

THE ENOWNING OF THOUGHT AND WHAKAPAPA: HEIDEGGER'S FOURFOLD

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ABSTRACT. Throughout colonization, Maori have been constantly urged to think of their terminology, and the objects it relates to, along constrained lines. In this practice, the self and other things are arguably restricted and impoverished. However, certain frequently used Maori terms – such as “whakapapa” and “whakaaro” – may be read alongside Heidegger’s “Ereignis,” revealing a completely other sense to them than their orthodox, respective translations of “genealogy” and “to think” allow. This kind of thinking in concert with an existential philosophy is an active process that allows for the “freeing up” of entities and a colonized group. With Heidegger’s assistance, the terms, and the original sources they refer to, reflect a kind of “Geviert”/Fourfold that ensures a continual strife and interplay between things in the world and self.

Keywords: Maori; Heidegger; enowning; Fourfold, metaphysics; Being

1. Introduction

In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger (1971) lamented humanity’s dominant way of thinking as having “long been accustomed to *understate* the nature of the thing” (p. 153), in which the thing is diminished so that, described as a particular entity through terminology, it must possess “perceptible properties.” This impoverishment in a basic relationship with the thing relates not only to thinking but also to the verb “to think” itself. Of course, here Heidegger was discussing the decline in thought in relation to humanity’s tendency to represent a bridge as a self-evident, solid construction, rather than as an entity that gathers to it what he calls the “Fourfold” of sky, earth, divinities and mortals. Of vital importance is that we do not limit Heidegger’s critique solely to a focus on humanity’s representation of things but that we additionally undertake an inquiry into the concealment of Being as those things are revealed.

The focus on things to the detriment of such an ontological inquiry is, I argue, an insidious aspect of colonization. In an era where Maori, for instance, are set upon by a bewildering array of arguments to do with water rights, language revitalization, and proper political representation, the chance for an inquiry into Being is not only absent but probably also discouraged. Crucially, the ontological sense of Maori terms, which are meant to represent things in the world so that they are inherently related, is endangered. Two terms that I discuss in this chapter are “whakaaro” and “whakapapa.” Not only are they solidified individually as entities possessing a specific meaning, though; they are additionally segregated off as intrinsically *unrelated* to other terms, including each other. Against this human centered agency, Delamere had identified in traditional Maori philosophy that humans had much less control over “reo” (language):

In the grander scheme of things, traditional Te Reo are the voices of nature; the jolt of an earthquake, the song of a bird, the rustling of leaves, the rumbling of thunder before a storm, the piercing bolt of lightning in the night sky, the rushing waves of a tsunami, the cry of a whale, the fresh smell of rain on the earth” (Milton 2011, p. 10).

To this list of Delamere’s might be added the following: “..., the concern that thinking itself expresses as one is moved towards the draw of the world.” My addition assumes that language much more opens up aspects of the world, including thought, than it merely comprises soundwaves. If that addition is indeed permissible, then one may see a marked conviviality between Delamere’s proposal and that of Heidegger’s Fourfold, in which thinking is an active consideration of Being *within* the interplay of entities, in the sense that thinking is a responsive movement towards, and assuredly within, the world.

Heidegger provides an antidote to the colonizing straightforward view of “whakapapa” and “whakaaro” as separate entities by providing certain ontological signposts, especially in his suggestion that humanity is “enowned” or “appropriated” by Being. Drawing on Heidegger’s philosophy about Ereignis (enowning), in the context of his writings on the Fourfold, I argue that both whakaaro and whakapapa contain to them, above all else, the sense of the disclosure of what is absent, and that they proclaim this more loudly than their individual meanings of “to think” and “genealogy” respectively. It is proposed that whakaaro and whakapapa signal a move back to the source of that enowning, and that there is therefore an intimacy between what the two Maori terms evoke.

2. Heidegger's "Ereignis," or Enowning

For Heidegger in his later work, Being is the central event to be thought by humanity, because, simultaneously while Dasein, as he calls humanity, is thrown into the world among things, Being withdraws itself. In his "Building Dwelling Thinking," Being as an event "owns" man by unfolding so that certain areas of concern are opened up for man. Being holds sway over humanity, and is the sense of existing poetically in the world amongst the interplay of phenomena. The phenomena he describes in the Fourfold – earth, sky, divinities, and mortals – are not separate, but entities that arise from a common unity. As we dwell, we are at home amongst the energetic, conflicting activities of these four. Being, unfolding as event, appropriates Dasein because it unfolds within him, and claims him, opens up for him what is significant. As the name for this event of unfolding, Being's call for thinking is not one that is meant to be *Gestell* (enframing) in nature; it is instead to be the subject of poetic thinking as it "recedes into the depths beyond all relations" (Harman, 2009, p. 294).

This sense of concealment is more significant for Heidegger – and is more urgent for thinking – than whatever is revealed. Things that are revealed are only disclosed because of Being's withdrawal. To that extent, more important than man's present state of visibility is how man's being is highlighted by what is absent. It is this absence that highlights for an entity its present being. An example of this is the "movement of the leaf towards the sun" (Royal, 2005, p. 10), where the leaf is not yet fully formed. Royal positions this as an aspect of knowledge, where it may be thought of instead as an aspect of Being, in which what is absent dispenses an entity's being by highlighting what it is (Sheehan, 1998). This view of a thing's essence being determined by what is anticipated is in opposition to a reliance on the presently visible as independently possessed of its own essence. A thing is cleared as visible within a world, for instance – and one must here retain an "openness for things to emerge" (Joronen, 2013, p. 629) – but this occurs in the context of a world as a whole, in which the thing is not a thing in its own right.

The unfolding that is Being is immediately suggestive of movement. That Being unfolds and enowns entities, including man, should imply that there is a kind of movement occurring. The anticipation towards what is not yet realized is this movement (Sheehan, 1998); the "draw" of Being, as it withdraws, brings the concern of Dasein towards it. As Heidegger notes "all revealing belongs within a harboring and a concealing. But that which frees – the mystery – is concealed and always concealing itself" (Heidegger, 1978, p. 306). Dasein's own movement, the becoming of humanity, is towards death. Dasein is present because of the absence of its death, towards which Dasein is moving. The aim of Dasein, for Heidegger, is to interrogate Being

and, at the same time, to be thankful (which is to be thoughtful as well) to Being for giving things their presence through its withdrawal.

Thinking has its source in enowning in that man resides within the four-fold of earth, sky, divinities and mortals. In this relationship, Being withdraws to reveal the oneness of the relationship between the four, and to provide for thinking into that mystery. Here we can see the relationship between the Fourfold and the active process of thinking, in which thinking is given to humanity to consider the source, or Being. In responding, humanity shows that this gift is not one way; as it issues the call for thought, Being is already dependent on a response from humanity (Schalow & Denker, 2010). Thus thinking is already there in the call that enowning issues for Being, and in that relationship neither thinking nor Being are subservient to the other. The Fourfold is an illumination of that world for thinking; its constituents are not, therefore, meant to be read as wholly concrete, physical entities, as they also call for thought into the concealment of Being and into man's capacity to think itself.

3. The Relationship between whakapapa and whakaaro through Heidegger's Fourfold

Heidegger's Fourfold does not figure frequently in accounts about his work, suggesting that there is either something uncomfortable or unsustainable in it. Whether his more poetic language in his later works may indeed be called "philosophy" as such is the subject of some debate. Plebuch (2010), a writer on Heidegger's Fourfold, recounts that he himself has been informed "that the later Heidegger is more mysticism than philosophy" (p. 5), adding that "[w]hat, precisely, they mean by 'mysticism' has never been entirely clear to me." I agree with Plebuch's questioning of the term here, and am interested in the discomfort provoked by Heideggerean calls for thinking about Being, although I do not have the scope at this stage to track and describe it fully. What may be said quite affirmatively is that, traditionally, Maori had no concept for "mysticism" as such; a concept or entity could be "huna," or "hidden," but this term hardly carries with it the tinge of the pejorative that "mystical" does in Western philosophical discourse. Moreover, theorizing *about* what gives rise to entities for Maori cannot help but bring to the fore a mystical account, even when Maori themselves would not immediately think of the discussion as mystical. That Heidegger's Fourfold "provides a way of seeing magic in the everyday" (Lang, 2013, p. 330) but that it may indeed on that basis be a shortfall is, for Maori, a perplexing prospect, as the magical and the pragmatic are at once the same.

Fascinating discussions about cultural attitudes towards mysticism aside, Heidegger's Fourfold provides impetuses towards thinking about both whaka-

papa and whakaaro in different ways. He reveals that genuine thinking is linked to an authentic experience of being in the world, which, I argue later, may be represented through the Maori term “whakapapa.” For him, “to dwell” is linked to the verb “to be,” and so to belong on the earth is to dwell among what Maori might call “te taiao” (which includes the invisible elements of those things that can be seen). He notes that: “It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language’s own nature. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages around an unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as though *he* were the shaper and master of language, while in fact *language* remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man’s subversion of *this* relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation. That we retain a concern for care in speaking is all to the good, but it is of no help to us as long as language still serves us even then only as a means of expression” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 146). Whilst he does not address “thinking” in those sentences, we can nevertheless identify that thinking is commonly turned over to a human-centered, autonomous exercise. Thinking itself is less important in the current discourse than “knowledge” with the result that the active process of reflection is buried in the first instance. To add insult to that injury, thinking is misrepresented as an internal function. According to Heidegger, though, thinking is given to man, instead of emanating from man as its source.

Thus the term “think” is not a suitable translation for “whakaaro.” The translation falls short of the true comportment towards things in the world, including their absence, that “whakaaro” draws our attention to. In a Maori sense, both body and the thing being focused on are results of an activity that is not explicable through the common, economical verb “to think.” Smith (2000) asserts that whakaaro means “*to cast attention to*” (p. 58), which he places as an “activity of the stomach and the entrails.” He continues “the stomach is associated with the *ira tangata* aspect or earthly component of that which forms the basis of action.” It is not, however, “the actual process of rational thought” (p. 58) but a concerned inclination towards the world that whakaaro heralds.

That the issue is one to do with language concerns the later Heidegger (1999), when he states, against the view that language is available for linguistic study, that “[l]anguage is the house of Being” (p. 239). About language, Pohatu (n.d.) has this to say: “Kai te reo ōna ake whakaaro e puputia ai ngā take pū Māori” (p. 2).

Even a conventional reading of this assertion would render it as suggesting that language has its own thinking such that issues that are important to Maori are given expression. This is certainly true of language; it does have its own voice that cloaks things in the world. Even silence, an absence of words, will cloak those things, and whakaaro, as an orientation towards

things, does not need words to give it validity. But what does whakaaro mean in this assertion? If issues for Maori are to be cloaked with words or silence, then whakaaro must be a mode of orientation towards those issues in the first instance. Words and silence have their own way of drawing a person's thoughts towards things, not necessarily through what they point to as visible but what is not immediately before the self. It is here that we see "whakapapa" as a crucial evocation of Being.

For Maori, there appear to be two philosophical paths to take as far as an ontological thinking of the term "whakapapa" goes: it can either be proposed as a progression of names on a framework (even if the names are significant), or, instead, it can be thought of as a means of an inquiry into Being. A third, more difficult, alternative may yet exist, however, consisting in an inquiry into the progression of names as a call to think about Being, in conjunction with the "sense" that whakapapa offers. Extremely important to many Maori is the knowledge and recital of those names, but the challenge in a colonized context is, in line with Heidegger's thinking, to inquire into the call of those who we continuously become through our concern with our own mortality. This interrogation calls for us to listen to the more secret but insistent senses of the term "whakapapa," either quite apart from, or alongside, its common meaning.

For those not familiar with the Maori language, it may be helpful at this point to express in short form two dominant meanings of the term "whakapapa," and then to consider the term in its separate components in an equally brief way, before thinking through the term's hidden nature on the basis of those meanings. Whakapapa can mean:

-genealogy

-to layer (in a physical sense).

Taken as two of its components, the term can evoke:

-to become ("whaka") earth ("papa")/be embraced towards Papa (mother earth)

-to cause to become ("whaka") earth ("papa").

Both sets of meanings – the common and the more obscure – are equally as helpful in one's rethinking of the term. Heidegger might have called the first two – genealogy and to layer, in particular genealogy – "calculative" because they are bordered off within a prescribed horizon of thinking of the highly visible. The latter two, more fully explained, are more meditative or poetic because they rely on much more on what Novalis called "the active association of ideas – on the self-active, purposeful, and idealistic *production of chance* – (fortuitous – free *concatenation*)" (Wood, 2007, p. 168). In other words, on their own they do not amount to much, but in conjunction with active thinking they may be allowed to assume a life of their own.

In his book *What Is Called Thinking?* Heidegger (1968) remarked that “Man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, however, is no guarantee to use that we are capable of thinking. For we are capable of doing only what we are inclined to do. And again, we truly incline only toward something that in turn inclines toward us, toward our essential being, by appealing to our essential being as the keeper who holds us in our essential being” (p. 3). These few lines could spur the Maori writer on towards greater thought, even at the individual points at which he uses certain terms. For instance: how is thinking reliant on being inclined towards something. How does a thing incline towards us? How are we “essential” in the sense that there is something that endures throughout whatever we think? And what “keeps” us in a Maori way?

4. “Becoming” as a Form of Enowning within the Fourfold of Earth, Sky, Divinities and Mortals

Whakapapa, read in light of its layering nuance, enables us to think of things in the world as constantly moving. Although this layering might be expressed as referring to a physical movement, it is not limited to what is present. Heidegger began his questioning into the notion of the Fourfold with an apparently concrete idea of a phenomenon called “earth,” although, as we shall see, to read earth as a solid entity is to misinterpret him: “Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 149).

Earth here is a metaphor for experienced world as much as it is a physical event. Whakapapa, thought about poetically, portrays both also. As things in the world become “whaka” earth “papa,” they are committed to the task of being collected *within* the world, and also its mystery. In that gathering in which the world comes to be what it is (Rose, 2012), they are immediately moved towards the earth. Papa, the earth mother, is the hidden aspect of “whenua” (land), resulting in man’s sense-making of what it is to be within the world. But, vitally, Papa has withdrawn and it is this concealment that is important for man, because it has allowed the disclosure of the earth in the first instance. Hence, “whakapapa” is the constant draw that is exerted on man, where man is pulled continuously back to the earth but never quite to Papa herself. Man is moved towards Papa, and is hence maintained in relation to it, complete with man’s concern for reaching some form of finality. In “becoming” earth as Being, however, one never reaches that determined state. In a more abstract fashion, it might be said that, for Maori, one’s point of concern is never completely reached, nor is one’s thinking entirely grounded in certainty. Instead, one’s thinking is called by a ground (“papa”) that we

widely believe to be solid and rationally “antecedent” (Rose, 2012, p. 758) but that perception never reaches.

Whakapapa dictates that whakaaro is always to be a continuing activity into the nature of Being. They are interwoven terms that call for an inquiry into Being by virtue of the deeper recesses of what they evoke. Whakaaro is not, first and foremost, “to think.” Importantly, as much as whakapapa insists, it is a constant movement within the world, but man is moved by the interplay of the world, and by its mystery, rather more than self-control will allow. An illustration is necessary here: when one states “kei te whakaaro au mo taku whenua,” what is really the ontological sense of this activity may be this: “I am being moved towards a state of concern about my land, and at the same time what has given my land its presence.” The sense of becoming that is inherent to the prefix “whaka” in whakaaro is of utmost importance here because it places the self at the mercy of the greater inter-relationship of things in the world. Therefore I am not just deciding to think autonomously about my land; I am becoming regardful of my land through the pathway that the withdrawal of Being provides. Furthermore, the bringing to my concern a phenomenon does not foresee that I shall be able to alight onto that phenomenon tidily and finally.

Listening to the sense of “whakapapa,” we can consider “papa” as an overall process of thinking that includes not just earth but other entities, such as sky, divinities, and mortality, as Heidegger had noted. When man thinks, one is collected and is guided along the path between those entities, for “papa,” as the precursor of humanity, also brings with it “rangi,” or sky. One is hence attuned (another meaning of “rangi”) towards the movement of “vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 149). Thinking is an immediate acknowledgement of that attunement even when the sky is not thought of, or when it is absent. As a derivative of “Papatuanuku,” or “rock foundation beyond expanse” (Marsden, 2003, p. 22), earth’s spreading out through rock and water is deeply concerned with the sky. Moreover, Maori creation narrative has it that Rangi and Papa were once inseparable. Despite their eventual parting, they retain to each other elements of the other.

In his poem “We, who live in darkness,” Tuwhare (n.d.) tells of the potency of the night: “Black intensities/of black on black on black feeding on itself.”

He was drawn to that absence that underlies the night as much as Marsden was. Poetry resonates with the absence and is probably the most appropriate medium of thinking, as it does not prefer the visible object as instrumental language does. But what is important in these lines is not merely a retelling of creation; instead, the draw towards thinking about nothingness is iden-

tified. It is the absent that Tuwhare has thought about. The void that he dwells on here is a precursor to the light:

Eyes I never knew I possessed
Were stunned by it.
Forcing me to hide my face in the earth.
It was light, my brothers.

Sky here is vital as a tilt for humanity towards the absence, in its relationship with earth. It is plain that what is resisted is the darkness, but darkness is meant to represent more here than just complete nothingness. It is darkness because of the absence of light. Later, light is light because of the absence of darkness; yet, darkness still holds man in its thrall even when there is light, precisely because there is light. Hiding one's face in the earth – in a sense, returning to the earth, or heeding both the sky's and the earth's call – one is returned to the darkness even amongst the light. The discomfort light causes calls man's attention yet again to what is absent – darkness.

What remains concealed is what draws humanity's attention to it. To return to the activity of becoming: one becomes (whaka) by being predisposed towards the world. The history of the thing in the world, and other things in their relationships with each other, all turn the attention of the self towards something or other, or, as I have proposed, towards the hidden or the nothing. Royal points out that the term "aro" is related the front sensory field of the perceiver. I consider that one is then *amongst* the world and that one, at times, apprehends aspects of the world. However, what is paramount here is the nature of the self as an entity among others, not as a transcendent, autonomous entity. The Heideggerean sky, in conjunction with the earth, and in its reading together with earth as "the concealed nature of Being within the world," proposes that one's visible sphere is dispensed by that concealment.

Maori know well the relationship of the divinities or atua to the sky and earth, including the link between them both that atua provided. Heidegger (1971) notes here, "The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment" (p. 150). "Atua" can mean "divinities" but the term carries with it the additional sense of "of the beyond" (a-tua). Gods for Maori are actually those that do not reveal themselves, in their totality, as solid entities but remain beyond the senses even when they are present. That is, they are considered to be "there" (in the sense of "ira," which can refer to "essence," a surprised "over-thereness!," or even "genetic inheritance") but in their presence there is concealedness, or "beyondness" to their nature. To think in the presence of the divinities is simply to acknowledge their mystery, along with that of the earth and the sky. As for whaka-papa, we can return to the interpretation of "whaka" to mean "to become" and "papa" as a reference to "Papatuanuku," one of the atua involved with

continual human nourishment. As we saw in “Earth” above, in becoming apparently solid, Papatuanuku herself remains concealed, because she allows herself to move towards human perception but never quite reveals her full self. When man thinks of this process, he moves within her presence but never gets so detached as to see her in her entire visibility. Here, whakaaro means more than simply a gift of thinking by the divine, and hence a striving after communion that Being demands of mankind; it is instead a continual activity that occurs within the concern that man has to answer the perpetual call of Being, with whakapapa standing alongside whakaaro as an impetus for thinking about what is not perceptible. “Whakaaro” does not, then, open up opportunities for man to “be at one,” as it were, with Being, but instead depicts the response of humanity to the enowning process.

In respect of language that refers to the divinities and their withdrawal, Heidegger (1968) noted that “[w]hat withdraws from us, draws us along by its very withdrawal” (p. 9). In Maori, a facet of that withdrawal could be termed “ngaro,” although Marsden avers that this void, after metaphysics, is called “kore.” Whatever is not a thing, therefore, orients man towards it, makes man consider it. Marsden (2003) proposed that “kore” assumed so much of its nothingness that it became “korekore,” which is so much absent that it is present. This contradiction is not just a metaphysical one, although it does remain metaphysical; it is also quotidian. One is inclined towards the “nothing” of a thing, and this is precisely what gains our concern. Moreover, the nothingness of the interplay of all things gains our concern, not just the thing in its isolation. When man is engaged in whakaaro, one is at the whim, to a certain extent, of the unpredictable nature of the seen and unseen aspects of the world, meaning that one is thinkingly in the thrall of Being.

Heidegger (1971) identifies that humanity is preoccupied with its eventual demise. He states that “The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. To die means to be capable of death *as* death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before the divinities” (p. 150). Man’s mortality, therefore, involves reflecting the earth, sky and divinities at the same time through considering, as a finite entity, the “plenitude of possible worlds in which I am not” (Wheeler, 2011, n.p.). Dwelling in the Fourfold requires that one not only acknowledge the unitary nature of what is illuminated through poetic thought but also the deep rift in thinking that occurs when one realizes the extent and mystery of other worlds in which one is not located.

Heidegger’s idea of mortality in the Fourfold calls us to think about the absence of our presence in other possibilities, in a Maori way. The role of memory as a connection to the past and future, for Maori, perhaps highlights this best. Heidegger (1968) states that “memory” (what Maori term “mau-mahara”) is the gathering (“mau”) of thought (“mahara”). When one thinks in the field of another utterance, one is *being* gathered to think by that utter-

ance, as much as one is autonomously gathering oneself to think. To that extent, thinking is a certain kind of bringing together, in the sense that man is collected, cognitively and emotionally, towards the mystery of the absent. Man retains in their essence the thinking of the utterer and responds – this is perhaps a sort of memory. Yet whatever is not present about the utterance, and indeed whatever is not present in general, notwithstanding the utterance, may be more poignant for thinking than what is present and what is heard, or the utterance.

Memory, as a gathering of thinking, is often thought of as a rarefied entity:

Memory – from Latin *memor*, mindful – has in mind something that is in the mind, thought. But when it is the name of the Mother of the Muses, ‘Memory’ does not mean just any thought of anything that can be thought. Memory is the gathering and convergence of thought upon what everywhere demands to be thought about first of all. Memory is the gathering of recollection, thinking back. It safely keeps and keeps concealed within it that to which at each given time thought must be given before all else, in everything that essentially is, everything that appeals to us as what has being and has been in being. Memory, Mother of the Muses – the thinking back to what is to be thought is the source and ground of poesy. This is why poesy is the water that at time flows backward toward the source, toward thinking as a thinking back, a recollection (Heidegger, 1968, p. 11).

The silence of what must be thought about, due to its absence, is what is loudest in thinking; what wells up is what is to be thought about through its concealment to man. The thinking of an ancestor (“tu-puna”), then, is that aspect of an ancestor that wells (“puna”) up before us. Hence an ancestor is always on the way to meeting us in our thinking, as much as having existed in the past. In thinking, we meet that ancestor to some extent as they rise before us, are part of their world and yet are not fully accommodated within it. One’s mortality in a Maori sense, then, at least partially revolves around the distance – yet proximity – of those things that emerge through thinking.

5. Conclusion

An interesting facet of any discussion about either “whakapapa” or “whakaaro” is that, on their own, they could be considered within the horizon of any one of the elements of the Fourfold and yet would have to allude to the other, even unnamed, elements in that same analysis. I argue that this is Heidegger’s intention – to retain the substance of the other elements *at the same time*. Further, I would posit that neither whakapapa nor whakaaro can be discarded in Maori metaphysical discourse as they show both human

agency and mystery at the same time. Thus, what “keeps” us in a Maori way, to answer Heidegger’s question, is that mysterious interplay of things in the world, including what gives rise to those things. This “wana,” or continual awe at things, is what underlies both thinking and “gathering” that whakaaro and whakapapa respectively call for.

Glossary of Maori terms

aro	regard
atua	god; of beyond
huna	hidden; concealed
ira	gene; interjectory (over there)
ira tangata	human gene
kore	metaphysical nothingness
korekore	overwhelming metaphysical nothingness
mahara	thought
mau	gather to; hold onto
maumahara	to remember
ngaro	disappear
papa	earth (abbreviation of Papatuanuku)
Papatuanuku	earth mother
puna	spring
Rangi/rangi	sky father (complete form: Ranginui)/sky
taiao	environment
tupuna	ancestor
wana	awe
whaka	to cause; to become (less conventional)
whakaaro	to think (conventional)
whakapapa	genealogy; to layer (conventional)

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