The creation that is described is not sequential in the sense that the last step is left behind; what is taken to be a previous step is carried into the present one, leading to what Novalis has noted in “Astralis” with the words “Now, future in the past”. Just as perceivable and visible phenomena pass and merge, so Being allows the constant folding over into the future of the unseen and mysterious. Thus, the form of darkness and silence that is “Te Pō” holds sway over the ensuing states of being. In other words, Te Pō did not just evolve those other states of being and now ceases to exist; it is as much a part of current states of being as those arriving.

I argue that this interpretation of that chant, guided by Novalis in the form of his poem, has consequences for Tau’s thesis. Noting that we now have a much more rational explanation for the creation of the world, Tau argues that “[w]e now know that the world was not created from a giant act of copulation” (p. 138). This “giant act of copulation”, however, suggests that a definitive event took place that brought about the world, a turn of phrase that does not do justice to the process of creation. What has preceded the act of copulation is avoided with a focus on the event. This may be to do with the step-by-step layout and account of the process. The translation that is offered deceives the reader into thinking of those states of being as separate and superable, when what the chant is trying to convey is that all current states of being are dependent on that initial presence of Being that is nevertheless enduring. Even when attempting to clear some validity for the elements of this chant, Tau consigns the elements to human-derived forms:
But what is important is that the creation chant and lullabies show how a people attempted to explain the world and that the explanation came from the observation of their immediate experiences. The world was a mirror of their lives. Light and darkness were personified as male and female elements. Heaven and earth were projections of one’s father and mother. With these primal elements established, the world of plants, fish, rocks and stars was ordered and understood as a cosmic family. All things referenced back to the individual and ultimately to the centre of creation – the self. (p. 138)

**Fundamentally unknowable entities in the chant**

Solidifying the primordial agency of Being through embodying it in physically identifiable forms occurs here. Although this may have occurred traditionally, I suspect that ‘male’ and ‘female’, ‘mother’ and ‘father’ were not as straightforward as Tau suggests they are. The use of these terms may be reductionist; whilst it is true that the earth was probably conceived of as ‘female’ (Hanson & Hanson, 1983), this is not to be reduced to a familiar form. The same applies to ‘male/father/sky’. Moving on, Tau is ensnared by the instrumentalist process of translated language. If we accept that all those states of being amount to an act of copulation, then he may be partially correct. However, the chant that refers to the parent talking to the child is not sufficiently explicated in the English version:

E tama i kimia, e tama i rapā!
I rapā tāua ki roto
Ki te Kore te whiwhia
Ki roto te Kore te rawea;
Pupuru, mau ake ki te kanoi o te uha na.

Ko Kura-waka ano Kura-waka, ka tohia ki te one
Ko tohi-nuku ano ko Tohi-raangi ano,
Ka kukune, Hawai-iki, e.
O son searched for, O son sought for!

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36 In other words, the terms are more anthropocentric, and personalised to human familiarity, than they were traditionally.
We two were sought for in the intangible void,
And with the shapeless Void;
Once held fast, and suspended on a female strand.

The Crimson-bowl remained a Crimson-bowl, until soil sanctified,
As was the conception in Hawaiki. (pp. 137-138)

Nau mai, e tama, kia mihi atu au;
I haramai koe i te kunenga mai o te tangata
I roto i te ahuru mōwai, ka taka te pae o Huaki-pōuri;
Ko te whare hangahanga tēna a Tāne-nui-a-rangi
I te one i Kura-waka, i tātāia ai te Puhi-ariki
Te Hīringa matua, te Hīringa tipua, te Hīringa tawhitorangi….

Welcome, O son, let me greet you;
You indeed have come from the origin of mankind
From the cosy haven emerged, out from the barrier of Darkness ajar
Out of the abode fashioned by the renowned Tāne-of-the-heavens
On the sands the Crimson-bowl, wherein the Exhalted-one rejoiced
In the implanting of parenthood, sacred implanting, heavenly implanting in times remote… (pp. 137-138)

The translation of those chants given to us is certainly construable so that the self is seen as willing the human form onto the world. Yet the mention of te kore is not as easily dealt with. Indeed, te kore is one manifestation of Being, and stands behind the chant, with both the child and parent being found within Being (“I rapā tāua ki roto/Ki te Kore te whiwhia/ki roto te Kore te rawea”). Both the writer and the child are to be found within the Being that cannot be grasped or had (te whiwhia), and that cannot be felt (te rawea), thus identifying that the Being that is under discussion at the time of the poem is not determinable. Indeed the composer(s) of that chant are themselves moved by Being to give words to many facets of creation and movement.
Tau is correct, I believe, when he states that this does not amount to knowledge in the objectifiable sense; however, I argue that the intention of the chant does not lie in gleaning knowledge. Like many other chants of its kind, greater emphasis is on allowing a space for Being to reveal itself and then to conceal when appropriate. In these instances, there may be different feelings attached to the chant at each time even one reader approaches it. This, as Novalis would have it, is the activity of Being as it moves the utterer to convey feelings and words in various ways. The independent movement that heralds the Absolute, or Being, is found at the end of the chant in the use of the word/name “Hīringa”, which is given as “implanting”. Implanting partially conveys the intention of the word, which can also mean “pure energy” or “determination” (King, 2007, p. 273). Thus, the idea that implanting is an exercise that is really only to do with transmission is incomplete; the implanting is really only happening because of the presence of pure energy. But that entire process of implantation is also only capable because of the proximity of those names that are given in the chant – those names are not only conceptually but also affectively linked in the text. The relational nature of Tāne-nui-a-rangi, Kura-waka, Puhi-ariki, and the various Hīringa come to bear in ways that defy the strict text, revealing Being for both the reader and the utterer.

How may one know any of this for sure? The nature of Being as an independent force that surpasses human understanding in its totality, as noted by Novalis, ensures that its movement is not certain to humanity. In this reading of what is usually common sense, we can see that Māori traditionally – and to a lesser extent contemporarily – allowed a much more fluid, relational notion of the effects of words and the things that they referenced. Tau’s article on the other hand is underscored by the same sort of certainty that the translation in English provides us with, and thus supports his overall thesis that Māori did not possess knowledge in the objectifiable sense. This certainty manifests itself in a number of ways. Firstly, Tau states that there was a “projection of the self” (p. 136). In this way, the Māori self to begin with is certain; the outside world, after all, is grounded in the supreme Māori self. It is the absolute self that starts with the projection. The self has been decided on, at some point, as an autonomous entity. Even as an iwi, hapū or whānau, the self – as group – is itself first and foremost in the world. One could say that such a certain view of the self is as a result of the self’s awareness
of itself; the awareness is based on senses and perceptions of the outer world, and is aware because of a number of immediately present attributes that the self possesses.

Related to that point: According to Tau, because the self is first, then its certainty lies in its ability to regard the world. However, in that light, the world is not reciprocally coming to bear on the self, apart from maybe in ways that are directly perceivable. Thus the self is certain of its priority in the world because it possesses a number of attributes that allow it to perceive the world and affect it. The self is held out as being grounded in whakapapa and so on, as prior impacts, but this prior grounding is just genealogical – it is not currently and continuously grounding the self. Whakapapa is rendered certain, as a foregoing part of the self. The self, therefore, has full licence to label the world as he/she sees fit, simply because he/she is first in the world. He/she is not being guided or moved to do so by anything prior or transcendent to him/her.

3. Philosophical fragments that propose a notion of Being for Māori readers

Thus far I have employed Novalis’ method of reacting to text in order to start a process of philosophising about Being, the outcomes of which may be interesting to Māori readers. One could stop there and come to some conclusions about Being, without including any substantive input about Being from Novalis. Ignoring Novalis’ beliefs about Being that I cited earlier in this chapter, and just from my response to Tau’s prompts, I could already conclude the following in a tentative sense:

- Being flows between man-made delineations.
- Being operates in the background of our activities.
- Being comes forth at times in traditional text and insights.
- Being is not equivalent with ‘knowledge’.
Yet, as Pihama (2001) argues, one may refer to Western theory and at the same time ensure that “the foundation for analysis will be Māori” (p. 92). Indeed, as she notes, this can be useful. I argue that, having drawn on Novalis’ method of philosophising, I can also consider Novalis’ direct assertions about Being and incorporate them where appropriate in creating theories about Being for interested Māori and Western readers. For Novalis also actively adds to the above list by providing more detail to it. In particular, he emphasises the following crucial points (in italics) alongside the above list:

- Being flows between man-made delineations: *it does not stop at a point delineated by the self*.
- Being operates in the background of humanity’s activities: *this does not preclude its everyday activity*.
- Being comes forth at times in traditional text: *it also gives rise to current forms of expression*.
- Being is not equivalent with ‘knowledge’: *it may, however, give rise to tentative knowledge about things in the world at times*.

Novalis’ assertions about Being (and the relation of the self to Being), and my approach to Te Maire Tau’s text as one that provokes a response to a colonised notion of mystery (and is hence made self-conscious, mirroring Novalis’ gratitude to Fichte’s philosophies), merge to allow me to offer my own theories about Being, and its link with mystery. Together with Novalis’ descriptions about Being, Tau’s text provoked responses in me that are informed by my specific (Māori) philosophical thought, and intuitions; that is, they are not immediately based on the rational process of intellect, even though I structure my argument after I have identified parts of Tau’s text that jar against my own experiences and background. Combined with Novalis’ and Tau’s arguments and methods, we may get a glimpse of what Novalis desires when he states that:

> Der ächte gegenseitige Beobachter operirt, bemerckt, vergleicht in allen seinen Sinnen und Vermögen zugleich oder successive, zu *Einem Zweck*. (1960b, p. 379)
The true reciprocal observer simultaneously or successively operates, contemplates and compares using all of his senses and abilities toward a single goal. (Wood, 2007, p. 112)

In continuing with an outcome - some of my own assertions about Being and mystery – I should acknowledge some of my own subjective inclinations that inspired responses to Tau and which then ‘push’ me to construct a mystical notion of Being from a position of being Māori. A formative experience was the time spent with my aunt:

From the age of 15 until about the age of 18, after my grandfather had died, I spent just about every night until quite late with an aunty of mine. She had asked me to bring my grandfather’s whakapapa book, and from that time onwards we had many discussions about the names in the book.

When my grandfather was dying, he asked my aunt to ‘take care of the family’. My aunt apparently had no idea what he was talking about, but stayed around our immediate family. Not long after he had died I mentioned to her that my grandmother had given me this whakapapa book. It was at that point, she realised, that she saw what my grandfather had meant. She explained this to me in quite some detail and wanted me to understand that there are some things outside of our control – those things that are controlled by what she called ‘wairuas’.

There was very little that my aunt did not attribute to those outside forces which, as she described them, were quite beyond our knowledge. For her, the reason for her help became clear, even though the type of help she was to give was something she would never have thought of, by her own admission. For three years she encouraged me to think of every event in terms of what was before, or greater than, my own perspective. This was a form of critical thinking for her; it meant that I had to look underneath the surface of things in order to become familiar with the idea that those things were fundamentally beyond my complete knowledge.

One example was the whakapapa book itself. The book was precious because of the intention of my grandfather, it contained his focus. Thus it contained aspects of him that continued to come to the fore, according to my aunt, even though he had died. But also the names, their immediate combination with other names, and their link back to whenua/land, were phenomena that were beyond my complete knowledge. So when we would talk about whakapapa, the time would have to be right, certain people could not be present, the way in which those names were to be discussed would change (sometimes used along
with certain ‘qualifiers’ such as ‘wairua’, sometimes not used with them, sometimes used with ‘tipuna’/ancestors, and so on). But there was also a ‘silence’ in these discussions. Cherryl Smith (2007) has described how Māori often believed questions were interruptions; the silence, I theorise, was not just about having a breather from discussion but also a means of allowing other unspoken elements to come to the fore.

My aunt recoiled from any assertion that humanity has complete control over things and determinate knowledge about them. Yet she was an incredibly practical woman. She did not distinguish between the things before her and the unseen aspect of things in the world.

In a similar fashion to Novalis, I acknowledge the assistance that Tau’s article offers in bringing the issue of the Māori self to the fore in a postcolonial context. Tau emphasises the self; we can take from that the importance of systems of thinking that are based on reason, but within what Linda Smith (1999) notes is a “uniquely ‘Maori’ way of looking at the world and learning” (p. 174). Even though there is evident in Māori existence a colonised reality, the need to continue that Māori way of thinking but in a currently colonised situation is part of the emphasis that Tau brings to bear here. This means incorporating, or holding the presence of, Māori traditional discourses as they are uttered within these contexts. The process of philosophising, then, is one that Tau stresses as a means of getting Māori readers to think about the place of the self in the world. Ultimately for me, this has meant including my own experience recounted above – it took place in a colonised context, in the sense that it was relatively current – whilst responding to the meaning behind Tau’s philosophies. Novalis also helps here because he offered some very cogent ideas about Being and mystery. Together with other Māori writers, what follows are some theoretical expressions about Being, and resulting mystery, that have their genesis in the entire process that I have engaged in, outlined above; these expressions are aligned with “channelling collective creativity in order to produce solutions to indigenous problems” (Smith, 1999, p. 158) and are intended to be both contemporary and innovative. Being provides Geheimnis to things in the world for the Māori self in the following ways:
Named and unnamed Being: Its ongoing activity

Despite its unknowability, because of its overall activity Being is considered even in the most banal contexts. Here it becomes necessary to think of Being as an activity which impinges on both traditional and colonised settings, and the Māori self needs to think of Being as present in both when carrying out any task, even when it is not named.

That it is at times not named should not lead one to think it is not coming to bear on everything to do with the person. While some Māori writers may name Being explicitly, often it is left unmentioned. It is variously called ‘Te Ao Tua Atea’ (Raerino, 1999), or, in its potential, korekore (Marsden, 2003), but may be called nothing at all. Indeed, “to think that Being only exists when noted by name would itself raise problems” (Mika, 2011a, p. 3). At times it is useful to identify it specifically, but this act should not be confused with explicitly defining it. It may be glimpsed when either named or not referred to:

Although Being for Māori may be glimpsed through the use of the term, its real ongoing existence pulses within a holistic relationship with the world. This may or may not be expressly noted. We do obtain glimpses of its linguistic revelation, through such words as ‘whakapapa’, which can mean ‘to layer’ as much as ‘genealogy’. As a verb, it moves vibrantly and actively throughout history and the current era, as well as through humanity and nature (Mika, 2007; Royal, 2007; Pohatu & Pohatu, 2007). Indeed, utterances about its unknowability abound, with hints of its presence only being uttered to humanity now and then. The word ‘ako’, with its multi-layered definitions that can all act simultaneously (Thrupp & Mika, 2011), also provides a glimmer into a greater role of the natural world in humanity: a process which is also about learning and teaching, ‘ako’ serves as a holistic and occasional revelation of the natural world and its primordial atmosphere, and is, hence, evident even where a mention of the word Being is absent. (Mika, 2011a, p. 3)
I build on the words ‘whakapapa’ and ‘ako’ in this context in chapter seven. My point here is that giving a brief definition of a word provides a collective understanding of what it is referring to but does not do full justice to an insight of its relationship with Being. Being will also be present even when it is not explicitly stated: It moves throughout the words and expressions in Māori existence when it is not uppermost in the minds of writers. Indeed, this mode of operating within Being may be one that accords Being its unknowability – in contrast with ‘equating’ it with another thing – and allows it to be best revealed (Kollias, 2000).

Along with those writers cited, I assert that Being is by its nature inclined to movement. Whether or not this is a ‘hovering’, as we have seen Novalis posit, is uncertain. The ‘hovering’ of Being is important because it demonstrates that Being will neither land on the subject or the object (or the I/nature) because it underpins them both in an active sense. It does not, however, rest on one or the other specifically, because then it would be stationary. In his discussion about Being, Marsden (2003) states that Being takes on the characteristics of the positive while “not entirely emancipat[ing] itself from the negative” (p. 20). Raerino (1999) similarly notes that Māori believe that “everything has an oppositional counterpoint” (p. 32), evident in the concurrent nature of life and death, and darkness and light. These oppositions provide the extremes between which Being floats. This neither/nor working of Being is significant, identifying that the physical state of an object is not all there is to the object, as an animate thing might be physically dead, for instance, but hold life in an unseen sense (for example, a dead body still possessing some degree of mauri or, conversely, a living person labouring under a devitalised mauri). Māori consider themselves to be the embodiments of their ancestors, and this ensures that, as Raerino noted, that life and death are always present with each other. Underlying all phenomena and experiences, Being is such that those seemingly opposed elements are in fact a part of each other at all times.
In “Overcoming Being in favour of knowledge” I explored other writers’ accounts of Being’s movement as follows:

Marsden (2003) points to the paradox contained in the term ‘korekore’ as a doubling of the term ‘kore’. Kore means nothingness but in its doubling it ‘… assumes the characteristics of the positive’ (p. 20) due to its ‘… thorough-going negativity’ (ibid). It represents the ongoing manifestation of Being, and provides the living momentum for the universe and all things within it. In this activity it is complementary with mauri, or life force, which is needed to keep korekore ‘in being’. This uninterrupted flow between objects is echoed by Raerino (1999), who deliberately includes the human element when he observes that there is a sacredness to mātauranga that derived initially from ‘The energy flow … from the Atua to the Tangata’ (p. 5) ending eventually back with the Atua. He continues that with the concomitant entry of light to the world and the unfolding of human life, mātauranga Māori came into existence. A process of learning in its broadest sense could occur if there was an acknowledgement of the Being that underpins activities such as karakia and waiata.

Being is also related to movement in Pohatu’s (n. d.) description, written within the context of well-being. He notes the working together of whakapapa and movement; referring to the transition outwards of mauri, he states that whakapapa links can then ‘… ‘move out’ through the generations’ (p. 3), indicating that there is a whole set of influences beyond humanity’s control over ‘all worlds’. Royal (2009) explicitly points to a connection between movement and mātauranga, as mātauranga for him is also about ‘departure’ (p. 36), involving the human need to physically venture outwards. In this sense, there is very little room for belief in static phenomena; and objects and the knowledge to be gleaned from them must avoid the tendency toward this paralysis. The process of naming and identifying links - relating to the world as a whole – was an active, interdependent one. The tenor of Pohatu & Pohatu’s (2007) writings is that this
activity continues, whether one is cognisant of it or not: it enables Māori to ‘… imagine, feel and appreciate the soul, pulses, and rhythm of our worlds’ (p. 17). Learning is analogous with, and even dependent on, the flux of nature: for instance ‘… the flight of the sun across the sky’ which is ‘… symbolic of the life journey of the individual’ (Royal, 2007, p. 55). (Mika, 2011a, p. 3)

The activity of Being means that a thing in the world is always in a state of flux, even thought it appears to be constant. As both its backdrop and its essence are intimately connected, then both are always changing. Things in the world thus retain their Geheimnis because of that changing state that is provided by the Absolute.

**Being intuited in text and in silence**

Leading on from my first assertion about Being, I related the following:

As Pohatu (n. d.) notes, lessons exist about the uncertainty of Being for humanity; thus, where Being is not mentioned – not contained within one term – it may retain more of its mystery. In certain Māori verse, then, the given, static translation offered will need to be overcome in favour of the verse’s Being-oriented context (Aranga, Mika & Mlcek, 2008). In Hauroa’s *Lament for the Brave*, recorded by Ngata (1974, p. 227), the translation provided may give some assistance in a fleeting understanding of the verse’s more primordial depth, but should be avoided as a final depiction of the verse’s point:

Takoto rawa iho ki te po  
E huihui ana mai o tatou wairua  
Kia piri, kia tata mai ki taku taha.  
Matatu tonu ake, ka maranga kei runga  
Whitirere ki te ao, tirotiro kau au;
A, me he wairua atua te tarehutanga iho
E te manawa i raro kapakapa tu kei runga!

For this discussion the first two lines are particularly relevant. The given translation of the first line is ‘Composing myself for sleep in the night’. However, there is no subject in this sentence, suggesting that the ‘self’, while implicit, is subsumed in a greater activity. This more fundamental movement is a lying down, but is towards the night, or into the night, which implies that the indefinite self is engaged with travelling through a state of uncertain being – which is another meaning of ‘te po’, besides the commonly given ‘night’. The movement towards this unknowable state of being is never arrived at, suggesting that the state of being can also not be grasped by, or encountered through, cognition alone. Movement in the direction towards the mysterious would be a particularly suitable setting for the activity of the second line, the given translation of which is ‘Kindred spirits gathered all around’. The structure of this line, with the use of the particles E ... ana, suggests continuous change in all the past, present and future tenses, not merely in the past as the translation offers. Thus, Hauroa articulates a collapse of those parts of time, and implies that there is an ongoing, spiritual action set up even in the writing.

Such renditions of verse might be evidence of literary licence on the part of the interpreter, but are, I argue, necessary for the Māori reader to both challenge the conventions of linguistic certainty, and also to encourage a process of what Novalis (1960a) called ‘romanticising’ (p. 545) – the lifting of the banal to the creative, allowing, at times, the revelation of what he termed the Absolute, and what Heidegger noted as Being. These sorts of descriptions and interpretations are not just abstract ideas that allow us to staircase to discussing something rational; instead, they reveal aspects of Being to humanity. The Māori language, as a metaphorical means of communication, clears the way for Being to emerge in ways that respect its primordiality. Its
metaphorical nature allows for gaps in understanding so that Being can appear from time to time. Silence is therefore highly valued amongst Māori, allowing more to divulge itself than what was possible solely through utterance. Being itself is affected by the interrelationship between the self and the natural world, with the result that speaking, art, silence, and contemplation produced a conduit for Being to hold sway. Although it is often stated that karakia and so on were highly important here (Beattie, 1990; Best, 2005/1924; Mead, 2003; Moon, 2003; Robinson, 2005), I speculate that these were mechanisms merely for reminding humanity of the existence of Being: Being is beyond the control of humanity, and so may even emerge through an apparently ordinary thought or interaction. (Mika, 2011a, pp. 3-4)

Things in the world disclose elements of their mystery because Being can be alluded to (but not precisely represented) in various modes of expression. Engaging in those expressions, humanity is likewise geheimnisvoll because its members are acting, intuiting and reflecting within those mysterious things in the world.

**Being, present in both solitary and combined words.**

Being is therefore present when not perceived by the Māori self. Like Novalis, Being unifies everything for the Māori self: The omnipresent nature of Being is illustrated in the holistic nature of terms such as ‘mauri’, ‘wairua’, ‘mana’, ‘te reo’, ‘kaitiaki’ and so on that writers mention (Barlow, 1991; Browne, 2005; Durie, 2001; Pere, 1982, 1997; Pihama, 2001). Not only the phenomena behind these terms but the terms themselves reflect the activity of Being; thus Browne (2005) highlights the link of Māori words to spirituality and their ongoing relationship with each other, not just as letters forming eventual words but as links to both concrete and abstract things. Many Māori stress the constant interplay between humanity and Being in both traditional and postcolonial ways, and many writers declare outright the fact that humanity and nature are closely linked (Marsden,
2003; Pere, 1982; Rapatini & Bradley-Vine, 2005; Royal, 2009b); others (Smith, Whatahoro, Matorohanga, & Pohuhu, 1913; Tikao & Beattie, 2004) describe the interrelationship of Being and human without naming it explicitly. Recounting the process of creation, Robinson (2005) notes of the Pohutukawa that “it covered her [Papatuanuku’s] whole body…. All things can be traced back to this one garden, be they plants, reptiles or human” (p. 35). As he implies, that ‘one garden’, as primordial as it is, is itself the subject of a vast process of creation, indicating that the engagement of Being with humanity is continuous as well. The traditional voice embodied humanity within nature through what Krupa (1996) calls “metaphor”; he observes that “[a]bout half of all lexical metaphors in Māori take their vehicles from the realm of nature and [the] majority of them come from the domain of fauna, flora or animal and plant anatomy” (p. 21). He provides an extensive list of metaphors; given their vast array of them we can assume that Māori have not simply decided to adopt them as linguistic tools but that they actually arose from the natural world and their effect on humanity. In current times Māori may also refer to the intervention of Being with humanity in broader terms. Thus Russell (2005) asserts that “[i]n terms of whakapapa though, they [rural New Zealanders] are not ‘of’ it [land] in the literal and cosmological sense that we conceive of ourselves to be; that is, as actually being the landscape” (p. 154).

Despite the apparent precision of words, things in the world that they refer to contain their own autonomy. Given life by the Absolute, things in the world may be referred to by words but those words may not neatly prescribe them, as the utterer of those words, the nature of those words, and the things that they refer to are constantly geheimnisvoll through Being.

**Humanity as creative agency, within the domain of the Absolute**

We may think of Novalis’ term Romantisieren as describing a set of activities that transform the world in synchronicity with Being. At times this transformational process will involve contrasts - “Entw[eder] such ich nun die Unbekannten
Größen mit Functionen der Bekannten zu gleichen, oder umgekehrt – Zur letztern RechnungsArt gehört der Infinitesimalcalcül” (1960b, p. 261)/“I now either seek to equate the unknown quantities with functions of the known, or the inverse quantities – Infinitesimal calculus belongs to the latter type of calculation” (own emphasis) (Wood, 2007, p. 18) - showing that Being stands behind the rational measurement and transformation of the universe, involving both known and unknown. Calculus here involves not staying with one but moving between two extremes for a constantly changing outcome. Here we encounter the ability of humanity to interact with Being. Novalis’ encouragement that humanity should understand Being as a consistently prior but mysterious force, also lending mystery to objects in the world, suggests that even in common activities Being provides humanity’s encounter with objects and the world in general. Thus, although Fichte had proposed that one should have an idea of what nature looks like from the standpoint of the Ich, Being (and the objects in the world that it reveals) is uncontrollable. Humanity may not decide how Being best fits: The objects in the world that Novalis believes are the manifestations of Being are organised by Being, not by humanity.

Novalis discusses Being abstractly in his philosophical writings and in his poetry. When highlighting the mystical, dynamic role of the poet, he is careful to include the description of nature (which he sometimes uses interchangeably with Being or the Absolute) as containing a ruling “wildes, gewaltthätiges Leben” (Novalis, 1960o, p. 524)/[wild, violent life]. This sort of direct expression about Being is then reflected in his poetic verse. We see this unrestrained vitality recurring in his fragment “Die Natur”. His “Die Natur” intends to reveal man’s constant pursuit of enjoyment in nature, evident in Hyazinth’s easy communication with nature. An obvious message of the tale is the synthesis of man and nature. Hyazinth is constantly talking to animals, birds and other natural phenomena. Interestingly he is ridiculed for this practice by other humans, presumably because they have forgotten their own ability to communicate with nature. His later exasperation with the gossipy spirit of some beings in nature early into the fairy tale suggests that his relationship with nature does not rely on an enjoyment of it, although later in the fairy tale there are times when he revels in its existence.
For the Māori self, not seeking to know everything about a natural phenomenon was considered paramount: discussions about ancestors, for example, would take place at some times and not at others, showing a tentativeness towards how deed and person would be talked about (despite at times the deed and person being recounted in some detail). The uncertainty of the effect of such a discussion – its uncontrollability – is evident here. This somewhat undetermined notion of Being contrasts with knowable, clear positionings of nature, or, in line with Heidegger’s (1977) ideas about Gestell, with anticipated constraints that are placed on nature so that it conforms with humanity’s expectations.

It may be safely assumed that a drive to relate in a geheimnislose way with the world prefers knowledge to the existence of Being. In a discussion about memory, Royal (2005) alludes to both Being and knowledge, and argues that “knowledge is within the body” (p. 16). Memory relies on sensation which is oriented by the body rather than the simply cognitive knowing that is brought about by “images presented by text and screen” (p. 16). The bodily experience of Being is one that does not privilege the uptake of factual information but instead allows that the body may feel instances of awareness – which may indeed be brought on by facts, but may also be induced by quite unpredictable interactions with elements outside of the person. Being therefore organises the interplay of quite disparate elements so that they invoke responses in the human body. A greater emphasis is placed here on the mystery or uncertainty of elements outside of the control of humanity (even though humanity may respond to the arrangement of these elements in rational or emotional ways). According to Awatere (2008) it is whakapapa that provides that “interrelationship” (p. 5). He continues by exploring the converse situation, in which naturally interrelated aspects of the world are posited as being isolatable:

The ability of CV [contingent valuation] to package one aspect of the indigenous perspective and present it as representative of all things indigenous is both appealing and appalling. In effect it has decontextualised the indigenous perspective, rendering it malleable and conducive to the ‘mainstream’ agenda. CV can be seen as having
the power to condense Māori ontology to a single ‘magical’ number.
(p. 14)

Awatere is not just bringing to the indigenous reader’s attention the undesirability of capitalism in its broadest sense; he is more forcefully indicating that the prior act that allows a particular action to occur (in this case ‘CV’) is manifestly undesirable.

Humanity is constituted and moved by Being and other things in the world. Despite apparently being the sole driver of action in relation to things in the world, because humanity is impacted on by expressions of things in the world, things in the world in their ever-changing essence, and the backdrop to those things, the Ich is itself never certain. Humanity is hence geheimnisvoll because of the infinite combinations of all these aspects.

Language as a potential unifier of Being and beings

Importantly for my thesis, there is a link between language, Being and things in the world that suggests an ongoing relationship between all three. For instance, the word ‘tangata’ in Tau’s cited chant refers to the human person. This word intends to refer not just to the physical dimensions of the person, however, but also the spiritual and mental dimensions (Durie, 1994; Pere, 1997). ‘Tangata’ carries with it the history of everything that has occurred both to that person and to the people and other beings that precede and follow that ‘tangata’. ‘Tangata’ therefore reveals the natural world around the person as much as the notion of ‘person’. Alongside its disclosure of things in the world, it has the capacity of driving together all apparently disparate elements that the self is both aware and unaware of. The word acknowledges that holistic relationship of all things and is not just limited to the sound of the word and its immediate reference to the phenomenon thought of as a person. At all times the word calls forth the various aspects of the person’s character, related to that person’s relationship with everything. Hence the word may stay phonetically the same and is to that extent
reliable’, but it opens up onto a person or people that are continuously impacted on by history, other present things in the world, and events and things that are yet to occur.

The enduring, permanent nature of an object is only so because of humanity’s construction of it. If we take Novalis’ notion of Being, as developed above in a Māori context, to its fullest extent, in fact the thing is not permanent. The object may have been constructed as a discursive, understood one and may then appear static, but the unseen nature of Being means that anything could be happening with the object beyond our perception. Even words that signify things in the world would have to be considered infused with life, if we take those words of Marsden’s and Raerino’s seriously, because of their relationship with the thing that they signify, with the relationship of one word to another, and the relationship of the thing being signified by that word to all other things. This view of language eludes the idea that a word is just an envelope of denotative meaning. While Being does not force together an object and a word referring to it so that they are inseparably one, it definitely has the potential to strike an ontological relationship between the two that is of greater strength than Saussure would agree with. Ferdinand de Saussure was the main linguistic champion of structuralism. His work, titled Course in General Linguistics, would soon be heralded as a major revolution in linguistic theory, and is worthy of mention here. Briefly, Saussure’s language is concerned with the ways in which language functions at a precise moment by considering “how the elements fit together” (Johnston, 2006, p. 187). The relationship between a ‘sound-image’ (signifier), which is essentially psychological and not an audible sound, and the concept (signified), is arbitrary. Saussure’s theories on language neglect the deeper connections that Being can make through a word with the rest of the world apart from the thing being referred to.

Language that is cognisant of Being is everyday language as much as ceremonial language, because it connects so strongly with the material and metaphysical surroundings of the user. Being is nowadays viewed as a sacred event but its effects and activities have as much of an impact on everyday contexts as determinedly mystical ones. Even when using a language that is not one’s own,
Being still comes to play on the speaker. Language carries the often-imperceptible history and surroundings of the speaker and the listener. Because of this imperceptible quality to language, both the wielder of it, and language itself, are geheimnisvoll.

Summary

Novalis’ own beliefs about mystery through his deliberations about Being, alongside those of Tau, and of the express articulations of other Māori writers, were productive for my own assertions in respect of a Māori view of mystery through Being. My assertions come about through my awareness of a dialectical situation. In this dialectic I drew on a number of interacting elements. Firstly I discussed Novalis’ reaction to Fichte’s proposal that the self is the ground of all consciousness. Here Novalis was grateful to Fichte for both bringing into debate the issue of self-hood and for highlighting that the self’s experiences are important in philosophising. I then took Novalis’ own dialectic response – his assertions about Being – and Fichte’s endorsement of a self-conscious approach to explorations about mystery and the self, and applied them to my own cultural context. The productivity of drawing on Novalis’ ideas about mystery allowed me to posit my own considered theories about contextually positioned (that is, colonised and current) mystery. Invaluable here were Tau’s writings that I coupled with Novalis’ poetry, fragments and fairy tales, my own experiences, and Māori writings.

Having considered what both Geheimnis is, as an outcome of Being, I shall now turn to a discussion of the historical, political and social factors that have encouraged the Māori self to think of objects in the world as being free of Geheimnis. We shall see in this second part of my thesis that there were a number of mechanisms that oriented the focus of the self toward the direction of Geheimnislösigkeit.
Chapter Four: Poesy as Stoßsatz: “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren”. A critique of Geheimnislosigkeit

Thus far I have discussed Geheimnis and its origin from Being. I also hinted at a certain aspect of Geheimnislosigkeit, namely its Ich-focus. There are many forms of Geheimnislosigkeit, and the purpose of this chapter is to identify some of these, as Novalis recognises them, to bring my attention to philosophical Geheimnislosigkeit for the Māori self. This chapter provides the impetus for a discussion in the following two chapters, with those two chapters drawing on a Māori application of Novalis’ themes as Stoßsätze in his poem “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” (“Wenn nicht mehr”) from Heinrich von Ofterdingen. In the poem Novalis identifies that there are abstract, fundamental and philosophical manifestations to Geheimnislosigkeit as well as everyday ones. Here, also, I build on the former chapters by considering the self, at an everyday level, as a geheimnislose entity that then thinks of things in the world as similarly geheimnislos. In chapter three I argued that Māori traditionally experienced Being as prior to self and objects, and as organising the relationships between them, with the self’s perception occurring after that activity. Being for the Māori self was perhaps explainable in stages but this does not represent the true process of Being: Being is instead felt and thought of as overflowing, non-schematic and even non-sequential. Novalis assisted in my approach to that theme by alerting me to the fact that we may talk about Being but that, at the moment we try to confine it, it will evade us. We may say that Being is this or that, and this may help our representation of it, but to think that such an assertion neatly defines Being is a flawed exercise.

Resistance to, or unawareness of, Being in everyday human activities is therefore the focus of this chapter. I argued in the preceding chapter that establishing the conscious self as ground for all philosophical perception of the world leads to Geheimnislosigkeit. One consequence of this is the wrongful belief that Being does not impinge on the activities of humanity – namely, that humanity is entirely
autonomous – but that instead, if it is to be discussed it all, then it should be kept as a rarefied, abstract concept. I argued in the previous chapter that Being does not just stop at a particular point of creation: It spills forth into everyday terms and activities. Geheimnis, an outcome of that encroachment, should be similarly viewed as continuously present in things in the world.

Through Novalis’ poem “Wenn nicht mehr”, the current provides specific Stoßsätze as well as one meta-push to discuss colonisation for Māori. This response of mine to those Stoßsätze occurs in chapters five and six. Thus in a general sense “Wenn nicht mehr” brings to our attention that a change in worldview is likely to occur through the import of other notions of philosophy. In this chapter, the message of this overarching Stoßsatz is that very problem, and we could decide to solely devote ourselves to the philosophical colonisation of a Geheimnis-oriented view of the world just on that grand point. However, there are many subtler, but equally as important, manifestations of this imposing meta-colonisation that “Wenn nicht mehr” identifies and which illuminate aspects of philosophical colonisation. These specific Stoßsätze really describe both the detailed ways in which Geheimnislosigkeit emerges, and the ways of Geheimnislosigkeit that the self as grounding principle allows. This chapter therefore continues Novalis’ project of critique.

The substantive importance of “Wenn nicht mehr”

There are numerous works in which Novalis explains his resistance to Geheimnislosigkeit: however, “Wenn nicht mehr” articulates and structures his concerns most concisely. His concerns in “Wenn nicht mehr” are many. They cover capitalist human behaviour; the scientific representation of knowledge production which excludes the mysterious; problems associated with thinking about Geheimnis and its creator, Being, in merely cognitive ways; and the nice, neat conceptions of things in the world that actually constrain its mystery. One may broadly state, as Walker (1993) does, that Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” “begins with rejection of unitary and reductionist vision” (p. 45), and I argue that
the vision is directed to a very general spectrum of things in the world, including those I have just listed. “Wenn nicht mehr” is an appropriate text of Novalis’ to refer to because it achieves two outcomes: It castigates the rationalist excesses of the Enlightenment but at exactly the same time it highlights Novalis’s preference for creative “chaos inherent in natural systems” (Walker, 1993, p. 47). Kellner (1977) also points to the overall lament of the poem, in which “quantitative knowledge was rejected, the reduction of the world to matter in motion deplored, the notion that the world can be plotted onto a table of laws discredited” (p. 218). For Kellner, the poem describes a widespread phenomenon of Geheimnislosigkeit that then manifests at the most basic level of human activity.

Constituting a group subjected to the influence of Western philosophy through European colonisation (with greater influence coming from British quarters), Māori might also be interested in the influential figures of Descartes (whom I mentioned in chapter three), Locke, Hume and Bacon, with “Wenn nicht mehr” as a backdrop. Descartes is charged with being the father of modern philosophy (Johnston, 2006) and lived at the onset of the Scientific Revolution. The Scientific Revolution would act to repudiate the notion that materiality was possessed of a spiritual force (Pepper, 1984) and Descartes’ famous ‘cogito, ergo sum’ maxim would accordingly reify the pure thinking human and would allow the affirmation of God’s existence through reason (Tarnas, 1991). Bacon, his British contemporary, devised experiments and drew conclusions from them so that one could reason inductively. Locke would agree with Descartes that God’s existence was provable but now through “concrete experience” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 309), and Hume would bring “[s]ensory experience, not ideal apprehension, [to the] standard of truth” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 340) in a more extreme way than Locke. In the case of the rationalist Descartes, the self was certain, and for the empiricists Locke and Hume helped make what one perceives of total significance (Johnston, 2006).

I argued in chapter three that Fichte was Novalis’ main cause of consternation – Fichte “was, in his own way, an eighteenth-century rationalist” (La Vopa, 2001, p. 61) – but ideologically Novalis’ concern with Fichte is equally translatable to Descartes, Locke and Hume. Novalis’ resistance to the centrally focused entity of the self might conjoin with his reply to empiricism, although such a response may
be more moderate: After all, he did insist in his “Teplitzer Fragmente”, which form part of the Vorarbeiten zu verschiedenen Fragmentsammlungen, that forms of empiricism could eventually lead to Magical Idealism through a creative combination of disciplines. Beiser (2002) argues that Novalis advocates placing aesthetic emphasis on Fichte’s and Kant’s systematic philosophies; thus, the labels of rationalism, empiricism and idealism are not so inimical to Novalis if they are used actively against each other. Yet it must be remembered that Novalis’ own mystical leanings preclude a pure solipsist approach to things in the world, as he had huge respect for the impact of things in the world on the self even when those things were not perceptible.

Novalis may be said to share commonalities with William Blake. Blake’s diverse messages are contained in the labels assigned to him, with even his very identity forming the beginning of Nathan’s (1975) introduction:

What is Blake? As a lyric poet he is concerned with philosophy; as a philosopher he is concerned with the problems of daily living; as a realist who lives in the present, he is concerned with eternity. As an extreme radical, he is against the use of force. (p. 11)

Novalis can be described as equally multi-faceted, and his “Wenn nicht mehr” addresses in quite some depth the sheer latitude of the content he wished to critique and cover. Novalis’ own identity matches that of Blake’s in extensiveness, and its breadth coincides within the verses of “Wenn nicht mehr”: He is cautiously anti-Enlightenment, but more precisely anti-reductionist; he is critical of the uptake of colonised behaviour and is hence a radical himself; he is concerned with acknowledging Being in the present, even though he, too, is “concerned with eternity”. “Wenn nicht mehr” exhorts the reader to see radicalism, identity, Being and present-day living as intimately connected, and to resist the compartmentalisation, and perhaps eventual dismissal, of each of these individual, important elements. Novalis’ staunchness in this regard refers to both the identity of the person and to things in the world, reflecting Schleiermacher’s (1969) similar wish that all things in the world be viewed as connected, with the centrality of the things’ integrity as all-important:
[I]m Universum kann [das Ding] nur etwas sein durch die Totalität seiner Wirkungen und Verbindungen; auf diese kommt alles an, und um ihrer innezuwerden, muß man eine Sache nicht von einem Punkt außer ihr, sondern von ihrem eigenen Mittelpunkt aus ... betrachtet haben, das heißt ... in ihrem eigenen Wesen. (p. 102)

[I]n the universe [the thing] can only be something through the totality of its activities and connections; everything depends on this, and in order to be conscious of it, one must not regard it from a point outside of itself, but instead from its own middle point ... this means, then, in its own essence."

“Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” – manifestations of Geheimnislosigkeit

The melded character of humanity and Being is evident in the way nature, the signs of the Absolute (Stone, 2008), helps and hinders humanity. This holistic involvement is noted by Novalis (1960l) in the following way: “Ich weis nicht warum man immer von einer abgesonderten Menschheit spricht. Gehören Thiere, Pflanzen und Steine, Gestirne und Lüfte nicht auch zur Menschheit” (p. 490)/[I do not know why humanity is always spoken of as something apart. Is it not true that animals, plants, stones, stars and winds also constitute humanity?] In his “Wenn nicht mehr” humanity may only escape its current modernist state when the elements of the Absolute – he cites ‘light and shade’ – are both allowed to come forth. The initial malaise which he sees restricting man is never fully dispensed with: In his poem “Es färzte sich die Wiese grün” he charges that the process of movement towards a god-like state for man is marked by stages which remain within his or her spirit (Schrock, 2006). Thus mankind’s apparent progress is at all times informed by nature; indeed, mankind is nature, is immersed within and part of nature, but may only rationalise precisely because of the fact that Being organises its manifestations, the movement of which results in perception.
Novalis’ (1960h) “Wenn nicht mehr”, from the posthumously published notes for the second part of his novel, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, can be read as a warning against Geheimnislosigkeit, with the retention of some human agency allowed as well. It reads as follows:

Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren  
Sind Schlüssel aller Kreaturen,  
Wenn die, so singen, oder küssen  
Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen  
Wenn sich die Welt in’s freie Leben,  
Und in die Welt wird zurück begeben,  
Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten  
Zu echter Klarheit werden gatten,  
Und man in Märchen und Gedichten  
Erkennt die ewgen Weltgeschichten,  
Dann fliegt vor Einem geheimen Wort  
Das ganze verkehrte Wesen sofort. (p. 360)

When numbered technicality  
has ceased to be the single key  
to every life’s identity  
and those who kiss or dance or sing  
their deeper truer knowledge bring,  
restoring this world’s liberty,  
setting all living beings free  
in all their primal clarity,  
the real world in which we live  
poets and story tellers give,  
where one potent single word  
scatters all nonsense we have heard. (Dane, 2011 n. p.)

Wordsworth (2007) wrote in a similar fashion, at times introducing the dehumanising effects of a mechanistic philosophy, in which he also laments the self-assuredness of science. In this he is typical of the English Romantic movement generally:

When, hereto, I placed before your sight
Let us now turn to an analysis of the separate couplets of his poem.

**Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren/Sind Schlüssel aller Katuren**

The first couplet, “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren/Sind Schlüssel aller Katuren”, encapsulates Novalis’ resistance to the common belief that one can have immediate access to Being and its manifestations, such as nature, at will. Zahlen and Figuren for Novalis are a means of interpreting the world but are not to be used in wrongful assumption and practice that nature is separate from humanity. Novalis iterates Being’s inherent intervention in all human affairs when he notes of humanity’s relationship with truth that “[m]an muß ... überall repraesentiren (im thätigen, producirenden Sinn) können” (1960b, p. 445)/“[w]e must everywhere … be capable of representing (in the active, productive sense)” (Wood, 2007, p. 164). Humanity is indeed capable of utilising Zahlen and Figuren but not in a way that demonstrates a static, repetitive view of things, or in a way that operates against the manifestations of Being.

In an additional fragment quite near to the aforementioned one, Novalis laments that humanity has tended to prefer “[e]ine Idee” (1960b, p. 446)/[o]ne idea over another, which has “die andern erstickt”/[stifled the others]. He promotes collecting those ideas together “[i]m gei[stigen Nat[ur] System” (1960b, p. 446)/“in the system of spiritual Nature” (Wood, 2007, p. 165) instead of using them to isolate and prefer certain ones. This is not to suggest that humanity should lack

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*a*[a most familiar object of our days,  
A Little-one, subjected to the Arts  
Of modern ingenuity, and made  
The senseless member of a vast machine,  
Serving as doth a spindle or a wheel. (p. 279)*

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He remarked on the tendency of science to destroy life through its method, and his words reflect those of Novalis. Under science, according to Novalis, “starb die freundliche Natur, und ließ nur tote, zuckende Reste zurück” (1960e, p. 84)/“friendly nature died, leaving only dead, quivering remnants” (2005, p. 27). Novalis was not precisely averse to science but to science as a total explanation of things in the world so that the world is rendered static.
discernment but, as he continues in that same fragment, that those preferred ideas should be set down in their “eigenthümliche Nachbarschaft” so that they continue to grow in community with their surroundings. Of course here the interplay between a preferred idea and its neighbourhood(s) leaves us with no certain outcome because any outcome is potentially at the whim of the relationship between them all. Methods that are thought of as belonging to one group instead belong to “[d]as Confusionssystem”; one’s Zahlen or Figuren appear to provide assurance but instead fall into a system that mimics the unknowability of Being.

In his translation of the poem, Peter Dane equates ‘creatures’ with ‘life’s identity’. One’s identity, then, should thrive in its own right. More personal than ‘creatures’, one must be on guard against the seduction of numbered technicality. Here we start to get a glimpse of Novalis’ veiled reference to the problem of hegemony, evident in the use of the double genitive in the phrase Schlüssel aller Kreaturen. This usage suggests that the key is to all creatures but it also implies that the key is of all creatures, in the sense of belonging to them. Is Novalis here hinting that through the colonisation of numbers and figures, through its hegemonic play, the key he refers to is gradually endorsed by that which originates from the creator of that key? If so, then the condition that Freire (1970) refers to, the adoption of tools of colonisation by the colonised, becomes pertinent:

Submerged in reality, the oppressed cannot perceive clearly the ‘order’ which serves the interests of the oppressors whose image they have internalised. Chafing under the restrictions of this order, they often manifest a type of horizontal violence, striking out at their comrades for the pettiest reasons ... the oppressed feel an irresistible attraction toward the oppressors and their way of life. Sharing this way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration. In their alienation, the oppressed want at any cost to resemble the oppressors, to imitate them, to follow them. (p. 44)
Freire’s warning against the uptake of colonised behaviours is hence a poetic device of Novalis’, yet it is more than just a stylistic intervention. Figures and keys to and of all creatures means a general caution to those impacted on by the excesses of the Enlightenment. But we should not forget that Novalis was himself a mathematician. As Fritz (2009) indicates in relation to this, Novalis actually cherishes mathematics - more than his Enlightenment contemporaries, in fact - but nevertheless wishes that both mathematics, and a mathematical representation of things in the world, were not used for mastery in the way they are. His hidden text in these verses implies that it is when the uptake of this mastery tool is complete (or perhaps even just a threat) that the colonised is endangered.

Novalis suggests that the purity of creation itself is overtaken by the grand truth of science and enters into a co-creation of numbers and figures. The preference for this view of nature comes forth in the idea that one may communicate a sense of logical equivalence. More intriguing in this specific context is:

[T]he etymological relationship between the noun Zahlen (numbers) and the verb erzählen (to tell a highly concentrated story), suggesting that the process of telling such a story is imbued with numbers by its very nature. This form of ‘erzählen’ embodies Novalis’ unease with the almost contractual nature of telling a linear story – that ‘this’ is built logically on ‘that’ – resulting in a tightly controlled version of language. With such a version of language, the story itself is constrained so that it lacks spontaneity. In short, although a highly valuable tool for modern man, quantifying language is not poetic. (Mika, 2011b, p. 93)

This becomes problematic for Novalis when a value of either ‘worthy’ or ‘unworthy’ is assigned to speech as a final measure. Again, we see a mathematical preference for this method, in which conversation is valued solely according to whether there are logical responses between the talkers. Knowing Novalis’ simultaneous love and wariness of numbers, we can glimpse a tolerance towards this attitude, as long as it does not do away with other, less rational and abstract conversation. The quantification of the ‘good’ of a story, especially on its rational
merits, is almost a financial exercise, and if we allow this etymological
interpretation of Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” then a loss of mystery becomes
evident to the life of a story in favour of an accounted-for balance. This almost
contractual notion of speech – this built directly and linearly on that – predicates a
belief in the control of language so that its adherence to the rules of rational
speech is its paramount role.

In *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, Novalis avows that spontaneous speech as well
as sounds of the universe have been restricted by the “modernen Denkungsart”
(Novalis, 1960d, p. 515)/[modern way of thinking]: “der Religions-Häß ... machte
die unendliche schöpferische Musik des Weltalls zum einförmigen Klappern einer
ungeheuren Mühle, die vom Strom des Zufalls getrieben ... sey”/[the hatred of
religion ... has turned the unending, creative music of the cosmos into the
standardised clatter of a monstrous mill, driven by the stream of coincidence].
Sound typified by communication that is founded on cognition, the solipsism of
the self, and the over-critiquing of the mysterious, all figure here as part of
Novalis’ critique. Again characteristic of the early industrial form of the
Enlightenment, particularly La Mettrie’s philosophical materialism, which
dominaates not only the everyday way of thinking but also the ways in which
things in the world are organised, Novalis’ *Die Christenheit oder Europa* in
particular considers the historical and social consequences of thinking things in
the world lack mystery and their own spontaneous sound and mode of
communication.

Kreaturen include manifestations of nature, and Zahlen and Figuren may hence
provide access to things in nature as well as nature as a whole. Nature may
become banalised through concise descriptions of it: Nature in this sense is neatly
packaged and ready to be objectified. Talking about nature as a ‘thing’, rather
than an autonomously but connected activity and entity, is one way in which this
occurs. *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* shows in poetic form the uncertainty of the three
Lehrlinge in respect of the place of man in nature, and thus reflects the
ambivalence with which one even should discuss nature, leading Novalis (1960e)
to state that:

[One may not say that there is a nature without being gushy, and all pursuits of truth in talk and discourse about nature increasingly distance one from the natural.]

More forgiving than Novalis, Schiller noted that the poet had begun to speak of nature since the time of the ancients had passed. Where the ancients “empfanden natürlich” (1840b, p. 1195) [felt things naturally], members of humanity since those times instead “empfinden das Natürliche” (p. 1195) [feel the natural], with nature appearing as a discussed phenomenon. Yet despite this lenient attitude, Schiller rejected absolute depictions of nature as much as Novalis did. The domain of reflecting on nature in determinate ways is that of the Enlightenment philosophers, who have “schließen und folgern gelernt, wie ein Schuster das Schuhmachen” (Novalis, 1960m, p. 431) [learned to infer and bring to logical conclusion like a shoemaker has learned to make shoes].

Marsden (2003) supports Novalis’ thesis that this tendency to discuss nature predominantly as a tangible event has meant that “[m]odern western man has fallen into the trap of regarding values as tangible goods” (p. 118). Speaking of the way in which Māori view nature, Raerino (1999) offers that Māori did not talk of ‘nature’ on the basis that it was not separate, and that this led “a great chief [to] speak of himself as the mountain or the river; these cannot be objectified or externalised. They are not ‘out there’; but ‘in here’” (p. 73). The dialogue that is occurring here between Novalis and some Māori commentators takes on deeper significance when, as the Lehrling identifies, the idea that ‘nature’ is a static concept is antithetic to the:

Mannigfache[n] Wege[n] [der Menschen]. Wer sie verfolgt und vergleicht, wird wunderliche Figuren entstehen sehn; Figuren, die zu jener großen Chiffernschrift zu gehören scheinen, die man überall, auf

Various … roads of man. He who follows and compares them will see strange figures emerge, figures which seem to belong to that great cipher which we discern written everywhere, in wings, eggshells, clouds and snow, in crystals and in stone formations, on ice-covered waters, on the inside and outside of mountains, of plants, beasts and men, in the lights of heaven, on scored disks of pitch or glass or in iron filings round a magnet, and in strange conjunctures of chance. (Novalis, 2005, p. 3)

That ‘nature’ becomes fixed by a static description of it is something that Novalis resists. A number of senses are brought to bear in knowing, where one “ahndet … den Schlüssel dieser Wunderschrift, die Sprachlehre derselben; allein die Ahndung will sich selbst in keine feste Formen fügen, und scheint kein höherer Schlüssel werden zu wollen” (1960e, p. 79)/“suspect[s] [in the various roads of man] a key to the magic writing, even a grammar, but our surmise takes on no definite forms and seems unwilling to become a higher key” (2005, p. 3). The Sprachlehre that Novalis refers to is a grammar but not the academic, linguistic sort that is commonly conceived of. Instead it belongs to the great “Chiffernschrift”/[cipher script] which is nature as language. The Sprachlehre is the formation of nature into a structure (O’Brien, 1995) that may not be understood determinately. Novalis suggests that we struggle instinctively to form a definitive concept of this grammar but our efforts often end in disappointment, which is a form of homesickness that philosophy poses as one of the greatest challenges to modern thought. Further, O’Brien notes that “[t]he language of nature resists comprehension because all approaches to it are already mediated by language” (p. 199). The double property of language – as discusser of nature and as nature itself – means that in talking about nature we are never able to grasp its
full grammar. As an outcome of “[e]in[em] Alkahest[, das] scheint[,] über die Sinne der Menschen ausgegossen zu sein” (Novalis, 1960e, p. 79) “[a]n alkahest … hav[ing] been poured over the senses of men” (Novalis, 2005, p. 3) all talk is about nature in one form or other. Our senses are constantly deceived by the language of nature as nature, with the ‘Formen’ constantly playing and changing before our senses. Language is never just about language as a distinct, rarefied phenomenon – it is also nature.

One may see a circuitous reasoning here that is also reflected in the journey of Hyazinth, the protagonist of the tale of Hyazinth and Rosenblüte, as he seeks Saiš but finds her instead where he began: in Rosenblüte. This realisation requires moving through nature as a talking, sentient phenomenon, in which Novalis talks about nature as if nature were talking itself. Nature has to have its say before self-realisation occurs. Language as a tool which is directed towards a thing is therefore not a genuine medium through which one may either talk about nature or allow nature to talk: Indeed it will ‘fix’ nature (or allow humanity to proceed as if they had fixed nature). Nature in this latter view is left discovered and reified, as if it will express itself in a predictable manner. However, nature for Novalis is partly unpredictable, just as its language is; in synch with nature’s volatility, Novalis attributes wildness to it, such that it is completely indomitable and remains “sheer otherness” (Kuzniar, 2003, p. 435). “Die Natur” in particular expresses the capriciousness of nature, with its friendliness on the one hand but hostile character on the other. Its inhabitants are amiable but are also capable of mocking.

Nature’s relationality with humanity, the interdependence of things in the world, and the need for proper ways to describe these connections, all come forward in Die Lehrlinge zu Saiš in which Novalis asks a series of questions about the inseparability of humanity and manifestations of nature:

Drückt nicht die ganze Natur so gut, wie das Gesicht, und die Gebärden, der Puls und die Farben, den Zustand eines jeden der höheren, wunderbaren Wesen aus, die wir Menschen nennen? Wird nicht der Fels ein eigentümliches Du, eben wenn ich ihn anrede? Und
was bin ich anders als der Strom, wenn ich wehmütig in seine Wellen
hinabschaue, und die Gedanken in seinem Gleiten verliere? (1960e, p.
100)

Is it not true that all nature, as well as face and gesture, colour and
pulse, expresses the emotion of each one of the wonderful higher
beings we call men? Does the cliff not become a unique Thou,
whenever I speak to it? And what am I but the stream, when I look
89)

Here Novalis is avoiding the typical ‘othering’ of nature that can occur through
scientific discourse, and even uses language that refers to things in the world as if
they are related. This venture into the use of poetic language alone signals that
there is a different relationship between language and object than is assumed by
Zahlen and Figuren.

Wenn die, so singen oder küsse/Mehr als die
tiefgelehrten wissen

The second couplet, “Wenn die, so singen oder küsse/Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten
wissen”, refers to the Romantics’ belief in love as the creative principle and to the
need for poetry to bring this fundamental principle into being and to the awareness
of the audience. Those who love, those who sing, are able to know more than the
deeply learned. Interestingly, as a poet Novalis does not call them ‘singers’ or
‘lovers’, resisting assigning a label to them and instead stressing the process of
song and love by using a verb (and preserving for them some sort of agency). In
this focus he challenges the view that ‘singing’ and ‘loving’ belong to a select
group of people and instead makes it universal and accessible for all.
‘Tiefgelehrten’ is used in an ironical way, depicting those who have valued
rationalism and empiricism over other relationships with the world and resonating
paradoxically throughout Novalis’ works. It can be said to stand in for the
phenomenon of the Cartesian ‘living, moving brain’ and the denial of sensations which might “misunderstand and misconstrue the order of nature” (Descartes, 1964, p. 137).

The “mind-world correspondence” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 342) that Descartes advocated indeed stands in direct contrast to Novalis’ idea of love that Novalis wishes to highlight in these verses. Although the love that Novalis speaks of in others of his works – such as Hymnen an die Nacht – does contain aspects of sentimentality, instead it is much bigger, encompassing also how one connects with others, with things in the world, and with the issue of whether one is cognisant of Being in this regard. In Die Lehrlinge zu Sais the master demonstrates love for both things in the world and for the students by encouraging the students to see the relationship between those things as well as treating the students with sincerity. The students’ progress from a scientific view to a holistic one matches Novalis’ own experience, which characterises scientific training at a higher, more poetic level, and although the students’ specific experiences with the stones as separate entities are not invalid, it is in the stones’ relationships with each other whilst retaining some individual character that love as a philosophical attitude is nurtured.

Novalis’ singen und küszen transcends the intellectual workings of the Tiefgelehrtten and may be brought into dialogue with the Māori term ‘aroha’/love. Singen und küszen signify “a spiritual aspect of one’s life that was at the base of one’s whole reason for being, where one acknowledges the presence (aro) of the breath of life within others (haa) and nurtures and cares for them, both individually and as a group” (Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector, 2007, p. 22). Moreover, the ‘ha’ (or ‘haa, as it is expressed in that quote), is involved as a regard for the emotions of the other; hence, one “looks or ‘breathes’ into another” (White & Mika, forthcoming, n.p.). ‘Ha’ in this regard is similar to the idea of love that the Romantics propose is born of Being and that characterises a sensual relationship with the world such that Being is the underlying force. Empathy with the world as a whole is not calculated in advance but is spontaneous and, to a large extent, unpredictable. The ‘deeply learned’, on the other hand, explain things in the world in their quantitative terms – what
Heidegger (2003) termed the “Dingheit des Dinges” (p. 57)/[thingness of things] – and are the products and exponents of “der Bereinzelung und getrennten Wirksamkeit unserer Geisteskräfte, die der erweiterte Kreis des Wissens und die Absonderung der Berufsgeschäfte nothwendig macht” (Schiller, 1840b, p. 1231)/[the segregation and disunified activity of our mental powers, which the increased extent of knowledge and the specialisation of the professions make necessary]. For Novalis, however, their primary concern should be the “[i]nnigste Gemeinschaft aller Kenntnisse” (Novalis, 1960m, p. 451) /[the most intimate community of all forms of knowledge]. The ‘deeply learned’ are intent on pursuing knowledge in its rarefied and confined sense (even though relevant knowledges may be allowed to sit next to each other, for instance in the Academy). They are concerned with abstract principles and are “d[ie] traditionellen Vertretern akademischen Wissens” (Fritz, 2009, p. 3)/[the traditional agents of academic knowledge]. According to Rousseau (1992) the rationalism that resounds with these thinkers is to be viewed with some scepticism due to the basic incapacity of humanity to know with absolute certainty. These exponents follow established methods that produce knowledge but do not allow for what Beiser (2003) describes as a need for more “discursive language” (p. 14). Novalis sees poesy as a healing power when the dichotomy of subject and object – the method of the Tiefgelehrten - becomes overwhelming: Suspension of the “logical faculty” (Fife, 1911, p. 19) is not enough to completely displace the negative or ambitious effects of intellect, which can only ameliorate its consequences (Stockinger, 2004). Humanity as the subject of logic is split off from its surroundings so that the surroundings are actually viewed as being intrinsically separate, not merely separate by humanity’s construction. The problem that Novalis envisages here is that the actual workings of Being are ignored in favour of a position that favours a logical perspective. The full extent of Being – its mystery, creative contingency – is neglected. Instead of seeking the “Überirdische” (Kaiser, 1988, p. 125)/[celestial] through a sacred experience of the earthly, one is limited by “Abstraktheit” (Kaiser, 1988, p. 124)/abstraction.

A tome of Novalis’ that strongly questions both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution is his Die Christenheit oder Europa. If Novalis’ Fichte-Studien was feted as a contribution to Romanticism of magnum opus proportions, it would be
his treatise *Die Christenheit oder Europa* that perhaps fomented the greatest reaction from some of his peers, even though – or perhaps because - it was marked out as a grand failure (O’Brien, 1995). Written in 1799, it would not be until 1826 – well after Novalis’ death - that it would be published. It attracted controversy from its inception, including parody from Schelling, suspicion from Schleiermacher (who saw ‘Papacy’ in it), and strident opposition from Schlegel’s wife, Dorothea (O’Brien, 1995). These detractions in total led to *Die Christenheit oder Europa* being put to the side. After being dispatched it would be referred to as a reactionary tome, one that looked with nostalgia to the past but did little to achieve much else. Such an overly simplistic interpretation of *Die Christenheit oder Europa* would become outmoded, but that reception would remain typical until the 1960s (O’Brien, 1995), when the essay would be regarded anew as a somewhat more sophisticated piece of work than widely assumed. The reason for its relative failure, however, lies not in its substance but in its wrongful reception. Like others of Novalis’ works, it is multi-layered and intends to address Novalis’ uncertainty about the French Revolution and the Enlightenment in an ironic way. *Die Christenheit oder Europa* asserts that there are consequences for a loss of spirituality and religion in Europe, and that these make themselves known at a social and political level. Taking aim at the sudden ubiquity of a philological and linguistic understanding of language, particularly religious language, Novalis (1960d) states in *Die Christenheit oder Europa* that:

Indeß liegt dem Protestantismus bei weitem nicht bloß jener reine Begriff [der Revolutions-Regierung] zum Grunde, sondern Luther behandelte das Christenthum überhaupt willkürlich, verkannte seinen Geist, und führte einen andern Buchstaben und eine andere Religion ein, nemlich die heilige Allgemeingültigkeit der Bibel, und damit wurde leider eine andere höchst fremde irdische Wissenschaft in die Religionsangelegenheit gemischt – die Philologie – deren auszehrender Einfluß von da an unverkennbar wird. (p. 512)

[Far from that pure concept [ruling by revolution] being all that there is to the foundation of Protestantism, Luther also treated Christianity in a completely haphazard manner, misjudged its spirit, and

159
introduced another Letter and religion, namely the holy, universally valid Bible. With that, unfortunately, another highly foreign and worldly science was mixed into religious matters – philology – whose emaciating influence from that point on becomes unmistakable.]

Novalis intends on pointing out to the reader that the linguistic and scientific revolution is just one outcome here. It is the philosophical effect of the introduction of another response to things in the world that he is especially interested in:

Dem religiösen Sinn war diese Wahl höchst verderblich, da nichts seine Irritabilität so vernichtet, wie der Buchstabe. Im ehemaligen Zustande hatte dieser bei dem großen Umfange der Geschmeidigkeit und dem reichhaltigen Stoff des katholischen Glaubens, so wie der Esoterisirung der Bibel und der heiligen Gewalt der Concilien und des geistlichen Oberhaupts, nie so schädlich werden können; jetzt aber wurden diese Gegenmittel vernichtet, die absolute Popularität der Bibel behauptet, und nun drückte der dürftige Inhalt, der rohe abstracte Entwurf der Religion in diesen Büchern desto merklicher, und erschwerte dem heiligen Geiste die freie Belebung, Eindringung und Offenbarung unendlich. (1960d, p. 512)

[This choice was most destructive to the sense of religion; nothing destroys its sensitivity to such an extent as the letter does. In the previous state of affairs it could never have become so harmful, given the great extent of flexibility and the substantiality of the Catholic faith, as well as the esotericising of the Bible and of the holy power of the councils and of the spiritual head. But now these counteragents were quashed and the overwhelming popularity of the Bible maintained; and now the sketchy contents and the raw, abstract sketch within these books struck more manifestly and weighed down the sacred spirit of unconstrained vitalisation, permeation and revelation.]

It is the ‘Letter’ that encourages people to focus on the visible, with the result that
they have no longer any respect for Being. The Bible, reducing religion to the knowable through the Letter, is avidly taken up by the ‘erudite’, and knowledge is placed into opposition with faith and art. Faith assumes a mere supporting role, an auxiliary towards knowledge. By focusing on the Letter, a complete system of knowledge flourished that had nothing to do with “[dem] Sinn der Welt” (1960o, p. 594)/[the meaning of the world]; it is the ‘Buchstabe’/letter that has rendered humanity static. This static position is opposed to Novalis’ own; his love of contextual relationships means that environment, history, earth, and the nature of things must be allowed to flourish in their interrelationships.

Here, again, we must take account of the lack of mystery that was threatening the social fabric of Europe at the time of Novalis’ writing. Even though the German Enlightenment was “weak and of short duration” (Wellek, 1965, p. 49), followed by a late Industrial Revolution, Novalis’ early response illustrates in broad terms the coming to power of fragmented, scientific perceptions of the world. In this he shares the ambitions of the English Romantics, such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, who sought to “link one to the Infinite” (Saunders, 1965, p. 4). Novalis’ reaction is aware of those growing philosophies that characterise the admittedly condensed Enlightenment and slow Industrial Revolution of Germany at that time, but he does not wish to understate their effects: He indicates the very crux of the problems they pose rather than their specific technological and social manifestations, specifically because his concern is voiced particularly early. Where there could have been a tendency to focus solely on those manifestations as technology progressed (and, despite the weak impact of the Enlightenment at that time, its progress is indeed evident in Germany), the Romantics may have been unusually positioned because of the Enlightenment’s somewhat more blunted impact. The Romantics’ early placement in relation to the development of the Enlightenment, and their influence by English pre-Romanticism and Rousseau (Wellek, 1965), as well as by the decisive reaction of the Sturm und Drang’s Johann Georg Hamann (Berlin, 1999), may have provided them with some distance from those distracting symptoms of the Enlightenment and allowed them to focus on the emergence of its first, basic principles instead.

Yet in *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, more than in any of his other writings, we
see Novalis focusing on an outcome of those philosophies of alienation, scientific thinking, and rationalism. Scientific progress, while not a problem when poeticised, becomes detrimental when it expunges Geheimnis from life. The elements that are affected in that fragmentation are made geheimnislos, and it is through poesy that they are brought back into relationship with each other again.

**Wenn sich die Welt in’s freie Leben/Und in die Welt wird zurück begeben**

The third couplet – “Wenn sich die Welt ins freie Leben/Und in die Welt wird zurück begeben” – reflects the Romantics’ stance that human life is characterised by freedom, affecting choices in thinking and in lifestyles. “[I]ns freie Leben begeben” means that these choices can be explored and then focused on a coherent life. By exploring these choices the individual is meant to construct a path of development that produces identity and meaning, both for the self and the collective. There is greater good to be attained from engaging with the world. In turn one is delivered back to one’s own world, more aware of its breadth and depth. A person is then able to produce what they have experienced in greater depth through their absorption into the wider world.

**Freedom and the playfulness of the name ‘Novalis’**

This socio-political interpretation fits well with how Novalis advocated for the freedom to transform nature. Romantisieren encompassed the ability to transform nature but, in turn, to be transformed by nature. One’s membership with society depended on how well one could organise the elements of the world for the greater good. Recall though, that Being could rearrange those elements spontaneously, influencing how humanity could transform them. Even the name ‘Novalis’ opens onto Novalis’ own playful expression: The impetus for change, from Enlightenment’s ‘Zweckrationalismus’/[instrumental rationality] to a more poetic existence, is reflected by Novalis’ (1960m) assertion that “[w]ir sind auf einer Mißion: zur Bildung der Erde sind wir berufen” (p. 427)/[we are on a mission: We are called to cultivate the earth]. The message of change from a
conditioned, static form of thinking to a more holistic one is woven throughout that fragment: To begin with, in its recollection of a cultivated earth it hints at the ancestral name ‘Novali’ itself (O’Brien, 1995)\(^{38}\). The inclusion of the name is significant for Novalis because it ensures that he himself is embodied in his writings, linking to his belief that, to a large extent, writing is an emotional activity. In this the individual is forged with their writing so that they hopefully take on poetic form themselves.

The name ‘Novalis’ explicitly avoids the noble form ‘de Novali’ and also indicates a preference for the possessive structure that is less grandiose than ‘von Hardenberg’ and more playful. It is playful in a number of ways. First, the act of sowing is a wager on how well something will grow, in that its outcome is dependent to a large extent on chance and on the interactions of things in the world. The name also points to the arrangement and rearrangement of things in the world through sowing: One may arrange a certain place as suitable for sowing, and then within that place constantly reorganise the planting. Here we are reminded of the irony of Romantic thinking and statements, which are characterised by the positioning of various terms and ideas next to each other, only to be changed around from time to time:


[Our temperament longs for convalescence and change, and where should this respectable and charming way of doing things be found but through the involvement with free play and production of this fashion’s most precious power, of creative force. Nowhere else will

\(^{38}\) The name Novali means ‘the person who ploughs/develops new land’.
we hear such graceful singers, or will we find such beautiful painters, and nowhere in the dance halls will we see easier movements and lovelier forms.]

Here Novalis refers directly to the identity of singers and painters, in contrast to his earlier couplet of “Wenn die, so singen oder küszen/Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen” where he prefers to think of the activity of singing and kissing. This is an example of the Romantic irony that Novalis fully embraces. In the above quotation he names a ‘way’ or ‘fashion’ – in other words, a set mode of operating. His preference for the identity of the person may be related to his wish to remain in synch with the initial concreteness of ‘way’/‘fashion’. Yet even here the reader is thrown into some confusion with the last clause of that quotation, which reverts to what we have seen in the “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” couplet: not a dancer or Kreatur/creature, but the almost mysterious emergence of movement and form. His combination here of humanised, concrete description on the one hand, and more mysterious signs of activity on the other, point to the play that Novalis advocates.

Play or Spiel is thus meant to be a mission itself. The goal here is one that involves a ‘down to earth’ approach, with play being “gemeine – und höhere” (Novalis, 1960b, p. 320)/“common – and higher” (Wood, 2007, p. 65). The free life that is envisaged is equivalent to the capacity to think and play freely. A sense of renewal is therefore inherent to the name ‘Novalis’, with Kluckhohn (1960) observing that “als ein Neuland Rodender und Saaten Streuender mochte der Dichter [Novalis] sich selbst empfinden” (p. 2)/[the poet [Novalis] liked to think of himself as a clearer of (new) land and a scatterer of seeds]. It is precisely the new moment in Novalis’ writings that he brings to our attention.

A more mystical interpretation is equally plausible here; two meanings are therefore possible which are not exclusive. In this second reading, ‘freie[s] Leben’ aligns with Novalis’ equivalence of Being and freedom. The universal activity that underpins all existence should be seen as a responsible force to which the world should be returned, thereby freeing itself from the social problems that are incurred by an overly rationalistic approach. The phrase ‘earthly strife’, taken
within the wider context of the poem, is that which is wrought by representing things in the world as purely within the control of humanity, rather than those things being, in the first instance, part of the ‘freie[s] Leben’.

**Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten/Zu echter Klarheit werden gatten**

This couplet alludes to Novalis’ beliefs about the relationship between light and dark and binary oppositions in general, and specifically refers to the debate between Goethe and Newton in relation to the nature of light. It is likely that Novalis had Newton in mind when he stated in *Die Christenheit oder Europa* that:


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[[Shrewder] members busied themselves tirelessly with purging the poetry from nature, the earth, the human soul, and the sciences – eradicating every trace of the sacred, spoiling the memory of all virtuous events and people by sarcasm, and divesting the world of all colourful decoration. Due to its submission to mathematics as well as its brashness, light had become their [those members’] favourite. They delighted in the fact that it would sooner be refracted than play amongst colour, and so their great concern – Enlightenment - became its namesake.]
Maintaining light and dark as opposing forces is not an option for Novalis, even though these forces may separate from time to time, only to reunite. Newton’s claim that white light was reliably unwavering and unchanging once it separated into primary colours was one that Goethe had resisted (Burwick, 1987). Goethe claimed instead that the “prismatic picture” (Burwick, 1987, p. 32) was always changing. Goethe’s resistance to Newton’s assertion of static light is typical also of the Romantics’ resurrection of the fluid nature of existence, which contains echoes of Heraclitus’ philosophy of the flux of things in the world. According to Burwick, Goethe actually demonstrated that any colour chosen from Newton’s spectrum would “cast a shadow in complementary colour and a full array of colours could be seen in the dioptric Säume [band] of the shadow” (pp. 32-33).

For Novalis, as for Goethe, the binary opposition revealed between light and dark was one that could only be reconciled by a focus on the relationships between them. In other words, Novalis encourages their unification so that one could move about freely into the world. He disputes the widely held notion that only light will bring about enlightenment and suggests that the two be brought together so that there the focus becomes one of holism rather than delineation. Novalis emphasises that both may not be kept in opposition with each other: In keeping with the focus on constant change in the Romantic tradition the continuous movement between light and dark is one that Novalis strives to acknowledge, rather than strict delineations evident in classicism (Blankenagel, 1940). This emphasis on balance is close to that of Māori writers, including Pere (1982), Jackson (1988), Mikaere (1994), who agree within their own topics of focus that the separation of one phenomenon from another, in a definitive sense, leads to a fragmented relationship with the world. Novalis’ proposal that the elements of light and dark is reminiscent of the drive towards a respect for creative chaos, advocated often throughout his novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen (Walker, 1993). Indeed the fictional ‘Golden Age’, a time that Novalis remembers and anticipates through Heinrich von Ofterdingen, is conditional upon a state of chaos and is “heralded by the melting of the winter ice and the return of the flow to the world” (Walker, 1993, p. 49). He foresees great movement in swirling and changing states of both light and dark and expects that, through their union, clarity could ensue. Rather than the Enlightenment notion of static objects and linear forces in
physics, he advocated for a return to an older belief in the cyclical structure of nature.

The poet is the person who can unite different factions of Being, but because light and clarity themselves unite, creating a higher clarity, then the poet is really just giving expression to the true self-organisation of Being. In the first instance it is the autonomous workings of light and shade that provide illumination. As with ‘freie[m] Leben’ there are two occasions at work here: one involving the spontaneous, unknowable organisation of Being, and the other more social, in which society should be composed of true poets who can reflect nature in an everyday sense. The poet is meant to work with binaries and manifest their joining; he or she must provide the elements of Being with a voice.

In his *Hymnen an die Nacht* Novalis (1960i) banished an epistemological and metaphorical preference for light: Although it is “allerfreulich … mit seinen Farben, seinen Strahlen und Wogen” (p. 131)/[all-joyful … with its colors, rays, and waves] and “schwimmt tanzend in seiner blauen Flut”/[swims dancingly in its blue flow], Novalis tends towards the night – not to oppose it to light but to point out its potential which itself contains elements of light (fire, sun, sight). In these relevant verses of “Wenn nicht mehr”, as with *Hymnen an die Nacht*, we see a role for humanity as the true refractive mirror of Being’s manifestations. Humanity’s activities should therefore organise themselves around this role for Novalis. The aim of the poet is, in a social sense, to present humanity as a whole with a vast array of choices that reflect the cloaked and sometimes opaque ways of Being.

**Und man in Märchen und Gedichten/Erkennt die ewgen Weltgeschichten**

One of Novalis’ concerns is with describing the story of the world. It is through literature and art that this can best be achieved, although scientific propositions and traditional, rationalistic writing can play a part in compelling the author to
think more poetically. Here we encounter his Märchen und Gedichte which may be superficially translated as ‘fairy tales and poems’ but which mean more than those labels. Märchen und Gedichten are expressive critiques and descriptions by which one may come close to the mysterious, and are not limited to any specific genre. The story of the world – or its natural and cosmological ‘history’ as ‘Geschichte’ also translates – is a non-linear process, in which even the past is present, the past affects the future and, somewhat oddly, the future flows back to the past and present. Novalis’ contemporary, the theologian Schleiermacher (1969), also advocates a move away from a linear sense of history towards a temporally unified one with a view that “[a]ber nicht nur in ihrem [So-] Sein müsst ihr die Menschen anschauen, sondern auch in ihrem Werden” (p. 67)/[you should not only consider humanity in its static appearance but also in its state of becoming]. With a link to the spiritual (religiösen) realm, history is forever returning to its beginnings there:


[History in its actual sense is the highest subject of religion: With it, history lifts itself up, and with it history ends – and all true history has had, in the first instance, an omnipresent religious meaning, and has proceeded outwards from religious ideas.]

Having a spiritual genesis and ending means that expression is all-important to describe history. These stanzas continue the theme of the previous lines but with more emphasis on the poet. Again, in “Die Natur”, Novalis considers that the only way to embrace the whole of nature is through the spirit of poetic craft. Through one voice, poets and natural scientists become one person. Poetry ensures that the poem is the object of the vision of nature (von Molnár, 1970). Apparently this representation indicates that Being remains a subject status and that the poet is merely tracing its path. One may recognise the story of the world, because it is something that is reflected at the individual level. As with Hyazinth, who
identified that his journey through nature concluded with him recognising what was familiar, one recognises something because it is familiar. The emphasis here is not on the gleaning of knowledge but on the wonder at realising that the story of the world presents itself to its beings.

As I indicate in chapter five, at times Novalis will satirise himself, revealing in the “Monolog” the capriciousness of language. His “Dialogen” in some ways disclose that a truer way of discussing the world generally is achieved by turning the world into a story. The sixth Dialogue revolves around a conversation between two drunks. I shall not quote this dialogue in its entirety, but the first lines will show the reader what is intended:


[[A.] Hey, it’s become fashionable to throw the word nature around, and discuss it in rational terms. We’d better do the same and add to the conversation. Ok, what’s it going to be? Go on, give me an answer.
[B.] I’ve been racking my brains for ages trying to come up with a properly natural start to our conversation – I’m squeezing out my natural understanding, but it’s dried up, and there’s not a drop left.]

The dialogue shows not only the problem of ‘nature’ as the subject of discussion but also that of common speech generally. It happens in this dialogue that the issue of ‘nature’ being made into a solid, known thing through common usage is highlighted, but any phenomenon may be subject to that process by being ‘thrown around’. Heidegger gives a more current indication of this problem in his coining of the term ‘Gerede’, along with an analysis of its meaning. ‘Ge-’ as a prefix signifies a confused “gathering together of several items of a kind” (Hirsch, 1978,
p. 169) and can signal a negative connotation. The collection of many words together indicates that there is a stockpile of them at humanity’s disposal, even though for Heidegger these modes of speech can be an impetus for other ways of talking (Hirsch, 1978). These words, however, only cement a conventional way of thinking and, even more importantly, an orthodox relationship between humanity and the world that the words are held out to open onto.

**Dann fliegt vor Einem geheimen Wort/Das ganze verkehrte Wesen sofort**

Novalis’ constant use of ‘wenn’, a form of parallelism (Feldman, 2010), draws the reader’s attention to a continuous weaving of time throughout the words. Time comes in from the sides of the poem, infusing itself so that it is a concern for the reader. A subtle collapse of time occurs through this continuous process, which points to the future, and through the accompanying and equally consistent use of the present tense. Novalis looks to a future *when* numbers and figures *are* no longer the keys to all God’s creatures. Also the futurity and presence of each factor is necessary at once, suggesting that each element will and can exist and form with the other. Each preferred state is listed with no precise tense assigned to each, suggesting that they are all desirable. By dealing with Zahlen, Figuren, Tiefgelehrten, Light/shade binary, one may then banish alienation of man from mystery – das verkehrte Wesen – with a single word.

Novalis’ optimism is due primarily to the role of the poet. The poet is finally able to utter the Word of wisdom, evident in the final lines “Dann fliegt vor Einem geheimen Wort/Das ganze verkehrte Wesen sofort”. This sacred ‘word’ is used in conjunction with Einem, a hint at the sacred and ineffable, one that is given special significance through the capitalisation of the usually banal indefinite article ‘einem’. In the context of Novalis’ poem it assumes a quality of uniqueness - the all comprising only One which is another way of putting his notion of panentheism, a cosmological view which recurs frequently in his works. A sacred word is given effect through the bringing together of opposing dualities such as
light and darkness, which will occur by considering a world without measured edges. It is through this, Novalis believes, that the delusion that Being is knowable will be dispelled, and the newly transformed idea of Being as mysterious will be moved towards the sacred.

The mention of a ‘word’ here reminds us that Novalis’ had specific views on language. Novalis sets out one of his most strident treatises on language in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* which, along with his “Monolog”, is his most thorough treatment of the subject (O'Brien, 1995). Intrinsic to his treatment is a constant expression of Being, which as we have seen predefines the self and precedes the self’s consciousness. In addition to these expressly language-related works, his views on language may be inferred from his other sources as well. He sets about his task by referring to language both directly and indirectly, motivated by his need to point out to his reader in a number of ways that excessive objectification through language can occur. His methods do entail an upfront warning, although generally this is a rare tactic for Novalis, who prefers to warn through poeticising the potential of an issue rather than baldly stating what the problem is.

**The dialectics of “Wenn nicht mehr”**

Novalis’ poem occasionally emphasises the absence of a phenomenon or activity – ‘if there were a lack of something, then this would occur’. Those activities or phenomena, currently carried out or utilised but which are less preferred than those others that he lists, are not meant to just fade away or be totally replaced. They are present, after all, and this should count for something, but because they presently overwhelm humanity and nature they need some moderating. Novalis is aware that humanity needs tools of rationalism and scientific thinking yet asks humanity to come to terms with the stark contrast and discomfort that the ‘preferred’ and ‘non-preferred’ provide when used next to each other. The poem in its entirety uses some devices that impinge on its obvious meaning. With these devices Novalis wants to both make certain that the poem is about mystery and to draw our attention away from relying on the certainty that the surface meanings of the words
offer. Thus the poem denotes meaning – this is the extent to which we can have some certainty about the points he wishes to make – but underpinning the words lies the mysterious Being. The poem then reflects the utter mystery of Being.

Novalis had an outcome in mind by placing such divergent elements directly alongside each other. He had a love of oppositions: Such fragments as “[i]n einer wahrhaft robusten Constitution ist der Wechsel der Zustände sowohl schnell, als langsam – heftig und schwach – Groß und klein – Mannichfaltig und einfach” (1960b, p. 350)/“[i]n a genuinely robust constitution the alternation between the stages is both rapid and slow – vehement and weak – large and small – diverse and simple” (Wood, 2007, p. 89), frequent as they are, display not only a love of paradox but also a need to contravene on a modern reader’s love of strict categories. A sort of dialectic is provided for humanity, which can basically be reduced to the love of rationalism against the mystical workings of Being. Both are necessary in his provocation; the total absence of the ‘less preferred’ would itself not be desirable because the resulting void would be filled by the ‘preferred’ one. This thoroughgoing mystical state would be equally undesirable for Novalis as it would simply mean that one frame of thinking has come to dominate.

Both poetic device and denotative meaning of his words issue a challenge for the anthropocentricist. Modern man in Novalis’ poem would be moved away from just viewing Enlightenment rationalism as a means of engaging with the world. But this is unlikely to happen if humanity does not realise the current workings of elements that occur. That is, just because they are not currently acknowledged phenomena – both isolated and co-existent – does not mean that they do not exist regardless. A problem arises then for the anthropocentricist: he is confronted with the possibility that the world does in fact operate in an holistic fashion, that its holistic arrangement can continue without him being aware of its working, and he does not have control over nature as much as he thinks he does. Indeed, he is caught up in these workings of Being and thus is just another element within Being’s grasp. Yet, on the other hand, modern humanity, with its overriding fixation on numbers, figures, rationalism, binary oppositions, properties and so on, cordons off those elements of Being that do not fit with a preordained anthropocentric relationship with the world. This will have consequences for
humanity, as the lack of correspondence between the workings of Being and of humanity will only lead to a search for the truth of nature in “ihre[r] Krankenstube, ihr[em] Beinhaus” (Novalis, 1960e, p. 84)/“her sickroom, her charnel house” (2005, p. 27).

Here Novalis’ apparent contradiction may be summarised. One may educate nature, but nature opens up things to emerge in the first place. This is characteristic of humanity’s engagement with nature. In all of Die Lehrlinge zu Sais a dialectic takes place between nature and the student; even if it appears that activity starts with the student in their determining of the world – because the student is recorded as saying something, as an example - in fact this rational process takes place within an infinitely unknowable scheme of Being, whether this is alongside the voices of nature, against the play of light from the world, from the arrangement of stones, and so on. Even when one is apparently making a statement that fits with the requirements of logic, preceding this – and allowing it to happen – is the freely creative mood of nature, as an emanation of the Absolute.

**Thinking affirmatively within the problem: Overcoming Geheimnislosigkeit**

In *Fichte-Studien* Novalis begins his famous description of the striving after a philosophical ground with the surmise that “Filosofiren muß eine eigne Art von Denken seyn” (1960j, p. 269)/“philosophizing must be a unique kind of thinking” (Kneller, 2003, p. 167). His use of the term ‘philosophizing’ refers to the pursuit of clarity, and of “Vivificiren” (1960o, p. 526)/[enlivening]. In *Das Allgemeine Brouillon*, in which he attempts to bring together all the sciences into the domain of poesy, he further indicates that pure philosophy may be “uninterressirt” (1960b, p. 249)/[disinterested]. It is placed in that same fragment in opposition to a “Philosophie des Geistes überhaupt”/[philosophy of the spirit in general], suggesting both that the spirit itself may philosophise and, socially speaking, one may philosophise with a sense of community. To philosophise is to take an active attitude towards things, and the orientation towards something may
be either clarifying or, as the tendency of “spirit” would have it, tentative and dependent on context, with the former, despite needing a degree of activity, nevertheless an outcome of a certain lack of emotional impetus. Taken in its totality, the postcolonial reader may note the following about philosophising in the context of “Wenn nicht mehr”:

1. We can see from Novalis’ grouping of elements in “Wenn nicht mehr” a reiteration of the theme of opposition that I discussed in the preceding chapters. Geheimnislosigkeit should be considered as fully as possible. To move on to positive utterances without considering Geheimnislosigkeit in depth threatens to render those Geheimnis-related utterances geheimnislos. The equal consideration of each is a critical exercise that must take place at all times. For the colonised person, any discussion about an apparently obvious thing in the world must similarly take place alongside a consideration of how one’s perception of that thing in the world might be affected by Geheimnislosigkeit. Both “Wenn nicht mehr” and the ever-present negativity and positivity of korekore support the use of the imagination in these discussions.

2. Although Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” suggests that one must firstly consider the negative in order to actively contemplate the positive, in fact the two occur at exactly the same time. To be sure, “Wenn nicht mehr” utilises a ‘if (negative)/then (positive outcome)’ structure; however, embedded in all the verses are simultaneous, ironical positionings of both negative and positive phenomena.

3. Through recognition of Geheimnislosigkeit one may come to the conclusion that one has only limited ability to make definitive assertions about things in the world. Even in these situations, Geheimnislosigkeit has made one aware of one’s own incapacity to find exact words that align with both Geheimnislosigkeit and Geheimnis.
Chapter Five: The epistemological and ontological loss of Geheimnis as a colonising act on Māori

Novalis’ poem “Wenn nicht mehr” resonates closely with another of his fragments that deals with the philosophical split between the subject and the object - a divide which forms the basis for empiricist and rationalist traditions in Western philosophy. In it he uses the term ‘Urtheil’ which is commonly defined as ‘judgement’ but has its etymological roots according to Donehower (2007) in the sense of ‘original division’:

Die Gabe der Unterscheidung, das reine trennende Urtheil muß, um nicht tödtlich zu verwunden und überall Haß zu erregen, mit großer Behutsamkeit auf Menschen angewandt werden. (1960f, p. 653)

[The gift of distinction, the pure original division [in subject and object, and conceptual demarcation] must, in order to avoid being harmful and inciteful of hatred at every juncture, be employed upon individuals with great caution.]

In ‘original division’, Novalis refers to the prominence of distinction made on the basis of the intellect. He concedes that there is a place for this practice but thinks it should not be exercised without careful consideration for its effects. ‘Urtheil’ reflects a move into individual components through the corresponding process of judgement: The danger here is that, as things in the world are regarded and fragmented, a deep sense of alienation manifests:

Man haßt es [das trennende Urtheil], theils aus Schmerz über den Verlust eines befriedigenden Irrthums, theils aus Gefühl eines erlittenen Unrechts, weil auch das schärfste Urtheil eben durch die Trennung des Untheilbaren, durch die Absonderung von der Umgebung, der Geschichte, dem Boden, der Natur der Sache zu nahe
tritt, und über die Ansicht der einzelnen Erscheinung an sich ihren Werth, als Glied eines großen Ganzen, vergisst. (1960f, p. 653)

[The distinction that typifies judgement is to be detested partly due to the pain that is experienced when one may no longer take solace in being wrong, and partly due to a feeling that one has suffered injustice. Even the most acute distinction/act of judgement will cause insult through the separation of the inseparable, through the disassociation of the environment and of history, of the earth, and of the nature of things. By viewing the appearance of the individual it forgets its own worth as a member of a greater whole.]

Individualised, and separated from its relationships with other things in the world, the isolated thing (and here Novalis includes people) is made an object for the subject’s gaze. At this point, the onlooker is lifted out of the context of those things – their interplay – and made distant from them. This assertion of Novalis’ suggests that the rupture of things in the world causes damage to the relationship between them; in the process, importantly, the perceiving self is also hurt. As one constrains those things, the self is constrained. It is only poesy that resists that project of fragmentation:

Die Poësie heilt die Wunden, die der Verstand schlägt. Sie besteht gerade aus entgegengesetzten Bestandtheilen - aus erhebender Wahrheit und angenehmer Täuschung. (1960f, p. 653)

[Poesy heals the wounds that intellect causes. It comprises contrary parts – soaring truth and pleasurable deception.]

An overarching theme of Novalis’ critique that I have outlined in the previous chapter, and reiterated in this quote of his, is one of modern humanity’s tendency to constrain or banalise things in the world, thereby ignoring their Geheimnis.
Stoßsätze to be addressed

This grand theme of his prompts me to consider how a similar phenomenon occurs here in New Zealand in respect of Māori. Novalis identifies that there are other more specific Stoßsätze that, within that grander theme, I shall address in this chapter. With particular regard to how Māori are constantly impinged on by colonisation, I express these in the following way:

How are Māori encouraged, in modern times, to forget aspects of Being that I mentioned in chapter three, and to constrain things in the world, including the self? Specifically, drawing on the main themes of “Wenn nicht mehr”, what is the nature of this constraint,

- through the use of reifying words and language?
- through the active fragmentation of things in the world, including, but not limited to, the opposition and exclusion of particular things at any one time?
- through the preference of one idea or method over another?
- through assigning numbers – which may include a financial value but are by no means restricted to that - to things in order to explain them fully?
- through the idea that a thing in the world can be discussed as a separate entity from other things?
- through the essentialising of the ontological self by responding in accord with a self-evident question or utterance, and in the staticising of the self to a historical entity?

Most of the Nachdenken that takes place in the chapter brings those separate but related themes together.
The forgetting of everyday Being: “Das ganze verkehrte Wesen”

That Māori are currently affected by the strict reifying and colonising operation of numbers and figures – for example, in the form of instrumental science and capitalist economy - as a primary means of describing things in the world may not be surprising, but how vastly and covertly its reach is may be more astonishing. Indeed, to describe the whole nature of this form and manifestation of colonisation, which is less about the removal of a tangible resource and more about the subtle imposition of a geheimnislosen worldview, would require another thesis. For this thesis I contend that it is sufficient to begin examining the very broadest parameters of Geheimnislosigkeit as it has impacted on Māori and then to offer some more specific examples of where it manifests. Zahlen and Figuren are emissaries of Geheimnislosigkeit in the sense that they bring about the forgetting of the Absolute\(^39\). In relation to colonisation, much Māori attention has tended to be directed towards the loss of a real thing, with land and language two obvious examples\(^40\). Land and language in a Māori worldview are linked\(^41\), but

\(^{39}\) Sheilagh Walker (1996) emphasises the addition of a negative influence when she states that “[there] is also a spiritual disease; it attacks the hinengaro of Maori. The name of this spiritual disease – ‘internalisation of colonisation’. Here the disease is most potent…. [The] causes are hard to see. They came in latent form, in the crevices of the minds, in the processes of thought, in the guise of World Views that sought to appropriate, dominate and negate other World Views that it found in its path” (p. 122). Casting Māori as the ‘other’ as a process of racism is one part of the problem discussed in this chapter, but it is the uptake of viewing things in the world, including the self as ‘other’ from other things in the world, which I mainly focus on.

\(^{40}\) While these are two outstanding examples, there exists some discussion about loss of wellbeing (which tends to be written about as tied to loss of language and land): see for instance Levien (2007); Reid and Robson (2006). The following authors describe loss of culture in its various forms: Ranginui Walker (2004); Smith (1999); Pihama (2001); Melbourne (1995).

\(^{41}\) As one gives one’s tribal saying, for example, there is an acknowledgement that one’s language is linked to landscape, and that land gives the utterer the ability to refer to it. This is also the nature of ‘whakapapa korero’ (T. Smith, 2000) which I define in English as ‘layers of expression that acknowledge the Absolute’.
have been fought for in separate forums\textsuperscript{42}, have been formed as separate political issues for successive governments (with Māori language being primarily posited as an educational concern and land a legal one). How successful claims have been to have land returned and language recognised has varied widely. The significance of land and language as separate entities has been highlighted as items of loss; they were formerly here but now are not, and they have been made focused \textit{things}. The fact that they then had to be moved out as separate phenomena from each other further entrenched a belief that they are to be focused on as different entities\textsuperscript{43}.

Whether it was the loss itself of solid entities that would threaten Geheimnis is hard to determine, but one may expect that their solidification as separate and unrelated phenomena would start to generally orient the focus of Māori towards Geheimnislösigkeit. I speculate that at the instant they were regarded as concrete phenomena they were proclaimed to be highly visible and definable and were presented to the awareness of Māori in that way\textsuperscript{44}. In terms of language this would

\textsuperscript{42} Occasionally, land and language have been fought for in legal forums, but they are regarded as separate issues. The Te Reo Māori claim (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986), the prime example of a legal fight for the validity of the Māori language, sought intervention to save the Māori language from demise, and framed language as a separate entity that, in this case, was in need of saving.

\textsuperscript{43} Whilst Māori did indeed see the uniqueness of various phenomena, their inherent link was always recognised. This is quite different from the belief and practice that they should be separate events, leading Ka`ai and Higgins (2004) to observe that “for Māori, this definition [whakapapa meaning connections between people] extends beyond human relationships into connections between humans and their universe. This intricately woven whakapapa has often made defining individual customary concepts extremely difficult, as each concept is defined by its relationship with other concepts and not in isolation” (p. 13).

One’s traditional interaction with things in the world was thought of as interrelational. For indigenous peoples generally, stories – ‘Weltgeschichte’ as Novalis would call them – relate directly to the nonhuman world and back again (Whitt, Roberts, Norman, & Grieves, 2001). To “converse with”, as Whitt et al note is “to live or keep company with” (p. 734), suggesting not only that there is a mysterious way of interacting with things in the world through language. More tacitly, there is a manner of interaction that lacks company and thus mystery.

\textsuperscript{44} As spiritual phenomena, things in the world were understood as possessing mystery. Pere (1997) clarifies this when she states that “[t]he physical realm is immersed and integrated with the spiritual realm. A powerful belief in spirituality governs and influences the way one interacts with other people, and relates to his or her environment” (p. 16). Here, Pere indicates that the physical realm is not all there is to those perceivable
have happened even without Māori being expressly told of their visibility: It would have happened as soon as foreign concepts were conveyed through the Māori language, such as occurred in the Mission Schools of the early 19th century – and in the subsequent notion that one should think and talk about the world as precisely as possible. The introduction of Christian-based language to Māori, to both bring the Christian word and to spread the practice of literacy, may have seen a contrast of language to its message occur. In cases where the message being disseminated is so different to a previous belief, then it is possible that the medium through which that message is disseminated is focused on. Language is made a solid, evident phenomenon. Although we can only speculate about that event, it is clear that many aspects of this new Christian belief diverged sharply from traditional ones. As one missionary described in respect of his daily routine in the classroom:

I begin with prayer with them, then set them their lessons and spelling, then ask them questions or teach them to repeat lessons which I have made for that purpose concerning God, the Creation, the fall of man, the law of God, the birth of Christ, His death, regeneration and such like things.... After this I sing an hymn and close in prayer. (Elder, 1934, pp. 258-259)

The difference between traditional and colonised religious belief is beyond the scope and general concern of this thesis; however, the above instance of religious instruction, in content at least, reveals a marked difference from a Māori belief in many gods, in gender (Mikaere, 1994)45, and generally in life, death and things in the world. It is the mystery of things for her that brings one to focus on things in the world.

45 Pere (1982) explains that Māori did not impose hierarchies of importance on the basis of gender. This reflects itself in the very language of Māori, according to her. Yet the replacement of ‘tangata’ to mean ‘him’ (Pihama, 2001), and similarly ‘ia’ with ‘him’ or ‘her’ (Mikaere, 1994) has had profound influences not only on how women are positioned in relation to men, but also on the new ways in which terms would now become disturbed issues for Māori.
afterlife. The largely fear-ridden message of the fall of man, for instance, encouraged a fixation of the language of its delivery. The use of ‘tētahi’ when describing a supreme deity could jar with the traditional use of ‘ētahi’ in relation to a number of deities. If that were true, then the sound and form of language would have been brought into stark relief to the listener and reader, thereby taking on new psychological and philosophical significance. With that, language suddenly becomes a separate phenomenon.

The actual subsequent loss of language, a devastating blow to Māori for successive generations, would have further entrenched the movement of language into a separate, almost demanding concern for Māori, but before it was withdrawn from Māori it was instrumentalised to identify a thing in the world as if it were merely a separate, reified object. One’s speech is then not thought of in terms of its link to the external world but as a self-directed event. Land is similarly held out to be a self-evident entity; one may trace its demarcation out from other elements of existence when it was listed alongside other concrete resources in article two of the Treaty of Waitangi. Land took its obvious form as a Zahl/number when it was assigned a name and number by the Native Land Court, with successors’ names listed nearby with their own share attached. Again, as with language, the loss of land ensured that land itself, posed as a separate, ‘chartered’ event, would be a cause for concern for forthcoming Māori generations.

Zahlen and Figuren should not be associated with just a series of traumatic events, either, even though they may best be constrained and discussed in that way. That is, although those historical events were occurring which are perhaps more obviously to do with the visibilising and solidification of things in the world, there has always been an everyday interaction between the Māori self and

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46 The various ways in which Māori were affected by a Christian view of the world are beyond the scope of this thesis. For an indepth consideration, see Simon (1990), who delves into some of the substitutions of one group of philosophies for another.

47 Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi: “o ratou whenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa”/[their lands, their places of residence and all their prized possessions].
This relationship highlights the propensity of institutions to carry out their practices in a way that encourages Māori to view things in the world as clearly visible and solid. It may therefore be said that Māori are continuously exposed to a form of oppression through mystery being expunged. This form of oppression has a different emphasis to the types of racism that Māori frequently encounter, or from the lack of funding that comes the way of Māori communities that would see them perform on a par with the mainstream populace: It arises instead from an anticipation of philosophies underpinning Western institutions that Māori will conform to a set of expectations in not only conscious ways but also in their ontological, deeply primordial ‘fit’. Through meeting these expectations, Māori make not only other things in the world equivalent to the anticipated set of equivalences of these institutions, but they also align their ontological selves up with those equivalences. By this, I mean that the constant, unseen change that the self is given through the Absolute is restricted by the engagement of the Māori self through some institutional expectations. This correspondence between Māori and the philosophical wish of the institution is therefore a far more fundamental one than the issue of which social group Māori are allowed to align themselves with, or whether a certain Māori group would be allowed to call themselves ‘iwi’ or not.

48 Things in the world were thought of as spiritual as much as physical, to the extent that no great distinction was made between them. In relation to this, Pere (1982) states that, from day to day, “children developed an appreciation of their inherent spirituality through being exposed to such things as karakia (incantations, invocations), or to people talking about their own spiritual experiences…. The spiritual world became just as meaningful and as present for the children as the physical worlds that surrounded them. Nothing was done or attempted without some thought being given to the spiritual side of things” (p. 54). She notes the traditional belief that quotidian activities are seen as posing both spiritual and physical realities for Māori.

49 I draw a subtle but marked distinction in the examples that I have provided in these paragraphs between the social discrimination that occurs with racism (institutional and overt) and the very deep ‘pull’ of colonisation on the Māori self. Yet I acknowledge the link between the two forms of colonisation, and argue that the ontological equivalence brings about the subsequent conformity with institutions’ wishes that one sees manifesting in common settings. Therefore, by being made obvious entities, Māori are then able to fit in with the social criteria of whether they can call themselves iwi, whether they are eligible for funding for various health and educational initiatives, whether they may speak Māori in general settings, and so on. However, to focus on those social inequities without firstly identifying that arguably far more fundamental, often individual, experience is to only consider the surface manifestations of colonisation. Indigenous writer Waziyatawin (2004), along with Māori writers such as Smith (1999), Sheilagh Walker (1996), and Smith (2003), emphasises the
How deeply the sense of Being, and then the Māori self, is disturbed by these expectations in advance is impossible to quantify, but one may theorise about the disruption by drawing simultaneously on certain traditional and counter-colonial discourses. I noted the following about the practice of naming:

Naming and reference still show flashes of … traditional beliefs. One would still be careful to call someone else by a name which was suitable for a particular location, even though the person may bear a number of names. Care had also to be taken when reciting whakawai, or translating ancestral sayings, where behind the words lay the mana of a number of authors, who immediately connected to the mana of particular lakes, mountains, and other whenua (Seed-Pihama 2004: 50). (Mika, 2007, pp. 187-188)

If the main message here is that the fluidity of the self is to be retained at all costs – and that, moreover, there were certain values attached to that process – then Zahlten and Figuren, as Novalis would have them in their literal and especially their ontological senses, threaten to move the self towards the opposite of that existential state. The reverse of this fluidity would be a fixed state of being.

huge colonial project that characterises the changes made to indigenous minds, through “the combined efforts of government institutions and Christian workers” (p. 360). I speculate that it is difficult to devote the spotlight to theoretical possibilities such as spiritual, emotional and intellectual colonisation without being tempted to refer back to those social inequities that manifest thereafter, but a focus on the underpinning causes and beliefs appears to be precisely what Cherryl Smith (2000) advocates when she states that “I have realised the urgency of beginning to make Māori philosophy more overt in our approaches to all aspects of the way we live our lives and the ways that we engage academic practice” (p. 44).

One resolution to this problem is to theorise. My argument for decolonisation here is different to that of Pihama’s, which pushes for a unity of theory and practice; instead, I contend that it is now necessary to firstly theorise about the vast reach of colonisation, but, as Pihama (2005) rightly asserts, “within our experiences and practices” (p. 197). Theorisation in this way is reflective of what the individual brings with him or her, but it does not have as its first concern an immediately practical outcome (although this is preferable in the long term). I speculate that the focus on practical outcomes is a form of what Smith (2003) terms ‘common-sense’, distracting Māori from thinking about the highly theoretical activity of colonisation.

50McIntosh (2004) discusses that a ‘fluid’ identity is preferable to either a ‘fixed’ or ‘forced’ identity. A fluid identity emphasises that self and the collective constitute culture. In this chapter, I argue that institutions have not just removed tangible Māori values and resources such as land, language and culture but have replaced them with
through having as its aim a neat order and arrangement of responses and interactions by Māori. Māori are brought into line, epistemologically and ontologically, with the expectations of institutions in numerous ways. It is the equivalence that is at issue here, for it ensures that Māori connect neatly with the preordained expectation of those institutions. Western institutions raise as questions the characteristics of Māori, the expectations of which Māori must meet. The institutions do not explicitly insist that Māori answer to those criteria but they confine the responses of Māori – in a literal and figurative sense – so that Māori either are in accordance with them or not. This either/or response insists that Māori orient themselves towards the external world as either an equivalent entity or as an entity that does not neatly fit. The effect of the highlighting of certain characteristics that the institution wishes to see from Māori is that Māori carry this highly illuminated, preferred self into other aspects of their lives that do not appear to be institutionally involved at all. The notion of Being, and the Geheimnis that results from it within things in the world, becomes forgotten.

**Preventing the autonomous manifestation of things: Die Tiefgelehrten**

Rowley Habib, a poet from Ngāti Tūwharetoa, penned the work “Ancestors”, which does not have the optimistic outcome envisaged by Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” but does similarly require the reader to consider both the broader implications of colonisation and the events that enabled a change in worldview:

Where once my ancestors grubbed for the fern’s root  
They build their hygienic homes now.  
And where the wild pig roamed and rooted  
They’ve measured the land into precise sections  
Worth 3000 dollars (or to sound better  
For the prospective buyer, 1500 pounds] (cited in Roscoe, 1992, p. 154).

another worldview altogether.
Not only does the poem deal with settlers’ problematic developments with land that formerly belonged to Māori, as Roscoe (1992) correctly notes, but it also suggests that the land has been expunged of its natural, spiritual significance. Here we come close to a Zahlen and Figuren description if we draw away from those terms as just literally representing numbers and figures. Earth and its manifestations have been replaced with the “hygienic”, to begin with. Cleanliness is placed in the poem just after foraging for food, as a latecomer to the land. “Ancestors”, “grubbed” and “fern’s root” are all juxtaposed, indicating the wild, unkempt nature of the land, but “hygienic” and “homes” point to neatly contained, packaged and controlled environments. Noticing this, the poet is aware of the philosophical contrast. Zahlen and Figuren are reflected in the last three lines: Land can be cordoned off, measured and sold. ‘Precise sections’ are now the key to a correct perception of land, and through these Schlüssel, Kreaturen are dispatched. Moreover, through the neatly delineated sections, one can possibly relate in a much more logical way to land, which used to be an untamed phenomenon. Thinking about land outside of its colonially packaged way – that is, as one would in a way close to singen and küssen – is untenable. Taken in its totality, the poem suggests that one is encouraged to think of nature in ways plausible to the Tiefgelehrtten\(^51\).

**Example: The Waitangi Tribunal: Die [trennenden] Weltgeschichten**

While this interpretation of Habib’s poem highlights certain *substantive* similarities with Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr”, I argue that the reader is even more urgently encouraged to consider both poems as precedents to focus on the somewhat gloomy nature of general institutional interaction for Māori, and not just physical loss that events bring about in a tangible sense but also their ongoing philosophical effects. Habib’s poem brings to our attention the problem of land loss and is an appropriate introduction for the geheimnislose impact of law. The

\(^{51}\) ‘Tiefgelehrtten’ for Novalis include priests, academics, jurists and statesmen.
Waitangi Tribunal is a good example to highlight the problem here, because it deals specifically with Māori grievances. As a creature of statute the Waitangi Tribunal will unsurprisingly carry out the philosophical agenda of the dominant Western legal system, but it is rarely critiqued as being deeply prescriptive in its form and process. At the outset, when a claim is first lodged it is given a ‘WAI number’. At this stage the claim is registered and referenced, and while the registration and numbering of a claim “are not an indication that the claim is well founded, or that the persons bringing it are appropriate representatives for those on whose behalf [the] claim is brought” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2007, p. 12) – this stage is just thought of as an administrative one - the beginning of the overall reduction of things in the world that normally hold their full mystery occurs through prescribed claim. Thereafter occurs the process of research, which is overwhelmingly technical in nature, recounts historical events with a standard of proof as its aim, and speaks about things in the world and people also with that same objectifiable standard of proof in mind. The greater the degree of Geheimnislosigkeit of the people and other things in the world the more those things in the world meet with the threshold of a claim.

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52 Just because it deals with obviously Māori issues does not mean that it is the sole forum of Geheimnislosigkeit for the Māori self, however.

53 I have highlighted ‘number’ here to signal to the reader that the literal symbol of a number is ascribed to things in the world at the earliest stage of the process. The Zahlen process occurs earlier than this, however, with things in the world anticipated as separate entities even before any submission is made to the Waitangi Tribunal. I argue that the nature of the grievance itself compels Māori to suddenly orient themselves towards the things involved in that grievance as if separate from other things.

54 The inherently emotional nature of the claim is avoided by the use of a statement of claim that lays out the nature of the grievance in a contained way.

55 Accompanying the legal process is an administrative one that closely engages with the compliance of things in the world, including the client(s). This process is both manifestly and essentially Zahlen-based. Alongside the registering of the claim, clients are asked to provide financial and personal details if applying for Legal Aid. They then form part of a statistical analysis for the Ministry of Justice. Lawyers themselves are asked to justify their expenditure and are expected to keep time sheets. The sorts of details I describe here are expected given the huge government funding behind the expenditure, but they require some subtle translations from geheimnisvoll to geheimnislos.
In this process Māori claimants, or others with an interest in the claim, are allowed to give evidence. Here I argue the self is actively involved in connecting neatly with the sorts of questions that a legal institution prefers. The questions in that forum have an already desired response in mind and posit the Māori witness as the knowable other, regardless of whether the questions are in cross-examination or evidence in chief. The entire process is designed to meet the overall strict standard of proof of a juridical system, with Māori themselves participating as interrogated entity. Before even a question is posed, then, the Māori witness is caught within the expectation/response process of an institution which attempts to remove all sense of the Absolute, and hence Geheimnis, from the written material, the witnesses and the questions and answers themselves. In this exercise, language no longer brings together elements of Being, as I noted in chapter three, but instead aims to remove the interrelatedness and ultimate opacity that Being affords things in the world.

This process involves a spectacle in which various actors participate. Māori are quite familiar with being the spectacle, I argue, but have not considered the moderated, highly restrictive forums in which this has taken place. Their familiarity with being highly visible (and audible) has its roots early in contact times. I contend that the regard that Māori and Pākehā had for each other at the outset was reciprocated; firstly, Pākehā regarded Māori as the Other and hence as a spectacle, and the regard that Māori in turn had for the onlookers was one that subconsciously recognised the need of Pākehā to witness the spectacle. Whether fighting to maintain control of lands - within the Native Land Courts or on sites of battle - or whether deciding that they had to fight to maintain cultural integrity, Māori were forced into providing a sensible event while trying to preserve all they

56 The problem of the ‘institutional question’ is not widely written about amongst Māori. When discussed, colonisation is frequently a problem reduced to its overt physical symptoms, not thought of in the first instance as an influence on the recesses of the philosophical mind as we have seen Sheilagh Walker (1996) argue. With specific reference to health, Barnes (2000) highlights the focus that research has on visible elements that can be discovered and evidenced: “Frequently, issues of concern to Maori are not seen to be adequately addressed by non-Maori researchers and fail to answer questions other than those that are causation, disease and individually focused” (p. 3). The problem could be a similar one when Māori are forced into a Western institutional setting to explain a thing in the world in terms of its precise qualities and traits with no other discussion about related things in the world.
held valuable. As an offshoot, Māori constantly adhered to the behaviours that Pākehā expected; although there were individual ‘surprises’ relating to Māori behaviour, Māori would fight to defend their lands because they were ‘savages’ and as savages they would perform savagely. I propose more controversially that Māori were forced to watch the Other for further injustice, and so they developed a set of anxieties around adhering to Pākehā expectations, involving monitoring where Pākehā surveyors were, what the Pākehā headmistress was doing (and hence whether their children were performing), what the Pākehā judge would rule, and where the next onslaught would originate from. I assert that, although there were varying degrees to which Māori were subjected to the process of visibility, there were very few Māori, if any, who remained unscathed by an urge to watch. In watching, they were encouraged to believe that what lay before them was the most important thing; the phenomenon that gave rise to them could therefore be ignored.

The highly visible, evident self and thing: [Un]echte Klarheit

With this historical experience, it should come as no surprise that Māori would find themselves as the subjects of the spectacular in such forums as the Waitangi Tribunal. All actors or participants, such as lawyers, judge, and registrar, have their own role, and “the narratives that they encourage make the relations between the actors concrete and spectacular” (Mika, 2007, p. 194). Each of these actors thus fulfils a specific role of language by which their utterances have a purpose, to be heard and viewed by the other actors. Here, the process carefully scribes out what one may utter, and it is perhaps the Māori witness, having the relationship to the things in the world to be discussed, that is most tightly restrained. To begin with, a new identity is carved out for the Māori witness:

Shalleck (1993: 1733) considers directly the impact on the client of the legal process, and argues that the construction of a client occurs in the exercise of law, primarily in two stages. Firstly the client is stripped of individual identity; they are therefore completely removed

57 See for instance Moloney (2001), who examines the varying beliefs of settlers to perceived degrees of Māori civilisation.
from their social situation. This is an important step because it also replaces the context in which their case arose with the confines of the law. Their identities are then replaced with legal discourse and considerations. They are basically defined by the courts, a phenomenon reminiscent of Foucault’s (1989) analysis of the body in relation to the medical profession. (Mika, 2007, p. 194)

Becoming a speaker about things in the world is the identity of that individual. They may possess tribal affiliations and specific Māori language skills but these attributes only make them more suitable to meet what is expected of them as knowledgeable other. As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, Novalis believed that Geheimnislosigkeit through a Zahlen approach to things in the world results in an ontological estrangement from “Umgebung”/[context], “Geschichte”/[history], “Boden”/[earth]. Importantly, this is not an estrangement dealt with by a philosophical term such as ‘ontological’ but might be better described as a traumatic one, with ‘trauma’ equating etymologically with the “Wunden” that he talks of.

The fact that each identity in the court process has their role is perhaps evidence of their own constraint by the court process. My own concern is with Māori, but it is important to note that this constraint of other, seemingly unrelated persons – their divestment of their own identity – could have an impact itself on the Māori witness. This aspect of interaction between the actors is concerned with utterances – what may specifically be said and what may not. In this scenario, the Māori witness is asked a question, quite simply, but the question operates as a sort of constraining act of Vordenken, asking that the Māori witness respond in kind and with the equivalence that was set in train by the questioner. If we think about the realm within which Māori witnesses are forced to utter responses set down by the questioning other, then it becomes obvious that those witnesses are not separate from the questioner. But the relationship between them is not a beneficial one to
Māori; it is instead oppressive, because the room for open response, and the ability for the Māori witness to retain their own Geheimnis, is tightly prescribed\textsuperscript{58}. A consequence of viewing things in the world as highly significant, at least to the degree that such institutions as the Waitangi Tribunal require, is their separation out from everything else. Discussing a thing in the world in this context, Māori are required to focus on it as a separate entity, neatly delineated out from its overall background\textsuperscript{59}. For instance, in the Foreshore and Seabed case the term ‘foreshore and seabed’ became the vernacular for what is thought by Māori to be a living, related being. The uptake of this form of naming occurred despite the Waitangi Tribunal’s (2004) acknowledgement that it is constrained by legal English:

The need to distinguish the foreshore from the adjacent dry land and seabed arises from the English common law, which developed distinct rules for that zone. In Maori customary terms, no such distinction exists. We wanted to take our language out of the English legal paradigm. We raised with Sir Hugh Kawharu, a witness in our inquiry, whether there was a Maori term that clearly embraced the whole of the foreshore and seabed. Te takutaimoana was a term that he felt may be variously understood by different groups in different situations. To some, it had more of an inshore connotation, whereas

\textsuperscript{58} Indeed, this sort of oppression must be considered in the numerous assertions that Māori law relied on spiritual balance, supernatural intervention, or tikanga (Jackson, 1988). Where many writers tend to emphasise ‘spiritual balance’ as coming about through certain traditional practices, I focus here on the possibility that such a balance came about by the awareness that fragmentary situations and practices were undesirable. Constraining the response of the other by anticipating their purpose in advance constitutes an ontological problem for the Māori self (Mika, 2007).

\textsuperscript{59} The problem of separating a discussion of something from the thing itself was one that Novalis was acutely aware of. As I note later in chapter seven, for instance, he questions the assumption that sign and signified are only arbitrarily related. The greater role of expression, through language, carving or weaving (in a Māori context) would instead be mystically informed where “[e]in reiner Gedanken – ein reines Bild, - eine reine Empfindung sind Gedanken, bilder und Empfindungen – die nicht durch ein correspondirendes Object erweckt etc. sondern außerhalb der sog[ennanten] mechanischen Gesetze – der Sfäare des Mechanism entstanden sind” (Novalis, 1960b, p. 430)/”[a] pure thought – a pure image, - a pure sensation, are thoughts, images and sensations – that have not been aroused by a corresponding object etc. but have originated outside so-called mechanical laws” (Wood, 2007, p. 152).
others might understand it as also connoting the high seas. The word papamoana, simply meaning the bed of the sea, did not seem to be as widely used. We have therefore reluctantly resorted to the English terminology, foreshore and seabed. (pp. xi-xii)

The use of legally defined language as a focus for discussing the thing has certain implications in the above example. Māori are brought to meet the expectations of the Tribunal in imagining that they are outside of the activity of the Absolute. In this they are encouraged to think of the entity in terms of its qualities\(^6\). The descriptions that will follow from this way of thinking ensure that the entity remains at some distance from the witness, and in using institutionally appropriate language, in Māori or English, the Māori self is effectively lifted out of their holistic engagement with the thing discussed, and Being is rarefied or forgotten in that exercise.

\(^6\) Novalis states generally in *Die Christenheit oder Europa* that one can be alienated from things in the world through the kind of knowledge that seeks to define things in a final sense: “Mit Recht widersetzte sich das weise Oberhaupt der Kirche, frechen Ausbildungen menschlicher Anlagen auf Kosten des heiligen Sinns, und unzeitigen gefährlichen Entdeckungen, im Gebiete des Wissens. So wehrte er den kühnen Denkern öffentlich zu behaupten, daß die Erde ein unbedeutender Wandelstern sey, denn er wußte wohl, daß die Menschen mit der Achtung für ihren Wohnsitz und ihr irdisches Vaterland, auch die Achtung vor der himmlischen Heimath und ihrem Geschlecht verlieren, und das eingeschränkte Wissen dem unendlichen Glauben vorziehn und sich gewöhnen würden alles Große und Wunderwürdige zu verachten, und als todte Gesetzwirkung zu betrachten” (1960d, pp. 508-509). “With [good reason and] justice, the wise head of the church resisted impudent developments of the human powers, and untimely discoveries in the realm of knowledge, that were at the expense of the sense for the divine. Thus he prevented the bold thinkers from maintaining publicly that the earth is an insignificant planet, for he knew all too well that, if people lost respect for their earthly residence and home, they would also lose their respect for their heavenly home and race, that they would prefer finite knowledge to an infinite faith, and that they would grow accustomed to despising everything great and miraculous and regard it as the dead effect of natural laws” (Beiser, 1996, pp. 62-63).

Novalis hints that this alienation is not a mental one but a complete one, involving the very essence of the individual.
Overriding focus on highly visible presence: Zahlen und Figuren

Participation in Waitangi Tribunal hearings, and the subsequent separation of things in the world from their contexts that occurs in a setting discussing a Māori view of things, is quite widespread. Knowledgeable elders, technical experts, presiding officers and lawyers are all involved. Yet one sees even more frequent participation in other court, educational and medical settings. The above example of the Waitangi Tribunal starts to introduce the glaring obviousness of the physical self, separated from its relationship with other things in the world (apart from what may be discussed in a detached way). This deterioration in the relationship of the individual to those things may even occur if the things in the world are discussed in Māori: The setting calls for a linear identification and discussion between a thing to be discussed and the discussant, regardless of the language used. Although the relationship between discusser, thing, and of thing with thing may be buoyed to a certain extent by the location of the hearing – if it takes place on a local marae, for instance, then an argument could be made that, together with the use of Māori language, one is still amongst the interplay of things in the world – this relationship is compromised with the self’s movement.

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61 Novalis resisted the practice of complete identity between thing and impression of the perceiver: “Auf Verwechselung des Symbols mit dem Symbolisirten – auf ihre Identisirung – auf den Glauben an wahrhafte, vollständige] Repraesentation – und Relation des Bildes und des Originals – der Erscheinung und der Substanz – auf der Folgerung von äußerer Aehnlichkeit – auf durchgängige innere Übereinstimmung und Zusammenhang – kurz auf Verwechselungen von Subj[ect] und Obj[ect] beruht der ganze Aberglaube und Irrthum aller Zeiten, und Völker und Individuen” (1960b, p. 397)/“All the superstition and error of all times and peoples and individuals rests upon the confusion of the symbol with what is symbolised – upon making them identical – upon the belief in true complete representation – and relation of the picture and the original – of appearance and substance – on the inference from eternal similarity to complete inner correspondence and connection – in short on the confusions of subject and object” (Bowie, 1997, p. 66). The thing, while related to the subject, had to be approached as possessing its own, ultimately unknowable qualities. Nevertheless, the thing being represented had a link with the representation, although this association could not be depicted or expressed precisely.
into making statements of certainty about things in the world, and indeed with the self’s movement into isolation from other things.\(^{62}\)

This movement is at its most obvious in, but as we have seen is not limited to, a physical alienation. Answering questions with an outcome in mind, the self is anticipated and then viewed as an object of focus.\(^{63}\) The solid, highly visible and physical self has its genesis in New Zealand history at a very early stage, from the insistence that one be present to lay claim to land in the courts as soon as the Native Land Court was established; with the setting up of the Native Schools, which among other consequences resulted in the child’s attendance being an issue;\(^{64}\) and even with the outlawing of the practices of tōhunga, who worked with the mysterious in healing\(^{65}\) and not solely with the solid entity, the body, before

\(^{62}\) According to Novalis, it is modern human tendency to make things in the world certain through the initial certainty of the self: “Die Geschichte der Welt als Menschengeschichte zu behandeln, überall nur menschliche Begebenheiten und Verhältnisse zu finden, ist eine fortwandernde, in den verschiedensten Zeiten wieder mit neuer Bildung hervortretende Idee geworden, und scheint an wunderbarer Wirkung und leichter Überzeugung beständig den Vorrang gehabt zu haben” (1960e, p. 84)/“To treat the history of the universe as a history of mankind, to find only human happenings and relations everywhere, is a continuous idea, reappearing at the most widely separate epochs, always in a new form, and this conception seems to have excelled all others in miraculous effect and persuasiveness” (2005, pp. 23-24). Novalis identifies the replicating nature of the pursuit for certainty as it manifests itself in different guises but also observes in that same excerpt the importance of human creativity in relating to things in the world. His aphorism serves two ironic functions: to warn against thinking that one will validly only find the self everywhere, and simultaneously to recognise that creativity is a human asset.

\(^{63}\) “Klügere Mitglieder wußten jedoch die schon warmgewordenen Zuhörer sogleich wieder mit kaltem Wasser zu begießen” (1960d, p. 516)/“More clever members knew how to throw cold water on their inspired audience” (Beiser, 1996, p. 70). In Die Christenheit oder Europa, as we have seen, Novalis states that this objectification had implications for the everyday practices of education and scholarship which were given a “neuern, vernünftigen, gemeinern Sinn” (Novalis, 1960d, p. 516)/“new, rational and common sense meaning” (Beiser, 1996, p. 70), working themselves into the institutional level.

\(^{64}\) With the Education Ordinance 1847 Governor Grey instituted boarding schools to provide Māori children with the opportunity to focus more on education in an environment dedicated just to that and away from “the demoralizing influence of the Māori villages” (Barrington, 1966, p. 2).

\(^{65}\) Mark and Lyons (2010) interviewed Māori healers and found that those healers’ practices engaged with what is now often termed ‘the supernatural’. The mysteriousness of things in the world and the effect on individuals may, amongst other factors, be linked back to inherited curses, or to a “lack of respect for the land” (p. 1760). In this latter scenario, sometimes the land itself needs healing for the ‘client’ to also heal. Healers
them. The last instance in turn has its precedence and subsequence in the idea that health should be predicated on the fragmentation of things in the world, through combating the undesirable by ‘proper’ hygiene practices, and by the idea that an expert, himself trained in focusing on things in the world in isolation, is solely able to deal with ill health. These self-consciously health-focused practices would sit alongside notions of racial superiority through measurements of native peoples, blood quantum practices and, in an interdisciplinary sense, through cross-fertilisation and support from other disciplines such as law and education.

66 There was an extensive push to have Māori conform to Western ideals of hygiene, beginning in the mid-19th century. The government of the time established vaccination programmes and hospitals (Dow, 1999) to try to combat Māori mortality rates, but these were thought to be quite inadequate (Simon & Smith, 2001). However, after Pope’s appointment as Inspector, sanitation programmes began in earnest, due in part to his belief that there was widespread “[n]ative ignorance and neglect of sanitary laws” (Education: Native Schools, 1884, p. 1). Native Schools adopted active policies on hygiene, which, according to Simon and Smith (2001), were directly related to “wider policies of assimilation and the domestication of Maori” (p. 203). Simon and Smith discuss the widespread impact of the “Laws of Health” and the “Gospel of Soap and Water” with direct reference to narratives provided by past pupils and teachers. Māori communities often resisted the imposition of hygiene rules on their children, although at other schools parents acquiesced.

67 The privileging of Western medical science - which along with beliefs in civilisation fuelled these hygiene and health policies - reached one apex in many in 1907 with the introduction of the Tohunga Suppression Act. This Act was designed to prevent tōhunga from carrying out their healing practices and was backed by Native Minister Carroll (Durie, 1994). Besides actively making traditional practices illegal, one of the Act’s objectives was to force Māori to consult Western medicine, as traditional healing practices were thought to be exacerbating the ill health of Māori. The damaging effects of this Act on Māori communities have not been proven empirically, but it is commonly acknowledged amongst Māori to have delivered one of the most devastating blows to the social structures of Māori communities and to the qualitative and quantitative knowledge aspects of Māori healing. In statements of claim to the Waitangi Tribunal which are lodged on behalf of iwi, for instance, this Act frequently comprises a considerable and formative part of the grievance, with Durie (2001) describing it as “the greatest blow to the organisation of Maori knowledge and understanding” (p. 51).
Health as an issue of physical presence: Licht und Schatten

A physical focus on health can to a certain extent explain the trauma experienced by groups of people when they are forcibly transplanted from a context that is characterised by traditional diet and practices into a foreign one. The onset of diseases like diabetes and cardiovascular diseases in relation to Māori is often posed as a social problem of colonisation, to the extent that these explanations note that the pre-colonisation diet did not predispose Māori to those and other diseases that they are now prevalent sufferers of (Cambie & Ferguson, 2003; Rush, Hsi, Ferguson, Williams, & Simmons, 2010), and that this diet may even be used to combat those problems. These accounts accord with a Zahlen-based explanation in their indication that Māori have been moved out of a certain, more authentic mode of living in relation to the foods and activities that they engage with. Practices associated with food and eating – indeed, the nature and function of food at its most fundamental level – are also currently forgotten so that the food is constructed as an inert source of wellbeing, according to these explanations.

Zahlen-derived explanations for the place of the self in relation to the expert, and the self as that which reveals disease, are more fundamental than even those outlined above, though. In law and medicine the same problem exists as a current, disciplining one, where Māori must appear before the clinic or the court as a highly evident entity, displaying a particularly evident phenomenon – medical or moral. The fundamental principle of both is that the criminal or the invalid is actually physically present before what Foucault (1989) terms ‘the Gaze’. Here, obviously, what is extremely important to the practice of medicine and law is the physical presence of the Māori individual, an idea that itself may be critiqued. My earlier critique of the Waitangi Tribunal holds true for other courtroom practices.

68 In both medical and legal academic and political contexts it is often argued that Māori figure disproportionately because of the traumatic and intergenerational effects of colonisation – see for instance: Durie (2005); Jackson (1988); Walker (2004); Durie (2003); Goldsmith (2002). Spiritual dispossession is an element of trauma which, I am arguing, continues in the apparently straightforward and clinical forums of law and medicine.
as well. In the case of medicine – for instance, in the visit of the Māori self with
the doctor – the Māori individual can be given a diagnosis after his or her
individual appearance. Rather than the body being thought of as ‘tinana’, where
the energy of mauri, and the interplay of the Absolute as it relates things in the
world to what is called the body, illness is seen as a result of “personal
dysfunction” (Durie, 1985, p. 483) and is demarcably evident in that sense. The
diagnostic tools introduced by Western science are extremely useful for the
visibilising of the physical body: They can firstly frame the body in relation to a
state of normalcy and then assess where disease lies and, moreover, its properties.
After Foucault, the Gaze can plunge deeply into the viscera of the person before it
by reading the signs of illness inscribed on the body. The body is therefore a
phenomenon that displaces air and space and may be thought of as a measurable
entity. Disease is similarly a physical manifestation, exhibiting itself within
individual bodies. Alongside – or beneath - the general change in the perception
about diet amongst Māori due to colonisation, then, there rests a much more
fundamental change in the way that disease, associated with the Absolute and
other things in the world, is represented.

In tandem with this change, new names, many of which etymologically reflect the
physicality and isolation of these diseases, were introduced. In traditional belief
‘mate’ could refer to an imbalance of tapu and noa, even in the case of ‘mate
tangata’.69 This expression for an imbalance takes into account the activity of
things in the world as they come to bear on the ancestral body, which itself
actively participates with things in the world. However, terms such as ‘measles’,
‘diabetes’71, and ‘cancer’72 - terms which Māori encounter regularly – are now

69 Durie (1994) maintains that mate tangata, “accidents, injuries sustained through
combat” (p. 17), could be distinguished from mate atua, which were believed to be
illnesses with no physical causation. Despite this apparent distinction, many Māori will
still attribute a spiritual cause to mate tangata.

70 Measles derives from Middle English ‘maseles’, referring to pustule, or spot on the
skin (Onions, 1966).

71 Diabetes derives from Greek for ‘to go through’, where the disease was “marked by
immoderate discharge of urine, containing glucose” (Onions, 1966).

72 According to Onions (1966) ‘cancer’ derives from “crab, creeping ulcer” … “on
account of the resemblance to a crab’s limbs of the swollen veins about the part affected.”
dominant, together with their tendency to describe a solid, physical manifestation. The significance of this change is more than just an incidental change in names; it reflects the overall drive to keep the body scribed out from its context, in stark, visible relief, and to identify with as much precision as possible an offending element.

**The drive of the self to express him- or herself with precision: Schlüssel aller Kreaturen**

Encouraged by the apparent reification and visibility of things in the world, the self is able to prescribe some criteria for what a thing actually is. To some extent this assuredness, for the Māori self at least, arises as a response to a history of traumatic events that catapulted Māori into social uncertainty. From very early contact times, Māori had to contend with a number of situations in which things in the world would be compulsorily explicated and affirmed as comprising certain characteristics. The lived experience of Māori was such that very little would resemble what it first appeared to be. The uncertainty introduced by colonisation ensured that the grounds shifted for Māori, leading to a particular insecurity, both individually and collectively. Individually, the Māori self was left hesitant in their approach to a number of institutions. Rules governing the individual would change. In the case of Māori land, for instance, Māori were confronted with a whole host of changes, with land devolving in continuously changing ways between various statutes. Education would similarly manifest a host of changes, 

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73 There are numerous writings about the traumatic impact of colonisation on indigenous peoples. For those which allude to a subsequent sense of uncertainty, see: Smith (1999); Pihama (2001); Duran, Duran and Brave Heart (1998); Brave Heart (2004); Farrelly, Rudegeair and Rickard (2005). The continuing institutional push for Māori to define things in the world with precision is, I argue, equally as traumatic as those well-known events that took place with colonisation. Trauma in this sense is not solely confined to what can be felt or defined; it is instead a largely hidden phenomenon that resides in the murkiness of everyday dealings with Geheimnislosigkeit.

74 Since the Native Land Act 1865, Māori have had to contend with a bewildering raft of legislation that deals with who may succeed to land shares, who may set up trusts for the administration of shares, who may buy shares, who may sell shares, and which application forms are the correct ones for all these processes to take place, to name some
from biblically based teaching to secular teaching, and through the allowance/disallowance of Māori language in schools.

The drive to be precise about things in the world is then perhaps stronger in a social sense for indigenous peoples despite assured assertions being in conflict with a philosophical respect for the Absolute. The Geheimnislosigkeit of the ‘I’ understandably becomes an overriding concern here. Thus criteria are established by and about the traumatised group. Philosophically, the drive to find the ground of existence comes about by an expectation that the self is the ground of awareness and can then discern what a correct proclamation is about a thing in the world. Institutionally, this takes place in the most common settings and with what appear to be the most banal media: Governmental forms that specify a number of tribal names that the Māori individual is meant to align with and tick are an immediate example. At a grander but less socially pervasive level, this drive can be expressed through criteria that are set up to neatly package a formerly mysterious thing in the world, such as in highly prescribed research. An approach to research that posits the self as the inquirer and the other as knowledgeable shows that the assuredness of things in the world can occur especially in institutions that wish to find a thing out. An already established research method, for instance, would mean that there is an expected outcome from which expected objects, defined in advance, would be engaged with to produce answers. Some indigenous writers argue for an historical precedence to research:

The charter for rangahau in Maori culture is laid down in a Maori explanation of the genesis of the world. In this particular version (Walker, 2004) of the Maori genesis of the world Tane and his examples. These causes for uncertainty also highlight the administrative problems that Māori would have to surmount in order to have land viewed as discussable by the Courts to begin with. At all times, though, the self and land were highly visible and geheimnislose entities, despite the various regulations overseeing them.

Jones (2001) questions the possibility of there being any satisfactory pedagogical approach to teaching. She contends that because of the chasm between indigenous understanding of knowledge and western pedagogy “all teaching … is inevitably unsatisfactory or impossible – because it is based in the persistent and inevitable pedagogical fantasy about the linear and cumulative increase in knowing” (p. 288).
siblings lived in a world devoid of light between their sky father and earth mother. The siblings saw the light through the armpit of their father and this formed the question of what was beyond, light, the metaphor for knowledge became the catalyst for rangahau. They wished to separate their parents from their primeval embrace so as to experience the world outside their parents. They were also faced with the dilemma of whether separating their parents was ethical. Some of the siblings supported the idea and some did not and they had to solve the problem of just how to separate their parents. Many of them tried, unsuccessfully, as they tested their theories on how best to achieve their goal. Eventually it was Tane who as a result of his searching nature, separated his parents (Walker, 2004). The spirit of enquiry, theorising, empirical testing and knowledge created and inscribed in the Maori creation is woven through other ancient narratives. (Edwards, 2009, p. 17)

The emphasis here is on the creative individual, which as we have seen is not inimical to a reading of Being. Here, the creative individual is read as performing a deed for change, but the matter of emphasis is an important one: Edwards emphasises that the acting individual is solely responsible for creating a point of inquiry (and thereafter a resolution): I argue on the other hand that the individual is constantly interacted by, and interacts with, other things in the world that are sometimes unidentifiable, and thus is affected by a desire to find out. But in deciding that the self is the beginning of this process, one has managed to avoid the impact of the Geheimnis so that one stands out from other things in the world. A precise definition of the self is arrived at through the current sort of research that does not acknowledge sometimes unknowable elements of things in the world.

The excerpt of Edwards’ may also intend to acknowledge the Absolute, but unless it is explicitly allowed for then the idea dominantly becomes that the desire to inquire into another thing in the world is due to the self. That the self is the alpha of this process is one that Meyer (2008) likewise resists when, citing Calvin Hoe, she asks “[t]he question is, Who is the self? You’re not just who you are now.
You’re aligned with people who have gone through it lots and lots of times” (p. 218). With Meyer’s assertion we can see that the certainty of the self is brought into issue far more than it is by Edwards. Meyer goes on to say that knowledge is “a life force connected to all other life forces. It is more an extension than it is a thing to accumulate” (p. 218). Thus she subscribes to an active, ongoing process of coming to be acquainted with things in the world so that we can “enter spaces of wonderment”. She poses an altogether less empirical and more phenomenological approach to things in the world, as a means of progressing a research methodology. The self is inquisitive as a response to other things in the world, and the other is possessed of their own Geheimnis and avoids being an entity to approach for knowledge.

Adhering to specific criteria might be reasonable if it were just an occasional ‘incident’, but it is the pervasive essence of rigid and precise categories that is vexing for Novalis’s critique, as we have seen. The Māori health researcher might be expected to perform according to Rangahau Hauora Māori: Investment Signal published by Health Research Council of New Zealand (2012), for instance, and one might then think that it is just an isolated example of how one should operate in terms of one’s role as inquirer, but in fact it is the constant presence of a drive for precise selves and others that is important for Zahlen and Figuren to continue. Some forms of research, where the self is self-assured, are just examples of that problem. Another manifestation of this drive for an evident self is in the positioning of the self as a traditionally acting entity. It is to this example that I now turn.

The split between ceremonial and everyday thought

Among the other consequences of this colonising process is that the individual is encouraged to move outside of the interplay of things in the world so that they can discuss those things. In their identity as discussants it is assumed that the Māori knowledgeable/knowable other will provide information about those things, rather than dwell within their mysterious relationship. The witness in a legal setting is encouraged to move out of the dwelling that Novalis encouraged in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais to look at those things in the world as if they lay before him or her.
Expressions of identity play an important role here: As we have seen, the utterances that such institutions as the Waitangi Tribunal aim for are those which can neatly and precisely deal with things in the world, including Māori. Constituting agents of Zahlen and Figuren, Western institutions are concerned with concise discussions, and the kinds of literature that Māori encounter from Government departments may either be sourced in language about Māori or require involvement by Māori in many forms. In the former, which is largely linked with governmental policy, Māori can read about themselves as if they are obvious, evident entities, acting in set and certain ways, or they can be viewed as problematic entities which do not meet a set of normal expectations. Both instances here, however, have as their basis the same descriptive, highly classifying aspect of language. Here, Māori are this or do that.

The institutionally prescribed traditional self

As the clear entities that policy proposes, Māori fall into a concise category of either transparently traditionally acting beings or else of ontologically unmatched to Western institutions, particularly to law, health and education. The language of policy that talks about Māori as currently evident entities that are nevertheless historically derived appears to confer upon Māori the certainty of tradition. It is a language that is borne of observations of anthropologists, historians, and behaviourists. Ultimately it is a discourse that, because of its assured approach

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76 Barcham (1998) notes this tendency in his assertion that “[t]he continual reference by government and the courts to perceptions of Maori society of today as a replica of Maori society of 1840, fails to take in to consideration the evolution of Maori society” (p. 306).

77 Heidegger thinks that tradition itself becomes obscured and solidified rather than viewed as a silently manifest continuity: “Die hierbei zur Herrschaft kommende Tradition macht zunächst und zumeist das, was sie ‘übergibt’, so wenig zugänglich, daß sie es vielmehr verdeckt. Sie überantwortet das Überkommende der Selbstverständlichkeit und verlegt den Zugang zu den ursprünglichen ‘Quellen’, daraus die überlieferten Kategorien und Begriffe z. T. in echter Weise geschöpf wurden. Die Tradition macht sogar eine solche Herkunft überhaupt vergessen. Sie bildet die Unbedürfigkeit aus, einen solchen Rückgang in seiner Notwendigkeit auch nur zu verstehen” (1993, p. 21)“When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand” (1967, p. 43). Although Heidegger was
to things, locates Māori in a particular space so that they may thereafter talk about themselves as either traditionally certain or uncertain. Māori are hence caught here in a language that is dichotomising, with preference being given to those that can read themselves as traditional, according to the unstated criteria of the policy literature. It must be said that the language of policy, when it concerns Māori, never blatantly offers Māori a choice of whether they are traditional or somehow non-traditional, but it opens up a solidly preferred, yet not directly stated, mode of identity. The language that expresses this preference may start at the beginning, in the form of an ancient proverb:

E kore e ngaro
He kākano i ruia mai i Rangiātea

I will never be lost
For I am a seed sown from Rangiātea

This proverb is included at the beginning of a report undertaken by the Law Commission (2001) titled *Maori Customs and Values in New Zealand Law*. Taken solely it will not threaten a Māori view of the world, but it does hint at what is to come in the report. The report itself is nothing unusual in that it arises as the result of a perceived problem – in this case, that Māori tīkanga/customs are not reflected in Western law – and it does offer some discussion about the changing nature of tīkanga and identity, yet in order to explicate a desired approach to integrating the two laws it is the very tidy, concise language depicting traditional activity that is referred to. The language of solution is that which describes this activity.

*The restriction of tīkanga to the ceremonial realm*

Māori custom is simplified in these reports. A dominant means of securing a simplified custom is through the traditionalising of behaviour, for if government literature were to engage with an idea of a sophisticated culture that critically engaged with language and Geheimnislosigkeit in a philosophical manner to solve expressly discussing the uncritical uptake of a Being-denied Western metaphysics, his comments may be useful for the Māori reader as they suggest that one focus critically on the set of behavioural traditions as solid, identifiable entities. For him, this is an undesirable and uncritical mode of interaction with one’s heritage.
the problem of what is essentially the dominance of Western institutions then clarity is thwarted. Where the ill health of Māori is raised as an issue, for example, then a similar reversion to the apparently traditional ways of behaving is seen tacitly or explicitly as a panacea, with the result that the idea of a Māori culture is preserved. Māori culture is thereby neatly contained, and through the discourse of traditionalism it cannot threaten to overrun the fraught nature of the institutions that Māori have problems with. Another means of description that may outline some traditional behaviours but that is primarily and overtly critical, not just descriptive, is much more likely to produce difficulties for those institutions. This is not just because it expressly threatens those institutions in what it articulates but also because it is uncontainable: It is less likely to make culture highly evident for a start, and it threatens to move the focus away from an expected and predictable behaviour – usually ritualised - of Māori, to the problem of the institution itself.

In focusing on a set of traditional practices, such discourses threaten to neglect the birthright of the self to dwell on a daily basis within the realm of being Māori. The practices in themselves do not threaten a respect for this ‘withinness’, but an emphasis on them as preferred skill-sets does. An emphasis on traditional practices – the ability to perform or carry out a traditional practice in particular – means that the possibility of an everyday experience of dwelling within things in the world, without any outward expression, is discouraged or even disallowed. Here, a person may carry out an activity in an everyday sense but this is not seen as especially Māori. Yet the traditional idea that one is the embodiment of one’s ancestors, mountains, lakes and so on has its basis in the belief that what is performed is contingent on what the interplay of those elements is. What are now thought of as traditional practices, in other words, are obvious expressions of being part of that interplay but are not definitive of it.

*The problem of one ontologically special language: A place for non-speakers of Māori*

The power that Novalis believed was innate to poesy has consequences that branch into two directions for the Māori self. The first scenario is that the Māori language is inherently special and powerful. In order to transform things in the
world that are important to Māori collectively, at least in a spiritual sense, one should be conversant with the Māori language. The ability to comport oneself authentically towards things in the world is dependent on using te reo Māori, because te reo Māori somehow possesses an inwardly unique specialness when compared with other languages. This line of thought places particular emphasis on the need for speech, and, moreover, speech in a proper language. This view of a language special above all others is one that Heidegger preferred – and one that often earns him sharp criticism - with his assertion that “[d]enn diese [griechische] Sprache ist (auf die Möglichkeiten des Denkens gesehen) neben der deutschen die mächtigste und geistigste zugleich” (1953, p. 43)/“[f]or along with German the Greek language is (in regard to its possibilities for thought) at once the most powerful and most spiritual of all languages” (1959, p. 57). While not stated outright, the assumption is that one should not attempt Māori ceremonies without a certain level of competency in the Māori language. It is a view that is easily the most accepted amongst Māori communities and individuals. The Māori individual who wields te reo Māori in a poetic sense would be especially identified as an expert rendering spaces and people ‘noa’/[occupying more of a common space than a sacred one] or ‘tapu’ [within a space of sacrality]. Te reo Māori, used after poesy, does then escape the confines of Zahlen.

Despite the apparent distinctiveness innate to the Māori language, however, it is instead its ability as one language of many to reflect the relationship of things in the world, with its glimpses of Being, that makes it powerful. If we keep Novalis’ Zahlen in mind, then language that expresses the interrelationship of things in the world is that which is capable of dispelling the ‘perverse word’. As language produces “eine Welt für sich aus” (Novalis, 1960c, p. 672)/[a world by itself], according to O’Brien it is “a ‘natural’ phenomenon among others” (p. 197), and hence reflects the interplay of things in the world. In this the Māori language is not singular, although for the Māori self it may be of psychological solace that it represents the relationship more effectively than other languages. Language in general reflects this relationship when used poetically, and individuals that do not speak or understand Māori may still be capable of comporting themselves towards
things so that all those elements retain their Geheimnis. Further, specific knowledge of the Māori language may not be necessary for some individuals who are Māori but lack traditional knowledge. In these cases language as a specific entity may or may not be a factor in the comportment of those individuals to things, but the individuals are nevertheless operating within the interplay of those things. When they do speak, their words – even if in a language other than Māori – have an effect on the outer world. In other words, they operate in an ancestral and ontological space that, with regards to the ontological sphere, is not substantially different from those who possess traditional knowledge or who can speak Māori.

My argument here is not to downplay the importance of any inherent uniqueness of Māori language, but instead to note that the Absolute that gives rise to this uniqueness is shared by other languages, or that it even exists within realms of silence. What is crucial is whether any language being used reveals that there is a fluid relationship between things. There is also a social aspect to my argument, because often the abilities and skills of Māori to act in a Māori way are overlooked if they do not have the accompanying knowledge. Whilst both traditional and non-traditional individuals, carrying outward expressions of being amongst things in the world, do not convey with them the currently preferred ways of acting in a Western sense, they are nevertheless as much a part of those things in the world. Both groups of people – some of those working with traditional practices, and some operating in an everyday sense within things in the world but who do not have any Māori knowledge – are working with things in the world whilst operating within them. Consciously aware of this, these individuals come close to matching Novalis’ idea of the creative self. The individual saying a karakia to clear the house after a death, for instance, is clearly acknowledging the Geheimnis of things in the world whilst actively calling on some things for a desired effect, but the individual who undertakes the most banal task is at times no less in that same space.

78 Especially if they choose to romanticise what is normally assumed to be the given approach to things in the world. I apply this process in chapter seven.
The everyday self operating within Being

My argument for the parity of these selves is less prescriptive than that commonly allowed for the Māori individual because it claims that practices are one important area of several. In all these modes of being, the self appears to be immersed within the workings of the Absolute, and conveys that appearance to others. Whilst I do not deny the importance of traditional practices as expressions of specific acts with the Absolute, the emphasis on them detracts from the significance of that immersion. This over-emphasis may result in a focus on events disparate from the ongoing activity of Being, as I have argued. A third sort of individual, commonly thought of as operating within a space of intellectualism, is the one who actively engages with the theory and/or reality of colonisation. That they consciously react against, and commonly operate within, Western frameworks, shows a similar creativity to that of the other selves. The Spiel of creativity here is one that deliberately considers the form and essence of colonising practices and operates with things in the world whilst being immersed within them. This individual does not seek to transcend their present moment by highlighting a static traditionalism but instead stays within that moment to critically engage with things brought into their awareness. I argue that the current influx of Western educated Māori – teachers, lawyers, doctors, academics, scientists, alongside activists, for instance – potentially carry with them a way of operating that discloses to others the outward expressions of their relationship of things in the world, including history, colonial oppression and freedom, and ancestors. The conditional here, I continue, is that they remain thoughtful of Western colonisation in carrying out their professional duties. This is often a difficult undertaking for these individuals and so is a kind of dwelling that requires an engagement of thinking about, and awareness of, things in the world other than the traditional. The act of thinking here, as we shall see in chapter seven, is a conscious withholding from the self as central figure; the thinking here operates much less with static bytes of knowledge and much more with being tentative towards the Geheimnis of things. I argue that this is a thoughtful but

79 In this way of thinking, I argue, they are engaging in the metaphysical dialectic that has been founded by korekore by constantly taking into account an oppositional or colonised reality. These professional roles are conventional evidence of the ‘Tiefgelehrten’, but the static regard that underpins them may be disrupted by an awareness of their metaphysically colonising tendencies.
precarious space because the self must somehow have a traditional respect for Geheimnis and the Absolute but also be thoughtfully open to the practice of thinking that things in the world are geheimnislos. In pre-contact times this would have been thought of as a space that is equally as precarious as that occupied by the tohunga who is opening a wharenui, for instance: In both cases, the self is in a state of dwelling amongst things in the world but especially adopts a position of vulnerability in respect of those things\textsuperscript{80}.

It may be obvious to the reader that I am moving towards a suggestion in this section: that the notion of tikanga be broadened. ‘Tikanga’ is overwhelmingly constructed as a set of behaviours that carry with them discernibly unique traits of Māori expression. My argument in this section has been that such an approach accords with a constrictive manifestation of Zahlen and Figuren and threatens to reject a somewhat prior phenomenon – a belief that one is operating within the realm of Being. A counter-argument could be mounted that the term itself does not preclude these other modes of operating amongst things in the world but that it instead just intends to point to traditional behaviours. This is a credible argument, but the term itself has proliferated in reference to traditional behaviours to the neglect of that prior state of being.

\textit{The positioning of language as an instrument of precision}

There are two problems to be discussed in relation to language. These are:

1. That language itself is a phenomenon that is thought of in advance and then in practice as an instrument to convey precise meaning.

2. That individual Māori terms, even when not contextualised amongst institutionalising discourses, may be used to open up a geheimnislose view

\textsuperscript{80} López (1998) highlights this vulnerability when discussing the responsibility of the indigenous scholar in “writing against the mainstream” (p. 226). Briefly, he asserts that the problem lies in “engaging non-traditional epistemological forms in research” which he undertakes to be audible against “scientistic frameworks”. Specifically in respect of research, Mahuika (2009) observes the postcolonial experience of having to provide the ‘other’ Māori perspective in certain mainstream contexts and notes the continuing burden of this set of anxieties. His remark can be broadened to engage with the experiences of many indigenous professionals as they mediate between the colonising nature of Geheimnislosigkeit and arguing for various Māori worldviews.
of things in the world. This problem may occur even if those terms are held out to be inherently important.

Due to my focus on Māori terms in the thesis, and their colonisation by a geheimnislosen view of things in the world in the first instance, I shall leave the latter problem until the following chapter, but turn to the first of these problems now.

The precedence that specifically develops the position of language as merely an envelope of precise meaning\(^{81}\) takes many forms in New Zealand, and a complete description is beyond the scope of this thesis\(^{82}\). Pawley (1989) who refers to the

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\(^{81}\) And yet “a piece of writing or a speech therefore has its own mauri” (C. Smith, 2000, p. 43). The process of speaking is hence an action of mauri as much as the final outcome. Just as the process does not emphasise correctness as the predicate for mauri, neither does the outcome.

\(^{82}\) By sheer dint of its existence, the education system abstracted the worldview of Māori, and thus the objects referred to. It also set about interrupting and reconfiguring directly a Māori view of the world. Literature dealing with the education of Māori in Western schools is densely populated with comments about the apparent superiority of English, often with no justification of those assertions. However, there were a number of instances in which the precision of the English language was mentioned in support of its importance. In the second reading of the 1867 Native Schools Bill in the House of Representatives, for instance, Carleton (1867) mentioned the imperfect state of the Māori language in comparison with English:

> They could never civilize them through the medium of a language that was imperfect as a medium of thought. If they attempted it, failure was inevitable; and civilization could only be eventually carried out by means of a perfect language. (p. 863)

The 1867 Native Schools Act insisted that instruction be in English. That provision of the Act was subsequently upheld by Takamoana (1871), who was a Member of Parliament, and Simon & Smith (2001) note that in 1877 Wi Te Hakiro petitioned Parliament for an amendment to the 1867 Act, along with 336 others. Their proposed amendment specified that prospective native schoolteachers were to have no facility in the Māori language. That Māori were supportive of the move to oust Māori language and to embrace the teaching of English is undeniable, but this also probably indicates the success of the wider social and economic machinery of colonisation at that time. Carleton’s comments reflected the near universal endorsement, common to that era, of the linguistic superiority of English. English would provide Māori with access to the civilised world, but in its own right it was naturally precise and capable of correctness. The Māori language could only be used if it would step the students up to a better usage of English; hence Māori was seen as an auxiliary language, although the use of Māori altogether in schools would later be banned. Māori would have been associated with a preliminary step to a language that was naturally precise, and by implication was contrasted with the idea of precision. The focus on the precise use of language continued well into the twentieth
“analytic task” of studying another language gives a good example of the view of language as an instrument of precision. He continues that:

We need to treat language as part of a culture, a system of knowledge, and look at the structure of that knowledge as it is codified (author’s own emphasis) in the structural formulas and the vocabulary of the language. That means examining the semantic organisation of the vocabulary and of discourse. (p. 21)

The clear belief here that language should be systematised and broken down into its smallest components to be ready for an ‘analytic task’ is by no means solely that of Pawley’s. It has its roots in the linguistic study of language, which is a scientific study of language (Fromkin et al., 2000). Resorting to linguistics to unambiguously describe the framework of language has also been taken up with some enthusiasm by leading Māori writers in the area of language revitalisation. For instance, Karētu and Waite (1989) assert that “[f]ortunately, those who developed the writing system were good linguists – their legacy is a system founded on scientific principles” (p. 219). They also highlight the special and important aspects of te reo Māori. It is important to note here that a scientific study of language may lead to a technical understanding. Thus it is not wrong per se; it may indeed be achieving exactly what it set out to achieve. But more critique should be directed at the extent to which institutions endorse a scientific approach to language, to things in the world and then the terms that refer to them. The instances that could be recounted here are numerous: One example lies in a century, with the inspector of Māori schools noting in 1931 that Māori students were still not able to correctly express themselves in English (Barrington, 1966). Through those statements and in those forums, Māori were thus subjected to a view of precise, correct language, not one that was spiritual or emotional. It is true that knowledge traditionally had to be passed on accurately, with well-known writers such as Benton (1989) stating that “[t]raditional Maori education placed great emphasis on linguistic proficiency” (p. 7); however, the accuracy element may not have been the determining one in respect of language for Māori. Other explanations altogether could have been equally compelling, including the non-human, nature-derived origin of some forms of language, for instance, or the relationship of mauri with language. But the focus of schools, statute, and legal institutions was not on those alternative explanations, and thus Māori were overwhelmingly exposed to the notion that language was a tool for the communication of correct ideas. The very sources of language were being displaced with a subjectivist, yet objective, view of language.
research project I worked on with other researchers, which focuses on Māori attitudes to fertility. In January 2009 a discussion document titled Consultation on the Use of In Vitro Maturation in Fertility Treatment was published by Advisory Committee on Reproductive Technology and released for feedback. The one page section “Māori Perspectives” deals with ethical practice under the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 and at times bolds the words ‘te ao Māori’, ‘whakapapa’, ‘mana’, ‘whanaungatanga’, ‘tino rangatiratanga’, ‘kaitiakitanga’, ‘whare tangata’, and ‘tikanga’. These Māori words, then, are represented as novel ones that are moved out in the text, and impact on the reader as significant and possibly separate phenomena. However, that they are immediately equivalent with their common English translations within the terrain of written text becomes clear. For instance, in the fourth paragraph:

Some Māori have raised concerns over who has the mana to make decisions about the use of assisted reproductive technology. Recognition of mana through the potential involvement of whānau in decision-making is important because it:

- gives whānau an opportunity to explore ways to address infertility (an expression of whanaungatanga). (Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology, 2009, p. 10)

In the context in which they are used, these words mean no more than their English counterparts, where ‘mana’ could be substituted with ‘power’, ‘whānau’ with ‘families’, and ‘whanaungatanga’ with ‘family bondedness’. While Māori might know these words to be more than the connotations of the English translations, or indeed something else altogether, it is still likely that these unproblematic equivalences can move into common discourse. Unless these words are defined as something much greater in the context in which they are used, then they are constrained by the dominant Western context.

83 Novalis laments that fragmenting things in the world has dire consequences for the delicate interrelationship between them. This method can be contrasted with the holism of the poets: “Wenn diese [die Dichter] mehr das Flüssige und Flüchtige mit leichtem Sinn verfolgten, suchten jene mit scharfen Messerschnitten den innern Bau und die Verhältnisse der Glieder zu erforschen” (1960e, p. 84)/“Poets have lightheartedly pursued the liquid and fugitive, while scientists have cut into the inner structure and sought after the relations between its members” (2005, pp. 25-26).
Quite apart from that political problem that characterises the hegemonic movement of a Māori term to meet the strict meaning of its counterpart, language is also dominantly treated as a way of transferring one’s rational knowledge and thoughts. Language is then treated in advance as an instrument that is for the benefit of an acceptable progression of ideas. Novalis (1960c) has a great deal to say about this in his “Monolog”:

Es ist eigentlich um das Sprechen und Schreiben eine närrische Sache; das rechte Gespräch ist ein bloßes Wortspiel. Der lächerliche Irrthum ist nur zu bewundern, daß die Leute meinen - sie sprächen um der Dinge willen. Gerade das Eigenthümliche der Sprache, daß sie sich blos um sich selbst bekümmert, weiß keiner. Darum ist sie ein so wunderbares und fruchtbares Geheimniß, - daß wenn einer blos spricht, um zu sprechen, er gerade die herrlichsten, originellsten Wahrheiten ausspricht. Will er aber von etwas Bestimmten sprechen, so läßt ihn die launige Sprache das lächerlichste und verkehrtesteste Zeug sagen. (p. 672)

It is a strange thing about speaking and writing; a real conversation is just a game of words. One can only be amazed at the ridiculous mistake, that people think they speak for the sake of things. Of the fact that language is peculiar because it only concerns itself with itself, nobody is aware. That is why it is a wonderful and fruitful secret, - that precisely when someone speaks just in order to speak he pronounces the most splendid and original truths. But if he wishes to speak of something determinate, temperamental old language makes him say the most ridiculous and mistaken things. (Bowie, 1997, p. 65)

Novalis confers upon language a certain kind of ‘logic’ but not in the conventional sense. Language is logical because it enables thought to take place through the relation of concepts to each other, not because single words are self-explanatory through their denotative meanings. Language in the poetic and authentic sense is mystical – the guiding nature of the Absolute revealing itself
from afar, hidden behind words – so that what we refer to modernly as real language is merely an expression of what that guidance is. Glimpses are provided of the relationships between things but the things themselves may not be determined, although it is humanity’s drive to define them that demarcates humanity as unique. The ‘Wortspiel’ that Novalis anticipates here is also a serious one because of the manifestation of the Absolute that is to take place through language, and because it is meant to connect the self to things in the world and the self’s history with other things in the world.

Language viewed as possession

A view that language is humanity’s possession and that it can be used as such is a striking example of a thing in the world rendered geheimnislos. As we shall see in the following chapter, words are then used to reflect the thing in the world as a static entity. Yet ‘language’, dominantly conceived, is in its own right rendered similarly static. In the case of Māori, this may be seen in the proliferation of the term ‘taonga’ in relation to Māori language. Alongside merely being a term that indicates preciousness, ‘taonga’ is also widely used in relation to language itself. As King (2007) states when discussing the slogan ‘He taonga te reo’:

This adage has achieved prominence in Māori rhetoric and song in recent years, particularly since its enshrinement in New Zealand law in the 1987 Māori Language Act. The preamble to this Act states that Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi ‘confirmed and guaranteed to the Māori people, among other things, all their taonga’ and that ‘the Māori language is one such taonga’. The Māori Language Act instituted a Māori Language Commission (Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori) which has taken the sentiment enshrined in its founding Act and promulgated it widely, using it in titles to several of their publications. (p. 61)

She continues that its prominence has made it possibly the most widely cited metaphor in respect of te reo Māori. Such a metaphor places the language as an object, wherein the language becomes a “timeless unchanging treasure, or object”
She emphasises here how the language in effect has been made a permanent, fixed object in its association with taonga. Despite continuing to be arranged by Being among other things in the world, language itself may nevertheless be detrimentally affected by how it is referred to and by the labels that are affixed to it. However, the preciousness of language, or implicitly its taonga status, is something that is articulated to form both the basis of language rejuvenation and language possession. For instance, Tīmoti Karētu (1990) posits that:

[F]or me language is central to my mana [prestige, power, authority]. Without it could I still claim to be Māori? I do not think so for it is the language which has given me what mana I have and it is the only thing which differentiates me from anyone else ... what makes me Māori apart from the blood of my Māori ancestors which courses through my veins, is my language, the key to the song, proverb, legend, philosophy and rhetoric of my Māori world. (p. 17)

Here, language has ‘given’ the author some respect. It is therefore useful to the subject, and although it appears that language is something that intervenes with the subject of its own free will, by its nature it nevertheless fulfils a deep desire of the subject.

That language has taken on such pride of place is not surprising, as Māori have been exposed to a dominant belief that power resides in its correct usage. As I have argued, what underpins a notion of language as a precise instrument is the belief that language belongs to the self. When this view predominates then I speculate that the self is denied from thinking of language as embodying other qualities.85

84 Kaiser’s (1988) discussion of Zahlen identifies that it is the rigid version of the written word – “eine Abstraktions- und Verfestigungsform der lebendigen Mitteilung” (p. 121) [an abstract and solidified form of living disclosure] – that has taken precedence.

85 The view that language does not embody any spiritual quality, for instance, is contested by several Māori writers, who have different ways of ascribing a spiritual dimension. Browne (2005) focuses on the principle of ‘wairua’ [spirit] to explain the ontological aspect of language: “Wairua, a spiritual phenomenon, as described by participants in this...
Summary

There are two facets to Geheimnislösigkeit that emerge strongly in this chapter. Firstly, it can comprise a preference for a method that remains largely unassailable, such as a scientific one. In this aspect, a sort of grand truth appears that may manifest as a dominant approach to utterances, to the other and to the self. I have given some examples of this: These have included the primary belief that the other is knowable, and that language is a precise and self-derived phenomenon. Additionally, though, the method itself, quite apart from its social dominance, is characterised by its ability to rob things in the world of their Geheimnis through its pursuit to render things in the world separate from their context, to give humanity special powers in that pursuit, and to make things in the world highly visible.

Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” provided an effective Stoßsatz for me to write about the problems of Geheimnislösigkeit. I noted in the introduction to this chapter that study enters the learning environment through a variety of means, which can then be utilised within the teaching and learning process. It is posited that this is essentially through a physical gateway as paralinguistic phenomena, such that sound vibration derived from positive thought intent with related kinaesthetic body responses act as vehicles to transport wairua” (p. 6). Jeffries and Kennedy (2008) discuss the deeper aspects within Māori language as “manifestations … of the intrinsic relationship between tangata whenua … and the rest of the natural world” (p. 10). These writers argue for a spiritual component to language. Royal (1998) contends that it was Maori Marsden’s “emphatic expression of [his] statements that, at first, influenced the process of my entry into Māoritanga” (p. 20). Within the context of his discussion about “mysterious complexities of the spirit”, Royal shows that Marsden’s assertions about the deeper nature of the Māori metaphysical world themselves were imbued with a metaphysical quality, which then compelled him to take action. He continues that Māori did indeed make sense of the world empirically but as an influence of subjective experience, and posits: “I found that the subjective, spiritual reality of Māoritanga is accessed by objective, empirical symbols. The outcome of my research was to discover the Te Ao Mārama world view and philosophy. I have found that the Te Ao Mārama philosophy together with its analytical tool known as whakapapa is an attempt by traditional Māori society to explain, describe and account for everything in the known universe. This includes the phenomenal world experienced on both intellectual (te taha hinengaro) and physical (te taha tinana) planes as well as those illusory and subjective experiences of the spirit (te taha wairua)” (p. 22). I argue that it is the spiritual reality of the Absolute that allows the individual to encounter the empirical symbol to begin with.
his poem mapped out the Zahlen and Figuren in an exploratory way, meaning that my own voice was retained in the critique of a complex, philosophical problem that Māori are potentially threatened by. Underlying this discursive voice I referred to both Novalis’ and Māori reference points that highlighted my critique. This chapter has paved the way for a discussion that relates specifically to how Māori terms are agents of this Geheimnislosigkeit, especially when liberally used and referred to in science, education, law and medicine. Although I have decided to bring Māori terminology into issue in the following chapter, in fact the terms that I choose are merely one lens through which one may consider this Geheimnislosigkeit. While building on this chapter, the following one can also be seen as a direct result of my exploration of “Wenn nicht mehr”. It is therefore a further process of Nachdenken as this chapter has been.
Chapter Six: Nachdenken: The geheimnislose constraint of Being in some Māori terms

Those philosophies of displacement and Geheimnislosigkeit that I outlined in chapter five, which I derived from Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr”, prepare the ground for geheimnislose terms to be attached to things in the world. In modernity, things in the world lose their Geheimnis and lead to a strict, prescriptive use of terms that carries on the intention of these philosophies.

The current chapter reflects on the subversion of commonly used Māori terms so that they meet the expectations of those philosophies that are Zahlen-based. The Māori terms I have chosen are ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’, ‘mātauranga’, and ‘whenua’. For the first part of this chapter, I continue Novalis’ discussion about language and its link with the notion that things in the world should be addressed in accordance with their continued evolution from Being. I then argue that in particularly dominant use of Māori terms there is a forgetting of the Absolute that delivers things in the world their mystery, with the result that those things become geheimnislos. This happens in various ways depending on the term referred to: ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’ and ‘whenua’ are defined in constrained ways, and additionally they are not given as reflecting each other; and ‘matauranga’ is a new term that reifies a cognitive and instrumental approach to the world. In all cases the terms, when normally used, avoid the impact of the Absolute and seek to find a pure, unmysterious phenomenon. The reader will also discern a strong theme that is carried on from chapter five: that the self is also rendered geheimnislos as it engages in a geheimnislose manner with things in the world, through a dominant use of terms.

Novalis’ views on language, continued

I concluded the previous chapter by emphasising Novalis’ views on language. Language for Novalis is a philosophical issue because it is a crucial human
phenomenon, not because there is any one special language that has more access to the Absolute than others. It is instead “das wunderbare Gespräch in zahllosen Sprachen unter den tausendfaltigen Naturen” (1960e, p. 95)/[the wonderful conversation of the thousand-fold natures in countless languages] that allows Being to manifest in its creativity and in both its darkness and luminescence. I extrapolate from that idea of Novalis’ that there is then conversely no language that is immune from being intruded on by a lack of mystery. With this issue in mind, Novalis has the following to say in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais*:

Es mag lange gedauert haben, ehe die Menschen darauf dachten, die mannigfachen Gegenstände ihrer Sinne mit einem gemeinschaftlichen Namen zu bezeichnen und sich entgegen zu setzen. Durch Übung werden Entwicklungen befördert, und in allen Entwicklungen gehen Teilungen, Zergliederungen vor, die man bequem mit den Brechungen des Lichtstrahls vergleichen kann. (1960e, p. 82)

It may have taken a long time before men came upon the thought of designating the various objects of their senses with a common name and of setting themselves in opposition to them. Through practice developments were furthered, and in all developments separations and divisions occur that may well be compared with the dispersion of a ray of light. (O’Brien, 1995, p. 209)

Although Novalis’ propositions about language are sometimes contradictory – and all the more complex for that - he remains convinced that the ‘essence’ of language is only known indirectly. He argues that “[n]ichts in der Welt *ist* bloß; Seyn drückt nicht Identität aus” (1960j, p. 247)/“[n]ething in the world *simply* is; Being itself does not express identity” (O’Brien, 1995, p. 111), leading him to conclude that the word should not neatly sum up the object. Language according to Novalis is participatory in *illusion*, and if Being does not try to once and for all conclude the essence of a thing, then neither should language. The eventual denigration of the thing in the world through humanity’s expression of it is obvious here, with Novalis still retaining some caution in how he portrays this relationship between language, the describer, and thing. This tentative mode of
description continues in the murky nature of the thing, further emphasising that one’s use of language, even to talk about one’s expression and things, should be tempered with caution:

Mich freuen die wunderlichen Haufen und Figuren in den Sälen, allein mir ist, als wären sie nur Bilder, Hüllen, Zierden, versammelt um ein göttlich Wunderbild, und dieses liegt mir immer in Gedanken. (1960e, p. 81)

I take delight in the strange mounds and figures in the halls, but to me it seems as though they were only shapes, cloaks, ornaments, gathered around a divine, miraculous image, and this is always in my thoughts. (2005, p. 13)86

Here we see that Novalis is carefully describing the things as if they are unusual, mysterious, or full of wonder. Being inspires humanity to converse through language, with Novalis saying that:

Es dünckt dem Menschen, als sey er in einem Gespräch begriffen, und irgend ein unbekanntes, geistiges Wesen veranlasse ihn auf eine wunderbare Weise zur Entwicklung der evidentesten Gedancken. Dieses Wesen muß ein Höheres Wesen seyn, weil es sich mit ihm auf eine Art in Beziehung sezt, die keinem an Erscheinungen gebundenen Wesen möglich ist. (1960o, p. 528)

It appears to man as if he were engaged in a conversation, where some kind of unknown, spiritual being wondrously incites him to develop the most evident thoughts. This being must be a higher being, because it is placed in such a relation with himself that it cannot be a being of the world of appearances. (Wood, 2007, p. xxvi)

86 While containing elements of the unfamiliar, ‘wunderlich’ also carries with it an element of wondrousness and mystery.
Friedrich Schlegel, another German Romantic with whom Novalis collaborated, also highlighted the inherent power to poetic language. In his “Über die Unverständlichkeit” Schlegel revealed his wish for language:

Ich wollte zeigen, daß die Worte sich selbst oft besser verstehen, als diejenigen, von denen sie gebraucht werden, wollte aufmerksam darauf machen, daß es unter den philosophischen Worten, die oft in ihren Schriften wie eine Schar zu früh entsprungener Geister alles verwirren und die unsichtbare Gewalt des Weltgeists auch an dem ausüben, der sie nicht anerkennen will, geheime Ordensverbindungen geben muß. (1964c, p. 531)

I wanted to demonstrate that words often understand themselves better than do those who use them, wanted to point out that there must be a connection of some secret brotherhood among philosophical words that, like a host of spirits too soon aroused, bring everything into confusion in their writings and exert the invisible power of World Spirit on even those who try to deny it. (1971, p. 260).

The ontological language arranges elements: To that extent, “[d]ie logischen Begriffe verhalten sich aber zu einander, wie die Worte, ohne Gedanken” (1960o, p. 526)”logical concepts relate to one another as do words, without thoughts” (O’Brien, 1995, p. 132). This influence underpins every human use of that language, such that, as Heidegger (1971c) would later posit, “[d]ie Sprache spricht” (p. 12)“language speaks itself. Novalis, too, believes that language might move to depict a final form but it is precisely its inability to achieve this that gives it its power and influence (O’Brien, 1995). The task of language is to reflect the mystery of these things in the world and to take on creative form. While the ensuing loss of clarity might be intimidating for those influenced by pure philosophy, he believes that it is only the hazy form of language that will lift a veil onto a deeper relationship with the world, as language (alongside mathematical formulae):
His conception of language shows itself throughout his works; he notes specifically that grammatical translations – and by this he means ones that have precision as their greatest goal – are born of “Gelehrsamkeit”/[erudition] but do not require anything else apart from “discursive Fähigkeiten” (1960m, p. 438)/[discursive abilities]. It is as if the problem lies not so much in the event that occasionally words do not fit as the pursuit of their perfect fit. Quite explicitly, Novalis resists the practice of trying to capture the thing in the world in isolation from other things through language:

But if he [the utterer] wishes to speak of something determinate, temperamental old language makes him say the most ridiculous and mistaken things. (Bowie, 1997, p. 65)

Language is not separate from things in the world, because for Novalis it has its own relationship with other things quite apart from those things’ mediation through human intellect. Glimpses are provided of the relationships between things but the things themselves may not be determined, although it is humanity’s drive to define them that demarcates humanity as unique. The orthodox practice of logic, as an outcome of the “rohe, discursive Denker” (1960o, p. 524)/[rough, discursive thinker], is that of the scholastic, because “er vernichtet alle lebendige Natur”/[he destroys all living nature], by attempting to capture the thing in the world with absolute clarity and without giving it Spiel to interact and develop.
Just like any other thing in the world, we should therefore think of language itself as a thing in a state of flux. In chapter three I discussed “Lament for the Brave”, with brief reference to how the given English translation hindered a more poetic representation of the night, the self within the darkness, and the significance of these for Being. The narrow translation given of “Lament for the Brave” could just be an incidence of space allowable – only one given translation could be provided and the one that was provided just happens to be inimical to the more continually active Māori text. However, the fixing of things does occur in such translations, and with their publication they are the dominant ones relied on. For the orthodox language philosopher who believes that language is apprehended by thought alone, the more active language is bewildering for humanity:

Nur augenblicklich scheinen ihre Wünsche [der Menschen], ihre Gedanken sich zu verdichten. So entstehen ihre Ahndungen, aber nach kurzen Zeiten schwimmt alles wieder, wie vorher, vor ihren Blicken. (Novalis, 1960e, p. 79)

Only at moments do their [humanity’s] desires and thoughts seem to solidify. Thus arise their presentiments, but after a short time everything swims again before their eyes. (Novalis, 2005, pp. 4-5)

Representing things as identifiable and fixed to begin with – as static objects – will cause problems for the philosopher, who, in abstracting them, will be part of their illusory nature. We can see from the above fragment of Novalis’ that humanity’s consciousness of things is unreliable, due to the activity of those things; yet fixing objects is a preoccupation of modern humanity as it seeks Geheimnislosigkeit of things. In our article titled “Kia Hiwa Ra” (Aranga et al., 2008) we noted that the act of translating into a colonising language is a hegemonic practice, in that it clears things in the world of any mystery and imprecision. An English translation of a Māori text, then, sets the initial text firmly in the realm of fixed understanding. We gave an example of a lament:

In *A Lament for Te Huhu* for example (Ngata & Hurinui, 1974), Papahia grieves for his elder brother, Te Huhu, who had died. In it he
draws on a mist formation, seen and felt at the same time, to give impetus to his grief:

E titiro ana ‘hau te puia tu noa   I observe the mist that stands
I runga i a Heke, tineia kia mate,   Above Heke, clear it away
Kia mate rawa hoki, kei tae hoki ake,   Dissolve it clearly, that it may not recur
E mahara ana roto ki te kino ra ia,  For the mind recollects the evil
Ka tauwehea nei, e i!   That was happily removed.

In the footnotes to this lament, a ‘cloud of evil resulting in disgrace’ is referred to, caused apparently by the emanation from Heke’s personality. Heke was a personality who had fought against law and order, and if such a mist is seen standing from earth to sky it is seen as a portent of war. This stanza of the lament is important for a number of reasons. Firstly it shows that the cloud is perceived not just through sight – it is after all a ‘cloud of evil’. Hence the cloud is perceived emotionally too. Although the verb ‘titiro’ meaning to see with the eyes was used, the other important part of the stanza was the emotion it evoked – a part of the reading of the landscape. It also shows that signs could be read from the landscape to determine what was going to happen, and that these signs could manifest visually, emotionally and spiritually. (p. 6)

Of course, the poeticising of the literal is key to Novalis’ aim of poetry, and in the above section of our article we were attempting to re-read the text in order to acknowledge Geheimnis. This is not to say that our response to the text was irrational – a charge which Novalis would have distanced himself from – but merely that the neatly provided translation into a colonising language caused the Māori text to lose its vitality in a veiled way, and also acted to undermine the creative and emotional aspects of its messages.
Geheimnislose terms in focus

Similarly, Novalis’ “Monolog” contains a critique of humanity’s drive to find clearly defined elements through language at every step. This expectation of humanity about language poses the problem here. Novalis’ assertion that precise translations are limited by their focus on denotative meaning is echoed in a far more intense manner by Marshall and Martin (2000), who refer to Māori researcher and academic Cherryl Smith when they state that language is not simply open to the translation of meaning. Marshall and Martin raise the important function of words, as units of language, in maintaining the integrity of things in the world when they say that the cross-translation of words only leads to the Māori term (in their examples, ‘mauri’ and ‘wairua’) being “inserted violently into the pakeha world” (p. 22). There is an expectation for the most part that an empirical, simplistic translation will suffice, resulting in the kinds of Zahlen-derived violence that Marshall and Martin refer to. The holistic relationship between things in the world is corroded by a translation that is based on the objectifying comportment towards those things.

Like Marshall and Martin, I am interested in those immediate parts of language that are taken to refer directly to the thing in the world. Because the thing in the world is largely assumed to be a phenomenon separate from others, as Novalis alluded to when he stated that mankind has set themselves in opposition to objects, it is ‘captured’ so that it can be “inserted violently” into a colonised meaning. As an entity that resides in Being, humanity has the ability to interpret things in the world because of the interplay of things. The consciousness of humanity arises because of that interplay; indeed, as O’Brien (1995) notes, the self is “understood as a specific instance of universality and ideality” (p. 116), but humanity in modern times has tended to regard the thing in the world through strict, static terminology. The activity of the thing is overlooked, a view that runs counter to Novalis’ love of active representation of the Absolute. Of course, the thing was immediately active both in itself and in its relationship with other things, so object and activity were one and the same, and this should be reflected by the term, which in this reflection has some agency itself. In this chapter I shall
refer to those common terms listed above from the point of view of Being but by pointing out their Geheimnislosigkeit in their use and context. In most cases, Geheimnislosigkeit renders the terms as nouns and tends to ride over the inherent activity of the things to which those terms relate.

1. The positioning of ‘whakapapa’ as highly visible ‘genealogy’

Linda Smith (1999) indicates that a primary aim of imperialism was its move to classify things in the world according to a set of Western historical and cultural imperatives. Indigenous peoples themselves were objects of categorisation. It would follow, I argue, that terms which even hint at humanity’s relationship with things in the world were then subverted so that they would refer to the solidness of the indigenous person and the separateness of things in the world. As Cherryl Smith (2000) indicates, “[i]t is misinterpreted when writers translate whakapapa as genealogy, for genealogy usually covers the human and in a lineal descent fashion” (p. 45). Overwhelmingly, the word ‘whakapapa’ is equated with ‘genealogy’. It is suddenly revealed as an object, transportable towards its substitute term genealogy. It has become reduced from locating itself in a holistic discourse to one that enables the process of linear categorisation. Even in the word ‘genealogy’ there exists an etymological trace that favours a directly causal description of ‘kinship’, evident in its focus on ‘generation’ or ‘race’ (Onions, 1966), with that definition underlying the accepted method of ethnographers (Bouquet, 1996). With the creation of whakapapa as methodical kinship, some very central Māori tenets and philosophies were simultaneously created, to the extent that their reinvention is now almost unquestioned. Almost subtly, whakapapa was coming to be thought of as a biological event, and its application as such is evidence of that more fundamental issue of how things in the world are thought of in the first instance.

If Māori writers on the area of whakapapa are describing whakapapa as equivalent with genealogy, then they may simply be choosing that route. The reasons for this
are many, and include their resistance to disclosing any deeper nuances of the word for cultural and intellectual property reasons. In the case of research, they may be attempting to render the word, among others, acceptable for a Western context: They may believe that to introduce the more profound ‘traces’ of the word would be destructive to certain people in the community from which the word derives, and so on. These reasons are underpinned by the desire to allow the true depth of the word to flourish in the private domain that Māori occupy. In that sense the word has a subterranean life on the one hand and a public, politically useful life on the other. In the public domain the word becomes the term of convenience for what is essentially an object, while some agency over the matter is retained for the users and their communities.

Nevertheless, the precise problem with the Geheimnislosigkeit of a word is that it is supported by all hegemonic aspects of colonised life. Although we may not consider the dominantly objectifying definition for a word to be on the colonising agenda, it does suit the coloniser that there is universal acceptance of that static view of a word and the object it relates to. As already indicated, major colonising institutions enjoy and draw constantly on the discourse of Zahlen for their survival. Additionally, there is a seduction in the apparent symmetry inherent to explanations that embody a sense of finality, even though the search for such final ground leads, according to Friedrich Schlegel (1964c), not to the essence but to “[e]inige[n] Gegenstände[n] des menschlichen Nachdenkens” (p. 337)/[some oppositions of human thought]. The problem of “assertion itself” (Bowie, 1997, p. 79) – in this case, about the precise meaning of a term – is thus problematised here. The comfort that accompanies those explanations, we will remember, is one that Novalis warns against as accompanying the ‘keys to all creatures’, where the keys become ‘of’ all creatures.

A not untrue, but a particularly scientific, rendering of whakapapa emerges in the following utilitarian, symmetrical description:

In a commonly applied form, that of recording human descent lines and relationships, whakapapa functions as a genealogical table or
family pedigree in which the lineages connect each papa or layer (a metaphorical reference to each generation of a family).

The extent to which this underlying theoretical rationale for human whakapapa applies to the nonhuman has hitherto remained unexplored, at least in the published literature. To understand the meaning of plant and animal whakapapa requires knowledge of not only plant and animal names but also their accompanying narratives. Typically, these take an allegorical form in which explanatory theories as well as moral principles are explicated. In its totality, Māori use of whakapapa and narrative creates a ‘metaphysical gestalt’ or whole, integrated pattern, for the oral communication of knowledge. (Roberts et al., 2004, p. 1)

Such explanations - and even others that try to envisage whakapapa as being related to other traditional cultural institutions, such as “[i]t is safe to assume, however, that both [whakapapa and mauri] enliven each other, for if to possess mauri is to be alive, then this requires the belief and practice of whakapapa” (Mika, 2007, p. 186) - suggest that whakapapa steps in to fulfil a function. We can see with Roberts et al that whakapapa ‘records’ something, ‘functions as’ something, and ‘applies to’ something. It acts as a “fundamental form of knowing: it functions as an epistemological template” (Whitt, Roberts, Norman, & Grieves, 2003, p. 5). Whakapapa “enlivens” something, too. Here it is a useful or necessary event for humanity, and its importance in this regard is seen as its primary function. The productivity of the verbs used in the first example expedites the “oral communication of knowledge”. Roberts et al later consider the use of whakapapa as a “taxonomy” (p. 7), at which point we see an obvious movement of whakapapa into the strict discourse of science⁸⁷ – specifically, into the specialised area of the genetic modification of organisms. Novalis might have participated in this discussion by adding that whakapapa has been empirically constructed and that it has become part of the “versteinerte Zauberstadt” (1960f, p. 564)/[petrified enchanted city] that he refers to. In its usefulness to humans it is

⁸⁷ The writers intend for this discussion around whakapapa to occur in a scientific context.
interpreted through its rational properties, and examined, regarded and represented as a tool to come to know and manipulate the world better. Its properties have also been fixed and its subsequent clarity allows one to know the abstract object that it represents better. We therefore know the natural world better because we believe whakapapa is the taxonomical framework that groups it for us.

The permitted scope of whakapapa

Although Novalis was keen to explore scientific principles, on their own they could not ‘romanticise’ things in the world in accordance with Being. The fixing of constant attributes, he argued, ignored the flux of nature and would lead only to self-affirming complacency. The world is known by that method and need only be thought about again to the extent that one has to continue to add to knowledge through that scientised method. When the world is subject to an overtly scientific method, by the ‘Tiefgelehrten’ as he calls them, it is merely treated to another expression of grouping and objectification. Thus the scientific method could only exist because of that initial drive, as Novalis would have it, to scientise the world. However, with science now forming a meta-narrative in research and technology, it is important that we do acknowledge how science has especially secured whakapapa within its overt discourse. Whakapapa then moves within a discursive field to describe a smaller scientifically identified element, such as ‘gene’. Yet a move within a discursive field – or, towards a more thoroughly scientised interpretation – is the only movement allowed for the Māori term. It is as if those Māori terms are only important to the extent that they merely support their Western equivalents in prescribing a particular view of the world.

Example: Whakapapa prescribed within traditional metaphor

The prescribed travel of the traditional term within the field that scientism operates is obvious when there are links made between empirical knowledge and whakapapa. Barlow (1991) remarks that “whakapapa is the genealogical descent of all living things from the gods to the present time; whakapapa is a basis for the organization of knowledge in respect of the creation and development of all living things” (p. 173). Again, whakapapa is connected to knowledge, with the emphasis
being on knowing whakapapa in order to generate knowledge. The kind of knowledge anticipated here is scientific knowledge, generated by thinking of whakapapa as an already known tool. Whakapapa in this context has to be known: It must be the product of a conscious human activity. It might simply be summarised that whakapapa was created by humanity. However, the anthropocentric attitude towards whakapapa denies any belief that whakapapa exists before our perception of it, as Pihama (2001) argues it does. This may occur also through the use of metaphor, where an essentially scientific discipline – in this case, linguistics – is given Māori credibility by assimilating Māori ideas of whakapapa into the birth of ‘language modalities’:

The following analogy may be used to describe [the] entire evolutionary process. The oral-culture of pre-european Māori can be termed as the ‘Mother language’ (te whaea o te reo tupu). This term is encapsulated through the myths and legends of Papatūanuku or ‘Mother Earth’, as well as, the established international term of ‘Mother Tongue’ used by Linguists and Educationalists alike. As a consequence of European contact and amalgamation, the language changed to adopt the new mode of discourse through the means of a written symbolic system. There, it is appropriately called the ‘Father Tongue’ (te matua ā-tuhi). Thus, a marriage of the old and the new was consummated. In the following years, the offspring (or bi-products) of this language relationship are called the ‘child progenies’ (ngā uri o te reo Māori), these can be termed the ‘language modalities’. (Laws, 2001, p. 2)

Laws equates traditional Māori traditional terminology with scientific linguistic phenomena. The equivalence could be thought of as a form of poetic treatment (and hence revitalisation) in the sense of Novalis, but instead I argue that the direct equation still inserts the traditional Māori terms over into the ‘versteinerte’/petrified world of the linguistic equivalents.

Drawing either literally or metaphorically on traditional names in these contexts, to explain the phenomenon of whakapapa, is a natural outcome of its scientised
treatment. At times the attempt is made to describe holistically whilst genealogical names are denoted. In the *Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification* (Ministry for the Environment, 2002) the following comments were made:

To Maori this duty [of kaitiakitanga] is easily explained by tracing whakapapa (genealogy) up through the ancestors, to the Gods, and ultimately to Papatuanuku, the Earth Mother, and Ranginui, the Sky Father. By going sideways in these kinship links, Maori trace descent lines for all living creatures and so have to honour them as kin. (p. 19)

A focus on identifiable, solid beings is primary in this explanation of whakapapa, and indeed it appears to be of concern to many similar documents. Although the writers acknowledge the holistic relationship with the environment, they can only do so by referring to those beings listed. The list of those beings as constitutive of whakapapa is the sole descriptive, and whakapapa becomes solidified by a focus on the entities that apparently constitute it in its entirety. As an approach to whakapapa borne of common sense this may be of obvious help to those who learn and practise recounting whakapapa, but it may also lead to confusion, where the *solidity* of whakapapa is equated with the *solidity* of other entities, such as ‘genes’. When that misunderstanding occurs, ‘whakapapa’ is listed as being affected because it is the ‘gene’ that is being affected with the patenting of life forms. Their equivalence is not immediately acceptable, however, particularly when they are asserted to so neatly fit onto each other.

**Example:** *‘Fertility/infertility’ concurring with geheimnisloser/geheimnislosem whakapapa*

Words that are thought of as immune from contamination by Geheimnislosigkeit may actually assist other geheimnislosem terms. This hegemonic relationship between the colonised and colonising terms occurs between the word whakapapa and the words ‘fertility/infertility’ in current policy. Terms in Māori that are avowed to reflect Being by their very nature are sometimes warped to fit the already affected terminology that they find themselves associated with. The
significance of the term ‘whakapapa’ is said to lie in the fact that fertility ensures the continuation of whakapapa (Glover, McCree, & Dyall, 2008), and that reproductive technology might be inimical to the spiritual nature of whakapapa (Glover & Rousseau, 2007). The problem here is that this Māori term may itself be prescribed so that in fact it supports the hardened implication of ‘fertile/infertile’. At times ‘whakapapa’ slips in and out of scientific description, but whether it is located in or out of explicitly scientific text is irrelevant; when it is defined in a determinate way, it will assist a similarly hardened ‘fertile/infertile’.

The reductionist approach of the method of science is familiar to various Māori academics\(^88\), with descriptions of its tendency to dissemble an organism and isolate its parts. Often science is blamed for this approach. Despite being a scientist, Novalis would have empathised with those concerns with such assertions as “[j]ede Simplifikation ist von der andern Seite eine Complication” (1960b, p. 299)/“[e]very simplification is, on the other hand, a complication” (Wood, 2007, p. 49), referring to the apparently clarifying nature of the method of science as really a complicating one, leaving in the end more doubt than certainty, and as a method that has only emerged (as Heidegger had also argued (Glazebrook, 2000)) because of a far more fundamental, ontological orientation towards things in the world. Importantly, this does not only occur in strict science: ‘Research’, drawing from an “‘archive’ of knowledge and systems, rules and values which stretch beyond the boundaries of Western science to the system now referred to as the West” (Smith, 1999, p. 42), manifests as the result of that same fundamental ontological and metaphysical comportment. This kind of primordial regard, as I noted in chapter five, is one characterised by a view of things as orderable and lacking mystery. As a preordainment of thought it occurs in an incidental but organised way, and concurs with what Novalis (1960e) describes as “[d]er Glaube an [den festen Körper], der ihre Abhängigkeit und Niedrigkeit nicht ohne Bedeutung [veranläßt]” (p. 83)/“a not unmeaningful belief in their [solid bodies’] baseness and dependence” (2005, p. 23). In the case of our current example of whakapapa, the flurry of words equated with it - ‘gene’, ‘genealogy’,

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\(^88\) See for instance: Cheung (2008); Hutchings and Reynolds (n.d); Gardiner (1999)
‘genetic inheritance’ – is evidence of the clamber to accord objects their rightful place, according to their empirical identification, including the human condition as it relates to fertility/infertility. Thus the definite meaning of whakapapa does not counter discussions of fertility/infertility; whakapapa is merely arranged to support the hardening effect of ‘fertility/infertility’. There is a danger, then, that what are taken to be holistic terms are merely forced into geheimnislose utterances and realms.

The danger that the hardening of terms poses may depend on the context of the term. In cases where Māori use the term without trying to define it, it may resist the lure of Geheimnislosigkeit. Terms like fertility/infertility overtly cast the body in a fixed way, especially in medical and legal contexts. Whakapapa will avoid this by not having a set equivalence in English. Nevertheless, the word shows itself to be vulnerable to the hardened nature of policy. The Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology (2009) noted that “[k]nowledge and protection of whakapapa is a key concern that has been expressed to ACART…. Some Māori are concerned that whakapapa would be disrupted through the use of some assisted reproductive procedures” (p. 10). In that context the word whakapapa could conceivably be understood in a broad sense. It is just mentioned and undefined. However, the paragraph continues:

The HART Act requires that information about donors be kept by providers and the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages. The Act specifies that ethnicity and any relevant cultural affiliation must be recorded, along with, in the case of Māori donors, the donor’s whānau, hapū and iwi affiliations.

This paragraph does not mention whakapapa, but its reference to various components in the paragraph just cited, I argue, moves whakapapa over to a strict ordering with those other components. ‘Whakapapa’, having been dealt with in terms of a lack of mystery, is still present even though it does not now need to be mentioned. In this sense, terms such as whakapapa are vulnerable to the context in which they are used, particularly when used amongst other terms which are themselves geheimnislos. Hence whakapapa must now match up with the keeping
of information about donors, with the recording of cultural affiliations, and with whānau, hapū and iwi affiliations. It will therefore have to be thoroughly identifiable. Whakapapa is brought into a moment of certainty in these instances. Even in the use of the phrase ‘Māori donor’, whakapapa is fixed so that it fits easily with not just the identity but also the body of the Māori donor. The Māori donor is an identifiable body, against which whakapapa can be recorded. The Māori donor is a fertile entity that has a whakapapa, and the word whakapapa assists the fixing enterprise of ‘fertile/infertile’.

2. The introduction of epistemic certainty through ‘mātauranga’

With that frequent interpretation of ‘whakapapa’ there is a close link to the generation of knowledge that involves the cognitive self as the foremost element. As I argued in relation to Te Maire Tau’s text in chapter three, though, the connection that the Māori self wanted to articulate with everything in relation to them was not to be reduced to an epistemological process. Even in cases where ‘knowledge’ is given a Māori gloss in the form of ‘mātauranga’ (Mika, 2011a) - a post-contact term used in conjunction especially with the growth of the knowledge economy (Royal, 2009b) – the primordial activity of the Absolute stands as the primary focus. The temptation to render those continuous processes of Being/the Absolute as ‘knowledge’, even through the mediatory role of mātauranga is, I argue, an elucidation of Novalis’ warning about the delusion of having the self as a ground for all perceptions to flow from. The self as first and as certain is able to regard and group objects – abstract and concrete - so that they provide epistemic certainty. To do this, the self can ignore the prior activity that allows those objects to exist to begin with and that may rearrange those objects. This view ignores the important words of Marsden (2003) about humanity’s relationship to spiritual values:

Spiritual values are always beyond the full grasp of mortal man. They are ultimate and absolute in nature and yet always beckoning man onwards. The closer one approximates to the ideal the greater the
satisfaction. There is always a gap between the ideal and practice; between becoming and being; but towards that excellence all things strive. The Māori expression is, ‘Kia eke ki tōna taumata’ – that it may attain to the excellence of its being; or, to authentic existence.

This refers not only to humans but to all created things. (p. 39)

Marsden’s words suggest that the spiritual affects all aspects of existence. In the present topic – knowledge – knowledge that is spiritual is not just ceremonial knowledge; instead the self is involved in a relationship with the world that is, in Marsden’s words, ‘spiritual’ in its physical activity. What is prior to any prospective knowledge, then, is this relationship.

The explicit equivalence of mātauranga and knowledge and scientific knowledge occurs frequently in literature. Mātauranga is sometimes equated with science. This equivalence is not universally held; David Williams (2001) explores that issue in research dealing with the WAI 262 claim, and refers to those who disagree with a perceived correspondence between the two terms, and indeed Philip Catton (2009) asserts that the two are not the same. How science and mātauranga do not equate but may be reconciled with each other is also widely discussed in literature. Writers and academics are ready to pose differences between the two terms, perhaps because science as a methodology is readily accepted by some as being vastly different to mātauranga. With science appearing to be intimately associated with abstraction, precision and the visible idea, it seems more obviously and clearly to some as being dissimilar to mātauranga.

With the growth of the knowledge economy, including the transfer of knowledge based on Western commercial enterprises which have socially and politically exploited indigenous peoples (Smith, 1999), discussions about the various layers of knowledge – sociological, political, economic and so on – have taken on particular importance for some Māori (Royal, 2009b). Some writings of indigenous academics may be adumbrated here. To begin with, there is often expressed a dissatisfaction with the positivist nature of the language that goes to construct Western cultural knowledge. In this regard, Anne Waters (2004) notes that there are problems inherent to that language, because it sets up oppositions
between things in the world, whereas indigenous languages, in their intention and construction, tended to draw back from that practice. Thus language as a reflection of disparate worldviews is the initial problem. Linda Smith (1999) argues that dominant philosophies mean that Western researchers simply could not grasp the fact that an object of study could “contribute to anything. An object has no life force, no humanity, no spirit of its own, so therefore ‘it’ cannot make an active contribution” (p. 61). Here we begin to consider the possible converse, more in line with the organisational but unknowable effects of the Absolute that Novalis noted, where things in the world have a mode of communication with humanity, and where the object is given potential subject status. Kovach (2009) reflects that “tribal knowledge is not Western knowledge” (p. 30) because the two emerge from completely different perceptions of the world and of the place of the self within that world. She believes that the holistic perception that certain indigenous peoples have of the world is inherent to the way the world is discussed: “When Cree and Soulteaux Elders talk about the world as being alive, as of spirit, it makes sense because this is reinforced on a daily basis in the language” (p. 66).

Linda Smith’s words in particular hold implications for whether the concept of knowledge as an outcome of Geheimnislosigkeit can exist in indigenous philosophy when the object in the world does have a ‘life-force’. They immediately bring into dispute any belief that the object in the world may be known, outside of constructed beliefs about the object by the knower. What becomes more important, if we draw out Smith’s words, is that there is a sense of relationship with the object such that an epistemic certainty is of secondary importance. Buber (1997) notes here that “[i]n jeder Sphäre, durch jedes uns gegenwärtig Werdende blicken wir an den Saum des ewigen Du hin, aus jedem vernehmen wir ein Wehen von ihm” (p. 13)/“[i]n every sphere, through everything that becomes present to us, we gaze toward the train of the eternal You; in each we perceive a breath of it” (1996, p. 57). Crucial here is whether the word knowledge – or even its now Māori equivalent, mātauranga – should be given the wide scope that it has been afforded. Most debates around knowledge in an indigenous world tend to assume that there was ‘knowledge’, with knowledge sometimes being equated with, not dependent on, relationships with the Absolute
and the object before the subject. Western knowledge, however, assumes a
cognitive attitude towards the object.

Knowledge is hence taken as a universal phenomenon without much thought to its
immediate discursive effects – what the belief that the object in the world may be
known heralds for the Absolute, as an example. The two terms mātauranga and
knowledge are uncritically interchangeable. However, there are critiques that,
while not contesting the basic correspondence of the two terms, do start to
question the types of knowledge that are being referred to. Barnes (2006) for
instance disrupts the immediate precision between the terms mātauranga Māori
and Māori knowledge in the following way:

In 2005, MoRST’s Vision Matauranga was developed to ‘assist
research funders, researchers and research users when they consider
research of relevance to Māori – particularly its distinctive aspects and
how this might be supported’ (Ministry of Research Science and
Technology 2005:6). The glossary describes matauranga Māori as ‘a
body of knowledge first brought to New Zealand by Polynesian
ancestors … it changed and grew … and grew and changed again (on
European contact) … becoming endangered … in the 19th and 20th
centuries.’ I argue that matauranga Māori in this context describes one
form of Māori knowledge and is a sub-category and not
interchangeable with the term Māori knowledge as it is used in the
vision.

Māori knowledge is as broad and varied as any other knowledge. (p. 8)

Here she draws attention to the vexed question of whether mātauranga Māori as it
is defined in MoRST’s glossary can be equated with Māori knowledge. She
clearly advocates the belief that, although mātauranga Māori as defined by the
glossary might not be Māori knowledge, there is nevertheless such a thing as
Māori knowledge. In that sense Barnes’ disturbance of the equivalence between
the two terms might be described as politically derived. Although there is a
philosophical assertion in the last two sentences, it does not delve into the
metaphysical implications that the reification of the epistemically certain self
raises

**The self-focused tendency of ‘mātauranga’**

There are very deep implications, however, stemming from the word knowledge
as it is used dominantly and unquestioningly. To begin with, there is the
necessity for a phenomenon to be perceived by the subject; a dominant belief that
language must be the result of the subject’s awareness in order for it to be valid
will be recalled. I posit that the discourse of knowledge has infiltrated the term
mātauranga to the extent that absolute subjectivism is vital, and suspect that the
term itself constrains how academic writers, for instance, write about the
relationship of the Māori individual to things in the world. Thus in writing about
mātauranga it is difficult to escape the pull of the subject. Even writing about
collective group experiences does not mitigate that occurrence because it is still
the cognitive ability of the collective group that is emphasised in the writing.
Additionally it is almost impossible through the medium of text to describe the
experiences of the supposedly inanimate object, unless poetry or other forms of
verse are resorted to, with the teacher in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais having stated that:

> Ein Verkündiger der Natur zu sein, ist ein schönes und heiliges
> Amt…. Nicht der bloße Umfang und Zusammenhang der Kenntnisse,
> nicht die Gabe, diese Kenntnisse leicht und rein an bekannte Begriffe
> und Erfahrungen anzuknüpfen, und die eigentümlichen fremd

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89 Such an exploration may not have been her intention in this article.

90 This is not to say that Māori did not have a concept of ‘understanding’ a thing in the
world as it presented itself to them. The words ‘mātau’, ‘mōhio’ and ‘mārama’ all convey
that there may be a comprehension that those things offer. All of these verbs reflect
uncertainty because they automatically involve themselves actively with the Geheimnis
of things in the world.

91 The centrality of the subject becomes clear in such statements as ‘the exploits of
ancestors form the backbone of knowledge’ or ‘knowledge is handed down from one
generation to another.’
klingenden Worte mit gewöhnlichen Ausdrücken zu vertauschen.
(1960e, p. 107)

To be a prophet of nature is a sacred and beautiful office.… Not the mere breadth and system of knowledge, not the gift of relating this knowledge easily and purely to familiar concepts and experience and of exchanging the peculiar, strange-sounding words for common expressions. (2005, p. 115)

One can see the human centred nature of knowledge (mātauranga), particularly when that type of knowledge is not qualified but is merely cited as a self-evident term. If we refer back to Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” we recall that he was critical of relationships with the world that revolved around quantification. Underlying this warning was his recoil from setting out to know anything in the world with certainty at all. As he noted, “[w]as für eine Beziehung ist das Wissen? Es ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn, das doch im Seyn ist” (1960j, p. 106)/“[w]hat kind of a relation is knowledge? It is a being outside of being that is nevertheless within being” (2003, p. 5), demonstrating further that Novalis believed that knowledge of the world was a constant movement backwards between the I and the world – not just from the I-as-ground outwards. Beiser (2002) emphasises this important aspect of Novalis’ assertion about the relationship between the subject and object, and notes that in order for there to be a correspondence of one to another (thus producing knowledge), there needs to be common ground or even an identity between the two. Talking with certainty about the Absolute is moderated for Novalis, and so any knowledge that emerged from the movement of things in the world was offset by the very fluidity of that movement and of the things themselves.

The orientation of things so that they conform to solid, knowable objects before Māori is hugely consequential. This occurrence does not just stop at itself, though; it paves the way for a framing of the world such that an epistemological, knowing relationship with it is far more important than a Being-related involvement with things in the world is (Guignon, 1983). The term ‘mātauranga’, therefore, carries with it a reduction of a formerly mysterious view of the world to something much
more economical and manageable, even when the word ‘holistic’ is used alongside it. Georgina Stewart (2007), for instance, indicates “[a]nother important point is that mātauranga is holistic, without the compartmentalisation of Western conceptions of knowledge” (p. 139). Yet I believe the problem lies in the terminology of ‘knowledge’ itself, even if expressed in its Māori equivalent ‘mātauranga’. Its greatest difficulty, in other words, is the expectation that relationships that underpin Māori and the outer world are reduced to form either knowledge or mātauranga. In this colonised reading of those relationships, the human self becomes the most important arbiter of the outer world and is able to choose how they will relate to that world. An issue of tyrannical language arises. Those activities are narrowed precisely so they have to conform to an epistemic view of things in the world. Māori interrelationships with the world, which may or may not result in knowledge, are replaced with a concise term that stands in for those interdependent activities. Given the “fascination with epistemology” (Guignon, 1983, p. 13) 92 that characterises the modern age, those interrelationships must prove to be productive and hence identifiable as present, tangible forms of knowledge.

Indigenous writers have identified the problem with the apparent fixation on epistemology. Kincheloe and Steinberg (2008), however, note broadly that:

92 Ermines (1995) considers the economy of the term ‘epistemology’ for indigenous peoples in the following statement: “Ideology is one determinant of the quality of research on epistemology. Early ideas such as Destutt de Tracy’s (1801) definition of ideology as the science of ideas used to distinguish science from the metaphysical suggest the Western world’s direction and purpose in seeking the nature and origin of knowledge. Subsequent categorization and selective validation of knowledge by Western science has inevitably influenced Western ideology as the driving force behind knowing” (p. 102). In its use as a discourse, epistemology is understood to refer to knowledge as its central focus. In respect of research, Kovach (2009) raises the crucial question of reducing things in the world to whether they are capable of providing knowledge or not: “Indigenous forms of inquiry find an ally in the qualitative approaches that assume the relationally constricted aspect of knowledge production. Granted, qualitative approaches are based upon a non-animistic premise, which differs from tribal epistemology, and so deeper questions remain…. [such as] What does it mean to privilege human-centric knowledge?” (p. 43). The focus on the term ‘epistemology’ may, however, outweigh any similar focus on Being. It may also render indigenous philosophies more susceptible to the nice, neat “language of frameworks” (p. 43).
[I]t appears that Cartesian-Newtonian-Baconian epistemologies and many indigenous knowledge systems differ in the very way they define life – moving, thus, from the epistemological to the ontological realm…. Many indigenous peoples have traditionally seen all life on the planet as so multidimensionally entwined that they have not been so quick to distinguish the living from the nonliving…. [T]he Andean peasants’ and other indigenous people’s belief that the rivers, mountains, land, soil, lakes, rocks, and animals are sentient may not be as preposterous as Westerners first perceived it. (p. 151)

Indigenous peoples will have varied terms for ‘the ontological realm’ – we have already seen that Māori writers approach it in several ways – but it should be noted that the ‘ontological’ is itself a stand-in word for a complex set of events, involving things in the world. Language as a phenomenon may be a problem if it seeks to refer economically to this complexity, leading Heidegger to note that:

Insofern es den Menschen stellt, d.h. ihn herausfordert, alles Anwesende als technischen Bestand zu bestellen, west das Ge-stell nach der Weise des Ereignisses und zwar so, daß es dieses zugleich verstellt, weil alles Bestellen sich in das rechnende Denken eingewiesen sieht und so die Sprache des Ge-stells spricht. Das Sprechen wird herausgefordert, der Bestellbarkeit des Anwesenden nach jeder Richtung zu entsprechen. (1971c, p. 263)

Because Framing challenges man, that is, provokes him to order and set up all that is present being as technical inventory, Framing persists after the manner of Appropriation, specifically by simultaneously obstructing Appropriation, in that all ordering finds itself channeled into calculative thinking and therefore speaks the language of Framing. Speaking is challenged to correspond in every respect to Framing in which all beings can be commandeered. (1971a, pp. 131-132)
Royal, from an indigenous perspective, notes a similar problem with language that is predicated on singling out a thing for description, as it completes nicely the process of ordering in the name of knowledge. A unit of meaning is ascribed to the thing through that language such that language merely affirms the place of that thing in relation to humanity:

A claim activity commences with an assertion about a relationship between a group of people and an object. The ‘statement of claim’ locates the people and object in space and time. In order for the claim to be successful, this ‘location’ has to remain fixed so that various judgements can be made about the nature of the claim. (Royal, 2009b, p. 35)

Our role as subjects is likewise affirmed through this dominant process, even in the presence of authentic Māori language. This diminution of Being can be seen in the word ‘mātauranga’, even (and especially) when “it is possible that ‘mātauranga Māori’ will help facilitate the Māori dimension of New Zealand’s knowledge economy” (Royal, 2009b, p. 12).

3. The self-focus of ‘ako’

As to the fallibility of humanity in its attempts to find an absolute ground through its own efforts, Novalis notes that:

würde. Durch das freywille Entsagen des Absoluten entsteht die unendliche freye Thätigkeit in uns – das Einzig mögliche Absolute, was uns gegeben werden kann und was wir nur durch unsre Unvermögenheit ein Absolutes zu erreichen und zu erkennen, finden. Dies uns gegebne Absolute läßt sich nur negative erkennen, indem wir handeln und finden, daß durch kein Handeln das erreicht wird, was wir suchen. (1960j, pp. 269-270)

What do I do when I philosophize? I reflect upon a ground. The ground of philosophizing is thus a strivin… All philosophizing must therefore end in an absolute ground. Now if this were not given, if this concept contained an impossibility – then the drive to philosophize would be an unending activity – and without end because there would be an eternal urge for an absolute ground that can be satisfied only relatively - and that would therefore never cease. Unending free activity in us arises through the free renunciation of the absolute – the only possible absolute that can be given us and that we only find through our inability to attain and know an absolute. This absolute that is given to us can only be known negatively, insofar as we act and find that we seek cannot be attained through action…. This could be called an absolute postulate. All searching for a *single principle* would be like the attempt to square the circle. (Kneller, 2003, pp. 167-168)

Indeed, according to Novalis, we are only given certain signs, feelings, and intuitions about the Absolute through its mismatch with our own interpretations of it. Nature is very much an active part of humanity’s everyday, seemingly banal activities. It does not just come into play within ceremonial or religious discourse – if it did, it would be a ‘nonself’, a Fichtean postulation that, it will be recalled, Novalis resists (Becker & Manstetten, 2004) - but instead bears down on us through its arising within every aspect of life.
The exclusion of things in the world

The self-conscious process of teaching and learning is an incomplete depiction of this ongoing activity. The complexity of ‘ako’, similar to ‘whakapapa’, has shown itself to be susceptible to its placement amongst colonising influences (mainly amongst a geheimnislose orientation of terms). This is part of the hegemonic attraction of colonising language, which appears to bring the underlying primordial nature of a word in line with its own. In some cases a vast amount of literature may be generated in respect of a ‘value’ that is deemed to be a traditional one, but in the course of its overuse the traditional term is made thoroughly knowable. The term ‘ako’, I argue, has been rendered an activity that almost exclusively involves human beings and fits our description of certainty. In ‘ako’ the problem of Māori underachievement is deemed to be reparable through the reciprocity of teaching and learning (Bishop & Glynn, 1999). In essence, the dominant interpretation of ‘ako’ does not question the origin of knowledge or contemplate the presence of the environment in bringing to light both people and their relationships with the world. It does, to a certain extent, bring into question the established dichotomy of teacher/learner roles, but the presence of people in the learning process is what is seen to be most important.

Poetically, Novalis reflected on the intimate interplay of nature and humanity. In Die Lehrlinge zu Sais he recounts the conversation of ‘the thousandfold natures’:

O! daß der Mensch ... die innre Musik der Natur verstände und einen Sinn für äussere Harmonie hätte. Aber er weiß ja kaum, daß wir zusammen gehören, und keins ohne das andere bestehen kann.... Wie glücklich könnte er sein, wenn er mit uns freundlich umginge, und auch in unsern großen Bund träte, wie ehemals in der goldnen Zeit, wie er sie mit Recht nennt. In jener Zeit verstand er uns, wie wir ihn verstanden. Seine Begierde, Gott zu werden, hat ihn von uns getrennt, er sucht, was wir nicht wissen und ahnden können, und seitdem ist er keine begleitende Stimme. (1960e, p. 95)
O, if only man … could understand the inner music of nature, if only he had a sense for outward harmonies. But he scarcely knows that we belong together and that none of us can exist without the others…. How happy he could be if he treated us amiably and entered into our great covenant, as he did in the good old days, rightly so named. In those days he understood us, as we understand him. His desire to become God has separated him from us, he seeks what he cannot know or divine, and since then he has ceased to be a harmonizing voice. (2005, pp. 69-70)

In this quote we see that there is a nostalgia or longing on the part of nature to be treated properly by humanity. There is a suggestion that this former relationship merged throughout all the practices of humanity and that this included the perceivable (‘outward harmonies’), the cognitive (‘understood us’), and the imperceptible (‘what he cannot know or divine’). Colonisation for the Māori self and their communities, I have argued, has resulted in a rupture between that similarly holistic relationship with the environment, showing itself in the anthropocentrism of ‘ako’, to the extent that what has gained a foothold to the detriment of the others is the cognitive. Formerly, however, Māori believed that the self was part of the environment, and hence the self’s uptake of anything – emotion, feeling, cognition, even physical attribute – was dependent on the interplay of whakapapa with the natural world, leading to what Royal (2008) notes is “aroha”/love (p. 122). The deep links that Māori have with the natural world – seen and unseen – permeate outwards to include those who are deceased and those who are yet to come, as well as past and future impacts on the environment. Even thoughts and intentions could come to bear on the natural world and would dictate the reciprocity back from the natural world to the self. This suggests that there is very little room for subjectivity; however, humanity has always been able to affect the natural world individually and collectively through personality and uniqueness of whakapapa. We will recall from chapter three that the idea of Being was a constant activity that humanity could not fully conceive of mentally but that nevertheless always held sway, as ‘Te Ao Tua-Atea’, behind (‘tua’) all relationships. However, in dominant views of ‘ako’ the self is thought of as a constant, enduring presence. This is fortified in the belief that the human
faculty of knowledge is the sole domain of humanity; hence the overriding focus on people.

There are problems innate to casting people as enduring presences for a Māori consideration of the ontological realm. To begin with, it facilitates the idea that people are knowable things. As Heidegger (1993) asserts, the body is approached in advance as bodily. As exercises involving evident bodies, learning/teaching is thus conceived in terms of what validly comprises teaching and learning. Curricula are devised, even if in the Māori language, which fit with the necessary components of learner and teacher as those present and evident bodies. Past examples heralding the body as beyond an exercise in learning and teaching are forgotten: The lessons of ancestors in shape-changing, for instance, are more easily relegated to myth with the practice of viewing the body as an unchanging entity involved in the exercise of learning or teaching. While it is tempting to add to the debate by taking the consequences down a sociological path – the person is more easily stereotyped through being posited as an object; the person’s learning needs might change; and not all knowledge can be measured, and so on – in fact a far more fundamental impact is possible in respect of the spiritual integrity of the body. With their contemplation of Being, Māori knew the importance of a tentative approach towards any perceived presence of things, even though those things were greatly valued. With ‘ako’, though, there remains the likelihood that the self becomes frozen through being approached as identifiable. Although that process does not necessarily affect the existence, as such, of Te Ao Tua-Atea, that same phenomenon’s ability to maintain movement in respect of the self is compromised.

Participants in ‘ako’ are subjected to the idea that the knowledge that they are given is an explanation about particular things. The explanation is likely to be based on the belief that a certainty in respect of objects in the world is desirable, and that such certainty can be grasped by using reliable tools. The ability to intuit, which Māori particularly value, is indistinguishable in its translation ‘rongo’ from other senses (Raerino, 1999); yet, although it may be valued as an important tool in initially identifying a feeling about the world, its importance as a Gefühl/feeling for the Absolute is likely to comprise, at best, a step towards knowing the thing.
with certainty. In its self-consciousness, besides its reciprocal focus, ‘ako’ really entails little more than Western conceptions of teaching and learning. This following description is quite representative of common descriptions of the term:

The concept of ako describes a teaching and learning relationship, where the educator is also learning from the student and where educators’ practices are informed by the latest research and are both deliberate and reflective. Ako is grounded in the principle of reciprocity and also recognises that the learner and whānau cannot be separated. (Ministry of Education, 2009, p. 20)

In its focus on learning and teaching (and hence its adherence to an approach that centres on things that go to make up learning and teaching), a clarity results which suggests that the term ‘ako’ need never be thought of in any other way. In other words, the apparent suitability of its translation as ‘learn/teach’ is unquestioned, although creative interpretations within the permissible field of its denotative clarity may occasionally happen. The term is thus made static. Moreover, its complicity with knowledge – the teaching and the uptake of it – means that knowledge is now on the side, a thing ready to be consumed, and is made transferrable between human beings.

4. A solid portrayal of phenomena through ‘whenua’

I argue that what the eye discloses, as with science, is only the physical world and can in fact cause some vexation, as the self can detect other phenomena behind that evident one and will always feel compelled – at a very deep, instinctual level – to mythologise that evident object. This is the transfiguration or Romantisieren that Wordsworth, Coleridge and Novalis advocate. Language that is used to point to the precise event before the person, however, has a tendency to deflate the romanticised thing, as Novalis broadly highlights in his belief that “das reine trennende Urtheil” (1960f, p. 653)/[the pure original division] can be
“tödlich”/[fatal], and as Friedrich Schlegel (1964b), in respect of a precise word, laments:

Ein einziges analytisches Wort, auch zum Lobe, kann den vortrefflichsten witzigen Einfall, dessen Flamme nun erst wärmen sollte, nachdem sie geglänzt hat, unmittelbar löschen. (p. 7)

[A single analytical word, even directed as praise, can immediately quench the unusually convivial moment – a moment which should be warmed with its flames, having sparkled.]93

Following Schlegel the analytical word could, in the context of a geheimnislose view of ‘whenua’, refer to the mapping of land, title registering, or earth sciences that deal with the flat surface of the land in a technical way, as some examples. Even seductive descriptions of land used in tourist literature, possibly construed to be ‘directed as praise’, quench the real essence, as land is talked about as isolated and reified event. Both Novalis and Schlegel here resist the fundamental belief that the thing before the self is all that there is to that thing, with land posing one example. In Māori language, even terms that point to apparently banal objects open up onto other objects and hence lose their solidity. In sites where there was an overwhelmingly focus on the evident, however, there appears to be a concerted effort to prevent their continued state of flux. I noted this happening in Waitangi Tribunal hearings and was particularly frustrated at the sterilisation of Māori terms, so that they threatened to mean no more than their Western, legal counterparts. The Waitangi Tribunal, dealing largely with land issues, first piqued my concern with its epistemologically certain tone of ‘land’. While by no means the only entity to sterilise Māori terms, because it frequently concerns itself with the term it is a significant contributor to the idea that ‘whenua’ and ‘land’ are direct equivalences of each other (Mika, 2007).

Geoff Park (2006) has alluded to the disparity in meaning between ‘whenua’ and ‘land’, noting that “the grievous losses that Māori have suffered since the treaty,

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93 ‘Witz’ for Schlegel is “unbedingt geselliger Geist, oder fragmentarische Genialität” (1964b, p. 6)/[unreified sociable spirit, or fragmentary geniality].
while sited in the solid surface of the Earth that we call ‘land’, have been much more than the loss of ground” (p. 242). He indicates the spiritual connection that Māori have to that which is called ‘whenua’, asserting that it means something quite different from ‘land’, which has “connotations of the solid ground of earth” (Park, 2001, p. 12). He refers to David Abrams (1996) who is himself an advocate of a view of language such that it does not just refer to a package of meaning but that it opens up the life that transcends human experience and control. Correctly citing the other meaning of whenua – placenta – he then draws a relationship between nourishment and whenua. This reading of ‘whenua’ would have it that there is automatically an inherent inclusion of an acknowledgement of the Absolute and other emerging elements to the very word. This may be to do with its immediate reciprocity with the other meaning of whenua. However, that ‘whenua’ has come to illuminate no more in the world than its chosen counterpart ‘land’ means that it is self-evident in its solidness. This is entirely possible, given the “power of law to organize our awareness of phenomena before they reach the level of consciousness” (Banner, 1999, p. 807).

Perhaps all that may be said is that the word ‘whenua’ in its broad sense should refer to all these elements activating against each other as an expression of the Absolute. ‘Land’ may have similar activities taking place behind it, yet in certain forums the lack of acknowledgement of this interplay means that the Absolute is probably constrained to fit with a dominant skewing of enframing. ‘Whenua’ is not automatically exempt from a similar limitation because, as ‘land’, it is the object that is disclosed to our eye: visible, measurable and able to be isolated as Zahlen and Figuren. When both terms are used to refer to no more than the flat surface of the earth, though, then they are both being touted as meaning nothing more than those in the forum of law. ‘Whenua’ may then be used as if it holds some innate spiritual reference, but in that forum it is suborned to meet the certain utterance that is expected with its equivalence, ‘land’.
Summary

Novalis was concerned with bringing to awareness the intricacies of the relationships that underpin things in the world and making them mysterious so that they were not merely the domain of humanity. Words could therefore not be certain, as their references – things in the world – were in a constant state of flux. This changeable nature of things was brought about by the Absolute, which resides behind the horizons of human consciousness. In this chapter I have carried on “Wenn nicht mehr” as a Stoßsatz, as well as the broader philosophies that I arrived at through “Wenn nicht mehr” in chapter four, from which to discuss germane issues for the Māori self that arise in a colonised use of terms in respect of things in the world. I drew also on other fragments of Novalis’ and other early Romantics to sustain this process of Nachdenken. The issues that arose may be briefly summarised. Firstly, language as a means of talking about an isolated thing with precision is a delusion for Novalis. Coinciding with that delusion is a belief that things to which language points are static, arising because there is no relationship between the thing being discussed and other things. The constantly moving relationship between things, for Novalis and for Māori, means that the thing being discussed is also shifting and hence is never isolated.

One of the most striking aspects of Novalis’ philosophies is that he advocates a process of thinking about things in the world so that they retain their mystery. He calls this process ‘Romantisieren’. I now come to the final part of my thesis, which delves into this innovation of his, and use it to reinvigorate those terms I have outlined in this chapter.
Chapter Seven: The Geheimnis of Māori terms in light of Novalis’ Romantisieren

Preliminary remarks

In the previous chapters, the main points of which I now briefly summarise, I have drawn on Novalis’ fragments to both provoke me into Nachdenken about a notion of Being and Geheimnis that may be of interest to Māori and also to bring to my awareness the overall nature of Geheimnislosigkeit for the Māori self, with particular reference to terms for things in the world. Those previous chapters now inform this one, in which I now refer to Novalis’ fragments to specifically romanticise those terms that, I identified in chapter six, have been used in a geheimnislose fashion. Chapter two, my method chapter, has some substantive impact on this chapter. Importantly, chapter two emphasised the enduring nature of Novalis’ fragments, but I also raise here that the outcomes I reached as a Māori writer continue too. The various aspects of the discussion in chapter two manifest in the following ways: The self is not really an isolated ‘self’ but is constantly impacted on by elements of the Absolute; Nachdenken occurs as a result of that essentially unknowable interaction; and one operates as much as an outcome of one’s history in Nachdenken (what is thought of as ‘historical’ is in fact always present in the location of the Nachdenker). Colonisation is hence an important factor for Māori writers to always keep at the forefront of their assertions about the nature of things in the world, as it must always be accounted for in these assertions.

Chapter three set the context for further discussions about Geheimnislosigkeit and also expanded on the notion of the Absolute/Being in a Māori sense. Novalis believed that, in order to make affirmations about Being, one should reflect its nature by engaging in a dialectic, oppositional critique. I chose a text written by a Māori author with which I strongly disagreed and I engaged in a critique with it, using Novalis’ own method and substantive affirmations together with philosophies that certain Māori discussed as a form of Symphilosophie. That
dialectical exercise reflects a central element of the Absolute. In his own dialectical process with Fichte’s works, Novalis notes that Being contains oppositional forces, a surmise that I had earlier brought to light in chapter two. Being is also in a constant state of activity and arranges things in the world on that basis.

Things in the world have their Geheimnis because of the Absolute. Chapter four provided a subtle provocation in the form of Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” to bring to our awareness the deeper layers of Geheimnislosigkeit and to stimulate a discussion about the forgetting of Being and resulting Geheimnislosigkeit for the Māori self, especially as the self engages with dominant institutions. This analysis was then extended to a speculation on how overriding uses of Māori terms reflect the Geheimnislosigkeit of the colonial project. Chapters four, five and six set the opposition from which to work for the current chapter, which makes some affirmations relating to the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’, and ‘whenua’. In chapter six of the thesis I noted the Geheimnislosigkeit of those terms is really just a continuation of a problem of the forgetting of Being and of the relationship provided by the Absolute between the self and things in the world generally. This latter and quite fundamental problem I had considered in chapter five.

The term ‘mātauranga’ encourages the self to be central in its very construction and meaning. I romanticise the centrality of the self that the term urges, by romanticising the other terms I have mentioned and by discussing some aspects of the self that ‘mātauranga’, dominantly equated with ‘knowledge’, neglects. I note soon in this chapter in footnote form that one may indeed directly romanticise the term ‘mātauranga’; however, I wish to show that another way to romanticise the knowing self is to engage with Novalis’ Stoßsätze both in discussions about the self directly and about the things in the world that ‘whenua’, ‘whakapapa’, and ‘ako’ can refer to.
Reclaiming the spontaneity of terms

Novalis engaged in romanticising at many steps of his works. In *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* he gives nature itself a voice. In turn, nature in its many forms notes the need for humanity to romanticise:

Der Zauber des Goldes, die Geheimnisse der Farben, die Freuden des Wassers sind ihm nicht fremd, in den Antiken ahndet er die Wunderbarkeit der Steine, und dennoch fehlt ihm noch die süße Leidenschaft für das Weben der Natur, das Auge für unsre entzückenden Mysterien. Lernt er nun einmal fühlen? Diesen himmlischen, diesen natürlichsten aller Sinne kennt er noch wenig: durch das Gefühl würde die alte, ersehnte Zeit zurückkommen; das Element des Gefühls ist ein inneres Licht, was sich in schöneren, kräftigeren Farben bricht. Dann gingen die Gestirne in ihm auf, er lernte die ganze Welt fühlen, klarer und mannigfaltiger, als ihm das Auge jetzt Grenzen und Flächen zeigt. (1960e, p. 96)

The magic of gold, the secrets of colors, the joys of water are not alien to him, he surmises the wonder of ancient stones, and yet he lacks the sweet passion for nature’s weavings, the eye for our [nature’s] entrancing mysteries. Will he ever learn to feel? This divine, this most natural of all senses is little known to him: feeling would bring back the old time, the time we yearn for; the element of feeling is an inward light that breaks into stronger, more beautiful colors. Then the stars would rise within him, he would learn to feel the whole world, and his feeling would be richer and clearer than the limits and surfaces that his eye now discloses. (2005, pp. 71, 73)

Clearly nature laments the lack of drive of humanity to romanticise, but it also promises – in typical Romantic form – that there is a means of finally acknowledging the Geheimnis of things in the world. Alongside the obvious need
to problematise, I contend that it is necessary to think along proactive lines, beginning for my thesis at the theoretical level.

**Emphasis on the active imagination**

One way of going back to a state of Geheimnis – a philosophical approach that respects the unknown of seemingly familiar concepts and ideas - is, I maintain, to revisit those core terms that are taken to be traditional because they originate from a Māori world and then to make them active. Novalis suggests in a *Fichte-Studien* fragment that the deeper, proper meaning of a word could often be grasped in its etymology. It is in both its etymology and its grouping with other words that the silent sense of the word is revealed, because the tendency to rely on accepted meaning assigned to that word is avoided:

> Eigenschaft bedeutet das Gesetz einer ursprünglichen Thatsache –
> eine Selbstthätigkeit –
> Eine Erscheinung, Offenbarung des Wesens.
> /Weisen - wissen - weis - Beweiß - zeigen - Zeugen - zeichen –
> zogen./ (1960j, p. 237)

Property means the law of an original fact – a kind of spontaneity –
An appearance, revelation of essence.
/indicate – to know – show – proof – to show [zeigen] – witness – to

Two aspects relating to Novalis’ wider exposition in the sphere of the Absolute are apparent here. First, Novalis does not undertake an etymological analysis of these terms as such: He notes that there is a property, which is hidden but active, inherent to a group of terms that he then lists. Nevertheless, an etymological breakdown is necessary in order to fully understand the sense that Novalis wishes to convey. He starts with an epistemological context – “Eigenschaften” – which indicates the visible traits or properties of a person or thing in the world. They belong (‘Eigen’) to the thing and are not incidental to the thing itself: Novalis wants us to remember that, in accordance with the word itself, properties are one’s
‘own’ and are embedded in the thing. Moreover, these properties are contingent on an original “fact” (“Thatsache”), which can be broken down into two components – That/activity and Sache/thing. The combination of these two components suggests that things are active and that there is an original affinity with fact here. As a “kind of spontaneity”, again drawing on the word That, the properties of a thing are active and are self-arranged. As “an appearance” the essence of a thing reveals itself in its own way. This is its own activity. In this first component, Novalis encourages the reader to explore the intrinsic character to things in the world through what they reveal to the perceiver, even though that essence that those things reveal may not proclaim itself loudly. This may be best achieved by moving beyond the referential nature of terms to their ontological senses that they carry with them - that appear to be hidden but are still able to reveal themselves. Through his use of the terms ‘Eigenschaft’ and ‘Thatsache’ his encouragement encompasses an etymological dimension.

The showing of the thing in the world that occurs demonstrates the activity of intuition (‘Anschauung’) and thereafter the representation (‘Vorstellung’) of that thing. Novalis calls the intuitive consciousness of objects ‘matter’ because it is not the solid component of awareness that is supposed by cognition. In its lack of solidity it “cannot conceive pure form … [but it] can grasp determinate form – some unity of form and content” (Beiser, 2002, p. 416). The ‘hovering’ that occurs is an indication that one never alights fully on the thing, because in striving for cognition one is simultaneously connected with things in the world through intuition – indeed, one’s intuition is the showing of those things - and removed from them by imagination (Rommel, 1996). Through the imagination and the imaginative association of signs assigned to the thing in the world - signs which in relation to language Novalis thinks of as “conceptual image[s]” (Rommel, 1996, p. 101) - Romantisieren takes place. At each level or stage, the self reflects the showing of the thing, with Buber identifying that this continuous reflection through the imagination, from apparent start to finish, is the essence of freedom:

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94 By this, Beiser means that there is form there, but that it is accompanied by other elements aside from the matter that appears to make it up.
Er lauscht dem aus sich Werdenden, dem Weg des Wesens in der Welt; nicht um von ihm getragen zu werden: um es selber so zu verwirklichen, wie es von ihm, dessen es bedarf, verwirklicht werden will, mit Menschengeist und Menschentat, mit Menschenleben und Menschentod. (1997, pp. 72-73)

He listens to that which grows, to the way of Being in the world, not in order to be carried along by it but rather in order to actualize it in the manner in which it, needing him, wants to be actualized by him – with human spirit and human deed, with human life and human death. (1996, p. 109)

The active theme of Novalis’ continues in the list of words that are apparently independent, discrete activities, but which for him show the uncertainty of the imaginative process. This list of words is important for two reasons: Firstly, it demonstrates the showing of the thing in all its guises – starting with “Wesen”/essence, and then moving through a number of seemingly self-agentic processes. The showing of the thing in the world is processed through all those activities listed, but the listing of the terms shows the interdependency and, in the end, obscurity of each ostensibly discrete activity. The beginning ‘essence’, therefore, is never fully revealed to the self. The inference that occurs is as a result of a number of imaginative processes that draw on each other and that then arguably lead the perceiver back to the essence of the thing being perceived. Recalling chapter two: The object being regarded, and the imaginative response to it, are still contained in the representation.

For this chapter, the above discussion adds a fuller explanation to my method. In the disclosure of things in the world, Being reveals aspects of itself in the subsequent imaginative process of the self, and in that disclosure Being indicates its interrelatedness with the properties of a thing. Here, Novalis draws to our attention that true ‘knowing’ comes about through this genuine self-showing of the
thing and its properties. Knowing is a form of revealing which is proof of the thing’s contingency on Being. One may see this and make inferences from the process, but the close connection with all those other terms shows that Novalis prefers that, in ‘witnessing’, ‘signifying’, or ‘inferring’, one is also indicating and showing their own interdependency with Being. We can see through this activity that Being reveals itself but is being revealed also: This is the nature of the double genitive that Novalis uses in “Offenbarung des Wesens”/[disclosure by/of Being].

I shall show in this chapter that a similar ‘self-revealing’ of things in the world through Māori terminology is made possible by interpreting the terms in their active senses. The rendering active of things in the world is not an uncommon exercise of those in the creative arts, as I noted briefly in chapter two, but it is not a usual one in an academic setting. For the most part, Māori terms are protected as having specific (denotative) meanings that are already established and used in a collectively understood sense. This chapter again looks at things in the world through the lens of terminology, as chapter six did, but now I romanticise those terms. The reader should note that the terms interweave more strongly in this chapter, and so I shall not provide merely one space to discuss each term but

95 Thus, alongside what Novalis asserts in that fragment, one could romanticise the term ‘mātauranga’ by regarding its etymology. ‘Mā’ refers to ‘clear, transparent’, and ‘tauranga’ is a form of settling, physical, emotional or mental. The transparency or clarity that is being discussed here, within the context of inaccessibility to “true assertions of the kind which apply to the object-world” (Bowie, 1997, p. 82) that characterises the beliefs of the Romantics, is one that depicts a lack of substance. The settling that occurs here is characterised by a lack of perfect or precise showing of the thing’s essence to the self. The settling, moreover, is shown to the self as an overall disturbing activity because the self becomes aware that he/she cannot perfectly posit the thing settled on for contemplation.

This impossibility of the precise representation of the thing is also incidentally reflected in the romanticising of the other Māori terms through Novalis’ Stoßsätze.

96 This exercise does not, however, deal with assertions that posit one thing’s equivalence with something else. That is, even romanticising terms may not diminish the tendency to say that a thing ‘is’ another. I noted in chapter six that the term ‘mātauranga’ may constrain how Māori writers describe the relationship of the self to things in the world, and now broaden a discussion of this unfortunate tendency to the outcome of academic writing where, particularly in Indo-European languages, one is forced to determine the equivalence of even geheimnisvollen terms. Novalis was to some extent resigned to humanity’s tendency to find an ultimate ground that would explain a thing. On that basis, I attempt not to avoid what is an inevitable consequence of academic writing but instead deliberately equate a term with a continuous, changing, and ultimately unknowable movement. Additionally, in offering a critique of the terms earlier on, I have opened them up to be potentially thought of as fluid things in the world.
engage with them so that they relate to each other. Both Novalis’ philosophies and Māori ideas of Being and Geheimnis, I have shown, require that things in the world be autonomous in their workings and yet actively interrelated: This chapter recognises that necessity and draws firstly on some basic, active definitions of each word to begin imaginative Romantisieren in a unifying way.

### Some contemplative fragments for the reader of the early German Romantics

The activity of Romantisieren is ongoing, and with that in mind I have provided a further step, with the Romantisieren of terms found commonly in the German Romantic tradition, this time using Māori terms as Stoßsätze. I had already romanticised these Māori terms, and they in turn provide sentences that push for the revitalisation or rethinking of those German Romantic terms. Although the overall aim of this thesis is to use Novalis’ philosophies and fragments as Stoßsätze to revisit Māori terms, and to infuse them again with Geheimnis, that aim is an incomplete one in the grander scheme of Romantisieren. This last step of Nachdenken is offered in the hope that it will be particularly interesting to the reader of German Romantic philosophy. The tables that they are incorporated into the text with are not meant to ‘border off’ this discussion from the overall aim of the thesis but to show that there is a further step in what to me has become obvious as an ongoing aspect of Stoßsätze.

### The benefits of romanticising terms: Wellbeing

Recall my observation that while present in the Waitangi Tribunal I had suspected a complete disparity between the terms land and whenua. In these forums, which talked in an overriding way not about whenua (even though the word might have been commonly used) but land, I started to theorise about what happens in the judicial process, even in the Waitangi Tribunal, which is inquisitorial but not adversarial. In even participating in these processes, the claimant threatened to be distanced from whenua in its fullest sense. The participant is encouraged to think of themselves as separate from all other things...
in the world and to discuss them. Whenua as one example is expunged to the world of the outer and, even if not named such, becomes ‘land’. Fragmenting things in the world, the body is constrained, corresponding with the view of Māori writers on the theme that words have important repercussions for the metaphysical and physical self. This constraint can also occur in dealings with the dead body, even in the absence of words, as they may isolate the body from whenua. Māori typically have various ways of managing this, but many of these expressions appear to resist the casting of the self as a highly visible, certain object, devoid of any interplay with Being.

I speculate that the primary concern here is the view of the self as a totally evident entity, able to be retained, moved around, and split off from all other elements (whakapapa, whenua and so on) that make it whole. The self then becomes pure abstract body, disembodied rational agent, or self. Those things in the world, whakapapa and whenua for instance, are equated with ‘land’ and ‘genealogy’ so that they are separate, physically discernible and geheimnislos. Royal (2008) resists that fragmentation and proactively points to the relationships that the self has with everything else, so that what he terms ‘knowledge’ arises:

E pā ana ngā taonga o te mātauranga Māori –pēnei me te whakapapa, i te kōrero, i te mōteatea, i te haka, aha atu – ki a rātou anō. (p. 10)

[These treasured elements of Maori knowledge – such as genealogy, speech, ancient verse, dance - whatever the element – relate to each other.]

Those offshoots of knowledge are in fact themselves linked. This belief has practical consequences:

Ehara i te mea, me ako i te mātauranga mō te mātauranga te take, engari, kia puta he māramatanga, he aroha ki te ao. (p. 12)
[It should not be that one learns knowledge for the sake of knowledge; instead, there should be understanding, and compassion for the world, stemming from that process.]

Royal indicates here the need to acknowledge the full interplay of elements within the realm of Being. From a process arises a feeling, corresponding with Novalis’ (1960b) seemingly scientific but metaphorical assertion that “[b]ey allem Verdichten erfolgt Abstoßung von Wärme – Wärme wird fühlbar - Bey allem Verdünnen wird Wärme angezogen – es entsteht das Gefühl v[on] Kälte” (p. 468)/“[e]very solidification produces an expulsion of heat – heat becomes perceptible – All rarefaction attracts heat – engendering the feeling of coldness” (Wood, 2007, p. 182). In that fragment, Novalis points out that what appears to be a solid object is actually emanating another form of energy that at first is not perceptible but becomes so. This energy moves back towards another process, resulting in an opposite energy. Casting the self as something inert and solid, then, has consequences for what occurs with the self afterwards.

In chapter three I recounted Novalis’ language to do with the relationship between a technical view of nature and an approach to nature’s sick-room, or charnel house. Illness results from that relationship, primarily because “[j]etzt sehn wir nichts, als todte Wiederholung, die wir nicht verstehn” (1960o, p. 545)/[now we see nothing other than dead repetition, which we do not understand]. Nassar (2006) suggests that because of this change in attitude towards the mysterious (the Absolute) we are left with limited capacities for feeling the presence of spirit, and correspondingly with an ‘inadequate’ physical form. While an ability to be open to the miraculous in the visible object must be an aspect of what Novalis’ ‘Magical Idealism’ wants to achieve, the converse must presumably be true: that a lack of that ability leaves humanity with a sort of illness, leading Novalis (1960b) to note in fragment form:

Theory of diseases on the whole in the most general sense. Dietetic occupation of the spirit with both what is definite and indefinite. (Wood, 2007, p. 114)

Whether what I have suspected is enough of an impact to render the Māori self ‘ill’ in the allopathic sense is up for some speculation, but certainly if we take Novalis’ lead on the weakness of the organs because of the rendering of things in the world as certain it becomes clearer that there are effects on the self in such situations that are not immediately (or, in fact, ever) discernible. Novalis (1960b) also notes that “[d]ie Körper sind in dem Raum precipitirt und angeschoßne Gedanken…. Der Mensch ist ein Focus des Aethers” (p. 449)/“[b]odies are precipitated and crystallized thoughts in space…. Man is a focus of the ether” (Wood, 2007, p. 167), and further in his Hymnen an die Nacht juxtaposes light, darkness, colour, light beams and waves, stars, stone and plant, alongside eyes, gait and lips of humanity. We can see here that all manner of things are physically and spiritually connected. Even stones may be sentient. Moreover, the ways in which the forces of nature come to affect these things are through their organs and organisation; the ‘widespread space’ is the ‘most inner soul’ of life and thus moves in a non-linear fashion around and through these entities. The gentleness of the light plays across them, and animals ‘burn’, metabolise, or move, meaning here that they are the results of unseen processes – chemical and otherworldly – that interact with these dancing forces. The complexity of the Absolute is seen in the interdependence of these things that find them moving and disclosing themselves throughout it. Here Novalis incorporates the body with poetry; not only is the substance of what he says important but also the form he chooses to convey it. In this he presages the contemporary Harmut Böhme, who analyses the Romantic idea of the ‘analogia entis’ with a view to reclaiming aspects of poetic holism. In his chapter “Der sprechende Leib: Die Semiotiken des Körpers am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts und ihre hermetische Tradition”, Böhme argues that discourses that look at the relatedness of body, nature and language are well worth considering:

Körper ist Sprache und Sprache ist Körper: in den ver-rückten Diskursen sprachtheologischer Mystik und paracelsischer Signaturenlehre spricht sich ein Begehren aus, das die bürgerliche
Both Novalis and Böhme argue for an expansive approach and recognition of things in the world on the body itself. As I have argued, conceiving of whenua and whakapapa as static entities has consequences for the body. The positing of things in advance has an effect on the self because the self is an intrinsic part of the activity that whenua and whakapapa anticipate. It is known amongst Māori that a 'makutu'/curse may be uttered against another, and so the negative intentions of humanity are acknowledged. I argue the effectiveness of this sort of activity is contingent on operating against the Other as if they are a separate, isolated event in the world. Browne’s (2005) observations that words operate in conjunction with environment and body are important because they herald a new approach to the wellbeing of Māori. If there are utterances with intentions behind them that can heal, however, then the converse must be true. In this latter situation the involvement of the body in seemingly neutral situations may have insidious effects on the self, as the self is effectively cut off from its ability, through the greater activity of ako, to acknowledge the effect of whakapapa and whenua on the self at a very deep and personal level. Of course this effect moves outwards as well, so that whenua and whakapapa, cut off from the self, are also negatively impacted. These are some of the far-reaching but theoretically possible effects of conceiving of things in the world through narrow terminology.
Challenging the geheimnislose self: ‘Dasein’/‘ira’:

Reviewing Novalis’ interpretation of the ‘self’

We will recall that Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” reveals both a corporeal and esoteric meaning to the existence of the self, not solely a corporeal, visible, physical and precise one that tends to dominate. The lines “Wenn die so singen oder küssen/Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen” expose that physical activity is involved as much as the hidden feeling of an activity. Novalis advocates that the world be viewed as a merging of feeling and expression. As “[e]in volkommner Trope des Geistes” (1960o, p. 564)/[a perfect trope of the spirit] he extends the physical self outwards into the ether, returning as we have seen in “Die Natur” to the self. In this movement, which is constant, the All is involved. As one expression of Being, the self encounters and incorporates other things in the world in both so-called 97 physical and spiritual ways together 98.

97 I describe ‘physical’ and ‘spiritual’ as ‘so-called’ because for Māori writers such as Pere (1982), Durie (1994), Marsden (2003) they are artificial constructs, particularly in respect of the effects that one facet has on the other. Pere in particular notes the complete unity of the notions of ‘physical’ and ‘spiritual’ such that they are indivisible.

98 This constant activity of coming into contact and relating to things in the world in both spiritual and physical ways makes perfect sense from traditional Māori discourses. It exemplifies that an outcome is no more important than the process because both are important physically and spiritually. The ascent of Tāne to retrieve the three baskets of knowledge may be read in light of Novalis’ idea, illustrated in his “Die Natur”, that Romantisieren includes moving to a different way of perceiving the world and is hence dependent on activity and process. In “Die Natur”, Rosenblüté was compelled onward into an animate nature towards the Jungfrau (Isis); similarly, Tāne was encouraged to leave the ordinary realm in order to obtain knowledge for mankind. Indeed, the ascent aspect of accounts to do with the baskets of knowledge appear to be of high importance: the relationships between the characters involved; the ways in which Tāne was assisted to ascend; the reasons that he was permitted to ascend to begin with are all important preliminary concerns central to the accounts.

There are contextual considerations to be had in respect of the Tāne stories. First, Tāne was opposed by Whiro, who sought to reach the baskets of knowledge before Tāne. Tāne’s heroic deeds were thus emphasised by the undermining efforts of Whiro, who, it could be argued, is equally involved in the spiritual and physical encounter of the baskets - in opposing Tāne, Whiro distinguished himself as one who highlighted Tāne’s efforts and eventual success and provided the proceedings with a form of discomfort. Often Whiro is described generally as the nemesis of the ‘good’ gods (Hongi, 1911; Jordan, 2005); however, his association with Tāne as Tāne aimed for the baskets brings to mind Novalis’ endorsement of elements working separately but in conjunction.
In his summary of the Early Romantics, Berlin (1999) observes that the self is something we cannot be readily aware of. It is interesting that he hints at the changeable self towards the end of a passage on the general fluidity of the world:

One is reminded of the famous cynical story about someone who said to Dante Gabriel Rossetti when he was writing about the Holy Grail, ‘But Mr Rossetti, when you have found the Grail, what will you do with it?’ This is precisely the typical question which the romantics knew very well how to answer. In their case the Grail was in principle both undiscoverable and such that one’s whole life could not be prevented from being a perpetual search for it, and that is because of the nature of the universe…. The brute fact about the universe is that it is not fully expressible … it is not at rest, it is in motion … and this is what we discover when we discover that the self is something of which we are aware only in effort. Effort is action, action is movement, movement is unfinishable – perpetual movement. (p. 106)

Thus nature is not a static non-self that Fichte argued it was but was to be reflected in the self’s striving for awareness. The movement of the self is one characterised by a turn towards becoming “half conscious” (Berlin, 1999, p. 98) as the self acts in a fluid relationship with the Absolute. But in the self-awareness that the self strives for, the self also becomes highly aware that the Absolute may not be represented fully. In this, the self has a will of its own, but just as Schelling had theorised that nature strives after a thing (Berlin, 1999), so the self strives also, but

In a similar way, in Novalis’ poetic treatment of the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom, Roseblüte und Hyazinth bring to our attention that nature had as much to do with Rosenblüte’s movement to another realm as Rosenblüte did himself. For instance, the garrulous aspects of nature – both cruel and kind – provided a context within which Rosenblüte was immersed and without which he may not have proceeded. Both Tâne and Rosenblüte, then, endure moments of discomfort that is holistic in nature. Tâne appears to be more certain of his aim and outcome although, again, Whiro’s actions provide uncertainty. Rosenblüte encounters Sais in the Jungfrau but Novalis explains quite explicitly that the end of Rosenblüte’s journey results in the self-realisation that what he is encountering is contained within; the Tâne accounts, on the other hand, do not go this far, although the reader may interpret that the relationship that exists between Tâne and those elements around him lead to the conclusion that Tâne is not entirely disconnected from the baskets of knowledge either.
in a state of consciousness. It would be this moderated form of striving – itself only possible because of things in the world and their mystery – that would bring the body and other things in the world into relationship with each other.

**The relationship of the self to things in the world**

Advocating for a ‘metaphysical’ respect for the process of learning, Browne (2005) notes a similarly agentic yet externally related phenomenon occurring between body, environment and language for Māori:

> Languages that have a kinaesthetic feeling base, ‘deal with rhythms, and vibrations of process’…. ‘Listening’ to vibrations within objects emitting sounds outside of the human hearing range yet felt by the body kinaesthetically, could enable one to attune to the environment more completely. (p. 12)

For her, terminology is important in ensuring that one is attuned to whenua. Māori terms for what we nowadays call ‘illness’ likewise foreshadow vital approaches to the body. Here, whenua as a sustaining force draws into the individual as emanating from the combination of elements; as I have maintained it must be acknowledged as an holistic agency if it is to have a positive impact on the body and spirit. Terms are therefore vital in how they preconceive the relationship of the body to the effective and interdependent character of whenua. With Novalis’ assertion that the body is reflective of the social “fort bis zur Sonne und ihrem System” (1960b, p. 370)/“up until the sun and its system” (Wood, 2007, p. 104), one sees the uncertainty of the body, which also recurs in different language in Pere’s (1997) and Durie’s (1994) writings at times. Novalis illustrates a holistic sketch of the body and personhood and even covertly attacks the practice of assigning language to the body that is specific to the body. He believes instead that “[d]as Äußre ist ein in Geheimnißzustand erhobnes Innre” (1960b, p. 293)/“[t]he exterior is an interior that has been raised to a mysterious state” (Wood, 2007, p. 144) – that the link between the self and the world is implicit.
Instead, terms reflect the greater-than-physical character of the self: In that sense there is an ebb and flow between what is real and what is ideal, revealing the intent behind Novalis’ (1960b) rhetorical question: “Sollten die Körper und Figuren die Substantiva – die Kräfte die Verba – und die Natur[ehre] – Dechiffirirkunst seyn” (p. 443)/“Should bodies and figures be nouns - forces, verbs - and the theory of Nature - the art of deciphering?” (Wood, 2007, p. 163). The link between the spiritual and the physical is evident here, and the terms merely disclose the changing interplay of the environment, the body and language. The ‘hiddenness’ or opacity innate to the Māori terms shows a broader description of Māori language as one reflecting Being. Novalis believed that, due to the instantaneous change of the individual moment, definite knowledge about nature is also quite labile. Certain knowledge, or even a confident impression of nature, is useful, however, in that it brings humanity to a point of uncertainty. An uncomfortable process, the confusion of knowledge results from nature’s tendency to provide the genuine seeker with only a “dunkles Gefühl” (Novalis, 1960b, p. 256)/[dim feeling]. Humanity consequently can obtain vague guidance from nature, and may even “mit desto größerer Genauigkeit das versteckte entscheidende Phaenomèn finden und bestimmen [lassen]” (1960b, p. 256)/“discover and determine with much greater precision, the hidden and decisive phenomenon” (Wood, 2007, p. 14). Nature is thus never to be viewed as an immediate satisfier of mankind’s thirst for certainty; it might provide a voice which guides humanity to a method of discovery, but it will never yield precise answers. Additionally, merely discovering with precision the “decisive phenomenon” does not unearth the phenomenon; indeed, the essence of nature that, according to Novalis (1960e), complains about the “entsetzliche Qualen und Schmerzen” (p. 95)/[hideous anguish and pain] stemming from the process of objectification would prefer to keep the phenomenon within its own, embedded context.

We can see that whenua, in combination with a number of other entities such as mauri and whakapapa, confuses the idea that there is certainty to be had about the body. This comes forth in Māori terms to do with a disorder. Whenua and whakapapa have hence come to bear on the body in both dramatic and subtle ways. Our proper acknowledgement of whenua and whakapapa as things in the world
that are guided by all other things is imperative to an awareness that the body is concomitant in the activity that whenua and whakapapa imply. For the Māori self, the ability to talk about wellbeing in a holistic way is predicated on this awareness, because terms either act in synchronisation with Being by opening up onto an unpredictable, unknowable world, or they distance humanity from an awareness of Being by seeking to narrow the scope of the body through terms that objectify.

**Dasein**

For the self, this interplay takes form in a number of ways that can be explained by referring again to Novalis. We have already seen that poetry for Novalis has the capacity to articulate an emotional, bodily response; it lacks the meticulous systematising approach of philosophy but it may “einen allegorischen Sinn im Großen haben und eine indirecte Wirkung wie Musik etc. thun” (1960f, p. 572)“have an allegorical meaning on the whole and, like music, exert … an indirect effect” (Behler, 1993, p. 206). The self as ‘Dasein’/existence is occupied with the act of poetry, not just the ability to intellectualise. As for the notion of ‘Dasein’, the existential state of the self, Novalis notes that “[d]er reine Stoff d[es] reinen Geistes ist – Seyn – der empirische Stoff - bezogenseyn (Daseyn) – oder mannichfaltiges Seyn” (1960j, p. 174)“the pure material of pure spirit is – being – the empirical material [of pure spirit] is – relational being (presence [Dasein]) – or manifold being” (Kneller, 2003, p. 72). Dasein is hence involved with feeling, even though Being may not be felt in its pure sense but as an mediated relationship to the self.

Dasein in its authentic sense is poetic, bringing together different realms of existence to make something new of the seemingly banal. In this the poet is uniquely self-contained but only within the context and workings of the Absolute:

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99 Dasein is a particularly German philosophical concept that is commonly translated as ‘existence’. Literally it means *there-being*. Other writers besides Novalis used the term, including Hegel, for whom Dasein is something because of its contrast and relationship with other, different things (Inwood, 1992). Notably, Heidegger referred to Dasein in place of the usual term ‘human’ to denote the historical and temporal self. Dasein for him raises Being as an issue or a problem.

[To be sure, the poet is deprived of his senses – because of that, everything takes place within him. He imagines subject and object in the most authentic sense – soul and world.]

The introspection that Novalis prefers here is not an independent one, however. He makes this point clear in “Blüthenstaub” when he discusses the self as a part of what he calls the universe, but, peculiarly, with the universe residing within at the same time:


We dream of traveling through the universe – but is not the universe within ourselves? The depths of our spirit are unknown to us - the mysterious way leads inwards. Eternity with its worlds – the past and future – is in ourselves or nowhere. The external world is the world of shadows – it throws its shadow into the realm of light. At present this realm certainly seems to us so dark inside, lonely, shapeless. But how entirely different it will seem to us – when this gloom is past, and the body of shadows has moved away. We will experience greater enjoyment than ever, for our spirit has been deprived. (1997, p. 25)
The self as Dasein experiences both its own limitations as well as its potential within the Absolute. In *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* Novalis assumes that this Dasein is the poetic existence of the self. In “Blüthenstaub” he had already accused the philistines of living a banal life that might, to them, delude them into thinking that they had achieved the full intellectual potential of the self. ‘Dasein’ is used in *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* as existence that experiences the mysterious relation of things in the world, which can, however, lead to some deep consternation:

Es läßt sich auch diese volle Befriedigung eines angeboren Wunsches, diese wundersame Freude an Dingen, die ein näheres Verhältnis zu unserm geheimen Dasein haben mögen, zu Beschäftigungen, für die man von der Wiege an bestimmt und ausgerüstet ist, nicht erklären und beschreiben. (1960h, p. 242)

Nor is it possible to describe or explain this complete satisfaction of an inborn desire, this wondrous joy in things, which may have a close relation to our mysterious existence, to activities one is prepared and predestined for from the cradle. (1990, p. 67)

Thus the feeling of one’s own limitations is implicit to the self. Later in the novel Heinrich is afforded a view of the relations between things in the world, affecting his “Daseins” (1960h, p. 252)/“very existence” (1990, p. 77) due to the poetic and perceptive words of the figure of the old miner. Occasionally, Being will provide glimpses of its workings to the poetic and existential self, which is made aware of its own limitations in that very revelation. The self as an entity amongst the workings of the Absolute, and within the impression of all things in the world, is Dasein, which Novalis directly equates with “unserm irrdischen Daseyn überhaupt – das aus mannichfaltigen Arten zu existiren, gemischt ist” (1960m, p. 446)/“our whole earthly being – which is a mixture of diverse ways of existing” (1997, p. 37). These various ways of being in the world are impacted on by things near and far, so that in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* the impact of things in the world is emphasised in Novalis’ mention of Dasein:

The thinking man returns to the original function of his existence, to creative contemplation, to the point, where knowledge and creation were united in a wondrous mutual tie, to that creative moment of true enjoyment, of inward self-conception. If he immerses himself entirely in the contemplation of this primaeval phenomenon, the history of the creation of the nature unfolds before him in newly emerging times and spaces like a tale that never ends, and the fixed point that crystallizes in the infinite fluid becomes for him a new revelation of the genius of love, a new bond between the Thou and the I. (2005, p. 93)

It is in Dasein that one finds the holistic existence of the self for Novalis, and it is characterised by feeling and inward concern. The Absolute creates other realms for Dasein, and other beings poeticise this wondrous, earthly Dasein but do not have to be immediately present to have an effect on the poet, with the nature of that remove not the same as the objective position of the scientist. We will remember Novalis indicated the sense-deprived nature of the poet, with the poet containing the whole world within: The poet is therefore not focused on one object, although he or she may conclude by finding the external object to be a reflection of what is within, as occurred with Rosenblüte in his Jungfrau-Sais encounter. It is clear that the world is within the poet as a whole, not just a resident of the poet’s mind, bringing Novalis to observe that poetry is the “willkührlicher, thätiger, produktiver Gebrauch unsrer Organe” (1960f, p. 563)/“intentional, active, productive employment of our organs” (Behler, 1993, p.
203), with various influences coming to bear on the poetic activity\textsuperscript{100}. The experience of the poetic self is therefore bodily but only because it has been moved by the overall impact of things in the world.

\textsuperscript{100} The activity behind poeticising is important for the poetic self to allow a phenomenon to emerge. Exactly what the nature of that process is deserves some exploration. In the case of Tāne, we have seen that there was movement upwards, towards the baskets of knowledge. Again, there are echoes of Novalis here with the concept that moving the banal upwards or the unworkably mysterious downwards is fundamental to \textit{ira} as it seeks to transform a thing in the world. Movement or glance upwards is also seen in the Māui stories. Māui, - a “very tricky demi-god, creating much mischief” (Robinson, 2005, p. 267) - was responsible for not only reaching upwards to slow the sun, but also descending into the underworld to obtain fire from his grandmother. The separation of Rangi and Papa demonstrates the use of force upward to allow light to start to emerge. Hinetitama, the Dawn Maiden, moved into the underworld and became the Goddess of Death; and in order to acquire a moko from Uetonga (and then bring that art to the human world) Mataora had to descend into the underworld, thereafter returning to humanity (Adsett, Whiting, Karetu, & Lardelli, 1996). The characters are important to the activity, and their movement is metaphorically important because it depicts activity from one sphere to another. In karakia and other verse it is not uncommon to see the differing states of emergence being acknowledged. The following is a reminder of Tāne’s ascent:

\begin{verbatim}
Tēnei au te hōkai nei o taku tapuwae
Ko te hōkai nuku ko te hōkai rangi
Ko te hōkai a tō tapuna a Tānenui-a-rangi
Ka pikitia ai ki te rangi tūhāhā ki te Tihi-o-Manono
Ka rokohina atu rā ko Te Matua-kore anake
Ka tīkina mai ngā kete o te wānanga
Ko te kete-tuaui
Ko te kete-tuaitea
Ko te kete-aronui
Ka tiritiria ka poupoa
Ka puta mai iho ko te ira tangata
Kī te wheiao ki te ao mārama
Tihei-mauri ora!
\end{verbatim}

This is the journey of sacred footsteps
Journeyed about the earth journeyed about the heavens
The journey of the ancestral god Tānenuiarangi
Who ascended into the heavens to Te Tihi-o-Manono
Where he found the parentless source
From there he retrieved the baskets of knowledge
Te kete-tuaui
Te kete-tuaitea
Te kete-aronui
These were distributed and implanted about the earth
Growing from dim light to full light
There was life. (Taonui, 2009 n.p.)

This karakia points directly to the manifestation of different states, dependent on the ascension of Tāne. Tāne’s journey opened the way for the acquisition of the baskets, which then allowed for the emergence of full light. Those elements – the baskets and the
As with the collective or nation, the self needs to be aware of including *otherness* in their usual way of relating and communicating. This view comes to the fore in a fragment of Novalis’ that states:


Every individual has its distinct measure – or relation of health - His illnesses lie above or below this measure. Thus the most perfectly healthy individual would be one whose sphere of health also included the spheres of illness, just as the most developed nation would be one whose prose-speech [-] conversations - also embraced the entire sphere of poesy and song - where no distinction existed between poesy and prose. (Wood, 2007, p. 56)

Novalis’ message here is twofold. First and most obviously he is referring to a non-standardised formula of health for the individual, by which the self has his or her own thresholds for health and illness. Just as importantly, he notes the need for the individual to be seen as part of a collective or nation. Both must embrace the undesirable *other* if they are to be whole. Thus the individual must be cognisant of, and make room for, their own limitations (illnesses); moreover, though, he or she must be ready to accept those limitations wholeheartedly. By analogy, the nation, preferring prose as a means of communication, must allow and integrate what it

light – already existed, but the self’s involvement with them in a poetic sense allowed them to emerge. Thus the self does not have to bring elements into existence; it can simply clear the way for their appearance. When journeying to the underworld to find Niwareka, for instance, Mataora acquired the moko from Uetonga. As with Tâne, the concrete entity already existed, and he was really just provided with the conditions to allow the entity to emerge, albeit in innovative ways.
considers undesirable - poetry - so that there is thereafter no distinction between the two. Again, as with Novalis’ equation of the individual’s talents with those of the nation, the individual should be reflected nationally.

Not only is the self involved in poetry, however; it is also the product of poetry. While one may start with the anatomical and physiological features of the body, those only contribute in the first instance to a more mystical explanation. Novalis ties the physical attributes of the body with the emotions and thence with the spiritual aspects of the world. Alluding to the traditional theories of humoralism, or humoral pathology, he notes in one fragment that the soul has a manifest impact on the bodily organs. He continues that the soul appears to be the seat of emotions. The interaction of the organs and the emotions forms a “Licht” (1960b, p. 351)/[illumination] that then works on the “einfachen Operationen[,] Formen und Stoffen des menschlichen] Geistes” (1960b, pp. 351-352)/“simple operations, forms, and substances of the human spirit” (Wood, 2007, p. 90). The self works from the inner to the outer, which is nevertheless always connected; this is a form of the “Verbindung der innern und äußeren Poësie – des Allgemeinen und Speziellen”/“inner and outer poesy – of the universal and the specialized”. Poetry, then, ensures a link between those three supposedly distinct aspects of the self – physical, emotional and spiritual – particularly when the body is also thought of as a relational entity.

The starting points of physicality or sensibility remain even into the mystical realms, and it is here that Novalis refers to the traces of usefulness in these first principles. His emphasis on the continued presence of life in explanations of life suggests that a living explanation, even when rendered mystical through poetry, remains tinged by a continual presence of the process of experienced living. The poetic self is likewise borne of the body, despite the self apparently having “certain zones” which match location – firstly, the physical body, secondly, the individual’s town or whenua, thirdly, the province, continuing through to the “Sonne und ihrem System” (1960b, p. 370)/[sun and its system]. Acknowledgement must then be given to those base factors; indeed, to forget their presence would be to imitate the proponents of the Enlightenment, who seized on a new way of explaining nature without any acknowledgment of the limitations of
aspects of their approach, such as the inquiry into a thing with a view to explaining it completely\textsuperscript{101}. An “\textit{ununterbrochener Strom}” (1960o, p. 575)/[unbroken stream] that he ascribes to all life holds true for other phenomena also. His observation “\textit{daß das Höchste … vor dem Niedrigeren etc. kommt}” (1960b, p. 415)/[that the highest … comes before the lowest etc] suggests that, in any event, the lowest exists (and may precede the highest at this stage in modernist thinking). Taken together with his indication that there is a remnant of the first and lowest physical element, we can extend that latter fragment so that the lowest is in fact extant but not necessarily higher in the sense of more desirable.

The Māori self: A general introduction

Novalis’ assertions about the self as a poetic and creative expression of Dasein provide Stoßsätze which prompt a similar Māori idea of the self. Importantly, the Māori self as a holistic entity has already been written about by a number of Māori writers. That the Māori individual is reliant on the acknowledgement of Being, not only for his or her own state of wellbeing but also for that of the world in which they reside, is at the forefront of these writers’ minds. Recall Durie (1994), for instance, who argues that the whare tapa wha/four walls of health, comprising the ‘taha wairua’/spiritual side, ‘taha tinana’/physical side, ‘taha whānau’/the family, and ‘taha hinengaro’/emotional and mental sides, are all to be taken into account when thinking about the Māori self in the first instance and thereafter when discussing the wellbeing of Māori. Hoskins (2010), recounting Heidegger’s theories about being-in-the-world, argues that Māori are wholly within their environment in a holistic and total sense. Royal generally notes the sourcing of the self within the location and natural features about the self.

\textsuperscript{101} Novalis posits that “‘[d]ie Philosophie ist … die Substanz der Wissenschaft – die überall gesucht wird – überall vorhanden ist, und nie dem Sucher erscheint’” (1960b, p. 302)/[philosophy is the substance of science as it were - that is sought everywhere - present everywhere, and yet never appears to the seeker] (Wood, 2007, p. 52). It would be a mistake, then, to assume that it were not present merely because it could not be perceived.
Two points are worth noting here, however. First, as I have argued elsewhere, those sorts of philosophical discussions are useful only if they are melded with the use of common terms. Those terms would then express those philosophical assertions in everyday life, and would not be caught by the Geheimnislosigkeit that tends to entrap things in the modern Western world. Novalis’ positioning of the self is firmly political as much as spiritual or bodily, and as an experienced, living existence in the world, Dasein in particular reflects the inability of the self to fully apprehend the workings of the Absolute. The self is therefore, from Novalis’ promptings, less likely to be interpreted as a certain, self-assured entity as it regards things in the world. In this chapter I expand on the workings of things in the world behind those common terms as they are experienced by the uncertain self.

Romanticising the epistemic self: Ira and its geheimnisvolle nature

Secondly, and related to the first point, this task can only be undertaken with a transformation of the term ‘self’. There are problems in labelling the Māori self as ‘self’ – in much the same way as ‘mātāuranga’ is an inappropriate term to use for a Māori cognitive orientation towards things in the world – because of its historical and political involvement with the primary and autonomous subject. Novalis’ affirmations about the self, within the greater holistic dimension of Dasein, to some extent mitigate these problems. We have seen that Novalis prefers the idea that the self is at once spiritual, political and poetic/poeticised. A compelling possibility for Māori lies in considering the self as one uncertain, dynamic entity of many, with decidedly creative powers informed by the Absolute. A potential Māori term here is ‘ira’ that, when its meanings are taken together, includes all aspects of the social, physical and mysterious. Ira means simultaneously ‘gene’ and ‘life-force’, corporeal and mysterious. Edwards (2009) highlights the necessity of ira in the interrelationship of things:
A discussion I had with Ngati Rereahu kaumatua Piripi Crown explained how we are continually reminded of the relationship and interconnectedness between entities. Piripi recounted one explanation of the beginnings of whakapapa that he was once given by a kuia (female elder) that he didn’t name and at a time he did not give. He recalled that the kuia explained that uira, lightning, rekindles and connects our human whakapapa. Every living thing is part spirit and part animate in the Maori world and in relation to humans this is referred to as ira atua and ira tangata. Uira refers to the presence of being, the presence of ira, what Mead calls genes. Lightning connects both the spiritual and human elements connecting the genes of the spirit world to that of the living so that the connection is maintained. This would possibly also explain why many Maori view the signs of lightning over hills as a sign that death has come to someone or group. Crown explained it to me like this:

Ka u te ira atua me te ira tangata i te uira, ara te timatanga o te whakapapa.

_Spiritual and human essences are recalled in lightning, that is the beginning of whakapapa._ (p. 253)

There is innate to the word ‘ira’ a sense of inheritance, but that is dependent on one’s ongoing interactions with Being. Ira ensures that the “limitless power of the divine” (Reinfeld & Pihama, n.d., p. 24) finds expression in both the body and the ‘divine’. These descriptions have importance in an everyday sense, in that they demand that every interaction with things in the world – including language for those things – be based on a notion of mystery for the world. We may again take our cue from Novalis when he discusses how the human body is at every stage impacted by Being and hence itself is geheimnisvoll. ‘U’ of ‘uira’ suggests a gathering to oneself of things in the world within the movement of those things in the world; it also recognises the self in whatever is unfamiliar in the sense that ‘lightning’ is a foreign, even overpowering entity that nevertheless is a potent force in the gathering that ‘ira’ involves.
Also similar to the term ‘Dasein’ in the sense of ‘there-being’, or ‘being there’, the term ‘ira’ carries with it an element of wonder. A dictionary search of the term will yield that it is an exclamatory expression to bring the attention of a person to a phenomenon – an event or a thing. In being caught up with the mystery of the appearance of the thing, the Māori self is also made mysterious. As with Dasein, ‘ira’ is a reference to a constant geheimnisvolle presence that imbues throughout things in the world and shows itself in a lack of groundedness and certainty to the self’s comportment towards those things. With an emphasis on the appearance of a thing, ‘ira’ is undoubtedly related to self-hood but it relates just as much outwards from the self. As a term denoting ‘essence’, the existence that it denotes is dependent on how it involves itself with the Geheimnis of things in the world.

‘Whaiaro’ as a Māori term for the self is preceded by the activity of ‘ira’. In that term as well one may gain insight into this activity, although the immediate self is more strongly emphasised. ‘Whaiaro’ comprises two terms – ‘whai’ and ‘aro’. The self, when recognised as constituents of these terms, constantly pursues or has (‘whai’) a regard or concern (‘aro’). I return to the term ‘aro’ later in this chapter in the context of ‘whakaaro’/to think, but note at this stage that it is linked to the front sensory field of the person (Royal, 2005) which allows the self to have concern for a thing in the world. The immediate self is the whaiaro that possesses this trait, but in a much greater way ‘ira’ emphasises the historical, social and spiritual existence that whaiaro undertakes. With this introduction to the Māori self in mind, let us now turn to examine how the self as ‘ira’ can interact with the

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102 Novalis did not use ‘Dasein’ as a common noun, as Heidegger would later, but Novalis nevertheless indicated the need to supersede the solipsistic Fichtean term ‘Ich’ and create a sense of its totality. In the ‘Exkurs’ sections of this chapter, the reader will note that I have referred to the European self as ‘the self’, and the Māori self as ‘ira’, to distinguish between the two. My usage here preserves Novalis’ own view of the self as a potential confluence of historical and future events, unseen and seen things in the world and, ultimately, the Absolute. To that extent, my use of ‘self’ in the Exkurs fragments refers to the potential of the individual to romanticise, and also to be transformed in that process.

103 My reference to ‘ira’ as a term for the self comes about because of my impression that ‘self-hood’ needs some reference in this thesis, but the ‘self’ must automatically convey with it everything in relation to the self, not just the individual object. Yet the issue of ‘self-hood’ cannot be avoided in a romanticised context that deals with terms such as ‘whakapapa’, although as I have shown it can be resolved by allowing it its mysterious orientation towards things in the world.
historical and material presences that lie behind the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘whenua’, ‘ako’ and ‘whakaaro’. In my romanticised use of the term ira, I expand on the linguistic and phenomenological features of ira in the context of those terms discussed in chapter six.

Exkurs: A Māori romanticisation of the Dasein of the Ich

Ira is strongly connected to its specific location of belonging. The “spiritual and human elements” that Edwards recounts can be interpreted as borne of the stories and accounts of specific, exclusive locations. As utterances they are not just about those places but are also intrinsically, ontologically oriented towards those places. The ability for ira to poeticise in respect of elements outside of its ‘rohe’/area or ‘tūrangawaewae’/place of standing, is somewhat more limited.

If the self, as a European rendition of poetic selfhood through the term Dasein, were similarly understood as the confluence of exclusive events and locations, then the self is challenged to contemplate its place of standing as both coloniser and colonised. We have seen that Novalis’ *Die Christenheit oder Europa* addresses to a large extent the problems of philosophical colonisation in an historic context, but the poeticising that the self undertakes is broadened, when thought of alongside the Māori notion of ira, to include the acknowledgement that self-colonisation has taken place and that Geheimnis may best be reclaimed for the self when this contemplation has occurred. As *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* indicates, the self must bring to the forefront of its poeticising the discussion amongst the community of its individual and collective colonisation. With a greater emphasis on the collective history of colonisation that the self has experienced, the Geheimnis of the self in its dealings with things in the world becomes more marked. The self’s poeticising involves a degree of political and theoretical resistance here, with an uncertain outcome.

Being a product of spiritual and human elements, there is a responsibility for the self, as an outcome of Dasein, to protect those elements. For ira, this is understood as a form of being-over-there that is inseparable from the Absolute. Again a political as much as a theoretical or literary exercise, Dasein as ‘being-there’ is ‘there’ amongst things in the world that appear to be separated from the self. Ira is active as in the verb ‘akiaki’/urge on, which forms the particle of the verb ‘tiaki’/to look after. The Dasein of the self, read in the context of ira, is hence ‘being there’ as an active form of movement or concern towards something.

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I note here that ‘ira’ would not normally be used to denote the noun ‘self’ in normal speech, but I have romanticised it to take on aspects of selfhood in relation to those Stoßsätze of Novalis’ that I have referred to. It is therefore a possible term to be used in an abstract manner that reflects on the notion of selfhood.
The groundlessness of the apparent ground

Ira’s judgement of its fragility: Whakawā

The indirect nature of poesy is discussed by Novalis in relation to the quality of distance. His belief is that distance provides the Romantic clarity that is needed to heed the poetic call. Even that most personal of individual characteristics, the ego, is susceptible to the distance of time:

Im ächten Selbstbewusstsein … sind alle Zustände und Veränderungen unser empfindlicher Selbst simultan - Wir sind so gut, in demselben Moment, wir vor 2 Jahren, als wir in diesem Augenblicke – wir sind nicht Ich durch Schlüsse und indirect – sondern unmittelbar. (1960b, p. 431)

In genuine self-consciousness … all the states and variations of our empirical ego are simultaneous – We are as much in a moment that occurred two years ago as we are in the present moment – We are not an ego indirectly or by means of inferences – but rather directly. (Wood, 2007, p. 153)

Novalis raises a number of possibilities within this fragment. When he speaks of indirectness and directness, he is adamant that one is as much in a moment that occurred two years ago as in the present. Pihama (2001; 2004), O’Connor (2007), and Whitt et al (2001) reflect that possibility in their belief that present generations in one way or other manifest their ancestors. Ira is thus never definite, particularly in modernist times, and Ira can be certain that it is as involved in the past as the present, even though the past might be quite distant. There are two implications here: First, and more concretely, that Ira is the result of a confluence of events; and secondly, and more mystically, that Ira might be currently embroiled in a past that was never directly experienced. In the light of Novalis’ overarching Romantic philosophical approach, both are equally likely interpretations. The first, social
explanation proposes that one is collectively influenced by the whole. It remains in keeping with his aphorism of cooperative progress:


And just like each individual child, each particular nation possesses a special talent. - However, the other talents must not be neglected while developing it … nourishment can only be provided by the other talents. The collective talents constitute one body as it were. (Wood, 2007, p. 45)

Just as the nation needs all talents to be fostered, so the individual is envisaged as having holistically accrued a number of experiences from past to present. Ira here is not involved in one-dimensional time; instead, it is part of a temporality that involves place also. The word ‘wā’ in Māori expresses both time and place, leading Takirirangi Smith (2000) to state that:

Within the discourse of whakapapa korero, the notions of time and space are linked together. Time cannot exist without space, and space cannot exist without time. There are no singular terms in the language which describe time or space independently. Seasons (Nga tau o te Rangi) and days (Rangi) are seen as relationships of space; for example the position of the sky (Rangi) in relation to the earth (Papatuanuku). In the expression tona wa, its time and place, there is no singular distinction to mean either time by itself, or position by itself, but a singular union of the spatial and temporal context. (p. 56)

Things in the world are constantly influencing i-ra, whether or not there is awareness of that fact. Things in the world, such as trees, rocks, whenua and so on, rise up to engage in a horizon of time that is non-linear, and carry with them the
current and past. The mauri of those objects forms complex relationships with ira in all settings – rural, urban, traditional or postcolonial – reflecting what Murton (2012) calls a “cosmic generative power” (p. 93).

The horizon of judgement, time and place

The “original phenomenon” (Baker, 2002, p. 65) occurs when we reflect on our inability to be Being. At this point we experience temporality. Novalis had noted here that “[d]ie Gegenwart läßt sich nicht fixiren. Das vor und nach bestimmt oder bezieht den gegenwärtigen Augenblick” (1960j, p. 187)/[the present does not let itself be fixed. The before and after determine or occupy the present moment]. It is hence the ‘moment’ that is important to Novalis (Baker, 2002). I argue that ira is reflectively but primordially aware of time and place as one horizon. This is innate to the word ‘whakawā’. Conventionally, ‘whakawā’ is given to ira to mean ‘judgement’ as a discriminatory ability. This latter sense of ‘whakawā’ is a colonised one because it prefers the self as ultimate ground; here, ira decides the apparently proper mode within which time and place may reveal themselves, and is hence self-assuredly restrictive on time and place as separate entities104. Yet ‘whakawā’ in its more authentic sense points to the one horizon of time and place, and it involves an awareness that one may not be the ground of experience, despite what the orthodox, fixed rendition of ‘whakawā’ would have ira believe. In that

104 This is probably because of one reading of the etymology of the world ‘whaka’ (to cause) and ‘wā’ (specific time or place). This etymology suggests that the self is solely involved in the specifying of which time or place it will involve itself with. A useful Stofsatz in thinking about the simultaneity of time and place is Novalis’ assertion that “[v]om Unendlichen ist jedes bestimmende Urtheil ein Unendliches, in dem Sinn, wie man jede Negation eines Besondern am Besondern unendliche Urtheile nennt” (1960j, p. 166)/“[f]rom the unending, every determining judgment is an unending one, in the sense in which every negation of a particular in the particular [thing] is called an infinite judgment” (Kneller, 2003, p. 64). Novalis draws together a number of elements here necessary for judgement which draw judgement out of its neatly rational faculty and into one involving Being. These elements are: determining, negation of the particular, the infinite, and of course judgement itself. I surmise here that Novalis lists the apparently final decision on a thing as in fact a continual (temporal) exercise that deals with the seemingly solid entity (which takes up space, even if it is just an idea). Hence he brings together the ideas of space, time, and human agency in one assertion. Donehower (2007) indicates the Romantics’ tendency to return to the etymology of ‘Urteil’, which unearths time as an issue in the sense of ‘original’. For the Romantics, including Novalis, the original act of judgment “separates thinking from its ground” (p. 12) – a ground which through whakawā would be the unity of time and space.
initial stage of ‘whakawā’ time and place as one horizon are felt as the coming to bear (‘whaka’) of time and place (‘wā’) on ira\textsuperscript{105}. Hence ira is aware of its own finitude because it feels itself as one convergent point of time and place. In that moment, ira posits Being as ‘there’, with its sense of calling attention to something yonder. In the moment that ira judges itself not to be Being, as with Novalis’ ‘Dasein’ it allows Being to be ‘there’ without truly representing it. Ira is then in a state of wonderment at the ‘over-there-ness!’ of the Absolute.

Thus, as Novalis proposed, ira is engaged with ‘moment’. I add, however, that the nature of the ‘moment’ is a vexed issue in a colonised setting. Whether it has always been a wonder for ira to realise that it is not itself Being is uncertain; we can only be sure that since colonisation, as ira has been encouraged to think of itself as ground, the moment is maybe more poignant than it was. This moment, as a static notion of ‘whakawā’ encourages, is dealt with by proposing the self as agent in a determination of how time and place should be located. It makes a definite ruling on the nature of where and when something should occur, or whether it should occur/have occurred at all. This idea of judgement, as we have seen, is subsequent to the more original one. It is thus incomplete. The ‘over-there-ness’ of Being – and indeed of ira itself - is denied with that incomplete positing of whakawā.

\textsuperscript{105} This realisation may be emotional for ira. The turn of emotion that comes about is a form of movement that reflects the Absolute. Novalis’ \textit{Hymnen an die Nacht} displays the relationship of an emotional feeling to the understanding that one is not the ground of one’s awareness. Emotion is associated with a lack of certainty, or the introduction of the night, which is outside of one’s control.

Novalis’ own immersion within the night becomes more obvious as the hymns progress, and the night itself becomes increasingly mythical. A spiritual element also evolves, with “[h]immischer, als jene blitzenden Sterne, dünnen uns die unendlichen Augen, die die Nacht in uns geöffnet” (1960i, p. 133)/“more heavenly than those flashing stars the endless eyes seem, which Night opens up in us” (1988, p. 13), moving toward a more direct reference to the burial site of Novalis’ dead lover, Sophie von Kühn, in the third hymn, where he addresses the night directly as taking him over and releasing him in spirit form.
Exkurs: ‘Urteil’, romanticised by ‘whakawā’ ‘Urteil’

Geheimnislosigkeit is a necessary issue of consideration for ira, and ira therefore has to act on its constant presence. This also holds true for the self within its own cultural context. ‘Whakawā’ for ira romanticises ‘Urteil’ for the self because a sense of activity emerges much more strongly in ‘whakawā’. The prefix ‘whaka’ shows that there is less of an emphasis on a base foundation – or primordiality, as ‘Ur’ would have it – and far more a state of becoming. ‘Ur’ does indeed have to it this sense also, but taken together with ‘whaka’ the original act as a ‘constant but necessarily continual primordial presence’ is stressed. ‘Urtheil’, in relation with ‘Ursprung’/origin, is therefore also concerned with a state of becoming but with more of an emphasis on an original point.

Moving from an interpretation in ‘Urtheil’ as a decisive judgement, towards its explanation as an ongoing discriminatory ability that involved an initial decision to begin with, means that the self retains some sense of Geheimnis. Firstly, ‘Urtheil’ as a constant process of change and tentativeness means that the approach to things in the world is less concerned with making assured divisions between those things in the world, even if one is making a discerning judgement. ‘Urtheil’ romanticised with ‘whakawā’ is an example of humility towards things in the world that nevertheless involves human agency. Thus the verb ‘urteilen’, read with ‘whakawā’ as a romanticising Stoßsatz, emphasises that the division (‘Teil’) being made both originates from some time prior to the self’s awareness, as it is ‘Ur’, and that the division actively changes from that original point onwards. Thus the ‘urteilen’ is related to ‘mitteilen’ (communicate) and is predicated on another meaning of ‘teilen’ – that is, to share.

This romanticising of Urtheil with whakawā suggests that the self should retain some tentativeness towards things in the world, even when a self-assured judgement is being made. Dealing with things in the world involves awareness that the things have an autonomous but independent relationship with the self. Things may be divided so that the self can focus on them but there is a simultaneous acknowledgement that the thing is submerged within a fundamentally unknowable environment.
Being’s geheimnisvolle arrangement of things and \( \text{ira} \)

The Absolute’s active layering and accrual: Whakapapa

This sense of incompleteness, or of lack, that reveals itself in ‘whakawā’ also shows up in the word ‘whakapapa’. It is here that one of the lesser-known meanings of ‘whakapapa’ takes on an importance that transcends the usual translation of ‘genealogy’. Another meaning of the word is ‘to layer’. Whakapapa points to the special place of absence: ‘Papa’, an abbreviation of Papatūānuku, exceeds \( \text{ira} \)’s sensory sphere, meaning that the layering that is taking place is both from local and distant realms. In direct opposition to Geheimnislosigkeit, which is necessarily concerned with what is immediately perceptible, Novalis notes that:

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Thus in the distance, everything becomes poesy-poem. Actio in distans. Distant mountains, distant human beings, distant events etc. all become romantic, quod idem est – hence our archetypal poetic nature is a result of this. (Wood, 2007, pp. 51-52)

Evident here is the interplay of all elements that nevertheless retain their own character. Similarly, whakapapa can be understood as the activity that the Absolute undertakes in order to arrange things in the world, which Novalis describes, but it is also dependent on the activity between all elements in order to take place. While it may be tempting to think of ‘whakapapa’ as the first grounding principle due to its common association with ancestry, instead it is interdependent with any other element that we name for our own reference. Whakapapa accrues to all objects in the world, including \( \text{ira} \), the various effects of other objects according to the
organising principles of Being. As to this effect of things in the world, Novalis refers back to older texts: “In manchen ältern Schriften klopft ein geheimnißvoller Pulsschlag und bezeichnet eine Berührungsstelle mit der unsichtbaren Welt – ein Lebendigwerden” (1960a, p. 276)/[In some older texts a pulsing beat reverberates and indicates a point of contact with the unseen world – a coming-into-being of life]. What is not necessary here is the physical presence of a thing; thus one does not need to have occupied one’s whenua in order to relate to it with as much significance106, as whenua as an active but distant phenomenon will rise up within ira nonetheless107.

Ngata (1972) noted that “[w]hakapapa is the process of layering one thing upon another” (p. 6). According to Royal this process does not just involve materiality:

‘Whakapapa’ describes the actions of creating a foundation, and layering and adding to that foundation. This is done by reciting genealogies (tātai) and stories, and through ritual. Whakapapa allows people to locate themselves in the world, both figuratively and in relation to their human ancestors. It links them to ancestors whose dramas played out on the land and invested it with meaning. By recalling these events, people layer meaning and experience onto the land. (2009c, p. 8)

This account is useful for indicating the experiential as well as the material aspect of whakapapa. However, if viewed as if final, the account is also quite anthropocentric. To begin with, whakapapa does not just involve the recital of genealogies and stories, but it is additionally an unspoken movement that involves the active participation of Being, nature (finite objects in the world) and ira. All things are involved in an ongoing evolution of change and fluidity. As far as ira is concerned, change occurs due to this process of layering, from objects in the world

106 At the time of writing, the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 intends as a test for customary marine title that Māori applicants have “exclusively used and occupied [the area] from 1840 to the present day without substantial interruption” (s.58(1)(a)). The Act is one example of how Māori are currently being forced to measure the worth of an entity in terms of its visibility.

107 I discuss this emerging effect of whenua later in this chapter.
that are both near and distant\textsuperscript{108}. Sometimes imperceptible in the effects this has, ‘whakapapa’ itself reveals linguistically that it is without final foundation:

Perhaps the greatest clue to its profound sense lies in its etymological meaning which, according to Hudson et al (2007), relates to the word ‘papa,’ a word for ground or solid foundation and ‘whaka,’ referring to the transitional process of ‘becoming’ (p.44). What is revealed in the use of that word is a view of the world as inhabiting a state of becoming; the ground, an embodiment of certainty, itself is then in a state of becoming and so it moves through different forms of solidity. Certainty is never solidified, is never finalised; this view of the term ‘whakapapa’ seems to fit with the overall belief that even identity is in a state of flux (Webber 2009), and also that apparently ‘concrete’ institutions, such as whanau, are in a constant act of transformation (Durie 2005). There is a certain degree of emotional turmoil inherent to that reading of ‘whakapapa’: that there is no certainty to it forces humanity to a position of parallel relationship with it. Shifts in its stability likewise produce changes in the human form, including the body’s emotional form.

Aspects of certainty remain in that continuous transforming state of being, however. To begin with, we can be certain that the term is never completely knowable – we can be certain that there will be nothing but change, and even with its genealogical portrait ‘whakapapa’ throws us into doubt at times. Thus completely confident knowledge is evaded. Even within the genealogical names themselves, upon which a contemporary rendition of whakapapa is founded, there

\textsuperscript{108} Thus there is an aspect to ‘whakapapa’ of the recital of genealogy, but this only happens because of the fact that iro is part of this overall activity of the Absolute. Iro may ‘layer’ or “order” (Royal, 2009a, p. 70) ancestors’ names in sequence and recite the outcome. Each name, however, is historically and socially enmeshed within the Absolute, as is the reciter. Thus the Geheimnis of this aspect of whakapapa is preserved, but I suggest it is important that one be aware of one’s own enmeshment within this process of layering even when reciting. This continuous awareness or frame of mind when carrying out a poetic exercise is what Novalis endorses when he encourages the poet to work within a colonised context.
exists uncertainty; a person could be possessed of several, additional names, and they could be transmutable, to begin with, and even the name, when recited, could inhabit a different ontological ‘field’ when uttered by various individuals. (Mika, 2011b, pp. 106-107)

The Geheimnis innate to the process of whakapapa lies in the fact that it is unpredictable and often – although not always – imperceptible\(^\text{109}\). Yet even if

\(^\text{109}\) In his discussion about the baskets of knowledge, Marsden (2003) allows for the existence of things in the world that are not perceptible. The concrete world is not separate from the abstract one, but their separation out from each other is apparent in Geheimnislosigkeit. An artificial delineation is one that Novalis alludes to when he discusses the earlier view that poet and priest were one, but currently the poet, according to Novalis, was robbed of their knowledge of nature, despite the fact that he or she traditionally “versteht die Natur besser, wie der wissenschaftliche Kopf” (1960b, p. 468)/“understands Nature better than the scientific mind” (Wood, 2007, p. 182) to the extent that he or she was also a priest. Here Novalis accords with Goethe’s belief (Nadler, 1996) that the mind that is open to nature is more finely tuned than a scientific instrument. Novalis is convinced that, although recently separated, both priest and poet will become one again, but he draws attention to the latter distinction between poet and priest to emphasise the now seemingly unspiritual quality of the poet. Geheimnislosigkeit, particularly the qualitative approach to nature, has reduced the poet’s role to literal verse. Formerly, however, the poet undertook a responsibility to hint at what cannot be directly portrayed. Another similar distinction is revealed in his aphorism that “[d]ie Trennung von Poët und Denker ist nur scheinbar – und zum Nachtheil beyder – Es ist ein Zeichen einer Krankheit – und kränch[haft]en Constitution” (1960b, p. 406)/“The separation into poet and thinker is only apparent - and to the disadvantage of both - It is a sign of sickness - and of a sickly constitution” (Wood, 2007, p. 132). This alludes again to the sudden importance of the rational thinker.

Ira is often acutely aware of the artificial delineation that Novalis describes, and tends to be motivated by an unseen dimension as much as a physical one. This impetus may be sourced in ‘taha wairua’/[spiritual side]. It can be clearly seen in resistance measures. Traditional figures such as Rua Kenana (Derby, 2009) and Ratana (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2011) feature prominently here, with their frequent references to a spiritual world, alongside political motives, as an impetus for their movements. Te Puea had expressed her desire to reacquire 10 acres of land “sacred to all Waikato, because it contained a spring at which her grandfather, King Tawhiao, once drank” (Ramsden, 1953, p. 7). More recently, Eva Rickard had carried through her protest at the fact that Raglan Golf Course had not been returned to the traditional owners and descendants, and particularly because it had been a burial ground (Margolis, 2002). Placards in the march protesting at the Foreshore and Seabed Bill often referred to the Foreshore and Seabed as a spiritual phenomenon, and the ‘Taniwha Claim’ of Ngati Naho was premised on the existence of a local taniwha, which would be disturbed if Transit New Zealand continued with its plans of building an expressway (Durie, 2005).

Indeed, in Māori resistance strategies it is unusual not to see evidence of spiritual belief. The challenge for the Māori poet is to hold the realm of rationality while recognising the spiritual realm. The WAI 262 claim, registered by two elderly Māori women who noticed that a number of native types kumara were being deposited in a research institute in Japan ("The WAI 262 claim by six Maori tribes: Flora and fauna and cultural and intellectual
perceptible, the layers that accrue to i ra emanate from objects in the world, the existence of which is underpinned by Being, with the result that the ability to perceive the process does not result in knowing with certainty the objects concerned (O'Brien, 1995). Trying to explain the ground of whakapapa is a futile exercise; as Novalis (1960b) noted, such an exercise leads only to “Heimweh” (p. 434)/[homesickness] because i ra longs to encompass all of the ontological and physical attributes of ‘Papa’ at once. More dramatically than Novalis, Goethe believed that to try and know every phenomenon would be an impossible exercise (Nadler, 1996). As the groundless nature of ‘whakapapa’ indicates, attempts at getting to know every phenomenon would prove impossible, as they would require each individual knowing every aspect of ‘Papa’.

‘Whakapapa’ is hence the term given to the process of arrangement that Being undertakes. The ways in which those things in the world emerge will impact on i ra in frequently imperceptible ways; however, at times i ra becomes conscious of those influences of whakapapa. Through this process of the self-organisation of Being, though, sometimes objects come into our view of ‘aroaro’/concern. This first ground is ‘kaupapa’. ‘Kau’ suggests that there is an initial disclosure of “papa” (Marsden, 2003, p. 66)/[ground or foundation] that is our first impulse of

heritage rights: Interview with Maui Solomon,” 2001), as Maui Solomon remarks, was not just an exercise in preventing the loss of the physical kumara; it also sought to protect its spiritual attributes (and would be extended to cover all forms of mātauranga Māori, taonga and so on). Resistance to the taking of Māori DNA would be premised on similar, unequivocal arguments – that it is not so much the physical expropriation of the gene that is at issue as the effect that this could have on one’s (and hence future generations’) whakapapa (Hutchings & Reynolds, n.d). Interestingly, these spiritual arguments, advanced by various Māori poets or proponents of taha wairua, may be common sense to many Māori, but they are more often than not greeted with disbelief by mainstream institutions. Thus particular arms of Western society endorse the banality that these poets try to escape. When attempting to put forward Māori definitions for disease, for instance, including such terms as mate Māori, health professionals will still default to “hold[ing] unfounded beliefs that Māori are genetically more prone to psychosis and other serious mental illnesses” (“Māori mental health: "The greatest threat to Māori health is poor mental health"," 2008, p. 32). The law is particularly opposed to entertaining other explanations for the physical phenomenon at issue: In Ngāti Wairere’s opposition to AgResearch’s plans to field test a genetically modified cow which would produce milk with a human protein, for instance, the High Court, on appeal, stated that ERMA had indeed taken into account the spiritual relationship of Māori to their taonga (Adhar, 2003). Other historical cases, too numerous to mention, follow similarly dismissive lines of reasoning.
concern, caused by the ‘aroaro’ (coming into our view) of those objects. ‘Kau’ also means the absence of something; thus the ground that depicts our first impulse of concern is not actually a ground at all (although it appears so to i ra) but is a disclosure of ‘whakapapa’. Although it appears that we are building on our concern because of the solidity of that first concern, in fact that concern is not a ground but is merely the revelation of a move towards a ground. That i ra misreads a concern as a fully formed, final yet initial ground is part of i ra’s pursuit of finding the ‘thing in itself’ or Being. ‘Kaupapa’, then, is not so much about a self-assured identification of principles upon which one may proceed but an awareness brought about by the appearance of an object that is indeed uncertain.

**Saying/speaking things through whakapapa**

Yet notwithstanding i ra’s depiction of ‘kaupapa’ as a solid ground for concern, the thing that moves into i ra’s aroaro, or realm of concern, is apparently congealed, or managed, by i ra’s saying of that thing. In saying (‘mea’) a thing (‘mea’) i ra sets those things in motion (‘ranga’) or calls (‘ka ranga’) them so that those things are brought closer into our field of immediate concern (‘whakaaro’). Here i ra is

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110 This realisation that one has not reached the ground is a form of ‘slippage’, which allows the expression of Being according to Novalis (Donehower, 2007). But this division of the ground of Being through thought does not actually allow for the precise representation of the ground of Being.

111 A ‘thing’ may be either concrete or abstract, but is not entirely knowable. In all uses of the word ‘mea’ there is a sense of the unknown or unidentifiable. Coming to bear on i ra, the thing appears to be certain but is another object of Being. It is therefore characterised by Geheimnis. For Heidegger, ‘saying’ the thing emphasises laying Being forth, and allowing the thing to “shine forth as what it is” (Richardson, 2003, p. 496). Novalis’ preference is for a type of speech that poetically also allows the thing to move forward in its own way, evident in his discussion in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* of the various ways in which nature may manifest (and in which the self may interpret those manifestations).

112 I argue that the creative arts are another form of ‘mea’ even though there may be no verbal utterance involved. ‘Mea’ in this vein would be more aligned to ‘comportment’. One’s ontological inclination towards a thing in the world is as a result of the ‘showing’ that the thing in the world invokes, and one responds according to that showing, verbally or through other means. This comportment is not a solid, unchanging one, and can show itself in the mixture of traditional and contemporary art. Jahnke and Ihimaera (1996a), for instance, see the continuing presence of traditional work in contemporary art: “For him [Pakariki Harrison], the work of contemporary artists is founded in tradition. ‘But you must understand,’ he says, ‘that our carving is not static and never has been. People say, ‘Why don’t you do it traditionally?’ and they are having a sly dig at contemporary
engaging with a language that is tied to the thing but originates from a primordial arrangement of Being, for it means that language is also given to ira. As I noted previously, this account of language – which has largely been fixed to the term ‘reo’ – runs counter to a common notion of self-constructed language. Whakapapa moves ira to talk in different ways at different times, despite the dominant belief that ira has complete control over its language. Ira will discern signs (‘tohu’) at the time of saying them, thereby pointing to the object through language, suggesting that there is a certain agency involved in how ira sets about saying those things; however, the ontological given of what Novalis has termed ‘Sprachlehre’ and what I would call ‘whakapapa’, through the Absolute, has already moved ira to speak in particular ways. The physical signs act as an affirmation to that primordial inclination of ira to the impact of those particular things in the world, and their relationship with other things that may not even be of concern to, or perceived by, ira.

Several Māori groups – not just those with aesthetic concerns – aim to directly transport traditional discourse into the contemporary realm. Te Whānau o Waipareira, for instance, sought to represent non-traditional urban iwi in legal proceedings to acquire a share of the allocation assets. In their argument they noted that ‘iwi’ was not a prescribed structure and that, moreover, tradition has shown “many instances where iwi had formed around a cause, rather than an ancestor” (Durie, 2005, p. 121). The overall impression of the Absolute is to create an ontological concern of ira in contemporary times towards things in the world, including those things that are allegedly meant to belong either solely to traditional times or contemporary.

Royal (2008) gives an example of a ‘rākau’/tree. He states that the word ‘rākau’ comes to mind, not the actual rākau, and that this is a form of, as he calls it, ‘mātauranga’. Whilst I agree that of course a specific rākau itself is not present in all its physicality in the mind of the subject, I argue that the complex interaction of things in the world produces, or brings the self’s attention to, the word ‘rākau’. It is not just brought about by the self. Important for the manifestation is our concern for an aspect of a thing in the world – which may or may not involve either a specific ‘rākau’ or the general abstract notion of ‘rākau’. Royal notes this weddedness to the world as a whole in his book. It is possible, though, that the occurrence of ‘rākau’ to ira indicates that ‘rākau’ in all its forms has impacted on ira, not just as an idea but as an evolving, layering process that ‘whakapapa’ envisages. This may be likened to the thinking of one’s tribal saying, where the natural phenomena spoken of are not just ideas but are actively coming to bear on the thinker. Similarly, the thinking of these phenomena itself has an impact on them.

This ‘incline’ towards things that is brought about by those things is important for ira. Like Goethe (1964), who had stated that “[d]as Gebildete wird sogleich wieder
Ira’s discussion after the comportment of things

However, Ira does have some agency in the language given but only because of the power of that thing and in turn its association with other things to begin with. While I have drawn on the links between language and thing here, we can gain support from Novalis in this interpretation of language:


Signification by means of sounds and strokes is an amazing abstraction. Three letters signify God to me – a few strokes a million

umgebildet, und wir haben uns, wenn wir einigermaßen zum lebendigen Anschauen der Natur gelangen wollen, selbst so beweglich und bildsam zu erhalten, nach dem Beispiel mit dem sie uns vorgeht” (p. 56)/[the intellectual is yet again, and simultaneously, uneducated, and if we in some measure want to aspire to the living regard of nature, we ourselves must preserve our fluidity and educability, after the example that nature has set us], Novalis advocated that nature be related to as a constantly changing, fundamentally unknowable entity: the master in “Die Natur”, for instance, is mysterious, but his mystery merely helps Rosenblüte interpret the signs of nature. This role of the poet is clearly seen in the Māori equivalent. Robinson (2005) gives an illustration of how the Absolute reveals tohu/signs to the onlooker: “The signs are all seen through the weather patterns, in the clouds, the waves of the ocean, in the winds and especially when the weather changes. One only need look around one’s surroundings to let the atua speak to you. Tawhiri speaks in the winds, Ruaimoko in clouds and lightning, Tangaroa or Takaroa in the rolling waves of the ocean, Tane through the birds and in the forest. Sometimes you might see a bush shake wildly when you pass it by and this is a wairua or spirit speaking. Every time you see a landslide it is Ruaimoko, the god of mana, calling out to you. Even in the little signs of nature as when you see the mist, the snow, a flood, or a leaf dancing along in the wind, the atua are calling out, giving you a tohu or sign for some reason” (p. 142). Clearly these signs are perceivable by the conventional senses, making them less mystical than they might have been despite their origins in the various gods. The Māori poet, however, leaves room open for the existence of those phenomena that do not impact on humanity through the empirical senses, and is hence not bound by the rules of the senses. Closely related to this is the place of critique, based in unidentifiable prompts. In our article titled “Kia Hiwa Ra”, we (Aranga et al., 2008) consider the critical role of the injunction or phrase ‘kia hiwa ra’, which holds in it the necessary conditions for critical engagement with the world. With this pre-existing element in what is essentially taken to be a traditional phrase, we identify that one must be open to various signs, physical, emotional and spiritual, when involved in critique.
things. How easy it is to handle the universe in this way! How perceptible the concentricity of the spiritual world! Grammar is the dynamic of the spiritual empire! A single word of command moves armies – the word freedom – nations. (O'Brien, 1995, p. 146)

O’Brien (1995) argues that, for Novalis, language is how we “affect ‘things’” (p. 146). Recall that, to that extent, ira wishes (‘mea’), as a form of language (‘mea’), to deal with (‘mea’) the thing (‘mea’). Language thus allows ira to momentarily solidify the concern for discussion. What I maintain here is that ira is within a realm of language that, due to its link with things, primarily involves an awareness of things and a desire to move those things through the activity that underpins ‘whakapapa’. This moving-to-the-front (aroaro) involves facing those things, still with that initial moment of desire manifesting itself. Discussing a word, Novalis (1960b) continues:


115 These dictionary definitions of the word ‘mea’ all indicate simultaneous activities. They appear to allow for a speaker to have some agency in dealing with the thing to be spoken of. Because of the prior ontological engagement that I highlight, however, ira’s dealings with the thing are premised on referring to it so that it can maintain its relationship with other things and with the Absolute. I argue that, generally, the depth and breadth of Being, as it comes to bear on ira and thus allows the spoken (or written) word to manifest, is largely ignored in most text. This regrettable omission comes about because of an overly great emphasis on the self in the role of language as socially constructed. One learns language, acquires it, and may dispense with it as one sees fit, according to that explanation. While there is an element of language being constructed by the self, as I have noted, the fact that the Absolute figures very rarely in discussions is concerning. Language is dependent on the movement of things in the world in relation to ira (and to other things in the world), together with the desire of ira to utter aspects of those things. One writer who does illustrate this prior agency to language is Browne (2005) who argues strenuously and convincingly for the active influence of wairua/spirit in language (mainly in its teaching and learning). She points to the tendency of mainstream education to oust these sorts of philosophies around not only language but relationship with the world generally.
Every word should be an acoustic formula for its construction and pronunciation - the pronunciation itself is a higher, *imitative sign* of a higher pronunciation – *construction of the meaning* of a word. All of these are ultimately dependent on the laws of *association*. So-called arbitrary signs mightn’t be as arbitrary as they appear - but stand in a certain real nexus with what is signified. (Wood, 2007, p. 54)

The saying of a word is the pronouncing of a thing for Novalis; words are to become audible and visible, so that “[das seltsame Verhältnißspiel der Dinge] spiegelt sich in ihnen [den Worten]” (1960c, p. 672)/[the peculiar relational play of things mirrors itself in them [words]]. In saying a word, its sound, or pronunciation (as an active movement of *ira*) takes on special importance. Novalis appears to envisage that the pronunciation of a word is merely a step in the direction of another, perhaps more mystical, pronunciation, coming to bear on the thing bringing about the saying of it. However, none of these elements – thing, pronunciation – work independently of each other. I surmise that Novalis advocated a view that the word is involved in a deeper mystery with the speaker of it and the object to which it relates. The pronouncing of a word – in effect, saying it – gives it some sort of force. This is his ‘acoustic formula’: a relational structure between sound, thing being spoken of, and *ira*. Again, by coming into *ira*’s sphere of consciousness, the thing is said.

Desire is a keen participant in these activities that word and language indulge in. As we have seen, there is a realm of concern for *ira* that permits *ira* to engage with things in the world to begin with and to say them\(^{116}\). According to Novalis it is the

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\(^{116}\) *Ira’s* desire to say something is important for the word and may result in the extension or romanticising of a traditional term in order to explain a phenomenon. If romanticised it will not necessarily bear strict resemblance to its traditional meaning. I note here Holman’s (2007) analysis that “presentist arguments” (p. 372) are undesirable because they ‘ascribe contemporary meanings to the past’ resulting in “anachronistic etymologies” that result from “unexamined revisionism”. Holman takes to task Marsden’s apparently unbounded and liberal application of the traditional term ‘mauri’, stating that “[m]auri meanwhile continues to mutate into an available vessel that may contain whatever the writer requires of it” (p. 372). This is admittedly true if one is anxious at the potential for the terms to be rendered static in the contemporary environment, but I argue that Marsden is more intent on highlighting a philosophical
soul that, when confronted with a thing, seeks out “genetischintuitiven Worte” (1960b, p. 431)/[genetic-intuitive words]. The formula is one that allows the soul to apprehend and ‘complete’ a concept by making it into both spirit and matter. Here, as in other fragments of his Das Allgemeine Brouillon, Novalis is eager to synthesise the empirical with the unknown. In this fragment, the soul is given the task of instinctively grasping a thing by orienting it towards ewart. He suggests that:


Our language - was much more musical to begin with, and has gradually become so prosaic - so unmusical. It has become more like noise - sound, if one thus wishes to degrade this beautiful word. It must become song once again. The consonants transform tones into noise. (Wood, 2007, p. 37)

He shows that language has been narrowed in scope considerably by reason but that the musical nature of things in the world means that their saying should likewise be musical.

When ewart desires (‘mea’), says, deals, manages a thing that is shown to it, ewart also pronounces (‘whakahua’) or brings to fruition (‘whakahua’) that thing in turn. Thus there is an impact back on that thing that has come into the view of ewart by the activity of whakapapa. Both word and thing remain mysterious to ewart because of the process of whakapapa as a self-organising, layering movement of Being. But ewart can point out (‘tohu’) a thing and lay it by or preserve it (‘tohu’) as a means of carrying on in relation to and on the instruction (‘tohu’) of that thing. The original phenomenon than the linguistic purity of a term. Marsden wishes to envisage the term ‘mauri’ as an activity, not as a static event. Moreover, the phenomenon that he wants to refer to is an enduring one for him, and he therefore finds a contemporary manifestation different from the traditional one.
desire that the thing arouses in ira should be retained in ira’s dealings with that thing. There are consequences for ira in misconstruing that original ‘tohu’ of the thing, and here we are again reminded of the lament of the thousand-fold voices of nature in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais*. For ira, even supposedly banal words – ones that are not reserved for ceremony – move into ira’s inclination in the first instance because of Being. The moment of desire that ira feels for the thing to be said is important here, because it is what initially inclined ira to the thing and it ensures that ira reflects the unknowable nature of the thing. Ira is involved with the ‘huna’ (mystery) of language and saying that word necessitates at the same time acting in accordance with the sensuous nature of that word.

Where words, such as those outlined in chapter six, have lost their ontological sense, ira may help reenergise them by uttering them in accordance with the original Being of their orientation towards the speaker. With ira being particularly aware, in a traditional way, of the power of words, then the saying of those words may be constantly allowed to emerge from that initial point of desire. This poses challenges for the push to have one meaning for a word. Yet as Novalis indicated, the initial interference of Geheimnislosigkeit can form a pathway towards Romantisieren. In the case of ‘whakapapa’, for instance, I have outlined that there is a problem for the wellbeing of the person in strictly scribing its parameters. The point of desire may be unidentifiable (which itself is another construal of ‘mea’) but is innate to the saying process; thus, allowing for the possibility that the word emanates from that point of desire, which is in itself not sayable, is important. Romantisieren is an acting out of that point of desire – it is carrying out the innate instruction of that word as a Being-oriented object. One may start with the geheimnislose rendition of that word and use that first principle, which is self-assured and certain, to lift the word up to a more poetic realm.

**Social outcome of accrual for ira**

Recall that Novalis wishes things to be viewed as working in conjunction with each other. The thing and ira are physically distinct from each other yet inform each other in totally intimate ways at the same time. Pihama (2001) discusses the inextricable link between te reo and ‘ōnā tīkanga’/[its customs] that does not
nevertheless override the significance of those two elements. She notes that the two can be discussed separately and yet viewed as linked; in a similar way, we may talk about speech, nature, the Absolute and ira as occupying separate spaces but as constantly interacting with each other\textsuperscript{117}. Such a description, as Novalis would have it, results in a far more effective way of talking about the whole subject of layering and the self. Even in relation to ira’s association with whakapapa, Pihama (2001) recognises that:

Within whakapapa we are a part of a complex set of interrelationships. We are a part of whānau, hapū and iwi. Yet contrary to dominant belief, this does not deny our own person as individuals, rather what it contends is the prioritising of cultural relationships over a notion of privileging the individual. Rangimarie Rose Pere writes that each individual has their own absolute uniqueness and that we need to keep a balance between individual and group pursuits. (p. 130)

There is a dilemma that collectivist discourse poses for the Māori self when the activity of ‘whakapapa’ is considered. It assumes that everyone will be affected by their surroundings in exactly the same way; namely, everyone accrues exactly the same experience, feeling and mysterious qualities of objects (which are henceforth not mysterious as the experience is now general). Certainly, collectivity is important insofar as it recognises the impact of others on the self and vice versa. To that extent Māori are collective – and that form of collectivity is responded to by the idea of whakapapa, because it immediately demonstrates the influence of others on ira – but this does not stand in for the effect that that layering process has

\textsuperscript{117}Mildon (2011), recalling Delamere’s words, identifies the interrelatedness of nature and reo in a more primordial sense than human speech: “In the grander scheme of things, traditional Te Reo are the voices of nature; the jolt of an earthquake, the song of a bird, the rustling of leaves, the rumbling of thunder before a storm, the piercing bolt of lightning in the night sky, the rushing waves of a tsunami, the cry of a whale, the fresh smell of rain on the earth” (p. 10). I suggest that these reo may not even be heard or sensed by ira but will nevertheless have an effect on ira, as they appear to be more aligned to the arrangement of things in the world than just pure sound.
on i-ra\textsuperscript{118}. Novalis’ emphasis on the individual working in conjunction with other elements supports the idea that there are a number of aspects to whakapapa that tie in with each other but have their own separate aspect: Thus Pihama (2001) continues that “[w]hakapapa is not only about identity and knowing who we are as Māori, but is surrounded by discussions of the whenua, of inter-relationships, of past experiences and key events in whānau, hapū and iwi history” (p. 149).

\begin{center}
\textbf{Exkurs: Actio in distans – whakapapa}
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For i-ra, whakapapa has as part of its meaning the connection of things in the world (through the activity that whakapapa denotes). Novalis’ phrase ‘actio in distans’ allows for the distant activity of things in the world that cannot be seen, but with ‘whakapapa’ those things take on a greater intimacy for the self. Those things that are to be poetiscised are hence not detached objects for the self but are, in a sense, only affective because they are linked with the self. Speech, as one mode of expression, affirms that distant action for the self, and is one example of comportment towards things in the world, when thought about alongside the various meanings of ‘mea’. The distance that is inherent to the notion of ‘Dasein’ is especially evident here because the comportment that is involved for the self is oriented towards those things that are ‘there’ or are not immediate.

‘Actio in distans’ may refer to events in the past and to the people associated with those events, when romanticised by ‘whakapapa’. Novalis indicates this in his assertion, quoted above, that “[u]nsre Sprache – sie war zu Angang viel musicalischer” (own emphasis)/“[o]ur language – was much more musical to begin with”, hinting at the utterances of ancestors. ‘Sprache’, then, has the potential for the self to be a constant reaffirmation of those ancestors, when it is spoken poetically. As I have noted above, though, ‘Sprache’, when romanticised with ‘mea’, is not simply speech; it is also a mode of orientation towards things. Novalis’ poem “Astralis” contains some important stanzas in relation to this, for instance: “Noch war ich blind, doch schwankten lichte Sterne/Durch meines Wesens wunderbare Ferne,/Nichts war noch nah, ich fand mich nur von weiten,/Ein Anklang alter, so wie künftger Zeiten” (1960h, p. 318)/“I still was blind, yet twinkling stars was seeing/Through distant, wondrous reaches of my being/Nothing yet was near; I found at distant stages/Myself a hint of old and coming ages” (1990, p. 151). The emphasis on distance demands that attention be paid to the influence of what cannot be perceived, and simultaneously to the impact of what is to come. In a moral sense, the self is reminded of its inability to take control over those things in the world that are activated by Being and which remain at a distance from the self. ‘Whakapapa’ and ‘mea’, taken together with ‘actio in distans’, argue that the self is morally responsible for remembering the mystery of the activity of those things.

\textsuperscript{118} Indeed this process of layering is individual but not in the sense of the individual unrelated to other things in the world.
The concerning comportment of things for *ira*: Whakaaro

The ‘over-there-ness’ of Being does not in any way mean that *ira* is unrelated to Being, but merely that one may not find an identity with Being. We should be able to see here that there is a distance, yet intimacy, in the dealings of Being. Here, finite manifestations of Being – objects in the world – do not have to be immediately present to affect *ira*. In current colonised settings, as I noted particularly in chapter five, Māori are encouraged to pursue things in the world as if those things’ importance is in their visibility. Yet things in the world have an effect on *ira* even when not present, through the ultimately unfathomable nature of ‘whakapapa’. Novalis (1960b) declares that “[a]lle körperliche Operationen sind ein entgegengesetztes Denken. Drüben ist Brennen, gähren, stoßen etc. – was hier Denken, Empfinden etc. ist” (p. 268) “[a]ll bodily operations are an inverse thinking. What is thinking sensing etc. here – is burning, fermenting, thrusting etc. yonder” (Wood, 2007, p. 24), showing that the body makes visible its activities at a distance (although the body might not perceive what is occurring in those distant places). The effect that distant entities may have on *ira* is also demonstrated in his statement that:

Alle Wirckungen sind nichts, als Wirckungen Einer Kraft – der Weltseele – die sich nur unter verschiedenen Bedingungen, Verhältnissen und Umständen offenbart – die überall und nirgends ist. (1960b, p. 423)

All effects are nothing else than the effects of one single force – of the World-Soul – which only manifests itself under certain conditions, relations and circumstances – it is everywhere and nowhere. (Wood, 2007, p. 146)

Novalis’ description of thinking as a distant activity has application for the Māori self too. Unnerved by the ‘over-there-ness’ of Being, *ira* is therefore influenced by Being. Being arranges things in the world according to its own autonomy and at times these things are perceptible. Whakaaro, although quickly rendered as
think/thought, means more fundamentally to cause something to come to the front or comport towards one. Takirirangi Smith (2000) argues that whakaaro means “\textit{to cast attention to}” (p. 58), which he places as an “activity of the stomach and the entrails”. He continues “the stomach is associated with the \textit{ira tangata} aspect or earthly component of that which forms the basis of action”. It is not, however, “the actual process of rational thought” (p. 58), which he believes is closer to “\textit{Te Whanau a Rua}”. \textit{Te Whanau a Rua}, involving as it does a connection with meetinghouse, earth mother, and sky father, still attracts the interaction of \textit{Geheimnis} of things in the world with rational thought so that \textit{ira} is still in a state of wonderment at those things, even though rational thought may be an outcome. The awareness that \textit{ira} is involved in here is located in the realm of desire or inclination, not just in cognitive reflection that ‘thinking’ expects. Royal’s (2005) reference to ‘aroaro’, which is that area directly in front of the person, emphasises balancing the senses in that exercise. I agree with Royal that this process of harmonisation is important: It contributes to the wellbeing of \textit{ira}, in much the same way as Novalis believes it does. In an important reminder of the need for revisiting the long-held belief of thinking, Royal (2005) states that:

\begin{quote}
[T]exts – and latterly screens – serve to narrow the aroaro. Consider what happens to our bodies when we spend some time either reading texts or sitting in front of a screen. This experience, the physical position, narrows and sharpens the aroaro. The more time and the more often we do this, the more the aroaro becomes fixed in a certain shape and the less ‘omni-directional’ we become. (p. 16)
\end{quote}

I argue that the ‘becoming’ aspect of the prefix ‘whaka’ needs more recognition generally in Māori scholarship, alongside the ‘to cause’ interpretation that is commonly attributed to it. It is possible that, within the activity of ‘causing to consider’ that whakaaro denotes, both causative and gradual elements are possible. However, the ‘cause to consider’ is not one that originates from \textit{ira} but instead from without. Yet we must make room for the necessity of \textit{ira}’s recognition of the thing to be considered, and it is here that the ‘desire’ facet of aro becomes especially important. Novalis (1960m) asked:
Wie kann ein Mensch Sinn für etwas haben, wenn er nicht den Keim
davon in sich hat? Was ich verstehn soll, muß sich in mir organisch
entwickeln. (p. 419)

[How can a person have a sense for something if he does not have the
seed of it within himself. What I am meant to understand must
develop organically within me.]

To become considered, a thing must first have some emotional quality for ira. Here
the “sense for something” occurs at a very subjective level, with the consequence
that ira can then start to consider it. The desiring in respect of the object occurs at
the point that it is made conscious, even if not identifiable, for ira.

In becoming inclined towards the object that has come into ira’s view of concern,
there occurs a reciprocal activity between them, one that carries on the movement
of Being through the dynamism of whakapapa. Thus the object has an ongoing
effect on ira even when ira believes itself to have ceased thinking about the object.
To this extent, Māori were traditionally careful about the nature of their
relationship with objects; for instance, they would not blithely overturn a rock
(Smith, 2007) or fell a tree - not simply for environmental reasons but also, I
argue, because they are responding to the constantly impinging activity of Being
through whakapapa. Whakaaro, then, concurs with whakapapa because it
continues long after ira’s awareness of it has ceased. Hence as aro, one is in the
presence of (‘aroaro’) Being because one remains inclined towards the object,
even when that relationship appears to ira to have ended.

**Wonderment through the groundlessness of Being: Ako**

There is a learning process here for ira in the sense that the initial orientation
towards the thing is what causes it to become focused on. Novalis discusses this in
terms of poesy. Novalis’ love of poesy is key to his surmise that nature and
humanity are interdependent. Poesy is not merely an exercise in aesthetics but is
more importantly a way of clearing the path for things to reveal themselves in their proper surroundings. Poesy is aware of the shortcomings of logocentric ways of speaking that adhere to rules and appear certain at that level but that cannot acknowledge a prior mysteriousness offered by nature. Things may show themselves in their inherent character through poesy. What is learnt through this way of revealing is that one carries vestiges of things in the world throughout one’s certainty towards things and is hence forced to engage with those things with a sense of Geheimnis. Novalis advocates permanent wonderment in learning; thus learning does not just relate to the capture and uptake of factual data but to the Geheimnis that whakapapa as a layering process provides. He proposed that education is cyclic with one always returning to a child-like state (Schrock, 2006). In *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* the students are constantly aware of the revealing that is allowed through statements of Geheimnis and through the mysterious disclosure of nature. What is more important to Novalis is this constant marvel at things in the world.

In *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* the young messianic boy who enters the students’ demesne is seen as inspiring wonderment among the students, as well as being in a state of quiet wonderment himself. His wonderment, however, is not only self-created; it also arises from the world around him. For ira, ‘ako’ as I outlined in chapter six is currently restricted to knowable bodies involved in a tightly constrained exercise of learning and teaching (even if the learner and teacher exchange roles). I argue, however, that the wonderment that should be felt by ira in any conscious process should also be part of that activity of ‘ako’. To be sure, there are two additional meanings for the word ‘ako’: to split, have a tendency to split; and to move, stir (Williams, 1921). In thinking about the role of things in the world with language, Raerino (2000) stated that:

Kai roto i ngā kupu me ngā momo kōrero, waiata, haka me ngā karakia a te Māori ngā oro o te taiao. Ko ngā oro nei hai tūhono i te ao tangata, ki te ao o te wao. Ko ngā momo oro hai tūhono i te ao kikokiko ki te ao wairua, te ira tangata ki te ira atua. (p. 1)
Within words and the diversity of talk, songs, performance and prayers of the Māori, resides the sounds of the world around us. These sounds link man to the world of the environment. These sorts of sounds connect the bodily realm to the spiritual realm, the intrinsic humanness to the intrinsic godliness.

The sounds that Raerino refers to are manifestations of the Sprachlehre giving rise to the tones of words that Novalis mentioned. Taken together with Novalis’ overall impression of the mysterious, however, Sprachlehre is not entirely perceptible. There is a prior orientation of nature that allows signs in nature to manifest to begin with; this prior ontology is something that depends to a large extent on the interplay of person, nature and object. The impressions that the person gleans may differ according to that ontological movement underpinning those sound manifestations. This may impart a sense of moving or stirring for i ra. Moreover, there is a need to incorporate to ako the idea of ‘a tendency to split’. Addressing this unorthodox attempt at bringing together the various meanings of ‘ako’ into one activity, Thrupp and I (2012) noted the following:

At first glance these meanings are all irresolvable to the mind which endorses commonsense. However, how this word might move together with the weight of all its meanings represented together is a fascinating idea. In other words, how would it have been for the reader to see ako defined as: learning, teaching, while having a tendency to split and being in a state of moving and stirring? (Thrupp & Mika, 2012, p. 209)

Royal (2008) refers humanity’s concern with two types of knowledge in relation to “Te Ao”/the world, which may be distilled to rationalism: “[T]e mātauranga e hāngaia ana e te tangata hei whakamārama mō te Ao” (p. 26)/[Knowledge that is constructed by the person to explain the world], or empiricism: “[T]e mātauranga … e homaingia e te Ao anō hei kōrero mōna”/[Knowledge given by the world so that it may be discussed]. Royal rightly complicates the strict delineations between these two traditionally Western forms of knowledge. In both cases Novalis would have it that they are actually processes of being in the world. ‘Knowledge’ may be an outcome, but it is constantly affected by Being and is hence not free from continual Geheimnis. It is therefore still located within the interplay of things in the world that he indicates; as knowledge it is still active and mysterious.
The danger of common sense is that it tends to cast things in the world as evident to the self. With the more romanticised approach to words that Thrupp and I envisaged, however, we attempted to depict the activity of the word ‘ako’ as involving all meanings at once\footnote{120}. We had therefore drawn on the banal definitions offered in the dictionary to begin the process of Romantisieren. In respect of the ‘split’ element of ako:

It would be tempting to suggest that the process of learning or teaching stirs one to split what is being learnt from its context. However it could also refer to that which is fragile and which is deserved of respect; in the sentence *kei te ako au* one could be in a state of fragility while moving or stirring in the process of learning or teaching. In the sentence *kei te ako au i te reo* - and although there is only one transitive verb – to learn, teach, instruct – one could be learning the language and at the same time be stirring or moving, whilst in a fragile state, even because of the reo. Thus language in this light is something that affects the person, rather than just being an object of creation by the person. (p. 209)

Again the issue of the effect of the external on i ra arises; this is a major theme in Novalis’ works. We indicated that stirring and moving occurs because of the impact of the thing on i ra:

Stirring and moving does not take an object; hence it seems that the activity takes place with a sense of independence and autonomy. The action occurs within, although the self-involvement envisaged here
does not preclude a collective movement; it may be an activity which engages the individual but can be reflected in the wider group. Care has to be taken here, though, to ensure that the individual is not immediately and urgently submerged within a collectivist discourse, especially when it is indeed just the individual that is moving and stirring within. It is sufficient to recognise that one moves or stirs singly or as part of a group.

So what exactly is this moving and stirring? Does it necessarily have to involve the person? If we were to state the phrase *kei te ako au* (commonly accepted as *I am learning*) but wanted to acknowledge that one is inextricably part of a landscape that encompasses whenua, whakapapa and so on, is it possible that the moving and stirring occurs outside of a person and also they are moved to a different state of being? We are reminded again of Heidegger, who conceived of language, for instance, as that which speaks (Heidegger, 2001). With Beings constantly being summoned into presence by language, and language as something which we hear and then speak, we then become dependent on the movement of entities outside of our realm of control which then nevertheless become meaningful to us. Here, ako is the action of the external which always at the same time concerns us and involves us because of our link to the external. In other words, our movement and even agitation are entirely dependent on how the environment itself moves toward us.

Stirring and moving can also take the *ki* participle which suggests a sort of behaviour toward a thing, rather than a concerted action exerted directly on the thing as a direct object. At this point a fragile approach is appreciable; the acknowledgment of one’s own frailties and mortality while moving toward a thing ensures a sort of respect not too different to that envisaged by Levinas (1969) who asserted that the beholding of the Other did not involve knowing the Other but rather treating the Other as different and unknowable; thus the Other was not reduced to something less. The individual or group may reach
out toward another or a thing in a fashion which carries a feeling or sense of fragility, not the bold sense of confidence that is conventionally supposed to attend the acquisition of knowledge. (p. 210)

As with Rigby (2004), Schrock (2006) refers to Novalis’ assertion that we are to teach nature. Yet the coming into view of things in the world before the Lehrling should be remembered here. Ira is engaged in saying things in the world and this will impact on these things but ira still acts as a vulnerable entity in this way because of the moving, stirring process of those things. Cherryl Smith (2000) states that “within whakapapa there are origins and explanations for trees, birds, parts of the human body, words and speaking, the cosmos, the gods, karakia, the moon, the wind and stones” (p. 45), allowing “the speaker and listeners to negotiate the terrain of both seen and unseen existence”. Such involvement with “seen and unseen existence”, of course, does not mean that one set out to acquire complete knowledge about those existences but that one should acknowledge the impact of their co-existence on the self, amongst other things in the world. Ako may hence be thought of as another active layering:

When we do consider the learning, the uptake, or the teaching of a segment of knowledge, we are now involved with an objectifying process – or, at least, we would be if we were not cautioned by the other states of being inherent to the word ako that we have outlined. The stirring and fragility are states of being, but they temper the tendency of the learner and teacher to objectify through any supposedly pure act of learning. With our movement toward the thing that is to be related to in a careful fashion while learning and teaching, we are not just seeing the thing being learnt or taught as something distant. Knowledge itself is imparted from the natural world and thus the interaction of the self with that knowledge is consonant with a traditional Maori worldview that endorses a holistic relationship. (Thrupp & Mika, 2012, p. 210)
‘Ako’ as the impact of the unknown

Novalis’ works are replete with references to the mystery of the felt world. In his *Hymnen an die Nacht* he reflects on the emotional state of darkness:

Doch was quillt
So kühl und erquicklich
So andungsvoll
Unterm Herzen
Und verschluckt
Der Wehmuth weiche Luft,
Hast auch du
Ein menschliches Herz
Dunkle Macht -
Was hältst du
Unter deinem Mantel
Das mir unsichtbar kräftig
An die Seele geht?
Du scheinst nur furchtbar –
Köstlicher Balsam
Träuft aus deiner Hand
Aus dem Bündel Mohn
Weiter sehn sie
Als die blässten
Jener zahllosen Heere
Unbedürftig des Lichts
Durchschaun sie die Tiefen
Eines liebenden Gemüths,
Was einen höhern Raum
Mit unsäglicher Wollust füllt. (1960i, pp. 130, 132)

But what wells up?
So cool and refreshing
So forebodingly
Under the heart
And swallows up
The soft air’s sadness?
Have you also
A human heart,
Dark night?
What are you holding
Under your cloak,
That grabs so unseen, strongly
At my soul?
You seem only fearful.-
Costly balm
Drips from your hand
From a bundle of poppies.
In sweet drunkenness
You unfold the heavy wings of the soul,
And give us joys
Dark and unspeakable,
Secretly, as you are yourself,
Joys which let us
Sense a heaven. (1988, p. 51)

Darkness is unseen Being for Novalis that involves an influence on the body. Darkness ‘grabs so unseen’ but ‘strongly’ at the body, resulting in emotional turmoil. Evident in the poem is the sense of the not – uncertainty as to whether a characteristic exists in relation to the night. Novalis identifies there is secrecy to the night that is not evident in the day. Robinson (2005) indicates of the ‘Te Kore’ traditions that only nothingness may be spoken of; he states that ‘Korekore’, meaning “not nothing” (p. 298), confronts us with negation that can only itself be referred to negatively. Yet even in speaking about it we can be assured that there has been a movement of the element of korekore towards ira as a manifestation of concern. As with Novalis’ Hymnen an die Nacht ira is able to respond to korekore as a thing to be considered in subjective ways because ira carries within it the seed of korekore itself. Just as night never ceases to exist for Novalis, so korekore
thrives within iRA despite the various stages of creation. It will be recalled that, as whakapapa would have it, the presence of Being occurs at all times and everywhere. For iRA there are effects of whakapapa that are not immediately, or indeed ever, discernible, yet their impact will involve a kind of learning. Novalis’ actio in distans, while intended to refer to art and aesthetics, concisely represents also his views about the presence of things in the world in relation to the self. He identifies various things in the world that are distant but are nevertheless influential for the poet. They may all influence, but are not perceivable by, iRA. What happens at a distance happens for the conscious mind, as we have seen; yet how things in the world influence us without our awareness is also a matter of concern for Novalis. In other words, we may be aware of a thing coming into our sensory realm but we can never be aware of all of them at once. Things in the world, vast in number, are constantly participating with each other, leading Novalis to speculate that:


Ein unendlich caracterisirtes Individuum ist Glied eines Infinitinomiu[m]s – So unsre Welt – Sie gränzt an unendliche Welten – und doch vielleicht nur an Eine. (1960b, p. 261)

The more diversely individualized something is – the more diverse its contact with other individuals – the more variable its boundaries – and neighborhood.

An infinitely characterized individual is a member of an infinitinomium – Thus our world – borders on infinite worlds – and yet perhaps only One. (Wood, 2007, pp. 18-19)

Royal (2005) similarly notes in relation to Māori that “[t]he land and the person becomes one as in the well known term, ‘tangata whenua’. The person is the earth, the earth is the person” (p. 18). Although he was stating this to highlight how Māori come by knowledge, I argue that it could equally apply to the unknowability of the impact that all things in their entirety have on iRA. As to the vastness of this
impact, expressed through the presence of whakapapa, Tomas (1994) argues that there is a bond that is beyond the experience of humans, as it branches out to the “rest of the physical world” (p. 40). In this activity, ira seeks to go “immer nach hause” (Novalis, 1960h, p. 325)/[always towards home], which is in fact always back to the point at which one recognises the vastness, and simultaneously the homeliness, of the relationship between things in the world. Pihama (2001) noted about whakapapa that it “exists irrespective of our specific knowledge of its complexities, and for many Māori the search towards knowing those specificities can be fraught with complications” (p. 129). As the indiscernibility of whakapapa will affect ira to the same extent as its perceivable elements, there will be a greater impact on the ontological aspects of ira than the dominant interpretation of ‘ako’ as ‘teaching and learning’ would allow.

Disclosure and concealment for ira: Whenua

Whenua appears to ‘rise up’ to ira because it is a constant disclosing to ira of a number of elements. These include: emergence, Papatūānuku/Earth Mother, Ranginui/Sky Father, tīpuna, forthcoming generations, history, and concealment. The simultaneous nature of these things in the world means that whenua both reflects and impacts on humanity’s emotional and physical state and therefore acts as a constant, active influence on ira. Ira is the object of special forces, according to Novalis when he states that “[u]nser Geist ist eine Associationssubstanz – Aus Harmonie – Simultanēitaet d[es] Mannichfachen geht er hervor und erhält sich durch sie” (1960b, p. 456)/“[o]ur spirit is a substance of association – It results from harmony – from the simultaneity of the diverse, which also preserves it” (Wood, 2007, p. 172).

At all times, whenua contains ira, so that emergence and concealment for instance are inevitable activities confronting ira. Emergence constantly concerns ira, not just through the physical birth of another human (and hence it is not just an event) but also because of ongoing concerns that ira has in respect of their history. What has gone before for ira is reflected in whenua and all its disclosing elements. In a
sense, emergence is a confronting issue for ira because it is an ongoing process of strange elements as well as familiar. Things in the world are present for ira but in an unobtainable way; their ongoing existence, whether physically or imperceptibly, is confronting because they continue to exist without confirmation by ira. Emergence, or ‘whānautanga’, represents the constant membership of things in the world that will have an impact on ira. Indeed, I speculate that the word ‘whānau’, which is commonly termed ‘family’, may initially have its etymological origins in the idea of ‘causing something to come or go’, in the sense of ‘whā’ and ‘nau’121. ‘Whānau’, dominantly constructed as ‘family’, clearly prefers the emergence of things (in that case, people) in a community. Taken together, the idea of ‘whānau’ is the ongoing emergence and concealment of things in the world. Their emergence and concealment will come to bear on other things in the world, including ira.

Ongoing emergence and concealment are attributes of the Absolute that also take place through whenua. In Heinrich von Ofterdingen, whilst talking about poetry, the merchants stated that:

> Wie aus tiefen Höhlen steigen alte und künftige Zeiten, unzählige Menschen, wunderbare Gegenden, und die seltsamsten Begebenheiten in uns herauf, und entreißen uns der bekannten Gegenwart. (Novalis, 1960h, p. 201)

121 If I am to discuss the family members that are normally concretely discussed in much governmental literature, then I do so here within the context of ‘whānau’ as I have rendered it in the text. My rendition of ‘whānau’ prefers the notion that those finite members of a family unit emerge and depart actively within the similar process of emergence and concealment that occurs in the wider world, which may also be described as ‘whānau’. ‘Whānau’ thus depicts the fragility of human presence (or the presence of any entity) and highlights the tendency of things in the world – including family members – to either suddenly come forth or draw back. ‘Families’ are hence phenomena that are reflected in the wider world, and as a verb the term becomes ‘to move towards’ or ‘move away from’. Novalis also noted the “Anlage”/[potential predisposition] of every family “zu einer unendlichen individuellen Menschheit” (1960o, p. 540)/[to an infinite individual personhood]. As Stoßsatz this assertion of his is incredibly useful, because it acknowledges the birthright of the individual but within simultaneous infinitude. As ‘birth’ (which is the other meaning of ‘whānau’), what comes forth is finitude, and the Absolute remains concealed in its totality. One may then be aware of finitude but is also reminded of the immersion of that finitude within the infinite. Novalis’ “Astralis” may be recalled here, with its emphasis on concealing and revealing occurring during birth, which is the birth not only of a child but also of infinitude.
Within us as out of deep caverns there rise ancient and future times, countless people, *marvelous* regions, and the strangest occurrences, snatching us away from the familiar present. (Novalis, 1990, pp. 31-32)

The hard surface of land is thus imbued with other qualities that immediately engage with the self. Amongst these entities that arise are time (ancient and future) and countless people. These entities all match the solid, physical notion of ‘tūpuna’ that is often given to mean ‘ancestors’. ‘Tūpuna’ is another form of emergence to the extent that there is a welling-forth (‘puna’) of something, often attributed to one’s ancestors but, I argue, also referring to the non-human act of manifestation. Again, the history of the individual is one aspect of this welling-forth, so that it remains in front of iro as much as an historical precedent. That the welling-forth is a confronting activity shows itself in the way that it stands as an emerging thing in the world. There is an attribute of what has happened in the past here – evident in the equivalence of ‘tūpuna’ and ‘ancestor’ – but simultaneously there is a manifestation of what springs up towards iro. What is important here is that whenua becomes an active entity through its membership with other elements which are often taken to be just nouns but which are, in fact, constantly revealing (and concealing) things. Ira becomes aware of this activity through the solid manifestation of Papatūānuku (land) and the aforementioned process of layering (whakapapa) as well as the occasional glimpses of what has taken place in the past, and what may occur in the future.

Novalis noted that “[j]edes Ding ist positive und negative Größe; denn es ist ja nicht das nicht, was es ist – Was es nicht ist, ist es nicht – i.e. es wird von Seyn

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122 For Novalis, a romantic land is active. Linguistically it may be a noun, but Novalis highlights the active nature of the land: “Das Land der Poesie, das romantische Morgenland, hat Euch mit seiner süßen Wehmut begrüßt” (1960h, p. 283)/[The land of poesy, the romantic Orient, greeted you with its sweet sadness] (1990, p. 111). Similarly, while strictly a noun, ‘whenua’ is also active. Browne (2005) notes that Māori thinking prefers the verb, but does not venture outside of the orthodoxy that treats nouns as such. An attempt to turn ‘whenua’ into a verb, taking account of its nounal aspects of ‘ground/land/afterbirth’, might give it a sense of ‘to give rise to’, with land or afterbirth allowing a thing to come forth, but also as a phenomenon that rises around a thing, at times concealing it. What may also be given rise to is the act of concealment, both of which are possible in the nounal versions of ‘land’ and ‘afterbirth’. 

311
und Nichtseyn, von Setzen und Nichtsetzen, bestimmt und nicht bestimmt/bestimmbar und nicht bestimmbar" (1960j, p. 180)/[every thing is positive and negative size, because it is not not what it is – What it isn’t, is that it is not – that is, it is made up of Being and Not-Being, place and Not-place, definite and not-definite, determinable and not-determinable]. Concealment and not-concealment can be added here, so that the concealment of a thing in the world through whenua is also its emergence. Māori traditionally say of death “ka hinga he tetekura, ka ara ano he tetekura” – “as the fronds of the fern wither, new shoots replace” – which comes close to the simultaneous concealment/revealing of, in this case, humanity. Although the activities I have outlined – tūpuna, Papatūānuku, whānau – appear to be instances of disclosure through whenua, they also actively indicate withdrawal. ‘Whānau’, as I have already suggested, implies causing to move away as much as move towards. Whenua is therefore evidence of mortality but is actively the presence of life as well.
Exkurs: Tupuna/‘Vorfahr’ romanticised

The reaffirmation of the ancestors of the self becomes more marked in a romanticising of ‘Vorfahr’/ancestor with ‘tupuna’/ancestor. ‘Tupuna’, as we have seen, also means to well forth with both human and non-human elements. In that light, ‘Vorfahr’ suggests that the self encounters both what has gone before and that which currently ‘goes before’ the self. Thus things also manifest before Dasein that are simultaneously connected to the past. As we have seen, Novalis notes that one’s land is more than just the inert object that it is often taken to be. ‘Vorfahr’, as both land and people that well forth before the self, provides the self with both physical and spiritual sustenance in the present, even if ‘Vorfahr’ intends to deal with past and future but not the immediate present. The self, as with ira, is a thing in the world that draws to it that which has gone before and continues to go before and so provides that current continuity for ‘Vorfahr’.

As constantly emerging ancestor, land for self, as for ira, is evidence of the Absolute. “[A]lte und künftige Zeiten”, as Novalis has noted, “steigen … aus tiefen Höhlen”, and emerge before the self as expressions of the Absolute. This manifestation shares some similarities with the verb form of ‘ao’/[to world]. Here, past and future times come into the vision of the self, or dawn toward the self. Alongside these ‘Zeiten’ are “unzählige Menschen” that, along with ‘Zeiten’, are those things that materialise before the self. Tūpuna dawn constantly for ira, and, romanticised in a similar way, Vorfahr also move towards, before and prior to the self.

This linguistic Romantisierung suggests that the self is responsible for viewing the earth as an unknowable but intimate entity that manifests mystery from a distance as well as proximately. One’s ancestors are in fact these manifestations that are not only human but also entities from one’s local and distant space.
Summary

In this chapter I have romanticised the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘whenua’, and ‘ako’ so that some essence of Geheimnis is reclaimed for them. Romanticising the self so that it is a participant with things in the world was also an aim of this thesis; thus the idea behind ‘mātauranga’ was romanticised to the extent that the complexity of the other terms stepped in to explain the highly complex movements that the Absolute undertakes and that ‘mātauranga’ threatens to overlook. The terms ‘whakaaro’, ‘whakawā’, ‘mea’, ‘tohu’, ‘whakapapa’, and ‘whenua’ ascribe an interrelationship to the self as it is placed within things in the world.

Novalis was an architect of highly novel ideas around the relationship between the self and things in the world, alongside that of the interface of Being, those things, and the self. His works reveal some fascinating glimpses into the possibilities for an interpretation of things in the world, together with an incorporation of an empirical, scientific approach to both words and nature. We have seen that the poetic and fragmentary nature of his philosophies, quite apart from posing difficulties, allows us to achieve the impetus to start to critique geheimnislose beliefs. However, Novalis enables us to start a far more vital and exciting process than that: his fragments contribute to the foundations of a more organic, unfolding way of looking at things in the world and the self. This endeavour is exciting because it is dependent on the deviser’s ability to hold the different fragments of a holistic worldview, which is, I argue, the only way to do justice to Novalis’ works.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion

The Absolute, not able to be perfectly represented by human language and science, may nevertheless be glimpsed in writing as well as the process of thinking. As a ubiquitous phenomenon it may dwell distinctly in spaces where disciplines meet, because it allows those disciplines to work and activate themselves to begin with. It underpins divergent fields of knowledge and acts as a unifier as it resides under and within those fields. In this thesis I have established a dialogue between Early German Romantic and Novalis’ philosophies, Māori Studies, the social mechanisms of powerful colonising institutions, and epistemology, in a novel way and with a fresh outcome. I have addressed the Geheimnis that accompanies this interdisciplinary method and retained it throughout my substantive discussion as well, so that a presence of Being is always remembered. The special place of interdisciplinary work in allowing mystery to yet again be part of things in the world has been a focus of this thesis.

I have highlighted aspects of epistemology and language philosophy in this work, and have also touched on areas that are not accounted for in dominant philosophical disciplines. Novalis has been of particular assistance here, because he emphasises the precarious but necessary role of the philosophising writer in taking account of the ontological and spiritual realms so that they are, indeed, no longer ‘realms’ but are infused with those objects that are normally held with epistemic certainty. This for him, and for me, has been the nature of Geheimnis: the recognition and acknowledgement of Being as one engages with a thing in the world. I have revisited ontological elements that move throughout all things in the world so that one may not discuss them without involving oneself within those elements.

Uniqueness of the thesis

Because of these unusual groupings of cultural thought, I can confidently assert that my thesis is unique. For scholars of Early German Romantic thought it brings to the fore some of Novalis’ philosophies and interprets them through an
indigenous lens. For the Māori reader it similarly highlights certain philosophies and starts to discuss them within their fuller implications for language, but with Novalis constantly in the background. It hence brings to the fore a Novalis-inspired Māori critique of Being and Geheimnis with relevance to epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, and postcolonial studies.

To some extent, my overall method of placing a Western philosopher alongside aspects of Māori thought and scholarship is a risky one. There is not a big body of scholarly work on this sort of method – particularly to discuss what I have proposed is a Māori metaphysical problem - so I had no precedent to work from. I could not use established empirical methods and bring those to bear on these particular philosophical questions, because I actually challenge those methods. This has made the work both demanding and exciting, because if we are to give Novalis full room for movement, the ‘method’ should be one that is quite similar to the actual substance of the work – not viewed so much as a distinct mechanism by which one has a desired outcome. Even though through my Erkenntnisinteresse I did have a prospective outcome in mind as I worked through the thesis, the method forms part of that outcome as folded into the overall discussion as well as the mechanism to arrive there.

**Specific arguments**

In chapter two I described my method, which drew on Novalis’ broad project of Romantisieren in specific detail, and pointed out that I would refer to Novalis’ writings as Stoßsätze to write from, to propose Māori notions of Being, Geheimnis and Geheimnislosigkeit. I began that chapter with a quote from Novalis about the oppositional nature of Being, and this would provide a push to describe Being, the Absolute, and the unreified. However, this description occurred due in no small part to Marsden’s metaphysical theories of korekore as well. To that extent, I placed Novalis and Marsden in a discussion with each other to compel me to think about the significance of those terms. My responses, which were spurred on from variously provocative, illustrative, and romanticising Stoßsätze, were brought about also by the impact of things in the world, including
past experiences and tribal affiliations. I argued that this method/methodology chapter was additionally substantive because it set the scene for the development of the colonised self generally as a geheimnislose entity. What became clear, as the thesis developed, was that a dialogue was developing between my thinking and Novalis’. Combined, these dual discussions would then act as a collaborative Stoßsatz for the discussion at the time. The Stoßsatz method was therefore not as one-directional as I had imagined it would be. ‘Dialogue’ may not be an entirely sufficient term to use here, as I maintain that any term used to describe this exercise should emphasise the ‘push’ that was nevertheless still evident in the progress of my discussions. ‘Sympathischem Stoßsätzchen’/[philosophically collaborative sentences that push] could be an appropriate phrase to use here. Despite what turned out to be a unified discussion of the Geheimnis/Geheimnislosigkeit of things in the world, however, I still assert that the general emphasis was on Novalis’ beginning sentences to provide a subsequent discussion that included Māori scholarship and thought. The cumulative effect of these sentences that push, I argue, added to the depth of the work, because their culturally disparate character provided a greater impetus for that push. In association with each other, they gathered momentum to encourage discussion about things in the world with an unusual and distinctive twist.

In order to discuss Geheimnis I had to raise Being as an issue, and then posit some theories of what Being would be from a Māori worldview, through my own thinking and that of other Māori writers. This was the focus of chapter three. Novalis assisted me with this because he provided a means of critique that I could imitate. Although Fichte’s theories of the absolute self grated against Novalis in no small measure, we have seen that Novalis also admired Fichte for positioning the self to be the central figure of all things in the world. This admiration was based not only on the fact that there were several appealing aspects to that positioning, as it amplified the fraught place of the self; it additionally turned on the nature of Fichte’s instigation of Novalis’ interest in the self and Being, which then enabled Novalis to philosophise on the theme. Despite disagreeing in marked fashion with Fichte, Novalis was appreciative of that assistance from Fichte. This means of critique formed an impetus for me to then undertake a similar discussion against a Māori writer, Te Maire Tau, whom I also admire for his courageous and
innovative analysis of the self and knowledge. This chapter was intended to show that one could and indeed should make assertions about Being through the practice of critique, as Novalis had with Fichte. I also wanted to lay the ground for a discussion about Geheimnis and its relationship with the Absolute, to demonstrate that both Being and Geheimnis were meant to be acknowledged as everyday phenomena and not to be relegated to any specific part of human life or purely to esoteric thinking. Novalis, along with some reflections on my upbringing with my aunt, assisted me in some assertions about how the Absolute works, and the implications of this for Geheimnis (which, because of the Absolute, should be retained for every thing in the world).

The problem of Geheimnislosigkeit in Western modernity as well as colonial discourses then formed the focus for the next three chapters. Chapter four described Novalis’ views on the Enlightenment, which impinged on his society in a number of ways. The problem for him was not science as such, but the much more fundamental rise of a static view of things in the world, together with the self as the absolute central figure in that view. Although the Enlightenment had not taken hold in Germany to the same extent as it had in France and England, Novalis and the other Early German Romantics witnessed its progress with some trepidation, because its tenets of rationalism threatened certain traditional worldviews; namely, the belief that things in the world were suffused with the Absolute and were therefore not knowable with any determinacy, and that the self was one of many things in the world. Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” gave us the problem in poetic form. I analysed the poem and supported it with various historical and poetic discourses. What emerges is that Geheimnislosigkeit is often hard to identify, because it lies deeply beneath some very entrenched philosophies and practices. Its submerged character allows it to manifest as diverse, everyday social problems and yet remain protected from being recognised. Thus, Novalis identified that what are taken to be common problems have their roots in philosophies that sought to divest the world of Geheimnis and make it thoroughly knowable and clear to the objectifier.

That chapter acted as an overall Stoßsatz for my Nachdenken about a similar problem in the Māori world, in chapter five. In modern times, we see that Māori
are encouraged through various institutional mechanisms to view both the self and other things in the world as geheimnislos. Commonly, Māori have observed and experienced the excluding practices and philosophies, in their various guises, of the institutions of law, health and education. Occasionally, the philosophical impetus for this exclusion is acknowledged but rarely has the theme been sustained for a complete discussion, as if it is the underlying problem. I carried out this chapter on the basis of “Wenn nicht mehr” on the basis that it is the constant but invisible problem for the Māori self. I pointed out that the exclusion by institutions is in fact an exclusion of Geheimnis, not just of the self (although this is a substantial portion of its working mode) but, importantly, of other things in the world too. There are potential implications in those procedures for the ontological and metaphysical balances of things in the world, including the self. Some of these consequences relate to preventing the thing in the world from manifesting according to its own agency through the language that is directed at it. In turn, the self is isolated and ontologically affected. The nature of the critique here is that things in the world come to be discussed on the basis of those very primordial, initial orientations of the self towards those things. Language comes to be framed according to that inclination, and it is my discussion of that regard that allows me to then turn to chapter six, which addresses how certain common Māori terms have either been banalised over time because of Geheimnislosigkeit or have been introduced to justify the staticising of the self and other things in the world.

Chapter six therefore considers Māori terms as they have become commonly used, also on the basis of the critique that “Wenn nicht mehr” provided. Those terms are ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’, and ‘whenua’. The term ‘mātauranga’ I discussed as an introduced one; I argued that it coincides with a tendency of Geheimnislosigkeit to place the self as an entity that is capable of getting to know things in the world thoroughly. Because it conjoins so readily with ‘knowledge’ in its overly rationalistic form, it has become particularly predominant since knowledge of a thing in the world gained in importance. The first three terms have been interpreted in line with the philosophy that things in the world are solid, self-evident phenomena that promise to be fully knowable by the self. Thus these entities either assist the self in gleaning knowledge or else provide it outright. Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” helped me to disturb that idea, also with a focus on
the subterranean problem that lies underneath those terms. My discussion in chapter five had outlined that problem, and the terms that I raised in chapter six showed a definite lack of Geheimnis, as if the terms were not connected to the Absolute.

Chapter seven was an important one for this thesis, for two reasons: It demonstrates more explicitly than the others the nature of the romanticising Stoßsatz, and it additionally used those sentences of Novalis’ to romanticise the terms that I noted had become geheimnislos in their use. It is the most vivid example of the cumulative Stoßsatz. Chapter two had introduced in some depth the idea that one is constantly affected by things in the world, and chapter three added to this by a discussion of how one’s selfhood relies on the movement of the Absolute, and is hence largely mysterious. Chapter four then emphasised more explicitly the importance of critique and showed the general problem of the self as central entity; adding to that discussion, chapters five and six showed that the ontological problem of Geheimnislosigkeit affected Māori on an everyday, terminological level. For chapter seven, all these chapters revealed both problem and possible resolution. In combination they provided a fertile ground for romanticising the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’ and ‘whenua’, and, by romanticising the self, the idea behind ‘mātauranga’ was also romanticised, even though it had ceased to figure as an outright term to be romanticised in that chapter. What came clearly to the fore was that, if romanticised along the lines of Novalis’ writings, the Māori terms’ activity is highlighted, and they lose their self-evidence. Things in the world, distant as well as near, emerge and conceal through a romanticised view of those terms. Because of that constant autonomous activity, the Absolute, providing Geheimnis, is recognised as a romanticising and infusing phenomenon.

I also directly romanticised some German Romantic terms through my own Nachdenken and by drawing on relevant Māori scholarship. These forms of Nachdenken are an important facet of Romantisieren, as they acknowledge the ongoing character of that project. The aim of those Nachdenken is to alert the German Romantic scholar that there are possible extensions to be made to those terms, and to highlight the vitality of collaborative work in that regard. Despite these visible additions, though, I speculate that I have romanticised aspects of
Novalis’ thinking by bringing it into an engagement with Māori indigenous ways of thinking.

**Philosophical and cultural implications of the thesis as it relates to postcolonialism**

Arising from the philosophical focus and implications of my thesis, there are specific postcolonial ones that are important. I believe that my thesis could contribute to what already exists in terms of Māori research about colonisation. My critique has been both general, starting with the metaphysical, and has moved towards the specific in my discussions about particular discourses that refer to things in the world with Geheimnislosigkeit. Where writers such as Pihama and Linda Smith have started these discussions, I have gone in a different direction, tending to look at the fundamental assumptions that predicate a colonised placing of the self in relation to Being. This has underpinned my discussions even when talking about specific instances of colonisation. I attempted to sustain the phenomenon of Being in those discussions so that it would become apparent that Being was not simply a thing that could be relegated to another (usually mystical) space.

This thesis may assist those Māori readers who are seeking other ways of thinking about things in the world. At a time in which I believe we are being encouraged to think of our things in the world as highly evident, it becomes necessary to think of these things in totally different ways. Perhaps the greatest help that Novalis has been here is in his identification of how Being is a current (yet historical and future) phenomenon that is not consigned to the realm of ceremony or to certain geographical spaces. He has been helpful in bringing me to discover that Being is a dominant force in our lives that impacts on everyday activities. This is largely forgotten in New Zealand and threatens to become lost in writing about Māori issues. There is also a logical tendency to forget that, if Being is no longer acknowledged as a primordial activity, our regard for things in the world is affected. I have identified in this thesis – in particular in chapter five – how it has
been a colonial project, intentional or otherwise, to encourage the Māori self to forget this fact.

**Everyday nature of ontological metaphysics**

Geheimnis, as I have emphasised throughout, is given by the Absolute. Thus the metaphysical realm encroaches and moves throughout the common, everyday realm. Geheimnislosigkeit is a forgetting of the Absolute, but despite the fact that one of the causes of this forgetfulness is that the Absolute is consigned to either the past or to particular sites, it is nevertheless a problem occurring here and now. My thesis has opened spaces that are generally discussed as socially oriented and given them a metaphysical focus, and I have reflected the everyday relationship of the Absolute with things in the world by offering both a critique and a resolution of common terms. My aim here has been to question the commonly held belief, or the drive to adhere to the belief, that the Absolute somehow ceases its influence at a particular point, either in time or in practice. This has been an ambitious aim because at most junctures we are urged to think of Being as somehow rarefied or bygone. In that sense I have tried to show that one should attend to the tension between critique and affirmation and construct them so that are both part of one’s normal affirmations. The affirmation part places a resolution to a problem as a possibility for the thinker, and to critique forces the thinker to engage with a current problem, and thus places the issue of philosophy as a problematic, contemporary theme. I argue that this critique needs to be a sustained one, and is even itself a resolution simply because it aims to place the thinker, and other things in the world, in the present.

I have not yet come across much indigenous writing that so sustainedly focuses on *philosophical* colonisation as Novalis does. To be sure, there are various interpretations of ‘philosophy’. What I mean by the term here is the metaphysical place of self and things in the world in combination with Being, then *in relation to* current colonised existence. When it does crop up in indigenous writing it is superseded by, or is folded within, what Royal (2007) terms a “sociological” (p. 11) discussion. He maintains that this approach to explorations of ‘knowledge’
form the greater part of Māori research. The colonisation that I am referring to in my thesis is more fundamental than an epistemological one: It is ontological and occurs at quite a primordial level. Novalis has enabled me to access this level.

**Challenges arising during thinking and writing**

In chapter seven I discussed the fact that language is given to one to speak, evident in both Novalis’ theories and certain Māori terms. The Absolute, or Being, governs this provision through the active nature of whakapapa. One may therefore encounter another’s thoughts and then incorporate them with his or her own, with the aim of romanticising normal thinking and in tandem with ethical Nachdenken.

An interesting challenge was that of maintaining my cultural voice while responding to Novalis. Some readers may find that one of the limitations of the method might be that the outcome has remnants of Novalis’ own cultural background within it. Indeed, in chapter two I argued that these traces would be evident, and I maintain that argument at this stage also. Novalis certainly wanted various aspects of his argument accounted for in one’s Nachdenken: notably, the place of the individual self in relation to things in the world, the mediation of the self as it responds to a colonised notion of those things, and the ability of the self to transform the world even as the self acts within Being. These are not common considerations in Māori scholarship, and Māori readers in particular will find these desiderata either refreshing or problematic. I have found them to be inspirational and worthwhile, but acknowledge that limitations may arise.

**Retaining a Māori ‘voice’**

Due directly to Novalis, terms such as ‘Being’, ‘the Absolute, and ‘self’ have been mentioned much more frequently than one normally encounters in Māori scholarship. A sustained focus on them in this thesis could be critiqued on the grounds that the terminology is not of the Māori world. When I began this thesis I was worried about the possibility that I would somehow introduce foreign
theoretical matter into Māori experience. Novalis’ Stoßsätze placate this concern to some extent because in their ideology they have some similarities to Māori belief. Thus ‘Being’ and ‘the Absolute’ are markedly similar to ‘korekore’. Having taken aim at the equivalences of terms between cultures, I realised that I had also talked about a key term within my own cultural context. This term, Being, is historically fraught for the West and so, as Novalis would have it, may convey with it similar discursive problems to words such as ‘knowledge’. Yet writers such as the German Romantics have attempted to talk about Being while retaining some uncertainty. Being is not a self-generated phenomenon with them, and so as a term it does not demarcate out a specific thing. Instead, for them Being underpins all things in the world. I feel protected to a certain extent in my use of it because of the fact that they describe it in such opaque ways to begin with. The problem, if there is one here, would be that I am talking about it in the language that directly colonised us – English.

The problem may more appropriately be traced back to written academic language. One major challenge in tackling the questions I have lies in sequentially laying out an argument that requires clear terms. Novalis himself was unclear when talking about Being, and would not say that it shared an exact identity with this or that. He would, however, describe that it exists, and at best he said that it was ‘freedom’, which is hardly a precise definition. One has to name it in order for it to be valid in research, however, and a term had to be given to this unknowable activity that underlies everything. This is a major challenge for Māori writers who talk about a significant term at a time and it prohibits a discussion of Being that reflects Being’s integrity. In my research I have found this a difficult problem, because, as we have seen, Māori terms, if approached from a position of Being, each revolve naturally around each other.

“Self” as a dominant figure in research discussions is potentially much more challenging. My response to the difficulty that reifying “self” poses is twofold: Firstly, there is a tendency to discuss Māori constantly as a collective group and not to discuss the ontological characteristics of the individual (if I were to offer a phrase to describe this tendency, it would be “the enforced collectivisation of Māori”); and, secondly, colonisation largely provokes individual responses at a
number of levels, and so “selfhood” must be catered for in discussions about Geheimnislosigkeit. Geheimnislosigkeit as Novalis would have it challenges Being in favour of the primacy of the self. The introduction of Geheimnislosigkeit to Māori thus requires that the place of the self is addressed and hence that ‘self’ is mentioned. My rendition of ira, though, aims to thwart the normal expectations that come with “self” by making the self less certain through the term.

I identified in chapter two that sentences that push stay with the outcome and are embedded in them. Because Novalis has played an indispensable role in the outcome of this thesis, it follows that his influence will be all the more palpable, and that the outcome will have vestiges of his thought in it. Discussions about a ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ voice are not his primary concern, and are not mine either, but the fact that he has been drawn on to such an extent will mean that he will appear from time to time in the thinking and writing of this thesis. As a Māori writer who writes in the field of cultural philosophy, I welcome the turn from a discussion of the pure voice to one that engages with the voices of many in text and speech.

**Complicating what is actually quite simple**

The reader may have gathered that I think of the influence of the Absolute as far from straightforward. Novalis certainly gives the impression that the idea of the Absolute is difficult enough, to say nothing of the nature of its role in everyday things in the world. My thesis has deliberately engaged with the notion that those terms needed complicating, if complicating is indeed the appropriate word here. Tied in with this is the possibility that I have overly spiritualised certain terms that were actually quite pragmatic and that have served both the German and Māori audiences quite well for a long time. Chapters two, three and seven, where I make affirmations about certain terms, reveal what is my deliberate transformation of those terms so that they no longer particularly show what they used to. The Māori terms figure much more here than the German ones do, but placing the German Romantic terms alongside Māori interpretations does alter them, or at least it does.

325
give them a different slant. I suspect that, if anything, rather than spiritualise those terms, I have made them more attuned to things in the world, and more concrete.

Perhaps I can theorise with more authority about the Māori terms. I have heard various knowledgeable people assert that terms such as whakapapa are actually straightforward. My response is that, beneath and within that transparent level of the terms, lies Being, which allows things in the world to manifest at all. The appearance of the thing that whakapapa refers to might appear obvious, and it may be used in that vein, but there are other senses to the word that are silenced but nevertheless persist in that silence. So, whakapapa might be used as genealogy, but even in that expression the ‘quietly clamorous’ voices of those other senses echo too. This is not necessarily a ‘spiritual’ phenomenon, either – although I argue that Māori have been encouraged to redefine matters that are not immediate as spiritual – but one that is part of a quite concrete, yet still unknowable, activity that underpins all things in the world.

Potential for future research

My recommendations are not aimed at government departments and the like: That is, I have nothing to say on the matter of how either my method or the discussion about colonisation and solutions could be incorporated as a ‘framework’ into conventional government policy or law. Instead, I would like to think that my thesis was accessible for a Māori audience, in particular a Māori academic audience. To this end, as my thesis indicates I would like to highlight that as Māori we need to constantly address colonisation (and its remedies) in innovative and fresh ways. The method I have drawn on here has given me the freedom to explore theoretical considerations, and it has not involved community research. The beauty of this sort of method is that it allows a certain degree of creativity and it focuses almost solely on the critique of assumptions, rather than gaining data as a first method. It is a given premise of this sort of research that one is setting out to critique and, if necessary, resolve, and one can start this process from the outset. I do not maintain that community research does not critique, but
the method I have used is intent on questioning first assumptions rather than adding to knowledge based on those assumptions as a central method.

I have referred to various other philosophers – notably Friedrich Schlegel and Heidegger – to support my approach to Novalis. In their own right, these philosophers could form the basis for an interesting Stoßsatz project that would yield different philosophies from that of this thesis. There are other additional theorists, too, who could give that impetus to the Nachdenker. Work into romanticising common Western philosophical terms would be desirable, preferably with the assistance of literature that is not sourced in dominant philosophy. Novalis had attempted it in his Das Allgemeine Brouillon, and a similar project could be attempted in a current context. Also, working with a philosophical source that is at least partially inimical could be a worthwhile project, as it would involve delving into the sort of Stoßsatz that Fichte’s theories represented for Novalis as a focus. A different style of writing is envisaged from that sort of project: one that is reactive yet highly energetic.

Summary: Reference back to “Tērā te Auahi”

The lament “Tērā te Auahi” that I started with in the introduction is a way of referring to the continued reflection that Novalis’ and my Romantisieren project represents. It refers to the survival of certain elements, including people from that iwi, as well as a way of thinking. In the introduction I referred to it as a means of gathering disciplines to discuss the notion of Geheimnis and Being. For me, the importance of the lament is that it heralds continued thought in foreign terrain – thought that continues to ‘gather’ that terrain to it - but always with the elements that it mentions within my writing. What the potential of this lament points to is the ability to refer to everyday activity and think about it in terms of its Geheimnis.

Just as there are numerous combinations of things in the world in the lament, so there is undoubtedly the potential for several collaborations of thinking in
philosophy. One of the enchantments of bringing seemingly unrelated cultural groupings together is that they immediately engage with the uncertain, and retain enough Geheimnis so that things in the world keep their inherent mystery. For the Māori self, I have argued this is a positive approach, so that things in the world that are normally framed in an everyday manner can retain their self-governing but interrelating integrity. I speculate that Novalis, were he living today, would have sympathised with that contemporary application of theories, and may have understood “Tērā te Auahi”, assisting the disciplines as it does, as a decidedly romanticising influence.
Glossary

This glossary is an aid for readers unfamiliar with German and Māori terms. I include the common, well-known meanings of those terms. I also include my romanticised interpretations of those terms, noted with ‘Romanticised’. Some of the common translations are delved into in more depth, and the romanticised interpretations are more fully described, in the text.

The reader should note that both common translations and my romanticised interpretations are just meant to help the reader and are not meant to provide pure, definitive explanations for them. My proviso here reflects my overall thesis argument; that pure definitions may deprive things in the world of their Geheimnis and sever those things from their connection with the Absolute. I do not aim to offer any finality to the terms – inherent to the etymology of ‘de-fine’ (to end, terminate, limit) - but to just provide a first glance for the reader.

### German terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German term</th>
<th>English translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>das Absolute</td>
<td>the Absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>der Anstoß</td>
<td>Shock/impetus</td>
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<tr>
<td>aufheben</td>
<td>to sublate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>der Buchstabe</td>
<td>letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Dasein/Daseyn</td>
<td>Existence (at present); there-being; actuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romanticised: agent of thought about colonisation; agent that moves towards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
things with concern
einst \text{ once (past and future adverb)}
der Exkurs \text{ digression}
Frühromantiker \text{ Early German Romantics}
das Geheimnis \text{ mystery}
geheimnislos \text{ lacking in mystery}
die Geheimnislosigkeit \text{ lack of mystery}
geheimnisvoll \text{ replete with mystery}
das Geheimnisvolle \text{ the state of being replete with mystery}
das Gerede \text{ idle chatter; the gathering together of words of a certain kind}
das Geviert \text{ the Fourfold; Quadrate}
die Heimat \text{ homeland; dwelling}
das Heimweh \text{ homesickness}
(das) Ich \text{ I; self}
die Kreaturen (pl) \text{ creatures}
der Lehrer \text{ teacher}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Word</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>die Lehrlinge (pl)</td>
<td>students; apprentices</td>
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<tr>
<td>das Nachdenken</td>
<td>reflection; contemplation; (lit.) after-thinking; meditative thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>der Nachdenker</td>
<td>meditative thinker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Natur</td>
<td>nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Nichts</td>
<td>the nothing; ontological void</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Romantisieren/romantisieren</td>
<td>romanticising/ to romanticise</td>
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<tr>
<td>der Schlüssel</td>
<td>key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(das) Selbst</td>
<td>self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(das) Sein/Seyn</td>
<td>Being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Spiel</td>
<td>play</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Sprache</td>
<td>language;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Romanticised:</em> expression or mode of orientation towards things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Sprachlehre</td>
<td>Linguistics; language theory; (natural) grammar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>der Stoß</td>
<td>push</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Stoßsatz;</td>
<td>sentence(s) that push and challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Stoßsätze (pl)</td>
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<tr>
<td>German Term</td>
<td>English Translation</td>
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<tr>
<td>die Symphilosophie</td>
<td>collaborative philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Systemphilosophie</td>
<td>rational philosophical system; foundationalist philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Tiefgelehrten (pl)</td>
<td>erudite person or scholar; deeply learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unbedingt</td>
<td>unreified; absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Unbedingte</td>
<td>the unreified; the Absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Unbegrifflichkeit</td>
<td>non-conceptual representation; incomprehensibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Urteil/Urtheil</td>
<td>judgement; original division;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romanticised: state of becoming, with an evident original emphasis; original, changing division occurring prior to Dasein’s awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>versteinert</td>
<td>petrified; hardened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Vordenken</td>
<td>thinking in advance of/on behalf of; exploration on behalf of/in anticipation of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>der Vorfahr</td>
<td>ancestor;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romanticised: that which ‘goes before’ or ‘has gone before’; that which moves towards, before, and prior to Dasein</td>
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</table>
**Māori terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Māori term/phrase</th>
<th>English translation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>akiaki</td>
<td>to urge on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ako               | to teach/learn; to stir; fragile; to split;  
*Romanticised*: the movement of the natural world towards the self so that wonder takes place; impact of the unknown |
| ao                | world; to dawn;  
*Romanticised*: to world |
| te Ao Tua Atea    | Being               |
| aro               | to have regard for; presence; regard or concern; a linguistic component of aroaro;  
*Romanticised*: initial point or regard or concern, coming about through desire |
aroaro
view of concern; sensory field; coming into self’s view or awareness; moving to the front; area directly in front of the self

awa
river

ētahi
some

hā/haa
breath

hapū
subtribe; pregnant

hinengaro
intellect; mind; emotion

huna
mystery

ia
he/she

ira
gene; life-force; derived from uira; Romanticised: self (ira); Dasein; a concurrent exclamation to denote the ‘over there’ aspect of Being in relation to the self

iwi
tribe; bone(s)

kaitiaki
guardian; steward

kaitiakitanga
guardianship; stewardship

karakia
prayer
kau  initial disclosure; absence of a thing

kaupapa  theme of discussion;
Romanticised: Disclosure of ground, but revelation to the self that the ground is absent; awareness brought about by the appearance of a thing in the world that is uncertain

kōaro  regard of a thing so that it is inverted

kore  void; Being; negativity;
Romanticised: to noth; nihilation; sheltering

korekore  Being; thorough-going negativity; negativity to the point of positivity.
Romanticised: a thing in the world as well as shear activity; finite thing and infinite phenomenon; the metaphysical underpinning of critique and affirmation/Māori dialectic

kuia  older woman

kupu  word(s); speech

kupu ohorere  immediate provocative response that the words arouse in the reader or listener

kupu whakakōaro  the regard to respond to the word with the result that a conventional approach
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kupu whakakōkiri</td>
<td>the challenge that a word or set of words invokes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana</td>
<td>prestige; power; authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manaakitanga</td>
<td>urging on with care in mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori/Maori</td>
<td>indigenous people of Aotearoa/New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māoritanga</td>
<td>Māori cultural way of living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mātauranga</td>
<td>knowledge; <em>Romanticised</em>: the lack of disclosure of a thing’s essence as the thing is settled on/contemplated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mate</td>
<td>illness; death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maunga</td>
<td>mountain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mauri</td>
<td>life-force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mea</td>
<td>say, thing, deal, wish; <em>Romanticised</em>: ultimately inexplicable comportment or ontological inclination towards things in the world as a result of the showing of those things; the self’s speech after the autonomous showing of things in the world; a desire to deal with/congeal the thing by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
speaking it after the thing has shown itself through the Absolute/Being

Pākehā/Pakeha of European descent (mainly used in relation to New Zealand Europeans)

papa rock; earth; derivative of Papatūānuku; 
Romanticised: ground of concern

Papatūānuku/papa-tua-nuku rock foundation beyond expanse; the infinite; Earth Mother; Being/the Absolute

te pō/po dark; night; derivative of pō-uri

pō tangotango/po tangotango darkness

pō-uri/pōuri distress; 
Romanticised: jarring emotion stemming from realisation that a thing in the world is also infinite in nature

rākau tree

ranga set in motion

rangahau research

Ranginui Sky Father

reo language; voice; 
Romanticised: natural expression of things through their arrangement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>te reo Māori</th>
<th>Māori language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rohe</td>
<td>area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>roto</td>
<td>inside; lake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taha</td>
<td>side; aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taonga</td>
<td>treasure; prized possession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangata</td>
<td>human; person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangata whenua</td>
<td>people of the land; indigenous people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tētahi</td>
<td>one; a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiaki</td>
<td>the active urge towards a thing that results in care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tikanga</td>
<td>custom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tinana</td>
<td>body;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Romanticised:</em> the self that comes about as physical body within the interplay of things in the world and within Being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tino rangatiratanga</td>
<td>intrinsic chieftainship/autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tohu</td>
<td>sign; represent; point out; lay by or preserve; instruction;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Romanticised:</em> the agency of the self in representing things in the world as</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
those things instruct and relate to the self

tohunga/tōhunga
specialist(s)

tupuna/tūpuna/tipuna/tīpuna
ancestor.

Romanticised: an active welling-forth with both human and non-human elements; a confrontation of the self through a welling forth of whenua

tūrangawaewae
place of standing

uira
lightning; origin of ira; presence of Being; presence of genes.

Romanticised: a momentous gathering to oneself of things in the world through those same things; a recognition of the self in the unfamiliar

wā
time; space;

wairua
spiritual; spirit; lit. two waters

whai
to have, possess

whaiaro
self; that which has a regard or concern

whaka
to cause; to become; coming to bear

whakaaro
to think; to cause to have regard for; to apprehend through the use of the senses; to cast attention to;
Romanticised: becoming a concern; the bringing closer of things in the world towards the self’s field of concern through the autonomous activity of Being; the orientation of things in the world; the continuous impact of things in the world after their orientation to, and impact on, the self through the Absolute

whakahua

bring to fruition; pronounce

whakapapa
genealogy; gene; pedigree; connections between things in the world; analytical tool to order things in the world; recital of genealogy; methodical kinship; taxonomy; to layer.

Romanticised: the movement of finite things in the world into new terrains but within the influence of Being; groundless layering and accrual; the ontological accrual to things in the world of the effect of things in the world, resulting in state of fluidity; the activity that the Absolute carries out to arrange things in the world, with an emphasis on the interplay of those things in the world; constant movement towards a ground (such as a definitive proposition); the identification of a lack, through never arriving at the ground
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>whakarehurehu</td>
<td>fade from sight; premonition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whakataukī</td>
<td>a saying; proverb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whakawā</td>
<td>judgement; to judge;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Romanticised:</em> primordial awareness of time and place as one horizon;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>realisation that the self may not be the ground of experience; coming to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bear of time and place on the self; incomplete judgement through positing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the self as ground of experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whānau</td>
<td>family; birth;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Romanticised:</em> the tendency of things in the world to reveal and conceal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>through the activity of the Absolute; the tendency of things in the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to suddenly come forth or draw back; the emergence of finitude with the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>concealment of Being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whanaungatanga</td>
<td>family bondedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whānautanga</td>
<td>birth;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Romanticised:</em> emergence and concealment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wharenuī</td>
<td>meeting house</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
whare tangata  womb

whenua  land; placenta;

*Romanticised:* that which prompts; to give rise to, in the sense of rising around things in the world, occasionally concealing those things; that which rises up; that which actively contains the self; that which evidences mortality
References


