In the initial chapter in this section (Chapter 14) the major categories of policies relevant to ethnic pluralism were outlined and justification was given for implementing policies consistent with cultural pluralism. The present chapter examines the changing patterns of inter-ethnic relationships among Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand, specifically the moves from assimilation towards biculturalism. The impact of recent debate about the Treaty of Waitangi is described and examples of bicultural policies and their consequences are outlined.

In Aotearoa the indigenous peoples are collectively called Maori. Their language and cultural patterns are closely related to those of other Eastern Polynesian peoples. People of Maori descent comprise about 12% of the population. The term "Maori" emerged as a direct consequence of the arrival of the British in the nineteenth century and is used to describe a collection of diverse tribal people who recognized that they had more in common with each other, than with British settlers. In 1991, Maori people continue to exist tribally and, while adapting, have to a large extent resisted pressure to assimilate to the ways of the majority Pakeha culture. The dominant ethnic group in New Zealand are Pakeha or Anglo-New Zealanders who comprise about 81% of the population. Since British colonization of New Zealand, Pakeha have become dominant in most nationally-organized institutions.

Early history of Maori-Pakeha contact

Several hundred years after Polynesian navigators guided their canoes from islands in Eastern Polynesia, to Aotearoa, European explorers began to arrive in the Pacific. The Dutchman, Abel Tasman, who arrived at Aotearoa in 1642, was the first recorded European land on these shores. His "discovery" attracted little interest among colonial powers as there were no readily identifiable resources in the new land (Kelsey, 1984, p. 22). Following that initial European-Maori contact, traders, whalers, sealers took an interest in Aotearoa. They were followed by missionaries intent on bringing the "good word" to the Maori people. Kelsey reported that there "was general Maori acceptance of this small number of Pakeha, especially as they opened up routes for trade and access to technology and arms" (Kelsey, 1984, p. 22).

Maori people quickly adapted to using Pakeha technology such as ploughs, the written word, carts and other technologies that were introduced by the traders and missionaries, to improve their trading activities. The extent of Maori economic development into the late 1850's was described as follows;

Large areas of Waikato were cultivated for wheat, potatoes, maize and kumara. With missionary help the Waikato Maoris built and operated several flour mills. ... in 1858 in the Port of Auckland 53 small vessels were registered as being in native ownership and the annual total of native canoes entering the harbour was more than 1,700. At about that time the Waikato Maoris established their own trading bank. This was the golden age of Maori agriculture. (New Zealand
Although Maori economic activities were thriving, Pakeha settlers were hindered due to lack of access to land. Also, Maori tribal groups, by mobilising human resources communally, more effectively used the resources available to them, compared to Pakeha settlers.

In the early decades of the 1800’s, two trends influenced the way in which Maori-Pakeha relations developed. The first was land speculation, organized primarily by the New Zealand Company. This company favoured the colonisation of New Zealand and its inhabitants to acquire land to sell to British immigrants. As the British Crown had experienced the cost of failed colonies elsewhere, it resisted formal backing of such a venture. The Crown was also aware of the development of more humanitarian values in relation to indigenous peoples. In spite of the attitude of the British Crown, the New Zealand Company persisted in acquiring large tracts of land directly from Maori people. This resulted in a gradual deterioration in Maori-Pakeha relationships.

**The Treaty of Waitangi**

In the period prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi inter-ethnic relationships began to deteriorate. Reasons included; increasing numbers of Pakeha arriving in Aotearoa, Pakeha introducing alcohol to Maori communities, conflicting Maori and Pakeha conceptions of land ownership, and unruly behaviour on the part of Pakeha. Some Maori people took the opportunity to sign the Treaty of Waitangi, drawn up by the British Governor in 1840, with the intention of controlling negative developments initiated by Pakeha, and restore a balance to inter-ethnic relations.

British Crown interest in securing a treaty was influenced by the fact that treaties were formally recognised instruments used to acquire sovereignty over nation states. The act of treaty-making between indigenous peoples and colonists was not unique to Maori and Pakeha in Aotearoa. Britain, France and the United States had regularly negotiated treaties with indigenous peoples (Kingsbury, 1989). Treaties were also viewed as humanitarian and civilized methods of interacting with nation states. It was anticipated that, with the British Crown securing sovereignty over Aotearoa, the New Zealand Company would be forced to conform to British law and order.

The Treaty of Waitangi signed in 1840 was understood by Maori to guarantee a number of things, according to the Maori translation of the Treaty (reproduced in Yensen, Hague and McCreanor, 1989, Chapter 2). Firstly, that Maori people would cede 'Kawanatanga' (governorship) of Aotearoa to the British Queen. Secondly, that Maori would retain "the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures" (Yensen et al., 1989, p. 29) and in turn would "sell land to the Queen at a price agreed to by the person owning it and by the person buying it" (Yensen et al., p. 29). In signing the Treaty, Maori understood that they would receive from the Queen and her Government, protection and those "rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England" (Yensen et al., 1989, p. 29).

Maori understanding of what was intended in the Treaty of Waitangi is illustrated in a statement made by Nopera Panakareao. He said that, "the shadow of the land will go to him (the Governor) but the substance will remain with us." (cited in Ward, 1974, p. 38).

Although the issue of whether Maori ceded sovereignty to the British Crown is still a matter of debate, the present reality is that, having been subjected to the colonizing processes of British settlers, Maori people cannot exercise their sovereign rights over Aotearoa.

Since 1840, it has become evident that the intentions and understandings of Maori who signed the Treaty were not the same as those of British settlers. The Treaty was consistently broken by Pakeha land grabbers and undermined by legal processes that completely ignored the Treaty (National Council of Churches, 1987). For Maori people, violations of the Treaty have not been forgotten. These violations have served to inflame and complicate inter-ethnic relations between
Maori and Pakeha today.

Policies of assimilation and integration

During the period up to 1960 the practices of successive Pakeha governments have been marked by paternalism and prejudice. Assimilation was the dominant policy and the accompanying practices which involved monolingualism and monoculturalism were seen as appropriate and correct for New Zealand society by the majority of Pakeha (Walker, 1989).

In the 1960's Government policy towards Maori people was given a new label. It became one of "integration." A report published in 1962 by the Department of Maori Affairs set out policy for Maori-Pakeha relationships (Booth & Hunn, 1962). This report described the new policy of "integration" and some of the values and assumption underlying it.

... integration denotes a dynamic process by which Maori and pakeha are being drawn closer together, in the physical sense of the mingling of two populations as well as in the mental and cultural senses where differences are gradually diminishing. (Booth & Hunn, 1962, p. 2)

When it came to spelling out details about the new policy, it was clear that Maori people were expected to do most or all of the changing.

Like the individual, each Maori or mixed community is faced with conflict stemming from the differences between the Maori and the pakeha way of doing things. The community has to arrive at a solution by adapting Maori to pakeha ways and vice versa so that the optimum conditions may be provided for the people to live satisfying and successful lives. Most of the activities of the Department of Maori Affairs in housing, land settlement, and welfare are directed towards helping Maori, both individually and in their local groups, to make the necessary adjustments to their changed and changing environments. (Booth & Hunn, 1962, p. 8).

The contribution of Pakeha to the processes of change expected under the new policy was minimal.

The pakeha's minimum contribution to the process of integration is a willingness to accept Maoris as Maoris [sic], without expecting that they will conform entirely to his pakeha ways. (Booth & Hunn, 1962, p. 9)

The policy of integration set out in the report by Booth and Hunn was, in effect, assimilation under another name. Many of the assumptions underlying assimilation remained unchanged. For example, Maori people were expected to change to fit in with Pakeha ways of doing things. Pakeha were not expected to change very much, if at all.

Over time, the policies of assimilation and integration have become less reputable. These policies were clearly derived from ethnocentric views held by dominant Pakeha concerning the need for Maori people to change to suit Pakeha. Many Maori people have become more effective in asserting themselves and are refusing to accept that Maori lifestyles or practices are less desirable than Pakeha ones (Greenland, 1984; Walker, 1989). Some Pakeha are threatened by such assertiveness because of its perceived challenge to Pakeha dominance (Vasil, 1988).

The period of social protest: The 1970s and 1980s

During the 1970s and 1980s a number of events occurred which sparked debate about the nature of, and desirable patterns for, Maori-Pakeha relationships. These debates, through the media and other contexts, have led to changes in attitudes towards inter-ethnic relationships. Two notable topics of debate have been the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in developing more just and equitable relationships between Maori and Pakeha, and the extent to which Pakeha individuals
and social institutions have been guilty of racist practices which need to be acknowledged and changed. Some of these events are described in the following sections.

**Waitangi Day protests**

Even though protests at the annual Waitangi day celebrations had occurred previously, over the decade of the 1970s protest activity escalated steadily. The Waitangi Day celebrations, on 6 February each year, were seen by government as expressing its "commitment to the celebration of the Treaty of Waitangi as the cornerstone of nationhood" (Walker, 1990, p. 211). In 1973, the New Zealand Day Act changed "Waitangi Day" to "New Zealand Day" and made 6 February a public holiday with a view to increasing the "pomp and ceremony" of the occasion. Aggravated by this obvious display of "window dressing," protesters declared the 1973 New Zealand Day celebrations "a celebration of mourning" for the loss of Maori land (Walker, 1990, p. 211).

**The 1975 Land March**

In 1975, Whina Cooper, an elder from a northern Maori tribe, initiated and led a land march to Parliament to protest continuing loss of Maori lands. The march, which covered the length of the North island, began in Te Hapua, a small settlement in the far north, and ended at Parliament in Wellington. The core group of marchers comprised about 50 people. As the marchers moved through towns and cities, their numbers grew with local people providing support. During the march, participants were hosted overnight at 25 different marae. Discussions about the purpose of the march, land grievances and related issues were held. These discussions politicized local Maori communities which was perhaps the most significant impact of the land march.

In 1984, the hikoi (protest march) to Waitangi, was led by Eva Rickard who had fought successfully for the return of tribal land at Raglan, that had been taken from the local tribe by the Government during World War Two. The hikoi arose from a meeting called by the northern Maori tribes who were alarmed at the increase in protests and violence at the Waitangi Day celebrations (MacDonald, 1989). The northern tribes were keen to find a peaceful approach to treaty issues. The hikoi was planned as a peaceful approach to draw attention to Maori grievances. The purpose of the hikoi was summarized by MacDonald (1989);

> We seek radical changes in the policies affecting Maoris [sic]. All political parties should be aware that Maoridom is looking for a period of change and development, for the Maori people are no longer willing to remain marginal participants in New Zealand life. We seek genuine equality of treatment and equal access to the system. That is why we are marching to Waitangi. (p. 135)

Organisers and participants in the hikoi intended to present a document, containing submissions for change, to the New Zealand Governor-General (The British Queen's representative) who was to be present at Waitangi.

Although the presentation of a document to the Governor-General was one purpose for the hikoi, another purpose was to march in protest at the Waitangi Day celebrations with the intention of stopping the official part of the celebrations through pressure from large numbers of people (Walker, 1990).

As with the land march of 1975, the hikoi had the affect of unifying many of the respective factions in Maoridom in peaceful protest. The difference on this occasion was in the heterogeneous composition of protesters. A wide range of tribal groups were represented among participants in the hikoi, which included both elderly and young people, radicals and conservatives, church representatives and politicians. A significant coalition was formed between two of the oldest Maori political movements, Kotahitanga and Kingitanga. Participants in the hikoi did not easily fit the stereotypes of "radical, activist or deviant" portrayed by the media. The most respected people in Maoridom were present.
In 1984 the 3000 strong hikoi did not get to hand any documents to the Governor-General, nor did they get to stand on the Treaty grounds. Walker (1990) reported that although the Governor-General was prepared to meet with some representatives of the hikoi, this gesture was blocked by the police, who feared that the hikoi would not withdraw from the Treaty grounds after meeting with the Governor-General. Given the peaceful spirit of the hikoi, participants dispersed. Even though some short-term goals were not achieved, there were longer-term outcomes from the hikoi in the form of continuing meetings and discussions.

The He Taua incident

Since 1954, groups of Pakeha engineering students of Auckland University, had participated in traditional pre-capping festivities which involved the annual performance of a mock haka. A haka is a traditional dance of the Maori, of serious nature, performed primarily by men involving "expressive bodily gestures - such as foot stamping, exaggerated facial expression including protrusion of the tongue, and vigorous chanting" (Hazlehurst, 1988, p. 4).

The performance of the annual mock haka by the engineering students involved dressing in grass skirts (female attire for Pacific islanders), painting obscene sexual symbols on their bodies and chanting offensive phrases and gestures. One version reported by Auckland District Maori Council (1979, p. 15), of the chants performed by the engineering students, is as follows:

Ka Mate! Ka Mate!
(Translated as Death! Death! accompanied by stamping feet and slapping thighs)
Hori! Hori!
(Translated as a derogatory name for Maori, accompanied with left hand patting head, right hand simulating masturbation)
I got the pox (venereal disease) from Hori! Hori!

Ever since the first performance of the mock haka in 1954, individuals and groups from within the Maori and Polynesian communities, as well as Church and students groups, registered complaints objecting to the capping stunt. Complainants viewed the antics of the engineering students as culturally offensive, denigrating and insulting to Maori men and women, and to Pacific Islanders. The formal channels, to whom complaints were made, failed to take effective action to halt the increasingly offensive capping stunt. The general attitude prevalent among University authorities at that time was described as "...[they] appeared to consider it too trivial a matter to investigate or to use their powers to intervene" (Hazlehurst, 1988, p. 7).

In 1979, 25 years after the offensive capping stunt began, Maori and Polynesian protesters, who later called themselves He Taua confronted the engineering students at a dress rehearsal of their capping week stunt. (The term He Taua describes a hostile expedition which seeks redress of a wrong). Accounts of what actually happened during the confrontation are numerous. The account by Hazlehurst (1988) probably best describes what happened.

On the morning of 1 May (1979) ... a group of twenty to twenty-five young Maoris and Islanders (male and female) burst in on the engineering students during their rehearsal of the 'haka' in the common room of the Engineering Faculty at the University of Auckland. The protesters were said to have told the students that they were not to 'mock the Maoris' and that they were to stop their 'bastardization of the Maori culture'. ... they demanded that they take off their 'grass' skirts. The students, dressed mainly in raffia skirts, either gave the protesters the skirts or had them ripped off. Some blows were exchanged, and the main force of the attack evidently came from the intruding protesters. In less that ten minutes the raid was over and the intruders fled the building leaving many of the students with welts, bleeding noses, cuts, and bruises. Three of the students were more seriously injured. (p. 7)

From the time of the confrontation, the interpretation of events and attitudes of the press were absolutely damning of the actions of He Taua. The media focused on the acts of physical
violence, ignoring the 25 years of racist activities on the part of the engineering students. As a result of the incident, 11 people were arrested and faced 88 charges laid under the 1961 Crimes Act. Charges included "unlawful assembly" and "rioting." A mild sentence of 4 weeks periodic detention was imposed on the defendants. Following the conviction of the those charged, the Human Rights Commission launched an inquiry into the incident, which further led to a major national inquiry into Maori-Pakeha relationships. Some findings from the inquiry are discussed in the following section.

Two basic themes arose from submissions to the Human Rights Commission. The first view, which was assimilationist in outlook, maintained that the emphasis on race divided the nation and should be submerged within a single national identity. The second view was consistent with pluralism, arguing for recognition of ethnic diversity with each respective group accorded respect and a rightful place within the total society. The interpretations of the confrontation between the engineering students and protesters also varied.

Those writers who held an assimilationist outlook, ignored the culturally inappropriate behaviour of the engineering students and its effects on Maori and Pacific Islanders. Instead, writers attributed stereotypical labels to the protesters such as "Maori stirrers and agitators" who were bent on dividing New Zealand society. Writers supporting assimilation viewed the legal system in New Zealand as being the appropriate means for settling disputes among New Zealanders. Any expectation that the legal system should consider the cultural context of individuals was viewed as "ludicrous". The view that certain ethnic groups are accorded "special rights and privileges" was viewed as divisive, not promoting harmony or equality, and in the view of some, as promoting apartheid.

In contrast to the assimilationist view, the pluralistic view considered the repeated performance of the mock haka by the engineering students to be culturally insensitive and insulting, and a form of cultural violence. Although not condoned by these writers, the acts of physical violence towards the engineering students were viewed within the context of the culmination of 25 years worth of repeated denigration, and the ignoring of peaceful complaints made through appropriate channels. Furthermore, the justice system was criticized as the engineering students could not be held accountable for their perpetration of cultural violence. Writers believed that lack of accountability highlighted the monocultural nature of the justice system - it was created by Pakeha for Pakeha.

The enquiry by the Human Rights Commission highlighted a major ideological split amongst the people of New Zealand. The Race Relations Conciliator urged the wider public to acknowledge and address these issues to prevent further violence.

Underlying assumptions about Maori-Pakeha relationships

In the 1980s there has been increasing discussion about "race relations" in New Zealand (e.g., Fisher, 1984; Spoonley, Macpherson, Pearson and Sedgwick, 1984; Spoonley, Pearson and Macpherson, 1991; Vasil, 1988). Maori spokespeople have increasingly challenged the myth, accepted by many Pakeha, that inter-ethnic relations were primarily harmonious. During the 1980s debate has increasingly focused on the implications of the Treaty of Waitangi for inter-ethnic relations and the sharing of resources, held primarily by Pakeha, with Maori people (e.g., Kawharu, 1989). Understandings about Maori-Pakeha relationships need to be seen in the context of the dominance-subordinate relationship, which is common to ethnic relationships in many countries. Most Pakeha do not question the extent to which their complete control of all of the major political, economic and institutional systems allows them to dictate the nature and reality of relationships between Maori and Pakeha people. As part of this dominance, the nature of being Maori, and what constitutes "just" and appropriate treatment of Maori concerns are determined by Pakeha elites. In this section of the chapter a central assumption held by many Pakeha, and which influences their thinking about inter-ethnic relations in New Zealand, is
examined: the assumption that ethnicity means physical appearance or “race.”

Assumption of ethnicity as race

One of the assumptions held by many Pakeha about Maori-Pakeha differences is that such differences are primarily physical or “racial.” A number of Pakeha, some of whom profess to have egalitarian and anti-racist values, believe that to avoid ethnic conflict in New Zealand it is necessary to minimize or avoid reference to ethnicity or race, and implement assimilationist policies to reduce differences among ethnic groups. Two sources of information are used to illustrate the assumption that “ethnicity means race.” In the first, ways in which information about ethnicity is gathered and analyzed in the five-yearly New Zealand population census undertaken by the Department of Statistics is outlined. In the second, results from a survey on conceptions of ethnicity are described.

Ethnicity and the census survey

Every five years the Department of Statistics undertakes a census survey of the New Zealand population. In every census there is a question concerning each individual’s “ethnicity.” In the 1981 census, respondents were asked to provide their “Ethnic Origin,” which was described in the accompanying instructions as “… the blood mixture of races within a person.” (Brown, 1983). The most recent survey for which results have been published is the 1986 census. The question on ethnicity asked respondents “What is your ethnic origin?” The following categories were listed and respondents were asked to “tick the box or boxes which apply to you.” European, New Zealand Maori, Samoan, Cook Island Maori, Niuean, Tongan, Chinese, Indian, Other (such as Fijian, Tokelauan). (Source: Department of Statistics, 1988)

Several points are evident from the framing of this question. First, there is an elaboration of non-European groups and the category “European” is not elaborated. “European” is primarily a racial category. It does not correspond to a specific language or cultural group (cf. Thomas, 1986). People of Dutch, Yugoslav or other non-Anglo descent, or from other Anglo-dominant counties, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, are not clearly given the option of classifying themselves as distinct from Pakeha or Anglo-New Zealanders. Second, people of Pacific Island descent are given very specific categories for classifying their ethnicity. Census planners clearly have a primary interest in enumerating the numbers of the different types of Pacific islanders in New Zealand. While the Pacific Islands have been an important source of non-European migrants to New Zealand, they are not a major source in terms of numbers (Trlin, 1987, p. 216).

“Ethnic” groups of 10,000 or more, taken from the 1986 Census returns, are shown in Table 15.1. The relative proportions give the impression of a single European racial group, contrasted with a number of other non-European groups.
A contrasting perspective can be derived by listing proportions of the population by birthplace from the 1986 Census data. As shown in Table 15.2, there are a large group of people who are likely to identify themselves as English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish, based on the 7.83% of the population born in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Overseas-born Europeans constituted about 11% of the New Zealand population, a fact disguised by the way in which the question about ethnicity was asked and the ways in which the data were analyzed and reported by the Department of Statistics.

### Table 15.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>2,651,382</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>295,314</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori and European</td>
<td>94,884</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori and other non-European</td>
<td>7,302</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori and 2 other ethnic groups</td>
<td>6,384</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total reporting Maori ethnicity</strong></td>
<td><strong>404,775</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>50,196</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islander</td>
<td>33,973</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Pacific Island Polynesians</strong></td>
<td><strong>94,655</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>19,309</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>12,123</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of data: Department of Statistics (1988)

### Conceptions of ethnicity

A survey carried out by Thomas & Nikora (1991) investigated the characteristics associated with the terms “Maori” and “Pakeha” among New Zealand high school students. Among both Pakeha and Maori students the main characteristics associated with being Pakeha was skin colour (Pakeha 57%, Maori 51%), and culture, customs and lifestyle (33% and 15%). A considerable number of Pakeha respondents (28%) described being Pakeha as the absence of Maori.
characteristics, while 10% thought there were no differences between Maori and Pakeha. Among Maori people, 14% described some Pakeha as having antagonistic attitudes to Maori people.

In contrast to the similarities in their ideas about Pakeha ethnicity, Maori and Pakeha students showed very different responses in their conceptions of Maori ethnicity. Among Maori respondents, the most common attributes associated with being Maori were: culture, customs, lifestyle (71%) and Maori language (61%). Other attributes included skin colour and appearance (48%), accent (29%), descent (25%) and tribal and kin affiliations (20%). Among Pakeha respondents colour and appearance (49%) was most frequently used to describe Maori people, followed by culture, customs and lifestyle (35%), accent (28%), and language (17%).

The ways in which Maori and Pakeha respondents described Maori people showed differences in the degree of emphasis given to cultural and "racial" attributes. Maori students tended to define Maori ethnicity primarily in terms of cultural attributes whereas Pakeha students commonly defined Maori people in terms of their physical appearance. Similarly the collection of census data on ethnicity has emphasized racial criteria rather than conceptions of ethnicity based on self-identity or culture.

The strong pressures to assimilate to the Pakeha lifestyle, that Maori people have experienced are undoubtedly related to the lack of acknowledgement, among Pakeha, of the importance of Maori language and culture to Maori people. As a dominant group, most Pakeha do not seem to have a shared conception of a distinctive Pakeha culture or lifestyle. Thus it may be difficult for such Pakeha to accept the choice of Maori people to maintain their own distinctive culture and lifestyle, which is different from that of Pakeha people.

Development of a bicultural society

In the 1980s there have been changes in patterns of interaction among Maori and Pakeha people which are related to changed circumstances and especially to changes in attitudes, values and social policies. These changes can be seen as broadly reflecting decreasing acceptance of assimilationist policies and practices and greater acceptance of biculturalism in the functioning of social relationships and operation of institutions. The changes can be illustrated by describing a number of different perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi. The Treaty is now regarded by many Maori people, and a considerable number of Pakeha, as the framework within which the future course of Maori-Pakeha relationships in New Zealand must be negotiated.

A perspective which has historical links to the context in which the Treaty was originally signed, is that the Treaty initiated a "partnership" or power-sharing between Maori and Pakeha. Conceptions of partnership were evident from the time the Treaty was signed in the early 19th century. Social change strategies based on partnership have resulted in organisations that allow two major components, Maori and Pakeha, to develop autonomously yet come together to share resources, advocate common directions and causes, and lobby for funding.

Another perspective is an assimilationist one; that the Treaty is a nuisance, being a document that is not relevant to present-day life in New Zealand. Proponents of this view hold that all people in New Zealand have equal opportunities, and for Maori to keep harping back to a document that is outdated is a barrier to progress of not only the dominant group but for all other peoples whose "rightful" place should be to conform to the views of the dominant group. A major survey (Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988, p. 530) reported that only 44% of Pakeha considered that the Treaty should be honoured, in contrast to 78% of Maori respondents.

The assimilationist view is that most challenged by the other perspectives. Within a framework of cultural pluralism, the assimilationist view would be seen as counter-productive as a basis for negotiating Maori-Pakeha relationships as such a view denies the legitimacy and value of lifestyles other than that of the dominant Pakeha.
A further perspective is that Maori are the only rightful sovereign people within Aotearoa. All other peoples are present in Aotearoa, by the goodwill of Maori. Such a view links directly to Maori sovereignty rights being retained within the Treaty. As a social action strategy, this view was transformed into protest slogans such as "Pakeha go home!" or "this is Maori land!". The radical or activist campaign, related to these slogans, focused attention on fighting Pakeha domination and the continual ignoring of Maori grievances. Social action strategies embracing this perspective did not stop at slogans, but helped fuel protests related to the return of unjustly alienated Maori land and the 1981 Springbok Tour.

An alternative perspective, related somewhat to the previous one, is that "the Treaty is a fraud" as it does not fulfill the original expectations of Maori signatories or Maori people today. This perspective was the basis for protests designed to focus attention on the manipulative activities of Pakeha elites, and to call the government to account for its actions.

A further protest slogan has been that of "Honour the Treaty." This slogan was perhaps designed to encourage government agencies to engage in genuine processes of working towards agreeable outcomes. Given the more conservative nature of this movement, it may have arisen as a result of radical and conservative groups combining energies to achieve common goals.

More recently, references to the Treaty of Waitangi have gradually begun to appear in legislation such as the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the Environment Act 1986 and the Conservation Act 1987. Walker described this as a "remarkable elevation in the status of the Treaty in a few years from a 'simple nullity' to the level of a institutional instrument in the renegotiation of the relationship between Maori and Pakeha in modern times" (1990, pp. 265-266). From here springs the perspective of tribal entities being sovereign nations within their own right able to determine their own development, government, and direction. As a social action strategy, the Crown is forced to acknowledge, act and negotiate, not with a vaguely defined population dubbed "Maori" with its Pakeha-appointed spokespeople (such as the Minister of Maori Affairs and the Chairperson of the New Zealand Maori Council which are both positions created by the dominant Government), but with traditionally defined and organised tribal entities. Through the government having to deal with tribal organizations, which are the effective political units within Maori society, tribal groups are better able to represent themselves, their grievances and their needs.

In summary, Maori perspectives on the Treaty reflect the agenda-setting process that the Treaty performs in allowing Maori input into developing a bipartisan context for negotiation and mutual determination of the agenda for negotiation. Pakeha clearly have mixed views about the role of the Treaty as a framework for negotiating changes in Maori-Pakeha relationships.

**Strategies for social change**

A core aspect of creating more positive patterns of inter-ethnic relationships in New Zealand, is the need to move from relationships based on a dominant group-subordinate group pattern to those based on mutual respect and the right to self-determination. The policy option of biculturalism has been selected by the authors for detailed examination. Values related to biculturalism include, self-determination, empowerment and cultural pluralism. Understanding the processes of oppression, and individual and institutional racism are also important.

There are a number of reasons for New Zealand adopting a policy of biculturalism in relation to Maori and Pakeha. Some of these reasons are:

- Maori people are the tangata whenua of Aotearoa and their world view and cultural practices are linked directly to the environment of Aotearoa. Further alienation of the land and environment would have devastating results.
- Maori people, in common with indigenous peoples in other countries, have been submerged by a dominant colonial culture. They have suffered a great deal of oppression and constitute the most economically and socially disadvantaged ethnic group in the population. As such they
deserve the most assistance in reversing the negative impacts of previous oppressive policies. People identifying themselves as Maori in New Zealand comprise about 12% of the population and therefore have a much greater claim to resources on a population basis than other ethnic minorities. If the Treaty of Waitangi is accepted as a policy document guiding the implementation of biculturalism then the obligations arising from the Treaty need to be clarified and accepted. Maori language can only survive in New Zealand. Given its status as the indigenous language, and the official language of New Zealand, it must take priority over the teaching of other minority languages.

At the individual level, implementation of a policy of biculturalism would encourage people to learn Maori language and cultural patterns, in addition to English. Within organizations, special consideration would be given to removing or changing practices that were inappropriate for Maori people and allowing the use of Maori cultural patterns as part of the regular operation of organizations. At the institutional level, special planning for bicultural services would be required. For example in hospitals, health services would be set up which incorporated Maori health practices. Maori health units are already operating at some hospitals in New Zealand.

At the state or national level, several bicultural developments have already taken place. These are; the setting up of the Waitangi Tribunal to hear land grievances, establishing Maori as the official language of New Zealand, and developments in bicultural education such as the establishment of Kohanga Reo (Maori language pre-schools).

The Waitangi Tribunal

The Waitangi Tribunal was convened as a vehicle by which Maori grievances could be heard, inquire into claims made under the Treaty of Waitangi, and make recommendations to parliament. Issues that have been placed before the tribunal include land claims, grievances with regard loss of language, culture, hunting and rights, and access to fisheries. When the tribunal was first convened under the Waitangi Tribunal Act in 1975, it was limited to hearing only claims that arose after 1975.

The hikoi of 1984 assisted in politicizing Maori people and highlighting the inadequacy of a tribunal that was hamstrung in its attempts to consider Maori claims based on longer-term injustices. A hui (meeting) in September 1984, made recommendations to parliament to make the scope of the Waitangi Tribunal retrospective to 1840 and to provide the tribunal with sufficient resources to ensure that grievances were fully researched. In 1985, the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act, which incorporated key recommendations from the hui, was passed by parliament. Subsequently there was a dramatic increase in the number of claims put to the Tribunal. The changes incorporated in the new legislation increased Maori approval of the Tribunal (Walker, 1990).

Bilingual education

A study conducted by Benton (1979) that there was a continuing rapid decline in the number of people who were fluent in Maori language. Most of the fluent speakers were among the elderly. The response by Maori people to the potential death of their language, was to develop the Kohanga Reo Maori language pre-schools. Kohanga Reo is run by native speakers of the language with the aim of making every Maori child bilingual by the age of five.

The first Kohanga Reo was established in 1981. By the end of 1983 there were 188 Kohanga Reo in operation and by 1988 the number had increased to 521. In 1991, children who had attended Kohanga Reo since its inception were now aged 13 and in their first year of high school. Although there is no research available on the progress of these Kohanga Reo children, the impact of Kohanga Reo highlights the struggle to develop opportunities for children to learn Maori throughout the school system.
One of the effects of Kohanga Reo was families. Parents strove to develop more fluency in Maori language in order to support the child at home. Parents also became more politically active through involvement in managing Kohanga Reo and generally in seeking more culturally appropriate education for their children. A major issue after their children left Kohanga Reo for primary school, was the lack of Maori language programmes in primary schools in New Zealand. Some parents kept their children in Kohanga Reo until they were six. Another strategy was to place pressure on local schools to make appropriate changes to accommodate Kohanga Reo children through continuing Maori language programmes.

Since the early 1980s there has been gradual development of bicultural policies and practices which recognize the rights of Maori communities to have access to education which is culturally appropriate for Maori people. In the early 1980’s a few schools in New Zealand were granted approval by the central government Department of Education to set up bilingual programmes of instruction in English and Maori. Some of these schools, which were in predominantly Maori communities, had been trying for many years to gain bilingual status. They had been consistently denied approval because of the prevailing assimilationist and integrationist educational policies which did not recognize the legitimacy of using Maori language as a language of instruction. In 1988 the Hamilton Education Board was still denying state schools the right to teach in Maori and English, even where over 85% of parents supported bilingual teaching. In the early 1990s increasing numbers of schools, which provide Maori language immersion programmes with culturally appropriate teaching practices, are being set up by Maori parents.

Roles for psychologists in the process of social change

There are a number of appropriate roles for psychologists and other social scientists in the social change process. Three roles mentioned in the previous chapter are relevant to the development of biculturalism in New Zealand; agenda-setting, facilitating the development of services appropriate for a bicultural society, and evaluation of policy formulation and implementation.

In terms of agenda-setting, psychologists can play a role in ensuring that biculturalism continues to be part of social and political agendas for change. This can include educating fellow psychologists, human service organizations and the general public about the benefits which bicultural policies and practices provide and the continuing problems created for both Maori and Pakeha people by assimilationist practices.

Procedures for facilitating the development of services for a bicultural society include empowering Maori people to take control of those processes that they are ready to control. For example, social welfare services have adopted bicultural policies and have been referring clients to Maori service providers, but have not made equitable resources available to these service providers. Community psychologists could act as negotiators between tribal organizations and representatives of government services to ensure that Maori wishes are heard and acted upon in ways determined by Maori people.

The evaluation of policy formulation and implementation requires ongoing involvement of applied psychologists in the policy-making process, and the use of conceptual and information-gathering skills in the evaluation of policy implementation (see Chapter 2). There are still many policies that impede moves by Maori communities towards self-determination. These need to be identified and changed through facilitating the participation of Maori tribal groups in policy-making and implementation processes.

In summary, applied psychologists could use their skills to support Maori communities in their quest for greater self-determination, and to ensure that the reality of Maori-Pakeha relationships is consistent with the ideology of a democratic society. Although steps have been taken to redress the position of Maori people, much still needs to be done.
References


