A New Form of Authoritarianism? Rethinking Military Politics in Post-1999 Nigeria

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Policy at The University of Waikato by

IBIKUNLE EDWARD ADEAKIN

2015
Acknowledgements

My gratitude and appreciation goes to my chief supervisor Professor Daniel Zirker whose insightful contributions and guidance made it possible for me to complete this thesis. I am also grateful to my other supervisor, Dr. Alan Simpson who took his time to read this work and offered his advice.

I am grateful to the administrative support I got as a doctoral student from the programme administrator of political science and public policy, Frances Douch, to the subject librarian, Jillene Bydder, and other staff at the post-graduate office.

I am also indebted to the military respondents who took time off their busy schedules (even at short notice) to grant interviews for my doctoral research. The staffers at the National Archive (University of Ibadan) were highly professional and need to be acknowledged as they assisted me in newspapers materials and official government documents during my field work.

To my doctoral colleagues and friends, Graeme, Chandra, Anita, Ben, Gauri, Debrin, Nyamaaamaa, Melanie, Rebecca and Simon, it was wonderful knowing you all and the nice social interactions we had. Lastly, I cannot but be grateful to my immediate family, Tinuke, my wife, and my son, Oreoluwa, who at this period in his life is too young to understand the educational journey I had embarked on. The support by the Adeakin dynasty as usual, is impeccable, my dad, Folasayo, mum, Wuraola, sisters, Yemi, Bola, Solape and brother, Yewande. In addition, thanks go to my uncle, Olanibugbe and family, my mother-in-law, Dr. Sidikatu Ajayi, whose contacts within the military greatly helped me in locating the right respondents needed for my research.

Above all, I thank the members of Waidrodro Assembly of God church (Pastors Mata, Taito and Rajesh you are awesome), and God Almighty, who spared my life and has made me witness the end of this educational journey.
Abstract

Despite the vast research that has been done on the Nigerian military, virtually all of these studies have failed to critically examine the accepted role of the military in the democratising phase. This is important because the relationship between the political elite and the military in post-military authoritarian states guarantees either democratic consolidation, or its reversal. In Nigeria, despite an appearance of significant progress in subordinating the military institution to democratic civilian authority, the military remains a crucial political actor in the polity. It appears that the military has yet to accept the core democratic principles of civilian oversight of the institution. This thesis, therefore, explores whether a new form of military authoritarianism is emerging in Nigeria, with the aim of understanding Nigeria’s military behaviour in a transitional phase, from prolonged military authoritarianism to democratisation. To examine this military behaviour, Alfred Stepan’s concept of military prerogatives that was used to understand the military’s behaviour in a transitional phase in Latin America is applied to Nigeria.

A crucial understanding of authoritarianism in Nigeria is initially discussed in this study using mainly document analysis strategy to examine whether multi-ethnic states, such as Nigeria, tend to have authoritarian systems. Six hypotheses form the core analysis of this thesis: first, that the military has retained significant military prerogatives; second, that retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic positions; third, autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999; and fourth, that civilian government oversight remains weak, and facilitates military authoritarianism. These hypotheses are primarily analysed using the elite interview technique. During the first half of 2011, the author conducted field research where serving and retired military officers were interviewed. The fifth hypothesis is that the military has intervened in politics post-1999. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on key security-related media reports (mostly newspaper editorials) on the military after 1999. The examination of the final hypothesis, that increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism, relies primarily on descriptive statistical analysis. In addition, this study collated relevant historical materials that relate to the military, utilising national archival collections.
The empirical findings of this research did not identify a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. The study, however, argues that the unrestricted institutional framework accorded the military has contributed significantly to authoritarian practices in the post-military era in Nigeria. This study discovered that there were similarities between the Brazilian and Nigerian militaries in regard to their military spending during their period in power. Both countries had lower defence budgets. Just as in Brazil, it appears that part of the reason the Nigerian military decided to relinquish power in 1999 had to do with its desire to gain a higher budget, something that was precluded in a military government struggling to retain a sense of legitimacy. The military needed a higher budget to modernise and re-professionalise its institution after more than a decade in power. This feature, which the Nigerian military shares with the Brazilian military, appears to justify the application to Nigeria of Alfred Stepan’s concept of military prerogatives.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>State Security Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>COAS</td>
<td>Chief of Army Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Directorate of Military Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>Nigeria Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>Nigerian Security Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>Special Bodyguard Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Action Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Northern People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Northern Elements Progressive Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNNDP</td>
<td>Nigerian National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMBC</td>
<td>United Middle-Belt Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPN</td>
<td>United Party of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPN</td>
<td>National Party of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>Nigerian People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Oduduwa People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Arewa Consultative Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ING</td>
<td>Interim National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPVF</td>
<td>Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMN</td>
<td>Islamic Movement in Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYSC</td>
<td>National Youth Service Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCC</td>
<td>Constitutional Debate Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHCN</td>
<td>Power Holding Company of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRVIC</td>
<td>Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NADECO</td>
<td>National Democratic Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Campaign for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOSOP</td>
<td>Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUPENG</td>
<td>Nigerian Union of Petroleum and National Gas Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>PENGASSAN</td>
<td>Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DICON</td>
<td>Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Freedom of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPGA</td>
<td>United Progressive Grand Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNA</td>
<td>Nigeria National Alliance</td>
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Chapter One

Background to the Study

Introduction

This thesis has explored whether a new form of military authoritarianism is emerging in Nigeria. On 29 May 2014 Nigeria celebrated fifteen years of uninterrupted civilian rule. This was the first time in more than fifty years of Nigeria’s political history that the military had not terminated the civilian process. Prior to this, the military in Nigeria had ended the First Republic in 1966, the Second Republic in 1983, and the Third Republic in 1993. There was, therefore, a renewed hope on 29 May 1999 when General Abdulsalami Abubakar handed over power to a former military head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo. Many had high expectations at the start of the Fourth Republic that Nigeria, Africa’s most populated country and until recently the largest economy on the continent, would live up to its full potential after decades of military authoritarian rule. This expectation was, however, short-lived as the relatively smooth transition of 1999 has not led to democratic consolidation in Nigeria. As Larry Diamond (2008) states:

… governance in Africa is in a state of transition, or some would say, suspension. Two powerful trends vie for dominance. One is the longstanding organization of Africa politics and states around autocratic personal rulers; highly centralized and over powering presidencies; and steeply hierarchical, informal networks of patron-client relations that draw their symbolic and emotional glue from ethnic bonds. The other is the surge since 1990 of democratic impulses, principles, and institutions. Of course, the formal institutions of democracy—including free, fair, and competitive elections—can coexist with the informal practices of clientelism, corruption, ethnic mobilization, and personal rule by largely unchecked presidents. Indeed, much of the story of Africa politics over the last two decades has been the contest between these two approaches to power—even in countries that are formally democratic (Diamond 2008: 138).

Diamond further argues that there is no democracy in Nigeria. This is similar in his view to five other big countries in Africa (Congo Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania), which constitute a significant part of the continent’s population (Diamond 2008: 140). Similarly, Adigun Agbaje (2004) argues that the current political system in Nigeria is a showcase of ‘electoralism’, or what some other scholars refer to as ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’(Agbaje 2004; Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006; Schedler 2006; Lindberg 2009: 3).
The importance of the military’s contribution to the democratising phase in Nigeria cannot be overstated. The Nigerian military remains a crucial political actor. As William Gutteridge (1985) notes, “the question is not whether armies will participate in politics but to what extent and by what means” (Gutteridge 1985: 79). While the role of the military within a full blown authoritarian system could be negotiated with the ruler, a democratising/democratic system requires civilian control over the security apparatus (especially the military) if it is to remain a well-functioning and effective democratic system (Houngnikpo 2010). As Staffan Lindberg (2009) argues, a ‘true democracy’ can only be achieved when there is:

An absence of ‘reserved domains’ of power for the military or other political forces that are not accountable to the electorate;

Established and effective mechanisms for “horizontal accountability” of officeholders to one another, constraining executive power and protecting the rule of law; and,

Extensive provisions for political and civil pluralism, as well as for individual and group freedoms (Lindberg 2009: 11).

Overall, the several studies on democratization in Nigeria over the last decade or so have presented this period as less than democratic, even though the country typically holds elections that are, at least on paper, multiparty and competitive (Omotola 2009; Adejumobi 2000; Guardian Editorial 2014; Vanguard Editorial 2013).

The quest for Nigerian achievement of a ‘true democracy’ is also complicated by the challenge of providing adequate security in the country principally due to the rise since 1999 of several violent ethnic and religiously inspired militias across the country (Hill 2012; Maier 2000; Peel 2010). The second challenge entails how to ensure that the military does not defy civilian authority or play a role that is unconstitutional within the country. In the past decade, there have been cases that appear to suggest that the military acted in an unconstitutional manner. Noteworthy examples include 2010, when the then-Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant-General Abdulrahman Dambazau ordered a brigade of guards (the president’s personal security), without the approval of the then acting president Goodluck Jonathan, to welcome and escort the ailing president Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua (2007-2010) who flew in from Saudi Arabia at the Nnamdi Azikiwe International airport in Abuja (Zounmenou 2010; Sahara Reporters 2011).
Similarly, on 6 June 2014 the military conducted the censoring of the leading newspapers in the country. Explaining the reasons for such an action against the print media, the director of defence information, Major General Chris Olukolade said that:

Troops, this morning, embarked on a thorough search of vehicles conveying newspapers and newsprints across board. This followed intelligence report indicating movement of materials with grave security implications across the country using the channel of newspaper related consignments. The Defence Headquarters wishes to clarify that the exercise has nothing to do with content or operation of the media organizations or their personnel as is being wrongly imputed by a section of the press. The military appreciates and indeed respects the role of the media as an indispensable partner in the ongoing counter-insurgency operation and the overall advancement of our country’s democratic credentials. As such, the military will not deliberately and without cause, infringe on the freedom of the press. The general public and the affected media organizations in particular are assured that the exercise was a routine security action and should not be misconstrued for any other motive (Nigerian Tribune Editorial 2014a).

What is, however, unclear about this military action is the civilian authority that ordered this particular action. Based on media reports, the office of the presidency, through the president’s senior special assistant on public affairs, Dr. Doyin Okupe, denied that President Goodluck Jonathan ordered the clampdown on the press (Nigerian Tribune Editorial 2014a; Fabiyi 2014). We must ask the following question in response: Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria, given that the military have been heavily involved in the civilian process since 1999? While the old form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria was achieved by a coup d’état, and was characterised by, military dominance of civil society (even though some level of civil society was allowed, but not guaranteed), rule by decree, a culture of impunity (human rights abuses unpunished), a lack of accountability on the part of appointed officeholders, political instability—fear of counter coups and a lack of public accountability of the military as an institution. The new form of military authoritarianism conceptually manifests as a largely unrestricted military role within the polity, one that is devoid of significant civilian oversight.

I will suggest that the Nigerian military post-1999 may have first developed its own distinct ‘quasi-ethnic identity’ among its officers and troops within the context of mutually accommodating and possibly antagonistic ethnic identities simultaneously co-existing in Nigeria (Zirker et al. 2008; Bah 2013); second, just as under military rule, the military since 1999 appears to have a monopoly over
national security. This is evidenced in several internal engagements where the military have been called upon to maintain law and order in the polity; third, there is an appearance of a culture of impunity for military officers, as occurred under military rule, in the current civilian process in Nigeria; and lastly; it is assumed that as Nigeria is in a political transitional phase toward democratic consolidation, it is also logical to assume that the military, which for decades dominated the political process in Nigeria, may have instituted several institutional rights and privileges for itself on the eve of the formal handover of political power. These may pose a challenge to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

The literature on Nigeria’s Fourth Republic can be analysed in different phases. Initially, some studies were sceptical about the transition programme of the military to hand over political power based on General Ibrahim Babangida’s (1985-1993) transition programme that failed to usher Nigeria into the Third Republic (Diamond et al. 1997; Mustapha 1999; Ojo 2000). With the eventual emergence of a former military ruler as president on 29 May 1999 most of the discussion in these studies has focussed on either the role of high ranking retired military officers in a civilian dominated era, or whether the civilian elite could achieve adequate civilian control of the military (Adekanye 1999; Ntiwunka 2012; Akinrinade 2006; Fayemi 2003). Other studies have also discussed how the legacy of military rule in Nigeria seems to be at least partially responsible for the militarised nature of the Nigerian state post-1999 (Obi 2007; Ajayi and Ayodele 2004; Fayemi 2002). The following thesis contributes to the existing literature by analysing the Nigerian military in the processes from military authoritarian rule to democratization, and the continued role that the military seems to be playing in constraining democratic consolidation in Nigeria. It will attempt to identify and examine whether a new form of military authoritarianism has been emerging in Nigeria since 29 May 1999. Six hypotheses arise from this for examination.

**The first hypothesis:** The military in Nigeria has retained significant military prerogatives. It examines Alfred Stepan’s (1988) Latin American concept of military prerogatives as applied to Nigeria. ‘Military prerogatives’, according to Stepan (1988), are defined as:

those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise
effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society (Stepan 1988: 93).

Stepan (1988) argues that societies in a transitional phase with a long history of military authoritarian rule have military legacies that are powerful obstacles to extension and consolidation of democratic rule (Stepan 1988: xi,xii). In the case of Nigeria, such military prerogatives may include the military’s mission, the role of the National Assembly in civilian oversight of the military, the military’s role in the defence sector and, lastly, its role in intelligence.

**The second hypothesis:** The military has intervened in politics post-1999. The military have had a significant role expansion since 1999, especially in areas that pertain to internal security duties, and this has had the effect of increasing military power *vis-à-vis* civilian authorities. The military is involved in internal engagements such as guarding oil installations in the Niger-Delta area, maintaining law and order in areas of ethnic and religiously driven crises and, at times, aiding or substituting for other security agencies in riot control or guarding sensitive government buildings. It seems, during these internal engagements, that the military has significant latitude in decisions determining when and how to carry out its duties.

**The third hypothesis:** Retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic positions. High ranking retired military officers are running for and holding public offices both at the federal and state level, thus possibly extending military influence into the civilian political era since May 29 1999. Such notable office holders have included the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Minister of Defence, the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Senate President, key strategic decision makers in positions in political parties, members of the state and federal legislative bodies, and many others. Also, the patterns of leadership style exhibited by retired officers, especially those at the federal level, evince comparisons with periods of overt military rule in Nigeria. Perhaps the most egregious example is that of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who throughout his tenure in office (1999-2007) appeared to violate the rule of law repeatedly with no legal consequences.
The fourth hypothesis: Autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999. There is a culture of impunity for military personnel engaged in internal security duties. That culture, which was significantly prevalent under military rule, seems not to have abated during the current civilian era. Noteworthy examples include the alleged ‘Odi massacre’ in 1999 by soldiers in retaliation for their colleagues having been ambushed and killed while on security patrol, as well as several alleged cases of human rights violations as reported by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International in which the military served as security police in volatile spots across the federation.

The fifth hypothesis: Civilian government oversight remains weak, and this facilitates military authoritarianism. The new (post-1999) civilian institutions are weak and unable to control the military, and this in itself may facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. The two primary institutions that should limit the activities of military are the civilian-led Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the federal National Assembly. The level of expertise in military matters within the MOD and the National Assembly is less than would be desired to assure on-going civilian control over the military.

The sixth hypothesis: Increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism. Military expenditures post-1999 have increased beyond reasonable limits appropriate to civilian dominance. Since the return to civilian rule, there has been a significant rise in the cases of ethnic and religiously driven conflict across the country. Under this condition of political unrest and instability, the annual budgetary allocation to the military has increased significantly. In 2012, for example, the government allocated approximately US $5 billion to defence and national security as a means to limit the activities of these violent militia groups (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2013b; Adebakin and Raimi 2012). However, these increases in monetary allocation to the military have not significantly reduced the activities of these violent militia groups and none of the allocations appear to have been accounted for by the military. We must assume, based upon this, that the military is acquiring increased power vis-à-vis the civilian authorities.
As mentioned earlier, the new form of military authoritarianism is conceptually defined as one that manifests as largely unrestricted military rule within the polity, one that is devoid of significant civilian oversight. Table 1.1 (below) presents some of the most potentially important manifestations of this new form of military authoritarianism in the democratising phase. It indicates what would constitute as ‘low’, ‘emerging’, and ‘high’ levels of a new form of military authoritarianism. It should be noted that ‘Low’ is classified as having an inadequate civilian institutional framework that limits military activities in the polity. It denotes a complete dominance of the military in areas of its activities. ‘Emerging’ are classified as those areas where there are certain degrees of civilian oversight of the military, but the institution can decide not to comply with certain directives or to informally disengage from a procedure if sanctioned by the civilian institution(s). ‘High’ denotes an appropriate civilian institutional framework that limits military activities in a democratising regime.

As Stepan (1988) noted when discussing the concept of military prerogatives, there are two possible approaches for the civilians to adapt as regards to such prerogatives. These are similarly applied to one’s understanding of the six dimensions of a new form of military authoritarianism. In the first, civilians can significantly reduce the levels of military authoritarianism in a civilian era without significant contestation from the military. This suggests the presence of genuine civilian oversight. The second approach assumes that low levels of civilian control in any of the six dimensions identified might not be challenged by the civilian political elite, likely because there have been no articulated policy alternative tabled by the civilians. This situation may cause the political elites to accommodate these dimensions. Overall, for the case being explored, a new form of military authoritarianism is thought to be present in the democratising process if all the six arenas are classified as ‘Low’.
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<tr>
<th>Arena: Military prerogatives</th>
<th>Indicator: level of military influence over these four institutions</th>
<th>Military mission</th>
<th>Role of national assembly</th>
<th>Coordination of defence sector</th>
<th>Role in intelligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Constitution is not explicitly clear on the military’s mission and provides the institution with significant role expansion without adequate civilian oversight</td>
<td>No legislative tradition of detailed hearings on military matters. Especially in internal security engagement.</td>
<td>Active-duty military officers fill almost all top defence sector roles. Civilian participants normally do so as employees of the three military services</td>
<td>Intelligence agencies are controlled by active-duty officers. No independent review boards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>Constitutional provisions allow the executive unlimited powers to engage the military. Some informal military participation in the political process</td>
<td>Most major issues affecting the military including weapons procurement are monitored by the legislature. Cabinet officials routinely appear before legislative hearings</td>
<td>Military has some authority over the coordination of the defence sector and the process of designing and implementing national security policy</td>
<td>Military has the ability informally to engage its intelligence unit outside of the narrowly defined cases of internal military discipline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Constitution is clear on the military’s mission and provides an appropriate framework of engagement that include the executive and the legislature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Arena: Media perception of military internal engagement
Indicator: media commentaries on the level of military internal engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of civilian control</th>
<th>Media commentaries of the military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Almost all media commentaries reports unconstitutional internal engagements of the military. No civilian sanctioning of autonomous conduct of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>No evidence of media commentary report of unconstitutional internal engagement by the military. There are institutional framework to monitor and sanction unjustified military operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) Arena: Retired military officers
Indicator: retired military officers influence on the rules of political competition and the economic sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of civilian control</th>
<th>Retired military officers in politics</th>
<th>Retired military officers in the economic sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Retired military officers dominate rule setting, process and outcomes of civilian elite selection. There is a formal/de jure alliance of retired military officers with active duty officers</td>
<td>Retired military officers head or have influence over key state and private enterprises and use that to channel funds to the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>Retired military officers have no influence on the rules of political competition and elite selection. No informal/de jure alliance of retired military officers with active duty officers</td>
<td>Even if retired military officers head or have any influence on state and private enterprises, they have no informal/de jure alliance or obligation with the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Retired military officers have no influence on the rules of political competition and elite selection. No informal/de jure alliance of retired military officers with active duty officers</td>
<td>Retired military officers in the economic sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Dimensions of a New Form of Military Authoritarianism in a Democratising Regime

8
4) Arena: Human rights
Indicator: civilian oversight of military in internal security engagement especially in alleged cases of human rights abuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of civilian control</th>
<th>Military attitudes towards allegations of human rights abuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No institutionalised framework or oversight to sanction inappropriate military conduct in internal security duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>Civilian oversight to monitor and sanction military operation is limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Institutionalised framework to sanction and monitor military internal security engagements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5) Arena: civilian military expertise
Indicator: civilian institution influence on articulation and aggregation of military activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of civilian control</th>
<th>Civilian expertise on military matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Military activities are not subject to civilian monitoring. Civilian branches lack military expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>Military has the ability to selectively withdraw itself from some civilian oversight. The institution can intentionally refuse civilian inputs or mis-inform them on some military matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>All civilian branches that are constitutional mandated over the military are able to monitor military activities. These branches have adequate civilian military experts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6) Arena: Military budget
Indicator: military influence on defence budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of civilian control</th>
<th>Control of budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Military allocates less of expenditure for itself under the period of military rule due to legitimacy crisis. Military dominance over its budget after military rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>The military have certain de facto prerogatives over its budgetary process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Institutionnalised civilian participation in the allocation of expenditure to the military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from (Stepan 1988; Croissant et al. 2010)

In sum, it is logical to assume that a new form of military authoritarianism may be emerging in contemporary Nigeria. Over four decades ago, Samuel Finer (1966) discussed the idea of military disengagement in politics. He posited that the only way to prevent the continuous cycle of military interference in the civilian political process was to produce a successor government that neither needs the military nor is needed by it. In a more contemporary study, similar views to Finer were argued by Rollin Tusalem (2013). He stated that societies in which there are highly politicised military institutions or military institutions with a culture of coup d’etat tend to have the challenges of democratic consolidation and, in some cases, democratic reversals (Tusalem 2013: 13-14).

I have used the ‘single-country studies as comparison’ case study research design in the broader subfield of comparative politics to examine the research question. The combination of research methods used to explore this research question is what John Creswell (1994, 2003) calls “mixed methods procedures” (Creswell 2003: 208-225). According to Creswell (2003), a mixed methods approach provides:

the researcher [the] base knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds (e.g., consequence-oriented, problem-centred, and pluralistic). It employs strategies of
inquiry that involve collecting data either simultaneously or sequentially to best understand research problems. The data collection also involves gathering both numeric information (e.g., on instruments) as well as text information (e.g., on interviews) so that the final database represents both quantitative and qualitative information (Creswell 2003: 18-20).

The main qualitative data collection strategy is that of a field research conducted in 2011 (elite interviews), where the author interviewed serving and retired high ranking military officers. In addition, a quantitative approach was also employed in which a cross-national analysis of the military expenditure of Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon was undertaken. The data collection involved data from reputable and recognised organizations such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

My focus upon Nigeria, aside from my own subjective interests as a native-born Nigerian, is principally because in comparison with other African countries, the incidence of military interference in politics is obviously very high in Nigeria. It is hoped that the findings on Nigeria will shed light on African civil-military relations in general, and, in subsequent studies, be used more comparatively to analyse civil-military relations across Africa.

**Nigeria’s Military History in Brief: From Inception to a Culture of Political Intervention**

The modern military in Nigeria traces its roots to the British incursion into what is now called Nigeria in the Nineteenth Century. Prior to that, there were pre-colonial empires in this geographical area. Some of these autonomous and semi-autonomous empires, like modern states, were mindful of the power that institutions responsible for territorial defence could have over the political system, and thus had some semblance of modern political institutions with limited powers. An example of this was the Oyo Empire, whose territory occupied much of what is now modern-day south-western Nigeria. In Oyo, the Aare-ona kankanfo (a title given to the general military commander of Oyo) never resided in the same city as the Alaafin, who was the spiritual and administrative head of the empire. This was done as a way of limiting the powers of the Aare-ona kankanfo and also ensuring that the Aare could not easily nurture the idea of overthrowing the Alaafin (Johnson and Johnson 1970; Akinjobin 1971; Ajayi and Crowder 1971).
The first seed of what later became known as the Nigerian Army, however, could be found in 1862 when Lieutenant Glover, of the Royal British Navy and governor of the colony of Lagos, organized a group of 18 armed Hausas into a militia known as the “Glover Constabulary” and the “Glover Hausas” (Momoh 2000: 443-444). The militia’s initial responsibility was to mount punitive expeditions to protect British trade routes around Lagos. This small force of militia went through several expansions and reorganizations and, in 1897, metamorphosed into the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). By 1940, WAFF was conferred with the royal charter to become the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). This was in recognition for the gallant performance of this force in previous British wars (Ubah 1998; Falola 2009, 1999).

The visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Nigeria in 1956 led to the renaming of the Northern and Southern Regiments as the ‘Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiments’ (QONR). Later that same year, the British granted military autonomy to their dependencies and, therefore, the QONR was re-designated the Nigerian Military Force (NMF). At Independence in 1960 the name was changed to the Royal Nigerian Army (RNA). The present name, Nigerian Army (NA), came into use when Nigeria became a Republic in 1963. Likewise, other branches of the Nigerian Armed Forces came into existence at different phases. First, the Royal Nigerian Navy in 1959 later changed its name to the Nigerian Navy when Nigeria became a Republic in 1963. In 1964, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) was formally established by an Act of Parliament and immediately became functional (Momoh 2000: 445-446; Omotoso 1988).

The pre-eminence of the military in Nigerian politics, however, started in 1966 when the military first directly intervened into civilian administration. Since 1966, the military have not only had a significant influence in all transitional processes to civilian rule, they have also become a significant factor in Nigerian politics. In sum, Nigeria’s military dominance in politics is well illustrated by Ben Nwabueze (1989), who categorized Nigeria’s political history into five pre-1989 phases:

1. *Era of British colonial military-like autocracy and absolutism.* This was characterized by the British using the coercive apparatus of the state (the military and police) to maintain law and order. This period of formal
colonialism started in the 1800s and ended 1 October, 1960 when Nigeria gained her independence from the British.

2. Emergence of constitutional democracy, which was based on a modified British Westminster parliamentary model. This lasted from 1960-1966.


4. Return of constitutional democracy, with the change from the Westminster model to the American presidential model of political system. This lasted from 1979-1983.


In addition to Nwabueze’s five phases of Nigeria’s political history, the country has also added another three phases to its political history:


3. The ushering in of the Fourth Republic in May 29, 1999, after a relatively successful military lead transition to civilian rule.

In all, it can be argued that Nigeria has witnessed six successful military interventions in politics. First was the January 1966 intervention by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu (Ademoyega 1981). This intervention led to the killing of several prominent politicians of the first republic, including Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (the prime minister at that time), Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (the premier of the Northern Region and sardauna of Sokoto at that time), Chief Ladoke Akintola (premier of the Western Region at that time), and Chief Okotie-Eboh (the federal minister of finance at that time). Because Nzeogwu’s coup was partially successful, the head of the army, General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi was eventually made head of state (First 1970: 286; Ademoyega 1981; Muffett 1982; Diamond 1988). The counter-coup of July 1966 followed the perception that the first intervention of 1966 was ethnically based to favour the Igbos (Siollun 2009; Luckham 1975; Panter-Brick 1970). Eventually, the counter-coup of 1966 saw the killing of two prominent military officers, General Aguiyi Ironsi (head of state) and Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi (military governor of the Western Region): Lieutenant Colonel Yabuku Gowon was subsequently made head of
This regime lasted until 29 July 1975, when the Gowon regime was overthrown in a bloodless coup d’état and Brigadier General Murtala Mohammed was made the head of state. On 13 February 1976, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo became the head of state following an unsuccessful coup led by Colonel Bukar Sukar Dimka. This attempted change of regime had led to the assassination of Murtala Mohammed, a significant event in the context of African coups as observed by Ruth First (1970). Obasanjo eventually ushered Nigeria into the Second Republic when he handed over power to Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979 (Oyediran 1979; Panter-Brick 1978).


Nigeria has had four unsuccessful coups d’état as well: the first was that of Colonel Bukar Sukar Dimka of February 1976, an attempt to topple the regime of General Murtala Mohammed (Panter-Brick 1978; Oyediran 1979); second, the August 1985 attempt led by Major General Mamman Vasta to overthrow the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida; third, another attempt by Major Gideon Orkar on the regime of Babangida in 1990 (Babarinsa et al. 1990); and last, the 1995 attempt on General Sani Abacha. The attempted overthrow of the Abacha regime is still very controversial because General Oladipo Diya (then Abacha’s second in command) and other officers later indicted for the coup attempt claimed
that the allegations brought against them were ‘a setup’ (Ushe 1995; Anyanwu 2002; Njoku 2001).

**Research Question and Hypotheses**

*Research Question*

Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria?

*Hypothesis One*

The military in Nigeria has retained significant *military prerogatives*.

*Hypothesis Two*

The military has intervened in politics post-1999.

*Hypothesis Three*

Retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic positions.

*Hypothesis Four*


*Hypothesis Five*

Civilian government oversight remains weak, and this facilitates military authoritarianism.

*Hypothesis Six*

Increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism.

**Older Forms of Authoritarianism in Nigeria: A Literature Review**

Most studies on authoritarianism in West Africa, and especially in Nigeria, from the 1960s to the late 1990s, focused primarily on military intervention in politics as the main cause of authoritarianism in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa (Mwakikagile 2001; McGowan 2006; Johnson et al. 1984; McGowan 2003). Several studies have questioned why it is that military intervention is so prevalent on the continent and, in particular, in West Africa. These studies can be divided into two main areas. The first explores the reasons or causes for military
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa; the second investigates the processes for attaining civilian supremacy or control over the military.

As regards the former, it is well-established that in post-colonial Africa, military intervention has been a successful avenue for changing government. Since 1963, Africa has had some ninety military interventions, not counting unsuccessful attempts (Howe 2001: 2; McGowan 2003). Various reasons have been postulated as to why military intervention is so prevalent in Africa, and these, according to Kposowa and Jenkins (1993), can be categorized under four main themes (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993: 127; O'Kane 1983: 28): political development theory; military centrality; ethnic antagonisms; and world systems/dependency theories.

**Political Development Theory**
The basic assumption is that military intervention follows from weak institutions. Political and social institutions that are weak are therefore vulnerable, and create a high likelihood that the military will intervene in the polity. This approach suggests that countries in Latin America and Africa, are confronted with participatory crises stemming from the tension between an increasingly mobilized citizenry and weak political institutions (Deutsch 1961; Huntington 1968; Binder et al. 1971). Researchers note that state building and industrialization that have been occurring in these countries since gaining political independence from colonialism, coupled with increased social mobilization and, with it, more mass participation in the polity, have tremendously increased demands on the political system. However these countries lack strong social and, most especially, strong political institutions, such as broad-based political parties that are not affiliated with ethnic cleavages, and dynamic legislatures with sufficient strength to articulate and regulate mass participation. As a result, this causes participatory overload that generates political unrest and civil-disobedience, and this provokes direct military intervention in the political processes (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993: 129).

**Military Centrality**
The main argument of military centrality theorists is that resourceful and cohesive militaries are more likely to intervene in the polity (Andreski 1968; Janowitz
1977; Finer 1975). It is argued that since colonial and early post-colonial times, the military institution was the only agent of modernization for a largely underdeveloped society that was still characterized by primordial loyalties (Enloe 1980; Pye 1962). It was argued that the reason for this was the military institution in new nations had access to advanced technologies, meritocracy was institutionalized, army discipline and esprit de corps among its officers was manifest, and lastly, it had a well-articulated and defined organizational structure. The military institution was confronted with the failure of civilian institutions and the reckless excesses of the political office holders, and had no choice but to intervene and help salvage the anarchy created by the civilians, while continuing to participate and even ‘drive’ the modernization of society. However, others have argued that factionalized militaries are more prone to military interventions (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993). They argue that inter-service rivalries, training school loyalties, and ethnic tensions stemming from colonial staffing policies have created conflicts within the military that have ultimately caused military interventions. Morris Janowitz (1964: 40) illustrates further that factionalized and recently ‘professionalised’ militaries are more likely to engage in plots, while a more cohesive officer corps is more likely to mount successful seizures of power. Others, like Wells (1974), Johnson et al. (1984), Wells and Pollnac (1988), and Jenkins and Kposowa (1990), have further argued that the larger the military budget and number of troops, the greater the likelihood of military intervention.

Ethnic Antagonisms There are three perspectives to this approach: ethno-politics in deeply divided societies, the ethnic dominance thesis, and ethnic competition.

Ethno-politics in Deeply Divided Societies: One branch of this body of literature posits that, for developing countries, if there are fewer ethnic groups within a society, it tends to create large and dominant ethnic identities. Such societies tend to have greater domestic ethnic tensions, and the less ability to form political coalitions, arguably the essential component of democracy. Hence, this creates a tendency for military intervention (Rabuskha and Shepsle 1972). When there are several major ethnic groups within a large system, there is greater vulnerability to inter-ethnic competition, tension, and ultimately conflict.

Ethnic Dominance Thesis: The proponents of this theory argue that a large and politically hegemonic group in a developing system tends to provoke conflict and through this, military intervention. Jackman (1978) argues that large and
politically powerful groups provoke military intervention, usually because they exclude smaller groups from power. They fall into this by monopolizing access to political offices. Such monopolizing acts include fostering single ethnic domination of key cabinet posts in government, in the military and in state-owned public enterprises. Such acts stir up ethnic hostilities and provoke military intervention from the less dominant groups who are being marginalized.

**Ethnic Competition:** The central theoretical argument of this aspect of ethno-political theory is that state building and economic development simultaneously increase the competition between groups and provide greater resources (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Bates 1983; Olzak 1983). With the end of colonialism, diverse ethnic groups that were geographically and traditionally isolated, some of them because of their lack of Western education and modernisation suddenly became competitors for jobs, housing, schools and social services. State-building thus created a centre point for political competition as well as an arena for ethnic mobilization. Rapid urbanization and industrialization in post-colonial societies tended to bring different groups into greater competition, simultaneously creating more proximity and intra-ethnic political mobilization (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993). National level competition in these societies had never been fair or democratic, and thus political tensions and, ultimately, bloody conflicts, between these groups escalated in many cases. Unresolved competition of this kind has been used in many cases in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, to justify military intervention.

**World Systems/Dependency Theories**
This body of somewhat diverse theories focuses on “neo-colonialism”, often defined as export dependence and foreign capital penetration. One prominent theorist of the 1970s (Wallerstein 1979) describes the basis of these theories as ‘unequal exchange’. Export dependence centres on the persistence of colonial trading patterns, especially export concentration, and the continued reliance on the exporting of (inexpensive) primary products and the importing of expensive manufactured goods (Migdal 1988; Mamdani 1996; Amin 1977). This dependency creates low and unstable returns for the developing country, economic stagnation and poverty, and thus provides the basis for political turmoil and social instability. This pattern is also frequently linked to a coercive labour system that requires a strong military, and involves an ethnic division of labour.
Since there are few economic opportunities for the educated middle class in most developing countries, and specifically in Nigeria, economic competition is focused on the state, and this also encourages military intervention and corruption as vehicles of upward social mobility (Thomas 1984).

Civilian Supremacy over the Military

Our understanding of the dynamics of establishing civilian supremacy over the military comes originally from the classic works of Samuel Huntington (1995, 1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960). Huntington argues that only military professionalism can guarantee “objective civilian control” over the military (Huntington 1957: 83-85). He further states in later works that the main features of civilian control over the military are:

- A high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence;
- The effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; and
- The recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military (Huntington 1995: 9-10).

The consequence of military professionalism, according to Huntington (1957: 83-85), is that it provides an avenue for the military to be systematically weakened politically (keeping it out of political matters), while ensuring at the same time that it is strengthened militarily. This thus assures both civilian control and military effectiveness.

In contrast, Janowitz (1960) argued that as the distinction between war (the ‘orthodox’ military mission) and peace (largely relegating the military to ‘police’ functions) was becoming increasingly blurred. With the former declining in frequency, modern world military forces were increasingly becoming ‘constabulary forces’ rather than the traditional war fighters of old. This, he argued, led the professional soldier to become politically involved with corporate (military) interests, while remaining uncomfortably dependent upon civilian politicians and budgets. Janowitz (1960) argued that as this sense of corporate solidarity within the military grew, and military professionalism in developing countries increased, so did the likelihood of military intervention. The common characteristic of both scholars as regards civil-military relations is that civilian...
control of the military is affected in some way by military professionalism. For Huntington, this is assured through civilian non-interference in the military realm; while for Janowitz, submission of the military is based only on shared institutional, cultural and social values (Baker 2007: 118), and in developing countries the corporate solidarity that accompanies military professionalism actually intensifies the tendency to intervene politically.

In more recent times, works by Feaver (2003), Desch (1999), Cohen (2002), and Howe (2001) have also sought to explain the dynamics of civilian supremacy over the military, and how this might be achieved. These studies are relatively similar although they suggest diverse means of achieving civilian control. Feaver (2003), however, suggests a more comprehensive means of how this can be achieved, what he terms ‘agency theory’. The central theme of this theory is a monitoring technique by the civilians over the military. According to Deane-Peter Baker (2007), this monitoring has six elements: restricting the scope of the delegation of authority to the military; contractual incentives; screening and selection mechanisms; fire alarms; police patrols; and revocation of delegated authority.

1. **Restricting the scope of the delegation of authority to the military:** This requires that the civilians devise strategies, operational plans and provide essential equipment and operational budgets to ensure the smooth running of the military institution. The military, in this approach, has very limited political authority, but is adequately provisioned and thus has no obvious cause for collective antagonism.

2. **Contractual incentives:** This less intrusive approach ‘builds in’ incentives to the contract between the principal and the agent. In economic terms, *profit sharing* is perhaps the best analogue. Even though economic ‘profit’ should not exist in civil-military relations, Feaver notes that the military’s desire for institutional autonomy is analogous (Baker 2007: 127). Feaver contends that:

   since monitoring mechanisms vary in their degree of intrusiveness, and assuming that the military prefers less intrusive means, civilians have a powerful incentive with which to influence military behaviour: offer to use less intrusive means to monitor military agents. Indeed, this is how traditional civil-military relations theory treats autonomy (Feaver 2003: 78).

3. **Screening and selection mechanisms:** Such mechanisms (known as ‘accession policy’ in a military context) enable civilians to address the adverse
selection problem, and also provides (in a relatively non-intrusive manner) information that can help the civilian in predicting the future behaviour of the military agent selected (Baker 2007: 127).

4. **Fire alarms:** In a civil-military relations context, defence-oriented think tanks, the media, civil society and so on can ensure that excesses in military behaviour are challenged or questioned, and properly reported for appropriate sanctions or actions.

5. **Police patrols:** This essentially involves civilian scrutiny or in-depth investigation of the military institution as frequently as warranted. Feaver (2003) states that:

   Police patrols include regularized audits and intrusive reporting requirements designed to turn up evidence of agent wrongdoing and, through regularized inspection, to deter moral hazard. Public investigative hearings and specific mandated reports are staples of congressional oversight and represent one of the more visible avenues of political control (Feaver 2003: 84).

6. **Revocation of delegated authority:** This involves the partial or total withdrawal of some delegated authority (if need be) by the civilian authority. Such withdrawal could either be given to another coercive apparatus of state, for example, the police or an intelligence unit or organization. For the case of military planning and operations, the civilian authority could take responsibility. Virtually none of these mechanisms are currently in place in Nigeria.

In summary, the research on civil-military relations has sought to explain military intervention in politics (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1964; Nordlinger 1977; McGowan 2006; Mwakikagile 2001). These studies have tended to focus on the role of the military in democratic transitions, since in most regions of the world over the past 30 years the transition from autocratic military regimes to civilian administrations has been a continual process. However, there have been far fewer studies on the role of the contemporary African military in the democratization process. The literature, rather, has tended to focus, where it focuses at all, on Africa, on past African military regimes—their justification for intervening in politics and the asymmetric relationship between colonialism and military regimes (First 1970; Kolawole 2005; Olurode 2004; Olurode and Anifowose 2004a; Bruneau and Matei 2008). Since the demise of the bi-polar world, and especially in the past fifteen years, the emphasis in literature, rather, has been on how to
achieve civilian political supremacy over the military (Feaver 2003; Kieh and Agbese 2004; Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Hutchful 2004; Houngnikpo 2010).

There are a number of lacunae in the studies on African civil-military relations and this thesis has sought to address part of them using Nigeria has its central focus of analysis. First, there is little attention paid to democratic consolidation and civil-military relations, especially in relation to acceptable military roles, the cost of the military, their effectiveness and efficiency, and the implications of their roles and missions for democracy (Bruneau and Matei 2008; Harris 2004). Second, there is also the persistence of military prerogatives, particularly as they interfere directly with civilian administration, and whether such prerogatives endanger these emerging democracies (Stepan 1988; Croissant et al. 2010). Third, little attention is paid to what the military should do beyond national defence, their ‘orthodox role’, because in the modern world, there is a very low likelihood that a country’s military will actually wage war against another country (Bruneau and Matei 2008; Weiss 2011). Furthermore, in emerging and newer democracies, little attention is paid to the fundamental need for the military to be transparent and accountable to legislative oversight and citizens’ scrutiny (Hutchful 2004; Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006). Fourth, little systematic attention is paid to the political activities of high ranking retired military officers and their apparently increasing influence within the civilian administration, as well as the simultaneous influence that they retain in the military institution from which they have retired (Adekanye 1999; Akinrinade 2006).

Methodology

The overall research methodology used in this thesis is categorized under the ‘single-country studies as comparison’ case study research design, in the broader subfield of comparative politics (Landman 2008; Hopkin 2010; Lijphart 1971). A case study is defined “technically as a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable” (Eckstein 1975: 124; Yin 2003). Harry Eckstein (1975) regarded single-country studies as the equivalent of clinical studies in medicine, where the effects of certain treatment are examined intensively. He argues that the case study method is valuable for the theory building process, especially in:
the subfield of comparative politics most associated [with] macro-political phenomena, that is, units of political study of considerable magnitude or complexity such as nation-states and subjects virtually coterminous with them [for example], party systems or political cultures (Eckstein 1975: 119-120).

In addition, single-country studies provide a contextual description, develop new classifications, generate hypotheses, confirm, contextualise, and rebut theories, and explain the presence of deviant countries identified through cross-national comparison (Landman 2008: 28-29).

According to George and Bennett (2005), there are six types of theory-building research objectives in case study method. These are outlined below.

**Atheoretical/configurative-idiographic case studies** provide good descriptions that might be used in subsequent studies for theory building, but by themselves, such cases do not cumulate or contribute directly to theory.

**Disciplined-configurative case studies** use established theories to explain a case. The emphasis may be on explaining a historically important case, or a study may use a case to exemplify a theory for pedagogical purposes.

**Heuristic case studies** inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths. ‘Deviant’ or ‘outlier’ cases maybe particularly useful for heuristic purposes, as by definition their outcomes are not what traditional theories would anticipate. Also, cases where variables co-vary as expected but are at extremely high or low values may help uncover causal mechanisms. Such cases may not allow inferences to wider populations if relationships are nonlinear or involve threshold effects, but limited inferences might be possible if causal mechanisms are identified (just as cancer researchers use high dosages of potential carcinogens to study their effects).

**Theory testing case studies** assess the validity and scope conditions of single or competing theories… to identify whether the test cases are most-likely, least-likely, or crucial for one or more theories. Testing may also be devised to identify the scope conditions of theories (the conditions under which they are most- and least-likely to apply).

**Plausibility probes** are preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted. The term ‘plausibility probe’ should not be used too loosely, as it is not intended to lower the standards of evidence and inference and allow for easy tests on most-likely cases.

**Building block studies** of particular types or subtypes of a phenomenon identify common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose. These studies can be component parts of a larger contingent generalizations and typological theories (George and Bennett 2005: 75-76; Eckstein 1975; Landman 2008; Lijphart 1971; Gerring 2007).

This thesis uses the disciplined-configurative case study method. It allows the author to “impugn established theories if the theories ought to fit it but do not” (Eckstein 1975: 99). Another important attribute of this type of case study is that it can serve heuristic purposes by allowing a researcher to highlight the “need for
new theory in neglected areas” (Eckstein 1975: 99). Overall, there are basically four steps used in theory building in case study method. The following four steps guided the author in his research, and are outlined below.

The process of theory building, needless to say, always begins with questions about experience for which answers are wanted....

Questions, to be answered by theories, must usually be restated as problems or puzzles... and it consists essentially of stating questions so that testable rules can answer them....

The next step is hypothesis: formulating, by some means, a candidate-solution of the puzzle that is testable in principle and sufficiently plausible, *prima facie*, to warrant the bother and costs of testing....

.... After that, of course, one searches for and carries out an appropriate, and if possible definitive, test. Such tests are rarely evident in hypothesizes themselves, especially if questions of practicability are added to those of logic. [Therefore], testing is, in a sense, the end of the theory building process.... (Eckstein 1975: 127).

The specific methodological approach used for this thesis is the ‘new institutional’ approach to political science (March and Olsen 1984: 734). New institutionalism derives from the traditional institutional analytical approach, although it differs in several significant ways. According to Fox and Miller (1995: 92), new institutionalism differs from the traditional institutional approach because in the former, political institutions are no longer equated with political organizations. Rather, they are seen as sets of ‘rules’ that guide and constrain the behaviour of individual actors. Furthermore, the new institutionalists are concerned with the informal conventions of political life as well as the formal constitutions and organizational structures. Attention is paid to the way in which institutions embody values and power relationships, and to the obstacles as well as the opportunities that confront institutional design. Crucially, new institutional studies tend to be concerned not only with the impact of institutions upon individuals, but with the interaction between institutions and individuals (Lowndes 2010: 61).

In a nutshell, new institutionalism seeks to shift the analysis in six main themes. Specifically, it shifts:
From a focus on organizations to a focus on rules;
From a formal to an informal conception of institutions;
From a static to a dynamic conceptions of institutions;
From submerged values to a value-critical stance;
From a holistic to a disaggregated conception of institutions; and
From independence to embeddedness (Lowndes 2010: 66).

The quantitative and qualitative research technique is used to investigate the thesis hypotheses. The combined model design used in this thesis is what John Creswell (1994) termed the ‘dominant-less dominant design’. This design basically allows “the researcher [to] present the study within a single, dominant paradigm with one small component of the overall study drawn from the alternative paradigm” (Creswell 1994: 177). A quantitative research strategy for this thesis is viewed as the provision of valid and objective description, which views social science as analogous to natural science with the aim to produce causal explanations, and preferably scientific laws about the relationship between the social phenomena being studied (Read 2002: 232). However, because it is practically impossible to apply fully a quantitative research strategy to a full range of problems in the behavioural science/political science, the qualitative method will also be used. Qualitative research strategy is a generic term that refers to a range of techniques including observation, participant observation, intensive individual interviews and focus group interviews which seek to understand the experiences and practices of key informants and locate them firmly in a context (Lareau and Shultz 1996: 3). According to Ariadne Vromen (2010), it has four core attributes:

Inductive analysis, premised on discovering categories and being exploratory, with open-ended questions, in contrast to testing theoretically derived hypotheses through deduction.

A holistic perspective that seeks to understand all of the related phenomena and their complex interdependence in issues of interest, rather than reducing analysis to a few discrete variables. This also demonstrates sensitivity to the context as analysis is located in the social, historical, and temporal context from which data has been gathered.

Qualitative and adaptive data collection based on detailed ‘thick’ descriptions and depth. For example, qualitative analysis uses direct quotation to capture unique perspectives and experiences. Furthermore, the research process is not locked into rigid requirements but is adapted to changing situations and has the ability to pursue new paths of discovery as they emerge.

Recognition of, and compensation for, empathy in the research process. This is important because, as most qualitative researchers affirm, complete objectivity in social sciences research is impossible. The researcher’s agenda is to understand
the complex social world with empathy, while also attempting to be non-judgemental (Vromen 2010: 257).

**Primary Data Sources:** These can be defined generally as the original work(s) of the researcher, raw data without interpretation or pronouncements that represent an official opinion or position (Cooper and Schindler 2003: 282). The main data sources for this thesis are primarily two: the first, elite interviews conducted in 2011 where the author interviewed serving and retired high ranking military officers; and the second, archival materials also collected in 2011 in Nigeria.

An elite interview is based upon an ‘instrument’, an oral questionnaire. When an interviewer asks an elite interviewee a set of questions, the responses, including wider volunteered commentary, represent a primary data set (Goldstein 2002). The difference between elite interviews and random behavioural interviews in political science is that elite interviews are non-random, subjective, open-ended, and response-seeking, rather than narrow and response-limiting. They are usually targeted at political elite, or key actors, especially those who have participated in particular event (Berry 2002; Tansey 2007; Richards 2007; Aberbach and Rockman 2002). There are three basic goals that researchers have when conducting elite interviews. They are:

- Gathering information from a targeted group of interested and knowledgeable actors regarding the wider topic of the research;
- Discovering primary information about the central thesis, including, if possible, obtaining a particular piece of information or getting hold of a document; and,
- Informing or guiding work that uses other sources of data (Goldstein 2002: 669).

The structured elite interview technique was used in this research. In this method, the researcher had a planned (and research committee-approved) series of questions to ask the interviewees. The questions were derived from the research question and hypotheses. The researcher, however, gave each interviewee the opportunity at the end of the session to air their personal opinions regarding particular events or questions. The author was able to get access to some of these officers through local contacts, and at the end of each interview, the author asked the interviewee whether he could recommend other officers who would be willing to be interviewed for this research. Some officers interviewed made such
recommendations, while others did not. By the end of the interviews, the researcher achieved the three basic goals of elite interviews highlighted above. The following broad themes aided the interview questions:

1. The military and human rights abuses;
2. Military prerogatives in Nigeria;
3. Legislative and civilian oversight of the military institution;
4. Civilian expertise on defence matters in Nigeria;
5. Jurisdiction of military courts;
6. Corporate interest of the military in Nigeria;
7. The constitutional roles of the military; and,
8. The influence of retired high ranking military officers on the current civil rule process.

The military ranks of the officers contacted or interviewed are:

1. Vice Admiral (retired);
2. Major-General (serving);
3. Commodore (serving);
4. 2 Brigadier-Generals (serving and retired);
5. Air-Commodore (retired);
6. 3 Colonels (serving);
7. 2 Lieutenant-Colonels (serving); and
8. Major (serving).

The selection criteria used by this author included interviewing only officers who were enlisted in the military prior to the start of the Fourth Republic and officers who held or are holding important departmental positions within the military. Last, for the retired officers, the author interviewed officers who held very top positions prior to retirement and who, under military rule, held important political position. Overall, the author contacted 18 respondents, and 12 accepted the invitation to be interviewed for the research.

Archival research is a means of evaluating and the systematically interpreting and analysing sources found in archives (McNabb 2004: 451). The archival materials collected for this thesis include old newspaper articles and editorials, news magazines, official government documents and past Nigeria constitutions. The author used the National Archives (University of Ibadan) in Ibadan, Oyo State. Other primary data sources used in this thesis include data from the Stockholm
International Peace Research (SIPRI), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

**Secondary Data Sources:** These can be defined as re-analysing data that have already been collected for some other purpose (Saunders et al. 2003: 188). The author used the document analysis technique to supplement the primary sources used in this thesis. Document analysis, according to David McNabb (2004) is defined as, “the study of documents and archival data [that] is usually undertaking to supplement the information the case study researcher acquires by interview or by observing in a situation” (McNabb 2004: 365). The selection criteria used in the collection of documents in this thesis is guided by Tim May’s (2001) four main criteria in approaching and utilising a document in social research: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.

**Authenticity:** to identify whether a document is genuine, look for factors such as internal consistency of presentation of style, soundness of the origins of the document and recognized authorship.

**Credibility:** to identify whether the document is accurate, and is a reliable relaying of events.

**Representativeness:** to find whether the document is typical of the genre or, if it is ‘untypical’, to understand how a particular interpretation of an event sits among or excludes others.

**Meaning:** this refers to the document’s clarity and comprehensibility, and what its meaning is in the social and political context within which it was produced (May 2001: 189-190).

The main secondary data sources used in this thesis include:

1. Relevant journal articles and textbooks on civil-military relations, democracy and democratization, comparative politics, Nigerian history and military intervention in Africa.

2. Contemporary news articles and editorials from reputable magazines and newspapers such as, *The Economist, Nigerian Tribune, Guardian Newspaper (Nigeria), Punch Newspaper (Nigeria), Vanguard Newspaper (Nigeria)* and others.

**Validity and Reliability of Data Analysis**

Validity, the determination that we are measuring what we think we are measuring, is concerned with whether our findings are really what they appear to
be (Saunders et al. 2003: 101). Reliability, on the other hand, can be assessed by posing the following three questions:

Will the findings be same when we use similar instruments (test/retest)?

Will similar observations be reached by other observers?

Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw data? (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 53).

The validity and reliability for the data analysis include: triangulation of data; validity and reliability of the elite interview; the provision of detailed descriptions; and data collection and analysis strategies being reported in detail.

1. **Triangulation of data**: the data is collected through multiple sources using both qualitative and quantitative methods. It includes elite interviews, and other primary sources. It also includes secondary data sources such as, relevant texts, journal articles, media reports and so on.

2. **The validity and reliability of the elite interview** is based on only high ranking military officers being interviewed (ranks of Major and above). The officers interviewed also had stringent selection criteria, that is, only officers who had been enlisted in the military before the start of the Fourth Republic were interviewed. Also, some of the officers had held or were holding top positions in the military, and as for the retired officers, some had held political positions such as, military administrators, during military rule.

3. **There is the provision of rich, ‘thick’, detailed descriptions** so that anyone interested in transferability will have a solid framework for comparison.

4. Finally, **data collection and analysis strategies are reported in detail** in order to provide a clear and accurate picture of the methods used in this thesis.

**Thesis Chapters**

**Chapter One**: This is the introductory chapter of this thesis; it presents a general overview of this thesis and research methodology. It discusses the rationale of this research beginning with the fundamental research question, the hypotheses derived from the question, the general scholarly literature that relates to the main aim of the thesis, and the gaps within that literature. It further describes the methodology used in this research and the validity and reliability of the data analysed. Finally, it discusses the significance of the research to the current body of knowledge in civil-military relations in Nigeria.
Chapter Two: This chapter presents the background to our understanding of authoritarianism in Nigeria by examining the extent to which multi-ethnic states, such as Nigeria, may be prone to authoritarian systems. The analysis of this chapter is largely based upon result the responses derived from the research interviews. Although this consideration was not formally part of my interview questions, some of my interviewees volunteered that ethnicity is an important factor in the military. The chapter also discusses the several theoretical underpinnings regarding multi-ethnic states and authoritarian practices within such societies. In addition, it examines some pre-colonial, semi-autonomous and autonomous kingdoms in present day Nigeria before colonialism. It discusses how the merging of these culturally distinct identities by the British in 1914 has impacted negatively on the country’s development post-independence. Finally, the chapter examines how ethnic factors became prevalent in the military, and discusses whether the military post-1999 has developed a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for itself within the context of the various ethno-religious cultural identities co-existing in Nigeria.

Chapter Three: This chapter examines whether there is a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria by analysing three hypotheses. The first hypothesis, that the military has retained significant military prerogatives, basically applies Alfred Stepan’s (1988) Latin American concept of military prerogatives to the case of Nigeria. It also discusses whether such prerogatives may facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. To test this hypothesis, the author relies primarily on the responses of his interviewees. The second hypothesis, the military has intervened in politics post-1999, investigates the level of military involvement in the democratising process in Nigeria. The level of involvement analysed centres mainly on the military’s activities in internal security duties. It further investigates whether this might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on key security-related media reports (mostly newspapers editorials) on the military after 1999. Lastly, the hypothesis that retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic positions, examines whether the sheer number of high ranking military officers contesting and winning important political positions may
facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on the responses of my interviewees.

**Chapter Four:** This chapter examines key institutions that should limit any excessive military activities within a civilian dominated era. It examines two hypotheses. The first hypothesis, autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999, discusses whether the military has significant latitude in determining how they engage in internal security duties without what is generally perceived to be inadequate civilian oversight, and whether this is a contributing factor to allegations of human rights violations against the military. Furthermore, it analyses whether these factors (civilian oversight and alleged human rights abuses) against the military facilitates a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on the responses of my interviewees. The second hypothesis, civilian government oversight remains weak, and this facilitates military authoritarianism investigates whether institutions constitutionally and legally empowered by law have weak military oversight, and whether this may facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on the responses of my interviewees.

**Chapter Five:** This chapter examines whether there is a link between the military budget and military dominance in civilian politics. It examines one hypothesis, that increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism. To test this hypothesis, the military expenditures of Ghana and Cameroon are investigated and compared to those of Nigeria to determine if there are regional trends in military spending. A time-series graph is used to present the empirical findings for this hypothesis. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on data of military expenditures from two reputable organisations: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

**Chapter Six:** This forms the concluding chapter of this thesis. The chapter presents the general summary of this thesis by restating the main objectives of this study. It briefly re-emphasises the research methodology used in this thesis and presents the main conclusions of each of the hypotheses analysed in this study. It
also presents a general conclusion based on the empirical findings of each of the hypotheses discussed and, lastly, states areas of further research, bearing in mind the limitations encountered during the course of this research.

**Significance of this Research**

In theoretical terms, and to my own knowledge, there has been no systematic theoretical discussion of the military in Nigeria applying Alfred Stepan’s (1988) concept of military prerogatives to interpret the behaviour of the Nigerian military. While several authors on civil-military relations in Nigeria agree that insufficient civilian control over the military in some way affects the quality of democratic governance, virtually all of the literature has tended to focus more on its potential to lead to military intervention if not adequately addressed. This thesis approach offers what may be the first comprehensive theoretical argument as to exactly how military behaviour in a transitional phase can affect the civilian process in Nigeria. It is advanced through detailed analyses of the current institutional framework that the military currently operates within the polity.

By disaggregating the issue areas of this thesis into six core areas (my hypotheses), this research reveals the complexity of civil-military relations in Nigeria, and this has allowed for differentiated empirical analyses and findings. While most recent studies on civil-military relations in Nigeria tend to be quite vague in interpreting civilian control of the military, the approaches used in this study go beyond the existing conceptions used by other scholars. The framework used in this research is built around a common question: Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? In addition, the application of Stepan’s (1988) concept to Nigeria points to a clear set of institutional indicators. This allows for detailed empirical analyses of each of the hypothesis, how they might be measured, and how they assist in interpreting the fundamental research question. This analytical framework therefore, provides an empirical tool for assessing in detail the case of Nigeria in its most recent democratic period, and also for longitudinal, cross-national comparisons with other similar cases within West Africa.

Last, by explicitly framing this analysis within the broader field of civil-military relations, it has provided a basis for a stringent scholarly debate of contemporary Nigerian politics. An approach of this sort allows for a systematic discussion of
the impact of unrestricted military political autonomy on the democratisation processes. Furthermore, as all the hypotheses and arguments are deductively and inductively derived every step of the conceptual and theoretical endeavour can be logically and empirically traced back to this basic theoretical foundation. This, then, is a significant contribution to the body of knowledge in civil-military relations in Nigeria. My approach is pointedly contemporary, and should offer the most relevant insight into contemporary Nigerian politics.

In practical terms, stable civil-military relations in Nigeria would, in part, resolve issues that are germane to the continual survival of the country. Such pressing, multi-faceted issues include the appearance of the misuse of the coercive apparatus of the state to maintain law and order, and the leadership style of the country that seems to have a semblance to the military’s rulership style.

Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter has presented a general overview of the main aim of this thesis, its justification, significance and the research methodology. The following chapter introduces the concept of authoritarianism in Nigeria within the context of the different ethnic and religious identities co-existing in the country. It is, important for this thesis to first discuss authoritarianism within the context of the ethnic configuration of the country because authoritarianism in Nigeria cannot be discussed without first understanding how the different autonomous and semi-autonomous ethnic identities merged into a single political entity. This understanding, therefore, provides an important background for how ethnic factors affect (positively or negatively) the entire political process and all the institutions in the country. Accordingly, authoritarianism in the following chapter is explored within the context of whether multi-ethnic states, such as, Nigeria, tend to have authoritarian political systems.
Chapter Two

Authoritarianism, Ethnic Factors, and the Nigerian Political Process

Introduction

Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper... We do not want our Southern neighbours to interfere in our development... But I should like to make it clear to you that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage; the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea.¹

Do multi-ethnic states like Nigeria tend to have authoritarian systems? This chapter will present the various scholarly arguments of whether there is a link between multi-ethnicity in a state and authoritarianism. It first examines various studies on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in societies. It then investigates these studies within the Nigerian context, and considers whether there is a link with authoritarianism; it then analyses the impact of colonization on the autonomous and semi-autonomous kingdoms of present day Nigeria, and the reason for amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by the British in 1914; it describes the political development of the young nation, and the various constitutional developments from 1922 until independence in 1960; it analyses how ethno-politics, initially a problem of the political sphere, later impacted on professionalism within the Nigerian military in the 1960s; it analyses key ethno-politics issues from 1967 to contemporary times in the country; and lastly, it discusses the possible development of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity within the military post-1999.

In general, there seems to be no consensus among scholars on whether multi-ethnic states are prone to a continuous cycle of high and low intensity conflicts. The literature on this subject can, however, be divided into two types. The first type is presented by researchers who suggest that societies that are highly fragmented along ethnic and religious lines tend to have dominant ethnic groups that terrorize their citizens, especially minorities, and deny them their basic rights of expression (Osaghae 2002; Reilly 2006; Ukiwo 2003; Agbese 2001; Horowitz 1994; Reynal-Querol 2002). Researchers who support this argument appear to conclude that there seems to be a connection between ethnicity, authoritarianism...
and high/low intensity conflicts in multi-ethnic states (Agbese 2001; Nmoma 1995; Horowitz 1994; Berman 1998; Kifordu 2011; Reynal-Querol 2002; Osaghae 2003). The second is presented by researchers who argue that ethnic and religious diversity appears not to lead to high or low intensity conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Krain 1997; Walker and Poe 2002). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have argued along this line and found no significant correlation between civil wars and ethnic diversity. They state that:

Ethnic and religious diversity tends to make a society safer, societies with many groups, none of which is large enough to be ‘dominant’, have substantially lower risks of conflict than homogeneous societies… because in diverse societies the organization of rebellion becomes more difficult (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 4; Walker 2007).

It is, however, crucial to note that even though researchers on ethnic conflict seem not to agree on what leads to high and low intensity conflicts in multi-ethnic states, there seems to be consensus amongst researchers on one central point. That is, of a need for multi-ethnic states to fashion a political system that adequately caters for, and respects, the rights of all, no matter what ideological, religious or ethnic differences may exist in such plural societies. In a sub-Saharan context, most of the literature tends to posit that the failure of sub-Saharan states to adopt Western style democracy, within their cultural and contextual elements, is partially responsible for these states’ inability to properly articulate and aggregate diverse ethnic demands on the political system (Nnoli 1995, 1994; Bah 2005; Dahl 1971; Mbaku et al. 2001; Agbaje et al. 2004). Other researchers have argued otherwise, stating, for example, that one of the key reasons why autocracy and democratic reversal is endemic in most sub-Saharan African states is that democracy promotes subnational ethnic demands that are capable of pitting different ethnic groups against each other, and this produces ethnic conflicts and authoritarian tendencies (Nnoli 1994: 10; Adejumobi 2010). Donald Horowitz (1994) argues that:

Democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion. In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded. Since the lines appear unalterable, being in and out may quickly come to look permanent… most Africa countries remain severely divided, and ethnic divisions have proved a major impediment to the attainment of stable democracy all over the continent (Horowitz 1994: 35-36).

Using Horowitz’ concept of democracy and its inter-play in multi-ethnic societies, it is useful to explore further how African political elites have used ethnic identity
to exclude competing ethnic groups within the polity. In a number of African states, whether or not in a process of democratization, the central government is the main source of employment and provider of basic social amenities. This is partly due to a lack of an indigenous bourgeois class. Under this condition, opportunities—economic, political and educational—can be bureaucratically patterned in such a way that they permanently favour a particular ethnic group (Osaghae 2002; Agbese 2001).

The Nigerian Variant
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, is a conglomeration of over 250 different ethnic groups and approximately 300 languages, with almost an equal representation of the two dominant religious beliefs in the world: Christianity and Islam. This ethnic diversity and, more importantly, the tensions that it creates, can be observed in all spheres of socio-political life. This is particularly evident today in employment opportunities, sports, schooling, and commerce. Each of these are impacted on by ethnic divisions, whether by the perceived historically and politically grounded preferential hiring of northerners in the public services, or the perception of ethnically based selection of national sports representatives, particularly in widely followed, and hence profitable, sports such as football (soccer), athletics and table-tennis. Even admission into federal government-owned secondary schools and universities is subject to ethnically-based quotas that favour educationally backward states in the federation—all of which are northern states. Finally, business relationships at the local level are often primarily based on ethnic affiliation, frequently witnessed in the form of ethnically based cooperative societies, most of which cluster around the various commercial cities in the federation (Abutudu 2010; Achebe 2012, 1983; Nnoli 1995). Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (below) highlight these ethnic tensions by presenting the ethnic composition of two important political institutions in the country: the federal cabinet and the National Assembly. The two tables clearly highlight the problems of selection into political institutions, especially into the federal cabinet. The impact of this on the state has been one of constant ethnic animosity and authoritarianism.
Table 2.1: Ethnic Composition of Nigerian Cabinets, 1960-2004 (per cent)\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Hausa-Fulani</th>
<th>Igbo</th>
<th>Northern Minorities</th>
<th>Yoruba</th>
<th>Southern Minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balewa 1960</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowon 1967</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murtala 1975</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shagari 1983</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buhari 1984</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obasanjo 2004</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from (Osaghae 1989: 21; Nigeria Army Education Corps and School 1994; Mustapha 2006).

Table 2.2: Ethnic Composition of the National Assembly, 1999-2003 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population (1963 Census)</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>House of Representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa/Fulani</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Information on National Assembly members computed from data on 109 senators and 356 members of the House of Representatives (Ayanwui 1999; Mustapha 2006).

In political terms, the link between ethnic diversity and authoritarianism is caused by the emergence of modern bureaucratic states and capitalism. Hutchinson and Smith (1996) argue that in old empires, such as the Ottoman empire, ethnic communities were recognized but passive because of the existing mode of production and structure of society. But in the modern ‘rational’ state, and the new ideologies of political nationalism, all component units of a nation-state are required to be united and homogenous. This, in turn, has produced conflicts of interests across many ethnic communities in the modern state (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 11). As for Nigeria, state formation and the mode of production were based on external rather than internal factors and Nigeria, as a product of the colonial (British) imperialistic imagination, did not even exist in name until 1914, when the Northern and Southern protectorates of the Niger Area and the colony of Lagos were amalgamated into one single political entity (Muffett 1978; Burns 1963). Historically, the diverse ethnic groupings in Nigeria did not have a single political administration. Also, the mode of production in Nigeria, typical of other
colonized territories, was exploitative and served only the interests of the colonialists. This economic structure forced the subjects to produce goods (cotton, cocoa, rubber, and precious minerals—gold, tin, limestone, coal) that were greatly in demand in factories across the metropoles of Europe and the Americas. Such products were bought from the peripheries at cheap prices based on the cheap labour costs in these territories, and processed into finished products in factories across the metropoles. These products were later resold at exorbitant prices to the colonies (Mamdani 1996; Rodney 1972; Amin 1976). Therefore, Nigeria, like all former colonies at independence, was involuntarily linked to a global economic system that was created by a few countries of the world. These economic institutions created a system that tended to foster economic dependence, unequal exchange and underdevelopment for countries that were former colonies (Amin 1976, 1977). In an African context, Bade Onimode (1988) described this economic crisis of unequal exchange and underdevelopment not entirely as an economic crisis based on ideological orientation—Marxism African socialism, capitalism—but rather, as an economic crisis that had further fostered massive unemployment, growing deficits and debts, poverty and sluggish economic development. These multi-layered problems, added to ethnic diversity in several African societies, have, according to Onimode, contributed to political instability and the many non-democratic regimes that the continent has witnessed over the years (Onimode 1988: 1-10, 1978; Frank 1979; Chew and Denemark 1996).

At independence in 1960 two core factors primarily exacerbated ethnic competition in Nigeria and further increased authoritarian tendencies in the polity. The first was a lack of an indigenous bourgeoisie or economic class, which could fully capitalise the factors of production. The effect of this was to make the state the sole originator, provider and adjudicator of the allocation of scarce resources in the country. The second was caused by the ethnic groupings that were forcefully merged into a single political unit by the coloniser. This strange bedfellow’s arrangement invariably created a culture of ethnic competition at the federal level because the various ethnic groups in the country saw the capturing of political power at the centre as a means of allocating resources in a way that could be disadvantageous to opposition ethnic groups. As a result, a sense of constant mutual fear and suspicion was created among the various ethnic groups. There was a perception, if not always the reality, of ethnic domination. It is, therefore,
unsurprising that political contests in Nigeria became inherently problematic (Sanda 1976; Onimode 1988; Young 1986; Fatton 1988; Sklar 1979). In this context, it is often easier for campaigning parties to attract voter support by appealing to ethnic allegiances rather than issues of class or ideology (Reilly 2006). Political contest of this matter was the major flaw of the First Republic (1960-1966), because party formation, politics and competition were based along the three major ethnic groups of the country. In the South-West of the country, the dominant party of the region initially started as a socio-cultural group for the Yoruba’s Egbe Omo Oduwa, but later transformed into the Action Group (AG), a political party in 1951. The party’s initial objective, after formation, was to forestall an Igbo lead party (NCNC) from controlling the Western Region House of Assembly. Similarly, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was formed in 1949 from a socio-cultural and religious group in the North (Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa). The party also believed, like the AG, that only the northerners could effectively articulate and solve the problems affecting the region, and that this was preferable to allowing other political organizations from other parts of the country to rule them politically (Coleman 1963; Mackintosh 1966; Falola 1999).

In view of the mutual mistrust by the political elites of the three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria, the three major parties (NCNC, AG, and NPC) sought political alliances with those minority ethnic groups and parties within the regions that shared similar ideological views, with the sole aim of trying to weaken the strength of the dominant party of a particular region. For example, there was the NEPU/NCNC alliance, while the AG formed alliances with minority parties in the North and Eastern Region. Also, the elites of each region tried to consolidate their regional base by mobilising followers along ethnic and, in the North, religious lines. Party candidates who utilised the ethnic card were rewarded with electoral success, and as rival parties responded in kind, a process to outbid became the political norm, pushing the locus of political competition toward extremes. As a result, the democratization experience of the First Republic collapsed under immense ethno-politically driven demands which ultimately led to the military taking over the reins of power in 1966 (Siollun 2009; Sklar 1963; Ademoyega 1981).
While it is perceived that ethnic conflicts were instrumental in the collapse of the First Republic, ethnicity as a dominant factor in Nigerian government and politics seems to remain a key variable. Even though ethnicity was not part of my interview questions during the course of my field research, some of the serving and retired military respondents spoke of, or at least acknowledged, that religion and ethnicity played a role in the military. However, while such opinions expressed by these respondents were not elaborated in detail, perhaps due to the sensitive nature of ethnicity in Nigeria, the comments provided a little more understanding of the general workings of the military. One serving officer stated that things were much better in the military now, unlike before, when one’s ethnic group and the language spoken fluently (Hausa, in this case), determined success in the military. Similarly, a retired officer opined that the military was much better under civilian rule, and gave credit to President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) for his ability to stabilize the military. He attributed this stabilizing factor to Obasanjo’s promotion of northern minority officers (Middle-Belt officers) to key military positions upon assumption of office in 1999. The retired officer stated that even though Middle-Belt officers had contributed significantly to the military, and were known for their professionalism and loyalty, they have been marginalized for some time. He attributed this marginalization to the failed coup attempt by Major Gideon Orkar, a Middle-Belt officer, in 1990 against the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. This officer then asked the writer to read the coup speech of Orkar, in order to gain a better understanding of what he was talking about (Babarinsa et al. 1990). The retired officer went on to state that as long as successive governments after Obasanjo could limit certain ethnic interests in the military, there would be more stability in the political system in Nigeria. Another retired officer gave an example of how ethnicity and religion affected military engagements, arguing that:
... Sometimes, [when] the military [are engaged in internal security duties], they do not even come out with the mandate to do their [constitutional] roles. I was once in Kaduna when [there was ethno-religious conflict in the state] and [none of the political elites in the state] could call [on] the state security council [to address the situation at hand]. Is it that they didn't know? They know, but [did] not give the order to quell it [until the civil unrest had caused serious havoc on non-indigenes of the state]. But [when] those of us who [were] aggrieved [started] getting angry about how the situation was handled, [soldiers] and top officers from that region of the country confronted us. [They told us to] be quiet [and not to question] how the military handled the conflict…

Based in part on this anecdote, it is logical for this thesis to look into ethno-politics in Nigeria, as it appears to be a key variable in understanding contemporary happenings in the country.

**Ethnicity as a Political Concept in Nigeria**

Ethnicity has been defined within several academic disciplines (for example, cultural anthropology, political science and sociology) to mean different things. A conceptual definition of ethnicity is, therefore, a debated topic because there is no single theory of how ethnic groups are formed. Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 4-5) posit that the term ‘ethnicity’ is relatively new, and first appeared in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1953. Its English origins are connected to the term ‘ethnic’, which has its roots in the Greek term ‘ethnos’, which was used to reference a band, tribe, race, a people, or a swarm. Overall, ethnicity according to Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 6-7), consists of six main features:

1. A common proper name, which identifies and expresses the essence of a particular community;
2. A myth of common ancestry that includes the idea of common origin in time and place, that gives an ethnic group a sense of fictive kinship;
3. A sense of shared historical memories, of common pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration;
4. One or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified but normally include elements such as religion, customs and language;
5. A link to a specific geographical homeland; and

The political concept of ethnicity appears to manifest itself in three different academic understandings or approaches: primordialist, instrumentalist and constructionist. The primordialist view is that ethnicity is the primary causal variable in human interactions, and suggests that kinship, common descent, state
of origin, place of birth, language and religion, call forth emotional attachments and ethnic solidarity from the members that provide a basis for their ‘consciousness’ (Seol 2008; Hale 2004; Geertz 1963). Primordialists argue, then, that ethnicity is an independent variable, one which is the primary cause of key political outcomes in multi-ethnic states (Cohen 1969; Geertz 1963; Shils 1957; Barrows 1976). These political outcomes arise in the struggle for political power and allocation of resources and this is an important observation as regards multi-ethnic states such as Nigeria. Ethnic groups tend to see control over political power and resources as crucial (Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Eder et al. 2002; Fenton 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002).

There seem to be several cases in which it appears that the primordialist idea of ethnicity being the causal variable in conflicts is noticeable in Nigeria. Two political events, however, stand out. First is the first coup in 1966, where there was an appearance of a particular ethnic group, Igbo, who wanted to exploit its significant number in the officer corps of the military and public institutions to dominate other ethnic groups in Nigeria (Coleman 1963; First 1970; Sanda 1976; Diamond 1988). Second, the Biafra war of 1967-1970 appears to manifest primordialist ideas, since the primary cause of the conflict was based on ethnic mistrust, especially by the three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria (Jorre 1972; Siollun 2009; Achebe 2012).

The second major approach to ethnicity is instrumentalist. This does not regard ethnicity as the causal variable to key political outcomes in multi-ethnic states. Rather, the instrumentalists posit that it is the politicisation of ethnicity by elites, and it use as a vehicle to gain and retain power and resources, that is the primary cause of key political outcomes of ethnic conflicts and authoritarian outcomes in multi-ethnic societies (Barrows 1976; Reynal-Querol 2002; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Brass 1991). Instrumentalists argue that the political elite compete for resources and use ethnicity as a means to manipulate politics to their advantage. During the period of the 1959 general elections that were to usher in Nigeria as an independent nation, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sarduna of Sokoto, was an example of an instrumentalist, using ethnicity as a means of protecting the Northern Region from what was termed the invasion of ‘southern parties’ into the conservative North. In so doing, he not only preserved the idea of ‘one North, one destiny’ but was able
to consolidate his political power base beyond his region. In one of his electoral campaign speeches in Kano, he stated that,

There is no need for me to do any election campaign here. In the old days, the Emir of Kano was known as the chief warrior of the Sultan of Sokoto, and today I regard all people of Kano as the warriors of the Sarduna of Sokoto (CBS Reports c.1959).

The constructionist view of ethnicity maintains that ethnicity is socially constructed, and consists largely of social inventions. Individuals have the ability either to associate with, or disassociate from, diverse ethnic heritage and cultures so as to forge their own individual or group identities (Seol 2008; Rothschild 1981; Hutchinson and Smith 1996). Support for this thesis includes showing how ethnic identities wax and wane, and how ethnic boundaries are porous, shifting and unsustainable. This makes ethnic markings arbitrary, and the so-called common past and traditional values on which members of ethnic groups anchor their identity have often very little to do with any historical realities, and more to do with social invention or creation (Ake 2000: 95). An example of the constructionist approach has to do with an individual’s identity in the global world. An African, for example, depending on social context and religious orientation, may be perceived to be a member of a particular dialect-speaking group or larger language group. Such an individual in another social context could be identified as a citizen of a particular country or a region of Africa, Anglophone West Africa or a person from Africa (especially if the individual is overseas), a ‘black person’ and so on. Each of these possible ties can be strong, depending on the context. The primordial nature of the individual’s ties tends to evaporate in an unfavourable situational context, and may be reconstructed in a favourable one (Zirker et al. 2008: 319-320).

In sum, at least some of the problems associated with authoritarian tendencies in Nigeria are linked to ethno-politics and ethnicity in their various approaches. This ethno-politics effect is evidenced in all political institutions of the Nigerian state. The military, for example, aspires to be a cohesive unit, but has, in the past, been subject to the nation’s deep ethnic divisions. Ethnic relations continue to shape the attitudes and behaviours of members of the military, from combat soldiers to administrators, and at all the ranks (Ekeh and Osaghae 1989; Ekeh 2004; Ubah 1998; Anugwom 2001), although this may be changing in the post-1999 era,
where the military is compelled to engage in national ethno-politics at a distinct disadvantage.

It should be noted that even though ethno-politics has been blamed in part for the authoritarian practices in Nigeria, this is not always the case. Over the decades, elite competition at the federal level has witnessed several compromises in Nigeria. To a significant extent, such compromises have created a certain level of political stability and conflict management in Nigeria. Some of the important compromises that have provided political stability for the country are:

1) Creation of states—Nigeria moved from four regions in 1966 to 36 states in 1996, as an attempt to limit ethnic marginalization (Sklar 2004; Ekeh 2004; Bah 2005);
2) Granting of political amnesty to all who fought in the Biafra civil war, 1967-1970 (Ojeleye 2010; Gould 2012);
3) Adoption of an ethnic quota system in the recruitment of personnel in all federal government institutions—this also includes the military (Sanda 1976; Ekeh and Osaghae 1989);
4) Adoption by the ruling political party at the federal level since 1999, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), of zoning in the selection of presidential candidates for the party (Adejumobi 2010; Campbell 2011, April 25, 2011);
5) Adoption by the civilian transition of 1999 of two main candidates, General Olusegun Obasanjo and Chief Olu Falae, both of whom were Yoruba and Christian. This political gesture was made by the predominately northern military elite as a way of pacifying the Yoruba’s after the presumed winner of the 12 June 1993 presidential elections, Chief Abiola, a Yoruba, was not allowed by the military elite to claim his electoral mandate (Adekanye 2005); and
6) Since the start of civilian rule in 1999, the federal government has approved 13 per cent oil derivation to the oil producing states of the federation (Peel 2010; Maier 2000).
Administration and the Economy: The Impact of Colonialism

Nigeria, like most countries in Africa, is a colonial creation and, in the words of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the most prominent Yoruba politician of the First Republic, Nigeria is ‘a mere geographical expression,’ rather than a nation (Awolowo 1947: 47). Similarly, Chris Anyanwu describes Nigeria as:

not a nation-state rather it is an amalgam of states, a nation of nations. Its beauty as well as its weakness lies in the variety and contrasts among the peoples, traditions, and norms, even their physical attributes, hair texture and complexion (Ayanwu 2002: 1xii).

The country is a product of the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, which was, in effect, an expression of blatant colonialism that involved the great colonial powers of the day, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and Germany (Asiegbu 1982; Flint 1960). The delegates of these countries sat around a table and literally carved up Africa, creating states without any African representation and without taking into consideration the diversity of the different nationalities that were going to be grouped together as unified geographical entities. Colonialism was, therefore, not for the purpose of fusing Western values and civilization with new national identities claimed at the time, but rather, colonialism was forged as an essential tool for the further economic and social exploitation of the Africans. It was to the immediate advantage of the commercial centres in Europe that were in the later stages of industrialization. The colonialists saw an Africa rich with natural resources, many of which were needed as raw materials for the industries in Europe and the Americas (Rodney 1972; Falola 1999; Carland 1985).

The trade patterns that followed created an outcome that strongly favoured the colonialists. Raw materials were bought at cheap prices, processed in these commercial centres, and then sold back to the colonies at exorbitant prices. At the heart of colonialism was trade, investment and enterprise, all for the benefit of an alien society. All political and economic power, in effect all decision-making and thus beneficiaries of those decisions, lay outside the colonies. Indigenous African enterprises and African trade were not encouraged, and African partners who were permitted to operate, tended to do so only as very junior partners and as, at the most, a petite bourgeoisie (Rodney 1972; First 1970; Mamdani 1996).
The foundation of ethno-politics in Nigeria began in 1914 when the governor of the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of the Southern Niger Area, Lord Fredrick Lugard, amalgamated the Northern and Southern Protectorates into one single entity (Nmoma 1995; Falola 1999; Isichei 1983). The name ‘Nigeria’ was credited to Lugard in 1914 by the colonial editor of the Times of London, Flora Shaw, who was reportedly Lugard’s mistress. Shaw later married Lugard, who went on to become the first Governor-General of Nigeria (Campbell 2011: 1-2; Crowder 1966). The intent of amalgamation was for administrative purposes rather than as a process of state-building. No regard was given in the process to the ethnic diversity of the area. The Northern Protectorate was economically poor when compared to the Southern Protectorate, in part because it had no seaports, but had been useful in colonial times to generate revenue from customs duties. This lack of adequate revenue from the Northern Protectorate made colonial administration difficult to operate: the Northern Protectorate needed revenue to operate the colonial civil service, fund educational institutions and importantly, the railway project that linked principal Northern commercial cities such as Kano, Kaduna and Zaria, to the port in Lagos. As a result of this lack of adequate revenue, the Southern Protectorate and the Imperial Treasury had to render financial aid to the Northern Protectorate (Falola 1999; Carland 1985; Sagay and Wilson 1978).

Amalgamation was another means whereby excess revenues generated in the Southern Protectorate were used for important social infrastructure projects that the Northern Protectorate could not afford alone. It should be noted again that this almost solely benefitted the metropole, and the region’s native population was largely excluded. The other primary benefit of amalgamation for the metropole was the streamlining of administrative departments in the amalgamated Protectorate (Carland 1985; Falola 1999). This was to reduce the duplication of tasks and duties in a region of Africa where highly skilled Europeans were less likely to settle. The heat and humidity of Nigeria (and West Africa in general) and the high likelihood that personnel from Europe would contract malaria severely discouraged European settlement (Crowder 1966; Sagay and Wilson 1978; Umoren 1996; Christy 1928). Amalgamation, however, did not establish the bases of nation-building in Africa. The North and the South continued to administer themselves separately, largely because of profound ethnic differences and the
policies put in place by the British. Lugard and his successors strongly believed that it was beneficial to separate these two regions administratively, mostly because of the successful indirect rule scheme that Lord Lugard had implemented in the North when he was the High Commissioner of the Northern provinces (Okafor 1997: 21; Nwabueze 1982). This was a system that the British had devised and implemented successfully in Imperial India where Lugard had worked before being posted to the Northern Protectorate.

Indirect rule worked well in the Hausa-Fulani area of Northern Nigeria due to the highly centralized traditional political system that operated in the North (which also had a well-organized taxation system), and the impact of Islam—the predominant religion in that area. Islam created societal cohesion through which the Emirs, the Sultan and his associates ruled as God’s representatives on earth and were, therefore, above question and without challenge from the general populace. Furthermore, indirect rule made British administration very easy in the North because it was a system where the colonial officers passed instructions and ruled through the indigenous political authorities to maintain a facade of continuous indigenous rule (Okafor 1997: 21; Umoren 1996; Isichei 1983; Crowder 1966).

The system of indirect rule was, however, a failure in the Southern part of Nigeria when it was introduced after the amalgamation of 1914. The Yoruba traditional political structure did have a stratified social system based on class and title like that of the Hausa-Fulani’s in the North, but the fundamental difference between the two political structures was that the headship in Yoruba land (Alaafin) was not an absolute ruler like the Emirs and Sultan in the North. The Yoruba political system was more like a constitutional monarchy, where the Alaafin had checks and balances from the Oyomesi, the Council of Chiefs (Johnson and Johnson 1970; Eades 1980). This council ensured that edicts pronounced by the Alaafin were fair and just. If, by chance, the Alaafin decided to act in an autocratic manner, the Oyomesi could dethrone the Alaafin by presenting him with an empty calabash or a parrot egg, which meant that the Alaafin, his eldest son, and a member of the Oyomesi were required to commit suicide to renew the vitality of the government (Akinjobin 1971; Eades 1980; Ajayi and Crowder 1971).
For the Igbo speaking people of South-East Nigeria, the indirect rule scheme was a total failure because the traditional political system of the Igbo was acephalous in the classic Athenian city-state sense. There was no clear hierarchical structure as in the other two regions, where individuals and certain families stood above the others in society. In Igbo country, policies and decision-making were by communal consensus and through the age-grade to which one belonged. Although the colonial officers appointed warrant chiefs as a means of creating a stratified society, these warrant chiefs were the targets of resentment and uprising by the Igbo people. The most notable uprising of that time was the Aba women’s riot of 1929, which erupted after a rumour circulated that the warrant chief had announced that women in that region would be taxed. This would have violated the tradition and culture of the Igbo people (Afigbo 1992; Chukwuezi 2001; Isichei 1976).

The colonial creation of the Nigerian state from 1914 became the basis of subsequent ethno-political crises that would later haunt the country, especially after the process of constitutional development began in earnest in 1922. Deliberate efforts by the colonial officers to integrate the diverse ethnic nationalities socially and politically were rare or non-existent. Colonial officers continued a policy of balkanising the three major ethnic groups in the country right up to independence. Western democratic institutions were established immediately after amalgamation when the Nigeria Council was constituted in 1914. This council was never fully representative of the people of Nigeria. It was made up mostly of colonial officers, and the laws it passed required consent from the Governor-General who also had the power to issue proclamations in respect of Northern Nigeria (Nwabueze 1982; Burns 1963; Crowder 1966).

**Becoming a Nation**

The first constitution for Nigeria was adopted in 1922 when the successor of Lugard, Sir Hugh Clifford, initiated what became known as the Clifford Constitution of 1922. The Nigerian Council and the Lagos Legislative Council were abolished and a new administrative body was instituted for the colony of Lagos and the protectorate of Nigeria which was called the Legislative Council. The council comprised 46 members, made up of 27 officials and 19 unofficial members, 10 of which provided seats for Nigerians/Africans. Four of these
unofficial members were elected, three from the colony of Lagos and one from Calabar (Okafor 1997: 24; Nwabueze 1982). The major flaw of the Legislative Council was that it did not have the power to legislate for Northern Nigeria but it could discuss fiscal issues regarding the region. Northern Nigeria was, therefore, cut off from mainstream political development in Nigeria until a new constitution, the Richard Constitution of 1946, was adopted. This constitution brought, for the first time, the Northern Region into the political and constitutional development of Nigeria. The initial policy adopted by the colonial officers prior to 1946 enforced the notion of separate development for the regions. Other pre-independence constitutions adopted after 1946 were the Macpherson Constitution of 1951, the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, and the Independence Constitution of 1960 (Mackintosh 1966; Coleman 1963). Table 2.2 presents all of Nigeria’s pre-independence constitutions, their key provisions and major flaw.

### Table 2.3: Main Provisions of Pre-Independence Constitutions in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutions</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key Provisions</th>
<th>Major Flaw</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clifford Constitution</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Started political development in Nigeria.</td>
<td>• No provision for the administration of the Northern Region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Result, Northern and Southern Regions were administered differently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards Constitution</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Provided central legislative council incorporating the Northern Region.</td>
<td>• Failure to consult Nigeria’s elite before being passed in the British Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macpherson Constitution</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Strengthened regional federal structure for Nigeria.</td>
<td>• Created several ethnic conflicts along regional lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyttelton Constitution</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Attempted to correct the existing constitutional problems. Started the process of independence, and the election of the first generation political elites for the country.</td>
<td>• Anthony Enahoro (Action Group (AG) moved a motion for self-government in 1956.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Northern elites, afraid of southern domination, moved against the motion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Did not address the concerns of minority ethnic groups in the three regions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Okafor 1997; Nwabueze 1982; Schwarz 1968).

None of the pre-independence constitutions adequately provided for national integration and development. Rather, they separately strengthened the regions.
The political power within these three regions was given to the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba. Minority agitations for the creation of more regions were left aside by the British during the constitutional debates for independence (Coleman 1963: 384-396). These agitations were meant to balance the lopsided federal structure that favoured the dominant ethnic groups and the Northern Region in terms of allocation of seats to the Federal parliament in Lagos (Oyediran 1979; Coleman 1963).

The mechanism for electoral competition to the Federal parliament was ethnically based: there were no national political parties, only regionally based ones. At independence in 1960, Nigeria had three regions: the Western Region (Ibadan was the capital), the Eastern Region (Enugu was the capital), and the Northern Region (Kaduna was the capital), Lagos was the Federal capital. The Action Group (AG) political party controlled the Western Region under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was also the leader of the opposition party in the Federal parliament in Lagos. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) party controlled the Eastern Region under the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) party controlled the Northern Region under the leadership of the Sarduna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello. His deputy, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, became the country’s Prime Minister (Mackintosh 1966; Isichei 1983).

Ethno-Political Crises of 1960-1966: Precursors and Events of the Time

Nigeria’s federal structure at independence was rooted in ethnic divisions, and this greatly affected the workings of the political institutions that emerged post-1960. The emphasis on regionalism along ethnic lines was not inevitable (Peel 2010; Schwarz 1968; Falola 1999). At independence, the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo ethnic groups (Northern and Eastern regions) controlled political power at the centre. This strange bed-fellow alliance between the NCNC and the NPC party was, however, short-lived and ended when disagreements over several issues that were germane to both parties and the Nigerian state were not easily reconciled by the elite in the two parties. This, in turn, created conflicts that culminated in a military take-over in 1966. This alliance was bound to generate conflicts based on the ideological viewpoints and social cultures of the two parties. The Northern Region, relatively poor when compared to the two regions in the South, had a
The first test for the NPC/NCNC coalition government occurred in 1963 when the first independence census was conducted. The census in pre- and post-independence Nigeria was deeply rooted in ethnicity because governments used these figures to forecast capital and public infrastructure expenditures (Mackintosh 1966; Umoren 1996). The census figures were also used to determine the number of seats each region would be allocated in parliament. The pre-independence census figures greatly favoured the Northern Region and they held more seats in the parliament than the other two regions combined. The census figures enabled the Northern Region to introduce an ethnic quota system in the recruitment of staff to the public service, and especially the officer corps in the army. The 1963 census was a means by which the Southern elite could rectify the lopsided federal structure through a reduction of the number of parliamentary seats in the Northern Region. The Northern counterparts saw the 1963 census as a means of consolidating their seats in parliament and of further increasing the number of people from the region in the federal public service institutions. The initial results of the census revealed a tremendous increase in the population in the South, with the Western and Eastern Regions having a combined population greater than the Northern Region. These results were, however, rejected by the Prime Minister and NPC even though the coalition party (NCNC) accepted the results in principle (First 1970; Ademoyega 1981; Siollun 2009). The Prime Minister, dissatisfied with the results, ordered verification, after which an additional eight million people were added to the Northern Region. The
verification and acceptance of the census figures by the North re-affirmed the political dominance of the Northern elite and contributed to the souring of the relationship between the NCNC and the Southern part of the country. In general, each region accused the other of massively distorting the census results (Siollun 2009: 15-16; Bah 2005; Sklar 1963).

The ethnic rivalry motivated by political interests was not limited to the federal level. No region in Nigeria was mono-ethnic. There was significant ethnic rivalry within the regions, the most notable being the case of the Western Region. The leading political figure of that region was Awolowo, Premier of the Region from 1952 to 1959 and leader of the opposition party in the federal parliament at independence. Though loved by many in the South-West, he had problems within his party, with some factions finding him egocentric, stubborn and someone who never took advice from his aides (Oyediran 1979). The rivalry was partly driven by ethnicity and the ideological stance of the two contenders in the Action Group party (AG).

Awolowo was from the Ikenne district (Ijebu), and was leftist in ideological orientation, while Chief Ladoke Akintola, his rival and deputy in the party, hailed from Ogbomosho and was more to the right in economic orientation (Coleman 1963: 228). Awolowo favoured maintaining the party as an effective opposition against what the Southern elite, perceived as a conservative federal government that was content with the British offering advice on critical domestic and foreign issues. Akintola, at that time the Premier of the Western Region, was not impressed with the liberal socialist ideology of his party’s leader and his supporters. He favoured the party forging closer links with the NPC at the federal level and saw no benefit in being an opposition party member (Siollun 2009: 15,16; Sklar 1963; Crowder 1966; Schwarz 1968; Falola 1999). This disagreement between the Awolowo and Akintola factions led a faction loyal to the party leader to attempt to remove Akintola as Premier of the Western Region during a session in the Western House of Assembly in 1962. The house session ended in a free-for-all fight and the police were called in to restore order.

The aftermath of these chaotic events in the Regional House of Assembly led the federal government to impose a state of emergency in the Western Region and the
appointment of a sole administrator, Dr. Moses Majekodunmi. At the end of the state of emergency rule, the Awolowo faction in the party was restricted in parliamentary seats, while the Akintola faction increased due to disloyal members within the Action Group. It also included members of the regional opposition party (NCNC), who crossed the carpet to join Akintola after they were promised ministerial appointments (First 1970: 151). The move established a minority government in the Western Region without any general elections. It received the support of the NPC/NCNC coalition federal government, which sought to end the political career of Awolowo and his loyal supporters (Nwabueze 1982; Coleman 1963; Bates 1983; Mackintosh 1966; Omotoso 1988).

The crises in the Western Region worsened when, in 1962, Awolowo and other AG leaders were put on trial on the allegation that they were plotting to overthrow the federal government. Awolowo, it was alleged, had lost confidence in the federal parliamentary political system because it routinely delivered an absolute majority for the Northern Region. As a result of this, Awolowo had sent men to train in Ghana in guerrilla-like warfare who were then to come back to Nigeria and take over the federal government. In their defence of these allegations, Awolowo and his associates acknowledged that they did have some men undergoing military training in Ghana, but that they were to be used to counterbalance the autocratic style of governance of Akintola in the Western Region (First 1970: 152; Siollun 2009). At the end of a nine-month trial, in which most of the incriminating evidence came from accomplices turned state’s witnesses, all but four of the twenty-five accused were found guilty, and Awolowo was given a ten-year prison sentence. The incarceration of Awolowo and his accomplices, and the perpetuation in the Western Region of an unpopular political leader, led to numerous instances of political violence and instability which only ended after the military intervention of 1966 (Ademoyega 1981; Muffett 1982; First 1970; Sklar 1963).

The first general election in independent Nigeria took place in 1964 at a time when the young nation’s political system was tense following the conflicts that had occurred during the trial of Awolowo, the census figures controversy and the installation of an unpopular premier in the Western Region. The institutions put in place by the British did not have the capacity to handle all the many ethnically-
driven political demands (Crowder 1966; First 1970; Wunsch and Olowu 1990). The weakness in the political system made it impossible to conduct free and fair elections because of the political antecedents witnessed after 1960. By the time of the 1964 general elections, the political alliance between the NPC/NCNC had crumbled. Initially, it was expected that the Eastern Region-backed NCNC would be able to out-manoeuvre the NPC because of the calibre of the politicians who were members of the NCNC. In the end, the elite within the NCNC found themselves out-manoeuvred by the NPC. The idea that the NPC elite could not grasp the art of politics did not occur. Rather, the crisis in the Western Region provided the NPC with the opportunity to install a premier who they could trust. As a result, the NCNC was in danger of being displaced as a coalition partner by Akintola’s party machinery in the Western Region. Ironically, the NCNC had, in partnership with the NPC, helped to install Akintola in the West\textsuperscript{12} (Nwabueze 1982; Bah 2005; Mackintosh 1966). The NPC, therefore, found a new ally that would help it consolidate political power at the centre. As the election approached, the NPC/NCNC coalition collapsed and new alliances were formed to capture the government from the NPC. In theory, the NPC did not need any ally to form the government because the census figures of 1962 consolidated the Northern Region in terms of representation of seats in parliament (Falola 1999; Okafor 1997; Omotoso 1988; Ademoyega 1981).

The 1964 election witnessed the formation of two alliances from the various political parties in the country. On one side, there was the NPC with Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and some minor southern parties, and together they formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). On the other, there was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), composed of the NCNC, the remnants of the AG and the opposition parties of the North, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC).\textsuperscript{13} After a few months of campaigning by UPGA, it became clear to the party elite that it was not possible for them to win seats in the Northern Region. The NPC had an iron grip on its constituencies and intimidated opposition candidates and their supporters. Guaranteed of an outright defeat in the Northern Region as well as the intimidation of its candidates in the Western Region, UPGA called for the postponement of the elections (First 1970: 154; Sklar 1963, 2004; Siollun 2009).
The ploy by UPGA to postpone the general elections of 1964 was not successful and the NPC government went ahead with the elections. The election was largely a political farce: 67 candidates of the NPC in the Northern Region had been returned unopposed. On Election Day, voting did not take place in the Eastern Region, and the Mid-West Region decided to go ahead with the elections at midday. In the Western Region, the supporters of the AG and UPGA did not go to the polling stations as instructed by their party leaders because the polling booths had been destroyed by political thugs employed by these same party leaders; this, therefore, made voting in Lagos practically impossible. Voting, however, went on unhindered in the Northern Region and the NPC won 162 of the 167 seats, enabling it to run the Federal House of Representatives without any allies from the Southern part of the country (Omotosho 1988: 227; Schwarz 1968; Isichei 1983; Nwabueze 1982). The opposition immediately criticised the election, which they said was full of severe irregularities and therefore not free and fair. The President of Nigeria, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, prepared a dawn broadcast in which he voiced his concerns about the election.

The independence of Nigeria was like a flame that consumed my political ambition.... I would rather resign than call upon any person to form a government.... This should release my conscience from the chains of power politics.... (First 1970: 154-155).

Azikiwe never delivered this speech, however. He hesitated during the five-day deadlock with the Prime Minister. The text of this speech was, however, released to the press. The aftermath of the five-day deadlock witnessed the President announcing that he had reached a decision to re-appoint Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister “in the interests of national unity” (First 1970: 155). The dramatic change by the President came after it was clear he would not get constitutional support from the service chiefs of the army, navy, and the Inspector-General of Police if he decided to take over as the head of government. Balewa was re-appointed Prime Minister on the morning of 4 January 1965 for another term of five years after the victory of his party, the NPC, in the general elections of December 1964. The NCNC again went into coalition with the NPC, and the AG party made no political gains. The Akintola-led NNDP was also now in the federal governing coalition and Azikiwe continued as President of Nigeria (First 1970: 155; Omotosho 1988: 229-230; Forsyth 1982).
The last significant political crisis that occurred before the intervention of the military in 1966 was the crisis in the Western Region in 1965, commonly referred to by Nigerian commentators as the Wild West Crisis of 1965 (Siollun 2009: 19; Omotoso 1988; Schwarz 1968). The crisis started as a result of the Western Region election which was to determine the political party that was to dominate the politics of the region for some years to come. Prior to the elections, the government of Akintola had used its years in office to destroy the remnants of the AG and had created its own alternative network. This was not a new network model foreign to the Western Region; Akintola had used the method employed by the AG when they were in office. It was based on traditional patron-client relationships that included local chiefs, traditional rulers (Obas), local government officials, contractors, petty bourgeoisie and professional men who had moved from the AG party to the NNDP. The involvement of the network ensured its members had the means of financial survival. This was guaranteed by the network’s patronage of the government of the day (Smith 2007; Mbaku 1996; Sklar 1963; Siollun 2009). The Election Day was marked by the use of blatant and unrestrained thuggery and ingenious trickery by both political parties, bent on winning the elections at any cost. A dichotomy was evident in the Western Region populace by the election of 1965. There were clients who needed the patronage of their patrons to maintain their lavish lifestyles and social prestige. They supported the Akintola-led NNDP. Popular opinion maintained that the AG party and Awolowo were still very popular among the masses of the Western Region despite Awolowo’s imprisonment in 1962. The polarisation in the society of the Western Region created a great deal of tension as events before and after the election showed.

Unsurprisingly, when reports of the election results began to emerge on the radio announcing that the NNDP had won the elections, there was uncoordinated and uncontrolled rioting and chaos. The protesters attacked anyone who they perceived to have had any connection with the NNDP, burning their farms, properties, vehicles, and, in some instances, murdering them. What had begun as political violence designed to defeat a rival political party in an election turned into a Hobbesian state of nature where life was soon solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. The law enforcement agencies, primarily the police and army, were brought in to put down the revolt, but were clearly unable to do so. The NPC-led
government at the federal level had the option of declaring a state of emergency, as it had done in the 1962 crisis in the Western Region, but refused to go ahead with it. Despite the crisis of 1965 being greater than that of 1962, the NPC was worried that if they did declare a state of emergency, it was going to hurt the cordial relationship that they had fostered with the NNDP and Akintola (Siollun 2009). Akintola was thus very instrumental, through the NPC, in reducing the influence and power of the AG party in the Western Region and ultimately the political career of Awolowo (Omotoso 1988; Panter-Brick 1970; Ademoyega 1981; Muffett 1982; Mackintosh 1966).

1960s Ethnic Relations in the Military

The ethno-political conflicts of the latter years of colonial rule and the various crises of the first republic highlighted in this chapter shaped the ethnic relationship between the military and the political elite (First 1970; Siollun 2009; Miners 1971; Luckham 1975). The elite sought to maintain their power through the appointment of officers from their own ethnic origins into key positions in the army (Fayemi 2002; Miners 1971). The political elite reckoned that officers who shared their ethnic origins were going to be loyal to their government and ensure that military actions that could threaten the government would be contained from within. If factions within the military planned to take over the government, the army officers of the same ethnic origins as the political leaders would act to ensure that this did not happen (Bah 2005; Siollun 2009).

Ethno-politics in the Nigerian military was probably an accidental rather than a deliberate policy of the elites because of their own indifference to the new political realities. This is because the perception of the military profession was negative, and unattractive to elite, especially in the Southern part of the country. It was frowned upon and less desired than other sought-after professions like medicine, law, and engineering. The recruitment process was such that regular combat soldiers did not have specific educational requirements, and this fostered the general belief that officer recruits were school drop-outs, unlikely to gain university entrance qualification, and certainly not from the class of people whose parents could afford educational expenses (Ubah 1998; Miners 1971). In contrast, the colonial military structure inherited by Nigeria was one that based its officer recruitment policy on merit, and in which promotion from one rank to the next
entailed fulfilling all of the rigorous academic and military requirements that were needed to function effectively in that rank or department. As a result, the Southern part of the country had attained higher levels of educational achievement in their military officers than those of their Northern counterparts, and this created an unhealthy dichotomy in the army structure. Although rooted in education, this educational dichotomy quickly came to reflect a division primarily based on ethnicity (Luckham 1975; Miners 1971). In the twilight of colonial rule, educated Southern elite joined the army at the officer corps level. Most were of Igbo ethnic origin, while in the North, those from the Middle-Belt area (Plateau and Benue) who were historically known for their war-like tradition, joined the combat units of the army. At independence in 1960, the army’s officer corps was 60 per cent dominated by Southern officers, most of whom were from the Igbo ethnic group (Siollun 2009: 28).

Prior to and immediately after independence in 1960, the Northern-controlled NPC government sought to limit this imbalance in the army and therefore, with the approval of the British, introduced a quota system into the Nigerian army. The quota system not only specified the number of recruits that could enter the army from the Eastern and Western Regions, it also lowered the educational qualification for admission to the officer corps. The quota system gave the Northern Region 50 per cent of army recruits, officers and soldiers, while the Eastern and Western Region got 25 per cent each (First 1970: 161; Siollun 2009: 28). The principle of regional balance was also applied to the selection of military officers for training overseas. The recruitment of combat troops also became subject to provincial allocations in order to prevent any particular region from being over represented. There were concerns among the Northern political elite that the Middle-Belt part of the Northern Region had the bulk of the combat troops. The Middle-Belt, even though at that time part of the Northern Region, did not represent the true North, that is, the Hausa-Fulani. Historically, the Hausa-Fulani followers of Uthman dan Fodio Jihad did not achieve the kind of successes that they had experienced in other pre-colonial Northern ethnic areas of Nigeria because their influence was resisted by the various ethnic groups in the Middle-Belt area. As a result, the Hausa-Fulani political elite were very conscious and suspicious of Middle-Belt officers in the Nigerian army (Ubah 1998; Panter-Brick 1978).
The quota system effectively ratified ethno-politics in the army. This became highly noticeable in 1965 when the government’s policy of the Nigerianisation of the army was completed. Hitherto, the key positions in the army had been manned by British officers. The quota system did provide a little ethnic balance in the upper echelons of the army’s organizational structure, although half of the officer corps was still from the Igbo ethnic group. Within the highest levels of command, there was a careful sprinkling of regional representation: two of the five brigadiers came from the Western Region; two came from the Eastern Region and one from the Northern Region. Among the battalion commanders, two were from the Northern Region, one from the Western Region, one from the Mid-West Region and two from the Eastern Region (First 1970: 162,163; Siollun 2009: 27-29).

Even though Igbo officers still dominated the middle level ranks, especially at the level of major, officers from the Northern part of the country were favoured for promotion and pushed upwards faster than their Southern counterparts. The quota system, particularly for officers, in the 1960s Nigerian army was designed to favour the Northern Region, often to the detriment of officers apparently more qualified for promotion from other parts of the country (Miners 1971; Ubah 1998; Siollun 2009).

There were also tensions surrounding issues of eligibility for overseas training, and specific overseas training venues. Tension and rivalries also arose among university graduates who joined the military, and were easily commissioned as officers, and those who lacked the proper educational qualifications and rose through the ranks via service and experience. Early noteworthy army officers included Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, who was the first master’s degree holder to join the army after he graduated from Oxford University. Other educated officers included Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo, and Majors Olufemi Olutoye, Adewale Ademoyega, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Emmanuel Udeaja and Oluwole Rotimi. All of the initial university graduates were from the Southern part of the country: three were Igbo, the remaining four were Yoruba (Siollun 2009: 30; Luckham 1975; Anugwom 2001). The Northern political elite became so suspicious of the entrance of Southern graduates into the army that the Premier of the Northern Region and leader of the NPC, Sir Ahmadu Bello, requested the Defence Minister, Inuwa Wada, to stop the recruiting of graduates of Southern origin into the Nigerian army (Osuntokun 1987: 101).
The army was not immune to internal ethnic crises, and several occurred prior to the 1966 military intervention. A significant number of middle-level officers indirectly participated in political events during this time. Their political involvement was comparable to that of the political elite; supporting or opposing any political elite depended on one’s ethnic affiliation. Invariably, Igbo officers supported the Southern elite, especially the Igbos and the NCNC. Yoruba officers tended to support the AG, while officers from the Middle-Belt and ‘Core North’ tended to support the NPC-controlled federal government and the Akintola-led NNDP in the Western Region.

An example of note was the way in which the political elite used the army to frustrate their political opponents during the Western Regional electoral crisis of 1965. The fourth battalion, whose initial base was in the Northern Region, spent most of its active duty during this time in the Western Region due to the various crises that had occurred there since independence in 1960; the first of these was the crisis in the Western Regional assembly. This 1965 crisis erupted when Akintola’s NNDP was declared the winner of the Western Regional elections even though the electorate had apparently voted for the AG party (Schwarz 1968; Mackintosh 1966; First 1970; Siollun 2009; Sklar 1963). The fourth battalion was used extensively by Akintola’s government to quell the looting and violence that occurred. Young officers resented being used to legitimatise an unpopular government. The battalion commander, Colonel Largema, was publically excoriated for giving secret military support to the ruling party, the NNDP, at the expense of peace, stability and the apparent wishes of the electorate for a change in government. When a soldier was court-martialed for military misconduct, for example, during the course of his trial, he itemized his commander’s acts of partiality, and included harbouring Akintola in his official quarters, bringing politicians into the army barracks to sign for self-loading rifles, and inviting them to practise firing at the forty-five yard range. Colonel Largema, the soldier claimed, had personally supervised Akintola during target practice (First 1970: 166,167; Siollun 2009; Omotoso 1988).

The plan and execution of the first military intervention in the early hours of 15 January 1966 revealed ethnic bias in that the notable personalities who were killed were mostly politicians and army officers whose ethnic origins were the Northern,
Mid-Western and Western Regions. Many concluded that the first military intervention was an Igbo coup, a means of political domination by the Igbos (Nmoma 1995: 318; Jorre 1972: 78-80). A majority of the officers in the army at this time were of Igbo ethnic origin. It is likely that Major Kaduna Nzeogwu easily convinced his fellow officers in the rank of major to intervene politically because the majority of them were Igbo or of Southern origin. Had the composition at the officer corps level been more ethnically balanced (especially at the rank of major), however, Nzeogwu would likely have had far greater difficulty in discussing his plot, and convincing fellow majors to participate (Siollun 2009; Ademoyega 1981; Obasanjo 1981; Forsyth 1982; Achebe 2012; Amadi 1973).

The aftermath of the political turmoil and events that followed this intervention was the counter-coup of July of 1966, and the subsequent and unprecedented killing of Igbo officers by Northern officers in the army. This spilled over into the wider society, as Igbos, who at that time dominated clerical positions and commercial trading posts in the Northern cities, were killed in large numbers. This culminated in a civil-war that lasted from 1967 to 1970. Between five hundred thousand and one million people, mostly Igbo, were killed (Panter-Brick 1970; Obasanjo 1981; Jorre 1972; Forsyth 1982). The Igbos have never regained their earlier dominance of the officer corps. Rather, there has been an apparently deliberate effort over the years by the predominant Hausa-Fulani political oligarchy to prevent the return of this dominance. It was not until August 2010 that another Igbo officer was promoted to the highest position in the Nigeria army, that of Chief of Army Staff (COAS)16

**Ethnic Politics, 1967-1975**

Upon assumption of office on the first of August 1966, the immediate concerns of the General Yabuku Gowon regime (1966-1975) were twofold. The first was to officially abolish the ill-conceived Decree No. 34, which led to the ousting of the regime and the killing of Ironsi during the coup. This decree officially abolished the federal structure and established a unitary system of government for the country. The second had to do with the violent and indiscriminate killings of Igbos in the Northern Region following the successful counter-coup that brought Gowon to power. The inability of Gowon to stem the massive killings of Igbos and significantly limit the high wave of Igbo refugees, many of them badly
wounded and exhausted, from the North to East ultimately led to the secession of the Eastern Region from the federation (Achebe 2012; Jorre 1972; First 1970).

Prior to this, there were numerous debates on the future of Nigeria and how the federal system should operate (Gould 2012; Jorre 1972). Initially, the North and East had suggested a confederal arrangement, while the West suggested the creation of states from within the existing regions. The Mid-West Region, which was the newest and smallest of the regions, however, favoured the existing structure, which was a strong central government. All of the ad-hoc conferences and meetings, however, failed to provide a consensus agreement acceptable to the three major ethnic groups. At the last of such meetings, held in Aburi, Ghana, the Aburi Accord, on the invitation of the Head of State of Ghana, General Ankrah, offered a way of resolving the crises within Nigeria. This initiative was led by Yabuku Gowon and the military governor of the Eastern Region, Emeka Ojukwu. At the end of the meeting in Ghana, Ojukwu travelled back to the Eastern Region capital, Enugu, and announced that Gowon had accepted confederation in principle. Gowon on the other hand, on arrival in Lagos, was told by senior federal civil servants, on seeing the documents and communiqué which was issued in Aburi, that he had unintentionally signed the disintegration of Nigeria (Siollun 2009; Omotoso 1988; Gould 2012). Subsequently, Gowon back-tracked on earlier statements on the success of the Aburi meeting. Ojukwu in defiance, stated that he stood by the communiqué from Aburi and started the process of secession. Gowon, in a counter move to end the secession bid, announced the creation of twelve states in 1967 as a way of breaking up the monopoly of the three major ethnic groups in the federation. Although this did not stop the eastern part of the country from declaring itself the Republic of Biafra, it clearly started the process of state creation in Nigeria (Jorre 1972; Gould 2012; Forsyth 1982; Oyediran 1979).

It is, therefore, crucial to recognize that state creation in Nigeria was done so as to minimise the problems associated with ethnic domination in the four regions in Nigeria, pre-1967 (Bah 2005; Nmoma 1995). One of the reasons why the Biafra secession attempt did not materialise was that minority ethnic groups, like those in the riverine area of the Eastern Region, did not want Biafra, and sabotaged its cause throughout the civil war (Amadi 1973; Achebe 2012). Rather, they supported a united Nigeria after the Gowon regime had created a rivers state, an
idea that minority ethnic groups in the four regions had agitated for during the constitutional conferences for independence. A rivers state invariably granted the riverine people of the Eastern Region the political autonomy they wanted from the Igbos, who, they feared, wanted to dominate them. State creation ensured that “no one state should be in a position to dominate or control the central government” (Panter-Brick 1970: 203).

State creation in Nigeria had the following aims:

1. No one state should be in a position to dominate or control the central government;
2. Each state should form one compact geographical area;
3. Each state should be based on administrative convenience, history and the wishes of the people;
4. Each state must be in a position to discharge effectively the functions allocated to regional governments;
5. The new states should be created simultaneously;
6. Each new state should bring the government nearer to the people;
7. State creation should bring forth more even development across the federation;
8. New states must preserve the federal structure of government;
9. Each state must provide peace and harmony within the federation; and

The Gowon regime also decided after the war to create an institution that would give the Nigerian youth a sense of unity which was not based on an individual’s creed, religious affiliation or ethnic group. Thus, on May 22, 1973, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was established. The initial aim of this paramilitary organization was the encouragement and development of common ties among the youth of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity. Based on this aim, all Nigerian graduates of higher institutions below the age of thirty by law are required to be enrolled in this scheme for one year after graduation. The scheme also made it mandatory that participants in this scheme must be posted outside of the individual’s geographical and ethnic enclave (National Youth Service Corps 2013).
The Gowon era can be described as a period in Nigerian political history when conscious efforts were made to create a sense of patriotism and nationalism. This was very critical for the regime after leading the country through a civil war and so many human casualties (Ojeleye 2010; Panter-Brick 1978; Gould 2012; Jorre 1972).

Ethnic Politics, 1975-1979

On 25 July 1975, General Yakubu Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup while he was attending an (OAU) Organization of African Unity summit in Kampala, Uganda. The coup was staged by junior military officers who had become critical of the regime. The grievances of the junior officers included charges of procrastination in economic reforms, corruption, the over-reliance on federal permanent secretaries in the civil service rather than members of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) before critical political and economic issues were decided upon, and the absence of a set date to return the country to civilian rule (Panter-Brick 1978; Siollun 2009; Nmoma 1995). From an ethnic point of view, there have been allegations that the Gowon regime was overthrown by some Northern junior officers who felt left out by the regime. Even though Northern Hausa-Fulani military officers were instrumental in the counter-coup of 1966, they decided to make General Gowon, a Christian from a minority ethnic group in the Northern Region, Head of State. However, the Northern junior officers alleged that Gowon instead promoted officers from his Lantang ethnic group into key principal military positions, and that these were the only officers who had direct access to him (Panter-Brick 1978; Siollun 2009).

So as to avoid the mistake of Kaduna Nzeogwu in 1966, the Northern junior officers in 1975 needed a close ally of Gowon who was also someone from his plateau area of the Middle-Belt to support a planned coup. The officers were able to solicit the support of Major General Joseph Garba, who was the commander of the Brigade of Guards—the Head of State’s personal security unit. Even though Garba only reluctantly accepted this role, which also meant that he was the officer that went on the radio and announced the overthrow of Gowon on July 29, 1975, Garba’s involvement in the coup ensured that the ousting of Gowon was bloodless and was not perceived, at least, to have any ethnic or religious implications (Ajayi 2007; Peters 1997; Siollun 2009).
With the ousting of Gowon, General Murtala Mohammed became the Head of State. He promised to tackle the various challenges facing the nation and also restore the country to civilian rule on October 1, 1979. After Mohammed was assassinated in an unsuccessful coup plot in February 1976, his successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo, continued the policies of his predecessor in office and created a timetable for the restoration of civilian rule in 1979. During his period in office, new states were created in 1976 and a Constituent Assembly was established with the primary aim of framing a new constitution for Nigeria. The elected assembly members were advised by the regime to draw up a constitution for Nigeria which was devoid of the bitter political experiences of the First Republic (Oyediran 1979; Nwabueze 1982; Oyovbaire 1983).

One of the essential features of the constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly (the 1979 Constitution), was that it made a major effort to regulate the future activities of political parties and elections. The 1979 Constitution stated that:

Membership in political parties must be open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of place of origin, sex or religion or ethnic grouping;

Names, emblems and mottoes of parties must not contain ethnic or religious connotations or give the appearance that the activities of the parties are limited to a particular geographical area of the country;

The headquarters of parties must be located in the country’s Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja;

The constitutions of political parties must ensure that members of the executive committee or other governing body reflect the federal character of the country;

The programs, aims and objectives of parties must conform to the provisions of the constitution on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy;

No parties must retain, organize, train or equip any person or group of persons for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use of physical force or coercion;

No association of any kind shall function as a political party unless registered by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO);

The conduct of elections to the offices of President and State Governor and the National and State Assemblies shall be supervised by FEDECO, and the elections to local government councils by State Electoral Commissions; and

Members of the executive committee or other governing body shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement of the federal character only if the members belong to
different states not being less than two-thirds of all the states comprising the federation (Nmoma 1995: 319-320).

Ethnic Politics, 1979-1999

The next two decades in Nigerian political history witnessed several transitions to civilian rule (Diamond et al. 1997; Ojo 2004). The Second Republic (1979-1983) failed to deal with the problems of political corruption and ethnic politics in the polity. Even though the 1979 Constitution framers provided several provisions that could limit ethnic politics, in the end, political alignments and politics were similar to those of the First Republic. For example, a significant number of old party members of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) joined the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and became the dominant party in the country. The party also produced the first executive president of Nigeria, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, and a Muslim from Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. Also, core members of the Action Group party (AG), who were predominately Yoruba, reconstituted and formed the United Party of Nigeria (UPN). The party was under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and as in the First Republic, the party became the dominant party in the South-West and a formidable opposition to the NPN. Similarly, former members of the National Congress for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) formed the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) and had Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe as their leader (Ojukwu 1989; Diamond 1984, 1987).

On December 31, 1983, three months into the second term of President Shagari, the military intervened. The official justification for this bloodless coup led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari stated that:

… The last general elections were anything but free and fair. The only political parties that could complain of election rigging are those parties that lacked the resources to rig. There is ample evidence that rigging and thuggery were relative to the resources available to the parties. This conclusively proved to us that the parties have not developed confidence in the presidential system of government on which the nation invested so much material and human resources. While corruption and indiscipline have been associated with our state of under-development, these two evils in our body politics have attained unprecedented height in the past few years. The corrupt, inept and insensitive leadership in the last four years has been the source of immorality and impropriety in our society (Omojuwa 2013; Daily Times 1984).

The regime, however, did not last long, partially because it could not address the perceived ethnic, regional and religious tensions that followed the coup. There were accusations that the Buhari’s regime was dominated by Muslim northerners, chiefly the Hausa-Fulani. Also, unlike the Second Republic where the President
was a Muslim from the North and his Vice-President was a Christian Igbo. Buhari’s deputy, Major General Tunde Idiagbon was also a Muslim like the Head of State from the Middle-Belt of Nigeria. Likewise, the regime promulgated two Decrees that caused serious resentment in the country. The first, Decree No. 2 authorized the government to detain without trial any one deemed a threat to the regime. The second, Decree No. 4 forbade any publication or broadcast that would embarrass the government. These two laws led to the arrest and detention of many journalists (Diamond 1985; Ajayi 2007; Peters 1997).

On August 27, 1985, Buhari was overthrown in another bloodless coup by his Chief of Army Staff and third-in-command, Major General Ibrahim Babangida. The justification of the coup was that Buhari had lost the confidence of key military officers who felt that the regime ruled in a very harsh and draconian manner. Also, that the regime had not announced any time table for transition to civilian rule. Thus, the new regime abolished Decrees 2 and 4, and released all political detainees held on corrupt charges from the Second Republic. The excitement over the new regime was, however, short-lived, as Babangida continued to rule in a similar fashion to that of his predecessor. After several failed civilian transitions by the regime, this included a new constitution in 1989, local councils, gubernatorial and state assembly elections in 1990, and cancelled presidential primaries in 1992, the regime finally picked June 12, 1993 for the presidential elections. The contest in this election was between Chief M.K.O Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim from the South West, and Alhaji Bashir Tofa, a Hausa-Fulani Muslim from the North (Diamond 1987; Diamond et al. 1997; Mahmud 1993; Lewis 1994; Okoroji 1993).

Before all the election results were announced, with Abiola already leading, Babangida cancelled the election. The official explanation was that the elections were laced with fraud even though several local and international electoral observers who monitored the election stated that it was the freest, fairest and most peaceful in Nigerian electoral history. There have been several explanations why the June 12 1993 election was cancelled. The most frequently re-occurring is that the Northern elite did not want political power to shift from the North to the South, because there was a perception by the Northern elite that the Southern elite would never allow the north to produce another president (Okoroji 1993; Diamond et al. 1997). Whatever the case, by the time General Abacha staged a
palace coup against the Interim National Government (ING) of Chief Ernest Shonekan in 1993 (a body to which the regime of Babangida had handed over power after eight years of military rule), several key supporters of June 12, especially those from the North, became federal ministers in the Abacha cabinet. The most prominent was Abiola’s running mate from the North, Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe (Abdulsalami; Lewis 1994).

With Abacha’s mysterious death in 1998 after five years of draconian rule which witnessed several human rights abuses and international sanctions, the Northern elite, especially those in the military, were eager to return the country to civilian rule based on the economic predicament with which the country was faced with. With another mysterious death after Abacha, this time that of Abiola, who had been under detention under Abacha and was about to be released from incarceration, there were several calls for secession, especially from the Yorubas who felt that they were cheated by the North over the office of the presidency (Ukiwo 2003; Ojo 2000). Given this tense condition of ethnic conflict and the possibility of another civil war, the Northern military elite decided to hand-over power to the civilians (Williams 1999; Olurode and Anifowose 2004a). These elite officers tried to show the genuineness of their political power shift from North to the South when, for the first and only time in Nigerian political history, the two presidential candidates for the election were Yoruba. They were Chief Olu Falae of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) party, and former military Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the preferred candidate of the military. Obasanjo won the election and the Fourth Republic was ushered in (Ojo 2000; Olurode and Anifowose 2004b; Williams 1999).

**A Rise in Ethnic and Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Civil-Military Relations, Post-1999**

One of the striking features of the civilian rule in Nigeria since 1999 has been the rise of several ethnic and ethno-religious groups in the polity. These groups appear to be primarily responsible for the unprecedented rise in ethnic conflicts in the country (Maier 2000; Hill 2012) and appear to be crucial to an understanding of why authoritarian tendencies persist in Nigeria post-1999. Basically, these groups are not entirely the same in terms of individual goals or aspirations, as
each group has its own characteristics that are unique to itself. These can be categorised into three types: groups that seek to preserve, expand or consolidate their political gains; ethnic associations that use ethnic solidarity to demand a change in the revenue allocation formula; and religiously inspired ethnic associations that emphasise accountable leadership and good governance are not being provided.

The groups that seek to preserve, expand or consolidate the political gains of their ethnic group are the oldest of such groups in Nigeria. They are similar to socio-cultural associations that were formed in the 1940s and 50s which were later transformed into political parties in pre-independence Nigeria (Coleman 1963; Cunliffe-Jones 2010). Groups such as this usually rely on ethnic solidarity and use this to rally members with the sole aim of ensuring that their ethnic group is not marginalised at the federal level. Marginalisation for these ethnic associations usually means the number of that ethnic group who are federal ministers, the percentage of revenue allocated to that ethnic geographical area and which ethnic group should vie for the positions of president and vice-president. Examples of contemporary ethnic associations are the Igbo’s Oha neze Ndigbo, the Yoruba’s Oduduwa People’s Congress (OPC), and the North’s Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) (Maier 2000; Campbell 2011).

Some contemporary ethnic associations use ethnic solidarity as a rallying point to demand a change in the revenue allocation formula in the country. The ideological view of such groups is that geographical areas that have abundant natural resources that generate significant foreign exchange for the country should benefit from the royalties and taxes paid by these extractive companies. Most of the time these groups are very violent in articulating their demands on the political system. MEND and the NDPVF are examples of such ethnic associations operating in the Niger-Delta area of the country. Their activities have included attacking the country’s vital oil infrastructure (oil pipelines, pumping stations, oil wells, platforms and vessels), as well as participating in oil bunkering. Such vandalism usually puts pressure on the Nigeria federal government, as well as on Western countries—especially those that significantly depend on Nigeria’s crude oil and gas—and multinational corporations. The effects of such vandalism are usually some sort of financial settlement for these groups, which appear not to benefit the
people they claim to protect from exploitation (Ikelegbe 2006; Ekeh 2004; Peel 2010; Oriola 2013).

Some other ethnic associations are religiously inspired, and their leaders believe that the current secular political system in the country has failed to provide accountable leadership and good governance. Therefore, the only solution as a remedy to bad governance is to institute strict divine law, Sharia, as the solution for the diverse problems that Nigeria faces. It is, however, crucial to note that ethno-religious groups that believe in the strict Sharia code are not new to Nigeria. The first notable group that attracted media attention was known as Maitatsine, a name that has its origin from the group’s leader, Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa’s abusive sermons (the literal meaning of Maitatsine: the one who continues to curse). This group’s foundation dates as far back as 1962 when Marwa founded a group which preached against people who owned items of modernisation such as television, radio, wrist-watches, cars, bicycles and so on. It was the belief of Marwa that any Muslim who read any book other than the Quran was a pagan and should be killed as an infidel, or convert to Islam. Even though Marwa was eventually killed by security forces after the religious riot of Kano in 1980 and his loyal allies suffered the same fate or escaped, groups such as Maitatsine are the precursor of ethno-religious militant groups such as Boko Haram (literal meaning: Western education is evil or a sin). Currently, Boko Haram’s primary focus appears to threaten the existence of the Nigerian state in its current form as the group has vowed to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria (Okafor 1997; Hill 2012; Chothia 2012; Hashim et al. 2012; The Economist, 2011).

In ideological terms, it can be argued that Boko Haram has undergone fundamentally different phases of evolution, and although its roots are local, it represents a distinctly new phenomenon in the context of Islamism and the presence of political Islam in Nigeria. The first phase in the development of Boko Haram was the implementation of a Missionary-Activist ideology, as emerged in 2002. Its founder and original leader, Mohammed Yusuf, had belonged to both Ibrahim Zakzaky’s Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and Abubakar Mujahid’s Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, Ja’amutu Tajidmul Islami (Movement for the Islamic Revival, MIR). Its main financial backer, Alhaji Buji Foi, had close ties with Sheikh Abubakar Gummi and Dr. Ahmed Gummi’s Jama’atul Izalatul Bid’ah Wa’ikhamatul Sunnah (Izala). Initially, its primary goal was establishing an
autonomous Islamic community ruled by a radical version of Sharia Law (Islamic Law), something that Boko Haram sought to implement in the Northern state of Yobe (International Crisis Group 2005; International Institute For Counter-Terrorism 2012).

After late 2003, Boko Haram evolved into a Nationalist Jihadist Islamist organisation employing militant tactics and targeting politicians, members of the Nigeria Police Force, and other security agencies. From that point forward, Boko Haram sought the institutionalisation of Islamic Law throughout the twelve predominately Muslim states in the North, and in the longer term, to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state. This period represents the second ideological phase of Boko Haram. After 2009, following more than five years of clandestine activities and the establishment of a new leadership, the organisation appears to have re-branded itself. Boko Haram had further evolved into a militant terrorist organisation and begun targeting both combatants and civilians. Within this context, it appears that Boko Haram has begun to develop or possibly strengthen, strategic ties with other Jihadist groups in Africa, especially al-Qaeda, in the Islamic Maghreb and North Africa (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Al-Dine (Defenders of the Religion) in northern Mali as well as with al-Shabab in Somalia—all of which are al-Qaeda affiliates (Foxnews 2012; Ayoob 2008; Hill 2012; Campbell 2011, April 25, 2011; Chothia 2012; The Economist 2013).

Nigeria’s Military and the Formation of a Distinct Quasi-Ethnic Identity?

It seems that the Nigerian military post-1999 may have initiated the development of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for itself within the context of the various ethno-religious driven demands and conflicts that appeared to threaten the very existence of the Nigerian state (Maier 2000; Cunliffe-Jones 2010; Hill 2012). Historically, the military in Nigeria was dominated by the culture and religious identity of the Hausa-Fulani (Anugwom 2001; Mustapha 2006). Quasi-ethnicity is conceptually defined in a broad context that includes several developing countries (especially those with past/present military intervention) as: a distinctive (and separate) ethos, a language (broadly construed—a technical/military patois), a distinctive history, usually a separate mythology, a distinctive mind set (if only to justify a typically weak ‘orthodox military raison d’ etre), clear (and arguably ascriptive)
membership boundaries, and so on (Zirker et al. 2008; Bah 2013). In the post-1999 era, it appears that the Nigerian military is compelled to engage in national ethno-politics as a means for competing for power and resources.

The development of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity within the Nigerian military also appears evident considering that there has been no direct intervention by the military in the national ethno-political processes since 1999. William Ehwareime (2011) explains further when he argues that the non-intervention of the Nigerian military post-1999 cannot be easily explained by what other studies on the Nigerian military post-1999 seem to explain as the reasons for its non-intervention. According to Ehwareime (2011), the studies on the non-intervention of the Nigerian military post-1999 in the political process can be classified under two broad themes: first, the internal characteristics of the military have necessitated its non-intervention; and second, the nature and character of democratic governance, are proposed to explain the unusual more than a decade long survival of civilian rule in Nigeria (Ehwareime 2011: 500). Explaining further, Ehwareime (2011) notes that the idea of internal characteristics of the military such as the compulsory retirement of all military officers that had held political office positions prior to 1999, the re-organization, re-training, and re-professionalization through joint military training with other military advanced countries, and seminars which have been an on-going routine exercise since May 29, 1999, cannot easily explain the military’s non-intervention. These measures, it is argued, cannot explain why there was an alleged coup plot uncovered by the government in 2004. Similarly, the argument that the nature and character of democratic governance in Nigeria appear to be a significant reason why the military has not intervened in the political process seems difficult to justify. This is because, despite improvements in certain areas of the Nigerian economy such as, retail, aviation, telecommunications and real estate, the core issues that have necessitated military intervention in the past, institutional corruption, decay in basic infrastructures and a general lack of a liveable income still persist in the country. Based on the foregoing, it is logical to assume that the Nigerian military’s lack of intervention, even though there have been several cases since 1999 to justify its intervention, may be based on the development of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for itself. The development of this quasi-ethnic identity for
the military may allow the institution to be more successful in its competition for resources in the ethno-political struggle.

That is, however, not to say that there are no challenges in the military with forging a separate identity. This appears to be evident in the on-going security challenges in the northern part of the country where the state response to religiously-inspired terrorist groups has greatly favoured military solutions. This has required the Nigerian military, still dominated by the culture and religion of the predominantly Muslim north, to create an identity for itself that is devoid of any ethnic attachment. However, in 2013, a media report quoted the former Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, as stating that several soldiers and officers had been arrested for conspiring with Boko Haram in a military offensive against this group in northeast Nigeria. This brief mention of internal ethnic divisions, an admission that no military establishment would make lightly, underscores the commitment of the top echelon of the military to military professionalism and discipline (Soriwei). This is turn, appears to require the forging of an independent military identity, the ‘quasi-ethnicity’ that we have observed, albeit in inchoate form, as a vital concomitant of Nigerian military professionalism.

Based on the author’s observation during his field research to Nigeria in 2011, it appears that there seem to be three main areas that the military establishment after 1999 has emphasised internally, all of which point to the intent to forge a separate military identity. The first of these involves an emphasis on individual achievement in higher education as a key part of the recruitment and selection of officers; the second, an insistence on a level of discipline during internal engagements; and the third, an observable degree of military professionalism, including all of the corporate and closed social ramifications that this implies.

A greater emphasis on higher education in the recruitment and selection of officers, while insisting that the selection process maintain equal representation from each state, has arguably created the beginnings of this separate identity, or a sense of quasi-ethnicity, within the military. As earlier mentioned, the creation of an ethnic balance within the military in the 1960s meant that merit had to be sacrificed in favour of creating a semblance of national unity. It also meant that the educational requirements for officers (especially from the North) had to be
lowered to achieve this goal. Since 1999, it also appears that there have been fewer conflicts in the recruitment and promotion of officers, and opportunities for overseas training. As Ehwarie notes,

Opportunities for training especially overseas, which depended so much on whether one was an Abacha or Babangida supporter are liberalized since 1999, permitting many more officers without special connections to benefit (Ehwarie 2011: 506).

A serving military officer reiterated a similar view on the required level of educational attainment, and noted that:

…This is [a new] millennium. The kind of officers we have now are more learned and exposed…We keep learning by watching what is happening in the international community and [also] events occurring.18

The military, along with other security agencies, has been involved in recent years in a number of armed conflicts across the country. While there have been several allegations of human rights abuses committed by security officers in their offensive against such groups, it appears that the military has consistently tried to maintain a separate identity based upon discipline and accountability, and to make this especially evident during such engagements. An example of this was the author’s interview with a serving military officer. During the course of the interview, the discussion focused on accountability especially when some media report had alleged that there were cases of accidental weapon discharges of the security agencies. This officer noted that:

We are not [like] the police… for us a single round is meant to kill and it must be accounted for… it must be accounted for and an express order must be given to fire so that it is extremely difficult for them to misfire.19

Finally, and as earlier stated, since 1999 there have been significant efforts taken by civilian governments to increase the level of military professionalism and hence the corporate unity of the military. In addition to both local and overseas training opportunities, it seems there has been a deliberate effort by governments since 1999 to significantly improve the general welfare of military personnel without the prejudice of ethnic factors that was prevalent under military rule. As a serving officer noted, beginning “immediately after 1999 we have fared better in terms of salary [and] resources. They give us more attention now”.20 we can surmise that they must eliminate (to a significant degree) the implication of ethnic favouritism to do so.
Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter discussed whether multi-ethnic states such as Nigeria tend to have authoritarian systems. The chapter discussed this notion within the various studies on multi-ethnicity and conflicts in states and also within the concept of political ethnicity in Nigeria. It then discussed how Nigeria came into political existence, and how ethno-politics have dominated the political process of pre to post-colonial Nigeria up to contemporary times. Lastly, it examined the possibility of the formation of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for the military post-1999 after the author’s observation of the military during his field research in 2011.

In all of the multi-ethnic challenges that have occurred in Nigeria, especially after the first military intervention of 1966, the military has played a crucial and multifaceted role. This is, however, partly due to the long years of military authoritarian rule. As Jonathan Hill (2012) notes, apart from the constitutional roles mandated for them, the military throughout the years has launched several political initiatives and economic programmes, restructured the federal system, became a dominant factor in Nigerian politics, and created social campaigns that emphasised the indivisibility of Nigeria. All these initiatives appeared to be within the military’s primary missions, especially after the civil war, when there was a need for Nigeria to celebrate its cultural diversity while still being seen as a united country. However, it seems that some of the policies that were initiated may have unintentionally created opposition to the outcomes that the military initially sought, and this appears to have encouraged authoritarian tendencies after 1999. Some of these perceived failures appear in the form of abuses perpetrated by officers in internal security duties, failure to pacify the various ethnic and ethno-religious groups currently waging a war on the state, and the institutionalisation of military provisions that appear to provide the military with undemocratic latitude in their operations, without any significant civilian oversight. The following chapters investigate the military’s missions and roles after 1999, utilising the author’s interviews with high ranking and retired military officers to investigate whether or not there is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria.
Endnotes

1) Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s first and only Prime Minister (1959-1966), a speech delivered to the Nigerian Legislative Council in 1953.

2) Check Appendix No. 12 for a comprehensive list of names of federal cabinet ministers from 1960 to 2007.

3) A serving Brigadier General made those statements but thereafter refused to be interviewed. He, however, called in a personal aide to assist with the interview. Serving Brigadier General, Zaria (April 7, 2011).

4) Personal interview with a retired Vice Admiral, Lagos (May 30, 2011). Check appendix 14 for Major Gideon Orkar coup speech.

5) Same officer

6) Personal interview with a retired Brigadier General, Lagos (May 27, 2011).

7) This informal zoning formula of political power moving from North to South was not followed by the PDP for the election of President Goodluck Jonathan, after the sudden death of Umaru Yar’Adua (PDP has won the presidency since 1999). The current crises in the North initially started after the result of that election (Campbell April 25, 2011).

8) The 1999 elections that ushered Nigeria into the Fourth Republic were marred with electoral irregularities partially because key Northern military elites appear to have ensured that Obasanjo became the civilian president. The circumstances leading to the death of Abiola is still a mystery even though the autopsy conducted on Abiola after his death stated that he died of natural causes. There are several allegations that he was killed by the military who felt it was not in their best interest to hand-over power to Abiola after the sudden death of Abacha in 1998 (Olurode and Anifowose 2004b; Diamond et al. 1997).

9) The 13 per cent oil derivation formula was a massive victory for the states in the Niger-Delta area of Nigeria after several years of agitation against the federal government (even though they had requested the revenue formula return to the pre-1966 days of 50% going back to Regions). Basically, the derivation formula refers to the percentage of revenue that oil producing states retain from taxes on oil and other natural resources produced in the state (Peel 2010; Maier 2000).

10) The Aba women’s riot of 1929 occurred when Mark Emereuwa, a census official, wanted to count the animals of a widow called Nwanyeruwa (which is against Igbo tradition as women are not taxed). This particular census was related to taxation. They exchanged angry words and Nwanyeruwa went on to discuss this issue with the women at the village square. Believing that they would also be taxed, the women embarked on a riot (Isichei 1976).
11) The names of the pre-independence constitutions in Nigeria were named after the British Governor-Generals who were in-charge of Nigeria at that time. The only exception is Lyttelton. This was named after Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the Colonies (1951-1954).

12) The minority party and main opposition in the Western Region, the NCNC split off and joined Akintola to form a new majority party for the Western Region, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).

13) NEPU—Northern Elements Progressive Union. The leader of this party was Mallam Aminu Kano. The party stood for the ‘talakawa’ meaning the poor non-elitist people of the North. UMBC—United Middle-Belt Congress. The leader of the party was Joseph Tarka. The party basically represented the Middle-Belt/minority ethnic groups in the Northern Region, (predominantly non-Muslims/non-Hausa-Fulani).

14) Middle-Belt states are Adamawa, Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau, Kogi, Kwara and Benue. Check appendix 13 for a map of Nigeria indicating the middle-belt states.

15) The last British officer to leave the service of the Nigerian army in 1965 was the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Major General Welby-Everard.

16) Lieutenant-General Azubuike Ihejirika was appointed the Chief of Army Staff in 2010.

17) The alleged coup plot of 2004, according to Tell Magazine (2004), was to involve retired military officers who were compulsory retired by President Obasanjo in 1999. Also see Emmanuel Ojo (2006) and Andrew Meldrum (2004).

18) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011).

19) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).

20) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011).
Chapter Three
A New Form of Military Authoritarianism in Nigeria?

Introduction

Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? This chapter focuses upon this question within the context of an understanding of military behaviour in a transitional phase, from prolonged military dictatorship to a civilian-dominated system. Alfred Stepan’s (1988) analysis of military behaviour during democratic transition in Brazil appears to provide a useful conceptual understanding of the potential conflicts that may arise between the military as an institution and a civilian government during re-democratization. Stepan notes that the military in post-authoritarian regimes in Latin America have

Left legacies in civil-military relations that are powerful obstacles, both ideologically and practically, to the difficult tasks of extending and consolidating democratic rule (Stepan 1988: xi,xii).

Such powerful obstacles could undermine civilian democratic control over the military, and are observed in areas such as the military’s mission, defence budgets and its role in the intelligence services (Stepan 1988).

This chapter and the next chapters will present an examination of the retention of military prerogatives in Nigeria, using Alfred Stepan’s terminology (Stepan 1988). The sources of data used in this study include interviews with high ranking, serving and retired military officers, and important political events concerning security-related issues as reported in key print media (mostly key newspapers editorials) since 1999.

Three hypotheses shed light on whether there is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria based, as noted above, upon retention of military prerogatives as explained and enumerated below. The first hypothesis is that the military in Nigeria has retained significant military prerogatives. The second is that the military has intervened in politics post-1999. Third, it is hypothesized that retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic positions as a way to secure and retain Nigerian military prerogatives in a civilian dominated era. This third hypothesis is distinctively African, and thus seeks to test Stepan’s concept of military prerogatives in a Nigerian context.
There have been initial concerns in Nigeria over the role top military elite have played in the democratic transition process and the various key political outcomes that have been achieved ever since (Adekanye 2005; Badmus 2005; Ntiwunka 2012). Kayode Fayemi (1999) argues that the sizeable number of high ranking retired military officers who initially joined the ruling political party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), at the start of the Fourth Republic in 1999, and the alleged controversial electoral outcome that produced a retired military head of state as the first civilian president, appear to reveal the retention of entrenched military interests in the re-democratization process in Nigeria (Fayemi 1999; Olurode and Anifowose 2004b). These entrenched interests, it seems, initially centred on high ranking retired military officers’ amnesty from punishment for human rights violations committed during decades of military dictatorship and their involvements in alleged corrupt practices under military rule (Agwuncha 1999; Djebah 1999; Fayemi 1999; Ikpe 2000).

Even though there is an appearance that the military in Nigeria has dis-engaged itself from directly intervening in politics and formally accepted the new political order, the essential democratic principle that guarantees effective political power for elected representatives and other institutions in charge of defence appears to be lacking after 1999 (Fayemi 2002). In turn, this may provide the military with a significant degree of autonomy in what the military sees as its ‘internal affairs’, and appears to provide the military with great decisional latitude in determining when and how to carry out their responsibilities in the polity (Fayemi 2002; Stepan 1988). The problem this seems to create in the polity is weak political institutions, which ultimately may pose a challenge for democratic consolidation in Nigeria (Croissant et al. 2010; Njoku 2001; Migdal 1988).

This chapter, therefore, suggests that a new form of authoritarianism may be emerging in Nigeria through the persistence of military prerogatives after the prolonged military dictatorship. Military prerogatives, as in Chapter One, are defined by Alfred Stepan (1988) in a Latin American context, although one that appears to be highly applicable to the case of Nigeria as

Those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military
It is crucial to note that even though numerous studies on democratic transition and democratisation in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, have omitted Stepan’s concept of military prerogatives in their analysis of democratization, some studies were at least in part influenced by Stepan’s concept, suggesting that his analysis of Brazilian transition may apply to the case of Nigeria. Scholars such as Eboe Hutchful (1997, 2004) and Mathurin Houngnikpo (2010) for example, have discussed the demilitarization and democratic control of the military in African contexts by applying Stepan’s (1988) concepts. Hutchful (1997, 2004) and Houngnikpo (2010), like Stepan, argue for the need to empower civilian political institutions responsible for military matters by educating a corps of civilian specialists in military and national security strategy.

While Stepan’s concept of military prerogatives may not fully apply to most African countries, there are three important features that make it directly applicable to Nigeria. First, after almost three decades in power, the military as an institution is guided by what it perceives to be the ‘true nationalist mission’ of the Nigerian military (Abegunrin 2003). This military-crafted nationalistic mission initially developed during the start of the civil war in 1967, and appears to have been consolidated a decade after the war ended (Oyediran 1979). The central theme of this mission has emphasised the indivisibility of Nigeria, and appears to have placed the military as the principal focus for ensuring national unity (Frank and Ukpere 2012; Hill 2012; Ehwarieme 2011). Second, the military in Nigeria appears to have constructed a unique identity for itself after re-democratization, one set against a background of mutually accommodating and antagonistic ethnic identities in the country. This unique identity seems to be evidence of the degree of autonomy the military has maintained over its affairs. Third, in a Nigerian context, military prerogatives appear to highlight the potential conflicts that may arise between a ‘re-professionalized’ military institution and civilians.

The foregoing empirical observations of the Nigerian state post-1999 appear to indicate that the military as an institution has acquired special rights or privileges within the polity (Ojo 2000; Ojo 2009; Ehwarieme 2011). Such privileges appear to be seen in the relationship between the military and democratic institutions that are tasked with ensuring effective civilian control, and this underscores the
analytical applicability of Stepan’s concept of ‘military prerogatives’ to the case of Nigeria.

Some of the problems associated with a lack of civilian accountability for the military are evident in the military’s domestic engagements. For example, on 16 April 2013 in the remote village of Baga, Borno State (North-East Nigeria), a group of military personnel were routinely patrolling the border area for Boko Haram. The event on this particular day is still a matter of political and media debate because there are several versions of what really happened. One version is that soldiers killed as many as 200 civilians and burnt several houses in retaliation for a suspected Boko Haram killing of one of their own in Baga (Nossiter 2013; Adepegba 2013). In another version, a preliminary report presented by the military high command and the National Emergency Management Agency to the president, only 36 persons died during the event. In addition, the report indicated that 30 terror suspects died in the town, while six corpses were recovered in neighbouring Lake Chad. Overall, the preliminary report not only contradicted various media accounts of this story, especially in regard to the level of civilian casualties, it also added that the number of houses razed in the confrontation was grossly exaggerated by the media (Adepegba and Adetayo 2013). The incident of April 16 is not a one-off case. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, there have been numerous media reports of soldiers involved in internal engagements that have led to the killing of civilians in retaliation for the deaths of soldiers. This has apparently occurred with impunity (Adepegba 2013; Agency Reporter 2012; Amnesty International 2012; Yusuf 2007).

The Nigerian military has been significantly involved in internal security duties, including crime control, disaster management, and the guarding of installations, apparently with minimal civilian oversight (Fayemi 2003). These roles have moved this institution from an older form of military professionalism, which is characterized by a restriction in the roles, mission and function, especially in terms of internal security duties, to that of a new form of military professionalism, in which internal security duties are largely unrestricted. The major difference between the two is that the former is thought to render the military politically neutral, and to contribute to civilian control, while the latter appears to politicize the military and contribute to an expansion of its role (Punch Editorial 2013; Stepan 1988; Cawthra and Luckham 2003). This new professionalism, then,
involves the inclusion of the military in what should be the functions of other institutions responsible for law and order. This dynamic appears to have endowed the military with a dominant political position (Ojo 2000; Ojo 2006; Ehwarieme 2011). The new professionalism discussed at some length in Stepan’s works (1971, 1988) assigns the military the duty of keeping the nation together, rather than relying upon the traditional civilian security apparatus to do so (Ehwarieme 2011; Fayemi c.2012). The effects of this role expansion appear to be contributing to institutionalized authoritarian tendencies of the Nigerian state (Harris 2004; Hill 2012), as the following study seek to demonstrate.

Alfred Stepan (1988: 15), writing at the end of a period of authoritarianism in Latin America, explicitly contrasted the old and new professionalism of the military within the state sphere, and the likely political outcomes of such role expansion. This analysis of Latin American military professionalism is transposed conceptually to apply to the Nigerian case in Table 3.1 below:
Table 3.1: Old and New Military Professionalism in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function of military</th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Current in Nigeria (2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>For most part of the Fourth Republic, the military has been engaged in internal security duties (through the Joint Task Force ‘JTF’) basically, the role entails limiting the rise of ethno-religious militant groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civilian attitudes toward government

|                  | Civilian accept legitimacy of government | Segments of society challenge government | Elections to all political positions are usually highly contested (especially at the federal level). Segments of society challenge the legitimacy of the government(s) |

Military skills required

|                  | Highly specialized skills incompatible with political skills | Highly interrelated political and military skills | Military and political skills perceived as interrelated |

Scope of military professionalism

|                  | Restricted | Unrestricted | Unrestricted |

Impact of professional socialization

|                  | Renders the military politically neutral | Politicizes the military | Not politically neutral |

Impact on civil-military relations

|                  | Contributes to an apolitical military and civilian control | Contributes to military political managerialism and role expansion | Increasing expansion of role of military |

Sources: (Stepan 1988: 15; Ehwarieme 2011; Ojo 2009).

Does it matter whether the military has retained significant prerogatives, especially when it comes to internal security duties for the military? It would appear to, even though some contemporary Western scholars, while analysing the current state of civil-military relations and the global security environment, have
posited a setting in which there should be a blurring of lines between the military and police in external and, especially, internal security duties (Edmunds 2006; Bronson 2002; Boot 2005; Andreas and Price 2001; Weiss 2011). Tomas Weiss (2011) argues that the world post-9/11 is increasingly unsafe due to the rise of terrorist groups, and it is therefore important that the military adapt to this changing environment so that “soldier[s]…coordinate and cooperate with police units and with civilians, sometimes even substitute for them” (Weiss 2011: 398).

It might be argued that for Nigeria there is nothing wrong with the recurring involvement of the military in internal security duties, considering the rise of ethno-religious militant groups. There are, however, problems associated with this line of debate. It does not take into account contextual differences between countries that have civilian control and oversight over their military institutions, and those that do not. Also, it does not take into account the roles that ethno-religious sentiments might play within military institutions in sub-Saharan African countries (Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Luckham 1998). Countries that do not have effective civilian oversight of the military might well tend to have authoritarian tendencies, it can be argued, because the military institution can operate in these circumstances with virtual impunity (De Waal and Mohammed 2014). In the case of Nigeria, in addition to ineffective civilian oversight functions, the role that modified ethno-religious sentiments play within the military cannot be over emphasised (Luckham 1975; Mustapha 2006; Anugwom 2001). In view of this, a direct application of Thomas Weiss’s (2011) thesis to Nigeria does not represent a suitable path to achieving stable civil-military relations.

Causal explanations of the retention of prerogatives by the Nigerian military after 1999 include the view that, after repeated interventions in politics between 1966 and 1999, the military has been able to maintain and even increase its sphere of influence in the political arena; it is not significant in this regard that the military at the end of the transition to civil-rule was assured by the incoming elected government that certain ‘rights’, which amounted to prerogatives, would not be challenged (Ojo 2004; Abiodun 2000; Adekanye 2005; Fayemi c.2012).

Ruth First (1970) had observed 43 years earlier that after an initial military intervention in sub-Saharan African countries, it was likely that a military would
move out of the barracks and into the government in successive phases. This was, she argued, primarily because of the continuing inability, well-documented after First’s 1970 work, of civilian governments in Africa to deal decisively with social and economic conflicts. The military, it was argued, steps in partly to mediate, partly to guard its own interests, and partly to reinforce a system that it supports and judges to be in its own interests. National military budgets are also important in this regard. Such actions are essentially the military prerogatives that Stepan described in a Brazilian context in 1988.

Military prerogatives are said by Stepan to be characterised by:

The constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military;

The military’s special relationship with the chief executive;

The retention of the military as the institution in-charge for the coordination of the defence sector;

The guarantee of places in the civilian cabinet for active-duty military officers;

A weak or non-existent role of the legislature in the oversight of the military;

The special roles of senior career civil servants or political appointees in designing and implementing defence and national security policy;

The active participation of the military in intelligence agencies;

The operational command of senior active-duty military officers over the police;

The exclusive role of the military in its internal promotions;

The appointment of military officers to head state enterprises; and

The role of the military court’s jurisdiction outside of the narrow internal offences against military discipline (Stepan 1988: 94-97).

Ideally, in a broad context that includes Latin America as well as Africa, every prerogative retained by the military after its formal hand-over of power to civilians can, and should, be contested by the new civilian government. According to Stepan, there are two possible approaches for the civilians to adapt as regards to prerogatives. In the first, civilians can significantly reduce the level of prerogatives in a civilian era without much contestation from the military. It is assumed under this first possible outcome that there is a general consensus between the civilians and military for genuine civilian oversight of the military. The second approach assumes that the retention of high levels of military prerogatives might not be challenged by the civilian political elite, likely because
there has been no articulated or agreed upon policy alternative tabled by the civilian political elite. The situation may cause the civilian political elites to accommodate the military prerogatives, which may or may not be the consequence of military intervention (Stepan 1988: 98; Harris 2004).

**Hypothesis one:** The military in Nigeria has retained significant military prerogatives.²

The military in Nigeria, it is hypothesized, has retained significant prerogatives that are tied to authoritarian tendencies. Based on the application of Stepan’s central thesis of understanding military behaviour in post-authoritarian Latin America, these prerogatives can be observed in the institutional roles of the military in a civilian dominated era.

**Quest for a Military Mission**

In ensuring stable civil-military relations after military authoritarian rule, it is crucial for the political elite in Nigeria to articulate the military’s mission (Fayemi 2002; Harris 2004). Ineffective articulation of roles of the military (excluding its primary role as the defender against external aggression), is said to pose a risk to the Nigerian state, especially when viewed from a historical perspective. The historical use and misuse of the military by the political elite is blamed for the polarization of the military along ethnic lines, and appears to be part of the reason why the military has intervened in politics (Anugwom 2001; Enloe 1980; Osaghae 2003; Ademoyega 1981).

The laws that govern the operational use of the military are basically derived from the 1999 Constitution, and the Armed Forces Act (Cap. A20), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004). Section 217(2) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria explicitly spells out the roles and functions of the military. It also provides a framework for the civilian use of the military, one that requires that the president must seek and gain approval from the National Assembly for all military engagements (*Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999*). However, there is little evidence that military missions have been subject to the approval of the National Assembly after 1999. The president apparently has unlimited powers to engage the military in internal and external duties, and has not been required to
seek the approval of the National Assembly (Punch Editorial 2013; Agbese 2004; Agbese and Udou 2005).

During the execution of the internal duties of the military, there appears to be great latitude in determining when and how to carry out missions, and these seem to have very limited civilian oversight. Military engagement in this sense appears to pose a challenge to the Nigerian state, given the nature of alleged authoritarian practices, e.g., alleged indiscriminate killings of civilians during military operations (Nossiter 2013; Smith-Spark 2012; Human Rights Watch 2012; Adepegba 2013). In addition, even though the Nigerian military have been heavily engaged in external missions since independence, the 1999 Constitution, like all other post-independence constitutions, does not explicitly specify peacekeeping operations as a constitutional role (Fayemi 2003; Adeleke 1995). In sum, it is perceived that potentially questionable expansions of the military’s mission have maintained the military’s political role within the state, and this seems to have authoritarian consequences.

**Role of the National Assembly**

There is little if any legislative tradition of civilian oversight of the Nigerian military (Houngnikpo 2010; Fashagba 2009). Ideally, it is expected that most major policy issues affecting military budgets, force structure and new weapons initiatives should be closely monitored by the National Assembly. Also, top civilian appointees in charge of the military, such as the Minister of Defence, should routinely appear before legislative committees to defend and explain military policy initiatives and other issues such as alleged human rights violations committed by the military during internal engagements.

The 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly with oversight functions as follows:
the National Assembly has budgetary control in allocation through the ministry of defence;

the president cannot unilaterally engage the military in any internal or external duties without formal approval from the National Assembly;

the National Assembly ensures that the composition of the officer corps reflects the federal character of the country; and

the National Assembly has the power to make laws as regards the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control of the military (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

For budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Defence, there are four phases according to the law: formulation, approval, implementation, and auditing and reporting (Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006; Omitoogun 2003). It is expected that during each process, the civilian Minister of Defence, the permanent secretary in the defence ministry and other civilian experts within the ministry will be significantly involved. Also, committees in charge of defence within the National Assembly are expected to scrutinize defence expenditures when the budget is submitted as a draft to them. After that, the Minister of Defence is invited to a public hearing of the committee to explain and clarify any issues regarding the anticipated or planned expenditure. The committee in charge of defence then evaluates the budget, and, it is subsequently debated in the National Assembly (House of Representatives and Senate) before being approved.

Despite the appearance of being a rigorous process, it appears that the approval of defence expenditures in Nigeria is largely a ‘rubber stamping’ of the draft submitted to the National Assembly, with minor adjustments (Abiodun 2000; Fayemi 2003). This probably stems from a lack of civilian expertise in military matters in the National Assembly, which in turn arises from a general lack of understanding among civilians of what Nigeria’s defence priorities are, and how such priorities should be adequately funded (Fashagba 2009).

Another issue that appears to hinder legislative oversight of the military budget is extra-budgetary spending, including funds allocated to the military directly by the presidency. Under military authoritarian rule, this method was effectively used to undermine the functions of the civilian Ministry of Defence (MOD). Additionally, peacekeeping allocations under the military were never channelled through the MOD, and were inadequately accounted for. Under present civilian rule, this method of allocation appears not to have changed. Funds are allocated to the
military under ‘security votes’ on the budget, and allocations for peacekeeping duties continue to come from funds outside of the MOD (Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006; Gberie 2003; Saliu 2000; Egbo et al. 2012)

**Coordination of the Defence Sector**

The civilian political elite in charge of the defence sector in Nigeria have not been able to articulate policies that would assure the presence of civilian expertise in decisions regarding military matters (Agbese and Udogu 2005; Agbese 2004; Kieh and Agbese 2004). It is expected that the core of military expertise and the coordination of the defence sector would involve extensive participation by professional civil servants, politicians and civilian political appointees, all with expertise in military matters. At present, it appears that the Chief of the Defence Staff is empowered to have supervisory oversight of the three service chiefs (Army, Navy and Air force), even though each individual service chief, to a significant extent, has considerable operational and technical autonomy (Agbese 2004; Hutchful 1997, 2004).

Similarly, it is expected that a significant level of civilian expertise in the coordination of the defence sector will bring security structures under democratic control. The Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom lists principles which countries with decades of military interventions might adopt as a means of assuring democratic control. These can be summarized as follows:

- Security sector organizations, particularly in the security forces, are accountable both to elected civil authorities and to civil society;

- Security sector organizations operate in accordance with the international law and domestic constitutional law;

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Information about security sector planning and budgeting are widely available, both within government and to the public, and a comprehensive and disciplined approach to the management of defence resources is adopted;

Civil-military relations are based on a well-articulated hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and the defence forces, and a relationship with civil society that is based on the respect for human rights;

Civil authorities have the capacity to exercise political control over the operations and expenditure of the security forces and civil society has the capacity to monitor the security forces and provide constructive input to the political debate;

An environment exists in which civil society can be consulted on a regular basis on security policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues;

Security-force personnel are adequately trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner consistent with the requirements of democratic societies; and

Fostering an environment supportive of regional and sub-regional peace and security has a high priority for policy makers (DFID 2000; Hutchful 2004: 122).

At present, none of these security principles specified by the DFID appear to have been implemented.

**Role in Intelligence**

By law, Nigeria has three main intelligence agencies: State Security Services (SSS), Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). In addition, there is the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), tasked under military rule with both military and domestic intelligence (Mwalimu 2009). The primary function of the (SSS) is domestic intelligence gathering. It is headed by a civilian. Similarly, the (NIA) is responsible for overseas intelligence and is also headed by a civilian. Lastly, the (DIA) is responsible for intra-military intelligence and is headed by an active-duty military officer (Ashaolu 2012; Osamgbi 2006; Taiwo 2009).

Historically, the main intelligence gathering in Nigeria was performed by the Special Branch of the Nigerian Police Force, and was modelled after the metropolitan arrangement in the United Kingdom (Ashaolu 2012). However, because this unit was blamed for its failure to uncover the failed coup attempt of 1976, which eventually led to the assassination of the then Head-of-State, General Murtala Mohammed, and the entire intelligence unit was re-organized. As a result, in 1976 an independent agency outside of the Nigerian police was created, the Nigerian Security Organization (NSO) (Siollun 2009; Fayemi 2002). Its mandate
involved both external and internal intelligence and it was initially headed by an active-duty military officer. However, this position devolved to a civilian when the country transitioned from military authoritarian rule to civilian rule in 1979.

During the Second Republic (1979-1983), three problems arose within the NSO that the political elite found difficult to address. First a conflict over the way in which the NSO was created in 1976 developed. Second, the initial composition of this organization involved the merging of the External Affairs Ministry’s ‘research department’ with the military regime to form part of the NSO in 1976. Third, there was competition between the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the NSO for dominance in intelligence gathering, which persisted throughout the Second Republic and into the regime of General Buhari (1983-1985). By 1986, the regime of General Babangida (1985-1993) tried to address these concerns by creating the current intelligence framework. In 1988, the regime created the post of a coordinator for national security, National Security Adviser (NSA) for the three intelligence agencies. However, the DMI still appeared to be the dominant intelligence agency (Fayemi 2002; Ashaolu 2012; Hutchful 2004).

The regime of General Abacha (1993-1998), mindful of the activities that these intelligence agencies (especially the DMI) had played in previous military regimes, sought to create an alternative para-military agency as a means of limiting the influence of the other intelligence agencies, and in order to consolidate his political power. Under Abacha, there were agencies such as the Special Bodyguard Services (SBS), created for the personal protection of Abacha, and the Strike Force and K-Squad, whose tasks are said to have involved state sponsored terrorism and assassinations (Useh 1995; Anyanwu 2002).

The Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission, otherwise known as the ‘Oputa Panel’, after the chair of the commission, Justice Chukwudifa Oputa, was set-up by President Obasanjo in 2000 to investigate cases of gross violations of human rights after 1966 and up to 1999 (Yusuf 2007). Part of what the commission discovered, from evidence gathered through research and petitions, involved the extent of the activities of the DMI as a gross violator of human rights during military rule (Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002b). The human rights commission concluded, based on evidence, that the DMI under military rule had become an agency where both the military, and other men and
women of influence outside of the military, sent those with whom they had a grievance, to be detained and often tortured. The commission, therefore, recommended in their final report that there should be an overhaul of the DMI, with its powers and functions placed under civilian rule. A key recommendation of the human rights commission called for the limitation of the activities of the DMI to military intelligence gathering (Yusuf 2007; Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002a).³

In sum, it appears post-1999 that neither the recommendations of the human rights commission for the overhaul of the DMI, nor for the limiting its powers and functions to strictly military intelligence, were actioned. This lack of re-organization of the DMI can be explained by the on-going ethno-religious tensions and conflicts occurring in various parts of the country. The military apparently feels the need to rely on the DMI for information. In addition, the inter-agency intelligence rivalry, which first occurred under military rule, has not diminished significantly, and affects the four intelligence agencies. Accordingly, the main intelligence agencies in Nigeria have remained highly independent, and tolerate no significant civilian oversight (Aghedo and Osumah 2012; Fayemi 2002; Ashaolu 2012).

As is commonly seen in transitions from military rule to civil-rule, the Nigerian military ruled for several years by military decree, and subsequently felt the need to repeal some of the decrees that were not compatible with the incoming 1999 civilian constitution and existing laws. On the eve of the hand-over to the newly democratically elected civilian government, the military regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1999) repealed some of the decrees that it had sought to guarantee major military prerogatives, and were thought to be incompatible with the 1999 Constitution. Other decrees left behind by the regime were considered to be Acts (laws) after the hand-over. Four key military decrees ceased to be in effect after May 29, 1999: Decree 2; Decree 29; Decree 5; and Decree 1.

Decree 2, *State Security (Detention of Persons)*. This decree was enacted during the regime of General Buhari in 1984. The decree gave the now defunct (NSO) powers to arrest and detain indefinitely without trial any individual or group that was considered a security risk to the regime (Diamond 1985; Adebna 2011).
Decree 29, *Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree of 1993*. This decree, enacted under the regime of General Babangida, gave the regime the right to seize any publication within the country that the regime deemed likely to “disturb the peace and public order of Nigeria” (Uko 2004: 196). Journalists who wrote articles that were considered offensive to the regime, or that might cause popular protests, were liable to the regime’s ‘treasonable felony’ charge. The punishment for such treasonable offences ranged from stiff prison sentences to death.

Decree 35, *Offensive Publications (Proscription)*. This decree, enacted under the regime of Babangida, empowered the regime to shut down or suspend the operations of media organizations that published articles that the regime deemed to be damaging or harmful to the Nigerian state. General Babangida’s successor, General Abacha, effectively used this decree in 1995 to convict journalists Kunle Ajibade, Chris Anyanwu, George Mba and Ben Charles Obi as “accessories after the fact to treason, for reporting on an alleged coup plot”. (Uko 2004: 195-196; Anyanwu 2002; Useh 1995).

Decree 1, *Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunals)*. This decree was initially enacted after the failed coup attempt by Lieutenant Colonel Buka Dimka in 1976 that killed General Murtala Mohammed, then Head-of-State. The Special Military Tribunal’s (composed of military officers) first assignment was to try all the officers who took part in the failed coup plot (Siollun 2009: 206; Panter-Brick 1978). Successive military rulers likewise used the special military tribunal to try abortive coup attempts, such as Major General Mamman Vasta’s (and other officers’) alleged coup plot against General Babangida in 1986 as well as that of Major Gideon Orkar (and other officers) against this same regime in 1990 (Babarinsa et al. 1990). General Abacha, however, expanded the provisions of this decree and used this tribunal to try serving military officers and civilians. Notable civilians who were arraigned under the military tribunal included retired military officers involved in the alleged coup plot—Generals Olusegun Obasanjo and Musa Yar’Adua. Environmental activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other Ogoni leaders were executed by hanging after their murder cases were heard by a military tribunal (Mumuni 1995).

It is important to note that of all the decrees repealed by the military before their handover of power to civilians in 1999, only four were directly related to the
military. These included: decree 13 of 1984 (*the Federal Military Government Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers*), which dealt with the method of operation and workings of the regime, is the free exercise of unlimited powers of policy articulation, direction and implementation. The other decrees have been discussed above. In addition, decree 63 of 1993—the National Guard Decree, was repealed. The National Guard was to be a parallel, quasi-military body that General Ibrahim Babangida (Head of State 1985-1993) established during his regime, even though its mission was never fulfilled. It was meant to guard Babangida and his closest aides (Babarinsa et al. 1990: 10-17; Diamond et al. 1997).^4^

Does it matter that only four decrees directly related to the military were repealed, and that the remainder were automatically considered Acts by the new constitution? Considering that virtually all post-1966 constitutional debates and conferences unsuccessfully sought to include constitutional provisions that would have made military intervention illegal, and allowed for the trial of military officers who plotted military take-overs (Panter-Brick 1978; Oyediran 1979; Ojo 2000; Olurode and Anifowose 2004a; Fayemi 1999), it appears that this was significant. In the past decade there have been calls for security sector reform in view of increasing insecurity in Northern Nigeria and the Niger-Delta area (Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Hill 2012; Abiodun 2000; Ikelegbe 2006; Harris 2004). The current institutional arrangement of military force in internal engagements appears to have failed to subdue the various ethnic and religious militia groups that are waging war on the Nigerian state. A closer examination of the current constitution will assess the current level of military prerogatives in this regard.

Contrary to previous military transition programmes, the 1999 Constitution (as amended, 2011), which is the current law of the country, was not debated before it was promulgated in 1999. Rather, General Abubakar’s regime created a Constitutional Debate Coordinating Committee (CDCC), whose task it was to articulate public comments made on the 1995 draft constitution promulgated by Abubakar’s predecessor in office, Genera Abacha. Moreover, the regime gave the CDCC only two months to deliberate on this task, without public hearings with civil society, the political elite or academia, as had been the practice of other military regimes (Oyediran 1979; Ojo 2004; Olurode and Anifowose 2004a;
Fayemi 1999). After two months, the members of the committee discovered that the ruling military elite had established its own agenda. Several key recommendations made by the CDCC were ignored. The military’s ruling elite ensured that any constitutional provisions that might haunt them after their exit from political power were absent from the 1999 Constitution (Fayemi 2003: 66).

It was only immediately after the swearing-in ceremony of the new civilian president in 1999 that media reports began describing the constitution as one that the military had ‘super-imposed’. Soon there were concerns expressed that the constitution did not meet the general expectations of Nigeria. In regard to the military and other security agencies, critics cited Section 315(5) c of the 1999 Constitution, which states that the National Security Agencies Act (a body of principles, policies and procedures on the operation of the security agencies) is entrenched, and can only be repealed with the support of two-thirds of the National Assembly at both the state and federal level. Critics of this provision argue that the Act came into being via military decree; to argue that it still had legitimacy under civilian rule after 1999, they added, called into question the democratization process in Nigeria (Fayemi 2003; Ojo 2000; Ojo 2004). It was also said to expose Nigeria to the dictates of the security agencies, which continued to operate without effective civilian oversight. Fayemi (2003: 70) notes that this provision contradicts Section 1(2) of the 1999 Constitution, which states that:

The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this constitution (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

Fayemi (2003) argues that the National Security Agencies Act can be interpreted as overriding Section 1(2) of the constitution. An interpretation is thus possible that any person or group that successfully removes a constitutional government in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Agencies Act is acting in a constitutional, or at least a legal, manner (Fayemi 2003: 70).

Also evident is that the constitutional composition of statutory members in a security-related organ in the Federal Executive Bodies (established by Section 153), the bureaucratic organ of the office of the presidency. The National Security Council is a statutory federal executive body whose mandate is to advise the
president on matters relating to public security, including matters relating to any organization or agency established by law for ensuring public law and order in the country. Even though the 1999 Constitution does specify active-duty military officers as military ministers in the civilian cabinet, it constitutionally empowers the Chief of Defence Staff to be a member of the National Security Council (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

In sum, the constitutional sections highlighted above have provided the military with the means of searching for new missions within the country, especially within the context of the highly unstable political environment in which Nigeria is currently challenged (Stepan 2009: 87; Hill 2012; Smith-Spark 2012). As one of the serving military officers interviewed in the course of this research boasted, in other parts of the world, civil society, or ‘the people’, was perceived to be the custodians of democracy. As far as Africa, and especially Nigeria (as an aspiring democracy) is concerned, the military is the primary custodian of democracy.7 This is an important point of comparison with Stepan’s analysis of Brazil, a country that was at least temporarily in a similar position after the promulgation of its 1988 Constitution (Stepan 1988). In this model, it is the military that is mandated to keep the nation together, not the civilians. One interviewee noted that the Nigerian military retained the capacity to topple the civilian government if they so desired, but had refrained voluntarily from such tactics during the last decade.8 Ostensibly, he based his view on the constitutional roles of the military, and the various internal military engagements after 1999 that had been implemented, it should be added, without significant civilian oversight.

**Interviewees Responses to Hypothesis One**

Most of the high-ranking, serving and retired military officers interviewed during the course of this research asserted that the military did not retain any prerogatives for itself after 1999. Rather, perceived prerogatives, especially those that related to the military’s constitutional role, were described by the interviewees as merely vehicles to minimise operational conflicts, or to allow for greater accountability in security issues in a society where virtually all things are politicised. Other serving military officers interviewed insisted that such provisions were necessitated by the profound ethnic rivalries present within Nigeria.
One serving officer explained that the constitutional provisions were added so that no ethnic group in the country could hold the country to ransom. The military leadership that ruled the country after the civil-war of 1967-1970 ensured that these security provisions (Section 315(5) c, National Security Council and Section 217(2) c) were included as a way to ensure that ethnic disharmony would not recur.\(^9\) This officer argued that ethnic crises of the proportions witnessed in Nigeria pre-1966 had the potential to cause the disintegration of the country, were they to recur.\(^10\)

Other officers interviewed were of the opinion that these constitutional provisions were warranted to secure effective unity of command. They see Nigeria as significantly different from other countries, requiring the ability to frame a constitution and security establishments to meet its own peculiar challenges, particularly in matters of national security.\(^11\) These officers noted that such provisions were not explicitly written in the first two constitutions (1960, 1963) because:

a) The army was not fully under Nigerian command until 1966, when the last high-ranking British officer, who was at that time Nigeria’s highest ranking military officer, handed over the position to a Nigerian commander; and

b) Nigeria was not a fully independent country until 1963 because the last judicial appeal from 1960 to 1963 was directed to the Privy Council in London. Therefore, the country’s experience over-time (especially during the civil-war of 1967-1970) necessitated the inclusion of these provisions in later military-crafted constitutions.\(^12\)

A retired military officer who was interviewed in this study, however, categorized these constitutional provisions into three broad terms: first, the security of the nation; second, the territorial defence of the nation, and the internal security of the nation; and third, the role of Nigeria as a lead nation in regional peacekeeping operations, as agreed by successive governments after independence in 1960.

The retired officer further stated that:

…the territorial defence of the nation… is the major duty of the military [that is] to support the civil authority in maintaining a peaceful government that provides the total security of both the human, economic and total well-being of the nation. The internal security is a matter of providing assistance to the police [which is] supposed to be in charge of internal security. But in a developing nation where
you have things at times beyond police handling, the military is called in most of the time to assist [the police] so that the nation is secured. In that [sense], the recent happenings in Nigeria, if you recall to mind during the last [presidential] election of [2011], although it is the duty of the police to secure and ensure that things went peacefully... because of the nature of the politics in Nigeria, which is an emerging democracy, the military still have a role to play not directly as the police, but as a show of force... not that they are to arrest or intimidate anybody, it's just... psychological warfare to keep miscreants at bay. The third major role is [that of] peacekeeping [which] is...consonant with the charter that [the] government entered with the United Nations.13

Another serving military officer commenting on these constitutional provisions, moreover, stated that:

Looking at it holistically, by retaining some of these prerogatives as you rightly enumerated in some of the [constitutional] sections, if you recall, the military has been in power for quite some time and mostly then it governs with or uses decrees before they hand over power. [We] governed using decrees that the few members of the Supreme Military Council or Provincial Ruling Council [would] sit and come up with. Although, before they came up with some of these decrees... they still had [civilian] professionals because the military did not rule entirely in itself... you could say, for example, in a state you had just one military governor, his ADC and military assistant[s]. Who made the other [cabinet] composition of that state? The commissioners [and] other appointees? They are the civilians. But you would find out that some of this [things that where constitutionally retained]... one says to aid civil authority apart from defending the territorial integrity, which is our major function for Nigeria as a nation both by air, land and sea. We still have another role... who else when all political apparatus has been destroyed or fallen, who else can they [civilians] hand over the reins of power and who [is] going to ensure continuation of governance? It actually falls back to the military. [So that is why the military in Nigeria] had to retain those [constitutional provisions]. The key word [here] is security.14

Virtually all of my interviewees acknowledged that the constitutional sections on security, and even in some respect the entire Nigerian Constitution, were heavily flawed in several ways. A serving officer gave an example of how the present Constitution was flawed when it comes to the security agencies by citing an incident that occurred during the 2011 general elections. According to him, the National Security Adviser and the Inspector-General of Police made sensitive pronouncements to the press with regards the 2011 general elections. Such statements should not have been tolerated because it is expected that individuals occupying such positions should be politically neutral and accountable to whichever political party wins election.15

Lastly, none of the respondents interviewed seemed to have a coherent interpretation of the military’s constitutional roles, except for Section 217(2) A and B,16 that is, the constitutional provisions that required the military to aid civil authority and to suppress insurrection. This was diversely interpreted by my
interviewees, particularly with respect to the qualifying clause that states that such aid is subject to approval from the National Assembly. A serving military officer opined that even though the federal and state governments had statutory security councils, the only difference between these two tiers of government is bureaucratic in nature. He noted that before the military can be deployed in any state of the federation, there must be a written order from the Commissioner of Police of that state declaring that the police force of the state is no longer capable of maintaining law and order. This order must be communicated to the Commandant or General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the key army unit of that state. From there, the order must be communicated to the state executive governor, who subsequently communicates to the President, who then either approves or declines the request without necessarily seeking permission from the National Assembly.\(^\text{17}\)

**Conclusion, Hypothesis One**

There have been significant role expansions of the military post-1999 in Nigeria. By my estimate, the military has maintained four out of the eleven military prerogatives similar to those enumerated by Stepan in a Latin American context. These are: its constitutional mission, the defence sector, its role in intelligence, and restricted legislative oversight. Has the retention of these prerogatives produced a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria? In some respects it may have done so in that the constitution provides the military with the ability to search for new missions and roles in Nigeria without effective civilian oversight. Also, it does not allow for adequate funding and training of weaker security institutions, such as the police, whose primary role is currently being shared with and occasionally dominated by the military. The annual security budgetary allocation is also important in this regard (Omitoogun 2003; Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006).

**Hypothesis Two: The military has intervened in politics post-1999.**

Do the Nigerian media regard military involvement in the polity post-1999 as constituting ‘intervention’ of one form or another, and thus a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria? In the course of analysis, the previous hypothesis focused upon the constitutional role of the military post-1999; the analysis concluded with the possibility that the military in Nigeria, as in some Latin
American countries, has moved from an old form of military professionalism to a new form of professionalism (Stepan 1988; Cawthra and Luckham 2003) as shown in Table 3.1.

The second hypothesis explores this new form of military professionalism in Nigeria, testing whether it regards the military as having significant latitude in decisions regarding internal security. It explores whether the media regards the military as engaged in a new form of authoritarianism. The primary research data in this section are the media reports, and personal interviews.

Since 1999, the media reports on the military’s involvements in the polity can be categorized under three broad headings:

- Military involvement in ethnic militia and ethno-religious conflicts;
- Military responses to maritime challenges; and,

**Media Reports and Commentaries on Military Involvement in Ethnic Militia and Ethno-Religious Conflicts**

Since 1999, the military has consistently intervened in ethnic militia and ethno-religious conflicts. The first notable case for the new civilian administration occurred in July, 1999, during the Oro cultists’ festival in Sagamu, Ogun State. A Hausa woman was accused of violating the cultural custom of the Oro cultists by leaving her house. By Oro tradition, women are supposed to be at home. This act was said to contravene the cultural traditions of that time of the year (the Oro festival) in the town of Sagamu, a predominantly Yoruba town in Southwest Nigeria. The local reaction led to altercations, and resulted in Yoruba and Hausa casualties, including deaths. Several days after this incident, reprisal attacks on Yoruba were carried out in Kano city, a predominantly Hausa-Fulani city in Northern Nigeria (Post Express 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Tempo 1999).

The 2001 attacks on New York City and the US Pentagon also had consequences in Nigeria, especially after October, 2001, when the United States launched an offensive against the Taliban government in Afghanistan. There were riots in Kano to protest the United States’ action, especially after President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), a southern Nigerian Christian, announced that the
Nigerian government supported the United States military offensive in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several southerners in Kano were killed, and their properties, places of worship and businesses were destroyed as reported in media (VOA 2001; Ugoh 2001).

Other ethno-religious conflicts that had a major presence in the Nigerian media reports took place in Kaduna and Enugu. These riots were caused by the introduction of the Islamic Legal Code (Sharia) by governors in the Northern states of Nigeria, the first being Zamfara state under Governor Ahmed Yerima. When Sharia was introduced in Kaduna state in February 2000, hostilities erupted between Muslims and Christians—most of the latter were Igbos residing in Kaduna City. The resultant riots in Kaduna also had effects in the South-eastern city of Enugu, a predominantly Igbo city, in the form of reprisal attacks on the Hausa communities there (Soyinka 2000a, 2000b; Yornamue 2000).

Lastly, the military in Nigeria through the Joint Task Force (JTF), is currently engaging an ultra-religious, militant group, Boko Haram, all over Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram is described in the media as seeking to overthrow the present federal government of Nigeria and establish an Islamic state (Chothia 2012; Vanguard 2012b; Vanguard Editorial 2009).

**Military Responses to Maritime Challenges:** Nigeria’s major export is crude oil which is mostly pumped in the Niger-Delta area. This area supports several onshore and offshore oil installations owned by multi-national as well as local corporations. The enormous wealth coming from these oil reserves has never been well-managed and this, in turn, has resulted in media reports of conflicts between the local communities, the multi-national corporations operating in the area, and the federal government (Banjo 2000; Vanguard Editorial 2010).

The international community first heard of the plight of the Niger-Delta people when the attention of the international media was directed to human rights violations there, committed by the regime of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). The most notorious of these cases was the verdict of a Special Military Tribunal that condemned civil rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa and nine others to be hanged in 1995. Saro Wiwa had consistently accused the Royal Dutch Shell Company of serious environmental violations—particularly of his home town of Ogoni. The Abacha regime, reacting to the perception that the non-violent demonstrations by
these activists were slowing and even stopping vital crude oil production, carried out the executions despite widespread international protest (Peel 2010; Useh 1995; Djobah 1999).

As a result of the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and nine others, the region now is reported to have many expressly violent ethnic militia groups who are described as fighting against the oil companies and the federal government. The most prominent of these is the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Asari Dokubo. The military, through JTF, has consistently intervened in the Niger-Delta area, countering the rise of piracy, robbery on the high seas, illegal oil bunkering, crude oil theft, pipeline vandalism, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the various ethnic militias in the region (Hill 2012; Maier 2000).

Military Aid in Time of Disasters: The military has been actively engaged in disaster management, one key case widely reported in the media was the Sokoto state flood of 2010. The Nigerian Army Engineers were called upon to construct bailey bridges to facilitate the movement of Internally Displaced Persons into safety zones. Similar efforts were devoted to the Anambra state floods of 2012 (Obe 2012). The military also organized structures to assist civil authority in emergency situations. For instance, ‘Operation Second Eleven’ is an aid to civil authority initiative aimed at complementing civil agencies in the maintenance of essential services such as telecommunications, petroleum product distribution and medical services in the event of a natural or man-made disaster (Ogah 2011; Ehwarie 2011).

Much of the media focus on the military has tended to be less on the involvement of the military in response to maritime challenges or aiding civil agencies in times of disasters. Emphasis has focused more on the military limiting violent ethnic militias and, recently, their involvement in the electoral process (Punch Editorial 2012a). Why the media tends to focus more on the engagement of the military in ethnic conflicts perhaps has to do with the historical context of how the military started its involvement in internal security duties (Idang 1970; Fayemi 2002). The internal security duties of the Nigerian military were initially perceived to be an instrument of the political party that had the majority of parliamentary seats at the federal level during the First Republic. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC)
probably wanted to use the military as an instrument for ethnic and regional domination (Panter-Brick 1970; Mackintosh 1966). Consequently, the Hausa-Fulani elite in the North, even though it was educationally and economically underdeveloped as compared to the Western and Eastern Regions, had apparently used their geographical size, population and superior numbers in the military (though not at the officer-corps level at the time) to their advantage (Siollun 2009; Luckham 1975). It was apparently by design that shortly before independence the NPC passed into law the ‘Royal Military Forces Act’. One of the main provisions of the Act was clause 6(2), which provided for the “operational use of the Nigerian Armed Forces for internal security” and for the “maintenance of public safety and public order” (Idang 1970: 235). This section also empowered the Prime Minister “to give directions direct to the commanding officer with regards to the use of the Army for internal security purposes in support of the civil authority” (Idang 1970: 235). It is interesting to note that the NPC government’s decision to take advantage of this clause, and to send the army to prop up the unpopular Akintola Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) government of the Western Region, was ultimately one of the causes leading to the January 1966 military intervention (First 1970; Siollun 2009; Muffett 1982; Ademoyega 1981; Daily Times 1966).

Since the start of the Fourth Republic media reports have focused on the continuous involvement of the military in internal security duties (Punch Editorial 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Guardian Editorial 1999a, 2000; Vanguard Editorial 2010). At the moment (2014), just as during the period of military rule, the president has absolute power to engage the military (Punch Editorial 2012b, 2014b, 2012a).

As for interviews, all my respondents felt that it was not necessary for the military to be ‘submissive’ to any other political institution in the country. Under these current terms of engagement, it seems unlikely that military officers will be prosecuted for human rights violations, especially in high stakes political contests, because of the military’s option to claim that it is carrying out the orders of the president. Consequently, presidents since 1999 are repeatedly said to have abused the constitutional powers of military engagement. The danger of this constant abuse of political power without proper legislative approval (as required by the constitution) is that it may tend to polarise the military, as it did before 1966 (Panter-Brick 1970; Ademoyega 1981; Muffett 1982). Such polarisation has
tended to focus on the ethnic composition of the military (Mustapha 2006; Luckham 1975).

As stated in the previous chapter, virtually all of my respondents spoke of, or at least acknowledged that religion and, most especially, ethnicity played a role in the military. As regards the role of religion in the military, a retired military officer alleged that:

*It is the Christian military that is holding Nigeria [together] because they are still nationalists. The day Christians in the military see themselves other than Nigerians, this country is gone. I’m sorry about that. The day the average Christian who is in military sees himself first, as not a Nigerian, this nation is gone because maybe, they are more liberal than an average Muslim officer because his first inclination is Islam. He will do anything for Islam, even against the nation. When it’s not in his personal interest that means Islamic interest. That’s my experience...*

As a consequence of ethno-religious factors in the military, appointments to high military positions are usually said to have ethnic and religious implications. For example, the appointment to the position of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is perceived by other mid-to-high ranking members of the military to be based on ethnicity. Since 1999, all democratically elected civilian presidents in Nigeria have tended to dismiss the previous COAS upon taking office. The appointment of a new officer to replace the incumbent officer usually follows the pattern of selecting someone from the geographical region of the president. Alternatively, there may be the appointment of an officer from a minority ethnic group as a means to counterbalance the perceived hegemonic dominance of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group in the military.

In 2012, there have been two questionable political interventions by the military. The first involved the decision of the federal government to deploy soldiers in the streets of Lagos during the peaceful protests over the government’s decision to remove the subsidy on fuel in early January. Commenting on this, a *Punch Newspaper* editorial of January 12, 2012 pointed to the dangers of such engagements and the continuing relevance of the military as an important factor in the Fourth Republic. The editorial stated that:

*Events since President Goodluck Jonathan made his broadcast on the fuel subsidy removal...the democratic space [has been] shrinking in the country. By breaking up peaceful protests on Monday morning with troops, President Jonathan added awesome military might to the shocking, over 100 per cent increase in petrol prices he had effected on New Year’s Day. With armed troops setting up roadblocks in parts of Lagos and Abuja, democracy and the right to peaceful assembly are taking a battering and raising great tension in the land...*
is uncalled for, heavy-handed and tactless. Throughout the duration of the protests organized by civil society in Lagos, peace and orderliness had reigned and the non-violent nature of the action was repeated in speech after speech by the organisers… This is not quite how democracy is designed to operate… The troop deployment is a dangerous sign of a government that has lost the trust of the people… It is also an ominous reminder of the dark days of the late General Sani Abacha era (1993-1998). Not even under the military have soldiers become so involved in internal security, serving in crime control, riot control and guarding installations. The sad thing is the extent to which history has repeated itself…. There are serious implications in using the military for political ends…. The powers of the President to deploy soldiers must be more closely controlled by the National Assembly and more cautiously applied (Punch Editorial 2012b).

The second questionable deployment occurred in the month of July, where a sizeable number of soldiers manned the entrance to the headquarters of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) in Abuja. This followed the workers’ dispute with the government over pensions and gratuities. The government justified their action by stating that the move was made to secure government property and installations (Amaefule 2012).

It seemed that the institutional position of the military as an ‘intervening impartial umpire’ is generating negative consequences in Nigeria, with the military able to independently in an unconstitutional manner if the top military officers judge it to be in the best interest of some political elite in the country (Adepegba and Adetayo 2013; Adepegba 2013). An example of this was the 2009-2010 political succession crises in Nigeria. On 23 November 2009, President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua (2007-2010) was secretly flown out of Nigeria to Saudi Arabia for an undisclosed sickness. The constitution, however, required a serving president to write a letter of leave of absence, to be approved by the senate. This was especially the case if the absence was on grounds that the serving president was incapacitated and unable to perform the duties required of the office. This constitutional requirement was not followed, however, and this created a power vacuum. According to a WikiLeaks report, it is alleged that the then COAS Lieutenant-General Abdulrahman Dambazau, an officer from the North, met the United States ambassador at the time, Ms Robin Sanders, on 24 February after the sudden and unexpected return of the ailing president from Saudi Arabia. The report further stated that Dambazau expressed his opinion to the U.S. ambassador that even though the National Assembly had unconstitutionally declared Goodluck Jonathan the acting president, there were concerns, especially from the North, that he was not a person politically capable of ruling a complex country like Nigeria. He was thought to have owed his political career to former president
Olusegun Obasanjo. Dambazau assured the United States ambassador that he had no plans to take over the government, and was on the lookout for any attempt by officers to stage a coup. Dambazau apparently ordered a brigade of guards (the president’s personal security) without the approval of the acting president, Goodluck Jonathan, to welcome and escort the ailing president from the Nnamdi Azikiwe International airport in Abuja (Wikileaks 2010; Sahara Reporters 2011; Zounmenou 2010).

Similar media reports of the military acting outside of its constitutional duties have appeared in 2013 and 2014 (Punch Editorial 2013; Nigerian Tribune Editorial 2014b). As noted in the Punch Editorial (2012b) cited above, they include reports of military actions in crime control, riot control, guarding of oil installations and preventing journalists from performing their duties during internal security operations (Punch Editorial 2012a; Fabiyi 2012). In addition, there has been a significant rise of reports of soldiers serving as security escorts to politicians (Soriwei 2014); soldiers attacking and destroying public property and private property of civilians (Olabulo and Oparaocha 2014; Vanguard Editorial 2014a, 2014c; Punch Editorial 2014c); some reports suggest that the military is used to harass politicians during security operations (Ameh et al. 2014); other media reports suggest that the military appear to take sides in political events (Aziken et al. 2014; Punch Editorial 2014b). One particular case in 2014 provides an important example of the appearance of the military’s unrestricted involvement in the polity. On 6 June, 2014, the military was reported to have conducted the censoring of the leading newspapers in the country. The military proceeded to several newspaper distribution outlets in major capital cities across the federation and prevented these newspapers from getting to the public. Explaining the reasons for this overt action against the print media, the director of defence information, Major General Chris Olukolade was reported to have said that:

Troops, this morning, embarked on a thorough search of vehicles conveying newspapers and newsprints across board. This followed intelligence report indicating movement of materials with grave security implications across the country using the channel of newspaper related consignments. The Defence Headquarters wishes to clarify that the exercise has nothing to do with content or operation of the media organizations or their personnel as is being wrongly imputed by a section of the press. The military appreciates and indeed respects the role of the media as an indispensable partner in the ongoing counter-insurgency operation and the overall advancement of our country’s democratic credentials. As such, the military will not deliberately and without cause, infringe on the freedom of the press. The general public and the affected media organizations in particular are assured that the exercise was a routine security
What is, however, unclear about this military operation is whether the civilian authorities had ordered this particular action. Based on media reports, the office of the presidency, through the president’s senior special assistant on public affairs, Dr. Doyin Okupe, denied that President Goodluck Jonathan had ordered the censoring of the press. Okupe, however, noted that the military carried out that action based on intelligence reports that suggested that some individuals or groups were possibly going to use print media distribution vehicles to convey materials that had serious security implications for the country. Overall, the presidential spokesman stated that the action of the military was not aim at any particular media organization, and insisted that the military action was an issue of national security in the light of the security challenges confronting Nigeria (Nigerian Tribune Editorial 2014a; Fabiyi 2014; Vanguard Editorial 2014b).

**Conclusion, Hypothesis Two**

Has military intervention via internal security duties post-1999 created a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria? Security-related media reports on the military since 1999 and my personal interviews with serving and retired military officers, confirm that it has at least given this impression. The military, through the Joint Task Force (JTF), are frequently reported in the media to have violated human rights in areas of engagement (Chiedozie 2012; Smith-Spark 2012; Nossiter 2013; Vanguard Editorial 2010, 2009). These alleged incidents of abuses are, however, difficult to verify, mostly because of a lack of adequate civilian enquiries into these cases. What is clear is that key newspapers and other media report such abuses frequently, and link them to authoritarianism in their editorials (Vanguard Editorial 2013; Punch Editorial 2012b).

There seem to be two major reasons why the political elite in Nigeria are not able to strengthen institutions that should limit authoritarianism if media reports and my interviews are accurate. The first is the legacy of military rule, and more importantly the pattern of political administration after military rule, which is arguably ‘over-centralized’ at the federal level (Wunsch and Olowu 1995). This in turn can be said to have created weak political institutions that are also militarised (Hutchful and Bathily 1998; Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Best 1999; Obi 2007). The second reason seems to be that repeated military-crafted transitions to civilian
rule have created another power elite in Nigeria, the retired high ranking ‘military politicians’ (Badmus 2005; Akinrinade 2006). Since 1999, the retired military elite have been perceived to be a dominant factor in Nigeria’s civilian politics (Adekanye 1999). Retired officers are contesting and winning key political positions, including the presidency, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), the current senate president, Senator David Mark, many past and present members of the National Assembly, and so on. Has the leadership pattern of these retired officers in civilian positions manifested authoritarianism based on their military background? The following hypothesis explores this question and the possible consequences this may have on the state.

**Hypothesis Three: Retired Military Officers are gaining Influential Political and Economic Positions.**

Retired military officers’ involvement in civilian rule is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The short-lived Second Republic (1979-1983) had an array of retired military officers, including Colonels Amadu Ali and Garba Musa Dada, in the Senate. Similarly, Lieutenant J.C Ojukwu and Lieutenant-Colonel P.C Amadu were members of the House of Representatives (Adekanye 1999: xi). Other retired officers who were prominent politicians in the Second Republic include: Brigadier-General Benjamin Adekunle (a famous civil war commander); former Biafra secessionist leader, Chukwuemeka Ojukwu; and Brigadier-Generals U.J. Esuene and George Kurubo; Major-Generals Adeyinka Adebayo and Hassan Usman Kastina were executive members of political parties (Adekanye 1999: xi). What was, however, different with the military’s transition to civilian rule in 1998/1999 was that it produced a former military ruler as a democratically elected civilian president.

Several scholars have written about the retired military officers as an emergent political factor in Nigeria post-1999 (Adekanye 1999; Badmus 2005; Ntwunka 2012; Akinrinade 2006; Amuwo 2009; Siollun 2013). They have argued that retired military officers would continue to dominate, direct and even determine the future of democratic governance in Nigeria (Badmus 2005). Their sheer level of influence, wealth, connections with government, ‘old boy’ networks, organizational skills and experience have transformed retired military officers into a formidable political elite. Do this, however, constitute to a new form of military
authoritarianism? Perhaps the most egregious example of this perceived military authoritarian comparison after 1999 has been that of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who throughout his tenure in office (1999-2007) appeared to violate the rule of law repeatedly with no legal consequences (Adejumobi 2010; Agbaje et al. 2004; Ajayi and Ayodele 2004).

Even though the influence of retired military officers was not included in Alfred Stepan’s ‘military prerogatives’ for Latin America, it appears to be a crucial variable, an additional Nigerian military prerogatives in understanding the state after 1999. The sheer number of retired military officers seeking and holding key government positions in Nigeria (in the hundreds) is impressive. This trend has involved officers who were compulsorily retired by President Obasanjo in 1999, and those who left the military before then (Sankore 1999; Guardian Editorial 1999b).

**Retired Military Officers in Economic Positions**

Prior to this present civilian government, mid-to-high ranking military officers tended to have relatively short career spans. This can be attributed to three factors. The first is based on the coups and counter-coups that have taken place over the years in Nigeria. Many military officers have been killed during coups and coups attempts, or, accused of staging coups. Those in the latter category face the possibility of death by firing squad if found guilty by courts-martial. The second factor occurs when a new military dictator assumes office. The usual practice for a changeover of this kind is the compulsory retirement of all officers senior to the new dictator in rank, and the retirement of officers who are perceived to be a threat to the new regime. The last factor is also key to a successful military transition to civilian rule. The usual practice is for the incumbent military ruler and, with him, his loyal aides, to retire from the military (Nwagwu 2002; Siollun 2009).

It is, therefore, not surprising that military officers who are still in their prime are frequently forced to retire from the military. For example, when the military handed over power to the civilians in 1979 the ages of military officers retired from service were revealing in this regard: Generals Obasanjo and Danjuma, 42; Major General Yar’Adua, 36; Vice Admiral Adelanwa, 39; and Major General Shuwa, 40 (Adekanye 1999: 12). The retirements in 1979 were similar to those in
1999, when President Obasanjo compulsorily retired eighty-nine military officers who were still in their prime (Sankore 1999).

High ranking retired military officers tend to be highly selective in their post-retirement careers. The military institution has traditionally been a means for higher social mobility, and high ranking retired military officers’ post-retirement careers tend to fall into one of ten categories:

Defence Procurement and Contracts—supplying of fuel, food, apparel, boots and furniture. This also includes arms and equipment, and contracts for building and construction. Examples of this category are not easy to find, although a sizeable number of high ranking retired military officers are engaged in this type of business;

Large-scale Farming and Agro-Allied Ventures—particularly in poultry, feed-mills, maize, citrus and other fruit cultivation, livestock and fishery, food processing and other agro-allied industries. A noteworthy example of large-scale farming is the property owned by former head of state and president, General Olusegun Obasanjo;

Building and Construction (Other than Defence)—contracting for building, civil engineering and construction projects of all kinds, and related services. Examples include, Major General Obada, Rear Admiral Sode and Rear Admiral Olukoya;

Petroleum production—petroleum and gas exploration, production services, bunkering, marketing and distribution, running petrol stations. Major General Magoro, Lieutenant General Inuwa Wushishi and General T.Y Danjuma;

Real Estate—property and real estate investment, building and management, provision and renting of house and office accommodation: most retired and serving military officers have at least one interest in real estate, and thus the list is too extensive to list;

Finance, Banking and Insurance—financial investment and lending, including ownership of banking institutions, stock broking firms, investments in the insurance sub-sector: Lieutenant General Jeremiah Useni, Brigadier General Anthony Ukpo and Major General O.A Obada;

Printing and Publishing—companies specializing in printing, investment in the book trade, and government printing/currency printing institutions: Colonel Sambo Dasuki;

Imports and Exports, including Shipping—imports and exports, clearing and forwarding, container services, warehousing, running of private jetties, operation of shipping charter lines, and ownership of ocean-going vessels: General T.Y Danjuma;
Sporting Activities—stakeholding/chairing sporting activities such as football, table-tennis, and athletics: Major General H.E.O Adefope (late) and Brigadier General D.O Onyea; and


Retired Military Officers in Political Positions

The 1999 military transition to civilian rule could be described as a ‘vague’ transition process (Ojo 2004: 64; Fayemi 1999). Unresolved policy conflicts were left by the military to the new civilian government (Adejumobi 2010; Olurode and Anifowose 2004b). The two most significant of these were the 1999 Constitution, which had not been debated and fully considered before it was promulgated into law; and a large number of high ranking retired military officers who were directly involved in the transition process. It was not insignificant that General Abubakar in 1998 had private meetings with most of Nigeria’s retired military rulers, top retired generals and retired police chiefs within three months of taking power after the death of General Abacha (Guardian Newspaper 1998). There were two notable persons absent at that luncheon: Generals Obasanjo and Buhari. By the time of one meeting, it had already been agreed that Obasanjo would declare his interest and run for the presidency under the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The major financiers for Obasanjo’s presidential campaign in 1999 included high ranking retired officers, including Generals T.Y Danjuma and Ibrahim Babangida, and Lieutenant Generals Mohammed Gusau and Mohammed Wushishi (Adekanye 2005; Fayemi 1999).

Since the election of Obasanjo in 1999, there have been a number of retired military officers contesting for, or being appointed to, senior government positions at the federal and state level. Particularly noticeable is the position of the National Security Adviser (NSA). This position, from the beginning of civilian rule, has been occupied by retired military officers. Generally, retired military officers’ post-retirement careers in politics include:

1. Contesting for the highest political position of the country, the presidency.
2. Contesting for governorships across the federation.
3. Occupying influential positions in political parties.
4. Becoming members of state and federal houses of assembly.
5. Becoming ministers in both state and federal cabinets.
6. Occupying positions in civilian intelligence agencies, e.g., State Security Service (SSS) and National Security Advisor (NSA).

Interviewees Responses to Hypothesis Three

Virtually all my respondents stated that there was nothing wrong with retired military officers contesting political positions. In fact, one serving officer said that this trend is likely to increase as more officers seek elected positions.\(^{23}\) they were all of the opinion that retired military officers posed no threat to the current democratization process in Nigeria. One retired officer, commenting on whether retired military officers continued to be influenced by the military, noted that some high ranking military officers are occasionally invited by serving officers to air their views on issues that are of importance to the military. He stated that:

…apart from personal relationships of past leaders with the new ones, there is no provision for it by law, although it may be through personal relations [or] interactions. For example, if [the current political elites] are thinking of something that they feel will enhance the well-being of the navy. [There is] what is called the annual conference [of] the chief of naval staff. In that conference, they sort of discuss issues that they feel will advance the progress of the navy. They call the older ones [past service chiefs], and some senior officers that they feel in their own imagination can contribute effectively to such discussion [and lobby against any policy that may not be in the interest of the navy].\(^{24}\)

A serving officer commenting on high ranking retired military officers in politics, added that, regarding officers in politics,

You would find out that these were the same political officers that were in the same military politics then who had the experience and the act of governing and ruling [or] the expertise [in] ruling. If you look at the United States army, at times you see one or two people [who took advantage] of their background and experience [into politics and did well]….David Mark is an ex-military politician but look at the way he controls the senate, he still has the attitude of discipline, self-control and strong control.\(^{25}\)

Another serving officer commenting on this same issue stated that:
… in the United States and other developed democracies in the world, ex-military men play significant roles in the polity and in Nigeria a lot of military men are into politics. It can tell you that there is something they are doing right because they have no hold or relationship with the military. They have something to offer; if Obasanjo was anything it was because he put his 100 per cent energy in work. It might not have solved the [numerous] problems. His ADC [told] us that he [has] meetings till 3.30am in the morning, but [Obasanjo] still wakes up at 5.00am to play squash. So that’s because of the training he received in the army, that’s my take.26

Commenting on whether the military is a means to higher social mobility in Nigeria, politically and economically, a serving officer answered:

Not really; it was because we were involved in governance. Look at other African countries like Niger. Their leaders are former military men because they had the power of the gun. But [I] am going for [an academic career when I leave the military] because I don’t have a flare for politics per se [or maybe] because of the way it is being done in this country. But if it was played in a proper way, I would have been interested….The truth is that the military exposes you a lot through peace-keeping and courses that we attend…so it places you on a higher pedestal or the stepping stone that you are talking about.27

Another serving officer commented on this same issue:

Each and every individual aspires for greater heights and I don’t think there is anything wrong [in that]. Every Nigerian has the right including ex-military men. It doesn’t restrain us….the training is key because a military man is trained a little in everything, as I said, we are constantly trained….Look at Dimeji Bankole [former federal speaker House of Representatives] for instance; he had some military training in the UK. It means that military training allows you do something differently from the civilians and we have the right to serve….The era of military intervention is over and gone for good….We shouldn’t be seen as people that should sit down because we have a higher stake….28

Conclusion, Hypothesis Three

My third hypothesis, that retired military officers who gain influential political and economic positions might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria is not supported by the evidence. Retired military officers in economic and/or political activities are apparently pursuing personal interests. That the military decided to hand-over political power to a retired military general in 1999 seems to suggest that the military elite in 1999 were worried about the prospects of the military under a civilian leader, particularly one who might limit the prerogatives of the military post-1999, and might limit military operational capacity. The ruling military elite of the day probably felt that only a retired officer could gain the confidence of the military and stay out of political power. The notion that retired military officers had de facto influence over current serving officers could not be ascertained. However, top ranking retired officers are occasionally invited by the military to air their views in regard to issues that are
regarded as fundamental to the operational functions of the military. This is significant in regards to the central question of this thesis.

Apart from General Azazi, a post-1999 retiree appointed as the National Security Adviser, all retired officers gaining influential positions were either those compulsorily retired by the Obasanjo government in 1999 or those who had left the military before 1999. They did not owe the military their allegiance, and did not seem to be influenced by it. The era of retired military officers in influential positions in the political sphere may be a passing phase in Nigerian politics. This is reinforced by the ages of these categories of officers. For example, Generals Obasanjo, Babangida and Danjuma are, respectively 75, 71 and 74 years old. There is no current evidence to suggest that post-1999 retirees from the military would dominate the political and economic space to the extent of their predecessors, who had had the advantage of being the first ‘military politicians’ (Fayemi c.2012). For the foreseeable future, it seems that the position of the National Security Adviser will be occupied by a retired military officer, however.

**Chapter Summary**

This chapter presented an examination of *military prerogatives* in Nigeria, using Alfred Stepan’s interpretation of late military authoritarianism in Latin America. It also analysed three hypotheses that seek to shed light on whether there is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria based upon retention of military prerogatives.

For hypothesis one, *the military in Nigeria has retained significant prerogatives*, it seems that the military has maintained four out of the eleven military prerogatives enumerated by Alfred Stepan. These are: its constitutionally hegemonic mission, the nature of the defence sector, its dominant role in intelligence gathering, and the low level of legislative oversight. In some limited respects, the retention of these prerogatives may have produced a new form of military authoritarianism because it provides the military with the ability to search for new missions and roles without effective civilian oversight.

The second hypothesis, *the military has intervened in politics post-1999*, discussed three key military involvements under a civilian era. These are: its involvement in ethnic militia and ethno-religious conflicts; the military’s
responses to maritime challenges; and its activities during time of disasters. The analysis of this hypothesis however revealed that most of the studies on the military have tended to focus on their activities as they relate to ethnic militia and ethno-religious conflicts. It appears that the military especially through the Joint Task Force (JTF), been perceived to have engaged to some extent in a new form of military authoritarianism, based on the media reports of alleged human rights violations in areas of engagement.

Finally, the third hypothesis, *retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic positions*, discussed the perceived link between retired officers involvement in the economic and democratic sphere, and the relationship with the military institution. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is not valid. Top ranking retired officers are occasionally invited by the military to air their views in regard to issues that are regarded as fundamental to the operational functions of the military, however.

To conclude, based on the data analysed and the hypotheses that were discussed, it appears that the current authoritarian tendencies of the Nigerian state cannot be fully attributed to the activities of individuals (retired and active officers) operating in the political system as hypotheses two and one extensively discussed. Neither can it be explained from the perspective of *military prerogatives* alone. It seems that the problems are rather more institutional, especially on examination of the current internal engagements of the military and the level of alleged human rights abuses by the military. The next chapter will explore the institutional bodies responsible for limiting the activities of the military, and the extent to which they have fulfilled their responsibilities.
Endnotes

1) A coup attempt was uncovered by the government in 2004. See Ehwarieme (2011); Ojo (2006).

2) The table in appendix 15 gives a profile of the various governments Nigeria had since independence and their relationship to the military institution.

3) The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) was set up by the Obasanjo government in the year 2000. In 2002, the commission submitted its main report to this same government after several people had testified at the panel sittings in various states across the federation. To date, 2013, the report of the commission is yet to be officially published by the government. The author used the unofficial report that is available on the internet.

4) One of the key plotters of the unsuccessful April 1990 coup attempt against General Babangida, Major Gideon Orkar, alleged that one of the reasons why he decided to take-over the reins of power was to prevent the establishment of the National Guard. See (Babarinsa et al. 1990). Check appendix 16 for a table that shows the decrees that cease to have an effect from May 29, 1999.

5) The 1995 constitutional conference that produced a draft constitution was a political farce. As General Sani Abacha had no plans of relinquishing political power, rather, he had plans of succeeding himself.

6) Section 315(5)c. The National Security Council as defined by the 1999 Constitution states that:

25. The National Security Council shall comprise the following members
   a) the President who shall be the Chairman;
   b) the Vice-President who shall be the Deputy Chairman;
   c) the Chief of Defense Staff
   d) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged with the responsibility for internal affairs;
   e) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged with the responsibility for defense;
   f) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged with the responsibility for foreign affairs
   g) the National Security Adviser;
   h) the Inspector-General of Police; and
   i) such other persons that the President may in his discretion appoint
26. The council shall have power to advise the President on matters relating to public security including matters relating to any organization or agency establish by law for ensuring the security of the Federation.
Section 217(2)c (c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly… (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

7) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Ibadan (May 12, 2011).

8) Same officer (above).
9) This information was provided during the course of my interview with a serving Major, Zaria (April 2, 2011).
10) Same officer (above).
11) Personal interview with a serving Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 7, 2011).
12) Same officers (above).
13) Personal interview with a retired Vice-Admiral, Lagos (May 30, 2011).
14) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011).
15) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 7, 2011).
16) Section 217(2) a) defending Nigeria from external aggression. b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
17) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Ibadan (May 12, 2011).
18) This information was provided during the course of my interview with a serving Major, Zaria (April 2, 2011).
19) Personal interview with a retired Brigadier General, Lagos (May 27, 2011).
20) Check appendix 1 for a list of retired military officers in business and public service positions. It is important to note that the table in the appendix attempts to replicate the research done by Bayo Adekanye (1999) for retired military officers in the mid-1980s. It is, however, hard to track the business ventures of top retired military officers, as majority of these officers have their stolen loot and business ventures overseas, while others use other person to front in their businesses. An example is General Babandiga, who several media reports has linked with Chief Mike Adenuga, Chairman of Globacom—the second largest telecommunications mobile provider in Nigeria. Some have said that Babandiga owns or has significant shares in the company. This compilation was, however, made by the author through a Google search on some key past military officers. The list is inexhaustible.
21) Check appendix 2 for a list of political activities and government positions that some retired military officers have been appointed to and occupied since 1999. It is important to note from the table that former President, Olusegun Obasanjo is no longer the Chairman Board of Trustees (BOT) of the PDP but has a significant influence in the party. In 2015, Obasanjo left the PDP partly due to irreconcilable differences between him and President Goodluck Jonathan.
22) Former military ruler Babandiga is a political godfather for many aspiring politicians due to his level of political influence. Media reports credit him with being instrumental in the appointment of his former aid-de-camp (ADC), retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki as the current National Security Adviser.
23) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Ibadan (May 12, 2011).
24) Personal interview with a retired Vice-Admiral, Lagos (May 30, 2011).
25) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011).
26) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).
27) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011).
28) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).
Chapter Four

Civilian Control of the Nigerian Military

Introduction

Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? This chapter suggests that a new form of authoritarianism may be facilitated in Nigeria because of weak civilian oversight of the military. The previous chapter extensively discussed the role that the retention of military prerogatives may have on the operational workings of the military in Nigeria after 1999, and the link they seem to have to authoritarian practices within the polity. This chapter continues this investigation of military behaviour and operations within the context of civilian rule, and the effectiveness of civilian political institutions that should, but in some cases apparently do not, limit the activities of the military in a civilian era.

Two hypotheses are tested to identify whether there is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria due to weak civilian oversight of the military. The first hypothesis is: autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999; and the second: civilian government oversight remains weak, and this facilitates military authoritarianism.

In general terms, effective political institutions are particularly important for both liberal and aspiring liberal democracies such as Nigeria. This is because political institutions in liberal democracies are the “decisive step towards… the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules” (Przeworski 1991: 14; Przeworski et al. 2000). Political institutions are not only seen as organisations which create, enforce and apply laws that mediate against societal conflicts, they are also seen as the pillars of order in any political system. Given this importance, it is expected that conscientious effort should be made to develop effective political institutions in Nigeria, since there is the appearance of weak political institutions in general (Przeworski et al. 2000; Mamdani 1996; Apter 1965; Coleman 1975).

There have been reasons postulated as to why developing countries tend to have weak institutions. Joel Migdal (1988) argues that some developing countries have weak institutional capacity because of the state’s inability to exercise effective
social control over its geographical area. This lack of effective social control, Migdal elaborates, is based on the drastic societal transformation that occurred under colonialism where colonial societies were exposed to the global capitalist system of trade. Migdal adds that some dictators see the emerging institutions as political rivals, and systematically undermine them. Colonial authorities may well have done the same. In a sub-Saharan African context, this resulted in colonial societies being introduced to a new form of taxation that was exploitative, forced labour on plantation farms (especially in Francophone Africa), and ensured that agricultural production for export was greatly encouraged (Chew and Denemark 1996; Rodney 1972), while the development of local institutions was discouraged. These changes, tax procedures, to a certain degree land tenure laws, and the development of accessible means of transport (railway lines) that quickly brought cash crops from the hinterland to the coastal areas for export, fundamentally transformed the conditions of colonial societies. In turn, it greatly affected the existing social organisation and the social control which had been exercised (Migdal 1988).

As noted above, based on the contextual realities, the colonialists in sub-Saharan Africa either discouraged, permitted, or encouraged the creation of new social organisations for societal control, especially when they were perceived to be in their economic interests (Ajayi and Crowder 1971; Crowder 1968; Mamdani 1996). An example of encouraging an existing social organisation for social control that would benefit the colonial establishment can be found in the old Sokoto Caliphate of present day Northern Nigeria (Falola 2009; Ubah 1998). The colonial authorities introduced a policy of indirect rule where colonial interests were transmitted through the existing social structure that consisted of paramount rulers such as the Emirs, Sultan1 and other important traditional authorities in the Caliphate2 (Muffett 1978; Burns 1963; Isichei 1983; Lugard 1922).

Similarly, James Wunsch and Dele Olowu (1995) posit that, in a post-colonial context, the failure of political institutions in virtually all African countries can be attributed to the ‘over centralised’ system of governance that African countries adopted after colonial rule. This, they argue, is due to the system of political administration inherited from colonial rule, decades of military authoritarian rule, and the strong personal rulership system that African states tended to adopt (Wunsch and Olowu 1995). Under this condition of centralisation, based on the
variables itemised (colonial legacy, military rule and personal rulership system), there was a significant shift of political power from the component units to the central government in revenue generation, the distribution of revenue generated, and a more centralised economic development policy. As a result of the emphasis on centralised socio-economic development, several African states were not adequately equipped with experienced manpower at the local level to transform government policies to desired outcomes at the local level (Adamolekun 1986; Mawhood 1983; Smith 1985).

In a Nigerian context, while it seems that, since 1999, policies have been adopted to address weak political institutions, it appears less is being done to address the institutions of the security agencies. This has been observed since the start of civilian rule in 1999. Local and international media reports, and also those of international organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have accused Nigerian security agencies (especially the military) of human rights abuses in their internal engagements (Human Rights Watch 2012). In addition, some of these reports have also blamed the federal government for a lack of civilian enquiries into these alleged human rights abuses by security agencies. Does ineffective civilian oversight of the military facilitate the emergence of a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria? This chapter will examine this within the context of the two hypotheses mentioned above.

**Hypothesis Four: Autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999.**

Since 1999, the military has been involved in numerous internal engagements, the most notable being those in the Niger-Delta area and, currently, in the northern part of the country. In these engagements, casualties have been witnessed within both the combat soldiers and the group(s) waging violent activities against the state. In virtually all of the engagements by military personnel, there have been allegations against the military of human rights abuses by both local and international media organisations (Punch Editorial 2014a; Guardian Editorial 1999a; Vanguard Editorial 2010; Punch Editorial 2014c).

It should be noted, however, that allegations against the military of human rights abuses in internal engagements did not start with the advent of civilian rule. Under each of the military regimes there were allegations against the military of gross
human rights violations. The military regime with the worst record for human rights violations was that of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). During the Abacha regime, it was observed that the main security apparatus that committed such violations was a brigade of guards—personal security of the president, the military police, and most importantly, a strike force—a unit that was set up and used by Abacha’s Chief Security Officer (CSO), Major Hamza Al Mustapha, to assassinate the regime’s enemies and also to sponsor covert terrorist activities. Such terrorist activities included bombings in the Lagos metropolitan area (Useh 1995; Anyanwu 2002). The regime also used these bomb attacks as an excuse to arrest pro-democracy activists (Sankore 1999; Agwuncha 1999).

An annotated list of prominent victims of human rights abuses under the Abacha regime includes:

- Chief Moshood Abiola, presumed winner of the 12 June 1993 presidential election that was later cancelled by the regime of Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993). Abiola was later arrested by the Abacha regime under questionable charges of treason brought against him when he declared himself the lawful president of Nigeria. He eventually died while incarcerated in 1998 (Diamond et al. 1997).

- Wariebi K. Agamene and Frank O. Kokori, national president and general secretary NUPENG, (Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers). Both were imprisoned for embarking on a national strike against the Abacha regime (Useh 1995).

- Ken Saro Wiwa, writer and civil activist. He and eight other Ogoni chiefs were executed by hanging in 1995 by a Special Military Tribunal that was set-up to investigate murder charges brought against Saro Wiwa and the eight others. Prior to his death, Saro Wiwa was the leader of the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). This organisation led a nonviolent campaign against environmental degradation of the land and waters of Ogoniland by the operations of multi-national corporations, especially those of the Shell Oil Company (Mumuni 1995; Useh 1995).

- Tell Magazine’s George Mba, The News’ Kunle Ajibade, TSM Magazine’s Chris Anyanwu and Classique Magazine’s Ben Charles Obi were accused
of aiding a coup and all got a life sentences which were later commuted to 15 years (Anyanwu 2002).

- Colonels Lawan Gwadabe, Bello Fadile and R.A. Emokpae were accused and imprisoned for staging coups. A number of retired military officers also faced similar accusations and sentences; these included General Olusegun Obasanjo and Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (who died in prison in 1997).

- Dr Frederick Fasehun, civil rights activist and founder of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in the mid-1990s, was arrested 18 December 1996 in connection with the Lagos bombings, and released 25 June 1998.

- Chief Olu Falae, a former finance minister under the Babangida regime, and the main opposition presidential aspirant against Olusegun Obasanjo to usher in the Fourth Republic in 1999. He was arrested on 10 January 1997, also in connection with the bombings in Lagos, and was released on 25 June 1998.

- Milton Dabibi, general secretary of PENGASSAN (Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria), was arrested on 21 January 1996 for his role in the 1994 oil workers’ strike, and released on 16 June 1998.

- Chief Olabiyi Durojaiye, National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) member, was arrested on 3 December 1996 in connection with the Lagos bombings and released 16 June 1998.

- Femi Falana, a human rights activist, was detained on a number of occasions throughout the Abacha regime.

- Sylvester Odion Akhaine, general secretary of Campaign for Democracy (CD), was released from detention without charge on 31 December 1995 following his arrest on 17 January 1995.

- Ledum Mitee, vice president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) prior to Ken Saro Wiwa’s death, was acquitted at the same trial.

- Wole Soyinka, Nobel laureate and NADECO member, left Nigeria in November 1994 after charges were brought against him by the Abacha regime.

- Babafemi Ojuda, managing editor of The News, was imprisoned for eight months by Abacha, and then freed 24 July 1998.
- Malam Ibrahim Zakzaky, a leader of a militant group, the Islamic Liberation Movement which was involved in the Kastina religious disturbances in April 1991, was imprisoned from 1996 until late 1998.
- Abraham Adesanya, chairman of NADECO, was detained in 1996 and later released. He survived an assassination attempt, likely by the Abacha regime in 1997.
- Beko Ransome Kuti, chairman of Campaign for Democracy (CD) and a well-known human rights activist, was found guilty by the Aziza Tribunal and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This was later commuted to 15 years (Home Office (UK) 2000: 43-45; Anyanwu 2002).

**Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission (HRVIC)**

Upon assumption of office in 1999, President Obasanjo, a victim himself of human rights abuses by the Abacha regime, constituted the Human Rights Violations Commission (HRVIC). This was known as the Oputa panel after the chair of the commission, Justice Chukwudifu Oputa. Initially, the commission was mandated with the task of investigating cases of human rights abuses from 1983 to 1998. This was strongly criticised by human rights activists, civil society organisations, politicians and the general public. It was argued that the years selected by President Obasanjo were too restrictive, and that this was more or less a ‘witch hunt’ targeting past military rulers and politicians. It was suggested, rather, that the period of Nigeria’s civil war and Obasanjo’s period as military Head of State (1976-1979) should also be included (Yusuf 2007, 2013). Ultimately, the mandate of the commission was extended to the first military intervention of January 1966. Overall, the commission was mandated to:
Ascertain or establish the causes, nature and extent of all gross violations of human rights committed in Nigeria from 15 January 1966 to 28 May 1999;

Identify the person or persons, authorities, institutions or organizations which may be held accountable for such gross violations of human rights and determine the motives for the violations or abuses, the victims and circumstances thereof and the effect on such victims and the society generally;

Determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of deliberate state policy or the polity of any of its organs or institutions or whether they arose from abuses of their office by state officials or whether they were the acts of any political organization, liberation movement or other groups or individuals;

Recommend measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, legislative or institutional to redress past injustices and to prevent or forestall future violations or abuses of human rights;

Make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of the Judicial Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the evidence; and

Receive any legitimate financial or other assistance from whatever source which may aid and facilitate the realization of its objectives (Yusuf 2007; Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002b).

The commission was, however, constrained by a lack of skilled personnel and finances, and decided in the end to hear only 200 cases. The criteria for selection of cases was based on the nature of the rights violations involved, the extent or degree of the infringements alleged and the selection of representative cases. Eventually, the commission invited testimony from 2,000 witnesses nation-wide in their various public hearings and received 1,750 exhibits related to these selected cases (Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002b; Yusuf 2013). Upon completing its task in May 2002, the commission submitted its findings, conclusions and most importantly, recommendations for the political institutions of the country. The main recommendations for the military were:

That from May 29, 1999, anyone who stages a coup in the country must be brought to trial, no matter for how long they had ruled and regardless of any decrees they had passed to shield themselves from future prosecution;

The military should be trimmed down to a manageable size;

There be a programme of civil and human rights education in the military formations across the country;

The military should review its methods of internal discipline, especially in relation to detention in the guardrooms, court-martial and other methods of justice that violate human rights. Proceedings in guardrooms and court-martial should conform with the African Charter especially relating to torture;

The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), with its powers and functions is limited strictly to military intelligence gathering;

An urgent return to military professionalism in terms of training as an on-going process, while also encouraging the authorities to act decisively to sanction the
display of any form of religious, ethnic or sectarian sympathies in the exercise of official duties; and that;

The attention of the chaplaincies of the military and those of the Directorate of Military Intelligence must be drawn to the creeping fragmentation of the Barracks, along religious lines by the intrusion of fanatics (Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002a).

As laudable as the South African-style commission was in Nigeria, there were segments of the civil society and the general public who were disappointed with the commission’s final outcome and especially with the inability of the commission to compel three former Heads of state and former top government functionaries to appear at one of the public hearings. The former heads of state were Generals Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida and Abdusalami Abubakar (Fayemi 2002). These three challenged the legality of the commission in court and sought an injunction barring them from being summoned to any public hearing of the commission. The other top functionaries who refused to honour the commission were Colonel Halilu Akilu, a former director of Military Intelligence under Babangida, and Lieutenant Colonel A.K Togun, a former deputy director of the State Security Service (SSS) under Babangida. Both were accused of sending a parcel bomb that killed Dele Giwa in his home in 1986. At that time, Giwa was a prominent journalist, and editor and founder of *Newswatch Magazine*. The magazine had published articles that were damaging to the regime (Yusuf 2013, 2007; Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002a).

**Interviewees Responses to Hypothesis Four**

The government of President Olusegun Obasanjo and successive governments have refused to publish the report of the HRVIC, and it is logical to presume that the recommendations of the commission have not been implemented. The same can be presumed for the military in relation to the commission’s recommendations. During the course of my field research in 2011, two notable cases informed the question asked by the author as regards the allegations of human rights abuses by the military. The first was what has been described as the Odi massacre of 1999. This incident happened during the early period of the civilian administration of President Obasanjo six months after the military formally handed over political power. Commenting on the Odi incident, an editorial in the *Guardian Newspaper* on 13 December 1999 stated that:
The government ordered the military action on November 20 following the horrendous killing earlier in the month of about a dozen security personnel at Odi. The act was barbaric and it was universally condemned. On November 10, President Olusegun Obasanjo issued a 14 day ultimatum to the Bayelsa State government to apprehend and prosecute the killers else a state of emergency would be imposed. But a few days before the expiration date, the soldiers struck. The ruthless manner the attack was executed points to a premeditated plan to rout the community. The soldiers did not only deploy the most lethal of weapons, they sealed off the area and made escape practically impossible, even for the children and the aged. Worse still, no access was opened for observation nor was relief allowed to reach the injured and the dying. The media was shut out. This is a violation of all conventions governing war. It is inexcusable (Guardian Editorial 1999a).

Similarly, the second noteworthy case that informed the question asked by the author in relation to allegations of human rights abuses dealt with the recurring ethno-religious crises in the north eastern state of Plateau, and especially its capital, Jos. The media repeatedly carried stories to suggest that soldiers posted to that region continuously violated human rights. The crises in Plateau state initially started as an ethnic conflict between the predominantly Christian indigenous people of the state, and Muslim Fulani herdsmen and later settlers of Plateau state (Ukiwo 2003; Suberu 2001; Maier 2000; Anaba 2010).

It is perhaps not surprising that military officers roundly deny the violation of human rights by the military. Two serving officers interviewed observed that the military should not be blamed for any human rights abuses. They further elaborated that the military in its external and internal engagements is guided by three closely followed laws:

- Their own internal laws sanctioned by the military courts or tribunals;
- The civil laws of Nigeria; and,
- International laws that deal with human rights. For example, the Geneva Convention.

According to this, whenever the military is deployed in a particular area of the country for internal security duties, the rules of engagement are always clear, and begin with trying to stop a crisis as quickly as possible without causing greater hardship to the people. This is taking into consideration that the military is only called into a crisis when other enforcement agencies are unable to handle it. Accordingly, the military’s mind-set whenever deployed is said to have an emphasis on stopping the emergence of a war-like situation. Examples which the officers cited included the Niger-Delta crisis and the crises in Plateau State. It is
significant that the only way that the military can address such crises is to deal with them as a war-like situation.

The interviewees further stated that if it were true that the military allegedly violated human rights so repeatedly, how was it then possible that in states prone to ethno-religious crises, for example Kano, Kaduna, Borno and Bauchi, that the non-indigenous of those states and others affected by the crises normally ran to the nearest military barracks for protection. The two serving officers further cited an example of a particular family that was affected by the ethno-religious riots in Kano city in 2001. This particular family was said to have run into a barracks in the city and stayed there for seven years! This, the officer claimed, was proof that the military was not perceived as being out to violate individual human rights.

The two serving officers further stated that the allegations of human rights abuses attributed to the military were based on misinformation propagated by the Nigerian media. They insisted that the crisis in Odi was caused when local people in Odi ambushed three out of four military vehicles and killed the soldiers who were inside. The military considered this as an outright act of war this was why they attacked the village the way they did. They also stated that people who had no ulterior schemes or motives definitely would not have been affected in the targeted area, because the military had informed the locals prior to their operation.

When it was asked during the interview if military personnel should be liable to civilian prosecution for allegations of human rights abuses, the two serving officers cited an example of a soldier who shot a tanker driver in 2010. The soldier was court-martialled and dismissed from the military after a proper investigation was made into his case. The deceased family sued the military for the incident and at the time of the interview, the officers claimed that some three weeks earlier a court verdict was given. The military was ordered to pay the deceased family nineteen million naira and the company that employed the tanker driver, four million naira.

The two interviewees argued that part of the crisis the military was facing in 2011 was that of being deployed in tasks that constitutionally were not within their role. They further cited the 2011 general elections where approximately twenty thousand Nigerian troops were deployed in several states across the federation.
They stated that from a security perspective, this was not good for the country because it meant that Nigeria was very vulnerable to external attacks during election periods when soldiers were deployed in large numbers across the federation.  

Another serving officer, commenting on the allegation that the military committed gross human rights abuses in their engagement in Odi, seemed to affirm this while arguing that:

… Under President Obasanjo we had the Odi issue. It was unfortunate it happened and every reaction is in response of an action. The highest professional [military institution in the world is] the American army, but apart [from] Guantanamo prison issue, just recently about two or three weeks ago, the American troops were posing with dead bodies of Afghans. The type of job you do affects your psyche [unless] you are a super human. When you see your colleague butchered, although one injustice does not warrant another… [Soldiers tend to retaliate].

Similarly, another serving officer attempted to justify the military’s action in Odi, commenting further about the military’s rule of engagements in internal security duties while confusingly, denying that human rights violations had occurred. He noted that:

The militans were the sons [of the community] and also part of the [daily life of the] community. When [the army goes] on security duties, [we] have what is called the rules of engagement [and] we operate within the norms and the rules. When you are there to make peace and you are probably fired at, what happens? What do you do? And when they actually allege that places were destroyed and we ask them where? Sometimes these things are blown out of proportions. What is the collateral damage done to the place? Did they go into Odi? How big is Odi? How did the military kill people and destroy Odi? We have the Geneva Laws of Convention. We are not fighting a war but we draw out certain rules that would guide us. We have principles of international security—that what we do when we are in internal security operations. [That is], justification, use of minimal force, evidence and the others. These are things we are trained to do. Tomorrow [I am going out for the election patrol. I have a camera man with me so that anything we are doing would be filmed to justify whatever we are doing on the field. So that when cases of abuse comes up we can use [the camera for evidence]. If a man in Kawo says I saw the military beating people, we would come out to say how and who are the military people? We have so many of them who are [not genuine soldiers and] commit [these] crimes.

Commenting further on the alleged abuses of the military in Jos, this officer stated that:

… People were not killed like [in] Odi. Houses were not razed down and people were not targeted deliberately. It was only in the course of duty that one form of over zealousness occurred. We have moved far away from where we used to be to where we are now. [I have] just finished a course on the law of armed conflicts organized by UNICEF. So this kind of training goes on often in the army in which our rules of engagement for everything you do [are] stated. [Even for the 2011 general election], there is a guideline and code of conduct [for] the military
because we want to be seen as professionals and this training makes it virtually impossible to do anything that is not within the confines of the law. With a higher level of training and the conscious effort of the army, I don’t think human rights abuses is an issue.7

This officer also commented on the issue of the military’s alleged bias in their operation in Jos as mentioned in some local media outlets. In fact, some local media organisations even went as far as alleging that soldiers deployed to enforce peace in Jos were taking sides with the Muslim Fulani herdsmen and aiding them to kill the indigenous Christian people of Jos and the immediate environs (Vanguard 2012a; Morning Star News 2014). Regarding the allegation of bias in Jos, this serving officer noted that:

Even in Jos we had to change our uniform because they alleged the military [did] so much of killings so we changed our uniform from green camouflage to brown desert camouflage because it was easier for people to get the green camouflage to perpetrate those evil acts than the brown one. From the [time of the change], you would find out that we have been absorbed from that [because] if [you are in] the military [but] not part of the Task Force in Jos, you will be easily identified because you are not using the same type of uniform. Honestly, I don’t think we abuse human rights; it’s just circumstances that we find ourselves sometimes. [Rather], we try to protect and respect that freedom, the fundamental human rights of the citizens, which [are] our main duty, to protect people. So why should we go and abuse them? We are not going to jump up and go to Zaria and start bombing them, Odi was yes… we have the rules of engagement of what we are doing, you cannot run into a church or mosque and start firing at us and you expect us to keep staring at you. Even before we go into a community or place, we try to ensure that the people are actually isolated from those cases. We have had crisis in other parts of the country and how did we cool it? Let’s go far back as 1982 during the Maitesene crisis in Kano and so on. The military had to come in when the police was overwhelmed; we had to use force.8

When asked whether there was legislative oversight or civilian enquiry into the military, especially regarding the allegations of human rights abuses, another serving officer stated that, in general, the National Assembly had adequate oversight over its affairs:
… The military is completely subject to civilian governance even up to the yearly budget of the army… [And there are legislative] committees to decide [the army’s annual expenditure]. Remember the issue of the naval admiral who was driving in a convoy and [unfortunately], a lady [accidentally] cut into the convoy and the overzealous escorts jumped down from the car while the admiral was still in the car oblivious of what was happening. There was [supposedly] an abuse [because the lady] was beaten and [she filed] a petition to the Nigeria army. The Chief of Naval Staff was made to explain [what happened] and [the case] was taken to court. [The verdict from the court was that about 100million naira must be paid to the lady because of the assault on her]. So the rule of law is working and there is no sacred cow [anymore]. There [are legislative] committee[s] on defence, security [and so on] and they have a right to ask questions [and] if anybody does what is wrong, they would be made to face the music.9

A similar argument that the military was submissive to legislative oversight functions, especially as regards cases of alleged human rights abuses, was expressed by another retired military officer. However, this officer blamed successive civilian governments for not investigating such cases. He stated that:

… It’s the government’s choice. The military is always subject to the government of the day. The point [that] remains is how aware or how willing is the government to try such cases? Even if it’s an instrument of government, it’s an agency of government, the military does not just come out… it’s unlike the mobile police. The mobile police are a riot police, the military does not go out to arrest offenders, they go out to kill and suppress uprising. So to move out, government called them out.10

Another serving officer, however, disagreed with the idea that the military had any legislative oversight, especially when it came to cases regarding human rights abuses:

I don’t think we really have any oversight but in our Armed Forces Act, we have a provision that could cater for such things if they happen. We have some section there that deals with such cases, ill treatment of people, torturing [and so on]. If a soldier is found guilty after an investigative body has written a report, [the officer] is court martialed but I don’t know about the civil aspect of it, but I think in the military, we have that provision.11

Overall, the author identified two major strands of arguments from the interviewees. The first line of argument agreed to a certain degree that military involvement does increase human rights abuses. This considering the fact that the military is usually called in as the last resort against any form of civil uprising. In this situation, the police and the mobile police apparently could not handle the situation. It seems inevitable that human rights abuses will occur because the military will use force to quell civil-disturbances, and restore law and order. Also, virtually all of my respondents claimed that all military deployments are well documented, but that the reports were not meant for the general public. This was partly due to the sensitivity of some of these operations.
The second line of argument is that the media in Nigeria is very judgemental when it comes to the activities of combat soldiers on internal engagements (probably based on the military’s historical antecedents). Soldiers, according to all my respondents, are never instructed to kill during internal operations. What they are told to do is maintain law and order. Generally, when soldiers are on duty during internal engagements, they try to identify the ring leader of any uprising with the aim of demobilising, arresting or crippling that individual so that the group will be disorganized. Also, during internal operations, combat soldiers never carry tear-gas or rubber bullets—these are used by the police. Unlike the police, who shoot into the sky to disperse a rioting crowd, for example, soldiers are not able to do this because there is a greater accountability for the bullets they fire in internal engagements. This is because all bullets are accounted for and documented by their superior officers, therefore, making it practically impossible to violate human rights on the scale reported in the media.

Regarding legislative enquires on alleged human rights abuses, there seems to be a general consensus that the committees in charge of the military in both houses of the National Assembly are not pro-active or responsive to military-related issues. Most of the respondents stated further that in general terms, the military does not have any real form of legislative oversight apart from the annual budget, which is approved by the National Assembly, and that all widely reported human rights abuses in the media, in Jos and Odi, for example, were investigated by internal military enquiries. A majority of the officers said that the Odi and Jos engagements were documented, but have been classified as they are considered issues of national security, and therefore cannot be released to the press.

Finally, it is important to note that in 1995, when Nigeria was still under military rule, the National Human Rights Commission was established by the National Human Rights Act (Amended 2004 and 2010). The Act gave the commission greater financial and operational independence. Examples of these are:
Independence in the conduct of the affairs of the commission;

The funds of the commission to be a direct charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation of Nigeria;

The establishment of the Human Rights Fund; and;

The recognition and enforcement of the award and recommendations of the commission as decision of the High Court (National Assembly Nigeria 2010).

The commission’s thematic includes:

Women and gender;

Children;

Corruption and good governance;

Police, prison and other detention centres;

Environmental and Niger-Delta;

Education;

Freedom of religion and belief;

Torture, extra-judicial, summary and arbitrary executions;

Law reform and law review;

Independence of the judiciary and access to justice;

Labour, food and shelter;

Communal conflicts and other related violence;

Health;

Freedom of expression and the media; and

People with disabilities (National Human Rights Commission 2012).

It is, however, difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of the commission even with the two amendments giving it greater independence. This is noteworthy when it comes to addressing military-related human rights abuses since 1999. However, a 6 February 2012 news item on the commission’s website indicated that it had requested the National Security Adviser and the Inspector General of Police to carry out urgent investigations over allegations of extra judicial killings, torture, harassment and other forms of human rights violations levelled against the Joint Task Force (JTF) operating in Borno and Kano States. It is not possible for the author to know if such an investigation was ever carried out as it does not appear that any civilian investigation was made against the JTF. This is based on the fact
that it was not reported by any major media organisation in Nigeria. Also, throughout 2012, the author was not able to find any major news item from leading media outlets in Nigeria that reported the trial of a number of active military personnel in regards to human rights violations in these states.

In sum, it is logical to assume that the inherent weaknesses of civilian institutions responsible in limiting human rights abuses have allowed the military greater independence during internal engagements. A high degree of discretion is vested in the president, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, when it comes to military deployments, and there is little oversight from the National Assembly. This consistent pattern of a single line of command, without significant oversight from civilian institutions, appears to have contributed to allegations of human rights abuses against the military.

**Conclusion, Hypothesis Four**

Based on the various data collected and analysed, there is some evidence to suggest that the military has had inappropriately autonomous involvement, especially as regards human rights abuses. Additionally, the current operational method of deployment of the military in internal engagements appears to have facilitated authoritarian tendencies in Nigeria.

As previously stated, under military rule a human rights commission was established to investigate and recommend on cases of human rights abuses. As of 2014 this commission seems not to have been adequately responsive to its mandate. The next hypothesis will explore further the problems of authoritarian tendencies in Nigeria, as the result of weak civilian oversight.

**Hypothesis Five: Civilian government oversight remains weak, and facilitates military authoritarianism.**

It appears that there is insufficient government expertise available to monitor the actions of the military. Two institutions have primary responsibility by law to exercise oversight functions over the military: the National Assembly and the Ministry of Defence.

The National Assembly of Nigeria is a bicameral legislative house and the highest law-making body of the country. It consists of 109 members in the Senate and 360
members in the House of Representatives. It is empowered by law to legislate on wide range of issues. As a result, it has numerous standing committees in both houses that are empowered to investigate social and political issues before laws are made. This process is expected to be achieved by seeking input from officials in the sector under investigation and from experts invited to the public hearings of the committees.

The enabling law that empowers the National Assembly to have these oversight functions over the military is categorised under four areas as specified by the 1999 Constitution. They are:

a) The National Assembly has budgetary control; allocations are provided through the Ministry of Defence;
b) The president cannot unilaterally engage the military in any internal or external duties without formal approval from the legislative chambers;
c) The National Assembly ensures that the composition of the officer corps of the military reflects the federal principles of the country; and
d) The National Assembly has powers to make laws as regards the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control over the military (Section 217-218).

Further expanding each of the constitutional roles of the National Assembly as highlighted above, the \textit{de jure} process for budgetary allocation passes through four phases: formulation, implementation, auditing, and reporting (Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006: 158). It is expected that during these processes, the civilian minister of defence, the permanent secretary in the defence ministry and other civilian experts within the ministry will be significantly involved, and that the committees in charge of defence within the National Assembly will scrutinise defence expenditures when the budget is submitted as a draft to the House. The Minister of Defence will then be invited to a public hearing of the committee to explain and clarify any issues regarding the allocated funds. From there, the committee in charge of defence will evaluate the expenditures. The budget will then be debated in the House before being approved.

Despite the appearance of being a rigorous process, the reality is that approval of defence expenditures is more or less a ‘rubber stamping’ of the draft submitted to the legislative house, with insignificant adjustments. This, it seems, revolves around a lack of civilian expertise in military matters, partly due to a lack of
understanding of what Nigeria’s defence priorities are, as well as a lack of knowledge of the committee members in charge of defence in the House. At present (2012), the Senate has committees for the Air Force, and Defence and Army (combined). Similarly, the House of Representative has committees for the Air Force, and Defence and Army (combined). The jurisdiction of these committees basically comprises the following:

- Payments, promotion, retirement and other benefits and privileges of members of the army;
- Size and composition of the army;
- Defence headquarters;
- Ammunition depots, forts, arsenal reservation and establishments;
- Scientific research and development in support of the army;
- Barrack projects;
- Military application of nuclear energy;
- Disarmament;
- Army cadets;
- Resettlement scheme for serving officers of the army;
- War graves, monuments and memorabilia;
- Peacekeeping operations; and
- Consideration and appropriation of annual budget estimates for the army (National Assembly Nigeria).

Likewise, within the Ministry of Defence (MOD), it is also expected that there should be experts on military matters. The MOD’s core function should be that of formulation and execution of Nigeria’s defence policy and the planning of military expenditure. The ministry is also expected to provide administrative and support services for the training, equipping and combat readiness of the military. This support expected from the MOD is thought to ensure that the military will perform their missions and functions, both actual and potential (Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006: 157).

Issues that appear to hinder legislative oversight over budgetary issues of the military are the extra-budgetary spending and funds allocated to the military from the presidency. Under military rule, this method was used effectively to ‘loot’ the treasury, especially under the Abacha regime (Djebah 1999), and to undermine the
functions of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Also, peacekeeping allocations under the military were never channelled through the MOD and were inadequately accounted for. An example of this was the estimated US$12 billion that successive regimes spent through the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in attempting to end the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Omitoogun 2003; Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006). Under the present civilian dispensation, this method of allocation has not significantly changed. Funds are allocated to the military under ‘security votes’ in the budget, and allocation for peacekeeping duties is still catered for through funds not allocated by the MOD (Egbo et al. 2012).

In terms of the National Assembly’s oversight in ensuring that the recruitment and selection of officers reflects the federal character principle of Nigeria, it is difficult to ascertain whether this process follows the constitutional principle of federal character. This is because, to a considerable extent, enlisting in the military is purely a military affair. Since the start of civilian rule in 1999, there has been no significant suggestion that the principle of federal character has not been abided by in the military as specified in the constitution. At present, the process of recruitment for officers into the military is usually advertised in reputable and national print and electronic media outlets. The advertisement usually specifies the number of prospective officers that will be taken from each state of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. It is usually in equal numbers from each state.

In terms of the National Assembly’s oversight functions in the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control of the military, at present this is only applicable to the appointment of the service chiefs. However, under the tenure of Presidents Obasanjo and Umaru Yar’adua, the appointments of the service chiefs were never sent to the National Assembly for formal ratification. This constitutional process only started under the current presidency of Goodluck Jonathan.
Interviewees Responses to Hypothesis Five

Virtually all of my respondents agreed that civilian expertise (National Assembly and the Ministry of Defence) was lower than desired. The officers interviewed were asked to comment on the perceived weakness of these civilian institutions. To aid the interviewees in answering this question, the author asked both the retired and serving officers to comment on the institutional processes framing the nation’s defence policy.¹²

Some officers stated categorically that things of military importance could not be shared with civilians and that people within the MOD were not trained or sufficiently educated to understand military affairs. A serving officer, however, tried to clarify why the military could not share information with employees within the MOD. He contended that those working in the MOD would not be familiar with the tactical aspects of military operations because of national security. However, civilian employees understood the normal day-to-day administrative workings of the military well. The officer also stated that it was the function of civilians to craft the defence policies for the country and to do this beyond the jurisdiction of the military. Explaining further, this officer stated that the defence policy of any country was measured in terms of the strength of that country’s military, and that Nigeria, due to its regional strength in its economy, military strength, population and labour force, had a defence policy that was more like a ‘big brother’ to other neighbouring countries. According to the serving officer, this was important when such countries had internal crises. Examples the officer cited included Liberia and Sierra Leone.¹³

Another serving officer, commenting on the level of civilian military expertise, especially as it related to framing defence policies with the MOD, commented that:

… For example, we have people in the civil society who have majored in issues like defence policies, if they get involved with [the military] we would have that expertise… we have the Ministry of Defence [but] who are the people that make [up] the ministry? They are civilians. It is supposed to be a joint effort just like the Pentagon; I don’t know what the British call their own MOD. But I think it is [the] same too. But in the MOD when you have this civilians, the weakness is that you could find someone from the Ministry of Health with the professional knowledge of health been posted to the MOD as permanent secretary to come and handle defence matters or issues. He has to rely on people or the residual knowledge of what he reads and so on. So you could have some of these lapses. But people who might have studied in the field that is related to defence policy,
defence matters or international relations, I don’t really think they would be
deficient in this aspect. But when you now diversify talking about the core basis
[I mean], talking of the technicalities of arms and the rest, we can now advise.  

Commenting further, this serving officer explained in detail the process of
framing defence policies in Nigeria. He stated that:

[It is] the civilians [responsibility to frame the defence policy]. It’s a process we
start from the lowest rank up to the top and that’s why we have schools like the
National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies. We [also] have military ones
like the National Defence College, the Armed Forces Command and Staff
College. [This is] where some of these policy issues are discussed and papers are
written and these are sent up to be collated and [further] discussed at that level. It
becomes some policies and strategies that are used… We formulate it but there
are inputs when it gets to the top. There is a defence policy but it starts from the
military but it is chartered with the civilians too. So the policy is formulated by
both and adopted.

Another serving officer commented on civilian weakness in military matters by
citing the challenges the military had with the MOD in terms of acquiring military
equipment. According to this officer, this lack of expertise was noticeable in the
lack of synergy in equipment within the three branches of the military. He stated
that:

… I think the people [that] are missing out are the military men because we must
have a vocal person that would translate ground strategy to the military’s
strategic level. The civilians at the top would say ‘Let us make the Nigerian army
combat ready [and] equip them adequately’. [But] it is the military guys that
know the weapon[s] they need. [It is therefore very unfortunate] that the
military’s presence is lacking in the MOD. Let me give you [an] instance without
sounding as if I am castigating [anybody]. Some of the equipment’s procured [by
the MOD] are not what we need. So there is no [compatibility of equipment]
between the army, air force and the navy. [But] there should be synergy, for
example, if you are buying communication equipment, it should be the same
because we go on operations together and it hinders proper communication.
[Therefore], there should be synergy so that we can all work on the same page.

A retired military officer gave an example of the potential conflicts that could
arise because of a lack of military expertise within the National Assembly. He
provided this example, citing the case of some members of the National Assembly
debating whether or not the country needed to have a maritime coastguard just
like the United States of America. He stated that:

Of recent [the National Assembly] is talking of [the] formation of [a] maritime
coastguard. But is [the] coastguard provided for in the constitution? No. Some
people are sponsoring this to [be a constitutional provision]. Things are still
evolving. If some interest groups want to bring in such thing, I think they must
start from the maritime organisation they have on the ground. They must identify
the weakness, they must find out how viable such an organization they are
[establishing] will be. They must know if the government can support it, can the
economy support it? For even without finding out first, if it is necessary or [not],
they are already debating it in the [National Assembly] and I as an individual felt
that it is a wrong way of going about it because you can lead the nation astray by
putting something in the constitution that is not well grounded. You have not
thought over it well… [to] see the pros and cons of it because people just say that
the United States of America has a coastguard so Nigeria must have a coastguard, that is illogical. The United States of America has an overall view of the world and they have a navy to look outside their coast to safeguard their interest. What [institution] looks [after their] internal security [in terms of] US territorial waters? They have a coastguard. [This] is sensible. While [one state] is looking at the global interest, another one is securing the internal. But for Nigeria to say, [that it needs] a coastguard without that understanding is not normal. The navy [that we have here], what is their role? And have they equipped the navy well enough? To be able to do certain things [which are, already] ineffectively [being done] by the navy… [The question is,] is it the organization that is ineffective or the government that is ineffective in [adequately] providing for [the navy?].

Also, this retired officer cited another example of what he perceived as civilian ignorance of security issues in the country. He used the example of the current military engagement in the Niger-Delta to reinforce his argument:

… That I am assisting in internal security for the nation does not make it my responsibility. Somebody has a major role, [the other supportive], the one that is acting on supportive cannot make that job is major job; he is only on the supportive role… Of recent what we have in the [Niger]-Delta, is something that is not permanent [it is a Joint Task Force], and when you say a task force, after a while they disband when they finish that particular task for which they formed. But if we look at what is happening in the [Niger]-Delta area is it a task force that you engage in that area? We now see the army, navy and at times the police doing this work, but it is internal. Where is our inland waterway that I told you about?—[the First Republic Constitution provided for a police unit that was solely responsible for policing the inland waterways and creeks]. [But] because we jettisoned [the inland waterways police unit during decades of military rule], which is the organization that should have been developed now to a level [that would have firmly taken care of the present crises] that is, [policing] the creeks and waterways… but in the absence of that, we have the task force…

A serving military officer, commenting on the level of civilian expertise in military matters within the National Assembly, cited the example of an Air-Force officer who represented the Air-Force before the committee in charge of the Air-Force to defend their budget. He stated that:

I would give you an instance: the Nigerian Air-Force went to defend their budget [at the committee level of the National Assembly]… usually a particular senior officer goes, but on that particular day another officer went… He [is] a general and this was his particular field of expertise [the item to be purchased]… There was a professor who was a committee member… the professor [was of the opinion that the proposed aircraft that was budgeted was not needed]. The general stood up and said with due apologies ‘Who are you? You don’t have a clue as to our [particular] need.’

On the MOD level of civilian expertise, this same officer stated that:

I want to agree with you that we have a rather huge defence ministry with [civilians]. [I am not very competent to talk about their qualification[s], but there is a need for a higher level of cooperation in order to have a more functional MOD, so that they operate on the same page. So there [is] need [for some kind of re-training] so that persons working there [MOD] must have value to add and we have a lot of Nigerians who can do it…. 
Conclusion, Hypothesis Five

It appears that civilian weaknesses in expertise within the MOD, and the inability of the National Assembly to investigate and enforce recommendations of alleged cases of human rights abuses, have facilitated the possibility of authoritarian practices in Nigeria.

It should, however, be noted that there is a wide perception that allegations of human rights abuses by military personnel in internal security duties are of concern to the government of Goodluck Jonathan. This is based on reports in the *Punch Newspaper*, such as that of 2 September 2012. That report noted concern of the federal government over the rising incidence of alleged human rights abuses by the military, observing that it had sent a bill to the National Assembly to address this issue. The bill, if passed into law “forbids unjustifiable attacks against civilian population” (Chiedozie 2012). Other offences that are deemed punishable include:

Rape, torture, murder, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer of population, forced pregnancy or enforced sterilisation or any form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. (Chiedozie 2012)

The bill also states that:

…. Soldiers that may directly be involved in such abuses, military commanders will also be liable for war crimes committed by the troops such as “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (Chiedozie 2012).

The newspaper report concluded that all military personnel alleged to be culprits in human rights abuses would be liable to be tried by the International Criminal Court.

As laudable as the bill may be, it is still unclear whether the bill would be passed into law by the National Assembly. What would be the reaction of high ranking military officers to this bill if they were invited to the defence committees of the National Assembly to air their views. For now, cases of human rights abuses by the military apparently continue unabated. The *Punch Newspaper* of 9 October 2012 reported that operatives of the Joint Task Force (JTF) killed 30 persons in Maiduguri, Borno State, in reprisal for an attack on their patrol vehicle in the city. The report further noted that most of the victims that were attacked or killed by the soldiers during the reprisal attack were civilians. The report alleged that over
50 houses, shops and vehicles were burned by the soldiers during this ‘reprisal attack’ (Agency Reporter 2012).

**Chapter Summary**

This chapter investigated whether the lack of civilian control facilitates a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. It analysed two hypotheses that are perceived to be crucial to our understanding of civilian control over the military.

For hypothesis four, *autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999*, there may be a link between alleged human rights violations by the military and authoritarian practices in the polity. Even under military rule, and General Sani Abacha’s regime, a Human Rights Commission was established to address cases that involved alleged cases of human violations in the country. The author, however, found no evidence to suggest that since its establishment, commission reports investigations have been adequately pursued by the agencies responsible for the prosecution of violators of human rights.

The fifth hypothesis, *civilian government oversight remains weak, and this facilitates military authoritarianism*, examined interviewees’ impression of the level of civilian expertise within the Ministry of Defence and the National Assembly, especially as regarded alleged cases of human rights abuses against the military. While President Goodluck Jonathan sent a bill to the National Assembly in 2012 that was meant to address cases of human rights violations brought against the security agencies in Nigeria, it is unclear whether the bill has been debated by the National Assembly. At present (2014), most cases against the military for alleged human rights violations are apparently still ignored.
Endnotes

1) The Sultan of Sokoto is the supreme traditional leader of the Sokoto caliphate in present day Nigeria. The sultan is often regarded as the ‘Amir ul-Momineen’ translated to mean the commander of the faithful or the leader of the faithful in Nigeria.

2) The Sokoto Caliphate is in present day Nigeria. At its peak in the 1800s, it included a significant portion of present day northern Nigeria.

3) It is widely believed that part of the reason the HRVIC report has ever been officially published by the government is that several of the people involved in alleged human rights abuses (mostly high ranking retired military officers) are aware of the legal consequences this report may have on them.

4) Personal interview with a serving Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 7, 2011).

5) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).

6) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011).

7) Same officer.

8) Same officer.

9) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).

10) Personal interview with a retired Brigadier General, Lagos (May 27, 2011).

11) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011).

12) At present (2014), Nigeria does not have a well-articulated defence policy that involves all the main stakeholders. The current policy is derived from a draft policy that was produced by the Obasanjo government in 2001. As a result, each arm of the military has its own interpretation of the defence policy in terms of operational capabilities.

13) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Ibadan (May 12, 2011).

14) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011).

15) Same officer.

16) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).

17) Personal interview with a retired Vice-Admiral, Lagos (May 30, 2011).

18) Same officer.

19) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).

20) Same officer.
Chapter Five

Military Expenditures and Authoritarianism in Nigeria

Introduction

Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? This chapter suggests that a significant increase in the military budget post-military rule might facilitate a form of military authoritarianism in a civilian-dominated era. The previous chapter discussed the roles of institutions that should limit the activities of the military especially in the area of allegations of human rights abuses. It also assessed other civilian institutions that are primarily responsible for on-going civilian control of the military. This chapter continues this investigation of the military’s behaviour in post-military Nigeria by comparing military expenditures of Nigeria with those of Ghana and Cameroon. One hypothesis is derived for examination: increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism by creating a powerful and even hegemonic institution.

Literature on the military’s budget in transitional states has been examined from different perspectives. There have been a number of empirical studies that suggest that when the military is in power, its corporate interest is to ensure that there is a significant increase in the monetary allocations accorded to the military as an institution. Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) stated that in most military regimes, the military elite in power needs the support of the military as an institution to consolidate their regime. As a result, there is usually the need to adequately cater to the budgetary demands of the military (increases in its budget) as a way of protecting the regime against opposition groups. Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) further states:

… even when the threat from other opposition groups is minimal, the regime may not be in a position to reduce allocations to the military, since attempts to decrease the military budget may create discontent within the military, and destabilize the government. The regime then allocates resources to the military, not because it requires military services for its survival, but rather because there is need to buy off the military (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995: 701).

Similar views of the military acting in its corporate interests as regards its budget are discussed by Bayo Adekson (1981), Jenkins and Kposowa (1992), Robin Luckham (1998), and, Herbert Howe (2001).
In a Brazilian context, Alfred Stepan (1988) argues that at least part of the reason why the military decided to relinquish political power in 1985 was the decline in its military budget. The military in Brazil, to enhance legitimacy when in power, had deliberately under-funded itself, and subsequently reasoned that the only way it could effectively lobby for its monetary needs was to disengage itself from political power (Stepan 1988: 72-80). In a more recent study, Justin Clardie (2011) notes that in all post-military societies, the civilian political elite have basically two options as regards the military budget. The first is to further increase the allocation, because this may guarantee the success of the democratic transition as it serves as a ‘pacifying mechanism’ for the military. The alternative option suggests that decreasing the monetary allocation help to assure the success of the democratic transition because a financially strong military is more capable of influencing the political process (Clardie 2011). Some other studies have argued that increasing the monetary allocation to the military tends to have a negative impact on the economic development of transitional states because allocations are taken from other productive, often important, sectors such as education, health, agriculture, public works, and housing to pacify the military (Bel and Elias-Moreno 2009; Stroup and Heckelman 2001; Clardie 2011; Dauda 2004; Adebakin and Raimi 2012).

**Hypothesis Six: Increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism.**

This hypothesis will examine whether increases in the military expenditures of Nigeria post-1999 could facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. Military expenditure for this study, are defined according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as:

all spending on current military forces and activities. It tries to also include current and capital spending on: the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations; and military space activities (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2013a).

In a global context, significant increases in military spending are based on regional contextual realities, or regional strategic interests, and conflicts that may be present in a particular region of the world. According to SIPRI (2013b), the world’s military expenditures in 2012 were estimated at $1756 billion,
representing approximately 2.5 per cent of the global gross domestic product or $249 for each person in the world (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2013b: 125). This varies across regions however. In Western and Central Europe, and the United States, there has been a drastic reduction in military spending. This is largely due to the aftermath of the global economic crisis and the need for states within this region to adopt austerity measures to limit the vulnerability of their local economies to the global market. The SIPRI (2013b) report also noted that in Asia and Oceania, military spending increased slightly in 2012, with significant increases in regional powers such as Indonesia and China, while military spending in India decreased. In addition, there were substantial increases in military spending in the Middle East and North Africa, while military spending in sub-Saharan Africa appears to have fallen. Lastly, all over Central and Meso America, military spending increased, especially in countries where there is a high level of insecurity, such as Mexico and Panama. Table 5.1 presents the military expenditures for 2012 by region, and the major increases or decreases in military expenditures of some countries within a region.
Table 5.1: Key Military Expenditure Statistics by Region 2012

<table>
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<th>Region/Sub-Region</th>
<th>Military expenditure 2012 (US $b)</th>
<th>Change (2011-12)</th>
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<th>Major changes, 2012 (%)</th>
<th>Decreases</th>
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<td>Zimbabwe 53</td>
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<td>-3.2</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Paraguay 42</td>
<td>El-Salvador -9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America &amp;</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Venezuela 39</td>
<td>Jamaica -8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru 16</td>
<td>Ecuador -7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia 11</td>
<td>USA -5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Kazakhstan [30]</td>
<td>Afghanistan -12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; South</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Vietnam 26</td>
<td>Sri-Lanka -9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mongolia 24</td>
<td>Australia -4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia 24</td>
<td>Thailand -3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ukraine 24</td>
<td>Hungary -20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Estonia 17</td>
<td>Portugal -18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia 17</td>
<td>Spain -13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western &amp; Central</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>Russia [16]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>(138)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Oman 51</td>
<td>Iraq -3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia 12</td>
<td>Egypt -2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kuwait 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2013b: 131) Notes: () = SIPRI uncertain estimate; [ ] = SIPRI estimate. " changes in real terms; the list shows the largest increases or decreases for each region as a whole, rather than by region. Countries with a military expenditure in 2012 of less than $100m, or $50m in Africa are excluded.

The data in Table 5.1 also shows for the year 2012 that military expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa and in Nigeria in particular, have significantly decreased. The reliability of military expenditures data in sub-Saharan Africa are, however, difficult to verify based on the quality of data available from Nigeria and the rest
of the region. Most of the time, military expenditures in sub-Saharan African countries is shrouded in secrecy, or does not include other sources of monetary allocations to military institutions (Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006). Overall, South Africa, Angola, Morocco, Libya and Nigeria were regarded as the top military spenders on the continent in 2012 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2013b). In the case of Nigeria, there appear to be two main factors that affect the data quality in military budgets as released by organisations that collate the defence expenditures: lack of comprehensiveness, and determination of actual expenditure of the ministry of defence (MOD).

**Lack of Comprehensiveness:** A major challenge to virtually all data sources on military expenditures in Nigeria is a lack of comprehensiveness. The main reason for this is that military budgets tend to be narrowly defined as ‘government allocation to the MOD’ (Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006). Data sources fail to include extra-budgetary allocations to the military in their annual publications on Nigeria. Such allocations include security allocations for peacekeeping activities such as those through the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the United Nations. Lastly, even when some of these data sources try to distinguish in their annual report the differences between military budgets and military expenditures, the data for Nigeria do not account for internal military-related projects that generate a source of income for the military. For example, income from products produced by the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) a significant money generator, are not included in such annual reports (Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006; Egbo et al. 2012).

**Determination of the Actual Expenditure of the MOD:** Another problem that undermines the data quality of the military’s budget in Nigeria is the problem of ascertaining the actual expenditures for a given financial year. As is the usual practice in Nigeria since the return to civilian rule in 1999, budget estimates for the following year are sent to the National Assembly for deliberation and approval. The problem, however, is that at the end of the budgetary year, the actual amount released to the MOD is usually different from the initial estimates approved by the National Assembly (Omitoogun 2003; Willett 2009).
Despite the shortcomings highlighted, this study will use the annual reports of SIPRI and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) as the principal data sources for military expenditures in Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon.

**Cases**

The cross-national analysis for this study assesses two countries bordering on Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon, for the following reasons. While it is undeniable that Nigeria has the largest military expenditures and best equipped military in West Africa, in their political histories, all three of these countries have had periods of low intensity conflict and diplomatic tension. Both Nigeria and Ghana have similar histories of colonisation by the British, as well as their political elite’s commitment to end colonial and apartheid rule in Africa, and their periods of military authoritarian rule. The ‘infamous’ deportation programmes of both countries against each other’s citizens in the 1970s and early 1980s is similarly comparable (Diamond 1984; Gravil 1985). At present, in democratic consolidation and the establishment of responsive political management and governance, most studies rate Ghana over Nigeria (Freedom House 2014).

Nigeria and Cameroon also share certain similarities though not as strongly as those between Ghana and Nigeria. In political history, for example, Southern Cameroons was a trustee territory of Nigeria until 1961, when the United Nations conducted a plebiscite to gauge whether the region would like to be part of Nigeria or Cameroon. The region voted for the latter. Also, both countries have had territorial disputes in the Bakassi Peninsula. This led to the involvement of both countries’ militaries in the early 1990s in the disputed area. Eventually, Cameroon took Nigeria to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994, and again in 2002, where the ICJ ruled in Cameroon’s favour. In governance, Cameroon is quite different from Nigeria and Ghana because it has had a long period of one political party dominating the political process, and a strong authoritarian ruler who has ruled for more than three decades.

In sum, Ghana and Cameroon are good subjects with which to examine Nigeria because they offer comparisons of two different extremes in their political systems, although all three have a semblance of Western-style liberal democracy. Ghana is seen, by most Western countries and organisations, as a model country
within the sub-region, regarded as having transitioned successfully from military authoritarian rule, and as being on the track towards fully consolidating its democracy. Cameroon, on the other hand, is seen as occupying another extreme, a heavily flawed democratic system with a president who has undermined the political processes since he assumed political power in 1982. Nigeria appears to be positioned between the two ends of this political spectrum. Ghana and Cameroon are important because they help our understanding of military expenditures across the different political systems and the possible trends within the region.²

**Method**

Microsoft Excel (2007) was used for the analysis of this hypothesis, which examined the military expenditures of Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon from the early 1980s to 2013. The data result is presented in a time-series graph. In the annual military expenditures for the three countries examined, the monetary values are in constant 2011 US$ millions. The three countries were examined under two categories. The first category analysed the military expenditures under absolute authoritarian rule: for Ghana and Nigeria, the period of military rule, while for Cameroon, the period of the one-party state system. The second category examined military expenditures of the countries after the introduction of a multi-party electoral system: for Ghana and Nigeria, the transition from military authoritarian rule to civilian rule, and for Cameroon, the legal provision that allowed for other political parties to contest the ruling party.

Military expenditure data for the year 1987 is missing for Cameroon, and the years 1982, 1983 and 1987, for Ghana.

**Results**

The data for military expenditures under authoritarian rule are presented in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. For Cameroon, they reveal that the country’s military expenditures after the commencement of the one-party state system under President Paul Biya (1982 to date) showed an initial constant increase in expenditures. This, however, changed around 1988, when spending decreased. Expenditures for subsequent years remained similar to the 1982 level until the end of absolute authoritarian rule in 1992.
Figure 5.1: Cameroon: Military Expenditure under Absolute Authoritarian Rule

Ghana’s military expenditures under military authoritarian rule showed a different pattern from that of Cameroon. Its expenditures decreased in the first four years of the military assumption of power, but experienced a constant increase from 1988 until the end of military rule in Ghana in 1993.

Figure 5.2: Ghana: Military Expenditure under Absolute Authoritarian Rule

Compared to the other two countries, Nigeria’s military expenditures under military authoritarian rule differed in its pattern. As with Ghana, there was a decrease in the country’s military expenditure from 1984 to around 1987. Thereafter, Nigeria’s military expenditures fluctuated, but not as significantly when compared to its pre-1987 levels. Overall, it seems Nigeria’s military expenditures under absolute authoritarian rule differ from Cameroon but was similar to that of Ghana.
Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 present the results of Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria after the introduction of the multi-party electoral system. The results for Cameroon and Ghana show similar patterns in the sense that its military expenditure did not increase significantly in the first four years after the end of military rule for Ghana, and the introduction of multi-party elections in Cameroon. In fact, for Cameroon, military expenditure decreased in 1994, maintaining a similar pattern until 1997 when its expenditure increased significantly. Ghana’s military expenditure remained virtually the same in 1994 and 1995, decreasing over the next two years (1996 and 1997) until 1998, when they began to increase.
Figure 5.5: Cameroon: Military Expenditure after the Removal of Term Limit for Paul Biya

Figure 5.6: Ghana Military Expenditure under Multi-Party Electoral System

Figure 5.7: Ghana Military Expenditure after Jerry Rawlings

Nigeria’s pattern of military expenditures differed from that of Ghana and Cameroon at the start of its multi-party system (the Fourth Republic). Its military expenditures in the first three years after the end of military authoritarian rule increased significantly. This contrasted with both Ghana and Cameroon, where expenditures remained relatively constant or decreased.
Discussion

The result of the cross-national analyses of the military expenditures of Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon suggest that the pattern of military expenditures in Nigeria differed from the other two countries examined under the period of absolute authoritarianism. The notion that, according to some studies, the military’s corporate interest while in power is to significantly increase its budget does not appear to apply to Nigeria (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995; Howe 2001). This result for Nigeria confirms the empirical findings of Anyanwu, Egwaikhide and Aiyedogbon (2012), in which they argued, based on a comparative study of Nigeria’s military expenditure under the Second Republic, the period of military authoritarian rule and the Fourth Republic, that the military allocated less funds for itself while in power (Anyanwu et al. 2012: 99). Their main finding is presented in Table 5.2 (below). 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years/Period of Civilian/Military Rule 1980-2010</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Total Milex (^4)</th>
<th>Total Federal Government Expenditure (₦ Million)</th>
<th>Milex as a % of Federal Govt Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-1983 Civilization</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>4,674.80</td>
<td>47,942</td>
<td>9.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1998 Military</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>83,056.44</td>
<td>2,203,275.30</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2010 Civilization</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>976,100.74</td>
<td>21,866,990.9</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Based on the findings on Nigeria, it is logical to assume that, as in Brazil, part of the reason the military handed over power in 1999 was to increase its budget. As Alfred Stepan (1988) observed regarding Brazil, there were combat soldiers in
distant garrisons and some top military officers who felt that the military elite in power had neglected the military’s needs, and therefore needed to disengage itself from power and pressure the civilian administration for a bigger budget (Stepan 1988: 80). The political requirement of a military dictatorship to maintain its limited legitimacy precluded its ability, in the case of Brazil, at least, to raise its own military budget. The Nigerian military was in a similar situation after more than a decade in power. Military professionalism was at its lowest point and successive military elites in power had deliberately refused to allocate funds for newer and more sophisticated military equipment out of fear of a loss of legitimacy, or at least that junior officers might stage a coup that would be similar to that of the first coup in 1966 (First 1970; Ademoyega 1981; Babarinsa et al. 1990).

Do increases in the military expenditures facilitate new forms of military authoritarianism? While it can be argued that the increases in the latter years in Nigeria’s military expenditures appear to be linked with the level of insecurity in some parts of the country, the monetary allocations accorded the military seem to have been unchecked by institutions constitutionally mandated to have oversight functions over the military. Omitoogun and Oduntan (2006) argued that the challenges of civilian control over the budgetary process of the military sector in Africa are largely due to the lack of responsiveness of institutions that are legally and constitutionally mandated to ensure an on-going civilian control (Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006: 175). This is also confirmed by some of my interviewees (chapter four) in their discussion of whether there were civilian or legislative enquiries as regarded military personnel who were alleged to have committed human rights abuses in internal security duties. At present, there have also been calls made to the National Assembly by trade unions and other groups in civil society to investigate funds released to the military to fight the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria. This is against the backdrop of the continued onslaught by this sect in numerous villages and towns which have led to hundreds of civilian casualties. However, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Petroleum and Downstream, Senator Magnus Abe, stated that the Senate would not probe the funds released to the military to fight the insurgency. Abe added that:
The call on the National Assembly by the Nigerian Labour Congress to investigate funds appropriated to the military to fight insurgency is a two-edged sword. First of all, the military right now is involved in a sensitive operation to stabilise the country and provide adequate security. If we start any form of public probe and the military thinks we are only interested in the money and not the efforts at combating insurgency that may become counterproductive. The troops would not feel supported. However, clearly, there are issues dealing with the ways our security funds are being expanded. We have more money than Boko Haram, we have more personnel than them, so if we spend our money properly, it should show in the field… I think it is rather between the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities that should go back to the drawing board, find out what happened to the money that are being released for security operations and how well the money was being spent. What are the target areas of the money and who is ensuring that the money actually gets to those it should get to and that the money is achieving the purpose for which it was released. At this point, I will not advocate for the National Assembly to carry out that investigation but I will insist on a thorough, internal review of the financial dealings as regards the security votes, war on terror and the expenditure of the federal government on security. It is a very critical point and nobody should overlook it. Our troops should be well motivated with money, training and necessary equipment to prosecute the war against insurgency (Vanguard Newspaper 2014).

In sum, and based on Senator Abe’s response to the question, it seems enquiries into military spending, especially during periods of crises, remain unanswered and devoid of legislative oversight, even though it appears the Commander-in-Chief would be able to initiate such an inquiry.

**Chapter Summary and Conclusion**

This chapter examined whether military expenditures were increasing in post-1999 Nigeria, and whether, if so, might facilitate new forms of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. To investigate the first part of this hypothesis, a cross-national analysis of military expenditures of Ghana, Cameroon and Nigeria was examined. Two categories were used to analyse the three countries. The first category examined military expenditures under periods of absolute authoritarian rule, while the second category analysed military expenditures under multi-party electoral systems. The findings suggest that Nigeria’s military allocations under a period of absolute authoritarianism differed from those of Cameroon in similar periods. Nigeria’s expenditures did not increase significantly. Also, when these three countries transitioned into multi-party electoral systems, only Nigeria’s military expenditures significantly increased, at least in the first three years of the new administration.

The author, therefore, argued that it is logical to assume for Nigeria that, as in Brazil, part of the reason the military decided to hand over power in 1999 was to augment its defence budget. The military elite, aware of the institutional decay
that had occurred within the military and its inability while in power to jeopardise its legitimacy by raising the military budget deliberately under-funded any significant modernisation programme of the military during their period in power. The only means by which the military could then truly re-professionalise and modernise was through their disengagement from power. Based on the foregoing, and secondary evidence that links military budgets to institutional power, this chapter argues that it is plausible to assume that increases in military expenditures may facilitate new forms of military authoritarianism. In the areas where the military were heavily engaged due to heightened levels of insecurity, the institution primarily responsible for on-going civilian control, the National Assembly appears to be unresponsive to its constitutionally required mandate to oversee the monetary allocations budgeted to the military.
1. Adebakin and Raimi (2012) argue that the monetary allocation given to national security in Nigeria is economically unsustainable. To support their claim, they compared the federal government recurrent expenditure on education, agriculture, health and construction with that of national security. The primary data used in their analysis is presented in Table 5.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Security (₦ Million)</th>
<th>Education (₦ Million)</th>
<th>Agriculture (₦ Million)</th>
<th>Health (₦ Million)</th>
<th>Construction (₦ Million)</th>
<th>GDP (₦ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>2361.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>27.73</td>
<td>10.61</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>25.29</td>
<td>3110.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>135.18</td>
<td>24.44</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>12.48</td>
<td>14.28</td>
<td>5205.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>610.11</td>
<td>126.5</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>52.85</td>
<td>31.97</td>
<td>20957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>595.13</td>
<td>155.81</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>52.79</td>
<td>46.03</td>
<td>49632.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1430.2</td>
<td>258.60</td>
<td>20.36</td>
<td>132.02</td>
<td>151.11</td>
<td>70633.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6540.2</td>
<td>2,402.80</td>
<td>500.70</td>
<td>643.40</td>
<td>271908</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11855.2</td>
<td>9,746.40</td>
<td>1,510.40</td>
<td>3,320.70</td>
<td>1,699.10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>68556.99</td>
<td>57,956.64</td>
<td>6,335.80</td>
<td>15,218.08</td>
<td>4,991.09</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>85922.29</td>
<td>39,882.15</td>
<td>7,064.55</td>
<td>24,522.27</td>
<td>7,202.04</td>
<td>5374335</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>132369.9</td>
<td>80,530.88</td>
<td>9,993.55</td>
<td>40,621.42</td>
<td>7,452.14</td>
<td>6232244</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>119444</td>
<td>64,782.15</td>
<td>7,537.35</td>
<td>33,267.98</td>
<td>16,951.37</td>
<td>6061700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>174117.5</td>
<td>76,524.65</td>
<td>11,256.15</td>
<td>34,197.14</td>
<td>14,897.01</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>153618.1</td>
<td>82,795.06</td>
<td>16,325.60</td>
<td>55,661.63</td>
<td>17,914.96</td>
<td>15610882</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>202200</td>
<td>87,294.56</td>
<td>17,212.81</td>
<td>62,300.00</td>
<td>20,100.00</td>
<td>18564595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>253400</td>
<td>107,529.39</td>
<td>21,202.73</td>
<td>81,900.00</td>
<td>71,300.00</td>
<td>20,657,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>164500</td>
<td>164,000.0</td>
<td>65,400.0</td>
<td>98,200.00</td>
<td>94,500.00</td>
<td>24,396,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>276490</td>
<td>137,156.6</td>
<td>22,435.2</td>
<td>90,200.00</td>
<td>80,630.00</td>
<td>24,794,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>422900</td>
<td>170,800.00</td>
<td>25,200.00</td>
<td>99,100.00</td>
<td>94,500.00</td>
<td>29,205,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>563200</td>
<td>335,800.00</td>
<td>41,200.00</td>
<td>231,800.00</td>
<td>195,900.00</td>
<td>33,994,612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. Check appendix 17 for Nigeria’s total defence expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). It confirms the claim that the military allocated less to itself while in power.

4. Milex stands for military expenditure.
Chapter Six

Summary and Conclusion

This thesis has examined whether there is a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. To explore this research question, a “mixed-method procedures” (Creswell 2003: 208-225) research strategy that included qualitative and quantitative strategies was implemented. The main qualitative collection strategy was that of field research, conducted in the first half of 2011 in the form of elite interview, where the author interviewed serving and retired high ranking military officers based on a structured interview technique, even though the interviewee had the opportunity to air their personal opinions regarding events or questions (see appendix 18, for University of Waikato approved interview questions and other ethics documents). The selection of the officers interviewed was limited to those who had been enlisted in the military before the start of the Fourth Republic. In addition, some of the officers interviewed are holding or have held top positions in the military, and for the retired officers, some of the interviewees had held political positions such as military administrators, during military rule. Overall, 18 officers were contacted and 12 accepted the invitation to be interviewed.

A quantitative strategy was also used that involved a cross-national analysis of the military expenditures of Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon. The data collection involved data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Other primary sources used for this thesis included archival research, were the author collected relevant newspapers reports, news magazine articles, editorials, official government documents, and previous Nigeria constitutions. For secondary sources, the author used a document analysis technique (McNabb 2004: 365). The main secondary data sources used in this thesis were relevant journal articles and textbooks on civil-military relations, democracy and democratization, comparative politics, Nigerian history and military intervention in Africa. Contemporary newspapers and news magazine articles and editorials were also used from reputable print media organizations such as The Economist, Nigerian Tribune, the Guardian Newspaper (Nigeria), the Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) Vanguard Newspaper (Nigeria) and others.
The ‘single-country studies as comparison’ case study methodology in the broader subfield of comparative politics was used in the analysis. The ‘new institutionalism’ methodological approach, pioneered by March and Olsen (1984) framed the way this study was approached. The approach is derived from the traditional institutional analytical approach, although it differs in that political institutions are no longer equated with political organizations. Rather, they are seen as sets of ‘rules’ that guide and constrain the behaviour of individual actors. The new institutionalists are concerned with informal conventions of political life as well as the formal constitutions and organizational structures (Lowndes 2010).

Alfred Stepan’s (1988) Latin American concept of ‘military prerogatives’ was applied to Nigeria herein. Military prerogatives are defined as:

Those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society (Stepan 1988: 65).

In brief, this concept initially examines, in a Latin American context, military behaviour in a transitional phase from prolonged military dictatorship to re-democratization. Stepan (1988) identifies these military prerogatives in an early democratizing society as:
The constitutionally sanctioned independent role the military;

The military’s special relationship with the chief executive;

The retention of the military as the institution in-charge for the coordination of the defence sector;

The guarantee of places in the civilian cabinet for active-duty military officers;

A weak or non-existent role of the legislature in the oversight of the military;

The special role of senior career civil servants or political appointees in designing and implementing defence and national security policy;

The active participation of the military in intelligence agencies;

The operational command of senior active-duty military officers over the police;

The exclusive role of the military in its internal promotions;

The appointment of military officers to head state enterprises; and,

The role of the military court’s jurisdiction outside of the narrow internal offences against military discipline (Stepan 1988: 94-97).

The author, aware of the contextual differences between Latin American military establishments and that of Nigeria, justified the use of Stepan’s (1988) concept of military prerogatives in Nigeria based upon Nigerian military’s uniquely high level of professionalism in the African context, and close comparisons with the Brazilian military interlude. While Stepan’s concept may not fully apply to most African countries, there are three important features that make it applicable to Nigeria. First, after almost three decades in power, the military as an institution has apparently been guided, to a large extent, by what it perceives to be the ‘true nationalistic mission’ of the Nigerian military (Abegunrin 2003). This military-crafted nationalistic mission initially developed during the start of the civil war in 1967, and appears to have been consolidated a decade after the war ended in 1970 (Oyediran 1979). The central theme of this mission has significantly emphasised the indivisibility of Nigeria, and appears to have placed the military as the principal focus for ensuring national unity (Frank and Ukpere 2012; Hill 2012; Ehwarieme 2011). Second, the military in Nigeria, like that in Brazil, appears to have constructed a unique identity for itself after re-democratization, one set against a background of mutually accommodating and antagonistic ethnic identities in the country. This unique identity seems to be evidence of the degree of autonomy the military has over its affairs. Third, in a Nigerian context, military prerogatives, a concept that Stepan derived from the Brazilian case, appear to
highlight accurately the conflicts that have arisen between a ‘re-professionalized’ military institution and civilians.

Six hypotheses were from the research question explored, and this formed the body of this study: **hypothesis one**, the military in Nigeria has retained significant military prerogatives; **hypothesis two**, the military has intervened in politics post-1999; **hypothesis three**, retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic positions; **hypothesis four**, autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999; **hypothesis five**, civilian government oversight remains weak, and facilitates military authoritarianism; and lastly, **hypothesis six**, increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism.

**Hypothesis one**, *the military in Nigeria has retained significant prerogatives*, tested whether military prerogatives constituted a new form of authoritarianism in Nigeria. To test this hypothesis, the author relied on the primary data sources (interviews) from the field research conducted in 2011, and the behaviour of media, the latter seen only as an indicator. Basically, and from a theoretical perspective, this hypothesis analysed the concept of military prerogatives as postulated by Alfred Stepan (1988) in Nigeria. It discussed and justified the applicability of this concept to Nigeria and concluded that the military in Nigeria have retained four out of the eleven prerogatives as enumerated by Stepan in the case of Brazil. These four prerogatives include: the Nigerian military’s constitutional mission; its role in the defence sector; its role in intelligence; and lastly, the low level of legislative and civilian oversight. These military prerogatives have to some degree facilitated authoritarian tendencies in the polity because they provide the military with the ability to search for new missions and roles without adequate and effective civilian and legislative oversight. Lastly, the retention of these prerogatives after the dictatorships appear to discourage adequate funding and training of other security agencies, such as the police, whose primary role is the maintenance of law and order. There is, in sum, an over-reliance on the military in breakdowns of law and order in the country.

**Hypothesis two**, *the military has intervened in politics post-1999*, assessed the level of military involvement in the polity and examined whether this constituted a new form of military authoritarianism. The examination of this hypothesis relied
on key security-related media reports on the military after 1999, and concluded that it may have contributed to a new form of military authoritarianism based on the sheer number of internal security-related duties that the military has been involved with post-1999. It also observed that minus the many allegations of human rights violations by the military in internal security duties, this level of internal security involvement of the military seems to have its own challenges considering the historical antecedent of ‘over-involvement’ of the military in the political process. As William Ehwarie (2011) comments:

… it is important to note that since 1999, civilian authorities have been deploying the armed forces to handle civil and political crises as in the deployment of troops to Odi, Ekiti gubernatorial rerun elections and the Niger-Delta. Indeed, officers commanding the military Joint Task Force (JTF) deployed to the oil rich region have become household names in Nigeria. Over time, such continued use of the military could lead to increased visibility, creation of networks with civilian populations, and a sense of military self-importance that have encouraged military intervention in the past (Ehwarie 2011: 507).

**Hypothesis three**, retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic positions, examined whether the sheer number of high ranking military officers contesting and winning important political positions such as, the position of the president, senate president, members of houses of the federal national assembly among others, constitute a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. It also examined the economic interests of high ranking retired military officers. The examination of this hypothesis relied on the data gathered during the field research (interviews) conducted in 2011 as the primary data source for analysis for this study. Overall, this hypothesis found little or no current evidence to suggest that high ranking retired military officers had any significant link with the military institution they retired from that could facilitate a form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. It seems based on the empirical evidence presented that the retired military officers’ phenomenon in the country is a passing phase in Nigeria’s political history. This is based on the ages of those retired officers who have previously dominated the political process. Also, excluding those officers compulsorily retired in 1999, and those who retired before then, no group of high ranking retired officers have dominated the political process, or the economic sector of the country. It is also questionable whether their loyalty to the military establishment that, in many cases, forced their retirements, would be sufficient to sustain some elements of conspiracy.
Hypothesis four, autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999, examined whether the military has had significant latitude in determining how they engage in internal security duties and this without adequate civilian oversight; and whether this is a contributing factor in the many allegations of human rights violations by the military. The study relied in this hypothesis on the answers given by the author’s respondents (retired and serving military officers) during field research conducted in 2011. In sum, and based on the empirical evidence presented, it would appear that the military has had autonomous involvement in internal security missions, and that this has led to human rights abuses. This in turn, appears to have created renewed authoritarian tendencies within the polity. It also started that under military rule, a human rights commission was established. At present, it is yet to be seen whether the commission’s findings of human rights abuses in the military will proceed to the courts.

Hypothesis five, civilian government oversight remains weak, and facilitates military authoritarianism investigated whether institutions constitutionally and legally empowered by law, to have oversight over the military, are weak, and whether this facilitates a new form of military authoritarianism. The study, again, relied on the responses given by the respondents (serving and retired military officers) who were interviewed, on the behaviour of key media outlets, as evident in reports and editorials, and on abundant secondary sources that tend to affirm my primary sources. The analysis showed that there appear to be significant weaknesses in institutions responsible for oversight of the military. It also showed that these weaknesses in civilian oversight are noticeable in human rights violations alleged against the military, and the inability of these civilian institutions to properly investigate such claims and ensure that due process of the law is followed for any alleged offenders. Although the current government of Goodluck Jonathan has sent a bill to the National Assembly that forbids military personnel from committing unjustifiable attacks against civilian populations in their area of internal security duties, it is yet to be seen whether the bill will be passed and if it is passed, whether it will limit such cases alleged against the military, given the low level of civilian oversight.
Hypothesis six, increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism, examined whether increases in the defence budget post-military rule may facilitate new forms of military authoritarianism in a civilian dominated era. To ensure a level of objectivity in this study, a cross-national analysis of the military expenditures of Ghana and Cameroon was compared with Nigeria. The data was from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The author argued based on the data, for Nigeria, as for Brazil, part of the reason the military decided to hand-over power in 1999 had to do with its weak budgets. It seems that the military elite, concerned with the loss of legitimacy that would be suffered if the military dictatorship raised the military budget, and aware of the institutional decay that had occurred within the military, and the fear of a junior officers coup d'état, as a result, had deliberately under-funded any significant modernisation programme of the military during their periods in power. The only way the military could then truly re-professionalise and modernise was through their dis-engagement from power. Based on the foregoing, it was stated that it is plausible to assume that increases in military expenditures might facilitate new forms of military authoritarianism. It is logical to suggest this, considering that in the areas where the military were heavily engaged, the institution primarily responsible for on-going civilian control (the National Assembly) appears not to have been responsive to its constitutionally required mandate, especially as regards military allocations and expenditures.

Aside from these hypotheses, Chapter Two provides the necessary background to this thesis. It is impossible to do effective research on authoritarianism in Nigeria without discussing the role of ethnicity and the significant impact on the political processes of the country that this exercises. Although ethnicity was not part of my interview questions during the course of my field research in 2011, several of the high ranking serving and retired military interviewees volunteered that the role ethnicity has been crucial in the military. Some interviewees, however, also volunteered that ethnic tensions had improved, suggesting that a separate military identity, a ‘quasi-ethnicity’ had gradually emerged and was allowing the military to avoid internal schisms, and to play the ethno-political game more effectively.

Chapter Two explored whether multi-ethnic states such as Nigeria tend to have authoritarian systems. It discussed the theoretical underpinnings regarding this
question, and concluded that there was no general consensus among scholars on whether multi-ethnic states in the African context are prone to authoritarian practices. The chapter also examined some pre-colonial semi-autonomous and autonomous kingdoms subsumed in present day Nigeria and how the merging of these kingdoms by the British to create Nigeria in 1914 has impacted negatively on the country’s development post-independence. Such areas include the ethnic driven politics that were largely instrumental for the failure of the first, second and third republics; the Biafra civil war; the first and second military coups had several ethnic underpinnings; and the other major ethnic driven politics/conflicts that Nigeria have dealt with since independence. Lastly, the chapter as noted above, returned to the ethnic factors that became prevalent in the military, and discussed post-1999 whether the military had developed a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for itself within the context of the various ethno-religious driven demands and conflicts that seem to threaten the very existence of the Nigerian state.

In summary, and based on the primary and secondary data used for this thesis, several observations can be made about the Nigerian military as an institution.

1. The Nigerian military today appear to have a virtual monopoly over national security. Contributing factors to this include: the legal and constitutional roles of the military that appear to allow for role expansion and the continual adoption of new missions, without adequate civilian oversight; and the failure of civilian enforcement agencies (notably the police), and the political elite to adequately address the many ethno-religious, economic and societal concerns that have significantly increased post-1999.

2. Apart from the defence budget that is deliberated upon in the National Assembly, there is little if any legislative oversight of the military, especially in cases where there are alleged human rights violations. In addition, some of my interviewees stated that top military service chiefs can only attend House of Representative or Senate committee hearings if granted approval by the president.

3. There appear to be significant weaknesses in civilian expertise as regards defence matters in Nigeria: in virtually all cases, the military is only answerable to the president.

4. The three arms of the armed forces (navy, army, and air-force) work relatively independently of each other, even though they do claim to work as a
coordinated unit. One of my interviewees stated that military equipment that is not compatible with the other arms of the military is sometimes purchased.

5. Military promotions are purely a military affair expect for top political positions, for which the president requires the ratification of the National Assembly.

6. The depth of ethno-religious sentiments within the military cannot be overstated, although based on the comments made by some of my interviewees they are not as significant as in the past. The author argues that the military may be in the initial stages of forming a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for itself, as mentioned in chapter two.

7. Military deployments in internal security matters and alleged cases of human rights abuses will continue to rise as long as the level of insecurity in the country is not properly addressed. Within this context, it seems practically impossible, based on the current institutional arrangement, to control combat soldiers if their colleagues are killed or wounded in internal engagements. A retired officer observed that in such situations, it is even difficult for the commanding officer to restrain soldiers as this may put the commanding officer’s life at risk.

8. The Nigerian army created a section called the Department of Civil-Military Relations in 2011, during the time of my field research. The department, according to an officer who spoke about this, was created as an avenue were ordinary citizens could source information and better understand the activities of the army. It should be noted also that even before the creation of this department, the army’s corporate affairs section dealt with similar cases. As at the time of my field research, none of these departments were easily accessible by the public except by invitation from an officer who worked in the army headquarters. The security personnel at the gate of the army headquarters in Abuja told the author he would not be granted entry because of the Freedom of Information (FOI) bill, which at that time had not been signed into law, and this failure meant the author could not be granted access to this particular department in the army headquarters.

9. Finally, all of my interviewees agreed that the system was not perfect, but noted that it was, however, evolving in phases.
Conclusion

As noted earlier, the aim of this thesis has been to focus on assessing whether a new form of military authoritarianism is emerging in Nigeria. Based on the empirical evidence, the author could not identify a new form of military authoritarianism. However, the legal, institutional, constitutional, and operational framework of the military, which is largely devoid of civilian oversight and effective civilian expertise in military affairs, has contributed significantly to authoritarian practices in the country post-1999. Table 6.1 (below) presents the author’s findings on Nigeria based on the earlier discussed most potential important variables or manifestation of a new form of military authoritarianism in a democratising phase.

Table 6.1: Dimensions of a New Form of Military Authoritarianism in Democratising Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Degree of civilian control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Military prerogatives</td>
<td>Military mission</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role of national assembly</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination of defence sector</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role in intelligence</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Media perception of military internal engagement</td>
<td>Media commentaries of the military</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Retired military officers</td>
<td>Retired military officers in politics</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retired military officers in the economic sector</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Human rights</td>
<td>Military attitudes towards allegations of human rights abuses</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Civilian military expertise</td>
<td>Civilian expertise on military matters</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Military budget</td>
<td>Control of budget</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conclusion of this study appears to confirm a recent quantitative study of transitional states that have cultures of military intervention by Rollin Tusalem (2013). Tusalem argues that in the past:

Transitional states where the military apparatus has a large role in shaping policies, are more likely to have lower levels of democratic accountability and are more likely to reverse democratic gains... politicised military institutions and the institutional legacy of overthrowing civilian regimes in pre-transitional past have an enduring effect in eroding prospects for democratic consolidation (2013: 13).

The importance of this argument cannot be over-emphasised, given the current state of high insecurity in some parts of country, and the rise of a violent,
religiously inspired militia group, Boko Haram. The apparent failure of security agencies, and especially the military, to deal with the current challenge of Boko Haram and other ethno-religious crises since 1999 suggests that the institutional framework that guides the military and civil society appears to be inadequate. Areas that are of importance in this regard include:

1. How the executive uses the military as part of the administration;
2. How to address the increasing autonomy of the military and its tendency to search for new missions in the absence of civilian oversight. If this condition persists, it may ultimately allow the military to act as if it is not part of any administration; and
3. The articulation of an effective national defence policy and armed forces act for Nigeria. Such articulation should include inputs from all stakeholders and the relevant NGOs in the country.

Overall, the Nigerian political elite may need to re-think how to effectively administer the military in a civilian-dominated era. It may, for example, want to apply some of the institutional measures adopted by Spain, which was in a similar situation some four decades ago (Linz 2000). Narcis Serra (2009) while describing how Spain was able to reform its military from the country’s transitional phase to democratic consolidation, identifies four areas of institutional reforms that non-consolidated democracies need to resolve vis-à-vis their military establishments: define new missions for the armed forces; continue with the modernization of the security and defence sector; foster mechanism of regional cooperation in security; and guide and direct the armed forces.
Define new missions for the armed forces, especially in areas of human security and international collaboration. This definition will help prevent the armed forces from attempting to cover any perceived legitimacy deficit that would entail the mere continuity of traditional missions, or seeking out of new domestic missions, which might imply unacceptable interventionism in the state or displace the civilian administration from its own task.

Continue with the modernization of the security and defence sector, establishing [or strengthening] ministries of defence [to make them] equivalent to those existing in already consolidated democracies.

Foster mechanism of regional cooperation in the field of security as the European process has been essential to solving problems in Spain.

Guide and direct the armed forces of each country toward a progressive contribution to regional and international governance (Serra 2009: 89).

Some of the suggestions made by Serra may not be easily applied to a Nigerian context because of the profound contextual differences between Spain and Nigeria. This is especially true in the area of regional and African contributions of armed forces personnel to deal with Nigeria or regional security concerns. Part of the reason has to do with the huge financial commitment of maintaining such a regional force. Nigeria’s neighbours seem not to have the necessary financial resources available to them. In addition, there are relatively low levels of technological sophistication among the neighbouring countries, including Nigeria, to effectively deal with some of the security concerns without external assistance from more militarily advanced countries.

However, as earlier stated in this chapter, this thesis has concluded, based on the empirical evidence presented, that the current institutional arrangement for the military seems to have contributed to authoritarian practices. This suggests that institutional reform is needed to adequately cater to the many challenges that the Nigerian state faces.

Finally, even though the author could not identify a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria, it is still worth asking why the military decided to hand-over power when it did in 1999. Based on the empirical findings of hypothesis six (chapter five), part of the reason why the military relinquish power in 1999 was because of its waning military budgets. It needed to dis-engage from politics so that it could gain more allocations to modernise and re-professionalise its institution after it had suffered from a decade of neglect. This feature, which the Nigerian military shares with the Brazilian military at the tail end of military authoritarian rule in Brazil, may justify, at least in part, the application of a
concept initially used to understand the military's behaviour in a transitional phase in Latin America, the retention of military prerogatives well into a period of democratisation.

**Further Areas of Research**

The research findings of this thesis suggest that there is not, in the evidence, support for the conclusion that a new military authoritarianism is emerging in Nigeria. The current institutional framework of the military does, however, seem to contribute to authoritarian practices within the polity. This thesis offers three main contributions to the framework of research on civil-military relations in emerging democracies.

First, to my own knowledge, there has been no systematic theoretical discussion of the military in Nigeria that applies Alfred Stepan’s (1988) concept of military prerogatives to military behaviour in Nigeria. While several authors on civil-military relations in Nigeria agree that insufficient civilian control of the military in some way affects the quality of democratic governance, virtually all of the literature has tended to focus more on its potential to lead to military intervention. This thesis, then, offers the first comprehensive theoretical argument regarding military behaviour in a transitional phase, and how it might affect the civilianisation process in Nigeria.

Second, by disaggregating the issue-areas of this thesis into six core areas (hypotheses), this research has revealed the complexity of civil-military relations in Nigeria. Most recent studies on civil-military relations in Nigeria have been unclear as to the state and the achievement of civilian control of the military. The application of Stepan’s (1988) concept of military prerogatives to Nigeria provides a potential set of institutional indicators together with a sharpened research question. This analytical framework provides an empirical tool for assessing in detail this case, as well as others.

Finally, by explicitly framing this thesis analysis within a discussion of civil-military relations, it has provided a possible basis for a stringent scholarly debate in a Nigerian context. A systematic discussion of the impact of unrestricted military autonomy on the democratisation process holds broad comparative implications. This would appear to be a significant contribution to the body of
knowledge on civil-military relations in Nigeria. Furthermore, the approach used in this thesis allows for further rigorous analyses, and opens it up for critical evaluation by other scholars.

This research does not claim to be a definite work on contemporary Nigerian politics. As stated, the main research method used for this thesis entailed field research where the author interviewed high ranking retired and serving military officers (elite interview technique). The limitations of my research design as observed during and after my field research devolve into three main points:

1. The primary research method relied on the responses of military interviewees. However, the author realised during the course of these interviews that there seemed to be a significant level of bias in all the respondents. Some based on the positions they held or had held (retired officers), ‘blindly’ defended the military and justified some of the actions taken by this institution (some even defended past military rulers). Others were significantly uncooperative during the course of the interview, or stated that some of the questions asked were issues of national security and therefore could not be discussed.

2. In terms of archival documents used for this thesis, getting access to official documents was surprisingly difficult. For example, it was almost impossible to find the annual military budgets from the early 1980s to date, numerous newspaper issues were missing from the archives, and some official government documents from the mid-1980s were also difficult to obtain. An official who helped me at the archives told me that this is partly due to Nigeria’s long decades of military rule, where the military elite did not allow adequate funding to the archives. With the re-emergence of civilian rule in 1999, sourcing adequate funding is still a major issue according to this staff member.

3. The sixth hypothesis analysed the military expenditures of Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon. As earlier noted in chapter five, the major limitation of military expenditure data in Nigeria, and to a considerable extent sub-Saharan Africa, is data quality. Therefore, researchers embarking on any statistical analyses of military spending in Nigeria or sub-Saharan African countries should be aware that their research findings are inevitably flawed to some extent, and may be subject to scholarly debates and interpretations.
Given the high state of insecurity in Nigeria at the moment, the author foresees the emergence of more scholarly literature on civil-military relations in Nigeria and possibly other security agencies. It is important that these scholarly articles expand the sample size used in this thesis. That is, rather than base the military respondents on only a very stringent selection criteria; they should include all military officers and combat soldiers also. They should also include key actors in the National Assembly and the Ministry of Defence, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as notable academicians whose research areas are in civil-military relations. Finally, attention should be paid to the Nigerian police and intelligent agencies, especially in regard to issues that appear to hinder them from performing their duties at the highest professional level.

These are dangerous times for researchers, however. I doubt that I would have been able to conduct the same field research that I conducted in 2011 today. Ironically, perhaps, a moment of rich opportunities in researching civil-military relations in transitional Nigeria is also, for would-be researchers, a most challenging hour.

Postscript

Since the start of this study and especially after my doctoral field research was conducted in 2011, there have been numerous significant political events in Nigeria, many of which directly involved the military. The most noteworthy of these, widely reported in both local and international media, has been the inability of the Nigerian military to stop Boko Haram from claiming vast tracts of territory in northern Nigeria. This is in addition to other horrifying activities this group has perpetrated. On 14 April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped more than two hundred girls from a state secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. Two months later, at an agricultural training school in Buni Yadi, Yobe State, it attacked and killed sixty boys in a school dormitory. These are two cases of the numerous acts that this religiously inspired militant group has committed since it evolved into a pan-jihadist organisation, and pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The question most observers and political commentators on Nigeria have been asking is an obvious one: how can a relatively professional and well-resourced military institution be apparently incapable of stopping such a group from seizing
towns and villages and committing atrocities on Nigerian soil, and since 2015 rely on the far less developed armies of neighbouring Niger and Chad to resolve what is fundamentally a Nigerian problem? Was the military establishment using the crisis in the North as a political bargaining chip to enhance its budget, or improve its political position in the new ‘democratic’ setting?

To complicate matters even further, on the eve of the presidential elections of 14 February 2015, the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Professor Attahiru Jega, announced that the elections would be delayed by six weeks because the service chiefs had written to him that they could not guarantee the security of INEC personnel if the elections were conducted as scheduled. This was complicated by the apparent support that the military had given to the candidacy of the incumbent candidate, Goodluck Jonathan, and apparent military resistance to the challenger, who was leading in the polls at the time, a former military dictator-turned-democrat, Muhammaddu Buhari.

After the re-scheduling of the elections, the Nigerian military suddenly and unexpectedly started a massive counter offensive against Boko Haram, which continued to be aided by the armed forces of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. This offensive ultimately reclaimed all the territory that had been lost to Boko Haram. Why had the Nigerian military refrained from its security duties in the North prior to the rescheduling of the elections? Perhaps the nonchalant attitude towards the insecurity in the northeast was a political tool used by the Jonathan government but later backfired based on the sudden popularity of Buhari as an alternative to the PDP/Jonathan? If that was the case, the plan failed. Buhari was elected to the presidency with a substantial majority at the end of March 2015, and will assume the office in May.

There are points that need to be reiterated based on the continuing situation in the country as of April 2015, especially as it relates to the military. The ineptitude of the military in its response to Boko Haram, reportedly due to low morale and military shortages (military hardware, basic military medical supplies and care, non-delivery of military wages and allowances, and even the demoralising effects of endemic corruption, which continues to be a hindrance not only in the military as an institution, but the entire society), while difficult to link to abandonment of post and bases during attacks by Boko Haram, may be related to the desire to
increasingly pressure the government by a dissatisfied military establishment that is willing to lose bases, and fail in security engagements until it gets the budget that it wants. As noted in chapter five, civilian control of the military budget is low and the National Assembly merely approves the budget without adequate scrutiny of how the funds allocated are spent. In the case of the military’s offensive against Boko Haram, it should be expected that the National Assembly would be concerned whether appropriate military equipment are being procured by the military to fight this militant organisation. Therefore, is the surprising military failure, then, nothing more than a strategy? What has changed in the military institution that suddenly, after more than two years of repeated failures in tackling such a threatening insurgency, it has been able to achieve tremendous progress against Boko Haram in just six weeks, coincidentally after the rescheduling of the 14 February elections?

Overall, and as this thesis has repeatedly stated, there is an urgent need for the civilian elites to create an institutional framework that would adequately provide broad-based civilian (not just presidential) oversight of the military. Simply having presidential control of the military seems to have failed Nigeria at its crucial hour. There have been allegations that President Jonathan is not really interested in northeast Nigeria. The military’s pressure tactics, if that is what they were, then, were gauged to pressure the National Assembly. President Jonathan was ‘under their influence,’ and challenger Buhari was suddenly the political threat. The National Assembly, apathetic, lacking in military expertise, could be shocked into submission. An appropriate civilian institutional framework, one with focus on the military and civilian expertise in military matters, would guarantee adequate oversight of the military, ostensibly eliminating the situation in which the military routinely instructs the INEC and other government institutions on when and how to carry out their legal responsibilities, and occasionally resorts to shocking the nation into funding an ever increasing military budget.
References


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## Appendices

### APPENDIX 1: Retired Military Officers in Business Ventures and Public Service Positions, 1999-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Venture type</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Procurement and Contracts</td>
<td>The most natural venture for top retired military officers in Nigeria and several other countries.</td>
<td>Nigerian examples are not easy to come by, but certain to involve countless private companies or individuals, civilian and retired military officers, foreign and local contractors.</td>
<td>A sizeable number of high ranking retired military officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-Scale Farming and Agro-Allied Ventures</td>
<td>Obasanjo Farms Nigeria Limited</td>
<td>Several retired military officers are engaged in farming.</td>
<td>A noteworthy example of large-scale farming is that owned by former head of state and president, General Olusegun Obasanjo Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building &amp; Construction (Other than Defence)</td>
<td>Davnotch Nigeria Limited</td>
<td>Major General O.A. Obada</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical &amp; Civil Works Contractors</td>
<td>Sabita Nigeria</td>
<td>Rear Admiral A.O. Sode</td>
<td>Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Engineering Consultancy Company, Construction</td>
<td>Intercontinental Engineering and Home Development, ScanHomes Afri-Luck Nigeria Limited.</td>
<td>Rear Admiral A.O. Sode</td>
<td>Board of Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rear Admiral S.A. Olukoya</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venture type</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Business, (incl. Natural Gas)</td>
<td><strong>Oando Group</strong></td>
<td>Major General Magoro</td>
<td>Chairman, until 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Lottoj Oil and Gas</strong></td>
<td>Rear Admiral A.O Sode</td>
<td>Board Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Acorn Petroleum</strong> (as at 2010).</td>
<td>Lieutenant General Inuwa Wushishi</td>
<td>Board of Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>South Atlantic Petroleum Limited</strong></td>
<td>General T.Y Danjuma</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property or Real Estate Business</td>
<td>Most military officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and above or their equivalents, whether serving or retired, have one interest or the other in real estate business. Thus, examples of retired military involvement here are so numerous that it makes no sense to list any.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Banking and Insurance</td>
<td><strong>Diamond Bank</strong></td>
<td>Lieutenant General Jeremiah T. Useni</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Keystone Bank</strong></td>
<td>Brigadier General M. Aminun-Kano</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Skype Bank</strong></td>
<td>Brigadier General Anthony Ukpo</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Agbarho</strong></td>
<td>Major General O.A Obada</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Microfinance Bank</strong></td>
<td>Brigadier General D.O Oneya</td>
<td>Board Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Standard Alliance Insurance</strong></td>
<td>Air Commodore I.E Nkanga</td>
<td>(2001) Former Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Development Bank</strong></td>
<td>Lieutenant General Inuwa Wushishi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venture type</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conglomerates</td>
<td>United Africa Company (UAC)</td>
<td>Lieutenant General Inuwa Wushishi</td>
<td>Chairman (until 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPDC (Property Development).</td>
<td>Lieutenant General Inuwa Wushishi</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>National Security and Printing Company</td>
<td>Colonel Sambo Dasuki</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria Jemibewon International Academy</td>
<td>Major General David Jemibewon a School Major General Garba Mohammed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture Institute of Strategic Management of Nigeria</td>
<td>Major General L.S Ajiborisha General Martin Luther Agwai, post-1999 retiree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institute of Strategic Management of Nigeria</td>
<td>Brigadier General B. Asuguo Brigadier General S.T. Bello</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institute of Strategic Management of Nigeria</td>
<td>Air Commodore I.E. Nkanga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Psychiatric Hospital, Calabar Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria Akwa Ibom Airport Implementation Committee</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
### Other Business Ventures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Key Personnel</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Falpas Ventures Limited</td>
<td>Brigadier General S.B Chamah (late)</td>
<td>Managing Director/CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globusure Technologies Limited Kaddara Group of Companies.</td>
<td>Brigadier General D.O. Oneya</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albarka Airlines—no longer in operation</td>
<td>Brigadier General D.O. Oneya</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTS First Wireless Integrated Energy Distribution and Marketing Limited</td>
<td>Brigadier General M.B. Marwa</td>
<td>former Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant General Inuwa Wushishi</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Abdulsalami Abubakar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Foreign Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Key Personnel</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria’s High Commissioner to South Africa (2007)</td>
<td>Brigadier General M.B. Marwa</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2006)</td>
<td>Air Commodore Dan Suleiman</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officer</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Political Activities/Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
<td>1976-1979, 1999-2007</td>
<td>• Former military ruler&lt;br&gt;• Civilian president&lt;br&gt;• Chairman Board of Trustees (BOT) People’s Democratic Party (PDP).&lt;br&gt;• Member, People’s Democratic Party (PDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Muhammadu Buhari</td>
<td>1983-1985, 2003, 2007, 2011</td>
<td>• Former military ruler&lt;br&gt;• Main presidential contender under the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) and Congress for Progressive Change (CPC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Ibrahim Babangida</td>
<td>1985-1993, 2007, 2011</td>
<td>• Former military ruler&lt;br&gt;• Founding member People’s Democratic Party (PDP).&lt;br&gt; • Unsuccessfully sought nomination as the party’s presidential candidate for the general elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General David Mark</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Former military administrator of Niger State and head of the Communications Ministry all under military rule.&lt;br&gt;• PDP member and senate president (2013).&lt;br&gt;• Former head Directorate of Military Intelligence and Chief of Army Staff under military rule.&lt;br&gt;• Appointed National Security Advisor (NSA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Mohammed Gusau</td>
<td>1999-2006 and 2010</td>
<td>• Member of the PDP.&lt;br&gt;• Former military administrator of Kaduna and Katsina State.&lt;br&gt;• Appointed National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Sarki Mukhtar</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>• Former military administrator of Kaduna and Katsina State.&lt;br&gt; • Appointed National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Kayode Are</td>
<td>1999-2007, 2010</td>
<td>• Served in the Directorate of Military Intelligence under military rule.&lt;br&gt;• Appointed Director-General State Security Service (SSS).&lt;br&gt;• National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officer</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Political Activities/Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Owoye Azazi</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>Former Chief of Army Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(late)—post 1999 retiree</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>Appointed National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Sambo Dasuki</td>
<td>2012-To Date</td>
<td>Former ADC to General Babangida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Commodore I.E. Nkanga</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Appointed National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Magoro</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Former military administrator of Akwa Ibom State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unsuccessfully sought governorship of Akwa Ibom in 2003 under the Nigeria Democratic Party (NDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Tanko Ayuba</td>
<td>2002-2011</td>
<td>Former Minister for Internal Affairs and Transport under military rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former governor of Kaduna State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Captain Caleb Olubolade</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Former military administrator for Bayelsa State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Magashi</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Current, the Minister for Police Affairs (2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Former military administrator of Sokoto State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>legal advisor to the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unsuccessfully sought governorship of Kano State under the Democratic People’s Party (DPP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General Y. Mu’azu</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>Unsuccessfully sought governorship of Adamawa State under the PDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former military administrator of Sokoto State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chairman of a committee investigating a fire that gutted the Department of Planning, Research and Statistics in Bauchi State Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chairman commission of inquiry into civil disturbances in Bauchi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officer</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Political Activities/Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General O. Oyinlola</td>
<td>2003-2010</td>
<td>• Former military administrator of Lagos State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel J.O Dungs</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>• Governor of Osun State under PDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel A.A. Usman</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Former military administrator of Delta State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General M. Mana</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>• Unsuccessfully sought governorship of the PDP in Plateau State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel T.O. Bamigboye</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>• Former military administrator of Ondo State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Mohammed Bawa</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>• PDP chieftain in Kogi State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel J.I. Akaagerger</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>• Senator under PDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodore J.N.J. Aneke</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>• Former military administrator for Bauchi and Osun State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Commodore I. Kefas</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>• Prominent politician in Kwara State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General T.Y. Danjuma</td>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>• Unsuccessfully sought governorship Kebbi State under the Action Congress (AC) party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>• Lost the governorship election under the Accord Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Former military administrator of Katsina State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Became senator under the PDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• His election was later nullified by an election tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Former military administrator of Imo State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• A member of the PDP in Enugu State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Former military administrator of Cross River and Delta State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unsuccessful governorship candidate for Taraba State under National Democratic Party (NDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Chief of Army Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General C.B. Welby-Everard (GOC)</td>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General J.T.U Aguiyi-Irons (GOC)</td>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Y. Gowon</td>
<td>Jan1966-Jul1966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel J.R.I Akahan</td>
<td>May1967-May1968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General H.U Kastina</td>
<td>May1968-Jan1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General D.A Ejoor</td>
<td>Jan1971-Jul1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General T.Y Danjuma</td>
<td>July1975-Oct1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General I.B Babangida</td>
<td>Jan1984-Aug1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General A. Mohammed</td>
<td>Sept1993-Nov1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General S.L Malu</td>
<td>May1999-Apr2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General A.O Ogomudia</td>
<td>Apr2001-Jun2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General M.L Agwai</td>
<td>June2003-June2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.N. Yusuf</td>
<td>June 2007-Aug 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.A. Ihejirika</td>
<td>Aug 2010-2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.T.J. Minimah</td>
<td>2013 to Date</td>
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## APPENDIX 4: Past and Present 1 Division GOCs, 1967 to 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel M. Shuwa</td>
<td>30 Aug 67-20 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier I.D Bisalla</td>
<td>24 Sep 69-14 Dec 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier I.B Haruna</td>
<td>15 Dec 73-31 Jul 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General I.A Akinrinade</td>
<td>01 Aug 75-04 Jan 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier D.Y Balli</td>
<td>05 Jan 78-01 Sep 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier P.A Eromobor</td>
<td>01 Sep 78-04 Sep 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General G.A Innih</td>
<td>02 Oct 79-16 Apr 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General D.N Jemibewon</td>
<td>09 Jan 80-01 Nov 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.D Aduloju</td>
<td>01/11/ 81-29 Aug 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General H.A Hananiya</td>
<td>30 Aug 83- 09 Jan 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier J.O Oni</td>
<td>09 Jan 84-16 Sep 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General P.I Adomokhai</td>
<td>16 Sep 85-12 Oct 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General M.S Sami</td>
<td>25 Oct 88-17 Jan 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General I.O.S Nwachukwu</td>
<td>17 Jan 90-03 Sep 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.A Abubakar</td>
<td>03 Sep 90-01 Nov 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General A.M Daku</td>
<td>25 Nov 91-18 Jan 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General J.N Shagaya</td>
<td>18 Jan 93-20 Sep 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General M.C Ali</td>
<td>20 Sep 93-06 Dec 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General A.J Kazir</td>
<td>06 Dec 93-22 Sep 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General A.A Abdullahi</td>
<td>22 Sep 94-22 Apr 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General M.O Sule</td>
<td>22 Apr 96-01 Jul 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.S Mukhtar</td>
<td>16 Dec 96-10 Jun 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.O Ogomudia</td>
<td>19 Jul 99-24 Apr 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General D.R.A Ndefo</td>
<td>30/05/ 01-29 Dec 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S.A Asemota</td>
<td>Aug 02-7 Jan 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General O.A Azazi</td>
<td>17 Jan 05-09 Jul 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General L.O Jokotola</td>
<td>10 Jul 06 - 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General M.B Obi</td>
<td>NA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General K.A Role</td>
<td>2008 - 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General J.O.A Shoboiki</td>
<td>2010 - 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General GA Wahab</td>
<td>2012 - 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General KC Osuji</td>
<td>2014 to Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Location: Kaduna

*Not available
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel M.R Mohammed</td>
<td>08/67-05/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel I.B.M Haruna</td>
<td>06/68-05/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel G.S Jalo</td>
<td>06/69-05/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General Oluleye</td>
<td>08/70-08/75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General M. Adamu</td>
<td>08/75-06/78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General E.O Abisoye</td>
<td>08/78-09/79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S.E Tuoye</td>
<td>09/79-01/81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General M. Buhari</td>
<td>01/81-11/81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General H.A Hananiya</td>
<td>11/81-08/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General M.D Jega</td>
<td>08/83-08/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S Abacha</td>
<td>01/84-05/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General Y.Y Kure</td>
<td>16/9/85-15/9/86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General G Duba</td>
<td>15/9/86-12/6/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Dogonyaro</td>
<td>30/12/89-30/9/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.G Mohammed</td>
<td>01/90-09/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General J.M Inienger</td>
<td>09/90-10/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General G.O Abbe</td>
<td>20/9/93-12/9/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General P.N Aziza</td>
<td>12/9/94-22/4/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General B.S Magashi</td>
<td>22/4/96-9/12/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S.V.L Malu</td>
<td>8/1/98-10/07/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General F.A Mujakperuo</td>
<td>10/7/98-8/4/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General P.G Sha</td>
<td>22/04/99-19/7/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General E Archibong</td>
<td>19/7/99-8/4/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General O.E Okon</td>
<td>18/4/01-08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General D.R.A Ndefo</td>
<td>08/02-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General C.I Obiakor</td>
<td>03-03/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.N Bamali</td>
<td>03/06 - 17/09/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General M.S Saleh</td>
<td>07/01/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.B Dambazau</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Lawerence Ngubane</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General M.D Abubakar</td>
<td>2011 – 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General AT Jibrin</td>
<td>2013 -2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General EF Abejirin</td>
<td>2014 to Date</td>
</tr>
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Location: Ibadan
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel B.A.M Adekunle</td>
<td>Jul 67-Aug 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel O. Obasanjo</td>
<td>May 69-Jan 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel T.Y Danjuma</td>
<td>Jan 71-Dec 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General E.O Abisoye</td>
<td>Jul 75-Jan 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General M.M Remawa</td>
<td>Aug 78-Jan 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Jalo</td>
<td>Jan 79-Oct 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General G.O Ejiga</td>
<td>Oct 79-Nov 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General M Buhari</td>
<td>Jan 84-Aug 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General S Ibrahim</td>
<td>Jan 84-Aug 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General J.N Dogonyaro</td>
<td>Sep 85-Dec 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General G Duba</td>
<td>Jan 88-Jan 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General D.O Diya</td>
<td>Feb 90-Sep 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier A.I Olurin</td>
<td>Oct 90-Jan 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General A.M Daku</td>
<td>Jan 93-Sep 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General T.A Olarewaju</td>
<td>Sep 93-Mar 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General L.A Onoja</td>
<td>Mar 95-Apr 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General A Dada</td>
<td>Apr 96-Oct 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General P.G Sha</td>
<td>Nov 96-Sep 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General E Archibong</td>
<td>Mar 99-Jul 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General T.S Akande</td>
<td>Jul 99-Feb 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Owonibi</td>
<td>Feb 02-Feb 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General D Dyaji</td>
<td>Feb 03-17 Jan 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General I.A Dikko</td>
<td>17 Jan 05-09 Jul 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General I.O.S Oshanupin</td>
<td>10 Jul 06-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Akinyemi</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Saleh Maina</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S.O Idoko</td>
<td>2011-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Nwoga</td>
<td>2012-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General EB Awala</td>
<td>2013–2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General JS Zaruwa</td>
<td>2014 to Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Location: Jos
APPENDIX 7: Past and Present 82 Division GOCs, 1975 to 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General D.E Obada</td>
<td>07/08/75-22/03/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier M.I Wushishi</td>
<td>23/03/76-31/07/78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General D.Y Bali</td>
<td>01/09/78-14/12/79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier M. Buhari</td>
<td>14/12/79-04/01/81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Aduloju</td>
<td>09/01/81-08/01/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier Y.Y Kure</td>
<td>09/01/84-15/09/85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier O Diya</td>
<td>16/09/85-13/12/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General M.S Sami</td>
<td>31/12/87-25/10/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier A.A Abubakar</td>
<td>25/10/88-02/01/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S. Ibrahim</td>
<td>02/01/90-07/09/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General C.A Garuba</td>
<td>07/09/90-19/09/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General T.M Shelfidi</td>
<td>20/09/93-25/09/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General SVL Malu</td>
<td>20/09/94-06/08/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General F.A Mujakperuo</td>
<td>06/08/96-23/07/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General O Popoola</td>
<td>24/07/98-01/01/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.A Sangotade</td>
<td>01/01/99-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General B.A Jinadu</td>
<td>2003 - 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General R Adeshina</td>
<td>2004-3/09/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.G Adewuyi</td>
<td>3/09/04-09/07/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S.U Atawodi</td>
<td>10/07/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.T Ibrahim</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General M.D Isah</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S.Y Bello</td>
<td>2009 -2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S Idoko</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General O O Oshinowo</td>
<td>2012 -2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Olaniyi</td>
<td>2013 - 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S Yusuf</td>
<td>2014 to Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Location: Enugu
### APPENDIX 8: Past and Present 81 Division GOCs, 1992 to 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General AK Adisa</td>
<td>13 Jan 92 - Oct 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General IR Bamaiyi</td>
<td>20 Sep 93 - 30 Dec 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General PN Aziza</td>
<td>1 Jul 96 - 30 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General BS Magashi</td>
<td>14 Jan 98 - 4 Aug 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General SVL Malu</td>
<td>4 Aug 98 - 19 Jul 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General G.T Zidon*</td>
<td>19 Jul 99 - 25 May 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General T.N Abdu</td>
<td>13 Apr 01 - 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A.A Mshelbwalla</td>
<td>2004 - 17 Jan 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General S Lliya</td>
<td>17 Jan 2005 - March 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General J.O Adesunloye</td>
<td>March 2006 - 17 Sep 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General O.A Ihejirika</td>
<td>07 Jan 2007 - 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Eugene Nwanjuwa</td>
<td>2008 – 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General KTJ Minimah</td>
<td>2010 - 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General OA Umahi</td>
<td>2013 - 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General TI Dibi</td>
<td>2014 to Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Location:** Lagos

*It was under the headship of Brigadier General G.T Zidon that this military unit became a division. Prior to that, it was known as the Lagos Garrison Command (LGC).*
**APPENDIX 9: Past and Present 7 Division GOCs, 2013 to 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General O T Ethan</td>
<td>22 Aug 13 - 01 Jan 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General J S Bindawa</td>
<td>01 Jan - 24 Feb 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General A Mohammed</td>
<td>24 Feb 14 - 16 May 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General MY Ibrahim</td>
<td>16 May 14 to Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Location: Maiduguri

Source: Nigerian Army (2014)
APPENDIX 10: Military Officers Compulsorily Retired from the Armed Forces by the President Olusegun Obasanjo Government, 
June 1999

Army

1) Major General S.O.G Ango
2) Major General P.N Aziza
3) Major General I. Garga
4) Major General B.S Magashi
5) Major General A.S Mukhtar
6) Major General J.M Madaki
7) Major General G.A Mohammmed
8) Major General L.S Ajiborisha
9) Major General A.O Mohammed
10) Brigadier General B. Asuguo
11) Brigadier General J.E Yeri
12) Brigadier General A.A.U Kama
13) Brigadier General I. Aliyu
14) Brigadier General S.B Chamah
15) Brigadier General S.T Bello
16) Brigadier General D.O Oneya
17) Brigadier General M.B Marwa
18) Brigadier General S.O Makka
19) Brigadier General C.K Emein
20) Brigadier General Y. Mu’ Azu
21) Brigadier General S. Ahman
22) Brigadier General M.E Attah
23) Brigadier General O. Oyinlola
24) Brigadier General I.J Isah
25) Brigadier General Y. Abubakar
26) Colonel J.O Dungs
27) Colonel P.A.M Agar
28) Colonel A.A Usman
29) Colonel M. Mana
30) Colonel T.K Zubairu
31) Colonel M.O Fasanya
32) Colonel B.I Afikinya
33) Colonel M. Shehu
34) Colonel T.O Bamigboye
35) Colonel U.F Ahmed
36) Colonel D.M Kama
37) Colonel H.I Shu’Aibu
38) Colonel U.A Amiebo
39) Colonel J.B Yakubu
40) Colonel H.I Ali
41) Colonel A.I Kontagora
42) Colonel A.U Obi
43) Colonel M. Mohammed
44) Colonel D.O Akintonde
45) Colonel A.I Awoniyi
46) Lieutenant-Colonel A.I Shekoni
47) Lieutenant-Colonel M.I Bawa
48) Lieutenant-Colonel Mas Onuka
49) Lieutenant-Colonel P.E Obi
50) Lieutenant-Colonel A.G Hussaini
51) Lieutenant-Colonel A.S.Z Maimalari
52) Lieutenant-Colonel B.M Mande
53) Lieutenant-Colonel J.I Akaagerger

**Navy**

54) Rear Admiral O.O Joseph
55) Rear Admiral S.A Oluwakoya
56) Rear Admiral A.A Afolaban
57) Rear Admiral A.O Sode
58) Commodore A.E Oguguo
59) Commodore A.I Ikwechegh
60) Commodore T. Ejoor
61) Commodore E.A Acholonu
62) Commodore J.N.J Aneke
63) Commodore K.L Olafinmoyin
64) Navy-Captain J.A Kalu-Igboamagh
65) Navy-Captain J.A Adewusi
66) Navy-Captain A. Udosia
67) Navy-Captain R.A Raji
68) Navy-Captain A.B Agbaje
69) Navy-Captain O. Olubolade
70) Navy-Captain M.A Yusuf
71) Navy-Captain A.I Onyiarugbulem
72) Navy-Captain W.A Fegbabo
73) Navy-Captain C.I Osondu

**Airforce**

74) Air Vice-Marshall F.O Ajobena
75) Air Vice-Marshall G. Agboneni
76) Air-Commodore A. Salihu
77) Air-Commodore B. Iyam
78) Air-Commodore I. Kefas
79) Air-Commodore I.E Nkanga
80) Air-Commodore P.N Gana
81) Air-Commodore I. Dada
82) Group-Captain I.I Orji
83) Group-Captain R.D Garba
84) Group-Captain I.I Ben-Kalio
85) Group-Captain E.C Ewang
86) Group-Captain E.J Ebiye
87) Group-Captain L.N Haruna
88) Wing-Commodore E.U Ukaegbu
89) Wing-Commodore A. Msheha

**Police**

90) AIG (Assistant Inspector General) Dabo Aliyu
91) Acting AIG Simian Oduoye
92) Acting AIG A.E Oyakhire
93) CP Mustapha Ismaeil

Source: Nigerian Tribune Friday June 11, 1999, pp. 1-2
APPENDIX 11: Comparative Rank Structure of the Nigerian Armed Forces: The Officer Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy Equivalent</th>
<th>Air Force Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Marshal</td>
<td>Admiral of the fleet</td>
<td>Marshal of the Nigerian Air force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>Air Chief Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-General</td>
<td>Vice-Admiral</td>
<td>Air Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>Rear-Admiral</td>
<td>Air Vice-Marshall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>Commodore</td>
<td>Air Commodore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Group Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Wing Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Commander</td>
<td>Squadron Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Flight Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Sub Lieutenant</td>
<td>Flying Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Midshipman</td>
<td>Pilot Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 12: Names of Federal Ministers from 1960 to 2007

Federal Ministers 1960-1965

1) Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa
2) Defence Minister Alhaji Mohammad Ribadu
3) Minister of State (Defence) Alhaji Tanko Galadima
4) Minister of State (Navy) M.T Mbu
5) Minister of Finance Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh
6) Minister of State (Finance) Chief H. Omo-Osagie
7) Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Jaja Wachuku
8) Minister of Transport & Aviation Mr. R.A Njoku
9) Minister of State (Transport & Aviation) Mr. M. Amechi.

Dr. K.O Mbadiwe (1965)
10) Minister of Works Alhaji Mohammadu Inua Wada
11) Minister of Labour Chief J.M. Johnson. Mr. J.C. Obande (1965)
12) Minister of Commerce & Industry Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima
13) Minister of State Commerce & Industry Mallam Usman Maitambari
14) Minister of Education Mr. Aja Nwachukwu. Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (1965)
15) Minister of Establishment Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Mr. J.C Obande (1963-65)
16) Minister of Internal Affairs Alhaji Usman Sarki. Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1963-65)
17) Minister of Mines & Power Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule
18) Minister of Information Mr. T.O.S Benson
19) Minister of Health Dr. M.A Majekodunmi
20) Minister of Communication Mr. Olu Akinfosile
21) Minister of Lagos Affairs Mallam Musa Yar’Adua
22) Minister of Economic Development Hon. Waziri Ibrahim
23) Minister of Justice Dr. T.O Elias (Attorney General)
24) Minister of State (Police) M.O.A Olanrewaju (Police Matter)
25) Minister of State (Cabinet Rank) Alhaji Hashim Adaji

Federal Ministers 1966-1971 General Yakubu Gowon

1) Minister of Finance Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1972)
2) Minister of Internal Affairs Mr. Okoi Arikpo
3) Minister of Transport Mr. Joseph Tarka. Dr. R.A.B Dikko (1972)
4) Minister of Communications Alhaji Aminu Kano
5) Minister of Health Dr. J.E Adetoro. Alhaji Aminu Kano (1972)
6) Minister of Justice Dr. T.O Elias. Dr. Graham Douglas (1972)
7) Minister of Economic Development Alhaji Yahaya Gusau. Dr. Adedeji
8) Minister of Establishment Rear Admiral Wey
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Minister/Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Minister of Information &amp; Labour</td>
<td>Chief Anthony Enahoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Alhaji Kam Salem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td>Mr. Wenike Briggs. Chief A.Y Eke (1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Minister of Works and Housing</td>
<td>Mr. Femi Okunnu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Minister of Mines and Power</td>
<td>Dr. R.O Dikko. Alhaji Shettima Monguno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Minister of Trade and Industry</td>
<td>Alhaji Ali Monguno. Dr. J.E Adetoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture &amp; Natural Resources</td>
<td>J.O.J Okezie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Minister of Trade</td>
<td>Mr. Wenike Briggs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Federal Ministers 1975 General Murtala Mohammed</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td>Mr. B.O.W Mafeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
<td>Mr. A.E Ekukinan. Major General J.J Oluleye (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
<td>Mr. Dan Ibeke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Minister of Communication</td>
<td>Mr. S.O Williams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Minister of Petroleum &amp; Energy</td>
<td>Mr. M.T.O Akobo. Colonel M. Buhari (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Minister of Housing, Urban Dev’ &amp; Environment</td>
<td>Dr. Adeleye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Minister of Co-operative</td>
<td>Mr. M. Ajose Adeogun. Mr. U.A Mutallab (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Minister of Mines &amp; Power</td>
<td>Mr. Effiong Olu Ekong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Minister of Economic Dev’</td>
<td>Mr. Umoru Mutalab. Mr. M.T.O Akobo (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Mr. Shinkafi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Minister of Water Resources</td>
<td>Dr. I.U William. Osisi Ogu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Minister of Aviation</td>
<td>Mr. Shaibu Kazaure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td>Lt. Col. A.A Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Minister of Industry</td>
<td>Col. M.I Wushishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Minister of Labour</td>
<td>Brig H.E.O Adefope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Minister of Works</td>
<td>Capt Olufemi Olumade. Major Gen. O.A Obada (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Minister of Health</td>
<td>Col. Dan Suleiman. Mr. K. Tinubu (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
<td>Brig. I.D. Bissala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Minister of Establishment</td>
<td>Brig. J.J. Oduleye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Col. Joseph Nanven Garba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Minister of Trade</td>
<td>Brig. M. Shuwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Minister of Information</td>
<td>Brig. I.B.M. Haruna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Minister of Youth &amp; Sports</td>
<td>Brig. Olufemi Olutoye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Minister of Special Duties</td>
<td>Comm. O.P. Fingesi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Minister for Federal Capital Development Authority  Mr. Ajoje Adeogun

**Federal Ministers (1979-1983) President Shehu Shagari**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Ministers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4) Health</td>
<td>Mr. D.C. Ugwu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Housing &amp; Environment</td>
<td>Dr. Wahab O. Dosumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Industries</td>
<td>Alh. Adamu Ciroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Mines &amp; Power</td>
<td>Alh. Mohammad Ibrahim Hassan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Science &amp; Tech</td>
<td>Dr. Sylvester U. Ugoh. Dr. W.O Dosumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Communications</td>
<td>Alh. Akanbi Oniyagi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Fed. Capital Dev’ Territory</td>
<td>Mr. Jatau Kadiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) Aviation</td>
<td>Mr. Samuel Mafuyai. Mr. John Kadiya (1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) Education</td>
<td>Dr. I.C. Madubuike. Dr. S. Ugoh (1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Prof. Ishaya Audu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18) Finance</td>
<td>Prof. Sunday Matthew Essang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19) National Planning</td>
<td>Mrs. Adenike Ebun Oyegbola</td>
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<td>20) Police Affairs Dept’</td>
<td>Prof Emmanuel C. Osamor</td>
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<tr>
<td>21) Social Dev’, Youth, Sport &amp; Culture</td>
<td>Engr. Paulinus C. Amadike</td>
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<td>23) Transport</td>
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<td>24) Justice</td>
<td>Chief Richard Akinjide</td>
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**Ministers without Cabinet Ranks**

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<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25) Agriculture</td>
<td>Mr. Emmanuel Aguma</td>
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<tr>
<td>26) Communication</td>
<td>Chief Etang Okoi Obuli</td>
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<tr>
<td>27) Education</td>
<td>Mr. Claudius A. Bamgboye</td>
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<tr>
<td>28) Employment Labour &amp; Productivity</td>
<td>Dr. T. Michaulum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29) Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Dr. Abubarkar Usman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30) Finance</td>
<td>Mr. Ademola Thomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31) Industries</td>
<td>Dr. I. Igbani</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
32) Internal Affairs  Chief (Mrs) Janet Akinriade
33) Social Dev’ Youth, Sports & Culture  Alh. I.A Dan Musa
34) Transport  Alh. Garba Wushishi
35) Agriculture  Chief Olu Awotesu
36) Commerce  Alh. Ahmadu Nahuce
37) Education  Alh. Benjamin Usman
38) Internal Affairs  Chief Patrick O. Bolokor
39) Finance  Alh. Ali Baba
40) Housing & Environment  Alh. Ahmed Musa
41) Works  Alh. Asheik Jarma
42) Information  Mr. G. Wushishi

Federal Ministers 1984-1985 General Buhari

1) Brig. M. Mangoro  Internal Affairs
2) Brig. S.A Omojoku  Labour & Productivity
4) Lt. Col. Abdulahi  Communications
5) Maj. Gen Mohammed Vasta  FCT Minister
6) Group Capt. S. Omeruha  Information, Youth & Culture
7) Comm. P.S.K Osoni  Health
8) Dr. Agboola Gambari  Internal Affairs
9) Dr. O. Sholeye  Finance
10) Prof. Tam David West  Petroleum & Energy
11) Dr. Mammud Tukur  Commerce & Industry
12) Mr. C. Ofodile  (Attorney General) Minister of Justice
13) Alhaji Ibrahim Yerima  Edu. Sci. & Technology
14) Alhaji Abdulahi Ibrahim  Transport & Aviation
15) Dr. Buka Shail  Agric. & Natural Resources
16) Alhaji Lukman Rilwan  Mines, Power & Steel
17) Chief M.O.S Adigun  National Planning
18) Dr. E.N. Nsan  Works & Housing

Federal Ministers 1985-1993 General Ibrahim Babangida

Ministries  Ministers
1) Agriculture  Retired Lt. Gen Alani Akinrinade
2) Communications  Lt. Col A.T. Ayuba
3) Defence  Major Gen. D.Y. Bali
4) Education  Prof. Jubril Aminu
5) Employment, Labour & Productivity  Rear Admiral Patrick Koshoni
6) External Affairs  Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi
8) Finance  Dr. Kalu. I. Kalu
<table>
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<th>Ministry</th>
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<tr>
<td>9) Health</td>
<td>Prof. Olukoye Ransom-Kuti</td>
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<td>Alhaji Lawal Mala</td>
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<td>11) Information</td>
<td>Lt. Col. A.S.I. Ukpo</td>
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<tr>
<td>12) Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Lt. Col. J.N. Shagaya</td>
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<td>14) Mines &amp; Power</td>
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<td>15) National Planning</td>
<td>Dr. S.P. Okongwu</td>
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<tr>
<td>16) Petroleum Resources</td>
<td>Prof. Tam David-West</td>
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<tr>
<td>17) Social Dev’ Youth, Sport &amp; Culture</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Ahmed Abdullahi</td>
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<tr>
<td>18) Science &amp; Technology</td>
<td>Prof. Emmanuel Emovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>19) Trade</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. M.G. Nasko</td>
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<tr>
<td>20) Transport &amp; Aviation</td>
<td>Brig. J.T. Useni</td>
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<tr>
<td>21) Works &amp; Housing</td>
<td>Air Comm. Hamza Abdullahi</td>
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<tr>
<td>22) Special Duties</td>
<td>Air Vice-Marshal A.L. Shekari</td>
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**1993 Transitional Council Federal Secretaries of Cabinet Ranks**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Agric. Water Resources &amp; Rural Dev’</td>
<td>Alh. Garuba Abdulkadir</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Secretary of State for Agric.</td>
<td>Alh. Isa Mohammed</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Commerce &amp; Tourism</td>
<td>Tinuwa Bakari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Defence</td>
<td>Gen. Sani Abacha</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Secretary of State Defence</td>
<td>Alh. Bello Dogondaji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Finance</td>
<td>Chief Dele Olasore</td>
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<tr>
<td>7) FCT Administrator</td>
<td>Major Gen. Gado Nasko</td>
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<tr>
<td>8) Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Mr. M.T Mbu</td>
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<tr>
<td>9) Secretary of State Federal Admin.</td>
<td>Alh. Seidu Isa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Health &amp; Human Services</td>
<td>Dr. C. Okogie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Secretary of State</td>
<td>Mrs Laraba Gagash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Secretary of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Alh. Abdurahaman Okene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Industry &amp; Tech</td>
<td>Alh. Aminu Sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) Information &amp; Culture</td>
<td>Uche Chukwumerije</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) Attorney General &amp; Justice</td>
<td>Mr. Clement Akpamgbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16) Petroleum &amp; Mineral Resources</td>
<td>Chief Philip Asiodu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Labour &amp; Productivity</td>
<td>Chief Francis Elah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18) Power &amp; Steel</td>
<td>Air Vice Marshal Nuru Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19) Police Affairs</td>
<td>Chief Francis Orji</td>
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<tr>
<td>20) Transport &amp; Communication</td>
<td>Chief Oluwole Adeosun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21) Works &amp; Housing</td>
<td>Engr. Barnabas Gemade</td>
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<tr>
<td>22) Chairman National Planning Commission</td>
<td>Alh. Mustapha Umaru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23) Secretary Establishment &amp; Management Services</td>
<td>Alh. Zarma Gogharam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24) Secretary State &amp; Local Gov’ Affairs</td>
<td>Alh. Maccido Dalhat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Federal Ministers 1993-1998 General Sani Abacha

Ministry                        | Names                        
---                            |------------------------------
1) Foregin Affairs            | Alhaji Baba Gana Kinigbe     
2) Federal Capital Territory  | Lt. General J.T. Useni       
3) Education                  | Dr. Iyorcha Ayu              
4) Industry                   | Alhaji Bamanga Tukur         
5) Works & Housing            | Alhaji Lateef Jakande        
6) Finance                    | Mr. Kalu Idika Kalu          
7) Petroleum Resources        | Mr. Don Etiebet              
8) Power & Steel              | Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu        
9) Health & Human Resources   | Dr. Sarki Tafida             
10) Internal Affairs          | Dr. Alex Ibru                
11) Communications            | Alhaji Abubakar Rimi         
12) Labour & Productivity     | Dr. Samuel Ogbemudia         
13) Agriculture               | Alhaji Adamu Ciroma          
14) Information               | Professor Jerry Gana         
15) Justice and Attorney General | Dr. Olu Onyormua             
16) Commerce and Tourism      | Chief Alfred Okilo           
17) Transport and Aviation    | Chief Ebenezer Babatope      
18) Water Resources           | Alhaji Isa Mohammed          
19) Science and Technology    | Dr. Lazarus Unagu            
20) Police Affairs            | Mr. Solomon Lar              
21) Local Government Affairs  | Ambassador Mohammed Anika    
22) National Planning         | Chief S.B. Danyan             
23) Establishment & Manpower Services | Mrs Mobolaji Ojomo         

Minister of State

1) Petroleum                  | Alhaji Umaru Baba            
2) Health                     | Mr. Silas                    
3) Agriculture                | Mrs. Ada Adogys              
4) Transport and Aviation     | Alhaji A.B. Yahaya           
5) Power and Steel            | Elder Wole Oyelese           
6) Education                  | Alhaji Wada                  
7) Foreign Affairs            | Chief Anthony A.             
8) State and Government Affairs | Alhaji Aminu Saleh          

President Olusegun Obasanjo 1999-2007 First Term, 1999-2003

Ministry                        | Names                        
---                            |------------------------------
1) Finance                    | Mallam Adamu Ciroma          

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Ministry/Department</th>
<th>Minister/Secretary</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Alhaji Sule Lamido</td>
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<td>Chief Lawrence Nwuruku</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Chief Dapo Sarumi</td>
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<td>Major Gen. David Jenbewon (Rtd)</td>
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<td>Professor Jerry Gana</td>
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<td>Vincent Ogbulafor</td>
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<td>Damisi Sango</td>
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<td>Alhaji L. Haruna Elewis</td>
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<td>Mr. Ojo Maduekwe</td>
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<td>Gen. Yakubu Danjuma (Rtd)</td>
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<td>Mrs. Dupe Adelaja</td>
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<td>Mr. Solomon Ewuga</td>
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# President Olusegun Obasanjo Ministers (Second Term)

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<th>Ministry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Agriculture &amp; Rural Development</td>
<td>Alhaji Adamu Bello</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) State, Agriculture &amp; Rural Dev’</td>
<td>Dr. Bamidele Dada</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Aviation</td>
<td>Dr. Babalola Borisade</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Commerce</td>
<td>Alhaji Idris Waziri</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Communications</td>
<td>Chief Cornelius Adebayo</td>
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<td>6) Culture and Tourism</td>
<td>Mr. Franklin Ogbuewu</td>
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<tr>
<td>7) Defence</td>
<td>Dr. Rabiu Kwankwasko</td>
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<tr>
<td>8) State for Defence</td>
<td>Dr. Rowland Oritsejafor</td>
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<tr>
<td>9) Education</td>
<td>Mrs. Chinwe Nora Obaji</td>
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<td>10) Environment</td>
<td>Dr. Iyorchia Ayu</td>
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<td>Mallam Nasir el-Rufai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Power and Steel</td>
<td>Senator Liyel Imoke</td>
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<tr>
<td>13) Finance</td>
<td>Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala</td>
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<td>14) Finance (State)</td>
<td>Mrs. Esther Nenadi Usman</td>
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<tr>
<td>15) External Affairs</td>
<td>Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji</td>
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<td>Alhaji Abubakar Tanko</td>
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<tr>
<td>17) Health</td>
<td>Prof. Eyitayo Lambo</td>
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<td>19) Housing &amp; Urban Dev’</td>
<td>Dr. Rahman Mimiko</td>
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<td>Mr. Frank Nweke (Jnr)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ambassador Magaji Muhammed</td>
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<td>Dr. Joseph Itotoh</td>
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<tr>
<td>23) Industries</td>
<td>Ambassador Fidelis Tapgun</td>
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<td>24) Inter-Governmental Affairs &amp; Special Duties Col. Musa Muhammed (Rtd)</td>
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<td>25) Integration &amp; Coop. in Africa</td>
<td>Alhaji Lawan Guba</td>
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<tr>
<td>26) Justice &amp; Attorney General</td>
<td>Chief Bayo Ojo (SAN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>27) Labour and Productivity</td>
<td>Alhaji Hassan Lawal</td>
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<td>28) Petroleum Resources (State)</td>
<td>Dr. Edmund Daukuro</td>
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<td>29) Police Affairs</td>
<td>Mr. Brodrick Bozimo</td>
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<td>30) Power and Steel</td>
<td>Senator Liyel Imoke</td>
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<td>31) Power and Steel (State)</td>
<td>Alhaji Ahmed Abdulhamid</td>
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<tr>
<td>32) Science and Technology</td>
<td>Prof. Turner Isoun</td>
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<tr>
<td>33) Solid Minerals</td>
<td>Mrs. Obiageli Ezekwesili</td>
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<tr>
<td>34) Sports &amp; Social Development</td>
<td>Alhaji Samaila Sambawa</td>
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<td>35) Transport</td>
<td>Chief Abiye Sekibo</td>
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<td>36) Transport (State)</td>
<td>Alhaji Abibu Aliyu</td>
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<td>37) Water Resources</td>
<td>Alhaji Murktar Shagari</td>
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<td>38) Water Resources (State)</td>
<td>Chief Ishola Awoterebo</td>
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<td>Senator Seye Ogunlewe</td>
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<td>Ministry</td>
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<td>1) Attorney General &amp; Justice</td>
<td>Mr. Michael Kaese Aandoakaa (SAN)</td>
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<td>2) Agriculture &amp; Water Resources</td>
<td>Alhaji Sayyadi Ruma</td>
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<td>Mrs. Fedelia A. Njeze</td>
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<td>Mr. Babatunde Omotoba</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Culture and Tourism</td>
<td>Senator Bello J. Gada</td>
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<td>6) Defence</td>
<td>Dr. Shettima Mustapha</td>
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<td>Ademola Seriki</td>
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<td>8) Education</td>
<td>Dr. Sam Egwu</td>
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<td>9) Education (State)</td>
<td>Mrs. Aishatu Jubri Dukku</td>
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<td>10) Environment</td>
<td>Mr. John Ogar Odey</td>
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<tr>
<td>11) Federal Capital Territory</td>
<td>Senator M. A. Aliero</td>
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<td>12) Federal Capital Territory (State)</td>
<td>Mr. J.C. Odom</td>
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<td>13) Finance (State)</td>
<td>Mr. Remi Babalola</td>
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<td>Alhaji Jibril Maigari</td>
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<td>Prof. Babatunde Oshotimehin</td>
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<td>Prof. Dora Akunyili</td>
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<td>21) Interior</td>
<td>Major General Godwin Abbe (Rtd)</td>
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<td>22) Labour</td>
<td>Chief A. Kayode</td>
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<tr>
<td>23) Mines &amp; Steel Development</td>
<td>Mrs. Deziani Alison-Madueke</td>
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<tr>
<td>24) Deputy Chairman, National Planning</td>
<td>Dr. Shamsudeen Usman</td>
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<tr>
<td>25) Niger-Delta Affairs (State)</td>
<td>Elder G. Orubebe</td>
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<tr>
<td>26) Petroleum</td>
<td>Dr. Rilwan Lukeman</td>
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<tr>
<td>28) Police Affairs</td>
<td>Dr. I.Y. Lame</td>
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<td>Arch. Nuhu Uya</td>
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<td>30) Science and Technology</td>
<td>Dr. A.B. Zaku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31) National Sports Commission</td>
<td>Engr. S.M. Ndanusa</td>
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<td>32) Transport</td>
<td>Alhaji Ibrahim Bio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33) Women Affairs</td>
<td>Mrs. S.H. Suleiman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34) Works and Housing</td>
<td>Dr. Hassan M. Lawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35) Works and Housing (State)</td>
<td>Mrs. Grace Epiwhre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36) Youth Development</td>
<td>Senator Akinlabi Olasunkanmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37) Special Duties</td>
<td>Ambassador A. Kasaure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38) Niger-Delta</td>
<td>Obong Ufot Ekaette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39) Finance</td>
<td>Alhaji Muktar Mansur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40) Power</td>
<td>Mr. Olanrewaju Babalola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41) Commerce and Industry (State)</td>
<td>Mr. Humphrey E. Abah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42) Interior (State)</td>
<td>Abdulrahamari Adamu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43) Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>Chief Achike Udenwa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data Collected from National Archive, Ibadan
APPENDIX 13: Map of Nigeria Middle-Belt States
APPENDIX 14: Major Gideon Orkar’s Speech

Fellow Nigerian Citizens,

On behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and the southern parts of this country, I, Major Gideon Orkar, wish to happily inform you of the successful ousting of the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil man, deceitful, homo-sexually-centred, prodigalistic, un-patriotic administration of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. We have equally commenced their trials for unabated corruption, mismanagement of national economy, the murders of Dele Giwa, Major-General Mamman Vasta, with other officers as there was no attempted coup but mere intentions that were yet to materialise and other human rights violations.

The National Guard already in its formative stage is disbanded with immediate effect. Decrees Number 2 and 46 are hereby abrogated. We wish to emphasise that this is not just another coup but a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the south with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country.

Our history is replete with numerous and uncontrollable instances of callous and insensitive dominatory repressive intrigues by those who think it is their birth-right to dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the people of the Middle Belt and the south.

They have almost succeeded in subjugating the Middle Belt and making them voiceless and now extending same to the south.

It is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppression and marginalisation is against the wish of God and therefore, must be resisted with the vehemence.

Anything that has a beginning must have an end. It will also suffice here to state that all Nigerians without skeleton in their cupboards need not to be afraid of this change. However, those with skeleton in their cupboards have all reasons to fear, because the time of reckoning has come.

For the avoidance of doubt, we wish to state the three primary reasons why we have decided to oust the satanic Babangida administration. The reasons are as follows:

(a) To stop Babangida’s desire to cunningly, install himself as Nigeria’s life president at all costs and by so doing, retard the progress of this country for life. In order to be able to achieve this undesirable goals of his, he has evidently started destroying those groups and sections he perceived as being able to question his desires.
Examples of groups already neutralised, pitched against one another or completely destroyed are:

(1) The Sokoto caliphate by installing an unwanted Sultan to cause division within the hitherto strong Sokoto caliphate.

(2) The destruction of the peoples of Plateau State, especially the Lantang people, as a balancing force in the body politics of this country.

(3) The buying of the press by generous monetary favours and the usage of State Security Service, SSS, as a tool of terror.

(4) The intent to cow the students by the promulgation of the draconian decree Number 47.

(5) The cowing of the university teaching and non-teaching staff by an intended massive purge, using the 150 million dollar loan as the necessitating factor.

(6) Deliberately withholding funds to the armed forces to make them ineffective and also crowning his diabolical scheme through the intended retrenchment of more than half of the members of the armed forces.

Other pointers that give credence to his desire to become a life president against the wishes of the people are:

(1) His appointment of himself as a minister of defence, his putting under his direct control the SSS, his deliberate manipulation of the transition programme, his introduction of inconceivable, unrealistic and impossible political options, his recent fraternisation with other African leaders that have installed themselves as life presidents and his dogged determination to create a secret force called the national guard, independent of the armed forces and the police which will be answerable to himself alone, both operationally and administratively.

It is our strong view that this kind of dictatorial desire of Babangida is unacceptable to Nigerians of the 1990’s, and, therefore, must be resisted by all.

Another major reason for the change is the need to stop intrigues, domination and internal colonisation of the Nigerian state by the so-called chosen few. This, in our view, has been and is still responsible for 90 percent of the problems of Nigerians.

This indeed has been the major clog in our wheel of progress.
This clique has an unabated penchant for domination and unrivalled fostering of mediocrity and outright detest for accountability, all put together have been our undoing as a nation.

This will ever remain our threat if not checked immediately. It is strongly believed that without the intrigues perpetrated by this clique and misrule, Nigeria will have in all ways achieved developmental virtues comparable to those in Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, India, and even Japan.

Evidence, therefore, this cancerous dominance has as a factor constituted by a major and unpardonable clog in the wheel of progress of the Nigerian state. (Sic) It is suffice to mention a few distasteful intrigues engineered by this group of Nigerians in recent past. These are:

(1) The shabby and dishonourable treatment meted on the longest serving Nigerian general in the person of General Domkat Bali, who in actual fact had given credibility to the Babangida administration.

(2) The wholesale hijacking of Babangida’s administration by the all-powerful clique.

(3) The disgraceful and inexplicable removal of Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, Professor Tam David-West, Mr Aret Adams and so on from office.

(4) The now-pervasive and on-going retrenchment of Middle Belt and southerners from public offices and their instant replacement by the favoured class and their stooges.

(5) The deliberate disruption of the educational culture and retarding its place to suit the favoured class to the detriment of other educational minded parts of this country.

(6) The deliberate impoverishment of the peoples from the Middle Belt and the south, making them working ghosts and feeding on the formulae of 0-1-1- or 0-0-0 while the aristocratic class and their stooges are living in absolute affluence on a daily basis without working for it.

(7) Other countless examples of the exploitative, oppressive, dirty games of intrigues of its class, where people and stooges that can best be described by the fact that even though they contribute very little economically to the well-being of Nigeria, they have over the years served and presided over the supposedly national wealth derived in the main from the Middle Belt and the southern part of this country, while the people from these parts of the country have been completely deprived from benefiting from the resources given to them by God.
(8) The third reason for the change is the need to lay a strong egalitarian foundation for the real democratic take off of the Nigerian state or states as they circumstances may dictate.

In the light of all the above and in recognition of the negativeness of the aforementioned aristocratic factor, the overall progress of the Nigerian state a temporary decision to excise the following states namely, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi states from the Federal Republic of Nigeria comes into effect immediately until the following conditions are met.

The conditions to be met to necessitate the re-absorption of the aforementioned states are as following:

(a) To install the rightful heir to the Sultanate, Alhaji Maccido, who is the people’s choice.

(b) To send a delegation led by the real and recognised Sultan Alhaji Maccido to the federal government to vouch that the feudalistic and aristocratic quest for domination and operation will be a thing of the past and will never be practised in any part of the Nigeria state.

By the same token, all citizens of the five states already mentioned are temporarily suspended from all public and private offices in Middle Belt and southern parts of this country until the mentioned conditions above are met.

They are also required to move back to their various states within one week from today. They will, however, be allowed to return and joint the Federal Republic of Nigeria when the stipulated conditions are met.

In the same vein, all citizens of the Middle Belt and the south are required to come back to their various states pending when the so-called all-in-all Nigerians meet the conditions that will ensure a united Nigeria. A word is enough for the wise.

This exercise will not be complete without purging corrupt public officials and recovering their ill-gotten wealth, since the days of the oil boom till date. Even in these hard times, when Nigerians are dying from hunger, trekking many miles to work for lack of transportation, a few other Nigerians with complete impunity are living in unbelievable affluence both inside and outside the country.

We are extremely determined to recover all ill-gotten wealth back to the public treasury for the use of the masses of our people. You are all advised to remain calm as there is no
cause for alarm. We are fully in control of the situation as directed by God. All airports, seaports and borders are closed forthwith.

The former Armed Forces Ruling Council is now disbanded and replaced with National Ruling Council to be chaired by the head of state with other members being a civilian vice-head of state, service chiefs, inspector general of police, and one representative each from NLC, NUJ, NBA, and NANS.

A curfew is hereby imposed from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. until further notice. All members of the armed forces and the police forces are hereby confined to their respective barracks.

All unlawful and criminal acts by those attempting to cause chaos will be ruthlessly crushed. Be warned as we are prepared at all costs to defend the new order.

All radio stations are hereby advised to hook on permanently to the national network programme until further notice.

Long live all true patriots of this great country of ours. May God and Allah through his bountiful mercies bless us all.

Major Gideon Orkah

April 22, 1990

Lagos, Nigeria

# APPENDIX 15: A profile of Nigeria’s Government since Independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
<th>Control of the military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1960-1966</td>
<td>Elected civilian, with strong regional bias</td>
<td>Prime Minister Balewa, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (Premier, Northern Region), Chief Awolowo (leader of federal opposition 1960-62), Chief Samuel Akintola (Premier, Western Region) President Azikiwe</td>
<td>Small military (10,000), colonial in orientation but professional in character, increasingly drawn into internal security by rising political tension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-July 1966</td>
<td>Military junta after first coup</td>
<td>Major Nzeogwu, General Ironsi</td>
<td>Assassination of prominent political leaders, destroyed military <em>esprit de corps</em> when Igbo military officers were indiscriminately killed by northern soldiers during the July counter-coup of 1966. This threatened military professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1966-July 1975</td>
<td>Collegial military junta, weak at inception, but strengthened by civil war (1967-1970) victory</td>
<td>General Gowon, members of the Supreme Military Council and the civilian ‘super permanent secretaries’</td>
<td>Broad-based support of all armed forces for military junta, in spite of earlier problems partly due to lack of commitment to transition to civil rule table-table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1975-September 1979</td>
<td>Military junta</td>
<td>Generals Mohammed, Obasanjo, Yar’Adua, Danjuma and middle-level officers who overthrew previous junta</td>
<td>As above, but more credibility and more emphasis on military professionalism and transition to civilian rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Main Actors</td>
<td>Control of the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1979-December 1983</td>
<td>Elected civil rule under 1979 Constitution</td>
<td>President Shagari of National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Chief Awolowo of Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). Multi-party political structure, presidential style of government</td>
<td>Limited control of the military, creation of alternative base in the Nigeria Police Force as well as patronage to ensure loyalty to government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1983-August 1985</td>
<td>Popular military junta</td>
<td>Generals Buhari, Babangida, Idiagbon and Abacha</td>
<td>Professional-political prerogative; increasing authoritarian tendency in a largely internally oriented policy agenda Co-option of the military in the ruler’s personal project via patronage and deft political manœuvrings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1985-August 1993</td>
<td>Transition from junta to personalized dictatorship in a palace coup</td>
<td>General Babangida, with ‘bit parts’ to close civilians and ‘military politicians’</td>
<td>Clear military control of government that lacks legitimacy and popular support in a period of high political tension Undermined military professionalism, increased use of military intelligence and other security outfits (especially death squads) against civilian and military opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1993-November 1993</td>
<td>Interim government representing interregnum after annulled elections and 12 June 1993 and exit of Babangida</td>
<td>Chief Ernest Shonekan, head of interim government and General Abacha, Defence Minister</td>
<td>Clear military control of government that lacks legitimacy and popular support in a period of high political tension Undermined military professionalism, increased use of military intelligence and other security outfits (especially death squads) against civilian and military opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1993-June 1998</td>
<td>Full-blown military dictatorship</td>
<td>General Abacha</td>
<td>Clear military control of government that lacks legitimacy and popular support in a period of high political tension Undermined military professionalism, increased use of military intelligence and other security outfits (especially death squads) against civilian and military opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Main Actors</td>
<td>Control of the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1998- May 1999</td>
<td>Military dictatorship with a ‘human face’ under internal and external pressure to reform politically and exit gracefully</td>
<td>General Abubakar Abdulsalam</td>
<td>Maintain the military’s <em>status quo</em>, with no effective reform plan. More focus on political transition and preparation for military’s withdrawal from government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1999- May 2007</td>
<td>Elected civilian government</td>
<td>General Obasanjo, presidential style of government</td>
<td>Increasing presidential control of military, rather than democratic control, commitment to military professionalism, and seems to have diminished the likelihood of full-blown military coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007-to date</td>
<td>Elected civilian government</td>
<td>President Yar’Adua (2007-2010), Goodluck Jonathan (2010-to date)</td>
<td>Increasing presidential control of military, rather than democratic control. Commitment to military professionalism. It appears that issues regarding ethnicity and religion in the military may undermine military professionalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Sources: (Fayemi c.2012, 2003; Ehwarieme 2011).
APPENDIX 16: Decrees Ceasing to have Effect on the Coming into Force of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Promulgated</th>
<th>Decree No</th>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
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<td>Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Banking (Freezing of Accounts) Decree 1984</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Civil Service Commission and other Statutory Bodies, Etc. (Removal of Certain Persons from Office) Decree 1984</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Public Officers (Special Provisions) Decree 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Military Courts (Special Powers) Decree 1984</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Regulated and Other Professions (Private Practice Prohibition) Decree 1984</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Judgements of Tribunals (Enforcement, Etc.) Decree 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunals) Decree 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunals) Decree 1987</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>National Council of State Decree 1990</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Executive Power (Constitution Amendment, Etc.) Decree 1990</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>Association of Individuals (Dissolution and Proscription, Etc.) Decree 1992</td>
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<td>Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree 1993</td>
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<td>National Guard Decree 1993</td>
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<td>Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1993</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Transition to Civil Rule (Lifting Ban on Politics) Decree 1996</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Ahmadu Bello University (Appointment of Sole Administrator) Decree 1996</td>
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<td>Constitutional Court Decree 1998</td>
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<td>Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Decree 1998</td>
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<td>Political Parties (Registration and Activities) Decree 1998</td>
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<td>National Assembly (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 1999</td>
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<td>Presidential Election (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 1999</td>
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Source: www.nigeria-law.org (April 16, 2012)
APPENDIX 17: Total Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 1980-2010

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Military Expenditure</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Percentage of Military Expenditure to GDP</th>
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<td>2.1</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>928.2</td>
<td>59622.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>2245.3</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>5492.87</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>61743.99</td>
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<td>86978.46</td>
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<td>93205.24</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>86029.4</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 18 : Ethics Documents

Appendix 1 Information Sheet

Name of Researcher: Ibikunle Edward Adeakin
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Background

This researcher is a doctoral candidate in political science and public policy at the University of Waikato. The research being investigated primarily focuses on civil-military relations in Nigeria. The research argues if Nigeria has adopted a new and more sophisticated form of military intervention in the twenty-first century. The justification for this analysis is based on the several political events that have occurred in Nigeria since the military handed over power to civil-rule in May 29, 1999.

Interview Process

The interview questions focuses on civil-military relations in Nigeria over the last decade. I am interested in hearing about your views on whether a new pattern of military intervention is occurring in Nigeria.

The entire interview should approximately take 60-90 minutes of your time depending on time you have available. I would like to tape-record the interview so that I can obtain an accurate record of your views.

As a participant, you have the choice of being anonymous or not; this will be discussed at the start of the interview and again at the end of it. I will not use your name or identity in any form in the doctoral thesis, unless you give permission.

However, I wish to notify you that even when all this will have been done, confidentiality may be inadvertently breached with people who may be familiar with your opinions and arguments on the issue at hand. I will, on my part, do whatever is humanly possible to protect your identity.

All information(s) derived from this interview (for example, audio recordings, written transcripts and others) will be held securely by the School of Social Sciences, Political Science and Public Policy University of Waikato. No one expect me or my supervisors will have access to them. They will be stored there until the research is complete and the doctoral thesis has been approved and accepted by the University of Waikato. After this period, the research materials will be stored securely for an indefinite period by the University of Waikato.

If you agree to take part in this interview, you have the following rights which are:
• To refuse to answer any particular question, or withdraw from the interview at any time.

• To ask any further questions about the interview that is, how the data collected will be used, or on the general nature of the research project.

• To re-examine any information you have provided and amend any part you wish, and/or request that certain information not be used, up to a period of one month after the interview has taken place.

• To withdraw your consent (written or verbal), up to a period of one month, by contacting me at the address above.

• To take any complaints you may have about the interview process to the University of Waikato Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee or you can email its secretary at fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz

• You may also contact my chief supervisor or supervisor whose contacts are given above.
Appendix 2 Consent Form for Elite Interviews

**Topic of Study:** Is a New Pattern of Military Intervention Emerging in Nigeria?

I consent to undertake in this elite interview after reading and understanding the Information Sheet for this doctoral research.

This doctoral research has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University’s Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Any questions about the ethical conduct of this research may be sent to the secretary of the Committee, e-mail: fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz, postal address, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Te Kura Kete Aronui, University of Waikato, Te Whare Wananga o Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240.

I would like to be identified for this part of the doctoral research project

YES   NO   (Please circle one)

I would like to be identified with a pseudonym

YES   NO   (Please circle one)

I consent that this interview be audio recorded

YES   NO   (Please circle one)

I would like to receive a transcript copy of this interview

YES   NO   (Please circle one)

If yes, kindly print your e-mail address here...................

I have read and understood the requirements for this research exercise and willing to participate.

Name............................................................ (Participant)

Signature......................................................

Date.................................

I agree to abide with all the conditions outlined above for this research exercise

Name............................................................ (Researcher)

Signature......................................................

Date.................................

Thank you for your invaluable contribution, your cooperation is highly appreciated by the researcher.
Elite Interview Questions

1) Does the military have any prerogatives enshrined in the 1999 Constitution?

2) Does a significant level of military involvement in the polity increases the level of human rights violations in Nigeria?

3) Is there legislative or civilian oversight on the military particularly as regards human rights abuses?

4) Is there a weakness of civilian expertise in defence matters in Nigeria?

5) Is there a blurring of jurisdictional lines between the military and civilian courts?

6) Does military professionalism strengthens the military’s corporate interests in Nigeria?

7) Can it be argued as a statement of fact that informal political alliances between the political office winners and high ranking ex-military officers impact specific political outcomes in Nigeria?
APPENDIX 19: Ethics Approval for Field Research

Ibikunle Edward Adeakin

Prof Dan Zirker

Dr Alan Simpson

12 December 2010

Dear Ibikunle

Application for Ethical Approval: FS2010-51: “Is a New Pattern of Military Intervention Emerging in Nigeria?”

Thank you for submitting a revised Information Sheet and Consent Form in response to my email of 9 December. These were received by email on 11 December. The changes you have made fully satisfy the issues raised by the Committee (although there are just a couple of minor proofreading errors in the forms which you should correct before using them).

This letter is to provide formal ethical approval for your PhD project.

In cases like yours, where you are undertaking research as a student of the university in a risky context overseas, the Committee has been asked to advise you to contact the University Risk Manager, Ken Housley, at some point prior to leaving New Zealand, in order to discuss with him anything his Office might wish to advise, especially with regards to insurance arrangements.

With best wishes for a successful project,

John Paterson Chair FASS Human Research Ethics Committee