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Making Sense of the Census:
Classifying and Counting Ethnicity in Oceania, 1965-2011

A thesis
submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree
of
Master of Social Sciences in Demography
at
The University of Waikato
by
PATRICK BROMAN

2013
So vast, so fabulously varied a scatter of islands, nations, cultures, mythologies and myths, so dazzling a creature, Oceania deserves more than an attempt at mundane fact; only the imagination in free flight can hope—if not to contain her—to grasp some of her shape, plumage, and pain. I will not pretend that I know her in all her manifestations. No one—not even our gods—ever did; no one does (UNESCO ‘experts and consultants’ included); no one ever will because whenever we think we have captured her she has already assumed new guises—the love affair is endless, even her vital statistics, as it were, will change endlessly.

- Albert Wendt, *Towards a New Oceania*, 1976

Modern states are statistical states.

– Marc Ventresca, 2002
Abstract

As the flagship government effort to count and classify its population, censuses are a key site for rendering and making visible group boundaries. Despite claims to objective rationality, however, census taking is a political and inherently subjective exercise. Censuses help shape the very categories they claim to capture: censuses do more than reflect social reality, they also participate in the social construction of this reality (Kertzer and Arel, 2002b, p. 2). While ethnicity – as a social construct – is imagined, its effects are far from imaginary, and census categorisations may have significant material consequences for the lives of citizens.

Although an increasing number of studies have examined how and why governments in particular times or places count their populations by ethnicity, studies that are both cross-national and longitudinal are rare. Attempting to in part bridge this gap, this thesis studies census questionnaires from 1965 to 2011 for 24 the countries in Oceania. In doing so, it explores three general questions: 1) how ethnicity is conceptualised and categorised in Oceanic censuses over time; 2) the relationship between ethnic counting in territories to that of their metropoles; and 3) Oceanic approaches towards multiple ethnic identities. Spread over an area of thirty million square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean, Oceania provides an interesting context to study ethnic counting. The countries and territories which make up the region present an enormous diversity in physical geography and culture, languages and social organization, size and resource endowment. As the last region in the world to decolonise, Oceania includes a mix of dependencies and sovereign states.

The study finds that engagement with ethnic classification and counting is near-ubiquitous across the time period, with most countries having done so in all five cross-sectional census rounds. In general terms, in ethnic census questions
‘racial’ terminology of race and ancestry has been displaced over the focal period by ‘ethnic’ terminology of ethnicity and ethnic origin. Overall, the concept of ethnic origins predominates, although interestingly it is paired with race in the US territories, reflecting the ongoing social and political salience of race in the metropole. With respect to ethnic categories provided on census forms (and thus imbued with the legitimacy of explicit state recognition) the study finds a shift away from the imagined and flawed Melanesian/Micronesian/Polynesian racial typology and other colonial impositions to more localised and self-identified Pacific identities. It is theorised that these shifts are emblematic of broader global changes in the impetuses for ethnic counting, from colonially-influenced ‘top down’ counting serving exclusionary ends to more inclusive, ‘bottom up’ approaches motivated by concerns for minority rights and inclusive policy-making.
Acknowledgements

Utmost thanks must first be extended to Dr Tahu Kukutai, whose knowledge, guidance and support throughout the research process has been outstanding. Financial support provided by the Marsden Fund of the Royal Society of New Zealand and the administrative and institutional support of the superb National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis (NIDEA) at the University of Waikato have been indispensable.

To probably a worrying degree, this thesis has been researched and written ‘between drinks’. For generally keeping me sane during the process, I have a wonderful group of friends to thank. Jemma Campbell, Cassandra Blue, Hannah Johnston, Nikki Renowden and Jordyn Wilson deserve particular recognition for their friendship and support over the period this thesis was written.

Finally, I must extend a special thank you to my parents, David and Catherine Broman, for their endless encouragement and support (not only monetary!) during this process.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION

Of the many categorising tools at the disposal of the state, censuses are the most visible, the most politically contested, and, in terms of their social implications, the most significant (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a). While census-taking has traditionally been viewed simply as a process of statistically recording an objective reality, or at least as an impartial, detached representation of a socially-constructed and subjective ‘truth’, in recent years scholars from a range of disciplinary perspectives have begun to more critically examine the process, and the categorisation it records. A number of studies have examined the varied motivations for, and the implications of, the counting and classification of population by ethnicity (see, for example, Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; Nobles, 2000, 2002; Rodríguez, 2000; Hochschild & Powell, 2008).

Most modern states collect data which categorises the resident populace in this way, whether based on notions of race, ethnicity or national origin (see Morning, 2008). These categories are taken as expressing the identity and cultural affiliations of the population, and provide the data for quantitative assessment of a nation’s ethno-cultural diversity. Ethnic data is further useful for policy development and planning, for managing and evaluating programmes and for monitoring development against a broad array of social indicators, including access to employment, education, social security and health, especially for traditionally marginalised groups. Ethnic data plays an indispensable role in ensuring equitable allocation of national funds and services (Simon, 2005; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008).
Many scholars have focused attention on these various forms of cultural distinctions and categorisations countries have applied to their populace - what may be termed ethnocultural enumeration. Almost without exception, these scholars have undertaken case-study analyses of one or two countries.¹ Principally, these studies have shown how census-taking is an inherently political process, and never more so than when dividing national populations into group identities. Far from the neutral and objective instruments of scientific enquiry censuses are often presented as being, censuses both reflect and help shape a nation’s social and political order.² They provide a means for the state to ‘divide, count, mark, and erase’, where prevailing (and intrinsically political) views on race and ethnicity are expressed and state anxieties articulated (Wanhalla, 2010). Moreover, these studies have suggested that the identity categories which censuses recognise are state-enshrined and hence legitimised, and so censuses have important implications for shaping people’s own subjective identities and sense of self. In this way, processes of census enumeration both shape and are shaped by wider society (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b).

Incorporating and extending these findings, this thesis adopts a relatively rare supranational and quantitative approach to study ethno-cultural enumeration in censuses, focussing on ethnic enumeration practice in one particular region - Oceania³ - over the period 1965-2012. To do so, the thesis extends upon a global dataset recently collated as part of the Ethnicity Counts? project, funded by the Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden Fund (PI: Tahu Kukutai). This project provides a centralised repository of census ethnicity questions and response options for the past three census rounds, covering the period 1985 to 2013, along with various economic, social and political indicators. This dataset provides a unique and unprecedented opportunity to examine how ethnic enumeration in

¹ For example, Kertzer & Arel (2002a); Nobles (2000); Blum (2002); Hochschild & Powell (2008); Rodríguez (2000).
² In this respect modern demography seems every bit as much the ‘Politikal Arithmetik’ Sir William Petty described the infant discipline as in the seventeenth century (Pool, 1991, p. 11).
³ The terms Oceania and the Pacific are used interchangeably throughout this thesis and refer to the island countries of the South Pacific including Australia and New Zealand.
the national censuses of countries worldwide has changed over time. In the context of Oceania, the dataset allows for a comprehensive investigation of practices as they relate to colonialism, given that the beginning of the dataset coincides with the beginning of post-war Oceanic decolonisation. While political independence in the Pacific began as a gradual process in Australia and New Zealand, beginning as early as the nineteenth century, Western Samoa was the first of the smaller island nations to gain independence, in 1962 (Campbell, 2011). Oceania also provides an ideal site for such an investigation, with a mixture of dependent territories and independent states with various constitutional arrangements; various past and present colonial metropoles; and interesting sub-regional dynamics tied to colonialism, such as the economic gulf between affluent and developed settler-colonial Australia and New Zealand and the developing countries elsewhere in the region.

Other differences in national socio-economic, demographic, linguistic and political profiles render Oceania a rich environment in which to examine regional patterns of ethnic enumeration. Morning (2008), in one of the few studies examining enumeration on a supranational scale, suggests that her findings of clear regional patterns in countries which count by ethnicity and how they do so, provides merely a starting point for further work in this area. For instance, her findings around the type of ethnic nomenclature countries use (such as how questions related to ‘race’ are in the modern era almost exclusively the preserve of nations with a modern history of slavery) suggest that social, political and historical organisation results in specific ethnic terminology. She argues that further exploration of these relationships should be pursued, but notes that this would require the further consideration of historical, social, economic and political factors infeasible at a global scale. Such research on a regional scale, Morning argues, combining both breadth and depth of knowledge, would provide “real theoretical reward” in this area (Morning, 2008, p. 265). Oceania’s vast diversity and rich history makes it an excellent region for this kind of study.
This thesis adopts a constructivist understanding of ethnicity (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007), which holds that ethnic groupings do not correspond to any innate patterns of human variation; instead they are “constructed” through social processes that take place in particular historical, political and economic contexts. A historical or comparative perspective reveals that ethnic boundaries are fluid and can be based on varied criteria (Barth, 1969). Census classifications of ethnicity may therefore be somewhat arbitrary, but they are never accidental. The official selection of particular classifications and categorisations of ethnicity are a reflection of the nature of ethnic relations in a given country, of the dominant ideology, and of the local political economy (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; Nobles, 2000; Morning & Sabbagh, 2005). This study is premised on the theoretical assumption that the meaning and measurement of ethnicity has in Oceania over the focal period has changed alongside shifts in the local political economy tied to processes of decolonisation. Constructivism recognises the importance of political and economic structures on the ways in which ethnic populations are defined and structured (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). In Oceania, groupings and ideologies of race were effectively ‘created’ by colonial powers, establishing a local hierarchy to justify the political dominance and economic exploitation of colonialism. Colonial censuses helped build and support such hierarchies – acting to establish the position of local populations as ‘Others’ (in the terminology of post-colonial theorist Edward Said) and producing and stabilising colonial dominance. Given that political independence would negate these motivations, decolonisation may have prompted a local shift in the meaning and measurement of ethnicity. This thesis explores how ethnic enumeration has changed in Oceania over the decolonising period to the present, and considers how these changes are related to shifts in the regional political economy.

This introductory chapter outlines the specific scope of this thesis, given the ambiguity of key terms such as ethnicity, and the relatively broad cross-national demographic of the study. A broad consideration of census-taking in the modern era serves to historically contextualise the study, while a general description of
the Oceanic region does the same geographically. An outline of the thesis structure is also provided, followed by a discussion of the academic contribution of this study.

1.2 SCOPE

The main area of enquiry of this thesis lies in investigating historical patterns of census\(^4\) ethnic enumeration in Oceania from 1965. Adopting a comparative analysis of census questionnaires, it seeks to explore local patterns and their influences, consider the underexplored relationship between political independence and ethnic counting, and relate findings to the study of ethnic enumeration more generally. The focus is limited to a study of Oceania, given its unique status as the last region in the world to undergo the (incomplete) process of decolonisation in its non-settler colonies\(^5\). The study is narrowed to the censuses taken between 1965 and 2011, which corresponds with the primary period of Pacific decolonisation (Campbell, 2011). This section outlines further the specific scope of this study.

The Statistical Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008) has noted how countries collect data about the ethnic and cultural identities of their populations in different ways and for different reasons, and that no internationally relevant criteria or classification can therefore be recommended. This is a reflection of the heterogeneous ways in which the

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\(^4\) The dataset also includes population registration forms for several countries (predominantly in Europe) which maintain on-going population registers as an alternative to a nationally administered census, although this approach has yet been adopted in Oceania. Detailed information about the dataset used and its collation are included in Chapter four.

\(^5\) Settler colonialism is recognised as a unique form of colonial phenomena where colonial outsiders come to settle and establish territorialised sovereign political orders rather than simply obtain colonial control of resources (Pearson, 2001). In terms of Oceania, it is common to distinguish between the ‘colonies of settlement’ of Australia and New Zealand (and to a lesser extent, New Caledonia, sometimes cited as the only other French settler colony after Algeria) and the ‘colonies of exploitation’ of the tropical South Pacific. These differing patterns of colonialism mean that the populations of Australia and New Zealand are dominated by the European descendants of colonial emigrants, and that these countries are the only truly industrialised nations of the region (Veracini, 2007; Aldrich & Connell, 1998).
concept of ethnicity, in its broadest sense,\(^6\) is understood or applied. In recognition of this opacity and the absence of an international standard to measure the ethnic characteristics of a population, the UN lists a wide range of concepts which may be used to identify ethnic groups. These include ethnic nationality (country or area of origin as distinct from citizenship or country of legal nationality), race, colour, language, religion, customs of dress or eating, tribe or various combinations of these characteristics (United Nations Statistical Division, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, these terms may have differing connotations within different countries and at different points in time. As Morning (2008, p. 240) has noted: “what is called ‘race’ in one country might be labelled ‘ethnicity’ in another, while ‘nationality’ means ‘ancestry’ in some contexts and ‘citizenship’ in others. Even within the same country, one term can take on several connotations, or several terms may be used interchangeably.”

Given these methodological and conceptual differences in approaches worldwide, this thesis adopts a similar approach to that taken by Morning (2008), in treating any of the differing underlying concepts that countries use when measuring intranational cultural difference as measurements of ethnicity, and thus a form of ethnic enumeration. This position will be validated further in the following chapter, but it essentially considers the varied terms and concepts measuring such difference all in some way convey a common connotation: that of common ancestry or descent (Morning, 2008; Hollinger, 1998). While the specific markers of each term (physical characteristics for ‘race’, geographic location of ancestors for ‘nationality’, or cultural practices or beliefs for ‘ethnicity’, for example) may differ, all are ultimately manifestations of this single broad concept: a group-based identity based upon shared or common origins. As such, any of these (or various other) terms signifying such origin-based

\(^6\) The term ‘ethnicity’ is of central importance to this study and will be discussed in depth in Chapter two. The term essentially signifies a Gesellschaft-level group of people who share the same culture, origins, ancestry, race or so on, and identify themselves with this particular group.
'groupness' (Morning, 2008, p. 243), if incorporated in a census question, are included in this study as constituting a form of ethnic enumeration.\footnote{Excluded, however, are questions which are clearly intended to determine citizenship-type ties to the state, what we may term 'civic-legal nationality'. These individually-held, administrative and official ties can be clearly differentiated from the various forms of collective ethno-cultural affiliations based on ancestry which we are concerned with here – described as ethnic nationality (Kellas, 1998, pp. 65-88).}

It is also important to note here what is meant by the terms nation, state and country. These terms are typically used synonymously, although they denote different things. Kellas (1998) labels a nation as a group of people who feel themselves bound together by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry. A state, however, is a self-governing political entity, which often comprises citizens predominately from one nation as a ‘nation-state’, although states may also be multinational (e.g. Canada and Belgium), while some nations are stateless (e.g. the Kurdish nation of the Middle East). A country is a specific territorial area with defined and recognised boundaries. A nation, therefore, is primarily a social entity, a state a political entity, and a country a geographic entity. All three may, although not necessarily, overlap as a ‘nation-state’. The population universe for the dataset used in this study is every country of the world listed by the United Nations Statistical Division as having completed a census during the time period considered. It includes independent states, as well as non-sovereign dependencies, territories, and overseas departments (United Nations, 2003).

This study is limited in scope to the countries of the Oceanic region. This narrowed geographic focus both provides for a more manageable study scope. Moreover, a comparative and systematic empirical analysis of substantive patterns of similarity or difference in ethnic enumerative approaches within an entire region is lacking in the current literature (see Morning, 2008). A regional focus also allows for the consolidation and strengthening of knowledge in the ethnic enumeration area of research, which has been somewhat ad hoc and fragmented, having almost exclusively limited its analytical focus to the level of individual countries (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; Nobles, 2000, 2002; Blum, 2002;
Hochschild & Powell, 2008; Rodríguez, 2000). Oceania’s unique status as the final region in the world to decolonise (Lee, 2009) and its widely-acknowledged importance in the development of colonial logics of race (Douglas & Ballard, 2008; Anderson, 2009), make the region a particularly interesting region to study ethnic enumeration, particularly in the context of decolonisation. Moreover, the regional focus of this study allows census agencies and users to evaluate local ethnic enumerative practices within a wider regional context.

The study scope is also limited temporally, with the dataset used comprising census questionnaires from the 1970 to the 2000 census rounds dating from 1965 to 2012. The term census round is used by the United Nations and denotes ten-year periods, so that the 1970 round includes censuses carried out between 1965 and 1974, while the 2000 round spans 1995 to 2004 (United Nations Statistical Division, 2003). The United Nations recommends countries conduct a census at least once within each round (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008). To capture contemporary developments, data from censuses carried out in the 2010 round up until the end of 2011 are also included in the dataset underpinning this study. The study therefore examines census practices of ethnic enumeration in the 46-year period between 1965 and 2012. Such a lengthy temporal focus is rare in existing census scholarship, so that the cross-national, longitudinal nature of this study is somewhat unique.

Census-taking has been near universal in Oceania in recent years, with most classifying and counting by ethnicity (Morning, 2008; Haberkorn, 2004). The ethnic nomenclature adopted and the response categories offered constitute the key variables of interest for this study. In examining this counting in depth, the study seeks to address three key research questions:

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8 Ethnicity in the region may itself be considered a colonial construct, given Linnekin and Poyer’s (1990) findings suggesting that pre-European Pacific identities were non-ethnic, “emphasising context, situation, performance, and place over biological descent” (p. 11).
1. What, if any, patterns may be observed in approaches to ethnic counting in the censuses of Oceania over the focal period (1965 to 2011)?

2. What is the relationship between ethnic counting practices in Oceanic dependencies and their colonial metropoles?

3. Given the importance of discourses of ‘miscegenation’ and ‘racial mixing’ in the historical trajectory of colonialism in Oceania, how have countries approached the measurement of multiple ethnic identities across this decolonising period?

While these are substantive questions, the foregoing section has noted some of the many conceptual and methodological issues which underlie them. These are further explored and resolved as necessary in the following sections and chapters.

1.2.1 Oceania: An Overview

Having addressed the scope of this thesis, it is useful to give a brief overview of the geographic context in which this study is embedded. This section briefly outlines some of the key political, economic, and cultural features of Oceania. A more detailed account is provided in Chapter three.
There is no singular perspective as to what constitutes the region of Oceania. Definitions range from the entire insular region between Asia and the Americas, including the sub-regions of Malaysia, Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia (D’urville, 1832); to a much narrower entity made up of the relatively small coral atolls and volcanic islands of the South Pacific, and excluding ‘continental’ Australia and New Zealand (see Rallu, 2010). This study adopts the geopolitical conception used by the United Nations and other official bodies, which includes Australia, New Zealand and the island countries of the Pacific from Papua New Guinea east, but not the Malay Archipelago or Indonesian New Guinea, which are usually considered geopolitically as part of Asia. The islands at the geographic extremes of the Pacific, although ethnologically (in term of their indigenous populations) and biogeographically Oceanic, are politically integrated into countries from neighbouring regions, and as such are also excluded from geopolitical Oceania by the United Nations and most other sources. They include the state of Hawai‘i incorporated into the USA, Rapa Nui/Easter Island of Chile, and the Galapagos Islands of Ecuador in the eastern Pacific, as well as the
western Pacific islands of Japan and the Aleutian Islands of the far northern Pacific, which are divided between the USA and Russia.

If the relatively inconsequential Pitcairn Island, a British overseas dependency with fewer than 100 inhabitants is excluded, Oceania comprises the twenty-four island countries of the Pacific Ocean shown in Figure 1.1 above, including New Zealand and Australia, plus Norfolk Island, which is administratively part of Australia but enumerates its population separately. Figure 1.1 shows the four sub-regions of Oceania, as applied by the United Nations Statistical Division (2012). Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia are island groupings which correspond with the ethno-linguistic regional classification of French explorer Dumont d'Urville (1832), while Australia and New Zealand are usually considered separately owing to their relatively high levels of development and unique status as settler-states.\(^9\)

While colonial processes and attitudes are implicated in the ethno-cultural basis of d'Urville's sub-regions, geographically they do display distinct characteristics, and broader demographic differences between them are appropriate to outline as a background to this study. The following information is taken from French demographer Jean-Louis Rallu’s excellent demographic summary of the region (Rallu, 2010), and the Central Intelligence Agency’s *World Factbook* (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).

Except Australia, considered as a continent in its own right, Oceania is composed of volcanic high islands and of low-lying atolls, some of which are uplifted coral reefs. Kiribati and the Marshall Islands (in Micronesia) and Tuvalu and Tokelau (in Polynesia) are entirely made up of atolls. The other island countries are comprised mainly of volcanic high islands. Melanesia, the westernmost sub-region, contains the largest and most resource-rich volcanic islands, while the countries of Micronesia and Polynesia are made up of smaller islands, in most

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\(^9\) Although Māori, the indigenous population of New Zealand, are one of the major Polynesian cultures, with Aotearoa/New Zealand, along with Hawai‘i and Rapa Nui (also not included in the United Nations list of Polynesian territories due to political incorporation with the United States and Chile, respectively) making up the ‘Polynesian Triangle’ demarcating the four corners of ‘ethnological’ Polynesia (Campbell, 2011).
cases separated by large distances. Only Guam and Nauru (Micronesia), and Niue (Polynesia) comprise a single island. Territory sizes range from the 462,000 square kilometres of Papua New Guinea to the 12 square kilometres of Tokelau (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). With 34.9 million inhabitants at mid-2008, Oceania is the least populated geopolitical region of the planet. If Australia and New Zealand are excluded, the Pacific Islands have 9.6 million inhabitants – of these, Melanesia represents 87 percent of the total while Micronesia makes up 6 percent and Polynesia 7 percent (Rallu, 2010). With much larger islands, Melanesia has the lowest population densities, while the small islands and atolls of Polynesia and Micronesia, even with their low populations, often have extremely high densities, some above 300 inhabitants per square kilometre (Rallu, 2010, p. 14).

Aside from the high level of geographic diversity between the sub-regions of Oceania, there is also a wide range of political diversity, as shown in Figure 1.1. By the end of the 19th Century, every inhabited island of the region had been effectively colonised by an external colonial power (Campbell, 2011). With the exception of settler-colonial Australia and New Zealand, which soon attained their own colonies, these colonial relationships were to persist until the global wave of post-war decolonisation saw Western Samoa the first ‘managerial’ colony to declare independence in 1962. Decolonisation in the Pacific, the last region in the world to begin the process, remains incomplete. Today, the twenty-four countries of the region include sixteen which are independent: Australia and New Zealand; the Melanesian countries of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau and Nauru in Micronesia; and Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, the Cook Islands, and Niue in Polynesia. Of these, five countries - the Cook Islands, Niue, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau are self-governing, though they maintain relationships of free-association with former
colonial powers.\textsuperscript{10} Table 1.1 shows the land area, population, and the previous sovereign powers of these sixteen independent Oceanic nations. Note that with the most recent changes in the imperial order occurring in Oceania in the aftermath of World War Two, the colonial power as at 1946 is given here as most relevant for this work, under the assumption that any lingering influence into the post-colonial order of these countries will mostly be held by the most recent colonial power.

Table 1.1: Independent Oceania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Land area (sq. km.)</th>
<th>Population (2012 est.)</th>
<th>1946 colonial power &amp; year of independence\textsuperscript{11}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7,741,220</td>
<td>22,015,576</td>
<td>Britain 1850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>267,710</td>
<td>4,327,944</td>
<td>Britain 1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Melanesia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>462,840</td>
<td>6,310,129</td>
<td>Australia 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>28,896</td>
<td>584,578</td>
<td>Britain 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>18,274</td>
<td>890,057</td>
<td>Britain 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>12,189</td>
<td>256,155</td>
<td>Britain/France 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polynesia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>2,831</td>
<td>194,320</td>
<td>New Zealand 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>106,146</td>
<td>Britain 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>1,269</td>
<td>New Zealand 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>10,777</td>
<td>New Zealand 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10,619</td>
<td>Britain 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micronesia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>101,998</td>
<td>Britain 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States Micronesia\textsuperscript{12}</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>106,487</td>
<td>USA 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau\textsuperscript{12}</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>21,032</td>
<td>USA 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands\textsuperscript{12}</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>68,480</td>
<td>USA 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9,378</td>
<td>Aust./Britain 1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from CIA World Factbook (2012)

\textsuperscript{10} Such arrangements mean these countries are independent and sovereign, and recognised as such, but with various powers (of foreign affairs or defence, for example) retained by the former metropole under bilateral agreement (Aldrich & Connell, 1998).

\textsuperscript{11} Many countries in the region have complex imperial histories, with the islands now making up the Marshall Islands, for example, having been first claimed by the Spanish in 1874, were ‘sold’ to Germany in 1884 then occupied by British-allied Japan during WW1, before being invaded and occupied by the United States in 1944, whereupon they became the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands until 1986 (Campbell, 2011).

\textsuperscript{12} The Micronesian countries currently known as the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Palau were from 1946 collectively administered by the United States as the vast Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) until the territory’s dissolution in 1986. Standardised censuses were used in these territories during this period.
The remaining eight non-independent territories are made up of the French territories of New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia; the New Zealand territory of Tokelau and Australian territory of Norfolk Island, and the United States’ dependencies of American Samoa, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. Table 1.2 details these eight territories and dependencies.

Table 1.2: Non-Independent Oceania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Land area (sq. km.)</th>
<th>Population (2012 est.)</th>
<th>Colonial power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Melanesia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>18,575</td>
<td>260,166</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polynesia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>4,167</td>
<td>274,512</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>54,947</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis and Futuna</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>15,453</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk Island</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokelau</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micronesia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>159,914</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Mariana Islands(^{12})</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>51,395</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from CIA World Factbook (2012)

As these tables suggest, the countries of Oceania display considerable heterogeneity. There are political differences, with a mix of dependencies and sovereign states and diverse governance arrangements. There are vast differences in physical size, from Australia - considered a continent in its own right at 7,741,220 sq. km, to Tokelau, an archipelago of three small atolls totalling 12 square km (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). Population size also varies considerably, from Australia’s 22 million-plus inhabitants to fewer than 1,300 in Niue. Significant cultural differences, even within the broad categorisations of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia, are not represented in the tables. Neither are the substantially differing socio-economic profiles between the twenty-four countries. Rallu (2010) identifies Australia and New Zealand as the only truly industrialised countries in the region. Of the smaller PICTs (Pacific Island Countries and Territories), he argues that the remaining politically dependent territories are those where economic conditions are most
favourable, although typically heavily dependent on disbursements from the metropolitan countries. The independent island nations of the Pacific have generally low levels of development and limited prospects for growth, given their limited resources and geographic isolation. Of these, the countries of Melanesia, with larger and more resource-rich and with comparatively higher populations, have the most promising opportunities for economic growth, but they are often politically unstable and lack capital for successfully developing their natural resources (Rallu, 2010). In recent decades, many PICTs have experienced substantial emigration to metropolitan fringe states, mainly the USA, New Zealand and Australia, and remittances are a central part of many island economies (Connell & Brown, 2005). A more extensive discussion of Oceania as the setting of this study is provided in Chapter three.

1.3 CENSUSES AND ETHNICITY: A BACKGROUND

A short history of census-taking and its motivations

Having introduced the geographic location of this study, the key focus of this study, censuses and ethnic enumeration, are now considered. A ‘census’ refers to the systematic acquiring of demographic, economic and social information pertaining, at a specified time, to all persons in a given population. Some limited and local examples of such population counts have occurred throughout recorded history - in China as early as c. 3000 BC, Egypt c. 2500 BC, and England’s famous Domesday Book of 1068. In the modern day, census refers almost exclusively to the regularly occurring official population counts of particular nations and territories undertaken by nation-state governments (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). The oldest continuously occurring such example ostensibly dates to 1790, when the United States of America carried out the first full, state-sponsored enumeration of its population, though censuses in the modern sense were carried out elsewhere still earlier. Such counts had become a defining feature of the modern state by the late 19th century, according to Kertzer & Arel (2002b, p. 7), with most European states and their ‘New World’ colonial possessions having conducted their first census by the year 1900.
Today, most countries and territories conduct population and household censuses at regular intervals. In principle, the exercise entails “canvassing the entire country, reaching every single household and collecting information on all individuals and on a broad range of topics within a brief stipulated period” (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008, p. 1). As such it is a massive operation, among the most complex, expensive and substantial undertakings governments undertake in peacetime. While earlier population counts were designed for a specialised purpose, such as taxation or conscription (often including only male citizens or the property-owning classes), modern censuses are motivated primarily by a scientific desire to know population dynamics in order to make recognisable and improve society (Ventresca, 2003). Indeed, the term statistics originally pertained solely to the information collected by and for nation-states, having its origins in the Italian word for ‘state’ (Anderson, 1988, p. 6). The nineteenth century development of both the modern nation-state and official statistics are intertwined, part of what Jürgen Habermas (1983) has termed the ‘project of modernity’. The antecedents of the intellectual and cultural movement of modernity included the Industrial Revolution and the invention and spread of the printed word. Characteristic notions and tendencies of the modern era include heightened rationalisation, the development of the modern nation-state and its constituent institutions, and the formal establishment of ‘social science’ as a field of enquiry (Giddens, 1991).

As states in the modern sense came into being during the nineteenth century (which several scholars, notably Gellner (1983), argue is itself a consequence of modernity) they predicated the emergence of a new discourse of nationalism and motivated new conceptualisations of national belonging, along either legal or cultural criterions. Leaders of recently-formed nations, typically with relatively heterogeneous populations, saw censuses as a means of demarcating and

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13 “From the early nineteenth century, state-organized and conducted census activity evidences a self-conscious modern administrative intent to simply ‘know’ about a population, as a basis for systematic knowledge of condition and dynamics and, later, for ameliorative intervention. The trend was toward a more rationalized process, conduct, and content. The intent to enumerate individuals is an expression of new state sensibilities that treats persons as (equal) citizens, deserving of being counted.” (Ramirez, 1987, as cited in Ventresca, 1995, p. 65).
distinguishing a recognised and circumscribed nation of co-cultural citizens, famously described by Benedict Anderson (1983) as an *imagined community*. Carrying out censuses provided a means for the state to impose a totalising, bounded grid upon its territory and to identify all inside it as its own – part of what Scott describes as the “state’s attempt to make a society legible” (as cited in Kertzer & Arel, 2002b, p. 5).

Such motivations in part gave rise to the United States census carried out in 1790, one year after the formation of the first Congress. This and subsequent US censuses have been described as “a kind of mass public performance of nationality... both a legal and cultural mechanism for imagining the American nation” (Mezey, 2003, p. 1703). An especially clear example of the role which census-taking may play in constructing a distinctive national identity is the 1948 Israeli census. The state of Israel was officially founded in May of that year as the modern nation-state of the Jewish people. In November, at the height of a war of independence and during a strict national curfew, military personnel conducted the country’s first population census. By not counting hundreds of thousands of resident Palestinian Arabs who had fled or been driven from their homes, and in effectively registering as citizens those who participated, this census brought into existence the very entity it was counting (Leibler & Breslau, 2005).

Alongside this contemporary 19th Century prerogative of nation-building was the ever-increasing rationalisation - in the Weberian sense – of Western society and the birth of a formal social science. Rationalisation, a concept central to Weber’s theoretical perspective, describes the process by which nature, society and individual action are increasingly mastered by an orientation to planning, technical procedure and rational action (Morrison, 2006). This process, which gradually sees technical knowledge and calculation replace considerations of morality, emotion, custom, or tradition in understanding and approaching the natural and social world, was seen by Weber as a broad trend in historical development which characterised the modern period and gave rise to modern
Western society. This rationalistic motivation, for ‘technical’ knowledge about the population, is associated with the Positivist social science which also emerged in the early nineteenth century. Positivism is an epistemological doctrine associated with the work of Auguste Comte and which emphasises the scientific method of the natural sciences to study society and create general laws or generalisations. Comte believed that there is such a thing as objective social reality which can be observed and described empirically (Morrison, 2006, pp. 32-32). These influences compelled states to seek ways of scientifically and objectively measure their populace, to chart the nations progress and address its social problems. This would allow them to know (in a positivist sense) their population and devise appropriate plans for dealing with it (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b, p. 6).

These factors were the primary impetuses which meant most Western countries were undertaking full, regular and periodic state-sponsored enumerations of their populace by the latter part of the nineteenth century. New Zealand, for example, undertook its first national census in 1851 (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). Indeed, by the middle of the 19th Century International Statistical Congresses were regularly being convened to promote census activity and standardisation in official statistics (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). This is of particular relevance for this thesis as it suggests clear cross-national influences from the advent of modern census-taking. Ultimately the association between the modern state and statistics is such that Ventresca (2003, p. 3) stresses that:

Modern states are today statistical states. The goals and dimensions of state activity are expressed in terms of numbers; modern governments at all levels generate enormous quantities of statistical data, and much practice of governing today turns on attention to and the use of various quantified information.

Kertzer and Arel (2002, p. 6) note half-heartedly how such nation-building impetuses for census-taking “bring to mind Foucault, and his view of the emergence of a modern state that progressively manages its population by extending greater surveillance over it.” The central premise of philosopher-
Historian Michel Foucault’s work is that power and knowledge are inseparable. In *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1979), he charts the progressive transition in the modernist era from *sovereign power* – social control in the form of physical coercion meted out by those in positions of authority – to a more diffuse and insidious form of social surveillance and process of normalisation described as *disciplinary power*. For Foucault, modern states have gradually introduced various disciplinary technologies which together with normative social science police both the mind and body of individuals. This forms a large part of the central Foucauldian concept of *governmentality*: the art of government via techniques of control (Foucault, 1979). It is not unreasonable to consider the official and ubiquitous census categorisation of individuals into various state-defined categories as an imposition and thereby an extension of central state control as a form of Foucault’s disciplinary state power. It is not the intention of this thesis to explore these concepts in depth, or adopt a strongly Foucauldian lens, but these concepts are mentioned as a useful concept frame for understanding the state’s motivations for categorising and counting its population.

**Measuring ethnicity and race**

From the onset of modern censuses, when the United States constitution first instructed that slaves be counted as three-fifths of a person\(^\text{14}\) (Anderson, 1988), many states have used the census to categorise their populations into racial, ethnic or linguistic categories assumed as sharing a collective common identity. The likelihood of countries doing so, as well as the particular approach adopted, depends on a multitude of internal and external socio-political factors. The motivations for governments to pursue ethnic enumeration are multivaried. They include the rational - and modernistic - desire to *know* the social body\(^\text{15}\) in

\(^{14}\) This came about due to Philadelphia Convention debates around the apportionment of federal electoral representation based on state population, the initial impetus for US census-taking. Southern delegates advocated for slaves to be counted (though not as voters), while those from the North opposed such representation because it would have given the South a numerical advantage. The so-called ‘three-fifths compromise’ was the result (Nobles, 2000).

\(^{15}\) Perhaps best expressed in the somewhat oblique quote from the United Nations report, *Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses*, which promotes census-
order to “diagnose its ills and manage its welfare” (Urla, 1993, p. 819). Also significant are various categorical imperatives (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b, p. 10) operating within countries. For example, in colonial (particularly slave-owning) states, where racial categorisation was of immense social and political consequence, the division of populations into mutually exclusive ‘racial’ categories, pseudo-scientifically based upon certain physical characteristics, was typically a key feature of the census. The ‘three-fifths compromise’ in the United States is a clear example (Hochschild & Powell, 2008; Nobles, 2000). Inasmuch as it is presented as a scientific instrument, the census in such situations provides an aura of state-sanctioned legitimacy to particular modes of ethnic or racial thought more generally (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). Census categorisations are deeply implicated in the construction of a country’s social and political order.

Numerous researchers have noted the importance of official ethno-cultural categorisations and schemas, including those employed in censuses, in creating and sustaining ethnic boundaries. Such ‘boundaries’ are usefully understood as frameworks which people use, consciously or unconsciously, to include or exclude others - to make distinctions between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (Barth, 1969). These boundaries are made up of abstract norms, beliefs and behaviours, although they are given tangible expression through legal and political institutions, including official ethnic categorisations. As Nagel (1994, p. 154) notes, “ethnic boundaries determine who is a member and who is not and designate which ethnic categories are available for individual identification at a particular time and place.” In creating and sustaining these boundaries, the state promotes a particular vision of social reality. Moreover, given that ethno-cultural classification systems are closely linked to the distribution of material and symbolic resources (Long, 2002), such systems may be seen as inherently privileging worldviews of the dominant ethnic group (Kukutai & Didham, 2011).

taking and standardisation across the world (2008, p. 1): “The most important capital a society can have is human capital. Assessing the quantity and quality of this capital at small area, regional and national levels is an essential component of modern government. Aside from the answer to the question “How many are we?” there is also a need to provide an answer to “Who are we?” in terms of... crucial characteristics.”
The operative role of state bureaucracy and institutional processes such as the census in preserving and maintaining the boundaries of the assumed dominant identity lies in part in promoting a notion of the Other. This term is associated particularly with post-colonial literary critic Edward Said, who famously argued in his seminal text *Orientalism* (1978) that “the development and maintenance of every culture requires the existence of another different and competing alter ego...the construction of identity...involves the construction of opposites and others” (Said, 1978, p. 332). When various ethnic identities are recognised in censuses it can be seem to facilitate this process of Othering by allowing for recognition of the Self (or ‘Us’) for the social and economic class and ethnic group represented by the political elite running the census in relation or opposition to various ‘Others’. Said argues that Othering is central to colonialism and is always linked to power relations and often to the demonization and dehumanization of groups. The dominant or privileged group in a society perceives others as lacking essential characteristics possessed by their group, and thus almost always as lesser or inferior beings (Said, 1978). The concept of Othering is significant in the Pacific region where racialised identities, the forerunners of today’s ethnic identities, essentially came into being alongside colonialism. Said’s theory therefore important for this study, and is considered in greater depth in the following chapter.

**Modern censuses and ethnic counting**

The era of the ethnically homogenous nation state, if it ever existed, is over. In the face of unprecedented global migration flows, a major driving motivator for governments to pursue ethno-cultural enumeration in recent times is the need to ensure equitable outcomes for immigrant or ‘minority’ groups (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). Moreover, since the 1970s, a growing discourse in the Western world has centred on the need to address forms of discrimination or structural oppression experienced by particular groups within society. There are certainly compelling motivations on public policy grounds for collecting ethno-cultural data. In the context of New Zealand, Pool emphasises “a need, particularly in a
bicultural or multicultural nation, for everybody to appreciate what is happening to other ethnic groups... in formulating policy, at all levels of government, an essential element is an awareness of differences and similarities in demographic patterns between the different cultures in the society” (1991, p. 243). As such, statistical recognition of those most likely to be discriminated against is often deemed necessary, even within those countries which had hitherto studiously avoided ethno-cultural categorisation. Such data is necessary to measure the characteristics and conditions of such groups, and to aid in devising and measuring the progress of policy interventions aimed at preventing discrimination and reducing disparities. The United Kingdom, for instance, asked the first question related to cultural categorisation in the 1991 census, as a result of growing governmental concern with measuring outcomes for the ‘minorities’ targeted in the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK). This Act explicitly prevented discrimination on grounds of “race, colour, nationality, ethnic or national origin”, in both the private sphere and also for public organisations, notably containing a statutory duty for public bodies to promote race equality (Ballard, 1997).

Given the considerable resources involved in their production, it is hardly surprising that governments promote censuses, and the various ethnic categories which they recognise, as being both objective and scientific (Ventresca, 2003). As this discussion suggests, however, these categories are in reality historical and political constructions, reflecting particular notions of identity and furthering particular ideas about the nature of ethnicity itself. The perceived existence of any objective ethno-racial category (in the sense of classic demographic variables such as age) may in fact be rejected as reification, given the situational and amendable nature of such identities, which, as substantial research has shown, often change between time and place. For instance, Akinwale (2005), using longitudinal, birth record-linked data from the UK Office for National Statistics, finds empirical evidence of such ethnic mobility in inconsistent ethnic identification in the 1991 and 2001 British censuses.
It is important to acknowledge how any officially recognised census category fundamentally legitimises a socially imagined group, by ‘nominating it into existence’, rendering it visible and fashioning its boundaries. Ethnic communities ‘classified’ in censuses often receive both symbolic and material benefits that are unavailable to other communities (Long, 2002). Census distinctions recognising such communities are thereby neither innocent nor inconsequential – and minority groups recognise this fact and often lobby for the inclusion of their particular identities (Perlmann & Waters, 2002; Long, 2002; Kukutai & Didham, 2011). In New Zealand, the contestation and negotiation of census classifications of ethnicity is evidenced in the three large-scale official reviews of the standard ethnic classification carried out by the national statistics agency since 1988 (Department of Statistics, 1988; Statistics New Zealand, 2004, 2009). Some commentators have pointed to these perturbations as arguments against official attempts to count by such ethnic categories, claiming that they are ‘not real’ and act as an impetus for divisive political manoeuvring between different groups (see Ballard, 1997). However, as Kertzer and Arel (2002, p. 20) point out, such categories, even without objective foundation, do exist, even if only as what Emile Durkheim would term ‘social facts’. In socially and politically acting upon the belief that such identities are real, people ultimately give them an objective reality. This point is powerfully expressed by French academic Colette Guillaumin: “Race does not exist. But it does kill people.” (1995, p. 107).

1.4 THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis follows a six-chapter structure expanding on the research questions and background raised in this introductory chapter. The purpose of Chapter two is to review some of the more pertinent work from the large body of literature related to ethnicity before detailing the constructivist approach adopted in this thesis. It also summarises key findings of existing case-studies which have specifically examined ethno-cultural enumeration in censuses. The chapter therefore considers both theoretical and applied research of relevance to this study, contextualising the thesis in the literature. It provides academic justification for the cross-national focus which is undertaken in this thesis, with a
general discussion of world society theory associated with John W. Meyer and introduces postcolonial theory also useful for understanding the study results. Ultimately, the chapter spells out the theoretical framework which underpins this study.

Drawing on the theoretical approach outlined in the previous chapter, **Chapter three** provides a descriptive and historical account of cultural difference in Oceania, demonstrating how discourses of race became prevalent in Oceania during the era of colonialism. It provides a generalised account of enumeration in Oceania as the region of interest in this study, and identifies broad historical trends in the region’s census-taking. This historical analysis serves to further contextualise the wider study.

**Chapter four** details the methodology used in this thesis and details data collection and sources. It outlines the method by which census forms were collected and coded, and how the resulting data was studied using a content analysis methodology examining these forms in a systematic way. The chapter restates the key research questions and draws upon the theoretical framework to operationalise them into specific hypotheses. These hypotheses guide the analysis of the following chapter.

**Chapter five** presents and discusses the results of the study in two sections. Tables and figures are used to visually present findings for the three research questions in the first section. The second section discusses these findings in relation to the literature, advancing arguments to explain the patterns of ethnic counting observed. This discussion draws upon the theoretical framework, including world society theory, postcolonial theory and existing census-ethnicity literature.

**Chapter six** discusses the conclusions of the study as a whole. It reiterates the study findings and outlines their contribution to existing scholarship, considers the implications of the study, and suggests further directions for research.
2.1 INTRODUCTION

The underlying ‘problem’ of this thesis relates to the lack of work that examines census measurement of ethnicity beyond the level of individual countries. Very few formal and systematically sampled international analyses of ethnic enumeration approaches have preceded this study\textsuperscript{16} and understanding of ethnic enumeration at a cross-national level is lacking. Little is known about any cross-national patterns of variation in approaches, providing opportunity to consider commonalities and divergences in approach across countries. Identifying patterns will allow for a better understanding of the salient historical, social, economic and political factors that influence specific types of ethnic enumeration. This is particularly important given increased recognition of the role of ethnic enumeration as not simply a scientific measurement of objective fact but as itself playing an important role in conceiving, articulating and structuring the identities it claims to capture (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a). This chapter considers the conceptual and analytical issues raised by such a study.

The first of these issues is the nature of ethnicity, a concept which has proved vague, elusive and expansive. Its meaning is contentious, not just within academic literature but also in the ‘real world’, and its ambiguity has often resulted in misunderstandings and political misuse (Malešević, 2004). The first section of this chapter outlines some of the academic debate around ethnicity, eventually coming to a working definition of this important concept. The second

\textsuperscript{16} Notable exceptions being Rallu, Piché, and Simon (2006), and Morning (2008). Rallu et al. provide a fourfold typology of governmental motivations for ethnic enumeration (though based on a limited set of countries); while Morning’s work consists of a comprehensive, but relatively basic taxonomy of ethnic classification approaches and terminology.
section examines the burgeoning case-study literature, and scrutinises how and why particular governments have classified and counted their populations by ethnic criteria. A number of key findings or principles are discerned from these studies are identified and discussed. Finally, world society theory and postcolonial theory, two schools of thought useful for hypothesizing patterns of ethnic counting across Pacific states are briefly considered in turn. Taken as a whole, the chapter provides the framework for considering and hypothesizing patterns of ethnic counting in Oceania.

2.2 REVIEWING ETHNICITY

2.2.1 Defining ethnicity

As previously noted, this thesis follows a similar approach to that taken in the innovative research of Ann Morning (2008), in treating any of the concepts that countries use when measuring intranational cultural difference as signifying an underlying notion of (at least perceived) origin-based “groupness”. This is important because the terminology used to describe such identities is context-specific, differing between countries and across time, and thus defying any standardised typology (Aspinall, 2007). Morning justifies this transposable approach by noting that at their core, despite the fluidity between their conceptual borders, they all share a common connotation of communities of descent (Hollinger, 1998). Ultimately, they convey an accounting of origins or ancestry, real or fictive, and for this reason may be seen simply as dimensions of the same fundamental concept (Morning, 2008).

Adopting this approach sees ethnicity equated here with such heterogeneous terms as ethnic group, race, people, tribe, ancestry, and ethnic nationality.17 Yinger (1994, p. 10) concedes that each of the terms has “a vast literature and a tradition of its own”, but argues that ethnicity is the concept “best able to tie them together... to highlight their common referents.” As Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p. 3) emphasise, although “the term ‘ethnicity’ is recent, the sense of

17 Though not ‘civic’ nationality, based on legal distinctions or citizenship. The distinction between the two is further detailed in Chapter 4.
kinship, group solidarity, and common culture to which it refers is as old as the historical record.” It is official categorisations of this fundamental notion with which this study is primarily concerned, and ethnicity is the term used in this study to describe it, although it should be considered here as signifying any such ‘community of descent’, as the most commonly recognised such term in contemporary literature (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996).

Many scholars in the field refer to a discourse of ethnicity (Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009; Tonkin, McDonald, & Chapman, 1989). Discourse, in the Foucauldian-context it is used here, refers to specific ways of thinking and speaking about aspects of reality (Crossley, 2005). Discourses do not just provide a way to describe an external reality, but are in fact constructive of the world as we experience it (Cooper, 2008). As a consequence of power relations not all discourses are afforded equal presence or equal authority. Ethnic categories, for instance, are often seen as representing an underlying reality, despite being arbitrarily socially-defined. Inasmuch as one of the main ways in which western people discuss and conceptualise themselves and others is through the discourse of ‘ethnicity’ (or race), they participate in the conceptual construction of a world in which such distinctions exist. Other representations are devalued, dismissed, or remain out of view (Taylor, 2011). It is important to recognise that this thesis is itself subject to ethnic discourse in that it shares in a ‘narrative’ of ethnicity which inherently presupposes not only the relevance, but also the existence, of ethnic groups as juxtapositional and self-contained categories.

In a thorough overview of the history of ethnicity John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1996) show how the term is a relatively recent term in the literature. They are careful to note that the notion of shared groupness to which it refers is as old as the historical record. According to Wan and Vanderwerf (2009, p. 3) the word ‘ethnicity’ has its roots in the Greek term ethnos, denoting "a large group of people bound together by the same manners, customs or other distinctive features." Hutchinson and Smith (1996) argue that the first use of ethnicity, in the sense now commonly accepted, was in an article by American sociologist
David Riesman in 1953, and that this prompted its introduction into the Oxford English Dictionary as a neologism later the same year. The term saw relatively little use up until the 1970s, however, with the seminal 1975 work by Glazer and Moynihan stating that “ethnicity seems to be a new term” (p. 1).

Before then, the more common way of conceiving and describing such common groupings was in terms of ‘race’. Ethnicity came to replace this earlier conception of difference, largely because of the inherent notions of superiority and inferiority bound within its meaning. Race, in traditional usage, signifies distinguishable biological ‘phenotypes’ - inherent physical and genetic difference. Ample evidence now suggests that no genetic variation capable of justifying any such categorisation exists. Moreover, conceiving interpersonal difference as based on empirically grounded biological differences in and of itself leads to the assumption that different races possess variation in intellect and abilities, and that therefore races may be ‘ranked’. Such beliefs and attitudes – known as scientific racism – were adopted and politically misused by ultranationalists and other racial ‘purists’, most chillingly in Nazi Germany (Spoonley, 1988). After World War Two, this formed the basis of increasing academic challenges to the ‘social myth’ of race explicitly condemned by many leading scholars of the period in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s 1950 statement The Race Question (UNESCO, 1950). The appropriation and political misuse of racial doctrines to some extent predicated the emergence of ethnicity as a new concept for explaining group distinctions, without explicit recourse to ‘biological’ difference (Tonkin, McDonald, & Chapman, 1989). This theoretical turn was further encouraged by the ‘human rights revolution’ of the 1960s and 1970s, which saw the idea of scientifically differentiated groups seem increasingly pejorative. As academic (though not necessarily popular) realisation grew that conceptions of what makes up biologically differentiated ‘races’ in fact varied widely across time and between places, such ideas became increasingly

18 Joireman (2003, p. 4) summarises this contemporary view within modern scholarship: “Scientists have never come up with any conclusive evidence to show that there is any such thing as race.”
difficult to justify. Discourses of ethnicity have thus gradually come to replace previous discourses of race (Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009).

Ethnicity has nonetheless proved to be a contentious concept and there is no widely accepted definition of what it comprises. The classic definition of ethnicity is that of Glazer and Moynihan (1974, p. 1), being "the condition of belonging to a particular ethnic group." Jones (1997, p. xiii) takes a different approach, arguing ethnicity is not a condition of being but as "all those social and psychological phenomena associated with a culturally constructed group identity." Importantly, both definitions (as well as most others) relate the term explicitly to particular ethnic groups. The concept of ethnic group, according to Isajiw, is the most basic, from which the other terms related to ethnicity are derivative. Ethnicity therefore refers to the phenomenon of collective ethnic grouping of individuals (Isajiw, 1992, p. 5).

Ethnic groups, however, have also proven difficult to define. Scholars have devised many descriptions; emphasising separate features (see Hutchinson & Smith, 1996). One particularly comprehensive and widely-cited definition is that of Anthony D. Smith, which forms the basis of the official New Zealand Statistical Standard for Ethnicity. Smith defines an ethnic group, or ethnie, as comprising six main features (1986/1996, pp. 6–7):

1. A common proper name, to identify and express the ‘essence’ of the community;
2. A myth of common ancestry that includes the idea of common origin in time and place and that gives an ethnie a sense of ‘fictive kinship’;
3. Shared historical memories, or better, shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration;

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20 Termed by Donald Horowitz (1985) a super-family. This notion of kinship ties forming the basis of ethnic groups is central to Horowitz’s understanding of ethnicity and further serves to support an approach towards census measures of cultural difference as more semantic than substantive.
4. One or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified but normally include religion, customs, and language;

5. A link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnie, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with diaspora peoples; and

6. A sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the ethnie’s population.

From this definition a broad understanding of ‘ethnic group’ can be expressed as referring to a named and recognised group of people, usually related through real or fictive kinship, who share a sense of solidarity and see themselves as distinct and different from others, by virtue of a common culture, a link with a homeland, and by shared historical memories. This is a comprehensive definition which shows how ethnic identity may be made up of many separate dimensions.

In practice, the various criteria used by countries to classify their populations emphasise different dimensions of this relatively comprehensive definition of ethnicity. This adds weight to an important aspect of the methodological approach of this thesis, in treating ethnicity as a multidimensional, umbrella term. Conceived as such, it represents all of the many terms used by countries (in often in conflicting and overlapping ways) to measure and distinguish population groups. An example of this is the concept of race, until relatively recently the most commonly used such term, which has largely been replaced in academia and in practice by ethnicity in many countries, though not in necessarily in popular understanding (Rodríguez, 2000). The relationship between the two, particularly the question of whether they comprise independent or overlapping concepts, has “not yet been fully resolved” (Rodríguez, 2000, p. 46). However, Pierre van den Berghe (as cited in Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009) describes race as a “special marker of ethnicity” (p. 4) that uses biological characteristics as an ethnic marker. While this is a simplification, and other writers disagree, it does indicate the approach taken in this thesis. Race may be understood as a particular conceptualisation of ethnic difference, emphasising shared ‘biological’

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21 Primarily on the grounds that ethnicity does not convey the extent of discrimination experienced by particular groups in the United States and other former slaveholding countries where the discourse of race predominates (see Rodríguez, 2000, pp. 44-45; Nobles, 2000).
characteristics. The same may be said for other terms signifying, and used in censuses for categorising, ‘origin based groupness’. Such terms are often perceived and used in non-uniform ways. For example, questions asked about the respondents ‘race’ in the United States census blur definitions of race, national origin, and ethnic grouping (Hochschild & Powell, 2008), while in the United Kingdom an ethnic question contains the racial categories of ‘White’ and ‘Black’ alongside Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese and Any Other Ethnic Group, an amalgamation of ethnicity and race (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b, p. 14).

2.2.2 Explaining ethnicity

More important than simply defining what is signified by the term ethnicity, however, is providing a conceptual or theoretical basis for understanding its nature. What are the origins, or ethnogenesis, of ethnic groups, and ethnic recognition more generally? Such questions are important for any meaningful consideration of the official measurement of ethnic groups.

Most writers in the field divide opposing theoretical paradigms of ethnicity into three main categories: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism (see, for example, Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009; Hutchinson & Smith, 1996; Baumann, 2004)\(^{22}\). These theories broadly reflect changes of metatheoretical approach in social science, or more precisely the shift from sociocultural evolution theory to structural-functionalist/modernist theory to post-modern theory (Isajiw, 1992; Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009). This section critically examines the primordial and instrumental schools of thought before outlining the constructivist approach adopted by this study.

\(^{22}\) Some authors, such as Smith (1999) and Conversi (2006) discuss the dichotomous streams of thought known as primordialism and instrumentalism as paradigms for approaching the phenomenon of national mobilisation/nationalism (although via the rootedness of nations in notions of shared kinship and ethnicity). This thesis has taken the dominant approach in the literature in delineating these theories as primarily referring to ethnicity as a unique concept, while ‘perennialist’ and ‘modernist’ theories are broad conceptual equivalents concerning nationalism.
The earliest theoretical paradigm in the literature engaging with the nature of ethnic identity is known as primordialism. According to Hutchinson & Smith (1996, p. 8), this term was first adopted and applied to ethnicity in a well-known 1963 essay by Glifford Geertz. Classical primordialism views ethnicity as “something given, ascribed at birth, deriving from the kin-and-clan structure of human society and hence something more or less fixed and permanent” (Isajiw, 1992, p. 2). It sees individuals’ ethnic groups as based on deep kinship and descent ties to a particular ‘primordial’ social group. Groups are real and concrete, and attachment to them is natural, even spiritual, rather than social. Moreover, because identities are ascribed from birth and based on ascribed, or pre-existing, social ties, ethnic groups are a fixed and fundamental, unchangeable part of an individual’s identity (Geertz, 1963; Eller & Coughlan, 1993). An influential study by Harold Isaacs (1974) argued that deep, prescribed ties to primordial ethnic groups explained the power and persistence of ethnic identity and of intertribal or interethnic conflict (which was as such a ‘natural’ phenomenon). The primordialist understanding of ethnic groups as prescriptive and existing from time immemorial is how ‘race’ was always, and remains, popularly understood (Rodríguez, 2000).

The primordial approach soon began to be critiqued on the grounds that it was neglected social and cultural factors that influenced ethnic groups. A common critique is that primordialism ignores the manifest fluidity of ethnicity and its situational nature, with people often assuming different identities in different situations. These twin observations have undermined the primordial view of ethnic groups as “immemorial, discrete, persisting units” (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996, p. 8). Moreover, the primordial approach appears too general and does not possess enough explanatory power for a concept as diverse and multifaceted.

23 “Race and ethnicity are not separate phenomena to be addressed by different analytical frames. As social categories and in common usage, both assume that human origins are uniquely powerful in determining what happens to social groups. While one privileges genes and the other privileges kinship, both claim to be in some sense “natural” categories, given by the circumstances of birth. At the same time and despite their essentialist pretensions, both are demonstrably social constructions, although the construction process lies largely in the hands of others in the case of race (assignment), and largely in the hands of groups themselves in the case of ethnicity (assertion).” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007, p. 105).
as ethnicity. As argued powerfully by Jones (1998, p. 68): “the intangible nature of primordialist ethnicity constitutes an, at best ex post facto argument... the approach explains everything and nothing”. Horowitz sums up the criticism of the approach neatly, declaring that scholars of the school are “the most maligned for their naiveté in supposing that ethnic affiliations are given rather than chosen, immutable rather than malleable, and inevitably productive of conflict (2005, p. 72-73). The perspective has for these reasons largely been superseded, and no major scholar today holds to classical primordialism (Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009).

The paradigm shift away from primordial understandings of ethnicity has been tied to the writings of Fredrik Barth, which have proven influential throughout the social sciences (Baumann, 2004; Hutchinson & Smith, 1996). Barth, a Norwegian anthropologist, published a seminal work in this area, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, in 1969. This study, influenced by his work studying the Pathan ethnic group of north-west India, argued that ethnic identity is what results when a given social group interacts with other groups, it exists as a process. Ethnicity is not a fixed and immutable quality “developing its cultural and social form in relative isolation” (Barth, 1969, p. 11); it does not exist ‘out there’ in the real world. Barth argued instead that ethnic groups emerge only in relation to other such groups: both self-ascription and ascription by others are critical factors in the making of ethnic groups and identities. Ethnicity only exists in a dichotomous relationship between “us” and “them”, and what matters, in such an understanding, are not the cultural practices which help constitute or make up an ethnic group (as was the primordial perception), but the formation and maintenance of negotiated boundaries of ethnicity24. These boundaries are made up of various cultural practices (language, religion, rituals, rites, values), but in any given case, “the features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant” (Barth, 1969, p. 14). Ethnicity under such an understanding is a

24 “The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.” (Barth, 1969, p. 15).
product of perceived differences, as marked by subjectively defined (and constantly shifting) boundaries, rather than any objectively distinct grouping of individuals.

Because ethnic identification only emerges in interaction between assignment (i.e. what others say we are), and assertion (i.e. who or what we claim to be) ethnic boundaries are defined both from inside and outside the group (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). This is known as the double boundary of ethnicity. The interaction is ongoing – this is the “reciprocal fluxion” to which this chapter’s title refers (see Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). Barth’s approach was among the first to recognise how ethnicity is a dynamic, non-static and situational feature of social organisation. In identifying ethnicity as an ever-changing and subjective social construct, Barth’s work influenced the development of both instrumentalist/circumstantialist, and later constructivist theories of ethnicity which challenge primordialism (Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009).

Instrumentalism or circumstantialism (Gil-White, 1999) is a model of ethnic identity which holds to Barth’s view of ethnic groups as collections of individuals sharing a common self-ascription. Central to its approach is the stance that ethnic groups are ‘manufactured’ depending on circumstances and submitted to by rationally acting individuals in pursuit of their own interests. Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p. 8) state that: “the instrumentalists treat ethnicity as a social, political, and cultural resource for different interest- and status- groups”. The approach therefore views ethnicity as an instrument that is created, changed and manipulated in particular situations to serve particular ends. Writers from this perspective concentrate on the circumstances that put ethnic individuals and groups “into particular positions and encourage them to see their interests in particular [ethnified] ways” (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p. 59). Within the broader perspective is some debate as to whether these interests are usually those of the collectivity as a whole (with little doubt that ethnic mobilisation allows for political pressure to be exerted on behalf of the overall group), or
rather of the socio-political elite, who may manipulate ethnicity for their own ends (see Isajiw, 1992).

This instrumentalist perspective of ethnicity, as something created, used and exploited by people based on circumstance, has been critiqued by several authors. The most obvious criticism is that it is essentially reductionist in that it “confuses function, or use, of the phenomenon with its nature.” (Isajiw, 1992, p. 3). Taking such a view, instrumentalism simply confuses what ethnicity is with what it does. More importantly, it underplays the affective dimensions of ethnicity (Jones, 1997). Throughout history ethnic group identities have proved deeply meaningful for people. These psychological attachments are seemingly neglected in an instrumentalist perspective that holds ethnicity is created in one’s pursuit of practical interests (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996). There is also no doubt that many people believe that there is a permanence and an objective foundation to their ethnicity. In a persuasive study based on survey data from a multi-ethnic area in Mongolia Gil-White (1999) found ethnic actors to be strongly primordialist, at least in terms of their own cognisance of ethnicity and its nature. It is this neglect of what Hutchinson and Smith (1996) term participant’s primordialism which is probably the major pitfall of the instrumentalist model (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996; Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009).

Based on the critiques of traditional primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnicity, many authors, such as Jones (1997) and Hutchinson & Smith (1996) argued that a new theory was needed to ‘bridge the gap’, to incorporate the valid assertions of both approaches. At the same time, following the postmodernist trend in contemporary thought, there was a desire to recognise the fundamental subjectivity of all phenomena, including ethnicity. The resultant approach has come to be termed ‘constructivism’ (see Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009). Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann’s (2007) work is significant here. Their approach accounts for the forces of both (constructed) primordial ties and instrumental processes in explaining the foundation of ethnic groups. According to Cornell & Hartmann (2007, pp. 75-76):
The approach focuses on the ways ethnic and racial identities are built, rebuilt, and sometimes dismantled over time. It places interactions between circumstances and groups at the heart of these processes. It accepts the fundamental validity of circumstantialism, while attempting to retain the key insights of primordialism, but it adds to them a large dose of activism: the contribution groups make to creating and shaping their own -and others'- identities.

This ‘constructivist’ understanding of ethnicity underpins understanding of how ethnic identities are shaped and constructed for this study. It is therefore important to outline the approach in more detail.

Central to the constructivist understanding of ethnicity is the notion that ethnic identities are by their nature changeable, contingent and diverse. Ethnicity’s form and function change between places as well as over time (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). In New Zealand, indigenous Māori identity is an example, at least inasmuch as it represents a post-contact social construct, is an example. Before colonisation, Māori saw themselves solely as tribal peoples, with a considerable degree of tribal and regional diversity. The notion of Māori as a distinct collectivity, as an ethnie in and of itself, only came about when the tribes were confronted by outsider Europeans (Maaka & Fleras, 2001, p. 107; Kukutai, 2011). The flexible nature of ethnicity is also illustrated by historical change in how socially and politically meaningful ethnic identities are. Cornell and Hartmann (2007, p. 77) use the notable example of South Africa: during the apartheid era (1948 to 1994, race was a remarkably influential aspect of South African social life. It dominated social organisation with a comprehensiveness and power unmatched by any other dimension of identity. These authors describe such an identity as thick, arguing that since the end of apartheid, given concerted efforts of the multiracial government in South Africa, ethnicity has become thinner, with a greatly reduced role in organising society (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007).
In this respect the constructivist approach agrees with circumstantialism about the fundamentally fluid nature of ethnicity. Ethnic groupings change in their nature and significance across time and situations as the forces that influence them change and the claims made by group members and others also change. Ethnicities are negotiated and constructed in everyday living, a process which continually unfolds. “Part of the meaning of ‘construction’”, write Cornell and Hartmann (2007, p. 82), “is that ethnic and racial identities are not rooted in nature, but are situational precipitates, products of particular events, relationships, and processes that are themselves subject to change.” In this respect, the theory holds to Barth’s notion of ethnicity as an essentially subjective phenomenon, which is now widely accepted in the social sciences: “the claim that ethnic group boundaries are not primordial, but socially constructed, is now the overwhelmingly dominant view” (Hechter & Okamoto, 2001, p. 193).

On the other hand, however, Cornell and Hartmann’s approach retains some key insights from primordialism. Ethnic group members may in fact be bound to each other, a physical tie may exist – even if it is a construction. Cornell & Hartmann (2007, p. 81) put it thus:

Construction involves both the passive experience of being ‘made’ by external forces, including not only material circumstances but also the claims that other persons or groups make about the group in question, and the active process by which the group ‘makes’ itself.

Ethnicities are not just a response to circumstances but are also influenced by individuals own preconceptions and dispositions – prime among which is often a notion of shared kinship, culture and ties, even if such notions are ‘felt’ rather than ‘real’. They are embodied in the (changeable and contingent) significance that is attached to them, but they nevertheless still exist, as social facts if not as objective reality. Importantly, unlike some instrumentalists, Cornell and Hartmann recognise the kinship metaphor as a crucial source of the power of
Moreover, they argue that “our experience at the hands of circumstances may ‘tell’ us that we constitute a group, but our identity is also a product of the claims we make” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007, p. 83). People are influenced by circumstances but also use the ‘raw materials’ of history, cultural practice, physical appearances and pre-existing identities to fashion their own distinctive notions of who they are. These claims themselves change over time, in response to factors such as utilitarian group interest, subjective meanings (such as feelings of belonging), happenstance and inertia. Beyond both earlier approaches, the constructivist view highlights the active and creative role played by ethnic individuals in identity construction. This is the key departure point of constructionism from circumstantialism.

For the purposes of this thesis, taking such a constructivist approach towards ethnicity allows understanding of how the ethnic identities recognised in censuses are created, recreated, and sometimes dismantled over time. Such a conceptualisation allows for a critical examination of the census as more than simply measuring objectively the *ethnoscape* of a country. Under constructivism, a focus on the role of the census in the process of ethnicity is appropriate. Censuses both help create the look or ‘image’ of ethnicity as well as provide a mirror of that image for a nation’s self-reflection (Hochschild & Powell, 2008). Perhaps most importantly for this thesis, in expanding upon the circumstantialist or instrumentalist understanding, the constructivist view allows for a wider focus on the creation of ethnicity as an active and ongoing process.

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25 As Cornell and Hartmann (2007, p. 94) note: “…we have had to abandon “pure” primordialism, arguing that much of the power of ethnicity and race comes not from anything genuinely primordial, but from the rhetoric and symbolism of primordialism that are so often attached to them. A constructionism that does not take the primordial metaphor into account loses touch not only with how ordinary human beings in many cases experience their own identities but also with much of what is most potent, distinctive, and revealing about ethnic and racial phenomena.”

26 Although distinctiveness in terms of skin colour, stature, and other physical appearances can to some degree constrain how far one can imagine oneself into another ethnicity. This is not to argue that these constitute scientific categories - findings provide empirical evidence that there is more genetic variation within than among ‘racial’ groups (Cooper & David, 1986; Williams, 1994), and the human species overwhelmingly shares characteristics and traits. It simply acknowledges that physical differences can serve as ‘markers’ of ethnicity, utilised in the ultimately social construction of ethnic groups.

27 To borrow Appadurai’s (1996) term.
reflecting numerous influences and concerns. In this regard, various influences and factors, both endogenous and exogenous to ethnic groups themselves, can be recognised as playing a role in the interrelated process of ethnic group construction and therefore classification. Considering the relative influence of such factors in the Pacific region is a key focus of this study.

2.3 ETHNIC CLASSIFICATION AND COUNTING

This study adds to a growing literature which has examined how and why countries classify and count their populations into ethnic groups (see, for example Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; Nobles, 2000; Rodríguez, 2000). This existing work has almost without exception taken a case-study approach in examining in detail one or a few country’s practices in this regard. Findings typically have limited applicability beyond these national settings but a close reading uncovers a number of key principles which these studies have consistently established. In reviewing the literature related to census engagement with ethnicity, it seems best to focus on these key principles rather than describe each country in any depth. This is appropriate given that the study seeks to move beyond the local level to a regional analysis. Ultimately it is not the individual studies but their key insights or findings which are of interest to this study.

2.3.1 Ethnicity as a social construct in the census

“The census does much more than simply reflect social reality; rather, it plays a key role in the construction of that reality”, note Kertzer and Arel (2002b, p. 2). This is the crux of the first key point identifiable in the census-ethnicity literature of recent years – censuses themselves help fashion ethnicity as a social construct. In this respect, existing studies examining census classifications of ethnicity adopt (at least implicitly) a constructivist view. This is unsurprising, given that the critical literature surrounding the phenomenon is relatively recent, occurring after the theoretical turn away from primordialism instigated by Barth. During the era of primordialism, when ethnicity was largely regarded as an innate and natural given, that the collection of data related to such a concept
was apparently viewed straightforwardly, as simply recording an objective, primordial reality.

This misconception, of ethnic enumeration as a neutral means of quantifying an underlying social reality, remains a common view (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; Nobles, 2000). Despite growing recognition in the social sciences that group identities are socially constructed, traditional primordialist understandings of ethnicity still hold sway for many. Rodríguez (2000), for example, argues that the United States public has always adhered to a rigid belief in race as a biological fact, while Nobles (2000, p. 14) notes that demographers and officials have long regarded race as “naturally created and objective”. These authors examine race, given that it remains the dominant conceptualisation of difference in these former slaveholding territories of the US and Brazil where their case-studies are located than elsewhere. ‘Race’ has undoubtedly been more strongly conceptualised as objective and scientific ‘reality’ than ‘ethnicity’, which arose in part as a denial of racial thinking (Nobles, 2000). Nevertheless, even in those censuses where ‘ethnic’ distinctions are emphasised, understanding of ethnic categories as benign descriptors persists. For example, the 2011 UK census asked “What is your ethnic group?” (UK Office for National Statistics, 2011), a question itself implying that ethnic groups are unquestionable, objective categories into which respondents will have little difficulty classifying themselves. Moreover, ethnic statistics are typically used authoritatively, without consideration of their ultimately subjective nature (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b).

This understanding of official statistics, as unproblematic, universal and objective is promoted by census bureaus and governments more generally (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; Ventresca, 2003; Hochschild & Powell, 2008). This is partly because of the considerable resources invested into census-taking, and because of the unique status of censuses as a mandated source of authoritative information (Ventresca, 2003). More important, however, is the role of the census in legitimising particular ways of conceptualising the social order. In the case of ethnic enumeration, censuses create the official language and taxonomy of ethnicity in
a given country and “imbue them with the authority of the state” (Hochschild & Powell, 2008, p. 68). Censuses tend to reflect the a priori vision of the majority, or at least the politically powerful (see Rallu, Piché, & Simon, 2006). In this context, the official presentation of ethnic data as neutral and objective may be viewed as supporting a particular discourse or ideology of ethnicity, reflecting majoritarian interests in a hegemonic sense.28

Despite this, ethnic affiliation is situational and amendable. One particularly salient finding in this regard is that the mere specification of particular groups on census forms as examples or prompts increases the size of the group. In a study of an ancestry question included in the Australian census, for example, Khoo and Lucas (2006) show how a ‘South Sea Islander’ example listed in the 2001 census saw a six-fold increase in those reporting such an ancestry from the previous census. Scottish and Welsh ancestries, listed as response options on the 1986 but not the 2001 forms, saw declines of 27 and 29 per cent respectively (Khoo & Lucas, 2006). When the 1996 Canadian census proffered ‘Canadian’ as a response option for a question on ‘ethnic origin’, it was recorded by 31 per cent of the population – a substantial increase from the nearly four per cent who had recorded it in an open-ended ‘Other’ response in 1991 (Boyd & Norris, 2001; Lee & Edmonston, 2010). In and of itself, listing such categories to some degree ‘nominates ethnic groups into existence’ (to borrow Goldberg’s 1997 phrase), giving government recognition and thereby legitimacy to particular imagined collectivities.

Also telling with regards to the socially constructed nature of ethnicities is the often significant, even contradictory, changes in the ways in which censuses conceive and measure ethnicity over time. For example, in New Zealand the

28 One such example of censuses categorisations reflecting dominant, hegemonic interests is how the conceptualisation of ‘race’ in the United States census is comparatively unproblematic for the European majority compared to those of Hispanic origin. Many Latinos reluctantly adopt one of the standard racial categories of the US census, believing themselves to have other, or multiple, identities (Rodriguez, 2000).
standard nomenclature to distinguish cultural difference has only been ‘ethnic group’ since 1981, with various measures of blood quantum utilised prior to that time. This change came about in part as a result of Māori cultural revivalism and political activism and the gradual influence of global ideological shifts away from race (see Pool, 1991; Callister, 2004; Kukutai, 2012). Race has been the terminology used in the United States census since the 1790, although Nobles (2000) and Hochschild and Powell (2008) note significant changes in the ways in which it has been conceived and applied. During the pre-abolition era, for example, slaves were enumerated (for purposes of taxation and electoral representation) as three-fifths of a person, a reflection of their status as property. The 1930 census saw the introduction of a ‘one-drop’ rule of racial membership, which meant even the smallest amount of non-white ancestry saw people designated as Black. This subjected those redesignated to all the legal and social disqualifications of such categorisation, demonstrating the profound racial logics of the segregationist era. Political and social changes can lead to altered enumeration practices, even of categories previously considered to have possessed natural and self-evident qualities, a further demonstration of the constructed nature of ethnic categories.

Given these findings, it is important to consider how fallaciously ascribing primordial or objective characteristics to ethnic identities, through the census or otherwise, is problematic:

The use of traditional models or paradigms of ethnic cultures is fraught with serious problems... the tendency is to slip into reification of ethnic culture, that is, to attribute an independent or real existence to a mental creation. (Gelfand & Fandetti, 1986, p. 542).

Since at least since Barry Hindess’s 1973 work The use of Official Statistics in Sociology: A Critique of Positivism and Ethnomethodology it has been argued that...

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29 Today, the Federal Government recognises that the racial categories it measures are ‘socio-political constructs’ which "should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature" (US Office of Management and Budget, 1997), although the US public has nevertheless adhered to “a rather rigid belief in race as a biological fact” (Rodríguez, 2000, p. 42).
such “true” categories as ethnic groupings are a “figment of the empiricist imagination”. As an unavoidably theoretical exercise measuring social statistics can never be reduced to a purely technical evaluation (see also Caldwell, 1996). Recognising that ethnic categorisations are not objective or neutral reflections of the underlying reality is an important foundation of studies of ethnic enumeration, and of this thesis.

It is important to make clear though, as do many of the authors cited here, that to deny that there exists no stable, biological, or objective ethnic groupings is not to discount their role and influence in society. Even as artificial and subjective categorisations they are nonetheless considered salient by social actors. Rodríguez (2000) notes how we should not lose sight of the continuing social significance of race. Reifications or not, ethnic categorisations still have clear and consequential influences on day-to-day lives, inasmuch as they influence social interactions and behaviour in social settings. The socially constructed nature of such categories, their imperfect and inherently politicised measurement, their lack of objective foundation and sometimes variance with scientific and moral principles does not mean that ethnic distinctions do not exist, and nor does it discount the personal significance of the bonds people have with their perceived ethnic communities. It does suggest that these communities are imagined, social communities based primarily on subjective perception and ascription (Rodríguez, 2000; Guillaumin, 1995). Counting and classifying by ethnicity is not a futile exercise.

Ultimately, this principle finding is important because it discredits the still-powerful notion that ethnic categories are reducible to an objective core. Labbé (2000, as cited in Ketzer & Arel, 2002b, p. 19) calls this idea “statistical realism”. Under such a view, ethnicity has a core outside of statistics, and the task of census agencies is to methodologically and accurately record it. That such a view appears to have many adherents among demographers and statistical agencies is significant. Friedman (1996) recounts how expert demographers dispatched to Macedonia to review claims of systemic undercounting of ethnic Albanians were...
completely perplexed by the complexity and political nature of the exercise, far from the simple technical and statistical assignment they had expected. Modern demography still retains vestiges of primordial notions of ethnicity as a timeless identity, a notion which the literature examined in this section discredits. That ethnic groups lack any ontologically-objective foundation means the recording of ethnicity in censuses is always subjective and normative, and thereby apt for critical examination of the type attempted here.

2.3.2 Census as politics - a ‘tool of statecraft’

A related key finding across existing studies is that the population census serves as a tool of statecraft. Census is an instrument at a state’s disposal, rather than simple registers and recorders of population. Numerous studies have shown that census enumeration is an intensely political exercise (including Nobles, 2000; Kertzer & Arel, 2002b; Rodríguez, 2000; Rallu, Piché, & Simon, 2006; Hochschild & Powell, 2008). These findings further discredit the common portrayal of censuses as neutral, scientifically objective recorders of a country’s social order. The United Nations, sponsors programmes that seek to standardise national census-taking – implicitly suggesting that censuses can transcend local politics (Nobles, 2000). These findings suggest that this is unlikely, at least in the realm of ethnicity, which Aspinall (2001) cannot be standardised across countries.

Ethnic data is collected, presented, and most often used in a way that maintains the illusion of positivistic empiricism and value neutrality, despite the process being heavily politicised (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). Nobles (2000, p. 16) argues that the notion of ethnic enumeration, as a “technical procedure in need of little explanation” is the typical view taken in scholarly and popular publications. Critical authors such as Kertzer and Arel, (2002b) and Hochschild and Powell (2008), take issue with this discourse of technical detail and preciseness,

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30 Nobles (2000, pp. 14-15), notes: “History and politics cannot, however, be expunged from census-taking. Numbers without categories are useless, and the origins of categories require explanation. This view of census-taking, as political in origin and consequence, competes with concerted efforts by international bodies and national governments to ensure and demonstrate its political impartiality.”
suggesting that it leads people to view official ethnic categorisations as if they self-evidently exist outside of politics, devaluing and placing out of view alternative discourses and representations. In this respect, the census serves as a technology of truth production (Urla, 1993, as cited in Kertzer & Arel, 2002b, p. 20), privileging, promoting, and legitimising a particular ethnic discourse.

One particularly valuable contribution to the literature in this area is the typology of governmental motivations for ethnic enumeration proposed by Rallu, Piché, and Simon (2006). The typology is useful for considering the social and political logics underpinning the development of ethnic and racial classification, as well as for locating the insights of other case-studies within a cogent framework. It consists of four categories, which are detailed more fully below.

a) Counting to dominate and exclude
Counting to dominate and exclude is the form of ethnic counting that is most closely associated with colonialism. It comprises official ethnic enumeration which is motivated, to a large degree, by imperial concerns with controlling local populations. In such situations censuses and ethnic statistics carefully differentiate between the dominant powers that be (colonial administrators, settlers or privileged locals) and the local populace or ‘natives’. Imbued throughout colonial categorisations are racist ideologies and notions of superiority and inferiority, of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (Said, 1978). Censuses record and legitimise colonial patterns of stratification and inequality present in such societies. Official ethnic categorisations in colonial-era Oceania were motivated by such logics, and this categorisation is an important part of the theoretical framework employed in this study.

In his seminal study of nationalism (1983), Benedict Anderson studied the importance of censuses in defining the colonial subject. Enumeration served as a tool to define subjected populations as subjugated to colonial control and agendas for ‘improvement’. Anderson focused on South-East Asia, but his findings can be applied across the colonial world. Snipp (1989) demonstrates a
similar role for the United States ethnic statistics vis-à-vis the Native American population. He notes how the federal government’s adoption of blood quantum rules for determining tribal populations limited the size of their populations and reduced the state’s obligations. In Hawai’i blood quantum has been used to determine eligibility for a homestead lease from the Department of Hawaiian Homelands. In New Zealand, colonial censuses were typically utilised to mark progress in the colonial project of assimilating the indigenous Māori population (Kukutai, 2011; Wanhalla, 2010).

Another example of ethnic enumeration which further reflects hierarchical colonial power arrangements is the case of the Belgian colonial enumerations of the central African territories of Burundi and Rwanda (Uvin, 2002). During the colonial period, from 1884 to 1962, and continuing after, the Rwandan population was officially categorised into two main categories – Tutsi and Hutu. These categories, originally largely fluid and socio-economic, were treated by the Belgians as separate and distinct ‘races’. Vast social, economic and political advantages were granted by colonial administrators to Tutsis, who as the superior ‘race’ were considered to possess intellectual and moral capacities superior to Hutus in all respects. In 1994, ethnic conflict on a nationwide scale broke out in Rwanda, leading to the genocide of an estimated 800,000 Tutsi. The process was greatly aided by the identification cards with ethnic notations – a measure the Belgians had introduced in the 1930s.

b) Not counting to unify and assimilate

Countries exemplifying this approach specifically shy away from the collection of official statistics based on ethnic criteria. Rallu et al. (2006) note how the justifications for such an approach differ, but broadly fit into two camps: fostering national integration, or in the name of national unity. The first type, not counting in the name of national integration, is typical of weak states, which avoid ethnic counting in order to minimise intra-national differences. It is associated with multiethnic postcolonial states engaged in post-independence nation building within colonial borders, which rarely took cultural geography into
consideration (Rallu et al., 2006, p. 535). This approach is characterised in the censuses of much of sub-Saharan West Africa, where official ethnic categorisation was introduced by colonial powers and used as a basis for social stratification. Post-independence governments there have since rejected ethnic enumeration in an effort to diminish ethnic awareness in favour of a sense of national unity.

The second basis for not enumerating by ethnicity is related to the republican ideal of national unity, an ideological belief that is particularly prevalent in Western Europe. A close reading of Rallu et al. (2006) suggests that these cases are related to an ideological refusal to enumerate by ethnicity, rather than a refusal based on practical motivations of nation building. France perhaps best exemplifies such a view. Blum (2003) shows how the French have repudiated any official recognition of ethnic difference (which is even expressly illegal by statute) in favour of simply differentiating between French citizens and resident foreigners – a solely legal distinction. This has been the case since the first French censuses in the 19th Century, and is associated with the post-revolutionary political and constitutional origins of the French state. As the body politic could no longer support the social, religious, and regional divisions that existed under the Ancien Régime, the sentiment changed towards belonging to the same symbolic community: the French nation (Dieckhoff, 2005). This credo, of one and indivisible republican unity, which characterises most national models in Europe, sees sovereignty vested in the national citizenry, and is the basis of French distaste towards official ethnic data. In France and other Western European countries, including Italy, Belgium and Germany, the tendency is to consider the social influence of ethnic identities to signify incomplete assimilation to the singular and indivisible nation-state (Simon, 2008).

c) Counting or not counting in the name of multiculturalism
In countries where the political and social ideology views the ‘racial mixing’ occurring in society positively, counting or not counting in the name of multiculturalism is often adopted. Rallu et al. (2006) associate this position in
particular with the polyethnic societies of Latin America, where a discourse of interethnic mixing is prevalent. Some countries enumerate by race or colour, and others not, but always the rationale lies within the prevailing political ideology of supporting population hybridity. The countries which do not ethnically enumerate for such reasons are most prevalent, and include Venezuela, Columbia, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Here, ethnic or racial groupings are seen as inconsequential given the gradual mixing acknowledged by the national polity as a positive value. Nobles (2000; 2002) examines the census of Brazil, where citizens are counted by ‘cor’ (colour) derived, from the mixture (or not) of Europeans, Africans and Indigenous American Indians – Brazil’s original races. In the Brazilian context the census has been used as a tool to demonstrate how racial mixing has seen the ‘whitening’ of society as a distinct and harmonious Brazilian race is formed. This discourse has long been a preoccupation of the Brazilian political elite, reflecting again censuses status as political tools.

d) Counting for positive action
To an extent, this final approach, of counting for positive action, came about as a response to the previous categories of the typology. The growth of transnational migration is increasingly altering the ethnic makeup of countries around the world (United Nations Statistical Division, 2003). This, combined with the global rise of the minority rights movement, and associated anti-discriminatory ideology has called into question the modernist ideological constructions of ethnicity which underpin all three of the previous models. Increasing state pluralism is “imposing an increasing number of new statistical practices and risks transforming the enumeration practices of censuses” (Rallu et al., 2006, p. 536). In these countries ethnic counting is carried out as a tool to measure and so help develop policies against social discrimination of particular minority groups. This approach stands in complete opposition to the first category of counting to dominate and exclude. While other three census approaches remain the most common approaches, there is increasing pressure in many states to pursue

31 “It was “white blood” into which “black” and “red” were mixed and “diluted,” creating a mixed but whiter people.” (Nobles, 2000, pp. 102-103).
Illustrative of these changed motivations over time is the United States. Rallu et al. (2006) note US censuses have moved away from counting to dominate and exclude African American and American Indian populations towards recognising racial diversity. Multiple racial identities are now recognised and an ethnicity-related question was introduced to capture the Latino population - both reflecting increased ethnic pluralism. Racial data for larger groupings, specifically “Blacks”, “Indians”, “Hispanics”, and “Asians”, is now collected and utilised for affirmative action programmes and policies (see Nobles, 2000). Morning and Sabbagh (2005) offer an excellent account of this mid-twentieth century US transition, from counting races for purposes of excluding various groups to racial enumeration for purposes of antidiscrimination. Great Britain is another example. Its first census question related to ethnicity was included in 1991, deemed necessary for the most part to quantify the phenomenon of ethnoracial discrimination in light of growing anti-discrimination awareness (Ballard, 1997). Simon (2005) traces a rise in such awareness, and associated adoption of proactive policies, in many of the ‘multicultural societies’ of the world. He shows how official statistics are often required for such policies, which vary between countries but “aim principally at ensuring equal access to the main areas of social life for groups... on the grounds of their exposure to prejudice and to discriminatory treatment” (Simon, 2005, p. 9).

Ultimately, such findings reflect the socially constructed nature of ethnicity earlier established. Census ethnic categories are never benignly descriptive markers of unalterable, primordial identities. Instead, their recognition of particular conceptualisations of ethnicity, and particular ethnic categorisations and schemas, are best understood as a selective, political process. The census is therefore a flashpoint of ethnicity, revealing different political pressures and
logics. It typically represents the interests of those with political power (Nobles, 2000) although it reinforces the hegemonic dominance of such understandings in claims to recording the sociocultural reality. Censuses are partly an institutional marker of the ethnoscape of a given country, but are also a tool utilised in shaping it.

2.3.3 Census as a response to top-down and endogenous pressures
An implicit assumption across most studies of ethnicity and censuses is that racial categorisations in the census are established in a ‘top-down’ manner, that is, controlled by influential political actors and imposed on the population to serve political ends. An example is Rallu el al.’s (2006) study, which has been key in the development of the theoretical framework developed in this thesis. It proposes a valuable typology of ethnic enumeration practices, or more correctly their rationales, which is logical and valuable. Implicitly, however, the typology frames enumeration as a top-down process which is developed in response to governmental concerns, as a tool of statecraft. It groups countries with broadly similar political motivations together (Kukutai & Thompson, forthcoming). Other notable studies of ethnic enumeration also adopt such a top-down focus. Blum (2002) argues that French rejection of ethnic enumeration is due to governmental efforts to minimise ethnic distinctions. Other studies focus on the utilisation of ethnic statistics by politically-powerful actors to exclude segments of the population, as in Uvin’s (2002) study of Rwanda and Burundi, and Hochschild and Powell’s (2008) and Snipp’s (1989) studies of racial measurement in the censuses in the United States.

In this respect, most such studies subscribe to an instrumentalist perspective of ethnic categories, as a contrivance conceptualised, changed and manipulated by the socio-political elite to serve particular ends. Recent work, however, has demonstrated that while censuses have been controlled by officials, statisticians and politicians for most of their histories, there is an increasing influence of groups within civil society which should not be discounted. Long (2002) argues that ethnic communities which are classified in censuses receive both symbolic
and material benefits unavailable to other communities, and that ethnic communities make up political interest groups which seek to achieve such recognition. She shows how such interest groups have at various times exerted influence on the formation of ethnic categories in the United Kingdom and United States.

Nobles (2000, 2002) shows how America’s Hispanic community lobbied and organised for recognition in the United States census, something the multiracial movement has also sought. She documents attempts by the Brazilian black movement, *movimento negro*, for a ‘black’ race to be measured in the Brazilian census, in hopes of awakening a sense of solidarity and advance demand for resources and power for an oppressed majority. Census agencies in Canada and New Zealand have been forced to acknowledge grass-roots demands for recognition of national-labels of Canadian and New Zealander as ethnic categories (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b; Kukutai & Didham, 2011). Such findings support the notion that the census is an inherently political undertaking, while making clear that the political influence exerted on census agencies may increasingly be as much of a bottom-up process as a top-down one.

A further key assumption of existing case-studies is that approaches toward ethnic enumeration are largely a result of a country’s own unique historical and political factors (Nobles, 2000; Blum, 2002; Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; Rodríguez, 2000). The historical research of Ventresca (2003) shows an international influence on governmental statistics from the beginnings of modern demography. His study shows how from their beginnings in the 19th century, international and regional intergovernmental organisations, scientific and professional organisations and International Statistical Congresses promoted and exerted considerable influence on census-taking at the individual-state level. The 1853 Statistical Congress in Brussels, for example, resolved and published a set of comprehensive and specific guidelines and desiderata for census activity. It is not just internal social and historical factors that influence state level enumeration approaches but also the international context matters. The
exclusive focus on endogenous influences is a key limitation of the dominant case-study approach.

2.4 WORLD POLITY THEORY

A key argument of this thesis is that the case-study approach favoured in the census ethnic enumeration literature does not adequately consider cross-national influences on ethnic counting. Morning’s (2008) exploratory and descriptive study, one of few studies examining ethnicity-related census practices in a global context, found that census question and answer formats display regional patterns, suggesting that exogenous factors also influence national approaches. This may be unsurprising, given the gradual integration of countries into a globalised community. Constitutional expert Sir Kenneth Keith makes a valuable point here:

In the present world, made even smaller by technology and many other human and natural forces, no State is fully sovereign... no politician or government has real or internal sovereignty. What we are seeing is the dispersal of power from so-called Sovereign-states in at least three directions – to the international community, to the private sector, and to public bodies and communities within the State (as cited in Durie, 1998, pp. 218-219).

This passage highlights two influences on censuses in the modern context which seem to have been largely overlooked: the growing capacity of ethnic communities within a State to influence census practice; and the increasing role and influence of international organisations, instruments and arrangements on practices at the national level.

In considering such exogenous, international influences on census activity this thesis will utilise insights from a neo-institutional perspective of globalisation known as world society or world polity theory. Associated particularly with the

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32 Rallu et al. (2006) being the notable exception. This study however, while global in nature, is not drawn from the complete international sample universe. A wider sample may influence their findings and alter their four-part schema. Moreover, in proving a four-part typology situating states with broadly similar political motivations with regards to ethnic enumeration, it is more descriptive than explanatory in nature.
work of John W. Meyer (see, amongst others, Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; Meyer, 2009), the central claim of this theory is that features of individual nation-states derive from “worldwide models, constructed and propagated through global cultural and associational processes” (Meyer et al., 1997, pp. 144-145). Emerging global institutions, international organisations, and an increasingly common world society (or ‘culture’) have come to shape the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in virtually all domains of modern social life. A growing number of studies adopting a world society theory approach\(^{33}\) have demonstrated how the modernist vision of nation-states as autonomous and calculated entities is disingenuous, that in fact ‘no nation-state is an island’ (Meyer, et al., 1997). Such studies have demonstrated how activities at the national, local, and even the individual level are influenced by ideas and practices diffused from a common, core ‘world society’.

While such theorists argue that aspects of a cross-national world society have long been operating as shapers of individual states and societies, they have become especially relevant post-World War Two as organisational development of world society has intensified. Such pressures have seen societies become increasingly more similar – or isomorphic - in terms of government and society. For example, previously-colonised nations such as those of the Pacific have developed education systems remarkably similar to wealthy Western countries. World polity theory explains such isomorphism in terms of countries conforming to the dominant and legitimated views, ideas, and policy approaches. Such conventional notions about what a normal or appropriate nation and government looks like can be seen as cultural models (Meyer et al., 1997). In explaining these cultural models, world society theory stresses the historical build-up of international organisations and structures – such as the United Nations and international associations – that serve to institutionalise them, arguing that these are what embodies and sustains a global culture.

\(^{33}\) For a comprehensive bibliography, see Boli, Gallo-Cruz, & Mathias, 2009.
Institutions and associations which make up the world polity are therefore important to consider in world society theory, inasmuch as they act as propagators for standardised social and governmental arrangements worldwide (Meyer, 2009). Such institutions include intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund; and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) including Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund. Such organisations are in unique positions to influence states towards particular practices in line with the global norms of civil society. The various human rights treaties and instruments established under the auspices of the United Nations since the 1960s, including the International Convention of the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, is an important example. This, and subsequent, international human rights instruments institutionalised the global recognition of minority rights, prohibiting “any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin” and promoting even-handed and anti-discriminatory state policies (United Nations General Assembly, 1965). Given the importance of adequate and robust ethnic and racial statistics in establishing reasoned and effective equality policy (Simon, 2005), it seems reasonable to surmise that the influence of the UN, in diffusing global norms about minority rights and anti-discriminatory policy, have influenced the practice and pattern of ethnic enumeration worldwide.

Existing studies in this area have mostly left unexplored any cross-national influences upon local approaches toward ethnic enumeration. This thesis takes a relatively novel approach in considering the influence of global society on national-level practices of ethnic enumeration in the countries of the Pacific.

2.5 COLONIALISM AND COUNTING

Central to this thesis is the argument that the evolution of ethnic enumeration in the Pacific is closely tied to colonialism. While little firm information on the levels of ethnic recognition in the pre-colonial Pacific exists, Linnekin and Poyer (1990) argue strongly that Pacific Islanders did not conceive of themselves as having
ethnic differences, at least not in the way the term in now understood. Ethnic awareness, at least as we understand it, likely developed in Oceania alongside colonialism.

‘Postcolonialism’ or post-colonial theory has been influential in shaping modern debate about the colonial experience and its aftermath, and therefore important for considering the role colonialism has played in forms of ethnic enumeration (Lawson, 2010). This theory is concerned with the political and cultural subjugation of peoples in colonial empires. A central claim is that a key body of ideas supported Western imperialism and colonialism, and that power, representation and knowledge were intertwined in maintaining colonial hegemony (Larson & Aminzade, 2009). Orientalism (1978), the critical study of Edward Said mentioned in the previous chapter, is regarded as the founding work of post-colonial theory. Critiquing (Western) colonialism and its mechanisms of oppression and control, Said and subsequent post-colonial thinkers argue that European social and political thought framed and represented colonial subjects patronisingly as ‘Others’, who were static, irrational and undeveloped. Implicit in this fabrication was the notion of Europeans and European society as developed, rational and superior (Said, 1978). A long tradition of western thought and literary works, post-colonialists argue, have supported such notions and served as an implicit justification for European imperialism and, inasmuch as Western dominance continues, neo-colonialism (Lawson, 2010).

The idea of colonial subjects as racially inferior was a particularly important theoretical foundation for justifying global European hegemony (Hirschman, 1987). Colonisers, in keeping with Western Enlightenment thought, regarded race as a natural, self-evident component of human identity. Claims that the colonised were racially inferior sustained and justified the economic, social and political privileges granted to the colonisers. Chatterjee (1993, p. 29) refers to this as the “rule of colonial difference”, arguing that the colonised were represented as biologically “incorrigibly inferior” (p. 33). Racism was therefore a
built in and natural product of colonialism. In the colonial Pacific, racial identification mattered because the nature of citizenship and participation in the political and economic system depended on it (Firth, 1997; Luker, 2008). From this perspective, and acknowledging the link between knowledge and power, it is easier to understand the counting to dominate and exclude approach toward ethnic enumeration which Rallu et al. (2006) argue is exemplified by colonial demography.

The use of enumerative strategies to buttress European rule are well demonstrated in Hirschman’s study (1987), which traces the meaning and measurement of ethnicity in Malaysian censuses. Throughout the period of British colonial possession the Malayan populace was enumerated according a strict pseudo-biological understanding of ‘race’. Europeans were “put at the top of the list and sub-classified in obsessive detail, in spite of their relatively trivial demographic size” (Hirschman, 1987, p. 562). Another well-recorded colonial demographic impulse saw the coalescing of native Malay persons into vastly simplified categorisations, according to European perceptions, something also found in Africa (Cordell, Ittmann & Maddox, 2010) and India (Cohn, 1987, 1996). The vastly culturally, religious and linguistically heterogeneous Malayan populace, built from centuries of extensive population movement and trade, were recorded in colonial censuses as either “Malay”, “Chinese” or “Indian” (Hirschman, 1987). The simplified Polynesian/Micronesian/Melanesian taxonomy of ‘races’ in Oceania is an expression of similar homogenising colonial compulsions.

Especially important for this study spanning the decolonising era in the Pacific is postcolonial theory’s insight into changing forms of knowledge in newly-independent colonial states. Because post-colonialism views the nexus between power and knowledge as absolute, new forms of non-colonial power necessitate the development of new (or a return to) non-colonial forms of knowledge. This is problematic, as Ashcroft (2000) argues:
The most intransigent problem to face post-colonial states today is (still) the challenge of re-constructing inherited institutions and practices in a way that adheres to the demands of local knowledges, makes use of the benefits of local practices, and maintains an integrity of self-representation.

As post-colonial theory argues that colonial states relied on ‘Othering’ in the form of racialised social orders, post-colonial nation-building must “resolve, subsume or otherwise overcome the racial and ethnic legacies inherited from a colonial past marked by racial domination and inequality” (Larson & Aminzade, 2009, p. 171). Colonial states usually inhabit arbitrarily defined borders. Alongside the labour flows of global imperialism, this has meant that post-colonial states are usually markedly poly-ethnic. Because colonial powers tended to privilege particular local groups as localised elite, particular groups often dominate politics or the economy. Examples include the pastoral Tutsi in colonial Rwanda (Uvin, 2002), and Indians in Fiji, though more economically than politically (Larson & Aminzade, 2009). Because post-colonial notions of nationalism are premised on turning back the clock to a pre-colonial era, there are often fraught debates surrounding who the newly-formed state really represents, which groups merit membership, and which are legitimately entitled to access power and resources. In many countries, interethnic conflict, even civil war, has resulted from the difficulties faced by states in both addressing colonial-era injustices and building national unity despite legacies of deep racial divisions (Uvin, 2002). This “dilemma of national identity”, Larson and Aminzade (2009, p. 170) argue, is the key challenge facing post-colonial states.

As the countries of Melanesia are more culturally and linguistically diverse, it is unsurprising then that they have experienced greater challenges in post-independence nation-building than the countries of Polynesia and Micronesia. Commentators refer to an ‘arc of instability’ of inherently weak and unstable states in Melanesia (Rumley, Forbes, & Griffin, 2006; May, 2003). Coups, ethnic

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34 The need to develop ‘national identities’ outside of colonial frames was felt even by Europeans in settler colonies. The ‘quest for origins’, a New Zealand national identity and a nationalist mythology has occupied many writers and much New Zealand historiography (Tyson, 2007).
conflict, separatist movements and weak and ineffective governments have characterised recent history in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, despite these Melanesian islands being far more resource-rich than smaller islands elsewhere in the Pacific. This is perhaps a reflection of the difficulty in forming self-conscious national communities in these more culturally heterogeneous islands.

One emergent post-colonial model of governance and articulation of identity which has emerged in newly-independent Oceania is the so-called ‘Pacific Way’ (Crocombe, 1976). This term was first used by Fijian Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, during an address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1970 (Mara, 1997). It came to signify a collective political identity for Oceanic island states in the aftermath of independence, and a unique Pacific character based on broadly shared political and social values (Crocombe, 1976). The ‘Pacific Way’ represents the shared interests of Pacific societies in doing things outside of Western thinking and influenced the establishment of regional institutions such as the South Pacific Forum and the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Crocombe (1976) argues that “it [the Pacific Way] clearly connotes some perception of an element of uniqueness and unity relative to external influence.” The Pacific Way provides a postcolonial defence against what Borofsky (2000) describes as “Outlanders” (non-Pacific Islanders). He suggests that opposing Outlanders offers a ready way to mobilise Islanders — silencing the differences within and becoming a call to action against previous colonial oppressors. Local and regional practices and institutions continue to be informed by such notions of a ‘Pacific Way’, a term which maintains much positive currency in the region (Lawson, 2010). Connected with this has been the rise in the term ‘Pasifika’ (or Pasefika), the translation of ‘Pacific’ in several of the Oceanic languages. This may be seen as a postcolonial term in that it (as least superficially) originates within the multi-ethnic Pacific. As indigenous scholars have noted, when the power to define and give meaning is in the hands of others (rather than indigenous peoples), then a group has lost power and control over their own constructions (Smith, 1999; Samu, 2007).
Post-colonial theory can be critiqued as somewhat simplistic in its approach, ignoring class and gender in its analyses (Dirlik, 1997). It also tends to gloss over cases involving local, non-Western instances of domination because they do not fit the particular normative framework of postcolonial analysis of Western/non-Western, oppressors/oppressed. For example, in the Pacific context Tongan scholar Epeli Hau’ofa points out:

> Europeans did not invent belittlement. In many societies it was part and parcel of indigenous cultures. In the aristocratic societies of Polynesia parallel relationships of dominance and subordination with their paraphernalia of appropriate attitudes and behaviour were the order of the day. In Tonga, the term for commoners is me’a vale, “the ignorant ones”, which is a survival from an era when the aristocracy controlled all the important knowledge in the society. Keeping the ordinary folk in the dark and calling them ignorant made it easier to control and subordinate them (Hau’ofa, 1999, p. 28).

The colonial oppressor/indigenous oppressor binary of postcolonial theorising may be somewhat misleading, as Lawson (2010) points out. Nevertheless, post-colonial theory accounts for the post-independence development of cultural and national identities challenging the cultural, intellectual and philosophic assumptions and misrepresentations inherent to colonialism. Caution needs to be taken in making any grand generalisations about the colonial experience or its legacy, as colonialism adopted distinctive forms in specific national contexts (Larson & Aminzade, 2009). However, general shifts in the conceptualisation and measurement of ethnic difference, and the influence here of political independence and decolonising processes, is a key consideration of this thesis. These are well considered through a post-colonial theoretical lens. Such changes, it is hypothesised in the following chapter, will include movement away from rigid conceptualisations of group identity such as race (important for justifying the colonial order), towards more fluid, cultural based understandings, terminology and response options.
2.6 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

While the preceding sections have outlined the literature informing this study, this final section summarises these into a succinct theoretical framework.

This study adopts the constructivist understanding of ethnicity, and considers ‘ethnicity’ to refer of any of the terms and concepts used to measure at their core common descent. The key influence of constructivist ethnic theory is the conceptualisation of ethnicity as both socially constructed and historically contingent. Ethnicity, constructed by boundaries symbolically maintained between groups, is a social process rather than a primordial given. Censuses are a key site where constructions and understandings of ethnic identity may clearly be witnessed, as their claims to legitimacy and influence on access to real and symbolic resources make them a key tool in the creation of a socially-constructed ‘reality’ in the highly politicised realm of ethnic identity (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). Official approaches towards enumerating (or not enumerating) by ethnicity are carefully considered and adopted according to differing political motivations (Rallu et al., 2006) and changes in the measurement of ethnicity “reflect shifts in ideology and the political economy” (Hirschman, 1987, p. 557). Knowledge, as Michel Foucault has pointed out, and Edward Said demonstrates in a colonial context (1978), is tied to power, and remains one of its major modes of operation. Thus the widely differing forms and approaches towards ethnic enumeration adopted in different countries (see Morning, 2008) are reflections of broader social and political influences.

Especially when ethnic groups are considered in a constructivist sense as “situational precipitates, products of particular events, relationships, and processes that are themselves subject to change” (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007, p. 82), Oceania offers an ideal site to examine the role of the census in ethnic construction and influences on the process. As a colonised region, where human difference was not traditionally conceived in terms of ethnic communities of descent, constructivist understandings of ethnic identities as created by social processes in particular historical, political and economic contexts may be
especially evident. In Oceania, ‘top-down’ influences tied to colonialism should be especially prominent in historical patterns of ethnic grouping. For instance, the labels Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian identities are a common categorisation of Pacific island identities. These identities originated as colonial constructions; impositions of knowledge useful for European ends but a gross simplification of local identities (Douglas & Ballard, 2008; Howe, 2003). Colonial censuses were both influenced by, and used to buttress, racial theory. Racial theory, in turn, provided a rationale for the unequal political, social and economic treatment of the indigenous population. Processes linked to political independence are likely to have played a role in why and how countries have counted by ethnicity in Oceania.

Aside from changes in political motives emphasised by postcolonial theory, research in the world polity tradition suggests regional impacts and influences in ethnic enumeration connected to trends in world society. The influence of such world society, driven by international organisations, is increasingly felt at a national level – ‘no country is an island’. This study considers regional trends and patterns in light of these insights, considering global changes and trends in ethnic counting practices and their impact in the region. The following chapter applies and extends the theoretical insights of this chapter to the Oceanic region, further contextualising the substantive findings of later chapters.
3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter argued that ethnic differences are not inflexible and fixed, but rather situational, contextual and, to some extent, malleable. They are determined - or “constructed” - by institutions, historical epochs, economic endowments, politics and demographic practices, including census categorisations (Kanbur, Rajaram, & Varshney, 2011; Anderson, 1991). Considering ethnicity in such terms necessitates closer examination of some of the forces which have historically shaped understandings of human difference in the Pacific region, to adequately contextualise this study. This chapter provides for such contextualisation. Alongside the foregoing theoretical chapter, it provides the framework for understanding the substantive conclusions of later chapters.

Made up of many thousands of islands, the region of Oceania encompasses the most heterogeneous collection of cultures and languages in the world relative to its population (Rallu, 2010). Original inhabitation of the region began in Australia and Papua New Guinea as early as 60,000 years ago. The dates and methods of subsequent eastward voyaging and settlement have been disputed since Europeans first entered the Pacific (an excellent summary of academic debate in this area is provided by Howe, 2003). Settlement likely occurred as a gradual migration, with key phases of exploration and settlement, until New Zealand, in the far southeast, was settled last, around 1,300 AD (Howe, 2003). While substantive cultural distinctions always existed between the region’s indigenous inhabitants, these distinctions were traditionally fluid and transmutable, with significant cross-cultural contact maintained through the region (Hau’ofa, 1993;
Campbell, 2011). Extensive and sustained interaction with outsiders was not to occur in much of Oceania until the 1800s, with some local peoples not encountering any until well into the 1900s. Oceania was the last inhabited region in the world to be colonised by European powers, and is has not fully decolonised (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2009). Indeed, according to some commentators and academics, colonial relationships in the region have even accelerated and intensified, in new and changing forms linked to economic, rather than directly political dominance (see, for example, Denoon, Firth, Linnekin, Meleisea, & Nero, 1997).

While kinship was always an important organising principle in the Pacific, Linnekin and Poyer (1990) have argued that “ethnic group organisation was absent in the pre-colonial Pacific” (pp. 10-11). Local theories of affiliation, they argue, “emphasised context, situation, performance, and place over biological descent” (1990, p. 11). While gemeinschaften communities of kin have always existed in the Pacific, gesellschaften ethnic groups beyond the level of direct familial or community ties did not exist as categorical imperatives in pre-contact Oceania. The gradual formation of racial identities reflected the mounting influence of Western modes of thought, with ‘race’ squarely a rationalist European concept. The impacts of colonialism were more than just practical, with new and unfamiliar political and economic structures emerging, but also conceptual. The colonial formation of such gesellschaften identities, and their subsequent hegemony, is a further illustration of how such identities are not primordial but products of particular historical circumstances.

Political and bureaucratic institutions – not least the census – played an important role here, promoting notions of inflexible and salient racial identities vastly different to how human difference had been conceived pre-colonially. To expand on Widmer’s (2008) argument, the colonial desire for the representation of a social whole, a ‘population’, saw enumerative strategies utilised which played a large role in both establishing and naturalising hitherto non-existent ethnoracial categories (and a racial order) in Oceania. Such processes of
‘representation’, including census enumeration, demonstrate Mitchell’s (2000, p. 17) observation that “the colonial-modern involves creating an effect that we recognize as reality, by organizing the world to represent it”. The state-backed introduction of racial ideologies was a powerful idea which came to alter pre-existing notions of identity: prior to such colonial influences, Pacific peoples tended to possess “multiple, nested affiliations in a conceptual hierarchy... no evidence exists that group identity was seen as categorical, innate, and superordinate” (Linnekin & Poyer, 1990, p. 11).

This chapter applies a constructivist lens in a broad overview of how ‘origins’, cultural groupings and human difference have been imagined in Oceania, prior to and during the primary colonial era which immediately precedes this study. It outlines some notable influences (such as the racialised scientific imaginings of the colonial era) on constructions of ethnicity in Oceania. In doing so, it both historically contextualises and further conceptually informs the study as a whole. Existing global case-study literature examining colonialism and census-taking is considered and related to the Pacific in the later part of the chapter, reflecting the key research focus of this study in considering the influence of colonial processes on ethnic enumeration. The final section of the chapter outlines a number of key assumptions and conclusions drawn from this and the preceding chapter, which constitute the basic theoretical framework of this study.

3.2 SETTLEMENT AND ORIGINS – THE PRE-COLONIAL PACIFIC

While Australia and New Guinea (and its nearby islands) have been inhabited from prehistoric times, perhaps 60,000 years ago, most Pacific islands appear to have been uninhabited for much of human history. Although controversy has long raged over the origins and timing of Eastern Pacific settlement (see Howe, 2003), conventional opinion states that they first came to be settled by

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1 Archaeological, linguistic and genetic evidence ties the ‘Papuan’ peoples of New Guinea and nearby islands to Australian aboriginal populations from when the island was connected to the continent via a land-bridge in a landmass known as Sahul. Various Papuan-speaking groups make up the majority of the population in Melanesia, while Austronesian groups (of Asian origin) make up part of the population. A significant degree of cultural and genetic mixing between the two groups has occurred (Campbell, 2011; Howe, 2003).
‘Austronesian’ peoples, originating from Asia, in a gradual seafaring migration which began around 3,500 years ago (see Campbell, 2011; Irwin, 1992). Western Micronesia, the islands closest to mainland Asia, were settled by 1,400 BC, roughly the same time archaeological evidence (primarily through distinctive ‘Lapita’ pottery) dates Austronesian-speakers in the Bismarck Archipelago of western Melanesia. These ‘Lapita’ people were active colonists with an expansive attitude who possessed remarkable seafaring skills. They established settlements on neighbouring islands and retained trade links between islands. By perhaps 900 BC they had appeared in the eastern islands of modern-day Micronesia, eastern Melanesia, and as far east as Samoa and Tonga in the west of Polynesia and about half way across the Pacific (Di Piazza & Pearethree, 1999). There appears to be evidence of two-way movement between these different settlements, with fairly rapid spreading of cultural innovations, so that Lapita people were evidently capable of return migration and voyaging throughout the general sphere of settlement shown in Figure 3.1. Given this area’s vastness, this represents extraordinary feats of navigation – Lapita people were likely the most advanced seafarers in the world at the time (Campbell, 2011).

Figure 3.1: Distribution of Lapita Sites in Oceania

Source: Di Piazza & Pearethree, 1999
This ‘Lapita phase’ of expansion, however, lasted only a few centuries or less, with exploration and colonisation seemingly having ceased once Fiji, Samoa and Tonga in the east were settled, in around 1,000 BC (see Howe, 2003, p. 68). At the same time, contact between (though not within) island groups seemingly dwindled to become a progressively rarer event. The isolated island groups began to diverge from each other, with language, pottery styles, and other cultural practices gradually changing from one another. In the islands now known as Melanesia, genetic intermixing occurred with pre-Austronesian ‘Papuan’ populations, resulting in many of the distinctive physical traits today associated with people of this island group (Spriggs, 1997). After Tonga and Samoa were settled, evidence suggests that up to a century elapsed before exploration and colonisation resumed into eastern Polynesia. Although dates remain disputed, this likely originated from Samoa (Campbell, 2011), into the Marquesas and Society Islands (in modern-day French Polynesia), earliest, in about 200 BC (Howe, 2003). From here, subsequent voyagers apparently ventured into the rest of modern-day French Polynesia, Hawai’i, Rapa Nui (Easter Island), and the Cook Islands before 1,000 AD, and finally from there to New Zealand, around 1,300 AD (see Howe, 2003; Denoon et al., 1997).

According to this recent scholarship, peoples of Micronesia and Polynesia share common origins and ancestry with a much larger ‘Austronesian’ population grouping which, for reasons not yet certain, began an epic colonisation of the Pacific, likely from somewhere in Asia around 2,000 BC (Howe, 2003). The existing ‘Papuan’ peoples, who had occupied the islands of Melanesia from prehistoric times, genetically and culturally intermixed with Austronesian newcomers in those islands (especially in coastal areas). The indigenous inhabitants of Australia, sharing distant ancestry with Papuans, remained distinct. Austronesian settlement took place in a long and convoluted chain of island-hopping voyages stretching across the South Pacific Ocean in an easterly direction (Howe, 2003; Campbell, 2011; Denoon et al., 1997). While extensive two-way contact between island groups can be demonstrated, the sheer size of the area (almost an entire hemisphere) meant relatively isolated populations of
different islands began to diverge linguistically and culturally, gradually becoming genetically distinctive (Campbell, 2011).

To discuss the cultural differences of the Pacific it is difficult to avoid using the tripartite division of the region into Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia, sub-regional groupings based on geographical and cultural distinctions first proposed by French explorer Dumont d'Urville in 1832 (and discussed in further detail below). However, it is important to note how, as Tongan scholar Epelu Hau’ofa (1993) points out, that before the colonial period there was no such sub-regions, nor even ‘countries’, only a vast sea in which people interspersed. Despite misconceptions of the contrary, the 'boundaries' between these regions were always permeable, not least culturally, and the differences between the regions are not as obvious as such a succinct categorisation suggests. Cultural historian Roger Green (1991), among others, believes a more meaningful categorisation is to partition Oceania two-fold, into ‘Near Oceania’, comprising mainland New Guinea, its outlying Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands, and ‘Remote Oceania’, comprising Micronesia, the Melanesian archipelagos of Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Fiji, and all of Polynesia. This distinction recognises the far longer history of ‘Papuan’ human occupation and influence in Near Oceania (beginning at least 40,000 years ago), and the relatively late expansion of Austronesian peoples into Remote Oceania (beginning around 2,000 BC). Howe (2003, p. 25) argues that the three-way Melanesia/Micronesia/Polynesian division should no longer be seen as denoting cultural regions. To do so is to continue with nineteenth century racial categories and classifications, although he concedes the terms remain useful (and are used in this study) for designating broad geographic regions. The three regions are shown in Figure 3.2 below.
Of the three groupings, Polynesia probably comes closest to representing a single coherent cultural region. Studies of molecular biology suggest that Polynesian ancestors passed through a ‘genetic bottleneck’ in their early history, likely associated with early Lapita-phase colonisation of the Tonga-Samoa region of western Polynesia, and suggesting relatively recent common origins (Blake et al., 1983). The cultures of the inhabited islands within what is now known as the ‘Polynesian triangle’², made up of Hawai’i in the north, Rapa Nui (Easter Island) to the east and New Zealand to the south, are relatively speaking culturally and linguistically homogenous (Kirch & Green, 2001; Howe, 2003). They generally share similar forms of social organisation and clear tribal groupings. Broad ethnographic dissimilarities can be discerned between western and eastern Polynesia, so that the two are sometimes considered separately. For instance, while all the languages of the region can be traced back to a Proto-Polynesian

² Although the so-called ‘Polynesian outliers’ exist as small communities of linguistically and culturally Polynesian groupings outside of this triangle proper, well to the west in geo-political Melanesia and Micronesia. Linguistic evidence and studies of DNA suggest they descend from western Polynesian seafarers and from around the same period that eastern Polynesia came to be settled (Blake et al., 1983).
language, those of eastern Polynesia are mutually comprehensible without too much difficulty, while western Polynesian languages diverge from each other more substantially and present more difficulties for eastern Polynesian speakers. This may be attributed to the extensive lag between settlement of the western islands of Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Wallis and Futuna before the relatively rapid colonisation of the more isolated eastern islands (Irwin, 1992). Nevertheless, the island populations of the entire Polynesian region share many common mythologies and spiritual beliefs - notably the universal concepts of mana and tapu/tabu/kapu. Many other social practices and aspects of material culture also retain commonalities (Campbell, 2011). This distinctiveness does not however suggest that substantial links cannot be observed between the islands of ‘Polynesia’ and their only slightly more distant neighbours in what is described as Micronesia and Melanesia (see Hau’ofa, 1993).

According to Campbell (2011), Micronesia can similarly be divided broadly into two distinct island groupings, although it displays somewhat fewer cultural commonalities than the islands of Polynesia. The western part, including the islands of Palau, Guam and the Mariana Islands, appear to have been settled in the earlier stages of Austronesian migration from Asia. The eastern islands, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands, were not settled until perhaps a thousand years later, northward from eastern Melanesia, probably during the period of relatively rapid ‘Lapita’ expansion. As a result the region always consisted of two cultural strands, and although the fact the islanders of the region were perhaps the greatest navigators of the Pacific saw the distinction lessened with time, it remains discernible (Denoon et al., 1997). As elsewhere, the differing archipelagos gradually became self-sustaining and developed their own distinctive, albeit related, cultures and languages. Linguistically, Micronesia is more diverse than Polynesia, with 15 less closely associated languages, but still far less numerous and perplexing than Melanesia. Socio-politically, these islands resemble Polynesia, with inherited ranks and similar kin-based groupings. Overall, their cultural practices can be said to be located at a mid-way point
between the extremes of Polynesia and Melanesia and with discernible Asian influences (Campbell, 2011).

In contrast to Polynesia, and to a lesser extent Micronesia, the population of the islands making up the region now regarded as Melanesia displayed a remarkable degree of heterogeneity. New Guinea, for instance, is widely acknowledged as the world’s most genetically diverse and culturally varied human population (Campbell, 2011, p. 45). With one-fifth of the world’s languages and an immense variety of social organisation, some generalisations about Melanesian societies are possible, though never universally applicable. For the most part, social units throughout Melanesia were small, based on villages of no more than a hundred people, and were notably xenophobic. In their larger and more resource-rich islands, the level of maritime exposure and expertise was generally lower in Melanesia than in either Polynesia or Micronesia. Inheritable leadership is less prevalent (Campbell, 2011). Few other generalisable cultural similarities may be discerned.

In Australia, the indigenous inhabitants, a hunting-gathering people often referred to as Aborigines, arrived about 60,000 years ago. Although their technical culture was fairly static (though highly efficient), their spiritual and social life was highly complex. Most spoke one or more of languages, and confederacies sometimes linked widely scattered, mostly nomadic, tribal groups, at least as diverse as the population of Melanesia. By the time Australia was claimed by Britain in 1770 (as uninhabited terrae nullius) the indigenous population may have numbered around 750,000 in as many as 500 tribes, speaking several hundred languages. While Aborigines originated within Australia from prehistoric times, they may be distinguished from Torres Strait Islanders, who take their name from the strait dividing mainland Australia from Papua New Guinea, and who are a distinct Austronesian seafaring people with their own culture and identity (Spriggs, 1997).
The past and present patterning of Pacific languages suggests a long history of intensive contact in trade and exchange between Pacific peoples and complex processes of indigenous migration and settlement. The Pacific, with local peoples being excellent seafarers, was always a region in which peoples and cultures moved and mingled unhindered. A useful and way of conceiving this (perhaps somewhat counterintuitive) interconnectedness is provided by Tongan scholar Epeli Hau’ofa (1993), who argues against the common presumption that the Pacific nations are small and isolated – ‘islands in a far sea’, and who instead describes the Pacific as ‘our sea of islands’. Hau’ofa believes the common view of a region of isolated and small islands is a basic misconception of continental Europeans, and that Pacific peoples traditionally saw their world as anything but tiny: “Their was a large world in which peoples and cultures moved and mingled unhindered…the sea was open to anyone who could navigate his way through” (Hau’ofa, 1993, pp. 8-9). Examination of the settlement of the Pacific and the cultural origins of its populations demonstrates that the human populations of these islands were always significantly more culturally dynamic and mobile than later categorisations and narratives may suggest. Pacific peoples moved freely and frequently, created social networks, traded and exchanged goods, and at times engaged in conflict and attempted to exert dominance over one another (Lee, 2009). For example, Kaeppler (1978) shows how Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, while culturally distinct, maintained an interconnected social system during the pre-colonial era in which goods and cultural practices were exchanged and significant interisland mobility maintained. Similarly, ancestral ties have long been maintained between the Southern Cook Islands and Tahiti, in French Polynesia, with land rights in Papeete, the capital of Tahiti held by the people of Atiu, in the Cook Islands (Mason & Hereniko, 1987).

3.3 RACE AND RACISM – THE COLONIAL PACIFIC

Contact between the peoples of the Pacific and the eventual colonisation of the region was a gradual process, and as such there is no sharp break between a pre-European and a European era. Campbell (2011, p. 61) describes the coming of Europeans as “sporadic, intermittent and protracted”. The first Europeans to
enter the region were the Spanish, who had conquered much of the Americas and in the 1500s began to explore westward into the Pacific. In his attempt to circumnavigate the globe for the first time, Spaniard Ferdinand Magellan crossed the Pacific in 1521 and ‘discovered’ the Marianas and other islands of northern Micronesia, before reaching the Philippines in Southeast Asia\(^3\). While the Spanish were the only significant presence in the Pacific for much of the following century, later expeditions came eastward from the Dutch and Portuguese, who had established commercial interests in modern-day Indonesia. Contacts between these early explorers and native inhabitants were brief, with neither power seeking more than immediate commercial opportunity (Denoon, 1997).

It was the famous British explorer Captain James Cook who ushered in the modern era of European Pacific contact. In three voyages beginning in 1768, Cook mapped lands from New Zealand to Hawai‘i on a scale and depth not previously attempted by Europeans. His voyages marked a shift in Western perceptions of the Pacific, formalising its geography, assessing its strategic and mercantile prospects, and beginning the European study of local cultures and of probing the nature which characterised the colonial era (Howe, 2003). Other governments soon sponsored Pacific expeditions, often in rivalry or emulation of Cook, so that by the end of the 1700s, most of the region had been ‘discovered’ (Denoon et al., 1997). Soon, ever greater numbers of Europeans began to enter the Pacific region and establish contact with the local inhabitants. Commerce and religion were the two chief motivations, the first seeking natural resources and trade opportunities, the second seeking to evangelise native populations. Both irrevocably altered local cultures, as Campbell (2011, p. 88) writes:

> When the stream of foreigners first began to flow into the Pacific, changes in island cultures and politics became inevitable. New weapons of war, new tools, new foodstuffs and new microbes had irreversible effects, catastrophic for some and unsettling for all.

\(^3\) Which would become a Spanish colony.
While originating with the Spanish in Micronesia, the central trend of European exploration and settlement was from east to west, with European ships typically entering the region via Cape Horn in the east. Thus, small European communities began to form in Polynesia from the late 1700s, and gradually spread eastward, eventually settling in Melanesia to the west, at first as missionaries, during the 1830s (Campbell, 2011).

Early European influences in the Pacific soon placed pressure on European governments to get involved politically and administratively in Pacific societies. Missionaries despaired at the influence of ‘lawless’ Europeans, while entrepreneurial traders and commercial interests sought secure land title and capital, with investors placing a premium on government oversight. European governments were wary of the inevitable responsibilities and costs of forming official administrations, but gradually began to obtain and acquire territories. While Spain administered some Micronesian islands since 1565, the first colonial territory established in the southern Pacific was the penal British colony of New South Wales, in 1788. Imperial rivalry between European powers, trade opportunities and missionary zeal drove further colonisation. Thus, in 1900, when Tonga became a British protectorate and de facto colony, no inhabited islands of Oceania remained outside the effective control of Great Britain, France, Germany, or the United States (Campbell, 2011; Denoon et al., 1997).

For the purposes of this study, it is most important to consider the influence of colonialism on the cultural identities of native Islanders. In terms of interpersonal divisions, Hau’ofa’s (1993) argument that the traditional dynamism and mobility of Pacific peoples came to a halt as colonial borders, ‘imaginary lines in the sea’ were established in the 19th century is an important one. Whereas historians have recorded the exchange of peoples and cultures throughout the region, as voyaging for trade and other purposes kept islands in contact, colonialism meant national borders were established which soon curtailed such movement and mingling. As Hau’ofa argues:
Nineteenth century imperialism erected boundaries that led to the contraction of Oceania, transforming a once boundless world into the Pacific islands states and territories that we know today. People were confined to their tiny spaces, isolated from each other. No longer could they travel freely to do what they had done for centuries (Hau’ofa, 1993, p. 10).

Wherever colonies were established, Islanders’ mobility was restricted, and old networks of trade and contact lapsed or shrank (Denoon, 1997, p. 249). This ‘colonial confinement’, the imposition of cultural (and physical) boundaries, was the greatest physical influence on the cultural landscape, or ethnoscape, of Oceania in the colonial era. National identities not previously recognised or considered came into being as named and comparatively rigid categories, with their boundaries defined by outsider Europeans. This reflects constructivist understandings of ethnicity as both changeable and contingent, and flexible in terms of its social relevance. During the colonial era, imposed identities to which Pacific people belonged became more influential in ordering social lives.4

Europeans had a dramatic influence on the cultures of the Pacific region. They introduced capitalism, exploiting natural resources and instituting paid work, and new, sometimes destructive products including alcohol, iron goods and firearms (Campbell, 2011). They brought new diseases, epidemics of which contributed to shocking levels of depopulation - such as an estimated 90 percent decline in the Australian Aboriginal population by the 1930s (Denoon, 1997, p. 244). The expropriation of land and collapse of native tradition, aided often by deliberate policies and the evangelisation project of European missionaries, resulted in significant social and cultural dislocation (Denoon, 1997; Campbell, 2011). In terms of ethnicity and ethnic enumeration, the labour flows established by colonial regimes are important. European migrants, entrepreneurs and administrators came to settle throughout the region as colonialism saw the Pacific islands incorporated into a global economy. The labour requirements of European-established economic concerns such as plantations (sugar cane in Fiji, copra in Samoa) and mines (nickel in New Caledonia) prompted the recruitment

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4 Or thicker, in the terminology of Cornell and Hartmann (2007).
and importation of workers by colonial administrators, given the understandable reluctance of locals to engage in the slave-like conditions of these early enterprises. Asian peoples had experienced longer exposure to Western monetary economies and had fewer options, and many Indians and Chinese were induced to travel to Oceania as contract labourers. Most returned to their homelands, but sizeable numbers settled and began to think of the Pacific as home. Indeed, Crocombe (2007) argues that Asians that came to Oceania as colonial labour in fact outnumbered Europeans, though in less powerful roles, and usually at the bottom of the colonial racial hierarchy. These flows ran counter to the generally lessened mobility (and thus cultural dynamism and fluidity) that colonial structures such as national borders meant for Pacific peoples (Hau’ofa, 1993). They did, however, prompt the beginnings of truly multi-ethnic Pacific societies.

### 3.3.1 Ideas of race in Oceania

Cultural differences in the Pacific were seen through the colonial European lens, as markers of ‘racial’ difference, in keeping with the 19th and early 20th century predominance of racial discourses in explaining interpersonal difference. From the inception of European contact, categorising and classifying the races of the Pacific absorbed the attention of many European ‘experts’ of various stripes (Campbell, 2011). According to Howe “the Pacific was a major laboratory for human studies” (2003, p. 23). European newcomers were concerned with recording and interpreting the new and unknown, a concern which led to the classification of local peoples according to assumed frameworks and hierarchies. Pacific missionaries, administrators and scholars devised numerous schema and taxonomies to classify local populations, but it was the French naval explorer Dumont d’Urville’s proposed three-part geo-racial division of 1832 (geographically represented in Figure 3.2) which entered the popular lexicon. d’Urville’s taxonomy divided Pacific peoples into three ‘races’ on the basis of skin

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5 A notable exception being the notorious ‘blackbirding’ trade, akin to slave trading, which involved indigenous Pacific Islanders being recruited through nefarious means to work as labourers in various colonial enterprises, such as plantations in Queensland (Mason & Hereniko, 1987).
colour, physical appearance, language, political institutions, religion, and even the reception toward Europeans of the local population. It comprised three island groups: Melanesia - ‘black islands’, Micronesia – ‘small islands’, and Polynesia – ‘many islands’ (Douglas, 2008b). These categories were racial, in that they were based on a concept of race which had emerged in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, and thought to constitute immutable and distinct human types (or even species) which shared particular physical characteristics, such as body type, temperament and mental capacity.

d'Urville's typology, widely accepted by the end of the 19th century, intrinsically included racialised European attitudes and biases (Howe, 2003). Polynesians were regarded as relatively superior with Melanesians as smaller, darker and inferior. d'Urville found them “disagreeable” and “generally very inferior” to the “copper-coloured” Polynesians, while Micronesians, given the small size of their island homes, were seen as insignificant. The ‘Australians’ and 'Tasmanians' were at the base of the original typology, and were described by d'Urville as “the primitive and natural state of the Melanesian race” (d'Urville, 1832, as cited in Douglas, 2008a, p. 10). The creation of such racial categories in Pacific, and their gradation into a hierarchical scheme, had less to do with classifying the population than with providing a legitimacy to the European world view (Howe, 2003). In locating and measuring the Oceanic ‘Other’, the self was also located and measured, allowing for notions of European cultural superiority and ideologically supporting the colonial project.

From its inception the European colonisation of Oceania was influenced by the understandings and projections of taxonomic races in contemporary Western scholarship. Indeed, the Pacific was central to the development of European notions and understandings of race during the 19th and early 20th century. Far from being a locale where theories related to race were secondarily applied, scholars of biology, anthropology, eugenics or colonialism were influenced by the Pacific (see Howe, 2003; Douglas & Ballard, 2008). Racialised attitudes and beliefs were implicated in administrative structures throughout the colonial
period. In 1920, the Foreign Office handbook on British Possessions in Oceania differentiated Pacific Islanders along explicitly racial lines: Solomon Islanders were “a Melanesian race, still largely in a state of barbarism” and “naked savages scarcely beyond the head-hunting stage of development”; whereas Tongans were “a branch of the Polynesian race”, “a highly advanced native race who have accepted Christianity” (as cited in Douglas, 2008a, p. 12). Everywhere, local cultures were treated as less valuable and valid than those of the colonisers, as inferior, native ‘Others’. It is notable that, shorn of some of their more overtly racist connotations, the terms ‘Melanesian’, ‘Polynesian’ and ‘Micronesian’ have been naturalised in modern indigenous usages by some Pacific Islanders themselves (Douglas, 2008b, p. 124). This is a reflection perhaps of the active process by which ethnic groups also ‘make’ themselves in the constructivist sense of the term.

An oft-cited example of the strength of racial discourse in the colonial-era Pacific is the significant contemporary administrative and scholarly concerns with the so-called problem of ‘miscegenation’ (Anderson, 2009; Widmer, 2012). This term entered the historical record during the 19th century and refers to the ‘racial admixture’ of different populations (Luker, 2008). As a challenge to the racial hierarchy, reproductive relationships between Europeans and colonised locals were widely considered to be problematic and racially transgressive. So-called anti-miscegenation laws were enacted to legally prohibit such relationships. In Oceania, European partnering with darker Melanesians and Aborigines was of particular concern for the European establishment (Widmer, 2012). By contrast, in the more favoured Micronesia and Polynesia, the ‘invigoration’ of the local populace through hybridisation with Europeans was sometimes regarded as

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6 This is not to suggest that Polynesian populations were especially privileged subjects. An 1881 parliamentary quote from a Dr Newman reveals the level of ideological Eurocentrism and cultural superiority which underpinned European views of Māori in colonial history: “Taking all things into consideration, the disappearance of the race is scarcely subject for much regret. They are dying out in a quick, easy way, and are being supplanted by a superior race” (Newman, 1881, as cited in Buck, 1924, p. 362).

7 Such genetic mixing has of course occurred since ancient times. Given the extremely dubious nature of ‘race’ as a concrete phenomenon, the term miscegenation simply refers to certain relationships which were frowned upon in particular historical, political and economic contexts, and is today considered offensive.
desirable. In 1927, for instance, European scholar Stephen Roberts promoted “racial mixing” in the colonies of “Hawaii, New Zealand, Tahiti, Tonga and perhaps Samoa in the future”, while being clear that he would not extend his support for it to include unions with Melanesians (Roberts, 1927, p. 366).

3.3.2 The ‘post-colonial’ Pacific

Just as trends in world society earlier legitimised the establishment of colonial empires, the international attitude towards expensive and increasingly less viable colonies fast shifted towards decolonisation and self-determination in the years following World War II. In keeping with their commonly recognised influence in world polity theory (see, for example, Meyer et al., 1997), international organisations played a central role in promoting this worldwide trend. The 1960 formation of the influential United Nations Committee on Colonialism (known as ‘the Committee of Twenty Four’), denounced colonialism in all its forms and especially promoted moves towards independence as soon as was practicable (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2009). The Pacific was the last region of the world to be affected by European and American imperialism and it was also the last region to undergo the often difficult process of decolonisation. This began in 1962 when (Western) Samoa gained independence from New Zealand, and continued throughout the following decades. Today many of the islands remain dependent (Lee, 2009). Almost one-third of the remaining entities on the United Nations’ list of non-self-governing territories are in the Pacific, despite the region making up just nine percent of the world’s countries. Moreover, some commentators have argued that regardless of the degree of notional autonomy exercised by the region’s post-colonial nations, Oceania continues to be dominated by former colonial powers, particularly Australia and New Zealand (Frazer & Bryant-Tokalau, 2006). Such continued control, termed neo-colonialism, relates to continued economic dependence, particularly upon aid. These commentator’s argument centres on the notion that aid is often tied to the donors’ interests and priorities rather than the needs of the recipients.

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8 As noted by former Prime Minister and President of Fiji, the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara in 2001: “Too often, aid had strings attached, and projects were devised that were more in line with the thinking of the donors” (cited in Frazer & Bryant-Tokalau, 2006). These authors assert that
around the use of economic resources as a lever to drive the political objectives of donor nations (see Himona, 2000). It is perhaps disingenuous to speak of a ‘post-colonial’ era, given that much colonial influence remains in Oceania.

Indeed, the ethnoscape of the Pacific retains significant influences from the colonial era. Rallu (2010) notes how colonisation by European powers, followed by the migration of indentured labour, increased the ethnic diversity of the region. In general terms, and in keeping with global trends, migration of those of ‘non-Oceanic’ origin, especially from Asia, has continued to increase in many countries of the region. Expatriate populations in most of the Pacific did not decrease but rather increased after decolonisation, as business and government expanded beyond the resources of the local skilled labour supply (Campbell, 2011, p. 333). Nevertheless, with the exception of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji, the indigenous peoples of the other independent countries of Oceania continue to comprise more than 90 percent of the population (Rallu, 2010). The populations of the dependent French and American territories are more mixed, containing varying proportions of Europeans, from seven percent in Guam to nearly 40 percent in New Caledonia (Rallu, 2010). The unique ‘settler colonial’ experience of Australia and New Zealand has resulted in European populations which vastly outnumber indigenes. In New Caledonia, the so-called caldoche French-origin settlers, alongside other expatriates, outnumber the indigenous Kanak population. In Fiji, a large community of Fijian-Indians remain, descendants of indentured labourers of the colonial sugar industry (Rallu, 2010).

Even where decolonisation has occurred, the modern ‘nations’ of Oceania are remnants of the colonial project. As Foster (1997, p. 42) writes, “geopolitical competition, a concept of nation, and administrative ease led the colonial regimes to aggregate, sometimes arbitrarily, people and territories into larger

Australia and New Zealand, and increasingly Asian powers have become more interventionist in the region, pursuing strategic and economic goals often given force by threats of reduction in aid. Tonga and possibly Samoa could be described as near equivalents to nation states as conceived in the Western sense, with cultural and linguistic homogeneity and a ranking system acknowledged across the cultural and geographic territory, although a unified system of authority only existed in Tonga (Campbell, 2011, p. 343).
polities than had existed before.” With the exception of the former Gilbert and Ellice Islands, which split into two independent states (Kiribati and Tuvalu) at independence, colonial borders have been retained post-independence, despite some notable anomalies. The island of Rotuma, for instance, remains part of Melanesian Fiji, while being culturally and linguistically Polynesian. Bougainville Island is politically incorporated into Papua New Guinea despite being part of the Solomon Islands group. The arbitrary nature of colonial borders is perhaps most clearly seen in New Guinea, where the Indonesian west of the island is considered geo-politically part of Asia (Campbell, 2011; Denoon et al., 1997; Foster, 1997).

Such modernist nation-building of the colonial era was a particularly powerful normative and ideological project. It continues to define Oceanic ethnies, so that “we call the diverse people of eastern New Guinea ‘Papuans’ and ‘New Guineans’ as if they shared a common identity in the 1920s, yet they were as foreign to each other as Europeans were” (Firth, 1997, p. 255). Recognition of identities which received statehood surpasses those of (sometimes more populous) communities which were incorporated into wider states. National identities are often misconceived as primordial rather than historical constructions, while self-identifying ethnic groups such as Motu, Briandiare, Tolai or Trobriand Islanders, for example, are lumped together ahistorically, as Papua New Guineans (Firth, 1997). Similar ‘ethnic agglomeration’ has taken place for indigenous Australians and New Zealand Māori, in that they have been viewed and referred to primarily as collective entities with little recognition of tribal identities (Durie, 1998; Rangihau, 1975).10 Similarly, the ‘supra national’ identity of Pacific Islander has long been imposed on Pasifika migrants in New Zealand and Australia (Gray, 2001). The continuing recognition of identities which essentially reflect the happenstance congealing of colonial borders rather than historical trajectories of settlement or human movement is testament to the powerful role of colonialism in influencing the ethnoscape of the Oceanic region.

10 Though such collective identities were to a significant extent wilfully adopted, serving to differentiate such groups as opposed to newcomers more generally.
3.4 CLASSIFYING AND COUNTING IN OCEANIA

3.4.1 The colonial era

If human difference was not conceived in terms of ethnic or racial groupings in the pre-colonial Pacific, such group identities spread and were synthesises in the area alongside colonialism. Demographic practices of colonial governments played a key role here, instituting such identities and rendering them salient – helping construct race and ethnicity in the Pacific context. Bernard Cohn’s 1987 and 1996 studies, exploring the practical consequences of colonial censuses in British India, are telling here. Cohn argued that British governance of the Raj reduced existing patterns of society into simplified forms that were comprehensible to English rulers, and which formed the basis of policy-making. At first resisted by local populations, these simplified categories eventually became discursively normalised. Locals began to see themselves in terms of these imposed categories, and ironically perhaps later resisted any attempts to change them (Cohn, 1996). Colonial classificatory schemes and demography played a similar role in Oceania. While cultural, linguistic and phenotypical differences existed prior to colonisation, the colonial application of fixed categorical frameworks, exemplified by censuses, helped give effect to racial modes of thinking and legitimise ‘race’ during the colonial era.

As the previous chapter has shown, censuses and official statistics in general are inherently political. This is especially true of colonised territories, where censuses help to shape the image of a colonial state and the relative positions within it (Anderson, 1991). This holds true for colonial Oceania. Soon after colonial powers gained control over territories, governmental, judicial and militarist (domestic and foreign policing) institutions were established. State agencies of political rule, legitimate violence, and most importantly surveillance spread tentacles, as swiftly as practicable, from initial bridgeheads of settlement such as trading or mission stations. Demographic practices and population statistics played a critical role in this gradual imposition of political rule and surveillance in colonised areas. Demography served as an important tool to
define colonial subjects as “Others” subjugated to European control and agendas for “improvement” (Cordell, Ittmann, & Maddox, 2010; Anderson, 1991).

The classificatory and quantitative schemes imposed upon native Pacific Islanders by various colonial powers were strongly implicated in the practice of colonialism in the Pacific. As Cordell, Ittmann and Maddox (2010) point out in their study of demographic practice in colonial Africa, the alien and heterogeneous nature of their colonial possessions meant that classificatory grids for race and ethnicity remained elusive for imperial powers. This elusiveness, they argue, saw the quite deliberate “restriction, compression, and simplification of differences and ambiguities” (p. 6) in the categories instituted by colonial governments. These simplified and compressed categories rarely reflected local understandings of human difference. Nevertheless, the trend in colonial demography was to coalesce local ‘Others’ into as few groupings as practicable. This practice was disconnected from social reality in the in the Pacific where day-to-day identities and cultural practices were remarkably changeable, contingent and diverse. Colonial administrations in the Pacific routinely eschewed tribal or other sub-national cultural groupings, even in the face of substantial differences (see Firth, 1997). This colonial impulse saw Māori, for example, officially enumerated as a collectivity for most of the 20th century, with a question on iwi affiliation only reappearing in 1991 (see Kukutai, 2012), despite often substantial tribal differences. Moreover, many colonially-defined nations, particularly in Melanesia, were formed from groups with few linguistic or cultural similarities, subsequently regarded, and enumerated, by authorities as homogenous groupings (Campbell, 2011). The Pacific ‘races’ are probably the clearest example of this impulse for amalgamating local groupings.

As elsewhere (see Patriarca, 1994), colonial Pacific censuses were important tools of legitimisation for colonial ideals. They produced representations of

11 Tūhoe scholar John Rangihau (1975) described this as a colonial strategy of “combine and conquer”, and spoke of his preferred identification with his Tūhoe iwi and his Tūhoetanga rather than a collective Māori identity.
“national populations”, emphasising categories that overcame localistic or pre-colonial forms of identity. The cultural, ethnic, and national distinctions codified by colonial masters did not align with the relatively fluid, localised and transmutable social distinctions of the pre-colonial era. Official usage legitimised European classifications and understandings, and so helped create new ‘facts’ on the ground. As Bowker and Leigh Star (1999) argue, integrated systems of knowledge such as census classification, especially when mobilised by powerful authorities, work by changing the world such that the system’s description of reality becomes true. This is witnessed in the Pacific, for instance, in the three-fold d’Urville classification, which remains part of the cultural consciousness of the peoples of Oceania, despite being essentially a colonial imagining (see Hau’ofa, 1993).

Colonial classifications often had arbitrary, administratively-imposed consequences, where colonial racist patterns of what Rallu et al. (2006) describe as counting to dominate or exclude were clear. In Australia, for example, to be classified as Aboriginal meant being denied rights of full citizenship, including franchise, until at least 1949 (still later in Western Australia and Queensland). Registered Aboriginals also came under the jurisdiction of the local Aboriginal Protection Board, which ‘protected’ and regulated the lives of Indigenous Australians (McGregor, 1997)\(^{12}\). In British Fiji, paternalistic colonial policy meant land ownership was vested in the hands solely of indigenous Fijians (Crosetto, 2005). For much of the history of French New Caledonia, the official designation of Kanak meant being legally confined to reserves or tribus (Muckle, 2011). Everywhere, official categorisation as a member of the indigenous populace served to mark one out as an ‘Other’ - a colonial subject able to be contrasted to European viziers. According to Kertzer and Arel (2002b, p. 3):

\[
\text{The rise of colonialism, based on the denial that the colonized had political rights, required a clear demarcation between the settlers and the indigenes. The “Others” had to be collectively identified... The}
\]

\(^{12}\) For a detailed discussion of enumeration of indigenous Australians, see Rowse and Smith (2010).
categorization of identities became part and parcel of legitimating narratives of the national, colonial, and “New World” state.

Similar dichotomies existed for various other ‘non-European’ immigrants, such as Asian indentured workers whose labour was required by colonial plantations. Ultimately, the fundamental truism that official classificatory schemes do not only represent social divisions but also help create them, is especially true in colonial areas such as the Pacific, because here schema are typically devised by outsiders from their own frames of reference and experience, and with the power to make these distinctions socially salient. Bernhard Cohn (1987, 1996) notes how British census-taking practices in colonial India came to shape understandings of caste systems by both coloniser and colonised.

Despite the usefulness of demographic information for the colonial project, the historic beginnings of censuses vary across the Pacific. While pre-colonial populations had little need for any formalised population counts, the modernist rationalism of European newcomers meant they were interested in classifying and counting Oceanic peoples from earliest encounters. The first estimates of populations were not, in the modern sense, the result of censuses. Most of the records that have survived from the 18th century were provided by sailors, whalers, and missionaries, and are usually little more than crude population counts or estimates of the total population of particular islands (Lewis, 2001). In some colonies, impressive census records do date back to the mid-19th century or even earlier. A 1710 census commissioned by the Spanish governor of Guam was the first census carried out in Oceania. It made clear distinctions between the ‘native’ Chamorro population of 3,614 and the ‘Mestizo’ (mixed Spanish and Native) population of 471 (Karolle, 1978). In other areas, the first official censuses were not attempted until the mid-twentieth century.

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13 For a discussion of such impulses as they relate broadly to European rationalist modernism and enlightenment thought, see Ventresca, 2003.

14 Guam was discovered by Ferdinand Magellan (in 1521) and claimed by Spain as early as 1565, although it was not officially colonised until 1668. Spain mainly used the island for the reprovision of galleons sailing between Mexico and the Philippines. Neither the Spanish nor other Europeans had significant contact elsewhere in the Pacific until the 18th century, the Spanish being unaware of even neighbouring Palau (Campbell, 2011).
Key distinctions with regards to the census may be made between the settler and non-settler colonies of the region, with the former generally conducting censuses much earlier. Settler colonialism is a unique colonial form which Veracini (2007) defines as a “circumstance where outsiders come to stay and establish territorialised sovereign political orders.” Australia and New Zealand, the lone such states of the region, experienced large-scale European immigration from the outset of colonialism. Both soon acquired some measure of self-government, and moved quickly to conduct official censuses - New South Wales undertook its first census in 1821; New Zealand in 1851. In both countries these early censuses did not include the indigenous population. This was likely a result of twin aims – one of deliberate policies of political exclusion for indigenous groups, and one of nation-building, counting the nascent European population to promote national political identity and awareness, to ‘constitute a national population.’ As Rocha (2012, p. 4) writes: “New Zealand’s first national census in 1851 included only the European population, providing a clear message as to which population counted (literally) in the nation-building process.”

Outside of the unique positions of Australia and New Zealand, the other colonial administrations of the Pacific are of the more common non-settler variety. The Pacific’s island groups were gradually taken as colonies by one of the imperial nations. While locals generally retained their numerical majority and much of their land, they were ruled by a foreign colonial administration, with foreign elites controlling the market economy (Linnekin, 1997). For much, if not all of their history, however, colonies lacked both financial and human resources to significantly progress the ‘colonial project’. Many Pacific colonies were subsidised, often reluctantly, from coffers of the imperial treasury (Campbell, 2011). Resource constraints limited colonial power, as did simple geography, particularly in Melanesia. Under such constraints, Lewis (2001) notes that census-taking did not generally begin until well after initial colonisation, and was often very limited in scope. Most early censuses were generally simple headcounts, disaggregated sometimes by sex and native and foreign-born
populations. As the various colonial administrations sought to extend their authority in the later part of the 19th and early 20th century the census became more frequent and detailed. From the late 1880s, German, United States, British, and French administrations carried out routine censuses throughout their territories in Polynesia and Micronesia. Tonga’s first recorded census was in 1891 and Samoa’s was in 1905 (Lewis, 2001). In Melanesia, where enumeration was more complicated, given the harsher geographic terrain, scattered and isolated populations, and the multiplicity of local languages, censuses were not undertaken until significantly later, usually well into the twentieth century. The Solomon Islands’ first recorded census, for example, occurred in 1931, the New Hebrides’ (now Vanuatu) in 1967 (McArthur & Yaxley, 1968).

In measuring human difference, 19th and 20th century colonial censuses typically reflected contemporary European belief in fixed biological race. For instance, the following question was included in the 1916 New Zealand Population Census (Statistics Office, 1916, as cited in Cormack, 2010):

(b). Race. (If not of European race, write “Maori,” “Chinese,” “Hindu,” “Javanese,” “Negro,” “Polynesian,” &c., or “Maori halfcaste,” “Chinese half-caste,” &c., as the case may be).

Wherever it occurred, such counting and classification of different ‘racial’ groupings reflected the preoccupations of colonial overseers, privileging and promoting European identities over those of indigenes. Even in the French territories, where the metropole had long staunchly rejected such categorisation as detracting from broader national identity, the population was carefully classified into imposed and racialised categories, such as the all-encompassing indigenous identity of Kanak in New Caledonia (see Muckle, 2011). Colonial administrators were careful to categorise separately any non-European immigrant populations, particularly ‘coolies’ of Asian origin whose migration took

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15 Excepting New Caledonia and Fiji, where colonialism was pursued with greater fervour than elsewhere in Melanesia and which had correspondingly well-resourced and effective colonial administrations. New Caledonia’s first census occurred in 1887, the territory having been colonised in 1853 (Brookfield, 1972). Fiji, annexed in 1874, held its first census in 1881 (Ember, Ember, & Skoggard, 2004).
place into many colonies for labour purposes. In New Zealand, the small community of Chinese in New Zealand were carefully enumerated separately as ‘Asiatics’, in colonial censuses, included in separate census volumes on ‘race aliens’, and subjected to discriminatory policies (O’Connor, 1968).\(^{16}\)

Other colonial concerns, such as official preoccupation with the ‘problem’ of miscegenation or ‘racial mixing’, can also be clearly discerned in the censuses of the colonial period. Administrative concern and interest in such ‘mixing’ often meant the careful enumeration of ‘half-caste’ or other ‘mixed-race’ individuals into separate categories. For instance, the 1926 New Zealand census included a ‘blood quantum’ measure of race, with race categories given strict technical meaning which saw those any person with blood fractions of ½ Māori or more allocated to the Māori population (Kukutai, 2011). In the colonial South Pacific race was simultaneously an organising principle, an identifier and a value (Luker, 2008). In Fiji’s hierarchy, Europeans were at the top, with indigenous Fijians beneath them, and Indians at the bottom. Interbreeding between Europeans and other ethnic groups disrupted the "purity" of these distinctions. The category half-caste, included in the 1911 Fijian Census, has been described by Howard and Rensel (2001) as a ‘pariah category’, emblematic of the breakdown of a hierarchy in which Europeans were distinguished conceptually as ‘civilised’, while all others, to varying degrees, were considered ‘uncivilised’. Such categorisations were a reflection of the biological understandings of race characteristic of the period and the related challenge half-castes placed on the social, political, and economic hierarchy of the Pacific island colonies.

Ultimately, the scope of colonial censuses differed widely between countries. While global trends had always existed (see Ventresca, 2003; Lewis, 2001), census design and the development of statistical concepts, definitions and procedures depended largely on the preoccupations of the various colonial administrations. Lewis (2001) argues that the political and constitutional linkages of Pacific colonialism influenced census-taking ‘on the ground’ from the outset.

\(^{16}\) Such as the Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act 1919.
For instance, the relationship of the United States to its Pacific overseas territories of Samoa and Guam ensured that they were included as an integral part of the decennial US censuses from 1930. Similarly, the strong linkages between New Zealand and the island states of Tokelau, Niue, the Cook Islands and (Western) Samoa, set in motion a practice of five-yearly censuses aligned to the New Zealand census program.

### 3.3.2 Modern Pacific censuses

For the island countries of the Pacific which have decolonised, the process of government often proved difficult. Without financial contributions and subsidies from metropoles, many countries experienced serious resource constraints. As colonial administrations typically neglected local capacity development, many countries lacked human resource capability in areas which had previously been staffed by colonial officials. Government statistics were no exception, with statistical offices typically operating under very severe financial constraints (Lewis, 2001). For example, Dr Gerald Haberkorn, head of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s population and population division, in a discussion of 2000-round Pacific censuses, argues that:

> ... many Pacific island countries unfortunately experienced considerable difficulties in financing their census operations. This impacted severely on routine census operations, either ignoring or severely short-cutting accepted best-practice procedures such as commencing census field operations with updated (and complete) household listings, data verification (completeness checks) at enumeration stage, undertaking comprehensive data edits before embarking on data processing and tabulating, and running post-enumeration surveys to check on completeness of coverage; it also meant considerable delays in producing different census outputs, as well as compromising the types of outputs produced (Haberkorn, 2004, p. 2).

Similarly, Lewis (2001) argues that a noticeable absence of continuity appeared in the post-independence censuses of the smaller island countries, as the problems of developing census-taking capacity were tackled. In successive censuses the government of Samoa was assisted by universities in the United States, New Zealand and the Statistics Office in Fiji. Little in the way of continuity
of approach or regional consensus in census-taking developed under such conditions, given ad hoc resourcing and influence.

Despite these challenges, both colonial territories and independent countries in the Pacific continue to undertake national censuses. Often, these are the only source of reliable social and demographic data, given the absence of functioning civil registration systems in most Pacific countries acknowledged by Lewis (2001) and Haberkorn (2004). In the most-recently completed 2000 census round (1995-2004) every country and territory in Oceania completed at least one census (Habercorn, 2004). Every Pacific Island country and territory has a National Statistics Office (NSO), with staff numbers ranging from a single staff member to several hundred (Lewis, 2001). Many of the smaller offices of the Pacific Islands require continued technical and financial assistance with undertaking the national census (Haberkorn, 2004). Historically, this support was provided by United Nations Statistical Office and more recently has been sourced from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, based in Noumea and receiving much of its funding from Australia and New Zealand. In the last two decades, some moves towards a standardised regional approach have been made, in keeping with such moves elsewhere in the world. Lewis (2001) describes a regional Heads of Statistics meeting held in 1997 as a breakthrough in this area. National statistical offices across the region committed to regional cooperation in the interest of cost-effectiveness, quality and sustainability (regional capacity in this area being easier to maintain than ad hoc national capacity). To simplify census design, processing and analysis, the meeting also agreed to commit to a core set of census topics and questions. Neither the meeting nor the resulting Pacific Islands Model Population and Housing Census Form (South Pacific Commission, 2002) cover any questions relating to ethnicity, probably reflecting the intensely political nature of the concept and the considerable heterogeneity of its operationalization. This suggests that patterns of ethnic enumeration in the Pacific have not been influenced by any formal processes of regional standardisation, with national statistics offices largely independently electing the approaches adopted in each country.
There are many examples of census approaches in the Pacific which demonstrate the political nature of ethnicity. In 2003, for instance, French president Jacques Chirac was asked at a meeting with local youth why a category of New Caledonians of European-descent could not be added to the ‘community of affiliation’ (ethnicity) question in an upcoming census. Such questions had long been asked in the New Caledonian census. Chirac, apparently surprised, replied in strong terms that such a question was against the spirit of the French constitution and contravened French law. With census taking in New Caledonia still carried out under the auspices of the French state (by a branch of the national statistics office INSEE), the census was promptly cancelled, and questions on community of affiliation and tribe of affiliation were deleted from the Census questionnaire before a new census was carried out the following year (Haberkorn, 2005). In response, ethnic Kanak leaders, extremely sensitive to ethnic balance issues, given the controversial issue of New Caledonian independence, called for a census boycott. The following census reincluded ethnic questions. Ethnic divisions are particularly important in New Caledonia, given the delicate balance of political power between settlers and indigenes (Gorohouna & Ris, 2012).

3.5 SUMMARY
Cultural differences have always existed in Oceania, with groups developing distinctive cultural practices in relative, but perhaps overemphasised, isolation. It was probably not until the arrival of Europeans, however, that these practices became recognised as markers of distinctive identities, framed as ‘races’ in the hegemonic colonial discourses of the era. ‘Racial’ thinking saw the myriad indigenous cultures of Oceania lumped together in European eyes as pseudo-biologically differentiated races. The imposition of European political power also meant interrelated understandings of racial hierarchy, with Europeans naturally at the apex, began to influence Oceania. Such a racial order was necessary to justify the otherwise illegitimate privileged access to property and power of
colonisers over colonised, and was essential to the colonial project, in Oceania as elsewhere.

Censuses were introduced to Oceania by Europeans, and are heavily implicated in the creation and maintenance of the local racial order. Cultural identities in Oceania were always complicated but were traditionally situational. Cross-cultural exchange appears to have been more of norm than exception, and identity in the Pacific appears to have been more fluid and transmissible than European understandings of identity based in descent and innate characteristics (Linnekin & Poyer, 1990). Demographic categorisations had significant social implications during the colonial era. Colonial Pacific censuses enforced European understandings, counting populations according to strict ‘racial’ categories developed according to coloniser’s tastes. Characteristic features included strict ‘blood quantum’ measures of race; the aggregation of cultural differences into broader categories not previously recognised by locals; overemphasis on counting the European population; and careful attention paid to ‘mixed-race’ populations, whose members transgressed racial boundaries and thereby challenged the colonial order.

While decolonisation has taken place in much (though far from all) of Oceania, countries have continued with census programmes post-independence. Censuses, particularly in the smaller island states, provide the only source of important empirical evidence for policy development and planning. Given that the ethnic enumeration practices of the colonial-era clearly reflected the political aims of colonial governments, the impact decolonisation has had on ethnic counting is an interesting question.
4.1 INTRODUCTION

While most research on the census measurement of ethnicity has been limited to small case studies of single countries, this study uses a cross-sectional content analysis methodology to examine approaches across the 24 countries of Oceania. Content analysis is the process of analysing verbal or written communications in a systematic way to measure variables quantitatively (Krippendorff, 2004). Here, a unique time series data base of census questions and formats extracted from the Ethnicity Counts project is used to examine how census classification practices have varied in Oceania between 1965 and 2011. This study examines change over time in approaches toward ethnic enumeration in the region, and considers them in light of broader political and historical changes and census ethnicity literature. This chapter outlines the data and methodology adopted for this study and restates the research questions, providing testable research hypotheses drawn from the theoretical insights of preceding chapters.

4.2 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

In exploring the research questions, this study draws upon a purpose built database of population census forms from around the world which was developed as part of the Ethnicity Counts project (eCounts?) project (see Kukutai & Thompson, forthcoming). eCounts? is a collaborative research project led by Dr Tahu Kukutai and based at the National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis (NIDEA) at the University of Waikato. The database covers the period 1985 to 2014 – corresponding with the three most recent ten-yearly census ‘rounds’. It includes information about the form and format of ethnic recognition adopted in the censuses forms of countries and territories across the world. The sample universe of 239 countries and territories was taken from the List of...
Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use maintained by the Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretariat (United Nations Statistical Division, 2012), last updated in September 2011. Information about the censuses conducted in each country was obtained from a separate UN list. Questionnaires from each of these censuses were then sought, using a variety of methods. Locating forms worldwide was a resource-intensive process, made practicable only by the increasing availability of electronic copies of forms via the internet and the concerted efforts of some key organisations. The United Nations Statistics Division maintains an online repository of many forms, and others were available from the University of Minnesota’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) International website. The remaining forms were located, wherever possible, from extensive internet searches, usually on websites of national census offices, or through direct correspondence with those offices. Total census form coverage for the eCounts? database stands at 409 of the 562 national-level censuses recorded by the UN as having been conducted between January 1985 and December 2011.

To form the eCounts? database, the ethnic nomenclature and response categories present in each of the located census questionnaires were coded verbatim into a database (for a full coding scheme used in rendering the forms to code, see Appendix I). Foreign-language forms were translated into English prior to coding. In cases where a question contained references to two different conceptions of ethnicity – for example, ‘what is your ethnicity or nationality’ – it was coded in terms of both concepts. References to colour were coded as race.

1 unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm
2 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/censusdates.htm
4 http://www.hist.umn.edu/~rmccaa/IPUMSI/enumf orm.htm
5 A centralised repository of the located census forms is maintained on the eCounts? website at www.waikato.ac.nz/nidea/reasearch/ethnicitycounts
6 This follows Morning’s (2008) approach, deeming all the underlying concepts ultimately measuring shared descent as measures of ethnicity. Terms coded include nationality, race, ethnicity, ethnic origins, ancestry, tribe, undefined ethnicity, language and mother tongue. Non-ethnic measurements of interest, such as birth place, parental birth place and citizenship are also included.
Where questions did not refer specifically to ethnicity (or race, etc.)\(^7\), but response categories implied some sort of ethnic distinction, they were coded separately, as undefined ethnic questions.

Data for the 24 countries of Oceania was drawn from this established database. The focus here, exploring the influence of decolonising processes, meant the inclusion of data from prior to 1985 was desirable. The reduced sample universe made the collation of pre-1985 forms feasible, and a similar collection process, also under the aegis of the Ethnicity Counts? project, was carried out for Oceanic census forms from the 1970 and 1980 census rounds (spanning 1965 to 1974 and 1975 to 1984 respectively). While no centralised official records of censuses conducted exists for censuses completed pre-1985 (such as the United Nations list utilised in building the wider database), Rallu (2010) provides a list of censuses held in Oceania from 1945. Forms from censuses recorded on this list dating between 1965 and 1984 were sought via the IPUMS website, internet searching, and through direct correspondence with national statistical agencies across the Pacific region. If located, they were translated and coded according to the same coding scheme as the wider eCounts? database. Information on the former colonial power, current sovereign status and where applicable, year of independence for each country were also incorporated into the study dataset. This supplementary information was obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency’s online World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).

It should be noted that questions related to citizenship, civic nationality, birthplace, or parental birthplace, although included in the eCounts? database, were excluded from this study. The United Nations includes birthplace and citizenship questions as ‘core census topics’, recommending that countries ask birthplace questions to distinguish the native born from the foreign born population and a citizenship question because the country of citizenship is not

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\(^7\) For example, the 2001 Honduras census asked: ‘A que grupo poblacional pertence?’ (‘To what population group do you belong?’), with response categories that included indigenous populations such as the Lenca and the Pech (Paya). Similarly, the 2001 Canadian census asked ‘Is this person’, followed by a list of tick boxes that include White, Chinese and Latin American.
necessarily identical to the country of birth. It recommends that these questions be collected to measure the national impact of increasing movement of people across national boundaries and establish information about “the immigrant stock and its characteristics” (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008, p. 125). These ‘civic dimension’ questions are therefore concerned with legal, rather than ethnic, bonds between individuals and the state. Data on ethnicity is therefore separate and distinct to, and cannot be derived from, information collected on country of citizenship or country of birth. The distinction was evidenced by most Pacific countries enumerating ‘ethnic’ distinctions separately from civic distinctions. Questions relating to nationality, which can have civic or ethnic connotations depending on the context, were included, if either a separate citizenship question or an ethnic signifier demonstrated the term was used in an ethnic sense. This understanding of nationality as an ethnic concept is most prevalent in Eastern Europe (Morning, 2008).

While some countries in the region, including Australia and New Zealand, have aligned with imperial British practice (see Pool, 1991) of 5-yearly censuses, other countries have followed a decennial (ten-yearly) programme. Many countries have fluctuated between the two approaches, although none have carried out more than two censuses in any one census round. Where countries have undertaken two censuses in a single round and both forms have been located, the earlier census in the round was included in this analysis, to avoid bias toward these countries. This decreased the number of data points used in this study but is important to maintain comparability. Changes in ethnic counting practices were assumed to be unidirectional, so that variation in each country should have been captured in the next census round. The final sample therefore

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8 No formal census is conducted on Pitcairn Island, though a headcount is made on 30 or 31 December each year (United Nations Statistical Division, 2013).

9 29 of the 105 located census forms over the period, representing second census forms for those countries which undertook two censuses in one round, were thus excluded. These forms, were coded and available however, and their implications for the study were included.

10 I.e. moving or operating in a single direction in terms of terminology or categorisations (see Figure 4.1). Census offices are widely-recognised as reluctant to change (Hochschild & Powell, 2008).
consisted of 85 census questionnaires, which represent 77 percent of the national censuses conducted in Oceania during the focal period if only one quincennial forms are included. Table 4.1 shows the number and percentage of countries for which a form has been located for each round:

Table 4.1: Countries included in data set, by census round

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<td>14%</td>
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<td>Total countries(^3)</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>% of final sample</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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\(^1\) To December 2011. Nauru and Tuvalu had not by then conducted a 2010-round (2005-2014) census.
\(^2\) Refers to countries which the UN records as having undertaken at least one census for which no one form was located.
\(^3\) Refers to the number of countries recognised as existing in the region at the beginning of each round. These have changed over time as colonial entities have split into separate successor entities.

For each census round the coverage rate defined as the percentage of countries with a located form per round, varied significantly. The general trend has been toward greater coverage over time\(^11\), with full or near-full coverage for the 2000 and 2010 rounds contrasting with a low 35 percent coverage in the earliest 1970 round. The still-incomplete 2010 round includes censuses conducted as at December 2011 - Tuvalu and Nauru were yet to complete any census by this date. Otherwise, in each round, every country (or their predecessor state) undertook at least one census.\(^12\) Aside from the clear bias against earlier census forms, an examination of the distribution of located forms suggests that they were spread reasonably randomly in terms of sub-region or colonial relationships. A full table of coverage by country and census round is provided in Appendix II. With the exception of the 1970 and perhaps the 1990 round, the results of this study should provide fairly representative indicators, although no probabilistic assumptions should be made about the sample.

\(^{11}\) Although a greater number of 1980 round forms could be located than 1990 round. The reason/s for this are unclear.
\(^{12}\) Such regional census coverage rates are very high by international standards, as Morning (2008) and Kukutai and Thompson (2007) demonstrate.

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Where census questionnaires could not be located, attempts were made through library interloan services to find the subsequently published census reports of each country. The information and cross-tabulations contained in these reports allow for a fairly robust inference of the questions contained in forms. While these have not been used to substitute for missing forms, this information has been considered in this analysis. Where they were used to support findings reported in the following chapter, their use has been clearly signalled. Ultimately, although the coverage rate is less than 80 percent, the sample is reasonably systematic in terms of sub-region or colonial relationships. With census reports also considered where census forms were not located, confidence may be held in the general patterns observed.

There are several important points about the dataset that ought to be noted. Firstly, the dataset adopts for each census round the historical formation of countries and territories, rather than contemporary political boundaries. These have changed over the study period: the British colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands reformed into Kiribati (Micronesia) and Tuvalu (Polynesia) in 1976, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands split into four successor states from 1986. While both territories were previously enumerated in united censuses (Rallu, 2010), their successor states began individual census programmes which increased population universe for later census rounds.

While the United States territories in the Pacific have occasionally undertaken their own censuses, for the most part they have been included as an integral part of the decennial census programme of the US Bureau of Statistics. Guam and American Samoa were included in this programme from 1920; the former TTPI was from 1950 until 1980; the successor state of Palau was in 1990 (before declaring independence in 1994) and the Northern Mariana Islands have been since 1990 (United States Census Bureau, 2013). These censuses use a single standardised form based on the US census but typically include unique questions for each territory. For the purposes of this study these were treated as separate censuses for each historically existing territory. In addition, the four states which
make up the Federated States of Micronesia (Kosrae, Pohnpei, Chuuk, and Yap) conducted censuses at different dates between 1986, when FSM was declared an independent territory in free association with the United States, and 1989. Comprising a single form, this was treated as a single census. These approaches were in keeping with the list of national censuses recorded in the UN Statistics Division’s Master List of Census dates, available online.¹³

Basic empirical methods were applied to this dataset to test the research hypotheses. The small sample universe meant that the number of responses was relatively small, and Microsoft Excel computer software was used to manage and analyse the data. Excel allowed for the easy exploration of the data in multiple ways. The specific methods adopted are clearly noted in the presentation of results in the following chapter. It must be noted that as a descriptive and exploratory study, this work was concerned with identifying systematic shifts in the form of ethnic counting adopted in censuses, rather than explaining via statistical modelling the reasons for the observed shifts. Thus, while factors driving change are suggested and discussed, their influence has not been statistically determined. While high-level statistical analysis and modelling was considered for this study, the small sample universe and the generally unreliable and incomplete nature of county-level data for the small Pacific island nations (see Rallu, 1996; Nyasulu, 2011) made this infeasible. The presentation of results was intentionally kept simple, given that the hypotheses the research aimed to test were easily supported without advanced statistical methods.

4.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
This section restates the key research questions and outlines and justifies hypotheses for directing the research. The first key research question investigates how Oceanic countries engage in ethnic enumeration and how such practices have changed over time:

What, if any, patterns may be observed in approaches to ethnic counting in the censuses of Oceania over the focal period (1965 to 2011)?

The first hypothesis here is that over the period studied, an increasing number of Oceanic censuses will enumerate along some form of ethnic distinction. This is based on Piché and Simon’s (2011) argument that ethnic diversity has reached unprecedented levels in the contemporary world and “increased recognition of diversity and the need to capture it” worldwide (p. 8). Government requirements for reliable ethnic data have been motivated by increasing concerns globally about intergroup inequality and the need to address it. This shift in the global world culture is evidenced in the growth in NGOs committed to addressing these issues and the introduction of human rights instruments such as ICERD\(^\text{14}\), which expressly prohibits “distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, and national or ethnic origins” and promotes even-handed and anti-discriminatory state policies (United Nations General Assembly, 1965). As the United Nations notes in its *Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing*, such policies require the collection of ethnic statistics both “for the elaboration of policies to improve access to employment, education and training, social security and health, transportation and communications, etc.”, and “for taking measures to preserving the identity and survival of distinct ethnic groups” (2008, pp. 87-88). This rising impetus for ethnic counting, involving the needs of policy-makers in addressing inequalities, suggests that Oceanic governments will increasingly seek information related to potentially marginalised social groups. This generates a second hypothesis: that over time we will see an expansion in the number of ethnic dimensions enumerated, as governments seek information on as many social groupings which may experience discrimination as possible.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{14}\) Although this study is primarily a descriptive and exploratory study of the dependent variable (census ethnic counting practices) in Oceania, the wider eCounts? data base includes an extensive set of country-level variables which may influence patterns of ethnic counting, including signatory or ratification status with ICERD (see Kukutai & Thompson, 2007a).

\(^{15}\) Kukutai and Thompson advanced a similar hypothesis on a global scale in their 2007 paper.
**H1a:** More Oceanic countries will enumerate some form of ethnic criterion in censuses over the focal period.

**H1b:** The average number of ethnic dimensions enumerated in Oceanic censuses will increase over the focal period.

Aside from these changes in the degree of ethnic enumeration undertaken, it is also hypothesised that the *form* of ethnic enumeration adopted across the region, in terms of the specific ethnic terminology used in census questions and the output categories, prompts or group names provided, will also change. It is expected this change will be typified by movement away from pseudo-biological terminology and categorisations serving to justify the colonial political economy towards those reflecting and recognising more localised, Pacific cultural identities.

As been seen, ideas about race were used to defend colonial dominance and to disqualify the full participation of indigenous populations in economic and political life (Cordell, Ittmann, & Maddox, 2010; Hirschman, 1987). These ideas were supported and advanced by imperial demography and census taking. In colonies, censuses buttressed racial stratification and helped provide rationales for the ‘white man’s burden’ of conquering, leading and ruling non-European peoples in global empires (Hirschman, 1987). Rallu, Piché and Simon’s 2006 typology terms this ethnic enumeration approach, typified by the censuses of colonial regimes, as *counting to dominate and exclude*. It is hypothesised that colonial-era Pacific censuses served such purposes in their approach toward counting and classifying ethnic groups, and that these purposes are evidenced in the particular ethic counting schema adopted.

As numerous scholars have made clear, however, global trends have made ethnic enumeration on this exclusionary basis progressively less common worldwide over recent decades (Simon, 2005; Morning & Sabbagh, 2005). As Piché and Simon argue (2011, p. 1360):
Ethnic or racial data are (almost) no longer collected to preserve racist social systems, or to maintain unacceptable hierarchies among social groups, but to describe objective and subjective group realities in order to facilitate the enforcement of generally progressive social programmes.

The well-established wave of political independence following World War Two, though still incomplete in the Pacific (with seven territories retaining political ties with colonial metropoles), seems likely to have accelerated movement away from counting for political control towards counting for other purposes, primarily for purposes of anti-discrimination policy making or postcolonial nation-building. A fundamental assumption here, supported by numerous previous case studies examining ethnic counting at the national level, is that changes in political motivations for counting will influence the enumerative approaches adopted. These approaches include both the specific terminology used in the question and the output categories (group names) provided on forms.\footnote{The post-census aggregation of individuals into named groups by census agencies constitutes much the same explicit recognition of particular identities as do categories provided on forms. The reliance here on census questionnaires means these post.enumerative aspects of ethnic counting are not included in this study.} It is envisaged that the data will demonstrate clear changes over time in both of these dimensions, as a result of changes in the regional political economy tied to decolonisation.

A useful visual representation of the expected changes on the form of ethnic counting is shown on a Cartesian-coordinate plane in Figure 4.1 below (note that this representation does not address the underlying drivers of change such as political independence and incorporation into civil society).
Figure 4.1: Hypothesised change in enumeration approaches

The x (horizontal) axis represents the specific terminology used in questions measuring group membership. The y (vertical) axis represents the type of ethnic group responses provided as response options or answer prompts. The arrow represents the hypothesised direction of change over time. In terms of nomenclature, racial terminology is considered to include references to both race and ancestry. The clear role of ‘race’ in promoting ethnic divisions and notions of superiority essential to the assertion of colonial hegemony has already been established in this study. While ‘ancestry’, is a more benign term than ‘race’, it is conceptually closer to conceptualisations of race than ethnicity. As Aspinall (2001, p. 831) argues, ancestry is different to ethnic group in that it “focuses the question back in time and conveys an historical and frequently geographic context”, whereas ethnicity is a “self-perceived conception of social group membership”. It is also closer to a biological than a cultural measure, as evidenced in the increasing use of ‘ancestry’ in biomedical human genetic research found by Fujimura and Rajagopalan (2011). Moreover, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in a publication entitled *ABS Views on Content and Procedures* (Edwards, 2003) state that ancestry has been adopted as the predominant ethnic determinant to ensure high quality data and “identify the
respondents’ origin rather than a subjective perception of their ethnic background.”

These foregoing terms, more rigid and pseudo-biological, may be contrasted with more fluid terms measuring cultural difference and termed in Figure 4.1 ‘ethnic terminology’. Such terminology includes ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic origins’. These types of questions differ from racial terminology in that they emphasise subjective notions of group differences as more socio-cultural than biological (Tonkin, McDonald, & Chapman, 1989). Statistics New Zealand’s ethnic standard, for instance, recognises that ethnicity is a measure of cultural affiliation, as opposed to race, ancestry or citizenship.\(^{17}\) While ethnic origin seems to stress historical connections and in this respect is similar to ancestry, it still measures cultural affiliation, albeit with historical provisos: “ethnic origin is a person’s historical relationship to an ethnic group, or a person’s ancestors’ affiliation to an ethnic group, whereas ethnicity is a person’s present–day affiliation.” (Statistics New Zealand, n.d.). Where nationality is not used in a civic-legal sense, synonymous with citizenship, it signifies ethnic origins. This understanding is typical of Eastern Europe (Abramson, 2002). It is hypothesised that Pacific countries, particularly those which are politically independent, will adopt these less rigid conceptualisations of group identity over time. This is in keeping with Hirschman’s (1987) findings in Malaysian censuses, where ‘race’ was swiftly replaced with ‘ethnicity’ and ‘community’ post-independence.

Other terms used to measure ethnic characteristics do not fit as easily into this two-part typology of colonial-racial and postcolonial-ethnic terminology. ‘Tribe’, for instance, is to some extent a colonial construct, with Mafeje (1971) insisting that ‘tribalism’ and the seeking and ‘discovering’ of tribes, as discrete social entities, was a result of the preconceptions and mentality of European anthropologists. However, social groups bound by common ties of kinship are a

\(^{17}\) “Race is a biological indicator and an ascribed attribute. Ancestry is a biological and historical concept and refers to a person’s blood descent. Citizenship is a legal status. These terms contrast with ethnicity which is self–perceived and a cultural concept.” (Statistics New Zealand, n.d.).
defining social feature of indigenous Oceanic cultures. Tribal questions are as such not considered essentially racial (biological) or ethnic (cultural) but considered on a case-by-case basis in the following analysis. Enumerating by tribe in any case appears to be rare in Oceanic censuses, mainly in supplementary questions for those who record indigenous responses to more general ethnicity questions. Language, and any other terms used to ethnically categorise groups, must similarly be considered on an individual basis. Though used as a key marker and widely recognised indication of ethnic group boundaries in many national contexts, particularly in Eastern Europe (Arel, 2002), they not appear to be customarily used as such in much of the Pacific. Though language or mother tongue questions have not therefore been automatically considered to comprise ‘ethnic’ questions in this study. Where they are present alongside ethnic questions, they are presumed to be primarily asked for the purposes of providing governmental services. Where present, they are examined on a case-by-case basis to determine their purpose. Question wording and structure shows if they are ethnic in nature.

Apart from the specific terminology of ethnic counting adopted, the classification of various groups as response options (for closed questions) or answer prompts (in open questions) is also of interest. As Long (2002) argues, such ‘classification’ affords groups symbolic and material benefits that are unavailable to other communities. Recognised groups receive state recognition and thereby legitimisation. Their inclusion is not a systematic or technical process but is inherently political, determined by the relative influence of the various communities which comprise the national polity (Long, 2002; see also Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). With regard to such response options in the Pacific, it is hypothesised that a move away from colonial categorisations in favour of Pasifika categorisations will be seen over the focal period, reflecting growing local influence and postcolonial political concerns. The differences between

18 For instance, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (2002) advised member states to consider whether language questions are to determine the language of government services or to assist in determining educational levels, with no mention of their use to signify ethnic divisions.
these two types of responses are more subjective than the clear contrast of ethnic terms. Significant differences in response options or answer prompts provided in each country mean only a close reading of the specific group names provided on forms allows for the categorisation of each questionnaire.

Although these are presented as a binary in Figure 4.1, the differences between colonial and Pasifika categorisations are best understood as a continuum. The naming, defining and controlling of how the world is understood is an expression of power and a key aspect of colonialism (Smith, 1999). As such, ‘colonial categorisations’ include foreign-imposed groupings: the three colonial ‘races’ (Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian) most obviously, but also standardised categorisations for territories of the same metropole. These are contrasted with so-called locally identified and named ‘Pasifika’ categories, largely self-identified by the groups in question.

**H2a:** Fewer Oceanic censuses will ask questions using terminology of race, ancestry and tribe over the study period. Censuses will increasingly use contrasting ethnic terminology including ethnicity, ethnic origin or (ethnic) nationality.

**H2b:** Oceanic censuses will include fewer colonial-racial groupings as response options or answer prompts to ethnicity questions over the study period.

**What is the relationship between ethnic counting practices in Oceanic dependencies and their colonial metropoles?**

Given the hypothesis that changes in approaches towards ethnic enumeration in Oceania have been driven by colonisation (and decolonisation), this question examines the relationship between ethnic counting approaches in Pacific Island colonies and their metropoles over the period studied. The global nature of the

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19 Rallu (2010) notes how the censuses of Pacific territories are conducted by the statistical services of the metropolitan countries (and argues that they are therefore of higher quality than
eCounts? data base allows for the comparison of ethnic counting approaches and terminology in Pacific island dependencies with their sovereign powers. For each of the cross sections (ten-yearly census rounds), approaches to counting ethnic groups adopted in the then-existing dependencies can therefore be compared to approaches of the metropoles.

World society trends towards decolonisation, which can be understood as a similar world process to those which promoted the imperial partition of Oceania, has meant that the “powers that still maintain dependencies have faced growing opposition at home, in the dependencies themselves, and in the world community” (Davidson, 2001, p. 133). The influential United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960 declared that all peoples have the right to self-determination and that “immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations” (United Nations, 1960). This general trend towards decolonisation has seen much of the region, once entirely under foreign control, achieve independence. It seems reasonable to assume that the impulses which gave rise to it will have predicated greater autonomy in the remaining colonial territories in the Pacific.20 This greater autonomy would suggest that the ethnic counting practices of these colonies would show greater divergence from those of the metropole over the study period.

**H3:** Ethnic enumeration practice in Oceanic dependencies and territories will show greater distinctiveness from those in the metropole over the study period.

__in the independent island states__, demonstrating the influence of foreign powers over the census-taking process in dependent political territories.

20 These include Tokelau (a New Zealand dependency) New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia (French overseas collectivities) and American Samoa, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (unincorporated territories of the United States).
Given the importance of discourses of ‘miscegenation’ and ‘racial mixing’ in the historical trajectory of colonialism in Oceania, how have countries approached the measurement of multiple ethnic identities across this decolonising period?

With Oceania serving as a key site worldwide in the development of European racial science and the study of racial mixture (Luker, 2008), the official measurement of racial/ethnic ‘mixture’ is of interest. How such identities have been classified and counted over the period is the subject of this research question. Interest and concern with the ‘problem’ had largely faded by the study period (Young, 1995). Nevertheless, fractional proportions of descent were requested for those who identified more than one group until the New Zealand census of 1986 (Rocha, 2012) suggesting a lingering concern with ‘blood quantum’ measurements of population hybridity. Due to the ascendency of culturally based understandings of ethnicity (Aspinall, 2001) and the easing of colonial concerns with race, it is hypothesised that less official conception of ethnic boundaries as rigid and discrete will be seen, with fewer self-contained categories for multi-ethnic individuals. In practice, this would suggest that over time fewer Oceanic censuses should be seen with mixed identities appearing as answer categories, either in the form of ‘part’ identities (e.g. ‘part-European’), or specific combination group names (e.g. ‘Cook Island Maori/Other’). Rather, mixed ethnic identities will be measured through respondents being able to indicate more than one ethnic category.

**H4:** Combination group or ‘part-’ names for individuals with multiple ethnic identities will appear less in census questions of group identity over time, replaced by provision for multiple responses.

This chapter has outlined the procedure used for data collection and outlined the methodology of this study. It has restated the key research questions, and outlined a number of hypotheses. These hypotheses will guide the analysis of the following results chapter, which presents the research findings and discusses their significance.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the results of the study in three sections, corresponding with the three research questions presented in the previous chapter. Section one presents an analysis of the terminology and response options used in census forms in Oceanic countries over the study period. It demonstrates significant changes in both over time, and suggests some explanations based around changes in the political motivations for ethnic counting reflecting anti-discriminatory public policies and commitment to minority rights. An historical examination of ethnic enumeration schemas in the colonies of the region compared to those of their metropoles is presented in section two, with a general trend of convergence in practice found and explained. Section three focuses on the measurement of mixed-ethnic individuals. It finds a wide variety of approaches across the region and a persistence of relatively conservative practices outside of Australia and New Zealand. In all three sections, cross-historical changes in ethnic enumeration demonstrated in the unique longitudinal and regional data set employed are discussed in relation to the literature introduced in earlier chapters, with the aim of elucidating some of the driving factors.

5.2 RESULTS
5.2.1 Trends in ethnic terminology and categories
The Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses published by the United Nations makes few recommendations on the topic of ethnicity. In particular, it recognises the challenges of implementing a global ethnicity standard, given the diverse ways in which ethnicity is understood and measured:
Since countries collect data on ethnicity in different ways and for different reasons, and because the ethno-cultural composition of a country could vary widely from country to country, no internationally relevant criteria or classification can be recommended (1998, p. 140).

This is certainly true of Oceania, where even a cursory examination of census forms reveals wide diversity in ethnic enumeration schemas, in terms of both the ethnic concepts used and the ethnic categories listed on forms. This section focusses on these concepts and categories, addressing the first research question.

Analysis of included census forms suggests that the majority of countries in each ten-yearly census round employed some form of ethnic classification categorising their population by cultural affiliation or identity. Ethnic questions seek to enumerate the entire national populace into ethnoracial groupings, and in the Pacific context include questions related to ethnicity, ethnic origin, (ethnic) nationality, ancestry, tribe, race, community, home island, indigeneity, and questions where no such ethnic description was used but where response categories or prompts suggested ethnic distinctions. Language or mother tongue questions have been considered for their use as a proxy for ethnicity if no other more direct ethnic concept is present. The structure and wording of the question can determine whether these questions have been used as a substitute for ethnicity or for purposes of governmental administration or educational levels. Questions related to religion, which in Oceania is not generally indicative of cultural differences, except perhaps in Fiji, are not included.\(^1\) Table 5.1 shows the distribution of censuses which have undertaken some form of ethnic enumeration in each round:

\(^1\) In her global study, Morning (2008) excludes both language and religion, which she considers indirect references to ethnic affiliation. Language has been included here due to its clear use in an ethnic sense in several included censuses. Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, for instance, have asked respondents if the language spoken most in the family is ‘Français’ or ‘Polynésienne’. This is a clear ethnic proxy, given that French settlers and indigenous groups constitute the primary ethnic groups of both territories.
Table 5.1: Ethnic coverage in included Oceanic census forms, by census round

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic question/s¹</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No such question</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Includes forms including questions related to ethnicity, ethnic origin, (ethnic) nationality, ancestry, tribe, race, community, home island, indigeneity, or questions where no such ethnic description was used but response categories or prompts suggest a broad ethnic distinction, and language where the question is suggestive of ethnic difference. Religion questions are excluded.

The five located censuses which did not enumerate the population by any ethnic characteristic over the focal period included those of Samoa (1966 and 1976) and Papua New Guinea (1980, 1990 and 2000). These appear to have been the only countries which declined to enumerate along ethnic lines over the entire study period. Censuses in the French territories of French Polynesia (1996 and 2008) and Wallis and Futuna (1996 and 2008), as well as the post-independence censuses of the Marshall Islands (1999 and 2011) asked questions on language or mother tongue. Upon examination, these were deemed to be surrogate questions for ethnic difference and here are analysed as such.

While Table 5.1 examined the prevalence of broad ethnic counting over the focal period, Table 5.2 considers the degree of ethnic enumeration undertaken. It tests hypothesis number two, that the average number of ethnic dimensions enumerated in Oceanic censuses will increase over the focal period. The table shows the number of ethnic questions asked in included censuses per round. The hypothesis tested here predicts greater governmental concern and therefore measurement of any cultural or ethnic characteristic along which people may experience discrimination, given the global rise of identity politics and civil rights across the period. Ethnic questions have been operationalised here to include all ethnic ‘dimensions’ or any question implying group based cultural difference, including subsidiary questions concerned with certain segments of the population.²

² As such, it includes are questions on ethnicity, ethnic origin, (ethnic) nationality, community, ancestry, race, home island, indigeneity, descent, language or mother tongue questions if they
Table 5.2 demonstrates a clear cross-sectional increase in the mean number of ethnic questions asked over time, from an average of less than one ethnicity question in the 1970 round to almost two in the most recent 2010 round. Although the table does not show specific details for each country, it is helpful to consider variations at the country level. The smaller Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) tended to ask one or two ethnic questions, with two questions becoming more common over time. There were only a few countries that asked three ethnicity questions in the census - Australia (1986, 1996, 2006), Fiji (2007) and New Caledonia (1976, 1996 and 2009). New Zealand was the only country in Oceania in the focal period that included four ethnicity questions in the census. Since 1996 censuses there have included questions asking ethnic group/s, Māori descent, their tribal/iwi affiliation, and language.

Given that ethnicity is a remarkably heterogeneous concept, the terminology used to measure it differs between countries and from one point of time to another. With these patterns of usage a key point of interest in this study, Table

Table 5.2 Number of census questions measuring intra-national ‘dimensions of difference’- included census forms per round

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zero questions</td>
<td>1 14%</td>
<td>2 11%</td>
<td>1 7%</td>
<td>1 4%</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One question</td>
<td>6 86%</td>
<td>9 50%</td>
<td>6 40%</td>
<td>11 46%</td>
<td>7 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two questions</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>6 34%</td>
<td>6 40%</td>
<td>9 38%</td>
<td>10 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three questions</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>2 13%</td>
<td>2 8%</td>
<td>3 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four questions</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>1 4%</td>
<td>1 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of questions</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ‘Dimensions of difference’ include ethnicity, ethnic origin, nationality, ancestry, tribe, race, indigenous status, language, mother tongue, home Island, and questions where no ethnic description was used but response categories or prompts suggest a broad ethnic distinction. Civic (rather than ethnic) questions, related to citizenship, birthplace or parental birthplace, are excluded, as are questions related to religion.

| % = Percentage of included forms for each round. |
5.3 shows the distribution of terminology by census round. This analysis concerns itself solely with ‘principal’ ethnic questions, defined as:

- The first ethnic questions where two or more such questions were asked;
- Questions which applied to the entire population;
- Adopted one of the seven general ethnic terms shown in Table 5.3.

Questions measuring other ethnic dimensions such as tribe, indigeneity or home island, were in every case preceded by a principal ethnic question and are therefore excluded from table 5.3. The terminology classification is based on that used in the Ethnicity Counts? database, and is derived from the concepts in questions used in census forms themselves. In some cases questions included combinations of two or more of these terms. In these cases, the table follows the approach of the global study of Morning (2008), in recording ‘primary’ terms (the first to appear if more than one term is used in a question) separately to ‘secondary’ subsumed terms. For example, in a question asking ‘What is this person’s ethnic origin or race?’, ethnic origin would be recorded as the primary term and race as a secondary term.

Table 5.3 Ethnic nomenclature used in principal ethnic question – number of countries per census round

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Ethnicity'²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Ethnic Origin'</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Nationality'²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined ethnicity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Ancestry'</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Race'</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Where countries have conducted two censuses in one round, and both questionnaires located, the approach of the earlier census has been counted in this analysis. Principal ethnic questions only. Excludes questions related to indigenous status, tribe, language, mother tongue or religion.

²Where questions subsumed two ethnic terms, such as “what is this person’s ethnic origin or race?” the first term to appear is counted as the primary term, the following term as secondary.

²Ethnicity’ includes questions on ethnicity and ethnic group.

As Table 5.3 demonstrates, ethnic origin was the term most frequently used ‘primary’ (sole or first-appearing) term for measuring ethnicity in every census
round, accounting for at least half of all countries measuring ethnicity in each round since 1980. In most cases these questions took the format “What is this person’s ethnic origin?” Ethnic origin questions differ from ethnicity questions in that they are inherently less subjective in nature, focussing the question back in time to convey the historical and frequently geographic context (Aspinall, 2001, p. 831). Reference to the census reports of missing forms for the low-coverage 1970 round suggests that race or ancestry were predominant, and that the shift to ethnic origin as the preferred term for measuring ethnicity occurred for most countries between these rounds. By the most recent (2010) round, ethnic origin was used in American Samoa, the Cook Islands, Guam, Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, Niue, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tokelau and Vanuatu, representing every local sub-region except Australia/New Zealand.

In recent rounds, the second most frequent term after ethnic origin has been ethnicity, which includes questions asking respondents to identify their ethnicity or their ethnic group. Such questions, while not apparently used by any country in the earliest 1970 round (not having been found in any located forms nor any consulted census reports), were used by several countries in subsequent rounds, and a peak of six countries (Fiji, New Zealand, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) asked respondents to indicate their ethnic affiliation in censuses of the penultimate 2000 round. In the following round, two of these countries, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, replaced their ethnicity question with one asking ethnic origin and Samoa subsumed the term ethnicity under nationality as its principal ethnic question. Only Fiji (since 1986) and New Zealand (since 1981) have consistently used questions relating to ethnic group, continuing to do so up until the latest round.

Nationality is a lesser used term. Note that here nationality denotes origins rather than legal or civic nationality or country of citizenship. Such questions were found in principal ethnic questions just twice – once in Nauru’s 2002 census, where output categories in a question asking the respondents nationality
consisted of a list of countries but a separate question asked country of citizenship, and in Samoa’s of 2006, where the question subsumed ethnicity, asking “What is his/her country of nationality/ethnicity?”

Language may also be used as a marker of ethnic affiliation (Aspinall, 2001). Here it includes questions asking respondents their knowledge or proficiency in particular languages, or mother tongue. As noted earlier, these questions are also asked for literacy or governmental reasons, and have only been included here where other ethnic questions have not been used and examination of the question suggests it has been asked as a proxy for ethnicity. This appears to have been the case in two of the French colonies, Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, which stopped asking ethnic origin questions in the 2000 round, instead asking respondents if they speak ‘Français’ or ‘Polynésienne’, suggestive of the key ethnic divide between French newcomers and the indigenous population. Similarly, the Marshall Islands, asked “what language(s) does ______ speak” and provided a list of 10 local, European and Asian languages for respondents to indicate, in 2000 and 2010 round censuses.

‘Undefined ethnicity’ includes those questions where no ethnic terminology is used but response categories imply an ethnic distinction. It featured twice in the 1970 round, when censuses in Tonga and Fiji asked simple ‘Is this person-’ questions followed by a list of ethnic categorisations. The two later appearances of this type of question represent New Caledonian censuses (in 1996 and 2004), which asked “À laquelle des communautés suivantes estimez-vous appartenir?” (to which of the following communities do you think you belong?), with ethnic output categories including Melanesian (1996) or Kanak (2004), European and Asian.

Ancestry, another concept used to measure ethnic composition of a population, is a “biological and historical concept which refers to a person’s blood descent” (Statistics New Zealand, n. d.). Descent questions have therefore been included in this category. The use of either term here appears to have been limited. It was
used in the censuses of Niue in 1976 and 1986 and in Tonga’s census of 1976, though subsumed after race in a question asking for the ‘person’s race/ancestry’. In the latter two census rounds, between 1995 and 2011, it has only been asked in Australia\(^3\), where the 1996 census asked “What is each person’s ancestry?” and censuses since 2001 have asked “What is the person’s ancestry?” and in Niue, where the 2001 census asked a question subsuming descent and ethnicity.

Race was asked for by some countries, though usage of this term follows an interesting and unique pattern. While at least\(^4\) two countries in the 1970 round (New Zealand and Australia) and three in the 1980 round (Australia, the Cook Islands and Tonga) asked for respondent’s race, in the subsequent three rounds it has only appeared as a secondary term in questions subsuming two ethnic concepts. This has occurred almost exclusively in the United States territories of Oceania (American Samoa, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands) where since 1990 decennial censuses have asked respondents “What is your ethnic origin or race?” The former US territory of Palau has also retained this question format in censuses since gaining independence in 1994. Otherwise, the only other appearance of ‘race’ since 1985 was in the Solomon Islands, where a questionnaire in 1999 used ‘Ethnicity’ as a category heading but subsequently asked “What race do you belong to?”.

Overall the clearest trend shown by Table 5.3 is the on-going dominance of ethnic origin as the term most used for operationalising ethnicity in Oceanic censuses. Ethnicity has grown in usage, but experienced an interesting decline between the 2000 and 2010 rounds, as several countries replaced it with ethnic origin. Race, whilst prevalent in several countries from across the region in earlier two rounds to 1985, is increasingly limited to secondary appearances, almost always in the censuses of current or former US territories, while countries

\(^3\) Though New Zealand has also asked a subsidiary ethnic question asking respondents if they are descended from a Māori since 1991.

\(^4\) Examination of census reports for countries for which forms were not located suggests that race was still more popular, with tabulations by ‘race’ appearing in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (later Kiribati and Tuvalu) census report of 1973.
which previously used race have typically shifted to ethnicity or ethnic origin. Use of other terms, including ancestry, community and nationality, has been limited, to one or two countries at most per round.

While Table 5.3 represents the terminology used in the questionnaires, the specific response categories or answer prompts provided are not presented. Figure 5.1 represents graphically both the terminology used and the responses provided over time. These response options or prompts also represent an important part of a country’s ethnic classificatory system. Groups named receive symbolic state recognition and thereby legitimacy (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a). Figure 5.1 plots located census forms from each of the five census rounds included in this study on a Cartesian or coordinate plane first introduced as Figure 4.1. This plane represents the ethnic terminology used in the principal ethnic question along the vertical axis and the response options/prompts provided along the horizontal axis.

As in Table 5.3, the analysis has been limited to the first-appearing principal ethnic questions categorising the overall population into named ethnic groupings. Specific answer categories provided for closed questions, where respondents select from a list of answers provided, are not distinguished from answer prompts, or suggested answers where respondents write-in their answer. This is because the specific ethnic group names provided are only of interest inasmuch as their presence on the census form as named categories imbues them with the legitimacy of state recognition, and this recognition occurs regardless of the form in which they are present.5

Figure 5.1: Terminology and response categories in Oceanic censuses, 1965-2011

5 Consider also in this context the considerable ‘example effect’ where the mere inclusion (or exclusion) of an example category results in wide differences in reporting rates.
Of other censuses located and in the data set, Samoa (1966) did not include an ethnic question. Papua New Guinea (1980) and Samoa (1976, 1981) did not include an ethnic question. Papua New Guinea (1990) did not include an ethnic question.


NAME = dependent territories. NAME = independent nations.
Notes: Racial and ethnic terminology refers to the ethnic nomenclature/terminology used in framing the question. Colonial and Pasifika categorisations refer to response options/answer prompts provided, in the principal census question measuring ethnicity. Where countries have conducted two censuses per round and both were located, the categorisation here is based on the earlier form.

Where questions subsume two different terms, the primary, or first appearing term, has been used in this analysis. Countries plotted on the ‘racial terminology’ left of the axis have used the biological/primordialist terms of ‘race’ (plotted to the far left) or ancestry/descent (mid left). Ancestry, while biological in nature, is not as overt as race, being less of a mutually exclusive categorisation, less suggestive of specific physical traits, and with fewer racist connotations. On the right, ‘ethnic terminology’ side of the axis, questions asking respondents their ethnicity (far left) or ethnic origins or language (middle left) are plotted. Nationality and community are terms not as readily classifiable along this biological-social continuum, though they are most likely to be seen as closer to ethnicity than race. Countries using these terms are plotted on the centre axis, on neither side of the ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ split.

The terminology/nomenclature used to operationalise ethnoracial characteristics is plotted on the left-right (x) axis, along an ethno-racial continuum reflecting the two opposing ways of thinking about group identity – as a biological trait or as a social phenomenon. Despite the intellectual consensus today whereby most scholars agree that racial categories have no biological or fixed basis (Nobles, 2002, p. 47), race continues in popular understanding and usage to represent a biological grouping, while ethnicity is typically understood to be social in nature. Ethnicity, as opposed to race, is generally considered to denote a cultural grouping with a common socio-history, defined by its members and outsiders on the basis of socially created and moveable boundaries or ethnic markers. It is therefore imbued with more of a social constructivist understanding than race.¹

¹ Although traditional primordial views of race as rooted in biological differences have long been discredited in academia, where race is more commonly understood as socially-constructed (see chapter two). Nevertheless, biological connotations of ‘race’ remain in popular understanding and usage (Rodríguez, 2000; Morning, 2008; Omi, 2001).
Response options or prompts are located on the top-bottom (y) axis, with the continuum based on colonial categories as opposed to Pasifika categorisations. Colonial categories, plotted at the top of the axis, are those reflective of colonial concerns and mores. These categories include racial labels such as Melanesian, Micronesian and Polynesian and those where ethnic categories provided reflect colonially-named nationalities or island groupings. These categories are contrasted with the Pasifika identities plotted at the bottom of the axis, where identities reflect locally-named or understood identities or cultures. The plotting of forms along this axis was based on a close reading of the group names provided as response categories or prompts on each census questionnaire.

Figure 5.1 portrays a number of trends. First, it shows a clear shift over the focal period from the use of racial terminology in Oceanic censuses to ethnic terminology. It also reveals a change in the identity categories specified in census forms, from those reflecting colonial conceptions of identity to more Pasifika categorisations using more localised identities. This change took place in various ways. Some countries demonstrated more gradual, incremental changes in categories and terminology. Others pursued more rapid change. The Cook Islands, for example, moved from a question discerning race and showing profound concern with European and part-European identities in 1976, to one asking ethnic origin with no reference to Europeans in the 1986 census. In general, shift to ethnic terminology occurred first, with only Niue and Australia using terminology on the racial end of the continuum by the 1990 round\(^2\), while the move toward Pasifika categorisations has occurred later, and for some countries did not occur. By the 2010 round, only Australia used terminology on the racial end of the spectrum, in the form of a principal ethnic question asking respondents “what is the person’s ancestry?”. Colonial categorisations as response options persisted in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and in the

\(^2\) Although some countries retain questions with ‘racial’ terminology as subsequent questions excluded from this analysis of ‘principal’ questions. New Zealand, for example, a question asking Māori descent is asked secondarily to the ethnic group question.
standardised censuses of the US Pacific territories of American Samoa, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.³

The lingering tendency for Melanesian countries, including the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and New Caledonia to use clearly colonial categorisations is of interest. In the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, the racial designation of Melanesian (and sometimes Polynesian) appeared as response a category in all the censuses included in this study, up to and including the most recent round. In New Caledonia, the term Kanak, the self-defined term for the indigenous population only replaced Melanesian in the most recent census, while the labels European and Asian remain. Elsewhere in Melanesia, Papua New Guinea appears to have rejected ethnic enumeration, having only included citizenship questions in the 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses included in this study (with the 2010 census form unfortunately not able to be located). Only Fiji asked ethnic questions without any acknowledgment of Melanesia or other Pacific races.⁴ Instead, the census forms differentiated between indigenous Fijians, Indians, Europeans and Rotuman,⁵ as well as Samoans and Tongans, recognising historic linkages with these islands (see Campbell, 2011). The presence of the colonial Pacific races elsewhere in Melanesian censuses is particularly significant because these categories were not found in censuses anywhere else in the region over the study period.⁶

Although not illustrated in the figure or earlier tables, the degree of subjectivity in the conceptualisation of ethnicity is also important and can be inferred from the wording of census questions. Enumerating across the region has been based on self-identification, at least across the study period (i.e. respondents, not

³ Where answer prompts for the standard question, asking ‘what is this person’s ethnic origin or race? has been ‘For example, Chamorro; Samoan; White; Black; Carolinian; Filipino; Japanese; Korean; Paulauan; Tongan, and so on’ in ten-yearly censuses since 1990.
⁴ Fiji appears to have always shown comparatively progressive approaches to ethnic counting, being one of the first island countries of the region to use the terminology of ethnicity.
⁵ Rotuma is a Fijian dependency north of Fiji with a culturally Polynesian indigenous population constituting a recognisable minority within Fiji (Campbell, 2011).
⁶ Although French Polynesian censuses in 1996, 2002 and 2007 asked respondents if they speak French or Polynesian, these labels are not used to signify ‘racial’ categories.
enumerators, selecting or indicating their ethnic identity). Few censuses, however, recognise ethnicity as a matter of subjective belief in question wording, generally treating ethnic distinctions as matters of objective fact. An examination of questions for words which emphasising the subjectivity of ethnicity, such as ‘believe’, ‘choose’, ‘think, or ‘affiliate’ reveal only two countries ever having used such wording over the study period – Australia in 1971, 1976 and 1981 censuses, which advised respondents “if of mixed origin, indicate the one to which the person considers himself/herself to belong” and New Caledonian censuses in 1996 and 2009, which asked “To which of the following communities do you think you belong?”.

5.2.2 Metropoles and dependencies
The global nature of the eCounts? data base from which this study is drawn allowed for comparison between the ethnic enumeration practices in the Pacific island territories and those of historical colonial metropoles. These metropoles include Britain, France, and the United States. Australia and New Zealand, though founded as British colonies themselves (and certainly colonised territories in respect to their indigenous populations), became political metropoles themselves in the 20th Century, with control of territories elsewhere in the region. Given their large size and established governmental infrastructure, all completed census form for these metropoles have been located. Practice between these metropoles and their Pacific territories can therefore be compared cross-sectionally across census rounds. This section explicitly examines this relationship between ethnic counting practices of the Pacific island states in comparison to their colonial metropoles over the period.

The British Pacific territories appear to have enumerated ethnically since well before the beginning of the study period. Of these territories, Tonga and Fiji, during the earliest census round included in this study, the only one for which they remained colonies, included undefined questions asking “is this person-followed by a list of ethnic categories. In the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (modern-day Kiribati and Tuvalu) colonial-era forms were not located, though the census
report for the colonial-era census of 1968 references ethnic origins. British Solomon Islands censuses in 1970 and 1970 similarly asked ethnic origin. In all four cases, Lewis (2001) and earlier published census reports suggest ethnic counting had originated with the earliest colonial censuses. As British colonies, Australia and New Zealand differentiated racial groups from at least the early 1900s (Kukutai, 2012; Wright, 2011). Britain itself, which had largely exited the Pacific by 1980 retaining authority only of tiny Pitcairn Island, did not itself measure ethnicity in national censuses until 1991, for anti-discriminatory reasons prompted by the 1976 Race Relations Act (Ballard, 1997).

French territories in the Pacific similarly appear to have counted and classified ethnicity in the early colonial period. In the 1980 census round, all three territories asked respondents their ‘origine ethnique’ (ethnic origin) while the New Hebrides/Vanuatu (a condominium colony until 1980, where authority was shared between Britain and France) asked ‘group ethnique’ (ethnic group). France itself does not ask ethnic questions, with questions on ethnicity, language or religion illegal under French law (Blum, 2002). The only permissible division on the French census is between the nationals (les Français) and resident foreigners (les étrangers). While earlier having no qualms counting their subjects in this way, in recent years the French Pacific territories show greater similarity with metropolitan French practice in this respect. French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, France’s Polynesian colonies, stopped asking ethnic questions in the 2000 census round, asking nationality (civic, differentiating between French and foreign) and birthplace. New Caledonia, the largest French colony in the region, asked ethnic questions over the entire study period, except in the 2003 census, when French President Chirac declared the question unconstitutional and such questions were erased. After a public outcry and considerable debate in the territory, and a boycott of ten percent (Haberkorn, 2005), the following census again included such questions.
In the United States the government has conducted a census every ten years since 1790, with a question on ‘race’ always included. In its Pacific territories ethnic difference has similarly been measured since the US first acquired sovereignty (United States Census Bureau, 2013). Interestingly, like that of France’s colonies, in the remaining US territories ethnic counting practice over the study period has also converged with practice on the mainland. Early censuses in American Samoa, Guam and the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (modern-day Palau, the Northern Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia) were administered by local administrations and asked separately worded questions (such as an American Samoan census asking ethnic origin: “e.g.: Samoan, Part-Samoan, Caucasian, Tongan, Niuean, Korean etc.”). However, beginning in 1970, the US Census Bureau began conducting decennial censuses in conjunction with mainland censuses in all three territories, using standardised forms. In 1980, the census asked respondents their ethnicity, and provided a standardised list of response prompts. In 1990, question formats in the remaining territories moved still closer to mainland practice, with questionnaires asking respondents their ethnic origin or race (using these terms interchangeably) and including in the response prompts the categories of white and black. An identical format was used in 2000 and 2010.

In the territories of the other colonising powers of the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand, the overall picture is difficult to ascertain due to missing forms in the early study period. However, in the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, New Zealand’s colonies during the study period (Western Samoa gained independence in 1962) appear to have earlier asked ‘race’-based questions, and although after they gained self-governance (in free association with New Zealand) the 1976 Niuean form contained a descent question asking those of...
mixed descent to give racial fractions\textsuperscript{10} and the 1976 Cook Islands form explicitly asked respondent’s their race. This does correspond with practice in New Zealand, where questions referred to descent or race until 1981. In Tokelau, New Zealand’s sole remaining Pacific Island territory, the earliest located census (1996) and those subsequent have asked ethnic origin questions, differing in practice from New Zealand, where respondents were asked their ethnic group. In the Australian territories, Nauru\textsuperscript{11} and Papua New Guinea, which gained independence in 1968 and 1975 respectively, pre-independence forms were not located, limiting the analysis available, although Papua New Guinea appears to have rejected ethnic counting, and the only located Nauruan census (in 2002) asked respondents their nationality (in an ethnic sense).

5.2.3 Measuring multiple ethnicities

The third key research question of this study examines how multiple ethnicity has been treated in official census statistics over the study period. The underlying assumption being that ethnic enumeration will follow distinct regional patterns and trends. The literature review that informed this research demonstrated the discursive influence of racial mixing/miscegenation in colonial Oceania. How to count such identities often causes official consternation, and the approaches eventually adopted reflect contemporary racial/ethnic logics (Hochschild & Powell, 2008).

Figure 5.4 shows how the censuses of Oceanic countries have classified residents who identify (or are identified) with more than one ethnic group over the focal period of this study. It relates to principal ethnicity questions, and is restricted to those which explicitly use the nomenclature of ethnicity, origins, ancestry, race or community of affiliation. It excludes ancillary questions about indigenous status, tribe or home island, as well as language or mother tongue questions.

\textsuperscript{10} “If of more than one origin give particulars e.g. 1/2 Niuean, 1/4 Tongan, 1/4 Samoan. If of Niuean descent state home village. If not applicable write NA.”

\textsuperscript{11} Nauru was a United Nations mandate from 1947, officially administered by New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain, although Australia was in effective administrative control (Highet & Kahale, 1993).
These questions capture ‘ethnic’ characteristics, broadly defined, but cannot be operationalised in ways that allow for ‘mixed’ or hybrid responses of interest here.\textsuperscript{12} Note that the multiple ethnicity approaches identified, which are concerned with the response options or answer prompts printed on census forms for such questions, are considered irrespective of how the principal ethnic question is operationalised or the particular question format used. For instance, no distinction has been made between questions measuring ethnic origin and ethnicity, or between tick-box response categories and write-in prompts.

Table 5.4: Approaches toward multiple ethnicities by ethnically enumerating Oceanic countries, by census round

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No mixed ethnicities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fractional reporting</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partial-identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific combination</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple responses</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12%</td>
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\textit{Note:} Where countries have adopted two different approaches within one round, the approach of the earlier census has been counted in this analysis. Percentages sum to the number of countries enumerating by ethnicity in each round.

As the table suggests, the enumeration of multiple ethnicities has been approached in a number of ways. The most common approach taken has been to require respondents to choose one single ethnicity, or for national statistics offices to subsequently allocate them a single identity. This practice, termed \textit{no mixed identities} in the table, has been the most common approach adopted in each of the five census rounds examined in this study. Though used in all sub-regions, apart from Australia and New Zealand, it is particularly prevalent in

\textsuperscript{12} Note too that countries that do not ask ethnic questions in each round avoid conceptual issues related to the classification of those of mixed ethnicity and are excluded from this analysis.
Micronesia, which accounted for half of all countries that did not recognise multiple ethnicities in the most recent round.

Fractional reporting was the approach adopted in the 1966 Australian census and in New Zealand censuses until 1986. This approach asks for the respondents race (or later, ethnic origins), and for respondents of mixed origins to “give particulars” (Australia 1966, New Zealand 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981), meaning specific racial fractions or proportions of descent, examples of which were given. Of all the approaches recognising mixed ethnic identities, it is the most conservative and pernicious, and such blood quantum measurements are notably absent from elsewhere in the region, with the only other recorded instance of such fractionalised reporting having occurred in the Niuean census of 1976 (which appears to have been heavily based on the New Zealand census of the same year). It does not appear to have been used at all after 1981.

Partial identities and specific combinations are specific types of mixed identity included as prompts or response options to ethnicity questions. Partial identities refer to ‘part-something’ identities such as the ‘Part-European’, included in the Fijian census of 1966 or the ‘Part-Tongan’ in Tongan censuses of 1986, 1996 and 2006. In ignoring the other identity and implying that respondents are not ‘full’ members of the named ethnic group these ‘part’ identities are more conservative than the other type of named mixed identity, specific ‘/’ combination groups such as ‘iKiribati/Tuvalu’ (included as a response option in Kiribati censuses since independence), with the named groups typically referring to the local dominant ethnicity and either identities of neighbouring countries or those of colonial-era national associations.

Of the two approaches, providing partial identities has been more common than specific combinations as a way of recording mixed ethnicity, having been in every round been the most common approach used which recognises the existence of multiple, or shared affiliations. Both approaches have been used by PICTs from all over the region and appear to be becoming more common over time, with at
least 7 countries from across the region (the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Tokelau, Tonga and Vanuatu) including such identities as response options or answer prompts in the 2010 census round. Part-identities have been used exclusively in Fiji and Tonga across the study period and in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Niue in later rounds. Specific combinations have been utilised in all available Tokelauan and Kiribati censuses as well as in Tuvalu in recent times. In terms of the combinations provided, a limited trend seems to be occurring toward recognition of geographically, rather than colonially linked groups (similarly with general response options given). For instance, early Tokelauan census reports record other New Zealand territories as ‘Tokelauan/Western Samoan’ and ‘Tokelau/Cook Island’ ethnic origins, whereas census forms from 2001 onward have dropped the mixed Cook Island category and included ‘part Tokelauan/Tuvaluan’, with Tuvalu, a former British colony, being of greater proximity than the more distant Cook Islands which was like Tokelau a New Zealand territory.

*Multiple responses* refers to the practice of allowing respondents to signal more than one ethnic affiliation in ethnic questions, exemplified by New Zealand (1981): “What ethnic group do you belong to? Tick the box or boxes which apply to you.” This approach, the most permissive of those identified, has not been widely adopted in Oceania. It has been used in New Zealand (from 1981) and Australia (from 2001), but was not elsewhere, except for the 1990 census of the US Pacific territories, which instructed respondents to “print no more than two groups.” This provision was subsequently dropped but accounts for the temporary increase in numbers of countries using this approach in the 1990 round.

Generally, Table 5.4 shows a high level of stability in the enumeration of multiple ethnic affiliations over the period. New Zealand and Australia followed remarkably similar trajectories, making dramatic leaps from being essentially the only countries measuring fractional ethnicity (the most conservative approach recognising multiple affiliations) to being the only countries recording multiple
ethnic groupings (the most permissive). In their located forms Kiribati, Tuvalu and Tokelau consistently took the specific combination approach while partial identities were recorded by Fiji and Tonga over the entire period and by Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Niue in more recent rounds. While the Cook Islands earlier provided specific combinations, from at least 1996\textsuperscript{13} they provided the partial identity of part-Cook Island Maori. Where countries enumerated by ethnicity elsewhere in the region they recognised no mixed identities.

5.3 DISCUSSION

5.3.1 Terminology and categories

Contrary to the hypothesis that more Oceanic countries will enumerate some form of ethnic criterion in censuses over time, Table 5.1 shows no such increase. This, alongside an analysis of census reports for missing forms, suggests that the majority of Pacific countries had counted their populations in this way across the period. This corroborates Morning’s (2008) global study of 2000-round censuses, which found Oceania to have the greatest propensity of all world regions to include ethnic questions in national censuses. Morning suggests that “populations are largely descended from relatively recent settlers (voluntary or involuntary) are most likely to characterise their inhabitants in ethnic terms” (2008, p. 246). Rallu et al. (2006) note a long history of refusal to recognise ethnic categories in official statistics in nearly all of Western Europe for philosophical reasons connected to the republican principle of national unity, and a more recent disavowal, in the name of post-colonial national integration, of such statistics in much of Africa. Inasmuch as censuses Oceania’s censuses have overwhelmingly collected ethnic data, these impulses do not appear to have been powerful in the region. Of the countries that have not enumerated ethnically, Papua New Guinea’s rejection is probably more practical than theoretical, given the country’s enormous cultural and linguistic diversity and the enormous challenges of conducting even a rudimentary census given the remote mountainous terrain of much of the country. The impetus for the disavowal of such statistics in the early post-independence censuses of Western Samoa is less

\textsuperscript{13} While 1986 and earlier forms provided specific combinations the 1991 form was not located.
apparent. It may be related to postcolonial concerns with promoting national unity. The trend away from these statistics in the French colonies of Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, which have moved away from explicit ethnic origin questions to asking a more oblique language question\textsuperscript{14} is suggestive of growing convergence with mainland French practice, which has long repudiated ethnic statistics (see Blum, 2002).

The associated hypothesis 1(a), that countries will enumerate more ethnic dimensions in censuses over the focal period, is however borne out in the data. Table 5.2 demonstrates a clear increase in the mean number of ethnicity-related questions in the census over the focal period. This increase may be considered as an expression of governmentality, ever-widening of state surveillance and control, but are especially interesting when it is considered that the immense and rising costs of national census-taking means only questions considered absolutely vital for the exercise of governance are likely to be included on census forms. As Kenneth Prewitt, former Director of the US Census Bureau notes, “These are not matters of idle curiosity. Every question asked... connects to a specific government program or purpose” (Prewitt, 2005, p. 3, as cited in Hochschild & Powell, 2008). Inasmuch as the number of ethnic questions present in a census is therefore indicative of the overall level of state interest, this trend is likely a consequence of the expansion worldwide in civil and human rights and ethnic revivalism or ‘identity politics’. This expansion, institutionalised and perpetuated on a global level through global human rights instruments such as ICERD, ICCPR and the ICESCR, as well as INGOs committed to minorities’ and indigenous rights, have meant increasing isomorphism in world society, towards institutional and national recognition of minority rights. This appears to have increased Oceanic states’ concern with measuring ‘ethnic’ minorities and groupings, to fulfil the data needs of policymakers to evaluate and address group level disparities and ensure these rights are upheld. In New Zealand’s case, these motivations are outlined by Statistics New Zealand (1996):

\textsuperscript{14}As well as the furore caused by their intended inclusion in New Caledonia’s 2003 census (see Haberkorn, 2005).
Information on ethnicity is needed by government agencies, policy makers and administrators, researchers and ethnic or cultural associations to study the size, location, characteristics and other aspects of the different groups. The data is used, among other things, in the planning of services directed at the special needs of ethnic groups in areas such as health, education and social welfare; the allocation of funds from government agencies to ethnic groups; and the measurement and assessment of the economic and social well-being of various ethnic groups.

This hypothesis is supported by the conspicuously multidimensional measurement of ethnicity in the settler colonies of Australia, New Zealand and New Caledonia, which were the only three countries that included at least three ethnic questions in the national census. They are the only Pacific countries where the indigenous population constitutes a national minority (Rallu, 2010), and as historic countries of immigration have minority populations unrivalled in the region. Moreover, as the highest developed countries of the region, they have amongst the highest levels of integration into the ‘world society’ increasingly concerned with minority recognition. The special attention paid to indigenous status or tribal membership in all three countries likely relates to the ongoing recognition and expansion of indigenous rights worldwide, increasingly evidenced in international declarations/conventions and national legislation (O’Faircheallaigh, 2012). This growth of indigenous rights since the 1980s is ideologically linked and associated with increasing human rights norms worldwide (Parrish, 2007).

Also in line with the hypotheses of the previous chapter, the study demonstrates clear changes in the form of actual ethnic enumeration schemas utilised across the region, involving a shift away from racial towards ethnic terminology and from colonial categorisations towards greater concern and recognition of localised Pasifika identities. These wide ranging regional trends are particularly interesting considering the natural conservatism of bureaucracies, with statistical

15 The settler colonies of Canada and the United States, with similar indigenous minorities and immigrant populations, have similarly increasingly adopted multidimensional ethnic counting comprising several ‘ethnic’ questions.
agencies recognised as being “cautious and not readily inclined toward making changes in either the questions or their coded responses” (Lieberson, 1993, p. 26). Somewhat contrary to the argument advanced in the previous chapter, however, this movement does not appear to be directly tied to decolonisation, given that it has occurred across the region (particularly in terms of concepts used) and in most countries, not just those which have gained independence. The progressive shift away from ‘racial’ terminology appears to be a worldwide phenomenon (Morning, 2008; United Nations Statistical Division, 2003), a reflection of the fundamental shift in the way intergroup differences were viewed beginning in the 1960s and 1970s (Spoonley, 1988), and termed by Fishman (1985) the ‘ethnic revolution’. This trend, away from racial beliefs and the biological determinism of the past, toward the more positively-connoted ethnicity, had several historical antecedents:

In the five decades after World War II, a critical historical conjuncture - the defeat of Nazism, the Cold War, decolonization, the civil rights movements in North America and Australasia, and the anti-apartheid movement — authorized antiracism to the extent that the word ‘race’ itself, in its naturalized scientific sense of a broad, hereditary human grouping, became all but unsayable in public and academic discourses in both the West and the Soviet bloc. Biologists and anthropologists denied the physical or cultural reality of races and predicted the demise of the concept (Douglas, 2002a, p. 3).

Given the region’s colonial history, it is unsurprising that ‘racial’ measures have been largely purged in Oceania.

The observed shift in response categorisations is more difficult to explain, with decolonisation again not appearing to have ipso facto influenced the structure of such categories. Response categories often blur concepts because of the conceptual proximity of ethnic terms, and so should be considered separately to change in ethnic terminology. The changes observed in this study may be

16 For instance, where countries change the ethnic terminology used in questions, the response categories or prompts provided do not necessarily change. Even more strikingly, some countries provide the same response categories for separate and distinct questions measuring different ethnic concepts (see Morning, 2008).
explained by changes in the political motivation for ethnic counting, according to Kertzer and Arel’s notion of shifts in the ‘locus of power’ in census categorisations (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b, pp. 27-31). These authors argue that as the state’s motivations for census taking changes, from a focus on nation-building and state control, as in traditional colonial censuses (‘counting to dominate and exclude’, in Rallu et al.’s 2006 typology), those in power impose categories as they see fit. Such an approach is evidenced in the early censuses of the period, when ethnic counting clearly reflected colonial concerns. Conversely, when the state’s motivation changes, towards nation building or especially the incorporation of previously excluded social groups, a shift in the locus of power towards ethnic groups themselves occurs. In such cases, these groups “have more opportunity to negotiate with the state over the form that ethnoracial categorisation will take” (Hochschild & Powell, 2008, p. 13). Nobles (2000, 2002) notes a similar trend in the United States, describing it as a move from a ‘top down’ approach to a ‘bottom up’ one, from census categories crafted by political elites to a messy and politically contested process involving ethnic interest groups themselves. She charts recent lobbying efforts of various ethnic and interest groups to have their groups officially recognised. It’s not difficult to consider how such ‘bottom up’ processes have influenced, for example, the enumeration of tribal identity in New Caledonia and New Zealand; the general trend away from colonially-imposed ‘catch-all’ racial categories; and the lessened concern with ‘European’ categories since the colonial era.

That is not to say that the legacy of colonial mapping has not been completely purged. Oceania’s recent past is structured by its colonial nature, and given that censuses were introduced as a tool of colonialism, it is unsurprising to see some vestiges of colonial influence. ‘Nationality’, for example, found by Morning (2008) to be the second most common term used to denote ethnic origins worldwide, was almost never found in Oceania (see Table 5.3). ‘Nationality’ is

17 It is worth remembering here that state strategies and policies to eliminate discrimination and promote such full inclusion of minority populations to a large degree require ethnic data (Simon, 2005).
more common in censuses of Eastern Europe, reflecting the so-called German model of a ‘cultural nation’, or a philosophical view that ‘nations’ are cultural groupings not necessarily coterminous with state-boundaries (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). In Western European usage, ‘nationality’ is a civil distinction, indicating political belonging/citizenship. This reflects the French ‘state-nation model’, where the state corresponds with the boundaries of the citizenry and not to ethnic communities of descent. Nationality is overwhelmingly used in this ‘civic’ sense in Oceania, a reflection of colonial ties to the Western European countries of Britain and France. Also notable in this sense, relating to categories listed instead of ethnic language used, is the unique and continued appearance of the racialised colonial categorisation of Melanesian in the sub-region of Melanesia.\(^{18}\) The isolated use of such terms in several Melanesian countries (Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and New Caledonia), even after independence, appears almost certainly to be related to colonial attitudes and influences, given that the ‘Melanesian’ race was considered the bottom of Oceania’s colonial racial hierarchy, as noted by Hau’ofa (1993):

> A direct result of colonial practices and denigration of Melanesian peoples and cultures as even more primitive and barbaric than those of Polynesia can be seen in the attempts during the immediate postcolonial years by articulate Melanesians to rehabilitate their cultural identity by cleansing it of its colonial taint and denigration (p. 149).

Postcolonial theory suggests that derogatory and belittling views held by colonial actors, integral to the colonial relationship of dominance and control, may be accepted and ‘internalised’ by subordinated colonial groups, who may come to accept illogical and pernicious racialist thought and attitudes (Hau’ofa, 1993; Fanon, 1952). Given that colonial attitudes were most pernicious in this sub-region; this viewpoint may go some way to explaining the unique presence of Melanesian racial categories in this part of the Pacific.

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\(^{18}\) While the Melanesia/Polynesia/Micronesia geopolitically division remains common, the racialised and problematic use of such terms to denote ethnic difference was established in Chapter Three.
The literature review which informed this research identified the term ethnicity as being a more modern term associated with shared cultural markers or beliefs, values and practices, while race revolves around (outdated) notions of physical commonality and shared biological origins. It also noted the use of ‘racial’ discourse to ideologically underpin colonialism. The findings reported in this section generally suggest that approaches towards ethnic counting reflect more progressive ‘ethnic’ conceptualisations than increasingly outdated racial measures. However, given the explicit focus of the term in the historical past, the persistence of ‘ethnic origins’ as the dominant conceptualisation of ethnic difference in Oceania suggests a lingering primordialism, or equation of current ethnocultural identity with ancestral identity, in the censuses of the region.\footnote{Especially the somewhat retrograde moves from ethnicity to ethnic origin by several countries between the 2000 and the 2010 rounds. We could hypothesise that the prevalence of ethnic origin is tied to the centrality of kinship as an organising principle in the indigenous cultures of the Pacific.} This, combined with the notably low recognition in questions of the inherently subjective nature of ethnic belonging, suggests that Oceanic censuses have a way to go before truly reflecting modern-day understandings of the concept.

5.3.2 Metropoles and dependencies

A key impetus for this research and its focus on Oceania was the suitability of this region for exploring the relationship between colonialism and ethnic counting. Oceania’s recent past (since 1800) has been structured by its colonial nature (Campbell, 2011). As has been seen, the colonial project relied heavily ideologically on racial hierarchies and racial thought more generally, and census-taking was introduced to Oceania as an important facet of the colonial project.

The finding that French and British colonies in the region counted and classified their populations by race and ethnicity is hardly surprising, but is interesting when it is considered how both countries traditionally rejected ethnocultural characterisations in their censuses as incompatible with their philosophical understanding of the nation state (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). This ‘French model’ of nationhood, based on the ideological belief that the nation is defined as the sum
of its citizenry, allows for no other public identity than the civic national identity (Blum, 2002). This position, particularly strong and still maintained in France (though not in Britain) is best expressed by the French government, in a reservation presented on Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects the rights of minority groups:

Article 2 (of the French constitution) declares that France shall be a republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. Since the basic principles of public law prohibit distinction between citizens on grounds of origin, race or religion, France is a country in which there are no minorities, and, as stated in the declaration made by France, Article 27 is no applicable so far as the Republic is concerned (CCPR/C/22/Add.2, as citied in Thornberry, 1991, p. 245).

The non-problematic application of such racial categories in the colonies of Western Europe is a reflection of administrative colonial desires to dominate and exclude non-European groups (Rallu et al., 2006), and of the racial ideologies which underpinned colonialism. Another important factor, however, was the absence of any such ‘nation-state’ construct of common citizenship in the colonies, compared to the long consolidation processes that European states underwent over two or more centuries. This meant new categories had to be devised for the vast majority of the population, given that no historical shared civic identity united the newly-formed states of the colonies (Anderson, 1997, p. 58).

Contrary to hypothesis three; that the ethnic counting of the remaining colonies of the Pacific will increasingly differ from that of their metropole, censuses in six of the remaining seven political territories show increased convergence with metropolitan practices. These territories, the three of France and three of the United States, have demonstrated changes in distinct directions, though in both cases in line with respective metropolitan practices. In The French territories, the exclusion of ethnic questions in Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia from the
2000 round, and their exclusion in the 2003 census of New Caledonia\textsuperscript{20} is reflective of the well-known denunciation of ethnic counting in the French metropole. Similarly, the incorporation of the US Pacific territories in the national census programme from 1970, and the introduction of questions asking ethnic origin or race in 1990\textsuperscript{21}, with white and black as response options, is convergent with practice in the “thoroughly racialised” United States (Morning & Sabbagh, 2005, p. 5).

One possible explanation for this increasing convergence between practices in the remaining Pacific colonies is that global moves towards decolonisation have promoted ever-greater political integration with home territories for the dwindling dependencies of the world (Aldrich & Connell, 1998). Under this view, increasing disdain for colonialism in post-war world society has meant pressure for non-sovereign territories to be granted independence or be fully incorporated into the political framework of the controlling state, being the only means of being removed from the influential United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories.\textsuperscript{22} This might account for the growing links between census taking in metropoles and territories noted by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in 2010:

US and French Pacific territories’ close working relationship with the US and French national statistical systems, with something similar emerging in recent years with Statistics New Zealand assuming a more prominent role in assisting the NSOs [National Statistical Organisations] of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau (p. 7).

This explanation also accounts for the lesser convergence in practice (if not in implementation) between ethnic counting in the final remaining colonial power New Zealand and its sole territory of Tokelau, as well as the Cook Islands and

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\textsuperscript{20} Which has in any case used the notably innocuously worded ethnic metonym ‘communities’ in recent years and is one of only two countries to have recognised the subjectivity of ethnicity, asking “To which of the following communities do you think you belong?” in 1996 and 2009.

\textsuperscript{21} Being essentially the only Pacific territories continuing to reference ‘race’, albeit subsumed under ethnic origin.

\textsuperscript{22} As was Hawai‘i, for instance, was removed from the list when it became the 50\textsuperscript{th} state of the USA in 1959 (Aldrich & Connell, 1998).
Niue with which it maintains significant ties. New Zealand, having offered Tokelau independence in two recent referenda (Gregory, 2006), is a much less enthusiastic colonial power than France or the US, which remain committed to their Pacific territories for strategic and geo-political reasons (Fisher, 2011; Clinton, 2011).

5.3.3 Measuring multiple ethnicities
Although Oceania has always demonstrated significant cultural diversity, since the colonial period labour flows and global migratory patterns have resulted in increasingly diverse populations across the region (Rallu, 2010). Given these demographic trends, rates of intermarriage have increased, alongside the number of people who could potentially affiliate with multiple groups. Categorising such population hybridity poses challenges to demographers and statisticians and adds to the complexity of ethnic data (for a review, see Cormack & Robson, 2010). Many writers have noted the tendency of countries to reject the enumeration of multi-ethnic identities because these challenge, complicate, and disrupt basic assumptions about ethnicity as homogenous and mutually exclusive (Nagai, 2010; Nobles, 2000). These findings suggest that in Oceania, where ethnic counting has occurred, multiple ethnic identities have usually been recognised in some form, at least outside of the US territories. Changes in the terminology and response options asked in Pacific censuses over time reflects historical movement away from biological, racialised approaches to ethnic identity towards self-identified cultural identity. While these changes in the way ethnicity is conceptualised and operationalised do seem to have influenced the enumeration of multiple ethnic identities, it does not appear to have done so in the way hypothesised in the previous chapter.

There it was hypothesised that hybrid identities in the form of specific combinations (‘/’/’) and partial ‘part-’ identities would become less prevalent.

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23 All three of which have asked questions on ethnic origins in the past two census rounds, opposed to New Zealand’s ethnic groups, and use their own, highly localised, response categories.
as response options to ethnic questions, with mixed ethnic identities instead recognised by allowing multiple ethnic group responses. This supposition was based upon the assumption that the complex and dynamic nature of ethnicity has become more obvious as social constructivist understandings have replaced primordialist perspectives of ethnicity/race (Aspinall, 2001; Isajiw, 1992). These primordialist attitudes, including that ethnic attachments are concrete, fixed and permanent, underpinned historical attitudes to ‘intermixing’ and ‘miscegenation’ (to use the terminology of the era). Such partial identities and specific combination categories are akin to colonial ‘half-caste’ terminology inasmuch as they fall short of acknowledging full membership of two (or more) ethnic groups. They can therefore be considered inherently more conservative and primordialist than allowing multiple responses.

In fact, this expected movement towards allowing multiple responses has not occurred outside of the highly economically developed New Zealand and Australia, which are unique in Oceania as high immigrant receiving nations (see United Nations report *World Population Policies, 2005*) with explicit bicultural/multicultural political agendas (Durie, 1998) and the only Pacific countries where non-indigenous people constitute significant majorities (Rallu, 2010). New Zealand has allowed multiple responses to census questions asking ethnic origins (in 1986) and ethnic group (from 1991)\(^{24}\), while Australia allowed as many responses as necessary to a reintroduced ancestry question in 2001 and two responses to a similarly worded question in 2006 and 2011. Outside of these countries there is no evidence of the predicted shift towards allowing respondents to indicate more than one ethnic identity. The only other instance of this practice is in the standardised form for the 1990 census of the then-Pacific Island territories of the United States (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands and Palau), which instructed respondents to “print no more than two groups” in an open-ended question asking for the respondents ethnic origin

\(^{24}\) Though only three ethnic group responses were coded per individual in 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001 and six in 2006 (Cormack & Robson, 2010).
or race, both of which were coded. Subsequent US Pacific territory censuses (in 2000 and 2010) have dropped this provision.²⁵

Perhaps the most surprising finding is the continued lack of any recognition of multi-ethnic identities in many of the Pacific Islands - in at least eight censuses in the 2010 round – despite growing ethnic diversity across the region (Rallu, 2010; Crocombe, 2007). This approach has been the most common across the region in every census round, although it does seem to be declining slightly, with countries more likely to be using other approaches. Forcing people into one ethnic category is problematic. Multiple ethnic affiliations are not new, having existed from ancient times. Having biological antecedents from two or more ‘races’ is far from uncommon, and many individuals identify (or are identified with) more than one cultural community or ethnic group. Neither races/ancestries nor ethnicities should be viewed as mutually exclusive, discrete categories. Forcing mixed-ethnic respondents to select one group, or being after the fact allocated into only one by statistical agencies²⁶ ignores important parts of their identity (Nagai, 2010) and may distort national ethnic complexity. Especially important to note is that, in violating the “principle of self-identification” (Robson & Reid, 2001), these censuses go against important facet of post- Fredrik Barth social constructivist understandings of ethnicity, as a subjective, contingent, and non-ascribed phenomenon.

Specific combination group names and particularly partial identities have historically been, and continue to be, the most common approach to measuring mixed ethnicities. Of the two approaches, the most dominant has been part-identities, which of the two is the most conservative and in keeping with pre-

²⁵ The US Pacific territory’s censuses are undertaken as part of the general decennial effort of the national Bureau of the Census, with data collection, processing, and presentation in Pacific territories consistent with mainland censuses. Census forms, however, vary to accommodate local requirements (United States Census Bureau, 2013). Interestingly, the subsequent 2000 mainland US census was the first to include provision for multiple responses, as a response to mounting public pressure (Nobles, 2002).

²⁶ Such as the situation in the United States prior to 2000, where former Census Bureau director Kenneth Prewitt reported that people who marked two or more racial categories on the 1990 US Census were assigned to a single race based on which box had the darkest pen mark (Williams, 2005).
constructivist understandings, inasmuch as ‘part’ identities imply that such individuals are not full members of either ethnic group. Such responses also to a certain extent delegitimise the other ethnicity – in recording part-Tongan, for example, a respondent’s ‘other’ identity is rendered invisible. This is especially problematic when the well-demonstrated role of official censuses and statistics in legitimising identity is considered, and was a key impetus for recognition of multiracial identities in the US, where white women married to middle class black men organised and lobbied for change at the state and local level because they felt their children were being forced to choose one parent over the other in official statistics (Williams, 2006).

It should be noted that statistically ignoring ethnic hybridity or providing such ‘named’ mixed categories are easier to statistically process than recording multiple ethnic responses, and provide for simpler census tabulations. Added costs in terms of time and resources may have influenced aversion multiple-ethnicity reporting across the PICTs. However, optical character recognition (OCR) scanning and other forms of digital imputation have dramatically simplified data entry processes in recent years, with this technology near universally available across Oceania by the 2010 census round (South Pacific Commission, 2002). Such technology, as well as electronic data processing, makes recording multiple ethnic responses increasingly practicable, and there are many ways to address concerns around the usability or proportionality of output data (see Cormack & Robson, 2010). With only around 10 percent of respondents indicating two or more ethnicities in globalised and pluralistic New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2009), the number of multiple ethnic responses in the PICTs is unlikely to be unmanageably large. Adopting multiple ethnic reporting would both recognise the fluid nature of ethnicity and acknowledge that ethnicity should be conceived as a marker of cultural identity.

27 For instance, in New Zealand during the 1990s multi-ethnic individual responses were prioritised, essentially involving reallocating mixed-ethnicity respondents to single ethnic groups based on a hierarchical scale (with Māori receiving the highest prioritisation and Europeans as the residual). This practice has since been discontinued in favour of a ‘total response’ output option which counts individuals in every group with which they identify so the total number of ethnic responses exceeds the total population (see Kukutai & Callister, 2009).
The actual part- and specific combination names presented on these forms are not shown in the findings but trends can also be observed. In earlier rounds, 1970 and 1980, located forms which included partial identities as response categories almost exclusively do so only for ‘part-European’ mixed identities. In doing so, these censuses – Fiji (1966, 1976), the Solomon Islands (1970), and Tonga (1966, 1976) - display illogical concern with the careful enumeration of European residents despite relatively trivial population sizes typical of colonial states (Hirschman, 1987). Colonial demography often carefully measured the level of ‘miscegenation’ in a country as European intermarriage with the local population challenged the racial order which justified foreign rule (Chatterjee, 1993). Although these countries have typically retained partial identities in later censuses they have more logically replaced part-European with part local identities such as part-Tongan. Where instead specific combination categories are provided, the limited trend towards recognising geographic relationships or locality as opposed to former colonial relationships of shared metropole or combined administration suggests too a limiting of colonial influences. These findings further support a central argument of this study that processes of colonialism and decolonisation have a clear impact on policies and practices of ethnic enumeration in Oceania.

Also of note is the historical use of fractionalised reporting or proportions of descent for ‘mixed race’ individuals in earlier period censuses of New Zealand and Australia. While missingness admittedly limits the inferences that may be drawn from earlier rounds, the dataset and inspection of census reports suggests this practice was always extremely rare across the region. It’s almost exclusive adoption in the settler colonies of Australia and New Zealand is best understood in light of the argument concerning miscegenation or ‘racial mixing’ advanced by Freeman (2005). Freeman’s argument is that concern about miscegenation differed depending on the political and economic circumstances of the particular colony and especially “whether the colonizing power’s relationship to the colonized centred on land or labour” (Freeman, 2005, p. 42). In settler colonies,
where the colonial interest was primarily in land, miscegenation discourse tended to support “territorial expropriation and elimination or absorption of the competing [indigenous] presence” (Freeman, 2005, p. 42). The purpose of fractionalised reporting in the only true settler states in the region was therefore to determine how fast indigenous groups were being assimilated. As numerous authors have shown, in the case of New Zealand, where absorption of Māori into the white settler population was to some degree officially encouraged, the purpose of collecting such relative proportion data was an important indicator of how fast Māori were being amalgamated into the European population (Pool, 1991; Kukutai, 2012; Cormack & Robson, 2010). In 1906, for instance, the Registrar-General remarked that the census provided insight into the widely-held belief that the “ultimate fate of the Māori race is to become absorbed into the European” and “any tendency... shown in this direction must be gathered by the increase or decrease in the number of half-castes” (as cited in Wanhalla, 2010, p. 205).

Such fractionalised reporting may be contrasted with practice in the non-settler island territories over the study period, where for the most part no recording of mixed identities occurred or where only specific part- or combination identities were recorded. According to Freeman (2005), these differences may be explained by the different form of colonialism experienced in the smaller Pacific Islands, centred more on labour than land, which influenced a more negative view on racial mixing in the ‘pan-European debate about human difference’ (Freeman, 2005, p. 44). In New Zealand Samoa, for instance, where ‘afakasi (mixed Samoan-Europeans) were officially viewed as detrimental, colonial officials were actively discouraged from conducting relationships with Samoan women. One observer in 1927 noted that “an attitude of regarding the half-caste as an inferior person was maintained in Government circles from [the

28 To form what one government minister described as a “white race with a slight dash of the finest coloured race in the world” (as cited in Belich, 2001, p. 190). In pursuing such policies, New Zealand is somewhat unique among settler states. In contrast, Australia, Canada, and the United States formally restricted intermarriage between indigenous peoples and (predominantly European) settlers (Freeman, 2005).
Administrator] down” (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2012). This contrasts with New Zealand policy toward indigenous Māori, where “physical and cultural absorption was regarded as the key to Māori survival in the twentieth century” (Wanhalla, 2010, p. 205). This practical difference appears to have meant that measuring specific degrees of assimilation and intermarriage (as in graduated blood categories) was less of a concern in the island colonies.

The change from fractional reporting toward recognition of multiple ethnicities evidenced in both Australia and New Zealand is further evidence of the general purging of racial logics (at least in official census taking, if not public discourse) evidenced across the region. Why this practice (the most permissive approach towards multiple ethnicity recording) should be today utilised exclusively in Australia and New Zealand, where previously the most conservative blood quantum approaches were adopted, is an important question. To a large degree, this major shift in official approaches to ethnic data appears to have been the result of growing dissatisfaction on the part of (growing) ethnic minorities and the rise of identity politics (especially indigenous revivalism) in both countries (see Spoonley, 1988; Stokes, 1997). The growth in multiculturalism in Australia and New Zealand since the 1970s and 1980s, both demographically and politically, contrasts with the island countries where minority populations are relatively few (Rallu, 2010). Such trends saw blood quantum measures increasingly questioned – for example, a 1983 report of the then-Department of Statistics recommending adoption of multiple ethnic reporting in New Zealand noted that:

...there is evidence to suggest that since at least the turn of the century the biological definition of Māori (i.e. half or more Māori blood) has not been accepted by a considerable proportion of the Māori population as a valid measure of their ethnicity (Brown 1983, p. 29).

The relative influence of global civil society trends, in terms of greater recognition of minority rights and ethnic inclusion, in highly developed and globally integrated Australia and New Zealand, should also be considered in this context. Multiple ethnicity reporting reflects political sentiments of minority and
human rights advocated by large numbers of International Non-Governmental Organisations and institutionalised in several United Nations instruments.

While the categorisation of mixed-identity individuals has progressed since the fractional enumeration of racial ‘half-castes’, growing migration and intermarriage increasingly problematises census treatment of ethnicities as discrete groupings. The continuing denial of hybrid ethnic identities in many Pacific countries and the continued continuing classification of ‘part-something’ partial identities in others indicates a lingering attachment to primordialism in the measurement of ethnicity in the Pacific. In this respect, it appears work remains to be done in aligning the conceptualisation and classification of ethnicity in Oceanic censuses to growing understandings (among social scientists at least) of ethnicity as a fluid, socially constructed, and contingent concept.

5.4 SUMMARY
This cross-sectional profile of ethnic counting practices in Oceania has established four main findings, generally supportive of the study hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter. Firstly, it has quantified the expected increase over time in the average number of questions measuring broadly defined ethnic differences in censuses across the region. This increase, the study suggests, is best explained by the global diffusion of minority rights and recognition throughout the common ‘world society’. Second, and in relation to this, the findings suggest significant shifts have occurred in the specific terminology and response options used to measure ethnicity in the region. Essentially these changes have involved the predicted movement away from colonial-era racial understandings and terminology, traditionally underpinned by pseudo-biological understandings, toward ethnic terminology associated with cultural understandings and the increasingly acknowledged socially-created nature of group difference.

Much like the persistence of ethnic origins over ethnic group/ethnicity as the dominant conceptualisation of ethnic difference.
Thirdly, the study records an interesting regional pattern of ethnic enumeration in the smaller island colonies sharply diverging from those of their imperial powers during the early study period, which it suggests is a function of the differing governmental motivations of essentially surveillance and control for ethnic enumeration in colonies, particularly given their ideological basis in the form of racial thought. Later in the study period, however, increasing levels of standardisation of ethnic enumeration practice between in the remaining colonies and their metropoles is apparent. It is suggested that this standardisation may in part reflect the growing political integration of remaining colonies given growing international pressure to decolonise. Finally, in examining the measurement of mixed ethnicity the study has not found the anticipated growth in the number of countries allowing multiple ethnic responses to census questions, a practice which appears to be limited in the main to Australia and New Zealand. Elsewhere, exact combinations of interest continue to be specified, either in the form of partial (part-something) identities or specific combinations. Limiting respondents to such combinations is considered more retrograde than allowing multiple responses, given increasing views of ethnicity as a social category and growing population diversity across the region.

Ultimately the findings reported in this chapter have quantified and outlined significant shifts which have occurred in the measurement of ethnicity in Oceania. They have extended theoretical knowledge, presenting a regional picture previously neglected in the scholarship. They have quantified a number of significant shifts, and related these to the literature, empirically supporting a number of case-study observations and theories. Importantly, the finding that ethnic counting practice in the territories of the region is converging with those of their metropoles is novel. A theoretically-supported explanation for this observation has been provided, in that it reflects the growing political integration of these relatively rare remaining territories. The following chapter discusses the conclusions and considers the implications of this study.
6.1 CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSIONS

In recent years the official systems that governments use to count and classify their populations by ethnicity have come under increased scholarly attention. Much of this work has taken the form of national level case-study (see, for instance, Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; Blum, 2002; Arel, 2002; Kukutai & Didham, 2011; Hochschild & Powell, 2008; Nobles, 2000, 2002). These studies have authoritatively examined how and why governments count their populations by ethnicity at particular times and in particular places, and offered much insight into the political and contested nature of ethnic counting. However, because case-studies are highly selective, their findings have limited explanatory power beyond their own specific context (Kukutai & Thompson, 2007). One weakness is that the localised view of ethnic counting tends to result in an exclusive focus on pressures, processes and structures which are internal to countries. This belies the substantial evidence that global exchanges – whether through treaties, trade agreements, or participation in global civil society – also affect domestic policies and practices, of which ethnic counting is one (see, for example, Tsutsui, 2004; Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez, 1997).

This thesis has taken a different, more broad approach, utilising a unique global and longitudinal dataset which allow for a cross-national, comparative analysis of census ethno-cultural questions and response options missing from existing literature. It has advanced existing knowledge of state practices of ethnic enumeration by systematically examining practice in a single region over an almost 50 year period. So far as the author can ascertain, this thesis is the only such longitudinal regional study which has been undertaken to date. In this
respect, it has gone some way towards heeding the call of Morning (2008) for research which examines ethnic counting on a regional scale, combining breadth and depth for theoretical insights. The focus on Oceania has also allowed for a detailed examination of ethnic counting in colonies relative to practices in their metropoles, a relationship about which little is known.¹

Substantively, this thesis has shown that in Oceania there has been a regional shift in census-based practices of ethnic counting over the last half century. This has entailed a move from racial terminology emphasising identity-as-biology to ethnic terminology emphasising a cultural understanding of identity. At the same time, the labels used to name groups have changed, from colonially imposed racial categories and emphasis on Europeans and colonial relationships to closer recognition of localised, Pasifika identities. These regional changes are telling, and demonstrate the limitations of the prevailing case-study approach which in examining census taking and ethnic enumeration within a specific temporal or spatial context, is somewhat blind to broader trends. These findings also comprehensively and empirically support assertions made in case studies elsewhere (Nobles, 2002; Morning & Sabbagh, 2005; Simon & Piché, 2011) that a major shift has occurred; from enumerative schema devised by power elites to exclude marginalised groups, to a more positive bottom-up approach reflecting governmental desires to address discrimination and disadvantage. Kertzer & Arel argued in 2002 that this shift required further research: “the history of the US census suggests such a shift has taken place. Whether this observation holds comparatively cries out for research” (p. 27). This study has suggested that it does, at least in Oceania.

This study has also advanced theory in the area of ethnic enumeration. It has argued that that changes in ethnic schema have been influenced by regional political factors. Specifically, the changed political zeitgeist driving movement

away from colonial-era motivations for imposing, reinforcing, and extending colonisers’ racial perceptions (Nobles, 2002, p. 181), were held to have been gradually replaced with more inclusive nation-building motivations influenced by the rise of identity politics and human rights on the world stage. Whereas census data in the past were commonly used as an apparatus of state control of subordinated groups, as in the segregationist United States (Nobles, 2002) and in colonial settings (Cordell et al., 2010; Uvin, 2002) censuses and ethnic classification increasingly serve aspirational ends, enabling inclusive policies for counteracting ethnic discrimination. Indeed, as Simon (2005) notes, strategies to eliminate ethnic disparities require ethnic data. In New Zealand, for example, censuses of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, were a key site for official views of race to be expressed and colonial anxieties, such as those of racial mixing or ‘miscegenation’, to be expressed. Colonial censuses were a central part of the governmentality used to mark the ‘progress’ of colonialism. As Wanhalla argues in the context of colonial New Zealand, “racial documents were employed to trace the biological assimilation of Māori into the mainstream population” (2010, pp. 202-203). The careful enumeration of ‘race alien’ Chinese and other non-White immigrants has also been well documented (Statistics New Zealand, 2004). Today, however, New Zealand’s ethnic statistics serve more inclusive ends, including the planning of services directed at the special needs of ethnic groups in areas such as health, education and social welfare; the measurement and assessment of the economic and social well-being of various ethnic groups; and the equitable proportionment of Māori electoral boundaries (Statistics New Zealand, 2004).

Throughout Oceania generally, it would appear that ethnic enumeration appears to be serving more inclusionary goals than was previously the case. This thesis has argued that this inclusionary impulse has driven the observed shifts in nomenclature (racial to ethnic terminology) and labelling (colonial to Pasifika) in the ethnic schema of the region’s censuses. These empirically demonstrated changes in ethnic counting on a regional scale lend weight to Rallu, Piché & Simon’s

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2 Alongside the related growing appreciation of ethnic divisions as social constructions.
valuable typology of ethnic counting. They reveal movement between counting to dominate and exclude to counting for positive action. The former model is implicated in earlier censuses which include schema which spuriously conflate culture with biology and racial terminology and group categories reflecting colonial imaginings and impulses rather than self-identified identities. Such groupings and conceptualisations underpinned the social, economic and political exclusion inherent of colonial Oceania. Conversely, the more recent model of ethnic counting used for anti-discriminatory ends involves the use of terminology emphasising the cultural basis of ethnicity and postcolonial (or precolonial) categorisations emphasising localised and indigenous identities. Importantly, this study demonstrates empirically that a given country (or region) may shift across these types as influencing factors change over time. Morning and Sabbagh (2005) have shown this at the national level (in the case of the US), but this study has shown it on a regional scale.

The study has also broken new ground in investigating the statistical treatment of mixed ethnicities on a supranational scale. It found a range of approaches have been used in Oceania to statistically measure individuals who identify with more than one ethnic grouping. Importantly, the finding of early ‘fractional’ racial measurements of mixed biological descent being limited essentially to Australia and New Zealand lends empirical weight to Freeman’s (2005) hypothesis that ‘miscegenation’ was treated differently in settler colonies, where the colonial foundation of land appropriation encouraged assimilation, than in non-settler colonies, where intermarriage was viewed more negatively. Fractional measures allowed governments to chart the process of assimilation. While these practices have been replaced by less regressive approaches, the number of countries continuing to adopt relatively conservative partial-identities or neglecting to recognise mixed-ethnicity in official statistics at all is suggestive of a lingering primordialist assumption of ethnic purity within Oceania. This is at odds with a growing consensus in the social sciences that such unchanging ‘primordial’ identities are a figment of the nationalist imagination (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b, p. 26).
Finally, this appears to have been the first study to examine the relationship between ethnic counting practices in modern-day dependencies and territories and their metropole. Oceania has undertaken a gradual decolonisation, most of which has occurred within the scope of this study, and remains home to a significant proportion of the world’s remaining political dependencies. These features make it an ideal site to explore this non-sovereign political relationship. During the early study period (c. 1965 to 1984), colonial practices in the smaller island countries of the region tended to diverge sharply with practices in their political metropoles. This appears to be a result of manifestly different governmental impulses in more inclusive home countries and characteristically exclusionary colonial territories. Recent forms, however, demonstrate a notable convergence over time with metropolitan ethnic counting practices in the remaining political territories of the United States and France. It was argued that this is a result of increasing political integration of these territories with their metropoles, a reaction to the powerful trend toward national self-determination in world society. Statistical practices may be a clear indication of such integration, with full incorporation of remaining territories the only alternative to decolonisation deemed acceptable by the influential UN Special Committee on Decolonisation (Committee of 24).

6.2 IMPLICATIONS

Aside from its methodological and substantive contributions, this study has applied and theoretical implications. Firstly, its findings of little recognition of ethnic subjectivity on census forms; the continued use of relatively retrograde approaches to counting mixed-ethnic populations; and the predominance of ‘ethnic origins’ to conceptually measure ethnic difference are reflective of older attitudes towards ethnicities as timeless, primordial identities. Ethnic origin, while acknowledging ethnicity and the cultural basis of identity, still equates present ethnic identity with ancestral identity, at odds with recent scholarship recognising the flexible, contingent and socially constructed nature of ethnicity. Similarly, the lack of subjectivity in ethnic questions emphasises assumed (from
the outside) rather than felt belonging; and partial identities or the complete disavowal of mixed ethnicity are suggestive of ethnicity as fixed and permanent. Together, these approaches may be seen as continuations of regressive notions of primordial group identities of the colonial era. As such, work remains to be done in revising censuses of the region to reflect modern theoretical insights of ethnicity as a socially constructed, cultural phenomenon.

Secondly, this work further affirms the general argument of Kukutai and Thompson (forthcoming) that state-level factors can be generalised across different national contexts. Pre-colonial Pacific people probably did not see themselves in an ethnic sense in the way now understood3, and the censuses introduced across the region in the colonial era, and the primordial culture-as-biology schema they used to categorise people, were ideologically important for underpinning the colonial project. Seemingly impartial and objective demography (alongside other disciplines) was instrumental in producing actual forms of colonial administration and subjugation, demonstrating the “complicity between power and knowledge” (Young, 1995, p. 151). Global transformations in ethnic relations and minority rights have seen a shift in ethnic counting practice across Oceania, with ethnic data increasingly used to serve anti-discriminatory ends. This finding in particular, of a broad trend having occurred across the region, is at odds with the prevailing case study approach, which implicitly considers national strategies of ethnic enumeration as contingent on unique and internal national factors.

This regional approach also has policy implications inasmuch as it allows for a comparison of national practices in a wider context. Ethnic counting schema can now be placed in a regional and historical perspective, highlighting unusual approaches, such as Australia’s sole continued use of an explicitly biological conceptualisation of ethnic difference (ancestry), and perhaps promoting re-evaluation. Attention to strategies employed to register ethnic diversity

3 Though it is admittedly problematic to say what the pre-contact consciousness of Oceanic peoples actually was, and the author wonders if this could ever actually be known.
elsewhere provides useful input for the review of any one approach in particular. Statistical agencies may evaluate their practices regionally, identifying options that might generate desired processes and outcomes and promoting optimum interregional statistical comparability, particularly given ever-greater local cooperation and ties (Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2002). Finally, in locating individual forms within a regional frame the findings seem to suggest little scope exists for ethnic standardisation in Oceania, despite UN moves towards this ideal on a global scale (see Nobles, 2000). Terms used and (particularly) group categories provided display too much - and increasing - heterogeneity to make this a realistic prospect. The growth of highly localised and national-context specific identities recognised in Pacific censuses, in keeping with ‘bottom-up’ mobilisation of group communities, defies any attempts at standardisation. These would represent a retrograde step, akin to the pan-ethnic ‘racial’ categories of the past. In this respect, the findings support Aspinall’s (2001) argument, that any standardisation of ethnic questions is neither possible, nor desirable.

6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH
Although it is somewhat of a cliché of academic research, this thesis raises several directions for future study. The approach used here could be adopted for further regions, exploring whether the conclusions here hold true on a wider scale. In particular, the general applicability of regional findings around the colonial-metropole relationship and the general shift from imposed racial categories to ethnic categorisations more reflective of self-identified cultural groupings is of interest. Further work incorporating censuses of the ubiquitous colonial period, despite the difficulties locating such forms, would broaden this analysis and provide a clearer picture of the regional shifts observed in this study. Other more theoretical work could usefully explore the mechanisms by which National Statistical Organisations are influenced ‘on-the-ground’ by wider trends such as those raised in this study. The world society theory inexpertly put forward here offers much scope for further analysis in this area.
This study has comprehensively identified the trends in ethnic enumeration in Oceania over time. Probably its biggest limitation, however, is the lack of empirical support for the explanations presented for these trends. While explanatory factors for the patterns of change observed have been argued with theoretical support from the literature, they have not been quantitatively measured in this univariate analysis. Bi- or multivariate analysis, modelling regional ethnic counting alongside comprehensive historical, social, economic and political data, would have further enhanced understanding and allowed for statistically supported conclusions to be made. The descriptive findings of this study are unequivocal inasmuch as data coverage allows. Its explanatory conclusions, however, are held only with a qualified confidence. Empirical theory-testing, while beyond the scope of this project would further strengthen these findings. It is important to note that such data, on a worldwide scale, has been included in the Ethnicity Counts? data base utilised in this study. Ongoing work connected with this project will further help us understand what types of states enumerate by ethnicity, how they enumerate, and under what conditions they do so.
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# APPENDIX A

## DATA DICTIONARY

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<td>1</td>
<td>Write-in</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Write-in, with examples in prompt</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Binary option</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Specified options, no write-in</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Specified options, with write-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>N/A (no question asked, ances==0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ances.nu</td>
<td>Number of groups listed as ancestry or descent options</td>
<td>num</td>
<td>Number of groups listed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A (ances.cat==1, 2 or 3)</td>
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<td>mixed</td>
<td>Recognises 'mixed' identities in question on ethnicity, race, ancestry, etc.</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes, mixed, multiracial, mestizo etc. recognised as unique identity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes, specific combination or group name recognised</td>
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<td>'No' includes questions where multiple tick boxes are allowed but there is no explicit mention of a 'mixed' identity.</td>
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<td>natid</td>
<td>National identity as ethnic distinction</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>The name of the country (e.g., Australia) or national identity (e.g., Australian) appears in a question on race, ethnicity, ethnic origin, ancestry, or &quot;undefid&quot;, either as part of the question, or as a response option.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>N/A (no question on ethnicity, race, ancestry, &quot;undefid&quot; or both nationality and citizenship).</td>
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<td>Includes nationality questions on forms where citizenship is also asked.</td>
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<td>Format of indigenous question</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Specified options, with write-in</td>
<td></td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>N/A (no question asked, indig==0)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>indig_name</th>
<th>Name of indigenous or aboriginal group, or term 'indigenous people' included as a category or listed as an example write-in response to a question on ethnicity, race, culture etc.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Binary option</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Specified options, with write-in</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes, but subsumed under another question</td>
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<th>Format of tribe question</th>
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<td>Specified options, no write-in</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Specified options, with write-in</td>
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<td>99</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>undefid</th>
<th>Unclear what the conceptual basis is for the question, but</th>
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E.g. Canada (2006): Is this person...? Options include
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<th>Field</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Values</th>
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<td>response categories</td>
<td>imply some kind of broad ethnic distinction</td>
<td>White, Chinese, South Asian ..., undefid=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>subj</td>
<td>A question implies distinctions based on ethnicity, origin, ancestry, tribe, indigenous are subjective</td>
<td>0 No, 1 Yes, 99 N/A (no question on ethnicity, race, ancestry, &quot;undefid&quot; or nationality)</td>
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<td>mtongue</td>
<td>Question on mother tongue asked</td>
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<td>1 Write-in, 2 Write-in, with examples in prompt, 3 Binary option, 4 Specified options, no write-in, 5 Specified options, with write-in, 99 N/A (no question asked)</td>
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</table>

Yes if question framed to include words such as "believe" "choose" "think" "affiliate", or emphasizes self-identification.

Also includes questions which don't explicitly use the term 'mother tongue' but are obviously eliciting info on ethnic or ancestral language.
<table>
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<th>rel</th>
<th>Question on religion asked</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Yes, but subsumed under another question</td>
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<td>Write-in, with examples in prompt</td>
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<td>Binary option</td>
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<td>Specified options, with write-in</td>
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<th>&gt;25q</th>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#1 starts after name, renumbered if preceded by enumerator information &amp; counting sub-questions as separate. Excludes household questions and those about members who have emigrated. Includes fertility and other questions asked to persons of certain age/sex.</td>
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### APPENDIX B

CENSUS FORM COVERAGE BY SUBREGION

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</table>

† Kiribati and Tuvalu were enumerated collectively as the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands in the two 1970-round censuses.

‡ Palau, the Marshall Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia were administered collectively as the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands from 1947 until 1986. They undertook a single census in the years 1970, 1973 and 1980. Of these, the 1970 and 1980 censuses standardised with those of Guam and American Samoa, the other US territories in the region.